Building Bridges or Building Walls? Explaining Regionalization Among Transnational Social Movement Organizations*

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Abstract
Recent increases in transnational social movement activity lead to questions about whether this kind of activity can persist and grow, given the challenges of mobilizing people and resources across wide physical, political, and cultural distances. Data from the Yearbook of International Associations show that, since the mid-1980s, a larger percentage of transnational social movement organizations were organized within either the global North or South than was true in the past, when most groups organized across the North-South divide. I explore two different explanations for this organizational pattern. One might interpret the regionalization of transnational organizing as a result of the failures of prior organizing efforts to overcome the North-South polarization that divides the international community. Alternatively, regionalization might reflect activists’ efforts to take advantage of institutional openings in order to maximize their influence in global political arenas. I analyze ties between regionally organized transnational social movement organizations and other non-governmental organizations to assess the extent to which transnational organizations relate to groups within or outside their own regions. Groups in the global South were more likely than their Northern counterparts to maintain cross-regional ties. At the same time, Northern groups were significantly more likely to report only regional ties. Environmental and women’s organizations were the most likely to maintain only regional ties while economic justice and human rights organizations were the most likely to report cross-regional ties. These findings best support the argument that the regionalization of transnational social change organizations signals their adaptation to the institutional environment rather than polarization.
The increased prevalence and importance of transnational political protest is beyond dispute, and extensive attention has been paid to the rapidly growing numbers of transnational social change organizations and transnational protest events (See, e.g., della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Anheier et al. 2004). Indeed, there is strong evidence that the explosion of transnational organizing has significantly impacted the dynamics of global decisionmaking, and it has also shaped the operations of regional and global institutions (Glasius 2002; Friedman, Clark, and Hochstetler Forthcoming; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Willetts 1996).

Nevertheless, analysts still question whether social change advocates can develop and maintain the transnational ties required to mobilize sustained challenges to global elites (e.g., Tarrow 2001; Forthcoming; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002). After all, activists must work in the places in which they live, and their possibilities for doing transnational work will be constrained by the resources and political conditions of their local and national contexts. For most activists, it is far easier to collaborate with people in close geographic proximity who share a common language and cultural or professional context than it is to move beyond these bounds. Even with new technologies that enable more rapid communication and transportation, it seems reasonable to expect that organizers can more readily build trust and foster cooperative relations locally than transnationally.

At the same time, the expanding numbers and significance of international political and economic agreements require that activists work together in order to face much stronger, global adversaries. Also, understanding the nature of threats posed by global political and economic integration requires dialogue across diverse groups.
Moreover, as governments turn increasingly to international forums to address a growing array of problems, they create opportunities and incentives for social movements to look outside national borders in search of allies. So while physical and perhaps political barriers might work to limit transnational cooperation, there are strong factors pulling activists into global level political arenas (see, e.g., Young 1992).

This article examines the population of transnationally organized social movement organizations (TSMOs) for evidence about whether this population appears to be expanding or declining in the face of competing pressures from global and local sources. By looking at how the numbers and organizational structures of TSMOs has changed over time, we can better identify what are the most important factors shaping global political change. In particular, we can begin to assess whether the recent wave of transnational political protest is an anomaly that will recede back into local and national political spaces, or whether it is linked to ongoing processes of global integration and therefore an enduring and expanding feature of political life.

The Population of TSMOs

Data from the Yearbook of International Associations show that the population of TSMOs continued to grow during the 1990s, but that its rate of growth was considerably slower than that of prior years (Smith 2004). So the overall numbers of groups continues to rise, but at a rate of about half that of the 1980s. We also see a change in the way groups are organizing transnationally. Specifically, by the late 1990s, more groups were drawing members from within particular regions of the world rather than building ties among activists across major global divides. This was especially true among those
groups formed after 1985 than among more established organizations. Specifically, more TSMOs were organized within the global North or South than was true in the past, when the vast majority of groups crossed this regional divide.

In their analysis of the more general category of international non-governmental organization (INGOs), Boli and Thomas (1999) also found a growing tendency in recent years for these groups to organize along regional lines. They explained that regional organizing enjoyed the "practical advantages of shared language, culture, and history as tools for mobilization with respect to the larger world" (1999: 31). In their view, the broader world culture and its institutional artifacts define an overarching framework within which "world culture authorizes and compels organization at diverse levels" (1999: 31-2). As a sub-set of INGOs devoted explicitly to promoting social or political change, TSMOs can be expected to follow similar organizational logics. While various regional categorizations are possible, this analysis uses the North-South division to distinguish between the “core” of the global economic and political order (the North) and the “periphery” states, which are concentrated in the global South. This North-South divide is the major cleavage in major global policy debates, and the historical experiences and interests of each region differ in ways that are likely to affect political mobilization.

The tendency towards regionalization of TSMO structures is most pronounced in the global North, but the regionalization pattern holds for the South as well. About a third of all TSMOs were organized within either the global North or the South in 2000, whereas this figure was around one-fifth of all groups in 1973. There has been a parallel decline in the percentages (though not the overall numbers) of groups that organize across North and South. Comparisons of the mean age of groups that were intra-regional
versus trans-regional confirm this pattern. Seventy-two percent of TSMOs formed before 1990, and just 47% of groups formed after 1989, were trans-regional. The mean age of intra-regional groups was 18, while the age of trans-regional groups was 32.\(^1\) Between 1985 and 1995, the population of regional groups doubled while that of trans-regional groups grew by just over one third.

Table 1 about here

Although the number of intra-regional groups is growing more quickly than that of trans-regional groups, the absolute number of trans-regional groups continues to grow, albeit at a slower rate than was true before the mid-1980s. Thus, we cannot say that regional organizations are completely displacing more universal ones. Rather, it is likely to suggest important changes in the dynamics of this organizational population.

