PSYCHAGOGIA: A STUDY IN THE PLATONIC TRADITION OF RHETORIC FROM ANTIQUITY THROUGH THE MIDDLE AGES

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This dissertation is a history of an idea that has endured in rhetorical theory from Plato to Weaver – the idea that rhetoric can lead souls to their own betterment; that is, guide them in an ascent along a metaphysical hierarchy through beauty, goodness, and truth to a fuller participation in being. This is a study of what Plato calls psychagogia. Comprising replicating hierarchies, the Platonic tradition saw intricate connections between cosmology, theology, psychology, and language. At the height of this tradition, St. Bonaventure notes that rational philosophy is consummated in rhetoric, indicating that such an inquiry transcends the disciplinary sub-field of “the history of rhetoric” and engages much larger issues concerning the nature of language, language’s relationship with human rationality, and its analogy with the divine.

Thus, this study maps the structural framework of the Platonic intellectual tradition from antiquity to the Middle Ages in order to identify the conditions necessary for rhetorical activity under a tripartite metaphysics. By comparing the parallel structures inherent in reality, language, and the mind, I contend that rhetoric plays a definitive role for the Platonist in the process of spiritual formation. Indeed, in some cases it represents the only machinery that humanity has to achieve intellectual, spiritual, and societal amelioration. But reality, knowledge, and language for the Platonist were all living things. So while I do not deny Plato’s rationalism, idealism, or realism in this study, I seek to investigate their interaction with his own skepticism, aestheticism,
and above all, mysticism. The same is true for Augustine, Bonaventure, and the Platonic tradition as a whole. Such models as the Platonists provide can illustrate how philosophical tensions now thought to be in diametrical opposition can be brought into dialectical synthesis. The result is a truly organic intellectual framework that informs a rhetorical theory of equal vitality – a tripartite rhetoric, at once rational, spiritual, and emotive, culminating in the soul in a rhetoric of ascent.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
PREFACE

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Poulakos has served as the very example of erudition, reflexivity, and charitableness that this dissertation attempts to theorize. For that, and for his friendship, I am truly thankful.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION: PSYCHAGOGIA AS A RHETORICAL CONCEPT

This dissertation is a history of an idea that has endured in rhetorical theory from Plato to Weaver – the idea that rhetoric can lead souls to their own betterment; that is, guide them in an ascent along a metaphysical hierarchy through beauty, goodness, and truth to a fuller participation in being. In a word, this is a study of psychagogia or ‘soul-leading.’ The term itself is neither innately rhetorical nor innately positive.¹ But Plato’s definition of rhetoric in the Phaedrus as “a way of directing the soul [psychagogia] by means of speech [logon]” (261a) has assured its place in rhetorical history.² In so defining rhetoric, he argues that the “true” art imposes a number of epistemic criteria on the would-be rhetor concerning the object of rhetorical activity – the soul; and the means by which this object is affected – speech:

First, [he will] describe the soul with absolute precision and enable us to understand what it is…Second, he will explain how, in virtue of its nature, it acts and is acted upon by certain things…Third, he will classify the kinds of speech and soul there are, as well as the various ways in which they are affected, and explain what causes each. He will

¹ Indeed, Plato uses cognates in other dialogues with negative connotation (see Tim. 71a and Laws 909b). The history of the term is discussed more fully in section 3.4.
² “…τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων” Greek texts of Plato are taken from Plato: Complete Works. Ed. James M. Cooper, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1997. For the convenience of non-Greek reading reviewers, Greek terms appear transliterated in the main text without diacritic marks. Primary citations appear in-text, while more general references to primary sources and all secondary citations and references appear in footnotes.
then coordinate each kind of soul with the kind of speech appropriate to it. And he will give instructions concerning the reasons why one kind of soul is necessarily convinced by one kind of speech while another necessarily remains unconvinced. (271a-b)

Plato’s definition and the criteria that it implies are noted in any digest of the *Phaedrus* and present a milestone in rhetorical history. Yet in so far as we can talk about a received history in the contemporary rhetorical discipline, his suggestion of a psychagogic rhetoric is dismissed as an impractical ideal. Although it is frequently assumed that this ideal influenced Aristotle’s more practical treatment of human psychology in the *Rhetoric*, the possibility of meeting Plato’s lofty requirements have been rejected by prominent historians of rhetoric in no uncertain terms.

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3 This is in addition to the general criterion that would-be rhetoricians know the truth of the topic on which they are about to speak (262c).


In one of the earliest contemporary pieces on Plato and rhetoric, Hunt states that the “psychological demands of the theory are little short of appalling” (“Plato on Rhetoric” 47), saying later that “the ideal rhetoric sketched in the *Phaedrus* is as far from the possibilities of mankind as his Republic was from Athens” (“Plato and Aristotle” 42). Likewise, Kennedy holds that “Plato’s account of rhetorical psychology is rather unsatisfactory” and unrealistic compared to its sophistic counterparts (*The Art of Persuasion* 79). Though Kennedy later reads Plato more positively, he still characterizes the psychological theory as incomplete and of questionable practicality (*Classical Rhetoric* 72). Brownstein is adamant that Plato presents dialectic as the only art that meets his criteria for a true art of speech, while “persuasion of the sort the rhetoricians claim is clearly impossible in Plato's view” (397). Murphy praises Plato for the clarity of his fundamentals of rhetoric while asserting their inadequacy since, “Plato’s ideal of knowing the soul’s of men is impossible for mortal man to achieve (even with computers)” (Metarhetorics 212-213). In Vickers’ *Rhetoric Revalued*, Moss calls Plato’s ideal rhetor a “dubious entity” and maintains that “the gap between human need and Plato’s idealism remains as great as ever” (217). More recently, despite a very positive read, Yunis concludes that “the vast systematic psychology of desire and discourse that [Plato] proposes has so far proved unachievable and seems likely to remain so” (“Eros in Plato” 120). And Johnstone concludes his
Given the commonplace verdict that Plato’s psycho-philosophical rhetoric is incomplete and impracticable, *psychagogia* has yet to enjoy a full analysis in rhetorical scholarship. Yet this does not mean that it has been widely ignored by scholars in general. In fact a number of studies have emerged over the past decades that view psychagogy in terms of philosophy, education, and theology.\(^5\) This is not surprising, as rhetoric and philosophy were both fluid concepts at the time the *Phaedrus* was composed, both at the heart of educational theory, and both intimately tied to the divine. Indeed, much of the ancient debates between rhetoric and philosophy were attempts to demarcate the legitimate provinces of the two fields of study.

What is surprising is the degree to which rhetorical theory and tradition have been left to historians of other disciplines to cultivate in this instance. Granted, some of these extra-rhetorical studies accept the commonplace that *psychagogia* is a non-starter in terms of practical rhetorical theory and argue that Plato holds interpersonal dialectical inquiry as the “true” rhetoric.\(^6\) Were this the extent of the findings offered by the various analyses of Platonic psychagogy the dearth of rhetorical scholarship might be justified, but it is not. Rather than an impractical ideal or a call to dialectic, recent philosophical interpretations have argued that

\[^{6}\text{See Teloh, *Socratic Education*, where *psychagogia* is meant to be the positive counterpart in dialectical inquiry to the refutative *elenchus*. Also, Kim takes the impossibility of Platonic rhetoric as one of the major premises of his dissertation: “As I believe Plato thought that there could be no such thing as true rhetoric, I present the view in this dissertation that *psychagogia* is in fact Plato’s ideal of philosophy and education” (“Plato’s Ideal Education” 1). And Werner argues that “if dialectic represents the best approximation of the ideal τέχνη of rhetoric, then…in the process of supposedly ‘reforming’ rhetoric…Plato has all but done away with it.” (“Rhetoric and Philosophy” 25).}\
Plato’s “philosophical” rhetoric is actually the practical application of his ideal philosophy to the imperfect circumstances of the political state and the human soul. The auditor is not led through philosophy to a better life, but rather is led to philosophy through rhetoric. This may sound off-putting to the sensitive rhetorician who has long played second fiddle to the celebrated philosopher, but rendered in the love language of the Phaedrus it means only this – the beloved is brought to the love of truth through the love of the lover. Rhetoric as psychagogia is love.

Beyond philosophical reinterpretation, however, historical studies in early Christianity have traced a fairly uncontroversial path of development showing the impact that psychagogia as a rhetorical concept has had on theories and practices of pastoral care, such as the adaptation of the Gospel message to particular audiences and the administration of therapeutic aid to troubled souls. Even if it does not fit squarely with the “received” disciplinary history, historians of medieval rhetoric recognize that rhetoricians such as Victorinus and St. Augustine were deeply influenced by Platonic thought concerning the notion of the soul’s ascension to God through the liberal arts, as were the Arabic commentators of Aristotle who so influenced the Scholastics. However well-documented this tradition may be concerning the supposed effects rhetoric could have on the soul, Plato’s criteria for psychagogic rhetoric remains relatively neglected in terms of the ability to analyze and account for the soul itself – its make-up, its types, and the means by which it is affected. Although we know the concept was transmitted in a variety of forms

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7 See Moss: “The Republic’s education may in Plato’s view be the ideal means of soul-turning, but it is dependent on the existence of the ideal city; rhetoric turns out to be a means for the same end, and one available in actual, imperfect states like Athens” (“Soul-leading” n.9). See also McCoy, “Love and Rhetoric”.

8 Again, see Moss, “Soul-Leading,” and McCoy, “Love and Rhetoric.”

9 See Glad, Paul and Philodemus, who traces the concept of psychagogia in terms of adaptability to audience in order to contrast the genuine rhetorician with the flatterer. See also Kolbet, Augustine and the Care of Souls, who traces the therapeutic tradition of psychagogia and its effect on the preaching and teaching of St. Augustine.

10 For instance, Neoplatonism and spiritual ascent through the liberal arts appear throughout the translations and commentary offered by Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter in their authoritative anthology Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric: Language Arts and Literary Theory, Ad 300 -1475. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Many of the primary works in this collection, as well as their commentaries, are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
through antiquity to the Middle Ages, we still lack a clear understanding of how rhetoric supposedly “worked” on the soul. Thus, the medieval picture remains incomplete so long as the classical antecedent – Platonic rhetoric – is perceived as an unanalyzable ideal.

In this dissertation, I seek to understand the tradition of rhetoric as *psychagogia* by first arguing that the epistemology and psychology presented in Plato’s dialogues offer a workable model of the *psyche* that meets the criteria laid out in the *Phaedrus*. As such, this dissertation serves as a corrective for the commonplace notion that Plato’s theory of rhetoric is untenable. I then show that the structure of this model influenced thinkers in late antiquity and the Middle Ages, establishing a continuous tradition of Platonic rhetoric that held similar assumptions about the soul’s structure and functions. In so doing, it both deepens and compliments contemporary studies concerning the influence of Platonic *psychagogia* in the history of Christian thought by offering a structural foundation above and beyond the notions of adaptation to, care for, or ascent of the soul. In fact, the structural analysis I offer shows how all three actions are performed simultaneously through the structural reformation of the soul through rhetoric.

1.1 BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS

One would most correctly characterize this dissertation as a study in the history of rhetoric. However, it is largely motivated by contemporary circumstances that should be articulated in order to illustrate the frame of mind in which I pursue it. As a discipline, rhetoric is filled with many, sometimes antithetical, voices. Theorists engage in earnest debate about whether rhetoric
is epistemic or aesthetic;¹¹ whether its situations are given or invented;¹² whether it can be employed as a hermeneutical tool or is capable only of production,¹³ and so on. Such a circumstance alone is not cause for lamentation or correction. Indeed, it has historically been the role of rhetoric to complicate perceived certainties and to voice opposition to issues that were once thought settled. It is a role celebrated by theorists and practitioners even today.

Fittingly, however, contradiction and critique form only one side of rhetoric's historic function. For it was also the role of rhetoric to find harmony among seemingly disparate theories and practices. Having lost sight of this function, the contemporary field has become internally fragmented as healthy debate has slipped into entrenched ideology. Moreover, such ideology has separated the discipline from the rest of humanistic study. Age-old skepticism about the value of “knowledge” produced by either faith or reason has transformed into separation along disciplinary lines. Rhetoricians no longer seek the generalized learning that was once their hallmark, but have rather pitted themselves against departments of philosophy, theology, and the various sciences. We anachronistically interpret historic controversies as interdepartmental struggles in which each discipline is the champion of a worldview that is incompatible with the others. The other disciplines are only too happy to oblige. Indeed, without rhetoric's architectonic function, the humanities themselves have become woefully fractured.


These theoretical conflicts, both within and outside the discipline, are reflected in a pedagogical tension that has resulted in an identity crisis for rhetoric as it has struggled to define its place between logic and poetry.\textsuperscript{14} This tension was recognized by the ancient Greeks, and the relationship among the three arts of the \textit{logos} has remained tenuous ever since. However, though debates raged throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages about the proper relationship of the language arts, most agreed that there was a relationship. Today there exists nothing like an integrated language arts curriculum at any level of education. In our universities, the arts are each subsumed under departments of communication, literature, English, and philosophy, where there is little interplay between them, if any. That is of course if the arts of language are taught at all and not merely replaced with arts of criticism. It is ironic that dialectic no longer has an academic home since it was dethroned by analytic logic, yet its deconstructive activity is what occupies contemporary rhetoricians and grammarians. For the most part we remember only the ancient antagonisms, each discipline laying sovereign claim over knowledge production, critical thinking, social cohesion, etc. We do not realize that so divided we have turned cannibal and have eaten away at our very foundations. The arts of language, the truly humanistic arts, have warred themselves into irrelevance; their once glorious societal functions replaced by the teacher, the psychiatrist, the political scientist, the lawyer, the advertiser, and the screenwriter.

I hope that by recalling the cooperative nature that the language arts once shared, I can illustrate how mutual communion rather than disdain or neglect might better serve the disciplines and better serve the human community for which they all profess to care. From the standpoint of

the rhetorician this means demonstrating that, while distinct from the logician’s and the poet’s art, our art entails a respect and understanding of both to the degree that we must employ their tools to achieve our own ends. It further means the more difficult task of realizing the subordinate role we must play in aiding the logician and poet in their own work. Perhaps most radically, the study of the Platonic tradition suggests that beyond the need for society to have its share of philosophers, poets, and orators, there lies a more pressing need for these arts to be unified in the individual soul. The speaker must also be thinker and dreamer; the audience must be taught, delighted and moved. So the true humanist is neither the rhetorician nor the poet nor the sage, but that person who has mastered all three arts and knows the proper use of each. Rhetoric, although necessary, is insufficient for the humanistic endeavor. It is an obvious truth, but a bitter one nonetheless.

These conflicts represent huge issues that span the whole of contemporary academia. While this dissertation has implications that affect them, I do not claim that it comes close to resolving any. Rather, as I have noted, these conditions should be recognized as providing numerous related tensions that motivate the conciliatory nature of this study. At a time when the humanistic disciplines operate in relative isolation, I deliberately chose psychagogia as an object of inquiry that sits historically at the intersection of rhetoric, philosophy, theology, and pedagogy so as to recover at least one view that asserts an inextricable connection among them. The theorists in this tradition often attempt to reconcile the antipathies that have permeated the various branches of human inquiry from antiquity to the present. Additionally, such theorists maintain a view of rhetoric and the language arts that unify many of the concepts that our contemporary discipline finds incompatible. Thus, whatever its scholarly implications, I hope
that this dissertation might point a way towards repairing the discord in which the rhetorical
discipline now finds itself, both internally and externally.

1.2 ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS

Although motivated by broad contemporary concerns, the study is a focused conceptual history, tracing the development of interrelated concepts as they are appropriated and refined from theorist to theorist over an extended period of time.\textsuperscript{15} Specifically, this study investigates the development of rhetorical thought in the Platonic tradition. I purposefully use the adjective ‘Platonic’ even when discussing concepts presented in the dialogues themselves in order to avoid the controversial practice of ascribing doctrines to Plato based on the views put forth by his characters.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, I do not take the Platonic tradition to be a sustained and direct engagement with Plato’s texts, but rather refer to it as a living tradition in which Platonic threads in a theory can be traced back to concepts presented in the dialogues via previous thinkers, although the authors under consideration may not have engaged them directly. Consequently, and in keeping with the classical sources, I use the term ‘Platonist’ and similar terms where contemporary intellectual historians might use the term ‘Neoplatonist.’ My focus here is on the rhetorical concepts and structures that pass through and reach back to Plato.

Recognizing that various threads of Platonic thought run throughout late antiquity and the Middle Ages, I focus on a single, well-documented thread running from Plato through St.

\textsuperscript{15} Terms appear in bold followed by definition in italics.
\textsuperscript{16} E.g. “Platonic psychology” as opposed to “Plato’s psychology.”
The lineage is a fairly uncontroversial one and well documented in many regards. However, the importance of rhetoric in this lineage is less recognized and forms the focus of this study. I contend that a reciprocal relationship exists within this tradition, meaning that the development of rhetorical theory is greatly influenced by the greater intellectual framework and the rhetorical theory greatly influences the development of the framework itself. As such, I investigate the rhetorical theory together with a number of other interrelated concepts. I employ the term psychagogia to refer to the complex of concepts under consideration, denoting a rhetorical theory in the Platonic tradition for which the main object is the soul and for which the main activity is the leading of the soul. Its application is taken from Plato’s description of rhetoric as an art that leads souls by means of speech. This means that knowledge of the soul’s nature is necessary for any would-be rhetorician to possess. A basic thesis that is demonstrated in the following chapters is that psychagogia implies leading the soul upward along a metaphysical hierarchy. As such, soul, speech, psychology, and metaphysics are key concepts implied by psychagogia, to which I add cosmology and theology.

I understand metaphysics in its classic sense as the first philosophy or the study of first principles. Since the basic metaphysical structure is replicated from macro to microcosm, the various other studies – cosmology, theology and psychology – represent subfields of metaphysics. I take each in the most literal sense as an account of that which the name implies.

17 Via Cicero, the Greek Platonists and Victorinus.
18 Via St. Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius (hereafter referred to simply as Dionysius), the Victorines and the Arabic commentators.
19 There are many controversies over the degrees of influence that one theorist had over another, especially concerning the effect of Platonic thought on St. Augustine. But that Augustine was familiar with some forms of Platonism, and that later thinkers, including St. Bonaventure, picked up Platonic themes through Augustine, is fairly uncontroversial. Indeed, these influences are well documented by the theorists themselves.
20 The term literally means “leading the soul” and carries with it the implication of “soul raising” in the necromantic sense of conjuring spirits. As stated above, its etymology will be further discussed in section 3.4.
21 Speech here translating logos. Phaedrus 261a
22 Phaedrus 270e-272b
so that **cosmology** simply means *an account of the cosmos*; **theology**, *an account of God, the gods or the divine*; and **psychology**, *an account of the soul*. **Soul** indicates *the seat of human intellect, emotion and will* and is used in this study to translate the Greek *psyche* and the Latin *animus*, unless the original context clearly indicates ‘mind’ specifically, i.e. the rational faculties alone. **Speech** translates the Greek *logos*, where appropriate, and the Latin *oratio* and *sermo*. However, I use the term *logos* when I feel that more is implied in the original than speech alone or where the Greek term is employed specifically by authors writing in languages other than Greek.

Additionally, **the trivium, language arts, and arts of the logos** are employed synonymously in reference to *grammar, dialectic and rhetoric as a single unit, inclusive of poetry and logic*. Another basic thesis that I demonstrate is that the structure of the **tripartite soul** in Platonic psychology, that is, its *division into three distinct elements – rational, spirited and appetitive* – is indicative of the structure that underlies all the concepts considered in this history, including Platonic rhetoric itself. Finally, I use **modern** to refer to *the period of time from the Enlightenment to the present* and **contemporary** to refer to *the period of time from the early 1900’s to the present*; not in contrast with modernity, but as a segment thereof.

### 1.3 Overview

Comprising a complex of replicating hierarchies, the Platonic tradition saw intricate connections between cosmology, theology, psychology and language. At the height of this tradition, St. Bonaventure notes that rational philosophy is consummated in rhetoric (*Collations on the Seven
Gifts of the Holy Spirit, IV.12), indicating that a study of Platonic rhetoric transcends the disciplinary sub-field of “the history of rhetoric” and engages much larger issues that concern the nature of language itself, language’s relationship with human rationality and its analogy with the divine. In order to understand this tradition I will establish what James J. Murphy has termed a metarhetoric – the first principles of a rhetorical theory – by situating the rhetoric of each theorist in relationship with their own theories of metaphysics and the language arts. Since the tripartite soul marks the proper object of rhetoric and indicates its structure, I contend that Platonic psychology plays a central role among the other metaphysical disciplines in the articulation of this rhetorical tradition. As the foundation of this tradition, I begin this study with a thorough analysis of Platonic psychology, starting with an investigation into the roles of each part of the soul and the interplay among them.

Since the advent of modernity it has been common to reduce Platonic psychology, and psychological schemes in general, to a simple dichotomy between the rational and the non-rational, with reason and calculation on the one side and emotion, passion and appetite on the other. Accordingly, modes of persuasion are reduced to two: arguing in order to convince the rational part and describing so as to entice and incite the non-rational part. Left out of this

23 Bonaventure defined rational philosophy as consisting of the arts of the trivium, which he identifies as grammar, logic, and rhetoric.
24 See Murphy, “Metarhetorics.” In this piece, Murphy argues that every student of rhetoric should be concerned with metarhetoric, which “investigates what a rhetorician needs to know in order to be a rhetorician” (202). To illustrate this concept he gives a cursory outline of the metarhetorics of Plato, St. Augustine, and Marshall McLuhan. He finds them all connected by certain Platonic assumptions that “images are not realities,” but ultimately finds each inadequate for various reasons (212-213). He concludes that, “the most practical kind of metarhetoric so far proposed in Western culture is to be found scattered through the books on logic, psychology, ethics, and politics written by a famous pupil of Plato, Aristotle “ (213). This is somewhat ironic since Murphy praises Plato’s statements about psychagogia as a clear and concise statement of his metarhetoric while condemning its inadequacy and impracticality, yet touts Aristotle for his practical metarhetoric which is scattered throughout various works and needs to be reconstructed. The irony is exaggerated in this dissertation by the fact that, while I agree with Murphy’s assumptions about the value of metarhetorical investigation, I hold that it is Plato who offers the most complete and functional metarhetoric, which can only be assessed if we look through the lens of the Phaedrus at his various works on psychology, epistemology, politics etc. The aim of Chapter 4 is to do just that.
dualism is any notion of the spirited element, which for Plato is much more than simply non-reason, but rather the seat of courage and the auxiliary to rational action. The importance of this psychological structure for rhetoric has yet to be explored by either historians or contemporary theorists of rhetoric and so a major element of classical theory is often overlooked. For in the internal struggle of the soul it is the spirited element that often decides the fate of the agent by aligning with either reason or the appetites. The Platonist rhetoricians of antiquity and the Middle Ages were well aware of this psychological condition and so viewed rhetoric’s final end as neither to teach nor to delight, but to move the will to action.

Although this movement was recognized in its mundane sense as moving the individual to practical socio-political action, the ultimate goal was the transcendent movement of the soul upwards towards a higher level of being. Hence, this study investigates a rhetorical tradition that begins with Plato’s characterization of rhetoric as psychagogic and develops in an intellectual and spiritual tradition that touts rhetoric’s anagogic or soul-raising function. This represents a special development of Plato’s exhortation that rhetoricians correlate the psyche with the logos – the soul with speech. In the Platonic tradition, logos-as-speech is structurally analogous to the Divine Logos, a structure that the soul also shares. Thus, by adapting an argument to a particular audience, one could reform their souls in the image of the divine. Through its merger with Catholic thought in the Patristic era, Platonic psychology becomes intricately tied to Trinitarian theology. For Trinitarians such as Augustine and Bonaventure, this means there exists a corresponding alignment between language, the soul and the Christian Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The result is a rhetoric with an underlying geometrical scheme as informed by Platonic philosophy as it is by Judeo-Christian theology.

\[25 \text{ Again, “soul-raising” was a possible meaning of psychagogia.}\]
Beginning with Plato and his predecessors, I articulate the triadic structure that connects the soul, speech, and the metaphysical order. In particular, I look at the concept of the soul as Plato presents it in the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic*, and the *Timaeus*. In addition, I consider the accounts of the *logos* in the *Theaetetus* and the structure of the cosmos presented in the *Timaeus*. I then trace the development of these concepts and their corresponding structures over the next two thousand years with focus on the thought of St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure. Specifically, I consider Augustine’s account of spiritual ascent as it appears in the *Confessions*, his explanation of the oratorical duties as they appear in *On Christian Doctrine*, and his psychological analogy of the Trinity as it is presented in the *Confessions* and *On the Trinity*. Finally, I investigate the role that the unified language arts play in realigning the soul with the Trinity, thus aiding in its ascent as articulated in Bonaventure’s *Reduction of the Arts to Theology*, *Journey of the Mind to God*, *Collations on Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit* and *Collations on the Six Days*. Through this analysis I demonstrate that a Platonic tradition of rhetoric existed throughout the Middle Ages in contrast to the overt Ciceronianism of the medieval teaching curriculum and the Aristotelian logicized rhetoric of the Arabic-Thomistic tradition. These are broad and often overlapping categories the boundaries and intersections of which are drawn with more precision in the following chapters. But the basic distinction is one of focus: while the Ciceronians focus on the practical applications of rhetoric that would become the arts of letter writing, poetry and preaching and the Aristotelians subsume rhetoric under logic as a genre of argument, the Platonists focus on the capacity of rhetorical activity to reform the soul of speaker and auditor.
In short, this study maps the structural framework of the Platonic intellectual tradition from antiquity to the Middle Ages. While such a map might serve as the foundation for a number of studies in intellectual history, I construct it primarily to identify the conditions necessary for rhetorical activity under a tripartite metaphysics. By comparing the parallel structures inherent in reality, language, and the mind, I contend that rhetoric plays a definitive role for the Platonist in the process of spiritual formation. Indeed, in some cases it represents the only machinery that humanity has to achieve intellectual, spiritual, and societal amelioration.

Although this is largely a study in parallel structures, the tripartitions are not often neat and tidy, and indeed sometimes slide along a scale of much larger conceptual hierarchies. Therefore, I do not simply point out correlations three by three. Rather, I untangle masses of knotted concepts, seeking to find consonance where possible, and pointing out variations among theorists and the implications that they bring. I attempt to bring to this ostensibly untidy hodgepodge a sense of geometrical elegance while at the same time allowing for the organic adaptability that permeates the Platonic tradition. Reality, knowledge, and language for the Platonist were all living things. It is only by way of a crass caricature derived from the modernist’s celebration (and perversion) of Platonic rationalism that we now think of him as a stodgy idealist. I do not deny Plato’s rationalism, idealism, or realism in this study, but seek to investigate their interaction with his own skepticism, aestheticism and, above all, mysticism. The same is true for Augustine, Bonaventure and the Platonic tradition as a whole. Such models as the Platonists provide can illustrate how philosophical tensions now thought to be in diametrical opposition can be brought into dialectical synthesis. The result is a truly organic

26 Though this may seem like an overly broad goal, I mean ‘structural framework’ in the very exact sense of the overarching tripartite apparatus that governs the intellectual inquiry of this tradition.
intellectual framework that informs a rhetorical theory of equal vitality – a tripartite rhetoric, at once rational, spiritual, and emotive, culminating in the soul in a rhetoric of ascent.27

1.4 DISCIPLINARY SIGNIFICANCE

This study presents two main areas of significance for contemporary rhetorical scholarship. The first pertains to current thinking in the history of rhetoric, the second to the trend of rooting contemporary theory in recovered historical traditions. As a history of rhetoric that purports to investigate the Platonic tradition from Plato through St. Augustine to St. Bonaventure, it is clear that some revisionary historical analysis must be undertaken. Here the most substantial rethinking comes by way of my treatment of Plato and Augustine.

In the first instance, it is a truism that while Plato indicated a more philosophical trajectory for rhetorical theory, he himself never constructed one. Much less than being a founder of a rhetorical tradition, Plato is often viewed as the discipline’s preeminent critic whose dialectical method is antithetical to the rhetorical enterprise. Nonetheless, I treat Plato as a rhetorical theorist whose theory is discernible through a wider encounter with his works than is typical; that is to say, by looking beyond the Gorgias and the Phaedrus.28 Thus, I seek to

27 While the terminus of this ascent differs among Platonists, the process consistently entails a reordering of the inward elements of the soul in imitation of the outward, intelligible world. This goal of achieving inward harmony through participation in the liberal arts might appeal to pagan, Christian and secular humanists alike.

advance our thinking of Platonic rhetorical theory by demonstrating that the knowledge deemed necessary for the art of rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* can be obtained in part by considering the model of the soul in the *Republic* and the discussion of the *logos* in the *Theaetetus*.

Less reviled in our discipline, indeed often revered, is the figure of St. Augustine. However, an increase in reverence does not amount to a decrease in controversy. For general Augustinian scholarship holds that the saint had a complicated relationship with Platonism, ultimately refining or even abandoning many of the philosophical ideas that so influenced his younger writings.29 Given disciplinary biases against Platonism, however, we have been quick to interpret this complex developmental narrative as offering rhetorical history a Plato-free Augustine. This despite Augustine’s own mature exhortation that rhetoricians take from the Platonists what is worthy, as the Hebrews took treasures from Egypt (*DDC* 2.40). As such, this study challenges the current mainstream of Augustinian rhetorical scholarship.30 Nevertheless, rather than argue that Augustine may or may not have been a Platonist, to what degree, and for how long – a procedure Augustine himself would have held as useless for understanding his writings – I proceed by asking what we may gain by reading Augustine’s rhetoric through a Platonic lens. I hold that regardless of any theological differences, Augustine’s theories of psychology and language place him squarely in the Platonic tradition of rhetorical theory.

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29 What Platonic works Augustine actually read is a matter of continued discussion. Concerning this project, it is enough that Augustine was steeped in Ciceronian thought and had almost certainly read some Plotinus and likely some Porphyry. These authors would have given Augustine ample grounding in Platonic metaphysics and psychology.

Reading Augustine in this manner reveals a number of connections between the theory of rhetoric presented in *On Christian Doctrine* and the theory of spiritual progress found in *Confessions*. These connections not only indicate the mystical foundations of Augustinian rhetoric, but also suggest that Augustine’s rhetorical theory greatly impacted his spiritual theology.

The third contribution to the history of rhetoric comes not by way of revision, but by introduction; since the third major theorist to be considered is St. Bonaventure, who remains a marginal figure in the history of rhetoric. Granted, McKeon makes much of Bonaventure in his seminal article, “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,” and identifies him as the culminating figure of the Platonic-Augustinian rhetorical tradition, but little has been said of him before or since by our disciplinary historians. In agreement with McKeon, I contend that Bonaventure represents the most developed and systematic view of the relationship between the divine, language and the human soul. The result of this theory is a pedagogy of ascent in which rhetoric plays a consummative role amongst the arts of reason and language. To leave Bonaventure out of the history of rhetoric is to overlook the most spiritual development of rhetoric in the high Middle Ages. Thus, investigation into his thought offers more than just the contribution of a previously neglected rhetorical theorist; it provides us with an account of rhetorical theory pushed to the limits of significance for traditional Western theology.

However, as each theorist attests to his influences, there would be no Bonaventure without Augustine, and no Augustine without Plato. So the major contribution that this study provides the history of rhetoric is a developmental account of a rhetorical tradition that flowed from antiquity to the Middle Ages and beyond. Such an account is all the more important

because it does not merely mark the discovery of some overlooked thread of rhetorical history, but rather documents a tradition that, due to contemporary biases, is widely believed to have never existed. That Plato never constructed a rhetorical theory and that rhetorical theory stagnated in the Middle Ages are contemporary commonplaces born out of the assumption that rhetoric is a democratic activity essentially opposed to Platonic elitism and medieval dogmatism. A documented history of an evolving Platonic tradition of rhetoric in the Middle Ages should cause us to rethink these basic disciplinary assumptions.

Beyond its value as a work of rhetorical history, this study offers the foundation for a Neoplatonic/Neomedieval rhetorical theory. Although it might seem that such a rigidly geometrical system must result in a wooden, unwieldy, and unnatural rhetoric, I contend that its foundation in triadic psychology makes for a more flexible rhetorical theory than the dualisms of our own age. In much the same way that the middle term joins two seemingly unconnected terms in the Aristotelian syllogism, the middle element of the soul forms a link between our animal and rational natures. When we view this psychological triad as representative of the structure of both human speech and the divine cosmos, a link appears between a number of concepts thought to be incompatible by scholars since the Enlightenment. As such, this study can point the way towards repairing some of the fractures that motivated it in the first place.

For instance, within the discipline, a study of the Platonic tradition brings to light insightful attitudes towards the epistemic and aesthetic qualities of rhetoric. Despite the caricature of Plato that currently exists within our discipline, he was no rigid logician. Indeed, lovers of beauty stand beside philosophers atop Socrates’ psychic taxonomy in the Phaedrus (248d), and Plato’s intellectual descendants were quite aware of both the epistemic and aesthetic roles that rhetoric played. Rather than viewing these roles in opposition, the Platonic tradition
saw them as operating in harmony. Moreover, the role of transmitting knowledge and the role of appealing to the senses were joined by a third role, that of moving the soul. Thus, this study offers suggestions for rapprochement in the epistemic versus aesthetic debates by tracing the three duties of the orator to their origins in Platonic psychology. Such an analysis shows that the epistemic and the aesthetic views are not mutually exclusive and can be theoretically balanced in a more robust sense of the duties and functions of the rhetorical enterprise.

From an interdisciplinary perspective, the parallel dichotomies of “faith and reason” [fides et ratio] and “reason and speech” [ratio et oratio] are major concerns in this study. These dichotomies permeated philosophical and pedagogical debates in the Middles Ages and persist today under such monikers as “religion versus science” and “philosophy versus rhetoric.” When viewed through the dialectical lens of a tripartite rhetoric we see that ratio plays the middle term and sets up a syllogistic relationship between faith and rhetoric that has gone overlooked for quite some time. Indeed, for many contemporary rhetoricians, faith and reason are both false authorities which dogmatically constrain humanity, and so they seek a rhetorical theory that has a foundation of neither faith nor reason, indeed no foundation at all. Far from expelling faith and reason from rhetorical practice, Platonic theorists sought to unify these concepts, recognizing that each term has for itself the same object, the human soul in its entirety. To suppress or neglect any of the terms completely is to maim our abilities to know, to act individually and to come together in joint activity. By restoring the spirited element to rhetorical psychology, I argue that we can see the humanistic importance of a rhetoric that recognizes the value of faith and reason, while not subordinating itself to either. Thus a balance is sought between fides et ratio et oratio instead of the perpetuation of an interdisciplinary conflict that merely mirrors the internal conflict of our souls.
1.5 THEORETICAL COMMITMENTS

This history is a study of the rhetorical tradition, a concept that has met with some misgivings in contemporary scholarship and not without good reason. Rhetoric and tradition have endured an uncertain relationship since the _nomos/physis_ controversies of ancient Greece. On the one hand, rhetoric and tradition are inseparable. As teachings handed down through generations by means of oral and written discourse, there is no tradition without rhetoric. Insofar as discourse must be adapted to the norms of a given cultural context in order to be effective, there is no rhetoric without tradition.

On the other hand, rhetoric and tradition exist in common tension. Since the Sophists, rhetoricians have worried about tradition masquerading as natural law, converting _doxa_ into _dogma_, presenting _nomos_ as _physis_. At the same time, traditionalists have worried about the disruption that seems inherent in rhetorical skepticism – testing the foundations to shore them up is one thing, tearing them down with wild abandon is quite another. With such an ambivalent relationship, it is no wonder that the rhetorical tradition is a concept of some angst amongst rhetoricians. Over the past few decades it has been defended, revalued, reinvented, reclaimed, rethought, retold, regendered, reread, refigured and challenged outright.\(^{32}\) In this study I view the rhetorical tradition as extant and worthy of regard, yet always incomplete. As such, I seek to

add to the critical reexamination of the tradition, not by way of sweeping revision, but by recovering a particular tradition of rhetorical thought – a tradition that according to some does not exist as a matter of fact, and to others, should not exist as a matter of preference.

Given the nature of the Platonic tradition and my current study of it, I should acknowledge my own commitment to metaphysical and ontological realism. However, as these viewpoints are often misunderstood in contemporary academia, I would quickly add that similar to the Platonic tradition I propose to study, my own realism is no unreflective dogmatism; rather it is tempered with a high dose of skepticism towards any claims about what exists and what can be known, including and especially my own. As such, I labor to make my presuppositions clear throughout this study, as well as the logical implications that seem apparent to me, in order that the arguments I produce do not take on the air of dogmatic assertions about the nature of the world, but rather are taken for what they are meant to be – dialectical propositions which welcome further confirmation or refutation.

I should also note that while my philosophical orientation is consciously pre-modern, my philosophical training is that of contemporary analytic philosophy. Thus, the conversation I initiate between rhetoric and philosophy throughout this study is one of bringing contemporary analytic work on Plato, Augustine and Bonaventure to bear on rhetorical scholarship and vice versa. I feel justified in this focus for two related reasons: First, much attention has already been given to Continental philosophy by rhetorical scholars. Second, little attention has been given to analytic philosophy. I believe that this mutual neglect is unfortunate and hope that this study shows that there is a lot of room for fruitful interdisciplinary discussion. With that said, I acknowledge that this study will be devoid of a sustained engagement with Nietzsche,

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33 I would sooner identify my philosophical disposition as Platonist, or Augustinian, or Scholastic than as analytic, Continental, or post-modern.
Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida and the like. I recognize this as a necessary limitation for an already ambitious undertaking and look forward to entertaining any objections raised against this study by students of Continental and post-modern philosophy.

Finally, it may be noticed that a good deal of this study is focused on the Catholic intellectual tradition. I readily acknowledge my commitment to this tradition and hope that this study falls in line with it; for I recognize it as the last living intellectual tradition in the West to be directly rooted in antiquity. Thus, as a historian of rhetoric, I openly lament the separation that has occurred in modernity between the rhetorical and Catholic intellectual traditions, which were intertwined for centuries. Hopefully, I show that this union was beneficial to humanistic study as a whole, and that its reintegration can once again offer benefits to humanity beyond the scope of Catholic adherents or post-modern rhetoricians. However, some may be prompted to suggest that I have too easily conflated the Catholic, Platonic and rhetorical traditions and might even acknowledge their separation as a point of celebration. Towards such individuals I offer this study in humble disagreement and only ask that such readers not reject the arguments that I proffer simply because they are rooted in a rival ideology, philosophy, or theology. Rather, I hope that they can engage the arguments on their own merits, acknowledging that which seems plausible and offering correction where correction is needed.

34 Excepting, or rather, including, the extant tradition of the Eastern Orthodox Church and the smaller national churches that have retained their identity since antiquity.
1.6 HISTORICAL LIMITS

Although it is my intention to recover a rather neglected tradition, such a task cannot be completed entirely in one sitting, especially one that ranges over thousands of years. As I have indicated above, the focus is on certain epochs within this tradition, spread out by some 800 years apiece: Plato in the late fifth and early fourth centuries of antiquity, St. Augustine in the late fourth and early fifth centuries on the cusp of antiquity and the Middle Ages, and St. Bonaventure in the thirteenth century of the high Middle Ages. That leaves roughly the same 800-year span until the contemporary period. Although the majority of the study focuses on these rather disparate eras, I review and summarize relevant primary and secondary literature at the beginning of each chapter concerning the development of the tradition in the near century between each theorist.

1.7 CHAPTER OVERVIEW

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY CONCERNING PLATO AND RHETORIC – This chapter engages disciplinary concerns that attempt to delimit appropriate practices for investigating rhetorical concepts in the works of Plato and his predecessors. In particular, I consider the thought of Edward Schiappa and Carol Poster in order to forestall methodological criticism and open the appropriate space for investigating concepts that adherence to their methodological concerns would ultimately close off. At the close of this chapter, I lay out my procedures for investigating concept clusters in ancient works and articulate the basic structures that will guide the remainder of the study.
CHAPTER 3: PRE-PLATONIC PSYCHAGOGIA – In this chapter I summarize the pre-Platonic metaphysical and psychological landscape with a synoptic overview of the various tripartite structures and psychagogic concepts that run through Homer, Heraclitus, Gorgias and Aristophanes. Through this analysis I establish certain latent structural threads that situate Plato in a tradition of implicit psychagogical instruction and provide him with the materials he needs to construct a robust theory of psychagogic rhetoric.

CHAPTER 4: PSYCHAGOGIC RHETORIC IN THE PLATONIC CORPUS – After establishing the intellectual and cultural background, I begin the analysis of Platonic rhetoric by highlighting the importance of psychagogia in the Phaedrus. I argue that Plato is in earnest when he admonishes the would-be rhetorician to acquire systematic knowledge of the soul, its structure, and its types in order that one may then know which type of speech corresponds to which soul. I argue that such admonishment goes far beyond considerations of simple (but impossible to meet) criteria of audience adaptation and strikes at the heart of Plato’s system of internal reform. I then show that such a systematic explanation of the soul is laid out in the Republic with a corresponding discussion of speech and argument indicated in the Theaetetus. However, a proper alignment requires that the spirited element of the soul function in a way that runs counter to most contemporary views of Platonic psychology. Ultimately, I construct a model of Platonic psychagogic rhetoric and explain its basic functions.

CHAPTER 5: THE PERIAGOGIC RHETORIC OF SAINT AUGUSTINE – The opening section of this chapter engages the methodological concerns of Calvin Troup, who argues against the possibility of reading St. Augustine’s rhetoric Platonically. The chapter then reviews the development of Platonic metaphysics and psychology in late antiquity with special attention paid to Cicero, Plotinus, and Victorinus, who are all identified as influences by St. Augustine. In the
following section I examine the contemporary thesis that St. Augustine wholly abandoned Platonic thought in the development of his rhetoric and demonstrate that many of the recognized aspects of his rhetorical theory can be enlightened by the Platonic psychagogy developed in the previous sections. In the end, I demonstrate that the Platonic tripartite soul gives Augustinian rhetoric an object, an aim, and a structure that undergirds its more obviously Ciceronian framework.

CHAPTER 6: SAINT BONAVENTURE’S ANAGOGIC THEOLOGY OF LANGUAGE – Due to the diversity of influences that bear on the development of intellectual history in the centuries between St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure, this chapter opens with two separate reviews. The first section summarizes the three major strands in the history of rhetoric: 1) the Ciceronian preceptive tradition articulated by Murphy, which remains the major focus of contemporary studies in the history of medieval rhetoric, 2) the Aristotelian tradition of Boethius and the Arabic commentators in which rhetoric was recognized as a subspecies of logical argumentation, and 3) the Platonic influence on rhetorical thinking as explored in recent literature on the cathedral school of Chartres. The second section summarizes pseudo-Dionysius’ Platonically inspired hierarchical metaphysics and its impact on the pedagogical thought of Hugh of St. Victor. I argue that all three of these lines – the Ciceronian, the Aristotelian, and the Platonic – overlap in many regards and collectively influence the Schoolmen of the thirteenth century to varying degrees. The dominant influence of Platonism over, but not to the exclusion of, the other strains in the rhetorical thought of St. Bonaventure serves as the topic of investigation for the remainder of the chapter.

In the following sections I trace the unique confluence of pedagogy and theology in the works of St. Bonaventure. For Bonaventure, all arts emanated from God. As such, practice and
contemplation of the arts brought us closer to Him. Bonaventure’s unique Trinitarian system collates the arts into sets of three, the trivium among them, each mirroring the Trinity in some fashion. I illustrate how for Bonaventure, in the tradition of Plato and Augustine, the arts of language hold a central place in the soul’s ascent, since more than any other triad in his scheme the trivium functions analogously to both God and the human mind. However, more than a mere descendent in the Platonic tradition, I demonstrate that Bonaventure presents a number of innovations that result in the most systematic view of the relationship between language, humanity and the divine that the tradition has to offer among the Scholastics. Consequently, more than Plato or Augustine, Bonaventure explores the effect that rhetorical practice has on the speaker, who is raised up by the very contemplation of his linguistic abilities.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION – The final chapter opens with a brief summary and moves to an exploration of the development of Platonic psychagogy as it progressed through the Renaissance and into Modernity in the likes of Ficino, Coleridge, Brownson, Lewis and Weaver. I close by discussing the broader implications that a neo-medieval theory of rhetoric in the Platonic tradition has to offer contemporary rhetorical practice and instruction.
2.0 METHODOLOGY CONCERNING PLATO AND RHETORIC

Given some of the methodological suggestions and accompanying biases that have arisen over the last few decades concerning the proper way to address rhetorical concepts in and before Plato, it is prudent to set forth exactly what I hope to achieve in this chapter and by what means as precisely as possible. But first it may be prudent to discuss what aims and means I also reject.

In particular, Edward Schiappa and Carol Poster have voiced important and influential methodological concerns that I would like to address, mainly because I intentionally choose to ignore some of their more prominent methodological suggestions in this study. I do recognize that the suggestions and cautions of each offer many insights to the historian and philosopher of rhetoric and I am far from rejecting them outright. However, often despite professed authorial intentions, their suggestions can carry a dogmatic tone and their cautions a sense of arbitrary constraint. By directly acknowledging and justifying my calculated transgressions, I hope to forestall some popular objections based on their writings that my study might otherwise incur.

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2.1 PLATONIC RHETORIC AND THE TERM RHETORIKE

In the first instance, Edward Schiappa makes much of the idea that Plato likely coined the term *rhetorike*. He infers from this probability that “fifth-century texts concerning *logos* differ substantially from fourth-century texts” that employ the newly coined term. Schiappa argues that as a consequence of overlooking this difference, scholars have been reading back the thought of Plato and Aristotle anachronistically on to the Sophists. This observation naturally leads to the methodological suggestion to pay greater attention to the conceptual terms that are employed by the Sophists, Plato and others concerning the arts of speech. However, this sensible suggestion morphed into a hard and fast methodological distinction between the “historical reconstruction” of sophistical rhetoric and its “contemporary appropriation.”

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36 “*Rhêtorikê*” 1.
37 Ibid. 4.
38 While Schiappa might have sought to draw a simple line in an attempt to avoid scholarly anachronism, his categories did not sit well with the newly minted “neosophists” who had previously considered themselves historians of rhetoric, and still do. See the following – Schiappa’s attempts to reclassify the works of John Poulakos given his methodological suggestions: “Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines?” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 23.3 (1990): 192-217; Poulakos’ response: “Interpreting Sophistical Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa.” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 23.3 (1990): 218-228; and Schiappa’s reply: “History and Neo-Sophistic Criticism: A Reply to Poulakos.” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 23.4 (1990): 307-315.

Against Schiappa’s protestations that he was not valorizing or condemning methodologies, historians and philosophers of rhetoric took methodological sides using Schiappa’s categories. See, for instance, the somewhat belatedly published opinion of Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., the editor of *Philosophy & Rhetoric* during the Schiappa-Poulakos colloquy (“On Schiappa versus Poulakos.” *Rhetoric Review* 14.2 (1996): 438-440). Johnstone awards points to both sides, but in the end he “can’t give [Schiappa] much comfort” on methodological grounds, finding the totalizing force of the reconstruction/appropriation dichotomy too constraining to be useful for historical work in rhetorical studies (440).

Scott Consigny briefly took up the methodological mantle of “Schiappa’s neosophistic rivals” against the “foundationalist” methodologies championed by “Schiappa’s camp” (“Edward Schiappa’s Reading of the Sophists.” *Rhetoric Review* 14.2 (1996): 253-269 (p.253)). Schiappa replied by insisting on the value neutral distinction between appropriation and reconstruction – both were good scholarship in which he himself was involved, but only one was properly historical scholarship (“Some of My Best Friends are Neosophists: A Response to Scott Consigny.” *Rhetoric Review* 14.2 (1996): 272-279; See also the earlier “Forum” between the two concerning Schiappa’s *Protagoras and Logos* in *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 25 (1995): 217-222.)

Later, trying to steer a methodological middle course, Consigny placed himself somewhere between Schiappa’s “empiricism/objectivism” and Poulakos’ “rhapsodic/idiosyncratic” methodology. Rather, he attempts a “pragmatic, conventionalist, or ‘communitarian’” approach that makes the most persuasive case of interpreting the text based on the criteria of a given interpretive community. Thus, Consigny does not avoid “anachronistic”
While I do not consider this study to be a “neosophistical appropriation,” the focus of this chapter and the foundation of my subsequent analysis is the critical juncture of rhetorike and logos in the thought of Plato. In some ways, this is exactly where Schiappa says the focus should be: “it is the transition from logos to rhêtorikê that deserves the attention of the historian of Greek rhetorical theory.”\(^{39}\) However, while I agree with Schiappa that Plato at times seeks to distinguish the arts of logos through coining terms by which to label them, my study is concerned far more with the similarities that Plato shares with his predecessors and successors. In Platonic terms, where Schiappa emphasizes division, I look at collection. In so doing, I do read Plato back on to his predecessors and I admittedly seek to show that the difference between fifth-century texts concerning logos and fourth-century texts concerning rhetorike is less substantial than he suggests.

To those that subscribe to Schiappa’s revised historical methodology, my basic assumptions might appear as methodological anathema. But insofar as my analysis is grounded in textual evidence, I believe that there should be little problem with the arguments I set forth as arguments about the history of rhetoric – whether they stand on logical grounds is another matter. As such, I want to forestall the objection that because I look for rhetorical concepts where they supposedly aren’t, my arguments are therefore anachronistic and I am somehow a

\(^{39}\) “Rhêtorikê” 3.
contemporary appropriator of historical rhetoric as opposed to a proper historian of the art. As I hopefully made clear in the introduction, I am both; for while a scholar may work exclusively as one or the other, the categories are not themselves exclusive by nature. This study, however, is strictly historical.

2.2 RHETORICAL FETISHISM IN PLATO

When faced with a constraining tendency to narrowly focus on keywords, one impulse might be to invoke Carol Poster’s concept of “rhetorical fetishism” to justify expanding attention to a broader constellation of concepts. The argument is simple and important enough to restate fully:

Rhetorical historiography (perhaps as yet another unfortunate side-effect of a manner of thinking based on “keywords”) has tended to fetishize the term “rhetoric,” treating the word “rhetoric” as if it represented some transcendent reality rather than simply being a convenient label existing within a system of differences, and thus ignoring works dealing with issues of persuasion, language, oratory, writing, writing pedagogy, etc. in which the word “rhetoric” does not occur.

40 In this way, I too seek a middle ground between the popular conceptions of Schiappa’s and Poulakos’ methodology. But unlike Consigny, I do not see the two as representing unattractive and untenable extremes. Rather, I reject the hard and fast distinction altogether and see them as offering a number of useful methodological suggestions that I will appropriate as I see prudent. While I do trace the conceptual development of certain keywords throughout history, I do so in part by following their “traces” and “echoes” (Poulakos, “Interpreting” 225). Nevertheless, I will always follow the single methodological guideline on which I think both would agree: make good arguments. It is my hope that the end result will be acceptable to members of all methodological “camps.”

41 “Reframing Theaetetus” 39.
The warning seems to directly engage the sort of terminological puritanism that I am consciously attempting to avoid while preserving the kind of rigor that such fetishes hope to maintain. Indeed, Poster offers many methodological suggestions that seek to expand how both rhetoricians and classicists approach rhetorical concepts in Plato that I take as general guidelines in this study. In addition to a broader conceptual outlook, I also embrace Poster’s call to widen disciplinary boarders in terms of secondary literature, as well as the call to expand the disciplinary notion of Plato’s rhetorical canon. However, a closer analysis of Poster’s suggestions demonstrates why one cannot adhere to them uncritically. For in her enumerated areas where classicists and rhetoricians could benefit from interdisciplinary conversations of method, an interesting interaction takes place between (5): “Broadening the Platonic Canon” and (6): “Avoiding Rhetorical Fetishism.” And what they expand with one hand, they contract with the other. As these movements bear directly on the central methodological assumptions of the following chapters, I would like to look at them carefully.

The Platonic canon in rhetorical scholarship is often limited to a very small group of dialogues, which do not adequately reflect the range of positions articulated by Platonic characters. Protagoras is often read without the Theaetetus (which presents Socrates correcting his own earlier misrepresentations of Protagoras), Gorgias and Meno without Parmenides and Sophist (which further analyze “sophist” and provide a reductio ad absurdum of the “theory of forms”), Republic without Laws, and Phaedrus and Symposium without Philebus (which gives a more complex analysis of love and pleasure). The sheer number of cross-references and shared characters among the dialogues suggests that the Platonic corpus needs to be studied as a whole, and that dialogues read in isolation are liable to egregious misinterpretation. Furthermore, it is necessary to read each dialogue as a dramatic whole, rather than interpreting in isolation those sections of a dialogue that contain the word “rhetoric,” a fault exacerbated by the frequent use of anthologies rather than complete texts in graduate courses on the history of rhetoric. (Ibid. 38)

Rhetorical fetishism follows as number 6. See n.28 above for other iterations of this perennial call to expand our disciplinary familiarity with the Platonic corpus.

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42 “Rhetorical awareness of underlying polemical impulses, however, should lead, not to dismissing all scholarship as biased, but rather lead to citing works from several disciplines more judiciously while avoiding the tunnel-vision resulting from allegiance to individual disciplinary ideologies” (ibid. 34). This is more or less the difference between my middle ground and Consigny’s discussed in the note above.

43 This appears as the fifth of Poster’s seven general areas where rhetoricians and classicists could benefit from an interdisciplinary conversation on methodology:

44 Ibid. 38-40. The abbreviated names in quotations are my own construction.
In (5) we are told that by expanding the rhetorical canon to include the entire Platonic corpus we gain a greater sense of what concepts and figures are important to Plato. As a consequence, we learn that it is language that is important to Plato, not rhetoric.\textsuperscript{45} This assertion seems plausible at first read, but when mixed with (6) the methodological implications lead to perplexing results.

In (6), as we have seen, Poster warns against a narrow focus on the term “rhetoric” and its cognates and favors a broader investigation into related ideas. Poster asserts that if rhetorical scholars want to have greater extra-disciplinary impact, “we need to incorporate into our research studies of the entire range of verbal and persuasive practices.”\textsuperscript{46} But the target of her correction is not Schiappa’s terminological fixation;\textsuperscript{47} instead it is the likes of Edwin Black and James S. Murray.\textsuperscript{48} The resulting polemic is difficult to follow, but if I am reading it correctly, those who see the \textit{Phaedrus} as an account of “true rhetoric” as opposed to “false rhetoric,” are guilty of rhetorical fetishism because: “In Plato’s Greek, the good arts being praised by Socrates, with the assent of Phaedrus, are called those of ‘dialectic’ and ‘speech,’ not ‘rhetoric’”;\textsuperscript{49} that is to say, their investigation is unsupportable because the term “rhetoric” does not appear at the right moment in the text, only terms that deal with other “verbal and persuasive practices.” But if that is the case, are Black and Murray not doing exactly what Poster says they \textit{should} by avoiding

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. 38. We also learn that Isocrates “is an insignificant figure for Plato and efforts in rhetorical scholarship to read a significant degree of interest in Isocrates into the Platonic dialogue…are based on the false assumption, that because modern rhetorical scholars are interested in both Plato and Isocrates, Plato must have been interested in Isocrates.” Rather, focus should be given to those figures that Plato names directly. (39). Cf. n.51.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. 40

\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, Schiappa’s historical work is conspicuously absent from the entire article, save for a footnote that recognizes him as one of the few scholars in the discipline who relies on his own translations (ibid. 57n.6). To underscore the oddity of the omission, Schiappa’s contemporary work is cited in support against rhetorical fetishism, noting that “scholarship advances not through metadisciplinary wrangling . . . but through the production of exemplary work” (40). Ellipsis in Poster’s citation of Schiappa. “Second Thoughts on the Critique of Big Rhetoric.” \textit{Philosophy and Rhetoric} 34:3 (2001): 260-274 (p. 271).


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid. 40
terminological tunnel-vision and looking at larger conceptual constructs within Plato’s theory of language? If their only error is that they have focused on the *Gorgias* and/or the *Phaedrus*, it seems more related to (5) than (6). But if we look back at (5) with their indiscretions in mind, we see that the combination of (5) and (6) results in a self-defeating methodology for historians of rhetoric interested in Plato.

Simply put, in (6) we are told to expand research from the term “rhetoric” to other linguistic concepts in Plato. This would naturally lead to the sort of textual and conceptual expansion that is advocated in (5). However, if we are not allowed to read “rhetoric” back in to the text in which it does not appear, then all that we can learn by expanding the texts and concepts we investigate in Plato is that he is not interested in rhetoric, *only* language.50 Thus in combining the two, it seems that all that is legitimately left to the historian of rhetoric is to show how Plato did not care for rhetoric despite any indication to the contrary.

It appears that Poster has opened up the methodological stores of academia only to drastically restrain the purposes to which they could be applied.51 If we add (3): “Order and Developmentalism” to (5) and (6), we get a sense of the hermeneutic roadblock Poster tries to set

50 Similarly, we learn that he is not interested in Isocrates, *only* the sophists.
51 Granted, her reading of *Theaetetus* offers a number of insights to the historian of rhetoric, but I would argue that this is due to the opening of method and not the closing of aim. That such positive and negative heuristic suggestions result in a confused methodology is evidenced by the fact that Brad McAdon’s “Plato’s Denunciation of Rhetoric in the *Phaedrus*” (*Rhetoric Review* 23:1 (2004): 21-39) is twice invoked as a paradigm example of the refutation of the “*Phaedrus = True Rhetoric*” thesis; once in (5), and again in (6) in direct opposition to Black and Murray (*Ibid.* 39, 40). The problem? McAdon’s textual analysis that Poster finds so insightful is rooted in a reading that sees Plato’s *Phaedrus* as a direct interaction with Isocrates. Thus his argument should be methodologically suspect at best, since the historical context from which he gleans his philological insights is one that Poster explicitly rejects as anachronistic and mistaken. This is compounded by the fact that the rejection of the scholarly importance of the Plato/Isocrates relationship is the main argument that appears between the two McAdon citations (see n.45). It might appear to the cynic that Poster is happy to hold up as exemplary what she would otherwise denounce as methodologically questionable if it supports her own conclusions.
up in front of scholars who want to assert that Plato discusses “true rhetoric” in the *Phaedrus*. For obvious reasons, this is a roadblock I would like to circumvent before the study proceeds.

In (3) Poster argues that the order in which we arrange the dialogues has hermeneutical consequences that often serve the interpreter’s biases. There is sound advice in the caution. Scholars really should consider whether they have begged the question in their arrangement of the dialogues rather than proven something about their arrangement based on contextual or historical evidence. But the caution is not itself an argument for or against a particular arrangement.

In Poster’s “Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* against Rhetoric,” (3), (5) and (6) come together in a definitive challenge to those who want to read the *Phaedrus* as indicating a positive direction for rhetorical activity. As I engage in a thorough refutation of Poster’s arguments, I would like to give her the courtesy of stating them in her own words:

52 *Ibid.*. 37. Again, the abbreviated name for (3) in quotation marks is my own construction.

53 The argument is sparse on content and directs the reader to the author’s other work on the topic, “The Idea(s) of Order.”

54 In (3), Poster attempts to cast doubt on the “*Phaedrus* = True Rhetoric” hypothesis using nothing more than the suggestion that it can’t be proven that the *Phaedrus* was written after the *Gorgias*, since many scholars who make the argument rely “on the (possibly unprovable) assumption that *Phaedrus* was written after *Gorgias* to support the claim that a Platonic critique of rhetoric was followed by a reconstruction of an ‘ideal’ rhetoric” (“Framing *Theaetetus*” 37). The problems with this line of argument appear in the main text below; but in case of (3) the biggest problem is that it is not an argument, it is a simple assertion meant to undo a whole tradition of scholarship on the assumption that because something might be unprovable it is therefore unreasonable to assume. Not that tradition trumps reason, but in the face of a well-established tradition among reasonably knowledgeable scholars, the onus of proof is placed on the one who wishes to revise the common wisdom. Moreover, there is no indication that the order of writing is important when one juxtaposes a critique and an ideal construction (the prefix “re-” affixed to the notion of “construction” is logically unnecessary here and only gives the appearance of a necessary temporal order). It should be noted that Poster does not make such an argument in her earlier “Idea(s) of Order” to which she refers. Still, Poster’s suggestion has been taken as a serious challenge by some, regardless of their views. See for example James Kastely. “Addressing Souls: Persuasion and Psychological Praxis.” *Style* 45.3 (2011): 464-488. Kastely cites Poster’s organizational qualms in his opening footnote only to say that his argument about the *Phaedrus* is not developmentally dependent and so not subject to Poster’s critique.

