OPPOSITION PARTIES AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTESTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

by

Yen-Pin Su

B.A., National Taiwan University, 2001
M.A., National Taiwan University, 2005

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This dissertation was presented

by

Yen-Pin Su

It was defended on
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and approved by
Steven Finkel, Daniel Wallace Professor, Political Science
John Markoff, Distinguished University Professor, Sociology
Co-Dissertation Advisor: Scott Morgenstern, Associate Professor, Political Science
Co-Dissertation Advisor: Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Associate Professor, Political Science
My dissertation adopts an interdisciplinary approach to examine the relationship between political parties and social movements in democratic countries. This work touches on the debates about why protest movements emerge and the literature on the consequences of party politics. It draws on rational choice and political process theories to explain the variation in anti-government protests in the context of democracies. I argue that the mobilization capacity of opposition parties matters for understanding the differing levels of protests. Specifically, focusing on the size and unity of the opposition camp as two unique dimensions of mobilization capacity, I contend that a larger opposition camp should encourage more anti-government protests only if the camp is more united. Moreover, I argue that, because of the differences in socio-economic backgrounds, political development trajectories, and the role of parties as mobilization agents, the effects of opposition mobilization capacity should work differently in developed countries and developing countries.

My research methodology includes work with both quantitative and qualitative data sources. I test my arguments empirically using statistical analyses of an original dataset incorporating protest event data and electoral data in 107 democratic countries. The analyses demonstrate that when opposition parties are strong and united, they are more able to mobilize large-scale collective protest actions. Moreover, I find that a higher level of mobilization capacity of opposition parties matters more to encourage anti-government protests in developing
countries than in developed countries. Drawing on the interviews that I conducted during field trips in Peru and Taiwan, the qualitative case studies further illustrate why opposition mobilization capacity matters for the developing countries.

Overall, my research contributes to the literature on political behavior and enriches institutional theories by providing an innovative theoretical perspective and rigorous empirical analyses. More importantly, my research is relevant to more than political scientists and sociologists: the quantitative and qualitative data will help researchers understand the extent to which the dynamics of party/movement interactions vary across different regions, a necessary advance in a literature that has been dominated by single case studies.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an overview of the dissertation. First, I discuss a research puzzle that this dissertation addresses: if the opening of the political process has reduced mobilization costs such as state repression and thus encourages more social mobilization, why do some democracies experience more social protests than other democracies? Next, I discuss why this research is important for the literature and for policy-makers. Third, I revisit traditional explanations for the frequency of protests, such as economic performance, democratization, and political institutions. I provide a critical review of the existing literature and introduce an innovative theoretical perspective for this study. Specifically, focusing on opposition parties as a camp, I argue that it is important to consider the interaction effect of opposition size and opposition unity for understanding the differing patterns of anti-government protests in democratic countries.

1.1 PUZZLE

Social protests have played an important role in the political development of many democratic countries (Collier and Collier 1991; Collier and Mahoney 1997; Ekiert 1999; Herrera and Markoff 2011; Tilly 2004; Wood 2000). For instance, the rise of the Tea Party Movement has changed the electoral dynamics in American politics (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). In 2011, labor union members, students and citizen groups organized a series of demonstrations in
Wisconsin, which garnered widespread support from workers across the United States (Oppel and Williams 2011). Recent economic crises in Europe triggered large-scale protest mobilization in Greece (Psimitis 2011) and Spain (Castañeda 2012), which greatly influenced the stability of governments. Since the 1990s, popular protests in Latin America have been a crucial force for the removal of an elected president from office before the end of a term (Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007).

Waves of protests that have swept the world since the Third Wave of democratization have opened up an important question that is difficult to ignore: Why do some countries experience more protests than others? One important explanation pertains to the calculation of cost and benefits that is associated with protest action, and studies have argued that the level of democratization matters for explaining why protest movements are encouraged or discouraged (e.g., Goldstone 2004). However, if the opening of the political process has reduced mobilization costs such as state repression and thus encourages more social mobilization, why do some democracies experience more social protests while others have fewer?

Several recent studies have argued that political parties matter for explaining social protests. At the country level, Arce (2010b) finds that the level of protests tends to be higher when a country has a poorly institutionalized party system. At the party level, given that party/movement interactions tend to be prevalent when parties are in opposition because there may exist mutual benefits for both actors (Almeida 2010b; Goldstone 2003), it is expected that opposition parties should play an important role in shaping the patterns of protest movements. Under what conditions are opposition parties more likely to use protests for pursuing political goals? Almeida (2012) demonstrates that size matters, specifically finding that the number of protests increases with a larger size of opposition camp.
But does a large opposition camp always guarantee more protests? After the fall of Fujimori, Peruvian opposition parties together captured 74% of the vote in the 2001 legislative election and 79% in the 2006 legislative election. The aggregated data suggest that the opposition camp in Peru had a considerably strong presence. Based on Almeida’s (2012) finding that a larger opposition camp will mobilize more protests, it may be expected that Peru was likely to experience a high level of mass protest mobilization against the Alejandro Toledo administration (2001-2006) and the Alan Garcia administration (2006-2011). However, as Arce (2008, 40-1; 2010a, 278) describes, many Peruvian protests took place spontaneously without a coordinating body, and most of them were geographically segmented in peripheral regions.

The case of Peru clearly poses a puzzle for the effects of opposition size on protests. One possible explanation for the limited scale of Peruvian protests is the lack of strong political actors for building movement coalitions. According to Cotler (1995), contemporary Peruvian parties have several common features. First, the leadership tends to be personalized and authoritarian. Second, parties’ connections with the society tend to be clientelistic. Third, parties tend to adopt exclusionary approaches in the political process, making it difficult to create institutionalized channels for social demands. Given that parties in Peru generally lack organizational roots in society (Tanaka 2005), the high level of party system fragmentation further undermines parties’ capacity for collective action (Levitsky and Cameron 2003, 15-6). Hence, the absence of strong parties suggests that social movements lack important allies for coordinating large-scale protest mobilization. Although it is possible that citizens could still mobilize protests without coordinating with other political actors such as political parties, the scale and duration of such uncoordinated protests would be limited (LeBas 2011, 113; Tanaka and Vera 2010). Overall, the
case of Peru implies that a large opposition camp does not necessarily guarantee a higher mobilization capacity if it is disunited.

This dissertation examines patterns of anti-government protests (or government-targeted protests)\(^1\) in democracies by focusing on the role of opposition parties. Incorporating the insight of neo-institutional theory from political science and that of resource mobilization theory from sociology, I build a theory of opposition mobilization to explain variation in the frequency of anti-government protests and how patterns of protests differ in different socio-economic contexts. Specifically, I focus on how opposition size and opposition unity, the two important dimensions of opposition mobilization capacity, affect patterns of anti-government protests.

In general, most scholarly work on social protests has either adopted a micro-level approach or a macro-level approach. Studies based on the micro-level approach have used survey data to examine why some individuals tend to participate in protest activities while others do not (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Caren et al. 2011b; Finkel et al. 1989; Finkel and Opp 1991; Norris et al. 2005; Schussman and Soule 2005; Walgrave and Rucht 2010). Although these studies help identify the elements that make individuals more or less likely to engage in protest activities,\(^2\) they fail to account for the conditions under which social movement organizations are more likely to ask people to participate in protests.

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\(^1\) Clearly, the target of social protests varies. The target can be government, a private company, a foreign country, a public policy or law, etc. Moreover, a protest can have multiple targets. This dissertation focuses on government-targeted protests because such collective political actions often greatly (and sometimes quickly) influence a country’s political development. However, in order to build my theory, I not only review the literature on anti-government protests, but also the literature on protests with different features in claims, targets, tactics, etc. The advantage of reviewing different protest studies is that it will be more useful to capture a general pattern about why protests take place. However, the disadvantage of doing this is that it is difficult to tell whether some factors that influence the occurrence a certain type of protest can be theoretically justified as also influencing the occurrence of anti-government protests. Thus, one purpose of the literature review in this study is to discuss what factors might potentially affect anti-government protests and should be controlled for when estimating statistical models.

\(^2\) The classic “baseline” model (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1978) argues that individuals with higher socio-economic status (SES) are better able to offset the costs associated with participation and thus are more likely to participate in collective political behavior. In addition, rational choice theory suggests that individuals’ decision to
Regarding the macro-level approach, studies have used research designs of small-N or large-N analyses. Case studies of social movements provide more detailed analyses on the emergence and decline of a movement. McAdam et al. (1996) have suggested an emerging research agenda that stresses the importance of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, framing processes, and repertoires of contention in understanding protest movements, and social movement case studies have increasingly adopted this analytical framework (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Brysk 2000; Friedman and Hochstetler 2002; Hawkins and Hansen 2006). However, as Bruhn (2008, 4) argues, the challenge of the case study approach lies in its lack of theoretical generalizability and its inability to determine the respective weight of the identified explanatory factors.

Finally, cross-national quantitative analyses of social protests have found that large-scale collective protests were often driven by macro-level factors such as poor national economic performance (Caren et al. 2011a; Gurr 1968; Walton and Ragin 1990), neoliberal economic reforms (Arce and Bellinger 2007; Bellinger and Arce 2011; Roberts 2008), the level of overall economic development (Arce 2010b, 676; Bellinger and Arce 2011), and the level of political democratization (Goldstone 2004; Markoff 1996, 2011; Meyer 2004; Yashar 2005). Yet, with a few exceptions, most studies that underline the importance of macro-level factors in explaining protests fail to uncover how meso-level factors, such as political parties, link democratic regimes with protests (Arce 2010b, 671).
This dissertation does not attempt to explain individual propensities to participate in collective protest actions. I adopt a cross-national time-series quantitative approach. The core of this dissertation is the analysis of an extensive dataset of protest events and elections in 107 advanced and new democracies. I retrieve anti-government protest data from a large event database based on Reuters News Service and collect data on legislative elections and political parties. The large-N analyses not only use the entire sample of democratic countries, but also test whether certain explanations work differently in advanced democracies and new democracies. In addition to the large-N quantitative analyses, I conduct a comparative case study of Peru and Taiwan that draws on historical documents, news reports, and elite interviews. The main purpose of the large-N study is to test how generalizable my theory is while the main purpose of the small-N study is to offer a detailed account of the interacting mechanism between political institutions, parties, and anti-government protests.

Based on the empirical analyses, this dissertation makes three major claims. First, the mobilization capacity of opposition parties exhibits important explanatory power on my worldwide sample of democracies. Specifically, focusing on the size and unity of opposition parties as elements of opposition mobilization capacity, a larger opposition camp is more likely to encourage more anti-government protests only if the camp is more united. Second, the dynamics of opposition parties and protests differ in developed countries and developing countries. While a large and united opposition camp helps mobilize more protests in developing countries, a large and united opposition camp does not have a significant effect in mobilizing protests in developed countries. Third, some macro-level variables identified in previous studies help explain the frequency of anti-government protests in democratic countries, but other factors do not fare well in my tests. I find that a higher level of democratization and a higher level of
economic development have positive effects on increasing protests. Moreover, I find that a
country that adopts a proportional representation electoral system tends to experience fewer
protests. However, my analyses show that factors such as the adoption of a parliamentary
system, electoral cycles, and government partisanship do not make a significant difference in
explaining the patterns of protests.

1.2 WHY STUDY PROTESTS?

Social movements involve “continuous interaction between challengers and power holders”
(Tilly 2003, 247). Tarrow (2011, 9) describes social movements as “collective challenges, based
on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and
authorities.” According to Goodwin and Jasper (2009, 4), “[a] social movement is a collective,
organized, sustained, and noninstitutional challenge to authorities, powerholders, or cultural
beliefs and practices.” Protest, with various forms of repertoires such as street marches, sit-ins,
road blockades, building occupations, and so on, is an important mode of action adopted by
social movement activists (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 163-92). This dissertation focuses on
anti-government protests, which can be defined as collective activities that adopt disruptive
tactics (e.g., strike, street demonstration) for the purpose of influencing the actors and/or policy-
making process of the government. Therefore, according to this definition, anti-government
protests do not necessarily indicate the collective activities that aim to bring down the
government.

In the political science literature, social protests are often considered an “unconventional”
form of collective action (Dalton 2008, 67; Finkel et al. 1989). However, this does not
necessarily imply that the research on protests is less important than the research on conventional political participation such as voting and lobbying. Rather, there are important normative and theoretical reasons for understanding why social protests take place and intensify in particular contexts.

First, although many researchers have emphasized the negative impact of social protests on political stability (Blanco and Grier 2009; Huntington 1968; Posner 1997), protests are not necessarily normatively undesirable. Instead, the occurrence of social protests often helps to uncover facts about who suffers from political stability. In addition, a strong civil society where collective protest is routinized as a “normal part of politics” (Goldstone 2004, 348; Meyer and Tarrow 1998b) helps improve the quality of democracy by enhancing the democratic values of participants (Pateman 1970; Putnam 1993; Thompson 1970), providing a space for public deliberation (Parry et al. 1992), and even offering resources for political development (Warren 2001). In a country where the government and political parties lack responsiveness, “societal accountability” (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000) in the form of social protest may be an effective vehicle forcing politicians to be responsive to societal demands and to be accountable for certain political outcomes (Mainwaring 2003, 10).

The theoretical importance of studying protest lies in protest’s role in affecting national politics (Adler and Webster 1995; Collier and Collier 1991; Eckstein 2001; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Giugni et al. 1998; Goodwin 2001). Peasant movements in Southern Mexico were considered the main actor in the Mexican Revolution (Knight 1986; Tutino 1986; Womack 1969). Labor movements have had great influences in public policy-making in Argentina and Venezuela since the 1930s (Murillo 2001). Popular movements played a critical role in promoting democratization in Brazil (Collier and Mahoney 1997; Mainwaring 1987). In Asia,
the “People Power Revolution” initiated by various societal sectors in the Philippines ended the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship in 1986 (Hedman 2005).

Social movements matter for theories of political institutions because social movements provide a breeding ground for new parties. For instance, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) emerged from strong labor movements in Brazil (Hunter 2007; Keck 1992; Mainwaring 1999); moreover, strong indigenous movements in the Andes countries have transformed themselves after great institutional change, with notable examples of the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaq Katari de Liberación (MRTKL) in Bolivia and the Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP) in Ecuador (Birnir 2004; Van Cott 2003, 2005); also, in South Africa, the democratically elected African National Congress originated from the struggles of the anti-apartheid movement (Zunes 1999).

Given that studying protests matters for both normative and theoretical reasons, social protest should be a very important subject of political behavior studies. However, it is surprising that social movement research has never been a top priority for the political scientists (van Deth 2010). The “Political Science: The State of the Discipline” book (Katznelson and Milner 2002) published by the American Political Science Association (APSA) contains contributions about various subfields such as institutional theories and experimental theories, but the book unfortunately overlooks social movement studies. Among the more than forty “organized sections” within APSA, research on social movements belongs to the section of “New Political Science,” which suggests that political science has not yet developed a dominant paradigm for studying movements as a distinct set of political phenomena (Meyer and Lupo 2007, 112).

My dissertation provides a nuanced understanding of the interaction between political parties and social protests. This dissertation makes a number of contributions across different
social science disciplines. First, I adopt a novel interdisciplinary approach to examine patterns of protests. Second, the dissertation contributes to the literature on political behavior by showing the importance of party politics in understanding social movements. Third, the dissertation enriches theories of party politics by providing rigorous empirical analyses on the consequences of party development. Fourth, the dissertation is relevant to more than political scientists and sociologists; the quantitative and qualitative data will help researchers understand the extent to which the dynamics of party/movement interactions vary across different cultures and different levels of context, a necessary advance in a literature that has been dominated by single case studies.

Last, this study provides important implications for social movements, opposition parties, and the government. On one hand, the empirical results suggest that if social movements and opposition parties choose to use protests to pressure the government, a unified opposition with strong support is a key to producing a larger number of protests. On the other hand, in order to reduce the frequency of anti-government protests and maintain political stability, it is important for the governing party or parties to secure a large and stable support base. Moreover, this research also provides crucial implications for democracy. In general, groups with effective partisan representation tend to work through the legislative process, while those who do not see an ability to win through that process turn to the streets. Thus, it is important that policy makers design institutions that can better connect political parties to social movements.
1.3 EXISTING EXPLANATIONS RECONSIDERED

1.3.1 Opportunity, Threat, and Protests

Why do protests occur? While some early studies describe protests as simply irrational behavior (Hoffer 1951; Le Bon 1896), other later studies have adopted a social psychological approach to argue that protests are caused by people’s grievance, discontent, frustration, and emotions (Berkowitz 1972; Goodwin et al. 2001; Klandermans 1997; Kornhauser 1959). Gurr (1970) contends that protest participation (often in a violent form) can be explained by people’s frustrated feelings of “relative deprivation” (see also Davies 1962). As Gurr describes: “[t]he primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicization of discontent, and finally its actualization in violent political action against political objects and actors” (Gurr 1970, 12-3).

One important implication that Gurr’s study of political violence can provide for protest studies is that certain protests, even protests that are peaceful in nature, would be simply driven by high level of popular grievance. However, Gurr’s approach has been widely criticized by many scholars. For instance, Tilly (1971, 416) criticized that Gurr’s approach is nothing more than a “sponge” that aims to “make every other argument, hypothesis, and finding support his scheme, and to contradict none of them.” Moreover, both resource mobilization theory and political process theory (see below) suggest that “grievances are ubiquitous and that the key question in movement participation research is not so much why people are aggrieved, but why aggrieved people participate” (Klandermans 2004, 362).

Recent sociologists have gone beyond Gurr’s social psychological approach by stressing the importance of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing process in analyzing
social movements (McAdam et al. 1996). First, the political opportunity approach has its roots in structuralism and contends that the emergence, strategies, and outcomes of social movements are influenced by a broad set of political constraints and opportunities, such as economic determinants, social structures and political institutions (Kriesi 2004; Meyer 2004; Skocpol 1979). Second, the approach of mobilizing structures is based on rational choice assumptions of Olsonian collective action theory (McAdam et al. 1996, 155; Olson 1965). It focuses on analyzing the resources that can help social movements overcome the free rider problem, such as structured social movement organizations, informal social networks, or material support from other actors (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973). Third, the framing approach has its roots in culturalist tradition and aims to explore the sources and functions of cultural values, collective identity, and socially constructed ideas within movements (McAdam et al. 1996, 5; Melucci 1980; Offe 1985).

Based on the political opportunity approach, Tilly (1978, 133-8) and Goldstone and Tilly (2001) distinguish two general paths that drive collective action: opportunity and threat. Almeida (2003, 347) defines “opportunity” as “the likelihood that challengers will enhance their interests or extend existing benefits if they act collectively,” while “threat” is “the probability that existing benefits will be taken away or new harms inflicted if challenging groups fail to act collectively.”³ Considering opportunity and threat as ideal types, it is expected that popular mobilization may either be driven by positive incentives to pursue certain policy goals (opportunity) and/or be driven by fear of losing benefits (threat) (Almeida 2003; Tilly 1978).

Many quantitative studies of social mobilization have examined the roles of democratization and economic development in mobilization. Studies have shown that

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³ As Goldstone and Tilly (2001, 181) argue, it may be mistaken to view threat as a negative measure of opportunity, but opportunity and threat can be combined to shape contentious action.
democratization encourages protest mobilization because democratization provides a “favorable” opportunity for popular mobilization by expanding political access for citizens, relaxing state repression and facilitating coalition formation between important political actors and social actors (Goldstone 2004; Meyer 2004; Tilly and Tarrow 2007; Tilly 2007; Yashar 1998, 2005). However, other studies argue that democratization might lead to a decline of social protest activities because a more democratized political system provides more institutionalized channels for political participation and grievance resolution (Hipsher 1996, 1998; Pickvance 1999). In addition to a high level of democratization, a society with greater economic development might provide more mobilization resources for social actors to transform their grievance into collective protest action (Arce 2010b, 676; Bellinger and Arce 2011).

Another important political opportunity factor that can help explain protest incidence is the presence and absence of influential political elite allies in the government (McAdam 1996, 27; Stearns and Almeida 2004; Tarrow 1996). Based on the evidence from Western democracies, some studies have demonstrated that social movement organizations tend to increase protest activities when the legislature has more members that share similar ideological position with the movements (Jenkins et al. 2003; Minkoff 1997, 794; Van Dyke 2003, 240-1). However, other studies show that with more elite allies in the legislature, the incentives for protest might be reduced because there is a higher probability that the movement’s demands can be channeled through institutionalized means (Kriesi et al. 1995; Larson and Soule 2009). Unlike the studies discussed above, Lee (2011) shows that the share of legislative seats of the opposition parties does not have a significant impact on encouraging protests.

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4 However, it is noteworthy that the concept of “favorable opportunity” may not be straightforward. For instance, Herrera and Markoff (2011) argue that the presence of partial democratization in rural Spain can be opportunities but also obstacles for social movements.
Using data about new social movements in Western European countries, Jung (2010) shows that social protests tend to occur less often when leftist governments are in power because such governments tend to provide more routine institutionalized political access to various social actors. However, Meyer and Minkoff (2004) find that, in the United States, Democratic presidential administrations have helped promote more civil rights protest movements because such an institutional environment represents a favorable opportunity for activism. The mixed findings about the hypothesis of elite allies in the context of Western democracies suggest that the relationship between parties and movements is complicated and deserves more scrutiny.

On the other hand, a certain macro-level context might pose a threat to citizens’ lives and result in “threat-induced” defensive collective action. For instance, ordinary citizens tend to protest in response to macroeconomic problems such as economic depression and high inflation rates (Gurr 1968; Midlarsky 1988; Walton and Ragin 1990). The implementation of neoliberal structural adjustment reform could also triggered large-scale protest movements since such policies often result in severe social inequalities, reductions in public services and subsidies, and higher unemployment rates (Almeida 2007; Babb 2005; Eckstein 2002; Roberts 2008; Shefner 2002; Weyland 2004). However, some studies argue that neoliberal reforms would pose a threat that prevents collective protests. In this sense, neoliberal reforms demobilize civil society organizations by eroding the organizational bases of the society and thus citizens would like necessary resources for mobilizing (Kurtz 2004).

Political process theory synthesizes insights of the political opportunity approach and resource mobilization theory (Klandermans 1991; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998). It considers social movements as strategic, rational actors whose actions are affected by a broad set of structural constraints and opportunities. In addition, it examines how movements use resources to
facilitate mobilization and how the state alters opportunities available to the movements. Thus, some political process theorists analyze social movements as sustained challenges to the government that flourish and decline in cycles (Meyer 1993; Meyer and Whittier 1994). In this sense, a social movement is a sustained challenge to the state that has periods of mobilization, diffusion, peaks, declines, and realignments in activity, and uses conventional and unconventional repertoires to achieve goals (Markoff 1996, 1999).

Although some scholars state that the political process theory “has become the hegemonic paradigm among social movement analysts” (Goodwin and Jasper 1999, 28), it also has received numerous critiques. For instance, the core concept of the political process approach—political opportunity—may “suffer from its definitional sloppiness...which tends to reduce its heuristic and theoretical value” (Kriesi 2004, 68-9; see also Gamson and Meyer 2006). Goodwin and Jasper (1999) argue that political opportunity theory is tautological and that the structural bias embedded in the political process approach may result in less attention to the role of cultural identity, activists’ agency, and creative strategies in the making of social movements. Meyer and Minkoff (2004) find that the empirical effects of political opportunity structure depend on how researchers conceptualize, theorize, and measure political opportunity. Last, Goldstone (2004, 346) contends that the political opportunity approach lacks clarity about “whether the main contribution of favorable opportunities was to movement emergence or success.”

1.3.2 Institutional Approaches

As discussed above, previous empirical work based on the political opportunity approach has underlined the importance of structural factors such as democratization and economy in
explaining protest behavior. However, a macro-level explanation of protests that relies on institutional theories has been increasingly tested recently. Here institutions are conceptualized “as collections of rules and incentives...that establish a ‘political space’ within which many independent political actors can function” (Peters 2012, 48). One important institutional approach is rational choice institutionalism (Shepsle 1989, 2006; Tsebelis 1990), which suggests that political actors’ behavior is driven mainly by a strategic calculus about the limitation and opportunities that particular institutional or organizational settings offer.

How do institutions matter for explaining protest activities? In general, stronger representative institutions are more able to effectively channel popular demands and discourage citizens to resort to non-institutional means to affect policy processes. Some empirical studies have shown that strong and well-functioning legislatures reduce the likelihood of social protest at the macro level (Nam 2007) and micro level (Machado et al. 2011). Other studies suggest that certain institutions can provide opportunities or constraints that shape the decision of actors mobilizing protests. Below I will discuss the effects of constitutional design, electoral institutions, and election timing on protests.

Assuming that political elites will choose either institutional or non-institutional ways to engage in the political process under certain institutional environments, studies have found that a country adopting institutions that encourage the formation of new parties, such as the parliamentary system and proportional electoral system, should experience fewer protests (Bhasin 2008; Krain 1998; Özler 2013). One important theoretical reasoning for these empirical analyses is that such political institutions provide more incentives for the elites to form new political parties to access seats in the legislature and provide more opportunity for elites from

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5 See Green and Shapiro (1994) for criticisms of rational choice theory.
different groups to hold posts in the government (Bhasin 2008, 58). As a result, the institutions that are better able to encompass political minorities in the political process thus should discourage political elites from mobilizing protest activities to pursue political goals.6

The timing of electoral cycles might be an important structural factor that shapes protest activities. Bruhn (2008) argues that the election year and the first year under a new government (i.e., the “honeymoon” year) are two important timing variables that can help explain the frequency of protests. Specifically, it is expected that more protests tend to occur during a presidential election year because protest groups expect that their voice might be more likely to be heard during the period of electoral campaign. In addition, it is possible that movements might reduce the protest activity in the first year of a new government because these movements might be willing to give the new government more time to respond to their demands during the “honeymoon” year.

The empirical findings about the effects of electoral cycle factors are mixed, however. Bruhn (2008) and Meyer and Minkoff (2004) find that protest incidence is not particularly higher or lower during an election year as opposed to a non-election year. However, Martin and Dixon (2010) find that labor strike activities in the United States are reduced during a presidential election year, while Álvarez Rivadulla’s (2011) study of Uruguayan social movements demonstrates that the frequency of protest events in the form of land occupation is higher during an election year. Moreover, empirical studies have shown that the “honeymoon year” effect on protest might be in an opposite direction from the theoretical expectation: Bruhn (2008) and Álvarez Rivadulla (2011) find that there are more anti-local-government protests during the year after an election. One possible explanation for this result is that “[i]n the first year of a new

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6 Studies on ethnic conflicts have also demonstrated that proportional institutions outperform majoritarian institutions in reducing political violence related to ethnic issues (Cohen 1997; Saideman et al. 2002).
government, organizations have strong incentives to protest in order to establish their priority in the policy agenda” (Bruhn 2008, 6-7).

1.4 PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

The next chapter reviews the literature on social protest that discusses the relationship between opposition parties and protests. As a brief review of the previous research has demonstrated, macro-level theories of protests have not considered the organizational basis of protest mobilization. Thus, in Chapter 2 I attempt to fill the theoretical gap by building a theory of opposition mobilization capacity. Two testable hypotheses are derived from this theory. The first hypothesis is that a large opposition camp will encourage more anti-government protests only if the camp is more united. The second hypothesis is that a higher level of mobilization capacity of opposition parties matters more for encouraging anti-government protests in developing countries than developed countries.

Chapter 3 presents the research design of the dissertation, including data, testable hypotheses, operationalization of variables, and methods. Specifically, there are quantitative and qualitative analyses in this dissertation. The quantitative analyses rely on protest event count data and legislative electoral data from 107 democracies for testing the empirical implications of the theory, while the qualitative analyses rely on interviews and histories in Peru and Taiwan. Chapter 4 presents the empirical results for the quantitative data. The results provide strong support for my two theoretical hypotheses. The findings are robust across different data, different measures of variables, and different estimation methods.
Chapter 5 and 6 present case studies of opposition parties and anti-government protests in Peru (Chapter 5) and Taiwan (Chapter 6). I trace the process in which social movements emerged, were strengthened, and declined in different historical periods. I also discuss the impact of opposition parties on different protest movements. For the case study of Peru, I find that the large opposition camp in this country has not been able to mobilize more large-scale protests because of the high level of fragmentation within the camp. However, this does not imply that protests never occur when the opposition camp is fragmented. In fact, I find that protests indeed take place in Peru, but most of them are weak and localized because the opposition lacks strong mobilization capacity.

In contrast, the case study of Taiwan shows that from the late 1980s to the 1990s, the opposition camp was able to mobilize large-scale anti-government protests because the camp was relatively strong and unified. However, after 2008 an interesting pattern has emerged in which the role of opposition parties in mobilizing protests has become less important. I argue that this pattern might be explained by the fact that Taiwan is transforming itself from a developing country to a developed country. During the process, protests have become more routinized, and citizens are becoming more resourceful. Thus, more large-scale protests have been organized without the support of the opposition parties. Last, Chapter 7 concludes and establishes a research agenda for the future.
2.0 THEORY

This chapter builds a theory of opposition mobilization capacity drawing on the insights of resource mobilization theory and neoinstitutionalism. I first discuss how political parties matter for democratic representation. Second, I focus on the role of opposition parties as mobilization agents of social protests and build my theory accordingly. The core intuition of this theory suggests that when the camp of opposition parties is large and united, the camp is more able to mobilize large constituencies for large-scale collective action. The third section of this chapter further discusses how patterns of parties and movements differ in different socio-economic contexts. I argue that opposition mobilization capacity matters more for anti-government protests in developing countries than developed countries.

2.1 THE THESIS OF REPRESENTATION CRISIS

Many political scientists view democratic representation as unthinkable without parties (Rosenblum 2008; Schattschneider 1942). An essential function of parties is to obtain “popular consent to the course of public policy” (Key 1964, 12). Parties perform numerous crucial democratic functions, such as articulating political interests, recruiting political elites, allocating government offices, framing ideological and programmatic alternatives, fielding candidates for elections, socializing citizens in democratic values, and creating grassroots channels for popular
participation (Dix 1992, 489; Roberts 2002, 29-30; Ware 1996). Therefore, parties are so important in the political arena that Sartori even states that “citizens in modern democracies are represented *through* and *by* parties” (Sartori 1968, 471, italics in the original).

Given that parties perform essential functions for democratic representation, a poorly-functioning party system is likely to result in partisan representation crisis. In a country that suffers representation crisis, politicians’ interests and citizens’ interests are not congruent (Dalton 1985; Luna and Zechmeister 2005), and the government is not responsive to citizens’ demands (Pitkin 1967; Eulau and Karps 1977). One indicator is whether politicians are able to keep their commitment in the electoral campaigns credible. When the credibility of the commitment is low, citizens are left unrepresented, and democratic representation is in crisis.⁷ In the spring 2010, the Socialist Government in Greece announced a series of austerity and stabilization plans created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) to tackle the worst economic crisis in the history of the country. The government was accused of “having forgotten its pre-election promises to impose taxation on the rich” (Psimitis 2011, 193). Later, labor unions in both the private and public sectors cooperated with leftist political parties launching waves of general strikes and street protests against the government’s policies from March to May 2010.

Before the Peruvian 2001 general elections, candidate Alejandro Toledo’s written declaration to the Departmental Federation of Workers of Arequipa (FDTA) promising not to privatize the electricity in Arequipa helped him win over 70% of the vote in this region in the

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⁷ Stokes (2001) challenges this perspective by showing that in some Latin American countries people might appreciate the unexpected policy change if such a shift results in good policy outcomes in the long run. Moreover, Stokes argues that the policy shift that results in worse outcomes does not necessarily end up in the incumbent party’s electoral defeat if attention can be diverted to other policies that lead to better outcome. However, Stokes also argues that abrupt policy changes might erode the quality of democracy if the elites fail to provide candid explanation for the policy shift.
2001 elections (Escárzaga 2009, 168). However, in 2002 President Toledo broke the promise by announcing the plans to privatize the two state-owned electric companies, Egasa and Egasur. The resistance to the sale resulted in the Arequipazo, with weeks of mass uprising in June 2002 (Arce 2008).  

Consequences of party representation crisis vary, but it is expected that under such an environment, people will lack effective institutional access for channeling their demands, and thus it is more likely that people turn to use non-institutional means to affect the policy-making process (Huntington 1968, 412; Morlino 2005, 758). At the elite level, such crisis may result in a military coup d’état and presidents’ autogolpe “against the congress, courts, parties, and all vehicles that help civil society seek advocacy and representation for its interests” (Domínguez 1997, 109). In contrast, at the mass public level, when partisan representation is in crisis citizens may be more likely to shift from traditional forms of representation such as political parties to “newer” modes such as social movements (Arce 2010b; Chandhoke 2005, 308; Luna and Zechmeister 2005).

Mainwaring (2006, 15) argues that politically underrepresented citizens not only are more likely to resort to unconventional forms of participation such as antisystem popular mobilization, but also become less likely to engage in electoral participation, thus withdrawing support from the regime. In his study on the “partyarchy” of Venezuela, Coppedge (1994) finds that over-

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8 The protests successfully forced the Interior Minister to resign (The Economist 2002) and in late 2002 a judicial ruling declared that the electric companies are owned by the province of Arequipa and thus halted the government’s privatization plans (Paredes 2002, 46; cited in Arce 2008, 52).

9 With the definition of polyarchy as freedom of expression, universal suffrage, free election, etc (Dahl 1971), Coppedge (1994, 19) defines “partyarchy” as “the degree to which political parties interfere with the fulfillment of the requirements for polyarchy.” While all democracies are assumed to possess some characteristics of partyarchy to some degree, Coppedge (1994, 19-20) argues that Venezuela comes close to the extreme form of partyarchy because parties dominate all nominations for public office and practically decide who is elected, parties penetrate citizens’ organization life thoroughly, party discipline is so strong that the legislature has no autonomy, and mass media are highly politicized along party lines.
institutionalized traditional political parties such as Acción Democrática (AD) and Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI) are so hierarchically controlled by rigid bureaucratic bodies that they have monopolized the state and suffocated civil society by dominating electoral campaigns, keeping new issues off the agenda in legislative proceedings and blocking channels of participation (Crisp 2000). As Coppedge (1994, 43-4) shows, under the domination of partyarchy, Venezuelan citizens’ party identification dramatically declined and the abstention rate in the elections increasingly climbed. Although the 1989 Caracazo was largely triggered by the implementation of the AD government’s neoliberal reforms such as privatization of state enterprises and taxation reforms (López-Mayra 2003), the repudiation of the traditional parties in the 1993 elections help explain why rioters chose to not express their frustration within the system (Coppedge 1994, 44; Morgan 2007, 82).

Venezuela’s case implies that for some citizens voting participation and protest engagement may be alternatives. Norris’ (2002, 202-7) cross-national analysis also supports such a perspective, showing that citizens with strong environmentalist attitudes are less likely to turn out to vote but more likely to join protest movements. Inglehart’s (1997) research on Western democracies shows that, while voter turnout has stagnated due to citizens’ declining support for parties, citizens have actually become much more engaged and active in protest politics. However, other studies have shown that voting and protest activity can be complements rather than alternatives (Kubik 1998). For instance, Rudig’s (2010, 149-55) study shows that there is no evidence that people participating in anti-war protests are alienated from electoral participation. As Goldstone (2004, 340) contends, protests can be complementary to conventional political participation for many social movement actors, because “it may be the ability of groups to combine both protest and conventional tactics for influencing government actors that best
conduces to movement success” (see also Andrews 2001). In short, although it is not clear whether voting participation and protest participation are alternatives or complements, it is plausible that partisan representation crisis is likely to lead to more popular protests.

As discussed before, the thesis of representation crisis suggests that a poorly-functioned party system is likely to result in more protests. One specific indicator of partisan representation quality in a country pertains to the level of party system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007), which implies “the stabilization and social embeddedness of the major party alternatives and their relative policy positions” (Tóka 1997, 96). According to Mainwaring and Scully (1995, 5), an institutionalized party system denotes 1) higher stability in the rules of the nature of inter-party competition; 2) strong party/society linkages that structure political preference over time; 3) major political actors’ acceptance of the parties and elections as legitimate institutions in determining who governs; and 4) party organizations generally having stable rules and structures.

As Mainwaring and Scully (1995, 23) contend, an institutionalized party system can “help groups express their interests…channel political demands and can dampen political conflicts.” In contrast, an under-institutionalized party system implies poor quality of partisan representation, where parties are not well connected to society and governments are less responsive and accountable (Arce 2010b, 672). As a result, it is expected that a poorly institutionalized party system “creates a political vacuum, producing a more conducive environment for greater levels of mobilization” (Arce 2010b, 671-2; see also Levitsky 2001; Luna and Zechmeister 2005).

Using electoral volatility and party system fragmentation as indicators of the level of party system institutionalization, Arce (2010b) finds that the level of protests tends to be higher
when a country has a high level of electoral volatility and a higher degree of party system fragmentation. As Arce (2010b, 672) argues, parties in a poorly institutionalized party system are not connected to society and do not provide consistent polices that articulate societal demands. Moreover, a high level of party fragmentation is known to imperil the ability of executives to pass their agenda, thus hampering the capacity of states to respond effectively to popular sector demand.”

