OUTSIDER PRESIDENTS, INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE, AND GOVERNABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA

by

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

2014
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December 1, 2014
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In the last 25 years, eight outsider candidates won presidential elections in Latin America. Outsiders are candidates with little political experience running with new parties. This reality presents a dual puzzle, which is the focus of this dissertation. First, what explains the sudden rise and election of political outsiders in presidential elections? Second, what are the consequences of the election of outsiders for democratic governability and institutional performance? I address these questions through a combination of quantitative analyses and an in-depth qualitative analysis of the case of Alberto Fujimori (outsider president of Peru who governed between 1990 and 2000).

Against the conventional wisdom, the first part of my dissertation shows that the rise of outsiders is not a “peril of presidentialism.” When other important economic and political factors are controlled for, the political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) is not a good predictor of outsider success. The rise of outsiders in Latin America is associated with a combination of supply and demand factors. A series of institutional design characteristics (compulsory voting, reelection provisions, and non-concurrent elections) make it easier for outsiders to run. Once viable outsiders are in the race, their success is facilitated in contexts where a severe crisis of representation exists. Dealigned citizens and voters whose preferences are not reflected in the established party system are more likely to support outsiders on election day.
The second main contribution of this dissertation is to show that outsiders are more likely to threaten democratic governability and to commit authoritarian excesses. There are three main factors that contribute to executive abuses when political outsiders reach the presidency: 1) the lack of democratic political socialization of outsiders, 2) the difficult socio-political context faced by outsiders—which creates a “window of opportunity” for executive excesses—, and 3) the lack of a strongly organized party monitoring the actions of outsider presidents. This work shows that executive-legislative relations tend to be more acrimonious when the president is an outsider. The in-depth analysis of the Fujimori case also suggests that outsiders tend to form very inexperienced cabinets, which generates serious governability problems.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have been possible without innumerable personal contributions and considerable institutional support, for which I am very grateful.

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán was an extraordinary advisor and a constant source of intellectual guidance and encouragement. I am especially grateful for the significant amount of time he made available to me in reviewing and commenting on all my chapters with such speed and insight. He is a great mentor and role model. I also wish to thank Scott Morgenstern for his invaluable help. I am grateful for the many hours that he devoted to our conversations about this work and the study of political parties in Latin America. I also thank the other members of my dissertation committee, B. Guy Peters and Melanie Hughes, for long conversations, encouragement, and practical advice.

Other University of Pittsburgh faculty members have been helpful, either through comments on the project, or because of interactions or instruction that continue to benefit me. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Barry Ames for his constant support and encouragement. His doors were always open for me, and his sharp comments on this and other projects have taught me to think like a political scientist. I also thank Steve Finkel, George Krause, and Kevin Morrison for reading early drafts of some chapters of this dissertation and providing useful feedback. Beyond Pittsburgh, other scholars took the time to discuss my project, share data, or share drafts of their own work. I especially thank Otavio Amorim Neto, David Altman, Taylor

The project also benefitted from feedback received at presentations made at several MPSA and APSA meetings, the 2010 Joint Sessions of Workshops of the ECPR in Münster (Germany), the VI Congress of European Council for Social Research on Latin America in Toulouse (France) in June 2010, the 21st ECPR Standing Group Summer School on Political Parties in Brussels (Belgium) in September 2011, and the 54th International Congress of Americanists in Vienna (Austria) in 2012. I also received feedback and suggestions in presentations at University College London, Nuffield College (Oxford), and the University of New Mexico.

I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Pittsburgh, and the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. I received fellowships from these three institutions which allowed me to focus full time on my dissertation research and other research projects. I also thank the European Union Center of Excellence at the University of Pittsburgh—and especially its director Ronald Linden— for supporting my trip to Brussels in 2011 to present part of this dissertation at the 21st ECPR Standing Group Summer School on Political Parties.

During the course of my fieldwork in Peru, I accumulated many debts. I especially thank Carlos Meléndez, José Carlos Requena, and Sofía Vera for sharing their contacts with me, and Jorge Aragón for providing me with a lot of information on Peruvian cabinets and ministers. I would also like to thank several colleagues in Lima who shared their experience and knowledge of Peruvian politics with me: Carlos Amat, Julio Cotler, Eduardo Dargent, and especially the late
Henry Pease García. I am also grateful to the many politicians and former ministers who took time off their busy schedules to discuss with me.

While at Pitt, I was also fortunate to cross paths with several great friends and colleagues. They provided companionship and intellectual stimulation during challenging times. In particular I thank Aaron Abbarno, Ignacio Arana Araya, Néstor Castañeda-Angarita, Hirokazu Kikuchi, Juan Negri, Reynaldo Rojo Mendoza, Cassilde Schwartz, Yen-Pin Su, Alejandro Trelles, Sofía Vera, and Laura Wills-Otero.

Most of all, I thank my family, especially my parents Luis and María and my siblings Cecilia, Santiago, and Pablo for their love and support. This thesis is the end-point of a long process of education, which would have been impossible without their encouragement and backing. I thank my father for introducing me to scientific inquiry and for teaching me the value of hard work and self-discipline. I acknowledge my mother for having transmitted to me an unquenchable curiosity and passion for books. It is with great appreciation that I dedicate this dissertation to them. I also thank my in-laws in Turkey (Gül, Yaman, Müge, and Nurhan) for their unwavering love and support. Nurhan Atasoy is also a great inspiration and role model for an aspiring academic.

Finally, my greatest debt of gratitude is to my wonderful wife, Yasemin Irepoglu. She has been a constant source of inspiration, love, and happiness. Without her, the stay in Peru would have been much less enjoyable. Her support and her joie de vivre helped me navigate the many difficult times in graduate school. Although she is also a political scientist, she constantly reminds me that there is much more to life than political science.
To my parents, María and Luis Carreras
1.0 INTRODUCTION

“Alberto, what are we going to do if we win?” The campaign manager and chief advisor of Alberto Fujimori (president of Peru between 1990 and 2000) recalls asking him this question in late March 1990 when they were in a car going to a campaign event. Fujimori laughed for a long time but he could not give him a coherent answer because he was not prepared for an electoral victory.¹

Alberto Fujimori can be considered as the paradigmatic example of a successful political outsider. Fujimori was an agricultural engineer and mathematics professor at the Universidad Nacional Agraria (UNA) and the son of Japanese immigrants. He ran for president in 1990 with a new and weakly organized political party called Cambio 90 (Change 1990). Fujimori had no political experience, no political connections, and no clear program of government. His rise to power was meteoric and is often characterized as a tsunami because it shook the political system in Peru. In early March 1990, Fujimori was one of five minor candidates who together had less than 1% support in public opinion polls. Yet in the presidential election on April 8 Fujimori was the second most voted candidate with a stunning 29.1% of the votes. He was elected president when he won the runoff election by a landslide on June 10 (Schmidt, 1996).

The example of Fujimori and the opening anecdote suggest a dual puzzle, which will be the focus of this study. On the one hand, what explains the sudden rise and election of political

¹ Interview with Víctor Paredes, November 2012, Lima
outsiders in presidential elections? This is something that surprises scholars, analysts, and often the candidates themselves. On the other hand, what are the consequences of the election of outsiders for democratic governability and institutional performance? How do outsiders govern given their lack of political expertise and political connections?

1.1 THE POLITICAL ARENA: NO PLACE FOR AMATEURS

Political systems since ancient times have tended to create institutional mechanisms to make sure that the people occupying positions of political authority have the right combination of skills, connections, and expertise. During the period of the late Republic in Ancient Rome, aspiring politicians had to respect a sequential order of public offices, known as *cursus honorum* (“course of honors”). Public officials had to be elected to lower offices if they wanted to be eligible for the more prestigious offices. Public servants gradually received more prerogatives as they went up in this ladder of political advancement. The different roles that public officials had to perform during their careers covered different areas of public life (financial affairs, maintenance of public buildings, organization of public festivals, and administration of justice). This institutionalized system insured that individuals reaching positions of high authority had a long and diverse political experience having occupied various positions in public administration during their careers (H. Beck, 2012; Petit, 1974). But Ancient Rome did not have a democratic political system. It was much easier for the aristocratic families in Rome (the “patricians”) to enter into the *cursus honorum* than for the rest of the population (the “plebeians”). Most citizens in Rome were not involved in political decisions.
The other major political system of the Ancient world in Western Europe was the Athenian democracy, and it had a completely different approach to political recruitment. The vast majority of magistrates and public officials in the Athenian Regime were selected by lot. One of the key features of the Greek democratic culture was rotation in office. Every citizen occupied the position of governor and governed alternatively. This practice was an important building block of Athenian democracy because all citizens had equal chance of occupying positions of political authority. Selection by lot made it possible for newcomers and amateurs to hold important magistracies while more experienced and knowledgeable individuals often had to wait on the sidelines (Hansen, 1999; Manin, 1997). But this was not considered a flaw of the Athenian institutions. On the contrary, there was a clear distrust of professionalism in Athenian democracy. Selection by lot guaranteed that individuals serving as magistrates would not enjoy extra power because of their expertise. In the words of Manin (1997: 33), “the Athenian democrats perceived a conflict between democracy and professionalism in political matters. Democracy consisted in placing decisive power in the hands of amateurs, the people the Athenians called hoi idiōtai.”

This brief historical excursus makes it clear that the government of expert politicians is by no means the only option available or normatively superior in all instances. However, modern representative democracies are based on principles and institutions that favor professionalization and expertise. Modern democracies are much larger (in size and population) than the city states in pre-modern times. Hence, governing is more complex and requires the full-time attention of a body of experts. Moreover, citizens in modern states do not have slaves who can take care of their private activities while they are concerned with public affairs. These realities naturally lead to a representative system of government. In the words of Benjamin Constant in an important
essay comparing the liberty of the moderns with the liberty of the ancients, political representation is “nothing but an organization by means of which a nation charges a few individuals to do what it can’t or doesn’t want to do itself. (...) The representative system is a mandate given to a certain number of men by the mass of the people who want their interests to be defended but don’t have the time to defend them constantly themselves” (Constant, 1988 [1819]).

Political representation goes hand in hand with a new conception of citizenship. The role of citizens is to provide political legitimacy to the elected leaders, rather than to hold office themselves (Manin, 1997). The emergence of political amateurs is not excluded de jure in most representative democracies. De facto, however, it is very difficult for political newcomers to hold high-level public offices. Representative systems select their leaders through elections. While citizens cannot directly influence political decisions, elections serve as a key mechanism of political representation and accountability (Fearon, 1999; Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999). Elections operate under a logic of distinction. In an electoral process, “voters are led to select a candidate who is superior to them in that he possesses a quality that they particularly value and that most of them do not possess” (Manin, 1997: 141).

Political experience is one of the key characteristics that voters look for when they make voting decisions. Although the political class is discredited in many countries, the public continues to value the previous political experience and the previous record in public administration of the candidates running for positions of high political authority (Johnston, Blais, Brady, & Crête, 1992; Page, 1978). More experienced candidates tend to be perceived as more competent, which is one of the basic criteria voters use to evaluate political leaders running for office (Kinder, Peters, Abelson, & Fiske, 1980).
Another characteristic that matters to voters is the party affiliation of politicians. The extension of the suffrage to increasingly large sectors of the population during the late 19th and the 20th centuries in most modern democracies made it impossible for political leaders to rely on patronage and direct contact with voters to obtain electoral support. Political leaders gradually became more policy oriented and joined political parties that were close to their policy goals. As a result of this political evolution, voters also became increasingly party-oriented, casting their votes for political parties as much as for individual politicians (Cox, 1987). Partisanship often works as a “shortcut” for voters, helping them to understand complex political debates and to choose among the different electoral options (A. Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960).

Political experience (developed in different political offices and inside political parties) is especially important in positions of high political authority, such as the presidency in a presidential system or the office of prime minister in a parliamentary system. Political leaders in these positions are expected to have issue expertise to be able to tackle difficult policy challenges, but also political expertise to be able to navigate the political and institutional system. In his classic study of presidential leadership in the United States, Neustadt (1990 [1960]: 152) states that the presidency “is not a place for amateurs”. He further points out that “expertise can hardly be acquired without deep experience in political office. The presidency is a place for men of politics.”

In sum, in modern representative democracies political leaders competing for the highest political office in their countries are expected to have a long political experience and are often evaluated by voters on the basis of their political expertise and their party affiliations. The vast majority of elected presidents and prime ministers are politically experienced and belong to established political parties, as will be shown in Chapter 3.
1.2 THE PUZZLE

We can now go back to the research questions I posed at the beginning of this introduction. The rise of Alberto Fujimori is not an isolated event in the contemporary political history of Latin America. Despite the natural tendency of voters to support experienced party politicians in presidential elections, seven other presidents were elected as outsiders since the rise of Fujimori in 1990. Many other presidential candidates obtained significant support from the voters but fell short of an electoral victory.

The outsider presidents elected in Latin America had different profiles but shared two key characteristics: very limited political experience and rise to power with a new political party or political movement.

Violeta Chamorro was elected as an outsider president in Nicaragua in February 1990. Chamorro was the widow of an important journalist and opposition leader to the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua (Pedro Joaquín Chamorro). Violeta Chamorro had no political experience –except for a brief participation in the first National Junta of National Reconstruction after the end of the Somoza regime. She spent most of the 1980s as a manager of the opposition newspaper La Prensa that she had inherited from her husband. In 1990, she became the leader of the Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO), an electoral movement that included political forces from the left to the right, as well as many political independents. She won the presidential elections by a landslide because she was seen as a unifying figure after the civil conflict that divided Nicaragua in the 1980s (Chamorro, 1996).

The next political outsider to be elected president in Latin America was Hugo Chávez (president of Venezuela between 1999 and 2013). Chávez was an army officer with very limited political and administrative experience when he ran for the presidency in 1998. In the early
1990s, Chávez was completely unknown to the general public. He was opposed to the neoliberal policies implemented by Acción Democrática and wanted to reform political institutions in Venezuela, perceived by him as very corrupt. In February 1992, he attempted a military coup against the democratically elected government of Carlos Andrés Pérez. Although the coup failed, Chávez became a popular figure in Venezuela. He ran in the 1998 elections in Venezuela with a new political movement called Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) which combined an anti-establishment rhetoric and a vague leftist ideology. Chávez comfortably won the presidential elections in 1998, and governed Venezuela in a delegative fashion for more than a decade (Canache, 2002; Corrales & Penfold, 2011; Hawkins, 2010).

Lucio Gutiérrez (president of Ecuador between 2003 and 2005) followed a very similar pathway to power than Hugo Chávez. In the late 1990s, Gutiérrez was an army colonel with no experience in politics or in public administration. In January 2000, he led a military-indigenous popular uprising and coup attempt against the democratically elected government of Jamil Mahuad (Democracia Popular). Gutiérrez suddenly became a popular political leader and began a rapid political career after this failed coup attempt. He created a new political party called Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero (January 21 Patriotic Society –PSP–).\textsuperscript{2} This personalist political party ran in the 2002 national elections with a vague leftist and nationalist program, and allied with indigenous movements. Gutiérrez made it to the second round which he won with 58.7% of the votes, defeating the right-wing populist candidate Alvaro Noboa (CIDOB).

Another political newcomer came to power a few years later in Ecuador: Rafael Correa. Correa has been the president of Ecuador since 2006. He is an economist trained at the Université Catholique de Louvain and at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where

\textsuperscript{22} January 21 refers to the date of the 2000 Ecuadorean coup d'état.
he obtained his PhD in 2001. In 2005, Correa served as Economy and Finance minister under
Alfredo Palacio. He only served in that capacity for four months, but he used that position as a
platform to launch a new political movement: Alianza PAIS. The movement’s platform proposed
institutional reforms, anti-corruption policies, regional integration, and economic relief for
Ecuador's poor. In spite of his political inexperience and of not having the support of an
organized political party, Correa defeated Alvaro Noboa by a landslide in the second round of
the presidential election (Philip & Panizza, 2011).

Ecuador is not the only country in which more than one outsider has been elected
president since 1990. After the election of Fujimori in 1990, two other political newcomers came
to power in Peru. In 2001, Alejandro Toledo was elected president defeating Alan García
(APRA). Toledo was an economist with an impressive academic and professional background.
After receiving his PhD from Stanford University in the 1970s, he worked as an economic
consultant for many international organizations (IADB, USAID, OECD, and WTO), and as a
professor in the Graduate School of Business (ESAN) in Lima. In the mid-1990s, he launched a
political movement called País Posible to fight against the political and economic excesses of the
Fujimori administration. First unsuccessful, Toledo managed to position himself as the main
opposition figure to the Fujimori regime. With very limited political experience, Toledo won the
first presidential elections after the fall of the Fujimori regime.

The honeymoon period for Toledo was short. Although his time in office coincided with
a period of sustained economic growth, he also became a victim of the public disenchantment
with governmental institutions. Toledo’s approval ratings hovered around 10% during his last
two years as president. Toledo’s party, Perú Posible, was repeatedly accused by the media of
nepotism and influence peddling in Congress and the president himself was involved in a series
of corruption scandals. In this context of renovated discontent with political parties and
democratic institutions, another outsider emerged with force in late 2005: Ollanta Humala. As in
the cases of Chávez and Gutiérrez, Humala became a prominent political figure when he led an
unsuccessful military revolt against President Fujimori in October 2000. He was later pardoned
after the downfall of the Fujimori regime. In 2005 he founded the Peruvian Nationalist Party
(\textit{Partido Nacionalista Peruano} –PNP–) and registered to run in the 2006 presidential election.
Humala positioned himself as an anti-corruption crusader criticizing career politicians and
traditional political parties. His program combined some elements of left-wing and nationalist
ideas, as well as a defense of ethnic interests (Cameron, 2007). In spite of his electoral
inexperience, Humala qualified to the second round of the presidential election –obtaining 30.6%
of the votes in the first round– but was narrowly defeated in the second round by the APRA
candidate Alan García. Following the example of Toledo, Humala ran again in the 2011
presidential elections with a more moderate program. While maintaining a leftist platform, he
toned down the nationalist aspects of his program and pledged to maintain foreign investment in
Peru. In this second attempt, Humala was elected president of Peru after narrowly defeating
Keiko Fujimori in the second round.

Another country that experienced the rise of a political outsider is Paraguay. This South
American country was under the rule of the Colorado Party for 61 years between 1947 and 2008.
In the 2008 presidential elections, the candidate of the ruling party was defeated by Fernando
Lugo, a former bishop of an impoverished area –adherent of the “liberation theology”– and
progressive reformist who had no previous political experience. Lugo led the Patriotic Alliance
for Change (APC), a new and broad coalition of parties and groups spanning the entire
ideological spectrum. He took advantage of the factionalism and fragmentation within the ruling
Colorado Party and managed to attract the second major party in Paraguay (the Liberal Party) to the APC coalition. Lugo proposed to fight against the entrenched corruption of the ruling party and to combat poverty and inequality in Paraguay. He clearly benefitted from his image as a political outsider in an electoral context in which the population was deeply disenchanted with the corruption and inefficiency of the traditional political class. The outsider candidate won with 41% of the vote in a plurality system, while the Colorado Party candidate obtained only 30% of the votes cast (Abente-Brun, 2009; Lambert, 2008).

Although each case of “outsidership” is different, some general observations can be made about these independent candidates. First, outsiders tend to be elected in moments of deep sociopolitical turmoil related to severe economic hardships (e.g. Fujimori and Chávez), institutional instability (e.g. Gutiérrez and Correa), and a context of widespread internal violence (e.g. Chamorro and Fujimori). These are also moments in which citizens’ trust in the traditional political class is extremely low. Political experience and policy expertise are most valuable in this context of crisis. Paradoxically, however, outsiders reach the highest office in this difficult situation without any previous political socialization and without political skills.

The second general observation that can be made about outsider presidents is that they tend to generate situations of extreme institutional conflict and instability. Outsiders tend to govern in a very personalistic way, bypassing and confronting other institutions, such as the legislature, the judiciary, and the media. Outsiders such as Fujimori, Chávez, and Correa are among the most vivid examples of “delegative” presidents in Latin America after the Third Wave of democratization (O'Donnell, 1994), and they have managed to remain in power beyond their constitutional terms through a variety of illegal measures. On the other hand, the confrontational style and lack of political experience of other outsider presidents has led
powerful political actors to push for a democratic breakdown. Gutiérrez in Ecuador and Lugo in Paraguay were removed from power before the end of their terms.

After analyzing in detail the contextual and individual-level factors that explain the rise of outsiders, this dissertation will focus on the governability problems and institutional failures that often materialize when a political outsider is in power.

1.3 WHY STUDY OUTSIDERS?

It is important to analyze the rise of political outsiders for several reasons. First of all, this study addresses a glaring empirical gap. As the previous section makes clear, the election of outsider presidents is not an isolated event in the fragile democracies of Latin America. Eight outsiders came to power in the region in the past 25 years, but we still lack a comprehensive comparative analysis of the causes and the consequences of the election of these political neophytes.

Second, this dissertation also makes an important theoretical contribution. My study has important implications for different literatures and different areas of study in comparative politics such as the literature on party system weakness and the rise of new parties, the literature on the crisis of democratic representation in Latin America, the literature on democratic consolidation in fragile democracies, and most importantly the literature on the perils of presidentialism. I hope that this dissertation will contribute to the broadening of theoretical horizons about the crisis of democratic representation in Latin America by analyzing one of its most extreme outcomes: the rise of political newcomers to positions of high political authority. In line with Maiwaring et al. (2006: 12), democratic representation in this work refers to a “specifically democratic form of representation that is established when a voter (the principal)
chooses an agent (a politician or a party) to represent her interests in a democratic regime.” In many Latin American countries, especially in the Andean countries, this link between voters and politicians has eroded over the past three decades (Carreras, Morgenstern, & Su, 2013). Across the region, there is a widespread disaffection with political institutions in general – and political parties in particular –, as reflected in survey data (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Lagos, 1997). The deficient government performance in three key areas (economic security, public security, and corruption) has increased citizens’ disenchantment with democratic institutions (Hagopian, 2005; M. A. Seligson, 2002a). One of the most dramatic manifestations of the crisis of representation is the rise of outsiders (Mainwaring et al., 2006: 21-23), and the present study seeks to analyze the consequences of the election of political newcomers for democratic stability and institutional performance.

This dissertation also revisits the theoretical debate on the perils of presidentialism. In the early 1990s, a series of scholars argued that presidential regimes threatened democratic quality and consolidation. In particular, executive-legislative relations in presidential systems were described as prone to conflict. Among the main perils of presidentialism, these scholars mentioned the dual democratic legitimacy, the temporal rigidity of presidentialism, the winner take all logic of presidential elections, and the principle of non-reelection (Lijphart, 1992a; Linz, 1990, 1994). Since the early 1990s, several scholars of political institutions and Latin American politics tested these different claims. The current consensus is that these perils of presidentialism were greatly exaggerated in these early studies (Carreras, 2012). However, the critics of presidentialism also pointed out that the rise of outsiders is a peril of presidentialism because elections tend to be more personalized in presidential systems (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982). That argument was never tested empirically. My dissertation contributes to closing that empirical and
theoretical gap. I analyze whether outsiders are more likely to come to power in presidential systems, and whether they destabilize democratic institutions once they are elected.

Finally, this study addresses an important policy concern. There is a clear global tide of anti-political feelings. This crisis of representation is obvious in the fragile and weakly institutionalized democracies of Latin America, where polls repeatedly show the low approval ratings of political institutions and political parties (Lagos, 1997, 2008). Very similar patterns of political disenchantment are observed in Eastern European countries, where there was a clear erosion of trust in elected institutions since the democratic transitions (Jovanović & Pavićević, 2012). But this crisis of confidence in democratic institutions and political leaders is also affecting consolidated democracies in Western Europe and North America, where trust in political parties is on the decline and citizens are becoming more critical of politicians and political institutions (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Norris, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000). Given this situation of widespread political distrust, it is reasonable to expect that many other political newcomers will be elected to positions of high political authority both in fragile and in more robust democracies. In addition to the outsider presidents in Latin America analyzed in this dissertation, political outsiders appear to be increasingly popular in many other democracies. Outsider candidates are emerging with force in presidential, gubernatorial, and mayoral races in Asia, in countries such as Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Pakistan. According to a recent article in The Economist, “a new force is emerging in Asian politics: the non-politician—or at least the politician posing as such” (The Economist, 2012). All these outsiders run anti-establishment and anti-corruption campaigns which excite young people cynical about politics. Political newcomers are also becoming popular in Eastern Europe. In the presidential elections in Slovakia on March 30 2014, a political outsider (Andrej Kiska) defeated the candidate of the
incumbent party by a landslide. Kiska is a successful entrepreneur and a philanthropist, who has no political experience and prides himself on not having any political affiliations. This political newcomer ran on a wave of continuing popular anger at allegations of sleaze and distrust in established parties (BBC, 2014; Kral, 2014). Political outsiders and anti-party movements are knocking at the doors of more established democracies also. The Five Stars movement, an anti-establishment political party launched by the comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, obtained 25.55% of the votes in the 2013 general elections in Italy, making it the second most voted party. The party has rejected to enter into coalitions with other established parties, creating a series of governability problems (Amenduni, 2014). The Tea Party movement in the United States is another example of a successful anti-establishment movement in a consolidated democracy. Given this global phenomenon of anti-parties or anti-politics feelings and the concomitant rise of newcomers and non-politicians, it is essential to understand the specific factors that lead to the election of outsiders and the consequences of the rise of outsiders for democratic governability.

1.4 MOVING BEYOND INSTITUTIONS

The study of Latin American politics has been dominated by the institutionalist approach in the last twenty-five years (Ames, 1999). This approach holds that political behavior and policy outcomes are shaped by political institutions. The formal rules of the game “regulate the formation of binding policy decisions and the selection of the people in charge of such decisions in a polity” (Pérez Liñán & Castañeda Angarita, 2012: 395). This approach has undoubtedly generated valuable insights and yielded promising answers to the key areas of theoretical debate in Latin American politics; and the research presented in the first part of this dissertation
contributes to this institutionalism literature. In fact, I conduct institutional analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study in order to assess the different institutional determinants of the rise of outsider politicians in presidential elections in Latin America. As will be shown below, this institutionalist approach produces important findings that challenge the conventional wisdom regarding the emergence of independent candidates.

The focus of the political science discipline on political institutions, however, came at the price of “a diminution of interest in those selected few without whom political history can never be understood” (Wiatr, 1988: 91). Without disregarding the importance of institutions, the second part of this dissertation shifts the spotlight to the dynamics of political leadership in countries governed by outsider presidents. Bermeo correctly points out that “the quality of governance ultimately rests on the qualities of those who govern. If we ignore these qualities (…), we risk overlooking the essentially human dynamic of politics. Elites formulate preferences and weight constraints in accord with what they have been taught, where they have been, and where they think they might be going” (Bermeo, 2002: 205-206). This is exactly the approach I adopt in the second part of the dissertation, when I show that the socialization of the leaders and their previous political experience (or lack thereof) is essential to understand how they govern.  

Studies of political leadership focus on three interrelated questions: who are the leaders; how do they make decisions; and, what effects do their decisions have? (Wiatr, 1977: 82). These are three prominent questions in this dissertation. By differentiating between outsider and traditional politicians, this study implicitly argues that it matters who the leaders are in a democratic system. My dissertation also assesses how outsiders govern despite the fact that they

3 Other studies in the American or Latin American context focus on the impact of personality traits on presidential leadership style (Arana Araya, 2014; Barber, 1992), but the link between political experience, political socialization and governing style is rarely established in the literature.
are devoid of political connections and political expertise. I also analyze the consequences of the arrival to power of outsider leaders for democratic governability and the functioning of democratic institutions.

1.5 ROADMAP OF THE DISSERTATION

As noted previously, the key aim of this dissertation is to provide a systematic, empirically oriented analysis to answer two questions: (a) What are the factors that determine the rise to power of outsider presidents? (b) Once these outsiders are elected, how do they impact democratic governability and institutional performance? In order to answer these questions, this research proceeds in the following way. Chapter 2 starts by proposing a rigorous definition of the term “political outsider”. Although the concept seems commonsensical, previous studies have defined “outsidership” in very different ways. While some scholars focus on the previous political experience of politicians, others characterize politicians who run with new parties as outsiders. In Chapter 2, I argue that both elements are essential in the definition of “outsidership”. An outsider is a newcomer politician who rises to power with no (or very limited) experience in politics and public administration and with a new party or electoral movement. I also discuss at length the operationalization of the term “political outsider” which is then used in all the empirical analyses of the dissertation.

One of the key arguments of this dissertation is that outsiders are more likely to threaten democratic governability and to commit authoritarian excesses. Chapter 2 also provides the basic theoretical framework that explains why outsiders are more likely to behave undemocratically
and to bypass other institutions. I argue that there are three main factors that contribute to executive abuses when political outsiders reach the presidency: 1) the individual characteristics of the outsider, 2) the difficult socio-political context faced by outsiders, and 3) the strategic constraints faced by outsiders when they come to power. Outsiders tend to come to power in moments of deep sociopolitical crisis and economic decline, when citizens’ disenchantment with established parties and political institutions is at its peak. These are moments in which political experience and political skills are most essential. But outsiders lack the political socialization and the political connections that would help them to reach compromises and govern in these moments of crisis. The sociopolitical crisis also provides a “window of opportunity” for outsiders to commit executive abuses because citizens are less likely to sanction presidents when they abuse discredited institutions. Finally, outsiders are not disciplined by strongly organized parties so they have more leeway to commit authoritarian excesses. Since they are elected through electoral vehicles (which are often nothing more than empty shells), outsiders are not sanctioned or controlled when they take controversial or undemocratic decisions. This theoretical chapter sets the stage for the empirical chapters that follow.

The empirical chapters of the dissertation are divided in two different parts, which address the two research questions in this study. Part 1 (Chapters 3-5) analyzes the contextual and individual-level factors that contribute to the rise of outsider presidents. Part 2 (Chapters 6-7) assesses the consequences of the election of outsider presidents for democratic governability and institutional performance.

The research on the determinants of the rise of outsiders proceeds from the general to the specific. Chapter 3 empirically tests the claim that the rise of outsiders is a peril of presidentialism (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982). Using a series of multivariate logistic regressions, I
estimate the likelihood of outsider rise in presidential and parliamentary systems. In order to conduct this analysis, I built a database including biographical information on all the heads of government that arrived to power following parliamentary and presidential elections in all democratic countries in the period 1945-2010. Interestingly, the results cast doubts on the conventional wisdom. When other important economic and political factors are controlled for, the political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) is not a good predictor of outsider success.

The negative finding reported in Chapter 3 generates a whole new series of questions. The fact remains that eight outsiders arrived to power in Latin America in the last 25 years, and many other independent candidates were narrowly defeated. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the presidential systems of Latin America, and try to assess the individual and institutional factors that explain the sudden rise of outsider candidates in the region. Chapter 4 analyzes the institutional design characteristics that facilitate the rise of outsider candidates in presidential elections. Through a cross-national time series analysis, I find that the rise of outsiders is more likely when three factors are present: 1) legislative and presidential elections are not concurrent, 2) voting is compulsory, and 3) the incumbent president is not up for reelection.

Chapter 5 uses available survey data from LAPOP and Latinobarómetro surveys to analyze the individual-level determinants of the rise of outsiders in the region. The main conclusion of this chapter is that the vote for outsiders is a political vote capturing deeply held feelings of political disenchantment, rather than an economic vote of citizens dissatisfied with the economic performance of the incumbent government. My results suggest that outsiders are likely to be supported by people who do not trust political parties, citizens who are dissatisfied with the performance of democracy, and leftist voters disenchanted with the convergence of traditional parties on neoliberal policies.
The second part of the dissertation shifts the focus of analysis to the consequences of the rise of outsiders for democratic governability and institutional performance. In line with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, my expectation is that outsiders threaten governability and are more likely to commit executive abuses against other democratic institutions. Chapter 6 analyzes the impact of outsider presidents on executive-legislative confrontation. I argue that outsider presidents tend to face more serious and prolonged conflicts with the legislature for a series of reasons. First, outsiders tend to be minority presidents with very low support in the legislature. Second, outsider presidents lack the skills and resources that could help them to overcome this minority situation and reach deals with the most represented parties in the legislature. Third, outsiders are not punished by the citizenry when they confront the legislature because outsiders come to power in moments in which political institutions and politicians are very discredited. In this chapter, I show using cross-national time series data that outsider presidents are more likely to face protracted confrontation with the legislature over the approval of bills and over executive appointments. The empirical analysis also demonstrates that the probability of congress dissolution attempts by the president is much higher when the president is an outsider.

The study of the link between outsider presidents, democratic governability, and institutional performance is problematic because the relationship might be spurious. It is indeed possible that an antecedent condition—economic and sociopolitical crisis—explains both the rise of outsiders and the institutional instability that follows. My dissertation takes this concern very seriously. In Chapter 6, I address this potential spuriousness in two different ways. First, I conduct confirmatory statistical analysis with propensity score matching. This procedure estimates the impact of outsiders on executive-legislative confrontation with a reduced sample in
which the negative cases match the key characteristics of the positive outsidership cases. This estimation confirms the deleterious impact of outsiders on executive-legislative relations. Second, I conduct an in-depth analysis of the case of Peru which compares executive-legislative confrontation during the 1980s (under the presidency of two career politicians –Belaúnde and García–) with executive-legislative confrontation in the early 1990s (under the administration of an outsider –Fujimori–). The three presidents faced a similar situation of severe economic crisis and sociopolitical turmoil. However, the level of executive-legislative confrontation was much higher under Fujimori. The outsider president went as far as dissolving the legislature in 1992, a clear authoritarian move (Conaghan, 2005). In sum, this dissertation strongly suggests that outsider presidents produce negative effects for democratic governability and institutional performance that go above and beyond what the crisis conditions that they inherit would have produced in their absence.

The last empirical chapter of the dissertation (Chapter 7) continues to study the consequences of the rise of outsider presidents by analyzing the impact of outsiders on the composition and functioning of cabinets. An in-depth analysis of the case of Peru –comparing the administration of the outsider Fujimori to the administrations of traditional party politicians who preceded him– demonstrates that outsiders tend to appoint neophyte ministers who lack ties with the political establishment. This chapter suggests that cabinets formed by outsiders are less partisan and less politically experienced. The fieldwork I conducted in Peru also allows me to assess the consequences of this pattern for cabinet politics and governability. Chapter 7 shows that cabinets formed by outsiders are affected by two problems that threaten democratic governability: 1) loss of ministerial autonomy, 2) difficulty for the cabinet to work as a coordinated team.
The main contribution of this dissertation is to analyze the link between the election of outsider presidents and the performance of democratic institutions under presidentialism. The big message of this study is that outsider politicians pose a considerable threat to democratic governability and institutional performance in presidential systems. Outsiders tend to be elected in contexts of economic crisis and sociopolitical instability. However, they lack the political experience, connections, and skills to deal with this difficult situation in a democratic fashion. Outsiders are more likely to confront and bypass other democratic institutions because they lack a democratic socialization within longstanding parties, they are not constrained by strong and organized parties, and they often obtain political and electoral rewards by choosing an aggressive strategy. In the last 25 years, political outsiders have been more prone to engage in direct and repeated confrontation with the legislature, the judiciary, and the media. This is the first study to tease out the causal mechanisms behind these authoritarian excesses and to demonstrate empirically the negative “outsider effect” on democratic governability and institutional performance.
2.0 DEFINITION, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND THEORY

There are very few comparative studies analyzing the causes or the consequences of the rise of outsider presidents. This theoretical and empirical gap is partly linked to the dearth of a clear and consensual definition of the phenomenon. Academic works on outsiders have mostly focused on one case –Fujimori and Chávez receiving most of the scholarly attention—, and have thereby not deployed serious efforts in defining the term “outsider.” The first contribution of this dissertation is to propose a rigorous definition and operationalization of “outsidership.” This operationalization effort then allows me to define the universe of cases of “outsidership” that will be analyzed in the empirical analyses in this study. The second key contribution of this dissertation is to analyze the causes and the consequences of the rise of outsider presidents in Latin America, which will allow me to test whether the election of outsider presidents constitutes a peril of presidentialism as argued by the critics of presidentialism (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982).

The main argument in this dissertation is that independent presidents pose a serious threat to democratic governability and institutional performance.

After providing a definition and operationalization of the term “outsider”, this chapter gives an account of the research design and the methods used to analyze empirically the factors that lead to the emergence of outsiders and the consequences of the rise of outsiders for democratic governability. The final section of this chapter provides the basic theoretical
framework that explains why outsiders are more likely to behave undemocratically and to bypass other institutions. Hence, this chapter sets the stage for the empirical chapters that follow.

2.1 POLITICAL OUTSIDERS: DEFINITION

The concept “outsider” seems commonsensical but the literature on Latin American presidentialism has not converged to a single and consensual definition of the term. In fact, scholars interested in the rise of political independents have tended to study this issue under the theoretical framework of “populism” or “neo-populism” (Armony, 2002; Barr, 2003; Cammack, 2000; Crabtree, 1999; Freidenberg, 2007; Hawkins, 2010; Knight, 1998; Madrid, 2008; Panizza, 2000; Roberts, 1995; Walker, 2008; Weyland, 1999). Others have preferred to use the term “anti-politics” or “anti-party” politicians to describe leaders who climb to the highest office using an anti-establishment rhetoric during campaigns (García Montero, 2001; Kenney, 1998a).

Many scholars interested in “outsiders” lump together this concept with the notion of “populist” and “anti-party politician” which has led to a conceptual muddle. This is evident in the definition of outsider offered by Linz in which the three dimensions are lumped together. According to Linz (1994: 26), outsiders are “candidates not identified with or supported by any political party, sometimes without any governmental or even political experience, on the basis of a populist appeal often based on hostility to parties and “politicians”” (emphasis added). In his study of political outsiders in Bolivia, Mayorga (2006: 133) defines outsiders as “neopopulist and anti-political actors”. Other studies talk about “populist outsiders” (Doyle, 2011; Weyland, 2003) or “antipolitical establishment outsiders” (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003) without clearly defining the concept of “outsider.” I use a different conceptual strategy by distinguishing these
three concepts –“populism”, “anti-politics”, and “outsiders”– as has been advocated by other scholars (Barr, 2009; Kenney, 1998a). In this dissertation, politicians will be defined as either “insiders” or “outsiders” depending only on their party system origins and the nature of their previous political experience.

This conceptual and research strategy has many advantages. “Populism” is a highly contested concept which is difficult to operationalize. This conceptual fluidity has led some scholars to abandon the study of populism altogether, and to describe it as an “empty concept” (Lynch, 1999a). On the contrary, the concept of political outsider can be straightforwardly operationalized and measured by focusing on the previous trajectory of presidential candidates. Moreover, whether outsiders are populists or anti-establishment politicians is an empirical question which should not be assumed a priori by researchers. Even if all outsiders were populists, it could still be the case that some insiders were populists too. For instance, two Argentinean presidents –Menem and Kirchner– have been described as populist politicians despite being insiders since they had a long political career within the traditional Partido Justicialista before coming to power (Castorina, 2009; Leaman, 1999). Hence, it is important to distinguish the study of populists and outsiders.