55 Poster refers the reader to this article directly in (6) when she rejects the “*Phaedrus* = True Rhetoric” thesis as rhetorical fetishism. The basic argument of the article is that since Plato did not outline a positive art of rhetoric in the *Phaedrus*, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* could not be viewed as a positive art based on that outline. Rather, it is either an anti-Platonic art or, as Poster argues, it is an anti-rhetorical text unified with Plato’s view. These arguments have been influential in recent years. For instance, Poster’s essay forms the foundation for McAdon’s “Reconsidering the Intention or Purpose of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.” *Rhetoric Review*, 23.3 (2004): 216-234. McAdon goes so far as to
There are two problems with considering *Phaedrus* as a work describing an ideal rhetoric: the evidence of the other dialogues and the argumentative movement of *Phaedrus* itself.

Three of the four Platonic dialogues which directly address rhetoric are uncompromisingly negative towards it: *Gorgias, Protagoras,* and *Sophist.* Passing mentions of rhetoric in *Apology* are equally negative, as are the portrayal of the polymathic sophist in *Hippias Major* and the caricature of the wrangling eristics in *Euthydemus.* Unless one makes a developmental argument for a Platonic reconciliation with rhetoric by assuming *Phaedrus* is later than *Sophist* and by giving some reason why Plato might have transformed himself from a lover of *sophia* to a lover of *sophistes,* a reading of *Phaedrus* as promoting an ideal rhetoric is difficult to reconcile with the overwhelming majority of available textual evidence.

In the *Phaedrus* itself, the description of the suspiciously philosophical form of ideal rhetoric is immediately followed by a firm statement of the superiority of dialectic as the *techne* appropriate to serious speech. At 276e4-6 Socrates says “but, in my opinion, serious discourse about them [subjects like justice] is far nobler, when one recognize Poster’s as “the historical approach” against the “popular/prevaling view” that suggests that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* establishes the art as a preferred mode of civic discourse promoted by the likes of Schiappa, Thomas Farrell, Eugene Garver, and Gerard Hauser (216-217). More recently, Robin Reames characterizes her own narrative analysis of rhetoric in Plato and Aristotle as “a third option in addition to the two outlined by Poster” (“The μῦθος of Pernicious Rhetoric: The Platonist Possibilities of λογός in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric.*” *Rhetorica,* 30.2 (2012): 134-152 (p.135)). Note that in rejecting the “*Phaedrus = True Rhetoric*” thesis in both “Framing *Theaetetus*” (40) and “Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*” (221n.9; 222n.11) Poster refers to her “Plato's Unwritten Doctrines: A Hermeneutic Problem in Rhetorical Historiography.” *Pre/text* 14.1-2 (1993): 127-38, as if it offers solid philosophical and philological argumentation for the refutation of scholarship that supports such a reading based on her own analysis of the available textual evidence. However, the argument is not as developed as it is in “Aristotle’s *Rhetoric,*** as it simply consists of the claim that “reading into Plato a bifurcation between ‘true’ and ‘false’ rhetorics or good and bad writing, is difficult to reconcile with the available textual evidence” (130). See n.61.
employs the dialectic method [dialectike techne].” When Socrates continues to discuss the components of the techne of his ideal discourse at 277b5-c6, he does not use the term “rhetorike” at all, but in describing this ideal speech, refers to it exclusively as “logos.” The dialectical logos leads the rational soul, much as rhetoric sways the emotions. Here, Plato seems to be setting up a series of analogies, implying that rhetoric is to dialectic as emotions are to intellect or as body to soul or as phenomena to noeta.\(^{56}\)

I will begin with the second argument first and will invoke Poster’s own caution against rhetorical fetishism. I would amend this with a similar caution against “dialectical repulsion.” That is to say, we cannot simply assert that the presence of the term “dialektike” forces out any room for an ideal “rhetorike.” There is no doubt that Plato’s ideal rhetoric would be subordinate to dialectic; subordination, however, does not entail repudiation.\(^{57}\) If we are to avoid being

\(^{56}\) “Aristotle’s Rhetoric” 222-223.

\(^{57}\) In many ways, Poster’s is a more philologically sophisticated version of Oscar L. Brownstein’s attempted refutation of Black, Weaver and other Platonic sympathizers:

Plato is here following the same line that he follows everywhere, that of arguing the superiority of philosophy and its methodological aspect, dialectic. We might argue that Plato is wrong in his arguments, that Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric answers most of Plato’s objections or makes them irrelevant, that Plato himself uses what we now call rhetoric, that Plato's dialectic can be or has been made a useful instrument of rhetoric, or that his dialectic was neither so disinterested nor so universally useful as he hopefully thought, but none of this will make Plato a lover of rhetoric. To argue that his criticism was directed merely against the rhetoricians of his own time, however, is wholly specious, for his objections to rhetoric are as fundamental as his objections to poetry, and for much the same reasons – by his standard of truth they both lie. (“Plato’s Phaedrus” 398)

Consequently, my response to Poster is not unlike Kaufer’s response to Brownstein:

But if Plato really believed that a true rhetoric was impossible and if, as Brownstein asserts (p. 397), it would require that the speaker had “absolute knowledge,” then not only the possibility of a true rhetoric but a true dialectic would be undermined. I agree with Brownstein that Plato identifies the true rhetor and the dialectician. But, unlike Brownstein, I do not associate dialectic with superhuman knowledge or morality. Plato's dialectician is distinguished by rigor and openness of arguments, not by their perfection. (“Influence” 64n.4)
fetishists then the argument must rely on something more than the mere presence or absence of a
given term. The argument must show that the presence of the one term excludes the possibility
of the other. Though it is not how I would divide the labor between the arts, Poster’s analogies
between dialectic/intellect/soul/noeta and rhetoric/emotions/body/phenomena far from expel
rhetoric as an art of discourse; 58 rather they show that such an art would be necessary in any but
a purely mental world. In other words, the analogies show the insufficiency of dialectic.

If we insist on terminological exactitude, however, a number of things become
immediately obvious. First, although Poster sees Plato as setting up dichotomous analogies,
there is no philological indication of them in the text at 277b or any of the other locations she
cites. As for what is present, dialektike techne does not follow immediately after a description of
the ideal rhetoric. Rather, it directly follows the discussion of “aptness and ineptness in
connection with writing [graphes]” (274b). The entire context of discourses about justice and
similar subjects sets up a contrast between the noble dialectic that plants and waters the seeds of
these discourses in the soul (276e-277a) and the art of writing about which “the man who knows
what is just, noble, and good” won’t be serious (276c). He will, however, occupy his time in
later life by using writing to recall these noble matters and thus he sows and waters “gardens of
letters for the sake of amusing himself…and for everyone who wants to follow in his footsteps,”
while others “water themselves with drinking parties” (276d). Phaedrus replies that Socrates is
“contrasting a vulgar amusement with the very noblest – with the amusement of a man who can
while away his time telling stories [mythologounta] of justice and the other matters you

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58 The main outlier here is the soul/body portion of the analogy. While emotions may be a consequence of
embodiment, Plato obviously locates them within the soul, not the body. Emotions are not the same as sensations.
mentioned.”

It is here that Socrates replies that while writing and telling such stories is indeed a noble pastime, “it is much nobler to be serious about these matters, and use the art of dialectic” (276e). As such, the contrast is not between the noble and the base, but between more and less noble intellectual pursuits both of which Socrates and Phaedrus recognize as being superior to other base worldly activities.

Of greater philological importance, the term “rhetorike” is nowhere to be found in contrast with dialektike, only graphe and mythologeo. It will not do to argue that graphe is the part of rhetorike which is currently under investigation, for the part of rhetoric directly preceding the discussion of writing is none other than the art of logos (274b). If the term “logos” is somehow exclusive of rhetoric at the end of the Phaedrus, it must be explained how the term is not only inclusive of rhetoric, but subordinate to it just prior to the discussion of writing.

The focus on the term “logos” raises another related issue, because Poster is accurate in pointing out that when “Socrates continues to discuss the components of the techne of his ideal discourse at 277b5-c6, he does not use the term “rhetorike” at all, but in describing this ideal speech, refers to it exclusively as ‘logos.’” If the exclusive term that Plato uses is “logos,” then not only is the term “rhetorike” absent, but so is the term “dialektike.” Thus, in addition to explaining why “logos” now means “not rhetorike” where before it meant “a part of rhetorike,”

59 παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ άλλων ὄν λέγεις πέρι μυθολογοῦντα.
60 I do believe that Plato is discussing a part of the art of rhetoric; the point is simply that “rhetorike” is absent.
61 Before switching focus to graphe at 274b, Socrates formerly closes the discussion about what constitutes the art of speech and what does not: “οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἄτεχνης λόγων πέρι ικανής ἔχει.” So within the same Stephanus page of text, Socrates declares that having finished discussing what is and is not art in speaking, they will move on to the question of proper and improper writing. With this in mind, it seems very uncharitable of Poster to assert without argument that prominent scholars have employed “a considerable degree of ingenuity in claiming that Plato did not condemn all writing but rather was attempting to distinguish between good and bad writing or true and false rhetorics” (“Unwritten Doctrines” 130). Contrary to Poster’s multiple assertions that such a view is difficult to reconcile with the textual evidence (“Unwritten Doctrines” 30; “Aristotle’s Rhetoric” 221n.9; “Framing Theaetetus” 40) this appears to be Socrates overtly professed goal so far as the text is concerned. The ingenuity would be in explaining that Socrates does not mean what he says. See n.55.
62 “Aristotle’s Rhetoric” 222.
Poster must explain why we are entitled to add the absent term “dialektike” to Plato’s description of the ideal art of speech and not “rhetorike.” Terminological absence is either telling on its own, or it is not.

If we insist on terminological presence as a measure of what Socrates means in his final summary of the art of logos, we will find that while neither dialektike nor rhetorike is directly mentioned both are directly indicated in the summary. For when Socrates states that “you must know the truth concerning everything you are speaking or writing about; you must learn how to define each thing in itself; and, having defined it, you must know how to divide it into kinds until you reach something indivisible,” this is exactly what he has defined as the art of dialectic at 265d-266c.

Socrates follows the summary of dialectic by stating that “you must understand the nature of the soul, along the same lines; you must determine which kind of speech is appropriate to each kind of soul, prepare and arrange your speech accordingly, and offer a complex and elaborate speech to a complex soul and a simple speech to a simple one.” Whether we interpret this passage as ideal, ironic, impossible, or simply dialectic in disguise, the text itself clearly links the

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63 The full Greek text of the summary at 277b-c is as follows:

πρὶν ἂν τὶς τὸ τε ἄλληθς ἐκάστου εἰδὴ πέρι ὧν λέγει ἢ γράφει, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τε πάν ὁρίζεσθαι δυνατός γένηται,
ὁρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατ᾽ εἰδὴ μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμητοῦ τέμνειν ἐπιστηθῇ, περὶ τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διόδον κατὰ
tαυτά, τὸ προσαρμόστον ἐκάστη φύσει ἐνόδον ἀναφερόντων, οὕτω τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῆτο τὸν λόγον, ποικίλη μὲν
ποικίλους ψυχὴν καὶ παναριμονίους διόδους λόγους, ἁπλοὺς δὲ ἀπλὰ, συν προτερον δυνατὸν τέχνη ἐπιστηθῇ
cαθ᾽ ὅσον πέρικε μεταχειρισθητίη τὸ λόγον γένος, οὕτω τι πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὕτω τι πρὸς τὸ πείσαι, ὡς ὁ
ἐμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἦμιν λόγος.

64 Indeed, the term “dialektike” does not appear again in the text until 276c, and it only appears three times throughout the entire text in inflected forms – twice at 266c (once by Socrates when he calls the practitioners of collection and division dialecticians, and once by Phaedrus when he confirms that the art should be called dialectic) and once at 276c. Any broader application of the term to the content of the Phaedrus, while certainly defensible by argument, must be read in to the text as a matter of interpretation. I admittedly read the term back into the summary at 277b, but believe that this textual interpretation is argumentatively sound.
description to Socrates earlier definition of rhetoric at 271c-272b. He is clear that this is an art that is separate from dialectic proper and that it belongs to the rhetorician to master and practice.

While this second part might be rooted in dialectic, it is not the art itself. This is made clear in the two passages Poster cites concerning dialektike and logos. For the “dialectician chooses a proper soul [psychen prosekousan] and plants and sows within it discourse accompanied by knowledge [epistemes logous]” (276e). The dialectician deals with one type of psyche and one type of logos, and the interaction between the two imparts knowledge to the hearer. The master of the art of logos deals with many psychai and many logoi, “either in order to teach [didaxai] or to persuade [peisai]” (277e). Persuasion has never been a hallmark of dialectic. So while there is little doubt that dialectic is represented in this ideal art of logos, all the textual evidence indicates that rhetoric is represented as well.

If we reject that Socrates outlines an ideal rhetoric informed by dialectic, then we must admit that he transforms dialectic to be more like rhetoric. I’m not sure which would be more uncharacteristic of our typical view of Plato. What Socrates does not do is suggest that dialectic as it is usually presented in the Platonic corpus is capable of doing everything that the ideal art of logos is said to be capable of doing. In reality, he appears to transform both rhetoric and

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65 For examples of these various readings, see the first section of the Introduction.

66 At 266c-d, Phaedrus acknowledges that they have discovered dialectic, but that “rhetoric still eludes us.” Socrates replies “Could there be anything valuable still grasped by art? If there is, you and I must certainly honor it, and we must say what part of rhetoric it is that has been left out.” They then embark on the inquiry that terminates with the list of criteria that the rhetorician needs in order to become a master of his art (271c-272b). It is important to realize that the criteria are not arbitrary but follow from the very definition of rhetoric as a type of psychagogia: “Since the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul, whoever intends to be a rhetorician must know how many kinds of soul there are...” [ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὕσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἀποδίδει ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴσπ ἔχει] (271c-d). Of course, we may quibble again about whether “the nature of logos” entails rhetoric in this passage; but it would be difficult to maintain the negative argument against Socrates blatant definition of the rhetoric as an art of psychagogia through logos at 261a: ἦρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἢν εἰς τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων. Again, interpretation would have to show how Socrates’ meaning is different from the literal text.

67 See the discussion of Statesman 304d-e below. Here rhetoric is defined as the art of persuading by telling stories as opposed to teaching using the same vocabulary as the Phaedrus.
dialectic to form a single art of *logos*.\(^{68}\) I would agree that rhetoric is still subordinate to dialectic. However, going strictly from the textual evidence it is difficult to deny that if we had to give the single art a name it would be *psychagogia*, which Socrates associates with rhetoric, not dialectic.\(^{69}\) Of course, one could mount a philosophical argument that explains how the text does not actually mean what it appears to say. But Black, Murray, and the like who read the *Phaedrus* as outlining an ideal rhetoric cannot simply be dismissed on textual grounds. There is no textual necessity that prohibits such a *prima facie* reading, and no great ingenuity is needed to interpret the text in this way. Indeed, the “argumentative movement” of the *Phaedrus* appears to support this reading from start to finish.\(^{70}\)

In showing that there is no textual incongruity involved in maintaining that the *Phaedrus* advocates an ideal rhetoric, we free Black and Murray from the charge of (6), rhetorical fetishism. And we do so somewhat ironically by showing that the term *is* either present or clearly indicated where it is absent. The second obstacle that Poster sets up is a mixture of (3) and (5), which constructs a developmental challenge to a pro-rhetoric reading of the *Phaedrus* that stretches through the entire Platonic corpus. As stated in (3), it cannot be proven that the

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\(^{68}\) If this is true, then what Schiappa sees as a wholesale demarcation of rhetoric from the more philosophical art of *logos* in the *Gorgias* is somewhat reversed in the *Phaedrus*. Harvey Yunis makes an argument approaching these lines in “Dialectic and the Purpose of Rhetoric in Plato's *Phaedrus.*” *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 24 (2009), 229-48.

\(^{69}\) Despite her objection to reading the *Phaedrus* as pro-rhetoric, Poster appears to tacitly accept this position when she states: “While Platonic texts are overtly opposed not only to rhetoric but also to language, they do deploy language in a dramatically rhetorical fashion to control the reader and lead her analogically to a vision of an extra-linguistic reality” (“Unwritten Doctrines” 128). This is exactly the type of activity Plato designates to rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* according to many of the scholars she dismisses.

\(^{70}\) To offer a counterstatement to Brownstein (see n.57): We might argue that Plato endorses an ideal rhetoric that we find repugnant, that it denies everything that modern rhetoricians suppose rhetoric to be, that it is impractical or impossible to enact, that it is subordinate to dialectic, that it could only be wielded by the philosopher or the intellectual or societal elite or worse yet, by an oppressive tyrant-king, that it is based on deceit and lies, or that it is a rouse or a parody of true rhetoric, but none of this will alter the textual fact that Socrates claims to be engaging in constructing a true art of rhetoric. Arguments that Plato simply hated all rhetoric and so therefore could not be serious about the stated intent of Socrates beg the interpretive question and close a door to investigation due to disciplinary biases about what Plato could and could not believe.
*Gorgias* was written before the *Phaedrus*, so any argument that relies on this as a fact of composition is dubious at best. The more sophisticated developmental challenge articulated in “Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*” asserts that any pro-rhetoric reading of the *Phaedrus* must place its composition after the *Sophist*, since rhetoric is still ridiculed in that dialogue.

Since Poster seems to be placing all pro-rhetoric readers of the *Phaedrus* into a single class, it should first be noted that there at least two kinds of readers that make up this class. The developmental challenge applies to only one of them. The first type consists of scholars like Black, Murray, and Curran, who clearly state that they are not making a developmental argument.71 Rather they take Plato at his word when he discusses the possibility of a true art of rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, which he outlines at length in the *Phaedrus*.72 To maintain this position one need not say that Plato necessarily deconstructs rhetoric in the *Gorgias* first, and only afterwards is able to reconstruct it in the *Phaedrus*.73 Even less does one need to say that Plato has changed his mind about rhetoric from one dialogue to the next.

In asserting that Plato maintains a clear distinction between a “true” or “good” rhetoric and a “false” or “bad” one throughout his writings, this class has freed themselves of developmental charges altogether. For all Black or Murray or Curran care, the *Gorgias* could be Plato’s last work. This doesn’t change the fact that the type of rhetorical practice Plato condemns there is exactly the type of rhetorical practice he chastises as being artless in the *Phaedrus*; while the positive type he alludes to in the *Gorgias* is the type identified as artful in the *Phaedrus*. For the same reason, this group need not worry about any condemnation of rhetoric in the *Sophist*, so long as the kind of rhetoric being condemned can be identified as the

72 See the qualifications for the “true rhetorician” (ὀρθῶς ῥητορικὸν) at Grg. 508c.
73 See n.54 above.
type that is condemned in both the *Phaedrus* and the *Gorgias*—what they would argue is, for Plato, the false art of rhetoric. Thus, there is no need for members of this group to give “some reason why Plato might have transformed himself from a lover of sophia to a lover of sophistes.” He can still value “philosophical” rhetoric while condemning the “sophistical” practice. If their interpretations are correct, no amount of condemning false rhetoric will undermine Plato’s construction of an ideal rhetoric no matter where the condemnation lies in the corpus, either dramatically or compositionally. Consequently, the only way to prove their interpretations false is to engage the arguments they present. No amount of citing Plato’s dislike for “false” rhetoric will suffice.

However, there is a second group of scholars who do read Plato developmentally and Poster’s roadblock may very well cause trouble for them. Poster rightly acknowledges Harvey Yunis’ description of Platonic rhetoric in *Taming Democracy* as such an account. In so doing, she criticizes him for overlooking the fact that the later *Sophist* seems to reiterate the position of the *Gorgias*, rendering the genetic description of development moot. This is a combination of the negative aspects of (3) and (5), which argues that if we expand the corpus and properly order it we are forced to acknowledge that Plato is overwhelmingly critical of rhetoric. The only problem is that this not the *textual* case as Poster presents it. Again, it is merely an interpretive

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74 Poster “Aristotle’s Rhetoric” 222. This leg of the challenge relies solely on an anachronistic conflation of rhetoric and sophistry. To parallel Poster’s claim concerning Plato and Isocrates (see n.45 above), it is based on the false assumption that, because modern rhetorical scholars equate rhetoric and sophistry, Plato must have equated rhetoric with sophistry.

75 My own analysis of the Platonic corpus below offers a more unified reading and so situates me in the first group. However, Poster’s developmental objection implies that Plato’s treatment of rhetoric throughout the corpus is overwhelmingly negative. As my own analysis makes the opposite case, it is worth presently refuting this line of argument as thoroughly as possible.

76 Yunis 1996 has attempted a politically oriented reading, which assumes a genetic model of Plato moving from an antirhetorical stance in *Gorgias* to a later reconstructed rhetoric in *Phaedrus*. Yunis does not, however, account for the relatively late *Sophist’s* promulgating a critique of rhetoric quite similar to the one of *Gorgias*” (ibid. 222n.11); referencing Yunis. *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
one. If we follow the positive guidelines of (3), (5) and (6), we see that Poster’s case collapses in much the same way that the micro-level argument regarding the text of the *Phaedrus* did. Concerning *rhetorike*, the pro-rhetoric reader finds Plato saying what we anticipate he should be saying where he should be saying it.

The first thing to note is that there is no philological rhyme or reason to Poster’s assertion that “Three of the four Platonic dialogues which directly address rhetoric are uncompromisingly negative towards it: *Gorgias, Protagoras, and Sophist.*” Whatever the criteria for labeling *Phaedrus, Gorgias, Protagoras,* and *Sophist* as the four dialogues that directly address rhetoric, it is not a philological one – of the many dialogues in which Plato mentions *rhetorike*, the term is not mentioned once in either *Protagoras* or *Sophist*. The cognate term “rhetors” [*rhetors*] does appear at *Prt.* 329a. But it is used to distinguish Protagoras – as a sophist capable of answering questions – from the typical demagogue [*demegoron*]. Likewise, in the *Sophist*, the Eleatic stranger twice differentiates the subject of their inquiry from the public speaker (222c-223b and 268b), distinguishing between the sophist and the *demologikon* (268b). This is the converse of the distinction made in the *Gorgias*, where Socrates distinguishes between rhetoric and sophistry in order to maintain that their current inquiry is focused on rhetoric, not sophistry (465c-d). In this same vein, it should be noted that while Socrates does caricature “eristic wrangling” negatively in the *Euthydemus*, he closes the dialogue by advising Crito not to be dissuaded by these bad practitioners of *philosophia* (307b). Socrates suggests that we carefully distinguish between good arts and bad practitioners in every case and lists rhetoric among the fine arts –

77 *Ibid.* 222
78 All term searches have been verified using the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG).*
79 This is complicated by the fact that in the *Sophist*, the demagogue is contrasted with the statesmen and the sophist with the philosopher; while in the *Gorgias*, rhetoric is contrasted with justice (as cookery is with health) and sophistry contrasted with legislation (as cosmetics are to gymnastics). However, even though the analogies don’t quite match up, it is clear that Plato maintains and important distinction between sophistry and rhetoric.
along with gymnastics, generalship and moneymaking (307a). As far as the text is concerned, Protagoras, Sophist, and Euthydemus engage a topic similar to, but distinct from, rhetoric. Hence, even on a developmental model of Plato’s rhetoric we do not need to account for a switch in admiration from sophos to sophistes because Plato maintains a constant distinction between “public speaking” and sophistry.

Granted, one may now invoke the injunction against rhetorical fetishism to argue that Plato is clearly concerned with concepts germane to rhetoric in these dialogues, thus reading rhetoric back in to them. However, one could not ignore that the term rhetorike and descriptions of persuasive activities appear in later dialogues that align with Plato’s description of “true” rhetoric in the Phaedrus. Most notably, the Statesman does directly deal with “that part of rhetoric [rhetoreia] that in partnership with kingship persuades people of what is just and so helps in steering through the business of cities” (304a). It is thus an art subordinate to, but necessary for, the art of statecraft – on par with generalship and legal judgment (304a-e). It is an art that in the shared vocabulary of the Phaedrus, “is capable of persuading [peistikon] mass and crowd, through the telling of stories [mythologias], and not through teaching [didaxes]” (304d-e). So if Yunis’ account falters because it does not consider the later critique of sophistry offered by the Sophist, which mirrors the condemnation of rhetoric in the Gorgias; then Poster’s critique similarly fails because it does not consider the presumably later acknowledgement in the Statesman of a positive art of rhetoric that can persuade the many of what is just – one that directly alludes to the “true” art of rhetoric in the Phaedrus.

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80 ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ὧν ὑδεθά ὅτι ἐν παντὶ ἐπιτηδεύματι οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι πολλοὶ καὶ οὐδένος ἄξιοι, οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι ὀλίγοι καὶ παντὸς ἄξιοι; ἐπεὶ γυμναστικὴ οὐ καλὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ καὶ στρατηγία; Granted, the presence of moneymaking might make us think that Socrates is being ironic, but even moneymakers have a proper place in the just city. Thus, there is a right and wrong way to practice the art.

81 The more technical terms ῥητορικῇ (304d) and ῥητορικόν (304e) appear as well. Indeed, the Stranger goes so far as to call rhetoric the scientific knowledge [ἐπιστήμῃ] of persuasion (304c).
However, I would argue that Yunis’ account does not falter by neglecting the Sophist or Statesman at all. First, because he does mention this period of composition as “presenting no straightforward development on rhetoric”; noting the above passage from the Statesman, but not deriving from it any meaningful evolution in Plato’s rhetorical thought. Nor is this surprising, for as Poster and I agree, Sophist and Statesman at best reiterate thoughts concerning rhetoric that can be found more fully developed in earlier dialogues. Poster, however, fails to mention that Yunis ends his analysis with Plato’s last work, the Laws. While rhetorike does not appear in the Laws, Yunis gives a reasoned account of how the preambles of the laws conform to the “true” art of rhetoric prescribed in both Phaedrus and Statesman.

In the Laws the Athenian is clear that the preambles are necessary so that the laws can gain the acquiescence of the citizens principally through persuasion and education, rather than relying on coercion alone. Moreover, in this final text the Athenian reiterates all the distinctions we have noticed about rhetoric in the rest of the corpus. Persuasion should be employed by the statesman to persuade the masses about justice while sophistry, demagoguery

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82 I do offer criticisms on other grounds in Chapter 4.
83 Taming Democracy 212n.2.
84 See Taming Democracy, Ch. 8 “Laws: Rhetoric, Preambles, and Mass Political Instruction.” Yunis is hardly alone in this observation. Among rhetoricians and philosophers who have examined the Laws in the last sixty years the question has not been whether Plato endorses using rhetoric in the preambles, but whether his use of rhetoric is noble or base. See, for example, Glenn R. Morrow. “Plato’s Conception of Persuasion.” The Philosophical Review 62.2 (1953): 234-250; Charles Kauffman’s section on ‘Rhetoric and Social Control’ in “Axiological Foundations” (111-115); The closing of Ch. 2 “Plato’s Attack on Rhetoric” in Vickers, In Defence, (1988) 143-7; Yunis. “Rhetoric as Instruction: A Response to Vickers on Rhetoric in the Laws.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 23 (1990): 125-35; Christopher Bobonich. “Persuasion, Compulsion and Freedom in Plato's Laws.” The Classical Quarterly 41 (1991): 365-88; Andrea Nightingale. “Writing/Reading a Sacred Text: A Literary Interpretation of Plato’s Laws.” Classical Philology 88.4 (1993): 279-300; and sections 2.3 “Preludes to the Laws” and 2.4 “The Place of the Preludes,” in Bobonich. Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. 97-119. See 505n.18 in Plato’s Utopia for a more complete bibliographical list of philosophical sources. 85 While such contrasts abound in the early books of the Laws, the primary theoretical conversation appears in Book IV. In particular, see the closing passage (720-723) in which πείθω and πειστικός are the primary focus of the preambles in contrast to the βία of the unadorned law. See also Book IX, where the preludes are identified as a means of educating [παιδεύει] (857e) and instructing [διδάσκοντα] (858d) the citizens in matters of justice (857c-859a). Yunis (“Rhetoric as Instruction”; Taming Democracy, Ch.8) and Bobonich (“Persuasion”; Plato’s Utopia, 2.3 & 2.4) provide solid textual arguments that the rhetoric of the preambles is meant to instruct through persuasion.
and sycophancy should be condemned and punished by law.\textsuperscript{86} Thus without employing the term \textit{rhetorike}, Plato appears to maintain the distinction between “true” and “false” rhetoric – exhorting the use of the first and condemning the use of the second.

The \textit{Laws} presents an endpoint for the corpus, so it is the terminus for any developmental narrative of Platonic theory. Its seeming embrace of the dichotomy between “true” and “false” rhetoric thus trumps any interpretation of the \textit{Sophist} as a foil for those who would read Plato as developing a positive space for rhetorical practice. There is, however, one criticism that the \textit{Laws} might offer a developmental account like that of Yunis:\textsuperscript{87} by reiterating both the criticism of the \textit{Gorgias} and the cautious optimism of the \textit{Phaedrus}, the \textit{Laws} might show that Plato’s view of rhetoric remained amazingly consistent as Black, Curran, and Murray argue. This is the line that I take in my analysis of Plato.

In short, on either the micro-level of the \textit{Phaedrus} or the macro-level of the entire corpus, the text itself does not bar the way for an interpretation of Plato as advocating certain rhetorical practices. In fact, if we follow Poster’s positive methodological suggestions in (3), (5) and (6) we find that by expanding the canon, appreciating its order and avoiding terminological tunnel-vision, such readings are encouraged by the text. My goal in the remainder of this study will be to analyze what those practices are and how they work. My focus, however, is not the state-

\textsuperscript{86} Plato condemns naturally talented atheists who become tyrants [τύραννοι] and demagogues [δημηγόροι], the likes of which produce the tricks of the sophist [σοφιστῶν] (908d). Plato also condemns those who would corrupt justice and the role of the advocate by pursuing court cases without regard to truth through employing a so-called skill or “a knack born of casual trial and error” [εἴτε οὖν τέχνη εἴτε ἄτεχνος ἐστίν τις ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή] (937d-938c). This skill sounds a lot like “false” rhetoric and employs the same terminology of the \textit{Gorgias}. Plato shows a consistency of condemning the part of rhetoric which serves injustice (and so could not be a true science or art) without contradicting his embrace of a technical science of persuasion that can be employed in the name of justice.

From a psychological perspective, it is interesting to note that the Athenian recognizes two motives for sycophancy – the love of victory [φιλονικία] and the love of money [φιλοχρηματία]. The individual who pleads unjustly and dishonestly due to love of money is to be put to death immediately; the one who does so through love of victory should be punished and only be put to death after the second offense. On the psychological significance of the love of honor and money, see the relevant sections below and in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{87} Or Kaufer, Bobonich, etc.
employed use of rhetoric, at least not directly. Rather, I focus on what it means to correlate a 
logos with a psyche and lead it thereby.

2.3 KEYWORDS AND PATTERNS

Having identified what popular methodological procedures I am intentionally choosing to observe or ignore, I would like to outline some further methodological guidelines that will direct my investigation into Plato and his predecessors. In the remainder of this chapter I deal little with the term rhetorike as it is used in the Platonic corpus. Rather, following Socrates’ lead in the Phaedrus, I investigate the concept of rhetoric as a certain art of leading the soul through words – techne psychagogia tis dia logon (261a). While the noun psychagogia implies an activity, I do not consider soul-leading as a process until Chapter 4. My current aim instead is to construct a model of psychagogia by examining those elements that Socrates asserts the process entails: psyche and logos (271c-d). Thus the following chapter offers an historical overview of the two concepts as they are employed from Homeric times until Plato.

Even in limiting the initial overview to these two terms, the possible ways to proceed are virtually limitless. With Plato’s use of psyche and logos in mind and his exhortation to the would-be psychagogue to correlate the one to the other, I confine my initial analysis to those thinkers who specifically address the relationship between speech and soul. In many ways this procedure results in a keywords analysis. However, I do consider instances in which the specific Greek terms “psyche” and “logos” are not present if the text can reasonably be interpreted as

88 Remaining portions of this chapter and subsequent chapters on Greek texts from Homer to Plato represent a substantial revision and expansion of the original research and analysis that appears in my master’s thesis, “The Psyche and the Logos: The Platonic Corpus as Rhetorical Theory,” Kansas State University, 2007.
expressing the effects of verbal articulation upon the internal mental or psychic movement of a given agent. Such a procedure is not only justifiable but actually necessary given contemporary analysis that demonstrates that terms like *logos* and *mythos* can mean almost exactly the opposite in Homeric language than they do in the vocabulary of later thinkers like Heraclitus and Plato.\(^89\)

Perhaps the most important and delimiting guideline I follow in my analysis is one of structure. As the introduction of this study might suggest, I am specifically interested in tripartite structures that can serve as prototypes to Plato’s well-known division of the soul into rational, spirited, and appetitive elements; structure that can likewise aid in identifying and developing a similar arrangement in Plato’s concept of *logos*. Thus I not only focus on keywords and their relationship, but I actively engage in conceptual “pattern recognition.”\(^90\)

This focus on a preconceived structure does mean that I am approaching the literature with a certain degree of bias about what I expect to find. However, rather than a methodological hindrance, my acknowledgment of this bias motivates me to supply rigorous evidence and argument in support of my structural findings and their presumed influence on the development of Plato’s thought.\(^91\) Viewed in a more positive light, the focus on structure drastically reduces the applicable pre-Platonic literature to a very manageable size. While I do not claim that my selection of texts is exhaustive, even given the conceptual and structural criteria, I do maintain

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\(^91\) There are admittedly findings that I acknowledge as merely indicative or suggestive of particular conclusions rather than fully defensible in terms of philological or philosophical argumentation, but I characterize them as such.
that the selection represents some of the major influences that Plato draws upon and specifically alludes to in his discussions of the *psyche*, the *logos*, and the interactions between the two. Consequently, I believe that my analysis of these texts in the following chapter can offer insights into a number of issues that have perennially perplexed contemporary scholars interested in Plato’s rhetorical thought.

At this point it might appear that the importance of the term “*psychagogia*” is reduced to the concepts of *psyche* and *logos* and the relationship between them. Indeed, it is likely that the astute reader could piece together a robust model of psychagogic rhetoric based on nothing more than Plato’s discussions of *psyche* and *logos* throughout the dialogues. However, I end the conceptual overview of the next chapter by tracing the history of the term “*psychagogia*” itself. For in investigating the term in light of its historical usage, the importance of the vocabulary choice is made clear. And what initially appears to be just a witty pun is found to carry with it allusions that aid the reader in situating Plato’s discussion of rhetoric, dialectic and the arts of discourse in the *Phaedrus* with its counterpart in the *Gorgias* – bringing both to bear more fully on the relationship between the *psyche* and the *logos*.

### 2.4 A PRIMA FACIE RENDERING OF THE PLATONIC PSYCHE

The following inquiry into pre-Platonic psychagogy is guided by the structure of the *psyche* as it appears in Plato’s dialogues, with which most readers will be at least superficially acquainted.

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92 What Plato says about these concepts, their structure and their possible relationship in the dialogues will be the focus of Chapter 4. Amazingly, although Plato’s use of these terms has been much studied by rhetoricians, classicists, and philosophers – a comprehensive, correlative analysis of their structure does not exist in the literature of which I am aware.
While this structure itself is a subject of controversy and will undergo closer scrutiny in the later chapters, a basic understanding of Socrates’ description of the psyche as it appears in the Republic is necessary to have in mind at this point. As such, a brief summary of Platonic psychology is warranted prior to the investigation, with the caveat that the results of the inquiry will later aid in a deeper analysis of the very structure that is its guide. In this brief account, I will combine Socrates’ comments on the polis with those of the psyche in ways that should not be problematic for such a superficial rendering.93

In Plato’s Republic there is a complex and systematic examination of the psyche, its elements, and the nature of the different types of psychai that might be generated from the interplay of these elements. The psyche is partitioned into three distinct elements, each with its own peculiar domain: one over reason and calculation, one over spiritedness and passion, and one over appetite and desire.94

93 In fact, such a rendering might help to shine light on claims that Plato’s psychological tripartition evolved from his political observations in completely original, if somewhat awkward, ways. See, for instance, John Dewey’s characterization of Plato’s psychological tripartition as originating in political reflection (Art as Experience (1934) New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2005. 257-58); a perspective that Burke appropriated directly from Dewey (Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 3rd ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 132).

94 For ease of reading, I refer to each element with the typical English labels of “reason/rational element” “spirit/spirited element” and “appetite/appetitive element” instead of the Greek τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές, and τὸ επθυμητικόν respectively. Whether the provinces of each element are exclusive (i.e., whether the rational part has desires or whether the spirited part can calculate) is a topic of controversy that will be addressed later. For now, a
2.4.1 The Rational Element

Early in the Republic (376c), Socrates lists attributes that any “fine and good” [kalos kagathos] guardian of the state requires. Among other things the guardian must be a lover of wisdom [philosophos] and a lover of learning [philomathe]. Later, in discussing the nature of the philosopher-king, Socrates remarks that such a disposition naturally entails the love of truth and being.\(^{95}\) Unsurprisingly then, terms that denote concepts like “wisdom,” “learning,” “truth,” and “being” are key when inquiring into philosophical and literary prototypes of the rational element.

However, when Socrates discusses the particular virtue of wisdom [sophia] that is attributed to the deliberative class in the polis (428bff), it is not directly linked with philosophy or abstract contemplation but is described as a sort of practical knowledge that exhibits euboulia, ‘good judgment’ or ‘prudence.’ While such wisdom is practical, it is not the sort that enables one to “judge about any particular matter” such as the kind possessed by carpenters, metal smiths, farmers or the like. Rather, it is knowledge “about the city as a whole and the maintenance of good relations, both internally and with other cities” (428b-d). In the city this knowledge is attached to guardianship and right rule “and is possessed by those rulers [archousin] we just now called complete guardians” (428d). Similarly, in discussing the rational part of the psyche, Socrates states that it is appropriate for the rational element to rule because “it is really wise and exercises forethought on behalf of the whole soul” (441e).\(^{96}\) Thus the general understanding of the supposed provinces is all that is needed. See chiefly Books IV, VIII and IX of the Republic for discussion about the elements and subsequent psychological constitutions.

\(^{95}\) See Socrates’ comments at 485c: “They must be without falsehood – they must refuse to accept what is false, hate it, and have a love for the truth.” [τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ τὸ ἑκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δ’ ἀλήθειαν στέργειν]; and 501d: “Would they deny that philosophers are lovers of what is or of truth?” [półteron μὴ τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀλήθειας ἔραστις εἶναι τοῦ φιλοσόφου].

\(^{96}\) Actually, Socrates poses the following question, which is affirmed by Glaucon: “Therefore, isn’t it appropriate for the rational part to rule, since it is really wise and exercises forethought on behalf of the whole soul, and for the
individual is called wise “because of that small part of himself that rules in him…and has within it the knowledge of what is advantageous for each part and for the whole soul, which is the community of all three parts” (442c). In short, Socrates describes the rational element as the natural and right ruler [archon] of the soul because of its capacity for good council and forethought in regards to all the soul’s parts. Therefore prototypes of this element are not relegated simply to discussion of reason and wisdom, but encompass notions of right rule and good council.

2.4.2 The Spirited Element

Though Socrates discovers spirit last, he regards it as the “middle” element of the soul and it is usually treated as such – and so spirit will take the middle position on this model. It is first discovered as a state of anger distinct from appetite in the example of Leontius rebuking the desire of his eyes to gaze upon dead bodies (440a). It is thus the source of emotions like shame, when such anger is geared inwards at appetites that drive us away from reason’s plan (440b); and righteous indignation, when it is directed at someone who has treated us unjustly (440c-d). However, though it is allied with reason in these regards it is distinct from it, for a primitive spirit is found in agents that lack refined reasoning ability like infants and animals (441a-b). Thus the middle element is defined by strong emotions which are often regulative in nature but dependent on education for its normative formation.

On the other hand, a properly developed spirit will endure any number of trials and pains if reason tells it that these are being administered justly (440b).
Spirit is thus the psychic counterpart of the auxiliary class that serves as both a military and police force in the state – it regulates internal and external behavior. And as Socrates attributes a city’s courage \([\textit{andrea}]\) to “that part of itself that has the power \([\textit{dynamis}]\) to preserve through everything its belief \([\textit{doxa}]\) about what things are to be feared” (429b-c), he also identifies courage as the distinctive virtue of the spirited element: “And it is because of the spirited part, I suppose, that we call a single individual courageous, namely, when it preserves through pains and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn’t” (442b-c). So, spirit is also defined as the ability of an agent to maintain its “moral compass” when tempted to the contrary. This might seem to mean the same as getting angry or not at the right times for the right reasons, but that is merely the capacity to fear what should be feared and endure what should be endured. Rather, Socrates’ definition of courage highlights spirit’s preservative role in the belief system of the soul, granting it a special place in self-reflection, the management of self-identity and the projection of one’s normative belief’s on to others. Thus spirit does not merely house reactionary emotions, but is key in self-preservation and self-maintenance in both reality (what one might refer to as moral conscience) and appearance (what one might refer to as saving face or social posturing).\(^98\) And since the very image it doggedly preserves is provided by the dictates of reason, it proves itself loyal and obedient to the rational element like a sheepdog to a shepherd (4.440d). So maintenance of self-image and loyalty to an ideal are also key concepts to consider when seeking out prototypes of the spirited element.

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\(^98\) Of course, whether personal integrity always translates into social recognition becomes a prominent question in the \textit{Republic}; but again, the ideal is what concerns us here and spirit ideally maintains our self-image both privately and publicly.
In Book VIII, Socrates further develops his portrait of the spirited element. He attributes to spirit a love of victory [philonikia] and love of honor [philotimia] (548c),\(^9\) which along with a love of rule [philarchos] actually makes the spirited person vehemently obedient to superiors (549a). In a constitution in which such natures rule it is not facility in political thought or public speech that recommends one to high office, but rather one’s “abilities and exploits [ergon] in warfare and warlike activities” – as is natural among those whose love of music [philomousia] and listening to discourse [philekoi] is overshadowed by a love of gymnastics [philogymnastia] and hunting [philotheria] (438b-439a). This explains why spirited people “value the tricks and stratagems [dolous te kai mechanas] of war” (547e-548a) over peaceful contemplation and artistic appreciation. More importantly, it highlights the active nature of the spirited element in comparison to the more passive character of reason.

Socrates summarizes the list of spirit’s rather scattered characteristics in Book IX when he states that the spirited element wholeheartedly pursues control [kratein], victory [nikan] and good repute [eudokimein] (581a). Prototypes of spirit, then, might deal not only with competitiveness and military prowess, but also with moral education, management of social status, regulation of emotions and actions, and the desire for effective action in general.

2.4.3 The Appetitive Element

The appetitive element is the most varied of the three in that it houses numerous seemingly unconnected appetites and desires. Socrates’ first examples of such desires are the basic biological urges for food and drink (437b). But he augments the list soon after with sexual desire\(^9\) Actually, he attributes these loves to the constitution that arises between aristocracy and oligarchy because of the rule of the spirited element – hence he calls the soul that mimics this constitution “timocratic” (549b).
and the tantalization of various other pleasures \([tas \ allas \ epithumias]\), finally designating the appetitive element as the “company of certain indulgences and pleasures \([hedonon]\)” (439d). Moreover, in discussing the decline from aristocracy, the worst constitutions – oligarchy, democracy, and ultimately tyranny – arise from appetites’ ascent to rule in the soul.\(^{100}\) So it is easy to see how discussion of appetite might devolve from what is physically basic into what is morally base. Both are obviously entailed to some degree, but the immorality of certain appetites often outshines the necessary functions that others play in discussions of the tripartite soul.

While the destructive hedonism of the tyrant looms large over characterizations of appetite, it will not do to simply identify this element as a basic impulse towards pleasure or, worse yet, the corrupting influence in the soul. Rather, it should be remembered that the miserly attitude of the oligarch, in whom necessary appetites rule, does more than foreshadows the blind lust of the tyrant. For in many ways oligarchy is a perverse mirror image of Socrates’ original city. Not aristocracy, but the simple city which arises out of basic human needs like food, clothing and shelter.\(^{101}\) Although it is commonly referred to deridingly as the “City of Pigs,” this title is bestowed upon it by Glaucon. Socrates, on the other hand, asserts that this is the true city \([alethine \ polis]\), a healthy one in comparison to the luxurious and feverish city they are about to investigate (372e).

With the morally ambivalent nature of appetite in mind, possible prototypes abound. Thus one must not only take into consideration instances in which following desire leads to

\(^{100}\) See Books VIII and IX.

\(^{101}\) Compare the description of the first city 369b-373a, which is generated out of, and constrained by, human necessity \(\tau\alpha\nu\alpha\gamma\kappa\alpha\iota\alpha\) (373a), with the distinction between the necessary appetites \(\alpha\nu\alpha\gamma\kappa\alpha\iota\alpha\oslash \ \epsilon\pi\theta\mu\iota\mu\alpha\zeta\) that motivate the oligarchy and the unnecessary ones that join in ruling the democracy at 558d-559d. The main difference between the two, I suggest, is that the first city does not subordinate reason and spirit to appetite, but naturally harmonizes the three in a way that exceeds even the aristocratic constitution.
disharmony and troublesome outcomes, but also those that demonstrate that properly ordered desires form the foundation of a healthy life. The key is, simply, that appetitive prototypes should deal with motives arising from basic physical urges – e.g., the desire for food, shelter, sex, etc.; and the activities that are associated with them, be they consumptive or productive – i.e., both feasting and farming could be considered examples of appetitive prototypes under certain conditions. Thus we are not only on the lookout for examples of “lust” and “hedonism,” but for traces of “contentment” and “moderation” [sophrosune], which is the virtue that Socrates associates with the appetitive part (389d-d; 430d-e).

2.4.4 Harmony, Justice, and the Whole Soul

The identification of each element is for the express purpose of locating justice, which Socrates describes as the virtue of the whole soul. In truth, the exploration of justice is the driving theme of the Republic, but its structural importance is fairly abstract in relation to the constituent parts and can be briefly summarized: The just soul is a type of harmonia, in which each element in the soul – the rational, spirited, and appetitive – plays the part it is suppose to, just like the notes of a chord. Injustice occurs when one part does the work of another, a discord in the soul (443b-445b). Hence prototypical accounts relaying events of discord or unity, especially in relationship to fragmented or integrated tripartitions, are of special interest to the investigation.

With the rendering of the psychological model complete, I can now turn to investigating the historical literary and philosophical antecedents that establish a subtle tradition of psychagogic rhetoric which Plato inherits and makes overtly manifest. It should be remembered

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102 Socrates admits that this virtue is peculiar within the psyche in that it concerns itself with all three elements, whereas courage and knowledge each affect only the element of which they are a virtue (432a).
that I make no claim to completeness in the following analysis nor do I consider disconfirming examples for the simple reason that I am not attempting to draw out a comprehensive model applicable to all ancient Greek thought. However, I do claim that the samples I have selected are representative of a tradition of thought that Plato knew and drew from, and are therefore instructive for understanding Platonic rhetorical psychology.
3.0   PRE-PLATONIC PSYCHAGOGIA

3.1   NASCENT PSYCHAGOGICAL STRUCTURES IN HOMER

The review begins at the extant textual beginning of Greek poetic thought, with Homer and the *Iliad*. No doubt the epic provides a rich catalogue of motivational forces that influence action. In the first few lines alone we see motives that resonate with the Platonic elements described in the previous chapter: Homer opens by identifying the poem as a song of Achilles’ wrath [*menis*] (1.1). This wrath is brought about by a slight from the high-lord and military commander, Agamemnon. Agamemnon, in turn is motivated both by his desire for the girl Chryseis, whom he must give up; and by his own anger at the insolence of Achilles, who dares

103  The question of whether Homeric literature demonstrates knowledge of rhetorical theory is perennial among classicists and historians of rhetoric. For a good digest of the historical debate with commentary, see George Kennedy. “The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer.” *The American Journal of Philology*, 78.1 (1957): 23-35. This section, however, falls outside the scope of that discussion for it is less about formal modes of speech and more about the insights we might derive from Homer about the structure of the soul, its motivations, and the effect that words have on these motivations.

address him as if his equal. In lust and anger Agamemnon lays claim to Briseis, Achilles’ own prize (1.182-187). But a hodgepodge of forces does not necessarily grant insight into Plato’s thinking. The question remains whether there is any continuity between Homer and Plato regarding the nature of speech, the structure of the soul, and the effect that the one has on the other.  

Given the significant difference in terminology between Homeric Greek and later Greek philosophical vocabularies, a keyword analysis would only lead to confusion. Rather, I will seek out possible correlations that both underscore and inform the structure of human motivation.

105 Snell (Discovery) points to the Homeric corpus as “the first stage of European thinking” as regards self-understanding; a seminal moment in the concept of ‘mind’ in which people “no longer feel that they are the playthings of irrational forces” (22). Yet Snell outlines a long and complex conceptual evolution from Homer to Plato and beyond. In tracing the development of concept of logos, Johnstone (Listening) describes the contrast between the mythic worldview of Homer and the rational view of Greek philosophers as a “paradigm shift” akin to the difference between the worldviews of creationists and evolutionists (36). Yet he maintains that the transition “from mythopoetic to naturalistic ways of understanding the world – was neither sudden nor linear nor final” (37).

106 See n.89. See also Snell’s characterization: “Since the time of Aristarchus, the great Alexandrian scholar, it has been the rule among philologists not to base the interpretation of Homeric words on references to classical Greek, and not to allow themselves to be influenced by the usage of a later generation when investigating Homeric speech. To-day we may expect even richer rewards from this rule...Let us explain Homer in no terms but his own, and our understanding will be the fresher for it” (Discovery, 1).

An example of the sort of false certainty that can arise by not following this rule can be seen in Johnstone’s analysis of Athena’s intervention to stay the hand of Achilles against Agamemnon (1.193-222). For Johnstone, “What is particularly interesting about this episode is the picture it paints of the act of choosing. The contest is not between two elements of Achilles’ own psyche but between his own thymos (his passion or anger) and the logos of the goddess. Thus does the locus of self-control lie outside the self, and thus is divine action a factor in all human decision” (Listening, 20). This simplification of terminology is an anachronism that forces a dichotomy between psyche and thymos that was foreign to Homer. For instance, as the Liddel-Scott entry for thymos shows, the word could mean a great deal more than passion or anger, with the important inclusion of Homeric examples (including the passage under consideration) where the term means “mind, soul, as the seat of thought, ταῦθ᾽ ὥρμαινε κατὰ φρένα κατὰ θ. Il.1.193, etc.” John Cooper describes the anachronism best: “τὸ θυμοειδές derives from a Greek word, θύμος, that by Plato’s time seems to have been in ordinary use mostly as a name for anger: the word is in fact etymologically the same as our word “fume” someone in a state of θύμος would be “fuming” about something. But in Homer, where it appears very frequently, the word has a broader usage: it names the part of themselves to which Homeric heroes speak, or which speaks to them, when they are aroused for action, and into which they, or some tutelary deity, pour might and strength when their prowess is about to be put to the test” (“Plato’s Theory” 12). Thus, for Homer the terms psyche and thymos are more akin to synonyms than the whole-part relationship of later Greek thought. So Johnstone’s reading reduces a complex psychological moment of inner conflict in which a goddess comes to aid Achilles into a cut-and-dry episode of divine determination. Cf. n.123 and 127. The reduction works for Johnstone, who we saw above (n.105) wants to present a paradigm shift between Homer and the Greek philosophical tradition concerning the individual’s relationship to logos. But if we consider the context of the terms more closely, we see that Achilles is truly divided. The search for patterns and structures is meant to offset the anachronistic tendency without becoming too philologically tedious.
and the effect that speech has on it. There are four instances from the *Iliad* that I will examine as instructive for Platonic psychagogy: the Judgment of Paris (alluded to at 24.28-31), the Shield of Achilles (18.478-608), the Embassy to Achilles (the whole of Bk. 9) and the Supplication of Priam (the whole of Bk. 24). The first two, the Judgment and the Shield, act as counterparts that lay out the motivational map for the second, more rhetorically significant pair.

### 3.1.1 The Judgment of Paris

The first instance, the Judgment of Paris, is not actually recounted in the text of the *Iliad*; but it supplies the context for the entire Trojan conflict.¹⁰⁷ The story reads somewhat like a fairy-tale,¹⁰⁸ but it is a fairy-tale of Platonic psychological forces if ever there was one. During the marriage of Thetis and Peleus, the goddess Eris (Discord or Strife) – not invited to the wedding – threw into the festivities a golden apple on which was inscribed “To the Fairest.” Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite vied for the apple, appealing to Zeus as arbiter. Unwilling to decide the fairest between the three, Zeus commanded Hermes to lead them to Paris, Prince of Ilion, who was

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¹⁰⁷ As mentioned above, the Judgment is alluded to at 24.28-31. Whether Homer was aware of the judgment is not without historical controversy. For detailed accounts of the historical controversy and its contemporary evolution, see T.W.C. Stinton. *Euripides and the Judgement of Paris.* Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies Supplementary Paper No. 11 (1965): 1-5; and Malcolm Davies. “The Judgement of Paris and *Iliad* Book XXIV.” *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 101 (1981): 56-62 (pp. 56-58). In short, beginning with Aristarchus of Samothrace, the second century librarian of Alexandria, the passage is atoned as a later addition to the text, possibly originating with the *Cypria* of the late seventh century in which the tale is first fully recounted. This was the traditional position of Homericists until the relatively recent discovery of a Spartan comb that depicts the Judgment, which could be dated back to the early seventh century (R. M. Dawkins. *The Sanctuary of Artemis Orthia at Sparta.* B.S.A. Athens, 1929: 223, fig. 127. Cited in Stinton, *Euripides* 2n.1 and Davies, “Judgement” 56n.1). Inspired by the discovery, Karl Reinhardt defended the passage as a genuine and necessary element for the backdrop of the action in the *Iliad*, without which the enmity of the goddesses would not make sense (*Das Parisurteil, Wissenschaft und Gegenwart.* vol. xi, Frankfurt, 1938. Cited in Stinton 2n.2 and Davies 56n.1). Reinhardt’s position has since shifted the burden of proof unto claims of spuriousness among contemporary Homericists. Regardless, even Aristarchus acknowledges that the Judgment belongs to the “mythic” age, and so would have been understood as supplying the context of the *Iliad* for Plato, as it did for Euripides and Isocrates (the myth occurs in Euripides *Trojan Women* (914-940), *Adromache* (274-290), and *Iphigenia in Aulis* (1179-1310) and in Isocrates’ *Encomium to Helen* (43-43). For the importance of the myth on the works of Euripides, see Stinton’s study cited above).

¹⁰⁸ The lack of epic quality is one reason that Aristarchus cites in favor of athetisation.
herding sheep on Mount Ida. At Hermes behest, Paris agrees to act as judge. However, during his judgment each goddess offers Paris a certain gift befitting their character: Hera offers Paris sovereignty over Europe and Asia; Athena offers victory and skill in battle; and Aphrodite offers the hand of Helen in marriage. Finding marriage to Helen most appealing, Paris awards the apple to Aphrodite.

The judgment, then, transfers from the appearances of the goddesses to the gifts they offer – or rather, to the promise of the gifts. Hence Paris transforms from a judge of spectacle into a judge of speech, with the criteria for victory being the affect that each speech has on his soul. Hence, Homer describes the enmity of Hera and Athena towards the Trojans: “Ilion and Priam and his people had incurred their hatred first, the day Alexandros [Paris] made his mad choice and piqued two goddesses, visitors in his sheepfold: he praised a third, who offered ruinous lust” (24.27-31). However, the parable here is not simply about the perils of choosing


As to the judgment of Paris (Alexander), see Hom. Il. 24.25ff.; Cypria, in Proclus, Chrestom. i. (Epicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, ed. G. Kinkel, pp. 16ff.); Eur. Tro. 924ff.; Eur. IA 1290ff.; Eur. Hel. 23ff.; Eur. And. 274ff.; Isoc. 10.41; Lucian, Dial. Deorum 20, Dial. marin. 5; Tzetzes, Scholiast on Lycophron 93; Hyginus, Fab. 92; Serv. Verg. A. 1.27; Scriptores rerum mythicarum Latini, ed. Bode, i. pp. 65ff., 142ff. (First Vatican Mythographer 208; Second Vatican Mythographer 205). The story ran that all the gods and goddesses, except Strife, were invited to attend the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, and that Strife, out of spite at being overlooked, threw among the wedding guests a golden apple inscribed with the words, “Let the fair one take it,” or “The apple for the fair.” Three goddesses, Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite, contended for this prize of beauty, and Zeus referred the disputants to the judgment of Paris. The intervention of Strife was mentioned in the Cypria according to Proclus, but without mention of the golden apple, which first appears in late writers, such as Lucian and Hyginus. The offers made by the three divine competitors to Paris are recorded with substantial agreement by Eur. Tro. 924ff., Isocrates, Lucian, and Apollodorus. Hyginus is also in harmony with them, if in his text we read fortissimum for the formissimum of the MSS., for which some editors wrongly read formosissimum. The scene of the judgment of Paris was represented on the throne of Apollo at Amyclae and on the chest of Cypselus at Olympia (Paus. 3.8.12; Paus. 5.19.5).

Note that while Hyginus is in relative agreement with the other authors, he does add great wealth [divitem praeter ceteros praestaturum] to Hera’s bribe and knowledge of every craft [omni artificio scium], not just warcraft, to Athena’s. (Fabulae 92. Latin text from: <www.thelatinlibrary.com/hyginus/hyginus5.shtml#paridis>). Once material gain becomes a consideration of sovereignty and universal knowledge a part of victory, the delicate balance
lust over better motives. Indeed, behind the fairy-tale exterior, there are subtle complexities that are easily overlooked and provide insight beyond the superficial identification of Platonic psychological prototypes in ancient myth.

There is a tendency in digesting the myth for children to too quickly cast the story in superficially Platonic terms, in which the reader is told that Athena offers Paris wisdom, Hera power and Aphrodite the hand of Helen.\footnote{110} Most children would see, not only that Paris made a bad choice, but that the wisdom of Athena was the proper one. This makes the correlation with the psychic structure rather easy. But Paris’ job was much more difficult, and much more instructive. For the choice was between sovereign rule, victory in battle and the satiation of one’s physical and emotional desires. Now perhaps Paris proclaimed the most foolish of the three possible verdicts by pitting the enmity of Hera and Athena against the aid of Aphrodite, but it was not this choice that brought forth discord. There was no good choice, for the implication of the tripartition starts to teeter. Such overlap may play well into an integrated model of the tripartite divisions, but if done carelessly it may also make proper distinction difficult, if not impossible. See n.110 below.


In Sutcliff’s *Black Ships* Athena promises wisdom, while Hera offers wealth, power, and honor. This points to another trend of complicating the bribes in later retellings by blending the original gifts with the later evolutions. This is perhaps an evolution of Hyginus’ additions (Cf. n.109) but such blending often causes the goddesses’ gifts to overlap. For instance, in Bernard Evslin’s, *The Trojan War* (New York: Scholastic Book Services, 1971. 11-13), Hera argues that sovereign rule will naturally lead to great wealth, while Athena counters that rule and wealth are meaningless without great wisdom to maintain them. Without connecting wisdom and war, Athena concludes by adding the she is the “Mistress of Strategy” and that victory in war is also necessary for maintaining rule and wealth. See also, Cheryl Evans and Anne Millard, *Usborne Illustrated Guide to Greek Myths and Legends*, New York: Scholastic, 2001. 40-41; and the Wikipedia entry on the Judgment of Paris <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judgement_of_Paris>. Even the notable poet-scholar, Robert Graves, who mainly recounts the Lucian version of the Judgment (*Deorum Dialogi XX*), adds wealth to the gifts of Hera along with wisdom and, uniquely, handsomeness, to the gifts of Athena (*The Greek Myths*, Revised Edition, London, New York: Penguin Books, 1960, Vol. 2. Reprinted, London: The Folio Society, 1996: 571-575).