However, contrary to Arce’s findings, Rice (2003) shows that party system institutionalization has no effect on social protests. Other studies find that a fragmented party system might help reduce the incidence of protests. Wilkinson (2004) and Arce and Rice (2009) demonstrate that protests tend to decrease with the level of party system fragmentation because such a party system suggests greater electoral competition, which encourages the governing party to make policies to prevent mass protests. Unlike the studies mentioned above, Jung’s (2010) study of Western Europe’s New Social Movements demonstrates mixed results about the effect of party system fragmentation on different phases of a protest cycle.

If lower party system institutionalization suggests that citizens generally have weaker partisanship, Arce’s (2010b) finding may suggest that citizens with a low level of partisanship (who are more likely to shift votes between parties) tend to engage in protest activities. However, other studies have shown that citizens with stronger partisanship may be more likely to engage in protest activities under particular conditions. Finkel and Opp’s (1991) analysis demonstrates that, when political parties provide behavioral cues to promote protest, individuals with strong loyalties to the party are likely to be motivated to comply. In addition, Crozat (1998, 78) in his study on advanced democracies demonstrates that partisanship had a stronger effect in increasing a typical individual’s probability to accept protests as a form of collective action. Other studies
also show that protesters tend have much stronger partisanship than the general public (Dalton 2008, 68; Rudig 2010, 149).

In addition, it is theoretically unclear whether a higher level of party system institutionalization necessarily helps to demobilize popular protests. In fact, the concept of party system institutionalization indicates only how institutionalized the parties are in a very general sense. It offers no information about which party is more institutionalized than the other within the system.\(^\text{10}\) This is a serious problem because parties in a democracy are different in size, ideology, age, and, most importantly, in status as a governing party or an opposition party. Without taking into account substantive differences among parties, the thesis of representation crisis simply suggests that the level of social protest tends to be lower in countries where both the governing party and the opposition parties are institutionalized. It may be plausible that a strong and institutionalized governing party may try to demobilize anti-government protests. However, if the opposition parties are also strong and institutionalized, it is not necessarily the case that these parties also tend to demobilize anti-government protests, as a strong governing party would do.

\(^{10}\) See Randall and Svåsand (2002) for the discussion about the relationships between party system institutionalization and party institutionalization.
2.2 INSTITUTIONS AS AGENTS OF MOBILIZATION: OPPOSITION PARTIES
AND PROTESTS

In the political science literature, a neo-institutional perspective suggests that certain institutions can be viewed as a rational agents with strategic goals (Peters 2012, 155). In contrast, the neo-institutional theory in the sociology literature argues that “the interconnectedness of organizations as well as shared meanings among them enforce specific, similar organizational behaviors” (Saruya 2012, 21; see also DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). According to Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008, 651), neo-institutional analyses of social movements emphasize agency and systematically examine the relations between collective organizations and the embedded institutional contexts.

Institutional/organizational actors abound, including the state (e.g., Skocpol 1985) and political parties (e.g., Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Strøm 1990). This section focuses on opposition parties as agents that can help mobilize collective protests to pursue certain political goals. I will first discuss how parties link and ally with social movements. Next, I will use several episodes to discuss the relationships between opposition parties and social movements. Third, and more importantly, I will propose an opposition mobilization theory of protests, generating testable hypotheses about how opposition parties mobilize protests.

11 In general, there are at least three different types of new institutionalism in the political science literature: historical institutionalism, rational-choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996).
2.2.1 Party/Movement Coalitions and Linkages

Many protest mobilization efforts involve collaboration efforts between different political and social actors. Such coalitions can be formal or informal (Caniglia 2001; Jones et al. 2001; Zald and McCarthy 1980), within the national territories or across borders (Bandy and Smith 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Walgrave and Rucht 2010). As Staggenborg (2010, 316) points out, the importance of a movement coalition is that “by combining resources and coordinating strategies, movements and their allies are bound to be more effective in achieving goals and creating social changes in culture, institutions, and public policy.” Social movements take various forms in terms of planning and execution of protest events. According to Jones et al. (2001), a protest event might involve several different kinds of organizational forms: 1) a single social movement organization (SMO); 2) an alliance comprised of two or more SMOs with relatively equal responsibility; 3) a network invocation in which a key SMO takes major responsibility for making decisions and drawing other organizations in mobilization; and 4) a network assistance in which an institutionalized professional SMO pays other SMOs for mobilization.

As important political actors in democratic systems, political parties and social movements often build certain connections with each other. In general, political parties might take advantage of the party/movement linkages to build a stable popular base of electoral support (Luna 2011; Resnick 2012; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), to recruit candidates and campaign activists for elections (Hamayotsu 2011; Thachil 2011; Wuhs 2008), and to mobilize protest campaigns for pressuring the incumbent government (Almeida 2010b, 2012; Arce and Mangonnet 2013; Auyero 2007; LeBas 2011). From the perspective of social movements, McAdam and Tarrow (2010, 533-7) argue that movements are able to introduce innovative forms of collective actions to support a particular party in the elections (Carty 2011), proactively
engage in electoral campaigns (Muira and Peetz 2010), and polarize political parties internally (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

Based on an organization-centered view, Schwartz (2010) identifies different interaction strategies between parties and social movements. The overarching assumption for Schwartz’ typology is that the interactions between organizations involve a tradeoff between preserving autonomy and pursuing stability (Scott and Davis 2007). If the leaders of organizations seek stability, parties and movements might adopt bridging interaction strategies, including mergers or alliances (Schwartz 2010, 590-2). To ensure autonomy, parties and movements might adopt hostile interaction strategies to distance each other through disruption, discrediting, or purging (Schwartz 2010, 597-600). In between the extremes of bridging strategies and distancing strategies are invasive strategies, in which parties seek to control movements through cooptation and movements seek to control parties through insurgency or displacement (Schwartz 2010, 592-7).

Focusing on the bridging strategies, Lawson (1980, 13-9) argues that a party may build a particular linkage with the society by making programmatic policies (policy-responsive linkage), setting channels for citizens to directly participate in the party’s decision-making process (participatory linkage), providing particularized benefits through patron-client networks (linkage by reward), and/or simply maintaining coercive or educative control over the constituents (directive linkage). Kitschelt (2000) focuses on three types of linkages. First, the

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12 In his study of party development in Mexico, Wuhs (2008) argues that while the historically dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) uses corporatist linkage parties to maintain formal and enduring organizational ties with civic organizations, Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) and Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), the two major opposition parties, have tried to link civic organizations through a type of non-corporatist linkage, such as overlapping membership affiliation, through short-term strategic alliances, or through party support of the formation of civic organizations with partisan sympathies.

13 Linkage analysis has been adopted in the areas of international politics (Rosenau 1969) and local politics (Eulau and Prewitt 1973).
programmatic linkage is similar to Lawson’s policy-responsive linkage, which assumes that the citizen-elite linkage work through politicians’ programmatic appeals and policy achievements. Moreover, the clientelist linkage is similar to Lawson’s linkage by reward, concerning the exchange of material benefits and voting support. While the programmatic linkage results in greater depersonalization of politics and more collective goods provision, the clientelist linkage “often yield a bias toward high income inequality skewed toward resource-rich rent-seeking clients and legislative immobilism” (Kitschelt 2000, 852).

Kitschelt (2000) contends that in order to make programmatic and clientelist linkages work better, a certain level of bureaucratic-organizational infrastructure for the party is required; when politicians make no such investment, the linkage between politicians and citizens is the charismatic authority. The main feature of the charismatic linkage is that politicians would use unique personal skills of persuasion to build and maintain the relationship between leaders and their rank and file. Building on Kitschelt’s and Lawson’s discussions, Roberts (2002) proposes another type of linkage: marketing linkage. The party that uses marketing linkage to develop its relationship with supporters is similar to Panebianco’s (1988) concept of the electoral-professional party. As Roberts (2002, 19-20) notes, such linkages are generally formed in specific electoral conjunctures as parties appeal to uncommitted voters via mass media and public opinion polls rather than processing strong grassroots branches or affiliated mass

14 Kitschelt (2000, 849) analyzes two different circuits of exchange. First, resource-rich but vote-poor constituencies (e.g., big enterprises) can provide politicians with money in exchange for material favors such as public work contracts or regulatory legislations. Second, resource-poor but vote-rich constituencies would receive selective material incentives such as gifts before and after elections in exchange for surrendering their votes.

15 Panebianco (1988, 265-7) argues that a common shift from “mass bureaucratic parties” to “electoral-professional parties” in many democratic countries is a product of (1) the social structural transformation that gives rise to multidimensional political cleavages and (2) the increasing use of television for political communication. In this sense, parties have increasingly become a more candidate-centered and issue-oriented vehicle for electoral contests and less attached to the society. As a result, “television and interest groups become far more important links…between parties and electorates…Bureaucrats and activists [of a party] are still necessary, but their roles are now less important” (Panebianco 1988, 266).
organizations. Thus, the marketing linkages “generate conditional support rather than political loyalty, as citizens do not forge lasting organizational bonds or identities” (Roberts 2002, 19).

Other literature discusses the factors that facilitate social movement coalitions. Although not exclusively focusing on party/movement alliances, the authors in Van Dyke and McCammon’s (2010) edited volume have emphasized the importance of individuals’ social ties in the past, shared ideological orientations among social movement organizations, and political contexts in understanding movements’ coalition building. Specifically, Corrigall-Brown and Meyer (2010, 17) find that some activists are more likely to be recruited by other activists to participate in a coalition because of high levels of trust because the activists have worked with each other in the past. Moreover, research shows that while shared ideologies or identities facilitate movement collaboration, ideological differences inhibit coalition formation (e.g., Gerhards and Rucht 1996; Roth 2010).

Third, studies demonstrate that an antagonistic socio-political environment (Okamoto 2010; Staggenborg 1986) or a protest-oriented local political culture (Diani et al. 2010) are important contextual factors that encourage the formation of movement coalitions. McCammon and Van Dyke’s (2010) qualitative meta-analysis of various existing movement coalition research shows that outside political threats and common ideological stances may be sufficient conditions for coalition formation in many cases.

In this section, I have discussed the reasons for parties and movements to build coalitions, different ways that they build the coalitions, different types of party/movement coalitions or linkages, and various factors that facilitate party/movement coalition building. This discussion will lay out an analytical framework for the qualitative analyses of this dissertation. Table 2.1 summarizes this framework:
Table 2.1 Analytical Framework for Party/Movement Relations

| Purposes of party/movement coalition | 1. For parties: electoral mobilization, candidate recruitment  
2. For movements: resources, polarizing the party |
| Organizational forms of a protest event | 1. A single SMO  
2. Alliance  
3. Network invocation  
4. Network assistance |
| Party/movement interaction strategies | 1. Bridging  
2. Hostile  
3. Invasive |
| Linkages between the party and society | 1. Programmatic linkage  
2. Clientelist linkage  
3. Charismatic linkage  
4. Participatory linkage  
5. Marketing linkage |
| Factors that facilitate party/movement coalitions | 1. Past social ties  
2. Shared ideologies or identities  
3. Protest-oriented local political culture  
4. Outside political threats |

Sources: Jones et al. (2001); Kitschelt (2000); Lawson (1990; 2005); Roberts (2002); Schwartz (2010).

2.2.2 Opposition Parties and Social Movements

As discussed above, parties can use and combine different bridging strategies to ally with social movements for collective actions (Lawson 2005), but it is not clear which type of party/society linkage is most effective for political mobilization. In fact, protest activities may be mobilized by any party/movement coalition regardless of the types of linkages that the party builds with society. However, we do see some parties are more likely to mobilize protests than others. Here I argue that it is necessary to consider the division of governing party and opposition party as a
salient political cleavage. In general, since the government tends to maintain political and social stability, the party or parties that control the government would try to demobilize political activities that would threaten stability. Opposition parties might also pursue political stability, but these parties might use both institutional and non-institutional means to influence the policy-making process (Almeida 2010a). For instance, in mid-nineteenth-century France, the members of Republican Party contested electoral office and at the same time adopted disruptive protest actions to pursue political goals (Aminzade 1995).

Assuming that opposition parties and social movement organizations are rational actors seeking to survive and thrive, there may exist mutual benefits in forming a coalition between opposition parties and social movements. Strong interaction between parties and movements tends to be prevalent “when parties are in opposition and are building social coalitions for electoral purposes” (Maguire 1995, 199). Almeida (2010b; 2006) proposes the term “social movement partyism” to denote the strategic coalition between social movements and oppositional parties in new democracies. Specifically, this term is defined as: “(1) an electoral opposition political party taking up a social movement cause as its own by coalescing with a movement, and (2) the use of social movement-type strategies…to mobilize party members and other groups to achieve social movement goals” (Almeida 2010b, 174). Therefore, the concept of social movement partyism implies that opposition parties seek to enhance their electoral

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16 Recent studies have focused on the role of opposition parties in explaining political outcomes (e.g., Almeida 2012; Maeda 2010a; Morgenstern et al. 2008).

17 Although less commonly seen, protest mobilization led by the governing party might also take place. In Argentina, Auyero (2001; 2007) reveals that the presence of local Peronist Party organizations played a crucial role in brokering protesters and the police in the food riots and piquetero movement during the 2001 financial crisis. Alvarez-Rivadulla’s (2009) study on Uruguay also shows that the governing Frente Amplio often actively facilitated protest actions in the form of land squatting initiated by the urban poor after it won the presidential election in 2004. Since my dissertation focuses on anti-government protests, the pro-government collective actions and government-led protests are excluded from the analyses.
competitiveness and social movements seek to gain more leverage to affect the policy-making process through forming a party/movement coalition.

Maguire (1995, 203-4) argues that opposition parties and movements may ally with each other in order to exchange organizational, cultural, constituency, and policy resources. In such party/movement coalitions, the opposition parties may develop their social movement partners as their constituency (Almeida 2003, 350; Kriesi 1995). In addition, opposition parties can be more able to exert more influence on policy agenda-setting when the movements help to increase the salience of the related issues (Almeida 2006, 64; Burstein 1999; Goldstone 2004, 343). In turn, such a coalition helps movements to obtain more resources from the parties such as financial support, media visibility, supporters recruiting networks, and the parties’ insider advocates in the legislature to push the movement’s agenda (Ho 2003; Klandermans 1997; Rochon 1988). Moreover, the coalition can help the movements to “increase the likelihood that their investments in organizing result in new advantages and organizational survival” (Almeida 2003, 350).

Cases of coalitions of opposition parties and movements abound. The Green Party of Germany has made tremendous efforts to cooperate with environmental groups in the elections (Frankland 1995, 2008; Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992). Diani (2010, 203) finds that the Groen Links and SP in Netherlands, the Rifondazione Comunista in Italy and the socialist PSOE in Spain played a prominent role in promoting massive anti-war marches. In El Salvador, the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) has coordinated with several social movements to protest against neoliberal economic reforms adopted by the ARENA government since late 1990s (Almeida 2006).

In Bolivia, the crackdown of coca production during the Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) government (1997-2002) coupled with various neoliberal structural reforms
adopted by both the ADN government and later the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) government provided an opportunity for Evo Morales’ Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) to launch popular protest mobilization to exert influence on Bolivia’s politics. The notable protest movements include the coordination of the MAS with the Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida protesting against privatization of water in Cochabamba in 2000 and the protest coalition of the MAS with Central Obrera Boliviana against privatization of natural gas in El Alto in 2003 (Spronk and Webber 2007). Such protest mobilizations not only further weakened the traditional parties but also helped the MAS to gain tremendous support in the 2005 elections (Giulino 2009).

2.2.3 A Theory of Opposition Mobilization Capacity

An opposition party may mobilize protest by itself. An opposition party may also coordinate with certain social movements to mobilize protests for pursuing mutual benefits (Goldstone 2003). However, in multi-party systems, large-scale protest mobilization often requires coalitions of multiple actors. Under what conditions is a large-scale coordinated protest campaign more likely to occur? This study argues that the mobilization capacity of opposition parties is a key factor.

As D’Anieri (2006, 334-5) suggests, the concept of mobilization capacity for a social movement involves “the organizational ability of a movement to persuade people to protest, to coordinate their protest activity, and to offer material support to it.” This concept can be also used for describing the potential of opposition parties for protest mobilization, as I consider opposition parties as rational agents that can strategically coordinate with social movements to mobilize protests for pushing certain political agendas. Opposition mobilization capacity can be
measured in multiple ways. At the individual party level, a party might be more able to mobilize supporters if it has strong and prevalent local party organizations (Ames 1994; Clark 2004; Holbrook and McClurg 2005; Scarrow 1996; Whiteley and Seyd 2003). Arce and Mangonnet (2013) show that the Argentine provinces in which the Peronist Party is in the opposition tend to experience more protests because of the Peronist party’s widespread organizational networks rooted in society. Moreover, Lebas (2011, 27) argues that opposition parties are more capable of mobilizing mass constituencies when they are able to stably secure a certain level of electoral support over time.

Recent empirical studies have shown that the size of opposition parties matter for explaining social protests. In general, a larger opposition camp indicates that the opposition parties received relatively large popular support, and thus this camp should be more able to mobilize their supporters for collective action. Focusing on the anti-privatization protest campaign in Costa Rica and El Salvador, Almeida (2012) shows that a community where the opposition parties receive higher levels of electoral support tends to have a higher level of collective protest. As Almeida contends, these opposition parties might be more able to provide stronger mobilizing capacity for coordinating protests with local social movement organizations.

However, it is possible that when the opposition parties are strong, they might be less likely to mobilize protests. For instance, Boulding (2010) demonstrates that the frequency of protests in Bolivia tends to be lower in the municipalities where the opposition party (in her study, Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) has greater popular support. Boulding (2010, 464) explains that this reducing effect of opposition party on protests suggests that “participation will be channeled into electoral routes if those routes are promising.” Contrary to Almeida’s and
Boulding’s studies, Manukyan (2011) finds that the size of opposition parties (measured as the relative size of seats in the parliament) does not significantly affect post-election protests.

The empirical inconsistencies about the effects of opposition parties’ size suggest that the measure of opposition mobilization capacity might be multi-dimensional. One particularly important dimension of opposition mobilization capacity is opposition unity. Scholars have pointed out that a more united political opposition is an important prerequisite for successful democratic transitions in competitive authoritarian regimes (Baturo 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Howard and Roessler 2006; Oxhorn 1995; Solt 2001; van de Walle 2006). Moreover, in the context of democratic countries, a higher level of opposition unity might affect the electoral fortunes of incumbent parties (Maeda 2010a), raise social expenditures (Le Maux et al. 2011), and delay the passage of bills (Hiroi and Renno 2012). Studies have also shown that the fragmentation of opposition parties contributes to the persistence of the Peronist Party in Argentina (Calvo and Murillo 2012, 155-6) and the Liberal Democratic Party’s dominance in Japan (Maeda 2010b).

Does opposition unity matter for larger and successful protest mobilization? Kuzio (2006) argues that the organization efforts made by the youth movements such as Otpor in Serbia (2000), Kmara in Georgia (2003), and Pora in Ukraine (2004) were crucial to push for democratic revolutions. These movements assisted in the creation of unified opposition blocs that consisted of opposition parties and various NGOs, which had long been divided and ruled by the authorities (Kuzio 2006, 372). Bieber (2003) and Nikolayenko (2013) also indicate that the Serbian democratic movement Otpor has successfully pushed for the unity of the opposition parties and fostered strong ties with different allies to mobilize massive protests against the Milosevic government from 1999 to 2000. Bieber (2003, 86) argues that one important feature
for the civil society organizations that promoted Serbian regime change in 2000 is that they were able to unite the opposition actors that suffered from consecutive internal splits, and the unification of the opposition was “largely the result of intensive pressure by Otpor.” As Nikolayenko (2013, 148) describes:

> Acting as an independent force, Otpor members contrived and frequently chanted a provocative slogan (‘Traitors Are Scum!’) to shame the opposition for its internal factionalism. In the long run, the opposition political parties succumbed to popular demands, agreeing upon a viable presidential candidate from the united opposition.

In contrast, the lack of opposition unity against the government led to the failure of protest mobilization. In November 1996, large-scale protests broke out immediately against the electoral fraud in the municipal elections in Serbia; the protest lasted three months, but it ended because of a split in the movement. As D’Anieri (2006, 340) argues, Milosevic successfully broke the protest movement by co-opting certain opposition elites by “exchanging positions of power for defection from the protest movement.” Moreover, the limited magnitude of the anti-Kuchma protests in 2001 Ukraine was also the result of a divided opposition camp (D’Anieri 2006, 342-3). In late 2000, President Kuchma’s alleged involvement in the death of the opposition journalist Georgi Gongadze had led to large-scale street demonstrations in 2001. However, the protests never grew to the extent that could threaten the Kuchma government. As Kuzio (2005,120) points out, among various fractions of the anti-Kuchma camp, only Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Fatherland Party and Moroz’s SPU supported the street protests led by the grassroots “Ukraine Without Kuchma” movement.
The above literature review suggests that the size and unity of opposition parties are two important dimensions of opposition mobilization capacity. To my knowledge, Manukyan’s (2011) research is by far the only empirical study that uses both dimensions of opposition mobilization capacity—opposition support and opposition unity—to explain social protests. Manukyan finds that while a more united opposition has a statistically significant effect in increasing the odds of protest after fraudulent elections, the effects of opposition size is statistically insignificant. While Manukyan’s study provides important insights about the relationships between opposition parties and protests, it has several limitations. First, it only focuses on post-electoral protests, and thus her findings might not be generalizable to protest activities with broader objectives such as anti-government protests. Second, Manukyan’s statistical model only considers the additive specification of the two opposition mobilization capacity variables. In fact, it is possible that the frequency of collective protests might be a multiplicative function rather than an additive function of opposition size and opposition unity.

Unlike Manukyan’s (2011) research, I build a theory that seeks to explain the frequency of anti-government protests by considering the interaction effects of opposition support and opposition unity. How do the opposition size and opposition unity affect the level of protests? First, I argue that the size of opposition captures the amount of resources that opposition parties are potentially able to mobilize for protests. Second, I argue that the unity of opposition captures the degree to which opposition parties are able to coordinate as a collective actor. My core theoretical intuition suggests that when opposition parties are strong and united, they are more able to mobilize large-scale and well-coordinated collective protest action. In other words, I argue that a large opposition camp helps encourage more large-scale protests only if it is more united.
LeBas (2011, 26) argues that opposition parties with a larger size either indicates that these parties are effective in mobilizing supporters, or indicates high levels of discontent against the incumbent party and has little to do with the strength of opposition parties. Although these two scenarios may be equally possible, both scenarios suggest that when the opposition camp is large, there are more potential resources that opposition parties can mobilize. Such resources may include financial support, staffing, and social networks that can facilitate the opposition camp to organize political campaigns. Moreover, the larger the opposition camp, the more likely that the leaders of opposition parties are able to seek social movement partners with similar goals for cooperation. Therefore, a larger opposition camp suggests a higher probability that opposition parties and social movements will build coalitions for protest mobilization.

However, a large opposition camp does not always guarantee the mobilization of large-scale anti-government protests. What factors help increase the size of protests? The literature of “threshold models” (Granovetter 1978; Lichbach 1995; Schelling 1978) provides some insights. There are two basic assumptions of the threshold model of protests. First, individuals have different thresholds of benefits and costs for joining a protest. Second, as more people join a protest, the likelihood that any protester will be repressed decreases (Karklins and Petersen 1993, 595), and thus it encourages additional people to join the protests, including those with a higher threshold of participating in a protest. Based on these two assumptions, the threshold model suggests that once there are enough people joining the protest, its chance of success would increase and the protest will reach the “tipping point” at which the protest grows continuously and become self-reinforcing (D’Anieri 2006, 334).

Factors that facilitate protest to reach the tipping point vary. For instance, D’Anieri’s (2006) study shows that elites’ defection from the incumbent government is a key factor that
catalyzes more mass protests to reach a tipping point. Moreover, government’s miscalculation of repressing a protest might also trigger further protests. Karklins and Petersen (1993) argue that because the East German communist regime misbelieved that using repression should be as effective as it was in the past, the intense repression on protests in early October 1989 served as focal events that encouraged more people to rally around the issue of police brutality and accelerated the reach of a tipping point.

While there are various factors that can facilitate protests to reach the tipping point, I argue that the unity of the opposition camp is also a crucial factor. A higher level of opposition unity suggests that the opposition parties are more able to coordinate as a collective actor. A united opposition camp might or might not imply that this camp is homogeneous. It is possible that there exist remarkable differences in the constituent parties of an opposition camp. But if these opposition parties are able to establish a relatively unified coalition, these parties are more able to make consistent decisions for organizing political campaigns. Moreover, the opposition unity is expected to “diffuse” to other actors. Specifically, social movement leaders or citizens who are affiliated with each of the constituent parties are more likely to join actions organized by the united opposition camp. In short, a united opposition camp helps accelerate the reaching of a tipping point for large-scale protest mobilizations.

Taking both opposition size and unity into account, my theory suggests that the frequency of protests is a multiplicative function of opposition size and opposition unity instead of the additive specification of these two variables. In other words, whether a large opposition camp is able to mobilize more large-scale anti-government protests depends on how united the opposition camp is. In this sense, a large opposition camp does not necessarily lead to larger protests if the camp is highly fragmented. Protest activities might still occur when the opposition camp is
fragmented, but a high level of fragmentation makes it more difficult for the various groups to coordinate for mobilizing larger collective protests. This coordination problem also makes people skeptical about the possibility of protest success and thus may discourage them from joining the protests. In contrast, a large and united opposition camp indicates that the camp has both sufficient resources and the capacity to coordinate large protests. In this case, the expected probability of a successful mobilization will be higher, and large-scale protests are therefore more likely. In short, based on my theory, the main testable hypothesis for the empirical analyses is that a large opposition camp will encourage more anti-government protests only if the camp is more united.

It is important to note that my theory does not claim that all protests must have something to do with opposition mobilization capacity. In fact, opposition parties might have strong or weak linkages with social movements. When opposition parties and social movements have weak linkages, social protests would still occur, but it is very likely that such protests will tend to be small and localized. When opposition parties and social movements have strong linkages, my theory suggests that a large and united opposition camp can escalate protests. However, it is possible that strong opposition parties might actually help reduce the number of protests. If a camp of opposition parties is large and united, this camp may be more able to make certain policies that reflect their supporters’ demands in a more effective way. In other words, if the opposition camp is large and united, the camp might also focus on the institutional means to channel people’s demands because the camp is more able to achieve political goals by institutional means. Therefore, my theory of opposition mobilization capacity does not totally rule out the possibility that a large and united opposition camp might constrain their supporters from protests by providing institutional channels with better representation quality.
Moreover, my theory does not claim that opposition mobilization capacity is the single most important factor that shapes the patterns of protests in a country. In the quantitative analyses, I test the effects of the opposition mobilization capacity variables against other variables such as the level of democratization, political institutions, and economic performance. In the qualitative analyses, I not only discuss how protests have been shaped by the abovementioned variables, but also discuss how protests are influenced by other variables that are not included in the large-N analyses, such as particular presidents, labor unionization, and state policies (e.g., corporatism and labor laws). These variables are not tested in the large-N analyses due to the unavailability of the cross-national data for these variables. Overall, the major goal of these empirical analyses is to show that, while factors such as economic performance, democratization, and political institutions might influence the frequency of anti-government protests, it is possible that countries in which the opposition camp has strong mobilization capacity are more likely to experience anti-government protests.

2.3 OPPosition mobilization AND PROTESTS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS

In the first section of this chapter, I have discussed the role of parties as agents of political representation and argued that strong parties might be more likely to help citizens to channel their demands through institutional means (e.g., lobbying) rather than extra-institutional means (e.g., street protests). Many previous studies have found that at the aggregate level, a country with strong political parties tends to discourage protest activities, and a country where parties are generally weak tends to experience political representation crises and thus more protest incidence. However, in the second section, I argue that it is necessary to consider whether a party
controls the government as an important political cleavage. Specifically, I contend that, while a strong governing party tends to constrain citizens from anti-government protests, a strong opposition party should have the opposite tendency. Focusing on the size and unity of the opposition camp as two dimensions of mobilization capacity, my theory suggests that a large opposition camp will encourage more anti-government protests only if the camp is more united.

However, it is possible that the effect of opposition mobilization capacity on increasing the number of protests might depend on different socio-economic contexts. In other words, it is possible that a higher opposition mobilization capacity helps to encourage more protests in some countries but not in others. Here I argue that the level of modernization is an important factor that influences the role of opposition parties in mobilizing anti-government protests.

2.3.1 Opposition Mobilization and Protests in Developed Countries

Studies have shown that there is a distinct trend for certain democratic countries becoming “movement societies” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998b) or having “normalization of contention” (Tarrow 2011, 267), in which protest activities are expanding (Dalton 2008, 52; Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 122-3; Norris 2002, 211) and becoming a conventional form of political participation along with lobbying and voting (Meyer and Tarrow 1998a; Rucht and Neidhardt 2002; Tarrow 2011, 111-7). More importantly, several studies have shown that movement societies are particularly common in postindustrial societies (Dalton 2008, 48-52; Soule and Earl 2005).

Why do countries with a higher level of modernization experience more protests? Here I begin with discussion of the description of a movement society. According to Soule and Earl (2005, 346-8), the concept of a movement society suggests four characteristics: (1) the frequency
of protest activities is increasing over time; (2) more different groups are using protest activities as a form of political expression, and more different claims are made; (3) protest activities have become less disruptive over time; (4) the police’s response to protests has become more institutionalized, routinized, and predictable. Focusing on the first two aspects, Rucht and Neidhardt (2002) draw on the insights of differentiation theory to explain why a movement society emerges. The authors argue that, as a society modernizes, it further differentiates certain sectors and structures. Because differentiation processes promote certain interests at the expense of others, social conflicts are more likely to occur (Rucht and Neidhardt 2002, 14). For instance, the impact of labor market differentiation on family relationship has resulted in the feminist movement, and the impact of the globalization of the world economy on nation states has led to immigrant-related movements (Rucht and Neidhardt 2002, 15-6). In short, the social functional differentiation processes in modern societies not only expand social protests but also complicate them.

Rucht and Neidhardt (2002, 20-1) further argue that, because the functional differentiation processes have brought about more new issue areas that go beyond what political parties are able to deal with, the role of parties becomes less influential in citizens’ political life. Instead, more flexible forms of organization such as new social movements (Dalton and Kuechler 1990) and transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), take up parties’ role in mobilization (see also Dalton 2008, 52; Norris 2002, 189-90).

Inglehart (1990; 1997) proposes a cultural explanation, arguing that a deeper modernization process will result in a cultural change from materialism to postmaterialism. The core of postmaterialism is the emphasis on self-expression values, such as social tolerance and life satisfaction, which “involves an inherently antidiscriminatory orientation” and “provides
people with a strong motivation to engage in social movements” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 293). Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 123-5) find that a country with stronger self-expression values tends to experience more protest activities, and one consequence is that “the bureaucratic organizations that once controlled the masses, such as political machines, labor unions, and churches, are losing their grip, but more spontaneous, expressive, and issue-oriented forms of participation, such as joining in petitions and demonstrations, are becoming more widespread” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 294).

Another possible reason for the declining importance of parties as mobilizing agents in highly modernized societies is that the people have more access to gadgets (e.g., mobile phones and laptops) and communication networks (e.g., social media) that help to recruit participants (Carty 2011; Earl et al. 2013; Earl and Kimport 2011; Walgrave et al. 2011). Moreover, people with better-off economic conditions generally have more free time and resources to protest. These factors can help people free themselves of party structures that provide transportation, patronage, coordination, and so on. Hence, since the role of parties and other mobilizing agents becomes less influential in highly modernized societies, it is expected that many citizens tend to actively use protest to affect the policy-making process without being mobilized by traditional mobilizing agents such as political parties.

However, the institutionalization of social protests and the diminishing role of parties in social mobilization do not necessarily mean that parties will no longer engage in protests. In some cases, opposition mobilization capacity does matter for protests, as Cooper (2002) shows that in 1999 the strong opposition party CDU/CSU had successfully launched an influential protest campaign in Germany. In other cases, the role of parties in protests has increasingly shifted from a mobilizer to a bystander. In the 2011 Wisconsin anti-state-government protest
movements, while many protesters were Democrats, the Democratic Party did not actively mobilize in this protest campaign, which was described as “a mix of spontaneity and organizing…led not by a single organization or coalition but rather by a variety of different groups, organizations, and coalitions, not all of which were in contact with one another” (Barrett 2011, 67). It is also possible that large-scale protests could occur without coordination with political parties in some developed countries. One example is the *Indignado* protest movement in 2011 Spain, which “did not have any affiliation with a given political party and included many young individuals who were inexperienced in public affairs, party politics, labor and social movements” (Castañeda 2012, 310). In sum, in a highly modernized society, the effect of opposition mobilization capacity on protests is not clear.

### 2.3.2 Opposition Mobilization and Protests in Developing Countries

There is a trend that advanced industrial democracies become movement societies in which protests are expanding and institutionalizing, but is there a similar trend for developing countries to become movement societies? The answer for Goldstone (2004) is not only yes, but there is even a trend that we are moving toward a “movement world.” Norris’ (2002, 194-200) analyses using individual survey data have shown that there is a rise in street demonstration activism for both new and old democracies, and the patterns for citizens to join protest activities are not very different for advanced democracies and new democracies; that said, citizens in new democracies (as well as semi-democracies in Norris’ study) are as likely as citizens in advanced democracies to engage in protests.

However, in terms of the relationship between opposition parties and social movements, I argue that the level of opposition mobilization capacity matters more for collective protest
activities in the context of developing countries than developed countries. First, in many
developing countries that are also new democracies, protests are less institutionalized as a
conventional form of political participation. Due to the political legacies from the former
authoritarian regime and the lack of democratic learning experiences, citizens in new
democracies are generally less prone to engage in activities that have generally been considered
“unconventional,” such as street demonstrations. For instance, Dalton (2008, 50) observes that:
“Protest lags behind in the former East Germany, where people are still learning their roles as
democratic citizens.” Similarly, Kiel (2012) finds that citizens protest less often in Latin
American countries that have experienced bureaucratic authoritarianism. Moreover, the
responses of the police are less institutionalized, and thus violent repression is often used in post-
authoritarian countries. Jenkins et al. (2008, 15) state that post-communist new democracies
provide limited opportunities for protests because of the prevalent “conservative authoritarian
attitudes among police who are responsible for keeping public order” (see also Reiter 1998).

This implies that the role of mobilizing agents, such as unions and parties, is much more
crucial for protest mobilization in developing countries. In other words, without being mobilized
by these agents, citizens in developing countries might not participate in protests as actively as
citizens in developed countries. This makes more sense if we consider the role of traditional
mobilizing agents in developing countries using the perspective of modernization theories. As
modernization theories suggest, certain social trends such as individualism, secularization, and
suburbanization brought by the modernization process have weakened citizens’ links with
traditional institutions such as political parties, churches, and unions in Western postindustrial
societies (Norris 2002, 23). Thus, it is expected that in a society that is not as modernized as
Western postindustrial societies, citizens’ loyalties to these traditional institutions have not
eroded to a greater extent. More importantly, these traditional institutions still play an important role in providing necessary resources for the economically less-well-off people to solve collective action problems.

In addition, because political parties and social movements in new democracies are not as strong as those in advanced democracies (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005), a strong and united opposition camp is a key for large-scale collective protests. Lebas (2011) shows that many opposition parties and popular movements of some sub-Saharan countries have a greater propensity to coordinate with each other to use more disruptive tactics for protest mobilization in order to sustain their organizational strength. As Almeida (2010b) has shown in his case studies on Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, a stronger opposition camp is more capable of mobilizing larger protests to influence the policy-making process.

My argument does not imply that, without being mobilized by political parties, citizens in developing countries will never go to the streets to protest. However, I do contend that in developing countries, without a strong and united opposition camp, it is expected that the scale, scope, and political impact of the anti-government protests will be limited. In short, I hypothesize that a higher level of mobilization capacity of opposition parties matters more for encouraging anti-government protests in developing countries than developed countries.

### 2.4 SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed why and how political parties matter for explaining anti-government protests. Previous studies have focused on the importance of political parties for the quality of
democratic representation. However, the empirical analyses that use party system fragmentation as an indicator of representation crisis suggest inconsistent findings. Specifically, studies show that a higher level of party system fragmentation might have a positive or negative effect on protests. In short, party system fragmentation might not have clear effects on protests.

However, such inconsistent findings do not necessarily reject the importance of parties for understanding protests. Rather, it is possible that we might focus on the wrong level of the analyses. Thus, I propose an opposition mobilization capacity theory of protests. Assuming that opposition parties can provide resources for encouraging protest mobilization, I emphasize size and unity as important elements for the mobilization capacity of the opposition camp. I contend that in all democratic countries, a larger opposition camp tends to increase the number of anti-government protests only if this camp is more united. In addition, I also argue that the effects of opposition mobilization capacity on protests might depend on different socio-economic contexts among democracies. Specifically, my discussion suggests that a higher level of mobilization capacity of opposition parties matters more for anti-government protests in developing countries than developed countries.