Given the conceptual confusion surrounding the concept, it is essential to propose a clear definition of the concept “political outsider” that will guide the empirical analysis that follows. Social science concepts are both multidimensional and multilevel (Goertz 2006; Sartori 1970). The basic level is the concept as used in theoretical propositions (e.g. capitalism, democracy, corporatism). In this dissertation, the basic level is “outsider” and I test several theoretical

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4 In his work, Hawkins (2009, 2010) proposes an interesting way of measuring populist discourse through content analysis. However, his approach is not applicable to my research since it is almost impossible to obtain campaign speeches delivered by all candidates in presidential elections in Latin American countries in the period 1980-2010.
propositions related to this concept. For instance, I hypothesize in Chapter 6 that outsiders tend to have more conflictive relations with the legislature. The secondary level is made of the multiple constitutive dimensions of the basic level concept. In this case, the basic level concept “outsider” has two constitutive dimensions: 1) political inexperience and 2) rise to prominence through a new party. The indicator level provides specific information on how the constitutive dimensions identified in the secondary level can be operationalized by looking at empirical data. This third level will allow me to identify which presidents (and presidential candidates) fall under the concept “outsiders” when conducting the different empirical analyses in this dissertation.

2.1.1 Secondary level: the constitutive dimensions of the concept “outsider”

Two main “outsidership” dimensions have been identified in previous works. The first dimension is related to the characteristics of the politician’s party. Barr defines an outsider as “someone who gains political prominence not through or in association with an established, competitive party, but as a political independent or in association with new or newly competitive parties” (Barr, 2009: 33). Similarly, Kenney (1998: 59) uses “the term 'outsider' to refer to politicians who have become politically prominent from outside of the national party system, and the term 'insider' to refer to politicians who rise to political prominence from within the party system.” A working paper of the Inter-American Development Bank also looks at the party system origins of the candidates when categorizing presidential candidates as either “outsiders”
or “insiders” (S. Miller, 2011). Several studies of independent candidates in U.S. presidential elections do not specifically talk about “political outsiders” but they frame their studies in terms of “third party” candidates, suggesting that not being part of the established two-party system is their main distinguishing characteristic (Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, & Rohde, 2000; Chressanthis & Shaffer, 1993; Gold, 1995; Peterson & Wrighton, 1998). In a similar vein, Seawright (2011) points out that the main characteristic of outsider candidates is that they do not belong to their country’s traditional parties. Finally, Weyland (1993: 23) characterizes the Brazilian president Collor de Mello –president between 1990 and 1992– as an outsider because of “his distance from national, more established political parties.”

The second “outsidership” dimension focuses on the previous political career of presidents and prime ministers. Scholars often describe presidential candidates with no previous experience in politics or public administration as outsiders. In one of the rare large-N studies of the causes of outsider emergence in Latin America, Corrales (2008: 5) defines outsiders (or ‘newcomers’) as “those who run for president with no prior electoral experience (running for political office) and no major public administration experience.” In a study of independent candidates in legislative elections in 34 countries around the world between 1945 and 2003, Brancati (2008: 650) similarly describes legislative candidates as outsiders when they have “no experience in government.” In a recent contribution, Samuels and Shugart (2010) also focus on the previous political career of presidents and prime ministers. They consider politicians with

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5 Miller (2011: 2) defines an outsider as “a candidate who is not part of the traditional party system in the country.”

6 Although Seawright (2011: 2) argues that outsiders “typically have little governing experience,” political inexperience is not a defining characteristic of “outsidership” in his analysis.
limited previous political experience (in the party, in the cabinet or in the legislature) as outsiders.\(^7\)

In sum, the concept “outsider” has two constitutive dimensions: 1) political inexperience, and 2) rise to prominence through a new party. Given these two dimensions, it is possible to conceptualize a positive pole (political outsiders) and a negative pole (political insiders). In the positive pole, we find presidential candidates that are both politically inexperienced and run with a new party or as independents. In the negative pole, we find “traditional” or career politicians who run with an established party. However, not all presidential candidates fall in these two poles. There is a “grey zone” between these two poles that needs to be conceptualized. Although politically inexperienced candidates tend to run in presidential elections with new parties, there are several examples of presidential candidates with no experience in politics or public administration who are recruited by established parties.\(^8\) For instance, the two last elected presidents in El Salvador – Antonio Saca from ARENA and Mauricio Funes from FMLN – ran as political neophytes but on the ticket of established parties.\(^9\) There are also presidential candidates with a long political career in established parties that decide to run under the banner of a new party. One of the best examples in the recent political history of Latin America is Álvaro Uribe – Colombian president between 2002 and 2010 – who was a well-known figure in the Partido Liberal, and decided to run in the 2002 presidential elections as an independent. The dichotomy insiders vs. outsiders is not satisfactory because it hides these important distinctions. This discussion implies that there are four types of presidential candidates. “Insiders” are career

\(^7\) In addition to the political positions discussed by Samuels and Shugart (2010), I also look at the subnational level. In this work, I do not consider former governors as political outsiders.

\(^8\) This strategy of recruiting politically inexperienced outsiders with “name recognition” is also often used by parties in legislative elections (Brancati, 2008).

\(^9\) Both Antonio Saca and Mauricio Funes were popular radio and TV hosts who were recruited by the strongest parties in the country to run as presidential candidates.
politicians who run under the banner of established parties. “Outsiders” are politicians that have not had a political career and compete in presidential elections with a new party (e.g. Lugo in Paraguay). “Mavericks” are politicians that were political figures in already existing parties but that compete with a newly created party (e.g. Uribe in Colombia).10 “Amateurs” are politicians that are new to politics but compete in traditional parties (e.g. Mauricio Funes in El Salvador).11 Figure 2.1 presents a typology of presidential candidates incorporating this conceptual refinement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Experience</th>
<th>Prior Political Career</th>
<th>New Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newcomer</td>
<td>INSIDER</td>
<td>MAVERICK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amateur</td>
<td>AMATEUR</td>
<td>OUTSIDER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.1.** Typology of presidential candidates

Amateurs and mavericks are presidential candidates who share one of the constitutive dimensions of political “outsidership” but lack the other one. Can we consider these types of

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10 The term “maverick” was first used to refer to party renegades by Barr (2009).
11 I borrow the term “amateur” from David Canon’s work on political amateurs in the US Congress (Canon, 1990, 1993).
candidates as “diminished subtypes” (Collier & Levitsky, 1997) of the pure concept “outsiders”, or else should we exclude them completely from the domain captured by the concept? Theorists of social science concepts suggest two distinct answers to this question. Sartori (1970, 1984) holds a “necessary and sufficient” view of concepts, according to which all the constitutive dimensions are necessary and they are jointly sufficient for something to fit into the category. On the contrary, the “family resemblance” concept structure does not contain any necessary condition. A given object or phenomenon fits into a category if it is similar enough on the constitutive dimensions to be part of the family (Collier & Mahon, 1993).

In this study, we define outsiders in a Sartorian fashion and we consider both constitutive dimensions as necessary for a candidate to be considered a political outsider. The reason for rejecting a radial conceptualization is mainly theoretical. In fact, Goertz (2006: 5) recommends the identification of “ontological attributes that play a key role in causal hypotheses, explanations, and mechanisms.” The main theoretical goal of this dissertation is to analyze the consequences for governability of the arrival to power of presidents that come from outside the political arena. Hence, it is important to exclude from the definition politicians who made a career in established parties before running for the presidency as independents (mavericks) or inexperienced politicians who run with established parties and benefit from the support of their party once they arrive to power (amateurs). Mavericks and amateurs often claim to be real outsiders and tend to run anti-establishment campaigns, but they still benefit from their political experience and partisan resources when they come to power. In that sense, they have more in common with insiders than with outsiders. Although analyzing the rise to power of mavericks or amateurs may be interesting in its own right, this dissertation will focus on outsiders who are both politically neophyte and run under the banner of a new party.
2.1.2 Indicator level: operationalization of the concept of political outsider

The indicator level is “where the concept gets specific enough to guide the acquisition of empirical data” (Goertz, 2006: 62). In this section, I provide details about the empirical criteria that politicians need to fulfill in order to be categorized as outsiders.

The first constitutive dimension of “outsidership” is political inexperience. Political experience can be acquired through different political positions or roles. The most common form of gaining political experience is by becoming elected to a national legislative body such as the lower house or the Senate. Legislators have a first-hand experience with the policy-making process. They also become politically socialized, as they often belong to parties that have to reach compromises and enter into coalitions to get some of their policies adopted. They also become familiarized with the “dirty” aspects of legislative politics (filibustering, pork, corruption) that may facilitate or stall the adoption of certain policies. Party leaders of nationally competitive established parties also accumulate significant political experience over the years.12 Even when they are not members of any legislative body, party leaders gain political experience because they negotiate political deals with other parties and they take some of the strategic electoral and policy decisions of the parties they lead. Political experience can also be acquired through executive positions at the regional or national level. Heads of government, governors, mayors of major cities, and cabinet members have different responsibilities but they all have to interact with an array of political actors and make use of their political resources to try to obtain their goals and implement their desired policies. Finally, political experience can be acquired

12 Nationally competitive parties are parties that “have been at least competitive in national contests for executive office over several election cycles” (Lupu, 2011: 4). No politician that was a leader of one of these established parties in his previous career can be considered a real outsider (or appear as such in the eyes of the electorate).
through positions of prominence in *public administration*. High-ranked public officials (e.g. the head of the Central Bank or the National Audiovisual Council) work in close contact with political actors and try to influence policy decisions. In sum, presidential hopefuls fulfill the first constitutive dimension of political “outsidership” (political inexperience) if they have not occupied any of these four political positions before running for president. At this point, an important caveat is necessary. Some presidential candidates who had a very brief political experience before running for office will still be considered political outsiders in my study. The main objective of this dissertation is to assess whether presidents who are not career politicians have a negative impact on governability and institutional performance. It would be problematic to exclude some relevant cases because they had a very limited political experience before the campaign that brought them to power. Hence, in this dissertation, a president is considered as a “political outsider” when he had *less than two years* of political experience before reaching office –combining executive, legislative, party leadership, and public administration experience. The two-year rule is somewhat arbitrary, but reasonable. The objective is not to consider as “insiders” presidents who did not have a political career before coming to office but occupied a political position for a limited period of time immediately before the elections that took them to power –often as a building block to be able to run successful outsider campaigns in national elections—.¹³

The second constitutive dimension of “outsidership” is the rise to political prominence outside of the national party system. There are three empirical indicators that satisfy this second

¹³ Two interesting examples are Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Marc Ravalomanana in Madagascar. Correa was an economist with no political experience when he briefly joined the cabinet as minister of finance in 2005. After less than a year in the cabinet, he broke with the government and positioned himself as one of the main contenders in the 2006 presidential elections. Ravalomanana rose to prominence as the founder and CEO of a series of successful companies in Madagascar. In late 1999, he won the municipal elections and became mayor of Antananarivo as an independent. Less than two years after he became mayor, he won the presidential elections also as an independent. I consider that the political experience of these two candidates is too limited as to consider them political insiders.
dimension: running with a new party, running with an ad hoc electoral movement, and running as an independent. In this dissertation, I follow previous studies and define “new parties” as parties that are on the ballot for the first time in any given election (Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Hug, 2001). A new party is one that either results from a split from an existing party, or a party that is genuinely new –i.e. it emerges without any help from career politicians from existing parties– (Hug, 2001: 79-80; Tavits, 2006: 106). However, mergers and electoral alliances between already existing parties are not considered as new parties in this work even if they use a “party label” that is on the ballot for the first time (Hug, 2001). As indicated above, running with a new party is not the only way that a candidate can fit into this second constitutive dimension of “outsidership.” Many Latin American presidential candidates in the last twenty years have run with “electoral vehicles” that are empty shells whose only objective is to facilitate the election of certain individuals to positions of political authority at the local and national level. Levitsky and Cameron (2003) describe these types of electoral vehicles as “candidate-centered parties,” but the term “electoral movement” (Levitt, 2012) is more accurate because these movements are extremely personalized and they lack some of the key criteria necessary to be considered political parties, such as a clear program and a stable party organization (Key, 1942). In this dissertation, ad hoc electoral movements are defined as “personal vehicles for promoting or maintaining an individual candidate or leader” (Levitt, 2012: 92). Finally, some electoral systems allow independent candidates not affiliated with any political party or electoral movement to run for top executive positions. In line with my definition, politically inexperienced independent candidates will also be considered political outsiders. The three levels of the concept “political outsider” are presented graphically in Figure 2.2.
Following the proposed definition and operationalization, I have identified 16 cases of heads of government –in presidential and parliamentary systems– who arrived to power as “political outsiders”, considering all democratic elections in the period 1980-2010 (see Table 2.1). This list of outsiders reveals that there are many more cases of outsider heads of government in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems. Eleven out of the sixteen outsider leaders emerged in presidential systems. The list also shows that outsiders have succeeded primarily in three regions of the world (Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa), where democracies are less consolidated and less institutionalized. The only two exceptions are

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In this table, and in the remainder of this dissertation, I only include “pure outsiders”. Although interesting, the study of the rise of maverick and amateur candidates in national elections is beyond the scope of this study.
the emergence of an outsider in Venezuela in 1998 and in Italy in 1994. Chávez and Berlusconi emerged in comparatively more institutionalized and older democracies.

**Table 2.1. Outsider presidents and prime ministers (1980-2010)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Elected President or PM</th>
<th>Presidential System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Georgios Vasiliou</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>József Antall</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Violeta Chamorro</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Alberto Fujimori</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Mart Laar</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Silvio Berlusconi</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Andris Skele</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Hugo Chávez</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Alejandro Toledo</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Lucio Gutiérrez</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Marc Ravalomanana</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Juhan Parts</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Yayi Boni</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Rafael Correa</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Fernando Lugo</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Ollanta Humala</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I have also identified 34 cases of presidential candidates in Latin America who obtained more than 5% of the total votes running as outsiders in the period 1980-2010 (see Table 2.2). This sample of cases will be used to construct the dependent and independent variables in the empirical chapters of the dissertation in order to analyze the causes and consequences of the arrival to power of outsiders. This list shows that the “outsider phenomenon” in Latin America is much broader than the list of elected outsiders in Table 2.1 suggests. Outsiders tend to obtain high scores in presidential elections across the region, which suggests that there is a deep dissatisfaction with the political establishment in many Latin American countries. Outsiders obtain especially good results in the Andean countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) where repeated performance failures by the governing parties have resulted in a severe crisis of democratic representation (Mainwaring, 2006; Mainwaring et al., 2006). Although I will focus on outsiders in power in this dissertation, viable outsider candidates who fall short of electoral victory can also have an impact on the political arena by threatening party system stability and by forcing established parties to address the political shockwaves of their sudden rise.

Table 2.2. Outsider presidential candidates in Latin America (1980-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>OUTSIDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2003: Ricardo López Murphy (RECREAR): 16.35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Bolivia     | 1989: Carlos Palenque (CONDEPA): 12.25%  
1993: Carlos Palenque (CONDEPA): 14.29%  
Max Fernández (UCS): 13.77%  
1997: Ivo Mateo Kuljis (UCS): 16.11%  
2002: Evo Morales (MAS): 20.94%  
Felipe Quispe (MIP): 6.09%                                                                                      |
| Brazil      | 1994: Enéas Canneiro (PRONA): 7.38%                                                                                                                 |
| Chile       | 1989: Francisco Javier Errázuriz (UCCP): 15.43%  
1993: José Piñera Echenique (Independent): 6.1%  
Manfred Max-Neef (Independent): 5.6%                                                                            |
| Colombia    | 1990: Antonio Navarro Wolff (Alianza Democrática M-19): 12.43%                                                                                       |
| Ecuador     | 1988: Abdala Bucaram (PRE): 17.61%  
Frank Vargas Pazzos (APRE): 12.63%  
1996: Freddy Ehlers (Movimiento Nuevo País): 20.61%                                                                 |
|             | 1998: Freddy Ehlers (Movimiento Nuevo País): 14.75%                                                                                                 |
|             | 2002: Lucio Gutiérrez (PSP): 20.32%  
2006: Rafael Correa (Alianza País): 22.84%  
Gilmar Gutiérrez (PSP): 17.42%                                                                                    |
| Nicaragua   | 1990: Violeta Chamorro (UNO): 54.73%  
2006: Edmundo Jarquín Calderón (MRS): 6.3%                                                                         |
Table 2.2. (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Panamá    | 1994: Rubén Blades  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | (Movimiento Papa  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | Egoró): 17.1%    |        |        |        |        |
| Paraguay  | 1993: Guillermo  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | Caballero (EN): 23.04%  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | 2003: Pedro Fadul  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | (MPQ): 21.96%     |        |        |        |        |
|           | 2008: Fernando Lugo  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | (APC): 42.3%      |        |        |        |        |
|           | Lino Oviedo (UNACE): 22.8%   |        |        |        |        |
| Perú      | 1990: Mario Vargas Llosa  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | (FREDEMO): 33%    |        |        |        |        |
|           | Alberto Fujimori (Cambio 90): 29%  |        |        |        |        |
|           | 2001: Alejandro Toledo  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | (PP): 36.5%      |        |        |        |        |
|           | 2006: Ollanta Humala  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | (UPP): 30.06%    |        |        |        |        |
| Venezuela | 1993: Andrés Velásquez  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | (La Causa Radical): 21.95%  |        |        |        |        |
|           | 1998: Hugo Chávez  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | (MVR): 56.20%    |        |        |        |        |
|           | Henrique Salas Römer  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | (Proyecto Venezuela): 39.97%  |        |        |        |        |
|           | 2000: Francisco Arias  
           |        |        |        |        |
|           | Cárdenas (Independent): 35.75% |        |        |        |        |
2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Before providing an overview of the main theoretical contribution of the dissertation, this section briefly presents the research design and methodology that will be used to address these theoretical concerns. This study asks two main research questions. The first part of the dissertation analyzes the different contextual and individual level factors that are associated with the rise of outsiders in democratic polities. The second part of the dissertation seeks to explain the consequences of the rise of outsiders on a series of institutional and political outcomes, in particular the level of executive-legislative confrontation and the composition of cabinets.

The goal of the first part of the dissertation is to understand and explain why outsiders obtain high voting support and often get elected in democratic elections. Chapters 3-5 seek to test theoretical hypotheses regarding the rise of outsiders through the quantitative analysis of contextual and individual-level data. Hence, in this part of the dissertation I rely almost exclusively on a series of quantitative cross-national analyses. The statistical analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 focus on institutional and contextual variables and attempt to identify cross-national patterns in the success of outsider candidates in national elections. The statistical analysis in Chapter 5 looks at individual-level data corresponding to election-years in which outsiders were elected presidents in a Latin American country. The goal here is to identify statistically significant differences between respondents who support outsiders and respondents who support traditional politicians. These differences in turn can help us to understand and explain the key motivations that push individuals to vote for outsiders.

In the second part of the dissertation, I study the consequences of outsiders for governability and institutional performance. In this section of the dissertation, I use a mixed-method approach combining quantitative statistical analyses and qualitative information obtained
in the fieldwork I conducted in Peru between October and December of 2012. I follow the mixed-method strategy proposed by Lieberman (2005). This nested analysis strategy proposes to start with the quantitative models, and then move on to the case studies. Of course, the quantitative models have to be based on pre-existing knowledge of at least some cases. Alternatively, they can be based on previous findings solidly established in the literature. The quantitative models test whether the hypothesized relationship between a dependent and an independent variable exists. The results of the quantitative analysis dictate the strategy that scholars should follow in their case studies. If the large-N analysis produces robust and satisfactory results, the case study (or case studies) should be used to test the accuracy of the theoretical model. The qualitative information is useful to make sure that the statistical results are not spurious, and that the statistical findings are in fact due to the causal mechanisms advanced by the researcher. If the case study suggests that the theoretical model is correct, the analysis ends at this point. If the case study detects a theoretical flaw, the scholar has to revise the model. If the large-N analysis produces unsatisfactory results, the case study is used to do “model-building” and to try to establish a new and coherent theoretical framework. This qualitative work may lead to the abandonment or to the revision of the previous theoretical expectations.

I follow the research strategy proposed by Lieberman (2005) in Chapter 6 of this dissertation which analyses the impact of outsiders on executive-legislative relations. Using a database on political processes, institutional conflicts, and scandals in Latin America (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2008), the statistical analyses I conduct suggest that the likelihood of executive-legislative conflict increases when the presidency is held by an outsider. This quantitative finding
is then corroborated with supporting qualitative evidence from the in-depth study of the case of Fujimori in Peru.

The case study analyzes the governing style of Fujimori but also of the two non-outsider presidents who preceded him (Belaúnde and García). In fact, it is impossible to explain the consequences of the access to power of outsider presidents if these political amateurs are not systematically compared with more experienced party politicians. In order to assess whether outsiders are really a peril of presidentialism, I will compare political and institutional outcomes when an outsider was in power (Fujimori) and when traditional politicians were in power in these countries (Belaúnde and García). The cross-time research strategy is useful because it holds constant a series of cultural, social, and institutional factors that are difficult to control for in a small-N cross-national research design (Peters, 1998: 23-25).

I will systematically compare the Belaúnde (1980-1985) and García (1985-1990) administrations with the Fujimori administration (1990-2000) in Peru. I selected the “negative” cases taking into consideration the “possibility principle” (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004). According to this principle, only negative cases where the outcome of interest is possible are relevant and should be selected in small-N analyses. In this case, the Belaúnde and the García administrations are relevant because these two presidents –like Fujimori– governed during periods of severe economic and sociopolitical crisis. These crisis conditions could have produced conflicts between the executive and the legislature, regarding the policies that needed to be adopted to tackle the crisis. Moreover, the economic meltdown and the political violence\(^\text{16}\) in both countries could have led Belaúnde and García to govern in a more assertive way, and to select more

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\(^{16}\) The terrorist activity of the Shining Path guerrilla started during the administration of Belaúnde.
politically inexperienced ministers that could have been more easily controlled by the executive head. In other words, I selected two negative cases where the outcome of interest was possible.

I selected the case of Fujimori for the in-depth qualitative analysis because he can be considered an extreme case, in the sense that he was probably the most outsider of all the independent candidates who were elected in Latin America in the last 25 years. As already pointed out in the introduction, Fujimori was a complete unknown for the general public a few months before the elections that took him to power. He was a university rector with no experience whatsoever in the political arena. The electoral movement Fujimori created (Cambio 90) was a few months old when this outsider won the presidential elections in 1990. He was not formally allied with any established political party during the campaign. Hence, Fujimori had no staff ready to occupy the different positions in the administration. By selecting an extreme case, I follow the recommendation made by Seawright and Gerring (2008) in a paper in which they discuss case selection. These scholars argue that in exploratory studies working on new topics it is beneficial to pick extreme cases because it is precisely in these extreme cases where the causal mechanisms are the most clear. If there is an effect of outsidership on democratic governability, it should be clear when analyzing the case of Fujimori. It is of course important not to take these cases as fully representative of the whole population. The arguments and causal mechanisms that emerge from these extreme cases then have to be tested with data from the other cases. This is the role of the large-N in my study. In the quantitative analyses in Chapter 6, the sample includes all Latin American outsiders in the period 1980-2007.

Finally, Chapter 7 uses descriptive statistics and qualitative information collected in my fieldwork in Peru to study the impact of outsider presidents on the composition and functioning of cabinets. As in the previous chapter, I compare the administration of Fujimori to the
administrations of two traditional party politicians who preceded him as presidents (Belaúnde and García). Although ideally a mixed method approach similar to the one used in Chapter 6 would provide a better test of my hypotheses, the cross-national biographical data of ministers in Latin America is extremely difficult to obtain. Hence, I decided to focus on the case of Peru (country for which I gathered all the relevant biographical data) to test these theoretical claims until the data for cabinet composition in the other countries becomes available.¹⁷ More details on the methodology and the research design are provided in each specific chapter but Table 2.3 provides an overview of the data, research design, and methods used in the empirical analyses of the different chapters.

¹⁷ I am currently part of a multinational team of researchers who is gathering this information for all Latin American countries, but this information will be available only in a few years.
Table 2.3. Data and methods used in the dissertation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART ONE. Causes of outsider rise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART TWO. Consequences of outsider rise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3 THEORIZING “OUTSIDERSHIP”

Modern representative democracies institute an effective system of “checks and balances.” This system implies that the executive power is not only accountable to the people –vertical accountability– but also to a series of institutions that oversee and control its actions –horizontal accountability– (Kenney, 2003; O'Donnell, 1998). One of the main threats to the quality of democracy in Latin America is that the executive is prone in many countries of the region to overstep its authority –as defined by the constitution– and bypass other institutions, such as the judiciary or the legislature, to attain its goals (O'Donnell, 1994). One of the main arguments of this dissertation is that the risk of executive excesses increases when the president is a political outsider. This section elaborates on how outsider presidents pose a more severe threat to democratic governability and institutional performance than traditional politicians.

2.3.1 The “perils of presidentialism” literature

The first wave of studies of political institutions after the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization was marked by the comparison between presidential and parliamentary systems by many prominent scholars. The democratization of many countries in different regions in a short timespan generated a series of timely research questions regarding the likelihood of efficient governability and democratic stability (and consolidation) under presidentialism and under parliamentarism. Many articles and books were published comparing these two systems. Titles such as Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government (Lijphart, 1992b) are characteristic of that period in the early 1990s.
The prevailing view of this first wave of research was that presidential regimes threatened democratic quality and consolidation. In particular, executive-legislative relations in presidential systems were described as prone to conflict. The separation of power was presented as a liability of presidential systems that threatened the consolidation of democratic regimes in Latin America. Executive-legislative relations were presented as more conflictive in presidential systems for four main reasons. First, presidential systems permit a dual democratic legitimacy. Both the president and the legislators in congress are popularly elected. According to this perspective, a disagreement between the executive and the legislative branch almost inevitably leads to a situation of deadlock. In the words of Lijphart (1992a: 15), the problem of executive-legislative conflict “is the inevitable result of the co-existence of the two independent organs that presidential government creates and that may be in disagreement”. Second, the problem of executive-legislative conflict is aggravated by the temporal rigidity of presidential systems. The fixed term in office of the president and the fixed duration of the legislative period do not leave room for the readjustments that political events may require. In a parliamentary system, the prime minister can be changed at any time without creating a regime crisis. In presidential systems, the fixed term in office of the president increases the likelihood of deadlock, governability crises, and regime breakdown (Linz, 1990, 1994). Third, presidential elections generate a “zero-sum” or a “winner-takes-all” result. Whereas in parliamentary systems many parties may form broad coalitions after the election, presidential elections lead to outcomes in which one party wins and everybody else loses. The concentration of power in the executive gives the president little incentive to form coalitions (Lijphart, 1992a: 19). Finally, presidential systems produce a more conflict-prone political style in the part of the executive. In the words of Linz (1994: 19), “the feeling of having independent power, a mandate from the people (…) is
likely to give a president a sense of power and mission that might be out of proportion to the limited plurality that elected him”. This in turn may produce tensions between the presidents and the legislators of non-incumbent parties (see also O'Donnell, 1994).

Other studies suggested that parliamentary democracies were more stable than presidential democracies. For instance, Stepan and Skach (1993, 1994) compared the democratic stability of countries that gained independence between 1945 and 1979, and found that countries that started independence as parliamentary systems were more likely to become or remain democracies than countries that started as presidential systems.

The “perils of presidentialism” literature was rapidly discredited because many of its main arguments did not resist empirical assessments. A series of studies cast serious doubts on the arguments and findings of the “perils of presidentialism” literature in the early 1990s. Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) argue that the correlation between parliamentarism and democracy presented in the work of Stepan and Skach (1994) is doubtful because they do not control for key factors, such as income level, population size, and British colonial heritage. They show that presidentialism is more likely to be adopted in Africa and Latin America, regions that tend to be unstable for reasons that may be largely unrelated to the form of government. Although the evidence they present is not conclusive either, their data suggests that the link between regime type and democracy has been greatly exaggerated. However, the link still exists according to a more recent statistical analysis conducted by Cheibub (2002). Although Cheibub finds that presidential regimes are more unstable than parliamentary regimes, he also demonstrates that the causal mechanism put forward by Linz (1990) and Lijphart (1992a) is not valid. Using data from all presidential democracies that existed between 1946 and 1996, Cheibub
shows that minority governments and executive-legislative deadlock do not affect the survival of presidential democracies.

Moreover, the argument that presidentialism is a system in which the winner takes all was also proven wrong. A large number of studies have shown that presidents tend to form multiparty coalitions when they are in a minority situation. Presidents often recruit cabinet members from the most represented parties in the legislature in exchange for the support of these parties for the president’s program in the legislature (Altman, 2000; Amorim Neto, 2006; Chasquetti, 2001; Deheza, 1998; Zelaznik, 2001). Actually, Cheibub et al. (2004) show that coalition formation is almost as likely in presidential systems as in parliamentary systems.

2.3.2 The rise of outsiders: a neglected peril of presidentialism?

The critics of presidentialism also pointed out the potential problems associated with the rise of outsiders. Linz (1994: 26) argues that “the personalized character of a presidential election makes possible, especially in the absence of a strong party system, the access to power of ‘outsiders.’” Independent candidates running without party support—or even against parties—may take advantage of the disenchantment of the voters with traditional parties. In presidential elections, voters consider the personal qualifications and positions of the candidates, in addition to the parties they represent. When traditional politicians are discredited, voters may evaluate more favorably the qualifications of independent candidates. Since voters can now be reached directly during electoral campaigns through mass media, the mediation of parties is no longer essential for presidential candidates.

The rise of outsiders is considered as a threat by the critics of presidentialism for several reasons. First, independent candidates come to power with very limited administrative
experience. They often do not have any previous experience as ministers or state governors. They also lack a pool of persons with experience in office that can compensate for their amateurship (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982). Second, the rise of outsiders increases the risk of the personalization of power. Since independent candidates can appeal directly to the citizenry and govern through a small political clientele composed of cronies and friends, they may destabilize political institutions and threaten fragile party systems (Suárez, 1982). Third, outsiders come to power with weak support in congress, which increases the risk of executive-legislative conflict inherent in presidential systems (Kenney, 2004; Linz, 1994). None of these arguments has received empirical demonstration. This is one of the tasks I will undertake in my dissertation.

The main contention of this dissertation is that outsider presidents pose a greater threat to governability and institutional performance than presidents who are career politicians and belong to established parties. Outsider presidents in Latin America have shown a greater tendency to overstep their authority and bypass other political and non-political institutions. They are less likely to reach compromises and form policy alliances with other parties. Chapters 6 and 7 of this dissertation will empirically demonstrate some of the pernicious effects of outsider presidents for democratic stability and institutional performance. Before getting into the specifics, however, the remaining of this chapter outlines a theoretical framework that helps explain the greater governability problems when outsiders are in power. I argue that there are three main factors that contribute to low institutional performance when political outsiders reach the presidency: 1) the individual characteristics of the outsider, 2) the socio-political context faced by outsiders, and 3) the strategic constraints faced by outsiders when they come to power.
2.3.2.1 Individual characteristics of outsiders and lack of democratic socialization

The first factor that makes outsider presidents more likely to behave undemocratically and to bypass other political institutions is the individual characteristics of these amateur politicians and their lack of democratic socialization within political parties. As made clear in the definition, political outsiders have two problematic characteristics that career politicians don’t have: they are politically inexperienced and they lack links with established parties. The combination of these two characteristics significantly increases the risk of undemocratic behavior on the part of the administration. In fact, political parties play a key role in the recruitment and socialization of democratic political elites. In the words of Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 4), political parties “provide the foundation for a democratic political class.” Even if they have experienced serious political conflicts during their career, experienced party politicians tend to be imbued with a democratic culture. They are aware that political decisions often involve negotiations and compromises, both within and between parties. This give-and-take nature of political decision-making is often negatively perceived by pundits and public opinion alike, but it is essential for the good functioning of a democratic polity. Party politicians become socialized with a series of implicit rules that govern the democratic game. They accept that elections can be lost and that policy proposals can be defeated if the majority so decides. In fact, losers’ consent is often mentioned as one of the key dimensions of democracy (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug, 2005).

Outsiders are political amateurs who lack this democratic socialization within established political parties and, in some cases, do not have a commitment to democratic institutions. Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 5) point out that outsiders are less likely than insiders “to have
experience with (and be oriented toward) democratic practices such as negotiation, compromise, and coalition building.” Rospigliosi similarly argues that negotiating and building consensus in the congress requires “lots of skills and experience” which outsiders do not have.\textsuperscript{18} Outsiders do not necessarily see this as a problem. In fact, political outsiders tend to have a technocratic approach to politics which emphasizes fast results, and derides the long and painstaking negotiations in congress as a “waste of time.”

The classic study of American presidencies conducted by Neustadt (1990 [1960]) put strong emphasis on the political experience and the previous socialization of American presidents in explaining how successful they are in office. The comparison between Roosevelt and Eisenhower is revealing. Whereas Eisenhower was surprised that orders did not carry themselves out and that he needed to constantly negotiate compromises, Roosevelt was perfectly aware of the political game in Washington and was much more skillful at navigating the political arena. The relative insensitivity of Eisenhower to political affairs “can be explained, at least in part, by Eisenhower’s background. He lacked Roosevelt’s experience. Instead he had behind him the irrelevancy of an army record compiled for the most part outside Washington” (Neustadt, 1990 [1960]: 138). A key argument made by Neustadt is that experienced presidents are more successful in office because they understand better and engage more productively with other political actors in the administration and in the opposition. This is also a key argument in this dissertation.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Caretas,} May 7, 1990
\textsuperscript{19} This argument is not only valid for presidential regimes. In an interesting study of the regeneration of Communist parties in East Central Europe after the fall of Communist regimes, Grzymala-Busse (2002) shows that experienced political leaders are more successful in building inclusive party coalitions and in mobilizing actors within and outside their parties.
The outsiders’ lack of democratic socialization within political parties is normally not compensated with a different sort of socialization during their previous professional career inviting to deliberation and consensus building once they come to power. Outsiders tend to come from very hierarchical and vertical organizations in which the common practice is to respect the decisions taken by those who occupy positions of authority. Their socialization does not prepare them to behave skillfully in the political arena, in which decisions often have to be negotiated and important concessions have to be made. Table 2.4 shows the professional profile of each of the outsider presidents in Latin America, showing both their profession and the top position reached in their profession.

Table 2.4. Professional profile of outsider presidents in Latin America (1980-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Elected President</th>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Top position reached</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Violeta Chamorro</td>
<td>Publisher</td>
<td>Newspaper director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Alberto Fujimori</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>University rector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Hugo Chávez</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Senior officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Lucio Gutiérrez</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Senior officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Rafael Correa</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>University professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Fernando Lugo</td>
<td>Catholic Church Priest</td>
<td>Bishop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Ollanta Humala</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Senior officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three outsiders (Chávez, Gutiérrez, and Humala) were military leaders of some stature. The military is probably one of the least democratic institutions if we consider the way decisions are taken. From an early age, military men are used to obeying orders and respecting decisions taken by those in a position of authority without consulting them. This professional culture undoubtedly influences the way outsiders with a military background govern.20 The other

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20 According to Henry Pease García, Peruvian president Humala has a top-down approach to government decision-making which is explained by his military background (interview, October 2012).
outsiders also come from professions in which decisions are normally taken by those at the top rather than negotiated. Lugo was a bishop in the Catholic Church, which is a very hierarchical institution. Fujimori was rector in the National Agrarian University in the five years prior to running as a presidential candidate. According to some biographical studies of Fujimori, decisions in this institution were taken unilaterally by the university authorities (Jochamowitz, 1993). Thereby, this short experience of Fujimori as the head of a public university did not allow him to develop the skills necessary to negotiate with other political actors and build consensus.

In sum, the individual characteristics of outsiders (political inexperience and lack of ties with established parties) make them more likely to behave undemocratically and to bypass other institutions when they come to power. This would be true even under “normal” political circumstances. However, as I discuss in the next section, the rise of outsiders tends to take place under exceptional circumstances (economic hardships and sociopolitical crisis).

2.3.2.2 Socioeconomic and political context

The context in which outsiders come to power is also an important factor which influences their political style. The election of outsiders to the presidency often takes place in moments of economic crisis in which citizens’ disenchantment with the political system in general (and political parties in particular) is at its peak.

The first example of outsider success in Latin America after the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization is Alberto Fujimori. The Peruvian president came to power in the midst of the most severe economic and sociopolitical crisis of Peru’s contemporary history. On the economic front, the two democratic administrations of the 1980s (Belaúnde between 1980 and 1985 –Acción Popular– and García between 1985 and 1990 –APRA–) were unsuccessful at
redressing a failing economy. The real GDP per capita in the 1980s in Peru dropped 28% in 10 years from 5314 dollars in 1980 to 3839 dollars in 1990. The heterodox policies attempted by García during the late 1980s had catastrophic consequences, as they resulted in hyperinflation and a major increase in the foreign debt (Kenney, 2004: chapter 2; Murakami, 2012: 159-178). In addition to these economic problems, Peru suffered the rise of a violent insurgency (the Shining Path), and governmental efforts to defeat it were unsuccessful. The Shining Path was the deadliest insurgency in Peru’s modern history. Between 1980 and 1992, this terrorist group killed more than twenty-five thousand people (Gorriti, 1990; Kenney, 2004: 24). The failure of the Belaúnde and the García administrations to address this internal conflict undermined support for these presidents and the political system as a whole. The economic and security crises also had consequences at the societal level. The economic problems led to the destruction of businesses and jobs, and weakened organized labor. At the same time, Peruvians migrated massively from the *sierra* to Lima seeking economic opportunities and trying to escape the internal violence. This led to a rapid increase of the informal sector, which in turn led to the erosion of traditional party-society linkages (Cameron, 1997: 40-42). In sum, in the early 1990s Peru was facing a multifaceted crisis which was partly the result of the failure of established parties to govern effectively after the democratic transition. The disenchantment of Peruvian citizens with the political class paved the way for the election of a complete neophyte.

The context that led to the election of outsiders in other countries in the 1990s and 2000s may not have been as catastrophic, but in all cases the rise of outsiders was one of the consequences of a severe crisis of representation combined with serious economic problems. There are three important characteristics that describe the context in which outsiders come to

21 Calculated using the Penn World Tables.
power: 1) failed economic performance of governments led by established parties, 2) crisis of political representation, and 3) partisan dealignment. Concerning economic performance, both Ecuador and Venezuela suffered a long period of economic decline preceding the arrival to power of outsiders. While most Latin American countries achieved some per capita growth between 1990 and 2000, real per capita growth fell in Ecuador and Venezuela during this period –8% in Ecuador and 17% in Venezuela– (Philip & Panizza, 2011: 5). The neoliberal policies that were implemented in these countries to try to address these economic problems resulted in an increase in income inequality (Bulmer-Thomas, 1996). Neoliberal policies also contributed to a crisis in political representation. Roberts (2002b) argues that the deepening of social inequalities in Latin America during the neoliberal period has gone hand in hand with an erosion of class cleavages in the political arena. According to this important contribution, the transition from ISI (Import Substitution Industrialization) to neoliberalism led to a decline of mass-based, labor-mobilizing parties, thereby producing a crisis of political representation in countries like Ecuador, Venezuela, and Paraguay. The crisis of political representation was accentuated by the broad consensus in all these countries on the desirability of neoliberal market reforms. Populist and left-leaning parties that traditionally supported more heterodox economic policies accepted the need for neoliberal reforms, thereby leaving an important part of the electorate (e.g. the working classes and the informal sectors in urban areas) unrepresented. Economic failures and unrepresentative governments ultimately led to a rapid decline in partisan attachments that paved the way for ambitious political outsiders. Support for political parties was extremely low in Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela in the years preceding the arrival to power of outsiders as can be observed in Table 2.5.