Analyses of organizational populations have found a consistent pattern of organizational foundings that responds to different pressures or incentives in the environment (Johnson and McCarthy 2005; Minkoff 1995). In the early phases of the rise of a new organizational population, one tends to see few new organizational foundings. However, as the population size expands, the rate of new foundings grows much more rapidly, as that organizational form becomes established and legitimated. This growth continues until the formation of new groups begins to outstrip the availability of resources and members needed for organizational survival. At this saturation point, the number of new foundings each year declines in response to this more intense competition for scarce resources (see Hannan and Freeman 1977; Hannan and

\(^1\) T-tests of mean differences were significant at the .01 level (2-tailed tests).
Carroll 1992; Minkoff 1995). While the trans-regional forms of transnational organizing might be in the latter phase of this curve, we may be seeing the rise of a new, intra-regional transnational organizational form in response to a changing political environment.

While dynamics internal to the population of social movements themselves might tell us part of the story, we must also consider how the external environment may be affecting organizing patterns. A number of such explanations emerge from popular and scholarly discussions. The first account holds that regionalization indicates a failure on the part of more universal, trans-regional groups to successfully bridge the structural differences in interests, experiences, and cultures that characterize their diverse memberships. Attempts to cultivate a global civil society around a set of shared values, assumptions, and strategies may have triggered defensive responses from local and regional groupings. Benjamin Barber (1995) calls this kind of response “jihad,” describing a range of different, defensive localisms (with Islamic fundamentalism being just one example) that has arisen as individuals struggle to maintain the familiar identities and communities that are challenged by globalizing forces, which Barber calls “McWorld.” This scenario would lead us to expect a growing polarization among transnational social movement organizations along the major structural divide in the world system. It would signal that social movement actors have been unable to mitigate or overcome the major lines of inequality in the global system in order to forge alliances. Activists may be finding their local or regional interests threatened within broad-based

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2 Glasius and Kaldor (2002) offer a more elaborated categorization of groups in relation to globalization processes. Their category of “rejectionists” parallels Barber’s “jihad,” although they and their collaborators apply the term somewhat differently from Barber, using it to describe more narrowly defined debates, such as those over particular trade agreements, rather than in the universalizing manner of Barber.
groups, leading them to pursue more locally defined goals by reinforcing alliances within their respective regions.

There is some evidence to support this kind of argument. For instance, in an analysis of the entire population of TSMOs I found that Southern-based organizations were more likely than their Northern counterparts to organize around broad, multi-issue frames. The greater tendency of Southern groups to work within multi-issue frameworks suggests that such groups tend to favor a different strategic orientation from their Northern counterparts. Whereas Northern organizations might prefer to organize around single-issues for the purposes of political expediency, Southern activists may see such compartmentalized approaches as avenues that avoid addressing fundamental conflicts over power and access to resources.

For instance, among human rights groups we find a tendency of Northern activists to focus on political and civil rights and seek to defend and advance the legal structures that help promote these. In contrast, Southern activists – while not opposed to promoting the legal defense of civil and political rights—have a harder time separating the economic and political dimensions of human rights. They prefer to advocate a “right to development,” despite the considerable political and legal obstacles to achieving such a goal (see, e.g., Smith et al. 1998; Smith 2002; Steiner 1991). A long-time scholar and activist from the global South, Walden Bello, makes a similar observation about these differences in how Northern and Southern activists frame their struggles with regard to global trade debates. While Northern activists are more open to the idea of expanding global trade rules to include environmental and labor regulations, Southerners want no
part of an effort to expand the jurisdiction of an already very powerful and Northern-controlled regime (Bello 2001).³

While polarization may indeed be explaining some of this shift towards regional-level organizing, a look at the existing research and case studies of transnational activism suggests some alternative explanations. For instance, much of the literature identifies important ways that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) channel or otherwise influence activities of transnational citizens’ groups (Friedman et al. forthcoming; Tarrow 2003; Willetts 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Thus, the regionalization of TSMOs might be a response to developments in inter-governmental organizations. IGOs serve as focal points, and they create opportunities and obstacles that affect how movement actors mobilize and otherwise engage in collective action. They do so in a number of ways. First, they can grant or deny legitimacy to actors through formal and informal certification processes, such as the United Nation’s arrangement for “Consultative Status” for non-governmental organizations. Second, they help broker relationships among political actors—such as activists, government delegates, and IGO officials and staff—who otherwise would not interact. Third, they establish and reinforce norms that allow challengers to gain leverage through the use of what Keck and Sikkink have called “symbolic politics.” Sometimes the correspondence between the aims of international organizations and social movements is so close that they generate durable alliances.

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³ This difference between the North and South could also be explained by population ecology theories, where a core idea is that the organizing contexts of the North and South create different patterns of organizational competition and cooperation in these diverse regions. For instance, several contributors to Rootes’s (2004) compendium on environmental protest in Western Europe found that more recently emerging political issues attracted a more diverse collection of movement groups with a wide array of issue frames. Over time, as the issues become defined within the political context, the organizational field becomes more structured and specialized. If this is indeed the case, we would expect that, over time, groups in the South will take on more single-issue agendas. If, however, global processes are encouraging multi-issue frames, then such consolidation is not likely.
between these groups, bringing important resources to movements. And finally, they encourage the diffusion of models of collective action that include contentious politics (see Tarrow 2001). To the extent that IGOs create opportunities for movements to gain advantages in their attempts to influence state behaviors, they encourage the formation of new organizations.