In general, my theory aims to explain how the level of opposition mobilization capacity affects anti-government protests. Clearly, there are many features of anti-government protests, such as frequency, duration, size, geographical coverage, and so on. While it is interesting and important to examine all of these aspects, my large-N quantitative analyses focus exclusively on how opposition mobilization capacity affects the number of anti-government protests, due to the limitation of data availability. However, this does not mean that other features of protests are not important. In fact, I analyze these other protest features in my qualitative case studies. The next chapter discusses the research design for my quantitative and qualitative analyses.
3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter describes the research design of my large-N tests and small-N comparative case studies. In the large-N analyses, I select 107 democratic countries and construct two unique datasets: one is a dataset of anti-government protest events, and the other is a dataset of opposition parties’ electoral performance. I use negative binomial regression to test my hypotheses. The purpose of the large-N studies is to test the generalizability of my theory. In the small-N analyses, I use qualitative methods to compare Peru and Taiwan to examine how the mobilization capacity of opposition parties affects anti-government protest campaigns in the context of new democracies. The purpose of the qualitative comparative case studies is to use a cross-regional perspective to provide a better understanding of party/movement dynamics that goes beyond the large-N analyses.

3.1 LARGE-N TESTS

3.1.1 Case Selection: Democratic Countries around the World

This dissertation focuses on large-scale anti-government protest in democratic countries. There are three aspects of this focus: 1) the scale of protest activities; 2) the anti-government nature of protests; and 3) the context in which the protests take place: democratic countries. For the first
aspect, I focus on large-scale protests for two reasons. First, the data source that I rely on is Reuters, an international mass media organization. As I will discuss later, such media would mostly be interested in reporting large-scale protest events instead of every single protest event. The second reason is that, although small-scale protests can be important, large-scale protests would receive more attention from the government and society, and thus they should be more influential on the political dynamics of a country.

In addition, my focus on anti-government protests does not suggest that protests targeting objects other than the government are unimportant. In fact, social movements such as the anti-pollution movements in 1980’s Taiwan have had a strong impact on political liberalization in the country (Ho 2011). Nevertheless, anti-government protests are perhaps the type of protest that can have more direct and stronger influence on domestic political dynamics in a country. An anti-government protest does not necessarily target the executive. Rather, in my study, anti-government protests are defined as protests that target government agents with different concerns. For instance, an anti-government protest might demand that the government change or maintain a certain policy, request that the president step down, or call for institutional reform.

Last, my focus on anti-government protests in the context of democratic countries does not suggest that anti-government protests in non-democratic countries are unimportant. In fact, the protest waves of the “Arab Spring” in many authoritarian Middle Eastern countries since the end of 2010 have opened a great opportunity for democratic transition in this region (Bellin 2012; Puddington 2012). However, one goal of this study is to examine how opposition parties affect anti-government protests in a systematic way. It will be extremely difficult to gauge the strength of opposition parties in countries without elections or in countries that suffer serious electoral fraud. More importantly, focusing on protests and opposition parties in democracies
facilitates a better understanding of how political parties ally with social movements to affect the political dynamics in a democratic institutional setting.

In the large-N tests, I use quantitative data for anti-government protests and opposition parties in 107 democratic countries from 1990 to 2004 (see Appendix A for the cases included in the empirical analyses). The unit of analysis in the empirical test is the country-year. To ensure that electoral results are relatively reliable for measuring the level of opposition mobilization capacity, a country-year observation is included in the analysis when its Polity IV (Marshall et al. 2011) score is greater than or equal to 5 during the period under study. The national lower house elections in bicameral countries and the elections of the national assembly / congress in unicameral countries are considered. The sample of 107 countries is selected to include a diversity of democratic countries in terms of their levels of development, size, and geographical locations. More importantly, the large-N design facilitates the test of how well my theory can be generalized to different national contexts.

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18 The polity score in the POLITY IV project ranges from -10 to 10 based on the autocracy-democracy scale (see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). The cutoff point of 5 follows Quackenbush and Rudy (2009) and Reich (1999). The Polity IV database lacks entries for the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cape Verde, Grenada, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Suriname (2000-2004), and Vanuatu. However, I include these cases in the analyses because they are categorized as “free” countries by Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org/). I use different cutoff points (Polity IV score of 4 and Polity IV score of 6, respectively) to re-select observations. When setting the Polity IV to 4 as the cut-off point, additional observations of Malaysia (1990-1994), Nigeria (2000-2004), and Papua New Guinea (1990-2004) are included. When setting Polity IV of 6 as the cut-off point, the total number of observations drops to 1,241. The re-estimated results in either sample remain substantively unchanged.

19 I exclude countries that have fewer than one hundred thousand population (e.g., Saint Kitts and Nevis) because these countries receive scant attention from international mass media such as Reuters, the news source that my protest event data rely on.
3.1.2 Data for Anti-Government Protests

For the statistical analyses, I constructed two unique datasets. The first dataset that I constructed is about the **frequency** of *Anti-Government Protests*, operationalized as the annual number of protest events that were initiated by domestic actors against the domestic government in a country. First, I acknowledge that protest events vary in frequency, timing and duration, location, claims, repertoires, targets, sizes, and consequences (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). These properties of protests may be quantified for particular research goals. Due to my research design and theoretical concerns, the statistical tests will exclusively focus on the **frequency** of anti-government protests in a country in a particular year. This does not mean that other properties of protests are unimportant. Instead, I will discuss these other features in my qualitative case studies.

To code the anti-government protest variable, I use King and Lowe’s (2003) 10 Million International Dyadic Events database, which was constructed based on *Reuters Global News Service* from 1990 to 2004. King and Lowe’s dataset has several important features. First, it uses the *Integrated Data for Event Analysis* (IDEA) framework (Bond et al. 2003) to code an event in a “who did what to whom, when and where” manner. Second, it covers about 300 countries/territories/regions and about 250 different types of the events. Third, each event in King and Lowe’s dataset was coded using automated information extraction software developed

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20 King and Lowe’s (2003) database has been increasingly used in recent research on social protests (e.g., Caren et al. 2011a; Jenkins et al. 2012; Meier 2009; Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Ritter and Conrad 2012). The research team led by J. Craig Jenkins at the Ohio State University has relied on this database for their NSF-funded project, *The World Handbook of Political Indicators IV*. (It must be noted that Jenkins’ data look somewhat similar to my data, but in fact they are very different. It is because they have coding procedures that are different to my procedures). A recent article of Özler (2013) published in *Representation* uses Jenkins’ data.
by the Virtual Research Associates, Inc. (VRA). The software extracted the first two sentences in a news report, identified the elements of the IDEA framework, and coded an event accordingly. King and Lowe (2003, 619) argue that this practice is reasonable because it “takes advantage of a common practice in journalism, in which reporters learn to write lead sentences that summarize the key points in their article.” Moreover, to evaluate the performance of the automated information extraction, King and Lowe’s (2003, 627) research team coded a sample of 711 news pieces using the IDEA framework and compared their coding with the work done by the software. King and Lowe (2003, 636) conclude that the performance of the machine and that of human coders are “virtually identical.”

King and Lowe’s data code an event in a “who did what to whom” manner, which permits me to select protest events that are anti-government in nature. An anti-government protest event is retrieved from the 10,252,938 events in King and Lowe’s database if (1) government-related agents are the “whom” and (2) protest activities are the “what.” I do not specify the actors for each protest event count, so that the analysis encompasses as many observations as possible for the empirical analyses and tests the generalizability of my theory. In this sense, my dissertation aims to examine under what conditions large-scale anti-government protests tend to occur, rather than examining under what conditions the opposition parties tend to initiate more large-scale anti-government protests.

The goal of my theory is to explain protests regardless of actors, like many previous studies have attempted to do. For instance, many existing protests studies have observed that protests tend to occur when the national economy deteriorates (e.g., Walton and Ragin 1990) and when party systems are under-institutionalized (e.g., Arce 2010). These studies use event count

protest data that do not take into account who initiated the protests and even do not take into account the protests’ targets. In other words, the data that they use contain protest events that are directly related to economic performance or party systems as well as those that are not necessarily related to economic performance or party systems. Based on their empirical analyses, they claim that the economy matters and/or party system matters for explaining protests regardless of who organized the protests. It is because the aim of these studies is to test theories that capture a general tendency about how economic performance and party system institutionalization affect protests.

It is noteworthy that King and Lowe’s database lacks information for the claims made by the protesters. Clearly, the use of a broader definition of “anti-government protests” in this study does not suggest that such protests aim only to bring down the executive. In other words, such protests may have very different claims and goals, given that they generally target government actors or public policies. The limitation of King and Lowe’s database will inevitably prompt me to amalgamate government-targeted protest events with different claims in my empirical analyses. While conflating anti-government protests with different claims in my statistical analyses might impede a better understanding of how different protest actions were mobilized by specific concerns, it can further understanding of how different factors might influence protests in a general sense. Moreover, I will provide more discussion on the claims and grievances of certain anti-government protests in the cases studies.

Besides King and Lowe’s data, another protest database with worldwide coverage is Banks’ (2005) *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive* (CNTS), which relies on the *New York
Times as source of information. Banks’ database has been widely used by numerous quantitative protest studies (e.g., Arce and Bellinger 2007; Kurtz 2004; Schatzman 2005), but it has also been criticized for its lack of information completeness. For the same sample of countries in my dataset, the total count of anti-government protest events based on King and Lowe’s database (N=5,057) is almost four times the number of collective protests based on Banks’ data archive (N=1,339, the total count of anti-government protests, strikes, and riot events). The correlation coefficient for the protest variables in each database is only 0.37.

There are two possible reasons for the lack of information completeness of Banks’ database. First, unlike Reuters, which has 200 news bureaus worldwide, the New York Times has only 26 foreign news bureaus worldwide. Second, Banks’ database imposes certain criteria for coding protest events, while King and Lowe’s database does not. Given the problematic issues of Banks’ database, I will use the data only for a robustness check of my theories.

Both King and Lowe’s data and Banks’ data must be used with due caution, however. First, scholars have noted problems surrounding the use of newspapers as a source of data on contentious events, particularly the issue about media bias toward disproportionate reporting of certain kinds of events. For instance, studies have shown that factors that determine the newsworthiness of a protest event include the size of the event (Franzosi 1987; Koopmans 1998; 

22 There are other protest databases that have global coverage, such as the widely-used Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. However, since my research aims to study anti-government protests in a broader sense, the MAR database will not be helpful since it covers only data on ethnic-political protest events. Another cross-national time-series protest event dataset that I can use is the Social, Political and Economic Event Database Project (SPEED, http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/research/speed.html). This database contains protest event data for every country from 1945 to 2009 reported by the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, Summary of World Broadcasts, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. However, at the time of writing this manuscript, this database is still under construction. According to my email communication with SPEED’s principal investigator, the released data were generated based on only 12.4% of collected news sources. Moreover, the data for the United States have not been released. Thus, it is problematic to use the preliminary version of the SPEED database for the dissertation.

23 See Nam (2006) for a detailed critical examination of Banks’ database.
24 See http://thomsonreuters.com/content/media/pdf/news_agency_overview.pdf.
26 See Murdie and Bhasin (2011, 174-5) for more comparison of Banks’ database and King and Lowe’s database.
McCarthy et al. 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000) and the level of violence of the event (Barranco and Wisler 1999; Myers and Caniglia 2004). Such biases may be particularly serious for international mass media (Mueller 1997), as many studies have shown that international media tend to report lower protest event frequencies than national and local media (e.g., Hug and Wisler 1998; McCarthy et al. 1996). Therefore, it is expected that King and Lowe’s data mostly capture large-scale protests or protests that occurred at the subnational level that were nationally relevant. Moreover, compared to national or local media, King and Lowe’s data might have less information.

Another potential problem in relying on information from news media is that the media might show a significant “regional bias” in coverage of protest events that 1) occurred in close geographical proximity to the source compiling networks and the targeted information-consuming areas of the media company (McCarthy et al. 1996; Snyder and Kelly 1977), or/and 2) occurred in a location with higher political importance (e.g., the capital city of a state/province) (Oliver and Myers 1999). The regional bias is also commonly seen in international media (Silver 2003), but in a slightly different sense. Specifically, international media often pay more attention to news events that occurred in larger and more strategically important countries (Fenby 1986). The geopolitical bias in protest event reporting suggests that “[international] media sensitivity is directly influenced by the practice of giving news coverage to geographic areas in direct proportion to their positions in the international political economy” (Mueller 1997, 824).

To reduce the selection bias due to location proximity, Franzosi (1987) recommends collecting the parallel “control” data. Based on this idea, Silver’s (2003, 191) study uses two data sources (New York Times and London Times) in order to “counterbalance the regional biases of each source taken separately.” Unfortunately, such practice is not feasible for my research.
It is clear that King and Lowe’s data do not contain information on all protest incidences that have taken place in a country, but do include protest events that are important enough to capture international media attention. Although King and Lowe’s database might underestimate the amount of small-scale protest events, it is sensitive to the anti-government protests that are likely to have greater political impacts. Thus, while the database does not allow me to explore how opposition parties affect the frequency of all protests, it facilitates the analyses about how parties affect the frequency of larger and more important protests.

Ideally, researchers should use as many news sources as possible to construct the database. However, as Silver (2003, 36) points out, this is not only unfeasible but also may have problems of comparability of news sources when “attempting to combine information retrieved from different national sources into a single world indicator.” Moreover, datasets relying on local news source are not necessarily guaranteed to be better than the datasets using international news source (Oliver and Myers 1999). For instance, Sherman’s (2011) study shows that all things equal, local newspapers are less likely to report news about local environmental movements if the county is considered politically conservative.

Another concern with using event count databases is that the analyses assume each event has equal weight without considering the differences in properties such as size, the level of violence, duration, and so on. These properties certainly deserve analytical attention. For instance, a protest event involving 100,000 participants can be very different than a protest event involving 100 participants. However, since King and Lowe’s database and Banks’ database rely on international media, it can be assumed that only the protest events that are important and large enough were coded. Still, there might be protest events that were very influential in a country but did not capture the international media’s attention, but after all, “no data source is without error,
including officially collected statistics” (Franzosi 1987, 7). Moreover, as Franzosi (1987, 7) states, the problem of using event count data may be less severe than expected because researchers risk mostly collecting insufficient rather than faulty information.

3.1.3 Operationalization of Anti-Government Protests

The detailed coding procedure for the number of anti-government protests is discussed as follows. First, unlike many existing quantitative protest event datasets that use a country-year as the unit of analysis, King and Lowe’s database is unique because it comprised of various events, including international and domestic events. The unit of observation, an event, is comprised of the following information in King and Lowe’s database:

(a) the type of the event;
(b) the location where the event occurred;
(c) the date when the event occurred;
(d) the actor who initiated the actions of the event;
(e) the place where the actor belongs to;
(f) the target of the event;
(g) the place where the target belongs to.

To generate the anti-government protest variable using King and Lowe’s databases, I selected the events that I needed for this study and then calculated the number of these events for each country-year observation. First, I kept observations whose (b), (e), and (g) have the same country name and dropped those otherwise. This procedure ensured that the event was done by a
domestic actor to a domestic target in the country that both the actor and the target belonged to. Second, I kept observations if their (a) is a protest event and dropped those otherwise. I considered seven types of events as protest activities defined in King and Lowe’s codebook: sit-ins, hunger strikes, protest demonstrations, picketing, defacing properties for protest, labor strikes, and riots.28 There are certainly other forms of protest, particularly those that are less observable. For example, Scott (1987) argues that, in some contexts, people use “everyday forms of resistance” (e.g., foot-dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false-compliance, pilfering, etc.) as “the weapons of the weak.” Protests can be in a form of collusion with political rivals of a particular government official. Unfortunately, the dataset cannot be used for a detailed study of these hidden forms of protest resistance.

So far the implementation of the first and the second procedures transforms the database into a domestic protest event dataset, regardless of the targets. To ensure that government actors are the object of the protest, I retained observations if their (f) is a domestic governmental target, and dropped observations otherwise. I considered nine types of domestic governmental targets defined in King and Lowe’s codebook: the national executive, the judiciary, legislators, laws, government agents, national government officials, subnational government officials, the military, and the police. After implementing the procedures above, I counted the number of anti-government protest events for each country and coded the dependent variable for my dataset.

28 There is a form of protest called “rally support” in King and Lowe’s dataset. Apparently, it is possible to create a pro-government protest variable from the data by combining “rally support” as the protest type and government-related objects as the protest’s target. However, this variable is excluded from my analyses because this study focuses on anti-government protests.
3.1.4 Patterns of Anti-Government Protests

Based on King and Lowe’s database, the sample statistics of anti-government protest events suggests some interesting characteristics. First, the sample variance (56.2) is much larger than its mean (3.8). Second, the values of Skewness and Kurtosis are 3.69 and 21.58, respectively. While Skewness reveals the direction of the dispersion, Kurtosis measures peakedness in relation to tails. In my case, these measures suggest that the anti-government protest distribution is over-dispersed, positively skewed, and leptokurtic with a long right tail. Table 3.1 summarizes the number and percentage of different categories of anti-government protest events in my dataset. Among the all 5,057 anti-government protest events, protest demonstration is the most common form of protest (31.58%), followed by labor strikes and boycotts (23.43%), picketing (19.44%), and riots (14.42%). Hunger strikes (0.71%), property-defacing protests (4.43%), and sit-ins (5.99%) are less common forms of reported protest.

Table 3.1 Summary of Different Forms of Anti-Government Protest Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms of Protests</th>
<th>Observed Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage of Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sit-ins and other non-military occupation protests</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>5.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest demonstrations that place the protestors at risk for the sake of unity with the target (e.g., hunger strikes)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All protest demonstrations not otherwise specified</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>31.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picketing and other parading protests</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>19.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage, sabotage and the use of graffiti to desecrate for protesting</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>4.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor and professional sanctions reported as strikes or boycotts</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>23.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil or political unrest explicitly characterized as riots</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>14.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Protest Events</td>
<td>5,057</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The total number of anti-government protest events is 5,057.
Figure 3.1 provides a graphical distribution of the count data across time and countries. It shows a distinct feature of the sample, namely a large number of zero counts, which is approximately 46% of the total number of country-year observations. In addition, there is also a high frequency of low anti-government protest activity (values ranging from 1 up to 4), which is approximately 31% of the total number of country-year observations. Figure 3.2 illustrates the annual distribution of anti-government protest events from 1990 to 2004. As can be seen, the data show a clear peak in anti-government protests in 1999 and a declining trend from 1999 to 2004.

Figure 3.1 Distribution of Anti-Government Protest Counts in Percentage

Note: A: 0, B: 1-10, C: 11-20, D: 21-30; E: 31-40; F: 41-50; G: 61-60; H: 61-70.
Table 3.2 shows the number of anti-government protest incidents on a country basis. For the distribution of countries across various anti-government protest ranges, 14% of the democratic countries have no anti-government protest events reported by Reuters in this dataset. Moreover, 31% of the countries have 1 to 10 anti-government protest events reported.
### Table 3.2 Counts of Anti-Government Protest Events across Countries (1990-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Incidents</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Barbados, Cape Verde, Croatia, Estonia, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Saint Vincent, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Suriname, and Vanuatu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>Armenia, Bahamas, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Paraguay, Sao Tome &amp; Principe, Slovakia, Slovenia, St. Lucia, Sweden, Trinidad &amp; Tobago, Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Macedonia, Madagascar, Moldova, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Ukraine, Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>Austria, Bolivia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ireland, Peru, Russia, Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>Albania, Netherlands, Sri Lanka, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Chile, Ecuador, Indonesia, Portugal, Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>Mexico, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-80</td>
<td>Belgium, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-90</td>
<td>Australia, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91-100</td>
<td>Brazil, Japan, Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101-200</td>
<td>Greece, Israel, Italy, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201-300</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Germany, South Korea, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301-400</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401-500</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-600</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.4 compares the annual average number of anti-government protests in different socio-economic contexts. The following 23 OECD countries are included in the sample of developed countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The remaining 84 countries are categorized as developing countries.

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29 This study considers developed countries to be the high-income OECD countries, defined by the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups#OECD_members). I exclude the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, South Korea, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia from the group of developed countries because these eight countries joined the OECD more recently.
Figure 3.3 shows that the developed countries have a higher rate of annual reported anti-government protests (7.2) than the developing countries (2.6). Specifically, the top 6 countries that have the largest reported annual average number of anti-government protests are the United States (37.6), France (28.3), India (20.1), Bangladesh (19.3), the United Kingdom (18.7), and Germany (18.5).

For a robustness check, I also constructed an anti-government protest variable using Banks’ CNTS database, which relies on the information from the *New York Times*. Following Arce (2010b, 675), I constructed this variable by summing the annual count of the following three types of protest activities for a country-year observation: anti-government demonstrations, general strikes and riots. According to Banks’ codebook, the definitions for each of the protest

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30 Without considering the countries that have no annual reported anti-government protests, the average number of anti-government protests for developing countries rises from 2.6 to 3.0.
activity are: a) Anti-government demonstration: “Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature”; b) General strike: “Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority”; and c) Riot: “Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.”

As I have mentioned before, Banks’ (2005) CNTS database has a serious problem of information incompleteness. Similar to King and Lowe’s database, the CNTS database also has a large number of zero counts, but the number is much larger, which is approximately 68% of the total country-year observations. In addition, 17 out of the 107 countries have no anti-government protest events reported by the New York Times in this dataset (approximately 14% of total country-year observations). However, there are many cases in which protest events have been reported by Reuters but not by the New York Times. For instance, the New York Times reported no anti-government protest events for Portugal (1990-2004) and Russia (2000-2004), while the number reported by Reuters for Portugal is 42 and the number for Russia is 23. Other cases show that the New York Times has a serious under-reporting problem. While Reuters’ annual average numbers of anti-government protests for the United States and France are 37.6 and 28.3, respectively, the New York Times’ numbers for these two countries are only 1.9 and 3.4, respectively. However, both datasets show a similar pattern in which the developed countries have a higher frequency of anti-government protests than developing countries.

31 These countries include Bahamas, Benin, Cape Verde, Czech Republic, Estonia, Gambia, Ghana, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Suriname, and Sweden.
3.2 CASE STUDIES

3.2.1 Case Selection: Peru and Taiwan

In addition to the quantitative analyses, I conduct a comparative case study of Peru and Taiwan. There are three reasons for such a case selection. First, both countries have experienced arguably the most radical political change among the new democracies in Latin America and East Asia in recent years. It is interesting that both cases underwent some process of democratization during the time frame of my study (1990-2004), with incumbent turnover around 2000. In Peru, the cycles of democratic breakdowns and returns occurred several times since the end of World War II. The under-institutionalized party system and the rise of populist leaders in the 1990s not only attracted scholarly attention but also provided important lessons for new democracies (Crabtree 2011b; Seawright 2012). Before it had the first party turnover in 2000, Taiwan was ruled by the authoritarian party-state regime led by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) for over half a century. Taiwan’s political change from an authoritarian regime to a multi-party democracy since early 1990s serves an important case for democratization scholars and may even augur a possible path of future democratization for China, the second largest economy in the world (Chu 2012; Tsang and Tien 1999).

Second, I select Peru and Taiwan to examine how opposition parties matter for protest mobilization in developing countries with very different backgrounds. Seawright and Gerring (2008) call such a case selection strategy a “diverse case method,” which requires selection of at least two very different cases for exploring or confirming particular theoretical reasoning. As Falleti and Lynch (2009, 1145) argue, it is important that “[causal] mechanisms must be general enough to be portable across different contexts.” Thus, selecting Peru and Taiwan, two very
different cases, can help examine the “portability” of the causal mechanism of my theory. Moreover, one important advantage of the diverse case selection strategy is that “it has stronger claims to representativeness than any other small-N sample” (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 301). Peru and Taiwan are very different in terms of political parties’ organization strength, party/movement relationships, and scale of anti-government protests. Specifically, Peruvian parties have been generally weaker than Taiwanese parties. Moreover, the party/movement relationship in Peru has been much weaker than that in Taiwan. Also, Peru’s anti-government protests have been generally small in scale and localized in scope, while Taiwan has experienced more large-scale anti-government protests.

Third, these two countries are selected not only because I would like to test whether the same causal mechanism operates in very different contexts, but also because I would like to control for the level of democratization and the size of opposition and to vary the marginal treatment—opposition unity. Both Peru and Taiwan are new democracies. Moreover, the overall opposition size in both countries is large, but the opposition camp in Peru is very fragmented, while the opposition camp in Taiwan is relatively more united. If the causal mechanism of my theory is correct, my qualitative analyses should show that Peru has experienced fewer large-scale anti-government protests than Taiwan.

In short, Peru and Taiwan are two different instances of my theory. Taiwan is an instance that directly supports my theoretical hypothesis that a strong and united opposition camp tends to mobilize more anti-government protests. In contrast, Peru is an instance that shows a large opposition camp that failed to mobilize more anti-government protests because the camp was disunited. While the case of Peru shows a more complicated story about the causal mechanism of
my theory, both cases suggest the importance of considering both opposition size and unity in explaining the frequency of large-scale protests.

3.2.2 Data for Case Studies

For conducting case studies on Peru and Taiwan for this dissertation, I gathered three types of qualitative data: historical documents, news materials from online electronic archives, and elite interviews. To collect the interview data, I conducted two field trips in 2012. The field work plans were under the approval for human subjects review from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of Pittsburgh on September 23, 2011 (ID: PRO11070466). I conducted 18 confidential interviews in Taipei, Taiwan, from February 27 to March 15, 2012. Moreover, I conducted 21 confidential interviews in Lima, Peru, from March 19 to April 10, 2012 (see Appendix B for information about the elite interviews).

In general, there are two approaches for selecting respondents for elite interviews: random sampling (Beamer 2002) and non-probability sampling (Tansey 2007). While random sampling aims to obtain a representative sample and make generalizations from the findings of that sample to the full population, non-probability sampling involves subjective judgment in drawing a specific sample to ensure that the important actors are included in the analyses. Many scholars have argued that random sampling is superior to non-probability sampling, but as Tansey (2007, 769) argues, “that position may only hold if the aim is to extrapolate broader generalizations from the sample to a wider range of respondents.” The goal of my qualitative analysis is to uncover the causal mechanism of my quantitative findings about opposition parties and protests, rather than making generalization from a sample to the full population of political elites. Given the goal of the process-tracing method, I conduct elite interviews to “obtain the
testimony of individuals who were most closely involved in the process of interest” (Tansey 2007, 769). Hence, the use of non-probability sampling is preferable for my qualitative analyses.

For elite interviews that I conducted in Taiwan and Peru, I have interviewed three groups of elites: social movement activists, politicians (including legislators, government officials, and party elites), and intellectuals. In Taiwan, I used the purposive sampling method (Babbie 2013, 190-1) to select interviewees. I first identified important anti-government protest mobilizations that took place from 2000 to 2011. I also searched newspapers and online sources for whether there would be any upcoming protest campaign to be organized, and identified at least two key organizations that would take charge of mobilization. I also identified important DPP legislators and intellectuals with social movement activist backgrounds. Since most social movements in Taiwan have, or used to have, strong ties with DPP, conducting interviews with the activists of these movements might result in very similar answers. Thus, I also conducted interviews with some important organizers of the Red-Shirt Army protests against the DPP administration in 2006, which were comprised of mostly pro-KMT activists and participants. Overall, I confidentially interviewed thirteen social movement activists, three intellectuals, and three DPP politicians in Taiwan.

In Peru, I used both purposive sampling and snowball sampling methods (Babbie 2013, 190-2) to select my interviewees. I contacted a political analyst who used to be a student movement activist and socialist party worker in Peru. After discussing with him, we came up with a reference list for my interview schedule that contained names of important social movement activists, politicians, and intellectuals. Since he had a background as a leftist movement activist, it was possible that these potential interviewees shared similar beliefs and thoughts with him. To avoid such a bias, I asked him to suggest names of elites from right-wing
parties. Finally, I set up a schedule for interviewing 25 elites, but in the end I conducted 21 interviews overall because four of them were unavailable. The confidential interviewees include eight social movement activists, six intellectuals, and seven politicians.

According to the norms of confidentiality approved by the IRB, the elite interview information was initially recorded confidentially but later made anonymously. I first kept the names of my interviewees confidential using a name-to-number system, with the key locked away in a safe place. Then only the assigned number was used in the transcripts that I made of the interviews. When the interviews were complete, I destroyed the key to make the data anonymous. Therefore, in any article or report that I write based on the interview data, I will not be able to quote them using their proper names but with the interview numbers in order to preserve confidentiality.

In addition to qualitative data, I also use some quantitative data to analyze whether opposition mobilization capacity has a positive impact on increasing the number of protests in different historical periods for my case studies. Because King and Lowe’s data cover only protest events from 1990 to 2004, I use additional data from different sources that cover other periods. Because the data sources and the operationalization of protest variables are different, one limitation for the inferences is that it is impossible to compare patterns of protests across different datasets in different periods of time. In other words, the comparison of protests makes sense only within the same dataset.

For the case of Peru 1957 to 1968, I use Sulmont’s (1982, 202-4) labor strike data to measure the number of protests. To my knowledge, Sulmont’s (1982) study is the only one that records data for social protests during this period (although the data are exclusively about labor
strikes). From 1981 to 1990, I use the protest data from Lodola et al. (2009), which operationalizes social protests as the level of protests instead of counts. Moreover, I compiled data based on 71 issues of the Peruvian Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo) monthly report on social conflicts and calculated the average monthly number of collective actions of protests for two periods: one is the period between April 2008 and July 2011 under the García government, and the other is the period between May 2011 and February 2014 under the Humala government.

For the case study of Taiwan, I rely on the data for Assembly and Parade Handled by Police Organizations, compiled by the National Police Agency, Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan. I use the data to construct a variable of the monthly median number of assemblies and parades for three periods: the first is the period between February 2005 and January 2008 under Chen’s second administration, the second is the period between February 2008 and January 2012

32 The reporting source of Lodola et al. (2009) is based on Latin American Weekly Report (http://www.latinnews.com/lwr/archive.asp). In this dataset, the unit of analysis is administration-year, and protest mobilizations are categorized for eight social sectors: public employees, non-public employees, peasants/indigenous people, urban popular sector, middle class, upper class, students/NGOs, and local rebels. Each protest variable is coded as “1” if the social sector launched protest mobilizations in a given administration-year and as “0” otherwise. I constructed an overall protest variable, which sums the values of each protest category in a given administration-year. The value of this variable ranges from 0 (no protest incidence reported) to 8 (all social sectors are reported engaging in protests).
33 The protest data are certainly not perfect because they capture all kinds of protests without differentiating the targets of protests. Still, they are useful given that no other reliable protest data exist in the same period.
34 The Peruvian Ombudsman monthly reports (http://www.defensoria.gob.pe/) began to record information about various social conflicts in Peru from April 2004. However, the reports have undergone changes in how a social conflict is defined and how protest data are coded. I complied the data for my purpose from issue no. 50 (April 2008) because it is the first issue of the monthly reports that clearly codes a collective protest event based on various specific features of an event (e.g., locations, actors, and claims), which allows me to specify whether a protest occurred at the national level or subnational level. At the time of my writing, the latest issue for the Peruvian Ombudsman monthly report was issue no. 70 (February 2014).
35 The data were retrieved from http://www.stat.gov.tw/. According to the data instruction, assemblies and parades coded by the National Police Agency may include four types of protests: protests with political claims (e.g., discontent with particular public policies), protests with economic claims (e.g., fraud in banking services), protests with societal claims (e.g., industrial disputes), and protests with claims about foreign affairs. Due to the data limitation, it is impossible to differentiate these protest activities by different claims.
36 I do not use average number because there were months with extreme values under Chen’s second administration and Ma’s first administration.
under Ma’s first administration, and the third is the period between February 2012 and February 2014 under Ma’s second administration.37

3.2.3 Research Design for Case Studies

The comparative case studies in this dissertation include two within-case analysis chapters for Peru and Taiwan and a comparative case analysis in a section in the conclusion chapter. The comparative case studies not only help illustrate how opposition parties with certain organizational features influence protests, but also provide a cross-regional perspective on the patterns of party/movement dynamics in new democracies. In terms of the research methods for the within-case study, I utilized the method of process tracing (Tansey 2007; Vennesson 2008). The purpose of process tracing is to draw descriptive and causal inferences from the sequential historical process by critically examining qualitative materials to validate the causal mechanism that a theory hypothesizes (Collier 2011).

In each within-case analysis, I use process tracing to discuss party/movement dynamics based on different historical periods of the country. Through process tracing, I not only illustrate my theory’s causal mechanism, but also provide a better understanding of party/movement dynamics that goes beyond the large-N analyses. Specifically, I examine the mechanism by which opposition parties and social movements coordinate protests and the coordination strategies that facilitate large-scale protest mobilization. In addition to the discussion about the effect of opposition parties on protests, I also analyze how protests are influenced by other factors, such as democratization, economic performance, executive-legislative relations, political

37 At the time of my writing, the latest report for the data was for February 2014.
institutions (e.g., corporatist framework), state policies (e.g., corporatist structure and labor laws), political leaders (in both cases, presidents), and labor unionization. These variables are considered contextual factors in which opposition parties work for mobilizing protests.

Some of the variables discussed in the case studies, such as economic performance, do not have a statistically significant effect on protests in the large-N studies. This does not mean that economy is never an important factor for any protest, but that economy might be an important factor for some protests but not for others. Therefore, the purpose of discussing the role of economy for some cases of protests in the case studies is not to reject the finding of the large-N analyses, but to provide a more complete discussion about the conditions under which protests are mobilized. Moreover, some variables, such as political leaders and certain state policies, are not included in the large-N analyses mainly because of data unavailability. Discussing the effects of these variables on protests in the case studies does not mean to challenge the finding of large-N studies. Instead, such discussions help illustrate how popular grievances are processed by movements and parties.\footnote{Given that these variables play an important role in shaping certain party/movement dynamics, the discussion also implies that it is important that future studies should construct these variables for large-N analyses.}

In addition to qualitative narratives, I also use quantitative data to demonstrate the correlation between opposition mobilization capacity and protests in different historical periods. The unit of analysis in such quantitative analyses is an inter-election period. For each observation, I demonstrate data for opposition size, opposition unity, combined opposition mobilization capacity (the product of opposition size and opposition unity), and the annual average or monthly average number of protests. Take the observation of Taiwan (1993-1995) for example. The opposition size and opposition unity were calculated based on the 1992 legislative election in Taiwan. The data for the protest variable were calculated based on the annual average
number of protests for 1993, 1994, and 1995. I will make inferences by focusing on two variables: the interaction of opposition size and unity, and the average number of protests. Using the interaction variable as a proxy for opposition mobilization capacity is intuitive and convenient for my purpose in the small-N analyses. However, it is noteworthy that the interpretation of the effect of this variable in my large-N studies is different. In statistical models, the interaction term is not a true variable, but an artifact that forces relevant linear estimators (in my case, opposition size and opposition unity) to correct the size of their coefficients, conditional on other predictors.

Regarding the within-case analysis for Peru, the first section discusses the emergence of organized social movements and the evolution of the APRA and its changing interactions with social movements. The second section discusses how party/movement relations were shaped by the military regimes (1968-1980). The third section analyzes party/movement relations under the multiparty system in the 1980s. The fourth section focuses on examining the relationship of opposition parties to anti-government protests under Fujimori’s rule in the 1990s. The fifth section discusses how opposition parties are still unable to mobilize large-scale protests due to Fujimori’s legacies and the high level of party system fragmentation. My interview data indicate that, after Peru returned to democracy for the second time since the 1980s, social movements in the 2000s seemed to rise again to some extent, particularly for anti-mining protests, but the lack of a strong and united opposition camp has made the movements fragmented and less influential.

Regarding the within-case analysis for Taiwan, the first section discusses the social and political circumstances under the authoritarian KMT regime, analyzing the evolution of the political opposition from the birth of the Dangwai movement to the building of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. The second section discusses the interactions between the DPP
and social movements from late 1980s to 2000, in which Taiwanese politics had become more open due to Chiang Ching-kuo’s political liberalization and Lee Teng-hui’s democratic reforms. The third section discusses the changing relationships between the DPP and social movements from 2000 to 2014. Taiwan experienced its first party turnover in 2000, when the DPP defeated the KMT and won reelection in 2004. From 2000 to 2008, the social movements that used to have close relationships with the DPP became weakened, as many important activists were incorporated into Chen Shui-bian’s government. The KMT returned to power in 2008, and there has been a surprising resurgence of social movements since then. Although there was a correlation between opposition mobilization capacity and protests, most protests were not mobilized by the DPP because the substantive linkage between the DPP and social movements had been greatly undermined during Chen’s two administrations.

