Estrangement and Reconciliation: French Socialists, German Social Democrats and the Origins of European Integration, 1948-1957

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French Socialist (SFIO) and German Social Democratic (SPD) responses to early European integration initiatives indicate that there was a postwar generation of SFIO and SPD leaders who were informed by similar experiences rooted in memories, policy proposals, and outcomes from the interwar period. They formulated similar visions of the postwar period that drew upon existing socialist ideology and narratives, but at crucial moments they were perplexed as to how to respond to dilemmas that placed different socialist objectives in conflict with one another.

When devising proposals and responding to policies generated by other parties on European integration, French Socialists and German Social Democrats considered the potential repercussions of supranational institutions not only for processes of French-German reconciliation, but also for a wide range of domestic, geopolitical, economic, and at times regional party objectives. As they had to make choices between competing domestic priorities in the early postwar period, conflicts emerged between the SFIO and SPD, as was the case over the proposal to create a European Coal & Steel Community.

Conflict between the parties was paralleled by conflicts within the parties. The minority view in one party often shared the assumptions, logic, and viewpoint of the majority of the other party, as the raucous debate over the European Defense Community made clear. By 1954, however, French Socialist and German Social Democrat deputies in the Common Assembly of the European Coal & Steel Community had achieved a working relationship increasingly marked by good will, cooperation, and a mutual respect for each other’s positions. Inter-party cooperation at the supranational level created a form of Socialist consensus politics. These developments facilitated a SFIO-SPD entente in the form of European economic integration as embodied in the Treaties of Rome. Decisive for the parties’ support of these Treaties was the Socialist parties’ view that some form of trade liberalization within an organized market was a precondition for peace, economic expansion, and international competitiveness. Hence French
Socialist and German Social Democratic leaders developed a common *approach* to issues of European economic integration that created opportunities and conditions necessary for the success of the Treaties.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Fifty-seven years have passed since six European nations ratified the Treaties of Rome to set up the European Economic Community, the antecedent to today’s European Union. Much has changed over this time period. The Community has experienced several waves of enlargement and now incorporates much of the former Soviet sphere of influence in East-Central Europe. As it has done so, it has sought to strike a balance between proposals to “widen” its territorial borders and to “deepen” the Community’s competences. The challenges of enlargement, substantial in their own regard, have been accompanied by a series of challenges that have struck at core features of the ideals that the European Union purports to encompass: economic solidarity among rich and poor states, and a transcendence of nationalism in favor of a “European identity” that has proven difficult to inculcate in the minds of a reluctant public.

Nonetheless, that the European integration process has survived despite the challenge posed by French President Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s, monetary instability and the oil crisis in the 1970s, the rise of neoliberal economics in the 1980s, and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s is a sign of its continued ability to elicit substantial support among political and economic elites or, at the least, indicates a fear among these elites of what might happen if the European project came to an ignominious end. The EU’s longevity has been in large part due to its success in sustaining a centrist political consensus that incorporates much of the principal political groups of “core Europe,” the Christian Democratic or People’s Party, the European Socialists, and, to a lesser extent, the European Liberals and Green Party.¹ It is also widely celebrated for its success in creating a system that reconciled the French and German governments and stabilized Europe’s economic and political reconstruction after the cataclysmic period of 1914 to 1945.

¹ The strength of right-wing populist parties makes it possible that they will upend this consensus, but their steady rise in recent history is not the subject of this study.
The creation of the European Coal & Steel Community in 1952 after the ratifications of the Treaty of Paris and its successor, the European Economic Community in 1958, are generally considered children of postwar European Christian Democracy. This perception, present in public discussions and in scholarship, is correct but the disarray of the Socialist parties in this period has lead scholars to overlook how Socialist traditions, policies, and politicians were instrumental in the creation of important parts of the early Community’s features, as well as in channeling the European integration process away from areas that conflicted with some Socialists’ ideals, such as the European Defense Community, which failed to pass the French National Assembly in 1954. Here I examine the processes of policy formation and the transnational relations of the socialist parties of the two largest states of the early Community, the Section française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) or French Socialist Party and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) or German Social Democratic Party. I consider how the European integration process at times engendered an estrangement and, at other times, a reconciliation between the two parties and, in turn, how the Socialist parties themselves contributed at times to the estrangement, but more often to the reconciliation process that developed between the French and German governments and their peoples.

In this introduction, I lay out the argument of this dissertation by placing it in an extended conversation with the most prominent literature in the field of European integration studies. The European Union has understandably attracted a great amount of scholarly attention due to its unique design and wide ambitions. In turn, scholars have long been fascinated by European socialism, though the European policies of the socialist parties have attracted less attention. Though the role of the SFIO and SPD in the early European integration is not terra nova, my combination of a transnational approach and attention to how continuities in the Socialist parties’ policies in concrete fields (heavy industry, defense policy, trade liberalization, etc.) influenced the parties’ participation in the creation (and rejection) of specific supranational European institutions allows me to offer an original account. My intention is to revise existing scholarly narratives on the French Socialist and German Social Democratic roles in these processes that were often constructed before the relevant historical archives opened. As my account makes clear, at times historical arguments, like institutions, have developed their own forms of path dependency.
This study draws from a range of scholarly approaches to European integration, many of which are inspired by political science and sociological methodologies. A subject as important as the modern European Union encourages a diversity of methodological approaches but this has also created a field of research in which scholars from varying academic traditions needlessly polemicize with one another, dismiss each other’s conclusions without engaging in serious analysis, or simply ignore each other’s existence. Interdisciplinary research on European integration continues to face the challenge of moving from rhetoric to effective practice. Often this is because methodological differences are encouraged by the high academic walls erected by real pressures for disciplinary conformity, but also because many scholars also share the premises and world-views of their respective camps. Certain ontological and epistemological orthodoxies within political science are heretical to many historians, many of whom have been nurtured in the “cultural turn” that has so affected historical research since the 1980s.

Historians of European integration have struggled to design research projects that successfully address, and hence evoke the interest of, the interdisciplinary audience of European integration studies and historians of contemporary Europe on both sides of the Atlantic. The detailed, at times monumental, tomes and edited volumes emerging from historians in the 1970s to the early 2000s, almost all of whom are based in Europe, have elicited only scant attention from political scientists, mostly working in the United States, whose primary interests are testing and contesting grand theories. Andrew Moravscik’s and Craig Parsons’ work here represents important, though only partial, exceptions. The differences in narrative technique, scope, and attention to minutiae between historical, political science, and sociological scholarships have encouraged the creation of a cacophonous field of research. In turn, modern political theory tends to make “political outcomes a function of three primary factors: the distribution of preferences (interests) among political actors, the distribution of resources (powers), and the constraints
imposed by the rules of the game (constitution).”2 In such a conception, history hardly plays any role at all.

Yet these differences at time conceal ontological commonalities that the diplomatic and economic historians who have dominated historical studies of European integration share with researchers with a training and research agenda rooted in International Relations theory. Hence both political scientists and historians from the 1970s through the early 2000s, despite their different approaches, generally examine European integration through a “realist” lens that considers politics an arena in which states, politicians, and economic actors rationally pursue their interests. This has insulated an older generation of European integration historians from their younger disciplinary counterparts, who have largely abandoned realist approaches to understanding historical change. At the same time, the emergence in political science and sociology of constructivist and historical institutionalist approaches to European integration studies offers the possibility of bridging the gap between more widely accepted historical research approaches and the interdisciplinary literature on European integration studies. Recent rapprochements between younger historians and constructivists, though, risk isolating historical research within the wider interdisciplinary field. It is unlikely that the dominating paradigm within International Relations, which is steeped in various realist traditions, will accept historians crowning as victor a minority approach within their field. It is not the ambition of this dissertation to do so.

The varying intra- and inter-disciplinary approaches or theories of European integration, however, do each elucidate an aspect or aspects of short- and long-term change and stability in the European Communities. The interdisciplinary cacophony is in part the consequence of the challenge of conceptualizing and analyzing complex social and political phenomena. The practitioners of each approach can successfully point to developments that seem to reflect the validity of their methodology and its superiority to its competitors. Though I have my own disciplinary and methodological preferences, my research draws upon and benefits from ontologies the presumptions of which I reject because they nevertheless assist me in understanding some of the processes that I examine. In the discussion below, I address a number of these methodologies, analyze the ways in which they assist my research agenda, and consider

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how my findings seem to point to some of the limitations of established methodologies in European integration research. After doing so, I discuss why I turn to concepts and methodologies that are just beginning to emerge within history to construct an original argument about the sources of French Socialist and German Social Democratic policy in the early stages of the European integration process.

The primary foci of the scholarly debates on European integration have been meta-questions that seek to explain the evolution of the European Communities as a whole. Such questions only partially intersect with my agenda because the bulk of my work examines the origins, rather than the development, of the European integration process. Specifically, I address the role of two political parties within these processes, rather than the policies of the member states’ governments in general, whether understood as “unitary actors” or fragmented into factions based on interests and world-views. One argument of this dissertation is that the SFIO and SPD played larger and more influential roles in the early European integration process than is generally recognized by scholars, but this is not my primary focus. Rather, I am interested in explaining the driving forces in the two parties’ processes of policy formation on European integration questions, examining how the policies of both were at times mutually constituted, and considering how they interacted with the parties’ wider political goals, ambitions, and world-views.

Though I write of the actions or policies of the SFIO and SPD, as this work makes clear, I do not consider them to be unitary actors, nor do I consider the French or German governments to have been or to be unitary actors. In fact, a primary finding of this dissertation is that not only were the parties not unitary actors, but in a number of important cases factions of one party shared more in common with the vision and policies represented by the official position of the other party than they did with their own party leadership. When I write that the “SFIO did” or the “SPD argued,” I do so to simplify what would otherwise be a burdensome narration. I intend this phraseology to mean the party policies as set out in resolutions of party congresses, formally the sovereign institutions within the two parties, in meetings of the party executives, formally charged with interpreting how to enact congressional resolutions but which often crafted their own policies, and in meetings of the parties’ parliamentary factions, which at times competed with the party executives in an attempt to carve out an independent voice in the parties’ affairs, as was particularly the case in the French Socialist Party.
The unitary actor thesis has strong support in International Relations theory. Though the term is a neologism of the twentieth century, it picks up on a presumption that has guided much of historical research since its inception. The term premises a Hobbesian international arena in which cohesive states rationally pursue geopolitical objectives in competition with one another. Much of diplomatic history reflects this view, in part because its primary source base often captures governments’ foreign policies after they had already been crafted and hence overlooks asymmetric domestic contests the outcome of which are cemented in governmental policies. Some scholars highlight the importance of Cold War and other balance of power considerations to argue that European union was a geopolitical imperative of the postwar era.³

No doubt the potentially apocalyptic geopolitical uncertainty following the Second World War was a structural factor that contributed to the launch of the European integration process. With the exclusion of the French Communist Party (PCF), there was a domestic political consensus in France by 1949 that a large U.S. and British troop presence on the European continent was necessary to deter the Soviet Union, which maintained an overwhelming conventional military advantage in Europe. In addition, recent revisionist accounts in diplomatic history, as discussed in chapter four, argue that many important French officials in the Foreign Office and military came to view the potential Soviet threat to French security as greater than the German threat far earlier than what had been the scholarly consensus of an older generation of diplomatic historians. However, these more recent “realist” depictions at times rely on a questionable reading of sources and exaggerate the degree to which the “German question” lost valiance within the internal politics of the French Fourth Republic. There is also a normative tendency at work in this scholarship that depicts West German rearmament to counter the Soviet military advantage in Europe to be the “rational” and hence, superior, policy to that of emotionally-driven politicians and officials who fretted about the potential threat of German rearmament to West German democracy and to the stability of the western alliance. This is the case not only in the treatment of French politics, but also in the scholarship on the SPD, which realist scholars often treat as an irreconcilable nuisance to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s realistic appreciation of the necessity of binding West Germany to the western alliance to ensure

West German security and to reconstruct the bases for German sovereignty. Nevertheless, not only government officials but French Socialists and German Social Democrats also worried about the capabilities and intentions of their massive neighbor to the east, and this did affect their policies on defense, though their perception of the geopolitics of the early Cold War also led them at times into conflict with their governments and with one another.

Perhaps more compelling have been realist arguments rooted in economic imperatives. In the following chapter, I argue that the French Socialist Party considered an economic balance of power between France and West Germany to be a constitutive part of French security. This argument would come as no surprise to Alan Milward and Andrew Moravcsik, each of whom places economics at the center of their analyses. In their accounts, the governments that formed the European Economic Community negotiated in terms that would be understood by scholars who focus on the dynamics of inter-state bargaining. The governments of France, Germany and the other member states brought their national economic interests to international negotiations and institutions, and the deals that they made represented optimal outcomes for the participants. In Milward’s view, rational and able mid-level bureaucrats correctly assessed the economic challenges of the postwar era and, in international negotiations with their counterparts, built a European system that “rescued the nation-state” by supranationalizing policy fields that could not be adequately addressed at the national level.4

Moravcsik constructs a more complex picture of the driving forces of European integration. More so than Milward, he sees the domestic sphere as a setting of conflict between various economic interest groups. His theory of liberal intergovernmentalism posits that national preferences are derived from a competition among these domestic interest groups, the outcome of which reflects “primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions.”5 National governments then bring these domestically-produced preferences to intergovernmental negotiations. The resulting treaties between the states reflect the varying weight of each state’s bargaining power. Like Milward, Moravcsik argues that states cede sovereignty reluctantly and only do so after a careful cost-benefit analysis. The supranational authorities constructed by the intergovernmental negotiations that have so defined the European integration process are the

result of the member states’ determination to have binding “credible commitments” that the other states cannot back-slide and will be forced, if necessary, to fulfill the obligations to which they agreed in the intergovernmental negotiations. Moravcsik theorizes about the origins and content of the most important treaties as “critical junctures” that have marked the European integration process from the Treaties of Rome to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. His purpose is to analyze large-scale, purposeful changes to the European integration system rather than to make claims about the internal functioning of the institutions set up by the treaties.

I have learned much from Milward and Moravcsik, and the reader will notice their influence in this text. Milward’s work demonstrates how material shortages of raw materials, in particular of coal, became determining factors in the foreign policies of European governments after the Second World War. A struggle over raw material supplies for European reconstruction played an important role in the dispute that broke out between the French Socialist and German Social Democratic parties, and contributed to their inability to craft a common socialist policy towards the Schuman Plan. In addition, Milward provides an excellent analysis of how the western European governments’ chronic dollar deficits created persistent economic pressures on the governments to devise a medium-term economic policy that would restructure their nations’ foreign trade patterns away from dependency on the United States and towards some sort of European preferential trade arrangement. However, Milward provides a static, somewhat anachronistic portrait of inter-state bargaining that does not adequately explain why European leaders opted to erect a supranational set of institutions to achieve goals that could perhaps have been attained through more traditional forms of international cooperation.

Moravcsik’s study encouraged me to conceptualize governmental policies as an interactive process of exchange between producer groups and policymakers. In a sense, Moravscik fills in some of the loose ends left by Milward by designating precisely those interest groups that governments needed to defend or promote in order to attain their macroeconomic goals. Nonetheless Moravcsik’s work leaves the reader perplexed as to exactly why the French government, which was the most reluctant of all negotiating governments to engage in a binding system of trade liberalization, decided to sign the Treaties of Rome. Moravcsik also freely admits that his theory does not apply to the creation of the European Coal & Steel Community. Hence

he leaves the origins of the process open to debate and focuses instead on the dynamics pushing the process forward. It was only when I read Matthias Kipping’s excellent book that I came to appreciate the political-economic importance attained in French politics by French steel-transforming industries, such as machine-tools and automobiles, which, unlike in West Germany, were engaged in a domestic war with French steel producers. Kipping fills some of the gaps left open by Moravcsik, but his study ends in 1952. In addition, a team of historians has scrutinized Moravcsik’s influential study and called attention to significant problems in his citations and references to primary source materials, which has cast a pale over his work in the eyes of many historians, for whom a close critical reading of primary sources is a prerequisite for assessing a work’s scholarly validity.

These geopolitical and economic accounts both presuppose the existence of a “national interest” that leaders correctly perceive and act upon. The “national interest” in their view is fixed, given, and leaders’ merits or demerits result from their capacity to understand, promote, and defend it. Moravcsik’s theory is only a partial exception because, though the national interest may be domestically contested, governments are generally responding to the domestic balance of power between economic interest groups. Mark A. Pollock has noted “signs of a convergence around a single rationalist model which assumes fixed preferences and rational behavior among all actors in the EU (including individuals as well as member governments and supranational organizations)” that has made the rationalist approach “the dominant approach to the study of European integration in international relations theory...” Some political scientists, while accepting much of the premise of this approach, offer certain qualifications. George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett, for instance, have argued that, “If actors operate under complete information (that is, they know all relevant information about each other), they will design institutions that best promote their preferences—subject to the constraints that every other actor will behave similarly.”

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Milward’s “European rescue of the nation-state,” Moravcsik’s theory of liberal internationalism, and the reassertion of realism in European integration scholarship emerged in large part as a critique of neofunctionalist theories of European integration formulated as contemporary analyses of the impulses that led to the signing of the Treaties of Rome.\footnote{For a useful overview of neofunctionalism and the literature on European integration up to 1995, see James A. Caporaso and John T. S. Keeler, “The European Union and Regional Integration Theory,” in Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey, eds., \textit{The State of the European Union, Vol. 3, Building a European Polity?} (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers: 1995): 29-62.} Political scientist Ernst B. Haas applied sociological theories to the study of the young supranational community. In Haas’ analysis, sectoral integration develops internal dynamics that push the actors involved in the process to support a further extension of integration into neighboring policy fields, a process called spill-over. His form of neofunctionalism de-emphasizes the role of states and formal politics in favor of civil society actors and technocrats whose supranational entrepreneurship combines with feedback between sectors to, in effect, compel the regional integration process forward regardless of the wishes or intent of the national governments. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen write that a functionalist approach is “inclined to see history as an efficient mechanism for reaching uniquely appropriate equilibria [and is] less concerned with the possibilities for maladaptation and non-uniqueness in historical development.”\footnote{James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism,” 735-37.}

Though Haas and his successors present a more nuanced and rigorous theorization than traditional functional analyses, neofunctionalism still tends towards teleology. There is a predictive logic inherent to the theory (as there is in most political science theories), and Haas’ presentation gave to the expansion of supranational governance and the Community’s areas of competence an air of inevitability that was in large part shattered by subsequent events, as Haas subsequently admitted. Theories of European integration have evolved in a dialectical relationship with changing contemporary forms of integration and scholars’ and policymakers’ perceptions of these changes. His theory therefore suffered as a consequence of the perceived stalling of the European integration process in the 1960-1970s.

Nonetheless, I find Haas theory quite fruitful in my examination in chapter five of the interaction of the Socialist parties in the Common Assembly of the European Coal & Steel Community. My analysis suggests the possibilities and limitations of a neofunctionalist theory of European integration. While a spill-over dynamic did indeed occur in widening the scope of Socialist parties’ policy proposals, which by 1955 called for an extension of the Community to
cover all fields of energy production and to expand the executive’s power into social policy, these reflected in part pre-existing ideological commitments. In addition, the parties’ ambitions were only partly satisfied through collaboration with the supranational High Authority executive body. Under Socialist pressure, the High Authority did gingerly step into the realm of the Community’s social policy as advocated by the Socialists, but it also evoked restraints codified in its founding Treaty as well as opposition from some of the member-state governments to claim an impotence to pursue many of the Socialists’ stated objectives.

In part as a result of a relance of European integration in the 1980-1990s, neofunctionalism has experienced a revival in European integration studies. Perhaps the most promising theory to emerge based in part on neofunctionalist reasoning has been historical institutionalism. Scholars have increasingly focused on the role that institutions play in politics and society because their number and powers have considerably expanded over the last century. Such a focus is most fruitful in the field of European integration studies because the “EU has become the most highly institutionalized international organization in history...”13 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor define institutions as “the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy.”14 They argue that an institutional perspective views “the institutional organization of the polity or political economy as the principal factor structuring collective behaviour and generating distinctive outcomes.”15 Institutionalists unite around an argument that institutions play a causative role in political and economic life, but they then divide over methodologies based on rational choice, sociological, and historical approaches.

14 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” *Political Studies* XLIV, (1996): 938. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen write that, “In a general way, an ‘institution’ can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations. Such practices and rules are embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them. Practices and rules are also embedded in resources and the principles of their allocation that make it possible for individuals to enact roles in an appropriate way and for a collectivity to socialize individuals and sanction those who wander from proper behavior.” *Ibid.*, 948.
15 Hall and Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 937. Tsebelis and Garrett give a more expansive definition. They write that, “Since institutions determine the sequence of moves, the choices of actors, and the information that they control, different institutional structures affect the strategies of actors and hence the outcomes of their interactions. Consequently, institutions can be studied as independent variables...to see how they influence outcomes, or as dependent variables to see how particular institutions are chosen.” Tsebelis and Garrett, *op cit.*, 384-85.
Political scientist Paul Pierson coined the term historical institutionalism as an alternative theory of the dynamics driving European integration to Moravcsik’s theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. The basis for the theory is Pierson’s claim that, after an institution has been created, there develops “significant divergences between the institutional and policy preferences of member states and the actual functioning of institutions and policies,” which Pierson calls “gaps.” Over time, these gaps allow supranational actors autonomy to pursue their own policies, which then develop a “path dependency” that combines with the investments that governments have already made in erecting the institutions (“sunk-costs”) to “lock-in” certain policies and make it difficult for the member states to alter institutional forms and practices. Historical institutionalism shares with neofunctionalism a view that “unintended consequences,” “learning,” and “spill-over” are internal to the European integration process. Unlike the realist and neofunctionalist approaches outlined above, though, theorists inspired by historical institutionalism make change over time and an attention to the influence of historical developments integral components of their analyses. Pierson’s “gaps” result in part due to “the short time horizons of decision makers [and] the prospect of shifting member-state policy preferences” that constrain the ability of the member states to control the Community’s institutions. His theory also breaks with neofunctionalism by not positing a “zero-sum game” between the member-state governments and supranational institutions for power. Rather, it blends well with recent advances in European integration studies that focus on the EU polity as a system of multi-level governance. In a sense, historical institutionalism, like neofunctionalism, de-politicizes history, but it is a much more flexible methodology capable of borrowing approaches and influences from other fields of scholarship. However, the theory, while quite compelling, is only marginally relevant to this study because the dynamics that it analyzes come into play only after the creation of the institutions the origins of which are my focus of study. Nonetheless, I do see the dynamics that it posits at work, in part, within the Common Assembly of the European Coal & Steel Community, in particular in the ability of actors, in this case

19 Hall and Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” 942.
German Social Democrats, to “learn” and adapt to an institutional environment that turned out to be quite different from the negative image conjured in SPD critiques of the Treaty of Paris.

Historical institutionalism’s focus on the impact of institutional rules and norms, and its openness to incorporate the impact of “socioeconomic development and the diffusion of ideas” has presented an opening for an intellectual cross-fertilization with recent constructivist approaches emerging in political science that challenge neorealist paradigms. Constructivists start with the premise that interests are socially constructed and that ideas play an autonomous role in political developments in interaction with “material reality [and] organizational arrangements.” Craig Parsons argues that, “Any choice is predicated on assumptions about causal relationships, the prioritization of costs and benefits, and the normative legitimacy of various actions.” In doing so, Parsons reintroduces a focus on the “ideology of European integration” that marked early historical research on European integration. 20 This early research, epitomized by the work of Walter Lipgens, celebrated the role of the transnational European federal movement in encouraging governments to integrate the nations of Western Europe after World War II. 21 Realists successfully challenged his claims by noting that the European federal movement had little impact on the decision-making processes of governing elites, who tended, in their view, to mobilize European rhetoric to achieve other goals.

Parsons offers a more sophisticated analysis of the role of ideas in the origins and development of the European project. The basis of his model is a claim that scholars can isolate beliefs as causative factors when ideas “cross-cut” political lines of “shared material interests.” 22 He acknowledges that there may be psychological or historical factors to explain why actors come to hold certain ideas, but he does not investigate the formulation of ideas. 23 Rather, he is interested in examining the causative impact that ideas have on political processes after they have already become fixed. In propitious circumstances, leaders are able to use their powers to set agendas and have recourse to issue linkages and side payoffs to assemble coalitions in favor of their ideas. In his account, Christian Democratic French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and Socialist Prime Minister Guy Mollet were two such leaders during our period of study. Parsons argues that the existence of cross-cutting political coalitions around European

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23 Ibid., 51.
integration within French politics created the possibility for a supranational solution to the problems of the postwar period, and that well-positioned and (to surmise from the tone of his book) well-intentioned leaders exercised political will to create a supranational institutional structure that reflected their ideas. Hence, it follows that were it not for the power of ideas, French politicians likely would have chosen to pursue more traditional forms of interstate bargaining and organization.

Parsons’ assertion that the origins, failures and successes in creating supranational forms of European integration can be traced to an ideological battle among federalists, confederalists, and traditionalists within French politics that cut across the party structure and cleavages between right and left is an ambitious and compelling argument. His focus on the importance of Mollet, a figure who is often overlooked compared to Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, is a welcome and appropriate contribution to the literature on the policy of the postwar French government. Like Moravcsik, Parsons covers a fifty-year span of history and his account, again like Moravcsik’s, is ahistorical in its methodology, if not also in its presumptions. In addition to some factual errors (Léon Blum died in March 1950 and could not have opposed the Schuman Plan), there are deep flaws in Parsons’ analysis. For instance, the SFIO did not oppose “liberalization” if by that Parsons means trade liberalization. He also underestimates ideological cohesion within the French Christian Democratic Party, the Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP), as Wolfram Kaiser has pointed out. More importantly, one gains the impression that Parsons forces historical actors into ideological straitjackets that many of them would not have recognized. Hence Parsons neatly divides French Socialists (and the other French parties) into federalists, confederalists, and traditionalists without exploring the range of factors affecting individuals’ motivations. He assigns people to ideological factions based on their votes on each treaty. If one is to maintain his thesis, it would be necessary also to explain why some people moved from supporting one treaty to opposing another. While side payoffs and issue linkages can account for some of these individuals’ shifts, this needs to be empirically demonstrated, not simply asserted.

Parsons is certainly correct that trans-party coalitions formed on European integration treaties and that cooperation of actors across party lines was a prerequisite for the creation of the

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24 Ibid., 70.
25 Ibid., 61-62.
European Economic Community. For instance, the “federalist” Radical President René Coty selected his “federalist” counterpart Guy Mollet to be Prime Minister in January 1956 over a more popular candidate, the “confederalist” Pierre Mendès-France. The “federalist” Guy Mollet then selected a fellow “federalist,” Maurice Faure of the Radical Party, to lead negotiations for the Treaties of Rome. Without these trans-party ideological affinities on European integration, the French government may well not have agreed to the creation of the European Economic Community. However, Parsons’ portrayal lacks depth and complexity, and presents a superficial over-simplification of the French Fourth Republic at odds with the historical record.

First, it is not true that, “Prior to 1947, French elites across the political spectrum shared a fairly stable consensus on a traditional model of European policies, aimed at dismembering vanquished Germany, building military and economic alliances to balance German power, and defending French sovereignty.” Here Parsons should examine again Lipgens’ older account of European integration, which highlights how French Socialists and others explicitly rejected this “consensus” during the war and in the immediate postwar period. Second, to claim that, “These [by which he seems to mean all] actors uniformly described their debates as ideological,” is questionable. It seems to retrospectively lend credence to the argument of “federalists” who accused their opponents of being anti-European in an effort to de-legitimize their arguments against specific treaties.

Most importantly, Parsons does not consider how ideas intersect not only with material interests and institutional constraints, but also with other ideas. One gains the impression from his book that the question of Europe was the only, or at least the primary, ideological battle occurring within France in the 1950s. Colonial issues, Cold War politics, and other matters of domestic dispute become secondary in the political process; they were addressed through payoffs and issue linkages. A tendency towards European myopia leads Parsons to fail to address the real causes of division in the French Socialist Party, within which there was a battle between different sets of ideas that each had their own logics and histories, and hence also constituted autonomous factors in the political process. For Parsons’ model to be correct, he would have to also investigate how other ideas, such as conceptions of the trajectory of German democracy and

22 Parsons, “Showing Ideas as Causes,” 65.
perceptions of the Soviet Union, cross-cut established political coalitions while others did not. Then he would have to consider how his cross-cutting ideological coalitions on European integration interacted with cross-cutting (or non-cross-cutting) ideological coalitions based on other issues. Hence, Parsons hardly addresses concerns about West German democratic stability within French politics even though this was a central axis around which the political debate revolved.

Parsons also claims that there were 70 “confederalists” among the French Socialist deputies during the debates on the European Defense Community. He describes them as “confederalists” because they “favored plans [for defense integration] within two weak organizations under Franco-British direction.” The problem with this argument is that many of these figures shared a preference with most Socialist “federalists” and even “traditionalists” for a strong organization under Franco-British direction. Quite often, as I demonstrate, French Socialists agreed on their ideal vision. Disputes broke out when they could not gain their maximum objectives. In such cases, they had to choose between options that placed certain ideas that they supported, supranational institutions for instance, against other ideas that they also supported, like British membership. Mollet, a “federalist” in 1956 due to his support for the EEC, was a “confederalist” in 1950 due to his insistence on British participation as a condition for his party’s approval of the Schuman Plan. It is perhaps a dubious proposition to “isolate the ideational filter from its contexts,” though I recognize that this is necessary for Parsons’ claims to be falsifiable and convince political scientists of the vigor of his model. However, Parsons also isolates ideas from other ideas, which then exit (or never enter) the picture, and here his model breaks down.

Recently, a younger generation of European integration scholars, including Wolfram Kaiser, Michael Gehler, Brigitte Leucht, and Morten Rasmussen, has sought to overcome the interdisciplinary divide between political science and history by pairing a pragmatic use of social science theories with the close textual and contextual analyses intrinsic to history as a discipline. Wolfram Kaiser has called for a conversation between “theory-sensitive historians and history-sensitive political scientists” on the origins and trajectory of European integration. Whereas Parsons assigns causation to domestic cross-cutting ideological coalitions, Kaiser argues that transnational networks have played “a crucial controlling role in the process of European

29 Ibid., 59-60.
integration...”30 He and others draw on the work of Manuel Castells on networks to claim that transnational networks predated the creation of European institutions and that, without their prior existence, the European integration process would likely not have led to the creation of the strong institutional structure embodied in today’s European Union.31 These scholars encourage European integration scholars to examine the “growth and character of the transnational political society in the making.”32

Kaiser’s research intersects well with “multi-level governance” theories that have emerged in political science to explain policymaking in the modern EU, but Kaiser argues that elements of this system predate scholars’ focus on the 1980-90s. Networks allow a “transfer of ideas and policy solutions between national and sub-national actors below the supranational level” through an informal political process that often includes non-state actors operating within multiple institutional contexts that are far more flexible than formal political structures, which are based on hierarchical systems and power struggles.33 He argues that the creation of Christian-Democratic networks facilitated the building of “social trust in the form of normative-emotional bonds between [transnational] party elites” that allowed them “to define common policy objectives”34 based on a “shared social system for interpreting the world.”35 Through transnational contact in informal settings, Christian Democrats were able to learn about and empathize with the domestic challenges facing their counterparts in other nations, and to mobilize their transnational alliances to strengthen their position within their domestic spheres.

Kaiser’s work offers a promising path forward for historians disillusioned with the cognitive dissonance that often marks interdisciplinary European integration research and with a


33 Kaiser, “Transnational Networks in European governance,” 17.


historiography overly reliant on antiquated state-centric presumptions. In this dissertation, I seek to examine how transnational contacts between French Socialists and German Social Democrats shared some of the features of the Christian-Democratic networks analyzed by Kaiser, but I also explicitly address the question as to why they tended to be less successful in crafting common policies. Here I pick up on avenues of research suggested by Kaiser and associated historians. Kaiser’s recognition of “multiple actor identities” breaks with Parsons’ rigid system of categorization, and helps scholars to conceptualize historical actors as three-dimensional beings who are at times forced to make decisions between competing priorities that tug at varying aspects of their identity. In addition, I take up his suggestion that historians “re-conceptualize the possibly fundamental impact of collective experiences that have the potential of uniting people of the same generation, class, confession, or political belief across borders.”

In this dissertation, I argue that an analysis of SFIO and SPD responses to early European integration initiatives indicates that there was a postwar generation of SFIO and SPD leaders who were informed by similar experiences rooted in memories, policy proposals, and outcomes from the interwar period, who formulated similar visions of the postwar period that drew upon already existing socialist ideology and narratives, and who were at crucial moments perplexed as to how to respond to dilemmas that placed different socialist objectives in conflict with one another. I am following in part on the recent work by Talbot Imlay, who considers Socialists a “counter-society to the one dominated by states” in the postwar period. Imlay defines a counter-society “as a distinct group whose members developed organized and persistent patterns of relations with one another that, viewed as a whole and over time, offered an alternative social model.” When devising proposals and responding to policies generated by other parties on European integration, French Socialists and German Social Democrats considered the potential repercussions of supranational institutions not only for processes of French-German reconciliation, but also for a wide range of domestic, geopolitical, economic, and at times


38 Here I follow Alain Bergounioux in arguing that age, while a factor, need not be the only factor defining a generation, but rather that a generation can be defined by a modification of its social composition or, in this case, the ideology and “mental universe” of its members. Alain Bergounioux, “Générations socialistes?,” *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire* 22 (1989): 93-102.

regional party objectives. I also emphasize the importance that experts in the parties gained over areas within their fields of knowledge, including industrial, defense, scientific, agricultural and trade policy. I consider these individuals’ expertise to be autonomous factors as well in the development of party policies, but also point to how their advice at times reflected general ideological trends or narratives within the parties. Ideologies of European integration interacted with and at times came into contradiction with other ideologies, forcing Socialists to make choices between competing priorities. This was the case more often for Socialists than Christian Democrats in the early postwar period in part because they were less likely to be directing government policy.

Much of the scholarship on socialist internationalism emphasizes the superficiality of the parties’ commitments to this principle and claims that it generally constituted little more than a reflexive rhetorical exercise. The starting point for such a view is a focus on the polemics on first-order issues that broke out among the various parties. Indeed polemics were important features of inter-socialist relations and there were at times severe crises of trust between the parties’ leaderships that do not seem to have had a parallel in the smaller transnational network of Christian Democrats analyzed by Kaiser. In addition, unlike the case for the Christian Democrats, these parties often represented domestic or electoral burdens for their fraternal party, which in part de-incentivized their efforts to come to consensus. However, as this dissertation demonstrates, conflict between the parties was paralleled by conflicts within the parties. Scholars to date have overlooked how the minority view in one party often shared the assumptions, logic, and viewpoint of the majority of the other party. That transnational cross-party coalitions emerged despite formidable obstacles suggests that it is proper to think in terms of a single generation of postwar French Socialists and German Social Democrats who, despite their

disagreements with each other and among themselves, tended to ask similar questions, to make reference to similar narratives and traditions, and to face similar dilemmas when ideas and objectives important to Socialist goals and identities came into contradiction. Hence quite often Socialists agreed on a set of (in)dependent objectives, but then came into conflict over which objective to prioritize over others when they had to set concrete policies for developments over which they often had only partial control or influence.

That such processes of transnational exchange and contact did not always result in a consensus between the party leaderships does not mean that such processes were not occurring, though it does suggest that the parties’ commitment to socialist internationalism needs to be weighed in the context of other party objectives as well as contextualized within the institutional constraints of their domestic spheres. They also have to be contextualized within the economic and geopolitical constraints of an increasingly globalizing economy in the context of a Cold War between East and West. It is the objective of this dissertation to do just that, so as to provide a holistic analysis of the ideas, experiences, and constraints within which French Socialists and German Social Democrats set policies on European integration initiatives from 1948 to 1957.

To set the stage for this generational argument about the sources of postwar French Socialist and German Social Democratic policy on European integration, it will be useful to introduce readers to the parties’ most important figures in the postwar period. That their visions and ideas shared so much in common despite wide differences in personal backgrounds and experiences (both among individuals within and between the parties) strengthens my thesis that their identity as socialists and their conception of the meaning of this identity had a causative influence over their designs for and reactions to postwar European integration proposals.

1.2 Profiles of Leading Postwar French Socialists and German Social Democrats

There was a great diversity of personal experiences represented within postwar French Socialist and German Social Democratic leadership circles. Below I focus on a group of individuals who had the most influence over their parties’ general policies. For specific policy areas, such as heavy industry, agriculture, etc., the parties tended to defer to the expertise of individuals who
had a wealth of experience in their specific sector. I introduce these actors within the chapters themselves in order to have their backgrounds fresh in the minds of the reader.

Léon Blum and Kurt Schumacher were the most powerful forces in the reconstruction of their parties after the Second World War. They could hardly have been more different in temperament and background. Born in 1872 into a bourgeois Jewish family, the soft-spoken and bookish Blum began his career as a literary and theatrical critic. A great admirer of the German romantic poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Blum made his name around the turn-of-the-century through his lyrical pen. The tumult surrounding the Dreyfus affair politicized Blum and galvanized him to identify with France’s splintered socialist movement. Too old to be mobilized for the First World War, Blum entered the *Union sacrée* government as cabinet director of Socialist Marcel Sembat’s Ministry of Public Works. When the war ended in 1919, the foundational generation of the SFIO had either died (Paul Brousse, Jean Jaurès, Édouard Vaillant), were too elderly to lead the party into the postwar era (Jules Guesde, Marcel Sembat), or had lost their seats in the nationalist electoral wave of 1919 (Jean Longuet, Ludovic-Oscar Frossard). Pierre Renaudel and Albert Thomas, for their parts, had effectively disqualified themselves through their continued support of ministerialisme. The party leadership fell to Blum, who adopted a centrist position within the SFIO and led an anti-communist resistance against advocates of associating with the new Communist International.

Kurt Schumacher, born in 1895 to a bourgeois Protestant family in Eastern Prussia, was twenty-two years Blum’s junior. At the age of eighteen, he volunteered to fight in the First World War. Sent to the Eastern front, he had an arm amputated as a result of a gunshot wound. After recovering from a life-threatening illness, Schumacher threw himself into the violent world of Weimar street politics. By 1924, he had moved to southeastern Germany and was active in paramilitary groups associated with the SPD. He became a sensational speaker who, in contrast to Blum, relied on short, declarative statements and an aggressive, polemical speaking style. His success haranguing audiences gained him national prominence, but he was too young to challenge the leadership of the aging SPD of the Weimar era. Vehemently anti-Communist, Schumacher pushed an intransigent attitude against concessions to the “bourgeois” parties as well.

Léon Blum was the leader of the party’s parliamentary faction through most of the interwar period and became France’s first SFIO, and first Jewish, Prime Minister as the head of a
Popular Front government in 1936. Through much of the interwar period, his primary focus was the preservation of unity within a party that experienced factional infighting and a series of schisms. He tended to support SFIO participation in center-left Radical-led governments or parliamentary support for Radical governments against a party base insistent that the SFIO maintain doctrinal purity. After right-wing riots appeared to threaten the republican government in February 1934, Blum steered his party towards an anti-Fascist coalition with left republicans and Communists. Riding a wave of excitement, Blum unexpectedly ascended to Prime Minister in 1936 as the leader of the strongest party within the Popular Front coalition. As Prime Minister, Blum had to balance an ambitious social program fueled by high expectations amidst a wave of strikes and social agitation with a steadily deteriorating geopolitical situation, which included the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, and rearmament and increased aggression from fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Vilified by anti-Semites in the French press, Blum increasingly advocated a more bellicose response to Nazi provocations. This stance led him into conflict with the party’s secretary-general Paul Faure, who represented the party’s pacifist wing. The battle within the SFIO came to a head with the French military defeat against German forces in the Second World War. Faure and others adopted a policy of accommodation in the initial stage of Marshall Philippe Pétain’s “National Revolution,” while Blum and his supporters opposed the new antidemocratic French collaborationist government.

Facing clear danger as prominent political dissidents against the Nazi and Vichy dictatorships, Schumacher and Blum both made the conscious decision to remain in their home nations. Schumacher went underground in 1933 to help orchestrate clandestine party operations until the Gestapo captured him that summer. He spent the next ten years in a concentration camp, from which he emerged physically broken in 1943. When the July 1944 coup against Adolf Hitler failed, Schumacher found himself again subject to detention but managed to evade the authorities until the end of the war. Blum, for his part, was arrested by Vichy authorities in September 1940 but was allowed to correspond, to receive visitors, and to read and write. He used his time to write *À l’Échelle humaine*, which became the political testament of the Socialist underground. Blum urged Socialists to overcome their suspicions and join Charles de Gaulle’s Free French struggle against the Vichy government. After Vichy cut off Blum’s prosecution mid-
trial, Blum wound up in the hands of the Gestapo, which flew him to Germany and placed him under house arrest outside of the Buchenwald concentration camp. Transferred to Dachau in the final months of the war, Blum was marched to Innsbruck and, as the Nazi empire collapsed, was lucky that the Gestapo officers accompanying him decided to allow him to fall into the hands of U.S. soldiers.42

The two men barely survived the war. Many of their Socialist colleagues did not have such good fortune. A number of the titans of the interwar SPD had either died in Gestapo custody (Rudolf Breitscheid and Rudolf Hilferding) or had died in exile (Otto Wels). Hermann Müller died in 1931, in the twilight of the Weimar years. Kurt Schumacher’s energy and drive made him the force around which the SPD rallied during its resurrection in 1945-1946. His uncompromising struggle against the Nazis, his martyred figure, and his balance of charisma and inflexible determination lent him a moral force that few within the reconstituted party could challenge.

Paris welcomed Blum home as a martyr and hero in 1945. However, his advanced age and a subterranean struggle between the resistance SFIO and the party at large meant that while his was the most authoritative and respected voice within the party, powerful factions arose from within to contest his position. The secretary-general of the SFIO, Daniel Mayer, and his resistance cohort had constructed the policies of the SFIO resistance under the guiding hand of Léon Blum, and looked to him for inspiration.43 Nonetheless, a young, inexperienced and relatively unknown figure, Guy Mollet, through a combination of tactical maneuvering and an insistence on doctrinal purity, succeeded in placing Blum in the minority at the 1946 party congress, and wrested leadership of the party from Daniel Mayer. While the blumiste faction continued to be central to the party’s development in the postwar period, supplying ministers, expertise, and casting a critical eye on Mollet’s leadership, Mollet was able to secure an unprecedented longevity as secretary-general (1946 to 1969) through an alliance with the largest party federations.

In addition to a stint as Prime Minister, Blum’s voluminous editorials for the party organ Le Populaire from 1947 to 1950 provided him the opportunity to continue to influence the

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42 For Blum’s biography, see Serge Berstein, Léon Blum (Paris: Fayard, 2006). For Schumacher’s, see Peter Merseburger, Der schwierige Deutsche: Kurt Schumacher, Eine Biographie (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1995).
party’s positions on foreign and economic policy. Léon Blum died in March 1950. For his part, Schumacher suffered a series of illnesses, including an amputation of a leg in 1948, before succumbing to tuberculosis in summer 1952. The era of heroic and larger-than-life leaders of the SFIO and SPD came to an end with their deaths. Guy Mollet and Schumacher’s second-in-command, Erich Ollenhauer, stepped into the shoes of two of the giants of twentieth-century socialism. To some, they hardly appeared up to the task. Both skilled primarily as internal party operators, they lacked the stature and charisma of their predecessors. Their long stints as leaders represented a compromise between various wings of the parties.

Whereas Blum and Schumacher came from social milieus that for the most part kept distant from socialist ideas, Mollet and Ollenhauer came from more humble origins. Mollet grew up the child of workers in Normandy, and Ollenhauer in the SPD bastion of Magdeburg. They embodied the rise of an age cohort that was too young to be mobilized for the First World War. Ollenhauer, born in 1901, and Mollet, born in 1906, experienced the war from the vantage points of their domestic households. Both of their fathers were mobilized for war. Ollenhauer had to take care of his family while his father was at the front. Mollet’s father survived a gas attack and returned home a broken man. Mollet then experienced the trauma of watching his father deteriorate physically and mentally over the next ten years, an experience that solidified an unyielding pacifism within him during the interwar period.

Mollet conquered his party as a relative outsider in 1946; Ollenhauer in effect inherited his party in 1952. Mollet was steeped in local politics and taught English to high school students in Arras, a small city in the north of France. He supported pacifist positions and likely favored the Munich accords of 1938. Mobilized and captured by German armies in 1940, he was released in 1941, was in contact with the Socialist underground resistance by 1942, and had joined a paramilitary group in 1943. Sought by the Gestapo in 1944, he went into hiding and was on the move for the rest of the occupation period.44

Ollenhauer, on the other hand, rose through the ranks of the SPD apparatus in the interwar period. At the age of nineteen, he was elected to the leading committee of the SPD’s youth congress, and was at the center of the European socialist youth movement through the 1920s. Closely aligned with the SPD’s moderate center, in 1928 he was elected to head the

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SPD’s youth movement. On the eve of the Nazi seizure of power, he joined the SPD Central Committee in late April 1933, at the last Central Committee meeting that the SPD held in Germany before the party leadership went into exile. Ollenhauer was at the center of the party’s activities in exile, residing first in Prague and, after 1938, in France. Due to his role as head of the European socialist youth movement, he rubbed shoulders in exile with the principal SPD leaders of the Weimar period, including with Otto Wels, Rudolf Hilferding, and Rudolf Breitscheid, as well as with international socialists. In addition, he worked closely with Fritz Heine, who served as editor and led the exiled party’s correspondence, a task he continued for the SPD leadership after the war. Ollenhauer and his family experienced the Nazi bombing raid on Paris in 1940, were separated when Erich was taken into police custody, and then reunited in the south of France. Through a U.S. diplomatic intermediary, Ollenhauer and his family were able to receive permission to escape France through Spain and Portugal, before making their way to Great Britain in January 1941. There Ollenhauer remained with the SPD-in-exile for the duration of the war. In fall 1945, he travelled back to Germany. He quickly developed a close relationship with Schumacher, and became his right-hand man upon his definitive return to Germany in February 1946.45

Ollenhauer and Mollet were rather unremarkable personalities who rose to power through a clear understanding of party sensibilities and rank-and-file sentiment. André Philip and Carlo Schmid, in contrast, were two of the leading intellectuals of postwar western European socialism. They exerted considerable influence in the postwar era, but never felt fully at home within the socialist movement. Both were in a sense “heretics” who rejected Marxism, promoted cooperation with “bourgeois” parties, and advocated reconciliation between socialism and Christianity. They were also two of the most assiduous supporters of the European integration process through the entire postwar period.

Carlo Schmid was born in Perpignan, France, in 1896 to a French mother and a German father. Though he moved with his family to southwestern Germany, all of his life he spoke French better than German and was an aficionado of French literature. In 1914, he was mobilized and served on both the Western and Eastern fronts. After the war he embarked on a career in law and received a doctorate in 1923. Though sympathetic with the moderate SPD in the initial

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45 For a biography of Erich Ollenhauer that ends with his return to Germany in 1946, see Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, *Ollenhauer: Biedermann und Patriot* (Berlin: Wolf Siedler, 1984).
postwar period, he kept a distance from Weimar politics and seems to have moved somewhat to the right, though he was always a steadfast critic of national socialism. He put his services to work for the German government’s legal assaults on the Versailles treaty, an effort he later regretted. He had a long interest and training in classical studies, and began offering courses at Tübingen University, where led him to a career as a professor. His classical training contributed to his distinctive speaking style as a SPD politician after WWII. His lyricism, replete with references to classical history and littered with ancient Greek and Latin, made his speeches among the most learned of the period, which at times elicited frustrated reactions from his audience.

André Philip was born in 1902 in the Gard and then moved to Marseilles as a youth. Too young to fight in the First World War, he moved to Paris to pursue university studies at the Sorbonne, from which he received a degree in law and philosophy. He was awarded a doctorate in law in 1924, and was certified in economics in 1926, which henceforth became his life passion. Philip cast a wide gaze on the world, writing economic texts on Great Britain, India, and the United States, before turning his attention to Africa and the economic problems of the developing world in the 1950s. Like Carlo Schmid, he became a popular professor, working at the university in Lyon. In 1936, he was elected to the National Assembly in the Popular Front wave. There he was a steadfast supporter of Léon Blum, who valued Philip’s expertise. After casting his vote against Pétain’s investiture in 1940, he returned to teaching. Philip plunged himself early into the socialist resistance movement, and his activity caught the attention of the Gestapo, leading him to flee France and join de Gaulle’s Free French in London. There he developed a close friendship with de Gaulle that continued after the war. He played a central role in de Gaulle’s war-time entourage and became a leading force within the provisional government in exile. He emerged from the war at the center of policymaking on issues of postwar political economy.46

Carlo Schmid, on the other hand, spent most of the war in Lille, where the Nazi government appointed him head jurist in the Occupation government headquartered there. Prior to his appointment, Schmid had become increasingly isolated within his university before being released due to his political views, which were known to oppose national socialism. However,

46 For André Philip’s biography, see André Philip, André Philip par lui-même ou les voies de la liberté (Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1971).
the Nazi government believed his knowledge of international law and French would prove useful in the occupation administration. In Lille, Schmid worked subtly to sabotage the most egregious aspects of Nazi occupation. He cultivated ties with resistance groups, warned resisters of upcoming arrests, gave secret advice to defendants coming before occupation courts, annulled execution orders, and helped a number of Jews obtain false documents. In the final months of the war, there was a Gestapo order to murder Schmid, and he went into hiding before successfully travelling back to Germany. Upon his return to southwestern Germany, he cultivated ties with the French military occupation that gave him the reputation among some as a puppet of the French occupation. He became a primary force in the political reconstruction of Baden-Württemberg. In January 1946, he joined the SPD, and was quickly considered a potential rival to Kurt Schumacher.47

Nonetheless, his efforts on behalf of the French resistance were often unknown within Lille, a situation that had the advantage of delaying Gestapo suspicions. It also meant, however, that he could not avoid signing execution orders that others had already decided, and he acquired a reputation as “the butcher of Lille,” which led him into a personal conflict after the war with Guy Mollet, who was active in the resistance movement in the area. In 1949, Mollet went so far as to notify the SPD that he would refuse to sit in the same room as Schmid. The SPD leadership defended Schmid and the international socialist movement served as a mediator in the conflict, exonerating Schmid, who then developed close ties with a number of French socialist leaders.

Christian Pineau and Herbert Wehner were two fairly prominent figures who first joined the socialist parties in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Their influence climbed steadily during the period under study. In the second half of the 1950s, Pineau served for several years as French Foreign Minister and Wehner was part of a three-person team that was in effect directing the party (with Carlo Schmid and Fritz Erler). Pineau was born to a middle-class family in the northeast of France in 1904. He graduated with a degree in economics from Sciences-po and made a career as a banker during the interwar period in Paris. In 1934, he joined the Confédération générale du travail (CGT) trade union and became active in the revolutionary movement. In 1949, he was elected to the French National Assembly, and in 1956, he became the French Foreign Minister. Wehner was born in 1912 and studied law at the University of Munich. He joined the SPD in 1930 and became a prominent figure in the party, serving as a member of the party Executive Committee from 1955 to 1965. In 1957, he was elected to the Bundestag, and in 1965, he became the Federal Minister of Housing, General Planning, and Reconstruction. In 1969, he was appointed as the Federal Minister of Defence.

syndicalist movement, developing close personal ties with CGT leader Léon Jouhaux. Pineau was dismissed from his job at the bank Paribas for participating in a strike in 1938. He was close to Albert Gazier and Robert Lacoste in the CGT movement, each of whom followed Pineau’s path into the SFIO in the postwar period.

When the Nazi occupation began, Pineau was the primary impetus for the founding of the Liberation-Nord resistance network and became the editor of a resistance journal. He secretly travelled as a leader of the French resistance to meet with de Gaulle in London. Unlike Philip, Pineau’s relationship with de Gaulle was rocky from the outset. In 1942, Pineau left Liberation-Nord to organize resistance in the Vichy south, where the Gestapo arrested him in 1942. Though he escaped, he was arrested again in 1943 and transported to the Buchenwald concentration camp. Upon his release with the liberation of the camp in 1945, Pineau was immediately appointed to de Gaulle’s cabinet and became a member of the SFIO’s Directing Committee. In the following years, he became one of the party’s principal financial experts and was several times the President of the National Assembly’s Finance Commission. Though he supported Mayer against Mollet for secretary-general in 1946, he quickly became one of Mollet’s most important allies within the party. Mollet tapped him to become Foreign Minister in his 1956-57 government, a position he retained under the coalitional governments that followed Mollet’s fall until the end of the Fourth Republic in 1958.48

Herbert Wehner was born in 1906, a year after Christian Pineau, to a working-class family in the heavily social-democratic milieu of Dresden. His father was mobilized for war in 1914 and returned a changed man. Alcoholism and unemployment haunted his father and Wehner found himself having to work a series of odd jobs to help his family while also continuing his education. By 1925-26, he was participating in Bohemian reading groups and espousing a sectarian form of left anarchism. He shifted course in the late 1920s and became active in local communist groups. He joined the German Communist Party (KPD), became a steadfast defender of Stalinist Russia, and adopted the KPD’s mantra that the SPD represented a form of “social fascism.” In 1930, he was elected to the Saxon parliament and became the second-in-command of the regional KPD faction. After narrowly escaping arrest in 1933, Wehner organized Communist activity in the Saarland and then spent the rest of the Nazi period

in exile. He was elected to the Directing Committee of the exiled party and became a rival of Walter Ulbricht, the KPD leader. Against his will he was forced to go to Moscow, where he became caught up in the dramatic party purges of the late 1930s. In 1941, he was sent to Sweden to organize activities there, but was arrested by the Swedish police and sentenced to hard labor.

His writings in prison reveal that he had broken with Soviet communism and favored alliances with socialists and liberals to create a parliamentary democracy. There was no concrete date when Wehner abandoned the Communist Party. Rumors swirled around him that he had betrayed his comrades in Moscow and again in Sweden. After his release from prison in 1944, Wehner spent the rest of the war in Sweden, a country for which he developed a lifelong devotion. Impressed by Schumacher’s speeches over the radio, he successfully sought contact with the SPD. After a detailed briefing on his experiences, Schumacher and the SPD leadership accepted Wehner into the leadership circle and his influence grew steadily over the course of the 1950s. He became the party’s principal expert on relations with East Germany and the Soviet sphere. Nonetheless, his long career was plagued by continuous accusations about his political past, which descended frequently into innuendo and slander.49

Despite these figures’ differences in age, background, temperament, and experiences, it is the contention of this dissertation that they by and large emerged from the Second World War with a similar vision for the postwar world. That they were soon to come into conflict on the issue of European and, in particular German, heavy industry was not a reflection of a lack of commitment to the principle of socialist internationalism, to the ideal of European unity, or to cooperation with one another. The dispute that then emerged over the European Coal & Steel Community and the European Defense Community had more to do with perceptions of German democracy and the pressures of geopolitical, economic and institutional constraints upon the French Socialist leadership and with the impact of the regional politics of the Ruhr on the national SPD than with fundamental disagreements on perceptions of world developments, though these then emerged. Such disagreements at times taught French Socialist leaders that a sizable number of their party’s members had a vision more in common with that developed by the German Social Democratic Party than with their own leadership. It is to these developments that we now turn before considering how the parties succeeded in overcoming the disputes of the

49 For Wehner’s biography, see Christoph Meyer, *Herbert Wehner: Eine Biographie* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006).
1948 to 1954 era to promote a common vision of European integration from 1955 to 1957. In those later years, the parties succeeded in constructing a common policy within the Common Assembly of the European Coal & Steel Community and towards the Treaties of Rome that established a common European atomic energy agency (Euratom) and the European Economic Community. That they were able to do so demonstrates the parties’ will to reconciliation, and their mutual dedication to a shared socialist vision of European economic cooperation.
2. VISIONS OF THE POSTWAR ORDER: EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION, SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM, AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF HEAVY INDUSTRY, 1944-1948

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets the context for the dispute that erupted in 1948-1951 between the French Socialist and German Social Democratic Parties on the integration of European heavy industry by investigating the place that heavy industry had within each party’s conceptions of a postwar European future in 1945-1948. It demonstrates how domestic political imperatives shaped by material necessities and party narratives about what went wrong during the interwar period led the two parties into conflict with one another.

As the following chapter shows, the French Socialist and German Social Democratic Parties proved capable of compromising amongst themselves and formulating a common vision in favor of European coal and steel integration through transnational contact and discussion prior to the announcement of the London Accords of June 1948, which set West Germany on the path to statehood. It was in the Socialists’ reactions to these Accords negotiated by the Allied governments and their aftermath that the dispute broke out. As had occurred so often in the interwar period, Socialist designs and compromises on heated issues of French-German relations did not come to fruition in the frenzied work of international diplomacy. It was in response to the marginalization of their proposed compromises on coal and steel that French Socialists and German Social Democrats fell back onto defensive positions of protecting core domestic priorities related to coal and steel policy.

The rationale behind these SFIO and SPD domestic objectives is the subject of this chapter. These domestic political priorities reflected core socialist objectives that were not
necessarily at odds with either party’s goals of achieving a transnational consensus with their cross-Rhine neighbor. However, geopolitical and domestic developments outside of the parties’ control placed the principle of socialist internationalism into contradiction with other goals central to these parties’ visions for the postwar order. With traumatic memories of the interwar French invasion of the Ruhr industrial valley fresh in their minds, SPD regional and national leaders considered the allegiance of the Ruhr working classes to be a central front in their struggle to, first, eliminate German Communist Party (KPD) influence from western Germany and, second, reorder property relations in the region to satisfy the yearnings of the Ruhr’s workers and to break the military-industrial complex that had contributed so much in their view to the wars of the recent past. The region’s SPD leaders exerted a disproportionate influence on SPD national policymaking in the initial postwar period, an influence that present scholarship overlooks. In this context, it is more appropriate to speak of a regionalization, rather than a nationalization, of SPD policy on heavy industry from 1948-51.

Such an approach allows one to revise much of the literature on postwar SFIO-SPD relations that views the breakdown of relations between the parties on heavy industry integration as proof of the hollowness of each party’s commitment to internationalism. As discussed below, Kurt Schumacher plays a central role in this scholarly narrative as an exemplar par excellence of the nationalization of postwar European socialism. I argue that efforts to create a Socialist consensus on the geopolitical issues of the period competed with domestic goals that also were as much part of German social democracy’s sense of historical exigency as was internationalism.

The same holds true for the SFIO. This chapter shows how the SFIO pursued a campaign similar to the SPD to gain the support of industrial workers in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais regions, and to battle against the influence of the local French Communist Party (PCF). However, the PCF emerged from the Second World War far stronger than did the KPD of Western Germany and was able to gain hegemony over the workers of France’s key industrial regions. The SFIO, in part due to this outcome, did not come to represent French coal miners in the same way that the SPD became the mouthpiece of the Ruhr valley’s coal miners and steel workers.

The source of SFIO policies on heavy industry lay not in a defense of a key regional constituency, as was the case for the SPD. Rather, SFIO industrial policy was part of an ambitious program for national economic transformation. The SFIO was an important impetus
for the “planning consensus” that emerged in the initial postwar period. This consensus held that a large-scale industrial modernization program as proposed in Jean Monnet’s Plan for Modernization and Reconstruction was necessary to overcome French economic and military decline, which had become evident to all in the French military defeat of 1940 and the continent’s eclipse between the emerging superpowers in 1944-47. This program required raw material imports from the Ruhr Valley, hence making SFIO domestic policy dependent on a satisfactory resolution of the postwar European economic order and on Germany’s place within it.

To understand why a harsh dispute erupted between the two parties in 1948-51, it is necessary to transcend the facile dichotomy of “internationalism” and “nationalism” and to place the parties’ sincere desires for a Socialist consensus on the geopolitics of European heavy industry within the material and economic realities of the period and the galaxy of domestic priorities pursued by postwar French socialism and German social democracy. Practitioners of politics have to juggle a constellation of priorities, which they often find contradict one another. In order to understand the world in which they operated and the decisions that they made, so do we.

### 2.2 NATIONALISM, INTERNATIONALISM AND POSTWAR GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

One of the few areas of agreement between the German Communists, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the French and parts of the German press, and a diverse set of international political and diplomatic figures was that the policy of the SPD after WWII was driven by the “nationalism” of its leader, Kurt Schumacher. After first meeting Schumacher, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman told the French Foreign Affairs Commission that Schumacher was “an

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infinitely respectable man who has suffered enormously for his ideas, but [he] is driven by passion and is a violent person who does not like France.” 52 A denunciatory international press campaign against Schumacher’s “nationalist” tone and policies reached a climax during the last years of his life in the period 1949-1952. During the French Assembly debates on the “German question” during this period, Schumacher symbolized the bête noire of German politics, a Prussian bogeyman whose possible ascent to political power seemed to threaten the bases of French security.

His reputation as a nationalist extended into Schumacher’s fraternal party, the SFIO, the leaders of which complained in internal discussions of the SPD’s nationalist policies. Party leader Guy Mollet told the SFIO Directing Committee in 1948 that, “It is necessary to denounce the nationalist point of view of the German socialists.” 53 SFIO deputy André Philip drew particular ire from Schumacher when he made the “nationalist” claim in public fora. 54 This characterization was also present at times among the SPD’s usual domestic allies. During the SPD’s campaign against the Schuman Plan, for instance, an official of the national trade union federation, the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) complained to the SPD Central Committee about the “nationalist accents” coming from SPD leaders that risked ruining “our international reputation.” 55

Nor have historians been particularly kind to Kurt Schumacher. I agree with Talbot Imlay’s claim that most scholars have reproduced uncritically the widespread contemporary portrayal of Schumacher as a nationalist. 56 Most view the postwar SPD’s nationalism to be more pronounced than its socialism or internationalism. V. Stanley Vardys writes that, “After World War II, the SPD freed itself from indecision, abandoned its proletarian internationalism and frankly embraced nationalistic views,” and that, “The Party not only had become nationalistic; it

52 Commission des affaires étrangères, 29 November 1951, C/15591, Archives nationales (AN).
53 Comité directeur, 20 October 1948, Office Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste (OURS).
54 Schumacher said of Philip in a letter to Hermann Brill dated 4 September 1951 that, “The most pernicious [Übelste] is surely André Philip, who in the most infamous manner agitates against German social democracy and against me.” Dietmar Ramuschkat, Die SPD und der europäische Einigungsprozess: Kontinuität und Wandel in der sozialdemokratischen Europapolitik (Niebüll: Verlag videel, 2003), 33.
also wanted to wrap itself in the flag for all to see, and the German public correctly discerned that the SPD was more often motivated by nationalism than by socialistic arguments.”

William Paterson agrees that Schumacher was “anti-French” and that his “relations with other countries were normally colored more by his nationalism than by his internationalism.” Dietrich Orlow writes that, “Schumacher’s blowing of the nationalist trumpet” made him “sound like Bismarck” and that, “the SPD under Schumacher appeared to present itself as a postwar edition of the German Nationalists.” Only recently have historians begun to challenge this depiction.

Scholars correctly point out that the SPD’s intransigent attitude in the initial postwar period resulted at least in part from the party’s determination to avoid being once again labeled “fatherlandless elements” (Vaterlandlose Gesellen) and among the “November criminals,” as had occurred under Weimar. Schumacher and the SPD leadership believed that it would be a grave threat to the prospects of German democracy if the German public perceived national claims to be an exclusive terrain of the political right. While scholars present this view as understandable, they widely criticize the leadership for not realizing that post-WWII developments in Germany and Europe differed fundamentally from those following the First World War. In this view, Schumacher and “his party seemed to be persecuted by the trauma of socialist experiences after World War I,” and pursued an anachronistic policy to correct the mistakes of Weimar when the postwar era required a different, more conciliatory form of politics that Konrad Adenauer’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) came to embody.


59 Orlow also writes that, “In stridently nationalistic tones the SPD’s national leaders insisted that national unification (and the recovery of the lost territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line), and the restoration of full sovereignty had to precede any agreements on European integration. Orlow, Common Destiny, 55.

60 For example, see Talbot Imlay, “The policy of social democracy is self-consciously internationalist.” Imlay adds his own list of contemporaries and historians depicting Schumacher as a nationalist: French High Commissioner André François-Poncet, American military commander Lucius D. Clay, British High Commissioner Ivone Kirkpatrick, Konrad Adenauer, and historians Kurt Klotzboch and Beatrix Bouvier.

61 Lewis Joachim Edinger writes that, “Tactical considerations as well as the ‘lessons of the past’ were no doubt contributing factors but it is also clear that already in the pre-Hitler period [Schumacher] had held views that led him to assume this role.” Lewis Joachim Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 150.

62 Vardys, op cit., 242-43.

evidence for the widespread contention that Schumacher was a nationalist directly pertains, as we shall see, to the SPD’s position on heavy industry and French-German relations from 1948 to 1951, and its reaction to the following developments of the early postwar era: the 1948-49 announcement of the Ruhr Statute, the November 1949 Petersburg accords, and the SPD campaign to defeat the Schuman Plan in 1951. The SPD came to be the most insistent advocate of German reunification in the initial postwar period, and Schumacher’s reputation as a nationalist had much to do with his incessant lambasting of CDU Chancellor Konrad Adenauer for privileging Western integration over German reunification. Schumacher suspected, perhaps justly, that Adenauer was rather content to allow the crucial SPD constituencies of Berlin, Saxony and Thuringia to remain on the other side of the “Iron Curtain,” votes without which the SPD would be unlikely to reach a majority in national elections.

It is perhaps fair for historians to critique the SPD for not correctly assessing the political spirit of the postwar era, but at times scholars’ critiques themselves suffer from anachronisms. Schumacher and company could not have known that German democracy would successfully implant itself over the next decade, that the German economy would experience an “economic wonder” in the 1950s, and that the German coal and steel industries would re-emerge for a period as the driving force of European heavy industry. The SPD’s determination to represent German national claims was based on what it perceived to be the errors of its recent past. Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman were as equally obsessed by the demons of Weimar and the French defeat of 1940 as was the SPD, and the “lessons” that they derived from their experiences directly shaped their views as well. These “lessons,” though, led the SPD to different conclusions than the CDU when faced with early efforts to unite the European continent under French leadership from 1949 to 1952.

Scholars have been nearly unanimous in their condemnation of SPD policy on Europe and Franco-German reconciliation. At times their critiques read more like editorials than analyses. Haas writes that the SPD’s policy was “sweeping and self-contradictory” and “boil[ed] down to purely national demands.” Orlow writes that, “Schumacher’s convoluted reasoning allowed most party leaders as well as rank-and-file activists to live with the illusion that once the

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Schuman Plan had been defeated, the party and Germany would regain the initiative in foreign
relations.”65 There is also general agreement among historians that Kurt Schumacher alone set
SPD international policy, especially as it pertained to German heavy industry.66 There is
considerable evidence to support this point of view. For instance, when the Allies announced the
results of their negotiations to establish an International Authority of the Ruhr (IAR),
Schumacher issued the official SPD response without consulting the party’s Central Committee.
An exclusive focus on Schumacher, however, risks assigning excessive causative value to
Schumacher’s whims and personality to the detriment of other structural and internal political
factors. Such is the case with Orlow, who writes that the SPD suffered due to Schumacher’s
“arrogant, authoritarian, uncompromising personality.”67 An early biographer of Schumacher
goes even further, explaining the SPD’s policies in large part through the claim that,
“Schumacher’s behavior and attitude patterns point to character traits clinically identified with
those of an obsessive-compulsive personality striving to adjust to the objective environment in a
socially acceptable manner.”68

This study offers a different perspective. It argues, first, that scholars have been sloppy
and loose in their claims that Schumacher was a “nationalist,” and that a myopic over-emphasis
on the role of Schumacher has led scholars to overlook other reasons for SPD opposition to
French policy for European heavy industry. In particular scholars neglect to analyze the
influence that SPD politicians from the Ruhr valley and from the Land North-Rhine-Westphalia
(NRW) exercised in support of Schumacher’s policies, as this and the following chapter make
clear.

Did the SPD in fact reject French proposals for the Ruhr and the Schuman Plan because
of the party’s or its leader’s “nationalism”? The question is polemical by its very nature.
Whereas the term “nationalist” had at times positive connotations in German history, particularly
during the Weimar period, it emerged as one of the strongest pejoratives of the postwar era. Its
employment represented an unambiguous condemnation of the SPD’s policies, tone, and attitude,
both when deployed at the time and when made later by historians. The evidence, however, is
not at all as clear cut as many have presented it. On only one occasion, and only when pressed,

65 Orlow, Common Destiny, 179.
66 Edinger, op. cit., 117, 144; Ramuschkat, op. cit., 17.
68 Edinger, op. cit., 275, 294.
did an historian define what he meant by designating Schumacher a nationalist. Paterson in 1995 substantiated his claim of “nationalism” by stating that Schumacher under-estimated the security needs of other states, a point to which we will return.69

The term “nationalism” was anathema among European Socialists, including the SPD. For a Socialist to call another Socialist a “nationalist” in the postwar era cut deep; in effect it questioned the individual’s credentials as a Socialist. Years later, for instance, when André Philip broke with SFIO leader Guy Mollet over the Mollet government’s repressive Algerian policy and the invasion of the Suez peninsula, Philip’s central charge was that Mollet had abandoned “socialism” and adopted “nationalist” policies.70 For his part, Schumacher forcefully and continuously rejected accusations of “nationalism,” seeking to discredit the charge by telling an interviewer that the allegation had its roots in the Soviet Union’s campaign to achieve the organic fusion of the KPD and SPD, a development Schumacher had successfully resisted in 1946.71 Schumacher countered the accusation by identifying himself as a Socialist or Social Democrat, an internationalist, and a German patriot. The SFIO’s resistance-era leader, Daniel Mayer, retrospectively endorsed Schumacher’s self-depiction:

...the Socialists did not accept that Schumacher, after the Second World War, would not accept that a democratic Germany be humiliated. That is what one call[ed] nationalism, but in reality it is a form of patriotism and the identification of the working class with the nation.72

Regardless if we find Schumacher’s distinction between nationalism and patriotism convincing, Schumacher gained legitimacy for his point within the tradition of international socialism. In fact, he found historical legitimacy within the canons of the French Socialist Party. He quoted the martyred French Socialist leader Jean Jaurès ad nauseum to demonstrate that his policies were consistent with international socialism. Schumacher distinguished “patriotism” from “nationalism,” a distinction that had a long history: Jean Jaurès in 1911 declared the claim of the Communist Manifesto that the workers had no country to be “nonsense.” Famously he wrote that:

69 Ramuschkat, *op. cit.*, 38. Paterson’s account is discussed in Ramuschkat.
71 Ramuschkat, *op. cit.*, 37.
...a bit of internationalism distances one from the country (patrie), a lot of internationalism returns one to it. A bit of patriotism distances one from the International; a lot of patriotism returns one to it.73

According to Jaurès, patriotism was a positive attribute for a Socialist, whereas nationalism was degrading and dangerously tied to militarism. Jaurès’ position did much to shape the language of French socialist internationalism that Schumacher himself appropriated. Most French Socialists viewed themselves as the inheritors of the French revolutionary tradition and believed that republican universalism made French republicanism central to internationalism. The SPD, on the other hand, as the largest Socialist party of Europe during the Kaiserreich, made equal claims for the mantle of internationalism. In light of the social accomplishments of the early Republic, the SPD argued that the defense of the Weimar state meant as well the defense of socialism and the working class, which was being progressively integrated into the German nation despite conservative and völkisch efforts to exclude them.74

An examination of Schumacher’s policies and demeanor with definitions of “nationalism” in the scholarly literature leaves an ambiguous picture. The first challenge is that there is no consensus on what “nationalism” means, and scholars of nationalism stress that it is more appropriate to speak of “nationalisms.” It is highly questionable whether Schumacher falls under Karl Deutsch’s definition:

Nationalism is a state of mind which gives “national” messages, memories, and images a preferred status in social communication and a greater weight in the making of decisions. A nationalist gives preference in attention, transmission, and communication to those messages which carry specific symbols of nationality, or which originate from a specific national source, or which are couched in a specific national code of language or culture. If the greater attention and the greater weight given to such messages is so large as to override all other messages, memories, or images, then we speak of nationalism as “extreme.”75

An examination of Schumacher’s speeches shows that ideas, memories and images derived from the socialist international tradition were prominent in his rhetoric. The question then turns on whether “nationally”-derived ideas were the determinant factors in SPD decisions. According to Peter Alter, “Current linguistic usage defines ‘nationalists’ as people whose action or reasoning gives indiscriminate precedence to the interest of one nation (usually their own) over those of

other nations, and who are prepared to disregard those others for the sacrosanct honour of their own nation.”

It is clear that the SPD under Schumacher did place certain domestic interests above French claims for security, but the following analysis suggests that the party’s decisions were hardly “indiscriminate” and that “disregard” is too strong a term to adequately denote the SPD’s response to French security claims.

“Nationalism” as an explanatory factor is not a particularly useful frame of analysis for policy-making in the SPD after WWII. As political practitioners, SPD leaders often had to make choices when presented with sets of conditions that placed different policy goals in opposition to one another. The same held true for the SFIO, as it does for all political parties that seek not only to claim, but also to exercise power. Struggles over material resources can be understood as examples of “nationalist” claims. However, those who suffered most acutely during the periodic coal shortages of 1944-1951 were the poor and working classes of both countries. The coal for French heat had to come largely from the Ruhr, but the Germans needed this coal for heating as well. Is it not reasonable to consider SFIO and SPD efforts to attain sufficient coal so as to ensure lower heating prices for working-class consumers “socialist” policies as well? In that case, as both parties were pursuing the same “socialist” goal of cheap coal for domestic heat within their nations, this would lead them inevitably into conflict with one another. Is it proper to consider “nationalism” a causative factor if both of these parties at times prioritized the health and welfare of their own poor above the more abstract efforts for Franco-German reconciliation? My point is that scholars should not be so quick to apply pejorative labels without considering the range of interacting political priorities that the parties were pursuing simultaneously. This chapter focuses on the SFIO’s support for the Monnet industrialization plan, and the SPD’s

77 If one judges the characteristics of nationalism by Umut Ozkirimli’s criteria, the term “nationalism” does not appear to apply to Schumacher. The “discourse of nationalism” was not central to Schumacher’s public reasoning. Schumacher did not claim and it is doubtful that he thought that, “the interest and values of the nation override all other interests and values.” Schumacher certainly did not “regard the nation as the only source of legitimacy.” Though Schumacher often “operate[d] through binary divisions—between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ ‘friends’ and ‘foes,’” he was as likely to counter “Socialist” or “Social Democrat” and “bourgeois” or “capitalist” as he would “German” and “foreigner.” See Umut Ozkirimili, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, 2nd Edition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Schumacher conforms to some of the definitions of “nationalism” in a work by Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski and Andrezej Marcin Suszycki but not to others. It would be accurate to describe Schumacher as having the “sentiment of belonging to the nation and [displaying a] readiness to sacrifice [himself] for its well-being, security and social welfare” but he did not display “a nationalist ideology based on a definition of the genealogy of the nation, [and] the core narratives of national identity,” though he did present “the political preferences of the nation [as he conceived them, my addition] and the present state of the nation in relation to other nations, as well as suggestions for the way in which national goals could be realised.” Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski and Andrezej Marcin Suszycki, The Nation and Nationalism in Europe: An Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011).
policies in the Ruhr, the center of postwar West German heavy industry, to explain the context within which the SFIO and SPD came into conflict on the politics of European heavy industry, and why, despite this lack of agreement, the label “nationalist” is inappropriate.

Considering the central place that the mine basin and steel industry of the Ruhr had in the eventual breakdown of SFIO and SPD relations, it is rather surprising that historians have not investigated the impact of the Ruhr SPD on postwar SPD policy-making. As the following discussion makes clear, the regional politics of the Ruhr were central to SPD national policies on coal and steel integration. In order to understand how the politics of heavy industry played out in postwar relations between French Socialists and German Social Democrats, it is necessary to first examine the fraught legacy bequeathed to them by the interwar dispute between the French and German governments on reparations, which led to a nearly two-year occupation of the Ruhr territory by French and Belgian military forces in 1923-24.

2.3 FRENCH SOCIALISTS, GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND THE LEGACY OF THE 1923-24 MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE RUHR

Scholars have generally considered the SFIO to have been the postwar Western European Socialist party most dedicated to the principle of internationalism. Claims that the SFIO also demonstrated “nationalist” attitudes and policies generally focus on the period following the Schuman Plan’s ratification, especially on the colonial policies of Mollet’s 1956-1958 government. Although the party supported a forceful defense of certain national interests in Allied negotiations, the SFIO position remained consistent in 1945-1951. Rather, diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and Great Britain, and the lonely domestic opposition offered by the SFIO had reduced the French government’s demands on the German question to the core of French and SFIO claims on the Ruhr region. Unlike the interwar and initial postwar period, the SFIO and the French government now pursued policies that were, with important nuances, largely in tandem with one another.

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As discussed below, the crux of the SFIO and SPD rhetorical dispute over the Ruhr came down to whether one considered the French policies from 1948 to 1950 that culminated in French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman’s proposal for the supranational integration of European heavy industry to be a break (tournant) from the traditional French thesis on the German question or, rather, its continuation in European disguise. Overhanging the dispute that developed on this question from 1948 to 1951 were memories and narratives from the 1923 French occupation of the Ruhr territory. Although German Social Democrats publicly evoked the occupation of the Ruhr only on occasion, it is clear that the occupation directly informed SPD considerations of postwar French proposals at the national and local levels. The bitter memory of the social, economic and political cataclysm of 1923-24 framed the inter-party dispute of 1948-1951.

The SFIO evoked its forceful condemnation of Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré’s decision to invade and occupy the Ruhr in 1923 as proof of the party’s internationalist credentials. SFIO parliamentary leader Léon Blum was the most prominent French politician to oppose the Ruhr invasion.79 The French Socialist Party organized protests in France against the Ruhr invasion, welcomed SPD leaders to Paris, and called for an immediate withdrawal and an agreement with Germany to create a reparations schedule that the German government would be capable of following without crippling the German economy.80 Postwar SFIO narratives of the errors of the interwar period competed with other narratives in France that claimed that the rise of Nazism was the result of a weakening of French intransigence. A number of postwar right-wing French politicians assigned the fault for the French defeat of 1940 to the cartel des gauches government’s decision in 1924-25 to abandon Poincaré’s occupation policy and engage in a period of détente with the German government. The SFIO’s postwar position, on the other hand, reflected its continued opposition to the 1923 invasion. For the SFIO, the pernicious consequences of the Ruhr invasion spoke for themselves. SFIO leaders, in fact, were unlikely to disagree with SPD Economics Minister of North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) Erik Nölting’s claim

79 The French Socialist and French Communist parties were the only parties to vote in opposition to the Ruhr invasion in the National Assembly when it began. Thomas Raithel, Das schwierige Spiel des Parlamentarismus: Deutscher Reichstag und französicher Chambre des Deputés in den Inflationskrisen der 1920er Jahre (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 368-71.
that the French invasion offered Hitler’s movement its “starting chance.”

In announcing his party’s opposition to the Ruhr Statute of 1948, the SPD’s factional leader in NRW, Fritz Henssler, warned that the consequence of the statute would likely be “the danger of increasing nationalism” for which “the experiences of the year 1923, the year of the Ruhr invasion, [offer] an extraordinarily good lesson.”

It is useful to take a brief excursion back to 1923-24 to examine how many of the defining features of the postwar SFIO-SPD dialogue on heavy industry resulted from SPD leaders’ interpretations of the catastrophic impact that the Ruhr invasion had had on the Ruhr working classes and residents, on the SPD and, ultimately, on the Weimar Republic itself. To do so, it is necessary also to consider the reactions of the largest trade union federation, the SPD-aligned Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (ADGB). I briefly examine the causes, the social impact, the roles of the SPD and the ADGB in the Ruhr struggle, and the outcome and consequences of the French invasion in order to demonstrate how these events directly informed SPD analyses of French proposals on the Ruhr from 1948 to 1951.

The official French government position in 1923 was that, if the Treaty of Versailles was to have any meaning at all, the German government could not be permitted to systematically violate its obligations to deliver coal and reparations to France. The French government’s demands came in the context of an insistence by the United States government that the Allies pay back their war debts regardless of the successful collection of reparations from the defeated powers. Seemingly abandoned by its U.S. and British allies, French leaders worried that, just five years after the end of the war, they would soon find themselves alone facing a revanchist Germany freed from the strictures placed on it following the war. Announcing that French troops were moving to occupy the Ruhr, French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré told the French
Assembly that, “We will extract coal, that is all.”\textsuperscript{83} From its inception, international opinion suspected that Poincaré’s government harbored secret aims beyond those made in public. Historians continue to debate whether the Ruhr occupation was a defensive maneuver by the French government to fulfill the legal provisions of the Versailles Treaty and meet U.S. demands for a repayment of war loans, or rather an offensive assault to go beyond Versailles and permanently cripple the German economy and government.\textsuperscript{84}

In November 1947, NRW factional leader Fritz Henssler recalled that the Ruhr occupation “brought unheard of sacrifices for the workers.”\textsuperscript{85} The social catastrophe that accompanied the French occupation in 1923-24 remained permanently engrained in the region as a mythology of working-class martyrdom for the national interest. Ruhr workers were bitter towards the French government even before the Ruhr invasion: in order to meet reparation quotas, coal miners had been working extra shifts from 1920 to 1922 “at an appalling cost to their own health and that of the mining communities.”\textsuperscript{86} As an industrial region chronically dependent on an enormous amount of food imports from other regions, hunger and malnutrition had been a defining feature of daily life in the Ruhr at the end of the First World War. French occupation authorities in 1923 set up a customs border to isolate the Ruhr from the rest of Germany, an isolation that was further exacerbated by the ubiquitous transport disruptions that resulted from the German campaign to disrupt the French authorities. By the summer of 1923 starvation threatened the Ruhr. Panicked workers sent their children to other German regions,


\textsuperscript{84} Klaus Schwabe argues that the French Ruhr action was “not the expression of a hegemonic effort, but rather the reflex of a deep-seated French insecurity regarding the long-term development of French-German relations.” Klaus Schwabe, “Grossbritannien und die Ruhrkrise,” in Schwabe, ed., \textit{Die Ruhrkrise}, 61. Jacques Bariéty, on the other hand, asserts that reparations were “only a piece of the economic holistic conception of the Versailles Treaty” and that the French government was in effect pursuing a goal from the Versailles negotiations that had not attained the support of the U.S. or Great Britain. He writes that, “Much more encompassing and deep-reaching was the intention of the economic concept to fundamentally change over the long term the structure of the German economy through a considerable weakening of the productive capacity of its iron industry.” Bariéty, “Die französische Politik in der Ruhrkrise,” in Schwabe, ed., \textit{Die Ruhrkrise}, 12-13. Wolfram Fischer leaves the question open. Wolfram Fischer, “Wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen des Ruhrkonflikts,” in Schwabe ed., \textit{Die Ruhrkrise}, 96. An important corollary to this effort was, as Felten demonstrates, the French occupation authority’s efforts to encourage movements favoring separatism from the German central government along the Rhine. Franz J. Felten, “Frankreich am Rhein—eine ergänzende Einleitung,” in Franz J. Felten, ed., \textit{Frankreich am Rhein—von Mittelalter bis heute} (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2009), 31-35.


\textsuperscript{86} Conan Fischer, \textit{The Ruhr Crisis, 1923-1924} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 17.
household supplies of coal for cooking and heat ran short, and workers began plundering wood and food from the surrounding countryside to support their desperate families.\(^{87}\) Weakened by malnutrition, disease swept through the SPD stronghold of Dortmund, disproportionately afflicting the elderly and children.\(^{88}\) The Ruhr region, despite the demographic and migratory upheaval of the National Socialist period, continued to carry the physical and psychological scars of the French invasion for decades to come. It was a defining experience for the generation of SPD leaders who sought to attain power in the Ruhr during the postwar period.