While some transnational association may simply be a response to opportunities created by the institutionalization of inter-governmental relations, we also find in the literature substantial evidence to support the argument that transnational activist networks are catalysts for change in inter-governmental relations. They do not merely await opportunities for transnational mobilization, but they have actively sought to create and expand those opportunities. For instance, Chatfield (1997) finds connections between transnational peace activism with the formation of both the League of Nations and the United Nations. Smith (1995) documents the central role of transnational human rights activists in shaping the international human rights regime. Not only did they help to expand definitions of human rights violations and to strengthen the mechanisms for sanctioning human rights violators, but they also helped to institutionalize a role for civil society actors in global political processes (Willetts 2000). And numerous scholars have identified transnational activist influence in the expansion of international law and norms (See, e.g., Friedman, Clark, and Hochstetler Forthcoming; Keck 1998; Price 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Thus, we have a strong history of activism that aims to exploit and expand institutional openings.

This history of transnational advocates’ relationships to inter-governmental institutions suggests that regionalization of transnational organizations might reflect the
role that civil society groups play to *bridge* local and global policy processes. TSMOs are among the only actors that show how national and local interests are impacted by international institutions and propose strategies for influencing those processes. As the number of transnational activists grows, and as these activists expand their role in global politics, they might be recognizing a need to ‘fill in’ some of the gaps between local and global level organizing. While activists recognize the need to have representation near the sites of global decision making such as Brussels, Geneva, and New York, they also demand opportunities for democratic participation in policy debates, and they want organizations that are responsive to members’ interests and needs (Moghadam 2000:82, note 19; Polletta 2002). Organizational structures that can help serve as intermediaries between global and local sites of collective action may help reduce these tensions.

Such an interpretation would be consistent with the expectations of world culture theorists (see especially Boli, Loya and Loftin 1999; see also, Frank 2000; Meyer et al. 1997). In their view, regional structures facilitate the aggregation of diverse interests of local actors in order to more effectively integrate local and regional interests into global-level negotiations. They make it easier-- in particular, for groups whose language or historical experiences differ most dramatically from the dominant, Western-influenced world culture-- to define their interests within the world cultural framework and to devise effective strategies for fostering their regional interests. Indeed, inter-governmental conferences in the UN especially encourage region-specific organizing through regionally-based preparatory meetings for major global conferences and through their
emphasis on balancing regional representation in their formal structures and negotiation processes.

Clearly political processes at the global level are affecting the ways activists organize across national borders. The 1990s more than any other decade was one for United Nations global conferences, and at least half a dozen such conferences took place during the decade. These conferences encouraged transnational mobilizing by opening spaces (however small) for citizen input into global political negotiations. Organizers took great advantage of these, and unprecedented numbers of activists participated in these meetings. United Nations negotiating contexts encouraged efforts among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to build broad alliances and to generate consensus around key principles and demands. Governments often used regional meetings to cultivate regional consensus positions that would increase their influence on the overall conference agenda. Using the same logic, NGOs made use of regional caucuses during their meetings that paralleled official UN conferences. They also turned increasingly to regional NGO meetings as more activists expanded both their understandings of UN negotiating processes and their skills for influencing them (Riles 2001).

Southern activists found themselves at a disadvantage in many of these conferences, lacking the lobbying and organizing experience as well as the resources and facility with UN working languages (Krut 1997). But in the course of participating in UN Conferences, and along with their counterparts in the global North, many Southern activists learned how to advocate for their interests in inter-governmental forums (Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; Riles 2001; Snyder 2003). This learning involved attempts to improve strategies for influencing global political arenas. For instance, many
groups learned to mobilize well in advance of global conferences in order to influence the conference preparatory committee meetings or “prepcoms,” where much of the work of framing the negotiating text and principal aims of the conference was done. Many also took part in both UN-led and NGO-organized regional meetings and caucuses. Regional organizing allows activists with similar interests and political environments to come to some common understanding of their collective interests with regard to a particular UN meeting. As was also true in inter-governmental contexts, civil society groups’ efforts to prioritize and aggregate interests at the regional level would then facilitate global-level consensus building at global meetings (Willetts 1989).

We also see important changes in the 1980s and 90s in other inter-governmental arrangements. Most importantly, this decade saw the consolidation of the European Union, with the 1991 Maastricht treaty establishing the broad parameters of regional cooperation and launching the European Monetary Union. This arrangement helped focus regional attention at the European level, and it brought new resources for citizens’ groups that organized around the emerging European polity (Cullen 2003; 2004).

Regional structures focusing on economic integration, especially the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), were key initiatives advanced throughout the 1990s, and these certainly served as focal points for regional transnational organizations, attracting new resources to support regionally based transnational organizing work. Outside of Europe and the Americas, however, broad-based regional integration has been more limited. Any opportunities for regional organizing would have been created within
the framework of United Nations global conferences, which incorporated a series of regional prepcoms in advance of each major conference.\(^4\)

This interpretation would suggest that regional TSMOs might be complementing rather than competing with the work of broader TSMOs by helping to bridge local- and regional-level concerns with international processes. Regional groups provide spaces for activists to address the particular issues that are priorities in their locale while helping them identify ways to advance these interests within a more diverse global setting. Such regional groups can help articulate the specific connections between global policies and local conditions since they do not need to appeal to the very wide range of potentially competing interests that trans-regional groups do. Thus, they may be more effective than the more diverse, trans-regional groups are at mobilizing new constituencies into transnational political arenas. In order to assess whether the regionalization of TSMOs reflects polarization or bridging tendencies within this organizational sector, we must look at how groups relate to the broader field of organizations.

