TWILIGHT STATES: SLEEPWALKING, LIMINAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND SENSATIONAL SELFHOOD IN VICTORIAN LITERATURE AND CULTURE

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Twilight States: Sleepwalking, Liminal Consciousness, and Sensational Selfhood in Victorian Literature and Culture argues that sleepwalking was everywhere in nineteenth-century culture, both as a topic for scientific, legal, and public debate, but also as a potent symbol in the Victorian imagination that informed literature and art. Furthermore, the nineteenth-century interest in the somnambulist was provoked by what the figure represented and revealed to the Victorians: namely, themselves. The sleepwalker represented the hidden potential within the self for either greatness or deviance, or, more mundanely, simply a fuller existence than consciousness has an awareness of. Sleepwalking writ large the multi-layered self at a time when the self—by psychiatry and society at large—was being accepted as increasingly multivalent. The sleepwalker was a visible and often sensational embodiment of the multilayered consciousness that became the accepted model of the mind over the course of the nineteenth century, visibly demonstrating what doctors and philosophers suggested that the mind could do. By connecting literary representations of sleepwalkers in the works of Wilkie Collins, Thomas Hardy, Bram Stoker, and Sheridan Le Fanu to both nineteenth-century medical discourses of somnambulism and popular press’s accounts and illustrations of altered states, we see that the discourses surrounding the figure of the somnambulist indicate that it was a cultural receptacle for fears associated with the changing scientific and political landscape, but also a locus for hopes about human potential and innate goodness: an ambivalence possible because of the sleepwalker’s liminality.
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1.0  INTRODUCTION

Complete sleep is a temporary metaphysical death, though not an organic one…Sleep, which shuns the light, embraces darkness, and they lie down together under the sceptre of midnight.

Robert Macnish, 1830

Somnambulism and the conditions allied to it have always attracted peculiar interest, probably because most men have felt that common sleep is yet a wondrous and solemn thing, and full of mysterious possibilities for each of us.

David Yellowlees, 1878

This affection [sleepwalking] is surely worthy of more attention and study than it has received…how much anxiety is causes, how much peril it involves, and how often parents and schoolmasters seek counsel as to the best moral and medical treatment to adopt! One-third of our existence is passed in sleep, and it would be strange if this unconscious life, in which the will, but not necessarily action, is suspended, were not one of serious importance both medically and legally.

Daniel Hack Tuke, 1884

1.1  THE NINETEENTH CENTURY SLEEPWALKER

A strange and sensational story circulated in the early 19th century, the tale of a naval ship menaced by the figure of “a woman dressed in white, with eyes of flaming fire.” Four days out from England members of the crew began to report sightings, first mentioned by a sailor who insisted that this “ghost” had stood over his hammock and stared down at him. Other men soon corroborated this story, terrified of the apparition, and in response one of the officers begins to spend nights beneath the crews’ hammocks, hoping his presence would diminish the accounts. And yet, “the horrors and fears of the people rather daily increased than diminished,” until “one
very dark night” the officer sees “a stately figure in white stalking along the decks!” Assuming this is the ghost, the officer follows it across the deck, through the gallery, and out at the head-doors, but it then immediately vanished. The following day the crew realizes that a sailor named Jack Sutton is missing. Upon inquiry, the officer learns “that Jack Sutton used to tell [his messmates] a number of comical jokes about his walking in his sleep.” The mystery stands solved: the flaming eyed, spectral, stately “woman in white” is a flesh and blood—and male—sailor, “who had walked overboard in his dream.” The anecdote is closed with mention of the first man who reported seeing the ghost, and it is revealed on inquiry that he was “a most flagitious villain” and a murderer, convinced that his female victim haunted him; “the appearance of the sleep-walker confirmed in his mind the ghost of the murdered fair one.” In conclusion, the story insists, “conscience is a busy monitor, and ever active to its own pain and disturbance.”

This story is taken from Chapter Seven of physician Edward Binns’s *The Anatomy of Sleep; or, the Art of Procuring Sound and Refreshing Slumber at Will* (1842), which contains accounts of 25 separate sleepwalkers, some encountered in Binns’s own experience, but many culled from a variety of texts from the 17th through 19th centuries. Binns attributes the story of Jack Sutton to “a naval gentleman,” but gives no other personal, historical, or chronological details. Like many “cases” found in Victorian psychiatric texts, tales of sleepwalkers often circulated between multiple authors, and were sometimes drawn from newspaper accounts or even literary sources: William Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth was praised as an exemplary depiction, “a masterly description…no modern neurologist would repudiate” (Regnard 270).

I begin with the anecdote of Jack Sutton because it demonstrates several elements key to understanding how nineteenth-century Great Britain regarded its sleepwalkers, and the
importance and interest sleepwalking held for Victorians in their literature and culture. Like many others, this account is presented from the point of view of a non-sleepwalker, someone who narrates the story as if it were a mystery to be solved. This narrative aspect is echoed especially in newspapers, where articles adopted a self-conscious metanarrative tone, sometimes interrupting the account of sleepwalking to say, “Now for the solution of the mystery” or “the scene altogether, if fully described, would read more like a romance than reality.” The imagery also harkens to a kind of literariness, the somnambulist-mistaken-for-ghost recalling gothic novels filled with supernatural specters, and suggesting the liminal position the sleepwalker might be seen as occupying in regard to life and death. Furthermore, because Sutton’s story is one of a male sleepwalker mistaken for a woman, it helps to demonstrate how sleepwalking—in its imagery, its psychological implications, and its erotic potential—dismantles easy assumptions about gender binaries. It is not simply that some male sleepwalkers were taken to be female (although that clearly happens in this account and others), but that often the Victorian sleepwalker, regardless of sex, occupied a symbolic position of gender liminality, simultaneously masculine-active and feminine-passive.

Although Binns’s discussion of Sutton includes several other elements that will be discussed in this introduction and throughout my dissertation—criminality’s relationship to sleepwalking; the possibility that Sutton and many other sleepwalking fatalities were actually suicides; the way that the comic potential of sleepwalking is at least gestured at (in Sutton’s entertaining “jokes” about his sleepwalking history), despite the story’s tragic components—what is perhaps most intriguing about this tale are its final lines and attempt at psychologizing the incident. Jack Sutton’s sleepwalking death is not only an occasion for the storyteller to speculate on how “a dream” must have sent “unfortunate poor” Sutton to his death; it is also an
opportunity to reflect back on human psychology more generally. Because the first sailor
mistook the sleepwalking Sutton for the ghost of “the murdered fair one,” the author takes the
opportunity to ruminate on the nature of guilt and the unconscious more widely, making clear
that a tale of somnambulism could easily become an occasion to ruminate on natures of
psychology, morality, and humanity for non-sleepwalkers as well.

This dissertation argues that sleepwalking was everywhere in Victorian culture, both as a
topic for scientific, legal, and public debate, but also as a potent symbol in the Victorian
imagination that informed literature and art. Furthermore, I argue that nineteenth-century interest
in the somnambulist was provoked by what the figure represented and revealed to the Victorians:
namely, themselves. The sleepwalker represented the hidden—or not-so-hidden—potential
within the self for either greatness or deviance, or, more mundanely, simply a fuller or more
extensive existence than consciousness has an awareness of. Sleepwalking writ large the multi-
layered self at a time when the self—by both psychiatry and society at large—was being
accepted as increasingly multivalent. The sleepwalker was a visible and often sensational
embodiment of the multilayered consciousness that became the accepted model of the mind over
the course of the nineteenth century, visibly demonstrating what doctors and philosophers
suggested that the mind could do.

Because sleepwalking is naturally or spontaneously occurring liminal state, the
Victorians perceived it as having unique potential for both psychological exploration and for
sensation and mystery: anyone could begin to sleepwalk or could already be doing it. Thus,
everyone had the potential to be a figure of sensation or scandal, a realization that could lead to
horror or delight. In other words, any self could be sensational. In the first chapter I suggest that
the sleepwalker represented a failure of self-surveillance, but one for which a citizen was not
necessarily responsible, a model represented comically in Henry Cockton’s *Sylvester Sound the Somnambulist* (1844), wherein the titular character is “perfectly unconscious of being a somnambulist; he not even the most remote suspicion of the fact” (16); this admission is followed by nearly 500 pages in which Sylvester amusingly “bedevils” the whole neighborhood, “unsuspected by his victims [and] by himself.”

I suggest that representations of sleepwalking were present throughout many areas of Victorian culture, including literature, periodicals, visual art, psychiatry and medical texts, legal texts and law courts, and on the theatrical stage: in fact, many more than can easily be thoroughly discussed in this dissertation. These include, for instance, Ellen Nussey’s record of how Charlotte Brontë’s school girl storytelling at Roe Head school included “her thrilling relations of the wanderings of a somnambulist,” in which she “brought together all the horrors her imagination could create, from surging seas, raging breakers, towering castle walls, high precipices, invisible chasms and dangers.” The terror she created in herself and her listeners was so potent that after the relation of one somnambulist tale ended in such a “panic of terror”—a “shivering terror” from the audience and “a subdued cry of pain from Charlotte herself”—that Brontë refused for weeks to tell stories to her classmates, and “never again created terrors for her listeners.”

Other uses give a sense of the Victorians perceived somnambulism as symbolically flexible. In Mary Elizabeth Braddon’s first bestselling novel, *The Trail of the Serpent* (1861), we are introduced to heiress Valerie de Cevennes as she watches a Parisian performance of Bellini’s opera *La Sonnambula*, incredibly popular throughout the nineteenth-century. Braddon uses the perceived infidelity of Amina, the titular character, to foreshadow the romantic deceptions of her own tale. In Charles Dickens’s *Little Dorrit* (1857), domestic servant Affery Flintwinch is
convinced by her controlling and dubious husband that she sleepwalks, in order to hide the existence of his twin brother, Ephraim. “The Forest Keeper” (1860), performed in a spring run in Drury Lane, used the figure of the somnambulist to lampoon dysfunctional marital dynamics, while two of the most famous actresses of the nineteenth-century—Sarah Siddons and Ellen Terry—book-ended the era with much-praised and publicized turns as Lady Macbeth.⁵ And John Everett Millais’s painting *The Somnambulist* (1871), with its “the fair figure of the somnambulist, and the accompanying night effect, with the mysterious, half-iridescent glimmer of an unseen moon on the sleepwalker’s nightdress” has been praised as lacking “obtrusive sensationalism.”⁶

The wide extent of these representations reveals that nineteenth-century Great Britain’s fascination with the somnambulist was twofold: first, there was interest in a literal sleepwalking figure populating newspapers, law courts, and medical case studies, and thus participating in and challenging contemporary revisions of accepted notions of human selfhood, volition, and responsibility. Second, in literature, drama, and visual art there was interest in the sleepwalker as a symbol for/expression of the liminality of individual consciousness across the entirety of the nineteenth century, predating the experiments in consciousness more closely associated with modernist and postmodern expressions/art/literature.

Despite representations of sleepwalking that pre-date and post-date the century, the popularity of the Victorian somnambulist makes it feel like a particularly nineteenth-century image/symbol for selfhood, sparked by the late eighteenth century coining in English of “somnambulism,” and by an increasing interest in science, specifically in the gradual development of a more clearly demarcated field of psychology. Within literature sleepwalking was deployed with striking metaphorical power in texts ranging from the Gothic to more
“realist” traditions (and various modes in between). These texts are powerful examples of a cultural expression of the possibilities and anxieties associated with what was seen, on the one hand, as a doubling of consciousness, and, on the other, as a fracturing of individuality.

There has been much recent critical discussion of the fruitful relationship between nineteenth-century literature and science. Most of these studies have focused on abnormal psychology, though there has been some recent interest in how Victorian novelists were informed by contemporary psychological theories when representing normative states of consciousness. My research inhabits a middle ground: while sleepwalking was often featured in texts concerning abnormal psychology at large and its relationship to madness debated by nineteenth-century physicians, most authors differentiated it from severe states of derangement, calling it simply a “nervous disorder” (Morison 4). Novelists rarely presented their sleepwalking characters as “mad” and only on occasion as particularly aberrant. Sleepwalking—itself a liminal state—thus occupied a liminal position in the spectrum of mental states: it was portrayed as an abnormal mental state experienced by otherwise “normal” individuals. Even though it could be prompted by external or abnormal stimuli, sleepwalking was largely perceived as a naturally occurring abnormal state: not just as a way that the mind could respond under external stimuli, but something that the mind and body can do on its own. As such it occupies a separate place from that of mesmerism, which, in the Victorian understanding, always required an external will, originating from the mesmerist or “operator”: with sleepwalking, the secondary consciousness of the self could be studied in isolation.

Beyond psychological discussions, popular newspapers and periodicals were also frequent sources for news of sleepwalking incidents throughout the nineteenth-century, revealing that interest in the somnambulist was not isolated to professional circles but extended to more
general audiences whose interest—from the facts and details highlighted in the articles—evidently seemed to combine a fascination with sensationalistic incident with an increasing desire to understand what made their friends and neighbors behave in such baffling ways.

I emphasize “their friends and neighbors” for two reasons: the first is that newspaper accounts often focused on the point of view of the witness or onlooker, such as The Leicester Chronicle’s account of how “a little after 11 o’clock” Mrs. Williams “who resides in Union Street, saw a figure of a person in undress…run along their yard and leap over the palisades into the road.” The narrative follows other eyewitnesses “who saw it” and a policeman who “heard its cry but did not see the person.” The article presents its reader with a mystery, an unknown sensational figure—called “the naked nightly wanderer”—before revealing the figure to actually be the sleepwalking “servant lad of Mr. Hine.” The last line of the article reiterates not only the tone of intrigue and danger from its opening, but also the sense of the human community involved and the possibility that these events could take place—repeatedly—in the reader’s backyard (while the railway had recently reached Bedford in 1846, it was, after all, no teeming metropolis): “The inhabitants of the neighbourhood will not soon forget the fright it caused them, more especially as two persons last year walked in a similar manner, and afterwards drowned themselves.”

The second reason I emphasize “their friends and neighbors” is that nineteenth-century newspapers—in conjunction with contemporary medical texts that featured case studies—clearly demonstrate that Victorians perceived sleepwalking as a pervasive phenomenon affecting all demographics. While our knowledge of the most famous sleepwalkers of the Victorian stage—Amina from Bellini’s La Somnambula and Lady Macbeth from Shakespeare’s Macbeth—may propagate the idea that the nineteenth-century sleepwalker was only tragic, female, and a visual
spectacle combining beauty with horror, a broader look reveals that reported and studied cases of sleepwalking included everyone from servants to the nobility, with a strong showing from the growing middle class, and more men than woman represented in both the press and the medical community. The exception to the latter are parapsychological works, such as Reichenbach’s \textit{Somnambulism and Cramp}, which combine psychiatry with mysticism, espousing an interest in both natural/spontaneous somnambulism and somnambulism induced via hypnotism or some similar manipulation of what was perceived as the “vital fluid” of the body. These texts build on Britain’s earlier interest in Anton Mesmer’s popularization of the idea of animal magnetism and mesmeric display, popularized in England by professor and doctor John Elliotson. Although many people in both Great Britain and the Continent were mesmerized in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Elliotson’s two most famous and frequent subjects were Jane and Elizabeth O’Key, sisters and former servant girls who Elliotson used for large public experiments, many of which were recorded—and then denounced—in \textit{The Lancet}, England’s earliest medical journal.\footnote{A continued interest in this sort of trance figure—the lower class woman who does extraordinary things while unconscious—clearly persists in some accounts of sleepwalking. Lower class women were, for instance, the sleepwalking demographic most likely to be experimented on by doctors and early psychiatrists.\footnote{Recent critical work in the history of Victorian interest in trance states has suggested that we, too, may want to see the Victorian trance subject as a nubile young woman—extensively discussed by Winters—or, at the very least, as a heavily feminized young man, as discussed in Luckhurst’s account of gothic trance fiction.}} Victorian periodicals suggest, however, that the nineteenth-century sleepwalker was just as likely to be a brawny, heroic soldier or sailor as they were to be a romanticized and
astonishing young maid. In fact, in the over 200 separate accounts of sleepwalkers that I have located, the servant sleepwalker is as likely to be male as female, and while usually young—a detail supported not only by Victorian mental science but also by twenty-first century neuroscience—the sleepwalker discussed in popular culture stood a good chance of being a skilled craftsman, a barrister, a student, a clergyman, or a “lady.”

1.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY

The Victorians viewed sleepwalking as neither an exclusively a physical or psychical property, but rather a result of their combination. The sleepwalking question was, for authors, doctors, and jurists, a technical question, but in its exploration of such issues as the mind-body relation, the freedom of the will, the extent of human responsibility, and the capacity for human development, it was a moral, social, and symbolic question as well. By examining sleepwalking-related discourses from a variety of cultural sources, this project participates in the construction of a pre-history of neural science, one largely forgotten by twenty-first century psychologists and cognitive scientists.

My analysis of the role that the sleepwalker played in Victorian literature—and in Victorian culture at large—is situated within larger discussions within Victorianist criticism about the relationship between psychology and literature in the nineteenth century. Both scholarly accounts of sensation fiction and feminist analysis of Victorian culture note the ways psychology was used to warn against the dangers of inappropriate literature that was “overstimulating” to the nerves, and to advise young women against exhausting their mental resources through intellectual work. Recent work has suggested that psychology was also used to “trace literary genius to the bones and marrow of a particular writer” (Talairach-Vielmas 2)—
such as Henry Maudsley’s 1862 essay on Edgar Allan Poe\textsuperscript{12}—by using clinical discourse to analyze the nineteenth-century writer’s creativity. At the same time, the novelist could—and did, in often well-documented ways—draw new plot devices from the advances of psychological science, at the same time that psychology and cognitive theories shaped literary ideas about characterization and the relationship between plot (action or circumstance) and character (the way an individual reacts). My chapter on the relationship between the fiction of Wilkie Collins and nineteenth-century medico-legal culture sheds new light on the work of an author whose relationship to “true crime” and medical discourse has become a commonplace of scholarship, while my chapters on Thomas Hardy’s \textit{Tess of the d’Urbervilles}, Sheridan Le Fanu’s “Carmilla,” and Bram Stoker’s \textit{Dracula} explore the more implicit and subtle ways that nineteenth-century novelists participated in the creation and revision of cultural formulations of individual subjectivity and agency. It is important to not see these various domains of discourse as isolated, because similar language, images, and assumptions appear in very different arenas. Even when the language and images in one area \textit{do} challenge those in other areas, the perception of Victorian society as a multifaceted culture still in the process of creating disciplinary boundaries as well as invested in forms of media—such as the middle-class periodical—that combined literature and illustration with scientific articles and national and international news, helps to inform our understanding of the Victorian sleepwalker as a complex cultural construction and as a real figure.

Looking at Victorian discussions of sleepwalking not only expands and deepens our understanding of nineteenth-century models of the mind, but in some ways challenges the critical narratives we’ve recently constructed about Victorian psychiatry. Take, for instance, Sally Shuttleworth’s assertion that nineteenth-century psychology helped to codify and shore up the
gendered division required by the social ideology of separate spheres for men and women. She claims this was done via the presentation of competing models of selfhood: one a masculine free agent who has self-control and a feminine self increasingly seen as subject to an unstable, hysterical body (an interpretation supported by the new medical science of gynecology) with a “uterine economy” (4). Shuttleworth’s work on nineteenth-century psychiatry—in books on Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot, and Victorian periodicals—has had foundational importance for this subfield, but her interpretation of this issue is limited. A broader look at nineteenth-century psychiatry’s treatment of altered states in general, but most especially sleepwalking, reveals theories of mental science which challenge and complicate a narrative of masculine self-control and feminine hysteria. Mental science frequently used sleepwalkers as evidence of consciousness’s inability to completely control the self, and many nineteenth-century medical writers claimed to see more male sleepwalkers than female sleepwalkers. Clearly, early psychiatry saw men—at least those who sleepwalked—as at the mercy of their minds and physiology. Specific cases support this assertion of a breakdown of the psychiatric model that Shuttleworth suggests. For instance, in 1883 Dr. Daniel Hack Tuke, in an attempt to provide an important contribution to what he felt was an understudied area, created and circulated a survey for sleepwalkers. His survey yielded many examples from the professional middle-class, barristers and even doctors who habitually found themselves at the mercy of sleepwalking. Other writers, such as Binns above, report stories of naval men with a tendency to somnambulate.
1.3 VICTORIAN PSYCHOLOGY

There existed in the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century multiple medical—or “mental science”—narratives that shaped and enabled the Victorian view of and fascination with the sleepwalker. The first of these was Franz Joseph Gall’s neuroanatomical theories and methods which would lead to the development of what was later called phrenology, a psychological system that viewed the brain as compartmentalized and holding contradictory impulses. Gall’s theories can be found throughout mental science texts of the early nineteenth century, both in those who endorsed phrenology and in those who never mention the term or who sought to distance themselves from Gall’s work. In The Philosophy of Sleep (1830)—one of the earliest texts to attempt to discuss that state in the new psychologically oriented language of the day—Scottish physician Robert Macnish not only quotes Gall’s discussions of sleep and the sleepwalker, but proclaims “The phrenological system appears to me the only one capable of affording a rational and easy explanation of all the phenomena of the mind” (iv). He adds that otherwise it is “impossible to account for” things like dreaming and sleepwalking, but also “spectral illusions” and monomania (v). Twelve years later Binns does not name phrenology in The Anatomy of Sleep; or, the Art of Procuring Sound and Refreshing Slumber at Will, but he quotes extensively from Gall, at times mentioning that somnambulism “has been so ably, acutely, and satisfactorily explained by Gall” that he need hardly provide more discussion of possible physical causes and can simply move on to bombarding the reader with case studies and anecdotes (142).

Gall’s phrenological handling of sleepwalking seems to have met with some British approval not only because it appeared to provide a means by which the brain could be understood as housing multiple selves and contradictory impulses, but also because its
physiological impulse stood in contrast to popular Continental explanations that perceived sleepwalkers as mystical “visionaries” who saw with an “internal sight.” Gall, instead, suggested, “Experience proves that somnambulists who have their eyes shut hit themselves when objects unknown to them are placed in their way.” He goes on to argue that “Some persons think that somnambulism is a completely extraordinary state, because somnambulists execute during their sleep things which they could not accomplish awake” but “All astonishment ceases as soon as we reflect upon the circumstances in which we do the boldest things, and upon others in which we cannot.” Gall suggests that sleepwalkers can do extraordinary things simply because they do not experience fear, which aligns with arguments concerning the sleepwalker’s lack of inhibition. Binns further endorses Gall’s position by insisting, “This is what Gall says upon the subject, and is it not conclusive?” The next several decades of mental science suggest “no,” but his work was clearly influential.

The second of these medical narratives was Anton Mesmer’s experiments in Animal Magnetism—later called “mesmerism”—which encouraged a growing interest in the existence of a second level of consciousness, an interest that would persist and increase throughout the nineteenth-century and across Western Europe; the late-nineteenth-century work of Sigmund Freud is clearly the most famous response to this interest in secondary levels of consciousness. Between Mesmer and Freud, however, the sleepwalker occupied a privileged position in investigations as to what this level might contain. Mesmer was an eighteenth-century Austrian physician who claimed that his theory of “Animal Magnetism” was an application of Newtonian philosophy to bodily health. His creation was dubbed “mesmerism” by skeptics who sought to deny that any physical forces were involved, but the term eventually became more popular than Mesmer’s own appellation. The therapy worked through a series of “magnetic passes”—long,
sweeping movements of the hands close to the surface of the skin—that the mesmerist made over
the subject as they stared deeply into each other’s eyes. Via these “passes” the mesmerist would
be able to manipulate the “magnetic fluid” of the subject, putting him or her into a trance state
that allowed access to other levels of consciousness. In the mesmeric state the subject had
inconsistent and limited access to her external senses, though she was able to hear and speak to
the mesmeric “operator” if he addressed her. A strange internal communion would develop
between mesmerist and mesmerized: “she would speak his thoughts, taste the food in his mouth,
move her limbs in a physical echo of his” (Winter 3).

Scholars such as the historian Alison Winter have written extensively on the cultural
impact and presence of mesmerism in Victorian England. I do not wish to diminish that work,
especially considering that mesmerism and its attendant displays were popular pastimes mid-
century, but scholarship has often taken a less nuanced approach to the relationship that the
Victorians perceived between sleepwalking and mesmerism, with scholars either conflating the
two phenomena or suggesting that sleepwalking held a less resonant or secondary position within
the Victorian imagination. However, cultural interest in somnambulism predated and extended
beyond Mesmer’s popularization of Animal Magnetism—which experienced its heyday within
England in the 1830s-1850s—and mesmerism drew much of its symbolic power from the
spectacle and symbolism of sleepwalking. As a subject would sink into a mesmeric “trance”—
appearing to sleep but with eyes still open—the mesmerist would often paraphrase Macbeth’s
sleepwalking scene, commenting, “her eyes are open but their sense is shut” (Winter 3). For a
period during the first half of the nineteenth century the two phenomena were sometimes often
linked, with proponents attempting to boost mesmerism’s legitimacy by claiming a strong
relationship to spontaneous sleepwalking, and opponents of mesmerism suggesting
spontaneous sleepwalking as a more authentic counterpoint to mesmerism’s inauthenticity. Influential physician James Cowles Prichard complained in 1839 that he did not want to discuss somnambulism and animal magnetism in the same article because he was “unwilling to blend the consideration of [the] facts” of sleepwalking with “that of stories which most persons in this country look upon as entirely fabulous and absurd” (28). Prichard’s suspicions aside, however, Mesmer’s work did help to shift the larger cultural conversation around sleepwalking because of his attempts to create a more codified or “scientific” language for discussions of secondary consciousness.

More metaphysically oriented models of selfhood—like Mesmer’s—combined with those more physiologically informed. The third influence on Victorian views of sleepwalking was physiologist Marshall Hall’s theory of reflex action, based on his concept of two nervous systems within the body, one with the brain at its center and one with the spinal cord at its center. Hall, founder of the British Medical Association, published a series of influential papers on the reflex nervous system in the 1830s, which formed the basis of his *Memoirs of the Nervous System* (1837). In it he argues that the “Cerebral, or Sentient and Voluntary, System” is the intellect and judgment and thus the source of all willful activity; the “True Spinal, or Excito-Motory, System,” in contrast, has “no sensation, no volition, no consciousness, nothing psychical,” and operates in a wholly mechanistic manner that Hall christened the “reflex arc.” His model of the “True Spinal” system replaced the eighteenth-century concept of “sympathy” and “humors” between parts of the body with the reflex action in the spinal system (73). By arguing for a system that allows the body to engage in unwilled forms of action and thus separating bodily action from mental involvement, Hall “opens the route for new forms of meaning in the body’s acts and gestures…a body that is capable of containing more than one
narrative in its physiology” (Logan 167-8). This “multi-storied” body is key to nineteenth-century understandings of sleepwalking and its connection to the perception of personhood as an ever-expanding container for experience and impulse. Newspaper articles like “Somnambulism and Animal Magnetism” from an 1851 issue of Edinburgh’s Caledonian Mercury acknowledged Hall’s influence on theories of sleepwalking behavior; the author, after detailing how a lecturer attempting to explain somnambulism used diagrams of the nervous system in order to discuss its connection with the brain, mentions Hall’s suggestion that the spinal system never sleeps as one way to understand how parts of the mind-body connection seemed “awake” during somnambulism while others did not.