The interwar SPD leadership viewed the Ruhr conflict through the prism of working-class suffering for the German nation as a whole. SPD propaganda pamphlets from the period constructed a mythology celebrating the Ruhr workers’ struggle. As an historian has noted, the “burdens” of the passive resistance campaign launched in the Ruhr by the German government “were to be borne by the Republic’s grass-roots supporters.”\(^{89}\) The SPD newspaper Vorwärts compared Poincaré’s actions to the policy of King Louis XIV. The party, though, was also the most forceful advocate in the Reichstag for proactive proposals to end the crisis through negotiations that would lift the occupation, satisfy French security concerns, and achieve a compromise on French reparations demands. In a series of crisis meetings, SFIO and SPD leaders met with other Socialist parties to craft their own proposal for reparations, which they then presented to their home parliaments and governments.\(^{90}\)

To Poincaré’s surprise, among the fiercest opponents of the Ruhr invasion were the SPD and the ADGB union. With the German government’s encouragement, the Ruhr miners rose against the French occupation and the German government left it to the ADGB to channel these sentiments into a passive resistance campaign to block coal extraction designated for export to France. The SPD and ADGB were, in effect, at war with the French occupation authority’s program for the Ruhr, while they also denounced violence and sought to avoid armed confrontations between workers and French troops. They largely succeeded in these efforts, but they could not prevent incidents such as one at the Krupp works in Essen in which French troops fired on workers, killing thirteen and wounding twenty-five. Miners took it upon themselves to guard pits outside their working hours to prevent coal from leaving the mines. ADGB leader

\(^{87}\) Fischer, op cit., 108.
\(^{88}\) In 1912, the SPD won 44.5% of the vote in Dortmund. Günther Högl, “Zur Biographie und zum Nachlass,” in Högl and Borisch, eds., 19; Fischer, op cit., 115.
\(^{89}\) Fischer, op cit., 2, 39.
\(^{90}\) Feucht, op cit., 221-304.
Theodor Leipart and SPD leaders Rudolf Breitscheid and Hermann Müller called for negotiations but opposed any capitulation to the French government. As Ruhr industrialists increasingly sought an accommodation with French authorities, SPD leaders accused them of betraying the Ruhr workers. Henssler made this claim again in 1947, claiming that the “large property owners were splendidly remunerated” and “used the achievement of the German people to undermine the Republic.”

The Ruhr occupation ended in disaster for both the French and German governments. The French government found itself forced by international pressures to retreat from its hard-line demands and the German government, while perhaps the moral victor, faced the devastating social and political consequences of having financed its passive resistance campaign through a policy of inflation, a policy the repercussions of which shook the foundations of the Republic. As Henssler later recalled, perhaps the worst hit of all was the Ruhr industrial working classes. Not only had they had to endure the humiliation of daily life under occupation and the full impact of food shortages, but the end of the Ruhr occupation in 1924 signaled a renewed employer assault on the social and economic gains that workers had attained during the German Revolution of 1918-20. Evoking the need to satisfy Allied and German coal requirements and to ensure the financial health of the battered mining industry, the government sanctioned the owners’ efforts to shed the constraints of the constitutionally-mandated eight-hour day. Conditions continued to deteriorate in the mines through 1924, wages increasingly lagged behind inflation, and a wave of bitter strikes and lockouts pitted owners and workers against each other. In the aftermath of the Ruhr invasion, Ruhr industrial owners succeeded in making the Stinnes-Legien accords of 1919, the signature labor achievement of the German Revolution, a dead letter and forced a return to the working practices of the pre-First World War era.

91 Fischer, op cit., 49, 58, 155, 165, 182-83.
93 Fischer, op cit., 271-4, 292. Hans Mommsen, “Die Bergarbeiterbewegung an der Ruhr, 1918-1933,” in Jürgen Reulecke, ed., Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Rheinland-Westfalen (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer, 1974), 306. The Stinnes-Legien Accords was a compromise between ADGB leader Carl Legien, the newspaper empire magnate Alfred Hugenberg, and German industrialists Hugo Stinnes and Carl Friedrich von Siemens in which the trade unions agreed to work to end strikes, limit the role of factory councils, and work against the nationalization of industries in exchange for a 40-hour work week, the recognition of the trade unions as the sole representative of workers, and mediated arbitration to end any disputes between labor and management.
The SPD emerged from the Ruhr crisis a wounded party. Realizing that the passive resistance campaign had led to a stalemate along the Rhine, the SPD joined Gustav Stresemann’s unity government, which had formed to oversee international negotiations and to end the resistance campaign. Under attack from its left and right in the months to follow, the SPD created a pretext to exit Stresemann’s government. The SPD fared especially poorly in the subsequent 1924 national elections. As Conan Fischer writes, “this left Germany’s republican Socialists almost pathologically reluctant to assume governmental responsibility again.” Memories of this experience, as well as of the “toleration policy” of the SPD towards Heinrich Brüning’s government in 1930-32, did much to strengthen Schumacher’s case following the 1949 Bundestag election that the SPD should avoid joining any coalition in which it was not the leading political force.

The political climate following 1924 was even worse for the SPD in the Ruhr. Despite decades of effort, the SPD and ADGB had been unable to win the loyalty of more than a plurality of the Ruhr’s industrial workers. Steeped in a Catholic tradition, the Ruhr was the heart of the labor wing of the Center Party and tensions had often been sharp between the social democratic and catholic trade unions. After the formation of the German Communist Party (KPD), the SPD had an additional rival in the Ruhr. The KPD had been able to gain a foothold in the Ruhr with the militant offensive that it launched from its base in Essen against Wolfgang Kapp’s attempted right-wing coup in 1920. Nonetheless, other than significant support in some of the metal unions, the KPD remained hopelessly outmatched in the Ruhr until the French invasion of 1923. From the start of the occupation, local KPD activists encouraged the Ruhr workers to abandon the passive resistance campaign of the official unions and to engage in militant resistance to the French occupation. The KPD sought to claim the leadership of wildcat strikes, often launched out of desperation. Although the SPD’s inclusion in Stresemann’s cabinet served to calm labor unrest on the national level, it had far less of an impact in the Ruhr. As the ADGB sought to maintain a moderate campaign against the occupation, it found itself under constant harassment from KPD activists eager to channel the harsh material circumstances and sense of affronted national pride towards its revolutionary program. When the SPD and the

95 Fischer, op cit., 261, 292.
97 Thirty percent of all KPD trade union members were in the metal industries, 12% were in the building and only 7% in the mining industries. Ibid., 328.
government called an end to the passive resistance campaign, the KPD responded with mass protests across the Ruhr. A miniscule force in 1922, the KPD now presented a formidable challenge to the SPD’s position in the Ruhr.

The 4 May 1924 Dortmund election, the first in which Henssler participated, revealed how the occupation had upended the political constellation of the Ruhr. The KPD won 29.4% of the vote in Dortmund, becoming the strongest party, while the SPD won a meager 16.2%, its worst result in decades. In the 1930 national elections, the Ruhr was the strongest area of KPD support in Germany, and the party won 17.3% in the territory that became NRW after the Second World War. At the same time, the ADGB experienced a hemorrhage in the factory council elections from 1929 to 1931, with the KPD-aligned Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (RGO) reaping the benefits. As the Weimar Republic began to disintegrate and voters fled moderate parties in favor of the far left and right, the KPD defeated the SPD and its other rivals by wide margins in the 31 July 1932 elections in the cities of Dortmund, Herne, Castrop-Rauxel, Gelsenkirchen and Wattenscheid. In the November 1932 elections, it surpassed the Center Party as well to become the strongest party in the Ruhr territory for the first and only time in its history.

In light of events in the Ruhr in the decade from 1923 to 1933, one can well understand the explanation Ollenhauer gave to the SPD Central Committee in June 1948 for the SPD’s decision to reject the CDU’s call for a united campaign against the Ruhr Statute. Such an accord would mean, he said, that Germany would be “brought into the same situation that we once experienced in 1923 during the Ruhr struggle, and German Social Democracy is not prepared to

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98 Fischer, *op cit.*, 198, 206, 215-17, 229.
99 KPD deputies in the city assembly mercilessly attacked the SPD. Though the SPD rebounded later that year to 27.9% (the KPD winning 17.7%), the KPD had demonstrated that in times of crisis it message appealed to disillusioned SPD voters. Having won only 1.7% in the 1920 elections in the area that later encompassed NRW, the KPD won 18.1% in May 1924, before sinking to 12.2% in the December 1924 elections. The impact was even starker in the factory council elections, in which the unions competed to represent the workers in negotiations with management. In November 1925, the ADGB lost its plurality to the Christian democratic union because the KPD union achieved a staggering 35% of the vote. In the late 1920s, the KPD and SPD share of the vote stabilized. The Ruhr KPD had incontrovertibly become a threat to the SPD in the Ruhr, in some cases surpassing the SPD vote in communal elections in key industrial cities like Gelsenkirchen. Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 20; Martin Marty, “Arbeiterbewegung an Rhein und Ruhr vom Scheitern des Räte- und Sozialisierungsbewegung bis zum Ende der letzten parlamentarischen Regierung der Weimarer Republik (1920-1930),” in Reulecke, ed., 248.
take a position that would please only one party in Germany, namely the Communists, who seek to operate a nationalist policy in the western zones.”

2.4 THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE POLITICS OF THE RUHR TERRITORY, 1945-1948

The Ruhr occupation and the bitter struggle between the SPD, KPD, and the Center Party for the allegiance of the Ruhr working class were experiences that shaped the central goals and tactics of the SPD in the Ruhr after the Second World War. The overwhelming continuity in personnel between the inter- and postwar Ruhr SPD assured continuity as well in outlook and policy. Quite often SPD leaders emerged from the silence and “hibernat[ion]” of the Nazi period to reclaim positions at all levels of the SPD local organizations, and gained appointments to formerly-held administrative posts. In the large territorial unit formed by the British called North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), the SPD sent to its newly established regional parliament (Landtag) a leadership all of whom had exercised political functions for the SPD prior to 1933. Not only the leaders, but 93% of the Ruhr SPD delegates in total had been members of the Weimar-era SPD.

Important SPD politicians in the post-war NRW political scene included NRW Interior Minister Walter Menzel, and NRW Economics Minister Erik Nölting. Most prominent of all was Fritz Henssler, the head of the SPD faction in the NRW Landtag, the mayor of Dortmund, the most important industrial city in the Ruhr, chair of the Ruhr-based West-Westphalian SPD chapter, and chair of the British zonal council. Nölting and Menzel had both joined the SPD in 1921. In 1928 and 1932, Nölting was elected to the Prussian parliament; Menzel entered that parliament as well in 1931. Henssler had an even longer and more illustrious history within the SPD. He was reported by the police as an “agitator” prior to WWI for his socialist activities; in

102 SPD-PV Gemeinsame Sitzung von Parteivorstand und Parteiausschuss in Hamburg am 29. und 30. Juni 1948, Erich Ollenhauer (EO) 72, AdsD.
105 Other important SPD politicians included Alfred Dobbert, Robert Görlinger, Ernst Gnoss, Emil Gross, Heinrich Wenke, Viktor Agartz, Willi Eichler, the future NRW minister presidents Heinz Kühn and Fritz Steinhoff, and the Weimar-era member of the SPD leadership Carl Severing.
1921, he was elected to chair the West-Westphalian SPD chapter; in 1930, he entered the Reichstag.\textsuperscript{106} Henssler in particular is destined to play a central role in our story, as his influence on national SPD policy on the Schuman Plan has been overlooked. Not so his influence within the NRW and Ruhr SPD: regional historians have branded Henssler the “dominant figure in the Land” for the SPD, “the ‘central figure’ of the political reconstruction of the Ruhr territory,” and the “most high-profile and influential politician among the leadership of the NRW SPD,” who “in international political questions could be [considered] the speaker for the entire Ruhr territory.”\textsuperscript{107}

Henssler’s biography offers intriguing parallels with SPD leader Kurt Schumacher. Both had been active in the anti-Nazi Iron Front (as had Menzel as well), and both experienced arrest and imprisonment for their resistance activities during the 1930s. They each spent almost ten years in Nazi concentration camps and emerged from the war with chronic physical afflictions and illnesses that contributed to their early deaths: Schumacher died in 1952 and Henssler in 1953. Both used the moral authority that they gained from resistance as a catapult to leadership within the first months of peace. At the same time, neither spoke in public about their experiences in the concentration camps.\textsuperscript{108} Henssler was welcomed back to Dortmund in June 1945 and received stormy applauses similar in enthusiasm to those that greeted Schumacher at nearly all party meetings and speeches. In August 1945, Henssler was elected again to head the West-Westphalian SPD chapter. By the fall, he was the preeminent SPD politician in the NRW area. Like Schumacher, Henssler was renowned for his “brilliance” but also for an “authoritarian leadership style.”\textsuperscript{109} That Henssler’s thinking was shaped, like Schumacher’s, by a determination to avoid the stigma of “November criminals” that had stained the interwar SPD is clear from the title of one of his writings from May 1945: “No more November 1918.”\textsuperscript{110}

What influence did the NRW SPD and, in particular, the Ruhr SPD have within the national leadership? Schumacher is reputed to have paid relatively little attention in general to regional politics except when policies at the regional level contradicted national party goals.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{106} Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 18.
\textsuperscript{107} Düding, 31; Hans Peter Ehni, “Der Wiederaufbau der SPD nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Reulecke, ed., 427; and Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 32.
\textsuperscript{108} Högl and Bohrisch, eds., 6.
\textsuperscript{109} Günther Högl, “Zum Biographie und zum Nachlass,” in Högl and Bohrisch, eds. 31-32.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 27.
However, the Ruhr territory was one of the most concentrated areas of the industrial working classes in all of Europe, and the SPD’s traditional weakness there had long been an embarrassment to the party.  With the loss of the industrial region of Silesia in the Allied Yalta agreements and with Thuringia and Saxony falling within the Soviet zone, the SPD had lost a great reservoir of votes that had allowed the SPD to become such a powerful political force prior to the rise of Nazism. As a consequence, the Ruhr gained even greater sentimental and tactical importance for a Social Democratic Party eager to fashion a majority in West Germany. Scholars have pointed out that the SPD’s efforts to “open” to the middle classes failed during the late 1940s. Less attention has been paid to the party’s sustained and forceful effort to create a SPD hegemony among the workers of the Ruhr and thereby give credence to the party’s claim to represent the German working class. While the proportion of workers in the SPD membership averaged 45% nationally, in Dortmund and Gelsenkirchen it was 60%; in Bochum and Witten the proportion reached 70%. Among SPD candidates for local positions, 30-50% were workers, most of whom were miners; an additional 20-30% were employees.

The NRW and Ruhr SPD were also positioned to exercise power within the national party. Seven members of the NRW Landtag also held posts in the SPD Central Committee: Fritz Henssler, Ernst Gnoss, Roger Görlinger, Emil Gross, Walter Menzel, Willi Eichler and Viktor Agartz. Henssler’s SPD chapter in the Ruhr had the largest membership of all of the SPD’s 23 chapters in the western zones, making it the largest voting bloc in party congresses as well. From his base in Dortmund and NRW, Henssler became one of the most influential of all postwar SPD politicians.

While historians have granted much attention to Schumacher’s opponents among the SPD’s “regional princes,” few have pointed out that the SPD in West Germany’s largest region, NRW, and the strongest SPD local chapter, West-Westphalia, located in the Ruhr Valley, were among Schumacher’s most adamant supporters. The regional and local chapters had warm

113 Vardys, op. cit., 233.
114 Pietsch, op. cit., 207, 213.
115 Felten, op. cit., 65.
117 For examples of scholars’ focus on Schumacher’s opponents rather than supporters, see Edinger, op cit., 128-136; Orlow, Common Destiny, 56-57, 175; and William E. Paterson, “The German Social Democratic Party,” 438-40.
relations with Schumacher as soon as they learned of his positions and campaign for leadership in August 1945. As the local chapters began to reconstitute themselves, Henssler’s subordinate, Heinrich Wenke, the chapter undersecretary for Dortmund, served as a vital link with Schumacher’s Hannover office, and distributed its literature to the local Ruhr chapters. The West-Westphalian chapter supported Schumacher’s leadership claims “as self-evident,” one historian notes. When he spoke to the West-Westphalia chapter congress in November 1945, he received an emotional and enthusiastic response from local party members. Schumacher remained extraordinarily popular in the Ruhr for the rest of his career.

The Ruhr-based SPD did not support Schumacher because of an attitude of subservience. The personality and strength of its leader, Henssler, precluded this possibility. Henssler was no less single-minded or assertive than Schumacher’s regional opponents, perhaps even more so than Schumacher himself. Rather, Henssler and the great majority of local politicians supported Schumacher because his policies were almost completely in line with their own conceptions.

Probably the most important factor in the community of interests between the Hannover leadership and Ruhr SPD was a determination in the short term to prevent all cooperation between the SPD and the KPD and, over the long term, to eradicate Communist influence from the western zones. As grass-roots Antifascist Committees (Antifas) sprang up in early postwar Germany and a number of local-based politicians, especially in eastern and southern Germany, declared themselves in favor of creating a “Socialist Unity Party” (Sozialistische Einheitspartei), Schumacher made the struggle to maintain the SPD’s independence the centerpiece of his campaign for leadership in the western zones. The history of the SPD in the years 1945-1946 is in large part the story of Schumacher’s gradual victory over the unity-minded SPD leadership from the Soviet Zone.

The Ruhr SPD emerged from World War II ready to recommence its Weimar-era battle against the KPD. A bastion of the SPD right under Weimar, none of the post-WWII Ruhr SPD leadership belonged to the SPD left. Henssler had been particularly active in the anti-KPD struggle in the Ruhr. In 1920, as the KPD launched strikes throughout the territory, Henssler wrote to the Hermann Müller government demanding that it employ soldiers to crush the

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118 Felten, *op cit.*, 166.
119 Hans Peter Ehni writes that, “The circulars of the West-Westphalian district...make clear that Schumacher’s position against the Communists was taken up without any fundamental critique.” Reulecke, ed., 436.
120 Felten, *op cit.*, 155.
“terrorist minority” until “the last man of the red bands [were] disarmed.”121 In the months following Germany’s defeat in WWII, antifascist committees sprang up across the Ruhr territory, establishing bases in the key cities of Bochum, Dortmund, and Essen. Although the occupation authorities ordered these dissolved as alleged communist-front organizations, the KPD claimed the mayorship of Wattenscheid and achieved important posts in the communal administrations of Bochum, Dortmund, Essen, Gelsenkirchen, and Herne. At first, SPD activists in the Ruhr seemed divided about how to react to KPD overtures and a number of local officials seemed all too eager to collaborate with Communists in 1945. As Schumacher worked to suppress such efforts throughout the western zones, the West-Westphalian leadership, without needing any prompt from Schumacher’s Hannover office, forcefully clamped down on unity efforts in its territory.122 Only in Bochum and the Ruhr-neighboring city of Düsseldorf were there aborted attempts to create a “Union of Socialists.”123

Henssler used the full weight of his influence to support Schumacher’s anti-unity position. Both men had reason to worry at that time about the KPD. The Ruhr territory appeared to be fertile ground for a Communist renaissance in 1945-46. The KPD had not only been the strongest party in the Ruhr at the end of the Weimar Republic, it had also been the most active resistance party during the Nazi period and the most successful at distributing propaganda through its underground network.124 The KPD presented a formidable challenge to the SPD in the Ruhr, the most formidable, in fact, of any region in the western zones.125

121 Düding, op cit., 65.
122 Felten, op cit., 110-17, 134, 136.
123 The continued collaboration between Social Democrats and Communists in Duisburg was an increasingly lonely endeavor. Wenke, who denounced unity efforts in August 1945, demanded that any such initiative receive the chapter’s approval, which would surely not be forthcoming. Wenke wrote Schumacher in September that his chapter fundamentally mistrusted the Communists. At the first large party congress of the SPD in the western zones from 5-6 October in Wennigsen, the West-Westphalian SPD was among the most aggressive in denouncing unity efforts throughout Germany. Ulrich Borsdorf, “Der Weg zur Einheitsgewerkschaft,” in Reulecke, ed., 433; and Felten, op cit., 160.
125 In December 1946, the KPD had 50,596 members in the Ruhr to the SPD’s 83,317. Almost all of the KPD members in the NRW Land were from the Ruhr territory. In the 1947 NRW land elections, the KPD won more than 20% of the vote in 14 NRW cities, most of which were in the Ruhr. In Bochum the KPD tied the SPD vote of 32%, allowing the CDU to reach a plurality. The ostracism practiced by the SPD, CDU and British military authorities dampened the impact of the KPD’s vote but the KPD still attained important posts throughout the Ruhr, while the SPD surpassed the CDU’s presence in official positions in 1946 to become the most influential party in the Ruhr by a small margin. Hans Peter Ehni, in Reulecke, ed., 417; Werner Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945: Wiederaufbau, Krise, Anpassung (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1984), 40; and Felten, op. cit., 194-95.
The SPD shared the prevailing view that the Communist success in the Ruhr territory was a direct result of the miserable working and living conditions in the area. Indeed conditions in the Ruhr were dismal. Food shortages became ubiquitous and daily average calorie intake fell to life-threatening levels. Food shortages became ubiquitous and daily average calorie intake fell to life-threatening levels. Wartime bombing also had a disproportionate impact on the Ruhr’s urban areas and destroyed much of the region’s working-class housing. In many of the Ruhr cities, half of pre-war housing lay in ruins. The large influx of expellees from the lost German Eastern provinces into NRW exacerbated the situation. Conditions continued to deteriorate over the next years. Heating, coal, and electrical shortages (in November 1946 the electrical supply covered only 30% of demand) made for dark and cold winters and combined to create an explosive social situation. Only over the course of 1948-49 did the food and electrical supply display marked improvement.

In the winter of 1947-1948, massive strikes and demonstrations broke out across the Ruhr. Although the strikers in 1947 demanded socialization and co-determination in industry, these strikes were in essence spontaneous, grass-roots hunger strikes with a political accent. The first protest broke out in Essen in February 1947. Its demands almost all related to the dire food situation. The strike aroused particular support in the mines. By March, tens of thousands of workers were demonstrating in each of the major Ruhr cities; in Duisburg the number reached 100,000. The NRW regional government and the British military occupation responded with a number of reforms. Nölting introduced a point rationing system for coal miners that assured

126 With the impact of the social unrest caused by food shortages during the First World War in mind, the Nazi government had taken great strides to ensure an adequate food supply for Germany’s cities during the war. As late as 1944-45, the rationing system provided an average consumption of 2,000 calories for Ruhr consumers. At the end of the war, rations were on average 1,200 calories, due primarily to the Allied bombing campaign of 1944-45, which targeted the rail system and destroyed the distribution network. The occupation authorities thrust responsibility for the rationing system into German, in fact, into SPD hands. NRW Economics Minister Erik Nölting became the target of popular frustration at the ineffective rationing system until the task moved to the CDU’s Hans Schlange-Schöningen. The targeted average ration of 1,500 calories was almost never achieved in practice from 1945 to 1948. In 1947, the average daily ration in the Ruhr sank to 750 calories. The SPD’s early association with the failures of the rationing system did much to tarnish the party’s image. The KPD’s greatest success in the 1947 NRW elections was in Bochum, a city that had the lowest daily calorie ration of any area of the Bizone in spring 1947, a meager 629. Coal workers scoured the countryside, often offering to trade coal for potatoes. Klessmann and Friedemann, op. cit., 22-24; Abelshauser, op. cit., 32, 40; and Brunn and Hobbing, eds., 82-84.

127 In fact, an overwhelming majority of the heavily and medium-damaged dwellings of the Bizone were in the NRW and, especially, in the Ruhr territory. Brunn and Hobbing, eds., op. cit.,16; Klessemann and Friedemann, op. cit., 25.

128 Klessemann and Friedemann, op. cit., 25.

129 Claudia Nölting, op. cit., 225, 236.

130 Abelshauser, op. cit., 71; and Claudia Nöling, op. cit., 239.

them a far higher ration than the rest of the population. These actions succeeded in quieting
the protest movement, but it broke out again in February 1948 as the Ruhr food supply reached
its nadir. Throughout the British zone, 1.6 million workers struck on 3 February. This time the
impetus came from the metal workers, rather than the miners.

The SPD recognized that hunger was driving workers to protest but it also interpreted the
strikes within the context of its own anti-Communist tradition and the escalating Cold War.
Though sympathetic to the strikers’ demands, it suspected that a “Communist orchestra director”
had provoked and was exploiting the 1948 strikes for the KPD’s own political designs. The
SPD press asked whether “One wishes to repeat the French and Italian experiments with internal
unrest in West Germany?” Historians have since shown that SPD claims of KPD subversion in
the strikes “belongs to the propaganda arsenal of the Cold War,” though Communists did lend
enthusiastic support to the strikes. The SPD feared that the strikes might grant the Communists a
propaganda coup and gain them greater traction within the trade union movement. The Social
Democratic-leaning leaders of the trade unions, while split over whether to support the 1947
strikes, were overwhelmingly hostile to their repetition in 1948. Within weeks of their
outbreak, Schumacher conferred with the trade union leadership, telling them that, “We are of
the opinion that the strikes under the current circumstances have no hope of success.”
The trade unionists agreed, with the head of the German trade union federation, re-christened the
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), Hans Böckler, announcing that the strikes would not
extract “one piece more of bread.”

The union leadership itself engaged in a battle to eliminate Communist influence from
the Ruhr mines and factories. The task was not easy. Communist power in the local Ruhr
unions made these the strongest bastion of KPD influence in the western zones from 1945 to

132 Claudia Nölting, op. cit., 36-37.
133 Klessmann and Friedemann, op. cit., 36.
134 Ibid., 58-59.
135 Ibid., 60.
136 Ibid., 50.
137 Ibid., 52, 55-56.
138 SPD Parteivorstand, 26 January 1948, AdSD.
139 Klessemann and Friedemann, op. cit., 75.
140 At the founding congress of the coal miner’s union (Industrieverbandes Bergbau) on 9 December 1946, the
Social Democrat August Schmidt only narrowly defeated Willi Agatz, the Communist candidate, for the leadership
of the miners’ union. Although the federal unions succeeded in blocking a Communist presence among their
leadership, the Communists were quite active and enjoyed wide support at the local levels. On the initiative of KPD
workers, local unions took up KPD-inspired resolutions and submitted them directly to municipal governments.
Borsdorf, op. cit., 401-2; and Felten, op. cit., 203.
1950. The union leadership faced the dilemma that the strike tactics that they rejected were popular beyond the ranks of the KPD. The DGB leaders had to make great exertions in order to reassert the prerogative of the federation over the local chapters to set strategy and tactics. They succeeded in defeating efforts to institutionalize decision-making autonomy for the local chapters, but the leaderships’ control over local actions was shaky throughout the territory and non-existent in parts of it. Future DGB leader Christian Fette sought to divert the workers’ anger towards the Communists at the DGB delegate conference of 30 January 1948. The food shortage, he told the assembly, was the consequence of the Soviet practice of exporting goods from its territory, but the delegates greeted this interpretation with “fierce protest.”

Although the non-Communist union leadership survived the crisis, the 1947 and 1948 strikes made apparent to all the limits of the federal unions’ power over their members.

In the context of its national campaign to eliminate Communist influence, the SPD leadership found the situation in the Ruhr unions intolerable. During the crisis, the factory councils throughout the Ruhr had acted as a counterweight to the unions’ efforts to end the strikes. As they had after the First World War, the union leadership regarded the factory councils with suspicion and as a threat to their own position and power. Unlike the SPD, the KPD had expended great efforts to win the factory council elections in the aftermath of WWII. Following the 1947 strikes, the SPD leadership, and the West-Westphalian SPD in particular, denounced the party’s “lethargy” in competing for these posts and undertook a decisive campaign to reclaim power in the councils from the KPD. By fall 1947, the party had groups operating in all the mines, though they were still outmatched by the KPD’s ground-level organization. There was a bitter struggle for power in the local mine unions for the next two years.

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141 Klessemann and Friedemann, op. cit., 61-63.
142 Ibid., 65.
143 In the September-October 1945 factory council elections, the KPD appears to have had a majority of the delegates; from 1946 to 1948, the KPD and SPD had an almost equal number of delegates. Pietsch, op. cit., 102-03; and Klesseman and Friedemann, op. cit., 68-70.
144 Klessemann and Friedemann, op. cit., 71. In the document “Sozialdemokratische Partei, Unterbezirk Dortmund, Betriebssekretariat 9.9.1947 Rundschreiben Nr 8/47,” Emil Emanuelsson (Betriebssekretär) writes that, “the KP(D) saw and carried through its most important work before 1933 in the mines. Their entire structure leads through the mines, through the factory council groups. The political organization is a factor of second rank for them. Their primary determination is the conquering of the factories. They have better discipline and for this reason their people are more active. Carefully regulated, until the last man they will lead and strictly and obstinately carry out the orders and instructions given from a central location...” In a circular the SPD West-Westphalian leadership instructed its officials in 1947 that, “The first task of the factory council groups is to eliminate the impact of Communist faction’s work through the enlightenment and activation of the social democratic council members.” in Ibid., 118-19; and Document “Sozialdemokratische Partei, Bezirk Westliches Westfalen Entwurf Richtlinien für die Arbeit der Betriebsgruppen” 21.3.1947, in Ibid., 114.
years. Aided by support from the occupation authorities, the CDU, and the propagandistic nightmare that the Berlin blockade brought upon the KPD, the SPD was able to deliver a decisive blow to the KPD in the factory council in 1949. Rapidly losing support at the federal level, the KPD never recovered.145

The SPD had attained its long-standing goal of becoming the dominant party in the Ruhr by the end of 1949. It is of vital importance for our understanding of SPD responses to various proposals for the Ruhr from 1948 to 1951 that they coincided with the SPD’s efforts to consolidate its gain in the territory. As such, the national SPD often became a mouthpiece for the interests of the local Ruhr SPD. The policies and temperament of Schumacher’s leadership circle and the Ruhr SPD were often indistinguishable from 1948 to 1951. The national SPD made the socialization of heavy industry the centerpiece of its campaign for Germany’s reconstruction.146 It did so due to party tradition and conviction, but in particular because it sought to represent the demands of the Ruhr working classes, mediated through the influence of the Ruhr SPD in the national party. Dramatic local events in the territory influenced SPD national policy.


A British military report from late 1945 laid bare the brewing conflict over socialization in the Ruhr: “Miners wish to eject all management as Nazis: however RCD (Ruhr Coal District. D.V.) [is] in favour of their retention as irreplaceable technical experts, who can obtain coal.”147 A campaign for the socialization of heavy industry swept through the mines and metal factories of the Ruhr from 1945 to 1948, and polls revealed majorities for socialization among the Ruhr population, and heavy majorities among workers.148 Much of the impetus for this wave resulted from workers’ desire to prevent the reconstruction of the “reactionary” system of industrial

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145 Having won 33% of the factory council mandates in 1948 to the SPD’s 36%, the KPD share sank to 27% to the SPD’s 42% in 1949. Ibid., 72. In the October 1948 local elections, the KPD won only 7.8% of the vote in NRW compared to 14% in the regional elections the previous year and suffered a significant loss of votes in the Ruhr. Pietsch, op. cit., 24. For Pietsch, the SPD organizational assault on the KPD was the “decisive” factor in these developments.

146 SPD leaders preferred the somewhat ambiguous term “socialization” to “nationalization,” in part because the latter term recalled the state-centered control apparatus of the Nazi period. Generally what SPD leaders meant by “socialization” was a balance of worker’s management with regional and national interest representatives.

147 Pietsch, op. cit., 106.

148 Abelshauser, op. cit., 30.
relations that the Ruhr industrialists had succeeded in (re)implanting in the Ruhr in the aftermath of the Ruhr occupation by the French government in the interwar period. Demands for the eviction of management were often the result of personal animosities, fueled by the frustrations of daily experiences. Ruhr industrial circles had secretly begun coordinating a strategy by late summer 1945 to reclaim their power and influence in the Ruhr mines and factories. The British military government vacillated as it sought to fashion its own policy for the region. The future of ownership in the Ruhr remained in doubt. After arresting over a hundred Ruhr industrialists and managers in 1946, British authorities allowed the old industrial families to reclaim the leadership of the holding societies of many Ruhr firms.¹⁴⁹ Ruhr workers were furious to learn that the names of industrialists such as Hermann Reusch and Günther Henle (the nephew of the deceased industrialist Peter Klöckner) were yet again being placed in positions that allowed them to rebuild their influence and claims to ownership.¹⁵⁰

Until 1951 the question of ownership of the Ruhr mines remained open.¹⁵¹ Resolving the conflict-ladden politics of the Ruhr became one of the principal tasks of the trizonal Parliamentary Council and of the national SPD. At the founding congress of the British zone DGB, the delegates approved a program calling for the socialization of heavy industry.¹⁵² As early as May 1946, a SPD office in Westphalia lamented the lack of zeal with which the de-Nazification committees engaged their task.¹⁵³ When the deliberately impotent de-Nazification law passed the NRW legislature on 29 April 1948, the SPD voted in opposition. A SPD deputy condemned the “failed” de-Nazification policies: “While a great number of fellow-travelers have been punished with the loss of their office and position, the truly guilty ones have not been

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 19-20.
¹⁵⁰ After protest strikes broke out in 1948, a trade union delegation turned to the SPD faction in the council to block the British from allowing Hermann Reusch to sit on the Iron and Steel Commission. The “Reusch” affair became one of the most divisive issues of the pre-parliamentary body, pitting the SPD against the CDU and FDP. Though Reusch himself had maintained distance from the Nazis, the local and national SPD considered the reappointment of compromised personnel to be symptomatic of a failed British de-Nazification program. Werner Bührer, *Ruhrstahl und Europa: Die Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie und die Anfänge der europäischen Integration, 1945-1952* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), 44-46. See also, S. Jonathan Wiesen, *West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
¹⁵¹ Sopade, 30 July 1947, “Gefahr für die Industrie,” EO 451, AdsD. The SPD national press took up the campaign to prevent former owners, such as M. C. Müller, the head of the Office for Steel and Iron, from returning to power and preventing the socialization of industry.
¹⁵³ This was the view of Alfred Gleisner. Klessmann and Friedemann, op. cit., 18. According to Pietsch, in the Ruhr cities 15-30% of civil servants, 10-30% of employees and 10% of workers were fired due to de-Nazification proceedings. Pietsch, op. cit., 76.
brought to justice.”154 The truly guilty ones, in SPD parlance, referred to influential figures in the economy who, in SPD narratives, were responsible for aiding and financing the rise of National Socialism.

While SPD leaders considered socialization a key step towards the “planned economy” that they wished to implement in Germany, their foremost concern was the political power fostered by economic concentration. The experience of Weimar directly informed the SPD viewpoint. NRW Economics Minister Nölting called the failure to socialize the Ruhr in 1918-19 a missed opportunity: “In my opinion Weimar in the end went the path of Golgotha because it was unable to solve the decisive problem of dissolving the power of private concentration and tearing down the State within the State” that resulted from such great economic power lying in private hands.155 In the internal discussions of the SPD’s socialization commission, Nölting returned to this argument, telling his colleagues that, “Our socialization has not only economic purposes, but also comes out of considerations of political power.”156 The lessons of history were equally important for Fritz Henssler, who called for socialization as early as May 1945. He told the West-Westphalian district congress that after the First World War, “we had perhaps not clearly enough recognized that the complete destruction of the power of large ownership (Grossbesitzes) was decisive for the implantation of democracy and that our argument at the time that one cannot socialize ruins appears to us today almost as a comfortable alibi.”157 The majority SPD (the SPD had experienced a schism during the First World War) and ADGB had in fact opposed socialization during the massive April 1919 miners’ strike. Only after the failure of the 1920 Kapp Putsch, by which time socialization had become politically impossible, did the SPD and ADGB shift gears and call for socialization in the Ruhr.158

The views of the regional leaders Nölting and Henssler fit quite well with those of the SPD national leadership. Often referring to the binds that tied heavy industry to the Wilhelmine state of the nineteenth century, Schumacher saw socialization as an historic duty for the party. His narrative of German history made this clear:

154 Düding, op. cit., 73-74.
155 Ibid., op. cit., 85.
156 Claudia Nölting, op. cit., 212.
Supported by the Prussian government, its officials and military, the Master-in-House [policy] was established. The trinity of throne, altar and money (*Geldsack*) became the strongest factor. For the entire period of the *Kaisserreich* industrial power was the real master of the country...One can say of the western German large industrialists that they were more rigid, harder, more violent and had less of a conscience than the exponents of the eastern-Elbe agrarian- and military feudalism, whose societal example they sought, like awkward *parvenus*, to copy.\textsuperscript{159}

By autumn 1946, Schumacher had designated two leading NRW officials, Nölting and Viktor Agartz, to collaborate in formulating a SPD proposal for the socialization of heavy industry.\textsuperscript{160} When the KPD preempted the SPD and offered a socialization bill to the NRW legislature in December 1946, Henssler wrote to Ernst Gnoss that the SPD must counter with its own proposal. In the 21 January 1947, NRW-SPD faction meeting, the group decided to present a proposal to transfer the coal, iron and steel industries into “collective property.” The SPD faction brought the law to the legislature on 29 July 1947, with the clear intention that a NRW socialization law would serve as a model and precedent for a national German government. NRW Minister President Karl Arnold of the CDU, who was close to Christian-democratic trade unions, worked to achieve consensus between the SPD and CDU, while Adenauer encouraged the NRW-CDU to employ tactics to delay a vote on the law.\textsuperscript{161} Over a year later, the socialization bill passed the NRW legislature with the votes of the Center, KPD, and SPD parties.

Under U.S. pressure, the British military authorities vetoed the bill, as they had in the SPD stronghold of Lower Saxony. Having defeated its Communist opponents, the SPD found the coalition of the CDU right and occupation authorities a far more formidable challenge to their designs for the Ruhr. In fact, the Ruhr and national SPD became increasingly strident by 1948 as the chances for a fundamental realignment of power in the Ruhr appeared to be escaping their grasps. The SPD deplored that the Allied de-concentration program seemed destined to leave property relations unreformed.\textsuperscript{162} Socialization remained a fundamental demand of the industrial unions as well.

As the fight to socialize Ruhr heavy industry continued to suffer defeats, the trade unions shifted to a strategy of trying to obtain as much power for workers’ representatives in the

\textsuperscript{159} “Rede des Vorsitzenden der SPD Dr. Schumacher am Donnerstag,” 13 February 1948, Kurt Schumacher 44, AdsD.
\textsuperscript{160} Claudia Nölting, *op. cit.*, 40.
\textsuperscript{161} Düding, *op. cit.*, 77-85.
\textsuperscript{162} For an overview of the relationship between the Allied governments and the Ruhr industrialists organized into the Wirtschaftsverein Eisen- und Stahlindustrie, see Werner Bührer, *Ruhrstahl und Europa*. 60
management of firms as possible. The postwar trade unions sought to reconstruct and deepen the “co-determination” (Mitbestimmung) institutions dismantled by the Nazis. In the interwar era, the social-democratic unions had at first kept their distance from the co-determination bodies guaranteed in the Weimar constitution. After the 1922 law assuring workers’ representation in the firms’ oversight boards passed the Reichstag, the ADGB warmed to the institution and, at its 1925 congress, called for an extension of co-determination powers and for “parity” between workers and employers. The federal union’s demand received a theoretical basis when Fritz Naphtali published his influential book, *Economic democracy—Its Essence, Path and Goal*, in 1928. In August 1946, the trade union conference of the British zone resurrected the demand for co-determination in industry. The primary thrust for the co-determination campaign came from the *IG Metall* union, which placed it at the center of its demands for a renovation of German industrial relations. The demand also surfaced in the protest strikes that broke out. In response, the British military government went part of the way to meet the unions’ demands in 1947/48, reestablishing a form of co-determination in 1947/48 for the iron industry as well as for the *Deutsche Kohlenbergbauleitung* (DKBL), a board set up to oversee the coal industry.

Wedded to the socialization campaign, the SPD leadership took up the call from their union allies for co-determination with some reluctance. The national SPD press called for co-determination and the building of an “economic democracy” in December 1946. Henssler announced his support of the co-determination strategy, but argued that it must include workers’ representatives from outside the industry being administered, in order to prevent the development of “group egoism” that might pit the workers and employers of one industry against those of another. After the British veto of the NRW socialization law, the SPD took the unions’ demands for co-determination to the NRW legislature where, after a year of bitter debate, it approved a co-determination law in summer 1949. Again the British military

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government vetoed the law. Blocked at the regional level by the military authorities, the SPD had to bring the co-determination campaign into the newly constituted Bundestag. As we shall see, the debate over the Schuman Plan would be conspicuously tied to the national fight over co-determination from 1950 to 1952.

Finally, the greatest threat of all to the Ruhr working class in the view of the SPD was the Allied dismantlement program. Erich Ollenhauer’s private notes reveal how memory from the recent past prompted the SPD leadership to consider dismantlements as an existential threat to the future of German democracy. He wrote that, “Dismantlements mean a serious crisis of confidence/Hopelessness for millions/Economic Crisis 1930/33 fertile soil for Nazis and KPD.” As the British plans for dismantlement began to take shape, Henssler and Nölting took on the task of defending their own. As early as February 1946, Henssler warned that the announced dismantlement of the Union and Hösch factories would be “for Dortmund—if not a death sentence, it would certainly mean a condemnation to a long-lasting infirmity [Siechtum].” Henssler was among the foremost advocates of a hard line on the dismantlement issue within the SPD. As chief intermediary between the NRW government and the British military authorities on economic issues, Nölting was the most important political figure working to mitigate the consequences of the dismantlement program.

In October and November 1947, Nölting and the SPD Central Committee worked in tandem to set SPD strategy in the campaign against dismantlements. Their responses mirrored one another: both placed ultimate blame for the dismantlements on the “criminal” policies of the Nazis, but also stressed that the program contradicted the aims of the recently announced Marshall Plan and was proof that the Allied policies lacked a “European spirit.” Revealing

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168 Düding, op. cit., 92-96.
169 Notes for speech 1947, EO 60, AdsD.
171 Düding, op. cit., 72.
172 When the British finally announced on 17 October 1947 their list of 681 factories to be dismantled, Nölting at first adopted delaying tactics. In his diary he laid out his strategy: “Play for time, don’t conjure any nationalism, cast doubt upon the capacity calculations, offer no objects for exchange.” In the next years, Nölting tirelessly assembled portfolios on employment and production statistics of the Ruhr factories and, with notable success, worked to convince the British to reduce their list of dismantlements. Düding writes that Nölting “put his stamp on the North-Rhine-Westphalian Anti-Dismantlement-Policy.” Düding, op. cit., 292-93. SPD Vice President of the NRW legislature and SPD central committee member Alfred Dobbert later said that, “It is thanks to Economics Minister Prof. Dr. Nölting that the struggle against the dismantlements ended with such a remarkable success.” Klessman and Friedemann, op. cit., 12-13; Claudia Nölting, op. cit., 243, 248, 257-67.
again the central place that the Ruhr and NRW had in SPD national policies, the SPD faction in the Economic Council demanded that the burden of dismantlement be shared equitably across the zones and not be focused disproportionately on NRW and the French zone.¹⁷⁴ Long absent from exercising direct influence on the policies for the Ruhr’s future, the negotiations to merge the French zone with the Anglo-American Bizone hinged in large part around the French government’s demand that it participate in Allied designs for the Ruhr. The assiduousness with which the French authorities pursued dismantlement in their largely agricultural zone augured poorly for a moderate policy in the Ruhr. As Schumacher never tired of noting, “the real impact of French dismantlements lies only slightly behind those of the Russian zone...”¹⁷⁵ The French government from 1948 on presented a new, and in the view of many in the SPD, the most formidable of all obstacles to the SPD policy on the Ruhr.

2.6 THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY, ECONOMIC SECURITY, AND FRENCH INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION, 1944-1948

Rooted as they were in domestic concerns, the SPD’s policies for the Ruhr put it on a collision course with its French fraternal party. As we shall see, the SFIO shared many of the SPD’s views on Ruhr policy, far more, in fact, than did any other French party. However, the Ruhr also conjured French Socialist fears rooted in national history and memory. Crucially, the Ruhr’s resources constituted a material necessity for French and French Socialist designs for a far-reaching industrial modernization program. As discussed above, historians for the most part concur that the SFIO was among the least “nationalist” and most “internationalist” of the postwar western European socialist parties.¹⁷⁶ No doubt the SFIO leadership’s rhetoric on international issues from 1948 to 1952 was generally far milder than that coming out of Schumacher’s Hannover circle. Examining the reasons for the SFIO’s program for the Ruhr, though, reveals

¹⁷⁴ Aktennotiz Fraktionssitzung Montag, den 27. Oktober 1947, 15 Uhr, Frankfurt, Gerhard Kreyssig 62, AdsD.
¹⁷⁵ Referat Dr. Schumacher auf der Redakteurkonferenz der Parteipresse am 30. November 1947 in Hannover, Schumacher 43, AdsD.
that the SFIO was also pursuing policies rooted in domestic political aims. Like the SPD, it seemed to the SFIO that the stakes in the dispute over the Ruhr could not be higher.

French Socialists, like their German counterparts, would never have conceded that their postwar policies on heavy industry represented “nationalist” claims. Historian Michel Winock, himself coming out of the French left tradition, distinguishes between an “open nationalism” of “patriots,” which was “of the left, republican, founded on popular sovereignty, and call[ed] on suppressed nations to liberate themselves from their chains” against a “closed nationalism” of the “nationalists” that “subordinated all interests exclusively to the nation, the nation-state, to its force, its power, its grandeur.” The SFIO generally falls into Winoch’s characterization of “open nationalism” within the Jacobin tradition, as one can see in the SFIO’s moderate policies toward German reconstruction in the postwar period.

In the contemporary parlance of the French Fourth Republic, however, the attributes of “closed nationalism” were synonymous with the term “nationalism,” and evoked as well a punitive Poincarist-style policy for Germany. Though the French word nationalisme appears to have arisen during the late 1790s, the term gained new connotations during the tumultuous Dreyfus Affair a century later. The political realignment brought about by the Dreyfus Affair and the campaign of Jean Jaurès, Léon Blum and others for Dreyfus’ exoneration was a defining moment in the political identity formation of many of those who went on to found the SFIO, which united the various currents of French socialism under a new program and name in 1905, just a year before Dreyfus regained his position in the French army. French Socialists consciously expunged anti-Semitic rhetoric from their rhetorical armature and declared a domestic struggle against “nationalists,” who combined racism, anti-Semitism and militarism to rebrand the French political right. SFIO leaders considered themselves to be anti-nationalist by definition. Given its dedication to a program for French-German reconciliation, why did the SFIO lay out far-reaching demands for the Ruhr territory that led it into a bitter conflict with the SPD?

Considering the national traumas of the First and Second World Wars for France, and the often very personal traumas that these wars brought about for many leading French Socialists, it is rather remarkable that they pushed as hard as they did within the French political scene for a non-punitive, reconciliatory policy for France-German relations from 1945 to 1948. However, as

one of the leading parties of postwar France, one must remember that, despite claims to internationalism, they were elected by French voters to govern France and to repair the economic and social disaster left by the Second World War. In addition, they could not but be affected by the principal psychological and political currents of French politics, even if they so often found themselves opposed to the policies of the majority. As we have seen, the SFIO steadfastly opposed the French government’s program to ensure French security through a long-term destruction of centralized German political power. What they did share with a majority of the French political world, however, was a view that French security was in large part economic in nature and required that France achieve a level of industrial power sufficient to contain what they saw as a rapacious and insatiable German economy on their border.178 The SPD, for its part, never came to fully accept the SFIO’s position that French security had a central economic dimension.

In the realm of high politics after the Second World War, most statesmen directly tied geopolitical power to levels of national industrialization. Today politicians and economists tend to analyze economic strength by measuring a nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), productivity, unemployment levels, and by use of the more elusive category of competitiveness. Utilizing GDP as a method of appraisal was a child of the postwar era and was first employed in the United States in 1947. It took some time to gain credibility as a measure within Europe. Unemployment had already gained great importance as a standard in Western Europe due to the social cataclysm it wreaked during the Great Depression. Postwar politicians often saw the fate of their democracy to be reflected in unemployment statistics. Productivity was just gaining traction in Europe as a measure. It soon became a constant in the analyses of leading SFIO economist André Philip, who did much to popularize the concept in French politics. The head of the French Planning Commission, Jean Monnet, only began stressing the importance of productivity within the French administration in the years 1948-1949.179 The concept would continually gain in importance over the course of the 1950s.

179 Thum, op. cit., 70-71.
Emerging from the Second World War, however, the gold standard for measuring national economic power remained raw industrial production and population statistics. The language of the Economic and Defense Ministries, newspapers, and National Assembly debates were replete with monthly (often comparative) national statistics of coal, steel, iron, gas and electrical production.\(^\text{180}\) This standard gained particular resonance in France because it was entwined with national narratives of the history of French-German relations that emphasized French economic inferiority and the “crisis” of French natalism.\(^\text{181}\)

Many postwar French politicians premised their views of France’s geopolitical strength on raw production statistics with which they based their assessments of the diverging historical evolution of French and German industrialization.\(^\text{182}\) The “shock” of Napoleon III’s defeat to Prussia in 1870 had, after all, been in large part a result of the Germans armies’ superior use of railways as a military tactic. In the 1880s, German industrialization took a clear leap forward compared to developments in France, in large part due to explosive growth in the coal, iron, steel, machine-building, chemical and electrical industries. Much of the driving force for this growth lay in the Ruhr territory. Whereas in 1850 France had produced twice as much raw iron than the states that came to form the German Empire, in 1910 Germany produced three times more raw iron as France and four times as much steel and electricity.\(^\text{183}\) Although French coal production had increased from 1 million tons in 1820 to 41 million in 1913, it seemed to lag hopelessly behind the industrial engines of Great Britain and Germany.\(^\text{184}\) These developments were fueled by a demographic chasm: while the French population grew from 37 million in 1850


\(^{181}\) As Kaelble has demonstrated, if French public opinion had utilized GDP statistics as a standard for the period of industrialization from 1870 to the First World War, it would have found French economic growth to have lagged only slightly behind German growth. The greater German economic growth, he claims, was mostly the result of larger demographic growth in Germany. The principal French industrial regions, the Nord, Lyon and Paris grew as quickly as their German counterparts. In fact, he argues that despite the prevalence of narratives claiming national decline, the French population on the eve of WWI was wealthier, enjoyed a higher standard of living and lived longer on average than Germans. Helmut Kaelble, Nachbarn am Rhein: Entfremdung und Annäherung der französischen und deutschen Gesellschaft seit 1880 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1991), 20-27.

\(^{182}\) Kuise1, Capitalism and the state in modern France: Renovation and economic management in the twentieth century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 201.


to 42 million in 1910, in Germany the population grew from 32 to 59 million. From 1879 to 1910, four million Frenchmen and women migrated from rural to urban areas; seven million Germans did so from 1870 to 1914. The result was that eleven million workers labored in German industry by 1900; in France, the number was six million. German heavy industry employed more than double the number employed by French heavy industry. Trade between France and Germany added to a growing sense of malaise as the strength of French agricultural exports to Germany seemed paltry compared to the influx of German steel, iron, chemicals and machine tools into France. French exports on the European continent gave way before the German export boom; German exports to France doubled from 1898 to 1913.

French victory in the First World War did little to change the balance of economic power, real and perceived, between the two countries. France regained the industrial region of Alsace-Lorraine, but the Lorraine iron industry remained dependent on coal imports from a Ruhr industrial class eager to inflict damage on Germany’s lost territory. Helmut Kaelble writes that the First World War “plainly revealed what some prewar pundits had noted; on the economic terrain France could not meet Germany as an equal.” As the Great Depression and new war clouds darkened European skies, French industrial production failed to match the gains made under the Nazi re-industrialization program. Whereas in 1929 Germany had produced 16 million tons of steel to France’s 9.5, in 1938 the statistics were 19.8 and 6.1. With steel pouring into the production of planes, tanks, and rail, these were ominous statistics indeed.

The French far right hammered the Third Republic for falling behind Germany throughout the interwar period. It saw in the demographic and production statistics a crisis of the French character and soul that, in its interpretation, proved the decadence of French political and cultural elites. While eschewing the cultural determinism of their right-wing critics, of which they had often been the primary targets, French Socialists shared the prevailing post-WWII consensus that French defeat in the recent war had in large part been economic in nature.

185 Kaelble, op. cit., 22-29.
186 There were 1.6 million employed in French mines and metal-producing and transforming industries while 3.5 million worked in these industries in Germany in the lead-up to the First World War. Klaus Schwabe, “Grossbritannien und die Ruhrkrise,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Ruhrkrise, 70.
188 Ibid., 28.
189 Ibid., 31.
France’s industrial apparatus had suffered considerable damage during the war. Still reeling from the Great Depression, the impact of which hit France later than most other European countries, it then suffered four years of systematic exploitation during the German occupation of World War II. Then French industry ground to a halt as liberation armies swept through France in 1944-45. The energy sectors (gas, coal, electricity) lay still, creating an acute crisis for a transport system already over-burdened by the demands of the Allied militaries.\textsuperscript{191} Years of low capital investment in heavy industry had created an industrial landscape littered with broken or barely functioning machinery, much of which had been built during the reconstruction phase after the First World War in the early 1920s.\textsuperscript{192} Industrial workers were overworked, underfed, and demoralized. A massive miners’ strike came on the heels of liberation, further exacerbating the energy crisis. Shipments of coal under the Lend-Lease program from winter 1944 to summer 1945 were all that shielded the French population from the complete devastation a lack of coal for transporting food and heating homes would have inflicted.

Material necessities dictated that the primary objective of France’s liberation government would be to restore the coal supply and prevent its malnourished population from experiencing starvation. Much of the task fell on the new Socialist Minister of Industrial Production, Robert Lacoste, who told the French Constitutive Assembly in December 1944 that his first task was to attack the coal problem and reconstruct the country’s electrical network.\textsuperscript{193} The government also charged him with coordinating the rationing of raw materials, primarily coal, to industry.

In the next years, the French government reached a conclusion that became decisive for France’s postwar development. It accepted the argument of Jean Monnet and others that France must not only reconstruct, but also fundamentally modernize its industrial sector. To do this, Jean Monnet set up a Planning Commissariat outside the control of the Ministries of Industrial Production, Finance, and Economy that answered directly to the Prime Minister. As is often the case, Monnet’s designs for the Commissariat led to an inter-ministerial turf war, as the other economic ministries struggled to maintain their prerogative to shape the postwar French

\textsuperscript{191} Kuisel writes that in 1944 “coal supplies were so low that French industry was on the verge of expiration.” Kuisel, \textit{op. cit.}, 183.

\textsuperscript{192} “Most coal-mining firms never moved far beyond the modernization efforts of the early 1920s...They continued to use steam-powered locomotives to move coal rather than switch to more efficient electrical-based transport systems.” Holter, \textit{op. cit.}, 31.

\textsuperscript{193} 7 December 1944, \textit{Journal Officiel} (JO), 466.
economy. Robert Lacoste and André Philip, Economics Minister from 1946-47, fought against granting far-reaching powers to the Commissariat.\footnote{Kuisel, op. cit., 194-5.}

The initial resistance to Monnet’s planning designs within the ranks of the SFIO was not based on principle. The idea of planning as a Socialist mode of governing under a capitalist system had made great strides within the party during the interwar period. Much of the impetus came from the Belgian Socialist Henri de Man, who popularized a Socialist alternative to the Soviet planning system. By the early 1930s, a young generation of economic experts in the trade union federation, the Confédération générale du travail (CGT), and in the SFIO worked to win the party and unions to the planiste philosophy. Many of the early planistes became prominent figures in postwar French socialism and attained government positions. In addition to André Philip and Jules Moch for the SFIO, the CGT planistes included Christian Pineau and Robert Lacoste.\footnote{Philippe Mioche, Le Plan Monnet: Gênèse et élaboration, 1941-1947 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1987), 103.} Although party leaders Léon Blum and Paul Faure opposed the planistes at the 1934 party congress, the debate turned around the usefulness of planning as an electoral tactic, rather than its substance.\footnote{Kuisel, op. cit., 114-15.} With political power seemingly far out of their reach, there seemed to the party delegates little reason to develop a detailed economic program for government. To everyone’s surprise, however, the Popular Front (PF) election of 1936 brought the SFIO to power under Prime Minister Léon Blum. Although the PF government had little time to institute a planning policy due to the tumultuous domestic and international political climate, a Socialist planiste, Charles Spinasse, became Economic Minister and Jules Moch entered Blum’s government as well.

The idea continued to gain ground among Socialists in the French resistance. In December 1941, Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle created study commissions to devise economic policy for a postwar government. André Philip headed the Commissariat for the Interior and Labor within which planners carved out an influential role, though political differences led to a failure to issue recommendations.\footnote{Ibid., 160-63.} Meanwhile other efforts at planning among the Free French paralleled the Vichy government’s attempts to create planning institutions amidst the difficulties of German interference in the French economy. Following the
war, a “planning consensus” emerged among French politicians, signaling an economic sea-shift from the austere interwar period.  

On 4 December 1945, Jean Monnet proposed that Charles de Gaulle create a “Plan of Modernization and Equipment” and charge him with its execution. On the eve of de Gaulle’s resignation, the government accepted Monnet’s proposal and named Monnet Director of Planning on 3 January 1946. The new government, under Socialist Félix Gouin brokered a compromise between Monnet and the new Economic Minister, André Philip. While Philip would oversee the short-term reconstruction plan, Monnet’s Commissariat would design a four-year plan to be effective through 1950. Over the next months Socialists Jules Moch and André Philip tried to take charge of France’s postwar planning. The Socialists, in this phase, were Monnet’s principal opponents. They argued for a more powerful and centralized form of planning than that promoted by Monnet and for its extension to the private economy. In Monnet’s design, the plan would not be binding on private industry; rather, the state would use its power to direct resources and investment in a period of paucity to push industry to conform to its objectives. Here Monnet received the unexpected support of the PCF, which sought to stem the Socialists’ efforts to direct economic policy. The debate that ensued was never over the principles of the Monnet plan, but was rather primarily about political power. Philip, in fact, supported the most controversial part of Monnet’s proposal, when he told the Economic Commission on 18 February 1946 that, “Like Russia on the eve of the first Five Year Plan, we must sacrifice present consumption to assist future production.” It is noteworthy that the most assiduous opponents of Monnet were those Socialists who had been immersed in the interwar planning efforts.

The Gouin government approved the Planning Commission’s recommendations and charged Blum and Monnet with the task of acquiring the loans and raw materials from the United States needed to begin to put the plan into effect. The result was the Blum-Byrnes accord of 1946.

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198 Hitchcock, op. cit., 39.
199 Jules Moch’s planning proposal from 1942 was a large source of inspiration for Philip. “Moch proposed creating some twenty autonomous sectors, autonomous because they were free of both capitalism and the state. Only the large firms in each sector need be expropriated to render an entire branch autonomous. A general council composed of managers, workers, and representatives of the general interest managed each sector...In Moch’s view this was a democratic and socialist form of production.” Kuisel, op. cit., 175.
200 Mioche, op. cit., 91.
201 Philip argued that Monnet’s intention to raise French industrial production to 25% above the 1929 figure was overly optimistic. In addition, he argued that the plan overestimated the role of coal and did not consider the use of oil as a substitute energy source. Mioche, op. cit., 191-93.
202 Ibid., 190-91.
that opened up a line of credit and increased deliveries of U.S. coal to France. When Blum formed an all-Socialist interim government in December 1946, Monnet’s position appeared again to be under threat. The SFIO was determined to appoint Gouin Minister for Planning. Monnet pleaded his case to a sympathetic Blum, who enacted a compromise in which Gouin entered the government as an unofficial Minister for Planning and Monnet remained at the head of the Planning Commissariat. After defeating the SFIO planistes in 1934, Prime Minister Blum signed the decree making the Four Year Plan official policy in January 1947. Blum called the document an “essential piece” of France’s economic recovery.203

Although the Socialist Party had failed in its effort to enact a more far-reaching and interventionist form of planning, it found much to be enthusiastic about in Monnet’s Four Year Plan. In February 1947, Monnet’s former Socialist opponents (Philip, Moch, Gouin, and Pineau) publicly rallied in support of the Plan’s objectives.204 Gouin presented the Monnet Plan to the SFIO Directing Committee on 27 February 1947. Noting the heavy French reliance on imports, “the weakness of our birth rate,” and “our obsolete equipment,” he argued that, “I believe that the Plan translates the efforts of the Party in the economic domain.”205 As the Communists were forced from government and the French political scene began to move markedly to the right over the course of 1947, the Socialist Party became the most ardent defender of the Monnet Plan against liberal politicians determined to strangle the postwar experiment with planning in its infancy. SFIO delegates tirelessly took to the floor of the National Assembly over the course of 1947 to 1951 to stem efforts of the political right to reduce government investments aimed at modernizing heavy industry.206 As we shall see, the SFIO’s determination to see the Monnet Plan through to a successful conclusion is essential for understanding how SFIO policy on the Ruhr developed.

Before the domestic assault on financing the investment policies of the Monnet Plan began, an even more serious problem confronted supporters of the Plan. France faced a hopeless shortage of coal. In the interwar period, France had been the most reliant of all the industrial nations on coal imports, habitually importing about 30-45% of the coal it consumed.207 France

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204 Philip, 18 February 1947, and Pineau, 20 February 1947 to the National Assembly, JO 367, 392.
205 Comité directeur, 27 February 1947, OURS.
206 See, for instance, SFIO deputy Francis Leenhardt’s speech to the National Assembly, 26 April 1950, JO, 2885.
207 Hitchcock, op. cit., 67.
had, like all industrial nations of the time, a coal-based economy, with 76% of its entire energy consumption coming from coal. The coal shortage threatened the steel and transport industries, and hurt consumers, who still relied overwhelmingly on coal for heat. But it also affected all sectors of the economy. Lacoste and others explained to the National Assembly in 1945 how the lack of coal was causing shortages of goods in sectors as diverse as bicycles and sugar, as these industries required coal to operate.

The government had no choice. The coal had to come from the Ruhr. Other sources were impossible. The Labour government in Great Britain, a country that had exported a great amount of coal in the interwar period, was determined to keep its coal in Britain to build its own industry. Another important supplier, Poland, lay on the other side of what was soon to be popularly known as the “Iron Curtain” and needed coal for its own reconstruction. Whereas it had exported on average 1 to 2 million tons of coal per year to France in the interwar period, it exported only 576,000 to France in 1946 and it was possible that the geopolitical situation would cause this source to dry up completely. The French government signed a series of short-term accords with the United States to meet its minimum needs for coal, but the cost of transporting coal across the Atlantic made a continued reliance on this source prohibitive. In addition, the French government had to pay for U.S. coal in dollars and the chronic “dollar shortage” of the period made this an even bleaker option. Coal from the Ruhr, on the other hand, was selling at half the world market price.

The Ruhr, however, lay in the British occupation zone. This was a fundamental structural factor for French and, as we shall see, for French Socialist foreign policy in the initial postwar period. The French government was able to acquire tutelage over the Saar region, another coal-producing area, but exports from the Saar could only go part of the way to meeting France’s energy needs. By late 1945, the French government angrily noted that it was receiving only half of its allotted amount of Ruhr coal. The situation deteriorated further in 1946. Half of

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208 Korff, op. cit., 132.
209 Agricultural Minister André Tanguy-Prigent to the Provisional Assembly, 12 December 1944, JO, 487-88.
211 From May 1945 to September 1947 German coal sold at $10.50 a ton, less than half the world market price. Matthias Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz: Der Schuman-Plan und die Ursprünge der europäischen Einigung 1944-1952 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996), 87.
213 France received 386,000 tons of coal from the British zone in February 1946. In April 1946 this figure had fallen to 111,561 and averaged about 100,000 for the rest of 1946. Korff writes that, “Little by little over the course of the
France’s imports of coal in the first six months of 1946 came from the U.S.; only one-seventh came from the Ruhr.\footnote{Korff, \textit{op. cit.}, 158.} By the end of 1946, coal shortages forced the French government to cancel trains and close factories for several days at a time.\footnote{Lefèvre, \textit{op. cit.}, 52-53.}

If the French government could not obtain an adequate supply of coal, the Monnet Plan would remain no more than a fantasy. A pessimistic climate developed among the planning staff and, on 26 November 1946, Monnet signaled that he had underestimated France’s coal needs and that industrial production was stalling throughout France.\footnote{Gerbet, \textit{op. cit.}, 143.} Mollet’s report argued that it was imperative to raise coal imports from Germany from 300-400,000 a month to 1.3 million.\footnote{Mioche, \textit{op. cit.}, 149.} Here is not the place to retrace the work of diplomatic historians, who have demonstrated how the French government in effect demanded a secure supply of cheap coal as its price for aligning with the Western countries against the Soviet Union in 1946-1947.\footnote{Hitchcock, \textit{op. cit.}, 34.} As the most ardent defenders of the modernization plan, Socialist ministers were among the most insistent that France receive a greater supply of coal and coke from the Ruhr. Prime Minister Blum wrote British Prime Minister Clement Atlee in early 1946:

\begin{quote}
One or two million tons of coal more per month, voilà what will determine our economic construction or our political destruction. I don’t exaggerate in the slightest when I affirm that the fate of democracy and of socialism in France—and by extension in Europe—is in play for this price. One or two million tons, that is to say a tiny quantity relative to your total production in Great Britain or of normal production in the Ruhr.\footnote{Pierre-Olivier Lapie, \textit{De Léon Blum à de Gaulle: Le caractère et le pouvoir} (Paris: Fayard, 1971), 64.}
\end{quote}

The situation became even more dire due to developments in the French coal regions. Philip wrote a distressing report for the planning staff in early March describing how the repatriation of German Prisoners of War working in French mines had caused the French coal industry to fall far short of the Monnet Plan’s 1947 targets for domestic coal production. The consequence of this was that the iron, steel, electrical and gas industries would also not be able to meet their objectives. Philip told the Commissariat in March 1947, that “the entire economic outlook is dominated by the coal problem.”\footnote{Hitchcock, \textit{op. cit.}, 67.} The massive strikes that shook French mining in 1947 and...
1948 threatened to cripple the reconstruction efforts. The prominent role of the French Communist Party in these strikes and the insurrectionary intentions cast upon them by the government assisted the French government’s efforts to convince the U.S. and Great Britain to guarantee France greater supplies of Ruhr coal. As Irwin Wall has brilliantly shown, French diplomats deftly used France’s economic weakness and the strength of the PCF to extract a series of concessions in 1947-1950 from western allies worried that France might fall into the Communist orbit.\textsuperscript{221} What, in fact, was happening in the French mines?

Coal mining in France was overwhelmingly concentrated in the northern departments of Nord and Pas-de-Calais, as well as in the Lorraine. The Midi had a smaller number of mines and the southern industrial town Decazeville, the constituency of Prime Minister Paul Ramadier, had a long-established coal operation as well. The Nord, however, was the heart of French mining. Subjected to direct rule during German occupation and merged into an administrative unit with Belgium, the Nord and Pas-de-Calais suffered more than most French regions during the occupation. The expulsion of the German armies took the form of a social revolution in the Northern mining basin. Miners downed tools and refused to work for their former bosses, whom they accused of collaborating with the enemy during the occupation.

The Nord and Pas-de-Calais had a long history of class conflict dating back to the late nineteenth century. Jules Guesde’s \textit{Parti Ouvrier Français} built its base of support among the region’s miners.\textsuperscript{222} Massive strikes shook the region and led to the infamous repression of the 1891 Formies strike, which was popularized in Émile Zola’s classic novel \textit{Germinal}. The Nord coal miners became the symbol of French industrial working class militancy, earning a place next to the Communards in French Socialist iconography. During the First World War, the Nord and Pas-de-Calais were among the martyred departments, as the Western Front calcified for years across the northwestern French plain. After the war, the introduction of Taylorism in the northern mines embittered the miners. The drive for productivity, known as the Bédaux system, raised coal production, but often at the expense of the miners’ health. The number of injuries on the job increased from 1932 to 1935, from 48 to 79 per thousand workers. Penalties, surveillance, privileges and housing segregation between management, engineers and workers

\textsuperscript{221} See Wall, \textit{op. cit.}
led to a segmented social system in the Nord largely based around class. The Popular Front strikes brought the miners substantial gains, but these were erased by the reaction that set in under Édouard Daladier’s government, a process that continued under German occupation.

There are clear parallels between the situation in the Nord and Ruhr in the initial postwar years. Class animosities and hatred pulsed through the northern coal basin. The authorities feared for the physical safety of the managerial class. The miners insisted that the mines be socialized and purged of those managers who had collaborated, by which they meant virtually all of the managers. The postwar SFIO leadership sought to channel the miners’ demands and fight against Communist influence in the basin. From the 1890s, the leaders of the three major Socialist factions, Jules Guesde, Jean Jaurès, and Édouard Vaillant, had all called for the nationalization of the coal mines, and the SFIO repeated this demand in its 1943 resistance platform. The SFIO was the most committed of all French parties to an extensive program of nationalizations in the postwar period and the coal mines were the party’s first target. The popularity of the miners’ strike and the coal shortage made a quick resolution of the miners’ demands appear imperative. In December 1944, Industrial Production Minister Lacoste issued a decree that provisionally nationalized the mines. Over the next years, SFIO deputies vigorously defended the nationalization program against charges that the continued coal shortages were the fault of the nationalized bodies. Socialist Prime Minister Gouin’s government definitively nationalized the mines in spring 1946. Miners were angry, however, that most of the management had been shuffled to different mines rather than replaced. The purge commissions had difficulty substantiating the miners’ often vague charges of collaboration and, as happened as well in the Ruhr’s de-Nazification program, officials found that purges and a quick restoration of production often proved to be contradictory goals.

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223 Holter writes that, “Coal operators enjoyed a degree of social control over coal miners that was unparalleled in France...The companies controlled virtually all aspects of the lives of the coal miners and their families: wages, housing, schools, churches, medical care, retirement, and distribution of food and water. They also employed the local police force.” He goes on to write that, “Economic isolation combined with geographic concentration produced a mono-industrial economy in the coal-mining villages...Engineers formed a privileged class as the mining companies raised barriers that prevented easy access to such positions. The establishment of separate residential areas and schools for the engineers and their families further defined the difference between worker and manager.” Holter, op cit., 25-27.
224 The French miners achieved a 12 percent raise, the right to return to work for laid-off workers, and the banning of the Bédaux system.
225 The French Communist Party was largely mute on the nationalization program until it announced its formal support in a joint communiqué with the SFIO in March 1945.
Under SFIO pressure, the French government rapidly achieved the goal of nationalizing the coal mines, a goal that eluded the SPD in postwar Germany. It also set up *comités d’entreprise*, a form of worker participation in management throughout French industry.\(^\text{226}\) The committees were charged with managing the firms’ welfare and social activities, examining corporate accounts, and receiving reports of the companies’ progress. Unlike the co-determination system later enacted in Germany, this left the committees little influence over the firms’ decision-making processes. In the nationalized coal bodies, miners’ representatives received seats on the steering and consultative committees. In a pamphlet entitled “War on Trusts,” Jules Moch argued that the nationalizations had not gone far enough and demanded that the wartime management be given no representation on the consultative committee. In addition, the Consultative Assembly approved a new Miners’ Statute on 14 June 1946 that satisfied many demands that the Federation of Miners had pursued for decades.\(^\text{227}\)

Under these conditions, the miners went back to work. When they did, the PCF announced with much fanfare a “battle for coal” and exhorted miners with Stakhanovite imagery to produce more in the interests of the nation. The Socialists sought to take advantage of the unpopularity of the PCF campaign among the miners to win the miners and unions to their party. Hence, SFIO propaganda in this period legitimized working-class discontent in the mines, even though the SFIO was as concerned as the PCF with the need to produce coal. Similar to what was happening in the Ruhr, the local SFIO in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais also revived its interwar battle with the Communists for the allegiance of the northern miners. After the 1920 schism, the SFIO had initially held a hegemonic position among this old Guesdist constituency, but the Great Depression and unity efforts between the Socialist-aligned CGT and Communist *Confédération générale du travail unitaire* (CGTU) invigorated the Communist Party in the region.\(^\text{228}\) The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 gave occasion for the CGT to expel Communists from

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226 Socialist Albert Gazier, a former CGT leader, presented the Social Affairs Committee report to the Provisional Assembly arguing for the creation of this system in December 1944. Gazier also argued that the committees should be instituted in all businesses with 50 or more employees, rather than the envisioned figure of 100, a proposal that would double the number of affected businesses. He argued for applying the system to agriculture and public administration as well. Socialists Lacoste, Moch, and Verdier called for granting as much power as possible to these representative committees as an extension of democracy into the economic sphere. 12 December 1944, *JO*, 487-88.

227 Holter writes that, “The statute defined the terms of employment in the mines, labor and management rights, and procedures for setting wages, resolving grievances, and taking disciplinary action. It was basically an agreement reached between the top managers, the miners’ union and the ministries concerned.” Holter, *op. cit.*, 102.

228 Holter argues that the Popular Front was more myth than reality in the mining regions because Socialists and Communists fought bitterly for control of the newly united mine unions. Pottrain writes that, “In the Nord a climate
its leadership ranks but the Communist-based resistance that developed during the German occupation allowed the PCF to emerge from the war with a clear advantage over the SFIO in the region. As Holter writes, “For the first time Communist unionists were in the majority in several unions, including the coal mines of [the Nord and Pas-de-Calais], the metal industry in Lille, the chemical industry in the Nord, the local transit system and the construction industry.”229

In the next years, the PCF not only consolidated these gains, but extended them into the newly nationalized coal boards. Communist Marcel Paul, who replaced Lacoste for much of 1946 as Minister of Industrial Production, appointed his comrade Auguste Lecoeur, recently elected head of the miners’ union, to be his undersecretary. The SFIO leadership shared and fanned a widespread belief that the PCF was stacking the personnel of the nationalized Charbonnages de France with its patrons and complained of its inability to place its own officials in positions of influence. In 1945-46, the PCF and SFIO were clearly engaged in a grass-roots war for power in a coal industry rich with Socialist historic and symbolic importance. Unlike the SPD in its battle with the KPD, however, by 1947, it was clear that the SFIO had in large part failed. The miners’ unions and the comités d’entreprise became Communist strongholds at the same time that an acceleration of Cold War tensions caused Socialist leaders to view their domestic dispute with the PCF through a dangerous international lens.

Unable to defeat the Communists in the mines, the Socialist-led governments of 1947 worked to expel them from the administration of the Charbonnages de France. A series of decrees from Lacoste’s ministry sharply cut CGT representation on the coal boards, scaling back the representation in management miners had only recently acquired.230 Strikes broke out of rancor, even of hate installed itself between the fraternal enemies...The militants lived a permanent drama, with insults and injuries raining down from both sides...Physical violence multiplied and the police had to intervene on several occasions...From 1921 to 1925 Communists frequently disrupted Socialist meetings...After February 8 1934, unlike what happened in Paris, the Socialist and Communist strikers clashed physically.” Pottrain, op. cit., 45, 56.

229 Holter, op. cit., 57.
230 “One of the first things Lacoste did was to alter once more the composition of production committees by reducing the number of representatives selected by the mine workers to one. This left management responsible for naming the remaining three representatives...Then Lacoste turned to the task of making changes in the boardrooms. ...He changed the requirement for membership on the board of directors of the Charbonnages de France by requiring the state to select representatives with at least five years of administrative experience in government agencies. ...Another decree allowed the Minister of Industrial Production to dissolve the boards of directors at the national or regional level of those agencies considered to be failing in their responsibilities. ...The new decrees reduced the number of CGT representatives in the Charbonnages de France from twelve to six. ...While removing CGT representatives from the councils, Lacoste reinstalled many of the old mining chiefs. Indeed, eleven administrators who had served on the Coal Mines Committees during the 1930s and the Coal Mines organizations committee under the Vichy regime were appointed by Lacoste to board positions in the nationalized mines. His actions angered the mine workers.” Holter, op. cit., 123-4, 159.
throughout French industry in spring and fall 1947, culminating in a massive strike wave in autumn 1948. The strikes were spontaneous responses to the economic and social difficulties of the early postwar period but, like in the Ruhr, they had clear political implications. The workers’ claims struck at core government priorities. The miners’ demands for wage increases threatened to nullify the economic centerpiece of the Blum and Ramadier governments: the holding down of prices and wages to prevent an inflationary wage-price spiral. They also threatened to deepen the coal shortages that had plagued French industry from 1944 to 1946.231

The strikes were not part of an insurrectionary plot by the French Communist Party to overthrow the French government but, rather, were largely a rearguard effort by the miners to preserve their recent gains. Like the SPD in 1947-48, however, the SFIO saw the sinister hand of Moscow at play.232 After Prague, why not Paris, French leaders asked themselves.233 While the miners in the Ruhr faced the occupation authorities, the 1947 strikes in France pitted much of the northern working classes against the 1947 Socialist-led government. Though the Christian Democrat Robert Schuman became Prime Minister in late 1947, the tripartite coalition continued with Lacoste remaining head of Industrial Production and Jules Moch taking the Interior Ministry, a position that he used to suppress the strikes.

Fall 1948 was a dramatic period in postwar French history. As Holter writes, “the government considered itself at war with the striking miners.”234 Moch consciously applied military tactics to ensure miners’ “right to work.” The government called up military reserves and sent in the national police to conquer the mines one by one.235 Skirmishes, sabotage, train derailments, and deaths turned the mining region into a bloody battleground that created political

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231 Philip complained to the National Assembly about the spring 1947 strikes’ negative impact on French coal supplies. 1 July 1947, JO, 2599-2601.

232 Minister of the Interior Jules Moch believed that the Russian Communist official Andrei Zhdanov himself had given the orders to strike in June, three months before the strike began. Holter, op. cit., 153.

233 In fact, that the PCF never called for mass demonstrations in Paris during the period of the strike is part of the overwhelming evidence that there was no Communist plot against the republic.

234 Holter, op. cit., 170.

235 On 22 October 1948, the French cabinet approved Moch’s proposal to call the 1948 reserve class to report to duty, to allow the police to shoot after a warning had been issued, to allow prefects to prohibit assembly, to expel foreigners from France who participated in demonstrations and to allow prefects to censor or seize newspapers supporting the demonstrators. Moch laid out his strategy to Blum: “1) requisition by the army of all the vehicles of the nationalized enterprises in order to prevent their use by the strikers for transporting commandos and distributing food as had happened last November; 2) encircling, from a distance, the mining basin in order to occupy them in case of suspension of security; 3) reaching an agreement with the FO and the other unions if possible.” Anticipating the strike, “Moch had already crafted an elaborate system of communications, setting up special radios and telephones between the prefects and the ‘problem areas’ and linking together the mining management from the different mining regions.” Holter, op. cit., 146-69.
fault-lines and a web of personal hatreds that shaped the region’s culture for decades to follow.\(^{236}\) The government’s hard-line reaction to the strikes forced the CGT to admit defeat in exchange for a few token face-saving measures.

The strikes also gave birth to a new union: *Force Ouvrière* (FO). The FO union, though formally independent, associated itself with the SFIO. It supported the SFIO’s central economic policy of working to increase purchasing power rather than wages.\(^{237}\) Discontent had been brewing within the CGT ever since the Communists achieved hegemony in the organization. The CGT right, the centrists around Léon Jouhaux, and anarcho-syndicalists coalesced to create a faction within the CGT that broke with the union during the 1948 strikes. The hand of Washington, as French Communists claimed, was no more at play in the CGT schism than Moscow had been in launching the strike. Though the C.I.A. funneled money to finance the creation of the FO’s office, the schism itself was the culmination of decades of tension between grass-roots militants.\(^{238}\)

These developments are central to understanding the SFIO’s about-face on policy towards the mines, and, ultimately, its decision to support the Schuman Plan even though the Plan envisioned the closing of a substantial number of the northern coal mines.\(^{239}\) Historians have not examined the link between the SFIO’s domestic policy for the French mines and its decision to support the Schuman Plan.

Germany had a significantly higher proportion of industrial workers in its population than was the case in France. Whereas the SPD had gained a hegemonic position in the Ruhr mines by 1948, the Socialist trade unionists had all but been thrown out of the northern mines. Though the SFIO continued to receive substantial electoral support from the region’s miners, the March 1948 *comités d’entreprise* elections in the northern mines confirmed the weakness of the party’s trade union allies: the CGT won over 50% of the vote; the FO received a disappointing 14%. Jean-

\(^{236}\) Lacoste described incidents of sabotage to the National Assembly. 18 November 1948, *JO*, 7091-3.


\(^{238}\) “In a general sense, the grass-roots militants disdained compromise and lived these divisions more intensely...The actions of the [PCF and SFIO] had only to act as catalysts during the course of events.” “In effect the schism was less the product of a voluntary, deliberated decision than the expression of a profound rift.” Bergounioux, *op. cit.*, 38, 83.

\(^{239}\) Lefèvre writes that, “For the technical services of the Ministry of Industrial Production, the application of the measures proposed by Robert Schuman “will probably lead to a decrease in French coal production until it reached equilibrium with German productive profitability, therefore the closing of mines with less profitability in the center regions and Midi of France, as well as some of the Eastern mines producing excessive quantities.” Lefèvre, *op. cit.*, 262.
Pierre Rioux goes so far as to write that, “the handling of the strike in the mines had lost the Republic the support of the working classes.”

The SFIO had always had a more distant relationship with the French industrial working classes than had the SPD in Germany. Its policies in 1947-48 definitively alienated the party from key elements of the industrial working class and, in particular, from the miners. Force Ouvrière remained weak in industry and strong among public servants, the latter of which made up much of the SFIO electoral base as well. Developments among the steel workers, an industry concentrated largely in the Lorraine region, paralleled these developments. Steel workers played an important role as well in the 1947-48 strikes; the FO Metal Federation that emerged in 1948-49 was hopelessly outmatched by the CGT. The SFIO experienced a significant electoral setback in the 1948 Nord elections and the national party found that its voting base was migrating from industrial cities to more rural areas and small towns.

Miners were therefore not as large a constituency for the SFIO as they were for the SPD and the SFIO was therefore more willing to sacrifice the miners’ interests for economic gains elsewhere. Before the Schuman Plan was even announced, the SFIO had sanctioned a policy that many in France warned the Plan would accelerate: the implementation of rationalization in the mines, the recreation of the Bédaux system, and mass layoffs. The SPD in 1948, on the other hand, had more support among the Ruhr mine and steel workers than they had ever had before. The party was determined to defend their interests and local SPD leaders pressured a sympathetic leadership to make the defense of the Ruhr industrial workers a central party objective.

Like the West-Westphalian SPD, the Nord Federation had been the most powerful federation in the SFIO since the party’s founding in 1905 and had the most votes in party elections before the Schuman Plan was announced. In the October 1945 national elections, the SFIO won 30% of the Nord vote, a share that shrank to 26% in the June 1946 national elections. In the 1951 national elections, the SFIO share of the Nord vote fell to 24% but the party won more seats due to the 1951 electoral law created to disadvantage the PCF and the Gaullist RPF. Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 362.

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241 Kaelble, op. cit., 90-94. The SFIO had always had more of a following among farmers and small property owners than had the SPD.
242 Bergouinoux, op. cit., 5.
243 In 1938, 67% of steel production was located in the Lorraine, 19% in the Nord and much of the rest in the Centre-Midi region. Michel Freyssenet, La sidérurgie française: 1945-1979. L’histoire d’une faillite. Les solutions qui s’affrontent (Paris: Savelli, 1979), 17.
244 Freyssenet, op. cit., 12.
245 Bernard Vanneste, Augustin Laurent, ou toute une vie pour le socialisme (Dunquerke: Beffrois, 1983), 101-2. From 1948, the Nord federation lost a high proportion of its dues-paying members. The SFIO won 30% of the Nord vote in the October 1945 national elections, a share that shrank to 26% in the June 1946 national elections. In the 1951 national elections, the SFIO share of the Nord vote fell to 24% but the party won more seats due to the 1951 electoral law created to disadvantage the PCF and the Gaullist RPF. Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 362.
congresses. Martine Pottrain writes that, “With [a membership] of more than 40% industrial and agricultural workers, the Nord Federation remained one of the most working-class of the party[’s]” federations. The Nord Federation leader from 1947 to 1967, Augustin Laurent, was, along with Gaston Defferre, mayor of Marseille, the most powerful of the SFIO’s regional politicians. Nicknamed the SFIO “pope,” Laurent defended the government’s actions during the strikes and supported the Socialist Ministers’ policy of holding down prices and wages. Unlike the leadership of the NRW-SPD, however, the Nord-SFIO did not take the initiative within the party to oppose the Schuman Plan. Although the SFIO retained a sizable base in the industrial regions, support for Socialists among miners and steel workers fell significantly behind that of the PCF. In addition, SFIO national leaders found that working-class militancy threatened their economic policy of keeping both prices and salaries low. This configuration helps to explain why the SFIO was more supportive of efforts to keep coal and steel prices low in order to stimulate industries that consumed coal and steel. The SFIO’s policies on coal and steel of 1948-51 were therefore constructed more out of a consideration for France’s economy as a whole rather than as a sectoral defense of the coal and steel industries, as was the case for the SPD.