**Coalition Dynamics**

The notion that the regionalization of TSMO structures might reflect either polarization or bridging tendencies parallels Staggenborg’s (1986) finding that movement coalitions were formed in response to either opportunities or threats in the political environment. Many of the groups we examine here are actually coalitions of

\(^4\) The frequency of global conferences increased dramatically during the 1990s. UN agencies typically provide funding for under-resourced groups to attend these Prepcoms, further encouraging efforts to organize within regions around UN agendas. By the latter part of the decade, however, interest in such conferences has waned, and critics cite their high costs as a reason to discontinue their regular use. However, a recent UN Secretariat report on “UN-Civil Society Relations” (2004) sees such conferences as cost-effective measures for helping integrate civil society groups into global governance processes.
organizations, and thus these regional TSMOs may likewise be either a jihad-like response to the threat that the group’s interests would be eclipsed by other voices in the broader alliance, or they may seek to take advantage of opportunities in the political environment. If regional coalitions are forming in response to a perceived threat, then we should find regional groups to be insular, focusing their attention primarily within their own region. Moreover, given that world culture emerged from and corresponds more closely to Western or Northern traditions, we would expect Southern groups to be much more regionally oriented than their Northern counterparts. However, if regional coalitions are a response to opportunities in the political environment, we should find relational patterns that correspond to those opportunities. If the political opportunities lie outside the region or at the global level, we would expect to find groups cultivating ties to actors outside their region. If the opportunities for policy influence are regionally defined, then regionally oriented ties are more likely.

If either of the above interpretations is accurate we should expect regional groupings to be more common around the more contentious issues. Activists may turn to regional structures either to pursue regional interests independently or to better articulate regional interests within a global alliance. On issues where primary interests differ across the North-South divide, greater efforts are needed to build broad consensus around some fundamental aims. If regional groups work to build consensus and expand understandings of both the issues at stake and the political processes involved, they can better incorporate regional concerns into a wider trans-regional platform. If polarizing forces are at work, we would expect the more contentious issues to drive activists—especially less powerless ones—to devote their energies to bolstering their own particular
interests and influence rather than engaging in the challenging work of building broad alliances around limited shared goals. Table 2 examines the issue focuses and age of organizations according to their geographic scope.

Table 2 Here

Looking at the issue-focus of regional transnational organizations, we see that the shift towards more intra-regional organizing within both the global North and South may indeed be reflecting more deep-seated cleavages in the global polity. In areas where the North-South conflict is most pronounced, i.e., where the conflict centers most directly on decisions about resource distribution and use, we find more intra-regional groups forming as opposed to trans-regional groups that include members from both North and South. Thus, higher percentages of South-only groups focused on development and economic justice, whereas a higher percentage of North-only groups focused on the environment, which is often portrayed as an issue that is at odds with economic development. More North-only groups also focused on peace issues, perhaps because for some Southern groups this may be seen as a lesser priority behind immediate material needs. The fact that a larger percentage of South-only groups focused on women’s issues further supports this interpretation, as many women’s groups tend to address the development inequities faced by women as a consequence of their differential legal protections (Moghadam 2000; Subramaniam et al. 2003).

Although issues may divide groups, political processes and the weakness of social movements demands that these groups build broad coalitions and cooperate with diverse
groups in order to enhance their political leverage (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Lipsky 1968). Thus, case studies of specific campaigns have shown that both Northern and Southern activists have had to alter the ways that they conceptualize conflicts if they hope to increase their political leverage and/or legitimacy (e.g., Bob Forthcoming). Analysts have documented a slow and conflict-ridden process of dialogue and re-framing of conflicts as activists experience new opportunities for transnational dialogue and exchange. For instance, environmental organizations such as Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund, and Rainforest Action Network have learned, through their greater contact with Southern activists, to emphasize the links between environmental degradation and the protection of human rights (e.g., Brysk 1994; Brysk 1996; Rothman and Oliver 2002; Warkentin 2001). Moreover, the experiences of transnational organizations working on issues of environment and development especially show that interactions between activists in the North and South led to a process of "unmaking" of the dominant, Western ways of organizing societies and economies and of constructing an alternative (see also Macdonald 1997; Warkentin 2001:139; International Forum on Globalization 2002).

Because social movements must rely primarily on the voluntary efforts of participants, and especially because they bring costs as well as potential benefits to members, they must work to cultivate participants’ commitment to the movement (or the organizations that are part of it). Many would argue that movements cultivate commitment by modeling participatory democracy in their decision-making processes. For instance, Francesca Polletta’s work on movements in the U.S. demonstrates how participatory democracy evolved in movement groups there. She identifies “deliberative talk” as an essential component of this form of decision making, whereby participants air
their views in order to justify the selection of particular options over others and to make transparent the reasoning behind others’ preferences and priorities. Deliberative talk does not aim to produce consensus, but it does seek to foster openness and respect among participants, and it provides them with a sense of ownership of collective decisions (Polletta 2002:7). Annelise Riles’s study of Fijian womens’ activists illustrates this learning process within transnational organizations:

Where delegates at previous meetings had been acrimoniously divided over whether structural adjustment or the Palestinian liberation were in fact ‘women’s issues,’ . . . at this meeting Fiji’s participants in the academic women’s networks from ‘the South’ who had led the fight for the expansion of what counted as women’s issues at previous conferences found, to their own surprise, that most of the European and North American attendees at their sessions were in fact converts to their position. (Riles 2001:182)

Valentine Moghadam’s study of the emergence of transnational feminist networks in the mid- to late- 1980s demonstrates how such a convergence of understandings came about. She cites the 1985 UN Conference on Women in Nairobi as a turning point in transnational feminist organizing:

During the decade of the 1980s […] a shift took place. In the sociodemographic context of a worldwide growth in the population of educated, employed, mobile and politically aware women, feminist discourses and networking began to spread
and to take on not only an international but a transnational form. The new information technologies, along with the changing and increasingly harsh economic environment, broadened the horizons of women's organizations, resulting in considerable international networking and many joint initiatives. Feminists from the North came to appreciate the relevance of economic conditions and foreign policies to women's lives, while feminists from the South came to recognize the pertinence of 'body politics.' (Moghadam 2000:61)

For their part, activists in the global South (as well as in the former Soviet Union) benefit from the transnational transfer of "'the technology to unite us' [such as . . . ] techniques for speaking in groups, listening to each other, forming networks around a concrete issue, thinking strategically at the grassroots level about specific actions" (Sperling, Ferree, and Risman 2001: 1172; see also Rupp and Taylor 1999). Transnational organizations help facilitate this kind of learning by routinizing transnational communications and facilitating transnational collective action of various kinds (See, e.g., Waterman 2001; 2005).