These developments were accompanied by the popularity of “moral management” as a psychiatric doctrine which suggested there was no insurmountable barrier between sanity and insanity, and that sanity and a normative nervous profile were the result of self-control. While such a doctrine suggested that rehabilitation was possible for many of the most disturbing cases and was an “acknowledgement that the working of transformed states of consciousness…[were] key to the operation of the mind as a whole” (Shuttleworth and Taylor 67), it also created uncertainty about the division of “deranged” and “sane” states of mind.17 This flexibility provided, however, an atmosphere in which liminal states were increasingly regarded as central and important to psychological discussion.

In this psychological milieu could also be found the remnants of a strong eighteenth-century associationist tradition in philosophy, which was based on the idea that the mind spontaneously links ideas in chains of thought, suggesting—almost whimsically—that the mental representations themselves somehow recognized their affinity with each other. This idea of mental association had been developed by John Locke, whose theories of consciousness and
selfhood maintained, as I discuss in chapter 1, a persistent influence in the Victorian legal system, if not one that consistently shaped Victorian literary approaches to sleepwalking. Before the growing distance between associationism’s strong legal presence and its lessening centrality to medical discussions sowed the seeds of a mid-to-late century medico-legal conundrum, the associationist work of John Abercrombie did provide medical history with popular case studies of sleepwalking. The most-repeated was that of “Nancy,” a maid who sleepwalked from the ages of 6 to 17, and although “much inferior, intellectually, to the other servants in the family” when awake, while sleepwalking Nancy spoke French and Latin, vocally imitated the sound of a violin, and told “what she called fable[s], and in these her imagery was both appropriate and elegant” (Abercrombie 245-48). Nancy’s story was repeated by many psychological writers, but most notably by J. G. Millingen, who lamented

To what serious reflections does not this curious history give rise. Here there did unquestionably exist a double existence. The one a relative being surrounded with the realities of life; the other a natural condition, unshackled by constraint, and left entirely to the wild enjoyment of a luxuriant fancy and an apprehension quick and brilliant…In her second existence she became the free child of nature. (84)

In suggesting the sleepwalker is a “freechild nature,” Millingen not only characterizes the somnambulist as uniquely able to reveal the natural potentials of human existence, but also suggests that the spontaneous ability to reveal things while sleepwalking provides clues to the mind’s relationship to the unconscious and its ability to contain vast stores of unconscious knowledge. Unlike Abercrombie—who notes without interest that “Nancy” was later dismissed from the family and possibly went insane (248)—Millingen does not pathologize her behavior: he celebrates it as a utopian possibility for the mind.

From the 1850s onward, mental science was increasingly physiologically based, although—as Roger Smith has persuasively argued via a study of nineteenth-century
periodicals—this did not mean that mysticism and metaphysics were immediately banished in
the creation of a wholly materialist discipline of psychology. William Benjamin Carpenter’s
theory of “unconscious cerebration” became increasingly popular and relevant at midcentury, as
seen in Wilkie Collins’s use of the term in The Moonstone (1868) and Francis Power Cobbe’s
series of articles on the subject in Macmillan’s Magazine in 1870-71. The term first appeared in
Carpenter’s Principles of Human Psychology (1854), a text which he revised and expanded upon
multiple times throughout the second half the nineteenth century. Some of the most eminent
novelists and scientists began to look seriously at non-deliberate thought, specifically at what
they called “unconscious cerebration.” This concept, emerging from new ideas of reflex as the
central function unit of the nervous system and as the purview of the cerebrum—from the lowest
motor action to the highest mental functions—was the starting point for a new orientation toward
the mind.\textsuperscript{18} Carpenter suggested that unconscious cerebration was the means by which the mind
produced “intellectual products,” which we only become conscious of upon their completion:
their evolution is, however, automatic and unconscious. Carpenter’s work included extensive
commentary on sleepwalking and although his physiologically driven work included admissions
that “there is the same want of Volitional control over the current of thought…as in dreaming”
(591), his fascination with the subject was clearly driven by curiosity as to how the “nervo-
muscular apparatus” was activated in such a way “[the sleepwalker’s] purely Automatic action in
this state will frequently evolve conclusions which Volitional exertion has vainly striven to
attain” (592).

Although for decades the subject of great interest, a consensus regarding the place of this
“Volitional exertion”—or will—in a scientific psychology was never reached, but the debates
informed sleepwalking discussions of the last half of the century. Herbert Spencer’s
physiologically informed yet dynamic understanding of the will, especially in his discussions of mental action as “the continuous differention and integration of states of consciousness” (332) informed Tuke’s later work in delineating the exact role of ideation within sleepwalking (7), as he claimed “ample evidence of the action of ideational centres in somnambulists” (31). Questions about the will’s status and its relationship to conscious and unconscious states forged a strong relationship between the concerns of mainstream psychology and nineteenth-century authors interested in exploring the liminality of somnambulism and other sleep-related phenomena.

The physiologically informed mental sciences of the mid- and late-nineteenth century sought to understand a relationship whose mysteries are still at the heart of neuroscientific debate: that between the physical brain and the processes of the mind.¹⁹ In investigating this relationship, Victorian scientists raised new questions, such as, is the self united or multiple? And, what are the limits of self-control and volition? Nineteenth-century novelists also attempted to address and answer these questions, and representing and exploring the phenomenon of sleepwalking provided them with an opportunity to present a dramatized and heightened form of this potential for a multifaceted self with uncertain limits of control. I do want to suggest, however, that as Victorian psychology shifted toward deterministic theories of heredity and degenerative physiognomy, authors like Wilkie Collins shifted their representations of sleepwalking to models that were more symbolic and experimental, and Le Fanu and Stoker drew on the more metaphysical parapsychology of figures like Reichenbach, or rejected humanistic portrayals of sleepwalking in favor of those which emphasized the somnambulist as an inhuman automaton. This could be seen as, on the one hand, a reaction to the banality of medical writers who began to portray sleepwalking as more mundane, and, on the other hand, a
capitalization upon the works of psychiatrists like Henry Maudsley, who argued for a more mechanistic interpretation of types of consciousness, suggesting “that lunatics and criminals are as much manufactured articles as are steam-engines and calico-printing machines” (Body and Mind 51).

1.4 INDIVIDUAL CHAPTERS

Throughout my dissertation chapters I place analysis of Victorian novels and short stories alongside discussion of nineteenth-century psychological theories, non-fiction depictions of sleepwalkers, and wider cultural context and concerns, such as legal cases and attitudes toward mystical experience. This study of the somnambulist’s symbolic resonance and real world positioning reveals not only a constellation of how notions of selfhood were represented and revised within literature, but also how these projects intersect with concerns of genre and aesthetics. I begin with Wilkie Collins's attempts at psychological realism before moving onto Thomas Hardy's exploration of materialism and mysticism, which presents a model of the self that has much in common with that of Collins, while adding and exploring a metaphysical dimension largely (though not entirely) absent in Collins’s work. I conclude with the explicit supernaturalism of the vampire narratives of Sheridan Le Fanu and Bram Stoker each of which simultaneously explodes and reiterates what it means to have a human self.

In my first chapter on the work of Wilkie Collins, I first examine the larger context of Victorian attitudes toward crime, self-management, and guilt, exploring the unique position held by the sleepwalking criminal, a figure who complicates nineteenth-century ideals of the limits of self-discipline and the coherency required to constitute a unitary legal self. In this chapter I analyze Collins’s use of the sleepwalker as key figure in four of his texts, arguing for a
reevaluation of Collins’s work which takes into account both his investment in exploring the relationship between guilt, intention, and the unconscious, and the continuity and evolution of his key concerns and symbols through his long literary career, including both his canonical works and his critically neglected later texts.

With the complex relationship of criminality and liminality as my focus, I place my analyses of No Name (1862), The Moonstone (1868), “Who Killed Zebedee?” (1881) and The Legacy of Cain (1889) alongside an examination of three cases of sleepwalking crime which occurred in mid-to-late nineteenth century England. My discussions of trial transcripts and newspaper accounts alongside medical jurisprudence texts and the testimony of medical experts establish a context of the complex medico-legal construction and interpretation of the somnambulist. These trials are juxtaposed to Collins’s more fluid literary handling of sleepwalking guilt: the complexities of his depictions suggest that the easy assumptions of real life sleepwalking cases—such as the necessity of discontinuous consciousness in establishing innocence—need to be more closely interrogated.

In my second chapter I argue that sleepwalking is also a productive symbol for Thomas Hardy because of its liminality, which brings together seeming opposites without resolving the tensions between them. I pair Hardy’s novel Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891) with William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), arguing that in Hardy we see an anticipation of James’s complex handling of mysticism, just as James’s psychological investigations can better inform our understanding of the seeming contradictions in Hardy’s work.

In Angel Clare, Hardy creates a perfectly liminal sleepwalker: the middle class idealist who rejects both the Christian doctrine and the bourgeois life of the mind chosen by his father and brothers, and is consequently of a liminal class position, and in a liminal state of belief.
between materialism and spirituality. Occupying the position of sleep but also of “not-sleep”; Angel’s sleepwalking serves as a metaphor for a transition between life and death, and the psychological spectre of divided selfhood. Hardy uses the spectacle of somnambulism to explore the tension and connections between nineteenth-century materialism and nineteenth-century mysticism—both the ways that psychological debates divided the human subject between religious and scientific worldviews—but also the inability to resolve those world views. Consequently, Hardy’s discourse within *Tess* seems to support opposing worldviews which he refuses to reconcile within the scope of the novel.

In the final chapter I explore the important connections between sleepwalking and vampirism in *Dracula* (1897) and *Carmilla* (1872), showing how in these texts being a sleepwalker is like being a vampire. Stoker and Le Fanu use this pairing to both re-sensationalize and supernaturalize a naturally occurring liminal state of consciousness while also naturalizing a supernaturally liminal state between life and death. This is accomplished via representations of sleepwalking that portray it as a type of metaphysical or mystical automatism, a gothic, dehumanized state, although one that actually exists. By linking somnambulism and vampirism, Stoker and Le Fanu help to both reestablish the frightful potentials of sleepwalking while at the same time use its reality—its actual place in Victorian culture and society, epitomized by its strong showing in periodical literature—to suggest the potential truth of a vampiric presence in nineteenth-century Europe.
2.0 “GUILTY FORMS OF INNOCENCE”: SLEEPWALKING AND CRIMINALITY IN
THE WORKS OF WILKIE COLLINS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

By 1887, Parisian detective Robert Ledru had made a name for himself as both deeply corrupt and a fine detective. That year Ledru’s Sûreté supervisors sent him to Le Havre on the Normandy coast to assist in a case of several sailors who had gone missing. His investigation there was quickly interrupted when local authorities asked for his assistance in a new murder case, wherein a visiting Paris merchant, Andre Monet, had been found fatally shot on the beach. As Monet was a lone traveler, authorities faced difficulties in determining why someone in Le Havre would have attacked him. While investigating the site of the murder, Ledru noticed misshapen footprints on the beach which suggested that the killer’s right foot was missing its big toe, a detail that became crucial to solving the crime.

Ledru had woken up that morning with his socks inexplicably wet. As he was also missing the big toe on his right foot and sometimes suffered somnambulistic fits (possibly tied to the strain that ten years of syphilis had placed on his nervous system), he quickly came to this conclusion: he had been sleepwalking the night before, likely carrying the gun he always placed under his pillow at night, and somehow made his way to the beach where he had been startled by Monet. That the bullet was from a German pistol—the same type that he carried—supported this theory. Ledru explained this to both the local police and his Parisian supervisors, who concluded that Ledru’s theory was impossible to prove and that as Ledru had no motive to kill Monet, he...
should be exonerated of the crime. This did not, however, prevent them from placing Ledru in jail for observation. The guards reported that he did indeed somnambulate in his cell, and that after they placed a gun (containing only blanks) under his pillow without his knowledge, he then shot at the guards while sleepwalking. Because Ledru’s actions did confirm a tendency toward violence while sleepwalking, he was committed to a farm in the French countryside, where he spent the last 50 years of his life under guard.20

The story of Inspector Ledru’s sleepwalking highlights multiple issues key to nineteenth century legal and literary discussions of somnambulistic criminality. Because Ledru did not remember his sleepwalking episodes and the actions committed therein, and because he had no apparent motive to kill Monet, his sleepwalking conforms to a psychological and legal model that perceives the sleepwalking and waking selves as discontinuous—almost separate—entities. Accounts of the crime, however, reveal that Ledru had taken his case files and reports to the beach the night he shot Monet; both this detail and his access to and adeptness with a gun were clearly facilitated by his social role as a policeman. These details support a more continuous model of selfhood, as the sleepwalking Ledru had the same anxieties about his casework as the waking Ledru, and the same skills and resources.

Within much of nineteenth-century legal culture, “true” sleepwalkers had discontinuous personhood: they committed crimes of which they had no memory and for which they had no motive. They often committed crimes that seemed to work against the best interests of their waking selves—most notably attacking their own children—and juries and judges were most likely to acquit or dismiss charges when no motive or intentionality could be identified. Intention, it was argued, was necessary for criminal culpability, and unconscious people committed actions that were devoid of intention. Sleepwalkers who were brought to trial and
demonstrated some continuity of self were often not viewed as sleepwalkers at all. If a
sleepwalker were found to have a possible motive for his or her crime, he or she was deemed a
liar, a real criminal who was using somnambulism as a convenient ruse. In these trials, probable
motive was equated with clear intention, which was deemed incompatible with unconsciousness.

This question of whether unconscious people had motives and intentions, and how
unconsciousness could or could not be shaped by conscious action, was central to the debates of
nineteenth-century psychology. These discussions also informed the way that the question of
how guilt and innocence were shaped by intention was explored in the literature of the day.
Popular sensation novelist Wilkie Collins addressed this issue via sleepwalking at four different
points in his literary career. Three of these attempts were in the novels *No Name* (1862), *The
Moonstone* (1868), and *The Legacy of Cain* (1889).

It is in the fourth—a short story called “Who Killed Zebedee?” (1881)—that we see
Collins represent what seems to be the typical sleepwalking criminal. Mrs. Zebedee is a habitual
sleepwalker, aware of tales of sleepwalking crimes, and when she wakes to find her husband
stabbed, she immediately assumes that she has killed her husband, even though she has no
memory of and no motive for the crime. This, she feels, is what sleepwalkers are prone to do and
how they tend to do it. But Collins turns these assumptions on their head, revealing Mrs.
Zebedee is innocent, but that the real murderer had intended to use Mrs. Zebedee’s sleepwalking
to set her up as a convenient scapegoat. In “Who Killed Zebedee?” we can see Collins as
suggesting that the sleepwalking criminal of the trial courts shows a convenient and
psychologically unrealistic empty interiority, a discontinuous self that supports a simplistic and
reassuring interpretation of the divide between guilt and innocence.
In Collins’s novels, his treatment of sleepwalking uses its liminality to further push against these boundaries of culpability. Though his sleepwalkers do not always remember the actions they’ve attempted while asleep, the sleepwalkers in *No Name*, *The Moonstone*, and *The Legacy of Cain* have continuous selves because their somnambulistic actions stem from their waking desires and concerns. Their waking intentions are largely consistent with the intentionality they show while sleepwalking. Despite this, these characters are not perceived as either fully responsible for their somnambulistic actions, or as the perpetrators of particularly heinous actions—this judgment is reserved for the other, non-sleepwalking characters to which they are contrasted—suggesting that unlike the police courts, in matters of the unconscious Collins viewed intentionality as a separate—or, at the very least, more complicated—issue from guilt. In *No Name* the sleepwalker actually commits no crime whatsoever; he is, however, victimized (while somnambulating) by the completely sympathetic criminal/heroine. Collins clearly represents guilt and innocence as a spectrum, not as opposing binaries, and his dedication to exploring sleepwalking interiority makes clear his literary project of psychological realism, the exploration of the layers of the psychological self.

In my analysis of Collins’s work, I first examine the larger context of Victorian attitudes toward crime, self-management, and guilt, exploring the unique position held by the sleepwalking criminal, a figure who complicates nineteenth-century ideals of the limits of self-discipline and the coherency required to constitute a unitary legal self. I then examine three cases of sleepwalking crime which occurred in mid-to-late nineteenth century England, discussing trial transcripts and newspaper accounts alongside medical jurisprudence texts and the testimony of medical experts in order to establish a context of the complex medico-legal construction of and interpretation of the somnambulist. My argument then shifts to the handling of these issues
within the popular literature of the day, first arguing for the intimate relationship between sensation fiction and somnambulism, and then examining this connection in two mystery novels contemporary to Collins’s work. In the final section of this chapter I argue for an evaluation of Collins’s work that takes into account his investment in representing and redefining the relationship between guilt, intention, and the unconscious, as evidenced by his repeated returns to the sleepwalker as an image of liminal consciousness. I begin with “Who Killed Zebedee?” and argue that Collins uses this very direct engagement between the sleepwalker and the British legal system to interrogate the easy assumptions of real life sleepwalking cases. “Zebedee” takes sleepwalking criminality as its focus, giving us an example of Collins’s most distilled use of the phenomenon. I then move to his novels, using the earliest—No Name—to begin analyzing Collins’s counter-project, arguing that we see in his first use of the sleepwalker an attempt to use liminal states as symbolically potent literary techniques; he uses fiction to force a reexamination of presumed divides between conscious and unconscious modes. I finish with an analysis of two rarely linked novels—the popular and much-analyzed The Moonstone and the largely critically forgotten The Legacy of Cain—that both use opium-induced sleepwalking to catalyze criminal impulses in the heroic subject. I argue that while The Moonstone initiates a somnambulistic quest to plumb the possibilities of what the self may contain, The Legacy of Cain extends that inquiry to explore the role of will and self-management in the relationship between the conscious and unconscious selves.

2.2 VICTORIAN CRIME

Recent literary and historical scholarship suggests that Victorians were fascinated by all sorts of crime, and perhaps this fascination comes from being a part of a surveillance culture that
encouraged self-discipline and control, fostering a type of twisted delight in inundating oneself with examples of the ways in which that self-discipline had failed. Victorian interest in crime included both “true crime” and fictional criminality. The nonfiction sources for these criminal accounts included the infamous Newgate Calendar, the Old Bailey Session Papers, local and metropolitan newspapers, and illustrated tabloids. Fictional sources included penny dreadfuls and sensation fiction, the latter of which will be addressed at the start of the next section.

The Newgate Calendar (subtitled “The Malefactors’ Bloody Register”) was popular in the 18th and 19th centuries, and originally began as a simple bulletin of monthly executions. It grew to include biographical sketches of notorious criminals and editorial material extensively condemning crime and any sort of dissipated behavior, and was one of the three books most likely to be found in the average British home. Its popularity, however, diminished in the first half of the nineteenth century, replaced by the even more colorful “penny dreadfuls,” a mid-to-late-nineteenth-century type of publication that featured lurid stories, often told in serialization, and directed to both adult and child audiences.

A more long-lasting record of true crime was the Old Bailey Sessions Papers, first published in 1674, and—continuing up through the 20th century—reported courtroom testimony of every trial at the Old Bailey, London’s central criminal court. Legal historian Joel Peter Eigen has suggested that Victorian interest in legal proceedings showed that nineteenth-century readers possessed an insatiable curiosity for trial detail fueled by “a rich mixture of prurience and moral outrage” (5). In addition to the coverage offered by the OBSP, the Times of London maintained a complete index of criminal trials, and other city newspapers were likely to report the events surrounding the more unusual crimes and innovative defense strategies. The publishers of the OBSP nominated ten to fifteen trials each year to be highlighted in special publication, which
included thumbnail descriptions of specific cases and their unusual forensic elements. These
descriptions also included “an eye to alerting the reader to an apparent departure in legal thinking
reflected in a singular verdict, or to unfamiliar issues raised in judge-jury dialogue,” which
suggests that the British reader was “a legally savvy, well-educated Victorian consumer attuned
to, and hungry for innovations in courtroom drama” (5). The OBSP and prominent newspapers
provide most of the current available material on how sleepwalking was handled in the
nineteenth-century criminal courtroom, from the way that defenses were constructed and counsel
presented somnambulists on trial, to what sort of medical expertise was offered and how the
judges and juries responded.

But the savvy, well-educated Victorian consumer also had a taste for the more sensational
accounts of crime and criminals which could be found in popular periodicals like the Illustrated
Police News, published from 1864 until 1938. The tone and illustrations of the IPN were
reminiscent of the Newgate Calendar, but the IPN reported on not only brutal murders and
executions, but also crimes that were strange and dramatic without being particularly violent or
serious (sometimes the crimes weren’t even committed, only threatened). These more unique
crimes included many sleepwalkers, such as a monk who “nearly commits a great crime while
asleep,” featured in the IPN on May 19, 1888, or the 1894 headline “Somnambulism at
Wimbledon,” accompanied by a full page illustration of a policeman being approached by a
scantily clad woman whose nightgown cannot fully contain her cleavage. The subjects of these
two illustrations commit no actual crime: the monk sleepwalks into the room of his superior and
violence is threatened though none actually occurs, while the policeman of Wimbledon had
initially thought he was being accosted by a prostitute (or possibly a ghost, depending on
whether he took her declaration that she was meeting “kindred spirits” as more literal or
figurative) before realizing that the woman in front of him was merely a somnambulist who had managed to exit her home. Because these illustrations and their accompanying stories are surrounded by accounts of actual murders, robberies, assaults, and arsons, the question is raised as to why these non-crimes were considered worthy of inclusion in the *IPN*. It would be too far to suggest that the Victorians considered sleepwalking in itself a crime—indeed, I will discuss below how the nineteenth-century public seemed to view the sleepwalking criminal as actually quite sympathetic, at least in some situations—but the representations in the *IPN* are sufficient to demonstrate that the phenomena was almost always viewed as transgressive. These two examples beautifully demonstrate this: we see the limitations of self-discipline in the secretly violent man of the cloth—whose murderous impulses are buried so deeply that even when told of them he insists that they could not be possible—and the incompletely dressed young woman—who, regardless of the truth of the depiction, is represented as buxom and half-exposed—discussed as a shadowy “it” before she finds herself in the arms of a strange policeman. Their transgression and their apparent lack of control over whether or not they transgress highlight sleepwalking’s inherent violence to the self, not unlike the symbolic function of Wilkie Collins’s repeated use of sleepwalking in his fiction. Like Thomas Hardy—who represents Angel Clare as a potential physical threat to Tess but also as a vulnerable potential victim who while sleepwalking is at her mercy—Collins sometimes presents the sleepwalker as the perpetrator of violence, sometimes as the recipient of brutality or deceit, and sometimes as both perpetrator and victim all at once. Without fail, however, for Collins the sleepwalker is always the site of criminal concern, suggesting that the liminality the sleepwalker embodied and symbolized was perceived as inherently violent to a conception of the self as coherent, intact, and whole.
A coherent self was necessary not only to the successful working of the legal system—which, at least since John Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), predicated legal responsibility on a cohesive, unitary consciousness—but also to the type of disciplined selfhood encouraged within Victorian society.\(^{24}\) In *Discipline and Punish* (1975), Michel Foucault famously discussed the larger social effects of Jeremy Bentham’s “panopticon” design, first put forth in the late 18\(^{th}\) century, but influential in nineteenth-century England.

Bentham’s original design for a prison—a circular structure or “inspection house” surrounded by a group of cells all visible to the central tower—was also suggested as an effective design for hospitals, asylums, schools, and factories, highlighting how the panopticon’s design was useful for the amplification of power in all areas of society. Foucault argues that the panopticon’s impersonal yet highly effective dissemination of power served as a metaphor for modern disciplinary societies and their pervasive inclination to observation and surveillance.

At the heart of the panopticon’s effectiveness is the way that the observed subject participates in the exercise of power. Though the observer/guard in the inspection tower can see all of the prisoners (or workers, or patients, or students), the design of the tower does not allow the prisoners to see the observer/guard.

Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that inmates should be caught up in power situation of which they themselves are the bearers. (Foucault 201)

Because the inmate can never verify when he is being observed, he must always assume that he could be observed, and therefore must exercise self-surveillance in order to avoid punishment.
Because the power of the panopticon was unverifiable, it was also anonymous. This anonymity and the self-perpetuating nature of the structure meant that “any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine: in the absence of the director, his family, his friends, his visitors, even his servants” (202). This notion enacts a democratization of surveillance, and although the Victorian mainstream rejected Bentham’s later ideas for increased government power and structuring, his ideas of how everyone and anyone could exercise disciplinary power or have it exercised on them influenced and bolstered the Victorian liberal desire for and valuation of self-government. In fact, resistance to a strong, centralized external government made internalized governance all the more necessary. With the public increasingly aware of legal proceedings and laws—which makes everyone a judge—and also increasingly aware of the potential for crime (fed by sensational fiction and tabloids)—which makes everyone feel they are potentially a victim—then it seems likely that the need for self-control and management would feel very heightened.

Within this overall fascination with crime, sleepwalking provides a unique example regarding self-discipline. With sleepwalking in particular, there is a failure of self-surveillance and discipline that is unaccompanied by guilt and culpability. The sleepwalker is asleep: how can one observe oneself—let alone discipline that self—in one’s sleep? It is a critical commonplace to suggest that Victorians were quite invested in self-control, and popular nineteenth-century advice literature supports this, but medical authority Alfred Swaine Taylor argued in his *Principles and Practice* (1844) that a fit of sleepwalking is a criminal defense. If violence was indeed perpetuated unconsciously during sleep, it was frequently assumed that malice and intention, the chief ingredient of criminal culpability, were lost. Eigen notes that, “The failure to remain a constant person suggested an inability to know what one was up to, let alone an
awareness that any specific act was wrong. Without a fundamental knowledge of the nature and consequences of one’s act, there could be no intentional choice to do evil” (133). When he wrote in 1863 that will and intention were required to make an act criminal, James Fitzjames Stephens singled out somnambulist acts as voluntary and yet not accompanied by intention. “Hence, if a man killed another in his sleep, there would be no crime, because there would be no intention and therefore no action” (79).