2.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated how French Socialists and German Social Democrats brought different visions and priorities to questions of postwar European industrial reconstruction. As the uniting element of France’s tripartite coalition government, French Socialist Prime Ministers and Socialist Ministers of Economy and Industrial Reconstruction were often directly responsible for managing their country’s precarious economic reconstruction. To this challenge was added an ardent commitment to a long-term industrial modernization of the French economy. French Socialist leaders shared a core premise of the Monnet Plan that French national security could

246 The Nord Federation had 10% of the party’s total membership and 367 delegates at the national congresses. Pottrain, op. cit., 17, 96.
247 Ibid., 94-95.
248 Laurent later said that SFIO general secretary “Guy Mollet never made an important decision without consulting me and without me being in agreement with him, besides the Suez affair.” Vanneste, op. cit., 54.
249 Laurent told the newspaper “Nord-Matin” in June 1948 that, “It is absolutely necessary that the government take energetic measures in the coming days to ameliorate workers’ purchasing power through a serious lowering of prices...” Ibid., 100.
only be secured if French industry surpassed or achieved parity with German industry. Jean Monnet’s Modernization Plan became a core element of the SFIO’s economic policy. The success of the Plan was a domestic priority for which the party demanded satisfaction in its transnational meetings with German Social Democrats, as the next chapter shows.

The policy of the German Social Democrats towards heavy industry, on the other hand, was the result of a regional struggle for political hegemony in the center of postwar West German industry, the Ruhr valley. The domestic fight for the allegiance of Ruhr workers was refracted through the lens of the region’s experience in the interwar period. The traumas of the Ruhr occupation and the scars it left in its wake were stitched into the minds of SPD leaders of the powerful new region North-Rhine-Westphalia, all of whom had personally experienced the French occupation of 1923-24. Under occupation, regional politics had an inherent international dimension because the British authorities, under U.S. pressure, stymied the regional SPD’s efforts to restructure property relations in heavy industry. With the French government making its demands concerning the Ruhr’s future a precondition for unifying the three Western zones, the SPD now faced another potential obstacle to its designs in the region. Under these circumstances, regional politics were grafted onto the national party’s foreign policy.

In addition, the priority granted to attaining the loyalty of industrial workers and weakening communism in the region, which were central goals of the SPD, had a parallel in the SFIO’s campaign to defeat Communists among the coal and steel workers of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais regions. The SPD succeeded, however, while the SFIO failed. These contrasting outcomes had implications for the parties’ national economic policies that explain in part the parties’ differing approaches to the Schuman Plan. Whereas the SPD represented the interests of the Ruhr’s coal and steel workers, the SFIO gave priority to other economic sectors and was willing to countenance the potential layoffs that might result from the integration of Western Europe’s coal and steel industries. Thus, competing priorities, but also contrasting developments in the political contexts of the French and German coal and steel industries, created the contours for the SPD-SFIO dispute over the Schuman Plan discussed in the following chapter.
3. CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE: THE INDUSTRIAL POLICIES OF
THE FRENCH SOCIALIST AND GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES,
AND THE DEBATE OVER THE SCHUMAN PLAN, 1948-1951

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter demonstrates why an initial convergence between the SFIO and SPD from 1945 to
Spring 1948 on issues of European heavy industry and, in particular, on the future of the Ruhr
industrial valley, degenerated into a public conflict between the two parties from June 1948 to
the ratifications of the Treaty of Paris that formed the European Coal & Steel Community
(ECSC) in December 1951-January 1952. It argues that existing interpretations within the
scholarly literature, particularly a focus on SPD “nationalism” and SFIO “internationalism” as
explanatory factors, oversimplify the policy considerations that went into the SFIO’s decision to
support and the SPD’s decision to oppose the Schuman Plan.

The SFIO and SPD made great efforts from 1948 to 1951 to achieve a consensus on the
Allied diplomatic negotiations surrounding European industrial recovery and the fate of the
Ruhr, a territory that had fueled German industrialization since the nineteenth century and the
rich resources of which the Nazi government utilized to launch its assault on its neighbors. That
the discussions between the SFIO and SPD ultimately failed does not prove that the parties were
not dedicated to a policy of international socialist understanding. Rather, efforts to achieve an
entente between the French and German governments, as well as between their fraternal socialist
parties, were important priorities for both parties. To attain these goals, each party was willing to
go to considerable lengths. However, these priorities competed with, and sometimes
contradicted, other key party goals.

Uncertainty and fear of a repetition of the horrors of the recent past characterized the
political climate of the initial postwar period. Neither socialist party had full faith that their
nation’s future would be democratic. In this context, the SPD’s defense of sectoral interests, such
as the fate of the Ruhr coal and steel industries, was enveloped in a general fear concerning the fragility of German democracy. In turn, while supportive of most SPD policies, including many SPD goals for the Ruhr, the SFIO found itself pursuing economic goals that forced it into conflict with the SPD. For the SFIO, postwar security meant not only a Europe free of the threat of German militarism, but also a form of industrial parity between France and Germany. Its own fears about the stability of German democracy, which intensified in 1949-1950, led the SFIO to harden its position on the German question and to seek more wide-reaching guarantees vis-à-vis its cross-Rhine neighbor. In this context, the SFIO came to view the SPD’s demands for “equality of conditions” (Gleichberechtigung), which SPD leaders viewed as essential to gain credibility for Germany’s democratic parties, as too dangerous to countenance for the immediate future. Both parties mistrusted the intentions of the other country’s government and, as this chapter shows, they often had good reason to do so. Each worried that the other country would attain an economic hegemony on the European continent at their nation’s expense if left to its own devices. Hence, each party lamented Great Britain’s self-exclusion from the first initiatives of European integration, which left France and Germany as the only large powers within the first supranational European Community.

The SFIO and SPD were actually much closer to one another’s policies in this period than has generally been recognized by scholars. However, they had to interact in a universe in which the great powers set geopolitical policy, often with little heed of the wishes of the two socialist parties. Such was the case in their diverging responses to the June 1948 London Accords that created an International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR) and opened a pathway for West German statehood. In addition, the SFIO and SPD were often unable to achieve their goals within their domestic polities and these failures led the parties to more vigorously defend their other fragile policy victories, a process that led the parties into conflict at the transnational level. The parties’ inability to assert their maximal program for European recovery amplified the policy areas that separated them, in particular their disagreement about the necessity of supranational European anti-cartel legislation.

The announcement on 9 May 1950 by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, crafted in secret by Planning Commissioner Jean Monnet and his small team of advisers, was a momentous event in postwar history. The French government proposed the integration of Western European heavy industry under a supranational High Authority that would have the
powers to supervise the production and distribution of heavy industrial goods, and to intervene to prevent national or business disruption of the conditions necessary to assure fair competition. After a period of hesitancy following the announcement, the parties returned to the narratives that they had developed in 1948 in response to the London Accords. The fundamental disagreement concerned Jean Monnet’s decision to break the Ruhr sales cartel as a condition for the creation of the ECSC. The SPD leadership, which believed in the utility of cartels for economic stability, saw in this maneuver a return to a traditional French policy of pursuing French economic hegemony on the continent at the expense of German workers. The party leadership’s views was directly influenced and informed by the SPD leaders in North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and the Ruhr Valley and, in particular, by Dortmund mayor Fritz Henssler. The SFIO leadership, on the other hand, generally opposed cartels within French domestic politics, and was convinced that a muzzling of the Ruhr industrialists’ appetite for concentration was necessary to ensure French economic security.

The parties did pursue a policy of international cooperation in the postwar period. However, other important political goals, in particular economic prosperity and democratic stability, ultimately resulted in a bitter conflict between the SFIO and SPD over the future of European coal and steel. That the parties later achieved a positive working relationship within the Common Assembly of the European Coal & Steel Community and pursued common goals against their Christian Democratic and Liberal opponents at the transnational level indicates that there was in fact a basis for a German-French Socialist policy on coal and steel that differentiated socialists from their domestic political opponents, despite fundamental areas of disagreement between the SFIO and SPD. Thus the disagreement from 1948 to 1952 was perhaps the exception rather than the rule, as the parties were able to create a wide-ranging consensus on most of the controversial issues relating to coal and steel from 1946 to June 1948 and again after 1954. Politicians operate within a set of constraints. It was these constraints, as outlined below, that led the SFIO and SPD to oppose one another in a period when the French and German Christian Democratic parties achieved a greater degree of transnational consensus in their pursuit of a customs union for coal and steel.250

The previous chapter demonstrated how the SPD and SFIO pursued different interests as they related to the future of the Ruhr territory in the aftermath of the Second World War. The SPD sought to represent the Ruhr working classes, and battled with Communists and Catholic unions for workers’ allegiance. The SFIO needed larger and more secure supplies of Ruhr coal and coke to ameliorate the French government’s dollar deficit and to allow for the realization of the Monnet Plan. Despite these different approaches based on national and regional priorities, the SFIO and SPD were not all that far apart in their official positions on the Ruhr from 1945 to early 1948. In fact, they had more in common with one another than they did with any of the other political parties in either country. Historians’ emphasis on the conflict that broke out between the parties from 1948 to 1951 has led many of them to overlook this early convergence.

The French Socialist and German Social Democratic positions shared much in common. Each party supported the centerpiece of their fraternal party’s program for the Ruhr. The SFIO called repeatedly for the expropriation of the Ruhr magnates, arguing in line with the SPD that they represented a danger to a future democratic system and to the maintenance of peace in Europe. But, socialization under a German government was more controversial within the SFIO and pitted SFIO hardliners on the German question against those more willing to accommodate the wishes of their German comrades. The SFIO was, though, the only French party willing to countenance socialization under a German government and the party formulated an official position that the Allies should encourage socialization in a global settlement that would satisfy Léon Blum’s call for an “international nationalization” of the Ruhr.251 The CDU initially supported socialization in the Ruhr in its Ahlener Program of March 1947, but this position quickly lost its relevance as Konrad Adenauer accumulated support for a reorientation towards market principles within the CDU. Adenauer’s offensive isolated the Christian trade unionists, largely based in the Ruhr, most of whom supported socialization. By 1948, the SFIO and SPD were the only large parties in either country that supported some sort of socialization of Ruhr

industry. This represented not only a victory of the leftist faction of the SFIO around Marceau Pivert, but also resulted in part from the expressed desire of the SFIO leaders to publicly support a central demand of the SPD, which it hoped would lead the first postwar government.

In turn, the SPD supported the SFIO’s call for the internationalization of the Ruhr, under the condition that all of Western heavy industry be internationalized under equal conditions. The demand for *Gleichberechtigung*, or equal conditions, would be a staple of SPD demands concerning German participation in efforts to unify Europe for the next decade. Some within the SFIO hesitated when faced with this proposal, which was clearly aimed at the Nord and the Lorraine, as well as at the industries of Belgium and Luxembourg. However, a general internationalization of heavy industries and raw materials was in line with the vision for a postwar world that the SFIO had developed during the resistance period. The SPD’s position was ideologically compelling and found support not only among Pivert’s supporters, but also with André Philip, who came to be the foremost exponent of this concept in French politics in 1948-1949. The SFIO was the only party in France committed to an internationalization of European, rather than exclusively German, heavy industry in these years. Though the idea found concrete expression in government policy in Robert Schuman’s famous declaration of 9 May 1950, the Christian Democratic MRP had not signaled that it supported this idea before Schuman took the initiative to support Monnet’s proposal. In fact, from 1945 to 1948, French Foreign Minister and leading MRP politician, Georges Bidault, was a tenacious opponent of a program to internationalize European heavy industry as a solution to the Ruhr question.

From 1945 to early 1948, the SFIO and SPD critiques of French government policy on the Ruhr were virtually the same. Charles de Gaulle, head of the provisional government, called in December 1944 for the internationalization of the Ruhr. The SFIO, overtly hostile to any annexation or the breaking up of Germany, wanted an economic, but not political, internationalization of the Ruhr. Foreign Minister Bidault was even more intransigent than de Gaulle under Socialist Prime Ministers Félix Gouin and Paul Ramadier, earning him the wrath of a Socialist Party frustrated by coalitional politics that forced it to acquiesce to a tacit MRP-PCF

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alliance on the German question within the French cabinet. When Blum formed a temporary all-
Socialist government in December 1946, he definitively abandoned the official French policy for
an independent Rhineland state and called for an international organization on the model of the
Tennessee Valley Authority to supervise heavy industry in the Ruhr. Though historians have
recently questioned the sincerity of Bidault’s hard-line policy on Germany, Socialists viewed
Bidault as an irredeemable foe of their efforts to forge a conciliatory policy towards Germany.\textsuperscript{254}
When it seemed that Bidault, re-installed as Foreign Minister on the MRP’s insistence in Paul
Ramadier’s 1947 government, was seeking to resurrect his German policy of 1945-46, an angry
SFIO Central Committee demanded that a Socialist delegate accompany Bidault to the
November 1947 Allied Conference in London. French Socialists believed that Bidault was
pursuing his own foreign policy separate from that of the French cabinet.

The SPD also formulated an official position that any future German government must
ensure French security concerns in the Ruhr. Within the Parliamentary Council, the SPD faced a
Christian-Democratic-Liberal coalition that became the governing coalition of Germany after
national elections took place in summer 1949. The SPD did not enter the national government
until 1966. Therefore, we can never know precisely how far the SPD would have been willing to
go to satisfy French security demands. Outside of government, it was easier for the SPD to fall
back on a resolute defense of the interests of Ruhr workers than if it had had to engage in the
hard political bargaining required of a government under Allied occupation. Yet from the
inception, there was a crucial difference between SFIO and SPD visions of what constituted
French security. The SPD leadership argued that socialization and the removal of the industrial
magnates whom it associated with German militarism would suffice to assure that the Ruhr
would not again be used for aggressive purposes. The SFIO leadership, uncertain about who
would lead Germany in the future, was divided about whether socialization without some form

\textsuperscript{254} This is part of Michael Creswell’s thesis in Michael Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance: How France and the
United States Created Cold War Europe} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). For the debate, see the
responses to Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg’s article “France and the German Question, 1945-1955” in \textit{Journal of
Cold War Studies}, Vol. 5, 3 (2003): 5-28. See also the responses in this edition to their argument. Hitchcock writes
that, “while Bidault remained inflexible [on the German question], Gouin, Auriol, Blum, and other Socialists of
cabinet rank were in contact with the American ambassador, trying to cut a deal that would enhance the Socialist
Party’s prestige and undermine the foreign minister, a political rival.” William I. Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored: Cold
War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954} (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
of internationalization would definitively prevent a renewed exploitation of the Ruhr resources for rearmament and war.

There was another, central, dimension separating SFIO and SPD conceptions of French security. The SPD never fully accepted the SFIO’s and French government’s argument that French security had an economic dimension. This argument had, after all, been a primary consideration in the formulation of the Monnet Plan. SFIO leaders were insistent on this point. SFIO deputy Géraud Jouve spelled out the SFIO’s vision in clear terms: he asked the National Assembly “to concentrate its attention on what we consider to be the essential aspects of the entire German problem from the French point of view: security and coal, I would even say security through coal.” He went on to say that, “Today the problem of coal is more important [l’emporte] than that of security. I would say that it commands it,” and, “The Ruhr for us is coal, it is security through coal.” He concluded that government policy must be “the permanent occupation of the Ruhr as a condition sine qua non of the success of a plan of supervision and economic internationalization” and that, “It would not displease us at all, to the contrary, to see the Ruhr become the station for the contingents of the future international army, the creation of which the best among us have called for since 1919.”

For the SPD, however, such rhetoric conjured frightful memories from the interwar Ruhr occupation. Henssler evoked the Ruhr occupation in November 1947 to counter proposals along the lines of those put forth by Jouve. He declared that:

Proposals for control of the Ruhr territory mean the degradation of the Ruhr territory into a colony. Precisely because we seriously seek a German-French understanding, we must state that this understanding can only be reached through an abandonment of the disastrous thinking of the Rhine-Bund-Method, and that we must seek a new political path...
Schumacher, for his part, was already complaining about a French “security sickness” as early as May 1946.\textsuperscript{258} Henssler told the NRW SPD conference that, “The security guarantee will be best achieved though the stabilization of democracy...” Rumors of schemes to grant the French a form of supervision over Ruhr industry in exchange for French investment in the Ruhr met with vigorous opposition from the SPD, which worried that these were camouflaged efforts to eliminate the possibility of a socialization of Ruhr industry. SPD statements about the dangers of reawakening German nationalism amongst German workers subjected to foreign management and “rule” (\textit{Herrschaft}) were direct allusions to the experience of the interwar Ruhr occupation.

Nevertheless, there remained sufficient areas of agreement to awaken hope within both parties that they could achieve a form of consensus on the Ruhr issue through transnational contact. Diplomatic developments, however, intervened. From February to June 1948, the Allied governments held a painstaking series of meetings in which they negotiated a common policy for the merger of the French zone with the U.S.-British Bizone, and set forth the contours of a future West German state. In these negotiations, the French government pursued its long-standing goal of achieving a form of supervision or control over the Ruhr territory. Parallel to these diplomatic meetings of the Allied governments, the western European Socialist parties sought to reach a consensus on the Ruhr and publicize a common Socialist position. For the first time in the postwar period, the inter-Socialist discussions clearly pitted SFIO against SPD delegates.

3.3 THE DISPUTE EMERGES: THE SFIO AND SPD DEBATE
THE JUNE 1948 LONDON ACCORDS, AND THE CREATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY FOR THE RUHR (IAR)

Although an international Socialist conference in March 1945 had approved the SFIO’s proposal for the internationalization of the Ruhr, the British Labour government, after a period of hesitancy, decided in 1946 to support efforts to socialize, rather than internationalize, Ruhr industry.\textsuperscript{259} In 1948, both the SFIO and SPD supported in principle the internationalization of


\textsuperscript{258} “Deutschland und das Ruhrgebiet,” 31 May 1946, Kurt Schumacher (KS) 37, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD).

\textsuperscript{259} Grumbach report, “Deutschland und die Probleme der Ruhr” (Vorgelegt bei der Pariser Konferenz der Sozialisten v. 24./25. April 1948), Erich Ollenhauer (EO) 452, AdsD.
European heavy industry, a position that the Labour Party refused to adopt for its own industry. However, SFIO and SPD designs for an international management of European heavy industry came up against the reality that the French government, and Foreign Minister Bidault in particular, was steadfastly opposed to discussing the internationalization of French industry. The SFIO’s position that Socialists must support the internationalization of the Ruhr regardless if other European countries simultaneously internationalized their industries set the SFIO on a collision course with the SPD at a 24-25 April 1948 inter-Socialist meeting. The SPD came to the meeting intent on insisting that an internationalization of French and Belgian heavy industry accompany any internationalization of the Ruhr.

SPD leaders worked hard to gain SFIO support for their position. The SPD’s liaison with the SFIO in Paris, Günther Markscheffel, conducted a series of meetings with French Socialist leaders in anticipation of the April meeting. His report to the SPD Central Committee makes clear that the SFIO leadership had united around a demand that the Allies internationalize the Ruhr as part of any settlement of the German question. The SPD leadership had hoped that the SFIO’s primary delegate to the Socialist meetings, Salomon Grumbach, represented a minority view. Grumbach had told Markscheffel that he was going “to plead for the immediate internationalization of the Ruhr without discussing the internationalization of other European raw material territories” and that, “the Ruhr internationalization in a way was a first step and an experiment for later internationalizations.” For Grumbach, internationalization must begin with the Ruhr because Germany had begun and lost the last war. He said that the Socialists should also agree in principle on a future internationalization of Luxembourg, Belgium, Northern France and the Saar territory. Markscheffel quoted Grumbach as saying that, “Any other attitude would place us automatically in an irreconcilable opposition with the newly fashioned position of the French government” and make the SFIO more susceptible to Communist propaganda against the Third Force government. The left-wing Marceau Pivert, who had the Seine Federation as his power base, had called for the party to support simultaneous internationalization but, as Grumbach told Markscheffel, “These people around Pivert want to conduct foreign policy without taking into account in the slightest the realpolitische preconditions for foreign policy.” He went on to say that, “They proclaim something or other and have no idea whether their proclamations can in reality be carried through.”

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260 Markscheffel to Parteivorstand, 9 April 1948, EO 451, AdsD.
The SPD leadership had also hoped to win Léon Blum to their view, but he had recently published a series of articles insisting again on the Ruhr’s immediate internationalization. To the SPD leadership’s dismay, Blum told Markscheffel that, “I am in these questions completely one with comrade Grumbach...you can all take what he says in these series of questions as though it had come from me.” Markscheffel reported that the party’s secretary general, Guy Mollet, had told him that, “in the German question, in particular in the Ruhr question, he was of the same opinion as Léon Blum.” In all of Markscheffel’s interviews, French Socialists expressed hope that Markscheffel could explain and gain the support of the SPD for the SFIO’s predicament that, though the party supported an internationalization of European, rather than simply Ruhr industry, it did not have the political power to sway the French government to support such a policy. At the 24-25 April 1948 Socialist Conference in Paris, Grumbach proposed a three-point program for the Ruhr: the expropriation of the coal and metal magnates; the socialization of this expropriated property on an international basis; and the erection of an international supervisory body with authority over the management of production and distribution.

Schumacher’s handwritten notes on Markscheffel’s letter show that a clash was in the making. Schumacher, working from his sick bed, wrote on the back of the letter “colonial status,” within which the Ruhr workers would have “a foreign management,” that such a program would provide “stimulus for nationalism through political formulas based on class,” and that, “the SPD has no interest in” going forward “before the others” with internationalization. Here Schumacher found the agreement of DGB chair Hans Böckler, who threatened to conduct a general strike against any “regime of force as well as all unjustified control measures for the Ruhr...that were a cover for political or economic hegemonic efforts.” Crucially, Schumacher also had the support of Fritz Henssler, who expressed the fear that, “one wishes to make the Ruhr territory into a mere raw material provider for Western Europe.” The SPD Central Committee published its position eleven days before the inter-socialist conference opened:

On the question of the Ruhr territory, German Social Democracy cannot agree to any arrangement that removes the territory from German jurisdiction (Verfügungsrecht). An international supervision of production and distribution must be tied with two

261 Ibid.
262 Grumbach Report, “Deutschland und die Probleme der Ruhr.”
263 Markscheffel to Parteivorstand, 9 April 1948.
265 9 April 1948, Parteivorstand (PV) 1948, AdsD.
preconditions: a German participation and that it be applied to all heavy industry in the
economic territories of Germany and Western Europe.

The party delegated its vice president, Erich Ollenhauer, as well as Carlo Schmid, Willi Eichler,
and Fritz Henssler to represent the party at the conference on the Ruhr.\footnote{For the 7 June 1948 conference in Vienna, the SPD delegated Erich Ollenhauer, Herta Gotthelf, Carlo Schmid, Fritz Henssler, Ernst Reuter and invited the trade unionist Viktor Agartz to attend as a guest. “Staatsrechtliche Entwicklung und Ruhrprobleme,” 7 May 1948, PV 1948, AdsD.}

At the 24-25 April conference in Paris, the SPD succeeded in delaying a public socialist
resolution on the Ruhr. The socialist delegates agreed to grant more time to crafting a common
position and scheduled a conference for June 1948. In the meantime, positions hardened. At a
SPD Central Committee meeting on 6 May 1948, Ollenhauer charged the party with constructing
a proposal on the Ruhr’s future for the next conference. In the ensuing discussion, it became
clear that the SPD would insist on property ownership for the German people. The SPD decided
that it could agree to an international supervision of the Ruhr to prevent German rearmament, but
not to manage heavy industry or to oversee the distribution of its production. Henssler expressed
hope at the meeting that the SPD could win Labour Party support for its position. In a letter to
the Central Committee four days later, Henssler explained his position at length.\footnote{Henssler to Parteivorstand, 10 May 1948, Fritz Henssler 48, AdsD.}

His demands were nearly identical in tone and content with the official position that the party publicized in a
pamphlet dated five days later, “The German Social Democratic Party and the Ruhr,” written by
Schumacher from his sick bed.\footnote{In it Schumacher writes, “The internationalization of the Ruhr would make impossible the internationalization of the remaining sections of Western European industrial centers...It would strengthen nationalist agitation...When the real possibility of a simultaneous program of internationalization of the Western European heavy industry under equal conditions is not on hand, then socialization stands for the German Social Democratic party on the immediate agenda....The transfer of leading functions to Allied bodies is therefore to be avoided because the opposition between employers and employees should not be undermined at the national level and it would create propagandistic difficulties for daily praxis that would awaken a situation that would be similar to that of a colonial status.” PV 1948, AdsD. The otherwise conciliatory Max Brauer, who later supported the Schuman Plan, offered a similar assessment in the SPD Central Committee: “I have the feeling that the three years since the capitulation...will be considered later historically as the colonial period of postwar Germany.” Eröffnung der Tagung des Parteivorstandes und des Parteiausschusses (29.6.48—15, 20 Uhr), EO 72, AdsD.}

They are worth quoting at length because Henssler lays out the rationale with which the SPD approached French proposals for the Ruhr for the next three years. His letter demonstrates how memory politics and the political conditions of the Ruhr granted
Henssler a power within the national party to shape the SPD’s response to SFIO proposals for
internationalization:
A one-sided international administration of the Ruhr industrial territory cannot be considered as a beginning for [European] internationalization. Rather, it raises the impression—and has the effect—of forcing a colonial status on the Ruhr...Our agreement to such an internationalization would prepare the path for a nationalist atmosphere of hate that would destroy all conditions for a true understanding and cooperation. In addition: the strongest and most effective argument against the Bolshevik influence is that they [sic] are pursuing in the Eastern zone a great number of dismantlements and the Russification of valuable operations. The demand of the French Socialists would have the same result. We must say to it: impossible. If one wishes to manage the Ruhr question primarily through the point of view of reparations (Wiedergutmachung) in the style of old methods, then it would be a false policy to demand that democrats take the responsibility. They expect us to commit political suicide and destroy all hope for a new arrangement in order to repay the debts caused by Hitlerism...The French demand is rooted in old methods. They wish to dress it up [beschöningen] with a new name.269

Under these conditions, the SPD and SFIO had opposing reactions when on 6 June 1948 the Allies made public the fruits of months of secret negotiations in the London Accords. The essence of the London Accords was the fusion of the French zone with the Bizone, the creation of a constitutional committee, and the introduction of a West German currency. The Accords also paved a path towards West German statehood. In return, the French government attained an assurance of “the firm determination of the [Allied] governments to not proceed to any general retreat of the occupying forces from Germany until the peace of Europe is assured” and that, “the occupation of Germany should continue for a long period.”270 In France, uproar against the Accords erupted across the political landscape, including within the French Socialist Party.271 Pressed by the U.S. team, French negotiators had, in fact, made substantial and far-reaching concessions on the German question.272 The Marshall Plan proposal and French diplomatic pressures to create a military alliance with the U.S. had allowed the U.S. delegation to gain a larger degree of maneuver with the French government on the German question. In agreeing to the Accords, the French delegation forfeited not only the bases of the de Gaulle/Bidault thesis of

269 Henssler to Parteivorstand, 10 May 1948, PV 1948, AdsD.
271 Gerbet writes that, “The London recommendations elicited in France, even before their publication, a violent opposition from the political parties, the press, public opinion and even within the government and the parliamentary majority.” Pierre Gerbet, Le relèvement, 1944-1949 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1991), 287.
272 “On 23 February 1948 the first session of the London conference opened. On the 27th René Massigli presented again the French project for an International Authority for the Ruhr at the opening of the fourth session. According to the French proposal, the future international authority, including henceforth ‘German representatives,’ would supervise not only the distribution of the Ruhr coal, but would also have the power to approve the production plans, investments and financial policy, guaranteeing in that way the supervision of the managements of the heavy industries. In addition, rights to investigate and station an international force would guarantee the power of the organization to [carry through] sanctions...” Lefèvre, op cit., 156.
splitting the Ruhr from Germany, but had also agreed to the creation of an International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR), which was granted only a shadow of the powers demanded by the SFIO and the French government. Crucially, French negotiators had failed to gain the Allies’ agreement to internationalize Ruhr industry. Opinion was split on the accords within the SFIO. Blum said privately to Lapie that,

“The agreement is poor but one cannot not vote for it. We must focus our efforts on article 12, the Ruhr. The powers of the new authority only deal with distribution. If we do not achieve the internal supervision of management we will fall back on the exterior supervision similar to that of the League of Nations, that is to say, little at all.”

Showing that some basis for agreement remained with the SPD, Blum went on to say that, “What matters is that the English and Americans do not oppose the socialization of the Ruhr by the Germans.” In the Foreign Affairs Committee and in a speech to the National Assembly, Philip offered a vigorous defense of the Accords but demanded that the powers of the IAR be strengthened.

In its 17 June 1948 resolution, the French National Assembly approved the London Accords by a mere six votes, thanks only to the addition of a resolution demanding further negotiations to internationalize the Ruhr territory. By insisting on this resolution, the French Assembly explicitly rejected the preamble of the London Accords, which had claimed that, “these recommendations form a whole; their principal dispositions are in effect interdependent” and “their approval by each government of their totality is the necessary condition for the approval of it by the others.” In Lapie’s view, it was only the fear that the Accords’ rejection would strengthen Gaullist agitation against the fragile government that led a sufficient number of deputies to rally in favor of ratification.

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274 “Of all the participants in the general discussions only Philip (S.F.I.O.) and [Marc] Scherer (M.R.P.) did not demand the rejection of the recommendations or the resumption of negotiations.” Adalbert Korf, *Le revirement de la politique française à l’égard de l’Allemagne entre 1945 et 1950* (Lausanne: Imprimerie franco-suisse, 1965), 252.
275 The London Accords passed the Foreign Affairs Commission by one vote, 21 to 20 with two abstentions on 9 June. Commission des Affaires étrangères, C/15333, Archives nationales (AN).
276 The six-point resolution also demanded the expropriation of the Ruhr owners, an occupation of Germany during a sufficiently long period so as to assure French security and reparations, the prevention of the recreation of a centralized government, the search for a four-power accord on the German question, and actions toward the creation of an economic and political organization for Europe.
277 Buffet, *op. cit.*, 142-43.
At a cabinet meeting on 11 June, French President Vincent Auriol, a Socialist, expressed his “fears” that “we risk having [another Munich] or a brawl [bagarre].” Socialist Christian Pineau wished to accept the Accords in principle, accompanied with reservations, while Jules Moch “wanted to subordinate parliamentary approval to the obtaining of a certain number of ameliorations.” This was, in fact, how the National Assembly chose to proceed in this atmosphere of geopolitical uncertainty. Having obtained a resolution to expand the powers of the IAR, the SFIO held ranks by demanding party discipline on the vote, which helped to assure the Accords’ narrow passage. In return, the SFIO demanded Bidault’s head, whose policies they had long despised. In the next government, Robert Schuman replaced Georges Bidault as Foreign Minister, a post that remained in his hands until December 1952.

Although the London Accords continued limits on industrial production and the policy of dismantlement, the SPD leadership was largely relieved that the supervisory organs agreed to by the Allies were less interventionist and intrusive than previously feared. In his private notes, Ollenhauer stressed the positive aspects of the London accords, in particular, the abandonment of efforts to split the Ruhr from Germany and to internationalize the territory. Pointing to the success of Communist and Gaullist propaganda against the accords in France, Ollenhauer wrote that, “Without France no European order is possible” and that, “France’s approval [of the Accords] lies in our interests,” a view he repeated two weeks later to the SPD Central Committee. Transnational conversations and reports by Markscheffel led Ollenhauer to sympathize with the reasons for the SFIO’s position: “And the difficulty lies in the fact that there is a united front of nationalists in France against a reasonable arrangement on this question; from the Communists to the Gaullists there is a front against [the French coalitional] government and especially against the French Socialists.”

In response to CDU overtures to form a cross-party front to oppose the occupation authorities, a SPD delegation including Erich Ollenhauer and Fritz Heine met with Adenauer. The SPD leaders refused his request that the two parties conduct a united campaign against the Accords. In the SPD press, Ollenhauer warned darkly against nationalist tendencies within German society seeking to take advantage of the Accords to resurrect revanchist politics. At the 28-30 June 1948 Central Committee meeting on the London Accords, Ollenhauer warned that a

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278 Ibid., 144-46.
279 Ibid., 123-24, 148. In an April 1948 letter, the five Socialist ministers wrote a scathing attack against Bidault’s tenure as Foreign Minister in a letter to Prime Minister Robert Schuman.
united campaign including the Communists and Christian Democrats could reawaken the politics of the 1923 Ruhr struggle and reproduce its result, thereby reviving a dangerous nationalist climate. Ollenhauer at this time favored an accommodating attitude for the SPD to counter the more aggressive policies of the CDU, which Ollenhauer believed was considering removing its deputies in protest from the parliamentary bodies set up by the Western Allies. Ollenhauer called the agreement “clearly a progress.” Despite this optimism, the party decided to adopt a reserved public attitude in large part due to the efforts of Henssler, who argued that:

We must explain that a final position on the London Accords is not possible as long as all of the details are not known. We cannot approve the one-sided control of the Ruhr’s heavy industry.

In a sign of the influence Henssler had within the Central Committee on these issues, he succeeded in striking from the resolution a paragraph that approved in principle an international supervision of the Ruhr. Henssler was a hardliner within the SPD on this question, and his influence was in large part responsible for the SPD’s move towards a more intransigent attitude over the next year. The SPD went on to place conditions on its acceptance of the Accords, conditions all of which focused on the Ruhr: the right to socialize industry and to determine the final property arrangement for the Ruhr must lie in German hands; the SPD would accept French government calls for security guarantees only to the extent that it be allowed to supervise German industry to prevent rearmament; and the SPD supported European unity efforts and the creation of an international regime for heavy industry as long as German industry entered on the same conditions as its partners.

Although the SFIO and SPD had reached a consensus on a combined resolution supporting the London Accords at the Socialist conference in Vienna, in which the SPD agreed to the military, but not economic, security demands of the SFIO, this agreement merely papered over the continued differences between the parties over how to react in practice, rather than in principle, to developments over which they only had partial control. The Conference approved a common resolution without knowing the exact content of the Accords, which was in large part a

280 Ollenhauer went on to say that we responded “in our attitude towards Adenauer’s arguments that the latent danger of nationalism among the Germans seems so large that we found his proposal to counter nationalism through a united front to be the worst path possible.” Gemeinsame Sitzung von Parteivorstand und Parteiausschuss in Hamburg am 29. und 30. Juni 1948, PV 1948, EO 72, AdsD.
281 Parteivorstand Hamburg, 28 June 1948, PV 1948, AdsD.
282 See for instance Henssler’s statements in the 21-22 January 1949 SPD Central Committee meeting on the Ruhr Statute, PV 1948, AdsD.
victory for a Labour Party eager to have European Socialists endorse the outcome of negotiations in which its government had played a leading role. In a compromise that gave satisfaction to the SPD’s position, the resolution called for the inclusion of the Ruhr territory in an international supervisory organization that included all of European heavy industry.

Although French Socialists had always put forward a reconciliatory policy towards German reconstruction within French politics, the London Accords threatened not only the party’s internal political position, but also the party’s commitment to modernize the French economy. Nobody knew what powers the IAR would have in practice and, therefore, it was unclear whether French industry would receive a sufficient supply of coal and coke to meet the Monnet Plan’s targets. The difficulty for the French government intensified with the unleashing of the strike wave in October-December 1948, which increased France’s reliance on coal imports. Fearful that the Fourth Republic might soon fall under the combined assault of the PCF and the Gaullist Party (RPF), a revision of the London Accords appeared imperative to French Socialists for the survival of the regime. Influenced by the ideas of Blum and Monnet, the French Socialist President of the Republic Vincent Auriol helped craft the government’s position in early August 1948. The government took the position that the Allies could allow property and administration to remain in German hands in return for the creation of a regional control mechanism, like the Tennessee Valley Authority, to oversee production and the distribution of industrial resources.

In this context, relations between the SFIO and SPD began to deteriorate. The French Socialists lacked the power within the French government to meet the SPD’s condition that it internationalize French industry. The party’s leaders, though, remained unwilling to sacrifice the supervision of Ruhr coal. German Social Democrat Willi Eichler sought the mediation of the Labour Party but his efforts were shut down by the SPD party secretariat under Fritz Heine, who responded to Eichler’s letter by writing that,

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283 Hitchcock writes that for the rest of 1948, “French officials had to keep the modest retreat that the London Accords represented from turning into a rout.” Hitchcock, op cit., 101.

284 In August-September 1948, because of its trade deficit with its zone, “The French found themselves in the situation in which they had to either reduce imports of coal, to pay for them immediately or to increase their exports of essential goods to Germany.” Gérard Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine et la construction européenne 1944-1954 (Paris: Ministère des Finances, 1992), 621.

We believe that a common French/German declaration on the Ruhr cannot be created (at the present moment) that would be useful to them or to us. It is much better to avoid under the present circumstances written commitments and rather just attempt to discuss orally together our different standpoints or find another way so far as possible to come together or at least make clear the conviction among ourselves that the other side does not harbor any bad intentions.  

On the eve of the next round of Western Allied negotiations set to open 11 November 1948 in London, the U.S. and British governments came to a bilateral agreement on the Ruhr and published it as Law 75 of the Bizone. The SPD and German public in general were furious to learn that the U.S. and G.B. intended to carry through a large program of factory dismantlements, though the number had been reduced considerably compared to previous Allied announcements. The French government and SFIO, for their part, were livid for a different set of reasons. Excluded from the negotiations, they rejected what they saw as a fait accompli. Law 75 envisioned the return of management to German hands, leaving the question of ownership to a future elected national government. In a gesture of goodwill, Britain and the U.S. accepted the French delegation’s demand that it be included immediately in the current organs administrating the Ruhr industries in Essen (the Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung). Philip publicly denounced the U.S.-British agreement in the name of the SFIO and the party approved a National Assembly resolution that demanded its revision. In defending the SFIO’s thesis on internationalization, Socialist deputy Jean Le Bail argued that nationalization would have been a great weapon for Hitler. At the same time, Philip put forward the SFIO view that the Ruhr Statute should lead to “the formation of a common sales cartel for coal and steel,” and that a “public cartel [should be placed] in the hands of the European nations as a whole,” which, as Lapie said, should be an acceptable solution for the SPD.

In a tenacious series of negotiations on the design for the future IAR, French diplomats extracted important concessions intended to give teeth to the new organization. In the Ruhr Statute made public on 28 December 1948, the Allies agreed to grant the IAR not only the right to supervise and influence the distribution of Ruhr production, but also to transfer the supervisory powers of the Deutsche Kohlenbergbau-Leitung over Ruhr management to the IAR.

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286 Eichler to Heine, 6 August 1948; Heine to Eichler, 12 August 1948, Willi Eichler (WE) 110, AdsD.
287 Philip told the National Assembly that the British and American military authorities had no right to set policy outside the channels of Allied inter-governmental negotiations and that no government could itself make final decisions about German property. 30 November 1948, JO, 7312.
288 2 December 1948, JO, 7327.
once a German government formed. The IAR was to coordinate Ruhr production with goals set by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), forbid discriminatory practices, and balance foreign needs for coal with internal German consumption. The Allies intended that the IAR ensure French economic security, while the military program of preventing remilitarization and rearmament would be taken up by a different organization, the Office of Military Security. The agreement was a clear, though fragile, victory for the French delegation.

The announcement of the Ruhr Statute gave occasion for a nasty and public dispute between the SFIO and SPD that set the contours for how the parties would react to the Schuman Plan. A chorus of protest from the ranks of the SPD greeted the announcement of the Ruhr Statute. The concrete design of the IAR remained to be worked out over the course of 1949. Nevertheless, though with different degrees of nuance, the national leadership and the NRW SPD condemned the agreement. That the SPD argued so forcefully against an arrangement the content of which remained unknown signaled that a crisis in trust towards the Allies and, in particular, towards the French government, had become a driving motive in the party’s policies and strategy. As we shall see, the SPD was fighting the design for what turned out to be an impotent agency. At the time, though, the party leadership and NRW SPD emphasized the potential powers of an organization the actual powers of which remained largely to be determined.

Henssler and NRW Economic Minister Nölting developed the most comprehensive critiques of the IAR in January 1949 and led the charge against the treaty in the NRW Landtag. A day after its announcement, Henssler claimed that the treaty “came close to a colonial statute,” an assertion that Nölting repeated. The party leadership took up this argument in only a slightly less polemical form. The potential powers of the new organization threatened to make nonsense of any future German sovereignty because control of Ruhr industry by the Allies would remove from a German government its ability to set its own economic policy. The IAR, like the German military in previous decades, would constitute a “State within the State.” Instead, the party must continue its pursuit of socialization. Ollenhauer, for his part, saw the SFIO’s embrace of the IAR as a betrayal of the compromise that he and Grumbach had reached at the Vienna Conference. With an eye to the SFIO, he argued that the SPD, for its part, still felt itself bound

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by the socialist conference’s resolution. The SPD leadership argued that the SFIO’s argument that this was a first step towards the internationalization of European heavy industry was invalid because the treaty said nothing of extending the regime to other nations. The SPD found itself in alliance with the West German trade union leadership, which quickly rejected the Allied agreement as well. The SPD press celebrated the enthusiastic embrace that it claimed the Ruhr working classes had for the SPD’s stance on the Ruhr Statute. Though the CDU rejected the Ruhr Statute as well, its tone and response was this time far more moderate.

To the SPD’s fury, Philip took the SFIO’s campaign in favor of the Ruhr Statute to the Ruhr territory itself. In January 1949, Philip held a series of conferences, touring the Ruhr cities of Dortmund, Bochum, and Hagen. He presented the Ruhr Statute as a first step towards a European economic union and met NRW Minister President Karl Arnold of the CDU, who was developing similar views. Yet, seemingly unbeknownst to SPD leaders, Philip was willing to go considerably further in accommodating the wishes of the SPD than much of the rest of the SFIO leadership. The noisy agitation of a minority in Germany had awakened a general fear in Germany’s neighbors that nationalism was again rearing its head in Western Germany. As Germany lurched towards national elections, many believed that a sizable part of the electorate silently agreed with the fulminations of right-wing demagogues. By early 1949, SFIO leaders began to see dangerous signs within German politics as well, and considered the upcoming German national elections with a sense of foreboding.

Like the SPD, the SFIO could not know the outcome of the elections slated for August 1949, but a deep sense of mistrust led the party leadership to harden its position on internationalization and, for the first time, to formally reject a policy for the socialization of Ruhr property under a German national government. There had always been divisions within the party on this question but, in general, public statements had been supportive of the SPD’s socialization.
campaign. Philip was especially sympathetic. At a February 1949 Directing Committee meeting, Philip reported on his trip through the Ruhr. He called the dismantling of factories “economic craziness” and said that, “From the moment of an internationalization of management, property is of no interest...I am a partisan of the nationalization of the [Ruhr] property.”

That same meeting, though, made clear that the climate had shifted within SFIO leadership circles. Party leader Mollet not only expressed concern about renewed nationalism in Germany, but also presented the SPD as one of its bearers. The SPD campaign against the IAR was an important example but, more so were reports that, “in Germany the socialist party still shows the effects of the political past of Nazism; purification has not been conducted by our comrades.” As for the IAR, Mollet stated darkly that, “If the German Social Democrats had understood their just role, they would be in agreement with us to adopt the idea of internationalization.” The Committee agreed to a suggestion that it strengthen its public calls for an extension of internationalization to cover other European countries. Then it voted to support the internationalization of the Ruhr property rather than its socialization. Mollet said that, “Personally I remain profoundly hostile to any German control of the Ruhr due to the average spirit prevailing still today in Germany.” Only Philip, Marceau Pivert, and Oreste Rosenfeld voted against this provision. The committee did not heed Philip’s stated worry, which was put forth by the SPD as well, that internationalization would strengthen “neo-nationalism” in Germany.

In essence, the SFIO and SPD rift on the IAR and, later, on the Schuman Plan, came down to contrary assessments of whether the French government had in fact experienced a conversion or turn (tournant) on the German question under Foreign Minister Robert Schuman from 1948-1950. In the view of SFIO leaders, the French government had abandoned the revanchist policies reviled by both parties in 1945-1947. They considered the more limited demands of the French government to be imperatives for French economic and military security that could not be further reduced. Whereas SFIO leaders saw the IAR and, in particular, the Schuman Plan, as departures from traditional French policies, the SPD leadership viewed them as their reincarnation.

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294 SFIO comité directeur, 2 February 1949, OURS.
295 SFIO comité directeur, 16 February 1949, OURS.
At a press conference in March 1950, Schumacher called Schuman “a much friendlier and more polite man” than, one would presume, Bidault, but this did not amount to recognizing a change in French policy. Historians have criticized Schumacher for not perceiving the sea-change that had occurred in official French policy. However, the historiography on the Schuman Plan provides a more complicated picture of the French “turn.” Some historians, usually emphasizing the Plan’s political components, have considered the Schuman Plan “a complete rupture” with previous French policy. Historians who have examined in detail the economic components of the Schuman Plan, on the other hand, have demonstrated that the Plan sought to achieve a number of traditional French economic goals through a different set of means. The SFIO stressed the positive aspects of the policy that sought to integrate Germany

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296 Schumacher Pressekonferenz am 24. März 1950, KS 50, AdsD.
297 “Schumacher...did not always discern with precision the evolution of the German policy of the Quai d’Orsay under [Foreign Minister Robert] Schuman.” Jean-Paul Cahn, Le Parti social-démocrate allemand et la fin de la quatrième république (1954-1958) (Berlin: Peter Lang, 1996), 4. “Though French policy relaxed after the first two or three years of the occupation, Schumacher maintained that basically it had not changed, as French insistence upon a decentralized German state during the 1948-49 dispute over the Basic Law. He claimed that French proposals in the early 1950’s for the economic and military integration of the new German state with other European nations were aimed at keeping Germany permanently feeble, divided and under French domination.” Lewis Joachim Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 174.
298 Bossuat wrote that the Plan was “a complete rupture.” Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine, 752. Willis, who focuses on politics, writes that, “Schuman broke completely with the foreign policy that since [Cardinal] Richelieu’s time had been based on the axiom that the weakness of Germany is the strength of France.” F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1943-1967, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 1965), 81.
299 Alan Milward writes that, “the Schuman proposals [...] far from being a change of economic and political direction, evolved logically from the consistent pursuit of France’s original domestic and foreign reconstruction aims.” Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 380. William Diebold writes in his inaugural study that the Schuman Plan “proposed going, at one leap, well beyond what had already been done, yet it was linked with what had gone before, both in its aims and in some of its methods.” William Diebold, The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1959 (New York: Praeger, 1959). According to Korff, “At first view, the Schuman Plan seems a complete reversal of the French policy regarding Germany. Analyzed in light of the constants of French policy, one perceives however that the Plan takes up all the themes that had always guided French policy regarding Germany...despite the turn that it announced, the solution was, in fact, profoundly French...[The Plan’s originality] resides in having adopted so soon after the war the positive variant, not new, of course, but long neglected by French diplomacy” and “offering to the European countries the possibility of resolving themselves their own problems, of recovering gradually all of their freedom for political action and to follow their own path.” Adalbert Korff, Le revirement de la politique française à l’égard de l’Allemagne entre 1945 et 1950 (Lausanne: Imprimerie franco-suisse, 1965), 173. Hitchcock notes that, “the shift from confrontation to cooperation did not imply any weakening of French determination to contain Germany and bolster French influence.” Hitchcock, op cit., 74. Trausch cites a Quai d’Orsay memo that the Schuman Plan was a “second Monnet Plan,” which was necessary because the Commissariat General’s first plan had largely failed, to argue for a continuity in French policy. “Here the continuity in goals is clear.” Gilbert Trausch, “Der Schuman-Plan zwischen Mythos und Realität: Der Stellenwert des Schuman-Planes,” Historische Zeitschrift 21 (1995): 115. In Nausch’s view, “A comparison of the Monnet and Schuman Plans, especially the creation and functioning of the General Commissariat and the High Authority, justifies the claim that the Schuman-Plan was intended as a continuation of the Monnet-Plan on the European level.” Eckart F. Nausch, Die Entwicklung der deutschen und
within a united Europe on formally equal terms. It was a policy, in their view, that abandoned the punitive goals of the early postwar period and set a framework for peaceful cooperation between the German and French governments. During a debate on the Schuman Plan on 12 July 1951, however, Carlo Schmid asserted that, “it is not a beginning for Europe, but rather a piece [meant] to carry through the [French] policy of the postwar period.”\(^{300}\) In responding to the Ruhr Statute in early 1949, Henssler and Deist both perceived and praised the more positive attitude emanating from Schuman’s ministry but still rejected the Statute as containing too many traditional French demands.\(^{301}\) The following section examines the substance of their claims before turning to the debate that ensued between the SFIO and SPD from the Petersberg Accord of November 1949 to the ratifications of the European Coal & Steel Community by the Bundestag in January 1952. The SPD’s position can only be understood through an examination of 1) French policy on the Saarland, 2) French economic competition policy and the Monnet Plan, and 3) French policies on cartelization. An examination of these factors makes clear that there is more to SPD claims of continuity in French policy than historians have generally granted in their assessments of SPD policy in the initial stage of European integration.

### 3.4 Poison on the Moselle River: The Saarland Between France and Germany

The issue of the Saarland plagued French-German relations from 1946 until the two governments reached a resolution in 1956 under Guy Mollet’s Socialist-led coalition government. Within the tripartite coalition of 1945-47, the SFIO had sought to block any annexation of the Saarland, but it approved the economic union of the Saarland with France that occurred in 1946 and the introduction of the French franc for a provisional phase. Unlike French Christian Democrats, who made political annexation a part of their official platform in 1945, and most other French parties, the SFIO recognized that the Saarland was culturally and historically German and expected it to return one day to German sovereignty. Economic imperatives, however, led the

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\(^{301}\) Das Ruhr-Statut: Vortrag von Dr. Heinrich Deist, gehalten auf der Arbeitsdirektoren-Konferenz am 27./28. Januar 1949 in Berkhöpen, Erich Potthoff 41, AdsD. Henssler on Westfälische Rundschau, 19 June 1949, pointed to the danger that, “the Ruhr will be abused as a competitive buffer by its supervisors.” KS 47, AdsD.
SFIO to refuse an immediate return. In light of the severe coal shortages of the initial postwar period and the uncertain fate of the Ruhr territory, the SFIO was unwilling to sacrifice French claims for Saar coal.

The SFIO had reason to be satisfied with the situation in the Saar by the beginning of 1948. While the French government blasted the British occupation for the meager recovery of coal production in the Ruhr, which had only reached 55% of its 1938 level in October 1947, the figure was 80% in the Saar. However, the coal was of only limited use to French industry because it was not the type required for Lorraine steel production, which remained reliant on the higher quality output from the Ruhr. In addition, while clamping down on unwelcome political agitation, the French occupiers pursued a more liberal economic policy than they did in their zone of occupation, raising the salaries of miners, assuring scarce steel supplies for Saar industry, and raising ration levels. This helped to create an initial period of political calm and strengthened an autonomous movement seeking closer accommodation with France, despite a political approach that repressed pro-German parties. Nevertheless, SFIO leaders were uncomfortable with the political situation in the Saarland. Mollet correctly predicted in early 1947 that a referendum in the Saar for economic union would come out in France’s favor. He noted to the SFIO Directing Committee, though, that such a vote would be “for not particularly noble reasons” because it would be the result of French occupation efforts to woo the Saar population through the granting of material privileges.

SPD policy on the Saar and Ruhr developed in tandem and developments in both regions mutually reinforced the SPD conception of French policy. Like the Ruhr, SPD leaders argued that French policy in the Saar strengthened KPD propaganda by offering a Western example of the annexations taking place in the East. Schmid and some others, though, went to great length to balance a denunciation of French policies with assertions that the situation was far worse in the eastern regions. As the French government successfully instituted the “Saar Statute” in early 1950, German Social Democrats characterized it as a “protectorate constitution” backed by a

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302 Sylvie Lefèvre, *op cit.*, 64. On 20 February 1948, the French government obtained from the Allies a concession that Saar coal would not be considered a part of the quotas for coal exports from Germany to France.

303 In its circular to the International Socialist Conference, the SFIO claimed that, “No one contests, in any respect, the advantages to be gained by the Saar population through economic union with France.” International Socialist Conference Circular No. 102/50, “The French Socialists and the Saar question,” 12 May 1950, Internationale Abteilung 02516, AdsD.

304 SFIO comité directeur, 19 February 1947, OURS.

“police state.”306 Time and again SPD speakers denounced the widespread violations of political freedoms in the Saar and the refusal by the French regime to grant licenses to pro-German parties. Jacques Freymond’s study demonstrates that the SPD was the most persistent of all German parties in raising the issue in the Bundestag during the length of the dispute from 1949 to 1955.307

Verbal attacks were only a part of the SPD’s arsenal in its battle against the detachment of the Saar from Germany. Here is not the place to reproduce the detailed historical studies analyzing the ground war that the SPD conducted against the French occupation of the Saar.308 Suffice to say that the secret funneling of money, propaganda and personnel between the western zones and the Saar, an effort led by SPD deputy Karl Mommer, represented in part a mirror to the surreptitious efforts that the SPD conducted in the postwar period to undermine Communist rule in Eastern Germany through its “Eastern bureau.”

For the SPD, French policy in the Saar was tangible proof that the French “turn” was more show than reality. The fate of the Saarland fueled the breakdown of SFIO-SPD relations from 1948 to 1951, and a controversy over the Saar’s status in international bodies led the SPD to reject Germany’s inclusion in the Council of Europe, the first institution for European unification in the postwar period. The SPD also fought against the inclusion of representatives of the autonomous Saar government in the international Socialist conference when the Saar Socialist Party, the Sozialistische Partei Saarlands (SPS), placed the SFIO in an embarrassing situation by applying for membership.

Policy on the Saar was a divisive issue within the SFIO leadership, which sought to balance its coalitional commitments and the need to import coal with pressures from the SPD and other socialist parties to revise French policy. Both the SFIO and SPD made considerable efforts to reach a consensus on the Saar, but each had to face the reality that neither party was the driving force behind their governments’ policy on this issue until Mollet formed a government in 1956. In socialist international meetings and in their speeches, SPD leaders recognized French economic interests in the Saar and agreed that an accord over the output of the Saar coal mines be made part of a deal for the Saar’s return to Germany. The question of property again divided

the parties, with Ollenhauer telling his international socialist colleagues that, “We want to stress that, although we recognize this right of the French government to exploit the Saar coal mines, we consider them to be German property under the administration of an occupying power.” Reproducing the SFIO approach to the Ruhr question, Mollet responded that, “The [Saar] mines should belong to an international body; the only solution is an international one, perhaps at first on a European basis.” To SPD objections that this occur simultaneously with the Europeanization of the Lorraine, the SFIO replied that this was “unrealistic” in light of present French government policies and that, “the discriminatory nature of this has been imposed upon us by events, as it is the circumstances resulting from the war” that were responsible for the present situation.309

Although SFIO leaders rejected the SPD’s claims that the Saar be immediately returned, they did support in principle a referendum for self-determination, a position unique at the time among French political parties. In laying out this position, Mollet told the Socialist conference that, “the population is predominately German and if a plebiscite were held in the Saar territory, the result would probably be the same as that of 1935” when the Saarlanders voted to return to German sovereignty.310 The parties agreed in April 1950 to set up a sub-committee to seek a socialist consensus on the Saar question. The commission’s report, issued in May 1950, gave satisfaction to much of the SFIO position in favor of an Europeanization of the Saar mines. It also called for a referendum on the territory’s future, but Mollet now objected that his party opposed this method for the present time, citing the dangers of a recrudescence of German nationalism.311 The SFIO hoped to delay any proposal for a long-term solution.312 As workers and miners began to protest French policies and the Saar government in 1950, the SPD made clear its intention to channel this anger. The party agreed to the resolution only because it

309 A year later the SFIO circular to the International Socialist Conference claimed that, “The system established by the Versailles Treaty, and in force until the plebiscite of 1935, gave France not merely privileges, but also a property right in the Saar, though it was attached neither politically nor economically to France.” International Socialist Conference Circular No. 102/50, “The French Socialists and the Saar question,” 12 May 1950, Internationale Abteilung 02516, AdsD.
310 Note that Mollet’s comments here come several years after the referendum approving the French-Saar Economic union. 15 April 1950, Comisco circular on “The Meeting of the Committee of the International Socialist Conference at Hastings, 18-19 March, 1950, Internationale Abteilung 02512, AdsD.
312 “On a long term basis it is most likely that the Saar will again be attached or called back to the German ‘Fatherland.’” International Socialist Conference Circular No. 102/50, 12 May 1950, “The French Socialists and the Saar question,” Internationale Abteilung 02516, AdsD.
condemned the bilateral Saar Statute between the French and Saar governments, but it refused to revise its public position, which had recently been affirmed at its 1950 party congress.

The SPD leadership bitterly resented the decision of the international socialist conference to admit representatives of the Saar Socialist Party as observers to its meetings in 1949-1950. The SFIO Directing Committee approved the inclusion of the SPS delegates as observers, rather than as full members.\textsuperscript{313} That such prominent figures as Georges Brutelle, Pierre Commin, Daniel Mayer, Mollet, and Rosenfeld voted against their inclusion reveals how sharply the SFIO split over this issue. The SPD was also incensed that the French government had linked its agreement to allow Germany to apply for membership in the newly constituted Council of Europe to German agreement for Saar membership in the Council. The SFIO continued to promote its alternative policies within the French government. In a nod to the SPD position, Mollet was the only French delegate to vote against the Saar’s inclusion in a Council of Europe session. While Mollet denounced the French government’s demand that the Saarland be admitted simultaneously with West Germany into the Council of Europe, he insisted that the SPD not predicate its agreement to join the Council on the exclusion of the Saar.\textsuperscript{314} The SPD leadership, in fact, favored European integration within the Council of Europe and Germany’s membership in it. Its only objection was the inclusion of the Saar, which, party leaders argued, amounted to a German recognition of the Saar’s separate status. The dispute on whether to approve German membership resulted in a serious rift within the SPD and bitter exchanges among prominent SPD figures, such Wilhelm Kaisen, Hermann Brill, Ernst Reuter and Max Bauer on the one hand, and the party leadership on the other. Nonetheless, the party congress overwhelmingly supported the party leadership’s position and the SPD Bundestag faction voted against the treaty.

The vote on the Council of Europe in June 1950 set a precedent for the SPD faction’s rejection of the European Coal & Steel Community in January 1952. First, the SPD immediately

\textsuperscript{313} SFIO comité directeur, 11 May 1949, OURS.
\textsuperscript{314} The SFIO circular stated that, “Simultaneous admission necessarily implies German recognition of the Saar’s admission to the Council of Europe, and thus implicitly the recognition of her political separation from Germany. However, our Party does not consider that Germany should make conditions concerning her joining of [sic] the Council of Europe. The French Socialists appreciate the courageous fight of the German Social Democrats against Neo-Fascism and Nationalism, they also know of the difficult situation in Germany today. Dictatorship has been the fate of this country for so long that the task of the rebirth of democracy is most difficult and slow; but the German Socialists must have the courage to adopt a positive attitude towards their adherence to the Council of Europe even though this may risk incurring a certain unpopularity.” International Socialist Conference Circular No. 102/50 “The French Socialists and the Saar question,” 12 May 1950, Internationale Abteilung 02516, AdsD.
rejected a part of the international socialist conference report that praised the Schuman Plan as a possible means for resolving the Saar issue through the Europeanization of Saar property. French Foreign Minister Schuman in 1951 sought again to link European integration proposals to German recognition of the French position in the Saar. French negotiators tried, but failed to win Adenauer’s endorsement for the Saar Statute, as the SPD conducted a virulent public campaign against French policy in the Saar. The SPD in fact strengthened Adenauer’s hand and the final treaty was accompanied by an exchange of notes in which the French government recognized the German government’s position that the final status of the Saar would be left to a definitive peace treaty. The governments resolved that the Saarland would be represented by the French delegation in the ECSC rather than have an independent delegation, a decision that the SPD also rejected.

There can be no doubt that the Saar issue played a large role in the SPD’s decision to reject Germany’s entrance into the Council of Europe and the ECSC Treaty. However, it is not clear that the issue would have sufficed to lead the SPD to oppose the Schuman Plan without the influence of other, though related, factors. That the SPD did not reject the Schuman Plan out of hand when it was announced in May 1950, during the height of agitation against the Saar Statute, indicates that more was at play in the party’s decision. The Saar issue helped forge a larger narrative within the SPD that the French government intended to confine West Germany to a subordinate position in the postwar European order. The SPD leadership viewed the French economic union with the Saar, as well as the policies enacted in the French zone of occupation, as a continuation of a long-term French effort to attain economic hegemony on the European continent through the exploitation of German raw materials for French interests.  

3.5 HEGEMONY THROUGH STEEL: SOCIALISTS AND THE QUEST FOR AN ECONOMIC BALANCE OF POWER

In its reaction to the announcement of the Ruhr Statute, SPD leaders developed a rationale that they later employed in their campaign against the Schuman Plan in 1951. In their view, the

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315 One example among many is *SPD-Pressedienst*, Dr. G. Lütkens, “Die Montanunion der ‘Festen Hand,’” 20 April 1951, WE 114, AdS D.
fundamentals of French policy had not changed since the time of Georges Clemenceau.\textsuperscript{316} The Ruhr Statute and the Schuman Plan, they argued, were in effect a French conspiracy to permanently change the economic balance of power between the two nations by crippling German steel production.\textsuperscript{317} Factory dismantlements, the naked exploitation of primary resources in the French occupation zone and the Saarland, and French policy towards the Ruhr were part of a unified effort to fulfill the Monnet Plan by eliminating the foundations for German competition in the future.\textsuperscript{318} The first victims of this effort, in the SPD leadership’s view, were the German

\textsuperscript{316} Carlo Schmid said of the Ruhr Statute that its control mechanism would be used “for the purpose of eliminating German competition from the world market, manipulated for the purpose of a one-sided exploitation of the German people’s work, for the purpose which once—it was the beginning of the twenties—was called ‘taking Germany by the belt’ [‘die an die Gurgel Deutschlands legen’]. We know what calamitous consequences this had...” Hauptausschuss-Sitzung vom 7. Januar 1949. Erklärung der SPD-Fraktion zum Ruhrstatut, vertreten durch Carlo Schmid, EO 453, AdsD. In September 1951 the SPD press wrote about the Schuman Plan: “In 1918 France began to build the Lorraine steel industry with large state subsidies. For this the French steel industry required the high-quality Ruhr coke because French coal was not good for the coking process. The relentless French reparations policy towards Germany, at first supported by the other victorious powers, aimed to weaken Germany’s heavy industry and assure the cheapest possible supply of Ruhr coal for French industry (autonomy of the Saar territory, attempt to found an autonomous Rhineland State, occupation of the Ruhr territory). This attempt failed in the end. After 1945 France wanted to permanently remove the superiority of German heavy industry. France was the most adamant power for the dismantlement policy that robbed Germany of all its modern equipment. The heavy industry plan worked out by the French manager Jean Monnet and approved by the government (Monnet-Plan) intended to build up French steel industry above German capacity, [and] therefore keep German capacity low and limit German steel production.” Der SPD Redner: Informationen und Unterlagen, “Der Schuman-Plan,” September 1951, WE 114, AdsD.

\textsuperscript{317} In the party brochure, “SPD and Ruhr Statute,” written by Schumacher and published in February 1949, Schumacher argues that, “For the time-being some of the countries may find it convenient to have Germany as a supplier of raw materials and not as a competitor in the export market.” KS 46, AdsD. Ollenhauer characterized French policy in his notes on the announcement of the June 1948 London Accords in this way: “Two [sic] factors are decisive for France. Security needs. Securing of the highest possible share of Ruhr production. Maintenance of the supremacy of steel production.” EO 72, AdsD. After the announcement of the December 1948 Allied Accords, Ollenhauer told a private meeting of SPD leaders and regional ministers that, “What is harder for us to accept [than French security guarantees] is that the French want to secure their aspiration for the supremacy of the French steel industry over the German through the arrangement for the Ruhr territory...” EO 73, AdsD. “Finally in the industry plan developed in London, in which German capacity is limited to 10.7 million tons [of steel], while the French and Benelux countries are allowed a doubling of their steel production compared to the prewar period and everyone knows that if the French steel industry wants to reach this level, it can only reach it with the support of the coal and coke of the Ruhr and only as long as it is assured that it does not have to face large German competition on the international market...in practice the Ruhr Statue is an attempt to stabilize national economies at the cost of another economy, namely at the cost of the German economy.” Fraktion Parlamentarischen Rat, Ministerpräsidenten, Minister Länderregierungen, PV PA-Sitzung, 22 January 1949, EO 73, AdsD. Schumacher used the same argument in a private SPD meeting in September 1951 to justify his opposition to the Schuman Plan: “As for the Schuman-Plan, Schumacher explains that it had become ever clearer which direction it was going—namely a guaranteed mastery of the Ruhr by foreign influence and a fundamental repositioning of European heavy industry at the expense of the German and a gradual washing away of German steel capacity.” Auszug aus der Rede Dr. Kurt Schumacher am 8. September 1951 in Bonn vor Parteivorstand und Parteiausschuss der SPD, PV 1951, AdsD.

\textsuperscript{318} In its brief for COMISCO, the party criticized the IAR and wrote that, “Germany must be a partner with equal rights and be protected against [efforts by] its real and potential competitors to use it as a competitive buffer.” Comisco Witten, “Vorschlag Deutschlands zur Änderung des Ruhrstatuts,” 2/PVT4 AdsD. In his notes, Ollenhauer wrote: “Steering of the type and scale of the Ruhr production based on the competitive needs of other interested
and, particularly, the Ruhr, working classes. As Kurt Schumacher’s private notes show, the party considered Adenauer’s government to be “passive” in the face of French initiatives and this passivity before an exploitative occupier risked channeling Germans’ frustration into the momentarily ascendant neo-fascist movement.319

Allied policies to limit German industry in the initial postwar period and the favoritism exhibited by the Marshall Plan administrators for French efforts to modernize the French steel industry provide the background for the SPD’s argument that a customs union for coal and steel was disadvantageous to German industry because of the different “starting conditions” for German industry.320 The SPD focused its critique at first on the impact that a customs union would have on German steel, rather than on the German coal industry. It did so because it was apparent to all that, until Monnet raised the cartel issue in fall 1950, the Schuman Plan posed no threat to the Ruhr coal industry; in fact, it was rather advantageous for Ruhr coal because it provided a large guaranteed market for its exports.321 The SPD view, on the other hand, that the Ruhr Statute and Schuman Plan aimed to continue the French assault on German steel was a central factor for the SPD decision to oppose the Schuman Plan. As Schumacher told a private party meeting in July 1950, “No, no, my dear assembly, we refuse to let ourselves warm to a program that favors German coal by disadvantaging German steel; such a disadvantage of German steel production would mean unemployment in those industrial areas where we have [realized] our best accomplishments, in iron transformation, in machine tools, in the construction of apparatuses, in electronic techniques.”322
SPD economic experts, including Fritz Baade, Erik Nölting and Hermann Veit, furnished the party leadership with statistics showing that German steel would enter a customs union at a strong disadvantage. The experts were correct that Marshall Plan funds allocated only a relatively small sum for the German steel and iron industries. Foreign investment flooded into the Ruhr coal mines, while it studiously avoided assisting German steel and iron. As Gillingham writes of these industries, “For whole months at a time the very physical existence of key production installations seemed in jeopardy.” In both France and Germany, private capital for large-scale investments was largely non-existent in the initial postwar period.

While the French government embarked on a massive investment program in heavy industry that reached its zenith in the years 1949-50, SPD economic experts bemoaned the seeming lack of interest in investment on the part of Adenauer’s government. The construction of the first two broad-band train systems in France, one in the Nord and the other in the Lorraine, symbolized French ambitions for its steel modernization program. Meanwhile, the Soviet occupation had removed Germany’s only broad-band train system for steel. As Veit and Nölting argued, only state investment financed through taxation could make up for lost time. The situation seemed all the more dangerous for German steel because the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) warned in 1949 of a massive European overproduction of steel by 1952-53. The UNECE’s conclusions were a result of a situation in which all the major western European nations were investing in large steel export industries for which there was not

323 Baade told the Bundestag on 18 January 1950 that the Marshall Plan had provided 12 dollars per capita to Germany in 1949/50, 17 to England, 22 to France, and 45 to the Netherlands. In his view, “This is a discrimination against Germany.” Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 18 January 1950, 836.
325 The broad-band steel train system was an innovation pioneered in the United States that allowed operators to produce over a million tons of high-quality steel per year. At the end of World War II, the U.S. had twenty of these trains, Germany one, and Great Britain one. France had none. The first broad-band steel train in France was built in 1946 by two Nord companies that combined to form Usinor after Economic Minister Pierre Mendès-France’s gave impetus to the project. Philippe Mioche, Le Plan Monnet: Génèse et élaboration, 1941-1947 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1987), 251. Three Lorraine companies, including the industrial giant de Wendel, after having lost their initial application for the trains in 1946 to the Nord companies, combined in 1948 to form La Sollac with the purpose of financing a broad-band steel train in Florange. As Poidevin writes, “The second [broad-band steel train] at Sollac where de Wendel had the major share represented a victory for the French planners over [U.S. High Commander] General [Lucius] Clay and the German steel industry which had made a bid for it to go to Germany.” Poidevin, “Le rôle personnel de Robert Schuman dans les négociations C.E.C.A. (juin 1950-avril 1951),” in Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge, 124. According to some historians, “Until the mid-1950s the American authorities, with the backing of the OEEC, prevented German industry from acquiring a new wide strip mill from the United States, even though the steel producers managed to secure entirely private funding.” Matthias Kipping, Ruggero Ranieri, and Joost Dankers, “The emergence of New Competitor Nations in the European Steel Industry: Italy and The Netherlands, 1945-1966,” Business history 42, 1, (2001): 69-99.
a sufficient projected future demand. In their final analysis of the Schuman Plan, SPD leaders argued that Germany’s economic competitors would utilize the proposed High Authority, which had the power to approve or disapprove certain investment plans, to freeze investment in German steel and iron and cement the transformation in national market shares that had occurred in the postwar period. Again, this argument represented a lack of trust in the intentions of Germany’s neighbor, a view rooted in long-term historical developments and party narratives.326

Did the position that the SPD developed on the Schuman Plan reflect a degree of paranoia? An examination of French historiography gives reason for pause before making such an assessment.327 Internal administrative documents and notes from the diplomatic service make clear that many French ministers and officials hoped to make use of the occupation period to gain a long-term competitive advantage for French steel.328 This appears to have initially been

326 Schumacher’s private notes from this period read, “Monnet-Plan expanded and supported by the Schuman Plan. Structural transformation of the French steel industry. Everything modernized. French iron industry is expanding and is encroaching upon the transformation industries. Consequences for German iron industry. High Authority decides about the distribution of consumption quotas.” KS 63, AdsD.


328 Economic Minister Pierre Mendès-France announced the resistance government’s policy in a radio address on 24 February 1945: “instead of sending, like before, Lorraine minerals to the Ruhr so that they may be converted in German heavy furnaces, contributing to Germany’s fortune, we should import Ruhr coke to convert in our heavy furnaces so that it contributes to French reconstruction and prosperity. For this purpose we must renovate our equipment, construct heavy furnaces and rolling mills...Master of this industry, France will be a great power not only because steel is the industry most fundamental for national defense, but also because the production and wealth of the nation depend on it...” Also, instructions dated 28 December 1946 to the French delegation of the three-party Allied council stated that, “France, Belgium and Luxembourg have the capacity to replace the Ruhr steel production on the European and world market and meet British and Dutch needs.” Gerbet, Le Relèvement, op cit., 138, 152. Later, “In response to American journalists, [Pierre Mendès-France] denied wanting to eliminate German steel, but he continued to plead in September 1948 for a new balance of steel to benefit France.” Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine, op cit., 658. An internal memo prepared by an economic sub-commission on German affairs in the Foreign Affairs ministry carried the title “Economic Disarmament of Germany.” It argued for the suppression of certain industries like airplane construction and machine-tools, and called for a severe curtailment of the German steel industry. Lefèvre, op cit., 17, 22. An internal memo from October 1945 also made this intention clear: “...in a measure to be determined, the Ruhr should be fed with semi-produced steel products of the French industry in the
Jean Monnet’s view as well. In addition, during the Schuman Plan negotiations, the effort of the French delegation to ban government subsidies to the proposed Community’s coal and steel industries, following what had been a period of restrictions on German production and expansion of French production, appeared to be a naked attempt to solidify the advantages French industry had gained from 1946 to 1950. Nevertheless, it is less clear that French negotiators were pursuing an offensive, rather than defensive, policy in their efforts to contain a German steel industry that was already rebounding dramatically by 1949-1950. Nor is it clear that French Socialists, who supported the Monnet Plan, intended to permanently eliminate or cripple German economic competitiveness.

To determine the SFIO’s position on German competition, it is necessary to examine again the views of Professor of Economics André Philip, who was the SFIO’s principal economic expert in this period. He wielded influence within the government, within the SFIO central committee, and in crafting SFIO economic resolutions at party congresses. As Economic Minister in early 1946, he wrote that, “The complete economic disarmament of Germany risks leading to unfavorable consequences for the French economy” and he argued that the French policy of limiting German industrial production had to be revised and brought into “harmony with the new German and French economic necessities.” Philip was willing to go a considerable way to meet German economic claims, telling the National Assembly that Germany’s need to import food and its greater population density caused by an influx of refugees

Lorrain, in exchange for the sending of refined coke from the Ruhr. German steel production and French-Belgian-Luxemburg steel production are closely tied but the smelting and steel production of the Allies should be raised to the detriment of Ruhr production. Instead of exporting French iron ore to Germany, we will import coal and refined coke for the Lorraine.” Rombeck-Jaschinski, op cit., 17. Hervé Alphand wrote a memo that, according to Hitchcock, “envisaged a control system in which German coal and coke were exported from the Ruhr to the Lorraine forges, steel would be exported to Germany. This arrangement would invert the traditional relationship of these two countries, whereby France had exported iron ore from Lorraine to be used in German forges for the production of steel that then was exported by Germany. France could thereby direct the Ruhr’s industries away from the production of steel and pig iron and toward the production of finished goods, using French steel.” Hitchcock, op cit., 53.

Su writes that in 1943, “Monnet suggested stripping Germany of its metallurgical industry.” And, “Even if he declined to accept integrally the American Morgenthau Plan, his core concern during and in the aftermath of WWII was how to reduce German industrial strength to the extent that any German aggression would become improbable in the future.” Hung-Dah Su, “Jean-Monnet’s Great Design for Europe and its Criticism, Journal of European Integration History 15, 2 (2009): 30. In an internal memorandum, Monnet wrote that, “France’s reconstruction will not progress unless the question of German industrial production and its competitive potential finds a quick solution.” Werner Bührer, “Dirigismus und Europäische Integration. Jean Monnet aus Sicht der deutschen Industrie,” Andreas Wilkens, ed., Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 212-13.

Hitchcock, op cit., 55.
made a Morgenthau-style de-industrialization plan impossible. He called the Ruhr “the industrial lung through which all the industry of continental Europe breaths.” French foreign policy must, he argued, recognize that imports from the Ruhr, and not just of coal, would have to be allowed to increase if the German economy was to avoid complete collapse.\(^{331}\)

Philip had developed a policy far in advance of many of his French counterparts, including of Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, the most celebrated Frenchmen among the early “founding fathers” of European integration. To Philip, German industrial recovery was necessary for the health of the European economy as a whole, a view that fit well with that of the U.S. and Benelux governments. However, Philip also envisioned a fundamental restructuring of the European economy, a view that put his ideas on a collision course with the SPD. He argued that the German government had used its steel exports in the interwar period to bully other countries to support its foreign policy. In 1946, he wrote that, “Rather than leave Germany the ability to export only in areas without military significance—but which might nevertheless be dangerously competitive with France (i.e., in areas such as textiles, optics, clocks, chemicals, etc.), we should rather authorize the Germans to conserve some part of their export markets of finished goods...while rigorously controlling the commercial organization of these markets.”\(^{332}\) Philip envisioned a realignment of French-German trade, with France exporting to Germany high quality steel that German steel-transforming industries would then convert into machine tools and other finished goods. That vision clashed with elements in the French Economic Ministry that intended not only to limit German steel, but also to eliminate high-quality German finished goods from the European market.\(^{333}\) In this regard Philip offered a far more conciliatory economic policy towards German recovery.

However, Philip’s economic vision did require a French supremacy in steel over the Ruhr steel industry, to be compensated by a liberal policy on exports of German finished goods. Thus, as Economic Minister, Philip adamantly supported continued limitations on German annual steel production and fought the Allied Control Council’s efforts to lift the steel quota from 7.5 to 10

\(^{331}\) 30 November 1948, *JO*, 7313-5.
\(^{332}\) Hitchcock, *op cit.*, 56.
\(^{333}\) A meeting chaired by Hervé Alphand on 9 August 1948 set French government policy for a new wave of German factory dismantlements. According to Bossuat, the meeting decided to target high technology. “The French wanted to hit the heart of German technological innovation: magnesium, aluminum, beryllium, vanadium radioactive isotopes, electronic tubes, synthetic oil, and reduce chemical production, the dying industry and heavy machine-tools.” Bossuat, *La France, l’aide américaine, op cit.*, 668.
million tons.\footnote{Hitchcock \textit{op cit.}, 69.} Out of government, Philip continued to promote an economic entente with Germany as chair of the steel committee of the OEEC and in his position on the United Nations’ steel committee for Europe, activities that culminated with his proposal for a European heavy industrial union in 1948-1949.

Socialist deputy Géraud Jouve, named \textit{rapporteur} by the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly to report on the activities of the IAR, shared Philip’s view. He submitted a motion that argued that, “the activity of the German transformation industries constitutes a more effective means to combat unemployment than the development of the steel industry,” and asked the government to “resolutely oppose any rise in German steel production and make efforts to find, on the level of a European agreement, a solution that takes account of the steel needs of German transformation industries that can be covered by deliveries from the steel industries of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg.”\footnote{Jouve motion to the Foreign Affairs Commission, 29 March 1950, C/13334, AN.} He pointed to the far greater number of employees in the German transformation industries. This was true, as it was in France as well, but such a policy would still have inflicted heavy damage on the Ruhr industries, as most of the transforming industries lay outside the Ruhr territory.

Philip’s position reflected well the general SFIO approach to German economic recovery in government. As Prime Minister, Blum asked Lapie:

\begin{quote}
Why should we conserve a point of view on Germany which no one believes anymore? What idea do we have of Germany? We must be clear. Germany works today at 18% of its prewar production. One cannot permanently block the development of this country. We must revise [French government policy].
\end{quote}

At the same time, though, Philip seconded Socialist Prime Minister Paul Ramadier’s public objection to the Allied increase in the German steel quota in July 1947. “The German renaissance,” Ramadier insisted, “must not come before our own.”\footnote{Philip told the SFIO congress in 1947 that, “Today we face our Allies’ desire for a German recovery and I believe that it must be said that Germany cannot remain as it is because it must also have its reconstruction, its industrial development, but we demand that this industrial development be linked to the industrial development of France, that the victim countries have priority because it is normal that this project intends also the increase of primary resources for the victim countries, that it truly be a general recovery for all the countries, that Germany not have a general recovery while France continues to weaken due to the present lack of coal and steel.” 1947 SFIO Party Congress, OURS.}

As de Gaulle thundered against the French government’s “policy of abandonment” on the German question, SFIO leaders shared the widespread malaise in French policy circles brought...
about in part by the rising statistics of German steel production. In 1948 the Bizone produced 5.47 million tons of steel against 7.12 in France; in 1949 German and French industry each produced 9 million tons of steel; in 1950 Germany surpassed France, producing 11.9 million tons against 8.5 million in France, in part due to continued coal shortages and strikes in French industry.\textsuperscript{337} It appeared that the objectives of the Monnet Plan for French steel might be washed away in a rising tide of German steel exports. The major Monnet Plan allotments to modernize French steel came in 1949 and 1950, the same years that the UNECE and U.S. began to warn that an overproduction crisis in European steel lay on the near horizon.\textsuperscript{338} The Ruhr industrial magnates looked with optimism to the re-conquering of their prewar markets as the Allied governments progressively lifted production limits. German steel industrialists, with Adenauer’s support, began to complain about French steel ambitions, which they considered to be counterproductive to European recovery. The Monnet Plan’s goal to eventually produce 18 million tons of steel, an 85% increase above the 1929 level was, in their view, unrealistic. Despite SPD fears, the IAR proved a hapless and ineffective organization from its inauguration due to British and U.S. obstruction of French policy.\textsuperscript{339} Unaware that the Korean War would bring a huge increase in demand for steel starting in June 1950, French policymakers from fall 1949 to spring 1950 scurried to forge an alternative policy to supervise Ruhr production, guarantee Ruhr coal exports to French industry, and create a form of European cooperation that would save the Monnet Plan. French Socialists were heavily engaged in these efforts.

Few in France had confidence that French industry could resist German competition if the Allies lifted all production quotas. However, at this moment a different set of French industries began to assert themselves within official channels. The French steel-transforming
industries used their muscle to successfully block efforts to include Germany in the trade liberalization negotiations between France, Italy and the Benelux countries, known as “Finebel,” in late 1949. The industries had the ear of the Socialist chair of the National Assembly’s Finance Committee, Francis Leenhardt, who argued that the steel-transforming industries could not withstand German competition at the present moment. With the nationalized Renault management and the Trade Association of the Mechanical Engineering and Metal Transforming Industries taking the lead, the steel-transforming industries insisted that, unless French steel prices fell to German levels, they could not compete with lower German prices for finished goods. In particular, their ability to compete required ending the German government’s policy of “double-pricing” for coal, in which German firms sold coal to domestic producers in 1949 at $12.90 per ton, and exported it at the price of $19.70. From late 1949, the French government began the acrimonious process of demanding an equalization of German coal prices for domestic and foreign consumption, a fight that continued later under the auspices of the Schuman Plan negotiations. A May 1949 French Foreign Ministry report lent credence to the argument of the steel-transforming industries, reporting that the differing costs of steel created a 20% cost disadvantage for French steel transformers. A bitter internal struggle played out within French industry and government, as the steel transformers angrily derided the French steel industry’s inadequate appetite for modernization and its policy of favoring steel exports by selling steel at a higher price on the French market. From the middle of 1949, the steel transformers made trade liberalization conditional to the opening of the French steel industry to competition. They found the sympathy of André Philip, who rubbed shoulders with important representatives of these industries as leader of the Senate’s Working Group on the European Coal & Steel

340 Kipping writes that, “The decisive rejection of a German participation came completely from the Industrial Ministry. More precisely it probably came from the Directory for Mechanical and Electrical Industries” in which, in particular, the steel-transforming section worried that free competition under the present conditions of high steel prices in France would ruin their industry and cause unemployment. An internal note of the Foreign Ministry confirms that the opposition of the Industrial Ministry was responsible for the failure of the Finebel negotiations. Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen, op cit., 127-29.

341 A May 1949 Foreign Ministry report claimed that steel cost 6,000 francs per ton in the Lorraine but only 3,500 in the Ruhr territory. Leading Renault manager Pierre Lefècheux complained in fall 1950 that Volkswagen benefited from steel prices 40% below that of Renault. Kipping argues that steel was 5 to 29% cheaper for the German than the French steel transformers. Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen, op cit., 94-107. Jean Constant, the Secretary General of the Trade Association of the Mechanical Engineering and Metal Transforming Industries, was a relentless critic of the steel industry and supported the creation of the ECSC. Matthias Kipping, “Inter-firm relations and industrial policy: the French and German steel producers and users in the twentieth century,” Business History 38, 1 (1996): 1-25.
Community. Philip’s appreciation for the position of the French steel transformers was in part a reversal of his previous policy, which looked to guarantee a large market for German steel transformers in return for their reliance on French steel exports. Representatives of the steel-transforming industries enthusiastically greeted the Senate committee’s recommendation in favor of the ratification of the ECSC. Designed to limit coal and steel prices within a competitive internal market, the steel transformers were the largest supporters of the ECSC among French industrialists, and did much to blunt the anti-ECSC campaign conducted by the French steel industry.

