Pérez-Liñán, A and Ames, B and Selingson, MA
(2006)
Strategy, careers, and judicial decisions: Lessons from the bolivian courts.
Journal of Politics, 68 (2).
284 - 295.
ISSN 0022-3816
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Abstract
Using survey data from Bolivian trial courts, we explore the relationship between judicial decisions, career goals, and hierarchical pressures in continental legal systems. Based on a principal-agent approach, we hypothesize that inferior court judges are more likely to defer to superior courts when they share their interpretation of the law, when they anticipate reversals, and when they fear political manipulation of judicial careers. In turn, superior judges are likely to exercise informal pressures over inferior court judges who deviate from the former's legal views and do not anticipate their preferences. The conclusions emphasize the utility of survey research for the study of strategic compliance in judicial institutions. © 2006 Southern Political Science Association.
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