22 For a good analysis of partisan dealignment in Venezuela before the election of Chávez in 1998 see Morgan (2007).
Table 2.5. Percentage of support for political parties before the election of outsiders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Outsider elected</th>
<th>Trust in political parties (%)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Lucio Gutiérrez</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>Latinobarómetro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Rafael Correa</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>Latinobarómetro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Fernando Lugo</td>
<td>17.07</td>
<td>LAPOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Ollanta Humala</td>
<td>13.71</td>
<td>LAPOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Hugo Chávez</td>
<td>15.50</td>
<td>Latinobarómetro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: I consider as trustful individuals those who express “a lot” or “some” trust in political parties.

This partisan dealignment was partly due to the failures of the governments in their attempts to redress the economy, but were also associated with the rampant corruption and citizens’ perceptions that governments were out of touch (Hagopian, 2005; Hawkins, 2010). In sum, political outsiders tend to come to power under difficult economic circumstances, and at a time in which the political class is extremely discredited and the party system is on the verge of collapse.

The empirical analysis I conduct in Chapters 3-5 of this dissertation provides strong support for these arguments. The aggregate analyses show that outsiders tend to be more successful during economic crises, when growth is low (or negative) and inflation is high –this latter variable appears to be especially significant in the Latin American context–. The individual level models show that support for outsiders is high among dealigned and disenchanted voters. The survey data also suggests that voters dissatisfied with the convergence of all established parties on neoliberal economic policies were more likely to support outsiders in presidential elections.

This context of deep economic and sociopolitical crisis, as well as the disenchantment of the population with the political class, represents a window of opportunity for outsiders to commit excesses against discredited political institutions. Directly confronting the political class and bypassing other institutions –such as Congress, the judiciary, and political parties– may be a
smart strategic choice for outsider presidents, as the population is likely to turn against the discredited institutions and in favor of the presidents. The Fujimori example is again illustrative. During the first two years of the Fujimori administration (1990-1992), there was a deliberate campaign from the president to confront parties and politicians. Fujimori repeatedly pointed out that corrupt and self-serving politicians were responsible for everything that was going wrong in Peru. The Peruvian president channeled all the dissatisfaction of the citizenry in the direction of the political system and the traditional political class.23 As a result, Fujimori’s self coup in April 1992 which dissolved Congress received massive public support (Kenney, 2004: 227). According to McClintock (1994: 24), the loss of legitimacy of democratic political institutions “enabled Fujimori to fulfill his authoritarian proclivities without fear of popular upheaval.” The outsiders that came to power after Fujimori learnt from the Peruvian experience in the 1990s. For instance, Chávez in Venezuela and Correa in Ecuador knew that political parties were very discredited institutions. They were perfectly aware that they could benefit politically from a direct confrontation with parties and other institutions, such as Congress and the judicial branch.24 This political calculus related to the context in which they come to power partly explains the anti-democratic excesses of the Chávez and Correa administrations (Brewer-Carías, 2010; Corrales & Penfold, 2011; Philip & Panizza, 2011).

In order to understand popular support for undemocratic measures, it is important to take the context of economic crisis and sociopolitical debacle into account. Using insights from prospect theory, Kurt Weyland demonstrated that acceptance of painful market reforms (“the bitter pill”) was more likely in the domain of losses –i.e. in the midst of a deep economic crisis–. In other words, a risky move –even if painful in the short term– was accepted to overcome

23 Interview with Henry Pease García, Lima, October 2012
24 Interview with Eduardo Dargent, Lima, October 2012
economic collapse and hyperinflation (Weyland, 1996, 1998a, 1998b). The same logic applies in the political arena. Given how discredited political institutions are when outsiders come to power, authoritarian excesses may be accepted as an unpleasant but necessary fix to a corrupt and inefficient political system. For instance, a poll in the immediate aftermath of the self-coup in Perú revealed that 33 percent of the population took the position that it was objectionable but necessary (Kenney, 2004: 227).

In sum, a very unstable context of economic collapse and sociopolitical crisis provides a window of opportunity for outsiders to commit excesses and bypass other political institutions. However, the context in which they come to power is not the only element that affects the strategic calculations of political outsiders. A series of institutional factors affect the strategic constraints faced by outsiders, making them more prone to commit undemocratic excesses.

2.3.2.3 Institutional factors and strategic constraints

The strategic constraints faced by outsider presidents once they arrive to power differ significantly from the ones party politicians face. This difference also helps explaining why outsiders are more prone to commit excesses against other institutions and to threaten democratic governability. Politicians are self-centered individuals who pursue a series of goals, including vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking (Strom, 1990). Politicians want to be elected (or re-elected) and they also want to achieve policy results when they are in office. Once they reach

25 Of course not all economic and political crises lead to outsiders. For instance, in spite of severe sociopolitical turmoil and economic collapse, no outsider was elected in Argentina in the 2002 presidential election. The empirical analysis in chapters 3-5 suggests that a context of crisis is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rise of outsiders. In particular, a series of institutional factors are key to explain when crises lead to the emergence of an outsider candidate.

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a position of authority, politicians normally aspire to deliver policy results that facilitate their re-election or a good result for the party they represent in future elections.

When they become presidents, political leaders may become very frustrated by the long and difficult negotiations that are required in a democratic polity, especially if the party of the president does not have a majority in Congress. Presidents often discover when they are in power that implementing the policies they advocated during the campaign is harder than they expected. Although this may be frustrating for the incumbent, deliberation and horizontal accountability are part of the democratic policy-making process. When the president faces a situation of gridlock, he may be tempted to simply overstep his constitutional authority and bypass other institutions. In fact, the abuse of power by the president is one of the main threats to democratic quality in Latin America (O'Donnell, 1994). However, the organizational and institutional factors that constrain the behavior of politicians differ, depending on whether the president is an outsider or a career politician.

Party politicians are members of an organization –i.e. the political party– that constrain their ability to take controversial or undemocratic decisions. Established parties are concerned about the shadow of the future. A clear abuse of power (i.e. an attempt to illegally dissolve Congress) may negatively affect the reputation of the party for a long time, and may be harshly sanctioned by voters. Moreover, the other established parties may prefer not to ally in the future with a party that takes advantage of its power to attempt to notoriously overstep its authority and bypass other institutions. For all these reasons, it may be a bad strategy for an established party to make an undemocratic move even when it faces a situation of gridlock. Hence, the actions of party politicians in power are first held in check by the party they represent. Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 3) summarize this nicely: “Because they exist beyond a single election and must
compete on a national scale, parties develop longer-term priorities and broader goals than individual politicians do. To the extent that parties discipline politicians, then, they can reshape politicians' incentives in ways that induce them to act in a more farsighted and collective manner.”

The calculus for an outsider president is completely different. If they are not able to govern effectively the first time they are in office, there may be no political future at all. Since the parties through which outsiders arrive to power are often nothing more than empty shells, these parties have much less to lose when the president attempts authoritarian moves. Political outsiders in office are more likely to take risks because their political future is inextricably linked to the success they have (or appear to have) in office. When outsiders face obstacles in other political institutions, such as a situation in which they lack support in Congress, they are then more prone than non-outsiders to bypass these institutions and commit undemocratic excesses.

These strategic considerations are made more acute by the minority situation in which most outsiders find themselves. A series of studies show that presidents with very low support in the legislature are more likely to have conflictive relations with other political institutions (Colomer & Negretto, 2005; Negretto, 2006). As will be detailed in Chapter 6, outsider presidents have considerably smaller legislative contingents than insider presidents. Some outsider parties are little more than electoral vehicles for the presidential campaign of an independent candidate.

In sum, outsiders have a different strategic calculus than career politicians when they come to power, and they are more likely to commit undemocratic excesses and to bypass other institutions when they face a gridlock situation. They are also more likely to get into gridlock situations in the first place which reinforces these anti-democratic tendencies.
2.4 SUMMARY

In this chapter, I have shown the basic theoretical intuitions that guide this work. A series of individual, contextual, and strategic factors appear to create an “explosive cocktail” that makes anti-democratic actions much more likely when the president is an outsider. First, outsiders come to power during exceptional circumstances of severe economic decline and sociopolitical crisis, when citizens’ disenchantment with political institutions is at its peak. This context provides a “window of opportunity” for outsiders to bypass other institutions without paying a political or electoral cost – and sometimes even benefitting from the authoritarian moves –. Second, the personal characteristics of the outsiders (political inexperience and lack of ties with political parties) deprive them of the skills and the resources necessary to govern democratically in a context of crisis when urgent measures are needed. Finally, outsiders face a strategic predicament that also pushes them to commit excesses. In fact, the political career of outsiders may come to a premature end if they are not able to provide quick policy results when they are in office. Moreover, outsiders are not disciplined by established political parties concerned about the “shadow of the future.”
3.0 OUTSIDERS: A PERIL OF PRESIDENTIALISM?

Why do outsiders rise to political prominence? This question can be tackled from many different perspectives. In this study, I start by focusing on macro-institutional factors (presidentialism vs, parliamentarism) and then move on to micro-institutional factors (institutional design characteristics within presidentialism) and individual-level explanations. In line with the main theoretical concerns advanced in Chapter 2, this chapter assesses whether outsiders are really a “peril of presidentialism” as the conventional wisdom holds.\textsuperscript{26}

In other words, I analyze one of the major institutional factors that may have an impact on the rise of outsiders in democratic countries, i.e. the basic distinction between presidential and parliamentary democracies. Some early studies suggested that the rise of outsiders was a “peril of presidentialism” (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982) but this claim was never substantiated empirically. Here, I first present the different facets of the conventional wisdom explaining why the arrival to power of outsiders is more likely to occur in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems. Then, I test this argument using a database including biographical information on all the heads of government that arrived to power following parliamentary and presidential elections in all democratic countries in the period 1945-2010. Surprisingly, however, the results cast doubts on the conventional wisdom. When other important economic and

\textsuperscript{26} Other chapters of the dissertation (especially Chapters 6 and 7) focus on the related question of whether outsiders create a peril for presidentialism, by increasing the likelihood of executive abuses and governability problems.
political factors are controlled for, the political system is not a good predictor of outsider success.

### 3.1 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the wake of the euphoria generated by the Third Wave of democratization during the 1980s, a group of scholars studying Latin America were more pessimistic about the prospects for democratic consolidation of the countries in the region. These scholars argued that there were a series of “perils of presidentialism” that created obstacles for the healthy functioning of democratic regimes in Latin America (see Chapter 2).

One of the purported perils of presidentialism according to this literature is the election of outsider presidents (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982; Valenzuela, 2004). This issue has been neglected until recently, and the main empirical implication –i.e. outsiders are more likely to come to power in presidential systems– remains untested to this day.

This chapter first advances a series of theoretical arguments that led prominent scholars to expect that the rise of outsiders is more likely in presidential regimes than in parliamentary systems. In fact, they had good reasons to believe presidential systems are associated with the two constitutive dimensions of “outsidership”: political inexperience and rise to political prominence through a new party.
3.1.1 Presidentialism and political inexperience

The nature of presidential elections leads to a more personalized link between voters and candidates, which may facilitate the rise of political outsiders. According to Kitschelt (2000), there are three types of linkages between citizens and politicians in democracies. The first type is the programmatic linkage, which means that politicians make programmatic appeals to voters based on clearly identifiable policy packages developed by political parties. The second type is the clientelistic linkage, which is based on voter-leaders linkages through selective material incentives in networks of direct exchange. The third type is the charismatic linkage, which is based on the candidates’ personal skills and powers of persuasion. According to Kitschelt (2000: 860), presidential systems “personalize competition for the highest office and attract ambitious politicians who are often distinguished only by their personal support networks buttressed by personal charisma or relations of clientelism but not by policy programs.” Since programmatic linkages are weaker in presidential systems, and voters tend to focus on candidates rather than parties, political outsiders with no political experience are less disadvantaged in presidential than in parliamentary elections. On the contrary, if voters are disenchanted with political parties and political elites, outsiders with no previous involvement in politics may benefit from this inexperience. Voters may see political outsiders as less corrupt and unscrupulous than career politicians. For instance, in a moment of partisan dealignment in Venezuela in the late 1990s (Morgan, 2007), a political outsider –Hugo Chávez– came to power in 1998 receiving the support of voters disenchanted with political corruption who perceived him as honest (Hawkins, 2010).

The same personalization argument was made in two pathbreaking studies emphasizing the “perils of presidentialism.” Suárez (1982) mentioned the advantages given to outsiders as one
of the main problems of presidentialism. This argument was based on the observation of many cases of successful outsiders in the presidential systems of Latin America during the twentieth century. In Suárez’ words, “presidentialism appears to increase the importance of individual politicians over the political system.” He also argues that this personalization allows political leaders who secure a political clientele to run successful presidential elections. In a very influential essay, Linz (1994) also contends that the personalized character of presidential elections facilitates the access to power of outsiders. Linz is more specific about the causal processes that lead to the rise of outsiders. The first important factor in Linz’ framework is the solidity of the party system. When the party system is weak, and citizens are disenchanted with all the parties in the system, anti-systemic options –e.g. outsiders– may emerge to capitalize on citizens’ discontent. The second factor –the most important one according to Linz– is presidentialism. The rise of outsiders is more likely in presidential systems because elections are more personalized. Voters have to decide which candidate has the better “personal” qualification to become the head of state irrespective of the candidate’s links with a particular party. The third factor is the candidates themselves. Wealthy and popular outsider candidates are more likely to obtain high scores in presidential elections.

The importance of candidates’ individual characteristics for voting behavior in presidential elections has increased in the second half of twentieth century with the advent of the electronic media.27 In contemporary democracies, the number of political information recipients using TV as their preferred medium has clearly surpassed the number of those who rely on other media (e.g. the press) for political coverage. Television tends to focus on the personalities of the political leaders because it finds it easier to communicate information to viewers through the

27 According to King (2002), four attributes of party leaders or presidential candidates are particularly relevant: physical appearance, native intelligence, character or temperament, and political style.
images of the candidates than through abstract documents and complex policy debates (McAllister, 2007; Ohr, 2011). In turn, this way of presenting political information reinforces the “personalistic” linkage between candidates and voters which is inherent to presidentialism. For instance, studies of campaign coverage in the United States demonstrate that the focus of the media gradually shifted in the last fifty years from an in-depth coverage of the issues of the day to a “horserace” news coverage of presidential contests – discussing who’s ahead, campaign events, scandals, and political marketing – (Graber, 2009; Iyengar, Norpoth, & Hahn, 2004). In Linz’ words, “in the past (...) no candidate, even one who did a lot of ‘whistle-stop’ campaigning, could reach every voter. Today, perhaps in most countries, people can be reached through television” (Linz, 1994: 27).

In the United States (the most analyzed presidential system), several studies have demonstrated that candidate assessments influence voting decisions in presidential elections even controlling for other key factors such as partisanship and economic evaluations. In a seminal contribution, Stokes (1966) was the first scholar to argue that candidates’ personal characteristics had a strong impact on electoral decisions. According to Stokes (1966: 27), “the fluctuations of electoral attitudes over these four elections [four presidential elections in the United States between 1952 and 1964] have to a remarkable degree focused on the candidates themselves.” Later studies reached similar conclusions, by showing that candidate evaluations matter both for individual voting behavior and for aggregate election results (Kelley & Mirer, 1974; A. H. Miller, Wattenberg, & Malanchuk, 1986). Wattenberg (1991) contends that electoral contests have become even more “candidate-centered” since the 1970s because the media focus has shifted from parties to candidates. The personalization of electoral contests in the United States may explain why a political “amateur” (Dwight Eisenhower) was chosen as the candidate of the
Republican Party in 1952 over a traditional politician. The leadership style of Eisenhower was seen as an asset by voters in the primary elections of the Republican Party. The high personalization of American elections may also explain why independent candidates such as George Wallace in 1968 and Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996 obtained relatively high scores in presidential elections (Abramson et al., 2000; Gold, 1995). Unfortunately, little is known about the impact of candidate evaluation on voting behavior in other presidential systems in Africa and Latin America. However, it is plausible that candidate evaluations will matter more in the context of less institutionalized party systems which have weaker partisan attachments (Blais, 2011).\(^{28}\)

In sum, the conventional view is that the personalized nature of presidential elections facilitates the rise of politically inexperienced outsiders. “Political outsiders” may decide to run as independents or with newly created electoral vehicles because a direct and personal connection with voters may compensate for their organizational deficit.

### 3.1.2 Presidentialism and new parties

In the previous section, I presented one side of the conventional wisdom which suggests that the personalized nature of presidential elections increases the risk of the election of very inexperienced leaders as heads of government. As discussed in the previous chapter, the second key dimension of “outsidership” is the rise to political prominence through a new party. The

\(^{28}\) On the lack of party system institutionalization in Africa and Latin America, see Kuenzi & Lambright (2001) and Mainwaring & Scully (1995).
presidential system may also facilitate the rise of leaders running with new parties for three main reasons.

First, the organizational efforts that are necessary for leaders to become contenders for the top executive position differ significantly in presidential and parliamentary democracies. Outsiders would need to create a formidable party organization and recruit viable legislative candidates in many districts in order to have a chance of becoming prime ministers—especially in plurality electoral systems with low district magnitude. In fact, in parliamentary systems, prime ministers are always the leaders of parties with considerable representation in the legislature. Outsider candidates in presidential elections do not face equally insurmountable obstacles. Presidential elections are much more personalized, and independent candidates may win with very little support in the legislature (and without the support of any traditional party), especially in moments of deep economic and sociopolitical crisis that create a loss of confidence in the established parties. In fact, previous research shows that outsider presidents tend to have a much smaller legislative contingent than insider presidents (Negretto, 2006).

The second, and related, factor is the impossibility of popular outsiders to transmit their charisma or popularity in parliamentary systems. In fact, legislative candidates may ride on the coattails of very popular outsiders irrespective of the type of political system, but the probability of them winning is always lower than the one for the charismatic candidate. Thus, the probability of an allied legislator winning a seat is always lower than the probability of the outsider winning a seat (or being elected president). This implies two things: (a) in presidential systems, outsiders’ parties are likely to receive less support in legislative than in presidential elections; and (b) outsiders are less likely to become prime ministers than directly elected presidents.
The third factor is the possibility to split the ticket in presidential elections. In presidential systems, voters normally have the possibility to vote for a legislative candidate of one party and for the presidential candidate of another party. Sometimes, this leads to a high discrepancy between the votes received by a party in concurrent legislative and presidential elections (Ames, Baker, & Renno, 2009; A. Campbell & Miller, 1957; G. Helmke, 2009). In parliamentary systems, on the contrary, voters cannot split the ticket and support one candidate for the head of government and another candidate for the legislative spot in their district. The prime minister tends to be the leader of the party that received most votes in the parliamentary elections. The possibility to split the vote facilitates the election of an outsider in presidential systems, because it allows ambitious politicians or popular public figures to run in presidential elections with a new party or a new electoral movement. These candidates may win, even if they are not associated with a single legislative candidate.

In sum, the theoretical discussion in the last two sections provides a series of arguments in support of the intuition of the critics of presidentialism regarding the link between outsiders and presidential systems.

3.1.3 Alternative explanations of outsider rise

Before moving on to the empirical analysis, I will present some alternative explanations of outsider rise that have been mentioned in previous research. Factors that are not related to the type of political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) can also affect the likelihood of outsider rise by having an impact on the strategic choices of both candidates and voters. I will integrate these variables to my statistical model as control measures.
First, the rise of outsiders may be related to socioeconomic factors. The classical retrospective voting literature predicts that voters will punish incumbent parties when they suffer an economic crisis (Fiorina, 1981). In addition to explaining how the vote is distributed among the established parties, a pervasive economic crisis may contribute to the rise of outsider politicians. According to Mayorga (2006), socioeconomic problems constitute a “critical context” for the success of outsiders in the Andean countries. Corrales (2008) argues that voters suffering from economic anxieties are more prone to support newcomers in presidential elections. His empirical analysis shows that outsiders tend to be more successful when the level of inflation is high. In a similar vein, Benton (2005) argues that voters develop long and sophisticated economic memories. When both incumbent and non-incumbent traditional parties are blamed for economic hardship, voters are more likely to vote for small parties or outsider candidates in order to punish all the established political parties.

Another key factor that may explain the rise of political outsiders is the weakness of party systems. In strong and institutionalized party systems political parties develop strong roots in society and there is a considerable degree of stability in party competition (low electoral volatility). Moreover, the existing political parties are seen as legitimate by voters. Finally, strong party systems are characterized by the existence of solid party organizations independent of individual leaders (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). A stable party system with political parties that have developed strong ties with society makes the rise of a political outsider unlikely since voters feel attached to (and represented by) the existing parties. In the same vein, strong party organizations create obstacles for the rise of political outsiders within established parties. According to some scholars the decline of the party system is the main explanation of the emergence of outsider and populist politicians (Mayorga, 2006). In fact, the crisis of party
systems paves the way for the rise of political outsiders not connected with traditional and institutionalized parties, directly appealing to unorganized mass constituencies (Roberts, 2007).^{29}

The rise of political outsiders may also result from the legitimacy crisis affecting political institutions in developed and developing countries (Booth & Seligson, 2009; Norris, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000). Studies show a decline in public confidence in the core institutions of representative democracy—including parliaments, the legal system and political parties—in both the newer democracies of Latin America and Eastern Europe and in many established democracies (Norris, 1999). Political independents may provide an electoral option to citizens who have lost faith in political institutions and political parties. In many cases, political outsiders gain prominence by using an anti-establishment and anti-party discourse.

The issue of corruption is related to the legitimacy crisis. Several studies demonstrate that exposure to corruption leads to an erosion of political support (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Morris & Klesner, 2010; M. A. Seligson, 2002a). This disenchantment with political institutions may pave the way for the rise of political outsiders, who criticize corrupt practices and promise to fight against corruption if they are elected.

There is also a structural factor that may affect the likelihood of outsider success: ethnic heterogeneity. In fact, a society deeply divided along ethnic lines may increase the probability of the rise of an outsider representing (or claiming to represent) the minority groups. For instance, Madrid (2005) shows that indigenous populations in Latin America have lagged behind the rest of the population according to different indicators of socioeconomic status, such as income, education, and life expectancy. Thus, in all likelihood, indigenous populations do not feel well represented by traditional catch-all parties and they may “switch their votes particularly

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^{29} This argument leads to a potential endogeneity problem since the rise of outsiders is also one of the factors that accelerate the decomposition of the party system (Dietz & Myers, 2007).
frequently since they have little reason to establish enduring ties to political parties that fail to cater to their needs” (Madrid, 2005: 3). Hence, ethnic heterogeneity is likely to increase electoral volatility. This instability, in turn, paves the way for the rise of outsiders that appeal to these disadvantaged and unrepresented ethnic minorities.

Comparisons between presidential and parliamentary systems also need to take into account other confounding factors that differentiate countries located in geographical areas where presidential systems predominate and countries located in areas where parliamentary systems predominate. Following Shugart and Mainwaring (1997), I control for two additional factors – income level and British colonial heritage– in my statistical analysis. Although there is no study analyzing the link between the rise of outsiders and the level of democracy, the empirical analysis in this chapter will also control for the quality of democracy. When democracy is robust, citizens may be less inclined to support an outsider because existing democratic institutions provide a channel for them to express their political demands and their political frustrations. Moreover, when the quality of democracy is high political institutions are more legitimate and voters are less tempted to vote for outsiders. Since countries with presidential systems tend to have less consolidated democracies than countries with parliamentary systems, controlling for the quality of democracy is also important to make sure that any correlation between outsidership and presidentialism that the statistical analysis might uncover is not spurious.
3.2  RESEARCH DESIGN

3.2.1  Data

The level of analysis in this chapter is elections in the world in the period between 1945 and 2010. All national democratic elections conducted in presidential and parliamentary systems and leading to the popular selection (or the confirmation in office) of the head of government were included in the sample. Following conventional practice –and in order not to bias the results–, I include elections only in periods when countries had a Polity IV score equal to or higher than 5. Appendix A shows all the elections included in the database.

In order to construct the dependent variables measuring “outsidership”, I built upon a database of presidents’ and prime ministers’ careers created by Samuels and Shugart (2010). This database includes data on the political experience of presidents and prime ministers for all democratic countries in the period 1945-2005. It has information on whether the heads of government had been party leaders, cabinet members, and legislators before becoming presidents or prime ministers. It also includes information on how many years the heads of government occupied each role before arriving to power. I expanded this database by gathering additional biographical data about heads of government. I included three other variables in the database to have a more accurate picture of the previous political career of heads of government. The first variable measures whether heads of government occupied an executive position at the regional or local level before coming to power. The second variable measures whether heads of government

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30 This database was used by these scholars in the third chapter of their book (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). It is available online: http://laderafrutal.com/academic/samuels-shugart.html.
31 I extended the database until 2010. I also reorganized it to have one observation per election, instead of one observation per prime minister or president.
had already been presidents or prime ministers in the past. The third variable is labeled “other posts of political importance”, and considers politically relevant experience that is not included in the previous variables (e.g. the vice-presidency). These dummy variables are also accompanied by continuous variables that measure how long each head of government occupied these positions before arriving to power. Finally, I added a dummy variable measuring party origins coded as 1 if the president/prime minister came to power through a new party or electoral movement, and 0 otherwise.

Following the definition and operationalization proposed in the previous chapter, presidents/prime ministers are considered “political outsiders” when they run with a new party or electoral movement and when they had no significant political experience before becoming head of government. The variable “outsider” is coded 1 when both of these conditions are satisfied and 0 otherwise.

The main independent variable in the model is a dummy variable coded as 1 when the country has a presidential system of government. This variable was taken from the database of Samuels and Shugart (2010). I also include other independent variables in the model to test a series of alternative explanations. The election of outsiders may be due to the fragility of democratic institutions in some countries after difficult democratic transitions. In order to measure the quality of democratic institutions, I include the Polity IV score (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2008) in the model. The rise of outsiders may also be associated with economic development or with the countries’ economic performance in the years leading to the national

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32 Including this variable is important because “incumbent former outsiders” in presidential systems may be re-elected without any kind of experience in the cabinet or in the legislature. However, it would be a mistake to consider them as outsiders if they are running as incumbent presidents.

33 In line with the operationalization proposed in the previous chapter, politicians are considered as politically inexperienced if they had less than two years of political experience before the elections that brought them to power.
elections. In order to control for these effects in the statistical model, I include a measure of GDP per capita to capture economic development; and a variable measuring the mean two-year GDP growth (one year prior to election year plus the election year) to capture economic performance.\footnote{The results reported below do not change if I use GDP growth of the year of the election as a measure of economic performance.} These two variables come from Maddison (2010). In order to control for inflation, I also include a logged measure of the inflation rate (average of the inflation rate of the year of the election and of the inflation rate of the year preceding the election). The inflation rate is calculated using the variation of the consumer price index from one year to the next. The historical inflation data was obtained from many online sources.\footnote{These online sources include: http://www.rateinflation.com/; http://www.eclac.org/estadisticas/; http://www.inflation.eu/; http://www.tradingeconomics.com/; and http://inflationdata.com/.

Some scholars have used average aggregate survey responses to legitimacy questions as a proxy for trust in political institutions (Doyle, 2011). This is problematic in our case for several reasons. First, survey data exists only for certain periods and certain countries. Hence, including such a variable would force me to reduce the sample size dramatically. Second, it is difficult to code legitimacy from survey responses because we include countries from different regions which are included in different surveys (Afrobarometer, Asian Barometer, Eurobarometer, Latinobarómetro, etc.). Since different surveys ask slightly different questions and code answers differently, it would be difficult to come up with a reliable legitimacy index using survey data.} Controlling for the legitimacy of political institutions at the aggregate level is challenging.\footnote{The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is released annually by Transparency International. It measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world.} In this analysis, I control for the legitimacy of the political system by using a measure of the corruption perception index (Transparency International). This proxy is warranted because corruption is closely related to political legitimacy. Indeed, several studies demonstrate that exposure to corruption leads to an erosion of political support (Morris & Klesner, 2010; M. A. Seligson, 2002a). I operationalize perception of corruption in the period 1980-2012 by assigning a fixed number to each country averaging the values of the corruption perception index the countries received between 1995 and 2012.\footnote{The results reported below do not change if I use GDP growth of the year of the election as a measure of economic performance.} This index goes from 0 to 10 and a higher level means less corruption. It was reversed for the purposes of this data analysis, so that a higher level...
reflects more corruption, rather than less. This variable is only included in models 2 and 4 in Table 3.3, which estimate the impact of presidentialism on the rise of outsiders in the period 1980-2012.\footnote{The level of corruption in a country tends to remain stable over the years, so assigning a fixed number is justified. Indeed, the average standard deviation of the CPI index within countries in the period 1995-2012 in the 63 countries included in this analysis is only 0.41 in the 0-10 index.}

Finally, the statistical model includes measures of British colonial heritage and ethnic fractionalization. The former variable is a dummy one coded as one if a country was colonized by Britain and 0 otherwise. The data on ethnic heterogeneity was taken from the fractionalization dataset compiled by Alberto Alesina et al. (2003).

### 3.2.2 Model estimation

Given that the dependent variable in the analysis is binary, logistic regression is the most suitable statistical method of analysis. However, the empirical analysis is conducted with cross-sectional time series data. Hence, I will first estimate a series of random effects logistic regressions. The random effects logistic regression has many advantages because it takes the unique structure of the data into account. First, the error term in the model is partitioned into error across countries and error across time within countries. Second, the standard errors of the estimates are corrected to take into account repeated observations for each country. Third, this procedure produces robust parameter estimates in situations where countries have valid data in some years but not others –i.e., unbalanced data– (Pendergast et al., 1996). Since the outcome analyzed (election of an outsider) is a rare event –see Table 3.1 below–, I also run two additional models using a rare events logistic regression as the estimator. This estimator develops corrections for the biases in logistic regression that occur when predicting or explaining rare outcomes (G. King & Zeng, 2001).
3.3 OUTSIDERS AND PRESIDENTIALISM

3.3.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 3.1 shows the number of instances of presidents or prime ministers that came to power as political outsiders.

Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics: outsiders in presidential and parliamentary elections (1945-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of political system</th>
<th>Number of elections in the sample</th>
<th>Number of outsiders elected</th>
<th>Outsiders’ success rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidentialism</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentarism</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first finding of this chapter is that the election of outsiders is uncommon, both in presidential and in parliamentary systems. However, the descriptive statistics also suggest that rise to power of outsiders is *much rarer in parliamentary systems*. Every twenty presidential elections, there is one instance of a political outsider being elected to the presidency. The arrival to power of political outsiders through parliamentary elections is much more infrequent (one instance every 100 elections). Still, the fact that outsiders win elections in only 5% of presidential elections shows that the phenomenon is not as widespread as sometimes assumed by the “perils of presidentialism” literature (Linz, 1994).³⁹

An analysis of bivariate regressions between presidentialism and “outsidership” again suggests that the rise of outsiders is more common in presidential systems. The coefficients for the variable “presidentialism” are positive and statistically significant in the two models

³⁹ An analysis of a bivariate regression between presidentialism and “outsidership” again shows that the rise of outsiders is more common in presidential systems. The coefficient for the variable “presidentialism” is positive and statistically significant in the bivariate regression. The bivariate regression is not presented here but is available upon request.
presented in Table 3.2 (random effects logistic regression and rare events logistic regression). In the absence of any controls, presidentialism appears to be a good predictor of the rise of outsiders to the highest political office. Predicted probabilities calculated on the basis of a bivariate logistic regression indicate that the predicted probability of the rise of an outsider prime minister after parliamentary elections is 1.6%, while the predicted probability of the election of an outsider candidate in presidential elections is 5.1%. These figures are very similar to the ones revealed in the descriptive statistics.

### Table 3.2. The impact of presidentialism on the rise of outsiders (bivariate logistic regressions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Random Effects Logistic Regression</th>
<th>(2) Rare Events Logistic Regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidentialism</td>
<td>1.394* (.794)</td>
<td>1.201** (.546)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.068*** (.872)</td>
<td>-4.125*** (.410)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Is the pattern revealed in Table 3.2 somehow indicative of a causal relationship? In other words, is “outsidership” caused by presidentialism or is it related to some other characteristic of countries that have a presidential system of government? It is important to control for other structural or dynamic factors given that presidential systems have been adopted primarily in less developed countries with more fragile democratic institutions—as can be observed in Appendix A most presidential systems are located in Africa and Latin America—and more prone to suffer economic crises. In order to illustrate this problem, it is useful to go back to a series of seminal works by Stepan and Skach (1993, 1994). These scholars compared the democratic stability of
countries that gained independence between 1945 and 1979. They found that countries that start independence as parliamentary systems were more likely to become or remain democracies than countries that started as presidential systems. However, these conclusions were later challenged by other scholars (Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997) who showed that the correlation between parliamentarism and democracy presented in the work of Stepan and Skach is doubtful because they do not control for key factors, such as income level and British colonial heritage. In order to avoid a similar problem, the next section will present the result of a multivariate analysis assessing the impact of presidentialism on the rise of outsider candidates.

### 3.3.2 Results and analyses

I estimated the impact of presidentialism, economic development, economic performance, democratic quality, corruption, and ethnic fractionalization on the election of outsiders with a series of logistic regression models. Table 3.3 presents the results.

Surprisingly, the results do not support the conventional wisdom. The rise of outsiders is not causally related to the type of political system. On the contrary, the results suggest that other political and economic factors must be taken into account to explain the rise of outsider political leaders.
The multivariate analyses presented in Table 3.3 suggest that presidentialism is not a good predictor of the election of political outsiders. Models 1 and 2 predict the impact of presidentialism on the rise of outsiders with random effects logistic regressions. Models 3 and 4 assess the link between the political regime and the election of outsiders with rare events logistic regressions. The second and the fourth models in Table 3.3 include two variables (inflation and corruption) which are only available for the period 1980-2010. Hence, these models have a lower number of observations.\(^40\) As expected, the coefficient for “presidentialism” is positive in all the models, but it does not reach standard levels of statistical significance. Hence, the election of

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\(^40\) This is not very problematic in this case because the number of observations is still relatively high, and also because the vast majority of outsiders (both in presidential and in parliamentary systems) came to power after 1980.
outsiders to the top executive position is not primarily explained by the nature of the political system (presidential vs. parliamentary).

The models in Table 3.3 show that one structural factor (the level of democratization) and one dynamic factor (economic performance) are better predictors of political “outsidership”. The mean three-year GDP growth (two years prior to election year plus the election year) is a negative and statistically significant predictor of “outsidership” in three of the four models presented in Table 3.3.\(^{41}\) This suggests that outsider candidates are more likely to be successful in presidential and parliamentary elections when countries are going through periods of sustained economic crisis. This finding is in line with previous studies that show that economic adversity increases the likelihood of outsider success in presidential elections (Corrales, 2008). The models in Table 3.3 also reveal that the rise to power of outsider politicians is associated with the solidity of democratic institutions. In fact, the coefficient for the Polity IV score is negative and statistically significant in models 1 and 3, and is close to statistical significance in models 2 (P value=0.153) and 4 (P value=0.209). The evidence is not fully conclusive but the election of outsiders appears to be easier when the quality of democratic institutions is low.\(^{42}\)

Most of the other coefficients in the model have the expected direction but they do not reach standard levels of statistical significance. The rise of outsiders appears more likely in countries where corruption is high and where society is ethnically divided, and during periods of

\(^{41}\) If GDP growth on election year is used to measure economic conditions the results are even stronger. This alternative measure produces a negative and statistically significant coefficient in the four models reported in Table 3.2, suggesting that this finding is robust. These additional models are not presented here but they are available upon request from the author.

\(^{42}\) The effect is potentially endogenous since—as will be demonstrated in future chapters of this dissertation—outsiders are also more likely to threaten the quality of democracy than traditional party politicians. However, this is unlikely because the Polity IV measure included in the regressions reflects the quality of democracy in the election year. Democracy measures such as Polity IV or the Freedom House score normally take some time to reflect the undemocratic tendencies of outsider presidents. In any case, the effect of the “presidentialism” variable remains insignificant when the Polity IV variable is not included in the models.
high inflation. But the lack of statistical significance of the coefficients associated with these variables suggests that these relationships are weak at best.

In sum, the pattern suggested in the descriptive statistics presented in the previous section is not confirmed by the multivariate analysis. The critics of presidentialism overlooked that presidential systems have other characteristics that make them more prone to political instability and the rise of outsiders in the first place. Most presidential systems are located in the developing world and are more likely to suffer serious and politically destabilizing economic crises. Moreover, many countries with presidential systems democratized during the Third Wave and still have more fragile democratic institutions (as revealed by lower Polity IV scores). These structural conditions undoubtedly also affect public trust in democratic institutions and facilitate the rise of independent candidates that run successful campaigns capitalizing on citizens’ malaise with the political class. More robust democracies may also have developed institutional mechanisms to channel political discontent. Finally, support for established parties may be less volatile where the quality of democracy is good. Of course, outsider candidates sometimes participate in national elections in high-quality democracies (e.g. George Wallace and Ross Perot in the United States) but they almost never get elected.