French Socialists became increasingly responsive to the campaign of the French steel transformers over the course of 1949. Minister of Industrial Production Lacoste evoked the difficulties of the French automobile industry and said his ministry intended to focus its energies on increasing the export of tractors. Pointing to the ominous reports of a coming overproduction to support his concept of a “Inter-European Public Authority for Steel,” Philip turned his attention to the steel-transforming industries, arguing that, “It is urgent to foresee from this moment a slowing of investments in the steel industry and, instead, a systematic development of investments in the steel-consuming industries, in order to reach a balance.” Socialist Finance Commission chair Francis Leenhardt called for subsidies for the steel-transforming industries over the course of 1950 to aid French exports.

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342 In a speech in February 1950, Philip said that, “A very important element which led to a prolongation and aggravation of the economic crisis [of the interwar era] was the maintenance of stable prices through the steel cartel, while the sales prices of consumer goods industries in the unprotected sectors collapsed.” Matthias Kipping, “Inter-firm relations,” op cit. The “Economic Council” chaired by Philip to advise the National Assembly on the economic implications of the Treaty of Paris included representatives of the government, parliament and economic interests. It voted on 29 November 1951, 111-29 with 29 abstentions in favor of a report recommending ratification of the treaty. Ludwin Vogel, Deutschland, Frankreich und die Mosel: Europäische Integrationspolitik in den Montan-Regionen Ruhr, Lothringen, Luxemburg und der Saar (Essen: Klartext, 2001), 109. The report explicitly called for the building of canals, a coking program for the Lorraine and the electrification of Lorraine railways. See Commission des Affaires étrangères, Rapport d’information de M. André Philip sur le projet de pool du charbon et de l’acier, 11 avril 1951, C/13334, AN.

343 Sebastian Rosato is therefore incorrect when he claims that, “French industry was uniformly opposed to the ECSC proposal when it was made public.” Sebastian Rosato, Power Politics and the Making of the European Community (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 97-99. The position of the steel transformers, overlooked by Rosato and others, undermines Rosato’s claim that the Schuman Plan was the result mostly of geopolitical, rather than economic and interest group, concerns.

344 This is the thesis of Kipping’s brilliant study. Kipping writes that Lefaucheux was considered a “fanatical supporter” of the ECSC. Monnet evoked the steel-transforming industry’s support, noting these industries employed 1.3 million workers to the steel industries 130,000. Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen, op cit., 274, 287.

345 15 November 1949, JO, 6306.

346 Leenhardt, 26 April 1950, JO, 2887. SFIO deputy Gozard did so as well, 27 December 1950, JO, 9700.
Thus the SFIO industrial policy as it related to domestic and foreign policy can be summarized as follows. Since 75% of the cost of steel in France and Germany came from raw materials and energy costs, cheap coal was necessary for lower steel costs, which in turn were necessary for the international competitiveness of the French steel-transforming industries, upon whose exports France’s balance of trade and currency depended. Therefore, after losing much of their support in the mines, the SFIO advocated a policy of rationalization and wage control in the nationalized mines to favor other industries. The SFIO accepted the possibility of mine closures, which Monnet and Schuman admitted would likely result from a customs union of coal and steel. SFIO economic experts also supported efforts to keep the price of French steel low, to favor both steel exports and the domestic steel-transforming industry. In turn, they demanded that the German government provide coal to France at the same price as that of the German internal market.

SPD leaders countered the SFIO position on “double-pricing” by arguing that German coal export prices remained considerably lower than the average world market price, which was true. However, for the SFIO, the maintenance of the double-pricing mechanism would place French steel and the French steel-transforming industries at a clear disadvantage vis-à-vis German industrial exports. French Socialists and the French government made its removal a precondition for a European customs union, while the SPD engaged in a policy to maintain higher coal prices in order to assure salary increases for the Ruhr coal miners. The dual-pricing

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347 Minister of Industrial Production Robert Lacoste told the National Assembly that, on Socialist Jules Moch’s initiative, the Charbonnages de France had launched an investigation to determine how to lower coal prices. The investigation inspired the Lacoste decrees, which sought to lower the price of coal in part through the layoff of 10% of mining employees. Ramadier fought efforts to increase the price of coal, saying that, if the French government “raised the price of coal, the increase will spread to the prices of almost all manufacturing...” 2 September 1947, JO, 4835. SFIO deputy Jean Minjoz referred to the increase in French steel prices as “the strongest and least justified [price] increase.” French coal prices were fixed by the government and as inflation continued, Moch and others were reluctantly forced a number of time for budgetary reasons to increase the French coal sales price in order to lower state subsidies.

348 Speaking about the potential consequences of the Schuman Plan, Philip said that, though he considered fears of the closing of metal and coal companies to be exaggerated, “it seems necessary to close businesses that are not able to adapt to the new conditions...” 25 July 1950, JO, 5942. Holter writes that, “For French miners, though, the plan offered little. Monnet, speaking at the signing of the ECSC treaty in April 1951, foresaw a general improvement in the standard of living for workers. But in making this first presentation to the French Cabinet members a year earlier, Monnet had indicated that the plan’s focus on productivity would involve closing a substantial number of French mines and laying off miners.” Daryl Holter, The Battle for Coal: Miners and the Politics of Nationalization in France, 1940-1950 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1992), 184. Monnet told the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly that, “I do not think that the Nord is situated such as to become a large center of development...” Commission des Affaires étrangères, 26 November 1951, C/15591, AN. The northern French steel industry representatives warned of “considerable unrest” and the loss of 45,000 jobs as a result of the Schuman Plan in its talks with Monnet and Schuman in December 1950.
mechanism allowed the SPD to claim support for increased salaries while also supporting German steel consumers’ interest for cheap coal and steel.\textsuperscript{349} The German trade union leadership also supported double-pricing.\textsuperscript{350} An equal price would place these two goals into contradiction.

The SFIO leadership, for its part, shared a widespread fear that trade liberalization might resurrect “German hegemony” on the continent if it did not occur within a carefully structured economic organization designed to assure an economic balance of power. Philip, Leenhardt and Lacoste demanded and received from the National Assembly a new infusion of investment capital for heavy industry as a precondition for SFIO ratification of the European Coal & Steel Community (ECSC) treaty.\textsuperscript{351} The SPD leadership, in turn, pointed to this new investment program as further evidence that France was solidifying its economic position at the dawn of the opening of the ECSC at the expense of German industry, workers, and consumers.

\textbf{3.6 SFIO AND SPD RESPONSES TO}

\textsuperscript{349} Veit wrote in a memo for a Socialist International meeting that the IAR “sets export quotas that do not take account of the capacity of the Ruhr mines and a sufficient domestic supply and sets export prices that lie below the world market price...” Memorandum der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands zu Punkt 8 der Sitzung des Generalrats der Sozialistischen Internationale. Methoden der Produktivitätssteigerung bei Aufrechterhaltung des gegenwärtigen Lebensstandards v. Dr. H. Veit, Md.B. u. Wirtschaftsminister v. Württemberg-Baden, 10 December 1950, PV-Internationale Abteilung 8, AdsD.

\textsuperscript{350} In its 21 November 1949 Memorandum of the Trade Unions regarding the Ruhr Statute and Law Nr., 75, the DGB leadership wrote that, “If German coal and steel industry should therefore be compelled to adapt the internal and export prices, a collapse of the precariously stabilized price and cost structure would be the inevitable consequence. Prices for finished goods would rise. Germany would be prevented to make [sic] her necessary contribution to the European export of finished goods. This would render impossible any development towards a balance of payments for Germany as well as for Europe.” DGB economic expert Potthoff, close to the SPD, claimed that, “Our coal price is about 50% cheaper than the world market price. This is an injustice towards us.” Erich Potthoff 41, AdsD.

\textsuperscript{351} With SFIO support, a rider was approved along with the ratification of the ECSC that called for the canalization of the Mosel River, an investment law to assist coke refining of Lorraine coal, and the electrification of a large number of rail lines to help French steel competitiveness. In addition, the government lowered its interest rate on its outstanding loans to the French steel industry from 7 to 4.5\%. Philippe Mioche, “Le patronat de la sidérurgie française et le Plan Schuman en 1950-1952: les apparennces d’un combat et la réalité d’une mutation,” in Schwabe, ed., \textit{Die Anfänge, op cit.}, 313. In the SFIO Parliamentary faction meeting during the ratification debates on 11 December 1951, Leenhardt “asked that the guarantees given at the moment of ratifications for the investments considered essential by Philip be effectively carried through. He did not receive a very precise response but he had no doubt that it was one of the essential conditions for the ratification of the group. This fundamental demand of the group is fulfilled in article 2 which declares that the government would bring a bill within four months...” At the same meeting Lacoste worried that without sufficient guarantees, the ECSC “could end in German hegemony.” While Leenhardt and Lacoste were less confident in French heavy industry’s ability to compete than were Philip and Jean Le Bail and therefore adopted a more skeptical attitude toward the ECSC, the party was united around the demand for increased government investment in heavy industry. The ECSC-enthusiast Le Bail also publicly worried about the possibility of “Germany conquering an economic hegemony in Western Europe.” 11 December 1951, Groupe Parlementaire Socialiste (GPS), OURS.
Schumacher’s response to Adenauer’s decision to sign the November 1949 Petersberg Accords and allow German representation in the International Authority of the Ruhr launched the young republic into its first major political crisis. In return for Adenauer’s concession, the Allied governments greatly reduced the number of factories subject to the dismantlement program. In the previous months SPD and DGB officials had vigorously resisted the Allied dismantlement program.352 They rejected as well efforts by the German government and industrialists to save the factories by offering French heavy industry the opportunity to purchase up to half the property share of key factories in the Ruhr. SPD and DGB officials viewed such attempts as part of a larger effort to forestall socialization and co-determination. Nölting and Henssler were particularly engaged in the SPD campaign to block French investment in the Ruhr.353

When the Allied military authorities and the German government announced the Petersberg Accord, Schumacher told a party meeting that, “Anyone who wants to enter the Ruhr Authority unconditionally is a national criminal.” Without having first secured the approval of the SPD Central Committee or the Bundestag faction, Schumacher set the SPD policy of intransigent opposition in interviews from 9-12 November.354 This approach infuriated Schumacher’s SPD colleagues, with Henssler and others complaining about Schumacher’s “authoritarian” tendencies. On the night of 15 November, Schumacher made his famous speech calling Adenauer “the Chancellor of the Allies,” a disparaging epithet that threw the Bundestag into turmoil and led the CDU to successfully sponsor a censorship motion the next day that formally excluded Schumacher from the Bundestag for twenty sessions.

Schumacher’s harsh rhetoric met with considerable unease within the SPD leadership. Nölting’s diary notes appear representative of the general sentiment within the party: “The entire faction despondent. Outrage at Schumacher’s lack of self-control.” However, the indignation and embarrassment of the SPD leaders was due to Schumacher’s indecorous language, rather than his

352 August Schmidt, head of IG Metall, told an assembly on 21 October 1949 that no “decent German” would take part in the dismantlement and called for a campaign of passive resistance which called to mind the union’s response to the interwar Ruhr occupation. Peter Merseburger, Der schwierige Deutsche: Kurt Schumacher, Eine Biographie (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1995), 460.

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policy of rejecting German membership in the IAR. Adolf Arndt, the SPD’s constitutional expert, gave voice to a general anger that Adenauer seemed to be undermining parliamentary democracy by not submitting the Accord to a vote in the Bundestag. Nölting and Schmid also rejected the Accord, arguing that it would recreate the atmosphere of the 1920s when the German government signed international agreements only to then immediately seek their revision. Schmid specifically evoked the 1924 agreement ending the Ruhr occupation to argue against Germany’s joining the IAR. SPD economic expert Fritz Baade complained to the Bundestag that Adenauer was breathing new life into the moribund IAR, revealing that the SPD was aware of the paralysis in the IAR. The only overt opposition to this line came from Wilhelm Kaisen, the SPD Minister-President of Bremen, who publicly supported the IAR. Faced with party sanctions and Schumacher’s wrath, Kaisen received no support in the Central Committee.

Scholars often overlook that Schumacher’s shout of “Chancellor of the Allies” resulted from an exchange in which Adenauer charged that the SPD’s rejection of the Petersberg Accord meant, in effect, that the SPD supported the factory dismantlements. The immediate occasion for Schumacher’s interruption was Adenauer’s announcement that the SPD-aligned DGB trade union federation supported the Petersberg Accords as a means to save the factories. The position of the DGB fomented confusion within the SPD ranks, as it was unusual for the union federation to take a position on such an important political issue without consulting the SPD. The discord signaled the temporary ascendance of trade unionists seeking an independent policy and collaboration with Christian Democrats within the DGB leadership, a development that created a sense of bewilderment within the SPD. The official DGB position on the IAR, which was controversial within the union movement, foreshadowed the break that later took place between the DGB and SPD on the Schuman Plan. In France, meanwhile, the unions split along

355 24-25 November 1949, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 477-80. At meetings in December 1949, Léon Blum and Grumbach agreed with SPD leaders that Adenauer should have submitted the accords for a vote. Pariser Gespräche, 12 December 1949, Erik Nölting 39, AdsD.
356 Carlo Schmid, “’Man muss die Affekte gegenstandlos machen’: Das Verhältnis Deutschland-Frankreich/der Kardinalfehler der Weimarer Republik,” Mannheimer Morgen, 24 November 1949, Carlo Schmid 49, AdsD.
357 Paterson, op cit., 32.
358 Merseburger, op cit., 462.
359 Theo Pirker writes that, “To the astonishment and anger of Schumacher the DGB placed itself in opposition to the party for the first time since the founding of the new republic.” Theo Pirker, Die SPD nach Hitler: die Geschichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1945-1964 (Munich: Putten & Lönig, 1965), 122.
360 The SPD-aligned leaders were in the minority from 1949 to 1952 within the union leadership and could not prevent the DGB from first offering its constructive participation in the work of the IAR in December 1949 and then, later, formally supporting the Treaty of Paris to create the ECSC. The DGB officially announced its support for
political lines. The Communist-aligned CGT denounced the Schuman Plan the day after its announcement while the FO supported it.361

The SPD reaction to the Petersberg Accords, which the SFIO supported, brought relations between the parties to a nadir.362 Blum told the SPD leadership privately that he could not understand the SPD’s negative attitude towards the IAR.363 Guy Mollet was furious, questioning the SPD’s commitment to international cooperation. In a secret meeting on 30 November 1949, the Labour Party tried to mediate between the SFIO and SPD. In this meeting Schumacher refused to give any assurance that, if the SPD came to power, it would recognize the obligations incurred by Adenauer’s government in the Petersberg Accord. SFIO leaders were left to wonder whether a SPD-led government under Schumacher would be such a good thing after all.

3.7 A LUKEWARM RECEPTION: THE SFIO’S AND SPD’S INITIAL RESPONSES TO THE SCHUMAN PLAN, SPRING-FALL 1950

Several socialist conferences called for the purpose of reconciling SFIO and SPD policies floundered on the same obstacles that had blocked consensus in the lead-up to the announcement of the Ruhr Statute. On Philip’s suggestion, a major socialist conference in March 1950 took place in Witten, a city in the Ruhr. Despite growing reservations, the SFIO still formally supported the SPD policy of socialization so long as it be accompanied by internationalization and the SPD supported the internationalization of European heavy industry based on equal conditions.364 The conference resolved a three point platform of “a) internationalization through the Treaty of Paris on 7 May 1951. Horst Thum, Mitbestimmung in der Montanindustrie: Der Mythos vom Sieg der Gewerkschaften (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt), 101. SPD deputy and IG Metall chair Walter Freitag had the clear support of the SPD to replace the deceased Hans Böckler as head of the DGB in June 1951. Christian Fette, who supported DGB policy independence from the SPD, defeated Freitag.


362 Orlow writes that, “Especially Schumacher’s unbridled criticism of the French policymakers led to a decided cooling of relations between the two parties, even though the German leader took care not to attack his French comrades specifically.” Dietrich Orlow, Common Destiny: A Comparative History of the Dutch, French, and German Social Democratic Parties, 1945-1966 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 176.

363 Vertrauliche undated/unsigned, Günther Markscheffel 26, AdsD.

364 At the SFIO Directing Committee meeting of 5 April 1950 and 26 April 1950, Grumbach and Mollet expressed regret that they had supported the SPD’s call for socialization but Grumbach argued that the party could not renege now on the commitment it had made in the COMISCO. Guy Mollet wondered aloud whether the SFIO should withdraw from the COMISCO due to its disagreements with the Labour Party and the SPD. The protocol reads that, “He declared himself very anxious, in particular concerning German Social Democracy. The Social Democrats seem
nationalization; b) international supervision of nationalized industries; c) international supervision of private industries.” SFIO leaders refused, however, socialization without internationalization and the SPD rejected an internationalization limited to the Ruhr. In the SFIO Directing Committee’s resolution on the Ruhr, issued shortly before Schuman’s announcement, the SFIO agreed with the SPD that the Ruhr property must not be returned to its former owners and should be socialized, a switch back to its policy before 1949. However, the resolution also stated that the SFIO “deplored” the SPD’s position on the IAR.

It appears that only the internationalization of the ensemble of Western European heavy industry could have broken the impasse between the parties. In a sign that a consensus was possible, Carlo Schmid embraced Philip’s proposal for a common authority for European coal and steel in November 1949. When Robert Schuman called a press conference and proposed a coal and steel customs union under the supervision of a supranational executive, Philip had good reason to view the proposal as his brainchild. It should come as no surprise that Philip immediately offered the Schuman Plan his enthusiastic support.

One might expect that the SFIO would do so as well. Yet many among the SFIO leadership expressed skepticism of the plan similar in tone and content to some of the initial
to want to conduct a nationalist policy.” Pointing to internal German politics, though, Grumbach argued that, “The SPD conducts on the internal level a campaign against nationalism.” Philip and Rosenfeld argued that the party should continue to support the SPD’s demands for socialization and seek cooperation with the SPD in COMISCO. Comité directeur, 5 April 1950, OURS.


SFIO Comité directeur, 26 April 1950, OURS.


After hearing Philip in person propose his plan at a conference in Geneva, Jean Monnet wrote him on 27 February 1950 to state that, “I am entirely in agreement with you on the essentials: construct Europe, which will only be possible if the various countries accept to reduce their national sovereignty and to create an international authority capable of taking the decisions the countries should execute. It is clearly an excessively difficult task. How to get there? I admit that I am perplexed...Industrial coordination...I fear, would result in the creation of cartels...” Pierre Gerbet, “La naissance du Plan Schuman,” in Wilkens, ed., Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire, 15-16. Monnet and his team later said that Philip’s proposals had little to no influence on their thinking but it is hard to lend credence to this view. Pierre Uri retrospectively said that, “We did not follow very closely the proposals made in the Council of Europe, in particular by André Philip. They did not play any role in the development of the ideas of those who prepared the May 9 declaration.” Étienne Hirsch, for his part, claimed that, “We were up to date but it did not play any role.” Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, “Le rôle de la France dans la naissance du Conseil de l’Europe,” in Poidevin, ed., op cit., 218-19. At the least, Philip’s proposals contributed to the favorable climate in which the Schuman Plan was greeted within France and abroad. Philip was not the only source of such proposals. CDU Minister President of NRW, Karl Arnold put forward similar views and developed a good rapport with Philip. Newspapers in both countries buzzed with various proposals from winter 1949 to spring 1950. Adenauer also proposed a complete French-German union in spring 1950. Schumacher responded to Adenauer’s proposal that, though he welcomed such a union in theory, due to the present balance of power such a union could only result in French dominance.
Her analysis transcends the false dichotomy created by Lacroix-Riz and Schwabe and has the benefit of including U.S. government shared the general frustration among pro-integration circles that the Labour government was lead in a letter from 30 September 1949 and U.S. diplomatic pressure increased from January to April 1950. The European integration initiative emanating from the French government. Acheson encouraged Schuman to take the fall 1949 to spring 1950 from, among others, Dean Acheson, that the United States government would welcome a and Poidevin give convincing accounts that emphasize how the French government officials received signals from "US Embassy working group," and a "transnational university network." Modernization and investments—equally patent. ECSC would be good only if French coal and steel can successfully compete with their German rivals. Hence, modernization and investments—*not* subject to High Authority direction—must be continued, argued Robert Lacoste...If commitment to ‘Europa’ was present, so was a determination not to allow a European rationale to interfere with the claims of French workers.” Ernst B. Haas, *The United of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, 1968), 116.

Both parties perceived the Schuman Plan within the context of a right-ward shift in their domestic politics. The Plan was suspect because neither party was involved in, nor informed of its crafting. This encouraged suspicion that the Plan bore the imprint of secret transnational negotiations and that Schuman’s lofty declaration perhaps concealed its true intention. Mollet initially thought that U.S. diplomacy was behind the plan and Schumacher’s famous line from September 1950 that the Plan was *konservative,* 369 See the SFIO Directing Committee meeting held the day after Schuman’s press conference on 10 May 1950. Comité directeur, OURS. Leading party member Lapie wrote in his memoirs: “A strange thing—but the Socialists never stopped astonishing me—my party comrades’ reactions were not enthusiastic. Guy Mollet took poorly the sentiment of having the ground cut from under the feet of his desperate attempts to build a political Europe in the permanent commission of the Council of Europe; [Paul] Sion a coal miner, president of the Labour Commission [of the National Assembly], worried about salaries; Leenhardt, president of the Economic Commission, of unemployment; Jules Moch, finally, worried about the specter of a Vatican Europe. I defended it.” Lapie, *op cit.*, 247. Craig Parsons’ distinction between “confederal” and “community” path in analyzing “the cross-cutting debate across French parties” does not hold up well for the SFIO. He cites as opponents Auriol and Moch, who, though influential in government, did not have a substantial political base with the SFIO. Blum, Parsons tells us, opposed the Schuman Plan. This claim would surprise our actors, as Blum had died three months before the Schuman declaration. The reluctance within the party was not about abstract principles of confederation or communitarianism but rather about how far to go in sacrificing supranationalism and supervision of the Ruhr to attract Labour Party support. Craig Parsons, *A Certain Idea of Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 56-57. Rioux writes that the French “Socialists had reservations about the emerging Europe of the Christian Democrats...but gave a mild support...” Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 143. Haas writes that, “In May of 1950 Guy Mollet saw in the Schuman Plan little more than a scheme to shore up a decadent German and French capitalism and affront the British Labour Party. Ultimately, the SFIO came to support the Treaty, but not without serious misgivings...the deep-seated national preoccupation of many Socialists was equally patent. ECSC would be good only if French coal and steel can successfully compete with their German rivals. Hence, modernization and investments—*not* subject to High Authority direction—must be continued, argued Robert Lacoste...If commitment to ‘Europa’ was present, so was a determination not to allow a European rationale to interfere with the claims of French workers.” Ernst B. Haas, *The United of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, 1968), 116.

369 Annie Lacroix-Riz appears alone among historians in asserting that the U.S. was the primary source for the crafting of the Schuman Plan, emphasizing Monnet’s extensive ties to U.S. policy circles. Annie Lacroix-Riz, “Paris et Washington au début du Plan Schuman (1950-1951),” in Schwabe, ed., *Die Anfänge, op cit.*, 254-68. Schwabe argues that the plan came exclusively from the French government. Klaus Schwabe, “Ein Akt konstruktiver Staatskunst—die USA und die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans,” in Schwabe, ed., *Die Anfänge, op cit.*, 211-28. It is true that the plan was crafted in secret among Monnet’s team without consultation until the last moment with the rest of the French government. Duroselle writes that, “When Schuman presented it to him for the first time Acheson was so surprised that he could not hide his embarrassment.” Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, “1948: les débuts de la construction européenne,” in Poidevin, ed., *op cit.*, 44. Diebold writes that “the French initiative was truly a surprise to the Americans.” William Diebold, “A Personal Note,” Schwabe, ed., *Die Anfänge, op cit.*, 24. Bossaut, Hitchcock and Poidevin give convincing accounts that emphasize how the French government officials received signals from fall 1949 to spring 1950 from, among others, Dean Acheson, that the United States government would welcome a European integration initiative emanating from the French government. Acheson encouraged Schuman to take the lead in a letter from 30 September 1949 and U.S. diplomatic pressure increased from January to April 1950. The U.S. government shared the general frustration among pro-integration circles that the Labour government was sabotaging efforts to achieve concrete measures of European cooperation in the late 1940s. Brigitte Leucht has recently introduced a most productive theme into this debate by highlighting the importance of experts in “two transatlantic policy networks,” including a “US Embassy working group,” and a “transnational university network.” Her analysis transcends the false dichotomy created by Lacroix-Riz and Schwabe and has the benefit of including German and Dutch figures as well in the crafting of the ECSC’s structures during the Paris negotiations. Brigitte
katholisch, klerikal, kapitalistisch, and kartellisch found agreement among large sections of the SFIO ranks. Jules Moch, in particular, saw the influence of the Vatican in the plans. The two parties’ reflexive anti-clericalism, combined with the frustration caused by their distance from the reins of power, fomented suspicion about the origins and intentions of Schuman’s announcement.

Nevertheless, French and German Socialists were not immune from the general public enthusiasm that greeted the project, and the expressed goals of the Plan were in line with the parties’ official policies. Schumacher welcomed the plan in principle at a press conference but declared that, for the moment, it was a “house without furniture” and that the SPD would reserve its vote until the content of the treaty negotiations emerged. Historians are divided about whether Schumacher intended to oppose the treaty from the moment of its announcement. The evidence presently available is ambiguous and inconclusive. If intransigence was Schumacher’s intention from May 1950, however, it is noteworthy that he left the party’s options open. Whether out of conviction or internal party tactics, Schumacher knew that the Plan had attained such a resounding public relations success that overt opposition might have caused a public split within the SPD.

Several reasons have been given for the SPD’s decision to oppose to the Schuman Plan. The SPD’s propaganda against the Plan in 1951 can be deceiving because, once the party made the anti-ECSC campaign a centerpiece of its efforts to distinguish itself within German politics, it offered a bewildering series of all-encompassing arguments to justify its position. Some historians have argued that the aggressive SPD campaign for German reunification, a campaign that so marked the SPD’s opposition to the European Defense Community, was already present

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371 Moch told the SFIO Directing Committee that the Schuman Plan was part of a “Vatican offensive against Anglican England.” Comité directeur, 10 May 1950, OURS.

372 Schwabe writes that the SPD “criticized the plan from its beginning” and, according to Spierenburg and Poidevin, “The day after the treaty was signed [SPD] leader, Kurt Schumacher, laid down conditions that left no doubt that the SPD would vote against.” Schwabe, “L’Allemagne, Adenauer et l’option de l’intégration à l’ouest,” in Wilkens, ed., Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire, op cit.; Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, The History of the High Authority of the European Coal & Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994), 32. Dietmar Ramuschkat argues that, “long before the opening of negotiations Schumacher had already made the decision not to support the Schuman Plan.” Dietmar Ramuschkat, Die SPD und die europäische Einigungsprozess: Kontinuität und Wandel in der sozialdemokratischen Europapolitik (Niebüll: videel OHG, 2003), 105. Paterson argues that, “The SPD position, then, had changed from benevolent neutrality to intransigent opposition in the course of the realisation of the Schuman initiative.” Paterson, op cit., 64-65.
in 1950 and was the primary factor in the party’s decision to oppose the plan. This argument is unconvincing. Though there are some statements expressing concern that the ECSC might be an obstacle to reunification, SPD leaders rarely put this argument forward in 1950 and only did so with hesitation. The SPD leadership had already signaled that it was moving towards a negative position before Winston Churchill famously called for a German military contribution to Western defense in August 1950 and before the French government put forward the Pleven Plan for a German contribution to a supranational military organization in October 1950. It appears that it was only in fall 1951-summer 1952 that the SPD leadership solidified a foreign policy that made European integration initiatives conditional to its impact on German reunification, as discussed in the next chapter.

A more compelling argument is that the six nations that agreed to the conditions that Schuman set to enter negotiations in summer 1950 were all countries in which Christian Democratic parties were the strongest political forces. It was apparent to all upon its announcement that the Plan’s design would be unattractive to the Social Democratic regimes in Scandinavia and to the Labour government in Great Britain. Nevertheless, the SPD leadership’s opposition to the Plan followed by at least a month the opening of the six-nation negotiations, by which time it had been clear for several months that the Scandinavian and British governments would not participate in the customs union for coal and steel. Without doubt

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373 Rudolf Hrbek’s path-breaking study over-emphasizes the reunification factor in the SPD decision to oppose the Schuman Plan. Hrbek’s citations for his argument come almost exclusively from 1951, by which time SPD policy had already been set. Rudolf Hrbek, Die SPD, Deutschland und Europa: Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie zum Verhältnis von Deutschland-Politik und West-Integration (1945-1955) (Bonn: Europa Union, 1972). Vardys also emphasizes reunification as the central factor in the SPD’s rejection of the Schuman Plan. V. Stanley Vardys, “Germany’s Postwar Socialism: Nationalism and Kurt Schumacher (1945-1952),” The Review of Politics 27 (1965): 238. Willis writes that, “Schumacher’s first reaction to the plan was guarded. That France had proposed it was enough to rouse his suspicions. Adenauer, he charged, was sacrificing all possibility of reuniting Germany by integrating the Federal Republic with the West.” Willis’ citation for this claim, however, has Schumacher expressing worry that the ECSC would block a socialization program and does not mention reunification. Willis, op cit., 127. Ramuschkat argues that, “The linkage [between the Pleven and Schuman Plans] was Schumacher’s major, if not his only, reason to refuse the ECSC.” Ramuschkat, op cit., 124-25. Klotzbach argues that the German reunification argument can be found “immediately in the opening stage of the debate, even if it did not have the clear predominance that it gained in the second half of the year 1951 and then especially in 1952.” Kurt Klotzbach, “Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Schuman-Plan,” in Schwabe, ed., Die Anfänge, op cit., 335. It is not clear that in May 1950 Schumacher had definitively broken with his assessment of the Marshall Plan, which the SPD supported. Schumacher had said that the “Marshall Plan was not cause but consequence of [European] division,” a position that could apply as well to the Schuman Plan. See also Hans-Peter Ehni, “Die Reaktion der SPD auf den Marshall-Plan,” in Othmar Nikola Haberl and Lutz Niethammer, eds., op cit.

374 Some historians argue that Britain’s self-exclusion was key to Schumacher’s decision, but Deibold argues that the SPD “needed no encouragement from the British.” Diebold, The Schuman Plan, op cit., 60.
these governments’ self-exclusions were contributing factors for the SPD reticence towards the Schuman Plan. However, they do not appear to have been definitive for the SPD’s final position.

The question of whether to make approval of the ECSC conditional to British membership, on the other hand, was the central question in the disputes over the Schuman Plan within the SFIO. The argument pitted ECSC-enthusiast André Philip against the anglophile Guy Mollet, who had been an English high school teacher before entering politics. The Labour government had dragged its feet in 1947-1949 on issues of European economic and political cooperation. Labour had imposed the principle of unanimity for binding resolutions both within the intergovernmental Council of Europe and within the Socialist International against the SFIO’s support for majority or qualified majority voting. In launching the Schuman Plan, the French government had taken the decisive step of refusing to make its initiative dependent on British approval. The question was now whether the SFIO, the votes of which would likely be necessary for the success of any treaty in the National Assembly, would follow its government.

Exasperation had grown among all sections of the party at Labour’s intransigence on issues related to European cooperation. All party leaders wanted British membership and saw Britain as a crucial counter-weight to the integration of Germany in European bodies. Various SFIO leaders, however, proved to have differing breaking points in their tolerance for Labour’s attitude. The Labour government’s unilateral devaluation in fall 1949, after it had claimed for months that it would not devalue, came as a shock to the SFIO and French government leaders. Its action forced a string of devaluations across the Western European economies and made nonsense of efforts to coordinate a unified European economic policy. Blum said in private that he was “scandalized” by Labour’s methods. Philip, active within the European movement and a star in both the OEEC and the Council of Europe, was fed up with Labour blocking his initiatives. In 1949, he called for European integration to proceed with or without Britain. This put him on a collision course with Mollet, who angrily rejected Philip’s position. This subterranean fight erupted again as the party debated its response to Schuman’s announcement. The party’s Directing Committee passed a compromise resolution supporting the Schuman Plan but insisted also on British participation. The SFIO parliamentary group made British participation a condition for its participation in government during coalitional negotiations on 5 July 1950. Point F of its position on the customs union was to “Insist on the absolutely necessary

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375 Lapie, op cit., 214.
presence of England. No French-German tête-à-tête.”376 However, rather than reflecting a party consensus, the leadership intended this statement more as a means to pressure the French government to reopen negotiations with Britain than as an ultimatum.

The Labour Party’s intransigent attitude in the next months did much to resolve the dispute over the Schuman Plan within the SFIO.377 In its June 1950 pamphlet titled “European Unity,” the Labour Party rejected British membership in any supranational institution and couched its position with a rhetoric French Socialists found to be overtly insulting to themselves and to the French government. Although Mollet travelled to Britain to try to dissuade the Labour Party from announcing this position, Labour made it clear that no progress would be possible if the Schuman Plan was made conditional on its participation.378 SFIO leaders noted with dismay that the Council of Europe was developing into a hapless body, devoid of any real power, a critique it shared with the SPD, which took its seats within the Council in summer 1950.379 Yet at the same time, German industry was recovering at a rapid rate and coal shortages were contributing to waning French industrial growth. In this situation Philip’s position that economic integration must proceed regardless of British participation gained the upper hand and his arguments of economic necessity resonated with an increasing number of SFIO deputies and members of the Directing Committee. A public dispute on this issue between Philip and Mollet at the Council of Europe in December 1950 further embittered relations between the two leaders.

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376 5 July 1950, GPS, AHC.
377 On 27 May 1950 the British government rejected Schuman’s preconditions for entering the negotiations.
378 Guy Mollet told the SFIO Directing Committee that, “The part of the brochure treating Robert Schuman seemed to me to have been after the fact. If it had only concerned the SCHUMAN Plan, we could accept the majority of the reservations. Only one thing seemed however unacceptable: the veto rule. What seems worse to me are the other aspects of the Labour’s international policy. We are the only ones to have imposed on ourselves, in all of our public positions, the concern to not bother our Labour friends. But they have never showed fair-play with regard to us in their international decisions...I must tell the Labour people that this cannot continue.” Comité directeur, 13 June 1950, OURS.
379 Schumacher said, for instance, that the “Strasbourg Assembly is a church without believers! What has it concretely accomplished? It is only a senate that merely grants the right to speak.” Translation of an article from *Franc-Tireur* interview with Schumacher 30 May 1950, KS 51, AdsD. Philip and Jaquet clashed with Mollet at the August and November sessions of the Council of Europe. On both occasions Philip and Jaquet embraced proposals to strengthen the Council of Europe’s powers at the risk of alienating Labour and Great Britain, while Mollet only supported texts designed to appeal to the British delegates. 13 September 1950, SFIO Comité directeur, OURS. However when the British House of Commons in November 1950 voted down Mollet’s draft from the Council of Europe’s Commission of General Affairs, arguing that it went too far towards supranationalism, Mollet was furious and told a meeting of COMISCO that, “I appeal to the British to consider this situation seriously. They have isolated themselves from the rest of the Strasbourg Assembly to a degree that is very dangerous.” Ollenhauer placed the SPD position between that of Labour and the SFIO at this meeting, arguing in favor of strengthening the powers of the Consultative Assembly vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers but he opposed SFIO efforts to go beyond the powers granted in the Council’s charter. International Socialist Conference, Circular No. 218/50, 22 November 1950, Internationale Abteilung 02516, AdsD.
and embarrassed the party on the international stage. Mollet, Ramadier and Leenhardt fought a rearguard effort to woo Labour to the European institutions but, by summer 1950, the party’s position had evolved to supporting the creation of the ECSC regardless of the British government’s position.\textsuperscript{380} The party remained split on how far to go to accommodate the British government’s position over the course of the 1950s.

Besides sentimental attachment to the French-British alliance and widespread anglophilia within the SFIO leadership ranks, one of the main reasons for the SFIO’s insistence on British participation in European institutions from 1947-Spring 1950 was a fear that only British membership could make possible the French government’s effort to achieve an acceptable balance of power against a potentially resurgent Germany.\textsuperscript{381} The SPD leadership, in fact, had the same view in reverse, worrying that Germany would fall prey to French hegemony if not balanced by a third large power. Given their size, few in either party thought much of the potential for power politics of the other nations negotiating to create the ECSC. Thus both the SFIO and SPD leadership wanted British membership in order to strengthen the left within the community but, perhaps more importantly, to mediate between the potentially hegemonic intentions of their cross-Rhine neighbor.

### 3.8 SFIO AND SPD POLICY ON INDUSTRIAL CARTELS AND THEIR RESPONSES TO MONNET’S ASSAULT ON THE GERMAN COAL SALES CARTEL (DKV), FALL 1950-SPRING 1951

The principal factor in the SPD’s decision in fall 1950 to oppose the Schuman Plan was Monnet’s push to ban cartels in the coal and steel industry and to grant the High Authority far-reaching powers to combat cartelization. By targeting the Ruhr Coal Sales Cartel for dissolution, the proposed ECSC now appeared to threaten not only German steel, but the German coal industry as well. Policies on cartelization and the issue of the export price of Ruhr coal were

\textsuperscript{381} The protocol of the 16 November 1949 SFIO parliamentary group meeting reads: “For months we have had a certain reservation from England in its decision to not enter Europe. It is necessary to have a response and it is from this response that our attitude regarding the German question depends. G. Mollet does not believe that one can construct Europe without England. In a Europe with \textit{a tête-à-tête} between Germany and France we will arrive at a German hegemony and it will be Germany that will govern this new unified Europe.” 16 November 1949, GPS, AHC.
essential components of each party’s economic policy. They made impossible a SFIO and SPD consensus on the Schuman Plan.

The Schuman declaration contained no mention of cartels. Throughout the occupation period, decartelization of German industry had been a primary goal of the French and American governments. The 1947 Allied Law on cartels went far beyond any previous German legislation in constraining firms’ ability to form industrial ententes.\textsuperscript{382} It was apparent to all that, if the Allies lifted these restrictions, German industry would engage in re-concentration and re-cartelization, a process that the German government and parliament were likely to welcome. In their proposal in the opening stages of the Schuman plan negotiations, the German government proposed granting powers to regulate ententes to industrial organizations, rather than to the High Authority. On 28 September Monnet, dramatically announced that the High Authority must be delegated the power to break cartels.\textsuperscript{383} As John Gillingham writes, Monnet declared “total war against cartels” and “was asserting the right to forbid re-concentration indefinitely.”\textsuperscript{384} Monnet made the granting of sweeping powers to combat cartels a condition for the continuation of the six-nation talks, warning an angry German delegation that he would otherwise resign as leader of the Schuman Plan negotiations.

Monnet’s assault on cartels was the result of his economic liberalism, worries within the U.S. government and businesses that the Schuman Plan would evolve into a restrictive cartel and, most importantly, a widespread conviction within French industrial circles that French industry could not effectively compete against a reconstituted coal and steel cartel system in the Ruhr. Monnet warned that, without restrictions on cartels, the ECSC would result in the “hegemony of the monolithic organization of the Ruhr.”\textsuperscript{385} French cartelization, particularly

\textsuperscript{382} This law banned not only formal agreements but also gentlemen’s agreements and banned not only horizontal integration, as German law had done previously, but also vertical integration, which so marked the relationship between coal and steel in the Ruhr. The law was based on article 12 of the Potsdam Accord in which the Allies made the deconcentration of German industry a primary goal of the war effort. Wolf Wank, “Die alliierten Entflechtungsmassnahmen—politische und juristische Aspekte,” and Günther Schultz “Die Entflechtungsmassnahmen und ihre wirtschaftliche Bedeutung,” in Hans Pohl, ed., Mitbestimmung: Ursprünge und Entwicklung: Referate und Diskussionsbeiträge der 5. Öffentlichen Vortragsveranstaltung der Gesellschaft für Unternehmensgeschichte e.V. am 7. Mai 1980 in Düsseldorf (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1981), 202-05, 210-11.


\textsuperscript{385} Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen, op cit., 251. In his 22 December note to Robert Schuman, Monnet wrote that a cartel ban was “essential to prevent the Ruhr magnates from recreating their dominance in German politics” and that “our industries cannot fight with equal arms if they must face the Konzern as they had previously”.

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vertical integration in heavy industry, had lagged behind that occurring in Germany since the late nineteenth century, in part due to the reluctance of French employers to combine as well as a liberal majority in government that, until the Great Depression, looked with disfavor upon cartelization efforts.\footnote{Richard F. Kuisel, \textit{Capitalism and the state in modern France: Renovation and economic management in the twentieth century} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 15-28, 95; Helmut Kaelble, \textit{Nachbarn am Rhein: Entfremdung und Annäherung der französischen und deutschen Gesellschaft seit 1880} (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1991), 24.} French policymakers after WWII generally viewed the disparities in cartelization as an essential feature of French economic and, hence, geopolitical weakness vis-à-vis Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, by 1948, French and German industrialists had begun private talks to reconstruct the interwar European steel cartel.\footnote{The first steel cartel was created in 1926 and welcomed in France and Germany as an industrial “armistice” and as part of the general spirit of cooperation and reconciliation of the Stresemann-Briand era. The steel cartel was initially considered disadvantageous to German industry because it fixed future quotas based on a year in which German steel output was substantially below average. The German steel industry entered the arrangement with a revanchist attitude to amend its quotas and its efforts resulted in the substantially more powerful steel cartel of 1933 that replaced its predecessor and that controlled sales and export prices, as well as distribution and that no longer restricted its members’ levels of production. The coal industry organized relatively late and the international cartel was principally an agreement between the coal-exporting nations of Great Britain and Germany. It excluded France, a coal-importing nation. Clemens A. Wurm, “Les cartels internationaux de l’acier de l’entre-deux-guerres: Précurseurs du Plan Schuman?,” in Wilkens, ed., \textit{Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire}, \textit{op cit.}, 56-64.} SFIO and SPD leaders were both determined to prevent a renewal of the private cartel arrangements and much of Philip’s efforts in 1948-50 to create a public authority over coal and steel were designed to assure that supervision of these essential sectors take place under government, rather than private, auspices.\footnote{Schumacher wrote, for instance, “Under this false flag German and French heavy industry would like to step towards an international cartel agreement. But international cartels operate against all peoples, against the French just as much as against the German.” “Dr. Schumacher. Die Zeit der Entscheidung: Deutsche Demokratie in Gefahr—Dr. Adenauers Aussenpolitik ist Klassenpolitik,” \textit{Volkstimme}, 9 December 1949, KS 49. Wilhelm Salewski of the WESI was clear in his determination for the “reconstruction of an international cartel on the basis of the private economy.” Bührer, \textit{Ruhrstahl und Europa}, 86-87. The French and German steel-transforming industries both supported anti-cartel legislation and pressured their governments to this effect. Kipping, \textit{Zwischen Kartellen, op cit.}, 202-03; Philip to the National Assembly, 25 July 1950, \textit{JO}, 5940-41.}

Quickly German industry, the trade unions, the government and the Social Democratic opposition rallied against Monnet’s far-reaching proposals. The subject of cartels became the most controversial issue of the Schuman negotiations, bogging down progress towards an accord from October 1950 until Adenauer capitulated to Monnet in April 1951. The central aspect of these negotiations was the fate of the German coal-sales syndicate (\textit{Deutscher Kohlen-Verkauf}, DKV), which the French, Dutch and Italian governments considered to have the potential to dictate the Community’s market conditions. In December 1950, Monnet succeeded in using his
influence to convince U.S. High Commissioner John McCloy to intervene with the German government in favor of the French position, which already had support in important U.S. policy circles.\footnote{There is consensus among historians that the U.S. influence “cannot be overestimated” and that, “There can be no doubt that the American-German negotiations in the first weeks of 1951 saved the Schuman Plan.” Klaus Schwabe, “L’Allemagne, Adenauer et l’option de l’integration à l’ouest” in Wilkens, ed., \textit{Le Plan Schuman dans l’histoire, op cit.}, 121; and Schwabe, “‘Ein Akt konstruktiver Staatskunst’—die USA und die Anfänge des Schuman Plan,” in Schwabe, ed., \textit{Die Anfänge, op cit.}, 238. The final agreement called for the dissolution of the DKV by 1 October 1952, the creation of 24 new steel groups with vertical integration to be permitted between coal and steel in only 11 of them, with a limitation on ownership share of 75%. This arrangement would place only 15% of German coal under the control of the German steel industries, whereas the figure was 56% before the war. Lefèvre, \textit{op cit.}, 267-8. For a useful overview of Allied negotiations with the West Germany government and the politics of the organization of the steel industry, see Isabel Warner, \textit{Steel and Sovereignty: The Deconcentration of the West German Steel Industry, 1949-54} (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1996).} This double assault proved too strong for the young German government to resist. In March 1951, Adenauer agreed to Monnet’s terms, thereby removing the last obstacle to the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 18 April 1951 to create the European Coal & Steel Community.

Internal German politics precluded the SPD from making the cartel issue the center of its public critique of the Schuman Plan. Historians have pointed out the irony that the SPD adopted a similar position on cartels to large industry, while accusing the ECSC of being \textit{“kartellisch.”}\footnote{Willis writes that, “ironically, the two political parties supposedly friendly to business interests, the CDU and FDP, opposed the demands of business, and the party of labor, the SPD, rejected the demands of the labor unions.” Willis, \textit{op cit.}, 120-21.} The truth, though, was that the SPD was not in principle opposed to cartels. At a 1949 meeting of the Political-Economic Commission under the SPD’s Central Committee, SPD deputy Paul Bleiss, himself deeply involved in the coal politics of the Ruhr, argued in favor of maintaining the cartels. A SPD official summarized the sentiment in the meeting as: “all the speakers were more or less in favor of concentration, but with public supervision.”\footnote{The protocol reads: “Bleiss argued for a certain maintenance of the cartels whose disadvantage admittedly was that they brought with them monopolistic dominance and demand monopolistic benefits that cannot be avoided. However, if one wants an economy steered by the state, one needs large economic units. Through an approval of the cartel economy, one can come to the setting of new prices. The more economic units one includes, the larger can be its cost effectiveness, real wages and distribution.” Baade responded that, “the concentration process of the capitalist economy is unavoidable and one should not forbid it but rather step-by-step take it under [state] supervision.” Protokoll der Tagung des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses beim Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands am 25. und 26.11.1949, Erich Potthoff 31, AdsD.} The SPD still supported a “planned economy” in this period and considered the concentration of industry to be an inevitable part of capitalist development and a necessary step towards the industries’ socialization. Frustrated in their efforts to socialize German heavy industry, the SPD called for the creation of a “monopoly office” and large state intervention and oversight of the Ruhr industries. They did not, however, want to break the vertical integration that they deemed
essential to the region’s competitiveness, nor did they wish to dissolve the centralized coal sales agency (DKV). In public, Nölting and Schumacher admitted the negative effects of cartels on consumers and the pernicious influence of their power in the political system. However, they also rejected a “ruinous competition of annihilation (Vernichtungswettbewerb)” and argued against allowing the economy to become “a football field.” This position reflected a continuity with the cartel policies of the August Bebel- and Weimar-era SPD. The SPD Bundestag faction sought to stem the de-concentration initiatives of the Allies, but also those of German Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard. It fought on the domestic level for a far-reaching state supervision of industrial combinations and against strict anti-cartel proposals.

In this context, SPD leaders understood the French efforts to place wide-reaching powers over the cartels in the hands of a supranational High Authority as a measure that was part and parcel of the overall French policy to place German steel at a permanent competitive disadvantage. SPD leaders pointed to the nationalization of the French coal industry and, with it, the central French coal purchasing agency, as well as concentration efforts in the private French steel industry from 1948 to 1951, undertaken under pressure from Monnet’s Planning Commission, to argue that the ECSC would de facto discriminate against German industry in the Ruhr. The DGB and the miners’ union, IG Bergbau, also threw their full weight into a defense of the vertical integration economy and the DKV, lauding the stability they fostered within the industry. As Schumacher argued to the SPD Central Committee, “The realization of the

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392 27 January 1950, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 983-86.
393 Nölting for instance told the Bundestag that, “The SPD would like to leave no doubt that it is less interested in a vague arrangements for competition than for a sensible and planned supervision of economic power.” 31 March 1950, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 2109. See also Peter Hüntenberger, “Wirtschaftsordnung und Interessenpolitik in der Kartellgesetzgebung der Bundesrepublik 1949-1957,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 24, 3 (1976), 287-307.
394 “One wishes to remove from the Germans the unified coal sales agency. Also, the claim against German vertical integration means a disadvantage for the German next to the nationalized French coal industry.” “Die SPD bleibt fest: Eigenbericht des ‘Neue Vorwärts’ über die Partei-Vorstandes,” Neuer Vorwärts, Sonderdruck, PV 1951, AdsD. The SPD made “The restoration of the vertical integration and the program of a new coal sales organization” a condition for its support for the Treaty of Paris in its resolution to the Bundestag (Drucksache 2484) on 12 July 1951. Paterson, op cit., 60. For details of the operations of the vertical integration economy in the Ruhr and why policymakers saw it as essential for the region’s competitiveness, see Kurt Klotzbach, “Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Schuman-Plan,” in Schwabe., ed., Die Anfänge, op cit., 339-40.
395 The concentration of the French steel industry had proceeded largely piecemeal from 1947 to 1950, but in 1950 four Lorraine steel companies combined to form Sidélor and further concentrations appeared to be on the horizon. With regard to the reorganization of iron and coal enterprises it is necessary to create efficient economic units. This means that they must have a size which is in conformity with the demands of modern industrial economy...In the Ruhr area, mining, iron and steel production and manufacture are closely concentrated on [sic] a small space. This allows an intensive compound economy...The high efficiency of the Ruhr industry is chiefly due to compound [sic] economy.” Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund für das Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Düsseldorf,
Schuman Plan will have as a consequence the social disintegration of the Ruhr. The dissolution of the vertical integration economy will first of all threaten workers and their jobs,” which, he argued, could breathe new life into Communist efforts in the Ruhr.397

The SFIO did not share the SPD’s view about the merits of cartelization. This was a policy area that clearly separated the two parties. Within French politics, the SFIO was among the parties most supportive of strong anti-cartel legislation in both the inter- and postwar era.398 There seems to have been little dissent within the party as Philip and Gazier pushed to strengthen proposed anti-cartel legislation in 1948-1950.399 The SFIO position was consistent with a general policy that was more focused on attaining lower coal and steel prices to aid the consuming industries. In addition, the party supported as early as 1948 “a European legislation for cartels and the creation of an inter-European organism, be it administrative, or judicial...to watch over the cartels and coalitions that inevitably and, as it is to be wished, are going to tend to surpass national borders.”400

SFIO efforts for strong anti-cartel legislation within France make clear that this policy was a matter of conviction within the party and part of the SFIO’s general economic policy, rather than simply a design to attack German competitiveness. The SFIO, in effect, supported Monnet’s campaign against cartels prima facie. On the international level, the party’s position was strengthened by a belief that a reconstitution of the interwar steel cartel would inevitably

November 21st, 1949, “Memorandum of the Trade Unions regarding the Ruhr Statute and Law Nr. 75,” Erich Potthoff 41, AdsD. Historian A. W. Lovett writes that, “the German miner...proved the most tenacious defender of the single sales agency.” A.W. Lovett, “The United States and the Schuman Plan: A Study in French Diplomacy 1950-1952,” The Historical Journal 39, 2, (1996): 446. To the SPD’s surprise, the DGB later came out in support of the Schuman Plan, again without consulting the SPD. The DGB’s position was tactical: it gained Adenauer’s support for the passing of a co-determination law in heavy industry in exchange for its embrace of the Schuman Plan.

397 9-10 March 1951, PV 1951, AdsD.
398 Kipping writes about Philip that, “his rejection of cartel agreements places him within the anti-‘trust’ tradition of the French left.” Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen, op cit., 246, 351.
399 See the discussion in the parliamentary group 30 May 1950 and 5 April 1951, GPS, AHC. Philip called for anti-cartel legislation on the model of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in a speech to the National Assembly on 6 July 1948, stating that, “Prices should be fixed by the nation or by free competition. What no one can tolerate is a dirigisme that escapes the hands of the state and passes it into the hands of professionals. That is unfortunately the present situation...in a great number of industries the conditions for a [price] decrease are present but a break is placed on it by certain professional organizations of owners.” On the initiative of Albert Gazier, the National Assembly’s Commission for Economic Affairs passed a resolution by a vote of 14 to 11 on 8 December 1948 calling for “the preparation of an anti-trust law...” to decrease prices. Kipping, op cit., 72. There was consensus on this policy within the SFIO Directing Committee during its discussions on proposed French anti-cartel legislation in 1950-51, with Philip, for instance, telling the committee on 25 January 1951 that, “the destruction of cartels should be a primary priority of Socialist action.” 25 January 1951, GPS, AHC.
400 Philip, 6 July 1948, JO, 4351.
result in German economic hegemony. The primacy of the cartel and price issue for the dispute between the SFIO and SPD was apparent to the parties’ leaderships following a meeting between the parties to discuss the Treaty of Paris on 27 June 1951. It is important to highlight the outcome of this meeting because it made clear the divisive issues at stake. Guy Mollet reported to the SFIO Directing Committee that the meeting was quite cordial. Mollet said, though, that, “Schumacher told us that the proximity of Hitler’s war made it difficult to reach a common position.” According to Mollet:

“It is very apparent that the problem for them is essentially one of domestic policy. Schumacher declared that the SPD favored cartelization and the maintenance of the double-pricing [mechanism] for coal. I responded to him that a common position with us was impossible if it included a defense of cartelization and double-pricing. At that moment Schumacher expressed a desire that the discussion cease.”

The SPD leadership’s position on the Schuman Plan hence evolved from an atteniste attitude in summer 1950 to overt opposition by November 1950, the period in which the cartel issue became the most prominent feature of the negotiations and public discussion. Much has been made of the internal SPD opposition around Max Brauer, Hermann Brill, Wilhelm Kaisen, and Ernst Reuter, who all supported the Treaty. Ramuschkat puts forth the scholarly consensus on Schumacher’s role by writing that, “The struggle against the Schuman Plan was Schumacher’s struggle.” Yet no one has pointed out that none of these SPD politicians came from the region of Germany that would be most affected by the Schuman Plan, North-Rhine-Westphalia and, in particular, the Ruhr valley. The SPD leadership designated politicians from this region, in particular Erik Nölting, Fritz Henssler and Joachim Schöne, to give most of the prominent speeches outlining the party’s position on the Schuman Plan from 1950 to its

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401 In Philip’s report about the Schuman Plan on 17 May 1950, he stated that, “in such a cartel, Germany would quickly exercise a dominating action.” Commission des Affaires étrangères, 17 May 1950, AN. Le Bail told the National Assembly that, if talks between French and German steel magnates continued, “I don’t believe I err in my prophecy, which is sinister: in ten years, German will be assured hegemony in Western Europe.” 15 November 1949, JO, 6286.
402 SFIO comité directeur, 27 June 1951, OURS.
403 SPD representatives abstained on votes welcoming the Schuman Plan within COMISCO and Nölting abstained at the Council of Europe vote on 14 August 1950. In September-October, the first signals came from Erich Ollenhauer and Schumacher (Schumacher interviews on 5 September and 24 October 1950) that the SPD was moving into opposition, a position that the party leadership confirmed by November 1950. Paterson, op cit., 55.
404 See the previous chapter.
405 Yet this is just one page after Ramuschkat points out that it was Henssler’s pressure that led Schumacher to stress the importance of defending the coal sales cartel. Ramuschkat, op cit., 108-09.
ratification in January 1952.\textsuperscript{406} Pitting region against region, Henssler suspected that Kaisen’s position resulted from the advantages to be gained for Bremen’s port by a potential increase in European maritime trade.\textsuperscript{407} The Central Committee resolution condemning Kaisen’s public attack on SPD policy claimed that Kaisen was willing “to sacrifice the foundation [Lebensgrundlage] and future of the Ruhr territory for the assumed interest of a Land [Bremen].” The SPD Bundestag faction lent support to CDU Minister-President Karl Arnold’s efforts to gain a seat for his Land government in the federal government’s policy-making bodies on the Schuman Plan because it believed that Adenauer’s team was ignoring the interests of the region.\textsuperscript{408} The protocol of the 20-21 January 1951 SPD Central Committee meeting reads that Henssler “completely shared Schumacher’s negative attitude on the question of the Schuman Plan.”\textsuperscript{409} The national and regional SPD of NRW and the Ruhr Valley walked as one in framing the SPD’s response to the Schuman Plan.

The polemics surrounding the Schuman Plan intersected with debates about a French proposal for a supranational European Defense Community that emerged in fall 1950 in response to a U.S. ultimatum that its western Allies permit a German military contribution to defend Western Europe after the outbreak of the Korean War. It is to this subject that we now turn, as proposals to widen the range of European integration measures in this period were largely overshadowed by the intense, emotion-driven theatrics of the EDC debate.

\textsuperscript{406} Paterson argues that besides Schumacher the greatest influence on SPD policy on the Schuman Plan came from Henssler, Baade, Nölting and Agartz, three of four of whom came from NRW. Paterson, \textit{op cit.}, 64-65. Nölting was also designated to represent the SPD in the Council of Europe’s sub-committees for production and coal. Claudia Nölting, \textit{op cit.}, 47.

\textsuperscript{407} Henssler speech, “Gleich im Recht—gleich in der Verpflichtung—Referat auf dem Bezirksparteitag in Hagen am 26./27. Mai 1951,” in Högl and Borisch, eds., 132-42.

\textsuperscript{408} See Lütkens speech to the Bundestag, 31 May 1951, \textit{Verhandlungen}, 5754. The SPD had been in coalition with Arnold from 1946 until summer 1950, when Adenauer insisted that Arnold form a Land government on the model of the national government with a CDU-FDP governing majority. SPD leaders Nölting and Henssler had positive personal rappedorts with Arnold, who wanted the NRW to represent “the social conscious” of postwar Germany. Christoph Klessmann and Peter Friedemann, eds., Streiks und Hungermärsche im Ruhrgebiet 1946-1948 (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag GmbH, 1977), 46. Arnold was close to the trade-unionist wing of the CDU and often found himself in opposition to Adenauer’s more conservative policies. Although Arnold approved the Schuman Plan, he campaigned vigorously for the maintenance of the DKV coal sales agency and for the maximum consultation possible between the German negotiators and the NRW government. See Rombeck-Jaschinski for more about Arnold’s activities in this period. Rombeck-Jaschinski, \textit{op cit.}, 82-105.

\textsuperscript{409} SPD PV 20-21 January, PV 1951, AdsD.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The politics of coal and steel and proposals for the integration of European heavy industry drew the attention of industry officials, industrial workers and trade unions, Allied governments, and a transatlantic set of political and economic elites. Outside of these circles and the Ruhr territory, the bitter debates surrounding the Schuman Plan were far too technical to attract much interest from a German and French public whom poll after poll revealed to be largely ignorant of what all the fuss was about.

Proposals to recreate a German military within an integrated European defense system was a different story altogether. When they began to broach the issue of German rearmament, Allied and German policymakers could hardly hope to confine their debates to political elites and economic and sectoral interest groups. As proposals to mobilize West German war potential for the Western alliance evolved from backdoor whispering in 1948-49 to concrete proposals and a U.S. ultimatum that a West German military be created in 1950, an emotional and rancorous public debate broke out in France and Germany. For the next five years, the issue of German rearmament was at the center of domestic politics in France and Germany and of diplomacy between the West German and Allied governments.

This chapter traces the actions and reactions of the French Socialist and German Social Democratic parties to the evolving proposals for German rearmament up to West Germany’s incorporation into the Western European Union (WEU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance systems in 1955. That West Germany would join NATO a mere ten years after the end of the Second World War was by no means pre-ordained. Although military officials in the Allied countries (and ex-military officials in West Germany) and some political leaders favored mobilizing West German forces for the Cold War in the late 1940s, most politicians considered such a step to be far too dangerous for German democratic stability and far too
provocative a move towards the Soviet Union. However, the outbreak of the Korean War upended this calculus. In response to a U.S. ultimatum that the French government agree to the formation of a West German military, French Defense Minister René Pleven proposed an integrated European defense system within which German troops could participate in Western defense. Pleven’s proposal was intended to at least stall, and hopefully to prevent, the creation of an autonomous German military.

The Pleven Plan allowed the French government to re-seize the initiative on Allied discussions of European defense. However, the French government faced a formidable foe in West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who was eager to exploit the Allied need for German manpower to reduce the Allied occupation’s limitations on West German sovereignty. Adenauer’s effort succeeded, and the signing of the General Treaty, which lifted almost all formal restrictions on West German sovereignty, accompanied the signing of a treaty to create a European Defense Community in summer 1952. Successive French governments, aware that there was no majority for these Treaties in the National Assembly, then developed cold feet and spent the next two years forcing a series of new concessions from the German and Allied governments that reinstated some of the discriminatory features towards Germany embodied in the original Pleven Plan. Still there remained no majority in the National Assembly, and the Treaties went down to defeat in August 1954. In response, a series of hasty Allied meetings resulted in the Paris Accords of 1954, in which the French government received a set of unprecedented military guarantees from the United States and Great Britain in exchange for agreeing to West Germany’s inclusion in the Western European Union, which provided an antechamber to its entrance into the NATO system. Despite these concessions it was only through recourse to threats and issue linkages that a majority in the French assembly voted for the Paris Accords at the end of December 1954.

This chapter analyzes the involvement of the SFIO and SPD in this protracted, acrimonious process. A common portrayal of SFIO and SPD policy on defense integration from 1950 to 1954 is one of failure. Despite nearly a decade of resistance to Adenauer’s security policies, the SPD failed to prevent the creation of a West German military. Furthermore, the party failed to force Adenauer to seriously engage in negotiations for German reunification. The results of the 1953 and 1957 elections seemed to confirm West Germans’ preference for Adenauer’s defense policy. For its part, the SFIO failed to prevent the French government from
acquiescing to U.S. demands that West Germany be rearmed in fall 1950. Once the leadership had accepted the principle of a West German military contribution to Western defense, it failed to maintain the party unity needed to ratify the Treaty to create the European Defense Community (EDC) and instead had to accept West Germany’s incorporation into NATO, a solution the leadership had vigorously refused to countenance before fall 1954. The SFIO opposition, which defied party discipline and caused the defeat of the EDC Treaty, failed in its aim of preventing West German rearmament and, due to its intransigent opposition, the French government was forced to agree to a West German army with considerably more autonomy than would have been permitted within an integrated defense community. Many thought that four years of incessant squabbling on the EDC issue had done irrevocable damage to the idea of a united Europe and to the Western alliance system.

Recent scholarship has argued that French leaders were far more able and competent in protecting French security goals during the Fourth Republic than previous scholars have recognized.410 As this new scholarship shows, through a cunning exploitation of their domestic constraints and an able manipulation of the shifting geopolitics of the early Cold War, French foreign policy leaders successfully resisted Allied designs for an autonomous West German military and in its stead gained a measure of control over the timing and shape of West German rearmament. Although these diplomatic historians tend to assign intention to what were often haphazard and sometimes desperate diplomatic maneuvers, their basic point remains valid. Against U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s wish, French leaders impelled the U.S. government to adopt a continental defense strategy that assured French security vis-à-vis both the Soviet Union and West Germany.411

This chapter argues that, despite the defeats mentioned above, the SFIO and the SPD were successful in achieving some central party goals related to West German rearmament in

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1950-1954. Their policies appeared reckless indeed to many contemporary, as well as scholarly, followers of “realism” or power politics because they delayed German rearmament for over four years while the Soviet Union maintained an overwhelming military advantage on the European continent. However, such a policy was reckless only if 1) the parties believed there to be a real threat of a short- or medium-term invasion from the Eastern bloc, and 2) the parties considered this threat from the East to be greater than the potential long-term threat posed by a reassertion of militarist personnel and values in the early West German republic.

As I argue below, the SPD did not believe a Soviet invasion to be imminent and considered the resurrection of a West German military to be part of a larger context in which reactionary, anti-democratic elements were reasserting themselves within West German society and politics. In addition, though the SPD’s defense policy was often murky and failed to inspire confidence in a majority of West German voters, the SPD more likely would have performed significantly better in the 1953 and 1957 elections had it not been for the crackdown on the East Berlin workers’ protest in June 1953 and the tense geopolitical situation following the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Franco-British-Israeli invasion of the Suez canal in November 1956. In addition, party leaders Kurt Schumacher and Erich Ollenhauer skillfully navigated deep party divisions on the issue of defense and managed to maintain party unity while pushing a largely pacifist base towards accepting some form of a German defense contribution. As in the case of coal and steel, the party leadership’s position was often a response to political currents lower down the party hierarchy. In this context, the SPD leadership was able to attain two goals: the maintenance of party unity by encompassing within its coalition pacifists, former Communists, neutralists and advocates of a limited contribution to Western defense. In this regard, murky language and imprecise policy were often to the party’s political advantage. At the same time, the party was able to blunt the stigma that it represented “Fatherland-less elements” by vigorously advocating for German reunification, having SPD defense experts construct close working relations with the budding West German military personnel, and asserting a substantial influence in crafting the designs for a German military the creation of which the SPD leadership realized it could not prevent.412

The SFIO, on the other hand, experienced one of the most profound internal crises in its history. The party schism over the EDC was among the most acrimonious and bitter episodes of postwar French socialism, comparable only to the conflict over the Algerian War that began just a few years later. As the SPD did in 1950-51, Mollet sought to balance opposing wings of his party through a “conditional yes” to West German rearmament that meant, in fact, a “no” for the present. However, the SFIO was not afforded the luxury of intransigent opposition because its pivotal role in the fractured French political scene meant that the full weight of domestic and foreign pressure fell upon a SFIO leadership that would have much preferred to maintain party unity through abstention. Although the party leadership failed to save the EDC, it did attain unprecedented U.S. and British military guarantees that provided French leaders with a sense of security that they had not had in many decades. In addition, the conditions that the party posed and its evident reluctance to alienate powerful conflicting intra-party sentiments was such that the SFIO contributed more than any other French party to the four-year delay of West German rearmament. With both wings of the party concerned about the impact of a German military on West German democracy, this delay may well have allowed a breathing space for anti-militarist social forces to assert themselves in West German society. A West German military formed in early 1951, when revisionist ideas and right-wing radicalism were on the upswing, may have presented a far more menacing face to democrats within and to enemies and allies alike abroad.

Examining the history of the failed European Defense Community reveals that a number of the major debates of the early Cold War played out within ad hoc transnational coalitions that blur the contours of “national interest” so central to realist presumptions. Here I examine how the issues of collective security, military blocs, threats to German democracy, the Korean War, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s offer to reunite Germany in 1952 often revealed a larger degree of agreement between SFIO and SPD leaders than either party had with their own governments. The most important question facing the socialist leaders was whether to assign primacy to détente and German reunification or to the strengthening of the Western alliance. This question split the SFIO. Many prominent SFIO leaders took a position that conformed with the SPD’s view rather than to that of their own party leadership, let alone to that of their own government. From the unconditionally pro-rearmament Dutch Labor Party to the anti-EDC SPD, the EDC, traditionally understood as an integration initiative that bitterly divided European Socialist
parties from one another, was also the impetus for transnational socialist coalitions or, more loosely, transnational communities of views that pitted French Socialists against one another.

4.2 COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND MILITARY BLOCS: THE SFIO, SPD, AND DEFENSE POLICY IN THE INTERWAR AND INITIAL POSTWAR PERIODS

French Socialists and German Social Democrats had always had a fraught relationship with their own nations’ militaries. From the parties’ origins in the late nineteenth century through to the precipice of the Second World War, Socialist attitudes to the military uneasily alternated from a wary distance and distrust to outbursts of angry accusation and recrimination. The momentary euphoria created by the “civil peace” of 1914 did not erase Socialists’ perceptions of the military as a vanguard of reaction, an instigator of war, and a threat to both the abstract ideal of democracy and to the physical bodies of democrats. The role of former general and Weimar President Paul von Hindenburg in the Nazi coup of 1933 and the acquiescence of German military leaders to their new rulers in peace and in war hardened such attitudes within German Social Democracy even further. On the other hand, the collaboration of the French Socialist resistance with elements of the French military hostile to Marshall Philippe Pétain’s National Revolution tempered SFIO anti-militarism and led the party to emerge from WWII with a far more ambivalent attitude toward their own military than that of the anti-militarist SPD.

Hostile to the military by temperament and history, both parties nevertheless supported in principle their nations’ right to self-defense.413 With Russian troops poised to Germany’s east and German troops on France’s eastern border, SFIO and SPD leaders claimed that their vote for war credits in August 1914 was a defensive policy, despite the violence that their decisions did to their conception of themselves as internationalists. Unwilling to suffer the opprobrium of patriotic sentiment in a time of international crisis and, in most cases, convinced of the moral superiority of the national effort over that of the opposing alliance, French and German socialists joined their nations’ war efforts. Yet their policies remained distinct from their governments: both parties refused the ancient principle of annexation by conquest and argued for a conciliatory peace against the harshly formulated “war aims,” some public, others secret, of their governments.

413 Drummond, op cit., 9.
While the concept of “revolutionary defeatism” championed by Vladimir Lenin and the Zimmerwald movement began to make inroads among a war-weary public, the moderate Socialists who would lead the charge against the coming Communist schism seized upon U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s design for a postwar order with a sense of fleeting hope and timid relief. For the rest of the war and into the interwar period, the SFIO and SPD leaderships held tight to a program largely inherited from the liberal international peace movement: international disarmament, national self-determination, peace without annexations, and a League of Nations to peacefully arbitrate future disputes between nations.

The SPD and SFIO carried this program into the interwar period. In its early years, the Weimar Republic lurched from crisis to crisis while the nationalist leaders of a revanchist French Republic short of allies peered apprehensively at developments across the Rhine. Opposed to the Versailles settlement, the SFIO and SPD steadfastly lent support to the efforts of centrist leaders like Édouard Herriot, Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann to stabilize an unsteady European peace. One historian writes that Blum “fought for disarmament with a conviction quite rare for the period, almost with an intractable firmness, an extraordinary radicalism.” Blum went so far as to call for a unilateral French disarmament before the Nazis came to power in Germany. However, although SPD leaders favored the Dawes and Locarno Treaties, as did the SFIO, there was an internal party conflict that later shaped much of the division among Social Democrats on the issue of rearmament following the Second World War.

As bearers of the stigma of participating in the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and subject to the daily taunts of conservative and right-wing radical forces that they were “November criminals” and “Fatherland-less elements,” Social Democrats were none too pleased that it was only with their votes that coalition governments to which they were often not even members were able to ratify the Treaties. Domestic politics made it such that SPD leaders wanted to thrust responsibility for the Locarno Treaty’s ratification onto conservative shoulders. When the right-wing German National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP) bolted Stresemann’s coalition, the SPD faced a dire choice. Although over a third of the SPD Reichstag faction, mostly the party’s left wing, voted against ratification in an internal vote, the

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414 Both the Independent Social Democratic (USPD) and Majority Social Democratic (MSPD) parties, the two Socialist parties that emerged from the wartime schism of the SPD, supported this program. See, for instance, Drummond, 19-20.

SPD reluctantly agreed to lend its votes to Stresemann’s embattled government and rescue the Locarno Treaty from defeat.416

The internal struggle within the SPD was rooted in fear. All factions of the party enthusiastically supported the concept of collective security, for which Locarno represented a considerable, if insufficient, advance. The SFIO shared this view. Prior to and following the First World War, SPD and SFIO leaders pointed to the alliance system as one of the principal destabilizing forces propelling the countries of Europe to war. While the French government desperately sought to resurrect its wartime alliance with Great Britain and the United States so as to permanently restrain its neighbor, the SFIO, with its parliamentary leader Léon Blum at the forefront, argued endlessly for a strengthening of the League of Nations and a program of international disarmament.417

The League of Nations, alas, never acquired the power necessary to live up to its high aspirations, a geopolitical reality that the SFIO would face again with the paralysis of the United Nations after the Second World War. By the mid-1930s, French Socialists watched with trepidation as an arms race broke out on the European continent. Their German comrades, suffering political and sometimes physical exile, incarceration or worse, had effectively exited the political scene while continental Europe lurched painfully through a cataclysmic decade. In 1935, Blum denounced the incapacity of the League of Nations to counter overt aggression and signaled out for criticism French Prime Minister Pierre Laval, who helped block sanctions against Italy’s fascist government after its invasion of Ethiopia.418 As Prime Minister of France’s Popular Front government, Blum pursued an international policy of disarmament and negotiation that conformed to the profoundly pacifist sentiment of both his party and nation. Dismayed at the consequences of “neutrality” in the Spanish Civil War and horrified by the Nazi rearmament of the Rhineland and its renunciation of its treaty obligations, Blum, in alliance with Jean Zyromski’s Bataille socialiste faction of the party, reversed the French Socialist position over the course of 1936 to 1938. Under relentless attack from the pacifist wing under SFIO party leader Paul Faure, Blum authorized a French rearmament program and sought refuge in bilateral diplomacy.


alliance treaties with Britain and the Soviet Union rather than in impotent collective security arrangements. Blum set a precedent the logic of which led directly to the Socialists’ later approval of the Atlantic Alliance.

Passions against Blum’s change of course ran so high within the party that the SFIO spent much of the year preceding the outbreak of the Second World War at war with itself. To preserve party unity, Blum and his supporters agreed reluctantly to vote for the Munich accords, in which the French and British governments agreed to German annexation of the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia in return for Hitler’s assurance that he would present no further territorial claims. However, Blum’s decision postponed only momentarily the intractable dispute.419 The German military invasion of France in 1940 and Blum’s public martyrdom at the kangaroo court at Riom lent retrospective credence to Blum and his faction. From prison, Blum’s authority grew to such an extent within the French Socialist resistance movement that his clandestine writings on a postwar order became the core of the SFIO’s wartime foreign policy even while he sat in a guarded house outside the Buchenwald concentration camp.

The Socialist platform, unique among the French resistance parties, envisioned a resurrected League of Nations shorn of the weaknesses that paralyzed it during the interwar period.420 In the party’s view, the organization must include both the United States and USSR, have the power to make decisions that bind its members and to enforce its decisions by economic sanctions or, crucially, through military force.421 Further, collective security should be guaranteed by both a world organization and regional federations, i.e., a United States of Europe, though Blum and the SFIO were vague about the relations they envisioned between these proposed organizations. In French Socialist André Philip’s words, “from the beginning we must inscribe the principle of an international police force in the international organization.”

422 27 March 1945, Journal officiel (JO), 721.
By 1943, the SPD leadership in exile had abandoned its overt hostility towards the Soviet Union and called for Europe to act as a mediator between the United States and Soviet Union.423 A number of scholars have commented that, in the initial postwar period, SPD party leader Kurt Schumacher endorsed a vision of the world shaped by power politics and national interests.424 However, a close reading of Schumacher’s statements makes clear that he was describing the geopolitics that he observed, rather than advocating in favor of them. Despite his visceral hatred of communism, Schumacher explicitly called for the inclusion of the USSR in an “international peace community of peoples.”425 SPD delegate Carlo Schmid, the chair of the body charged with crafting Germany’s Basic Law, inserted a clause into West Germany’s founding charter that permitted the delegation of sovereignty to international organizations for collective security.426

French Socialist leaders welcomed the announcement of the 1944 French-Soviet alliance treaty, but called for its immediate expansion to Britain and the United States during a period in which French President Charles de Gaulle was ratcheting up tensions with his western allies in North Africa and the Levant. Philip proclaimed that while “this is the security that France vainly sought in the years following 1918,” he also made clear that “alliances are not a substitute for an international organization.”427 French Socialists presented the Treaty of Dunkirk, a military alliance with Great Britain negotiated by Blum’s government in early 1946, as a Western complement to the alliance with the Soviet Union and as a contribution to collective security. At the same time, French Socialists rejected the idea of a western bloc aimed at containing the Soviet Union.428 Given such wide ambitions, the structure granted to the United Nations was bound to disappoint French Socialist and German Social Democratic leaders. SFIO leaders tirelessly denounced the right to veto resolutions granted to the Security Council and the paucity of enforcement measures to anchor a system of binding arbitration of international disputes into international law. In addition, the SFIO would have greatly preferred an internationally integrated army under U.N. command, rather than having the states lend national contingents to

425 Buczyłowski, op cit., 40.
426 Drummond, op cit., 36.
427 21 December 1944, JO, 590.
428 Ibid. and Depreux, 27 March 1945, JO, 720.
the U.N. to complete its missions. French Socialists condemned the Soviet Union in particular for preventing the creation of a powerful international organization.

Concepts of collective security coexisted with the reemergence of pacifism as a defining feature of internal socialist debates. This tendency was stronger among German Social Democrats, whose traditional anti-militarism found new legitimacy in the horror of Wehrmacht wartime atrocities. Carlo Schmid at first put forth a moral imperative of unqualified pacifism. He worked to insert provisions into the Basic Law that made all war unconstitutional, arguing against the efforts of right-wing delegates to limit the ban to aggressive wars. Such a position was quite popular among the SPD base. The SFIO, on the other hand, shared the mantle of the heroic, militarized, French resistance; many of its leaders had fought, whether in the army or clandestinely, against Vichy and German occupation. Yet distrust of the army ran deep among many SFIO leaders, and even deeper among the traditionally anti-militarist SFIO base. De Gaulle’s resignation in January 1946 was in large part the result of the SFIO’s refusal to agree to a large military budget after the war. Willing to risk the wrath of a generation of military leaders with long memories, the SFIO succeeded in slashing the military budget in 1946, arguing that the money was better served financing reconstruction and economic modernization. The SFIO returned for the moment to the Socialist tradition of constraining military spending, a common practice for both the SFIO and SPD in the pre- and interwar periods.

The SFIO accepted the polarized relations that came to embody the Cold War belatedly, grudgingly and with ideological agony. In these same years, the SPD bemoaned the development of twin power blocs that precluded a framework for German reunification. Blum refused to endorse or condemn the Truman Doctrine in spring 1947, but he reacted with enthusiasm to U.S.

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430 See for instance Carlo Schmid’s comments at the founding congress of the Sudwürttemberg SPD in Buczyłowski, *op cit.*, 54-55.
432 Serge Berstein, “French Power as seen by the Political Parties after World War II,” in *Power in Europe?*, 176.
433 In 1912 the SPD faction did vote for military credits after a harrowing internal dispute but these votes were not due to the party’s support for increasing military spending but rather because it was linked to a progressive income tax to finance the budget. In 1929, the SPD cabinet members and parliamentary faction split on the question of funding the Panzer program. The cabinet members called for a favorable vote in order to maintain what was already a shaky coalition. Drummond, *op cit.*, 21-22.
Secretary of State George Marshall’s offer of a large economic program to rebuild Western Europe, as did Schumacher and the SPD. The SFIO perceived the Marshall Plan as a source of funds to make a European “Third Force” between the developing blocs economically viable and did not want the economic program to further the divide on the European continent. The party leaders hoped that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European regimes under its sway would participate in the program. French Socialists were again at odds with Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, who said privately that, “We must make Molotov come but there can be no question of him accepting the American offer.” Molotov did come to Paris but he walked out of the conference on 30 June 1947 after receiving an intelligence report that described secret talks between the U.S. and Great Britain in which the Marshall Plan was portrayed as part of a western defense policy against the Soviet Union.

There also developed a tension between the parties’ formal programs to build a socialist “Third Force” between Western capitalism and Soviet communism, and an historical-cultural psychology that pulled them toward aligning with Great Britain and the U.S. That Schumacher and the SFIO leadership both incorporated the concept of a “Third Force” into their speeches and party resolutions was a clear sign of cross-party transnational transfer. The term gave expression to a joint SFIO-SPD desire to build a domestic system that avoided what French Socialists and German Social Democrats viewed to be the excesses of the Soviet and U.S.

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437 In private, he told French Socialist President Vincent Auriol that, “It is necessary to continue down the path that we have chosen. It is necessary to fight to the end, even if in despair, to prevent the situation from crystallizing into an eastern bloc against a western bloc.” Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus, 133, 150-1. Roger Quilliot, La S.F.I.O. et l’exercice du pouvoir, 1944-1958 (Paris: Fayard, 1972), 308. In a colloquium about Blum, Wall questions whether Blum could have been so naive as to think that the USSR might accept Marshall Aid. Gérard Bossuat responded that he did not believe Blum was naive, but rather “enthusiastic and optimistic.” He went on to say that, “When one reads the French texts, one notices that Léon Blum truly believed in the idea of maintaining good relations with the USSR.” Robert Verdier, in attendance and a close collaborator with Blum, opined that Blum was genuine in his hope that the USSR would participate in the Marshall Plan. Gérard Bossaut, “Léon Blum et l’organisation de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre mondiale,” in Léon Blum: socialiste européen, 153-186.
438 Elgey, op cit., 327.
440 There were elements among left-Catholic political movements, including Martin Niemöller and Eugen Kogon, who also advocated for this view in the late 1940s within West German postwar politics. Wilfried Loth, “German Conceptions of Europe,” in Power in Europe?, 518-19.
political and economic systems, and proclaimed the parties’ refusal to accept the accelerating geopolitical trend towards military blocs and spheres of influence. As Schumacher said in a speech on 16 October 1946, “There can be for us no orientation toward the East, nor an orientation toward the West.”

Yet an affinity for the West on the part of both party’s leadership was already clear in the initial postwar years. Blum spoke upon his return in 1945 of France belonging to the “Western family,” which he claimed differed from participating in a “Western bloc,” a distinction repeated by SFIO party leader Daniel Mayer in January 1946. Schumacher made clear in an internal circular from August 1945 that he considered Germany to have a similar culture and civilization with the Anglo-Saxon world (notice French civilization is absent) rather than with Russia. Though Adenauer’s background in the Rhineland likely made him more amenable in his dealings with the French government, there is no reason to give credence to the view that Schumacher’s Prussian upbringing made him more reluctant than most German politicians to accept a Western alignment. Schumacher had, after all, spent most of his Weimar political career in Frankfurt and had few ties with political circles in the east.