The preceding discussion leads to several hypotheses growing from each of the two contrasting propositions I offer to explain regionalization among TSMOs. First, the polarization thesis holds that global institutions privilege activists from the global North while complicating efforts of Southern governments and citizens to address underlying inequities in global policy. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H₀: Regional TSMOs based in the global South – regardless of the issues they work on-- will maintain ties mainly or only within their own region.

In contrast, the bridging thesis holds that regionalization of organizing structures results from the fact that international institutions incorporate practices that encourage such regional structures. I argued that regional structures could be facilitating the aggregation of diverse interests that transnational activists seek to bring to the global agenda. While internal conflicts are likely to remain, activists recognize a need to manage their differences in order to build broad alliances in order to advance some of their shared interests. Regional structures may help them manage conflicts more effectively so that they can foster agreement around shared aims. This interpretation generates the following alternative hypotheses:

Hₐ₁: Regional TSMOs based in both the global North and South will report high levels of ties to trans-regional groups and to other groups outside their own region.

Hₐ₂: The regionally based institutional openings created by the European Union will encourage larger numbers of regional TSMOs based in the North to report having only regional ties.

The institutional approach I have outlined would also lead us to expect some differences across the diverse issues these regional TSMOs address. In particular, we would expect
the policy arenas that are particular to a given issue to generate different strategic approaches by movement actors. On some issues—particularly where local variation prevents the top-down creation of policy implementation strategies, local officials maintain significant authority to shape policy implementation. On others, local officials may either be closed to movement input or they may be powerless to affect policy change. Movement strategies correspond to these policymaking structures.

$H_{A3}$: Because of the sensitivity of women’s and environmental issues to local political and ecological contexts, regional TSMOs working on these issues will be more tied to regional networks than will groups working on other issues.

$H_{A4}$: Because economic policies and human rights standards are increasingly defined in universal forums such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization, regional TSMOs working on these issues will be more tied to trans-regional networks than will groups working on other issues.

**Methods**

Data for this study are drawn from the 2000/01 edition of the *Yearbook of International Associations*. My research team selected those international non-governmental organizations working to promote some social or political change and recorded evidence about the organization’s membership, founding, structure, goals, ties to IGOs and other NGOs, and geographic scope.\(^5\) In addition to coding the individual countries in which each organization reported having members, we included a variable

\(^5\) Further details on the coding scheme and methods are available from the author or in Smith (2004).
indicating whether each organization had members in the global North (i.e., OECD countries) and the global South (middle- and low-income countries as classified by the World Bank annual *Development Report*). Regional organizations are those that reported having members only in the global North or South.

I selected those regional TSMOs organized around issue areas where we found different patterns of organizing between Northern- and Southern-based organizations (see table 2). These issues included human rights, environmental protection, economic justice, and women’s rights. This subset of regional organizations consisted of 151 organizations, or about half of all regionally organized TSMOs. For each organization, I returned to the Yearbook entry to record the names of those non-governmental organizations with which the group reported having contact. Each group’s list of ties with other international non-governmental organizations was then coded with regard to the type of organizational ties represented. I recorded, for instance, if one of the major, prominent global organizations that work on that issue (referred to here as the “big 10”) was among each group’s lists of contacts. Codes were assigned to indicate whether each TSMO reported contacts with regional NGOs, cross-regional groups other than those in the “big ten,” faith-based NGOs working outside the relevant issue-area, and labor NGOs. I also recorded whether each group indicated contact with a broad global NGO forum such as the CONGO (Conference of NGOs in Consultative Status with the United Nations, World Alliance for Citizen Participation-CIVICUS, etc.) Because these types of

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6 I excluded “development/empowerment” groups because of their atypical structure as well as their tendency to be trans-regional in practice, even if their members are located in a single region.
7 The “big 10” refers to the groups that are very prominent for their work on a given issue, including Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, OXFAM, etc. Their numbers may not equal ten, but they are relatively few.
groups work on topics relating to the overall sector of advocacy groups working in global political arenas, I decided to record them as a separate category of network ties.\footnote{Despite its value as the only comprehensive census of transnational organizations, the Yearbook certainly raises validity problems for social scientists. For instance, organizational entries are compiled mainly through annual surveys of the organizations, with some attempt by editors to supplement these records with other information sources, including Web sites and cross-references among entries themselves. So the completeness of entries will vary according to who in the organization completes the survey as well as the availability of staff time for this task. Moreover, the strength of the relationship indicated by a reported link between groups cannot be determined from these data. A link might signal daily, weekly, or monthly contact, or it can mean that the groups simply exchange mailings. We can assume that whatever validity errors introduced by the Yearbook’s reporting methods are random, but the conclusions drawn from these data should be tested against other sources of data on this organizational population in order to verify their validity.}

Data

Table three summarizes the types of network ties for each issue-area and for all regional TSMOs in this analysis. Ties to “big 10” organizations can provide groups with access to information about the issues on which they are working, as well as information about global conferences and political developments. They might also provide resources of some sort—including small grants for projects, training workshops, or opportunities to attend meetings of other activists. They also confer legitimacy to a local or regional group, certifying them as players in the international movement related to their issue focus. Comparatively few groups, however, reported ties to these groups, suggesting that such certification either is not needed for many regional organizations, or that the information and resources available from these key organizations can be obtained through other sources. It is also likely that, with declining communications and transportation costs, more groups are able to have the global reach of the “big 10” while remaining smaller and more responsive to the needs of their allies. Environmental and economic justice groups were most likely to report ties to “big 10” groups. This may be
tied to the fact that advocacy work on the environment and the global economy is more
tied to centralized forums, such as treaty review conferences or World Bank meetings,
thus requiring global-level analyses and information available from these groups.9

