RENEGOTIATING THE INHERITANCE: STRATEGIZING TARGETED SOCIAL PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA

by

Christopher Alan Belasco

B.S. Information Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2003

B.A. Sociology, University of Pittsburgh 2003

M.P.I.A, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, 2005

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This dissertation was presented

by

Christopher Alan Belasco

It was defended on

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and approved by

Paul Nelson, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

Nuno Da Silva Themudo, Associate Professor,

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

Louis A. Picard, Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

Dissertation Advisor: Scott Morgenstern, Associate Professor,

Department of Political Science

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Christopher Alan Belasco, M.P.I.A.

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In what ways do leaders help themselves to votes when they design and administer social policy? While political leaders acknowledge: "good policy, good votes" in social policy design and administration, the direction of redistributive targeting carries electoral implications, creating incentives to politicize distribution. This study utilizes a comparative framework to develop a theoretical model to explain targeted social policy choice in Latin American countries. It presents a systematic account of how programs are developed and politicized, and shows how they are a function of elements of horizontal accountability that affect how leaders pursue their agenda.

To assess this theory, the project utilizes a mixed-method approach to examine cases in Brazil and Venezuela. To show the variation between programmatic and parochial social programs it examines expenditure patterns, program oversight, and tests of political and demographic determinants on program distribution to examine how programs with different levels of oversight are targeted. It then examines the effect of partisan powers on the design of programs, showing how horizontal accountability affects integration of reform elements that provide oversight and moderation of program design. To understand the electoral payoff of different targeted programs, it examines survey data to test effects of program participation on incumbent electoral support.

This investigation reveals that leaders politicize targeted social programs by choosing distributional strategies, but are constrained in doing so by elements of horizontal accountability

such as political competition and the institutionalization of the party system. The effects of these elements are shown in the cases and analysis of program distribution. Both programmatic and parochial distributive strategies have electoral effects, but the degree of effect varies. The quality of program outcomes varies too by distributive strategy. Better programs are the product of political interactions that affect the degree to which leaders can redistribute in a parochial manner. Evidence from Brazil and Venezuela shows variation in the politics, their outputs, the electoral effects, and program outcomes. The relationship of "good policy, good votes" is determined by "good politics" showing the effect of political institutions that constrain leaders from seeking "bad policy" and votes that follow.

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PREFACE

Completing a dissertation project with fieldwork that spans multiple countries (and with a timeline of multiple years) requires the generosity (and patience) of a cast of dozens. Without their help, I could never have seen this project through to completion. For that, I must reflect with gratitude.

First and foremost, I am grateful to Dr. Scott Morgenstern, a true mentor, for his patience, guidance, recommendations for readings, and critical comments. His tremendous support has led me to bring this project to fruition, giving me tools for comparative analysis that will always remain with me. Dr. Morgenstern embraced my intellectual curiosity about ideas that eventually turned into this project. He also helped me to develop those ideas, and roped me in when I deviated from my goals.

I am full of gratitude for the wisdom and support of my other committee members, Dr. Paul Nelson, Dr. Nuno Themudo and Dr. Louis A. Picard. Dr. Nelson's kindness, advice, and careful review have made me a better scholar of policy and champion of the underrepresented. Dr. Themudo's guidance, critical reads, and advice have imbued a level of rigor in my approach to political science and policy studies. Dr. Picard's guidance, teaching, and encouragement inspire me to grow as a development studies research professional and scholar. Each of these individuals has had an enormous impact in helping me to find my place as a scholar and for that I am indebted to them.

Jessica Ghilani, whose acts of love and kindness stretch from the nerdy to the dearly needed. She has worked so hard to support Emilia and me as I was sequestered in the attic finishing this document. Her efforts tremendously contributed to my organization of this project, our house, our lives, our meals, our caregiving to the family dog (this is Speck's third dissertation acknowledgement, lucky dog), and our caring for our daughter late at night when I needed sleep to go to work and come home and write. She has given me encouragement and confidence, kept me in check, inspired my ambition, and made me feel whole as I survived this process. She is why I have accomplished this. Thank you.

1.0   INTRODUCTION

In what ways do leaders help themselves to votes when they design and administer social policy? While political leaders acknowledge: "good policy, good votes" in social policy design and administration, the direction of redistributive targeting carries electoral implications. The experience of targeted social programs in Latin America yields important lessons about the ways that leaders deliver policy to their constituencies. This project shows that the line between clientelism and good social policy is often a blurred distinction, as all social programs have vote-winning aspects to them. This requires a deeper understanding about the direction of targeting redistributive policy.

Leaders choose different means of targeting antipoverty programs to reach constituents. Variation in leadership redistributive choices reflects political strategy; politicization can achieve electoral support and ensure political survival. In some cases, leaders deliver to constituencies to hold them, while others seek to persuade voters. Still in other countries, leaders seek to increase participation broadly without discriminating among core supporters or the opposition. How they choose among these strategies is a determined by horizontal accountability in the relationship between executives and legislatures. Conventional wisdom on redistribution and democracy suggests that leaders have incentives to redistribute to constituents in democratic societies. Examining this variation provides detail into how political institutions influence distributive policy choice.

1.1   PROBLEM

Since the late 1970s, social program design has overwhelmingly shifted towards targeting — the identification and prioritization of certain beneficiaries over others — instead of universalistic policies pursued in the past (Besley and Kanbur 1990; Mkandawire 2005). Governments choose targeting over universalistic program design because they face political and financial limitations, as well as distributional coalitions that mobilize to protect programs that benefit them. The effects of globalization limit the expansiveness of social programs as limitations on deficit spending and existing entitlement commitment restrict the available amount of program funds, as governments pursue programs that reflect efficient distributions of resources. Leaders also must navigate existing political coalitions that lobby to protect the benefits they receive from legacy social programs.

However, leaders are not without political tools to deliver policy and win supporters. Though targeted programs reach a limited set of constituents, they represent an opportunity to leaders to design programs in ways that benefit electoral chances.

Leaders in Latin America faced similar opportunities among the informal sector to deliver benefits to the vast and growing sector of the population working informally within the countries. Figure 1 below shows an increase in the share of the informal sector as a percentage of employment in Latin America for nearly all countries where reliable data exists.

Figure 1. Informal Economy Employment as a Percentage of Employment in Latin America 1990-2000

The informal sector emerged as a relevant political constituency following a sequence of social events in Latin American countries, where neoliberal economic transitions disrupted societal linkages between governments and social groups. (Coker 2001; Roberts 2007) These citizens were excluded from traditional social welfare policy and dissatisfied with their personal experience with neoliberal policy diffusion. The evidence from Brazil and Venezuela presented in Chapter 6 suggests that participation in this sort of program has a positive effect on electoral support for leaders. Promoting social inclusion and mobilizing political participation from this group are ways that leaders can capitalize electorally on the targeting of social policy.

Despite having comparable elements to the social programs and similar opportunity among constituents to both deliver policy and gain electoral support, the electoral effect of the programs vary, revealed though examination of survey data for program recipient support in subsequent elections. Reviewing the electoral effects allows an investigation of whether voter allegiances changed in successive elections as the governments carried out the programs. Comparing electoral support for Chávez among recipients of the *Misiones* with that for Lula among the recipients of *Bolsa Família* suggests that the programs reflected different political strategies to win electoral support by targeting social spending. The programs had different effects on the voting behavior of citizens in each country, and this reflects how the leaders developed strategies to capture coalitions through targeting. Similar objectives that yielded different effects suggest that leaders varied strategies to reach the coalition. This variation requires investigation into the strategies employed by leaders to win votes when they design and administer social policy.

In the past decade in Latin America, the influx of leftist leaders has drawn renewed attention to income inequality and redistribution, particularly within the informal poor population

within the countries. The difference in politicization is no starker than the comparison between the *Misiones Sociales* policies of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and the *Programa Bolsa Família* of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil. Upon entering office, Chávez and Lula each inherited similar opportunities to design policies to accommodate the informal poor.

1.2   THE PROGRAMS

Both *Bolsa Família* and the *Misiones* suggest that reaching a poor constituency was the goal of each country's respective leadership. Both leaders initiated the policy changes at least two years after taking office. Both programs are intended to reach the informal poor within the countries. Both programs are intended to break the intergenerational cycles of poverty that persist particularly among the urban informal poor. Both were designed to complement the existing systems of social safety nets within the countries. Both have resulted in enormous political popularity among their leaders, as well as political polarization and claims of corruption and clientelism.

Both the *Bolsa Família* and the education *Misiónes* include cash transfer elements. *Bolsa Família* subsidized family income by incentivizing parents to keep their children within school. *Misiones* Robinson, Ribas and Sucre subsidized individual incomes by providing scholarships (*becas*) in a targeted manner to individuals to attend adult remedial education. Despite their similarities in targeting the expanding informal sector in these countries and goals of poverty alleviation, the policies varied in their design and administration. This variation affected program reach, and the degree to which redistributive spending reflected programmatic or parochial targets.

1.2.1 *Bolsa Família*

In 2003, Lula introduced *Bolsa Família* (Family Grant) a program that targeted the poorest sector of the population utilizing a registry and means test, including an interview process involving a social worker visiting the household that was set to receive the benefit. *Bolsa Família* itself was not entirely new. With *Bolsa Família*, the Lula government undertook a consolidation of many existing cash transfer programs. The program was designed to target informal sectors of the population with cash benefits to allow additional spending on family needs. While *Bolsa Família* consolidated existing programs, this change allowed a greater extension for program reach, allowing for new redistribution to Brazilian citizens. In this spirit, the country took up the slogan: "*Um Pais de Todos*" (A Country of All), extending its reach toward the marginalized.

Bolsa Família offers a cash transfer to registered participants with the following conditions for parents to maintain the transfer: vaccination and regular health check-ups and enrollment and school attendance for children; and for mothers, maternal care and health and nutrition seminars, as well as maintaining contact with the school and local program coordinator if the child changes schools (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & Brière, 2007, 18). The transfer levels are based on a means test for family income, with ceilings for very poor: R$60 (US$30) and moderately poor: R$120 (US$ 60) per month.[1] Benefits received for each level (depending on number of children per family range from R$15-45 to R$50-95 for the respective income categories (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & Brière, 2007, 17-8). A variable adolescent benefit was later added that allowed the maximum transfer to rise to R$172 (US$ 104) (Cunha, 2008, 8).

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[1] Initially the figures were R$50-R$100 for the income categories, but these were revised upward in 2006 (Cunha, 2008, 8).

The program was launched as a consolidation of existing CCT programs. It combined existing programs already performed by the government, including *Bolsa Escola*, a schooling program, and *Bolsa Alimentação*, an anti-hunger program, *Programa de Eradicação do Trabalho Infantil* (PETI), an anti-child labor program, *Vale Gas*, compensation offered by the government as it phased out cooking gas subsidies. Bolsa Escola itself was a national-level rollout of a municipal-level *Bolsa Escola*-style program. The antecedent was a similar 1995 municipal-level program initiated in Campinas and Ribeirão Preto, São Paulo and in Brasilia (Coêlho 2009). The *Programa de Eradicação do Trabalho Infantil* (PETI – Program to Eradicate Child Labor), begun in 1996, was a conditional cash transfer program that included conditions to ensure school attendance and prevent participation in the labor market (Britto & Soares, 2010, 6). In 1998, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso launched a *Programa Garantida Renda Minima* (PGRM, Program for a Guaranteed Minimum Income), which provided transfers to municipalities that implemented CCTs (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & Brière, 2007, 12).

Bolsa Família combined these programs in a way that ensured policy compliance among participating families – children's attendance at school and their immunization – in order to receive the financial benefit. The process combined the functions for government agencies that were previously performed across numerous agencies with a managerial center in the *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome* (Ministry of Social Development and Combating Hunger - MDS). The consolidation of cash transfers reflected the diffusion earlier programs initiated at lower administrative levels, introduced by politicians from multiple political parties including members of the PT and the PSDB (*Partido da Social Democraticia Brasileira*). It promoted efficiency among administrative costs by improving the targeting system, establishing synergy among the health and education programs, strengthening monitoring and evaluation, and

promoting vertical integration among sub-national programs (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & Brière, 2007, 14).

In introducing the program, the PT politicians faced criticisms ranging from *assistencialismo* to idea theft from opposition parties. Debates over the identity of the program – whether it was a targeted social program or whether it should be changed to serve as a guaranteed minimum income – occurred during the first year following the program's inception. This ultimately resulted in the strengthening of conditionality monitoring and institutional oversight to prevent the program from becoming a clientelist tool to improve the electoral chances of incumbent politicians.

Program design and the attention to oversight and eligibility criteria are a function of politics, and how they developed over the course of the decade provide a way to understand whether and how *Bolsa Família* was targeted to generate electoral support for incumbents rather than (or in addition to) support the poor. Later chapters will evaluate the electoral effect of the program, the politics of policy design in Brazil, and the degree to which *Bolsa Família* was targeted to generate electoral support.

1.2.2   The *Misiones*

Following the short-lived 2002 coup against him, Chávez initiated a new series of social programs, the *Misiones Sociales,* initiating a range of services complementary to existing government education, health and social welfare programs. These programs were wide-ranging, serving not simply the poorest, and only involved conducting means tests for certain aspects of the programs – those that included *becas*, or scholarships – but not for others, such as neighborhood medical care. The initial *Misiones* were: *Barrio Adentro* (Within the

Neighborhood; primary health care), *Mercal* (discount grocery), Robinson (basic literacy), *Ribas* (basic education), *Sucre* (postsecondary education), *Habitat* (housing), and *Vuelvan Caras* (About Face; cooperatively owned goods production businesses).

This process of initiating these programs drew together new and somewhat extraordinary functions for government agencies, some of which were outside of their traditional responsibility. This reflected a decision by leadership on how to administer the tasks associated with a new social program. *Misiones Robinson* was administered by the *Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deportes* (MECD – Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports), and Misión Ribas was administered by the *Ministerio de Energia y Minas* (Ministry of Energy and Mines) after starting in 2003. *Misión Sucre* was administered by the *Ministerio de Educación Superior* (Ministry of Higher Education). *Misión Barrio Adentro* was administered by the *Ministerio de Salud y Desarrollo Social* (MSDS – Ministry of Health and Social Development). *Misión Vuelvan Caras* was administered by the *Ministerio de Educación Superior*, but soon after, the *Ministerio de Economía Popular* (MINEP- Ministry of People's Economy). *Misión Mercal* was administered by the *Ministerio de Agricultura y Tierras* (MAT - Ministry of Agriculture and Land), but later the *Ministerio de la Alimentación* (MINAL – Ministry of Diet). Only two of the *Misiones* fell within the traditional responsibilities associated with their ministries: *Barrio Adentro*, and *Robinson*. For the others, these new responsibilities present issues of state capability as the government executes these extraordinary and remedial social programs.

With the *Misiones,* the Chávez government undertook several core social program initiatives in a relatively short time span. *Misiones Robinson, Ribas, and Sucre* were begun as part of a wider social policy push that also consisted of *Misión Barrio Adentro, Misión Habitat/ Vivienda, Misión Mercal and Misión Vuelvan Caras.* Of these, the education and health *Misiones*

were essentially remedial – programs begun by the government to accommodate the needs of individuals that had been underserved in traditional education and health systems within the country. These programs duplicated ongoing education and health functions of the federal government, but aimed offering these particular services to a larger constituent base than previous programs, consistent with the government slogan of: "*Ahora es de Todos*" – now it's all of ours. Because the programs were targeted to remedy underservice to traditionally excluded populations, they represented a new form of redistribution to Venezuelan citizens.

1.2.2.1 *Misión Robinson*

Misión Robinson was initiated in 2003 with a goal of eradicating adult illiteracy, which was estimated at 1.2-1.5 million citizens[2] (Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). The government oversees administration of the program through the *Comisión Nacional de Alfabetización* (National Literacy Commission), though a series of agreements with the Cuban Government provided advice and training for facilitators, video educational materials for the courses, advice on methodological techniques, and communication of the experience in using media for mass education and cultural knowledge (D'Elia, 2006, 79-80). The instructional method the government uses consists of facilitators presenting videos to students with a Cuban technique called "*Yo sí puedo*" (Yes I can), which runs seven weeks long with an intensive focus (D'Elia 2006). By the end of the course, students are expected to have the ability to write a letter to demonstrate literacy (Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). Graduates are then permitted access to *Robinson II* for basic education, which employed instruction techniques: "*Yo sí puedo seguir*" – Yes I can continue (D'Elia 2006; Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). After the initial program push,

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[2] The foundation bears the name of Simón Rodríguez, tutor and mentor to Simón Bolívar, and his pseudonym, Samuel Robinson.

facilitation of *Robinson* learning shifted to volunteer households, instead of in public spaces (Mundo 2009).

1.2.2.2 Misión Ribas

Misión Ribas was initiated in 2003 with a goal of providing adult secondary education to an estimated population of 5 million citizens that had not completed formal secondary education (*bachilleres*) within the country (D'Elia, 2006, 91).[3] Like *Robinson,* the instructional method employs video lessons with classroom facilitators, though here it was based on a methodology developed by the MED in its *Plan Nacional Educación para Todos* (National Education Plan for Everyone). The curriculum consists of 15 hours per week over four semesters, totaling 225 classroom hours for each term in the first level, and 300 classroom hours for each term in the second level. Instruction consists of the following subjects: mathematics, language, world and Venezuelan geography, English, science, Venezuelan history, world history and computing. The final element, *Componente Comunitario y Sociolaboral* (CCSL – Community and Social Work component), functions as a capstone project that involves an identification of a local community problem and solution, offering a way to lend critical thought and education to social betterment (D'Elia, 2006, 94). As in *Robinson*, facilitators are employed within this program to handle discussion, monitor and promote the program among participants to avoid attrition, as well as ensure learning among the students (D'Elia, 2006, 96).

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[3] Its namesake, José Félix Ribas was an independence leader and is considered a hero of the Venezuelan revolution against Spain.

1.2.2.3 *Misión Sucre*

Like its basic and secondary counterparts, *Misión Sucre* was founded in 2003.[4] It began offering degree programs to individuals through the *Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela* (UBV) locations in Maracaibo, Ciudad Bolívar and Caracas, the *Universidad Nacional Experimental de la Fuerza Armada* (UNEFA) along with 28 other colleges and institutes across the country (D'Elia, 2006, 103-9). It initially offered the following programs, created between 2003-05: the University Initiation Program (PIU – a university preparation program), National Program for Trainers, the Program for the Incarcerated Population, and Community Medicine Program (D'Elia, 2006 103). The programs currently include: law, social studies, environmental studies, social and administrative communication, accounting, engineering, plastics, chemistry, and mechanics (D'Elia, 2006, 110).

1.2.2.4 *Becas* **and Participation**

Participation in programs includes a scholarship award for some participants. *Becas* of 160,000 Bs ($100) were distributed for *Misiones Robinson*, *Ribas*, and *Sucre*. For *Misión Robinson*, the program offers the participants, known as "Patriots," a *beca*, free medical care, and facilitated microcredit participation (D'Elia, 2006 84). For *Misión Ribas*, *becas* are awarded for low-income participants, particularly: single mothers, unemployed, or individuals in precarious situations, over 60 years of age, or family breadwinners. For *Misión Sucre*, each *bachillier* receives a *beca* awarded to the low-income program participants with the same categories as *Ribas* (D'Elia 2006, 98; Lacruz 2006, 175). These were awarded within the classroom, not through a centralized administration of payouts (D'Elia, 2006, 98).

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[4] Its namesake, Antonio José de Sucre was an independence leader and one of Simón Bolívar's closest friends.

The extraordinary nature of the programs segmented the *Misiones* from the traditional education programs, ensuring that this separate set of program benefits reached a voting population that could in turn generate electoral success for its implementers. Over time, the Venezuelan government ensured that only voters – those aged over 18 – could receive the benefits of these remedial programs, as opposed to younger individuals who left the education system. In March 2008, the *Ministerio de del Poder Popular para la Educación* established the minimum age for adult education to at 18, raising it from 15 (Mundo, 2009, 36). As Mundo notes, recipients proceed through the Misiones in a tracked manner that does not permit the participants to leave the programs to integrate with the traditional education system. Because of this, progress is made only through the system, which limits the options available to participants, particularly as they reach the upper levels of the programs (Mundo 2009). In addition, enrollment rates are high, but *Sucre* students do not often take multiple courses at once. While this may suit nontraditional students taking courses, it also has the effect of maximizing the social program goods over many voters.

At the time the *Misiones* were initiated, opposition groups argued instead for programs that complemented existing educational programs to draw upon the expertise of government ministries. The establishment of the *Misión* administration outside the ministries resulted in challenges for new program design and attention to oversight and eligibility criteria. As with *Bolsa Família*, these elements are a function of politics, and tracing these choices over the decade provide a way to understand whether and how the education *Misiones* were targeted to generate electoral support. Chapters 4-6 will evaluate this effect, the politics of policy design in Venezuela, and the degree to which the education *Misiones* were targeted to generate electoral support.

1.2.3 Comparing the Two Programs

While *Bolsa Família* was targeted more narrowly, the programs were targeted broadly, to poor supporters and opponents alike. And though a larger share of the population participated in the *Misiones* than with *Bolsa Família* in Brazil, the Venezuelan programs divided constituencies by partisan dimensions of support. At times they favored supporters; during others, they courted the opposition.

Where *Bolsa Família* reflected a consolidation of existing program activity into one new unit, the *Misiones* were extraordinary in their scope, and extra-institutional in their administration. Both offered policies of social inclusion, a way to reach informal constituencies within their countries. Yet the way these programs were administered presents different possibilities for discretion in their administration. Choices to administer social programs in extraordinary ways can introduce spending outcomes broader in scope than originally intended. These are not merely issues of state capability; choices made by leaders to reach constituents in broad or narrow ways reflected the goals of electoral support.

1.3   RESEARCH QUESTION

This dissertation asks how leaders politicize targeting of redistributive programs, and what political factors constrain these choices. Towards this end, it investigates a set of related questions, asking: how political institutions affect leadership strategy in distributing targeted antipoverty programs; whether elements of program design and administration – oversight,

spending, and distributions – reveal political strategies; how executive power impacts program design; and what (if any) electoral payoffs exist for variants of targeted social programs.

Asking how leaders politicize targeting programs (or not) is interesting because the variation in targeting of social redistributive programs reveals lessons about leadership behavior and the rules that affect it. Different targeting strategies, revealed above and described in detail in Chapter 2, suggest that rationales vary for leadership decisions to accommodate political constituencies. These include the strategies pursued by politicians to link voters and goods. (Ansell and Mitchell 2011; Handlin 2012; H. Kitschelt and Kselman 2012; Herbert Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Lyne 2008; Pribble 2013) Targeting can take on the role of "investment," representing a means of accommodating core or undecided constituents if the policies are targeted toward them (Cox 2009; Luna and Mardones 2010; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007). The variation also reveals differences in the social construct of the political institutions present within the different polities. Investigating the different actions taken in comparable countries with similar political opportunities reveals the ways that societies create rules that constrain leadership behavior.

The question is important because understanding how policy choices for redistributive programs reflect leadership political strategy provides answers to questions raised by scholars who connect democracy and redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boix 2003; Taylor-Robinson 2010). How policies are designed shows the ways that institutions constrain leadership decision making within countries. Political "institutional architectures" shape targeting and the goals politicians undertake while delivering policies to their constituencies (Luna and Mardones 2010). The political institutions that constrain leadership behavior can be evaluated according to

the outcomes they create, allowing scholars to draw policy implications from particular institutional arrangements

1.4   EXPLANATION

In order to answer the question of how leaders politicize the targeting of social programs, this project builds a theory that offers a systematic account of the effect of democracy on redistributive choices. It does so by integrating perspectives from the politics of redistribution and executive-legislative relations to describe how horizontal accountability affects distributive strategies that characterize how programs are politicized – how they divide constituencies by partisan dimensions of support. It suggests that the horizontal accountability effects of executive-legislative interactions determine redistributive policy choices. Program politicization is a function of the partisan powers of the executive, who attempts to pursue their own agenda but encounters legislatures that seek to control their ability to do so. Democratic systems, particularly those with legislative checks on presidential power, make leaders choose and administer policies that are targeted to generate support for incumbents in addition to the poor, while less democratic systems that lack these checks allow leaders to choose and administer policies that are targeted to generate support for incumbents rather than the poor.

This informs a set of hypotheses about how institutional conditions allow leaders to target constituencies by strategizing how they redistribute to them. Variation in antipoverty programs takes the form of programmatic or parochial distributive strategies, depending on the degree to which executives are constrained by competitiveness in the political system. More competitive systems limit the partisan power of the presidency, resulting in programmatic distribution

strategies. Less competitive systems allow more partisan power, resulting in parochial distributive strategies. Targeting choices are linked to each distributive strategy. Their electoral effect, the political interactions that bring them about, and evidence of the targeting choices are each tested in the empirical chapters.

1.5   ASSUMPTIONS

The primary assumptions of this investigation include rational choice and historical institutionalism. Actors are assumed to make rational decisions based on the availability of information to their standpoint. To achieve their goals, leadership adopts a strategic approach based on the calculation of how existing institutions affect the costs and benefits of their activities as they seek to maximize the benefits accrued to them (Hall and Taylor 1996; 939). These institutions constrain the behavior of leaders and constitute a framework to analyze the choices they make.

Following from this, the project assumes that leaders treat club goods, such as targeted social programs, as a way to benefit their electoral chances, even though these exclude others from the policy. In doing so, leaders will find ideological or interest-based reasons to redistribute to build electoral support. This can be program-based (delivering on campaign promises) or clientelist in nature, reaching parochial distributive outcomes (attempting to trade programs for votes), but leaders are politicians and seek not only to govern, but to win future chances to do so.

This project also assumes that for electoral purposes the actual benefit from the social program matters less than the income transfer. Voters witness and respond electorally to the

immediate effects of transfers before they react to actual program effects such as poverty reduction (or inflationary) outcomes that show over the long term.

This investigation also assumes a degree of path dependence, that choices can rarely be easily reversed (P. Hall and Taylor 1996; Pierson 2000, 2004; Thelen 1999). This suggests that political institutions are path dependent: they are "unusually hard to change" since the timing and sequencing of activities can lead to inertia through increasing returns reinforcing the existence of institutions in a positive feedback cycle (Pierson 2000; 262-3). Leadership activity is constrained by institutions that result from the sequencing of social events that result in this feedback cycle (Pierson 2000, 2004). Due to this, over time certain policy avenues may become blocked, as behavior at one point in time can send policy off into certain tracks (Thelen 1999; 394). However, political change may occur if the mechanisms that reproduce and sustain institutions are disrupted (Thelen 1999 398-9). The theoretical assumption that a moment in time may have a lagged effect on institutional persistence (and policy outcomes) rests on understanding how the mechanisms function before they change. This in turn affects the rational behavior of individuals seeking to maximize their benefits. Identifying the mechanisms and their outcomes are crucial to the study of political behavior.

1.6   METHODOLOGY

This study draws on available literature to construct a causal model that connects the politics of social program design to targeting outcomes and electoral effect. Original research is conducted to gather data reflecting both the political context of policymaking in Brazil and Venezuela and the strategies employed in the design of social programs. To present a complete understanding of

the process of policy choice, this study employs a mixed methodology, drawing on semi-structured research interviews conducted in the field and on quantitative data collected from governments, secondary sources including nongovernmental organization reports on programs, and the AmericasBarometer at the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University.

Through case study comparison, this dissertation compares the political factors that resulted in the latitude that allowed executives to design and administer the antipoverty policies under analysis. Evidence supporting the explanation is presented along with electoral data and secondary source accounts of political events. The analysis of opposition group preferences is conducted to analyze what policies could have been introduced, absent the effect that political institutions had on leadership policymaking and administration.

This study employs statistical models to empirically examine both political and demographic determinants of program distribution (Chapter 4), and the electoral payoff – the effect of social program influence on vote choice (Chapter 6) – while controlling for other factors known to influence these behaviors. This allows both the assessment of targeting strategy and the operationalization of the effect by examining the electoral payoff of these choices. Statistical evidence is evaluated to examine theoretical claims made about the direction of social spending. The statistical and substantive results of the models are discussed.

The first statistical model in this study replicates and extends previous analysis by Fried (2012), Hawkins, Rosas and Johnson (2011), Hawkins (2010), Penfold-Becerra (2008), Rocha-Menocal (2001), Molinar and Weldon (1994) to assess political and program-relevant demographic factors that determine the distribution of resources for *Bolsa Família* and the

Misiones. This examines the degree to which program design reflected the political goals of leaders. Analysis is conducted though regression and marginal effects estimates in Chapter 4.

The second statistical model is a replication and extension of a model previously published by Bohn (2011). This model examines the influence of social programs on vote choice over time. It includes other controls such as income, gender, age, education level and regional status. The dissertation builds on the Bohn model by replicating the analysis on vote choice of the influence of *Bolsa Família* in Brazil and extending it to analyze the influence of the *Misiones* in Venezuela. Doing so allows for the analysis of the effects the direction of targeted social program spending on voter behavior.

Combined with the case studies, the results of the statistical tests support the thesis of the study, showing how partisan powers affect program choices, the differences in choices, and the effects of these decisions. The next section lays out the presentation of theory, methods, evidence, and conclusions.

1.7   PLAN OF STUDY

The study continues in Chapter 2 with a critical examination of existing theory and empirical research in social program targeting and democracy and redistribution. This literature is drawn together to propose a theory in the form of a causal model. The causal model connects competitiveness in the political system to the politicization of social policy. Competitive systems limit the partisan powers of the presidency in pursuit of a clientelist agenda. They lead to programmatic distributive strategies, while uncompetitive systems result in parochial ones. The chapter then explores logical outcomes of the model by examining targeted social programs in

Argentina (*Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar*) and Mexico (*Progresa/ Oportunidades*) as well as *Bolsa Família* and the *Misiones*.

Chapter 3 presents an overview of research design, outlining the requirements for data collection, operationalization choices, and expectations of observed behavior. It details the choices made in the case studies and models.

Chapter 4 examines the dependent variable, whether programs have parochial or programmatic characteristics, concluding that programs differ according to the classification presented in Chapter 2. It does so by providing a mixed method analysis of key details of program oversight and expenditure patterns for *Bolsa Família* and the education *Misiones*. It then presents a regression model that examines program targeting determinants including political and program-relevant demographic variables to compare the effects of each. Marginal effects analysis examines targeting trends over the course of the decade for the programs, revealing parochial distributive strategies in Venezuela and programmatic ones in Brazil.

Chapter 5 examines the independent variable, asking why programs differ in Brazil and Venezuela. It presents a case study analysis on the politics of policy design of *Bolsa Família* and the education *Misiones*. It shows how institutionalized political competition constrains the constitutional and partisan powers of the president. The competitive legislature in Brazil limited the latitude of Lula to develop programmatic distributive strategies in *Bolsa Família*, while the uncompetitive legislature in Venezuela allowed the executive to develop parochial distributive strategies in the education *Misiones*. It evaluates the policy preferences of opposition actors to show what policies could have been introduced if the institutional constraints on executives (or latitude of the same) were not present.

Chapter 6 examines the electoral payoff from targeting, by presenting a probit model that analyzes of the effect of social program participation on vote choice. Marginal effects analyses are conducted to assess the effect of increasing levels of income and education on vote choice, holding other factors at their means. The outcome of the analysis – differences in the degree to which the education *Misiones* and *Bolsa Família* influence vote choice – shows that the electoral payoffs vary for programmatic and parochial distributive strategies, but that both yield benefits for leaders that create programs.

Chapter 7 concludes with a hypothesis review, policy and theoretical implications of the findings, and agenda for future research. It examines the outcomes of the programs through secondary accounts to show that democracy determines the production of "good policies" even if they yield votes - "good votes." This raises implications of the incentives to pursue programmatic strategies. An agenda for future research is presented at the conclusion of the document.

2.0   THEORY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TARGETED SOCIAL

PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA

This chapter builds a theory that offers a systematic account of the politicization of targeted social policy. To do so, it integrates perspectives from the literature on the politics of redistribution and on executive-legislative relations to describe how horizontal accountability provides a theoretical foundation for distributive politics in Latin America. These perspectives inform a set of hypotheses about how institutional conditions allow leaders to target social programs to divide constituencies by partisan dimensions of support. These hypotheses are then examined in case studies that reflect the first empirical evaluation of the theory.

This chapter first draws on perspectives in the literature to characterize how program design results in politicized distributional effects. Two types of programs are identified: *programmatic,* those that target based on program rules, or *parochial*, a kind of clientelistic program that targets based on political considerations. These types are identified by distributive strategies that include core, opposition, swing voter, and turnout boosting.

It then offers a theory of executive-legislative interactions to explain how some policies become programmatic and others parochial. The theory suggests that targeted program design in Latin America results from the institutional effects of executive-legislative interactions, as executives who attempt to pursue their own agenda encounter legislatures that seek to control their ability to do so. How programs are targeted is a function of the competitiveness in the

political system. This, in turn, determines the degree to which there is serious program oversight. The institutional interaction identified in the theory is then hypothesized to relate to these outcomes, and is contrasted with the alternative hypothesis that legislative oversight is not important to program design.

The chapter concludes with the identification of cases that reflect observable implications of the hypotheses developed. It explores the variation in these countries' primary targeted social programs according to the theory to understand logical outcomes of the interaction. These interactions and their outcomes are detailed in brief illustrative case studies.

2.1   SOCIAL POLICY AND TARGETING

This section synthesizes perspectives that explain how leaders target redistributive programs, building political constituencies while delivering benefits to selected groups. In doing so, it draws on recent literature on democracy and institutions to develop a model of policymaking and on recent single country analyses for hypotheses relating political strategy to distributional outcomes. In doing so, it focuses on targeted social policy, distinguishing from regional analyses of overall social welfare regimes, particularly those assessing universalism in social policy (Esping-Andersen 1990; Pribble 2010, 2013; Riggirozzi 2010).

Democratic development scholars Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008) note that democracies extend greater social protections in Latin America, which squares with assessments of the effect of democracy on wider samples of less developed country social expenditures (Rudra and Haggard 2005). Boix (2003), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argue that institutions are created to ensure redistribution in order to mitigate threats to the credibility of political leadership.

These authors describe how leaders redistribute in instances where the threat of mass political opposition to regimes creates uncertainty about leadership political survival. In order to understand how institutions affect leadership design of social policy, it is necessary to understand how leaders extend political representation to groups left out of the political system. In the case of the Latin American countries above, leaders designed social spending programs to mobilize previously disenfranchised social groups, particularly those that lost financial security in the period following global economic integration. Targeting social policy allows policymakers to choose specific programs to reach populations excluded from the traditional social safety net.

Ideological rationales vary for the targeting of social policy, but programs allow leaders to "invest" in constituencies by generating private, excludable goods to different groups. This permits the construction of a "portfolio" of voting support for politicians who craft policy (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, & Estévez, 2007, 187). How policies are designed demonstrates how institutions constrain leadership decision making within countries. Luna and Mardones suggest that political "institutional architectures" can shape incentives that politicians face to delivering policies to particular constituencies (Luna and Mardones 2010). The political institutions that constrain leadership behavior can be evaluated according to the outcomes they create, allowing scholars to draw policy implications from particular institutional arrangements.

The increase in targeted social programs over universalistic ones is a hallmark of neoliberal government reform (Besley and Kanbur 1990; Grosh 1994; Mkandawire 2005). Targeted policies have been one mode through which governments facing fiscal pressures from global economic integration design programs that accept budgetary constraints in an era of economic globalization (Rudra 2002). Financial constraints are coupled with political limitations as leaders encounter distributional coalitions that mobilize to protect programs that benefit them

(Olson 1982; Rudra 2007). While leaders navigate these constraints to deliver programs to select constituents, early neoliberal advocates of targeting did not address the possibility that it could yield political benefits as beneficiaries were prioritized.

In many cases, however, leaders seeking to target social groups seize political opportunity with redistributing resources in what Luna and Mardones (2010, 6) term "selective distributional politics." Targeting allows politicians to design policy to reach specific constituents, which can be used to mobilize political participation from newly included social groups either in core or opposition constituencies (Cox 2009). This can be utilized to mobilize on the basis of class cleavages (Handlin 2012). The result is inclusion of traditionally disenfranchised groups that were left out of the social inheritance of Latin America.

Recent scholarship raises questions over the political distribution of targeted programs in Latin America, finding variation among the political effects of targeted programs in Chile, Argentina, and Mexico (Giovagnoli 2005; De La O Torres 2013; Luna and Mardones 2010; Takahashi 2007). Further scholarship on program distribution and vote choice shows that political effects are seen among other targeted programs in countries such as Venezuela and Brazil (Bohn 2011; Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson 2011; Hawkins 2010a; Hunter and Power 2008; Licio, Rennó, and Castro 2009; Nicolau and Peixoto 2007; Penfold-Becerra 2008; S. Soares and Sátyro 2009; Zucco and Power 2012). By raising different hypotheses of distribution strategies and showing the electoral effects of program reach, this literature responds to questions of clientelism raised in the transfer of social programs to particular recipients (Ansell and Mitchell 2011; Lyne 2008; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.; Penfold-Becerra 2008). These different effects suggest that politicians vary their strategies to reach voters: some target core or opposition support, others aim for close contests, while still others seek the

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politically excluded. Variation in distributional strategies and the electoral effect of program reach require a systematic approach to explain the range of targeting outcomes shown across Latin America. To understand how redistributive strategies demonstrate the political goals of leadership, the next section categorizes program expenditure outcomes.

2.1.1   Dependent Variable: Programmatic and Parochial Social Program Outcomes

Targeted social programs achieve political ends as leaders pursue distribution strategies, reaching particular constituents with benefits with both "good" and "bad" policy choices. This project draws its definition of politicization from Rosas's (2005, 827) discussion of political space: programs divide constituents by partisan dimensions by activating political support among particular populations. Electoral support can result from both "good" and "bad" forms of targeting. Both programs distributed according to antipoverty criteria as well as those distributed according to political criteria are tools that politicians can use to build constituent support. By delivering to constituents, "good" (programmatic) policies can produce votes that genuinely reflect the support of constituents who are receiving the benefits of policies designed to reach them. Trading excludable benefits for political support can generate electoral success through "bad" (parochial) policies. Leaders choose to redistribute because they seek political survival, but the choices between parochial or programmatic distributions are dependent on how political institutions constrain policymakers from redistributing to political constituencies over others. This section introduces definitions for both sets of programs. Indicators of distributive strategies including program oversight, expenditure patterns, and targeting choices – such as core, opposition, and swing voter strategies and turnout boosting – are then described.

Targeted social programs create "club goods," which provide benefits to a set of citizens but exclude others (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, 11). Leaders pursue these to "redistribute life chances across groups society" and to "increase the size of their electoral coalitions" (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, 11). Club goods can be distributed in a programmatic or clientelistic manner, depending on the targeting of constituencies and the nature of eligibility rules.

Targeted redistributive outcomes can be grouped into two categories of distribution strategies: programmatic and parochial. These are detailed in Table 1.

Table 1. Programmatic and Parochial Distributions

	Programmatic Distributions	**Parochial Distributions**
How Distributed	Targeted Social Program	Targeted Social Program
Inclusion Preferences	Preferences for inclusion based on program rules	Preferences for inclusion based on political criteria
Clientelism	No enforcement of patron-client relationship	Voluntary enforcement of patron-client relationship
Entitlement	Interpreted at national level	Interpreted at program implementation level
Political Effect	Little expectation of associating benefit with politician	Expectation of generating electoral benefit for politician

Programmatic distributions reflect antipoverty goals and are distributed nationally without a mediated enforcement of the distribution of the patron-client relationship. Programmatic distributions are created without regard to exclusivity, without leaders "verifying whether beneficiaries will actually deliver their votes" (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, 10). Because of this, leaders must distribute the program widely to hope for an electoral effect for their party or candidacy (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, 12). Programmatic distributions reflect general rules with specific implementation criteria, and rules by which administrators and recipients must abide

(Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, 12). Preferences for inclusion based on political criteria only include the technical aspects specifying program eligibility, and the political effect rests in program distribution to a general population, only some of which may associate the benefit with the politician.

Parochial distributions reflect policy goals but are distributed selectively with preference for inclusion based on political criteria. Kitschelt and Wilkinson note that clientelist distributions of club goods reflect narrow targeting of programs with rules and regulations that leave conditions of entitlement and disbursement to the implementation level (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, 12). Clientelist programs can include a range of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that a contingent direct exchange relationship between patrons and clients yields political results, including voluntary compliance and individual and group monitoring enforcement (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007 12.-18). Parochial distributions are a kind of clientelist policy. This analysis identifies characteristics of clientelism that relate to the targeted social programs that occur in Latin America. These include accepting voluntary compliance with voting by recipients, and a willingness to focus distribution in areas where politicians can be reasonably certain that these will win votes, while minimizing enforcement of inclusion criteria.

Parochial distributions are identified as selective distributions with rules that leave entitlement to the implementation level, with a voluntary scheme of patron-client enforcement. The political effect of parochial distributions rests in narrow targeting and minimal specification of exclusion criteria at the national level. These aspects allow for voluntary participation in programs that are expected to generate electoral benefits for officials associated with program implementation.

The club goods status of the targeted social transfers under analysis means that neither parochial nor programmatic distributions are universal, and neither is apolitical in its influence. Even programmatic redistributive strategies have influence on politics. By their very nature, the goals of political inclusion that mark the range of policies identified in this chapter have political effects. Programmatic distributions can boost participation among any group that finds the distribution of benefits to signify their inclusion in the political franchise. Parochial distributions are structured to produce political effects by inducing votes to support politicians who distributed benefits. The redistributive strategies employed in both kinds of policies are identified in the section below.

2.1.2   Indicators of Strategy

In each subsection below the macroeconomic effects of leadership behavior identified by Kaufman are mapped to the conditions that lead to targeting strategy and the targeting outcomes. Examining oversight reveals the degree to which program administration reflects rules implemented in the program. Spending trends reveal program oversight and time horizon effects of policy design, while the analysis of program distribution permits evaluation of the ways in which programs are parochial or programmatic in nature. These indicators operationalize the dependent variable by revealing observable differences in social programs.

2.1.2.1 Program Oversight

After designing a program, developing its bureaucratic capacity and guaranteeing its budget is accommodated through formal mechanisms ensures that a program functions according to its legal mandates. These institutional aspects allow for routine planning and budgeting within the

administrative centers of the programs, allowing program implementers the ability to focus on delivery of services. They mitigate the risk that poor implementation of the program will result in parochial distribution or corruption. Institutionalization is not only a matter of "state capacity," as introduced by Luna and Mardones (2010). It reflects political choices that executives make to ensure that target populations that can benefit according to program goals. Oversight is the product of the integration of rules into enabling legislature, as well as the minimization of interference from executives implementing the program. Limiting executive interference by ensuring budget resources and building capable administrative centers for programs both can reduce the likelihood of parochial distributions, ensuring that geographic targets are widely dispersed across potential program recipients.

Program budgeting provides one aspect of oversight. Ensuring that programs receive funds for expenditures through ordinary budgeting protocols allows administrators to develop long time horizons for the program instead of "now or never" strategies with the disbursement of resources to recipients. It also means that program administrators do not have to choose among program recipients in times when irregular funding sources are not available, resisting the temptation to deliver benefits parochially when budget shortfalls occur. Similarly, if programs are funded through extraordinary budgeting routines, windfalls can increase the propensity to distribute benefits parochially. Formal institutional budgeting is a form of oversight that generates certainty among program administrators.

Institutionalized program administration is a second aspect of oversight. It is generated through the development of rule-based decision criteria to distribute resources through the program and through formal agreements that strengthen inter-institutional cooperation. By including these components in policy design and administration, executives assure that programs

will function according to mandate. Deriving clear criteria for program eligibility – and strictly following it – provides a guide for inclusion. Absent this, the probability of deviating from program goals decreases. However, as targeted social interventions require increasingly more complex interactions between government agencies to deliver benefits to particular constituents, the use of contracts and evaluation mechanisms serves as a way to ensure program compliance. Contracts provide formal institutional mechanisms that generate certainty that programs function according to legal mandates established in enabling legislation.

Reduced oversight can be a political choice made during the development of programs, and can play out in administration by enabling clientelist distributions. Institutionalizing the administration of a targeted social program increases the likelihood of reaching the program goals, and reduces the likelihood of parochial distribution of benefits.

2.1.2.2 Program Spending

Program spending outcomes are a product of design and administration. Spending outcomes demonstrate whether programs reflect "now or never" strategies or measured expenditures that occur steadily over time (Kaufman 2008). Program expenditures displayed over time can reveal the extent to which the program receives consistent and reliable resources for administration, or whether the program shows short-term distributions to change the outcome of an upcoming election. Spending data disaggregated at the state level or below permits analysis of geographic targeting of program distributions.