Both party leaderships put forth the view that their nations should not join a military bloc against the USSR, but they also explicitly rejected “neutrality” in the growing conflict between the values that purportedly defined East and West. Both parties were in effect “Cold Warriors” within their domestic politics, but they did not want their domestic political fight with Communists to play out as well at the diplomatic level between the geopolitical systems. The “Third Force” was to a large extent a rhetorical protest to satisfy the various wings of the two parties, with some eager for a defense against the Soviet threat and others worried that their brand of socialism would suffocate in the tight embrace of an Atlantic alliance. The “Third Force” thesis represented a unifying effort around which the parties achieved near unanimity

442 Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus, 80-84.
443 Dietric Staritz and Arnold Sywottek, “The International Political Situation as seen by the German Linksparteien (SPD, SED and KPD) between 1945 and 1949,” in Power in Europe?, 217.
from 1948 to 1950, as Cold War tensions hardened. As a period of détente set in from 1951-52, the concept gradually lost its ability to reconcile internal conflicts.\footnote{Loth writes that, “More and more the commitment to a policy of the open door (for the Eastern countries to enter a European federation) lost its real content and they sought refuge in verbal self-justification...” Loth, \textit{Sozialismus und Internationalismus}, 185.}

Schumacher welcomed the Marshall Plan, saying that it was “not the cause but an effect of the division.”\footnote{Detlef Rogosch, \textit{Vorstellungen von Europa: Europabilder in der SPD und bei den belgischen Sozialisten 1945-1957} (Hamburg: Dr. R. Krämer, 1996), 77, 81.} The same logic led the SPD and SFIO to approve the formation of the trizone, the calling of a constitutional assembly for West Germany, and the introduction of a West German currency, all measures that elicited angry reactions from the Soviet government. SFIO and SPD leaders foresaw correctly that the failure of the Moscow Foreign Ministers negotiations in November 1947 marked a caesura in postwar history. Neither party considered the incorporation of the western zones into the western area of economic cooperation at this time to be at odds with their support for German reunification. Socialist outrage against Soviet actions reached a height during the Prague coup of February 1948. It had a lasting impact on Guy Mollet, who told an interviewer ten years later that he had been, “without doubt one of the last politicians to go to Czechoslovakia before it fell under Soviet domination.”\footnote{“A Rouen, devant un auditoire attentif, Guy Mollet,” \textit{La République de la Normandie}, 28 February 1958, AGM 44, Office universitaire de recherche socialiste (OURS).} Not only did Blum and SFIO leaders condemn the coup in unequivocal terms, but for the first time the party moved to infuse its program of European unity with a defensive component aimed to stem Soviet expansionism.\footnote{Loth, \textit{Sozialismus und Internationalismus}, 179-82. As Mastny writes about the Western reception of the news from Czechoslovakia: “[Stalin’s] subjugation of Czechoslovakia, despite all its efforts to oblige him, was plausibly, if wrongly, regarded abroad as the first act in the incipient westward expansion of his empire rather than the last act of its Sovietization.” Mastny, \textit{op cit.}, 43.}

Recent scholarship has demonstrated clearly that the Atlantic Alliance, rather than being forced upon Western Europe by its colossal U.S. ally, resulted rather from sustained pressure on the U.S. government, punctuated by outbreaks of panic, from Western European governments terrified by the prospect of a Soviet invasion. The role of Georges Bidault in this regard cannot be overestimated.\footnote{See, for instance, Pierre Mélandri and Maurice Vaïsse, “France: From Powerlessness to the Search for Influence,” in \textit{Power in Europe?}, 464-7. They write that Bidault overruled the Socialists in the cabinet, Jules Moch and Vincent Auriol, who in April 1948 argued for postponing the creation of an Atlantic Alliance until the French government had rebuilt its military. Auriol said on 9 April 1948 that, “Obviously there are some people in France who deliberately want to form two blocs and to align with the American bloc. I don’t believe that this would be}

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history, placed before the French Socialist Party, still a member of an allegedly “Third Force” governing coalition, the stark choice of whether to join a multilateral military alliance directed against the Soviet Union. While the party presented the Western European Union military alliance of early 1948 as a step towards its “Third Force” idea, the inclusion of the U.S. led significant voices within the party to protest against an abandonment of the “Third Force” foreign policy. 450 Within the cabinet, however, Socialist Defense Minister Paul Ramadier supported Foreign Minister Schuman, who had meanwhile replaced Bidault, in his efforts to create the NATO system. 451 In the shadow of the Berlin blockade, the SFIO quietly announced its support for NATO without lending it the effusive praise that it had reserved for the program for economic cooperation embodied by the Marshall Plan. In May 1950, the SFIO congress confirmed this position, passing a resolution condemning “an impossible neutrality” and affirming SFIO support for the “Atlantic Community.” 452 Henceforth, for the SFIO, collective security meant in practice a participation in the Western military alliance. However, the SFIO made its support for the Atlantic Alliance conditional on the exclusion of West Germany and the refusal of German rearmament. 453

The SPD, for its part, rallied around the popular SPD mayor of Berlin, Ernst Reuter, as Western media highlighted his heroic effort to maintain morale in a city that debuted in the starring role that it would play during the decades of Cold War. Reuter’s call during the blockade for the founding of a West German state strengthened SPD resolve. As Dortmund mayor Fritz Henssler had the party’s ear on issues of coal and steel, Reuter’s views in Berlin could not help but affect SPD policies related to the Cold War, though he did not entertain as close relations as did Henssler with the SPD leadership. Nonetheless, the SPD sought to keep the door open for reunification and, under Schmid’s impetus, the emerging text from the constitutional assembly received the epithet “Basic Law” (Grundgesetz) rather than “Constitution” (Verfassung). The

wise. Nor do I believe that we have to remain neutral...Western Europe must show the two antagonists a peaceful way of tackling all their problems.”

450 Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus, 178.
452 Quilliot, op cit., 309.
453 Lapie to the National Assembly, 25 July 1949, JO, 5237.
concept of the Bonn Republic as a provisional state was codified into West Germany’s founding charter.\textsuperscript{454}

Schumacher was unwilling at this stage to accept the division of Germany, but he was also determined that the western zones be granted equality within Western Europe’s program of economic reconstruction. Schumacher reconciled these objectives in the “magnet theory” that he expounded for German reunification.\textsuperscript{455} In this conception, which resembled in some respects the “policy of strength” thesis developed by Adenauer, West Germany, and by extension Western Europe, must raise its living standards through economic reform and make their societies so attractive in economic and cultural terms that East Germany and Eastern Europe would be inevitably drawn over the long term into the Western orbit. However, where Schumacher differed from Adenauer was that his “magnet theory,” while reliant on the Western militaries as a shield from overt Soviet aggression, provided no role for a German military contribution. Although Schumacher and SPD leaders in this period welcomed the creation of the Western European Union in early 1948 and NATO in 1949, party leaders wavered on the question of whether their social, economic and cultural affinity for the “western world” should lead them to accept a West German military contribution.\textsuperscript{456}

The SPD’s concept of collective security was malleable in the years 1948-1949, and served to mask a situation in which the leading figures in the SPD lacked a common position on the prospect of West German participation in defense structures. In light of the rapidly changing geopolitical situation, and the nebulous future of a West German state in the process of


\textsuperscript{455} The magnet theory was almost universally accepted within the SPD leadership. Schmid and SPD Minister President of Niedersachsen Heinrich Wilhelm Kopf were the only significant figures to oppose it. Rogosch, \textit{op cit.}, 99. See also Wilfried Loth, “German Conceptions of Europe during the Escalation of the East-West Conflict, 1945-1949,” in \textit{Power in Europe?}, 526.

\textsuperscript{456} Buczyłowski, \textit{op cit.}, 59. Nonetheless, until fall 1949 there were conflicting voices within the SPD on the question of whether it would countenance some sort of West German contribution to western defense. Ulrich Löwke, \textit{Die SPD und die Wehrfrage: 1949-1955} (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1976), 40-41. Rudolf Hrbek and Buczyłowski claim that the adoption of the magnet theory marked a turning point in which the SPD abandoned for a time hope in German reunification and rather accepted the incorporation of West Germany into the Western military bloc, an argument Rogosch rejects. In my view the “magnet theory” was an attempt by Schumacher to reconcile conflicting goals. While holding out hope for new initiatives leading to West German reunification, the SPD leadership was also pursuing the goal of ending occupation controls, such as the dismantlement plans, and of economic recovery within the OEEC. The “magnet theory” was a way to rhetorically pursue both goals at once. Buczyłowski, \textit{op cit.}, 42; Rudolf Hrbek, \textit{Die SPD, Deutschland und Europe : Die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie zum Verhältnis von Deutschland-Politik und West-Integration} (1945-1955) Bonn: Europa Union, 1972); Rogosch, \textit{op cit.}, 101.
formation, fixing the party’s position on defense for a state still without the basic attributes of sovereignty seemed unnecessary and potentially dangerous. The most coherent position was put forward by Carlo Schmid, who called for regional pacts for collective security under the auspices of the U.N.\textsuperscript{457} What then would the party’s response be to West German participation in the Atlantic Alliance, which was after all a regional pact outside the authority of the U.N.? SPD leaders’ statements from December 1948 to spring 1949, while Kurt Schumacher lay ill, seemed to leave the door open to some sort of West German military contribution.

While SPD Vice Chairman Erich Ollenhauer appears to have considered a regional security pact with West German participation on the basis of equality to be acceptable for the SPD, Schmid and others envisioned collective security to mean a worldwide system, to which regional pacts must be subjected. In one of his first interviews after overcoming a grave illness, Schumacher called German remilitarization “completely indiskutabel.”\textsuperscript{458} Then on 20 April 1949, he proclaimed that, “There is for us an absolute necessity for military neutrality.”\textsuperscript{459} As the public discussion of West German rearmament moved from the realm of fantasy to becoming an ever more concrete possibility over the course of 1949, the SPD position hardened into opposing even the discussion of West German rearmament, in large part due to domestic reasons discussed in further detail in the next section.\textsuperscript{460} When the newly inaugurated Christian Democratic Chancellor Konrad Adenauer publicly raised the idea of a West German military contribution to NATO in late 1949, Ollenhauer responded that the SPD opposed raising the issue at all. The next month Schumacher told a press conference that, “It would be a good idea if all Germans kept their mouths shut” about West German rearmament.\textsuperscript{461} As for calls to match East Germany’s military-style police build-up, sixty-thousand officers strong by 1948, Schumacher replied, “Our policy must not be to rearm the Western police but to disarm the East German police.”\textsuperscript{462} The

\textsuperscript{457} Drummond, \textit{op cit.}, 36.
\textsuperscript{458} “Ein Interview mit Kurt Schumacher: Kampf in und um Deutschland,” \textit{Neuer Vorwärts}, KS 35, AdsD.
\textsuperscript{459} Löwke, \textit{op cit.}, 25.
\textsuperscript{460} Myoungwan Lee writes that, “When one compares the resolutions of the Party Central Committee of December 1948 with Ollenhauer’s statements from December 1949 one can see a change. While the SPD a year before did not reject rearmament of West Germany under all circumstances, the SPD-faction as the parliamentary opposition stressed its fundamental rejection of any form of German rearmament.” Myoungwan Lee, \textit{Die Reaktion der deutschen Sozialdemokratie auf den Koreakrieg 1950-1951} (Cologne, 1998), 31.
\textsuperscript{461} “Journalisten Fragen—Dr. Schumacher antwortet.” \textit{Neuer Vorwärts}, 13 January 1950, KS 50, AdsD.
\textsuperscript{462} “Schumacher sprach vor 20 000 Berlinern,” \textit{Telegraf}, 10 January 1950, KS 50, AdsD.
May 1950 party congress, on the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War, made opposition to German rearmament official party policy. 463

Throughout the debate on West German rearmament in the 1950s differing conceptions of collective security, rooted in German Social Democratic traditions, became rhetorical swords against West German participation in the proposed European Defense Community and, later, against Germany’s incorporation into the WEU and NATO. At its party congress in Dortmund in 1952, the SPD enshrined its support for “collective security” into its party platform, but refused to define precisely what type of collective security organization would receive SPD support. 464 Many scholars and contemporaries have pointed out the vagueness, even incoherence of the SPD’s concept of collective security in these years. 465 Although at times an acute embarrassment to party leaders charged with countering Adenauer’s more easily explained “policy of strength,” the SPD’s policy did succeed in reconciling a range of competing views within the SPD on defense policy. It also maintained a flexibility in the party’s position so that it could adapt to what it hoped would be initiatives by the major powers to create an all-encompassing collective security system that would include within it a reunited Germany.

Within this context the SPD in effect reasserted a traditional socialist view of collective security that precluded participation in military blocs. SPD statements against West German participation in western military alliances were at times absolute. Foreign policy expert Gerhard Lütkens said, for instance, “We must finally stop this misuse of words that was already present during the time of the League of Nations in which one seeks to misdirect public opinion to support collective security treaties, when one really means military alliances.” 466 In February 1952, Schmid said that, “I have spoken of a collective security system that includes the entirety of the world and not of one based on the power politics of the blocs.” 467 What became the SPD’s standard line from 1952 to 1958, a line which conformed to an earlier socialist definition of collective security, was that a collective security treaty must bind together the opposing blocs. As Ollenhauer told an internal party meeting in October 1954, “Membership in a collective security

463 SPD Parteitag 1950, AdsD.
464 SPD Parteitag 1952, AdsD.
465 Löwke, op cit., 130; Drummond, op cit., 97-99.
466 Rede des Abgeordneten Dr. Gerhard Lütkens vor der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates 18.9.1954, 1/HWAA22072, AdsD. Adolf Arndt called NATO a self-defense rather than collective security organization. Drummond, op cit., 98.
system must exclude a one-sided military alliance for a reunited Germany." The SPD’s stance echoed within the EDC debate in France. A number of SFIO opponents raised this same dichotomy. René Naegelen, for instance, told the SFIO party congress that, “The EDC is for us a military coalition that has nothing to do with collective security,” while Jules Moch stated that the only form of collective security worth pursuing was international disarmament.

Nonetheless, a sizable portion of French leadership circles believed the Soviet threat in 1949 to be far greater than that posed by the potential of a West German state. And 1949 was indeed a worrisome year for the Western allies. Despite their success in sustaining an airlift to counter the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the divisions available to the new NATO alliance on the European continent were hopelessly outmanned by Soviet forces. Fearful of a vengeful congress, the U.S. had rapidly drawn down its troop presence on the continent, confident that its nuclear arsenal would deter any Soviet attack. The perception of the danger changed in 1949, when the U.S. detected a successful Soviet atomic weapon explosion and the Chinese Communists forcefully ejected their nationalist rivals from mainland China. The most vocal advocates for a West German contribution to Western defense within French politics were perhaps understandably France’s leading generals, as well as traditionally anti-Communist politicians like Paul Reynaud. There were prominent proponents of German rearmament within the ruling parties as well, such as former Foreign Minister Georges Bidault.

Despite the real perception of a Soviet threat, Dietmar Hüser’s thesis of a “double containment” policy toward the Soviet Union and West Germany is an apt description for generalizing about the motivations of French leadership. Such a “double containment” was a very difficult policy to sustain, as the next years showed, and there were certainly contradictions that emerged for French leaders from the tension between these two objectives. There was a

468 PV PA KK, 16 October 1954, PV 1954, AdsD.
470 By the end of 1945, U.S. forces in Germany shrank to three armored divisions and seven infantry divisions, plus a few smaller forces. Large, op cit., 32. After the Korean War started, the Allies had only twelve divisions to counter the twenty-seven Soviet divisions in Germany and the seventy-five additional divisions that the Soviets had waiting in the wings. Drummond, op cit., 41.
range of voices within French leadership that placed differing degrees of emphasis on the
German or Soviet threats. That the French leadership doggedly pursued these twin goals for at
least six years nonetheless testifies to the continued fear the prospect of a militarized Germany
conjured within France.

In truth, only a minority of the French governing elite favored German rearmament in
1949. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the ranks of those in favor swelled, but they
remained a minority. Such sentiments were not exclusive to France: both the British and U.S.
governments opposed German rearmament before the summer of 1950. In fact, it took nearly two
months after the first shots in Korea for Truman to finally acquiesce to the Joint Chiefs’ demand
that the U.S. government authorize West German rearmament.473 The cleavage over German
rearmament before the Korean War was less between the Western nations than between their
military staffs and political leaderships, with the foreign offices generally siding with the
latter.474 It may be that the Western militaries were more “realistic” in asserting that West
German rearmament was a prerequisite for a successful defense on the European continent, but
the foreign offices and political leaders had other concerns as well. The largest of these was the
nursing of a fragile West German democracy. While some observers believed that a “double
containment” policy was impossible, many also believed the same of a rearmed West Germany
democracy.

473 On 16 June 1950, Truman responded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that German rearmament “was not realistic
under the current conditions.” It took until 6 July for Secretary of State Dean Acheson to abandon his opposition to
German rearmament. Wilfried Loth, “Der Koreakrieg und die Staatswerdung der Bundesrepublik,” in Josef
Foschepoth, ed., Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage: Deutschland im Wiederstreit der Mächte, 1945-1952
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985), 338-344. The Dutch government pushed most aggressively for a
German contribution to defense efforts before the Korean War. Bert Zeeman, “Der Brüsseler Pakt und die
Diskussion um eine westdeutschen Militärbeitrag,” in Vom Marshallplan zur EWG: Die Eingliederung der
Bundesrepublik Deutschlands in die westliche Welt, 399-425.
474 Creswell tells us that, “Throughout 1948, U.S. military officials had often raised the topic [of West German
rearmament] with their French colleagues” and, “In autumn 1949, the U.S. Army General Staff devised a plan to
incorporate German forces into NATO.” Creswell, op cit., 13-14. Guillen argues that, “Very early French generals
were convinced that German rearmament was necessary for the strengthening of the defense potential of Western
Europe against the USSR. (...) most French officers returned to their traditional anti-communist and anti-Soviet
attitude. (...) There existed therefore an absolute opposition between the military officers and politicians.” Pierre
Guillen, “Die französische Generalität, die Aufrüstung der Bundesrepublik und die EVG (1950-1954),” in Hans-
Erich Volkmann and Walter Schwengler, eds., Die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, Stand und Probleme
der Forschung (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1985),125-27. Poidevin, on the other hands, shows internal
French diplomatic reports expressing concern about nationalist developments within German politics in 1951. He
discusses as well the dilemma facing French negotiators, who wanted German troops to lift some of the financial
burden off of France while trying to maintain a French military superiority vis-à-vis German troops. Raymond
Poidevin, “Frankreich und das Problem der EVG: Nationale und internationale Einflüsse (Sommer 1951 bis Sommer
1953),” in Ibid., 109-110.
4.4 DANGER AT HOME AND ABROAD: THE KOREAN WAR, RIGHT-WING RADICALISM IN WEST GERMANY, AND GERMAN REARMAMENT, JUNE 1950—FALL 1951

The North Korean government’s military invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 unleashed panic among the Western Allies. Nowhere was the fear more palpable than in Bonn, the capitol of the West German state. The postwar status and fate of Korea invited analogies with Germany. In an interview, Adenauer said that he was “completely convinced that Stalin plans the same procedure for West Germany as he did for Korea,” a claim that he repeats in his memoirs.\(^475\) As calls from East Germany for “people’s courts” to try the “treasonous” officials of West Germany resounded from East Berlin, West German deputies emptied the market of available cyanide tablets, made frantic efforts to get their names on a rumored U.S. list of West German “notables” to be rescued in the event of invasion and, led here by Chancellor Adenauer, stocked up on pistols to defend their homes and offices.\(^476\) Within and outside of Germany, there was widespread fear that the East German government would soon follow the example of its Korean counterpart.\(^477\)

Though more tempered, reactions were swift in France as well. Daniel Mayer presented a resolution to the Foreign Affairs Commission approving the U.N.’s intervention against North Korea. In it he lauded the intervention as “the first time that force has been placed in the service of the law by an international organization.”\(^478\) Jules Moch, now defense minister, pushed a reluctant Socialist Party to abandon its opposition to large increases in military spending. Henceforth, the SFIO authorized funds for France’s part in the arms race of 1950-1954.\(^479\) However, there is little sign that anyone in the SFIO expected a Western replay of events on the Korean peninsula. U.S. diplomats also reacted with more caution, perhaps one can say with more


\(^{478}\) 5 and 7 July 1950, Commission des affaires étrangères, C/13334, AN.

\(^{479}\) Eric Méchoulan, Jules Moch et le socialisme 1893-1985 (Paris: Bruylant, 1999), 299-300. From 1950 to 1953, France increased its defense spending from 6.5% of GNP to 10.1%. Trachtenberg, op cit., 156.
“realism,” than their West German interlocutors. Neither U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson nor U.S. High Commissioner in West Germany John McCloy believed the German and Korean situations to be analogous; McCloy even thought the Korean War made an attack on West Germany less likely.\footnote{Large, \textit{op cit.}, 65-66.}

Perhaps most sober of all was Kurt Schumacher. The initial Social Democratic press reaction, in line with the general climate in West Germany, stressed the parallel between Korea and Germany. Reuter, the SPD mayor of Berlin, and other party leaders called for energetic action by the U.N. to stem the North Korean armies (a position it shared with the SFIO) and for the building of an Allied defense of West Germany.\footnote{Myounghwan, \textit{op cit.}, 43-59.} However, there was clearly a wait-and-see approach from the SPD leadership, eager not to make hasty statements that could soon be overtaken by events. It became quickly evident, though, that the SPD gave little credence to fears of an East German invasion.\footnote{Buczyłowski, \textit{op cit.}, 78; Myounghwan, \textit{op cit.}, 24-25.} In party meetings and then in public statements, Schumacher highlighted the presence of Allied forces in West Germany to debunk comparisons between Korea and Germany.\footnote{Anspracher Dr., Kurt Schumacher in einer Funktionärversammlung der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands am 31. Juli 1950 um 17.30 Uhr, KS 52, AdsD; Myounghwan, \textit{op cit.}, 59-63.} Schumacher told an internal SPD meeting that, “The Russians for the moment and for the foreseeable future do not want a total war.”\footnote{7 September 1950, PV 1950, AdsD.}

To assess SFIO and SPD reactions to proposals for German rearmament, it is necessary to place their discussions on defense within the context of uncertainty that prevailed in the initial postwar period. Within German and French public debates, the rearmament question was tied up from the beginning with the polemics concerning the fate of German war criminals, as well as with the relative position of National Socialist and far-right movements in the young German democracy. De-Nazification measures, declared with much fanfare by the occupying powers in the wake of Nazi Germany’s defeat, were already being curtailed and their reach contested by the emerging German political elite, as well as by much of German society.\footnote{Wulf Kansteiner writes that, “the culture of [the 1950s in West Germany] is still most appropriately characterized as a period of communicative silence about the most troublesome aspects of the burden of the past, a silence that went hand-in-hand with noisy lamentations of German victimhood.” Wulf Kansteiner, “Losing the War, Winning the Memory Battle: The Legacy of Nazism, World War II and the Holocaust in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fugo, eds., \textit{The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe} (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 108.} Few within or outside of Germany thought that a democratic spirit reflected the belief of a concrete majority within the...
population at the time that West Germany went to the polls for its first federal elections in summer 1949. The threat of a reemergence of an organized and powerful National Socialist movement accompanied worries that West Germany would prove as ineffective or unwilling to suppress a radical right-wing opposition as had its Weimar predecessor just a few years before. It was in a context of international suspicion and doubt about political developments in Germany, particularly the rehabilitation of former Nazis and their integration into German politics and society, that the contours for the domestic political, international, and geopolitical struggles over German remilitarization emerged.

The present historiography on the origins of European integration and the early Cold War does not take adequate account of the impact of this brief resurgence of organized neo-Nazi activity in Germany. The same period that witnessed the first concrete European integration initiatives was also the heyday of neo-Nazism in the Bundesrepublik of the 1950s. That West German far-right movements received so much international attention meant that discussions of European unification in France and Germany were shaped to a large degree by fears of the prospects of neo-Nazism.

In addition, SPD reticence on the issue of German rearmament from winter 1948 to spring 1950 closely follows public concern about the resurgence of far-right movements and an abandonment of the rhetoric and policies of the postwar de-Nazification program. In early 1949, when the party’s position on German rearmament remained undefined, SPD leaders downplayed the importance of the embryonic neo-Nazi movement. By fall 1949 and especially by spring

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486 A series of amnesty laws to free people from the burdens imposed by de-Nazification, the readmission of former Nazis into government administration, and a public campaign for the pardoning of German war criminals, the term now often being placed in quotation marks in major newspapers, demonstrate the reassertion of right-wing elements who had kept a prudent silence during the early years of occupation. Most ominous of all was the emergence of a political party of former Nazis, called the Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP), whose rhetoric, means of mobilization and organizational structure aped that of Hitler’s National Socialist Worker’s Party. The Socialist Reich Party has received relatively little attention by historians and is largely forgotten within West German public consciousness, overshadowed understandably by the stronger and more successful far-right Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) that emerged in the 1960s. For a few years, however, the SRP became the target of German, but especially international, opprobrium. The occupation authorities and German government, as well as the German Social Democratic Party, kept close tabs on its activities. The party was depicted internationally as evidence that the Nazi spirit remained alive in a substantial sector of German society, and the party therefore remained a major embarrassment for Adenauer’s government, until it became the first party banned in West Germany in 1952. See Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: the politics of amnesty and integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); and Henning Hansen, Die Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP): Aufstieg und Scheitern einer rechtsextremen Partei (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2007).

487 On 1 January 1949, Schumacher said in an interview that, “A truly concentrated nationalist or Nazi underground movement, supported with a clarity of conception and the strength of a leading personality, does not yet exist.” KS 36, AdsD. Revealing a concern about the attention of foreigners and SPD assessments of the prospects of Neo-
1950, as attendance at right-wing rallies grew and far-right parties began to register minor successes at the polls, it was clear that the SPD leadership now took the movement quite seriously.

Even had they wanted to do so, German Social Democrats could not have divorced concerns about the reassertion of right-wing radicalism from their views on German rearmament. Soldiers’ groups and right-wing parties made an explicit connection between German rearmament and the elimination of punishments and restrictions enacted upon former Nazis. The policy of the Socialist Reich Party (Sozialistische Reichspartei, SRP), the German Party, as well as of former leading German generals, was that any German military contribution to western defense was unacceptable until the Allies restored in principle “the honor” of the German soldier and granted clemency to all imprisoned German war criminals. At the same time that SPD opposition to German rearmament was raised to party principle, the SPD introduced into the Bundestag a “Law against the Enemies of Democracy,” calling for two to three year prison sentences for those who threatened force against the constitutional order, and at least three to six months for anyone who “render[ed] the republic’s flag contemptible or impugn[ed] the dignity of a group of people on the basis of race, belief, or Weltanschauung,” or those who insulted the memory of anti-Nazi resisters.488

The power of these far-right movements waned over the next years after the Bonn government imposed repressive measures under pressure from Occupation Authorities and the SPD. West Germany’s constitutional court banned the neo-Nazi SRP, and the steadily improving economy took the bite out of much of the neo-Nazi critique of the young republic. Nonetheless, the SPD remained dubious about the prospects of a democratic future for West Germany. The German Social Democrats were less concerned about the existence of a neo-Nazi party than they were about the possibility of unreformed Nazis infiltrating right-wing political parties, and reasserting administrative power in the Foreign Office and the justice system.489

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488 For the text of this bill see Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen die Feinde der Demokratie, Antrag der Fraktion der SPD Drucksache Nr. 563, 15 February 1950, Hermann Brill 330, Bundesarchiv-Koblenz (BaK).
489 Schumacher wrote that, “We must now be clear that under such power distribution the police as an institution is not a reliable factor, but rather is a factor of insecurity, the justice system though, is a reliable factor against us.” [emphasis in original]. Alfred Joachim Fischer, “Soll wieder aufgerüstet werden? Fünf führendene Politiker der...
leadership saw the hand of political reaction gaining strength in the early years of the republic. The party’s opposition to a centralized police force in 1949-50 and then its obstinate refusal to have this force placed under the direction of the Chancellor arose from a fear that a national police was as likely to be used against SPD members and trade unionists as it was to be used against subversion from the East. The battle against a centralized police was a proxy fight in the SPD’s war against German rearmament: it would not be an exaggeration to say that many engaged SPD members feared a remilitarization of West Germany more than a hypothetical attack from Soviet Russia that party leaders considered to be implausible. Carlo Schmid summed up well the prevailing attitude when he rejected German rearmament at the Council of Europe in August 1950, stating that, “In a strong state the Wehrmacht is a servant of the government—in a weak state it is its master. West Germany is not yet a very strong state and we have not forgotten the role that certain generals played during the Weimar era...”\textsuperscript{490} The trajectory of the Weimar Republic became the lens through which SPD leaders analyzed political developments in West Germany.\textsuperscript{491}

The greatest ferment against the idea of German rearmament outside of Germany took place within France.\textsuperscript{492} The August 1949 elections and the formation of a center-right government caused consternation among French Socialists. It was the party’s expert on German affairs, Salomon Grumbach, a close follower of the German press, who sounded the alarm about the trajectory of German democracy between 1950 and 1952.\textsuperscript{493} The SFIO narrative of events in Germany from 1950 to 1952 closely corresponded to that put forth by the SPD: a Christian

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Bundesrepublik geben Antwort,” \textit{Welt am Sonntag}, 6 August 1950, KS 52, AdsD. Menzel estimated that 90-95\% of administrative posts were occupied by former Nazi party members. 24 and 25 November 1949, Bundestag, \textit{Verhandlungen}, 459. See also Ollenhauer’s personal notes, for instance Chefredaktuer-Konferenz am 30.11.52, Erich Ollenhauer (EO) 85, AdsD. SPD Hermann Brill reports on his work in the committee investigating the presence of Nazis in the Foreign Office in Bericht über meine Tätigkeit als Bundesabgeordneter in der Herbstsessions 1952, 20 January 1953, Brill 1, BaK.\textsuperscript{490} Carlo Schmid’s speech to the Council of Europe, 10 August 1950, SPD-PV 1950, AdsD.\textsuperscript{491} One of many examples is Schumacher’s article in \textit{Rheinsische-Zeitung} from 6 February 1950 entitled “About Neo-Fascism. Schumacher: the great sin of the Weimar Republic repeats itself,” KS 50, AdsD.\textsuperscript{492} Non-French Western diplomats and journalists in general also harbored deep suspicions and concerns about the potential impact of German rearmament on democratic institutions and values in West Germany. The U.S. State Department’s Bureau of German Affairs argued that rearmament was “premature” because more time was necessary in order “to develop democratic tendencies on the part of the German people.” Acheson thought that, “strong centralized German police forces” would constitute an “inherent danger to democracy.” U.S. High Commissioner John McCloy wrote in a private letter that rearmament “would mean the abandonment of all serious efforts to nurture the German state into a liberal constructive element in Europe.” Schwarz, \textit{op cit.}, 122-23.\textsuperscript{493} See the series of \textit{Le Populaire} articles Grumbach wrote against German rearmament in 1950-52, Daniel Mayer 1 MA 13.6, Archiv d’histoire contemporaine (AHC), Sciences-Po.
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Democratic Party imbued with a reactionary economic and cultural policy, allied with German nationalists and Nazi-sympathizers (the liberal and German parties), were providing space for neo-Nazis, militarist generals and secret right-wing societies to reclaim much of the influence war and occupation had torn away from them.

This analysis, widespread in the SFIO press and within internal SFIO discussions, was the starting point in discussions on German rearmament for all but the most anti-Soviet of SFIO deputies. Citations from German newspapers, reports of the accumulating strength of the secret soldiers’ society known as the *Bruderschaft*, the Socialist Reich Party, and incendiary statements by German politicians all achieved a prominent place in SFIO discourse on German policy. Here SFIO leaders felt themselves in a community of spirit with their SPD comrades, united in opposition to Adenauer’s right-wing brand of Christian democracy. The SFIO and SPD simply did not trust Adenauer at this time to build a democratized German army. Even had Adenauer wanted to do so, which the two leaderships doubted, the cultural and political climate in West Germany remained such that German rearmament seemed bound to overwhelm the young democracy.

Although French Socialists were largely united in 1950 around their conception of Adenauer’s government and fears of the consequences of German rearmament, by 1953 a fault-line ran down the middle of the French Socialist Party. The party leadership around Guy Mollet had taken up Léon Blum’s and André Philip’s thesis that German contingents supervised and controlled by a European institution could muzzle the forces of militarist reaction and allow for a constructive contribution of West German forces for Western Europe’s defense. Support for this position within the party in 1953 conformed almost exactly to whether one’s conception of Adenauer and German democracy still conformed to the image that prevailed in 1950. While pro-EDC leaders like party leader Guy Mollet and Jean Le Bail spoke with confidence and

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494 Mollet told the SFIO Directing Committee on 5 April 1950 that, “As Socialists we do not have the right to accept [West German] rearmament: it is a danger for [German] Social Democracy and for all democrats. Besides, I do not yet believe in democracy in Germany.” Mollet reiterated his opposition to the Directing Committee on 26 July 1950, a month after the Korean War had started. Comité directeur (CD), OURS.

495 Grumbach told the Directing Committee on 17 January 1951 that, “Re-establishing the sovereignty of a Germany in which [the power of] Social Democracy is not at least solidified seems dreadful...The large industrialists of yesterday have their protector in Adenauer and in the German administration there is a Nazi infiltration that Social Democracy denounces,” CD, OURS.

optimism about Adenauer’s policies and the results of the 1953 election, in which voters abandoned far-right parties for the CDU, opponents of the EDC portrayed Adenauer’s government in terms that aligned often verbatim with those of the SPD. The SFIO minority cloaked their arguments with internationalism by quoting at length from the SPD, German trade unionists and other West German opponents of rearmament, while also pointing to statistics confirming the prevalence of former Nazi officials in Bonn’s burgeoning bureaucracy. Anti-EDC SFIO deputies saw signs of positive democratic currents within German politics but, in their view, these currents lay not in government, but rather flowed through the youth organizations, unions and those churches that were struggling against rearmament. For these French Socialists, Adenauer and West Germany could not be trusted with an army, whether under a European flag or not.

In the wake of the invasion of South Korea, Adenauer publicly called for the Allies to permit the formation of a 150,000-person West German defense force, a proposal he linked in the next weeks to a demand that the Allies lift the Occupation Statute and restore full West German sovereignty. Drummond writes that, “More than anyone else Kurt Schumacher was responsible for the party’s intransigent opposition in the rearmament debate.” This claim needs to be revised. In order to understand the defense policy that Schumacher set for the SPD in summer to fall 1950, his actions must be placed in a wider context. Schumacher operated within a set of internal party constraints that encouraged him to be more rather than less intransient on the issue of German rearmament. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the German public

497 Le Bail said at the Congrès national extraordinaire, 29-30 May 1954, that, “For the first time in two centuries Germany is in the process of reconstituting itself around a different tradition, which gave rise to smiles just before, the Rhenish tradition, the liberal tradition, the German democratic tradition, the Western tradition, in a word.” OURS. Mayer, for his part, called Adenauer “the chief of German reaction” in internal SFIO discussions. CD, 16 June 1954, OURS. Marceau Pivert said, “I disapprove of the illusion that by integrating Adenauer’s Germany we prevent the renaissance of Nazism and German nationalism.” CD, 4 March 1953, OURS.

498 Grumbach and Ramadier both cited statistics about the presence of former Nazi members among the staff of the new German Foreign Office at the May 23 1952 party congress, as did Mayer at the May 1954 party congress. Mayer asked the Directing Committee, “If we are faithful to proletarian internationalism, is it necessary to take the part of German Social Democracy’s class enemies?” CD, 16 June 1954, OURS. See also Grumbach’s comments to the Directing Committee’s International Affairs Bureau, 29 January 1952, AGM 111, OURS.

499 See, for instance, Mayer’s statement to the National Assembly, 13 February 1952, JO, 697. This is not to deny that there were French Socialists who saw the entire German body politics as hopelessly infested for the moment with the inheritance of militarism and Nazism. This was the view, for instance of French President and Socialist Vincent Auriol, but he represented a distinct minority view in the SFIO.

500 Drummond, op cit., 91. In fairness, Drummond presents information that supports the revision outlined above. He writes that, “A study of the rearmament debate, however, shows that, whatever may have developed in the 1960s, during the previous decade the SPD leaders responded to pressure from the rank and file; in fact, they had to accept a number of compromise resolutions before formulating a new policy position.” Drummond, op cit., 5.
was war-weary and suspicion towards the military was the highest in perhaps all of modern German history. Such sentiments were strongest within segments of the population with a history of anti-militarism or pacifism, that is, within the Social Democratic and Communist voting base. In addition, rearmament was unpopular with the German public taken as a whole in this period and one could expect the SPD to also oppose German rearmament for tactical purposes. As the public increasingly turned against rearmament, support for the SPD rose. In 1951, the SPD became the most popular party in Germany, with 36-38% support in several polls, a seven to nine point climb over its results in the 1949 election.\footnote{A November 1950 poll revealed that 40% of West Germans were in favor of German rearmament and 45% opposed. Another poll in December 1950, by which time the Korean War had shifted against the North Koreans, showed 70% of West Germans opposed German rearmament. A different poll showed 45% in fall 1950 and 50% in 1951 opposed to rearmament, with support hovering between 22 and 26%. Those who declared themselves in favor of Adenauer’s policy shrank from 31 to 24% by fall 1950 and those opposed climbed from 24 to 32%, rising further to 39% by mid-1951. Edinger, \textit{op cit.}, 229-30; Loth, “Der Koreakrieg und die Staatswerdung der Bundesrepublik,” in Foschepoth, ed., 349; Creswell, \textit{op cit.}, 36.} Running often on explicitly pacifist or non-engagement platforms, SPD regional leaders scored a series of electoral successes in the fall of 1950.\footnote{In November 1950 the SPD benefitted from the CDU share of the vote falling from 31 to 19% in Hessen, with similar results in Baden-Württemberg. In Bavaria the CSU vote fell from 52 to 27%. Loth, “Der Koreakrieg und die Staatswerdung der Bundesrepublik,” in Foschepoth, ed., 352.}

More important was the clear expectation of the SPD rank-and-file that its leadership would vigorously resist German rearmament. Polling data, as well as the denunciatory climate of the 1954 and 1956 party congresses, demonstrate that the SPD base was more determined than its leadership to prevent German rearmament. When the SPD leadership sought approval at the 1954 SPD congress for a constructive stance in parliamentary discussions about the shape of a future German army, while still maintaining its opposition in principle to German rearmament, 21 of the 34 speakers on the subject argued against the leadership. Anti-militarist statements elicited the loudest applause. The intransigence of the SPD base does not appear to have diminished over time. As late as 1956, 80% of SPD respondents expressed their belief that the new German army would soon return to its past attitude.\footnote{Drummond writes that, “What most impressed observers in Berlin were the restrictions placed on the leadership” and “Rearmament sparked greater emotional resistance from the rank and file than did any other single issue.” The Munich Congress was a repeat of Berlin, with the SPD leadership pleading with its delegates to not allow the party’s anti-militarism to interfere with the SPD’s efforts to shape a German military the construction of which they could no longer prevent. Drummond, \textit{op cit.}, 127, 148, 280, 287.}

In this context, it is a testament to Schumacher’s strength within the party that he was able to propound a “conditional yes” to German rearmament. Schumacher’s position, developed
at length in a press conference on 23 August 1950, sought to strike a synthesis between the party’s anti-militarism and the leadership’s goal of overcoming its Weimar legacy by having Social Democracy represent German national claims. First, for Schumacher, the Occupation Statute must end so as to ensure equality among the Western defenders. Further, aware of rumors that U.S. defense plans called for a withdrawal in the first phase to the Pyrenees and Britain, while the French were insisting on a defense along the Rhine, Schumacher demanded an “equality of risk,” which meant, for West Germany, an “offensive defense” that would push the front not only east of the Bundesrepublik, but east of East Germany as well, between the Weichsel and Njemen rivers, i.e., into Poland.  

Schumacher’s announcement triggered a war of words with SFIO Defense Minister Jules Moch, who condemned Schumacher for proposing such an aggressive policy. Schumacher countered that Moch would have Germans act as a shield for France because Moch envisioned that the main fighting of a ground war would occur between the Rhine and Elbe rivers.  

Regardless of his verbal saber-rattling with Moch, Schumacher’s position in fall 1950 was only acceptable to his party because it still refused the setting up of a German military under the current conditions. Only once the Allies, by which Schumacher meant primarily the United States, agreed to station sufficient troops in West Germany to allow a plausible defense of German borders from Soviet troops would the SPD consider a German defense contribution. Schumacher’s thesis was in line with the position of many former German generals, with whom Schumacher and the German government had been engaged in conversation. Hence Schumacher’s position allowed the party to court different constituencies. The former German generals, involved in secret defense planning with the U.S. and Bonn authorities, were quite impressed with Schumacher’s range of knowledge and interest in military affairs.  

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504 Pamphlet from press conference, 23 August 1950, “Dr. Kurt Schumacher. Die deutsche Sicherheit: Die Sozialdemokratie zur Verteidigung Deutschlands,” KS 52, AdsD. Schumacher was explicit when speaking with the Central Committee a year later: “Train lines and air-landings in Poland must be destroyed in the first hours [of any war]...” Parteivorstand, 2-8 September 1951, PV 1951, AdsD. 
505 Dr. Kurt Schumachers Referat der gemeinsamen Tagung der SPD-Körperschaften am 17. September 1950 in Stuttgart, KS 52, AdsD. 
506 “Fritz Sternberg interviews Kurt Schumacher,” 9 September 1950. Schumacher told a Swiss paper on 25 September 1950 that under current conditions the SPD remained opposed to West German entry into NATO. “SPD gegen Mitgliedschaft im Atlantikpakt,” 7 October 1950, KS 53, AdsD. 
507 The German generals were also eager to see the envisioned front moved eastward. For background on the German generals’ influence on the West German government, see Alaric Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003); and Manfred Meserschmidt, Christian Greiner and Nortbet Wiggershaus, “West Germany’s Strategic Position and her Role in
simultaneously satisfying the demands of the SPD’s anti-militarist base and securing a working relationship with the authorities who might one day lead a reconstructed German military. His position represented a tenuous intra-party compromise.

4.5 GERMAN REARMAMENT ON THE WESTERN AGENDA: 
THE SEPTEMBER 1950 NEW YORK SUMMIT AND THE PLEVEN PLAN

In September 1950, the U.S. government summoned its Allies to a conference in New York with the intention of securing their public support for a German contribution to Western defense. To sweeten this bitter pill, the U.S. offered to grant teeth to the skeletal NATO defense system on the continent: the U.S. would agree to appoint a Supreme Commander for NATO defense, station him in Paris, and accelerate its financial and manpower commitment to the continent. There is disagreement among historians about how willing Foreign Minister Robert Schuman was to accept German rearmament at the time. 508 Internal French sources seem to support the view that Schuman was caught off guard by the U.S. demand. Historian Michael Creswell argues that Schuman agreed to the principle of German rearmament as long as it was kept secret, but he does not examine internal French sources. Regardless of whether Schuman did in fact personally support German rearmament in September 1950, he was acutely aware that the government’s survival was dependent on the continued participation of the SFIO, which remained publicly hostile to the idea. 509 Under these conditions, Schuman had little choice but to consult with Defense Minister Moch, who then travelled to represent the French government in New York.

Defense Policy as seen by the German Military, 1945-1959,” in Power in Europe?, 354-61. For SPD discussions with the generals in summer and fall 1950, see Drummond, op cit., 60-63; Large, op cit., 73-4; Peter Merseburger, Der schwierige Deutsche: Kurt Schumacher, Eine Biographie (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1995), 480-4; and Weber, op cit., 442-443.

508 Raymond Poidevin, Schuman’s biographer, argues that Schuman was firmly against German rearmament in September 1950 and tried as far as possible to prevent it. Raymond Poidevin, “Die europapolitischen Initiativen Frankreichs des Jahres 1950—aus einer Zwangsle ge geboren?,” in Vom Marshallplan zur EWG, 257-262. Wall writes that, “Schuman remained obstinately against any idea of German rearmament.” Wall, op cit., 198. Large writes that, “Schuman, for his part, refused to budge from France’s categorical rejection of any German rearmament.” Large, op cit., 85. Creswell argues that, “The records of these meetings paint a different picture. These documents show that Schuman did not object to rearming Germany. Rather, his primary concern was to keep the idea secret” and that “Although wanting to set limits on the growth of German power and independence, Schuman accepted the need for Germany to contribute to Western defense.” Creswell, op cit., 27.

509 The U.S. government was also aware of the vital need to gain SFIO consent for German rearmament. Creswell writes that, “Acheson knew that Schuman was as forthcoming as he could be on the question of German rearmament. The secretary of state informed President Truman that French officials indicated that domestic politics
Much has been made of Jules Moch’s intransigence at the New York summit. No doubt Moch was among the most suspicious of French socialists about developments across the Rhine. The loss of his son at the hands of the Gestapo during the Second World War, and the presence of his wife, who is reported to have hovered by his side dressed in black during the New York summit meetings, provided the lens through which U.S. diplomats understood Moch’s obstinacy in refusing German rearmament. Though his tone was more strident than that to which diplomats tend to be accustomed, Moch was faithfully transmitting the views of both the SFIO and the French government. The Council of Ministers had met before his departure and empowered him to resist demands for German rearmament. At the New York summit, Moch proposed a financial or economic contribution of West Germany for Western defense, a proposal that conformed precisely with the view of SFIO leader Guy Mollet. Due to Moch’s position, an agreement among the Allies proved impossible and the summit adjourned without agreement.

With the future of the Atlantic Alliance seeming to be in jeopardy, French leaders knew that they had to craft a constructive counter-proposal or risk strengthening isolationist currents in U.S. politics or, perhaps even worse, risk witnessing the reconstruction of a German military without their involvement. Prime Minister René Pleven and Foreign Minister Schuman also were aware that any French proposal must receive the support of the SFIO if it were to achieve a majority in the Assembly. In this critical hour, Monnet intervened to try an encore of the presented the major obstacle to agreement. The French Socialist Party (SFIO), which steadfastly opposed the rearming of Germany, controlled 99 of 622 seats in France’s parliament.” Creswell, op cit., 28.

510 Moch reports that the Council of Ministers granted him “carte blanche” to oppose German rearmament. Jules Moch, Une si longue vie (Paris: R. Laffont, 1976), 411-12. When Bevin cut off Moch’s objection to German rearmament, telling him that France would be “alone” in its position, Moch thundered back that, “Then France will be alone yet again, like in 1870, 1914 and 1939.” Elgey, La république des illusions, 461.

511 Loth, Sozialismus und Internationalismus, 283. Mollet told the SFIO Directing Committee on 26 July 1950 that, “I am deeply opposed to the remilitarization of Germany. To deny that is to truly ignore the reality of the German situation because a rearmed Germany will be at the service of whoever promises it unity. On the other hand, I do agree that Germany should be obliged to collaborate under a certain economic form to the defense of Europe.” CD, 26 July 1950, OURS.

512 Moch reports that under his pressure the communiqué issued from the summit read that the Allies favored “stages towards a more important participation of Germany in the preparation of European defense” rather than “stages towards the realization of the future objective, the creation of German units destined to serve within integrated forces for the defense of Europe.” Moch, Une si longue vie, 417.

513 Hitchcock argues that at this time, “a divisive and unproductive debate over Germany’s contribution to European defense nearly destroyed the still fragile Western alliance.” Hitchcock, op cit., 133.

514 Schuman met with his Belgian counterpart Paul van Zeeland in October and explained that the domestic political situation required him to gain the support of the SFIO before proposing any plan for Western defense. Creswell, op cit., 30-31. Pleven later recalled that, “Our discussions on the plan that carries my name took place with those whose adhesions were absolutely necessary (Jules Moch, Guy Mollet, the Socialist ministers), whom it was necessary to convince not because the plan was European, but because it proposed to resolve the problem of German
magic of his spring Schuman Plan proposal. Monnet presented a proposal for a European Army to Pleven, who quickly welcomed the idea. Over several weeks in October, the proposal went through dozens of drafts. Moch and Mollet were closely involved in the hasty effort to put together a proposal before a meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers in late October. The final version of the plan called for German units of the smallest possible number under a European defense minister. There was to be a common budget and the community was to be subordinated to a European Parliament, which must come into existence before the training of any German troops.\footnote{Large, \emph{op cit.}, 92-95.}

On October 23, the French cabinet met to vote on what was now called the Pleven Plan. Just three days earlier at an international Socialist meeting, Mollet had praised the SPD for its opposition to German rearmament and called for a non-military German contribution to Western defense.\footnote{Mollet: “SFIO [is] against German rearmament. Lots of reasons...Great satisfaction over the SPD’s refusal of German rearmament...Socialist point of view....must bring sacrifices, German contribution necessary, need not be military.” Stichwort-Protokoll der COMISCO-Sitzung in Paris vom 21./22./10.1950, 2/PVBT1, AdsD.} It was clear in the French cabinet meeting that the Socialist ministers remained uneasy with the proposal. At one moment Mollet began sobbing during the tense discussion.\footnote{Large, \emph{op cit.}, 92-95.}

Finally the cabinet unanimously approved the proposal with the support of its Socialist ministers.

Almost nobody liked the Pleven Plan.\footnote{Edward Fursdon, \emph{The European Defence Community: A History} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 87-88.} Paradoxically, the French Assembly’s approval of the Pleven Plan was motivated largely by opposition to German rearmament. Mayer’s speech laying out the SFIO’s decision to vote in favor is replete with dire warnings of the threat a recreation of a German military posed to German democracy and to Germany’s neighbors.\footnote{520 participation in the defense of Europe.” Philippe Vial, “De la surenchère atlantiste à l’option européenne: Monnet et les problèmes du réarmement occidental durant l’été 1950,” in Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens, \emph{Jean Monnet, L’Europe et les chemins de la paix: Actes du Colloque de Paris du 29 au 31 mai 1997} (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999), 338-339.} Moch’s speech made clear that the SFIO was only accepting the Pleven Plan because of the U.S.
promise to reinforce its military presence in Europe. At the NATO Defense Ministers meeting on 26 October, Moch insisted that German units not exceed 1,000 men, a figure his counterparts thought to be ludicrous. France’s allies considered the Pleven Plan to be militarily impossible, but that may well have been the only reason it was able gain Socialist support and pass the French Assembly. Moch later wrote that his key objective at this stage was to delay German rearmament for as long as he could, ideally permanently.

The NATO leaders rejected the Pleven Plan, but the fear of world war in November 1950 resulting from the Chinese government’s intervention in the Korean War led to an eagerness by all to compromise. Charles Spofford, representing the U.S. at the NATO talks, proposed integrating German “combat teams” of 5,000 to 6,000 soldiers into a European Army that would fall within the NATO structure. German troops would not exceed 20% of the total force and West Germany would still be prohibited from producing heavy armament. The French cabinet met in a marathon session on 6 December to consider the new U.S. plan. With a mixture of despair and futility, Mollet pleaded with his colleagues to reject the proposal. The morning meeting adjourned so that Mollet could consult with the SFIO Directing Committee.

At this meeting, Moch and Mollet made clear to their comrades that a rejection of the U.S. offer would mean a rupture in the Atlantic Alliance and a risk that the U.S. would refuse to set up a defense on the Rhine, which would leave France open to Soviet invasion. At this point, the SFIO remained largely united in its view. Grumbach, soon to become an ardent opponent of German rearmament, said at the meeting that, “At this moment, taking into account the collapse of the U.N.’s authority in Korea, I believe that a rupture with the Americans would be worse than German rearmament.” He called on Mollet to “make a last sacrifice for the party and for France.” Mayer lamented a “sensation of disarray and humiliation.” France, he said, “is a

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521 For Moch’s account of his involvement in Allied meetings from October to December 1950, see Jules Moch, Rencontres avec..., 217-19.
522 Moch, Une si longue vie, 426.
523 Large, op cit., 95-97; Wall, op cit., 200-04.
524 The 1948 U.S. military plans for a Soviet invasion, entitled “HALFMOON” and, its 1949 replacement, “OFFTACKLE,” envisioned an Allied withdrawal to the Pyrenees and to Great Britain, to be followed by a re-conquest of Western Europe. It was a goal of the SPD, the SFIO, and their governments to pressure the U.S. to revise these plans and defend their nations from invasion. See Wolfgang Krieger, “Die Ursprünge der langfristigen Stationierung amerikanischer Streitkräfte in Europe 1945-1951,” and Bert Zeeman, “Der Brüsseler Pakt und die Diskussion um einen westdeutschen Militärbeitrag,” in Power in Europe?, 382, 408-418.
small country and the Socialist Party is not influencing events.” With two negative votes and Mollet’s abstention, the committee voted to support the government. Mollet returned to the cabinet meeting to report the decision to vote in favor of the compromise. For his part, though, Mollet insisted he would rather resign than agree to German rearmament. It was only under the forceful pressure of President Vincent Auriol, himself a Socialist opposed to any German military contribution, that Mollet reneged on his resignation and remained in the cabinet. It was with deep reluctance that the SFIO backed the French government at this crucial hour. On 19 December, the NATO Council approved the Spofford Plan and set up a parallel set of negotiations: one to take place under the auspices of the Pleven Plan for a European army, and the other under the Spofford Plan, to come into effect if the Pleven Plan negotiations failed.

While Schumacher welcomed the news of a reinforcement of the U.S. military presence resulting from the New York summit, he rejected outright the idea of West Germany joining NATO. He considered the Pleven Plan to be a dangerous plot to achieve French hegemony over the new German republic at the cost of an effective defense, a view Adenauer also expressed in private. With words that could not but offend the French public and its leaders, Schumacher cast doubt on the French pretension to be a great power and spoke with barely concealed contempt of the impotence of the French military to counter the Soviet threat. A German-French-Italian military community would be an “alliance of the disabled.” Schumacher looked to Britain and the U.S. to defend West Germany, rejecting what he considered to be a French-crafted scheme to use an intentionally feeble West German military as a shield behind which a French military would organize a national, rather than international, defense.

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525 CD, 6 December 1950, OURS.
527 “SPD gegen Mitgliedschaft im Atlantikpakt,” 7 October 1950, KS 53, AdsD.
529 Auszug aus Rede und Schlusswort Dr. Schumacher in der Sitzung der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion von Mittwoch, den 1. November 1950, KS 53, AdsD.
530 “Was man dem Volke verschweigt: Dr. Schumacher vor der sozialdemokratischen Presse,” *Neuer Vorwärts*, 7 December 1951, KS 57, AdsD.
4.6 SOCIALIST SCRAMBLING: SFIO AND SPD RESPONSES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY, 1951—FEBRUARY 1952

The SPD defense policy of 1951 was a hodgepodge of often conflicting demands designed to bring into harmony diverse party goals and to maintain party unity. In several Central Committee meetings, SPD regional leaders expressed confusion as to what the party’s defense policy was: did the party’s insistence that “equality” for a West German military including its participation in the highest organs of Atlantic defense mean that the party now supported West Germany’s inclusion into NATO?\(^{531}\) If the party leadership’s main criticism was that a German military would be discriminated against within a European army, were there any core principles that divided Schumacher from Adenauer on military issues?\(^{532}\) Time and again the party leadership condemned pacifist and neutralist elements in West German society, but local and regional SPD politicians continued to often campaign on explicitly anti-military platforms, a position with which the SPD’s second-in-command, Erich Ollenahuer, seemed to sympathize. It was not at all clear that, if the SPD won the next elections, Schumacher would have been able to convince the SPD to support his design for German rearmament.

In fact, that the SPD remained in opposition at the federal level may be the only reason the SPD managed to avoid the searing divisions that were soon to afflict its fraternal party in France. In condemning Adenauer’s government, various SPD officials and candidates could stress that aspect of SPD policy that most conformed to their own views or to their perception of what their constituents wanted to hear. While at the local level, SPD organizations tended to

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\(^{531}\) French Socialist Lapie recalls in his memoirs that at the Council of Europe meeting in December 1950, “The German Socialists did not hide from us the fact that they would not admit German rearmament except on the condition of entering NATO and being assured that they would be entirely defended.” Lapie, \textit{op cit.}, 410. At the 26-27 January 1951 foreign ministers conference, the West German government declared that it would not be willing to participate in the Pleven Plan unless West Germany was also brought into NATO and this demand was made public on 28 January. The French government immediately rejected this demand. Creswell, \textit{op cit.}, 75-76.

\(^{532}\) At a Central Committee meeting on 20-21 January 1951, Henssler said, “The impression is dominating that the SPD represents a ‘jein’ [yes and no] stand point. The conditional No is often depicted as an absolute No. For political reasons the Central Committee must put forth a clear position.” Later the protocol reads, “[Fritz] Steinhoff confirmed Henssler’s declaration about the misinterpretation of the party line on the remilitarization question.” Confusion still marked the policy a year later, with one deputy telling the SPD faction that he was “not clear whether we fundamentally oppose a military contribution.” SPD-PV 1951; SPD-Faction, 15 January 1952, AdsD. When asked by a university student where the true difference between the German government and SPD policy on German rearmament lay, Carlo Schmid was unable to respond more than pointing vaguely to “various specific weight” granted to different aspects of policy. Weber, \textit{op cit.}, 444.
emphasize the threat that a German military posed to German democracy and a desire to stay out of the conflicts of the Cold War, Schumacher condemned Adenauer’s government for supposedly not defending West German national claims with sufficient assiduity. Schumacher insisted that, in the negotiations that took place in Paris for a European army, Adenauer had agreed to a “second-class” status for a West German army. Schumacher developed a narrative of a weak German government surrendering on issue after issue to the demands of French negotiators. According to Schumacher, Adenauer had to seize this moment when the Allies needed German troops to force the removal of the occupation controls. Showing again the strength of narratives derived from memories of the Weimar period, Schumacher argued that a German government subservient to foreign powers à la Weimar would only fuel a revisionist movement in Germany. The SPD campaign against Adenauer was at this time conducted at parallel levels, which would have contradicted each other had the SPD been charged with conducting actual policy.

The historiography argues, though, that Adenauer was in effect doing exactly what Schumacher was asking, leading a hard-nosed, stubborn effort to remove the discriminatory features of the Pleven Plan and to ensure West German equality in its structures. SFIO leaders had the opposite reaction to that of the SPD: they feared that Adenauer had gained far too much from a French team negotiating on the defensive. Schumacher’s approach clearly irritated SFIO

533 Drummond, op cit., 58-59.
534 “The only person who it seems can rightly speak of a success at the Lisbon [summit] is French Foreign Minister Schuman because all the concessions that were made on the question of the European army were done due to French wishes. Because France wished it, the inclusion of Germany into NATO was refused. Because France wished it, it was agreed that before the signing of the pact on the German army by all the participating parliaments (which naturally includes the French) no German contingents should be recruited. Because the number of French divisions is limited to twelve, the number of German divisions must be limited to ten...And Schuman can finally bring from London and Lisbon back home the ‘success’ that German armaments production would not only be limited, but would also be supervised by the Western occupying powers.” “Herausforderung des Volkes,” Neuer Vorwärts, 29 February 1952, PV 1952, AdsD.
535 Rede Gen. Schumacher in R’laentern, 16 April 1951, KS 55, AdsD.
536 Schmid told the Bundestag on 9 July 1952 that, “We must prevent the German people from again being forced into a cataclysmic foreign policy, as it was forced into after 1919. Therefore one should not sign any treaties for which one already knows at the signing that in the near future they cannot and will not want to maintain.” Carlo Schmid: Bundestags Rede, 145. Fritz Steinberg, an important politician and later Minister President of North-Rhine-Westphalen, worried in a letter to Henssler that, “It could perhaps be considered an irony of fate if we as the national opposition play a similar role as that of the national right after the First World War with a different banner.” Fritz Henssler (FH) 5, AdsD.
leaders, who opposed his insistence on “equal rights” for West Germany within a European army.\textsuperscript{538}

The French negotiators achieved a “coup” in summer 1951 when Monnet gained NATO Supreme Commander Dwight Eisenhower’s support for the European army and the U.S. government abandoned the Spofford Plan negotiations, placing its policy firmly behind the negotiations in Paris.\textsuperscript{539} Over the fall of 1951, the French team made a series of concessions to the German government, the most significant of which were: German combat teams would include 13,000 troops rather than 6,000 (Moch had originally insisted on 1,000 as a maximum); all participating countries would integrate their armies into the single command, i.e., the French military would enter under the same conditions as a German military; West Germany would contribute a third rather than a fifth of the Community’s military personnel; a German Defense Ministry would be permitted; German authorities, rather than supranational officials, would be charged with recruiting German soldiers; and, finally, the Occupation Statute would end with the coming into force of the Defense Community.\textsuperscript{540}

Defense Secretary Moch now renounced the European army. His principal objection was that the combat teams would be large enough to permit autonomous German military action.\textsuperscript{541} The SFIO had in the meantime abandoned the governing coalition and entered the opposition, where they would remain for much of the rest of the legislature.\textsuperscript{542} Discussions within the SFIO Directing Committee’s Bureau of Foreign Affairs revealed an incipient split as to how far the party might be willing to go to permit German rearmament.\textsuperscript{543} Like the SPD, though, being in political opposition allowed the party to paper over its differences and present a united front against the government. This unity was short-lived because the financial and political pressure

\textsuperscript{538} Grumbach presented the conclusion of the Directing Committee’s Bureau of International Affairs as “opposing any interpretation of equal rights” for West Germany. CD, 17 January 1951, OURS.


\textsuperscript{541} See Moch’s comments to the Foreign Affairs Commission on 8 February 1952 and to the National Assembly on 12 February 1952. \textit{JO}, 615-16; C/15591, Archives nationales (AN).

\textsuperscript{542} Mollet told the Socialist parliamentary group about René Mayer’s investiture that, “A government directed by René Mayer would be in certain disagreement with the Party on the problem of German rearmament.” Groupe Parlementaire Socialiste (GPS) 20 July 1951, Archive d’histoire contemporaine (AHC), Sciences-po.

\textsuperscript{543} Grumbach argued that the SFIO must do all it could to prevent the recreation of a German army, while Gérard Jaquet emphasized that a German military was inevitable and his principle concern was to construct European institutions. CD, 7 November 1951, OURS.
placed on the French government by its allies was so great that French leaders had no choice but to respond. As in 1950, there was no majority in the French assembly for German rearmament without the support of the SFIO. This distinguished the margin of maneuver of the SFIO from that of the SPD, the votes of which were not needed to establish a German military because the CDU-CSU had an absolute majority following the 1953 elections.

On 19 February 1952, Prime Minister Edgar Faure put the principle of a European army with a German military contribution to a confidence vote in the National Assembly. In the days before the vote, Faure was aware that there was no majority to support the government’s policy. The votes could only come from the SFIO. For days Faure negotiated in private with a weary Guy Mollet. The result was that the National Assembly granted Faure confidence but only at the cost of approving a long list of SFIO conditions, without which Mollet promised the SFIO would vote against any treaty. The Socialist conditions were: there was to be no training of German troops before the ratification of the treaty; Germany would not be permitted to enter NATO; the U.S. and Great Britain must make guarantees against any violation of the treaty; the combat team size of German troops must be the smallest possible; there must be no German military command organization; and, crucially, the European army must be placed under a supranational political authority responsible to a supranational democratic assembly.\textsuperscript{544} Having placed the European army in a Socialist straitjacket, Mollet achieved a vote of 22 to 4 in the SFIO Directing Committee in favor of the confidence motion. Ominously, however, the four opponents were political heavy-weights (Grumbach, Mayer, Oreste Rosenfeld, and Robert Verdier) and they brought with them 18 SFIO deputies.\textsuperscript{545} In total, 20 SFIO deputies broke party discipline and voted against the government and their party leadership.

\textbf{4.7 THE STALIN NOTE: SPD AND SFIO PERCEPTIONS OF DÉTENTE AND COLD WAR, MARCH-DECEMBER 1952}

Over the course of 1951, the official SPD position had undergone a radical revision which would entrench the party in an intransigent policy of opposition against the West German government

\textsuperscript{544} Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, \textit{Frankreich und die deutsche Einheit: Die Haltung der französischen Regierung und Öffentlichkeit zu den Stalin-Noten 1952} (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 96-100.

\textsuperscript{545} CD, 19 February 1952, OURS.
and the western Allies. In fall 1951, Schumacher abandoned the principle of a German military contribution to western defense and argued that European integration and German reunification had become antithetical goals. It is not clear from the sources exactly when or how the SPD reached this decision, but signs were clear from October 1951 when SPD foreign policy expert Lütkens gave a contested speech to the Bundestag. Lütkens called German reunification a “precondition” of European integration and opposed the principle of “equality” for West Germany because this principle could block a successful outcome for negotiations with the Soviet Union. Although Ollenhauer then rejected Lütkens’ statements and said that they did not represent party policy, by December 1951, the content of Lütkens’ speech had in effect become the official party line, though the party dropped Lütkens’ reference to its opposition to “equality” so as not to provide a platform for attacks from the government. It remains unclear whether the revised policy was the result of Schumacher’s evolving conception of the geopolitical scene or a sign of his weakness, i.e., that after yet another period of prolonged illness Schumacher adapted his policies to underlying party currents. Only at this moment, a year after the party had determined its opposition to the Schuman Plan, did it place greater emphasis on an argument that the ECSC Treaty would also create a further obstacle to German reunification. While Schumacher’s and Lütkens’ statements appear to exclude any form of European integration, the statements were vague enough that the party later claimed that they

546 Henssler made explicit reference to this shift in policy in his letter to Ollenhauer. 14 May 1952 letter, FH 5, AdsD. In September 1953 Ollenhauer told an interviewer that, “This policy of strength is nothing more than playing with fire. The policy of strength before 1914 resulted in the collapse of 1918 and the policy of strength in 1939 resulted in the catastrophe of 1945.” Interview mit Erich Ollenhauer im RIAS am 3. September 1954, 22,15 Uhr, EO 98, AdsD.

547 16 October 1951, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 6926-6946. Schmid seems to have previously represented this view in a 26 August 1951 meeting with McCloy. He argued against the granting of full sovereignty to West Germany, as envisioned in the Allied talks on German rearmament. Weber, op cit., 447-8.

548 Schumacher reminded Adenauer in a letter about the GDR proposal for German reunification in November 1951 that West Germany was only a “provisional” state designed to prepare a path to German reunification. In a 28 December 1951 article Ollenhauer explicitly rejected Adenauer’s “policy of strength.” Buczyłowski, op cit., 149-54. 

549 Drummond writes that, “It is possible that after the severe stroke he suffered in December, 1951, Schumacher no longer possessed the strength to maintain his forward strategy against those who took over the reins of the party.” However, he considers it more likely that, “By the end of the first year of the rearmament debate Schumacher realized that the Western powers would not meet his conditions, and from the Washington conference of September, 1951, he knew also that they would not wage a political offensive for German unity.” Drummond, op cit., 65, 76. Buczyłowski also emphasizes the key role of the Washington conference for Schumacher’s position. Buczyłowski, op cit., 146.

considered only military, rather than economic integration, to be an obstacle to German reunification.551

The SPD’s shift in policy was accompanied by a marked softening of tone towards the Soviet Union and East German initiatives to achieve German reunification. After the failure of the December 1947 Foreign Ministers conference in Moscow, the leading West German parties agreed that the Soviet Union seemed uninterested in permitting German reunification. They held to this view through 1950, with the SPD and CDU both depicting an East German note in fall 1950 that called for an all-German constituent assembly as purely propagandistic. Lütkens argued in the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Commission that the note should be taken seriously, but his view was rejected not only by Chancellor Adenauer, but also by party colleague Herbert Wehner, whose stature was growing within the party.552 Statements by important SPD figures in 1950-51 show that the temptation to take Soviet initiatives seriously was a powerful force within the party. The SPD leadership’s adoption of this policy seems to be a response to this undercurrent. As late as August 1951, Schumacher stated that he did not believe the Soviet Union would ever permit German reunification. After November 1951, though, the party began to demand that the government respond positively to a second East German note and seek a four-power conference to achieve free elections for a reunified Germany.553

In this context, it is no wonder that the SPD found encouragement for its new attitude in the Stalin Note of March 1952. On 10 March 1952 Soviet diplomats delivered a note proposing German reunification to the Allied powers. The note called for a united Germany independent of

551 Hrbek provides two Ollenhauer quotes from spring 1952 that contradict each other as to whether the SPD considered all integration attempts, or only military integration, to be an obstacle to German reunification. Hrbek, op cit., 160.
552 Wehner considered the East German note to be an attempt to influence the masses and increase Western insecurity. Bundestag Auswärtige Ausschuss (AA), 5 January 1951. Adenauer depicted the letter as a propagandistic attempt to block German rearmament and lead to German neutralization and the withdrawal of the occupying troops, which would facilitate an entry of a weak all-German government into the Soviet sphere of influence. AA, 19 January 1951.
553 Schumacher wrote, “For the Soviets a democratic unity that restores German unity [is]...a threat to its entire satellite system, in a political, propagandistic and military sense. Therefore they cannot want German unity unless it is a unity under Communist domination, a German instrument in Russian hands.” East German leader Otto Grotewohl called for negotiations for German reunification again on 15 September 1951 in a letter to the Bundestag. See Buczylowski, op cit., 159. For the SPD response to the second East German note, see Drummond, op cit., 51; and Weber, op cit., 449. Ollenhauer said before the Stalin Note was publicized that, “The letter from the Soviet government to Grotewohl calling for the conclusion of a peace treaty can completely change the situation. The Western powers must take a position and the West German government must take up the pursuit of this offer. We must be prepared for the possibility that the Chancellor will yet again capitulate without conditions.” 22-23 February 1952, SPD-PV, AdsD.
the two blocs, non-aligned militarily, which could have its own armed forces for self-defense and its own armaments industry; there would be no economic restrictions; Germany would enter the U.N.; and all those not convicted of crimes that took place during the Nazi period would have their full civil rights restored.

The circumstances surrounding this note, its rejection by the Western allies with Adenauer’s willing consent, and the speculation about the real motivations of the Soviet leadership has made the Stalin Note of 1952 perhaps the most polemical subject of postwar German historiography. Disagreements between scholars who portray the note as naked propaganda and those who consider the Soviet leadership sincere in its call for détente and four-power negotiations for German reunification have been long, bitter, and often overtly partisan.554 It is not my intention to intervene in this debate, which, after all, involves controversies that center around interpretations of Soviet sources and one’s take on the politics and evolution of the early Cold War. However, it is of vital importance for a discussion of SPD policy to point out that neither now nor then is there a scholarly consensus on whether or not the Soviet leadership was serious in its March 1952 initiative for German reunification. Research has shown that within the Western foreign ministries, at least, many believed the note to be genuine.555

554 Wilfried Loth places the Stalin Note within a long continuum of Soviet postwar policy, arguing that Stalin never intended to create a truncated East German satellite state, that he took great efforts to stem East German leaders’ pursuit of a “German path to socialism,” and that he tried time and again, within the Inter-Allied Control Council, during the period of the Berlin blockade, and then with his 1952 note to create the conditions for a reunited German state that would not pose a threat to the Soviet Union. Wilfried Loth, Stalin’s Unwanted Child: the Soviet Union, the German question, and the founding of the GDR (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998). The SPD shared much of Loth’s later analysis: In 1954 Ollenhauer said, “Up to now the Soviet government, against the pressure from the Pankow [East German] regime, has refused every attempt to turn the Soviet zone into a People’s democracy, to build it up as a self-standing state.” Erich Ollenhauer am 21.2.1954 vor sozialdemokratische Chefredaktüren und Verlegern im grossen Fraktionssaal. Wehner made the same point on 19 February 1954. PV, EO 101, AdsD. Rolf Steininger provides a close source analysis on the Stalin Note and concludes that the Soviet offer was genuine. He lambasts Adenauer’s government as responsible for the “missed opportunity” of German reunification. Rolf Steininger, The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, 1985). For an aggressive counterattack arguing that the Stalin Note was merely a “propaganda maneuver,” see Peter Ruggenthaler, “The 1952 Stalin Note on German Unification: The Ongoing Debate,” Journal of Cold War Studies 12, 2 (Fall 2011): 172-212. Thomas Alan Schwartz writes that, “Although the public nature of the Soviet proposal lends itself to the propaganda interpretation, both the timing and content of the Note indicate a serious Soviet imitative.” Schwartz, op cit., 263. Mastny agrees that the Soviets were serious about German reunification in the late 1940s, but he portrays the 1952 Stalin note as a tactical move to prevent German rearmament while Stalin privately encouraged the GDR leaders to pursue a path to socialism. Mastny, op cit., 21, 52, 65, 137-40. Trachtenberg argues that, “In public, the allies dismissed this offer as a mere ploy designed to sabotage the process leading to Germany’s rearmament as part of the western bloc. It turns out that this claim was correct: the Soviet move really was essentially a maneuver. But western officials had no way of knowing that at the time, and were in fact alarmed...” Trachtenberg, op cit., 129.

555 Large, op cit., 147; Meyer-Landrut, op cit., 42; Steininger, op cit., 52-53, 57.
Although the internal division of 1951 continued, the SPD argued that there were positive signs that the note was sincere. Party leaders argued that the Western powers should do all in their power to encourage the Soviet government in international talks and to determine as far as possible the degree to which it was prepared to make concessions. Some historians have claimed that the SPD was hesitant in its response, but the SPD press quickly celebrated the note as a vindication of SPD policy and the SPD parliamentary faction asked the western powers to give it serious consideration. The party knew that the weak point of any deal would be whether the USSR would accept genuinely free elections for a united Germany. While Soviet intentions remain shrouded in mystery, the same is not true for the Allied and West German governments’ responses to the note. The sources here are unambiguous: while the Allied and West German governments publicly expressed interest in the note to placate West German and international opinion, they adopted a policy of deliberate delay and obstruction. They would not allow a Soviet initiative to end the Cold War, genuine or not, to postpone negotiations on the European Defense Community.

The SPD correctly understood the Allies’ maneuver as a rejection of the Soviet initiative and excoriated Adenauer for not pressuring the Allies to take up the Soviet offer. The Allied

556 Buczylowski, op cit., 161.
557 The SPD appears to have been pulled in different directions by the conflicting views of some of its leading members. Orlow writes that the SPD’s “public response hid deep division within the party.” Orlow, op cit., 160-61. Ollenhauer, Schmid and others appeared to think there was a real possibility for German reunification, while Herbert Wehner believed it to be a ruse and sought to temper the SPD’s enthusiasm by insisting on conditions, namely free elections, that he believed the Soviet Union could not accept. Orlow reports that Wehner said as much in private to U.S. diplomats. Dietrich Orlow, “Delayed Reaction: Democracy, Nationalism, and the SPD, 1945-1966,” German Studies Review 16, 1 (Feb., 1933): 90-91, Weber, op cit., 454-5. Wehner preempted the efforts of a SPD deputy to call for mass protests for German reunification and direct SPD negotiations with the USSR. Drummond, op cit., 86. Ollenhauer, on the other hand, suggested the status of Sweden as a model for West Germany’s place in a bipolar world. AA, 2 April 1952. Henssler’s letter to Ollenhauer reflects the uncertainty prevailing in the SPD. He continued to reject the concept of all-German neutralization but imagined ways in which a possible reunification of a Germany outside of the two blocs could be achieved. 14 May 1952 letter, FH 5, AdsD.
558 The dispute among scholars is not about whether Adenauer worked to kill the Soviet initiative, but rather whether he was wise in doing so. Gordon A. Craig writes, for instance, that Adenauer had “an obsessive conviction that any overtures to the Soviet Union were by their very nature dangerous, and any agreement potentially disastrous.” Gordon A. Craig, “Konrad Adenauer and the United States,” in Reiner Pommerin, ed., The American Impact on postwar Germany (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), 7. Hans-Peter Schwartz describes Adenauer’s rejection of the Stalin Note as “a German sacrifice for stability.” Hans-Peter Schwartz, “Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik in die westliche Welt,” in Power in Europe?, 601-02. The three major western governments all rejected the Soviet initiative, though there were some diverging voices in internal discussions. Adenauer facilitated the Western allies’ position by telling them that he opposed holding four-power elections. Over the next several years, as the Allied-Soviet exchange of notes continued, Adenauer intervened at several points to block or temper momentary efforts by the French government and later by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to seriously engage with the Soviet Union to end the Cold War and to create the conditions for German reunification. See Meyer-Landrut, op cit., and Steininger, op cit.
response to the Stalin Note confirmed the SPD’s impression that the Western allies did not want German reunification under the present circumstances. Moreover, it confirmed its darker impression, which Ollenhauer had voiced as far back as 1950, that Adenauer preferred the status quo to braving the uncertainties of German unification. The impression grew within the SPD that Adenauer’s policy on German reunification and European integration was in part designed to secure the ascendancy of political Catholicism in West Germany and Europe by cutting off the Protestant East, which had been historically, not coincidentally, a large reservoir of SPD support.

The Allies and Adenauer made haste to conclude the negotiations for a European Defense Community in order to present the USSR with a fait accompli. The EDC and General Treaties to end the formal occupation period were signed on 27 May 1952. A “binding clause” had been inserted on Adenauer’s initiative, which asserted that a reunited German government was bound to the EDC Treaty. Although this clause was then removed, the Treaty still made explicit Allied approval necessary for German reunification, a severe check on German sovereignty. It is in this context that Schumacher’s temperamental harangue, “Whoever signs this Treaty ceases to be a German” is to be understood, though this renewed recourse to demagoguery again embarrassed the SPD. The SPD believed that, in the two Treaties and the Allied responses to the Stalin Note, it was witnessing the end of any real possibility for German reunification. The Allies and the West German government, in its view, rather than the USSR, were to blame this time.

559 Wehner pointed out in a report to Adenauer that it had been the French government that had blocked the unification of the four zones in 1945, implying that the French government had always opposed German reunification. Wehner to Adenauer, 2 October 1952, EO 424, AdsD.

560 Willi Eichler told the SPD Central Committee that, “Opponents of German unity are unfortunately not only in the Soviet Union. Opponents also sit in Bonn.” 30-31 January 1953, SPD-PV 1953, AdsD.

561 See Ollenhauer’s criticism of this feature of the treaty to the AA, 27 March 1952. Volkmann states that the “binding clause” was inserted at Adenauer’s behest. Hans-Erich Volkmann, “Adenauer, Frankreich und die europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft,” in Interessen verbinden, 175. See also Ludolf Herbst, “Stil und Handlungsspielräume westdeutscher Integrationspolitik,” in Vom Marshallplan zur EWG, 15-16.

562 United-Press Interview with Schumacher, Sozialdemokratische Pressedienst, 17 May 1952, KS 58, AdsD.

563 Ollenhauer told the Central Committee on 8 April 1952 that the Western Allies reaction to the Stalin Note was “unfortunate.” 8-9 April 1952, PV 1952, AdsD. In a meeting with local SPD sections, Ollenhauer said that the initial reaction of the Western allies was “foolish, superficial reaction to the Note, it was a delaying tactic, that displayed bad will.” Die Rede Erich Ollenhauers vor den Betriebsgruppensekretären am 30.8.1952 in Bonn, EO 83, AdsD. Schumacher had suspected the French government of opposing four-power talks for German unification even before the Stalin Note. “Frankreichs Machtpolitik verhindert Europa,” 24 August 1951, PPP, KS 56, AdsD. In summer 1953, Ollenhauer told a SPD audience that, “It is a regrettable fact that the West is delaying answering the latest Soviet note until after the Bundestag election on 6 September [1953]. I believe that the question of investigating the possibilities for German unification is more important and pressing than the Western allies providing election...
As it became clear that under no circumstance would Adenauer allow negotiations for German reunification impede his policy of Western integration, SPD leaders asserted with unprecedented vehemence that the government’s priorities must be reversed.\textsuperscript{564} Schumacher even swore to renounce the Treaty should the SPD take power, a position Ollenhauer later softened with the promise that any revision of the Treaty would occur through negotiations with the Allied governments.\textsuperscript{565}

The cleavage that separated Adenauer’s government and the SPD over the politics of the Stalin Note ran right through the middle of the French Socialist Party. The SFIO had been the most vocal proponent of German reunification within French politics in the initial postwar period. Internal party discussions in January 1951 about the first East German note reveal that the SFIO was already divided on the subject of German reunification before the famous Stalin Note of March 1952. Whereas Grumbach, Édouard Depreux, and Mayer insisted that German reunification and four-power talks be given a clear priority over efforts to build a European army, Jaquet and Philip insisted that a neutralized, independent Germany must be prevented because it would likely fall under Soviet sway.\textsuperscript{566} In December 1951, Mollet threw his hat in with those who gave priority to the western integration of Germany, telling the Central Committee that, “I place the problem of integration before that of unification because I place the Russian danger before the German danger.”\textsuperscript{567} With the exception of Pineau, who at this time gave priority to unification but later became an important supporter of the EDC, the position that the participants took on this question of priorities in December 1951 corresponds to their vote for or against the EDC Treaty in August 1954.

This disagreement within the SFIO contained within it a larger conflict of views about Western policy towards the Soviet Union. SFIO Cold War hard-liners like Léon Boutbien advocated a Western policy of strength that closely conformed to Adenauer’s foreign policy assistance to the present Adenauer-Coalition in Bonn.” Kundgebung der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Landesverband Berlin im Sommergarten am Funkturm am 14. August 1953, EO 97, AdsD.
\textsuperscript{564} Wehner told the Bundestag that, “It is well known that the Chancellor set constraining factors for the Western powers’ answer.” 10 July 1952, Verhandlungen, 9873. See also Ollenhauer’s comment on Bavarian radio, 2 July 1952, EO 82, AdsD.
\textsuperscript{565} Edinger, op cit., 231; Ollenhauer to the Dortmund party congress, 28 September 1952, 39-41, AdsD.
\textsuperscript{566} CD, 17 January 1951; B.A.I., 29 January 1951; Pontillon Réarmement ou neutralisation de l’Allemagne, AGM 111, OURS.
\textsuperscript{567} CD, 12 December 1951, OURS.
conceptions.\textsuperscript{568} Figures like Mayer and Alain Savary rejected this approach as dangerous warmongering and insisted that the SFIO, and by extension the French and Western governments, make serious efforts to create the conditions for four-power negotiations for détente, German reunification, and international disarmament. Soon after being replaced as Defense Minister, Jules Moch took on the assignment of special French ambassador to the U.N. for disarmament negotiations, a position he held until he resigned in 1960 due to President Charles de Gaulle’s decision to test a nuclear weapon.\textsuperscript{569} Flying weekly between New York and Paris, Moch consistently demanded that the party postpone German rearmament to give breathing space for the disarmament negotiations to bear fruit. In 1951, Mollet seized on Moch’s suggestion as a way of reconciling the conflicting positions within the party. Moch’s position became official SFIO policy by late 1951.\textsuperscript{570}

Opponents of German rearmament at this time within the SFIO argued in the same vein as did the SPD about the possibility of talks with the Soviet Union. Mayer had said as early as the first East German note that the Allied governments should “take [the East German government] at [its] word; it is well worth the effort.”\textsuperscript{571} In this context, one understands why Grumbach and others were dissatisfied with the hesitant response of the Western allies to the Stalin Note.\textsuperscript{572} Whereas those who prioritized German reunification and détente over four-power negotiations found their hopes confirmed in the Stalin Note, Mollet and others saw much cause for concern in the Soviet offer.\textsuperscript{573} Here the fear of a Russian-aligned neutralized Germany was important, but even more so was the inclusion within the Soviet plan of an autonomous German military separate from the blocs, a part of the Stalin Note that opponents of German rearmament

\textsuperscript{568} Le Bail argued that the best path to peace would be to show Russia that they could not win a war. 26 July 1950, \textit{JO}, 5260. This was Jaquet’s position as well. SFIO Congress, 23 May 1952, OURS. Mollet later adopted this view, telling a German interviewer that, “Russia will not accept discussion until the day when its policy of expansion has failed.” “Guy Mollet nous parle,” \textit{Tagesblatt}, 23 October 1953, AGM 44, OURS. Grumbach, Mayer and Moch rejected this view. CD, 12 December 1951, OURS.

\textsuperscript{569} Méchoulan, \textit{opt. cit.}, 463-68.

\textsuperscript{570} Mollet insisted in December 1951 that Prime Minister René Pleven call a four-power conference before making a final decision to rearm West Germany, but Mollet’s initiative led nowhere. 6 December 1951, CD, OURS. At the SFIO National Council held just before the Stalin Note was issued, the party passed a resolution demanding that German rearmament be delayed until after the conclusion of the U.N. disarmament commission. 1-2 March 1952, Conseil National, OURS. This policy had just been approved by the Directing Committee by a vote of 37 to 18 with 2 abstentions. CD, 1 March 1952, OURS. Jaquet, a tireless advocate for the EDC, told an interviewer later that, “In the middle of the Cold War the problem of disarmament was not on the agenda.” Interview conducted by Cyril le Guron, “La S.F.I.O. et l’Europe (1950-1958),” Mémoire de Maîtrise, Université Paris IV—October 1997.

\textsuperscript{571} 25 October 1950, \textit{JO}, 7194.

\textsuperscript{572} Congrès national, 23 May 1952, OURS.