In addition to the two within-case analyses, I utilized the method of structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2004) for the comparative case analysis. This method requires researchers to 1) ask a set of standardized, general questions that reflect the research objective, and 2) deal with certain aspects of historical cases based on well-defined theoretical interests (George and Bennett 2005, 68-72). This method is suitable for my project because I specifically deal with particular aspects of the party/movement cases and ask specific and structured questions that reflect my theoretical focus in elite interviews. In the last chapter of this dissertation, I utilized this method to compare the types of party/movement linkages, the level of anti-government protests, the level of opposition size, the level of opposition unity, and how opposition mobilization capacity affects the level of protests in both countries from 1990 to 2004.
3.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter provided a discussion of case selection, data, and research design for the empirical analyses. The large-N quantitative study adopts quantitative methods (see the next chapter) to test the generalizability of the theory of opposition mobilization capacity on 107 democratic countries. While the quantitative analyses provide evidence about how well my theory can “travel” to different contexts, it cannot provide evidence for the causal mechanism of my theory. Therefore, I conduct qualitative case studies of Peru and Taiwan by adopting process-tracing and structured, focused comparison methods. It is noted that while the qualitative analysis helps uncover the causal mechanisms of opposition parties and anti-government protests, it is not used for testing the generalizability of my theory.
This chapter presents a statistical test of my theory using a global sample. I first discuss the operationalization of the explanatory variables and control variables for the empirical tests. Next, I discuss the estimation techniques and statistical procedures that I employ on the data. Third, I statistically examine the effects of opposition mobilization capacity on anti-government protests in different political settings. I estimate models on data for all democratic countries, then I estimate models on data for developed countries and developing countries, respectively. The statistical results suggest that opposition mobilization capacity matters but depends on certain contexts. For the global sample, I demonstrate that a large opposition camp tends to encourage more anti-government protests only if the camp is more united. However, the effects of opposition mobilization capacity work differently in developed countries and developing countries: I find that a large and united opposition matters for encouraging more protests in developing countries rather than developed countries. Overall, the large-N analyses provide strong support for my theory.
4.1 OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES

4.1.1 Variables of Opposition Mobilization Capacity

The major explanatory variables of this study pertain to the mobilization capacity of opposition parties. For the purpose of the analyses, an opposition party is defined as a party that does not control or share the executive power. In parliamentary systems, an opposition party is a party that was not included in the cabinet. In presidential systems an opposition party is a non-presidential party, or a non-presidential party that was excluded from a coalition government formed by the president. In semi-presidential systems, opposition parties are those that are not the presidential party or the parties in the cabinet.

Opposition mobilization capacity is measured using three variables. The first explanatory variable is *Opposition Size*, measured as the vote share of opposition parties. The second explanatory variable is *Opposition Unity*, measured as the inverse value of the effective number of opposition parties (Maeda 2010a), which is calculated as:

\[ U = \sum (Ov_i / \Sigma Ov)^2 \]

where \( U \) is the degree of opposition unity, \( Ov_i \) is the vote share of the \( i^{th} \) opposition party, and \( \Sigma Ov \) is the sum of all opposition parties’ vote share in the election. The upper bound of \( U \) is 1, indicating that the opposition camp is fully unified as a single opposition party. The more that \( U \) approaches 1, the more united the opposition is. In this sense, a very fragmented party system should have a small value of \( U \). For instance, \( U \) is 0.1 for a country with 10 effective opposition parties, \( U \) is 0.2 for a country with 5 effective opposition parties, and \( U \) is 0.5 for a country with
2 effective opposition parties. The third explanatory variable is a multiplicative term of the first two variables: *Opposition Size*\*\*Opposition Unity. Based on my discussion, this variable should have a positive and statistically significant effect, indicating that the size of the opposition will have a greater influence on anti-government protests as the opposition is more united.

As I have discussed in the theoretical section, however, I contend that the role of opposition parties in mobilizing protests should be more important in developing countries than in developed countries.\(^\text{39}\) For the sample of developing countries, I expect that the conditional effect of *Opposition Size* on anti-government protests should be positive and statistically significant as the level of *Opposition Unity* increases. In contrast, for the sample of developed countries, I expect that the conditional effect of *Opposition Size* on anti-government protests should be statistically insignificant at different levels of *Opposition Unity*.

In general, the values of the three opposition mobilization capacity variables for a country vary by election cycle instead of by year. For two kinds of cases, the values of the mobilization variables might change within an electoral cycle: 1) when a presidential democracy has a non-concurrent schedule for legislative and presidential elections; and 2) when a parliamentary democracy experiences a change in the partisan composition of the coalition government within an electoral cycle. Last, since opposition mobilization capacity and protests might affect one another in an election year, I use lagged electoral data to construct the independent variables to account for possible endogeneity with the dependent variable. For instance, the values of the opposition mobilization capacity variables calculated using Mexican legislative election in 2000 are assigned for the observations of Mexico-2001, Mexico-2002, and Mexico-2003. This

\(^{39}\) The following 23 countries are included in the sample of developed countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The remaining 84 countries are categorized as developing countries.
procedure ensures the avoidance of reciprocal causality between opposition mobilization capacity and anti-government protests and thus helps to address the issue of endogeneity.\(^{40}\)

The data that I use for constructing opposition mobilization capacity variables are about the electoral performance of opposition parties in democracies. The electoral data are from the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s PARLINE Database on National Parliaments (http://www.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp), Adam Carr’s Election Archive (http://psephos.adam-carr.net/), the data archive of the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/ea.htm), the African Election Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/cf.html), the European Election Database (http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/), Bochsler (2010), Doring and Manow (2012), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (1999), and Nohlen et al. (2001).\(^ {41}\)

Clearly, the measures of opposition size and opposition unity have limitations and cannot be considered perfect measures of opposition mobilization capacity. For instance, it is preferable to consider all parties appearing on the ballot in a country to measure opposition size. However, because most available election results cluster parties/independents that received very few votes under a residual “other parties” category, I restrict the measure of opposition mobilization capacity to only the parties that received at least 0.5% of the vote. I do not consider independent candidates because this study mainly focuses on examining how opposition parties affect anti-government protests. However, it is possible that in certain countries the independent politicians are also able to mobilize anti-government protests. Moreover, it is common that certain political

\(^{40}\) There are other possibilities of endogeneity in the empirical analyses, such as spurious causation. I will discuss these issues in the following sections.

\(^{41}\) I use data on legislative seats for countries where vote data are unavailable; these countries include Benin (1999 election), Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau (1999 election), Haiti, Madagascar, Niger (1995, 1996, and 1999 elections), and Solomon Islands.
parties have organized factions (Morgenstern 2001). However, the measure of opposition unity in this dissertation considers only the number of opposition parties in the election and does not consider factions within parties. Thus, for certain countries, the measure of opposition unity might be overestimated.

4.1.2 Control Variables

To jointly test my theory, I include several variables based on existing explanations. First, I include Party System Fragmentation\(_{t-1}\) in the model, measured as the index of the effective number of parties (ENP) based on vote data for national legislative elections (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The data are mainly from Gallapher and Mitchell (2008), coupled with my own calculation for several missing observations in Gallapher and Mitchell’s dataset. In addition, I include three dummy variables for Parliamentary System, Proportional Representation System, and Leftist Government,\(^{42}\) relying on the data from Beck et al (2003). PR system is coded 1 if the majority of legislative seats are elected using a PR system, and 0 otherwise. To take into account the possible effects of temporal dimensions on protests, I include two dummy variables: General Election Year and Honeymoon Year (the year after the general election year).

Previous studies have argued that the national economy and democratization matter for explaining protest occurrence. The effects of short-term economic impacts on protests are captured by GDP Growth\(_{t-1}\) and Inflation\(_{t-1}\). Inflation\(_{t-1}\) is operationalized as the logged value of the inflation rate for the year prior to the election year. The logged inflation rate is used for

\(^{42}\) Another relevant variable about elite allies is the seat share of opposition party members in the legislature. I do not include this variable in the model because of its high collinearity with opposition size, which is measured using vote share. However, including the seat share variable in the model does not significantly alter the results.
preventing hyperinflation cases from skewing the results. Following Kurtz and Brooks (2008), I assign 1 to observations with deflation or with an inflation rate lower than 1. To control for the possibility that a higher level of economic development helps provide more resources for protest mobilization, I include \( GDP \) per capita\(_{t-1} \). The data for these three economic indicators are from the World Economic Outlook Database of the International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm).

*Freedom House Index*\(_{t-1}\) is included to control for the possibility that a higher level of democratization would encourage more protests. Freedom House rates the degree of political rights and civil liberties in most countries in the world. Scores for the two dimensions range from 1 to 7, with 7 representing the least freedom. I use Freedom House Index data from Finkel et al. (2007), in which the Index is constructed by subtracting the sum of the two scores from 15. Thus, the value of this variable ranges from 1 to 13, with higher values indicating a higher level of democratization. 43 Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for variables used in the empirical analyses.

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43 Some countries have a very low value on the Freedom House Index\(_{t-1}\) (not free) but a high value of Freedom House Index\(_{t}\) (free). There are only four observations with the value of Freedom House Index\(_{t-1}\) lower than 5: Haiti-1994, Panama-1990, Niger-1999, and Romania-1991. Excluding these observations from the statistical tests does not substantively alter the results.
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Empirical Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Government Protests</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Size</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Unity</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party System Fragmentation&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary System</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional Representation System</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist Government</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Election Year</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honeymoon Year</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-30.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged Inflation&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged GDP Per Capita&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House Index&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of observations for all variables is 1,335.

4.2 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES

The major empirical test of this study utilizes negative binomial regression to test the theoretical hypotheses about anti-government protest events. Due to the type of distribution and the nature of my dependent variable, it is not appropriate to estimate an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression because the distribution of events is skewed and discrete, which produces errors that are not normally distributed or homoskedastic (Long 1997).

For the event-count data, it is necessary to employ either a Poisson regression model or a negative binomial (NB) model because these models fit the number of occurrences of an event using maximum likelihood estimators. I choose to use the NB estimator rather than Poisson because summary statistics show that the variance of my dependent variable (56.2) is much larger than its mean (3.8), which suggests that the data are overdispersed and the use of NB
regression is a more appropriate estimation technique than Poisson regression (Greene 2012, 805-7; Long 1997, 236-8).

There are several methodological routines that can help produce more robust estimates for my model. Below I will explain why I adopt some routines but not others. First, because my data include multiple observations from the same country over time, observations within countries might not be truly independent. Hence, I employ Huber/White/sandwich robust variance estimators (clustered by country) to obtain robust standard errors for each model.

Moreover, some previous studies have recommended including country dummies to specify a country fixed-effects model to deal with the effects of unobserved factors specific to a particular country (e.g., Garrett and Mitchell 2001). I do not include country dummies in my model because doing this might yield problematic estimates for my unbalanced data, which have a large number of panels but limited temporal range (Arce 2010b, 677). As Plümper et al. (2005, 333, emphasis in original) suggest, “(i)f either a level effect of at least one variable or a time invariant variable of theoretical interest exist, the inclusion of country dummies is problematic because it suppresses the level effects.” The inclusion of country dummies for panel data often does more than address omitted variable bias as it also ignores the potential effects of time invariant independent variables (e.g., parliamentary/presidential system) on variation in the dependent variable, and more importantly, “unit dummies completely absorb differences in the level of independent variables across units” (Plümper et al. 2005, 331, emphasis in original). Elaborating the second point, Plümper et al. (2005, 334) argue that if one hypothesizes that the level of the independent variable has an effect on the level of the dependent variable, “one should not include unit dummies...[because] allowing for a mild bias resulting from omitted variables is less harmful than running a fixed effects specification.” Since I posit that the level of
opposition mobilization capacity has an effect on the level of anti-government protest, it is clear that a fixed effects model or the inclusion of country dummies might not be justifiable for my data.

Last, some previous studies have recommended including a lagged dependent variable to account for serial correlation (Beck and Katz 1996). However, in this study I do not include a lagged dependent variable and year dummies in the model for both methodological and theoretical reasons. First, I have conducted an Arellano-Bond test of autocorrelation (Arellano and Bond 1991) on my models, using Stata’s _abar_ module. I cannot use Stata’s _ac_ module for testing autocorrelation because my data structure has unbalanced panels; to my knowledge, _abar_ is the only way to test autocorrelation of the dependent variable for unbalanced panel data. For each of the empirical models, the test for AR(1) did not reach statistical significance. This indicates that autocorrelation should not be a problem for my statistical analyses. Therefore, it might not be methodologically necessary to include a lagged dependent variable in my models. Second, as Plümper et al. (2005, 335-6) argue, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and year dummies might cause serious bias under certain situation. In particular, Plümper et al. (2005, 339) show that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is likely biased upwards “if at least one of the independent variables exerts a persistent effect on the dependent variable.” Moreover, when including the lagged dependent variable and year dummies, the trend in the dependent variable will be largely captured by these theoretically uninteresting variables. In other words, the inclusion of these variables will leave little variance for the other theoretically relevant explanatory variables (Huber and Stephens 2001, 59).

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44 Huber and Stephens (2001, 60) further argue that the high correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the dependent variable is a result of the fact that both share a variety of causes for a country, and thus “a large part if not most of the extremely high coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is spurious. This problem is further
4.3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table 4.2 reports the results for four negative binomial models. Model 1 includes only the two explanatory variables of the theory of opposition mobilization capacity without the interaction term, while Model 2 specifies a model that includes the interaction term and the component variables. Model 3 included all independent and control variables without the interaction term, while Model 4 specifies a full model by including all the explanatory variables, control variables, and the interaction term. Regarding the effect of opposition mobilization capacity, the results in Model 2 show that the coefficient of the multiplicative term $\text{Opposition Size} \times \text{Opposition Unity}$ is positive and statistically significant. After including all the control variables, the coefficient of this interaction variable in Model 4 is still positive and statistically significant. This finding supports the hypothesis of opposition mobilization capacity, suggesting that the effect of opposition size on mobilizing more protests is stronger when the opposition parties are more united. In other words, the finding demonstrates that the frequency of anti-government protests is a multiplicative function of the size and unity of the opposition parties.

aggravated by the fact that measurement errors in the dependent variable within a country between years are certainly correlated."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition size</td>
<td>0.014*</td>
<td>-0.034**</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.043***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition unity</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-6.039***</td>
<td>-0.452</td>
<td>-6.167***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.968)</td>
<td>(1.597)</td>
<td>(0.735)</td>
<td>(1.747)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opp. size*Opp. unity</td>
<td>0.130***</td>
<td>0.131***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party system fragmentation</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.104*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
<td>(0.280)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary system</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.190)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General election year</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.132</td>
<td>-0.160*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honeymoon year</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House index</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.309***</td>
<td>-0.318***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (ln)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (ln)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.548***</td>
<td>0.519***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>2.964***</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>2.371*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.515)</td>
<td>(0.622)</td>
<td>1.170</td>
<td>(1.413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi-square</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>15.61</td>
<td>57.86</td>
<td>82.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; Chi-square</td>
<td>0.1419</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard error in parenthesis; *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.1

The results in Model 1 suggest that a country with a larger opposition camp tends to experience more anti-government protests, while the variable of opposition unity does not have a statistically significant effect. In Model 3, both variables of opposition size and opposition unity do not reach statistical significance after the control variables are included in the model. In addition, the results in both Model 2 and Model 4 show that the coefficients of both *Opposition Size* and *Opposition Unity* are negative and statistically significant. The interpretation of these results is less straightforward because of the inclusion of the interaction term. Technically, the
coefficient of Opposition Size suggests that a positive change of Opposition Size has a negative effect on protests when Opposition Unity equals zero, while the coefficient of Opposition Unity indicates that a positive change of Opposition Unity has a negative effect on protests when Opposition Size equals zero. A more substantive interpretation of the results suggests that a country with a very small opposition camp tends to experience fewer anti-government protests as the camp becomes more united. Moreover, a country with a very disunited opposition tends to experience fewer anti-government protests as the camp becomes larger.

In Model 4, the results show that the coefficient of Party System Fragmentation,\(_t-1\) is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that a country with a fragmented party system would experience more anti-government protests. This finding supports Arce’s (2010) thesis of representation crisis that more protests tend to be associated with a lower level of party system institutionalization. Second, I find that a country that adopts the PR system for electing the majority of legislative seats tends to experience fewer anti-government protests. This finding supports the argument that the institutions that are better able to ensure the representation of political minorities would discourage the political elites of these minority groups from mobilizing protest activities to pursue political goals (Bhasin 2008).

Third, GDP per capita,\(_t-1\) has a positive and statistically significant effect on protests. This result indicates that a country with a higher level of economic development tends to experience more protests. Fourth, Freedom House Index,\(_t-1\) has a negative and statistically significant effect on anti-government protests, indicating that, among democracies, a country with a higher level of democratization is likely to experience fewer anti-government protests. This result contradicts Goldstone’s finding that more democratization encourages more protests, but it supports Hipsher’s (1996; 1998) argument that a country with a higher level of democratization provides
more institutionalized channels for articulating popular demands and thus discourages anti-government protests. Fifth, the results show that not all the electoral cycle variables have statistically significant effects on anti-government protests. The frequency of anti-government protest activities tends to be fewer in the general election year, but not particularly higher or lower in the first year of the new government (Honeymoon Year). Sixth, the coefficients of some institutional variables, such as Parliamentary system and Leftist government, do not reach statistical significance.

Surprisingly, none of the indicators regarding short-term national economic performance (i.e., GDP growth and inflation rate) attain statistical significance. This suggests that the frequency of anti-government protests is not greatly influenced by national economic performance, at least in my data. Following Oberdabernig (2013), I construct a dummy variable for hyperinflation (defined as an inflation rate above 50%) and a dummy variable for deflation (defined as a negative inflation rate) for indicating economic crisis. I include these two variables in the model, and the results show that these variables do not attain statistical significance; the results of other variables remain largely unchanged.

45 Re-estimated results do not change much when models include economic data from the World Bank.
46 Unemployment is another economic variable that can influence the number of protests. However, this variable is not used because of a large amount of missing unemployment data. Moreover, in many developing countries, unemployment data “mask much higher levels of structural underemployment, and they are not a reliable indicator of short-term fluctuations in economic performance” (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, 580).
Table 4.3 Conditional Coefficients of Opposition Size at Different Levels of Opposition Unity (Model 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Opposition Unity</th>
<th>Conditional Coefficient of Opposition Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.030***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-0.017*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.023**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.062***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.075***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.087***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.1

One important implication of my theory is that a large opposition camp is insufficient for encouraging large-scale anti-government protests unless this camp has a higher level of unity. In other words, if my theory holds, I expect that a larger opposition camp will not always encourage more protests, but only helps when the camp is united. However, how united does an opposition camp need to be to mobilize more protests? Merely looking at the results in Table 4.2 does not help answer this question. Instead, a marginal effect analysis will illustrate this and provide a better interpretation of the results about the interaction term of the two opposition mobilization capacity variables.

The value of the coefficient for the interaction term indicates how the relationship between the number of protests and opposition size varies at different levels of opposition unity.
Based on the results of Model 4, Table 4.3 presents the coefficients of this relationship for a low level of unity (the effective number of opposition parties equals 10) to the highest level of unity (the effective number of opposition parties equals 1). Moreover, Figure 4.1 demonstrates the marginal effects of a one-unit increase in the size of the opposition camp on anti-government protests at different level of opposition unity.

Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 exhibit very interesting patterns that cannot be seen in Table 4.2. First, the marginal effect of opposition size on protests is negative when the opposition camp is very fragmented (e.g., the effective number of number of parties is larger than 5). While this finding is
somewhat surprising because it suggests that a larger opposition camp will in fact more likely demobilize anti-government protests when the camp is particularly disunited, this unusual result is not supported by many observations in my dataset. In fact, there are only 4% of observations with an opposition unity score lower than 0.15. In contrast, the marginal effect becomes positive and statistically significant when there are fewer than 2.5 parties in the opposition camp (i.e., the opposition unity score is larger than 0.4). This finding suggests that a larger opposition camp can help mobilize more protests only when it reaches a high level of unity. Overall, the results of Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 suggest that whether a larger opposition camp can facilitate more protests depends on the level of opposition unity.

So far I have presented the statistical results of the negative binomial model on my data and the analyses of marginal effects of the opposition mobilization capacity variables on anti-government protests. However, the coefficients of the negative binomial regression are difficult to interpret because of the log-linear nature of the negative binomial regressions. The marginal effect analyses indicate only when the conditional effect becomes statistically significant at a particular value of the conditioning variable. To get a sense of the substantive influence of opposition mobilization capacity, Table 4.4 presents the predicted number of anti-government protests derived by exponentiating the sum of the product of each independent variable’s estimated coefficient and a chosen value based on the results of Model 4, with the value of the other independent variables at their mean. The predicted counts of Anti-Government Protests are computed for different levels of Opposition Size and different levels of Opposition Unity. I set the small, medium, and large opposition sizes to indicate that the entire opposition camp obtains 35%, 50%, and 65% popular support, respectively. The low, medium, and high levels of opposition unity are set 0.2, 0.5, and 1; put differently, these three levels of opposition unity
indicate that the opposition camp is comprised of 5, 2, and 1 effective opposition parties, respectively.

Table 4.4 Predicted Number of Anti-Government Protests for Different Levels of Opposition Mobilization Capacity in Democratic Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of Opposition Unity</th>
<th>Sizes of Opposition Camp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (0.2)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (0.5)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (1)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Predicted numbers of anti-government protests are derived by exponentiating the sum of the product of each independent variable’s estimated coefficient and a chosen value based on the results of Model 4. The values of the rest of the independent variables are at their mean.

As Table 4.4 clearly demonstrates, there is great variation in the number of anti-government protests in different scenarios. Specifically, when there are five effective opposition parties in a country (low level of unity), the expected number of anti-government protests tends to decrease as the size of the opposition camp increases. The lesson here is that anti-government protests take place even when the opposition camp lacks resources and coordination because citizens lack quality representation agents for channeling their demands. One possible explanation is that large-scale anti-governments would be coordinated by non-party actors such as social movement organizations when the opposition parties are weak and fragmented. Thus, this finding supports the thesis of representation crisis to some extent.

However, when there are two effective opposition parties in the country (medium level of unity), the expected number of protests almost doubles as the size of the camp changes from small-sized to large-sized. A more dramatic result can be seen when the opposition camp reaches the highest level of unity. Holding other variables constant, when there is only one opposition party that captures 35% of the vote, the expected number of anti-government protests is about
0.7. However, when the opposition party captures 65% of the vote, the expected number of protests increases to 10.1.⁴⁷ Another way to interpret the results is that for a large opposition camp that comprises of 5 opposition parties, the predicted number of anti-government protests is 1.6, while the predicted number of protests increases to 3.1 when there are only 2 opposition parties. When there is only one opposition party that captures 65% of popular support, the predicted number of protests increases to 10.1. Overall, the evidence supports the theory of opposition mobilization capacity, suggesting that a larger opposition camp is more able to foster more protests only when it is more united.

4.4 ROBUSTNESS CHECK (I): SENSITIVITY TESTS

To check the robustness of the results regarding opposition mobilization capacity, I conduct extensive re-estimations using different operationalizations of the important variables and adopting different estimation techniques. Table 4.5 shows re-estimated results of three alternate model specifications. Recall that the opposition mobilization capacity variables included in the empirical tests are constructed based on electoral results of parties that received more than 0.5% of the vote. To test whether the statistically significant result of Opposition Size*Opposition Unity is driven by this specific operationalization, I re-construct Opposition Size and Opposition Unity by considering all of the vote share that is not captured by the governing party or parties. Given that most electoral data lump tiny parties and independents into an “Other” category, I

⁴⁷ It is necessary to reemphasize that these are simulated results based on a chosen value for opposition size and opposition unity. In my dataset, when the opposition camp has only one party (i.e., the unity score equals 1), the observation with the smallest opposition size captured 23.5% of the vote, and the observation with the largest opposition size captured 54.6% of the vote.
consider this Other category as another opposition party. The estimated results using the reconstructed explanatory variables remain virtually unchanged (Model 5).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 5 (NB)</th>
<th>Model 6 (NB, CNTS data)</th>
<th>Model 7 (Ordered Probit)</th>
<th>Model 8 (ZINB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Count Stage (NB Model)</td>
<td>Inflation Stage (Logit Model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition size</td>
<td>-0.027**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.037***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition unity</td>
<td>-6.517***</td>
<td>-2.520*</td>
<td>-2.119**</td>
<td>-4.566***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.758)</td>
<td>(1.303)</td>
<td>(0.961)</td>
<td>(1.697)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opp. size*Opp. unity</td>
<td>0.121***</td>
<td>0.053*</td>
<td>0.042*</td>
<td>0.107***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party system fragmentation, t-1</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.064**</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>-1.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary system</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.265</td>
<td>-0.229</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.310)</td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>(0.276)</td>
<td>2.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR system</td>
<td>-0.788***</td>
<td>-0.316</td>
<td>-0.398***</td>
<td>-1.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.277)</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td>-2.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist government</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>0.208*</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>-0.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General election year</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>-0.175**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honeymoon year</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>-0.961***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House index, t-1</td>
<td>-0.310***</td>
<td>-0.291***</td>
<td>-0.199***</td>
<td>-0.186***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>2.091*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth, t-1</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation, t-1 (ln)</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.158*</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>-0.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, t-1 (ln)</td>
<td>0.518***</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.416***</td>
<td>0.368***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>-2.318**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.887</td>
<td>1.150</td>
<td>1.983</td>
<td>-3.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.349)</td>
<td>(1.112)</td>
<td>(1.263)</td>
<td>(7.793)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τ1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τ2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τ3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.501</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τ4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.064</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τ5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τ6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.558</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>τ7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi-square</td>
<td>94.59</td>
<td>61.76</td>
<td>68.81</td>
<td>61.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; Chi-square</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard error in parenthesis; *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.1
In addition, I conduct a test using different data to check whether my results are driven by the use of King and Lowe’s database. As I mentioned before, Banks’ CNTS database is another available protest dataset with worldwide coverage, but this database has a serious limitation because of its lack of information completeness compared to King and Lowe’s data. Still, I re-estimate my model using a new dependent variable measured using Banks’ data. The new anti-government protest variable is constructed as the total count of anti-government protests, strikes, and riots coded in Banks’ database. The results in Model 6 show that Opposition Size*Opposition Unity has a positive and statistically significant effect on anti-government protests, suggesting that the results for opposition mobilization is robust even to different data.

To further check the robustness of my theory, I use another way to operationalize my dependent variable and adopt a different estimation method. I transform my dependent variable and conduct an ordinal regression analysis. Here the dependent variable is recoded 0 if the observation has no anti-government protest events, 1 if the number of protests ranges from 1 to 10, 2 if the number of protests ranges from 11 to 20, 3 if the number of protests ranges from 21 to 30, 4 if the number of protests ranges from 31 to 40, 5 if the number of protests ranges from 41 to 50, 6 if the number of protests ranges from 51 to 60, and 7 if the number of protests ranges from 61 to 70. I employ an ordered probit model on the new dependent variable. As can be seen, the results for opposition mobilization capacity in Model 7 do not change much. Overall, this section shows that my theory is supported by empirical evidence across different model specifications and different estimation methods.

In addition to the standard NB model and ordered probit model, I also estimate a zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB) for the purpose of a robustness check. It is possible that the zeros in my protest event count dataset might be divided into two types: the first type
indicates that a country indeed did not experience anti-government protests in a given sample, but the count of protests might be positive in another period; and the second type indicates that a country that never experiences any anti-government protests at all by nature because of country characteristics such as a small population or particular cultural factors. If both groups are present in a sample, estimating a Poisson or Negative Binomial model would overestimate the theoretical probability of zero (Drakos and Gofas 2006, 81). The standard Poisson or NB models assume that each country has a positive probability of experiencing an anti-government protest.48

For this study, the ZINB regression model combines 1) a logit model that predicts the probability of being a country that never experiences anti-government protests (inflation stage), and 2) a negative binomial model that predicts the expected number of anti-government protests (including zero) in a country (count stage). I include the same covariates in the inflation equation that appear in the count equation of the ZINB model. The interpretation of the results for each equation is different. A positive/negative coefficient of a variable in the count stage (negative binomial model) indicates that this variable has an impact on increasing/decreasing the number of anti-government protests in a country. Second, a positive coefficient of a variable in the inflation stage (logit model) indicates that the impact of this variable increases the likelihood that a country never experiences anti-government protests; in other words, the positive/negative coefficient in the inflation stage decreases/increases the likelihood of the presence of anti-government protests in a country.

48 It might be true that every country in the world would experience protest activities, regardless of the targets. But it is possible that large-scale anti-government protest activities are not possible in certain countries—or at least are not possible to be reported by Reuters—by nature because of country characteristics such as a small population or particular cultural factors. This claim does not rule out the possibility that these countries might have experienced smaller scale anti-government protests or protests that were against targets other than the government.
In general, the coefficients of a variable should have opposite signs in the count stage and the inflation stage of a ZINB model. In other words, if a variable has a positive coefficient in the count stage, it should have a negative coefficient in the inflation stage. However, this is not necessarily the case. For instance, a variable can have a positive effect on increasing protests, but it can have no effect on the likelihood of protest incidence. Moreover, it is possible that a variable has the same sign in each stage of a ZINB model. For instance, Pevehouse (2004) finds that trade interdependence may increase the probability of international conflict (a negative sign in the inflation stage of the ZINB model), but restrain the frequency of that conflict (also a negative sign in the count stage of the ZINB model).

In this dissertation, my theory mainly concerns why some countries have more (or fewer) anti-government protests than others and does not focus on why certain countries never experience protests. Thus, I will focus on discussing the results of the count stage of the ZINB.

Model 8 is a ZINB model that estimates the effects of the explanatory variables on 1) the absence of anti-government protests, and 2) on the count of anti-government protests in a single model by combining a logit distribution (inflation stage) with a negative binomial distribution (count stage). While the results in the inflation stage might show interesting information, it is only the negative binomial regression that provides a test of my hypotheses, because the explanations tested in this study mainly concern the frequency rather than the absence (or presence) of anti-government protests in a given country. Thus, my analytical attention will consequently focus on the results of the count stage.

The results for many variables in the count stage of Model 8 are similar to the results for Model 4. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the findings about party system fragmentation, PR system, the level of
democratization, and the level of economic development are consistent with the results for Model 4. As I have mentioned before, the interpretation of the results in the inflation stage of the ZINB model is very different from the interpretation of the results in the count stage of the ZINB model. In general, the coefficients of a variable should have opposite signs in the count stage and the inflation stage of a ZINB model. This is the case for the variables of level of democratization and level of economic development. However, there are also some interesting results. For instance, in the inflation stage of the ZINB, *Honeymoon Year* has a statistically significant and negative coefficient, suggesting that the likelihood that a country never experiences anti-government protests is significantly lower in the first year of the new government.

### 4.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECK (II): ADDRESSING ENDOGENEITY

So far the models that have been estimated do not take into account possible endogeneity between anti-government protests and the opposition mobilization capacity. In particular, it is possible that certain unobserved factors such as particular political cultures might simultaneously affect anti-government protests and the size of the opposition camp. If that is the case, the estimated results would be problematic due to endogeneity. To address this issue, I employ several estimation techniques, including coarsened exact matching, propensity score matching, and a control function model.
4.5.1 **Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM)**

The results of the negative binomial models will provide valid estimates only if the size of opposition camp is not endogenous to the occurrence of anti-government protests. Yet a large opposition camp may be more likely to mobilize protest activities when they anticipate certain favorable conditions that would lead to a higher probability of successful protest mobilization, such as a poor national economy. In this case, a large opposition camp’s decisions to protest are endogenous to these structural conditions. In the absence of an instrumental variable that is correlated with opposition size and opposition unity but not anti-government protests, using matching techniques to condition on certain observed variables that would possibly induce endogeneity between opposition size and protests would help minimize the risk of endogeneity.

One important goal of matching is to modify observational data so that they will be similar to experimental data. To do so, matching pre-processes the data by pruning observations from the sample that have no matches on certain pretreatment covariates (see the discussion below) in the treated groups and the control groups. As a result, matching helps to reduce model dependence, lower statistical bias, and increase computational efficiency (Ho et al. 2007; Iacus et al. 2012; King and Zeng 2006).

Among various matching methods, I first use coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus et al. 2012) to pre-process the data. According to King et al. (2011, 1), the use of propensity score matching (PSM) is often not benign because “on average, it increases imbalance (and variance) compared to not matching.” Moreover, CEM outperforms Mahalanobis distance matching (MDM) because MDM “does not guarantee any level of imbalance reduction in any given data

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49 I also use the propensity score matching approach. See below for more discussion.
set” (King et al. 2011, 2), while CEM allows controlling for covariate imbalance using a non-parametric estimate and does not require a particular matching algorithm.

To implement the CEM procedure, I first construct a treatment variable that indicates whether a country has a large opposition camp. A country-year observation is coded 1 if it has an opposition camp that captured more than 50% of the vote in the previous election, and 0 otherwise. This treatment variable is used to create a sample that contains a matched sample containing covariates with similar values in the treatment group (i.e., country-year observations with a large-sized opposition camp) and control group (i.e., country-year observations without a large-sized opposition camp). Next, I include a number of covariates that likely drive the opposition camp’s expectation of successful protest mobilization for pre-processing of the data. First, an opposition camp may anticipate when a country with poor economic performance may be more likely to experience more protests and make their decision to mobilize on that basis. Second, an opposition camp may be more likely to mobilize protests when the country is more democratized. Third, when a country has a high level of economic development, people generally have more resources for political participation. In such a context, opposition parties might be more able to organize protest activities.50

In the CEM procedure, I use cutpoints to coarsen four variables used for matching analysis, with each of GDP Growth_{t-1} and Inflation_{t-1}, Freedom House Index_{t-1}, and GDP per capita_{t-1} being coarsened into five categories.51 Thus, four new variables are created, in which substantively indistinguishable values in the original counterparts are grouped together in five categories.

50 I did not choose other variables (e.g., party system fragmentation, general election year, etc.) for the CEM procedure because I find no reasons for these variables to be perceived as favorable conditions for a high probability of successful mobilization. Moreover, coarsening these additional variables for the CEM eliminates a large number of observations from the dataset.

51 I tested different levels of coarsening (e.g., coarsening variables into three categories), but they did not significantly alter the results.
equally-spaced categories. After coarsening the data on these covariates, I apply exact matching by sorting the data into different “bins” or strata that consist of all possible combinations of the values from the four coarsened covariates. Thus, once the strata are created, observations from the original data are placed in the appropriate strata.

Next, the CEM ensures that strata that include at least one treated unit (with a large opposition camp) and one control unit (without a large opposition camp) are retained, while the remaining strata are dropped from the data. In other words, this procedure balances the treatment and control groups by eliminating treatment group observations that have no corresponding control group observations in their strata, and also eliminating control group observations that have no corresponding treatment group observations in their strata. If there are no “low-inflation, low-income, low-economic-growth, low-democratized” countries that have a large opposition camp, then this stratum is dropped.

In this dissertation, the CEM procedure for opposition size (large opposition camp = treatment group, while non-large opposition camp = control group) eliminated 12 country-year observations in the original treatment group, and 57 country-year observations in the original control group. Overall, the CEM procedure identified 40 matched strata for 1,266 observations remaining in the matched sample. Since the CEM is not a statistical estimator but a data preprocessing algorithm, I use negative binomial regressions to conduct post-matching analysis by including weights that are produced by the CEM procedure. These weights are added to the

52 I also use whether a country has a unified opposition camp (level of unity larger than 0.5) as the criterion for treatment groups and control groups (unified opposition camp = treatment group) for conducting another CEM for my analyses. The implementation of this procedure eliminated 10 country-year observations in the original treatment group, and 60 country-year observations in the original control group. Overall, the CEM procedure identified 40 matched strata for 1,265 observations remaining in the matched sample.
statistical analysis to “equalize the impact of treated and control units within each matched stratum” (Iacus and King 2012, 6).

4.5.2 Propensity Score Matching (PSM)

In addition to the CEM, I also conduct matching analyses using a propensity score matching (PSM) approach to check the robustness of my results. This technique helps deal with endogeneity issues by examining subgroups of observations that are strictly comparable. The PSM approach that I use involves the use of propensity score weights to adjust for selection bias between the observations (Imai and van Dyk 2004; Imbens 2000; Lechner 2002). Since my theory suggests that a large and unified opposition camp leads to more protests, I create a categorical variable in which 1 indicates that a country has a large and united opposition camp and 0 otherwise. A large and united opposition camp is when the camp captured more than 50% of the vote and when the camp’s unity score is larger than 0.5. This categorical variable can be conceived as a treatment variable as used in experimental studies.

To make more compelling causal claims about the effects of a particular treatment, we can compare observably similar country-year observations that did and did not participate in the treatment. To do so, I identify similar country-year observations based on their propensity score or their probability of receiving the treatment. In this study, each “case” receives a propensity score

53 It is possible to generate two-by-two scenarios based on different levels of the two dimensions of opposition camp. The scenarios thus produce four different categories: large opposition size with high unity (HH), small opposition size with low unity (LL), large opposition size with low unity (HL), and small opposition size with high unity (LH). In this way, the propensity score weight will be generated by a multinomial model. According to my theory, it is expected that observations that belong to the HH category should have experienced more anti-government protests than the other three categories. However, since my theory does not suggest clear relationships between the HL, LH, and LL, it seems not necessary to adopt the multinomial propensity score matching approach for my purpose. Therefore, I decide to use a more straightforward propensity score matching approach by constructing only one treatment variable.
score for a treatment (large opposition size and high opposition unity), and cases in the treatment group are then matched to cases in the control group based on the closeness of their propensity scores. Assuming that observations are matched on factors that influence the treatment on protest outcomes, the matched pairs simulate an experimental design.