Even considering the factors mentioned in the previous paragraph, the lack of a link between presidentialism and the rise of outsiders is surprising. This unexpected finding might be associated with the “presidentialization” or “personalization” of parliamentary systems that has marked the post-World War II era. The “presidentialization” argument holds that modern democracies are increasingly following a presidential logic of governance, through which leadership is becoming more centralized and more powerful. The power resources of prime ministers vis-à-vis other institutions and their own parties are constantly increasing. Party leaders
also develop a personal linkage with voters and are more autonomous from their own parties in parliament (B. Farrell, 1971; Foley, 1993; Poguntke & Webb, 2005). Another essential part of this process is the personalization of electoral processes. There has been a growing emphasis on leadership appeals in election campaigning in parliamentary systems at the detriment of more programmatic or partisan appeals. One of the main factors producing this personalization of politics is the changing structure of mass communications. Television naturally tends to focus on personality rather than policies or programs in order to reduce the complexity of political issues and generate more interest from the audience (D. M. Farrell & Webb, 2000; Mughan, 2000; Poguntke & Webb, 2005: 14-15). The personalization of electoral processes in parliamentary systems may have eroded some of the differences that existed between parliamentary and presidential elections. Since parliamentary elections have become very personalized, parliamentary systems also face the possibility of having a charismatic outsider as prime minister. If voters know that parliamentary elections are ultimately a way to select a prime minister they may also vote for the party of the candidate they prefer, even if it is a new party that only serves as an electoral vehicle for an ambitious political entrepreneur. For instance, the party created by Berlusconi (Forza Italia) obtained enough support in the 1994 parliamentary elections as to allow this charismatic outsider to form a government. The relatively high number of outsiders in Eastern Europe in the 1990s (see Table 2.1) suggests that this possibility is even higher in parliamentary systems with weak democratic institutions and suffering from economic hardships.⁴³

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⁴³ Since the literature on parliamentarism underscores the contemporary "presidentialization" of parliamentary systems, I also run the models in Table 3.3 for the period 1945-1980 to test whether the conventional wisdom is supported in this restricted sample. The variable “presidentialism” remains insignificant in this restricted sample, which suggests that presidentialism is not a good predictor of the rise of outsiders—even prior to the increased
In addition to the fact that parliamentary elections have become more personalized, other factors may contribute to the rise of outsiders in parliamentary systems. The formal requirements to run for president are more stringent, costly, and time-consuming than the requirements to run for a legislative seat. Some countries even allow legislators to run as independents without the support of any political party. For instance, Andris Šķēle (a political outsider and a business oligarch) obtained a seat as an independent in the 1995 parliamentary elections in Latvia. He subsequently became prime minister between 1995 and 1997 because the main political parties could not agree on a government coalition. The case of Berlusconi also illustrates the low barriers to entry in parliamentary systems. Berlusconi announced his decision to enter politics on January 26, 1994, just two months before the general election that made him prime minister. Berlusconi negotiated a coalition between his newly created movement (*Forza Italia*) and the already existing *Pollo delle Libertà/Polo del Buon Governo* coalition composed of many center-right parties; and he became a legislative candidate within this broad coalition (Burgess, 1994; Donovan, 1994). Running as a presidential candidate would probably have required Berlusconi to clear some additional bureaucratic hurdles such as registering his *Forza Italia* movement as a new national party and register his candidacy to become president—which is harder to do than becoming a candidate for a legislative seat.

A final factor that may facilitate the rise of outsiders in parliamentary systems is coalition-making. As noted in the literature comparing the nature of presidential and parliamentary systems, one key difference between these two types of political systems is that the executive can be divided in a parliamentary system; whereas presidential systems can be described as “winner-take-all” (Lijphart, 1992b; Linz, 1990). In other words, outsiders can come personalization of parliamentary elections—. However, there are few stable presidential systems before 1980 so the evidence is not entirely conclusive. These additional models are available upon request.
to power in parliamentary systems by leading a multiparty coalition, even if their parties or movements only obtain a small plurality of the votes. For instance, *Forza Italia* only obtained 21% of the popular vote in the 1994 national elections in Italy but that was enough for Berlusconi to become prime minister by leading a center-right coalition. In a similar vein, Juhan Parts (a political outsider) became prime minister of Estonia in 2003 by surprisingly gaining a majority among the right-of-centre parties in the elections. However, his new political party (*Res Publica*) only obtained 24.62% of the popular vote. In all likelihood, the low scores obtained by Berlusconi and Parts would not have sufficed for these candidates to become heads of government in a presidential system.

### 3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter casts serious doubts on the argument made by the critics of presidentialism regarding the link between presidential systems and outsider leaders. The results demonstrate that the type of political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) has no impact on the probability of the election of an outsider. The statistical analysis suggests that other factors, such as the quality of democratic institutions (as measured by the Polity IV score) and the economic performance of the incumbent governments in the years preceding the national elections, are better predictors of the arrival to power of political outsiders.

The critics of presidentialism argued that one regime type (parliamentarism) was clearly superior to the other (presidentialism). The findings in this chapter are in line with a large literature which suggests that these broad claims are not empirically grounded. Presidential systems come in very different forms and face very different challenges. It is essential to assess
variations within the presidential regime type to explain many political and institutional outcomes (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997). These differences within presidentialism might carry most of the explanatory weight in the explanation of outsider rise. The next two chapters will explore some of these contextual and institutional factors within presidentialism which are associated with the emergence of independent politicians in national elections.
4.0 INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND OUTSIDER RISE

The previous chapter demonstrates that the claim made by the critics of presidentialism regarding the higher likelihood of outsider rise in presidential systems is unfounded. Outsider candidates tend to emerge in fragile democracies and during situations of economic hardship, regardless of whether the regime is parliamentary or presidential. Although interesting, this negative finding generates a whole new series of questions. The fact remains that eight outsiders arrived to power in Latin America in the last 25 years, and many other independent candidates were narrowly defeated. This chapter and the next one will focus on the presidential systems of Latin America, to assess the individual-level and institutional factors that explain the sudden rise of outsider candidates in the region.

I begin by assessing whether a series of institutional factors influence the success of outsiders in presidential elections. If the type of political system cannot explain the emergence of outsider politicians, can we find some institutional characteristics within presidential systems associated with outsider success? Such a strategy was followed by Shugart and Carey in a pathbreaking book: *Presidents and Assemblies* (1992).

The most important contribution of that book was an innovative approach that moved away from the presidentialism vs. parliamentarism research design. According to the authors, presidential systems are not all alike. Different presidential systems have different institutional arrangements (presidential powers, party systems, electoral systems, electoral cycles), each of
which has implications for democratic stability, governability, representativeness, and accountability. The authors assess the strengths and weaknesses of various forms of presidential systems. They also evaluate how these institutional characteristics influence the prospects for cooperation between presidents and assemblies. For instance, in chapter 8 the authors evaluate the legislative and non-legislative powers of presidents. They conclude that “relatively strong assemblies should be associated with stable and effective government relative to strong presidencies” (Shugart & Carey, 1992: 165).

This approach paved the way for a new generation of studies on executive-legislative relations. In their pathbreaking contribution, however, Shugart and Carey did not address the issue of the rise of outsiders. Neither did the new generation of institutionalist scholars interested in Latin American political institutions. The explanation I put forward in this chapter identifies a series of institutional factors that reduce the cost of running for higher office for outsiders. This analysis demonstrates that the rise of political outsiders is determined by institutional design characteristics, such as concurrent elections, compulsory voting rules, and reelection provisions.

4.1 THEORY: INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF OUTSIDER SUCCESS

In this chapter, I draw from works analyzing the shape of the party system and the formation of voters’ preferences in order to build a theory emphasizing the possible causes of outsider success in presidential elections. I also draw from some case studies analyzing the emergence of individual political outsiders in Latin American countries.
Most previous research has focused on the socioeconomic and sociopolitical context that leads to the success of outsiders or anti-establishment parties in presidential elections. For instance, it has been shown that outsiders or minor parties are more successful when support for national political institutions is low (M. A. Seligson, 2002b) and when established parties repeatedly fail to address the economic problems of the citizenry (Benton, 2005). This chapter aims at discovering the institutional design characteristics that contribute to the rise of outsiders by influencing the decision of rational independent challengers to enter the electoral race.

4.1.1 Institutional design and the rise of outsiders

Several institutional design characteristics affect the probability that outsiders will participate in the elections, and their likelihood of success. I will review these different factors and propose hypotheses on how they impact the emergence of independent candidates. These hypotheses will be tested in the empirical section below.

The first important factor to consider is the electoral system. Electoral systems regulating the election of the president must determine a threshold of legitimacy considered sufficient for the chief executive to form an authoritative government. Plurality systems allow for a mobile threshold of legitimacy, whereas the majority and mixed systems adopt a rigid threshold of legitimacy (Shugart & Taagepera, 1994). When no candidate achieves this rigid threshold a runoff election is organized with the two most voted candidates in the first round. The choice between a plurality and a majority-runoff system has a direct impact on the effective number of presidential candidates (Jones, 1999). In plurality systems, presidential candidates from new or minor parties know that they are not likely to obtain enough votes to win the election. Hence, plurality systems tend to create broad party coalitions behind the front-runner. Minor parties
exchange their support in these electoral coalitions for political favors (pork, cabinet posts) after the election. In the same vein, the opposition tends to coalesce behind one principal challenger. On the contrary, majority elections in two rounds discourage the coalescence of political forces. Even minor parties that have minimal chances of winning the election participate. When they are eliminated from the race, the losing candidates have more leverage to negotiate their support in the second round against political privileges after the election (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart & Taagepera, 1994). Moreover, with majority runoff, parties tend to specialize. Some parties enter the electoral race with the objective of winning the second round even though they know they have no chances of winning the first round (Schlesinger & Schlesinger, 1990). Political outsiders tend to rise to power through new and non-institutionalized parties. As discussed above, this type of party makes a series of calculations before entering the presidential race. I contend that political outsiders are more likely to participate in a presidential election under a majority-runoff system in which they can hope to win the second round even if they are sure to lose the first round. Let us imagine a two-party system disrupted by the rise of an outsider. If an independent candidate makes it to the second round, the losing party may form a strategic alliance with the outsider to avoid the victory of the other traditional party. For instance, Schmidt (1996) argues that the rise of Fujimori in the 1990 elections in Peru was facilitated by the majority-runoff system, which allowed Fujimori to win the elections despite finishing second in the first round. The incumbent party (APRA) supported Fujimori after being eliminated from the race in the first round. Finally, outsiders may obtain better scores under majority-runoff systems because the voters may issue a warning or a protest vote against the performance of traditional parties without really losing their ballot since they can vote for their preferred candidate in the second round. Such arguments yield the following hypothesis:
**H4.1: Political outsiders are more likely to emerge under majority-runoff systems than under plurality systems.**

Another aspect of the rules governing presidential elections that may have an impact on the rise to political prominence of outsiders is the *electoral cycle*. In this regard, the main distinction established in the literature is between concurrent and non-concurrent elections. Concurrent elections occur when presidential and legislative elections take place on the same day. Elections are non-concurrent when presidential and legislative elections are held on different dates (Jones, 1995). I argue that political outsiders are more likely to emerge under non-concurrent than under concurrent elections for two main reasons. First, when elections are concurrent established parties are likely to be much more actively engaged in the campaign since they want to secure as many seats as possible in the legislature. When legislators campaign in their districts, they become indirect agents of the national campaign of the candidate representing their party in the presidential elections. Lacking a strong political apparatus, it is harder for political outsiders to compete with the candidates of established parties when presidential and legislative elections are held simultaneously. Second, concurrent elections have an indirect impact on outsider rise by affecting the number of parties. Several works have shown that the timing of elections has an impact on the number of relevant parties in the nation (Jones, 1994) (Jones, 1994; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997b; Shugart & Carey, 1992). According to these studies, concurrent elections are associated with two-party dominance. On the contrary, non-concurrent elections increase the number of competing parties. Multiparty systems increase the incentives for outsiders to participate in the elections since they do not need as many votes as in a two-party system to get elected or to reach the second round. At the same time, in a multiparty system voters may be more inclined to vote for an independent candidate, because they do not
feel that they are wasting their ballot by doing so. The second hypothesis of this chapter follows from this argument:

**H4.2:** *Political outsiders are more likely to emerge when presidential and legislative elections are non-concurrent.*

The electoral laws of many Latin American countries include *compulsory voting* provisions. Compulsory voting has been defined as “a system of laws and/or norms, mandating that enfranchised citizens turn out to vote, and usually specifying penalties for noncompliance” (Jackman, 2001). Compulsory voting may be related with the rise to political prominence of outsider politicians. According to the “exit, voice, and loyalty” model of political behavior (Hirschman, 1970) disaffected individuals who are not satisfied with the performance of political parties or do not feel represented always have the possibility to “exit” the system by abstaining. Compulsory voting forces all these disaffected citizens—who would otherwise abstain—to participate in the election. These voters with anti-party sentiments may decide to support political outsiders in the election either because they want to issue a protest vote against traditional parties or because they consider that outsiders will perform better than the other party options. The third hypothesis of this chapter follows from this discussion:

**H4.3:** *Political outsiders are more likely to emerge when voting is compulsory.*

Morgenstern and Siavelis (2008) identify another institutional variable that is possibly related with the rise of outsiders or, as they call them, “free-wheeling independents”: *reelection provisions.* Many Latin American countries have recently adopted reelection provisions (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela). Until now, all incumbent presidents seeking

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44 In the same vein, compulsory voting may affect the electoral fortunes of third parties as has been shown in a recent study (Bélanger, 2004). My argument in the previous paragraph is an adaptation of the argument Bélanger makes about third parties.
reelection have been successful. Incumbents have an advantage because they can distribute pork and because they have easier access to state resources and more exposure in the media. It follows from this argument that reelection provisions should discourage outsiders from participating in presidential elections. The following hypothesis follows from this argument:

\textit{H4.4: Political outsiders are more likely to emerge in countries that ban reelection.}

### 4.1.2 Alternative explanations of the rise of outsiders in Latin America

Factors that are not related to the institutional design can also affect the likelihood of success of political outsiders by having an impact on the strategic choices of both candidates and voters. The alternative explanations considered here are basically the same that I presented in the previous chapter as I am looking at a very similar dependent variable.\textsuperscript{45} In line with the review of relevant academic literature conducted in Chapter 3 (section 3.1.3), the alternative explanations of the emergence of independent candidates which are considered in this analysis are the legitimacy crisis affecting countries in Latin America, political corruption, electoral volatility, economic conditions (both economic growth and inflation), and ethnic heterogeneity. Hence, the specification of the statistical analysis in this chapter is similar to the model presented in chapter 3 although with some small adjustments.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45} Since I was able to gather more detailed data about Latin American elections, in this chapter the dependent variable is the percentage of support obtained by outsiders rather than a dummy variable measuring whether the outsider was elected or not.

\textsuperscript{46} I exclude a few variables which were meant to control for differences between parliamentary and presidential regimes but are irrelevant (e.g. British colonial heritage) or are not theoretically justified (income level) when the sample is made of presidential regimes in Latin America only.
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

4.2.1 Data

The level of analysis in the statistical model below is presidential elections in Latin America in the period between 1980 and 2010. The election results were obtained from on-line sources including the Elections Results Archive of Binghamton University, the Election Guide of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and the Adam Carr's Election Archive. I only include elections in periods when countries had a Polity IV score equal or higher than 6.47

The dependent variable in this study is the percentage of votes captured by outsiders during the aforementioned elections. In the only previous example of an empirical analysis seeking to explain the success of outsiders in presidential elections across the region, Corrales (2008) focused exclusively on candidates that obtained more than 10% of the vote. In this analysis, I lower this threshold since I gathered biographical information on all presidential candidates that obtained more than 5% of the vote. I do not take into account the candidates that obtained less than 5% of the vote in order to exclude the non-viable candidates that run knowing that their likelihood of success is minimal or inexistent. In a seminal contribution, Schlesinger (1994: 7) argues that his theory of political parties “is applicable only to those parties that have a realistic chance of winning elections over time”. My institutional theory of the rise of outsiders

similarly applies only to candidates that realistically hope to rise to political prominence by obtaining significant support in presidential elections, and not to those who seek other goals (personal prestige or psychological rewards). Using the 5% threshold allows me to distinguish between relevant outsiders and trivial newcomers.

The dependent variable in the empirical analysis comes from an original database on political outsiders in Latin America.\(^48\) In line with the definition and the operationalization proposed in Chapter 2, I code as an outsider any candidate that has no previous political experience and comes from outside of the established party system. To create the database of political outsiders in Latin America I collected information from many on-line sources. To gather information on successful candidates, I used mainly the on-line collection of political biographies provided by the CIDOB (Centro de Investigación de Relaciones Internacionales y Desarrollo). Others sources used (especially to gather information on unsuccessful candidates) include the Biography Reference Bank, the Biography and Genealogy Master Index, Lexis-Nexis Academic, ProQuest Newsstand, and the *New York Times* on-line archive. I also used the *Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture* (Kinsbruner & Langer 2008).

The independent variables related to institutions come from existing databases. The data concerning the type of rules in place for the election of the president (plurality vs. majority/runoff) were obtained through a database built by Pérez-Liñán for his study on this issue (Pérez-Liñán, 2006). The data on compulsory vote was obtained from the IDEA compulsory voting database available online.\(^49\)

To control for the effect of economic crisis on the rise of outsiders, I include a variable measuring the mean three-year GDP growth (two years prior to election year plus the election

\(^{48}\) See the list of all the outsider candidates in Latin American presidential elections in Table 2.2.  
\(^{49}\) http://idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm
year) coming from data in Maddison (2010). The growth rates for the years 2008-2010 were obtained from the last edition of the CIA World Factbook available online.\(^{50}\) I also control for inflation, which may have an independent impact on the rise of outsiders, regardless of economic growth. The inflation data comes from CEPALSTAT (the online database of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean –a UN institution–). I used the variations in the consumer prices index (annual average) as my measure of inflation. The data on ethnic heterogeneity was taken from the fractionalization dataset compiled by Alberto Alesina et al. (2003).

The data to test the legitimacy crisis argument was obtained from different sources. First, I use age of democracy (i.e. number of years since Polity IV score is > 6) as a proxy to test whether citizens become disillusioned with political parties when they cannot fulfill the expectations created by democratization. I operationalize perception of corruption by assigning a fixed number to each country averaging the values of the corruption perception index the countries received between 1995 and 2009.\(^{51}\) This index goes from 0 to 10 and a higher level means less corruption. It was reversed for the purposes of this data analysis, so that a higher level reflects more corruption, rather than less.

Finally, I added a measure of the lagged performance of outsiders (percentage of votes captured by full outsiders in the previous election) since the success of outsider candidates may be overdetermined by the previous rise of an independent candidate that destabilized the party system.\(^{52}\)

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\(^{50}\) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

\(^{51}\) The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is released annually by Transparency International. It measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the world.

\(^{52}\) Levitsky and Cameron (2003) show that after the success of Fujimori, Peruvian politicians quickly learned that they no longer needed political parties to advance their political careers, which led to an explosion of independent
4.2.2 Model estimation

The analysis of pooled cross-sectional time-series data is challenging since ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions of homoskedasticity and uncorrelated error terms are likely to be violated (Stimson, 1985). Although OLS estimates are unbiased in the presence of autocorrelation, these estimates are not efficient, which may contaminate tests of statistical significance.

In order to overcome these problems, I assessed the impact of different institutional and contextual factors on the rise of political outsiders through a series of panel analyses. First, I run the fixed effects and the random effects models. Then, I performed the Hausman test which produced a highly significant test statistic (Prob>chi2 = 0.000). Hence, I rejected the random effects model and continued to work with the fixed effects setup. However, fixed effects models cannot estimate the effect of time-invariant variables, and produce very inefficient estimates of variables that rarely change. When such variables are introduced in the model as independent variables, “the fixed effect will soak up most of the explanatory power of these slowly changing variables. Thus, if a variable (…) changes over time, but slowly, the fixed effects will make it hard for such variables to appear either substantively or statistically significant” (N. Beck, 2001: 285). The FEVD estimation technique developed in Plümper and Troeger (2007) is designed for PTSCS/Panel data consisting of data on independent variables that rarely or never change candidates in different elections at the national, regional, and municipal level. Gutiérrez Sanín (2007) uses a similar argument to explain the recent emergence of independent candidates in Colombia.

53 The methodology recommended by Beck and Katz (1996) (i.e. panel corrected standard errors -PCSE- with a lagged dependent variable in the specification of the model) is inappropriate for this data. First, the panel is very unbalanced. Second, the cross-units (countries) significantly outnumber the time points. Third, lagged dependent variables are generally inappropriate for models that include time-invariant or rarely-changing explanatory variables (Achen, 2001).
through time. As my main independent variables are institutional factors that change very slowly this estimation technique is appropriate.\textsuperscript{54}

As a final step, I estimated two more models in order to assess the robustness of my results. Serially correlated errors can lead to an incorrect estimation of panel data models. In this case, the problem is not likely to be very damaging because of the irregular nature of the time-series aspect of the research design (one observation per presidential election). However, I conducted a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data which provided a significant test statistic (prob$>F = 0.02$) suggesting that autocorrelation may affect some of the results. Hence, I run the FEVD model incorporating an ar(1) correction as a robustness check. Finally, I performed a modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effects models, which produced a significant test statistic (prob$>\text{chi2} = 0.00$) suggesting that there is heteroskedasticity across units (countries). Then, as another robustness check, I run the FEVD procedure with panel corrected standard errors in the third stage. If the results of the basic FEVD model are robust to the incorporation of these corrections, we can be confident on their robustness.

\textsuperscript{54} This estimator was criticized in a recent issue of Political Analysis. The main criticism leveled against this technique is that the standard errors of the time-invariant variables are too small, which leads to incorrect conclusions (Breusch, Ward, Nguyen, & Kompas, 2011; Greene, 2011). However, the latest xtfed ado file in Stata generates a correct estimation of the standard errors (N. Beck, 2011; Plümper & Troeger, 2011). Assuming the standard errors are calculated correctly, the consensus is that the FEVD estimator remains the most appropriate technique for panel models with time-invariant variables.
I estimated the impact of institutional, economic, and contextual factors on the rise of political outsiders with a series of panel data models including data from an original dataset on political outsiders in Latin America (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. Panel data models: determinants of vote for outsiders in Latin American elections (1980-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) FEVD Model</th>
<th>(2) FEVD Model with AR(1) correction</th>
<th>(3) FEVD Model with PCSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td>-4.15</td>
<td>-6.55</td>
<td>-4.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.15)</td>
<td>(4.29)</td>
<td>(4.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concurrent elections</td>
<td>-8.10**</td>
<td>-8.39**</td>
<td>-8.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.90)</td>
<td>(4.13)</td>
<td>(4.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory Vote</td>
<td>8.18**</td>
<td>7.42***</td>
<td>8.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(1.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Running</td>
<td>-8.53*</td>
<td>-8.25**</td>
<td>-8.53*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.36)</td>
<td>(3.06)</td>
<td>(4.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.47)</td>
<td>(.40)</td>
<td>(.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>5.87**</td>
<td>3.99**</td>
<td>5.87**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
<td>(2.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Heterogeneity</td>
<td>19.63**</td>
<td>26.29***</td>
<td>19.63**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.42)</td>
<td>(5.29)</td>
<td>(8.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Democracy</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>4.29**</td>
<td>3.02**</td>
<td>4.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td>(.85)</td>
<td>(.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged vote for Outsiders</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups (countries)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results provide support for three of the four hypotheses advanced in this chapter. Surprisingly, the results run against the conventional wisdom that plurality electoral systems are more stable and less likely to foster the creation of new political forces built by political outsiders. The coefficient for this variable does not reach statistical significance in any model, which suggests that the share of votes captured by outsiders is not influenced by the electoral formula. In other words, the incentives structure of presidential candidates does not seem to operate in the way suggested by most of the literature (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart & Taagepera, 1994). The results, however, are consistent with the findings of Kenney (1998b) who analyzed electoral reforms in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Peru; and concluded that the transition from plurality to majority-runoff had a limited effect on the number of presidential candidates in those countries. In unstable and volatile party systems, potential presidential candidates may even be encouraged to participate in systems in which they need only a plurality of the votes to win.

The model strongly supports the hypothesis that holding presidential and legislative elections concurrently reduces the likelihood of success of outsider candidates. Based on the regression results, holding elections concurrently reduces the share of votes obtained by outsiders by about 8.1%. In other words, the likelihood of outsider success is significantly reduced when elections are held at the same time. In fact, traditional parties are likely to be omnipresent during political campaigns if multiple positions are at stake, thereby leaving less space for newcomers in the political arena.

The hypothesis on compulsory voting is also strongly supported by the data. Compulsory voting significantly increases the likelihood of outsider success. According to the results, when voting is compulsory the share of votes obtained by outsider candidates increases by about 8%.
As mentioned above, this may be linked to the fact that unmotivated and dissatisfied citizens are nonetheless obliged to vote, which increases the likelihood of support for independent candidates who attack the corruption and inefficiency of traditional political parties. This finding calls into doubt the conventional wisdom that higher turnout is always better. Forcing unmotivated citizens out of their houses appears to contribute to the electoral success of outsider candidates.

The final institutional hypothesis held that outsiders are less likely to rise when presidential reelection is permitted. Presidents have an incumbency advantage because they can mobilize pork and state resources which may discourage the participation of political outsiders and reduce the share of votes captured by outsiders if independent candidates participate in the election. Again the model confirms my theoretical expectation. When incumbent presidents participate in the election the percentage of votes obtained by outsiders is likely to decrease by about 8%, magnitude similar to the other two primary independent variables.

Despite the loss of some observations in model 2, and the incorporation of corrections for first order autocorrelation and for panel heteroskedasticity in models 2 and 3, the three institutional variables that work as predicted in the basic FEVD model keep the expected sign and remain statistically significant in the robustness models.

As for the control variables, the results suggest that GDP growth is unrelated with outsider success in Latin American presidential elections. As will be shown again in the next chapter, short-term economic pains are not enough to push citizens to support outsider candidates in Latin America. On the contrary, inflation appears in most of the models as a strong predictor of the rise to political prominence of political outsiders. This variable is robust to the PCSE correction. This finding is in line with previous research showing the salience of inflation in the political choices of Latin American citizens (Weyland, 2002). The statistical results then suggest
that economic growth does not necessarily prevent the rise of an independent candidate in presidential elections, especially if growth is accompanied by inflation or by an increase in poverty.\footnote{I also tried \textit{per capita} GDP growth instead of GDP growth but the results did not change. The variable measuring growth remains an insignificant predictor of the rise of outsiders. The results of this model are not reported but are available upon request.}

I also ran several additional models to account for the possibility of an interaction between the institutional factors presented above and these two economic variables (economic growth and inflation). Moreover, in a recent contribution Hawkins presents a model of the rise of Chavismo in Venezuela and shows that the variables measuring economic growth “matter only when considered in combination with perceived corruption” (Hawkins, 2010: 160). Hence, I also tested a model with an interaction between growth and corruption. The results of these models are presented in Appendix B. Two main conclusions can be derived from these models. First, the results of the empirical analysis presented in this chapter are robust to the inclusion of these interaction terms. Second, none of the interaction terms that were tested in these models is statistically significant. This suggests that the institutional factors have an independent effect on the share of votes obtained by outsiders which is not affected by political corruption or economic performance.

Ethnic fractionalization increases the likelihood of outsider success in Latin America. In purely fractionalized societies political outsiders would obtain 20\% more votes than in purely homogeneous societies. Although these two extremes do not exist, the results suggest that in Latin America political outsiders are more likely to rise to political prominence in deeply divided societies.
The relationship between the emergence of outsiders and previous outsider success is not confirmed by the data. This result appears to suggest that there is not path dependence in the performance of presidential candidates in Latin America. On the one hand, outsiders may emerge in contexts, such as Venezuela, where candidates from traditional parties have competed successfully for a long time. On the other hand, the meteoric rise of an outsider may lead the traditional political class to react in order to avoid the emergence of another outsider. The case of Paraguay after the victory of Lugo in 2008 exemplifies this latter pattern.

The crisis of legitimacy is often hailed as one of the most serious obstacles to democratic consolidation in Latin America. Dissatisfaction with democratic institutions should materialize over time, when it becomes clear that the high expectations brought about by democratization are not fulfilled by democratic regimes (Przeworski, 1991). The age of democracy is a good proxy for this effect. Each additional year since the democratic transition increases the probability of voting for outsider candidates by 0.39%.⁵⁶ Traditional political parties may enjoy a certain prestige after authoritarian regimes, and they may be legitimized by their contribution to the democratic transition. But as the socioeconomic expectations associated with the democratic transition are disappointed, and as new generations of voters participate in the elections the likelihood of voting for outsider politicians in presidential elections gradually increase.

The legitimacy crisis of Latin American democracies appears to be aggravated by the widespread corruption in the region. According to the statistical results, corruption is positively associated with the performance of outsiders in presidential elections. This finding is not surprising in light of the efforts made by many outsider politicians to denounce the corrupt practices of traditional political parties.

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⁵⁶ This finding is robust when I leave out of the analysis the countries that were democratic at least since the 1960s (Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela) and have much higher values than the rest of the countries for this variable.
4.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The first conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that institutional design within presidential systems makes a difference in terms of outsider emergence. Outsider challengers are not less rational than career politicians. Independent candidates always evaluate the costs of running and the likelihood of victory before entering the race. They only participate in presidential elections when there are limited barriers for entry, and when the possibility of success (however defined) exists.

The results in this chapter cast doubts on the conventional wisdom that a plurality system automatically decreases the number of presidential candidates. In a highly uncertain and volatile electoral environment, such as the one that exists in many Latin American countries, a plurality system may not discourage the participation of political outsiders. The rest of my findings are more in line with my theoretical intuitions. When elections are concurrent, the electoral campaigns tend to be dominated by the strongest parties, which are likely to be very active in the whole country in order to gain as many seats in the legislature as possible, thereby limiting the possibilities of political outsiders who do not have a strong apparatus to back their campaigns. On the contrary, non-concurrent elections are more personalistic, and independent candidates with limited resources are more likely to make a breakthrough.

In the same vein, independent candidates tend not to trifle away their political capital by participating in presidential elections in which the incumbent runs for reelection. As the incumbent has a clear advantage during the campaign because he has easier access to the media and he can engage in clientelistic practices, outsider challengers are less likely to run. Finally, compulsory voting has an impact on the share of votes obtained by outsiders by affecting the voting behavior of the electorate. When dissatisfied citizens—who would otherwise abstain—
are obliged to turn out and vote, they tend to express their disenchantment by voting for political outsiders with an anti-establishment discourse. If outsider challengers perceive this effect, they are also more likely to participate when (enforced) compulsory voting rules exist.
5.0 WHO VOTES FOR OUTSIDERS IN LATIN AMERICA?\textsuperscript{57}

The two previous chapters have discussed the institutional determinants of the rise of outsider presidents. Although the type of political system (presidentialism vs. parliamentarism) does not explain the election of outsider politicians, a series of micro-institutional factors (within presidentialism) are linked to the outsider phenomenon. These findings are interesting because they suggest that certain institutions can facilitate the emergence of independent candidates running with new parties.

However, so far I have only considered the supply side of the outsider phenomenon. The present chapter will explore the demand side. Institutional factors make it easier for outsiders to run in presidential elections, but they do not explain popular support for these candidates. If viable outsider candidates participate in presidential elections, why and when do they attract strong popular support? Why do voters abandon established party options and choose to vote for neophyte outsider contenders?

I will analyze the individual-level factors that push voters to support outsiders. The availability of good survey data in Latin America has increased in the past two decades, which gives scholars the opportunity to analyze the determinants of voting behavior in the region. However, little is known about the sources behind the strength of political outsiders. Who votes

\textsuperscript{57} This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Ignazio de Ferrari (De Ferrari & Carreras, 2012).
for outsiders and why? Do outsiders benefit from the legitimacy crisis that affects traditional political parties in Latin America?

Logit models are estimated to explore the individual-level factors associated with the vote for outsiders in presidential elections in Latin America. I use individual-level data from eight different election surveys conducted in six countries by *Latinobarómetro* and LAPOP. The analysis reveals that the rise of outsiders is associated with the crisis of representation that affects many Latin American democracies. Citizens who feel unrepresented by established political parties are more likely to vote for outsiders. Moreover, under some specific conditions, citizens holding authoritarian attitudes may have a greater tendency to support independent candidates.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I present the main argument of this chapter linking the rise of outsiders in Latin America to the pervasive crisis of representation in the region (especially in the Andean region). Second, I review the previous literature on the vote for new parties and outsiders in order to identify relevant alternative explanations. Third, I describe the data that will be used in the analysis and the model estimation. Finally, I present the empirical results which suggest that the rise of outsiders can be understood in terms of a “crisis of representation.”

### 5.1 CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION AND OUTSIDERS IN LATIN AMERICA

Several Latin American countries have undergone a severe crisis of democratic representation in the last two decades (Mainwaring et al., 2006). This crisis of representation has two distinct aspects. The first one is a widespread disenchantment with democratic institutions –particularly political parties– in Latin America after the Third Wave of democratization. The second one is
the underrepresentation of certain societal or ideological segments of the population during the period of the “Washington consensus”. The main argument of this chapter is that individuals who have become disenchanted with traditional party options and are not represented ideologically by the established parties are more likely to support outsider candidates.

It has become a leitmotiv for scholars who study political parties to talk about the crisis of parties in fragile democracies. In the words of a prestigious scholar, “parties are not what they once were” (Schmitter, 2001). Political parties in Third Wave democracies have a hard time carrying out their basic functions (electoral structuration, government formation, and interest aggregation). In new democracies, political parties face an electoral competition that changed dramatically with developments in the mass media. In order to survive in this new media environment, parties often choose to develop appealing catch-all programs with very vague promises that are hard to keep after they come to power. This leads to citizens’ disillusionment with established parties in the long run, and it paves the way for an increase in electoral volatility in fragile democracies (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007). Moreover, political parties are less able to provide a stable political identity to citizens because they fail to develop strong organic links with civil society through associations and movements as they did in the past (Schmitter, 2001). In Latin America, market reforms in the 1990s have produced a weakening of intermediary organizations such as labor unions, thereby depriving political parties of some organic ties with the population (Roberts, 2002a). In sum, political parties in new democracies have failed to develop a “programmatic linkage” with certain segments of the population along clear ideological lines.  

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58 On the concept of “programmatic linkage”, see Kitschelt (2000) and Lawson (1980).
The “crisis of parties” also affects more consolidated democracies and for similar reasons. Citizens in advanced democracies have become more critical of democratic institutions, and the attachments between voters and parties have gradually weakened (Norris, 1999). As a title of a book suggests, political parties are losing their partisans in Western Europe and other developed democracies (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000). However, although the trends may be similar, the degree of citizens’ malaise and its implications pose a much greater concern in Latin America than in consolidated democracies in industrialized countries. As Hagopian (2005: 321) rightly points out, “levels of public support for democracy are far lower in the newer Latin American democracies than in the established democracies of the Trilateral region, and skepticism about government in the Trilateral countries has not produced the same degree of regime instability.” Although citizens are less identified with political parties than in the past in established democracies, the existence of deep-seated sociopolitical cleavages has prevented the collapse of party systems and has kept electoral volatility at relatively low levels (Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1997).

Citizens’ satisfaction with (and attachment to) political parties has been very low in all Latin American countries in the last two decades. A 2004 report from the United Nations Development Program concluded that Latin American countries are suffering from a severe crisis of confidence (UNDP, 2004). This is a relatively new political reality. Until the 1990s the electorates of many Latin American countries were reasonably aligned with established parties. For instance, Paul Lewis (1980: 145-150) described Paraguay in the 1970s as a country in which “party identification is practically universal” and is almost always a “lifetime commitment”. Strong party identifications also existed in Colombia for most of the twentieth century, until the recent collapse of the party system (Dix, 1987; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2007). Lupu (2011: 3) also
reports high levels of partisan attachment in Argentina and Venezuela until the 1990s. However, in the last two decades, many Latin American countries have gone through a process of partisan and electoral dealignment (Hagopian, 1998; Klesner, 2005; Levitsky & Cameron, 2003; Morgan, 2007). In fact, data from the *Latinobarómetro* surveys between 1995 and 2006 show that political parties have become the least trusted institutions among a long list of public and private institutions in Latin America. Only 19% of respondents express support for political parties in the region (Lagos, 2008). There are two main reasons that can explain citizens’ disenchantment with political parties in the region. The first factor is the gap between citizens’ expectations and government performance in Third Wave democracies in Latin America. In the aftermath of democratization, Latin American citizens had high expectations that were not limited to changes in the political system. They also expected socioeconomic changes that would bring higher prosperity and a better quality of life to all segments of society. These high –and somewhat unrealistic– expectations set the stage for political dissatisfaction later on (Przeworski, 1991). In the decades following democratization, many Latin American governments failed to provide economic security and public security to their citizens (Hagopian, 2005). On the one hand, the widespread implementation of market reforms and neoliberal policies brought about a much needed macroeconomic stabilization but imposed a high social cost on the most unprivileged segments of Latin American societies (Bulmer-Thomas, 1996; Kingstone, 2011). On the other hand, nearly all Latin American countries have experienced a significant —and in some cases dramatic— increase in the levels of crime since the Third Wave of democratic transitions. For authors like Bergman (2006), the rise of criminal violence represents a redoubtable threat to the stability of democratic institutions in the region. Other studies show that citizens exposed to
crime have lower levels of trust in democratic institutions (Carreras, 2013; Ceobanu, Wood, & Ribeiro, 2011; Fernandez & Kuenzi, 2010).

Policy failures certainly contribute to explain the malaise of Latin American citizens with political parties. But this is not the whole story. Citizens’ disenchantment with political parties also results from a feeling of moral failure associated with the perception of widespread corruption in government institutions. In the words of Hawkins (2010: 94), “legitimacy is ultimately a normative attribute of the regime, and only significant moral failures can weaken this legitimacy enough for it to become a true crisis.” This argument is corroborated by empirical studies that demonstrate that perception of corruption is negatively associated with trust in democratic institutions (Morris & Klesner, 2010; M. A. Seligson, 2002a). Since corruption affects regime legitimacy, it can also increase the likelihood of outsider success in presidential elections. In fact, Hawkins (2010) argues that the widespread corruption of Venezuela’s political class is the main factor leading to the election of a populist outsider (Chávez) in 1998 presidential elections. In a recent study of party system collapse in Peru and Venezuela, Seawright (2012) reaches similar conclusions. Using experimental evidence, he shows that corruption scandals increase voters’ level of anger, which in turn increases voters’ degree of risk acceptance and leads to a greater likelihood of success for anti-systemic outsiders.

Citizens’ disenchantment with political parties has clear implications for the vote for outsiders and anti-systemic candidates. It appears clear from previous literature that anti-party sentiments can have an impact on voting behavior. Several studies suggest that anti-partyism is among the strongest predictors of support for third parties and outsider candidates. Using individual-level electoral survey data from Canada, Britain, and Australia, Bélanger (2004) demonstrates that dealigned voters in these countries support minor parties to voice antiparty
sentiments. Previous research has also shown that weak partisans are also more likely to support outsider candidates in presidential elections in the United States (Gold, 1995; Peterson & Wrighton, 1998). In Latin America, anti-party sentiments are often exploited by outsiders who campaign with a clear anti-establishment rhetoric, promising to put an end to the reign of inefficient and corrupt parties—often referred as *partidocracia* (Cameron, 1997; Hawkins, 2010; Kenney, 2004; Philip & Panizza, 2011).