In *Unconscious Crime*, Eigen points out that there is a kind of horror that could be attached to the apparent lack of self-discipline during sleepwalking: the failure of the self to exert control over itself, especially during a time when this control is being discussed as so very necessary (the rule of empire comes to mind). But I think there is evidence to suggest that there was also a sort of delight in it as well, for unlike typical criminal behavior, somnambulistic crime or violence did not necessarily reflect a complete immorality on the part of the perpetrator. Consider, for example, the press account of a young male servant who attacks his master and mistress with an ax while all three are asleep; the newspaper notes, “No one suspects that the lad any evil intent.” The Victorians may have been darkly attracted to the nightmarish possibilities of somnambulism, but the extensive coverage of sleepwalking in the popular press suggests there was clearly a vicarious pleasure in the idea that “I” could do something in a failure of control and not be held responsible for that failure: when they did not lead to death or injury, lapses in the sleepwalker’s judgment or control were sources of titillation or amusement, not of social or moral censure. This is consistent with recent literary scholarship which has also noted that advances in the study of psychology in the period tended to emphasize the physiological basis of the mind, which created an awareness of limitations to the creation and maintenance of a rational, controlling self. The sleepwalker provided an especially resonant way—clearly
embodied in a highly visible and often sensational figure—to navigate the tension between highly valuing self-control and recognizing the physical and psychological obstacles to cultivating this self-control.

2.3 THE SLEEPWALKING DEFENSE

Though Victorian sleepwalking crimes may have been gruesome or violent, Victorian sleepwalking defendants were usually not habitual criminals, nor did they meet cultural expectations of repeat, hardened deviants. This detail likely influenced the lack of convictions: sleepwalking defendants often seemed unlikely to have purposefully committed the crimes of which they were accused. This is not to say that they had not, however, committed the crimes in question: often, there were witnesses to confirm this fact or even suspicions on the part of the defendants that they (or at least their bodies) had perpetrated the actions of which they stood accused. Instead, the issue for debate was whether or not the accused was responsible for the crime, even if he or she appeared to have committed it.

This question made sleepwalking criminal trials unique: in other legal cases of possible nonresponsibility, the defendant’s status as sane or insane was usually up for debate. But sleepwalkers were not generally regarded as anything other than of sound mind, providing a unique example of how defendants could be held legally non-culpable for violent crime for reasons other than insanity. Thus, all successful sleepwalking defenses in England in the nineteenth-century—and before—including the assumption that the defendant was unconscious but also that the defendant lacked a motive for the crime committed. Alfred Swaine Taylor mentions an unsuccessful use of the sleepwalking defense in 1836 in which a woman claimed that she had stabbed her son-in-law while somnambulating. Though there was an initial
suggestion that the woman was irresponsible for her action, “It was proved, however, that the prisoner had shown malicious feeling against the prosecutor, and that she had wished him dead. The knife with which the wound had been inflicted bore the appearance of having been recently sharpened.” The prisoner showed what was apparently deemed an unnatural dexterity that required intention, for she had to reach over her sleeping daughter in order to inflict the wound, and each of these facts were deemed “adverse to the supposition of the act having been perpetrated in a state of unconsciousness in awaking from sleep, and the prisoner was convicted” (Principles 600).³⁴

Below I’ve chosen three cases in which the sleepwalking defense was used either completely or partially successfully. The first is that of Sarah Minchin (1853), the second is that of Esther Griggs (1859), and the third is that of Simon Fraser (1878). Each of these three cases provides important insight into the legal history of how and why sleepwalking guilt and innocence were determined. This information ranges from the use of psychiatric texts and doctors in the courtroom, to insight into how it was determined whether or not a sleepwalking case would actually go beyond police court to a full criminal trial, to the first time a judge advised a courtroom jury that a prisoner was not responsible for a crime for reasons of unconsciousness “by reason of the condition of somnambulism” (British Medical Journal 108).

The 1853 case of Sarah Minchin demonstrates the role that medical expertise might play in determining the possible responsibility and intentionally of a sleepwalking defendant. The previous year Minchin had risen from her bed in the middle of the night, entered the room of the young boy for whom she was a nursemaid, and attempted to cut his throat with a large knife—all while sleepwalking. She was charged with “felonious wounding” and stood trial at the Old Bailey. A border in the same house testified,
“I heard [the victim] calling out, ‘Oh, Sarah! Oh Sarah!’ I got out of the bed, ran into the boy’s room, and saw the prisoner on the bed with the little boy underneath the clothes, she had a large carving knife in her hands, and she struck at the boy’s neck with it, and he caught it in his hands. The moment the prisoner found that somebody had interfered, she fell on the bed apparently insensible.”

Minchin’s mother also testified on her daughter’s behalf, attesting to her daughter’s horrible dreams—with accompanying screaming—and her suffering “a great deal from her monthly periods being irregular, which I believe has had an effect upon her mind” (Eigen 131). Minchin’s defense attorney reiterated this in his address to the court, and insisted that the jury understand Minchin was “under the influence of some frightful dream and that she did not know what she was doing.” He referred to other stories of lethal or violent sleepwalking—which I will discuss more fully below—and obliquely suggested that Minchin could not be subjected to a full physical examination because of menstruation (presumably—he was vague). The jury eventually found Minchin guilty of unlawful wounding—not attempted murder—and her sentence was three months in confinement (Times of London 7). Minchin’s conviction is singular for its time, though the downgraded charge and sentence suggests that her circumstances were perceived as unusual and sympathetic.

That the attorney compared Minchin’s case to others is significant as a part of his defensive strategy to argue for non-responsibility, and gives us a sense of the ways in which Victorian discourses about the sleepwalker drew from a variety of cultural sources. Familiarity with sleepwalking tales in culture and folklore may have increased sympathy and understanding for criminal sleepwalkers in legal cases. In Minchin’s trial, the defense attorney read from an early edition of Taylor’s Principles and Practices of Medical Jurisprudence (later editions would include mention of Minchin’s trial itself)³⁶, quoting sleepwalking tales that can be found in
several medical and legal sources from the nineteenth century. Minchin’s defense attorney read Taylor’s account of two hunters sleeping in the same bed, one of whom was a sleepwalker. Two persons who had been hunting during the day slept together at night. One of them was renewing the chase in his dream, and imagining himself present at the death of the stag, cried out ‘I’ll kill him!—I’ll kill him!’ The other, awakened by the noise, got out of bed, and by the light of the moon beheld the sleeper give several deadly stabs with a knife on that part of the bed which he had just quitted. (Principles 600)

The story is not unlike that of the monk, recorded in the Illustrated Police News years later (quoted above), and Taylor is aware of the role that perceived enmity might play in interpretation of and response to the crime. “Suppose,” he notes, “a blow given in this way had proved fatal, and the two men had been shown to have quarreled previously to retiring to rest!” (600) This speculation acknowledges that sleepwalking crimes occurred in a social and personal context that shaped the meaning ascribed to them, and which was likely why Taylor suggested although sleepwalking was a valid legal defense, he also admitted, “It is impossible, however, to lay down any general rules relative to cases of this description; since the circumstances attending each case will sufficiently explain how far the act of murder or suicide had been committed during a state of somnambulism, or under a hallucination continuing from a state of sleep” (Principles 601).

The attorney’s use of sleepwalking lore in the Minchin trial suggests the possibilities for overlap between philosophical writing and legal instrumentality, and gives us insight into how sympathy might have been created—or diminished—for a sleepwalking defendant. Minchin’s lack of motive was viewed as significant, but the court clearly perceived room for some sort of desire on Minchin’s part. Not so for Esther Griggs, who in 1859 also injured a child while in a
sleepwalking dream. This time, however, social context seems to have worked in Griggs’s favor: unlike Minchin—a hired servant, someone outside the family—Griggs injured her own child. Like Minchin’s case, Griggs’ injury was not fatal. The Times of London made report of the case in January of that year, recording the proceedings of the Marylebone Police Court. Griggs had allegedly thrown her youngest child out a second-story window, and on January 5th, the Times reported the testimony of Sergeant Simmons, a police constable who was one of the first at the scene.

At half-past 1 o’clock this morning, while on duty in East street, Manchester Square, I heard a female voice exclaim, “Oh my children! Save my children!” I went to house No. 71, whence the cries proceeded, and the landlord opened the door. I went up-stairs, accompanied by two other constables, and while making our way to the first floor front room I heard the smashing of glass. I knocked at the door, which I found was fastened, and said, “Open it; the police are here.” The prisoner, who was in her nightdress, kept exclaiming, “Save my children!” and at length, after stumbling over something, let me and my brother officer in. When we entered we found the room in darkness, and it was only by aid of our lanterns that we could distinguish anything in the room. On the bed there was a child five years old, and another three years of age by her side. Everything in the place was in great confusion. The prisoner told me that she had been dreaming that her little boy had said the house was on fire, and [she had thrown her child through the glass window] with a view of preventing her children from being burnt to death. I have no doubt that if I and the other constable had not gone to the room, all three of the children would have been flung out into the street…the window had not been thrown up. The child was thrust through a pane of glass, the fragments of which fell into the street.

Esther Griggs was, from the beginning, viewed by law enforcement as having borne no ill intentions toward her children. Her case was viewed as pitiable, and no one took her into custody the night she threw her daughter out a window. At her initial appearance in front of the police court, a second police officer testified that she “told me she had no wish to hurt any of her children, and that it was all through a dream” and “there had been no attempt to murder the infant. The prisoner had always evinced a kindly feeling towards her children…The dream under
which the act was committed showed that she had not at the time any consciousness of what she was doing.” Intention was perceived as having been separated from action via unconsciousness. Her child slowly recovered, and “when the grand jury empaneled to consider an indictment for assault with intent to murder refused to find a true bill, in effect rendering judgment on the ultimate question of Griggs’ guilt or innocence, which was of course the sole province of the petit jury” (Eigen 136).

Law officials, however, clearly took a more severe approach when such a somnambulistic attack resulted in death. Consider the case of Simon Fraser, whose wife, early on the morning of April 10th, 1878 awoke to hear her husband ‘roaring inarticulately like an animal.’ Mrs. Fraser was horrified to see Simon hurling things about the room, and she was deeply concerned when she realized that their 18 month-old son was not in the bed with her. When Simon had dreamed of a wild beast jumping into the bed, he reacted by leaping out of bed to chase the animal around the bedroom, throwing tables and chairs at it. He eventually caught the beast and threw it against the wall, but when Mrs. Fraser found their son fatally injured on the floor, it became clear that the beast Simon had vanquished was actually his own child. Fraser was brought to trial for the murder of his young son, and family members revealed that they had ample documentation of his history of bizarre sleep-related behavior. His father testified that he had once been the victim of a similar sleep-induced assault, and other family members shared stories of being “saved” when not drowning or pulled from imaginary fires. Despite the brutal nature of the Fraser assault, the trial was quickly halted by the foreman of the jury who announced that there was little reason to proceed with the case, as “the jury believed the prisoner was not responsible for his actions.” Though the Lord-Justice insisted that medical witnesses be heard, he nonetheless eventually advised the members of the jury that they return a verdict that the prisoner “had killed his child,
but that he was in a state in which he was unconscious of the act which he was committing by reason of the condition of somnambulism, and that he was not responsible for his actions” (*British Medical Journal* 108). Fraser was not acquitted (the Crown simply refrained from moving for sentence), nor was he declared insane. However, after being instructed that he should henceforth sleep in a room occupied by no one else, Fraser was dismissed from the stand. Though Fraser was identified as the killer, no one, it seemed, was responsible for the violent crime. When asked to plead, Fraser himself evinced an uncertainty about his own culpability and the cohesion of self. “I am guilty in my sleep,” he said, “but not guilty in my senses” (*Yellowlees* 455).

Though many sleepwalking crimes either never came to trial or resulted in a lack of conviction, opinion of sleepwalking culpability (and sleepwalking ingenuity and ability) remained divided among the doctors who were called to testify as medical witnesses before the court. Often doctors were asked to address—or chose to address—the question of whether sleepwalking defendants were insane, and while their answers varied, the legal courts ultimately and consistently ruled that the sleepwalkers were not insane.

Because Minchin could not afford the services of a medical expert to testify in her defense, the only medical authority who testified at Sarah Minchin’s trial was Henry Bullock, surgeon to St. Mary’s Hospital in London. Bullock’s testimony initially concerned Frederick Smith, who Minchin had injured and Bullock had examined after the attack. Though Bullock had not examined Minchin, her attorney asked the surgeon to speak to her condition and give his opinion on the likelihood of somnambulism prompting the attack. Bullock’s replies combine reiteration of his lack of experience with somnambulism with repeated recourse to his status as a
medical authority. Bullock mentions that he has read Taylor’s *Medical Jurisprudence*, but several times suggests his suspicion of sleepwalking abilities.

When defense counsel Ribton asked if and when Bullock has seen the prisoner, Bullock responded that, “I have not been in the habit of attending persons afflicted with somnambulism—I have read such cases—I have heard the evidence here today.” Ribton—determined to initiate a defense based on unconsciousness—was persistent despite this unpromising beginning.

Ribton: Suppose a person had had some alarming dream, and had started from bed under the influence of that dream, do you think that the condition of the prisoner could be accounted for in that way? Bullock: Hardly—I have read the “Medical Jurisprudence” of Mr. Taylor.

To further press his point, Ribton then read Taylor’s account of the episode of the two hunters (mentioned above) and followed by asking, “Do you think the prisoner’s conduct might be the effect of some terrible dream?” Bullock responded with suspicion, further reiterating his lack of experience with somnambulists while insisting on his medical authority.

Bullock: I should think it would be exceedingly improbable that a person would commit a manual act in that way—I have had no experience of somnambulism; I have read of cases similar to that which you have quoted—I am a member of the College of Surgeons and a licentiate of the Apothecaries’ Company—there are some few more cases of somnambulism in the books and they are doubtful; I should not be disposed to believe them, unless the evidence was exceedingly good in their favour—I think it quite possible that the prisoner might have done the act in a state of phrenzy, when she was not in her right mind—I should hardly think that a state of phrenzy could be produced by any horrible dream she might have had; but taking all the facts into my mind, her starting from bed and running into the room, I would not undertake to say that it is not possible.

When pressed by Ribton to explain what he means by “a state of phrenzy,” Bullock irritably responded that he meant, “A state of temporary insanity she might have done it in,” but again he insisted the limitation of his opinion: “I have not had her under my care, my attention has not
been directed to her at all; I merely went to see the boy—I cannot account for this act in any way.”

It is unclear whether the testimony of medical experts for the defense would have swayed the jury further in Minchin’s favor and resulted in an acquittal, but Bullock’s mixture of inexperience and conviction likely influenced the jury against her. The trial of Simon Fraser does provide a good example of what the testimony of several medical experts might look like in a sleepwalking trial. In Fraser’s case, there were medical witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense, and one—the psychiatrist David Yellowlees—later published an extensive account of the trial and his opinions in *The Journal of Mental Science*. All of the medical witnesses appear to have been convinced of Fraser’s lack of culpability, but there were differences of opinion on whether or not Fraser’s extreme somnambulistic episodes constituted an assessment of temporary insanity.

Yellowlees, though an expert called by the prosecution, attested to Fraser’s lack of responsibility, noting that “Somnambulism and the conditions allied to it have always attracted peculiar interest” and “The interest is, therefore, great which attaches to a case where the condition was so extreme as to lead to a capital crime, yet so unquestionable that the plea was sustained without hesitation, and the prisoner abjudged blameless” (Yellowlees 451). Although Yellowlees and Dr. Alexander Robertson (both of the Glasgow Royal Asylum) admitted that somnambulism “was not a known form of insanity in medical science,” both nonetheless argued the level of delusion shown by Fraser during sleepwalking was “practically equivalent to insanity”—but only when he was asleep (455).

The medical discussion of Fraser’s case provides fascinating insight into the revisions of selfhood prompted by sleepwalking crime. The layers of responsibility are nested: Fraser is
“blameless” because he was asleep when he killed his son; his sleepwalking delusions are so extreme, however, that they qualify as bouts of temporary insanity; and although this doesn’t make him responsible for the death of his child, it does make him responsible for the prevention of further violence. Yellowlees goes so far as to argue that the court’s ruling—that Fraser and his father be accountable that Fraser henceforth sleep in a room alone—is insufficient, as the Crown itself is responsible for the care of Fraser’s “insanity,” and that there needs to be institutional responsibility for the preservation of safety. He argues,

It is impossible to regard an undertaking given by Fraser and his father as at all a proper or sufficient safeguard, either for his own protection or that of others. There is no security that the promise will not be broken or forgotten, and no guarantee for the watchful care and supervision which such a malady must always require.

The case is so exceptional that the law does not seem to provide for it, but it would surely have been much wiser and safer to have sent Fraser formally to an asylum, liberating him at once, subject to certain conditions of residence and supervision, and holding him liable to recall, should the conditions be neglected.

(457)

Yellowlees’s article shows a slight suspicion of sleepwalking crimes—he observes “Somnambulism is a condition so obscure and ill-defined, and might be so easily simulated and used as a cloak for crime”—and then asserts the need for a close examination of the patient’s history (452). This indicates the importance of context (personal, social, and otherwise) to crimes perpetrated during somnambulism, a need noted earlier in Taylor’s work. Yellowlees follows these claims with an examination of Fraser’s abilities and life—including childhood sleep-related problems—and his relationships with those around him—including his young son.

These accounts of sleepwalking—and many others—were available to Victorian readers via a variety of periodicals and texts throughout the nineteenth century, and provide insight into the social, cultural, and historical context given to cases of somnambulism. Below I discuss
another dominant genre of the popular periodical—sensation fiction—in order to provide a literary context for Collins’s fictional innovations, and to more clearly outline the relationship between medical, criminological, and literary discourses in the nineteenth century.

2.4 SLEEPWALKING AND SENSATIONALISM

There is perhaps no better genre than sensation fiction within which to explore Victorian sleepwalking. Sensationalism provides a clear example of the multifaceted relationship between nineteenth-century literary discourses and the larger cultural conversations of the time, as exemplified by: the newspaper press, which reported not only the most noteworthy and brutal crimes but also the strange or seemingly innocuous; the medical and scientific community, which sought new ways to characterize, categorize, and pathologize the deviant—or just non-disciplined—aspects of human-ness; and the political and judicial systems, which dealt not only with outright criminals but also with the evolving ways in which behavior in general was legally codified and defined. With its focus not just on “sensational” events but also on the physical sensations a thrilling account could prompt in the reader, sensation fiction has also been perceived as a site wherein the boundaries of book and body break down. By 1863 Oxford professor Henry Longueville Mansel was complaining in the Quarterly Review that sensation literature “preach[ed] to the nerves” and that the genre produced a whole range of over-stimulating literature: “some which gently stimulate a particular feeling, and others which carry the whole nervous system by steam” (Mansel 487). Mansel’s account suggests that sensationalism is in danger of producing in its readers the same embodied nervous responses it represents in its characters.44
That sensation fiction included somnambulism in its bag of tricks is therefore not surprising. As I discuss above, sleepwalking was getting ample coverage in both the courtroom and the newspaper, both of which have been repeatedly credited with providing fuel for the fire of sensation fiction.\textsuperscript{45} Collins himself confessed to having found the plot for \textit{The Woman in White} in “some dilapidated volumes of records of French crimes, a sort of French \textit{Newgate Calendar}” and reveals that upon finding this stash “I said to [Charles] Dickens, ‘Here is a prize.’”\textsuperscript{46} Additionally, some nineteenth-century medical accounts reduced somnambulism to automatism, an altered state that reduced the body to a series of nervous reactions with no consciousness. The malady was a perfect fit for a genre perceived as “bypassing mental reflection” and working directly on the body (Radford 11).

The very rhetorical structure of sensation fiction creates uncertainty and questioning in the reader—in which, according to Patrick Brantlinger, “the forthright declarative statements of realistic fiction are, in a sense, now punctuated by question marks” (2). This prompts in the reader a taste for investigation and detection which is not unlike the acts of detection practiced in the methodologies of the doctor and the criminal investigator. But this does not situate the reader firmly in the seat of authority: because of readerly identification with characters and the characters’ nervous symptoms, the reader occupies a liminal position that is both a state of reason and evaluation—one of consciousness—and a state of embodied feeling—one of unconsciousness—that refigures the reader as a self divided, not unlike the somnambulist.

While I argue Wilkie Collins’s use of sleepwalking was unique among sensation novelists in its productive engagement with contemporary psychological and legal debates, he was not the only sensationalist\textsuperscript{47} author to focus on sleepwalking—or its possibility—in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. This participatory relationship of Collins’s work is due to his
investment in nineteenth century medico-legal discussions that try to understand the interiority or 
the personhood of the sleepwalker. I contrast Collins’s work with Charles Warren Adams’s *The 
Notting Hill Mystery* (1862)⁴⁸ and Fergus Hume’s *The Mystery of a Hansom Cab* (1886), the 
former of which is a likely influence on Collins’s novels of the 1860s. Both novels provide 
further insight into the symbolic force which somnambulism wielded in the mystery fiction of 
the mid-to-late nineteenth century, but both novelists show little investment in the psychological 
interiority that seemed to fascinate Collins. Collins was certainly willing to capitalize on the 
spectacle of sleepwalking and the threat of violence and mystery therein, but his treatment of 
somnambulism moves beyond surface. 

Despite the differences in their representations of sleepwalking, Adams’s *The Notting 
Hill Mystery* has much in common with Collins’s works. It recently has been acknowledged as 
“the first detective novel”⁴⁹—ousting *The Moonstone* from that position—and like Collins’s 
novels, it has an unusual narrative structure: Adams’s novel is arranged by documents collected 
by insurance investigator Ralph Henderson as he investigates a possible cause of insurance fraud. 
Adams’ self-conscious narrator assembles all other accounts with an eye for how things would 
fit together for a legal deposition, something we’ll see again in *The Moonstone*. Because the case 
is so sensational and occult, Henderson deems it appropriate to present his employers with all the 
materials he has amassed: “I have determined, therefore, simply to submit to your consideration 
the facts of the case as they appear in the depositions of the several parties from whom my 
information has been obtained. These I have arranged, as far as possible, in the form *in which 
they would be laid before counsel*, should it ultimately be deemed advisable to bring the affair 
into Court” (7, emphasis added). His materials include not only letters, journals, and newspaper 
articles, but also “photocopies” of source materials and diagrams of house layouts (in order to
show the exact path of the “sleepwalker” and possible views from various vantage points in the house).

Henderson’s employers become suspicious when Baron R** takes out five life insurance policies on his wife shortly before her death. Madame R**’s death occurs when she allegedly sleepwalks into her husband’s laboratory and drinks a bottle of acid, but Henderson’s investigation suggests that the Baron is guilty of not only her murder but also those of two others. These murders, however, are difficult to prove, as Henderson comes to believe that each victim—the Baron’s wife as well as her sister and brother-in-law (Mr. and Mrs. Alderton)—was led to his or her death via mesmerism. If Henderson’s suppositions are correct—and the novel strongly hints that they are, though no definite proof or prosecution is detailed—than The Notting Hill Mystery contains no actual sleepwalking. Nonetheless, by initially presenting Madame R** as a somnambulist and including multiple scenes of her “sleepwalking,” the novel participates in the Victorian discourses surrounding crime and somnambulism, and like real life examples of Victorian mesmerism, draws on the imagery of sleepwalking for its symbolic resonance.

Despite this bait-and-switch, the novel hinges on sleepwalking’s cultural and symbolic force, as the ruse is not revealed until the last few pages. Early in the plot Adams raises relevant legal questions about unconsciousness and culpability. Henderson writes to his employers that, “The chief element of suspicion…was to be found in the very unusual circumstances attendant on the death of Madame R**, especially following so speedily as it did on the assurance…This lady died suddenly on the 15th March, 1857, from the effects of a powerful acid taken, it is supposed, in her sleep, from her husband’s laboratory” (Adams 3-4). Henderson notes the circumstances are “very unusual” and prompt “suspicion.” This is consistent with Alfred Swaine Taylor’s suggestion that, “Somnambulism may become a subject of discussion under a contested
policy of life-insurance, in which it may be provided that it shall be vitiated by suicide. If a man falls from a height and is killed while in a state of somnambulism, would this be considered an act of suicide within the meaning of the policy?” (Principles 601) Taylor cites the 1841 ruling of Borradaile v. Hunter—which held that insurance provisions only applied to intentional suicide and that unconsciousness voided intention—but though he volunteers that one could conclude that a policy would not be voided, he ends his section on somnambulism by noting, as I state above, that, “It is impossible, however, to lay down any general rules relative to cases of this description” (601). The very premise of the Baron’s crime requires at least the strong possibility that an accidental sleepwalking suicide would not automatically invalidate the life insurance policy, although Adams was clearly working from the assumption that a case of this sort would prompt at least some investigation on the part of the insurance company: a sleepwalking suicide must occupy this liminal legal position in order for the plot to succeed.

Though Henderson relates that the Baron R** has responded to initial inquiries by vehemently denying that his wife had a history of somnambulism—presumably to deter any questions about whether he should have stored his chemicals more safely, or maybe just to further confuse and complicate the case; he is, after all, telling the truth when he says this—Henderson’s investigations eventually locate three witnesses to Madame R**’s somnambulating. Two of these witnesses provide Henderson with accounts of the spectacle\(^5\), which is represented only as one of surface. Through the necessity of the plot’s mechanizations, we do not have access to Madame R**’s point of view, who remains a fully mysterious, curiously blank character: other characters are not even sure if she speaks English. And unlike Collins’s sleepwalkers, Madame R** provides no “tells” during her episodes; witnesses do not claim for
her any verbal statements (revealing or not) and her only significant action is to repeatedly drink from a bottle.

The first witness\(^{52}\) to come forward is Mr. Aldridge, whose evidence “certainly goes to show that, within at least a very few months after the date of the latest policy, Baron R** was not only himself aware of such a propensity in his wife, but desirous of concealing it from others” (Adams 4). Aldridge once boarded in the same house as the Baron and his wife and gives an account of how one night, when arriving home late, “I saw some one coming out of her room, and went to look over the bannister. From the landing of my room you can see that of the floor below. I looked over, and saw that it was Madame R**. She was in her dressing gown, but had no candle. She went to the stairs, and there I lost sight of her” (227). Aldridge is convinced that Madame R** is walking in her sleep because she walks down at least one flight of stairs in complete darkness.\(^{53}\) In concern that she might injure herself, Aldridge wakes the Baron—who “seemed a good deal annoyed” (228)—and the latter quickly collects his wife from downstairs, returns her to her room, and assures Aldridge that all is well and “particularly begged [him] never to mention it, as it might come to her ears and do her harm” (230).