\textsuperscript{573} Gouin went so far as to compare the Stalin Note to the Nazi-Soviet pact. Congrès nationale, May 1952, OURS.
within the SFIO tended to pass over in silence. Mollet sought to reconcile the various currents within the SFIO around an insistence on four-power talks that included a series of conditions to avoid German neutrality, a position confirmed by the July 1953 SFIO congress.\(^{574}\)

With the Stalin Note, incipient divisions over Cold War politics, European integration and German rearmament within the SFIO and SPD, but, in particular, within the SFIO, calcified. Much of the battle-lines for the deep schism within the SFIO and for the SPD campaign against Adenauer’s defense policy were set in place by early 1952. Each subsequent Soviet initiative and change in the geopolitical situation gave buoyancy to the SPD leadership and SFIO opponents of German rearmament, and led them to repeat their insistence that the time had come for serious negotiations. SPD leaders and the SFIO minority began to emphasize the need to ensure Soviet as well as western security and lent legitimacy to a number of Soviet security claims.\(^{575}\) Jaquet, leader among the pro-EDC SFIO deputies, on the other hand, considered Soviet overtures to be a “change in tactics” rather than of “content.”\(^{576}\) Mollet agreed that the Soviet Union did not want a war in Europe, but he credited the deterrence provided by the presence of U.S. soldiers for Soviet moderation.\(^{577}\) In a report that he presented in July 1952, Mollet described the Stalin note as a “skilled maneuver.”\(^{578}\) The SFIO majority supported the principle of four-power negotiations, but insisted that they not be made a precondition for the EDC. It argued for a policy of “simultaneity” in the organization of western defense with German rearmament and the pursuit of negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Those historians who argue that West Germany had a “missed opportunity” to reunite Germany in 1952 agree that at some point after Stalin’s death, either after the suppression of the East Berlin uprising in July 1953, or after the failure of the four-power Geneva negotiations of

\(^{574}\) See the resolution of the SFIO Congress adopted July 1953 and CD, 17 November 1953, OURS.
\(^{575}\) Moch opposed the U.S. policy of “Roll-Back,” claimed that the USSR was not pursuing an aggressive policy in Europe, and argued that the Soviets had legitimate security concerns concerning the U.S. military’s arms buildup. 8 December 1953, GPS, AHC. In his memoirs Moch wrote that, “Russia seemed to distrust Atlantic policy as much as we did neo-Panslavic expansion.” Moch, Une si longe vie, 619. Mollet admitted that the Soviets had genuine concerns about U.S. “encirclement.” 20 November 1953, JO, 5350. In a meeting with SPD leaders, Rosenfeld and Jacques Brutelle were divided, with Brutelle, an advocate of the EDC, rejecting the anti-EDC Rosenfeld’s optimism about the prospects for four-power talks. Paris-London-Brüssel, 23-26 March 1953, EO 421, AdsD. See also Erler’s comments that the Western allies must not seek a Soviet capitulation in negotiations. 10 July 1952, Verhandlungen, 9905.
\(^{576}\) Commission des Affaires étrangères, 31 March 1954, AN.
\(^{577}\) Congrès national extraordinaire, 29-30 May 1954, OURS.
\(^{578}\) LES PROBLEMES EUROPEENS Rapport présenté par Guy Mollet au nom de la S.F.I.O., en vue de la réunion du Study Group de Bruxelles 11-12 Juillet 52, AGM 111, OURS.
July 1955, the Soviet leadership shut the door on the issue of German reunification. French Socialists and German Social Democrats were aware that the Soviet line had hardened, but did not believe this to be a reason to abandon their approach. After the failure of the Berlin four-power conference in early 1954, proponents of the EDC within French and West German politics insisted that the SFIO minority and SPD now admit that four-power negotiations had failed and accept the creation of the EDC. To this the SPD leadership and SFIO minority responded that the Western allies, in particular, the U.S., were as responsible as the Soviets for the failure of the negotiations. Even after the incorporation of West Germany into NATO in 1955, the SPD clutched at any available straw that seemed to have the potential to reopen the door to discussions with the Soviet leadership on German reunification. From 1954 to 1959, the party put forth a series of proposals to incorporate the U.S. and USSR in a collective security system to which a reunited Germany would be member. It was only in 1960 that the SPD finally accepted the security system created by the western allies, but this did not include a repudiation of the SPD policy on reunification from the 1950s. Fritz Erler, one of the architects of the SPD turn leading up to 1960, insisted shortly before his death that the SPD had been right to oppose Adenauer in 1952 because, whether or not the Soviets had been serious in their proposal for German reunification, Adenauer and the Western allies had not bothered to find out.

4.8: A WELCOMED DELAY: THE SFIO, SPD, AND THE STALEMATE OF JANUARY 1953-SEPTEMBER 1953

January 1953 marked a turning point in French policy on Europe. René Mayer of the Radical Party formed a government that saw an opening to the political right, an inclusion of a number of Gaullists in the cabinet, and the eviction of Schuman from the foreign ministry. With the SFIO in opposition, French prime ministers made ratification of the EDC dependent on the support of

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580 Mollet and Spaak appealed to Ollenhauer in a Socialist International meeting on 28 February 1954 to revise SPD policy in the wake of the negative results of the Berlin Conference, which Ollenhauer refused to do. See Ollenhauer to Schiller, 17 March 1954, Karl Schiller 132 (BaK).
Gaullists, whose votes they needed to maintain governing majorities. The pendulum now swung in the other direction, with the French government insisting on a series of revisions to the EDC treaty that in effect reasserted a number of the discriminatory features of the Pleven Plan. The proposals’ intent was to emancipate the French army from many of the powers of the common defense authority while keeping German units muzzled to them. The interminable vacillations that followed provided a welcome delay to SPD and SFIO leaders. The situation allowed the parties to maintain a fragile unity around a principled “yes” to collective security and (from February 1954 on for the SPD) to western defense and a conditional “no” to the EDC treaty.

Mollet and Ollenhauer, both rather colorless party operators, represented the median of their parties’ range of opinion on the EDC issue. That Ollenhauer was so much more effective at limiting the damage and extent of internal party squabbling is likely due to the Western governments’ recognition that, despite holding the allegiance of one-third of West German voters, not a single SPD vote was needed to ratify the Treaties. This situation can be symbolized by the short, curt, and frankly rude meeting that U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles held with SPD leaders in 1953. Meanwhile, U.S. diplomats spent countless hours courting Mollet and the SFIO, which despite its scant 11% showing in the last election, remained pivotal for the creation of a majority in the French assembly on all European treaties. Ollenhauer was simply not subject to a similar amount of intense pressure and could adapt slowly to changing currents within his party.

Mollet was not so lucky. While elements in the SFIO clamored for progress towards the ratification of the Treaties, Mollet adopted an attentiste attitude that often baffled domestic and foreign opinion. The dilemma facing the French government was that the SFIO and Gaullist parties’ conditions for supporting German rearmament were mutually exclusive, and the government had no confidence that either party’s leadership could in the end deliver the votes. The emergence of a new tendency within the SFIO opposed to the EDC in 1953 added to Mollet’s headaches. The initial vocal opponents of the treaty, besides Moch, had gone to lengths to present their opposition in internationalist rhetoric, by evoking their solidarity with pacifist, youth, and trade union elements within German society. These anti-EDC French Socialists eschewed essentialist depictions of “German” character.581 Delwit aptly describes Depreux,

581 Mayer, as he had in 1943, called the “idea of defining Germany in terms of race” to be “absurd.” “If I ever committed the error that the Hitleriens committed with regard to those who are of the same origin as me [Jewish], it
Mayer, Marceau Pivert and others within this group as the SFIO “left,” a designation that has much to do with this group’s subsequent opposition to the Mollet government’s escalation of the war in Algeria, which led many of them to exit the SFIO between 1957 and 1959. In 1952, however, a different group of anti-cédistes emerged within the SFIO, many of whom had held administrative posts in the defense ministry, such as Pierre Métayer and Max Lejeune or, in the case of René Naegelen, had been involved as Pro-Consul in repression in Algeria in 1948. This group shared some of the mindset of the Gaullists, fretted over the disappearance of the French military in a supranational morass, and sometimes gave vent to widespread stereotypes of a fatally flawed German phenotype.\footnote{Naegelen said to the SFIO congress in February 1955, “...I could have expected anything except to be chased [from the party] solely for not wanting to rearm the people who acclaimed Hitler, the people who plunged our country into the most awful material and moral distress, the people who wished to destroy forever socialism and democracy!” Congrès national extraordinaire at Puteaux, 5-6 February 1955, OURS.} They looked to the French military as the harbinger of French grandeur and as guarantee of their nation’s independence.\footnote{Lejeune told the May 1952 SFIO congress that, “The army is silent, the army does not have the right to say what it thinks in the republic, but it is worried and there is enormous emotion in the army today.” He went on to describe the military’s worries to the congress. He then said that, “One is witnessing the liquidation of the French military apparatus. France is falling more and more under the military tutelage of the USA. France is completely losing its independence.” CD/GPS joint meeting on 18 November 1953, OURS.} The public opposition of leading French generals to the EDC in 1953 gave momentum to this group’s position. With the exception of Moch, they were later to count themselves among the most ardent defenders of l’Algérie française.

Presiding over a severely divided party, Mollet took refuge in the official conditions for German rearmament approved by the 1952 SFIO congress. The pro-EDC SFIO center could hold the inter-party squabbling within acceptable bounds as long as it remained obvious to all that the SFIO conditions had not been realized. These conditions were: a legal guarantee from the United States to intervene in the event a member violated the treaty; a close association of Great Britain in the Community’s structures; and a European assembly elected on the basis of universal suffrage to which the EDC executive would be responsible. The last demand had helped spur Foreign Minister Schuman’s call for a European Political Community in fall 1952. Negotiations for the creation for this community added to the confusion surrounding the EDC, which eventually led Mollet to abandon his support for it.
4.9. REALPOLITIK VS. THE POLITICS OF CONSCIENCE IN SFIO AND SPD
DEFENSE POLICY: THE SOCIALIST CONTRIBUTION TO THE FAILURE OF
THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY, SEPTEMBER 1953-AUGUST 1954

The situation changed dramatically when Mollet attended a Council of Europe session in
September 1953. For years the anglophile Mollet had sought British inclusion in an integrated
Europe. There was a single area of agreement between the SFIO and SPD leaderships, and
among the various factions of the SFIO: the desirability of British membership. As in the case of
the ECSC, SPD leaders saw British participation as a safeguard against French hegemony in the
community, while the SFIO believed French arms alone to be too stunted to smother the
militarist attitudes of a renascent Germany on their own. Reluctantly from 1952 to 1954, the
British government proceeded step by step to meet these concerns. In attachments to the EDC
and Bonn treaties signed in May 1952, the British and U.S. governments stated their intention to
maintain their troops on the continent and to consider any violation of the Treaties to be a threat
to their own security. However, the two governments reserved the right to withdraw their troops
if they saw fit to do so and there were no binding military commitments (i.e., no “automatic
armed action” clause) in the EDC Treaty. The SFIO and French government made clear that they
did not consider these Allied guarantees to be sufficient.

Then a journalist announced that Mollet reported having achieved a personal diplomatic
triumph in private meetings with British undersecretary of state Anthony Nutting in September
1953. Eager to win the SFIO’s support for the EDC treaty, the journalist reported that Nutting
had offered Mollet to strengthen the British “partnership” so that British officials would be
represented in all the directing bodies of the EDC. In addition, the British military would
cooperate in the training of the cadres, integrate its logistical services with the EDC, and
maintain its troops on the continent.”584 In what seemed to be a *quid pro quo*, Mollet then
announced publicly that the SFIO would be willing to provide the necessary votes to achieve a
majority for ratification of the EDC, making the support of the Gaullist Party now seem
unnecessary. With this British guarantee in hand, Mollet threw his hat in with Georges Brutelle,
Jaquet and the other pro-EDC elements within the SFIO, though on the condition that the British
keep their word and that the SFIO National Council approve his position. On 14 April 1954, the

584 “Partnership” is in English in the original.
British government agreed to the Agreement regarding Co-operation between the United Kingdom and the European Defence Community, a treaty that closely followed the lines of what had been agreed between Mollet and Nutting.\textsuperscript{585}

Although Mollet claimed that the journalist had left out the qualifier “might” from his statement, Mollet’s comments unleashed open political warfare within the SFIO. Party unity completely broke down. Pro-EDC SFIO deputies voted against the Socialist nominee for French President, the anti-EDC firebrand Naegelen.\textsuperscript{586} In defiance of Jaquet and other pro-EDC SFIO deputies, anti-EDC Socialists accepted the support of anti-EDC deputies from other parties to seize the chairmanships of key National Assembly committees. These votes helped elect Daniel Mayer to the presidency of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Paul Couston to head the Industrial Production Committee, Max Lejeune to chair the Defense Committee, and Moch as "rapporteur" for the EDC treaty. Pro-EDC Socialists voted against their own party comrades. Fifty-nine leading Socialists signed a brochure condemning the EDC treaty and, against the wishes of the Directing Committee, distributed it widely.\textsuperscript{587} At party congresses, Naegelen channelled the frustration of the smaller federations, which tended to oppose the EDC, that their voices were being rolled over by the large pro-EDC federations (Pas-de-Calais, Nord, Bouches-de-Rhône), the votes of which provided the base for Mollet’s longevity as secretary general.\textsuperscript{588} The Directing Committee struggled to hold a recalcitrant parliamentary group to the resolutions of the party congress. As early as 30 January 1952, the party applied sanctions on deputies violating party discipline on the subject.\textsuperscript{589} This schism was not the sole work of the division among SFIO leaders; it also reflected a deep division at the party’s base. In polls in spring 1954, 38% of SFIO supporters declared themselves opposed to the treaty and 35% in favor, a statistic that anticipated the result of the final vote in the National Assembly, in which 53 SFIO deputies voted against the Treaty and 50 in favor. In the vast majority of cases, the deputies followed the vote of their

\textsuperscript{585} Fursdon, \textit{op cit.}, 253-5.
\textsuperscript{586} Lapie, who also opposed the EDC, later wrote of Naegelen that he had, “a violent character...[He was] sentimental and patriotic...He sought out all occasions to preserve or create contacts with the right, especially the former Gaullists.” Lapie, \textit{op cit.}, 488.
\textsuperscript{587} Laurent and Mollet were furious about the brochure. CD, 14 April 1954, OURS.
\textsuperscript{588} Naegelen represented the smallest of the SFIO federations, the Basses-Alpes. See his comments to the SFIO Extraordinary congress, 5-6 February 1955, OURS. Also see Quilliot, \textit{op cit.}, 492.
\textsuperscript{589} CD, 30 January 1952, and Conseil national, 1-2 March 1952, OURS.
federation on the EDC issue, signaling a deep-seated divide at all levels of the party organization.590

The SPD lent cautious support to opponents of the EDC within the SFIO, even musing at one point about intervening behind the scenes to try to overthrow Mollet’s leadership.591 The SPD embraced the blumiste faction, which provided the bulk of what Delwit calls the SFIO “left,” praising the attitudes of Depreux, Mayer, Verdier, and even opening its press to Rosenfeld when he fell afoul of the SFIO leadership.592 The SPD leadership now also had a change in heart towards Moch, welcoming his efforts to achieve disarmament and referencing his opinions and expertise within Bundestag committees. It passed over in silence, though, the figures and statements of the anti-EDC SFIO “right.” The anti-EDC group within the SFIO, for its part, wrapped itself in the cloak of internationalism provided by the SPD’s embrace. The newspaper “Reconstruction” served as a vital liaison between the SPD and SFIO opposition, translating SPD texts on German rearmament into French and providing a forum for disseminating arguments against German rearmament.593 The pro-EDC SFIO majority exploited the SPD’s internal confusion on the issue. To counter his opponents, Mollet presented the SPD position as being far more coherent than it actually was. He said that the SPD was not opposed to the membership of a West German military in NATO, and that the anti-EDC SFIO members and the SPD were in fact working at cross-purposes. That internal SFIO discussions at times descended into vitriolic debate about the true policy of the SPD testifies to the moral weight each side assigned the SPD in this inter-socialist dialogue.594

What Mollet and the pro-EDC SFIO leaders were referring to was the move by the SPD in the wake of the failure of the 1954 four-power Berlin Conference to accept in principle a West German contribution to a Western, rather than universal, collective defense system.595 At the 1954 SPD Congress in Berlin, the SPD leadership managed to wrest a resolution in favor of this

591 Cahn et al., eds., Allemagne et la construction de l’Europe, 76-82.
592 Delwit, op cit., 68.
594 See the discussions in the Directing Committee, 7 May 1952, and at the May 1952 congress, OURS. For the SPD’s take on this tri-party Labour-SFIO-SPD meeting, see Heinz Putzrath’s letter to Ollenhauer, 17 June 1952, EO 391, AdsD.
595 See Mollet’s handwritten notes about his conversation with Ollenhauer at the Conférence des Partis Socialistes Européennes, 27-28 February 1954, AGM 111, OURS.
principle from its reluctant party base but only by attaching to it a series of conditions that made clear that SPD support for German rearmament would not be forthcoming in any near term.\(^596\) With a four-power conference behind them and after years of delaying tactics that included a series of petitions to the constitutional court, the SPD leadership was aware that all that stood between it and West German rearmament was a vote in the French Assembly. Voices from the regional branches of the party urging a pragmatic participation in the formation of the new West German military began to assert themselves. The mayors of Hamburg and Bremen, Max Brauer and Wilhelm Kaisen, economic expert Karl Schiller and, crucially, the mayor of Berlin, Ernst Reuter, and his dauphin, Willy Brandt, called on the party leadership to work constructively to shape West Germany’s contribution to western defense.\(^597\)

The most important figure in this development was Fritz Erler, who emerged as the party’s expert on defense issues. As early as 1950, Schumacher had tapped Erler, who had no previous expertise in defense issues, as his point-man on defense in the new Bundestag.\(^598\) In meetings with Schumacher and others, Erler built a working relationship with the former generals advising the government on defense. With the young Helmut Schmidt, future SPD Defense Minister and Chancellor, Erler formed a security committee within the party’s Central Committee to construct a positive security policy.\(^599\) It recommended an agreement with NATO that would allow West Germany to be freed from its obligations in the event German reunification became a concrete possibility. Like Schumacher, the committee argued that the SPD must consider each military official as an individual rather than collectively stigmatizing former officers, a practice that remained common within the SPD. If there was to be a West German military regardless of the wishes of the SPD, then the SPD must work to shape it in its

\(^{596}\) Löwke, *op cit.*, 182-83; Wilker calls Erler and Schmidt a “counter-elite” within the party. Lothar Wilker, *Die Sicherheitspolitik der SPD 1956-1966: Zwischen Wiedervereinigungs- und Bündnisorientierung* (Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft, 1977), 19. These conditions were: 1) reunification remained the first priority; 2) equality of rights; 3) that West Germany and Berlin be accorded equal security to the other nations; 4) that the defense organization include as many countries as possible, in particular Great Britain and Scandinavia; and 5) that military spending must not negatively affect spending on social welfare. They had been laid out as early as 1953; see Ollenhauer’s speech to the Bundestag, 19 March 1953, *Verhandlungen*, 12318-27.

\(^{597}\) Brauer to 1954 SPD Parteitag, 74; Löwke, *op cit.*, 123; Paterson, *op cit.*, 96.

\(^{598}\) Drummond, *op cit.*, 84-85; Weber, *op cit.*, 442.

\(^{599}\) Drummond, *op cit.*, 122-24.
image and build a relationship of trust. Should they fail to do so, they ran the risk that this “massive apparatus of power” would be wielded yet again against the democratic left.600

In Schiller’s view, this was a “conflict between reason and sentiment.”601 When party reformers sought to de-stigmatize the German military for the SPD base and infuse it with democratic values, they provoked the ire of the pacifist and anti-militarist wing of the party. This internal conflict was not limited to the issue of the European army, but continued in dramatic form through the 1950s and into the 1960s, well after defense policy had been divorced from the European integration process. The SPD paired mass demonstrations to oppose German rearmament with a constructive participation in the debates concerning the military’s eventual formation. Erler, Schmidt, and others deeply immersed themselves in the detailed work within the Bundestag, forging alliances with members of other parties that allowed them to greatly influence the shape of the new German military that slowly emerged beginning in 1956. It is not correct to characterize Schumacher’s defense policy as one of intransigent opposition.602 To a large degree, Erler, Schmidt, and a radically reformed West German military are concrete legacies that can be traced back to Schumacher’s influence within the SPD between the summers of 1950 and 1951.603

This battle between what Schiller termed “reason and sentiment,” perhaps better described as a conflict between Realpolitik and a policy of conscience, took place within the SFIO as well, with far more personal acrimony and bitterness. The stakes here were higher because the party knew that its deputies would cast the decisive votes in the National Assembly. Pro-EDC deputies argued that the party must be pragmatic and realize that the geopolitical

600 Sitzung der Kommission zur Weiterführung der Parteidiskussion am 9. und 10.1.1954, Willi Eichler 163, AdsD. Helmut Schmidt told a SPD meeting that, “We must not forget the disastrous position of the party towards the Reichwehr under the Weimar state.” PV, PA, KK, Bezirksekretäre, Bundestagsfraktion und Länderminister, 17 September 1953 in Bonn, PV 1953, AdsD.
601 Schiller to the 1954 SPD Berlin Congress, 131; see also Schmidt’s comments, 138.
602 Orlow writes that, “Schumacher, Ollenhauer, and the hardliners seemed unconcerned about...repeating [the party’s] mistake during the Weimar years when the mutual alienation of the SPD and the Reichwehr prevented the party from influencing Germany’s military policy and essentially left the Reichwehr independent of parliamentary control.” This claim is completely false as it pertains to Schumacher. Orlow, op cit., 137.
603 Schumacher told the SPD Central Committee in November 1951 that, “In the event that we must say no to remilitarization, it will be necessary to undertake efforts to ensure that the officer circles do not built a front against us.” 2-3 November 1951, PV 1951, AdsD. Drummond argues that, “there is no question that without SPD collaboration the parliamentary controls established over the armed forces would have been less extensive.” Drummond, op cit., 184. Large writes that, “The Socialists’ Wehrexperten ensured that the SPD’s role would indeed be crucial. Overall, this development was extremely important because it meant that, for the first time in German history, the army’s shape and direction would be determined partly by the political opposition.” Large, op cit., 192-93.
situation was such that the choice was limited to West German rearmament within or outside of a European organization, rather than a choice on the question of rearmament itself. The party must choose the “lesser evil” of a West German army under French supervision and without an autonomous command structure.\textsuperscript{604} The anti-EDC deputies, in their view, were playing with fire. Not only were they risking that West Germany would gain sovereignty over its military, but their refusal to vote for the treaties also jeopardized the survival of the Atlantic Alliance. SFIO intransigence might push the U.S. government back to a policy of isolationism and a peripheral defense of the continent.\textsuperscript{605}

As the EDC drama makes clear, however, politics is not always a rational exercise. Perhaps it is more accurate to state that politicians often draw from competing rationales. Despite some half-hearted objections, the anti-EDC deputies knew that the U.S. government would continue to insist on West German rearmament regardless of the outcome of the EDC Treaty in the French assembly. Yet they opposed it nonetheless. Mollet fretted privately about a factional conspiracy within the party to overthrow his leadership and to restore to power Mayer’s faction, which Mollet had deposed from leadership at the SFIO party congress of 1946.\textsuperscript{606} The anti-EDC opposition evoked the word “resistance” time and again, reviving speculations that Mollet had sat out the Second World War while the clandestine party leadership risked life and limb. There is no evidence though that such a conspiracy existed and, given the heterogeneous nature of the anti-EDC opposition, it would seem to have had little prospect of success.\textsuperscript{607} Also, neither side of the EDC battle had a monopoly on suffering: deportation and personal tragedy marked the lives of important SFIO figures of both persuasions.\textsuperscript{608} Nevertheless, the legacy of the Second World War and the resistance myth, which remained hegemonic in French political discourse in this period, loomed heavy in the internal SFIO debate.\textsuperscript{609}


\textsuperscript{605} See for instance Gouin’s, Mollet’s and Philip’s speeches to the May 1952 party congress, OURS.

\textsuperscript{606} Lapie writes that, “Crazy with rage, Guy Mollet cried conspiracy. He denounced secret meetings...” Lapie, \textit{op cit.}, 479.

\textsuperscript{607} In an interview decades later, Verdier, who opposed German rearmament, said that, “in general people were wise enough not to live based on personal rancor. For Alain Savary and myself, it was completely excluded.” Interview with Cyril le Guron, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{608} Two of the most fervent pro-EDC deputies, Jaquet and Pineau, for instance, had both been tortured and spent time in Nazi concentration camps. Lefèbvre, ed., 37-38.

\textsuperscript{609} Pieter Lagrou writes that, “reference to resistance and persecution during the Second World War was a core element in the discourse of the Cold War and European integration, particularly in so far as both dealt with the
As children of the internal party purges that followed WWII, Socialists tended to consider
the SFIO’s culture of personal honor, party integrity and their personal place before history
through the lens of two events: the 1938 Munich Accords and the vote of full powers to Marshall
Philippe Pétain in June 1940 following the French military defeat to the invading German
armies. The word “Munich” surfaced time and again in the SFIO debates, and led to angry
exchanges concerning the relevance of its lessons for the present decision.610 In summer 1954,
French Socialists felt that the glare of history was once again focused upon them. Mayer justified
his violation of party discipline in terms of “individual conscience”; Jean Bouheyt called his
opposition “a question of conscience”; Robert Gourdon spoke of his “real objection of
conscience”; and Moch implored the Directing Committee to consider the “moral” aspect of the
question and wrote later that the EDC Affair was “a case of conscience.”611 Evoking the failed
Austrian Socialist uprising against the overthrow of democracy in Austria in 1934, Mayer told a
party committee in private that, “Perhaps we will end nonetheless with German rearmament, but
what I wish to save is the conscience of socialism, like in 1934...”612 At the time the “prudent”
vote, the “pragmatic” vote in 1938 and 1940, seemed to have been to vote for the Munich
Accords and for Marshall Pétain as the “lesser evils.” If West German rearmament was to occur
regardless of their votes, then it should occur without their votes. On 30 August 1954, the anti-
SFIO deputies buried the EDC Treaty when it came to a procedural vote in the National
Assembly.613 Had they voted in favor, the National Assembly would have had sufficient votes to
ratify the EDC and General Treaties.

610 For the controversy over invoking “Munich” in the EDC debates, see Philip’s comments to the July 1953
congress and Mollet’s speech to the National Council in November 1953, OURS.
611 13 February 1952, JO, 697; 16 and 21 June 1954, CD, OURS; Moch to the Foreign Affairs Commission, 9 July
612 Mayer to the Directing Committee’s Bureau d’affaires internationales, 26 January 1953, AGM 111, OURS.
613 The SFIO was by far the most important factor in the Treaty’s defeat. The enormous Communist and Gaullist
parties were irrevocably hostile. The Radical party split its vote 33 in favor, 34 against. United, the Radical Party
could have pushed the treaty over the bar but the Radical Party did not have the SFIO’s tradition of party discipline
and commonly split its vote, which was not the case for the SFIO. Francis O’Neill, The French Radical Party and
In the aftermath of the EDC’s defeat, Chancellor Adenauer placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France, who had refused to make the Treaty subject to a confidence vote. In an interview Adenauer said that, “I regret to say that Mr. Mendès-France wanted to destroy the E.D.C.”\(^{614}\) In a reversal of roles, the SPD defended Mendès-France to the German public and insisted that the Western Allies not force the French government to accept a treaty on European defense against its will.\(^{615}\) In fact, Mendès-France’s premiership found a more enthusiastic welcome among the SPD leadership than it did in the SFIO. While the SFIO left wholeheartedly greeted his investiture as Prime Minister, eager to support his initiative to end the Indochina War and grant independence to the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, Mollet and others in his leadership circle argued that Mendès-France’s domestic policies contradicted the party’s economic and social goals.\(^{616}\) The SPD, for its part, was gratified to see a compelling personality from the left finally come to power in the French Fourth Republic.\(^{617}\) More so, the SPD leadership hoped that the success of the Geneva negotiations that concluded the Indochina War and Mendès-France’s supposed “neutralist” tendencies would open a back door to four-power negotiations for détente and German reunification. The same reputation that gave the SPD cause for praise led Adenauer to treat Mendès-France with an unmasked hostility.

Although at first the SPD did not exclude a possible West German entry into NATO on the basis of an equality of rights, by September 1954, the party leadership made clear that it considered a new four-power conference and a Western initiative for German reunification to be

\(^{614}\) Creswell, op cit., 159.
\(^{615}\) See Wehner’s public praise of Mendès-France the day after the treaty’s defeat. Erklärung zur französischen Absage an die EVG, NWDR, 31 August 1954, 1/HWAA2072; Interview Erich Ollenhauer für JNS, 25 July 1954, EO 107. Also, see Cahn et al., eds., Allemagne et la construction de l’Europe, 58-62.
\(^{616}\) In the SFIO parliamentary faction, the vote was 80 to 39 to vote for Mendès-France’s investiture in June 1953. 3 June 1953, GPS, AHC.
a precondition for any SPD assent for West German rearmament.618 The leaders of the anti-EDC movement in the SFIO had a similar view, while the SFIO leadership continued its policy of pursuing “parallel” efforts for negotiations with the Soviet Union and Western defense. A new Soviet offer to restart negotiations for German reunification accompanied the most serious offer to date for a disarmament program under the U.N. Moch later recalled that he thought that, “the decisions in Paris and New York open[ed] a new path towards peace,” and he urged Mendès-France in a letter to suspend an accord with the Allies for a defense system to replace the EDC until the French government had sounded out the Soviet offer.619 The SPD also sought direct contacts with Mendès-France through Mayer, which did not yield the desired result, and welcomed the assistance of leading anti-EDC SFIO members in its campaign for new negotiations.620 Alas, in this regard the opponents of German rearmament in French and West German politics were disappointed in the stance Mendès-France adopted. He and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden quickly began a new round of negotiations to replace the EDC treaty, paying scant heed to Soviet entreaties.

Historians have provided conflicting accounts of the outcome of the Paris Accords that provided a path for West German entry into the Western European Union defense pact as a means of integrating West Germany into the NATO alliance. Contrary to an older view that British and U.S. negotiators defeated Mendès-France in the September negotiations, newer research argues persuasively that Allied and West German governments satisfied nearly all of the French government’s demands.621 In the resulting Paris Accords, the parties agreed that German troops would not exceed twelve divisions, and that German military authorities would be subject to NATO decisions. Reviving a key French government demand, Adenauer agreed to elections

619 Moch, Une si longue vie, 479-81; Méchoulan, op cit., 380-81.
620 In a letter dated 23 August 1954, Mayer wrote that, “Like you, I think that it is necessary to place the problem of German unity before its rearmament.” L. Georges Picot, Chef-Adjoint du Cabinet de PM to Daniel Mayer, 29 September 1954, responding to Mayer’s effort to organize a meeting between Markscheffel and Mendès-France. Günther Markscheffel 0, AdsD. For SPD internal discussions about contacts with the SFIO to create a common view, see the dispute within the SPD Central Committee, 18 September 1954, PV 1954, AdsD.
621 Fursdon argues that Mendès-France was “defeated” in the negotiations. Fursdon, op cit., 324. Thomas Alan Schwartz writes that, “Mendès-France, having defeated an idea that had originated in Paris, found himself isolated and too weak to oppose the strong sentiment of the other European states.” Schwartz, op cit., 291. Hitchcock and Trachtenberg demonstrate that Mendès-France already favored an agreement along the lines of the London Accords before it was proposed by Eden, who claimed credit for the idea. Hitchcock, op cit., 197-98; and Trachtenberg, op cit., 123-24.
within a year on the “Europeanization” of the Saar territory, a position that dismayed SPD leaders who remained relentless critics of French authority in the Saarland. In addition, Adenauer offered of his own accord to renounce German production of atomic, biological and chemical weapons, though this did not preclude German possession of them. The Allies also took up a SFIO demand for a pooling of the WEU’s armaments production industries, a design meant to supervise German weapons firms. The SPD saw in this last demand a naked attempt to promote the French armaments industry at its neighbor’s expense.622

Most importantly, the British and U.S. governments conceded to the French negotiating team far more extensive military guarantees than they had ever offered before. The price that the U.S. government paid for Mendès-France’s agreement to the Paris Accords was, in effect, a renunciation of Eisenhower’s grand strategy of massively reducing the U.S. troop presence in Europe. Eisenhower’s government issued a declaration asserting that it now considered NATO to be of indefinite duration, rather than the twenty years outlined in the 1949 treaty. French military leaders were ecstatic over the new U.S. commitment, believing that it “would ‘for the first time’ make an effective defense of Europe possible.”623 The British government had to go even further, promising to maintain four divisions and an air force on the continent for fifty years and subjecting their withdrawal to a majority vote of the countries in the WEU, a commitment unprecedented in British history.624

These guarantees and a fear that NATO might dissolve without the Treaty’s ratification assured the SFIO leadership’s support for the Paris Accords. The pro-EDC faction around Jaquet, Mollet and Philip bemoaned the absence of supranational controls over a West German army and that the alliance structure would not be subject to a democratic assembly. They also criticized that the decisions of the envisioned common authority for arms production were non-binding and violations would not result in automatic sanctions. The common authority was moribund in any case, and France’s allies discarded the idea in 1955. After hesitating and posing a series of conditions, Mollet announced that, though the treaty represented a “regrettable setback” from the EDC treaty, it constituted “a lesser evil.”625 As he told a meeting of the Socialist International in late December 1954, “For our attitude the guaranteed presence of

623 This new NATO policy, named MC 48, went into effect with the ratifications of the London Accords by the French National Assembly in December 1954. Trachtenberg, op cit., 175-76.
624 Fursdon, op cit., 325.
625 Mollet interview with Belgrade Nin, 17 November 1954, AGM 44, OURS.
American soldiers in Europe was decisive.” Facing an acute danger of French geopolitical isolation, he said that, “it is for negative reasons that SFIO policy changed” to supporting a system that included an autonomous West German military.626

This time Mendès-France put the full weight of his office behind the Treaty and announced a confidence vote in the National Assembly. To nearly everyone’s astonishment, on Christmas Eve, it defeated the part of the Treaty allowing West German entry into the WEU by a vote of 280 to 259. SFIO opponents of the treaty had lost 33 of the 53 votes that they had cast against the EDC in August.627 Two factors account for this shift. It is clear that Moch and a number of other anti-EDC deputies voted for the treaty out of fear that continued French intransigence would destroy the Atlantic Alliance.628 Another important factor in their decision had nothing to do with the West German army or the Treaty itself. In a clear case of “issue-linkage,” Mayer, Savary, Verdier, and others voted in favor in order to maintain Mendès-France at the helm of France’s government, in particular so that he could continue his project of reforms for the French Union and the French protectorates. Naegelen, who voted against the Treaty, told the February 1955 Party Congress that the number of opponents would have been significantly larger if the Treaty had not been attached to a confidence vote in Mendès-France’s government. Verdier reported to an interviewer later that, “We were not very proud of ourselves because we had placed ourselves in contradiction with ourselves... At that moment, we were very concerned to assure that the Mendès-France government survived.”629 Years later, Mayer also told an interviewer that he was still opposed to West German rearmament in December 1954 despite his

626 Kurzbericht über die Sitzung des Generalrats der Sozialistischen Internationale im Amsterdam, 21./22. Dezember 1954, 2/PVBT12, AdsD. The SFIO Congress, held in November 1954, overwhelmingly approved the leadership’s position. The vote was 2,817 to 454 with 93 abstentions. Congrès extraordinaire in Suresnes, 10-11 November 1954, OURS. For the internal party discussions, see the protocols of this Congress; the Directing Committee meetings of 6, 14, and 27, October 1954, and 7 December 1954; Mollet’s speech to the National Assembly, 8 October 1954; and Jaquet’s speech to the National Assembly, 22 December 1954, OURS, JO, 4642-44, 6745-6. On 14 October 1954 Mollet reports having told Mendès-France in a private conversation that the SFIO expected to vote in favor of the treaties.


628 Singer, op cit., 52. Orlow writes that, “The anti-Cedistes’ change of heart resulted from a mixture of motivations, but foremost among them was the fear that another debate over German rearmament would lead to a split of the party.” This may well have been the case, but I have seen no real evidence of this in the available sources. Orlow, op cit., 172.

629 Cyril le Guron, op cit.
vote in favor of the Paris Accords. He is worth quoting at length so as to reveal the mindset of a number of SFIO deputies who reluctantly switched their votes:

[The vote for the Treaty] was the only vote of my life as a parliamentarian that I regret. One could not overthrow Mendès-France, who ended the war in Indochina and solved the EDC Affair. I voted in favor of the confidence [motion] for Mendès-France; I suppose if I had to do it again under the same circumstances, I would vote for it again but I still regret this vote which in practice resulted in the rearmament of Germany.630

Yet the reduced group of twenty SFIO opponents represented a margin great enough to again sink the treaty. Lejeune and Naegelen were the most prominent among those who yet again voted “non.” Over the Christmas break, French deputies were subject to dire warnings from the French government and its NATO allies about the consequences of their refusal. Eden made clear that Britain would withdraw its military guarantees if the treaty was not ratified. Meanwhile, Konrad Adenauer pressured the Christian Democratic (MRP) leadership to swallow the bitter pill of voting confidence for their political nemesis, a pressure that yielded sufficient MRP votes to push the Treaty over the necessary threshold. In an atmosphere of great tension, a chastised French assembly met again on 30 December and approved the Treaty by the thin margin of 287 to 260. Two socialists switched their votes and voted for the confidence motion and the Treaty. Eighteen SFIO deputies voted against West German rearmament for a third time. They faced a new round of party sanctions in the early months of 1955.

SPD leaders considered the Paris Accords to be an improvement over the EDC Treaty, in particular because of the inclusion of Great Britain. However, the treaty also contained a “binding clause” that required Allied consent for the evacuation of western troops from Germany, denying the newly sovereign West German government the right to force them to leave. The clause had clearly been inserted to constrain the maneuverability of a future SPD government on the reunification issue.631 This clause alone would have sufficed to push the SPD into opposition, but the continued fear of the impact of a West German military on democracy remained central to the party’s attitude.632 As the SPD had expected, the Soviet government now signed a peace treaty with East Germany and incorporated it into an Eastern defense alliance, the

631 As the SPD revealed a new “German Plan” for a demilitarized zone to include a reunited Germany in 1958, Eisenhower said that he would not permit the U.S. to be “kicked out” of Germany. “If the Socialists did come to power in Germany,” he said, “we might have to put even more U.S. forces in that country.” Drummond, opt cit., 126-27.
632 For the SPD’s response in fall 1954, see Rede Gen. Ollenhauer Parteiausschussitzung am 16.10.54 and PV Fraktionsvorstand 1 November 1954, EO 109, AdsD.
Warsaw Pact. The SPD launched a series of mass protests in 1955, riding a rising wave of popular opposition to West German rearmament. The SPD’s struggle against Adenauer’s defense policies now entered a new phase. With defense integration off the agenda in 1955, though, a path opened for a different SPD response to issues of European integration.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Historian of European integration Alan Milward famously wrote that the European governments of the Community “rescued” their nation-states in the 1950s by creating common institutions capable of resolving issues that had become intractable at the national level.\(^{633}\) His thesis has aged well over time. Once common institutions were in place, though, there were new venues for transnational political groups, in addition to transnational technocratic elites, to influence the Community’s institutional development. The ECSC Treaty created a judiciary, an executive High Authority, an intergovernmental Council of Ministers, and a supranational Common Assembly to supervise the Community’s activities. Parallel to Milward’s argument about national governments, the actions and policies of the SFIO and SPD within the Common Assembly make clear that they were also bringing to the supranational level issues that they were incapable of resolving at the national level. The SPD, in perpetual opposition, and the SFIO, in opposition for almost all of the period from 1951 to January 1956, came to consider the ECSC an alternate route for accomplishing policies rejected by their domestic political opponents and their own governments.

By 1954, French Socialist and German Social Democratic deputies in the Common Assembly had achieved a working relationship increasingly marked by good will, cooperation, and a mutual respect for each other’s positions. This was a considerable achievement in the context of these parties’ bitter arguments surrounding the European Defense Community in this same period. The Socialists in the ECSC became the most effective practitioners of supranational party cooperation, and the most committed to reinforcing and extending the supranational

Their efforts surpassed those of the other party groups within the Common Assembly, the Christian Democratic and Liberal factions, except on issues of constitutional designs, in which the Christian Democrats achieved greater transnational consensus in the failed discussions for the creation of a European Political Community (EPC). In the process, the SPD was able to achieve an effective platform for policies and ideas that had been consistently blocked within Germany and, as a result, it completely abandoned its hostility to the ECSC, and became, in fact, one of its most erstwhile defenders.

5.2 THE SFIO AND SPD COMMON ASSEMBLY DELEGATIONS

The SPD sent to the Common Assembly its best and ablest. Ollenhauer and Wehner represented the party leadership. The mayor of Dortmund and the most important SPD figure in the Ruhr, Henssler, was also tapped. He may well have played a leading role in the new assembly had he not been too sick to attend its inaugural session in September 1952. He died on 3 December 1953. The other three SPD deputies had long been steeped in the politics of coal and steel. Gerhard Kreyssig, recently elected to the Bundestag in a by-election, was a Bavarian with deep knowledge of the national impact of coal and steel policy. He was a spokesman for the coal-importing regions of Germany. His son had married Ollenhauer’s daughter during the Second World War and he doubtless kept Ollenhauer abreast of developments in the assembly during their frequent dinner parties in the 1950s. Joachim Schöne, from the Ruhr territory, was perhaps the most knowledgeable deputy on the Ruhr’s coal and steel industries of anyone in the Bundestag, with the exception of Günter Henle, a Ruhr industrialist and CDU deputy. Heinrich Imig, a SPD deputy and leading figure in the IG Metall union, represented the union and Ruhr interests as well. Both Schöne and Imig had frequently been called upon to help formulate and articulate SPD policy on coal and steel during the debates on the ECSC and co-determination from 1949 to 1952. Willi Birkelbach, a leading expert in social policy, rounded out the delegation. Later, Heinrich Deist, an important official within IG Bergbau, the coal miners’ union, replaced the deceased Henssler. By the mid-1950s, Deist was perhaps the most important figure in SPD economic policy at the national level. Had it not been for his untimely death in

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634 This is Ernst Haas’ view as well. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 412-419.
1964, he likely would have been finance minister in Willy Brandt’s government. The SPD deputies’ collective expertise was to prove invaluable to the SPD in the new assembly.

The Bundestag and French National Assembly elected their representatives through an unofficial, but collegial method that respected in part the proportional strength of each political group. This was not particularly democratic, however, as both assemblies made sure to exclude the far left and right from representation. Despite winning around a quarter of the vote in France, no communist was elected to serve in the Common Assembly. The proportional strength of the SPD in the 1949 German election (29%), compared to the meager results of the SFIO in France in 1951 (10%), was such that the SPD delegation was more than twice as large as the SFIO’s. Guy Mollet, Roger Carcassonne, and Gerhard Jaquet represented the SFIO. When Guy Mollet became Prime Minister in January 1956, they were replaced by Étienne Weill-Raynal, and Gilles Gozard, both economic experts, and Pierre-Olivier Lapie, who was later appointed by Charles de Gaulle as Commissioner to the ECSC’s High Authority. With the partial exception of Carcassonne, a Socialist senator who was not particularly influential within the party, the SFIO had no coal or heavy industry experts in the new assembly. Thus the SPD delegation that arrived in Luxembourg was more robust than that of the SFIO and had far greater technical expertise in the fields under the competence of the Community. This situation was to have great repercussions for the working relations within the Socialist faction of the ECSC, as well as for SPD attitudes towards the ECSC.

5.3 SUPRANATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY POWER AND COOPERATION:
THE SPD AND SFIO IN THE INAUGURAL PHASE OF THE COMMON ASSEMBLY

Although they had all opposed the creation of the ECSC, the SPD deputies came to Luxembourg in spring 1953 ready to work. As in the case of German remilitarization, the SPD was determined to exert as much influence as possible within an institution the very existence of which it disapproved. Its first task, for which it received the full support of its SFIO colleagues, was to strengthen the powers of the Common Assembly vis-à-vis what the SPD at first considered to be a nearly all-powerful High Authority. The powers of the Common Assembly granted by the Treaty of Paris were paltry indeed, as it had neither legislative nor budgetary powers. Its only
source of power was that of censure. It could force the resignation of the entire High Authority with a vote of two-thirds of its deputies.

With the other Socialist parties’ support, the SPD led the charge to increase the Common Assembly’s powers. The Socialist faction made clear its intention of turning the skeletal Assembly into a true parliamentary body capable of effectively supervising the High Authority and directing the course of the young Community. At the opening session, therefore, Wehner proposed the creation of eight parliamentary commissions against the official proposal of four. He also insisted that the Community fund the activities of the party factions, so as to enable their work. On numerous occasions, Wehner, Mollet, and others complained that the information that the High Authority provided the Assembly’s commissions was insufficient to allow for effective parliamentary oversight. They also proposed that the Assembly exercise oversight of the High Authority’s personnel decisions. French Socialists and German Social Democrats demanded time and again that the High Authority inform the Assembly in advance or, better, make proposals to the Assembly before taking important decisions that resulted in *faits accomplis*, especially on matters related to investment and budgeting. Later a new SFIO deputy to the Common Assembly, Gilles Gozard, argued that the Assembly should be able to censure and remove a single commissioner, rather than having to censure the entire High Authority and risk thereby throwing the Community into turmoil. The ECSC Socialist faction was the most persistent of all the factions in trying to increase the powers of the ECSC Common Assembly.

635 The Christian Democratic and Liberal factions of the ECSC Common Assembly and the High Authority proposed to create four commissions: Transport, Investments, Workers’ Housing, and Supply and Requirements. Wehner proposed a committee for external relations, a rules commission, a commission on market questions and prices, a commission for questions of production, a commission for questions of provisioning and consumption, a commission for work and social questions, a commission for questions concerning exchange and transport, and an *ad hoc* commission charged with making general proposals on occasion. Common Assembly of the European Coal & Steel Community (CA-ECSC), 10-13 September 1953, Archive of European Integration (AEI), University of Pittsburgh.


638 CA-ESCS, 8 May 1956, AEI.

639 Note: when I refer to “Socialists” in this chapter I mean specifically the Socialist faction of the ECSC Common Assembly. In future research, I would like to integrate the activities of Belgian, Dutch, Italian and Luxembourgian Socialist representatives into these discussions. For the sake of simplicity, and to highlight the consensus that developed between the SFIO and SPD, I do not focus on the Socialist parties of the other four nations. This
In fall 1953, the work of the Common Assembly was truly underway. The protocols of the ECSC floor debates, of the various commissions, and of the Socialist faction all reveal a SPD delegation deeply engaged in the Common Assembly’s detailed technical work and policy debates. Schöne became chair of the Socialist faction and vice president of the investment commission, perhaps the most important of the Assembly’s commissions. He and other SPD deputies authored countless commission reports presented to the fully Assembly.

The Socialists worked quickly to forge a transnational Socialist faction within the Common Assembly that would effectively coordinate policy among the parties. Although one historian argues that the Socialists failed to create a “supranational” atmosphere within the faction, the available sources suggest otherwise. Braving the derision of the supposedly more supranationally-inclined CDU, which denounced the SPD within Germany for casting aside national loyalties, the SPD elected to join its Socialist colleagues in voting for the Belgian Socialist, Paul-Henri Spaak, to be president of the Common Assembly rather than the German CDU candidate, Heinrich von Brentano. When the Assembly formed working groups on various policies, the SPD argued in the name of the Socialist faction that these working groups should be assigned on the basis of political affiliation rather than on nationality. The Socialists unanimously agreed to caucus together a half hour before the meeting of all commissions. Generally a Socialist speaker on the floor represented a unanimous Socialist position. For instance, in the ECSC Assembly session of late 1954, the Socialists were united in countering Christian-Democratic proposals with their own on a wide variety of issues.

The SPD and SFIO party leaders were quite aware of the collegial atmosphere within the Socialist delegation. Ollenhauer told a radio audience in June 1954 that, “This cooperation among the Socialists must be considered a joyous [development] and a very positive sign for the analytical focus is not meant to minimize the contributions of the other four parties, though even so, the strength of the SPD faction vis-à-vis its partners, with the partial exception of the Belgian Socialist Party, is clear in the sources.

641 Wehner made this goal explicit in a letter to Ollenhauer on 17 January 1953. Bermerkungen zu den Richtlininen für die aussenpolitische Aktivität der SPD, Erich Ollenhauer (EO) 420, AdsD.
643 See Ollenhauer’s sarcastic rebuttal of CDU attacks at the SPD party congress. 25 September 1952, SPD Parteitag, 42, AdsD.
644 Kreyssig to CA-ECSC, 6 May 1955, AEL.
645 See Groupe Socialiste à la CECA, Réunion du 27 Novembre 1954, 30 Novembre 1954 and 1er Decembre 1954, GK 116, AdsD.
future [erfreulich und zukünfisträchtig].” Mollet happily told an interviewer in June 1955 that, “The accent has been so often placed on the differences between the attitudes of the German and French Socialists...[but] I am very pleased to emphasize that, for the last several months, it has been in the name of an unanimous [Socialist] group that the Socialist speakers have expressed themselves at the podium of the Coal and Steel Assembly.”646 When they were authorized to speak in their own name, including during the height of the polemics surrounding the EDC, the Socialists agreed that they would consciously avoid emphasizing their internal divisions. SFIO and SPD speakers studiously adhered to this practice and there is hardly a trace in the Assembly’s records of the divisions that so marked the relations between the parties outside the Common Assembly. By 1956, the Socialists even launched a combined assault on the new President of the High Authority, René Mayer, a development analyzed below.

This chapter examines the functional harmony that developed within the Socialist faction of the ECSC Common Assembly in order to demonstrate how inter-party cooperation at the supranational level created a form of consensus politics that contrasted with concurrent divisions taking place over European defense integration. It also argues that the experience of the SFIO and SPD deputies within the Common Assembly created a “spill-over” dynamic among the Socialists, which contributed to the SFIO and SPD’s responses to the Treaties of Rome.647 First I

647 “Spill-over” is a term Ernest Haas borrowed from economics to develop his early theory of European integration. The term is central to neo-functionalist interpretations of European integration. It means, in effect, that sectoral integration develops internal dynamics that pushes the actors involved in the process to support a further extension of integration into neighboring policy fields. Haas’ theory is holistic; it makes claims concerning the forces driving the integration process as a whole. Challenges to Haas’ theory include Stanley Hoffman’s realism, and Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, to name the most important scholars in this debate. Here I make no general claims about the forces pushing forward or backward the European integration process, but rather I focus on how “spill-over” is a useful term for understanding the evolution of SFIO and, in particular, SPD policy towards European integration during the early period of the European Coal & Steel Community. Haas writes that, “Sectoral integration...begets its own impetus toward extension to the entire economy even in the absence of specific group demands and their attendant ideologies.” This claim is controversial and open to criticism. However, when ideology is added to the mix, Haas seems to be correct at least in our case, but this does require qualifying his argument such that his central claims are in need of further adjustment. He is right to claim though that, “The ’spill-over’ is real for [those with positive expectations], since basic ideological tenets even in the coal-steel sector seemingly cannot be attained without expanding the supranational task to additional fields. The demand pattern of ECSC Labour and of the Socialist Parties is the most striking case in point.” However, in addition to ideological factors, I believe that Haas is correct to claim that, “the simple concern for the proper functioning of the integrated sector may also lead to a spill-over effect.” The SPD seems to be a case in point here. Ernst B. Haas, The United of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, 1968), 289-99. For criticism of Haas, see Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus 95, 3 (1966): 862-915; and Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1998.
investigate the areas of consensus between the parties and how they effectively worked together to further these goals. Then I turn to an examination of how they managed issues that divided them, the most important of which was the cartel issue, and how they developed a common vision for the community’s policies towards coal and steel in favor of a more supranational institutional design.

5.4 THE SFIO AND SPD AND THE PURSUIT OF AN ACTIVE COMMUNITY SOCIAL POLICY

Housing policy had long been a domestic priority for French Socialists and German Social Democrats. The material damage inflicted by world war and a postwar economic policy dedicated to prioritizing the reconstruction of heavy industry had created an acute housing shortage that was exacerbated by the deterioration resulting from decades of prewar government neglect of this crucial sector. As early as December 1948, the SFIO made note of this dire situation and called for a vigorous program to build 20,000 housing units per month.648 While the party gave its full support to the Monnet modernization plan, it retroactively regretted that it had relegated housing to a subordinate role.649 Hence in the first years of the Common Assembly, housing became one of the party’s top priorities.650

The Social Democrats put forth a similar view in West Germany. From the opening sessions of the Bundestag in 1949, the party emphasized the desperate need for increased investment in housing.651 As a sign of its importance, the party had formed a special committee on social housing under the SPD Central Committee. This special committee offered a technical report with quite specific guidelines for how much space a family needed to live comfortably, as

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648 Jean Minjoz to the National Assembly, 22 December 1948, Journal Officiel (JO), 7859.
650 Pineau considered housing “the second most important issue” facing the French government. National Assembly, 4 December 1952, JO, 3942. See also Mollet’s comment to the National Assembly, 6 January 1953, JO, 6.
651 See the Bundestag speeches of Georg Stierle on 20 October 1949; Erich Klabunde, 28 March 1950; Erich Schoettle, 10 November 1950; and Fritz Erler, 1 and 8 March 1951, Verhandlungen, 275-77, 3654, 4676, 4752-53.
well as what amenities should be included.652 In October 1953, Ollenhauer designated housing as “one of the most pressing matters” facing the German government.653 Due to its economic importance for Germany’s war effort, North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), and the Ruhr in particular, was the epicenter of this attention. Nearly 50% of houses in that Land had been damaged during the war, and the percentage was considerably higher in the Ruhr industrial cities.654

Regional SPD leaders had long called attention to the plight of workers’ housing, especially in the mining and steel communities. The NRW-SPD worked with Karl Arnold, its CDU coalition partner in 1947-50, to address this problem. But by 1949, it was clear that the Land government did not possess the financial means to meet SPD Reconstruction Minister Fritz Steinhoff’s ambition to build hundreds of thousands of new units by 1952. Steinhoff and the coalition turned to the other Länder for financial assistance to rescue their housing goals and to enact a large-scale housing program.655 On 23 October 1951, the Bundestag passed a law to invest in miners’ housing, which authorized financing for the construction of 90,000 houses by the end of 1954.656 Over the next years, the SPD criticized the government for building too few houses far too slowly.

While the SFIO and SPD continued to pressure for larger investments in housing in their domestic politics throughout the 1950s, the ECSC offered the parties an alternative forum in which to pursue their housing objectives. They seized this opportunity. Under the impetus of the Socialist faction, housing achieved a predominant place in the Common Assembly’s discussions in 1953-1957. SPD deputy Willi Birkelbach took the matter in hand. He led a delegation of the Assembly’s Committee for Social Questions through the principal mining communities, visiting, among others, the Lorraine, Luxembourg, the Saarland, Liège, and, of course, the Ruhr. He

652 Entschliessung Der Ausschuss für soziales Bauen bei dem Parteivorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands hat in seine Sitzung am 10. Februar 1951 zur Frage der Schlicht- und Einfacht-Wohnungen Stellung genommen, GK 189, AdsD.
653 Ollenhauer, 28 October 1953, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 43.
654 Falk Wiesemann, “Flüchtlinge in Nordrhein-Westfalen,” in Gerhard Brunn and Reimar Hobbing, ed. Nordrhein-Westfalen und seine Anfänge nach 1945/46 (Essen: Klartext, 1986), 165. In the Ruhr territory, 30% of housing owned by the mining companies was totally destroyed and an additional 22% suffered massive damage. Werner Abelshauser, Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1943: Wiederaufbau, Krise, Anpassung (Munich: C.H. Beck 1984), 34.
656 Abelshauser, op cit., 85.
reported that the delegation found conditions everywhere to be shocking. With SFIO support, he proposed a wide range of measures beyond simply constructing houses. These included: financing an improved water supply to the industrial regions, developing transport links to overcome the isolation of mining communities from surrounding areas; de-coupling workers from future housing contracts imposed by their employers; encouraging worker ownership; granting attention to the special situation of migrant workers; and reducing interest rates for housing investment.657

The Socialists made housing a bell-weather for a successful Community social policy on coal and steel.658 In his private notes, Wehner celebrated that through housing and other social policies, “the political groups have risen above national frontiers.”659 The Socialist faction put unrelenting pressure on the High Authority to investigate and address the housing crisis in the coal and steel communities. In response to formal questions, the High Authority responded that at least 10% of workers’ dwellings were “very bad.”660 Monnet then promised a High Authority program that would build 50-60,000 houses per year. After receiving a lower loan from the U.S. government than he had expected, however, he disappointed the Socialist faction by reducing this estimate to 20-25,000 dwellings. Nonetheless, Monnet sought loans for this purpose elsewhere with some success and, with these loans, the High Authority reached agreement with the French and Italian governments to indirectly help finance low-interest investments in housing in late 1955. For the SPD, a subsequent program was an important success. Two-thirds of the houses to be built were in Germany, the vast majority of these in the Ruhr. After a slow start, the High Authority's housing program gained momentum. By October 1957, 6,422 of the 7,406 houses built were in Germany.661 By 1 April 1958, the High Authority had sponsored the construction of almost 30,000 houses in the ECSC member states.662

657 Birkelbach, CA-ECSC, 13 May 1954 and 20 June 1956, AEI.
658 See the section on housing in Gemeinsame Versammlung der EGKS Sozialistische Fraktion Arbeitsunterlage für die Gemeinsame Sitzung der Sozialistischen Fraktion der Gemeinsamen Versammlung der EGKS und der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, von 13. und 14. Oktober 1955, GK 118, AdsD.
659 Vorschlag einer Gliederung für Broschüre: “Realistische Europapolitik,” 1/HWAA1033, AdsD.
661 Haas, op cit., 93.
Birkelbach, who had been a fierce critic of the High Authority before the ECSC began operation, lauded the “good will” that the High Authority displayed on the housing issue. The SFIO and SPD deputies recognized that it was money, rather than will, that limited the High Authority’s intervention in this sector. By 1955, a united Socialist faction pleaded for an expansion of the High Authority’s powers beyond those granted in the treaty so that it could levy direct taxes on coal and steel enterprises to increase its finances. The practical experience within the ECSC Common Assembly had led the SPD deputies to undergo a remarkable transformation. After years of denouncing a “dictatorial” High Authority, SPD deputies now looked to the supranational institution as an ally in its pursuit of goals rooted in German domestic politics.

This was not only the case for housing. The SPD’s about-face is evident in all areas of the Community’s social policy. Socialists in the Common Assembly worked harmoniously, first to pressure the High Authority to exercise the full powers granted to it by the Treaty of Paris for social policy and, second, to pressure their governments to revise the treaty in order to expand the range of supranational powers. French Socialists also took their domestic struggle to the ECSC Common Assembly. For example, they appealed to the Assembly to rescue the French miners’ retirement system. Although the High Authority did not have jurisdiction over this field, it made proposals to the member states for a multilateral accord to harmonize the community’s retirement funds.

Under the chairmanship of Willi Birkelbach, the Commission on Social Questions developed into one of the Assembly’s most active commissions. Arguing that the measures taken by their governments to assist and re-train laid-off coal and steel workers were insufficient, the Socialist faction called for the High Authority to intervene directly and formulate its own

663 Assemblée Commune Commission des Affaires Sociales Projet de Note au nom de la Commission en réponse à la lettre de M. R. Motz, Président du Groupe de travail, en date de 20 juin 1955 sur l’extension des compétences de la Communauté dans le domaine sociale (1) par M. G.M. NEDERHORST rapporteur, juillet 1955, CEAB 1/1627, BaK.
664 The SPD supported supranationalism in principle but opposed it when it believed intergovernmental arrangements might lead to the successful integration of Great Britain and Scandinavia. Moravcsik errs in writing that the “less supranational” features of the Treaties of Rome increased support for it in the SPD. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 95.
665 The former miner and SFIO deputy from the Nord, Paul Sion, argued for years for a national rescue of the miners’ retirement fund. 27 June 1952, 3284-85; 23 October 1952, 4344; JO, 801.

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programs. Under this pressure, the High Authority agreed to pay to help transport thousands of unemployed steel workers from the Centre-Midi to the Lorraine region of France. Community funds paid for half of this program. Rather than accepting mass displacements, Socialists pressured the High Authority to prioritize re-adaptation where the workers lived, in part because the Centre-Midi workers proved highly reluctant to leave their region. Overall French workers benefited the most from the ECSC’s re-adaptation fund. When leading the tour of workers’ housing, Birkelbach also had the delegation visit research institutes in the Ruhr city of Bochum charged with fighting occupational illnesses. His commission worked closely with the High Authority to sponsor research into workers’ health, promote workplace compensation and safety, shorten working hours, harmonize vacation and overtime pay, and assist the plight of migrant workers who often suffered discrimination and neglect. Over the next years, the High Authority made significant investments in these fields, achievements warmly welcomed by the Socialist deputies.

French Socialists found an ally in the SPD on an issue of fundamental economic concern: equal pay for men and women, and the harmonization of the member nations’ wages and social costs. This would become a central demand and obstacle during the negotiations to create a European Economic Community, as the German government and industrial leaders vigorously opposed Prime Minister Guy Mollet’s demand for wage harmonization. In a speech at a Lorraine coal mine in 1956, Mollet told his audience that:

It is necessary that our mines be competitive in the common market, that our sale prices be competitive. The problem of the harmonization of social charges and salaries in the countries of the ECSC is particularly important due to the considerable part that labor costs carry in coal pricing. It constitutes a constant worry for the government. In the

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667 Commission des Affaires Sociales, Projet de Note fait au nom de la Commission en réponse à la lettre de M. R. Motz, Président du Groupe de travail, en date du 20 juin 1955 sur l’extension des compétences de la Communauté dans le domaine social (1) par M. G.M. NEDERHORST rapporteur juillet 1955, CEAB 1/1627, BaK.
669 Mollet to CA-ECSC, 13 May 1955, AEI; Haas, op cit., 229.
670 Haas, op cit., 229.
671 Birkelbach to CA-ECSC, 13 May 1954 and 29 November 1956, AEI.
negotiations that are going to open for the general common market in Europe, this harmonization will be for us one of the essential conditions for an agreement.\textsuperscript{674}

In 1953, however, no one knew exactly what the comparative situation was. It was widely believed, though, that France had considerably higher wages and social costs than did Germany. Carcassonne considered this situation to be a distortion of free competition within the Community, a situation that encouraged “social dumping,” a claim that could have had wide implications for Europe’s economic and social organization had it been accepted.\textsuperscript{675} However, due to the different currencies and amorphous social charges, the High Authority’s first task was to develop reliable comparative statistics. After years of work, it found that France did indeed have higher wages and social costs than did Germany in the coal sector, though less so in steel. The total estimated difference was approximately 10%, though in certain areas it was considerably higher.\textsuperscript{676}

While German industry prospered from a lower cost of production that resulted from lower wages and social costs, the SPD and trade unions saw an opportunity to extract higher wages and benefits for German coal and steel workers. The SPD and the leading German trade union federation, the DGB, made common cause with French Socialists on this issue.\textsuperscript{677} Socialists on the Commission on Social Questions made consistent demands that wages and social costs be harmonized on the basis of the high-wage nations’ rates and called for the introduction of a minimum wage, though they conceded that its level might have to vary from nation to nation.\textsuperscript{678} The High Authority argued that its legal powers in this area were limited. In his personal notes, Kreyssig wrote that the “competence or full power of the High Authority in

\textsuperscript{674} Discours prononcé par M. Guy Mollet, Président du Conseil à l’occasion du centième anniversaire des Houillères de Lorraine Merlebach, le 23 juin 1956, AGM 68, OURS.
\textsuperscript{675} Carcassonne to CA-ECSC, 14 May 1954, AEI.
\textsuperscript{676} Ernst-Dieter Köpper, Gewerkschaften und Aussenpolitik: Die Stellung der westdeutschen Gewerkschaften zur wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Integration der Bundesrepublik in die Europäische Gemeinschaft und in die NATO (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus-Verlag, 1982), 156-57. The SFIO estimated that the daily wage for a French miner was 1559 francs while it was 1387 for German miners with the industry paying 1230 in social costs in France but only 733 in Germany. This represented a burden for each ton of French coal of approximately 610 francs vis-à-vis German coal. The situation was far better in the steel industry where the costs were almost the same. Note de la délégation française sur l’égalisation des charges salariales, GK 115, AdsD.
\textsuperscript{677} For the German trade unions’ view, see Köpper, \textit{op cit.}, 160-64, which includes a quote on this issue from Deist to the delegates of the JG-Metall conference in fall 1954.
the area of wage policy [is] of extraordinary importance." He told the Common Assembly that, if “the High Authority cannot intervene against salary dumping when it sees that to be the case, we must recognize that the dispositions of the Treaty are ridiculously insufficient.”

French Socialists and German Social Democrats brought their national priorities on social policies to the Common Assembly and succeeded in creating a united front when dealing with the High Authority. In doing so, they often found themselves in direct opposition to their Liberal and Christian Democratic colleagues as well as to their own governments. They continued to insist that the supranational powers over social policy were far too meager, and they brought this position into the ECSC Common Assembly’s successor, the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Economic Community.

### 5.5 FROM BITTER DISPUTE TO CONSENSUS: THE SFIO AND SPD AND THE COMMUNITY’S POLICY ON CARTELS

No issue related to coal and steel had so deeply divided the SFIO and SPD during the Schuman debates as that of cartels. There seemed to be little room for compromise. The two parties represented opposite positions within their domestic politics. The SFIO consistently argued for stronger legislation against cartels, while the SPD wanted to preserve certain forms of vertical integration in the Ruhr industry. The SFIO and French government’s intention to use the ECSC Treaty to dissolve the Ruhr coal sales cartel was the most substantive and irreconcilable disagreement between the two parties in this field of policy. In the first years of the ECSC, the SPD continued to argue that discrimination against German industry in the form of Allied de-concentration and dismantlement during a period of French industrial concentration constituted the original sin of the community.

Yet even in this sphere the two parties were able to achieve a relative consensus within two years of the opening of the customs union. Considering the bitterness of the dispute from 1948 to 1952, that they were able to do so is rather remarkable. It signaled a willingness to cooperate not only in the form of empty rhetorical solidarity, but also an ability to learn and

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679 GK 134, AdsD.
680 Kreyssig to CA-ECSC, 22 June 1956, AEI.
681 Kreyssig for instance repeated this view in December 1953. Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig Dienstag, den 15. Dezember 1953, GK 25, AdsD.
empathize with the situation that each party faced within its domestic sphere. At first the fundamental cleavage on cartels continued to shape the SFIO and SPD discussions. However, although SFIO and SPD speakers put forth their diverging positions on cartel policy to the Common Assembly, the parties studiously avoided criticizing each other’s position. By 1955, this mutual respect had transformed into common proposals on cartel policy within the Community.

What had happened? The most important development was that the cartel-busting High Authority proved to be a hesitant, even lame enforcer of the Treaty’s anti-cartel provisions. The six organizations that made up the Ruhr sales cartel (GEORG) operated in practice exactly as had its predecessor, the unitary DKV. More than half of the Community’s coal purchases occurred through this organization.682 After an initial effort to break cartels in 1953, Monnet signaled in spring 1954 that he would seek a compromise solution with Ruhr industry. Monnet was keen to ensure the political success of the ECSC, and his efforts to woo German political and industrial circles, including, crucially, the SPD and the industrial trade unions, dampened his eagerness to carry through an effective assault on the Ruhr coal sales cartel. The Ruhr industries took advantage of this breathing room and fortified themselves with a policy of intransigent non-cooperation, a position supported by the German government.

The SPD deputies in the Common Assembly took notice. Deist wrote to Schöne and Kreyssig in October 1954 that the High Authority was taking account of German views and had “without limitation recognized the particular situation of the Ruhr basin.”683 Also, contrary to the fears of French competition and discrimination that so marked SPD analyses in previous years, German steel was booming within the community. By 1954, German steel production had doubled since the Schuman declaration of May 1950.684 Dismantlements had in fact proved in part a blessing because they forced the German steel industrialists to modernize their methods and equipment once they were permitted to reconstruct their enterprises.

Over time the SFIO deputies in the Common Assembly came to accept much of the SPD’s position on the Ruhr coal sales cartel. This position was summarized well by SPD coal expert Deist in a report that argued that the sales cartel ensured a stability for a coal market in

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which the norm would otherwise be alternating periods of overproduction and shortages linked
to seasonal swings. In existence in some form since 1893, he asserted that the coal sales cartel
was necessary to maintain a secure supply for consumers and to protect the employment of the
industry’s workers. As coal supplies rose, a central SFIO concern from the Schuman Plan era—
that the Ruhr of its own accord would deny the French economy the coal that it needed to
survive—no longer posed a problem. Coal was plentiful in the mid-1950s, in fact, dangerously
plentiful for the industry’s future prosperity. It no doubt helped that the French steel-
transforming industries seemed quite pleased about the ECSC’s impact on the cost and
availability of steel provisioning within France.

The SPD, in turn, leapt to the defense of the French governmental purchase agency, the
Association Technique de l’Importation Charbonnière (ATIC), responsible for all coal imports
into France. In part to give the impression of balance, Monnet targeted ATIC for violating the
cartel provisions of the Treaty of Paris. French Socialist Lapie argued that there could no
comparison between the cartelistic attributes of GEORG and ATIC. Unlike GEORG, ATIC
made no attempt to control prices or the distribution of coal. Lapie pleaded for its maintenance,
telling the Common Assembly that, “It is the basis of the entire French economy.” He suggested
tentatively that a solution could be to extend this organizational form to the entire Community.
At the same session, Kreyssig came to Lapie’s defense, rebuking the High Authority for its
campaign against ATIC and urging it to consider Lapie’s proposal that it be used as a model for a
Community-wide organization.

In November 1955, the High Authority finally announced its program to bring GEORG
into conformance with the ECSC treaty. The proposed reforms were mild enough but even these
were ignored by the Ruhr industries. The continued vitality of the Ruhr coal sales cartel was
made clear when the individual sales agencies simultaneously announced identical prices

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685 Deist, 6.8.1954, Kurzbericht über die Problem des deutschen Kohlenverkaufs, GK 115, AdsD. Schöne made this
same point in a speech to the CA-ECSC, 15 May 1954, AEI.
686 Matthias Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz: Der Schuman-Plan und die Ursprünge der europäischen
687 Deuxième réunion jointe des Membres de l’Assemblée consultative du Conseil de l’Europe et des Membres de
l’Assemblée commune de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier (20 mai 1954) Compte rendu in
extenso des débats, CEAB 1/624, BaK; Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 267-72.
688 Kreyssig to CA-ECSC, 19 and 20 June 1956, AEI.
689 Abelshauser, op cit., 82-83; Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 90-99, 262-67.
increases in September 1957. The Ruhr industries had defeated the ambitions of the High Authority and the French government to stem cartel practices.

That the High Authority was practicing a permissive policy on cartels is evident from its refusal to block mergers throughout the coal and steel industries. By 1956, German industrial re-concentration was fully underway, and no one appeared to have the will and power to stop it. Sixty-one mergers had come before the High Authority as of April 1958; it did not reject a single one. The German companies displayed a preference for vertical rather than horizontal concentration, with steel companies extending their grasp back into the coal industry and into the steel-transforming industries. By 1958, eight companies controlled 79% of the Ruhr’s pig iron production, 75% of its steel production, and 33% of its coal production. As one historian writes, “It is indeed ironic that the Schuman Plan, conceptualized by France to harness the West German steel industry once it had undergone deconcentration, was to become its liberator.”

In a marked shift, SPD deputies in the Common Assembly now began to worry that German industrial re-concentration had become too successful. After all, while they approved of the rationalization and production-of-scale features of concentration, the concern reemerged that the central importance of these industries to economic life gave their private owners disproportionate influence over the German economy. The ECSC Common Assembly became a testing ground for what would be a new SPD push in the late 1950s to craft legislation within Germany to prevent the abuse of large-scale industrial power, a campaign they carried into the 1960s.

This shift opened a door for a policy consensus between the SPD and the SFIO. As early as December 1953, Kreyssig had suggested that the High Authority’s control over the Community’s cartels was preferable to them continuing to fall under that of private capitalists. It was the SFIO, however, that in fact made the most significant move. In two detailed policy reports in 1954, the SFIO delegation stated that, “It does not appear to be demonstrated that

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690 In 1956 five companies that had emerged from Thyssen’s deconcentration merged into two units. See Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 173-74.
691 Haas, op cit., 82.
693 Concentration in the French steel industry proceeded inexorably but at a much slower pace. The market shares of the three large French steel companies, de Wendel, Usinor and Sidelor, grew from 39.2% in 1954 to 45.4% in 1959. Kipping, op cit., 330-331.
[coal] export cartel harms the general interest.” Pointing to the success of the centralized ATIC purchasing organization in France, the SFIO conceded that a centralized Ruhr sales cartel was perhaps preferable to the “anarchy” that would result from de-cartelization. Nevertheless, in their view, GEORG could pose potential harm to the community’s interests and therefore must be subordinated to the supervision and controls of the High Authority, which must be charged with monitoring its activities. SPD deputies, in close consultations with IG Bergbau, found that the miners’ union, while relieved that GEORG had in essence been preserved, now also worried that the employers would escape supervision. Only through the supranational power of the High Authority, they believed, could the workers’ organizations achieve some influence over the coal sales cartel’s policies.

The SPD and SFIO came to an agreement in October 1954 that enabled the Socialist faction to present a united front on the cartel issue within the ECSC. In 1955, the Socialists attacked the High Authority, now presided over by René Mayer, for alleged derogation of duty. Countering “our proposal” to that of the High Authority, the Socialists argued that theirs had the merit of providing “real” powers of supervision, compared to the “ineffective” High Authority proposal that risked permitting the rise of an “international super-cartel” that would be “non-transparent, uncontrollable.” They demanded that the High Authority work closely with a consultative body representing trade union and consumer interests, and that its deliberations be publicized. The Socialist campaign to pressure the High Authority to more vigorously assert its powers reached a crescendo in 1956 and was incorporated in the Socialist group’s refusal to approve a confidence motion in the Authority’s activities. In a united resolution, the Socialist faction argued that, “The policy of the High Authority has led to a weakening of its position as well as a weakening of the supranational character of the Community because the High Authority has not exercised its designated powers, with the result that national governments and

695 Rapport de la délégation française sur la CECA; Vorschlag Gazier La Question des cartels dans la CECA. Projet de résolution, GK 113, 116, AdsD.
696 Imig on IG Bergbau letterhead to Deist, Kreyssig and Schöne, 26 November 1954, GK 116, AdsD. See also Vertraulich! Betr. Gemeinschaftsorganisation Ruhrkohle Arbeitsunterlage, October 1955, GK 118, AdsD.
698 Sozialistische Fraktion Gemeinsamen Versammlung der EGKS Bericht über die Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe für Wirtschafts- und Sozialfragen, 21 March 1955, GK 117, AdsD. Emphasis on “real” is in the original.
producer groups have been exercising functions on coal pricing and cartelization that should be those of the High Authority.\textsuperscript{699}

The SFIO and SPD ability to agree on cartel policy demonstrates how far the parties had come since the disputes of 1948-1952. At that time, both parties suspected the other of working to shape a postwar European economy in which its nationally-based heavy industry would achieve an economic hegemony on the continent through the marginalization of its cross-Rhine rival. SFIO-SPD rapprochement on cartel policy was the most overt sign that the parties had reached consensus on the essential aspects of the Community’s coal and steel policy. This consensus extended beyond the troublesome cartel issue.

5.6 PLANNING, PRICES, AND INVESTMENT IN THE ECSC:
SFIO AND SPD CONSENSUS ON COAL AND STEEL POLICY

The SPD did not easily abandon its assertion that the ECSC was designed to perpetuate the discriminatory features of the initial postwar period. For several years this assertion co-existed with more favorable commentary about the Community’s evolution. For a while, French economic policy appeared to German Social Democrats to be an effort to extract Ruhr coal for French heavy industry while permanently and artificially disabling German steel. The Monnet modernization plan’s investment goals for French steel during a period of dismantlement and then restriction in Germany, French governmental efforts to block an increase in German quotas for steel capacity through the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the rise in domestic German coal prices due to the elimination of double-pricing for the sale of German coal to domestic and foreign markets, and unilateral French taxes on German steel instituted on the eve of the opening of the ECSC, all boded poorly for a fair competitive common market in steel.\textsuperscript{700} SPD experts feared that a flood of French steel would wash through the open door

\textsuperscript{699} Gemeinsame Versammlung der EGKS Sozialistische Fraktion Erklärung der sozialistischen Gruppe 22-6-56, GK 119, AdSd.
\textsuperscript{700} See Kreyssig to the Bundestag on the French steel import taxes, 5 May 1952, Verhandlungen, 12798; and Ollenhauer on double-pricing at the Bezirksfunktionärskonferenz der SPD am. 24.1.1953 in der “Hanomag”, Hannover, Bredenbeckerstrasse, EO 86, AdSd. For an overview of the OEEC dispute, see Werner Bührer, Westdeutschland in der OEEC: Eingliederung, Krise, Bewährung 1947-1961 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997), 264-66; for the tax dispute, see Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 84-87.

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provided by the customs union. The result would decimate the Ruhr industrial working class; SPD speakers estimated a loss of up to 50,000 jobs in German steel. Large-scale investment by French and other European enterprises in German coal and steel fueled conspiratorial thinking. The French government was also readying a heavy push to canalize the Mosel River, an endeavor designed to assist the land-locked Lorraine steel industry and facilitate French steel penetration of the southern German market by decreasing transport costs by up to 60%. SPD opinion can be summarized by Fritz Henssler’s caustic remark in a letter to Ollenhauer in spring 1953 on developments in the Community: “I am extraordinarily mistrustful.”

The SPD had initially considered the High Authority to be a smoke-screen for French interests, and expected it to discriminate against German steel when authorizing investments in heavy industry. Nölting wrote in a letter that the Community’s “future investment policy will be the criteria” for judging the fairness of the ECSC. Initially, SPD deputies were convinced that this discrimination in steel and iron policy was taking place. Lorraine iron ore, one of the few products that German industry wished to import from France, was not made available in the expected quantities. Kreyssig pointed out in the summer of 1953 that German industry paid nearly half of the High Authority’s budget, yet a coherent investment policy was nowhere in sight. A downturn in the continental European steel market in 1953 made the ECSC an easy scapegoat, but this was the case in France as well. As late as April 1954, Kreyssig was

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701 That French steel exports to Germany rose from 243,000 tons in 1952 to 855,000 tons in 1954 likely confirmed the SPD’s initial suspicions. Kipping, op cit., 330.
702 Schöne told the Bundestag that, “It is obvious that in this manner in a very short time from now a crushing import of French steel is to be expected.” He went to say that, “An attentive observer of the German economy would not dispute that the German iron industry will witness more and more the signs of work suppression and shortened hours. The machinery will lay still; mills will operate with half shifts.” 28 April 1952, Verhandlungen, 12786-87.
703 For French investment in German heavy industry in 1952-53, see Lefèvre, op cit., 388-92.
704 For this dispute, see Ludwig Vogel, Deutschland, Frankreich und die Mosel: Europäische Integrationspolitik in den Montan-Regionen Ruhr, Lothringen, Luxemburg und der Saar. (Essen: Klartext, 2001).
705 Henssler to Ollenhauer, 9 March 1953, Fritz Henssler 57, AdsD.
706 Nölting to Direktor Rudolf Hannesen, 9 July 1953, Erik Nölting 27, AdsD.
707 See also Birkelbach to the Gemeinsame Sitzung der Mitglieder der Beratenden Versammlungen des Europarates und der Mitglieder der Gemeinsame Versammlung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl. Kurzbericht über den Verlauf Montag 22. Juni 1953, CEAB 1/624, BaK.
708 Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, Dienstag, den 24. Februar 1953, GK 25, AdsD. Wehner reported to the SPD Central Committee that within the High Authority, “[Iron] ore is being dealt with in far more favorable conditions for France.” 30-31 January 1953, Parteivorstand 1953, AdsD.
709 Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig Dienstag, den 7. Juli 1953, GK 25, AdsD.
710 See Kreyssig’s remarks to CA-ECSC, 20 June 1953, AEI. For the situation in the steel market in 1953, see Freyssenet, op cit., 49; Lefèvre, op cit., 300.
speaking of Monnet’s “stab-in-the-back policy (Dolchstossprogramm),” a remark that carries heavy undertones in German.711

Events proved these fears for the future of German steel in the Community to be unwarranted. After stagnating in 1953, the ECSC steel market took off in 1954, experiencing seven consecutive years of impressive growth. From 1954 to 1960, the German steel industry expanded 68% against 63% in France; whereas French production was at 71% of German steel production in 1952, the figure in 1960 was 50%.712 The Community developed into a seller’s market as prices rose and, by 1955, the SPD found itself making common cause with the SFIO’s long-held view that low steel prices were necessary to aid the steel-transforming industries. As for the Community’s investment policy, of the $50 million loan from the U.S., $28 million was earmarked for Germany against $13.5 million for France.713 Looking back in 1957, Kreyssig stated that although the “Community never faced a hard test...all in all the Community has been a positive and worthwhile success for Europe.”714

The success of the German steel industry erased concerns that German steel had faced discriminatory conditions when it entered the ECSC.715 In addition, the ECSC customs union opened at a moment when French politics took a turn to the right and successive governments sought to stem public investment in French heavy industry. SFIO deputies excoriated their government for first reducing, then delaying allocation of funds for the second modernization plan, pointing out that this had been a condition for their support of the Schuman Plan.716 Representing the long-held SFIO postwar view, Christian Pineau criticized the government and industry for resorting to high tariffs on foreign steel rather than vigorously investing to make French steel more competitive, a policy that damaged the export potential of France’s steel-transforming industries.717 Within German politics, the SPD was also constantly condemning

711 Kreyssig, 29 April 1954, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 1135.
712 Freyssenet, op cit., 44-62.
713 Spiersen and Poidevin, op cit., 322-23.
714 Wirtschaftsfunk, Der Wirtschaftskommentar Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, 21.11.1957, GK 27, AdSD.
715 Haas writes that, “When interest group demands and expectations are paired off against the decisions made by the High Authority, it appears that the German steelmakers are by far the most successful group...The Charbonnages de France have fared only slightly less well.” Haas, op cit., 476.
716 André le Troquer to the Conseil National, November 1952, OURS; Robert Lacoste, 18 December 1952, JO, 6578.
717 Pineau, 1 January 1952, JO, 11-12.
what it considered to be an inadequate public investment program in heavy industry. 718 Whereas national investment levels had been cause for dispute between the SFIO and SPD in 1948-1952, they were able to make common cause on the issue within the ECSC and did so despite the SFIO’s assertion that the canalization of the Mosel “was fundamental for French steel.”719 The two Socialist parties together turned to the High Authority to press their claims for higher investment in heavy industry. Thwarted within their domestic political spheres, Socialists argued that the High Authority should develop a common investment policy and compensate for the neglect of their national governments. 720 Their call had a distinct socialist hue: they argued that the High Authority should introduce an element of investment planning at the supranational level. 721

One can plausibly argue that the prosperity resulting from the steel boom of the 1950s created the conditions for a Socialist entente on steel policy. Coal, however, was a different story. Like steel, the community’s coal industries suffered a downturn in 1953. German Social Democrats and even some French Socialists placed the blame on the opening of the customs union. 722 In its official report, though, the SFIO recognized that, “The opening of the common market was not the determining factor in the unfavorable evolution of the French coal market.”723 As the economic take-off accelerated, the coal industries experienced their last moment of euphoria as coal prices rose dramatically from the end of 1954 until the end of 1956. 724 Production in the Ruhr and Lorraine regions reached record levels. 725 Coal became scarce and expensive. 726 However, this was a momentary boom contingent on the specific circumstances of Europe’s postwar economic recovery. 727

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718 For instance, see the Ruhr deputy and coal expert Paul Bleiss’ remarks 19 June 1954, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 1599.
719 Rapport de la délégation française sur la CECA,” GK 113, AdsD.
720 Ollenhauer, 28 October 1953, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 40; Deist to CA-ECSC, 14 January 1954, AEI.
721 Diskussionsentwurf von W. Birklebach Montan-Union VERTRAULICH! GK 192, AdsD.
722 SFIO deputy Roger Coutant, 15 November 1954, JO, 5032. Deist called the downturn in German ore production “a willful and logical result of the consequences of the interaction between the iron and steel industries within the Community.” 7 April 1954, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 806. Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig Dienstag, den 20. April 1954, GK 26, AdsD.
723 Rapport de la délégation française de la CECA, GK 113, AdsD.
725 Abelshauser, op cit., 85; Freyssenet, op cit., 50.
726 Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 253-61.
727 Bührer in Wurm, ed., op cit., 89.
Rising imports of oil were to be the doom of the Community’s coal industry. Having grown an average of 6% per year from 1929 to 1950, oil imports rose between 16 and 20% from 1953 to 1956.\footnote{Perron, \textit{op cit.}, 45.} History was about to take an unexpected turn. After seven years of acute struggle between the French and German governments over scarce coal supplies in 1946-1952, by 1958 coal was too plentiful to sustain prices covering its costs of production, and was nonetheless too expensive to compete against a steadily rising influx of oil. Neither the coal industries, nor the national governments, nor the High Authority fully appreciated what was about to occur.\footnote{Abelshauser, \textit{op cit.}, 89; Perron, \textit{op cit.}, 169-70.} Unlike the German government, French Socialists and the French government worked to shield France’s coal industry from oil competition, with one Socialist deputy pointing out in 1953 that, “95% or more [of the oil] comes from foreign sources situated in a region whose political stability and geographical situation gives rise to great concern.”\footnote{Coutant, 24 March 1953, \textit{JO}, 2266. France imposed a 9% tariff on oil products compared to 4% in Germany. Perron, \textit{op cit.}, 308.}\footnote{Ibid., 260-61.} The energy crisis resulting from the Suez invasion of 1956 greatly strengthened this sentiment. As a result, the increase in the Community’s consumption of oil was highest in Germany, rising 36.8% from 1955 to 1957, as compared to 19.2% in France.\footnote{Ibid., 260-61.}

Prime Minister Mollet offered a vigorous defense of coal’s future in a speech to Lorraine workers in June 1956.\footnote{Discours prononcé par M. Guy MOLLET, Président du Conseil à l’occasion du centième anniversaire des houillères de Lorraine Merlebach, le 23 juin 1956, AGM 68, OURS.} The High Authority followed the French government’s request and reaffirmed that, “coal has been and will remain the principal source of energy for the Community.”\footnote{Perron, \textit{op cit.}, 222-23.} It put in place a policy to store coal during periods of abundance. German Social Democrats were more circumspect about coal’s future. Schöne remarked that the industry’s future was “uncertain” in 1955.\footnote{Schöne to CA-ECSC, 14 May 1955, AEI.} Deist called for vigorous measures by the High Authority to invest in new equipment to make coal competitive against oil imports.\footnote{Deist to CA-ECSC, 22 June 1955, AEI.} That neither the SFIO nor the SPD blamed the ECSC for coal’s collapse after 1958 demonstrates an appreciation for the deep structural challenge facing the industry.