In order to obtain the propensity score for each observation, I estimate each observation’s likelihood of being in the treatment group using a logit model that includes the covariates described earlier for the CEM procedure. Specifically, the propensity score is estimated using a logit model to estimate the probability that each observation received the treatment based on its level of democracy, GDP growth, log of inflation rate, and log of GDP per capita. The inverse of that predicted probability will then be used to create the propensity score weight for subsequent analyses (Imbens 2000; see also Morgan and Winship 2007, 152-5).

Next, I estimate negative binomial regressions with propensity score weights. Each observation is re-weighted by the inverse of its probability of being in the treatment group. This reweighting process reduces selection bias by assigning higher weights to country-year observations that could plausibly be in the treatment category other than the one in which they were observed. If my theory holds for the propensity score matching approach, the treatment variable should have a positive and statistically significant effect on protests.

4.5.3 Control Function Model

While matching techniques help reduce the risk of endogeneity, it is also important to mention that matching cannot account for the possible bias induced by unobserved variables that may affect both treatment and outcome variables (Rosenbaum 2010). One common statistical method to cope with this issue is the instrumental variable (IV) approach. This approach suggests a two-
stage least-squares (2SLS) estimation with the use of an instrument that is a predictor of the major independent variable but does not affect the dependent variable. Since my theory involves the interaction effect of two variables, the IV approach would be very difficult to apply for my purposes.

Based on the core idea of the IV approach, however, it is possible to estimate a control function (CF) model for addressing this issue of endogeneity for my study. According to Woodridge (2010, 127-9), the CF model has several important features. First, unlike the IV approach, the CF model works well for nonlinear models such as count models. Second, compared to the IV approach, the CF model is less robust but more efficient. To employ the CF model, it is necessary to use an instrumental variable that is related with opposition size but not with anti-government protests. In my dataset, I find that the variable of language cleavage (Alesina et al. 2003) would be a good instrument because it relates to opposition size (correlation coefficient = -0.19) but not to protests (correlation coefficient = -0.08).

The estimation of the CF model involves two regression estimations. In the first stage, I use OLS to regress the endogenous variable (i.e., opposition size) with the instrument (i.e., language cleavage), opposition unity, and the control variables that are included in the second stage regression. Then, I predict residuals for the first stage regression, which are the unobserved heterogeneity. In the second stage, I employ a NB model on the dependent variable (i.e., anti-government protests) with the following variables on the right hand side of the equation: the predicted residuals, opposition size, opposition unity, opposition size*opposition unity, and the control variables. This step ensures that the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled in the second regression.
4.5.4 Results

Models 9 to 11 in Table 4.6 are estimated using different matching techniques to address the potential endogeneity issue. Model 9 is estimated using CEM-weighted negative binomial regressions on the matched sample for addressing the potential endogeneity between opposition size and anti-government protests. The idea here is that it is possible that a larger opposition camp is more likely to mobilize protest actions under certain socio-economic conditions that influence movement actors’ expectation of success for protest mobilization. To deal with this selection bias issue, I use the CEM procedure to pre-process the data. As the results show, the key variable, \( \text{Opposition Size} \times \text{Opposition Unity} \), has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, which is consistent with Model 4.
Table 4.6 Robustness Checks (II)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 9 (CEM weighted)</th>
<th>Model 10 (PSM weighted)</th>
<th>Model 11 (Control Function)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition size</td>
<td>-0.469</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.381)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition unity</td>
<td>-0.385</td>
<td>-6.500***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.813)</td>
<td>(1.863)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opp. size*Opp. unity</td>
<td>1.780**</td>
<td>0.132***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.825)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large and unified opposition</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.383**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>camp</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party system fragmentation t-1</td>
<td>0.116**</td>
<td>0.149***</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary system</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.344**</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.318)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR system</td>
<td>-0.972***</td>
<td>-1.131***</td>
<td>-0.894***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist government</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General election year</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
<td>-1.90</td>
<td>-1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honeymoon year</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House index t-1</td>
<td>-0.257***</td>
<td>-0.394***</td>
<td>-0.321***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth t-1</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.047**</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation t-1 (ln)</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita t-1 (ln)</td>
<td>0.465***</td>
<td>0.729***</td>
<td>0.531***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual term</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>-0.866</td>
<td>3.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.203)</td>
<td>(0.525)</td>
<td>(2.553)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi-square</td>
<td>83.22</td>
<td>197.23</td>
<td>84.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; Chi-square</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard error in parenthesis; *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.1

Model 10 is estimated taking into account propensity-score weights, which are calculated based on a logit model. As can be seen, the effect of the treatment variable (a large and unified opposition camp) is positive and statistically significant. Based on the results of Model 10, I use
the statistical simulation program Clarify (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2003) in conjunction with Stata to calculate the expected number of anti-government protests for the treatment group and control group, while holding all other variables at their mean values. The predicted number of protests for the treatment group is 4.5 and that for the control group is 2.9.

Model 11 is a control function (CF) model that takes into account unobserved factors that can potentially influence anti-government protests and opposition size. The CF model involves two stage regressions: in the first stage, I use OLS to regress opposition size with an instrument (language cleavage), opposition unity, and other control variables; then, I predict the residual and include it in the second stage, which is an NB regression. The results in Table 4.6 are from the second stage, which indicates that the coefficient for \( \text{Opposition Size} \times \text{Opposition Unity} \) is positive and statistically significant. Overall, the findings in Table 4.6 provide robust evidence for supporting the theory of opposition mobilization capacity.

4.6 PATTERNS OF PROTESTS AND OPPOSITION MOBILIZATION: DEVELOPED COUNTRIES VS. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The theoretical section of this dissertation discussed different patterns of party-protest dynamics in developed countries and developing countries. I also contend that the patterns of opposition mobilization and protests might be different for developed countries and developing countries. According to my theoretical expectation, the multiplicative term \( \text{Opposition Size} \times \text{Opposition Unity} \) should have no effect on anti-government protests in developed countries. In contrast, the effects of \( \text{Opposition Size} \times \text{Opposition Unity} \) on anti-government protests should be positive and statistically significant in developing countries.
Table 4.7 presents interesting findings about opposition mobilization capacity on protests in two different political settings. I estimate NB models with and without the interaction term for the data sample of developed countries and for the data sample of developing countries. The results exhibit similarities and differences between the two samples in terms of various explanations. First, for both developed countries and developing countries, General election year and Freedom House index_{i,t-1} have negative and statistically significant effects on anti-government protests. Moreover, all the economic variables (except GDP per capita_{i,t-1} for Model 15) do not attain statistical significance. Second, the coefficient of Party System Fragmentation_{i,t-1} is positive and statistically significant for the sample of developed countries but not for the sample of developing countries. Third, both the coefficient of Parliamentary System and that of PR System are negative and statistically significant for the sample of developed countries. In contrast, these two institutional variables have no statistically significant effects on anti-government protests for the sample of developing countries. Fourth, the results of Honeymoon year in Model 13 and Model 14 suggest that anti-government protests tend to be fewer in the first year of a new government in the context of developed countries. However, the results of Honeymoon year in Model 15 and Model 16 show that this variable does not have statistically significant effects on protests in developing countries.
Table 4.7 Negative Binomial Models for Anti-Government Protests in Developed Countries and Developing Countries (1990-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Developed Countries</th>
<th>Developing Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 13</td>
<td>Model 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition size</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition unity</td>
<td>0.745</td>
<td>-0.809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.755)</td>
<td>(2.480)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opp. size*Opp. Unity</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party system fragmentation t-1</td>
<td>0.097*</td>
<td>0.103*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary system</td>
<td>-2.005***</td>
<td>-1.955***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.434)</td>
<td>(0.435)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR system</td>
<td>-0.914***</td>
<td>-0.908**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td>(0.358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist government</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General election year</td>
<td>-0.249*</td>
<td>-0.247*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honeymoon year</td>
<td>-0.181**</td>
<td>-0.182**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House index t-1</td>
<td>-1.210***</td>
<td>-1.203***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.293)</td>
<td>(0.296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth t-1</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation t-1 (ln)</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita t-1 (ln)</td>
<td>-0.655</td>
<td>-0.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.522)</td>
<td>(0.518)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>25.518***</td>
<td>25.769***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.433)</td>
<td>(5.530)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward Chi-square</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; Chi-square</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard error in parenthesis; *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.1

Regarding the findings about opposition mobilization capacity, in the context of developed countries, the multiplicative term *Opinion Size* *Opinion Unity* in Model 14 has no effects on anti-government protests. In contrast, in Model 16, in which the model is estimated on the
sample of developing countries, *Opposition Size*\(^*\) *Opposition Unity* has a positive and statistically significant effect on anti-government protests. These results provide some preliminary information about how the effects of opposition mobilization capacity can be different in different contexts. To further understand how the effects of opposition size are conditioned by the level of opposition unity, I conduct a comparative marginal effect analysis based on the results of Model 14 and Model 16.

Figure 4.2 shows that, in developed countries, the marginal effects of opposition size on anti-government protests are negative when the opposition camp is comprised of more than 2.5 political parties. The marginal effect of opposition size becomes positive when the level of opposition unity is larger than 0.5, namely, when there are fewer than 2 parties in the opposition camp. However, these marginal effects never achieve statistical significance. Thus, these results indicate that, in the developed countries, whether a large opposition camp is able to mobilize more protests does not necessarily depend on the level of opposition unity.
In addition, Figure 4.3 demonstrates that, in the context of developing countries, the marginal effects of opposition size on protests is negative and statistically significant when the effective number of opposition parties is larger than 2.5. The marginal effects do not become positive and statistically significant until the opposition camp reaches the highest level of unity. Specifically, the marginal effects of opposition size for the developing countries are positive and statistically significant when the effective number of opposition parties is 1, i.e., when there is only one opposition party in the country. This finding suggests that, in developing countries, a large...
opposition camp is more able to mobilize more anti-government protests at a higher level of opposition unity. Overall, the results support my theory, which suggests that the mobilization capacity of opposition parties is a key to encouraging more anti-government protests in developing countries but not in developed countries. According to my theory, the findings might suggest that citizens in developed countries are generally more resourceful and that protests are used as a conventional, institutionalized form of participation. Therefore, the role of opposition parties in mobilizing protests is less important in such a context.

Figure 4.3 Marginal Effect of Opposition Size on Anti-Government Protests in Developing Countries (CI at 95%)
Finally, there is an additional concern that need to be addressed, which is whether the difference in significance levels between the three different samples is driven by different sample sizes. In other words, is the higher level of statistical significance for the results of the whole sample an artifact of the larger sample size? Is the lower level of statistical significance for the results of the two subsamples an artifact of their smaller sample sizes? To test whether the difference in significance levels between the three different samples is driven by different sample sizes, I re-weighted the sample size of developed countries and the developing countries as if their N=1,335. To do this, I employ OLS regression with the Stata command *iweight* (this command works only for OLS regression in my research design). The re-estimated result for the interaction term in the sample of developing countries has a higher level of statistical significance (changing from p=0.048 to p=0.008). The re-estimated result for the interaction term in the sample of developed countries also has a higher level of statistical significance (changing from p=0.561 to p=0.071). Clearly, the difference in significance levels between the three different samples is driven by different sample sizes, but this difference does not cast doubt about my theoretical argument.

### 4.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter empirically tests my theory, along with other existing explanations using different samples of democratic countries. For the whole sample, I demonstrate that a country where the opposition parties have a higher level of mobilization capacity will experience more anti-government protests. Specifically, a large opposition camp is more able to encourage more protests only if it is more united. Moreover, I find that a country with a PR system experiences
fewer anti-government protests, which provides support to the argument that, in an institutional environment that facilitates the formation of new parties, elites tend to use institutional means instead of extra-institutional means to influence the policy-making process (Bhasin 2008; Krain 1998; Özler 2013). In addition, I find that, during the general election year, anti-government protests tend to be fewer.

Do the effects of opposition mobilization capacity on anti-government protests work differently in different socio-economic contexts? My findings suggest that the answer is “yes.” Using different samples of country-year observations, I find that the marginal effect of opposition size in the developed countries is insignificant at different levels of opposition unity. In contrast, the marginal effect of opposition size in the developing countries becomes positive and statistically significant when the opposition camp is highly united. The marginal effect analyses suggest that traditional mobilizing agents such as unions and parties play a less important role for mobilizing protests because citizens generally tend to participate in protests on their own. In contrast, opposition parties are still important agents for mobilizing protests in developing countries where citizens lack democratic learning experiences.

The large-N analyses leave some unanswered questions. For instance, given that stronger opposition parties can help encourage protests in developing countries, what is the mechanism in which opposition parties and social movements coordinate protests? What kinds of coordination strategies facilitate large-scale protest mobilization? How are protest activities mobilized in a country where opposition parties are generally weak and fragmented? What are the grievances that drive anti-government protest mobilization? In order to answer these questions, a different research approach is required. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 develop case studies of Peru and Taiwan, respectively.
5.0 CASE STUDY (I): PERU

This chapter shows that both the party system and civil society are extremely fragmented in Peru, which greatly impeded strong protest mobilization in this country. Such a high level of fragmentation facilitates political participation in the form of “contentious representation” (Interviewee P13, April 3, 2012), in which citizens’ demands must be channeled through extra-institutional means such as protests. The high level of fragmentation in the party system leads to a large opposition camp, but this camp is always so weak that it is not able to form a unified force with stronger political leverage for holding the government accountable (Interviewee P15, April 4, 2012). Therefore, Peru is an instance that shows a large opposition camp failed to mobilize more anti-government protests because the camp is disunited.

Historically, the general pattern suggests that the relations between opposition parties and social movements in Peru were strengthened under the military rule, weakened in the 1980s due to severe economic crisis and guerilla insurgency, and further weakened since the 1990s. The first section discusses the emergence of organized social movements and the evolution of the APRA and its changing interactions with social movements. The second section discusses how party/movement relations were shaped by the military regimes (1968-1980). The third section analyzes the party/movement relations under the multiparty system in the 1980s. The fourth section focuses on examining the relationship of opposition parties to anti-government protests under Fujimori’s rule in the 1990s. The fifth section discusses opposition parties’ inability to
mobilize large-scale protests due to Fujimori’s legacies and the high level of party system fragmentation. My qualitative analyses suggest that after Peru returned to democracy for the second time since the 1980s, social movements in the 2000s seemed to rise again to some extent, particularly for the anti-mining protests, but the lack of a strong and united opposition camp has made the movements more fragmented and less influential.

5.1 THE EMERGENCE OF ORGANIZED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE ALIANZA POPULAR REVOLUCIONARIA AMERICANA (APRA)

In the early 20th century, Peru was dominated by oligarchic politicians. The first serious challenge to the oligarchic political rule in Peru took place in the 1920s, when Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre and José Carlos Mariátegui founded mass political parties. The rise of these two important political figures was related to organized labor movements. In 1923, Haya de la Torre led a mass protest of workers and students against the Leguía government (Alexander 2007, 15). In 1924, Haya de la Torre founded the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) during his exile in Mexico. The APRA aimed to establish a broad-based anti-imperialist alliance throughout Latin American countries. Its branch in Peru, the Partido Aprista Peruano (PAP), was officially founded in 1928. The name APRA has been exclusively used by the PAP thereafter. The close ties between Haya de la Torre and textile workers in Peru had affected the early development of the APRA (Collier and Collier 1991, 91). Initially, the APRA embraced a nationalist political program with a populist feature, advocating expropriation of foreign investment, state economic control, and equal rights for the indigenous people (McDonald and
Ruhl 1989, 210). The party also tried to incorporate political interests from different social classes.

Haya de la Torre’s universalistic political orientation was harshly criticized by José Carlos Mariátegui, a renowned Marxist thinker who had a great influence on Peruvian leftist movements. Mariátegui (1979) described the APRA as a Latin American version of Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party) for its “petit bourgeois” nationalism (see also Villanueva 1977). Mariátegui actually had worked with Haya de la Torre during the beginning years of the APRA. However, he broke with Haya de la Torre on the sharp difference in organizational directions and founded the Partido Socialista del Peru (PSP) in 1928. In 1929, the PSP formed Confederación General de Trabajadores del Peru (CGTP), the largest labor organization ever created in Peruvian history. Soon after Mariátegui’s death, the PSP was renamed Partido Comunista Peruano (PCP), seeking to build a pro-Communist international revolutionary organization for workers and peasants based on Soviet organizational and ideological principles.

In the 1931 election, Haya de la Torre was defeated by Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro. Soon after Sánchez Cerro assumed the presidency, both the APRA and the CGTP were banned and became underground organizations. Sánchez Cerro adopted harsh suppression of the APRA’s members, which prompted an anti-government revolt led by the APRA in Trujillo in 1932. This revolt created strong anti-Aprismo among the armed forces and the oligarchy, but it also strengthened the bond between the APRA and its supporters (Collier and Collier 1991, 152; Cotler 1978, 246-7). In 1944, the Apristas established the Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú (CTP), a remarkable organization that signified the unification of the labor movement of Peru. With the support of the APRA, José Luis Bustamante of the Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN) won the 1945 presidential election.
Due to the coalition with the APRA, the Bustamante government incorporated labor movements through a series of policies, including recognizing labor unions extensively and raising workers’ wages (Collier and Collier 1991, 319-25; Sulmont 1975). The APRA and CTP greatly infiltrated in the public bureaucracy, unions, and universities (Cotler 1978, 267). Alexander (2007, 34) indicates that in 1947 an estimated 90% of the labor movement was in the hands of the Apristas.

In 1948, Haya de la Torre encouraged an initiative created by some radical Apristas to stage a military revolt with a mass insurrection to topple the Bustamante government. The pro-APRA armed forces gained initial success, but soon the revolt was brutally crushed by military force. More unfortunately, Haya de la Torre did not demonstrate support for the revolt after it failed. The APRA was outlawed by the Bustamante government, and Haya de la Torre’s inaction regarding the revolt discredited the party’s image as a militant anti-oligarchic force (Masterson 1984, 482).

On October 27, 1948, General Manuel Odría led a successful military coup to overthrow the Bustamante government and continued the harsh repression of the APRA. Thousands of Apristas were arrested and tortured, and Haya de la Torre sought refuge in the Colombian embassy in Lima and stayed there for five years. The CTP was outlawed and its leaders were jailed or assassinated (Alexander 2007, 52-3). Because the APRA had become very weak after experiencing two cycles of repression and persecution of the party, Haya de la Torre decided to change his party’s armed insurrection strategy and struggle for obtaining state resources for its survival (Collier and Collier 1991, 475-6). Therefore, the APRA decided to exchange its support for Manuel Prado and the capitalist-oriented economic program of Prado’s Movimiento

54 The first repression cycle was from the 1930s to the 1940s, during the administrations of Cerro, Benavides, and Prado. The second repression cycle was during the Odría administration (from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s).
Democrático Pradista (MDP) for Prado’s support for legalizing the APRA (Collier and Collier 1991, 474; Werlich 1978, 257). Since Manuel Prado was a leading member of the oligarchy, the APRA’s cooperation with the MDP marked the APRA’s shift toward conservatism.

During Prado’s second term (1956-1962), there was considerable growth in the Peruvian labor movement. White-collar workers formed the Central Sindical de Empleados Particulares del Perú (CSEPP) in 1955 under the Apristas’ control and decided to be affiliated with the CTP in 1961. In 1959, groups of teachers formed the Federación Nacional de Educadores del Perú (FENEP), which carried out two strikes, in 1960 and in 1961, and gained success in salary increases for teachers (Payne 1965, 237). The APRA-led CTP, although far less militant due to the APRA’s coalition with the Prado government, had dominated the labor movement by having 75% of all Peruvian workers as its members (Payne 1965, 167).55

In the 1962 presidential election, Haya de la Torre ran as a presidential candidate for the APRA with the endorsement of Prado’s MDP. The other two candidates were Fernando Belaúnde from the Acción Popular (AP), and Manuel Odría from the Unión Nacional Odriísta (UNO). The APRA was the most well-organized party among the three parties because of its solid control of the labor movement. The electoral results showed that no candidate secured an immediate victory and according to the Constitution, the result had to be determined by a majority of the combined Congress members. However, before the election was held, General Ricardo Pérez Godoy and other military members initiated a coup in July.

The military junta suspended the Constitution, annulled the 1962 presidential election, and scheduled a new election in June 1963. The AP’s Belaúnde won the 1963 presidential election with the support of the military and the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC). After the

55 In contrast, the Communist Party’s influence in the labor movement, particularly in the sectors of construction workers and transport workers, declined during this period (Payne 1965, 73-4).
election, the APRA formed an alliance with the UNO. With its congressional majority, the opposition APRA-UNO coalition had blocked many of Belaúnde’s initiatives, such as agrarian reform and tax system reform. The Belaúnde administration was forced to change ministers 178 times (Collier and Collier 1991, 703). Moreover, the Belaúnde government relied on international loans for financing, and the increasing deficit led to problems of excessive external debt, rapid devaluation of the national currency, and high inflation (Wise 2003, 77-8). Peasant unrest grew as Belaúnde failed to implement agrarian reform (McClintock 1982, 135).

Faced with political and economic crises, Belaúnde reorganized his cabinet by including many APRA members in June 1968. The APRA-AP coalition government achieved a certain degree of success (Jaquette 1972, 652), but this coalition was seen as a betrayal by partisans from both parties. Moreover, the government’s unpopular structural adjustment programs and a scandal that involved the Belaúnde government and the International Petroleum Company (IPC, an Exxon subsidiary) had triggered large-scale protest movements (Cotler 1995, 333). The military eventually lost its confidence in the Belaúnde government, and General Juan Velasco Alvarado seized the government in a military coup on October 3, 1968.

56 See Werlich (1978, 289-96) for a more detailed account of the controversy surrounding the IPC.
Table 5.1 Opposition Mobilization Capacity and Protests in Peru (1957-1968)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Opposition size (in %)</th>
<th>Opposition unity score</th>
<th>Combined opposition mobilization capacity (Size*Unity)</th>
<th>Annual average number of labor strikes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1957-1961</td>
<td>33.87</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>15.71</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1964-1968</td>
<td>62.58</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>31.63</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The data for annual average number of labor strikes are from Sulmont (1982, 202-4). The electoral data for measuring the opposition mobilization capacity variables for 1956 and 1963 are from the Council on Foreign Relations (1957) and Nohlen (2005), respectively. The opposition size is measured by the seat shares of the opposition parties in the legislature. The opposition unity is measured as the inverse of the effective number of opposition parties in the legislature (see Chapter 4 for the details on the operationalization). Independent legislators were grouped as an Other category, and this category is excluded from the calculation for the opposition size and opposition unity variables because it is not a party.

Because electoral data and protest data in the earlier periods for Peru are generally unavailable, I can make only tentative inferences of the relationship between opposition parties and protests by using available legislative electoral data and protest data. Table 5.1 compares the level of combined opposition mobilization capacity and the number of labor strikes in two historical periods in Peru. As mentioned before, the APRA was not allowed to participate in the 1956 election, and in order to secure its future survival, Haya de la Torre supported Manuel Prado’s MDP, which became the incumbent party after the election. Thus, the APRA did not oppose Prado’s economic stabilization reform of the late 1950s and tried to restrain labor’s response (Payne 1965, 119). In contrast, the opposition camp from 1964 to 1968 was larger than the camp from 1957 to 1961, and the opposition camp in both periods had similar levels of unity. Assuming that we hold other variables constant, we can expect that the larger and more united

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57 Before the APRA was established, Peru was dominated by the “aristocratic parties,” which had little to do with popular sectors and mass protests (Roncagliolo 2011). The 1931 election was the first election in which the APRA participated. The opposition parties secured 51 out of 124 seats. Because Peru was still under a non-democratic environment (the Polity IV score is -3 in 1931), it is noteworthy that the electoral results might not accurately reflect the APRA’s strength. Still, before Benavides closed the Congress in 1936, the APRA had organized several important anti-government protests, including the anti-government revolt in 1932 and general strikes in 1934 and 1936 (Alexander 2007, 22-3).
opposition camp from 1964 and 1968 should have encouraged more protests. According to Sulmont’s (1982, 202-4) data, during the Belaúnde administration, organized labor, which was dominated by the APRA-affiliated CTP, initiated about 373 strikes per year from 1964 to 1968. In contrast, with the CTP less militant due to the APRA’s support for the government, organized labor initiated about 247 strikes per year during the Prado administration from 1957 to 1961.

5.2 THE STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS UNDER THE MILITARY REGIMES

The Velasco and Morales military regimes from 1968 to 1980, often called the “Peruvian Experiment” (Jaquette and Lowenthal 1987; McClintock and Lowenthal 1983), was an important period for the development of social movements in Peru. While the regimes were generally repressive of the society, many state policies and institutions had unintentionally provided favorable opportunities for strengthening social movements. The Velasco government was an “anomaly” compared to many other military governments in Latin America because the former adopted numerous initiatives that incorporated the Left’s social agenda, which was very uncommon for a military government. Specifically, the Velasco regime incorporated leftist intellectuals as advisers, implemented nationalization policies to expropriate U.S. multinational firms in 1968, adopted agrarian reforms in 1969, and promoted industrial reforms in 1970.

More importantly, the Velasco regime encouraged popular mobilization, aiming to control mass political participation and encourage labor to collaborate with employers and the government. The government recognized and supported the PCP-affiliated CGTP and the

58 The CGTP suffered harsh repression since late 1930s. However, in 1965, the PCP formed the Comité de Defensa y Unificación Sindical (CDUS), which later served as the basis for the recreation of the CGTP in 1968 (Sulmont
PDC-affiliated *Central Nacional de Trabajadores* (CNT) in 1971 as counterweights to the APRA-affiliated CTP. The government also sponsored the *Central de Trabajadores de la Revolucion Peruana* (CTRP) and used the organization to weaken other union organizations (Sánchez 2002, 200).

Second, the government imposed a corporatist organizational system. One important policy was the introduction of the *Comunidad Industrial* (CI) in 1970 and the formation of the *Confederación Nacional de Comunidades Industriales* (CONACI), which provided incentives for workers to identify themselves as co-owners of the enterprise and consequently refrain from taking militant actions (Stephens 1983, 66). Another important policy was the creation of the *Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social* (SINAMOS) (Lloyd 1980, 45). The SINAMOS was a vast agency that coordinated community development affairs in both rural and urban areas. The organization mobilized popular support of the military regime by organizing huge political demonstrations and fostering local participation of shantytown dwellers in the political process (Schonwalder 2002, 65). Therefore, the SINAMOS “interjected itself into all significant areas of organized popular activity and served as the only legitimate channel for citizen demands upon the government” (Werlich 1978, 347).

However, there were several unintended consequences of the above policies. First, with the number of recognized unions increased over 120% between 1966 and 1976 (Stephens 1983, 67), organized labor became increasingly militant instead of being tamed. It was because employers were generally unwilling to allow worker participation in ownership and had adopted numerous techniques to minimize profits that were required for the workers. In order to defend

1982, 95). Alexander (2007, 106-7) argues that the CGTP backed the Velasco government for two reasons: first, the PCP believed that a profound revolutionary change was underway; and second, the military regime had a very friendly relationship with the Soviet Union.
their interests, many workers relied heavily on existing unions to deal with employers and the state bureaucracy, while workers in sectors where unions did not exist became more likely to use collective disruptive actions in the struggle (Stephens 1983, 69).

Moreover, the mobilization agencies such as the CTRP and SINAMOS failed to achieve the government’s original goal of controlling the social sectors through mobilization. Rather, they created an unintended favorable condition for enlarging the size and the organizational consolidation of the neighborhood movements and labor movements (Tovar 1985; cited in Schonwalder 2002, 66). As a result, the Peruvian labor movement had changed from using vertical ties of clientelism that linked the union members to their bosses to using horizontal ties that relied on worker solidarity and confrontational strategies for pursuing their interests (Roberts 1998, 210).

While the pro-regime labor organizations created conditions that eventually undermined the Velasco regime, the CGTP and the Maoist leftist groups continued to promote confrontational tactics that helped instill class consciousness. In 1973, CGTP-affiliated unions engaged in 48% of all strikes, while CTP-affiliated unions engaged in only 7% of all strikes and other far-leftist groups engaged in 39% (Graham 1992, 42). General strikes in Ancash and Arequipa forced the departmental governments to issue states of emergency (Stephens 1983, 75-6). By 1977, 44% of all unions were affiliated with the CGTP, but only 27% with the CTP (Mauceri 1996, 22).

The failure of economic management destabilized the military government. Beginning in 1974, an exacerbating trade deficit and a heavy external debt caused an economic crisis in Peru (Werlich 1978, 358). Because of the repressive nature of the military government and the non-existent party politics, the growing social demands that the government’s mobilization policies...
stimulated could not be well-channeled (Cotler 1995, 334). There was an increasing number of labor strikes in 1974 and 1975, largely in response to the poor economy, the nationalization of the press, and a series of revealed scandals (Werlich 1978, 352-9).59 One of the turning points of the Velasco government was the February 1975 police strike, which was followed by protesters looting and burning the government-controlled newspapers Correo and Ojo and two SINAMOS headquarters (Graham 1992, 57).

On August 29, 1975, General Morales ordered the removal of General Velasco from office. With the national economic performance worsened,60 increasing anti-government popular movements sprang from the end of June 1976 (Werlich 1978, 367-8). On July 19, 1977, a 24-hour general strike was called with the support of the CGTP to protest the rising price of products for basic needs. On February 27 and 28 of 1978, a 48-hour general strike was called by a coordinated body, the Comando Unitario de Lucha, which was comprised of the CGTP and other independent unions (Alexander 2007, 130-1). On May 22 and 23, another 48-hour general strike was called by the CGTP. These massive protest activities were organized by labor unions, rural-cooperative organizations, and various leftist political groups (Stephens 1983, 61-2). The APRA-affiliated CTP remained reluctant to participate in these strikes,61 which “was damaging to the party’s image at a time when both the labor movement and the political spectrum were shifting to the left, and further tainted it as a collaborator with the regime” (Graham 1992, 65).

The dynamics of neighborhood movements were more complicated during the military regime era. In April 1971, a large land invasion occurred in Villa El Salvador, which had become

59 Because there were no elections under the military regime, it is impossible to measure the level of opposition mobilization capacity. Therefore, it is difficult to gauge how opposition mobilization capacity affected these labor strikes during this period.
60 For more discussion on the economic mismanagement of the military regime, see Palmer (1984).
61 While the APRA-led CTP generally did not join protest actions initiated by the PCP-led CGTP, the CTP did support the general strike in May 1978 (Sulmont 1982, 117).
one of the largest shantytown districts in Lima. While the SINAMOS had exerted influence in the development of Villa, the conflicts between this agency and the residents had increased since early 1974. Soon after General Morales seized power, the SINAMOS withdrew its support from Villa, and the new leadership of Comunidad Urbana Autogestinoaria de Villa El Salvador (CUAVES, the main decision-making body of Villa) also declared its opposition to the Morales regime and urged strengthening ties with leftist groups such as Patria Roja (Mauceri 1996, 102).

In April 1976, the CUAVES organized a protest march involving 20,000 residents in Villa, but it was later severely repressed. Despite the repression, the CUAVES continued their opposition protests against the regime during the national strikes of July 1977 and May 1978. The Morales government dissolved the SINAMOS in 1978 and enacted the law D.L. No. 22612 in July 1979. These policy changes indicated the end of the government’s support for popular mobilization, which spawned new waves of urban popular protests (Schonwalder 2002, 71).

Under the military regimes, it is impossible to gauge the opposition mobilization capacity due to the absence of electoral data. However, as I have shown above, many labor movements and neighborhood movements were still able to organize anti-government protests. These protests were considered unintended consequences of the military regimes, who originally planned to control the social sectors through mobilization. The labor stoppage actions and large-scale anti-government protests joined by shantytown dwellers had consequently forced the Morales government to call an election for a Constituent Assembly on May 18, 1978. The new Constitution was passed in 1979 and a new general election was scheduled in 1980.
5.3 THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY

In the 1980 general elections, Belaúnde won the presidency, and his AP won 98 of the 180 seats in the Lower House. Throughout the 1980s, Peru had a multiparty system consisting of the AP, APRA, PPC (*Partido Popular Cristiano*), and *Izquierda Unida* (IU). The APRA is considered a center-left party, the IU represents the Left, \(^{62}\) and the AP and PPC represent the Right. The AP and the PPC allied between 1980 and 1984. In 1984, the PPC allied with a group of Apristas to be the *Convergencia Democrática* (CODE).

The economic crisis of the late 1970s generated serious pressure for workers’ wage increases. An estimated 10,000 workers from different sectors participated in more than thirty strikes in August 1980, the month following Belaúnde’s inauguration (Dietz 1982, 91). To cope with the economic hardship, Belaúnde adopted a series of neoliberal economic policies. Some of these policies seriously undermined workers’ job stability protection and thus weakened organized labor (Bollinger 1987, 624). In January 1981, the CGTP led a large-scale national strike joined by the CTP, the CNT, and the CTRP, which had shown for the first time the unification of the labor movement in Peru (Scurrah and Esteves 1982, 116).

Waves of protests and strikes in 1981 forced the Belaúnde government to adopt a new strategy to reduce social conflicts (Mauceri 1996, 52). The result was the creation of the

\(^{62}\) Even though it had a national coordinating committee, the IU, a loose coalition of various leftist parties, was considered a poorly institutionalized party. The founding members of the IU were Congress members from five parties, including the *Unidad Democrático Popular* (primarily consisting of members from *Vanguardia Revolucionaria* and *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria*), *Frente Obrero Campesino Estudiantil y Popular* (FOCEP), *Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (UNIR), *Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores* (PRT), and *Unidad de Izquierda* (UI) (Tuesta Soldevilla 2005, 470). Other parties that joined the IU for subsequent elections include *Partido Comunista Peruano* (PCP), *Partido Socialista Revolucionario* (PSR), *Partido Comunista Revolucionario* (PCR), *Acción Política Socialista* (APS), and *Partido Unificado Mariateguista* (PUM) (see Roberts 1998, 222-3; Taylor 1990). Within the IU, the UNIR dominated the important teachers’ union because the Patria Roja was the principal force behind the creation of the UNIR. The PUM played a dominant role in the CCP peasant association (Roberts 1998, 230).
Comisión Nacional Tripartita (CNT), which was comprised of representatives from the business sector, the labor sector (including the CGTP), and the government’s ministries of labor and economy. However, as the economy deteriorated, the CNT failed, and the CGTP withdrew its participation in mid-1982.

The economic crises, corruption, and the lack of political accountability during the 1980s had resulted in further radicalization of mass mobilization, resulting in the rise of the Partido Comunista Peruano-Sendero Luminoso and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru. These two insurrection groups adopted armed struggle strategies to pursue political goals and greatly influenced Peruvian political dynamics. One consequence was a shift in electoral preferences toward the IU and the APRA. However, although the IU had an impressive electoral performance in the 1983 municipal election, it suffered increasingly severe internal conflicts and organizational fragmentation.63 With the IU continuing to be paralyzed by the struggles between different internal groups and the AP-PPC coalition losing credibility during the Belaúnde government, Peruvian politics seemed to be dominated by Alan García and his APRA.

In the 1985 election, the AP suffered a fiasco, gaining only 8.4% of the vote. While the IU gained 24.4% of the vote, the APRA won the election with 50.1% of the vote. Although García is often seen as a populist figure, he is very different from many previous populist leaders. For instance, while populist leaders such as Juan Perón in Argentina and Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico had incorporated organized labor movements in their respective governments, García did not rely on organized labor, partly because the economic crises in the early 1980s had seriously undermined the labor movements in Peru (Cameron 1994, 45-6).

63 Such a fragmentation “reflected the competing international loyalties and ideological currents in Peruvian Marxism, along with fierce tactical debates over the role of political parties, guerrilla movements, and social organizations in the revolutionary process” (Roberts 1998, 209; see also McDonald and Ruhl 1989, 215).
Instead, García sought to consolidate support from the squatter settlement workers, or the informal sector, by implementing various social programs.

Among the various social policy programs adopted by the García government, the Programa de Apoyo de Ingreso Temporal (PAIT), aimed at creating more employment for workers of the informal sector, was a crucial part of the government’s policy measures of raising domestic consumption capacity for economic development (Graham 1992, 180). This program was implemented in a highly partisan, clientelist fashion. For instance, the beneficiaries of PAIT were obliged to attend political rallies in support of the García government. Moreover, the PAIT workers formed counterdemonstrations to harass the medical doctors’ strike and the SUTEP teachers’ strike in 1986 (Graham 1992, 185). However, it is interesting to note that “many workers participated in pro-APRA rallies organized by the PAIT without feeling any obligation to vote for APRA” (Cameron 1994, 48). One reason might be that these workers were largely from the informal sector, which was not capable of establishing institutionalized connections with parties (Cameron 1994, 50). Moreover, since the PAIT was implemented in a manipulative manner and disrupted many existing community organizations, it made it more difficult for the APRA to build enduring connections with the informal sector (Graham 1992, 184).