The Baron’s insistence on silence protects him from his wife’s awareness of his scheme, but it does so via the illusion of protecting her from her own body. Through slow and subtle poisoning he has made her a perpetual invalid, and he repeatedly suggests that her sleepwalking is the result of her illness and that an awareness of the sleepwalking would be detrimental to her recovery. The Baron’s desire that Aldridge not tell Madame R** of her sleepwalking—because it might “cause her grievous harm”—is echoed in the statement of Jane Ellis, one-time night nurse to his wife: “I did not say anything to her about it, or about her walking. The Baron particularly desired I would not. He said it would frighten her” (220).
sense of the dangers of sleepwalking is shared by other characters: Aldridge is concerned that “she would hurt herself” and he calls her “poor Madame R**” when he writes to Henderson after hearing “she’d killed herself in a sleepwalking fit” (230). Aldridge’s letter to Henderson highlights the Baron’s strange behavior but at no point does Aldridge himself—a young professional man, seemingly educated—doubt that a young woman might kill herself while sleepwalking. And Henderson’s own summarization of the case normalizes this occurrence: “There is nothing extraordinary in a sick woman of exciteable nerves taking a sudden fit of somnambulism, and walking down even into the kitchen of a house that was not her own” (269).

These statements contain the insidious thrust of other sensational fiction when they suggest that the incident is completely usual though still extremely dangerous.

When the sleepwalking of the novel is actually revealed to be a mesmeric trance, the significance of the sleepwalking is not destroyed, though it certainly shifts. When defined in contrast to mesmerism and Baron R**’s mesmeric power, somnambulism shifts from carrying the taint of suicide to being a more innocent and victimized alternative to the nearly unlimited power that the mesmerist might hold over those in his sway. But a sleepwalking suicide also suggests that the somnambulist carries within her an impulse toward self-harm and self-destruction that may not be controlled or resisted when her conscious will is “sleeping.” The shift from sleepwalking suicide to murdering mesmerist effectively locates the threat to the self as external, allowing personhood to remain consistent: the danger is without, not within.

Like The Notting Hill Mystery, Hume’s The Mystery of a Hansom Cab is not focused on creating a psychologically informed model of the self, but nonetheless makes a contribution to our understanding of how sleepwalking was figured vis-à-vis criminality in the 19th century. Hume includes a couple of passages late in the novel that attempt to explore the possible
psychology of a murderer, but these passages make no reference to contemporary psychological or criminological debates (at least not in the explicit way of Collins) and seem to do little other than heighten the tension surrounding the question of who the novel’s murderer may be. Instead, Hume does initially allow sleepwalking to be aligned with intentional criminality, only to sever that connection—while still leaving the taint of unintentional guilt.\textsuperscript{56}

The titular “Mystery” of the novel surrounds the murder of Oliver Whyte, found dead in a hansom cab, poisoned by chloroform. Whyte’s romantic rival Brian Fitzgerald is the main suspect, though doubts are also eventually attached to Fitzgerald’s future father-in-law, millionaire Marcus Frettby. Frettby had at one time agreed to marry his daughter Madge to Whyte, but reneged when Madge expressed a preference for Fitzgerald. The investigation is headed by detective Gorby, whose suspicions of Fitzgerald are founded on public conflict between Fitzgerald and Whyte, and Fitzgerald’s refusal to provide an alibi for the night of the murder.

The eventual solution to the crime—that Whyte was romantically involved with the actress who was the actual, legal wife of Marcus Frettby, and had attempted to use his proof of Frettby’s marriage to finagle the hand of Madge; that Frettby was an inadvertent bigamist who believed his first wife to be dead and had no idea that his only legitimate daughter is not Madge but Sal Rawlins, a slum girl who becomes Madge’s maid; that Fitzgerald will not reveal his alibi because it would reveal Madge’s illegitimacy; and that Whyte’s best friend Roger Moreland is the actual murderer, having killed Whyte in order to take possession of the original Frettby marriage certificate in order to extort money from Marcus—reveals that the real mystery is not a simple murder, but instead a series of family secrets centering on the Frettbys.\textsuperscript{57}
The novel pathologizes sleepwalking, making it an extreme but not unusual symptom of physical illness. Marcus Frettlby is the novel’s sleepwalker, though he only does so once and his “fit” is discussed not as a chronic or habitual action but as a relatively normal response to physical and mental strain. As he dies immediately afterwards, there is no discussion of the event from his point of view. Frettlby’s two daughters—Madge, acknowledged and an heir to his immense fortune, and Sal, unknown and simply a maid in his household—sit up late one night, talking in the parlor, when they see Frettlby wander into the room, “clothed in his dressing-gown, and carr[ying] some papers in his hand” (164). Frettlby is a nervous man and suffers from heart disease. He has also recently been suspected of murder, and blackmailed by the actual murderer. The narrator observes a physiological—not psychological—explanation for his somnambulism, which has grave consequences.

In accordance with the dictates of the excited brain, the weary body had risen from the bed and wandered about the house. The two girls, drawing back into the shadow, watched him with bated breath as he came slowly down the room. In a few moments he was within the circle of light, and, moving noiselessly along, he laid the papers he carried on the table. (164)

The papers in question are important to the story—they prove Sal’s legitimacy—and key to solving the murder of Oliver Whyte. Madge recognizes these papers as the ones Whyte was killed for, and struck by horror, she calls out to her father before having a species of fit. “She staggered blindly forward, and then, with one piercing shriek, fell to the ground” (164). In doing so she accidentally strikes her father, who suddenly wakes “with that wild cry in his ears, [and] opened his eyes wide, put out feeble hands, as if to keep something back, and with a strangled cry fell dead on the ‘door beside his daughter” (164). The final line of the chapter reiterates the image of this scene, with the servants hurrying in “to find Mark Frettlby, the millionaire, lying dead, and his daughter in a faint beside her father’s corpse” (165).
Though the reader experiences little of Frettby’s psychological interiority, much discussion is given to the possible physical causes of his somnambulism. Owing to his heart disease, his doctor claims that death is the “natural consequence” of awakening suddenly while somnambulating (167). Like the discussion of sleepwalking in The Notting Hill Mystery, the emphasis here is on the body of the sleepwalker, not the mind. While this redirection emphasizes spectacle, it takes our attention away from the more psychological elements that could be prompted by an exploration of what somnambulism could entail.

2.5 WILKIE COLLINS: THE CRITICAL CONTEXT

In the last few decades there has been great evolution in the scholarly attention given to Collins’s work. Gone—mostly—are the unfavorable comparisons to Charles Dickens and the scholars who proclaim that Collins’s characters suffered at the hands of his plots or that Collins “was essentially a story-teller, and no matter how hard he tried, he never successfully became anything else.” More recent criticism has focused on Collins’s innovations and revisions of the Victorian novel form; Collins’s interest in and ambivalence about nineteenth-century discourses of race and colonialism; Collins’s apparent frustrations with Victorian constructions of gender and sex relations; the relationship between Collins’s fiction and calls for social reform; Collins’s legacy within the history of not only sensation fiction but also his contribution to the creation of the detective novel; and, most recently, Collins’s relation to twenty-first century disability studies.

My work on Collins draws from and is situated within two subfields of Collins criticism: the substantial scholarly interest in Collins’s use of and revisions to nineteenth-century psychology and theories of the relationship between mind and body, and a less explored area of
how Collins engaged with nineteenth-century ideas about criminality and legal reform. Jenny Bourne Taylor’s *In the Secret Theatre of Home: Wilkie Collins, Sensation Narrative, and Nineteenth-Century Psychology* (1988) has been foundational to the former subset of Collins’s studies, and more recent scholarship has further developed our understanding of Wilkie Collins’s relationship to Victorian mental science: Vanessa L. Ryan has argued for recognition of a relationship between Collins’s handling of “whether there is a third way between reason and emotion” (25) and William Benjamin Carpenter’s work on “unconscious cerebration”; Laurence Talairach-Vielmas’s *Wilkie Collins, Medicine, and the Gothic* (2009) suggests that Collins spent his career reworking the themes of an earlier Gothic tradition through the “prism” of Victorian scientific, medical, and psychological discourse (7); and Lyn Pykett’s recent Collins-centric contribution to the Oxford World’s Classics *Authors in Context* series features a substantial section on “Psychology and Science in Collins’s Novels.”

While there has been no book-length study of the relationship between Collins’s fiction and the criminal and legal context of mid- to late-nineteenth-century Great Britain, many scholars make passing references to this connection. More substantial attention can be found in Andrew Mangham’s chapter on Collins’s “dangerous women” in *Violent Women and Sensation Fiction: Crime, Medicine, and Victorian Popular Culture* (2007) and Alexander Welsh’s work on the use of circumstantial evidence in *The Moonstone* in *Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England* (1992).

My project brings together Collins’s engagement with Victorian medicine and psychology, and his interest in the criminal and legal contexts of his fiction. This is best accomplished via an extended exploration of Collins’s recurrent use of the somnambulist as a linchpin in how his fiction was able to represent the possibilities of personhood and the
relationship that personhood had to contemporary notions of intention and guilt. Collins explored
the symbolic uses of the sleepwalker in two of what have been regarded as his four major novels
of the 1860s—*The Woman in White, No Name, Armadale*, and *The Moonstone*—but also
continued to explore the figure in his later fiction, including the currently much-neglected works
of the 1880s. In the last two decades there has been more critical interest in Collins’s post-1860s
output, but even book-length studies of his oeuvre often limit their attention to one or two
chapters. By bringing together the little discussed “Who Killed Zebedee?” and *The Legacy of
Cain* with the more canonical *No Name* and *The Moonstone*, my project argues two things. The
first is that Collins used his fascination with the somnambulist to suggest a model of continuous
selfhood that revised and challenged legal and psychological notions of selfhood, which is itself
a significant contribution to Victorian understandings of personal consciousness. The second is
that sustained engagement with Collins’s work also demonstrates that his investment in the
literary use of the sleepwalker was an ongoing one: a testament to the thematic continuity of his
literary output and how his techniques and content evolved in relation to his understanding of
socially relevant topics and debates.

2.6 COLLINS SLEEPWALKER #1: “WHO KILLED ZEBEDEE?” (1881)

Collins’s little-analyzed short story “Who Killed Zebedee?” directly tackles the
question of how unconscious criminality is viewed within the Victorian legal system and in the
culture at large by representing a somnambulist who believes she has unconsciously and
accidentally killed her beloved husband while sleepwalking. By inverting assumptions about
sleepwalking consciousness and culpability, and having the real murderer capitalize on
expectations about unconscious crime, Collins suggests that the sleepwalking criminal of the trial
courts is an illusion, a discontinuous self that supports a reassuring interpretation of the divide between guilt and innocence. Collins dismantles expectations about the position of the sleepwalker within discourses of criminality by working from the outside in: he represents a case that seems to have much in common with those of Minchin, Griggs, Fraser, and others, and then shows the fallibility of a worldview that assumes continuity between inside and outside, before exploring the similarities of consciousness between Mrs. Zebedee and non-sleepwalking characters.

Mrs. Zebedee’s understanding of sleepwalking crime is based on an account she reads of a man who stabs and kills his wife while sleepwalking. Her assumptions are further based on a vague understanding of associationist psychology: she was reading about the murderous sleepwalker before she fell asleep the night of her husband’s death. However, Mrs. Zebedee has not actually killed her husband: the real culprit is his former lover Priscilla Thursby, now cook in the boarding house where the Zebedees stay on their honeymoon. Priscilla hopes the police will assume that Mrs. Zebedee is the guilty party, and declares that when she saw Zebedee asleep in bed and his wife asleep in a chair next to him, “the thought came to me to do it, so that they might hang her for the murder” (“Zebedee” 30). Both the criminal and the secondary victim of the crime work from similar assumptions about unconscious criminality. While Priscilla cannot know that Mrs. Zebedee will assume her own guilt for the crime, neither woman seems concerned that Mrs. Zebedee has no memory of or motive for the crime. That Mrs. Zebedee does assume responsibility makes a clear statement that the sleepwalker is an easy scapegoat for seemingly meaningless and otherwise inexplicable crime.

But Collins works against contemporary expectations of the unconscious criminal. Even after he has his fictional police, doctors, and lawyers ask and explore the same questions that
would have concerned real representatives of their respective professions—questions that seek to establish Mrs. Zebedee’s previous character, to understand her relationship to her husband, and to verify her sanity and mental history, similar to the questions we see in Minchin and Fraser’s trials—Mrs. Zebedee is ultimately not brought to trial, after going through an inquest in which the coroner and magistrate determine that it is unlikely that Mrs. Zebedee is the murderer. This conclusion seems in part based on Mrs. Zebedee’s lack of connection to the engraved knife that is the murder weapon and the lack of an eyewitness (as I note above, Fraser, Minchin, and Griggs were all witnessed during their sleepwalking acts), but also in part based on their perception of her as “pitiable” and “beautiful.” These are qualities, however, that Priscilla Thursby also possesses: she is introduced as “frantic,” “terrified,” and “nice-looking” (5-6) when she arrives at the police station house to announce a murder that she herself has secretly committed. Appearances, clearly, cannot be trusted.

Collins plays with this throughout the story, multiple times offering up seemingly guilty parties only to quickly reveal their innocence. The Zebedees’ landlord “so trembled with terror that some people might have taken him for the guilty person,” (8) but he gets no second mention in the text. The Zebedees’ neighbor Mr. Deluc—“supposed to be a Creole gentleman from Martinique” (9)—is innocent but so disreputable looking that the Inspector neither likes nor trusts him, though “he was not a man to be misled by appearances” (12). Even the victim has an unstable and unclear identity: John Zebedee and his wife are initially presented as “a pattern couple” (10) and John himself “a careful man” (15). However, by the end of the story, Zebedee is accused of being a “vicious and heartless wretch” (28) who tried to seduce Priscilla Thursby and then abandoned her the day after their wedding plans had been announced.
These choices may seem like now-typical detective story misdirection, but here they are consistent with sleepwalking’s role in destabilizing neat interpretations of identity and the self. Appearance-driven assumptions about identity are shown to be inconsistently successful: the landlord and Mr. Deluc look guilty but are not, Priscilla Thursby looks innocent but is not. That Mrs. Zebedee both looks and is innocent is the story’s opening irony and raises the questions, if the sleepwalker has a continuous self, what seemingly “normal” character does not have a continuous self? And, if the sleepwalker didn’t kill John Zebedee, then who did? That Mrs. Zebedee is presented as the most cohesive and transparent self in the story inverts legal and cultural assumptions about normative consciousness and its moral culpability.

Presumably Mrs. Zebedee would not have been charged even if she had been accepted as a likely candidate for her husband’s murder—Collins depicts the court’s treatment of her as so sympathetic that it is likely her case would have ended up like that of Esther Griggs. No one seems to believe that Mrs. Zebedee would have intentionally killed her husband. The account given by the policeman-narrator attests to the lack of intention shown by Mrs. Zebedee, even in the aftermath of the crime.

She stared straight at us without appearing to see us. We spoke to her, and she never answered a word. She might have been dead—like her husband—except that she perpetually picked at her fingers, and shuddered every now and then as if she was cold. I went to her and tried to lift her up. She shrank back with a cry that well-nigh frightened me—not because it was loud, but because it was more like the cry of some animal than of a human being. However quietly she might have behaved in the landlady’s previous experience of her, she was beside herself now.

(10-11).

The narrator presents Mrs. Zebedee as a creature with no active senses: unseeing, unhearing, and unspeaking. The narrator even goes so far as to suggest, “She might have been dead” except for the apparently automatic behavior of her hands. The passage succeeds in presenting her not as
the sort of human subject who would be held accountable in a court of law: she frightens the narrator with her “animal” cry and afterwards his language echoes John Locke’s observation that the “same Man [may have] distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times…[This] is somewhat explained by our speaking in English when we say that he is not himself, or is beside himself” (343). Given Collins’s legal training—after beginning legal studies in 1846 in Lincoln’s Inn, he was called to the bar in 1851—we might speculate that Collins would have been aware of the similarity between his language and Locke’s.

At the inquest Mrs. Zebedee’s behavior is explained by “terrible nervous shock” and the surgeon is initially unwilling to attest to whether she’s ever been a sane woman. While her lack of self-control and self-possession may be easily attributed to whatever cause makes her susceptible to sleepwalking, Collins suggests that the wider population suffers from similar ailments and weaknesses, an indication of the evolution of his ideology at this late stage in his career. The policeman-narrator is initially unsure if his pity for Mrs. Zebedee is the product of his also being “completely upset in [his] mind” (“Zebedee” 11), while Mr. Deluc’s nerves are so “shattered” (12) by John Zebedee’s murder that soon afterwards Deluc’s “rest was now disturbed by frightful dreams” (13). Mrs. Zebedee’s inability to speak is paralleled in the numerous “unspeakable” moments in the text, and her lack of control is mirrored in the other characters, raising the question of the relationship between self-control and responsibility.

As I note above, Mrs. Zebedee’s possible loss of control is viewed sympathetically, suggesting that if she went to trial she would have received a legal ruling of nonresponsibility. Collins also invokes this language when discussing the emotions and actions of the policeman-narrator and the murderess Priscilla. Near the end of the tale the narrator-policeman realizes that he’s been duped by Priscilla Thursby—now his fiancée—and his anger is so considerable that he
avoids her for some time: “On the other hand, if she and I met before time had helped me to control myself, I had a horrid fear that I might turn murderer next, and kill her then and there” (27). The narrator raises the issue of murder related to loss of control, and clearly perceives himself as capable of it. He has not lost so much control that he is unaware of his feelings or of their consequences—he takes steps to avoid provocation—but his criminal act of withholding evidence burdens him throughout the rest of his life: he immediately resigns from the police force and on his deathbed makes a public confession of his guilt.

Even Priscilla Thursby draws on the language of non-volition when she explains her behavior to her (now) ex-fiancé: “The devil entered into me when I tried their door, on my way up to bed, and found it unlocked, and listened a while, and peeped in” (29). “The devil”—not Priscilla herself—is in control as she stares at the sleeping couple, one on the bed and one in the armchair by the fire, and presumably it is “the devil” who decides to kill John “so that they might hang [his wife] for the murder” (29). Priscilla’s “devil” shares her desire for revenge on them both.

By showing the similarity of Mrs. Zebedee’s consciousness to those of Priscilla Thursby and the unnamed narrator-policeman and then suggesting that the somnambulist is the least criminal of the three, Collins challenges the expectations of a late Victorian reader whose assumptions would have been shaped by the very police reports and crime narratives that appeared in periodicals alongside Collins’s own fiction. Interestingly, those expectations could have also been shaped by Collins’s earlier work in his very popular novel *The Moonstone*, which I discuss below. Of Collins’s works that deal with sleepwalking-related crime, “Who Killed Zebedee?” engages most directly with contemporary criminal contexts, though unlike the more sustained explorations in his novels, it has a less direct engagement with Victorian psychology.
Below I show how in other texts—the earliest being *No Name*—Collins used sleepwalking as a more direct investigation into how liminal states could provide a literary platform for his interest in overlap between cognition and criminality.

### 2.7 COLLINS SLEEPWALKER #2: *NO NAME* (1862)\(^{70}\)

Though Collins will eventually solidify a more specific relationship between sleepwalking, continuous consciousness, and criminal intention, in *No Name* he is in the early stages of his exploration of how the representation of liminal states put into play a narrative performance of psychological models, and how those models reveal to the reader the relationship between the conscious and unconscious minds. While Collins does investigate how circumstances can influence selfhood and create the possibility of criminal behavior and guilt, here he has not yet moved to directly linking sleepwalking and criminality in the same human subject. In *No Name* he explores a variety of liminal states in order to investigate/symbolize the role of revelation in consciousness, and then provides an extended sleepwalking scene to show the expressiveness of the unconscious, both through the sleepwalker Admiral Bartram and in Magdalen Vanstone, who witnesses Bartram’s sleepwalking. The experience turns her into a reflection of the Admiral’s unconscious expression, via her automatic mimicry of his behavior; the scene also prefigures her own nervous breakdown and near death, a result of confronting the way that Bartram represents a unity of self that Magdalen has long denied herself in order to commit criminal acts.

Early in *No Name* the narrator insists, “Nothing in this world is hidden for ever…Look where we will, the inevitable law of revelation is one of the laws of Nature; the lasting
preservation of a secret is a miracle which the world has never yet seen” (No Name 25). This premise shapes the form and content of the text, and even serves as a basis for its representation of human consciousness. In the novel’s preface Collins’s suggests that the “only Secret contained in the book, is revealed midway in the first volume. From that point, all the main events of the story are purposefully foreshadowed, before they take place” (xxi-xxii). The entire scheme of the plot is built on revelation, suggesting that in this novel Collins is more interested in the effects of knowledge on human behavior than he is in piling up mystery and ambiguity to further bury what is hidden.

This is reflected in Collins’s handling of unconscious states: the narrator first introduces the Vanstone family early on a spring morning before anyone is awake. He refers to the Vanstones as “the sleeping family,” and, in a moment which foreshadows Admiral Bartram’s sleepwalking revelations, observes “Who are the sleepers hidden in the upper regions? Let the house reveal its own secrets; and...let the sleepers disclose themselves” (3). The majority of the cast of the first half of the novel—the Vanstones, their governess Miss Garth, various servants—are then introduced as a parade of the barely awake, yawning and sleepy as they begin their morning. Beginning with language that figures its characters as somnambulant is fitting for a novel that chronicles the movement of spoilt, privileged daughters from blissful ignorance to painful awareness of the world’s lack of concern for their plight: even their parents are so unaware of larger cultural dictates that they accidentally disinherit their two daughters—the younger Magdalen and the older Norah, both illegitimate—and then have the bad luck to die before a will can be made to remedy the problem. 71

It is clear that with a title such as No Name, the novel is self-consciously concerned with questions of identity, but although Magdalen reacts to her parents’ deaths by embarking on an
obsessive quest to literally regain her name and lost fortune, the thematic arc of the story reveals a counter narrative concerned with less external and material notions of selfhood. The story chronicles Magdalen’s shaky movement to greater consciousness of the world around her and her position within it but also her greater consciousness of self; Collins’s representation of these processes is neither linear nor straightforward. Collins’s characters often exist in and act from a continuum of various states of consciousness, and even the most “normative” characters can seem to hover on the line between conscious action and unconscious mechanization. This is not to imply that they are always on the verge of literal sleep; I mean instead that they show that the conscious, willed man can easily lapse into the position and behavior of the mechanical automaton, especially in response to emotional or psychological difficulty. In the first section of the novel Magdalen’s beloved bedroom is called “the dreamland of Elysian serenity” and is then contrasted to the world of “bright daylight” outside (39); her fiancé and neighbor Frank Clare is tellingly characterized as “a well-bred Incubus” (60). But after her parents’ death, Frank’s abandonment of Magdalen enables her revenge. As Magdalen contemplates the fate she has chosen for herself—a loveless, duplicitous marriage to the fatuous invalid who has unjustly inherited her father’s fortune—Collins often characterizes her with language that provokes images of sleepwalking. Her senses are closed—she muses on where her “blindfolded journey” will take her next (168)—and she often sits vacant and mechanical in her actions (290). Her life takes on a nightmarish quality, and as she contemplates the bottle of laudanum she had purchased in case the strain of married life becomes too much for her, she experiences “a strange confusion of feeling…a vague doubt even yet, whether the sight of it reminded her of a terrible reality or a terrible dream” (411). By confusing the language of consciousness and sleep, Collins
suggests that the attributes that characterize each are not separate or distinct, and that the self that inhabits each state is continuous.

Magdalen’s obsessive revenge plot creates similar effects in her designated “victim.” When Noel Vanstone learns of his wife’s deception—that her name is not actually Julia Bygrave; that she is actually his notorious cousin—the revelation causes him to lose what little self-possession he has. He allows his former housekeeper Madame Lecount to lead him around like a passive child as he “moves mechanically” and experiences horror that is “paralyzing...his mind.” His reaction reminds us that the reader is included in Collins’s vision of the necessary revelations of consciousness, and that his project seeks to adapt psychological theories to literary techniques. Noel vacantly repeats, “It’s like a scene in a novel—it’s like nothing in real life” (447, 448). This creates a connection between the revelations of the self and the revelations the reader encounters in the novel, which is further extended when the narrator notes that Noel “looked and spoke like a man in a dream” (447). As Noel’s comment suggests, the scene is exactly like one in a novel because that is precisely what it is; the progression of commentary, however, draws an analogous relation between dreams and fictions, and reveals the error of placing each in contrast to “real life.” On one level, neither Noel nor Magdalen are “real,” but the experience of exploring liminal consciousness through the two characters reveals to the reader something true about the nature of consciousness.

It is in this state of breakdown between conscious thought and unconscious reaction that Noel allows Lecount to convince him to write a new will, summarily cutting out his wife. As Noel finishes a letter to his cousin Admiral Bartram—a “secret trust” that only allows Bartram to leave Noel’s money to the admiral’s heir George if George marries within six months of Noel’s death and then only to a widow: i.e., not Magdalen—he complains to Lecount, “I’ll do it as well
as I can... My hands are cold, and my head feels half asleep” (448). Noel dies within moments of speaking these words, and they suggest that he is already half dead, unconsciousness and coldness stealing over the extremities of his body. Noel’s experience exemplifies Collins’s exploration of modes of continuity between the waking, willed self and the sleeping or unconscious self. The moment of new knowledge revealed breaks through the arbitrary barrier between the two which has been set up by legal and medical discourses. As a symbolic representation, Noel, whose artificially inflated ego has refused to suspect that a beautiful young woman might woo an unkind and irritable invalid for reasons other love, cannot survive such an awareness that pushes against the barriers he has erected against self-knowledge.

The centerpiece of Collins’s work with liminal consciousness in *No Name* happens in the last third of the novel, a scene in which Admiral Bartram sleepwalks in front of Magdalen. The scene is a gothic piece of psychological theatre, as the somnambulant Bartram expresses his fears about Magdalen while she follows along behind him. This episode suggests how close contact with the non-normative other reflects back on the (so-called) “normative” subject, and creates an encounter which diminishes difference and dismantles any binary between the two. I mention above that Magdalen’s relationship to shock causes her to behave in the automatic, senseless way of a certain kind of sleepwalker, but her direct encounter with a somnambulist makes clearer the relationship between the sleepwalker and the non-sleepwalker. Bartram’s sleepwalking is prompted by his anxiety surrounding Noel’s secret trust and the responsibility placed on the admiral by Noel’s will; the somnambulism scene makes him a living symbol of the expressive unconscious. As Magdalen follows him she reflects back the power the unconscious has over the conscious subject.  