Despite these trends, the retelling remains fairly constant in more careful chronicles even up until Thomas Bulfinch’s *The Age of Fable* (Originally published in 1855, the Judgment is recounted in Ch. 27 “The Trojan War.” The work is now a part of the classic and often reprinted collection *Bulfinch’s Mythology* which varies widely in pagination) and Edith Hamilton’s *Mythology: Timeless Tales of Gods and Heroes* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1942. Reprinted, New York: Warner Books, 1999. 186-188). Both recount the gifts as power and rule from Hera, victory and glory from Athena and the hand of the fairest mortal woman, Helen, from Aphrodite.
is that the choosing of any one goddess would entail the withdrawal of favor from the other two. Eris’ scheme was no long and drawn out affair. She did not necessarily anticipate Paris’ decision. Rather, discord struck the minute the three goddesses vied for the apple and the question was posed which one was most fair. Zeus realized the futility in choosing and the dangers inherent in even trying. It was not a question that a divine mind would ponder. It was, however, a question with which humanity was preoccupied and it is the question itself that brings discord – the fragmentation of right rule, normative force and the overall satisfaction of life. The moral of the parable then is not that wisdom is to be preferred over carnal lusts; it is that the components of a happy life cannot be separated from one another. It is not simply satisfaction, but discord, that should be avoided. Unfortunately, the appeal to one often brings with it the circumstances of the other.\footnote{For an in-depth analysis of the psychological, philosophical and aesthetic considerations underlying the Judgment and its evolution in narrative and, especially, visual art, see Hubert Damisch. The Judgment of Paris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Damisch deftly explores many of these tensions, such as whether Aphrodite had an unfair advantage in a beauty contest (121-22), how the Judgment is less about choice and more about integration (150), and how Athena’s gifts transitioned from prowess and fortitude to that of wisdom (186).}

In some ways, the themes of the Judgment provide a recurring motif throughout the epic – and each judgment is always a futile one that ends in fragmentation. Even as sovereign, Agamemnon cannot satiate all his appetites while maintaining the integrity of his military forces. And the invocation of his sovereignty as he attempts to do so only spurns Achilles and jeopardizes the Achaeans’ victory in battle. The misjudgment of Agamemnon results in a divided army, with Achilles and his Myrmidon troops sitting idle while the remaining Achaean forces argue over strategy. As such, the Achaeans foreshadow the middle tableau represented on the Shield bestowed to Achilles (18.509-19). The Shield depicts an ordered world in almost every detail the counterpart to the Judgments’ fragmentation. It also heralds Achilles’ reentrance

\footnote{For an in-depth analysis of the psychological, philosophical and aesthetic considerations underlying the Judgment and its evolution in narrative and, especially, visual art, see Hubert Damisch. The Judgment of Paris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. Damisch deftly explores many of these tensions, such as whether Aphrodite had an unfair advantage in a beauty contest (121-22), how the Judgment is less about choice and more about integration (150), and how Athena’s gifts transitioned from prowess and fortitude to that of wisdom (186).}
into the fray, the reintegration of the Achaean army, and the downfall of Troy. It is to the details of the shield that we now turn.

3.1.2 The Shield of Achilles

In Book Eighteen of the *Iliad*, Homer recounts the fashioning of Achilles’ armor prior to his reentry into battle. His original armor – a wedding gift to his father, Peleus – had been lost when Patroclus donned it to push back the Trojans from the Achaean ships, subsequently falling to Hector in battle. It is the death of Patroclus that finely rouses Achilles to rejoin the war. But before he can fight he must find new armor, which his mother, Thetis, promises to procure from the divine metal-smith Hephaestus. The process of making the armor occupies one hundred and forty-six lines (18.468-614), but only the Shield is described in great detail (478-608).

The armor is made of four metals – durable bronze and tin, and honorable gold and silver. The shield is five layers thick, bound by a threefold rim (479-482). Upon the Shield are a series of tableaus that Homer describes in a famous *ekphrasis*. Although it is unclear in what order or shape the collected images appear on the Shield, the content of each is relayed in

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112 This is the same wedding at which Eris sowed the seeds of discord that began the Trojan War. A marriage, we learn in this same Book, into which the bride was resistant in heart but nonetheless was duty-bound to endure (18.430-435). Thus the old armor is a symbol of the discord’s beginning; the new armor, a symbol of its end.

113 Scenes covered in Books Sixteen and Seventeen.

114 Although Plato attributes his “noble lie” or “Phoenician tale” of four metal types of humans that should not be intermingled (*Rep.* 414c-415c) to Hesiod’s four metal ages (546e-547a), it is worth noting the Hephaestus also builds his world with four metals interacting simultaneously (unlike Hesiod’s progressive stages), though Plato and Hesiod substitute iron [σίδηρος] for tin [κασσίτερος]. Further numerological analysis might suggest more connections. For instance, Plato’s political scheme of five descending constitutions with an underlying tripartite structure could also be described as constructed out of four metals, five layers thick with a triple-binding, and his ideal procreative cycle was based on some mathematical relationship between 3, 4 and 5 (546 b-c).

115 The Shield is usually assumed to be round with the images forming concentric circles, but Homer is unclear and scholars underscore this uncertainty often. For discussion of the composition of the Shield and further
vivid detail. The passage opens with mention of the earth and the sea and a description of the cosmos (484-89). At its close, Homer describes the Ocean streaming around the rim of the shield (607-08). Between sky and Ocean are several depictions of human activity: A city at peace, a city besieged, and various agricultural vignettes.

Like the Judgment of Paris, the Shield’s superficial correlation with the Platonic structure is immediately obvious – the Shield depicts wise rule, military combat, fecundity and festivity. But like the Judgment, closer examination is instructive. Flanked by the infinitude of the heavens and the sea, Homer suggests that Hephaestus has somehow captured the essence of a boundless world in the confines of the shield.116 As such, the inner scenes represent the essential totality of human, social existence. This existence is perfectly ordered and perpetual, as the end of Homer’s description (the courting dance of young men and women out in open fields (590-606)) flows right back to the beginning (the wedding festival with brides marching and grooms dancing in the city streets (491-96)). But though it is a perfectly ordered world, it is not a perfect world.117 The wedding party runs right into a legal dispute generated over a recent murder. Discord, again, attends the wedding. Again judgment follows. Although in this instance discord is contained by the city’s laws, which entertains the opinions of numerous judges and rewards the best (497-508). Twice more discord appears: Strife appears personified on the battlefield in the City at War (535-540) and two lions devour a bull in the otherwise peaceful rural scenes.


116 For a discussion of the Shield as a microcosm, see Taplin (“Shield” 11-12). For the totality suggested by the framing of the human events by cosmos and Ocean, as well as a discussion of the theme of limit, see Scully (“Reading” 40-45). The theme of limit also permeates Gregory Nagy’s analysis (“The Shield of Achilles: Ends of the Iliad and the Beginning of the Polis.” Homeric Responses. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. 72-87).

117 As Taplin states, “the shield is a microcosm, not a utopia, and death and destruction are also there, though in inverse proportion to the rest of the Iliad” (“Shield” 12).
The message, it seems, is that discord is accounted for in the perfect order, not expelled.

The conflict of the *Iliad* itself is played out in miniature in the City at War, as a unified city stands strong under siege against forces that are weakened due to internal fragmentation. There is something almost paradoxical here. It is the fragmentation of the perfecting structure in the Judgment scene that leads to the war. But war is a part of the perfect order. Indeed, why would military prowess be appealing if such order guarantees peace? The answer, quite simply, is that peace is never guaranteed. But then what good is an ordered world, or an ordered soul for that matter? While the shield suggests that discord is a fact of life, it also shows that adapting to the perfecting order can mitigate its consequences. Thus, while wise rule does not guarantee a city without crime, the well-ordered city may confront and dissipate the corrupting effects of criminal activity. The herdsmen lose a bull, not the herd. The city at war stands strong against a divided foe. If the divided foe represents the Achaeans, the totality of the Shield is symbolic of Achilles’ return to military action which itself signifies the reintegration of the Achaean forces and the restoration of military power. Though this reintegration signals Achilles’ personal demise, it means ultimate victory for the Achaeans.

At the level of the Judgment and the Shield, Paris and Achilles are representative of larger motivational forces that effect entire societies. Much like in the *Republic*, this macrocosmic representation provides an easily observable diorama of these forces at play. However, the rhetorical import of such interplay is not immediately apparent until we locate the same forces in the psychic structure of the Homeric individual. Once we do, however, the

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118 The allusion is rather obvious, but see Taplin for a detailed correlation (“Shield” 6).
119 This is not the same as arguing that the armor signifies Achilles’ social reintegration among the Achaeans. I believe that Scully argues convincingly against this thesis (“Reading” 37-40). Rather, I hold that the return of Achilles signifies the restoration of military prowess to the Achaean forces.
broader outline provided by the Judgment and the Shield allows us to view apparent mishmashes of rhetorical techniques as coherent, persuasive strategies that anchor the psychagogic tradition. In the next two sections I argue that the well-known appeals to Achilles by the Achaean Embassy and by King Priam demonstrate the same structural concerns on the psychological level of the individual and help account for the form of these appeals beyond a random collection of techniques.

### 3.1.3 The Embassy to Achilles

Book Nine of Homer’s *Iliad* describes the visit of three emissaries – Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax – to the malcontented Achilles. It is an account that has warranted the attention of rhetoricians from antiquity to present day. Like the various motivational factors discussed above, the embassy scene presents a catalogue of rhetorical techniques that would later be identified and codified by the likes of Aristotle and Quintilian. But again, a seemingly random catalogue does not establish a structural tradition. At first glance, it may appear that Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax form a somewhat arbitrary threesome, at most selected due to a

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121 For a reading of the Embassy in terms of Greek, predominately Aristotelian, rhetoric, see Kennedy (*Art of Persuasion* 36-38; *Classical Rhetoric* 11-15). For the identification of various tropes and schemes that appear in the Embassy, see Kennedy (*Classical Rhetoric* 11-15). For a reading of the Embassy in terms of both Quintilian and Aristotle, see Corbett (*Classical Rhetoric* 10-12).
particular personal regard for them held by Achilles. However, a close examination shows not only that the three envoys make separate appeals, but that they make very distinct types of appeals that foreshadow some of the more complex idiosyncrasies of the tripartite structure. Odysseus is rational, Phoenix is moralizing, and Ajax goads. The superficial correspondence to the tripartite division is at least strikingly coincidental, but in order to understand the full rhetorical significance of this correspondence it is worth starting at the beginning of Book Nine and examining the embassy in light of the immediate rhetorical situation.

At the Book’s beginning, Agamemnon has announced his decision to depart from Troy. The young and valiant warrior Diomedes interjects, claiming that Agamemnon is literally divided: he has been granted kingship, but lacks valor (9.1-40). Thus, the problem is laid out plainly – fragmentation. The old sage Nestor speaks next. He complements Diomedes as both strong in battle and the most prudent in counsel of those his age – that is to say, as undivided, if somewhat unripe. So Nestor takes over where Diomedes lets off, suggesting that they set up a guard, feast and then hold council (50-80). After the feast, Nestor urges Agamemnon to speak but exhorts him to take heed of his counselors, for it was his neglect of wise counsel that led to the situation in the first place (94-113). Agamemnon agrees that his actions were foolish and continues to list all the gifts he will grant Achilles if he would only submit to his rule once again.

122 In rhetorical scholarship, little analysis is given to the collection as a collection. According to Kennedy, “There are three ambassadors, Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax, chosen for their potential influence on Achilles. He acknowledges (9.204) that they are the men he loves most” (Classical Rhetoric). According to Corbett, “Agamemnon chose his ambassadors shrewdly: Odysseus, “the man who was never at a loss”; Ajax, reputed to be the mightiest Greek warrior after Achilles; Phoinix, Achilles’ beloved old tutor. Each of them will work on the aggrieved and disgruntled Achilles in his own way” (Classical Rhetoric 10). These statements are true, but give little consideration to how the three function together. For a deeper analysis of the selection, see Section III (232-238) of O. Tsagarakis. “Phoenix’s Social Status and the Achaean Embassy.” Mnemosyne, Fourth Series 32.3/4 (1979): 221-242. Though, again, Tsagarakis mainly considers their separate functions.

123 Διάνδιχα. It is worth noting that this is the same word Homer uses to describe Achilles’ internal division at the onset of his rage with Agamemnon (1.189). Achilles is divided whether to slay Agamemnon or stay his anger. It is safe to say that Achilles, like Agamemnon, is still divided at Book Nine. Cf. n.106.
(114-161). It is at this point that Nestor suggests sending an embassy to convey the offer to Achilles, insisting that he be allowed to organize it himself. The construction of the embassy is careful and calculated, and Nestor spends some time offering instructions to the embassy to which we are not privy (162-181). That it was the old sage Nestor that suggested and organized the embassy is often overlooked in rhetorical analyses of Book Nine, but it carries with it important psychagogic implications.

By dissecting the encounter analytically, much of the nuance behind Nestor’s strategizing is lost and the separate speeches do little more than exhibit an array of rhetorical techniques. The same core message – “come back and fight, your grievances will be redressed if you do and your kinsmen will die if you do not” – is communicated with a variance in tone and style as each speech fails a little less completely than the previous one. That this is the typical view is evidenced by the tendency to analyze only Odysseus’ speech as representative of the whole encounter despite the fact that his is the most obvious failure. Viewing the embassy synthetically, we see that Nestor’s strategy actually does move Achilles from a course of action that would be catastrophic for the military campaign to a position that at least acknowledges the conditions of his return. Moreover, we see that this movement takes place along a familiar path.

As the Embassy arrives, it is worth noting the familiar fact that Achilles welcomes them as a special, unified group unique from the rest. Even as he broods, those of the embassy are nearest and dearest [philototoi] to him out of all the Achaeans (196-198). After satiating their appetites once again through feast, Odysseus opens the plea of the envoys (225-306). Despite his apparent failure, it is fairly well agreed that Odysseus offers the most composed speech by

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124 See, for example, Corbett (Classical Rhetoric 5-15) and Kennedy (New History 14). To be sure, Kennedy and others elsewhere discuss all three speeches, but even then Odysseus is usually identified as the prime rhetorical representative and given the lion’s share of analysis (see Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric 12).
classical standards. It is well organized, well thought out, and employs various reasoned and emotional appeals. Indeed, Odysseus provides Achilles with all the necessary content that the embassy has to convey. As far as pure information is concerned, the following speeches are merely variations on a theme. Thus, it is no stretch to label Odysseus speech as rational in the Platonic sense. Not that it deals only with logical arguments, but that it displays more than any other speech offered a concern for all aspects of Achilles’ soul. He does indeed lay out the facts clearly and the probable consequences that those facts will have, but in doing so he flatters Achilles, stokes his pride, appeals to his pity, and to his honor and valor. Yet it is rational in yet another sense – not because it is wise per se, but because it is prudent. He will be rewarded greatly, and even if he spurns Agamemnon’s rewards, he will be honored by his kinsmen as a savior. Ultimately, he may gain the highest prize of slaying Hector. On the face of it, such considerations may seem like material inducements aimed at the lower parts of the soul, but at the base of all of Odysseus’ arguments is the supposition that what is good for the Achaeans – Achilles’ return – is also good for Achilles himself.

Viewing Odysseus’ speech as a rational appeal to prudent action makes the most sense out of Achilles’ otherwise meandering reply (307-439). While it may appear the Achilles is simply being stubborn and the offer, as Diomedes later claims, merely pushes Achilles further into pride (696-709), his response to Odysseus is really a direct refutation of Odysseus’ claims to

125 Kennedy recognizes Odysseus’ speech as being “well arranged rhetorically” (Art of Persuasion 37) and “the most carefully organized in the group” (Classical Rhetoric 12) while Corbett characterizes Odysseus’ speech as “a model, in miniature, of the well-organized oration” (Classical Rhetoric 11). For a view that Odysseus actually makes a grave rhetorical blunder by possibly speaking out of turn and not correctly communicating Agamemnon’s contrition, see E. Watson Williams. “The Offer to Achilles.” The Classical Quarterly, New Series 7.1/2 (1957): 103-108.
126 As Kennedy states, “Odysseus’ argumentation is based on an attempt to identify the interests of Achilles with those of the Greeks” (Classical Rhetoric 13). Corbett also mentions various appeals aimed at Achilles’ self-interests on both the material and emotional plane (Classical Rhetoric 12-13).
127 Kennedy calls it “personal and digressive” in contrast to Odysseus’ well-ordered speech, though he sees order beneath the surface in Achilles’ speech as well. (Classical Rhetoric, 13)
prudence. While initially brooding over the offense that he has suffered, he comes to ponder the actual motive to fight (337-343). Here we have Achilles at his most philosophical. What good is fighting if those who do little get rewarded the same as those who do much (315-327)? What good indeed if those who do much get stripped of their rewards by those who do little (328-337)? These are fair and prudent questions, but not so effective in the face of the grand offer that has just been made.\textsuperscript{128} Achilles is assured to gain more than any other hero for his services should he return. True, as Achilles states, he has reason to suspect that the offer may not be so grand given Agamemnon’s earlier seizure of Briseis (344-345), but this doubt is not what fuels his refusal. He would refuse the offer even if it were ten or twenty times greater (379-385). The real reason is twofold. First, he has more than enough to be satisfied with at home – wealth, natural resources and the potential for a happy family life (393-400). This is not only a prudent response, but a calculatedly personal response that Odysseus should find it difficult to counter, for it was he who would have famously avoided the war altogether to remain with his family in Ithaca.\textsuperscript{129} Second, Achilles knows from his mother Thetis that his choice is even plainer: he may return home and live a long, uneventful life or die gloriously on the battlefields of Ilium (401-416). Thus he informs the embassy that he will be leaving early the next morning and directs

\textsuperscript{128} For Kennedy, the gist of Achilles’ reply is just this “fighting gets one nowhere” (Classical Rhetoric 13). However, Odysseus has just made the claim that fighting will indeed get Achilles somewhere. While Achilles does employ this maxim to open up his speech, the actual refutation is much more direct and much more prudent.

\textsuperscript{129} This partially assumes that the story of Odysseus feigning madness to escape being drafted into the war, only to be outsmarted by Palamedes, was known before the Iliad. Like the Judgment of Paris, the story only appears in text in the later Epic Cycles. However, there is evidence in the Iliad that Odysseus was preoccupied with his family in ways that other heroes were not. For while the standard form of addressing Odysseus was the typical reference “Zeus-born son of Laertes” [διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη], twice in heated argument he refers to himself as “Father of Telemachus” (2.224 [Τηλεμάχοιο πατήρ]; 4.350 [Τηλεμάχοιο φίλον πατέρα]). The only other character in the epic properly referred to as a father by title is Zeus, “father of men and gods.” Every other character is referred to by their noble lineage in the form of “son of...” If we factor in that Odysseus is often addressed with the epithet “of many wiles” [ex. πολύμητις 1.285; πολυμήχανος 2.155], puns in speech play a special role when he utters them. “Telemachus” means “fighting from afar,” which suggests that he was named after being drafted into war. Thus, whenever Odysseus loses his temper in argument due to the foolish actions or comments of others, he seemingly shouts “I am a father, fighting far away from his family, and now I have to deal with this!?”
them to take his message to the Achaean chieftains (421). Against this counterargument and new course of action Odysseus, the voice of prudent reason, has nothing left to say. But he has played his role by moving the dormant Achilles to action nonetheless and by laying a rational, factual foundation that the others may build upon.

It is now Phoenix’s turn to speak, but his position is somewhat different than the other two. While it is easy to see Odysseus and Ajax as rationality and physicality personified and vocalized, Phoenix does not exude spiritedness in either visage or speech. In fact, reading the characters as psychic representations of the polis, it is Achilles that plays the role of spirit. But at the level of individual personality, Achilles is a single soul that Agamemnon seeks to persuade by means of the Embassy. Who then does Nestor select to rouse Achilles’ spirit? Not another spirited individual like Diomedes, but a paternal figure and a moral educator. Not a rouser of spirit at all, but one who has taken on the duty of training Achilles as a “speaker of words and doer of deeds” (442-43). He speaks directly both to Achilles’ spirit and to Achilles as the spirited element by asserting his position as educator and parental figure to whom Achilles is disposed to listen (ibid; 485-495) and then by reminding him about what beliefs are to be preserved. He does so by offering instruction through exemplars, first by appealing to the conduct of the gods themselves (497-514) and then through the recounting of mythic tales of

130 ἀριστήεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν. Cf. n.138
131 On the persuasive yet paradoxical logic of Achilles response, see Walker (Poetics, 162-163). Kennedy sees Odysseus’ speech as counterproductive to the point of actually driving Achilles away (Classical Rhetoric 13), but the circumstance of Achilles’ impending death alone justifies his departure aside from anything Odysseus has said. He does not leave because he fears the approaching army; he leaves because he has decided on a simple life over a glorious death.
132 Tsagarakis (“Phoenix’s Social Status”) addresses the controversy of whether Phoenix originally belongs to the Embassy or is a later addition. He, I think convincingly, argues that Phoenix is an original participant despite any philological oddities that might suggest otherwise. See also, Judith A. Rosner. “The Speech of Phoenix: Iliad 9.434-605.” Phoenix, 30.4 (1976): 314-327. Rosner argues for the genuine placement of Phoenix in the assembly based on the nature of his arguments and appeals and their consonance with the rest of the Iliad. Regardless, the Embassy was set by Plato’s time. Indeed, Plato references Phoenix’s speech in the Republic (390e). Cf n.135.
133 μόθον τε ἱητήρ’ ἔμελεν πρηκτήρά τε ἔργων. II. 9.443
warriors past (523-599). There is still appeal to prudence and to the emotions, but the central concern of Phoenix is instruction in right conduct. Achilles was once justified in his anger, but after Agamemnon’s atonement through gifts it is now time to let that anger subside and rejoin the fighting (515-523; 599-605).

As the rhetorical ground shifts from prudence to morality, Achilles changes tact as well. He counters by reminding Phoenix that as a Myrmidon he is under Achilles’ rule, so loyalty demands that he not take the side of Agamemnon (611-615). That is to say, Achilles turns the tables by reminding the moral teacher what right action demands. But again, Phoenix has done his part. While Odysseus had gotten Achilles thinking and acting prudently instead of brooding, Phoenix has indeed roused Achilles’ spirit. For, although his response to Odysseus is somewhat frank, it is not until faced with the possibility of Phoenix’s insubordination that he becomes personally heated. Note that at the end of Odysseus speech Achilles offers Phoenix a bed, but allows him to choose whether to stay or go (427-229). At the end of Phoenix’s speech, Achilles’ offer turns into a command (617-619). Still, Achilles is unsure of himself at this point and announces that he will decide whether to stay or go in the morning.

Ajax is the last of the embassy to speak (624-642). It is difficult to say that Ajax represents the appetite of the Achaean forces in so far as appetite means base desires. However, insofar as appetite refers to basic physical nature, Ajax is a prime representative. He is a towering physical specimen. Indeed, he is the only physical match for Achilles, who identifies

134 Kennedy, I think wrongly, points to Phoenix’s digression into myth as an artifact of Homer as poet, diverging from the purpose of the oration in order to relay a vivid story, “for he is not obsessed with logical proof; he is a poet rather than an orator and is more concerned with the past than with the present” (Art of Persuasion 38). Walker seems to me closer to the mark when he recognizes Phoenix’s recounting of heroic myth as a larger appeal to “traditional wisdom-lore.” Walker argues that “in Phoenix’s telling of the tale, we are to see a skillful speaker invoking poetic lore in a skillful recitation of epea, verses, to invoke a ‘precedent’ for determining the case in hand. Moreover, it seems likely that we are to think of these materials as being woven skillfully into the general texture of the speech” (Poetics 15). Such a use of myth would be appropriate for Phoenix’s position as moral instructor.

135 Although Plato mentions Phoenix’s speech, he notably condemns the appeal to gifts as bad moral advice. Cf. 132.
Ajax’s shield as the one possible replacement for the armor he had lost (18.192-93). His speech is blunt and forceful. He adds little by way of content save for the reduction of prudence and morality to basic material value – “all this for one girl, now you are offered seven and more!” (9.637-340). But his words hit harder than those previous. In terms of the psycho-somatic analogies that Plato employs in the Timaeus: Odysseus appeals to Achilles’ mind, Phoenix to his heart, while Ajax offers the closest verbal equivalent to a punch in the gut – not a plea for pity, but contempt and disregard from an honored friend. And yet Achilles responds that Ajax echoes his own mind, though he still cannot overcome his anger (645-648). He knows what he should do, yet wills not to act. He remains internally fragmented, but now he sees it. So he decides at that point to stay among the ships. Should Hector reach his encampment, he will fight. Thus Achilles sets forth the grim conditions for his return (649-655).

It may seem that Ajax has succeeded, at least somewhat, where the others have failed. But Ajax is not simply the next batter up with the two quick outs looming over him. Rather, the bases are loaded as he steps in to complete the movement that Odysseus began and Phoenix pushed along. Ajax alludes to this totality himself, speaking for the embassy as a whole as he closes and correcting Achilles’ perception that they are representatives of the Achaean cheiftens. Instead, he says, they are representatives of all the Danaans, the entire body of the Greek forces that currently await slaughter (640-41). Would that Achilles should treat them as such (639). Inverting Achilles’ words of friendship upon their arrival, Ajax closes by voicing the collective desire of the Greeks to be nearest and dearest [kedistoi...philtotoi] to Achilles most of all (641-136 My paraphrase.

136 My paraphrase.
137 Here we have a clear picture of Achilles’ internal conflict, his mind [θυμός] resonates with what Ajax has said [μυθέομαι] in opposition to the anger [χόλος] that swells in his heart [καρδία]. Cf. n.106 and 123.
138 ὑπωρόφιοι δὲ τοῖς εἰμὲν πληθὺς ἐκ Δαναών. Cf. n.130 ἀριστήεσσιν Ἀχαϊῶν.
42). Thus the embassy that was formed as a remedy for fragmentation ends by emphasizing their integration, acknowledging that it remains incomplete without Achilles.\(^{139}\)

### 3.1.4 Dialogue with Priam

On the interpersonal level the Embassy represents a projection of Agamemnon’s wisdom (Nestor) meant to appeal to Achilles’ prudence (Odysseus), morality (Phoenix) and basic impulses (Ajax). On this interpersonal level, the Embassy to Achilles is almost a direct contrast with the Judgment of Paris – three brought together to persuade one. On the level of the polis, they are beseeching their own withdrawn spirit to come back and fight. By most measures the Embassy cannot be called a success on either level and is very nearly a complete failure. But although it seems like a small consolation at the time, it is Achilles’ decision to stay that ultimately paves the way for his return and the final victory of the Achaeans over the city of Troy. Still, upon reading Homer’s account, there appears to be a glaring inconsistency between technique and efficacy. For all the prowess and careful thought that went into their selection, the emissaries fail to reintegrate stubborn Achilles.\(^{140}\) This disparity is intensified when in the final Book King Priam, enemy of the Achaeans, confronts Achilles and persuades him to relinquish the hard won body of Hector – Priam’s son, hero of Troy, and the individual responsible for the death of Achilles’ closest friend. What then is Homer saying about the power of persuasion and its effective execution? Are there reasons that the single Priam succeeds where the trio of

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\(^{139}\) There is an interesting comment on this tripartite relationship during the funeral games of Patroclus, after Achilles has reentered the fold. Wiley Odysseus and brawny Ajax wrestle to a standstill. Bored with the inaction, the spirited Achilles adjudicates between the two, calling the match a tie in which both share the honor (22.700-39).

\(^{140}\) This might speak against Nestor being wise at all. For a discussion of the controversy over Nestor’s efficacy as sage counselor, with a portrayal of Nestor as a voice for justice and social cohesion that resonates with the role I have cast him in here, see Hanna M. Roisman. “Nestor the Good Counsellor.” *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series 55.1 (2005): 17-38.
emissaries fail? Does his “oneness” correlate more exactly to Achilles’ psyche then the disjointed “three-ness” of the envoy?

Achilles suggests an answer in his reply to Odysseus, when he mentions an alternative condition for his return to battle; one less bloody for the Achaean troops, but perhaps more difficult for Agamemnon himself. He states that his soul [thumos] will never be persuaded [peitho] until Agamemnon pays back his heart-wrenching dishonor in full (9.386-87). Since such repayment is directly contrasted to the material gifts that have been offered, it is clear that Achilles desires a different kind of atonement from Agamemnon. His displays of wealth only assert his kingly position. What Achilles’ desires is Agamemnon’s humbling, a true supplication.

In understanding and enacting the role of the lowly supplicant, King Priam is very much the antithesis of King Agamemnon. For while Agamemnon might acknowledge his folly and even regret his slight against Achilles, what he seeks is the hero’s return to subjugation. At the advice of his counselors he assembles and dispatches an embassy to present the abundance of gifts that he is assured will sway Achilles. In deferring to his counselors and dispatching an embassy to communicate his message, he risks nothing of himself. Though Nestor is deftly able to construct a technical representation of Agamemnon’s will – a representation that moves

141 In this section, I am indebted to the analysis offered by Odysseus Tsagarakis in “The Achaean Embassy and the Wrath of Achilles.” Hermes 99.3 (1971): 257-277. Although I had already developed the basic argument of this section prior to encountering the article, Tsagarakis’ philological and logical insights allowed me to develop and articulate the argument better than I had originally anticipated. In particular, his contrast between the non-suppliatory nature of the gifts offered by Agamemnon and his Embassy and the Supplication of Priam permeates this section (260-262).
142 For discussion concerning traditions of interpreting Achilles’ refusal of Agamemnon’s gifts, including recent interpretations arguing that the kingly offer fails because its generosity is seen as lauding Agamemnon’s superiority over Achilles, see Benjamin Sammons. The Art and Rhetoric of the Homeric Catalogue. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 120-122.
143 He admits as much at 9.160-61, citing that he is more kingly and older. This is a point Odysseus is wise to leave out in communicating Agamemnon’s message, as is often noted (ex. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric 12; Sammons Art and Rhetoric, 122).
Achilles’ slightly as it also represents the will of the Achaeans – the king is still personally removed from the communicative encounter.

However, Priam is unable to keep such a distance from Achilles. In order to ransom Hector’s body he has been instructed by the divine messenger Iris to personally present the warrior with gifts that will melt his rage (24.160-187). His offerings are valuable, but rather humble compared to those of Agamemnon.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, he is assured by his wife, Hecuba, that the supplication will fail and that the mere attempt to ransom the body will result in his death (206-08). Priam proceeds against the advice of his wife and the collective will of his people, readily accepting death for the slight chance of bringing Hector’s body back to the city so that he might be properly mourned.¹⁴⁵ With Hermes as his guide, he arrives safely at Achilles’ ship (352-467). Hermes instructs Priam to take Achilles’ knees and invoke Achilles’ father, mother and son (465-467); that is to say, he must close the physical and emotional distance completely. Priam partially follows these instructions, but outdoes the strategic advice of the divine messenger: He kneels before Achilles, embraces his knees and kisses his hands (476-478). Invoking the image of Achilles’ father he asks for the body of Hector, announcing that he has now endured what no man has ever endured by kissing the hands of the man who killed his son (485-506). Achilles assents.

It is tempting to explain the success of Priam’s supplication by appealing to one of two necessary but insufficient elements. The first is to dismiss the episode as rhetorical at all, but rather as a product of divine intervention. Zeus has decided that Achilles will turn Hector’s body

¹⁴⁴ Compare Agamemnon’s list (9.115-160) to Priam’s (24.228-237). Whereas Agamemnon’s offer reaches its height with serving women, royal betrothals, and the rule of cities, Priam’s collection consisting of such things as stately robes, fine linens, gold bars, tripods and a royal cup all fit in a single wagon.
¹⁴⁵ Priam chastises the Trojan citizens and his own sons for their lamentation and fear (24.237-264) and his loved ones wail as he departs as if he rides to his death (327-28).
over to Priam and sends his messengers to see that it is done. He has Thetis instruct Achilles to accept the ransom for the body and sends Iris and Hermes to instruct Priam how to approach Achilles. However, Homer does allude to the possibility that even the will of the gods does not guarantee the outcome; for Iris assures Priam that he will be safe because, in addition to Hermes guidance, Achilles’ is neither a brute nor a madman but dutiful to both the gods and to suppliants (185-188). This suggests that either a brute or a madman might disregard the will of the gods or the mercy due to suppliants. This subtle warning is echoed in Achilles’ own impatience with Priam, who refuses to sit with Achilles before the body of Hector is handed over to him (552-556). Achilles warns Priam not to test his patience, lest he ignore the commands of Zeus and kill Priam in a rage (559-570). Nevertheless, he prepares Hectors body, but does so out of Priam’s view for fear that seeing Hector might provoke the king into outburst, which might in turn induce Achilles to violence (582-586). Thus the motives of the heroes still linger independent of the will of the gods, and the interaction of the agents still drive the action of the narrative. Zeus has chosen not to have Hermes steal the body, but to have Priam confront Achilles for a reason. Though the gods will Achilles to be persuaded by Priam, Priam must still have the courage of heart and presence of mind to execute that will.

Among rhetoricians, the tendency is to ignore the mystical backdrop and credit more technical aspects of Priam’s plea. In reminding Achilles of his own father – both by invoking him in speech and resembling him in appearance – Priam is able to persuade Achilles through

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146 Such an explanation is consonant with views that the epic heroes are little more than playthings of the gods, as Johnstone (Listening) seems to assert. See n.105 and n.106.
147 Of course, Iris strengthens his courage and Hermes refocuses his mind. Tsagarakis discusses the contrast between divine aid in the Supplication and the lack thereof in the Embassy (“Embassy” 262). Miguel Herrero de Jáuregui (“Priam's Catabasis: Traces of the Epic Journey to Hades in Iliad 24.” Transactions of the American Philological Association 141.1 (2011): 37-68) specifically examines the role of Iris in fortifying Priam’s courage (50-51). He also somewhat suggests Hermes as the restorer of Priam’s reason by observing that Priam becomes addled upon first seeing Hermes (52), but that Hermes then calms his fears (54). Herrero de Jáuregui later points to the same episode to argue that intelligence [νόος] is a necessary attribute for Priam’s successful journey (61).
pathos and identification.\textsuperscript{148} These are in fact the techniques he employs, but such an explanation does not satisfy. Odysseus repeats Peleus’ own words and Phoenix is an actual father figure, yet neither rouse him as Priam does. Are we to assume that, despite the same technical content, he identifies more closely with the enemy king than with his own kinsmen? Yet Homer tells us that the invocation of Peleus does move Achilles, and that he cries for his father as he also cries for Patroclus, while Priam sheds tears for his own son (507-512). They are both joined in a cathartic moment.

Pity and identification, then, have less to do with any connection that is made between Priam and Achilles’ father and far more to do with the connection that is established between Priam and Achilles himself. Here stands before him a man with incredible endurance, strong-willed with a heart of iron who would not be dissuaded from his chosen course of action (205; 219; 518-21). Hector had made the same assessment of Achilles as he pleaded for his body to be ransomed after his death: Achilles would not be persuaded, his heart was of iron (22.356-57). Achilles had rejected the plea in much the same way he rejected Agamemnon’s gifts as offered by Odysseus. Not if he was offered ten or even twenty times the normal price would he hand over the body (349-54).\textsuperscript{149} Yet, Priam found a way to melt his iron heart. Not by ransom, despite what Zeus decreed. The material offering was merely a formality. He melted Achilles’ heart by having a heart of iron himself, and more besides. He was able to do what Agamemnon was not, to pay Achilles back pain for pain, sorrow for sorrow, and dishonor for dishonor. But as he humbled himself, he reinforced his regal status. Whereas Agamemnon was internally divided,


\textsuperscript{149} Notably, Hector unsuccessfully employs the mundane tactics that Priam later uses, imploring Achilles by life \(\psiυχή\), knees and parents. Achilles retorts that no such pleas will move him (22.337-345).
Priam quite literally presents an ethos of integrity. With the help of the gods he retained his wits and his courage, and even regained his appetite (635-642). The parts of his soul are intact and properly ordered, even if strife remains, like the images on Achilles’ shield. It was the appeal to the integrity of the Achaeans, however fragmented their king, that moved Achilles slightly. It was the inherent integrity of Priam, however emotionally broken he might be, that moved him completely.

Neither divine intervention nor psychic integrity explains Priam’s success on its own – Priam was courageous and acted prudently only with the help of the gods, though it is his unguided actions that melt Achilles’ heart. Ultimately, Priam is successful through the mix of divine aid and inner cohesion. This is not to discount the technical skill that he exhibits, but to highlight those elements of his encounter that made it successful where the amazing technical skill of the Embassy failed. Taken together, divine aid and personal integrity form the bedrock of psychagogic rhetoric upon which the skillful psychagogue operates.\(^{150}\) However, rather than guarantee success, these two elements indicate that the psychagogic rhetor speaks at great risk to self. For in accepting divine aid, one must give up some degree of personal agency. And integrity is only needed where others often fall apart.\(^{151}\) There should be no doubt that of all the perils Priam faced, it was his humbling before Achilles that was most threatening to a king. Agamemnon could never risk such harm to his kingly pride, and so he fails before he begins.

Thus, Homer does not merely demonstrate a vast knowledge of rhetorical techniques and psychological motivations. Rather, in the construction of the Embassy and in Supplication of

\(^{150}\) As we shall see, “divine aid” does not always mean direct intervention. As the psychagogic tradition evolves, aid is often granted to the rhetor through various means such as divine inspiration, the reading of sacred texts, or by simply being “in tune” with the transcendent.

\(^{151}\) There is a paradox in giving oneself over to the gods in order to remain a personally whole agent. Such paradoxes might also be identified as contributing to the foundation of psychagogy.
Priam, he demonstrates a philosophical structuring of the soul and a correlate structure of symbolic appeals which foreshadows much of what Plato has to say in the *Phaedrus*. He offers the tradition the first representation of a tripartite motivational scheme that forms the basis of persuasion. These motivations are most persuasive when appealed to as a whole and most effective when voiced by an integrated individual. But this articulation comes only by way of personifications and allegories. It is not until Heraclitus that we receive a vocabulary that makes precise description and theorizing possible – although his application of that vocabulary is anything but precise.

### 3.2 *LOGOS AND PSYCHE IN HERACLITUS*

In the case of foundational psychagogy, examining Heraclitus warrants almost the opposite methodological extreme for examining Homer. While Heraclitus offers few obvious structural cues towards tripartition, he presents a watershed moment in philosophical terminology. Indeed, he may have been the first to use the term *philosophos*. And among the most important terms he employed in philosophically substantive and original ways were the key-terms *logos* and *psyche*. Moreover, although Heraclitus does not ostensibly render either term into tripartitions, he does directly correlate the two in a way that indicates an analogous, or even identical, structure. Thus, in this section I investigate the relationship between *logos* and *psyche* in the Heraclitean

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152 In the following section, unless otherwise noted, I use the text and translations of Charles Kahn. *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An Edition of the Fragments with Translation and Commentary*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Kahn, in turn, follows “Marcovich’s edition wherever possible, but without his spacing and occasionally without his punctuation” (25).

Clement attributes the word *philosophos* to Heraclitus in DK22b35 “Men who love wisdom [φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας] must be good inquirers into many things indeed].” Kahn argues that the vocabulary is a genuine attribution, which would make it the first recorded use of the Greek term (105). For a brief digest of arguments against the genuine use of the term by Heraclitus, see 308n.69.
fragments. I subsequently identify Heraclitus as a major figure in the history of psychagogy and so a primary influence on Plato’s views of rhetoric.

Interpreting the thought and work of Heraclitus has many well-known obstacles. Even in antiquity he was known as obscure by scholars who had more direct access to his works than the scattered fragments that we have today. So it comes as no surprise that there is much debate amongst contemporary classicists and philosophers as to even the general meaning of obscure statements. Recently, some of this debate has spilled over into rhetorical scholarship, but a definitive account of his influence on ancient rhetorical thought has yet to be given. I make no claim to offer such an account here, but do hope to show that any such endeavor needs to focus on the relationship of these two terms – not just on Heraclitus’ notion of logos alone nor on an abstract notion of his “doctrine of flux.”


Of these eight, six have appeared since 2006. So interest in Heraclitus, while increasing, is relatively nascent in rhetorical studies. Moreover, of the eight, only a few are relevant to the current study. Of those which are not relevant, Schiapapa (*Protagoras*) argues that Heraclitus’ doctrine of flux is influential for Protagoras, but does not examine his concept of logos. Helm’s (“Task of a Name”) attempt to read Heraclitus as a “pre-structuralist” in line with Heidegger and Derridas is easily refuted by Poster’s reply. Poster (“Evidence”) defends, on account of ancient evidence, the more mainstream reading of Heraclitus as empirically skeptical, but adhering to a stable logos – a position that she had made clear in her earlier 1996 article (“Being and Becoming”), but did not need to mention in her 2006 article (“Task of the Bow”), since this study dealt with the exegesis of a single fragment.

Of those that appear relevant because of their focus on logos, only a few really add to the current project. I ignore Reames (“Logos Paradox”), who tries to restrict interpretations of logos in Heraclitus to material terms, denying any reference to metaphysical or even non-material qualities. At the time of this writing, Reames’ article is very recent and so remains unfretted, but most of the seeds for refutation are sown in the article itself. So, I have chosen to not view it as a genuine obstacle to my reading in this case. In brief terms, she relies on a questionable hermeneutic tool developed from references that Aristotle makes to Heraclitus. Moreover, she feels justified in doing so based on an incomplete and incorrect reading of Poster (“Task of the Bow”) and her references to an unstable physical world, which Reames reads as contradicting her earlier statement about a stable logos in “Being and Becoming” (Reames, “Logos Paradox” 344 n.2). Reames seems to be unaware of Poster’s reply to Helms in
3.2.1 Logos in Heraclitus

Logos is a notoriously difficult word to translate, meaning at times story, account, speech, argument, measure, proportion, reason, ordering principle, Divine Intelligence, etc. And its semantic depth has led commentators of Heraclitus, both ancient and modern, to grapple with exactly how he uses the term over the course of what is supposedly one small book. Most have tried to narrow the semantic field through etymological hide-and-seek in an attempt to determine exactly what uses were available to him.154 But there seems to be a consensus that when Heraclitus uses the term, it carries with it the hint of multiple meanings hiding behind its most obvious reading.155 Martha Nussbaum, however, offers the most surprising analysis. Nussbaum argues that most of these renderings appear at least a generation after Heraclitus’ death, and that he was not necessarily likely to have encountered those in use within his own lifetime (e.g., the early works of Pindar):

which she uses similar sections of Aristotle to show that one can adhere both to material flux and a stable logos. Thus Poster negates exactly the sort of restriction that Reames argues for. Additionally, Reames focuses on a very few uses of logos in Heraclitus for which her meaning makes sense, largely ignoring other uses of the term in Heraclitus in which her proposed meaning is inelegant or even non-sensical. Thus, Reames misuse of Aristotle, Poster, and even Heraclitus leads me to reject her criteria on how to read logos in Heraclitus.

I will draw on Johnstone (Listening), who digests the earlier philosophical and classical secondary literature in terms germane for rhetorical study. I will also draw on Poster’s characterization of the logos as divinely uttered, as stable, and as a source for extralingual knowledge in her three articles. And finely, I find Hoffman’s analysis (“Structural Logos”) useful for its contribution of aptly extending the notion of logos as structure to the rhetorical concept of “composition.”

Though sometimes mentioned, none of the above works analyze the concept of psyche.


155 See, Kirk, Cosmic Fragments 38-39. Guthrie disbelieves that it is “credible that even when he appropriates it [logos] for a concept peculiar to his own philosophy he should divorce it completely from its ordinary uses” (History 1.419). Kahn calls this linguistic density, meaning “the phenomenon by which multiplicity of ideas are expressed in a single word or phrase” (Art and Thought 89). Both Poster (“Being and Becoming” 4) and Johnstone (Listening 54) reference and adhere to Kahn’s concept of linguistic density in interpreting Heraclitus.
What is interesting, however, is that if we examine the works of those writers known to have been read by Heraclitus (Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Xenophanes), as well as those of other poets distinctly prior in date (Solon, Theoginis, etc.), we find instead of an impressive diversity of usage, a singular unanimity. Λόγος in early writers is not used frequently. When it is used, it always means a story, or some sort of connected account told by a specific person. And, in the vast majority of cases, this account is a falsehood, a beguiling tale, one which is intended to deceive the hearer or to make him forget something of importance.156

Thus, Nussbaum suggests that Heraclitus is an innovator in his use of the term, if not necessarily changing its meaning then by taking a word that usually carried with it negative connotations of untrustworthy speech and using it to denote his overall theory of language, which he then made central to his philosophy. But while Nussbaum is content to view logos in Heraclitus as mainly representative of linguistic phenomenon, others have seen in its use at least a hint of what it would come to mean more explicitly in later generations.157 Charles Kahn is representative when he takes logos in Heraclitus to mean “not simply language but rational discussion, calculation, and choice: rationality as expressed in speech, in thought, and in action.”158 Edward Minar suggests what I take to be the best single-word English equivalent,

156 “Psyche in Heraclitus” 3. Lincoln’s lengthier analysis (“Competing Discourses”) corroborates this point.
157 “Psyche in Heraclitus” 14-15. Although Nussbaum focuses mainly on logos as language in Heraclitus, she does wonder if his use of the term, along with psyche “predicted the fifth century or created it” (14).
158 Art and Thought 102. Kahn continues to point out that he means “rationality as a phenomenal property manifested in intelligent behavior, not Reason as some kind of theoretical entity posited ‘behind the phenomena’ as a cause of rational behavior. The conception of logos as a self-subsistent power or principle is foreign to the usage of Heraclitus” (102).
“account,”159 which captures the multiple verbal and calculative senses the word can carry without taking the term too far into abstract “reason” – a meaning of logos with which scholars do have significant disagreement in terms of Heraclitus’ usage.160 Regardless of the exact array of meanings available, most commentators seem to agree that logos as employed by Heraclitus carried with it at least a minimal range that encompassed verbal expression, physical measure, and some sort of ordering.

That such a range is suggested can be evidenced by the variety of circumstances in which the word is employed in the fragments themselves. The use of logos as verbal expression in the sense of “discourse” or “report” is obvious in what is considered the introduction to Heraclitus’ book: “Although this account [logos] holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend, both before hearing it and once they have heard” (first sentence of D.1).161 Heraclitus even employs the original use that Nussbaum posits, false or suspicious speech: “A fool loves to get excited on any account [logos]” (D.87) and “Of all those whose accounts [logoi] I have heard, none has gone so far as this: to recognize what is wise, set apart from all” (D.108).

But logos seems to shift in meaning from simple “report” to something of quasi-quantitative value when Heraclitus states that “In Priene lived Bias son of Teutames, who is of

In a helpful appendix, Kevin Robb (“Psyche and Logos) digests some of the responses of preeminent classicists on the question: “Diels also took λόγος to mean ‘reason’; Marcovich considers this impossible and treats λόγος as meaning “numerical ratio”... E. A. Havelock (in conversation) emphatically denies that logos could carry the meaning “reason” either in Heraclitus or Parmenides” (350). However, Robb asserts that “this meaning cannot be ruled out by scholarly dictum on the grounds that only in later Greek did logos carry the connotations of “reason,” or by the accusation that one is importing Stoic connotations. Parmenides, Heraclitus’ philosophical contemporary, has his goddess command the kouros to judge with logos the argument which she has spoken (B.7.5), where logos may imply the meaning “reason” and is often so translated” (337). Nonetheless, Robb couches the translation as “reason(ing)” and so brings it more in line with Kahn’s treatment above.

159 “Logos in Heraclitus,” see especially 326, 336. Minar also rejects the notion of logos as reason in Heraclitus. Notably, I do appreciate Hoffman’s suggestion of “composition” as mentioned above (n.153) as a possible single-word replacement, though the calculative connotations are much more latent than in the word “account”.

160 For discussion of this disagreement, see notes 158 and 159 above.

161 Following Kahn, and for ease of reading, I will forgo the customary DK22b before the numbering of the Heraclitus fragments, indicating a direct quotation by Heraclitus in Diels-Kranz, and simply refer to fragments by D.x.
more account [logos] than the rest” (D.39). And it takes on full quantitative value when we are
told that “Sea pours out <from earth>, and it measures up to the same amount [logos] it was
before becoming earth” (D.31b).

The use of logos to indicate a process or structure by which things are ordered is born out
later in the introduction:

Although all things come to pass in accordance with this account [logos], men are like the
untried when they try such words and works as I set forth, distinguishing each according
to its nature and telling how it is. But other men are oblivious of what they do awake,
just as they are forgetful of what they do asleep. (Sentences 2 and 3 of D.1)

And again when Heraclitus asserts that, “Although the account [logos] is shared, most men live
as though their thinking were a private possession” (D.2). Though these passages are only
suggestive of order, they resonate with other fragments in which Heraclitus discusses the
everlasting cosmos (D.30), the divine nomos (D.114) and the “the plan [gnome] by which it
steers all things through all” (D.41). Thus, G.S. Kirk goes so far as to render logos as ‘the
formula of things’. W.K.C. Guthrie calls it Heraclitus’ governing principle. And Kahn
says that when Heraclitus employs the term in the first fragment he does not refer to his own

\[\text{\textsuperscript{162} Cosmic Fragments 39.} \] Kirk proceeds to attach this formula to the world-order, arguing, “it is undoubtedly true
that, whether or not he attached the word aei to the Logos, Heraclitus would have agreed that the formula of things
is unceasingly valid; in fr. 30 he states that the cosmos of things, which must be the manifestation of this formula, is
eternal” (40-41). He later also uses the apposite translations “structure, plan” (70).

\[\text{\textsuperscript{163} History 1.428} \]
words but “the structure which his words intend or point at, which is the structure of the world itself.”

Christopher Johnstone summarizes the interpretive tradition in a way that connects the first sense of logos to its more cosmically significant sense and in terms that illustrate its significance for the rhetorical endeavor: “Language or speech, viewed as logos, is therefore itself a manifestation of the enduring kosmos or world-order, where the Logos is the principle of that order.” Though the implications might be subtly apparent, these three senses of logos – as language, as measure, and as guiding formula or shared structure – will merge with Heraclitus’ radically new conception of the psyche to form the first, albeit obscure, account of psychagogia.

### 3.2.2 Psyche in Heraclitus

That Heraclitus’ notion of the psyche is radically evolved from his predecessors is well attested to. But in comparison to Heraclitus’ use of logos, his use of psyche has garnered less

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164 Art and Thought 98. Kahn uses this language throughout his commentary; for instance, commenting on D.2, he states, “In sum, the logos is ‘common’ because it is (or expresses) a structure that characterizes all things.”

165 Listening 58.

166 Snell: “The first writer to feature the new concept of the soul is Heraclitus” (Discovery 53); Robb: “the first significant changes in usage and meaning for the word psyche are to be found in the text of the philosopher Heraclitus” (“Psyche and Logos” 315); Thomas M. Robinson: “for Heraclitus psyche (“soul”) was seen as a cognitive principle, not simply a biological principle and/or source of our “emotional,” non-rational selves, as seems to have been thought by most of his predecessors (for a useful discussion see Kahn, 127); he is, as far as is known, the first Greek to have adopted such a view” (“Heraclitus on Soul.” Monist 69.3 (1986): 305-14 (p. 305)); Kahn: “This is apparently the first time in extant literature that the word psychē ‘soul’ is used for the power of rational thought” (Art and Thought 107). In further discussion Kahn also cites Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and Karl Reinhardt: “‘Heraclitus is the first to have given serious thought to, and had something to say about, the soul in man.’ (Der Glaube der Hellenen I (Berlin, 1931), 375). Wilamowitz’s point was that the psychē in Homer is mentioned only when it leaves the body...And so we find in Heraclitus, as Reinhardt said, ‘for the first time a psychology worthy of the name’” (126-27; citing Reinhardt. Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (Bonn, 1916; reprint, 1959.) 201). Kahn continues to examine the material controversy of the psyche. Similar to Wilamowitz, Nussbaum performs the same sort of analysis as she does for logos to show that psyche, while not innately negative, had almost always been used in negative contexts e.g., to discuss soul departing upon death or the risk of death (“Psyche in Heraclitus” 1-2). Notably, she doubts whether Heraclitus is the actual originator of these senses of logos and psyche, or whether the lack of textual evidence from this period merely
scholarly attention, less controversy and almost none of either amongst rhetoricians. Yet his employment of the term marks a more radical break from epic Greek and in many ways represents a more important development for rhetoric than that of logos. At the very least he renders the importance of logos possible, since he is the first thinker on record to identify the defining characteristic of humanity as the possession of a unified soul capable of thought and speech.

There are only two short fragments in which both terms appear and they are two of the most perplexing because of it. To emphasize the ambiguity, I have reinserted the Greek keywords:

D.45: You will not find out the limits of the psyche by going, even if you travel over every way, so deep is its logos.

makes it look that way. She assumes that he is not as novel in developing the meaning of the words as the radical new usages appear, but maintains that his novelty resides in the combination of the two terms (14-15).

To be sure, the major commentaries on Heraclitus, such as Kirk (Cosmic Fragments) and Kahn (Art and Thought), spend a good deal of time considering the evolution and usage of psyche. And of course, it is the focal point of inquiry in Nussbaum (“Psyche in Heraclitus”) and Robb (Psyche and Logos), to which I also add Snell’s reflections (Discovery 17-19); as well as Robinson. “Heraclitus on Soul”; and Joel Wilcox. “Barbarian Psyche in Heraclitus.” Monist 74.4 (1991): 624-37. But the controversies seem to be minor in comparison to those concerning logos, focusing mainly on the degree of materiality the psyche had for Heraclitus (see Kahn Art and Thought 127).

In the rhetorical studies I have noted on Heraclitus, only two mention the soul – Hoffman (“Structural Logos” 3; 16-17) and Johnstone (Listening). Of those two, Hoffman only mentions two psyche fragments to show that his meaning of logos makes sense in them, which it admittedly does. And while Johnstone’s comments are rhetorically significant, they are again mainly a summary of earlier commentators.

Nussbaum: “It is with ψυχή, that central and connecting life-faculty, that man may potentially understand λόγος, or connected discourse. Because of the central importance of language in understanding, the central life-faculty in man is, first and foremost, the faculty of language. Sense data are referred to ψυχή, and are interpreted according to the ψυχή’s degree of linguistic competence. All mortal living creatures, one would suppose, have ψυχή; only in human beings can that ψυχή grasp λόγος” (“Psyche in Heraclitus” 13). Kahn: “The new concept of the psyche is expressed in terms of the power of articulate speech: rationality is understood as the capacity to participate in the life of language, ‘knowing how to listen and how to speak’” (Art and Thought 107, referencing Heraclitus D.19).
D.115: To the psyche belongs a logos that increases itself.169

A third fragment, in which logos does not appear, is widely accepted as implying logos due to its otherwise non-sensical suggestion of language:

D. 107: Eyes and ears are poor witness for men if they have barbarian souls [barbaros psychas].170

Interpretations of these fragments vary widely, but can be roughly divided into three familiar categories based on the triple meaning of logos: 1) physiological interpretations reading the logos of the psyche as a physical boundary that grows as the body grows, and the “language” of the soul as being its ability to interpret the data of the senses, 2) a language-centric interpretation in which the logos represents the psyche’s ability to learn and grow through language acquisition and reflection on language, and 3) a metaphysical interpretation that relates the logos of the soul to the cosmic logos. Though some interpreters do insist on exclusionary readings in one category, they are not inherently exclusive in their nature.171 Robb combines aspects of the three in a polysemous rendering: “Psyche has (1) a measure, (2) an account/report, and (3) a

169 Kahn mentions doubt about the fragment’s authenticity, but sees enough resonance to cautiously conjecture about its meaning for Heraclitus (237).
170 I have altered Kahn’s primary translation “if their souls do not understand the language” in favor of the alternative that he lists, which is more standard. See Art and Thought 35. Moreover, Kahn’s primary translation reads logos into the fragment, while the standard translation remains more cryptic. At the time, ἐβαρβάρους literally means those who do not understand Greek.
171 See Robb (“Psyche and Logos”) and Wilcox (“Barbarian Psyche”) for bibliographical reviews of the various interpretations. As an example of a non-exclusive reading, Kahn gives D.115 a physiological explanation (Art and Thought 237) and focuses on language in the commentary of D.107 (107). Yet in both D.107 and D.45 he sees the logos of the soul as having an analogous or even identical relationship with cosmic logos (107; 130).
reason(ing).”172 Taken with Heraclitus’ Delphi-esque admonition that, “it belongs to all men to
know themselves and to think well” (D.116) and his own admission that, “I went in search of
myself” (D.101), the general consensus is that Heraclitus directs us to search the inner logos of
our psyche in order to come to know the cosmic Logos. This search is cognitively and
linguistically oriented – but as a means, not as an end.173

Thus Heraclitus is the first to identify a unified, central psyche in which human beings’
capacities for language and thought were located. As such, he is the first to conceptualize and
label both the object [psyche] and means [logos] of rhetoric that Plato will later recognize in the
Phaedrus. But beyond simple terminology, he charges those who would grasp the logos with
tasks similar to Plato’s Socrates, who begins the Phaedrus by reflecting on the oracular charge to
“know thyself” (229e-230a). Moreover, the introspective task for Heraclitus takes the form of an
impossible journey which we cannot complete, “even if you travel over every way” (D.45), but it
is one we must undertake nonetheless.174 Heraclitus has already started this journey and is
reporting to us what he has learned so as to guide us on our own. The logos of his book tells of
the cosmic Logos, which is mirrored in the logos of our own psychai. In this way, Heraclitus

172 “Psyche and Logos” 338.
173 According to Robinson, “The activity which results in the self-augmenting of logos is, then, both the self-
exploration of the inner cosmos, i.e., one’s own mental and speech acts, and the exploration of the logos of the
external cosmos” (339). Kahn asserts that “by seeking his own self Heraclitus could find the identity of the
universe, for the logos of the soul goes so deep that it coincides with the logos that structures everything in the
world” (Art and Thought 130). Even Nussbaum, who focuses her interpretation on logos-as-language, notes that the
linguistic aspect is necessary to grasp “if one is to understand λόγος in its wider, cosmic sense” (“Psyche in
Heraclitus” 10-11).

The interpretation carries the day among rhetoricians as well. Poster seems to tacitly accept it, identifying
Heraclitus as an “early example of logos philosopher, in the Gadamerian sense, in that he believes that investigation
of language can provide information that is not exclusively or trivially linguistic” (“Task of the Bow” 16n.2)
Hoffman asserts that for Heraclitus “the soul has a structure analogous to that of the kosmos that it is profitable to
investigate” (“Structural Logos” 17). And Johnstone maintains that, “One person’s psyché is, in actuality, merely a
particular embodiment of the singular cosmic Psyché…The quest for wisdom takes one into oneself, for the cosmic
Logos is continuous with the logs of the soul” (Listening 56).
174 For a comparison of Heraclitus’ use of hodos (“way”) in D.45 and its allusion to the Homeric journey, see Robb
(“Psyche and Logos” 335-38).
appears as the first psychagogue in the Platonic sense, the first to deliberately and knowingly use logos to direct the psychai of his hearers on their journey. He is the first thinker in the recorded history of the West to be concerned with soul-care and his method of caring for the soul was speech, divinely inspired but earthly directed.

Yet, Heraclitus cannot be completely divorced from Homer, no matter how much he castigated the poet or revolutionized epic vocabulary. In her contrast of Homeric thought with Heraclitean evolutions, Nussbaum articulates how Heracles is able to conceptualize and label the sorts of tensions and relationships I pointed out in the previous section between fragmentation and unity, which Homer could only personify and allegorize:

In general, then, Homeric man fails to recognize explicitly that in virtue of which he is a single individual. His use of the first person shows that he is conscious of the self, and that he is somehow aware that his limbs and faculties form a unity. But he cannot explain what connects his separate faculties; and though he implicitly acknowledges the centrality of ψυχή as a necessary condition for consciousness, he has not yet acquired a notion of its activities and its role. His understanding of language reveals similar limitations: he is aware of words rather than syntax, of the ear and the tongue rather than of the discursive reasoning and connection-making necessary for the proper learning of language. Heraclitus sees deficiencies in this view, and attempts to formulate a more complex picture of human life and language, conceiving the rôle of ψυχή as that of a central faculty connecting all the others, and ascribing to it the power of connected reasoning and language-learning for which his predecessors have no explanation.175

175 “Psyche in Heraclitus” 5.
So Heraclitus provides an advancement in the tradition we are outlining, not a break. He maintains, with Homer, the necessity of internal integrity and guidance from the divine. But he does take the tradition in a radically new direction. He is the first thinker we know of to overtly identify the macro-microcosmic relationship between soul, city and cosmos that Homer possibly alludes to on the Shield. And he is the first to suggest that the destiny of the individual is to journey across that identity, progressing from communication to self-knowledge to an eternal knowledge of the cosmos.