The popularity of the APRA did not last long. García’s heterodox economic program produced a temporary rebound in 1986 and 1987, but it ended in one of the worst economic crises with hyperinflation in Peruvian history. With steady decline of wage gains, the CGTP organized a successful general strike on May 19, 1987. In 1988, the CGTP called general strikes on January 28, June 19 and 20, October 14, and December 1 (Graham 1992, 107). The APRA-affiliated CTP did not participate in any major general strikes.
In July 1987, the government expropriated the country’s ten private banks, six finance companies, and seventeen insurance companies. The expropriation suggests that García had completely broken his own commitment during that campaign that he would reduce state intervention in the economy (Graham 1992, 111). A series of opposition protest rallies against the state expropriation of the banks was organized by a group led by Mario Vargas Llosa, with the support of the AP, the PPC, and the *Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y Campesinos* (FRENATRACA). In 1988, the AP, the PPC, and Mario Vargas Llosa’s *Movimiento Libertad* formed a coalition called *Frente Democrático* (FREDEMO) to support Vargas Llosa’s presidential candidacy in the 1990 election (Durand 1992).64

The economic crisis accompanied by hyperinflation and much violence had profound effects on Peruvian political and social development. First, the established parties were seriously weakened. The APRA’s clientelist networks established by various social policy programs such as the PAIT were undermined because of a lack of resources available to the state (Graham 1992, 198). With the negative economic legacy left by the García government, the APRA “gained a reputation of negligence, incompetence and corruption that has contributed to the loss of legitimacy that continues to date” (Roncagliolo 2011, 68). The deterioration in the economy also contributed to the growth of the informal sector. By the end of the 1980s, only about 11% of workers in the formal sectors were unionized (Alexander 2007, 151). The growth in informal employment seriously undermined the linkages between the Left and a broad working-class constituency. As a result, these political consequences provided a new political opportunity for “independent” anti-systemic politicians such as Alberto Fujimori (Cotler 2011, 57-8).

64 The formation of FREDEMO is a case that “protests facilitate opposition unity,” which can be considered an endogeneity problem between protests and opposition unity. However, the FREDEMO actually did not have a strong influence on unifying the whole opposition camp. In fact, the opposition unity score in the 1990 election was even lower than the opposition unity score in the 1985 election.
Table 5.2 Opposition Mobilization Capacity and Protests in Peru (1981-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Opposition size (in %)</th>
<th>Opposition unity score</th>
<th>Combined opposition mobilization capacity (Size*Unity)</th>
<th>Annual average level of social protests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>21.88</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>48.10</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>16.51</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The data for annual average level of social protests are from Lodola et al. (2009). Opposition size is measured by the vote shares of the opposition parties in the legislature. Opposition unity is measured as the inverse of the effective number of opposition parties in the legislature. Independent legislators were grouped as an Other category, and this category is excluded from the calculation for the opposition size and opposition unity variables because it is not a party.

Table 5.2 shows the correlation between opposition parties’ mobilization capacity and protests in the 1980s. Clearly, during the Belaúnde administration (1980-1985), the strong opposition camp was able to mobilize waves of large-scale protests. In particular, during the first two years of the Belaúnde administration, the APRA-affiliated CTP and the PCP-affiliated CTGP had made great efforts for mobilizing labor protests.

After the 1985 election, the opposition camp was much different because the APRA became the incumbent party for the first time in Peruvian history. The “new” opposition camp had relatively the same size (48.5% of the vote) with the camp during the period of 1980 to 1984 (51% of the vote). However, the data show that the level of opposition unity changed from 0.43 to 0.34, which suggests that the opposition camp became more fragmented after 1985. Therefore, it can be inferred that the overall opposition mobilization capacity decreased because the opposition camp became less united. As the protest data of Lodola et al. (2009) indicate in Table 5.2, the level of social protests was lower during the García administration. One way to interpret the finding is to compare the ratio of change in opposition mobilization capacity and the ratio of change in protests. Both ratios are similar: the ratio of change for opposition mobilization capacity is about -24.5%, and the ratio of change for average level of protests is about -29.4%.
Therefore, we can infer that when the opposition mobilization capacity decreases, the level of protests also decreases. The finding is confirmed with different data. The data from Banks (2005), although largely criticized by its information incompleteness, also show similar patterns of protests in the two periods of 1980s. Specifically, based on Banks (2005), the average number of anti-government protests for the period of 1981 to 1985 is 2.8 and that for the period of 1986 to 1990 is 1.8.

5.4 PERUVIAN SOCIETY UNDER FUJIMORI’S RULE

A senior researcher of the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP) commented in an interview that “there is no party in a real sense in Peru, so it is impossible to talk about the relationships between parties and social movements in this country” (Interviewee P7, March 30, 2012). While this comment might sound exaggerated, it is a reasonable description for the Peruvian party system after Alberto Fujimori defeated Mario Llosa in the 1990 presidential election.

Fujimori is widely described as a political outsider, although his career ascent was more complicated. He was a university professor, but in the late 1980s, he had spent years cultivating his connections with the ruling APRA (Planas Silva 2000, 295-301). García offered Fujimori a job as host on a weekly state-run TV program commentating on public affairs. His program’s ratings were low, but at least he started to garner a nationwide audience (Conaghan 2005, 17). Using a campaign strategy that heavily focused on mass media to boast his image as a “man of the people,” Fujimori won substantive popular support in the 1990 election.

However, such support was unstable for two reasons. First, he mainly relied on his charisma to maintain the linkage between him and the popular sector. His party, Cambio 90, was
nothing more than his electoral vehicle. Fujimori not only made no organizational efforts to cultivate the party, but even internally destroyed the party. After winning the run-off in the 1990 election, “[n]o longer needing their help, Fujimori brushed off his fellow C90 members, refusing to see them or even take their phone calls” (Conaghan 2005, 25). Fujimori’s anti-party discourse initiated a decade of “anti-politics” (Degregori 2000).

Second, the social base of Fujimori’s support largely came from the informal sector, comprised of a floating electorate without clear ideological commitments (Cameron 1994, 119). As Carbonetto et al. (1988, 403-15) demonstrate, the informal sector was largely comprised of people who were supportive of state intervention in the economy, and at the same time they were highly individualistic and potentially opted for social transformation. Moreover, Grompone (1991, 49; cited in Cameron 1994, 50-1) observes that the informal sector tended to not support well-organized parties and corporatist groups. Therefore, the relationship between the informal sector and the political arena was intermittent and fluid; political parties may win temporary support from the informal sector, but they would not be able to build lasting ties.

Following their electoral defeat in 1990, the traditional parties failed to improve themselves and were trapped in further internal disputes. The IU was largely besieged by Sendero. The APRA was discredited by the García administration. FREDEMO supported Fujimori’s neoliberal agenda. Thus, Fujimori began his administration in the unique position in which there were no strong opposition parties that would be able to confront him. After taking power, Fujimori immediately betrayed his commitments made during the electoral campaign, in which he promised to revive the Peruvian economy without seeking IMF-sponsored treatment. Instead, he implemented neoliberal economic “shock therapy” based on the demands imposed by international financial agencies for renewing funds that were used to stabilize the economy
(Chossudovsky 1992; Gonzales de Olarte 1993). More importantly, Fujimori used an authoritarian method to carry out the neoliberal reforms (Mauceri 1996, 84). He granted security forces greater authority and heavily relied on the intelligence agency Servicio Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) to stop the expansion of Sendero and control civil society groups and opposition parties.

Fujimori’s electoral success and authoritarian rule left two legacies for the party/society relationship in Peru. First, the landslide electoral victory of Fujimori and pro-Fujimori candidates suggested a lesson for politicians in Peru: established party organizations were no longer necessary (Levitsky and Cameron 2003, 10). The model of the ‘‘disposable party’’ created by Fujimori ‘‘became generalized as politicians of all ideological stripes borrowed Fujimori’s organizational strategy’’ (ibid, 11). Therefore, almost all political parties started to focus on personalistic campaigns and paid little attention to building organizational linkages with society. In the 1993 municipal elections, independent candidates won posts throughout the country and the traditional parties such as the APRA and the PPC obtained only few votes.

Second, Fujimori’s neoliberal structural adjustment projects and violent state repression seriously undermined the strength of numerous civil society organizations (Carrión 2006; Degregori 2008). The privatization policy of the agricultural sector disbanded cooperatives and allowed large amounts of capital to enter the sector (Mauceri 1996, 85). Moreover, Fujimori enacted various decrees to restrict the autonomy and mobilization capacity of unions and civil society organizations. The introduced change to the Labor Code had weakened the collective action capacity of labor unions, and the new agrarian law had made it more difficult for peasants to mobilize (Mauceri 2006, 58). Fujimori also enacted decrees to limit the right to strike for
public sector unions, to eliminate worker cooperatives, and to end the mediating role of the ministry of labor in the labor bargaining process (Mauceri 1996, 86).

Labor’s mobilization capacity was further deteriorated by the expansion of the informal sector and security forces’ repression of labor organizations due to Sendero Luminoso’s infiltration of these organizations (Burt 2004). Other social organizations were co-opted to constrain their ability to mobilize. Neighborhood organizations, such as Comedores Populares (soup kitchens) and the Vaso de Leche (glass of milk), were co-opted into new government agencies. One Fujimorista ex-congressman stated in an interview that the idea of Fujimorismo was to build a direct connection between Fujimori and the people, and thus the state incorporation of the intermediary social organizations “was necessary for such a connection” (Interviewee P3, March 28, 2012).

In response to the drastic economic “shock policies,” many strikes and anti-government protest actions took place, such as the teachers’ strike initiated by the Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores en la Educación del Perú (SUTEP) in 1991 (Vargas 2005) and three general strikes declared by the CGTP and other federations between 1990 and 1992 (Roberts 1996, 80). However, this resistance waned quickly because they lacked widespread support from opposition parties, which were highly fragmented.

In 1992, Fujimori made a dramatic move toward authoritarian rule. On the evening of April 5, Fujimori announced an autogolpe. He suspended the constitution, closed the Congress, placed a number of senators and deputies under house arrest, and claimed the coup as a “democratic exercise” using his high approval poll results as justification. Cameron (1994, 146-53) argues that the economic crises, severe tensions between the executive and the legislature,
and Fujimori’s political calculation for consolidating his power are possible explanatory factors for the autogolpe.

After the coup, the opposition camp urged a restoration of democracy and electoral politics quickly by holding an election for the Congreso Constituyente Democrático (CCD), while Fujimori wanted to hold a referendum regarding only his coup. Facing pressure from the Organization of American States (OAS), Fujimori finally agreed to hold an election for the CCD in December 1992. However, the decision whether to participate in the election was a heated debate for the existing political parties. On the one hand, participation might be interpreted as legitimating the coup; on the other hand, abstention indicates ceding all political resources to Fujimori. The election proved to be a disaster for the Peruvian party system. The two largest opposition parties, the APRA and the AP, chose not to participate, which resulted in Fujimori’s C90-NM securing an easy victory.65

After its inaugural session on December 29, 1992, the CCD began to work on writing a new constitution to be ratified in a nationwide referendum. Given that the C90-NM congressional majority drafted the new constitution proposal, a diverse group of politicians, intellectuals, grassroots leaders, and labor leaders kicked off a campaign for a No vote, forming the Comité Cívico por el No. However, as Conaghan (2005, 62) describes, there was no single, unified organization that led the charge in the opposition camp, and it was “largely due to the aversion that some groups had for working in any official capacity with APRA.”

Fujimori won a narrow margin of the 1993 vote on the referendum, but he later won the 1995 election by a large margin without strong opposition because he redirected large amounts of discretionary expenditures and resources to areas where he had lost the 1993 referendum.

65 The story here suggests that leaders of opposition parties might unite even when the camp is very fragmented, but such unification is highly unstable.
(Graham and Kane 1998). Fujimori soon sought another reelection bid in 2000. Without making an effort to build a real party organization, Fujimori’s campaign relied on the mobilization of Peru’s entire security apparatus—the armed forces, the police, and the intelligence agency. For instance, the SIN used state-of-the-art technology to track the activities of the opposition candidates; the army was ordered to build neighborhood sports facilities to enhance Fujimori’s popularity; and the police organized community events in poor neighborhoods and provided free food (Conaghan 2005, 164-5). Despite the use of state resources for Fujimori’s reelection campaign, the government also played dirty tricks, including pressuring mayors of opposition parties by threatening the deprivation of government funding and bribing prosecutors and judges (ibid., 167).

Facing these difficulties, the opposition leaders, despite being determined to run against Fujimori, “never achieved the organizational unity equivalent to that of the Chilean opposition under Pinochet” (Conaghan 2005, 170). There were sporadic protests demanding a return to democracy and the protection of human rights, but “party politicians were mainly absent from such demonstrations of opposition” (Cotler 2011, 59). As Conaghan (2005, 131) describes,

Since the coup, the government had counted on dealing with a passive, demobilized citizenry—people tired of politics, fearful of the violence once associated with it, and preoccupied with eking out a living under trying economic circumstances. Even when public opinion had opposed government conduct…no significant mass protest took place.

Right after the end of polling in the 2000 general election, the exit polls conducted by the news media showed that a second round of elections was inevitable. To ensure that Fujimori will not “steal” this result, the leading opposition candidate Alejandro Toledo mobilized supporters for
street demonstrations. These protest actions were also joined by presidential candidates and congressional candidates from other opposition parties. Finally, the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE) announced that Fujimori polled 49.84% of the vote and Toledo 40.39%. However, with concerns of biased electoral conditions, soon after the date of the second round election was set, Toledo asked for postponement but failed. Toledo decided to withdraw from the election, but the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE) refused to authorize Toledo’s withdrawal and kept his name on the ballot. The results in the run-off election favored Fujimori. More large-scale post-electoral mass protests and riots soon followed.

Calling for a new election was certainly the opposition’s major demand. Toledo announced a plan for a mass march to protest against the inauguration of Fujimori’s third term on July 28, 2000. The march, widely recognized as La Marcha de los Quatro Suyos, was organized with coordination among different political parties, opposition leaders, social movements, unions, regional associations, and Toledo’s Peru Posible party (Conaghan 2005, 210). An estimated 250,000 demonstrators joined a protest on the night before Fujimori’s inauguration, in which Toledo called for holding a new election, reconstituting the Tribunal Constitucional, and removing the head of the SIN (Peru’s intelligence agency), Vladimiro Montesinos (ibid., 216).

The anti-government La Marcha de los Quatro Suyos had captured the attention of most international news agencies because of its unprecedented large scale. However, it is important to note that when the Fujimori regime fell, “neither trade unions nor political parties acted as the essential dramatis personae in Peru’s peculiar political transition” (Conaghan 2005, 247). The opposition was still disparate, fractionalized, and with no unified strategy.

On September 14, Fernando Olivera, the leader of an opposition party Frente Independiente Moralizador (FIM), held a press conference in which he played a videotape
leaked from an insider of the SIN. This videotape revealed a secret bribe deal between Montesinos and a defected congressman from Toledo’s Peru Posible. The televised scandal outraged the public. Thousands of demonstrators soon gathered for street protests. About fifty hours after the video was aired, Fujimori announced that he would call for a new general election and pledged that he would not be a candidate in that election. Montesinos fled to other countries, returned, and fled again several times. The scandal also triggered waves of defection from Fujimori’s Peru 2000 party.

On November 13, Fujimori left Peru. With support from Congress members who defected from the president, the opposition camp unified for the first time since Fujimori came into power in 1990. 66 The Congress removed the president of the Congress (who was pro-Fujimori) and elected a respected veteran politician Valentín Paniagua as the new president of Congress. Fujimori fled to Japan on November 17 and announced his resignation on November 19, becoming the first president in the world who fled while still in office and resigned from abroad. However, the Congress rejected his resignation. On November 21, the Congress successfully voted to remove Fujimori from the presidency. Paniagua was sworn in as the interim president of Peru and successfully implemented necessary institutional reforms for the fairness and transparency of the new election in 2001 to ensure a smooth political transition.

66 The unity of the opposition camp described here is not captured by the data.
Table 5.3 Opposition Mobilization Capacity and Protests in Peru (1991-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Opposition size (in %)</th>
<th>Opposition unity score</th>
<th>Combined opposition mobilization capacity (Size*Unity)</th>
<th>Annual average number of anti-government protests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>78.03</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>15.23</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>34.88</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>7.96</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The opposition size is measured by the vote shares of the opposition parties in the legislature. The opposition unity is measured as the inverse of the effective number of opposition parties in the legislature. Independent legislators were grouped as an Other category, and this category is excluded from the calculation for the opposition size and opposition unity variables because it is not a party. The data for annual average number of anti-government protests are from King and Lowe (2003).

Overall, the number of protests decreased during the Fujimori government. Although sporadic protest events occurred under Fujimori’s rule, large-scale mass mobilization seldom took place because of weak parties and a weak civil society. As Table 5.3 shows, the opposition camp experienced dramatic changes under Fujimori’s rule. After the 1990 election, the camp was very large but fragmented. After the 1995 election, the opposition camp was fragmented but much smaller than the camp from 1990 to 1992. The protest data show that the opposition camp still had some level of mobilization capacity from 1990 to 1992, but when the opposition camp became weaker from 1995 to 2000, the protest event count shrank. The ratio of change in opposition mobilization capacity and the ratio of change in protests are similar: the ratio of change for opposition mobilization capacity is about -47.4%, and the ratio of change for average number of protests is about -45.0%.

5.5 POST-FUJIMORI PERU

The 2001 general elections marked a milestone: Peru became a new democracy after ten years of authoritarian rule. Alejandro Toledo won the election and became the first indigenous president.
in Peru’s history. However, with the APRA and the Fujimoristas exacerbating conflicts with the government and the internal fragmentation of Toledo’s *Peru Posible* party, for most of his period in government Toledo’s approval rate was very low. Moreover, the party system in post-Fujimori Peru was extremely fragmented. The relationship between parties and movements was very weak because it had been greatly undermined by Fujimori’s authoritarian rule. With an unpopular government and a large but fragmented opposition camp (that captured 73.7% of the vote in total with a unity score of 0.15), Peru had experienced a myriad of social protests across the country. More importantly, because of the lack of opposition unity, most of these protests were local in nature.

During the 2001 electoral campaign, Toledo’s written declaration to the Departmental Federation of Workers of Arequipa (FDTA) promising not to privatize the electricity in Arequipa helped him win over 70% of the vote in this region in the 2001 elections (Escárzaga 2009, 168). In March 2002, the Minister of Economy and Finance Pedro Pablo Kuczynski reaffirmed that privatizing public enterprises would harm the economy, but two months later, Kuczynski announced the proposed sale of two state-owned power companies, Egasa and Egasur, to a Belgian firm, Tractebel.

With the campaign promise broken, residents in Arequipa organized weeks of mass uprising to resist the sale. In mid-June, the government deployed troops to end the *Arequipazo*. The *Arequipazo* triggered new waves of localized protests, although most of these protests failed to be ongoing (Burron 2012, 134). For instance, in 2002 rice producers in Tarapoto went on strike in August, and peasant protesters occupied Cuzco’s airport in September demanding road construction. Beginning in August 2002, a series of protests were organized by *Federación de Productores Agropecuarios del Valle del Valle de Río Apurímac-Ene* (FEPAVRAE).
In late April 2004, citizens of Ilave in Puno organized a large-scale protest mobilization against the mayor involving thousands of protesters for three weeks (Meléndez 2012, 58). In July 2004, the protests in Quilish in Cajamarca against the expansion of mining projects that might cause water pollution had almost paralyzed the city and stopped mine construction (Meléndez 2009). On July 14, 2004, the CGTP called a national strike for the first time in the post-Fujimori era, demanding that Toledo change his neoliberal economic policies or resign (Brousek 2004).67 While the strike was generally peaceful, it failed to exert great pressure on the Toledo administration.68

After Alan García won the 2006 election for his second term in Peru, new waves of protest movements occurred in Peru. In 2007, the SUTEP, with little support from other parties (Interviewee P18, April 9, 2012), mobilized a large-scale national strike against the proposed educational law reforms, with the participation of more than 160,000 teachers (Salazar 2007). Conflicts between the police and local residents in rural mining areas over economic and environmental issues had been arising frequently, resulting in over 190 deaths (Lupu 2012, 622). In the Moqueguazo in 2008, the protesters demanded a larger share of mining taxes for their province Tacna (Meléndez 2012, 87-95).

Between April and June 2009, the Asociación Inter-étnica de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP) had led a large-scale protest campaign in Bagua (located in the northern Peruvian Amazon area) against the García government’s attempts to pass a promulgation of legislative decrees that allowed foreign investment to exploit natural resources in the region (Hughes 2010).

67 The CGTP claimed that 80% of the workers joined the strike, but the Toledo government said that only 2% of workers in the country joined the strike (Notisur 2004).
68 Interestingly, many interviewees mentioned the unforgettable “butt-kicking” scene captured by the news media in a protest march supporting CGTP’s strike. This incident was when a protester suddenly intervened in the way of Alan García: Garcia, while holding a Peruvian flag, kicked the protester’s buttocks angrily trying to remove him. In my opinion, this incident might be interpreted as a prelude of García’s antagonism against protests in his second administration.
This two-months long protest, known as Baguazo, resulted in the death of more than 24 policemen and ten civilian protesters (Salmón 2013, 376-7). The protest eventually forced the government to rescind the legislation, but with very high costs. There was little support from existing political parties in Baguazo. A sociologist who is also an important member of AIDESEP indicated that there was no presence of political parties in the protest (Interviewee P17, April 6, 2012).

During the Toledo and García administrations, the opposition camp was large but lacked sufficient mobilization capacity. Both Toledo and García chose to continue the process of economic liberalization and privatization, which had greatly weakened traditional labor unions such as the CGTP and the CCP. However, Toledo and García adopted different ways to interact with social movements. While “the Toledo administration exercised considerable restraint in dealing with the manifold social mobilizations” (St John 2010, 72), “the García administration adopted a combative stance as well as pursuing a legislative agenda which, for some, amounts to a ‘criminalization of social protest’” (Pegram 2011, 223; see also Laplante 2008, 332). The interviews that I conducted during my field work confirmed this point. A political scientist in the PUCP argued that Toledo neither had a pro-movement nor an anti-movement policy (Interviewee P19, April 9, 2012). A congressman of the PNP even stated that García’s antagonism toward social movements was as if all the social movement organizations were his enemies (Interviewee P12, April 3, 2012).

The rise of Ollanta Humala had its first signal when he entered the second round of presidential election in 2006 and fell to García. Being seen as another anti-systemic populist figure in 2006, Humala adopted a much more moderate stance in his 2011 campaign (Lupu 2012,
Moreover, Humala’s *Partido Nacionalista Peruano* (PNP) formed a broad coalition, *Gana Perú*, which received the support of various leftist parties (e.g., *Patria Roja*), indigenous movements (the AIDESEP and the CONACAMI), and organized labor (the CGTP) (Burron 2012, 136; León 2011; Schmidt 2012, 626).

While the relationship between Humala and social movements seems better than that during the García government, the regional protests initiated against the Conga project of Cajamarca from 2011 to 2012 posed a major challenge to Humala’s relationship with civil society. A political scientist in the PUCP commented during an interview that these protests earned Humala an image of a “traitor” of social movements (Interviewee P19, April 9, 2012). The Conga project was first initiated in the Toledo administration, involving foreign investment in arguably the largest gold mine in Latin America. The greatest controversy of this project is that it involved removing four lakes and replacing them with four man-made reservoirs. Local residents had serious concerns that these reservoirs would not ensure the necessary supply of water for human and agricultural use and that the mining would result in serious environmental damage.

69 It is interesting to note that, because of their low popularity at the end of their terms, neither Toledo’s party (*Peru Posible*) nor García’s party (APRA) fielded their own presidential candidates for the upcoming election. Moreover, *Peru Posible* won only two seats in the 2006 congressional election, and the APRA won only four in 2011. Lupu (2012, 623) argues that “[t]he fact that APRA – once considered Peru’s only institutionalized party – was unable to retain its seats without a presidential candidate suggests that its apparent comeback in 2006 was more the result of García’s electoral success than voters’ support for the party itself.”

70 There are competing explanations for why Humala defeated Keiko Fujimori in 2011. Interestingly, during my field work, non-leftist politicians (Interviewee P4, March 29, 2012; and Interviewee P11, April 2, 2012) tended to emphasize that Humala’s strategy of taking advantage of other candidates’ weakness was a key for his winning the election. In contrast, leftist party members (Interviewee P9, March 31, 2012) and social movement activists (Interviewee P7 and P8, March 31, 2012) tended to emphasize the importance of the support from small leftist parties, regional groups, and social movements that coordinated with Humala’s PNP. The scholars and intellectuals with whom I conducted interviews during my field work had diverse opinions about the role of social movements in Humala’s electoral victory. A political scientist at the PUCP mentioned that the left supported Humala “without questioning” him (Interviewee P5, March 29, 2012). A DESCO investigator argued that support from the political left has been “kidnapped” by Humala, so the key to Humala’s success was his de-radicalization of his ideological and policy stance (Interviewee P10, April 2, 2012). A political scientist in the PUCP also echoed this point, arguing that the change from a radical discourse to a more moderate, centrist discourse helped Humala win the election (Interviewee P19, April 9, 2012). In contrast, a sociologist in the PUCP contended that it is correct to say that Humala received a lot of votes from various social movements, but the key to his success is the media effects of the intense localized protests on influencing public opinion country-wide (Interviewee P13, April 3, 2012).
pollution (Triscritti 2013, 442). The decision to develop the Conga mine was approved by the García government. In July 2011, the Regional President of Cajamarca, Gregorio Santos, joined the communities’ protest against the Conga Project.

During the electoral campaign, Humala promised to stop the Conga project and promote the involvement of local communities in decision-making over resource extraction. However, after becoming president, Humala reneged on his promise. The government tried to urge the mining corporation to comply with more restrictive rules to protect the environment, and at the same time tried to urge the local communities to accept a revised Conga Project. However, the local residents did not accept the deal. The Regional President Gregorio Santos, an ex-member of Patria Roja who founded the Movimiento de Afirmación Social party in May 2012, continued to lead protests against the Conga Project.

The anti-Conga protests attracted some political parties’ involvement. For instance, many party members of Patria Roja joined; members of Tierra y Liberdad, a new party led by Marco Arana, also joined the protests. However, it does not mean that parties played an important role in organizing the anti-Conga mobilization (Interviewee P7, March 30, 2012). In fact, neither parties nor organized social movements organized the protest mobilization in Cajamarca (Interviewee P9, March 31, 2012). Instead, a localized organization of peasant communities, rondas campesinas, played an important role in the organization of anti-mining protests in the area (Bebbington et al. 2010; Taylor 2011).

In July 2012, a sixty-day state of emergency was declared to confront the local protests in Cajamarca, which had caused the death of five peasants. In September 2012, the mining

71 Meléndez (2009) has described protest mobilizations in earlier years in Cajamarca as “mobilization without movements.”
72 In some regions like Piura, rondas campesinas have strong relations with Patria Roja (De Echave et al. 2009, 242).
corporation decided to postpone mining until 2014 (Triscritti 2013, 443). To some extent, the cause of the protests for the case of Cajamarca was similar to that of the Arequipazo in Toledo’s administration (Interviewee P10, April 2, 2012). In both cases, presidential candidates made a commitment to defending local people’s interests during the electoral campaign, but broke such a commitment right after they won the election. Moreover, both cases generated political crises and raised important controversial issues.

One important feature of the contemporary Peruvian protests is that they were “geographically segmented or territorialized in peripheral regions or interior provinces” (Arce 2008, 40). A comment provided by an ex-director of Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER) in an interview supports Arce’s point, claiming that the social protests that SER has recently participated in were more successful at the local level than at the national level (Interviewee P1, March 26, 2012).

Table 5.4 Comparing Opposition Mobilization Capacity and Protests under the García Government and the Humala Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Opposition size (in %)</th>
<th>Opposition unity score</th>
<th>Combined opposition mobilization capacity (Size*Unity)</th>
<th>Monthly average number of national-level protests</th>
<th>Monthly average number of local-level protests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2007/4-2011/4</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011/5-2013/12</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Opposition size is measured by the vote shares of the opposition parties in the legislature. Opposition unity is measured as the inverse of the effective number of opposition parties in the legislature. Independent legislators were grouped as an Other category, and this category is excluded from the calculation for the opposition size and opposition unity variables because it is not a party. The data for monthly average number of national-level and local-level protests are from Defensoría del Pueblo.
Table 5.4 shows that the size and unity of the two different opposition camps during the García government and the Humala government are very similar. Given that the estimated overall opposition mobilization capacity for the opposition camp under both governments is similar, it is expected that the monthly average number of protests for both governments should be also similar. However, Table 5.5 indicates that there are interesting patterns for national-level protests and local-level protests for each government. First, the data show that a large but fragmented opposition camp is able to only mobilize a very limited number of large-scale protests, which suggests an important implication for my theory. Second, the data suggest that while a large and fragmented opposition camp is not able to mobilize more large-scale protests, it may have a positive effect in increasing local-level protests. In other words, protests still took place when the opposition camp is extremely fragmented, but most protests would be geographically segmented in peripheral regions, implying that many protests took place spontaneously without a coordinating body.

In addition, the data shows that there have been more subnational-level protests under the Humala government, which may cast some doubts on my theory given that the opposition mobilization capacity is similar under both governments. One possible explanation for the difference pertains to the level of analysis. In this sense, it might be necessary to use subnational-level electoral data to measure opposition mobilization capacity at the subnational level, which will be more adequate for explaining the frequency of subnational protests. Another possible explanation is about the leader’s attitude towards social movements. Given that the Humala government is generally less repressive of social movements compared to the García government, as some of my interviewees have pointed out (Interviewee P5 and Interviewee P6,
March 29, 2012), social movements might tend to take advantage of this opportunity to mobilize more localized protests.

5.6 CONCLUSION

In Peru, political parties are weak, the party system is fragmented, and substantive party/movement relations are virtually non-existent. As Roberts describes, the organizational development of contemporary Peruvian parties “was minimal, informal, and ephemeral, as they lacked the central features associated with modern political parties…Peruvian ‘parties’ were electoral labels rather than political organizations, and their empty shells served as little more than vehicles for dominant personalities” (Roberts 2006, 82; see also Tanaka 2003, 227). Although the opposition camp has been relatively large since the 2000s, the lack of unity in the camp often impedes the opposition parties’ mobilization capacity for protests. It is possible that some social movement organizations might be able to establish a stronger relationship with political parties, in particular when the organizations’ leaders were elected as a local Congress member (Interviewee P3, March 28, 2012). However, such a relationship might be difficult to maintain because these ex-leaders might choose to focus on their own political career and weaken relations with their previous organizations (Interviewee P1, March 26, 2012).

What kinds of linkages do parties establish with societal actors in Peru? For the APRA, arguably the most institutionalized party, the linkage was first established based on the charisma of its founder, Haya de la Torre. With the charismatic linkage, the APRA had a dominant influence over unionized labor in its formative years (Pareja Pflucker 1980). As the party developed, a kind of encapsulating/participatory linkage strengthened (Roberts 2002, 18), in
which the party provided an array of social services that facilitated participation and partisan
loyalty. During the two Alan García administrations, the APRA created very strong clientelist
linkages with their supporters.

Beginning from 1990, the charismatıc linkage and marketing linkage have been the two
dominant types of party/society linkages due to Fujimori’s political legacy. The rise of Humala’s
PNP seems to provide a relatively unified platform for the Peruvian left, but it is still not clear
whether the PNP will be further institutionalized and will build a programmatic linkage with its
supporting social movements.

Cooperation between social movement organizations and political parties does exist in
Peru, but in various ways. Many cases of close party/movement relations have their past social
ties with shared ideologies. For instance, the CGTP was established by Partido Comunista
Peruano (PCP), the SUTEP has a close relationship with Patria Roja, and the CCP has a
historical tie with Partido Unificado Mariateguista (PUM) (Tanaka 2002, 196). However,
having a historical tie between parties and social movements does not necessarily imply that such
relationships are strong. An associate investigator at the Centro de Estudios y Promoción del
Desarrollo (DESCO) argued that many relationships between parties and social movements can
be best described as only nominal instead of substantive (Interviewee P10, April 2, 2012). This
point is echoed by an ex-secretary general of SUTEP, who indicated that SUTEP’s coordination
with Patria Roja “only remains at the formal, institutional level,” and “while a group of
militantes of Patria Roja controls the leadership of the SUTEP, this kind of control never
becomes prevalent systematically throughout the whole sector of teachers…it is not surprising

73 When I visited APRA’s headquarters in Lima, which is called APRA-Casa del Pueblo (located on Ave. Alfonso
Ugarte), I was impressed that inside the headquarters there are childcare facilities and dental clinics. I also saw a big
field where many children were playing soccer.
that many SUTEP members vote for APRA or other parties in the elections” (Interviewee P18, April 9, 2012). In other words, while leaders of Patria Roja and SUTEP might have good friendships, the party might not have influence on the movement at the rank-and-file level and vice versa. A consultant for the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima who is also a party elite for Patria Roja stated that the relationship between Patria Roja and SUTEP is based on an instrumental logic (Interviewee P2, March 26, 2012), in which SUTEP only seeks help from Patria Roja for solving their materialistic problems.

Despite the historical ties, some social movement organizations might adopt a flexible strategy interacting with different parties. One important leader of the CCP stated that, although his organization currently has a coordination relationship with Partido Socialista del Perú, it also coordinates with other leftist parties in protest mobilization, “because all of us used to work collectively” (Interviewee P8, March 31, 2012). An adviser of the CGTP also stated that, unlike the CTP, “a mere appendix of the APRA,” the CGTP has more autonomy to work with many other leftist parties and movements (Interviewee P14, April 4, 2012). An adviser of Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER) indicated that “we generally coordinate with all kinds of parties. It depends on the regions where we work” (Interviewee P1, March 26, 2012).

The organizational form of protests varies in Peru, but most protests are in the form of alliance or network invocation (Jones et al. 2001). For instance, the general strike of 2004 and the Baguazo in 2008 are cases of network invocation, in which a key social movement organization takes major responsibility for making decisions and draws other organizations in mobilization. In terms of the strategies of mobilizing resources for protests, some parties directly provide support and resources for protest mobilization, while others provide indirect support through attracting media attention. As a high-ranked official in the Ministry of Intercultural
Affairs remembered, the PNP did not directly support Baguazo, but it sent a group of party representatives to visit the victims’ families in Bagua (Interviewee P20, April 9, 2012).

The level of institutionalization of the relationship between parties and social movements also varies in Peru. The CGTP has different organizational units to deal with public relations with the Congress and other external social groups (Interviewee P14, April 4, 2012), while the CUT maintained only informal relations with parties without an institutionalized unit within the organization (Interviewee P16, April 5, 2012). Unlike the CGTP and the CUT, the AIDESEP and the CONACAMI choose to keep some distance from other political parties by focusing on strengthening their organizations by coordinating with other social movements (Interviewee P17, April 6, 2012; Interviewee P21, April 10, 2012). In February 2012, five indigenous and peasant organizations—the AIDESEP, the CONACAMI, the CCP, Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA), and Organización Nacional de Mujeres Indígenas Andinas y Amazónicas del Perú (ONAMIAP) signed a Pacto de Unidad to advance indigenous interests.

One interesting finding from my field work is that, although leftist parties tend to have better relations with social movement organizations, these parties might not have an institutionalized organization to deal with their relations with movements. In fact, some conservative parties might try to maintain relationships with social movements. For instance, a leader of Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC) claimed that his party has an institutionalized unit for interacting with various social organizations, but at the same time the party is very careful to not let these organizations’ agendas dominate the party’s agenda because “unlike the PPC, which is a party that focuses on national issues, many social organizations only represent very particular interests and have strong clientelistic tendency” (Interviewee P11, April 2, 2012).
In contrast, while social movements’ support is often seen as a key for Humala’s electoral success in 2011, a congressman of the PNP said that his party currently neither has an institutionalized unit for dealing with its relationships with social organizations nor has a long-term plan for building such relationships (Interviewee P12, April 3, 2012). At the same time, this interviewee also emphasized that the PNP does not aim to build a party/movement coalition like the MAS in Bolivia, in which the social movements are an instrument for the party. An even more surprising answer was found for the APRA. An ex-Minister of the Alan Garcia administration (2006-2010) mentioned in an interview that the APRA, given the fact that it is the most institutionalized party in Peru, does not have a clear long-term plan for coordinating with particular social movements (Interviewee P4, March 29, 2012).

To summarize, social movements in Peru lack strong linkages with political parties. Moreover, Peruvian social movements often fail to make common cause and coordinate actions around a comprehensive set of political demands that would lead to more fundamental social changes (Crabtree 2011a, 244). As a result, most of Peruvian protests were on a localized scale and for a limited amount of time (Crabtree 2011a, 245).
Taiwan is an instance that directly supports my theoretical hypothesis that a strong and united opposition camp tends to mobilize more anti-government protests. In the first section, I discuss the social and political circumstances under the KMT authoritarian regime. I analyze the evolution of the political opposition from the birth of Dangwai movement to the building of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. In the second section, I discuss the interactions between the DPP and social movements from late 1980s to 2000, in which Taiwanese politics had become more open due to Chiang Ching-kuo’s political liberalization and Lee Teng-hui’s democratic reforms. In the third section, I discuss the changing relationships between the DPP and social movements from 2000 to 2014.