2.1.2.3 Distribution Strategy

In order to selectively deliver resources, leaders have a variety of political tactics at their disposal: scholars have identified programs that target core voters, swing voters, voters in closely contested

districts, opposition voters as well as strategies that boost turnout among recipient populations (Cox 2009; Giovagnoli 2005; De La O Torres 2013; Luna and Mardones 2010; Takahashi 2007, 2010). Linking the ways leaders redistribute to the different electoral strategies reveals outcomes of "selective distributive politics," as leaders choose how to integrate the political tactics through program oversight and recipient selection criteria:

- *Core Voter* targeting strategy is designed to reach constituents that support the incumbent, delivering benefits to win votes within leadership-aligned districts (Cox 2009; Luna and Mardones 2010; Takahashi 2007).

- *Opposition* targeting strategy is designed to reach constituents that oppose the incumbent, delivering benefits to win votes in leadership-unfriendly districts (Luna and Mardones 2010; Takahashi 2007).

- *Swing Voter* targeting strategy reflects goals of distributing resources to districts in which competition is close among incumbent and opposition parties (Cox 2009; Giovagnoli 2005; Takahashi 2010).

These three strategies are identified as parochial in that they distribute in either-or scenarios, offering benefits as leaders pursue voluntary compliance schemes to win support. In these cases, leaders choose among constituencies to combine program delivery with electoral support.

- *Turnout Boosting* strategy reflects goals of winning incumbent votes by targeting social drawing recipients into political participation (De La O Torres 2013; Luna and Mardones 2010).

Unlike the first three strategies, the turnout boosting strategy does not distinguish among constituents as "core" or "opposition" voters, reaching multiple geographies with their

distributions. Unlike the previous strategies, the electoral support is not expected to result in the favoring of constituents targeted in social policy distribution.

The next section introduces the explanatory factors that result in the distributive strategies explored here.

2.2   POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS

This section describes how executive and legislative institutions impact the design of targeted social policy. It provides the explanation for why some programs are parochial and others programmatic: legislatures delegate to executives the design of antipoverty policy to overcome their own limitations faced in representing the poor. The latitude afforded to executives in program design is a function of their partisan powers, which determine the amount of control legislatures have over executives. Greater partisan powers result in less control, allowing executives the ability to design excludable policies that maximize their electoral benefit.

This theory recognizes the variation in executive strength and legislative control, particularly in light of the alternative hypothesis: given the strength of Latin American presidents, horizontal oversight does not affect the policy choice of executives. Literature on presidential powers in Latin America focuses on the strength of the president versus the legislature, characterizing the relationship as strong presidencies and weak legislatures (Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich, and Shair-Rosenfield 2013; Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). Constitutional framers gave greater presidential powers to prioritize efficiency over checks, leading to presidents intruding into legislative territory traditionally by assemblies (Alemán and Tsebelis 2005; Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Cox and Morgenstern 2001). These

include: veto powers, decree powers, rights of legislative introduction, and declaration of state of emergency (Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich, and Shair-Rosenfield 2013; Reich 2002; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). Scholars recognize that the presidential ability to control the legislative agenda is also dependent on partisan powers (Morgenstern, Polga-Hecimovich, and Shair-Rosenfield 2013; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). In instances where control over the majority control exists the capabilities of president could render legislative oversight meaningless. In these delegative democracies, according to O'Donnell (1994), executive power is too great and the improper exercise of authority occurs absent these checks.

Yet even in delegative democracies, there are times when behaving like an elected king is unfavorable or impossible. Popularity has been shown to influence executive usage of decrees (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2005, 2008). Constitutional decree authority may not generate permanent laws, and delegated decree authority may require a greater majority than the plurality necessary to pass laws. Still, legislatures act according to their own preferences even when the same party controls both branches, including the bargaining outcome of annual government budgets. Presidential latitude to create policy is affected by the constraints set by their partisan powers.

Both presidents and members of assemblies act according to preferences for political survival. The subsections below lay out two key dimensions of the electoral logic of redistributive program design in Latin America. The first identifies how antipoverty programs are the product of strategic interaction between the executive and legislature. The interaction results in principal-agent behavior where executive initiatives are introduced but influenced by institutional checks that allow for legislative control. As the legislature seeks to advance its interest, two factors determine how the agenda is shaped. These factors are examined in the second subsection, which

identifies how partisan powers – executive popularity and legislative support – affect the latitude given to executives to determine policy priorities and the programs that implement them. Patron-client problems limit the representation of poor constituents in the legislature, resulting in delegation to executives to initiate social programs. This determines the patterns of principal-agent behavior practiced between the two branches, resulting in executive-designed policies that generate excludable benefits for the poor.

Legislators, even those aligned with the president, are influenced by goals of reelection. Worried about their own chances at building careers, they find it risky to introduce antipoverty programs, since their closest watchdogs are often the rich. Hoping to gain electoral benefits from redistributive programs, they delegate the task to executives. Opponents, however, may try to thwart executive initiatives, and if they are powerful enough, the executives must anticipate the reaction of the legislature to the initiatives and design accordingly. The degree to which executives do so depends on their partisan powers. Weaker powers lead to programs that hew closer to legislative demands, and stronger powers allow leaders to design programs that stray from legislative oversight.

2.2.1   The Dynamics of Executive-Legislative Interactions and Program Design

According to Taylor-Robinson (2010, 189), electoral rules lead career-seeking politicians to represent constituents that closely monitor their behavior and provide sanction for behavior that counters their interest. Checking the behavior of politicians is more difficult for the poor to undertake than it is for the rich. This shapes how politicians form preferences to achieve their goals as they respond to the demands of their constituents. It means that the rich are likelier to have their policy preferences accommodated by representatives than are the poor, and causes the

poor to be historically underrepresented in the legislature (Taylor-Robinson, 2010, 197). This results in fewer policies for poor, and when they do occur, they are likelier to be clientelistic in nature because "politicians can benefit *more*" from excludable policies (Taylor-Robinson, 2010 196).

Because executives build an electoral base independent of legislators and have their own fixed term in which to govern, their preferences often vary from those of the legislature. Executives offer initiatives and legislate by exercising decree power, which are two behaviors that allow them to overcome the risks the legislature faces in representing the poor. As Taylor-Robinson notes above, when politicians design these programs that provide benefits to a set of citizens but exclude others, they can help themselves and their political allies. Politicians deliver with social programs, reaching a specific constituency that receives a benefit that others do not share. In doing so, executives surmount the need for legislative majority support for an initiative, but they still depend on legislatures for approval through the power of the purse and in certain instances by controlling decree authority.

2.2.1.1 Delegation

Allowing executives to initiate policy means that legislatures can avoid the problem of representation outlined above. By delegating lawmaking to executives, allied legislators can still benefit electorally from the programs designed by executives. In cases of collective action, coordination, or social choice instability problems, Kiewet and McCubbins show how legislatures delegate authority to overcome deadlock generated by the patron-client problem (Kiewet & McCubbins, 1992, 232). Management of delegation is subject to the legislature's ability to control the agent, and controlling the behavior of the agent depends on reporting, monitoring, and institutional checks (Kiewet & McCubbins, 1992, 38). The legislature serves as principal: it

delegates antipoverty policymaking to executive initiative, but retains its ability to approve initiatives. Assemblies provide an institutional check on executive authority; while they rely on executives to introduce certain initiatives or laws, these are subject to controls including approval of spending. Another form of control is practiced in some presidential democracies where delegation of decree powers given by enabling laws has depended on the partisan composition of Congress (Carey and Shugart 1997; Crisp 1997).

2.2.1.2 Anticipated Reactions

Because of the institutional check that the legislature has over the president – even in cases of delegation – executives need to anticipate the reaction of legislatures in the policy they design. The legislative reaction to the policy process shapes executive agendas in Latin American politics (Cox and Morgenstern 2001). Legislative control of the executive is dependent on the interests of the assembly, which are defined by its composition. The degree of latitude legislatures permit depends on the whether the chamber majority is of the same party or coalition as the president. Designing policy that anticipates the acceptance of the assembly reduces the cost of bargaining between the executive and legislature integrating legislative influence into bills that initiate in the executive.

2.2.2   Independent Variable: Partisan Powers of the Executive

The question of when executives have power over legislatures to enact their agenda depends on the constitutional and partisan powers afforded to them by their country's political institutions (Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997, 40). The key independent variable affecting the design of antipoverty policy is partisan powers, which reflect the degree to which presidents maintain

popularity and legislative support among their own party and allied politicians. The variable is operationalized in this study by measuring the following dimensions: executive popularity, which reflects the ability to shape legislative interest through its own mandate; and legislative support, which reflects the degree to which presidential initiatives are met with approval. This is shown by two elements: the distribution of parties in the legislature; and the degree to which institutionalized party politics generate in systemic interactions over time.

How partisan powers are held in check represents a form of horizontal accountability between the executive and legislative branches. The structure and interaction of parties within the legislature shapes the ways executives design programs, contributing to constraints that lead to programmatic policy choice or parochial ones.

2.2.2.1 Executive Popularity

Accounting for delegation involves examining how executives take into account their own level of popularity to issue decrees or build a mandate to govern. Throughout the presidential term, popularity may serve as a factor in issuing decrees or influencing the Assembly but the effect is often indirect (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2005, 2008; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2010). At the beginning of presidential terms, margins of executive electoral support indicate popularity, with wider levels encouraging leaders to pursue their own agenda and legislators to respond, producing more executive-friendly outcomes. Competitive results threaten executive ability to stray from the interests of the legislature. Tighter popularity margins result in executive initiatives that are more closely shaped by legislatures.

2.2.2.2 Legislative Support

Legislative support also determines how executives control the agenda for their initiatives. Without backing, initiatives may be subject to withdrawal of funding or lack of approval. Two dimensions of support are examined: the composition of the Assembly and the stability of the party system. Both impact the amount of latitude of executives in implementing redistributive policy: composition reflects the numerical partisan advantage, while party system stability provides a way of examining how policies are shaped when executives anticipate opposition reaction to initiatives over time.

Legislative Composition

How the legislature is comprised defines its interest. The legislative reaction varies according to the distribution of seats among the strongest parties, configured between the government and opposition. The structure and interaction of parties within the legislature shapes the ways executives design programs, contributing to constraints that lead to programmatic policy choice or parochial ones. While parties that reflect clear majorities for an incumbent executive are likely to support their initiatives, the conditions for legislatures composed of mixed parties are different.

Geddes (1991) provides a theoretical tool for the assessment of party configurations on reforms. While her argument relates to administrative reforms in the civil service, particularly in a two-party context, implications exist for a multiparty setting involving antipoverty program choices where leaders are interested in political survival. Here, the electoral benefit of redistribution without oversight can be viewed as a patronage to support incumbents. Reforms that deprive incumbents of this kind of redistribution are likelier to be accepted when the large parties gain equally from this benefit; parties that benefit from the status quo will seek to maintain it, while parties that are disadvantaged by the electoral benefit will seek reform (Geddes, 1991,

376-7). When all major parties benefit electorally from parochial distributive strategies in social programs, they are likelier to integrate reform elements to make them programmatic. When a (or the) major party benefits from a parochial distributive strategy, the opposition will seek reforms.

In a multiparty context, configurations between government and opposition parties may take the form of coalitional politics in countries where no individual parties are large enough to shape outcomes. When no party can govern on its own, the distributional pressures can be balanced by the formation of coalitions. This is likeliest when patronage gains are distributed evenly. Geddes notes that further reform over time is likeliest through additional stability in the "electoral weight" among top parties (Geddes, 1991, 388). Similar conditions for reform orientation exist when seats are evenly distributed among coalitions. This lends importance to how the party system generates stability, identified below. Geddes notes that so long as the distribution of seats among large parties is even, the impact on reforms progresses regardless of the number of parties.

The implications suggest that if major parties share an electoral benefit of parochial programs, they stand to benefit by introducing reform measures to improve program oversight, since they could claim credit on their introduction and show that they were oriented towards clean programs. This would occur in two-party and coalitional multiparty systems. If a dominant party benefits from not introducing reform measures, they will seek to maintain that status, while minority parties seek reform.

Party System Stability

A second element that relates partisan powers to policy choices is how politicians view the effect of past interaction and prospects for future ones. The institutionalization of the party system creates "centripetal incentives" through systemic interactions that make it harder for politicians

without a stake in the system to introduce radical reforms, disrupting the status quo (Flores-Macías 2010). This has a moderating effect on policy, as it becomes more difficult for these politicians to exclude the input of opposition politicians that participate in the system.

Institutionalized party systems have specific macroeconomic effects that translate into social spending outcomes. They provide a measure of horizontal accountability that requires leaders to target multiple geographies with social spending, while the deinstitutionalization of the party system frees leaders to focus on parochial spending targets (Kaufman, 2008). They affect: how politicians appeal to opposition and undecided voters; self-selection and learning from experienced candidates; moderation through reelection goals (including out-of-office goals); and the framing of policy approaches, given the credibility of opposition parties to temper them. Variation in constraints encountered by leaders in institutionalized and weak party systems result in different incentives for macroeconomic policy choices such as spending.

Kaufman provides three reasons that Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) concept of party system stability matters to leadership macroeconomic decision-making. These include: the degree of policy stability given actor expectations about party competition, incentives to mobilize organizational identities and electoral bases of support, and horizontal accountability between executive and other governmental branches (Kaufman, 2008, 29-30).

Expectations about Party Competition: leaders that expect regularized "repeat play" competition in political contests are more likely to govern in a manner that prioritizes the targeting of multiple geographies or coalitions with redistributive policies (Kaufman, 2008, 29). Kaufman expects that leaders in systems with repeated-play characteristics look beyond "now or never" opportunities to consider the implication of their policy choice to times when they might be in opposition in order to assert their credibility as responsible governors (Kaufman, 2008, 29-

30). In the presence of "credible electoral challengers," leaders would be less likely to attempt policy approaches that risked macroeconomic instability (Kaufman, 2008, 29-30).

Organizational Identities and Electoral Bases of Support: Leaders in institutionalized party systems have incentives to mobilize both voters for rival parties and undecided "swing voters" that indicate their status as, according to Kaufman, "not only progressive but also 'safe' economic choices" (Kaufman, 2008, 31). Leaders in weakly institutionalized systems pursue a "plebiscitory" approach, and seek voters that want to reject the "institutional status quo" (Kaufman, 2008, 31). As a result, they mobilize groups on the economic margins.

Horizontal Accountability: building on O'Donnell's term, this refers to the acceptance that leaders "can be legitimately challenged by critics within their own party, and by competing parties based in the legislature and other institutional centers of power" (Kaufman, 2008, 32). In Shugart and Carey's ideal presidential arrangements, this leads to national policy preferences being articulated over parochial ones. The authors argue that these preferences are articulated in systems when strong parties balance a weak president within the system (Shugart & Carey, 1992, 194-7). Within their own parties, leaders in institutionalized systems were also capable of leaning on the experience of other candidates within the party for decisions on how to develop political credibility instead of relying on militancy (Kaufman, 2008, 30).

Relating the leadership decision-making incentives back to antipoverty programs, a stable party system can be understood as a generator of elements of horizontal accountability that force policy design to be national in its orientation (as opposed to parochial), to target multiple geographies with their approach, and to mobilize voters in political coalitions. An unstable party system can be understood as a failing to generate elements of horizontal accountability, resulting in policies with narrow time horizons and parochial distributions that mobilize bases of support

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from the margins. Given these effects, party system stability is a factor of the partisan powers examined, including executive popularity and the size of the legislative majority.

2.2.3   Comparing the Theoretical Outcomes

Four theoretical outcomes are arranged in a matrix according to the characteristics identified in Table 2. The table is organized according to elements of partisan powers through which executives shape agendas: presidential popularity and legislative support, two factors that impact how leaders pursue distributive strategies that characterize programs. These elements are arranged into a matrix to show the relationship between them.

The elements are operationalized in a basic manner to introduce a comparative framework that relates the level of partisan powers to distributive strategies. The matrix examines the relationship of executive popularity and legislative support. This matrix simplifies the latter category into composition, reserving detailed analysis of the party system for later. Greater partisan powers are present among popular executives with majorities in the legislature (the upper right cell), and less partisan powers are present among unpopular executives with legislatures composed of coalitions (the lower left cell).

Table 2. Executive and Legislative Partisan Powers

		Legislative Support	
		Coalition Politics	*Majority Politics*
Executive Popularity	*High*	**Uncompetitive Executive/ Coalition Politics** *Mixed Partisan Powers: Executives less influenced by reform-oriented legislatures* **Mixed Distributive Strategies**	**Party Hegemony** *More Partisan Powers: Executives least influenced; non-reform-oriented legislatures* **Parochial Distributive Strategies**
	Low	**Competitive Executive/ Coalition Politics** *Less Partisan Powers: Executives most influenced by reform-oriented legislatures* **Programmatic Distributive Strategies**	**Precarious Majority** *Mixed Partisan Powers: Executives more influenced but face less reform-oriented legislatures* **Mixed Distributive Strategies**

The combination of executive and legislative factors results in programmatic policy outcomes where executives have the lowest margin of victory and legislatures are balanced between presidential and opposition forces. In these cases, executives are afforded less latitude by legislatures, which are likeliest to incorporate reform-oriented measures into policy. Program distributions are designed and administered without regard to exclusivity.

Minimal incorporation of reforms and parochial policy orientation occurs where executives have the highest margin of victory and legislative politics are majoritarian. In these cases, executives are afforded more latitude by legislatures, which are least likely to incorporate reform-oriented measures into policy. Program distributions are designed and administered in an exclusive fashion with a goal of political influence.

There are two scenarios where mixed distributions, ones that incorporate parochial and programmatic elements into the policy, can occur. In the first, the executive margin of victory is high, and the leader faces coalition-oriented legislative politics. In these cases, the legislative influence is stronger, resulting in more reform-oriented measures, but fewer than in the competitive executive/ coalition politics scenario above. Program distributions may be designed and administered in an exclusive fashion with a goal of political influence, but these can be mitigated through legislative control. In the second, the executive margin of victory is low, and the leader faces majoritarian legislative politics. In these cases, legislative influence is weaker, allowing more latitude to the executive, but less than a hegemonic scenario. Program distributions may be designed and administered in an exclusive fashion with a goal of political influence, subject to weaker legislative control.

Understanding how leaders craft antipoverty policy requires an institutional approach to the constraints they face in doing so. The next section offers guiding hypotheses that link these concepts.

2.3   HYPOTHESIS

The explanation above suggests the following hypothetical implications about the political effect of targeted programs and how executive-legislative relations affect the way they are politicized. The main factor that determines the distribution strategy is the partisan powers of the executive. These reflect the ways in which executives exercise their latitude – and how much latitude afforded them by elements of horizontal accountability, including their own popularity, opposition party presence in the legislature, and the institutionalization of party systems. Partisan

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powers have identifiable effects on how executives can design and administer programs, detailed in hypotheses below. The guiding hypothesis of the study refers to the latitude possessed by executives to generate parochial programs:

H1)   Greater (less) partisan powers results in parochial (programmatic) program design.

Executives behave according to the constraints placed on their behavior, which is set by the degree of horizontal accountability practiced by the legislature during the policymaking process. This study expects to show evidence of partisan powers impacting program design according to the hypothesized relationship, which contrasts with the alternative hypothesis that legislative weakness in Latin America means that program design is unaffected. The dependent variable, program design, will be examined first, followed by the independent variable, partisan powers.

The elements of partisan power identified in this study here – the level of executive popularity and legislative support – each impact horizontal accountability. Executive popularity negatively affects the level of horizontal accountability while the components of legislative support – legislative composition and party system institutionalization positively affects it.

As executives initiate programs, they behave according to an electoral incentive to deliver excludable goods to different groups, seeking to maximize the extent to which the programs allow them to deliver to their electoral base. Executives with wider (tighter) electoral margins (and thus fewer concerns about future elections) design programs that offer benefits with fewer (greater) constraints to distribute to political supporters.

The configuration of the legislature provides an important horizontal check on the policymaking process. The executive encounters institutional control of their initiatives through legislative approval. Supporting (opposing) legislatures will approve (check) executive plans to

distribute excludable goods to populations. However, when parties in legislatures stand to gain evenly from distributing excludable goods, they are likelier to integrate more reform-oriented elements into program oversight. Balance determines how politicians seeking to integrate reform-oriented measures can influence the program

Executives also factor into their decisions the incentives of partisan competition that structure their behavior, which requires that they consider of the credibility of their choices as viewed by other parties in the political system. The degree to which policies are moderated to generate programmatic outcomes depends on how the party system affects leadership over time. This means that strong (weak) party system institutionalization results in the moderation (immoderation) of policy preferences by executives. By generating expectations about party competition, stability in organizational identities and electoral bases of support, and establishing horizontal accountability, the party system constrains leaders to moderate policy. This means they look beyond now-or-never approaches to policy to progressive policy choices and articulate national policy preferences that mobilize beyond their constituency instead of particular ones. By doing so they develop credible approaches that they aim to have survive beyond the time they are in power.

This establishes a set of basic expectations about the relationships examined in the later chapters of this study. The first relationship is expected between indications of oversight, expenditures, and program distribution: parochial social programs are expected to have weak oversight, unsteady expenditures, and distributions that favor inclusion based on political criteria, while programmatic social programs are expected to have strong oversight, steady expenditures, and distributions that favor inclusion based on demographic criteria. The second relationship is expected between targeted social programs and electoral payoff. Targeted social programs are

expected to have a positive effect on the probability of electoral support for candidates who implement them, but parochial social programs are expected to generate a greater probability of electoral support than do programmatic ones.

Designing programs to include disadvantaged populations generates political opportunity for leaders, and whether they design policies to deliver for constituencies or guide voters towards electoral support depends on how elements of electoral competitiveness affects the executive and legislative interactions in the antipoverty policymaking process. The hypothesized outcomes are illustrated through a brief discussion of cases in the next section.

2.4   CASE SELECTION

The following cases illustrate the four outcomes of the executive-legislative interaction on targeted social policy choice. Argentina (*Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desempleados*), Brazil (*Bolsa Família*), Mexico (*Progresa/ Oportunidades*), and Venezuela (*Misiones Sociales*) each introduced targeted social transfer programs in the past 15 years. Below, narrative descriptions of the programs are introduced and political effects are detailed. The section concludes by organizing the country cases narratives according to the variables and predictions described in the section above.

2.4.1   Organizing the Comparison

Assessing spending outcomes and strategy shows how the interaction between the executive and legislature produces programs that generate political effects. The outcomes are organized in Table

3 below, which relates executive and legislative elements of partisan powers to programs with parochial, programmatic, and mixed policy outcomes for the four country cases.

The four country cases are arranged according to executive and legislative elements of partisan powers that determine program characteristics, and are identified above in Table 2. Executive popularity is operationalized for this comparison is the level of executive margin of victory, categorized as high (≥10 percent) and low (<10 percent). Legislative composition is categorized by the composition of parties, according to coalition and majoritarian politics.

Program distribution strategy, evidence of political effects, and program oversight are detailed in the cells of the table. Political determinants, policies, and political effects are described in the narratives below.

Table 3. Partisan Powers and Targeted Social Policy Strategy

		Legislative Composition	
		Coalition Politics	*Majority Politics*
Executive Margin of Victory	*High*	***Bolsa Família*** (Brazil)*:* (Mixed Distribution) **Program Oversight:** Rollout followed by suspension of conditionalities. Reversion to auditing system. **Political Effects:** Turnout Boosting	*Misiones Sociales* (Venezuela): (Parochial Distribution) **Program Oversight:** Conditions not strictly enforced; limited auditing of participation. **Political Effects:** Opposition and core targeting among programs
	Low	*Progresa/ Oportunidades* (Mexico): (Programmatic) **Program Oversight:** Rollout included strict means test; survey & community review. **Political Effects:** Turnout Boosting (de la O 2013, Takahashi 2010)	*Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desempleados* (Argentina): (Mixed Distribution) **Program Oversight:** Rollout with no agreement on eligibility. Limited local oversight of "Municipal Councils." **Political Effects***:* Core voter strategy in swing districts (Giovagnoli 2005)

Comparing executive margin of victory, Brazil and Venezuela both shared high (greater than 20 percent) margins, while in Mexico and Argentina, the margins were closer (between 2 and a 10 percent). Lower margins reflect a higher level of program reform at introduction, while higher margins reflect a lower level of program reform. This is combined with legislative composition to provide a picture of partisan powers that lead to the different program outcomes: Brazil and Mexico are categorized as composed of coalitional legislatures with parties that are not large enough to control a majority of congress, and balance dependent on the alignment of major parties. Venezuela and Argentina have majoritarian compositions, with dominant parties comprising much of the legislature.

When taken into comparison on elements of partisan powers and program design, the four cases support the theory presented above. Greater partisan powers influence program design, which produces core, opposition, and swing constituent targeting, indicators of parochial political effects. Less partisan powers produce turnout boosting effects, an indicator of programmatic strategy. This contrasts with the legislative weakness alternative hypothesis: while in some cases, the legislature had less influence, even popular executives faced constraints on their ability to target redistributive programs in ways that bettered their chances of political survival.

These characteristics are detailed in the narrative cases below, which relate the political factors to the program design choices. Following the narratives, general lessons are collected and the variables and predictions are evaluated in a separate section.

2.4.2 Argentina (*Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desempleados*)

In Argentina, the emergency cash transfer program *Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desempleados* was organized in 2002 to counteract the unemployment crisis that stemmed from the austerity

measures implemented in 2001. President Duhalde, the loser in the previous election, had been recently appointed president, proposed the program during a period of legislative dominance for his Peronist party to respond to the wide public discontent over poverty and unemployment.

Plan Jefes was structured to deliver 150 pesos per month to unemployed heads of households aged 18 or under, other youth unemployed, or adults aged over 60 not receiving a retirement benefit or pension (Giovagnoli, 2005, 6). The program was initially structured to directly transfer funds for the purchase of basic goods, but the government changed the eligibility criteria twice which led to enforcement problems (Giovagnoli, 2005 8-9). Difficulties were encountered in verification of the criteria, particularly unemployment status in a labor market dominated by informal employment. It meant that effectively, there were very few administrative barriers to program enrollment (Giovagnoli, 2005, 8). After conditions were placed on the program, September 2002 only 42 percent of beneficiaries (approximately 750,000) had registered for a workfare project or activity (Módolo, 2004, 14-5). The selection process for recipients was devolved to the municipal level, with Municipal Consulting Councils determining the allocation of benefits, evaluating community development proposals, and the auditing of irregularities in program distribution (Kostzer, 2008, 8,19). These councils have been shown in early research to have a lack of administrative and technical capacity, and to present some evidence of political manipulation (Giovagnoli, 2005, 10).

These political distortions show parochial distribution outcomes. In an impact analysis conducted by Giovagnoli (2005, 37), the program distribution was shown to favor incumbents in majority Peronist municipal districts, suggesting a core voter strategy. Distributions are lower in areas with the greatest support for Peronist incumbents, and greater in areas with lower Peronist incumbent support, offering evidence of a core voter distribution strategy in swing districts.

2.4.3 Brazil (*Bolsa Família*)

President Lula initiated *Bolsa Família* in 2003. The program was designed and decreed at a time when Lula held a minority coalition within the Assembly, forcing the leader to accommodate the preferences of the neoliberal-aligned opposition majority by instituting program conditionalities. The program targeted the poorest sector of the population utilizing a registry and means test, including an interview process involving a social worker visiting the household that was set to receive the benefit. Health and education conditions were monitored through the Ministries of health and education, and the management of the registry and transfer of funds were conducted through the *Caixa Economica Federal* (federally controlled savings bank), though in Brasilia, funds were transferred through the *Banco de Brasilia* (Lindert et al., 2007, 21). Municipalities were responsible for implementing aspects such as local coordination, registration of potential recipients of the *Cadastro Único,* monitoring health and education conditions, linking program beneficiaries to other services and establishing social control councils (Lindert et al. 2007). Targeting and registration was conducted through this centralized mechanism, with oversight contracted to the state bank *Caixa Economica* on a performance evaluation basis (Lindert et al., 2007, 36, 42). Inclusion was based on the program rules, as evaluated by the national bank, and administration of the inclusion criteria for the program was conducted in a way that disassociated the recipient from the politicians that created the program. This enabled a programmatic distribution of resources.

Bolsa Família became part of a decade long debate over instituting a guaranteed citizen income when monitoring for conditionalities was temporarily suspended in 2004 (Britto & Soares, 2010, 14). This set off a debate over the impact of monitoring compliance and program purpose, (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 62-3). Opposition to the suspension of conditions grew

among government, press, and scholars, who suggested that this would hurt long-term structural goals of the program and lead to clientelism (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 63-4). This pressure led to the reinstatement of program condition monitoring. The debate over the program focused first on implementation issues, technical elements of the program, with a later debate over clientelism, showing that the program prioritized antipoverty goals rather than political ones.

Examining the distribution data reveals that despite early concerns with the enforcement of conditions, *Bolsa Família* favors the poor but not a particular group of political supporters. The program distribution shows a programmatic outcome. In Chapter 4, a series of regression analyses conducted to determine the effect of political and demographic factors on program distribution, and poverty is a consistent determinant. The overarching distribution of monthly assistance benefits does not target a specific political group, though targeting of voter support of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* was shown to be greatest in 2006.

2.4.4 Mexico (*Progresa/ Oportunidades*)

Progresa - Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación – was initiated to by then-President Ernesto Zedillo of the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional (*PRI) to distribute resources to combat poverty in rural Mexico during a series of fiscal austerity measures. The program included three components: a cash transfer to the female head of household intended to subsidize food purchases, a scholarship intended to offset income from child labor, and basic health care for family members (De La O, 2013, 3). A strict means test was employed, based on an index developed to evaluate the marginality of beneficiaries (Takahashi, 2007, 110). This index identified poor communities based on census data and then poor households were chosen households based on a survey that examined socioeconomic level and program eligibility

(Takahashi, 2007, 12). A series of institutional reforms included 1999 constitutional changes where the Supreme Federal Auditor was given a larger amount of investigative authority in matters of public finance (Takahashi, 2010, 9).

Following a crisis of legitimacy in the mid 1990s in Mexico, Zedillo allied with a reformist movement within his party that sought technocratic fixes to increase policy transparency and reduce corruption. The leader sought to avoid the clientelism that plagued Salinas with the program PRONASOL (Takahashi 2010, 7). For PROGRESA, the alignment with the reformist camp further reduced the degree of policy latitude afforded the president. This was reinforced by a reduced overall share of PRI politicians in the legislature, which reflected greater pluralism (Takahashi, 2010, 9).

Under President Vicente Fox of the center-right *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN), the program was renamed *Oportunidades* and expanded to urban areas. During the Fox administration auditing of irregularities was extended by the passage of three laws that provided legal assurances for citizen monitoring of government social program activities (Takahashi, 2010, 9). These changes allowed for the expansion social auditing measures to avoid manipulation of the program. The further development of democracy aided oversight, improving the program.

Takahashi and De la O Torres assess the program utilizing statistical analysis, investigating the effects of PRI incumbent status on program distribution, finding a turnout boosting effect for the incumbent in the 2000 election, consistent with this study's categorization of a programmatic distribution strategy. Takahashi finds the vote share for incumbent candidates of the PRI to be a significant determinant of program distribution during *Progresa*, but this effect is not found during *Oportunidades* for the PAN (Takahashi, 2010, 28-9). De la O Torres shows that the early group of individuals assigned to benefit from *Progresa* had increased turnout,

specifically on party vote shares for PRI candidates (De La O Torres 2013). The turnout boosting effect is shown in *Progresa* during the Zedillo administration but according to Takahashi, *Oportunidades* shows no similar effect during the Fox administration.

2.4.5   Venezuela (*Misiones Sociales*)

The *Misiones Sociales* were initiated in 2003 as a range of services complementary to existing government education, health and social welfare programs. They were wide-ranging, serving not simply the poorest, and only involved conducting means tests for certain aspects of the programs – those that included *becas*, or scholarships – but not for others, such as neighborhood medical care. The initial *Misiones* were: *Barrio Adentro* (within-neighborhood primary health care), *Mercal* (discount grocery), *Robinson* (basic literacy), *Ribas* (basic education), *Sucre* (postsecondary education), *Habitat* (housing), and *Vuelvan Caras* (cooperatively owned goods production businesses). Of these, *becas* were introduced for the education programs *Robinson*, *Ribas*, and *Sucre*, awarded to low-income participants, particularly: single mothers, unemployed, or individuals in precarious situations, over 60 years of age, or family breadwinners. These were awarded within the classroom, not through a centralized administration of payouts (D'Elia, 2006, 98).

The Chávez government interfered with the program design and organization multiple times over the course of the decade. Chavez supplemented the funding of the *Misiones* with resources drawn from PDVSA, avoiding subjecting them to budget oversight in the legislature. These programs were under near constant institutional redesign from 2005-8. The Misiones underwent their first full makeover following the release of the *Nuevo Mapa Estratégico* (*New Strategic Map*) established new institutional objectives and management structures for *Misiones*

Ribas and *Robinson* (Mundo, 2009, 45). The second set of changes occurred following the passing of enabling laws that established the quasi-institutional status of the Misiones as official bureaucratic structures.

Assessing the educational programs, in particular *Misiones Sucre* and *Ribas*, reveals a parochial distribution of benefits. In Chapter 4, a series of regression analyses conducted to determine the effect of political and demographic factors on program distribution. Poverty does not determine distribution, but political factors show an effect. *Misión Sucre* cash transfers and community education centers reflect a core voter strategy, prioritizing Chavez and *Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela* supporters over opposition votes. The distribution of *Misión Ribas* cash transfers reveal an opposition voter targeting strategy for program recipients. This analysis is consistent with Lupu (2010) who reports that voting support for Chávez has increased among the middle class, which coincides with education *Misión* program benefits, though the author does not inquire about a relationship. Prioritizing different blocks of electoral support through program targeting suggest goals of selective distribution of benefits consistent with the parochial distributions identified above.

2.4.6   Institutional Effects on Program Outcomes

The interaction between executives and legislatures shapes the policy design, resulting in programmatic or parochial outcomes as leaders pursue distribution strategies. In the first two cases – Brazil and Mexico – parties are not large enough to dominate the legislature, increasing the reform orientation of policies. In the latter two cases – Venezuela and Argentina – the

distribution of seats among major parties is out of balance resulting in majoritarian politics, limiting the reform orientation of policies.

Comparing the composition of the legislature, coalition politics define the legislatures of Brazil and Mexico. The structure of electoral rules in Brazil results in a multi-party system, limiting the party of the president from holding a majority in the legislature (Alston et al. 2006; Cheibub Figueiredo 2007). Lula, a popular leader, combined with a legislature with an opposition-aligned coalition that balanced, limiting Lula's partisan powers; this allowed latitude for a debate to suspend program conditions, but these were soon reinstated. In Mexico, regional dominance of the PAN, PRD, and PRI require coalition behavior to win a majority among the catch-all parties that developed there (Klesner 2005). A crisis of legitimacy produced a reformist camp within the PRI while the overall share of Zedillo's party declined in the legislature, resulting in a technocratic approach to PROGRESA that that avoided the parochial distributive outcome of a prior program.

Venezuela and Argentina are defined by majority politics, with histories of disciplined parties in the legislature. Venezuelan parties were highly disciplined until the early 1990s, which declined in a volatile manner and left a polarized system with partisan interactions between the parties associated with Hugo Chavez and opposition movements (Alvarez 2006; Crisp 2000; Lyne 2008; Monaldi et al. 2006). Chávez-aligned legislative dominance combined with a popular leader in Venezuela yields a considerable degree of partisan powers, allowing the president latitude to design programs distributed in a parochial manner, favoring core and opposition voters with program benefits in the education *Misiones*. The highly disciplined parties in Argentina are driven by regional relationships with governors result in the domination of the governing majority Peronists over the opposition *Unión Cívica Radical* (Jones 2002; Scherlis 2008). *Plan Jefes* was

introduced at a time of great public discontent over the large share of the population that was poor and unemployed, by an appointed president – the loser of the previous election – during a period when the Peronists dominated the legislature, resulting in a program that failed to have clearly defined eligibility criteria and parochial distributions.

Legislative composition and the degree to which the party system facilitates cooperation based on stable expectations of competition and draws from persistent electoral bases of support determines the extent to which policies are oriented toward programmatic or parochial outcomes. The cases support the theory, revealing variation in distributional outcomes that correspond to the institutional effects. Detailed evidence of how this interaction determines politicization of redistributive programs and their targeting outcomes will be presented in cases and statistical analysis comparing Brazil and Venezuela in Chapters Five and Six.

2.5   CONCLUSION

Despite limitations on their ability to initiate antipoverty programs, legislatures exert control by delegating the process to the executive, who seeks to seize on the electoral opportunity to deliver to its constituency. Partisan powers determine the latitude the executive has to shape programs. The extent of these powers is indicated by the amount of electoral popularity, the number of seats controlled by the executive and allied parties in the legislature, and by the institutionalization of the party system. The legislature maintains an important role in this process since the body ultimately approves the initiatives. Programmatic and parochial distributional outcomes are an effect of the ability of the legislature to introduce reform elements into targeted social program design. The content of these reform elements is determined by the institutionalization of the party

system in the legislature, which moderates appeals to voters through the generation of expectations about party competition, the construction of bases of support and organizational identities, and the establishment of horizontal accountability, resulting in the articulation of national policy preferences over parochial ones.

This chapter presents variation in outcomes across four cases organized by indicators of the theoretical mechanism presented above. It reveals leaders' ability to redistribute targeted social policy according to the strategies identified in the literature to be a function of legislative-executive interaction. Chapter 5 will examine in detail the executive-legislative interaction in Brazil and Venezuela that results in the different distributional outcomes.

3.0 METHODS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS OF TARGETED REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY

This chapter presents the research design and methods to evaluate the theory identified in Chapter 2, describing the elements of the design, methods and data sources used to perform the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the project. In order to investigate how social programs are politicized, this chapter describes the analytical methods employed in chapters 4-6 of the dissertation. First, it introduces a set of tests in Chapter 5 to evaluate the dependent variable – *program design*. These tests examine oversight, expenditure, and model the political and demographic determinants of program distribution on *Bolsa Família* and the education *Misiones*. Then, it identifies a country case study approach used in Chapter 5 to describe the independent variable – partisan powers – that determine how social programs are politicized in their design and administration. Then it introduces a statistical model used in Chapter 6 to evaluate the relationship between program participation and vote choice in Brazil and Venezuela to examine the electoral payoff of different program designs. It concludes with analysis of project validity and challenges to reliability of analysis.

3.1   RESEARCH DESIGN

This research project employs inductive inference, constructing a theory from rational choice and historical institutionalist perspectives in political and policy science in order to build a generalizable model based on the analysis of cases. To present a complete understanding of the theory, this study employs a mixed methodology, testing the hypotheses developed from the theory. In order to examine the electoral effects of policies, it employs a statistical model to examine the electoral effects of targeted social programs identified within the universe of cases. In order to understand the politics of the policy design, the study employs country case studies based on semi-structured research interviews conducted in the field, quantitative data collected from governments, including and elections data, as well as secondary sources including third-party organization reports on programs and academic and journalistic accounts of historical developments to examine the institutional effect of horizontal accountability on program design. Government and opposition political preferences are examined to determine what shape the programs could have taken, had the institutional effect not occurred. It then employs a statistical model evaluating program oversight, using interview and secondary accounts, government expenditure data, and program enrollment data to examine the influence of political and program-relevant factors affecting targeting strategy for the programs. Drawing inferences from data utilized to develop the theory, this project directly tests the effects of:

1. political and demographic determinants on program distribution to examine how programs with different levels of oversight are targeted;

2. partisan powers on the design of programs, particularly the integration of reform elements that provide oversight to examine how horizontal accountability affects the moderation of program design;

3. program participation on vote choice, to examine the effect of participation in programs of different design on incumbent electoral support.

Chapter 4 utilizes a mixed-method approach, informing the substantive results of a statistical model with qualitative data on program characteristics and oversight and expenditure data. Chapter 5 utilizes a comparative case study approach to examine the effect of partisan powers on the design of programs. Chapter 6 utilizes a statistical model to examine the effect of program participation on vote choice.

3.1.1   Unit of Analysis

In order to examine the institutions that constrain the behavior of political actors, this project employs levels of analysis both aggregate and individual to describe how leaders politicize redistributive social programs. Examining country cases aggregated at institutional levels permits the analysis of political inputs including executives, legislatures, and parties, as well as policy outputs such as ministry oversight, program expenditures, and for the purposes of examining targeting direction, the distribution of program resources across geographic lines.

Individual-level data is employed to describe the electoral effect of program politicization by identifying the effect of recipient (and non-recipient) status on vote choice across values of key variables. Examining survey data provides researchers with the ability to observe the effect of recipient status on individuals, rather than rely on examination of political effects at levels aggregated by district or state. Performing analyses on the causes of vote choice that are the product of recall data from surveys months and years on is acknowledged to be problematic, but choosing this analysis avoids problems with the ecological fallacy at the aggregate level. While observing directly (and immediately) whether recipient status affected vote choice is most

preferable, assuming that recipients are the voters casting ballots to support politicians that distribute resources to districts is inimical to understanding how leaders shape policy to encourage vote choice. Utilizing recall data to assess the effect of recipient and non-recipient status on vote choice is preferable so long that potential biases in the data are acknowledged.

3.1.2   Data Sources

This study employs the following quantitative and qualitative data sources to realize the mixed methodological approach it takes. It employs survey data to examine program effects on vote choice, primary data to examine firsthand accounts of political context, program oversight, design, and distribution, as well as secondary data to triangulate perspectives introduced in the primary interviews.

3.1.2.1 Survey Data

In order to examine the individual effect of program participation (and non-participation) on vote choice, this study utilizes survey data from the 2007 wave of the AmericasBarometer at the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University (LAPOP, 2007). Both Brazil and Venezuela surveys contained interview questions about recipient status for *Bolsa Família* and the Misiones as well as questions about prior deputy and presidential elections, in addition to the 2006 elections in each country. Coding choices are discussed in the model description below.

3.1.2.2 Primary Data

Primary data was collected in two months of field research in Brazil and Venezuela in November and December 2010. Over that time, 25 interviews were conducted among government officials

at the ministerial level, government program workers, nongovernmental organization members, and policy analysts within government. In addition to these, further discussions were had with members of academic and policy institutions including *Centro de Estudios de Desarollo* at the *Universidad Central de Venezuela*, the *Universidad Católica Andres Bello*, the *Universidade de Brasilia*, the UNDP International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, and the World Bank. These interviews were structured to provide description of political interactions and expert accounts of the coverage intended in the design and administration of targeted social policies.

3.1.2.3 Secondary Data

In order to corroborate the perspectives introduced through interviews, secondary data, including: expenditure data from government ministries, foundations, and state-owned corporations, elections data from government elections authorities, as well as third-party organization reports on programs, and academic and journalistic accounts of historical developments. This enables the triangulation of perspectives through the by comparing the viewpoints of interview subjects to actual coverage through statistical analysis of spending data by geography, controlling for population factors.

3.2   MEASURING PROGRAM POLITICIZATION

This study conducts a first set of tests to examine program politicization –whether strategy is programmatic or parochial – in Chapter 4. Programs are examined according to three assessment criteria: program oversight, program expenditure, and the direction of program targeting.

Program oversight, expenditures, and distributions are assessed separately to show the influence of partisan powers on indicators of programmatic and parochial programs. The assessment of program oversight is conducted through case study accounts based on interview data, third-party reports that detail oversight, and government program descriptions. This shows the ways in which programs reflect rule-based implementation, including specification of program eligibility based on poverty or political preferences for program inclusion. Program expenditures are assessed through government and third party reports on spending, which reveals ways that leaders are constrained from spending. Whether expansions are moderate or oscillate in a now-or-never fashion shows how program rules affect the level of expenditures on social programs.

Assessing program distribution – whether a program has parochial or programmatic distributive outcomes – requires examination of targeting strategies identified in Chapter 2, conducted through the modeling of participation in cash transfer programs across geographical regions within each country. Program targeting models are based on assessing the effect of political and program-relevant demographic factors that determine the targeting outcomes. Elections and program distributions for both programs are examined over multiple time points, in 2004, 2006 (Brazil), 2007 (Venezuela), and 2010. This allows for the assessment of political targeting over multiple electoral events during the period, during which the comparison of political and program-relevant demographic characteristics is conducted.

The distribution of program benefits shows how rules are incorporated into inclusion criteria of program design, allowing for the assessment of the "selective distributive politics" strategic political targeting hypotheses introduced in Chapter 2. These strategies include: *core* voter strategy, targeting incumbent supporting constituents; *opposition* voter strategy, targeting

supporters of challengers; *close* or *landslide* voter strategy, targeting competitive races or shoring up supporters, or *turnout boosting*, encouraging political participation. Support for the first three are identified as parochial, while support for the latter is identified as programmatic. Unlike the first three, his spending reaches multiple geographies, redistributing beyond narrow criteria.