Previous research has also demonstrated that low support for democratic institutions (another clear sign of a crisis of democratic representation) is associated with the vote for outsiders in American presidential elections (Gold, 1995; Peterson & Wrighton, 1998). In a similar vein, Doyle (2011) finds that political distrust (i.e., lack of trust in democratic institutions) is positively associated with support for populist candidates in Latin American presidential elections.\(^{59}\)

The discussion so far has focused on the performance failures and the corruption of Latin American governments. There is another important aspect of the crisis of representation in Latin America, namely the political underrepresentation of certain societal or ideological segments of the population during the neoliberal era in the region. Three recent analyses of party system collapse in Latin America argue that the unresponsiveness of the party system to the preferences of citizens with leftist ideological commitments during the neoliberal period is one of the driving forces behind the rise of outsiders and anti-systemic electoral movements (Morgan, 2011; Roberts, 2012; Seawright, 2012). In fact, under the influence of global neoliberal pressures, most Latin American countries implemented a series of painful economic reforms during the 1990s (Kingstone, 2011). In many cases, leftist and populist parties that had traditionally defended

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\(^{59}\) Although I focus on outsiders - rather than populists - there is a fair amount of overlap between the populist candidates identified by Doyle and the candidates I categorize as outsiders.
statist and protectionist policies put forward these reforms. It is worth mentioning, for instance, the cases of the Partido Justicialista in Argentina, the Partido Liberación Nacional in Costa Rica, the Partido Colorado in Uruguay, and Acción Democrática in Venezuela. In a seminal contribution, Stokes (2001) shows that many Latin American presidential candidates in the early 1990s ran anti-neoliberal campaigns, but rapidly violated their mandate and implemented “neoliberalism by surprise” when they arrived to power. The most paradigmatic examples of this pattern are Fujimori in Peru and Menem in Argentina.

As a result of the implementation of these market reforms by leftist and populist parties, the ideological differences between the main established parties in many Latin American countries blurred, creating a vacuum on the left of the political spectrum and leaving many leftist voters virtually unrepresented. In more institutionalized party systems, this space on the left was quickly filled by reinvigorated or new leftist parties, such as Frente Amplio in Uruguay (Luna, 2007) and Partido Acción Ciudadana in Costa Rica (Booth, 2007). In more fluid party systems, leftist voters abandoned old parties to support political outsiders. In a study of partisanship in Venezuela during the collapse of the party system, Morgan (2007) demonstrates that leftist voters were more likely to abandon the traditional parties in the critical 1998 elections. She finds that “frustration with the parties’ indistinguishable positions likely prompted Venezuelans, especially those on the left, to look outside the old system for parties that might speak for them” (Morgan, 2007: 85).

The discussion in this section generates clear expectations regarding the link between the crisis of representation and the vote for outsiders. Once outsider candidates are in the race in Latin American presidential elections (for the reasons discussed in the two previous chapters), their stronger supporters should be citizens who are disenchanted with democracy and
established political parties, and leftist voters who were left unrepresented during the Washington consensus. Voting for an outsider provides a channel for disgruntled and unrepresented citizens to voice their frustration with the political system. The three hypotheses in this chapter follow from this discussion:

H5.1: Citizens who hold anti-party sentiments are more likely to vote for outsiders

H5.2: Citizens who are not satisfied with the functioning of democracy are more likely to vote for outsiders

H5.3: Leftist voters are more likely to vote for outsiders in Latin American elections

5.2 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE VOTE FOR OUTSIDERS

Before proceeding to the empirical analysis to test these hypotheses, this section presents two alternative explanations of the vote for outsider candidates. The literature suggests two additional factors that might motivate citizens to vote for outsider candidates: negative economic evaluations, and authoritarian attitudes.

One of the most robust findings in the literature on electoral accountability is that the vote for incumbent parties is associated with economic performance, both in developed and developing countries (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Pacek & Radcliff, 1995). Voters punish incumbents if they presided over poor economic times, and reward them if the economic situation improved

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60 While the first two hypothesis should apply broadly, the third hypothesis is more context-dependent. I argue that leftist voters were more likely to support outsiders in Latin America in the last two decades because they were left unrepresented by the widespread adoption of neoliberal policies. If, in a different context, centrist or rightist voters were left with no voice in the party system they would be the ones more likely to support anti-systemic candidates.
during their term. Latin America is no exception to this finding. In analyzing 21 Latin American elections in the 1980s, Remmer (1991) shows that crisis conditions – high inflation and low GDP growth – undermine support for incumbents in the region.

The economic voting literature suggests that economic hardship may hurt the incumbent parties, and favor new parties or outsiders. Bélanger and Nadeau (2010) demonstrate that the support for third parties is negatively correlated with long-term income in Canada, both at the regional and at the national level. Similarly, Tavits (2008) shows that electoral support for new parties in fifteen Eastern European countries increases when unemployment is high.

In the Latin American context, Queirolo (2013) argues that the rise of leftist parties since the late 1990s was caused by the intent of voters to punish political parties unable to improve the economic well-being of their electorates. Citizens perceived most established parties as responsible for economic downturns and high unemployment rates. Hence, voters started to support those in the “untainted opposition,” which in most cases were leftist politicians. Outsiders can also be characterized as “untainted politicians” so it is important to assess whether a relationship exists between the vote for outsiders and citizens’ economic evaluations.

Another factor that may explain citizens’ support for outsider candidates is authoritarian attitudes. A series of early studies demonstrated that persons who held authoritarian viewpoints were more likely to support candidates whose profile, ideology, or personality was perceived to be more authoritarian (Milton, 1952; Wrightsman Lawrence, Radloff, Horton, & Mecherikoff, 1961). For instance, a survey analysis revealed that respondents who scored higher on an authoritarianism scale were more likely to support General MacArthur as candidate for the 1952 presidential elections in the United States (Milton, 1952; Wrightsman Lawrence et al., 1961)
In the same vein, more recent studies show that citizens with authoritarian predispositions are more inclined to vote for extreme-right parties in Western Europe (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000, 2002) and for former authoritarian rulers in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Deegan-Krause, 2006; A. L. Seligson, 2002; Seligson & Tucker, 2005). Latin American outsider candidates tend to have an anti-systemic discourse and to run aggressive campaigns. They often reject traditional political institutions – such as political parties, Congress, the Judiciary, and the Constitution – and advocate a major overhaul of the political system (Hawkins, 2010; Kenney, 2004; Weyland, 1993). This message may resonate well among voters who have authoritarian attitudes and want a strong leader. In fact, using LAPOP data Azpuru (2011) has shown that Latin American citizens with authoritarian predispositions are more likely to support “caudillo rule”. Moreover, outsiders tend to obtain high scores in presidential elections in moments of deep economic and sociopolitical crisis (Corrales, 2008; Mayorga, 2006). It is well-known that “threat conditions” activate authoritarian predispositions (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005). Hence, the empirical analyses below will also control for the possibility that authoritarian attitudes explain the vote for outsiders in Latin America.

5.3 DATA AND MODEL ESTIMATION

This section introduces the data and methods that I use to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section. I employ individual-level data for eight presidential elections in six Latin American countries between 1995 and 2010. I estimate pooled binomial logit models, and country-level binomial logistic regression models. This section starts by presenting the data and
showing how the dependent variables and the main predictors are measured. This is followed by a description of the model estimation methods.

5.3.1 Data

Until very recently, cross-national election studies in Latin America were based on the analysis of aggregate-level data (Benton, 2005; Samuels, 2004). However, in the last few years a shift towards using individual-level data has taken place, as new data has become publicly available (Cortina, Gelman, & Lasala Blanco, 2008; Singer, 2011). This is a positive development, since using individual-level data has the distinct advantage of allowing individual-level covariates to be controlled for, hence making estimates more precise and less confounded.

In line with this new scholarship, this chapter uses individual-level data coming from surveys that were conducted immediately before or immediately after an election in which an outsider obtained a significant share of the votes (more than 5%). There are two major sources for survey data in Latin America: Latinobarómetro and LAPOP. The Latinobarómetro survey is conducted every year since 1995 in every Latin American country. The same basic questionnaire is administered in every country every year; but some questions vary from year to year. Sample sizes fluctuate between 1000 and 1200 respondents per country. LAPOP surveys are conducted every two years in each Latin American country. The same questionnaire is administered in each country every other year. The first wave was conducted in 2004.

The analysis in this chapter draws on both sources of data. I used the list of outsider candidates in Latin America presented in Table 2.2 as the sample of relevant cases to study. Unfortunately, I had to eliminate from this sample all the cases of outsider candidates running before 1995 because there is no comparable survey data before that date. In the period 1995-
2010, there are fifteen cases of outsiders in Latin America who obtained a significant share of the votes in presidential elections (more than 5% of the vote). However, questions about voting or vote intention can give an inaccurate representation of actual voting behavior if they are asked much earlier or much later than the election date. If vote intention is measured a long time before the election, respondents may not be fully informed or may not have made up their minds. Moreover, the rise of outsiders is often a sudden phenomenon that crystallizes very late in the electoral process, as it was clear in the Fujimori emergence often characterized as a “tsunami” (Schmidt, 1996). On the other hand, surveys conducted more than a couple of months after the election can be misleading because respondents may start confusing their voting decisions in different electoral processes as the temporal distance from the last election increases. Hence, I checked for all these fifteen cases whether surveys (either Latinobarómetro or LAPOP) were conducted up to two months prior to or after presidential elections. As can be seen in Table 4.1, there are relevant surveys conducted for nine of the fifteen outsiders that were able to compete successfully in presidential elections in Latin America in the period 1995-2010. In this analysis, I will assess the main determinants of outsider support in this sample of cases. With the exception of Fujimori’s first election, and Lucio Gutiérrez’ 2002 victory, the empirical analysis in this chapter covers the most paradigmatic cases of outsider candidates.

The dependent variables in the empirical analysis measure vote intention in presidential elections. Latinobarómetro uses the standard formulation: “If there was an election tomorrow/this Sunday, which party would you vote for?” LAPOP asks for the names of the specific candidates. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent votes for an outsider candidate and coded as 0 if the respondent votes for other established opposition parties (“no answer” and “don’t know” are coded as missing).
Table 5.1. Outsider presidential candidates in Latin America (1995-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR AND NAME OF OUTSIDER</th>
<th>VOTE OUTSIDER</th>
<th>REASON FOR INCLUSION/ NON-INCLUSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>2002: Felipe Quispe (MIP)</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>LTB survey 1 month before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002: Evo Morales (MAS)</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>LTB survey 1 month before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1996: Freddy Ehlers (MUPP)</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>LTB survey 1 month before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006: Rafael Correa (AP)</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>LTB survey during election month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2006: Edmundo Jarquín Calderón (MRS)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>LTB survey 1 month before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2008: Fernando Lugo (APC)</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>LAPOP survey 2 months before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2001: Alejandro Toledo (PP)</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>LTB survey during election month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006: Ollanta Humala (UPP)</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>LAPOP survey 2 months after election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1998: Hugo Chávez (MVR)</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>LTB survey 1 month before election</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOT INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR AND NAME OF OUTSIDER</th>
<th>VOTE OUTSIDER</th>
<th>REASON FOR EXCLUSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2003: Ricardo López Murphy (RECREAR)</td>
<td>16.35</td>
<td>Voting behavior question not asked in LTB 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1997: Ivo Kuljis (UCS)</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>LTB survey 5 months before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1998: Freddy Ehlers (MUPP)</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>LTB survey 5 months after election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002: Lucio Gutiérrez (PSP)</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>LTB survey 5 months before election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2003: Pedro Fadul (MPQ)</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>Voting behavior question not asked in LTB 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2000: Francisco Arias Cárdenas (Independent)</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>LTB survey 6 months before election</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The explanatory variables are measures of government’s economic performance, confidence in parties, authoritarian attitudes, satisfaction with the way democracy works, and ideology. In order to capture the level of voters’ support for the political system in general, and for parties in particular, I use two different measures. First, I look at levels of satisfaction with
democracy. This variable is coded on a scale from 1 (not satisfied) to 4 (very satisfied) – I treat it as a continuous variable. Second, *Latinobarómetro* and LAPOP have questions on confidence in parties. This variable is also coded on a scale from 1 (not satisfied) to 4 (very satisfied). Since my intention is to assess the propensity of citizens deeply disenchanted with traditional parties to vote for outsiders, I recode this variable into a dummy, in which 1 represents no confidence in parties, and 0 represents some and a lot of confidence. However, I also present the results of the main model using the continuous variable of “confidence in parties” to make sure that the results are not purely driven by the codification of the variable.

I measure voters’ ideological self-positioning by recoding the standard 10-point left-right scale into four dummy categories – ‘right’, ‘center’, ‘left’ and ‘no ideology’ (coded as 1 for those respondents who cannot position themselves on the scale). I choose ‘center’ as the reference category.

Regarding the performance of the government, I use a standard sociotropic economic voting question⁶¹: “Do you consider the country’s present economic situation to be better, about the same, or worse than 12 months ago?” I recode this variable into three dummies – ‘worse’, ‘same’, and ‘better’ (‘same’ is the reference category in all models).

In order to measure voters’ attitudes towards authoritarian government, I use the following question: “With which of the following statements do you agree most? A) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. B) Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. C) For people like me, it doesn’t matter

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⁶¹ According to most studies of economic voting, assessments of the national economy generally trump pocketbook considerations (see Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Kiewiet, 1983).
whether we have a democratic or non-democratic regime”. I recode this variable into a dummy, coded as 0 if the respondent answered A and 1 if the respondent answered B or C.62

The models also control for gender, age, education, marital status, religion and socio-economic status. Details of how each variable is coded can be found in Appendix C.

5.3.2 Model estimation

As my primary theoretical concern is distinguishing the vote for an outsider candidate from the vote for any other candidate, the analyses discussed in the following section employ binomial logit analysis. In addition to mirroring my theoretical concern, binomial logit analysis has the added advantage of producing concise tables of coefficients and standard errors that can be easily presented.63

The statistical analysis below is presented in two tables. The first table (Table 5.2) presents the results of a pooled model which includes data from the six outsider cases analyzed in this chapter. The second table (Table 5.3) includes individual logistic regressions for each election-year. Relying on both types of models increases the validity of the results. The pooled models have the advantage of being more efficient, while the single level models are useful to identify whether the effect of one particular predictor is driven by the idiosyncrasies of one or two cases. The same predictors are included in both sets of models.

The pooled models presented below include data from the two sources used in this paper (Latinobarómetro and LAPOP). For the type of models that I run, pulling together surveys from

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62 The wording of the question is the same in Latinobarómetro and LAPOP.
63 I also estimated multinomial logistic regression models for the three cases in which outsiders compete both against opposition candidates and against government parties – i.e. Bolivia in 2002, Nicaragua in 2006, and Paraguay in 2008. Appendix D presents the results of these models, which largely confirm the effects detected in the logistic regressions below.
different sources is not a problem as long as the questions included are identical or equivalent, which is the case in this analysis. In recent years, important works that use individual-level data have pooled together surveys from different sources (Duch & Stevenson, 2008 is the finest example).

5.4 RESULTS

In this section I present the results of the empirical models. I find that voters who do not trust political parties and who identify themselves as leftists are more likely to vote for outsiders. I also find that, in some contexts, voters with authoritarian attitudes are more likely to support outsiders. Table 5.2 displays the results of the pooled binomial logit model. Table 5.3 display the results of the logistic regressions analyzing the vote for outsiders in single elections.
### Table 5.2. Binomial logit models of the vote for outsiders (pooled models)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No confidence in parties (dummy)</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in parties (continuous)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive economic evaluation</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative economic evaluation</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian attitudes</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>.52***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>-.62***</td>
<td>-.61***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ideology</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>.35***</td>
<td>.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.06***</td>
<td>-.06***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.25***</td>
<td>-.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic level</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-.34***</td>
<td>-.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Elections</strong></td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>5181</td>
<td>5181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.3. Binomial logit models of the vote for outsiders (individual models)

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</tr>
<tr>
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Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.3. (continued)

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Observations 701 585 1042 875  
Pseudo R² .03 .11 .13 .06

Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The main argument in this chapter is that the crisis of democratic representation in Latin America is associated with the high electoral support received by outsider candidates. One of the clearest signs of this crisis of representation in the region is partisan dealignment. Whether the reason for citizens’ disenchantment with political parties in Latin America is policy failure, moral failure, or—as it is more likely—a combination of both factors; the empirical analysis presented above clearly shows that the emergence of outsider candidates provides an outlet for this dissatisfaction. Table 5.2 shows that voters who do not trust political parties are considerably more likely to vote for outsiders than for established opposition parties. Similarly, Table 5.3 reveals that voters with no confidence in parties are more likely to vote for outsiders than for government parties. All in all, there is very strong evidence suggesting that citizens with anti-party sentiments are more likely to vote for outsiders than for candidates of established parties.

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 also reveal that ideology is an important determinant of the vote for outsiders in Latin America. In line with Hypothesis 5.3, Table 5.2 shows that voters on the left are more likely to vote for outsiders than voters on the right, the center, and non-ideological voters. While it is reasonable to expect that non-ideological voters (i.e. voters who cannot place themselves in the left-right scale) would be most likely to support outsiders, the results do not confirm this pattern. On the contrary, they clearly suggest an ideological, rather than a non-ideological, vote for outsiders. The results from Table 5.3 reveal that this relationship is quite consistent across the different cases of "outsidership" analyzed in this chapter. Voters on the left of the political spectrum were more likely to vote for outsiders Chávez, Morales, Correa, 

64 Only in two cases (Toledo in 2001 and Lugo in 2008), the results cast doubt on the link between low confidence in parties and vote for outsiders over opposition candidates. In both cases, the coefficient has the expected sign but falls short of statistical significance. This is probably due to the fact that in these elections there were other anti-establishment parties (e.g. UNACE in Paraguay) which captured some of the protest vote against traditional parties, thereby weakening the link between anti-party sentiments and vote for the outsider candidate.
Humala, and Lugo. In many Latin American countries, outsider candidates appear to have given voice and representation to segments of the population that were hurt by market reforms but could not find any credible party option on the left of the political spectrum.

The final expectation in this chapter is that the vote for outsiders is related to citizens’ dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their countries. The empirical results provide partial support for this hypothesis. The coefficient for ‘satisfaction with democracy’ in Table 5.2 is signed in the expected direction. Voters who are satisfied with the way democracy works in their countries are less likely to support outsiders. However, a closer look at the individual models in Table 5.3 shows that this relationship holds in three cases only. Venezuelan, Bolivian, and Peruvian voters who were satisfied with the way democracy worked in their countries were significantly less likely to support outsiders Chávez, Morales, and Humala than traditional opposition parties. Overall, these results suggest that the vote for outsiders in Latin American presidential elections is more strongly associated with specific distrust in political parties and the political establishment than with diffuse distrust in democratic political institutions.

As for the alternative explanations, the results indicate that economic perceptions are a weak predictor of support for outsiders. None of the coefficients measuring economic perceptions in the pooled models is statistically significant. However, the results from the country models presented in Table 5.3 suggest a more nuanced finding. In five out of the eight models, negative economic evaluations do not influence the vote for outsiders. But in the three other cases (Morales in 2002, Humala in 2006, and Lugo in 2008), the coefficient is statistically significant and signed in the expected direction. In these three elections, citizens with negative

65 In the case of Morales, the coefficient has the expected direction but falls just short of statistical significance (P>|z| = .122).
66 On the distinction between specific and diffuse political support see Easton (1965, 1975).
economic perceptions were more likely to support an outsider politician. In sum, mistrust in parties is a better predictor of support for outsiders than standard measures of economic evaluation. This suggests that the vote for outsiders is grounded on a deep-seated disenchantment with the political class, rather than a simple negative assessment of the recent economic performance of the incumbent government.

The empirical results also estimate the impact of voters’ authoritarian attitudes on support for outsiders. Table 5.2 suggests that voters who hold authoritarian attitudes are more likely to choose outsiders over other traditional opposition parties – the effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. However, the effect visible in the pooled model does not hold in all the individual cases (see Table 5.3). In fact, the expected relationship between authoritarian attitudes and vote for outsiders only holds for Chávez in 1998 and Humala in 2006. This result is not entirely surprising because both leaders had a long military career before running for president. Chávez had even been involved in a failed military coup in 1992. This finding is consistent with previous research in political psychology which demonstrates that voters possess different personality traits and orientate their assessment of candidates according to the principle of likeness (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006). Hence, outsiders who had a military career before entering the political arena are especially appealing to voters with authoritarian predispositions.

In two cases, the results show that voters with authoritarian predispositions were actually less likely to support outsiders (Toledo in 2001 and Lugo in 2008). This can be explained by the political context faced by these two outsiders. The case of Toledo is hardly surprising given the

67 The results of the multinomial models in Appendix D suggest that voters with negative economic evaluations are less likely to vote for the incumbent party, but not necessarily more likely to vote for an outsider (over a traditional opposition party). When the incumbent party is not in the race, citizens’ economic evaluations do not predict the vote for an outsider candidate (or only weakly do so).
fact that he emerged as an outsider in the late 1990s in opposition to the authoritarian regime of Fujimori. Even though he rose to power as an outsider, Toledo was a well-known supporter of democracy during the Fujimori regime. Lugo also emerged as the leader of a coalition opposed to the incumbent Partido Colorado, which had been in power during the long authoritarian period in Paraguay until the end of the 20th century and was still engaged in semi-authoritarian practices. He was also running against Lino Oviedo, a retired army general. It makes sense then that Lugo was supported by voters with democratic inclinations. In sum, the impact of authoritarian attitudes on support for outsiders is contingent on the profile of the outsiders themselves and on the nature of the other candidates (and parties) in the race.

5.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter demonstrates that a series of individual-level factors have an impact on the propensity to vote for outsider candidates in Latin American presidential elections. More specifically, I showed that citizens who do not trust political parties are much more likely to vote for outsider presidential candidates. The results also show that leftist voters are more likely to vote for outsiders than voters who place themselves on the right and on the center of the political spectrum, and voters who have no political ideology. In terms of government performance, the findings indicate that economic evaluations are not a strong predictor of support for outsider candidates in presidential elections.

This chapter identifies factors that are always good predictors of the vote for outsiders (lack of confidence in parties, leftist orientation), and factors that influence support for outsiders
differently depending on the context in which these independent candidates emerge, and depending on the personal characteristics of the candidates. More specifically, I demonstrate that authoritarian predispositions increase support for outsiders only when the outsiders had a military career before entering politics.

The main conclusion of this chapter is that the crisis of representation that swept Third Wave democracies in Latin America paved the way for the emergence of outsider candidates not associated with a discredited political class. The policy and moral failures of established parties after the democratic transitions increased citizens’ disenchantment with the political status quo and allowed ambitious outsiders to mount successful and appealing presidential campaigns. Moreover, the results of the empirical analysis presented above suggest that outsiders provided leftist voters with a representation channel that was closed during the neoliberal period when parties that were traditionally on the left of the political spectrum adopted painful market reforms.

So far, this study has analyzed the different institutional, contextual, and individual-level factors that are associated with the rise of outsider candidates in national elections. One of the main findings of the first part of the dissertation is that institutional characteristics within presidentialism matter to explain the emergence of independence candidates, while the broad distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism is not a good predictor of outsider rise. Hence, I concluded that the claim that the rise of outsiders is a peril of presidentialism is not empirically supported by the available data.

However, the critics of presidentialism described the rise of outsiders as a “peril of presidentialism” for another reason. Regardless of whether their rise to power had anything to do with the presidential system, authors such as Linz (1994) and Suárez (1982) considered the
election of outsiders as a threat for democratic stability and governability. According to these scholars, outsiders are problematic because they have little administrative or political experience when they come to power; and because they are more likely to commit excesses and centralize power. The argument was basically that outsiders constituted a threat for presidentialism, in addition to being a peril of presidentialism.

In spite of the tendency of Latin American presidents to centralize power and prerogatives, this argument was overlooked by students of Latin American political institutions. In line with the theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 2, the next two chapters will tackle this important question. I will assess whether the election of outsiders threatens democratic governability and institutional performance in Latin American presidential systems.
6.0 OUTSIDERS AND EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT

In June 1990, the presidential elections in Peru produced a shocking result. Alberto Fujimori, a university professor that was virtually unknown by the broader public six months before the election, was elected president. This unexpected electoral result led to a minority president who did not have enough support in the legislature to implement his policy agenda. In April 1992, Fujimori argued that emergency measures were needed to combat terrorism and to restructure the state and the economy. In order to overcome the gridlock created by the opposition in the legislative body, Fujimori decided to shut down Congress (Kenney, 2004). This example shows that executive-legislative relations may become strained when the executive power is held by a political outsider. Outsider presidents are more likely to face situations of institutional paralysis, and in some extreme cases this situation may result in the dissolution of the legislative body by the executive branch. This chapter will analyze the impact of outsider presidents on executive-legislative relations by conducting a large-N quantitative analysis and an in-depth qualitative assessment of the conflictive interbranch relations under Fujimori.

One of the defining features of presidentialism is the fact that both the chief executive and the legislature are popularly elected. Moreover, the terms of office of both president and assembly are fixed (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a: 14-18; Shugart & Carey, 1992: 18-27).\(^6\) One

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\(^6\) By contrast, only the members of parliament are elected in a parliamentary system; and they are in charge of selecting the chief executive (prime minister).
of the questions that have most interested scholars of Latin American presidential systems is the type of relationship that is established between presidents and assemblies. Since both the president and the legislature are key democratic institutions in presidential systems, executive-legislative relations have an impact on government efficiency, governability, and democratic stability (Jones, 2012; Morgenstern & Nacif, 2002; Shugart & Carey, 1992).

Executive-legislative conflict is one of the “perils of presidentialism” identified by Linz (Linz, 1990, 1994). According to this scholar, the dual democratic legitimacy in presidential systems is problematic. Both the president and the Congress have popular legitimacy since they are elected in democratic elections. It follows that “a conflict is always latent and sometimes likely to erupt dramatically; there is no democratic principle to resolve it” (Linz, 1994: 7). I argue that the risk of executive-legislative confrontation is more acute when the president is an outsider who has no political experience and lacks support in Congress.

The link between outsider presidents and executive-legislative conflict has not been sufficiently studied. In fact, the comparative study of the consequences of political outsiders has been neglected by the literature. This is the first study that seeks to assess the political consequences of the arrival to power of outsider politicians.

In this chapter, I will first propose a theory of the link between outsiders and executive-legislative confrontation which builds on the general theoretical framework presented in chapter 2. Then, I will review the relevant literature that has addressed issues related to executive-legislative conflict in order to identify a series of alternative explanations. My arguments regarding outsiders and executive-legislative confrontation will then be empirically tested using data from the original database of political outsiders that I described in Chapter 2. In the final
section of this chapter, I conduct an in-depth analysis of executive-legislative relations in Peru under Fujimori to assess the validity of the causal mechanisms I propose.

6.1 THEORY: OUTSIDERS AND EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONFRONTATION

The increased risk of executive-legislative conflict has been presented as one of the disadvantages of presidentialism. According to Lijphart (1992a: 15) the problem of executive-legislative conflict “is the inevitable result of the co-existence of the two independent organs that presidential government creates and that may be in disagreement”. In fact, unlike the mechanism of legislative no-confidence in parliamentary systems, there is no institutional means of resolving a confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches of government, which may lead to deadlock and paralysis. The problem of executive-legislative conflict is aggravated by the temporal rigidity of presidential systems. The fixed term in office of the president and the fixed duration of the legislative period do not leave room for the readjustments that political events may require (Linz, 1990).

The main argument of this chapter is that this problem of presidential systems is exacerbated when a political outsider is in power. I contend that the rise of outsiders has deleterious consequences for executive-legislative relations. The rise of political outsiders has also been identified as one of the perils of presidentialism (Linz, 1994). The arrival to power of independent candidates may increase the level of executive-legislative confrontation for four main reasons.
6.1.1 Outsiders as minority presidents

The rise of outsiders increases the likelihood of a minority president, i.e. a president supported only by a minority of the legislators in Congress. In fact, outsiders arrive to power through a new party that is often nothing more than the electoral vehicle they use during presidential elections. However, once in power outsiders have to face the opposition of the established parties in the legislature. The lack of presidential majorities imperils government stability and significantly increases the likelihood of executive-legislative gridlock (Linz, 1990, 1994). However, more recent studies have shown that interbranch cooperation is not automatically impaired when the president is in a minority situation (Cheibub, 2002; Negretto, 2006).

The greatest potential for executive-legislative conflict exists when the president’s party is unable to sustain a veto, and when no cabinet coalition holding a majority of seats in the legislature is formed (Negretto, 2006). Outsider presidents often find themselves in this exact situation, as Negretto shows in his contribution (Table 1 in Negretto, 2006). Two outsider presidents included in his analysis (Fujimori and Chávez) lacked the support of both the median and the veto legislator (see also Colomer & Negretto, 2005). Table 6.1 shows the percentage of seats in the lower chamber of Congress held by the president’s party when the president is an outsider (compared to the average percentage in the period 1980-2010 in each country).
Table 6.1. Percentage of seats of outsiders’ parties in the legislature

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Outsider Presidents</th>
<th>Percentage of Seats of the President’s Party in the Legislature (First Year in Office)</th>
<th>Average Percentage of the President’s Parties in the Legislature in Each Country (1980-2010)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lucio Gutiérrez (Ecuador: 2003-2005)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafael Correa (Ecuador: 2007-?)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violeta Chamorro (Nicaragua: 1990-1996)</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Lugo (Paraguay: 2008-2012)</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberto Fujimori (Perú: 1990-2001)</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugo Chávez (Venezuela: 1998-2013)</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Database “Legislatures in Latin America” (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2011)

As can be observed in the table, outsider presidents have considerably smaller legislative contingents than insider presidents. Some outsider parties are little more than empty shells serving as an electoral vehicle for an independent candidate. Hence, some outsiders –such as Gutiérrez, Correa, Fujimori, and Chávez– clearly fall in the worst case scenario identified by Negretto.

6.1.2 Lack of political experience and democratic socialization

Outsiders tend to lack a political and democratic socialization that would lead them to reach out to other political forces and seek compromises. In fact, political parties in democratic countries play a key role in the recruitment and socialization of democratic political elites. In the words of Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 4), political parties “provide the foundation for a democratic
political class.” Even if they have experienced serious political conflicts during their career, experienced party politicians tend to be imbued with a democratic culture. They are aware that political decisions often involve negotiations and compromises, both within and between parties. This give-and-take nature of political decision-making is often negatively perceived by pundits and public opinion alike, but it is essential to the good functioning of a democratic polity. Party politicians become socialized with a series of implicit rules that govern the democratic game. They accept that elections can be lost and that policy proposals can be defeated if the majority so decides. Outsiders are political amateurs who lack this democratic socialization within established political parties and, in some cases, do not have a commitment to democratic institutions. Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 5) point out that outsiders are less likely than insiders “to have experience with (and be oriented toward) democratic practices, such as negotiation, compromise, and coalition building.”

This lack of political experience and democratic socialization has a direct impact on executive-legislative relations. In presidential systems, the president often needs to cooperate with Congress in order to enact some of its policies, especially when he is in a minority situation. Outsiders may be less inclined to undertake the necessary negotiations which can lead to an institutional paralysis. Even if they actively pursue agreements with the legislature, outsider presidents may lack the political skills and the connections necessary to build stable support for their policies in the legislature. Outsider presidents are likely to lack ties with traditional parties. As a consequence, their cabinets tend to be constituted by members of their personal networks of support (cronies) with very limited previous experience in public administration. In the words of Shugart and Carey (1992: 33): “political outsiders are likely to be less disposed than ‘insiders’ to coalition building.” Using a database on political coalitions created by Altman (Altman, 2000;
Altman & Castiglioni, 2008), we can evaluate the composition of the first cabinet of three outsiders (Alberto Fujimori, Hugo Chávez, and Lucio Gutiérrez) who were in a clear minority situation. Despite having only 18% support in the legislature, only three of fourteen ministers in the first Fujimori cabinet were partisans. In a similar vein, Chávez’ first cabinet had a considerable number of independent ministers (six out of nineteen). More importantly, the “partisan” ministers belonged to the party of the president (Movimiento Quinta República) or to parties that were allied to Chávez (Patria Para Todos and the Communist Party). But these parties combined only had 24% of the seats in the legislature. The Venezuelan outsider was not willing or able to reach out to other parties in the opposition with a greater legislative contingent. Finally, Gutiérrez had a majority of partisan ministers (11 out of 15), but the three forces represented in the cabinet (Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero, Movimiento Pachakutik, and Movimiento Popular Democrático) amounted only to 20% of the seats in the legislature which shows his inability to negotiate a deal with the major opposition parties.

There is a broad consensus in the literature that presidents use cabinet choices as strategic tools to get their policy agenda through the legislature (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2010; Cheibub et al., 2004; Martínez-Gallardo, 2011; Raile, Pereira, & Power, 2011). Minority presidents often strive to build majority or near-majority cabinet coalitions in order to compensate for their weakness in the legislature (Amorim Neto, 2002; Deheza, 1998). This tendency of minority presidents to construct multiparty coalitions to promote their legislative agendas can be observed by analyzing a database on cabinet composition in Latin America built by Amorim Neto (2006). Out of the 82 Latin American presidents who governed as minority presidents in the period 1980-2000 (i.e. presidents that had less than 50% support in the legislature), 59 built majority or near-majority

69 I thank David Altman for generously sharing this database.
70 I thank Otavio Amorim Neto for generously sharing this database.
coalitions recruiting a high number of partisan ministers (at least 45% of cabinet members with a partisan profile). The decision taken by most outsiders to form non-partisan cabinets is clearly not the standard reaction of minority presidents.

Given that appointing cabinet members from the most represented parties in the legislature is essential to establish stable legislative coalitions when the president’s party is in the minority, the inability of outsider presidents to form broad-based coalitions is detrimental to executive-legislative relations. To compensate for this weakness, outsiders tend to engage more often in patronage and pork in order to build temporary legislative coalitions (Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008). But these coalitions are much more volatile and are less successful at preventing repeated episodes of executive-legislative confrontation.

6.1.3 Public tolerance for executive excesses

Another factor that may explain a higher risk of executive-legislative confrontation when the president is an outsider is the popular support for executive abuses. As shown in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 (and confirmed in the empirical findings of the previous chapters), outsiders tend to come to power in difficult moments of economic and sociopolitical crisis. In that context, citizens tend to be disenchanted with political institutions and distrust political parties. Outsiders are seen as saviors who can clean up the corruption and inefficiency of traditional parties and politicians. Political outsiders are then more likely to engage in authoritarian excesses against these discredited institutions and they are less concerned about cooperating with the legislature. In fact, they suspect that the legislature will side with them in case of institutional paralysis and
blame the legislators for all the problems. Since they are less likely to pay a political price for their excesses, outsiders should engage more frequently in undemocratic behaviors which generate interbranch conflicts.

6.1.4 Outsiders are not constrained by organized parties

When traditional parties are in power, they are concerned about the “shadow of the future”. An authoritarian excess by the president may negatively affect the reputation of the party for a long time. For instance, a traditional party that tries to bypass Congress (or even dissolve the legislature) may be harshly sanctioned by voters. Moreover, the other established parties may prefer not to ally with a party that abuses its power and engages in unconstitutional moves. Hence, it may be a bad strategy for an established party in power to directly confront Congress even when it is temporarily unable to govern because it lacks support in the legislature. As a result, established parties tend to constrain their own party leaders to make sure that they remain within the democratic rules of the games. This pressure exerted by party organizations on their own leaders facilitates cooperative executive-legislative relations.

The calculus for an outsider president is completely different. If outsiders are not able to govern effectively the first time they are in office, they may not have any political future at all. Since the parties that take outsiders to power are often nothing more than empty shells, these parties have much less to lose when the president attempts audacious moves –e.g. a Congress dissolution attempt–. In sum, political outsiders in office may be more prone to take risks because their political future is inextricably linked to the success they have in office. When outsiders lack support in Congress, they are then much more likely than non-outsider presidents to engage in authoritarian excesses and to bypass the legislature.
These arguments yield the following hypotheses:

*H6.1: Executive-legislative confrontation is more likely when the president is an outsider.*

*H6.2: Congress dissolution attempts are more likely when the president is an outsider.*

### 6.2 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF INTERBRANCH CONFLICTS

The literature on comparative presidentialism has identified several other possible explanations for executive-legislative conflict. In a seminal piece, Mainwaring (1993) argues that presidential systems and multipartyism are a “difficult combination” which is inimical to stable democratic governance for three main reasons. First, the risk of executive-legislative deadlock is more acute because the president is likely to lack stable support in the legislature in a fragmented system with many relevant parties. Second, in multiparty systems competition tends to be centrifugal which makes compromise and cooperation between the different parties (and between the different branches of government) more difficult to achieve. Finally, the formation of interparty coalitions to deal with these problems is difficult in presidential systems. On the one hand, the commitment of individual legislators to support an agreement negotiated by the party leadership is not assured. On the other hand, in multiparty presidential systems party leaders have incentives to distance themselves from the president in office when elections approach, which increases the likelihood of executive-legislative deadlock.

A split in the president’s party may also increase the level of confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches of government. When the presidential party is divided, the different factions have conflicting incentives. While they may want to cooperate on certain issues, they also have incentives to attack the other factions in order to attract voters to their own
faction (Katz, 1986; Morgenstern, 2001). This is especially true when elections approach if the electoral system allows or encourages different factions to participate in the race as happened in Uruguay or Colombia until recent electoral reforms. Moreover, intraparty rivalries often result from ideological differences. According to Morgenstern (2001: 243) “the factions are ideologically disposed to competition”. Hence, when the president’s party is divided into factions, the administration is less likely to obtain support from its own party for key bills, increasing the likelihood of interbranch conflict.

In his book on presidential crises –defined as “extreme instances of executive-legislative conflict” (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 7)–, Pérez-Liñán identifies two other factors that may produce confrontation between the two branches of government: political scandals and popular protests. Pérez-Liñán (2007: chapter 4) discusses the role of the media in communicating scandals that increase popular dissatisfaction with democratic presidents. The liberalization that followed the Third Wave of democratization increased the freedom of the press and permitted the creation of a right environment for the politics of scandal. These political scandals often produce popular protests that lead to an increase in executive-legislative confrontation. Deep public dissatisfaction may result in popular uprisings against the president. Analyzing elected presidents in Latin America between 1978 and 2003, Hochstetler (2006) argues that street protests are the main determinant of presidential failures, which is a partner phenomenon to the executive-legislative confrontation analyzed here. Media scandals and popular protests have an impact on executive-legislative relations most notably because they lead to a decrease in presidential approval (Pérez-Liñán, 2007: 114-124). Scholars of American politics have shown that declines in the level of presidential approval may create hurdles in executive-legislative relations. Presidential popularity influences the success of presidential policy initiatives (Rivers & Rose,
1985). Congress tends to be more reluctant to support bills proposed by an unpopular president. In fact, legislators may be concerned about reelection and decide whether they support the president based on the latter’s approval ratings (Edwards, 1976; Neustadt, 1964).

Executive-legislative relations may also be more conflictive when the rule of law is weak. One of the key dimensions of the rule of law is the establishment of “networks of responsibility and accountability which entail that all public and private agents, including the highest state officials, are subject to appropriate, legally established controls on the lawfulness of their acts” (O'Donnell, 2004: 36). In countries where the rule of law is weak and the judiciary is not an effective umpire, political players (both in the executive and in the legislature) are more likely to commit abuses and unlawful acts because they know that they are less likely to be held accountable. These excesses in turn make executive-legislative confrontation more likely. Unfortunately, it is not possible to control for this alternative explanation in the quantitative analysis. The existing databases of judicial independence cover only some of the countries included in this analysis (e.g. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches, & Shleifer, 2004) or a limited time period (e.g. Howard & Carey, 2004), so including this variable in the analysis would do more harm than good. However, it is important to keep this explanation in mind when we analyze the results.