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Admiral Bartram’s possession of Noel’s secret trust—the contents of which are unknown to Magdalen—leads Magdalen to pose as a parlor maid in the old man’s home. Because the admiral will only hire female servants, new maid “Lucy” has the rare opportunity to serve the admiral his meals—instead of the usual footman or butler—and Collins gives himself the opportunity for this rather ironic statement from the admiral: “A light meal, Lucy, if you take my advice—a light meal, or you will have the nightmare. Early to bed, my dear, and early to rise, makes a parlour-maid healthy and wealthy and wise” (514-515). Whether or not this is true for “a parlour-maid,” Magdalen clearly knows that staying up late can get the disinherited, illegitimate orphan useful knowledge that might help her reclaim her wealth.

Thus at night Magdalen walks when she should be sleeping, wandering around Admiral Bartram’s dilapidated home St. Crux-in-the-Marsh, looking for where Bartram might have hidden Noel’s “secret trust,” and hoping that whatever else might contain, knowledge of its contents will give her the opportunity to retake the upper hand and claim her father’s wealth. It is during these midnight wanderings that Magdalen notices that Bartram’s man Mazey sleeps in a trunkle-bed across the admiral’s threshold. This detail worries her, as she muses,

But why, with bedrooms enough and to spare, should he occupy that cold and comfortless situation at night? Why should he sleep on guard outside his master’s door? Was there some nocturnal danger in the house, of which the admiral was afraid? The question seemed absurd—and yet the position of the bed forced it irresistibly on her mind. (521, emphasis added)

This “nocturnal danger” is most obviously—and ironically—the danger that the admiral’s sleepwalking poses to his own safety, but the danger is also the repressed fear that prompts the sleepwalking, and even Magdalen herself, as she is the source of the admiral’s fear. Night after night, as Magdalen hunts for the secret trust, the admiral also concerns himself with the trust, filled with anxiety that Magdalen will enter his house unawares and gain access to the document.
When Mazey stays out late and abandons his usual post, the admiral escapes his bedroom and sleepwalks through the house, hiding and re-hiding Noel’s letter, continually expressing his fears to the dead man.

Magdalen and Bartram encounter one another in the house’s abandoned Banqueting Hall, a room that in its unlit “deep abysses” and “immeasurable silence” (546) seems to embody the untended unconscious. Magdalen pauses to watch a figure move through the strips of moonlight on the floor; she identifies the figure as an “it” sixteen times before she recognizes the admiral. As a figure he is dehumanized, more symbol than person as he “ris[es] out of the farthest strip of moonlight on the floor” and “advance[s], now mysteriously lost in the shadow, now suddenly visible again in the light” (547). Strikingly, watching a sleepwalker move across the room appears to turn Magdalen into a kind of sleepwalker as well. Like his own unequal senses, she, too, experiences the “disequilibrium” of her senses: she reacts like a sleepwalker. Her will is gone, as are all faculties other than sight: “Her voice was dumb, her will was helpless. Every sense in her but the seeing-sense, was paralysed. The seeing-sense—held fast in the fetters of its own terror—looked unchangeably straightforward, as it had looked from the first” (548).

Part of the uncanniness of the scene lies in the way that the “figure” begins to act in human ways even as the language of the passage continues to dehumanize “it.” Its methodical yet nonsensical behavior echoes eighteenth and nineteenth-century accounts of sleepwalking behavior that make clear that the sleepwalking self both is and is not a human subject: “It stopped at the tripod, and stood, shivering audibly in the silence, with its hands raised over the dead ashes, in the action of warming them at a fire” (548, emphasis added). Bartram’s shivering and attempt to warm himself are as understandable as his choice of the “dead ashes” is
inexplicable. Later Magdalen will watch Bartram “argue” with Noel and open and close various cabinets:

As those words escaped him, he walked to the buhl cabinet. He sat down in the chair placed before it, and searched in the basket among his keys. Magdalen softly followed him, and stood behind his chair, waiting with the candle in her hand. He found the key, and unlocked the cabinet. Without an instant’s hesitation, he drew out a drawer, the second of a row. The one thing in the drawer, was a folded letter. He removed it, and put it down before him on the table. ‘Take it back, Noel!’ he repeated, mechanically; ‘take it back!’ (548)

I’ve quoted this at length for good reason: here we see Bartram go to the right cabinet, find the right key, and get out the letter, all while asleep, and yet earlier he had tried to warm his hands at a nonexistent fire. Jean-François Fournel, writing in 1788 in defense of the reality of “spontaneous somnambulism” and “magnetical somnambulism,” and in the service of that defense quoting Diderot’s *Encyclopédie*, relates tales of a man in his sleep “saved” someone from drowning, and those present watched as the man “swam” in his bed and “drug” the victim to shore (Fournel 27). However, when the sleepwalker asked for brandy and was given water, he protested, and Fournel notes that, “By that example it is evident that the Somnambule, though deceived by the sight and feeling, had his taste sound and perfect, since he well knew how to discern brandy from water” (27). Here we see Collins give Admiral Bartram a similar inconsistency of the senses, suggesting that while Collins may have made use of sleepwalking for a sensational effect, he nonetheless wished to present a line of behavior consistent with popular understanding of sleepwalking behavior. This inconsistency was explained by nineteenth-century psychologists who theorized that sleepwalkers only “saw” what was alive in their imaginations.  

The admiral’s behavior is further coded as a natural and realistic form of revelation by characters who stress that his sleepwalking behavior is his “constitutional tendency” (*No Name* 69).
and his “constitutional peculiarity” (570); after Admiral Bartram’s death his nephew George writes to Miss Garth, “I surprised the lawyer (who seemed to be quite ignorant of the extraordinary actions constantly performed by somnambulists) by informing him that my uncle could find his way about the house, lock and unlock doors, and remove objects of all kinds from one place to another, as easily in his sleep, as in his waking hours” (570, emphasis added).

George’s easy acknowledgement of “the extraordinary actions constantly performed by somnambulists” suggests the larger cultural awareness and acceptance of the phenomenon which I discuss in my introduction, a whole series of expectations based around what sleepwalkers may or may not do.

Despite this normalization within the text, Admiral Bartram is not himself able to acknowledge his “constitutional tendency” and consistently denies that he sleepwalks, which may account for the way the text codes his behavior as gothic and troubling. What might otherwise be perceived as usual is instead perceived as alien because “no entreaties had ever prevailed on [the admiral] to submit to the usual precaution taken in such cases. He peremptorily declined to be locked into his room; he even ignored his own liability, whenever a dream disturbed him, to walk in his sleep” (555, emphasis added). Harkening back to the opening section of the novel, we know that because the admiral has hidden this, then it must return, it must be revealed. The scene that ensues, with Magdalen following Bartram as he frets over the secret trust, has much in common with the mental models suggested by psychologist Forbes Winslow, whose *On the Obscure Diseases of the Brain and Disorders of the Mind*—a copy of which was owned by Collins⁷⁸—suggests the barely hidden content of anyone—and everyone’s—mind:
Who has not occasionally had a demon pursuing with remorseless impetuosity his every footstep, suggesting to his ever-active and often morbidly disturbed and perverted imagination the commission of some dark deed of crime, from the conception of which he has at the time recoiled with horror? Is there any mind, pure and untainted, which has not yielded, when the reason and moral sense have been transiently paralysed and God’s grace ceases to exercise an influence over the heart, to the seduction of impure thought, lingered with apparent pleasure on the contemplation of physically unchaste images or delighted in a fascinating dalliance with criminal thoughts? (142)

Magdalen here becomes the literalization of Winslow’s “demon,” because she is for Bartram something that “suggest[s]…the commission of some dark deed of crime” and he does indeed “[recoil] with horror.” Though I mention above that Magdalen is a mostly sympathetic figure and clearly the novel’s protagonist, her transgressions by this point in the text include not only the social transgressions of overly independent, unfeminine behavior, but also the legal one of fraud, schooled by her con artist mentor Captain Wragge. Despite the reader’s desire to see her regain her position in the world, she is a criminal, and Peter Thoms has suggested that our sympathy for her becomes less satisfying when we see her deceptions lead her into conflict with the “decency” of an “essentially good” character like Admiral Bartram. After beginning the novel as an innocent, candid, and affectionate young girl, Magdalen is a clear representation of the “hidden Evil in all of us,” usually placed “deep down below the reach of moral encouragement and mortal repression” but sometimes “unlocked” by circumstance (No Name 146). However, because she suffers internally with each deception, she also demonstrates her capacity for the “hidden Good” as well. Magdalen feels guilt for her deceptions, and even horror at the success of her attempt to marry Noel: “The horror of herself with which her own act had inspired her, had risen to its climax when the design of her marriage was achieved. She had never suffered in secret, as she suffered when the Combe-Raven money was left to her in her husband’s will” (444). The novel makes clear that these successes and deceptions have been made possible only
by Magdalen’s willingness to fragment the self—what Talairach-Vielmas has called her decision to shape her person as an “endlessly reconstructible self” (“Sensational Shoppers” 63) literalized in both her professional acting roles and in the disguises she creates to achieve personal ends.

In one of her many letters to her sister Norah, Magdalen confesses “I have struggled against myself, till I am worn out in the effort” (No Name 181). These necessary barriers of self make it clear why Magdalen reacts to the sleepwalking Bartram with the same sort of horror she inspires in him: for the consummate actress, a confrontation with the bare, continuous self can only be gothic:

The bonds of horror that held her, burst asunder when it was within arm’s length. She started back. The light of the candle on the table fell full on its face, and showed her—Admiral Bartram. A long, grey dressing-gown was wrapped around him. His head was uncovered; his feet were bare. In his left hand he carried his little basket of keys. He passed Magdalen slowly; his lips whispering without intermission; his open eyes staring straight before him, with the glassy stare of death. His eyes revealed to her the terrifying truth. He was walking in his sleep.

The terror of seeing him, as she saw him now, was not the terror she had felt when her eyes first lighted on him—an apparition in the moonlight, a spectre in the ghostly Hall. This time, she could struggle against the shock; she could feel the depth of her own fear. (548)

Now that Magdalen knows that Admiral Bartram is walking in his sleep, she is no longer frozen. One might argue that this is because Bartram has shifted from being a supernatural terror to a more mundane one, but if we look at the language used—that she still experiences “terror” and that her realization that he is sleepwalking is a “terrifying truth”—I would argue that Bartram is no less alarming now, simply differently alarming. And as Magdalen watches Bartram she realizes that he is muttering to himself; the scene of terror becomes also a scene of revelation.

She ventured nearer still, and heard the name of her dead husband fall distinctly from the sleep-walker’s lips.

‘Noel!’ he said, in the low monotonous tones of a dreamer talking in his sleep. ‘My good fellow, Noel, take it back again! It worries me day and night. I
don’t know where it’s safe; I don’t know where to put it. Take it back, Noel—take it back!’ (548).

As Magdalen watches, Bartram continues his “conversation” with Noel, and she attempts to remove the letter from the admiral’s hand, only to hesitate in response to the sheer uncanniness of the man’s behavior.

In the impulse of the moment, she stretched out her hand towards the hand in which he held the letter. The yellow candlelight fell full on him. The awful death-in-life of his face—the mystery of the sleeping body, moving in unconscious obedience to the dreaming mind—daunted her. Her hand trembled, and dropped again at her side.

He put the key back in the basket; and crossed the room to the bureau, with the basket in one hand, and the letter in the other. Magdalen set the candle on the table again, and watched him. As he had opened the cabinet, so now he opened the bureau. Once more, Magdalen stretched out her hand; and once more she recoiled before the mystery and the terror of his sleep. He put the letter in a drawer, at the back of the bureau, and closed the heavy oaken lid again. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘Safer there, as you say, Noel—safer there.’ So he spoke. So, time after time, the words that betrayed him, revealed the dead man living and speaking in the dream. (549, emphasis added)

Magdalen has multiple opportunities to steal the letter—Noel Vanstone’s “secret trust”—but, in the face of the admiral’s sleepwalking, she simply can’t. Though Collins may have sought what was then perceived as a type of psychological and physiological accuracy, Magdalen’s reaction to the admiral takes place outside of the language and knowledge of medical science. Collins’s use of free indirect discourse gives weight to Magdalen’s alarm, as she hesitates to touch, get near, or draw the attention of the sleeping admiral, not, apparently, because she’s afraid to wake him, but instead because of “the mystery and the terror of his sleep.” Despite at least 80 years of medical exploration of somnambulism in its various forms, Magdalen can only see Bartram’s behavior as a “mystery,” an uncanny experience of the human body that so unsettles her that she falters in the execution of her desperate plan. For Magdalen, Bartram’s mechanical, unconscious behavior brings to mind death—continuing the association presented at the demise of Noel.
Vanstone and relevant because this scene prefigures her own near death—and “the awful death-in-life” of the admiral’s face is made even spookier as he behaves a near medium for the spirit of Noel himself.

Once Magdalen establishes that Bartram has locked the bureau and that she must now gain access to his keys, an “inscrutable fascination possessed her; some mysterious attraction drew her after him, in spite of herself” (549). Collins explicitly connects the two figures, noting that Magdalen moves “mechanically, as if she too were walking in her sleep” (549). They continue their somnambulant procession back to the admiral’s bedroom, where Bartram gets back into bed and Magdalen realizes that the trundle bed across the threshold is empty. But Magdalen fails to draw any inferences from this realization: “Her mind slowly recovering the exercise of its faculties, was still under the influence of the earlier and deeper impressions produced on it” (550). Magdalen is still distracted and frightened by the sleepwalking; her mind must “recover,” so she’s not as sharp as she usually is. This failure of inference results in her discovery by Mazey, who finds her back at the bureau after she has stolen the admiral’s keys. But though he grabs her and pulls the letter away, “She never struggled with him…The terrors of that horrible night, following one close on the other in reiterated shocks, had struck her down at last” (552). Magdalen, described early in the novel as having “the overflowing physical health which strengthened every muscle, braced every nerve, and set the warm young blood tingling through her veins like the blood of a growing child,” (9) has succumbed physically and mentally after her encounter with the somnambulist. In order to recover her mental and physical health, in the last section of the novel Magdalen must undergo her own extended liminal experience—a prolonged fever—which nearly kills her but also reunifies the conscious and unconscious parts of herself. She remains “betwixt” sleep and consciousness (579) and her attending physician—
provided, in her poverty and infamy, by deus ex machina love interest Captain Kirke—claims, “Her whole nervous system has given way; all the ordinary functions of her brain are in a state of collapse. I can give you no plainer explanation than that of the nature of the malady. The fever which frightens the people of the house; is merely the effect” (580). After a long period of illness she again finds herself unclear of the relation between conscious and unconscious states, asking “Was it a dream again?” (584) but this time her urge is toward revelation, not deception, and when Captain Kirke touches her, “Every nerve of her body felt that momentary pressure of his hand, with the exquisite susceptibility, which accompanies the first faltering advance on the way to health” (592). Magdalen will only agree to marry Kirke once she has confessed to him the details of her previous life and crimes, suggesting that physical and mental health accompany a desire to gain consistency between conscious and unconscious existence. In the next stage of Collins’s work with the liminal consciousness made possible by the sleepwalking figure, Collins brings the somnambulist out of the periphery and into the center of questions of characterization.

2.8 COLLINS SLEEPWALKER #3: THE MOONSTONE (1868)

Six years after No Name Collins revisits sleepwalking driven by anxiety in his novel The Moonstone. The attempted recovery of the missing titular jewel does not explicitly hinge on a revelation of sleepwalking; however, both the exoneration of an innocent man and the resolution of the novel’s romance plot hinge on such a somnambulistic spectacle and its recreation. By making the novel’s hero and main amateur detective also the story’s sleepwalking criminal, Collins makes Franklin Blake the center of the novel’s debates on the nature of the unconscious and what it contains, theorizing a view of selfhood that is as multifaceted as the novel’s own multiple narrator structure. By proving that Blake’s unconscious motives for stealing the
diamond mirror his conscious motives for trying to find it, Collins uses psychological realism to establish that continual consciousness—and thus some form of unified intentionality—is a key part of sleepwalking in its relation to criminality.

Collins obliquely refers to Blake’s somnambulism in the preface to the novel. Like many of his other prefaces, this one contains a claim to realism, suggesting that even if Collins’s novels were considered “sensational,” he valued authenticity within representation. Similar to his claim in *No Name* that he has tried to achieve his results in the novel “by a resolute adherence, throughout, to the truth as it is in Nature” (*No Name* xxii), here he states,

> In the case of the physiological experiment which occupies a prominent place in the closing scenes of *The Moonstone*, the same principle has guided me once more. Having first ascertained, not only from books, but from living authorities as well, what the result of that experiment would really have been, I have declined to avail myself of the novelist’s privilege of supposing something which might have happened, and have so shaped the story as to make it grow out of what actually would have happened—which, I beg to inform my readers, is also what does happen, in these pages. (*Moonstone* xxiii–xxiv)

In claiming realism and medical authenticity, Collins seeks to expand on what his readership might have perceived as “Natural”: such things can and do happen, he emphasizes, within the realm of everyday existence. His reference to both books and “living authorities as well” presumably included both William Benjamin Carpenter and John Elliotson, both of whom are quoted by Dr. Ezra Jennings in the second half of the novel, as he convinces Franklin Blake of the possibility of recreating Blake’s opium-induced sleepwalking trance of the previous year.

Like Collins himself, characters in *The Moonstone* are aware of and make use of cultural discourses and expectations surrounding somnambulism and the unconscious. When Blake returns to England and confronts Rachel as to why she will not talk to him, he is shocked to hear
her say that she saw him steal the diamond. He then asks her to help him read his body and his behavior.

‘Could you see my face?’
‘Yes.’
‘Plainly?’
‘Quite plainly. The candle in your hand showed it to me.’
‘Were my eyes open?’
‘Yes.’
‘Did you notice anything strange in them? Anything like a fixed, vacant expression?’
‘Nothing of the sort. Your eyes were bright—brighter than usual...’
‘Did you observe one thing when I came into the room—did you observe how I walked?’
‘You walked as you always do. You came in as far as the middle of the room—and then you stopped and looked about you...You stood quite still, for what seemed a long time. I saw your face sideways in the glass. You looked like a man thinking, and dissatisfied with his own thoughts.’ (355-7)

Their exchange demonstrates the difficulty of discerning, in the night and while in an excited emotional state, whether or not a person is in a conscious or unconscious state of being. Franklin Blake’s expectations for his own unconscious behavior have clearly been shaped by popular discussions surrounding sleepwalking—the “signs” that would or would not verify that he was in that state when he entered Rachel’s room.

Jennings later has Blake read short passages from the works of two Victorian authorities on types of unconscious behavior—Carpenter and Elliotson—to further demonstrate to Blake the validity of his suppositions. The scientific context provided by this has been the object of some scholarly discussion. Taylor has suggested that Jennings’s authority is undercut by the combination of Carpenter, who was in the 1860s a well-respected source on physiological psychology, and Elliotson, whose *Human Physiology* (1840) had been extremely popular, but was later abandoned by mainstream psychology (177). Collins would have known that Elliotson had resigned his academic post in disgrace after scandals related to his “questionable”
experiments in mesmerism, discussed in the introduction of this dissertation. More recently, however, Vanessa Ryan has convincingly argued that, firstly, Collins’s friendship with Elliotson (who was also a close friend of Charles Dickens and William Makepeace Thackeray) suggests that Collins—always something of an iconoclast anyway—might have supported Elliotson despite mainstream disapproval; secondly, that Jennings’s endorsement of Carpenter does not extend as wholeheartedly to Elliotson—he does not, for instance, directly quote or support any of Elliotson’s ideas about mesmerism; and, thirdly, that “this type of mining of competing scientific voices is in fact typical of the new psychology [of the 1860s], which was anxious to embrace opposed and less reputable opinions” (Ryan 40-1). In fact, we might see Collins’s specific use of scientific discourses as a way to “confute conventional understandings of objectivity” (41); below, I likewise argue that Collins uses a hybrid model of justice—one that combines legal and medical trappings with an understanding of criminal intentionality that undermines that of the legal system—to challenge more mainstream legal understandings of sleepwalking criminality.

It is important to emphasize that Jennings does not quote Elliotson’s work on mesmerism. He instead tells Blake an anecdote that is quoted by Elliotson, in which a porter loses a package while drunk, cannot locate the package while sober, but remembers the location of the parcel when he is next intoxicated (Moonstone 399). This is a theory more generally applicable to the unconscious, and to the sensory data and information gathered and recorded in altered states. This clearly relates to Blake’s situation and Carpenter’s theory (via Jennings) that any and “every sensory impression…registered…in the brain…may be reproduced at some subsequent time, although there may be no consciousness of its existence in the mind during the whole intermediate period” (398). The brain only needs the correct catalyst; for Blake this catalyst is opium, and its attendant liminal state.
Critical accounts of *The Moonstone*, however, have often misinterpreted the role that opium plays in Blake’s sleepwalking. The otherwise fascinating and comprehensive accounts of Taylor (187-9) and Talairach-Vielmas (76) have erroneously classified Blake’s sleepwalking as mesmerism, an error that is illuminated by my above discussion of *The Notting Hill Mystery*. In general, Victorian accounts created a distinction between sleepwalking and mesmerism: Charles Warren Adams suggests that although a display of each state might be easily confused by the layperson, their symbolism and import varied, especially regarding the issue of agency. Thanks to an early nineteenth-century popular interest in mesmerism, the mid-Victorian public understood that mesmeric display required not simply a catalyst—like opium—but an “operator,” a human agent who imposed his or her will on the mesmeric subject. Though Jennings “manages” the second experiment—he creates the same “moral and material” surroundings of the previous year in order to make Blake sleepwalk again—he does not act as an operator. Additionally, although Collins had written a series of letters defending mesmerism in G. H. Lewes’s *The Leader* in 1852—called “Magnetic Evenings at Home”—by 1862 he had distanced himself from the phenomenon, putting mesmeric doctrine in the mouth of the lampooned and detestable Noel Vanstone (*No Name*). He would continue to criticize the practice via the dishonest and vindictive charlatan Elizabeth Tegenbruggen of *The Legacy of Cain*.

Blake is led to Ezra Jennings by his attempts to discover who had stolen his cousin Rachel’s diamond on her 18th birthday in the summer of the previous year. Blake had been out of temper at the party, presumably because he had recently given up cigar smoking and had been sleeping poorly as a result. A dispute begins between Blake and Mr. Candy when Blake acknowledges his poor sleep, to which Mr. Candy replies “that his nerves were all out of order, and that he ought to go through a course of medicine immediately” (*Moonstone* 74). In the
account given by house steward Gabriel Betteredge, the following then happens, the catalyst for
the novel’s mystery and for its exploration of mind and selfhood via the subject of fraught
slumber.

Mr. Franklin replied that a course of medicine and a course of groping in the dark, meant, in his estimation, one and the same thing. Mr. Candy, hitting back smartly, said that that Mr. Franklin himself was, constitutionally speaking, groping in the dark after sleep, and that nothing but medicine could help him to find it. Mr. Franklin, keeping the ball up on his side, said he had often heard of the blind leading the blind, and now, for the first time, he knew what it meant. In this way, they keep it going briskly, cut and thrust, till they both of them got hot—Mr. Candy, in particular, so completely losing his self-control, in defense of his profession, that my lady was obliged to interfere, and forbid the dispute to go on. (74-75, emphasis added)

Mr. Candy’s wounded pride and mischievous nature combine in “a practical joke” he plays on Blake: using Blake’s cousin Godfrey Ablewhite as an accomplice, Mr. Candy laces Blake’s nightcap with opium in order to prove his point that a course of medicine will benefit Blake. The next morning the diamond is gone and Franklin Blake has had “a good night’s rest at last” and “the unaccustomed luxury of sleep had…apparently stupefied him” (85). Owing to Mr. Candy catching cold on his way home from the Verinder home, the reader does not learn of the opium dosing until much later, and Blake is also unaware of the cause of his satisfactory slumber. Ironically, “a course of medicine” and “a course of groping in the dark” do end up being the same thing for Blake: although he remembers the previous night as one of luxurious slumber, we later learn that his sleep contained much more activity than he supposes.

These details are only brought together a year later when Blake realizes that his once-fond cousin Rachel wants nothing to do with him, and he seeks the assistance of family lawyer Mr. Bruff, Betteredge, and—eventually—Mr. Candy’s assistant, the strange, tragic, opium-addicted Ezra Jennings. Jennings is sympathetic to Blake’s plight: Jennings was also separated
from the woman he loved because of being falsely accused of a crime, and as the person who had attended Mr. Candy during his fever and delirium, Jennings has access to information that no one else knows. This combination ensures that Jennings is “firmly persuaded that [he] can prove [Blake] to have been unconscious of what [Blake was] about, when [Blake] entered the room and took the Diamond” (389). Blake, having already dismissed alcohol and spontaneous sleepwalking as possible explanations, is hesitant to believe Jennings, but once Jennings shows Blake the transcription he made of Mr. Candy’s delirious ravings, Blake is willing to let Jennings restage the events that took place the night of Rachel’s birthday.

To win Blake’s confidence and provide context for the experiment, Jennings explains his methods and theory of unconscious behavior, but the passage also serves to put forth Collins’s own theory that selfhood is continuous, motivated by the same intentions and anxieties even when in a state of unconsciousness.

It has often occurred to me in the course of my medical practice, to doubt whether we can justifiably infer—in cases of delirium—that the loss of the faculty of speaking connectedly, implies of necessity the loss of the faculty of thinking connectedly as well. Poor Mr. Candy’s illness gave me an opportunity of putting this doubt to the test. I understand the art of writing in shorthand; and I was able to take down the patient’s ‘wanderings,’ exactly as they fell from his lips.—Do you see, Mr. Blake, what I am coming to at last?...In plainer words, after putting the broken sentences together I found the superior faculty of thinking going on, more or less connectedly, in my patient’s mind, while the inferior faculty of expression was in a state of almost complete incapacity and confusion. (382-3)

Here Jennings suggests that even if continuous selfhood does not appear to be present to an outside observer, the “superior faculty of thinking [is] going on, more or less connectedly.”

While Jennings is, at this particular moment, explaining Mr. Candy’s behavior during delirium, his explanation argues for a relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness that can be applied to other altered states. The disconnection that Jennings recognizes is one between the
thought and the expression, not between normative consciousness and the permutations of non-normative states. The interior self is the same, he suggests, no matter how able or unable it is to express itself in ways that are legible to the consciousness of others. This theorization is a step beyond Collins’s representation of Admiral Bartram, whose sleepwalking behavior sits outside of direct psychological explanation. By allowing Jennings to explain the relationship between the self and its legibility of expression, Collins suggests that a thorough exploration of unconscious criminal impulses requires greater psychological grounding.

These conclusions hold true even for someone who does not experience extreme altered states naturally or spontaneously. In the novel there is some confusion over whether or not Blake is a spontaneous sleepwalker and if this is how to explain his apparent theft of his cousin’s diamond. Unlike Mrs. Zebedee and Admiral Bartram, Blake is not a spontaneous somnambulist; like Bartram, however, his sleepwalking—catalyzed by opium—is driven by the anxieties of his waking self. Because Blake is the person who stole the moonstone, his attempt to find Rachel’s missing diamond is also a search for himself, both literally and figuratively, for what the self can actually comprise. Blake argues that he has a unitary self—which is supported by the experiment later in the story—but this self contains more than he initially suspects.