Analysis is conducted by assessing the factors that affect program distribution through evaluating the number of program recipients in each state according to political and program-relevant demographic variables. This involves regressing the number of recipients in each state on voting outcomes in political contests, partisan status of governors, a measure of educational enrollment, individuals living in poverty, and population. Substantive analysis is conducted through marginal effects calculations for each model, which allow the examination of two political influences on program distributions: changes in the level of support for Lula and Chávez, and being in a state with a Lula (or Chávez)-aligned governor. Examining whether the number of program recipients is greater in states with leadership- or opposition-aligned governors allows examination of targeting core (Lula- or Chávez- aligned) or opposition support, or whether the targeting reflects programmatic distribution among the poor population in each state. Comparing close and distant races provides evidence of support for the swing voter hypothesis, where recipient share is greater in close races.

The following variables modeled in a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analyses comparing political and demographic targeting effects, based on previous efforts by Fried (2012), Hawkins, Rosas and Johnson (2011), Hawkins (2010), Penfold-Becerra (2008), Rocha-Menocal (2001), Molinar and Weldon (1994). Political factors include the following variables: the partisan status of governors in each state during the period of analysis, and a measure of political support for the incumbent party during major electoral events. These include

presidential and gubernatorial elections as well as the constitutional and recall referendums in Venezuela. Program-relevant demographic variables include: the number of individuals living in poverty, the number of individuals enrolled in basic education. A population estimate is included to control for differences in state populations.

To supplement the regression analyses, marginal effects are plotted, permitting the comparison of the number of program recipients in states with core (incumbent-aligned governors) or opposition (opposition-aligned governors) states over increases in incumbent support with other variables held at mean values. The influence of close contests on program distribution is evaluated by examining the slope of the marginal effect plot. Negative slopes show support for close races, while positive slopes show support in landslide contests. Like the regression analyses, marginal effects analyses are considered over time to understand the overall effect of program targeting on the number of recipients in incumbent- and opposition-aligned states.

Assessment of targeting strategy is best conducted at the district level. As the lowest level of decentralization in national-level government, it provides the largest set of observations and richest data for analysis of the effects of the party system on program outcomes. Cases evaluating targeting strategy in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico examine data at lower levels (Giovagnoli 2005; De La O Torres 2013; Luna and Mardones 2010; Takahashi 2007). Limitations in Venezuela on availability of data at the district level require analysis at the state level. Analysis of targeting strategy in Brazil is conducted at the district level, which is also the state level. Despite the Venezuelan data limitation, the level of aggregation matches, and provides continuity of analysis between the two cases. Summary statistics for the state-level data are reported for Brazil and Venezuela in Tables 4 and 5.

Table 4. Summary Statistics for "Targeting" Data - Brazil

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Log of Number of Bolsa Família Recipients 2010	27	12.625	1.033	10.650	14.324
Log of Number of Bolsa Família Recipients 2006	27	12.281	1.291	8.066	14.146
Log of Number of Bolsa Família Recipients 2004	27	11.869	1.177	9.236	13.640
Share of Population registered in the *Cadastro Único* 2010	27	0.134	0.109	0.021	0.641
Share of Population Registered in the *Cadastro Único* 2006	27	0.092	0.036	0.036	0.154
Share of Population, Families Living in Poverty (IPEA) 2004	27	0.084	0.073	0.013	0.411
Share Students Enrolled in Primary Education 2010	27	0.048	0.006	0.038	0.059
Share Students Enrolled in Primary Education 2006	27	0.040	0.006	0.031	0.050
Share Students Enrolled in Primary Education 2004	27	0.036	0.007	0.025	0.048
Log Population Estimate 2010	27	15.255	1.065	13.020	17.535
Log Population Estimate 2006	27	15.217	1.084	12.908	17.530
Log Population Estimate 2004	27	15.181	1.098	12.853	17.500
PT Coalition Governor Vote 2010	27	0.519	0.189	0.182	0.956
PT Coalition Governor Vote 2006	27	0.280	0.222	0.000	0.629
PT Coalition Governor /Vote 2004	27	0.290	0.174	0.000	0.636
Governor 2010	27	0.593	0.501	0	1
Governor 2004	27	0.185	0.396	0	1
Lula Vote 2002	27	0.453	0.055	0.286	0.566
Lula Vote 2006	27	0.509	0.145	0.262	0.781
Dilma Vote 2007	27	0.475	0.120	0.239	0.706

Table 5. Summary Statistics for "Targeting" Data - Venezuela

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Log of Number of Sucre Becas 2010	24	7.555	0.733	6.078	8.748
Log of Number of Sucre Becas 2007	24	7.954	0.751	5.991	8.927
Log of Number of Sucre Becas 2004	24	8.079	0.756	6.142	9.029
Log of Number of Ribas Becas 2004	24	3.978	0.609	2.890	4.970
Log of Number of Aldeas 2010	24	4.171	0.701	2.833	5.030
Log of Number of Aldeas 2007	24	8.532	1.005	5.935	9.951
Governor 2010	24	0.583	0.504	0	1
Governor 2007	24	0.875	0.338	0	1
Governor 2004	24	0.750	0.442	0	1
Share PSUV Seats Assembly Election	24	0.025	0.010	0.006	0.043
Share Yes Constitutional Proposition A	24	0.529	0.072	0.427	0.658
Share Yes Constitutional Proposition B	24	0.523	0.068	0.425	0.627
PSUV Governor Vote 2008	23	0.544	0.072	0.418	0.735
Chávez Coalition Governor Vote 2004	23	0.600	0.094	0.435	0.785
Recall Referendum 2004 (no)	24	0.618	0.073	0.500	0.729
Share Chávez President 2006	24	0.664	0.081	0.511	0.802
Share Chávez Presidential Vote 2000	24	0.611	0.063	0.472	0.739
Share Individuals Living In Poverty 2010	24	0.332	0.090	0.135	0.478
Share Individuals Living In Poverty 2007	24	0.329	0.090	0.135	0.538
Share Individuals Living In Poverty 2004	24	0.546	0.114	0.305	0.732
Share Students Enrolled in Secondary and Vocational Education 2010	24	0.023	0.002	0.018	0.027
Share Students Enrolled in Secondary and Vocational Education 2007	24	0.026	0.002	0.022	0.030
Share Students Enrolled in Secondary and Vocational Education 2004	24	0.022	0.002	0.017	0.027
Secondary and Vocational Schools 2010	24	230.125	139.355	38.000	626.000
Secondary and Vocational Schools 2007	24	168.208	116.583	20.000	465.000
Log of Population Estimate 2010	24	13.707	0.832	11.942	15.156
Log of Population Estimate 2007	24	13.656	0.838	11.865	15.102
Log of Population Estimate 2004	24	13.601	0.845	11.781	15.045

Operationalization choices and expected relationships are described below.

3.2.1 Dependent Variable – Program Distribution

The dependent variable, program distribution, shows the amount that programs are made available to constituencies on a statewide basis. The distribution reveals whether program design has political determinants (parochial), or demographic ones (programmatic). In Brazil, distributions are expected to be unaffected by political factors. In Venezuela, they are expected to be dependent on the partisanship of governors and the amount of electoral support.

Program distributions for both programs in 2004, 2006 (Brazil), 2007 (Venezuela), and 2010 are examined. Participation rates are made available by government ministries that manage the programs, including Venezuela's *Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educación Universitaria,* and the *Fundación Misión Sucre*, and the third party report by D'Elia (2006) and by Penfold-Becerra (2005) for *Misión Ribas*. In Brazil, the measures are provided by the *Ministerio do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome*. Program participation is measured as a log count statistic in order to accommodate the normality assumptions of the model, but the figure is converted back to a count statistic to facilitate marginal effects analysis.

3.2.2 Independent Variable – Political Support

The independent variable, political support, is expected to determine the program distributions in parochial strategies. It is coded two ways, allowing for analysis of targeting according to core and swing support and closeness of electoral margins. Coding according to the alignment of incumbent governors allows for assessment of program targeting toward areas of core and opposition support. This is conducted by evaluating the partisan or coalition status of governors in

each country. Governors are coded according to whether they are affiliated with the government or opposition.[5] Coding decisions for relevant periods are displayed in Tables 6 and 7 for Brazil and Venezuela.

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[5] Coding choices are made according to criteria both Table 1 and 2 above for Brazil and Venezuela, respectively, including the coalition structure described during Lula's presidency in Cheibub Figueiredo (2007) and alignments cited in Crisp (2000), Ellner (2008), and Lyne (2008).

Table 6. Brazil Governors and Coding

State	Governor pre-2010	Party	Year	2006	Previous Governor During *Bolsa Família*	Party	Year	2004
Acre	Binho Marques	PT	2007-2010	1	Jorge Viana	PT	1999-2007	1
Alagoas	Lessa	PDT	1999-2006	0				0
Amapá	Pedro Paulo Dias	PP	2003-2010	0				0
Amazonas	Carlos Braga	PMDB	2003-2010	1				0
Bahia	Paolo Souto	PFL	2003-2007	0				0
Ceará	Lúcio Alcântara	PR	2003-2007	0				0
Distrito Federal	José Roberto Arruda	PT	2007-2010	0	Joaquim Roriz	PSC	2003-2006	0
Espírito Santo	Paulo Hartung	PMDB	2003-2010	1				0
Goiás	Alcides Filho	PP	2006-2010	0				0
Maranão	Jackson Lago	PDT	2007-2009	0				0
Mato Grosso	Blairo Maggi	PR	2003-2010	0				0
Mato Grosso do Sul	José dos Santos "Zeca do PT"	PT	1999-2006	1				1
Minas Gerais	Aécio Neves	PSDB	2003-2010	0				0
Pará	Ana Júlia Carepa	PT	2007-2010	1				1
Paraiba	Cássio Cunha Lima	PSDB	2007-2009	0				0
Pernambuco	Eduardo Campos	PSB	2007-2010	1	Jarbas Vasconcelos	PMDB	2003-2006	0
Piauí	Wellington Dias	PT	2003-2010	1				1
Paraná	Roberto Requião	PMDB	2003-2010	1				0
Rio de Janeiro	Sérgio Filho	PMDB	2007-2010	0	Rosinha Garotinho	PR	2003-2006	0
Rio Grande do Norte	Wilma de Faria	PSB	2003-2010	1				1
Rondônia	Ivo Cassol	PSDB/ PPS	2003-2010	0				0
Roraima	José de Ancieta Júnior	PSDB	2007-2010	0	Ottomar Pinto	PSDB	2004-2007	0
Rio Grande do Sul	Yeda Crusius	PSDB	2007-2010	0				0
Santa Catarina	Luiz Henrique da Silveira	PMDB	2003-2010	1				0
São Paulo	José Serra	PSDB	2007-2010	0	Alckmin	PSDB	2003-2007	0
Sergipe	Marcelo Déda	PT	2007-2010	0	João Filho	DEM	2003-2007	0
Tocantins	Marcelo Miranda	PMDB	2003-2009	1				0

1= Party of President or coalition member in particular year.

0 = Opposition-aligned Party (Freitas 2012).

Table 7. Venezuela Governors and Coding

State	Governor Current	Party	When elected	2010	Governor pre-2010	Party	Year	2007	Previous Governor During *Misiones*	Party	Year	2004
Amazonas	Liborio Guarulla	MAS/ Causa R/ PPT	2010	0	Liborio Guarulla	MAS/ Causa R/ PPT	2001-2014	0				1
Anzoátegui	Tarek William Saab	MVR/ PSUV	2008	0	Tarek William Saab	MVR/ PSUV	2004-2012	0				1
Apure	Jesús Aguilarte Gómez	MVR/ PPT/ PODEMOS/ PSUV	2011	0	Jesús Aguilarte Gómez	MVR/ PPT/ PODEMOS/ PSUV	2004-2011	0	Luis Lippa	AD	2000-2004	0
Aragua	Rafael Isea	PSUV	2008	1	Didalco Bolívar	MAS/ MVR/ PODEMOS	2000-2008	1				1
Barinas	Adán Chávez	PSUV	2008	1	Hugo de los Reyes Chávez	MVR/ MAS/ PODEMOS/ PPT	1998-2008	1				1
Bolívar	Francisco Rangel Gómez	MVR/ PODEMOS/ PCV/ PSUV	2008	0	Francisco Rangel Gómez	MVR/ PODEMOS/ PCV/ PSUV	2004-2008	0	Antonio Rojas Suárez	MVR/ MAS/ Bandera Roja	2000-2004	1
Carabobo	Henrique Salas Feo	Proyecto Venezuela	2008	0	Luis Felipe Acosta Carlez	MVR	2004-2008	0	Henrique Salas Feo	Proyecto Venezuela	1995-2004	1
Cojedes	Teodoro Bolivar	PSUV	2008	1	Jhonny Yánez Rangel	MAS / PCV / MVR / PODEMOS	2000-2008	1				1
Delta Amacuro	Lizeta Hernández Abchi	PSUV	2008	1	Yelitze Santaella	MAS / MIO / PCV / MIGENTE / MVR / PASR	2000-2008	1				1
Distrito Capital	Antonío Ledezma	Alianza Bravo Pueblo	2008	0	Juan Bareto	MVR	2000-2004	0	Alfredo Peña	MVR		1
Falcón	Stella Lugo de Montilla	PSUV	2008	1	Jesús Montilla	PCV / MAS / MVR	2000-2008	1				1
Guárico	Luis Enrique Gallardo	PSUV	2010	1	Eduardo Manuitt	PCV / MAS / MVR / PODEMOS / PPT	2000-2010	1				1
Lara	Henri Falcón	PPT / REF / PSUV	2008	0	Luis Reyes	PCV / OFM / MVR / IPCN / PPT	2000-2008	0				1
Mérida	Marcos Díaz	PSUV	2008	1	Florencio Porras	MVR / MAS / PODEMOS / PPT	2000-2008	1				1
Miranda	Henrique Capriles Radonski	Primero Justicia	2008	0	Diosdado Cabello	MVR	2004-2008	0	Enrique Mendoza	COPEI	1995-2004	0
Monagas	José Briceño	MVR / PSUV	2008	1	José Briceño	MVR / PSUV	2004-2012	1	Guillermo Call	AD	2000-2004	0
Nueva Esparta	Morel Rodríguez Ávila	AD	2008	0	Morel Rodríguez Ávila	AD	2004-2008	0	Alexis Navarro Rojas	NGI / MAS / MVR	2000-2004	1
Portuguesa	Wilmar Soteldo	PSUV	2008	1	Antonia Muñoz	MVR / PCV / PPT	2000-2008	1				1
Sucre	Enrique José Maestre	PSUV	2008	0	Ramón Martínez	Causa R / MAS / MVR / PODEMOS	2000-2008	0				1
Táchira	Cesar Pérez Vivas	COPEI	2008	0	Ronald Blanco	MVR	2000-2008	0				1
Trujillo	Hugo Cabezas Bracamonte	PSUV	2008	1	Gilmer Viloria	MVR / MAS /PCV / PODEMOS / PPT	2000-2008	1				1
Vargas	Jorge Luis García Carneiro	PSUV	2008	1	Antonio Rodríguez San Juan	MVR / MAS / PODEMOS / MEP	2000-2008	1				1
Yaracuy	Julio César León Heredia	PSUV	2008	1	Carlos Giménez	MVR / PPT / PODEMOS	2004-2008	1	Eduardo Lapi	Convergencia / COPEI / LAPY	1998-2004	0
Zulia	Pablo Pérez Álvarez	UNT / AD	2008	0	Manual Rosales	AD	2000-2008	0				0

Coding according to the share of votes received allows for analysis of whether programs targeted close elections. This is conducted by measuring the vote share of Chávez- and Lula-aligned candidates in governor, president, and special elections held in Venezuela during this period. It allows for the investigation of the relationship between candidate support in the state and the distribution of resources.

3.2.3   Independent Variable – Program Factors

The independent variables measuring whether programmatic targeting factors determine the distribution of program participants include: the number of individuals living in poverty and the number of individuals enrolled in education programs within each state. These are measured as count statistics in order to facilitate marginal effects analysis. A statewide measure of the number of individuals living in poverty is compiled from national statistics institute population estimates for given years, and in Brazil, the *Cadastro Único* registry where available. Poverty should be expected to determine the distribution of program participants, since it is a component of targeting criteria.

As these programs under analysis each focus on education, a statewide measure of the number of individuals enrolled in education programs provides an annual estimate of state populations that should determine the distribution of benefits. For Brazil, a basic education enrollment figure is utilized to assess how the youth attendance criteria affected program distribution. For Venezuela, as *Sucre* and *Ribas* are intended to reach individuals seeking secondary and postsecondary education, a measure of secondary and vocational enrollment is utilized to assess how program needs within each state.

3.2.4   Control Variables

As participation and program-relevant demographic factors are measured as count statistics in the models. A population estimate is included to control for differences in state populations, weighting the model for these count statistics.

3.2.5   Marginal Effects Analysis

Marginal effects analysis is conducted to compare the number of program recipients in states with core (incumbent-aligned governors) or opposition (opposition-aligned governors) states over increases in incumbent support with other variables held at mean values. The slope of the marginal effect plots illustrates the influence of close contests on program distribution. Negative slopes show support for close races, while positive slopes show support in landslide contests.

These participation rates are evaluated according to, as explained in the theory, whether programs seek to boost turnout among core or swing voters as part of the strategy employed in their selective distribution, or whether programs are distributed evenly, avoiding a selective distribution of resources. Programs that are distributed toward leadership-aligned territories form a core voter strategy, while those oriented toward opposition-aligned territories form part of an opposition targeting voter strategy. Programs that are distributed evenly boost turnout among all recipients. This chapter now turns to assessment of bias and reliability of the data employed to answer the research question.

3.3   METHOD FOR COMPARING POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF POLICY

CHOICE

Case study analysis of Brazil and Venezuela proceeds in Chapter 5, first with an illustration of the independent variable – partisan powers – and then for the dependent variable – program politicization – across both countries. This allows for detail of variation across the criteria specified for each variable to show how the theory explains different political targeting outcomes. The case studies examine the effect of partisan powers on the process of program design: the cases focus specifically on how horizontal accountability affects the moderation of program design and the integration of reform elements into the programs. They explore the effects of competitive political systems on the integration of reforms, showing how opposition policy preferences are (or fail to be) integrated into targeted programs. This shows the effect of horizontal accountability: where the political system is competitive, programs are moderated by opposition preferences, integrating more reform elements into programs. Where the political system is uncompetitive, programs are not moderated by opposition preferences, integrating fewer reform elements into programs. To assess the variation created by this effect, most similar cases must be examined.

3.3.1   Method

For theoretical development and case study illustration of the theory, this project utilizes a research design that compares what Przeworski and Teune (1970) term "most similar" cases from a set of four countries. Each of these country cases: is geographically situated within the Latin American region; is of middle to low per capita income; has a presidential system; has high

levels of informal sector populations (see estimates in Chapter 1) or unemployed to mobilize; and had leaders that have been described as having leftist ideological preferences (Forero 2003; Jordan 2003). This controls for variation in ideological orientation, regional economic history, presence of executive-legislative interactions, and of a coalition of low-income population to mobilized through social policy.

The variation occurs on the independent variable, where horizontal accountability differs for the presidents, shown through different levels of partisan power. Popular presidents that were elected with relatively margins of victory, encountered different configurations of parties in the legislature and institutionalized competition in a stable party system. This generates expected differences on the dependent variable, as countries with greater horizontal accountability should have policies moderated through the influence of the opposition, incorporating more reform elements into the their design. Less moderated programs with fewer reform elements incorporated into design is expected in countries with weaker horizontal accountability.

The project utilizes George and Bennett's (2005) method of structured, focused comparison to guide the cases along its research question to reflect the goals of my study. This enables standardization of data collection and ensures systematic comparison of the cases. The research is structured diachronically, that is, tracing the periods of political activity both before and during the determination of social spending policy as well as the distributional outcomes as the programs are administered (Dogan and Pelassy 1990).

3.3.2 Case Study Structure

The Brazil and Venezuelan case studies are designed to illustrate the model in Chapter 2. The cases proceed through the political determinants of policy design, describing executive and

legislative characteristics. They then continue with description of policy design and administration, followed by analysis of the program. The degree to which program design reflects the political goals of leaders is analyzed through bivariate analysis, allowing use of the state-by-state data releases by the ministries providing oversight.

Analysis of executive-legislative relations provides an assessment of how competitiveness of both governmental branches affects targeted social program design. In Brazil, greater horizontal accountability through a more competitive system that provided institutional checks resulted in programs moderated by the opposition, incorporating more reform elements. In Venezuela, less horizontal accountability through an uncompetitive system that provided fewer institutional checks, which resulted in programs there were not moderated by the political opposition, and incorporated fewer reform elements into policy design.

Examining the constitutional and partisan powers of the president provides an assessment of horizontal accountability. Executive decree authority is described along with three components of partisan powers including: executive powers and margin of victory, parties in the legislature, and party system stability. This study utilizes government electoral data, third-party, and academic reports on the executive, the legislature, and the context of the party systems within each country to analyze the partisan and constitutional powers. In Brazil, despite strong decree powers, the executive is limited by weak partisan powers that limit their ability to enact an agenda. In Venezuela, despite weak decree powers, the executive is able to enact their agenda due to strong partisan powers.

Multiparty systems – those that are more competitive – result in more moderated programs, as they limit the partisan power of the president. The degree of reform orientation of the legislature depends on the nature of political competition: competitive political systems

provide result in increased reform orientation, while majority politics result in limited reform orientation. The measurement of Effective Number of Parties is utilized to show the degree of party system stability, calculated according to shares of votes received by each party, and by shares of seats each party controls in parliament. This and other electoral data is collected from government electoral authorities to show how party systems consolidate or break down over time.

The degree to which opposing groups moderate programs is shown by the integration of reform elements into program design. These are context-specific for each program, but key to these targeted programs is the degree to which oversight is incorporated into program design. Moderation is examined by comparing how policy design reflects the preferences of government and opposition actors. To do this, the positions from government members and opposition politicians and policy organizations on targeted redistributed programs are detailed. This allows analysis of changes to programs that could have been made, if institutional effect detailed above had not determined the outcome.

Together the analysis of the cases is intended to present an illustration of the theory above and explain the variation in politicization found in the results of the model. Program politicization varies by the degree to which horizontal accountability limits their design and administration to programmatic outcomes.

3.4   MEASURING THE ELECTORAL EFFECT OF TARGETED SOCIAL PROGRAMS

A second set of tests examines the electoral payoff of program targeting. These tests replicate and extend a statistical model previously published by Bohn (2011), which uses individual-level LAPOP data employed by the author and the corresponding Venezuelan survey data. Bohn's model examines the influence of social programs on vote choice over time, including other controls such as: income, gender, age, education level, and regional geographic location.

This study builds on the Bohn model by replicating the analysis on vote choice of the influence of *Bolsa Família* in Brazil and extends analysis to examine the influence of the *Misiones* in Venezuela. It also examines multiplicative interaction models for each relationship, allowing for a baseline analysis of non-recipient probability of support for Lula and Chávez and to assess the importance of each factor – income and education – on program choice. This provides more substantive analysis examining the marginal effect of increases in values of key variables, while holding others at their means, and by comparing the probability of recipient support against that of non-recipients in each contest.

3.4.1 Model Justification

The final empirical test of this study examines the political effect of program design. Targeted programs are expected to have electoral payoffs, though programmatic and parochial distributive strategies are expected to differ in the amount. Previous research into the electoral effect of *Bolsa Família* and the *Misiones* suggests that both leaders benefitted from the introduction of the social

programs. The extent to which they benefitted has played out in debate in Brazil and has been examined only indirectly in Venezuela.

3.4.1.1 Brazil

The size of the electoral effect of *Bolsa Família* has been subject to debate in recent literature on the social program. Hunter and Power suggested an effect for *Bolsa Família* in their analysis of the 2006 election, as absolute poverty declined following targeted social program intervention (Hunter and Power 2008). With an average family size of 4.1, a basic estimate of the 11.1 million families meant that Bolsa Família covered approximately one quarter of the population. With Lula winning in long-held opposition states and an increased level of turnout, the President's success can largely be attributed to the delivery of the social program (Hunter & Power, 2008, 19-20). Nicolau and Peixoto corroborate a positive effect of Bolsa Família on vote choice (Nicolau and Peixoto 2007). Soares and Terron explore the expanded electoral geography resulting from *Bolsa Família*, with the positive effect of program participation increasing votes for Lula in municipalities in the poor Northeast, shifting from his 2002 base of cities (G. A. D. Soares and Terron 2008). The geographical transition is corroborated by Zucco (2008) but the Bolsa Família effect is not distinguishable from a pro-government voting pattern, as the author argues that the tendency in poorer areas to vote in favor of the incumbent holds over the four previous elections as well.

Using individual-level data from the 2008 AmericasBarometer, Licio, Renno and Castro (2009) find that *Bolsa Família* had a positive effect on voter support and public opinion of Lula. Bohn, however, compares the effect in 2006 to the effect the program would have had on 2002 supporters and argues that the program effect was diminished because Lula had already captured this coalition of supporters in 2002. Bohn claims that *Bolsa Família* recipients were already Lula

voters in 2002 – and that by 2006 there was no statistically significant difference in the probability of voting for Lula for beneficiaries or non-beneficiaries (Bohn 2011, 74). According to Bohn's analysis, at the individual level the effect of the program on vote choice was weaker in the 2006 election than other characteristics that comprised the electorate compared to 2002 because the *Bolsa Família* voter was already a Lula supporter.

Zucco and Power call this conclusion (as well as the use of recall data- see Chapter 3) into question by revealing a significant effect of *Bolsa Família* on the probability of a 2006 vote for Lula in their attempt to replicate Bohn's results (Zucco and Power 2012). This significant effect is corroborated in the model replication below. In claiming the effect on the probability of Lula vote choice, the authors underline the importance of analyzing marginal effects, but do not conduct the analysis in the paper. A marginal effects analysis contributes a substantive examination of the findings, exploring the difference between recipient and non-recipient vote choice among low-income and low education voters. Evaluating the effect of program participation on the probability of political support across respondent values of income and education allows assessment of program participation effects on the probability of voting for Lula according to factors relevant to targeting. This is key, since Zucco and Power suggest that this probability should increase as the program drew in more supporters, generating a demographic shift in support toward Lula among the poor. Analyzing the marginal effect of program participation at low-income levels between the two elections can determine whether the probability of voting for Lula increased after the program was introduced.

3.4.1.2 Venezuela

Problems relating to the availability of recipient data may be one reason that the effect on vote choice of the Misiones has been understudied. None of the major examinations of the

mobilization elements present in the *Misiones* examine the effect of the programs on vote choice (Ellner 2009; Hawkins 2010a, 2010b; Penfold-Becerra 2008). Hawkins considers voter issue salience, but not program participation (Hawkins, 2010b, 115-7; 120-3). The most recent study on voter behavior (Lupu 2010) does not model for the Misión participation, instead focusing on modeling class voting. Despite the absence of a direct modeling of the relationship, indications exist in previous research that an electoral effect was part of the calculus of program design.

Penfold-Becerra (2008) finds that allocation of the programs *Barrio Adentro*, *Robinson*, *Ribas*, and *Mercal* occurred according to differing political rationales. *Barrio Adentro* and Ribas were allocated to areas with incumbent opposition leaders, while *Robinson* and *Mercal* were allocated to areas with incumbent government leaders (Penfold-Becerra, 2008, 77). Hawkins presents evidence that the profile of education *Misión* recipients contrasts with the distribution of Mercal stores, which more heavily favored supporters (Hawkins, 2010b, 221-2).

An electoral effect may be a result of self-selection of partisans into the programs, but is less important for the education *Misiones* than for others. Hawkins shows that highest levels of affect for Chávez increase the probability of participation in the food market *Misión Mercal* and medical *Misión Barrio Adentro* (to 60 percent and 80 respectively), and the programs were made available in a manner that permitted any interested individual to utilize the program. These programs, though intended to reach the poor, had open-door policies that resulted in no screening or rejecting applicants (Hawkins, 2010b, 221).

The expected probabilities presented for the education *Misiones* were much lower compared to these other programs. The highest levels of affect reaching a probability of participating stood at nearly 20 percent in *Ribas* and *Sucre* and less than 10 percent for *Robinson* (Hawkins, 2010a, 59). As identified in Chapter 1, these programs had at least nominal barriers to

participation, including income and family status. Factors other than affect could determine participation.

The difference in self-selection suggests that estimating the electoral effect of the education *Misiones* is subject to less of an endogeneity problem since not only Chávez supporters participated in the programs. With fewer individuals joining the education programs based on support of Chávez, the chances of merely capturing Chavista support when modeling the effect of program participation on the probability of voting for Chávez is reduced.

In short, for Venezuela, the there has been limited assessment of program effects, requiring a detailed analysis of the effect of program participation on the probability of vote choice. The studies identified here suggest a positive correlation of *Misión* distribution and politicization among recipients. Extension of the Bohn panel analysis to the 2007 LAPOP Venezuela survey provides a direct measurement of the electoral effect of the Misiones. Analysis of this and the Brazil model proceeds below.

3.4.2   Model Summary

Recently, Zucco and Power have raised concerns about three issues associated with the methodological choices made by Bohn, including: validity issues associated with relying on memory recall from 2002 and 2006 elections in the 2007 survey, replication of coding, and the calculation and interpretation of marginal effects (Zucco and Power 2012). In light of these concerns, tradeoffs in model specification choices will be discussed in the sections below. Detailed discussion of the recall data issue will be covered at the end of the chapter in the section on threats to validity.

Key to the analysis of the effects is assessing how the direction of targeted social program spending affected voter behavior. Summary statistics are reported in Tables 8 and 9.

Table 8. Summary Statistics for "Electoral Support" Data - Brazil

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std Dev.	Min	Max
Vote Lula 2002	570	0.753	0.432	0	1
Vote Lula 2006	942	0.723	0.448	0	1
Gender	1214	0.495	0.500	0	1
Age	1212	2.932	1.583	1	6
Income	1032	1.424	0.722	1	4
Education Level	1214	2.503	0.722	1	4
Sul	1214	0.152	0.359	0	1
Centro Oeste	1214	0.079	0.270	0	1
Nordeste	1214	0.271	0.445	0	1
Norte	1214	0.058	0.233	0	1
Bolsa Família Recipient	1209	1.108	0.311	1	2
Bolsa Família *Income Interaction	1028	1.550	0.820	1	8
Bolsa Família * Edlevel Interaction	1209	2.737	0.958	1	8

Table 9. Summary Statistics for "Electoral Support" Data - Venezuela

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std Dev.	Min	Max
Vote Chavez 2006	984	0.755	0.430	0	1
Vote Deputy 2005	373	0.850	0.358	0	1
Gender	1510	0.501	0.500	0	1
Age	1510	2.564	1.240	1	5
Income	1270	2.541	0.997	1	4
Education Level	1509	1.993	0.735	0	3
Zuliana	1510	0.167	0.373	0	1
Occidental	1510	0.103	0.304	0	1
Centro Occidental	1510	0.252	0.434	0	1
Oriental	1510	0.176	0.381	0	1
Los Llanos	1510	0.106	0.308	0	1
Misión Recipient	1493	1.798	0.402	1	2
Education *Misión* Recipient	1480	1.167	0.373	1	2
Misión*Edlevel interaction	1492	3.552	1.517	0	6
Mision*Income interaction	1260	4.566	1.991	1	8
Education *Misión**Edlevel interaction	1479	2.335	1.142	0	6
Education *Misión**Income interaction	1249	2.944	1.425	1	8

   Key: Age: 1 = 16–24; 2 = 25–34; 3 = 35–44; 4 = 45–59; 5 = >59; education: 1 = illiterate; 2 = up to eighth grade, 3 = high school, 4 = college. Income is coded in Brazilian model: 1 = up to two minimum wages (MW); 2 = 2.1–5 MW; 3 = 5–10 MW; 4 = 10–20 MW; 5 = 20= MW. Income is coded in the Venezuelan model: 1 = 1/2 MW; 2 = .51-1 MW; 3 = 1.1-2 MW; 4 = 2.1-4 MW; 5 > 4 MW.

Operationalization choices and expected relationships are described below.

3.4.3   Dependent Variable – Vote Choice

The dependent variable, vote choice, is the reported vote of the respondent; in the probit models, the probability of vote choice is analyzed. The goal of the models is to reveal whether countries have differential impacts on vote choice, based on institutional differences. It is expected that in Brazil the programmatic distributive strategy has a lower impact on the probability of vote choice than the parochial strategy in Venezuela.

Analysis of the probability of vote choice is based on utilizing the questions about prior voting behavior in the 2007 survey in the form of a panel study. In the 2007 Brazil survey, questions are asked about the 2002 and 2006 second round vote for president. In the 2007 Venezuela survey, questions are asked about the 2005 legislative elections and the 2006 vote for president. This allows for a panel analysis of participant political support over time.

3.4.3.1 Coding Choices

Coding is conducted to measure whether respondents reported voting for the incumbent, which is expected to be conditional on receiving the program. This is accomplished by coding reported votes for Lula and Chavez as 1 and other valid responses as 0.

Coding for the presidential elections in Brazil requires careful consideration of which participants offer a valid answer to the question. A problem encountered in replicating the models Bohn employs in her analysis of 2002 and 2006 vote choice is that the author does not specify how the dependent variable is coded. Coding choices for *Bolsa Família* are examined in Table 10 below. Responses for Lula (or PT) are coded 1, Alckmin (or PSDB), are coded 0. For

this project, responses of "no one" (nenhum) or "other" (outro) are coded 0 as non-Lula votes in

both presidential elections, since both involve casting a vote.

Table 10. Dependent Variable Coding, Brazil 2002/06

		Bohn (Author's best estimate)		Zucco & Power		Belasco Coding Choices	
BRA VB4 (2006 2nd Round)		Valid?	How Coded	Valid?	How Coded	Valid?	How Coded
Lula	678	Valid	Coded as 1	Valid	Coded as 1	Valid	Coded as 1
PT	3	Valid	Coded as 1	Valid	Coded as 1	Valid	Coded as 1
Alckmin	210	Valid	Coded as 0	Valid	Coded as 0	Valid	Coded as 0
PSDB	2	Valid	Coded as 0	Valid	Coded as 0	Valid	Coded as 0
Nenhum (branco/nulo)	37	Valid	Coded as 0	Valid	Coded as 0	Valid	Coded as 0
Não Lembra	42	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded
Outro	12	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	Valid	Coded as 0
NR	21	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded
Não V otou	207	Valid	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded
Missing in File	2	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded
Lula Votes			681		681		681
Nonvotes			468		249		261
Share Lula			59.3%		73.2%		72.2%
Share Nonvotes			40.7%		26.8%		27.8%

Total

					How		
VOL3A (2002 2nd Round)		Valid?	How Coded	Valid?	Coded	Valid?	How Coded
Lula	429	Valid	Coded as 1	Valid	Coded as 1	Valid	Coded as 1
Serra	120	Valid	Coded as 0	Valid	Coded as 0	Valid	Coded as 0
Nenhum (branco/nulo)	13	Valid	Coded as 0	Valid	Coded as 0	Valid	Coded as 0
Não Lembro	272	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded
Não V otou	2	Valid	Coded as 0	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded
Outro	8	Valid	Coded as 0	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	Valid	Coded as 0
Missing in File	370	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded	No/ Bad information	Not Coded
Lula Votes			429		429		429
Nonvotes			143		133		141
Share Lula			75.0%		76.3%		75.3%
Share Nonvotes			25.0%		23.7%		24.7%

Table 10 includes a liberal estimate of Bohn's coding choices – adding abstention to nonvotes – in addition to Zucco and Power's choices (Zucco and Power 2012). All possible coding outcomes, including coding abstention as 0, result in a significant and positive effect for *Bolsa Família* participants on the probability of voting for Lula in probit models. This suggests that there may be an error in the coding decision on which Bohn bases her conclusions.

For the presidential election questions, responses for voting for Chávez or Lula are coded 1, and responses for opposition votes or nonvotes are coded 0. Utilizing the listing of party endorsements for Chávez and opposition candidates found within the survey, the responses to the legislative elections voting question are recoded into 0 for opposition parties or nonvotes and 1 for Chávez-aligned parties. Coding for Chávez-aligned parties is displayed in Table 11.

Table 11. Dependent Variable Coding, Venezuela 2005/06

VB 3 (2006 Presidential Vote)		Valid?	How Coded
Chávez	743	Valid	Coded as 1
Rosales	194	Valid	Coded as 0
Ninguno	10	Valid	Coded as 0
Otro	37	Valid	Coded as 0
Missing in File	526	No/ Bad information	Not Coded

Chávez Votes	743
Nonvotes	241
Share Chávez	75.5%
Share Nonvotes	24.5%

VB 7 (2005 Deputy Vote)		Valid?	How Coded
Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su	5	No/ Bad information	Not Coded
Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR)	279	Valid	Coded as 1
Partido Patria Para Todos (PPT)	11	Valid	Coded as 1
PODEMOS	12	Valid	Coded as 1
Unidad Popular Venezolana (UPV)	3	Valid	Coded as 1
MIGATO (Movimiento Independiente Ganamos Todos)	2	Valid	Coded as 1
CMR (Clase Media Revolucionaria)	1	Valid	Coded as 1
PCV (Partido Comunista Venezolano)	4	Valid	Coded as 1
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupamaro	2	Valid	Coded as 1
Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV)	3	Valid	Coded as 1
UNT (Un Nuevo Tiempo)	32	Valid	Coded as 0
Primero Justicia (PJ)	14	Valid	Coded as 0
Acción Democrática (AD)	3	Valid	Coded as 0
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)	1	Valid	Coded as 0
Un solo Pueblo	1	Valid	Coded as 0
Otro	10	No/ Bad information	Not Coded
Missing	1127	No/ Bad information	Not Coded

Chávez Votes	317
Nonvotes	51
Share Chávez	86.1%
Share Nonvotes	13.9%

The parties coded with "1" were referred to as the *Polo Patriótico*, which endorsed Chávez in the 2006 presidential contest, representing an alignment of "new" and old left parties. These coding choices were used in the Assembly elections of 2005 and the presidential elections of 2006 (Ellner 2008; Lacruz 2006; Lyne 2008; Mundo 2009).

3.4.4   Independent Variable of Principal Interest– Program Participation

Program participation is inquired of individuals in each of the LAPOP surveys. In Venezuela, the education *Misión* participation is aggregated from a listing of specific educational *Misiones*. The program participation variable is coded 1 (non-participants) and 2 (participants) in order to facilitate the examination of the multiplicative interaction. Program participation is expected to determine vote choice.

3.4.5   Independent Variables: Controls: Income and Education

Income and education, two targeting criteria for *Bolsa Família* and the education *Misiones* are expected to have a negative effect on the probability of voting for Lula and Chávez, as individuals with lower status are expected to have a higher probability of support. To remain consistent with Bohn's coding, education and incomes are coded categorically.[6] In marginal effects analysis, lower values are expected to be plausible for participating in the antipoverty programs, though this expectation should be relaxed partly for those individuals seeking college education in *Misión Sucre*, as few members of the poor are expected to qualify. In Venezuela, Lupu (2010) suggests

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[6] Education: 1 = illiterate; 2 = up to eighth grade, 3 = high school, 4 = college. Income is coded in Brazilian model: 1 = up to two minimum wages (MW); 2 = 2.1–5 MW; 3 = 5–10 MW; 4 = 10–20 MW; 5 = 20= MW. Income is coded in the Venezuelan model: 1 = 1/2 MW; 2 = .51-1 MW; 3 = 1.1-2 MW; 4 = 2.1-4 MW; 5 > 4 MW.

that Chávez has seen gains among the middle class during his presidency, and this may be revealed in analysis of the *Misiones*.

3.4.6   Interaction Terms – Income and Education with Program Participation

To establish a baseline analysis of whether leaders receive electoral support from the distribution of benefits, measures of income and education are interacted with program participation. This allows conditional analysis including examination of non-recipients: the interactive model shows those that did not participate in the program, providing a baseline analysis for the probability of electoral support for Lula and Chávez. The interaction variable also shows the effect of income and education for only recipients, providing a conditional analysis of each effect compared against non-recipients. This reveals which factor – income or education – is more important to explaining overall vote choice, informing the overall analysis. It is expected that both the income–program participation and education–program participation variables will have a positive effect on the probability of leadership vote choice.

3.4.7   Other Control Variables

In order to reconstruct the Bohn's model, replication of coding is conducted for respondent gender, age, income, education, and regional effects. Together these variables provide baseline predictors of vote choice among populations, taking into account characteristics of voters in the survey. Gender is coded dichotomously (with 1 = male), and in both Brazil and Venezuelan models the expected relationship is that male voters support the leaders. Age is coded

categorically like the other variables in the model.[7] It is anticipated that younger voters support Lula and Chávez.

Regional dummy variables are coded as well. While Bohn does not find that being from any region of Brazil significantly determines voter support of Lula, it remains likely that the Northeast and Southeast are regions that generate support for the president. In Venezuela, survey data suggests that voters in the Andina, Guyana, Los Llanos, Occidental, and Oriental regions are likeliest to support Chávez (Centro Gumilla 2012).

3.4.8   Marginal Effects Analysis

For marginal effects, Zucco and Power acknowledge the recommendations made by King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000) to present data across relevant quantities of interest, though neither they nor Bohn evaluate the effects of recipient status in this manner (Zucco and Power 2012). In this study, marginal effects are estimated and interpreted for *Bolsa Família* and *Misión* recipients and non-recipients across values of interest for key variables, education and income, two important aspects of socioeconomic status that impact class effects vote choice and *Bolsa Família* participation. Marginal effects analysis is also conducted to examine the effects of the multiplicative interaction models to assess non-recipient support and the conditional effect of income and education of program participants on the probability of support for Lula and Chávez.

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[7] Age: 1 = 16–24; 2 = 25–34; 3 = 35–44; 4 = 45–59; 5 = >59.

3.5   BIAS AND RELIABILITY

In this section, potential sources of bias and error are identified, followed by a discussion of how they could affect the findings of this study. They include the reliability of data collected during the 2007 LAPOP wave in Brazil, and limits to conclusions about political targeting based on analysis of data collected at the state level. Efforts to check the reliability of the recall data, and suggestions for future research steps to increase the number of observations are included in the sections below.

3.5.1   Reliability of Recall Data

Zucco and Power suggest in their criticism to abandon analysis on the 2007 LAPOP survey given the distortions they argue are present in the data. Yet for the exercise explored here, examining the effect of Bolsa Família program participation on vote choice, this is only necessary if systematic distortions in the data affect on the probability of Lula support. No attempt is made to gather wider conclusions about a shift in Lula's constituency, as discussed in Bohn (Bohn 2011). The analysis below suggests that abandoning the survey altogether is unnecessary.

Zucco and Power criticize the reliability of responses from 9-10 months after the 2006 election and 5 years after the 2002 election (Zucco and Power 2013, 10). In terms of assessing recall data, the authors report that doing so is "notoriously unreliable," drawing on examples in related disciplines of psychology and economics.[8] The authors also describe civic research that

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[8] Examples from other disciplines include underreporting time out of work by unemployed individuals, age (earliness) at which a parent's child reaches developmental milestones, and party identification (Dex 1995).

acknowledges that reporting bias is nonrandom and favors preferences to demonstrate: civic engagement, a desire to show consistency with behavior at time of recall, and association with successful politicians (Himmelweit, Biberian, and Stockdale 1978; Zucco and Power 2013). Research in reporting bias shows that it occurs in the "socially desirable direction" for political participation (Presser and Traugott 1992; Zucco and Power 2013).

Where should overreporting surface in survey results? Zucco and Power ignore an important caveat of the research: Presser and Traugott acknowledge the likelihood for reporting bias distortions to be stronger for both the better educated and more interested (Presser and Traugott 1992). This is particularly relevant to the analysis of voting behavior for a leftist politician such as Lula, since the tendency to overreport participation is likelier to occur among individuals who do not typically support leftists. Overreporting support for Lula should weaken the effect of Bolsa Família recipients on voters.

Overall response rate in the 2007 LAPOP is biased in support of Lula with estimates of support exceeding the actual electoral and poll results (Zucco and Power 2013). Interpreting the likelihood among those overreporting to be biased in favor of Lula involves reasoning through whether the groups that overreport voting for Lula would have an effect on vote choice. Bias among the interested does not suggest a direction; bias among the among the well-educated should weaken the effect, as those of high socioeconomic status support an alternative to the leftist candidate.