6.2.1 Presidential dissolution of congress

This chapter also studies the impact of outsider presidents on executive attempts to dissolve the legislature. A congress dissolution attempt or autogolpe (self-coups) can be considered as an extreme manifestation of executive-legislative confrontation. Congress dissolutions weaken mechanisms of horizontal accountability. According to Cameron (1998: 126), autogolpes
threaten democratic governability “by broadening the scope for executive abuses of power and destabilizing the self-correcting mechanisms that inhere in a functioning system of checks and balances.” Only a limited number of studies have looked into this issue, but they have produced interesting findings.

The first important conclusion of this literature is that the closure of congress is a rare event, which is attempted by presidents only under exceptional circumstances. According to Pérez-Liñán (2005: 52), in the post-Third Wave Latin American democracies “most cases of [interbranch] dissolution have involved the removal of the president from office rather than the closure of congress” (see also Helmke, 2010: 743). This is mainly due to the fact that, since democratization, Latin American constitutions have gradually removed constitutional tools used by authoritarian presidents to dissolve congress. This has created an institutional imbalance which favors legislatures because constitutions normally retain impeachment mechanisms. Moreover, the likelihood of military intervention in support of the executive during an interbranch crisis has been considerably reduced since the democratic transitions (Pérez-Liñán, 2005).

However, there have been five instances of congress dissolution in Latin America after the democratic transitions, as detailed in Table 6.2. As the table shows, Latin American presidents have used two main mechanisms to dissolve congress: 1) self-coup or 2) an indirect dissolution through a Constituent Assembly dominated by the president. Moreover, there have been several other instances of presidents threatening to dissolve the legislature.
**Table 6.2. Congress dissolutions in Latin America (1980-2014)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PRESIDENT</th>
<th>MECHANISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>César Gaviria</td>
<td>Congress dissolved by a Constituent Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Alberto Fujimori</td>
<td>Self-coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Jorge Serrano</td>
<td>Self-coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Hugo Chávez</td>
<td>Congress dissolved by a Constituent Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Rafael Correa</td>
<td>Congress dissolved by a Constituent Assembly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The existing literature suggests several explanations for this phenomenon. Kenney (2004) offers the most detailed analysis of Fujimori’s self-coup in Peru. The central argument in Kenney’s book is that minority presidents with weak support in the legislature tend to face much more acute executive-legislative crises, which in turn increases the likelihood of a congress dissolution attempt by the president. This argument is corroborated in the final chapter of Kenney’s book with information from constitutional crises in many Latin American countries during the 20th century.

In a similar vein, Pérez-Liñán (2006: 137) points out that runoff elections can produce an “outcome inversion.” The artificial majority created by the second round of the election creates a false sense of legitimacy for the election winner, while simultaneously upsetting the losing party which is likely to have more seats in the legislature. Hence, an “outcome inversion” might considerably increase the risk of institutional instability and congress dissolution attempt by the executive.
Helmke (2010) proposes a different explanation of institutional instability focusing on the strategic behavior of three institutional actors (the executive, the legislature, the judiciary). These institutions weigh the pros and cons of initiating an interbranch conflict. A severe institutional conflict between these branches is more likely when there is a clear imbalance of institutional powers because the concentration of institutional powers in one of the branches increases the stakes of interbranch disagreement.\(^7\) The president is also more likely to initiate an “attack” on the legislature when this “target” branch is perceived as illegitimate by the public.

Another factor that may explain congress dissolution attempts by the president is “constitutional fluidity.” Constitutional fluidity refers to a situation in which a constitutional assembly has been elected and places itself above the constitutional rules regulating the process of dissolution (Pérez-Liñán, 2005). On several occasions, Latin American presidents have used this mechanism to dissolve legislatures in which they had minority support (see Table 6.2). In sum, the existing literature has related congress dissolution attempts by the executive to a series of institutional factors (minority presidencies, institutional imbalances, constitutional fluidity, and democratization). Without disregarding the importance of these factors, I expand on the conventional wisdom by showing that the previous career and political socialization (or lack thereof) of the president is key to understand authoritarian excesses.

\(^7\) For a similar argument, see Pérez-Liñán (2006).
6.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

6.3.1 Data

The data on executive-legislative confrontation comes from a database on political processes in Latin America compiled by a team of researchers of the University of Pittsburgh (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2008). The unit of analysis in the database is the administration-year. This database was created using the Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR) as the source of information on political scandals, popular protests, and institutional conflicts in the region. LAWR presents itself as providing "timely and concise risk-oriented briefing". Hence, LAWR is attentive to interbranch conflicts that can be politically destabilizing. However, because of its weekly format, LAWR reports only the most important events. Since I am interested in serious and politically destabilizing executive-legislative conflicts -and not in the disagreements over policies between the incumbent government and the opposition that constitute the normal political process-, this bias toward more dramatic events is in fact an advantage (Hochstetler, 2006).

The first dependent variable in this study is based on one of the variables in this database coded 1 if there was a visible episode of executive-legislative confrontation during the year and 0 otherwise. An executive-legislative confrontation includes different types of episodes, including a conflict related to the approval of bills, a confrontation in which the Congress or the President question their authority or ability to legislate, and a conflict related to the impeachment of ministers.

\[http://www.latinnews.com/lwcILWR_2315.asp\]
In order to test the second hypothesis regarding Congress dissolution attempts, I use a different variable from the political processes database (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2008) as the dependent variable. I use a variable measuring whether there was any threat of dissolving the legislative assembly during a given year. The variable is coded as 1 if the president attempted to close Congress and 0 if there was no threat of dissolution.

The variable “threat of congress dissolution attempt” captures both trial balloons in which presidents seek to assert their power vis-à-vis the legislature and more serious dissolution attempts in which presidents take more concrete steps to dissolve the congress. The dissolution threats issued by Jaime Roldós Aguilera (president of Ecuador between 1979 and 1981) in 1980 and the threats issued by Rafael Caldera (president of Venezuela between 1994 and 1999) in 1994 are good examples of the former scenario. Both of these presidents faced strong opposition in the legislature when they reached the presidency. In order to send a message to the congress and consolidate their position, Roldós and Caldera publicly threatened to close the congress if the opposition parties made it impossible for them to govern (Hurtado, 1990; Semana, 1994). However, they did not carry out these threats. On the contrary, other presidents such as the outsiders Fujimori, Chávez, and Correa implemented these dissolution threats by taking active steps to close the congress and reorganize the political system.

The main independent variable in this study comes from an original database on political outsiders. In line with the operationalization discussed in Chapter 2, I code as an outsider any president that has no previous political experience and comes from outside of the established party system. A list of all the outsider presidents in this analysis is presented in Table 6.3.
### Table 6.3. Outsider presidents included in the statistical analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>OUTSIDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td><strong>2003-2005</strong>: Lucio Gutiérrez (PSP):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2006-</strong>: Rafael Correa (<em>Alianza País</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td><strong>1990-1996</strong>: Violeta Chamorro (UNO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perú</td>
<td><strong>1990-2001</strong>: Alberto Fujimori (<em>Cambio 90</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2001-2006</strong>: Alejandro Toledo (<em>Perú Posible</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td><strong>1998-</strong>: Hugo Chávez (MVR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I use a measure of the effective number of seat-winning parties in the legislature in a given year to test Mainwaring (1993)’s argument on the link between multipartism and executive-legislative deadlock. The information on the effective number of seat-winning parties in the legislature was obtained from the Electoral System Design Project database (Carey & Hix, 2008).

I use two variables from the political processes database to assess whether political scandals and popular protests have an impact on the risk of executive-legislative relations (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2008). The first variable measures whether the administration was involved in a corruption scandal in a given year. The variable takes a value of 0 if the administration was not involved in a corruption scandal, a value of 1 if there was one corruption scandal, and a value of 2 if more than one corruption scandal erupted. The second variable is a dummy measuring whether the administration was affected by social protests during the year.

Another variable from the political processes database (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2008) allows me to control for the possible effect of factionalism in the president’s party on the level of
confrontation between the executive and the legislative power. I use a dummy variable from the database coded as 1 if the president’s party is described as being divided into factions by the *Latin American Weekly Report* in a given year, and coded as 0 if the president’s party is not divided into factions.

Finally, I control for the effect of economic crisis on executive-legislative relations. I include a variable measuring per capita GDP growth coming from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2009). I also control for inflation, which may have an independent impact on executive-legislative relations, regardless of economic growth. The inflation data comes from CEPALSTAT (the online database of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean—a UN institution). I used the variations in the consumer prices index (annual average) as my measure of inflation.

### 6.3.2 Model estimation

Given that both dependent variables are binary, logistic regression is the most suitable statistical method of analysis. Table 6.5 below presents the results of a first series of models which assess whether executive-legislative conflict is more likely when the president is an outsider. The first model in Table 6.5 is a standard logistic regression. However, the empirical analysis is conducted with cross-sectional time series data. Hence, I estimated a random effects logistic regression. The random effects logistic regression is appropriate in this case because it takes the unique structure of the data into account. First, the error term in the model is partitioned into error across countries, and error across time within countries (random error). Second, the standard errors of the estimates are corrected to take into account repeated observations for each country (Pendergast et al., 1996).
A congressional dissolution attempt is a rare event in Latin America, as can be seen in the Table 6.4.

Table 6.4. Frequency of Dissolution Attempts in Latin America (1980-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dissolution Attempt</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Dissolution Attempt</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>96.56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that in only 3.4% of the administration-years in the sample there was an attempt of congressional dissolution. Standard logistic regressions are not appropriate when the outcome to be predicted is a rare event because they can underestimate the probability of the event (G. King & Zeng, 2001). I estimated the impact of outsider presidents on dissolution attempts with a rare events logistic regression that develops corrections for the biases in logistic regression that occur when predicting or explaining rare outcomes. I also performed a modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity, which produced a significant test statistic (prob>chi2 = 0.00) suggesting that there is heteroskedasticity across units –countries–. So I ran the rare events logistic regression with country clustered standard errors as a robustness check. Table 6.7 presents the results of these two rare events logistic regressions.

6.4 RESULTS

I estimated the impact of outsider presidents and other institutional and contextual variables on the likelihood of executive-legislative confrontation and Congress dissolution attempt with a series of logistic regressions including data from an original dataset on political outsiders in Latin America.
6.4.1 Executive-legislative confrontation

Table 6.5 presents the results of two models that analyze the relationship between outsider presidents and executive-legislative confrontation. The results provide support for my hypothesis. The likelihood of executive-legislative confrontation significantly increases when the president is an outsider. In fact, the coefficient for the variable “outsider” is positive and statistically significant in the two logistic regressions presented in Table 6.5.

As for the other independent variables in the model, the results validate again the seminal Mainwaring (1993) contribution on the impact of multipartism on executive-legislative deadlock. The results suggest that the level of confrontation between the president and the Congress increases as the number of parties that hold seats in the legislature increases. In the same vein, the results show that executive-legislative conflicts are more likely when the party of the president is divided into factions. Factions of the president’s party may prefer not to collaborate with the president for strategic reasons, especially when elections approach. The impact of factionalism on Latin American politics is understudied so this result warrants further investigation.

The results also show that scandals and popular protests influence executive-legislative relations in Latin America. Both variables –corruption scandals and popular protests– are positive and statistically significant in the three models, which suggests that unpopular presidents whose authority is contested by social protests are more likely to be challenged by the legislature, thereby increasing the probability of executive-legislative confrontation.

Finally, the model shows that the economic growth does not have a direct influence on executive-legislative relations. The variable measuring GDP per capita growth does not reach statistical significance in any of the models in Table 6.5. However, the variable measuring
inflation is positive and statistically significant in both models. This finding again suggests that presidential popularity has an impact on executive-legislative relations. 73

Table 6.5. Logistic Regressions. Determinants of Executive-Legislative Conflict in Latin America (1980-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Logistic Regression</th>
<th>(2) Random Effects Logistic Regression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outsider</td>
<td>1.211***</td>
<td>1.124**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.462)</td>
<td>(.513)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Number of Parties</td>
<td>.225***</td>
<td>.236**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.085)</td>
<td>(.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Scandals</td>
<td>.526***</td>
<td>.492**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.186)</td>
<td>(.199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protests</td>
<td>.724**</td>
<td>.677*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.331)</td>
<td>(.352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factionalism</td>
<td>.917**</td>
<td>.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.435)</td>
<td>(.477)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP Growth</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>(.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>.507**</td>
<td>.506**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.227)</td>
<td>(.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.259***</td>
<td>-3.270***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.497)</td>
<td>(.573)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 281          Number of Countries: 17

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results suggest that outsider presidents pose a serious threat to governability in Latin America. However, it is not possible to evaluate how serious this threat is just by looking at the results presented in Table 6.5. In fact, the coefficients of logistic regressions cannot be straightforwardly interpreted to gauge substantive significance. In order to estimate precisely what impact the outsider presidents have on the probability of executive-legislative conflict in a

73 Previous research has shown that in Latin America high inflation leads to a decline in presidential approval (Weyland, 2002).
given administration-year, predicted probabilities have to be estimated. I calculated predicted probabilities from the logistic regression.\textsuperscript{74}

Table 6.6 presents the predicted probabilities of executive-legislative relations at different values of the independent variables.\textsuperscript{75}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value on the independent variables</th>
<th>Predicted Probability of Executive-Legislative Confrontation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Variables at their Means</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Outsider President</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsider President</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Effective Number of Parties</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Effective Number of Parties</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Corruption Scandal</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than One Corruption Scandal</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Social Protests</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protests</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Factions in the President’s Party</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factions in the President’s Party</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Inflation</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Inflation</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results presented in Table 6.6 show that executive-legislative confrontation is much more likely when the executive power is held by a political outsider. When the president is not an outsider and all the other variables are at their means, the probability of executive-legislative confrontation is only 25.7%. When the president is an outsider and all the other variables are at

\textsuperscript{74} King et al. (2000) developed a Stata routine (Clarify) that estimates predicted probabilities in logistic regressions.\textsuperscript{75} I calculated predicted probabilities only for the independent variables that were statistically significant in at least one of the models in Table 6.5. For the dummy variables, I calculated the predicted probabilities when the variable is at 0 and when the variable is at 1. For the trichotomous variables, I calculated the predicted probabilities when the variable is at 0 and when the variable is at 2. For the continuous variables, I calculated predicted probabilities when the value of the variable is one standard deviation below the mean, and when it is one standard deviation above the mean.
their means, the probability of executive-legislative confrontation is 53.4%. The impact of outsider presidents on the likelihood of confrontation between the two branches of government is very high. When compared to the effect of the other variables in the model, the variable measuring whether the president is an outsider is the strongest predictor of executive-legislative confrontation.

6.4.2 Congressional dissolution attempts

Two other models are presented in Table 6.7. These models assess whether congressional dissolution attempts by the chief executive are more likely to occur when the president is an outsider. These two models provide support for my second hypothesis. The sign for the “outsider” variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both models, suggesting that the risk of Congress dissolution attempt is higher when the highest office is occupied by a political outsider. Surprisingly, most of the other variables in the model are not good predictors of dissolution attempt. Political scandals and popular protests help to explain executive-legislative confrontation, but they appear to be unrelated to dissolution attempts. The number of parties is also a poor predictor of Congress dissolution attempts by elected presidents. The economic context, by contrast, appears to be linked to Congress dissolution attempts. The model suggests that attempts to dissolve the legislative body are less likely when the economy is growing.
Table 6.7. Rare events logistic regressions. Determinants of congress dissolution attempts in Latin America (1980-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Rare Events Logistic Regression</th>
<th>(2) Rare Events Logistic Regression with Country Clustered SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outsider</td>
<td>2.521*** (.771)</td>
<td>2.521*** (.656)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Number of Parties</td>
<td>.189 (.124)</td>
<td>.189 (.158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Scandals</td>
<td>.191 (.471)</td>
<td>.191 (.403)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protests</td>
<td>-.295 (.825)</td>
<td>-.295 (.563)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factionalism</td>
<td>1.255 (.858)</td>
<td>1.255 (.978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP Growth</td>
<td>-.171** (.073)</td>
<td>-.171** (.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-.254 (.531)</td>
<td>-.254 (.429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.083*** (.719)</td>
<td>-4.083*** (.890)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Countries</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In order to estimate the substantive impact of outsider presidents on the likelihood of Congress dissolution attempt, I calculated the predicted probabilities of dissolution attempt in the rare events logistic regression (see Table 6.8).76 Again, the variable measuring whether the president is a political outsider is the best predictor of Congress dissolution attempt. The impact of “outsidership” is much higher than that of the two other variables that appear as significant in one of the rare events models. In any given administration-year in which the president is not an outsider (holding all the other variables at their means) the predicted probability of Congress

---

76 I used the statistical program Zelig (Kosuke, King, & Lau, 2008) to estimate the predicted probabilities in the relogit model. I followed the same steps used to calculate the predicted probabilities in the previous model. Only the predicted probabilities for the variables that were statistically significant in one of the rare events logistic regressions were calculated.
dissolution attempt is 1.9%. When the president is an outsider, the likelihood of a dissolution attempt is 19.6%.

**Table 6.8.** Predicted probabilities of congress dissolution attempts in Latin America (1980-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value on the independent variables</th>
<th>Predicted Probability of Congress Dissolution Attempt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Variables at their Means</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Outsider President</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsider President</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Economic Growth</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Economic Growth</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This finding shows that outsider presidents do not only imperil governability. They also represent a serious threat to democratic quality by undermining the authority and the legitimacy of the legislative body that is supposed to hold the executive power accountable for its actions. Outsider presidents often campaign using an anti-politics discourse promising radical changes to a disenchanted electorate (Hawkins, 2010). Moreover, they tend to arrive to power with no support in Congress. In many cases, this leads to repeated attempts or threats to dissolve the legislative body taking advantage of their high approval rating and of the lack of popular support for the legislative body. The rise of an outsider to the presidency can go hand in hand with a democratic breakdown if this dissolution attempt succeeds. But even when this strategy fails, the threat to dissolve Congress weakens the authority and the legitimacy of one of the key democratic institutions.
6.4.3 Endogeneity concerns and robustness checks

The empirical results in this chapter suggest that executive-legislative conflicts and executive excesses against the legislature are more likely when the president is an outsider. However, there is an endogeneity concern in these empirical models which will be addressed in this section. The basic problem is that the same unobserved conditions that lead to the election of an outsider may trigger executive-legislative conflict. As the first part of this dissertation has shown, outsiders tend to come to power in moments of economic and sociopolitical crisis. This context of instability may also be related to the outcomes studied in this chapter (executive-legislative confrontation and Congress dissolution attempts).

Endogeneity concerns are one of the hardest problems to tackle in the social sciences (G. King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). In experimental research, subjects can be randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. In this case, as in most research in comparative political institutions, countries were not randomly assigned to the “treatment” (i.e. the election of an outsider). Hence, we must be concerned with differences between the “treated” and the “non-treated” country-years to make sure the results are not affected by selection bias.

In order to rule out the possibility that executive-legislative confrontation would have happened anyway in the “treated” country-years in the absence of an outsider, in this section I use propensity score matching to estimate causal effects (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1985). The basic idea of this technique is to find among a large group of non-treated cases those cases which are similar to the treated cases in all relevant pre-treatment characteristics. This leads to a well-selected and adequate control group, which allows a better estimation of causal effects (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005).
Estimating a good matching model requires that researchers have a good theoretical understanding of the variables that influence the possibility of being treated in the first place. Fortunately, my cross-national research on the causes of outsider rise in Chapters 3 and 4 makes it possible for me to identify the relevant variables to include in the model. As pointed out by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005: 6), “only the variables that influence simultaneously the participation decision and the outcome variable should be included.” Moreover, the variables should be measured before the treatment to make sure that they are not affected by participation in the treatment. In this case, the relevant variables to be included in the matching model are the ones that influence both the probability of outsider rise and the likelihood of executive-legislative confrontation. Based on the research conducted in Chapters 3 and 4, the variables that were used in the matching procedure were the following: the level of democracy (Polity IV score), economic growth, inflation, electoral volatility, ethnic fractionalization, and the electoral cycle. Unconsolidated democracies, economic crises, weak party systems, divided societies, and non-concurrent elections can both facilitate the rise of outsiders and make executive-legislative relations more conflictive.

The procedure for estimating the impact of a treatment can be divided in three steps. First, the propensity score has to be estimated. Second, the researcher has to choose a matching algorithm that will use the estimated propensity score to match untreated cases to treated cases. I chose the most straightforward matching estimator (nearest neighbor matching). The last step is the estimation of the impact of the intervention with the matched sample and the calculation of

77 To make sure that these variables are not influenced by the treatment (i.e. an outsider president), I include in the model measures of these variables in the year of the presidential election. Following the recommendation of Bryson et al. (2002), I do not include in the estimation of the propensity score matching variables that are related to the rise of outsiders, but have no clear theoretical link with executive-legislative conflict or dissolution attempts (e.g. compulsory voting or reelection provisions).

78 When this matching algorithm is applied, the cases from the comparison group are chosen as matching partners for treated cases which are the closest in terms of the propensity score (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005).
standard errors. Two parameters are of primary interest. The average treatment effect (ATE) is the expected gain for a randomly selected case from the sample. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is the average gain from treatment for the cases which actually received the treatment. Although I will present both parameters, I will pay more attention to the ATT. The ATT tells us whether or not outsiders have an impact on executive-legislative confrontation in the treated country-years above and beyond the unstable context which influenced their rise to power. Table 6.9 presents the results of the estimated causal effects (ATE and ATT) of “outsidership” on executive-legislative confrontation and congress dissolution attempts by the president.

Table 6.9. Estimation of the treatment effects of outsiders on executive-legislative confrontation and dissolution attempts (after propensity score matching)

|                        | Coefficient | Robust SE | z     | P>|z| |
|------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------|-----|
| **Executive-legislative conflict** |             |           |       |     |
| ATE                    | .143        | .234      | 0.61  | 0.540 |
| ATT                    | .304**      | .129      | 2.34  | 0.019 |
| **Congress dissolution attempt** |             |           |       |     |
| ATE                    | .214***     | .080      | 2.67  | 0.008 |
| ATT                    | .200**      | .080      | 2.50  | 0.012 |

The results of these causal effect estimations provide support for the findings of the unmatched models above. Although, the average treatment effect (ATE) of the treatment (outsider presidents) is positive on both outcomes of interest, it only reaches statistical
significance in the ATE estimation for the congress dissolution attempt model. However, we should not put too much stock in this finding. The ATE is the expected gain for a randomly selected case from the whole sample when it receives the treatment. But it is clear that the rise of a political outsider does not happen randomly in the country-years in the sample. Hence, the most important parameter to analyze is the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT). The coefficient for this parameter is positive and statistically significant in both sets of models. In other words, independently of the context that leads to the rise of political outsiders, these independent and inexperienced politicians tend to have a deleterious impact on executive-legislative relations and are more likely to attempt a dissolution of the legislative branch.

In sum, the results of these causal effects estimations with propensity score matching suggest a nuanced finding. Outsiders would not necessarily generate an increase in executive-legislative conflicts if they emerged in politically stable countries. But this counterfactual is of limited empirical interest. We know that outsiders come to power in difficult contexts of economic and sociopolitical crisis. What these robustness checks confirm is that outsider presidents have a negative impact on institutional performance that goes above and beyond what one would expect given this unstable context.

### 6.5 EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT UNDER FUJIMORI

The statistical results reported above suggest that there is a link between the election of outsider presidents and sustained executive-legislative conflicts. In line with the methodological framework proposed by Lieberman (2005, see Chapter 2), this section goes beyond this statistical relationship to try to confirm the causal mechanisms identified above. It does so
through the in-depth analysis of the very conflictive executive-legislative relations in the first years of the Fujimori administration in Peru. This period of severe confrontation between the executive and the legislature will also be compared with the relatively more cooperative executive-legislative relations under the administrations of the two career politicians who preceded Fujimori in the presidency (Belaúnde and García).

6.5.1 The facts: executive-legislative confrontation under Fujimori

The first two years of the Fujimori administration until the Congress dissolution of April 1992 were a period of severe and acrimonious confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches. As I will discuss in more detail below, Fujimori was in a minority situation and had weak support in the legislature. Moreover, he was not able (or willing) to overcome this precarious position by negotiating and reaching agreements with the other political forces in the parliament. The difficult relationship between Fujimori and the legislature can be grasped by looking at four different areas of confrontation between the executive and the legislature: 1) confrontation over bills and policies, 2) confrontation over executive appointments, 3) confrontation in which one of the branches challenges the constitutional ability of the other to legislate, and 4) verbal confrontation between the two branches.

6.5.1.1 Policy disagreements

The first type of executive-legislative conflict that existed during the first years of the Fujimori administration was the confrontation over bills and policy disagreements. There were two main areas of confrontation between the president and the legislature: economic policies and security policies. The 1979 Peruvian constitution gave constitutional decree authority (Carey &
Shugart, 1998) to the president to decide and implement economic policies. The article 211 of the constitution allowed the president to “dictate extraordinary measures dealing with economic and financial matters when the national interest so requires.” This prerogative was used extensively by Fujimori during his first years in office. Most of the policies of the neoliberal economic shock were enacted by decree (Kenney, 2004). However, Congress was not completely powerless on economic matters. The legislature attempted to influence the economic direction during the executive-legislative budget negotiations of the 1991 and the 1992 budget laws. On both occasions, the executive presented a budget that was unacceptable for the legislature which generated a heated executive-legislative confrontation. Whereas the executive wanted a balanced budget, the Budget Committee in the legislature rejected the proposal of the president and approved its own bill with higher spending in a number of areas (especially social spending). The conflict ended in both occasions—after a long period of interbranch conflict—with the president vetoing the proposals of the legislature and enacting its own budget (with cosmetic changes) in order not to derail the neoliberal economic policies.

The main policy confrontation between the executive and the legislature was related to the controversial security strategy chosen in 1991 by Fujimori to fight against the Shining Path guerrilla. In June 1991, the legislature granted decree authority to Fujimori in three areas: pacification, employment, and investment. Taking advantage of this delegated decree authority, Fujimori enacted a deluge of highly controversial national security decrees that essentially militarized national life and significantly increased the extraordinary powers of the executive on security affairs. These national security bills received very weak support in the legislature. In the words of Kenney (2004: 174), “what distinguished opposition to the national security decrees was that those opposing them represented almost the entire political spectrum and constituted a
majority in both houses of the legislature.” On 25 and 26 November 1991, the Senate repealed eight and modified ten national security decrees, thereby increasing the level of confrontation between the two branches of government.

The repeated policy disagreements between the president and the legislature are reflected in the high percentage of laws approved by Congress vetoed by the president, and also in the high percentage of presidential vetoes overridden by the legislature. Table 6.10 shows a comparison of presidential vetoes and vetoes overridden under the three administrations considered in this analysis (Belaúnde 1980-1985, García 1985-1990, Fujimori 1990-1992).

Table 6.10. Presidential vetoes and overridden vetoes in Peru (1980-1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laws approved by Congress vetoed by the president</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential vetoes overridden by the legislature</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Schmidt (1998: 110)

These figures reveal that executive-legislative relations were much more conflictive under the administration of Fujimori than under the administration of the leaders who preceded him in the presidency. Instead of reaching negotiated policy agreements, the executive and the legislature often used their prerogatives to the fullest extent to try to defeat the policy proposals of the other branch. This led to long periods of executive-legislative confrontation over bills and policies.
6.5.1.2 Conflicts over executive appointments

Confrontation over executive appointments also contributed to increase the level of executive-legislative confrontation in the months that preceded the self-coup. The 1979 Constitution (articles 225-226) gave Congress the right to hold the executive accountable through two different mechanisms: interpellation (required the approval of one third of the deputies) and censure (required the approval of a majority of the deputies). Interpellation required that ministers come to the parliament to be questioned by legislators. Censured ministers were forced to resign. Interpellations were frequent during the administrations of Belaúnde and García during the 1980s, and continued under the Fujimori administration. But no minister had ever been censured under the 1979 Constitution. The weak support for Fujimori in the legislature made censures more likely. In November 1991, in the context of a severe executive-legislative confrontation over the national security decrees, the Chamber of Deputies announced that it would interpellate and maybe censure three ministers (Agriculture minister Enrique RossL Link, Defense minister Víctor Malca, and Economy minister Carlos Boloña). In the end, only one minister was censured (RossL Link), but this procedure infuriated Fujimori.79 Fujimori took advantage of a loophole in the Constitution to delay RossL Link’s resignation for two weeks which in turn frustrated the legislature (Kenney, 2004: 181). In sum, the confrontation over executive appointments was increasing in intensity when Fujimori dissolved the legislature in April 1992.

79 This was the first time Congress had censured a minister since the 1960s.
6.5.1.3 Confrontation over constitutional prerogatives

The third type of interbranch conflict that existed during the first years of the Fujimori administration was confrontation in which one of the branches challenged the prerogatives or the ability to legislate of the other branch. First, President Fujimori implicitly challenged the ability of the Parliament to legislate by making extensive use of decree and veto powers. Fujimori used these prerogatives much more often than the presidents who preceded him. This violated the spirit (if not the letter) of the Constitution by reducing the legislature to a very secondary role in lawmaking. Although Peruvian governments in the 1980s made extensive use of the decree powers that existed in the 1979 Constitution, this tendency was exacerbated under Fujimori. A considerable proportion of all legislation in Peru in the 1980s corresponded to laws approved by Congress: 41.6% of laws under the Belaúnde administration (1980-1985) and 33.9% of laws under the García administration corresponded to laws initiated and passed by the legislature. The corresponding figure for the first years of the Fujimori administration (1990-1992) is 8.5%, a much smaller proportion (Schmidt, 1998).

The excessive –and sometimes abusive– use of decree powers often generated frictions between the two branches of government. For example, in October 1990 Fujimori issued an executive order to free several thousand unsentenced prisoners accused of minor crimes. The goal of the president was to limit overcrowding. However, this unilateral decision was a clear infringement on Congress’s exclusive right to grant amnesties. As a result, the Senate immediately repealed Fujimori’s decree thereby generating considerable interbranch conflict (Kenney, 2004: 132). In another clear example of executive abuse, Fujimori issued a series of emergency decrees to implement new taxes required to meet the demands of the IMF in July

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80 Since the presidents’ parties had a majority in Congress, the use of decree authority by the president during the 1980s also generated much less interbranch confrontation (Schmidt, 1998).
1991. These decrees were enacted in spite of the fact that the Bicameral Budget Committee had rejected these fiscal reforms. The executive’s decrees on this issue were criticized on the grounds that they were not constitutional and that they challenged the prerogatives of the legislature on fiscal and budgetary issues (Kenney, 2004: 152-153). The deluge of executive decrees in November 1991 also jeopardized the capacity of the legislature to fulfill the role assigned to it by the Constitution. According to Caretas (18 November 1991, p.12), the goal of the flood of legislative decrees was to “saturate the capacity of the legislature which cannot review 126 laws in 30 days (…). In this way, the executive hopes that the laws will be enacted after 30 days have passed.”

The multiple occasions in which Fujimori challenged (openly or implicitly) the prerogatives of Congress produced a reaction by the legislative body. In December 1991, Congress passed the Law of Parliamentary Control over the Normative Acts of the President of the Republic. This law gave the legislature the right to veto emergency economic legislative decrees and other unilateral decisions of the executive. Many analysts and legal scholars declared that the Law of Parliamentary Control was unconstitutional because it limited the prerogatives given to the President by the 1979 Constitution (Murakami, 2012: 285-289). In other words, by early 1992 the executive and the legislature were confronted over substantive policy issues, but also challenged each other’s constitutional prerogatives.

6.5.1.4 Verbal confrontation

These serious interbranch tensions were aggravated by a rhetoric confrontation between Fujimori and the legislature. The outsider president chose deliberately to attack discredited politicians and political institutions. His populist, polarizing, and simplistic discourse started as soon as he gained office. Fujimori repeatedly portrayed congressmen as “unproductive
charlatans” dominated by “mean spirited partisan interests.” He described legislators as corrupt and as out of touch with the harsh realities of Peruvians (Conaghan, 2005: 30; Kenney, 2004: 178-179; Pease García, 1994: 107-108; 2003: 112-114). Occasionally, members of Congress replied to Fujimori and attacked him often using racist epithets to disqualify his leadership. For instance, Senator Rafael Belaúnde reacted to one of Fujimori’s attacks by saying “what can be expected of a president whose dead kin are not buried in this land?” (cited in Kenney, 2004: 182). These exchanges contributed to a “war of words” that also increased the level of executive-legislative confrontation.

The severe confrontation between the executive and the legislature came to an abrupt end in April 1992 when Fujimori committed an autogolpe (self-coup). On the night of Sunday April 5, 1992, Fujimori appeared on television and announced that he was "temporarily dissolving" the Congress of the Republic and "reorganizing" the Judicial Branch of the government. He then ordered the Army of Peru to drive a tank to the steps of Congress to shut it down. Fujimori immediately issued Decree Law 25418, which dissolved the Congress, gave the Executive Branch all legislative powers, suspended much of the Constitution, and gave the president the power to enact various reforms, such as the "application of drastic punishments" towards terrorists.

6.5.2 Causal mechanisms

This description of executive-legislative relations during the first years of the Fujimori administration makes clear that interbranch conflict was frequent and intense. But is this related to the causal mechanisms I identify in the theoretical framework (section 6.1)? The next section
will evaluate whether the conflictive executive-legislative relations under Fujimori can be explained by the factors mentioned above.

6.5.2.1 Fujimori: a minority president

The first fundamental difference between Fujimori and his predecessors in the presidency (Belaúnde and García) is that Fujimori found himself in a minority situation in the legislature as soon as he gained office, whereas the two other presidents had much higher support in the legislature.

As many other outsiders, Fujimori ran in the presidential elections with a new electoral movement (*Cambio* 90). This new political party was a platform for the personal ambitions of Fujimori but was very weakly organized. *Cambio* 90 legislative candidates did not always benefit from the personal appeal of Fujimori. As a result, Cambio 90 received very little support in legislative elections. As can be observed in Table 6.11, Fujimori only had 17.7% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 22.5% of the seats in the Senate. This level of support was so low that forming a stable coalition government was a very difficult task. The losers of the presidential race (APRA and FREDEMO) had larger cohorts in the legislature than Fujimori’s party (Tuesta Soldevilla, 1994: 65-68).

Table 6.11. Support for the party of the president in the Peruvian legislature (1980-1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Party of the President</th>
<th>Percentage of seats in the Chamber of Deputies</th>
<th>Percentage of Seats in the Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belaúnde (1980-1990)</td>
<td>Acción Popular</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>García (1985-1990)</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujimori (1990-1992)</td>
<td>Cambio 90</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In contrast, APRA held an absolute majority in both houses of Congress when the leader of that party (Alan García) was in power in the period 1985-1990. Acción Popular had an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies and held a majority in the Senate after forming a coalition with a smaller party (Partido Popular Cristiano). In sum, Fujimori had much weaker “partisan powers” than his two predecessors (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a). The situation was very difficult for Fujimori when he reached office. In a detailed analysis of executive-legislative relations in Peru in the early 1990s, Kenney (2004: 84) summarizes the difficult scenario facing Fujimori when he was elected: “Under the 1979 Constitution, an opposition majority in both houses of Congress could pass laws contrary to the executive’s wishes, override the president’s veto, block legislation that the executive deemed critical and had made a matter of confidence, deny extraordinary legislative powers to the executive, censure ministers one by one without restrictions, impeach the president, or declare the presidency vacant.”

Complicating things even further, Fujimori’s Cambio 90 group in the legislature was dismantled almost immediately because of internal divisions (Degregori & Meléndez, 2007, 23-31, 41-42; see also Chapter 7). Cambio 90 legislators were also very politically inexperienced, and it would have been very hard for Fujimori to anchor a stable coalition around such a weak and disorganized political party. Moreover, Fujimori did not take his own movement seriously and never attempted to strengthen its internal organization (Cameron, 1997: 38).

The low support for Fujimori in Congress and the weakness of his own movement put the outsider president in a very critical situation when he gained office, which Cameron aptly describes as a “potential time bomb in legislative-executive relations” (Cameron, 1997: 49).

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81 In March 1991, dissident legislators of Cambio 90 left the party to form a new party in government contrary to Fujimori. Half of Cambio 90 deputies formally abandoned Fujimori’s party in that moment (Degregori & Meléndez, 2007).
Unless he managed to form a stable coalition with other parties in the legislature, Fujimori was constitutionally limited to declaring and renewing states of emergency and issuing extraordinary financial and economic measures. As shown above, Fujimori used (and abused of) his decree powers extensively which led to a severe confrontation with Congress. But at the origins of his excesses is a situation of minority in the legislature that left him with few choices to govern the country in the midst of a serious sociopolitical and economic crisis.

6.5.2.2 Lack of political experience and democratic socialization

The weak support Fujimori had in the legislature undoubtedly increased the risk of confrontation between the two branches of government. However, this is not the whole story. Several studies have shown that minority presidents tend to form multiparty coalitions in order to obtain support for their policies in the legislature. They react in the same way a prime minister would react in a similar situation (Amorim Neto, 2006; Negretto, 2006; Zelaznik, 2001). Why didn’t Fujimori put together a stable coalition with other parties?

The key to answering this question is the lack of political experience and democratic socialization of Fujimori. A stable policy coalition was not unthinkable in Peru in the early 1990s. The policy shift of Fujimori in a neoliberal direction after reaching office opened the way for a coalition with FREDEMO (a rightist coalition of parties that were in favor of orthodox economic policies). FREDEMO legislators supported the market reforms implemented by Fujimori. Together Cambio 90 and FREDEMO had 52.2% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 53.2% of the seats in the Senate. Such a coalition would have provided Fujimori with a comfortable majority in Congress. According to several FREDEMO legislators interviewed by Cameron (1997: 54), “it would have been easy for Fujimori to build a stable governing majority within the Congress.” Pease García (leader of Izquierda Unida) similarly
argues that “the majority of the legislators agreed with the policies of Fujimori. It is not true that Fujimori needed the autogolpe to be able to govern.”

If a stable multiparty coalition proved impossible, Fujimori could have attempted to pass his bills through the legislature with a series of ad hoc alliances with different parties. Actually, in his first months in office Fujimori managed to pass some of his policy reforms through the legislature through temporary agreements with different parties. A PPC politician interviewed by Caretas in November 1990 made the following statement: “If one has the ability to negotiate agreements... I do not see that it is impossible for the president to find ways to gather together other groups temporarily, converting these five years into a succession of conjunctions within one political line” (Caretas, 5 November 1990, p. 27).