Table 3 about here

Interestingly, women’s groups were the least likely to report ties to “big 10” groups. This
may be the result of feminists’ aversion to hierarchy and bureaucracy, as well as the
sensitivity to the wide variety of local manifestations of gender-based discrimination. It
also is very likely related to the tendency of women’s organizations to adopt more
informal, decentralized, network-like structures (Keck and Sikkink 1998:chapter 5;
Subramaniam, Gupte, and Mitra 2003). As Moghadam notes, "Today feminist groups
and women's organizations remain rooted in national or local issues, but their vocabulary,
strategies and objectives have much in common with each other and have taken on an

Human rights and women’s organizations were most likely to report ties to global
NGO forum organizations, perhaps reflecting the importance that maintaining formal
access to UN processes and structures has for these groups. It may also reflect a better
correspondence of these organizations’ agendas, which tend to focus on issues of
inclusion, democracy, and access to political institutions. At least half of all groups
working on every issue reported at least one tie to another regional INGO. Human rights
and economic justice groups were the only organizations reporting ties with both

9 While these “big 10” groups are not the only ones providing access to relevant information on their issues,
they are more likely to have resources and regional presence that make them readily available to resource-
poor groups.
transnational labor and faith-based INGOs.\textsuperscript{10} Regional women’s and environmental groups did not report any cross-sectoral ties. While organized within regions, about half of all regional TSMOs maintain ties that cross the North-South divide.\textsuperscript{11} Groups working on the environment and women’s issues were the least likely to report such ties, with just 40\% and 46\% of all groups working on these respective issues reporting any cross-regional tie. Human rights and economic justice groups reported similar levels of ties to cross-regional groups. About a quarter of all regional TSMOs reported ties within their region only, and environmental groups were most likely to report such ties (37\%). In contrast, economic justice groups were least likely to report ties within a single region only (16\%).\textsuperscript{12}

**Ties to IGOs.** Groups reporting any cross-regional tie were somewhat more likely to report ties to intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations Economic and Social Council, Food and Agriculture Organization, or the European Union. For all of the groups in this study, the average number of IGO ties was 3.19 for groups with a cross-regional tie and 1.94 for groups without such ties. The average number of ties to international NGOs was 6.28 and 3.72, respectively.\textsuperscript{13} Comparisons

\textsuperscript{10} This does not mean that the groups did not maintain ties to other groups that are organized nationally. The *Yearbook* reports only international NGO ties.

\textsuperscript{11} For most groups, this is indicated by at least one tie to a cross-regional group. For a small number of groups, however, it reflects a tie to a regional organization outside their own region.

\textsuperscript{12} A collaborative, multi-city study of demonstrators at the February 15, 2003 global antiwar protests (See Mario Diani’s chapter in Walgrave and Rucht, Forthcoming) also found important differences between women’s and environmental activists and human rights/global justice activists. Diani found that women’s rights and environmental activists reported different overlapping organizational memberships from those of other demonstrators. These findings might suggest a reconfiguration of the ideologies and frames used by new social movements (cf. Kriesi et al. 1995).

\textsuperscript{13} Significance level for difference of means test (2-tailed) for IGO ties was < .01 for IGOs (t=2.753) and < .05 for INGO ties (t=2.352)
across North and South revealed patterns consistent with the larger TSMO population, namely that Southern groups tended to report more ties to both IGOs and INGOs.

When we examine the ties to international governmental and nongovernmental organizations within each issue area the general patterns hold, but we find no statistically significant differences between groups with cross-regional ties and those without for the human rights, environment, and economic justice organizations. However, there were statistically significant differences in the comparisons of women’s groups. Women’s organizations with cross-regional ties reported significantly more ties to both intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations than did those regional groups whose ties remained within a single region. This difference probably reflects the series of major UN conferences on women marking the International Women’s Decade (1975, 1980, and 1985), which facilitated contacts with the UN and its agencies as well as with other local, national, and international NGOs (Subramaniam et al, 2003:346).

What do these patterns say with regard to our hypotheses? First, the greater numbers of ties to IGOs and INGOs among groups with trans-regional ties suggests the importance of these institutions as potential allies or otherwise as important for these groups’ efforts to advance their social change goals. Regional groups, however, would be expected to have fewer ties, given their narrower scope and the smaller numbers of potential IGO and INGO contacts. While these observations provide some support for the hypotheses related to the bridging thesis, we should note that the fact that Southern-

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14 For the subset of women’s organizations, the average number of IGO ties was 3.69 for groups with at least one cross-regional tie and 1.38 for groups without such ties. For INGOs, these averages were 5.92 and 2.31, respectively. As is shown in tables 4 and 5, South-based groups were more likely to maintain cross-regional ties than were Northern groups.

15 Subramaniam and her colleagues note that the participation of local staff of women’s groups in international meetings "facilitated building informal networks across national boundaries, and provided renewed impetus to the movement in India" (2003: 346).
based TSMOs reported significantly more ties to other actors in their environment is not consistent with the null hypothesis that groups in the South would be more regionally-focused in their relations with other groups.