From 1955 to 1957, however, coal was booming. Rising coal prices gave occasion for yet another consensus to develop among the French Socialist and German Social Democratic
deputies of the ECSC Common Assembly. As early as 1954, Deist praised the High Authority for responding to the plea for assistance from the German trade unions for investment in the Ruhr’s iron ore industry in the face of German government neglect.\(^{736}\) By 1955, the SFIO and SPD were united in seeking a decrease in the rising price of coal and called on the High Authority to intervene to fulfill its treaty obligation of keeping coal prices low.\(^{737}\) When the German government lifted price controls on coal in April 1956, allowing them to continue to rise, the SPD condemned a liberal policy that they said would come at the expense of household consumers.\(^{738}\) The SPD had come around to the SFIO’s traditional position that coal prices must be kept low so as to benefit consumers and coal-consuming industries. The German government’s decision was of crucial importance for the SFIO as well, not only because it imported a great amount of Ruhr coal, but also because the Ruhr’s coal prices served as a benchmark for coal prices in general within the Community. Both parties turned to the High Authority in the hope that it would intervene and rectify the situation created by the German government’s liberalization of coal prices. By November 1956, the SPD speakers expressed anger that the High Authority had chosen not to intervene.\(^{739}\) Yet again the SPD found that what it had once considered to be a supranational authority invested with tyrannical powers had in fact turned out to be an organization too weak to effectively counter policies set at the national level.

### 5.7 SOCIALIST SUPRANATIONALISM IN THE ECSC: SFIO AND SPD VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1955-1957

In summer 1956, SPD ECSC deputy Gerhard Kreyssig explicitly called for an alliance between the High Authority and the Common Assembly to sway public opinion and to force the national governments to accord more powers to the supranational institutions.\(^{740}\) A year earlier, Guy

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\(^{736}\) Deist, 7 April 1954, Bundestag, *Verhandlungen*, 807.

\(^{737}\) Sozialistische Fraktion Gemeinsamen Versammlung der EGKS Bericht über die Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe für Wirtschafts- und Sozialfragen, 21 March 1955, GK 117, AdsD.

\(^{738}\) Wirtschaftsfunk, Der Wirtschaftskommentar Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, 6. März and 19. Juni 1956, GK 27, AdsD.


\(^{740}\) Kreyssig to CA-ECSC, 22 June 1956, AEI.

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Mollet in the name of the Socialist faction, had said that, “The Treaty, if fully implemented, can become a remarkable instrument of social progress,” so long as the Community ceased to be constrained “by an overly strict limitation of its competence.”741 As examined above, the Socialist faction sought to have the powers of the Community enlarged in order to create a common social policy, as well as a common policy to plan investments in the coal and steel industries. Socialists frequently criticized the High Authority for excessive deference to national governments.742 Jaquet proposed reducing the powers of the intergovernmental Council of Ministers, but his proposal was defeated by the other factions of the Assembly.743 The Socialist position after 1955 is evidence that there was a tendency for policy “spill over” within the Socialist faction.744 A united Socialist faction called for the treaty modification so as to allow a far-reaching supranational social policy in the coal and steel sectors, as well as the extension of the treaty’s field of competence to the entire energy sector, in particular to cover oil and electricity.745

German Social Democrats joined the French Socialists in criticizing the Messina report, which proposed the creation of a European Economic Community, for not granting sufficient supranational powers to the institution’s supranational bodies: the European Commission executive and the European Parliamentary Assembly. Wehner called for a common competitive policy, a common policy on investments, and a European Investment Fund.746 Although they remained critical of the High Authority, Socialists displayed pride in their accomplishments in the Common Assembly. In particular, they celebrated their success in converting the Common Assembly into an effective supervisory body capable of affecting the Community’s policy.747 Schöne, for instance, wrote that:

741 Mollet to CA-ECSC, 9 May 1955, AEI.
742 Wirtschaftsfunk, Der Wirtschaftskommentar Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, 19. Juni 1956, GK 27, AdsD.
744 Haas, op cit., 292, 299-301.
746 Wehner to CA-ECSC, 24 juin 1955, AEI.
The history of the ECSC parliament clearly shows how much influence an active parliament can be assured of. For the development of the institutions of the EEC-Treaty, there are no more natural allies than the Commission and the Parliament.

He argued that experience demonstrated that supranationalism would grow and that the “transfer of sovereignties will quietly take place of its own accord.” Hence the SPD had abandoned the view that one of its economic experts had expressed towards the Schuman Plan in 1951:

We know well that it is not possible to be independent from the development of economic conditions in the other land and pursue a sort of “Socialism-in-one-country-policy.” But we are convinced that the present power struggle can only be carried through in a promising manner on the internal German level.

Much of the credit for the SPD’s change of heart towards the Community must go to the President of the High Authority and the guiding force for the Community from 1952 to his resignation in 1955, Jean Monnet, who voted Socialist in French elections. French Socialists had long collaborated with Monnet within French domestic politics and he enjoyed close relations with SFIO leaders, including with Guy Mollet. The SPD deputies in the Common Assembly also fell under his impressive powers of political seduction. No doubt they noticed how Monnet “without cease solicited the advice of the trade unions which gave them a weight greater than that foreseen by the Treaty.” As the only major history of the ECSC states, “Monnet consistently showed himself independent of the governments of the [French] Fourth Republic.” Monnet spent many hours in private meetings with the SPD deputies, as well as with representatives of the German industrial unions, who were perhaps even more enthused about Monnet than were the SPD deputies. The DGB chairman Walter Freitag told Monnet in late 1954 that:

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749 Fritz Baade, “Professor Baade zum Schuman-Plan,” 5.5.1951, GK 111, AdsD.


752 Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 57.

753 Bayreuther Tagblatt, 10 January 1953, EO 12, AdsD; Walter Paterson, The SPD and European Integration (Glasgow: Saxon House Lexington Books, 1974), 115.
We have had occasion to closely watch the work of the High Authority in these last years and we trust you because you do what you say and you say what you do. Go forth, build Europe, and we will follow you.754

That Freitag had such a view is quite significant because, with SPD support, he had recently ascended to the DGB chairmanship following a coup against Christian Fette, who had supported the ratification of the ECSC treaty against Freitag’s opposition in 1951-52. Over time the SPD turned to the High Authority as a counter-weight to the power of German industrial groups and of its own government.755 One gains the impression that when Deist called Monnet his “friend” in a speech to the Common Assembly, his terminology represented more than a political nicety.756 Although SPD deputies regretted that the German government designated the trade unionist Heinz Potthoff rather than Deist as one of its two representatives on the High Authority in 1952, Potthoff proved capable and provided an effective link for informal contacts with the DGB and SPD.757

It is clear that French Socialists and German Social Democrats alike regretted Monnet’s departure from the High Authority in spring 1955. Their criticisms of his successor, the liberal René Mayer, often read as pleas that he act like his predecessor, who often showed blatant disregard for the views of the national governments in the Council of Ministers.758 Mayer’s appointment was in part an effort by the national governments, in particular the French government, to reign in the supranational powers of the Community, a development resisted by the Community’s Socialist faction.759 In addition, neither the SFIO nor the SPD liked Mayer. Kreyssig called him a “new managerial fellow” who was suspect due to his alleged affinity with the liberal German Economic Minister, Ludwig Erhard.760 As the High Authority began to increasingly demur to the national governments under Mayer, the Socialists constituted themselves into an organized opposition in 1956 within the Common Assembly against the Liberal-Christian-Democratic majority. Although they did not go so far as calling for a censure motion, the Socialists faction launched a coordinated political attack against the new approach of

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754 Köpper, op cit., 171-76.
756 Deist to CA-ECSC, 16 January 1954, AEI.
758 Spierenburg and Poidevin, op cit., 60.
759 Ibid., op cit., 338.
760 Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, Dienstag, den 2. August 1955, GK 26, AdsD.
the High Authority.\textsuperscript{761} The Socialist initiative brought a new vitality to the Common Assembly by, in effect, beginning the process of supranationalizing the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy.

Due to their experiences and changing perceptions, SPD deputies in the ECSC Common Assembly became lobbyists for the ECSC integration model within the SPD. As early as August 1953, Ollenhauer acknowledged that the SPD had “won a quite substantial influence” within the Assembly.\textsuperscript{762} At its 1954 party congress, the SPD dropped its official opposition to the ECSC and merely called for its extension to other European nations, a nod to its preference that European integration not to take the form of a six-nation “Small Europe.”\textsuperscript{763} Favorable comments from Schöne and Kreyssig had such an impact within the party’s Political-Economic Committee that, in 1958, a number of delegates considered the ECSC model to be a better means than socialization to achieve the party’s goals in heavy industry.\textsuperscript{764} Such a stance would have been unthinkable as recently as 1954. Party reformer Karl Schiller, for his part, praised the ECSC for its innovative “combination of planning and competition.”\textsuperscript{765} It is clear from these statements that the ECSC contributed to the SPD’s path towards moderation in the late 1950s, rather than vice versa. Praise of the ECSC model coincided with intensive efforts to reformulate the party’s program, an effort that reached fruition in the 1959 Bad Godesberg program.\textsuperscript{766}

The SPD deputies in the ECSC developed an institutional loyalty that reflected their belief that they had achieved concrete accomplishments during their tenure in the Common Assembly. This view, in place by 1954, shaped their reception of the 1955 Messina report, which recommended a supranational common market to cover all fields of the Community’s economic activity. Wehner announced the ECSC Socialist faction’s tenuous support for the project, criticizing only the fact that the project appeared to be less supranational than its ECSC

\textsuperscript{761} Assemblée commune de la CECA, Groupe Socialiste, Revue de la presse d’expression française, \textit{Combat}, 25 June 1956, GK 119, AdsD.
\textsuperscript{762} Ansprache von Erich Ollenhauer am Sonntag, dem 2. August 1953, 11,45 Uhr, im Sitzungssaal der SPD-Fraktion (Stadthalle-Hannover), EO 96, AdsD.
\textsuperscript{763} Paterson, \textit{op cit.}, 119.
\textsuperscript{764} Protokol der Sitzung vom 7./8. März 1958 des Wirtschaftspolitische Ausschusses bei Parteivorstand der SPD, Heinrich Deist 12, AdsD.
\textsuperscript{766} Though the party had begun discussing programmatic reform in 1952-54, it was only after the loss of the 1957 Federal German election that an acceleration of this process took place.

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predecessor. This standpoint led the SPD deputies in the ECSC into a conflict with other foreign policy experts within their party, in particular with those who had been delegated to serve in the Council of Europe. Gerhard Lütkens, Helmut Kalbitzer and Heinz Putzrath continued the party’s traditional critique of the ECSC in fall 1955, and called for integration to occur under the auspices of the intergovernmental Council of Europe and the OEEC. However, the SPD leadership was well aware that the Council of Europe, which issued non-binding resolutions, was often paralyzed when it came to crafting concrete initiatives. In an embarrassment for the party, this intra-SPD dispute played out in the open before the SFIO and other Socialist deputies in a joint meeting of the Socialist deputies of the ECSC and the Council of Europe. At the meeting, Deist decisively rejected the anti-ECSC position of Kalbitzer and Lütkens. All SPD deputies agreed that in the future the Community should be as large as possible, but the ECSC deputies, including the political heavy-weight Wehner, were no longer willing to make this a precondition for supporting an extension of the six-nation Community’s powers. The battle-lines had been drawn for the internal SPD debate on the Treaties of Rome.

767 Wehner to CA-ECSC, 24 June 1955, AEI.
768 Helmut Kalbitzer, 27.10.1955, Bemerkungen zu den gegenwärtigen Möglichkeiten der wirtschaftlichen Integration Europas. See Kreyssig’s marginalia on Kalbitzer’s text. GK 118, AdsD.
769 See, for instance, Ernst Paul’s comments, 19 March 1954, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 705.
770 Analytischer (Kurz-)Bericht der Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe Wirtschaft der Sozialistische Fraktion in der Gemeinsamen Versammlung (EGKS) erweitert um Mitglieder der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates am 11. November 1955 in Luxemburg, GK 118, AdsD.
6. A SOCIALIST APPROACH TO EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
FRENCH SOCIALISTS, GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND
THE TREATIES OF ROME, 1955-1957

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a fundamental revision of our understanding of the role of the French Socialist and German Social Democratic Parties in the formulation and ratification of the Treaties of Rome. The current scholarship does not provide adequate explanations of why the SPD decided to support the Treaties of Rome in 1957, nor does it explain why Guy Mollet’s government pushed the treaties through the French administration and National Assembly despite a reluctant French political climate and a seemingly unfavorable economic context. Struck by the contrast between the SPD leadership’s virulent denunciation of the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community, scholars overlook important continuities in the SPD’s position on European economic integration that go back to the interwar period. Likewise, the historiography on the policy of Mollet’s government towards the Treaties fails to take into account how long-held SFIO advocacy of a European preferential trade system as a means to increase living standards and to compete with the colossal united economic zones of the United States and Soviet Union was the economic and ideological mindset through which Mollet approached the idea of a common market.

In this chapter, I contest claims of scholars that the SPD’s decision to support the Treaties of Rome constituted a “reversal” of its previous position. Some historians have viewed the SPD decision to support the Treaties of Rome as a result of the party’s increasing moderation in tone and policy over the course of the 1950s. This view suggests that the SPD’s approval of the Treaties was a victory for the new generation of economic experts within the party, who were

pushing the SPD away from a program of socialization and towards Keynesian economics. Simultaneously, some argue that the vote for the Treaties was a victory for party reformers, who wished to turn the SPD into a “catch-all” party through a public renunciation of the party’s attachment to Marxism. These elements crowned their success with the transformational Bad Godesberg party program of 1959, which “modernized” the party by renouncing key elements of the SPD heritage. However, support for trade liberalization in general transcended the conflict between party reformers and traditionalists. Though the 1950-51 German balance of payments crisis in the European Payments Union (EPU) seemed to expose a conceptual divide on this issue between these groups, the conflict was a temporary reaction to a complex set of circumstantial challenges. Fritz Baade, one of the most important SPD economic reformers, was among the staunchest opponents of the treaty for a European Economic Community (EEC). Trade liberalization had little to do with the subterranean party struggle that shaped the SPD of the 1950s. Rather than marking a victory on the road to Bad Godesberg, the shift of the European integration process towards the SPD’s policy on economic integration was likely itself a contributing factor for the creation of a West German foreign policy consensus on European integration. Ollenhauer offers evidence for this thesis when he told the Central Committee in fall 1956 that, in European policy, Chancellor Konrad “Adenauer has come to adopt certain things that Social Democracy has represented since 1950.”

Moravesik and other scholars present the SPD’s support for the Treaties of Rome as rooted in an increasing acceptance of West German foreign policy. That this was not the case is clear from the bitter public campaigns that the SPD continued to organize against West German foreign and domestic policy in 1958-59, after the ratifications of the Treaties of Rome in summer 1957. In 1958, the SPD launched a “Fear Atomic Death” campaign to combat Adenauer’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. In 1959, the SPD called for a new European security pact in which West Germany would leave NATO and join a neutral zone with Poland

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773 Gabriele d’Ottavio sees SPD support for the Treaties as a sign of “internal maturation,” and as indicative of “the phenomenon of de-ideologization and modernization of the party, leading to the turning point of Bad Godesberg in 1959.” Gabriele d’Ottavio, op cit., 105.
774 PV, PA and KK, 18 October 1956, SPD-Parteivorstand (PV) 1956, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD).
775 Moravesik, op cit., 95; Rudolf Hrbek, Die SPD, Deutschland und Europe: die Haltung der Sozialdemokratie zum Verhältnis von Deutschland-Politik und West-Integration (1945-1957) (Bonn: Europa Union, 1972).
and the Czech Republic that would be guaranteed by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. These initiatives demonstrate that it was not a desire to attain a comprehensive foreign policy consensus with the CDU that led the SPD to support the Treaties of Rome in 1957. It was only in 1960 that Herbert Wehner gave his famous speech announcing the SPD’s desire to operate within the foreign policy contours created by Adenauer and the Allied governments. In 1957, though, Wehner urged the SPD to abstain in the vote on the common market.

Nor had the SPD embraced Adenauer’s version of a “policy of strength” towards the Soviet Union. A new round of Geneva negotiations on the German question failed in November 1955. Wehner, who was present at the negotiations, reported to the SPD Central Committee that the German government had made no real effort to achieve reunification.776 The party defended the spring 1956 initiative of Mollet’s government to try to achieve a breakthrough on the German question with the Soviet Union against the public opposition of Adenauer, who at the time mistrusted Mollet’s intentions.777 The failure of French-Soviet discussions and a realization that German reunification was becoming increasingly unlikely in the near or medium term may have facilitated the SPD’s decision in 1957 to support the Treaties of Rome.778 However, there is no direct evidence that this was the case. Ollenhauer had already agreed to join Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for the United States of Europe months prior to the November 1955 Geneva negotiations, as discussed below.

As impractical as it may appear, it seems that SPD leaders hoped to divorce West Germany’s integration into NATO from proposals for economic and atomic energy integration.779 Reunification was a concern (among others) during the internal SPD debates on the Treaties of Rome.780 However, in protocols attached to the Treaties, negotiators went a long

776 Wehner writes in the report that, “It is no longer possible to successfully push through the fundamental idea of the ‘policy of strength’ in relation to German reunification.” Wehner, Zum Ergebnis der Genfer Aussenministerkonferenz vom 27.10 bis 16.11.1955. See also Ollenhauer’s comments to the PV and Fraktionsvorstand, 29 November 1955, SPD-PV 1955, AdsD.

777 Wehner interview, 8 February 1956, 1/HWAA1065, AdsD; 3 April 1956, PPP, Mollet-Vorstoss ein Weg aus der Sackgasse: Widersinn des Nebeneinanders von Abrüstung und deutscher Aufrüstung, 1/HWAA886, AdsD.

778 SFIO interlocutors kept the SPD abreast of these developments and informed them of the failures of the bilateral talks. Bericht von der Reise nach Paris im Auftrag des PV (27.-29.5.56); and Pontillon to Ollenhauer, translation 22.6.1956, Fritz Heine (FH) 144 and 147, AdsD.

779 Fritz Erler speech in Bonn, 11 April 1957, Fritz Erler (FE) 13, AdsD; and Deist to the WPA Protokoll der Sitzung des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses beim Parteivorstand der SPD, stattgefunden am 26.10.56 im “Haus der SPD”, Bonn, Brüno Gleitze (BG) 158, AdsD.

way towards accommodating SPD demands that the EEC not be designed to further cement the division of Europe, regardless of whether they did so with the purpose of attaining SPD support. The six nations agreed that there would be no tariff barrier between the customs union and the German Democratic Republic, and that the treaties could be revised if German reunification appeared on the international agenda. Under these conditions, only a small minority of SPD deputies objected to the EEC on the grounds that it could stymie German reunification.

Scholars have also minimized the socialist contribution to the creation of the EEC, as I discuss below. This may be in part the result of investigating the postwar period through contemporary lenses. The European left in the last decades has generally had a reputation for approaching trade liberalization with suspicion, and “liberals” who support the concept of free trade are often portrayed as being on the right-wing of socialist parties. In the 1950s, however, there is hardly any evidence of a left/right divide on trade liberalization in the SFIO and SPD. While socialists had to account for the unique economic context of their own nation-states, this chapter argues that French Socialists and German Social Democrats shared a basic conception of the merits of trade liberalization that was rooted in party traditions and historical narratives that bear a great deal in common.

The same was true of atomic energy integration about which the two socialist parties agreed on a common design, although the realities of coaliotional government forced Mollet to break with his SPD partner and continue France’s program to build atomic weapons. However, the parties did have different traditions on agriculture, which proved to be one of the most difficult policy areas during the negotiations. Yet even in this fraught policy area, SFIO and SPD policies were closer to one another than they first appear. While national and party demographics made the SFIO far more attuned to the needs of the French countryside, SPD determination to stabilize German democracy and reduce its long-standing antagonism with German farmers led it to support guaranteed minimum incomes for farmers, a principle that became the basis for the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

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My argument is not that the EEC should be considered a “Socialist” invention, nor do I deny the influence and importance of other parties, demographic constituencies, and economic interests in its creation. Treaties of this nature represent compromises, and there was much in the Treaties that each party would have preferred to cast aside. Rather I argue that much more of the content and spirit of the Treaties of Rome than is currently recognized reflected socialist policies rooted in SFIO and SPD party traditions on economic policy and historical narratives. That these traditions and narratives emerged from a similar conception of historical exigency and trajectory allows one to speak of a French Socialist-German Social Democratic approach to European economic integration that created opportunities and conditions necessary for the success of the Treaties.

The Treaties of Rome were the most profound effort in European history to that date to achieve a comprehensive economic integration of the principal economies of Western continental Europe. The Treaties of Rome were in fact two treaties, one to create a supranational European atomic energy authority (Euratom) and the other to create a preferential European common market with a common external tariff within a European Economic Community that combined supranational and intergovernmental features. Their impact promised to deeply affect nearly all aspects of the participating nations’ economic structures and to fundamentally remake these nations’ relationships with non-participating states, in particular with Great Britain and Scandinavia, the United States, and the French overseas territories. In order to demonstrate how core features of the Treaties of Rome reflected a socialist approach to European integration, it is necessary to investigate SFIO and SPD traditions and responses to each major policy field which fell under the purview of the proposed European institutions. This chapter therefore starts by discussing Jean Monnet’s proposals for a European atomic energy organization, which provided a forum for a SFIO-SPD consensus on European integration, and then proceeds to investigate the parties’ conceptions of the merits of trade liberalization and the conditions they believed to be necessary to ameliorate some of its potentially negative social and economic repercussions. It concludes by examining the impact of French proposals to integrate France’s overseas territories into the new communities, as well as the parties’ traditions on agricultural policy and their responses to proposals for a preferential zone for the proposed community’s agriculture.
Eager to re-launch the European integration process after the EDC debacle, Jean Monnet announced a program for a supranational authority to oversee an integrated European atomic energy program in February 1955.\(^{783}\) Monnet struck at an opportune moment. In 1954, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower had famously announced a program of “Atoms for Peace,” in which he proposed an international atomic energy authority to assist nations in the peaceful development of nuclear energy.\(^{784}\) Historians have written of an “atomic euphoria” striking Europe in the mid-1950s, as governments contemplated the prospect of a seemingly inexhaustible fuel supply.\(^{785}\) After initially resisting Monnet’s proposal, Prime Minister Edgar Faure ceded to the advice of the French Atomic Energy Agency, which supported the plan.\(^{786}\)

French Socialist leaders were among the first to promote an atomic energy future. In the National Assembly in 1947, Prime Minister Paul Ramadier placed a box of colored crayons in the hands of his Socialist colleague, Pierre-Olivier Lapie. Inside were uranium crystals. “Voilà, the future,” Ramadier told him.\(^{787}\) Anticipating Jean Monnet’s 1955 proposal, in 1954, French Socialists proposed detailed legislation to build an “international super-laboratory” to train researchers and promote “an ‘indispensable international scientific collaboration in the field.’”\(^{788}\) In June 1954, French Socialist René Naegelen was named rapporteur for the discussion on a “European organization for nuclear research” in the National Assembly.

While France’s nuclear program had broad support, in large part due to its potential to lead to a French nuclear arsenal, in Germany the SPD was by far the party most enthusiastic about the potential benefits of atomic energy. Professor Walter Weizel, a leading SPD scientific expert, told an internal SPD audience that nuclear energy was akin to “the transition from bodily

\(^{784}\) Weilemann, op cit., 17.
\(^{788}\) Moch, 6 June 1954, Journal Officiel (JO), 3229.
energy to fire, which was the transition from animal to man.” 789 The SPD was at the forefront of efforts to create the foundations for a German nuclear energy program despite a formal ban on German nuclear activities, which was only lifted with West Germany’s ascension to formal sovereignty in 1955. As early as 1948, SPD North-Rhine-Westphalia Economic Minister Erik Nölting had allocated 500,000 marks for “future energy” and, due to his influence, the Land government set up a Research Council in February 1949. 790

The SPD was able to call upon a well of support within the scientific community. This was in part because a group of leading scientific researchers were associated with the SPD leadership circles, whose expertise the SPD Central Committee cultivated in crafting its policy on science. The most important figure in this process was Dr. Leo Brandt, who became the primary author of the SPD’s 1956 Atomic Program. 791 Brandt was such a prominent figure within the scientific community that, in 1956, the German government appointed him second in command of the German Atomic Commission despite his political affiliation. 792 The SPD leadership also received counsel from affiliated scientists, who kept the SPD abreast of the most advanced trends in their fields and offered their views on research policy. 793 This network of professional contacts allowed the SPD to present itself as a plausible mouthpiece for segments of the scientific community frustrated by what they considered to be the relative neglect displayed by Adenauer’s CDU-led government.

In addition to believing in the merits of atomic energy, the SPD leadership saw a political opening to attack the government. Leo Brandt spoke to the SPD Central Committee of “the passivity of the federal government in questions of research and training” and encouraged it to make research an electoral issue. 794 His influence combined with that of Professor Carlo Schmid to make nuclear policy a principal plank of the 1956 SPD party congress’ theme: “The Second

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789 Protokoll der konstituierenden Sitzung des Ausschusses für Frage der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD, 5 December 1955, 1/HWAA83, AdsD. Rudolf Pass wrote to Wehner that, “this energy is inexhaustible as far as the mind can imagine and in a general sense its ubiquity is the same as [when humans] moved from wood to extracting energy from coal and oil.” Pass letter to Wehner, 1/HWAA82, AdsD.
791 For Brandt’s biography, see Ibid., 184-98.
792 Ibid., 191.
793 Gewerkschaft Brundhilde letter to the SPD Central Committee, 28 March 1955; Rudolf Pass letter to Deist, 7 April 1955, Heinrich Deist (HD) 83, AdsD.
Industrial Revolution.” The SPD’s decision to join Jean Monnet’s Action Committee in 1955 allowed the SPD to present itself as the party of science. In December 1955, Ollenhauer called on the party “to develop its point of view on all questions of atomic energy” with the intention of presenting a coherent policy to the 1956 congress. The Central Committee called upon experts and party leaders to lead sub-committees charged with various aspects of nuclear energy policy, all of which conducted their work at a furious pace through January 1956. In the resulting drafts for the SPD Atomic Plan, the party regretted that, “the current federal government, like its predecessors under this Chancellor, has shown little understanding for scientific research.”

Professor Weizel presented a detailed proposal to the SPD deputies in January 1956. An atomic energy program, he wrote, required a budget of three million marks for the atomic research itself, two million for the training and salaries of physicists, chemists, and engineers, one million for the expansion of existing capacities, and an additional two million for associated personnel. He also pointed to the need to seek foreign assistance. Within weeks the SPD Bundestag faction presented proposals to drastically increase funding for nuclear research by creating a German Atomic Commission and an Albert Einstein Foundation. At the 1956 party congress, the party spent hours laying out a vision for Germany’s scientific future. It was a successful propaganda coup. Leo Brandt and Carlo Schmid’s widely-reported speeches were printed and distributed in brochures throughout Germany. The SPD followed up this success with a series of proposals to fund a German Research Council and other programs.

Even prior to Monnet’s announcement of the Euratom initiative, the SFIO and the SPD were advocates of their nations’ participation in an international atomic energy body. SPD experts believed that only the assistance of other nations would allow Germany to make up the ground it had lost due the isolation of the Nazi and occupation periods. French Socialists, for

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795 Protokoll der konstituierende Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD, 5 December 1955, 1/HWAA83, AdsD.
796 Among the members of the Central Committee’s Committee for Atomic Energy were Leo Brandt, Heinrich Deist, Willi Eichler, Fritz Erler, Hellmut Kalbitzer, Ludwig Rosenberg, Carlo Schmid, Joachim Schöne, Hermann Veit, Herbert Wehner, and Walter Weizel. 1/HWAA83, AdsD.
797 “Entwurf für einen Atomplan der SPD,” 27 April 1956, 1/HWAA83 AdsD.
798 Entwurf Prof. W. Weizel an die Bundestagsfraktion der SPD, 7 January 1956, AdsD.
799 20 January 1956, Antrag der SPD im deutschen Bundestag, HD 83, AdsD.
801 Der Deutsche Forschungsrat und seine Aufgaben Referat von Staatssekretär Professor Dr. Med. Hc. Dip. Leo Brandt. Antrag zum Bundeshaushalt 1957/58, Karl Schiller 73, Bundesarchiv-Koblenz (BaK).
802 Vorschlag zur Änderung des von Leo Brandt vorgelegten “Entwurf für einen Atomplan der SPD,” 27 April 1956, 1/HWAA82, AdsD.
their part, shared a general assessment that an isolated French program would prove far too great a burden for France’s budget. In addition, both nations needed to import the uranium necessary to create nuclear energy. A purely national atomic energy program was therefore not possible for either Germany or France. That the two nations would seek an alliance on nuclear energy with one another, however, was not foreordained. Rather, both nations, and their socialist parties, had originally looked to Great Britain for partnership. Yet again, the British government disappointed its continental allies, refusing French and later German overtures for atomic cooperation that it feared would jeopardize its privileged relations with the United States.

Absent British cooperation, French Socialists and German Social Democrats concluded that a French-German partnership was necessary if their nations would ever be able to compete with the United States and the Soviet Union in the field of atomic energy production. Leo Brandt and Hellmut Kalbitzer were the only prominent opponents of close collaboration with the French on atomic energy. The views of Weizel and Wehner won the day. During a time of rapid economic change, Weizel told the SPD’s atomic committee that, “there are only two options: swim or drown...” The French nuclear program was, after all, third among the Western countries in technology, had the largest production of enriched uranium, and employed twice as many atomic technicians as all the other Western-continental nations combined. While dismissing concerns that German science would experience “colonization” by the French nuclear program, Weizel reminded the SPD of the “backwardness of our technical capabilities,” which makes “[our] number one problem [our] participation in the new development[s].” Erler explained his support for Euratom by stating that, “I am convinced that each European power

803 Thomas Rhenisch, Europäische Integration und industrielles Interesse: Die deutsche Industrie und die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999), 19; Weilemann, op cit., 42.
804 The SPD recognized its dependence on foreign sources for raw materials. Zeitafel, Tageordnung und Thesen für die Entwicklung der Atomenergie, 1/HWAA83, AdsD.
805 Ludwig Rosenberg told the SPD Atomic Energy Committee that he “does not believe that on the national level what Monnet proposes can be achieved.” Protokoll einer gemeinsamen Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand und der Mitglieder der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für europäische Zusammenarbeit, 6 February 1956, 1/HWAA83, AdsD. For France, see Weilemann, op cit., 113.
806 Ludwin Vogel, Deutschland, Frankreich und die Mosel: Europäische Integrationspolitik in den Montan-Regionen Ruhr, Lothringen, Luxemburg und der Saar (Essen: Klartext, 2001), 319; Weilemann, op cit., 21-24, 41.
807 13-14 January 1956, SPD-PV 1956, AdsD.
808 Protokoll über die am 31. Mai (Fronleichnam) im “Haus der SPD”, Bonn. Stattgefandene Tagung des “Ausschuss für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD,” 1/HWAA82, AdsD.
809 Weilemann, op cit., 39-42.
810 Protokoll über die am 31. Mai (Fronleichnam) im “Haus der SPD”, Bonn. Stattgefandene Tagung des “Ausschuss für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD,” 1/HWAA82, AdsD.
alone—with the exception of England—will be incapable of catching up with the advance of the Americans and Russians...” Though Kalbitzer continued to advocate for a looser integration of atomic energy under the auspices of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), Wehner concluded succinctly that, “The OEEC-Framework will not suffice for us.”

Monnet’s initiative helped to create the basis for a SFIO-SPD entente on the European integration process. In conversations from April to June 1955, Monnet and his allies won Guy Mollet to the Euratom cause. Mollet was eager to seize upon the positive attitude the SPD had begun to display within the ECSC Common Assembly to overcome the inter-party tensions from the EDC period. He posed two conditions for his party’s support: that the SFIO remain free to support or reject other integration initiatives besides nuclear energy and, crucially, that Monnet make intensive efforts to woo the SPD and gain its adherence. Monnet sprung at the opportunity. He asked Mollet to use his contacts with the SPD to arrange interviews on the subject with party leader Ollenhauer and Wehner. After a series of personal interviews, Monnet succeeded in winning the SPD leadership to his cause, which was prone for the reasons above to support an atomic energy initiative. After years of conflict, the party was also eager to escape a sense of domestic and international isolation. By August, Gerhard Kreyssig, a key SPD deputy in the ECSC Common Assembly, was publicly praising the Euratom concept as “excellent” and as an “immediately workable solution.” He warned against proposals to water down the initiative and limit its competences, instead advocating for the transcendence of national programs and the development of “a European Common Program” for atomic energy.

811 Fritz Erler, “La politique extérieure de la république fédérale,” Politique étrangère, July/August 1956, FE 13, AdS.D.
812 Kalbitzer, Protokoll der konstituierenden Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD, 5 December 1955, 1/HWAA83, AdS; Wehner to PV 13-14 January 1956, PV 1956, AdS.D.
814 Monnet to Mollet, 22 July 1955, AGM 113, OURS.
816 Wehner wrote in his notes that among the “political consideration[s] for the SPD’s attitude on the atomic energy question” was that the “positive attitude of the SPD-leadership to Jean Monnet in terms of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe has greatly paid off because the SPD has been freed in the western press from its alleged position of isolation.” Pariser Diskussion, 17.-18.1.56, 1/HWAA83, AdS.D.
817 Wirtschaftskommentar von Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, Dienstag, den 30. August 1955, Gerhard Kreyssig (GK) 26, AdS.D.
Monnet was ecstatic to have the Social Democrats’ support. Keeping a promise he had made to Ollenhauer, Monnet made a conscious decision to give the Action Committee a left-leaning hue by actively seeking the collaboration of trade unionists, and not inviting the Community’s liberal parties, industrial organizations or business associations to participate. Ollenhauer reported having consulted and gained the support of Walter Freitag and Heinrich Imig, both important DGB officials, for Monnet’s proposal before giving a concrete response to Monnet’s entreaties. Monnet tapped the trade unionist Ludwig Rosenberg to preside over the Action Committee’s sub-committee in charge of law, administration, and finances. When Monnet announced the composition of his committee in 1955, Christian Democrats found themselves outnumbered by Socialists and trade unionists, the latter of whom constituted around 50% of the committee’s total membership.

The SPD became the most enthusiastic supporter of Euratom within German politics. In January 1956, the Central Committee agreed to the SPD’s formal representation in Monnet’s Action Committee, and Ollenhauer and Wehner became ubiquitous at the Committee’s meetings. Wehner constantly gave favorable reports of the Committee’s work to the SPD’s internal committees, and he publicly accused the government of “half-hearted” support for Monnet’s Committee, a claim that was broadly true. Over the course of 1956, the SPD seemed to relish in the embarrassment of Adenauer’s government that the SPD had seemingly outflanked them on Monnet’s initiative. After a unanimous vote of support from the SPD Bundestag faction, the SPD launched a public campaign to pressure Adenauer’s government to sign a treaty to create Euratom.

The SPD also celebrated its détente with the SFIO leadership. In early 1956, Ollenhauer made a habit of meeting with Prime Minister Mollet in Paris to coordinate Socialist

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818 13-14 January 1956, PV 1956, AdsD.
820 Zeitafel, Tageordnung und Thesen für die Entwicklung der Atomenergie, 1/HWAA83, AdsD; 13-14 January 1956, PV 1956, AdsD.
821 Wehner, “Nicht Appelle-Tatsachen entscheiden,” Die Freiheit, 28 September 1956, 1/HWAA2933, AdsD.
822 Ollenhauer to the PV and PA March 10 1956 in Bergueinstadt, PV 1956, AdsD; Genosse Selbmann, Wissenschaftl. Assistant An die sozialdemokratische Mitglieder des Arbeitskreises I, des Atomausschusses, der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, der gemeinsame Versammlung der Montanunion Oktober 1 1956, Auftrag des Arbeitskreises angefertigten Bericht über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Verhandlungen über die Bildung einer europäische Atomenergiegemeinschaft, 30 September 1956, HWAA/1607, AdsD.
823 Ollenhauer to the PV and PA March 10 1956 in Bergueinstadt, PV 1956, AdsD.
policy before sessions of Monnet’s Action Committee. Marking their new-found harmony, the six Socialist parties of the ECSC publicized a common resolution favoring atomic energy integration. The Socialist parties presented a united front within Jean Monnet’s Committee and were frequently at odds with representatives of the CDU and French Radicals. Prime Minister Mollet asked his German colleagues to pressure the reluctant CDU-leadership to prioritize Euratom. The SPD also supported a principal demand of the French SFIO-led coalition government: that the Euratom proposal be divorced from the negotiations for a common market. Ollenhauer went so far as to write German Foreign Minister von Brentano in October 1956 concerning the impasse between the French and German governments: “I do not mistake the importance of a quick conclusion of an agreement on the Common Market, but I would consider it very unfortunate if one makes it a precondition for the building of the European Atomic Community.”

The SPD became a firm advocate of Euratom in large part because it viewed its transnational contacts and a supranational community as alternative means to contest German government policy on nuclear energy. Within Germany, the SPD proposed a “German Organ for Fissile Materials and Supervision of their Application,” under a federal scheme that would allow SPD Land Minister-Presidents the power to observe and influence the launching of an atomic energy program in Germany. Frustrations within the SPD boiled over when the German government appointed a leading chemical industrialist to oversee Germany’s nuclear program, which the party interpreted as a clear sign that the German government intended to encourage private companies’ involvement. Its powers stymied within German domestic politics, the SPD used its transnational contacts to attempt to influence the design of Germany’s nuclear

824 Protokoll einer gemeinsamen Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand und der Mitglieder der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für europäische Zusammenarbeit, 6 February 1956, 1/HWAA83, AdsD.
826 BERICHT ÜBER DIE EURATOM, unterbreitet von GUY MOLLET, Generalsekretär der Sozialistischen Partei Frankreichs (S.F.I.O.), AGM 11, OURS.
827 Ollenhauer to von Brentano, 18 October 1956, EO 412, AdsD.
829 Der Wirtschaftskommentar Dr. Gerhard Kreyssig, 6 November 1956, GK 27, AdsD.
program by ensuring two central goals: that uranium and atomic energy be kept under public control, and that the program remain peaceful. SPD leaders knew that the CDU-government opposed public ownership, wishing to open the field to its supporters in German industry, and they suspected, correctly, that Adenauer’s government was interested in acquiring nuclear weapons.

The SPD offered a multitude of reasons for opposing private involvement in atomic energy policy, including that: uranium was not a normal commodity; atomic energy was inherently monopolistic; private industry did not possess enough capital to launch a nuclear program and should not profit from the results of public investment; and state supervision of dangerous chemicals was necessary for public health. Most ominous, one SPD leader noted in a letter to the Central Committee, was the possibility of the private production of atomic weapons and the arming of private militias. German Social Democrats insisted that atomic energy was different from a nationalization policy in general because a vast majority of people supported the nationalization of electricity, and the United States and Great Britain had decided to bar private companies from acquiring fuels needed for atomic energy production.

The SPD found firm allies in Monnet and the SFIO when it came to keeping nuclear energy out of the hands of private industry. As Monnet attempted to gain Mollet’s support for Euratom in spring 1955, Mollet insisted that its institutional design be that of a “public authority.” The SFIO and SPD brought their demand for an exclusively public atomic energy authority to the ECSC Common Assembly, to the Council of Europe, and to Monnet’s Action Committee, as transnational networks buzzed in the excitement of the European relance. A united ECSC Socialist faction presented its proposal in spring 1956, which was met by counterproposals from the Christian Democratic and Liberal factions, both of which insisted on the possibility of private involvement in this new energy field. SFIO deputy Lapie represented

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831 Georg August Zinn to Fritz Heine, 2 August 1956, BG 154, AdSD; and Rudolf Pass, letter to Deist, 7 April 1955, HD 83, AdSD.
832 Ollenhauer to SPD Congress 1954, 68, AdSD.
833 Antonio Varsori, “Euratom: une organisation qui échappe à Jean Monnet?,” in Bossuat and Wilkens, eds., 347.
834 Genosse Selbmann, Wissenschaftlicher Assistent, An die sozialdemokratische Mitglieder des Arbeitskreises I, des Atomausschusses, der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, der Gemeinsame Versammlung der Montanunion
the Socialists’ view in the Council of Europe, where he insisted that the intergovernmental committee chaired by Belgian Socialist Paul-Henri Spaak, which was charged with making recommendations for the design of the Community, explicitly exclude private enterprise, while the Christian Democrats sought to weaken the Spaak committee’s formulation to open the door to the private sector.\(^8\) The Socialists’ failure to achieve a ban on private industry’s participation in atomic energy within the intergovernmental Council of Europe dashed SPD hopes that it or the OEEC might prove a propitious venue for the new community. The SPD therefore chose to privilege public ownership and a strict oversight of the distribution of fissile materials over the involvement of non-ECSC countries, which had also been a long-held party demand concerning European integration.

Ollenhauer became the most ardent ally of Jean Monnet in his efforts to achieve an exclusive supranational control of the proposed Community’s fissile materials with oversight from a European parliamentary body.\(^9\) Many within the Action Committee resisted these strictures, but Monnet lobbied the governments negotiating the treaties to support public ownership. SPD leaders recognized that the problem, in their view, had been the position of the German government, rather than that of the French government or of Prime Minister Mollet.\(^8\) The U.S. government emerged as a decisive factor in the negotiations because it insisted that Euratom possess full powers over the use and distribution of any uranium delivered from the U.S.\(^8\) Though the German government, under pressure from the chemical industry, attained the right of industry representatives to attend certain meetings of Euratom’s supranational executive, the combined efforts of Monnet and the French and U.S. governments were able to attain a key SPD and SFIO demand: Euratom’s ownership and supervision of all fissile materials.\(^8\)

\(^8\) Weilemann, *op cit.*, 87.


\(^8\) See Ollenhauer’s positive reaction to this news. *Sitzung des Parteivorstandes am 7./8.3.1957 in Berlin, PV 1957, AdsD.*

\(^8\) Mollet celebrated this achievement in an April 1957 statement. *Declaration de M. Guy MOLLET, Président du Conseil, à la Revue “INDUSTRIES ATOMIQUES,” Avril 1957, AGM 70, OURS; Weilemann, *op cit.*, 164.*
As in the case of public ownership, the SPD also found support in the SFIO for its second key demand: that the member states’ nuclear programs remain exclusively peaceful in nature. Mollet had repeatedly made this objective clear to Monnet and, in part with an eye to attracting SPD support, Monnet included a ban on any military application for Euratom from the outset.\textsuperscript{840} Wehner, one of Monnet’s principal interlocutors within the SPD, cited Monnet’s support for the SPD’s demands as a primary reason for the SPD’s decision to join the Action Committee, noting that the OEEC proposals took heed of neither of the SPD’s conditions.\textsuperscript{841} The SPD was particularly concerned that a constant demand that they had supported in the postwar period, that West Germany be granted “an equality of rights” in all European integration initiatives, might be exploited by the West German government to create a nuclear weapons program if France decided to develop an atomic weapons arsenal. Mollet assured Ollenhauer that his government would limit its efforts to peaceful atomic energy,\textsuperscript{842} and thanked Ollenhauer for the SPD’s assiduous opposition to nuclear weapons. At the January 1956 meeting of Monnet’s Action Committee, which was held days before Guy Mollet was elected Prime Minister, opposition to the ban on nuclear weapons emerged from Christian Democrats, French Radicals, and others in the Action Committee. Together Mollet and Ollenhauer, in alliance with Monnet, defeated efforts to water down or eliminate a ban on nuclear weapons. The ban was then reiterated in the Committee’s public resolution.\textsuperscript{843}

The next month, though, Mollet found himself leading a coalitional government that included a number of prominent politicians who had expressed their “reservations” about the ban within the Action Committee. Though he and his party formally opposed a French nuclear arms program, his position faced an overwhelming coalition of political and administrative opponents.\textsuperscript{844} The French nuclear weapons program, launched under Pierre Mendès-France’s

\textsuperscript{840} Hans Furler, “Notizen,” in Wilkens, \textit{Interessen Verbinden}, 403-05; Weilemann, \textit{op cit.}, 76.

\textsuperscript{841} Protokoll der konstituierenden Sitzung des Ausschusses für Fragen der Atomenergie beim Parteivorstand der SPD, 5 December 1955, 1/HWAA83, AdsD.

\textsuperscript{842} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{843} Comité d’action pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe: Session des 17 et 18 janvier 1956, Résolution, 1/HWAA83, AdsD. This transnational political standoff emerged as well within the Common Assembly of the ECSC, where the Socialist faction proposed a resolution against the construction of atomic weapons. Genosse Selbmann, Wissenschaftl. Assistent An die sozialdemokratische Mitglieder des Arbeitskreises I, des Atomausschusses, der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, der Gemeinsame Versammlung der Montanunion Oktober 1 1956, Auftrag des Arbeitskreises angefertigten Bericht über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Verhandlungen über die Bildung einer europäische Atomenergiegemeinschaft, 30 September 1956, HWAA/1607, AdsD.

\textsuperscript{844} The SFIO congress in June 1956 passed a resolution demanding “for a long period an exclusively pacifist character for the European atomic industry.” OURS.
government in fall 1954, was continuously making progress and promised to produce a nuclear weapon within a few years.\textsuperscript{845} The French military, the Atomic Commission, and, more surprisingly, the Socialist Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, all favored an atomic weapon to strengthen France’s geopolitical position.\textsuperscript{846} Pineau argued that France should give up its program only if the world’s nuclear powers agreed to multilateral disarmament proposals being pursued by Socialist Jules Moch at the U.N.\textsuperscript{847} Most crucial of all was the insistence of centrist ministers within the coalition, including Defense Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, and Félix Gaillard and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, who each threatened to bring down the government if Mollet hit the brakes on the weapons program.

The impasse continued until summer 1956 as Mollet continued to resist making a French nuclear weapons’ exception a demand in the negotiations for Euratom. However, the math in the National Assembly was clear. There was no majority for Euratom, let alone for a common market, if Mollet insisted on abandoning the nuclear weapons program. Eager for a foreign policy success as the violence in Algeria accelerated, Monnet relented.\textsuperscript{848} He accepted a compromise worked out by Pineau and Spaak that the French government agree not to test a bomb for a trial period of four to five years, but reserve for itself the decision to build and deploy a bomb thereafter.\textsuperscript{849} On 11 July, Mollet announced the moratorium to the French National Assembly. He gutted much of the substance of Euratom in order to ensure the Assembly’s support in principle for the Euratom treaty under negotiation. The French government would


\textsuperscript{846} Weilemann, \textit{op cit.}, 103-104.


\textsuperscript{848} Jean Delmas writes that Guy Mollet revised his position on 25 June. He then writes, oddly, that the Suez Crisis gave the final impetus to Mollet’s decision. Delmas in Di Nolfo, \textit{Power in Europe II}, ed., 242. However, Mollet presented his new proposal to the National Assembly for debate from 5 to 11 July, weeks before Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s surprise announcement that Egypt would nationalize the Suez Canal on 26 July. It would be more accurate to say that Nasser’s announcement probably helped to cement Mollet’s new position. Berstein writes that Mollet “pursued the policy of his predecessors, against his party’s wishes.” Serge Berstein, “The Perception of French Power by the Political Forces,” in Di Nolfo, ed., \textit{Power in Europe II}, 247-48. This statement is true, but only after June 1956. It is also important to point out that there is little evidence at that time that Mollet’s convictions had changed, though they likely did in November 1956, following the French government’s geopolitical isolation and sense of abandonment following the failure of the Suez invasion.

\textsuperscript{849} For Pineau’s efforts to achieve a compromise, see René Dabernat, “La querelle de l’Euratom risque de réveiller les passions de la C.E.D. Le gouvernement est divisé sur la fabrication d’armes thermo-nucléaires,” \textit{Paris Presse}, 21 March 1956. Spaak initially suggested such a solution in February, and after a period of hesitation, Pineau stated at a conference in Venice presided by Spaak that he would seek a compromise along these lines. Weilemann, \textit{op cit.}, 105-06.
continue military research during the moratorium, and would assign only a limited amount of its atomic budget and scientific resources to Euratom, thereby ensuring a parallel weapons program. The National Assembly massively approved the Socialist resolution.

The SPD leadership was distraught and disappointed, but its reaction was relatively muted, especially when compared to its past rhetoric concerning the intentions of the French government in the European integration process. Public reports of the internal French divisions had no doubt already caught the attention of the SPD, and a document from September 1956 demonstrates that the SPD had knowledge of much of the internal political dynamics within Mollet’s government. Wehner lamented in a memorandum that, “Guy Mollet had sacrificed the central core of the Committee’s resolution on Euratom” and, by doing so, “he had endangered the whole raison d’être of the Committee.” He went on to state that now, “The SPD would have to explain why it had endorsed the January resolution [of Monnet’s committee to support Euratom] and how this resolution had been thwarted” as well as “contend with the argument that Germany was being discriminated against.” The latter was a real concern because the German government had made clear in the negotiations that it reserved the right to create a nuclear weapons program if France did so. In fact, by September, Adenauer was actively seeking to launch a German nuclear program. Nonetheless, the SPD continued to actively support Euratom within Monnet’s Committee and within German domestic politics.

Historians have pointed to the SPD’s enthusiasm for the possibilities of atomic energy, and a move to pragmatic politics as “proof positive that the party had lost all taste for ‘opposition’ on European matters.” The latter claim is a bit overstated, as the internal debates on the Treaties of Rome would reveal. In general, these claims, while plausible, are speculative. A sense of fatalism and the presence of a French Socialist at the helm of government in France no doubt helped quell agitation within the SPD. The SPD was acutely aware of the precarious situation facing the SFIO-led government and, in the summer of 1956, it feared that its potential

851 Genosse Selbmann, Wissenschaftl. Assistant An die sozialdemokratische Mitglieder des Arbeitskreises I, des Atomausschusses, der Beratenden Versammlung des Europarates, der Gemeinsame Versammlung der Montanunion Oktober 1 1956, Auftrag des Arbeitskreises angefertigten Bericht über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Verhandlungen über die Bildung einer europäische Atomenergiegemeinschaft, written 30 September 1956. HWAA/1607 AdsD.
854 Ibid., 194; Paterson, op cit., 126.
fall portended ominous consequences for democratic stability in France.\textsuperscript{855} Ollenhauer privately summed up the SPD’s reaction in September 1956: “Mollet’s collapse [on Euratom] has made our participation much more difficult but we should continue to try to make the best of it.”\textsuperscript{856} Wilkens errs therefore in his claim that, “It was in effect the Euratom project and not a certain abstract idea of European integration with the perspective of installing a Common European market that incited the German SPD to pronounce itself in favor of the Treaties of Rome in July 1957.”\textsuperscript{857} The source of the SPD’s decision to support the common market in 1957 must be sought elsewhere.

6.3 FREE-TRADE SOCIALISM: SFIO-SPD CONCEPTIONS OF LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC LIBERALISM

This section seeks to explain why the SPD voted to ratify the Treaty instituting the European Economic Community (EEC) after having vigorously opposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Defense Community (EDC). I disagree with scholars who argue that, “it was unmistakable that the party had experienced a conversion.”\textsuperscript{858} In turn, this chapter analyzes why Prime Minister Mollet gave the green light for a European common market despite a wide-reaching perception in French political and economic circles that the French economy was incapable of successfully competing with West Germany.

Neither French Socialists nor German Social Democrats viewed trade liberalization and economic liberalism as synonymous. In fact, French Socialists were quite explicit that a dirigiste internal economy based on planning could exist quite harmoniously with a progressive removal of trade barriers.\textsuperscript{859} SPD official Rudolf Pass echoed the SFIO view, instructing SPD economics

\textsuperscript{855} It was only after the Suez Crisis and the emergence of an internal SFIO opposition that the SPD began to tentatively criticize Mollet’s government in late 1956.

\textsuperscript{856} Ollenhauer, 17-18 September 1956, PV 1956, AdsD.

\textsuperscript{857} Besides, by this time Euratom had been gutted of much of its substance (see above). The quote is from Andreas Wilkens, “Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer et la politique européenne de l’Allemagne fédérale—Convergence et discordances (1950-1957),” in Bossuat and Wilkens, eds., 201.

\textsuperscript{858} Hrbek, \textit{op cit.}, 257. Paterson writes that, “All that remained of the Schumacher legacy [on European integration] was a bitter distrust of the French on the part of some members.” Paterson, \textit{op cit.}, 127. This claim is misleading because Schumacher embraced the pro-liberalization stance of his party’s economics experts.

experts to make a clear distinction between “liberalization,” which the party supported, and “liberalism,” which it rejected. The party report he distributed with his letter stated that, “Liberalization is a technique for import policy,” rather than a program for domestic economic policy.860 “Liberalism,” on the other hand, was represented as Economic Minister Ludwig Erhard’s efforts to “lift controls” against the SPD’s policy of “planning and steering.” Baade also asserted that, “the liberalization of trade does not mean a recognition of liberalism.” Foreshadowing SPD support for a European common market, he argued that, “Liberalization is in reality an internal European preference system.”861 At a time of acute dollar shortage among all Western European states, Baade linked West Germany’s recovery to increased trade with the Marshall Plan states and noted that increased trade with them would save Germany from having to spend precious dollar reserves to purchase U.S. goods.

Free trade was not a doctrinal issue for socialists.862 Rather, the lessons of history and the European continent’s economic and political eclipse by the gargantuan United States and Soviet Union made Socialists believe that a liberalization of European trade was an economic imperative. SFIO and SPD leaders pointed to the large internal market of the United States as the source of the success of the U.S. economy because it permitted “a division and specialization of labor which are essential factors” for “mass production.”863 The SFIO’s most fervent supporter of trade liberalization, André Philip, denounced the “excessive protectionism” of the interwar period as responsible for “an inevitable decline in the standard of living” and “generalized misery.” “The result,” according to Pineau, at the time President of the National Assembly’s Finance Committee, “is an outmoded [industry] and outdated equipment.”864 SFIO speakers in the initial postwar period constantly lambasted the poverty of the “France alone” slogan and, like their SPD counterparts, insisted that the French economy required a steady stream of imports in

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860 Pass to members of the WVA, 6 October 1950, GK 188, AdsD.
861 Protokoll zur Tagung des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses beim Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands am 17.4.50, BG 158, AdsD.
862 In a response to a questionnaire of the Socialist International, the SPD replied that, “The Party is neither dogmatically inclined to total free trade nor towards protectionism (or other forms of import restrictions). From our newly formed Action Program, there is a demand for the increase in social production through a rise in productivity that logically leads to an approval of an international division of labor. Therefore the party tends fundamentally towards the side of free trade. That does not exclude that, especially from the point of view of securing jobs, that party from time to time approves protective measures for a more or less limited time.” FRAGEBODEN Die Technik der staatlichen Wirtschaftsplanung Direkte Kontrollen, Karl Schiller 72, BaK.
863 Gouin, 17 November 1953, JO, 5222; Pass to members of the WVA, 6 October 1950, GK 188, AdsD; Deist letter to Heinrich Tröger, 8 January 1957, HD 42, AdsD.
864 Pineau, 1 August 1946, JO, 2908.
order to prosper.\textsuperscript{865} The German trade unions shared this economic vision, though it received markedly less enthusiasm within the \textit{Force Ouvrière} and other French unions.\textsuperscript{866}

The solution for the French Socialist Party was to prepare the French economy for competition by increasing productivity and lifting tariffs that shielded marginal businesses at the expense of economic growth.\textsuperscript{867} Philip, the chief French negotiator for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, succeeded in creating the legal basis for the later European Economic Community by inserting a clause into the GATT treaty that permitted regional customs unions or free trade zones.\textsuperscript{868} Such a regional customs union would represent part of Europe’s effort to decrease its reliance on imports from the United States, which continued to exacerbate Western Europe’s balance of payments crisis with the dollar zone.\textsuperscript{869} The economic theories of Jacques Levy-Jacquemin, who argued that Europe faced a structural, rather than temporary, trade crisis with the USA, encouraged French Socialist economic thinkers to privilege a European, rather than global, framework for trade liberalization.\textsuperscript{870} This did not mean that French Socialists favored lowering tariffs in all cases.\textsuperscript{871} All factions of the party supported an “organization of markets” to prevent the “anarchic character” of unbridled trade liberalization and some elements of the party were particularly concerned that French businesses

\textsuperscript{865} Gorse as \textit{rapporteur} for the Blum-Byrnes accord, 1 August 1946, \textit{JO}, 2875; Gouin, \textit{JO}, 2905.

\textsuperscript{866} Ernst-Dieter Köpper, \textit{Gewerkschaften und Aussenpolitik: Die Stellung der westdeutschen Gewerkschaften zur wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Integration der Bundesrepublik in die Europäische Gemeinschaft und in die NATO} (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus-Verlag, 1982), 105-06.


would not be able to successfully compete against their European, and in particular, German neighbors.\textsuperscript{872}

The first serious proposals for French inclusion in a customs union came in discussions with Italy in 1947-48, which were later extended to include the Benelux countries in 1949. As the Dutch government made the inclusion of West Germany a condition of any Western European customs union in 1949, the French government scuttled negotiations with its Italian and Benelux partners. Philip, who favored Germany’s inclusion against opponents within his own party, went so far as to call the moribund custom union proposals “a liberal Europe that carries many dangers for the near future.”\textsuperscript{873} German Social Democrats, on the other hand, expressed enthusiasm in 1949 at the idea that a customs union, often referred to as “Fritalux,” might be expanded into an “Alfritalux” with the inclusion of Germany (\textit{Allemagne}).\textsuperscript{874} Demands to include West Germany became the primary obstacle to the creation of a European customs union.

German competition appeared formidable indeed. After the French and German governments negotiated a series of short-term trade deals in 1950-53, Germany became France’s largest trading partner. This trade, however, took an ominous allure as German exports to France drastically outstripped French exports to West Germany in the early 1950s. This imbalance further exacerbated a French trade deficit that helped throw France into the mercy of the European Payments Union, a multilateral clearing house set up in 1949, just shortly after West Germany began to show export surpluses and re-embark on trade liberalization.\textsuperscript{875} The West German economy grew an average of 8.6\% per year from 1950 to 1960. Although the French economy also showed impressive growth, it lagged considerably behind West Germany with an average of 4.6\% growth.\textsuperscript{876} French trade deficits appeared chronic, and so successive French

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Leenhardt and Lacoste to the Groupe parlementaire socialiste (GPS), 10 November 1949, Archive d’histoire contemporaine (AHC), Sciences-po; Leenhardt, 24 November 1949, \textit{JO}, 6215-17; Tanguy-Prigent, 1 December 1949 to the GPS, AHC.
\item Undated document from 1949, AHC.
\item Kreyssig, 15 November 1949, “Kontinentaleuropa im Werden,” GK 23, AdsD.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
governments re-imposed restrictions on trade, culminating in the “super tariff” of March 1954.\textsuperscript{877} As the West German government and others clamored for trade liberalization in the early 1950s, all serious proposals to advance European integration by this means met the implacable resistance of French governments. Nonetheless, French policymakers were well aware that their export growth was increasing at a far greater rate with Western Europe than with any other part of the world, including with France’s overseas territories, and that, to protect this trade, it might be necessary to placate its neighbors’ wishes to avoid the creation of a preferential European trading bloc that excluded France.\textsuperscript{878}

6.4 THE SPD APPROACH TO TRADE LIBERALIZATION: CONTINUITY AND PARTY TRADITIONS

I argue that the SPD leadership and its economic experts remained consistent in their support for the principle of lowering or eliminating tariffs in the 1950s because they believed that an expanded single market was the best means of accomplishing the party’s economic goals of full employment and a higher standard of living. In addition, they viewed multilateral negotiation in a European organization, whether it be supranational or intergovernmental, as the best means of assuring reciprocity in European trade agreements. The SPD did not need to be converted to the wisdom of trade liberalization in 1957. The principal economic issue debated within the party concerning the EEC was whether it would lower trade barriers not only within the Community, which was assured, but outside of it as well. Despite the possibility of agricultural tariffs and barriers against the British-initiated Free Trade Area, in the end SPD economic experts determined that the EEC was the only means available at the time to attain any extensive form of trade liberalization. The SPD’s policy in favor of lowering or eliminating tariffs contributed in large measure to the party’s vote to ratify the EEC.

SPD leaders presented their views through the prism of a party narrative that had its origins in the critiques that SPD theorists had constructed back in the \textit{Kaiserreich} period. Bitterly divided on party tactics as well as on strategy, the competing factions within the SPD before the

\textsuperscript{878} Wendy Asbeek Brusse, \textit{Tariffs, Trade and European Integration 1947-1957} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 162.
First World War agreed on at least one thing: protectionism was a form of economic nationalism that facilitated monopolization and contributed to the imperialist tensions between the European powers. A year into the First World War, the SPD formulated and publicized a set of “war aims” designed to pressure the German government to abandon visions of a punitive peace in favor of a Wilsonian-style settlement. The SPD demands for a postwar order make clear their analysis of what had led to war: in addition to international mediation and a peace free of annexation, the SPD demanded an “open door” in international economic relations, including the adoption of “most-favored-nation” trade clauses within the peace treaty, a comprehensive removal of tariffs and restrictions on transport, and “freedom on the seas.” Their demands were largely ignored within the domestic politics of an Imperial German government at war; their vision was stymied again after the war by the victorious Allied powers. Nonetheless, the SPD consistently put forth trade liberalization as a principal means of attaining a peaceful international order. The party went to so far as to call for the member states of the League of Nation to delegate to the international organization the authority to approve or refuse tariffs enacted at the national level, in effect calling for a supranational regime to regulate inter-state trade.879 As the 1929 New York stock market crash turned into a world-wide economic depression, the SPD decried the wave of tariff barriers and trade restrictions that marked the national governments’ responses to the Depression on both sides of the Atlantic. Its 1931 party congress resolution re-asserted the economic vision of peace the party had pursued during and after the war:

The German economy is very closely intermeshed with the world economy, which has become completely disorganized due to the war, the peace and reparations treaties, the armaments nonsense, economic protectionism, and a lacking will of the peoples for peaceful cooperation. Therefore there is a necessity for a policy to secure peace, international disarmament, a cancellation or reduction [the term Streichung is ambiguous, its closest translation is “striking”] of the international war debts and reparations, the removal of all obstacles to an international exchange of goods, the elimination of tariff walls, the conclusion of long-term trade agreements, an international regulation of capital flows, and measures against capital- and tax-flight.880

In his travels through Germany in 1945-48 (though he was not initially permitted in the French or Soviet zones), Schumacher time and again re-asserted the validity of the SPD’s traditional narratives about protectionism and trade liberalization. He argued that the concentrated power of

880 Ibid., 80-81.
the industrial and Junker agricultural classes were responsible for the ascent of German militarism in the late nineteenth century. Presenting a partisan version of the Sonderweg, he assigned the lion’s share of the blame to a bourgeoisie that had not fulfilled its historic task of political liberalism and economic liberalization after the defeat of the Frankfurt Assembly in 1848, but had instead entered into alliance with the Junker class in the Iron-Rye Pact, a pact that marked Germany’s move towards protectionism in 1879. This narrative had a special significance for SPD policy on tariffs. As Schumacher told a crowd in October 1946, “If one searches for the strongest expression of modern imperialism in Germany...then one must consider the years that followed the [erection of] agricultural protective tariffs [in 1879] as the true birth of German misfortune.”

This analysis of the role of high tariffs for the concentration of power among reactionary classes combined with a belief among a number of Social Democratic leaders that an economic space larger than the European nation-state was necessary to assure optimal economic growth. This view, prevalent among leading European politicians of various political affiliations, seemed to mark the resurgence of support for trade liberalization in Europe as an answer to the marginalization of western and central European power that resulted from the Second World War, and to the autarkic economic doctrines of Nazism and Soviet Communism. Erik Nölting, a leader on the left-wing of SPD economic thinkers, called for a United States of Europe in 1947, with the purpose of facilitating increased production and a more specialized division of labor within a larger economic space. Fritz Erler, who was to become one of the most important SPD politicians of the 1950s, gave a speech in August 1949 in which he argued that modern transportation made small states economically anachronistic. On the eve of the creation of a federal West Germany, Erler supported the erection of a European Bundesstaat that would follow the model of the Zollverein (the customs union that preceded the founding of the German state), thereby instituting a framework for economic integration that would lead inevitably, in his view, to a political union. He envisaged a customs union and a common currency, though he saw

882 “Das deutsche Problem,” Ansprache des Prof. Dr. E. Nölting an die Verwaltungen der dem N.V.V. angeschlossenen Fachverbände am 12. November 1947, Eric Nölting (EN) 37, AdsD.
this as a long-term project predicated on first attaining a relatively equal standard of living between the European states.883

Much of the basis for national SPD economic policy was determined within a special committee under the party’s Central Committee: the Wirtschaftspolitische Ausschuss (WPA) or Political-Economic Committee. The WPA brought together important and powerful figures of postwar SPD politics. Its membership shifted over time but included, among others: WPA Chair Hermann Veit, the SPD vice president of the Bundestag Economic committee; Fritz Baade, Director of the Institute for World Economics in Kiel; Willy Birkelbach, chair of the SPD Bundestag faction from 1956-1964; Heinrich Deist, Veit’s successor as WPA chair and leading SPD economic expert from 1957 to his death in 1964; Hellmut Kalbitzer, former trade unionist and SPD representative to the Council of Europe; Gerhard Kreyssig, economics editor for the Süddeutsche Zeitung; Georg Kurlbaum, Veit’s successor as vice president of the Bundestag Economic Committee; Erik Nólting, Economic Minister for North-Rhine-Westphalia; Karl Schiller, Senator in the Hamburg Land and later Minister for Economics and Finance under Willy Brandt’s government; Joachim Schöne, another of Veit’s successors as vice president of the Bundestag Economic committee and a coal expert; and Gerhard Weisser, Finance Minister for North-Rhine-Westphalia and professor in Cologne. Charged with presenting recommendations on economic policy to the party’s Central Committee and giving expert advice to the Bundestag delegation, the range and influence of the WPA’s work rose steadily in the period leading up to the Treaties of Rome. The purpose of the inaugural meeting was to debate what would be the foundations of the party’s economic policy while in opposition. At a time when efforts for European economic integration in the OEEC had ground to a halt, it is striking just how important the SPD economic experts considered efforts for European economic cooperation.884

There was a widespread consensus in the committee in support of trade liberalization. The four goals that the committee laid out for SPD policy for the legislative session were: liberalization of trade; (an increase in) foreign trade; socialization; and Mitbestimmung (codetermination in industry). Members considered closer European economic cooperation to be essential for the realization of Social Democratic policy. One member argued that the larger the

883 Erler, “Bundesstaat Europa,” 24 August 1949, FE 6, AdsD.
884 Protokoll zur Tagung des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses beim Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands am 25. und 26. November 1949, EN 27, AdsD.

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economic area, the greater the possibilities for a state-directed economy; another pushed for a free trade policy that would facilitate Germany’s entrance into a common European economic program. While a debate ensued about what name to assign the SPD’s economic vision, the liberalization of foreign trade provoked no controversy at the meeting. The only indication of the debate that would break out within the committee in 1950-51 during the balance of payments crisis was one member’s comment that, though the party should maintain freedom of consumption and not erect price controls, state aid might be necessary to promote exports. In a speech a month later, Carlo Schmid argued that European integration could proceed by sectors and he called for a European union with sovereignty over national tariffs [Zollhoheit].885

When the WPA convened on 24 January 1950, Schumacher followed a criticism of the Council of Europe’s shortcomings with the assertion that Europe should assign itself four tasks: the creation of a common currency; a united dollar pool; a general agreement to lower tariffs; and a policy for a European division of labor.886 The party congress of May 1950 confirmed this policy. An amendment to the party program, accepted by the delegates, firmly set SPD tariff policy.887 It stated that though liberalization of foreign trade was a welcome goal, it must be conditional upon the reciprocity of the trading partners and a long-term amelioration of Germany’s trade deficit.

As socialist parties continued to seek a seemingly elusive consensus on economic and European integration issues, Ollenhauer went to the 13 September COMISCO (Socialist executive group) meeting armed with a technical report on the situation of the German economy and European trade. This report stated that Germany needed more imports to ensure economic recovery, but that a balance of payments would be impossible over the long term if restrictions on German industry remained in force.888 The report made clear that the SPD was more liberal in its trade policy than the German government, which it accused of protecting unnamed special interests (almost certainly the agricultural sector). It went on to state that the SPD wanted to lower tariffs with any country willing to reciprocate and would welcome groups of European Recovery Program (ERP) countries agreeing to lower or eliminate tariffs on whole sectors of

885 Referat Schmids 1949, Carlo Schmid 470, AdsD.
886 Bundesfraktion 1, AdsD.
887 SPD Congress 1950, 273-274, AdsD.
goods. West Germany would eliminate agricultural tariffs if nations like France would do the same for their industrial tariffs. The goal was to prepare Western Europe for a customs union.

Though there were already signs of the economic expansion to come, low standards of living for most Germans remained the norm when Konrad Adenauer carried the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) to victory in the September 1949 elections. A marked increase in food consumption in 1949, so important for Germans eager to physically and psychologically escape the scars of the hungry winters that had come before, itself worsened the trade situation because it was largely built on increased imports.\(^{889}\) In 1950, West Germany began to experience a trade deficit with its European neighbors as well. The resulting balance of payments crises of 1950-1951 exposed divisions within the SPD’s team of economic experts concerning the wisdom of immediate trade liberalization.

However, despite the Social Democrats’ vehement denunciation of Erhard’s liberalization programs in the context of worsening trade deficits, the official SPD position on the merits of European economic integration remained the same as before the payments crisis. This was evident when WPA Chairman Veit prepared the SPD’s report for an upcoming Socialist International meeting. Dated 10 December 1951, two days after Nölting publicly denounced the German government’s liberalization plan, Veit stated that though the SPD firmly opposed West Germany’s remilitarization and its inclusion in a supranational military body, the party remained committed to “the building of a united European economic region, the removal of customs and different currencies, the free movement of labor and capital, a division of labor and specialization in a large internal trade market that would multiply the economic power of Western Europe, markedly increase real income, and raise workers’ standard of living.”\(^{890}\) The 1952 SPD congress approved a program that made these demands party policy, a result that the 1954 congress confirmed.\(^{891}\)

The shock and disappointment of the SPD’s 1953 loss to Adenauer’s CDU unleashed a battle between liberal-leaning SPD leaders and traditionalists within the party that was only resolved years later by the clear victory of the liberals in the programmatic renovation contained

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in the 1959 Bad Godesberg program. However, one should bear in mind that support for the principle of liberalization of trade was in place well before 1953, let alone 1959, and was not disputed after the payments crisis ended. In 1954, the SPD faction was pressing the government for an across-the-board reduction in tariffs of at least 20%; by 1957 the party had increased this demand to 40% and proposed empowering the Economic Minister to make further reductions without requiring Bundestag approval. During the negotiations for the Treaties of Rome, SPD economic experts held tariffs responsible for high prices for consumers and hoped to raise living standards by permitting an influx of consumer goods. The SPD noted in a response to the Socialist International in 1955 that its policy on trade liberalization had not changed since 1945. Given this evidence of the SPD’s long-standing position on trade liberalization, it is time that historians recognize the importance of the SPD’s traditions and party narratives on trade liberalization for the position the SPD developed on the common market. There was no “conversion” in SPD policy; rather, the party’s policy represented a long-held position.

For this reason, Wehner warmly greeted the Messina Resolution for a European common market in the name of the Socialist Group of the ECSC Common Assembly on 24 June 1955. Erler called Spaak’s presentation of the Messina Resolution “excellent,” and praised it for showing how and why Europe must move to a common market. Schöne peppered Spaak with a series of technical questions at a 19 December 1955 working group meeting of the ECSC Common Assembly, but the tone of his comments and questions suggest that he was quite warm to Spaak’s proposals. The next day, Herbert Wehner wrote Ollenhauer about a meeting with Spaak. He stated that the SPD must look into the political and economic consequences of Spaak’s proposals and move quickly to agree on a party position. He recommended that Ollenhauer write Spaak to clarify certain aspects of the resolution and that the SPD make a public statement. Though cautious and conditioning its support on what proposals would ultimately emerge, it is clear that the SPD was favorably inclined to support European economic
liberalization initiatives. These proposals were, after all, much more in line with what the party had envisaged in 1949 to early 1950 (and earlier) than the ECSC and EDC proposals had been.

6.5 SOCIALIST DEMANDS FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION IN A EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

From the outset, French Socialists made trade liberalization conditional upon a series of social demands that took the term “social harmonization” in contemporary parlance. French Socialists shared the common perception in France that French labor costs were considerably higher than those in Germany and Italy, a situation that could lead to “social dumping” and a race to the bottom for wages within a common market. French Socialist speakers in 1949 called for a “special system of unemployment insurance,” a “European fund for the reconversion [of marginal businesses] and investment,” and a “unification of taxation, salary legislation, and social security legislation” in order to create “a sort of equality of the...operating costs [prix de revient]” among the participating nations.

Demands for social harmonization bridged the gap between those Socialists who were optimistic about France’s ability to compete in a customs union and those who feared social displacement and industrial damage. French Socialists denounced their government for not being more aggressive in the pursuit of social harmonization during negotiations for a customs union with the Benelux countries and Italy in the late 1940s, as well as in discussions on trade liberalization within the OEEC.

This position found expression in the approach of Mollet’s government to negotiations for the creation of a European common market. First, the French administration, business associations, and many leading politicians of other parties generally shared the SFIO’s demand for social harmonization out of a fear about the prospects of French businesses within a European economic community.

This consensus within French politics was reflected in the French government’s initial reaction to the Messina resolution, which proposed a common

898 Blum wrote that, “I’ve arrived precisely at this conclusion that customs barriers become legitimate to the extent that they constitute, from one country to another, a compensation between difference working conditions...” L’Oeuvre, op cit., 343.
899 Philip, 6 July 1948, JO, 4350-51; and Leenhardt, 24 November 1949, JO, 6216.
900 See the statements of pessimists like Leenhardt and Tanguy-Prigent, GPS, 1 December 1949, AHC.
901 Pineau and Leenhardt, 6 August 1954, JO, 3927, 3933.
902 Such demands were taken up by the French government as early as 1950. Bossuat, La France, l’aide américaine, op cit., 691, 732-33.
market in 1955. French demands increased over the course of 1955. Having begun with a demand for the extension of French legislation guaranteeing equal salaries for male and female workers, by September 1955, the French government insisted that the labor costs of France’s partners be raised to French levels simultaneously or prior to a reduction of internal common market tariffs. 903

Mollet’s expensive determination to pursue an active social domestic policy to guarantee healthcare and social security for seniors, add a third paid vacation week for French workers, and create a guaranteed annual minimum wage while escalating the French military effort in Algeria made the pursuit of social harmonization on the European level appear all the more imperative. 904 As negotiations entered a critical phase in fall 1956, the French delegation tabled far-reaching demands for social harmonization: in addition to equal wages for men and women, the French team demanded that its partners adopt France’s generous paid vacation system, create a European fund for investment, the reconversion of businesses and the retraining of displaced workers, and pay overtime for all labor above 40 hours per week, in effect instituting a 40-hour European work week. 905 A number of historians have questioned the sincerity of the Mollet government’s demands, yet they were clearly in line with the SFIO’s long-standing policy in this field. 906 The German government split over how far its negotiators should go to accommodate the far-reaching French demands, with Erhard insisting that the German negotiators refuse to

904 The Socialist Party’s social policy adopted by Mollet’s government was set forth at its 1955 party congress. 43ème Congrès national Asnières 30 Juin-3 Juillet 1955 PROJET de PROGRAMME ÉCONOMIQUE et SOCIAL présenté par la COMMISSION NATIONALE D’ÉTUDES (Section AFFAIRES ÉCONOMIQUES), AGM 12, OURS.
905 Mollet marked “Important” on the margins of an internal memorandum discussing the demand to create a European Investment Bank. NOTE OBJET: État Actual des négociations sur le Traité du Marché Commun, AGM 11 OURS; Mahant, *op cit.*, 79-80.
906 For skepticism as to the sincerity of demands for social harmonization, see Laurent Warlouzet, *Le choix de la CEE par la France: L’Europe économique en débat de Mendès France à de Gaulle (1955-1969)* (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2011), 39-42; and Guido Thiemeyer, *Vom “Pool Vert” zur Europäischen Integration, Kalter Krieg, und die Anfänge der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik 1950-1957* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 176. Warlouzet demonstrates, though, that studies within the Secretariat of Economic Affairs concluded in May 1956 that French prices were 10% higher on average than those within Germany. He and others argue that the French government could have resolved this issue by devaluing the franc vis-à-vis the Mark, but this argument ignores the great priority Mollet placed on avoiding devaluation during the entire length of his premiership. This also had precedence within the SFIO tradition, as Blum’s government worked hard as well to avoid devaluation. Mahant, on the other hand, recognizes this situation. Mahant, *op cit.*, 43-44. Lise Rye Svartvatn also cites devaluation, in addition to a need to gain a majority in the Assembly by protecting French industry, to argue that the French government’s pursuit of social harmonization was sincere. Lise Rye Svartvatn, “In Quest of Time, Protection and Approval: France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic Community, 1955-1956,” *Journal of European Integration History* 8, 1, (2002): 85-102.
compromise on social policy. The SPD and trade unions, in line with the consensus that they had built with the SFIO in the ECSC, as described in the preceding chapter, aligned themselves with SFIO demands for social harmonization because they believed that this would lead to higher wages for German workers. Willi Birkelbach represented an exception to this Socialist consensus, as he channeled the German business community’s fears that higher social costs could hamper German competitiveness.

At their meeting on 6 November, Mollet and Adenauer each displayed a willingness to compromise on social harmonization that broke the long-jam in the negotiations. Historians generally present Mollet as having made the more far-reaching sacrifices because he dropped the demand for equal social charges and allowed it to be replaced by a vague appeal that all nations pursue higher living standards as a matter of policy. In exchange, Adenauer confirmed Germany’s agreement to harmonize vacation times and to institute equal wages for men and women, which an internal French memo had considered the “essence of the causes of disparity.” The forty-hour week fell by the wayside. In its place the French government received safeguards that would allow it to continue to implement certain discriminatory measures against countries that did not adopt overtime pay at French levels. The less controversial French proposals for a re-adaptation and social investment fund also received satisfaction in the compromise.

6.6 THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL WILL AND SFIO PARTY TRADITIONS ON THE TREATIES OF ROME

Mollet’s readiness in November 1956 to compromise on core social objectives indicates that political will was a decisive element in the successful conclusion of the negotiations for a

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907 Mahant, op cit., 87; Rhenisch, op cit., 149-53.
909 For German Economic Minister Erhard’s campaign against this agreement, see Segers, op cit., 288. The contours for the agreement on social issues were drawn up by advisers (Karl Carstens and Robert Marjolin) under the direction of the two leaders. See Thiemeyer, op cit., 218, 250.
910 Rhenisch, op cit., 155, 183; Mahant, op cit., 102-105, 130. Segers, on the other hand, presents Adenauer as having made far-reaching concessions at the November meeting. Segers, op cit., 272.
911 “Problèmes relatifs aux charges salariales,” AGM 11, OURS; See also the preliminary work done by Foreign Ministers Pineau and von Brentano in the October 1956 negotiations and the impasse reached over the issue of the 40-hour week, op cit., 261-63; Thiemeyer, op cit., 218.
912 Warlouzet, op cit., 89-90.
European economic community. Historians have increasingly recognized the crucial importance of Mollet and his foreign minister, Christian Pineau, first, in giving impetus to the stalled negotiations in September 1956, and second, in intervening at decisive moments to break the intransigence of certain French positions crafted within the higher echelons of the Foreign and Economic ministries.913 Pineau goes so far as to retrospectively call the signing of the Treaties of Rome “a personal victory” for Guy Mollet.914 French President René Coty’s decision to designate Guy Mollet, rather than fellow Front républicain leader Pierre Mendès-France, as prime minister was a direct consequence of Mollet’s reputation for favoring European integration, a reputation Mollet did much to cultivate during the 1955 election. Mollet campaigned in support of European initiatives by placing the policy within SFIO tradition by referring back to Blum’s policy of reconciliation on the German question. Though the SFIO was by no means united in support of a common market when Mollet became prime minister, his influence sufficed to overcome the reticence of Socialist Economic Minister Paul Ramadier, who channeled his ministry’s fear that France could not compete within a liberalized market.

On New Year’s Eve, nearly a year into his government’s tenure, Mollet spoke on television and claimed that “my last year’s resolution” was to “liquidate all Franco-German misunderstanding.”915 Though this claim was made in retrospect, it accords well with his government’s actions over the course of 1956, which began with a determined and successful effort to resolve the Saar issue by returning the territory to German control in return for guaranteed exports of Saar coal and other economic guarantees. Mollet’s efforts were crowned in the November 1956 meeting with Adenauer. The Prime Minister and his team succeeded in building on the party’s traditional support for European integration. A poll taken at the end of 1957 reveals that effective support for European integration had filtered through all levels of the party: 77% of SFIO voters were in favor (compared to a 70% average within France) and only 11% were opposed.916

914 *Le grand pari*, *op cit.*, 278.
915 *SCHEMA* de déclaration télévisée de M. Guy MOLLET, Président du Conseil, à la National Broadcasting Corporation, 31 December 1956, AGM 69, AdsD.
In addition, Mollet appointed a team of advisers outside the traditional French ministerial structure to allow him to exercise direct control over the negotiations at crucial moments. Alexandre Verret was tapped to lead an Inter-ministerial Committee on Issues of European Economic Cooperation that served as a virtual annex to the Prime Minister’s office.\textsuperscript{917} In January 1956, Mollet asked Radical leader Pierre Mendès-France if he would permit the appointment of an additional Radical deputy to Mollet’s cabinet. Mollet tapped Maurice Faure and charged him in summer 1956 with leading the French negotiating team on the common market.\textsuperscript{918} Mendès-France agreed to Mollet’s request, remarking that, “Now I understand” to Mollet, a comment reflecting Faure’s reputation as a proponent of European integration.\textsuperscript{919} Robert Marjolin, who became Pineau’s cabinet chief in May 1956, and Emile Noël, Mollet’s cabinet director, both supporters of the European project, rounded out the Mollet’s team of experts on European affairs.\textsuperscript{920} In addition, Mollet replaced powerful opponents of the common market within several leading French ministries, leading to the retirement of the secretary general of Foreign Affairs, René Massigli, and Economic Ministry expert Olivier Wormser.\textsuperscript{921} These personnel decisions created the conditions for Mollet’s government to overcome entrenched opposition to the common market within the principal French ministries. Verret, Marjolin, and Noël were able to use their direct line to Mollet to overcome obstructionism that seemed at times to be coming from all corners of the French bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{922}

Nonetheless, some historians have argued that there is little to no evidence of the government’s support for the European common market until summer 1956. That rapid progress on negotiations for the common market coincided with the dramatic geopolitical events of fall 1956 has led a number of historians to construct a causative link between the two developments.