3.2.3 Hints towards Tripartition

Before leaving Heraclitus, it is worth noting how he may have preconfigured the structure of psyche and logos beyond simply implying that they shared a structure. The first hint I want to consider lies within his method of soul-care. It is difficult to say anything certain about his method because of the fragmented form in which we possess his work. But it is suggestive that all the fragments that discuss the possible harms of the soul can be collected under three distinct and recognizable categories.

3.2.3.1 Tripartition in Psyche

In the first instance there are the fragments we have considered and others like them that admonish those ignorant of the true logos and exhort them to listen to and understand it – a path
that will take much inquiry (D.35) and introspection (D.116). Thus, one of the harms, perhaps
the most prominent, is ignorance and its remedy wisdom.\textsuperscript{176}

Yet another harm is prideful anger and the violence it can inflame in the soul:

D.85: It is hard to fight against rage [\textit{thumos}]; for whatever it wants its buys at the
expense of the soul [\textit{psyche}].\textsuperscript{177}

D.43: One must quench violence [\textit{hybris}] quicker than a blazing fire.

But at the same time, this admonition is not a blanket call against pride or even violence as such.
For Heraclitus exhorts us to “realize that war is shared and Conflict [\textit{eris}] is Justice [\textit{dike}], and
that all things come to pass…in accordance with conflict” (D.80). He calls us to “great deaths”
(D.25), reminds us that “Gods and men honor [\textit{timosi}] those who fall in battle” (D.24) and recalls
Achilles choice when he states that “The best [\textit{hoi aristoi}] choose one thing in exchange for all,
everflowing fame among mortals; but most men [\textit{hoi polloi}] have sated themselves like cattle”
(D.29). It is hard to fight \textit{thymos}, and Heraclitus does not quite indicate that we should always
try. Only when \textit{thymos} flares with \textit{hybris} – wonton violence – do we need to restrain it, for it

\textsuperscript{176} Although Heraclitus tells us that neither deep inquiry nor much learning is any guarantee (cf. D.40, D.57, D.129).
\textsuperscript{177} I have here altered the primary Kahn translation to one of the alternatives he lists for the text for a few reasons.
Kahn originally translates \textit{thumos} as passion, but he indicates that the ancients took it more in the sense of anger or
righteous indignation (\textit{Art and Thought} 77). While “passion” can still carry that sense, it usually brings to mind
lustful connotations that would be more akin to the appetites. In his commentary on this passage (241-243), Kahn
makes it clear that when Plato echoes the text in the \textit{Republic} (375b), he is alluding specifically to \textit{thumos} in the
sense of righteous indignation and not lustful passion. Moreover, Kahn contends that this is likely Herciltus’ own
meaning, since it was the typical Ionic meaning of the time. So Kahn himself takes “passion” to indicate “the
passionate act of self-affirmation in righteous rage or indignation” (243). Although he perhaps uses the term to
preserve the possible ambiguity, I find it better to be clear on the meaning for the context of this study.
does a disservice to self and community.\textsuperscript{178} Constrained and focused violence wins us honor and fame. We are thus called to have spirits of “controlled indignation.”\textsuperscript{179}

Thirdly, Heraclitus warns us against the harms that come from drunkenness, for “a man when drunk is led by a beardless boy, stumbling, not perceiving where he is going, having his soul [$\textit{psyche}$] moist” (D.117). Although Heraclitus understands the pleasure [$\textit{terpsis}$] that drink provides (D.77),\textsuperscript{180} he exhorts his readers that “it is death for souls [$\textit{psychai}$] to become water” (D.36),\textsuperscript{181} while “a gleam of light is the dry soul [$\textit{psyche}$], wisest and best” (118).\textsuperscript{182} Given the physical imagery of moistness and drunkenness, it is easy to think that this is the only pleasure the Heraclitus warns against. However, remembering that the $\textit{hoi polloi}$ sate themselves like

\begin{quote}
The positive control of feeling consists in so directing it that it becomes a stimulus to knowledge or to action. The emotion of indignation, for example, is controlled, not when it is obliterated, but when it is so directed that it does not expend itself in vague or violent reaction, but quickens thought and spurs to action.

Many of the world's greatest orations, as well as deeds of valor, are so many illustrations of controlled indignation. (\textit{Psychology}. 3rd ed. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1893. 398.)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{178} As we have seen, we learn this in the \textit{Iliad}. See also Kahn’s commentary on \textit{hybris} in D.43 (\textit{Art and Thought} 241) and the commentary on \textit{thymos} in D.85 mentioned above (241-243).

\textsuperscript{179} Here Heraclitus does not only prefigure Platonic psychology but Dewey’s as well, who underscores the importance of Heraclitus’ point for both war and rhetoric and all prudent action of the body and mind:

\begin{quote}
...The emotion of indignation, for example, is controlled, not when it is obliterated, but when it is so directed that it does not expend itself in vague or violent reaction, but quickens thought and spurs to action. Many of the world’s greatest orations, as well as deeds of valor, are so many illustrations of controlled indignation. (\textit{Psychology}. 3rd ed. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1893. 398.)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{180} Robinson, following Diels, translates the fragment as: “For souls it is joy or death to become wet” (“Heraclitus on Soul” 1), but Kahn rejects Diels correction of the text which renders a negation as a disjunction. Rather, Kahn renders the text: “it is delight, not death, for souls to become moist.” Kahn argues that the negation is an attempt by the author (Numenius, paraphrased by Porphyry) to render Heraclitus “death” that is experienced in drink as allegorical, not literal. Further, Kahn notes that the fragment is suspect and dismissed by a number of interpreters, though accepted by a number as well (331-332n.337; 332n.338 and n.339). He does not offer his own opinion to its authenticity though he does argue that the text in which it is found does also preserve other verbatim citations of Heraclitus. Moreover, he does acknowledge that Herodotus, Heraclitus’ near contemporary, does use \textit{terpsis} in this way. Robinson, based on Numenius and Kahn’s analysis, seems to accept the fragment as likely genuine (308).

\textsuperscript{181} I have switched the syntax of Kahn’s original translation in order to better fit the grammar of the sentence; moreover, I have only used the first clause. The entire fragment is as follows: “For souls it is death to become water, for water it is death to become earth; out of earth water arises, out of earth water arises, our of water soul.”

\textsuperscript{182} The ambiguity of this fragment has troubled interpreters, for another way to read the fragment is that “the best and wisest soul is a dry beam of light.” Kahn argues that this does not make much sense, though he cites Porphyry as trying to explain it through reference to the soul being “clouded,” which is a type of moisture that blocks light (\textit{Art and Thought} 246; further explained at 332-333n.347). Though admittedly anachronistic, I wonder if Heraclitus perhaps noticed the fragmenting effect of rays of light passing through rain or other water splashes and saw this as analogous to the fragmentation of the private \textit{logos} from the cosmic \textit{logos}. The science was not there, but perhaps the intuition was, making Heraclitus a precursor to Tolkien who wrote, “Man, Sub-creator, the refracted Light/through whom is splinte red from a single White/to many hues, and endlessly combined/in living shapes that move from mind to mind” (“On Fairy Stories.” 1947. Accessed online 10/01/2013. http://brainstorm-services.com/wcu-2004/fairystories-tolkien.pdf (p. 18)).
cattle, while the *hoi aristoi* achieve everlasting fame, it seems appropriate to take the admonition against drunkenness as a particularly strong instance of the general admonition against overindulgence. Accordingly, he states that “it is not better for human beings to get all they want. It is disease that makes health sweet and good, hunger satiety, weariness rest” (D.110-11; cf. D.64, D.67)

So in the fragments that address the *psyche* we see three dangers that seem to operate on the soul in three distinct ways: ignorance, violent anger and pleasurable overindulgence. Ignorance makes the soul deaf and blind, anger consumes the soul in fire and pleasure drowns the soul’s senses. There could be more dangers in the lost parts of Heraclitus’ book, but that these three survive across multiple fragments at least suggests an ordering that prefigures the Platonic *psyche*.

### 3.2.3.2 Tripartition in Logos

I have already introduced the major hint – the triple meaning of *logos* as language, measure and structure itself. At this point, one might be able to conjecture a correlation with the *psyche* based upon it, but it would be premature given the nascent development of either concept. Indeed my own triple rendering of *logos* is an amalgamation of other commentators who have struggled with formulating Heraclitus’ term into something manageable, yet suitably dense. So, it is better to reflect upon these variations and let them guide the search for a tripartite *logos* as the concept develops further among ancient Greek thinkers.

We have already seen Robb’s tripartition into measure, account/report, and reason(ing). Kahn continually tweaks his own mixture. He indicates at first a tetradic *logos* that is “at once the discourse of Heraclitus, the nature of language itself, the structure of the psyche and the
universal principle in accordance with which all things come to pass.”\textsuperscript{183} He elsewhere suggests that a dyad is what really lies behind Heraclitus’ use, “For the logos of Heraclitus is not merely his statement: it is the eternal structure of the world as it manifests itself in discourse.”\textsuperscript{184} But Kahn seems to ultimately conclude that a triad best encompasses the full meaning of logos without being redundant, defining “the community of the logos” by “its triple application of discourse, soul, and universe.”\textsuperscript{185}

Although Guthrie is in the same semantic range as the other attempts to describe Heraclitus’ multi-layered usage of logos, he takes the present study furthest along its current trajectory by commenting that Heraclitus’ employment of the term “seems so puzzling to be at the same time the word he utters, the truth which it contains, and the external reality which he conceives himself to be describing.”\textsuperscript{186} Guthrie is by no means laying out any particular doctrine and is not far off from either Robb or Kahn, who each seem to have space carved out for discourse, interior thought and formal observation. However, Guthrie’s attempt to encompass the peculiarities of Heraclitus’ logos along the lines of ontology, epistemology and speech provides the smoothest transition from the fragments of Heraclitus to the thought of Gorgias of Leontini, whose thought I consider next.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{183} Art and Thought 22.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid. 94
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid. 131
\end{flushleft}
3.3 LOGOS AND PSYCHE IN GORGIAS

Unlike Heraclitus, Gorgias has received a great deal of attention in rhetorical scholarship over the last thirty years. With such attention comes a great deal of diversity in interpretation. In this section I hope to side-step some of the larger debates about Gorgias’ epistemology, so far as it can be understood from his fragments and seemingly extant compositions, and its relationship with his rhetorical theory. Rather, what I would like to focus on is his role in “setting the agenda” for discussions of logos and psyche, regardless of his beliefs concerning either concept. This is not to ignore his role as an innovator, as I will consider those innovations that are attested to him without much controversy. But I do not consider whether he is a foundationalist or an antifoundationist, etc. The reading I give in this overview should hold on any of those

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187 For a fairly comprehensive review of the general literature on Gorgias from antiquity to modern day, see Johnstone (Listening 101-118). For a useful review of disciplinary interpretations of Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, see John Poulakos. “Gorgias’ Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric.” Rhetorica 1.2 (1983): 1-16. Poulakos generally categorizes interpreters of the Helen into those who read it as a “model” and those who read it as a “pretext” for a larger discussion of rhetoric. For a useful review of disciplinary interpretations of Gorgias’ On Nature, see 16-18 in Schiappa. “Interpreting Gorgias’ ‘Being’ in On Not Being or On Nature.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 30.1 (1997): 13-30. Schiappa also divides interpretation into two camps – the “pure philosophy” camp that reads On Nature as a serious metaphysical work interested in questions of being, knowledge and language and the “pure rhetorical” camp that sees the work as a clever imitation of contemporary philosophers. Schiappa later divides the “pure philosophy” camp into those who read Gorgias as a nihilist, those who read him as an existentialist and those who read him as a philosopher of language investigating the use of the predicate (23-27). Moreover, the whole volume of Philosophy & Rhetoric 30.1 offers “state of the art” essays on translating and interpreting Gorgias metaphysical treatise from Robert Gains, who argues that no significant theory of communication is inherent in the work, as well as Michael Gagarin, John Poulakos, and Bruce McComiskey. Recent book length analysis of Gorgias’ thought and influence have been published by Robert Wardy (The Birth of Rhetoric: Gorgias, Plato and Their Successors. London; New York: Routledge, 1996.), Scott Consigny (Gorgias: Sophist and Artist) and Bruce McComiskey (Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002.). Consigny argues that Gorgias offers an “antifoundationalist” view of rhetoric, as opposed to a subjectivist or empiricist view, wherein “he depicts truth as a label of endorsement, a prize to be awarded by the audience or community to the accounts they find most persuasive” (60). McComiskey similarly holds that Gorgias offers a “nascent social constructionist view of language in which perceived realities (ta pragmata) condition the generation of statements (logoi) about the world” (34). Interestingly, however, while McComiskey agrees with Consigny’s interpretation, Consigny maintains that McComiskey has misread both Gorgias and Plato. (See McComiskey’s review in the Review section of Rhetorica 20.3 (2002): 299-301; See also, Consigny. “Misreading the Sophists.” The Review of Communication 3.3 (July 2003): 260–266). Consigny’s problem has less to do with any view of Gorgias’ epistemology, but rather is geared towards McComiskey’s reading of Gorgias has a radical egalitarian who sought to “subvert the dominant institutions of the culture” (265).
interpretations; for it is grounded less in what he means, and more in what he says and how he says it – that is, insofar as the fragments are reliable. If there is a controversial assumption in the methodology of this section, it is that Gorgias’ conceptual innovations are inseparable from his stylistic innovations.\textsuperscript{188} Thus, I do take his style to be indicating something beyond form for form’s sake.

3.3.1 Logos in \textit{On Not Being or, On Nature}

Echoing Guthrie’s complex reading of \textit{logos} in Heraclitus, G.B. Kerferd gives the following account of \textit{logos} in general:

In the case of the word logos there are three main areas of its application or use, all related by an underlying conceptual unity. These are first of all the area of language and linguistic formulation, hence speech, discourse, description, statement, arguments (as expressed in words) and so on; secondly the area of thought and mental processes, hence thinking, reasoning, accounting for, explanation (cf. \textit{ortho logos}), etc; thirdly, the area of the world, that \textit{about} which we are able to speak and to think, hence structural principles,

\textsuperscript{188} Consigny might disagree (see his, “The Styles of Gorgias.” \textit{Rhetoric Society Quarterly} 22.3 (1992): 43-53, for an argument that Gorgias’ style is subject to situational demands and not overly revealing of the substance of his rhetorical theory), but most other scholars writing on the subject seem to concur that his style and his philosophy of rhetoric are inextricably intertwined. Representative comments to this effect can be found in George P. Segal (“Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos.” \textit{Harvard Studies in Classical Philology} 66 (1962): 99-155.): “Thus there is seen to be a relation between the formal structure of the \textit{logos} and the aesthetic-emotional effect which it produces” (127); Jacqueline de Romilly (\textit{The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens}. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.): Gorgias “discovers the magic inherent in speech and the potential power of style” (60). Much of the Gagarin contribution to the \textit{Philosophy & Rhetoric} volume mentioned above (“On the Not-Being of Gorgias’s \textit{On Not-Being (ONB)}.” \textit{Philosophy & Rhetoric} 30.1 (1997): 38-40.) speaks of the importance of style to Gorgias’ argumentation, while acknowledging the differences in style within his own works that Consigny points out.
formulae, natural laws and so on, provided that in each case they are regarded as actually present in and exhibited in the world-process.189

While one meaning may be emphasized, “the underlying meaning usually, perhaps always, involves some degree of reference to the other two areas as well.”190 This is an account Kerferd believes holds from Heraclitus through the Sophists to Plato and Aristotle, and the account prefaces his investigation into “Sophistic Relativism.”191

It is not surprising that Kerferd should offer a formulation of *logos* that so closely approximates those who were struggling with the term as Heraclitus obscurely employed it, which he simplifies as raising the question of being on three levels: “(1) is what that thing is…(2) is what we understand it to be…(3) it is what we say it to be.”192 What is surprising is that in his thorough investigation of the Sophists, and Gorgias’ *On Nature* in particular,193 Kerferd makes no definitive connection between this triple understanding of *logos* and the structure of Gorgias’ famous argument that “(1) nothing is, (2) even if it is, it cannot be known by human beings, (3) even if it is and is knowable, it cannot be indicated and made meaningful to another person.”194 To be sure, Kerferd does argue that Gorgias’ tract provides a “starting point” for Plato’s *Cratylus* by questioning the relationship between “words, thoughts and things,”195 and ties this directly to his triple rendering of *logos*. But his view is that Gorgias has introduced a

190 Ibid. 83.
191 Ibid. 84.
192 Sophistic Movement. 100.
193 This is true both in the analysis offered in *The Sophistic Movement* and the earlier analysis Kerferd offers in “Gorgias On Nature or That Which Is Not.” *Phronesis* 1.1 (1955): 3-25.
194 Ibid. 93. In this section, I look at the general style and argument shared between the two extant versions of *On Nature* offered by Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Schoolmasters* VII.65-87, and the anonymous *De Melissio, Xenophane, Gorgia* (MXG) once attributed to Aristotle and still often included in editions of his complete works.
195 Ibid. 99-100.
“radical” or “fundamental” gulf between the three. To the contrary, I would argue that *On Not Being* is the first work on record to make the three senses of *logos* distinctly manifest in a manner that suggests that such a tripartition is both a complete and inseparable account of the realms of language.

At first glance, this may be a counterintuitive position. Gorgias definitely seems interested in “abolishing the criterion” to truth, as Sextus Empiricus states, by severing the ties between reality, thought and language. However, as others have noted, real things, true thoughts and communal understanding through language are necessary for the argument to come off. But that does not mean that the tract is simply “engaging nonsense.” The point that Gorgias seems to be making is that what can be *said*, that is, *logoi* about being and thought and even language itself necessarily lead to contradiction despite our common experiences. In this way, the argument is less an attack on the possibility of existence, knowledge, or communication and

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196 *Ibid.* 81, 98 respectively.
197 In all fairness, although he does not make an explicit connection here, I believe that Kerferd’s investigation largely backs up this assertion and I acknowledge that my own position is inspired by his study.
199 According to Kerferd, Gorgias’ conclusions about communication hold “because of what would follow about things and our thinking about them. There is no attempt to abolish thinking, only to deny that we can say of thoughts that they are – likewise there is no attempt to abolish things. Indeed the whole argument depends completely on the retention of both thinking and things” (*Sophistic Movement* 97). Likewise, concerning the impossibility of rational communication, Wady makes the following observation: “Notice that the mere act of hearing or reading and understanding what Gorgias says is enough to show that this cannot be true” (*Birth of Rhetoric* 19). This is so even for a “social constructivist view” such as that of McComiskey or Consigny, for communal recognition of even a socially constructed truth entails some sense of shared understanding, which Gorgias seems to deny.
200 This is a characterization of Gorgias by Guthrie (*History* 3.197n.2), often cited in the literature.
201 Here I am following Kerferd’s line of thought as laid out in “Gorgias on Nature”:

A real advance in the study of the treatise came with the suggestion that the first section of the treatise also is concerned with the status of objects of perception, and that the question at issue was not the existence or otherwise of Being and Not-Being, but a different one, namely whether the verb “to be” can be predicated of phenomena without leading to contradictions. (5; citing Calogero, *Studi sull’ Eleatismo*, 1932.)
more a problematization of any perceived one-to-one correspondence between the three.\textsuperscript{202} The certainty of knowledge and precision of linguistic reference are both indicted, but it would be folly for a professional teacher of rhetoric to seriously maintain that practical communication was impossible.

What is particularly relevant to the tradition under consideration is Gorgias’ style and what it might indicate about the nature of \textit{logos}.\textsuperscript{203} For Gorgias, style coalesced with argumentation, rather than simply augmenting it; and the structure of his arguments about language bring to the fore some of the latent assumptions already discussed in Homer and Heraclitus. As de Romilly observes of \textit{On Nature}, “At every turn, a sort of logical game is played out, sustained by rapid-fire verbal flourishes. The method is that of the master of rhetoric, but behind it stands the philosopher.”\textsuperscript{204} And her comments concerning his other works are equally apt here: “The impression given is that not a single possibility has been overlooked, and this makes that argument look like an impressive demonstration.”\textsuperscript{205} Thus, if the entire argument is seen as an exploration of the problems inherent within language, the structure of the argument suggests an exhaustive exploration of the realms of language. In this way Gorgias is perhaps the first to articulate “being, thought, and communication” as the complete parameters of linguistic activity.\textsuperscript{206} This may seem like a small deal, as the trio is somewhat ubiquitous in ancient

\textsuperscript{202} Here, again, I agree with Kerferd’s interpretation. See especially \textit{Sophistic Movement} 97-98.

\textsuperscript{203} True, as Wardy points out, we should be cautious, since the text “neither can preserve anything like Gorgias’ own words, nor even necessarily keeps intact the sequence of his reasoning” (\textit{Birth of Rhetoric} 15; here Wardy refers to the \textit{MXG}, but he is even more dubious about the Sextus version). But I agree with Gagarin that “despite their differences, in fact, both versions are stylistically similar” (“On the Not-Being” 39), and I take the similarity of general style in Sextus Empiricus and \textit{MXG} to suggest some consensus concerning the overall structure of the tract. My investigation deals with this general structure on which both versions agree.

\textsuperscript{204} \textit{The Great Sophists} 96.

\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Ibid.} 62.

\textsuperscript{206} Parmenides does introduce this language into his argument, and perhaps even suggests the formula’s exhaustive scope. According to Kerferd, Gorgias “was pulling apart and separating three things which Parmenides had identified in his fragment 8.34-36. On the traditional interpretation of Parmenides these lines read: ‘Thinking and the thought that it is are one and the same. For you will not find thinking without the being wherein it is expressed’”
philosophy and easily overlooked in contemporary rhetorical theory. But this is a watershed
moment of classical rhetorical theory that sets the agenda for Plato, St. Augustine and St.
Bonaventure, as I will show in the remaining chapters. Moreover, its effects are not confined to
the history of rhetoric, since many contemporary rhetoricians, philosophers, and communication
scholars have adapted similar schema in their musings about language as diverse as Kenneth
Burke,207 Richard McKeon,208 Jurgen Habermas,209 and Frank E.X. Dance.210

What is more, though the liberal arts had not been codified, Gorgias’ argument suggests a
correlation of each “realm of language” with a particular aspect of the nascent language arts or
*technai logon*. Of course, the overall form of the argument appears as a logical demonstration –
a grand *reductio ad absurdum*. But each segment focuses more on one art than another. For the
argument against “being” focuses on contradictions that occur in the employment of a single
word, *esti*, and its application to phenomena. This is true even if we accept the broadest
interpretation of Gorgias’ use of the term as discussing the actual existence of things. However,

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207 Burke identifies “words for the natural,” “words for the socio-political,” and “words about words,” as the three
realms of words that “should be broad enough to cover the world of everyday experience” to which he also adds
Press. 1970: 15-16.)

208 McKeon traces the shift in subject matter among the liberal arts from arts of being, to arts of thought, to arts of
communication in his “Philosophy of Communication and the Arts.” (*Selected Writings of Richard McKeon, Volume

209 According to Habermas, “language can be conceived as the medium of interrelating three worlds; for every
successful communicative action there exists a threefold relation between the utterance and (a) ‘the external world’
as the totality of existing states of affairs, (b) ‘our social world’ as the totality of all normatively regulated
interpersonal relations that count as legitimate in a given society, and (c) ‘a particular inner world’ (of the speaker)
as the totality of his intentional experiences.” These three worlds, along with language itself, constitute the four

210 Dance identifies three functions of communication, “The Linking Function,” through which the individual is
linked with the human social environment; “The Mentation Function,” through which the individual develops higher
mental processes; and “The Regulatory Function,” through which individuals regulate their own behavior and the
behavior of others (“Prolegomena to a Primitive Theory of Human Communication in Human Organizations.” *The
Southern Speech Communication Journal* 44 (1979): 233-243 (p. 238)).
Kerferd has persuasively argued that Gorgias is more interested with, perhaps only capable of interest in, the predicative use of the term. In either case, whether Gorgias is exploring the problem with saying “x is” or “x is y”, his problematization of esti occurs at the grammatical level and it is the grammatical ambivalence that allows the reductio against being to come off. The predicative application simply makes the grammatical issue explicit. In contrast, Gorgias’ exploration of the capacity to think true things occurs wholly on the level of contradictory propositions. In fact, according to the Sextus version of this section, as Johnstone points out, “Gorgias concludes each line of reasoning by saying that a proposition is ‘logical’ (kata logon, 77) or that it is ‘sound and logically follows’ (hygies kai sōzon akolouthian, 78).” The logic of the argument attempts to show that both true and false things can be thought, so that thought cannot be an indicator of truth. The final section, while also employing logical form, is overtly about the disconnect between verbal communication and the things and thoughts about which communication occurs. That the section has implications for classical rhetorical theory is largely assumed for obvious reasons. Thus Gorgias does not simply provide an argument that complicates the relationship between being, thought and communication – the complete

211 Kerferd explains how his own reflections on Gorgias build off of the work concerning the term esti of Kahn on Homer, G.E.L. Owen on Plato, and A.P.D. Mourelatos on Parmenides (Sophistic Movement 94-95). See also, Schiappa “Interpreting Gorgias’s “Being” for a review of literature and a conclusion on the same topic. Gagarin is “inclined to accept Schiappa’s conclusion that for Gorgias esti is intentionally “polysemous,” combining existential, copulative, and veridical senses of the verb” (“On the Not-Being” 38).

212 In commenting on this section, Johnstone notes that “The ‘logic’ of the argument, as it happens, is fallacious. Nonetheless, the ‘demonstration’ presents the form of a logical proof…” (Ibid. 104).

213 As if in summary, we see the whole of the argument replayed in the final section in which things provide thoughts that are not the things themselves and words produce other thoughts that are not the original thoughts themselves. “This suggests,” according to Kerferd, “a three stage analysis – the object itself together with its qualities, what we acquire from such an object, and the spoken words with which we attempt, but according to Gorgias inevitably fail, to pass on (knowledge of) such an object to someone else” (Sophistic Movement 98).

214 This is the only section where Gorgias mentions speech outright. This section of Sextus Empiricus (§82-86) is the only one in which Kennedy leaves the original Greek untranslated in the form of the term logos, which appears thirteen times (Older Sophists 46). Likewise, in his brief translation of MXG for the Philosophy & Rhetoric collection, John Poulakos only translates this third portion of the argument (“The Letter and the Spirit of the Text: Two Translations of Gorgias's On Non-being or On Nature (MXC). Philosophy & Rhetoric 30.1 (1997): 41-44).
realms that words can be about. He also provides a critical exploration of grammar, logic, and rhetoric – the complete arts of words, though perhaps not yet named as such. So the correlative implication of the double triad is an assumed connection between grammar and being, logic and thought, rhetoric and vocal communication. This correlation cannot be definitively proven from the primary text alone, especially given the pre-disciplinary status of the arts and the secondhand nature of the texts themselves, nor can more space be given to its defense at this time. But the plausibility of such a suggestion foreshadows the convention of the Latin trivium and places Gorgias at the forefront of a tradition in which pedagogues will come to overtly articulate such a correlation. For the time being, however, it is necessary only to have shown that On Not Being suggests an exhaustive tripartition within which the arts of language operate.

### 3.3.2 Logos and Psyche in the Encomium of Helen

If On Not Being problematizes logos on a metaphysical level, the Encomium of Helen continues to do so on an ethical level by arguing that speakers are responsible for the misdeeds of their hearers. However, the Encomium also offers solutions to these problems by demonstrating a perhaps nascent but nonetheless systematic understanding of both psyche and logos.

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216 Although less complex and varied than with On Not Being, there is still debate over exactly what Gorgias is trying to accomplish in the Encomium. As early as Isocrates’ own Encomium to Helen, Gorgias is charged with failing to meet the criteria of encomia in general, offering rather a defense or apologia of Helen. Again, for a good digest of the various interpretations, see John Poulakos (“Gorgias’ Encomium”). Poulakos indentifies two broad schools of interpretation: those who see the piece as a “model” for rhetorical education and those who see it as a “pretext” in which more complex matters, namely the nature and power of logos, are discussed analogically within the mythic references to Helen (3-4). Although I do not think that the two readings are exclusive, I mainly follow Poulakos and the “pretext” interpretation in the following analysis. However, it cannot be overlooked that in extolling the power of the logos and defending the art of rhetoric, Gorgias also indicates the potential for its misuse and indicts its abusers. For in defending Helen, he shifts the blame for wrongdoing to the one that persuaded her: “For speech constrained the soul, persuading it which it persuaded, both to believe the things said and to approve the things done. The persuader, like the constrainer, does the wrong, and the persuaded, like the constrained, in speech is wrongly charged” (§12). Unless otherwise stated, translations are from George Kennedy (‘Gorgias’ Encomium of
The key analysis in regards to Gorgias’ theory of human motivation remains Charles P. Segal’s “Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos.”

Segal observes Gorgias combining *terpsis* and *peitho*, pleasure and persuasion, in a theory of rhetorical aesthetics that highlights the motivational effect that words have on the soul. According to Segal, Gorgias outlines a two-fold emotional scheme in the *psyche* consisting of passive emotions like joy and pain and active emotions like fear and boldness. The scheme suggests a two-step process at the center of Gorgias’ rhetorical theory which starts at a proto-appetitive level and moves up to a proto-spirited level:

[Referring to §14] The grouping of both the passive and active effects enumerated at the beginning of the discussion of the *logos* (8) recurs as a kind of summary here at its end. *Terpsis* and *lype* are immediately paired by their proximity; *phobos* and *tharsos* go together as the two opposite forms of the active emotional state; and the description of the witchery of the *kake peitho* seems added as a summary of the final stage of the whole process…

Segal notes that Gorgias also describes a technique of rational persuasion. This is most obvious in the *Palamedes*, where Gorgias-as-Palamedes shuns the emotive employment of rhetoric for logical demonstrations; though Gorgias’ overall argument in the *Encomium* employs rational...
argument as well. This would seem to suggest a tripartite psychic division, but for some reason Segal divorces the aesthetic from the rational in his investigation of Gorgias’ psychology of rhetoric. The resulting analysis implies that the aesthetic and the rational are somewhat incompatible or at least distinct from one another, so that Gorgias’ multi-layered description of psychic movement and motivation in the Helen is taken to operate entirely on the aesthetic plane:

the emotive process of persuasion occurs through a series of aesthetic moods and impressions evoked by the work of art is especially important for Gorgias and is, in fact, the keystone of his rhetorical techne, for it implies that through the artistic elaboration of the logos as a form of poiesis a chain of emotional reactions will occur leading from the aesthetic terpsis to the final ananke of peitho.

But Gorgias gives us reason to believe that rational persuasion is an integral part of his overall theory and is to be combined with the aesthetic framework laid out in the Helen.

Primary in this regard is the fact that Gorgias opens by stating that his purpose is to free Helen “by introducing some reasoning [logismos] into my speech” (§2) and his structure follows suit. The Helen is literary in content, but logical in style; indeed, it is the Encomium that de Romilly refers to as “an impressive demonstration.”

His style is replete with triads and in
almost every case the triads distinguish separate categories. In fact, if Segal is correct in reading the *kake peitho* clause in §14 as a summary of the two stages of persuasion that precede it, it would be a unique instance in which Gorgias switches his balanced style from indicating a number of separate but related instances to one that summarizes the two preceding clauses by a third. In considering the various triads that Gorgias offers, I believe that it becomes fairly obvious that he maintains his schematic system even at §14 and incorporates an element of rational persuasion into his overall psychology of rhetoric.

In investigating the structure, we should begin by noting that Gorgias gives a couple of key indications that his speech is concerned with structure throughout; indications that are often lost in translation. The first word of the speech, translated variously as “what is becoming,” or “the glory,” or “the adornment,” is *kosmos*. While the various translations are all valid senses of the word, the underlying connection between these senses of the term is physical orderliness. Combined with Gorgias’ later discussion of speech [*logos*] effecting the arrangement [*taxis*] of the soul [*psyche*] (§14), it is difficult to ignore that Gorgias is discussing the relationship between structural parallels in both *logos* and *psyche*. What, then, does his speech tell us about these structures and what do these structures tell us about rhetoric?

In the beginning of the speech, Gorgias actually presents a pentad of objects and corresponding “cosmic” or “ordering” principles – city [*polis*], body [*soma*], soul [*psyche*],

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226 For some recognition of the importance of tripartite divisions in Gorgias’ organization, see Poulakos (“Gorgias’ *Encomium*” 16), Kirby (“Great Triangle” 13), and McComisky’s subtler discussion of *bia*, *eros*, and *logos* (*Gorgias* 41–42). See also notes 234 and 235 below.
227 Kennedy (“Gorgias’ *Encomium*” 50)
230 To be fair, Freeman, as well as Dillon and Gergel, bracket the original Greek *kosmos/cosmos* in their translations.
231 Freeman translates *taxis* as constitution (*Ancilla* 133) and Kennedy as condition (“Gorgias’ *Encomium*” 53).
action \textit{[pragma]}, and speech \textit{[logos]}, which are ordered by manpower \textit{[euandria]}, beauty \textit{[kallos]}, wisdom \textit{[sophia]}, virtue \textit{[arete]} and truth \textit{[aletheia]} respectively.\footnote{Κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῆι δὲ σοφία, πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγωι δὲ ἀλήθεια: τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων ἄκοσμια.} However, the pentad reduces to a triad in the following manner. First, “the city” does not play any role in the \textit{Helen} after being named first in the speech. This does not mean that the city is a throw-away reference, but rather indicates Gorgias’ position on a rather important question in rhetorical theory – the persuasion of the masses entails the same process as the persuasion of the individual. This position in born out in the association of the \textit{polis} with \textit{euandria}, which at its core means simply “a collection of good men.” Gorgias further supports the case in that the \textit{Helen} itself is about the abuse of persuasion towards a single individual in whose defense he oscillates between describing individual and mass persuasion without distinction.\footnote{See especially §15-17 and Segal’s discussion of that passage ("Gorgias and Psychology" 108): It is interesting to note in connection with the \textit{tarache} and \textit{ekplexis} of \textit{Helen} 15-16 the ease with which these emotional phenomena are applied both to collective groups (the army, 16) and separate individuals. The individual psyche seems to be discussed at the end of 15 and again in 17, while section 16 is concerned primarily with group phenomena. Similarly, while most of the section on the \textit{logos} is concerned with the individual psyche and the specific case of Helen (especially 8-10), section 13 speaks of the “contests of words in which one \textit{logos} persuaded and delighted a great mass (\textit{ochlos})”…} Thus, Gorgias implies that if the city is a collection of men, it is necessary for the successful rhetorician to know the motives that compel man in general, or any person specifically, in order to move both the individual and the city to action. The speech, then, is an exploration of those motives that persuade or compel the individual. This leads directly to the second reduction, for what Gorgias explores are the forces that act upon the \textit{psyche}. \textit{Psyche} and \textit{polis} are thus related as a part to a whole, or a microcosm to macrocosm, both of which represent the proper object of persuasion. The remaining triad of bodies, acts, and words house the forces under investigation;
suggesting that beauty, virtue, and truth – and their opposites – are the motivational forces with which Gorgias is concerned.\textsuperscript{234}

In the main body of the speech (§6-20), Gorgias indeed focuses on these forces as reasons for acquitting Helen of blame. In so doing, he superimposes another triad onto the ones already mentioned. He first introduces (§6) a divine triad of Fate [tyche], the gods [theos], and Necessity [anagke] whose collective will Helen is understandably unable to resist. Following the divine forces are the human forces of violence [bia], persuasion [peitho] and love [eros].\textsuperscript{235} Through the collective divine force, Gorgias introduces the idea that the weaker [esson] are blameless for succumbing to the power of the stronger [kreas].\textsuperscript{236} After acknowledging the divine as a possible motivation to action, Gorgias then attends to each human force in turn.

In discussing Helen as a possible victim of violence (§7), Gorgias is clear that she should be exonerated because someone else did the unjust deed, which she merely suffered.\textsuperscript{237} But the argument has further implications, especially in light of the weaker-stronger argument laid out just prior. While Gorgias expressly addresses those who suffer the violent physical actions of

\textsuperscript{234} Poulakos ("Gorgias’ Encomium") reaches a similar conclusion and sees the introduction as foreshadowing Gorgias’ intention to deal with these concepts:

In the case of the art of discourse, this means that what rhetoric can or cannot do depends on 1) the rhetor’s knowledge of the material he is working with, 2) his artistic ability to shape the material into an appealing (persuasive) form, and 3) his disposition to use it properly. This threefold conceptualization suggests that rhetoric can be approached three different ways and evaluated on the basis of three corresponding criteria: logically (truth), formally (beauty), and ethnically (goodness). Gorgias seems to allude to this tripartite approach at the beginning of his speech… (15).

\textsuperscript{235} I have admittedly taken a bit of grammatical license in rendering this list, since “words” [λόγοις] occupies the object of agency in the clause parallel to violence and love. Persuasion actually occupies the verbal portion of the clause: “by words persuaded [πεισθείσα]” parallel to “by violence constrained [ἁρπασθείσα]” and “by love overcome [ἁλούσα]” (my translations). This triad – bia, peitho, and eros – is what Kirby refers to as the “great triangle” of early Greek rhetoric. While Kirby briefly mentions that the three terms actually appear in the Helen, he oddly describes them as being “under the umbrella of Divine Will” and leaves it at that (“Great Triangle” 13). What my analysis suggests is that the great triangle that Kirby identifies is front and center for Gorgias as the motive forces inherent in the rhetorical act. See also McComisky’s analysis of these terms (Gorgias 41-42)

\textsuperscript{236} πέφυκε γὰρ οὐ τὸ κρεῖσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἥσσονος κωλύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥσσον ὑπὸ τοῦ κρεῖσσονος ἀρχεῖσθαι καὶ ἀγνωσθαι, καὶ τὸ μὲν κρεῖσσον ἑγεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἥσσον ἐπεσθαι.

\textsuperscript{237} ο μὲν γὰρ ἔδρασε δεινά, ἡ δὲ ἔπαθε
others, the subtler implication is that being forced or compelled to act by the immoral actions of another, stronger agent frees the weaker agent from blame. Thus, Gorgias’ first look at motivational forces under human control establishes a conceptual nexus between actions, agents, violence and virtue. In other words, he offers a prototypical exploration of what will later become Plato’s spirited element.

For reasons that should become clear shortly, I’ll next consider Gorgias look at erotic love as a motive towards action, which actually forms the fourth and final analysis of the speech (§15-19). The focus here is on the effect that seeing things has on the psyche. Strangely, Gorgias’ main example deals with how fearful sights can cause one to panic and act irrationally (§16-17), after which he discusses the pleasure that art can bring to the spectator (§18) and concludes that if a similar pleasure at the sight of Alexander’s body induced Helen to desire, she could not then be blamed for her actions (§19). Thus he argues that certain emotions induced from our senses are so overwhelming as to free the agent from blame for acting upon them. Similarly, then, Gorgias sets up a motivational correspondence between bodies, appearances, sensations, and emotions. Again, we see an early evaluation of a nascent appetitive element that motivates human action.

Following this trajectory, we would expect that Gorgias’ investigation into logos (§8-14) would identify some rational component that complements both the active, forceful, moral element of human motivation and its sensual, emotive counterpart. And sure enough, much of Gorgias analysis centers on speech’s ability to deceive opinion through persuasive arguments. In fact, despite Segal’s attempt to distinguish rational argumentation from Gorgias’ emotional motivational complex, Gorgias’ examination of the nature of false arguments [pseude logon] (§10-13) seems to be entirely about the types of (pseudo-)logical arguments offered by
intellectuals in rational enterprises. Emotive manipulation is conspicuously absent in this section, although it does take center stage in the previous discussion of how poetry can induce emotional states and vicarious experiences in an audience (§8-9).

But there is more. If we look closely, we see that Gorgias does an amazing thing in his discussion of *logos*, for he locates within its power the ability to wield all the characteristics of the other components of his motivational complex, both human and divine.\(^\text{238}\) He credits *logos* with having “the finest and most invisible body [*soma*]” through which it “effects the divinest works [*theiotata erga*]” (§8).\(^\text{239}\) He likens the poetic use of language to the emotive evocation that is appropriate to the senses and even grants to language the ability to allow the audience to experience various decrees of fate by hearing “of others in good fortunes [*eutychia*] and in evil fortunes” (§9).\(^\text{240}\) Gorgias then compares the power of argumentative persuasion to both physical violence [*bia*] and to the form, if not the force, of necessity [*anagke*]. He continues to relate argument, force and necessity together through the cognate verb constrain [*anagkazein*] (§12). *Logos*, it seems, has the power to replicate and impress upon the *psyche* each and every form of motivation there is.

However, there is an important omission in Gorgias’ analysis. Despite the use of terms like ‘pity,’ ‘fear,’ and later, ‘boldness,’ which Segal argues indicates the active emotional state that words can induce, there is no example of words actually moving one to action. There are no examples of rallying cries in battle or demagogues rousing the support of the masses or defendants pleading for mercy in the lawcourts. And yet this is exactly the charge that Gorgias

\(^{238}\) To be sure, Gorgias’ triads are by no means exclusive – action requires a body, love is perhaps a god, etc. But no other element under consideration so thoroughly exercises the characteristics of all the others as does speech.

\(^{239}\) ὃς σμικροτάτωι σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτωι θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ.

\(^{240}\) ἐπ᾽ ἄλλοτριόν τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίας καὶ δυσπραγίας ὑδίον τι πάθημα διά τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἢ ψυχῆ.
has taken up, to show that words can effect actions and thus that Helen is not to blame for hers. But his examples – audiences of poetry and debate – are notoriously passive. Few, if any, act after hearing a rhapsode or seeing a stage play or watching a debate or discussing things with a philosopher, etc. Again we have the riddle of the relationship between thought, emotion, and action.

When we examine closely what is present and what is missing, we see that words operate like divinities, like physical strength, like seductive experiences, like all other motive factors analyzed in the speech – but Gorgias does not present us with any unique characteristic of *logos*-qua-*logos*. Speech can take the form of any motivational force whatsoever and it can do this because it has a structure, a *kosmos*, that mirrors that of the soul; but when and how does speech act like, well, speech? I do not think that this is a mere oversight for Gorgias, but is rather intentional. Though he perhaps does not yet have the term for rhetoric, he knows that the art of persuasion lies between the emotive force of poetry and the intellectual constraints of logic, perhaps entailing and utilizing both at times. Yet in the *Helen*, I assume that he does not want to give the game away but rather is trying to pull others in. If the *Helen* is a display piece designed for public consumption, it is still designed to motivate students to study with Gorgias.

In a sense – in what is not expressed in the speech, in the hidden conclusion of the enthymeme, if you will – Gorgias is saying “if you want to simply make people feel, become a poet; if you want to make them think, become a philosopher; but if you want to move them to action, come with me and I’ll show you how…just not now.” But if we look at the conceptual clusters that are overtly discussed within the analysis of speech alone, what is absent will perhaps

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241 According to Poulakos, Gorgias in the *Helen* “is content to have participated in the game of words, to have demonstrated to his audience that he is a splendid player, and to have tried to bring them into the game” (*Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece*. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1995. 67).
indicate some of what Gorgias has in mind that is specific to rhetorical activity. For, we see poetry on one side of the language arts spectrum, which is associated both with the fickleness of human emotion as well as with fickle Fate herself. On the other side is logic, which takes the form of Necessity and constrains by violent force. What is omitted, in addition to rhetoric itself and the impetus to action, is the will of the gods. In joining the concepts together, we see that such a will is more deliberate than Fate, yet freer than Necessity. Rhetoric, then, is neither random nor bound, but somewhere in the middle. The rhetorician cannot simply respond to things as a brute to stimuli or a wanton to desire, but neither can the cold calculus of abstract thought always be a credible guide. Yet the rhetorician should remain attuned to the nature of things and to considerations of truth so much as is possible and adapt accordingly. As such, when what is omitted is compared to what is present, there is an indication that the goal of rhetoric is to move the soul of another to action; and it achieves this goal neither through seduction nor force alone, but through evaluation of circumstance, strategic self-reflection and willful execution. In other words, the rhetorician factors both what is and what is thought in to what will be communicated.

With the above framework in mind, it seems that Gorgias offers subtle hints in the Helen that speak to the metaphysical concerns he raises in On Not Being. While still maintaining that a gap exists between what is said, what is thought, and what is, Gorgias introduces a rhetorical concept that can bridge that gap, at least for practical purposes. Between the certainty of truth and necessity and the insecurity of false arguments and slippery opinions, Gorgias himself offers arguments of probability, of likelihood [eikos] (§5). Similarly, between a thing

242 Gorgias appears to assert a fairly objective ontology in the Helen, stating frankly that “things we see do not have the nature which we wish them to have, but the nature which each actually has” [-addon orótemen, eixi phosin oux hyn hmeis thelomen, allan hyn ekaston authen] (§15).
itself and the perception of it in the mind, Gorgias offers an image in words, a likeness [eikon] (§17). While neither the truth of thought nor the essence of things, Gorgias employs the doctrine of eikos that governs both likelihoods and likenesses not just because it is rhetorically effective, but because it is the best representative of being and thought that language provides.243 As such, Gorgias ties communication to thoughts and things in a sincere relationship that recognizes its own limitations while striving for practical verisimilitude.244

The employment of eikos in this manner points to Gorgias’ solution for the ethical problems he raises as well. For, in showing regard for both thought and things, he acknowledges that the power of logos is mighty while chastising those who would abuse that power. His aim is to shift blame to the persuader of Helen, after all. But in achieving this shift there is again another subtle indication of the solution to the ethical problem rooted in the famous claim of the Sophists to make the weaker case the stronger.245 For, as we pointed out earlier, blame is shifted from Helen because it is natural for the weaker to succumb to the stronger. This principle holds true for humans succumbing to the might of the gods, for the physically weak succumbing to the strength of their physical superiors, for a typical audience being influenced by a talented poet or a deceptive debater, and for the sensual animal whose rational capacities fail when confronted with strong visions of terror and beauty. But there are arts that exist that can mitigate the

243 The Palamedes further supports this relationship between truth and probability.
244 In many ways this conclusion is similar to Rosenmeyer’s famous analysis in “Gorgias, Aeschylus and Apate” (American Journal of Philology 76.3 (1955): 225-260). However, as Rosenmeyer interprets apate, or deception, as somewhat freeing language from the constraints of material reality, I read Gorgias’ use of eikos as acknowledging some degree of limitation imposed by the true and the real. I believe that the difference is more a matter of degree than one of contradiction, though perhaps others would disagree.
245 This, itself, is a claim of questionable ethical quality mocked by Aristophanes in the Clouds by the embodied contest between Just Speech [Δίκαιος Λόγος] and Unjust Speech [Ἄδικος Λόγος] (961-1104). The claim is actually part of the charges that lead to Socrates condemnation and execution according to the Apology [καὶ τὸν ἥπτο λόγον κρείττο ποιῶν] (19b-c). Socrates associates these charges with Aristophanes’ caricature of him in the Clouds (19c).
differential in relative strength.\textsuperscript{246} Just like martial arts can give a smaller opponent advantages over a larger one,\textsuperscript{247} the language arts [technai logon] can provide a defense against those who are naturally gifted in the use of deception and manipulation. These arts may be “unnatural” or “unconventional” in that they reverse the primitive laws of dominance; but in the framework thus described, the claim to make the weaker the stronger is actually an ethical imperative, not a mere advertising ploy aimed at the self-serving.\textsuperscript{248}

In his linguistic and psychic schemes, in his observations of metaphysical and ethical dilemmas, and in his practical and prudent solutions, Gorgias is not so far from Plato as contemporary scholars would have us believe. Rather Gorgias falls in line with the tradition we have laid out. He sees a similar kosmos running through speech and soul and indicates how the one can operate on the other by exposing the complexity of that shared, tripartite structure. Indeed, his brief exposition on the relationship between logos and psyche foreshadows Plato’s own call in the Phaedrus to correlate the one with the other. And his ethical employment of eikos and the weaker/stronger dichotomy also previews Plato’s own idiosyncratic usage of these doctrines, as will be shown in the next chapter. Thus, the potential influence of Gorgias’ theorizing on Plato cannot simply be dismissed by invoking the contention to rhetoric that Plato displays in the Gorgias. Whatever Plato’s problem with Sophistic rhetoric, it was not a disagreement that words could mirror, motivate, or even restructure the soul. In many ways, Gorgias is the first to overtly articulate and systematize the various latent threads that have been pointed out in the likes of Homer and Heraclitus; threads that Plato will interweave in his

\textsuperscript{246} Just like the integrated ordering of society can help mitigate the consequences of discord.
\textsuperscript{247} Remember Odysseus’ stalemate with Ajax. See n.139.
\textsuperscript{248} Aristotle would later use the same analogy between rhetoric and physical self-defense to justify rhetorical training (Rhetoric 1355\textsuperscript{b}38-1355\textsuperscript{b}3). But Plato would famously raise the question whether blame could be shifted further – from persuaded, to persuader, to teachers of persuasion (Gorg. 456c-457c; 460a-461b).
definition of rhetoric as a kind of *psychagogia*. The final thread, however, the history of the term itself, remains to be retraced.

### 3.4 THE TERM PSYCHAGOGIA

The development of the term “*psychagogia*” has been recounted many times in a number of works over the last half a century.²⁴⁹ Rehearsing this history underscores the innovation, ambiguity, and playfulness with which Plato likely employed the term. In brief, the term is a compound of *psyche* (soul) and *agein* (to lead) meaning, literally, “soul-leading.” Elizabeth Asmis gives the most succinct account of its early meanings: “The earliest attested meaning of the compound *psychagog-* is that of ‘conjuring’ or ‘evoking’ souls of the dead. From this use, there evolved the notion of influencing the souls of living people, with the connotation of ‘alluring’ or ‘beguiling’ them.”²⁵⁰ The necromantic meaning of the compound is found in Aeschylus’ *Persians* (687) written in 472 and Euripides’ *Alcestis* (1128) written in 438.²⁵¹ It also “was probably the meaning of the word in Aeschylus’ play called Ὀμηροί.”²⁵²

By the fourth century, the verbal cognate *psychagogein* had transitioned from the magical to the technical among the intelligentsia of ancient Athens. In this context the term indicated the process by which works of material and poetic art enchanted, allured, or even deluded the soul. For instance, Isocrates employs the term in *To Nicocles* (§49) to describe the desire of speakers

²⁵⁰ “Psychagogia” 155-6.
²⁵¹ Both using the word ψυχαγωγός
to “demand the attention of their hearers” and again in the Evagoras (§11) to portray the ability of poets to “bewitch their listeners.”\(^{253}\) In Xenophon’s Memoriabilia (3.10.6), Socrates uses the term to describe the charming effect that fine sculpting has on a spectator. Outside of the Phaedrus, Plato uses the term in the Timeaeus (71a) to indicate the effect that images have on the lowest part of the soul. He also uses it twice in the Laws, employing both meanings in the same passage (909b), when the Athenian warns against those who beguile the living with claims of being able to raise the dead. Finally, Aristotle employs the term in his Poetics (1450a33) in discussing the positive emotional effects of plot reversals and discoveries on the audience.

This shift in connotation suggests that the term transitioned in meaning sometime between Euripides and Plato. That Xenophon, Isocrates, and Plato all use the term in similar reference to the influence of art on the soul and that Xenophon and Plato both attribute the term to Socrates suggests that he was perhaps responsible for the term's new meaning, or at least made use of it. Indeed, the only transitional use in the extant literature is a play on the word employed by Aristophanes in his Birds (1555), when the chorus of birds in “flight” over Athens describe seeing Socrates “evoking spirits” [psychagogei] among the Shadowfeet. Either this is a pun on well-known Socratic terminology or the passage itself provides the source for the shift. In any case, Socrates’ former pupils seem comfortable employing the term in a relatively uniform technical sense.

However, the case of Plato’s use is not so simple. While Xenophon, Isocrates, and Aristotle employ the term in the new mundane sense seemingly abstracted from its magical roots, Plato continues to play with its ambiguous meaning. Indeed, the fact that in the Laws he

employs both distinct senses demonstrates that the term still carried both meanings depending on context.\textsuperscript{254} However, in the \textit{Phaedrus}, even the context is ambiguous. Socrates had just finished his famous second speech, which draws an allegorical picture of a fallen soul attempting to make its way back up to the heavens, when he turns from rhetorical action to talk of rhetorical theory. There is a sense, then, in which “leading the soul” means more than just “aesthetically effecting the emotional state of the audience” and actually means, or at least also implies, guiding a lost soul to a specific, desired destination.

Perhaps Aristophanes can shine further light on Plato's ambiguous use of \textit{psychagogia} if we consider another of his Socratic references. I refer not to the lampoon of Socrates in the \textit{Clouds}, but rather to his mention of Socrates in the \textit{Frogs} (1491-99). In this passage, Aristophanes mocks Socrates’ method of discourse as chatter that disregards the importance of the art \textit{[techne]} of tragedy while wasting the time \textit{[diatribein]} of its practitioners.\textsuperscript{255} But the \textit{Frogs}’ plot is a comic psychagogic adventure in which Dionysus undertakes a \textit{katabasis}, a descent into the underworld, in order to retrieve the soul of Euripides for his own pleasure; only to realize that it is the works and words of Aeschylus that would better serve both his needs and the needs of the polis. The psychagogic force here is double, since Dionysus leads the soul of Aeschylus from the underworld in order that Aeschylus may in turn affect the souls that inhabit the polis through his words. In a similar manner, Plato retrieves the soul of Socrates in his dialogues in order that Socrates might continue to perfect the souls of those whom he engages in conversation. Ironically, though, in so resurrecting Socrates as a literary figure engaged in

\textsuperscript{254} And as de Romilly notes, “This meaning [raising the soul from the dead] has never disappeared; it recurs, for instance, in Plato’s \textit{Laws} (909b), in Plutarch’s \textit{De Sera Numinis Vindicta} (560f), and in Lucian (\textit{Dialogi Deorum 7,224.1})” \textit{(Magic and Rhetoric} 15).

\textsuperscript{255} Note the similarity in both sentiment and vocabulary between Aristophanes’ charge against Socrates’ practice of dialectic and Socrates’ charge against Gorgias’ rhetoric in Plato’s \textit{Gorgias}. Socrates denies that rhetoric is an art \textit{[téchnη]} and instead calls it a “knack” \textit{[tριβή]; a closely related cognate term to the verb διατρίβειν}. Both text and translation come from the Loeb edition edited and translated by Jeffrey Henderson (2002).
dramatic dialogue, Plato both acknowledges and answers Aristophanes’ critique of Socratic dialectic. As if conceding to Aristophanes the cultural power of dramatic form, Plato executes the comedian’s plan of cultural reform by partaking in his own *katabasis* with the similar intent of having the words of a resurrected Socrates effect the souls of the living. This of course means that both Aristophanes and Plato engage in the very double-edged psychagogic act for which Socrates is made fun of in the *Birds*.\textsuperscript{256}

That Plato had something like this in mind when he defines rhetoric as *psychagogia* can be supported by his other descriptions of the activity and significance of “leading.” For as Jessica Moss argues, Plato’s other uses of the *psychagog*-compound are not as indicative of his employment of the term in the *Phaedrus* as are those of his other “guidance” compounds in the *Republic*. In fact in the *Republic*, these terms seem to indicate the very activity he is advocating for rhetoric by calling it a kind of *psychagogia*: “The *Republic* allegorizes such attempts at conversion in its story of the philosopher who goes back down into the cave and tries to ‘lead up’ (ἀνάγειν, 517a5) the other prisoners into the light. Socrates then declares that the aim of education is the literal analogue of such leading-up, namely ‘leading around’” or *periagoge* (518d).\textsuperscript{257} But, Moss argues, the realistic circumstances of Athens do not admit the possibility of the idealist education laid out by Socrates in the *Republic*. Rather, it is the *Symposium* that opens the way for rhetoric as the practical art of soul-leading: “The *Republic* asks what could lead souls toward the Forms; the *Symposium* proposes a method sweeter than the laborious education

\textsuperscript{256} Well, technically, not the very same, since Socrates in the *Birds* is caricatured as partaking in a *nekyia* in which he is calling souls up to him; whereas in the *Frogs*, Dionysus is undertaking a *katabasis* in which he is descending into the underworld to retrieve a soul.

\textsuperscript{257} “Soul-Leading” 4.
described in the *Republic*, and not dependent on the political structure of the state. A wise leader can use her disciple’s erotic desire for beauty as a tool by which to lead him to philosophy.”

For Plato’s Socrates the art of soul-guidance consists of a descent into the darkness in order to turn souls around from their delusions and lead them up to the light of truth and wisdom. Philosophy cannot be that method of turning the soul around, for it is that practice towards which we are want to turn. What is needed is a certain kind of *psychagogia* that can function in both its historical and contemporary forms simultaneously. The later meanings of the term are about moving the soul in the metaphorical sense of stirring the emotions, which is necessary but not sufficient for the task at hand. The former sense is about actual movement – a journey into the darkest depths and back up again to the light. Though they never used the term, the examples I have considered almost all employ this journeying: Priam’s descent to the camp of Achilles to retrieve the body of Hector; Heraclitus descent into his own soul to retrieve his own self; Dionysus descent into Hades to retrieve a great tragedian. The only outlier is Gorgias, who affirms the almost magical influence of words on the soul, but does not employ the image of danger or descent. In this way, he is closer to Isocrates and Aristotle than to Plato. This, I believe, is the largest divide between Sophistic and Platonic rhetoric. For the Sophist, rhetoric was a means for defense from attack and success in the polis. Teachers guaranteed such success, as even Aristotle boasted that with rhetorical skill one could come as close to victory as was

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258 *Ibid.* 6. While I agree with Moss’ conclusion that rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* is an art of loving soul-guidance that achieves the sort of “turning-around” indicated in the *Republic*, I think that she takes more steps than are necessary to reach that conclusion. While she claims that the rhetoric of the *Phaedrus* is the practical equivalent to the education of the *Republic*; I believe that rhetoric, not “education” is implied at the very point in the *Republic* when Socrates talks about the art of turning the soul around. For Socrates speaks of the capacity to learn being innate in us, though the instrument by which we learn is turned the wrong direction (517c). If this is the case, education cannot be the art by which we turn around, but the aim for which we want to turn around – we want to calibrate the instrument by which we learn so that we can learn. The art of turning around must be something different. Cf. Kolbet’s history of psychagogogy for a similar account of the cave narrative as implying the use of rhetoric for “conversion” (*Augustine* 35).

259 Not surprisingly, I owe this observation to Herrero de Jáuregui’s analysis in “Priam's Catabasis.”
possible in a given situation. However for Plato, Priam, and the others, rhetoric involved the risk of descent – into the camp of the enemy or the psyche of another – and such descent not only lacked a guarantee of success, but carried with it the very risk of self. 260

In this chapter I have traced the major historical threads that suggest the foundation of Platonic psychagogia. I have argued that rather than a collection of random attributes scattered throughout ancient literature, there appears an identifiable trajectory of thought prior to Plato focused on the effect that speech has on souls. Along this trajectory, I have demonstrated that a coherent picture develops that sees soul, language, and the universe of being as structurally analogous along amazingly consistent tripartite lines. Aside from the structural similarities, each thinker has highlighted some aspect or another of psychagogic rhetoric that has aided the development of the tradition as Plato would have received it. In Homer, we find the idea that the rhetorical situation is brought into being by an exigence of fragmentation within this structure – in either the individual or the community – which is best addressed by a speaker and message of integrity. Heraclitus assigns names for these basic units of psychagogia that have persevered to the present day. Moreover, he suggests not only that the structures of psyche, logos, and kosmos are analogous, but that through a contemplative journeying along the logos of our psyche we can come to know the Cosmic Logos. Gorgias comes the closest to a technical account of the structure of both psyche and logos. He suggests a logos that runs along being, thought, and speech; and a psyche consisting of emotion, reason, and a drive to action. Though somewhat abstracted from the technical, structural tradition, Aristophanes provides the technical term – if only in jest – for the rhetorical activity of leading a soul on a journey through words, psychagogia; and even demonstrates this phenomena in action.