Given the identification of groups that could potentially bias the response, it is important to examine empirically how these factors influence the LAPOP 2007 data. Combining the two effects – underrepresentation of *Bolsa Família* and overreporting Lula votes according to social desirability – should suggest a weaker program effect on vote choice.

Bolsa Família recipient status should generate interest, but program participation rates in the 2007 LAPOP data are considered to be, at most, slightly underrereported compared to the level of coverage at the time (Zucco and Power 2013). The program could demonstrate a smaller effect on vote choice as a result of underrepresentation of the population of recipients.

The effect of social desirability on vote recall could also bias the data, as those who respond incorrectly or misremember tend to be of higher status. This could reduce the effect of program participation on vote choice by exaggerating the effect of income or education on support for Lula. By estimating the probability of support across the values of these variables, potential bias is revealed in education, compared to other surveys, but not income. In Chapter 4, marginal effects analysis of the 2007 LAPOP survey is used to examine this effect on the probability of vote choice. Doing so allows for insight into whether a distortion impacts the data in the survey. The models show a negative effect for income among recipients and non-recipients on the probability of voting for Lula for income. In models where education is interacted with program participation, a positive effect is shown for the probability of support among both recipients and non-recipients, meaning that increases in education level show increases in the probability of Lula support. The education interaction is not significant, showing there is no nonrandom relationship between education and the probability of a Lula vote choice.

Analysis of other survey data conducted at the time (Vox Populi, 2006) by Zucco and Power shows a negative effect of education and income on the probability of voting for Lula (Zucco and Power 2013). Models that examine the interaction of education and program participation show the distortion that Zucco and Power describe, and suggest that modeling the relationship on income is a superior choice.

While overall presidential support in Brazil is biased toward Lula as compared to electoral outcomes, the socioeconomic elements of the survey reflect the political reality of Brazil in 2006. Their effects are corroborated through analysis of other survey data collected at the time and compared in detail within the LAPOP data. The pro-Lula bias should weaken the effect of *Bolsa Família*, and analysis in Chapter 4 reveals that the effect of the program is a significant determinant of vote choice in the 2006 election.

3.5.2   Limitations to Targeting Analysis

Because targeting distributions are made available in state-by-state releases, the evaluation of strategy faces limitations that finer-level evaluations may avoid. Data availability concerns are present, particularly in the Venezuela case where the government does not report on these programs in a regular manner. Because of this limitation the evaluation is conducted for cash transfers for *Misión Sucre* and *Ribas* but not for *Robinson*, where data were unavailable. Even with a reduced number of observations, the distribution is still assessed over 25 states in Venezuela, and 27 in Brazil. This provides an adequate number of observations for the degrees of freedom of the model developed to determine whether the programs reach groups in opposition- or government- aligned territories. Future analysis of the Brazil case could complement the targeting strategy assessment, permitting an examination of additional control effects beyond the demographic controls included in the present analysis.

The reliability and bias problems identified here can threaten the reliability of the analysis. However, the measures that have been taken to ensure that the analysis accurately reflects reality present acceptable solutions to the problems identified here. This chapter now proceeds to an assessment of theoretical validity.

3.6   VALIDITY

As this dissertation offers a novel method to analyze the interaction between the legislature and executive for the introduction of antipoverty policy, as well as how to measure the parochial and programmatic outcomes of such policies, attention must be given to the issue of theoretical validity of the project. The concepts of validity are identified in Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) include: conclusion validity, internal validity, construct validity, and external validity. Each is identified and discussed below.

3.6.1   Conclusion Validity

Conclusion validity examines the presence of a relationship between the variables examined in the analysis. For the quantitative portion of the research, the results of the probit and targeting model analyses will clearly indicate whether there is a nonrandom relationship between the independent variables and the probability of vote choice. For the case study portion, efforts are made to show robustness of the relationship by examining the policy preferences of government and opposition actors to show what shape the programs could have taken, had the effect not been present.

3.6.2   Internal Validity

Internal validity assesses whether there is a causal relationship between the variables identified in the analysis. Steps to ensure internal validity are taken by assessing a range of predictions, including whether an effect exists between the strategies employed and the political outcomes

predicted in cases examined. This is conducted by assessing whether the theoretical predictions are consistent with the outcomes of the statistical model, revealing an effect of program distribution on vote choice. To the extent that the analysis supports the effect in the empirical record in the two country cases analyzed, the author can assert the internal validity of the findings.

3.6.3   Construct Validity

The primary concern introduced in the concept of construct validity is whether it is acceptable to claim that the theoretical constructs are operationalized by the variables in an accurate and fair manner. The variables measuring program participation and vote choice capture the effect under analysis: whether program participation impacts the probability of electoral support for incumbent politicians. Issues of bias are addressed above, but are not concluded to be problematic for analysis. Observed measures would be superior to stated preferences of support, given potential for social desirability bias, but in the context of secret ballot, this is not possible.

Measuring the interaction between the executive and legislative branches includes assessment of: constitutional powers, executive popularity, share of parties in the legislature, coalition structure, and party system stability. These concepts are employed the institutional literature assessing powers of executives and legislatures. The degree of program moderation is subject to how government and opposition political preferences are incorporated into the programs. Since the degree of oversight matters to seriously check clientelism, the measurement is reserved for the targeting model. Here, accounts of serious oversight provide the detail of the outcomes of the political interaction.

Choices regarding operationalization of the targeting model involve measuring political targeting by directly examining political support in states, and whether elected officials are aligned with the incumbent or the opposition. Measuring program oversight involves program-relevant demographic variables, since programs are aimed at alleviating poverty, and increasing educational opportunities for targeted populations. Abstracting to the identification of program distribution strategy, such as: core, opposition, turnout boosting, and support of close races involves assessing the distributions reach these populations. Marginal effects analysis reflects a direct measure of the number of beneficiaries of program targeting according to these political criteria. The concepts identified here are shown in Chapter 2 as developed in the literature.

3.6.4   External Validity

External validity refers to whether the causal effect can be generalized to other cases. Because the project models the interaction between the executive and legislature, the theory developed within this dissertation only applies to presidential systems where targeted social programs are employed. Employing a model of delegation between these two governmental branches, and examining issues of horizontal accountability between the two limits the analysis to states where both institutions are present.

Targeted social policy is defined as those redistributive programs that are selective in their application and that employ a measure to determine eligibility according to criteria specified in advance by policymaking institutions. By establishing criteria, these programs are distinguishable from universalist programs for which all citizens are eligible. Such criteria can include conditions recipients must meet to be initially eligible for, or to remain eligible for social programs, such as a means test, or behavioral requirements such as: child school enrollment and vaccination

requirements (Mkandawire, 2005, 7). The definition of targeted social programs is wider than that of conditional cash transfers (CCTs), which would include both forms of criteria identified above. Some targeted programs do not include the progressive implementation of eligibility criteria such as the ones identified above, and instead focus on whether individuals meet initial eligibility criteria over time.

Based on these two eligibility criteria, lessons from this model are generalizable to nearly all of the 30 countries that employ CCTs, except Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Pakistan, and Yemen, but are not exclusive to these, as other presidential systems employ targeted social programs (Fiszbein et al. 2009; Mkandawire 2005).

3.7   CONCLUSION

This chapter presents a research design to assess the ways that leaders politicize targeted social programs. In doing so, it offers a mixed-methods approach, identifying statistical analysis to assess the degree of the political effect and country cases to assess both the political interactions that result on program design and the nature of political targeting. It introduces data sources, the statistical model employed in Chapter 4, the key components of the case study approach employed in Chapter 5, and the mixed methodology employed in the targeting analysis in Chapter 6. It assesses matters of bias and error and the validity of the theory developed. The project proceeds in Chapters 4-6 by offering an empirical record as defined by the choices made in the current chapter.

4.0   DISTRIBUTIONAL OUTCOMES OF *BOLSA FAMÍLIA* AND THE EDUCATION *MISIONES*

This chapter investigates expenditures and distributional outcomes of Brazil's *Bolsa Família*, and Venezuela's education-oriented *Misiones*. It presents the program design, expenditures, and distribution of program benefits. *Bolsa Família* and the education *Misiones* reveal different expenditure patterns, both in terms of the overall program expenditure and in the distributional outcomes described above. These aspects reveal the degree to which enforcement of a patron-client relationship exists with the programs, offering evidence that the latter is parochial while the former is more programmatic.

Combining oversight, expenditure, and distribution analyses yields the following conclusions about *Bolsa Família* and the education *Misiones*: the variation in distributional patterns in the two programs suggest political factors are more important in Venezuela than in Brazil, where targeting is determined by program inclusion factors such as poverty. *Bolsa Família* reflects a programmatic targeting strategy while the education *Misiones* show a parochial strategy.

In Brazil, this programmatic targeting strategy is revealed through steady increases in expenditures and program enrollment, revealing a moderation in program expenditures reflective of strong program oversight. The distribution of expenditures has been oriented toward turnout boosting over time as rule-based inclusion criteria predominates the effects of electoral considerations when analyzed together. Over the decade, the distributions first show limited

support for opposition-aligned states in 2002, then show peak differences between the two categories in 2006 as the distribution shifts to Lula-aligned states for the rest of the decade. The models provide evidence that inclusion criteria – poverty – is a chief determinant of the program rather than political criteria. This programmatic distribution does not reveal enforcement of a patron-client relationship.

In Venezuela, this parochial targeting strategy is revealed through unsteady expenditure patterns that coincide with initial rollout periods and attempts to reinvigorate flagging programs. The distribution of expenditures varied by program: *Misión Sucre becas* were oriented toward core voters in 2004 and 2007, and in 2010 they reversed to target opposition voters. Sucre *Aldea* targeting favored Chávez-aligned states in nearly all measures in 2007 and 2010. Ribas *beca* distributions favored opposition-aligned states according to 2004 contests. The program distributions show a parochial distribution strategy: they offered no evidence that distribution occurred according to poverty inclusion criteria, and divisions according to political criteria reveal the enforcement of a patron-client relationship.

The chapter proceeds with analysis of *Bolsa Família* and the *Misiones* through program design, expenditure, and distribution. The conclusion follows.

4.1   *BOLSA FAMÍLIA* IN BRAZIL

The case below presents analysis of *Bolsa Família* program oversight, expenditures, and targeting strategies based on secondary program accounts and government releases of social spending and beneficiary family counts. Examining the number of beneficiary families permits examination of the distribution of program resources according to political and program-relevant demographic

factors through regression and marginal effects analysis. This analysis extends Fried's (2012) assessment of *Bolsa Família* by providing marginal effects analysis according to political factors over the decade. Analysis of the distributions reveals a programmatic targeting strategy that shows rule-based inclusion criteria were a greater determinant than political factors in the distribution of program benefits. Below an account of program oversight is offered.

4.1.1 Program Oversight

The initiation of *Bolsa Família* resulted in the creation of the new ministry, the MDS, to administer of the program through its *Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidadania* (Senarc – National Secretariat for Citizenship Income) (Cunha, 2008, 16). The program established conditions for receiving *Bolsa Família*, including: vaccination and regular health check-ups and enrollment and school attendance (85 percent) for children, and for mothers, maternal care and health and nutrition seminars, as well as maintaining contact with the school and local program coordinator if the child changes schools (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & Brière, 2007, 18). Different transfer levels were based on a means test for family income, with ceilings for very poor: R$60 (US$30) and moderately poor: R$120 (US$ 60).[9] Benefits received for each level (depending on number of children per family ranged from R$50-95 to R$15-45 for the respective income categories (Lindert et al., 2007, 15-17). A variable adolescent benefit was later added that allowed the maximum transfer to rise to R$172 (US$ 104) (Cunha, 2008, 8).

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[9] Initially the figures were R$50-R$100 for the income categories, but these were revised upward in 2006 (Cunha, 2008, 8)

The MDS coordinated the program but devolved evaluation of conditions to ministries specializing in the respective areas: health and education conditions were monitored through the Ministries of Health and Education. The management of the registry and transfer of funds were conducted through the *Caixa Economica Federal* (federally controlled savings bank), though in Brasilia, funds were transferred through the *Banco de Brasilia* (Lindert et al., 2007, 21). Municipalities were responsible for implementing aspects such as local coordination, registration of potential recipients of the *Cadastro Único,* monitoring health and education conditions, linking program beneficiaries to other services and establishing social control councils (Lindert et al. 2007). State governments were responsible for support, training, complementary services, and identity documentation for families registered (Lindert et al. 2007). These included the *Vida Melhor* program offered by the Distrito Federal government in the state of Brasilia, which provided a complementary transfer of resources to extend additional benefits to qualified recipients

MDS established oversight mechanisms, which included performance-based measures to minimize program leakages and clientelistic distribution of benefits. These included the C*adastro Único*, which provided a single registry to access the programs. Targeting and registration was conducted through this mechanism, which was contracted to *Caixa* performance evaluation basis (Lindert et al., 2007, 36, 42). The *Cadastro Único* was inherited from *Bolsa Escola,* but 2005 changes to the management of the program established MDS monitoring, which allowed for improved correction of errors (Lindert et al., 2007, 42). The MDS also incentivized municipality performance with administrative cost transfers based on the *Índice de Gestão Descentralizada* (IGD – Decentralized Management Index), and on having signed the *Termos de Adesão* (joint

management agreement). Favorable scores on the IGD resulted in partial reimbursement for implementation costs for the program (Lindert et al., 2007, 27).

Use of the oversight mechanisms, enforceable contracts and participation conditions established *Bolsa Família* as a rule-based program reflecting clientelism concerns and ensuring delivery of the benefit to the constituents that fit the program criteria. This effort received renewed focus after debate over program conditions discussed in Chapter 5 was resolved, reestablishing rigorous program controls. This enabled steady program expansion, and the continued enforcement of eligibility criteria ensured participants were included based on need.

4.1.2   Program Expenditures

Spending for *Bolsa Família* increased steadily as the program expanded. The program's expansion coincided with efficiency gains from the combination of multiple programs into one. Program funding was dedicated up to 2007 through a public health tax initiated by Cardoso. From that point onward, the program has had to rely on alternative budgeting sources.

Figure 2 presents *Bolsa Família* and pre-program spending data from the MDS, the *Controladoria-Geral da União* (CGU), Cunha (2008) and Hall (2006). Social Assistance spending data from CGU annual reports on the MDS is presented for comparison.

Bolsa Família and Social Assistance Spending

Legend:
- BF: Share Total Federal Spending (%):
- BF: Share Nominal GDP: (%)
- BF Benefits: Share Total Federal Spending (%):
- BF Benefits: Share Nominal GDP (%):
- AS: Share Total Federal Spending (%):
- AS: Share Nominal GDP: (%)

MDS, CGU, Cunha 2008

Figure 2. Bolsa Família and Social Assistance Spending 2001-11

The amount of funds spent on *Bolsa Família* reflects overall about half of the amount spent on the Social Assistance programs. *Bolsa Família* spending increased from 1.8 percent-2.4 percent of total federal spending from 2004-11, while Social Assistance spending increased from 5.4 percent to 6.3 percent total federal spending over the same period.

Evaluating *Bolsa Família* spending is easiest when taken as a share of government spending, though it is important to acknowledge the small share of overall consumption the program undertakes. As a share of federal government spending *Bolsa Família* increases from 2004 (1.8 percent of total federal spending, over R$5.53 billion) to 2011 levels (2.4 percent of

total federal spending, over R\$17 billion). The data indicates a steady increase for *Bolsa Família* spending from the 2004 program launch, and an increase in spending compared to data available for the 2001-3 preprogram spending on *Bolsa Escola, Auxílio Gas, and Bolsa Alimentação*. Comparing overall *Bolsa Família* spending to program funds disbursed to beneficiaries, spending converges over the period of 2003-6 as management activities improved and duplicate functions were eliminated. This reveals that the managerial and oversight changes to the program resulted in real gains to the amount of resources available for distribution.

4.1.3 Program Distribution

Analyzing the distribution of program targeting requires the analysis of political and program-relevant demographic variables to determine their effect on the number of *Bolsa Família* recipient families in different states in Brazil. Table 12 and Figures 2-4 display the results of regression models and marginal effects analysis for the number of *Bolsa Família* recipient families. Data are compiled from various years of the *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social Matriz da Informação Social* (MDS Various Years) for recipients and MDS (2006-2010) and IPEA (2004) measures of poverty. The model examines the following political determinants: the 2002-2010 presidential and governor elections. The model includes a measure of the status of whether the governor is Lula- or opposition-aligned. The demographic determinants include statewide measures of: total primary school enrollment rates for each state for each year, an estimate from IPEA of families living under the poverty line (2004) and membership in the *Cadastro Único* (2006, 2010), and an estimate of population.

Marginal effects analysis evaluates the number of transfers provided for *Bolsa Família* participants over increasing values of electoral support, holding other determinants at their means.

The distribution of recipient families is analyzed by providing an estimate for both Lula-and opposition-aligned states according to coalition alignment of governors. The difference between the estimates reveals the effect of political alignment on recipient family distribution. In the plots below, the slope of the estimated values shows the attention to close or landslide races: a negative slope reveals targeting of close races (increasing numbers of recipient families as electoral support is lower), while a positive slope reveals targeting of landslide races (increasing numbers of recipient families as electoral support increases). While the models and plots are conducted with dependent variables transformed by natural logarithm, the estimates are transformed from the log values to actual values in the narrative below.

4.1.3.1 *Bolsa Família* Model

Table 12 displays the results of the *Bolsa Família* models 1-6, in which effects of the political and demographic variables on the distribution of recipient families are evaluated. Marginal effects analysis is conducted to compare the overall distribution of *becas* in states with Lula- and opposition-aligned governors, and these are shown in Figures 2-4 below. The models are examined below, followed by the marginal effects analysis.

Table 12. Bolsa Família Distribution Analysis

	Model 1 Bolsa Família Recipients 2002 (Log)	Model 2 Bolsa Família Recipients 2002 (Log)	Model 3 Bolsa Família Recipients 2006 (Log)	Model 4 Bolsa Família Recipients 2006 (Log)	Model 5 Bolsa Família Recipients 2010 (Log)	Model 6 Bolsa Família Recipients 2010 (Log)
Governor Vote 2002	-0.499					
	(2.170)					
Presidential Vote 2002		0.727				
		(0.693)				
Governor Vote 2006			-1.734**			
			(0.583)			
Presidential Vote 2006				0.933		
				(1.263)		
Governor Vote 2010					0.528	
					(0.510)	
Presidential Vote 2010						0.354
						(0.994)
PT-Aligned Governor	0.0123	-0.131	0.533†	0.288	0.0315	0.153
	(0.295)	(0.318)	(0.292)	(0.330)	(0.196)	(0.166)
Share of Low-income Families	7.463***	7.162***	10.84*	3.890	3.805***	3.793***
	(1.830)	(1.761)	(4.513)	(4.969)	(0.859)	(0.882)
Share of Population Enrolled in Primary School	-22.15	-30.12#	-33.63	-26.45	-39.48*	-35.00#
	(19.63)	(18.84)	(26.46)	(35.69)	(14.92)	(20.41)
Log of Population	1.086***	1.093***	1.111***	1.070***	0.990***	0.980***
	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.100)	(0.132)	(0.0836)	(0.106)
Constant	-4.225*	-4.438*	-3.882*	-3.827†	-1.389	-1.413
	(1.925)	(1.800)	(1.796)	(2.137)	(1.363)	(1.401)
Observations	27	27	27	27	27	27
R-squared	0.817	0.826	0.867	0.816	0.877	0.872

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, † $p<0.1$, # $p<0.15$

The key outcome revealed in Table 12 is that throughout the decade poverty, a program-relevant targeting criterion, is a more consistent determinant of the distribution of program benefits than political criteria, though important trends emerge from the analysis of political distributions. Overall, the model fit is strong, ranging from an r-squared of 0.816 (for Model 4 - 2006 presidential vote 2006 recipients) to 0.877 (for Model 5 - 2010 governor vote 2010 recipient families. Below the political and demographic criteria are discussed.

The models show two periods of political influence: early on in the decade, the program does not appear to target according to political criteria. As the decade proceeds, the program shifted to targeting core voters in landslide contests. The 2006 and 2010 presidential elections and the 2010 governor election each show this as a consistent outcome.

The level of electoral support has a positive effect on the number of recipient families in Models 2 and 4-6, while negative effects on the level of electoral support occur in Models 1 and 3. Targeting favored landslide races in the 2002, 2006, and 2010 presidential elections and the 2010 governor vote. Close races were favored in the 2002 and 2006 governor elections, and the measure is significant in the 2002 governor vote (at the $p < .01$ level). No landslide determinant is significant in the models presented here.

In Model 2 there is a negative effect on the number of families receiving benefits in states with Lula-aligned governors. In Models 1, and 3-6 the models reveal positive effect of Lula-aligned governors on the number of families receiving benefits in states. Only the measure in Model 3 – the 2006 governor election measure – is significant, but the marginal effects analysis below shows sizable differences at times between the two groups of states, particularly for the effects of the 2006 governor and 2010 presidential races on the number of recipient families.

The models also examine areas of program- relevant demographic influence, which yield consistent evidence for one aspect of program targeting: poverty has a significant positive relationship in all models, and is the most consistent determinant of all variables in each model. The enrollment variable shows a significant positive relationship with the number of recipient families in the 2004 elections but at other times this variable was negative. There is a clear indication that recipient families were targeted with an antipoverty focus, though enrollment shows less of a consistent impact.

The number of families living in poverty has a positive and significant effect on the number of statewide *Bolsa Família* families throughout Models 1-3 and 5-6. For models 1-2 and 5-6 the effect is significant (at the $p < .001$ level) and for models 3, the effect is significant (at the $p < .05$ level). The strength and persistence of this effect is worth noting in comparison to other variables in the model. Controlling for other factors, *Bolsa Família* recipients are families living under the poverty line, which is consistent with descriptions of program oversight above.

The number of individuals enrolled in basic education has a consistent negative effect for each model. The program is organized to remedy lower enrollment, so a negative relationship is consistent with expectations: more recipient families are located in states with a lower number of individuals enrolled. The measure is statistically significant in Model 5, (at the $p < .05$ level), and is also associated in Models 2 and 6 with the level of recipient families just beyond traditional alpha levels ($p < .15$).

Population has a positive and significant effect on the number of statewide *becas* for all models (at the $p < .001$ level). This means that the program distribution is appropriate for the population of each state.

Comparing political and demographic variables, poverty is the most consistent determinant. Evaluating the influence of each of these variables on recipient family distribution allows comparison of individual determinants. The marginal effects analysis below permits substantive examination of the political determinants, comparing the distribution according to Lula- and opposition-aligned states across relevant levels of electoral support for the PT.

4.1.3.2 *Bolsa Família* Marginal Effects

This section provides substantive analysis of the models above, particularly the effect of increasing values of electoral support for the PT on the number of *Bolsa Família* recipient families, holding other variables at their means. The distribution is compared between states with Lula- and opposition-aligned governors, and closeness in political contests is evaluated. Figures 3-4 below depict these comparisons.

The key trend revealed in the figures below is that, holding other values at their means, the distribution of recipient families changes over time to Lula- aligned states. Early on, negligible differences exist between pro-Lula and opposition states, but as the decade progressed, *Bolsa Família* benefits were distributed to families to Lula-aligned states, though the size of the effect varies between presidential and governor races in 2006 and 2010, and in 2006 the direction of targeting is indeterminate, as it varies between close and landslide races.

Taken in context with the significance of the determinants of targeting in the models above, the marginal effects estimates reveal a limited effect for the political outcomes, particularly in light of the consistency of the effect of program-relevant demographic variables on targeting over time. What begins as a programmatic distribution remains so throughout the decade, but the distribution also reveals political consequences.

Figure 3. *Bolsa Família* Distributions, 2004

Figure 3 shows on the y-axis the distribution of recipient families 2004 in states with Lula- and opposition-aligned governors, holding other values at their means. There is no clear pattern that emerges from the 2002 elections on the 2004 data: the differences are revealed to be negligible between Lula- and opposition- aligned states, with a larger difference occurring in the governor election.

The estimates for the 2002 governor election reveal the number of recipient families in opposition-aligned states was greater by 10 percent (14,535 more families). The estimates for the 2002 presidential election reveal the number of *becas* in Lula-aligned states was greater by just 1 percent (1945 more families). Comparing the slopes for the first and second contests, the governor election reveals support for landslide targeting while the presidential election shows support for closeness. There is no clear electoral targeting trend among the 2002 electoral data, as both core and opposition targeting is revealed, as well as support for close and landslide targeting.

Figure 4. *Bolsa Família* Distributions, 2006

Figure 4 shows the distribution of recipient families in 2006 in states with Lula- and opposition-aligned governors, holding other values at their means. Comparing against the 2006 electoral contests, pro-Lula distributions are revealed for program benefits, though the effect of closeness is unclear.

The estimates for the 2006 governor election show peak differences with the number of recipient families in Lula-aligned states greater by 70 percent (141,062 more families). The estimates for the 2006 presidential election reveal the number of recipient families in Lula-aligned states was greater by 32 percent (53,602 more families). In the governor contest the negative slope shows that states with lower levels of electoral support have more recipient families, though in the presidential contest, the slope is reversed, revealing support for landslide races. The two trends reveal core voter targeting, but neither the closeness nor landslide strategies are confirmed.

Figure 5. *Bolsa Família* Distributions, 2010

Figure 5 shows the distribution of *becas* administered in 2010 in states with Lula- and opposition-aligned governors, holding other values at their means. Comparing against the 2010 contests, pro-Dilma distributions are revealed for program benefits, with a clear effect for landslide states.

The estimates for the 2010 governor election reveal the number of recipient families in Lula -aligned states was greater by 3 percent (7,661). The estimates for the 2010 presidential election reveal the number of recipient families in Lula-aligned states was greater by 17 percent (41,601). In both the governor and presidential election, the positive slopes show that states with higher levels of electoral support have more recipient families. The distribution of benefits reveals core voter targeting supporting landslide elections.

Overall, the distribution of program benefits changes to support Lula (and Dilma) over the course of the decade, with limited support for landslide elections occurring in 2010. In 2004, no single trend emerges for the production of political support among constituents, holding other variables at their means. In 2006 and 2010 the program favors the PT consistently but the strength of the effect varies between governor and presidential elections. In 2006, the program

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strongly targets core voters though it is unclear whether the distribution favors close or landslide contests. In 2010, the program targets core voters, particularly landslide elections. Comparing with the examination of the models above, this appears to be the product of the program's focus on program-relevant antipoverty determinants.

4.1.4 Summing Up

Regression and marginal effects analysis of *Bolsa Família* reveals that over the course of the decade, the program produced some of the political targeting techniques under analysis: core voters were reached in the 2006 and 2010 elections, where the number of program beneficiaries exceeded those in opposition states. However, it did so by consistently prioritizing a program-relevant demographic criterion: poverty. The count of families living in poverty was the most constituent predictor of the distribution of program benefits over the decade. This was an institutionalized component of *Bolsa Família*, and was a rigorously evaluated element of participant eligibility. It was shown to be a better predictor than basic education enrollment – another program element – across the models. The poverty result suggests that the program was distributed according to programmatic criteria.

The program distributions revealed in analysis of *Bolsa Família* reflect a programmatic distributive strategy. The number of families living in poverty proves to be a consistent determinant, indicating the strong relationship between the program conditionalities and the distribution of benefits, limiting the patron-client relationship. The strength of the oversight is substantiated in the case study section above. The positive electoral effect shown Chapter 4 for program recipients on support for Lula and affiliated parties can be attributed to the programmatic focus of *Bolsa Família*. Comparing the political and demographic criteria, the

antipoverty focus of the program can be credited with producing political support by boosting turnout among participants that were not part of the political system. The program delivered social benefits, which yielded political ones for Lula.

4.2   THE EDUCATION *MISIONES* IN VENEZUELA

The case below presents analysis of education Misión program oversight, expenditures, and targeting strategy based on secondary program accounts and government releases of social spending and program beneficiaries. Examining the cash-transfer component of the education *Misiones* provides a measure of distribution to individuals – *becas* – to be analyzed according to political and program-relevant demographic factors through regression and marginal effects analysis. *Becas* are a only part of these programs, but since data transparency and availability problems make complete analysis of these *Misiones* difficult, the limited government state-by-state releases of recipient data allow for analysis of the distribution of program resources in the *Misión Sucre* program.

  The analysis below extends the work of Penfold-Becerra (2008), Hawkins (2010) and Hawkins, Rosas and Johnson (2011), showing with marginal effects analysis that over the decade, *becas* have distinct political distributions. Penfold-Becerra found political effects in targeting of *Misiones Ribas, Mercal,* and *Barrio Adentro* (Penfold-Becerra 2008, 77). Hawkins found that compared to 2000 electoral results, Ribas and Sucre had expected distributions into areas that were between 50 and 60 percent supportive Chávez, making it less likely that those interested in the personalistic appeal of Chávez could participate in the programs (Hawkins,

2010b, 221). This distribution was less Chávez-aligned than other *Misión Mercal*, which was made available in increasingly more Chávez-aligned areas (Hawkins, 2010b, 221).

This analysis extends assessment of the political effect on the distribution of *Misión Ribas and Sucre becas* with a longitudinal analysis of distribution in Chávez-aligned states, as well as the distribution of *Aldeas* and Community Centers. Analysis of the distributions reveals a parochial targeting strategy that shows rule-based inclusion criteria were less of a determinant than political factors in the distribution of program benefits. Below, an account of program oversight is offered.

4.2.1   Program Oversight

The Chávez government initiated the *Misiones* in a series of executive decrees, announcing extraordinary plans to reach individuals excluded from traditional education systems, including adults and the poor. These decrees bypassed the legislature in the creation of the programs, and funding for the initial program push was allocated from state-owned *Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.* (PDVSA) resources. Over time, as the government gained a loyal legislature, the programs were further institutionalized, through a *ley habilitante* that allowed a decree to establish formal legal status and regular budgeting to the foundations that managed the programs. As described in Chapter Five, the programs were declared successful in the authorizing legislation, which conflicted with the record of Chávez attempts to "reinvigorate" flagging *Misiones* by shuttling the programs to other ministries and attempting new strategic objectives with the programs.

The absence of registry and public documentation and the failure to institutionalize *Misión* administration reveals the extent to which the programs failed to integrate rule-based management (D'Elia, Lacruz, & Maignon, 2006 213-14). These effects were revealed in lower

program quality and enrollment declines discussed in Chapter 7 (Aponte Blank 2012; Mundo 2009). These problems were also revealed in unsteady expenditure levels, despite, as shown below, the legislature increasing ordinary budgeting activities for the programs.

Critics of the *Misiones* supported the general idea behind the creation of programs to provide remedial services to populations that had been excluded from educational opportunities. However, they decried low quality and educational content and use of the programs as a parallel system that was designed to reinforce the practice of "revolutionary" (in the Bolivarian sense) values (Aponte Blank 2012; D'Elia and Cabezas 2010). Descriptions of ideological content are partly validated through the anecdotal evidence of pro-Chávez political socialization described in Ortega and Rodriguez (n.d., 28), and Mundo (2009, 41), and raise further suspicion of politicization with the naming conventions of students in *Robinson* and *Ribas*: "*patriotas*" (patriots) and "*vencedores/ vencedoras*," (victors) respectively (D'Elia, 2006, 84-92). In *Robinson,* training was postponed in some cases in order to hold political discussions in the classroom during the campaign period for the 2004 recall referendum (Hawkins, Rosas, *&* Johnson, 2011, 193).

The above criticisms offer anecdotal validation of the problems of politicization within the programs. Failure to institutionalize program administration revealed further issues: the programs were not integrated into existing educational expertise within ministries, and the programs were subject to management interference throughout their existence. While the placement of new institutions outside of ministries that traditionally managed programs was cited as an attempt at generating efficiency, the absence of administrative expertise and interference with program administration made them costly alternatives to traditional programs, as the

programs failed to build on prior experience. This led to failures in enforcement of targeting criteria among national coordinators, described below.

4.2.1.1 Program Administration and Parallel Bureaucracy

The establishment of parallel bureaucracy for program administration meant that the programs avoided management expertise in ministries traditionally associated with related education programs. In addition to the creation of parallel administrative centers, funding the programs from PDVSA reduced the degree to which other bodies could practice oversight over the programs. The education *Misiones* were initiated in 2003 with decrees establishing extraordinary plans and foundations for each of the programs, which became their administrative centers[10] (D'Elia 2006). While *Misión Robinson* was located within the *Ministerio de Educación*, *Misión Ribas* was administered through the *Ministerio de Energía y Minas*, which combined resources including night and weekend physical space within public secondary schools together with resources from the state electric company - *Compañía Anónima de Administración y Fomento Eléctrico* (CADAFE) and *Petroleo de Venezuela, SA (*PDVSA) (Sanjuán Martinez & Gonzalez Plessman, 2009). Misión Sucre was administered through the *Ministerio de Educación Superior* (later the *Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educación Universitaria-* MPPEU), but later was moved to and from the *Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Telecomunicaciones y la Informática,* in an attempt at "reinvigorating" the Misión to fulfill its goal (Fundación Misión Sucre 2008).

  The government oversaw administration of *Misión Robinson* through a national

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[10]*Plan Nacional Extraordinario de Alfabetización Simón Rodríguez* (Extraordinary National Literacy Plan, Simón Rodriguez), Presidential Decree 2434, published in *Gaceta Oficial* 37,704; *Plan Extraordinario José Félix Ribas* (Extraordinary Plan José Félix Ribas), Presidential Decree 2656, published in *Gaceta Oficial* 37,798; *Plan Extraordinario Mariscal Antonio José de Sucre*, (Extraordinary Plan Mariscal Antonio José de Sucre) Presidential Decree 1635, published in *Gaceta Oficial* 37,359; See D'Elia (2006).

coordination office, which in turn oversaw state and regional level coordination offices (Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011, 194). The *Comisión Nacional de Alfabetización* (National Literacy Commission), directed the program but relied on the government of Cuba for advice and facilitator training, video educational materials for the courses, advice on methodological techniques, and communication of the experience in using media for mass education and cultural knowledge (D'Elia, 2006, 79-80). The instructional method the government used consisted of facilitators presenting videos to students with a Cuban technique called *"Yo sí puedo"* (Yes I can), an intensive program that ran seven weeks long. (D'Elia 2006). Students were required to show their government identification card, provide goals for their studies, and commit to finishing the program (Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011, 193). By the end of the course, students were expected to have the ability to write a letter to demonstrate literacy (Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). Later, *Misión Robinson II* was established to provide elementary education, extending the program.

Program facilitation and *beca* distribution presented evidence of politicization. There were no educational or experiential requirements for individuals to serve as a facilitator for the program, and initial facilitators were volunteers who surveyed their neighborhoods for students (Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011, 193). While all facilitators of *Robinson II* were required to have a high school education, only 10 per cent had prior teaching experience (Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011, 194). There was little organization in training facilitators, and for the first year of the program, the *beca* system was poorly regulated. Amid problems of clientelism, the national coordinator office began to require that recipients of the scholarships demonstrate need. The program then required that the regional multisite coordinator approve the *becas*, and in many cases the *beca* program was suspended while this change occurred (Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson,

2011, 194). Until this coordinator was required to certify the *becas*, discretion was left to the facilitator.

Like *Robinson,* the instructional method for *Misión Ribas* employed video lessons with classroom facilitators, though here it was based on a methodology developed by the MED in its *Plan Nacional Educación para Todos* (National Education Plan for Everyone). Students that participated were required to be eighteen years of age and to have completed primary education or the equivalent from *Misión Robinson* program (Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011, 194). Two levels were established: the first corresponded to middle school and the second reflected high school, and in total there were nine thousand sites where the program was administered with thirty thousand classrooms. At sites with more than one facilitator, a the program included coordinator staff (Hawkins, Rosas, & Johnson, 2011, 194).

In *Ribas*, *becas* were awarded for low-income participants, particularly: single mothers, unemployed, or individuals in precarious situations, over 60 years of age, or family breadwinners. These were distributed within the classroom, not through a centralized administration of payouts (D'Elia, 2006, 98). This allowed room for discretion in their distribution. This left considerable room for discretion among the facilitator staff in the distribution of the *becas*.

Sucre utilized live instructors in the classroom setting to provide post-secondary instruction to participants. Instructors were required to have bachelor's degrees and experience in the field instead of being full-time university faculty that have research obligations, though some university faculty volunteered for the program (Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson 2011, 195). Instructors that did not already work for the government were paid a stipend for teaching (Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson 2011, 195). However understaffing of core courses due to failure

to attract instructors led to overenrollment and unusual time periods between courses. For example, a *Misión Sucre* course could be taught once every other week (Interview with Education Expert 11/20). Students were required to have a high school diploma or the equivalent from *Misión Ribas*. Like *Ribas*, *becas* were awarded to some low-income program participants including: single mothers, unemployed, or individuals in precarious situations, over 60 years of age, or family breadwinners (D'Elia 2006, 98; Lacruz 2006, 175). These were also administered at the classroom level, allowing room for discretion by administrative staff for their distribution.

4.2.1.2 Management Interference

The education *Misiones* were subject to management interference as they were subject to near constant institutional redesign from 2005-8. They underwent their first full makeover following the release of the *Nuevo Mapa Estratégico* (*New Strategic Map*) established new institutional objectives and management structures for *Misiones Ribas* and *Robinson*. It ultimately shrunk both programs, reducing Robinson from a program administered in public spaces to courses hosted in homes. The second set of changes occurred following the passing of the *ley habilitante* through which Chávez established by decree the status of the Misiones as official bureaucratic structures.

In 2005, the Chávez government undertook the *Nuevo Mapa Estratégico*, a plan to advance the development of a new social structure, increase participatory democracy, develop a new electoral strategy, increase institutionalization and fight corruption, among other goals (Mundo, 2009, 45). The effect of this plan was to link education to the country's economic development, in part through changes to the education *Misiones*, changing their legal status from being situated within Ministries (particularly the MPPEU), to their own foundations. The foundations were charged with the responsibility of executing their respective extraordinary

plans (Mundo, 2009, 47-8). With the strategic objective for the period changing to reflect the standardization, organization, and indoctrination of the new strategic plan, these "institutional wildcard" organizations were intended to be more effective in producing the results of the plan. A major change in the *Misión Robinson* program that resulted from this was the transferring of classroom environments from school locations within municipalities to the location of the program to private houses of volunteers, still conducted in the evenings, offered a more limited (as well as potentially excludable) environment for literacy and basic education for program participants (Mundo, 2009, 56).

The second set of changes occurred when Chávez issued Decree Number 6217 with the Rank, Value and Force of Law of Public Administration, after the defeat of the constitutional referendum. It legitimized the structure of the *Misiones* as they existed, establishing them as a new type of bureaucracy in Venezuelan public administration (Mundo, 2009, 51). The preamble states that the measure was adopted following the success of the special programs referred to as the Misiones (Mundo, 2009, 51).

Changes to *Misión Ribas* as a result of the second institutional reorganization prioritized education with the goal of insertion of the excluded populations into local indigenous development strategies and the management of educational programs jointly implemented with Cuba in areas of health management, intended to complement other Misión activities (Mundo, 2009, 51).

The shifting of institutional priorities affected *Misión Sucre* as well, in the following ways: the organization faced a constant debate over whether the municipalization of higher education through the Misión was intended to supplant or complement the *Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela*. Eventually the structure was worked out to complement the

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organization, as UBV became one of the degree-granting institutions that awarded *Misión Sucre* graduates. Additionally, *Fundación Misión Sucre* was relocated twice among ministries as its success flagged. It was first moved between the MPPEU into the structure of *Ministry del Poder Popular para las Telecomunicaciones y la Informática*, situated within the *Compania Anonima Nacional Telefonos de Venezuela* (CANTV), the opposition news outlet that had been nationalized in 2007. At this point *Sucre* was subject to the minister, who was also president of CANTV. The move was credited with a goal of "reinvigorating" the Misión to fulfill its goal (Fundación Misión Sucre 2008). *Fundación Misión Sucre* was eventually returned to the MPPEU (Fundación Misión Sucre 2012).

Weak oversight, particularly in *beca* administration, and changes in administrative priorities affected the programmatic nature of the education *Misiones*, deviating from rule-based implementation based on inclusion criteria. The effects of program oversight and management changes are revealed below through the description of education *Misión* expenditures, both over time and in how they were distributed. As the programs shifted due to changing priorities, increases and decreases in expenditures occurred, and the distribution of expenditures prioritized particular groups over the decade. These two outcomes are shown below.

4.2.2   Program Spending

Examining government funding for the *Misiones* programs between 2003-07 reveals not only a significant expansion in program spending, but the transition of program financing to routine budgeting over time as the programs were legitimized by the legislature. This section presents government financing sources for all of the Misión programs, compiled by Aponte, from funding

material available from the *Ministerio de Finanzas* and news sources. [11] Examining government

spending data reveals how the programs proceeded through the decade. The initiation of the

Misiones begins with a sizable push for *Misión Robinson*, and ends with larger pushes from

Sucre, and considering the PDVSA transfers, the same is likely the case for *Ribas*. Given the

questions associated with the success of *Robinson*, the focus on *Ribas* and *Sucre* suggests that the

government has shifted priorities to areas that may yield more successful outcomes. Fluctuation

in PDVSA funding reveals the danger of reliance on extrabudgetary sources for social programs,

which may result in funding declines in certain years. The contributions of PDVSA as a share of

Misión funding may be on the decline, as the mix of funding sources shifted between 2003-07

toward routinizing the *Misión* spending within the country's budget. However, the extraordinary

beginnings of these programs may have limited administrative planning and budgeting for future

operations, which may force program planners into making tradeoffs among recipients.

Education *Misión* spending data are limited, but available spending figures are compiled

together in Figure 6. Data from Sanjuán & Plessman (2009, 2010), and the various years of

Memoria y Cuenta publications of the *Ministerio del Poder Popular Para la Educación*

Universitaria (MPPEU, Various Years)), and the *Fundación Misión Sucre* (2010).

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[11] It is necessary to acknowledge, as in Aponte (2010), that the tables and figures in this section and below are not consistent when compared against each other. The spending figures compiled from executed expenditures in the *Memoria y Cuenta of both the Ministerio del Poder Popular Para la Educación Universitaria* and reports by Sanjuán and Plessman reveal a lower share of spending than figures that PDVSA reports transferring to the programs. The overall government spending figures also reflect lower levels than do the PDVSA data, but the compilation of spending data, calculated by Aponte from the *Ministerio de Finanzas* and news sources through the year 2007 provides an account of the ways in which the programs have been funded over time. Aponte concludes that the PDVSA data is more up-to-date than government financial ministry figures so it is likelier to be correct (Aponte Blank 2010). We can conclude that the financial figures from ministries and funds responsible for administering the *Misiones* are also subject to the same logic. Additionally, the PDVSA data provides a distribution of *Misión* spending activities not made available from government sources, allowing an investigation into the priorities the government has placed on managing the programs over time (Aponte Blank 2010).

Figure 6. Education *Misiones* Spending, Share of Federal Government Spending

After initial increases from 2004-7, declines occur in Misión spending in 2008. After this, increases occur in *Misión Sucre* spending, and likely occur with *Mision Ribas*. *Misión Robinson* spending figures demonstrate the massive push and subsequent decline in the program reflected in registration figures described above. Program spending largely tapered off following the peak in program spending at $660 million in 2005. Consistent with enrollment, spending figures for *Robinson* over the first part of the decade dwarf that of Ribas and Sucre.

Contributions from PDVSA are displayed in Table 13. These reveal significant contributions over time for the *Misiones*: *Alimentacion (Mercal), Barrio Adentro (I, II, III), Ribas, Revolucion Energética, Vivienda, and Vuelvan Caras*. The total *Misión* spending also reveals an increase through *Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela,* a new initiative begun in 2011.

Table 13. *Misión* Spending: Contribution from PDVSA, Millions of USD

(Petroleos de Venezuela S.A., 2011, 201)
Millions, Current USD

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Misión Ribas	32	320	371	280	133	330	599	361	322
Misión Alimentacion	-	146	303	325	916	212	-	1,210	1,238
Gran Misión AgroVenezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,140
Misión Barrio Adentro I, II, y III	34	275	309	1,693	3,258	130	7	650	-
Misión Vuelvan Caras	-	172	220	240	29	11	-	-	-
Misión Milagro	-	-	125	-	25	9	-	1	-
Misión Guaicapuro	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-
Misión Sucre	3	113	668	-	-	17	6	-	-
Misión Identidad	-	44	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Misión Ciencia	-	-	-	291	28	-	-	-	-
Misión Vivienda	300	500	500	476	659	221	157	1,251	-
Misión Robinson I y II	72	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Misión Revolucion Energética	-	-	-	210	219	174	745	2,115	2,197
Misión Arbol	-	-	-	-	12	9	2	-	-
Misión Música	-	-	-	-	43	-	-	22	-
Misiones Spending	441	1,570	2,508	3,515	5,322	1,113	1,516	5,610	4,897
Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,010
Other Misiones and Contributions	96	13	481	152	175	280	246	3,984	307
Total Misiones Spending, PDVSA	537	1,583	2,989	3,667	5,497	1,393	1,762	9,594	9,214

Contributions reveal the priorities of the extrabudgetary activities determined by the government. They increased steadily between 2003-7, but decreased in 2008-9, during which oil price factors may have affected the organization's ability to contribute to the budget. They increased again in 2010-11, to a level of $8.9 billion in 2011. For the education *Misiones,* the company funded Misión Sucre in increasing amounts until a peak in 2005 at $688 million, then largely allocated resources elsewhere, only funding the program for $23 million in 2008-9. PDVSA only funded Misión Robinson in its initial year, for $72 million.