Once Blake realizes that both Rachel and the former Verinder maid Rosanna Spearman are convinced that Blake has committed a theft of which he has no memory, he begins to hypothesize possible explanations and asks Verinder house steward Gabriel Betteredge for assistance: “Now tell me plainly, do you remember anything strange of me, after I had gone to bed at night? Did you ever discover me walking in my sleep?” (341). Blake suspects that somnambulism could be a reasonable and likely explanation, but Betteredge replies in the negative. Blake later muses, “Neither at home nor abroad had my life ever been of the solitary
sort. If I had been a sleepwalker there were hundreds on hundreds of people who must have
discovered me, and who, in the interest of my own safety, would have warned me of the habit,
and have taken precautions to restrain it” (341). Despite what must be an exaggeration—
hundreds on hundreds?—Blake is positive that if he were a habitual sleepwalker, someone would
have noticed and informed him. Similar to the situation of Admiral Bartram, safety is
emphasized, but what we also see here is Blake’s conviction that those around him do have his
best interest at heart and would seek to protect him. This assumption about human nature
presumably includes his cousin Godfrey Ablewhite, but late in the text Blake will learn that not
only has Ablewhite witnessed him sleepwalking and refrained from mentioning it, but that he has
also taken advantage of Blake’s vulnerability.

Even though Blake’s sleepwalking requires an external catalyst, Collins also takes pains
to establish Blake’s personality—or personalities—as ripe for the development of that tendency.
Nineteenth-century accounts of “double consciousness” included not only sleepwalkers, but also
people who appeared to have multiple conscious selves. The most famous case was that of
“Felida X,” the patient of French surgeon Étienne Eugène Azam, an account of whom Azam
published in 1887. I do not intend to suggest that Blake literally has any condition even
approaching what has alternately been called multiple personality disorder or dissociative
identity disorder; I instead mean that Collins playfully suggests that Blake has a multiplicity of
conscious selves, a move that allows for the self to be multiplied in a way reminiscent of
nineteenth-century discussions of the sleepwalking self and its potentials.

We first read of this multiplicity in Gabriel Betteredge’s account of the theft of the
diamond, in a passage that both lampoons Blake and makes apparent Betteredge’s tendency to
take literally anything said by “Miss Rachel.”
It was not till later I learned—by assistance of Miss Rachel, who was the first to make the discovery—that these puzzling shifts and transformations in Mr. Franklin were due to the effect on him of his foreign training. At the age when we are all of us most apt to take our colouring, he had been sent abroad, and had been passed on from one nation to another, before there was time for any one colouring more than another to settle itself on him firmly. As a consequence of this, he had come back with so many different sides to his character, all more or less jarring with each other, that he seemed to pass his life in a state of perpetual contradiction with himself. He could be a busy man, and a lazy man; cloudy in the head, and clear in the head; a model of determination, and a spectacle of helplessness, all together. He had his French side, and his German side, and his Italian side—original English foundation showing through, every now and then, as much as to say, ‘Here I am, sorely transmogrified, as you see, but there’s something of me left at the bottom of him still.’ (47-8, emphasis added)

Though Collins’s tongue is firmly in cheek, and Blake will himself later deny the validity of Betteredge’s characterization, the passage holds resemblance to nineteenth-century descriptions of a multi-faceted self. Blake claims that Betteredge’s account is “overdrawn.” He continues,

He has, in his own quaint way, interpreted seriously one of his young mistress’s many satirical references to my foreign education; and has persuaded himself that he actually saw those French, German, and Italian sides to my character, which my lively cousin only professed to discover in jest, and which never had any real existence, except in our good Betteredge’s own brain. (299)

Despite Blake’s claims that Betteredge’s interpretation is overly literal, and despite the assurances of those around him that he has never walked in his sleep, these conclusions do not account for outside factors and catalysts. It is only when Blake encounters Ezra Jennings—the strange assistant to local doctor Mr. Candy—that all of the possibilities begin to be revealed.

Jennings fulfills his simultaneous position of doctor, detective, and martyr by interrogating Blake on the events of the night, while both using his medical expertise to draw conclusions and admonishing Blake to forgive Mr. Candy. His words draw a careful parallel to Blake’s own situation: “Try, and forgive poor Mr. Candy,” said the assistant gently. ‘He has done dreadful mischief, I own; but he has done it innocently’” (394). Jennings quickly comes to the
conclusion that while Blake may have taken the Moonstone, he is morally innocent of the crime, having taken the Diamond whilst in an opium-induced sleepwalking trance. Because of what we could call Blake’s continuous intention combined with the lack of continuity of memory, he is both guilty and innocent, but in a situation more complicated than Collins seems to assume the law courts could adequately categorize: when both waking and sleeping, Blake seeks to protect Rachel’s diamond, but when awake Blake would likely not respond to his anxiety by secretly taking the diamond. Aware of the difficulties of proving such a specific assertion about Blake’s culpability, Jennings decides that an experiment shall be done: both the personal and domestic circumstances of the theft shall be recreated as nearly as possible; Blake will again be given opium prior to bed (after Jennings encourages him to discuss his fears about the safety of the diamond); and Jennings, Betteredge, and Bruff will serve as witnesses to verify the circumstances.

The re-staging of Blake’s sleepwalking is the climax of the novel, its sensationalistic centerpiece. “Re-staging” is an apt term here because the whole event is a piece of theatre, with Jennings noting, “We shall have put you back again into something assimilating to your nervous condition on the birthday night. If we can revive, or nearly revive, the domestic circumstances which surrounded you; and if we can occupy your mind again with the various questions concerning the Diamond which formerly agitated it, we shall have replaced you, as nearly as possible, in the same position, physically and morally, in which the opium found you last year” (397-8). The restaging of Blake’s sleepwalking serves several purposes within the novel. Clearly, it serves to assist in the confirmation of Blake’s innocence—that even if he physically took the diamond, that he is morally innocent of theft—but also to exonerate Ezra Jennings, not only in the eyes of Franklin and Rachel—who already find him sympathetic—but also in the
surrounding community, as represented by head servant Gabriel Betteredge and family lawyer Mr. Bruff. On a larger symbolic-cultural level, the scene also serves as a centerpiece for Collins’s project of psychological realism.

There is a critical consensus that the novel intends us to see Blake as morally innocent of the specific crime of stealing the diamond, though several scholars suggest that the novel does not completely absolve Blake of all kinds of guilt or criminal taint, even if Blake does choose to absolve himself. On the one hand, Blake clearly must be cleared of suspicion regarding the diamond in order to facilitate his reconciliation with Rachel and provide a resolution to the novel’s marriage plot. On the other hand, his other shady behavior suggests that he is more generally criminally or morally implicated in the text. Lewis Robert has suggested that Blake’s claim to innocence is “extremely problematic” because Blake is “continually shown as a questionable character, both morally and socially enigmatic” (172). His most damning offense is his lack of awareness of and regard for Rosanna Spearman’s romantic feelings, and after her suicide, Blake shows no awareness of the disabled former thief’s struggles within the inequities of class and patriarchy. Limping Lucy repeatedly insists “He’s a murderer!...He has been the death of Rosanna Spearman!” (Moonstone 191) and even his beloved Rachel hisses that he’s a “villain” (352). Melissa Free has suggested that Blake is a representative of the family’s “buried imperial guilt” (353), as Blake’s “removal of the gem from [Rachel’s] Indian cabinet” mirrors ancestor John Herncastle’s original acquisition of the diamond by “penetrat[ing] the sultan’s treasury” (353). Eric Levy insists that Blake has moral responsibility for his “unconscious actions,” though Levy admits that his use of “unconscious” is easily equated with selfish oblivion: he argues for an anachronistic notion of unconscious action “ultimately construed in moral, not psychological terms” (68).
But the “guilt” these scholars discuss is not within a legal model that Victorian society would have acknowledged, and even Limping Lucy’s accusations of murder extend notions of responsibility beyond a recognized criminal model. Part of the confusion here extends from the complex issue of intention. Free suggests that “Blake ultimately absolves himself of the crime by absolving himself of wrong intention” (354); however, Blake’s actual intentions toward the moonstone are somewhat fuzzy within the text. Ezra Jennings suggests that Blake is primarily motivated by anxiety and a desire to “preserv[e] the Diamond” (*Moonstone* 401); Blake concurs, “I knew [the Diamond] to be the object of a conspiracy; and I was warned to take measures for Miss Verinder’s protection” (393). Blake’s comments during the second sleepwalking experiment, and Ablewhite’s account of Blake’s statements during the first, appear to support this supposition. Welsh, however, has suggested that Blake’s only confirmed conscious motivation is his gambling debts, and that on a metaphorical level, Blake’s entrance of the bedroom and Rachel’s “missing” gem are “sexual symbolism” that is “transparent” (Welsh 226).

That Blake has primarily stolen the Moonstone in order to pay his own debts is rendered a less credible hypothesis at the staging of the second experiment: Blake sleepwalks and “steals” the diamond again, after he has inherited his father’s money and achieved financial solvency. If, therefore, we are supposed to suspect Blake in the first half of the novel, Collins clearly wants us to accept Jennings’s hypothesis in the second half.⁸⁷ Therefore, Blake takes the diamond in order to protect Rachel, and, what Jennings refrains from mentioning, to prove himself to Rachel as a promising suitor. These are the exact same intentions that motivate Blake when he tries to find the diamond after it goes missing. By showing that the same intentionality can motivate the theft and the attempted recovery of the same object, Collins challenges the primacy of place given to intentionality in discussions surrounding sleepwalking culpability.
Via the sleepwalking reenactment, we are given insight into the workings of Blake’s mind—and, I might add, the relationship between conscious desires and unconscious action more generally. We are “allowed to understand…to look into Blake’s unconsciousness” (Thoms 155). While Thomas, Briefel, and others all confirm that the sleepwalking experiment “proves Blake’s innocence,” 88 (154) Welsh insists that the evidence provided by Jennings’s diary narration “would hardly stand as proof of innocence in a criminal trial” (225). Though Welsh’s assertion is supported in general by his own project on the legal and literary history of circumstantial evidence in England, he does not mention any specific sleepwalking trials or context to support his claim. That a defendant who has circumstantial evidence (the nightgown hidden by Rosanna) and eyewitness evidence (Rachel’s clear view of Blake when he entered her room and picked up the Moonstone) against him should be “rightly suspected” (226) by a legal court, even after Jennings’s recreation of the event, seems to follow—except in an altered state case such as Blake’s. As I discuss in the “Sleepwalking Defense” section of this chapter, even defendants who had been directly witnessed murdering or injuring others while sleepwalking could walk away with a partial conviction for a reduced charged (such as Minchin) or a lack of any conviction whatsoever (such as Fraser).

To make an overly direct comparison between Collins’s scenario and the actual legal system, however, might be a faulty attempt. Though we might tentatively suggest that because Jennings (doctor) and Bruff (lawyer) are witnesses to the restaging event they might provide it with a certain medico-legal significance, Betteredge’s presence and importance as witness complicates this analogy. Despite his affection for Blake, as head servant Betteredge’s loyalty is to the family overall: he provides social significance with his approval (and initial disapproval) of the event. This blend of public and private types of justice thus stands as a competing model.
alongside a strictly legal understanding of guilt and intentionality, using social significance to condemn—not exonerate—a sleepwalking defendant. This is consistent with a novel whose prologue “begin[s] like a legal deposition” but then appeals to the “justice [of] the institution of the family” (Miller 47-8). Blake, after all, has not yet been publicly accused or shamed. His desire for resolution is a desire “to square his relationship with Rachel Verinder if possible and reconcile her evidence and that of Rosanna Spearman with his own utter bafflement and inner denial of the experience” (Welsh 225).  

We are thus left with questions about “innocent forms of guilt” (224), and, perhaps, guilty forms of innocence, an even more complex engagement than we see in *No Name’s* splitting of sleepwalker and criminal into two persons, though consistent with that novel’s insistence that guilt and innocence be viewed as a spectrum. Collins’s preface claims that “the attempt, made, here, is to trace the influence of character on circumstances” (*Moonstone* xxiii), which we can easily read as an issue of personal responsibility and culpability. Interestingly, in Godfrey Ablewhite’s account of how he came to have the Moonstone, he—like Blake—seems to assume little personal responsibility for the theft. A sleepwalking Franklin Blake had, after all, under the influence of opium and worry, “put the Diamond into [Ablewhite’s] hand” (466). When Ablewhite determines that Blake has no memory and Rachel will say nothing, he realizes that he might “chose to keep the Diamond…with perfect impunity” (466). After all, Ablewhite has already witnessed Blake’s “unconscious theft” and has merely become the diamond’s “accidental new owner” (Free 361). But Ablewhite’s attempt to hide his possession of the diamond—along with his mistress and villa in suburban London—suggest a moral guilt that does not extend to Blake, whose desire to reveal himself—and his continuity of consciousness—is the strongest evidence of his moral innocence.
2.9 COLLINS SLEEPWALKER #4: THE LEGACY OF CAIN (1888)

In his last completed novel, The Legacy of Cain, Collins uses the figure of the somnambulist to intervene in contemporary discussions of hereditary criminal degeneracy while continuing his long term project of expanding and revising Victorian understanding of the relationship between intention and the unconscious. By the time Collins was writing in 1889, studies of the criminal had been shaped by degeneration theory—based in part on interpretations of the greater implications of Charles Darwin’s work on evolution—while British criminology had an awareness of—if not an endorsement for—Cesare Lombroso’s theories of the criminal man based on physical markers. In The Legacy of Cain we find Collins’s most direct engagement with the theoretical discussions of criminality: though Collins had frequently made his fictional criminals superficially attractive, it is in The Legacy of Cain that he most explicitly derides the study of physiognomy that substantially underwrote nineteenth-century discussions of the detection of criminal propensity. In contrast to The Moonstone, which builds on the possibilities opened up by mid-century psychology, here Collins suggests that degeneration theory has shut down possibility, turning scientific discovery into a monolith of power and horror.

We see this clearly when the prison governor—the organizing agent of the novel—insists that guilt is scarcely superficially legible: “Let me add that daily observation of all classes of criminals, extending over many years, has considerably diminished my faith in physiognomy as a safe guide to the discovery of character. Nervous trepidation looks like guilt. Guilt, firmly sustained by insensibility, looks like innocence” (Cain 7). His comments are prompted by interaction with a murderess who looks like a renaissance representation of the Madonna: “She presented the delicate light hair, the quiet eyes, the finely-shaped lower features, and the
correctly oval form of face, repeated in hundreds on hundreds of…conventional works of Art…” (7). Yet this woman waits on the eve of her execution, having committed premeditated murder. The prison governor pushes further, contending that not only might criminals have holy faces, but that “honest labourers (whose only crime was poverty!)” had often been mistaken by “judges of physiognomy” to be ideal types of “criminal atrocity” (8).

This discussion of the failures of physiognomy is Collins’s first interrogation of the ways in which the self might be read (or misread). The exterior, he suggests, is not where knowledge of self lies. Collins will extend this question of how to read the self throughout the rest of novel, further exploring the exterior approach, but also extending his analysis to readings of the interior and of personal history. His most decisive assertions about the more accurate ways of reading the self come through the revelations of sleepwalking, which serve to provide insight into the “true” self, as Collins’s depicts his first sleepwalker who not only has continuity of intention, but also continuity of memory.

The narrative’s prologue sets up various frameworks for defining personhood and its negative and positive capabilities. Here, three “representative types” (Taylor 237)—a doctor, a minister, and the aforementioned prison governor—debate the nature of criminal inheritance. Unlike the crucial Ezra Jennings and the playful Dr. Candy of The Moonstone (or even the benign and patient surgeon Mr. Merrick at the end of No Name), medical professionals are not represented sympathetically throughout The Legacy of Cain. The first doctor, seen in the prologue, clearly represents proponents of degeneration theory and echoes Henry Maudsley’s comments on “the tyranny of a bad organization” (Body and Mind 43) when he claims, “I have found vice and diseases descending more frequently to children than virtue and health” (Cain 19-20). This is contrasted by the non-Conformist minister’s ideology of moral management that
suggests training can overcome heredity, and prompts him to agree to adopt the Madonna-murderess’s one-year-old daughter (12).

When the minister’s wife also bears a daughter but then dies, the minister decides to raise the two girls as sisters, but obscures their pasts: because his adopted daughter is nearly two years older than his biological daughter, he refuses to celebrate their birthdays or reveal their ages to them as a means of frustrating anyone’s attempt to discern which daughter belonged to the murderess. Because the narrative skips ahead 17 years and Collins introduces the two teenage girls to the reader via their own diaries, the respective origins of the girls—now named Helena and Eunice—are obscured from the reader as well.95

Collins’s use of the diaries is clearly strategic. They serve as a plot point, consistent with their non-Conformist father’s Puritan ideals of moral management and self-discipline (41). But like the Collins’s use of religious symbolism—the murderess’s resemblance to the Madonna—in order to complicate and refute the aims of physiognomy, the use of the diaries combines theological ideals with nineteenth-century science: the need for self-surveillance and the internalization of conscience are not only the aims of Puritan self-discipline but also the aims of nineteenth-century psychology’s obsession with self-analysis.96 This suggests that while the diaries serve a formal purpose, they function on several levels, providing “clues” for the reader to use in solving the mystery of which girl is which, but also showing the work of consciousness building. As another way of making the self legible, the diaries provide the internal counterpoint to physiognomy’s understanding of externality.

The novel’s mystery of identity begins to unravel after Eunice loses her beau Philip to her sister Helena. Previously characterized by her father and sister as “lazy” (42) and “slow and simple” (44), Eunice bears traces of degeneration and regression.97 Her childish inability to hide
her feelings is demonstrated by her unwillingness to lock her diary—“It’s not worthwhile. Anybody who cares to do it may read what I write” (42)—and these qualities are contrasted to Helena who runs her father’s household, plans the meals, takes dictation for the minister, and makes it “a custom to use the lock on [her] journal” (44-5). When Eunice catches Helena and Philip together, however, she becomes less languid and more savage, compared to a “wild animal” (131) in her jealousy, and agreeing that she is “sorry” that she “didn’t kill [Helena] when [she] had [her] hands on [Helena’s] throat” (138). These changes do not simply suggest that Eunice is the recipient of a tainted hereditary transmission: Collins uses inheritance to suggest a new dimension of the unconscious. Eunice’s response of “yes” to the question of whether she wishes she had killed Helena seems to come from somewhere—or someone—else: she doesn’t “remember being conscious of meaning anything” and is concerned that she may not have been able to stop it. “It was as if somebody else had said Yes—not I” (138-9).

These shifts in what Eunice perceives as contained in her consciousness are recorded in her diary and accompanied by her increasing inability to sleep. Like Magdalen Vanstone, she gains a perception that waking life has been invaded by a sense of unreality: “Another sleepless night. Did I pass the miserable hours in writing letters to Philip, and then tearing them up? Or did I only fancy that I wrote to him? (139) She insists that the “want of sleep is killing [her] by inches” (139), but her troubled insomnia is dismissed by the town doctor as “foolish”; he tells her to “count a thousand, if you can’t sleep to-night, or turn your pillow” (140).

Combined with Eunice’s concern over “this new evil self” (142), the doctor’s dismissal leads to a climax in the novel’s handling of the ambiguity of identity. Eunice’s self-administered dose of her father’s “composing medicine” (142) leads to an episode of opium-induced sleepwalking, in which Eunice’s murderess mother “appears” to her and tempts her to kill
Helena. But while the scene confirms that Eunice is the adopted daughter, the sleepwalking makes clear to Eunice her unconscious inheritance. Just as sleepwalking prompts Franklin Blake to steal the Moonstone, Eunice’s sleepwalking reveals to her that she cannot deny her capacity for criminal behavior.98

Eunice’s episode of somnambulism is the first time Collins’s narration goes inside the experience of sleepwalking, recording the experience of transitioning from normative consciousness to a sleepwalking state, which is Collins’s most psychologically complex use of somnambulism. The use of opium as a catalyst makes clear the parallels to Franklin Blake, but though Jennings explains what had likely happened to Blake, here we see the entire experience from Eunice’s perspective. This shift is a complex one: Eunice shares with the reader an experience that contemporary psychology suggested she should not be able to share, and in doing so, supports Collins’s increasing depiction of consciousness as continuous. With sleepwalking described internally by the sleepwalker and not by an outside observer, the sleepwalker moves from being an “other” to being aligned with dominant selfhood. This dismissal of mainstream psychological models of somnambulism is consistent with Collins’s suggestion in The Legacy of Cain that mainstream medical theories—increasingly dominated by degeneration discourses—were no longer sites of literary possibility for him in the late 1880s. But even in rejecting a strictly psychological model, Collins nonetheless continues to embrace the somnambulist’s symbolic potential as a representative of expansive selfhood in a literary context.

Eunice’s self-narrated sleepwalking presents the consciousness of altered states as an extension of everyday consciousness. As “the strokes of the clock died out” and “the round of [her] thoughts stopped” (145), we can pinpoint when Eunice begins to fall asleep, and the quality of light she then perceives—“ghastly” and “like nothing I have ever seen by day” (145)—signals
her occupation of a liminal position. The strange light is followed by an “awful darkness” and her first encounter with the entity who will lead her in her dream experience. There are “dead-cold touches” and “whispers” before the entity identifies itself as “your mother,” and it catechizes Eunice on the state of her romantic life before insisting that Eunice kill Helena. Eunice agrees, and the order of the dream then follows the order of her waking mind: before falling asleep Eunice had considered all of the means of murder she had learned from her “lessons in history” (143)—stabbing, poison, suffocation—and in her dream she visits sites that would provide the tools needed for each attempt. The novel is ambiguous as to whether Eunice actually travels to “the Museum of our town” (where she could get a knife from a display) or “the burial ground of our parish church” (where she could take berries of the Yew tree), but when shaken out of her dream by Helena’s “sudden cry” (149), she does find herself standing over her sister’s bed, pillow in hand.

Before she is completely awake, Eunice stays her hand even in her dream, confronted by an image of Philip in the miniature that Helena always wears around her neck. Her awareness that her continued love for Philip is a more powerful motivator than her desire for revenge suggests that her consciousness building self-surveillance—via her diary—shapes her reaction, enabling her to respond to and resist her mother’s injunctions toward violence. Because Eunice is able to apply the moral management of consciousness building to her revelations of the unconscious, we see Collins again suggesting that selfhood is continuous. The lessons learned while awake can be applied while asleep, which suggest that the continuity of self is not deterministic. In The Moonstone Franklin Blake is at the mercy of his continuity—wherein the anxieties of the waking self rule the sleeping self, even if the inhibitions of the waking self do not—but Eunice’s experiences suggest an awareness beyond that of Blake.
The outcome of Eunice’s sleepwalking—that she does not actually kill her sister or commit any other crime—suggest that moral management and self-surveillance benefit Eunice and can extend to the actions of unconsciousness. However, the novel uses the Rev. Gracedieu to suggest that moral management is only valuable with self-knowledge. In contrast to Eunice—whose growing awareness of what her mother must have been culminates in her ready and calm acceptance of the governor’s confirmation of her criminal heritage (324)—the Rev. Gracedieu fails in the course of his own self-management, suffering from a breakdown which is initially attributed to “anxiety” and “overwork” that evolve into clear codes for his religious fanaticism (84). Despite Gracedieu’s history of spiritual devotion and selfless kindness, the minister nurses a denial of the morbid and evil propensities of the dead Mrs. Gracedieu, his wife and Helena’s mother. In his “nervous derangement” he often refers to her as Helena’s “sainted mother” and “the angel of [his] life” (173). When the prison governor attempts to reveal that Mrs. Gracedieu had spitefully visited him after Helena’s birth, with a “flashing shifting expression in her eyes” (30) and a determination to rid herself of Eunice by throwing the “little wretch” in an orphan asylum (32), the minister reacts to the information by staging a “trial” in front of a portrait of his dead wife and attacking the prison governor with a razor blade (225-9). He is described, like his adopted daughter, as a “wild animal” (229), but unlike Eunice he fails to gain greater self-knowledge and thus fails to recover, ending his days a “wreck of a man” (314). Ultimately, Collins seems to suggest here that the moral management of a religious education and the self-surveillance championed by both psychological writing and the legal code are nonetheless detrimental unless informed by a continuity of selfhood, such as that enabled by liminal states.
Sleepwalkers had been frequently appearing in newspapers, courtrooms, and medical and psychological texts long before Collins’s repeated depictions of these figures, but Collins—alongside other sensation and mystery writers—provided some of the first sustained investigations of these figures in British literature. His repeated return to sleepwalkers in his fiction indicates—at the very least—his conviction that nineteenth-century readers were intrigued by somnambulism and primed to read more stories that included—even hinged on—sleepwalking phenomena. I’ve argued here that Collins’s investment goes far beyond even that; unlike Adams and Hume, whose superficial engagement with the topic indicates an interest that remains at the level of spectacle, Collins used the sleepwalker and his or her symbolic resonance to deeply engage with and challenge contemporary medical and legal understandings of consciousness and unconsciousness. By representing the sleepwalker via a variety of narrative methods—which take us increasingly into the sleepwalker’s interiority—and by representing sleepwalkers as the protagonists in *The Moonstone* and *The Legacy of Cain*, Collins effectively moves the somnambulist to the center of literary debates about consciousness.
3.0 SOMNAMBULISM, MYSTICISM, AND MATERIALISM IN THOMAS HARDY’S

TESS OF THE D’URBERVILLES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Readers of the October 17, 1891 issue of The Graphic were greeted by a striking sight as they thumbed toward the middle of the magazine: a full page illustration by German-born British artist Hubert Herkomer (see Figure 1), accompanying the weekly installment of Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles. In the center of the picture is a woman, wrapped in what may be a sheet, though her placement atop a stone coffin suggests her garment is more likely a shroud. She is clearly the centerpiece of the illustration, her white garment in stark contrast to the darkness around her. She raises herself on one arm, the other draped around the neck of the man whose face she stares into. Her hand curls lightly on his shoulder, with only the slightest hint that her fingers might tightly grasp his shirt at any moment. Her expression is hard to decipher. There is sadness there, and a bit of curiosity, but both feelings seem overridden by a strange resigned placidity as she waits for the man to make his next move.