260 Note that Nestor seems to assure the success of the Embassy to Achilles (Iliad 9.162-175), while Priam was warned of the imminent failure of his plea and his ultimate demise (24.206-208).
In the next chapter, I investigate how Plato appropriates this foundation and builds a robust model of *psyche* and *logos* upon it. I argue that in constructing these models, Plato literally drafts a map of human motivation that guides readers on their own contemplative journey. However, far from being a call to the ascetic, contemplative life, once this journey is undertaken these psychic voyagers are called to actively lead the souls of others through their rhetorical activity – they are called to be *psychagogues*. 
4.0 PSYCHAGOGIC RHETORIC IN THE PLATONIC CORPUS

According to Socrates in the Phaedrus any would-be rhetorician must have intimate and exact knowledge of the nature of the soul: its make-up, its actions, and its natural responses. In addition, the rhetorician should be able to classify and coordinate the various types of soul with the appropriate type of speech (271a-b). Such knowledge should enable the rhetorician to explain how each soul is persuaded (or not) and why (or why not):

Since the nature [dynamis] of speech [logou] is in fact to direct the soul [psychogia], whoever intends to be a rhetorician must know how many kinds [eide] of soul [psyche] there are. Their number is so-and-so many; each is of such-and-such sort; hence some people have such-and-such a character and others have such-and-such. Those distinctions established, there are, in turn, so-and-so many kinds [eide] of speech [logon], each of such-and-such a sort. People of such-and-such a character are easy to persuade [eupeitheis] by speeches of such-and-such a sort in connection with such-and-such an issue for this particular reason, while people of such-and-such another sort are difficult to persuade [duspeitheis] for those particular reasons. (271c-d)
 Accordingly, it would be only natural to find extended studies of Platonic psychology among the myriad of works that explore Plato’s rhetorical thought. Amazingly, however, no such study of Platonic psychology vis-à-vis rhetoric seems to exist.

This is not to say that the disciplinary literature is completely absent of references to Plato’s psychological theories as they appear in the *Phaedrus*. Indeed, such references abound. But the abundance is largely a mirage. As I indicated in the Introduction, many scholars cite the psychological criteria that Plato establishes in the *Phaedrus* only to argue that such criteria makes for an incomplete theory, or is impossibly idealistic, or is morally repugnant, or is in some other way insufficient.261 Those rhetorical theorists who treat Platonic psychology as worthy of positive investigation are relatively small in number and nothing like a systematic rendering of Plato’s rhetorical psychology is attempted by them.

Perhaps the earliest investigation into the impact of Plato’s psychological thought on his rhetorical theory is offered in 1978 by David S. Kaufer in “The Influence of Plato’s Developing Psychology on His Views of Rhetoric.”262 I highly agree with Kaufer’s basic assumptions, 1) that “there is a systematic connection between rhetoric and psychology in the Dialogues, and it comes to this: Plato knew there was a way of using words to affect the soul for good or evil and, as he saw it, one of the tasks of psychology was to explain the moral difference between the two”; and 2) “In Plato's thinking, psychology must account for the power (*dynamis*) that underlies morally correct actions. The true art of rhetoric, in turn, is the procedure which

261 See Introduction n.4. For instance, Kennedy argues that “Plato's account of rhetorical psychology is rather unsatisfactory, for it seems basically a matter of using *ad hominem* arguments and is reminiscent of the so-called ‘noble lie’ of the *Republic* (414b7), where a hearer of inferior intelligence is brainwashed into acceptance of the truth by an omniscient philosopher-orator” (*Art of Persuasion* 79)
successfully transfers this power from one mind to another through language.” However, Kaufer stumbles in his attempt to construct Plato’s model of rhetorical psychology. For, although he sees a great deal of significance in the tripartition of the soul in the Republic, he quickly reduces the soul’s complexity into a dualistic model of psychic confrontation between the rational and irrational. As such, all that is “irrational” about the spirited part is lumped together with the appetites, while its positive psychic duties – like policing immoral behavior – are attributed to reason. Granted, Kaufer is operating in an interpretative tradition that sees Plato’s psychology as unnecessarily complex in its representation and so argues for a cleaner split between the rational and irrational part. Under this psychological model, rhetoric becomes the ability of reason to manipulate the unreasoning parts of the soul and for the rhetor to manipulate unreasoning audiences. I do not think that such conclusions regarding Plato’s rhetorical theory are necessarily false – just necessarily incomplete and so much cruder than what is possible given the materials provided. What I demonstrate in this chapter is that engaging the tripartite soul on its own, complete terms offers a more fruitful reading of Plato for

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263 Ibid. 64.
264 Kaufer goes so far in his redistribution as to label the horses in the Phaedrus’ charioteer myth of the soul as allegories for the driver’s own rational and irrational powers. Thus, the driver, who is usually taken to represent an individual’s reason, is split into lower rational and irrational parts; and the “good” horse, who acts much like the spirited element in that it “restrains, resists and checks” the baseness of the irrational drives, becomes the reason of reason (73). Johnstone makes a similar, though less radical reduction: “In the Phaedrus, as the myth unfolds, the soul is likened (246a-b, 253 c-e) to a union among charioteer (Reason, which steers the soul) and two winged horses (our bodily element), one representing the noble passions (such as the love of honor, temperance, and decency) and the other symbolizing such base appetites as wantonness, avarice, and gluttony (also see Rep. 4.439d-41a)” (Listening 170).
265 Kaufer explicitly rejects the tripartite model in favor of a bipartite one at 70n.18. At this point he becomes the first rhetorician to cite Jon Moline’s theretofore unpublished work on the complexity of the soul (see n.271 below), which provides probably the most complete account of Plato’s psychology in terms of intrapersonal communication. Unfortunately, Kauffer quickly dismisses Moline’s interpretation in favor of the reductive conflict model of psychological motivation offered by Terence M. Penner (“Thought and Desire in Plato.” Plato. Ed. Gregory Vlastos. Vol. II. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1971. 96-118), which is itself a classic account of the reductive model. The reduction itself goes back at least as far as Plotinus and is indicated in Cicero.
266 I do think that reading the psychological model as a binary as opposed to a triad is necessarily false. But the conclusion that rhetoric enables reason to influence the “irrational” parts, and by extension enables the wise rhetor to manipulate less wise audiences is certainly true – just incomplete. Such a conclusion on its own especially lacks the explanatory power to describe just how the rhetor is so enabled.
the historian of rhetoric and suggests a more important role for rhetoric in Platonic theory than is usually thought.

More recently, Yunis’ 1996 study of rhetoric and democracy in ancient Greece focuses a good deal on the prominence that psychological theorizing has in Plato’s rhetorical theory, that is, as it is presented in the Phaedrus. However, Yunis sees this theory as a marked development from the Republic. In large part this is due to the overwhelming disciplinary tendency to view the Republic as a political text rather than a text about constitutions in general and psychic constitutions in particular. This orientation leads Yunis to treat the soul-parts as representative as soul-types. In so doing, he sees his interpretative options for locating rhetoric in the Republic as between analyzing the interplay amongst philosophers (which he disregards) and analyzing “the discourse between the (relatively small) class of philosopher-kings and the (relatively large) class of producers.”

This line of analysis leads to the conclusion that “In the Republic political discourse is transformed into the imperative discourse of king to subject or master to slave;” whereas “the psychology of the Phaedrus provides the political expert with the necessary scientific framework to break down the recalcitrance of the masses, communicate with them as sentient, autonomous, though ignorant beings, and thereby improve them through instructive, persuasive discourse.” Yunis is discussing Plato’s call to know the nature and types of the soul. However, as he points out, this “scientific framework” appears in the Phaedrus in the various myths contained in Socrates’ second speech – the charioteer and the horses.

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267 Taming Democracy 161.
268 Ibid. 172.
indicating the nature of the soul (246a) and the nine-fold hierarchy implying the myriad of soul-types (248c-e).270

If we read the metaphors at the appropriate level, we see that the structure of the chariot team in the Phaedrus mirrors the structure of the city in the Republic. Thus, the question to ask in order to assess whether the rhetorical psychology is consistent or evolved, is whether the charioteer treats the subordinate horses in the same way that the philosopher-king treats the lower classes. The answer is yes, the charioteer commands the horses.271 Not much can be assessed by the fact that Socrates treats Phaedrus differently than the philosopher-king treats his subordinates. We are called, not to be like the philosopher-king per se,272 but to be like the Aristocratic City. A fuller assessment of the Republic along these lines shows that Socrates treats Phaedrus much like an Aristocrat would treat a Democrat. That is to say, that the scientific framework that the Phaedrus intimates is developed more fully in the Republic, not less.273

270 Ibid. 202-204.
271 In technical terms, as Jon Moline has persuasively shown, the Republic demonstrates intra-personal interaction (“Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche.” Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie 60 (1978): 1-26.) This has become a popular interpretation in contemporary philosophical analysis that has recently been advanced by the likes of Christopher Bobonich (“Communication and Persuasion” in Plato's Utopia Recast, 242-247) and Daniel Werner (Myth and Philosophy in Plato's Phaedrus. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 59-77). However, the interpretation has yet to have any significant impact on rhetorical studies of Plato outside of the conclusions that Moline himself drew concerning how this interpretation affects notions of credibility in rhetorical activity (see Jon Moline. “Plato on Persuasion and Credibility.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 21.4 (1988): 260-278). This is somewhat ironic, seeing that Kaufer mentions having access to a prepublication of Moline but opts to take as his psychological model the reduction offered by Penner. See n.265 above.
272 I qualify here because the philosopher-king is often treated as a soul-type, or something close to it, which is complex (in that it seems to also have spirited and appetitive elements) and approximates the Aristocratic City itself. However, how the philosopher-king treats subordinates cannot be indicative of anything other than intrapersonal communication because neither the auxiliaries nor the productive classes clearly represent soul-types, but rather elements that only make sense as functioning members of the Aristocratic City.
273 In the current work, Yunis points towards contemporary research in communications studies concerned with attitude change as the “blossoming” of “Plato’s psychology of rhetoric” (Ibid. 206n.54). However, by rejecting the complex psychology of the Republic, Yunis is eventually led, almost ten years later, to the conclusion that “the vast systematic psychology of desire and discourse that [Plato] proposes has so far proved unachievable and seems likely to remain so” (“Eros in Plato” 120). Still, Yunis accurately assesses much of what the psychological correlation is supposed to achieve in his analysis of the Phaedrus and the Laws by asserting that for Plato, the philosophically-learned political rhetor approaches the auditor lovingly, not selfishly (Taming Democracy 189), in order to reshape their soul (194), so as to balance the auditor’s psychic elements. The result is a combination of goals beyond simple dialectical instruction: “the preamble addresses the will and the emotions as well as the understanding” (226; See
model presented in the Republic, then, offers the rhetorician little by way of example of rhetorical interaction, but much in modeling the very thing that Socrates asserts we need knowledge of – the structure and activity of the psyche. Thus, we need a reading of this model as it pertains to rhetorical activity, as well as a correlate reading of the logos.274 What follows is just such an assessment of the Platonic model of psychology in relationship to speech.

4.1 PLATO’S GRAMMA OF MOTIVES

In the ensuing analysis I loosely borrow Burkean, and to a lesser extent Weaverian, terminology for a couple of reasons. I do this neither to argue that Plato is a proto-Burkean, nor that Burke is a Neoplatonist.275 Rather, I want to underscore the degree to which Plato ponders questions and

also 201: “More is at stake than conviction and understanding; the rhētōr needs to affect the auditor’s will”). But this only appears to mimic the tripartite psychic structure, for as Yunis summarizes his findings he reduces the goals to a binary similar to Kaufer in asserting that Plato’s ideal rhetor “must address at once both the intelligence and the appetitive parts of the auditors’ souls” (236). Again, excising the spirited element has major consequences that can only lead to an incomplete understanding of Platonic rhetoric. However, I should note that another important aspect of Yunis’ analysis as pertains to the current study is his observation that the genre of the preamble in the Laws prefigures the Christian art of preaching as it would later be described and practiced by St. Augustine (212; 229-235). Ultimately, and with this I agree, Yunis sees the preambles as “Plato’s attempt to use articulate instructive discourse to communicate the divine directly to the ordinary citizen” (236).

274 G.R.F. Ferrari (Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 101-102), Andrea Nightingale (Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 143-144) and Werner (Myth and Philosophy 68-73) all offer readings in which the speeches in the Phaedrus address different elements of Phaedrus’ soul. Such readings, I believe, are on the right track, but also show some limitations that I wish to avoid. For in their own way they are very mechanistic and fragmented. If we are simply called to address each part of the soul individually, then we do know better than Nestor addressing Achilles with a disjointed delegation with each member speaking to a different part of his soul. Rather, I think Ferrari indicates the fuller truth when he notices that Socrates’ speech seems to appeal to the timocret (101; See also Moss (“Soul-Leading” 19-20) and Yunis (Taming 190) who both seem to identify the target of the speech as a democratic soul.). Ferrari oscillates between soul-type talk and soul-part talk, and Nightingale and Werner pick up only on the soul-part talk. If there is a real model that Plato is trying to exhibit here, I argue that it is not simply showing how different speeches can appeal to different parts of the soul; rather, Plato is demonstrating the subtle reformation of Phaedrus’ soul-type from oligarch, to timocret, to aristocret (or close). Each speech thus speaks to Phaedrus’ whole soul, not just a part. In the following analysis, I demonstrate how this can be so.

275 Whatever influence Plato might have had on Burke’s rhetorical thought, Burke admits that “Aristotle was probably the greatest schoolmaster that ever lived and ever will live. And I feel most at peace with myself when I am on his side” (“Colloquy” 64).
proffers answers in the Republic and elsewhere that are often more germane and contribute more productively to contemporary rhetorical theory than those comments overtly about rhetoric in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus.\textsuperscript{276} Additionally, the terms that Burke employs are commonplace in the discipline and, though abstracted from his original analysis, they often provide an efficient vocabulary for explaining concepts that would otherwise necessitate more detail.

As I mentioned above, the Republic is usually considered by contemporary rhetoricians – if it is considered at all – as a work dedicated to exploring issues in political philosophy. Read in this way, it is ostensibly an anti-democratic work and thus an anti-rhetorical work. But if we focus on the reason for the political allegory – the investigation into the concept of Justice – it is difficult to deny that Plato, too, is interested in the question: “What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?”\textsuperscript{277} For it turns out that in order to understand Justice, one must understand the motivations of the soul. Moreover, Socrates also employs the terminology of the language arts in order to guide this inquiry. Because the soul is difficult to examine, he suggests that those gathered should shift focus to some larger entity that is easier to observe but still mirrors the soul in structure – namely, the city:

The investigation we’re undertaking is not an easy one but requires keen eyesight. Therefore, since we aren’t clever people, we should adopt the method of investigation that we’d use if, lacking keen eyesight, we were told to read small letters [\textit{grammata}] from a distance and then noticed that the same letters [\textit{grammata}] existed elsewhere in a larger size and on a lager surface. We’d consider it a godsend, I think, to be allowed to

\textsuperscript{276} This shouldn’t be surprising, since in exhorting the rhetorician to obtain knowledge of the \textit{logos} and the \textit{psyche} in the Phaedrus – topics which Plato only treats briefly in that text but in detail elsewhere – the text itself is directing the reader to search elsewhere within the Platonic corpus.

What Socrates is after, then, is his own grammar of motives – an understanding of how to read the language of the soul. This is no mean metaphor either; for it is the same language that Socrates uses in the *Phaedrus* in contrasting Theuth’s invention of writing [grammata] (274d-275d) with the type of a discourse [logos] “that is written down [graphetai], with knowledge, in the soul [psyche] of the listener” (276a). In the *Republic*, observing the motives operating within a city provides the student with an “easy reader” with the text writ large. But the real goal is to read the fine print of the soul, and ultimately, to be able to rewrite its text through discourse. This is the sort of psychic grammar that the rhetorician must master. Read from this perspective, the tripartite soul of the *Republic* offers the rhetorician a grammar of the soul that is consonant with the chariot metaphor in the *Phaedrus*, but is vastly more detailed.

The model of the psyche as it appears in the *Republic* has been examined at some length in the previous chapters. But this is only half of what the rhetor needs according to Socrates. In order to complete our grammar-school training, we need a similar account of the logos. Accordingly, I now turn to the following questions: Is there a correlative model of the logos that appears in the Platonic corpus whose elements correspond to those of the soul? Does knowledge of the soul’s motivational structure give insight into the possible forms of speech? Does knowledge of such forms grant the rhetor the ability to affect the movements of the soul with

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278 γράφω is the root of γράμμα. Note also that Socrates has just called this sort of discourse [λόγος], somewhat oddly, a legitimate brother [ἀδελφός] of writing [γράμμα] (276a). It is difficult to imagine that, for the punning Plato, this is not a reference to the opening citation of the Delphic inscription [τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα] to “know thyself” (229e).

279 Granted, there are differences as well, but that is no reason to dismiss the similarities insofar as they are insightful.
technical precision? If Plato is earnest in the *Phaedrus*, then the answer to each of these questions should be ‘yes.’ As such, the first step, which is my focus in the next section, is to identify Plato’s model of the *logos*.

### 4.2 THE TRIPARTITE *LOGOS* IN PLATO

The discussion of the tripartite *logos* in the previous chapter offers a good place to start the inquiry. In the final analysis, the tripartition split along lines of communication, thought and being. If we turn to Plato’s *Theaetetus* we find a strikingly similar split. In the dialogue, Socrates and Theaetetus examine three possible definitions of *logos*: 280 1) *logos* as a verbal account, 2) *logos* as accounting for the whole through methodical reference to its elements, and 3) *logos* as account of a thing as different from all other things 281 (206c-210b). Now none of these definitions are found to be satisfactory in aiding Socrates and Theaetetus in their inquiry into the nature of knowledge. However, as an account of the *logos* itself, none of these definitions are ever rejected. And though the remarks concerning the *logos* can hardly be taken to be a sophisticated model of the concept, it is clear that the three definitions follow the basic pattern that we have traced up to this point. 282 Thus, in line with the tradition established in the

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280 Note, also, that this comes as the third examination of what knowledge is following sense perception and true opinion. That is to say, that the question of knowledge itself is divided into three parts: interaction with the world, personal opinion, and opinion with some sort of reason.

281 The example that Socrates gives of such a *logos* is an account of the sun as “the brightest of the bodies that move round the earth in the heavens” (*Thet.* 208d). In Aristotelian terms this turns out to be an essential definition – putting something in its proper genus and then differentiating it from things in that genus, which also sounds a lot like Socrates’ method of collection and division in the *Phaedrus* (265d-266b).

282 Kerferd might take some issue with this split, as he breaks the concept of *logos* up along slightly different lines: “The logos of a thing is (1) the principle or nature or distinguishing mark or constituent elements of the thing itself, it is (2) what we understand it to be, and it is (3) the correct (verbal) description, account or definition of a thing. All three raise the question of being. For the logos under heading (1) is what that thing is, under (2) what we understand
previous chapter, Plato appears to have considered within the *logos* itself a level of objective knowledge, a level of subjective valuation, and an intersubjective level wherein the *logos* is manifested in the world and made capable of being shared with others. At the very least these divisions provide a basis for a model of the *logos* which is capable of correlation with Plato’s model of the *psyche*. In the absence of a more detailed model, the task is to read each level of the *logos* across to its corresponding element in the *psyche* to see if informative correlations can indeed be constructed.

### 4.2.1 The Wise *Logos*

The search for the first correlate, wisdom in the *logos*, leads to familiar territory and in many ways summarizes how the contemporary discipline characterizes Platonic rhetoric. In the *Republic*, the particular virtue attributed to the deliberative class in the city, and later the rational element of the *psyche*, is wisdom – a sort of knowledge that exhibits itself through *euboulia*, ‘good judgment’ or ‘prudence’ (428a-b). However, it is clear that wisdom is not a knowledge that might “judge about any particular matter” such as the kind possessed by carpenters, metal smiths, farmers or the like, but knowledge “about the city as a whole and the maintenance of good relations, both internally and with other cities” (428c-d). Similarly, the individual is called wise “because of that small part of himself that rules in him…and has within it the knowledge of it to be, and under (3) it is what we say it to be” (100). Logos as verbal account and *logos* as essential definition show perfect agreement between the two schemes with the only discrepancy being between the second levels. On Plato’s second level, *logos* is the ability to account for a thing through some systematic reference to its elements. Kerferd seems to move this type of account to the first level and replaces it with a personal understanding of what a thing is. However, Socrates’ example is of a student learning to spell and having some mastery over the method, in which case the student can have true belief about having spelled a name correctly and is even able to offer an account about how he did it. However, that same student could just as easily spell another name incorrectly, and so we would not say that he had knowledge of names, just some command of the method of spelling (207d-208b). Such methods of accounting seem much more suited to Kerferd’s second level of individual understanding than they do to the actual being of a thing.
what is advantageous for each part and for the whole soul, which is the community of all three parts” (442c). Thus, Socrates describes two distinct aspects of wisdom: the sort of self-knowledge that is distinguished by knowing what is good for the part and the whole; and another that deals with external relations, or how one should interact with others.

This discussion of wisdom and the kind of knowledge that comprises it precisely echoes the discussion between Socrates and Phaedrus concerning truth and knowledge in relationship to rhetoric (Phdr. 259e-274b). Here, Socrates outlines two necessary types of knowledge that the rhetor must possess and the method that should be followed to acquire such knowledge. First, Socrates asserts that “he must not be mistaken about his subject; he must have a sharp eye for the class to which whatever he is about to discuss belongs” (263b-c). The art by which the rhetor achieves this knowledge is dialectic. The acquisition of which gives a peculiar ability to the rhetor, for by this art one not only acquires knowledge of their subject, but also allows their “speech to proceed clearly and consistently with itself” (265d). This is important because according to Socrates, “every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole” (264c). Through dialectical knowledge the rhetor obtains true understanding of the thing that the *logos* represents, which subsequently allows the parts and the whole to be ordered properly. Therefore, this knowledge manifests itself both in the ability to discuss the subject matter cogently and competently by providing exacting definitions and in-depth analysis, as well as the ability to structure the speech in a logical and appropriate manner. So if the *logos* is like a living creature, the aspect of wisdom that allows it to know itself both in whole and in part has been identified.
But what of the other aspect of wisdom, the relational knowledge that lends itself to external affairs? At 269d Phaedrus asks, “from what source could one acquire the art of the true rhetorician?” Socrates acknowledges that the study of rhetoric necessitates an understanding of the “nature of the soul” (270b-c) and throughout the conversation he lists the various types of knowledge that must be gained both about the nature of soul and the nature of speech – the component elements and types of both and the correlates between the two (271a-b). In other words, like the wise leader that knows how to maintain good relations with other cities, the wise logos maintains good relations with other souls. Hence, two forms of knowledge must be present for the logos to be a truly wise account: a dialectical knowledge of the subject being discussed and a knowledge of how it relates to the psyche. So a logos is considered wise when a rhetor can define terms, analyze concepts, order thoughts and words, and ultimately adapt this knowledge so as to move a given audience. For many, this is a complete account of Platonic rhetoric, the application of the dialectical method to mass psychology. While I believe that to be true in part, it is also so much more as the following correlations show.

4.2.2 The Courageous Logos

A relationship between the objective aspect of logos and the rational element of the soul is to be expected; but what of the spirited element and the subjective level of logos? This is, after all, the level at which Socrates proposes a methodological exposition of elements. Such a correlation would suggest a systematic, calculative dimension to the spirited element that might seem

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283 Socrates continually refers to the account given at this level in terms of a systematic “way” or “method” – e.g., διέξοδος at 207c, 208a and ὁδός at 208b. Though Plato employs ὁδός often, it is perhaps telling that Heraclitus uses the term in discussing the inability to find the limits of the soul (D. 45) and the identity of the upward and downward way (D. 60). For, I argue in this section that this is a level of self-reflection and moral method. In the next chapter I hold that by descending into the soul by this way, we gain the ability to raise it up. Cf. Johnstone Listening 179.
counterintuitive at first glance – especially given the commonplace characterization of spirit as a glory-hungry brute inside the soul poised to fight. However, closer analysis reveals that Plato often refers to spirit as possessing cognitive capacities that are necessary for an agent to develop in order to achieve and maintain wisdom. For that reason, it is worth demonstrating how in fact spirit does calculate on the Platonic model before addressing what such calculation implies about psychagogic rhetoric.

4.2.2.1 The Courage to be Wise

It is important to note that, at least in the first stage of educational development outlined in Books II and III of the Republic, the analogy is such that those being trained comprise the spirited part of the city, so that the education at this stage fosters the rational element indirectly through the spirited. Socrates is clear that such an order of education is not an arbitrary ideal but is indeed necessary given the nature of the elements of the soul. Shaping of the spirit must come before the training of reason because guardians and rulers are selected from the auxiliary class after testing and observing their retention of true opinions (412d-414b). They must not be persuaded against their true beliefs, nor by pain and suffering be compelled from them, nor by fears and pleasures change their minds. Though not yet named, such training and testing prefigures what is said about the spirited element along with its corresponding virtue of courage.

Christopher Gill develops this argument fully, identifying “the first stage of education as, essentially, the education of one of the emotional elements (the θυμοειδές), and the second stage as the education of the rational element (the λογιστικόν)” (“Plato and the Education of Character.” Archiv Für Geschichte Der Philosophie 67 (1985): 1-26. (p. 7)). The entire program is one in which “Plato clearly sees the first phase of education as a means of training the θυμοειδές to obey the principles reason lays down, and the second phase as a means of training the λογιστικόν to arrive at such principles by reasoned reflection” (18-19).
Courage is defined in the spirited element as “the power [dynamis] to preserve through everything its belief [doxa] about what things are to be feared, namely, that they are the things and kinds of things that the lawgiver declared to be such in the course of educating it” (429b-c). It is the virtue of a well-formed spirited element and a prerequisite for guardianship.

This preparatory function of developing spirit is underscored if we look at the passage directly after the definition of courage. Here we are presented with the metaphor in which Socrates compares the courageous with wool that has been properly dyed (429d-430b). The wool is related to the guardians in two ways, nature and upbringing (430a). Because of these factors, because it is pure and properly prepared, it is capable of taking a lasting dye – steadfast in color, resistant to the elements. Its opposite quickly loses its potency in color, becoming washed out and faded. These are, metaphorically speaking, some of the qualities that Socrates reveals as prerequisite for guardianship such as being a fast learner and having a good memory (486c-d). So, a well-trained, developed spirited element is at least a precondition for achieving wisdom in the rational part. But there is evidence that the rational element requires the development of the spirited element, not merely as a preparatory exercise, but as a condition that must be continually maintained. If this is true, then courage cannot be completely bereft of cognitive value, it cannot be an element that must be mastered and continually kept in check, but rather it is a true ally to the rational element which plays an important role in sustaining cognition.

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285 It is worth pointing out that the virtue of the spirited element of the human psyche, which I have identified as correlating with the subjective, self-reflexive aspect of the logos, is literally ‘manliness’ or ‘of a man.’ That is to say, it is a self-reflexive virtue that exhibits or underscores or amplifies the very nature of the thing that possesses it.
If we look back at the preparatory education, we see that Socrates is keen to describe the spirit as being trained not merely in order to accept the mastery of reason, but also in order to provide a balance to it, so that distinct connections are made between the spirited and the rational elements such that they appear counterparts. This connection is clearest when the pitfalls are articulated for those who cultivate either their spirited or their “philosophical” part of the soul but not both, resulting in “savagery and toughness” for the one and “softness and overcultivation” for the other (410b-412a). Ultimately in Book V, Socrates suggests that these two elements, in conjunction, “do the finest job of guarding the whole soul and body against external enemies – reason by planning, spirit by fighting, following its leader, and carrying out the leader’s decisions through its courage” (442b). In political terms, reason might occupy the legislative branch, but it is spirit that executes the orders. Such execution, especially in face of fears and temptations ‘in the field of battle’ would be impossible to imagine without at least some capacity for prudent calculation.

When Socrates picks up the question of curriculum for the guardians at Book VII (521c) we are reminded that our rulers are equally warriors. Analogously, this reminds us that we are continuing to educate both the spirited and the rational parts. As the subjects of the curriculum are laid out, each – prior to dialectic – are explained in their practical, warriorly applications before their theoretical benefits are expounded. This is true for calculation (522b-e, 525a-b), so that the guardian may be able to count the number of troops in his possession and in the possession of the enemy (522b-e), and so that he may keep his orderly ranks (522e, 525a-b). Here we should stress that Plato makes the study of numbers compulsory for the guardian as warrior “so that he is able to count and calculate” (525e).
Additionally, the discussion of geometry (526c-527c) allows the warrior to become adept at “setting up camp, occupying a region, concentrating troops, deploying them, or with regard to any of the formations an army adopts in battle or on the march” (526d). Granted, Socrates states that only a little geometry is necessary for these things, and allots the study of geometry far more important philosophical characteristics. But the point is that there is a clear and “not insignificant” (527c) warriorly use of geometry standing in contrast to its philosophical use.

Lastly comes the discussion of astronomy (527c-530d), which includes a digression into a discussion about “solid geometry” (528a-528e) and concludes with a brief exploration of astronomy’s counterpart, harmonics (530d-531d). Neither solid geometry nor harmonics mentions any warriorly application, but Glaucon praises the main topic, astronomy, in this regard since “better awareness of the seasons, months and years is no less appropriate for a general than for a farmer or navigator” (527d). We do see a diminishing warriorly application as the arts become more complex, but we see them nonetheless.

Only dialectics appears as a purely rational activity (531d-535a), and even then, the actual act of dialectical refutation has amazingly “courageous” undertones since:

Unless someone can distinguish in an account the form of the good from everything else, can survive all refutation, as if in battle, striving to judge things not in accordance with opinion but in accordance with being, and come through all this with his account still intact, you’ll say that he doesn’t know the good itself or any other good. (534b-c, emphasis added)
These may just be simple allusions that emphasize the rigorous nature of dialectical encounters, but they are fairly specific allusions, and one must wonder why Plato would want to use phrases that are particularly reminiscent of the spirited element in describing the most rational of activities if not to suggest that even in such activities the spirit strengthens our fortitude and helps to see us through to the end. Regardless, the relation of the spirited element to the rational in the art of dialectics notwithstanding, the remaining calculative arts appear to be connected as much with spirit as with rationality.

Therefore the power for practical calculation, at least in terms of achieving predetermined goals and maintaining established standards, is attributed to the spirited element by Plato. That is, of course, insofar as we take Plato’s insistence that “our guardian must be both a warrior and a philosopher” to indicate that the guardian must have developed and counterbalanced spirited and rational elements; and that in addressing the warriorly uses of a given subject, he is addressing the capacity of the spirit to make use of the subject, and in discussing the philosophical applications, he is discussing that of reason. This seems to be a logical assumption given how the metaphors have been built up and employed throughout the entirety of the text. Moreover, if this is not how they are employed, then the insistence on such a division is quite meaningless – or at most, it is a very weak division to insist upon.

4.2.2.2 The Mathematics of Morality

With the calculative capacity of spirit established, its importance to the rhetorical endeavor becomes evident once its virtue is properly taken into account. As I stated previously, spirit is the element that serves as both a psychic police and military force by regulating internal and external behavior. The distinctive virtue of the spirited element is courage [andrea], defined in the city as “the power [dynamis] to preserve through everything its belief [doxa] about what
things are to be feared” (429b-c), and identified in the soul “when it preserves through pains and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn’t” (442b-c). It is, perhaps, the most enigmatically defined virtue of the soul. But insight can be gained if we turn to the discussion of this virtue in other texts such as the Protagoras and the Laches.286

The Protagoras presents a discussion between Socrates and Protagoras concerning the teachability of virtue, in which Protagoras holds that courage is unique amongst virtue’s parts. The final digest of the argument (359a-360e) shows in great detail what Plato means when he has Socrates define courage in such a strange and abstract form. Here the section ends with Socrates asking, “So the wisdom about what is and is not to be feared is courage and is the opposite of this ignorance?” (360d). The previous discussion is a contrast of the actions exhibited by the courageous and the cowardly which shows that each acts in similar ways concerning their confidence and fear. What differs in their actions is that the coward is ignorant about what should be feared where the other is wise. For instance, where war is concerned, the cowardly fear death over loss of honor, where the courageous know that it is more fearful to be disgraced than it is to die. The result is that courage becomes the mathematics of morality.287

Just as the second level of logos in the Theaetetus is an itemized evaluation of a things component parts, it is in the spirited element of the psyche that morally evaluative judgments are made – judgments that weigh the value of given propositions and actions with mathematical precision. These evaluations calculate the relative worth of a thing based on subjective

286 Again, there are important differences in the account of courage given in these texts, but the similarities are also insightful as long as they don’t lead to contradictions. Indeed, as I show below, the differences can supply insight as well.
287 According to W. Thomas Schmid (“The Socratic Conception of Courage.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 2.2 (1985): 113-129) “Courage must be rooted in the intellectual perception of the true values, and it implies therefore ‘an understanding of the comparative moral worth of objects for which risks ought or ought not to be taken’ (118; citing Gregory Vlastos without further attribution). Schmid maintains that such intellectual grounding is true on the Platonic conception, but must also be balanced with notions of endurance and self-mastery.
standards, though Plato would hold that a true standard does actually exist. Hence, the cowardly and the courageous each use the same mathematical process to establish their confidence and fears, the difference being that the courageous use the correct standard of measurement.

Rhetorically speaking, the initial implication of coordinating the evaluative sense of the *logos* with the spirited element of the *psyche* is the evolution of the emotional appeal. We uncover a method by which one may evaluate both topic and audience and thus develop an appeal to morality that is reasoned and appropriate, rather than merely reliant on catalogues of emotive stimuli and responses. So that if personal wellbeing were that which is held as the highest good of a given target, the rhetor would be capable of showing the audience how a given position actually secures their wellbeing when the opposite might be supposed. Emotive arguments then become evaluative arguments, and so true allies of the rational aspect of both the *psyche* and the *logos*. Informed by the rational, the spirited element’s appropriation of dialectic is diagnostic. It results in the ability to show both the courageous and the cowardly where a given argument fits into their schema of confidence and fear, and so allows the courageous rhetor to craft emotional appeals to the *psyche* of a given audience based on their moral predispositions. In this way, spirited rhetoric works to establish and maintain the normative standards that reason dictates – in battle, as it were, but more in the sense of guerrilla warfare and psychic espionage than by blunt brute force. The spirit is the military tactician of the soul. How such adaptation is achieved will be more obvious in the next section when the different types of *psychai* are addressed. Nevertheless, the emotional aspect is not the only implication that Plato’s discussion of courage offers for the subjective level of the *logos*. 
4.2.2.3 The Spirit of Integrity

The *Laches* is also concerned with courage as a virtue, and in it Nicias offers up an almost identical definition as those found in the *Republic* and the *Protagoras*, that courage “is the knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful in war and in every other situation” (195a). Throughout the dialogue, the question of integrity is persistently raised, suggesting that integrity is a primary concern of courage and the courageous. Moreover, the discussion bears directly on rhetorical activity for the two main topics are the integrity between words [*logoi*] and deeds [*erga*] on the one hand,\(^{288}\) and thoughts and words on the other.

The dialogue features two accomplished generals, Laches and Nicias, discussing the preferred method of educating the young with Socrates and two older gentlemen. The first question pondered is whether young students should learn the art of fighting in armor. Nicias maintains that such learning is likely to lead to greater learning in military tactics. Laches argues that what is taught in theory by such teachers is largely inapplicable to practical situations. As the discussion turns to moral education, the question of courage arises. Laches has acted courageously and can point to empirical instances of what the courageous do. When pushed for a definition, he points to an active quality, defining courage as “a sort of endurance of the soul” [*karteria tis einai tes psyches*] (192B). Ultimately, he admits that though “I still think I know what courage is…I can’t understand how it has escaped me just now so that I can’t pin it down in words and say what it is” (194b). On the other hand, Nicias removes all tell-tale physical signs of courage and offers in their place a sophisticated theory rooted solely in one’s knowledge of fears and hopes. Though this seems promising, it eventually proves to be his downfall since he

\(^{288}\) For a detailed analysis of the *logos/ergon* distinction in the dialogue, see Robert G. Hoerber. “Plato’s *Laches.*” *Classical Philology* 63.2 (1968): 95-105. The following analysis of the contrast between Laches and Nicias is indebted to his article.
lacks any criteria with which to separate courage from wisdom and hence the whole of virtue. A like fate befell Protagoras in his dialogue.

Socrates underscores this dual nature of courage in the evolved statement offered in the Republic, and at the same time avoids the pitfalls of the two previous formulations.²⁸⁹ For in showing courage to be “the power to preserve through everything its belief about what things are to be feared” the intellectual object of courage shifts from knowledge to belief, while at the same time making it a quality of action rooted in theory. It is no longer knowledge of what is to be feared, but the power to preserve the belief about what is to be feared, a belief derived from reason but not equal to it. Such a spirit guards against incongruity between action and belief. Thus, Plato provides an ethical standard in the classical rhetorical sense. One’s actions must be in accord with one’s argument. To the degree that the two lack unity, the argument will be incoherent and the speaker will strain to defend it, as do both Laches and Nicias. A courageous rhetor must align theory and action in order to exhibit a persuasive, credible ethos.²⁹⁰ Laches makes an appeal to exactly this kind of congruity when he begins his discussion [logos] with Socrates (188c-189b). If the man with whom he is speaking exhibits this sort of harmony between words and deeds, if he is “worthy of the words he utters” (188c),²⁹¹ then he enjoys the discourse, if not, then he cannot stand it. Since he knows Socrates for his valor, he is ready to entertain his words.

More important for the rhetor still, and more prominent, is the plea offered by Lysimachus in the opening speech of the dialogue: “we think it especially important to be frank

²⁸⁹ Note that Socrates comes close to uniting the two at some point, refining Laches’ definition into a “prudent endurance” [φρονήσεως καρτερία] which is both “fine and good” [καλὴ κἀγαθὴ]. As Hoerber concludes, reason and spirit “must act in unison to produce true courage” (ibid. 101).
²⁹⁰ As we will see, this standard is more akin to St. Augustine than Aristotle in that it suggests that one’s actions must go beyond appearing to be in accord with their arguments; it must actually hold that the rhetor practices what is preached.
²⁹¹ ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὧν λέγει
[parresiazesthai] with you. Now there are some people who make fun of frankness and if anyone asks their advice, they don’t say what they think, but they make a shot at what the other man would like to hear and say something different from their own opinion” (178a-b). This call to be frank connects the dialogue in general, and the ethical consideration of the rhetor specifically, to the Gorgias. Here Socrates makes that same appeal to Callicles when he lists the three qualities that a fit interlocutor must possess: knowledge, good will, and frankness [parresia] (487a), which consequently prefigures both Aristotle’s own ethical principles and the three elements of the soul established in the Republic. Concerning frankness, Socrates tells us that Gorgias and Polus are deficient, not in wisdom or fondness, but are “rather lacking in frankness, and more ashamed than they should be. No wonder! They’ve come to such a depth of shame that, because they are ashamed, each of them dares to contradict himself, face to face with many people, and on topics of the greatest importance” (487a-b). In other words, above all else it is important for the rhetor to align what is said with what is thought. This not only includes a condemnation of malicious deceit, but also of incongruence due to humility or flattery.

In the Sophist the unity between speech and thought is most clearly connected to the ethical consideration of the speaker, albeit in a somewhat ironic way since logos is used as speech rather than theory, and so transplants ergon as the active element to the more theoretical ‘thought’ [dianoia] produced by the psyche. Here the Visitor asks, “Aren’t thought and speech the same, except that what we call thought is speech that occurs without the voice, inside the soul in conversation with itself?” (263e). The interlocutors are led on to see that false speech, and subsequently false belief, are produced when speech no longer represents the thought of the speaker, but is tainted by the external world and so becomes the appearance of reason, rather than representative of reason itself (264a-b). The courageous account then, denies the
temptations to deceive based on “pains, pleasures, desires, or fears” (*Rep.* 429d) and preserves through these temptations the beliefs derived from reason concerning what should truly be feared and hoped for.292

In short, explication of the virtue of courage provides an insightful correlation between the spirited element of the *psyche* and the realm of subjective understanding in the *logos*. Through this correlation, Plato moves beyond basic emotional appeals towards a method that systematically valuates the moral dispositions of a given audience and places them in priority. In returning to the literal meaning of the somewhat abstract moral terms ‘value’ and ‘priority’ he is able to create a mathematics of morality revealed by dialectical inquiry. The use of this mathematics in order to create effective emotional appeals represents the practical force of the courageous account. At the same time courage provides ethical considerations that require the rhetor to align both theory and action, as well as speech and thought. In so doing the rhetor is able to comply with the definition of courage offered in the *Republic*, since a *logos* is derived, aligned with the *psyche*, that not only has the power to preserve its belief about what is to be feared, but has the power to produce that belief in others. As such, spirit proves to be a much more important element for the rhetorician than previously thought – perhaps, in some senses, the most important.

292 For a detailed argument of what Platonic psychology indicates about internal integrity and the credibility of the speaker, see Moline “Plato on Persuasion and Credibility.” The greatest difference between his assessment and my own is that he almost wholly attributes the internal integrity of thought and word to the rule of the rational element. The easiest argument for spirit playing a major role in maintaining integrity is simply that that is its job – it is, after all, the internal police force as well as the military. It may very well be reason’s job to map out a course of integrity, but it is spirit’s job to make sure the plan all hangs together under the worst of conditions – indeed, to preserve the belief that loss of integrity is to be feared should temptations towards a contrary belief present themselves. In the final analysis the timocrat, who is ruled by spirit once civil war breaks out between appetite and reason, is the image of the Laconian (*Rep.* 545a). The Spartan is not known for the love of learning or loquaciousness, but is known for frank and direct speech – hence the term, Laconic.
4.2.3 The Temperate Logos

The final correlation to consider is between the intersubjective level of the *logos* and the appetitive element in the *psyche*. Socrates identifies the virtue of appetite as *sophrosune*, ‘moderation’ or ‘temperance.’ His account of this virtue appears more overtly concerned with the rhetoric and philosophy of the older Sophists than any of the other elements. Moderation is described as a sort of consonance [*symphonia*] and harmony [*harmonia*] – a kind of order [*kosmos*] illustrated by the term “self-control” [*kreitto autou*] (430e). This expression is taken as an indication that in the soul:

there is a better part [*beltion*] and a worse one [*cheiron*] and that, whenever the naturally better part [*beltion phusei*] is in control of the worse [*cheironos*], this is expressed by saying that the person is self-controlled or master of himself [*kreitto autou*]. At any rate, one praises someone by calling him self-controlled. But when, on the other hand, the smaller and better part [*smikroteron to beltion*] is overpowered by the larger [and worse; *plethous tou cheironos*], because of bad upbringing or bad company, this is called being self-defeated [*hetto eautou*] or licentious and is a reproach. (431a-b)

Socrates admits that this virtue is peculiar in that it concerns itself with all three elements of the *psyche*, whereas courage and knowledge only affect that of which they are a virtue (432a):

It makes the weakest [*asthenestatous*], the strongest [*ischurotatous*], and those in between [*mesous*] – whether in regard to reason, physical strength, numbers, wealth, or anything else – all sing the same song together. And this unanimity, this agreement
between the naturally worse \([\text{cheironos}]\) and the naturally better \([\text{ameinonos}]\) as to which of the two is to rule both in the city and in each one, is rightly called moderation. (432a)

In this passage, Plato expands upon, complicates, and uniquely justifies the Sophistic claim to make the weaker \(\text{logos}\) the stronger.

Championed by Protagoras, the claim to be able to “make the weaker argument the stronger” \([\text{to hetto de logon kreitto poiein}]\),\(^{293}\) or in its most disreputable interpretation, to make “the worse cause appear the better,” has long been seen as both a calling card for the Sophists and an illustration of their relativistic scruples. In the analysis of Gorgias’ \(\text{Helen}\), we already noted how making weaker agents stronger could easily be perceived as a good and as a civic necessity. In a further evolution, Socrates’ account of temperance proffers a qualified version of the claim that appeals both to the stronger/weaker distinction as well as the better/worse. On this view, one is not only justified in making the weaker part the stronger, but is \textit{required} to do so by virtue. But this requirement only holds insofar as the weaker portion is indeed the better. Thus Plato grants the temperate \(\text{logos}\) both the power and the place to correct the upset in balance created by allowing the stronger but worse desires to rule over the weaker but better reason.\(^{294}\)

That Plato confers such corrective power upon the temperate \(\text{logos}\), and therefore to a moderate rhetoric, is further evidenced in the \(\text{Timaeus}\). After discussing how sight enables us to observe the orbits of reason in the heavens, and so aids us in imitating those orbits in ourselves, Timaeus considers hearing:

\[^{293}\text{The fragment appears in Aristotle’s }\text{Rhetoric} 1402^\text{23}. \text{The wording is nearly identical to the charge that Socrates recounts against him in Plato’s }\text{Apology: τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρεῖττω ποιεῖν. For a detailed analysis of the interpretive history and possibilities of interpreting the phrase, see Schiappa, }\text{Protagoras and Logos} 103-116. \text{For a more general analysis of }\text{to hetton} \text{ and }\text{to kreitton} \text{ in Sophistic rhetoric, see Poulakos, }\text{Sophistical Rhetoric} 64-67.\]

\[^{294}\text{I doubt that it is coincidental that similar language is used throughout the }\text{Protagoras}.\]
Likewise, the same account goes for sound [phones] and hearing – these too are the gods’ gift, given for the same purpose and intended to achieve the same result. Speech [logos] was designed for this very purpose – it plays the greatest part in its achievement. And all such composition as lends itself to making audible musical [mousikes] sound is given in order to express harmony [harmonias], and so serves this purpose as well. And harmony [harmonia], whose movements are akin to the orbits within our souls [psyches], is a gift of the Muses, if our dealings with them are guided by understanding, not for irrational pleasure, for which people nowadays seem to make use of it, but to serve as an ally in the fight to bring order [katakosmesin] to any orbit in our souls that has become unharmonized, and make it concordant [symphonian] with itself. (47c-e)

The passage shows speech, out of all the phonetic arts of the Muses, as particularly responsible for re-hierarchizing the elements of the soul in a way that mirrors Plato’s account of moderation.295

The sentiment of the Timaeus is further repeated in the Charmides, a small treatise on sophrosune. In promising Charmides a cure for his ailments, Socrates quotes a Thracian doctor:

And the soul…is cured [therapeuesthai de ten psyche] by means of certain charms, and these charms consist of beautiful words [tous logous einai tous kalous]. It is a result of

295 As Poulakos asserts: “When advocating something hetton, the orator relies on the resources of language and its surrounding circumstances to move what is regarded as weaker to a position of strength. At the same time, and in a similar manner, the orator attempts to show how to kreiitton, despite its dominance, is defective, ineffective, or harmful – that is, how to kreiitton is weaker than generally thought. To be successful in this endeavor means to reverse in some measure the established hierarchy of things” (Sophistical Rhetoric 64). Plato would seem to agree, with the addendum that when a rhetor is successful, not only is the hierarchy of things rearranged, but the internal hierarchy of the psyche is as well.
such words [logon] that temperance [sophrosunen] arises in the soul, and when the soul acquires and possesses temperance, it is easy to provide health both for the head and for the rest of the body. (157a-b)

Granted, these passages must be interpreted with caution. Consisting mainly of a long speech given by a character other than Socrates, the Timaeus is recognized as uncharacteristically rhetorical and overly metaphorical in many respects. And the passage from the Charmides is not owned by Socrates, but rather is given through quotation in such a manner that the audience is led to question whether it is real or not.

However, nothing in either the Timaeus or the Charmides suggests that these passages are meant to be ironic or in any way negative accounts of speech. Quite to the contrary, the works plainly suggest a positive, if a not-to-be-taken-literally account of the nature of speech’s ability to correctly align the soul. Furthermore, these accounts are in accord with Plato’s comments about aligning rhetoric with the soul in the Phaedrus and with Socrates’ short account of true rhetoric in the Gorgias which is “that of getting the souls of the citizens to be as good as possible and of striving valiantly to say what is best, whether the audience will find it more pleasant or more unpleasant” (503a). All of this sounds very much like Plato’s lone positive account of ‘noble’ sophistry in the Sophist:

Doctors who work on the body think it can’t benefit from any food that’s offered to it until what’s interfering with it from inside is removed. The people who cleanse the soul, my young friend, likewise think the soul, too, won’t get any advantage from any learning that’s offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it, removes the opinions that
interfere with learning, and exhibit it cleansed, believing that it knows only those things that it does know, and nothing more. (230c-d)

However, this commendation is also granted with qualification and so leaves room for question about what is truly asserted concerning sophistry.

What does seem clear is that the virtue of moderation has a direct correlation with the third, intersubjective level of the *logos* as a verbal, communicative account. Whatever Plato means to say about *sophrosune*, it obviously applies to the spoken word. However, the medical undertones cannot be dismissed, and so another link to the intersubjective realm is established. Unlike the other two levels, which deal with the formation and structure of the *logos* itself, this third level considers the effects and uses of the *logos*, the relationship that should be established between speaker and hearer. This relationship is consistently expressed as a beneficent accord between benefactor and beneficiary. In this way, the temperate account is never used for personal gain; it is always used for the benefit of others, or at least, for the betterment of everyone involved including oneself. Once again, the list of preferred qualities in an interlocutor discussed in the *Gorgias* is underscored, so that the objective level ensures knowledge, the subjective demands candor and the intersubjective requires good-will.

Ultimately, the impact that temperance has on the rhetor and the *logos* is no small matter. It requires the rhetor to act in the best interests of those who would listen, striving to champion the better cause even though it might be the weaker account. In so doing, the natural harmony of the *logos* is established, which is capable of restoring harmony in the souls of others. The result is a *logos* that strives for truth over efficacy and harmony over discord. It guides the intersubjective interaction between the rhetor and the audience. Of course, this interaction is
effected by the subjective call to integrity, and it also influences the objective level by planting the fruit of cooperative dialectic. So the model of the *logos*, and consequently of the *psyche*, is not a linear hierarchy from objectivity to intersubjectivity, but rather is a triangular model in which each element effects the other two.

**4.3 PLATO'S DRAMATISM**

Upon learning to read the *gramma* of the soul’s motives, Socrates and company map out the soul’s movements in the form of a grand degenerative drama in which the cohesion of the *psyche* literally *dis*integrates. At the end of Book IV of the *Republic*, Socrates remarks that there exists “five forms of constitutions and five of souls” (445d). At Book VIII, after a lengthy discussion of aristocracy, he finally makes good on his desire to, “enumerate [the remaining four kinds of constitutions] and explain how they developed out of one another” (449a). The Book begins by summarizing the discussion of the aristocratic city and the aristocratic individual, which had developed since Book V. Socrates frames the remaining four structures as a series of devolutions, examining first how one city emerges from its predecessor, then how the type of *psyche* that is similar to it develops. With a parallel model of the *logos* established, we can see how relevant forms of speech also shift with each constitutional permutation. The result is a striking hierarchization of the Burkean pentad complete with a Weavarian identification of relevant Ultimate Terms. While a complete analysis of the psychological models offered by Plato in the *Republic* can yield a robust handbook of rhetorical psychological typographies,296

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296 This was the ultimate focus of my Masters thesis on which this analysis draws. However, the recourse to Burkean and Weavarian terminology provides the most succinct, yet complete, way of summarizing this analysis for
the intent of the present account is to recognize the map of the soul’s movements and observe it as a guide for the purpose of psychic direction.

4.3.1 The Aristocratic Logos

The aristocratic *logos* is the most familiar and so is the easiest to explain. For Socrates, the constitution that should govern a city or an individual is either a kingship or an aristocracy (445e). The composition is such that the rational element rules the soul, aided by the spirited element, with the consent of the appetitive element. Thus, the actions of both the aristocratic city and the aristocratic individual are wise, courageous, and temperate – and so are ultimately harmonious and just.

The aristocratic *logos* follows suit in that it exhibits the virtues of speech laid out in the previous section. It is wise because it is knowledgeable of both itself and others, and so it is well informed, well organized, and logically articulated so as to appeal to an average, reasonable audience. It is courageous, first in that it is capable of valuating how given topics fit into the moral schema of its audience and so is able to demonstrate what should and should not be feared; second, in that it represents congruity in thought, word, and deed, and eschews incongruity resulting from deceit, humility, or flattery. It is moderate in that it seeks only the truth and wishes to communicate that truth to its audience. It works to correct maladies in the souls of its audience and cares not for personal gain. It says only what is supported by argument, and so avoids sacrificing logical rigor, even if it means failing to persuade.
Dramatically speaking, the aristocrat is *purpose* oriented and that purpose is the transcendence of the soul through beauty, goodness, and truth to a participation in being and the One beyond. So the Transcendentals supply the aristocrat with its God Terms: Unity, Being, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.\(^{297}\) Thus, the aristocratic *logos* is the very picture of Plato’s ideal rhetoric, which seems indistinguishable from his concept of dialectical inquiry. But to leave the issue there is to acknowledge only one fifth of Plato’s rhetorical types. For, while an aristocrat might only be persuaded by another aristocrat, the converse is true – the aristocratic *logos* is only effective when offered to an aristocratic *psyche*. But for Plato’s claims in the *Phaedrus* to hold, the aristocratic rhetor must be able to persuade anyone. Regardless of whether we agree with the value hierarchy, it is difficult to devalue the observations that are made about symbolic motivation in the remaining four constitutions.

### 4.3.2 The Timocratic *Logos*

The aristocracy begins to disintegrate due to “civil war breaking out within the ruling group itself” (545c). The city begins to shift away from rational rule and towards the appetites. However, the shift is not absolute and the struggle ends by settling on the middle way. The divisions of rule are still respected but the rulers are more spirited, “more naturally suited for war than peace” (547c-548a). The hallmark of the new city becomes “the love of victory \(\textit{philonikiai}\) and the love of honor \(\textit{philotimiai}\),” (548c), hence the name ‘timocracy’ or ‘rule by honor.’ The timocratic *psyche*, of course, is very similar and the timocrat “becomes a proud and honor-loving man” (550b). Hence, Honor and Shame are the Ultimate Terms of the timocrat,  

\(^{297}\) Although the correlations below are based on my own analysis, Burke overtly connects Platonism with “purpose” in the Grammar. See “Platonist and Neo-Platonist Purpose” 293-294.
who shifts priority from purpose to agent. Such shift does not denote an egocentric withdrawal of the agent’s interests from the community. Quite the contrary, timocrats are interested in raising the status of the community and their own status within it.

However, in shifting rule from the rational to the spirited part, the logos has slipped from the observance of objective Truth, though it still recognizes the existence of moral standards, as Protagoras-via-Socrates suggests in the *Theaetetus*:

> Similarly, the wise and efficient politician is the man who makes wholesome things seem just to a city instead of pernicious ones. Whatever in any city is regarded as just and admirable *is* just and admirable, in that city and for so long as that convention maintains itself; but the wise man replaces each pernicious convention by a wholesome one, making this both be and seem just. (167c)

This is quite appropriate considering the nature of courage, the virtue of the spirited element, which rules over the timocratic logos. That is to say, that the key to a successful timocratic logos is the manipulation of a given moral schema in order to show the interlocutor or audience that the position of the rhetor is indeed the position that follows from the audience’s basic moral suppositions. So persuasion would take place by correctly appealing to and manipulating those moral standards.

It is important to emphasize the shift in Ultimate Terms from the aristocratic to the timocratic logos. The sole locus of authority for the aristocrat is objective Truth and the transcendental knowledge that such Truth provides. Thus, the aristocratic logos is structured so as to best discover, communicate, and test unadulterated ideas. For the timocrat, the locus of
authority shifts slightly. While an objective standard of sorts is still observed – that is, a standard outside of a given rhetor, audience, or situation – that standard is relative in that “whatever in any city is regarded as just and admirable is just and admirable, in that city and for so long as that convention maintains itself.”

Here there is a peculiar mix of the objective, subjective, and intersubjective. The major drawback is that the timocratic psyche is subject to a more coercive type of rhetoric that locks the audience into a conclusion based on previously held belief without the check of critical inquiry. Plato alludes to this aspect of the timocrat when he states that, “they haven’t been educated by persuasion [peithous] but by force [bias],” (Rep 548b-c). So the model is that of a logos whose locus of authority rests in the conventions of the audience. Upon identifying these conventions, the timocratic logos seeks to draw connections between the strongest and most central of these conventions away from an audience’s inhabited position and towards that tendered by the rhetor. Such speech is agent centered, giving greatest consideration to the subject’s sense of honor and shame.

4.3.3 The Oligarchic Logos

The oligarchy develops by an increase of greed and desire for earthly wealth and personal possessions at the expense of virtue and so eventually the money-making, or appetitive, element takes over (550d-551b). This results in a complete shift away from objective value towards subjective egoism. Whereas the timocrat shifts from a “what is x?” attitude towards a “what is the value of x?” attitude (i.e., a shift from interest in the nature of a thing towards interest in what it is about a thing that should be respected or revered), the oligarchic structure shifts its inquiry towards the question “what is the value of x for me?” Where both the aristocrat and timocrat
enjoyed some degree of shared control between the objective, subjective, and intersubjective elements, the oligarch becomes completely egocentric.

Granted, self-centeredness may seem strange since the appetitive, or intersubjective, element is now ruling the rational and spirited elements. But the oligarch is unwilling to let the worst appetites have free reign out of caution and some sense of decency (554b-d). Another compromise is reached; the oligarch settles on procuring wealth, making “the rational and spirited parts sit on the ground beneath appetite… reducing them to slaves” (553c-d). Although the oligarch is ruled by the appetitive part, it has relegated rule to the most egocentric of the appetites – personal gain. Thus the oligarch shifts focus from the status of the agent to procuring the means of agency.

The type of logos that originates under this constitution is plain to see. The oligarch is motivated by God Terms that indicate Profit, Prosperity, and Utility. Accounts of this sort center on promises of wealth or fear of loss, depending on what is deemed most expedient. Accordingly, bad appetites are checked or subdued, as Socrates points out, “not by persuading them that it’s better not to act on them [i.e., a timocratic logos] or taming them with arguments [i.e., an aristocratic logos], but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his other possessions” (554d).

The oligarch’s thriftiness entails a miserly paradox – he wishes to procure the means of agency so much that he never acts unless necessary:

Further, this thrifty man is a poor individual contestant for victory in a city or for any other fine and much-honored thing, for he’s not willing to spend money for the sake of a fine reputation or on contests for such things. He’s afraid to arouse his appetites for
spending or to call on them as allies to obtain victory, so he fights like an oligarch, with only a few of his resources. Hence he’s mostly defeated but remains rich. (554e-555a)

This caution, however, means that the oligarchic *logos* is also rather reserved, spoken only when profit is assured, or else in attempt to stave off threat to wealth.

The motives of the oligarch are something quite different than the other two that have been examined. The oligarch does not love truth, honor, or even victory, so does not often enter into debate or discussion for the sake of intellectual discovery or moral conservation. Hence the oligarchic *logos* appears in the realm of economics on various scales. It is employed by salespersons who tout that the energy efficiency of given products will save the potential buyer $x$ amounts of dollars over so many years (as opposed to, say, its positive impact on the environment). And it is present in the twin fear appeals of illegal immigrants stealing jobs and draining the welfare system. But the true oligarch is shrewd. Rationality and valuation have not been abandoned; rather these faculties have been applied fully to increasing personal wealth. Thus, it is not enough to simply assert that a given position is profitable or costly. It must also be systematically demonstrated, only this time using material value as the locus of authority. Action must be shown to be of benefit, while inaction must be shown to yield negative results. While it might seem the most obvious of tactics, it is not always the easiest, since doing the “right” thing is not always the most profitable. When personal gain and morality appear to be in conflict, one must present arguments of indirect profit and cost. So one may threaten (or enact) a boycott as a rhetorical tactic; or one might explain to a political candidate that going “green” will ultimately translate into more votes. In short, any argument or tactic that can affect the bottom line will be the most likely means of moving the oligarchic *psyche.*
4.3.4 The Democratic Logos

The democratic constitution evolves out of the oligarchy due to its love of money. This love promotes laws that ensure that some become wealthy at the expense of others, leaving wealth in disproportion and strengthening the divide between the haves and the have-nots. Eventually, due to the oligarchs’ focus on procuring the means of agency, and not wishing to expend it on training in combat, gymnastics, etc. the impoverished realize that they are superior in strength and numbers, overthrow the oligarchs, and redistribute power equally. The result is the democracy (555b-557a).

The individual is similar to the city. Being ruled by the better appetites and keeping the worse in check, external desires eventually help the worse overcome the better. However, as counter influences struggle back and forth, the ultimate result is an individual in which rule is granted to all desires equally (558d-561b). The miserly conservation of agency leads violently towards the desire to act. For the democrat, then, the God Terms are the twin concepts of Freedom and Equality, while the Devil Terms indicate Restraint and Oppression.