Taiwan experienced the first democratic party turnover in 2000, when the DPP defeated the KMT. From 2000 to 2008, the social movements under the DPP government became weakened as many important activists were incorporated into Chen Shui-bian’s government. The KMT returned to power in 2008, and there has been a surprising resurgence of social movements. Although there was a correlation between opposition mobilization capacity and protests, my qualitative analyses suggest that the DPP did not engage in most of these protests, which implies that the role of opposition parties in mobilizing protests had become less important after 2008. I argue that this pattern might be explained by the fact that Taiwan is transforming itself from a developing country to a developed country. During the process,
protests have become more routinized and citizens are becoming more resourceful. Thus, more large-scale protests have been organized without the support of the opposition parties.

6.1 TAIWAN UNDER AUTHORITARIAN RULE

The history of Taiwan is a history of being ruled constantly by different colonial powers from 1624, including the Dutch (1624-1662), Spain (1626-1642), the Manchus from China (1683-1895), and Japan (1895-1945). At the end of World War II, Japan surrendered in August 1945 and ended its 50-year colonial rule of Taiwan. In October, Taiwan was placed under the control of the Republic of China (ROC) government led by the KMT. Facing increasing nationalist defeats, the ROC government enacted martial law in most provinces in China in December 1948. Beginning from May 1949, Taiwan was ruled under the imposition of martial law by the KMT government. In October 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in China. During the last two months of 1949, the KMT was defeated in a series of battles by the CCP in a Chinese civil war. The whole KMT regime apparatus, along with 1.5 million soldiers, officials, and refugees, retreated to Taiwan in December 1949.

After fifty years of Japanese rule, the Taiwanese were deeply influenced by Japanese culture and enjoyed a higher standard of living in a disciplined society, which posed a sharp contrast to the poor Chinese mainlanders who had just fled from a devastating war. Thus, “the Nationalist troops and officials were easily corrupted in the relatively affluent environment of Taiwan” (Wu 1995, 17). The first bloody clash between the Chinese culture and Japanese culture in Taiwan occurred on February 28, 1947, when a Taiwanese woman who sold untaxed cigarettes was caught and beaten to death by the police. The incident soon led to an nation-wide
revolt, and the KMT government’s violent repression caused about 10,000 to 28,000 deaths (Jacobs 2012, 34).

The massacre in 1947 “drove a generation of politically conscious social elites into self-imposed political passiveness” (Chu and Lin 2001, 113). After this tragic incident, the White Terror period began, in which the KMT regime repressed any views that were unfavorable to it based on the purpose of anti-communism. During the White Terror period, the KMT ruled Taiwan based on three tools: the “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion” (Temporary Provisions hereafter), martial law, and the Taiwan Garrison Command. With these tools in force, some 14,000 people were imprisoned for political reasons and among them three to four thousand were executed (Jacobs 2007, 236). The Taiwan Garrison Command, a military organization that enforced martial law by arresting and charging civilians at the KMT’s will, was the most notorious instrument of the KMT’s control over the society. This organization maintained an extensive network of informants to watch over all political and social sectors (Wu 1995, 25).

Despite using the tools of coercion, the KMT had penetrated deeply into Taiwan’s society through the building of clientelist networks. At the grassroots level, the KMT built up strong local political machines based on political spoils, rules manipulation, and the party’s penetration through anti-communist youth organizations, teachers’ associations, women’s organizations, farmers associations, irrigation associations, and produce cooperatives (Ho 2007; Sutter 1988, 57). Local KMT factions invested in land speculation by borrowing money from state-owned banks at a low interest rate, which helped these KMT factions accumulate wealth quickly.

74 In May 1948, the National Assembly enacted the “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion” which suspended the constitution, transferred to the president the powers reserved to other branches of the government, and prohibited the formation of new parties (Roy 2003, 83-4). When the KMT regime retreated to Taiwan, the only legal parties were the KMT, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the China Youth Party.
Moreover, above the local level, the KMT controlled and demobilized all social sectors through preemptive incorporation of business and professional associations, labor unions, state employees, journalists, intellectuals, and students (Chu 1994, 101). In particular, the KMT rewarded people who served in the military, educational sectors, and civil services with generous social welfare benefits, which made these groups more loyal to the KMT than other occupational groups. Overall, political clientelism helped depoliticize and de-radicalize masses but also helped mobilize individuals into loyal supporters (Wu 1987).

Although the KMT’s rule was authoritarian in nature, formally the regime had several “democratic façades.” First, there were elections held after the KMT retreated to Taiwan. However, these elections were held only at the local level, in which the KMT had widely used vote-buying and other fraud tactics to secure the electoral success of its candidates. Second, there were two institutions acting in the role of national legislatures. However, the positions of the representatives of the national-level Legislative Yuan (elected in 1948) and National Assembly (elected in 1947) on Mainland China were “temporarily frozen.” Before the first comprehensive re-elections were held for the Legislative Yuan in 1992 and for National Assembly in 1991, the average age of these representatives was over eighty. The KMT regime justified the “life term” of these representatives because a new comprehensive national election

75 The elections at the highest level were only for Provincial Assembly. The members of Provincial Assembly were elected by direct popular vote in 1959 for the first time. The posts for Provincial Governor and the mayors of the two “special municipalities” (Taipei and Kaohsiung, also the biggest two cities in Taiwan) remained appointed by the central government until the early 1990s.
76 In November 1947, the KMT invited all existing political parties to participate in the first National Assembly election. In January 1948, the first Legislative Yuan election was held. While the two KMT satellite parties (the Democratic Socialist Party and the China Youth Party) participated, the Communist Party and the Democratic League did not. These two elections are the only popular elections held in the whole of China so far.
77 The political opposition used to ridicule these two institutions as “ten-thousand-year Parliaments” and the representatives as “old thieves.”
would not be held until the ROC “retakes Mainland China in the future,” which is an unfeasible goal.  

Another crucial institutional factor of the KMT’s control over Taiwan was the institutionalization of ethnic discrimination. Similar to the Japanese, the KMT also considered the Taiwanese natives as second-class citizens and systematically favored Chinese mainlanders over the Taiwanese. The institutionalization of such ethnic discrimination was maintained through ethnically-biased political recruitment (Wang 1989, 87-8), ethnically-biased civil servant recruitment examinations (Luoh 2003), state-controlled mass media (Chun 1994, 66-7; Ku 1997, 178), language policies that marginalize Taiwanese (Cheng 1994), and educational policies that prioritize Chinese culture over local Taiwanese culture (Liu and Hung 2002). Therefore, scholars have argued that the post-1945 Chinese Nationalist Party’s (Kuomintang, KMT) rule of Taiwan is a type of “internal colonialism” in nature (Fulda 2002; Qi 2012).

6.2 THE EMERGENCE OF THE DANGWAI MOVEMENT

With strong ruling tools, the KMT felt little pressure for even a limited political opening. However, civil society was not absolutely compliant. For instance, Lei Chen and a number of liberal-oriented Chinese mainlander intellectuals published the first issue of the well-known Free China Fortnightly Journal (Ziyou Zhongguo banyuekan), with the purpose of promoting freedom

78 In 1954, the Council of Grand Justices ruled that the representatives in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly who retreated to Taiwan could occupy their seats until the next election. As sitting members died, the candidates who had finished second or third in the 1947-1948 elections would be appointed. Facing pressure for new parliamentary elections by the Taiwanese people, the government allowed the first supplementary elections in both legislative bodies in 1969, adding 11 new Legislative Yuan members and 8 new National Assembly members (Roy 2003, 85).
and democracy. On March 18, 1960, Lei Chen organized a group of 32 Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders and issued “Fifteen Demands” for political reforms to the KMT regime under the banner of Dangwai, literally “outside the (ruling KMT) Party” (Jacobs 2012, 39-40). However, after Free China published a series of issues criticizing Chiang Kai-shek and declared a plan of establishing a new political party called the China Democratic Party, Lei Chen and other members of Free China were arrested on September 4, 1960. Lei Chen was later convicted of the “crime of sedition incitement” and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment.79

The first change of the KMT’s authoritarianism since it ruled Taiwan occurred in 1972. In 1971, the ROC’s seat in the United Nations representing China was replaced by the People’s Republic of China. The diplomatic setback seriously undermined the KMT’s ruling legitimacy as its claim to represent all China became extremely problematic (Hood 1997, 64-5). Beginning from May 1972 when he became Premier, Chiang Ching-kuo started to adopt a so-called Taiwanization policy by co-opting more Taiwanese local elites in the KMT ruling circle (Tien 1992, 43). The Taiwanization policy had indirectly strengthened the political opposition because not all Taiwanese local elites who were incorporated were able to obtain higher posts in the KMT regime. Thus, some of these elites chose to leave the KMT and joined the Dangwai movement.

During the 1970s, the Dangwai movement grew with increasing publications of several political magazines. The Intellectual magazine (Dashuei) served as a platform for liberal scholars and writers from different ethnic backgrounds to advocate pro-reform ideas and arguments. In 1975, a Dashuei writer Chang Chun-hung co-founded the Taiwan Political Review (Taiwan

79 Another key event that challenged the KMT regime in the 1960s was the failed attempt to publish “A Declaration of Formosan Self-salvation.” See Peng (1972) for the details of this event.
zhenglun) with two important Dangwai political figures: Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang.

In the 1977 local election, Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang successfully formed a unified electoral alliance of Dangwai candidates, winning four mayoral posts and 21 Provincial Assembly seats. Fearing that the KMT would steal the electoral success of the non-partisan candidate Hsu Hsin-liang in the election for Taoyuan County magistrate, Hsu’s supporters gathered on the streets protesting against electoral misconduct of the KMT, burning down a police station. This unorganized riot was called the Chungli Incident, which marked the first ever large-scale post-election protest in Taiwan. After the protest, the KMT government allowed Hsu’s victory to stand.

In preparation for the 1978 supplementary elections for the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly, opposition politicians agreed for the first time to run a joint electoral campaign. On December 5, more than 40 Dangwai candidates and 700 supporters convened an in-door campaign rally and press conference, which was the first public campaign activity organized by the opposition since martial law was implemented (Jacobs 2012, 54). However, the election was postponed by the government after the United States announced its switch of diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on December 16.

The Dangwai continued its activities for the upcoming election. On January 22, 1979, the Executive of Taoyuan County Hsu Hsin-liang and a group of opposition leaders organized a protest rally in Qiaotou, which was the first ever organized protest activity since martial law was implemented in Taiwan. In May 1979, a number of opposition politicians formed an integrated political force around the Formosa Magazine (Meilidao). The Meilidao magazine soon became
propaganda media for Dangwai and its local distribution centers served as Dangwai’s local branches (Wu 1995, 35).

In December 1979, a mass rally was organized by the members of Meilidao magazine in Kaohsiung. This protest was violently repressed when the rally turned into a riot. Nearly all major Dangwai leaders were arrested and sentenced to imprisonment after the Meilidao Incident. The Meilidao Incident had a tremendous influence on Taiwanese political development. On February 20, 1980, eight Dangwai leaders were tried in a military court based on the formal indictments issued by the Taiwan Garrison Command, while other people under arrest were tried before civil courts. A group of lawyers that represented the defendants, including Chen Shui-bian, later became important members of a pro-democracy movement along with these eight Dangwai leaders.

In 1984, various Dangwai factions decided to work together in provincial and municipal elections scheduled in January 1985. In order to strengthen the coordination between candidates, the Dangwai Public Policy Research Association (DPPRA) was established in May. After a marathon nominating session on September 28, 42 candidates were recommended and ran in the electoral campaign under the DPPRA banner. The electoral results showed that the coordination efforts had paid off. Dangwai and other non-KMT candidates captured about 30% of the vote in the election. This DPPRA began setting up local offices in February 1986, which helped the Dangwai lay crucial foundations for the establishment of a new party (Liu 1999, 69).

While the Dangwai became stronger, there was an important change occurring in the KMT. In 1984, Chiang Ching-kuo picked Lee Teng-hui as his vice-presidential running mate for the 1984 indirect presidential election. The rise of Lee represents an important signal of a further Taiwanization in the KMT. Beginning from 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo adopted a series of reforms
toward political liberalization, which can be considered a response to pressure from a growing middle class in Taiwan’s civil society (Wang 1989). With foreign aid from the United States (Jacoby 1967; McBeath 1997, 33-6; Wang 1999) and export-oriented trade policies (Amsden 1979; Clark and Tan 2012, 9-39; Gold 1986), Taiwan achieved rapid economic development from the 1970s to the 1980s. The remarkable economic achievement had contributed to the emergence of the “new middle class” in the 1980s, which consisted of liberal intellectuals, white collar professionals, and university academics (Hsiao 2001). The growing middle class had led other classes in the democratic movement (Hsiao 2001, 172-3; Hsiao and Koo 1997) and thus produced structural pressures for a political opening in Taiwan (Cheng 1989; Tien 1989, 1992).

Similar to the patterns of Peruvian protests, during the 1980s many social protest activities in Taiwan were still fragmented, spontaneous, and unorganized in nature. However, as discussed earlier, the Dangwai emerged as an important unified force that was behind various protests. According to Huang (1988, 7; cited in Wu 1995, 61), the Dangwai were involved in 90 out of the 170 political protests that occurred between 1983 and 1987. As many Dangwai members became masterful in using protests to confront the KMT’s rule, this confrontational tactic also encouraged other marginalized social groups such as women and aboriginals to use the same strategy to pursue their interests (Chu 1993, 178).

On September 28, 1986, the Dangwai along with various societal actors formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). On October 15, 1986, the KMT Central Standing Committee voted to end the ban on party formation and lift martial law. Although the DPP

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80 The eruption of the Korean War was the major reason that the United States decided to support the ROC government to prevent the proliferation of communism to other regions in Asia Pacific. The US aid was comprised of military aid and economic aid. The latter helped stabilize Taiwan’s hyperinflation caused by the KMT’s poor currency policies in the first four years after it retreated to Taiwan (Amsden 1985; Jacoby 1967, 165).

81 Huang (1988) categorizes protest activities into political, environmental, economic, and labor protests, respectively. The categorization might be problematic because many protests had multiple goals and thus could be categorized in multiple categories.
candidates ran in the Legislative Yuan election in December 1986 under DPP the banner, they were treated as non-partisans in official statistics because the DPP did not formally obtain legal status until January 1989, when a new Civic Organization Law was implemented. The abolition of the martial law was effective in July 1987. On January 1, 1988, two weeks before the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, restrictions on newspapers were formally lifted, constituting the final important step in the political liberalization.

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the mass social protests in Taiwan became more diversified and intensified. Unsurprisingly, many of these protests were organized or supported by the DPP. In May 1987, the DPP set up a Department of Social Movements led by the New Tide faction with the explicit purpose of allying with various social organizations to form a united front in the struggle against the KMT regime. The New Tide faction had its cadres installed in the leadership of many social movement organizations, such as Taiwan Labor Legal Assistance Association (founded in 1984) and the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU, founded in 1987) (Ho 2005, 406). In this sense, the DPP not only played an important role in the political opposition movement, but also had a direct and strong influence on the labor movement and the environmental movement.

Because the first comprehensive re-election for the national legislature (i.e., the Legislative Yuan) was not held until 1992, it was impossible to accurately gauge the mobilization capacity of the opposition camp based on data from the supplementary elections. However, it is reasonable to infer that the opposition camp in the 1980s, led by the Dangwai movement, was highly united. It was because, for most opposition leaders and supporters, there was only one goal: to combat the KMT regime. After martial law was lifted, episodes of large-scale anti-government protests abound. On December 25, 1987, more than 20,000 people joined
in the protest demonstration against the “thousand-year National Assembly.” On April 23, 1988, the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union staged an anti-nuclear protest with more than 5,000 participants. On May 1, an unexpected one-day walkout by railroad workers took place, protesting against poor working conditions and a lack of salary for overtime working (Wu 1995, 61). On May 20, about 4,000 farmers from southern counties organized a large-scale demonstration protesting against the government’s policy to open up the agricultural produce imports, which ended in considerable violence and large-scale arrests (Hsiao 1991; Roy 2003, 178).

6.3 POLITICS OF PROTESTS UNDER THE LEE TENG-HUI GOVERNMENT

When coming into power in 1988, Lee Teng-hui adopted various complicated political strategies to deal with the challenges that he faced. For instance, in order to pursue further democratization, he had to minimize the possibility of military intervention. To secure his power, he allied with some groups of Chinese mainlander elites against other elite groups in the decision-making circle. Moreover, he took advantage of pressure from civil society as a legitimate reason for his democratic reforms.

Concerned with the rise of conservative forces in the KMT and the undemocratic continuous existence of the National Assembly, a strong student movement emerged to organize the “Wild Lily Movement” on March 8, 1990. On March 14, a large-scale student demonstration was organized in front of the KMT headquarters, and the movement became increasingly strong as another demonstration started on March 16. While many DPP members took advantage of this historical moment supporting the demonstrations (Hsiao and Ho 2010, 51), the movement itself
did not build a direct connection with the DPP (Interview T7, March 6, 2012). The Wild Lily movement had a great impact on political development in Taiwan. Specifically, pressure from the movement combined with general support from society had transformed into a force for Lee Teng-hui to push forward further political reform. After being elected as the president by the National Assembly on March 21, Lee met with student representatives and accepted the demands of the students by convening a National Affairs Conference. Lee also invited several important DPP figures to attend that Conference, which marked a major change of the KMT regime towards the opposition force.

However, Lee still faced a strong challenge from a group of conservatives within the KMT. In order to defuse the political crisis, Lee was forced to choose Hau Pei-tsun, the Chief of the General Staff in the Ministry of National Defense (1981-1989), to be the new premier (Wu 1995, 45). This move apparently angered and disappointed many people, as they had high expectations for Lee, the first president with a Taiwanese ethnic background in Taiwan’s history. During his tenure as the Premier (June 1990 to February 1993), Hao was very hostile to social movements, calling the activists “thugs” and violently cracking down on a number of protest actions (Ho 2010, 9).

On April 17, 1991, the DPP Chairman Huang Hsin-chieh organized a large street demonstration in Taipei, in which about 30,000 to 50,000 people joined. On April 22, the National Assembly abolished the Temporary Provisions and terminated the “Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion.” On May 9, four people were arrested and charged with being financed by Shih Ming, a renowned Taiwan independence movement activist who lived in Japan. The arrests soon resulted in serious criticisms. On May 15,

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82 In August 1992, the government abolished the Taiwan Garrison Command as the Period of National Mobilization had ended.
hundreds of college students gathered to protest in the Taipei Train Station, demanding the government abolish the Betrayers Punishment Act, a law that limits the freedom of speech. Finally, the government abolished the Betrayers Punishment Act on May 17.

On May 20, 1991, the DPP organized the Union of Intellectuals against Political Prosecution, with about 10,000 people participating, demanding all universities and schools must be free from the presence of the military, police, and intelligence cells. On October 8, the 100 Action Union organized an “Opposing Military Parade, Abolishing Bad Law” sit-in in front of the Presidential Office Building. The “100 Action Union” was organized by a group of intellectuals, demanding the abolishment of Article 100 of the Criminal Code, which stipulates that anyone with the intent to subvert the government is subject to a sentence of imprisonment for the crime of sedition. On April 19, the DPP organized a large-scale protest calling for a constitutional reform for direct presidential elections, abolition of Article 100 of the Criminal Code, cancellation of the construction project of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, and social rights. On May 15, 1992, the Legislative Yuan revised Article 100 of the Criminal Code.

In response to increasing social pressure, the Lee government not only removed laws that limited freedom of speech, but also pushed for constitutional amendments for democratic reforms during the 1990s. For instance, the first constitutional amendment, approved in April 1991, had established the rules for new comprehensive re-elections for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. The second constitutional amendment, approved on May 28, 1992, paved a road for the first presidential election by the entire electorate of Taiwan, which would be held in 1996. The third constitutional amendment, approved in July 1994, made clear that the presidential election would be a popular election instead of an indirect election.
Lee won the 1996 presidential election, becoming the first popularly-elected president in Taiwan’s history. During Lee’s administration from 1996 to 2000, the government had to deal with rampant corruption and organized crime. On November 21, 1996, the Taoyuan County Magistrate Liu Pang-yu and seven other people were brutally killed by criminals. In early December, Peng Wan-ru, the Director of the Woman’s Department of the DPP, was found raped and dead. On December 21, woman’s rights movement organizations mobilized a large-scale protest demonstration demanding women’s right for safety at night. There was an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 participants joining the demonstration, marking the largest protest activity in the feminist movement history in Taiwan (Chao 2005, 39). This protest forced the Legislative Yuan to quickly pass the Sexual Assault Crime Prevention Act within days, effective from 1997.

The most notorious case that threatened public safety was the kidnapping and murder of Pai Hsiao-yen,83 the daughter of a Taiwanese TV celebrity. Pai’s tragic case triggered two large-scale anti-government protests in May 1997, led by various women’s rights organizations and human rights organizations.84 There were an estimated 50,000 people (with about 150 citizen groups) joining the first protest on May 4 and an estimated 100,000 people (with about 550 citizen groups) joining the second protest on May 18 (Chao 2005, 39-40; Schafferer 2003, 151-2). An important feature of the “May Insurgency” was that they attracted major opposition parties such as the DPP and the NP to join. The demonstrations greatly shocked the Lee Teng-hui government. The Minister of the Interior (Lin Feng-cheng) and a Minister without Portfolio (Ma Ying-jeou) resigned their cabinet posts first, and the Premier (Lien Chan) resigned on August 21. The KMT’s inability to deal with public safety issues seriously undermined the

83 At the time of writing, authorities have not solved the crime for the cases of Liu Pang-yu and Peng Wan-ru. Only the case of Pai Hsiao-yen has been solved.
84 See Chuang’s (2004) study for the mobilization process and the cultural meaning of the movement.
party’s electoral support base. In the 1997 local elections, the DPP won 12 county magistrate and city mayor seats, a substantive increase from the 6 positions won in 1993.

As Taiwan became more democratized in the 1990s, social movements have been more able to utilize multiple strategies to achieve their goals, while continuing to mobilize their supporters for protest. From December 1992, the Meinung anti-dam movement has cultivated linkages between the environmental movement, the Hakka movement, and community movements. Meinung activists’ insistence on movement autonomy through coalition building between different movements proved to be a successful alternative organizational strategy for other social movements (Peng 2013). Another remarkable example is women’s movements. The first street protest mobilized for promoting women’s rights and children’s rights in Taiwan’s history occurred in January 1987, in which the Presbyterian Church and various women’s rights movement organizations advocated for the protection of teenage prostitutes (Huang 2008, 267). In 1994, the women’s right movement organized an anti-sexual harassment march. On March 7, 1996, women’s movement activists proposed 104 demands for gender equality and organized a protest demonstration (ibid., 268).

In the late 1990s, protest actions organized by women’s rights organizations became fewer, as activists were increasingly incorporated in institutional channels. The Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women’s Rights (TAPWER), an important leading group in the May Insurgency in 1997, and other women’s rights organizations began to cooperate with the Taipei City Government, which led to the formation of the Women’s Rights and Interests Promotion Council as an agency of the Taipei City Government in 1995. 85 Some women’s rights

85 Borrowing from Migdal’s (1988; 2001) theory of state-society relations, Huang (2007) describes the active participation of women’s rights movements in these newly established government agencies as reflecting a “mutually embedded and mutually constituting state-society relationship in Taiwan.”
organizations cooperated with other political parties. For instance, in the 1998 local elections, the Taipei Women’s Awakening Association (TWAA) worked with the Green Party’s Women’s Division to field candidates for the electoral campaign (Chuang 2004, 248).

There was a trend that social movements become more routinized and institutionalized in the 1990s. For example, anti-nuclear protests and the May 1 labor protests have been routinized as a kind of annual ritual (Hsiao and Ho 2010, 54). The Labor Legislation Action Council (LLAC), established in late 1992, also organized the “Autumn March” on November 12 annually. On April 10, 1994, over two hundred civil organizations mobilized a large demonstration asking for education reform, in which an estimated 20,000 people participated. In response, Lee invited the Nobel Prize laureate Lee Yuan-Tseh to form an official Education Reform Committee in the Executive Yuan for initiating a new curriculum incorporating humanistic and liberal values.

Under Lee’s administrations, labor movements have gained some success due to their continuous mobilization efforts. As many companies relocated their factories to China, labor activists found it difficult to push unionizing campaigns because of the loss of employment. Facing this difficulty, labor activists strengthened their cooperation with the DPP (Ho 2006a, 116). On November 12, 1992, the DPP and various labor movement organizations organized mass mobilizations in Taipei and Kaohsiung to protest against these proposals, which eventually forced the KMT government to withdraw in March 1993 the revision draft of the Act for Settlement of Labor-Management Disputes (Ho 2006b, 132).86

In 1994, the central government started a universalized health care system in Taiwan, but the ratio of premiums paid by employers and employees would be adjusted, in which the

86 Clearly, not all labor movements were successful under the Lee administrations. For instance, the dispute in the 1992 strike at the Keelung Bus Company was dragged into prolonged litigation and finally solved with mixed results in 2000 (Ho 2006a, 114).
employees’ burden would increase dramatically. On November 1, 1994, the Taiwan Labor Front (TLF) organized a nationwide one-hour slowdown strike, which forced the government to adopt a new formula for the premium ratio that did not increase the employees’ burden (Taiwan Labor Front 2009, 35). In May 1996, the TLF organized a “Protecting the Rice Bowl” rally in Kaohsiung, asking for an unemployment insurance law and the forming of an independent nationwide confederation of labor unions. As labor activists kept pressuring Lee’s government, they finally obtained the extension of the Labor Standards Act in 1996, which assured that two million white-collar workers received minimum legal protection regarding labor issues (Ho 2010, 11).

Continuing the close relations with the Dangwai opposition movement in the 1980s, many of Taiwan’s social movements worked closely with the DPP under Lee’s administrations. In 1992, Taiwan held for the very first time a comprehensive election for the Legislative Yuan, in which all the “life-term” members of the Legislative Yuan who were elected in late 1940s were constitutionally purged. The DPP secured about 31% of popular votes and won 51 of the 116 seats. After Hau resigned due to Lee’s pressure in 1993, a group of young conservatives broke away from the KMT to establish the Chinese New Party (or New Party, NP), which soon became an important anti-Lee political force that was mainly comprised of Chinese mainlanders. The NP was an important player in the new multi-party system in Taiwan in the second half of the 1990s.
Table 6.1 Opposition Mobilization Capacity and Protests in Taiwan (1993-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Opposition size (in %)</th>
<th>Opposition unity score</th>
<th>Combined opposition mobilization capacity (Size*Unity)</th>
<th>Annual average number of anti-government protests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1993-1995</td>
<td>31.03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31.03</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>46.30</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>27.51</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>43.60</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The data for annual average number of anti-government protests are from King and Lowe (2003). Opposition size is measured by the vote shares of the opposition parties in the legislature. Opposition unity is measured as the inverse of the effective number of opposition parties in the legislature. Independent legislators were grouped as an Other category, and this category is excluded from the calculation for the opposition size and opposition unity variables because it is not a party.

Table 6.1 shows the change in the party/movement relations in the 1990s. The data suggest that the number of ant-government protests decreased as the opposition camp became weakened. In the 1995 election, the size of the opposition camp became larger and the opposition unity score became lower because of the NP’s participation. In the 1998 Legislative Yuan election, the KMT made a slightly improvement in its vote and seat shares compared to that of the 1995 election, while the DPP’s vote and seat shares dropped. The NP suffered a calamitous decline, winning only 5% of seats compared to 13% in 1995.

After 1996, Taiwan has become a democracy in a “minimalist” sense, which means that rulers are selected through competitive elections (Przeworski 1999). However, the stage of democratic consolidation has not yet been completed due to the challenges of authoritarian legacy left by the long-standing KMT regime. First, the KMT still had strong dominance over the newspapers, TV stations, and radios. Second, the lack of political neutrality in the military, the national-security agencies, the judicial branch, and the civil service was also an obstacle for Taiwan’s democratic consolidation. Third, KMT’s large amount of party assets made it possible to survive without reforming its authoritarian tendencies. Since the KMT regime retreated to Taiwan, the party had accumulated vast wealth through direct subsidies from the government.
budget, the making of banking and finance services laws that helped the KMT to expand and protect its own enterprises, and the collaboration between different KMT-owned enterprises or pro-KMT conglomerates to manipulate the stock market (McBeath 1997, 74). The party’s estimated $3 billion in assets made it “the richest party in the non-communist world” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 59). Given that the KMT’s assets have provided an incomparable resource for maintaining its patron-clientelist networks and supporting its electoral campaigns, other parties’ prospects to win the presidential elections are almost always in question.

6.4 NEW RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE DPP UNDER THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN GOVERNMENT

The presidential election campaign in 2000 was a crucial event for Taiwan’s political history. Chen Shui-bian, who originally entered the opposition movement as a lawyer for the defendants in the Meilidao Incident, had served as a Taipei City councilman and a legislator in the Legislative Yuan before he won the 1994 Taipei Mayoral election. Chen lost the 1998 reelection to the KMT political star Ma Ying-jeou, even though Chen had maintained an average approval of 70% during his mayorship. Chen soon announced his intention to run for the 2000 presidential election on behalf of the DPP after the 1998 mayoral election. In the meantime, the KMT had a serious split between the camp for Lien Chan, who received support from Lee Teng-hui, and the camp of Soong Chu-yu. Because of the conflicts between Lien and Soong as well as Taiwanese disappointment with the KMT’s black-gold politics in general, Chen eventually won the 2000 election with 39.3% of the vote, defeating Soong’s 36.8% and Lien’s 23%. The result marked the first peaceful party turnover in Taiwan’s political history.
The political development during the first few months after the 2000 presidential election was dramatic. After the official electoral results were announced on March 18, both supporters for Lien and Soong soon gathered in front of the KMT’s headquarters, protesting against Chairman Lee Teng-hui. The protesters claimed that Lee secretly supported Chen and intentionally split the KMT during the electoral campaign. Lee denied the charge, but the protest eventually led to Lee’s resignation as the Chairman of KMT on March 24. Soong founded the People First Party (PFP) on March 31, trying to continue his political career. In August, Lee helped to build the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which attracted a number of politicians who would be willing to support the DPP’s “Taiwan-first” cross-strait policy. With Lee being expelled from the KMT in September, Taiwan’s party system became divided into the “pan-green” camp of the DPP and the TSU and the “pan-blue” camp of the KMT, PFP, and NP.

There were numerous serious political challenges facing Chen in his first months after inauguration. Perhaps the biggest problem was that Taiwan’s political, social, and economic structures were still under the KMT’s influence and did not change much as Chen assumed power. Moreover, because of the non-concurrent election schedule, Chen faced a strong opposition camp (formed in the 1998 election) at the time of Chen’s inauguration. The DPP controlled only less than one third of the seats in the Legislative Yuan.

In hopes of cooperating with the powerful opposition from the KMT, Chen appointed Tang Fei as the Premier, who was a conservative former Minister of Defense in the KMT government. However, political gridlock and economic recession soon followed Chen’s inauguration. The first political gridlock revolved around the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. As Chen tried to fulfill his campaign promise of shutting down the plant, Tang Fei submitted his resignation on October 3, as he strongly supported the KMT’s stance for
continuing construction of the plant. On October 27, the new Premier Chang Chun-hsiung announced the cancellation of construction of the plant. With a two-thirds majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan, the KMT proposed to recall the president but later failed.

The controversy of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant ended on January 15, 2001, as the Council of Grand Justice ruled that the cabinet could not cancel the construction of the plant without reporting to the legislature and gaining its consent for policy change. President Chen and Premier Chang accepted the ruling. On February 13, Chang reached a conciliatory agreement with the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-pyng, to continue construction of the plant.

Chen’s political challenges continued as the KMT legislators kept obstructing the government’s annual budget and blocked passage of financial reform bills. As Chen came into power, he tried to implement a labor reform to reduce the legally-allowed maximum 48 working hours to 44 hours in 2000 and finally to 40 in 2004. However, the KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan passed a bill of 42 hours per week despite the reluctance of the DPP government. On November 10, 2001, the KMT exploited workers’ discontent against the poor economy to stage large-scale demonstrations in 22 counties and cities to demand more job opportunities. With the participation of many KMT candidates for legislative election in December, the demonstrations were the first organized by the KMT as an opposition party (Low 2001).

87 As a leader of the Taiwan Labor Front indicated, “it is impossible for Taiwan’s independent labor movement to cooperate with the KMT, even when it is in opposition.” However, labor movements welcomed the spontaneous pro-labor law-making by the KMT, although it can be interpreted that “in Taiwan, a car [party] changes to the left lane [becomes left-leaning] only when it wants to overtake another car; after overtaking, the car will change back to the middle or right lane” (Interviewee T2, March 2, 2012). The controversial case of working hours also reveals the embarrassing role of certain pro-DPP labor unions. For instance, the newly established Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU) supported the DPP government’s proposal, but was criticized as a “traitor” by the Labor Legislation Action Council (LLAC) (Chen 2012).
Table 6.2 Opposition Mobilization Capacity and Protests in Taiwan (2001-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Opposition size (in %)</th>
<th>Opposition unity score</th>
<th>Combined opposition mobilization capacity (Size*Unity)</th>
<th>Annual average number of anti-government protests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>36.81</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>23.51</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The data for annual average number of anti-government protests are from King and Lowe (2003). Opposition size is measured by the vote shares of the opposition parties in the legislature. Opposition unity is measured as the inverse of the effective number of opposition parties in the legislature. Independent legislators were grouped as an Other category, and this category is excluded from the calculation for the opposition size and opposition unity variables because it is not a party.

Table 6.2 compares two periods during the Chen government from 2000 to 2004. Because of the non-concurrent election schedule, Chen faced different opposition camps in his first term. As can be seen, Chen faced more protests in the first period when the pan-blue camp had much strong mobilization capacity. In the second period, the pan-blue camp shrunk and became more fragmented, and thus the number of protests also decreases.\(^88\) An alternative explanation is that the DPP government opened up a plethora of channels for social movement activists to participate in the policy-making process (Ho 2005).\(^89\) On the one hand, the incorporation of

\(^88\) However, there was a number of protests organized by the actors of vested interests against certain policy reforms. In August 2002, the National Teachers’ Association (NTA) organized a large-scale demonstration on September 28, 2002, with about 60,000 participants taking part in the protest (Huang 2002). On November 23, 2002, organized by an umbrella organization Taiwan Agro-Fighters United (TAFU), an estimated 110,000 farmers and fishermen joined a rally protesting against government reforms of the farmers’ and fishermen’s rural credit cooperative units (Tsai 2002). These credit cooperative units had long served as KMT’s corrupt local machine for vote-buying, but at the same time they were also the major source for farmers and fishermen to find credits. Therefore, it was not surprising that many KMT local political bosses as well as the political heavyweights of the pan-blue camp supported the protest.

\(^89\) For instance, some social movement activists were recruited to formulate policy proposals in the Environmental Protection Administration, the Ministry of Education, the Council of the Indigenous People, the National Youth Commission, the Council for Hakka Affairs, the National Human Rights Commission, the Committee for a Nuclear-Free Homeland, the Environmental Impact Assessment Committee, and the National Council for Sustainable Development (Ho 2010, 13-4). The involvement of social movement activists in the government produced mutual understandings between the state and civil society and consequently led to some legislative successes, including the Act for Protecting Workers of Occupational Accidents (2001), the Act of Gender Equality in Employment (2002), the Basic Environment Act (2002), Employment Insurance Act (2002), and the Act for Worker Protection of Mass Redundancy (2003) (Ho 2010, 14). In September 2000, the DPP government recognized the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU), which was an important landmark for removing the monopolistic privilege enjoyed by the
social movements into the government system may facilitate the pursuit of social movements’
goals. On the other hand, social movement organizations had suffered a severe brain drain as
many of their leaders became politicians (Ho 2005, 407). One consequence of such incorporation
is that it largely reduced the level of the movements’ militancy in using protests to pursue their
goals. Ho’s (2011, 288-9) data show that the number of environmental protests reduced sharply
in the first three years of Chen’s administration, which suggested that “rule-breaking protests
were more and more replaced by rule-following negotiations.”

However, the lowering of militancy of social movements not only suggests that more
movements were incorporated in the institutionalized channels, but also suggests that the DPP no
longer had a close relationship with the social movements. After winning the presidential
election in 2000, the DPP gradually shifted from reform advocacy to a pro-status quo stance
regarding various social issues. One explanation for DPP’s orientation shift was that it is the
consequence of its calculative instrumentalism towards social movements (Wu 2002). In the
1980s, social movements were seen as an indispensable tool for the DPP because “each new
protest event generated anti-KMT sentiment and created windfall gains for the DPP” (Ho 2003,
695). However, once the electoral politics become routinized and democratized, the utility of
social movements ceased, and thus it was no longer necessary for the DPP politicians to maintain
close relationships with the social movements (Wu and Lii 2008, 46).