His face is also a complex study. He looks not at the woman in his arms, nor directly out at the viewer. His gaze seems caught by something far off, perhaps behind us and off to the side, just the smallest bit upward. His chin is raised slightly, his mouth mostly obscured by the mustache that saves his face from being overly feminine. He stands behind the woman as he grasps her below him, one arm tightly around her, his hand lost in the folds of the cloth. His
posture does not conclusively suggest whether he is in the process of laying her down on the stone slab or picking her up, but, regardless, his attention is not directly on her. All is dark around them, the shadowy grass and trees hovering in the background.

As I write this description, I am well aware of the scenes that will unfold once the page is turned: the readers of the 1891 issue of *The Graphic*, however, would have encountered this illustration without knowing that it depicts Hardy’s somnambulist Angel Clare placing his estranged wife Tess (*nee* Durbeyfield) atop the tomb of a dead monk. The week’s installment sensationally ends in the middle of chapter 37, where—having placed Tess on the stone—Angel lays down on the ground next to her: “the spurt of mental excitement which had produced the effort was now over.” The excerpt for October 17 was the fifteenth installment, with Angel’s titillating sleepwalking episode concluding the following week. I suggest here that the original publication of the story—through the illustration and the chapter break—sets up Angel’s sleepwalking as important as both a symbol and a plot point. Despite its sensationalized treatment during *Tess of the d’Urbervilles*’s first run of publication—serialized in *The Graphic* from July 4, 1891 through December 26, 1891—Angel’s sleepwalking has attracted little sustained critical attention. As discussed below, only a handful of scholars discuss the main sleepwalking episode, none of which analyze this illustration nor the other sleepwalking incident in the novel. This critical silence is problematic, given that Hardy turns to sleep-related altered states to explore the tension between mysticism and materialism regarding states of consciousness.

This chapter argues that sleepwalking is such a productive symbol for Hardy because of its liminality, which brings together seeming opposites without resolving the tensions between them. In Angel Clare Hardy creates a sleepwalker whose class mobility and ideological
confusion mirror his liminal consciousness: the middle class idealist who rejects both the
Christian doctrine and the bourgeois life of the mind chosen by his father and brothers, and torn
between materialism and spirituality. He performs these conflicts via his sleepwalking—which
occupies the position of sleep but also of “not-sleep”; it serves as a metaphor for a transition
between life and death, and raises the spectre of a divided self. Although he seeks to resolve
these tensions through a love of Tess which idealizes her, his somnambulant burial and
resurrection reveals the failure of this attempt: this simulated journey into death and back into
life fails alter their relationship, with his lack of agency highlighting the impossibility of uniting
all such opposites on a conscious level.  

Herkomer’s illustration—while not of a “real”
sleepwalker—ties Angel to the drawings of sleepwalkers (often female) published in other
periodicals of the day, and captures both the erotic potential and the ghostly/deathly element of
such depictions. The inclusion of Tess in the scene allows for the illustration to have a
sleepwalker and a nightgown-clad young woman, even if those two things aren’t the same,
capitalizing on the erotic potential of the phenomenon.  

Tess’s inclusion in the illustration
also highlights her importance in any depiction of Angel’s somnambulism. As noted, the
viewer’s eye is drawn most immediately to Tess’s white form, then to her face, after which we
follow her gaze to look at Angel himself, meaning that our interpretation of the figure of Angel is
already influenced by how we interpret Tess’s facial expression: that is, to say, what do we
expect to see based on her reaction to it? Our reading of the image of Angel and our
interpretation of Tess’s reading of the same image are thus tied together. But this is not the only
measure of Tess’s importance to the image. I have already noted, just as the novel itself does,  
that Tess’s garment functions as both sheet and shroud, leading to possible confusion for the
uninitiated reader who might fancy himself gazing at an illustration either of a sleepwalker
placing a living woman on a tomb, or of a conscious man assisting a dead woman as she rises from her grave. The ambiguity of the scene as it is represented—coupled with the innocent reader’s ignorance—allows for an image of Angel’s sleepwalking to double as an image of Tess’s resurrection.

Ultimately, Hardy uses the spectacle of somnambulism to explore the tension and connections between nineteenth-century materialism and nineteenth-century mysticism. His project highlights the way that contemporaneous psychological debates divided the human subject between religious and scientific worldviews, but also symbolizes the inability to resolve those world views. Consequently, Hardy’s discourse within Tess seems to support opposing worldviews which he refuses to reconcile within the scope of the novel, maintaining this tension even through the conclusion of the text. This analysis of Tess of the d’Urbervilles brings together scholarly discourses of consciousness with debates about the role of materialism in the novel, while shedding light on what has hitherto been interpreted as Hardy’s “ideological confusion” within the text.

3.2 TRANCE STATES AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY MYSTICISM

Though Angel Clare is the only somnambulist in Tess of the d’Urbervilles, his scenes of sleepwalking take place amidst a variety of representations of other semiconscious or unconscious states in the novel, with many scenes of characters dreaming, sleeping, intoxicated by alcohol, or in reverie or a trance. Angel’s mental landscape is shown as simply a more extreme type of the model of the mind which Hardy gives to most characters in Tess, who often seem on the verge of lapsing into sleep or reverie. Hardy’s half-asleep countryside represents a view of reality and unreality as open to slippages, at least within the limits of everyday personal
experience. Although Tess has heard of other sleepwalkers and their accidents, Hardy shares with us only one individual example of the species, and uses that to demonstrate how the learned and middle class Angel—so sensitive to aesthetic experience yet so hard and rigid in interpersonal experience—has inconsistent access to self-knowledge. In a sense, Hardy—like Bram Stoker, several years later—suggests that sleepwalking may be a malady of the cultured middle class. Kramer suggests that Tess “stresses the isolation of the individual, his separation from the consciousness of the people around him, his lack of importance to his peers and environment” (117). In the case of Angel, the subject is also isolated and separated from a part of himself, an isolation and separation which lessens the importance of the secret self for Angel but increases its importance for the reader. Garson stresses this as it applies to Tess when she remarks “Angel’s sin against Tess is his failure to realize [that Alec has possessed her body but not her soul]. His repudiation of her causes—or deepens—a radical split in Tess, makes her separate herself from her body; it constrains Tess to define herself—while it enables the narrator to redefine her—along the lines of pure spirit” (Garson 143). This division of self is an attempt on the part of Angel to deny the Tess the same liminal position which he himself unknowingly occupies.

Overall, scholars do not connect Angel’s sleepwalking with these other altered states of consciousness in the novel (sleep, trance, drunkenness), though nineteenth-century psychology writing most definitely did, with both early psychiatrists and the reading public perceiving these states as distinct while interrelated: each having different social and mental significance, but nonetheless studied together on a kind of mental continuum. *Tess of the d’Urbervilles* treats these altered states with varying degrees of indulgence or disapproval, but the scenes of Tess’s sleepiness and the drunkenness of both the farm laborers and the elder Durbeyfields create a
context for the sleepwalking that combines the mysticism of altered states with the hard facts of class-bound material realities. These altered states—especially somnambulism—not only drive forward the plot of the novel, with either calamity or revelation hinging on trance behavior, but also demonstrate the key role liminality plays in Hardy’s symbolism. By studying sleepwalking in a larger trance context, we see how the various states may superficially draw from similar imagery, but unlike sleepwalking’s multiple readings—material and mystical, often simultaneously—these other altered states are more overdetermined in their outcomes. I will first divide Hardy’s treatment of moments of reverie or drowsiness from his representation of moments of alcoholic intoxication and moments of trance, and then—in the next section—move on to examine the liminal position that Angel’s somnambulism holds within the variety of states that Hardy presents to the reader of Tess. By placing each state within mystical and/or materialist discourses, Hardy uses each of these states to comment on the role human will has within human action, with sleepwalking’s liminality suggesting that human agency could manifest itself in resistance to dichotomous ideologies.

Tess’s recurrent drowsiness introduces the concern of public sleeping and vulnerability, which sets up key concerns for the novel’s later exploration of sleepwalking. Scholars already have documented Tess’s tendency to fall asleep or be sleepy at inopportune moments and sleep through some of the most important events of the novel, though this tendency has too often been read as the result of Tess’s passivity and willingness to be a victim. Instead, I argue that although Tess herself is at times convinced that she is not in control of her life, and sees her encounters with Alec as supporting her (again, occasional) belief in fatalism—i.e., the individual’s lack of volition—Hardy actually presents these moments of drowsiness as opportunities to dismantle
The first two of these moments—the death of her horse Prince, and the night in the Chase when she is violated by Alec—are immediately precipitated by Tess’s responses to the alcoholic intoxication of those around her. She is kept up too late by the drunkenness of her family and coworkers, and falls asleep later because of it. Their drunkenness leads to her exhaustion which in turn leads to tragedy. The latter two are when Angel returns to collect her in Sandbourne, and her capture by the police at Stonehenge. Scholars Jeffrey Sommers and Bert Hornback have suggested that Tess’s sleepiness makes her at least partially culpable for her bad luck. This assessment highlights the appropriateness of my dissertation’s questions of how literary characters (and possibly the public at large) treat those made vulnerable by sleep. Thus Tess’s tendency to sleep publically makes her akin to sleepwalkers in terms of the dangers that they face.

Tess volunteers for the ill-fated trip to market with the family horse Prince after her father’s drunkenness means that he cannot take a load of beehives to Casterbridge to sell, a scene in which Tess is for the first time demonstratively differentiated from the other girls of Marlott and from her immediate family. In this scene we first see the beginnings of the liminal project that Hardy will more fully develop through Angel’s sleepwalking, especially in regard to the conventional boundaries of activity and passivity and conscious reality and unconscious fancy. Although Tess has had only two hours of sleep she volunteers to take the load with her little brother Abraham for company, but her tired body and mind are not up to her valiant attempt to protect her family’s honor and finances. She kindly allows Abraham to nap “with no longer a companion to distract her, Tess fell more deeply into reverie than ever” (21). In her reverie the
worlds of reality and fancy become deeply intertwined and allow her moments of insight: she realizes “the vanity of her father’s pride,” and—in what seems a period of hypnogogia—confronts an image of the “gentlemanly suitor awaiting herself in her mother’s fancy,” who grimaces and laughs “at her poverty and her shrouded knightly ancestry,” (22) surely a foreshadowing of Alec’s determination to treat her as a foolish plaything. The point where Tess loses consciousness is unclear, as everything grows “more and more extravagant” and she loses track of time. Ground is covered and much time passes before the wagon stops and she hears “a hollow groan, unlike anything she had heard before” (22). Disaster has struck: her lantern has gone out and a fast-paced early morning mail cart does not see her wagon until the pointed shaft of the cart had impaled itself in the chest of Prince, the family’s horse. Zena Meadowsong has written insightfully on the melodramatic tone of the incident, as the narrator observes that “the pointed shaft of the cart had entered the breast of the unhappy Prince like a sword; and from the wound his life’s blood was spouting in a stream, and falling with a hiss onto the road” (22). Meadowsong notes that “the quasichivalric rhetoric (of the Prince and the sword) seems to poke fun at the calamity, giving the death of the poor workhorse a kind of courtly significance at odds with the humble nature of the scene. Yet the incident has the gravest of consequences for the heroine” (Meadowsong 225). It is at this point that Tess—heavy with feelings of guilt and responsibility—agrees to claim kin with the Stoke-d’Urbervilles in order to raise her family’s fortunes, an act that throws her into the path of Alec and seems to lead directly to her violation and pregnancy, Angel’s abandonment of her, and her murder of Alec and subsequent arrest and execution. This early tragedy is presented in seemingly inflated language but it leads to very real, very devastating consequences, suggesting that Tess does indeed live on “a blighted star” (Hardy 22). In the eyes of the reader, this combination of Tess’s selflessness and her perspectives
on the cosmology of her universe may set her apart more definitely from the members of her class than the d’Urberville name, though it is the latter that will help to concretely determine her suspicions that she is not in control of her fate.

This notion of fatalism—the individual’s lack of volition—is supported by the next major event in Tess’s life. Hired by the Stoke-d’Urbervilles to tend their poultry, Tess becomes friendly with the other farm workers and one evening walks to Chaseborough to meet them for their weekend revelry. But Tess is tired, having worked hard all week and eaten little that day, and by the time the group starts for home she is exhausted (54). Provoked by the jealousy and anger of the other women and uncomfortable once she realizes the drunkenness of the farmhands, Tess impulsively accepts a ride from Alec, despite her usual distrust and dislike of him. They travel through the late-night mist, a journey prolonged by Alec’s desire for her company; eventually they find themselves lost and he leaves Tess while he searches for landmarks. Tess sits down in the nest of leaves he has prepared for her and “he plunged into the webs of vapour which by this time formed veils between the trees. She could hear the rustling of the branches as he ascended the adjoining slope…With the setting of the moon the pale light lessened, and became invisible as she fell into reveries upon the leaves where he had left her” (56). The use of “webs of vapour” forming “veils between the trees” alerts the reader that a trap is being set, and Tess’s obscured vision will be mirrored by the reader’s.

What comes next is a narrative gap that has often been treated as the most important silence in the text. When Alec returns, the novel implies that a rape or seduction takes place, one for which Tess blames herself. The lack of clarity here has led to critical disagreement, but a question that focuses on rape versus seduction fails to address the more important implications of the scene; I am inclined to agree with scholars such as J. Hillis Miller and Ellen Rooney who
suggest that the question itself is problematic, not in the least because either way the incident is one of Alec using the power of sex and class over Tess because she is subordinate to him in a variety of ways, but, more importantly, because it is a misreading of Hardy’s project, which, in its privileging of the liminal, rejects a simple “praise versus blame” binary. Thus we have both Tess’s acknowledgment of her “weakness,” telling Alec “My eyes were dazed by you for a little, and that was all” (59), and another fieldwoman’s later observation that “A little more than persuading had to do wi’ the coming o’ [Tess’s baby] I reckon. There were they that heard a sobbing one night last year in The Chase; and it mid ha’ gone hard wi’ a certain party if folks had come along” (70). Neither of these assessments satisfy or resolve our curiosity, and in so doing, coming as they do after complex plot machinations which trace a variety of choices and non-choices, they allow Tess to occupy the position of both agent and victim—and thus neither.

The way the scene in The Chase echoes and builds on the Prince scene really seems to develop a narrative of fatalism and the protagonist’s lack of agency, but it is the characters’ sensitivity to altered states and shifts in consciousness which are the real focus here. These are both made necessary or caused by (in the case of Tess herself) their class position. In Hardy’s Wessex world, altered states begin to be established as metaphors for class struggle, with one’s specific class position dictating which altered states one has access to.

As noted above, Tess’s responsibility for her behavior in these situations has been debated, with Rosemary Morgan providing the most sustained account of Tess’s exhaustion throughout the novel as a clear indicator that Tess’s agency has been compromised by her experience as an overworked and inadequately rested working class subject. Morgan uses the term “rape” when describing sexual relations between Alec and Tess because “the term suffices to denote the moral nature of the act, which passes beyond sexual assault to take account of
violation of rightful ownership” (Morgan 94). When Hardy’s narrator muses on Tess’s situation and asks “why so often the coarse appropriates the finer thus, the wrong man the woman,” (Hardy 57) Morgan focuses on the way that “appropriates” suggests the theft of property, which neatly summarizes the class and gender relation of the two characters (Morgan 94). Morgan also skillfully connects Tess’s sleeping to her class position, noting “the drowsy Tess is, in every respect, a thoroughly exhausted Tess, and Hardy takes pains to elicit in detail the sheer expenditure of energy and unremitting fatigue she endures in her efforts to keep body and soul together – her family’s as well as her own” (89). Tess’s complex relationship to an active vs passive binary is suggested from her opening participation in the survival of the female walkabout cerealia to her constant wandering with Angel in the last chapters of the novel. Morgan chronicles Tess’s miles walked (many) and sleep gained and food eaten (little) in both the events of Prince’s death and Tess’s violation in The Chase. Morgan asserts, “The labor/woman exploitative, machine-grinding world in Tess, its exhausting demands closely linked at salient points throughout the text to Tess’s beleaguered states of being, is quite clearly causal factor in her tragedy: the taxing demands upon her energy and resilience have immediate, palpably felt repercussions upon her faculties” (90). In short, Tess so frequently and inopportunistly falls asleep because she is an overtaxed working class laborer who must protect and support the rest of her family.

I agree with this as a larger critique of the portrayal of class-based inequality and injustice in the novel, but I’d like to draw closer attention to how the specific circumstances of Tess’s family life create and influence her experiences both on the road to Casterbridge and in The Chase with Alec: by placing Tess’s sleepiness in conversation with her parent’s desire for alcohol-induced conscious expansion and escape, Hardy draws our attention to the material
realities of Durbeyfield’s existence while introducing the more metaphysical and mystical concerns that take the stage in the second two-thirds of the novel. Tess’s recurrent struggle with sleepiness provides an excellent example of Hardy’s blend of gothic mysticism—trances, midnight seduction, secrets in the mist—with class-conscious materialism—Tess as overworked, working class subject. I have already noted that in the former situation Tess’s journey is precipitated by the drunkenness and neglect of responsibility of her parents, whose behavior frequently provides embarrassment for the girl, but Hardy complicates this view of alcohol by exploring, satirizing (albeit sympathetically) the mystical possibilities associated with intoxication. These representations are important within a textual examination of sleepwalking not only because the psychological studies of Hardy’s time would have perceived both intoxication and somnambulism on a larger continuum of altered states, but because Tess herself will later compare Angel’s sleepwalking to the behavior of a drunken man, misunderstanding the psychological possibilities symbolized by somnambulism.

Regarding the occupants of the illegal bar upstairs at Rolliver’s, the narrator observes that, “The stage of mental comfort to which they had arrived at this hour was one wherein their souls expanded beyond their skins, and spread their personalities warmly through the room” (16). The suggested experience is not only one of community and conviviality amongst the drinkers, but also one of transcendental experience, anticipating William James’s discussion of alcoholic intoxication in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). But as the alcohol “transforms” the shabby furnishings into more “dignified and luxurious” trappings (16), we are reminded that their “expansion” is actually tawdry and delusional. The experiences of Joan Durbeyfield further develop the idealizing function possible in intoxication, as we see that—
ironically—what plagues Tess—her “shiftless” father’s trips to the pub—provides one of the few joys in her mother’s life:

This going to hunt up her shiftless husband at the inn was one of Mrs. Durbeyfield’s still extant enjoyments in the muck and muddle of rearing children. To discover him at Rolliver’s, to sit there for an hour or two by his side, and dismiss all thought and care of the children during the interval, made her happy. A sort of halo, an occidental glow, came over life then. Troubles and other realities took on themselves a metaphysical impalpability, sinking to mere mental phenomena for serene contemplation, and no longer stood as pressing concretions which chafed body and soul. The youngsters, not immediately within sight, seemed rather bright and desirable appurtenances than otherwise; the incidents of daily life were not without humorousness and jollity in their aspect there. She felt a little as she had used to feel when she sat by her now wedded husband in the same spot during his wooing, shutting her eyes to his defects of character, and regarding him only in his ideal presentation as lover. (14)

Joan Durbeyfield’s experience of intoxication distances her from the material world—suggested by her children and various unspecified “troubles”—and displaces her within time, allowing her to feel “a little as she had used to feel when she sat by her now wedded husband in the same spot during his wooing.” This return to a pre-wedded, pre-maternal state suggests that trance becomes a way for Joan to reclaim her virginity (at least in her mind), a move that will anticipate a similar shift on the part of her daughter Tess, who, after the birth and death of her own child, will muse, “Was once lost always lost really true of chastity? She might prove it false if she could veil bygones. The recuperative power which pervaded organic nature was surely not denied to maidenhood alone” (78). The passage at Rolliver’s anticipates James’s estimation of how the value of mystical experience in alcoholic intoxication combines with its ephemerality: “If merely ‘feeling good’ could decide, drunkenness would be the supremely valid human experience. But its revelations, however acutely satisfying at the moment, are inserted into an environment which refuses to bear them out for any length of time” (James 16). Thus, intoxication ends, Tess must recover her parents, and the beehives must somehow make it to the market to be sold.
The mystical yet ephemeral possibilities of alcohol are further explored in scenes of the Trantridge laborers that anticipate the ideological concerns and imagery of the novel’s later Talbothay’s section, when Angel’s sleepwalking is first introduced. Throughout the scenes surrounding a late-night dance at the hay-trusser’s home, the narrator also seems to occupy a kind of liminal position: his narration presents conflicting views of the Tantridge laborers who harm his beloved Tess but who he seems to think nonetheless deserve a certain measure of sympathy in their desire for the possibility of transcendence. In describing the scene of the dance, the narrator’s tone is a curious mixture of mythic language, dreaminess, and mockery:

Through this floating fusty debris of peat and hay, mixed with the perspirations and warmth of the dancers, and forming together a sort of vegeto-human pollen, the muted fiddles feebly pushed their notes, in marked contrast to the spirit with which the measure was trodden out. They coughed as they danced, and laughed as they coughed. Of the rushing couples there could barely be discerned more than the high lights—the indistinctness shaping them to satyrs clasping nymphs—a multiplicity of Pans whirling a multiplicity of Syrinxes; Lotis attempting to elude Priapus, and always failing.

At intervals a couple would approach the doorway for air, and the haze no longer veiling their features, the demigods resolved themselves into the homely personalities of her own next-door neighbors. Could Trantridge in two or three short hours have metamorphosed itself thus madly! (48)

The narrator has already warned us that Trantridge has the “defect” of “drink[ing] hard” (46), and thus immediately alerts us the elevated language here may not sincerely describe transcendence, while he uses his position of educated aesthete to undercut and exaggerate the behavior of the workers via classical allusion. But there are two elements here that anticipate scenes and concerns brought up during the Talbothay’s section of the book. The “feeble” fiddles are incongruous with the zeal of the dancers, which seems to suggest that their “spirit” is inappropriate to the pitiful nature of the music, but this will be echoed when Hardy admiringly discusses Tess’s aesthetic sensitivity to Angel’s emphatically second-rate playing on his
secondhand harp. The second is how the narrator classifies them as “a multiplicity of Pans whirling a multiplicity of Syrinxes,” and therein eliminates their individuality, anticipating Angel’s later struggle to see the workers at Tantridge Dairy as full-fledged human beings and not simply the rustic “Hodges,” “pitiable dummies of the newspaper press” (92).

I highlight this language to suggest that Hardy’s imagery is not entirely unsympathetic. James is again relevant, sympathetically tying drunkenness to class, though his comments overall make it clear that he too has had experience with this state: “To the poor and unlettered it stands in the place of symphony concerts and of literature; and it is part of the deeper mystery and tragedy of life that whiffs and gleams of something that we immediately recognize as excellent should be vouchsafed to so many of us only in the fleeting earlier phases of what in its totality is so degrading a poisoning. The drunken consciousness is one bit of the mystic consciousness, and our total opinion of it must find its place in our opinion of that larger whole” (James 387). If the educated narrator of the novel suggests that the laborers should be objects of ridicule because he perceives their intoxication as pitifully effacing all individuality, perhaps the narrator—inconsistent anyway—perhaps we are overdetermining the narrator’s perspective, for in that same section, when the narrator notes that the “floating fusty debris of peat and hay, mixed with the perspirations and warmth of the dancers, and forming together a sort of vegeto-human pollen,” (48) he suggests a naturalness to their revels, a place for the human in the material world.

Changing partners simply meant that a satisfactory choice had not as yet been arrived at by one or other of the pair, and by this time every couple had been suitably matched. It was then that the ecstasy and the dream began, in which emotion was the matter of the universe, and matter was but an adventitious intrusion likely to hinder you from spinning where you wanted to spin. (Hardy 49)
Again, we see the idealization and a rejection of reality facilitated by an alcoholic trance in a moment that clearly echoes the representation of John and Joan Derbyfield at Rolliver’s, while maintaining the mixture of mockery and sympathy found in previous descriptions, blurring lines of tone just as the revelers attempt to blur the boundaries between the realities and unrealities of their existence.

The laborers’ idealization of situation becomes idealization of self on the walk home to The Slopes:

Yet however terrestrial and lumpy their appearance just now to the mean unglamoured eye, to themselves the case was different. They followed the road with a sensation that they were soaring along in a supported medium, possessed of original and profound thoughts; themselves and surrounding nature forming an organism of which all the parts harmoniously and joyously interpenetrated each other. They were as sublime as the moon and the stars above them; and the moon and the stars were as ardent as they (50, emphasis added).

This passage shows a sort of harmonious materialism based on the possibilities of transcendent consciousness, while Hardy’s choice of words within “however terrestrial and lumpy their appearance just now to the mean unglamoured eye” reminds us of Marx’s lumpenproletarier, but the narrator insists that these people who may look like the dregs of society are not that: they only appear useless to the viewer’s subjective perception.

For Tess this “harmonious” and “joyous” continuity is ruined by the realization that her companions are drunk: “Tess, however, had undergone such painful experiences of this kind at her father’s house that the discovery of their condition spoilt the pleasure she was beginning to feel in the moonlight journey” (51).

Then these children of the open air, whom even excess of alcohol could scarce injure permanently, betook themselves to the field-path; and as they went there moved onward with them, around the shadow of each one’s head, a circle of opalized light, formed by the moon’s rays upon the glistening sheet of dew. Each pedestrian could see no halo but his or her own, which never deserted the head-
shadow whatever its vulgar unsteadiness might be; but adhered to it, and persistently beautified it; till the erratic motions seemed an inherent part of the irradiation and the fumes of their breathing a component of the night’s mist: and the spirit of the scene, and of the moonlight, and of Nature, seemed harmoniously to mingle with the spirit of the wine. (53)

This description naturalizing drunkenness reminds one of nothing so much as Emily Dickinson’s “I drank a liquor never brewed,” and if alcohol is removed as an impetus, the scene’s staging of identification between man and Nature bears great resemblance to a later moment when Tess will cry over Angel’s harp playing, perceiving “the dampness of the garden” as “the weeping of the garden’s sensibility” (96).