Thus, the democratic structure might seem at least as subjective, if not more so, than its oligarchic predecessor since no authority exists save for the whim of the subject. However, the subject is not in control of these whims, rather “he lives, always surrendering rule over himself to whichever desire comes along, as if it were chosen by lot. And when that is satisfied, he surrenders the rule to another, not disdaining any but satisfying all equally” (561a). So the democrat sees a shift from the more subjective oligarch, which seeks out self-interested gain, to a mix of influences both internal and external. The freedom and equality that rule the democracy do not result in constantly identifiable characteristics, but are multifarious. In this way it becomes what Socrates calls “a convenient place to look for a constitution” (557d) since it
contains every kind of constitution within itself. Likewise, the multiple whims of the democratic psyche make it varied and complex.

Following Socrates’ observations, the logos that follows must be unstable and impulsive. This is not to say that it is without merit, or at least without meritorious specimens, but it is not systematic. The democratic logos is a whimsical logos. It may at times be oligarchic, timocratic, or even aristocratic, but these are fleeting moments, not pure productions of these more constant structures. Nor could they be, since the democrat eschews any authority beyond the almost anti-authority of individual autonomy. In fact, the democratic style is the diametrical opposite of the timocratic in that it works to reverse the moralistic mathematical calculation that is the driving force of the timocrat. In order to dissolve this moralistic authority “they call reverence foolishness and moderation cowardice” and “persuade the young man that measured and orderly expenditure is boorish and mean” (560c-d). In this way the democrat becomes “empty of knowledge, fine ways of living, and words of truth,” and “in the absence of these guardians, false and boastful words and beliefs rush up and occupy him” (560b-c).

With the objective standards abolished, there is established “a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike” (558c). Which is exactly the sort of thing Prodicus warns against in the Protagoras, wherein he states: “Those who attend discussions such as this…ought to listen impartially but not divide our attention equally: More should go to the wiser speaker and less to the more unlearned” (337a-b). Lacking a standard of judgment, the democratic logos must be purely aesthetic, attempting to stir the audience by evoking pleasure or dissonance in the psyche rather than persuading the rational element or moving the spirited element. Apparently then, the democratic logos is just that style of rhetoric Plato condemns in the Gorgias, wherein Socrates points out that only disciplines that have systematic knowledge of what they effect can be called
an art or craft; whereas those that “have investigated only, as in the other case, the soul’s way of
getting its pleasure, without considering which of the pleasures is better or worse” (Rep. 501b-c)
would be a knack, a form of flattery. Of course, it makes sense that this would be the case
considering that Athens was in the vanguard of democracy.

The difficulty for Plato is that in order to make good on the promise of the Phaedrus, the
ture rhetor must be able to move the democratic psyche just as well as the democrat. To do this,
the rhetor cannot avoid flattery but must be able to adapt it to a more rational and moral end. For
any other logos that has been previously established will automatically fail, since the democrat
“doesn’t admit any word of truth into the guardhouse, for if someone tells him that some
pleasures belong to fine and good desires and others to evil ones… he denies all this and declares
that all pleasures are equal and must be valued equally” (561b-c). Given Socrates’ outline of the
democratic psyche, the correcting logos of the true rhetor must be presented in a palatable
manner. A spoonful of sugar must help the pharmakon go down. On a cynic’s view, the
democratic rhetor finds out what the audience wants to hear and gains an honorable reputation
by presenting the audiences its own favorable predisposition. On a more sympathetic reading
the democratic orator, though well intentioned, is likewise mistaken about what is good for the
community, confusing it with the will of the majority. In contrast to both, Plato’s true rhetor
must use what the audience finds pleasurable to convert the corrective message into an account
that the audience will accept. The resulting messages would then be rather indistinguishable
from that of the pure democrat’s, save for the unknown desire of the speaker.
4.3.5 The Tyrannical Logos

Tyranny emerges from democracy when the people get so drunk off the “unmixed wine of freedom” (562d) that any attempt at upholding order is seen as an attempt at enslavement. Eventually “rulers who behave like subjects and subjects who behave like rulers” are honored by the people of the city, and the old “stoop to the level of the young and are full of play and pleasantry, imitating the young for fear of appearing disagreeable and authoritarian” (562e-563b). This trend continues until ultimately “if anyone even puts upon himself the least degree of slavery, they become angry and cannot endure it” (563d, translator’s emphasis). The resulting society falls into disarray as those who attempt to retain order are accused of oligarchy. Civil war ensues, out of which arises a champion of the people who is given power and protection at the expense of the city. Upon tasting the power over his fellow citizens, he becomes corrupt (564b-569c).

As Book IX opens the tyrannical psyche arises in similar fashion: “enjoying each in moderation, as he supposes, he leads a life that is neither slavish nor lawless” (572d). Eventually the psyche loses control over this apparent moderation and is consumed by appetites. No longer hovering between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the tyrant falls to the greatest intersubjective vice, loss of autonomy by surrender to insatiable worldly desire. The tyrant becomes a slave to exterior circumstances, a victim of the scene. The God Term for each tyrant is different, some single desire like Drugs, Alcohol, or Sex. They may be high-functioning, sophisticated, even intelligent; but their motives are uncontrollable and cannot be deterred. For the most part the tyrannical psyche is unable to be persuaded since it is driven not by reason, nor morality, nor even autonomy, but rather by a compulsive internal desire triggered by some external stimulus. However, Plato still offers some words concerning the rhetorical nature of the tyrant that the
would-be rhetor should heed.

It seems impossible to redirect the focused tunnel vision of the tyrant. At this point even the aesthetic appeal of the logos would matter little, if the aesthetic where not that which is already desired. In such a case, it appears that the rhetor, upon realizing that a given interlocutor or mass audience is of the tyrannical stock, has little recourse save for avoidance, coercion (up to and including deceit and physical force) or yielding to the tyrant’s desire. In his Letter VII Plato refers to these three possible reactions for dealing with a tyrant, and only really condones one:

But a man who does not consult me at all, or makes it clear that he will not follow advice that is given him – to such a man I do not take it upon myself to offer counsel; nor would I use constraint upon him, not even if he were my own son. Upon a slave I might force my advice, compelling him to follow it against his will; but to use compulsion upon a father or mother is to me an impious act, unless their judgment has been impaired by disease. If they are fixed in a way of life that pleases them, though it may not please me, I should not antagonize them by useless admonitions, nor yet by flattery and complaisance encourage them in the satisfaction of desires that I would die rather than embrace. This is the principle which a wise man must follow in his relations towards his own city. Let him warn her, if he thinks her constitution corrupt and there is a prospect that his words will be listened to and not put him in danger of his life; but let him not use violence upon his fatherland to bring about change of constitution. If what he thinks is best can only be accomplished by the exile and slaughter of men, let him keep his peace and pray for the welfare of himself and the city. (331c-d)
It is obvious that Plato promotes disengagement from the tyrant and from tyranny, as opposed to violence or compliance. Though in suggesting the possibility of piety in using force against a slave or one impaired by disease, it does leave open some situations wherein persuasion may be abandoned for force as the best recourse, since Plato uses both the metaphor of slave and disease to describe the tyrant.

4.4 THE MAP OF THE PSYCHIC JOURNEY

Though the Republic is often read as presenting a hierarchy of constitutional types, which in itself is practical for the rhetorician to understand, it offers something far more important to the would-be psychagogue. If we strip away the value judgments that so often raise the ire of rhetoricians and democratic adherents in general, we simply see the movements of the soul mapped out in its downward trajectory. Such a map is unnecessary for those ascendant souls who have broken free of their material bonds and follow the orbits of the spheres in heaven. It is only of use for those practically minded philosophers who wish to make the perilous return to the depths of the cave for the purpose of guiding other souls on their journey.

The way down, it turns out, is not very surprising. As is logical, it is the reverse of the way up. That is to say, that if we traced the process backward from the tyrant to the aristocrat, we would be tracing another well-known movement of the soul in Platonic philosophy. For if the soul were to reverse itself, the tyrant would move from the singular attraction to some outside stimulus – let’s say an erotic fixation on a beautiful woman – to an appreciation of all such objects equally, which would lead to a democratic appreciation for the act of looking at beautiful women. From the democrat’s appreciation for looking at beautiful women in general, we would
see in the emergent oligarch an appreciation for the agency of women and a desire to increase the effectiveness of that agency. From there, as the oligarch transforms into a timocrat, we would see the valuation of the moral goodness and overall virtue of womankind. And finally, the aristocrat comes to contemplate and appreciate the very purpose, the essential concept of womanhood. The constitutional degeneration is thus Diotima’s ladder in reverse; that ladder upon which Diotima instructs us to move from the love a beautiful body, to the love of all beautiful bodies, to the love of beautiful souls, to the love of beautiful laws, to the love of beautiful thoughts, to the love of the Beautiful (Sym. 210a-211c).

At the heart of the Platonic pentadic movement, however, is a triad of appetite, spirit and reason that provides the basic roadmap of outward, inward, and upward – and, of course, its reverse. Plato indicates the significance of this movement for the rhetorician especially; for if you juxtapose the Gorgias with the Phaedrus on either side of the Republic, you see more than arguments for and against rhetorical practice. You see the katabasis and anabasis of Socrates – his descent into the underworld and subsequent return. In the Gorgias, Socrates moves from a theoretical discussion with Gorgias about the nature of rhetoric, to a spirited discussion with Polus about the power of rhetoric, to a hedonistic discussion with Callicles about the appetites that rhetorical practice can satiate. Callicles warns Socrates that his lack of rhetorical knowledge might be his demise should he ever be brought up on false charges, thus

298 Polus means “colt.” Socrates puns on the name in conversation, calling him a colt that is young and passionate – hence, “ spirited” (463e).
299 For a detailed analysis of the three interlocutors as personifications of distinct aspect of rhetoric, see Adele Spitzer. “The Self-Reference of the Gorgias.” Philosophy & Rhetoric, 8.1 (1975): 1-22. Although Spitzer specifically compares concepts between the Gorgias and the Republics, she does not realize, or at least does not acknowledge, the close relationship that these characters have with the elements of the psyche. See also Seth Benardete’s comment that “The three interlocutors of the Gorgias exhibit rhetoric. They are the logos of Socrates’ geometrical schemes” (The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 7).
foreshadowing the manner of his death (486a-486b). And at the end of the movement, Socrates relays an apocalyptic account of the final judgment of the soul (523aff). By way of the logos, Socrates has descended to the depths of the democratic psyche and has come to realize an astonishing fact: his dialectic alone cannot cure it. Socrates, in the Gorgias, is a failure. He has spoken the truth bluntly and has persuaded no one, just as he remains unpersuaded. Both arts have failed. He is the mirror image of the Embassy to Achilles – one great philosophical hero sent to reintegrate the personifications of a fragmented soul, but to no avail. And as Achilles plighted began with a mortal’s judgment of three naked goddesses, Socrates ends with three gods judging his naked soul. He expects, however, to spend eternity in the Isles of the Blessed (526c).

In the Republic, Socrates descends [katabaino] into the depths of the underworld through a strange reflection of the movement in the Gorgias. Before discussing the nature of the soul with Plato’s brothers, Socrates speaks about justice first with the old temperate money-maker, Cephalus; next with his rough but agreeable son, Polemarchus; and finally with the intelligent and tyrant-praising sophist, Thrasymachus. At the end of this dialogue we are met with another apocalyptic myth, this time about eternal reincarnation. It ends with the return of a soul back to its home by way of the hot plains and flowing river of forgetfulness. But this soul
has retained with it the knowledge of the psyche that it had obtained in the underworld, remembering what others had forgotten. Socrates is thus armed with the knowledge of a complex, immortal soul whose intrapersonal communication dictates the motives and actions of human beings. He ends the story in his own voice telling the interlocutors to remember the upward way [ano hodon] (221c).

The Phaedrus finds Socrates on a hot day alongside a running river. It is the only dialogue in which he is not at home within the walls of Athens. Before his return home, he enters into a speech competition with an absent sophist, Lysias, brother of Polemarchus.306 In this competition, three speeches are offered for the affection of an absent boy, though Phaedrus plays the role of judge. It would be easy to agree with other commentators that each speech speaks to a different element in the auditor’s soul, the first highlighting pleasure, the second honor, the third the true love of wisdom.307 But then Socrates’ method would have not evolved at all from the Gorgias with the minor exception that instead of three separate appeals to a distinct part of the soul personified, we would have three separate appeals to a part of the soul housed in a single body. As with the Embassy and the Gorgias, this approach is bound to fail.308

306 We learn in the Phaedrus that Polemarchus has turned to philosophy (257b).
307 See n.274.
308 I hold that this is what Socrates means when he cryptically connects Gorgias and Thrasy machus to the Rhetoric of Nestor and the Rhetoric of Odysseus written “in their spare time in Troy” (261b-c). Not only do these two sophists mark the beginning and the end of Socrates’ psychic decent in the above narrative, but both have a detailed knowledge of some aspect of psychology. Gorgias, as we have seen, has a practical theory of the soul’s motives that directly prefigures Plato’s own model. And Thrasy machus is heralded in the Phaedrus as one “who knows best how to inflame a crowd and, once they are inflamed, how to hush them again with his words’ magic spell” (267c-d). Likewise, it is Nestor, in forming the Embassy, who knows the general make-up of the soul; while Odysseus is the wily manipulator who heads the Embassy. Moreover, the Embassy speeches that each gives are two of the only speeches in the Iliad that could have been composed beforehand, during some time of leisure, as both take place after a feast with prior knowledge of the impeding rhetorical situation. Conversely, Socrates’ mention of Palamedes in connection with Zeno (261b; 261d) indictsa purely dialectical inquiry as insufficiently complete for the guiding of souls through speech. Palamedes, though cunning in his own right, was brought up on false charges by Odysseus and killed, much like Socrates himself (in fairness to Odysseus, it was Palamedes who exposed his ruse to escape military service. It is worthy to note that Gorgias appropriates the trial of Palamedes for one of his extant speeches. For a related exploration of the interconnection between Gorgias’ speech and Socrates’ later myth of Theuth (274c-
What I suggest, following Ferrari’s observation that Socrates’ first speech appears crafted to a timocratic soul, is that the whole soul of the auditor is addressed in each speech. Thus, we are witnessing an example of the subtle reformation of the soul’s elements through words – the three speeches serving as intermediaries between soul types, yet still following the basic path of “outwards, inwards, upwards.” For each speech contains appeals to pleasure, honor, and reason; but with different orientations. The first speech casts the lover as wanton pleasure-seeker who lacks self-control. In the constitutional terms of the Republic, the lover is a democrat who cares little for honor or shame, for keeping promises or being loyal, for anything other than the satisfaction of his own momentary desire – a democrat is flippant, so untrustworthy in most respects. What Lysias proposes is a business-like contract with an oligarchic soul, which would transform the beloved in to an oligarch as well. For this reason the entire speech is a cost/benefit analysis that illustrates that such an arrangement maximizes utility, pleasure and profit. Hence, the closing of the speech: “this sort of thing is not supposed to cause any harm, and really should work to the benefit of both sides” (234c).

In the second speech, Socrates admits that Lysias is right to condemn the wantonness of the lover and the constancy of the non-lover (235e-236a). The oligarch maintains a high degree of self-control after all, with reason and spirit underfoot. Socrates’ first speech opens with similar talk of analyzing benefit and harm, but the orientation is decidedly different. Rather than focus on material benefit, which is mentioned as a final consideration, the entire analysis is cast in the terms of strength and weakness. The lover seeks to exercise his strength over the beloved,

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275b), see Nightingale, Genres 149-154). What is needed is not a theoretical, analytic model of the soul but an integrated, organic model that could only be gained by the perilous decent into the depths of the soul itself – what is needed, and what Socrates offers upon his return, is a Rhetoric of Priam.

309 Again, see n.274.

310 Speaking in terms almost straight from the Republic, the lover is not σωφρονέω, ‘of sound mind’ – a cognate of sophrosune – and “cannot control himself” [ἄλλος δύνασθαι αὐτόν κρατεῖν] (231d).
weakening him in mind, body, and possessions – and there is no pleasure to be found besides, only disgust. This is not a speech designed to appeal to the spirited element *qua* spirited element – for it is Socrates’ spirit that protests the speech from start to finish, such that he hides his head in shame while he speaks (237a) and cannot even bring himself to conclude (241d) – this is a speech aimed to transform an oligarch into a timocrat, shifting orientation from material cost/benefit analysis towards the care of the inner possessions of the *psyche*. Accordingly, the conclusion is a call to shift priority from material value to moral value so that the beloved does not end up “giving himself to a man who is deceitful, irritable, jealous, disgusting, harmful to his property, harmful to his physical fitness, and absolutely devastating to the cultivation if his soul, which truly is, and will always be, the most valuable thing to gods and men” (241c).

With the orientation now turned to the moral valuation of one’s soul, Socrates can identify the shame he felt while chastising love (243b; 243d). Socrates’ motives to rectify his transgressions are one that any timocrat could appreciate, for he has been warned by his guiding spirit and familiar divine sign [to daimonion te kai to eiothos semeion]\(^3\) that he should fear insulting the gods more than loss of victory in a speech contest (242b-c). By resolving to literally “take back” his previous words in the *palinode*, Socrates can now turn back from the cave which he had entered in order to reach Phaedrus’ soul, and so he emerges from his own head covering, leading Phaedrus with him (243b). So in his second speech, Socrates hopes to turn Phaedrus, if not *to* aristocracy, at least *towards* it by showing him a likeness [*eoiken*] in words of the properly balanced soul (246a). In so doing, he brings his own soul one step closer to breaking free of the cycle of psychic reincarnation; one step closer to the ascent into heaven

\(^3\) The wording suggests one of the more enigmatic fragments of Heraclitus (D. 119): ἕθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων. Though it is admittedly anachronistic to read any relevance to rhetorical theory in the terminology, it is worthwhile to note that in this case, Socrates’ *daimon* and characteristic sign did influence the *ethos* of his speech.
and a union with Being. Thus rhetoric is a psychagogic art on two plains; it is an art of *periagoge* – leading around – for the audience; and an art of *anagoge* – leading upwards – for the speaker.

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that a model of the *psyche* and a model of the *logos* can be discovered within the corpus of Plato that meet the criteria for a psychagogic rhetoric laid out in the *Phaedrus*. The result is a map of the soul’s movements and a guidebook for leading the soul on its journey by means of speech. But so far I have only established that such a rhetoric *can* be constructed. In the remaining chapters, I demonstrate that these movements were recognized by rhetoricians and orators and provided the basis for a rhetorical tradition that flowed through late antiquity and the Middle Ages. I take as my own guide these two plains of psychagogic activity. In the next chapter on St. Augustine, I explore rhetoric as the art of turning the audience around in orientation towards ascent. In the final chapter on St. Bonaventure I explore the transformative and uplifting affects of rhetoric on the speaker.
Having traced out the components and mechanisms of the psychagogic tradition as they culminated in the works of Plato, I now turn my attention to the reception and innovation of this tradition in the rhetorical thought of St. Augustine. In most disciplinary histories, establishing the continuity of the tradition up to and through Augustine would be a simple task of tracing its dissemination through such figures as Cicero, Plotinus, Porphyry, and Victorinus. The primary texts which Augustine would have engaged are filled with descriptions of the structures and movements necessary for psychagogic rhetoric, and the secondary scholarship has demonstrated a pervasive Platonic influence on the thought of the saint.\footnote{312} Frederick van Fleteren has gone so far as to trace the Porphyrian influence on Augustine’s notion of spiritual reformation through liberal arts study as presented in the first three books of On Christian Doctrine (DDC).\footnote{313}

In his own writings, Augustine displays an awareness of the basic “outward, inward, upward” motion of ascent found in Plato and reformed in Plotinus.\footnote{314} He describes such a contemplative ascent after reading the “books of the Platonists” \footnote{315} [platonicorum libros] in the Confessions (7.17.23), and presents a radical transformation of the ascent in conversation with

\footnote{312} Both the primary and secondary texts will be described in more detail below.\footnote{313} “St. Augustine, Neoplatonism, and the Liberal Arts: The Background to De doctrina Christiana.” De doctrina Christiana: A Classic of Western Culture. Ed. Duane W. H. Arnold and Pamela Bright. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995. 14-24.\footnote{314} For example, see Enneads 1.6 “On Beauty”.\footnote{315} Unless otherwise noted, English translations of the Confessions come from the F.J. Sheed translation. I find it especially fitting for this study as it is recommended by notable Augustinian scholars such as Peter Brown and
his mother, Monica, at Ostia (9.10.23). Methodologically, the philological and philosophical evidence to support Augustine as part of this tradition is abundant.

However, rhetorical histories of St. Augustine are somewhat unique regarding the question of Platonism and must be examined closely for the purposes of the present study. Compared to Plato, the secondary rhetorical literature concerning Augustine is fairly small. It is, however, fairly positive in its assessment. Much of that, I would argue, has to do with the noticeable absence of Plato. The vast majority of treatments tend to overlook any connection to Plato and Platonic thought in Augustine’s rhetorical theory, while those that do entertain the question tend to systematically remove Platonic connections from Augustine’s work on rhetoric.


317 For example, Johnson “Isocrates Flowering,” Camargo “Non solum,” and Troup Temporality each either suppose or attempt to demonstrate a substantial distance between Augustine’s rhetorical thought and Platonism. Major recent exceptions have been some investigations by Rita Copeland, which are discussed more fully below.
Temporality, Eternity, and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of Augustine’s Confessions. His arguments present an apparently formidable barrier that it is prudent to deconstruct before reading Augustine’s rhetoric as Platonic. Fortunately the arguments that Troup makes for such a dismissal are easily refuted. But contemplating the uncritical disciplinary reception of his basic assumptions reveals some of the biases that rhetoricians have against Plato and his successors, and the problems to which those biases can lead.

5.1 METHODOLOGY CONCERNING PLATO AND AUGUSTINE

In Temporality, Eternity and Wisdom, Troup dismisses the notion that Saint Augustine was influenced by the Platonists while writing the Confessions. Accordingly, anyone who reads the Confessions as being Neoplatonic in nature reads it incorrectly. This realization would have a profound impact on how one could interpret Augustine’s rhetorical theory. So as not to risk an overly reductive exposition of Troup’s position, it is best to present him on his own terms:

Troup’s Roadblock

Here we arrive at a pivotal point for interpreting the Confessions. Regarding rhetoric, philosophy, and interpretation, the Incarnation contradicts Neoplatonism. Just as the Neoplatonists of Augustine’s day denied the Incarnation, today’s dominant critical debate about the degree of Neoplatonic influence in the Confessions discounts the

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318 Cited above in n.316. This statement is true so far as I am aware, and it is the only book on Augustinian rhetoric consistently cited in the disciplinary literature.
319 This is not to suggest that no one has been critical of Troup’s analysis, though few have. Dave Tell, for example, asserts that Troup’s conclusion about Saint Augustine’s rhetorical theory simply place him, ironically, in a commonplace tradition that finds it roots in Plato. See Tell, “Chair of Lies” 391, 406.
Incarnation as an issue in interpreting the text. Therefore, textual criticism within the terms of the debate produces inadequate readings, for they cannot account for the Incarnation or its grounded and time-bound rhetorical implications.

Readings that presume Neoplatonic ascendancy in the text before they engage it must discount the Incarnation, because any serious attempt to account for the embodied Logos as significant reveals their presumption and explodes the interpretation. The Neoplatonic interpretive paradigm, once imposed upon the Confessions, cannot allow the Incarnation to disrupt the tendency of that paradigm to produce readings of the text that promote the Neoplatonic impulse to escape the material world in pursuit of a purely intellectual, disembodied, and transcendent union with “the One.”

The Neoplatonic impulse is profoundly anti-Incarnational and decidedly antirhetorical. It eschews the human body and the material world as the cause of evil; despises society, community, and human relations; and covets departure from time and space into a transcendent eternity. The incarnational impulse, by contrast, invests the human being – soul and body – with eternal significance in the temporal, social, and communal dimensions of experience.\textsuperscript{320}

If Troup’s basic assumptions are true, St. Augustine should have no place in the present study, since Neoplatonism would be patently incompatible with both rhetorical activity and orthodox Christianity.

Of course, this may just be a problem in terminology. There is no reason that one could not reject the Platonism of Plotinus or Porphyry, but still remain an adherent to the general tenets

\textsuperscript{320} Temporality 5-6.
of Plato and rhetorical psychagogy. In this case, my thesis could continue unchallenged. However, Troup makes it clear that his aim is to purge notions of Plato from Augustine as far as possible: from minimizing Cicero’s indebtedness to Plato;\textsuperscript{321} to arguing for Augustine’s preference for Cicero over Plato;\textsuperscript{322} to Augustine recognizing “himself as a creature, radically other than God, with no internal means of achieving union with God in any Platonic or Neoplatonic sense”;\textsuperscript{323} to concluding that Augustine’s conception of his relationship to God is “anti-Platonic.”\textsuperscript{324} In Troup’s reading, Augustine’s rejection of Platonism is broadly defined.

Troup warns us against identifying latent Neoplatonic systems in Saint Augustine “without textual evidence or contrary to it.”\textsuperscript{325} Rather, he proposes to leave the “terms of the debate” about Platonism behind while returning “to the Confessions itself to inquire directly into Augustine’s work on its own terms and in its own context.”\textsuperscript{326} This is a curious move, since he has just spent a good deal of time supporting the thesis that when Augustine says he rejects rhetoric, what he is really doing is rejecting the Second Sophistic and transforming rhetorical practice.\textsuperscript{327} Where he sees Augustine redeeming rhetoric, the term itself is not to be found.\textsuperscript{328}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid. 16-20.
\item Ibid. 20-23; See especially the interpretation that Troup gives to City of God 2.14 (22). In this chapter, Augustine agrees with Plato’s views on censuring poetry that would dishonor the gods. Augustine goes so far as to “award the palm to a Greek, Plato” [\textit{Graeco Platoni potius palma danda est}] for his views. Augustine closes his argument with a supporting quote from Cicero. Troup argues that Augustine “having drawn on Cicero, diminishes the image of Plato. This passage is particularly important because in it Augustine privileges Cicero’s view over Plato’s, even though the two views are somewhat similar” (\textit{Temporality} 22). In this passage of Augustine, Cicero is clearly used as a secondary source that endorses Plato’s view, and Augustine gives no noticeable endorsement of Cicero over Plato – he does not hand the palm over in any obvious way. This interpretive practice of reading an author in or out of St. Augustine’s good graces when no obvious endorsement or rejection is offered by Augustine is typical of the overall strategy of Troup throughout the book. Translations of City of God are taken from \textit{Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers}, First Series, Vol. 2. Trans. Marcus Dods. Ed. Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. Accessed online 12/10/2013. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120102.htm>. Latin text comes from J.P. Migne, \textit{Patrologia Latina} 42.
\item Ibid. 131.
\item Ibid. 147.
\item Ibid. 35.
\item Ibid. 35.
\item Ibid. 35.
\item This is the basic argument of his Ch. 1 “The Integrity of Philosophy and Rhetoric” (Ibid. 11-35).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Augustine says that he has rejected rhetoric. Conversely, Troup argues that when Augustine advocates appropriating what is true in Platonic philosophy for use in Christianity, as the Israelites did gold from Egypt (7.9.15), what he is really advocating is a wholesale break from Platonism. Surely it is an odd sort of interpretive strategy to take Augustine’s own acknowledged critical appropriation of Neoplatonic principles as really signifying a wholesale dismissal, while also taking his wholesale dismissal of rhetoric as really signifying a critical acceptance. This is simply the presumed antipathy of Plato versus rhetoric transferred onto the interpretive field of St. Augustine’s texts. If we look closer at Troup’s central claim we can see just how powerful the anti-Plato bias truly is.

The central claim upon which Troup’s dismissal of Neoplatonic thought rests is the assumption that Neoplatonism is inherently and essentially anti-Incarnational. It is true the Porphyry and other Platonists rejected the idea of the Incarnation. However Troup transforms this well-known historical fact into an a priori indictment of all who might read Augustine as having appropriated Platonic thought. Such interpreters, he maintains, cannot account for the Incarnation. It is a totalizing indictment that rejects out-of-hand the works of Etienne Gilson,

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328 See the section in Ch. 1 “Confessions Revisited” (Ibid. 28-32). Troup goes so far as to quote St. Augustine’s encounter with the Cicero’s Hortensius, at which point he rejects the style of what is being said for the substance of what is being said, as evidence that what Augustine is really advocating is a union of style and substance (29). The relevant portion of Troup’s text and translation runs as such: “Nor did it impress me by its way of speaking but rather by what it spoke” [neque mihi locutionem, sed quod loquebatur persuaserat] (Conf. 3.4.7). If we take Augustine on his own terms, he was persuaded by what was said, not how it was said. Nowhere do the terms themselves advocate the union of the two. This is not to say that I disagree with Troup’s positive interpretation of rhetoric in the Confessions, but I acknowledge that this interpretation also identifies a latent system, albeit of rhetoric, that runs “contrary to the textual evidence.”

329 Ibid. 69. Granted, Troup admits that St. Augustine “recovered truths of great value from the Neoplatonists” but emphasizes that the “Israelites were not sharing the gold with the Egyptians, they were ‘redeeming’ it from their slave masters. And they left.” However, he gives no indication of what these truths were or how they were redeemed. If Troup means to say that Augustine learned about the immateriality of God and His Trinitarian nature from the Neoplatonists, and rejected their rejection of the Incarnation, that is not a novel position and can be found in many of the contemporary authors that Troup dismisses.
John J. O’Meara, Mary T. Clark, Robert J. O’Connell, and by extension, H.I. Marrou, Pierre Hadot, and van Fleteren, to name a few. The argument and evidence in support of the claim is simple:

For instance, one of the most renowned current scholars in the debate about influence of Neoplatonism on Augustine, Robert J. O’Connell, dismisses the significance of the Incarnation in the *Confessions* (*Odyssey*, 24). Although most scholars are not so explicit, the Incarnation is rarely if ever made central in the interpretation of the *Confessions* and is often ignored entirely.331

The statement is, quite simply, false. But let us be clear on what Troup thinks he finds from taking such a radical departure “from the predominant assumptions guiding interpretation of the *Confessions* on exactly this point.”332 He summarizes the rhetorical significance of the Incarnation for Augustine in this way:

In Augustine’s terms, what he embraces is the speaking, embodied, Logos, who brings eternal wisdom into the contingency of temporal life. This “Lord Jesus Christ” becomes a model for temporal life because through the Incarnation the Logos volitionally enters time to enact and embody eternal principles of goodness and wisdom, producing a coherent and fully integrated life in a world defined by its contingent, temporal frame.333

330 *Temporality* 34.
331 *Ibid.* 6-7. Note that O’Connell is the most controversial of such interpreters writing in 1969.
A few examples of works taken from some of the scholars Troup identifies will suffice to demonstrate that his indictment is fallacious and that his departure from their ideas is not so radical.

5.1.1 The Incarnation and Philosophy in Etienne Gilson

Perhaps the most obvious disconfirming example of Troup’s assumption would be Gilson’s *Philosophie et Incarnation selon saint Augustin*, a published version of his 1947 address to the Institute of Medieval Studies at the University of Montreal. It is a meditation on being and becoming that not only considers the Incarnation as central to the *Confessions*, but considers Augustine’s account of the Incarnation in the *Confessions* as central to philosophy. Benoit Lacroix, an original attendee at the address, summarizes the argument in the most germane terms: “Following his usual method, and expressing himself with his habitual delicacy and depth, the eminent medievalist guided his audience, through the various stages of his research, to the conclusion that philosophy must lead to the Incarnation unless the philosopher is to retrace his steps along a road that can lead only to despair.” Indeed, Gilson appears to prefigure Troup’s own assessment, and deserves to be cited as supporting, not conflicting, with his findings:

God alone has saved Augustine from this despair, because the Christian God is at once He who is, He who creates and He who saves. Philosophy does not lack knowledge of Him who is, and even of Him who creates, but He who saves remains a mystery for philosophers who cannot penetrate its secret. And yet, this mystery alone makes the

334 Institut d’Etudes medievales, Universite de Montreal, 1947.
world intelligible. An historical cause, which itself transcends history and which
nevertheless could desire to be involved in history, in order to transform time into
eternity – how could philosophy grasp such a cause?336

5.1.2 Rhetoric as Theology in John J. O’Meara

O’Meara also continually identifies the significance of the Incarnation in Augustine’s conversion
throughout a number of his works and routinely acknowledges it as one of major differences that
Augustine’s thought has in contrast to that of the Neoplatonists. In “Neoplatonism and the
Conversion of Augustine,”337 O’Meara recognizes that in the Confessions:

Augustine marveled at the similarity, as he thought, between the Neoplatonic principles,
sometimes called the Father and the Father’s mind, and the Christian Father and Word.
He goes on to say that the Platonists did not recognize the Word when it became
incarnate. Their pride could not accept the humiliation of birth of a woman, and still less
death on a cross...They saw whither they were to go, but did not see the way, that is
Christ. He himself, however, although he at first shared in their pride and consequently
their foolishness, did accept Christ, and in that acceptance found strength to overcome all
difficulties.338

336 Translation of Philosophie 54-55, from Benoit “Review” 378.
338 Ibid. 124.
O’Meara acknowledges this contrast as central to Augustine’s theological rhetoric, stating that *both* the similarities and differences that Augustine identifies in the *Confessions* “give at once the history of his conversion and at the same time a statement of an idea, a theme, or τόπος, to which he is ever recurring and which reveals to us the germs of the master-ideas of the great Doctor Gratiae.” More importantly, in “A Master-Motif in Augustine,” O’Meara argues that such a synthesis of Platonist triads and Christian Trinitarian theory could only be possible by a master rhetorician such as Augustine:

It will hardly be disputed that St. Augustine was capable of formulating a synthesis, exploiting its possibilities, and commending it in enthusiastic language to the sympathetic consideration of his fellow men…Augustine had the kind of mind which worked, not meticulously in groping analysis, but universally, if I may say so, in intuitive synthesis. His rhetorical training and profession, moreover, tended to help him in the development of a particular theme, whether by the suggestion involved in antithesis, chiasmus, and alliteration, or the over-elaboration and likewise neglect of detail incidental to hyperbole…Augustine was a mastermind of his age.

But Troup seems to dispute just this point. He argues that St. Augustine *is* incapable of making just this synthesis. In so doing, Troup does not realize that he is not indicting the Platonists, but is instead indicting Augustine’s own rhetorical ability, transforming the saint into a rigid dogmatist who cannot see beyond systematic differences and so has no recourse other than

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wholesale dismissal. Time and time again O’Meara quotes or cites Augustine’s *Letter* 118, which demonstrates that as late as 410 he held no such *a priori* objection to the essence of Platonism on the grounds of the Incarnation, though he did object to certain Platonic philosophers:

> the example of divine humility, which in the fullness of time was furnished by our Lord Jesus Christ – that one example before which, even in the mind [*animo*] of the most headstrong and arrogant, all pride bends, breaks, and dies [17]…The Platonist school of philosophers [*Platonicae gentis philosophos*] felt it necessary to submit with pious homage to Christ and to apprehend the Incarnate Word of God [*et intelligere Verbum Dei homine indutum*] [21]…Then flourished at Rome the school of Plotinus which had as scholars many men of great acuteness and ability. But some of them were corrupted by curious inquiries into magic, and others, recognizing in the Lord Jesus Christ the embodiment of Truth and Wisdom, passed into his service [33].

There is an important lesson here, for this is, I think, a limitation with histories of Augustine’s rhetorical theory in general: they often focus on how his religious conversion transformed his rhetorical theory. Here we are one-upped by the historians of his Neoplatonic appropriations, for they indicate how his rhetorical training enabled his conversion and informed his theology. In synthesizing Platonic thought with orthodox Christianity, Augustine is thus engaged in the

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342 The translation is taken from O’Meara. *The Young Augustine: The Growth of St. Augustine's Mind up to His Conversion*. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Alba House, 2001. 142. Though it appears as a continuous quotation in the text, it is actually a compilation from the letter, which I’ve indicated with the addition of bracketed paragraph markers and ellipses. He often cites the letter, see “Neoplatonism and Conversion” 126 and “Master-Motif” 136. The Latin text is taken from Migne, PL 33.
venerable rhetorical tradition of finding concordance in discordant canons. Rhetoric for Augustine, as for many of the Patristics, was not simply a tool for evangelization; it was a method of theological inquiry.

5.1.3 The Incarnation as Symbolic Communication in Robert J. O’Connell

The final, and most ironic, of the disconfirming examples to Troup’s foundational hypothesis comes from O’Connell himself. To be fair, O’Connell does appear to diminish the importance of the Incarnation in the citation given by Troup. But to be equally fair to O’Connell, Troup ignores what significance he does give to the Incarnation – as a model for symbolic action:

Incarnation, Symbol, and Authority

In this comprehensive economy of return, the ultimate condescension of Divine Providence is Incarnation: The Logos Himself has been “made flesh” to call us back, “remind” us, make us “know again” the happiness we left.

All the works and words of men perform a similar admonitory function. Their effect is to remind the soul, turn its attention from “outer,” sensible realities to “within” itself where it can contact the intelligible Light…fallen into a body and immersed in sense-realities, it must communicate with other souls through the indirect medium of language, gesture, sign, and symbol…

344 Ibid. 28.
Even O’Connell then, who alone among the authors I’ve canvassed appears to diminish the significance of the Incarnation in the *Confessions*, sees the Incarnation as a model for human rhetorical activity. Indeed, the model is very similar to Troup’s own, with notable differences, namely the allusions to Neoplatonism. Troup may disagree with O’Connell’s assessment; he may disagree with the assessments of Gilson and O’Meara as well. We do not know, because he does not engage their thoughts on the issue, nor does he simply ignore their thoughts on the issue; rather, he states that their thoughts on the issue mostly do not exist and cannot exist in any positive sense, but can only exist in antipathy to the Incarnation and to rhetoric. He identifies such an antipathy as a short-coming in the methodology of their analysis, and moves on.

5.1.4 Un-Critical Reception

Misrepresenting the nature of, and subsequently dismissing, the last seventy years of Augustinian studies is a weakness in Troup’s argument to say the least. But the uncritical reception of his characterization signals a problem within the discipline itself. In framing the study as “rhetoric versus Platonism” in the interpretation of St. Augustine, and adjudicating in favor of rhetoric, the work has been heralded as a “dismantling of the Neoplatonic paradigm surrounding the *Confessions*” that demonstrates “that Neoplatonism, as a system of meaning, could not cope adequately with the *Confessions*…”345 As Martin J. Medhurst’s endorsement states “Troup pulls no punches…convincingly demonstrating that anyone who purports to teach Augustine, his

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rhetoric, or his *Confessions* must first understand the centerpiece of Augustine’s thought – the Word incarnate. ”

But no one seems to see that Troup is shadow-boxing. The Incarnation is well accounted for amongst the “Neoplatonizers” of Augustine, even if some do not make it the focus of their study, and his rhetoric is as well. Rather, concerning Neoplatonic philosophy, Troup shows only that Porphyry likely would not have enjoyed the *Confessions*, for it was he who was unable to reconcile the Incarnation with his system of philosophy. As a discipline, we seem only too happy to make the equation of Gilson and O’Meara to Plato and Porphyry, and thereby uncritically accept the assessment of an Augustinian rhetoric sanitized of its Platonic elements. But such a wholesale dismissal gravely under-appreciates both the internal struggle that Augustine underwent concerning just these issues, as well as his own genius in reconciling the one mode of thought with the other. What is more, it quarantines insightful scholarship that can inform our own. Ultimately, dismissing the Platonic aspects that Augustine does embrace greatly impoverishes our ability to understand his rhetorical psychology. If he can profoundly transform rhetorical theories, he can also transform Platonic ones – especially when he repeatedly tells his readers to take from just these philosophies what is good and useful.

Thus I propose an opposite strategy for interpreting St. Augustine. Rather than systematically removing Platonic elements from his rhetoric, we should attempt to identify them as much as we attempt to identify any other aspects of the acceptance and transformation of the rhetorical tradition in his work.

346 *Temporality* dust jacket material.
347 See *Confessions* 7.9.15 and *DDC* 2.40.60. As van Fleteren points out, “One of the ironies of Augustine’s thought is that he understood the role of God incarnate in terms of the philosophy of a pagan who explicitly denied its possibility” (“St. Augustine, Neoplatonism, and the Liberal Arts” 22).
5.2 THE TRANSMISSION OF THE PLATONIC TRADITION

In this section I survey the confluence of rhetorical and Platonic thought in a number of the key sources that Augustine cites as influential to his intellectual and spiritual development. I do this in order to establish that Augustine had been introduced to the concepts and vocabulary necessary to produce the foundations of a distinct branch of intellectual activity that Richard McKeon claims was an integral part of the rhetorical tradition in the Middle ages: “the tradition of philosophers and theologians who found in Augustine a Platonism reconstructed from the Academic and Neoplatonic philosophies (conscientiously reversing the process by which they were derived from Plato’s doctrines) and formulated in terms refurbished and simplified from Cicero’s rhetorical distinctions.”

5.2.1 Cicero

The secondary literature on Ciceronian rhetoric is massive and I have neither the space nor the need to review it here. What concerns me at this point is the explicit material about Platonic thought that is present in those texts of Cicero with which St. Augustine would have been familiar. For this reason, Cicero takes up the largest portion of this review, since in following O’Meara’s principle of interpretation, I find most of what I need from Plato in Cicero himself: “in the matter of tracing Plotinian influence (and this holds true for all Platonist influence here) on Augustine…one should always ask oneself what may be inspired by Cicero.”

348 “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,” 4.
As the major portion of my analysis of Augustine focuses on the *Confessions* and *De doctrina christiana* (*DDC*), I will confine my review of Cicero’s works to those Augustine is known to have read prior to 395. Of particular concern is evidence of those structures that have been identified in the previous chapters. In the case of Cicero that means a survey of the tripartite condition of the soul and the four virtues of the *Republic*. I do not claim this review to be anywhere near exhaustive, as Cicero often recounts these topics in a number of works, with two of the most important – the *Academica* and the *Hortensius* – being either incomplete or completely fragmented. I do, however, hold the review to be minimally representative of the Platonic elements and terminology that Augustine would have encountered in diligently reading Cicero’s works. Ultimately, I find what I need in texts other than those that are incomplete and can only speculate that further knowledge of those texts would reveal a more complete grounding in the tenets of Platonism.

5.2.1.1 The Tripartite Soul in the *Tusculan Disputations*

Cicero describes the tripartite soul explicitly in the *Tusculan Disputations*, stating that “Plato, the teacher of Xenocrates, made the soul threefold [*triplicem finxit animum*], placing its sovereign, reason [*rationem*], in the head [as in a citadel]; while he separated the two parts subject to its command, anger [*iram*] and desire [*cupiditatem*], giving to anger its seat in the breast [*pectore*], and to desire, under the diaphragm [*praecordia*]” (1.20).351

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One prominent omission or transformation in the Latin account that concerns this study is the absence of the “love of honor” in the middle part. However, the motive that honor presents is prominent in the *Disputations*. Cicero tells us early on that “Honor nourishes the arts, and all are inflamed by the love of glory *ad studia gloria* to the pursuits by which it may be won” (1.4). He subsequently describes how although the Greeks prided musicians above all else, the Romans gave the greatest honors to the orator (1.4-5). Thus he overtly connects a desire for honor with the practice of oratory which we will later see in the *Confessions*. In the second book, Cicero addresses honor in terms similar to the Platonic definition of courage in that it urges acknowledging what is to be valued and what is to be feared. However, this is a particularly Stoic permutation as what is despised as disgraceful is succumbing to pain.

Later in the second book, Cicero introduces the concept of a more general bipartite soul, in which the lower [*demissus/humilis*], weaker [*languidus*] part must be controlled by reason, in order to control pain “as a master commands his servant, or as the general his soldier, or as a father his son [*vel ut dominus servo vel ut imperator militi vel ut parens filio*]” (2.47-48). Finally, while discussing the passions that effect the rational functioning of the soul in the fourth book, Cicero again refers to a general two-fold distinction in between the rational and irrational parts, placing reason in the one and specifying anger’s place alongside desire in the other (4.10).352

Thus, Augustine would have encountered the basic vocabulary and conceptual structuring of the tripartite soul – though somewhat disjointed and reduced – in the *Tusculan Disputations*, if

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352 Augustine echoes both the tripartite division of the first book and the bipartite division of the fourth later in the *City of God* (14.19).
nowhere else within the Ciceronian corpus.\textsuperscript{353} The concept of honor, however, seems somewhat abstracted from the middle part with which it was joined in the Platonic psychology. Although it is still connected with the warriorly attitude, it is also identified with rational virtue as a whole. The structure of virtue and a partial rehabilitation of the middle part of the Platonic soul will be our next consideration.

\textbf{5.2.1.2 The Virtues in \textit{De Inventione}}

Virtue as a topic is discussed throughout the \textit{Tusculan Disputations}, \textit{De Officiis}, and elsewhere in Cicero’s writings, but perhaps the most systematic and compact treatment occurs in \textit{De Inventione}. Investigated for the purpose of rhetorical invention, a lengthy discussion of the four virtues that were the focus of the \textit{Republic} – prudence, justice, courage [\textit{fortitudo}], and temperance – takes place in \textit{De Inventione} 2.159-165. Here Cicero again defines the virtues as honorable [\textit{honestum}] (2.159) and lays out the definition of each virtue, further identifying and defining its parts. For instance “Temperance is a firm and well-considered control exercised by the reason over lust [\textit{libidinem}] and other improper [\textit{non rectum}] impulses of the mind. Its parts are continence, clemency, and modesty” (2.164).\textsuperscript{354}

The explication of courage is very important for the argument that Augustine repairs the balanced integrity, if not of the tripartite soul specifically, then of the triple motivations of the soul which cause the will to act in ways analogous to Plato’s tripartite structure:

\textsuperscript{353} Cicero also relates the divisions of the soul more abstractly through his partial translation of the \textit{Timaeus} ($§44=\textit{Tim.} \ 42a-b$), but there is no evidence that Augustine read this translation prior to 410. See O’Donnell “Classical Readings.”

Courage is the quality by which one undertakes dangerous tasks and endures hardships. Its parts are highmindedness \[\text{magnificentia}\], confidence \[\text{fidentia}\], patience, perseverance. Highmindedness consists in the contemplation and execution \[\text{cogitatio atque administratio}\] of great and sublime \[\text{magnarum et excelsarum}\] projects with a certain grandeur and magnificence of imagination \[\text{animi}\]. Confidence \[\text{fidentia}\] is the quality by which in important and honourable undertakings the spirit \[\text{animus}\] has placed great trust in itself with a resolute hope of success. Patience is a willing and sustained endurance \[\text{perpessio}\] of difficult and arduous tasks for a noble and useful end. Perseverance is a firm and abiding persistence in a well-considered plan of action \[\text{in ratione bene considerate}\]. (2.163)

Therefore, in the virtue that was once assigned to the spirited element, we still see all the distinctive features that had been located there: honor, administrative acumen, executive power, endurance and self-esteem. However, we now see added to it notions of a certain magnanimity of the soul. The constellation of ideas, I argue, will be crucial for understanding St. Augustine’s psychology of rhetoric.

5.2.2 The Platonists

Compared to Cicero, the secondary literature on rhetoric and the Neoplatonists – such as Plotinus and Porphyry – is noticeably scant. That is not to say that it is non-existent, but it can be quickly reviewed. Given Troup’s assertion that Neoplatonism is intrinsically anti-rhetorical, it should be. Reference to Neoplatonic commentaries on Hermogenes and Minucianus and other works by the likes of Porphyry, Iamblichus and their successors appear throughout Kennedy’s 1983 *Greek
Carol Poster dedicates a chapter to the subject in her 1994 dissertation, noting the paucity of research on the subject despite the historical influence that Platonic thought had on late classical rhetorical theorizing. She opines that “perhaps the most significant cause for this idiosyncrasy in our historical perspective is the current hostility to philosophy (and especially Platonism in all its incarnations) common among specialists in classical rhetoric.” The bias has seemed to endure in the main, though Malcolm Heath has provided some noticeable contributions by translating the fragments of Porphyry’s rhetorical work on stasis theory and providing a summary study about those fragments. But even he must admit that the commentary “has inevitably focused on technical details that readers unfamiliar with the intricacies of issue-theory are likely to find confusing, if not positively repellent.”

However, like with Cicero, I am not here constrained by the lack of secondary literature on Neoplatonic rhetorical theory, as I need only identify some key concepts in the primary texts. Specifically, I’d like to show that Augustine had access to some of the transcendental writings of the Neoplatonists that transmitted the basic movements of the soul’s ascent from its embodied state to the divine plain of God. Fortunately, this has been well attested to by the historians of philosophy and theology that were the topic of the previous section on methodology.

357 The case is a bit different concerning the effect of Platonic philosophy on Medieval histories of rhetoric, which I will discuss in the next section on Victorinus and the next chapter on Saint Bonaventure.
359 “Porphyry’s Rhetoric” 166.
5.2.2.1 Ascent and Conversion in Plotinus

As for who exactly the Platonists were that influenced Augustine and which readings he had access to, there has been much debate. For the current study, all I need is John J. O’Meara’s assessment that, “There is general agreement nowadays that Augustine in 386 read among other treatises of Plotinus that On Beauty (Ennead 1:6)” as well as some Porphyry,\textsuperscript{360} and it is to these early works that Augustine attributes the ability to conceive of an discarnate, transcendent God.

On Beauty itself is a collage of Platonic psychagogic imagery. John Dillon and Lloyd P. Gerson indicate numerous references or allusions to the central psychagogic dialogues that we have focused on in the previous chapter – Phaedrus, Republic, Symposium, and even Gorgias.\textsuperscript{361} However, the opening of the Ennead offers a key allusion that they miss. It brings clearly to mind the passage of the Timaeus (47c-e) concerning the ability of words to reorder the hierarchy of the soul, and makes such sense perceptions the first step in the soul’s ascent. Note the subtle tripartite structure of “outward” sense perception, “inward” moral and mental reflection and “upward” transcendence:

Beauty addresses itself chiefly to sight; but there is a beauty for the hearing too, as in certain combinations of words [logos syntheseis] and in all kinds of music, for melodies and cadences are beautiful; and minds that lift [ano] themselves above the realm of sense to a higher order are aware of beauty in the conduct of life, in actions, in character, in the

\textsuperscript{360} Young Augustine 131.
pursuits of the intellect; and there is the beauty of the virtues. What loftier beauty there may be, yet, our argument will bring to light. (§1)\textsuperscript{362}

Gerson and Dillon alert us to the importance of the concept of “turning” one’s attention as a propaedeutic for this ascent in terms synonymous to \textit{periagoge}: “The word ἐπιστρέφει, a central term in Plotinus’ philosophy and Neoplatonism in general, indicates a reorienting of the soul in the direction of the One, away from other objects of desire.”\textsuperscript{363}

In \textit{On Beauty} alone the concept of turning or reorienting appears at three important spots. First, Plotinus opens the investigation into beauty as a means of ascent by asking “What is it, then, that moves the eyes of spectators and turns [\textit{epistrephei}] them towards it and draws them on and makes them rejoice at the sight?” (§1).\textsuperscript{364} Second, he tells us that “We must, then, ascend [\textit{anabateon}] to the Good, which every soul [\textit{psyche}] desires…the attainment of it is for those who ascend upward and revert [\textit{epistrapheisi}] to it and who divest themselves of the garments they put on when they descended [\textit{katabainontes}]” (§7).\textsuperscript{365} Finally, Plotinus warns the ascending contemplative to “go and follow inside [\textit{eiso}], leaving outside the sight of his eyes, not allowing himself to turn back [\textit{epistrephon}] to the splendor of the bodies he previously saw” (§8).\textsuperscript{366}

Of course, Augustine tells us that he was reading the Latin translations of Victorinus, whom we will discuss next, so we can’t be certain that keywords carry the same weight. But insofar as Victorinus was a knowledgeable Neoplatonist and an attentive rhetorical theorist, it is

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{English Translation from Stephen Mackenna and B. S. Page. \textit{The Enneads}. 2d ed. London: Faber and Faber, 1956. I use McKenna’s translation in general for its noted poetic quality, however, at some points, when noted, I use the translation offered by Dillon and Gerson cited above (n.361), which stays closer to the literal Greek text.}
\footnote{“I 6 (1) On Beatuy” 19 n.5.}
\footnote{This translation comes from Dillon and Gerson. It was in reference to this particular passage that they noted the importance of reorientation in Plotinus’ philosophy.}
\footnote{Dillon and Gerson translation.}
\footnote{Dillon and Gerson translation.}
\end{footnotes}
a likely conjecture that Augustine would have been exposed to the central idea of “turning around” or “converting” one’s orientation as a propaedeutic for ascent. His own focus on conversion would suggest as much. Especially as he uses similar terms in the description of his own ascent in Book VII of the *Confessions*, which he was able to undergo with the help of God after reading the books of the Platonists: “Being admonished by all this to return [redire] to myself, I entered into my own depths, with You as my guide…and with the eye of my soul [anima], such as it was, I saw Your unchangeable Light shining over the same eye of my soul [anima], over my mind [mentem]” (7.10.16).

Ultimately, the entire *Ennead* 1.6 goes through the outward, inward, upward motion, and the psychic movement is summarized in the final sections, moving from beautiful external images (§8), to contemplating beautiful actions, then beautiful souls, to the beauty of the Forms, to the first principle of all Forms, the Good (§9). It is a variation of the of Diotima’s Ladder, on which Augustine offers his own variation (7.17.23). In the same passage, Augustine tells us that he could not maintain his sight turned towards God and ultimately “returned [redditus] to his old habits.” We should not, however, be too hasty to attribute any particular failure to Augustine in this return; nor speculate that he abandoned hope of union with God. As Pierre Hadot points out, commenting on the fact that Porphyry only knew Plotinus to have achieved such a union four times in his life and himself only once (*Life of Plotinus* 23.1-27), “This goal can be achieved

367 See O’Meara’s claim in reference to Plotinian *epistrophe* and Augustine’s notion of conversion: “In particular the term *conversio*, ‘turning to,’ was for him an emotional touchstone of deep and lasting importance. The *Confessions* is the story of his own and everyman’s conversion to God. The *City of God* is the same theme writ large in terms of all angels and humanity that ever was or will be. The intellectual inspiration is in Plotinus” (“The Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine” 38).
368 Michael P. Foley, annotating the Sheed translation, also notes similarities as well as differences to *Ennead* 5.1.11. See Sheed translation 133n.100.
during life, but only very rarely. It is a precise experience, which is transitory and cannot last.”369

If anything, Augustine addresses this particular failure in the Plotinian system of ascent based on rational contemplation that only few can accomplish and only rarely. Here I follow O’Meara who argues that at least as late as the *City of God*, “Augustine held the view that the Neo-Platonists, observing that the mass of men were incapable of raising themselves to a life of purgation and intellectual contemplation, supposed that there must be some Mediator between the Father and mankind, some commanding authority, some universal way of the soul’s deliverance.”370 Thus, blinded by their pride, Porphyry and others were wrong to reject Jesus as the Mediator between humanity and the Godhead. For Augustine, the Incarnation presented not the easiest way towards a sustained union, but the only Way. But this, perhaps, only the rhetorician could see. St. Augustine’s role, then, was not to lead others in an ascent to God, but to turn others in a conversion to Christ.

5.2.2.2 Porphyry’s Rhetoric

Among the several of Porphyry’s fragments on issue theory, there is one in particular that bears heavily on the psychagogic tradition and on the rhetorical significance that St. Augustine might have seen both in the Incarnation and in the duties of the rhetor: “Since speech *[logou]* is thought to have a soul *[psychen]* and a body *[soma]*, one could justly regard the invention of thoughts as the soul of speech and expression as its body.”371 This seems to be a fairly important evolution of *Sophist* 263e which identifies speech as thoughts uttered aloud instead of to oneself.

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370 *Young Augustine* 139.
For it introduces, or at least transmits, the notion of speech as ensouled and embodied and at the same time appears to reduce the rhetorical canons down to two – invention and expression. 372

As we will see, whether or not Augustine was aware that the formulation traces back to Porphyry, his appropriation of this scheme signals the psychagogic nature of his rhetorical theory and helps to elucidate its details.

5.2.3 Marius Victorinus

Scholarly interest in Victorinus has come in a couple of waves over the last fifty years. By far the largest wave was from the late sixties to the early eighties as an offshoot of the wider interest in Neoplatonism and St. Augustine. The high-water mark of this theological and philosophical interest included a number of important studies by Pierre Hadot,373 and the translation of Victorinus’ Trinitarian works into English, as well as a number of critical essays, by Mary T. Clark.374 More recently, historians of rhetoric have shown interest in Victorinus’ work as portions of his Explanationes, or commentary of Cicero’s De inventione have been published in two collections in the last ten years along with contemporary scholarly commentary.375

372 Alcidamas comes close when he compares a spoken speech to a live body, versus written speech compared to a statue (On the Sophists 28).
Understanding both the theological and rhetorical thought of Victorinus will help to immediately contextualize Augustine’s psychagogic theory.

5.2.3.1 Language, Psychology and Trinitarian Thought

In order to situate Victorinus’ thought on the Trinity, it is useful to understand the development of Trinitarian thought before him. As early as the first century philosophical writing of Philo, we see the dual sense of the *logos endiathetos* and *logos prophorikos* being associated both with the inner/outer word of man and the indwelling and expressed Word of God.376 As Trinitarian theory developed in the pre-Nicene Fathers, these dual senses of *logos* become an important early attempt at understanding the relationship of the Father and the Son by way of an analogy to human thought and speech. Explicit employment of the *endiathetos* and *prophorikos* in order to explain the Father-Son relationship can be found in Theophilus (*Ad Autolycum* 2.10; 2.22), while less technical talk of a two-stage *logos* can be found in Tatian (*Oratio* 5) and other second century apologists. In addition, Tertullian utilizes the Latin *sermo* and *ratio* to make much the same analysis (*Adversus Praxeum* 5). This interpretive strain is ultimately condemned by Irenaeus (*Against Heresies* 2.13.3-10) and rejected by later Fathers due to the subordination of the Son to the Father that was suggested by the terminology.377

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The internal/uttered word analogy made way for other, triadic, psychological analogies that avoided the subordination problems. Marius Victorinus suggested the first such analogy by way of the Neoplatonic noetic triad of being, life, and intellect [esse-vivere-intelligere] as a psychological analogy through which we could begin to understand the interactions between the three Persons of the Godhead. In so doing, according to Marcia Colish, he “maintains the intellectualism implicit in the Greek patristic use of the Stoic notions of logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos while he expands the functions of spiritual beings to include not only speech and intellection but also action, energy, and motion,” an innovation that “has important implications for human psychology as well as Trinitarian theology.”

That St. Augustine became familiar with Platonism through the translations of Victorinus and that he was influenced by his conversion he tells us explicitly in the Confessions (8.2.3-5, 8.4.9). To what extent his own theology is influenced by Victorinus is less clear. He appears to accept Victorinus’ psychological analogy of being-life-intellect as both psychological constituents of the self (Soliloquies 2.1.1) and in some way analogically indicative of the trinity (De trinitate 6.11; 10.13). Moreover, he indicates that even in the deprived state of his youth he had some sense of that unity that formed him for “I was [eram]; I lived [vivebam]; I felt [sentiebam]” (1.20.31). However accepting Augustine might be of this triad, he offers a more historically influential variation as the paradigmatic analogy between human psychology and the

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379 Sentio can be used as a synonym for intellego, but primarily indicates sense perception whereas intellego primarily indicates mental perception. That a connection is meant here between the two types of perception is demonstrated when Augustine adds that “in my interior sense [interiore sensu] I kept guard over the integrity of my outward sense perception, and in small thought upon small matters I had come to delight in the truth” (1.20.31).
Divine Trinity: being-knowledge-will [esse-nosse-velle] (13.11.12). He does connect this triad with that of Victorinus in the same passage, stating that, “I am a being that knows and wills: I know that I am and that I will: I will to be and to know. In these three there is inseparable life, one life [vita], one mind [mens], one essence [essentia].” In so doing, however, he reorders Victorinus’ triad.381

5.2.3.2 Neoplatonic Rhetorical Theory

As with the theological writings, it is not clear if Saint Augustine was familiar with Victorinus’ rhetorical texts. However, Augustine does mention Victorinus in the DDC as one of those scholars who had beneficially appropriated Neoplatonic thought for the service of the Church (2.40.60), thus connecting him with his own rhetorical theory at least indirectly. Rita Copeland argues in support of the conjecture that Victorinus’ rhetorical work provided an important precedent for Augustine by integrating Neoplatonic concepts into Cicero’s justification of rhetorical activity.382 The opening of Cicero’s De inventione itself is reminiscent of the Isocratean “Hymn to Logos” (Nicocles 5-9) as it argues that eloquence has allowed humanity to elevate itself above its original animal nature (1.1.2-1.3.5). But there is a strong undercurrent of Plato, as he articulates the common-place that wisdom without eloquence is unable to help society very much, while eloquence without wisdom is actually dangerous (1.1.1; 1.2.3; 1.3.4).