Investigating contributions offer the most interesting analysis for *Misión Ribas,* as this program's foundation is directly funded through PDVSA. Increases in *Ribas* funding occur from 2003-5 from $32 million to $371 million, and were then followed by a decline in 2007 to $133 million. Funding again increases beginning in 2008, peaking in 2009 at $599 million and declining to $361 and $322 million by 2011. This discontinuity in the primary funding source of *Misión Ribas* suggests that the program waned compared to other government priorities. However, PDVSA contributions tell only part of the story as the programs became more regularly funded in the ordinary budget.

Compiled by Aponte, Table 14 reveals a crucial period of transition for that the Misiones became ordinarily budgeted programs as funding transferred across four sources to make the programs more permanent: the ordinary budget, additional credits awarded to the program by the legislature, as well as contributions allocated at the discretion of Chávez from PDVSA revenues and the *Fondo de Desarollo Nacional* (Fonden – National Development fund).

Table 14. *Misiones Sociales:* Government Spending, Millions of USD

(Aponte Blank, 2010, 51)
Millions of USD, Current Spending

Financing Sources	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Ordinary Budget	9.2	257.6	211.6	-	-
Additional Credits	41.4	248.4	195.5	-	-
Budget and Credits Combined	-	-	-	3422.4	4025
PDVSA	50.6	729.1	1154.6	1297.2	1702
Fonden and Others*	16.1	138	46	285.2	282.9
Total	119.6	1237.4	1607.7	5004.8	6009.9
Share of Financing from PDVSA	42.3%	58.9%	71.8%	25.9%	28.3%

The Misiones became ordinarily budgeted programs through the following activities: a significant increase in the contribution of ordinary budget procedure funding for the programs, a decrease in the contribution of PDVSA to *Misión* budgeting, and a smaller increase in the level of Fonden and other funding. After increases in PDVSA funding from the initial level of 42.3 percent to 71 percent in 2005, the share declines to above 25 percent in 2006-07. Current values for 2008-9 in Table 13 also reflect this trend. The transition from heavy dependence of the programs on PDVSA resources to ordinary government budgeting for the *Misiones* over time reveals that not only were the programs increasingly accepted by the legislature, but funding began to occur in a manner that enabled the programs to demonstrate continuity in their administration. The transition to routine budgeting was certainly a positive for the programs, though the increasing amount of funding inputs based on non-guaranteed oil revenues contributed to the difficult task of program planning.

Because of the relationship between PDVSA and *Misión Ribas*, the decline in PDVSA funding in Table 14 between 2006-7 suggests that the corresponding spending data in Figure 6 are low points for spending on the program. For *Ribas*, program spending likely peaks in 2005

and 2009, as suggested in the PDVSA transfer data. Misión Sucre spending steadily increases into 2007, then decreases in 2008. Spending then increases for the program into 2010.

Examining government spending data reveals how the programs expanded and contracted over the decade. The initiation of the Misiones begins with a sizable push for Misión Robinson, and ends with larger pushes from Sucre, and considering the PDVSA transfers, the same is likely the case for Ribas. Given the questions associated with the success of Robinson, the focus on Ribas and Sucre suggests that the government has shifted priorities to areas that may yield more successful outcomes. Fluctuation in PDVSA funding reveals the problem of reliance on extrabudgetary sources for social programs, which may be subject to discretion or revenue problems. The contributions of PDVSA as a share of education *Misión* appeared to be decline, as the mix of funding sources shifted between 2003-07 toward routinizing the *Misión* spending within the country's budget.

4.2.3   Program Distribution

Analyzing the distribution of program targeting requires the analysis of political and program-relevant demographic variables to determine their effect on the number of *beca* recipients and program centers (*Aldeas*) in different states in Venezuela. Tables 4-6 and Figures 6-16 display the results of regression models and marginal effects analysis for the number of *beca* recipients *Misión Sucre* and *Ribas* and the *Aldeas* and community education centers of *Misión Sucre*. *Beca* and *Aldea* data are compiled from MPPEU publications including *Memoria y Cuenta* (MPPEU 2008), a retrospective report (MPPEU 2010), and *Fundación Misión Sucre* (2010). *Sucre Beca* data from 2004 are from D'Elia (2006) and *Ribas beca* data are from Penfold-Becerra (Penfold-Becerra 2005). The model examines the following political determinants between 2000-2010: the

2000 and 2006 presidential and 2004 and 2008 governor elections, the 2004 recall referendum, the 2007 constitutional referendum and the share of the PSUV in the 2010 assembly. The model includes a measure of the status of whether the governor is Chávez- or opposition-aligned. The demographic determinants include statewide measures of: total secondary and vocational school enrollment rates for each state for each year, an estimate of individuals living under the poverty line, and an estimate of population. For *Aldea* and community center models, the number of secondary schools in the state is substituted for enrollment data. Data are from Venescopio (Various Years) and the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* (2012).

Marginal effects analysis evaluates the number *becas* and *Aldeas* provided for *Misión* participants over relevant values of electoral support, holding other determinants at their means. The distribution of *becas* is analyzed by providing an estimate for both Chávez-and opposition-aligned states according to coalition alignment of governors. The difference between the estimates reveals the effect of political alignment on *beca* distribution. In the plots below, the slope of the estimated values shows the attention to close or landslide races: a negative slope reveals targeting of close races (increasing numbers of *becas* as electoral support is lower), while a positive slope reveals targeting of landslide races (increasing numbers of *becas* as electoral support increases). While the models and plots are conducted with dependent variables transformed by natural logarithm, the estimates are transformed from the log values to actual values in the narrative below.

4.2.3.1 *Misión Sucre Beca* Model

Table 15 displays the results of the *Misión Sucre* models 1-8, in which effects of the political and demographic variables on the distribution of *Sucre becas* are evaluated. Marginal effects analysis is conducted to compare the overall distribution of *becas* in states with Chávez- and opposition-

aligned governors, and these are shown in Figures 23-28 below. The models are first examined, followed by the marginal effects analysis.

Table 15. *Misión Sucre* Distribution Analysis

	Model 1 2004 Becas (log)	**Model 2** 2004 Becas (log)	**Model 3** 2004 Becas (log)	**Model 4** 2007 Becas (log)	**Model 5** 2007 Becas (log)	**Model 6** 2007 Becas (log)	**Model 7** 2010 Becas (log)	**Model 8** 2010 Becas (log)
2000 Presidential Vote	0.561							
	(0.752)							
2004 Governor Election - Chávez Coalition		1.428**						
		(0.377)						
2004 Recall Referendum			1.254#					
			(0.750)					
2006 Presidential Vote				0.814				
				(1.085)				
2007 Constitutional Referendum Package A					0.385			
					(1.362)			
2007 Constitutional Referendum Package B						0.313		
						(1.380)		
2008 Governor Election							0.618	
							(1.153)	
2010 Assembly Election								-2.649
								(9.599)
Chavez-Aligned Governor	0.00744	-0.0842	0.00714	0.197	0.241	0.244	-0.343#	-0.131
	(0.110)	(0.0773)	(0.0921)	(0.175)	(0.166)	(0.164)	(0.216)	(0.192)
Share of Individuals Living in Poverty	0.271	-0.0802	-0.131	-0.123	0.00302	0.0208	0.896	1.073
	(0.364)	(0.296)	(0.432)	(0.708)	(0.786)	(0.810)	(0.848)	(0.860)
Share of Population Enrolled in Secondary and Vocational Schools	42.19*	48.92**	51.09*	58.11†	50.81†	50.08†	61.21#	58.65#
	(17.83)	(13.50)	(17.79)	(28.76)	(27.82)	(27.64)	(35.35)	(38.08)
Log of Population	0.874***	0.876***	0.912***	0.895***	0.868***	0.861***	0.805***	0.756***
	(0.0489)	(0.0412)	(0.0520)	(0.0931)	(0.107)	(0.0997)	(0.0969)	(0.122)
Constant	-5.229***	-5.671***	-6.164***	-6.476**	-5.660*	-5.515*	-5.245**	-4.378**
	(0.890)	(0.614)	(1.052)	(2.146)	(2.286)	(2.156)	(1.563)	(1.451)
Observations	24	23	24	24	24	24	23	24
R-squared	0.953	0.973	0.958	0.910	0.908	0.908	0.835	0.838

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1, # p<0.15

Below the model results are discussed for political and demographic determinants on *Sucre becas*. The key outcome revealed is that throughout the decade, the program has a positive relationship early with the level of Chávez support, while later in the decade, estimates show a shift in the distribution from Chávez-aligned to opposition-aligned states. Among program-relevant demographic variables, poverty is not a determinant of *Sucre becas*, despite being a stated criterion for participation. However, enrollment has a significant effect on *beca* distribution, showing a degree of targeting according to program goals. Overall, the model fit is strong, ranging from an r-squared of 0.973 (for Model 2 - 2004 presidential recall 2004 *becas*) to 0.835 (for Model 7 – 2008 governor elections on 2010 *becas*). Below the political and demographic criteria are examined.

The models show three periods of political influence: early on in the decade, states with heavy Chávez votes receive *becas*, followed by a shift to those states with Chávez-aligned governors, and finally a shift to states with opposition-aligned governors. The first reveals landslide Chávez supporter strategy, and the second reveals core targeting. The third shows opposition targeting, as the leader sought support among the burgeoning opposition movement.

Models 1-7 show a positive relationship between the level of Chávez support and the number of individuals receiving *Sucre becas*. Model 8 – the effect of the share of 2010 Assembly seats on 2010 *becas* – shows a negative relationship. Early in the decade, the level of Chávez political support among states in the 2004 governor election and the 2004 presidential recall referendum both show positive relationships with *beca* distribution. The 2004 governor election is a significant determinant at the ($p < .05$) level, and the 2004 recall referendum is also associated with *beca* distribution just beyond traditional alpha levels ($p < .15$).

In the 2004 and 2007 models, those living in a Chávez-aligned state received more *becas* than those in opposition-aligned states. The measure is significant (at the $p < .1$ level) only for the constitutional referendum votes in 2007, but the marginal effects analysis below reveals persistent, and at times, sizable differences between the two groups of states. Controlling for other factors, more *Misión Sucre becas* are distributed to Chávez-aligned states from 2004-7, showing substantive differences among the distribution of *becas.*

Modeling the 2010 *becas*, the trend reverses, and opposition targeting is shown among 2008 governor and 2010 Assembly elections. Distributions significantly favor states with opposition governors in the 2008 model, and the trend continues with a substantive opposition support in 2010.

The positive effect of the level of electoral support on statewide *becas* persists across the pro-Chávez votes in models 1-4 for measures of the 2000 presidential election, 2004 governor election, the 2004 recall referendum, the 2006 presidential election, and in model 7 for the 2008 governor election. Targeting favored landslide contests in each of these races. The measures are significant in the 2004 and 2008 governor elections shown in models 2 (at the $p < .01$ level) and 7 (at the $p < .05$ level). A negative effect occurs for the level of electoral support on the *becas* in models 5 and 6 for the constitutional referendum in 2007 and model 8 for the share of PSUV seats in 2010. Targeting favored close races in these contests.

The models also examine areas of program- relevant demographic influence, which yield consistent evidence for one aspect of program targeting: education enrollment, which has a positive and significant effect on the number of statewide *becas* in models from 2004-2007. However, poverty – the difference between merely being enrolled in Sucre and receiving a *beca*

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– is not a significant determinant of the number of scholarships. Poverty has a negative relationship with the number of *becas* in certain models for the 2004 and 2007 data.

Sucre becas are distributed to states with more individuals enrolled in secondary and vocational education. The positive relationship serves as an indicator of targeting in the Venezuelan context, since the measure provides an estimate of eligible population for the program. Enrollment is significant in models from 2004 to 2007 and strongly associated with the 2010 models. This measure offers partial evidence that program targeting reached states where more students were located. This relationship was statistically significant in Models 1-6: at levels of significance between the ($p < .05$) level and the ($p < .1$) level. In Models 7 and 8 evaluating the 2008 governor and 2010 assembly elections, enrollment is also associated with *beca* distribution just beyond traditional alpha levels ($p < .15$).

The number of individuals living in poverty is a poor predictor of *beca* distribution. The variable is not a significant determinant of scholarships in any of the models, and Models 2-4 show *Misión Sucre becas* distributed to states with fewer people living in poverty when strong pro-Chávez political variables are modeled in 2004 and 2007.

Population has a positive and significant effect (at the $p < .001$ level) on the number of statewide *becas* for Models 1-8. The effect of the population measure is less important than the demographic educational enrollment and poverty variables, but it suggests that the education enrollment variable is robust, as the number of *becas* varies with the population.

Comparing political and demographic variables reveals an uneven effect: political determinants have some influence over *Sucre beca* distribution, while poverty does not. However, educational enrollment shows a degree of targeting influence. Evaluating the influence of each of these variables on *beca* distribution allows comparison of individual determinants.

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The marginal effects analysis below permits substantive examination of the political determinants, comparing the distribution according to Chávez and opposition-aligned states across relevant levels of electoral support for his parties.

4.2.3.2 *Misión Sucre Becas* **Marginal Effects**

This section provides substantive analysis of the models above, particularly the effect of increasing values of electoral support on the number of *becas* provided for *Misión Sucre* participants, holding other variables at their means. The distribution of *becas* is compared between states with Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors, and closeness in political contests is evaluated. Figures 7-8 below depict these comparisons.

The key trend revealed in the figures below is that the Venezuelan government distributed *Sucre* benefits in an increasingly parochial fashion over the decade: early on, negligible differences existed between pro-Chávez and pro-opposition states, but as the decade progressed *becas* were first distributed to Chávez-aligned and then to opposition-aligned states. However, the government did not give much consideration to close races: despite changes in the distributions across the decade, the program only targeted close races in the in the 2010 Assembly elections, a contest that reflected a narrow victory for the leader.

Holding other variables at their means the marginal effect of the number of *becas* distributed in 2004 is relatively similar between opposition- and Chávez-aligned states. In 2007, the marginal effect of the number of *becas* distributed is greater in Chávez-aligned states than opposition-aligned ones. The 2006 presidential election and during the 2007 recall referendum show pro-Chávez distributions of *becas* to be greater by 39 and 27 percent respectively. The trend then reverses in 2010 as the marginal effect of the number of becas distributed is greater in

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opposition-aligned states than Chávez-aligned ones. The 2008 governor election and 2010 assembly election show pro-opposition distribution of *becas* to be greater by 39 and 14 percent, respectively.

Taken in context with the significance of the determinants of targeting in the models above, the marginal effects estimates reveal a substantive effect for the political outcomes, particularly in light of weakening of the effects of program-relevant demographic variables on targeting over time. What begins as a relatively programmatic distribution then becomes parochial as core, then opposition targeting strategies are pursued in the distribution of *becas*.

Figure 7. *Misión Sucre Becas* Distributions, 2000 Election

Figure 8. *Misión Sucre Becas* Distributions, 2004 Contests

Figures 7-8 show the distribution of *Misión Sucre becas* administered in 2004 in states with Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors, holding other values at their means. The differences are revealed to be negligible between Chávez- and opposition- aligned states, with the largest difference occurring according to the 2004 governor elections. Figure 7 evaluates the distributions for 2000 electoral data, where pro-Chávez states receive just 1 percent (21) additional *becas* than do opposition states. Figure 8 evaluates the distributions for the 2004 governor elections and the 2004 recall referendum. In the 2004 governor elections, pro-opposition states receive 9 percent (165) more *becas* than pro-Chávez states, holding other values at their means, with significant differences between 55 and 70 percent support. In the 2004 recall referendum, pro-Chávez states receive just 1 percent (17) more *becas* than opposition states, holding other values at their means. In these three contests, the positive slope shows that greater levels of electoral support yield more *becas*. These estimates show support for landslide targeting strategy.

Figure 9. *Misión Sucre Becas* Distributions, 2006 Presidential Elections

Figure 10. *Misión Sucre Becas* Distributions, 2007 Constitutional Referendum

Figures 9-10 show a departure in 2007 from the early period, as the number of *becas* administered reflects a pro-Chávez distribution. Figure 9 evaluates the distributions for the 2006 presidential election, where the number of *becas* in pro-Chávez states was greater by 39 percent (458). The differences are significant between 60 and 75 percent support. Figure 10 evaluates the distributions for the two packages of the 2007 referendum, where the number of *becas* in pro-Chávez states was greater by 27 and 28 percent (598 and 612 respectively). The differences are

significant between 47 and 60 percent support for the recall referendum. In all three contests, the positive slope shows that greater levels of electoral support yield more *becas*. Like the 2004 data, the 2007 distributions offer support for landslide contests.

Figure 11. *Misión Sucre Becas* Distributions, 2008 Governor Elections

Figure 12. *Misión Sucre Becas* Distribution, 2010 Assembly

Figures 11-12 show a change in direction from the 2007 data, as the number of *becas* administered in 2010 reflects an opposition-targeted distribution. Figure 11 evaluates the distributions for the 2008 governor election, where the number of *becas* in opposition-aligned

states was greater by 41 percent (720). These differences significantly favor opposition states between 45 and 65 percent support. Figure 12 evaluates the distributions for the Assembly election, where the number of *becas* in pro-Chávez states was greater by 14 percent (270). In the 2008 contest, the positive slope shows that greater levels of electoral support yield more *becas*. Like 2004 and 2007, the data for the 2008 governor election shows a landslide contests. However, when the number of becas were examined according to the 2010 Assembly election determinants, the positive slope turned to negative, suggesting targeting for close races as opposed to the landslides that came before. The more recent 2010 data likelier reveals the strategy

Overall, the distribution toward Chávez-aligned states is evident. Holding other variables at their means, the targeting of *Misión Sucre becas* was separately targeted to core and opposition support in 2007 and 2010 by delievering program benefits to different constituencies. From 2004-07 the program was primarily targeted to landslide contests, though the 2010 Assembly elections show that the program eventually was directed to close contests.

4.2.3.3 *Misión Sucre Aldeas* and Community Centers Model

Table 16 displays the results of the *Misión Sucre* models 1-4, in which effects of the political and demographic variables on the numbers of *Aldeas* and Community Centers in 2007 and 2010 are evaluated. Marginal effects analysis is conducted to compare the overall distribution of *Aldeas* in states with Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors, and these are shown in Figures 29-31 below. The models are first examined, followed by the marginal effects analysis.

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Table 16. *Misión Sucre Aldeas* and Community Centers Distribution Analysis

VARIABLES	Model 1 2007 Aldeas and Community Centers (log)	Model 2 2007 Aldeas and Community Centers (log)	Model 3 2010 Aldeas and Community Centers (log)	Model 4 2010 Aldeas and Community Centers (log)
2007 Constitutional Referendum Package A	2.974			
	(2.317)			
2007 Constitutional Referendum Package B		2.473		
		(2.365)		
2008 Governor Election - Chávez Coalition Votes			0.119	
			(0.262)	
2010 Assembly vote				10.82
				(11.17)
Chavez-Aligned Governor	0.229	0.264	2.517#	0.125
	(0.307)	(0.307)	(1.498)	(0.214)
Share of Individuals Living in Poverty	-0.910	-0.747	-1.619#	-0.960
	(1.410)	(1.434)	(1.054)	(0.999)
Number of Secondary and Vocational Schools	7.52e-05	0.000505	0.00229	0.00176
	(0.00237)	(0.00237)	(0.00171)	(0.00152)
Log of Population	0.819*	0.714†	0.243	0.242
	(0.376)	(0.355)	(0.299)	(0.277)
Constant	-8.506#	-6.945	-0.810	0.240
	(5.225)	(4.833)	(3.632)	(3.393)
Observations	24	24	23	24
R-squared	0.645	0.635	0.674	0.674

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, † $p<0.1$, # $p<0.15$

Below the model results are discussed for political and demographic determinants on *Sucre Aldeas.* The key outcome revealed is that the program shows few significant determinants. However, in all four of the models, those living in a Chávez-aligned state received more *becas* than those in opposition-aligned states. No measure is significant, but the marginal effects analysis below reveals differences between the two groups of states for the 2007 and 2010, suggesting the greater distribution of *Aldeas* to Chávez-aligned areas. Overall, the model fit is weaker than for the *Sucre becas*, ranging from 0.635 (Model 2- 2007 constitutional referendum package B on 2007 *Aldeas)* to 0.74 (Model 3 and Model 4 - 2008 governor election and 2010 Assembly election on 2010 *Aldeas*).

Models 1-4 show a positive relationship between the level of Chávez support and the number of individuals receiving *Sucre Aldeas.* More *Misión Sucre Aldeas* are distributed to states with larger shares of Chávez support, offering evidence of landslide targeting strategy, though the electoral support measure is not significant in any of the models. Similarly, the models show greater numbers of *Aldeas* in states with Chavez-aligned governors. In Model 3, this measure is associated with *beca* distribution just beyond traditional alpha levels ($p < .15$).

The models also present areas of program- relevant demographic influence, which provide contrasting evidence. The number of secondary schools has a positive effect on the number of statewide *Aldeas* throughout the models, and population is positive over time. However the relationship with poverty is negative. The effect of both the number of secondary and vocational schools and population are positive over time. In general, the measures offer evidence that *Aldea* targeting reached states with more schools, consistent with greater populations.

The negative relationship of poverty on *Aldeas* suggests that the centers are being distributed to states that are not as poor. In Model 3, this measure is associated with *Aldea* distribution just beyond traditional alpha levels ($p < .15$).

Comparing political and demographic variables reveals the consistent effect of political determinants on the distribution of *Sucre Aldeas*. Evaluating the influence of each of these variables on *Aldea* distribution provides an understanding of their individual effects on the program. The analysis continues below as the effect of the key political variables are evaluated for each model.

4.2.3.4 *Misión Sucre Aldeas* and Community Centers Marginal Effects

This section provides substantive analysis of the effect of increasing values of electoral support on the number of *Aldeas* and Community Centers provided for *Misión Sucre* participants, holding other variables at their means. The distribution of *Aldeas* is compared between states with Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors, and closeness in political contests is evaluated. The key finding revealed is that there is a consistent distribution of *Aldeas* and community centers toward Chávez-aligned states in both 2007 and 2010, particularly among landslide contests.

Taken in context with the significance of the determinants of targeting in the models above, the marginal effects estimates reveal a consistent substantive effect for the political variables, which occurs in light of the weak effects of program-relevant demographic variables on targeting over time. Figures 13-15 below depict these comparisons.

Figure 13. *Sucre Aldeas*, 2007

Figure 14. *Sucre Aldeas*, 2010

Figure 15. *Sucre Aldeas*, 2010

Overall the *Aldeas* show targeting to pro-Chávez states, particularly among increasing levels of electoral support, though at no point are the distributions significantly different from each other. Figure 13 evaluates the distributions for the two packages of the 2007 referendum, where the number of *becas* in pro-Chávez states was greater by 9.3 and 11 centers (26 percent and 30 percent, respectively). In these contests, the slope of the line is positive, suggesting targeting for supportive races. By 2010, the differences in estimates vary, but the targeting is in the same direction as the 2007 data. Figure 14 evaluates the distribution for 2008 governor election, where the number of *Aldeas* in pro-Chávez states was greater by 86 percent (30 centers). In Figure 15, evaluating the distribution for the 2010 Assembly election, the number of *Aldeas* in Chávez-aligned states was greater by 13 percent (5 centers). For both the 2008 contest and the 2010 Assembly election, the positive slope shows that greater levels of electoral support yield more *Aldeas* in 2010.

Overall, the distribution toward Chávez-aligned states continues. Holding other variables at their means, the targeting of *Misión Sucre Aldeas* is intended to produce support among core pro-Chávez constituents in 2007 and 2010 contests. The core targeting is directed to landslide supporters in all of the contests here.

4.2.3.5 *Misión Ribas Beca* Model

Table 17 displays the results of the *Misión Ribas* models 1-4, in which effects of the political and demographic variables on the numbers of *becas* in 2004 are evaluated. Marginal effects analysis is conducted to compare the overall distribution of *becas* in states with Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors, and these are shown in Figures 32-3 below. The models are first examined, followed by the marginal effects analysis.

Table 17. *Misión Ribas* Distribution Analysis

	Model 1 2004 Misión Ribas Becas (log)	**Model 2** 2004 Misión Ribas Becas (log)	**Model 3** 2004 Misión Ribas Becas (log)
2000 Presidential Election	5.196		
	(3.626)		
2004 Governor Election - Chávez Coalition Votes		3.165	
		(2.634)	
2004 Recall Referendum			2.520
			(4.000)
Chavez-Aligned Governor	-0.0644	0.0162	0.251
	(0.532)	(0.541)	(0.491)
Share of Individuals Living in Poverty	-2.541	-3.307#	-3.031
	(1.758)	(2.070)	(2.304)
Share of Population Enrolled in Secondary and Vocational Schools	59.73	83.46	71.89
	(86.01)	(94.39)	(94.82)
Log of Population	0.592*	0.481#	0.660*
	(0.236)	(0.288)	(0.277)
Constant	-2.582	0.0627	-2.125
	(4.293)	(4.290)	(5.607)
Observations	24	23	24
R-squared	0.375	0.334	0.319

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, † $p<0.1$, # $p<0.15$

Below the model results are discussed for political and demographic determinants on *Ribas becas.* The key outcome revealed for the 2004 data is that the program shows few significant determinants. The models present two kinds of political influence: the model that accounts for the 2000 presidential election shows opposition targeting. According to models that accounts for the 2004 contests, those living in Chávez-aligned state received more *becas* than those in opposition-aligned states. No measure is significant, but the marginal effects analysis below reveals differences between the two groups of states. Overall, the model fit is much weaker than for the 2004 *Ribas* analyses, ranging from .319 (Model 3 recall referendum) to .375 (Model 1 – 2000 presidential election), and showing no significant determinants.

Models 1-3 show a positive relationship between the level of Chávez support and the number of individuals receiving *Ribas becas*, with targeting favoring landslide contests. However, variation occurs among states with Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors. Model 1 shows a negative effect on the number of *becas* distributed to states with, while Models 2-3 show a positive effect on the measure. The more recent measures support core targeting, while the older measure supports opposition targeting.

The models also present areas of program-relevant demographic influence, which provide contrasting evidence. The share of individuals enrolled in secondary and vocational school and population have positive relationships with the number of *becas* distributed, while poverty is a consistent negative determinant. The enrollment in secondary and vocational schools has a positive effect on the number of statewide *becas* in Models 1-3. Population is positive over time and significant in Models 1 and 3. In Model 2, population is associated with *beca* distribution just beyond traditional alpha levels ($p < .15$).

Like the *Sucre becas*, modeling the relevant political contests on 2004 Ribas *becas* shows that poverty is a poor predictor of scholarships. The measure is a negative determinant, consistent across all models. In Model 2 poverty is associated with *beca* distribution just beyond traditional alpha levels ($p < .15$).

Comparing political and demographic variables reveals an uneven effect: modeling the 2000 political variables present evidence for opposition targeting, while modeling the 2004 political variables shows evidence for core targeting, particularly in landslide contests. Like *Sucre Becas* and *Aldeas*, poverty was a poor determinant of the distribution of *Ribas becas*, though enrollment was slightly better. Evaluating the influence of each of these variables on *beca* distribution provides an understanding of their individual effects on the program. The analysis continues below as the effect of the key political variables are evaluated for each model.

4.2.3.6 *Misión Ribas Becas* Marginal Effects

This section provides substantive analysis of the effect of increasing values of electoral support on the number of *becas* provided for *Misión Ribas* participants, holding other variables at their means. The distribution of *becas* is compared between states with Chávez- and opposition-aligned governors, and closeness in political contests is evaluated. The key finding is the 2004 political contests show core targeting among for the *Ribas becas*, but this conflicts with the evidence from the 2000 model, which shows a slight level of support for opposition targeting.

Taken in context with the significance of the determinants of targeting in the models above, the marginal effects estimates reveal a limited substantive effect for the political variables in 2004, which occurs in light of the weak effects of program-relevant demographic variables on targeting over time. Figures 16-7 below depict these comparisons.

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
Figure 16. *Ribas Becas* 2000

Figure 17. *Ribas Becas* 2004 Contests

Overall the *becas* show evidence of targeting to pro-opposition states in 2000. However in 2004, they show consistent evidence of targeting to pro-Chávez states, particularly among increasing levels of electoral support, though at no point are the distributions significantly different from each other. Figure 16 evaluates the distributions for the two packages of the 2000 presidential election where the number of *becas* in opposition-aligned states was greater, by 7 percent (111 *becas*), holding other values at their means. For the recall referendum and governor election, however, core targeting is revealed. Figure 17 evaluates the distribution for these

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contests. Evaluating the distribution for the governor elections the number of *becas* in opposition-aligned states was greater by just 24 *becas* (2 percent), holding other values at their means. As above, the positive slope shows that greater levels of electoral support yield more *becas*. Evaluating the distribution for the recall referendum, the number of *becas* in core states was greater by 693 *becas* (29 percent), holding other values at their means. For each of the three governor and recall contests, the slope of the line was positive, suggesting targeting of landslide races, but for the recall referendum, the slope was negative, suggesting targeting of close races.

Overall, the evidence is mixed. The 2000 model shows opposition targeting primarily directed to opposition, though both the 2004 governor and recall referendum show core targeting support for close elections. With 2004 being the only year of available data for *Ribas becas*, it is difficult to conclude a single program direction for resources targeted that year, but two of the three measures support core elections.

4.2.4   Summing Up

Regression and marginal effects analysis of the education *Misiones* reveals that over the course of the decade, at different times the various programs accomplished most of the political targeting techniques under analysis: core and opposition voters were reached in both close and landslide elections. Modeling the program relationships with political and demographic variables shows particular trends: *Misión Sucre* initially targeted core states with *becas*, but moved to opposition targeting; its *Aldeas* and community centers were targeted to core states, and with limited evidence, *Ribas* targeted core states with *becas*.

The program-relevant demographic variables did not consistently predict distribution of benefits. The strongest evidence that programs targeted intended beneficiaries occurs according to

measures of the number of students enrolled in each state, but not according to measures of poverty. This is striking, as *Sucre* and *Ribas becas* were intended to reach disadvantaged students.

In *Sucre*, *beca* distributions were significantly determined by enrollment during the early part of the program, while during the middle of the decade the models revealed poverty to vary negatively with beca distribution. For *Ribas*, the enrollment variable varied positively with the number of *becas*, but the poverty variable was consistently negative, suggesting that the program was not distributed according to programmatic criteria.

Misión Sucre becas were distributed first among supporters and core voters in mostly landslide contests. Holding other values at their means, estimates of the effect of the 2006 presidential election and the 2007 constitutional referendum showed that Chávez-aligned states received 39 and 27 percent more *becas* respectively. Throughout the early part of the decade, *becas* were distributed to shore up support among core political constituencies in landslide elections. However, estimates of the effect of the 2008 governor contest and 2010 Assembly election reveal support for targeting among opposition constituencies, holding other values at their means.

Misión Sucre Aldeas and community centers were distributed to core voters in landslide contests. In the constitutional referendum of 2007, the size of the effect was clearer, but estimates of the effect of the 2008 governor contest and 2010 Assembly election show uneven effects for how many *Aldeas* supporting states receive. Controlling for other factors, the direction persisted throughout the decade.

The limited data for *Misión Ribas becas* shows distribution to core voters in landslide contests in 2004, though the estimate of the presidential election in 2000 shows distribution to opposition voters. The mixed result is less clear than *Sucre Aldeas*, but the most recent data is

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likelier a better predictor on 2004 distributions. A clear trend emerges for landslide contests: the 2000 presidential and 2004 contests each show landslide targeting.

The program distributions revealed in analysis of the education *Misiones* reflect a parochial distributive strategy. Program-relevant demographic variables, particularly poverty, prove to be limited determinants, indicating minimal program oversight to limit the patron-client relationship. The limited oversight is substantiated in the case study section above. The result is the stunning electoral effect revealed in Chapter 6 for education *Misión* recipients on support for Chávez and affiliated parties. In choosing among recipients according to political criteria, minimizing program rules and oversight, the education *Misiones* provided Chávez with a mechanism to build electoral support among constituents. The program delivered social benefits, but through careful political targeting, the electoral benefit to the leader was greater.

4.3 CONCLUSION

Analysis of *Bolsa Família* and education *Misión* program oversight, expenditures, and distribution of program benefits reveals the institutional effect on distributional strategy. *Bolsa Família* reflects a programmatic distributive strategy, featuring rule-based program administration. The education *Misiones* reflect a parochial distributive strategy, with the rule-based contours of the Brazilian program largely absent.

The distribution of *Bolsa Família* benefits is consistently determined by program criteria instead of political criteria. Although core voter targeting peaks in the 2006 elections and core is consistent between 2006 and 2010, there is otherwise no consistent difference between beneficiaries in Lula- and opposition-aligned districts. Case study analysis reveals the criteria to

be firmly established, with steady expenditure patterns that reveal no now-or-never expenditures to quickly gain the support of constituents in advance of an election. The outcomes of regression and marginal effects analysis show the effect of program oversight as *Bolsa Família* limits the patron-client relationship through its administration.

This contrasts with the distribution of the *Misiones*, which reflect persistent differences between Chávez- and opposition-aligned states: as *Misión Sucre* targeted supporters and core voters before switching to opposition voters in 2010. *Sucre Aldeas* were targeted to supporters in 2007 and 2010. *Ribas* appears to have targeted core voters. Case study analysis reveals the limited importance of program criteria, with oversight problems appearing throughout the decade. Expenditure patterns revealed both now-or-never spending peaks to quickly gain the support of constituents in advance of elections in the middle of the decade, and spending declines as programs flagged. The outcomes of regression and marginal effects analysis suggest parochial strategy, as program oversight and expenditures show that the *Misiones* do not limit the patron-client relationship in program administration.

This chapter depicts the expenditure and distribution of program benefits for the two programs. Chapter 5 will examine the determinants of parochial and programmatic policy choices.

5.0 EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE INTERACTIONS AND TARGETED ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS IN BRAZIL AND VENEZUELA

This chapter examines the political determinants of antipoverty policies chosen by presidents in Brazil and Venezuela. Each case illustrates the constitutional and partisan powers of the presidency by revealing institutional differences that determine relations as legislators delegate policymaking authority. The case begins by describing the capacity of decree power and the political context that enables decree usage. It then proceeds by describing the characteristics of the legislature that limit the latitude of the executive in designing policy: the institutionalization of the party system and the share of parties in the legislature. Following this, the cases describe the executive-legislative interactions that resulted in program passage. Key opposition and government representative political preferences are detailed, allowing for the analysis of what characteristics the programs could have had absent the institutional effect on the program features. The cases are then related to the theory introduced in Chapter 2.

The chapter proceeds with the Brazil case, presenting the characteristics outlined above, then continues with the Venezuela case. Presenting the cases in this order permits illustration of the horizontal accountability effects in Brazil that limit the executive's ability to exploit their authority before demonstrating the party system breakdown in Venezuela that exposes the limits of horizontal accountability. The political routes to *Bolsa Família* and the *Misiones* are described

here followed by detailed descriptions of program oversight, expenditure and redistributive outcomes in Chapter 6.

5.1   BRAZIL

This section will evaluate the constitutional and partisan powers of the presidency in Brazil. The Brazilian case illustrates the effects of a strong president with constitutional decree authority and favorable conditions to issue decrees. However, the partisan powers of the president are weak, as electoral rules limit partisan composition of the legislature from containing a majority of the president's party and require the crafting of coalitions to govern. This results in a limited president whose partisan powers matter more than their decree powers: to get decrees passed into laws, the executive relies on the presence of a stable supporting coalition.

Even as decree usage increased after 2001, presidents required a coalition to translate decrees into law. In Brazil, constitutional powers allow the executive to initiate legislation by decree, labeled by Carey and Shugart as a form of Constitutional Decree Authority (Carey and Shugart 1997). Constitutional changes and a public opinion climate amenable to delegation of legislative power to the newly elected President Lula resulted in a favorable climate for the leader to issue decrees: a 2001 constitutional amendment increased the decree powers of the executive, allowing the president to issue provisional decrees with a rule that required the assembly to act on them within 45 days. These changes were met with an executive that came to power with a large margin of victory, giving broad authority on which Lula placed his agenda.

Despite increased decree usage, the executive relies on partisan powers – political support from its coalition – to enact their agenda. The partisan powers of the presidency are constrained

by electoral rules that limit the president's party from maintaining an outright majority in Congress. This results in coalition behavior among the major parties that have institutionalized over time. Initial coalitional composition limited the policy agenda initiated by Lula, and due to institutionalized political opposition in a consolidating party system, the leader was met with a legislature amenable to the introduction of reform measures that moderated the policy outcome of *Bolsa Família*.

The strong decree power of the executive and broad electoral authority of the Brazilian presidency meet weak partisan powers, given how electoral rules affect the composition of the legislature. The interaction of these two factors explains how the legislature checks presidential initiatives introduced by decree (Alston et al. 2006; Ames 2001, 2002). Despite the particularly strong constitutional powers, the president is checked by the composition of parties in the system.

This section will review the strength of the constitutional and partisan powers in Brazil. It will then describe the passage of *Bolsa Família*, and relate the outcome to the theory proposed in Chapter 2 and elaborated in the earlier sections. In doing so, it will review the policy preferences of the opposition and members of the PT to illustrate the constraints faced: in the presence of the strong party system that left the PT with weak partisan powers, members of Lula's party could not reduce program conditionalities to deliver it in a way to include more political supporters.

5.1.1 Constitutional Powers

In Brazil, decree authority is constitutionally permitted under Article 62, allowing the executive to introduce legislation through decree, known as *medidas previsórias com força de lei* (provisional decrees with the force of law) (Carey and Shugart 1997; Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008). Delegation theory posits that decree use increases during periods of political conditions favorable

to the executive. Three conditions made decrees more likely: a change in decree rules that resulted in stronger agenda power and an increase in the number of decrees issued, Lula's overall level of popularity, and Congressional composition – here government coalitions – favorable to Lula's government.

5.1.1.1 Institutional Effects on Executive Power

The number of decrees has increased over successive presidential administrations from Franco to Lula. The practice of introducing decrees – (*medidas provisórias com força de lei,* or MPVs) is routine, however decree power sharpened in the early 2000s (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008; Reich 2002). That year, an amendment to Article 62 of the Constitution in 2001 limited their use to specific issue areas, and limited the number of times that decrees could be reissued to one from an unlimited number of reissues (Alston et al. 2006, 18). With the change, issuance allowed the executive to legislate while requiring Congressional review within 45 days (Alston et al. 2006). Failure of Congress to act within that timeframe resulted in the decree automatically rising to the top of the legislative agenda, overriding other business, a sure impact on the assembly's ability to prioritize initiatives (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008, 7). If no action were taken, the decree would expire 120 days after issue, and after expiration, and the president could not reintroduce the decree during the same legislative session. This allowed the president a limited window to propose legislation and secure a coalition for approval, and placed demands on the executive who had one chance to "get it right" (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008, 14). This placed pressure on the executive branch to decree legislation that would be met with approval. It also led to increases in decree introduction, as a decree would make a vote on legislation likely to occur within 45 days of issue. After this change occurred, the president had increased power over the Congressional

agenda: Lula signed decrees at a rate nearly 50 percent greater than the average rate of predecessors from 1988-2001 (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008, 7).

Passage of the amendment had a sharpening effect on the agenda power of the president, resulting in more decrees, not less, being introduced. After the amendment was passed, the monthly average of decrees more than doubled (from 3.1 to 6.8 per month) at the end of the Cardoso administration, and the high rate persisted during Lula's first term (4.8 per month) (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008, 7-8). Because presidents could reissue decrees indefinitely in the re-reform period, these decrees were more resistant to political context (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008, 21). The change resulted in greater sensitivity of the executive to the context of Congressional politics. Over time, decree usage by the president has become more sensitive to political context as the reduction in the number of decree reissues required more careful consideration of matters of popularity, management of the coalition that supports the president (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2008, 20-1). With careful management of Congressional politics, decrees became one of the specialties of the executive branch over time as rule changes focused the agenda power of the presidency.

5.1.1.2 Favorability Effects on Delegation

In addition to the effect of the constitutional change, positive public opinion creates a climate more favorable to decree usage. Periods where legislatures delegate to executives to issue decrees include times when presidents enjoy greater support from the legislature and the public and during congruence among policy preferences of the executive and legislature (Pereira, Power, and Rennó 2005). The relative popularity of Lula resulted in legislative support for measures he introduced, as shown below through electoral and public opinion data.

Table 18 shows electoral margin of victory in the second round of elections 2002-2010. The electoral margin of victory exceeded 20 percent in the second round of the 2002 election. Lula captured 61.3 percent of the vote compared to Serra's 38.7 percent, a 22.6 percent margin of victory (Álvarez-Rivera 2010).

Table 18. Executive Margin of Victory, Brazil 1994-2010

Margin of Victory, 1994-98; 2002-2010 (Second Round)

Year	Victor	% of Vote	Challenger	% of Vote	Margin
1994	Cardoso	54.3%	Lula	27.0%	27.3%
1998	Cardoso	53.1%	Lula	31.7%	21.4%
2002	Lula	61.30%	Serra	38.70%	22.60%
2006	Lula	60.83%	Alckmin	39.17%	21.66%
2010	Dilma	56.05%	Serra	43.95%	12.10%

(Álvarez-Rivera 2010)

Carrying a sizable electoral margin shows the public support for Lula compared to opposition candidates, but it also offers a mandate for the early part of the president's term. Lula's margin was smaller than Cardoso's first-term margin (27.3 percent), though certainly sizable. The level of popularity expressed through electoral support supports the presence of conditions favorable to delegation by the legislature.

This support is reinforced in the early part of Lula's term (through 2004) by public opinion data sampling the Brazilian population. At the time when Lula introduced decrees relating to *Bolsa Família,* favorable opinion (43 percent) provided him with a climate conducive to delegation. Figure 18 reveals that an overall rating of "Great/Good" greater than 40 percent extended into early 2004 (Datafolha 2006).

Figure 18. Evaluation of Lula's Performance, 2003-5

Lula's positive rating was overall high in early months compared to Collor (15 percent), Franco (32 percent), and near the first term of Cardoso (47 percent, 24 percent second term) (Datafolha 2004). In questions directly comparing the president and Cardoso, greater than 50 percent of respondents rated Lula's performance better than the former president from June 2003-Decemmber 2004 (Datafolha 2004).

Support for Lula in both public opinion and in the electoral arena shows the degree to which the conditions are favorable for delegation. The effects of support and institutional changes provided Lula with a position of strength to enact his agenda, and initiate its legislation through decrees. With decrees occurring at a rate 50 percent greater than Collor, Franco, or Cardoso, the

marginal difference in decree usage was a product of these enabling factors. The result of the increase in decree usages reflects greater agenda-setting power of the executive.

Constitutional powers that give presidents the strong authority to issue decrees reflect only part of the executive-legislative relationship. The assembly has the power to control their policy interests through the amendment process during deliberation (Cox and Morgenstern 2001). Both Reich (2002) and Ames (2001, 2002) show how exercise of final authority on the approval of presidential initiatives means that decrees rarely emerge from Congress unscathed. The partisan powers that influence decree passage will be explored below.

5.1.2   Partisan Powers

At the time of introduction of *Bolsa Família,* Lula's ability to exercise partisan power was limited by a weak governing coalition. Two components of the partisan powers of the president will be explored in this section: the institutionalization of the party system and share of congressional members in the governing coalition favorable to Lula. These reveal both regularization of interactions between the parties that compete in the system and the size of Lula's contingent. They also show *why* initiatives rarely pass the legislature unscathed: as deputies align with the pro-government and opposition coalitions, the share of representatives that support presidential initiatives and the institutionalization of the opposition affect the degree to which the President can enact their agenda. In the case of *Bolsa Família*, this mattered on two occasions: at passage, the program had to sufficiently reflect the policy preferences of opposition political groups that the PT needed to court to pass the program; and later during debate over the reinstatement over program conditions, in opposition mobilization to constrain the PT from eliminating them

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altogether. Both periods will be detailed later; the focus below is on the consolidation of the system that resulted in opposition checks.