**North-South Comparisons.** The next two analyses compare regional TSMOs in the global North and South to see if these groups differ in the extent to which they are inward or outward looking with respect to their relational ties. Given the greater institutionalization of regional inter-governmental relations in Europe, and the relative absence of substantial, broad-based inter-governmental organizations in the global South, we would expect to find different patterns of network ties. Specifically, we should find stronger regional connections among Northern groups, and more trans-regional ties among regional groups in the South. Because of the predominant influence of the United States and other OECD countries, Southern NGOs must build connections to a broad base of allies in order to enhance their organizational effectiveness (see, e.g., Levering 1997 Anheier and Katz 2004). Moreover, the relative lack of domestic sources of funding in the global South means that Southern groups are forced to look outside their national and regional borders for financial assistance. They may seek access to private foundations or international agencies through ties to groups outside their region, or they might make such connections in the course of their fund-raising efforts (Bob 2001; forthcoming; Riles 2001).

Table four reports the ties of regional TSMOs to other INGOs working within their own region. It also indicates the percentage of groups in each issue area that reported only regional ties. With the exception of environmental groups where North and
South patterns were similar, higher percentages of North-based regional TSMOs reported any or only regional ties than did South-based organizations. Again, these differences were significant only for women’s groups. We find statistically significant differences between women’s groups in the North and in the South. Our expectation (H_{a3}) that both women’s and environmental issues would be most regionally oriented is borne out only for Northern groups and for Southern environmental groups. While women’s issues attracted the highest level of within-region networking by Northern groups, this issue had the lowest level of within-region networking by Southern groups. This might reflect closed opportunity structures at the local level for Southern women’s groups to influence relevant policy structures. The fact that more Southern women’s groups maintain trans-regional ties suggests that they may be pursuing a “boomerang” strategy of going outside the state to bring international pressure on national and local officials (Keck and Sikkink 1998; cf. Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002).

The findings reported in Table 4 are largely consistent with the expectations of the bridging hypothesis outlined above. If polarization processes were at work, we would expect a greater regional emphasis among Southern groups. However, we still must account for the fact that environmental groups showed no real North-South differences in levels of regional organizing, even as environmental issues attracted comparatively higher levels of regional organizing than did some other issues. This may reflect a tendency for environmental organizations to mobilize around territorially defined
environmental threats, or it may reflect the nature of environmental policy arenas. Environmental policy is highly sensitive to local variations in ecosystems and societal structures. This may mean that environmental activists have more access to local environmental policy makers or that they must target their efforts on more local officials.\textsuperscript{16} For instance, our study includes ecosystem-focused groups like the International Commission for the Protection of the Alps and the International Association for Forest Resources Management.

Table five reports the percentages of groups in each issue area reporting at least one cross-regional tie. Contrary to the expectations of the polarization thesis, we find that Southern groups outpaced their Northern counterparts in their percentage of cross-regional ties two-to-one.\textsuperscript{17}

Consistent with hypothesis A4, Environmental and women’s groups in both North and South were least likely to report cross-regional ties, while human rights and economic justice organizations reported comparable levels of such ties. These patterns suggest that the ecological focus of environmental groups leads them to concentrate their organizing efforts within territorially defined regions, and that the tendency of women’s group strategies to emphasize relationships among individuals and groups lead these two types

\textsuperscript{16} Other studies of environmental movements found that they had comparatively greater access to local institutional arenas (McCarthy, Smith and Zald 1996).

\textsuperscript{17} Of course, the larger number of Northern groups means that their numbers are generally higher than their Southern counterparts in many categories, even though the percentages are lower.
or organizations in particular to produce stronger ties within geographic regions than across them.

Conclusions

I began this paper by raising the question about whether or not the transnational activism witnessed in recent years is likely to be deepened and sustained. To investigate this, I examined data on the organizations that are important (though not the only) actors in the mobilization of global protests, transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs). I explored two opposing explanations for why transnational social movement organizations have increasingly been organized along regional lines, asking if this trend reflects a reversal or a deepening of earlier globalizing tendencies within the field of transnational activism. On the one hand, regionalization may be a response to the frustrations and limitations that can result from attempts to build broad coalitions that include groups with very diverse interests and capabilities. Given that the North-South cleavage has proven to be a key roadblock to most major inter-governmental agreements since the early 1990s, it would not be surprising to find civil society groups polarized along similar lines. Thus, regionalization might be an organizational response to the threats to regional interests caused by attempts to build alliances among very diverse groups with varying abilities to influence policy processes and outcomes.

On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the relative powerlessness of social movement organizations demands that they find ways to overcome differences in order to build the broad coalitions needed to influence global politics. This is particularly true since global institutions like the United Nations are organized around principles of
equal representation and democracy, thereby encouraging efforts at inclusion. The better-resourced and more politically empowered minority in the global North must mobilize support in the “majority world” of the global South in order to enhance the legitimacy of their claims. The most legitimate groups in these settings are ones that can truly claim to represent the interests of people from many different countries.

The hypothesis I used to test the polarization thesis—i.e., that we would find more regional ties among Southern groups—is not supported by these data. Rather than being less connected to groups outside their region, regional TSMOs based in the South were more connected to transregional groups and to IGOs than were their Northern counterparts. The evidence here suggests that regional TSMOs are more likely to be helping to bridge local and transnational politics by aggregating interests at the regional level. Thus, we can say that regionalization more likely reflects an organizational response to the opportunities created by global institutions than an abandonment of efforts to overcome major divisions in global civil society.