380 Although the permutation memory, intellect, will [memoria, intellegentia, voluntas] is more influential still. See De trinitate 10.11.17.
381 Although these structural shifts may be significant, it should be remembered that Augustine articulates the original, Neoplatonic order as early as the Soliloquies and as late as De trinitate. The point here is that Augustine is capable of reordering the triad and finds it appropriate to do so when discussing his own psychological analogy, as he does at De trinitate 10.18
What he advocates then is a union of wisdom and eloquence; a union that neither Plato nor Isocrates would deny, though they might argue over concerns of balance and definition.

What latent Platonism there might be in Cicero’s early rhetorical writing is brought to the fore by Victorinus, who transforms Cicero’s argument of utility and ethics to one of metaphysics and psychagogic transcendence. As Hadot notes, Victorinus transforms virtue from conformity with the “immanent Logos” to the “pure, intelligible, and transcendent essence”\(^{383}\) that our soul once knew before being embodied, it “is conformity to the logos without doubt, but it is above all a return to our original nature.”\(^{384}\) Building upon Hadot, Copeland argues that the “redefinition of virtue enables Victorinus to elaborate Cicero’s fable of the origins of rhetoric in the persuasive powers of a sage who used his eloquence to tap the virtue inherent in (as yet) uncivilised people (\textit{De inv. 1.2.2})”\(^{385}\)

In explaining the process of the sage’s salvific endeavor, Victorinus reworks some familiar Platonic metaphors. Much like Porphyry, he likens eloquence to the embodiment of wisdom, arguing that “Every perfect good \([\textit{Omne perfectum bonum}]\)…attains its full essence through two things: the thing itself \([\textit{re ipsa}]\), and its external form \([\textit{specie}]\) and image \([\textit{imagine}]\),” and for the sage and those who follow him, wisdom is “the thing itself” and eloquence the “external form.”\(^{386}\) Moreover, Victorinus tells us of the possibility of literally embodied persuasion, through the life and actions of the sage: “Wisdom \([\textit{sapientia}]\) by itself can be persuasive \([\textit{persuadet}]\) about something in two ways. It may be silent \([\textit{tacet}]\), and somebody else imitates \([\textit{imitatur}]\) something that wisdom does, because it is good…or it may persuade by

\(^{383}\) Hadot, \textit{Marius Victorinus} 82. My translation.


\(^{385}\) “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 242.

words.”

So, Victorinus raises the Platonic notion of a fully integrated rhetoric – thought, word and deed – though Cicero denies that a silent, ineloquent wisdom would be enough to bring about such a societal conversion.

It is on this point that Victorinus, and indeed Cicero, is the most psychagogic; for in commenting on Cicero’s statement that an ineloquent wisdom could not have “suddenly [subito] turned [converteret] them away from what they were used to and led [traduceret] them to a very different way of life.” Victorinus tells us that this is a token quality of rhetoric: “Great is the power [Magna vis] of eloquence, if it causes sudden conversion [subito converteret] – this is what wisdom cannot do [quod non potest sapienta]. Elsewhere, wisdom too is effective, but not suddenly.”

Factor in the overall theme of a sage who remembers the nature of his soul and uses eloquence to turn others back towards their own true nature, and you have the Allegory of the Cave retold through Cicero by Victorinus. Although we cannot be sure that Augustine read this work, we can agree with Copeland that “Victorinus’ commentary could thus provide a certain philosophical, if not explicitly theological, platform for a transposition of rhetorical principles into a Christian hermeneutics,” and, I would add, psychagogic praxis.

5.2.4 The Cure of Souls

Before I depart from the traditional sources that St. Augustine would have been familiar with, it is worth noting a recent study published by Paul R. Kolbet, *Augustine and the Cure of Souls*. Kolbet’s study also looks at psychagogy from Plato to Augustine, but the scope is much

\[\text{387 “Marius Victorinus” 117; Rhetores 163, lines 23-34.}  
\[\text{388 “Marius Victorinus” 118; Rhetores 163, line 43 to 164, line 1.}  
\[\text{389 “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 243.}  
\[\text{390 Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010.}  
\]
different. He focuses not on the technical aspects that such a practice might entail, but looks at
the wider concept of “healing souls through words” that we located in the temperate aspect of the
logos. As such, the transmission of the tradition he traces runs along quite a different trajectory
meant not to establish Augustine’s direct reception, but rather to paint a general picture of the
intellectual landscape in which Augustine would have functioned.

It is worth rehearsing the figures through which Kolbet weaves his somewhat
asynchronous history of psychagogy, finding echoes, traces, and direct appropriations in the
writings of the Second Sophistic sophist Dio,391 who “presented himself as a physician who
brought with him medicine truly curative of the soul and productive of the moral good”;392 the
Epicurean philosopher and poet Philodemus,393 whose “handbook provides a number of
guidelines clarifying the optimal use of speech by members of the Epicurean community in the
cure of the soul”;394 Maximus of Tyre,395 who stated that “a genuine teacher would ‘rouse young
men’s souls and guide…their ambitions’ through instruction (λόγος) that is not ‘lax or slovenly
or casual, but so combines appeals to both character (ἠθεὶ) and emotion’ (πάθει) that it compels
them ‘to rise and share its fervor’”;396 the Stoic philosopher Seneca,397 whose “exposition of the
nature of the links between philosophical doctrines, affections, and moral exhortation supplies
important presuppositions for his practice of spiritual guidance”;398 and Plutarch,399 who “in the
familiar language of Plato’s cave…proposes that people who have resided in utter darkness can

391 Ibid. 19-24.
392 Ibid. 21.
393 Ibid. 42-44.
394 Ibid. 43.
395 Ibid. 44-45.
396 Ibid. 44. Quoting Maximus of Tyre Dissertation 1.8.
397 Ibid. 46-56.
398 Ibid. 46.
399 Ibid. 57-61.
only come to see the truth in all its brilliance when they are introduced to it gradually." Kolbet demonstrates the transmission of Platonic metaphors and psychagogic concerns that surrounded the general philosophical and rhetorical environment throughout much of the intervening period between Cicero and Augustine.

5.3 THE PLATONIC NATURE OF SAINT AUGUSTINE’S RHETORIC

With some notable exceptions – like the studies of Copeland and van Fleteren mentioned above – Platonic thought is often overlooked or overtly rejected as a source for St. Augustine’s rhetorical theorizing. However, with the tradition of psychagogic rhetoric firmly established within Augustine’s own admitted influences, I will now review the conclusions of some of the more prominent studies of his rhetoric and demonstrate that they situate the saint squarely within that tradition, rather than apart from it. This does not mean a refutation or a rejection of these sources or their findings – in most cases, I agree with them completely. But I also maintain that they are incomplete and abstracted from a wider tradition that would help to shine light on them. Thus, I do not wish to rob Augustine of any claim to innovation, but simply want to claim that his rhetorical thought is informed by a tradition that he himself transforms.

5.3.1 Rhetoric as Love

Perhaps the most obvious intersection between observations of Augustine’s rhetoric and what we can readily admit of Plato’s is the equation of rhetoric with love. This is one of the key points of

400 Ibid. 58.
the *Phaedrus*: the transformation of *eros* into *philia*. Thus, when Murphy holds that “there is no possible rhetorical technique or skill that can be learned (or taught) that will equip one human heart to speak to another heart. Only Christian love (*caritas*) can supply this interconnection,”401 a similar sentiment equating the effectiveness of rhetorical activity with the intimate loving relationship between souls could be made about Platonic psychagogy. This is a common assessment of Augustine’s rhetoric, because it is true – he is preoccupied with the proper orientation of our affections. But this is exactly because he is a psychagogue. Similar observations can be found in Copeland, who draws attention to the distinction that Augustine makes between *cupiditas* and *caritas* in Book I of the *DDC*,402 and in Troup, who argues that “The means by which the Incarnation moves Augustine toward true rhetoric – rhetoric in the service of wisdom – is love (*caritas*).”403

Camargo offers a variation of this theme – speaking for the benefit of the audience: “It follows that we become most like Christ when we too love our neighbors in such a way that we use them to their advantage rather than our own, although such use is also to our advantage, since God rewards us for it.”404 Speaking for the benefit of the audience, and the indirect benefit that such activity bestows on the speaker, is one of the traits of the temperate aspects of the *logos* that were observed in the last chapter. Indeed, the benefit of the beloved was one of the key themes in the *Phaedrus* speeches. Thus, when Farrell argues that this “is one of the startling differences between classical rhetoric and Augustine’s sacramental Christian rhetoric. In the classical attitude, the end of discourse is always victory for the speaker…With Augustine, the

401 “Metarhetorics” 208.
402 “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 243.
403 *Temporality* 115. Compare this to McCoy’s observation that “in some sense, the forms are the real ‘rhetoricians’: they alone have the power to move the soul” (*Plato on Rhetoric* 191).
404 “Non solum” 402.
good and the just are presupposed, and the purpose of discourse is to utter that truth for the good of the audience." He is perhaps right in that it sets Augustine apart but from the practicing civic orators of his day, but he is wrong if by “startling differences” he is suggesting that there is no precedent in the classical tradition.

5.3.2 The “Platonic Heresy”

In one of the earlier articles on Augustine’s rhetoric in the contemporary discipline, Murphy warns against characterizing Augustine as a proponent of the “Platonic Heresy.” He generates this term to contrast with the so-called “Sophistic Heresy” that Augustine is ostensibly reacting against, the notion that style is sufficient for rhetorical success without regard to content. Its counter-heresy, exemplified in Plato’s Gorgias according to Murphy, is the notion that “the man possessed of truth will be able to communicate his ideas effectively because he does know the truth.” Murphy believed that Augustine rejected both rhetorical heresies, and I agree with him. But I bring it up because this is a rather ironic theme that ties Augustine to the Platonic rhetorical tradition as it is usually perceived. That is to say, scholars seem to perennially characterize Augustine as a Platonic heretic. For instance, Fortin argues that Augustine inverts the Ciceronian duties of the orator so that teaching takes priority over delighting and persuading. In fact, Fortin goes so far as to maintain that “The duty to teach is not merely the Christian orator’s first duty, it is his highest and in a sense his only duty. The preacher will have accomplished all that is essentially required of him if what he teaches is the truth.” Camargo

405 “Rhetoric(s)” 282.
407 “Christianization” 28.
408 “Problem” 92.
also sees Augustine as clearly subordinating the other duties to that of teaching.\textsuperscript{409} It is true that Augustine reoriented the duties, and in a sense, it is true that he gave teaching the truth priority – this will be discussed in the next section. However, amongst rhetoricians, as Murphy points out, doing so should more closely associate Augustine with Plato, not separate the two.

\textbf{5.3.3 The Integrity of Rhetorical Activity}

The vast majority of scholars situate Augustine outside of Murphy’s rhetorical heresies, as a theorist who sought to integrate disparate aspects of public and intellectual life within the functions of rhetorical activity. Indeed, Murphy himself coined the terms in order to illustrate that Augustine argued for a union of wisdom and eloquence, thought and expression, matter and form, etc.\textsuperscript{410} The union can be found in abundance, articulated in Murphy, Kennedy, Troup, etc.\textsuperscript{411} But as Tell rightly points out, while the identification of this union in Augustine “is surely correct…it is also repetitive: Cicero and Quintilian made similar claims, as did Plato before them”\textsuperscript{412} and we have added Porphyry and Victorinus to that list. This union definitely positions Augustine in the Platonic tradition, but it can’t be his sole claim to innovation.

Camargo offers some indication of Augustine’s further innovations for the integrity of rhetoric in his discussion of the “embodied truth” in the orator’s imitation of Christ. Thus, the preacher’s “own good life is the Christian orator’s most powerful means of persuasion.”\textsuperscript{413} Importantly, he points to Victorinus as a prime illustration of such “incarnate rhetoric” because

\textsuperscript{409} “Non Solum” 406-407.
\textsuperscript{410} See “Christianization,” especially 29; and “Debate” especially 409.
\textsuperscript{411} In addition to Murphy, see Kennedy \textit{Classical Rhetoric} 152; Troup, \textit{Temporality} especially 6, 16.
\textsuperscript{412} “Chair of Lies” 406.
\textsuperscript{413} “Non solum” 403.
although Augustine never heard his words, he was persuaded by his example. This is a subtler line of Platonic rhetorical theory, but one that we have discovered in the writings of Victorinus himself and in Laches’ refusal to listen to anyone whose actions did not accord with their speech.

Troup brings both these unions together later in his analysis. He notes that in addition to knowledge and eloquence Augustine realizes that he must also add “control of fleshly desires.” Ultimately, following this rhetorical scheme means “serious consideration of the Incarnation on Augustine’s terms, a union of form, substance, and morality.” As we have seen, these terms are meant to be in opposition to those of Platonism, but what Troup articulates here is the courageous aspect of the logos that demands integrity of thought, word and deed.

Perhaps the most complete integration is that offered by Johnson, who in trying to demonstrate that Augustine was more influenced by Isocrates than Plato, defined his rhetoric in the most Platonic terms possible. I have no disagreement with the notion that Isocrates, through Cicero, also exerted influence on Augustine; for I do not see the two theorists as mutually exclusive. But, surely, to come to the conclusion that for Augustine, if “the communitas was to become a reality, the voluntates of individuals had to be chastened, enlightened, encouraged, and unified,” is to give more credit to Plato than we perhaps realize. The bettering of the community by making individual souls wise, courageous, temperate, and integrated (i.e. “just”) is the very definition of the Platonic rhetorical project. The notion of Augustine’s rhetoric as aimed at entire psychic unity is echoed by Tell, who argues that in the Confessions “the place of rhetoric is figured not so much by its relationship to wisdom as by its relationship to the self.”

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414 Ibid. 406.
415 Temporality 73.
416 Ibid. 83.
417 “Isocrates Flowering” 228.
Thus, Tell sees Augustine as choosing between a distended, dispersed self, “whose professions distend the self; and a gathered self that confesses, and whose confessions gather the self.”

5.3.4 Reduction to Invention and Expression

An important variant of the integration theme that highlights the inextricable union between thoughts and words is the realization that in DDC St. Augustine reduces the canons of rhetoric to two— invention and expression. This observation is made by Press, Tracy, Copeland, etc. As stated previously, Copeland recognizes that although the general reduction may be traced directly to Cicero’s union of wisdom and eloquence in De inventione, the philosophy and theology behind it might better be traced through Victorinus. But more than a simple reduction to a dual canon in line with preceding Platonists, Copeland points out that in DDC:

Under the modus inveniendi Augustine also synthesizes the adjacent arts of what would later be the trivium, for a Christian hermeneutical and evangelical purpose: grammar (including philology) is necessary to an understanding of the literal signs of Scripture, both unknown and ambiguous (2.11 - 16; 3.2- 3); and dialectic is implicit in the treatment of signification, where a theory of signs is joined to a theory of how meaning is produced.

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418 “Chair of Lies” 406.
420 “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 243.
421 Ibid. 240.
If we operate under the assumption, as with Press,\textsuperscript{422} that the entirety of \textit{DDC} is a rhetoric, then this subordination of dialectic to rhetoric might strike us immediately as anti-Platonic. However, if we acknowledge that in the \textit{Phaedrus} the union that Socrates suggests is that dialectic should furnish content and rhetoric form and adaptation, then the \textit{DDC}’s reduction of the canons produces, in broad terms, a Platonic rhetorical handbook.

Admittedly, the lion’s share of this handbook focuses on the discovery of truth, that which is needed for the wise \textit{logos}, but a significant share is allocated to style and adaptation. Although at the time of Press’s writing it may have been true that most studies of the rhetorical aspects of \textit{DDC} were aimed at Book IV,\textsuperscript{423} the attention has since then shifted considerably to the exploration of the first three books. Indeed, Tracy admits “that the opening sentence of book 4.2 is somewhat disconcerting for my reading of \textit{DDC} as providing a full rhetorical theory of inventio insofar as it seems to suggest a somewhat sophistic understanding of rhetoric.”\textsuperscript{424} My hope is to show that Book IV has a much greater role to play in Augustine’s rhetorical theory than has recently been acknowledged.

My plan in the final section is to offer a reading of the fourth book of \textit{DDC} in conjunction with the \textit{Confessions} in order to demonstrate that: (1) Augustine is indeed an innovator in the psychagogic tradition, not merely a passive recipient of it. (2) His innovation can be seen as a synthesis between Platonic psychology and Ciceronian rhetorical theory. (3) This synthesis involves a good deal more than the simple subordination of the duties of the orator to the teaching the truth.

\textsuperscript{422}Press “Structure” 118.
\textsuperscript{423}Ibid. 118.
\textsuperscript{424}“Charity, Obscurity, Rhetoric” 285.
To claim that St. Augustine’s rhetoric is aimed at conversion is not in itself unique. This has been a steady observation in the literature for some time. What I propose to investigate here, as with my previous analyses of psychagogy, are the psychological and rhetorical mechanisms of Augustine’s distinctly periagogic rhetoric. The technical vocabulary, the general movements, and the inducements of the soul, we shall see, are very much the same; though their employments and interactions show a great deal of ingenuity in synthesis and arrangement.

5.4.1 The Psychology of Desire

One of Augustine’s greatest theological innovations was the introduction of the psychological analogy by way of which humanity could come to understand some aspect of the Trinity. This analogy consisted in understanding our being or memory as analogous to the First Person of the Trinity, our intellect as analogous to the Second, and our will as analogous to the Third. By understanding ourselves as one individual with three distinct faculties, we could get a sense of the mystery of Three Persons in One God. Moreover, Augustine is known for his various Trinitarian analogies and metaphors with which De trinitate is filled. Kenneth Burke, in his study of Augustine, noted that, “Every triad, however secular, was for him another sign of the Trinity.” As such, one might take Troup’s notion of an Augustinian integrity between philosophy, rhetoric, and moral self-control as somehow grafting on to this Trinitarian model.

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425 See, for example, O’Meara “The Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine” 38; Camargo “Non Solum” 395; Farrell, “Rhetoric(s)” 291.
426 Rhetoric of Religion 2.
427 Temporality 73; 83.
Such an exploration may very well be fruitful. But to understand the full force of Augustine’s psychagogic rhetoric, I think that it is well to remember that Trinitarians often see Trinities inside of Trinities – and the level that is most explanative of his rhetorical theory, I suggest, is that of the will alone.

St. Augustine discusses the will [voluntas] explicitly in Book VII of the Confessions and at Ch.5 he begins to explore the idea of conflict within the will. He wants to follow the example of Victorinus, but is bound by his own perverse will. He investigates the possibility of two wills inside him, the spiritual and the carnal and roots this conflict biblically by quoting St. Paul: “the flesh lusts [concupisceret] against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh” (Gal. 5:17). These perverse lusts are further expanded into “the lusts of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life [concupiscentia carnis et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitione saeculi]” (1 John 2:16 quoted at 10.30.41). This triplet forms an exhaustive frame for Augustine’s examination of conscience (10.30.41-41.66), which consists of the temptations that flow from the senses, intellectual curiosity, and prideful ambition. In fact, this triplet forms a frame for the entirety of the first ten autobiographical books, since the first book ends with the following triad laden acknowledgement: “But in this lay my sin: that I sought pleasure [voluptates], nobility [sublimitates], and truth [veritates] not in God but in the beings He had created, myself and others. Thus I fell [inruebam] into sorrow [dolores] confusion [confusiones] and error [errores]. Thanks be to thee, my Joy [dulcedo] and my Glory [honor] and my Hope [fiducia] and my God”

428 Augustine does not acknowledge this phrase as a quote, although it is nearly identical to the Vulgate, except that the last part of the triad is superbia vitae which is quite literally the “pride of life.” Augustine’s ambitione saeculi is more properly translated “worldly ambition.”
(I.20.31). In so framing we see that it is not the drives themselves that are perverse; rather, it is our material orientation that perverts them.\[^{429}\]

Rendering the English a bit differently\[^{430}\] we see that Augustine sought pleasure [voluptates] in the material world and ran headlong [inruebam] into pain [Dolores] until he experienced the sweetness [dulcedo] of God. He sought elevation [sublimitates] amongst the creatures of the earth and so eagerly mingled [confusiones]\[^{431}\] with them; or perhaps, stretching the Latin to the fullest, he entered eagerly [inruebam] into shame [confusiones], until finding true honor [honor] in God. He sought the truth in worldly things and so threw himself [inruebam] into error, until finding confidence or trust [fiducia] in God.

Although biblically grounded, the three desires, for pleasures, for honors, and for truth, show a definite affinity with the Platonic tradition of the tripartite soul. So even if Augustine does not accept the tripartition as representative of actual elements of the soul, he does apparently accept the triad as an exhaustive map of the psychology of desire from which he develops his theory of motivation of the will. Moreover, we can see in this tripartition those very elements that he is called to reorient and integrate – philosophy, rhetoric and bodily temperance. For Augustine, it was his intellectual curiosity that drove him to false philosophies, his prideful ambition that led him to a professorship in rhetoric, and his carnal lusts that made him hesitant to take up a chaste life. His goal, then, is technically analogous to Plato’s: the reorientation and integration of the psychic motives. And as Plato calls on the student of rhetoric to seek out, analyze, and correlate the logos with the psyche in order to lead the soul through rhetoric,

\[^{429}\] For a positive account of these desires cf. Cicero, De officiis, especially 1.4.11-5.16.
\[^{430}\] Recognizing Augustine as an author that is cognizant that a single text can have multiple meanings (cf. Confessions XIII) I suggest that it is fruitful to offer alternative readings of Augustine’s texts without claiming them to be definitive readings. In the case of this study, I am considering what his wordplay might mean concerning the psychology and theology of rhetorical theory.
\[^{431}\] Taking the noun in a verbal sense, lit. inruebam confusiones “entered eagerly into a mingling.”

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Augustine too appears to align the structures of rhetoric with the desires of the soul in a similar psychagogic endeavor.

5.4.2 Rhetorical Correlations

In DDC, Augustine reminds the reader of the duties of the orator laid out by Cicero: “to instruct, to please, and to persuade [ut doceat, ut delectet, ut flectat]” (4.12.27). In her translation of the work, Sr. Therese Sullivan provides a lengthy footnote that outlines the tradition of these officia oratoris and traces them back through Cicero’s Orator to the triple atechnic pisteis of Arsitotle, correlating instruction with logos, pleasing with ethos, and persuading with pathos. It is a fairly accepted tradition. However, in his Latin edition of De orator John E. Sandys questions the correlation, pointing out that, while there may be a rather clear correspondence between logos and probare (for which Augustine substitutes docere), and between pathos and flectere, there is no seeming relation between delectare and ethos. Rather, Sandys argues, ethos, pathos and logos are, for Aristotle, all modes of proofs – what Cicero call probare, with one happening to coincide with flectere.

No doubt Augustine is consciously working in the Ciceronian tradition as he himself attests, but he seems to be consciously modifying it to adapt to his own Platonic psychology of...

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433 Ibid. 92n.1
434 M. Tulli Ciceronis Ad M. Brutum Orator: A Revised Text. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1885. 77. The tradition can stand a bit sturdier, however, if we take into consideration that Cicero offers a modified list of duties at De oratore 2.27 and replaces delectare with conciliare, which carries some of the sense of “pleasing,” but more along the lines as making a certain thing or person seem pleasing to another. And this is exactly how Cicero intends it, for he tells us that, “the feelings of the hearers are conciliated by a person’s dignity, by his actions, by the character of his life” (II.43). As such, conciliation provides a conceptual link between pleasing and ethos in the tradition of Cicero.
desire. For delectare in this case as well has nothing to do with the character of the speaker. Indeed the character of the speaker is discussed explicitly elsewhere in the text as an element distinctly separate from, and more powerful than, the duties listed above (4.27.59). Rather, the duties each appear coordinated to attend to a particular element of the triadic desire complex. The relation of ‘instruction’ to the desire for truth and that of ‘pleasing’ to the desire for pleasure are rather obvious, especially since pleasing is a matter of suavitatis (4.12.27), a synonym for the dulcedo used to identify the sweetness of God in the Confessions. The relation of ‘persuading’ to worldly ambition and honor, however, needs some explanation.

The key here is the fusing of the duties with the rhetorical styles: plain [genus submissum], temperate [genus temperatum], and grand [genus grande] (4.17.34). For the grand style or genus grande carries with it the connotation of loftiness or elevation of style. Indeed it is synonymous with the genus sublimine of which the term sublimitates is a cognate. This is the term that Augustine uses to describe the middle desire that motivated him in his ambitious youth; so that the element for which we are seeking to connect to the sublime style is that element which seeks sublimity.

The above connection could be just a happy coincidence of language, but I appeal to two probabilities: 1) Being a learned instructor of rhetoric St. Augustine would have surely been

435 Of course, if Plato’s Phaedrus provides the roadmap for Aristotle’s Rhetoric as some have suggested, then one may be able to trace the entire tradition of the atechnic pisteis back to Plato’s tripartite soul in the same way that we have already suggested that the Aristotelian components of ethos might find their origin in the attributes of a good interlocutor listed in the Gorgias (see p. 146 above).

436 Both can be rendered as either ‘sweetness’ or ‘charm.’ Augustine explicitly draws a connection between the two terms at DDC 4.5.7. Although here he is referring to harmful sweets [perniciosa dulcedo] in contrast to wholesome sweets [salubri suavitate] or sweet wholesomeness [suaui salubritate] the point is that he sees the terms as both satisfying the desire for pleasure. For an examination of Augustine’s attitudes towards the synonymous pair, as well as a general history of the rhetorical uses of the terms, see Mary Carruthers. “Sweetness.” Speculum 81.4 (2006): 999-1013, especially 1003, 1009, and 1012.

437 This synonymy is attested to in Sullivan’s translation IV.17.34n12. See also the glossary entry for μέγεθος in W. Rhys Roberts. Demetrius On Style. Cambridge University Press. 1902 (p. 292); and the entries for διηρμένος and ύψηλος in Larue Van Hook. The Metaphorical Terminology of Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism, University of Chicago Press, 1905 (p16); as well as the entries for grandis, sublimis and their cognates in Lewis and Short.
familiar with the rhetorical import of the term and 2) being a wordsmith, such plays on words are likely intentional. Moreover, this connection is supported by the fact that Augustine illustrates a dramatic and telling shift away from Cicero’s notion of the grand style. In *Orator*, Cicero is explicit that the grand style is the most ornate style of the three (27.97). For Augustine, ornament is paradigmatic of the temperate style, whereas the grand style is concerned little with ornament. Although ornamentation may be present, the distinguishing marks of the grand style reads like a litany of attributes of the Platonic middle element:

[I]t is…rendered passionate by the heart’s emotions [*violentum animi affectibus*]…borne on by its own vehemence [*impetus suo*]…governed by the ardor of the heart [*pectoris sequuntur ardorem*]…For if a brave man [*vir fortis*] be armed with weapons adorned with gold and jewels, being fully intent on battle, he accomplishes indeed what he does with these very arms, not because they are precious, but because they are arms; and still he himself is the same, and very formidable even when but anger [*ira*] furnishes a weapon for him at his seeking. (4.20.42)

In Cicero’s rendering of Platonic psychology with which Augustine would have been familiar, we have already seen that the heart [*pectus*] is the physical location of the spirited element and anger [*ira*] its paradigmatic emotion. But here we see the restoration of the entire complex of concepts proper to the middle element. Courage [*fortis*] is once more its virtue and thus it aspires to lofty [*sublime*] ends. It moves the soul through the passionate impulses of the emotions [*violens/affectus*]. Indeed, it is the executive power of the soul itself [*impetus suo*]. St.
Augustine, it appears, has reconstituted the spirited element of the soul, or at least, the spirited drive. But to what end?

If we rework Sullivan’s rendering and translate *flectere* not as ‘to persuade,’ for which Augustine uses *persuadere* elsewhere in order to characterize the aim of all three duties (4.25.55), but as ‘to move,’ we see that it is the only duty that is concerned with movement; whereas the search for *sublimitates* (elevation) is the only desire that is concerned with movement. If we ask ourselves what the object of this movement is, the more literal translation of *flectere* will tell us. For its primary meaning is ‘to bend’ or ‘to curve’ or even to ‘turn around,’ from which the metaphorical meaning ‘to persuade’ or ‘to move’ an audience comes out of the more literal transformation ‘to bend one’s will.’ The movement, then, is a turning of the will, making *flectere* akin to *periagoge*. However, when we consider the act in connection with its directional aim, *sublimitates*, the movement is specifically that of the soul towards its ascent. It is the art of turning one away from the shadows and towards the light. It is the art of conversion.

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438 This translation establishes a deliberate relationship between the verb *flectere* and the noun *conversio* whose primary meaning is ‘a turning around,’ which can come to indicate either a moral change (i.e., religious conversion) or change of opinion (i.e., the result of being persuaded). In this sense, the effect of the orator’s duty *flectere* – bending the will, could be understood as bringing about *conversio* – turning the will around. See DDC 19.38 where Augustine prescribes the use of the grand style if a soul averse to the truth is going to be compelled to conversion [*…granditer si aversus inde animus ut convertatur impellitur*].

439 See the dictionary entry of *flecto* in Lewis and Short.

440 There is an interesting check that we can perform to further support the hypothesis that Augustine is involved in a realigning of the duties and styles of the orator with the elements or drives of the soul. For in transferring ornament to the temperate style, another constellation of concepts is reestablished. The temperate style would be assigned to that element in which temperance is the virtue; ornament becomes the most important consideration for that element that is most enamored with form; and the duty to delight is aimed at that element which is most driven by pleasure.
5.4.3 The Psychology of Persuasion and Ascent

That Augustine had something like the conversion of the soul in mind becomes evident when we consider what for him is the ultimate aim of rhetoric and how this aim relates to the crisis of the will. For Augustine, it was possible to be successful in the endeavor of instructing and delighting without moving one’s audience to action. If the goal was action, then the first two successes were in vain. Granted, the attainment of the first two goals is necessary, and the first especially can be a goal unto itself. That is to say, teaching is a priority, if only temporally. It is a necessary, but insufficient condition in cases where action is the desired result. So action is the consummate aim of the rhetorical endeavor and where it is concerned the first two are but preliminaries. For this reason, Augustine exhorts the would-be psychagogue:

> It is necessary, therefore, that the sacred orator, when urging that something be done, should not only teach in order to instruct, and please in order to hold, but also move in order to win. For indeed, it is only by the heights of eloquence that that man is to be moved to agreement who has not been brought to it by truth, though demonstrated to his acknowledgement, even when joined with a charming style. (IV.13.29; emphasis added)

441 Earlier in this passage, Augustine characterizes this man as *duris*, an adjective meaning ‘hard’ or ‘inflexible’. Taken as a substantive it refers to one who has a hard nature or is hard-hearted. Cf. n.445 below.

442 Sullivan refers to this sentence as ‘a linking summary,’ almost a refrain; given in order to make sure that the ‘rhetorical progression’ is under stood” (n.9).
quippeiam remanet ad consenionem flectendus eloquentiae granditate\textsuperscript{443}, in quo id non egit usque ad eius confessionem demonstrata veritas, adiuncta etiam suavitate dictionis.\textsuperscript{444} (IV.13.29; emphasis added)

In other words, in shifting ornament to the temperate style, Augustine opens up a third space which makes the union of substance and form incomplete for the purposes of effective rhetorical action. What is needed in addition to substance and form is power – more specifically will-power.

The parallels of what elevated rhetoric can achieve to what Saint Augustine requires during his own internal conflict of the will are such that it is difficult to deny that he intends his psychology of desire to be read to some degree into his theology of rhetoric. For he relays what was a hypothetical scenario in \textit{DDC} as biographical fact in the \textit{Confessions} using synonymous language:

I regarded it as settled that it would be better to give myself to Your love rather than go on yielding to my own lust; but the first course delighted and convinced my mind, the second delighted my body and held it in bondage\textsuperscript{445}…and whereas You showed me by every evidence that Your words were true there was simply nothing I could answer… (8.5.12; emphasis added)

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\textsuperscript{443} \textit{Granditas} is a synonym for \textit{sublimitas}. See Sullivan’s note (n.12) on this passage, which connects its usage as a rare but extant technical term in rhetoric used by Cicero and Pliny.
\textsuperscript{444} According to Sullivan, this sentence is “a final statement of the importance of \textit{flectere}. Augustine finds the climax of his chapter in the culmination of the \textit{officia}” (n.11).
\textsuperscript{445} Earlier, Augustine refers to this condition as \textit{dura servitus}, commonly translated as hard or harsh bondage (VII.5.10). Thus, he further links his own inflexible condition with that of the man whose only remedy is the grand style of speech by reference to the adjective \textit{durus}. See n.441 above.
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ita certum habebam esse melius tuae caritati me dedere quam meae cupiditati cedere, sed illud placebat et vinciebat, hoc libebat et vinciebat…et undique ostendenti vera te dicere, non erat omnino quid responderem veritate convictus…(8.5.12; emphasis added)

Lest we too hastily conflate conversion with conviction, we should note that this conflict of the will is exactly the impediment that thwarts Augustine’s own spiritual ascent, in which he begins with a contemplation of corporeal bodies, rises up [erexit] through the faculties of the mind, and attains a glance at That Which Is [id quod est]. However, Augustine cannot maintain his gaze and is forced to return to his habits of the flesh. He is left with nothing “but a memory of delight [amantem memoriam] and a desire [desiderantem] as for something of which I had caught the fragrance but which I had not yet the strength to eat [comedere nondum possem]” (7.17.23). He knows and desires but lacks the will to act. It is at precisely this critical moment that Augustine prescribes the rhetor to employ the genus sublime. In fact, Augustine is explicit that this is the only remedy.

5.4.4 The Rhetoric of Conversion

I am not arguing that Augustine’s impeded conversion means that God is a bad rhetor. Only that Augustine is following the rhetorical progression of being convinced of the truth and finding delight in it before being transformed by it. But any worry about priority or hierarchy should be assuaged when we realize that Augustine, like Plato, is only providing an analytical account for

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446 The stages of ascent parallel those of the Neoplatonist Plotinus (cf. Enneads 1.6). However, there are important differences, the most notable of which is that for Plotinus ascent terminates with a convergence with the One beyond Being. For Augustine, it is the vision of Being, That Which Is [id quod est], which is the ultimate goal (i.e., the Judeo-Christian God who calls Himself “He Who Is” [qui est] (see Vulgate, Exodus 3.14)).
the purpose of instruction. The key is adaptation and integration. None of the styles can be employed nor the duties met without the aid of the others (DDC 4.25.55-26.58). Indeed, Augustine recounts this fact in his own conversion.

In Book VIII of the Confessions, Augustine’s whole soul is primed by God with three stories of conversion each addressing a different aspect of his soul. In the second chapter, he is told of the conversion of the most learned [doctissimus], highly skilled [peritissimus] rhetorician Victorinus (8.2.3), who through his study of the Bible was converted to Christianity. In the sixth chapter, Augustine hears the story of two Roman officials whose encounter with the Life of Antony turned them from their ambition in civil service to a life in service to Christ (8.6.15). In the final chapter, while his crisis comes to a climax, Augustine relays what he had been told of St. Antony, that he had heard the scriptures read aloud and had felt admonished to give up all worldly possessions and live a life of asceticism (8.12.29). Thus God had sent three stories of conversions, of reorientations of desires, to Augustine’s ears: one of intellect, one of ambition and one of material possession.

With his whole soul thus primed, Augustine completes his conversion by reading a passage from the Bible; a triple admonition against three false paths reminiscent of the three psychological desires in their perversion: “Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and impurities, not in contention and envy, but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh in its concupiscences” (Rom. 13:13-14).447 Thus the Word of God

447 non in comissionibus et ebrietatibus, non in cubilibus et impudicitiis, non in contentione et aemulatione, sed induite dominum Iesum Christum et carnis providentiam ne feceritis in concupiscentiis. Although at first glance the passage seems only to address carnal desires and worldly ambition, much like with Gorgias, it would be odd for a rhetorician, an a Trinitarian at that, to suddenly switch from distinct tripartitions to apparent triads that were really dyads. Thus, we should ask ourselves if there is any way to interpret the triad as a distinct group of three. The answer is pretty straight forward. Comissatio is associated with Bacchalian revelry (see Lewis and Short), Bacchus being the god of madness; whereas drunkenness dulls the mental faculties. Augustine addresses both Bacchus and drunkenness in his discussion of the faulty philosophy of Epicureanism in Contra Academicos 3.7.16.
ultimately satisfies the *officia oratoris* by integrating the disparate elements of Augustine’s tripartite will into a unity in Christ; and thereby turning Augustine’s soul, suddenly, as Victorinus had said, away from his worldly desires and towards the Word Incarnate. This is ultimately achieved not by the clunky technical process that is at best a preparation (and an education for the reader), but by addressing his whole, integrated soul.448

I am not, however, arguing that Augustine suggests rhetoric is sufficient for conversion over and above the role of God’s grace, it is not. In fact rhetoric alone is not sufficient for any true act of the rhetor as Augustine describes it, for he follows Cicero in maintaining that the true rhetor must possess both wisdom [*sapientia*] and eloquence [*eloquentia*] (4.5.7-8). Since wisdom for Augustine is found in the Holy Scriptures, then insofar as *docere* must precede *flectere*, the grace of God’s Word must precede any sudden conversion or sublime elevation of the audience. But, insofar as humanity has some intellectual machinery that contributes to the soul’s conversion, it is a rhetoric of three duties and three styles geared toward the soul of another culminating in the act of their reorientation through the *genus sublime*. Since this rhetorical act is grounded in an understanding of the Scripture, as is made clear in the first three books of the *DDC*, it outlines in what way human teachers may aide in guiding another’s soul in their conversion and subsequent ascent: through sacred reading and spoken word. This is, by Augustine’s own admission in his *Retractationes*, what the *Confessions* itself was meant to

In his commentary on the text, James O’Donnell refers to Augustine’s explanation of the same biblical passage in his *Ep. 22* in order to show that both the first and the second come from our carnal desires (http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/conf/). However, in applying the first pair to the specific problem of feasting at the gravesite in honor of the dead, Augustine suggests that this is a problem of ignorance that can be cured with teaching and advice. As such, I maintain that in both the *Confessions* and *Ep. 22* he treats this trio as the perversion of the three psychological desires when oriented to the temporal world.

448 See n.438 above on the relationship between the duty *flectere* and *conversio*. 
achieve: to “draw [excitant] a person’s mind [intellectum] and emotions [affectum] towards God” (2.6.1).449

I have argued that a thoroughly Platonic psychology of desire runs throughout St. Augustine’s *Confessions*, which consistently speaks of the desires of our intellect, our ambitions, and our senses. Likewise, I have demonstrated that a similar tripartition runs throughout Augustine’s discussion of rhetorical action in *On Christian Doctrine* in the form of the three Ciceronian *officia oratoris* (to teach, to please, and to move) joined to the three styles of rhetoric (plain, temperate, and grand). By investigating the parallels that exist between Augustine’s account of the soul’s conversion in the *Confessions* and his account of the movement of the will by persuasion in *On Christian Doctrine*, I maintain that one of the main roles of rhetoric for Augustine is to aid in the soul’s conversion along its tripartite lines. Ultimately, I suggest that it is the Platonic tripartite soul that gives Augustinian rhetoric an object, an aim, and a structure that undergirds its more obviously Ciceroonian framework. Similar to Platonic rhetorical psychology, the Augustinian theory sees the rhetorical enterprise culminating in its effect on the spirited element. Thus, I hold that regardless of any theological differences, Augustine’s theories of psychology, language, and divine ascent place him squarely in the Platonic tradition of rhetorical theory. Reading Augustine in this manner reveals a number of connections between the theory of rhetoric presented in *On Christian Doctrine* and the theory of spiritual progress found in the *Confessions*. These connections not only indicate a more mystical foundation for the technical aspects of Augustinian rhetoric than Ciceroonian theory alone, but also suggest how Augustine’s rhetorical theory impacts his spiritual theology. In the next and final chapter, I take

up Augustine’s psychological analogy and demonstrate how it provides St. Bonaventure with a template for a theology of communication that aids the soul of the speaker in its ascent to God.
The thirteenth-century scholastic St. Bonaventure is at best a marginal figure in the history of rhetoric. Kennedy mentions Bonaventure’s classificatory scheme of the language arts as one of a number of permutations that attempted to categorize rhetoric amongst its counterparts in the philosophical tradition in the Middle Ages. Murphy’s *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* mentions Bonaventure only to point out that certain works had been wrongly attributed to him. Conley mentions him once, wrongly situating him in a tradition that assimilates rhetoric to dialectic. McKeon, it seems, is unique among prominent historians of rhetoric for considering Bonaventure in-depth, identifying him as the culminating figure of the Augustinian-Platonic tradition of theological rhetoric. I should, however, note the 1972 dissertation and summary article by Harry C. Hazel, Jr. that review Bonaventure’s philosophy of linguistic communication in order to establish the importance of the *Ars concionandi*, the art of preaching that was questionably...

450 *Classical Rhetoric* 82. While Kennedy does not suggest a tradition, it is notable for reasons that will become evident below that the three examples of classificatory schemes he gives are from St. Augustine, Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bonaventure. In the second revised and “enlarged” edition of *Classical Rhetoric*, Kennedy does suggest “a form of the philosophic tradition of rhetoric” connecting Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bonaventure. However, he diminishes their importance by no longer mentioning any of the details of their classificatory schemes (97).
451 *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* 326-329. Murphy’s point is that the *Ars concionandi* that was once attributed to him and known thought spurious might be attributable to Richard of Thetford.
452 *Rhetoric in the European Tradition*. New York: Longman, 1990. 73. Here Conley mentions Bonaventure with the twelfth-century Hugh of St. Victor and John of Salisbury, neither of which assimilated rhetoric to dialectic. Both, as we will see below, did place rhetoric and dialectic under the class of “probable logic.” St. Bonaventure did not even go that far.
453 “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 23-25.
attributed to him. Hazel’s review is fairly straightforward, as the majority of the analysis deals with the manual itself. 454

Conversely, consideration of rhetoric is noticeably absent from contemporary studies of Bonaventure. That is not to say that rhetoric is belittled, as it is often mentioned positively as part of his overall theological schema. But it is not often treated as a topic worthy of investigation in itself, and often curious mistakes occur. For instance, more than one otherwise careful scholar has noted that Bonaventure learned all he knew about rhetoric from Aristotle. While Bonaventure shows some degree of familiarity with Aristotle’s Rhetoric, his rhetorical training is clearly Ciceronian. 455 There are, of course, exceptions. A few works have looked at Bonaventure’s style of preaching or philosophical argumentation in terms of rhetoric. 456 And Ewert Cousins explores the general relationship between language and mysticism in Bonaventure in terms that are helpful for my analysis. 457 But no work from Bonaventuran scholars of which I am aware treats Bonaventure’s philosophy of language in terms of the history of rhetoric, the language arts, or pedagogy. As such, this chapter establishes St. Bonaventure as an important figure in the history of rhetoric, not only as a great rhetor and theorist, but more


Healy professes a thought that was commonly held by Bonaventure’s contemporaries but, as we will see, not by Bonaventure himself: “Rhetoric may be considered a popular branch of logic. It is an art by which the speaker aims to persuade the reason or move the feelings. It is the art of argumentative composition which, in almost all essentials, must be regarded as the creation of Aristotle” (87). Bougerol simply says that “As a student in the faculty of arts, [Bonaventure] received from [Aristotle] all he knows of rhetoric and dialectic” (26).


importantly as one of the few theologians of rhetoric to emerge in the Middle Ages; second, perhaps, only to St. Augustine, to whom he admits his debt.

The first part of this chapter establishes the various threads of the intellectual tradition within which St. Bonaventure is working. The second part demonstrates how Bonaventure brings these threads together systematically into a pedagogy of psychic reformation and ascent. It should be remembered that in this chapter I often speak of the arts of language – grammar, logic, dialectic, and rhetoric – or the “trivium,” as a single entity; since, for Bonaventure and his predecessors these arts were inextricably intertwined as they collectively dealt with the human faculties of thought and speech.

6.1 THREE TRADITIONS

In his seminal 1942 essay, “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,” Richard McKeon identifies three key lines of intellectual development that were either determined or considerably influenced by rhetorical thought: the tradition of the rhetoricians proper, “who found their problems assembled and typical answers discussed in the works of Cicero and Quintilian”; the tradition of ‘Aristotelian’ logicians who “followed Aristotle only in the treatment of terms and propositions, and Cicero in the treatment of definitions and principles”; and as we saw in the preceding chapter, the tradition of philosophers and theologians, “who found in Augustine a Platonism reconstructed from the Academic and Neoplatonic philosophies…and formulated in terms
refurbished and simplified from Cicero’s rhetorical distinctions.” As McKeon notes, Bonaventure by his own admission is most firmly situated in the tradition of Augustinian Platonism. However, he is not completely abstracted from the other two. As an educated scholar of the Middle Ages, he is well trained in the precepts of Ciceronian rhetoric and the methodology of Aristotelian logic. In order to understand the uniqueness and innovation of his system, it is important to know the basic contours of the traditions in which he is trained.

6.1.1 Ciceronian Tradition

According to McKeon, the tradition of rhetoric proper “took form, for the most part, not in controversy or theory but in a vast number of textbooks which grew in three distinct groups differentiated according to the subject matters once treated by rhetoric but now concerned with verbal forms employed in those three fields in lieu of direct treatment of subject matter.” This is the tradition of the appropriation, transmission, and adaptation of Ciceronian and other Roman rhetorical precepts to the particular educational and practical needs of the Middle Ages.

Appropriately, most contemporary scholarship has focused on this tradition, with James J. Murphy’s *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* still offering the most comprehensive and concise statement. In the preface to this work, Murphy is clear that all he offers is a preliminary survey of the preceptive tradition, and so he specifically limits the breadth and depth of his pioneering

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458 “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 4. Note, for matters of exposition I have rearranged the original order in which McKeon presented the traditions, which ran Ciceronian, Augustinian-Platonic, Aristotelian. However, in McKeon’s own document, the particular order does not seem to matter.

459 Much of the following sub-sections contain rehearsals of the basic historical facts and broader trajectories concerning rhetoric in the Middle Ages as they can be found in McKeon’s article and developed further in the primary texts and introductory materials in the Copeland and Sluiter anthology. Both works offer plentiful primary and secondary bibliographies for further research into topics and figures that I treat here as providing important context, while acknowledging that deeper inquiry into them would take the current study too far afield from its object of investigation.

460 “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 27.
research. Yet despite his intention that the work be an opening foray into a long neglected field in the history of rhetoric, it seems to have become accepted as the definitive statement on the subject by the discipline at large. In fact it has become a disciplinary commonplace to view medieval rhetoric almost exclusively as a preceptive art that persisted in the classroom and was further trifurcated in its development into three distinct genres: the art of verse-writing [\textit{ars poetriae}], the art of letter-writing [\textit{ars dictaminis}], and the art of preaching [\textit{ars praedicandi}].\textsuperscript{461}

But influenced by Murphy and determined that his initial organic inquiries not become ossified dogma, historians of medieval rhetoric have continued to do productive work to expand both the breadth and depth of inquiry into this tradition.\textsuperscript{462}

As a scholar at the University of Paris in the mid-thirteenth century, the rhetorical tradition could have been transmitted to Bonaventure by the primary texts of Cicero (e.g., \textit{De inventione}) and Horace (e.g., \textit{Ars poetica}) as well as commentaries and encyclopedic renderings by Martianus Cappella, St. Isidore of Seville, Cassiodorus, and Alcuin in which the \textit{trivium} as a curriculum would have been codified, at least generally, though the authors displayed different biases in their arrangement and emphasis of the arts. While there are later figures and works in the ensuing trifurcation of the rhetorical tradition which Bonaventure might possibly have encountered – such as Alan of Lille’s late twelfth-century preaching manual, \textit{Summa de arte praedicandi}, or Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s early thirteenth-century \textit{Poetria nova} – Bonaventure gives few medieval citations in rendering his theory of the language arts and none that would be

\textsuperscript{461} For instance, the entry for “Medieval Rhetoric” in Sloane’s \textit{Encyclopedia of Rhetoric} consists of two essays. One by Rita Copeland summarizing the preceptive tradition and one by Jan Ziolkowski summarizing controversies in Medieval grammar. Indeed, at the 2010 Biennial Conference of the Rhetoric Society of America, Murphy chaired a roundtable discussion entitled, “Do We Know Enough about Medieval Rhetoric?” He answered this rhetorical question with a resounding (and ironic) “Yes,” referencing his own work as an essentially complete statement on the matter. See n.462 below.

\textsuperscript{462} See, among others, the works of Martin Camargo, Rita Copeland, Marjorie Woods, Jill Ross and Beth Bennett, who were all present at the roundtable mentioned in n.461 above and who emphatically (and not ironically, though in good fun) refuted Murphy’s opening assertion.
considered as coming from the rhetorical tradition proper. Bonaventure does quote Cicero and Horace directly however, indicating a grounding in at least the classical texts of the tradition.\textsuperscript{463}

Of course, Augustine’s \textit{DDC} also had a major impact on Bonaventure’s reception of the tradition proper. This is most evidenced in the Bonaventuran \textit{Ars Concionandi}. Although its authorship is disputed, most commentators agree that it depicts a line of thought consonant with Bonaventure’s own writings.\textsuperscript{464} The tract opens with text from \textit{DDC} stipulating the twofold duties of the preacher: “every interpretation of scripture depends on two things: the method of understanding the necessary meaning, and the method of expressing the meaning once it is understood.” (38, quoting \textit{DDC} 1.1.1). As such, the author lays out his plan to cover the three components that constitute the preacher’s efforts: Divisions, Distinctions, and Expansions, meant to instruct, delight, and persuade – again echoing Augustinian rhetorical theory. These three goals of the preacher are further connected to the arts of the trivium, at least implicitly, as Hazel demonstrates how these categories align with Bonaventure’s own description of grammar, logic, and rhetoric; as the first deals largely with grammatical divisions, the second with logical distinctions, and the third with rhetorical expansions designed to adapt to a particular audience.\textsuperscript{465}

Whether the text is from Bonaventure’s hand or not, there can be no doubt that he saw the art of preaching as one of the foremost duties of his order. As we will see, he offers practical advice on the mundane arts of exegesis and homiletics throughout his various works. As such,

\textsuperscript{463} For instance, in discussing the art of poetry in the \textit{Reduction of the Arts to Theology}, Bonaventure offers two quotes cited from Horace concerning the desire of poets to both serve and please (§2). Bonaventure cites Cicero (\textit{De inventione}) and quotes him at length on the virtues in the \textit{Collations on the Six Days} (6.15-18). As is usual, Bonaventure often quotes without citation, and some of those quotes from Cicero will be discussed below.

\textsuperscript{464} See Hazel, \textit{Translation} 10-17; McKeon, “Rhetoric” 23: “Bonaventura wrote no work on logic but did compose an excellent \textit{Art of Preaching}, which is useful for the interpretation of his theological treatises and commentaries as well as his sermons.”

\textsuperscript{465} Hazel, \textit{Translation} 28-30.
he recognizes the traditionally observed powers of the language arts to spread the message of the Sacred Scriptures and in so doing, bring souls to God. To this extent, Bonaventure’s view of the arts of the trivium is fairly traditional: they are important for their capacity to aid the preacher in understanding and expressing the Divine Word.

6.1.2 Aristotelian Tradition

A detailed history of the tradition of rhetoric and the logicians in Medieval Europe is yet to be written. But since it is virtually impossible to separate from the pedagogical concerns of the first tradition, one can find general outlines of it in most histories of rhetoric that consider the Middle Ages, such as Murphy and Kennedy. The historian of rhetoric who wishes to investigate this tradition further can find a rhetoric friendly foundation in the many translations and commentaries of the philosopher Eleonore Stump, who offers a summary history in her *Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic*.466 It is sufficient to say that the history of logic in the Middle Ages is quite a dense topic, and only a brief sketch is needed to understand the significance of Bonaventure’s scheme in relation to both the history of the trivium and the current state of the linguistic and logical arts among the scholastics.

The thought of Aristotle was always present in medieval pedagogy due to the digests offered by the encyclopedists, along with the translations and commentaries of Boethius on the first two books of what would be known as Aristotle’s *Organon* – the logical “instrument” – which consisted in its old form of Aristotle’s *Categories* and *On Interpretation*. In the twelfth-

century the “New Logic” expanded to include translations of the Prior and Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and the Sophistical Refutations. 467 With the translation of Arabic commentaries of Aristotle into Latin, especially those of Al-Farabi, the Organon gradually expanded to include Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics. 468 Thus, at the time of St. Bonaventure’s writing, St. Thomas Aquinas’ schema of the logical arts offered in his Expositio of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics “represents a culmination of twelfth- and thirteenth-century thought about the division of logic in response to the continued diffusion of Arabic Aristotelianism.” 469

In Thomas’ Preface, he goes through the entirety of the expanded Organon and assigns each to certain “acts of reason.” The first two acts of reason are those of the intellect. The Categories deals with the first of these acts, which is the “understanding of indivisible or non-compounded things.” On Interpretation deals with the second act which is “the combining or dividing of powers of understanding, in which true and false are now introduced.” 470 McKeon gives a concise partial translation of the remaining act of reason in Thomas’ account, which is the act of reasoning proper and comprises the remaining books of the Organon:

there are three processes of reason: those by which scientific certitude is acquired and in which no deviation from truth is possible; those which come to conclusions true for the most part but not necessary; and those in which reason deviates from the true because of some defect of principle. The part of logic which treats the first of these processes is called Judicative, since its judgment is made with the certitude of science, and this part is

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467 See McKeon, “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 7-8.
468 For the general progression of this tendency see Copeland and Sluiter, Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric: introductions and translation of “Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae, ca. 1150-1160” 461-483; “Hermannus Alemannus, Al-Farabi’s Didascalia on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 1256” 735-752; and “Thomas Aquinas, Preface to his Expositio of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, 1270” 787-791.
469 Copeland and Sluiter, Medieval Grammar and Rhetoric, “Thomas Aquinas” 785.
470 Ibid. 790.
treated in the *Analytics*: the *Prior Analytics* is concerned with the certitude of judgment which is based only on the form of the syllogism, the *Posterior Analytics* with the demonstrative syllogism in which the certitude depends on matter or on the necessary propositions of which the syllogism is composed. The part of logic which is subject to the second process of reason is called *Inventive*, for discovery is not always with certitude. *Topic* or *Dialectic* treats of this process when it leads to conviction or opinion (*fides vel opinio*); *Rhetoric* treats of it when it leads only to a kind of suspicion without total exclusion of the contrary possibility; *Poetic* treats of it when estimation inclines to one of the two parts of a contradiction only because of the manner of its representation. Finally the third process of reason is called *Sophistic* and is treated by Aristotle in the *De Sophisticis Elenchis*.  

In Thomas account “rhetoric and poetics are no longer part of the toolbox of the language sciences, or even of an art of logic whose object is speech…but instead are incorporated into a descriptive system of cognitive procedures that pertain to different acts of reason.” Bonaventure would reassert the separate provinces of the language arts, while at the same time arguing for their inextricable integrity.  

One of the major differences between Sts. Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure was their opinion concerning the relationship between faith and reason. Thomas, along with his fellow Aristotelians, felt that theology and philosophy operated in separate spheres of inquiry, so that his vast logical apparatus could reflect acts of human intellect without necessarily indicating anything about the nature of God. Thus, “he could use the devices of Aristotle in the *a posteriori*

471 McKeon, “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 24.  
472 Copeland and Sluiter, “Thomas Aquinas” 788.
proofs of his systematic theology and those of Augustine in his commentaries on Scripture.\footnote{McKeon, “Rhetoric” 23.}

Bonaventure was the preeminent master of the Franciscan-Augustinian counter-current in scholastic thought which deemed that philosophy was subject to theology, such that even the arts of logic and language revealed the Divine Nature through their arrangements and interactions.\footnote{For a further exploration of the philosophical disagreements between the “Aristotelians” and the “Augustinians” see Gilson. The Philosophy of Bonaventure. Trans. Illyd Trethowan and F.J. Sheed. Paterson, N.J., New York: St. Anthony Guild Press; distributor: Desclée Co., 1965. 21-28.}

It is for this reason that St. Bonaventure is more inclined to offer a theology of the language arts than he is to appropriate them as tools for logical inquiry.\footnote{This can be seen in the two saints’ differing disposition to analogical thinking according to Bougerol: “In the works of the two masters, the vocabulary and even certain texts may seem to correspond, but their spirit is profoundly different. While the Thomist analogy is as much difference as resemblance, the Bonaventurian analogy takes on a fundamentally dynamic and positive character. It appears in its own logical form as an EFFECTIVE means of knowledge, for Bonaventure insists most of all on its ‘anagogical’ function” (78, emphasis in original).}

This is, of course, a simplification, as Bonaventure was a master of Aristotelian logic and Thomas Aquinas argued against the Aristotelian excesses of Averroism.\footnote{See the passage cited in n.474 above for a brief account of this controversy as well. For a deeper account, see Gilson’s Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages. The Richards Lectures in the University of Virginia 1937. New York: C. Scribner’s sons, 1938. It should also be noted that Bonaventure had his own problems with Plato, while Thomas Aquinas appropriated many Platonic concepts. For studies on Thomas’ relationship to Platonic thought, see Fran O’Rourke. Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas. Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1992; see also, Patrick Quinn. Aquinas, Platonism, and the Knowledge of God. Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield, Vt.: Avebury, 1996.}

But the general contours of the Aristotelian tendency towards arranging the arts under logic are adequate for the purposes of my analysis.

### 6.1.3 Platonic Tradition

Until the last decade, the history of medieval rhetorical activity rooted in the Augustinian appropriation and reconstruction of Platonic philosophy was virtually non-extant in the rhetorical discipline outside of the treatment it received by McKeon. Granted, much has been written concerning Augustine and rhetoric and his subsequent influence on sacred reading and
preaching. But for reasons demonstrated in the previous chapter, little has been done by way of following the trajectory of his Platonic tendencies through to their effects on the rhetorical thought of his later adherents.

Recently, however, Copeland has investigated a major thread of that tradition as it developed in the cathedral school at Chartres.\textsuperscript{477} That history begins with Thierry of Chartres’ commentaries on Cicero’s \textit{De inventione} and the anonymous \textit{Rhetorica ad Herrenium}. According to Copeland, Thierry’s refiguring of the Ciceronian myth of the origin of rhetoric through the commentary of Victorinus “becomes a universal spiritual paradigm, because the beginning of rhetoric is not just at a moment in time, but in the soul.”\textsuperscript{478} So for Thierry and his students, “rhetoric begins, not just in past historical time, but also at the moment of its definition in the individual soul, which has been prompted towards action.”\textsuperscript{479} Additionally, Copeland notes that Thierry’s commentary on allegory in the \textit{Ad Herennium} “bears little relation to the teaching of the \textit{Ad Herennium}…it reaches back, instead, to a post-Augustinian fusing of theology and rhetoric-semiotics.”\textsuperscript{480}

But it would be wrong of me to characterize Thierry simply as an Augustinian-Platonist commenting on Ciceronian rhetoric; rather, the Chartres school demonstrates that the Ciceronian, Platonic, and Aristotelian impulses mixed in various proportions throughout the intellectual history of the Middle Ages. For Thierry includes large portions of the “New Logic” in his

\textsuperscript{477} See “The History of Rhetoric and the \textit{Longue Durée}: Ciceronian Myth and Its Medieval Afterlives.”\textit{The Journal of English and Germanic Philology} 106.2, Master Narratives of the Middle Ages (2007):176-202; as well as “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition.” The Copeland and Sluiter collection also highlights much of the Chartrian Platonic influence in the medieval history of rhetoric. See the two sections on Thierry of Chartres, the first on his two rhetoric commentaries on \textit{De inventione} and \textit{Rhetorica ad Herennium} 405-438, the second on his encyclopedic \textit{Heptateuchon} and Prologues to Donatus 439-443; the section on Dominicus Gundissalinus mentioned in n.468; the section on John of Salisbury’s \textit{Metalogicon} 484-510; and the section of Alan of Lille’s \textit{Anticlaudianus} 518-530.

\textsuperscript{478} “History of Rhetoric” 191.

\textsuperscript{479} \textit{Ibid}. 192.