Many social movement organizations has experienced disillusionment by the DPP and
lost strong momentum for large-scale protest mobilizations (Hsiao and Ho 2010). In the 1990s,
the annual May 1 Rally was an important institutionalized protest event for workers. However,

unrepresentative Chinese Federation of Labor (CFL) and eliminating the coercive KMT state corporatism over
Taiwan’s labor (Ho 2006a). The TCTU had regularly participated in the Council of Labor Affairs and played a
crucial role in the 2001 Economic Development Advisory Conference for making pro-labor laws.
during Chen’s eight years in power, the Rally was held in 2001 and 2005 only (Chiu 2011, 89). The relationship between the DPP and the anti-nuclear movement particularly illustrates the DPP’s opportunism. In its original party charter, the DPP was presented as a party strongly supporting environmentalism by vowing to challenge the KMT’s pro-nuclear stance. The first sign of the DPP’s betrayal occurred in October 1996, when the DPP parliamentary leadership tried to tacitly trade the anti-nuclear bill for other policy concessions from the KMT (Ho 2003, 702). Since then, the DPP’s interests in the anti-nuclear movement grew visibly weaker. The “asymmetric alliance” between the DPP and anti-nuclear movements collapsed when the government announced that it would resume construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant.

Before the 2004 presidential election campaign, many people had believed that the pan-blue camp of Lien Chan as the presidential candidate and Soong Chu-yu as the vice-presidential candidate would easily defeat Chen and his Vice-President Annette Lu. To mobilize popular support, President Chen and ex-president Lee organized a key campaign event on February 28, 2004 (Chang 2004). On March 13, the KMT’s candidates launched an electoral rally in Taipei for denouncing Chen’s poor performance where about 200,000 to 500,000 people participated (Huang 2004). These mobilization efforts by different parties made the campaign even more heated and the result more unpredictable.

Probably the most dramatic political event in the post-KMT era occurred on March 19, 2004, the day before the election. President Chen and Vice-President Annette Lu were shot and injured while standing in a moving jeep in Tainan. Both were sent to the hospital and survived. The assassination attempt occupied all newspapers’ coverage on election day. The electoral results turned out that the Chen-Lu ticket defeated the Lien-Soong ticket by only 0.23% of the vote.
Facing this result, Lien and Soong believed that the DPP had plotted the assassination attempt to generate a sympathy vote. They soon mobilized their supporters to protest against the electoral result for weeks. The protesters claimed that the election was illegitimate and must be invalidated. The High Court granted the demand for a recount, but the recounted results did not change by much. Several commissions had examined the assassination attempt, but no evidence had shown that the DPP had concocted the attempt (Jacobs 2012, 200). While the pan-blue camp believed that the assassination attempt had helped Chen “steal” the election, an empirical study using survey data from Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) suggested that this event did not have a statistically significant effect on voters’ vote choice in the 2004 presidential election (Chang 2006).

Taiwanese politics became much more polarized in Chen’s second term. The polarization achieved its peak in 2006. In the summer of 2006, a series of scandals of financial malfeasance involving President Chen, First Lady Wu Shu-chen, and their family members and friends was revealed. The pan-blue politicians and supporters launched an anti-corruption campaign trying to depose Chen. The “Red-Shirt Army” was led by former DPP chairman Shih Ming-teh and was strongly supported by pan-blue heavyweights such as Lien Chan, Soong Chu-yu, and Ma Ying-jeou. On September 9, an estimated 200,000 protesters went to the streets (Shih 2007, 91), dressed in red, to express their will to remove Chen. On September 15, Shih organized a “circle the city” demonstration, joined by about 360,000 protesters (Copper 2006, 23-4). Another large-scale demonstration of the Red-Shirt Army took place on October 10 in the ceremony for the National Day.

90 A Red movement activist admitted that this movement could be described as a movement with “a green head and a blue body,” which means that the leader of the movement, Shih Ming-teh, had a DPP background and the participants were largely pan-blue supporters (Interview T5, March 5, 2012).
The Red movement virtually paralyzed the DPP government for weeks. However, Chen survived the political crisis as the mass media turned attention to the approaching mayoral election. Moreover, a judicial charge was made against Taipei City Mayor Ma Ying-jeou over his alleged misuse of a special mayoral allowance fund, which had been criticized by the KMT as political revenge. The Red movement lost its momentum as the pan-blue legislators repeatedly failed to launch recall motions in the Legislative Yuan.  

With the DPP plagued by Chen’s scandals, the KMT won the 2008 elections in a landslide. In the legislative election held in January, the pan-blue camp captured more than three-fourths of the seats. In the presidential election held in March, the KMT’s Ma/Hsiao ticket won 58.5% of the vote, defeating the DPP’s Su/Hsieh ticket. The morale of the DPP had been destroyed by the electoral fiasco in 2008 and further suffered with the detention and indictment of former president Chen Shui-bian on corruption charges in December 2008.

6.5 THE RETURN OF THE KMT AND THE RESURGENCE OF PROTEST MOVEMENTS

After Ma won the 2008 presidential election, Taiwan’s social movements have faced a very challenging situation. The returned KMT government had not changed much compared to what it was eight years ago in terms of its authoritarian tendency and conservative stance. Ma clearly prioritized business interests and economic growth over issues about labor and environment.

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91 One campaign organizer argued that the major problem that resulted in the failure of the Red movement was that the leader Shih Ming-teh overemphasized his personal image-building and never paid attention to the development of organizational structures for the movement (Interviewee T6, March 5, 2012). Another interviewee argued that, unlike other social movements that have a long term goal, the Red movement failed to sustain because its cause of demanding Chen to step down was too specific and immediate (Interviewee T14, March 9, 2012).
Moreover, after retaking power, the KMT started to exert more partisan control over the public media and the judicial system. Thus, although many movement activists were disillusioned by the DPP’s failure to promote progressive reforms, they simply could hardly tolerate the KMT’s reactionary attempt to reverse the trend that has been generally more favorable for social movements (Ho 2010, 17-8). Facing this unfavorable political environment, there was an unexpected social movement resurgence during Ma’s administrations.92

During Ma’s administrations, both labor movements and farmers’ movements made a big resurgence. The labor’s May 1 Rally was resumed in 2009, 2010, and 2011, led by the Taiwan Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU) and other labor movement organizations. On February 5, 2013, members of the National Alliance for Workers of Closed Factories adopted a radical protest action by laying on the train rails in Taipei Main Station, trying to catch media attention about their disputed case.93 The farmers’ movement also regained its momentum. On July 17, 2010, the Taiwan Rural Front (TRF) organized a protest campaign on Ketagalan Boulevard94 against the Farm Villages Revival Act passed by the Legislative Yuan, with about 2,000 participants in the protest (Loa 2010). In 2013, the TRF successfully led two protest campaigns on July 17 (3,500 participants) and August 18 (20,000 participants) opposing the force demolition of four houses in the village of Dapu in Miaoli County.95

92 One of my interviewees provided an interesting point for the resurgence of protests after Ma came to power. According to a consultant for a TSU legislator, as many public employees who used to be social movement activists lost their jobs serving the DPP government after 2008, many of them returned to work in various social movement organizations (Interviewee T18, March 14, 2012). These returned forces certainly provided some energy for the resurgence of social movements.
93 See http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/02/06/2003582867.
94 Ketagalan Boulevard is a 400-meter-long boulevard in front of the Presidential Office Building.
95 See http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/08/19/2003570038.
Table 6.3 Comparing Opposition Mobilization Capacity and Protests under the Chen Government and the Ma Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Opposition size (in %)</th>
<th>Opposition unity score</th>
<th>Combined opposition mobilization capacity (Size*Unity)</th>
<th>Monthly median number of protest assemblies and parades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005/2-2008/1</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>25.40</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2008/2-2012/1</td>
<td>42.57</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>35.83</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2012/2-2014/2</td>
<td>48.02</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>41.23</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The data for monthly median number of protest assemblies and parades are from the National Policy Agency, Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan. Opposition size is measured by the vote shares of the opposition parties in the legislature. Opposition unity is measured as the inverse of the effective number of opposition parties in the legislature. Independent legislators were grouped as an Other category, and this category is excluded from the calculation for the opposition size and opposition unity variables because it is not a party.

Because King and Lowe’s data cover only protest events from 1990 to 2004, I use the data from National Police Agency, Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan to construct a variable of monthly average number of anti-government protests from 2004 to 2014. Table 6.3 shows that the opposition camp (led by the DPP) from 2008 to 2012 was smaller but more united\(^\text{96}\) compared to the previous opposition camp (led by the KMT). The opposition camp (led by the DPP) since 2012 has a larger size, but the level of unity did not change much.\(^\text{97}\) An interesting pattern suggests that, as the combined opposition mobilization capacity increases over time from 2004, the monthly median number of protest assemblies and parades also increases. It seems that the

\(^{96}\text{It is noteworthy that the increase of the opposition unity score is due to the adoption of the new SMD electoral system, which largely purged the small parties. For instance, the TSU in the pan-green camp obtained 0.96% of the vote, and the PFP in the pan-blue camp obtained 0.02% of the vote.}\)

\(^{97}\text{The level of unity should be lower if I use the data of seat share for measuring opposition unity. Learning from the frustrated experience of the 2008 election when the mixed electoral system was first adopted (the TSU gained no seats), the TSU did not field any candidates for the SMD system; instead, it focused on increasing the vote for the PR system. The strategy paid off, which resulted in three seats gained. Because elected legislators do not have a specific constituency, one interviewee argues that they can largely focus on national-level issues without worrying about particularistic local interests (Interviewee T18, March 14, 2012). Therefore, the TSU began to work with many social movement organizations, helping them to push progressive policy proposals on the floor of the Legislative Yuan (Interviewee T9, March 7, 2012).}\)
higher level of combined opposition mobilization capacity may have a positive impact on the increase of protests. However, the positive correlation between opposition mobilization capacity and the number of protests deserves more scrutiny.

Specifically, the following analyses suggest that the level of opposition mobilization capacity does not have a causal impact on increasing the number of protests in Taiwan after 2008. In fact, because the substantive linkage between the DPP and various social movements has been largely undermined under the DPP government, social movements tend to mobilize protests without coordinating with the DPP. The fact that many social movements are able to mobilize large-scale protests without the support of the opposition parties suggests that Taiwan is transforming itself from a developing country to a developed country. According to my theory, in the context of developed countries, opposition parties do not play an important role in mobilizing protests because protests have become more institutionalized. Moreover, social movements have developed better skills to coordinate with different actors for protests. Thirdly, in a developed country, citizens are generally more resourceful so that they can organize or participate in protest actions without being mobilized by traditional mobilizing agencies such as political parties. Therefore, there is a tendency that Taiwanese citizens tend to go to street protests no matter how strong or weak the opposition parties are.

As discussed in the previous section, the DPP failed to maintain a close relation with social movements under Chen’s administration due to its calculative instrumentalism toward social movements. It is not surprising that DPP’s negligence of social movements changed after it lost the 2008 presidential election. The party has tried to rebuild institutionalized ties with

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98 One consequence of the DPP’s negligence of social movements is that “[i]n the recent years, the DPP is always falling behind actions of social movements…When the DPP realized that there are problems in a certain place, it was always too late for the party to take action…the social movements and local residents had already taken actions by themselves” (Interviewee T1, March 1, 2012).
social movements and readopt street protests as a way to influence politics. The DPP’s Department of Social Development was renamed in 2009 to the Department of Social Movements. In addition, the DPP tried to readopt social protest strategies to gain more political leverage. For instance, the DPP had organized several protest campaigns by itself, mainly on the issues of China’s emissary and economic integration with China. A remarkable exception was the environmental movement against the Guoguang Petrochemical Project in Changhua County. This movement mobilized a large-scale demonstration in November 2010 and successfully pushed the government to cancel the project in April 2011. During the process, the support of the DPP legislators in Changhua County was crucial.

On March 20, 2011, several days after Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster caused by the tsunami and earthquakes, the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU), as well as several environmental organizations and social movement groups, organized a large rally asking the government to stop the project of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. Many DPP politicians joined the protest rallies and attracted much media attention. It was the first anti-nuclear protest activity in ten years, which had revived the anti-nuclear movement and attracted widespread popular support.

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99 DPP chairwoman Tsai Ying-wen argued that it was a necessary step for reforming the party by strengthening the linkage with social movement groups and preparing for a long-term engagement in street protests (Chang 2009). However, as a DPP legislator criticized, the Department could be best described as a “Department of Civic Organizations” (Interviewee, T16, March 12, 2012), which mainly deals with the relationships with interest groups and NGOs and less with social movements. To strengthen the relationships between the party and different civic organizations, Chairman Tsai decided to “assign” particular civil groups for each individual legislator to build connections with, in the hope that the higher reputation of each legislator could help strengthen such relationships. According to a DPP legislator, this obligatory assignment has never been done before; in the past, it was mainly the party staff’s responsibility for the liaison with civil groups (Interviewee, T15, March 9, 2012).

100 However, it should be noted that the movement had also made a great deal of effort trying to obtain KMT politicians’ support (Ho 2012, 49).

101 On November 3, President Ma announced a new nuclear energy policy proposal, proposing a timetable for gradually reducing nuclear dependence. While this new policy proposal was a response to the increasing popular support for anti-nuclear movement, which might help Ma’s prospects in the 2012 election, it also marked the first time ever that the KMT considered the nuclear-free goal (Interviewee T17, March 13, 2012).
Although the DPP became more willing to cooperate with social movements, many of the movements did not welcome the DPP. The major reason is that these movements felt awfully betrayed by the DPP government during the past eight years. While many anti-nuclear activists were excited about the turnout for the March 20 rally in 2011, some activists actually felt irritated by the DPP’s participation, in which many politicians took turns delivering speeches on the stage and left less time for the residents of Konglio (the place where the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant is located) and other anti-nuclear movement groups (Chen 2011). Thus, the Green Citizens’ Action Alliance (the reincarnation of the TEPU-Taipei Branch) and other environmental groups initiated another anti-nuclear protest rally on April 30. The Green Citizens’ Action Alliance announced that, if politicians want to join the protest, they are not welcome to deliver speeches on the stage or distribute candidates’ personal campaign flyers and flags (Chen 2011).

In November 2008, the student movement made a big comeback protesting against police brutality. Aiming to awaken citizens’ consciousness about the restrictions of protest organization stipulated by the Parade and Assembly Law, the “Wild Strawberry” student movement successfully mobilized protests in several big cities in Taiwan. This movement explicitly rejected any cooperation with any political party to maintain its autonomy (Interviewee T3, March 2, 2012). On November 6, 2008, the Wild Strawberry movement organized a sit-in action in front of the Executive Yuan and intentionally drew a “borderline” to separate its sit-in from another protest campaign held by the DPP on the same day (Interviewee T4, March 2, 2012). The Wild Strawberry movement did not exclude any supporters, but the movement intentionally wanted to

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102 The DPP still tried to join many protests organized by other groups, but the party became very low-key during the participation. In fact, some of my interviewees were surprised by the “self-control” of DPP politicians for not claiming credit when providing support for the movements (Interviewee T3, March 2, 2012; Interviewee T8, March 6, 2012).
keep a distance from the DPP by not letting DPP politicians deliver public speeches on the stage in their campaign events. Overall, the Wild Strawberry movement had shown that it is possible to use new media such as Facebook for large-scale mobilization without relying on traditional mobilizing structures such as parties’ networks.\textsuperscript{103}

The farmers’ movements also do not rely on DPP’s mobilization capacity for organizing protests. The Taiwan Rural Front (TRF) have tried to reach out to politicians from all parties for their support,\textsuperscript{104} but such contacts focus on proposing policies on the floor of the Legislative Yuan and never for the purpose of mobilizing protests (Interviewee T10, March 7, 2012). Instead, the TRF coordinated with other political actors and social movements for protests. For instance, to protest against the controversial Central Taiwan Science Park’s (CTSP) fourth-phase development project in Changhua County, the TRF had cooperated with the Xizhou Township office (Interviewee T10, March 7, 2012). The Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR) had assisted the TRF to apply for the official permit for the protest event on Ketagalan Boulevard on July 17, 2010 (Interviewee T8, March 6, 2012).

The above discussion suggests that, although there is a positive correlation between opposition mobilization capacity and the number of protest activities, this correlation might not

\textsuperscript{103} However, this does not mean that the movement never welcomed the resource that political parties provide. For instance, as one activist remembered, given that the Wild Strawberry movement was not related to the DPP, this activist heard that some DPP politicians still had donated some resources for sustaining the movement’s sit-in activities. However, these politicians did so in indirect ways, such as through certain non-governmental organizations that were supportive of the movement (Interviewee T3, March 2, 2012). The Wild Strawberry movement also received support from many other social movements. For instance, during the Wild Strawberry movement’s sit-in activities in the Liberty Square, a number of smaller social movement groups organized rallies on a daily basis to demonstrate their support (Interviewee T3, March 2, 2012). The Taiwan Association for Human Rights (TAHR) and the Taiwan Tongzhi Hotline Association had provided necessary resources and networks for the Wild Strawberry movement (Interviewee T12, March 8, 2012).

\textsuperscript{104} While there are several KMT legislators that can be considered for a potential alliance, most support comes from DPP’s politicians. “The major reason that we tend to coordinate with DPP’s politicians,” an activist of farmer’s movement noted, “is because we have similar issue preference and we had so much previous experiences of coordination” (Interviewee T11, March 7, 2012). Moreover, “depending on specific issues, we [TRF] tend to coordinate with individual politicians instead of his or her own party” (Interviewee T13, March 8, 2012).
imply that the former has a positive causal effect on the latter. One reason is that the substantive linkage between the DPP and various social movements has been greatly undermined under the DPP government from 2000 to 2008, and thus many social movements intentionally keep a distance from the DPP. However, without coordinating with the DPP, why are many social movements still able to mobilize protests?

Here I argue that it is because Taiwan is transforming itself from a developing country to a developed country. During this process, social protests have become more routinized and institutionalized, as the labor movement and anti-nuclear movement have shown. Moreover, social movements have developed better skills to coordinate with different actors for protests without solely relying on support from political parties, as shown in the cases of protests mobilized by the Wild Strawberry movement and the farmers’ movement. Thirdly, citizens are becoming more resourceful so that they are more able to organize or participate in protests without relying on traditional mobilizing agencies such as political parties. Based on these reasons, citizens participate in protests no matter how strong or weak the opposition parties are. Therefore, because the role of political parties in coordinating with social movements for mobilizing protests has become less important in Taiwan, we observe that there are an increasing number of large-scale protests that have been organized without the support of the opposition parties. Overall, Taiwan’s party/movement dynamics after 2008 provide evidence to support the second part of my theory, which suggests that opposition mobilization capacity is less important for protests in a developed country.
Taiwan has experienced dramatic political changes since 1978. Opposition parties and protest movements have played a very important role in shaping the changes, and these changes in turn influenced the development of parties and movements. This chapter has shown that there is a general pattern that higher levels of opposition mobilization capacity has important impacts on encouraging strong social protests during different historical periods. Under the authoritarian rule of the KMT regime, most social sectors were controlled by the party-state regime through clientelist and directive linkages (Lawson 1980). However, some social movements had found a way to cooperate with the political opposition, forming the Dangwai movement. Although the Dangwai movement received a setback after the Meilidao Incident in 1979, the continuing pressure from environment movements and labor movements had forced the KMT regime to implement political liberalization in 1986.

From the late 1980s to the 1990s, the membership of many social movements and the DPP largely overlapped. The DPP adopted an “invasive” mode to interact with social movements (Schwartz 2010, 592-7) based on a combination of programmatic and participatory linkages (Roberts 2002). The installment of the DPP New Tide Faction’s cadres in the labor movement and environmental movement reflected the ambition of the party to control the movements. The strong and unified force of the DPP and various social movements had led to large-scale protest mobilizations in the 1990s, putting a pressure on the KMT government for further political reform.

In addition, the DPP politicians had sponsored many social protests to challenge the KMT regime and enhanced their electoral competitiveness by speaking for the movements’ demands or coordinating with social movements for protests in their electoral district (Ho 2010,
For large-scale protest events, the DPP central party organization would even “assign” its legislators responsibility for mobilizing participants based on the size of their constituencies. “In a more populated district the legislator has to mobilize five ‘buses’ of people (approximately 200 people), but in a less populated district the legislator only needs to mobilize two ‘buses’ of people,” according to a DPP legislator (Interviewee T15, March 9, 2012). In addition to participant mobilization, the DPP also provided important tools such as jeeps with portable speakers and “professional announcers” (usually served by politicians or party officials).

However, as electoral politics became routinized and more democratized, the DPP began to focus on working in the institutional arena and became less willing to champion movements’ causes (Wu 2002). After winning the presidency in 2000, the DPP government had incorporated many activists from various social movements to work in the government. At the same time, the DPP began to further distance itself from street protest politics and more progressive social movement causes as it became more socially conservative.

The mobilization capacity of social movements had been eroded to a great extent during Chen’s two administrations. However, these social movements experienced a major resurgence since the KMT returned to power in 2008. The DPP tried to rebuild its broken linkages with social movements, but so far it is not clear whether their relationship can become as good as it was in the 1980s. There are some cases in which the DPP cooperates with social movements, but such a cooperation largely focuses on working via institutional channels such as proposing policies on the floor of the Legislative Yuan. Past social ties and shared policy preferences have been important factors that influence particular movements’ cooperation with the DPP. However, regarding protest mobilizations, my interviews indicate that the role of the DPP changed after 2008 from an initiator to a participant.
The protest campaigns in the 2000s took various forms. For instance, the two anti-nuclear protest demonstrations in 2011 took the form of a network invocation (Jones et al. 2001), in which a key social movement organization (the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union for the protest on March 20, and the Green Citizens’ Action Alliance for the protest on April 30) took major responsibility for organizing, while drawing other organizations in mobilization. The two important protest campaigns led by the Taiwan Rural Front on July 17, 2011, and August 18, 2013, also took the form of a network invocation. The Wild Strawberry movement, in contrast, largely took a form of alliance, with various local Wild Strawberry student groups with an informal organizational structure taking relatively equal responsibility for mobilization.

The development of parties and social movements in Taiwan since 2008 has posed an interesting puzzle for my theory. Specifically, since 2012, the camp of opposition parties has become stronger, while, there are also more protests mobilized. However, the seemingly positive correlation of these two variables does not suggest causal relations. As I have discussed in the previous section, the substantive linkage between the DPP and social movements has become increasingly weakened since 2000. Therefore, even as the opposition camp became stronger and more united after 2008, the pan-green parties did not actively engage in the organization of several large protest mobilizations under the Ma government. Since 2013, there have been an increasing number of large-scale protests that have been mobilized by various social movement organizations without the support of the DPP. These protest events include the large-scale protest action (approximately 250,000 participants) against the military’s human rights violations led by “Citizen Action Coalition 1985” on August 3, 2013, and the large-scale (approximately

500,000 participants) “Sunflower Student Movement” against the government’s trade deal with China on March 30, 2014.106

As I have discussed, the tendency that opposition parties have become less important in mobilizing protests in Taiwan after 2008 suggests that Taiwan is changing from a developing country to a developed country. During this process, social protests have become more institutionalized and routinized so that the mobilization capacity of opposition parties no longer matters for protest movements. Thus, Taiwan’s party/movement dynamics after 2008 provide some support for the second part of my theory, which argues that opposition parties play a more important role in protest mobilization in developing countries than developed countries.

7.0 CONCLUSION

7.1 SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

Parties, elections, and protests are tightly intertwined in democratic countries (Garner and Zald 1987; Goldstone 2003; McAdam and Tarrow 2010). While previous literature has examined how the presence of protest is influenced by various factors, such as democratization and national economic performance, this study focuses on how the mobilization capacity of opposition parties affects the number of anti-government protests in a democracy. Recent studies have highlighted the importance of opposition parties’ size (e.g., Almeida 2012) and unity (e.g., Bieber 2003) in explaining the emergence of protests, but these studies failed to consider the interaction effect of these two variables. This study fills this gap by examining the conditional effects of opposition size on protests at different levels of opposition unity.

Using a global sample of democratic countries, the empirical analyses contribute to the literature by highlighting that the mobilization capacity of opposition parties matters for anti-government protests. While my analyses confirm some conventional wisdom about the importance of democratization (e.g., Meyer 2004) and economic development (e.g., Bellinger and Arce 2011) in protest mobilization, the major theoretical contribution of this dissertation is telling a story that previous theories about protests have largely missed: a large opposition camp is insufficient for encouraging large-scale anti-government protests unless this camp has a higher
level of unity. Another important theoretical contribution of my dissertation is that I have shown that opposition mobilization capacity matters for protests in developing countries but not in developed countries.

The case studies of Peru and Taiwan illustrated the causal mechanisms of my theory. The comparative analysis that focuses on the party/movement relationships of the two countries can help shed light on the political development of new democracies. Table 7.1 shows a structured, focused comparison of opposition mobilization capacity and protests in Peru and Taiwan. Both case studies show that there has been a great variation in the organizational forms of protests, party/movement interaction strategies, and party-society linkages during different administrations.
### Table 7.1 Structured, Focused Comparison of Opposition Mobilization Capacity and Protests in Peru and Taiwan (1990-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Invasive: APRA and CTP; <em>Patria Roja</em></td>
<td>3. Invasive: DPP (1980s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Types of Party/movement Linkages</strong></td>
<td>1. Programmatic: None</td>
<td>1. Programmatic: DPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Clientelist: APRA</td>
<td>2. Clientelist: KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Charismatic: APRA</td>
<td>3. Charismatic: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Participatory: APRA; <em>Patria Roja</em></td>
<td>4. Participatory: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Marketing: C90/NM</td>
<td>5. Marketing: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factors that Facilitate Party/Movement Coalitions</strong></td>
<td>1. Past social ties: APRA</td>
<td>1. Past social ties: DPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Shared ideologies: <em>Patria Roja</em></td>
<td>2. Shared ideologies: DPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Outside political threats: APRA</td>
<td>3. Outside political threats: DPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition Size</strong></td>
<td>1. Fujimori gov’t: Very small</td>
<td>1. Lee gov’t: Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Toledo gov’t: Very large</td>
<td>2. Chen gov’t: Medium-large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Humala gov’t: Very large</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Opposition Unity</strong></td>
<td>1. Fujimori gov’t: Low</td>
<td>1. Lee gov’t: High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Toledo gov’t: Low</td>
<td>2. Chen gov’t: Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Humala gov’t: Low</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Toledo gov’t: Low</td>
<td>2. Chen gov’t: Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Humala gov’t: Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Anti-Government Protests</strong></td>
<td>1. Fujimori gov’t: Low</td>
<td>1. Lee gov’t: Medium-high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Toledo gov’t: Medium-low</td>
<td>2. Chen gov’t: Medium-low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Humala gov’t: High</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

More importantly, both case studies confirm the importance of opposition mobilization capacity in understanding the patterns of anti-government protests. As Figure 7.1 shows, there is a positive correlation between the combined opposition mobilization capacity and anti-government protests in both countries. From the circled area for Peru’s cases and the circled area for Taiwan’s cases, it is clear that Peru has relatively lower mobilization capacity scores and lower
numbers of anti-government protests, while Taiwan has relatively higher mobilization capacity scores and higher numbers of anti-government protests.

![Figure 7.1 Correlation between Combined Opposition Mobilization Capacity and the Number of Anti-Government Protests in Peru and Taiwan (1990-2004)](image)

**Figure 7.1 Correlation between Combined Opposition Mobilization Capacity and the Number of Anti-Government Protests in Peru and Taiwan (1990-2004)**

Note: The dashed line is a linear regression trend line. Each dot represents an inter-election period. Take the observation PE (91-92), for instance. The annual average number of anti-government protests for PE (91-92) is calculated based on the average numbers of protest events from King and Lowe’s dataset for 1991 and 1992 in Peru. The combined opposition mobilization capacity is the product of the opposition size and opposition unity based on data for the 1990 legislative election.

The case of Peru poses a theoretical puzzle because the country has an extremely large opposition camp (capturing on average 70% of the vote in elections after the year 2000) but the number of large-scale protests is limited, the geographic coverage of protests is localized, and the organizational form of protests is weak and spontaneous. The historical analyses show that street protests have been a common form of Peruvian political participation, and Peruvian parties used
to have strong ties with social movements in the past. In particular, the APRA had strong connections with labor movements. The *Patria Roja* has also involved in many local protest actions, especially in the recent waves of anti-mining protests.

However, my interviews with politicians and social movement activists suggest a very different finding for the party/movement relationship in Peru. The interviews show that the extremely high level of party system fragmentation is an important factor that restrains parties’ capability for large-scale protest mobilization. Moreover, the relationship between parties and social movements has become weakened because many parties have been greatly influenced by Fujimori’s anti-party model that overemphasizes candidates’ personal features and ignores party organization building. Overall, the case study of Peru shows that merely having a large opposition camp is insufficient to mobilize more large-scale protests. It is necessary to consider how the level of opposition unity interacts with opposition size for mobilizing protests.

In Taiwan, the relationship between opposition parties and social movements had been changed several times. Under the KMT’s authoritarian rule, the emergence and strengthening of the Dangwai movement had built a strong base for the cooperation of the DPP and various social movements in the 1990s. The strong and unified Dangwai opposition camp had contributed to the mobilization of large-scale protests and successfully pressured the KMT regime for political reforms and social policy changes. However, after the DPP won the 2000 presidential election, many social movement activists were incorporated in the government systems and pursued goals largely through institutional channels. The DPP was also becoming less willing to champion more progressive causes for many social movements. The DPP’s conservative shift has frustrated many social movements that used to have a close relationship with the party.
The relationships of opposition parties and social protests in Taiwan after 2008 have posed an interesting puzzle for the first part of my theory. The KMT returned to power in 2008 with a landslide victory, and there have been an increasing number of large-scale anti-government protests since 2008. However, most of these protests had no direct relations with the DPP. Thus, it is unclear whether the size and unity of the opposition parties matter for mass protests after 2008. As I have mentioned, this interesting puzzle might reflect the trajectory that Taiwan has taken from a developing country to a developed country. As street protests become a more institutionalized and routinized form of political participation, the role of opposition parties in protest mobilization becomes less important. Therefore, the case study of Taiwan has provided nuanced evidence for illustrating the causal mechanisms of my theory regarding the party/movement dynamics in different socio-economic contexts.

Both quantitative analyses and qualitative analyses of this dissertation suggest that a large and united opposition camp is key for mobilizing more large-scale anti-government protests. However, the qualitative case studies further suggest that the substantive linkage between political parties and social movements is also an important factor. In Peru, my interviews indicated that certain parties may work with some social movements merely due to past ties. Leaders of certain social movements and parties may generally maintain good relationships. However, many parties do not set up an institutionalized organization to deal with their long-term relationship with social movement groups. Moreover, the connections between the affiliated rank-and-file of parties and movements have been very weak. In contrast, due to the cooperation beginning from the 1970s, the DPP and various social movements used to have very close relationships. With such a strong substantive party/movement linkage, the opposition camp led
by the DPP had been able to mobilize a number of large-scale protests in Taiwan before the KMT was defeated in the 2000 election.

### 7.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA

This study not only facilitates a better understanding of the dynamics of social protest and the consequences of party politics, but also provides important implications for social movements, opposition parties, and the government. On one hand, the results suggest that merely having a large opposition camp is insufficient for mobilizing more large-scale anti-government protests. If social movements and opposition parties choose to use more protests to push certain agendas or pressure the government, a unified opposition with strong support is a key to producing a larger number of protests. On the other hand, in order to reduce the frequency of anti-government protests and maintain political stability, it is important for the governing party or parties to secure a large and stable support base. Moreover, this research also provides crucial implications for democracy. In general, groups with effective partisan representation tend to work through the legislative process, while those who do not see an ability to win through that process turn to the streets. Thus, it is important that policy makers design institutions that can better connect political parties and social movements.

This dissertation joins a growing body of quantitative studies on social movements (Almeida 2008; Arce 2010b; Arce and Wonik 2011; Bellinger and Arce 2011; Bruhn 2008; Weldon 2011). While my dissertation has suggested the importance of opposition size and unity in understanding different levels of protests, a point that is missing in many previous theoretical
approaches on protests, it has also suggested an important theoretical implication beyond my statistical findings. Specifically, as I have mentioned, the substantive linkage between parties and movements matters for whether a strong and united opposition camp is really able to mobilize more protests. Possible factors that can shape the substantive party/movement linkages include the past ties between parties and movements, ideological closeness between parties and movements, and whether a party has established an institutionalized organization within the party to deal with its relationship with social movement organizations. Future studies should construct and take into account these three important variables in the analyses for examining the effects of opposition mobilization capacity on protests.

There are a number of interesting and still unanswered questions that flow from this dissertation for future research. One such question focuses on the interactions between political parties and social movements: can my theory travel to different levels of analysis (e.g., the subnational level and individual level)? Moreover, given that my theory assumes that the effect of opposition mobilization capacity on protests is different for countries with different levels of economic development, it is possible that such an effect may be different for countries with different levels of political development. Therefore, future studies should explore a different story by taking into account a country’s democratic experiences (or the level of democratization) when examining how opposition mobilization capacity influences protest dynamics.

Furthermore, it is also important to explore the effects of protests on party politics. Do anti-government protests alter the dynamics of a party system? Under what conditions do different kinds of protest activities affect the electoral fate of the incumbent party or parties? Do anti-government protests help the opposition parties win elections? Investigating these questions will not only provide important implications for policy makers to design institutions that can
better connect political parties and social movements, but also offer insights for social movement activists to craft effective strategies interacting with particular political parties.

Another broader research agenda can be focused on how the size and unity of opposition parties affect certain policy outcomes. Does a unified opposition camp represent a strong opposition force that might hinder the passage of policy proposals by the government? Or, does a unified opposition camp reduce the number of veto players in the bargaining process and thus lead to a higher possibility of policy change? Is a unified opposition camp more likely to reject a certain kind of government proposal? Does a unified opposition camp have different impacts on public policy-making in developed countries and developing countries? Examining these questions can produce both theoretical contributions and profound policy implications for party development and executive-legislative relations, particularly for the developing countries that lack experiences in democratic learning. Overall, this dissertation suggests a number of directions for future research on social protests and opposition parties.
APPENDIX A

CASES INCLUDED IN THE LARGE-N STUDIES

Albania (1993-2004); Argentina; Armenia (2000-2004); Australia; Austria; Bahamas; Bangladesh (1992-2004); Barbados; Belgium; Belize; Benin (1996-2004); Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria (1992-2004); Canada; Cape Verde (1992-2004); Central African Republican (1994-2002); Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Croatia (2001-2004); Cyprus; Czech Republic (1993-2004); Denmark; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Estonia (1992-2004); Fiji (1993-2004); Finland; France; Gambia (1990-1993); Georgia (1996-2004); Germany (1991-2004); Ghana (2001-2004); Greece; Grenada; Guatemala (1996-2004); Guinea-Bissau (1995-2002); Guyana (1993-2004); Haiti (1994-1998); Honduras; Hungary (1991-2004); Iceland; India; Indonesia (2000-2004); Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Latvia (1994-2004); Lesotho (1994-2004); Lithuania (1993-2004); Luxembourg; Macedonia (1995-2004); Madagascar (1994-2004); Malawi (1995-2004); Mali (1993-2002); Malta; Mauritius; Mexico (1997-2004); Moldova (1995-2004); Mongolia (1993-2004); Mozambique (1995-2004); Namibia (1995-2004); Nepal (1992-2001); Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger (1994-1995; 1999-2004); Norway; Pakistan (1990-1998); Panama; Paraguay (1992-2004); Peru (1990-1991; 2000-2004); Philippines; Poland (1992-2004); Portugal; Romania (1991-2004); Russia (2000-2004);
St. Lucia; St. Vincent and Grenadines; Samoa; São Tomé and Príncipe (1992-2004); Slovakia (1993-2004); Slovenia (1993-2004); Solomon Islands; Republic of South Africa (1995-2004); Republic of Korea; Spain; Sri Lanka; Suriname (2000-2004); Sweden; Switzerland; Taiwan (1993-2004); Thailand (1993-2004); Trinidad and Tobago; Turkey; United Kingdom; Ukraine (2000-2004); Uruguay; United States of America; Vanuatu; Venezuela; Zambia (1992-1995; 2001-2004)

Note: Countries without a year indication are present in each year from 1990 to 2004. Malaysia, Nigeria, and Papua New Guinea are included only for the robustness check.
APPENDIX B

LIST OF ELITE INTERVIEWS

This appendix lists the codes and positions held for the 39 individuals that I interviewed in Taiwan and Peru between February and April 2012. The 18 interviews in Taiwan were conducted in Taipei City, and the 21 interviews in Peru were conducted in Lima. Information regarding each of the interviewees is followed by the city and date when the meeting took place. These individuals are politicians, social movement activists, and intellectuals. I list the interviews in alphabetical order by the interviewees’ last name. In compliance with the rules of the IRB, the interview data are made anonymous to preserve confidentiality.

B.1 INTERVIEWS IN TAIWAN

Interviewee T1. Associate Research Fellow at Academia Sinica. March 1, 2012.
Interviewee T5. Deputy campaign organizer of Red-Shirt Army Movement. March 5, 2012.


B.2 INTERVIEWS IN PERU


McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. 1996. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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