5.1.2.1 Party System Consolidation

After democratization the party system consolidated, transitioning from the dominance of legacy pro-government and opposition polices to a widely dispersed distribution of parties in the legislature that requires governing coalitions within the presidential system. The system lacks rootedness, with party switching, low partisan identity, and little education- and income- based party identification (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Zucco 2009). Yet the parties remain, and average party age has increased from nearly 10 years in 1990 to over 20 years in 2006 (Zucco, 2009, 31). According to Zucco, the party system in Brazil has shown to be more stable over time, despite the failure to establish rootedness.

Over time, the *Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira* (PSDB) and *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT), have emerged as the two most successful parties, while the *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (PMDB) has served as a swing party, with other smaller parties alternating their alignment over time (Zucco 2009). In an examination of polling data from 1989-2006, from Zucco (2009) finds low levels of societal rootedness among parties.[12] While respondents identified supporting the PSDB and the PT stands at a low rates of 7.5 percent and 19.9 percent, these parties captured 80 percent of the presidential vote in the last five elections (Zucco 2009). Support for the PT has traditionally rested with middle class voters, though the level of highly educated and middle-income voters decreased by 2006 (Zucco, 2009, 8-9). Yet

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[12]1989-2002 surveys conducted by Datafolha asked the open-ended question: "what is your preferred party?" The 2006 survey, conducted by Ibope, asked first whether the respondent "had preference or sympathy for any party" and "if yes, which party?"

over this time, the total amount of partisan identification has fallen below 45 percent of respondents. The PMDB maintains support among voters with little education, though the support is relatively uniform among low-income levels. Support for the PSDB is found among higher-level income and education groups (Zucco, 2009, 9). This lack of rootedness has resulted in a tendency to choose pragmatic strategies that maximize votes.

Because of electoral rules that limit the size of the presidential party, Brazilian parties must build coalitions to govern. This means that cooperation occurs among parties that mobilize via mass movement politics as well as those that are vote-maximizing, moderating their positions to achieve electoral strategy. Radical redistributive-oriented parties, which would historically apply to the PT, find moderation to be an important consideration of policy proposals that require legislative approval, including budgeting for new spending initiatives (Hunter, 2010, 33). As parties choose to maximize voters without class- or status- based mobilizing roots, their programmatic linkages become less clear, and delivery of benefits becomes more important.

Despite the incentive to generate vote-maximizing parties, the party system has consolidated, as can be seen in the measurement of the effective number of parties (Dunleavy and Boucek 2003; Laakso and Taagepera 1979). This provides not only a measurement of the size of vote-getting parties within the system but also a sense of the party competition that disciplines policymaking. Table 19 reveals the consolidation of the party system over the democratic period. It traces from the first post-liberalization election with limited parties through a considerable expansion in the 1990s where over 10 parties received double-digit numbers of seats in the legislature.

Table 19. Effective Number of Parties, Brazil, 1986-2010

(Álvarez-Rivera 2010)

Year	Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (Party Share)	Effective Number of Electoral Parties (Vote Share)
1986	2.83	6.94
1990	8.68	30.90
1994	8.16	24.62
1998	7.14	12.66
2002	8.49	9.28
2006	9.32	10.62
2010	10.37	11.21

The effective number of parliamentary parties increased steadily from 1986-2010. The value was at its lowest at 2.83 in 1986, expanded to 7.14 in 1998, and peaked in the 2010 at 10.37. The effective number of electoral parties increased from an initial value of 6.94 to a peak value of 30.90 in 1990, declining to 9.28 in 2002 and rebounding to 11.21 in 2010. While the two values differ in direction, by 2010 the share of voter support reaching double digits only included the PT, the PMDB, and the PSDB. The party system reflected three major parties and a number of smaller parties. How the parties aligned into legislative coalitions, particularly the share of the parties in the legislature during the conversion of *Bolsa Família* into law will be discussed below.

5.1.2.2 Parties in the Legislature

In Brazil, the coalitional structure forces political compromise among executives and rewards parties who deliver to their constituents. These governing coalitions are required due to electoral rules – open list proportional representation – that induce a multiparty system and limit the degree to which the president's party can hold a majority of congressional seats (Alston, et al., 2006, 9). After the Collor regime, which initially avoided politicizing the government, executives cultivated

coalitions with other parties (Cheibub Figueiredo, 2007, 199). In a system with weak party discipline and ideological roots for party strength, such coalitions are maintained through careful distribution of individual and coalitional goods, as well as cabinet positions.[13] This is particularly true for politicians seeking to draw support of opposing legislators during roll call votes (Ames 2002).

The ability of the executive to control their agenda is dependent on creating coalitions to enact policy change. The coalition that formed following Lula's inauguration comprised of the PT, the *Partido Liberal* (PL), *Partido Comunista do Brasil* (PC do B), *Partido Socialista Brasileiro* (PSB), *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* (PTB), *Partido Verde* (PV). The composition of Lula's coalition constrained his agenda for the first year of presidency, despite the typical enthusiasm associated with forcing him to rely on measures to court a winning coalition. Revisiting Table 1, Lula's 2002 vote share was over 61 percent, 8 percentage points higher than Cardoso's 1998 victory. Yet the leader could not muster a majority governing coalition until 2005, restricting the extent to which he could enact his agenda.

With a minority governing coalition, Lula lacked the partisan powers necessary to enact his agenda within the Assembly. Cheibub Figurerido (2007) offers calculations for the share of presidential party and government coalitions for democratic regimes in Brazil. Table 20 presents the composition and shares of the coalitions of Lula and Cardoso. In all the coalitions listed, the president's share of seats in the lower house never exceeds 18.3 percent.

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[13] Mainstream theory suggests that two main goods are exchanged to assist in the development of a coalition: patronage and cabinet positions. The exchange between the executive and members of the legislature allows presidents to manage the governing coalition. In a system with weak party discipline, the exchange of pork barrel and coalitional goods provides a means for ongoing adjustments to the coalition, given the weakness in party discipline (Alston et al. 2006; Ames 2002; Raile, Pereira, and Power 2010). In addition to pork, executives exchange ministry positions for coalition maintenance. The increase in this practice occurred following the Collor impeachment and continued through Lula's presidency (Cheibub Figueiredo, 2007, 199). Interestingly enough, pork was not included in the amendments approved for *Bolsa Família.*

Table 20. Government Coalitions, Brazil, 1995-2007

President	Term	Coalition	Party	Coalition	Dates	President's Party Share of Seats in Câmara	Coalition Share of Seats in Câmara
Cardoso	I	1	PSDB	PSDB-PFL-PMDB-PTB	1/1/1995-4/25/1996	12.5%	56.1%
Cardoso	I	2	PSDB	PSDB-PFL-PMDB-PTB-PPB	4/26/1996-12/31/1998	16.6%	77.2%
Cardoso	II	1	PSDB	PSDB-PFL-PMDB-PPB	1/1/1999-3/5/2002	18.3%	73.2%
Cardoso	II	2	PSDB	PMDB-PSDB-PPB	6/3/2002-12/31/2002	18.2%	45.2%
Lula	I	1	PT	PT-PL-PCdoB-PSB-PTB-PDT-PPS-PV	1/1/2003-1/22/2004	18.0%	42.9%
Lula	I	2	PT	PT-PL-PCdoB PSB-PTB-PPS-PV-PMDB	1/23/2004-1/31/2005	17.7%	62.4%
Lula	I	3	PT	PT-PL-PCdoB-PSB-PTB-PV-PMDB	2/1/2005-5/19/2005	17.7%	57.7%
Lula	I	4	PT	PT-PL-PCdoB-PSB-PTB-PMDB	5/20/2005-7/22/2005	17.7%	58.3%
Lula	I	5	PT	PT-PL-PCdoB -PSB-PTB-PP-PMDB	7/23/2005-1/31/2007	17.7%	69.6%

(Cheibub Figuerido 2007)

At inauguration, Lula's coalition reflected 42.9 percent of deputies in the lower house. This remained until 2005, when the PMDB joined the coalition, bringing its size to 62.4%. In comparison to Cardoso, Lula's initial coalition reflected a lower share of lower house seats (42.9 percent to Cardoso's 56.1%) Passage of Lula's agenda at the start of his first term – including converting decrees into law – required him to find the votes to secure a majority. This gave the assembly – particularly the opposition – the opportunity to react to the president's initiatives and influence his agenda. This meant that programs would either require enough pork to secure a majority, or accept the influence of opposition parties on legislation. Relying on opposition

legislative support affected the degree to which he could control the content of laws leading to the design of programs. For *Bolsa Família*, this limited how far the law could diverge from existing targeted social program design.

In the year following his inauguration Lula's weak partisan powers were laid bare. In the absence of a majority governing coalition, the leader lacked the political support necessary to pass key decrees without compromise. Lula needed to secure congressional conversion of MPVs into bills for final Senate approval, since his government coalition was smaller than necessary to pass without help. This meant that legislation needed to either reflect the policy preferences of members of both the government coalition and the opposition, or contain pork to reward opposition members individually for support. Passing an intiative without pork could allow opposition members to influence its content by requiring it to reflect their preferences as well as those of the government. In the case of *Bolsa Família,* politicians chose to attempt to influence policy.

5.1.3   Partisan Powers and *Bolsa Família*

This section reviews the policy preferences of actors during two key moments in the development of *Bolsa Família*. The first subsection examines the influence of opposition political parties on the content of MPV 132, the decree that introduced *Bolsa Família*, and program structure as the bill is sent from the Assembly to the Senate.

The second subsection examines preferences of PT members, as they sought to influence the imposition of program conditions when these were suspended while the programs were integrated. Assessing the preferences of these actors allows for the analysis of what could have been introduced, had the institutional effect not been so strong on the policymaking process.

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These two periods are described and then theory is related to the program details. Both reveal the moderation of *Bolsa Família* during a period of weak partisan powers for the PT.

5.1.3.1 Converting the *Bolsa Família* Decree into Law

MPV 132 incorporated key features of existing government programs, drawing on support of politicians from parties who could claim ownership on program antecedents. This meant integrating existing management elements from local-level programs initiated by PT and PSDB politicians, and simplifying the array of targeted income support programs initiated under Cardoso into one. This meant that the leader could not accommodate the policy preferences sought by some members of the PT, such as converting the income transfer program from a conditional cash transfer to a guaranteed minimum income.

Conversion of MPV 132 in the Câmara sent *Bolsa Família* to the Senate for final approval. The vote was conducted by secret ballot, obscuring the distribution of legislators that moved the legislation onto the Senate. The two parties that sought to obstruct conversion of MPV 132 were a sizable contingent of Cardoso's governing coalition.

A procedural vote early in the day's session to remove the conversion from the agenda offers evidence of opposition to passage. The PFL and the PSDB sought to remove the MPV from the agenda, offering party guidance to vote to obstruct the quorum. The obstruction failed (264/513, 51.4%), with a few members of the PSDB defecting from party guidance (Câmara dos Deputados 2003). Other procedural attempts at holding back conversion of MPV 132 included a PFL proposal to vote article by article. This proposal was rejected as well (Câmara dos Deputados, 2003, 68573). Reasons outlining this opposition were revealed in debate.

PFL representatives cited two concerns in their addresses prior to the procedural vote. Party members offered concerns about the potential for clientelistic exchanges between elected

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officials and beneficiaries (Câmara dos Deputados, 2003, 68449). At the same time, members sought to expand eligibility by increasing the age of children eligible to receive a benefit from 15 to 18 years of age, and by offering a higher (R$120 - half the minimum wage) income threshold on Bolsa Família (Câmara dos Deputados, 2003, 68450). Both changes would open *Bolsa Família* to a greater number of participants. During the debates on the conversion, the PFL reiterated these preferences, proposing them as amendments that were eventually rejected (Câmara dos Deputados, 2003, 68573). While these benefits would have distributed *Bolsa Família* more widely and transferred more resources to the poor, the PT held fast to their version of the program.

The PSDB sought to defeat the MPV conversion and propose separate legislation that reflected the historical record as they saw it on *Bolsa Família.* Many of the complementary programs proposed for consolidation into the new program – *Bolsa Escola*, *Vale Gás*, *Bolsa Alimentação*, and *Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil* (PETI) – were created under the Cardoso administration. The party sought to obstruct the vote on conversion, claiming ownership of the program's key features (Câmara dos Deputados, 2003, 68559-60). It is important to note that while the PSDB criticized ownership of the idea to consolidate social programs into *Bolsa Família*, it did not seek amendments that would alter the structure of the program, as the PFL did. In the program debate, the content of MPV 132 was not subject to challenge by the PSDB.

The matter of ownership of *Bolsa Família* was not enough to obstruct the vote, which occurred under secret ballot. MPV 132 was passed 18 December 2003, sending the bill enacting *Bolsa Família* onto the Senate. The content of the *Bolsa Família* decree was adequate for a majority of Assembly members to approve its passage because it contained many design elements

introduced by opposition politicians. Because there is no roll call record of the vote, it must be inferred that since the main obstacle to PSDB support was ownership of the idea, the party's votes helped pass the program that its politicians helped create.

5.1.3.2 Turning *Bolsa Família* into a Minimum Income Program?

The debate over guaranteed citizen income and conditions was an early feature of *Bolsa Família* program development in 2003-4. Much of the dialogue on social assistance had been framed by the work of PT Senator Edouardo Suplicy to implement a basic guaranteed income for citizens, attempting to establish a "compensatory social policy" up to 2.5 times the minimum salary (Britto & Soares, 2010, 5). Though it was never implemented, a law guaranteeing a minimum income was signed into law the day before *Bolsa Família* was approved (Britto & Soares, 2010). This law gave legitimacy to earlier debates over the establishment of pro-poor programs as the first steps to development of a guaranteed minimum income (Britto and Soares 2010). By the time it was passed, *Bolsa Família* was debated as a step in this direction (Britto & Soares, 2010, 10). During the period when the programs were consolidated and monitoring for program conditions was suspended, it almost became part of the process.

The debate between the targeted *Bolsa Família* and universal guaranteed citizen income was further set off when monitoring for the conditionalities of *Bolsa Família* participation was temporarily suspended in 2004 during the transition year. While monitoring for *Bolsa Escola* had only ever reached 19 percent of schools reporting, this suspension caused a crisis in legitimacy of the program that resulted in leadership changes and management reforms[14] (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 65, Britto & Soares, 2010, 14). As policymakers entered into the media fracas

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[14] The authors also note that conditionality in pre-Bolsa Família programs was not emphasized by the media, which may have been a product of *Bolsa Escola* being a part of the Education Ministry (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 62)..

that resulted from the suspension, a debate over the impact of monitoring compliance and program purpose occurred, with some policymakers suggesting that the mere existence of the conditions was enough to communicate to citizens their constitutional "rights" to basic services (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 62-3). Opposition to this view grew among government, press, and scholars, who suggested that this would hurt long-term structural goals of the program and lead to clientelism (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 63).

The government responded to the media firestorm by announcing plans to "reinstate and systematize the monitoring and compliance with program conditionalities" which resulted in the replacement of the ministry's technical team with "clear instructions to solidify all oversight and controls mechanisms – including for monitoring of conditionalities" (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 63-4). By 2006, 99 percent of municipalities and 93 percent of schools were reporting on school attendance compliance (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 64). Lindert and Vincensini noted that media did not heavily emphasize the use of transfers as a way of promoting basic citizen rights. Media coverage did however focus on the "long run structural impacts," "providing contractual incentives to invest in education and health," and "reducing welfare dependency and *assistencialismo*" (Lindert & Vincensini, 2010, 60-1). Despite the media coverage, the debate was framed according to institutional aspects of the program and constitutional rights by policymakers and the government.

This debate erupted during 2004, the same period of weak partisan powers in which the PT's coalition was in the minority. This limited the extent to which the members of the party could legislate the conditions away. Despite revealing their preference to remove the conditions, the program continued to be administered as designed. The moderation reflected political limitations of Lula's administration and prevented any backdoor option to achieving the goals of a

guaranteed basic income. It revealed the shift from initial party policy goals to a moderated approach, continuing to administer the program as it was designed. The reestablishment of the program criteria ensured that the long-term impacts would be felt and that parochial distributions would be largely avoided.

5.1.3.3 Relating the Passage to Theory

The institutional checks described in the sections above reveal the weak partisan powers of Lula and PT politicians as they proposed *Bolsa Família*. The integration of reform elements predicted by coalition government and the moderation effects predicted in Chapter 2 are shown in the proposal and conversion of MPV 132. The presidential decree that introduced the program reflected moderated policy preferences that bore many reformist characteristics of antecedents introduced by the opposition. This moderation carried through to a precarious period in program administration: when program conditions were suspended, the PT had a unique opportunity to reshape *Bolsa Família* into a guaranteed income program, a policy goal of a prominent member, and reach more constituents by guaranteeing transfers. It could not, and the reforms persisted as the party succumbed to opposition and media pressure. *Bolsa Família* was subject to the political constraints imposed by the opposition when the president's partisan powers were weak.

The program introduced in MPV 132 was more reform oriented, targeted more tightly than desired by even the center-right politicians in the PFL. Compared to the alternative program features proposed, the decree's thresholds were more restrictive in terms of income and age eligibility for recipient children. Even when conditions were relaxed during the first year of implementation, public pressure from opposition politicians and the media prevented the government from transitioning *Bolsa Família* into a guaranteed minimum income program. The limitations of the program's scope resulted from how political competition shaped executive-

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legislative relations.

In the early part of Lula's first term, his partisan powers were relatively weak. The institutionalization of the party system introduced an interaction between the government and opposition as political coalitions formed. It resulted in Lula anticipating the repeat-play characteristics of politics and factoring them into program design: *Bolsa Família* drew its reform-oriented design elements from programs already implemented under the opposition PSDB. The party's claims regarding the provenance of many of *Bolsa Família's* components were correct, though PSDB and PT governments each initiated programs similar to *Bolsa Escola* at the municipal level in Campinas and Distrito Federal, respectively. *Bolsa Família* passed with tighter income thresholds, proposed by a president with a minority coalition in the lower house. It consolidated existing programs passed under opposition government into a single program, simplifying administration.

During the year where programs were consolidated into *Bolsa Família*, the PT reopened a debate over whether the program should be changed to a guaranteed minimum income. With some party members viewing the program as a step in that direction, their best opportunity to do so came when program conditions were suspended during this transition. Two factors prevented the government from abandoning these conditions altogether, eliminating the reform-oriented elements from the program, and widening it to redistribute to more low-income constituents. The coalitional structure remained the same as when the program was introduced, resulting in weak partisan powers, and the public pressure from opposition and media made dropping the conditions impossible. The party simply could not change the program, despite members' preference to widen it from a conditional cash transfer into a guaranteed minimum income by eliminating the reform elements.

Examining the preferences of the political parties in Brazil shows how weak partisan powers affected the program contours: *Bolsa Família* bore significant resemblance to antecedent programs, and at a time when the opportunity to alter the program arose, those who wanted to do so could not. The result of these interactions was a program that retained reform elements – conditionalities that limited parochial distributions from occurring and a targeted, rather than universal program – as well as moderated policy change from earlier programs. Below, the Venezuela case will provide evidence of increased policy latitude where partisan powers are strong.

5.2   VENEZUELA

This section will evaluate the constitutional and partisan powers of the presidency in Venezuela. The Venezuelan case illustrates the effects of a strong president through informally exercised decree powers and the presence of a wide executive margin of victory. The decree powers are weak, dependent on the composition of the legislature. However, partisan powers of Chávez were strong, and since 2000 his political coalition contained a majority in the Assembly.

The president has weak decree powers except in extraordinary situations where the assembly grants sweeping decree powers to the president, labeled by Carey and Shugart as Delegated Decree Authority (Carey and Shugart 1997; Crisp 1997). Chávez used the weak decree authority to govern informally, frequently without legislative approval. Rules regarding decree powers were met with an executive that came to power with a large margin of victory, suggesting broad authority on which Chávez placed his agenda; however the leader was not met with popular

approval throughout his tenure. The patterns of decree usage and approval, particularly in the case of the *Misiones*, vary with the leader's favorability.

The partisan powers of the presidency include majority control of the legislature, which resulted in the Chávez-aligned *Movimento Quinta Republica* (MVR) and other smaller parties endorsing the leader's agenda following the 2000 election, and the *Partido Socialistia Unido de Venezuela* (PSUV), the new party of the president, doing so after the 2005 election. In addition, the breakdown of the party system resulted in the absence of institutionalized opposition to moderate policy proposals.

Decree usage and favorability of Chávez meet strong partisan powers, as the friendly legislature delegated decree authority to the President during a period of devastation for the opposition. The interaction of these two factors explains how the legislature does not provide strong checks on the presidential initiatives, allowing the Misiones to pass.

This section will review the strength of the constitutional and partisan powers in Venezuela. It will then describe the passage of *Misiones*, and relate the outcome to the theory proposed in Chapter 2 and elaborated in the earlier sections. In doing so, it will review the policy preferences of the opposition and government to illustrate how Chávez faced so few constraints – in the presence a weak party system that left him with strong partisan powers – the program criteria were so weak that they could include more political supporters. Below the constitutional and partisan powers presidency will be explored.

5.2.1 Constitutional Powers

Decrees factored separately into the introduction and institutionalization of the Misiones. The decrees that initiated the *Misiones* reflected informal use of ordinary executive power to establish

the foundations and institutions that reflected this new type of administration. The programs were decreed during a period of unfavorable public opinion during Chávez's second presidential term – in part a response to Chávez's favorability problem. They were institutionalized during a period of decree authority delegated by a Chávez-aligned Assembly. This occurred during a period of increased favorability and Congressional composition that was dominant in favor of Chávez-aligned parties.

5.2.1.1 Institutional Effects on Executive Power

Prior to the changes in 1999, the constitutional powers of the executive in Venezuela were considered to be weak, with restriction on consecutive terms, limited veto capability, and delegated decree authority (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). The new constitution enabled consecutive terms, which were lengthened to 6 years (Crisp, 2000, 232). While both constitutions permitted decree authority – *leyes habilitantes (*enabling laws) – delegated by Congress, under Article 203 of the Constitution. Decree authority was previously reserved for economic and financial matters. Under the 1999 Constitution, conditions of its use were expanded to all policy areas and in states of exception (Carey & Shugart, 1997; Crisp, 1997, 2000, 232). The expansion of decree powers and new term limits were pivotal in establishing the *Misiones*, as Chávez decreed the formal institutionalization of the programs in the term following their creation.

Despite the attention to the practice of delegated decree authority, *leyes habilitantes* reflected only part of the decree authority practiced by Chávez, as the leader governed informally by executive decree. Chávez regularly governed by decree, utilizing them to initiate the legislation sent to Congress for approval. Chávez utilized decrees of this type to establish institutions, including the *Misiones*, foundations established to fund infrastructure development, and to direct the activities of nationalized industries. Chávez did not often wait for legislative

approval after initiating a decree; activities often began before approval by the Assembly. It took five years for the *Misiones* initiated by decree in 2003 to be institutionalized into legislation, allowing for regular funding.

The *leyes habilitantes* granted by Congress have been exercised 8 times between 1961-2011. These included Caldera's attempts to institute neoliberal economic reforms, discussed later, which affected the party system. Monaldi, et al. suggest specialization of the executive as a reason for delegating the drafting of legislation to the executive, citing inexperience and lack of expertise among members of the Assembly (Monaldi et al. 2006). Chávez was granted decree authority four times: in 1999, 2000, 2007 and 2010. For all but the 1999 decree, where Chávez threatened a state of emergency, the instances supported Carey and Shugart's hypothesis that delegated decree authority was likelier when the president's party controlled Congress.

The 1999 law granted the leader the ability to issue decrees including a 0.5 percent tax on financial transactions, a value-added tax, income tax reform, and a reduction in the size of the government (Flores-Macías, 2009, 12). Chávez publicly threatened to declare a state of emergency to override Congressional refusal to grant him the authority he sought to renegotiate or incur additional debt and to decree laws that related to the oil industry (Flores-Macías, 2009 13). Congress eventually capitulated to the threat, allowing the additional changes. The 2000 law permitted Chávez to legislate on financial, economic, social, infrastructure and transportation, public safety, science and technology, and state organization, resulting in 49 decrees that increased the degree of state intervention in the economy. These included land reform, a new hydrocarbons law, and income taxes for oil companies (Flores-Macías, 2009, 13).

The 2007 law – granted for an unprecedented 18 months – included the national defense, public safety, energy and infrastructure, and resulted in nationalization of the electric sector, the

Orinoco Belt petroleum reserve, and determined the transition to the *Bolivar Fuerte* (Flores-Macías, 2009, 14). Many of the decrees issued during this period were amendments to the constitution rejected by referendum (Brewer-Carias 2010). In 2008, the final day of authority, the law giving force to the Misiones was included among those decreed.

The 2010 law, granted for 18 months following electoral gains by the opposition coalition, resulted in 54 decrees including disaster relief, banking sector reform, armed forces, and price controls (Procaduría General de la República 2012). This law allowed executive dominance over the new congressional session for the duration of Chavez's term.

5.2.1.2 Favorability Effects on Delegation

Favorability had an effect on how the Assembly delegated decree authority to Chávez, both for the formal decree powers given to him, and informal ones practiced at times of diminished popularity. With a strong margin of victory and favorable public opinion, the legislature delegated to Chávez formal decree powers. Chávez also declared initiatives in the *Gaceta Oficial* that founded the *Misiones* during a period of less favorable public opinion. Doing so allowed him to set the policy agenda, resulting in the introduction of these social programs at a time when popularity flagged. These were bold decisions, which reflected institutional weakness revealed by the collapse of the party system. Both kinds of decree powers impacted the *Misiones*: the programs were later formalized in legislation during a period of much greater popularity. By then, Chávez had an even more favorable coalition in the legislature, and much stronger partisan powers.

Table 21 shows electoral margin of victory in 1993-2012 elections. Between 1998-2012, Chávez won with double-digit margins over opposition politicians, exceeding 20 percent margins in 2000 (22.3%) and 2006 (25.9%).

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Table 21. Executive Margin of Victory, Venezuela, 1994-2012

Year	Leader	% of Vote	Challenger	% of Vote	Margin
1993	Caldera	30.50%	Fermin	23.60%	6.90%
1998	Chávez	56.20%	Römer	39.97%	16.23%
2000	Chávez	59.80%	Arias	37.50%	22.30%
2006	Chávez	62.84%	Rosales	36.90%	25.94%
2012	Chávez	55.07%	Capriles	44.31%	10.76%

(Consejo Nacional Electoral 2013)

The sizable electoral margins show the public support for Chávez compared to political opposition, but it also offers a mandate for the early part of the president's terms. Chávez's margin was certainly greater than Caldera's margin (6.9 percent). As the description of the party system below shows, the relative strength of Chávez reflected outsize agenda power during the period where deinstitutionalization of the party system most greatly affected the popularity of opposition presidential candidates and their share of seats in the Assembly. The periods between elections reflected lower levels of Chávez popularity.

Figure 19 shows the overall evaluation of Chávez management for the period 1998-2011 (Consultores 21 2011). The line consists of the sum of all respondents who answered "good" or "very good" to the question "how would you rate this government of Hugo Chávez?" in Consultores 21's quarterly survey (Consultores 21, 2011, 25). The favorability rating for the President's government exceeded 50 percent through the first term, but then dipped below 30 percent during the second term. The rating recovered during 2003 and peaked in 2006 before hovering at the leader's historical average between 2008-2010.

Evaluation of Chavez Management, 1999-2011

Source: Consultores 21, 2011

Figure 19. Evaluation of Chávez's Performance 1999-2011

(Consultores 21 2011)

Chávez did not acquire delegated decree authority to found the *Misiónes*, but he used it to legislate their status in 2007. At their founding, his popularity was relatively weak, suggesting that it was a poor time to ask for these powers. However, a decree legislating the programs was issued during a *ley habilitante* granted to the leader in a period of average popularity. The period during which Chávez founded the *Misiones* corresponded with May-September 2003, which reflects some of the lowest ratings in the 13-year chart. The period during which the *Misiones* were formalized by legislative decree reflected the historical average for the Chávez

government's favorability. Popularity was one factor in how the president decreed the programs: during low popularity, these programs were informally established. Even at a point of average popularity, the legislature provided Chávez with a *ley habilitante* during which he legislated the *Misiones*.

Support for Chávez in the electoral arena and in public opinion show the degree to which conditions were favorable to formal delegated decree authority, and the informal governance that occurred when conditions were unfavorable. The Misiones were introduced informally through decree during a period of diminished popularity after the coup. Later, during a period of average popularity, the assembly granted Chávez increased authority. In Venezuela, public opinion was a necessary but insufficient factor affecting delegation. When the legislature gave *Chávez* the power to codify the *Misiones* depended on its partisan composition. Described below, the partisan powers that affected delegated decree authority show what gave Chávez so much power at merely an average popularity level.

5.2.2   Partisan Powers

Two components of the partisan powers of the president will be explored in this section: the deinstitutionalization of the party system and the size of the political coalition favorable to Chávez. The account below reveals the absence of regularization of interactions between parties that compete in the system and resulting domination of Chávez's contingent. They reveal the sheer scope of the leader's agenda power in the absence of institutionalized competition: from 2006-10, Chávez-led initiatives could become law when the majority Chávez-aligned Assembly chose to delegate authority to the leader.

5.2.2.1 Party System Deinstitutionalization

The decline of the party system in Venezuela between the 1990s-early 2000s devastated the Punto Fijo "partyarchy" system of democracy present since 1958. The two parties that had hegemonic status over party politics in Venezuela: *Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente* (COPEI) and *Acción Democratica* (AD). Both AD and COPEI declined in popularity as voters began to abstain from political process, recognizing few possibilities in changing their fortunes in the system of representation (Crisp, 2000, 13). The collapse of AD and COPEI allowed outsider-led insurgent parties and once-smaller parties to gain in legislature. The transition to new parties occurred as social linkages to COPEI and AD were severed as leaders attempted to institute neoliberal economic policy (Roberts 2003a, 2003b). This change to rootedness of parties had a striking impact on how individuals identified with the once-hegemonic parties, and gave rise to the "new left" parties, the MVR, *La Causa Radical* (LCR - The Radical Cause), *Patria Para Todos* (PPT - Homeland for All), and eventually, the PSUV – parties that would come to dominate the Venezuelan National Assembly.

AD fell first, as support for the party fell following the 1988 presidential election of Carlos Andres Perez, who announced neoliberal reforms. After seeking support through party linkages to labor confederations, the leader's proposals were counter to these groups' preferences (Murillo, 2000). Following the election, the president announced economic reforms that enacted neoliberal policies including the privatization of state-owned industries, trade liberalization, and private sector deregulation (Morgan, 2007, 82). Despite the protests associated with the announced reforms, Pérez chose to proceed with much of his agenda, though some of the reforms were scaled back (Morgan, 2007, 82). While Perez made concessions, the neoliberal policies enacted resulted in a collapse in popularity for AD amid socioeconomic consequences of the

economic transition (Murillo, 2000, 154). Following the rejection of AD, COPEI too fell from popularity, as it failed to turn the unpopularity of the effects of the policies of Pérez into lasting political effects. The fall of COPEI began with the former president (and party leader) Caldera abandoning the party and then winning reelection in 1993 (Morgan, 2007, 82). According to Morgan, feuding over party control affected the institutional credibility of the party and its movement and weakened its viability of COPEI presenting itself as the alternative to AD (Morgan, 2007, 82).

Political polarization followed social polarization. Throughout the breakdown of the pacted system over the 1990s, a change occurred in the way that parties participated in the electoral arena. Two events: consolidation of parties competing against the parties of Chávez and the 2005 legislative boycott effectively reduced the number of competing parties within the country over the late 2000s.

Compiling polling data on partisan identification, Morgan (2007) depicts the decline of these traditional parties and a rise in popularity of the "new left" and "new right," with new parties surpassing old ones in 1998.[15] Decreases in the level of respondent support for AD and COPEI and "Old Left" parties, including: MAS, *Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo* (MEP – People's Electoral Movement), *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR - Revolutionary Left Movement), *Partido Comunista de Venezuela* (PCV - Venezuelan Communist Party) reveals a significant shift in partisan identification. The resulting transition toward the "New Left," included the parties: LCR, MVR, PPT, and "New Right," of *Convergencia Nacional* (National

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[15] Morgan categorizes the "Old Left" to include: MAS, MEP, MIR, PCV. The author categorizes the "New Right" to include: *Convergencia,* IRENE, PV, MPJ, and *Gente de Petroleo.* The author categorizes the "New Left" to include LCR, MVR, PPT. The author draws the sources from face to face polls conducted by the following public opinion organizations: Baloyra, Batoba, Consultores 21, DATOS, and IVAD, and compiled them accordingly (Morgan, 2007, 81).

Convergence)*, Integración y Renovación Nueva Esperanza* (IRENE - New Hope Integration and Renovation), *Proyecto Venezuela* (PV), *Movimiento Primero Justicia* (MPJ – Justice First Movement), and *Gente de Petroleo* parties (Morgan, 2007, 81).

The transition from the "partyarchy" of the previous party system to polarization in the current system can be seen in the measurement of the effective number of parties. This provides not only a measurement of the size of vote-getting parties within the system but also a sense of the party competition that disciplines policymaking. Table 22 shows how the party system changed between 1993 and 2010, with a steady decline in both the effective number of parliamentary parties and the effective number of electoral parties.

Table 22. Effective Number of Parties, Venezuela National Assembly, 1993-2010

(Consejo Nacional Electoral 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2010)

	Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (Party Share)	Effective Number of Electoral Parties (Vote Share)
1978	2.83	3.61
1983	2.42	2.71
1988	2.67	3.31
1993	11.72	8.38
1998	6.29	9.70
2000	2.12	4.30
2005	1.86	2.37
2010	1.97	2.19

Over the 30 years of elections, the effective number of parliamentary parties (those parties winning seats) swelled from just over 2.5 between 1978-88 to 11.72 parties during the period of crisis. The figure then declined to 1.97 effective parties in the legislature, with the steepest decline occurring between 1993-2000, where it reaches 2.12 effective parliamentary parties. The effective number of electoral parties (those parties getting a share of votes) expanded from just over 3.2

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between 1978-88 to 8.38 parties during the period of crisis in 1993. A peak value in 1998 of 9.70 effective parties occurred in 1998, and the vote share measure truly begins consolidating into two effective parties in the 2005 election, declining to 2.19 by 2010. While the two measures differ on which election exhibits the endpoint of the transition to polarization, the breakdown of the previous system of representation is evident over the timeframe. By the time the parties consolidated following the crisis, the result found is that one large party (MVR, then the PSUV) dominated the legislature, while many small parties compete.

The effective number of parties never reached a value of one, suggesting that Venezuela never became a one-party state. But during the decline, opposition parties became nearly completely ineffective, boycotting the 2005 Assembly elections and ceding it nearly entirely to Chávez-aligned parties (Alvarez, 2006, 25). The failure to effectively oppose Chávez's coalition is an outcome of the party system collapse described below. The change in party support over about a 15-year period reveals the effects of social and political polarization on the party system. The outcome of this effect – strong partisan powers for Chávez – is reviewed below.

5.2.2.2 Parties in the Legislature

The consolidation of the polarized political system in Venezuela is revealed in electoral data and the formation of coalitions among New Left parties. The reshaping of the Venezuelan party system offered Chávez a massive partisan advantage over opposition parties between 2000-10, allowing the leader broad sway in agenda power over the course of the decade.

The transformation of the party system in Venezuela is revealed in the shift of voting behavior away from AD and COPEI toward the Chávez-aligned parties. Table 22 displays the share of voting for Venezuelan parties in the lower house elections from 1947-2010.

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Table 23. Share of Votes for Venezuelan Parties, Venezuelan National Assembly, 1947-2010

(Figures in percentages)
(Alvarez 2006; Consejo Nacional Electoral 2005, 2010)

Election	PCV	VUC	NA	PPT	PODE MOS	MVR	PSUV	LCR	LS	MIR	MAS	MEP	Total New Left	MUD	AD	URD	COPEI	Others	Total
1947	3.65												3.65		70.83	4.34	16.95	4.23	100
1958	6.23												6.23		49.45	26.76	15.20	2.36	100
1963													0.00		32.71	17.34	20.82	29.13	100
1968	2.82											12.94	15.76		25.55	9.25	24.03	25.41	100
1973	1.20									1.00	5.30	4.97	12.47		44.44	3.20	30.24	9.65	100
1978	1.04	0.88								2.35	6.16	2.23	12.66		39.68	1.68	39.80	6.18	100
1983	1.75		1.04					0.54	0.57	1.58	5.74	1.96	13.18		49.90	1.91	28.68	6.33	100
1988	0.96							1.65	0.81		10.14	1.61	15.17		43.24	1.44	31.06	9.09	100
1993	0.45							20.66			10.81	0.59	32.51		23.34	0.56	22.62	20.97	100
1998	0.53			3.01		18.97		2.45			9.28	0.37	34.61		24.05	0.38	16.96	24.00	100
2000	0.36			2.27		44.25		4.40			5.31	0.08	56.67		16.07	0.06	5.10	22.10	100
2005	2.7			6.8	8.2	60.0		0.6			0.3		78.6		0.00	0.00	0.00	21.4	100
2010				3.14			48.2						51.34	47.17				1.49	100

The rise in vote share for the MVR between 1998-2005 reveals not only a significant increase in support for the party, but also a relative decrease for AD and COPEI along with other leftist parties including the MAS, LCR, and even minor parties such as MEP and the PCV. The consolidation of electoral support to the MVR (and later the PSUV) revealed an effective reduction in power to more diverse leftist interests within the legislature.

This transformation continued into a bottoming out in the 2005 legislative elections, the first to follow the coup. The number of parties competing for the legislature declined as AD and COPEI held a boycott of the 2005 legislative elections. The choice was made according to three reasons: claims of voting fraud, an attempt to delegitimize the MVR, and most importantly, the anticipation of significant losses. A pre-election poll showed that the MVR was preferred by 55 percent of voters, while opposition parties (AD, COPEI, PV, MPJ, ABP, UNT, and LCR) had the support of 14 percent of the voting population polled (Alvarez 2006).

Following the 2006 general election, Chávez called for a new party, forming the PSUV, which was organized to serve as a mobilizing vehicle for social movements. The party attempted to incorporate a form of organization that was bottom-up in its orientation, emphasizing member activism (Hawkins, 2010a, 45). The PSUV was intended to address challenges to the MVR, namely corruption and top-down hierarchical organization. It also reflected an attempt to transition from a coalition of Chavez-aligned parties to replacement of all Chávez-aligned parties[16] (Lyne 2008). Most Chávez loyalists followed the leader to the new party and by June 2007, over 5 million members had joined the party (Ellner, 2008, 127).

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[16] In some ways, the PSUV bore resemblance to the hierarchical structure of the MVR with its *Círculos,* utilizing a limited management structure and a primary organizational block, here referred to as "battalions." These campaigned

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The MVR formed coalitions with other smaller parties as it transitioned from a minority party behind AD and COPEI in 1998 to the dominant party in the 2000 and 2005 elections. Table 24 shows the governing coalitions under Caldera and the three Chávez terms from 1999-2009, based on alignments cited in Crisp (2000), Ellner (2008), and Lyne (2008).

Table 24. Chávez-aligned Parties in the Assembly 2000-10

President	Term	Coalition	Party	Coalition	Dates	President's Party Share of Seats in Assembly	Coalition Share of Seats in Assembly
Caldera	II	1	*Convergencia*	MAS-MEP-PCV-URD-MIN	1993-98	14.2%	15.3%
Chavez	I	1	MVR	MVR-PPT-PCV-MAS-MEP	1999-2000	16.9%	35.3%
Chavez	II	1	MVR	MVR-PPT-PCV-MAS	2001-06	64.1%	68.3%
Chavez	III	1	PSUV	MVR-PSUV-PPT-PCV-PODEMOS-MEP	2006-10	72.0%	93.8%
Chavez	III	2	PSUV	PSUV-PPT-LCR	2011-13	59.3%	59.3%

(Crisp 2000; Ellner 2008; Lyne 2008)

Comparing Caldera's term with the first term of Chávez, both leaders faced AD pluralities and sought coalitions consisting of smaller leftist parties, including MAS and the PCV. The growth in share of seats of the MVR reveals the scope of the partisan power of Chávez as the opposition held out of the electoral contests. For Chávez, the major shift in coalition size occurred with the 2000 election – after the enactment of the new constitution – when the contingent of

to mobilize voters heavily during the state and municipal elections in 2008, but were not considered central to the 2009 term-limit constitutional referendum (Ellner 2009).

MVR candidates reached 64 percent of the Assembly. The coalition seats brought the total Chávez-aligned figure to 68 percent, including *Patria Para Todos* (Homeland for All – PPT), MAS, and the PCV.

Partisan power peaked between 2006-2010. With the opposition boycott in the 2005 election, the MVR captured 72 percent of the seats in the Assembly. These members transitioned to the PSUV during the session as the MVR was dissolved. The Chávez-aligned coalition brought the total seats to 93.8 percent including the MEP, PPT, the PCV, and PODEMOS (*Por la Democrácia Social*) (Ellner, 2008, 127) .

By 2008, opposition parties formed a coalition, *Mesas de la Unidad Democrática* (MUD), comprised of AD, COPEI, *Primero Justicia, Un Nuevo Tempo, Proyecto Venezuela*, PODEMOS, and eventually the PPT. In the 2010 legislative election, this coalition captured 47 percent of list voting compared to the 48 percent won by the PSUV.[17] This resulted in 59.3 percent of seats held by the PSUV and 40.7 percent held by the opposition, reflecting a consolidation of the party system into two main opposing parties. With this new distribution of seats, Chávez lacked the two-thirds majority needed to introduce new *leyes habilitantes* into the Assembly. In response, the outgoing Chavez-dominated Assembly delegated decree authority for 18 months mere weeks before the new legislative session began, further cementing the power of Chávez ("Asamblea Nacional Sancionó Ley Habilitante Por 18 Meses" 2010).

The arc of MVR/ PSUV dominance in the Assembly resulted in sweeping partisan power for Chávez during his third term. The lack of seats held by opposition parties following the boycott reduced the competitiveness of the Assembly, allowing Chávez-led initiatives to

[17] In 2010, between party list seats and nominal seats, the PSUV won a total of 96 seats in the assembly, while the MUD won 64. The PPT chose to be listed separately and won 2 seats.

dominate the legislature and providing the president with broad authority to legislate the *Misiones* formally by decree.

5.2.3 Partisan Powers and the *Misiones*

This section reviews the policy preferences of the opposition and government actors surrounding the introduction of the Misiones. The first subsection describes how the *Misiones* were initiated in 2003. The Chávez government first attempted to formalize them during by including amendments into the failed constitutional referendum of 2007, and then finally codified their status in 2008 during a *ley habilitante*, during a period of strong partisan powers that permitted the introduction of decree legislation.

The second subsection then describes alternatives sought by opposition policy organizations at the time of introduction. Assessing opposition preferences allows for the analysis of what could have been introduced, had the institutional effect not been so strong on the policymaking process. Opposition politicians and policy organizations introduced alternatives to the *Misiones*. Their key features differed fundamentally from the *Misión* program designs, in terms of how the government integrated the programs into the existing ministry structure, their funding, the role of the private sector in social program delivery, and the nature of *Misión* oversight.

The section concludes with a discussion relating theory to passage. The strong partisan powers held by Chávez led to failure to moderate or introduce reform measures into the programs, and the failure of these groups to influence the policy outcome reveals the effect of a weak opposition on the policy process.

5.2.3.1 Legislating the Misiones

The Chávez government initiated the *Misiones* through executive decrees, the earliest of which appeared in the *Gaceta Oficial* between April 2003 and July 2004.[18] As mentioned earlier, the initiation of these programs coincided with one of the lowest periods of public opinion support for the Chávez government. Over the span of the announcement of the programs, support improved for the government, exceeding the historical average rating for the president over his terms.