As they work to influence global negotiations, many activists are likely to see a need to “fill in” some of the structural gaps between local and national organizers and global level political processes. More localized organizational structures can be more responsive to local needs, thus helping to aggregate interests and articulate the preferences of people from a given region in a way that facilitates global-level consensus building. This can give new groups a unique organizing role, or niche, that limits their need to compete for members and resources with larger, more established groups (e.g., Minkoff 1995; Murphy, this volume). The UN global conferences, and the incentives those conferences provided for improving regional integration, appear to be a key factor
shaping this organizational pattern. The fact that the World Social Forum—the major
global gathering of civil society groups that has met annually in Porto Alegre, Brazil and
in Mumbai, India since 2001—has generated parallel regional and local “Social Forums,”
demonstrates the appeal of and the demand for more localized dialogue within a global
framework. Within the Social Forum, activists have been explicit about the need to hold
more localized forums in order to integrate a more diverse array of voices, even as they
stress the importance of the global forum event (Smith et al. 2004). As scholar-activist
Walden Bello observes:

[O]ne of the main reasons the Porto Alegre process is gaining such momentum is
precisely that is provides a venue where movements and organizations can find
ways of working together despite their differences. While the usual ultra-leftist
groups remain defiantly outside it, the Porto Alegre process in Brazil, Europe, and
India has brought to the forefront the common values and aspirations of a variety
of political traditions and tendencies. The Porto Alegre process may be the main
expression of the coming together of a movement that has been wandering for a
long time in the wilderness of fragmentation and competition. The pendulum, in
other words, may now be swinging to the side of unity, driven by the sense that in
an increasingly deadly struggle against unilateralist militarization and aggressive
corporate globalization, movements have no choice but to hang together, or they
will hang separately. (Bello 2003, emphasis mine)
The strengthening of regional inter-governmental institutions also contributes to the regionalization of TSMOs. For instance, the European Union is the strongest regional IGO, and its role in regional affairs was greatly enhanced during the decade when we also witnessed a growth of regional TSMOs. European Union policies and structures encouraged groups to aggregate interests across Europe and articulate them in ways that were most likely to influence European decision-making. Regional groups focused on the EU polity do not provide evidence for a polarization thesis, since they are seeking to aggregate a sub-set of global interests in a narrower political arena. Southern activists lack a comparable regional structure.\textsuperscript{18}

Data on the ties that regional TSMOs reported with other non-governmental organizations allowed us to assess the extent to which these groups operate solely within their own regions and to what extent they maintain ties outside their region. The analysis showed that groups in the global South maintained more cross-regional ties than their Northern counterparts. At the same time, Northern groups were significantly more likely to report ties only to groups within their own region. Consistent with our alternative hypotheses 3 and 4, an institutional explanation makes sense of the variation we find across different issues. Issues with more local sensitivities and access (women’s rights and environmental issues) fostered more regionally based ties, while issues that are governed at a more universal level (economic justice and human rights) generated more cross-regional ties.

In summary, the data best support the theory that the regionalization of TSMOs is the result of the opportunity structures of international political institutions. New

\textsuperscript{18} Although this study suggests that, if policy makers are concerned with strengthening civil society actors in the global South, then efforts to support or promote regional inter-governmental institutions in that region would help advance this agenda.
opportunities in the European Union encouraged Northern groups to mobilize along regional lines in order to defend and/or advance social change goals within that institutional framework. However, Southern groups have no comparable regional intergovernmental structure. The regionalization of these groups, then, is more likely a response to the opportunities of United Nations global conferences and related initiatives. These encourage Southern activists to organize within their region so that they can best advance regional interests within a political context that is-- politically if not numerically-- largely dominated by Northern organizations and activists. They also encourage Southern groups to work with their Northern counterparts. By bringing to global forums positions that have been developed through regional dialogues, Southern groups have a better chance of influencing the consensus-building efforts of civil society groups. The jihad or polarization thesis, in contrast, would anticipate that Southern groups would be more particularistic and insular in their focus. Rather than signaling a North-South polarization in global civil society that mirrors this major cleavage in inter-state relations, regionalization seems to be the result of efforts to better bridge North and South within global political contexts. In places where regional IGOs are strong, such as Europe, regionally based organizing is encouraged as a means of integrating diverse populations around a shared, regional identity and political strategy. This study, then, supports the arguments of world culture and political process theory that transnational and global institutions affect patterns of social relations in ways that reinforce the institutionalization of the world polity.
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### Table 1: Regionally Organized vs. Trans-Regionally Organized Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Scope</th>
<th>North-Only</th>
<th>South-Only</th>
<th>Both North &amp; South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of organizations</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (Mean)</td>
<td>18.6 years</td>
<td>17.5 years</td>
<td>32.6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Median)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed during 1990s</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Issue Focus of Sub-Regional vs. Trans-Regional Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North-Only N=211</th>
<th>South-Only N=87</th>
<th>Both North &amp; South N=531</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Economic Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=41</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=42</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=151</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Network Ties of Within-Region TSMOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Economic Justice</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=41</td>
<td>N=42</td>
<td>N=40</td>
<td>N=28</td>
<td>N=151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big 10</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Forum</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional tie</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor tie</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith-based tie</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any cross-reg tie</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional ties only</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Categories of network ties are not mutually exclusive.

Table 4: Within-Region Ties Among Regional TSMOs
Comparing North & South

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of groups in ( )</th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Economic Justice</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Only Reg’l ties</td>
<td>Any Reg’l tie</td>
<td>Only Reg’l ties</td>
<td>Any Reg’l tie</td>
<td>Only Reg’l ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>28% (25)</td>
<td>64% (36)</td>
<td>38% (25)</td>
<td>60% (13)</td>
<td>22% (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>12 (16)</td>
<td>56 (6)</td>
<td>33 (15)</td>
<td>67 (15)</td>
<td>7 (15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                         | Only Reg’l ties | Any Reg’l tie | Only Reg’l ties | Any Reg’l tie | Only Reg’l ties | Any Reg’l tie |
|                         | 46%* (99)      | 77%* (99)    | 33%** (99)      | 61%* (99)     | 33%** (99)      | 61%* (99)     |

*T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .15 level.
* *T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .05 level.
** T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .01 level.
### Table 5: Regional TSMOs with Any Cross-Regional Tie Comparing North & South

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Human Rights</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Economic Justice</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>48% **</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>44%*</td>
<td>31%●</td>
<td>37%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .15 level.
** T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .10 level.
* T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .05 level.
** T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .01 level.