\textsuperscript{480} “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 250.
encyclopedic *Heptateuchon*, so that he could rightly be presented as “both as supreme explicator of the mysteries of Platonic thought about cosmic creation, and innovative exponent of Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics* and *Sophistical Refutations* – that is, what we would now see as the early wave of the *logic nova.”\(^\text{481}\) This scientific and allegorical legacy of Thierry culminates in the “Neoplatonist poetics of the Chartrian school, from William of Conches and Bernardus Silvestris to the greatest Latin beneficiary of that tradition, Alan of Lille.”\(^\text{482}\) Bernard’s *Cosmographia* and Alan’s *Anticlaudinianus* are grand allegories that use Platonic imagery to explore the nature of the arts and sciences, what Copeland describes as a Neoplatonic mythography and “poetics of integument (literary narrative seen as allegorical veiling of philosophical truth).”\(^\text{483}\)

Perhaps the most overt fusion of these lines of thought comes by way of the *Metalogicon*, a twelfth-century defense of the arts of the trivium, written by Thierry’s former student John of Salisbury. The work begins with a Ciceronian claim: “Just as eloquence, unenlightened by reason, is rash and blind, so wisdom, without the power of expression, is feeble and maimed. Speechless wisdom may sometimes increase one’s personal satisfaction, but it rarely and only slightly contributes to the welfare of human society” (1.1). John even offers a very Platonic linguistic re-appropriation of the Augustinian-Stoic physical principal of seminal reasons:

> Scientific knowledge is the product of reading, learning, and meditation. It is accordingly evident that grammar, which is the basis and root of scientific knowledge, implants, as it were, the seed [*sementem*] [of virtue] in nature’s furrow after grace has readied the

\(^\text{481}\) Copeland and Sluiter, “Thierry of Chartres” 406.
\(^\text{482}\) “Ciceronian Rhetorical Tradition” 257.
\(^\text{483}\) *Ibid.* 257.
ground. This seed, provided again that cooperating grace is present, increases in substance and strength until it becomes solid virtue, and it grows in manifold respects until it fructifies in good works, wherefore men are called and actually are “good.” (1.23)

However, John transfers this role to grammar, whereas Plato would have identified the inseminating language art as dialectic. Ultimately, John dismisses the idea that Plato’s dialectic is a systematic, scientific art of logic and identifies Aristotle as logic’s rightful founder (2.2). Indeed, most of the book is a defense of the need to learn Aristotelian dialectical and logical principles (Books 2-4).

For all its rich history, however, St. Bonaventure does not seem to have been greatly influenced by the Chartrian branch of Platonic thought. Rather, he credits a parallel tradition not wholly unrelated – that which can be traced back to the school of St. Victor with its roots in the doubly Platonic foundation of St. Augustine and the mysterious Dionysius the Areopagite. This strand has been little explored since McKeon. With the general contours of the intellectual landscape now established, it is to consideration of Dionysius, Hugh of St. Victor, and ultimately, St. Bonaventure that I now turn.

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484 While I’m not claiming that John had access to the *Phaedrus*, the allegorical description of the effects of grammatical training is remarkably like those that Socrates attributes to dialectic: “The dialectician chooses a proper soul and plants and sows within it a discourse accompanied by knowledge – discourse capable of helping itself as well as the man who planted it, which is not barren but produces a seed [σπέρμα] from which more discourse grows in the character of others. Such discourse makes the seed forever immortal and renders the man who has it as happy as any human can be” (276e-277a).

485 I say “not wholly unrelated” because John of Salisbury mentions Hugh of St. Victor with reverence and respect in the *Metalogicon* (see 1.5). However, Copeland and Sluiter do note some possible areas of disagreement as well (Medieval Grammar 486).

486 Once thought to be the Dionysius that was converted by Paul at the Areopagus in Acts 17:34, doubt began to arise about this attribution in the first half of the fifteenth century. It is now believed that he was a fifth or sixth century author writing under the pseudonym “Dionysius the Areopagite.” Consequently, he is variously referred to in modern scholarship as “Pseudo-Dionysius” or “Dionysius the Psuedo-Areopagite.” However, as the authors I am dealing with in this paper accept his identity and make reference to him as such, I will refer to him simply as “Dionysius” from this point onward in order to avoid any confusion.
In discussing the interpretation of Sacred Scripture in *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology*, St. Bonaventure rehearses his major influences. He tells the reader that although Scripture is one in the literal sense, “there is understood a threefold spiritual meaning: namely, the *allegorical*, by which we are taught what to believe concerning the Divinity and humanity; the *moral*, by which we are taught how to live; and the *anagogical*, by which we are taught how to be united to God” (§5). Each spiritual level is assigned to a certain type of churchman, and each type exemplified by certain individuals:

The doctors should labor at the study of the first; the preachers, at the study of the second; the contemplatives, at the study of the third. The first is taught chiefly by Augustine; the second, by Gregory; the third, by Dionysius. Anselm follows Augustine; Bernard follows Gregory; Richard (of Saint Victor) follows Dionysius. For Anselm excels in reasoning; Bernard, in preaching; Richard, in contemplating; but Hugh (of Saint Victor) in all three (§5).

A comprehensive analysis of Bonaventure’s theory of scriptural hermeneutics and homiletics would be most complete by situating him amongst all seven of these scholars. However, as we are seeking to ground Bonaventure in the general tradition of Platonic psychagogy, in particular,

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in its *anagogical* function, what is required is a review of the thought of Dionysius and Hugh of St. Victor.

### 6.2.1 Dionysius and the Hierarchy of Macrocosm and Microcosm

While St. Augustine transmits the psychagogic structure of tripartite desire and the psychological analogy of the Trinity to the Western Church, it is the late fifth-century mystic known as Dionysius the Areopagite who provides the grand triadic cosmological scheme that would so influence the Middle Ages in general, and St. Bonaventure in particular. In his *Celestial Hierarchy*, Dionysius attempts to explicate the overall structure of the heavenly hosts as a reflection of the nature of God. For Dionysius a hierarchy is “a sacred order [*taxis iera*], a state of understanding [*episteme*] and an activity [*energeia*] approximating as closely as possible the divine” (CH 164D).488 As such, we are presented with a concept of hierarchy that is overtly triadic in structure, comprising order, understanding, and activity.

In depicting the celestial hierarchy, Dionysius emphasizes the triadic nature of the universe by establishing a larger hierarchy encompassing three lesser hierarchies each consisting of three separate orders, which in turn illustrates the macro-microcosmic nature of the hierarchical order. The first hierarchy is composed of the Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones, who are most similar to what God is and most like His image (205B-212D). As such, they “possess the highest order [*taxin*] as God’s immediate neighbor” (205B) and so the entire first hierarchy shares an intimate kinship with the first attribute of hierarchy: order. However, once

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the nature of each constituent group is analyzed, we see that each maintains a particular relationship with the attribute of hierarchy that shares its triadic position.

The seraphim engage in “a perennial circling around diving things…the overflowing heat of movement that never falters and never fails” (205B). In this way, the seraphim exemplify order by maintaining a perfect arrangement of position and movement. Furthermore, through their perfect arrangement the seraphim possess “a capacity to stamp their own image on subordinates by arousing and uplifting in them to a like flame” (205C). And so they participate in the more abstract notion of order as a formal principle through which order arises. However, the triadic macro-microcosm is so complete that, though order is their primary function, they are not divorced from understanding and activity since they are busy in the activity of ordering through which they “do away with every obsuring shadow” that clouds the minds of their subordinates (205C). In like manner the cherubim are primarily concerned with understanding, as their name means “the power to know and to see God…to contemplate the divine splendor…to be filled with the gifts that bring wisdom and to share these generously with subordinates” (205C). As the seraphim provide formal guidance to subordinates, so the cherubim guide subordinates to understanding. Finally, the emphasis of the thrones falls upon the perfection of their activity. They are “completely intent upon remaining always and forever in the presence of him who is truly the most high, that, free of all passion and material concern, they are utterly available to receive the divine visitation, that they bear God and are ever open, like servants, to welcome God” (205D). By discussing each group in turn and then as a unity, we are shown that the hierarchical progression of subordinates is achieved through purification [katharsis], illumination [photismos], and perfection [teleiosis] (208A-209D); a tri-fold ascent that mirrors the hierarchical structure. It is the superior hierarchy as a whole that ultimately guides
subordinates in this process, although one can see how each order shares a special relationship with its respective hierarchizing function – formal purification through the transformative fire of the seraphim, cognitive illumination through the divine wisdom of the cherubim, and perfection in action through the chaste and continent motivations of the thrones (205B-D).

In the second hierarchy, Dionysius seems to fuse the cosmological middle part of “understanding” with the Platonic middle part of “spirit.” For later in the text we are told that all divine minds are divided into three: being, power, and activity [ousian kai dynamin kai energeian] (284D-285A). Indeed, the middle hierarchy consists of three powerful orders bearing the near synonymous names of dominions [kyrioteton], powers [dynameon] and authorities [exousion], which all are geared towards imposing order over temporal affairs.

Taking “understanding” as a power that operates between form and action, we can see that the intermediate orders play both a mental and material role. For in returning to their nominal sources (which is, of course, the same source in the Divine) the dominions “accept no empty appearances [eike]” (237C); the powers refer to “a kind of masculine and unshakable courage [andrea]…which abandons all laziness and softness during the reception of the divine illumination” (237D-240A); and the authorities “are so placed that they can receive God in a harmonious [eukosmon] and unconfused way and indicate the ordered nature of the celestial and intellectual [noeras] authority” (240A). Thus the middle hierarchy exemplifies not only the dominion, power, and authority that one would associate with the executive power of the auxiliaries, but also the intellectual dominion, power, and authority that come from understanding achieved through the purification, illumination and perfection of the higher order.

The third and final hierarchy is made up of the principalities, archangels, and angels who are most concerned with humanity. Yet, “principalities” translates archon, indicating once again
a formal principle at the head; the archangels mediate between these formal principles by interpreting and announcing what they have learned to the angels; and the angels administer to the material world, functioning as the actual mediums of communication between heaven and earth. So the third hierarchy also follows the paradigm by being primarily focused with activity, yet tripartitioned appropriately.

According to Dionysius, this same triadic hierarchy repeats itself in the institutions on earth as well as within every rational being:

Each intelligent being, heavenly or human, has his own set of primary, middle, and lower powers, and in accordance with his capacities these indicate the aforementioned upliftings, directly relative to the hierarchic enlightenment available to every being. It is in accordance with this arrangement that each intelligent entity – as far as he properly can and to the extent he may – participates in that purification beyond purity, the superabundant light, that perfection preceding all perfection. (273C).

As each hierarchy is lifted up toward God by the hierarchy that precedes it, there should be for Dionysius some process of purification, illumination, and perfection that human beings could participate in. He identifies such a process in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy:

As for us, this gift [of hierarchy] which the heavenly beings have received uniquely and unitedly has been passed on to us by the divinely transmitted scriptures in a way suited to us, that is, by means of the variety and abundance of composite symbols. Hence, the being of our hierarchy is laid down by the divinely transmitted scriptures…Furthermore,
whatever was given by these sacred men in a more immaterial initiation, as already given to our neighbors in the heavenly hierarchy, from mind to mind, this too our leaders have revealed, through the means of verbal expression and thus corporeal, but at the same time more immaterial since it is free from writing. (376B-C)

Thus, Dionysius names two processes by means of which intelligent corporeal beings may order their soul in imitation of God: by reading sacred texts and by means of speech. In so doing, he sets the structural frame for the remainder of the chapter, which will endeavor to uncover the hierarchizing triadic connections the existed in the psychagogic tradition that placed the use of language at its heart.

6.2.2 Hugh of Saint Victor’s Pedagogy of Re-Formation

As a scholar and teacher writing in the early twelfth-century, Hugh’s work covered a wide range of topics from the various arts and sciences, to scholastic philosophy and theology, to mystical spirituality. Yet as we have seen elsewhere, these topics are not distinct. Consequently, in what is perhaps his best-known and most influential work, Eruditionis Didascaliae or Didascalicon de studio legend [on the study of reading],489 Hugh presents a treatise that orients all the medieval arts and sciences towards a theory of reading dedicated to the spiritual reformation of the student reader. For Hugh, “properly ordered reading in the liberal arts serves to begin to restore the original order of humankind as the created image of God.”490 In reviewing the place of the

language arts in this scheme of restoration through encountering texts, we can get a good sense of Bonaventure’s appropriations and innovations.

Hugh saw the trivium as fundamental for the practice of reading. He discusses the trivium under the heading of the “logical” arts, acknowledging the derivation of its name from the Greek “logos” which could mean either word [sermo] or reason [ratio]. Grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric comprise what he calls “linguistic logic” with dialectic and rhetoric being further subdivided into arts of “rational logic” which deal with probable argument. Hugh also makes ratio a division of sermo: “Linguistic [sermocinalis] logic stands as genus…thus containing argumentative [disertivam] logic as a subdivision” (I.1). Later, Hugh divides discursive argument into a fuller range of demonstrative, probable, and sophistic; with probable containing dialectic and rhetoric. So while he recognizes the unity of the trivium, he also seems to foreshadow the expanded Organon of the later twelfth-century that lays claim to rhetoric as a mode of argumentation.

Admittedly, the entire Didascalicon is written so as to supply what is necessary for the reader to engage the text. When one considers that the logical arts are presented last after the

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491 Medieval pedagogues often acknowledged the origin of the language arts in the concept of the logos, arguing as Cicero did for their reunification. The tradition goes back to the Stoics, who noted multiple aspects of the logos in the inner word of thought (logos endiathetos) and the uttered word of speech (logos prophorikos). We can see this motive plainly in the fifth-century encyclopedic work of Martianus Capella, The Marriage of Philology and Mercury (De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii), for philology itself means “the love of the logos” and the marriage between the two figures serves as an allegory of the union between learning and eloquence (Stahl, et. al. 83). Isidore of Seville defined logic as dialectic and rhetoric, noting the logos means “rational” (McKeon, “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages” 15; citing De Differentiis Rerum c. 39; PL 83, 93-94.). And John of Salisbury, writing after Hugh and with reference to him, notes that ‘logic’ may be “limited to the rules of [argumentative] reasoning,” but holds that, “the twofold meaning of ‘logic’ stems from its Greek etymology, for in the latter language ‘logos’ means both ‘word’ [sermonem] and ‘reason’ [rationem].” (Metalogicon I.10).


493 See 2.28-30; 29-31 in PL 83. Hugh does not include poetics in his version of the expanded Organon, downgrading it from an art to an ‘appendage’ that may be worth reading occasionally, but not for serious study. Hugh also includes in this category certain philosophers “who are always taking some small matter and dragging it out through long verbal detours” (3.4).
theoretical, practical, and mechanical arts, it might appear that the trivium holds no more special place in the art of reading then does, for example, fabric-making, which is one of the mechanical arts. But Hugh is quite clear that although logic is discussed last, as it was the last of the arts to be discovered, it is of the first necessity to learn for sacred reading: “It is logic which ought to be read first by those beginning to study philosophy, for it teaches the nature of words and concepts without both of which no treatise of philosophy can be explained rationally” (1.11). As such, we see that the trivium is fundamental to the practice of reading. However, this conclusion is not merely a mundane practice of rational import. To the contrary, Hugh is quite conscious of the spiritual significance of his pedagogy and describes it in an almost Dionysian manner:

This, then, is what the arts are concerned with, this is what they intend, namely, to restore [reparetur] within us the divine likeness [similitude], a likeness which to us is a form [forma] but to God is his nature. The more we are conformed [conformamur] to the divine nature, the more do we possess Wisdom, for then there begins to shine forth again in us what has forever existed in the divine Idea or Pattern [ratione], coming and going in us but standing changeless in God. (2.1)

Hugh’s program of spiritual restoration through reading is one based, literally, in the reformation of the soul so that “salvation entails receiving again the form of Wisdom.” St. Bonaventure inherits much of Hugh’s reformative impulse. Like Hugh, the language arts will have a predominant place. However, Bonaventure will bring the Dionysian elements to the fore and

cast his project as one of inner rehierarchization through both knowledge and practice of the arts. Through this process of properly orienting ourselves, we might make our ascent to God.

6.3 SAINT BONAVENTURE’S TRIVIUM OF ASCENT

In this final section, I consider three anagogical aspects of St. Bonaventure’s theorizing and theologizing of the language arts. The first is the reorientation of the arts themselves and the “reduction” of their classificatory scheme. Second is the uplifting consequence of reading and preaching. Third is the anagogical effect of the speech act itself.

The first step in understanding the significance of Bonaventure’s spiritual interpretation of the language arts is to understand his reassessment of them in contrast with the dominant intellectual milieu. Even in Hugh of St. Victor we see a tendency towards the expansion of the Organon to include rhetoric. In the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure’s contemporary at the University of Paris, the expansion is completed to include poetics and relate each art to the acts of reasoning in a descending order of rational certainty. Bonaventure’s scheme is something quite different. Though perhaps not innovative in its ordering, it is literally “original.”

6.3.1 The Reduction of the Trivium

Paul Rorem has recently brought to light a previously obscured fact of translation that radically affects the unease that the modern scholar might feel upon encountering the title of one of St.
Bonaventure’s more prominent works, *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology*. In contemporary academic parlance, to “reduce” something is either to oversimplify it or to subordinate it or both. So Bonaventure’s title might indicate a desire to rob the arts of their independent identities and bring them under the yoke of theological inquiry – an act of intellectual colonialization not unlike St. Augustine’s “Gold from Egypt.” In the Latin, however, *reductio*, a compound of *re-* meaning “back” and *ductio* meaning “to lead” means literally “a leading back” or “a restoration.” Bonaventure is not interested in yoking. Like Hugh, he is interesting in restoring; but unlike Hugh, he is not only interested in restoring *through* the arts, but also in restoring the arts themselves.

Rorem adds mightily to the concept of “leading back” by noting that not only is Bonaventure greatly influenced by Dionysius, but that the translation he used of the *Celestial Hierarchy* – likely some version of John Scot Eriugena – would have been accompanied by the commentaries of Eriugena and Hugh. The significance is that Eriugena explains that he uses the Latin prefix *re-* to denote the Greek *ana*, so that “*reductio* was used to translate ‘anagogy,’ literally, ‘uplifting’” with Hugh following suit. Therefore, Bonaventure’s

495 *De reductione artium ad theologiam*.
496 See Lewis and Short *reductio*.
497 See Bougerol’s section on *reductio* for a similar analysis that interprets the term as part of Bonaventure’s dialectical method (*Introduction* 75-77). Bougerol concludes that “the reduction is not merely a technique – it is the soul of the return to God” (76). See also Burke’s comment that Bonaventure reduces “a ‘lower’ subject to a ‘higher’ one” (*Grammar* 97).
498 Bougerol shows through philological analysis that the translation itself was likely a version of Eriugena (ca. 867) modified by that of Jean Sarrazin (ca. 1167) (*Introduction* 39-48).
500 “Dionysian Uplifting” 185. True, Eriugena also transliterated the term, and Bonaventure employs *anagogicus* in his texts. But the point is that both Eriugena and Hugh are explicit that *reductio* is a Latin equivalent. Moreover, knowing that Bonaventure was aware of the equivalency makes a great deal of sense out of the way he employed the term *reductio*. This is the major thesis of Rorem’s article.
501 Ibid. 186.
reduction is not a distillation or a simplification or in any way a diminishing, but is an anagogical endeavor aimed at leading the arts themselves back to their original form and purpose.502

In order to understand his design, we must realize that St. Bonaventure is a consummate Trinitarian. He sees in every artistic scheme the image of the Trinity. This means that there can be hierarchy in the sense of order and emanation; but there can be no subordination in the sense of diminished importance or inferior capacity within any given triplet. For Bonaventure, the trivium is just such a triplet which he acknowledges simply as being comprised of the arts of grammar, logic, and rhetoric – three distinct arts of speech without which the others are incomplete. The emancipation of rhetoric from logic and the reemphasis of grammar as the essential grounding of the arts mark a radical departure from the dominant scholastic tendency of the times, evidenced even in Hugh and perfected in St. Thomas. But Bonaventure’s ordering best conforms to the psychological and cosmological schemes of St. Augustine and Dionysius who offer variations of the archetypical order of being, intellect and will. An order, I have argued, that was always implicit in the logos and was first made explicit in the negative proclamations of Gorgias. Grammar gives speech form, logic provides understanding, and rhetoric infuses vitality, activity, and communicative force.503

In an inversion of Hugh, Bonaventure goes so far as to name speech [sermo] as the primary concern [principalis intentio] of rational [rationalis] philosophy (Reduction §15). Thus he follows the tradition of unifying the fractured concepts of logos by reintegrating the bifurcated Latin circumlocution ratio et sermo. But the implication here is as subtle as it is revolutionary.

502 On Bonaventure’s inclination to treat forma in more of an Augustinian-Platonic sense as participation in the metaphysical ideas of God, than an Aristotelian sense (though he was capable of both), see Bougerol “The Language of Saint Bonaventure” (Introduction 55).
503 This is a general summary culled from the various expressions that Bonaventure offers about the trivium. The technical vocabulary he employs is examined in the final subsection.
Speech is no longer the manifestation of reason, it is its content. This is no longer a simple inversion of Hugh, but of the received tradition going back through Victorinus and Porphyry. Speech does not simply provide a body for the soul of thought, for there is no thought without words - speech is the substance of thought.

Of course, anyone with a disciplinary neurosis can find things to complain about in Bonaventure’s system. His complex way of looking at triplet within triplet results in some simplified statements when he looks at one triad, like the trivium, through a single aspect of another, like a single Person of the Trinity. For this reason Charles Sears Baldwin can complain that Bonaventure “is content to give rhetoric the narrow and barren field of ornatus, assigning docendum and verum to logic,” because he does so when “considering speech in the light of its delivery” in which he sees the “pattern of human life” (§17). Baldwin declines to mention that in the ornatus of speech, Bonaventure sees a basis for human action “regulated [ordine] and adorned [ornate] by uprightness of intention,” which suggests that Bonaventure saw ornatus as anything but barren, but rather was referring to the classical canons of arrangement and style as manifested in delivery.

As Baldwin notes, but dismisses as a mere summary, St. Bonaventure treats the arts most comprehensively in the Collations on the Six Days (CSD). Here he does summarize across the arts of grammar, logic, and rhetoric. But he does so in a manner the reasserts the distinctions of the arts, respecting the provinces and implicit classical authorities of each. For grammar he cites Priscian and notes that the art treats such things as moods, gender, syntax, prosody, number, case, etc. (4.19). For logic, without citing Aristotle or naming his works

505 Ibid. 177n.56.
506 Collationes in hexaëmeron.
directly, he covers the whole New Logic. He speaks of the “First Analysis” [prima analysi] and the “Second Analysis” [secunda analysi] that deal with syllogisms based on necessary arguments; Topical (i.e. dialectical) proofs [loci topici] that deal with probable arguments; Sophistical proofs [loci sophistici] that deal with errors in argument; and he finishes by mentioning the need to deal with “the nature of things” [nature rerum] through the “ten predicaments” [decem praedicamenta] and the “treatment of sentences [enuntiationes]” (4.20). The summary of rhetoric is indeed an outline of *De inventione* without direct attribution. But in that outline he asserts the nature of rhetoric in a way that demonstrates his position in a number of debates. He mentions that the orator provides a civic function [civili utilitati]; that its three types are demonstrative (i.e., epideictic), deliberative and judicial, explaining each through triplits of their own; that a proper speech has an exordium, narrative, etc.; and that rhetoric has five canons: invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery (4.21-25).507

Bonaventure’s remarks might seem like a simple summary, but amidst debates about the civic function of rhetoric, its relationship to logic, and the canons that rightly belonged to it, it is a subtle argument for an integrated art of language constituted of the trivium and organized by a hierarchy without subordination. It is a *reductio* of the language arts to their most spiritual form, which happens to be their most classical. So while a rhetorician might complain that in the CSD Bonaventure identifies logic with Christ and privileges it as the center of the trivium (1.11; 1.25-26); such a complaint only comes from misunderstanding that Christ is the Center [medium] of the Trinity, just as logic is the second art of the trivium. Conversely, and appropriately, in his *Collations on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit (CHS)*,508 which deals with the Third Person of the Trinity, Bonaventure – paraphrasing Cicero on the deliberative mode that considers utility,

507 *Inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio.*  
508 *Collationes de septem donis spiritus sancti.*
security, and honorableness – asserts that it is “certain that rational philosophy is consummated \[\textit{consummatur}\] in the discipline of rhetoric.”\textsuperscript{509} Whether it is better to be the center or the consummation is a moot point for Bonaventure. What he cares about is the leading upward of the soul through the rehierachized trivium. That anagogic project takes two basic forms, the reading and preaching of the Word of God and the contemplation of our own ability to language.

6.3.2 Hermeneutic Ascent

One might get the sense that although St. Bonaventure theorized about the language arts, he was no rhetorical theorist. This would be a mistake. Even outside of the \textit{Ars concionandi}, much of his works focus on the interpretative and expressive tasks of the preacher that occupied St. Augustine’s \textit{DDC}. Although he does not always make the connection explicit, Bonaventure tells us in the \textit{Reduction} that one of the roles of rational philosophy is to guide interpretation (§4) and its role in expression is obvious. Often, however, the word ‘rhetoric’ is not present. For instance, when Bonaventure opens the \textit{CSD} he situates it as, among other things, an investigation into preaching:

\begin{quote}
\textit{In the midst [medio] of the Church the Lord shall open his mouth, and shall fill him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding and shall clothe him with a robe of glory (Eccl. 15:5). In these words the Holy Spirit teaches [docet] the prudent man to whom he should address his speech [sermonem], from where he should begin [incipere] it, and finally where he should end [terminere] it. (1.1)
\end{quote}

He should direct it to the Church, he should begin from the center [medium], which is Christ, and end in wisdom and understanding. Hence, it is worth investigating in what way the art of preaching impacts the preacher’s ascent to wisdom and understanding.

In the Journey of the Mind to God, Bonaventure tells us that by observing “the certain and infallible laws” (3.7) of the constituent disciplines of natural, rational, and moral philosophy, we prepare our mental faculties to be reformed by the three theological virtues. These virtues reorder our mind in line with the mystical hierarchization of the Church through a threefold Dionysian process of “purification, illumination, and perfective unity” (4.6) which is brought about by the threefold mystical meaning of scripture: tropological, allegorical, and anagogical. In this way, we see that the trivium is not only necessary for the effective communication of Scriptural Truths; but also plays quite literally a central role in the full understanding of the Scriptures themselves insofar as it lays at the very center of the third step towards God, without which our minds cannot move on towards the fourth step: receiving the “hierarchical revelations of Holy Scripture” (4.7). If we follow Bonaventure’s advice on where to begin, then we must begin our hermeneutic encounter with the wisdom of Scripture at the center, with the trivium.

A sort of mystical circularity comes into play however, because hermeneutic interpretation is far from being sufficient for the task at hand. Indeed, prayer must augment the rhetorical process and the Spirit must guide the preacher even as the laws of rhetoric guide his

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mind. In his *Commentary on the Gospel of Luke*, Bonaventure gives a spiritual reading of Luke 9:16-17 wherein he discusses how the multiplication of the loaves serves as a “mystical and figurative example” to preachers, who should:

not search out new things from their hearts, for the Lord did not create new loaves to feed the crowd. But as the Lord multiplied five barley loaves by means of a divine blessing, so too must every abundance of true teaching be taken from the *foundation of Sacred Scripture*, multiplied by prayer, through which one looks to heaven, and devotion, through which it is blessed, and meditation, through which it is broken, and preaching, through which it is distributed and explained.

Rhetorical invention, then, becomes a spiritual gift, obtained through divine reading, prayer, devotion, and meditation, culminating in the act of preaching. The preacher seeks not for creative genius, but to be inspired by the Holy Spirit, at least in part. That is to say that Bonaventure does not want to divorce the labor of the preacher from the process of preaching, but points to the Holy Spirit as the foremost instructor on the subject. He tells us that the “Spirit is the best teacher, for the Spirit teaches men and women to understand and to express themselves in a refined manner” (12:12, Paragraph 20), which brings us right back to the two Augustinian duties of the preacher. However, the preacher should not rely solely on his own art, for as Bonaventure states, “when people rely on their ingenuity, their inventiveness is poor, their judgment falls short, and they frequently miss the mark. For which reason Proverbs 3:5 reads:

512 *Commentarius in Evangelium Lucae.*
‘Trust in the Lord with all your heart, and do not rely on your own cleverness.’” (12:11, Paragraph 19). The reliance on the spiritual thus aids in invention, but does not dominate it.

Of course the preacher must still work hard, in fact, “All preachers are instructed that they give time first to their own perfection and then to the edification of others” (1:80, Paragraph 143). Elaborating on this point, St. Bonaventure tells us concerning the finding of Jesus in the temple that “in this, too, it is to be noted spiritually that Christ teaches us that we must first learn before we teach, according to what Sirach 18:19 says: ‘Learn, before you speak.’ And thus, he wanted to be found in the midst of the teachers and in the temple because truth is attained through the reading of the Scriptures and through prayer.” (2:46).

Scripture becomes the beginning and end of the rhetorical journey. The preacher begins to read so that he may understand the literal level and become learned, and meditating upon it he is cleansed, enlightened and perfected. By partaking in the rhetorical act, which is the consummation of the grammatical act of interpretation and the logical act of understanding, the preacher sees the image of God in his own work. By reflecting on this image he begins to perfect the mind further and prepares it for the revelatory Truth of Scripture in its threefold sense, and his mind is thus hierarchized by it. The journey continues beyond this point into contemplation. This is the progression stated in Bonaventure’s De triplici via. For not only does this work discuss the individual’s progression to union with God through the steps of divine reading, meditation, and prayer culminating in the contemplative practice, but it also ends in a description of a Dionysian ascent to contemplation which explicitly hierarchizes these practices: “Note that on the first level, truth is to be invoked by sighs and prayers, which pertains to the Angels; it is to be received by study and reading, which pertains to the Archangels; it is to be communicated by example and preaching, which pertains to the Principalities” (3.13). Needless
to say that the process ascends six more levels into contemplation, but the practices we are concerned with are those that deal with the first level of truth. As such, true preaching is both a human and divine endeavor, consisting of prayer, sacred reading, and meditation; but also the earnest zeal for study and communication indicative of the human rhetor. It is indeed a circular activity of sorts, in which the preaching makes for better reading the reading for better prayer the prayer for better preaching, etc.

As St. Bonaventure points out in the preface to his Lucan commentary: “because the teacher or interpreter is like a farmer who must eat of the fruits of his own labor, he must not seek the curious, but the nutritious, not the praise of others, but the witness of a good conscience, not a display of vanity, but the edification of charity” (§11). Thus, this circularity is no different for the preacher than it is for a farmer whose quality of sustenance is directly proportionate to his quality of labor – they both work to live and live to work. Thus we see a mystification of the basic hermeneutical principals of On Christian Doctrine in the spirit of the Didascalicon, whereby the preacher is lifted up by the very reading and preaching of the Word through which others are moved. Such a process has definite undertones of Platonic psychagogy, but in the final subsection I look at Bonaventure’s most overtly Platonic program of ascendency through the correlation of language with the movements of the soul.

6.3.3 The Consummation of Rational Philosophy

In many respects, St. Bonaventure reflects the traditions handed down from St. Augustine, Dionysius, and Hugh of St. Victor. Yet he is an important innovator within this tradition along several lines. Working off the basic structures he inherits, he explicitly assigns each art of the trivium a particular cognitive function in the communicative process as a whole:
For reason [ratio] thinks of making whatever is in itself to exist in another, and whatever is in another to exist within itself: and this cannot be done except by means of speech [sermonem]. Whatever is contained in the soul [anima], then, is there either as a concept, as an assent, or as an affective disposition. And so, to indicate concepts, there is grammar, to induce assent, there is logic, and to move affective dispositions [ad inclinandum affectus], there is rhetoric. (CSD 4.18)

As such, he does not simply see an analogy between the structure of the trivium and the acts of the mind, but assigns to each art a definitive role to play in the expressive, argumentative, and persuasive aspects of the communicative act. While this description ostensibly concerns the communicative act as it pertains to the relationship between a speaker and an auditor, this correlation allows Bonaventure to analyze the act of speaking in terms of his overall Trinitarian system. Thus, he is able to explore not only how the act of speaking affects the auditor, but also how it affects the speaker as a reflection of the Trinity; for with Bonaventure, as with Plato, while one individual is capable of bettering another, it is really through self-reflection that they are truly reformed.

A major point of St. Bonaventure’s analysis of the arts of speaking, and indeed all the arts, is perfection through self-reflection. This is made clear in the Journey of the Mind to God, in which Bonaventure appropriates the Platonic itinerary of outward, inward, upward. However, as with the Dionysian hierarchy, every stage replicates the entirety of the journey. It is easy to get lost as Bonaventure begins to lay out his various tripartite schemes, six in all, analogous to the wings of the Seraph who appeared to St. Francis (Prologue 6). Two each deal with the
mind’s three principal powers of perception: two with the outward material world, two with the inward world of the mind, and two with the supernatural (1.4). The focus of this analysis will be that of the middle stage, in which the project is to “enter [intrare] our own mind [mentem], which is the image of God [imago Dei]” (1.2).

Looking directly at the two middle steps, those which reflect on the powers of the mind, we find a clear adoption of St. Augustine’s psychological analogy. Chapter 3 outlines the nature of these faculties – memory, intellect, and will or “elective capacity”[virtus electivus] – which themselves are tripartite. Memory retains and recalls things present, corporeal and temporal (3.2). Intellect understands the intelligible content of terms, propositions, and inferences (3.3). And the will consists in taking counsel, judgment, and desire (3.4). Here, Bonaventure discusses how reflection on a triple triplet of human sciences illuminates our understanding of God:

For this consideration which the soul has of its principle, one and triune, through the trinity of its powers, by which it is the image of God, it is aided by the lights of the sciences which perfect it, inform it, and represent the most blessed Trinity in a threefold manner. For all philosophy is either natural, or rational, or moral. The first is concerned with the cause of being [causa essendi] and thus leads to the Father; the second is concerned with the basis of understanding and thus leads to the Wisdom of the Word [sapientiam Verbi]; the third deals with the order of life [ordine vivendi] and thus lead to the goodness of the Holy Spirit…The first, natural philosophy, is divided into metaphysics, mathematics, and physics…The second, rational philosophy, is divided into grammar, which makes men capable of expressing themselves; logic, which makes them keen in argumentation; and rhetoric, which makes them apt to persuade and move others.
This likewise suggests the most blessed Trinity…The third, moral philosophy, is divided into individual, familial, and political. (3.6)

While we are concerned with rational philosophy, which is comprised of the linguistic arts of the trivium, its central relationship amongst the philosophical arts is important to understand. Set apart, physics and politics seem unconnected, but the trivium provides a bridge between them. That is to say, that although rational philosophy itself leads to the Wisdom of the Word, grammar approaches God the Father as an essential cause of language and rhetoric relates to the Holy Spirit as the active principle that orders life. Language can aid in both reading the book of nature and ordering the body politic, and so can mediate between the needs of the two.

Still, it might be argued that within Bonaventure’s scheme the trivium is presented as merely a portion of a much larger framework and holds no special place as concerns the reformation of the soul and the ascent of the mind to God. It should be noted, however, that Bonaventure literally places the trivium in a central place of importance; and as we’ve seen, for Bonaventure, the center is the place to start.513 For as the philosophy of reason, the trivium is the philosophical system that deals with the mind itself, presented in the stage of spiritual progress when the mind is reflecting upon itself. The first and third philosophies represent the lower and higher mental perceptive powers, natural and supernatural, within the perceptions of the mind. The trivium represents the mental perceptive powers to the inward looking mind, thus providing the most exact correlate to the mind among the various philosophies. Consequently, the arts of

513 Remembering Bonaventure’s advice to the preacher, speech begins at the center, which is representative of Christ (see p. 251 above). When we look there, we find speech itself. In this case, the medium really is the message.
When we investigate the correlation, we see the process of ascent inherent in language.

We are told in the *Reduction* that the main concern of rational philosophy is speech (*sermo*), and so St. Bonaventure considers the “three elements corresponding to the three aspects of speech itself: namely, the *person speaking*, the *delivery* of the speech, and its final purpose or its effect upon the *hearer*” (§15). We find the perfection of speech in its final purpose, which comprises a modification of the classical duties of the orator:

Considering speech in the light of its *purpose*, we find that it aims to *express* (*ad exprimendum*), to *instruct* (*ad erudiendum*), and to *persuade* (*ad movendum*); it never *expresses* except by means of a likeness (*species*); it never *teaches* except by means of clear light (*lumine arguente*); it never *persuades* except by power (*virtute*); and it is evident that these effects are accomplished only by means of inherent likeness, light, and power intrinsically *united to the soul* (*animae unita*). Therefore, St. Augustine concludes that he alone is a true teacher who can impress a likeness, shed light, and grant power to the heart of his hearer. (§18)

Here we can see a clear correspondence with the Augustinian psychological triad. First, realizing that ‘likeness’ translates *specie*, meaning, not simply ‘species,’ but rather ‘form’ and a visible form in particular, we see a direct correlation between the formal nature of grammar and the mental faculty of memory, which stores in itself the sensual forms of past experiences.

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514 According to Cousins “in our use of language – in our internal thinking and in our external expression – we reflect the dynamic process of the inner Trinitarian life…For Bonaventure – and the mainstream Western Christian theological tradition – we are Trinitarian images precisely in our linguistic activity. In our formulation and expression of words we mirror the inner Trinitarian life” (“Bonaventure’s Mysticism” 251).
Second, that teaching and light correlate to the intellect is obvious. And finally, realizing that
‘persuade’ translates *moveo*, meaning more properly ‘to move,’ and *virtute* means not only
power but a complex of terms associated with the Platonic middle element (e.g. courage, moral
excellence, etc.); we see that such action means specifically the ability to move the will of
another, not so much by force, but by the virtuous power of the speaker’s own will.

Thus, it is in aligning the threefold aims of speech to the threefold faculties of another’s
soul that we come to perfect the act of speaking. It is in the reflection of this act that our own
soul is perfected as well. For in analyzing the union that takes place between our own soul and
the soul of the hearer in this act, we become aware of the process by which we are united with
the knowledge of God:

Now as perfection of speech requires the union of power [*virtute*], light [*lumine*], and a
likeness [*specie*] within the soul [*unitis animae*], so, too, for the instruction of the soul in
the knowledge of God by interior conversation with Him, there is required a union with
Him who is “the brightness of his glory and the image of his substance, and upholding
the word of his power”§515 (§18).

So, by leading speech back up to its theological beginnings and so obtaining its perfection, the
speaker begins to reform, that is, perfect, their own soul.

The correlation with the Trinity becomes clearer if we return to the Journey. In speaking
of the faculties of the mind, Bonaventure shows how considering their relationship with one
another aids us in our ascent:

§515 Heb. 1:3
Moreover, if one considers the order, the origin, and the relationship of these faculties, he is led up to the most blessed Trinity Itself. For from the memory comes forth the intelligence as its offspring, because we understand only when the likeness [similitudo] which is in the memory emerges at the crest of our understanding and this is the mental word [verbum]. From the memory and the intelligence is breathed forth love [amor], as the bond of both. These three – the generating mind, the word, and love – exist in the soul as memory, intelligence, and will [voluntatem]…The soul then, when it considers itself through itself as through a mirror, rises to the speculation of the Blessed Trinity, the Father, the Word, and Love. (3.5)

And while this is meant to refer to the interaction of the mental faculties abstracted from the arts of language, it is strikingly reminiscent of the description of rational philosophy in the Reduction, that is, of speech specifically. Yet it differs in that its culminating effect is not internal, but is manifested in the soul of another:

Considering speech in the light of the speaker, we see that all speech signifies a mental concept [mentis conceptum]. That inner concept is the word of the mind [verbum mentis] and its offspring which is known to the person conceiving it; but that it may become known to the hearer, it assumes the form of the voice, and clothed therein, the intelligible word becomes sensible and is heard without; it is received into the ear of the person listening and still it does not depart from the mind of the person uttering it. Practically the same procedure is seen in the begetting of the Eternal Word, because the father
conceived Him, begetting Him from all eternity...But that He might be known by man who is endowed with senses, He assumed the nature of flesh...and yet He remained “in the bosom of the Father.”\textsuperscript{516} (§16)

If we read these two descriptions across one another and incorporate the earlier analysis of the final purpose of speech, we can see that for Bonaventure speech stands between the speaker and the hearer as an image that connects both their souls, and in so doing, mirrors not only their own souls, but the Holy Trinity as well.\textsuperscript{517}

Therefore, this is another, specifically anagogic way in which rhetoric is the consummation of rational philosophy. For only when the mind generates a concept, incarnates it in spoken word, and through it moves the soul of another in the rhetorical act do the rational arts of language truly mirror the Blessed Trinity. The preacher is then not only called to interpret and communicate the Word of God, but also to mirror the Divine Activity by the very act of speaking, through which the soul of the auditor is uplifted. By looking into this mirror the soul of the rhetor is further perfected, readying it for its continuing rehierarchization by the virtues and the Scriptures, and so the mystical circularity spirals ever upwards.

\textsuperscript{516} This may be seen as an evolution of the analogy drawn by the Pre-Nicene Fathers concerning the \textit{logos endiathetos} and the \textit{logos prophorikos}.

\textsuperscript{517} Again, see Cousins:

For Bonaventure, the Trinity provides the foundation of the worldview within which he sees language related to mysticism. The Trinity is primarily the mystery of the divine self-expression, the divine speech uttered from all eternity in the Word. Hence the divinity is dynamic and expressive; from all eternity the fecundity of the divinity wells up in the person of the Father and expresses itself in its perfect Image and Word, who is the Son, and who is joined to the Father in the love of the Holy Spirit. Thus we can say that the Son is the linguistic expression of the Father – the Language of the Father. Because of this, human language is not merely functional – an instrument or a tool for operating in society. Rather, it has its grounding in the most intimate life of the divinity. (“Bonaventure’s Mysticism” 240)
This is by no means St. Bonaventure’s final word on the role of rhetoric in the reformation and ascent of the soul. His works are replete with advice to his Franciscan brothers and students, who were both preachers and contemplatives, concerning the various ways in which the language arts work in conjunction with prayer, meditation, and contemplation to raise their souls in a rehierarchizing ascent. However, this chapter serves as a summation of his theology of the language arts which both transforms and is transformed by the soul in its upward journey. More importantly, this account highlights the Trinitarian foundation of his linguistic theory and places it squarely in a Platonic tradition that saw the individual as an analogue to the cosmos, and language as a mirror through which the structure of the Divine Order is reflected back to us. More than just an important figure in this tradition, Bonaventure synthesized the various strains and analogies that then existed and generated a cohesive and innovative model of ascent that connected the individual to the divine through a triadic linguistic hierarchy that is consummated in rhetorical practice.

What is perhaps most surprising for the history of rhetoric is that Bonaventure explores the effect that rhetorical practice has on the speaker, who is raised up by the very contemplation of the abilities to express a concept, explain an idea, and move the soul of another. This is a noticeable departure from the thought, of say, Victorinus, who argued that eloquence did nothing to affect the wisdom of the sage, but merely enabled the sage to be publicly effective. Tracing this insight back to the beginning of its intellectual tradition, we are reminded that Plato’s lover in the *Phaedrus* is also lifted up by love, indeed higher than the beloved, in the same manner that the preacher is reformed by rhetorical practice in St. Bonaventure. As Plato’s lover mentors his beloved, it is he that grows wings.518 To my knowledge, this aspect of rhetoric has been little

518 Both souls sprout wings after death, if they are chaste, as a result of the lover’s psychagogic activity (256b).
explored, and while it is implicit in Plato’s love metaphor, it is systematically demonstrated in Bonaventure. The exhortation, then, in both Plato and Bonaventure and presumably all adherents of psychagogic rhetoric, is to love the audience – not for what they can offer the speaker in terms of material gain and not simply because loving is good and we ought do it, but for how the very act of loving transforms all who participate in it. Thus, rhetoric is a practice that should not be taken lightly, for in attempting to move the souls of others, rhetors cannot but affect their own souls – for better or for worse.
7.0 CONCLUSION

In this study I have attempted to demonstrate two major theses. In the first part, I maintained that Plato’s reference to a true, psychagogic art of rhetoric was neither ironic nor idealistic nor simply dialectic in disguise. Rather, I argued that in consideration of Plato’s source material and his own exhortation to correlate the psyche and the logos, a robust rhetorical theory could be developed from the Platonic corpus based on the analogous structures running through language, the cosmos, and the soul. In order to illustrate that this rhetorical theory was more than a mere possibility of contemporary interpretation, the second part explored the recognition, appropriation, and evolution of Platonic psychagogic structures and methods across antiquity and into the Middle Ages, establishing a rhetorical tradition of soul-care amongst Platonic adherents.

Despite philosophical or theological differences, the Platonic rhetorical theory seems to remain fairly consistent. Indeed, the historical case studies often corroborate some of the more surprising aspects of the Platonic theory. St. Augustine confirms what Plato implies, that where rhetorical activity is concerned clear instruction is necessary but insufficient to produce action in an audience, thus placing the onus of movement on the spirited element or drive. St. Bonaventure demonstrates that rhetorical activity is never one-directional and only truly benefits the speaker the more the message benefits the audience. From Plato to Bonaventure, moreover, the basic structures remain the same – a tripartite scheme that promotes the movement of the soul
through speech rooted in wisdom, integrity, and love, thereby integrating the arts of the trivium in a single psychagogic act.

7.1 FROM HERE TO MODERNITY

There is, however, an irony to be appreciated here, and it is not the simple irony that Plato developed and practiced a rhetorical theory – Cicero had long ago recognized and appreciated that fact. It is the curious detail that when rhetoric was most threatened by cultural forces, a Platonist intervened on its behalf: St. Augustine among the Patristics, St. Bonaventure among the Scholastics and, of course, the ironic phenomena of the Renaissance which saw an interrelated revival in both rhetorical and Platonic thought along with a joint hostility towards Aristotelian disputation. Consequently, we should not be surprised to see vestiges of the psychagogic impulse in Renaissance thought. And we find it where one would expect, in the great translator and commentator of Platonism, Marsilio Ficino.

In having access to all of the dialogues of Plato as well as other Neoplatonic writings, Ficino’s Platonic philosophy and theology differed in many ways from his predecessors; but many of the structural and functional aspects of psychagogy remained the same. Hubert Damisch brings this study full circle, when expounding on the “Theme of Choosing” in The

519 “But I neither assented to those men, nor to the originator of these disputationes, and by far the most eloquent of them all, the eminently grave and oratorical Plato; whose Gorgias I then diligently read over at Athens with Charmadas; from which book I conceived the highest admiration of Plato, as he seemed to me to prove himself an eminent orator, even in ridiculing orators” (De oratore 1.11; English from Cicero on Oratory and Orators. Trans. J.S. Watson. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986).
520 Like with Plato and Aristotle in the Middle Ages, this is, of course, a simplification – but the irony must still surely be felt. However, Paul Oskar Kristeller has shown that Aristotelianism survived as much in the Renaissance as Platonism did in the Middle Ages. He has done so in a number of works, but for a thorough investigation into the various strains of Platonism, Aristotelianism, rhetoric, and philosophy that run up to and through the Renaissance, see Renaissance Thought and Its Sources. Ed. Michael Mooney. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.
*Judgment of Paris*, he notes Ficino’s endorsement to Lorenzo de’ Medici of the *triplex vita* – the integrated life of contemplation, activity, and art:

Ficino insisted on the danger of favoring one of the three routes over the two others: Paris, like Hercules, like Socrates was punished by the two goddesses he had offended and Ficino flattered his prince by stating that, having been instructed by the oracle of Apollo, Lorenzo had been wise enough to acknowledge and adore all three goddesses in accordance with their respective merits, with the happy result that he had been accorded wisdom by Pallas, power by Juno, and grace, poetry, and music by Venus.521

Although it seems that the language arts are lowest on this hierarchy of lifestyles, Ficino offers a hierarchy of the arts in his *Platonic Theology* in which rhetoric and poetry are at the top of another triarchy. First are the arts of the lower senses that consist of “perfumes or tastes and flavors,” in between are the physical arts of health and exercise, and atop, the arts of sight and sound. However, while painting and architecture are privileged among the others, “the artificer’s soul is most fully manifest in the works that pertain to the hearing: in speeches and poems and vocal music. For in these the disposition and the will of the entire intelligence is present for all to see.”522

521 150-151. Citing Ficino’s introductory epistle to his *Philebus* commentary.
According to Michael J.B. Allen, this “hierarchy reflects the three tiers of the traditional division of society into the learned, the knights, and the artisans.”\textsuperscript{523} Outside the structural implication, however, Ficino’s rendering of rhetoric is significant because:

these arts of hearing…are more exactly correspondent to the mind’s forms…and are thus closer to the world of the purely intelligible Forms. / They are closer, furthermore, because they are not required to shape base matter but rather air…The arts that pertain to hearing are therefore for Ficino “spiritual” arts in the literal sense of spirit as understood in the Galenic and Platonic traditions.\textsuperscript{524}

Thus, Ficino advocates the spiritually reformative aspect of rhetoric as a mode of art that can literally connect one soul to another through the medium of words spoken into the air.

One finds similar psychagogic tendencies even in modernity. Samuel Taylor Coleridge – speaking of both Plato and poetry, and noting the poetry need not be metered as Plato has proven – defines poetry as a psychagogic endeavor that unifies the soul:

The poet, described in \textit{ideal} perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other, according to their relative worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and, (as it were,) \textit{fuses}, each into each, by that synthetic and magical power, to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination. \textit{(Biographia Literaria 2.14)}

\textsuperscript{523} \textit{Ibid.} 162. \\
\textsuperscript{524} \textit{Ibid.} 162-163.
Orestes Brownson contrasts Platonic with Aristotelian philosophy asserting for Platonic psychagogy what he denies to Aristotelian inquiry – the ability to guide the soul and society in ascent:

Peripateticism, considering everything under the form of abstract thought, loses sight of life, of the real living universe, and therefore is unable to detect in the natural order the analogies, resemblances, copies, or reflections, without which this supernatural would be in every sense inapprehensible to our intelligence. Hence it never enables us to connect the intelligible and the superintelligible, and embrace the natural and the supernatural as one harmonious whole, having its unity in the Divine Essence.525

In so doing, he critiques modern philosophy and religion for having lost sight of the connection between the natural and the supernatural, between society and the Trinity.

In contemporary times, we would not be surprised to find Richard M. Weaver repeating such sentiments in the opening and closing essays of his *Ethics of Rhetoric*. He tells us exactly what we would expect from a psychagogue, which might be why no one quite expects to hear it: “All of the terms in a rhetorical vocabulary are like links in a chain stretching up to some master link which transmits its influence down through the linkages,”526 so that:

rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect men by showing them better versions of themselves, links in that chain extending up toward the ideal, which only the intellect can apprehend

and only the soul have affection for. This is the justified affection of which no one can be ashamed, and he who feels no influence of it is truly outside the communion of minds.

Rhetoric appears, finally, as a means by which the impulse of the soul to be ever moving is redeemed.\(^{527}\)

Although, perhaps, overlooked unless read in conjunction, it is this psychagogic idea that underscores Weaver’s very notion of “ultimate terms” for contemporary rhetoric: “We have shown that rhetorical force must be conceived as a power transmitted through the links of a chain that extends upward toward some ultimate source. The higher links of that chain must always be of unique interest to the student of rhetoric, pointing, as they do, to some prime mover of human impulse.”\(^{528}\)

But it is C.S. Lewis, with reference to Coleridge and the sublime and other pertinent persons and topics that we have discussed, who takes the most direct aim at the problem of psychagogic language in a world of post-Cartesian dualistic psychology:

We were told it all long ago by Plato. As the king governs by his executives, so Reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the ‘spirited element.’\(^{529}\) The head rules the belly through the chest – the seat, as Alanus [Alan of Lille] tells us, of Magnanimity,\(^{530}\) of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments. The Chest – Magnanimity – Sentiment these are the indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man. It may even be said that it is by this middle element that

\(^{527}\) Ibid. 25.
\(^{528}\) “Ultimate Terms in Contemporary Rhetoric.” Ethics 211-232 (p. 211).
\(^{529}\) Lewis here cites Republic 442b-c.
\(^{530}\) Lewis here cites Alanus ab Insulis. De Planctu Naturae Prosa, iii.
man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal. The
operation of *The Green Book* and its kind is to produce Men without Chests...And all the
time – such is the tragic-comedy of our situation – we continue to clamour for those very
qualities we are rendering impossible. You can hardly open a periodical without coming
across the statement that what our civilization needs is more ‘drive,’ or dynamism, or
self-sacrifice, or ‘creativity.’ In a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and
demand the function. We make men without chests and expect of them virtue and
enterprise.\(^{531}\)

For Lewis, both the problem and the cure start with the language arts, with the formation or the
deformation of the soul through reading and writing and – one would imagine since the work
was first a public lecture – speaking and hearing.

If it is by the systematic removal of psychagogic language that the spirited element is
excised from our souls, then, I maintain, it is by employment of such language that it can be
returned and nurtured. But it is not simply through the dynamic communication of lofty ideals
that psychagogy can begin to reestablish what has been lost in the modern mindset. Rather, it is
by realizing that all the great psychagogues have been pedagogues. Plato, Augustine, and
Bonaventure each theorized about instruction in the arts. Indeed, Weaver and Lewis were both
professors and were both discussing the role of language arts education in the college classroom.
Thus, I close with some modest implications that such a return of psychagogic concepts might
yield for the contemporary discipline with a particular sensitivity towards the student of rhetoric.

\(^{531}\) “Men without Chests.” *The Abolition of Man; or, Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the
1947. 1-16 (pp. 15-16).
7.2 SOME NEO-MEDIEVAL IMPLICATIONS

I have investigated three aspects of Platonic psychagogy as they developed through the Middle Ages that I believe have the potential to beneficially impact the contemporary rhetorical discipline. The first is the general cosmic worldview in which it operates. The second is the notion of the soul as the target of rhetorical activity. The third is the concept of love as the method of persuasion. While they might seem quite alien at first glance, I contend that contemporary correlates already exist within the discipline that need only be brought to the fore in order to be taken advantage of for the benefit of both theorist and student.

7.2.1 Cosmic Worldview

Now the macro-microcosmic progression that marks the context of psychagogic rhetoric might seem too esoteric an element to import into the contemporary rhetorical discipline, and I am not suggesting that we should attempt to show students their place in the cosmos or in the metaphysical ascent. However, I do maintain that the core hierarchical elements – of being, knowledge, and communication – are still pervasive in the contemporary worldview and that recognizing them is of benefit. That is to say, despite attempts to frustrate the ideas of ‘being’ and ‘knowledge,’ they persist for most audiences. Most people still think that things exist and can be known. Thus, the shared Platonic and medieval metaphysical view can help to re-establish a “three-dimensional” view of rhetoric; one in which we do not attempt to isolate the objective from the subjective from the intersubjective.

Granted, it is chic to think of rhetoric as a process by which we engage in shared meaning creation. I do not deny that this is sometimes, or even always, the case. I simply deny that it is
the whole case. Individual rhetors always approach a situation with their own subjective understanding and are likewise subject to the objective pressures of the situation (gravity, famine, natural disasters) before entering into the shared meaning making process. Yet, by focusing on or excluding any one of these perspectives we limit our rhetorical resources.

Much damage has been done by fighting amongst and within disciplines concerning whether ‘truth’ is an objective, subjective, or intersubjective concept. The Medieval-Platonic worldview provides the contemporary rhetor with a perspective that attempts to manage all three in a single rhetorical act – a template of communicative encounters by individuals who held fast to concepts of truth, yet still engaged those of different standards of inquiry on relatively civil grounds. Sts. Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas were, after all, contemporary Masters at the University of Paris. More than that, they held irreconcilable philosophical views while both remaining under the umbrella of a supposedly monolithically dogmatic Church. If such a variety of considerations could be balanced in the Middle Ages – considerations of truth, conscience, and community – then it would seem regressive for contemporary rhetoricians to be more dogmatic about the status of truth claims. Worse than that, it is rhetorically inexpedient in the case of most audiences. The Medieval-Platonic communicative paradigm illustrates an attempt to balance belief, reason, and communication – *fides et ratio et oratio*. While we need not adopt the paradigm, the effort itself is worthy of emulation.

### 7.2.2 Moving the Soul

Again, we may wonder in what way a concept as mystical as the soul might be introduced into the rhetorical discipline. However, I maintain that more than any other element of this study, the concept of soul is manifest in contemporary rhetorical theory, especially in its social scientific
iteration. For it is a truism in today’s scholarship that the goal of persuasion is attitude change; and attitude change, I maintain is nothing other than an attempt to operationalize the desires of the soul. Subsequently, the concept of ‘attitude’ is beneficial for gaining a scientific understanding of what the rhetor is attempting to achieve in speech or writing. However, in so speaking, we run the risk inherent in what Weaver calls “semantically purified” speech.\footnote{“The Phaedrus” 7.} That is, we forget that the target of our persuasion is the “whole man,” as Weaver elsewhere puts it.\footnote{“Language is Sermonic.” Language is Sermonic: Richard M. Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970. 201-226 (p. 205).} What this means escapes contemporary students of rhetoric and, perhaps, contemporary theorists as well, for it widens the ethical scope of our activity immensely.

It is easy for students to consider that in the rhetorical act we are attempting to get the audience to do something, to perform some action that we desire. But this action is often temporary. We often, if not always, fail to consider that in getting an audience to perform some action, we are actively attempting to reform their soul, literally attempting to “change their minds.” Granted, some rhetors such as teachers and preachers are quite cognizant that their target is the “whole person” and count on the reforming power of speech. But we seldom impart to our students that “changing someone’s mind” is not merely a metaphor, but carries with it all the weighty ethical considerations that its literal interpretation would suggest.\footnote{At least, as a student, the long-lasting effect of changing someone’s mind was never stressed to me. Ethical considerations revolved more around things like honesty, the morality of a given action or immediate goal, and the potential for immediate harm.} If we brought this element to the fore in our rhetorical classrooms, then students would think much more critically, not only about others’ attempts to change their own mind, but about their attempts to change others’ as well.
7.2.3 Love

Of course in today’s academic climate one cannot suggest that the goal of rhetorical training is to bring the student to a love of God or the Forms or another human being or any other entity that might suggest religious (or sexual) undertones. Yet there is still persistent in communicative relationships the residue of love, a residue that would be beneficial to emphasize in the rhetorical discipline. This residue comes by way of the Latin term *caritas*, which can also be translated as charity. We often hear that we should be charitable to our colleagues, offer them charitable reads and charitable treatment in our critiques of them. This is a commonplace in academia, but not so much in the field of rhetoric.\(^{535}\) If we can adopt the concept of love for the audience under the auspices of charity, then we can continue with the monetary metaphor and ask rhetors to see worth and value in their audience. So, then, treating an audience charitably not only means attempting to understand their point of view, which is still a good thing; but also means asking whether or not the messages that we plan to offer our audiences are charitable in the sense that they add value to them, that they make them better in some way. As one might be charitable to any who are in need of extra resources of which we have abundance, we should ask our students and ourselves to likewise treat audiences. “Are we giving generously of our intellectual and creative resources for the benefit of our audiences?” should be a major question for both the rhetor and the student of rhetoric; and I contend that if we are, we will find that, with Bonaventure, Augustine, and Plato, we reap greater benefits as well.

\(^{535}\) Wayne Brockriede, in his well-known essay, “Arguers as Lovers” (*Philosophy & Rhetoric* 5.1 (1972): 1-11) uses the lover metaphor to express the ideal orientation individuals in a dialogical encounter should maintain towards one another. My usage here is concerned more with the rhetor in a public speaking encounter and deals less with the sexual aspects of “lovers” and more, appropriately, with the benefits of a “Platonic love” – a phrase coined by Ficino.
I have argued that Plato articulated a rhetorical theory of soul-leading and soul-care that was transmitted from antiquity through the Middle Ages into modernity. Today the essentials of that theory still remain, if only as artifacts of language. I contend that those elements of psychagogic rhetoric – the context of cognitive integration, the object of reformative motivation, and the method of charitable interaction – although latent in contemporary rhetorical thought, would be of great benefit if acknowledged, developed, and presented explicitly to the student of rhetoric. I have endeavored to uncover the theoretical materials for such a practical project and so have been engaged in a historical study of rhetoric. But what this history has taught us is that the very study of rhetoric can move the soul and that eloquence itself is an impetus to action in the mind of the speaker. So in discovering something about our disciplinary past, I sincerely hope that I have recovered something of use for our rhetorical future.
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