The programs were structured to operate in foundations parallel to existing ministries that managed related program activities, avoiding being subjected to traditional managerial routines in ministries. The foundations avoided budget oversight in the legislature with funding supplemented with resources drawn from PDVSA (Aponte Blank 2010). The foundation structure was a departure from how remedial programs were administered: *Robinson*, was administered parallel to prior initiatives of the Ministry of Education.[19] *Ribas* was administered from the Ministry of Energy and Mines. This trend extended beyond the education *Misiones*, as *Barrio Adentro* was clearly separated from *Plan Médica Cubana*, the Ministry of Health and Social Development program that preceded it (D'Elia, 2006, 28). Chávez-aligned political figures endorsed the *Misiones* for their departure from the traditional ministerial structure. The president of PDVSA, Alí Rodríguez Araque, declared the *Misiones*: "the seed of the new institutionalism,

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[18] The decrees that created the *Misiones* included: *Mercal*: part of a basket of decrees, but institutionalized in decree 2359, *Gaceta Oficial* 37,672, April 15, 2003; *Vuelvan Caras*: decree 2898, Gaceta Oficial 37,966, June 23, 2004; *Robinson I*: decree 2434, *Gaceta Oficial* 37,702, June 2, 2003, with later modification June 13, 2003, *Gaceta Oficial* 37,711; *Robinson II*: decree 2602, Gaceta Oficial 37,775, September 15 2003; *Ribas*: decree 2656, Gaceta Oficial 37,798, October 16, 2003; *Fundación Misión Ribas*: decree 3048, *Gaceta Oficial* 37,999; *Sucre*: decree 2601, September 8, 2003; *Fundación Misión Sucre*, decree 2604, *Gaceta Oficial* 37,772; *Barrio Adentro*: first announced in *Aló Presidente* 174, December 14, 2003; formalized in decree 2745, *Gaceta Oficial* 37,865, January 26, 2004; *Vivienda (*later *Habitat)*: decree 3126, *Gaceta Oficial* 38,027, July 24, 2004.

[19] Robinson was intended to replace several programs: *Acude,* administered by the *Asociación Cultural para el Desarrollo* funded by private enterprises*,* and several other government initiatives directed by the Comisión Nacional de Alfabetización, the education ministry, and the *Instituto Nacional de Cooperación Educativ*n (Sanjuán Martinez & Gonzalez Plessman, 2010, 18).

before a major obstacle like this State bureaucracy, inefficient and ineffective, as they emerge, next to it parallel forms … of new institutions as instruments to make viable the principles of the constitution." (D'Elia & Quiroz, 2010, 5) The Chavista view of the *Misiones* was supportive of this parallel form of administration, but despite the decrees, the programs lacked legal status, requiring further legislation to legitimize the programs.

The Chávez government attempted to provide legal definition to the *Misiones* first through the constitutional referendum in 2007, which was narrowly defeated. Article 141 of the constitutional referendum of 2007 was an attempt to legally codify the Misiones as "exceptional and experimental systems" not governed by the Constitution or the laws, and instead under the direction of the executive to the attention of urgent and deep need (D'Elia & Quiroz, 2010, 6). The constitutional amendment packages narrowly failed at referendum, suggesting a divided but disapproving public. However, public sentiment was not enough to stop the *Misiones* from being institutionalized in by decree.

Later in 2007 Chávez was granted a *ley habilitante,* during which the leader codified the programs in decreed legislature. This decree was permitted during an enabling law in the MVR-dominated legislature following the opposition boycott of 2005, where the Chávez-aligned share of seats reflected 93 percent of the Assembly. The *Misiones* were formalized at the conclusion of the enabling law period in 2008. The foundation status of the programs was legally codified in Decree Number 6217 with the Rank, Value and Force of Law of Public Administration, *Gaceta Oficial* 5890, July, 31 2008. Articles 132-33 of this legislation legitimized the structure of the *Misiones* as they existed, establishing them as a new type of bureaucracy in Venezuelan public administration (Mundo, 2009, 51). The preamble stated that the measure was adopted following the success of the special programs referred to as the *Misiones* (Mundo, 2009, 51). As described

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above, this period coincided with relative popularity, as the *ley habilitante* was issued during above average popularity, and the final decrees under the period were announced during a period where public support reflected the historical average over the President's terms.

This led to a change in how the *Misiones* were budgeted by the Assembly. The legislature routinized the funding of the *Misiones* during this period, transitioning to ordinary budgeting procedures for the *Misiones* from the heavy reliance on PDVSA funds. The contribution of ordinary budget funding for the programs increased significantly during this period. This was matched with a decrease in the contribution of PDVSA to Misión budgeting, and a smaller increase in the level of other funding (Aponte Blank 2010). The transition from heavy dependence of the programs on PDVSA resources to ordinary government budgeting for the *Misiones* over time reveals that the programs were increasingly accepted by the Chávez-aligned legislature following the decree codifying legal status for the programs in 2008.

5.2.3.2 Alternatives to the Misiones

At the time the *Misiones* were introduced, several opposition organizations promoted contrasting proposals to change the redistributive landscape. These organizations presented alternative policy platforms that opposed fundamental features of the *Misiones*, including: the private sector's role in the delivery of complementary social programs, strong oversight, the timing of program implementation, and funding of social programs from oil wealth. The organizations included the political coalition *Coordinadora Democratica*, which consisted of syndicates CTV, and Fedecamaras; large parties AD, and COPEI; and smaller parties.[20] The *Proyecto Pobreza*, was a

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[20] Smaller parties included: *Acción Agropecuaria, Alianza Bravo Pueblo, Alianza por la Libertad, Bandera Roja, Convergencia, La Causa R, MAS, MIN Primero Justicia, Proyecto Venezuela, Solidaridad, Solidaridad Independiente Unión, Unión Republicana Democrática,* and *Visión Emergente.*

university consortium, which later became the *Grupo del Acuerdo Social*. [21] The *Foro Permanente de Constructores de Inclusión (Gente que Une Gente)* consisted of the Jesuit NGO *Centro Gumilla*, and the party *Primero Justicia* (Alarcón Cervera et al., 2007, 458).

Of these, the *Grupo del Acuerdo Social* produced the most developed social policy platform. The group itself consisted of a larger number of universities than the *Proyecto Pobreza*, also including the capacity development organization *Venezuela Competitiva,* and the investment promotion board *Consejo Nacional de Promoción de Inversiones* (CONAPRI).[22] The *Grupo del Acuerdo Social* echoed the critical perspectives introduced above, first acknowledging the legitimacy of the social problems the *Misiones* attempted to remedy, and supporting the empowerment of the poor population. They criticized the programs as clientelist, noting the timing of the programs coincided with the electoral campaigns and outside of the traditional social institutions, eliminating efficiency from consolidation with existing administration (Alarcón Cervera et al., 2007, 465).

The *Grupo del Acuerdo Social* developed a set of policy recommendations entitled *El Acuerdo Social para la Superación de la Pobreza* (The Social Accord for Overcoming Poverty) in February 2003. The group sought to influence the government at prominent levels. *Acuerdo Social* presented the plan to Diosdado Cabello, then-Minister of the Interior and Justice and power broker for Hugo Chávez. However, the government did not recognize the document upon submission (De Vincenzo 2003).

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[21] Universities included: *Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración,* and *Universidad Simon Bolivar.*
[22] These included: *Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración, Universidad Simon Bolivar, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Universidad de Zulia,* and the *Universidad de los Andes.*

The *Acuerdo Social* acknowledged the need to develop additional programs to include populations that were not reached in current social policy, but did not view the need to develop parallel bureaucracy to administer them. The group proposed the development of structural, complementary, and transitional social policies, of which the latter two overlapped with the aims of the *Misiones*:

1) *structural social policy* aimed at traditional governmental sectors: education, health, social and personal security, and housing;

2) *complementary social policy* constructed by a package of programs that addresses the causes of inequality that impede access to social services that enable the development of human and social capital among particular populations (juvenile offenders, homeless, indigenous population, population in extreme poverty, population in special territories);

3) *transitional social policy* that gives support to solve problems of inequality through welfare assistance and training and retraining programs to needy populations over the age of 35 (Acuerdo Social Para el Desarollo Y la Superación de la Pobreza, 2003, 4-5).

Complementary and transitional policies represented attempts to reach individuals excluded from the structural social policy framework. They were intended to address problems of access and administration through institutions that led to the need to create the *Misiones* instead of appending new social programs onto the existing system (Alarcón Cervera et al., 2007, 465). This differed from the extraordinary plans through which the *Misiones* were developed. Opposition proposals reflected the belief that these policies could be undertaken through the government ministries already in existence.

The *Acuerdo Social* called for independent social program oversight, addressing a matter that was not explicitly discussed by the government in *Misión* policy documents. Oversight and

social accounting were part of recommendations in order to ensure that program benefits were closely monitored through management indicators to evaluate whether or not programs benefited populations (Acuerdo Social Para el Desarollo Y la Superación de la Pobreza, 2003, 5). The plan called for monitoring solutions including academia, consultants, special committees, associations of beneficiaries, as well as public opinion, and social media (Acuerdo Social Para el Desarollo Y la Superación de la Pobreza, 2003, 7). The *Acuerdo Social* viewed it necessary to create a network of social accountability provide program oversight to ensure that programs were working.

Opposition groups criticized the government's role in the provision of antipoverty programs, proposing instead to promote both the state and the private sector as instruments in the delivery of benefits and participation in the labor market as a destination for those receiving benefits. In their policy vision statement, AD criticized state use of petroleum resources for funding of benefits (Acción Democrática, 2004, 7). The *Acuerdo Social* viewed private organizations as a potential provider of social benefits, stating that they could complement the state to provide social benefits to poor populations (Acuerdo Social Para el Desarollo Y la Superación de la Pobreza, 2003, 5). For the Misiones, the state bureaucracy was viewed as ineffective and yet the Chávez government sought new state solutions with less oversight. The private sector was not a part of the government's plan.

The preferences of opposition politicians and policy organizations differed greatly from the *Misiones* on key themes. However they were similar to proposed plans in other countries. Members of the *Grupo de Acuerdo Social*, the most developed of the contrasting proposals, could not get the state's attention, and the weak position of the political opposition meant that the contrasting preferences were not accommodated. The subsection below will discuss the relation of these weak partisan powers to program design.

5.2.3.3 Relating the Passage to Theory

Absent the institutional checks of a competitive political system, the strong partisan powers of Chávez resulted in failure to integrate into the *Misiones* the reform elements predicted in countries with greater horizontal accountability. Program decrees reflected policy preferences for administrative structures parallel to existing and predecessor programs with funding from PDVSA, avoiding legislative oversight. The *Misiones* incorporated none of the proposed policy reform elements, many of which would increase program oversight. Opposition preferences were not integrated into program design when the programs were initially informally decreed. Voters rejected an amendment legitimizing the programs in the constitutional referendum of 2007. The *Misiones* were eventually codified by decree during a period of sweeping authority for Chávez. After an opposition boycott in Assembly elections produced an uncompetitive legislature, Chavez-aligned legislators granted the leader the *ley habilitante* that permitted him to decree. Throughout this process, the *Misiones* were not subject to political constraints imposed by the opposition, given the strength of the President's partisan powers.

Compared to opposition political preferences for social policy change, the *Misiones* did not integrate reforms, showing fundamental differences in: program oversight, how the programs integrated existing bureaucracies and the private sector, and the use of oil wealth. In addition, these groups criticized the timing of program implementation reflected now-or-never expenditures intended to coincide with electoral contests. The minimal incorporation of oversight elements resulted from the absence political competition. The Chávez-aligned legislature did not choose to shape these executive-led initiatives by incorporating reform elements.

Two aspects made the political context more favorable to program introduction and formalization: public support of the government and composition of the Assembly varied in 2003-

4 and 2008. During the introduction of the *Misiones*, Chávez's partisan powers were weaker than when he formally institutionalized the programs. At introduction, with low public support, the programs were decreed through executive order but accompanying legislature was not introduced to make them into law. Their formalization did not win electoral approval in the 2007 constitutional referendum. This finally occurred in 2008 after a boycott of the Assembly elections by the opposition resulted in failure to effectively oppose the presidential agenda, during a period when the Chávez government was more popular and the legislative composition was even more favorable than the introduction period. Legitimacy led to a change in how the *Misiones* were budgeted and in the later years of the program, the Chávez-aligned legislature increased regular budgeting for the programs, presenting another form of approval once the programs were legislated.

Program elements, detailed here and in Chapter 5 reveal how sharply the programs differed from traditional education policy in Venezuela and opposition recommendations. The introduction and formalization of these programs – in the absence of political competition in the legislature – shows that the Chávez government did not recognize the repeat-play characteristics generated by a stable party system that introduces horizontal accountability to executive policymaking. With strong partisan powers, the Chavez government did not choose to moderate the programs or introduce reform measures, and the failure of opposition groups to influence this outcome reveals the extent to which horizontal accountability was limited. In the absence of the competition generated by a stable party system, the executive-aligned legislature delegated decree authority to permit Chávez to legislate the formalization of the *Misiones*.

Examining the preferences of the opposition in Venezuela shows how strong partisan powers affected the program contours: the *Misiones* bore little resemblance to recommendations

of the opposition, and those members who wanted to influence social policy could not. The result of the interactions detailed here was a set of programs that had little oversight and were disassociated from antecedent programs. The programs did not contain reform elements, allowing for parochial distributional strategies. The result of the absence of horizontal accountability will be described in the next chapter, revealing the extent to which education *Misiones* were targeted to achieve political results through the distribution of benefits.

5.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter illustrates the constitutional and partisan powers of Lula and Chávez and shows how these powers determine the latitude of the executive in choosing the antipoverty policies in their countries. For Lula, despite strong constitutional decree powers, weak partisan powers – particularly, weak partisan composition of PT-aligned parties in the *Câmara* – limited the extent to which he could introduce or modify a program to reflect his party's aims of a guaranteed minimum income for citizens. These weak partisan powers reflected the institutionalization of the party system, which created strong government and opposition parties that influenced coalition formation, even though the system generally lacks societal rootedness. This meant that Lula's decree for *Bolsa Família* reflected similarities to existing programs initiated by both the PT and PSDB, integrating reform elements such as conditionalities, and limited program reach.

For Chávez, despite weak constitutional decree powers, the President governed informally until strong partisan powers permitted delegation to him through a *ley habilitante.* Through this, he institutionalized the *Misiones* over four years after their introduction. Comparing program features to opposition preferences, reform elements were not integrated, leading to little oversight,

allowing for the funds to be distributed in a parochial manner. The deinstitutionalization of the party system resulted in the devastation of societal rootedness to the opposition and challenges to political mobilization for the government's parties. This influenced opposition participation within the system, and meant that the Assembly was comprised of nearly all Chávez-aligned politicians. Not only was the process of *Misión* introduction informal, and the program institutionalization extraordinary, but program design represented an explicit departure from the precedent of earlier antipoverty programs within the country. The absence of program oversight measures led to abuse in the distribution of the programs, allowing them to target beneficiaries on political criteria.

Oversight, expenditure patterns, and benefit distributions of these programs examined in detail in Chapter 4 reveal the extent to which the powers described in this chapter yielded variation in targeting strategies. In the case of Brazil, the strong horizontal accountability described in this chapter results in programmatic targeting of *Bolsa Família* benefits, while in the Case of Venezuela, the lack of horizontal accountability described here results in parochial targeting of education *Misión* benefits.

6.0   MODELING THE ELECTORAL EFFECT OF SOCIAL PROGRAMS IN BRAZIL

AND VENEZUELA

What electoral effect did *Bolsa Família* and the *Misiones* have after their introduction? Understanding whether the programs deliver electoral support is key to evaluating how programs are politicized: if the programs deliver no support, it matters much less how politicization occurs. Variation in support suggests politicization, as different levels of electoral support result from leaders reaching different constituents. The other chapters of this study present evidence of the constraints leaders face when designing targeted programs are institutional in nature, but the effect generated by the programs determines the relevance of this analysis.

This chapter examines the electoral effects of program recipient status using surveys conducted over 2006 and 2007 in the two countries. The sections describe the statistical and substantive significance of recipient voting behavior over subsequent elections in Brazil and Venezuela as the programs were introduced.

The key finding revealed in analysis of survey data is that while participation in both *Bolsa Família* and the *Misiones* increased the probability of voting for Lula and Chávez, the effect is much stronger – significantly so – in Venezuela as compared to Brazil. After introduction, the programs generated the positive support expected among recipients. However, when the effect of the programs is examined across values of income and education, first indications of the electoral effects caused by program politicization emerge: the *Misiones*

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generated a substantial degree more electoral support for Chávez among recipients than among non-recipients than did *Bolsa Família*, particularly among low-income recipients. While the poor tended to support Lula and Chávez, not all of the poor received the programs. The analysis reveals that Lula received about 10 percent and Chávez received greater than 40 percent more support among recipients. The differences among recipients and non-recipients are much smaller in Brazil than Venezuela.

In Brazil, the probit model shows a significant effect of *Bolsa Família* on the probability of voting for Lula for both 2002 and 2006 voters. Marginal effects estimates show that comparing program recipients and non-recipients over increasing levels of income and education on vote choice reveals that those receiving the program had a greater probability of support for Lula, particularly among low-income recipients. Low-income recipients have a higher probability of voting for Lula than non-recipients, while low-education non-recipients have a higher probability of supporting Lula than do recipients. Models containing interaction terms with education and program recipient status and income and program recipient status corroborate the contrasting effect of income and education. This contrast highlights the importance of income in contributing to the probability of electoral choices in Brazil.

The president was aided, but only minimally, by the effect of participation in *Bolsa Família*. The probability of voting for Lula among low-income recipients is only narrowly different between 2002 (10 percent greater) and 2006 (9 percent greater). The small variation between the two years suggests that the program effect, which benefits Lula, does not open up a larger electoral advantage among the respondents after the program was implemented. This suggests that the program may be less electorally important than other factors including the incumbent effect described by Zucco (2008).

In Venezuela, the probit model shows a significant effect of the Misiones on the probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties in 2005 and for Chávez in 2006. Marginal effects estimates show that comparing program recipients and non-recipients over increasing levels of income and education on vote choice reveals that those receiving the program had a greater probability of support for Chávez, particularly among low-income and low-education recipients. Support declines over unit increases income and education levels, though the effect extended beyond low-income and low education *Misiones* recipients. In both the 2005 and 2006 elections, the electoral effect of the *Misiones* on the probability of voter support holds among higher income and education levels as well.[23] Models containing interaction terms of education and program recipient status and income and program recipient status reveal probability of support among low-income and low education recipients. The relationships described here hold for both the education *Misiones* as well as the overall measure.

The president was clearly aided by the effect of *Misión* and education *Misión* participation on the probability of support for his party in 2005 and presidential campaign in 2006. Among low-income recipients, the probability of support widens from 2005 (27 percent greater) to 2006 (44 percent greater). This relationship holds for the education *Misiones*, widening from 2005 (9 percent greater to 2006 (17 percent greater).

This chapter describes the model and examines model parameters. It describes marginal effects estimates of the probability of leader support, as well as the effect of recipient status across key variables relating to the program status – income and education level. The findings suggest the necessity of further analysis of how programs were politicized – particularly program distribution and spending over time – to produce the electoral effects shown in this chapter.

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[23] Higher values of income and education levels are relevant to certain Misiones because the conditions that define excludability are not clearly specified, when they are enforced.

6.1   MODEL

This analysis replicates and extends Bohn's work using the 2007-8 survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Brazil and Venezuela country survey data. It reconstructs the author's model, examining the factors of education, income and program recipient status on the probability of an individual voting for Chávez or Lula, controlling for respondents' gender, age, and for regional effects.

The first section attempts to replicate Bohn's (2011) results for the 2002 and 2006 elections. The analysis reveals the probability of Lula support in 2002 prior to the introduction of the program. It finds that those individuals that identified themselves as recipients in the 2007 survey indicated an increased probability of support for Lula in 2002, implying that they had already had a greater probability of supporting Lula. Consistent with Zucco and Power's (2012) analysis, recipients had an increased probability of electoral support in the 2006 election. Interaction effects are examined for education and recipient status as well as income and recipient status on the probability of voting for Lula. Overall, low-income recipients have a greater probability of support for Lula, while low education recipients have a lower probability of support.

The next section presents an extension of the model. It presents survey responses comparing *Misiones* recipients, showing that the effect of the social program on voting behavior is reinforced between elections in 2005 and 2006 in Venezuela, with stronger results in the 2006 presidential voting, among both the overall *Misión* programs and education *Misiones*. Interaction effects are examined for education and recipient status as well as income and recipient status on the probability of voting for Lula. Overall, low-income recipients and low education recipients have a greater probability of support for Chávez. The model results are reported below.

6.1.1 Voter Support for Lula in Subsequent Elections

Models 1-6 in tables 11-13 below display the results of probit analyses on 2007 LAPOP respondents who reported voting in 2002 and 2006. The main models are evaluated, then separate models for multiplicative interactions of program participation and income and participation and education are examined. Marginal effects analysis is then conducted for each model.

6.1.1.1 Lula's 2002 Election

Models 1-3 in Table 11 below display the results of probit analyses on 2007 LAPOP respondents who reported voting in the 2002 election. These models show a positive effect for *Bolsa Família* recipients on the probability of voting for Lula, particularly when the relationship is modeled on income. The effect is shown to be positive and significant in Model 1 (at the $p < .01$ level) on the probability of voting for Lula. This effect is positive for the interaction term for income and program participation, shown in Model 2, but not for education and program participation, shown in Model 3. The 2002 models do not identify significant predictors beyond being *Bolsa Família* recipients in 2006. These models show a significant probability of support for Lula among low-income recipients.

Table 25. Probit of Being a Bolsa Família Recipient on Lula's Vote in 2002

	Model 1: Lula's Vote	Model 2: Lula's Vote: Income Interaction	Model 3: Lula's Vote: Education Interaction
	2002	2002	2002
Bolsa Família Recipient	0.424*	0.721	-0.650
	(0.237)	(0.459)	(0.771)
BF-Income Interaction		-0.238	
		(0.311)	
BF-Education Interaction			0.511
			-0.359
Gender	0.00967	0.0157	0.00644
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)
Age	-0.0638	-0.0653	-0.0671
	(0.0496)	(0.0497)	(0.0499)
Income	-0.0902	0.163	-0.0814
	(0.0894)	(0.344)	(0.0900)
Education	-0.0202	-0.0232	-0.568
	(0.0950)	(0.0951)	(0.394)
South	-0.0502	-0.0563	-0.0523
	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.189)
Center-West	-0.276	-0.281	-0.292
	(0.237)	(0.237)	(0.238)
Northeast	0.0844	0.0844	0.0838
	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.161)
North	0.134	0.134	0.172
	(0.303)	(0.303)	(0.306)
Constant	1.020***	0.284	1.769*
	(0.354)	(0.625)	(0.925)
N	471	471	471

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Those receiving *Bolsa Família* during the survey year reported supporting the president in the earlier election. However, low education recipients did not report supporting Lula in 2002, and the overall effect of program participation is lower. Interpreting the other independent variables in the model shows that respondents who indicated supporting Lula in the 2002 election were lower-income, less well-educated, male, and younger, though these were not significant predictors of support. Respondents from the Central-West and South opposed, while respondents from the poorer North and Northeast were supporters of Lula.

6.1.1.2 Comparing Marginal Effects

Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Lula support in 2002 for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 1 reveals that across all levels of income and education, the probability of supporting Lula is greater for recipients across all plausible (low) values. This is shown in Figure 20.

Figure 20. Model 1: Probability of Voting for Lula by Income & Education, 2002

The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases slightly from 10 to 13 percent over the income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting Lula among recipients is 88 percent, and the value declines modestly over levels of income to 66 percent. At highest levels of income, non-recipients have a 78 percent probability of supporting Lula, a value that decreases over income levels to 79 percent at the highest level.

The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases only slightly from 11 to 12 percent over the education values. At lowest levels of education, the probability of supporting Lula among recipients is 86 percent, and the value declines slightly over increasing levels of education to 84 percent. At lowest levels of education, non-recipients have a 75 percent

probability of supporting Lula, a value that declines slightly to 72 percent over the range of education levels.

While the boost to Lula of those who report receiving the program is not statistically significant, being a recipient does account for low-income status. The substantive difference between recipients and non-recipients is greater than 10 percent in both estimates.

Marginal effects analysis of Models 2 and 3 provides a second test of the relationship between participation and vote choice, examining the interaction effects of income and education with recipients compared against non-recipients. This provides as a baseline for the effect of income and education on electoral support, as the interaction shows income and education measures for only those that did and did not participate in the program, providing conditional analysis of each effect.

The marginal effects plots below reveal similar low-income support for Lula but not low education. The difference between the recipient and baseline low-income support is a continued trend in the income model: low-income recipients support Lula at higher rates than do non-recipients, and in general both recipients and non-recipients favor Lula at lower income levels than at higher ones. Low education recipients support Lula at lower rates than do non-recipients, but both recipients and non-recipients favor Lula at higher education levels than lower ones. The marginal effects are displayed in Figure 21.

Figure 21. Models 2&3: Probability of Voting for Lula by Income & Education, 2002

In Model 2, across levels of income, the probability of supporting Lula is greater among program recipients. The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 9 to 26 percent over the income values. These report a 93 percent probability of supporting Lula, decreasing to 78 percent over increasing levels of income. Non-recipients report an 84 percent probability of supporting Lula, decreasing to 52 percent over increasing levels of income. The key values here- low-income recipients and non-recipients. These values decline over increasing levels of income, though they are implausible past the scaled value of 2 (greater than or equal to 1 minimum wage). In Model 3, across levels of education, the difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients decreases from 34 to 16 percent over the education values.

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The probability of supporting Lula is greater among non-recipients. These report a 42 percent probability of supporting Lula, increasing to 91 percent over increasing levels of education. Recipients report an 8 percent probability of supporting Lula, increasing to 75 percent over increasing levels of education. Comparing the overall model and the interaction models shows the strength of the income effect on the probability of support for Lula among respondents when compared to education. Low-income recipients show greater for support for Lula, though the magnitude of *Bolsa Família's* effect on vote choice is smaller at lower levels of income because while not all the poor receive aid, many support Lula. Results from the 2006 vote model, which bears many similarities to the 2002 model, are shown below.

6.1.1.3 Lula's 2006 Election

Models 4-6 in Table 26 display the results of probit analyses on 2007 LAPOP respondents who reported voting in the 2006 election. These models show a positive effect for *Bolsa Família* recipients on the probability of voting for Lula, particularly when the relationship is modeled on income. The effect is shown to be positive and significant in Model 4 (at the $p < .05$ level) on the probability of voting for Lula. This effect is positive for the interaction of income and program participation, shown in Model 5, but not for the interaction of education and program participation, shown in Model 6. Like the models for the 2002 election, these models show a significant probability of support for Lula among low-income recipients.

Table 26. Probit of Being a *Bolsa Família* Recipient on Lula's Vote in 2006

	Model 4: Lula's Vote Lula's Vote	Model 5: Lula's Vote: Income Interaction	Model 6: Lula's Vote: Education Interaction
	2006	2006	2006
Bolsa Família Recipient	0.367**	0.511	-0.442
	(0.182)	(0.369)	(0.608)
BF-Income Interaction		-0.114	
		(0.253)	
BF-Education Interaction			0.367
			(0.268)
Gender	0.218**	0.220**	0.216**
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Age	-0.0846**	-0.0855**	-0.0864**
	(0.0371)	(0.0371)	(0.0372)
Income	-0.249***	-0.127	-0.245***
	(0.0714)	(0.280)	(0.0716)
Education	-0.246***	-0.248***	-0.641**
	(0.0770)	(0.0771)	(0.297)
South	-0.130	-0.131	-0.138
	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.138)
Center-West	0.231	0.230	0.214
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.182)
Northeast	0.359***	0.361***	0.356***
	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.127)
North	0.498**	0.498**	0.505**
	(0.243)	(0.243)	(0.242)
Constant	1.609***	1.093**	2.128***
	(0.270)	(0.489)	(0.730)
N	795	795	795

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The models show that the effect of income is negative and significant at the $p < .001$ level and education is negative and significant at the $p < .01$ level, suggesting that lower income, less well-educated supporters voted in favor of Lula in the 2006 election. The effect of gender (male) is positive and significant at the $p < .05$ level in the 2006 election. The effect of the regional dummies in the second model are significant in the Northeast and North ($p < .01$ and $p < .05$, respectively) revealing significant success for Lula in poorer regions of the country in the 2006 election. In this election, younger, less well-educated and poorer voters had a higher probability of supporting Lula, at statistically significant levels.

6.1.1.4 Comparing Marginal Effects

Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Lula support in 2006 for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 4 reveals that across levels of income and education, the probability of supporting Lula is greater for recipients across all plausible (low) values. This is shown in Figure 22.

Figure 22. Model 4: Probability of Voting for Lula by Income & Education, 2006

The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 9 to 15 over the income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting Lula among recipients is 88 percent, and the value declines modestly over levels of income to 57 percent. At lowest levels of income, non-recipients have a 79 percent probability of supporting Lula, a value that decreases over income levels to 42 percent at the highest level.

The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 6 to 14 over the education values. At lowest levels of education, non-recipients have a 92 percent probability of supporting Lula, a value which declines to 68 percent over the range of education levels. At lowest levels of education, the probability of supporting Lula among recipients is 86

percent, and the value declines over increasing levels of education to 54 percent. Given the already probability of low-income and low-education support for Lula among non-recipients, it is difficult for the program to dramatically increase the probability among recipients.

Marginal effects analysis of Models 5 and 6 provides a second test of the relationship between participation in the program and vote choice, examining the interaction effects of income and education with recipients compared against non-recipients. Non-recipients serve as a baseline for the effect of income and education on electoral support compared to the interacted recipient values. In the marginal effects plots below, they reveal low-income support for Lula but not low education. Like the 2002 data, the difference between the recipient and baseline low-income support is small: low-income recipients support Lula at higher rates than do non-recipients, but both recipients and non-recipients favor Lula at lower income levels than at higher ones. Low education recipients support Lula at lower rates than do non-recipients, but both recipients and non-recipients favor Lula at higher education levels than lower ones. Given that plausible values for recipient status are low-income categories, this suggests that income is a better predictor of Lula support than education. The marginal effects are displayed in Figure 23.

Figure 23. Models 5 & 6: Probability of Voting for Lula by Income & Education, 2006

In Model 5, across levels of income, the probability of supporting Lula is greater among program recipients. These report an 87 percent probability of supporting Lula, decreasing to 74 percent over increasing levels of income. Non-recipients report a 73 percent probability of supporting Lula, decreasing to 56 percent over increasing levels of income. The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 14 to 18 percent over the income values. These values decline over increasing levels of income, though they are implausible past the scaled value of 2 (greater than or equal to 1 minimum wage). In Model 6, across levels of education, the probability of supporting Lula is greater among non-recipients. These report a 31 percent probability of supporting Lula, increasing to 83 percent over increasing levels of

education. Recipients report a 17 percent probability of supporting Lula, increasing to 70 percent over increasing levels of education. The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients decreases from 14 to 13 percent over the education values.

As with the 2002 model, comparing Model 4 with Models 5 and 6 shows the strength of the income effect on the probability of support for Lula among respondents when compared to education. Low-income recipients show greater for support for Lula, though the magnitude of *Bolsa Família's* effect on vote choice is smaller at lower levels of income.

6.1.1.5 *Bolsa Família* and Vote Choice in Brazil

This section compares the difference in the probability of Lula support between low-income recipients and non-recipients between the 2002 and 2006 presidential election models, comparing Models 1 with 4 and models 2 with 5 to examine the effect of low-income respondents to non-respondents. Comparing the results from respondents who voted in the 2002 and 2006 elections, the overall effect of *Bolsa Família* results indicate that low-income recipients reported supporting Lula at similar rates. Recipients significantly supported Lula, but at a rate no greater than the same voters supported him before program introduction.

The magnitude of the effect of low-income *Bolsa Família* recipients between Models 1 and 4 – from 10 to 9 percent among recipients in the 2002 and 2006 contests – shows little variation in the level of overall program effect on support for Lula across income groups. A similarity in magnitude for multiplicative Models 2 and 5 – from 9 to 14 percent among low-income recipients – shows a small increase in the overall effect between 2002 and 2006. This means that after the program was fully implemented in 2004, respondents showed a similar probability of support for Lula, despite the sizable increase in vote share between his first and second victories (Hunter and Power 2008; Zucco and Power 2012). The overall effect of

participation, roughly an added 10 and 14 percent support for Lula depending on how the relationship is modeled, is much lower than the *Misión* effect shown below.

6.1.2 Voter Support for Chávez in Subsequent Elections

Models 7-18 in Tables 13-16 below display the results of probit analyses on LAPOP respondents who voted for Chavez-aligned parties in the 2005 Assembly and the 2006 presidential elections for *Misión* and education *Misión* participants. The main models are evaluated, then separate models for multiplicative interactions of program participation and income and participation and education are examined. Marginal effects analysis is then conducted for each model.

6.1.2.1 2005 Legislative Election - *Misión* Model

Models 7-9 in Table 27 display the results of probit analyses on LAPOP respondents who voted for Chávez-aligned parties in 2005 according to the characteristics identified above. These models show a positive effect for recipients of any *Misión* on the probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties, particularly when the relationship is modeled on income. Controlling for other factors, *Misión* recipients have a higher probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties even when accounting for income. These values are much higher than were found in Brazil.

Table 27. Probit of Being a *Misión* Recipient on Legislative Vote in 2005

	Model 7: Legislative Vote: Chávez Friendly-Vote	Model 8: Legislative Vote: Chávez Friendly-Vote Income Interaction	Model 9: Legislative Vote: Chávez Friendly-Vote Education Interaction
	2005	2005	2005
Misión Recipient	1.145***	3.058**	0.576
	(0.278)	(1.227)	(0.982)
Misión-Income Interaction		-0.570	
		(0.352)	
Misión-Education Interaction			0.247
			(0.408)
Gender	0.0532	0.0227	0.0396
	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.192)
Age	0.0408	0.0349	0.0400
	(0.0830)	(0.0839)	(0.0830)
Income	-0.0978	0.982	-0.101
	(0.106)	(0.677)	(0.106)
Education	-0.134	-0.129	-0.596
	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.779)
Zuliana	-0.610**	-0.697**	-0.627**
	(0.298)	(0.309)	(0.300)
West	-0.521	-0.611	-0.526
	(0.365)	(0.375)	(0.366)
Central-West	0.633	0.569	0.621
	(0.407)	(0.413)	(0.407)
East	0.121	0.0512	0.103
	(0.363)	(0.371)	(0.365)
Los Llanos	0.576	0.542	0.558
	(0.523)	(0.535)	(0.523)
Constant	0.579	-4.131*	0.533
	(0.638)	(2.378)	(1.993)
N	335	335	335

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The effect of the *Misiones* is positive and significant in Model 4 (at the p < .001 level) on the probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties. This effect is also positive and nearly significant for the interaction term for income and program participation (p-value of .105), shown in Model 8, and remains positive though not significant for education and program participation, shown in Model 9. These models show the expected significant probability of support for Chávez among low-income recipients.

Interpreting the other independent variables in the model shows that respondents who indicated supporting Chávez-aligned parties in the 2005 election were low-income, less well-educated, male, and older, though these were not significant predictors of support. Respondents from Zulia had a higher probability of opposing Chávez-aligned parties at a statistically significant level (p < .05).

6.1.2.2 Comparing Marginal Effects

Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Chávez-aligned party support in 2005 for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 7 reveals that across levels of income and education, the probability of supporting Chávez-aligned party is greater for recipients across all plausible (low) values. This is shown in Figure 24.

Figure 24. Probability of Voting for Chávez-aligned Parties by Income & Education, 2005

The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 27 to 36 over the income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties among recipients is 94 percent, and the value declines modestly over levels of income to 88 percent. At lowest levels of income, non-recipients have a 67 percent probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties, a value which decreases over income levels to 52 percent at the highest level.

The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients widens from 27 to 36 percent over the education values. At lowest levels of education, the probability of support among recipients is 94 percent, and the value declines over increasing levels of education to 88 percent.

At lowest levels of education, non-recipients have a 67 percent probability of support, a value that declines to 52 percent over the range of education levels.

Marginal effects analysis of Models 8 and 9 provides a way to examine the interaction effects of income and education with recipients compared against non-recipients. Non-recipients serve as a baseline for the effect of income and education on electoral support. In the marginal effects plots below, they reveal low-income and low education support for Chávez. The difference between the recipient and baseline low-income support is sizable: low-income and low-education recipients support Chávez at higher rates than do non-recipients. Both recipients and non-recipients favor Chávez at lower income levels than at higher ones, and the differences expand over increased levels of income. The significant relationship shown for the income interaction in Model 5 suggests that income is a better predictor of Chávez support than education. Marginal effects for both models are shown in Figure 25.

Figure 25. Models 8 & 9: Probability of Voting for Chávez-aligned Parties by Income & Education, 2005

The effect widens in Model 8 across levels of income, though in Model 9 it remains relatively steady across the education interaction. The probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties is greater among program recipients. The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients widens from 54 to 74 percent over the income interaction values, a staggering difference. These report a 99 percent probability of support, remaining steady at that level over increasing levels of income. Non-recipients report a 92 percent probability of support, decreasing

to 20 percent over increasing levels of income. In Model 9, the difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients widens from 23 to 27 percent over the education interaction values. Across levels of education, the probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties is again greater among recipients. These report a 62 percent probability of support, increasing to 85 percent over increasing levels of education. Non-recipients report a 39 percent probability of support, increasing to 68 percent over greater levels of education.

Comparing the overall model and the interaction models for the effect of participation in the *Misiones* on the 2005 Assembly elections shows the significance of the income effect on the probability of support for Chávez among respondents when compared to education. Low-income recipients show greater for support for Chávez, though the magnitude of the effect increases in size over levels of income. Results from the education *Misiones* are shown below.

6.1.2.3 2005 Legislative Election - Education *Misión* Model

Models 10-12 in Table 28 display the results of probit analyses on LAPOP respondents who voted for Chávez-aligned parties in 2005 according to the characteristics identified above. As with the overall measure for the *Misiones*, these models show a positive effect for *Misión* recipients on the probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties, particularly when the relationship is modeled on income. Controlling for other factors, *Misión* recipients have a higher probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties.

Table 28. Probit of Being an Education *Misión* Recipient on Legislative Vote in 2005

	Model 10: Legislative Vote: Chávez Friendly-Vote	Model 11: Legislative Vote: Chávez Friendly-Vote Income Interaction	Model 12: Legislative Vote: Chávez Friendly-Vote Education Interaction
	2005	2005	2005
Education *Misión* Recipient	1.264***	3.247**	1.841
	(0.360)	(1.629)	(1.626)
Education *Misión*-Income Interaction		-0.658	
		(0.479)	
Education *Misión*-Education Interaction			-0.244
			(0.658)
Gender	0.208	0.217	0.216
	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.196)
Age	0.0855	0.0949	0.0852
	(0.0846)	(0.0850)	(0.0847)
Income	-0.133	0.563	-0.134
	(0.106)	(0.511)	(0.106)
Education	-0.191	-0.197	0.0655
	(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.706)
Zuliana	-0.606**	-0.635**	-0.608**
	(0.296)	(0.296)	(0.297)
West	-0.544	-0.527	-0.535
	(0.363)	(0.363)	(0.364)
Central-West	0.859**	0.879**	0.860**
	(0.426)	(0.423)	(0.426)
East	0.322	0.314	0.315
	(0.372)	(0.372)	(0.373)
Los Llanos	0.696	0.705	0.701
	(0.538)	(0.538)	(0.539)
Constant	1.357**	-2.010	-0.511
	(0.581)	(1.788)	(1.792)
N	330	330	330

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The effect of education *Misión* participation is positive and significant in Model 10 (at the p < .001 level) on the probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties. This effect is positive and the interaction term for income and program participation, shown in Model 11, and remains positive for education and program participation, shown in Model 12. While the additive term is significant (and remains so in the income model), neither interaction measure is statistically significant.

Interpreting the other independent variables in the model shows that respondents who indicated supporting Chávez-aligned parties in the 2005 election were low-income, less well-educated, male, and older, though these were not significant predictors of support. Respondents from Zulia had a higher probability of opposing Chávez-aligned parties, and respondents from the Central-West region had a higher probability of supporting the parties at a statistically significant level (p < .05).

6.1.2.4 Comparing Marginal Effects

Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Chávez-aligned party support in 2005 for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 10 reveals that across levels of income and education, the probability of supporting Chávez-aligned party is greater for recipients across all plausible (low) values, and the effect widens across increasing values in both models. This is shown in Figure 26.

Figure 26. Probability of Voting for Chávez-aligned Parties by Income & Education, 2005

The difference in probability between recipients and widens from 7 to 10 percent over the income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties among recipients is 99 percent, and the value declines modestly over levels of income to 98 percent. At lowest levels of income, non-recipients have a 91 percent probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties, a value which decreases over income levels to 78 percent at the highest level. The difference in probability between recipients and widens from 2 to 12 percent over the education values. At lowest levels of education, the probability of support among recipients is 99 percent, and the value declines slightly over increasing levels of education to 97 percent. At

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lowest levels of education, non-recipients have a 90 percent probability of support, a value that declines to 78 percent over the range of education levels.

Marginal effects analysis of Models 11 and 12 provides a way to examine the interaction effects of income and education with recipients compared against non-recipients. Non-recipients serve as a baseline for the effect of income and education on electoral support. In the marginal effects plots below, they reveal low-income and low education support for Chávez. The difference between the recipient and baseline low-income support is large, but smaller than the overall *Misión* effect shown in the models above: low-income and low-education recipients support Chávez at higher rates than do non-recipients. Both recipients and non-recipients favor Chávez at lower income levels than at higher ones, and the differences expand over increased levels of income. The significant relationship shown for the income interaction in Model 11 suggests that income is a better predictor of Chávez support than education. Marginal effects for both models are shown in Figure 27.

Figure 27. Probability of Voting for Chávez-aligned Parties by Income & Education, 2005

In Model 11, across levels of income, the difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients widens from 1 to 45 percent over the income interaction values, a great difference, but one that may be affected by a low level of high-income recipients. The probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties is again greater among recipients. These report a 100 percent probability of support, which declines slightly to 99 percent over increasing levels of income. Non-recipients report a 99 percent probability of support, decreasing to 54 percent over greater levels of education. In Model 12, across levels of education, the difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients widens from 7 to 23 percent over the education interaction values.

The probability of supporting Chávez-aligned parties is greater among recipients. Recipients report a 99 percent probability of support, which remains constant over greater levels of education. Non-recipients report a 92 percent probability of support, decreasing to 76 percent over increasing levels of education.

Comparing the overall model and the interaction models for the effect of participation in the education *Misiones* on the 2005 Assembly elections shows the significance of the income effect on the probability of support for Chávez among respondents when compared to education. Low-income recipients show greater for support for Chávez, though the magnitude of the effect increases in size over levels of income. The effect is weaker than for the overall *Misión* participation level, generating a lower probability of electoral success for Chávez. Results from the 2006 vote models, which show a similar effect to the 2005 models, are shown below.

6.1.2.5 2006 Presidential Election - *Misión* Model

Models 13-15 in Table 29 display the results of probit analyses on LAPOP respondents who voted for Chávez in the 2006 presidential election according to the characteristics identified above. These models echo the 2005 data, showing a positive effect for *Misión* recipients on the probability of voting for Chávez, when the relationship is modeled on education and income. Controlling for other factors, *Misión* recipients have a higher probability of supporting Chávez.

Table 29. Probit of Being a *Misión* Recipient on Chávez Vote in 2006

	Model 13: Chávez Vote	Model 14: Chávez Vote: Income Interaction	Model 15: Chávez Vote: Education Interaction
	2006	2006	2006
Misión Recipient	1.342***	1.130***	1.105***
	(0.128)	(0.371)	(0.384)
Misión-Income Interaction		0.0765	
		(0.126)	
Misión-Education Interaction			0.110
			(0.168)
Gender	0.0895	0.0877	0.0866
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.103)
Age	-0.0288	-0.0283	-0.0289
	(0.0451)	(0.0451)	(0.0451)
Income	-0.0200	-0.157	-0.0192
	(0.0546)	(0.232)	(0.0547)
Education	-0.134*	-0.132*	-0.329
	(0.0768)	(0.0769)	(0.309)
Zuliana	-0.593***	-0.592***	-0.595***
	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.168)
West	-0.587***	-0.590***	-0.592***
	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.202)
Central-West	-0.136	-0.144	-0.140
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.165)
East	-0.126	-0.129	-0.130
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.182)
Los Llanos	0.191	0.190	0.183
	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.221)
Constant	0.201	-0.757	-0.712
	(0.303)	(0.730)	(0.753)
N	851	851	851

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The effect of Misión participation is positive and significant in Model 4 (at the p < .001 level) on the probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties. This effect is also positive for the interaction term for income and program participation shown in Model 14, and remains positive for education and program participation, shown in Model 15. While the additive term is significant (and remains so in both models), neither interaction measure is statistically significant.