\textsuperscript{917} Although the committee recommended a rejection of the customs union, it represented an effort to curtail ministerial opposition and centralize decision-making under the Prime Minister’s office, which facilitated the overcoming of entrenched opposition. Mahant, \textit{op cit.}, 78.

\textsuperscript{918} Thiemeyer considers Maurice Faure’s appointment to head the French negotiating team to have been “decisive” for the success of the negotiations. Thiemeyer, \textit{op cit.}, 206.

\textsuperscript{919} Faure in Serra, ed., 286-87.


Scholars have made a rather persuasive case that the geopolitical context of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt and the Soviet intervention in Hungary fueled Adenauer’s suspicion that the United States was not an ally to be trusted to defend long-term European interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The geopolitical context seems to have been an influential factor in the German government’s willing to compromise at key moments in the negotiations. Adenauer saw confirmation for his view in Eisenhower’s ultimatum that the French and British governments abandon their military operations in Egypt or face the prospect of Soviet retribution without U.S. assistance. No doubt Mollet deeply appreciated Adenauer’s decision to brave Soviet threats to bombard the French capital by coming to Paris on 6 November for a pre-planned meeting. Adenauer’s decision to demonstrate such solidarity in such a fraught climate was controversial within Germany. The SPD leadership objected to the timing of the visit because it feared German association with what appeared to be a neo-colonial endeavor.

Many scholars have hence concluded that Mollet’s determination to break the impasse in the negotiations was the result of geopolitical reasoning. Facing international opprobrium and isolation, so this argument goes, Mollet wrapped himself in Adenauer’s open embrace and sought to carve out a new venue for French power through an economic integration with France’s European neighbors so as to strengthen France’s international clout between the two blocs. Indeed this was the geopolitical line Mollet’s government came to adopt as it struggled to

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923 Segers, op cit., 273-85.
924 SPD leaders condemned Egyptian President Nasser’s decision to nationalize the canal but called for peaceful negotiations to resolve the impasse and reopen traffic at Suez. They condemned the French-British-Israeli invasion. Günther Markscheffel reports that Ollenhauer called Mollet by phone on the eve of the invasion to plead with him not to proceed. See Parlamentarischer Zwiegesprach Kiesinger und Erler, 8 October 1956, FE 12, AdsD; Gen. Ollenhauer Fraktionssitzung auf September 11.9.56, EO 125, AdsD; “Stärkt die Vereinten Nationen! Entschliessung PV 1956,” SPD-Pressedienst, 8 November 1956; “Interview mit Wehner,” 5 December 1956, 1/HWAA1065, AdsD; and Jean-Paul Cahn, Le Parti social-démocrate allemand, op cit., 286-89.
925 Mahant argues that, “the world geopolitical situation strongly influenced the negotiations, and indeed it is likely that without these geopolitical factors the treaties, and more especially the European Economic Community, would not have been created in 1957...” Mahant argues that “history rescued the negotiations.” Mahant, op cit., 102, 128. Küsters writes of the “decisive impact the Suez crisis of November 1956 would have on the success of the negotiations of the governments in Brussels.” Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Jean Monnet et les chanceliers allemands de Konrad Adenauer à Helmut Schmidt,” in Bossuat and Wilkens, eds., 206. Rosato also argues for a central role for geopolitics, though he then states that the Suez Crisis “strengthened a preexisting determination to establish a centralized West European entity.” Rosato, op cit., 121, 186. Thiemeyer sees the compromise emerging prior to Küster and Mahant in the weeks leading up to the meeting between Adenauer and Mollet. Like these scholars, though, he argues that, “only because of the world-political crisis of the summer 1956 did a wide-ranging German-French congruence of interests emerge which was necessary for a quick agreement and that made technical questions of detail appear secondary.” The “Suez crisis changed the political goals of the French regime on Europe” by reversing the priority accorded to Euratom and the customs union, with the former no longer having priority for the French government. Thiemeyer, op cit., 220-22.
hold onto French Algeria and to stand up to a U.S. government increasingly impatient with the
damage France’s colonial war was inflicting on the Western alliance within the “Third World,” a
concept that emerged in this period in the aftermath of the 1955 Bandung conference of Asian-
African states.926

Nonetheless, there is almost no evidence that this type of geopolitical reasoning had any
decisive influence on Mollet’s policy towards European integration. Geopolitical arguments are
compelling on their surface, yet their evidence relies almost entirely on conjecture. The only
evidence that I have found for this argument is a public message from Mollet in late October
1956, in which he said that he looked forward to resolving differences with Adenauer in their
upcoming meeting. He stated that, “Recent international developments, whether it be Suez or the
transformations in the satellite countries [meaning Hungary and Czechoslovakia], make all the
more evident the necessity of European construction,” adding that, “The Suez affair has made
manifest the insufficient cooperation of the policies of the European states.”927

Much of the scholarly controversy over the motivations of Guy Mollet’s government in
signing the Treaties of Rome revolves around differing depictions of Foreign Minister Christian
Pineau’s policy in spring 1956.928 It is true that in public Pineau was circumspect about the
proposed common market, a view that reflected the official government position.929 Also, it was
only after the successful debate on Euratom in July 1956 that the French government set concrete
objectives for its negotiations with its European partners, which lead to an acceleration of the
negotiations in September-October 1956. In statements at an academic conference on the EEC in
1986, Pineau expressly rejected what seemed at the time to be an emerging scholarly consensus
that Mollet’s government agreed to the EEC due to geopolitical considerations. Cutting to the
heart of a discipline whose epistemology rests on the collection and interpretation of primary
documents, Pineau warned historians to “mistrust” historical archives because at times they
conceal more than they reveal. Pineau gave an account that, shortly after he became Foreign

926 For a good analysis of these developments, see Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States, and the Algerian War
927 MESSAGE de M. Guy MOLLET, Président du Conseil aux Journées d’études de la Gauche Européenne
BORDEAUX 26./27./ Octobre 1956, AGM 69, OURS.
928 Segers writes that Pineau was “moderately pro-European.” Segers, op cit., 176. Orlow argues that, “Both in the
cabinet and the party Pineau supported the Common Market as enthusiastically as he had the EDC.” Dietrich Orlow,
Common Destiny: A Comparative History of the Dutch, French, and German Social Democratic Parties, 1945-1969
929 See for instance his comments to the April 1956 SFIO party congress, OURS; and to the Consultative Assembly
of the Council of Europe, Compte rendu officiel de la sixième séance mercredi, 18 avril 1956, CEAB 5/449/1, BaK.
Minister in February 1956, he approached Jean Monnet to help plan a strategy to achieve the ratification of the common market by the French National Assembly. He reported that Monnet rejected Pineau’s appeal to pursue the common market for the moment because he believed it was unattainable given prevailing political sentiments in France. Rather, he urged Pineau to focus exclusively on Euratom, a statement that Pineau claims profoundly disappointed him.930

Pineau went on to tell a surprised academic audience that he, Guy Mollet, and the French President, René Coty, had met secretly early in Mollet’s tenure to plot a course to achieve the common market. They resolved, he claimed, to use Euratom as a “smoke screen” behind which they would build majority support for a European common market. Given widespread opposition in the French ministries, industrial circles, and among political elites, the pro-European integration conspirators concealed their intentions from all around them until a propitious moment appeared. The Suez crisis created the necessary “shock,” according to Pineau, “to accelerate the process.” The government had not changed its method, but rather public opinion rallied to the Common Market as a means to create a certain independence for France vis-à-vis the United States.”931 While some scholars have adopted Pineau’s account, others have responded with incredulity.932

It remains an open question whether we should accept an oral account given by a participant thirty years after the events transpired and for which there exists no archival evidence. Pineau had also long been proud of his role in the EEC negotiations, a political success that countered some of the tarnish left by his role in the series of disasters in North Africa. One can understand Thiemeyer’s rejection of the account as a “retrospective self-interpretation.”933 As veterans of the EDC debacle, though, it is credible that Pineau and Mollet perceived a need for secrecy and caution. Pineau’s account, in my view, remains plausible and compelling because it does explain the French government’s public about-face on the common market performed between August and October 1956 after having secured parliamentary support for Euratom in July. In addition, Emile Noël backed Pineau’s story at the conference, adding additional weight to his account.934 Though not decisive proof, Lapie’s report in his memoir that Noël had told him that Mollet “did not want to precipitate things” by calling for both political and economic

930 Pineau in Serra, ed., 282-86.
931 Ibid., 525-30. See also Le grand pari, op cit., 194-210, 222-26.
932 Moravcsik gives credence to Pineau’s account, Moravcsik, op cit., 119-20.
933 Thiemeyer, op cit., 185.
integration, before ratifications of the treaties in order “to not openly reveal the opposition [to European integration] that could be born in France” reveals a mindset and strategy along the line of Pineau’s claims.935

Without relying on Pineau’s account, it is possible to come to similar conclusions. It may be that the Suez Crisis was a necessary prerequisite for the successful ratification of the Treaties of Rome, but it does not appear to have been the decisive factor in the government’s decision to support a common market. Mollet’s statement above on geopolitics can easily be reconciled with Pineau’s argument that they behaved like Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince in their plot to gain support in France for the common market. Historians who reject the geopolitical narrative grant varying weight to ideological and economic factors to explain the European policy of Mollet’s government.936 There is no reason to see these factors as mutually exclusive. In fact, Mollet and his party’s long-standing policy to make France competitive through an industrial modernization of the country and to liberalize markets as a means of creating a peaceful postwar order can be understood as rooted in ideological and economic concerns. The same can be said for the SPD. That this trade liberalization should take place within a closed common market for the SFIO, rather than a more open free trade zone, can be traced back to the economic vision repeated ad nauseam by Philip in the 1950s, a vision reliant in large part on Jacques Levy-Jacquemin’s economic analysis of the late 1940s about the need for a European preferential trade zone, a concept which received Blum’s stamp of approval.

Scholars have downplayed or rejected the influence of socialist ideas on Mollet’s policies by emphasizing divisions on the common market within the SFIO.937 Though the SFIO apparatus

935 Lapie, op cit., 726.
936 Milward and Moravcsik have been the main proponents of the economic thesis, arguing that the government came to see some sort trade liberalization as imperative as the French economy became increasingly reliant on the European market. Moravcsik, op cit., 103-122, 137; Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1999). Yet Moravcsik provides space for the influence of the pro-European ideology of key members of Mollet’s government, including Mollet himself, though he views ideology as a “secondary” factor. Moravcsik, op cit., 121-22. Parsons and Bossuat have most forcefully put forward European ideology as a decisive factor for the successful negotiations. Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe; Gérard Bossuat, Les fondateurs de l’Europe unie (Paris: Belin, 2001). Warlouzet also lends weight to “idealism as well as realism” in Mollet’s policy. Warlouzet, op cit., 36.
937 Parsons writes that, “Support in [Mollet’s] own party remained weak, especially for the Common Market...” and “Nor did farmers, technocrats, business, or Socialists coherently lead the way. All these groups were consistently divided on the EEC’s appeal.” Parsons, op cit., 108, 115. Newman writes that, “In this sense it can be claimed that, although the SFIO was in office during the negotiations for the establishment of the EEC, socialism exercised little influence over the ‘European’ policy of the French Government. By now, socialist rhetoric was hardly more than a rationalization, of an increasingly tortuous kind, for politics determined by other forces.” Michael Newman, Socialism and European Unity: The Dilemma of the Left in Britain and France (London: Junction Books, 1983), 12.
was largely left out of the decision-making process, Mollet’s approach to the common market clearly reflected the economic and ideological traditions of the party leadership as crafted after the Second World War, which in turn reflected a large degree of continuity with the party’s interwar stance. Trade liberalization within an organized market with social provisions was a central policy of the French Socialist Party and, though the EEC did not contain the extent of social protections that the party desired, the influence of the French Socialist tradition was a decisive element in the government’s policy towards a European common market during the negotiations for the Treaties of Rome. While scholars have noted that the SFIO was among the most pro-European of parties and that its votes were necessary for any treaty for European integration in the 1950s, it is time now to recognize that SFIO traditions were important elements in the European policy of Mollet’s government.

6.7 SOCIALISTS AND THE ASSOCIATION OF THE FRENCH OVERSEAS TERRITORIES WITH THE EEC: ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IN AFRICA AND THE IMPERIAL LEGACY

For Mollet’s government, the Suez invasion was an outgrowth of its increasingly desperate effort to keep Algeria French. As the negotiations for a common market sped towards a successful conclusion, the French government took advantage of its reputation for reluctance on trade liberalization to extract from its partners an association agreement between the European Economic Community and France’s overseas territories. After years of confusion about the place of the French Union within the European integration process, Mollet’s Socialist government resolved this dilemma by turning to Europe to save the remnants of France’s empire in Africa and the Caribbean. Christian Pineau first broached this subject in the negotiations with his European partners in April 1956, and the French team put forth concrete proposals for the association in the weeks following Mollet’s November meeting with Adenauer.938 The French delegation demanded a privileged place for French African agricultural imports into the common market, and a substantial financial commitment from Germany and the other nations to invest in France’s African territories with the goal of raising living standards there by 4% per annum. In

938 Thiemeyer, op cit., 250.
exchange French negotiators offered to open the French African market for trade with France’s European partners.

The German government received these proposals with a marked lack of enthusiasm because German businesses and politicians feared being associated with what seemed to be the dying woes of French colonialism, though the negotiations also revived hopes among some German businesses eager to penetrate the French African market.939 Others worried that trade privileges with French Africa would threaten German trade with Latin America.940 Nonetheless, the French team’s insistence that an association for the overseas territories was a condition sine qua non for the National Assembly’s ratification of any agreement, and Adenauer’s sympathy for the French investment program in Africa led German negotiators to swallow this bitter pill after a series of tough negotiations in winter of 1956-57.941 Mollet personally presided over the final set of negotiations on the association of the overseas territories, and the last obstacles were cleared in a private meeting between him and Adenauer.942 The final agreement promised a large investment in the overseas territories of the participating states, 90% of which would go to French territories. The German government agreed to match the French contribution to this fund, providing 34% of the total funding for the program.943 Mollet celebrated his success, arguing that without this agreement “the disaffection of the overseas population” threatened to continue to grow because “we will not be capable of bringing the aid that they expect.”944

The SPD would have greatly preferred that the overseas territories be left out of the Treaties of Rome. Though public statements remained tempered, opposition to Mollet’s policy in Algeria was beginning to reach a boiling point within the party. Many German Social Democrats worried that the French proposals threatened to tie Germany to the sinking ship of French imperialism.945 Nonetheless, important figures like Carlo Schmid and Fritz Erler sympathized with the economic investment and social programs envisioned by Mollet and his Socialist

940 Mahant, op cit., 63-64; Rhenisch, op cit., 202.
941 Mahant, op cit., 115.
942 Segers, op cit., 307-08.
943 Mahant, op cit., 119; Segers, op cit., 308.
944 Declaración de M. Guy MOLLET, Président du Conseil, pour le numéro spécial du journal “DEMAIN” consacré au MARCHE COMMUNE EUROPEEN, 27 mars 1957, AGM 70, OURS.
945 Deist commented that, “As long as France does not find a solution to the difficult problem in North Africa, any activity in this region will be considered as a contribution to the consolidation of colonial domination—whether rightly or wrongly, it will not matter.” Cahn, op cit., 275-76.

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Minister for Overseas Territories, Gaston Defferre. They argued that if constructed properly, a European investment program for French Africa could reap social benefits for the African populations without taking on the trappings of an outdated colonial project. After making their determination to avoid associating with French imperialism clear and explicitly calling for a move towards independence for the French overseas territories, the SPD acquiesced to the territories’ association with the common market.

6.8 THE DECISIVE TARIFF QUESTION: THE SPD DEBATE ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR A FREE TRADE AREA

In a meeting with Erich Ollenhauer, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower expressed surprise when he learned that the worries about Germany colluding with French imperialism were not the SPD’s principal concern about the treaties under negotiation. Ollenhauer stressed that the SPD was most worried that the French government would insist on a high common external tariff that would substantially raise German tariffs with non-EEC countries. As the treaty negotiations entered their final phases, the SPD leadership scrambled to gather information about the content of the treaty in order to reach a consensus on its position. Birkelbach delivered a report entitled “Realistic European Policy” to the WPA meeting held on 8 and 9 February 1957. Birkelbach’s response provides an essential clue to the eventual SPD decision to support the EEC. He stated that the party had abandoned its objection to “Small Europe” and that the British proposal of a Free Trade Area (FTA) had only surfaced due to British and Scandinavian fears of facing trade discrimination from a common market they were determined not to join. The relationship between the EEC and FTA proposals was central to the SPD debate that ensued in the next months. Birkelbach’s assessment that the dynamic of the EEC negotiations had propelled other states to pursue their own form of closer economic cooperation (which is of course what had

946 Gestern-heute-morgen Interview mit Präsident Robert Schuman und MdB Fritz Erler, SPD, über Fragen der europäische Zusammenarbeit. Interviewer Dr. Carl Helfrich, Hessicher Rundfunk, 2 December 1957, FE 13, AdsD.
947 The SPD countered the CDU’s resolution calling for more “autonomy” for French overseas territories with a SPD resolution calling for “independence.” Entschliessung der Fraktion der SPD 4 July 1957, Bundestag—Europäische Abteilung 0903, AdsD.
948 Sitzung des Parteivorstandes am 7./8.3.1957 in Berlin, PV 1957, AdsD.
949 Protokoll über die Sitzung des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses beim Parteivorstand der SPD am 8./9. Februar 1957 im Bundeshaus zu Bonn, BG 158, AdsD.
happened) provides a crucial lens through which to analyze the SPD’s subsequent decision to support the EEC.

On 6 March 1957, Ollenhauer announced in a radio address that the SPD would reserve its vote on the treaties until it possessed more information.950 After the signing of the Treaties, the SPD Bundestag delegation voted in support of the government’s resolution to begin parliamentary consideration of the European atomic energy organization and the common market on 22 March.951 On 30 March, the SPD leadership had its first serious discussion about whether to approve the common market.952 Crucially, the subject of tariffs appeared to be largely neutralized for the moment due to a general optimism that the FTA and EEC would reach an agreement, an optimism that did much to shape the debate on the Treaties within the SPD. Influential leaders such as Wehner and Karl Mommer noted that tariffs would fall once the EEC signed an accord with Great Britain and Scandinavia, though Wehner noted that agriculture would remain excluded. A few members expressed opposition to the Accords, but it appears clear that a consensus was forming that recalled in large part the party’s position in 1949 about the necessity for an enlarged economic space as a means to realize the party’s economic and foreign policy goals. Birkelbach argued that full employment was not possible by national means alone and that the EEC Treaty set the preconditions for its accomplishment. His WPA colleague Schöne saw the Treaty as a worthy platform for a policy of competition within a larger market. Wehner asserted that the party must support a European economic community and a common market, though it should continue to insist on its present conditions. Several members expressed confidence that the treaty was acceptable and could later be amended. While Ollenhauer and Wehner both asserted that the party remained free to reject or abstain on the EEC, Ollenhauer argued that the EEC rectified those aspects of the ECSC that the party had criticized. Announcing that it would be a shame to vote against European economic integration after having campaigned for years in support, Ollenhauer told his party comrades that the SPD should publicize its objections and then vote in favor.

In a press release on 4 April, the SPD demanded that the EEC remain open to eastern European states and that a reunified Germany be free to decide whether to join the EEC. In a

950 Sozialdemokratische Bundestagsfraktion Pressestelle, 6 March 1957, Ollenhauer, Süddeutsche Rundfunk, EO 131, AdsD.
951 Hrbek, op cit., 257.
952 Sitzung des Parteivorstandes am 30. Mai 1957 in Bonn, PV 1957, AdsD.
speech on 11 April, a passing comment on the EEC during a discussion on East-West relations
by Erler seems to show that he had determined that the EEC was not an obstacle to German
reunification. He said that, if the European states could offer guarantees to Soviet security, “a
reunified Germany would thus be able to belong to a common market and to a European atomic
community.” Though this seemed to signal that the SPD would not raise the reunification
issue to oppose the EEC, support for a common market open to, rather than closed from, the
world market remained. Erler told an international audience the week prior to his 11 April speech
that the SPD did not want the EEC to develop into a form of European nationalism and that it
should facilitate rather than prevent a greater exchange of goods within a free world economy.

With the first Bundestag reading of the Treaties of Rome less than a week away, the
WPA met on 3 May to formulate its advisory opinion for the Central Committee. After
instructing its members to only discuss the economic aspects of the treaty, Chairman Veit noted
that not all of the SPD’s conditions had been satisfied and announced that he was undecided. He
worried that a free market in labor might lead to the depopulation of underdeveloped economic
areas, to which Schöne responded that the structural adjustment and investment funds should
provide adequate safeguards. The members discussed a number of other potential problems,
including that the EEC, in Veit’s view, confirmed West Germany’s increasing economic
orientation towards the West and would negatively affect reunification. However, he stated that
none of these were sufficient reasons to reject the treaty. The central question facing the WPA,
he said, was how the new tariff situation would affect West Germany.

Kurlbaum asked whether there was any guarantee that tariffs would sink after Germany
gave up sovereignty in this area. Schöne and Birkelbach responded that the treaty would cause
tariffs to sink, but they seem to have been referring to tariffs within the common market. After
Veit noted that 75% of West German trade lay outside of the six-nation bloc, he argued that this
was no reason to reject the treaty, but rather meant that the treaty’s effectiveness was dependant
on an agreement to create the FTA. All members clearly agreed that an EEC-FTA accord was of
vital importance, but the debate turned around the question of whether to make the SPD’s vote
conditional upon a prior agreement on the FTA. As Kurlbaum noted, though, the party faced an

953 Fritz Erler speech, Bonn, 11 April 1957, FE 12, AdsD.
954 Erler, 4-7 April 1957, Erler 12, AdsD.
955 Protokoll der Sitzung vom 3. und 4. Mai 1957 des Wirtschaftspolitischen Auschusses beim Parteivorstand der
SPD im Bundeshaus, Bonn, BG 158, AdsD.

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upcoming vote and needed to immediately formulate a stance. It seems the discussion reached a crucial turning point when Birkelbach stated that there was an argument to be made that, without a preexisting common market, there would be no FTA because Britain would then refuse to join it. This was the view of Mollet’s government as well. Veit’s earlier suggestion that the SPD try to gain time by reserving its vote until a FTA agreement appeared promising was not a realistic option. Perhaps realizing this, Veit later amended a comment by Birkelbach that perhaps the SPD should demand that the FTA and EEC come into effect simultaneously to state that the party should instead demand that this happen as soon as possible, a crucial distinction indeed, as subsequent events would show. Birkelbach argued that Great Britain’s position towards the FTA would depend upon the U.S. position at the GATT negotiations and that agriculture would remain a stumbling block to any EEC-FTA accord. Concluding the meeting, Veit declared that the discussion had raised no reasons to justify a negative attitude and that, “we consider the treaty acceptable [brauchbar] if it is filled with our spirit and takes our ideas in hand.”

Two days before the first parliamentary reading, the WPA met again to confirm its position. The members discussed a number of issues, the most important of which was the prospect of increased prices, the specter of further agricultural protectionism, and a perceived need for a common currency. Despite these potential problems, the result seemed pre-ordained after Veit’s introduction. Stating that the party could still make its vote conditional upon an EEC-FTA agreement, Veit then revived Birkelbach’s point from the previous meeting. Veit commented, “However, we cannot fully ignore the multiple arguments brought forward that the greatest possibility is that without the erection of a common market the Free Trade Area will under no circumstance be built.” At the meeting’s conclusion, the WPA constructed the following advisory opinion:

The Committee Chair affirms with the agreement of those present that none of the points discussed should lead to a ‘No’ [vote]. The treaty is fundamentally acceptable [grundsätzlich brauchbar] as long as it is properly executed.

Therefore it seems clear that the primary consideration for the SPD’s approval of the six-nation EEC may be summarized thus: although the party’s economic experts determined that the EEC might itself be an obstacle to the creation of a wider Free Trade Area, given the attitude of the

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956 Zone de libre échange. AGM 11, OURS.
957 “Erste Stellungnahme des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses beim Parteivorstand der SPD zum “Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG),” 7 May 1957, BG 158, AdsD.
British government, they considered it also to be the only present means available to possibly attain it. When it came down to it, the SPD leadership recognized that if it wanted to advance its goal of increased European economic cooperation, the EEC was the only game in town. And so the SPD’s economic experts counseled the approval of the EEC. The SPD delegation voted in favor of the ratification of the Treaties of Rome in the treaty readings from May to June 1957, recording their first votes in the Bundestag in favor of a European integration treaty in the postwar period.

6.9 THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICAL WILL: GUY MOLLET’S GOVERNMENT AND THE SIGNING OF THE TREATIES OF ROME

The French government’s decision to proceed with the Treaties of Rome despite a new balance-of-payments crisis in spring 1957 is further testament to Mollet’s will and determination to achieve a common market.958 Negotiations accelerated quickly in the winter of 1956-57 and, along with the overseas territories, the negotiators agreed to French demands that trade liberalization proceed in stages over a twelve- to fifteen-year period and be subject to various safeguards.959 These clauses in the Treaties of Rome included the possibility of continuing French export subsidies, as well as a list of other types of regional or social aid to assist those negatively affected by trade liberalization. In an interview nearly twenty years after these events, Mollet claimed that he had tried to create a common production and investment program for Europe but had to give this up because his European interlocutors were “partisans of a liberal economy.”960 Despite the liberal features of the EEC, the Treaty was in line with much of the French Socialist conception of economic relations for the postwar period. Mollet revived the party’s vision from the late 1940s that modernization needed to be imposed on a reluctant, Malthusian, French economy. He told the SFIO congress in May 1957 that, “We shall be attacked since the employers, craftsmen and farmers will not move at the necessary speed in

958 For internal debates as to how to react to the balance-of-payments crisis, see Alexandre Verret’s 5 March 1957 NOTE pour Monsieur le Président du Conseil; his 7 March 1957 NOTE pour Monsieur le Président du Conseil; and Marjolin’s 12 April 1957 NOTE sur le déficit extérieur de la France et les méthodes de redressement, AGM 74, OURS.
959 Tarif extérieur, AGM 11, OURS. Mollet marked “Very Important” next to a section of the document discussing the transitional stages. NOTE OBJET: Etat actual des négociations sur le Traité du Marché Commun.
960 INTERVIEW DE Mr. Guy MOLLET LE 26/6/75, AGM 115, OURS.
order to adjust to the new world we are launching ourselves into...”

Overshadowed by the polemics surrounding the Algerian War, no Socialist publicly objected to the Treaties of Rome and the party congress unanimously approved of its government’s performance in the negotiations. Mollet and Pineau accomplished a coup by convincing the influential anti-EDC deputy, Alain Savary, to become rapporteur for the Treaties in the National Assembly.

With the Radical Party split on the issue of ratifying the Treaties of Rome, the unity of the SFIO provided the necessary difference between the EDC’s 1954 defeat, and the success of the EEC in 1957. In Germany, as mentioned above, the SPD for the first time provided the decisive votes to push the European integration process forward. With the CDU’s coalitional ally, the FDP, opposing the Treaties of Rome, the government relied on SPD support to create a pro-EEC majority. French Socialists and German Social Democrats votes were necessary in both countries to achieve a majority for the EEC and Euratom.

Given their support for trade liberalization, though, why did provisions for an “agricultural exception” and the creation of a Common Agricultural Policy that portended the maintenance of high food prices for consumers not elicit more opposition within the SFIO, and more importantly, within the SPD? It is to this question that the next section turns.

6.10 RECONCILING TOWN AND COUNTRY, RURAL DEMOGRAPHICS AND SOCIALIST POLICY TOWARDS THE “AGRICULTURAL EXCEPTION”

Recent revisionism in the historiography of the foundation of the EEC’s “agricultural exception” has complicated our understanding of the political, ideational, and economic factors that influenced the motivations and policies of the governments negotiating the Treaties of Rome.

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963 Pineau reports that he asked Savary to take on the role. In Le Grand Pari, the account is that, “Due to his influence, his decision guaranteed in an almost certain manner the adhesion of a good number of deputies of his group, who were uncertain until then.” Le Grand Pari, 266.
965 The FDP leadership criticized French protectionism and preferred a free-trade zone within the OECD with a free convertibility of currency without the creation of a common external tariff. Cahn, op cit., 152. It also began to call Western European integration an obstacle to German reunification.
The most convincing of these revisions, espoused in the landmark works of Ann-Christian Knudsen and Guido Thiemeyer, argue that ideational factors and the cultural weight granted agriculture within European social and political consciousness were determining factors in the decision to create a European preference zone for agriculture. European governments decided to engage in redistributive politics to align lagging salaries for farmers with the rising salaries that marked the launch of Europe’s postwar economic boom, a phenomenon Knudson has provocatively labeled “farmers on welfare.” As these programs became increasingly costly to maintain at the national level, the French government in particular looked to the European integration process to alleviate costs to the French budget.

As studies intended to provide a comprehensive picture of the factors contributing to the creation of Europe’s infamous Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), these works tend to amalgamate varying social and political factors within the welfare consensus that contributed to postwar European social stability. An examination of SFIO and SPD policy on agriculture reveals that, in their cases, the welfare factor was a preponderant, but not isolated factor in both parties’ decisions to accept or acquiesce to the agricultural components of the Treaties of Rome. The welfare factor was indeed important for the SFIO, but Mollet’s government deferred to agricultural interests in large part because it knew that their support would be decisive for the Treaties’ ratification. The government did so only after unsuccessfully attempting to restrain agricultural subsidies in spring 1956. The SPD had even less ideational affinity for the conservative ideal of a traditional agricultural community based on family farms and small-scale production. Its decision to accept the agricultural exception was much more an affair of the head than of the heart: it wanted to diminish a cultural-political antagonism between the urban SPD and a rural farm-base that had long destabilized German democratic politics. In addition, the Junktim between agricultural exceptionalism and European internal trade liberalization was likely more important for quelling doubts within the SPD leadership than it was for the CDU-led

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966 Thiemeyer emphasizes the importance of a “tradition of historical mentality,” writing that, “Behind the agrarian-political decision of the 1950s stood a complex system of social-political values and rationalizations, whose legitimacy in the wider public as well as in the political system were not in question.” Thiemeyer, op cit., 26-30. See also Ann-Christian L. Knudsen, Farmers on Welfare: The Making of Europe’s Agricultural Policy (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2011).
967 Moravcsik writes that, by 1955, French subsidies covered 64% of the total value of French agricultural exports. Moravcsik, op cit., 111; Thiemeyer, op cit., 262-63.
968 Moravcsik, op cit., 111-12.
969 There is more, therefore, to the SPD’s decisions on agriculture than the “emphasis on the farm-income objective” discussed by Knudson. Knudson, op cit., 68.
government, within which the liberal Economic Minister Erhard unsuccessfully sought to defeat
the powerful German agricultural lobby.

Agricultural policy had long been a thorn in the SPD’s side. The vitriolic internal SPD
debates of the 1890s on the place of agriculture in an industrial capitalist society pitted SPD
leaders from northern German cities, where trade union influence was strong, against southern
German and, especially, Bavarian moderates who called for a positive SPD platform for agarian
reform in the countryside. The belated SPD policy on agriculture after the First World War,
constructed in the twilight of the Weimar Republic, did little to mask the SPD leadership’s
general lack of concern for developments in German agriculture.970 By history, temperament,
and personnel the SPD had always been an urban-based party.971 It was in the interests of the
target SPD constituency, the industrial working classes, that food prices be kept as low as
possible. The issue was so important that when its allies proposed to triple the price of grain in
October 1922, the SPD left the Weimar coalition government.972 The SPD’s emphasis on the
interests of consumers was part and parcel of the SPD’s traditional policy, and German farmers
were well aware of the SPD’s position. Hellmut Kalbitzer was the principal spokesman in the
postwar era for the faction of the party that continued to put forth an aggressive campaign to
sacrifice the interests of Germany’s agricultural community in order to obtain lower food prices
for consumers. He argued that the tariff wall behind which German agriculture had shielded
itself since the introduction of high tariffs in 1879 had stunted the modernization of that sector.
In his view a government program to encourage rationalization and modernization, rather than
protection, was the only plausible policy.973

Postwar German electoral results continued to reflect this dynamic: 57% of farmers
supported the CDU in a poll taken in 1955, and 15% supported the FDP. The SPD trailed its
competitors with a meager 10%, approximately a third of its national average.974 Even as the
SPD began its slow transition to a “catch-all” party, one can conclude from these statistics that

970 Claudia Nölting, Erik Nölting: Wirtschaftsminister und Theoretiker der SPD (1892-1953) (Essen: Klartext,
1989), 105-107; Donna Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism (Chapel Hill: The University of
971 Orlow, op cit., 66.
972 Thomas Raithel, Das schwierige Spiel des Parlamentarismus: Deutscher Reichstag und französischer Chambre
des Deputés in den Inflationskrisen der 1920er Jahre (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), op cit., 144.
973 13 September 1950, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 3163; and 27 January 1955, Verhandlungen, 3333.
974 Werner Bührer, “Agricultural Pressure Groups and International Politics: The German Example,” in Richard T.
Griffiths and Brian Girvin, eds., The Green Pool and the Origins of the Common Agricultural Policy (London:
Bloomsbury, 1995), 80.
the farming constituency was largely out of the SPD’s reach. The party had only a partial electoral incentive to ingratiate itself with this demographic group in decline. The SPD leadership, however, was aware that its policy had done much to contribute to the historical antagonism between the SPD and rural Germany. Ollenhauer conceded at the SPD’s 1947 congress that, “We all know from experience that before 1933 we did not grant agricultural policy the attention that was necessary.”975 The postwar SPD was not only concerned with votes; it also feared for the future of the republic and the democratic system. As in the case of military officials discussed in chapter three, the SPD did not expect groups that had long opposed social democracy to adopt the red flag. Nonetheless, its leaders believed that only through engagement with hostile groups like German farmers could German democracy gain a measure of stability. The SPD’s willingness to make concessions to German agriculture, however warily, was crucial for its acquiescence to the “agricultural exception” in the Treaties of Rome and, in the following decades, to the longevity of the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy.

Fortunately for the postwar SPD leadership, it had the counsel of two figures with a deep knowledge of the politics and economics of agriculture: Fritz Baade and Herbert Kriedemann.976 Baade had been the President of the German-Polish Rye Commission and the co-author of the SPD’s agricultural program during the Weimar Republic. During the Nazi period, he went into exile and served as an agricultural adviser to the Turkish government.977 Kriedemann was a trained agronomist from Bavaria who held hopes of one day becoming minister of foreign trade.978 He became the main SPD spokesman on agricultural policy in the Bundestag. He lamented that he continued to hear people say in the postwar period that, “the SPD [wa]s proving once against that it is against agriculture.”979 Under his influence, the SPD recognized that German agriculture must be able to sell its goods at “sufficient prices” and farmers must receive a “just wage” for their work.980 These two SPD experts became instrumental in the SPD’s efforts to balance the conflicting interests of rural and urban Germany.

The SFIO had a quite different relationship with French farmers. French socialism had never been as tied to the industrial working classes as was German social democracy. The

975 SPD Congress, 2 July 1947, 198, AdsD.
976 Baade’s expertise was so appreciated in postwar Germany that he was at times consulted on agricultural policy by Walter Hallstein and other CDU officials.
977 “Biographical Notes on Dr. Fritz Baade,” Fritz Baade 5, AHC; 2/PVBT9, AdsD.
978 Weber, op cit., 393.
979 28 February 1951, Bundestrag, Verhandlungen, 4644.
980 Kriedemann, 1 June 1950, Bundestag, Verhandlungen, 2403; and 16 March 1951, Verhandlungen, 4885.
industrial working classes were smaller as a percentage of the population in France and tended to vote Communist in the postwar period. During the Fourth Republic, the SFIO gradually took over part of the Radical Party’s base in small towns and villages as support for the SFIO shifted to the more agrarian east and south.\textsuperscript{981} While far from the most popular party in rural France, the SFIO had always had a noticeable presence in rural politics. France had a higher proportion of farmers than Germany (28 to 22\%) and the number of SFIO deputies with roots in agriculture, 17\%, was an impressive figure.\textsuperscript{982}

Not only did the party have expertise in the sector, but it also had a clear pretension to capture the rural vote, a pretension that was largely absent in the case of the SPD. François Tanguy-Prigent, a peasant who served as agricultural minister in President de Gaulle’s postwar government, formed the \textit{Confédération générale de l’agriculture} (CGA), which attempted to unite French agriculture under a left-wing umbrella organization.\textsuperscript{983} Although this organization gradually lost clout before the right-leaning \textit{Fédération National des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles} (FNSEA), the influence of Tanguy-Prigent, as well as Michel Cépède, Kléber Loustau, and Gérard Vée provided the party with a fountain of experience in agricultural policy upon which to draw. Unlike the SPD, the SFIO also had practical experience in instituting agricultural reform. Blum’s Popular Front government had established a Wheat Office to assist small farmers by guaranteeing minimum prices for wheat and centralizing its import under government auspices.\textsuperscript{984} Loustau and Tanguy-Prigent evoked the success of the interwar Wheat Office as a counter-model to liberal approaches to agricultural policy in the Fourth Republic.\textsuperscript{985}

Like French political elites in general, the SFIO never fully resolved contradictions within its agricultural policy. The SFIO prioritized the modernization of French agriculture, but it also called for the maintenance of small and medium farms, which generated markedly lower rates of productivity.\textsuperscript{986} The romantic imagery of the family farm was an idealization that transcended French political boundaries. Mollet evoked this imagery as prime minister in a

\textsuperscript{981} Orlow, \textit{op cit.}, 67.
\textsuperscript{983} Gilbert Noël, “French Agricultural Pressure Groups and the Project for a European Agricultural Organization,” in Griffiths and Girwin, eds, 51-52. Tanguy-Prigent identified himself as a “peasant” because he had farmed for twelve years. 20 July 1949, \textit{JO}, 4881.
\textsuperscript{984} Graham, \textit{op cit.}, 38.
\textsuperscript{985} Tanguy-Prigent, 28 September 1946, \textit{JO}, 4128; and Loustau to GPS, 14 October 1953, AHC.
\textsuperscript{986} Loustau, 6 August 1954, \textit{JO}, 3935.
public speech and promised to defend the livelihoods of small landowners, a promise his predecessors in government had made during negotiations for the common market in October 1955.\(^{987}\) The official policy of the SPD and the trade unions, in contrast, was to “revise the size of the holdings and to consolidate the fragmented land...”\(^{988}\) SFIO agricultural experts also hoped to stop or at least stem a rural exodus that they feared would have devastating social implications for French society.\(^{989}\)

Both the SPD and SFIO explicitly rejected a “liberal” approach to agricultural policy, but, as in trade in general, their policies on “liberalism” referred more to a need at times to adopt price controls rather than to tariff policy. In the initial postwar period, both parties focused on restraining food prices, which soared in the context of the devastation of war and the great freeze of winter 1946-47. Tanguy-Prigent as agricultural minister decreed maximum and minimum prices on wheat and other essential foodstuffs, a policy extended by the governments of Léon Blum and Paul Ramadier.\(^{990}\) As food shortages turned into food surpluses by the early 1950s,\(^{991}\) the French and German governments extended minimum prices to protect agricultural sectors the costs of which would otherwise prove uncompetitive before an onslaught of international imports.\(^{992}\) In this context, the French and German governments made the policy decision to protect domestic agriculture through high tariffs, seasonal and non-seasonal import restrictions and, in particular, equalization taxes on importers that forced the price of imports up to the domestic level.\(^{993}\) German agriculture was less competitive and smaller than French agriculture, which allowed the German government to subsidize and protect its agriculture at a level that would have been unsustainable for the French budget.\(^{994}\) Under Christian Democratic leadership, German agriculture thus became the most protected agricultural market within Western Europe.

These measures were met with some resistance within both the SFIO and SPD. Despite its customary reticence, the SPD approved the German government’s erection of sweeping

\(^{987}\) Discours prononcé par M. Guy Mollet, Président du Conseil à l’occasion d’inaugurations d’écoles à Hazebrouck, Dimanche, 23 September 1956, AGM 74, OURS; Mahant, \emph{op cit.}, 106.

\(^{988}\) “The Integration of European Agriculture. Reply to the Questionnaire by the Socialdemocratic [sic] Party of Germany,” 2/PVBT6, AdsD; for the trade unions, see Mahant, \emph{op cit.}, 62-63.

\(^{989}\) Tanguy-Prigent, 20 July 1949, \emph{JO}, 4866; Loustau to GPS, 14 October 1953, AHC.

\(^{990}\) Guido Thiemeyer, “Jean Monnet, Pierre Pfimlin und das Projekt einer Europäischen Agrargemeinschaft,“ in Wilkens, \emph{Intessen verbinden}, 142-43; Vée, 16 May, \emph{JO}, 1615-20.

\(^{991}\) By 1954 French wheat production was 25% above domestic consumption. Griffiths and Girvin, eds., xxvii.

\(^{992}\) Thiemeyer, \emph{op cit.}, 22-23.

\(^{993}\) Griffiths and Girvin, eds., xxx.

\(^{994}\) Mahant, \emph{op cit.}, 61-62.
protections for agriculture in summer 1950 and adopted into its 1952 party platform much of the
demands of Germany’s leading farm organization, the Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV). Though the party continued its support for minimum prices, by 1952 Kalbitzer and others had launched a new offensive against tariffs on basic foodstuffs. The SPD sought to be the voice of consumers, using a rhetoric that evoked the difficulty of “house-wives” to balance the family’s food budget. Agricultural protection was controversial within the SFIO as well. Philip, Moch, and Max Lejeune complained that wheat prices seemed to be rising without constraint and insisted that French agriculture would have to be competitive on the world market in the near- to medium-term future. Like Kalbitzer in Germany, Philip blamed the 1892 French law instituting tariffs on agricultural imports for the backwardness of France’s agricultural sector. Nonetheless, the party approved the call of its agricultural experts to extend minimum prices and made it official policy to create a National Fund for the Stabilization of Agricultural Prices.

The concept of modernization, so important in French Socialist rhetoric for economic policy in this period, served to reconcile these conflicting viewpoints within the SFIO, while leading the party in fact to support the implanting of a protectionist regime for agriculture. All factions of the party agreed that in order to overcome protectionism and make French agriculture capable of competing on the world market, the sector needed government support to modernize its practices and infrastructure. Therefore the moment of reckoning for French agriculture was pushed into an indeterminate future, a future further postponed by the creation of a Common Agricultural Policy under the auspices of the EEC. Such a modernization was necessary because agriculture played a central role in the Planning Commission’s design for achieving a balance of payments within Europe and with the dollar zone, an imbalance that continued to plague French

996 See, for instance, Kriedemann’s comments to the Bundestag, 21 January 1953, Verhandlungen, 11707; and Käte Strobel’s comments, 1 February 1957, Verhandlungen, 10758.
997 Philip to the 46ème Congrès National—Asnières, 1-4 July 1954, OURS.
998 See the comments of Vée, Lejeune, Philip and Moch in the GPS, 30 May 1950, AHC; and Tanguy-Prigent, 24 May 1950, JO, 3858.
999 For the SFIO agricultural modernization program, see Tanguy-Prigent, 7 March 1947, JO, 1529; and Kléber Loustau, 8 July, JO, 3691-2.
currency reserves into the 1950s. As U.S. exporters continued to deliver enormous exports of wheat and other products to the European and even, at times, to the French market, French Socialists joined French governments in viewing agriculture as the principal means to escape chronic trade deficits. French policy for agriculture became as ambitious as its industrialization program. The goal was to convert France from a food-importing nation to a gigantic fount of exports, a program without which advocates of agricultural modernization would have come up against a stiff wall of resistance to their efforts to promote greater productivity in the countryside.

The key to this strategy was the guarantee of foreign markets, ideally in the form of a European agrarian union. Tanguy-Prigent announced his support for such a plan in February 1949, more than a year before the French government announced its first proposal for European agricultural integration. SFIO agricultural experts knew that there was a key flaw in this strategy: French agricultural goods were on average 25 to 30% above world market prices. Therefore, the only chance of success for such a policy was to convince France’s neighbors to accept huge imports of goods at prices high enough to sustain French agricultural ambitions, with the support of French export subsidies to reduce the price disparity. Monnet and other leading officials first turned to Great Britain, but the British government yet again disappointed its French counterpart by refusing to take part. British officials continued to resist French government overtures through the 1950s, including efforts by Guy Mollet’s government to make the British proposal of a Free Trade Zone more palatable by reaching a compromise that would remunerate French farmers. British stonewalling led the French government, and SFIO agricultural experts, to turn to Germany as the only plausible market for French agricultural surpluses. This policy began to come to fruition in a 1955 French-German trade agreement, when

1000 Loustau in the name of the party’s Agricultural Commission to the SFIO congress, 2 July 1954, OURS; Séretariat d’Etat aux Affaires économiques. Direction des relations économiques extérieures, confidentiel, Paris, le 15 Janvier 1957. Note pour le ministre, AGM 74, OURS; Thiemeyer, op cit., 128.
1003 Tanguy-Prigent, 27 July 1950, JO, 6073; Loustau to GPS, 14 October 1953, AHC.
1004 Loustau in the name of the party’s Agricultural Commission to the SFIO congress, 2 July 1954, OURS.
the German government agreed to double its imports of French wheat and markedly increase consumption of other French agricultural goods.\footnote{This August 1955 agreement between Adenauer and French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France at La Celle-St. Claude guaranteed for three years the import of 500,000 tons of French wheat per year and 200,000 tons of other agricultural goods without substantial French concessions on the import of German industrial goods. Thiemeyer, \textit{op cit.}, 136; Lefèvre, \textit{op cit.}, 397-98.} 

This Franco-German bilateral agricultural deal came about in large part due to the failure of French proposals for European agricultural integration. A month after Schuman announced his plan for coal and steel integration, French agricultural minister, Pierre Pflimlin, launched an initiative for a Green Pool to create an internal European market for wheat, sugar, milk, and wine, and a supervisory body to oversee production and marketing.\footnote{Pfimlin announced his plan on 12 June 1950. Bossuat, \textit{op cit.}, 787.} Under pressure from Guy Mollet, cabinet minister for the Council of Europe, the French government decided in February 1951 to submit the Green Pool initiative to the intergovernmental Council of Europe, rather than adopt the supranational approach favored by Jean Monnet.\footnote{Guido Thiemeyer, “Jean Monnet, Pierre Pfimlin und das Projekt einer Europäischen Agrargemeinschaft,” in Wilkens, \textit{Interessen Verbinden}, 151-156.} In fall 1950, Mollet was still determined to have the British government directly engaged in the European integration process and was willing to sacrifice its supranational features in order to obtain British allegiance. The SFIO-aligned farmers’ organization, the CGA, however, supported a supranational agricultural community and pressured subsequent French governments to strengthen the powers of that community.\footnote{Gilbert Noël, “French Agricultural Pressure Groups and the Project for a European Agricultural Organization,” in Griffiths and Girvin, eds., 61-64.} The French Peasants Party and the conservative FNSEA, on the other hand, opposed a supranational authority and tended to prefer bilateral agreements, rather than the multilateral accords favored by the SFIO and CGA. British resistance to an agricultural deal with France meant that the Pfimlin Plan arrived moribund in Strasbourg. Four years of tortuous, and ultimately futile, negotiations ensued before the Pfimlin Plan died in 1954, after having been transferred for consideration to the OEEC.\footnote{Lefèvre, \textit{op cit.}, 312-313.} During the life of the Pfimlin Plan, the CDU-led German government displayed an evident lack of enthusiasm for the proposal, a reticence that resulted in large part from the CDU’s reliance on the German farmers’ vote. The powerful German farm organization, the DBV, believed that an influx of French agricultural goods would destroy German agriculture, which had substantially higher operating costs.
The SFIO used its transnational contacts through the COMISCO organization to place agricultural integration on the international socialist agenda. In a confidential memo to its fraternal parties, the SFIO argued for a harmonization of Europe’s agricultural policies, and for a European fund to organize import and export taxes to compensate domestic farmers for “competition to which the producers are not in a position to quickly adapt.” The SPD leadership turned to Fritz Baade to formulate the SPD’s response to the SFIO’s initiative. Baade responded with a 76-page report, outlining a comprehensive overview of the state of German agriculture and the prospects for agricultural integration. Drawing upon the example of the single market in the United States, Baade rejected the DBV’s central argument. He argued that German farmers, like farmers in the northern United States, were capable of maintaining production rates in the face of imports from the south. Agricultural integration along the lines of the Pflimlin Plan did not constitute an existential threat to German farming. Nonetheless, the Pflimlin Plan was clearly constructed to benefit French interests and, therefore, the German government should demand an opening of the French market to German industrial goods as a recompense for such a “concession.”

In the subsequent COMISCO meeting, European socialist representatives debated agricultural integration. Though Kriedemann called the results of the meeting “hazy,” the conference was able to issue a united resolution that laid out a socialist perspective on agriculture. The resolution did not resolve the issue of French exports, nor did it convince the British and Scandinavian parties to support agricultural integration, but the conference did delineate a set of principles that paved the way for the SFIO to support, and the SPD to acquiesce, to an exclusionary common market for agriculture. The parties accepted that “production must be increased,” supported the creation of “a clearing-house for European imports and exports,” and called for the governments to give preference to multilateral agreements with “a real guarantee of a market for the produce.” Most important, the parties embraced what historian Knudson has called “welfare for farmers” through the use of “price

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1011 The French Plan, 14 April 1951, Braunthal to Member Parties and Delegates of COMISCO, 2/PVB 6, AdsD.
1012 Pass letter to Baade, 6 January 1951, 2/PVB 4, AdsD; and Baade to COMISCO secretary Julius Braunthal, 5 January 1951, 2/PVB 5, AdsD.
1013 Die deutsche Landwirtschaft als Partner in einer europäischen Agrargemeinschaft. Ihre Leistungsfähigkeit und ihre Lebensbedürfnisse, General-Gutachten erstattet im Auftrag der DEUTSCHEN DELEGATION bei dem Vorbereitungen Arbeitsausschuss der Konferenz für die Organisation der Europäischen Agrarmärkte durch Professor Dr. Fritz Baade, 2/PVB 6, AdsD.
1014 Aktennotiz Betr. Europäische Agrar-Union, 5. Mai 1952, 2/PVB 6, AdsD.
control[s].” The resolution states that, “We have to ensure a stable and reasonable standard of living for agricultural producers, and a stable and reasonable cost of living for consumers. Neither of these aims can be secured in a free market.”

A rejection of a “free market” in agriculture became the departure point for the French government’s call for an agricultural exception in the negotiations for the Treaties of Rome. As Prime Minister, Mollet took up his predecessors’ position on agriculture and made the tactful move of vigorously courting the agricultural lobby, a courtship that French negotiator Maurice Faure credits with securing the votes needed in the National Assembly for the Treaties of Rome. French agriculture offset the opposition to the common market emanating from French industrial interests, which tended to fear European competition. Facing a vigorous new export policy of wheat from the U.S. and other leading exporters, the French government demanded a European preference zone for agriculture with a common external tariff to combat “agricultural dumping from third countries.” After the French government had made a clear commitment to carry the common market negotiations to a successful conclusion, it laid out a set of conditions to be resolved for agriculture in October 1956. These demands reflected in large part the objectives to which the Socialist parties had agreed in 1951 as well as those of the domestic French agricultural lobby: a rise in farmers’ standards of living; guaranteed long-term contracts for imports/exports within the Community; an agricultural modernization fund; a common external tariff (not in the Socialist resolution); and price supports/compensatory taxes to equalize prices within the community. As in the case of industrial tariffs, the French government demanded a weakening of the supranational features of the community and a

1015 International Socialist Conference, 12 June 1951, Circular INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE REPORT of the SIXTH INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST ECONOMIC EXPERTS CONFERENCE met at Sonloup, Switzerland, 24-26 April 1951, 2/PVBT6, AdsD.
1016 Thiemeyer, op cit., 244.
1017 Maurice Faure in Sera, ed., 289; historian Thiemeyer agrees with Faure, Thiemeyer, op cit., 209; see also Moravcsik, op cit., 112-13.
1018 Agriculture, AGM 11, OURS. In summer 1955, U.S. agriculture began its largest export push of the 20th century, offering wheat and other exports in local currencies, rather than demanding payment from dollar reserves. At this time the combined efforts of the U.S., Canada, Argentina, and Australia had created a record surplus in international wheat reserves. Ulrich Kluge, “Wege europäischer Agrarintegration 1950-1957,” in Ludolf Herbst, Werner Bührer, Hanno Sowade, eds., Vom Marshallplan zur EWG: Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 310.
strengthening of intergovernmentalism. These demands had nothing to do with the ideological considerations of Mollet’s government, but rather reflected a conviction that maintaining national control over the reach and level of agricultural liberalization was necessary to secure the support of the powerful FNSEA for the Treaties of Rome.

However, the Treaty left it to future negotiations to determine the means by which the EEC would realize these goals. This ambiguity likely served to stem what might have been greater objections from German Social Democrats. The SPD continued to pursue a flexible policy on agriculture over the course of the 1950s, insisting on lower prices for consumers whilst approving the CDU-sponsored legislation in 1949-50 and 1955 to shield German farmers from the full impact of market forces. In the aftermath of the COMISCO conference, the SPD Central Committee called a meeting to debate SPD policy towards the Pflimlin Plan. There the battle lines between Kalbitzer and Kriedemann reemerged. Against Kalbitzer’s remonstrances, Kriedemann welcomed the principle of an agricultural union, as long as it did not develop into an “agrarian cartel.” When debating the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the WPA, while approving the treaties, stated its wish that, “the European Economic Community not degenerate into agricultural protectionism.”

The Treaties of Rome included a provision promising reasonable prices for consumers. European negotiators took little heed of this clause during the foundational negotiations for a Common Agricultural Policy from 1958-1964, when they set up a system that protected European agriculture behind a high tariff wall at the expense of consumers. However, when voting for the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the SPD did not know the gargantuan role the CAP would come to play in EEC affairs. The SFIO supported an “agricultural exception” because it had an ideational attachment to guaranteeing income standards for farmers, but also because it was the only means to gain support for the common market within the fractured French political scene. The SPD’s acquiescence, in turn, was more the result of its desire to stabilize German democracy by lessening the historical antagonism between German farmers and social democracy, and the German government’s success in linking French agricultural exports to

1020 Thiemeyer, op cit., 212, 247-56. The most important element of this was to prolong the period in which minimum prices would require a unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers, rather than a majority or qualified majority.
1021 Knudson, op cit., 59; Moravcsik, op cit., 147; and Thiemeyer, op cit., 258.
1023 Erste Stellungnahme des Wirtschaftspolitische Ausschusses beim Parteivorstand der SPD zum “Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG)”, BG, 73 AdsD.
industrial trade liberalization. Both parties’ vote in favor of the Treaties in effect sacrificed the linkage between productivity gains and governmental support for farming, a linkage that had previously contributed to blurring internal party conflicts on agriculture within the SFIO and SPD.

6.10 CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated how French Socialists and German Social Democrats approached European economic integration with similar party traditions and historical narratives about the virtues of free trade for the maintenance of peace and for economic expansion and prosperity. With the partial exception of agriculture, the policies of the SFIO and SPD towards the negotiations for a common market and an atomic energy agency bore more in common with each other than with their national governments, at least until Mollet became Prime Minister in January 1956. Even then, key SFIO ministers promoted policies along the line of the consensus that they had developed with the SPD under the auspices of Jean Monnet’s Action Committee.

Nonetheless, the challenges of leading a fractured coalitional government forced Mollet to sacrifice parts of this consensus, namely the exclusively peaceful nature of the French nuclear program, in order to assure the success of other areas of the Socialist consensus, in particular the common market. In addition, Mollet’s government made further demands on the conditions for the association of the Community’s overseas territories, the length of transitional periods for lowering tariffs, and various economic escape clauses, demands that the SPD would have preferred not be included in the Treaties. The concessions on these issues by the German government were necessary to create a majority for the treaties in the French Assembly. In turn, SPD acquiescence to this compromise was needed to create a majority for the Treaties within the Bundestag. As happened later when the SPD entered government, the realities of governance created constraints within which party leaders were forced to sacrifice or compromise on key party goals. Mollet’s government faced immense geopolitical, economic, and colonial challenges during its sixteen-month tenure. That he and his team were able to wrest the Treaties of Rome through the morass of late-Fourth Republican politics is a testament to the power of political will.
and to how, through a balance of cunning and dexterity, leaders can carve out space within the constraints posed by coalitional governance in times of national and international crisis.1024

1024 Here I am inspired in part by the thesis laid out in Richard Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2003).
7. CONCLUSION

This study has shown how a postwar generation of French Socialist and German Social Democratic leaders brought similar visions and concerns to the process of European integration from 1948 to 1957. The parties were not always in agreement, and at times their relations devolved into acrimony. However, as demonstrated above, these inter-socialist conflicts were often due to a clash in domestic goals that, while not internationalist in nature, were nevertheless rooted in the parties’ socialist traditions or in party narratives about how to avoid the errors of the interwar period. Even in cases of inter-party conflict, SFIO and SPD leaders had many policies in common, and when their leaderships disagreed, there continued a transnational Socialist discussion that at times bypassed the mediation of the party executives.

By the time of the ratifications of the Treaties of Rome, the power of the traditions and narratives that had emerged prior to the Second World War had begun to wane as German economic prosperity and the traumas of French decolonization led to a transcendence of concerns rooted in the interwar experience. A new set of geopolitical and economic challenges rooted in postwar realities asserted themselves. With these changes, there appeared new party narratives that have since then shaped French Socialist and German Social Democratic responses to European integration initiatives. In this conclusion I examine how the SFIO and SPD reacted to the changing context of the 1960s, and how much of the substance of current debates about European integration among French Socialists and German Social Democrats have their origin in the generational shift of the 1960-1970s.

The SFIO and SPD were among the political groups most supportive of the NATO alliance through the 1960s. SFIO leaders denounced President Charles de Gaulle for pulling out of the military system erected by NATO. As the rechristened Parti Socialiste (PS), led by François Mitterrand, looked to create a rassemblement of the left to challenge right-leaning
candidates for the presidency of the Fifth Republic, it adopted a more critical view of NATO. It began to call for a simultaneous dissolution of the NATO and Warsaw Pacts along the lines of the SPD’s vision from the 1950s. This stance was an explicit rejection of Guy Mollet’s leadership and its supporters, who continued to support the NATO alliance against de Gaulle’s *politique de grandeur* through the 1960s.

Far more than the SPD’s decision to support the Treaties of Rome, the SPD leadership’s decision to unambiguously announce its support for NATO in 1960, and to fully participate in its ancillary transatlantic political and security committees, marked a definitive caesura in the history of postwar German social democracy. The party’s first concession was to give assurances in 1958 that a SPD government would not unilaterally disengage from NATO, in effect giving the Western allies a veto over changes to West Germany’s participation in the NATO system. Then, in summer 1960, Herbert Wehner gave a heralded speech to the Bundestag in which he announced the party’s full support for West Germany’s defense integration in NATO, and for further economic and political integration within the European Economic Community (EEC). Wehner called for a policy of common ground (*Gemeinsamkeit*) between the CDU-government and the SPD-opposition. His move signaled the party’s intent to end the dispute on foreign policy that had plagued relations between the CDU and SPD through the entire period of our study.

The pursuit of *Gemeinsamkeit* had an international dimension that at times came into conflict with the pursuit of *Gemeinsamkeit* within German domestic politics. In a twist of history, the SPD found more common ground in foreign policy with the new Democratic administration in the United States under President John F. Kennedy than it did with Adenauer’s government. Unlike Adenauer, who did not hide his preference for Republican candidate Richard Nixon in the 1960 U.S. presidential election, the SPD leadership shared in the wave of excitement surrounding Kennedy’s inauguration and worked hard to ingratiate itself to the new U.S. administration. It quickly reaped rewards, as SPD leaders developed close ties with important U.S. officials, found a new forum to receive information about international developments, and exchanged points of view with a sympathetic U.S. government. When French President de

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Gaulle launched his campaign for a “European Europe” as a challenge to what he saw as the dangers of a hegemonic U.S. ally, the U.S. government had no firmer defender of the transatlantic relationship over the course of the 1960s than the SPD. As early as the weeks leading up to the Mollet-Adenauer entente of November 1956, the SPD warned against the “political nonsense” of any effort to construct European integration against the United States.1027

The SPD supported the Cold War defense strategy of the new U.S. government, which sought to replace the Eisenhower-doctrine of “massive retaliation” with a “flexible response” approach in which the Allied governments would build up conventional forces in order to have a range of options short of nuclear war available in the event of international crises. In addition, the SPD was quite content that the new U.S. administration abandoned President Dwight Eisenhower’s complacent acceptance of the prospect of a nuclear-armed West Germany in favor of pursuing an international postwar settlement with the Soviet Union to stabilize “the German Question.” That issue still had the potential to destabilize international relations, as demonstrated again during the Berlin crises of 1959-62. This international postwar settlement, brilliantly outlined by historian Marc Trachtenberg, constituted a deal between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963 to confirm the status quo of a two-nation Germany, allow Western military forces to remain in West Berlin and guarantee a long-term U.S. troop presence on the European continent, and, in effect, force the West German government to sign on to the new nuclear non-proliferation treaty.1028 Adenauer did all he could to prevent such a settlement, but the combination of support from the SPD and CDU dissenters sufficed to overcome Adenauer’s opposition. After a decade of conflict between the SPD and the U.S. government over foreign policy, the Kennedy administration compelled the German government to renounce nuclear weapons, much to the relief of the SPD.1029

Whereas the conflict between government and opposition was the principle fault-line for German foreign policy debates in the 1950s, the 1960s was marked by a dispute that transcended party lines between, in contemporary parlance, German “Gaullists” and “Atlanticists.”1030 This clash over the basic tenants of West German foreign policy included polemics surrounding the

1029 Wilker, op cit., 197-99.
failure of negotiations between the EEC and the British-sponsored European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1958-59, and de Gaulle’s subsequent veto of Great Britain’s application to join the EEC in 1963. The SFIO and SPD were united in their support of an EEC-EFTA accord, and both parties enthusiastically embraced Great Britain’s EEC application, though Guy Mollet also warned against allowing Great Britain to “dilute” integration in the EEC and challenge the six-nation compromise on agriculture.

Tensions came to a head when President de Gaulle announced that Great Britain represented a “Trojan horse” for U.S. intervention in the European integration process at a press conference in January 1963, and vetoed Britain’s application to the EEC. Adding fuel to the fire, he and Konrad Adenauer concluded a French-German Friendship Treaty eight days later that seemed to create a bilateral alliance that could, as Emile Noël pointed out in a memo to Guy Mollet, undermine the prerogatives of the EEC. The most incendiary feature of the Treaty was that its text studiously avoided any mention of the NATO alliance. A transnational alliance of “Atlanticists,” including the SFIO and SPD, kicked into motion in response to these dramatic series of events. CDU dissidents and Herbert Wehner met with an irate Jean Monnet to plot a response. SPD leaders also consulted with U.S. officials on the issue. In a direct rebuke to Adenauer and de Gaulle, CDU Atlanticists, with SPD support, inserted a clause into the Treaty’s preamble that reconfirmed the German government’s attachment to NATO. Under these conditions, the SPD voted in favor of the Treaty. In France, the SFIO proclaimed its appreciation of the SPD’s position and, then, in part because no comparable addition was inserted into the Treaty in France, voted in opposition. Guy Mollet presented the party’s vote as a means of reasserting its preference for the EEC and NATO over a bilateral Franco-German alliance. Two years later, when de Gaulle announced an “empty chair” policy to force France’s EEC’s

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1032 Matthias Schulz, “Die politische Freundschaft Jean Monnet-Kurt Birrenbach, die Einheit des Westens und die Präambel zum Elysee-Vertrag,” in Andreas Wilkens, ed. Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 318-19; and Trachtenberg, op cit., 377-78.


1034 Le débat sur la ratification du traité de Gaulle-Adenauer, Guy Mollet: Vous porterez devant l’histoire la responsabilité de l’échec de la construction européenne, extract from Journal officiel, AGM 58, Office universitaire de recherche socialiste (OURS).
partners to accept a national veto of Community policy, the SFIO and SPD united again to
denounce this affront to the supranational features of the Treaties of Rome.

Hence the SPD settled into a form of consensus politics within the German domestic
sphere, within European integration bodies, and within the western alliance. Internationally, the
party accepted that German reunification was not a realistic possibility in the near- or medium-
term, and it adopted much of the Western Cold War rhetoric that placed the blame for the East-
West conflict squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet government. Picking up on subterranean
currents within the party, Egon Bahr, a close adviser to Willy Brandt, coined the term Ostpolitik
in 1963 to describe a SPD policy of “small steps” to achieve a rapprochement with East German
authorities so as to facilitate daily interactions between the two countries. Domestically, the 1959
Bad Godesberg program signaled the party’s abandonment of a program to enact revolutionary
social and economic changes. The party would henceforth campaign on the slogan that the SPD
was the “better party” to manage West German economic and foreign policy within the postwar
system as it existed. The pursuit of consensus politics was not unconditional. Many issues
continued to divide the government and opposition, but the SPD leadership went to great lengths
to de-polemicize political conflict and to employ a moderate tone in its critiques. Hence, after
dire warnings about Adenauer’s authoritarian tendencies, warnings that continued until the end
of the 1950s, the party hardly reacted to the tumultuous “Spiegel Affair,” which broke out after
the German government raided the popular weekly’s office following an unfavorable article
about the status of the German military. In addition, the party formulated a constructive
response to the CDU leadership’s insistence that the Bundestag add an “emergency powers
decree” to the German Basic Law, a policy that would have sounded furious alarm bells just a
few years earlier. The SPD’s relations with the German military also steadily improved over
this period, as the party’s executive and security experts effectively sidelined rank-and-file
agitation against the German military.

This new political approach signaled the transcendence of the party narratives and
policies rooted in interwar experiences that had so shaped the SPD’s postwar policy. The parties’
power brokers from 1945 to 1950 had almost all died or were in semi-retirement. By the time

1035 Hütter, op cit., 99.
1036 Beatrix Bouvier, Zwischen Godesberg und Grosser Koalition: Der Weg der SPD in die
Regierungsverantwortung: Aussen-, sicherheits- und deutschlandpolitisiche Umorientierung und gesellschaftliche
1037 Hütter, op cit., 86.

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party leader Erich Ollenhauer died in 1963, much of the power in the party had already passed to the “troika” of Fritz Erler, Carlo Schmid, and Herbert Wehner, and was in the process of passing further to a newer generation of party leaders, in particular to Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, whose power at the center of the party’s affairs solidified only after the ratification of the Treaties of Rome. The prosperity of the German economy and a new perception of the stability of West German democracy led to a decline within the SPD leadership in the valiance of narratives informed by the traumatic experiences of the interwar period. The SPD of the 1960s represented a generational shift away from the driving concerns of the postwar period. That shift brought with it a new set of issues, a new set of leaders with markedly different temperaments, and a new approach to politics. Voters rewarded the new party leadership, which saw a consistent rise in its levels of national support until 1966, when the SPD entered a coalition government with CDU Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger. In 1969, Willy Brandt formed a government with the liberal FDP party, and he and his SPD successor as Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, presided over fourteen years of uninterrupted SPD-FDP coalition governments.

Although in a markedly different fashion, the postwar generation of leaders in the French Socialist Party came to an end as well. The disastrous policy of Guy Mollet’s government in Algeria, the ascension of Charles de Gaulle to power, and the creation of the Fifth Republic caused a sea-change within the French left and a massive political realignment. Tensions between Mollet and his opponents within the party, so evident in the EDC period, reached a boiling point in fall 1956, and again with de Gaulle’s investiture in 1958, culminating with a schism in the party and the creation of the Parti socialiste autonome (PSA), later rechristened the Parti socialiste unifié (PSU). The quickening dissolution of the once hegemonic French Radical Party created the conditions for a rapprochement between mendésistes formerly of the SFIO and the radical followers of Pierre Mendès-France. While Guy Mollet kept an iron-clad grip on the SFIO over the course of the 1960s, he presided over a party that was broken ideologically and electorally.1038

The constitution of the French Fifth Republic replaced an electoral system that favored centrist coalitions with a left-right form of majoritarian politics similar in some ways to the “winner-take-all” British and U.S. electoral systems. The SFIO was a stunted, marginalized party

during the period of de Gaulle’s presidency. The power once embodied in the party became diffused, and the SFIO had to engage with left-wing political clubs and reconcile itself to the rise of François Mitterrand in its elusive quest for a left-wing majority. For the first time since the Second World War, the leaders of the French government could effectively ignore the French Socialist Party, and so they did. The heavy baggage of Mollet’s tenure as prime minister, in addition to the tumult in Algeria and France surrounding the Algerian War in the early years of the Fifth Republic, led to the political eclipse of the postwar generation of French Socialist leaders, even while the atrophied party suffocated under Mollet’s tight grasp during the 1960s.

The SPD, on the other hand, celebrated one political success after another. Though the party’s stance on French designs for the Ruhr and the Schuman Plan had earned the party international opprobrium, its efforts were an important step in the party’s quest to gain the allegiance of the Ruhr industrial workers. Its efforts in this regard were successful; in the words of one historian, “the heart of the SPD [today] beats in the [Ruhr] valley.”\footnote{Dieter Düding, \textit{Zwischen Tradition und Innovation: Die sozialdemokratische Landtagsfraktion in Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1946-1966} (Bonn: J.H.Dietz, 1995), 218-19.} From its base in the Ruhr, the SPD steadily chipped away at the CDU’s majority in North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), the largest \textit{Land} of the postwar German republic. In 1956, the SPD formed its first government in NRW under Minister-President Fritz Steinhoff in coalition with the FDP. Although the coalition lost its majority due to FDP electoral losses in 1958, the SPD increased its share of the vote in NRW by nearly five points to reach 39.2%. In 1962, it bit at the heels of its CDU rival, winning 43.3% to the CDU’s 46.4%. In July 1966, the SPD won a stunning 49.5%, and remained in government in NRW for the next twenty-five years.\footnote{Ibid., 11, 162, 201.}

The SPD’s 1966 victory in NRW represents a pertinent epilogue to this study’s narrative of SPD policies towards heavy industry in the postwar period. The vote was a clear rejection of the policies of Konrad Adenauer’s successor, CDU Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. For ideological reasons, Erhard opposed government intervention in the crises of heavy industry that broke out across the European Coal & Steel Community in the years after 1958. In 1958, the first lay-offs of mine workers began in the Ruhr valley, in France, and in Belgium. As oil imports exploded on the domestic market and U.S. coal became competitive due to a drastic decline in transatlantic

It is indicative of the change of heart towards the supranational coal and steel community that SPD leaders focused their harsh criticism of the handling of the crisis on the governing authorities in Bonn, rather than on those in Luxembourg/Brussels.\footnote{See “Erklärung der SPD-Regierungsmannschaft zur Europa-Politik,” 29 July 1965, Gerhard Kreyssig (GK) 152, AdsD.} Millions of industrial jobs were at stake. SPD and DGB leaders, as well as their counterparts in the SFIO, recognized that Western Europe was suffering a structural, rather than temporary, crisis in coal, and in European steel as well.\footnote{Werner Abelshauser, \textit{Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau}, 93-94.} As it had in 1948-51, the regional and national SPD worked to defend their constituency in the Ruhr, and they looked, in part, to the ECSC High Authority for help despite the lackluster performance of the High Authority successors to Jean Monnet.\footnote{PA-Sitzung, 24 October 1958, Parteivorstand (PV) 1958, AdsD.} Though insufficient, ECSC re-adaptation assistance disproportionately aided German industrial workers.\footnote{More than two-thirds of the 64,312 workers who received ECSC re-adaptation aid by January 1964 were German and they received 60% of the total allotment. Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, \textit{The History of the High Authority of the European Coal & Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation} (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994), 548. For a critical overview of the ECSC’s program for de-industrialization of European heavy industry, see Anthony Ferner, Ewart Keep and Jeremy Waddington, “Industrial restructuring and EU-wide social measures: broader lessons of the ECSC experience,” \textit{Journal of European Public Policy} 4, 1 (1997): 56-72.} The SPD and SFIO called for a more ambitious ECSC intervention program to help industrial restructuring. Under the pressure of structural decline, the High Authority, with SPD (and usually with SFIO) support, sanctioned the (re-)concentration of industry and the maintenance of the Ruhr sales and French purchase cartels for coal.\footnote{Spierenburg and Poidevin, \textit{op cit.}, 438-43, 520-23, 616-19.} In power at the regional level, the SPD devoted a vast amount of resources to the industrial reconversion of the Ruhr valley over the course of several decades. Historian Stefan Goch credits SPD leadership for the Ruhr’s relatively smooth transition to a postindustrial economy. Although indeed difficult, the Ruhr suffered far less from social dislocation than did other areas hit by the Western de-industrialization wave of the 1960-1980s.\footnote{Stefan Goch, “Betterment without Airs: Social, Cultural, and Political Consequences of De-Industrialization in the Ruhr,” \textit{International Institutuut voor Sociale Geschiedenis} 47 (2002): 87-111.}
One of the region’s hit the hardest by de-industrialization was the Lorraine industrial basin.\textsuperscript{1048} Massive layoffs that began in 1962 shook the region, and workers responded with factory occupations. By the early 1970s, the mono-industrial region was depopulating at a rapid rate, yet still unemployment continued to grow. Social unrest forced government intervention, but the centralized French republic, under right-leaning governments through the 1960s and 1970s, forced through industrial consolidations that provided far less compensation for laid-off workers than their counterparts in the Ruhr received.\textsuperscript{1049} French society is still reeling from the consequences of the French government’s response to de-industrialization. Yet the French economy as a whole did quite well during this period, growing at rates equal to or greater than West Germany through the 1960s. This was in part due to the strength of the steel-transforming companies that, with auto manufacturers in the lead, were able to compete successfully against their German neighbors in the 1970s to a far greater extent than ever before or after. With the steel-transforming companies collapsing in today’s France, there seems to be less immediate economic recompense for contemporary economic losses.

As the EEC came into operation after 1958, French Socialists and German Social Democrats generally put forward a common vision of the direction that they wanted the European integration process to take. The Socialist faction was the most united of the EEC’s political groups, and voted unanimously in almost all cases from 1958 to 1964. As Adenauer and de Gaulle reached a closer rapprochement from 1958 to 1963, the SFIO and SPD provided a common front against the Gaullist vision for Europe. They called for a steady expansion of the powers of the European Commission and the European Parliament, for the Commission and Parliament to have their “own [revenue] resources,” for parliamentary control over the Community’s budget, and for universal suffrage to elect a future European Parliament, rather than having the Euro-deputies delegated by the national parliaments. By 1965, the SPD was


calling for an expansion of the Community’s powers into the fields of foreign, defense, and cultural policy.1050

The two parties supported De Gaulle’s surprise proposal in 1959 to lower tariffs within the Community at a faster rate than the stages envisioned in the Treaties of Rome, but the SFIO was more lukewarm towards the SPD’s desire to significantly lower the Community’s common external tariff, which particularly affected relations between EFTA and the EEC.1051 As a number of the SPD’s economic experts had feared, the common external tariff erected was considerably higher than the prevailing German tariffs had been. During the period when the European Commission was formulating the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), both parties supported the idea of European-level subsidies for agriculture and the principle that farmers should earn incomes similar to those of other economic sectors.1052 Although both parties wanted the CAP to privilege the modernization of the agricultural sector and also assure that prices for consumers not be allowed to exceed certain levels, for the most part they acquiesced in the creation of an exclusionary EEC-zone for agriculture. Rather than attack the CAP-system as Chancellor, Willy Brandt’s government oversaw its consolidation.1053

From the first days of the EEC to the present, demands for a more comprehensive Community social policy have been a commonplace Socialist critique of the European integration process. As early as November 1959, the SFIO leadership warned against the “majesteuse slowness” of the Commission’s initiatives in this field.1054 The Socialist faction called for social harmonization through an active regional policy to raise living standards and to promote a convergence of such standards throughout the Community, as well as proposing a European social law to cover working hours, vacation periods, and social insurance.1055 It also promoted the idea of a European minimum wage, with the caveat that it might be preferable for it

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1050 “Erklärung der SPD-Regierungsgemeinschaft zur Europapolitik,” 29 July 1965, GK 156, AdsD.
1051 Sitzung des Parteivorstandes am 1.4.1960, PV 1960, AdsD; Segers, op cit., 117.
1052 Herbert Kriedemann, “Stellungnahme der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (SPD) zur Agrarpolitik im Gemeinsamen Markt,” 16 September 1958, GK 150, AdsD; “Entwurf Dr. Diest an den Vorstand der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucherverbände e.V.,” 16 August 1961, Heinrich Deist 8, AdsD; and “Note sur le redressement économique et financier,” AGM 32, OURS.
to be set at different rates in each country due to economic disparities between the member states.\textsuperscript{1056} Fifty years later, none of these socialist demands concerning social policy have become EU law.\textsuperscript{1057} That has in part been due to an undercurrent of reluctance among German Social Democrats to take measures that might negatively affect the competitiveness of German exports. While factions within the SPD have consistently called for some form of social harmonization at the EU level, the governments of Willy Brandt and, especially of Helmut Schmidt, worked to defeat such measures.

The paucity of social accomplishments in the EEC contributed to a decisive shift in French Socialist attitudes towards the European integration process. From its foundation in 1971 to the present, today’s PS has had an ambiguous policy towards Europe that seeks to reconcile the contradictory policies of its various factions. In addition to the assertion of a new generation of voices within the diffuse Socialist movement, globalization emerged as a contested issue within the French left due to the de-industrialization process that was in full steam by the mid-1960s. By 1964, the SFIO was becoming increasingly strident in its demands for a more active EEC social policy. But the party’s choice for president in the 1965 election, Francois Mitterrand, who founded the \textit{Fédération de la gauche démocrate et socialiste} (FGDS), continued to support the traditional SFIO demands for a \textit{relance} of the European integration process, the incorporation of Great Britain, and the “loyal” respect of the Treaties of Rome against de Gaulle’s revisionist policies. As calls for a new umbrella party of the socialist left gathered strength, the SFIO and Mitterrand had to negotiate not only with one another, but also with left-wing political clubs hostile to a European integration process that they perceived as benefitting newly emerging multinational corporations and the United States.

The strength of a new generation of political figures on the left who viewed the EEC as a tool of “capitalist Europe” forced the PS leadership to compromise and to temper the enthusiasm of its predecessor, the SFIO, for trade liberalization. The PS of the 1970s and thereafter was a different party responding to different pressures than had the party of Guy Mollet and André Philip in the 1950s. Eager for French Communist support to create a left-wing majority in presidential elections, the PCF and Mitterrand reached a deal in 1968 in which the PCF

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1056} Konferenz der Sozialistischen Parteien der Gemeinschaftsländer über die Probleme der “Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, Konferenzdokument Nr. 5, “Die Revision des Vertrages über die Gründung der EGKS,” von Gerhard Kreyssig, GK 120, AdsD.
\end{footnotesize}
recognized the “reality” of European integration and Mitterrand’s FDGS highlighted the “capitalist nature” of the EEC. Michel Rocard, latter a major figure in the party, opposed universal suffrage to the European Parliament and co-authored a book in 1973 titled The Common Market against Europe. Mitterrand and the PS also had to deal with pressures from Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s Centre d’études, de recherche et d’éducation socialistes (CERES), which argued that socialist goals had to be defended at the national level, rather than at the supranational level, which he claimed represented capitalist interests. Chevènement was a prominent figure in French Socialist debates from the late 1960s to the early 2000s. His critique blended curiously with Gaullism, and helped to establish a political consensus in France that is generally suspicious of further supranational integration. Under this pressure, Mitterrand switched his position to support a de facto right to a national veto, the principle of which had been established in the Luxembourg compromise that resolved the crisis in the EEC that had resulted from Charles de Gaulle’s “empty chair” policy.1058

When the PS came to power in 1981 with the presidential victory of François Mitterrand, the new government, which contained Communist ministers for the first time since 1947, attempted to accomplish a wide-reaching program of socialist reforms at the national level. The collapse of Mitterrand’s agenda in response to capital flight and other economic pressures led Mitterrand to turn to European integration as an alternative policy. He thus supported the creation of the Single European Act, negotiated in large part by French Socialist Jacques Delors. That Act further liberalized economic relations through the creation of a single market and gave the Community a name to match its new ambitions, the European Union. Yet Mitterrand’s actions did not resolve the underlying conflict within his party between proponents of trade liberalization and critics of globalization. This division has led to a great deal of policy paralysis since the PS won the parliamentary elections of 1998, and again following François Hollande’s recent presidential victory. Pressures on the left for an alternative “Social Europe” were so great that the PS split over the proposed European constitution in 2005. Sufficient PS voters joined with the right-wing Front National to defeat the treaty. Due to these deep, underlying divisions

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on the impact of European integration and globalization, French Socialist Party policy on European integration since the 1970s has often been schizophrenic and incoherent.1059

Similar pressures have at times affected the German Social Democratic Party, but significantly less so. The party has declared its support for a “Social Europe,” but it has not pushed particularly hard for these goals at the European level and at times has been an impediment. By the time it came to power in the late 1960s, the SPD was a party that favored the European integration process. During Willy Brandt’s tenure as Chancellor, monetary integration emerged as the primary item on the EEC’s agenda. The origins of the Euro and the present-day debates on the merits and demerits of monetary integration lie in this period. Although discussions of a common currency were present as far back as the late 1940s, the impact of U.S. President Richard Nixon’s abandonment of the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system created a context of monetary instability and uncertainty that forced European governments to consider a common response. Then, as now, despite a rhetorical commitment to currency integration, the SPD’s Finance Minister, Karl Schiller, favored a national approach based on the maintenance of a hard currency and low inflation that was in line with the tradition established by his CDU predecessors. Due in part to Schiller’s opposition, Brandt’s proposal of a European currency reserve fund emerged moribund.1060 Mitterrand, for his part, criticized the French government for not pursuing a common currency in response to Nixon’s actions in 1971. Only in the early 1990s did President Mitterrand extract the promise of a common currency from German Chancellor Helmut Kohl during negotiations for German reunification following the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union.

The famous “French-German duo,” which has commonly been considered the “motor” of European integration, has survived through the geopolitical and economic changes of the past fifty years in various incarnations: Willy Brandt (SPD) and George Pompidou (Gaullist), Helmut Schmidt (SPD) and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (Independent Republican), François Mitterrand (PS) and Helmut Kohl (CDU), Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Jacques Chirac (Gaullist), and Nicolas Sarkozy (center-right Union pour le mouvement populaire) and then François Hollande (PS) and Angela Merkel (CDU). At no time in the postwar period have there been both a French

Socialist President and a German Social Democratic Chancellor. In all stages of the European integration process, when French Socialists and German Social Democrats have come to power, they have had to negotiate with the rival of their cross-Rhine fraternal party. Generally they have established cordial and productive relationships with their right-leaning counterparts. It is impossible to know whether a French Socialist-German Social Democratic “duo” would have had a decisive impact on the form European integration has taken since its inception in 1950. Nonetheless, as this study has shown, their participation in the process has been crucial for the origins, evolution, and longevity of today’s European Union.
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