In sum, Fujimori could have cooperated with the legislature either through a long-term coalition with FREDEMO or via temporary coalitions with different parties. The legislators made a series of goodwill gestures during Fujimori’s first months in office which suggests that Congress was open to cooperating with the executive. As Kenney (2004: 122-123) points out, “a politician more skilled at negotiating agreements and consensus building might have been successful at building a lasting governing coalition, and a politician more committed to democratic methods might have pursued the goal more single-mindedly.”

But Fujimori deliberately chose a different path which can be ascribed to his lack of political and democratic socialization. Fujimori had almost no political experience before reaching the highest office in the country, and given his background “it was not surprising that

82 Interview with Henry Pease García, October 2012, Lima, Peru
84 For instance, the presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies were selected from the ranks of Cambio 90 despite the fact that the president’s party only had a minority in the legislature. Also, Congress delegated decree authority to Fujimori in a number of areas (Cameron, 1997: 54).
once in power he was unwilling to play by the established democratic rules of the game” (Cameron, 1997: 47-48). Fujimori had a very vertical political style verging on authoritarianism (Levitt, 2012: 171; Tanaka, 2001: 78). The outsider president never actively sought to generate consensus or to reach negotiated policy agreements with the legislature.

The president of the Chamber of Deputies during the first years of Fujimori’s presidency (Víctor Paredes –a member of Cambio 90–) recalls an episode that shows this lack of interest of Fujimori in interbranch negotiations. In October 1990, Fujimori requested authorization to travel to a meeting of Latin American presidents in Caracas. The legislature stalled the authorization and used this as a mechanism to obtain policy concessions from the president. Fujimori decided not to attend the international meeting in order not to have to negotiate with the legislature. Opposition legislators were very surprised by this decision, and they approached Paredes to tell him they actually wanted to negotiate. Paredes revealed that Fujimori and the leaders of Cambio 90 in Congress were not interested in bargaining with political parties. This episode reveals that the political parties in the legislature were playing a game that Fujimori did not understand or did not want to play.

Fujimori emphasized the technical over the political. He saw himself as a manager or a political engineer who needed to solve the socioeconomic problems of Peru with the help of a small team of advisors only. This vertical political style focused on results, even if the means used to reach them were not democratic (Conaghan, 2005: 3-4; Murakami, 2012: 40-47). Unlike a traditional politician, Fujimori did not want to build a majority in Congress because he knew that such a majority would not be unconditional and he would constantly need to negotiate agreements with other political forces, which he refused to do (Cameron, 1997: 55; Pease García,

85 Interview with Víctor Paredes, October 2012, Lima, Peru
2003: 110). Some of Fujimori’s public statements in the early 1990s betrayed his anti-political views. For instance, Fujimori recognized in November 1991 that he followed the maxim “act first and speak later” (Kenney, 2004: 178). A month later, he stated that “perhaps it would be best that there be an emperor in Peru, and that he takes at least ten years resolving problems (Murakami, 2012: 288).

A good example of Fujimori’s unwillingness to negotiate a solution to executive-legislative conflicts is the fact that he wasted a very good opportunity for an agreement with the legislature in March 1992. A few days before the Congress dissolution, prime minister de los Heros attempted to find an agreement to facilitate cooperation with the legislature. This negotiation made considerable headway. De los Heros and the leaders of the main parties in the legislature agreed on a series of pacification laws that were acceptable for the legislature. If it had gone into effect, this agreement would have defused the main source of confrontation between the two branches of government. However, Fujimori scratched that agreement and chose an aggressive and authoritarian move: i.e. the dissolution of the legislature.86

It is interesting to compare Fujimori’s authoritarian excesses with the actions of Belaúnde during his first administration (1963-1968). Belaúnde was an experienced politician and the leader of a political party (Acción Popular). Although he was in a minority situation similar to the one faced by Fujimori, Belaúnde actively sought to reach agreements with the opposition in the legislature through partisan and personal contacts. In spite of the little success of this strategy, Belaúnde never deviated from this negotiating line (Kenney, 2004: 80; Murakami, 2012: 149-150). Similarly, during his second administration (1980-1985), Belaúnde formed a

86 Interview with Alfonso de los Heros, November 2012, Lima, Peru
coalition with another party (*Partido Popular Cristiano*) in order to have absolute majority in the Senate.\(^{87}\)

In sum, Fujimori had the possibility to reach compromises and negotiate agreements with the legislature. However, his lack of political and democratic socialization pushed him in a completely different direction. Fujimori’s disdain for consensus building is the key reason behind the severe executive-legislative confrontation in the first years of his administration.

### 6.5.2.3 Cambio 90: too weak to constrain Fujimori

The previous section focuses on the personal background of Fujimori to explain some of his authoritarian excesses. But there is also an institutional factor that may help to explain the lack of respect of Fujimori for the democratic rules of the game. The outsider president was the leader of a divided, incoherent, and weakly organized electoral movement. *Cambio* 90 was not an institutionalized party and it split in different factions as soon as Fujimori reached office (Degregori & Meléndez, 2007: 23-42). As mentioned above, Fujimori never attempted to change this situation by strengthening the organization of *Cambio* 90 and making it more internally

\(^{87}\) The Fujimori administration can also be fruitfully compared with the Lula administration in Brazil. As in the case of Fujimori, Lula was elected president in 2002 as a leader of a party that had never been in power at the national level (*Partido dos Trabalhadores* – PT). Moreover, the PT only had 17.7% of the seats in the legislature when Lula reached the presidency. The key difference between Fujimori and Lula is that the Brazilian president was clearly an experienced insider politician when he reached office. Lula was the leader of an established and strongly organized party, and he had participated in three presidential elections before winning in 2002. Lula’s way of dealing with the minority situation was very different from Fujimori’s reaction. Upon taking office, Lula constructed a diverse multiparty coalition by bringing eight parties into the cabinet (Baiocchi & Checa, 2008: 116; Samuels, 2008). The Lula government also convinced several deputies to switch parties and join one of the coalition parties, which is a common practice in Brazilian politics. As a result of these early efforts at coalition-making, Lula’s government passed several important pieces of legislation (Samuels, 2008). Later on, the Lula administration chose to distribute pork and cash to build ad hoc legislative coalitions, which created a corruption scandal known as the *mensalão* (Kingstone & Ponce, 2010: 120-121). By doing this the Lula administration disappointed the hopes of those who expected a less corrupt government. However, Lula managed to pass several controversial bills by engaging the legislature and negotiating deals with opposition parties and politicians. With all its flaws, the Lula administration tried to govern within the limits of the Brazilian political system rather than outside of it.
coherent. By contrast, Belaúnde and García were the leaders of more established and strongly organized parties.

This organizational difference is essential to understand executive excesses under the Fujimori administration. Although Belaúnde and García were also personalistic presidents who were criticized for their unilateral tendencies (Mauceri, 1997; Murakami, 2012: 159), these leaders were still constrained by formal rules and institutions – primarily their own political parties –. This is one of the main findings of Levitt in his analysis of executive-legislative relations during the administrations of García and Fujimori (Levitt, 2012). Levitt convincingly demonstrates that during President García’s first term, his own co-partisans curtailed his most unilateral tendencies.

For instance, in 1987 García embarked on a radical new economic direction when he proposed to nationalize all domestically owned private banks and financial institutions. This proposal caught many APRA leaders by surprise, and many ministers and top bureaucrats resigned in protest. Many APRA legislators also had serious reservations about this measure. The proposal passed in the Chamber of Deputies, but it was stalled in the Senate. Many APRA senators came from the conservative wing of the party and strongly opposed this measure. In the end, the Senate modified the measure in order to protect banking conglomerates from executive abuses. García kept pushing for the measure to be enacted but by mid-1988 the bank nationalization had been modified several times within the legislature. The ambitious nationalization program was only partially implemented, and García respected Supreme Court rulings which declared some aspects of this initiative unconstitutional (Crabtree, 1992; Graham, 1992; Levitt, 2012: 60-62).
Another example is the thwarted reelection bid of Alan García. The APRA leader took advantage of his high approval ratings during his first years in office to push for a constitutional reform that would allow him to run for reelection. However, this initiative failed because García did not obtain the support of the National Executive Council of his own party. APRA’s top politicians in the party and in the legislature refused to endorse this constitutional reform in the party and in the legislature because they were concerned about the long term electoral fate of the party and their own electoral aspirations (Levitt, 2012: 59-60; Reyna, 2000: 84).

This is an important difference between the institutional context faced by Belaúnde and García, and the institutional context faced by Fujimori. In more organized political parties (such as Acción Popular and APRA), congressmen and party members have longer time horizons and are more concerned about the future democratic reputation of their party. Hence, they tend to exert pressure on their respective leaders to keep them within the limits of the rule of law. On the contrary, Cambio 90 was a divided and weakly organized electoral movement. Fujimori exercised a very vertical control over his party. Most Cambio 90 legislators owed all their political capital to their leader and they had no political future without Fujimori. Hence, Cambio 90 was not in a position to constrain Fujimori’s authoritarian tendencies (Levitt, 2012: 156).

6.5.2.4 Popular approval for Fujimori’s authoritarian excesses

The final factor that contributes to executive-legislative confrontation when the president is an outsider is the sociopolitical context of deep disenchantment with Congress and political parties. The lack of trust in political parties may lead to executive excesses against other institutions because the outsider president knows that the public will tolerate (or maybe even reward) these authoritarian abuses. This pattern is very clear in the case of Fujimori. As described in Chapter 2, Fujimori came to power in the midst of a severe economic, political, and
security crisis. The general public was extremely dissatisfied with the way established parties dealt with these crises in the 1980s. Fujimori fed on this disenchantment by repeatedly pointing out the corruption and inefficiency of the partidocracia. This contributed to worsen executive-legislative relations in two different ways.

First, the outsider president was reluctant to enter into open agreements with discredited political parties. Fujimori knew that he was attractive to voters because of his image as an untainted outsider who had no links with corrupt politicians. Hence, Fujimori tried to avoid coalitions with political parties, which greatly compromised interbranch cooperation. In the words of Kenney (2004: 96): “to become wed to what was then the paradigm of all that was wrong in Peru would not have been an attractive option for the new president.”

Second, this context of popular discontent with political parties provided incentives for Fujimori to engage in executive excesses because he knew that the public would side with him rather than with discredited institutions in case of a serious conflict. Several scholars have shown that support for Fujimori increased every time he renewed his attacks on the legislature or other political institutions (Cameron, 1997: 50; Conaghan, 1995: 233-234; Pease García, 1994: 38). At the same time that Fujimori’s popularity increased, polls revealed low approval for Congress (Kenney, 2004: 152). All these polls led Fujimori to believe that authoritarian excesses against Congress would be accepted by the Peruvian population (Conaghan, 2005: 31-32). Víctor Paredes (president of the Chamber of Deputies between 1990 and 1991 and Fujimori advisor) describes Fujimori as “very astute” because he was perfectly aware that attacking legislators and political parties was politically advantageous for him.88

88 Interview with Víctor Paredes, October 2012, Lima, Peru
The best proof of the popular approval for Fujimori’s excesses came on April 5, 1992 when the outsider president illegally dissolved the legislature. Fujimori did not pay a political price for this authoritarian excess (McClintock, 1994). All the polls conducted at the time showed immediate and strong support for the autogolpe. On April 6, all major poll firms measured popular support for the coup. The closure of Congress was approved by more than 70% of the population according to the major three polls firms (Apoyo, Datum, and CPI). Fujimori even used this information as one of the post hoc justifications for the coup (Conaghan, 2005: 33; Levitt, 2012: 68). Popular support for the autogolpe proved durable as well. Two years after the coup, the dissolution of the legislature was still approved by 59% of the population (Lynch, 1999b: 251).

### 6.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter provides evidence that the level of executive-legislative conflict increases when an independent politician holds the presidency. On the one hand, governability is undermined when an outsider is in power. Outsider presidents lack support in the legislative body and also lack the connections and experience necessary to compensate for this situation by building stable coalitions in the legislature. Hence, the day-to-day relations between the two branches of government are negatively affected. Specifically, cooperation between the president and Congress on specific bills becomes rare and the president is more likely to engage in executive excesses, which further increases the confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches. On the other hand, the rise of outsiders has deleterious consequences for democratic stability. The results of the rare events logistic regressions presented above show that the risk of
Congress dissolution attempts is much more likely when the president is an outsider. This is also linked to the situation of institutional paralysis that results from the lack of support for outsiders in the legislature. This result also reflects the calculus made by political outsiders that absolutely need to deliver on some of their promises to survive politically. When their policy agenda is blocked by the opposition in Congress, outsiders are much more likely to attempt to dissolve Congress.

The in-depth analysis of the severe executive-legislative confrontation during the first years of Fujimori served to confirm the main causal mechanisms identified in the theoretical framework. There are four main factors that can explain the greater likelihood of interbranch conflict when the president is an outsider: 1) outsiders are minority presidents, 2) outsiders lack democratic socialization, 3) outsiders are not constrained by strongly organized political parties, and 4) outsiders govern in moments of acute public disenchantment with the congress.
7.0 OUTSIDER PRESIDENTS AND NEOPHYTE MINISTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FUJIMORI CASE

Outsider presidents arrive to power with very few ties with the political class and established parties. They do not have a government team ready to take on the different positions in the cabinet when they are elected. In general, they arrive to power through parties that are little more than electoral vehicles that serve their personal ambitions. In the previous chapter, I mentioned in passing that this situation makes it hard for outsiders to recruit partisan politicians to cabinet positions. This chapter analyzes in more detail how the composition and the work of the cabinet change when the president is an outsider. I do this through an in-depth qualitative analysis of Peruvian cabinets after the return to democratic rule in the country. I focus on the period 1980-1995 which allows me to compare the cabinets of the first administration of an outsider (Fujimori) with the cabinets of the previous presidents (Belaúnde and García) which were leaders of established parties.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I introduce the key theoretical argument linking outsider presidents with inexperienced and non-partisan ministers. Second, I take an in-depth look at the impact of outsiders on cabinet composition with detailed data about ministerial careers in Peru in the period 1980-1995. Finally, I analyze how a more inexperienced and non-partisan group of ministers affected the functioning of the cabinet in Peru during the Fujimori
years. I do so using the extensive qualitative information I collected in Peru, where I interviewed several ministers of the different administrations in the period 1980-1995.

7.1 OUTSIDER PRESIDENTS AND NEOPHYTE MINISTERS: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

7.1.1 Technocratic ministers, multiparty coalitions, and Latin American cabinets

In the past 20 years, numerous scholars have studied the composition and functioning of cabinets in Latin America. Until the mid-nineties, the conventional wisdom held that presidential institutions provided few incentives for presidents to form coalitions, and for opposition parties to join cabinets. In particular, the fixed terms of office in presidential systems were perceived as an important obstacle for coalition formation in Latin America (Linz, 1990; Sartori, 1994; Stepan & Skach, 1993).

The new generation of scholarly work on political institutions in Latin America showed that coalitions were actually common in the region. In her groundbreaking work, Deheza (1997) studied nine Latin American countries between 1958 and 1994, and showed that a majority of governments in this period were coalition governments. Other studies using different datasets also reached similar conclusions regarding the formation of coalition governments under presidentialism (Amorim Neto, 2006; Chasquetti, 2001; Martínez-Gallardo, 2012). Although presidents can survive without a coalition, “they still have incentives to include other parties in the cabinet to ensure a smooth passage of their political agenda through congress” (Martínez-Gallardo, 2012: 64). The central argument of this literature is that presidents use portfolio
allocation as a legislative strategy. Minority presidents attempt to form multiparty cabinets including members from the most represented parties in the legislature in order to govern through the legislature (Amorim Neto, 2002; Chasquetti, 2008).

From the perspective of this literature on coalitional presidentialism, the portfolio allocation strategy of outsider presidents is an anomaly. The argument presented in this chapter goes against the conventional wisdom. Given outsiders’ lack of support in the legislature when they reach office, these traditional works lead us to expect that they will form multiparty coalitions and invite important figures of opposition parties to join their cabinets. I expect exactly the opposite because outsiders lack the political connections and experience required to recruit members from opposition parties, and also because it is politically costly for outsiders to recruit traditional politicians to their cabinets. As a result, outsiders often prefer to invite politically inexperienced individuals (with a varying level of technocratic expertise) to occupy ministerial positions.

Of course, this is not the first study to analyze the rise of independent and politically inexperienced ministers in Latin America. There is a large literature on technocratic ministers in the region (Conaghan, 1998; Domínguez, 1997; Silva, 2009). Technocrats can be defined as “individuals with a high level of specialized academic training which serves as a principal criterion on the basis of which they are selected to occupy key decision-making or advisory roles in large complex organizations – both public and private” (Collier, 1979: 403). The appointment of technocratic ministers by several Latin American presidents is closely associated with the implementation of neoliberal policies after the democratic transitions. Presidents often recruited technocratic ministers who were ideologically committed to neoliberalism and had the technical

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89 For a detailed review of the literature on technocratic politics in Latin America, see Estrada Álvarez & Puello-Socarrás (2005).
expertise to manage complex structural adjustment programs in the midst of severe economic crises (Conaghan, 1998; Conaghan, Malloy, & Abugattas, 1990). The appointment of technocratic ministers to manage economic policies was also used by presidents during economic downturns to restore the investment climate (Schneider, 1998). The recruitment of “experts” in ministries with responsibility over economic policy is also common in the parliamentary systems in Western Europe (Blondel & Thiebault, 1991; Dowding & Dumont, 2009; Larrson, 1993). This literature provides important clues to understand the recruitment of several technocrats under Fujimori to implement neoliberal economic policies. Fujimori campaigned in 1990 promising an alternative to structural adjustment programs; but implemented very different policies when he reached office. Given the severe economic crisis facing Peru and the technical skills required to implement neoliberal reforms, Fujimori chose to appoint a series of experts to steer economic policies. However, the literature on technocratic politics cannot fully explain the ministerial appointment choices made by outsider presidents. Fujimori recruited neophyte ministers to occupy a wide array of cabinet positions (not only ministries with direct—or indirect—responsibility over economic policies). Moreover, a large number of non-partisan ministers recruited by this outsider president did not have a high level of technocratic expertise. Many cabinet members under Fujimori were public servants or worked in the private sector, but they were not technocrats if we accept Collier’s definition above. In fact, the literature on cabinets and ministers has tended to overlook other non-partisan profiles (beyond technocrats or “technopols”).

Furthermore, the recruitment of technocrats and other non-partisan ministers extended well beyond the period of severe economic crisis faced by the Fujimori administration in the early 1990s.

90 For an exception, see Martinez-Gallardo & Schleiter (2013).
Hence, the existing literature cannot fully explain the decision of Fujimori and other outsider presidents to appoint politically inexperienced individuals to their cabinets. Both the literature on coalitional presidentialism and the literature on technocratic ministers fall short of explaining this widespread pattern. I argue that the recruitment of neophyte ministers when the president is an outsider can be explained from two different perspectives.\textsuperscript{91} First, it is associated with a \textit{lack of political experience and political socialization}. This political inexperience reduces the willingness of outsiders to build consensus and negotiate with other political forces. Inexperienced politicians may also lack the political resources necessary to recruit politicians from other political parties. Second, this pattern can be understood as a \textit{political strategy} that outsiders use to distance themselves from a discredited political class. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are complementary and I analyze them separately solely for heuristic purposes.

\subsection*{7.1.2 Lack of political experience}

By definition, outsiders are political amateurs who do not have ties with established political parties. This characteristic has a strong impact on the governing style of outsiders. Political parties have a key role in the recruitment and socialization of democratic political elites (Key, 1942). According to Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 4), political parties “provide the foundation for a democratic political class.” Even when they have experienced serious political conflicts during their career, party leaders tend to be imbued with a democratic political culture. Traditional politicians know perfectly well that political decisions often require difficult decisions.

\textsuperscript{91} The theoretical framework in this chapter also builds on the general theoretical framework introduced in chapter 2.
negotiations in which all the actors make concessions. These negotiations occur both within and between political parties. Party politicians become socialized with a series of implicit rules that govern the democratic game. They accept that elections can be lost and that policy proposals can be defeated if the majority so decides. On the contrary, outsiders are political amateurs who lack this democratic socialization within established political parties and, in some cases, do not have a commitment to democratic institutions. Levitsky and Cameron (2003: 5) point out that outsiders are less likely than insiders “to have experience with (and be oriented toward) democratic practices such as negotiation, compromise, and coalition building.”

This lack of democratic political socialization leads outsiders to have a more direct and aggressive style that sometimes rejects opportunities to negotiate with other political forces. This is reflected in the lack of willingness of outsiders to recruit ministers that belong to other political parties. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, outsiders tend to arrive to power with weak parties which are often nothing more than the electoral vehicle they create to compete in the presidential elections. However, once they are elected they face the opposition of traditional parties in congress. In general, presidents who find themselves in a minority situation in parliament try to negotiate with other parties to form political alliances. As part of these deals, presidents tend to include members from other parties in the cabinet in exchange for support for the initiatives of the president in the parliament (Amorim Neto, 2006; Zelaznik, 2001). Outsiders, however, prefer cabinets composed by individuals without experience in politics or public administration –independent technocrats and individuals in their personal networks of support– (Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008).

Political inexperience affects not only the willingness, but also the capacity to carry on successful political negotiations at the highest level with leaders of other parties. Even if
outsiders try at some point to recruit members from other parties in their cabinets in order to obtain support in parliament, they often fail because they lack the necessary resources and experience to carry on these negotiations successfully. Rospigliosi similarly argues that negotiating and building consensus in Congress requires “lots of skills and experience” which outsiders lack (Caretas, May 7, 1990). The leaders of established parties tend to be very able negotiators because they are used to seeking agreements with other political forces and with other factions within their own parties. Career politicians know the modus operandi of inter-party negotiations and know when to make concessions to reach an agreement. Outsiders do not have such experience and often commit serious mistakes at key moments that condemn their attempts to recruit experienced politicians to their cabinets to failure.

7.1.3 Political strategy

In addition to the lack of willingness and capacity to form partisan cabinets, there is another fundamental cause that has to do with the political and electoral strategy of outsider presidents. As has been shown in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation, the election of outsiders tends to happen in moments of deep economic and sociopolitical crisis when citizens are disenchanted with established political parties. This context of deep economic and sociopolitical crisis, as well as the disenchantment of citizens with political parties, paves the way for several executive excesses against discredited political parties. Outsiders tend to use an aggressive rhetoric against the political class and political parties, accusing them of being the main cause of all the country’s problems. This defiant attitude towards political parties produces high political and electoral returns to outsiders,
as can be inferred from the high approval rates and the easy re-election of outsiders who chose this path.

This strategy of confrontation with the political class has clear consequences for the composition of the cabinet. Since outsiders choose an aggressive style and harshly criticize political parties, they cannot then recruit members of these parties to the cabinet. On the one hand, career politicians may choose not to collaborate with an outsider who attacks them publicly. On the other hand, outsiders prefer not to recruit individuals affiliated with traditional political parties in order to maintain a clear anti-politics stance that produces political and electoral benefits for them.

7.2 THE CABINETS OF FUJIMORI

I analyze the impact of outsider presidents on the composition and the functioning of the cabinet by conducting an in-depth analysis of the cabinets of Fujimori, which are systematically compared to the cabinets of the two presidents who preceded Fujimori in office (Belaúnde and García).

7.2.1 Descriptive statistics: the cabinets and ministers of Fujimori

The best way to understand the specificity of the cabinets of Fujimori (an outsider) is to compare their composition with the composition of the cabinets of the two predecessors of Fujimori in the presidency who were career politicians: Fernando Belaúnde and Alan García. These two men arrived to power as leaders of established political parties. Belaúnde was the historic leader of
Acción Popular (a center-right party) and arrived to the presidency by winning the first democratic elections since the return of democratic rule to Peru in the late 1970s. He governed Peru between 1980 and 1985. García took the reins of APRA—a center-left party with a long trajectory in the Peruvian political life—after the death of the historic leader of the party (Haya de la Torre). He won the presidential elections in 1985 and governed between 1985 and 1990.

In order to conduct this comparative analysis, I elaborated a database on Peruvian ministers in the period 1980-1995. Using the SEDEPE codebook and a recent codebook about cabinets in presidential systems (Camerlo & Pérez-Liñán, 2012), I collected detailed biographical information about each of the ministers of the cabinets of Belaúnde, García, and the first Fujimori administration. The database includes information about the age, the level of education, the professional experience, and the political career different ministers had before arriving to the cabinet. I obtained these data consulting the newspaper archives of the National Library of Peru and other specialized libraries such as the library of the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP). Moreover, two books were particularly useful to collect data on the ministers of Belaúnde (García Belaúnde, 1988) and the ministers of García (García Belaúnde, 2011).

Table 7.1 presents some descriptive statistics that show the previous political experience and the partisan affiliation of cabinet members of the different Peruvian administrations in the period between 1980 and 1995. First, the table shows the percentage of ministers in the different administrations that were affiliated with a political party, either as simple members, as members of the party executive, or as party leaders. Second, the table shows the percentage of ministers in

92 Belaúnde had already been president of Peru between 1963 and 1968, when his constitutional mandate was interrupted by a military coup.
93 SEDEPE (Selection and Deselection of Political Elites) is a network of researchers that studies the selection and deselection of ministers in different political systems. This network elaborated a codebook to facilitate the collection and exchange of data between scholars (Dowding & Dumont, 2009). The codebook is available on the SEDEPE website: http://sedepe.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/SEDEPE_Codebook_Jan2010.pdf.
each administration that had parliamentary experience before becoming cabinet members. In this percentage are included all ministers that had been senators, deputies, or members of a local legislature before arriving to the cabinet.

Table 7.1. Legislative experience and partisan affiliation of ministers in Peru (1980-1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage of ministers with partisan affiliation</th>
<th>Percentage of ministers with legislative experience</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Belaúnde 1980-1985</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan García 1985-1990</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberto Fujimori 1990-1995</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table clearly shows a striking difference between the cabinets formed by career politicians (Belaúnde and García) and the cabinets formed by an outsider (Fujimori) in what concerns the partisan affiliation of the ministers. The vast majority of ministers in the cabinets of Belaúnde and García naturally belonged to the parties of these two presidents (Acción Popular and APRA respectively). This was mainly due to reasons of programmatic and ideological affinity. The members of a political family tend to have similar goals and ideas, and defend a common program. The recruitment of ministers from the president’s party also responds to political reasons. Both Belaúnde and García took into consideration the internal divisions within their own parties in their appointments, and sought to give satisfaction to the different groups or factions. Moreover, Belaúnde and García negotiated political alliances with other parties. These alliances insured support from smaller parties for the presidents’ policies in parliament, in exchange for the appointment of some members of these parties in the cabinet. Belaúnde formed

94 Interview with José Carlos Requena, November 2012, Lima
an alliance with the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC). Acción Popular had a majority in the Chamber of Deputies but not in the Senate. The agreement with PPC insured support for Belaúnde’s program in exchange for two positions in the cabinet for the PPC (ministry of justice and ministry of industry). This agreement only broke when the 1985 elections approached.\textsuperscript{95} In a similar vein, APRA negotiated an alliance with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) when García arrived to power in 1985. This alliance was not essential for governability because APRA had absolute majority in both chambers of parliament. But the newly elected leader (García) wanted to make clear that he was open to collaboration with other political forces. This political agreement gave one position in the cabinet to the PDC during García’s administration (first the ministry of labor and then the ministry of justice).\textsuperscript{96}

The case of Fujimori is radically different. Only 16.6% of Fujimori’s ministers had a partisan affiliation before joining the cabinet. As mentioned above, most ministers in the cabinets of Belaúnde and García came from their own parties. On the contrary, Fujimori appointed very few ministers from his own party. Cambio 90 was little more than an electoral vehicle for Fujimori and had no experienced political cadres to take on these positions. At its origins, the members of Cambio 90 were scattered in four different groups: 1) the “molineros” (a group of individuals that were close to Fujimori when he acted as rector of the Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina), 2) the evangelicals (a group of activists in the evangelical community who helped organize the 1990 presidential campaign), 3) the small businessmen, and 4) members of Fujimori’s family and persons in Fujimori’s personal network of support in the Japanese community in Lima (Degregori & Meléndez, 2007: 23-29). These diverse support groups considerably helped Fujimori during the presidential campaign and members of these four

\textsuperscript{95} Interview with Lourdes Flores Nano, November 2012, Lima
\textsuperscript{96} Interview with Grover Pango, December 2012, Lima
groups were elected to the parliament representing *Cambio* 90. But these individuals had very little experience in politics or public administration. Given the severe economic and security crises that Peru was facing when Fujimori arrived to power, Fujimori opted for a group of independent technocrats rather than appointing inexperienced individuals from his party. This tendency was maintained during the whole Fujimori administration, with some rare exceptions such as Víctor Paredes (minister of health between 1991 and 1993) and Jaime Yoshiyama (who occupied different cabinet positions between 1991 and 1997). For reasons that will be analyzed below, Fujimori also failed to incorporate members of other political parties to his cabinet through broad agreements or political alliances. The few ministers that were affiliated to other parties entered the cabinet in their individual capacity and not as representatives of their parties. In many cases, these individuals received pressure from their parties not to accept a cabinet position or to leave the cabinet if they had already accepted the position. For instance, Félix Canal (an APRA militant), accepted a position in the cabinet as minister of fisheries in 1991 in spite of the strong pressures from his party to dissuade him.\(^7\) In the same vein, Gloria Helfer (minister of education in the first Fujimori cabinet) received constant pressures from the militants of her party (*Izquierda Unida*) pushing her to abandon her position in the cabinet.\(^8\)

Another clear difference between the ministers of Fujimori and the ministers of the presidents who preceded him has to do with the political experience acquired in the parliament. More than a third of cabinet members in the Belaúnde and García administrations had been deputies or senators before becoming ministers. In other words, a large sub-group of Belaúnde and García ministers were actively engaged in politics and had a distinct political trajectory

\(^7\) Interview with Félix Canal, November 2012, Lima
\(^8\) Interview with Gloria Helfer, November 2012, Lima
before being recruited in these presidents’ cabinets. On the contrary, only a very small minority of Fujimori ministers in the period 1990-1995 (8.3%) had some form of legislative experience. Only five cabinet members had legislative experience, and two of those had acquired this experience as members of a local legislature. The vast majority of Fujimori ministers were political neophytes when they were appointed to the cabinet.

So far, this section has shown that most Fujimori ministers had no partisan affiliation and very little political experience when they joined the cabinet. Now, I would like to present some descriptive statistics that show the typical profile of Fujimori ministers. Figure 7.1 shows the professional sector in which Fujimori ministers worked before being recruited into the cabinet. The figure shows the percentage of ministers that came from the political arena (deputies or senators), the military, the public sector, and the private sector.

![Figure 7.1. Sector of origin of Fujimori ministers](image)

99 The differences in the table may actually understated the differences that existed between the ministers of Fujimori and the ministers of the presidents who preceded him. In fact, many other ministers in the Belaúnde and García administrations had tried to become legislators but had been defeated in the elections. Hence, there were more politically experienced ministers in the Belaúnde and García administrations than the table suggests.
The figure clearly shows that very few ministers were career politicians. Only 6.3% of cabinet members (four ministers) came from the political arena. These are ministers that were recruited when they occupied positions in the parliament as deputies or as members of the Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD).\(^{100}\) A relatively important proportion of ministers (14.1%) came from the military. All defense ministers came from the military sector, but Fujimori also appointed some military men to occupy other positions in his cabinets.\(^{101}\) Close to a third of the members of Fujimori’s cabinets came from the public sector. Among these ministers, there were two main profiles. First, there was a group of technocrats that had acquired experience in public administration. Second, there was a group of academics or physicians who had specialized knowledge linked to the ministry they were called to head. Finally, the majority of Fujimori ministers came from the private sector. These individuals were professionals with experience in the private sector in a diverse array of positions (businessmen, engineers, lawyers, etc.). The vast majority of ministers in the economic area in the first Fujimori administration (ministers of economy, ministers of industry, and ministers of housing) came from the private sector. In sum, almost 80% of the ministers of Fujimori were professionals, originating either in the public or in the private sector, who did not have previous experience in politics. Most of them were also politically independent.

It is also interesting to analyze the activity of ministers after occupying a position in Fujimori’s cabinet. Figure 7.2 shows the main activity of cabinet members in Fujimori’s administration once they abandoned their positions.

\(^{100}\) It is even exaggerated to consider that these ministers came from the political arena because in fact they had a very limited political experience as legislators of Cambio 90. None of these four individuals were career politicians.\(^{101}\) For example, he appointed a retired admiral (Raúl Sánchez Sotomayor) as minister of fisheries in his first cabinet.
The figure shows that only a third of the ministers continued to be engaged in politics after they left their positions in the cabinet. Nineteen percent of the members of Fujimori’s cabinets occupied legislative positions after their ministerial jobs. A smaller number (12% of ministers) went on to occupy other positions in Fujimori’s government. Some of the neophyte ministers used the notoriety that they gained by joining the cabinet to start a political career. Such is the case of Jaime Yoshiyama Tanaka, an engineer who occupied two cabinet positions between 1991 and 1992 (ministry of transportation and communication, and ministry of energy). Then, he was elected to occupy a seat in the CCD and subsequently became the president of that legislative body. But the most important information revealed by Figure 7.2 is that almost 70% of the individuals that occupied cabinet positions during Fujimori’s administration went back to occupy professional roles (both in the public sector and in the private sector) and quickly abandoned all forms of political engagement.

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Figure 7.2. Main professional sector of ministers after leaving the cabinet

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102 For example, some ministers occupied diplomatic positions or became political advisors.
In sum, this section clearly shows that the vast majority of ministers during Fujimori’s administration were technocrats or professionals with a specialized training, but with very little political experience. They came mostly from the private sector, but there were also many cabinet members who had worked in the public sector. In general, these ministers had a very brief political involvement and went back to their professional activities (public or private) as soon as they left their positions in Fujimori’s cabinet.

7.3 NEOPHYTE AND INDEPENDENT MINISTERS: CAUSES

The previous section clearly demonstrates that the composition of cabinets radically changed with the arrival to power of Fujimori. The cabinets of the 1980s were formed by individuals affiliated with political parties, and a large number of them also had political experience (especially legislative experience) before arriving to the cabinet. Fujimori cabinets were composed of political neophytes who often had some technical expertise acquired in the public or in the private sector. In this section, I will analyze the main reasons for these differences in the Peruvian case. For this purpose, I will go back to the theoretical framework presented above.

7.3.1 Lack of political experience

The main reason that explains the lack of experienced and partisan ministers in the cabinets of Fujimori is the lack of political experience and political socialization of Fujimori, which reduced his willingness to negotiate with other political forces and generate consensus.
Fujimori favored a managerial approach of government to try to bring solutions to the problems Peru was facing. According to the vision of Fujimori, it was necessary to leave behind the petty interests of bureaucrats and politicians, who were portrayed as selfish, corrupt, and inefficient. Fujimorismo had a clear disdain for deliberation and the creation of consensus within political institutions. The “politics of anti-politics” – as Fujimori himself often described this vision – considered that governing was equal to an efficient management of public affairs by a team of technocrats and specialists. There was no space for negotiation or deliberation, because the focus was set on attaining a series of pre-established goals (Conaghan, 2005; Degregori, 2000; Lynch, 2000). This vision of democracy was defended by Fujimori in an interview in the Houston Chronicle: “We want a democracy that is more efficient, that resolves our problems. Democracy is the will of the people—good administration, honesty, results. They don’t want speeches, or to be deceived by images” (cited in Conaghan, 2005: 3).

This technocratic and managerial view of politics certainly had an impact on cabinet composition. Presidents who find themselves in a minority situation in parliament tend to seek an alliance or coalition with other political forces to facilitate the legislative work and the implementation of their programs (Cheibub et al., 2004; Negretto, 2006; Zelaznik, 2001). The easiest way to form these coalitions is to distribute some positions in the cabinet to the parties that accept to support the program of the president in the parliament. This often leads to an increase in the proportion of ministers who have political experience and a clear partisan affiliation when the president is in a minority situation in parliament (Amorim Neto, 2006). As was analyzed in the previous chapter, Fujimori faced a clear minority situation in the chamber of deputies, since Cambio 90 only obtained 18% of the seats in that body in 1990 elections.

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103 This was visible not only in the relations of Fujimori with his ministers, but also in the relations of the executive with other institutions such as parliament, the judiciary, and the media (Conaghan, 2005; Kenney, 2004).
However, he reacted very differently from what the comparative politics literature predicts. Instead of trying to create a government team with members of established political parties with a strong presence in parliament, Fujimori selected his ministers one by one following purely technical criteria. The leftist politician and academic Henry Pease points out that Fujimori segmented the relation with the individuals working in his administration, and preferred a vertical relation between him and his ministers. This vision lent itself more to the appointment of apolitical ministers, rather than partisan ministers who had an independent basis of political support. Even when Fujimori recruited ministers affiliated with traditional political parties, he took into consideration the individuals characteristics of these persons rather than the parties to which they belonged. Bowen (2000: 258) goes even further and argues that Fujimori saw himself as a general manager administering a team of employees –his ministers–.