Interpreting the other independent variables in the model shows that Chávez received significant support among low education respondents where the parties did not. Less well-educated respondents had a significantly higher probability of supporting Chávez in the overall and income interaction models (at the p < .1 level), though not in the education interaction model. Respondents who indicated supporting Chávez-aligned parties in the 2005 election were low-income, male, and - unlike the party support - younger, though these were not significant predictors of support. In the election, respondents from Zulia and the West had a higher probability of opposing Chávez-aligned parties at a statistically significant level (p < .001).

6.1.2.6 Comparing Marginal Effects

Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Chávez support in 2006 for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 13 reveals that across levels of income and education, the probability of supporting Chávez is greater for recipients across all plausible (low) values. This is shown in Figure 28.

Figure 28. Model 13: Probability of Voting for Chávez by Income & Education, 2006

The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases slightly from 43 to 44 percent over the income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting Chávez among recipients is 89 percent, and the value declines modestly over levels of income to 87 percent. At lowest levels of income, non-recipients have a 46 percent probability of supporting Chávez, a value that decreases over income levels to 43 percent at the highest level. The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 38 to 47 percent over the education values. At lowest levels of education, the probability of support among recipients is 92 percent, and the value declines over increasing levels of education to 85 percent.

At lowest levels of education, non-recipients have a 54 percent probability of support, a value that declines to 38 percent over the range of education levels.

Marginal effects analysis of Models 14 and 15 provides a way to examine the interaction effects of income and education with recipients compared against non-recipients. Non-recipients serve as a baseline for the effect of income and education on electoral support. In the marginal effects plots below, they reveal low-income and low education support for Chávez. The difference between the recipient and baseline low-income support is sizable: low-income and low-education recipients support Chávez at higher rates than do non-recipients. Both recipients and non-recipients favor Chávez at lower income levels than at higher ones, and the differences expand over increased levels of income. The significant relationship shown for the income interaction in Model 14 suggests that income is a better predictor of Chávez support across the levels of the variable than education. Marginal effects for both models are shown in Figure 29.

Figure 29. Models 14 & 15: Probability of Voting for Chávez by Income & Education, 2006

In Model 14, the difference in probability between recipients increases from 42 to 38 percent over the education values. Across levels of income, the probability of supporting Chávez is greater among recipients. These report a 79 percent probability of support, increasing to 87 percent over increasing levels of education. Non-recipients report a 37 percent probability of support, increasing to 49 percent over greater levels of education. In Model 15, the difference in probability between recipients declines from 41 to 37 percent over the education values. Across levels of education, the probability of supporting Chávez is greater among recipients. These report a 77 percent probability of support, increasing to 86 percent over increasing levels of education.

Non-recipients report a 36 percent probability of support, increasing to 49 percent over greater levels of education.

Comparing the overall model and the interaction models for the effect of participation in the *Misiones* on the 2006 presidential elections shows the significance of the income effect on the probability of support for Chávez among respondents when compared to education. Low-income recipients show greater for support for Chávez, though the magnitude of the effect increases in size over levels of income. Results from the education *Misiones* are shown below.

6.1.2.7 2006 Presidential Election - Education Misión Model

Models 16-18 in Table 30 display the results of probit analyses on LAPOP respondents who voted for Chávez in the 2006 presidential election according to the characteristics identified above. These models echo the 2005 data, showing a positive effect for education *Misión* recipients on the probability of voting for Chávez, when the relationship is modeled on education and income. Controlling for other factors, education *Misión* recipients have a higher probability of supporting Chávez.

Table 30. Probit of Being an Education *Misión* Recipient on Chávez Vote in 2006

	Model 16: Chávez Vote	Model 17: Chávez Vote: Income Interaction	Model 18: Chávez Vote: Education Interaction
	2006	2006	2006
Education *Misión* Recipient	0.964***	0.838*	0.819
	(0.163)	(0.444)	(0.553)
Education *Misión*-Income Interaction		0.0527	
		(0.174)	
Education *Misión*-Education Interaction			0.0675
			(0.247)
Gender	0.106	0.105	0.105
	(0.0999)	(0.100)	(0.0999)
Age	-0.0122	-0.0116	-0.0121
	(0.0442)	(0.0443)	(0.0442)
Income	-0.0454	-0.103	-0.0449
	(0.0523)	(0.196)	(0.0523)
Education	-0.215***	-0.214***	-0.288
	(0.0751)	(0.0752)	(0.279)
Zuliana	-0.492***	-0.492***	-0.491***
	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.160)
West	-0.565***	-0.567***	-0.566***
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)
Central-West	-0.0156	-0.0174	-0.0148
	(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.158)
East	-0.0701	-0.0682	-0.0669
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.176)
Los Llanos	0.111	0.112	0.110
	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.209)
Constant	1.253***	0.426	0.444
	(0.273)	(0.556)	(0.656)
N	844	844	844

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The effect is shown to be positive and significant in Model 4 (at the $p < .001$ level) on the probability of voting for Chávez-aligned parties. This effect is positive for the interaction term for income and program participation shown in Model 17, and remains positive for education and program participation, shown in Model 18. While the additive term is significant (and remains so in the income model), neither interaction measure is statistically significant.

Interpreting the other independent variables in the model shows that Chávez received significant support among low education respondents in general, where the parties did not. Less well-educated respondents had a significantly higher probability of supporting Chávez in all the models (at the $p < .01$ level). Chávez drew significant support from these individuals with lower socioeconomic status in the Misión and education Misión models, suggesting a lower level of importance for the programs, as low-educated non-recipients would also support the president.

Respondents who indicated supporting Chávez-aligned parties in the 2005 election were low-income, male, and - unlike the party support - younger, though these were not significant predictors of support. Respondents from Zulia and the West had a higher probability of opposing Chávez-aligned parties at a statistically significant level ($p < .001$ and $p < .01$, respectively).

6.1.2.8 Comparing Marginal Effects

Investigating the substantive effect of recipient status on the probability of Chávez support in 2006 for one unit increases in levels of income and education in Model 16 reveals that across levels of income and education, the probability of supporting Chávez is greater for recipients across all plausible (low) values. This is shown in Figure 30.

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Figure 30. Model 16: Probability of Voting for Chávez by Income & Education, 2006

The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 16 to 21 percent over the income values. At lowest levels of income, the probability of supporting Chávez among recipients is 96 percent, and the value declines slightly over levels of income to 95 percent. At lowest levels of income, non-recipients have an 80 percent probability of supporting Chávez, a value that decreases over income levels to 74 percent at the highest level. The difference in probability between recipients and non-recipients increases from 8 to 26 percent over the education values. At lowest levels of education, the probability of support among recipients is 98 percent, and the value declines over increasing levels of education to 90 percent.

At lowest levels of education, non-recipients have an 88 percent probability of support, a value that declines to 62 percent over the range of education levels.

Marginal effects analysis of Models 17 and 18 provides a way to examine the interaction effects of income and education with recipients compared against non-recipients. Non-recipients serve as a baseline for the effect of income and education on electoral support. In the marginal effects plots below, they reveal low-income and low education support for Chávez. The difference between the recipient and baseline low-income support is large, but smaller than the overall *Misión* effect shown in the models above: low-income and low-education recipients support Chávez at higher rates than do non-recipients. Both recipients and non-recipients favor Chávez at lower income levels than at higher ones, and the differences expand over increased levels of income. The figures show increasing slopes for the probability of electoral support for Chávez, meaning that recipients and non-recipients were likelier to support the leader at greater income levels.

The significant relationship shown for the income interaction in Model 17 suggests that income is a better predictor of Chávez support across values of the variable than education. Marginal effects for both models are shown in Figure 31.

Figure 31. Model 17 & 18: Probability of Voting for Chávez by Income & Education, 2006

In Model 17, the difference in probability between recipients decreases from 20 to 17 percent over the income values. Across levels of income, the probability of supporting Chávez is greater among program recipients. These report a 92 percent probability of support, increasing to 95 percent over greater levels of income. Non-recipients report a 72 percent probability of support, increasing to 78 percent over greater levels of income. In Model 18, the difference in probability between recipients decreases from 20 to 15 percent over the education values. Across levels of education, the probability of supporting Chávez is greater among recipients. These report a 92 percent probability of support, increasing modestly to 95 percent over increasing levels of

education. Non-recipients report a 72 percent probability of support, increasing to 80 percent over greater levels of education.

Comparing the overall model and the interaction models for the effect of participation in the education *Misiones* on the 2006 presidential elections shows the significance of the income effect on the probability of support for Chávez among respondents when compared to education. Low-income recipients show slightly less support for Chávez, with the magnitude of the effect of receiving the program narrows between recipients and non-recipients over levels of income and education. The effect is weaker than for the overall *Misión* participation level, generating a lower probability of electoral success for Chávez. Below, the overall effect of the *Misiones* on vote choice is analyzed.

6.1.2.9 The *Misiones* and Vote Choice in Venezuela

This section compares the difference in the probability of Chávez support between low-income recipients and non-recipients between the 2005 Assembly and 2006 presidential election models. For the overall *Misión* measure, it compares Models 7 and 13, and the interaction models 8 and 14. For the education *Misión* measure, it compares models 10 and 16 and the interaction models 11 and 17. For the overall *Misión* measure, low-income recipients reported supporting Chávez at sizable rates, while for the education *Misión* measure, low-income recipients support Chávez at lower levels.

The magnitude of the effect of the *Misiones* increases between 2005 and 2006 in models 7 and 13 – from 27 to 43 percent among low-income recipients – showing a sizable increase in the level of overall program effect on support for Chávez. Differences in the income-participant interaction in models 8 and 14 – from 54 to 42 percent among low-income recipients – show a slight decline in education Misión effect, though the magnitude is still quite great.

The magnitude of the effect of the education *Misiones* increases between 2005 and 2006 in Models 10 and 16 – from 7 to 16 percent among low-income recipients – showing a increase in the level of education program effect on support for Chávez. Differences in the income-participant interaction in Models 11 and 17 – from 1 to 16 percent among low-income recipients – show a similar level of effect for the education *Misiones*, though the magnitude is still sizable.

Compared to Brazil, the probability of support among poor non-recipients is low. This suggests a note of caution about the magnitude of the electoral effect: given the partisan divide described in Chapter 5, it is likely that *Misión* participation is saturated among Chávez supporters With roughly 80 percent of the sample participating in the *Misiones*, these poor non-recipients are likely opposition holdouts that avoid participation in *Misiones* because they do not support Chávez. The electoral effect of these programs would be lower in a case where the politics were less polarized.

In Venezuela, the relevance of the *Misiones* persists over time as the relatively strong effect of program participation on a Chávez or Chávez-aligned vote occurs in both the legislative and presidential elections. Comparing the two elections, respondents showed a sizable probability of support, as low-income recipients significantly supported Chávez at levels that increased over time in nearly all models. The overall effect was much higher than the *Bolsa Família* effect described above.

6.2   DISCUSSION

The models presented in this chapter reveal the significance of program participation to vote choice, showing a positive and mostly significant relationship between recipients and the

probability of support for Lula and Chávez. *Bolsa Família* and the *Misiones* both helped Lula and Chávez win electoral support. In isolation and across key variables, the magnitude of the effect of program participation on the probability of voting for the leaders persists. The effect of receiving them led to more support than among non-recipients.

While both programs benefited the presidents, the *Misiones* had a much stronger effect on the probability of Chávez support than *Bolsa Família* did for Lula. The electoral effect for *Bolsa Família* was relatively similar in 2002 and 2006, after the program was introduced. The *Misiones* showed substantial effects for the overall program measure and still sizable effects for the education program measure. This suggests that *Bolsa Família* did not substantively build electoral support in the way that the *Misiones* did.

For *Bolsa Família*, marginal effects analysis reveals that among low-income respondents, the magnitude of program effect was similar in 2002 as it was in 2006. Bohn's claim — that participation was not a significant predictor of the probability of support in 2006 since the program already reached Lula's constituency — is not confirmed; nor is Zucco and Powers' claim that the program effect was stronger as more members of the lower income constituency participated in the program. Rather, the recipient category shows about a 10 percent increase in support over non-recipients in both the 2002 and 2006 election. This shows the value of the marginal effects analysis to the debate over the *Bolsa Família* effect on vote choice.

The difference in the level of the effect suggests further analysis into how program design affected the probability of support. While Hawkins and Penfold-Becerra offer evidence of targeting of the *Misiones* toward certain groups, this examination of the electoral effect over time demonstrates that the programs were indeed responsible for delivering votes. Comparing the targeting of the education programs, which yielded a significant probability of support among

Venezuelan program participants, to *Bolsa Família* will show important differences in program design – particularly for oversight.

Examining the effect also raises questions about the policy process: how political institutions permit leaders to design programs that produce the electoral effect revealed in the analysis. Subsequent chapters will examine these institutions, program design, and outcomes among expenditures and program distribution that contribute to such differences among recipients and non-recipients in these two countries.

6.3   CONCLUSION

This chapter presents models for vote choice and predicted probabilities for recipients and non-recipients of *Bolsa Família*, the *Misiones*, and the education-specific *Misiones*. The key result revealed is that both programs aided their leaders, but the effect was stronger – and significantly so – for the *Misiones* than for *Bolsa Família*. Chapter 7 will conclude the dissertation with a discussion on the outcomes of programs identified by programmatic and parochial strategies, hypothesis review, and policy and theoretical implications.

7.0   CONCLUSION: GOOD POLITICS, BAD POLITICS, AND POLICY

Political institutions determine how social programs redistribute to constituents, in manners both programmatic in parochial. This chapter describes the effects of each, and what can be learned about the policy process that yields insight into theory and future programs. It includes a hypothesis review, discussion of policy outcomes, and theoretical and policy implications in light of the relationships described in the theory and demonstrated in the empirical chapters above.

The chapter begins by discussing the results of the empirical chapters in light of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter Two. The variation in horizontal accountability determines how executives design programs and generate electoral effects by redistributing resources according to rule-based or clientelist priorities. This section discusses evidence for the effect of opposition and party system influence on program characteristics and distributional outcomes that reveal strategy.

It continues with a review of secondary accounts of program outcomes and government participation data to contrast the effects of programmatic and parochial redistributive strategies, showing the importance of the income transfers to each program's impact. This serves as a first cut at the chief implication of the study: programmatic policy yields better outcomes for participants than do parochial ones. This is shown through a discussion of the evidence of program impact in both Brazil and Venezuela.

The chapter concludes with theoretical and policy implications. Drawing from literature on constitutional and partisan powers to present model of executive-legislative relations that result in horizontal accountability effects on antipoverty policy, it integrates recent perspectives on party system collapse to compare policy outcomes of collapse and consolidation. When leaders' partisan powers are moderated, the design of targeted programs results in programs that incorporate rules that determine inclusion. Governments seeking to implement targeted antipoverty policies can learn from the integration of rule-based elements into program design. These still yield electoral results – constituents respond when politicians deliver to them – but they protect against distributing limited resources to the non-poor. Additionally, the variation in quality shows that through the development of clear criteria for inclusion in targeted programs, compared to those that lack them, politicians can do a better job of reaching the poor. Since redistribution is an important element of leftist ideology, this should not be overlooked. The chapter begins below by examining the hypotheses and evidence presented in the study.

7.1   HYPOTHESIS REVIEW

This section reviews the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 2, finding support for the main hypothesis of the study and for several of the expectations it generates. Below the guiding hypothesis is introduced and evidence for each claim is discussed:

H1)   greater (less) partisan powers result in parochial (programmatic) program design.

The evidence introduced in Chapters 4 and 5 shows that the partisan powers – the president's control over the political agenda – are demonstrated to determine the degree of latitude in the design of antipoverty policy. In instances of weak (Venezuela) and strong (Brazil)

constitutional power, the partisan powers determined the degree to which the executive could craft programs that distributed in a manner that reflected their political preferences. By comparing the political preferences of government and opposition actors, the limitations of weak partisan powers in Brazil were shown to influence the extent to which the PT could successfully translate *Bolsa Família* into a guaranteed income program: the PT was forced to compromise on these matters. The strength of Chávez's partisan powers influenced the extent to which the program reflected his – and his supporters' – policy preferences over those of the opposition. Unlike in Brazil where Lula obtained a basic program, the Chávez government did not need to compromise on these matters.

Expectations regarding the components of partisan powers analyzed in the study, including: executive popularity, party composition, and the institutionalization of the party system are discussed.

7.1.1 Executive Popularity

This study produces limited evidence in support of expectations that executive popularity results in programs with fewer constraints to distribute to political supporters. Both the Brazil and Venezuela cases show a high level of electoral support for the respective executives. With an absence in variation, the evidence for executive influence on policy design requires an examination of evidence presented in the shadow cases illustrated in Chapter 2. Both the Argentinean and Mexican cases had greater constraints on the distribution to political supporters relying on eligibility criteria. A related matter is how executive popularity encourages delegation in the policymaking model. Both the Brazil and Venezuela cases have high executive popularity

that makes delegation more likely. The legislatures in both cases permitted the executive to develop policy proposals, and then acted on them.

However in both of the above instances, the absence of variation means that it is impossible to determine whether the evidence supports the hypothesis. Executive popularity is one element of the partisan powers model that is not supported through the case study analysis.

7.1.2 Legislative Composition

With an executive positioned to deliver excludable goods to selectively benefit populations, the importance of the legislature to provide checks as they determine final passage of proposals is great. Their ability to do so impacts the integration of reform elements into programs, though as shown in Chapter 5, this depends on the composition of the legislature. Of the elements of partisan power introduced in this study, legislative and party system aspects – those that establish horizontal accountability on the executive – are shown to matter most in both the Brazil and Venezuela cases: the process of design required careful legislative oversight to produce serious program oversight.

Legislative oversight constrained executive policymaking in Brazil, resulting in the introduction of reform elements into program design, and ensuring that they remained present during a period of debate about *Bolsa Família's* role in social policy. These reform elements excluded certain populations on the basis of whether they met program conditions, not on political status. In Venezuela, opposition members could not provide legislative oversight during the periods of program introduction and later approval, which reduced their ability to influence program design. This meant that the kinds of program elements introduced excluded certain

populations on the basis of whether they met political criteria instead of program conditions. The mechanics of horizontal accountability are detailed in the hypotheses below.

Program design varied according to legislative composition. The Brazilian case illustrated how passing the program through the legislature required the integration of reform elements common to municipal-level programs. The size of Lula's coalition was smaller than necessary to pass legislature on its own, meaning that the opposition had a strong effect in permitting passage. Incorporating these elements into program design provided a way to ensure passage. This was also evident during the debate over whether to continue to incorporate these elements into program design: these actions occurred during the period where the PT was in a minority coalition. The continuation of conditionalities was subject to a change of opposition preferences to provide legislative support, which did not occur. As the PT considered eliminating conditions, the opposition protested and the program remained a CCT.

The Venezuelan case illustrated how implementing the *Misiones* occurred under little legislative oversight, resulting in few (and when present, not enforced) reform elements. The size of the opposition coalition was small at the period of introduction, though Chávez skirted their influence by utilizing informal decree powers to initiate the programs. After securing a larger legislative coalition in following Assembly elections, Chávez utilized constitutional decree powers provided to him by the legislature to formalize the programs. The legislature was not a gatekeeper in the implementation of the *Misiones*, meaning that the programs were not subject to the implementation of reform elements that were expressed by opposition policy organizations.

In both cases, the numbers mattered. The extent to which the opposition was able to shape the programs determined how they were designed: the incorporation of policy preferences from

opposition actors that held significant seats in the legislature resulted in programs that took those preferences into account.

7.1.3   Party System Institutionalization

Party system institutionalization affected the degree to which executives sought credible policy change, through expectations of party competition, stable organizational identities and horizontal accountability among actors. During program design in Brazil, the President took into account opposition preferences to develop credible policies. The consolidation of the party system generated stable expectations about the policy preferences of opposition and government actors, leading to the integration of both into the *Bolsa Família*. This led the program to redistribute beyond the narrow constituency of supporters and reach beyond now-or-never redistributive strategies.

During program design in Venezuela, Chávez did not take opposition preferences into account. During the party system collapse, expectations about the policy preferences of opposition and government actors became subject to the political polarization that characterized their relationship. The *Misiones* reflected government preferences, but the perspectives of the opposition were excluded from influence on program design. This led to programs, which did not redistribute beyond a narrow constituency of supporters, and with transfers that reflected now-or-never expenditure patterns. In a future with a more dominant opposition, many of the policy preferences established into law with the *Misiones* would change. This was much less likely in Brazil.

The next subsection reviews the basic expectations that relate the partisan powers described in Chapter 5 to the distributive strategies examined in Chapter 4. The relationships are supported in the study.

7.1.4 Expectations about Oversight, Expenditures and Program Distribution

Combining the components above, the relationship between partisan powers and program characteristics is shown through comparative analysis of constraints on program design. The elements of oversight employed in Brazil resulted from the constraints placed on the executives as they designed and implemented policy by checking plans and moderating policy design to include reforms. The absence of these oversight elements in Venezuela resulted from the lack of similar constraints. As described above, the legislature generated the constraints and the party system affected how two popular executives designed and carried out their policies. Further analysis of executive popularity, introduced in the Mexico and Argentina shadow cases in Chapter 2, would detail how this third element contributes to the process of program design and implementation.

As the strength of partisan powers affects oversight, it also affects how executives devote resources to their antipoverty programs. In Brazil, the developed system of opposition parties resulted in systemic interactions that made it more difficult to introduce radical changes in spending. This consolidation required that Lula take a credible approach to distribute to constituents. The steady expansion of program benefits occurred according to program criteria credibly increased the likelihood that *Bolsa Família* would continue as a program during times when the PT was in the opposition. This differed from Venezuela, where the disintegration of opposition parties allowed Chávez to take a now-or-never approach to distribute to constituents. This was most evident in *Misión Robinson*, but expenditures for both *Ribas* and *Sucre* flagged as

institutional priorities shifted. The slow recovery of the opposition could not influence how the leader distributed resources. Chávez proceeded without concern about whether the opposition as electoral challengers could affect or even do away with the pattern of expenditures.

Linking partisan powers and distribution strategy reveals how executives constrained by legislatures and institutionalized party systems practice "selective distributive politics": the rules they implement and the spending priorities they undertake are influenced by the elements of horizontal accountability that influence policy. The checks that resulted in oversight and spending choices determined the distributive strategies implemented in the programs. This affected how leaders build political support through redistribution.

In Brazil, models examining the determinants of *Bolsa Família* targeting revealed that poverty, the chief program criteria for participation, was shown to be a chief determinant. Political factors were revealed to have minimal statistically significant and substantive effect, with a limited amount of core voter targeting in 2006. With program factors consistently determining distribution, a programmatic strategy emerges in the way *Bolsa Família* distributes to constituents.

In Venezuela, models examining the determinants of *Misión Sucre becas* and *Aldeas*, and *Misión Ribas becas* targeting revealed that poverty was not a chief determinant of geographic distribution. Political factors were revealed to have statistically significant effects (in the case of *Sucre becas*) and among all three programs, substantive effects, mainly resulting in core voter targeting. With program factors having little effect on distribution and either-or spending occurring to political effects, a parochial strategy emerges in the way the education Misiones distributes to constituents.

Partisan powers affect how executives redistribute, determining the ways they generate political support as they reach constituents with new forms of spending. The strategies introduced in the theoretical chapter and revealed in detailed analysis in Chapter 5 show how constraints on these powers enable leaders to develop parochial programs or force them to develop programmatic ones.

7.1.5 Expectations about Electoral Payoffs of Targeted Social Programs

The evidence introduced in Chapter 6 shows that recipients had greater probabilities of electoral support of candidates that introduced social programs, regardless of whether programs were programmatic or parochial in distribution strategy. In Brazil, the differences in the probability of support for Lula between recipients and non-recipients offered support for the effect of targeting on the probability of political support. These differences existed between recipients and non-recipients for both *Misión* and education *Misión* programs as well. In reaching certain constituencies, regardless of how the programs were distributed, these programs achieved political effects.

The difference in the probability of support between the programmatic *Bolsa Família* and the parochial *Misiones* on support for the respective leaders is revealed in the degree of electoral effect produced among the recipients. The programs that were designed and administered to selectively distribute benefits according to political criteria had a greater effect on the probability of electoral support than did the program that prioritized program criteria to distribute benefits. Evidence for the institutional determinants that lead to the programmatic and parochial distributional strategies that generate these effects is identified in discussion of the hypotheses below.

7.1.6   Summing Up

The hypothesis review shows support for the relationship between partisan powers and program design. Limitations to the analysis include evidence for one aspect of partisan powers: the influence of executive popularity requires additional analysis from the other cases elaborated in Chapter 2. Future analysis can develop this further, and relate it to the evidence for the external effect shown here.

Below, a discussion of program outcomes shows the impact of programmatic and parochial distribution. This is then followed by theoretical and policy implications.

7.2   OUTCOMES OF PROGRAMMATIC AND PAROCHIAL SOCIAL PROGRAMS

This section introduces the outcomes of *Bolsa Família* and the education *Misiones*, showing the effects of the programs over the course of the decade. The contrast shows how programs oriented toward programmatic and parochial redistributive strategies deliver benefits to constituents: programmatic policies yield better results, with more consistent participation and antipoverty outcomes, according to secondary perspectives. *Bolsa Família* is first described, followed by the education *Misiones*.

7.2.1   *Bolsa Família*

As program participation steadily increased over the decade, *Bolsa Família* had an impact on the levels of income inequality and poverty in Brazil. While it was not the only cause – other social

transfers exist and the economy grew as time passed from the economic crisis – the program had

an important effect on income and poverty, and a limited effect on educational participation.

7.2.1.1 Participation

Examining enrollment shows a steady increase over time in program participation, shown in

Figure 32. This mirrors the steady increase in program expenditure trends described in Chapter 6.

Data are from the *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social Matriz da Informação Social* (MDS

Various Years).

Bolsa Familia Recipient Families

Figure 32. ` Recipient Families

A doubling in enrollment of recipient families occurs from the point of program change in 2004

to 2011: over the decade the number of recipient families increases from greater than 6.5 million

to greater than 13.3 million participants. The steady increase in program participation yields

inequality- and poverty- reducing effects, and has a modest impact on improving schooling rates.

7.2.1.2 Income Effects

Inequality, poverty, and schooling outcomes are described below, with the strongest results shown in in the program's effect on extreme poverty. *Bolsa Família* had in important effect on reducing income inequality, but is not the only reason that this has declined. Comparing household survey data from 2001, 2004, and 2006 the program alone reduced 0.6 Gini coefficient points between 2001-4, and between 2004-6 it reduced inequality by another 0.2 points (Soares, 2012, 21-2). Studies estimating its effect show that over the early part of the decade, *Bolsa Família* was responsible for 21-30 percent of the decline in Brazil's Gini coefficient and over the later part of the decade, was responsible for16-21 percent (Soares, 2012, 22).

Between 2002-10 poverty was reduced in Brazil from 25 to 14 percent, and extreme poverty fell from 10.4 percent to 4.8 percent. By estimating a counterfactual based on if *Bolsa Família* transfers did not exist, Soares shows that between 2005-9 the program lowered extreme poverty by between 1.6-1.9 percentage points, accounting for about one third of the decline in extreme poverty (S. Soares et al. 2010). The program was estimated to have greater impacts other measures; *Bolsa Família* was shown to reduce poverty gap by 9.4 percent and the severity of poverty by 5.9 percent (S. Soares and Sátyro 2009; S. Soares 2012).

7.2.1.3 Education Effects

The impact of *Bolsa Família* on schooling reveals a modest effect, partly because attendance and enrollment were nearly universal (97 percent) before the program increased in scale (S. Soares 2012). Silveira Neto (2010) shows that the program results in a 2-3 percentage point increase in these outcomes. Glewwe and Kassouf (2012) show a 5.5 percent increase in grades 1-4 and a 6.5 percent increase in grades 5-8. They also show a decrease in dropout rates of 0.5 percent in grades 1-4 and 0.4 percent in grades 5-8. These effects are more moderate than the income effects above,

but they show that the program conditionalities resulted in changes in addition to the income transfer effects.

7.2.1.4 Evaluating the Results

According to secondary evaluations, *Bolsa Família* had a stronger effect on income than it did on education, partly because education rates were high to begin with. However, even this conditionality element showed a degree of improvement as a result of implementation. Steady program enrollment increases were consistent with the expenditure record over the course of the decade. *Bolsa Família* had demonstrable effects on inequality, poverty and other measures of income. Participants were incentivized to improve educational enrollment and attendance, and decrease dropout rates. These outcomes revealed a program with clear antipoverty guidelines. The program's narrow effect on income – particularly extreme poverty – was the result of its design to reach the poorest. Income effects are also revealed below as the Education *Misiones* are examined.

7.2.2 Education *Misiones*

The participation and outcome record in the education *Misiones* revealed in this section demonstrates problems associated with the parochial nature of the programs. Even as the programs were made official in 2008, they encountered a record of irregular funding and constant organizational change. Though no impact assessments of the Misiones have been conducted, a comparison of enrollment with graduation rates and estimates from the *Instituto Nacional de*

Estadistica (INE) 2011 National Household Survey provide ways to evaluate program outcomes through secondary sources.

7.2.2.1 Participation

Participation in the education *Misiones* varies for each program over the course of the decade. Data for the participation and the following section on graduation is compiled from Mundo (2009) and Bravo Jáuregui (2012) and the annual reports of the *Ministerio de Educación Cultura y Deportes*, *Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educación, Ministerio del Poder Popular Para la Educación Universitaria, Fundación Misión Sucre* and the *Ministerio del Poder Popular para Planificación y Desarollo*.

Figure 33 shows registration in the education *Misiones*. It reveals a steep decline in participation in *Robinson* programs between 2006-7 and *Ribas* participation between 2007-8. A decline, though much less steep is visible in *Misión Sucre* as well, between 2006-7.

Figure 33. Registration in Education *Misiónes*

Participation in *Misión Robinson* reflected the administration's massive push to eradicate illiteracy among the population and the follow-up basic education program activities described in Ortega and Rodriguez and Mundo (Mundo 2009; Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). Registration began at 1,371,595 participants, and peaked with 1,548,511 participants in 2006. In the years following, the number of registrants in *Misión Robinson I* dwindled both as participants presumably proceeded to *Robinson II, Robinson III,* and *Ribas*, and as the facilitation of *Robinson* learning shifted to volunteer households.

Participation in secondary and post-secondary programs *Misiones Ribas* and *Sucre* encountered peaks and declines in service, much like the counterpart in *Misión Robinson.* In 2004, the government reported 672,405 registrants in *Misión Ribas*, and by 2006, registration the

program had expanded to 1,207,046 (Mundo 2009). Participation then declined by roughly half to 517,585, and *Ribas* registration continued at a reduced level through 2011, when it reached 429,875. (Bravo Jáuregui 2012)

Misión Sucre encountered a similar early increase in participation only to witness a setback in registration, followed by an eventual increase at the end of the decade. In 2004, the government reported 286,915 bachilleres studying in the program. Of these, over 72,068 of the students had chosen majors. The program had over 3,323 facilitators with 5,270 sections in 987 locations (D'Elia, 2006, 111). Over the course of the decade, the number of registrants peaked at 517,174 participants in 2006, then declined nearly by half to 302,023 in 2007. By 2010, the program reached 462,199 registrants. (Bravo Jáuregui 2012)

7.2.2.2 Education Effects

Evaluating graduation as a schooling outcome shows that outside of the early years of Robinson, the programs does not consistently graduate the large number of participants. As described below, Robinson outcomes are shown to be suspect, further weakening the educational outcomes of the programs.

Graduation data is presented below in Table 30. Annual figures are not consistently available over the course of the decade for the programs.

Table 31. Registration and Graduation, Education *Misiónes*

	Robinson I	Graduates	Robinson II	Graduates	Robinson III	Ribas	Graduates	Sucre	Graduates
2003			697,192		432,886				
2004	1,371,595	1,314,790	1,261,793			672,405		286,915	
2005	1,493,211	1,482,543	1,452,542			763,177		362,786	
2006	1,548,511	1,534,267	1,542,931	327,390		1,041,114		517,174	
2007	69,748	28,360	167,109	64,299	72,496	1,207,046		302,023	
2008	95,485	48,021	403,732	73,500	48,021	517,585	97,000	318,920	30,993
2009	43,069	26,334	325,406	56,453	26,133	432,902	85,120	410,877	10,015
2010	14,829		297,833		19,985	425,875		462,199	95,627
2011	8,763		326,851		16,927	429,875			

From available data, *Misión Robinson* became far less successful at graduating students, though in comparison, the graduation rates for *Misión Sucre* students were lower. In 2004-2006 the graduation rate of Misión Robinson hovered between 95-99 percent. By 2009, the rates of registered students graduating from *Misiones Robinson I, II,* and *Ribas* were 61 percent, 17 percent, and 19 percent, respectively (Bravo Jáuregui, 2011, 35).

As the authors above note, *Robinson I* contains a peculiarity. By 2005 the National Assembly together with UNESCO declared Venezuela of a "nation free of illiteracy" announcing a literacy success of nearly 1.5 million people through Misión Robinson after six months of the program, all but eliminating the count of illiterates in the country (D'Elia, 2006, 83; Ortega & Rodríguez, n.d.). This is puzzling, particularly in light of UNESCO reports that note that nearly one million illiterate citizens remained within the country through 2006, two years after the declaration (Mundo 2009; Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). Researchers note that post-*Misión Robinson* household survey data does not corroborate a steep decline in illiteracy either in terms of change in illiteracy over time or over the illiteracy trend in a time-series analysis (Mundo 2009; Ortega and Rodríguez n.d.). According to the 2001 government census, adult illiteracy stood at

1,154,000 in 2001 (Sanjuán Martinez & Gonzalez Plessman, 2010). UNESCO adult literacy figures show an adult illiterate population of 1,318,000 for 2006 and a marginal decline to 931,000 in 2007 (UNESCO 2009, 2010). The evidence refutes the government's claim that Venezuela became a "nation free of illiteracy" through Misión Robinson. Yet matriculation into higher levels of the social program continued through 2007, particularly into *Misión Ribas*.

Data for the upper-level programs is limited, however. The rate of students graduating from *Misión Ribas* shows 18.7 percent in 2008 and 19.6 percent in 2009. For *Sucre* the rate varies from 9.7 percent in 2008, to 2.4 percent in 2009, and is followed by an increase to 20 percent in 2010 (D'Elia, 2011, 4). With limited reporting, it is difficult to make conclusions over the decade. However available data reveal weak educational outcomes for program participants.

Each of the programs witnessed an interruption in growth over the course of the decade, and by its end, each shows a declining graduation rate among registered participants. Graduation rates are particularly low compared to the earliest reported rates of *Misión Robinson.* Had the program generated the success claimed by the government, exit from the program would be evidence of success. Similarly, while the *Misión Sucre* program required a lengthier timeframe for completion of coursework, the ratio of enrolled students to graduates were low when compared to any year of program registration reported. With such low success rates in producing graduates, questions are evident about the instructional quality and purpose of participation within the programs.

7.2.2.3 Income Effects

Evaluating the program effect on income, The *Instituto Nacional de Estadistica* (INE) provides estimates in the 2011 National Household Survey of the effect of the *Misiones* on income and

inequality. The study reveals modest effects on income for the programs, with the largest share of redistributive transfers coming from the education *Misiones*. When taken together, this suggests a weak overall effect on income for the programs.

Estimating the value of overall *Misión* transfers, the study shows a reduction in inequality of 0.02 Gini points, from 0.4257 to 0.4072, a 4 percent decline in the Gini coefficient (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2011, 107). Estimates of *Misión* transfer effects on the level of individuals living under the poverty line show a decline as the result of transfers from 15.3 percent to 14.8, a 3 percent decline. Proportionally, the effect on extreme poverty is greater, with the transfers reducing the share of individuals in this income category from 5.5 percent to 4.8, a 15 percent decline (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2011, 106).

These effects should be considered modest in comparison with overall declines in inequality and poverty occurred over the course of the decade. The Gini coefficient declined from 0.477 in 2000 to 0.39 in 2011. Individuals living in poverty decreased from 48.3 to 31.9 percent. Those living in extreme poverty decreased from 19.5 to 8.6 percent over the same period (Weisbrot and Johnston 2012).

The INE reports redistribution from education as the largest component of social investment among the *Misiones*. Education transfers stood at 70.9 percent of overall investment with nutrition and health reflecting 19.6 and 9.5 percent respectively (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2011, 103). This resulted in education programs having the largest redistributive effect among expenditure categories for government transfers, particularly among the poor. Transfers for education increased resources to the lowest income quartile from 1 percent to 11.7, a 10 percent improvement. A 4.6 percent increase occurred in the overall effect, from 2.8 to 7.4 percent (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2011, 99-100). However, given the inefficiency

revealed in the administration of the education programs in Chapter 6, it is unclear whether recipients are realizing the results of expenditures.

7.2.2.4 Evaluating the Results

Combining secondary evaluations and government releases of graduation data reveals that the expenditures (and among these, the transfers) for the *Misiones* appear to have greater impact than the actual delivery of education. This is particularly so for *Misión Robinson*, which touted a reduction in illiteracy that did not reflect reality. Assessing the available data for graduation rates of the other programs reveals that the programs did not consistently deliver successful outcomes for participants. The participation rates were consistent with expenditures, reflecting the interference and problems with oversight shown in Chapter 6. Since the programs were intended to produce successful students, the larger effect that income transfer elements had compared to the graduation outcomes suggest that the programs did not reach its goal. *Bolsa Família* and the education *Misiones* are briefly compared below.

7.2.3   Comparing the Results

Bolsa Família and the *Misiones* reveal demonstrable effects on income, particularly extreme poverty. The effects should not be confused with program design. *Bolsa Família* was designed to redistribute resources but is conditional on participation in education and health activities. The cash transfer element has the most important effect with related conditional effects having a secondary effect. The education *Misiones* were designed to implement remedial literacy through university education, with an income transfer element for certain participants. The income transfer elements of the education *Misiones* appear to have a larger impact than the education

element. The transfers comprise a sizable share of all transfers in the *Misiones*, and having a large impact on those in the lowest income quartile.

The outcomes separate the good programs from the bad. With secondary evidence showing that the education *Misiones* were more effective as income redistributive mechanisms than education programs, the political implications of oversight problems shown in Chapter 5 and parochial distribution shown in Chapter 6 mean that the program was more successful as a delivery mechanism for political than for program outcomes. Unlike *Bolsa Família*, which was shown in Chapter 5 and 6 to have strong oversight, with poverty as the chief determinant of distributions, the delivery of resources occurred according to program goals. Political interactions that resulted in good policy yielded better program outcomes. This will be explored below in the hypothesis review.

7.3   THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This section presents theoretical and policy implications of the findings of the study. They include how the effect of "good policy" is acknowledged in the literature on clientelism and on politician incentives to redistribute. They also suggest that the literature on parties and social policy accommodate horizontal accountability in models of policymaking. Finally, recommendations are made for actors interested in encouraging programmatic policy.

7.3.1   **Theoretical Implications**

The following theoretical considerations emerge for the study of politicization of social policy. This study offers clarification for the murky relationship between the literature and vote-winning aspects of "good policy." It also presents considerations about how horizontal accountability affects existing models of antipoverty policymaking.

7.3.1.1 Clientelism and "Good Policy"

The literature on clientelism and the distribution of social policy suggests that winning votes by targeting constituents is an unfavorable outcome of social program delivery (Ansell and Mitchell 2011; De La O Torres 2013; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007). This is certainly the case when the delivery of goods is a function of contingent direct exchange of resources based on political criteria such as past allegiance or the probability of future electoral support. Because targeted social programs are likely to win votes whether or not contingent direct exchange occurs, important consideration is necessary for vote-winning policies that are not contingent on these criteria.

Programmatic policies deliver social benefits to constituencies while delivering votes to leaders, and suggest that "good votes" occur when social transfers are "good policy" –when they ensure that the poor are those recipients that receive benefits as intended, and make those benefits available without strings attached. They contrast with the "bad votes" that occur when social transfers are "bad policy" – when they fail to ensure that the poor are the recipients that receive intended benefits, and make those benefits available based on political criteria. Policies that provide social inclusion *should* win votes. But whether they do so by being parochial or programmatic is determined by the institutional effects of horizontal accountability.

7.3.1.2 Horizontal Accountability and Linkage Strategies

The literature on social policymaking suggests that factors internal to parties and politicians determine linkage strategies between politicians and constituents (Handlin 2012; Herbert Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Pribble 2013; Roberts 2007). The cases compared here do reveal the effect of the partisan powers of the executive in determining program politicization. However, the cases best provide evidence for the influence of horizontal accountability on the executive's scope of power to set and implement their agenda. The politician-constituent linkage that is built with targeted social programs varies depending on how legislatures and parties constrain leadership decisions.

These external influences affect how politicians strategize how to link redistribution to political outcomes. Two factors – the balance of parties in the legislature and the institutionalization of the party system – constrain leadership ability to politicize programs by determining how excludable goods are distributed to populations and by moderating how executives consider how programs will survive when they are out of power.

Legislatures that delegate to executives to carry out antipoverty policymaking can exercise a check on the form and content of programs before giving approval. This affects how programs integrate rule-based oversight into their administration.

As they design policy, executives consider whether to undertake a measured one that credibly articulates their redistributive goals. An institutionalized system of competing parties improves the ability of opposition to reshape their programs after a leader is in office, affecting current decisions about mobilizing through redistribution, including whether the program takes on a progressive approach to redistribution over a now-or-never manner or articulates national preferences over particular ones.

The policy implications below relate the findings described to leadership incentives to develop policy and recommendations for organizations interested in influencing program characteristics. Of particular relevance is how horizontal accountability can affect the quality of program impact in future policy design, but given the electoral impact of programs, leaders should have the incentive to develop good policy on their own.

7.3.2   Policy Implications

The following policy implications emerge for the study: since the electoral effect of targeted social policy is shown to exist for programmatic and parochial distributive strategies, politicians seeking an electoral boost from implementing social programs have few incentives to choose parochial policies. This is especially the case for leftist politicians, which share redistribution as an ideological preference. Additionally, for those who seek to promote programmatic distributive strategies, recommendations are made.

7.3.2.1 Incentives for Programmatic and Parochial Distributive Strategies

The positive electoral effect of choosing programmatic strategies should reduce the need to introduce parochial distributive strategies. Targeted programs have a positive electoral effect, generating a greater probability of electoral support for leaders that reach constituents with programs. Since the Brazil and Venezuela comparison reveals this is to be the case, the incentives for parochial strategies should be minimal. The evidence presented in this chapter comparing the impact of programmatic *Bolsa Família* in Brazil and parochial *Misiones* in Venezuela provides

evidence that the antipoverty effect is stronger when programmatic policies are pursued. If both win votes, leaders should be persuaded by the effect of the program on poverty outcomes.

Leftists and other politicians that endorse redistributive goals should be especially interested in choosing programmatic distributive strategy over parochial policy. Considering both the electoral effects described above and how the two programs impact poverty, politicians interested in redistribution can do so in a programmatic fashion without sacrificing the electoral benefits brought by targeting. Drawing electoral benefit from delivering to constituencies that benefit from social programs is a regular element of politics.

This implication exposes contradictions in the goals of the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela. Revisiting the evidence presented in Chapter 6 models, poverty does not have a determining effect on *beca* distribution, despite the sizable impact of the education *Misión* transfers on income. Had poverty determined the direction of *beca* targeting, the redistributive impact could have been stronger and consistent with ideological goals.

7.3.2.2 Encouraging Programmatic Policy

The effect of institutionalized competition on moderating redistributive policy suggests that those seeking to influence politicians from practicing clientelism, particularly in countries with weakly institutionalized political systems, should encourage the consolidation of party systems. Developed party systems represent a way of limiting radical changes to policy by ensuring that politicians consider their choices in light of how they will proceed when the government is in opposition.

Those interested in reducing clientelism should focus on the development of opposition parties that are rooted in society, mobilizing on class or identity in lieu of exchange relationships.

Party development projects to bring these changes about can include foreign assistance, civic education, or even as a byproduct of civil society mobilization.

7.4   CONCLUSION

This chapter presents a hypothesis review, an examination of outcomes, and policy and theoretical implications for the findings of the study. It reveals the following conclusions about how leaders politicize social programs in Latin America.

Leaders politicize targeted social programs by choosing distributional strategies, and are constrained in doing so by elements horizontal accountability such as political competition and the institutionalization of the party system. The effects of these elements are shown in the cases and analysis of program distribution. Both programmatic and parochial distributive strategies have electoral effects, but the degree of effect varies. The quality of program outcomes varies too by distributive strategy. Better programs are the product of political interactions that affect the degree to which leaders can redistribute in a parochial manner. Evidence from Brazil and Venezuela shows the variation in the politics, their outputs, the electoral effects, and program outcomes. The relationship of "good policy, good votes" is determined by "good politics" showing the effect of political institutions that constrain leaders from seeking "bad policy" and the votes that follow.

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