The lack of political willingness of Fujimori to incorporate politically experienced individuals with a partisan affiliation to his cabinet partly explains why the Peruvian cabinets in the 1990s were so apolitical. However, there were certain moments –especially during his first years in office– in which Fujimori tried to recruit some experienced politicians to his cabinet, but these attempts invariably failed. This failure is associated with the lack of political skills of Fujimori. The formation of the first cabinet by Fujimori can be considered a “critical juncture” that influenced the composition of the executive branch during the whole Fujimori administration. Fujimori arrived to power without a government team and for some time he seemed disposed to reach out to traditional parties and include representatives from various political forces in his cabinet. In fact, a few days after being elected president, Fujimori declared

104 Interview with Henry Pease, October 2012, Lima
105 A critical juncture is a contingent decision that establishes a path of institutional development that is difficult to revert later on (Thelen, 1999).
that he was interested in recruiting talents from different political parties (*La República*, July 15, 1990). However, in these key weeks Fujimori committed several mistakes that revealed his political amateurism and led to a cabinet formed mostly by technocrats and professionals from the private and public sectors. First, he irritated many party leaders because he tried to negotiate directly with some individuals affiliated with established political parties without negotiating with party chiefs first, which is the normal *modus operandi* when a president seeks collaboration with other parties. For instance, one of the leaders of FREDEMO (Javier Silva Ruete) pointed out in July of 1990 that “the normal procedure is to call the chiefs of the political parties with which collaboration is sought (…). In this case, there were contacts with certain persons belonging to political parties (…). But there was nothing clear” (*Caretas*, July 9, 1990). Similarly, an op-ed piece of the newspaper *El Comercio* pointed out that several politicians “considered that the procedure used [to form the cabinet] was inadequate, because the recruitment of partisan ministers should have been negotiated with the competent organs of the political parties to which they belong.” As a result, several party leaders outright rejected any form of political agreement with Fujimori, and gave orders to the members of their parties forbidding the participation in the cabinets of Fujimori. The most paradigmatic example is *Acción Popular*. The party leader (Fernando Belaúnde) was infuriated by the attempt of Fujimori to recruit members of *Acción Popular* without negotiating directly with him. This closed the door of Fujimori’s cabinet to some members of *Acción Popular* who rejected a position in the cabinet out of party discipline. The prime minister in the first Fujimori cabinet (Hurtado Miller) had to resign from *Acción Popular* to take on this position, which clearly shows that this appointment was not the result of an agreement among party leaders.
Fujimori also failed when he tried to negotiate with political heavyweights to incorporate them into the cabinet. For instance, Fujimori met with Henry Pease (leader of the main leftist party –Izquierda Unida–) when he was designing his first cabinet in July 1990 to offer him the ministry of education. The recruitment of Pease would have meant an important support for a political neophyte like Fujimori. But the president elect Fujimori did not have any experience in this type of negotiations. Pease was expecting a political and programmatic agreement but Fujimori did not give him any specific detail about the program he wanted to implement. In Pease’s own words, Fujimori “was complete improvisation and had no idea of where he was going. (...) He called people to appoint them to his cabinet but he did not tell them where the ship he was inviting them to embark was going.” 106

7.3.2 Political strategy

Finally, there are a series of “political strategy” factors that help understand the reluctance of Fujimori to incorporate experienced and partisan individuals to his cabinet. As already mentioned, Fujimori arrived to power in the midst of a serious economic and sociopolitical crisis. This dramatic situation resulted (at least partially) from the failure of the economic and security policies adopted by traditional parties after the return to democratic rule. Established political parties were greatly discredited in Peru in the early 1990s (Rospigliosi, 1994). Fujimori was perfectly aware of the dissatisfaction of the citizenry with political parties. In fact, he stirred this disenchantment even further with relentless attacks on the political class and political parties. During his administration, Fujimori criticized in countless occasions the traditional politicians

106 Interview with Henry Pease, October 2012, Lima
and the political parties, which he described as corrupt and inefficient. This defiant attitude produced great political benefits for the president. The citizenry clearly supported Fujimori in this confrontation between the president and traditional parties. In December 1991, Fujimori had a very high approval rate –95%– whereas the congress had an extremely low approval rate –8%– (Kenney, 2004).

Even though Fujimori tried to incorporate some representatives of established political parties to his cabinet during his first months in office, he quickly switched to a confrontation strategy. This conflictive relationship with the political class did not allow him to recruit ministers with a recognized political and partisan profile. The citizenry would not have understood if Fujimori had harshly criticized the inefficiency of political parties and the corruption of legislators, only to form later a cabinet composed by members of the traditional political class. On the other hand, political parties were also irritated by the strategy of confrontation chosen by Fujimori. This led them to reject any possibility of institutional collaboration with Fujimori through a stable presence in the cabinet. The mutual distrust between the president and the parties, and the confrontation path chosen by Fujimori naturally led to a cabinet composed mainly by independent technocrats.

A final factor to be considered is that outsiders arrive to power with a very limited political capital. When he arrived to power, Fujimori was a political novice who did not have a significant political capital. Several ministers I interviewed pointed out that this lack of political capital and political experience made Fujimori very distrustful and suspicious of cabinet members working alongside him. This also contributes to explaining why Fujimori did not call many experienced politicians to participate in his cabinet. In the words of a close advisor to Fujimori (Víctor Paredes), “Fujimori was afraid that someone could use a cabinet position to
confront him”107 If Fujimori had recruited experienced politicians into the cabinet, these individuals could have used this space to challenge the neophyte president. For the same reason, Fujimori preferred to trust in independent technocrats rather than recruiting prominent members of his own party, who could have used that position to try to challenge Fujimori’s leadership in the Cambio 90 movement.

7.4 NEOPHYTE AND INDEPENDENT MINISTERS: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CABINET

The previous sections analyzed the causes of the recruitment of politically inexperienced and non-partisan ministers when the president is an outsider. In this section, I will analyze the consequences of this pattern for the functioning of the cabinet and for the relationship between the president and his ministers.

The first consequence of having a cabinet composed by individuals who are political neophytes is a loss of ministerial autonomy. When ministers have acquired an important political status and have their own political capital, presidents are almost obliged to grant them a certain autonomy in their ministerial work. On the contrary, ministers who are complete political neophytes owe all their political capital to the president who appoints them. The difference between the insider presidents (Belaúnde and García) and the outsider president (Fujimori) is very clear in this respect. Belaúnde and García represented established parties that held presidents accountable and sometimes vocally opposed the positions taken by the party leaders.

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107 Interview with Víctor Paredes, November 2012, Lima
(Bowen, 2000: 209). These presidents respected the autonomy of the ministers who represented different tendencies within the parties they headed because they wanted to maintain a fragile internal equilibrium. Belaúnde was extremely respectful of the activity of his ministers, both the ones belonging to his own party (Acción Popular) and the ones belonging to PPC. For instance, a minister of fisheries during the Belaúnde administration points out that the leader of Acción Popular let his ministers work autonomously. Belaúnde gave the broad orientations but he also gave his cabinet members important latitude to decide the specific policies necessary to achieve these general goals. Although García is sometimes accused of governing in a direct fashion and not always respecting the investiture of his ministers, the leader of APRA was very much aware of the equilibrium of forces within his party. Hence, he gave many positions in the cabinet to individuals representing the different tendencies within the party. The APRA leader respected the most prominent figures of the party such as Luis Alberto Sánchez or Armando Villanueva who were offered important ministries during the García administration. These historic leaders of Aprismo had a consolidated political capital, and president García was obliged to reserve them a sphere of power and to respect their autonomy.

On the contrary, the vast majority of Fujimori ministers did not have any political capital. Hence, they were more easily malleable by the outsider president. This is patent in the justification that Fujimori gave to one of his advisors (De Soto) for the appointment of Hurtado Miller as prime minister in his first cabinet. De Soto recalls Fujimori saying that “Hurtado does not have anywhere else to go; therefore he is my man”, and De Soto further pointed out that Fujimori “is afraid that if you arrive to the cabinet with a team, this team will respond to you and

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108 Interviews with Alberto Musso and Lourdes Flores Nano, November 2012, Lima
109 Interview with Fortunato Quesada Lagarrigue, November 2012, Lima
110 Interview with Grover Pango, December 2012, Lima
not to him; but if the man is isolated, Fujimori is his only source of survival (cited in Bowen, 2000: 37). In the same vein, the main advisor of Fujimori during his first years in office points out that Fujimori was aware that he was the boss, and he did not let anyone escape from the direction he established. For instance, the inclusion of leftist activists in the first cabinet did not reflect a political agreement that would entail certain autonomy for these individuals. On the contrary, what Fujimori sought was to co-opt prominent individuals who could oppose his neoliberal policies and threaten his political survival but without giving a real space of autonomous power to these leftist activists.111 In any case, these ministers with a clear political profile were in the cabinet for a very short time during the first months of the Fujimori administration. As soon as these leftist militants abandoned their ministerial positions, the cabinet was formed by more subservient technocrat ministers with a low profile (Conaghan, 2005: 25-26).

The essential attribute demanded from the new ministers was absolute loyalty. Fujimori could accept inefficiency from his ministers, but never a betrayal. Given this reality, ministers often preferred not to speak to the press because they were afraid of saying something that Fujimori would not like (Bowen, 2000: 40, 362). According to Gloria Helfer (minister of education in the first Fujimori cabinet), the president limited the autonomy of his ministers by giving extremely precise orders to his cabinet members. Fujimori did not give any leeway or flexibility to his ministers in the implementation of the policies he decided.112

A very common practice used by Fujimori to control his ministers was the appointment by the president of the vice-ministers. While the ministers in the different ministries regularly changed, Fujimori kept in place the vice-ministers and these individuals directly responded to

111 Interview with Víctor Paredes, November 2012, Lima
112 Interview with Gloria Helfer, November 2012, Lima
Fujimori. Félix Canal (minister of fisheries in 1991) affirms that Fujimori tried to control his decisions through the vice-minister. Canal points out that the vice-minister once bluntly told him that “whatever you are going to decide, I have to see it first”. Canal aspired to have a more decisive and autonomous role, and he resigned only six months after his appointment in the wake of several disagreements with Fujimori. Carlos Amat y León (minister of agriculture in the first Fujimori cabinet) went through a similar experience. A few months after his appointment, Fujimori tried to change the staff of the ministry of agriculture and to impose a vice-minister that the minister had not approved. Amat y León quickly resigned because he considered that ministers had an excessively subordinate role in the Fujimori government (Kenney, 2004: 135-136). Neophyte ministers were to a certain extent obliged to work with their vice-ministers. Since many Fujimori ministers had no previous experience in politics or in public administration, there were many things that they ignored when they arrived to the ministry. This reality allowed Fujimori to limit the autonomy of his ministers by tightly controlling the vice-ministers. Some ministers of Fujimori have a more nuanced view of the margin of autonomy that ministers had under Fujimori. Although they recognize that Fujimori gave very precise orders and controlled some of his ministers through vice-ministers or other officials in the ministries, they also point out that Fujimori let ministers work more freely if he trusted them and if he perceived that they were trustworthy. All things considered, however, it is clear that the ministers of Fujimori had little autonomy in their decisions, and their lack of individual political capital often led them to be simple executers of a political line dictated by the president.

113 Interview with Lourdes Flores Nano, November 2012, Lima
114 Interview with Félix Canal Torres, November 2012, Lima
115 Interview with Carlos Amat y León, December 2012, Lima
116 Interview with Gustavo Caillaux, November 2012, Lima
117 Interview with Alfonso de los Heros, November 2012, Lima
Another consequence of the appointment of technocrat and independent ministers is a greater difficulty for the cabinet to work as a team. A cabinet is much more than the sum of its parts. A good collaboration and coordination between the different ministries is essential because there are many public policies that require many different ministries to work together. The coordination between ministers is more complicated when they have different professional backgrounds and they do not have any political experience. On the contrary, when most ministers belong to the same political family and know each other from past political activities, it is easier to achieve collaboration. From a purely institutional point of view, little changed between the governments of the 1980s and the Fujimori administration in what concerns the organs of ministerial coordination. Once a week, there was a council of ministers under the direction of the president. Moreover, there were additional informal weekly meetings where certain ministers discussed the issues that would be debated in the council of ministers.\textsuperscript{118} Fujimori did not dismantle these institutions, but they became less relevant during his administration. Víctor Paredes points out that Fujimori preferred a direct relationship with each minister, and councils of ministers were held less regularly –only when Fujimori considered it necessary–.\textsuperscript{119, 120}

Above and beyond this institutional dimension, several pieces of evidence show that Fujimori cabinets tended to work in a more atomized fashion. Fujimori favored a direct relationship between the president and the ministers with little deliberation between the different

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[118] Not all ministers attended these meetings. In general, only ministers that had a specific interest in the topics that would be discussed in the council of ministers at the end of the week attended the preparatory meetings. Ministers with a military background almost never participated in these meetings.
\item[119] Interview with Víctor Paredes, November 2012, Lima
\item[120] Unfortunately, there are no official statistics corroborating that the councils of ministers were held less frequently under Fujimori, but the information comes from a source very close to Fujimori (Víctor Paredes).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
members of cabinet (Conaghan, 2005: 4). As already mentioned, ministers were considered by Fujimori as managers that had to execute the decisions taken by the president. One of the ministers of justice of Fujimori points out that Fujimori did not want the councils of ministers to become long debates between the different cabinet members. By keeping these meetings short, Fujimori minimized the possibility of collaboration between ministries.\footnote{121} The testimony of Félix Canal (minister of fisheries in 1991) is very revealing. According to this minister of Fujimori, “each minister spoke individually with the president and there was no ‘team work’. (...) Everything was very divided”. Canal mentions the example of an industrial development complex that was ripped to pieces between different ministries. Each ministry claimed a part of the project for itself without collaborating with the other ministries. This lack of coordination led to the failure of the project soon afterwards. The reasons put forward by this minister to explain this lack of coordination are also interesting. Canal mentions that “Fujimori was not a leader of an established party who appoints a team of people that know each other to the cabinet. The individuals in the cabinets of Fujimori came from different professional backgrounds and did not know each other before occupying their positions. This led to several disagreements between ministries because there was no trust between the different cabinet members.”

The lack of “team work” is also evident in the fact that many ministers in the Fujimori cabinet were very surprised by some of the key decisions of the Fujimori administration, which clearly shows that these decisions were not deliberated in the cabinet. For instance, Gloria Helfer mentions that many leftist ministers did not know anything about the neoliberal shock that was implemented by Fujimori, and that they found out about it just a few hours before it was

\footnote{121} Interview with Sandro Fuentes Acurio, November 2012, Lima
announced to the public.\textsuperscript{122} Similarly, the prime minister de los Heros was surprised by the self-coup of Fujimori in April 1992. When this authoritarian excess was committed, de los Heros had reached a difficult agreement with the Congress regarding the measures that Fujimori proposed to fight against terrorism in Peru. Fujimori had approved this attempt to overcome the executive-legislative gridlock, but took de los Heros (and the other cabinet members) by surprise when he decided to dissolve the legislature soon after the agreement was reached.\textsuperscript{123} As a result of this decision, many ministers (including prime minister de los Heros) decided to immediately abandon the cabinet.

7.5 CONCLUSION

The last two chapters of this dissertation have analyzed the deleterious consequences of the election of outsiders for democratic governability and institutional performance. While the previous chapter showed the impact of outsiders on executive-legislative relations, this chapter suggests –through an in-depth analysis of the case of Fujimori– that outsider presidents also influence the internal work of the executive branch.

Outsider presidents reach office with very little connections with established parties and experienced politicians. More importantly, they lack the kind of political experience and democratic socialization that would help them to build these connections and to reach difficult agreements with the leaders of established parties. Hence, outsider presidents tend to offer

\textsuperscript{122} Interview with Gloria Helfer, November 2012, Lima
\textsuperscript{123} Interview with Alfonso de los Heros, November 2012, Lima
ministerial positions to professionals with no political experience, rather than to career politicians.

This tendency of outsider presidents to recruit neophyte ministers has important consequences for democratic governability and for the functioning of the cabinet. Executive-legislative relations are more conflictive as a result of the incapacity of outsider presidents to recruit partisan ministers belonging to the more represented parties in the legislature (see Chapter 6). Moreover, cabinets formed by apolitical individuals tend to work in a more atomized fashion since the group of ministers does not share a political socialization within one or a few political parties before arriving to the cabinet. Finally, politically inexperienced ministers are more easily dominated by the president because they lack an independent source of political capital and prestige, and they owe their cabinet position exclusively to the president.
The rise of outsider politicians to top executive positions is a priori surprising. University chancellors or provosts have long academic careers before reaching a top administrative position. The chief executive officers (CEOs) of large corporations also tend to have long careers in business administration before occupying senior corporate positions. Empowering someone with no academic expertise to lead a university or an individual without business experience to lead an important corporation carries considerable and obvious risks. In the political arena, however, outsider candidates with no (or very limited) political experience sometimes manage to reach high-level positions in the administration. This phenomenon has been particularly prevalent in Latin America, where eight outsider candidates were elected presidents since the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization and many other outsider candidates obtained very high scores in presidential races. This dissertation has attempted to show (1) which are the main determinants of the rise of outsider politicians in national elections (particularly in presidential systems), (2) what is the impact of outsider presidents on democratic governability and institutional performance.
8.1 KEY FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The first contribution of my dissertation is an effort at conceptualizing the outsider phenomenon. Scholars and political commentators often refer to candidates or politicians as outsiders but few have attempted to clearly define the term. In Chapter 2, I reviewed the literature on outsider politicians, and I identified two main outsidership dimensions: 1) rise to power through a new party or a new electoral movement, and 2) political inexperience. I argued that both dimensions are important constitutive elements of the definition of “political outsider.” I explained that it is misleading and counterproductive to consider candidates with many years of political experience as outsiders simply because they run with new political parties. Whether the future literature on the subject accepts, amends, or rejects this conceptualization I hope that the definition I have provided in this study will help anchor future academic debates on outsider politicians.

Beyond providing a rigorous definition of the concept, my dissertation also studies the main causes and consequences of the rise of outsider politicians. Chapter 3-5 of this study analyze the institutional and individual-level determinants of the electoral success of outsider candidates in national elections. Given the very good results obtained by outsider contenders in the presidential systems of Latin America, it was natural to start by testing the accepted wisdom that the rise of outsiders is a “peril of presidentialism.” As explained in more detail in Chapters 1 and 3, a series of scholars (sometimes referred to as the “critics of presidentialism”) argued in the wake of the democratic transitions of the Third Wave of democratization that presidential systems were more prone to institutional instability and authoritarian breakdowns (Lijphart, 1992b; Linz, 1990, 1994). These scholars identified a series of “perils of presidentialism” such as the problem of dual democratic legitimacy (both the president and the congress are democratically elected); the breaking down of political processes into rigidly determined periods;
and the difficulty of forming stable coalitions. As I showed in Chapter 3, further research on presidential institutions casted considerable doubt on the arguments of the critics of presidentialism. Many of the perils of presidentialism appeared to be non-existent or at least considerably overstated (Cheibub, 2002; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997a; Pérez-Liñán, 2007). However, the comparative institutions literature paid considerably less attention to another of the proclaimed perils of presidentialism: the rise of outsiders (Linz, 1994; Suárez, 1982). This was the last man standing after all the other claims of the critics of presidentialism were shown to be incorrect or exaggerated. The first goal of this study was to empirically assess the link between presidentialism and “outsidership.”

In order to test this argument, data were gathered on 517 presidential and parliamentary elections in 63 countries in the period 1945-2010. The dependent variable in the quantitative analyses was whether an outsider president or prime minister reached office immediately after the election. Previous works argued that presidential elections tend to be more personalized (Linz, 1994) and less programmatic (Kitschelt, 2000) than parliamentary elections. However, the findings in Chapter 3 challenged the conventional wisdom. Presidentialism does not influence the rise of outsiders. Two other factors (the level of democracy and the economic conjuncture) are the key predictors of outsiders’ success. Outsider politicians are less likely to become the heads of government in robust democracies and in countries which are undergoing economic expansion.

I proposed a series of tentative explanations to account for the lack of positive association between presidentialism and “outsidership.” First, the “presidentialization” of parliamentary systems in the last decades has produced a personalization of electoral processes (Foley, 1993; Poguntke & Webb, 2005). This process may have eroded some of the differences that existed
between parliamentary and presidential elections. Second, the formal requirements to run for
president are more strict and costly than the requirements to run for a legislative seat. Third,
coalition-making may allow popular outsiders to become heads of government after the election,
an option that is not available to presidential candidates.

This negative finding generated a host of new questions. If outsiders are not caused by
presidentialism, why have so many outsider candidates obtained high scores in the presidential
systems of Latin America? In order to answer that question, I scaled down the level of analysis.
Pathbreaking works in the early study of presidential institutions pointed out that the dichotomy
presidentialism vs. parliamentarism is often not the most important factor in explaining political
outcomes in presidential systems. These works suggested instead that looking at a series of
institutional factors within presidentialism might be more useful to explain variations in political
and institutional processes between presidential systems (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart &
Mainwaring, 1997).

In Chapter 4, I followed this recommendation by looking at the institutional design
characteristics that facilitate the success of outsider candidates in the presidential elections of
Latin America. The empirical approach adopted was quantitative. Using an original database on
political outsiders, I analyzed the institutional factors that predict the rise of outsiders in all Latin
American presidential elections between 1980 and 2010. The dependent variable in this analysis
was the percentage of votes captured by outsider candidates in each election. The key finding of
this chapter is that three institutional design characteristics influence the success of outsiders in
presidential elections. First, concurrent elections tend to make it harder for outsider candidates to
obtain high scores. In fact, concurrent elections tend to be dominated by established parties
which are very active during the campaign because they want to maximize the number of seats
they get in the legislature. This finding suggests a coattail effect in reverse, whereby presidential candidates can benefit from the campaign efforts of legislative candidates. Second, outsider candidates are less likely to be successful when reelection provisions are in place and the incumbent participates in the election. Incumbent candidates have easier access to the media and can use public resources to their advantage, thereby making it harder for other candidates (outsiders or not) to win the presidential election. I argued that viable outsider politicians are less likely to run when the incumbent runs for reelection. Third, compulsory voting facilitates the rise of outsiders in presidential elections. When disenchanted voters—who would prefer to abstain—are forced to participate in the elections, they tend to express their political dissatisfaction by supporting political outsiders who often use an anti-establishment rhetoric in their campaigns.

This dissertation shows that certain institutional design characteristics facilitate the emergence of outsider candidates in presidential elections. Institutions alone, however, cannot fully explain the success of independent politicians. In order to be electorally successful, outsiders must be able to connect with a large group of disgruntled voters. Chapter 5 analyzed the demand side of the outsider phenomenon, by showing the individual determinants of support for outsiders. I used survey data from two different barometers (Latinobarómetro and LAPOP) to analyze the vote for outsiders in several elections in which viable outsider candidates were on the ballot.

The key finding of this chapter is that voters with anti-party sentiments and voters on the left of the political spectrum are more likely to support outsider candidates. On the contrary, citizens’ economic evaluations are a much weaker predictor of the vote for outsiders. The results suggest that the rise of outsiders in Latin America is closely related to the crisis of democratic representation in many countries around the region. The crisis of democratic representation has
two dimensions, which are both linked to the vote for outsiders as reflected in the statistical analysis in Chapter 5. First, a large portion of the electorate is disenchanted with established political parties due to their poor performance in key policy areas –mainly the economy and public security– and to their moral failures –i.e. corruption– (Hagopian, 2005; Mainwaring, 2006). Second, citizens on the left of the political spectrum were left unrepresented during the neoliberal era in Latin America when many leftist and populist parties accepted the basic tenets of the Washington consensus (Morgan, 2007).

In sum, the first part of this dissertation showed that the rise of outsiders results from the combination of two series of factors: 1) on the supply side, a series of democratic characteristics (non-concurrent elections, compulsory voting rules, and the lack of reelection provisions) which make it easier for outsiders to run; 2) on the demand side, a serious crisis of democratic representation which explains citizens’ motivations to support outsider candidates once they are in the race.

The second part of the dissertation shifts the focus from the causes to the consequences of the rise of outsider presidents in Latin America. Most previous research on outsider leaders has attempted to explain the reasons of their success, but we still know very little about the impact of outsiders on democratic governability and institutional performance. This was one of the main goals of this dissertation. Although this study has shown that outsiders are not a peril of presidentialism, I argued that outsiders constitute a peril for presidentialism because they govern in a more personalistic way and are more likely to engage in authoritarian excesses against other democratic institutions. These practices threaten democratic consolidation and horizontal accountability.
The main theoretical contribution of this dissertation is the identification of the three main causal mechanisms which explain the deleterious impact of outsiders on the quality of democracy and on institutional performance. First, outsiders are politically inexperienced and lack democratic socialization within political parties. Political parties play an important role in the recruitment and in the political education of political leaders. Party politicians become socialized with the democratic rules of the game, and they become aware of the need for negotiation and compromise in the political arena. On the contrary, outsiders are political amateurs who tend to govern following technocratic criteria. They lack the key political skills necessary to govern democratically and they are not committed to democratic practices such as negotiation and consensus building (Levitsky & Cameron, 2003). This lack of democratic socialization results in a more direct and personalistic governance style and it often leads to executive abuses against other institutions.

The second factor that explains why outsiders pose a threat to democratic governability and institutional performance is the sociopolitical context faced by outsiders when they reach the presidency. Outsiders tend to come to power in moments of economic crisis and great sociopolitical instability. These are situations in which public disenchantment with political institutions (and political parties in particular) is at its peak. This context of public dissatisfaction with the political system provides a window of opportunity for outsiders to commit excesses against other democratic institutions. Bypassing other institutions –such as Congress, the judiciary, and political parties– may be politically beneficial for outsider politicians because they are aware that the public is likely to support them rather than other discredited institutions in case of an interbranch confrontation. In Chapter 6, I discussed in detail the case of Fujimori, outsider president who governed Peru between 1990 and 2000. Fujimori conducted a “self-coup” and
dissolved the legislature in April 1992. While the established political parties represented in the congress expected a popular upheaval against this undemocratic measure, all the polls conducted at the time revealed that the vast majority of Peruvian citizens supported Fujimori’s decision.

Finally, political outsiders are more likely to commit authoritarian excesses and to bypass other democratic institutions because they are not constrained by established and well-organized parties. Political parties are concerned about maintaining a long-term democratic reputation. When a political leader from an established party attempts a controversial or undemocratic move, the party might incur serious political or electoral costs. Hence, party cadres concerned about the good name of the party often control their own members to make sure that they respect the democratic rules of the game. Political outsiders, on the contrary, run in presidential elections with new parties or electoral movements that are often nothing more than an electoral vehicle for these independent candidates. These parties have weak organizations and lack the capacity to keep the outsiders’ actions in check. Moreover, political outsiders often have more incentives than established political parties to bypass other institutions. If outsiders cannot provide rapid results, they can quickly lose their electoral credit. Hence, outsiders are more concerned about delivering immediate policy results—which might push them to commit excesses—than about maintaining an untainted democratic reputation for the weak and personalized parties they lead.

This broad theoretical framework regarding the impact of outsiders on democratic governability was narrowed down in my dissertation by studying two specific empirical questions: 1) the impact of outsiders on executive-legislative confrontation, and 2) the influence of outsiders on the design and the functioning of cabinets. In Chapter 6, I analyzed the link between outsider presidents and executive-legislative conflicts. In line with the arguments described in the previous paragraphs, I hypothesized that outsider presidents in Latin America
are more likely to face sustained confrontation with the legislative branch. I also hypothesized that outsider presidents are more likely to attempt the dissolution of the congress. In addition to all the relevant theoretical mechanisms presented above, another factor that is especially important to explain executive-legislative confrontation when the president is an outsider is the fact that outsider presidents tend to be minority presidents with very little support in the legislature. These hypotheses were tested by using a mixed-methods approach. A cross-national longitudinal analysis assessed whether outsiders have a clear impact on executive-legislative relations. In the quantitative analysis, I used data from a database on political processes in Latin America (Pérez-Liñán et al., 2008). The empirical results showed that executive-legislative confrontations over bills and executive appointments are much more likely when a political outsider is in power. Similarly, outsider presidents are significantly more likely to try to dissolve the legislature.

The second part of Chapter 6 is an in-depth analysis of the evolution of executive-legislative relations in Peru between 1980 and 1992. The case of Peru is relevant because in the 1980s the country was governed by two career politicians representing established parties (Fernando Belaúnde –1980-1985– and Alan García –1985-1990–), but in 1990 an outsider candidate (Alberto Fujimori) was elected president. This made it possible to make an interesting within country comparison, closely approximating a most similar systems design. The main goal of the qualitative analysis was to tease out the causal mechanisms explaining the very conflictive executive-legislative relations under Fujimori and the absence of major confrontation under the administrations of Belaúnde and García. The in-depth analysis of the Peruvian case provided strong support for the theoretical framework proposed in this dissertation. Fujimori’s repeated conflicts with the legislature appear to be linked to four main factors: 1) Fujimori was a minority
president and was not able to form a multiparty coalition, 2) Fujimori had a technocratic political style and rejected compromises and negotiations with other political parties, 3) Fujimori’s party (Cambio 90) was too weak to constrain Fujimori, and 4) Fujimori’s authoritarian excesses received widespread popular support.

Chapter 7 analyzed the impact of outsider presidents on the formation and functioning of cabinets. This chapter focused on the case of Peru, and again the research design consisted of a within-country comparison between the political style and the executive appointments of two career politicians (Belaúnde and García) in the 1980s and an outsider president (Fujimori) in the early 1990s. Following the theoretical framework presented above, I argued that outsider presidents are more likely to recruit neophyte ministers with little or no political experience. First, outsiders’ lack of democratic socialization is often associated with a rejection of political negotiations or consensus-building. Hence, outsiders often prefer to recruit technocrats or cronies rather than experienced politicians from other political parties. Even when they consider the possibility of appointing members of the opposition as ministers, outsiders often fail because they do not have the experience to conduct these difficult negotiations. This lack of political experience often leads to political blunders, as I showed in the in-depth discussion of Fujimori’s cabinets. Second, outsiders often choose a strategy of confrontation against the political establishment because this approach pays off in a context in which citizens are disenchanted with established political parties. This confrontation strategy makes it very difficult for outsiders to recruit more experienced politicians to their cabinets without completely losing face. The comparison of cabinet composition in Peru revealed that the proportion of partisan cabinet members and ministers with legislative experience was much lower in the administration of Fujimori than in the administrations of the two presidents who preceded him in office (who were
career politicians from established parties). The last section in Chapter 7 showed that having a cabinet composed by individuals who are political neophytes has two major consequences for democratic governability. First, it leads to a loss of ministerial autonomy because ministers who are complete political neophytes owe all their political capital to the president who appoints them. The second consequence of the appointment of technocrat and independent ministers is a greater difficulty for the cabinet to work as a team. These conclusions again suggested that the rise of outsider presidents might have deleterious consequences for democratic governability and institutional performance in Latin America.

8.2 AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As always, the theoretical and empirical findings presented here open as many questions as they answer. In this final section, I would like to propose four avenues for further research.

8.2.1 Outsiders in parliamentary systems

Perhaps one of the most interesting questions that remains is whether the theoretical framework presented here applies more widely to parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. Against the conventional wisdom, this dissertation has shown that outsiders are not more likely to come to power in presidential systems. Several outsider politicians have become prime ministers in parliamentary systems across Europe in the last two decades. Are these outsiders equally threatening for democratic governability as outsider presidents have been in the Latin American context? A priori, many of the same causal mechanisms identified in the theory may apply in
parliamentary systems. Outsiders in parliamentary systems also lack democratic socialization within political parties, and they also run with new and weakly organized parties. Moreover, outsider parties suffer from “a lack of suitable personnel to occupy positions and a party organization capable of handling the added pressures of office” (McDonnell, 2011: 447).

However, outsiders in parliamentary systems often need to form some type of multiparty coalition in order to govern. Whereas outsider presidents can govern with scant support in the legislature, this is simply not possible for outsider prime ministers. Since outsider parties join forces with established parties, they might be less inclined to commit authoritarian excess. Also, electoral support for outsider parties may decrease because they start governing with discredited parties. An unpopular outsider may be less dangerous for institutional stability than an outsider president who maintains his popularity by attacking the political establishment. But whether this is really the case remains an open question. Answering this question might provide an interesting avenue for cross-regime comparison.

8.2.2 Subnational outsiders

Another potential line of inquiry is the analysis of the rise of outsider politicians at the subnational level. Since the costs of entry are lower for mayoral and gubernatorial elections, independent and inexperienced candidates might be even more successful in subnational elections. Since many more subnational officials (mayors and governors) are elected now than in the past (T. Campbell, 2003; Eaton, 2012), it is possible to analyze the institutional and contextual factors that lead to the emergence of outsider candidates at the subnational level. Scaling down would allow us to understand the impact of outsiders on institutional performance while holding many other confounding factors constant (Peters, 1998; Snyder, 2001). Future
research could explore whether outsider mayors or governors also pose a threat for democratic
governability. In addition to the problems pointed out in the analysis of outsider presidents,
outsider politicians at the subnational level might increase coordination problems between the
different levels of government. National governments might find it easier to negotiate with
experienced governors or mayors (even if they are in opposition) than with neophyte politicians.

8.2.3 Outsiders, democratic representation, and political engagement

Several outsider presidents –such as Alberto Fujimori, Hugo Chávez, and Rafael Correa–managed to maintain high popularity in the midst of a severe crisis of representation. This
observation generates several questions. For instance, can outsiders be considered escape valves
that allow the democratic system to survive (albeit with flaws) in contexts of deep sociopolitical
crises? Do outsiders succeed at providing political representation to previously marginalized and
excluded groups? Are the most unprivileged sectors of society more supportive of politicians and
democratic institutions when an outsider is in power? The widespread availability of survey data
for Latin America makes it possible to tackle these questions. Although the focus of this
dissertation was the negative impact of outsiders on the performance of democratic institutions,
the overall impact of outsiders on democracy might be more nuanced. Paradoxically, outsiders
might hurt the consolidation of democratic institutions but at the same time provide better
democratic representation for certain sectors of society.

Another interesting question is whether the rise of an outsider increases societal
polarization. It is possible that while certain people show very strong support for the outsider
president and are satisfied with the way democracy works –mainly people who felt
unrepresented prior to the emergence of the outsider–, other sectors of the population harbor very
negative feelings about the outsider and become extremely critical of democratic institutions. If outsiders do increase the level of political polarization, a follow-up question is whether this cognitive activation in turn leads to higher levels of political engagement when an outsider is in power. Again, available survey data could tell us whether citizens are more likely to vote and participate in public demonstrations when the president is an outsider.

8.2.4 Policy consequences of the rise of outsiders

Another natural extension of this research is to investigate the policy consequences of the rise of outsiders. Outsider candidates tend to succeed in contexts of economic hardship and deep sociopolitical crisis. Do outsiders favor a particular set of economic policies to address the economic downturn they face when they come to power? Since outsiders are not constrained by strong parties and often bypass other institutions, it is possible that they implement more irresponsible macroeconomic policies. However, some outsiders such as Alberto Fujimori and Ollanta Humala in Peru have chosen to adopt orthodox economic policies. Further research could analyze and explain the reasons that lead outsiders to choose very different economic policies.

Another policy issue that is worth analyzing is the fight against corruption. Outsiders often run in presidential elections with an anti-establishment rhetoric promising to “clean politics” if they are elected. But are outsiders any different from career politicians in the way they fight against corruption? Do they adopt anti-corruption policies when they are in power? Are these policies effective in reducing corruption? Anecdotal evidence suggests that corruption remained at very high levels during the administration of Alberto Fujimori in Peru or Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, but a more systematic empirical analysis is warranted.
APPENDIX A

Table A.1. Elections included in the statistical analysis in Chapter 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parliamentary Elections</th>
<th>Presidential Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Western Europe &amp; North America</strong></td>
<td><strong>Eastern Europe</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia &amp; Pacific Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number of Elections</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>428 elections (72% of the sample)</td>
<td>166 elections (28% of the sample)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX B

Additional models to Chapter 4

### Table A.2. FEVD models with interaction terms between inflation and institutional design characteristics: determinants of vote for outsider candidates in Latin America (1980-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
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<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>(4.786)</td>
<td>(3.211)</td>
<td>(3.150)</td>
<td>(3.205)</td>
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<td>-1.975</td>
<td>-8.090**</td>
<td>-8.236**</td>
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<td>(3.917)</td>
<td>(6.722)</td>
<td>(3.915)</td>
<td>(3.932)</td>
</tr>
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<td>8.066***</td>
<td>11.64***</td>
<td>8.304***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(2.548)</td>
<td>(2.603)</td>
<td>(3.515)</td>
<td>(2.518)</td>
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<td>Incumbent Running</td>
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<td>-8.513*</td>
<td>-9.113**</td>
<td>-0.0442</td>
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<td>(4.363)</td>
<td>(4.357)</td>
<td>(8.955)</td>
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<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.345</td>
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<td>(0.504)</td>
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<td>(0.494)</td>
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<td>10.04***</td>
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<td>(4.144)</td>
<td>(3.191)</td>
<td>(1.724)</td>
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<td>0.422***</td>
<td>0.420***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0903)</td>
<td>(0.0879)</td>
<td>(0.0876)</td>
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<td>Percentage Outsiders (lagged)</td>
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<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
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<td>4.616***</td>
<td>4.295***</td>
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<td>(1.320)</td>
<td>(1.322)</td>
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<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
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<td>18.45**</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Concurrent Elections * Inflation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>(1.988)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reelection * Inflation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-9.320</td>
</tr>
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<td>(8.540)</td>
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<td>(7.556)</td>
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<td>92</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-3.200</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(5.600)</td>
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<td>(3.911)</td>
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<td>(2.539)</td>
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<td>(0.826)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.0863)</td>
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<td>Percentage Full Outsiders (lagged)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
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<td>(0.975)</td>
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<td>Concurrent Elections * Growth</td>
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<td>Reelection * Growth</td>
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<td>(2.010)</td>
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<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.639</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
APPENDIX C

Variables used in the regression analyses in Chapter 5

VOTE FOR OUTSIDERS OR INCUMBENT FORMER OUTSIDERS
The dependent variable is a measure of national vote intention. *Latinobarómetro* uses the standard formulation of: “If there was an election tomorrow/this Sunday, which party would you vote for?” The LAPOP survey for Peru 2006 and Paraguay 2008 asks for the names of the specific candidates. In some models the response variable is binary – 1 for the vote for outsiders or incumbent former outsiders, and 0 otherwise (“no answer” and “don’t know” are coded as missing). In the models with three categories, 0 represents the vote for a traditional opposition party, 1 the vote for outsiders, and 2 the vote for the candidate of the incumbent party.

NO CONFIDENCE IN PARTIES (dummy)
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent has no confidence in political parties, 0 otherwise.

CONFIDENCE IN PARTIES (continuous)
Continuous variable coded as follows: 1 No confidence, 2 A little, 3 Some, 4 A lot.

POSITIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent thinks the economy improved in the past 12 months, 0 otherwise.

NEGATIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent thinks the economy deteriorated in the past 12 months, 0 otherwise.

AUTHORITARIAN ATTITUDES
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent thinks that a) under some circumstances an authoritarian government is better than a democracy, or b) does not care whether an authoritarian government is in place or not, 0 otherwise.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY
Continuous variable coded as follows: 1 Not at all Satisfied, 2 Not very satisfied, 3 Fairly satisfied, 4 Very satisfied.

IDEOLOGY
Categorical variable coded in the following way:
1 – Left
2 – Center (Reference Category)
3 – Right
4 – No Ideology
AGE
Continuous variable coded as follows:
1 - 18-24
2 - 25-34
3 - 35-44
4 - 45-54
5 - 55-64
6 - 64 and older

GENDER
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is a man, 0 if she is a woman.

EDUCATION
Continuous variable coded as follows:
1 - Illiterate
2 – Elementary school uncompleted
3 - Elementary school completed
4 - Secondary school uncompleted
5 – Secondary school completed
6 - Higher education uncompleted
7 - Higher education completed

SOCIOECONOMIC LEVEL
Continuous variable based on the interviewers’ observations of respondents’ living conditions. Coded as follows:
-2 - Very bad
-1 - Bad
0 - Regular
1 - Good
2 - Very good

CATHOLIC
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is catholic, 0 otherwise.

UNEMPLOYED
Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent is unemployed, 0 otherwise.
## APPENDIX D

### Additional models to Chapter 5

Table A.3. Multinomial logit models of the vote for outsiders in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(1) Bolivia 2002</th>
<th>(2) Nicaragua 2006</th>
<th>(3) Paraguay 2008</th>
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<td>No confidence in parties</td>
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<td>-.57***</td>
<td>-.83**</td>
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Observations 1874 616 673
Pseudo $R^2$ .10 .23 .09

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Kral, D. (2014). Although Robert Fico is the clear favourite in the Slovakian presidential elections, the real story may be the rise of political ‘outsider’ Andrej Kiska.