My analysis of this episode is not a popular one. J. Hillis Miller perceives these scenes as “a bitter parody of the Romantic union of subject and object,” that the moonlight and the “correspondent breeze,’ two major Romantic symbols for the harmony of man and Nature, are mocked, ironically reduced to sleepy illusions or to drunken self-deceptions” (Victorian Subjects 207). Miller is correct to highlight the connection here to Romantic aesthetics, but his conclusions contain a value judgment that does not necessarily come from Hardy. Those “sleepy illusions” and “drunken self-deceptions” take on a different meaning when we consider Dale Kramer’s observation that “the important formal principles of the late novels are concepts of consciousness – concepts of the manner in which perception of experience shapes the meaning of the experience and, indeed, even constitutes its significance,” (Kramer 112) and that Tess itself “stresses the subjectivity of experience and judgment” (112). While the drunkenness here implies that this mysticism is not as elevated as the everyday mysticism which is within Tess’s capacity, Hardy’s focus on the power of subjectivity and the relation this scene bears to the later episode with Tess herself suggests that the reader should not lightly dismiss the laborers’ late-night ramble. Instead, perhaps, there is only tragedy because the realities of their lives limit them so.
When Tess and Angel are eventually reunited in Tess’s boarding house in Sandbourne, the reunion finds them both in a kind of reverie or half-life, with Angel described as a “mere […] yellow skeleton” and Tess a “fugitive in a dream, who tries to move away, but cannot” (298). It is early in the day, and Tess—now a woman of leisure—has clearly just awakened, with her hair hastily half-arranged and wearing nothing but a dressing gown. Angel suggests that, unlike before, he can now see Tess clearly (298), but it still takes him several moments to realize that Tess is living with and cared for by Alec d’Urberville. Tess stands literally in the threshold of the doorway, hesitant to enter, hesitant to even clearly state anything: her conversation is characterized by half-ended sentences and she refers to Alec only by a pronoun. But the greatest absence here is Tess herself. “Speech was as inexpressive as silence. But [Angel] had a vague consciousness of one thing, though it was not clear to him till later; that his original Tess had spiritually ceased to recognize the body before him as hers—allowing it to drift, like a corpse upon the current, in a direction dissociated from its living will” (299). The language echoes that used to describe Tess’s ecstatic out-of-body trances, discussed below, but the evacuation here appears contrary to Tess’s will: a situation borne of desperation, not of will.

Tess views the other characters’ experiences of trance states through the lens of her own out-of-body experiences. She first describes these out-of-body trances while living and working at Talbothay’s, and we later witness her in one at the dairy. Because she perceives these trances as natural and controlled, in that she makes a choice to experience them and can end them at will, she contrasts them to states of drunken intoxication, as both unnatural and out-of-control. The point of connection between her trances and Angel’s sleepwalking is “natural-ness,” though sleepwalking is a rare enough phenomenon that Tess may mistakenly perceive it as unnatural. Clearly Tess might then relate sleepwalking to drunkenness—and not her own trances—because
of the lack of control experienced by the subject: Angel has no more power to end the
sleepwalking prematurely than the Durbeyfields and the farmhands have to stop being drunk. After Tess has killed Alec and reunited with Angel, the two wander for days before eventually ending their journey at Stonehenge. Though Angel urges her on, Tess—“really tired by this time” (310) and feeling a connection to the place (“You used to say at Talbothay’s that I was a heathen. So now I am at home”)—insists on lying down on the altar (a warm and flat stone slab) to rest (311). She falls asleep and remains thus as the policemen surround the area and close upon the pair. Angel implores that they not yet wake her, for he finally seems to understand the sheer need for repose that seems to haunt Tess throughout her life, and “when they saw where she lay, which they had not done till then, they showed no objection; and stood watching her, as still as the pillars around” (312). They remain thus, their attitude echoing the stones, until the rising sun wakes Tess and when she realizes the situation she declares, “It is as it should be! Angel—I am almost glad—yes, glad! This happiness could not have lasted—it was too much—I have had enough; and now I shall not live for you to despise me” (312). This is not the response of a passive woman but instead that of a woman who has chosen the location of her arrest—a spiritual monument that speaks to her—and who can acknowledge the limitations of a lover who has failed her before. Importantly, Tess is the first to go into action, standing up, shaking herself, and going forward, “neither of the men having moved” (313). While this incident seems to support the theory of Tess’s passivity or that when she sleeps publically she must come to harm, her declaration “I am ready” suggests choice—in fact, it is one of the few moments in the book where Tess exerts her will—and that she is able to sleep until ready to awake suggests that for now, at least, Angel can finally reciprocate the care Tess shows to him when he sleepwalks with her in his arms. 
The characterization of Tess is heavily shaped by her relationship to trances, and this, in turn, provides the basis for her initial relationship to Angel, who first singles out Tess from the other dairymaids when he hears her detail her trance experiences.

‘I don’t—know about ghosts,’ she was saying. ‘But I do know that our souls can be made to go outside our bodies when we are alive.’

The dairyman turned to her with his mouth full, his eyes charged with serious inquiry, and his great knife and fork (breakfasts were breakfasts here) planted erect on the table, like the beginning of a gallows. ‘What—really now? And is it so, maidy?’ he said.

‘A very easy way to feel ‘em go,’ continued Tess, ‘is to lie on the grass at night and look straight up at some big bright star; and by fixing your mind upon it you will soon find that you are hundreds and hundreds o’ miles away from your body, which you don’t seem to want at all.’ (Hardy 94)

It is after this that Angel first shows Tess marked attention—“select[ing] Tess in preference to the other pretty milkmaids when he wished to contemplate contiguous womankind” (95)—which is foreshadowed by the shape created by Dairyman Crick’s knife and fork: a gallows. A line of causality is established, as Angel’s choice of Tess sets in motion her death.

Not long afterwards, Tess wanders through the Talbothay’s garden, a borderland of half-cultivation gone wild, a liminal space ripe for liminal experiences.

It was a typical summer evening in June, the atmosphere being in such delicate equilibrium and so transmissive that inanimate objects seemed endowed with two or three senses, if not five. There was no distinction between the near and the far, and an auditor felt close to everything within the horizon. The soundlessness impressed her as a positive entity rather than as the mere negation of noise. It was broken by the strumming of strings. (96)

Tess, fraught that she may have given Angel the mistaken impression that he—not the secluded location—is the reason for her to stay at Talbothay’s, has sought the garden to mull over her regrets, and her mind is receptive to the evening’s suggestiveness. The real and the unreal seem no longer separate, nor do the animate and the inanimate, nor absence and presence.
Angel’s music breaks her solitude but does not break the spell; despite the dreaminess of the descriptions, Hardy’s narrator several times emphasizes the paucity of Angel’s performance: “To speak absolutely, both instrument and execution were poor: but, the relative is all”; “the thin notes of the second-hand harp”; “He concluded his plaintive melody, a very simple performance, demanding no great skill” (97-98). This serves to place greater emphasis on Tess’s response, which is not the result of Angel’s great ability to produce beauty, but instead the result of a consciousness so sensitive that it is transported by the meanest of stimuli. Hardy’s repeated emphasis on this quality is a testament to the centrality of consciousness to the aesthetic project of Tess, and symbolically it ties Angel and Tess together. Although Tess’s altered states are not, as I discuss below, able to attain the true liminality of sleepwalking, they go far beyond the alcohol-induced reveries of her family and neighbors, however sympathetically represented.

Brooke McLaughlin Mitchell claims that Tess’s trances are response to her sexual trauma at the hands of Alec d’Urberville, her attempt to distance herself from a body that has been sexually violated. This injury extends to Angel, who “exhibits evidence of trauma…further emphasizing the unity between them even as he tries to deny it” (Mitchell 203). But while I think the text makes Mitchell’s claim possible—we have no tangible proof of Tess’s trances until after the scene in The Chase—I’m not sure that it supports it. Mitchell’s reading hinges on an assertion of sexual trauma that the novel has no interest in proving or disproving, and I resist a reading of Tess’s trance experiences as resulting not from an everyday sensitivity but from an unresolved wound. To assert that Tess was raped may be to undercut the power of the ambiguity surrounding the events of The Chase, for Hardy seems determined to maintain that she is just as “pure” regardless of consent. Once we assert that Tess was definitely raped we in no way threaten the nineteenth-century assumption that a sexually active single woman is a sullied and
worthless, and to assert that that woman’s expanded consciousness is a result of that rape is yet another way to limit the character. Leaving the issue ambiguous allows greater possibilities for Tess’s human fallibility, which Hardy overall views as sympathetic, and furthers the novel’s investment in liminality as an alternative to unsatisfying attempts to resolve the tensions of limiting binaries.

3.3 SOMNAMBULISM AND THE SELF

Angel’s sleepwalking is driven by several things—emotions, his class position, and his assumptions about sex—which are each tied to or affected by his relationship with his wife Tess. But what his sleepwalking reveals is much more complicated, in that it is used as an attempt to stage a symbolic solution to the predicament he finds himself in, and in failing reveals that what underlies his attempts to idealize Tess is not the absence of a tie to his Christian origins, but instead an all-too-present conflict of belief. Through his sleepwalking, Angel’s conflicting and irreconcilable views are revealed to a varied audience: to the reader, who interprets it as a potent symbol for Angel’s concerns; to Tess, who initially misinterprets it and therefore does not reveal it; and finally to Angel himself, who through it eventually learns of his deeply ambivalent position to both love and belief.

When deeply agitated by the revelations Tess shares with him on their honeymoon, Angel not only performs a sleepwalking burial of Tess, but also tries to stage her subsequent resurrection, a topic over which he initially broke with his father’s church and why he refused to join the Nonconformist clergy. And yet, when faced with the loss of his pure and virginal Tess, what the reader has assumed to be his one ideal, he quickly reaches for a belief that he may consciously reject but which he clearly clings to unconsciously. This “resurrected” Tess is a
curious marriage of the material and the mystical, and Angel’s conflict becomes paradigmatic of Victorian attempts to join the religious and the scientific.

Very few critical accounts of *Tess* center on Angel Clare; often the focus is instead on Tess, particularly her relationship to nature and the landscape of Wessex, her role as an embodiment of womanhood and/or female sexuality, or her relationship to the narrator/narration. Those critics who (at least in part) do focus on Angel, infrequently ascribe any importance to his sleepwalking or completely subordinate the sleepwalking scene to the wedding night confession scene, but they nonetheless return to the language of “drifting” or “roaming” when analyzing the character. This gesture toward Angel as a particularly “mobile” character does suggest an awareness of the importance of mobility to any discussion of his role in the novel, and throughout the text his connection to thought and reason is characterized by Hardy with the language of restlessness and doubt: Angel’s mind is “restless” but his thoughts also produce physical restlessness. His inability to cease the searching in his mind results in physical displacement, as he questions the ideological structures around him; this question leads him to occupy physical spaces, such as Talbothay’s dairy or the Brazilian wilderness, which might otherwise be inappropriate for him due to concerns of class or social structure.

In a book chapter that calls Angel “a character much neglected, or, when not neglected, much maligned, by readers of the novel” (99), Peter Casagrande makes a case for more developed and more nuanced attention on Angel, noting that in him Hardy “offers a memorable portrait of equal importance if less emotional appeal [than Tess], the embodiment of doubting, drifting humanity incapable of unconditional love because incapable of radical belief in human worth” (109). Thus characterized, Angel—more so than Tess—becomes a figure more relevant to contemporary discussions of individuality, but also more of the embodiment of fin-de-siecle
doubt and discontent, better encapsulating the questions of soul and self prompted by the discoveries of materialist psychology.

Angel is one of Victorian literature’s sleepwalkers who do so “naturally.” While his episodes are caused by “continued mental distress” and “any strongly disturbing force” (Hardy 193), they need no chemical impetus (unlike the episodes experienced by The Moonstone’s Franklin Blake or The Legacy of Cain’s Eunice Gracedieu). Hardy does not present Angel as a completely realistic facsimile of a “real” sleepwalker. Like the other sleepwalkers I discuss in this dissertation, Angel-as-character does not provide something like the verisimilitude of an actual case study, but the details included suggest that authors like Hardy had some acquaintance with factual accounts of real life somnambulists, while Tess’s references to Shakespeare’s Macbeth indicate Hardy’s acquaintance with more symbolic treatments of sleepwalking. The “realism” in the midst of scenes that are frequently dismissed as sensationalistic indicates how sleepwalking is a fruitful representation of the unusual combination of realism and sensationalism, a way for materialist text to explore and comment upon altered states. Hardy uses realistic detail that invokes the language of actual sleepwalking accounts, but elevates the images and language to represent something more than a medical phenomenon. Hardy’s inconsistencies in detail allow the action to become a metaphor for Angel’s psychological crisis of class and faith.

Scholars variously refer to the main scene of Angel’s sleepwalking as “a mock burial”; “a grotesque”; an act that reveals “the deepest inclinations of his psyche, his very being”; a “gothic parody of consummation”; “murder”; and as a scene that combines Hardy’s “genius” and “bad taste.” While many of these interpretations offer useful insight, by placing sleepwalking back in the context of a nineteenth-century culture of the unconscious—explored by both literature
and science—we can better understand the possibilities that Hardy might have perceived in using it as a symbol, along with how his original audience might have read it. Taking somnambulism out of its context robs it of its possible mysticism and thus limits its metaphorical potential.

Both sleepwalking episodes explored in Tess are precipitated by incidents related to Tess’s sexual history, suggesting that her “indiscretions” have the power to send Angel into this state; however, between the pre-wedding episode and the honeymoon scene, something changes about Angel’s sleepwalking. The inconsistency is crucial for the ideological stakes of the novel and fits with the blurring of dichotomy that Hardy already has in play: the first mode is sleepwalking from the standpoint of the rational self, while the second provides a more mystical, liminal point of view.

The first direct mention of Angel’s sleepwalking is after he and Tess drive to the nearest town to have a day of shopping a few days before their wedding. The scene gives indication of Angel’s psychological triggers and how he deals with them. When they return to the town’s inn to retrieve their gig for the ride home, “a Trantridge man” takes note of Tess and recognizes her. When his companion calls her “a comely maid,” he responds with “True—comely enough. But, unless I make a great mistake –” (163). The dialogue breaks off here and the narrator simply notes “And he negatived the remainder of the definition forthwith” (163). Both Angel and Tess hear his comment but we do not; we can only speculate how exactly the Trantridge man “negatives” the notion of Tess’s maidenhood, a moment which adds to the silences surrounding Alec’s violation of Tess and the public’s subsequent understanding of that event.

Whatever the man says is enough to prompt Angel to strike him and the man lies, pretending it is a moment of mistaken identity. The lovers leave and the incident seems over, but Tess is grave on the ride home and Angel attempts to forget the matter and view it with good
humor. Later that night we learn that Angel’s attempt at suppression has failed. After they part
Tess hears “a sounding of thumping and struggling” (163) coming from Angel’s room and rushes
to his aid. Angel reveals that he has been sleepwalking, reliving the events of the evening:

I am so sorry I disturbed you! But the reason is rather an amusing one: I fell
asleep and dreamt that I was fighting that fellow again who insulted you, and the
noise you heard was my pummeling away with my fists at my portmanteau which
I pulled out today for packing. I am occasionally liable to these freaks in my
sleep. Go to bed and think of it no more. (164)

Here, by calling his experience “amusing,” Angel repeats the repressive tactics from his
conversation on the ride home with Tess, attempting to cope by treating their experience lightly
or even flippantly. This is at odds with the anger and distress he nonetheless feels as a single
punch morphs into him “pummeling away” at the furniture. The scene also reveals a new
element of his character, that he can be furious and violent, unwilling to forgive and let go of
anger. That Angel attacks his honeymoon portmanteau suggests that unconsciously he
recognizes the connection between his violence and his marriage to a possibly unchaste woman,
thus he strikes out at an object that represents their impending union. This incident anticipates
Angel’s reaction to Tess’s confession, foreshadowing the hard, unforgiving man who attempts to
repress anything unpleasant (in that case, the love he continues to feel for a woman who has
disappointed him) and acts out in a much more elaborate somnambulistic “freak” that culminates
with him placing Tess in a tomb. Though the narrative has previously suggested how greatly
Angel idealizes Tess—and thus foreshadows his unwillingness to accept her after she reveals her
secret—this passage and sequence of events are the clearest indication we get as to how Angel
will treat Tess once he learns her secret, as it suggests that the dangers the pair face shall come
from within and not from threats from without.
This first scene portrays the repression of feelings exploding into an exaggerated replaying of earlier events. The portrayal suggests a continuous consciousness wherein Angel knows what he has been doing (or at least claims to) and explains both the general habit and the current specific scenario to Tess. This scene establishes a connection between emotional disturbance and sleepwalking, and indicates how sleepwalking will initially be used in the text. After their wedding, however, Angel doesn’t even know that he has sleepwalked, much less what he was saying or doing during the episode: this inconsistency suggests that his sleepwalking is not merely a habit but instead a symbol. As I discuss below, the second episode portrays a divided self, that may maintain the established connection between sleeping and waking consciousness, and between emotional disturbance and sleepwalking, but severs the idea of a continuous self: the next day Angel does not remember his sleepwalking, including that his episode has revealed the discrepancies of belief between his conscious and unconscious selves.

This difference may represents multiple things, the first being the change in consciousness that Angel has experienced by this point in the novel. The earlier episode suggests great awareness, implying that attacking his furniture is a more honest reaction than the way he behaves later in the text, and which may explain why the first time he merely repeats a previous scene and the second time he does not: punching a man over Tess is more emotionally honest for Angel than treating Tess coldly. But later the metaphor of sleepwalking demonstrates how divided Angel has become: even his sleepwalking has been affected.

The second episode of somnambulism combines multiple symbolic functions—demonstrating not only Angel’s double consciousness but also his crisis of faith, his unconscious desire to work this crisis out romantically, and his severe loss of faith in Tess, which his psyche can only make sense of by “killing” her—and occurs a few nights after Tess’s confession of her
sexual history. While sleeping, he creeps into her bedroom, "rolled her in the sheet as in a shroud," and "then lifting her from the bed with as much respect as one would show a dead body, he carried her across the room, murmuring 'My poor Tess, my dearest darling Tess! So sweet, so good, so true!'" (194) This scene serves as an extremely overwrought gothic metaphor for Angel’s conviction that the Tess-he-loved has been taken from him (by the Tess-he-doesn’t-love), which I will discuss in further detail below.

Because Angel is represented as more present when sleepwalking—more engaged interpersonally—than when awake, Hardy’s presentation of somnambulism, an unconscious state, destroys any easy binary of “consciousness equals presence” versus “unconsciousness equals absence.” The terms are easily blurred. Because Angel perceives himself as a generally temperate man, sleepwalking may seem to be his natural response to emotional states which he believes are unnatural to him. The act may perform a cathartic function for him and appears more satisfying (for him) than the results of his conscious thought in trying to find a solution for his problem with Tess. When deliberating the previous day, “His thought had been unsuspended; he was becoming ill with thinking, eaten out with thinking, withered by thinking: scourged out of his former pulsating, flexuous domesticity” (Hardy 190). These terms suggest an emptying or hollowing out. Similarly, an initial—and ultimately incorrect—way to interpret Angel’s sleepwalking is as an absence. He’s “not there” in the same way as someone is not present in their corpse-state.

This lack of presence is dispelled by the narrator’s description of Angel when he first enters Tess’s room.

She saw the door of her bedroom open; and the figure of her husband crossed the stream of moonlight with a curiously careful tread. He was in his shirt and
trousers only, and her first flush of joy died when she perceived that *his eyes were fixed in an unnatural stare on vacancy.* (193, emphasis added)

I initially misread the last line as “fixed in an unnatural stare of vacancy.” “Of” seemed the expected pronoun, implying that his stare itself was vacant. However, if he’s fixed on vacancy, this means he is staring at vacancy, literally staring at nothing, at absence. He may be looking at Tess, an empty form for him to fill. He may be looking at where he should be in the bed next to her. Whatever he’s looking at, the narrator insists that he does so in an “unnatural” manner, which is the first hint to Tess and the reader that he is not fully conscious. The suggestion that Angel stares at vacancy suggests that he is more present while sleepwalking than when not, that he fills himself up then in a way he cannot otherwise. The earlier passage that suggests that Angel was being hollowed out by conscious thought supports this assertion that Angel is less empty as a mobile unconscious being than as a conscious subject. There is no sense that Angel’s hollowing continues throughout his sleepwalking, and the concept of double consciousness allows that his sleepwalking self may be empty of conscious reasoning but still filled with his unconscious desires. Ironically, this provides a moment when Angel—who frequently had been making himself absent from the honeymoon cottage—is emotionally and spiritually present for Tess, even if he is only attempting to make that self accessible to the “good” Tess (Tess herself sees also a dichotomy of Tesses, but identifies herself as the “good” one, and thus can experience what Angel strangely offers). That Angel also positions himself as an active subject opposite Tess’s “corpse-self” supports an interpretation of greater presence for the character during somnambulism than during consciousness. During the honeymoon, for Angel thought equals emptiness but emotional display—which he only willingly succumbs to during sleep—equals presence.
Tess, however, makes herself as corpse-like as possible, laying in “absolute stillness, scarcely venturing to breathe” as Angel murmurs “My wife – dead, dead!” (194) She cultivates an adherence to the image he has of her. She’s not just passive: she’s dead. The narrator acknowledges that she would not have moved from his arms, even if it meant saving herself from true physical death. By choosing to behave this way Tess enables what Angel is dramatizing, suggesting her power in the scenario: she may be able to use this to her advantage, either literally or metaphorically. Here, at least, by choosing to not act she exerts her will to not hurt Angel, and again we see her occupying a liminal position in regard to agency. The scene hints that her power could lie in not acting, suggesting the complexity of agency in Hardy’s schema.

That Tess does not use Angel’s sleepwalking against him—either to injure him during or to persuade/manipulate him afterwards—reinforces the saintly aspect of Tess that Hardy more and more emphasized in his revisions of the novel. It also sets her apart from many other nineteenth-century literary characters who take advantage of the sleepwalkers they see. Villains Dracula and Godfrey Ablewalla both victimize the somnambulists they encounter (Lucy Westenra and Franklin Blake, respectively) and end their novels found out and destroyed. Saintly Tess refrains but meets a similar fate. Tess presumably garners more sympathy than either of those men but that is cold comfort when she is as dead as either. This may tell us more about Hardy’s universe in contrast to those of Collins and Stoker, where the good tend to end well and the evil end badly. As in other of his most famous novels, Hardy uses tragedy to demonstrate the inability of the good to end well in a world that does not consistently reward goodness for its own sake. Bringing sleepwalking into this ethical debate at this particular cultural moment may be Hardy’s nod to what Roger Luckhurst discusses as a movement in late nineteenth-century gothic fiction toward “trance fiction,” which further suggests Tess’s
indebtedness to gothic tradition.\textsuperscript{137} This detail suggests that Hardy’s participation in the gothic was an evolving investment, and that Hardy—a writer with an eye on the ethical and socio-political landscape of nineteenth-century England—perceived the social relevance of somnambulism as symbol for the role of human will, and as a materialist metaphor for altered states.\textsuperscript{138}

As Angel first carries Tess out on the landing, and then down the stairs and out into the night, Tess feels like an observer, one who is outside of the current situation. It is a similar effect to the one frequently said to be experienced in dreams, which is consistent with other language that Tess and the narrator use to describe the ordeal. He calls her dead; she feels like she’s in a dream (and thus asleep). Hardy makes a tacit equation between sleep and death here, in order to imply that what Angel considers as final (death), Tess interprets as being only transitory (sleep): this functions as a metaphor for the feelings they have concerning the difficulties of their marriage, but also about sexual impurity or impropriety more broadly. For Tess a sexual “fall” is a temporary condition, one which can be rectified, can change like the seasons. Before heading to the Valley of Great Dairies, Tess muses, “Was once lost always lost really true of chastity…She might prove it false if she could veil bygones. The recuperative power which pervaded organic nature was surely not denied to maidenhood alone” (78). There is, for her, no reason why her virginity cannot be reborn. For Angel such a fall is irreversible: just as he claims to acknowledge no Christian resurrection, he does not allow a rebirth or resurrection of sexual purity, so Tess as a sexual being is clearly a Tess who has passed on.

While Tess and the narrator each heavily speculate on the nature of Angel’s possible intentions, the imagery of the scene is suggestive of the way that sleepwalking allows life and death to map on to one another. Tess speculates that he may be trying to kill her, and twice—on
the landing and then on the footbridge over the river—thinks he is about to throw her to her death. The narrator speaks of Angel’s footsteps as “curiously careful” as he “fixedly regards” Tess (193). Tess also considers that they might both fall into the river, and if so “His last half-hour with her would have been a loving one; while if they lived till he awoke his daytime aversion would return, and this hour would remain to be contemplated only as a transient dream” (195). Angel is characterized as present but “different” (without aversion) and we see a return here to the language of dreaming and another acknowledgement of the temporary nature of the feelings and the situation. Tess considers knocking them in, which exposes Angel’s utter vulnerability in this state. Not only might he bring harm upon himself but he is also unable to protect himself from other people, including Tess. His safety depends on her goodwill. Because this state of danger and vulnerability is united with a demonstration of his affection for Tess, does this imply that the two are united? As in, accepting Tess now is a dangerous and vulnerable proposition, where his safety is based upon her willingness to protect him? Once the two make it across the river and into the graveyard of the old abbey, Angel approaches the empty stone coffin of a former abbot, one “in which every tourist with a turn for grim humour was accustomed to stretch himself” (195). He gently lays Tess in the coffin, kisses her, and then “breath[es] deeply, as if a greatly desired end were attained” (195). When Clare then lays down on the ground beside the coffin, the narrator observes that he “immediately fell into the deep dead slumber of exhaustion, and remained motionless as a log. The spurt of mental excitement which had produced the effort was now over” (195). Angel’s fondness for Tess’s “corpse” creates an atmosphere of indulgent necrophilia, and as he lies down next to her here, he turns the grave and the ground into their marital bed. In her chapter on what she calls the
“honeymoon gothic,” Helena Michie devotes one sentence to Clare’s somnambulism, but she does give it some amount of narrative importance:

The honeymoon in *Tess* does have its gothic parody of a consummation in the sleepwalking scene, where Angel carries Tess across the bridge to a coffin, but despite Tess’s hope that their proximity will induce desire, their marriage remains unconsummated until, after Alec’s murder, the two spend the night in another empty mansion as fugitives. (184)

If, as Michie suggests, this is a gothic parody of a consummation, then sleepwalking to the tomb at least partially equals sex, or stands in for it, similar to how sleepwalking will be shown to stand in for vampirism in *Carmilla*. Earlier in the evening Tess had initially thought that Angel was coming to join her in bed but then realizes he is not awake. This interlude stands in for a different kind of joining, properly taking place within the marriage bed, transferred from a private space into a public one, much, as I will argue, like Stoker’s purpose in showing Lucy Westenra’s somnambulant removal of herself from domestic environs to public ones. This comparison further develops my comments below on how sleepwalking helps to stage the sleepwalker’s ideal romantic scenario, again suggesting that for these characters images of ideal romance produced by bourgeois notions of marriage and the sexual roles provided by the ideology of separate spheres are inadequate models for the situations the characters find themselves within. Mitchie’s use of the term “parody” implies that the scene is a humorous imitation of a more serious act, which sheds light on the narrator’s observation that the coffin was one “in which every tourist with a turn for grim humour was accustomed to stretch himself” (Hardy 195, emphasis added). The coffin is already a scene of touristic performance, and by placing Tess in the tomb, Angel “exchanges Tess’s living body for her corpse, doing so to preserve the figure in his mind” (Bronfen 81).141
At the end of this scene, sleepwalking is again acknowledged as a dangerous activity, perhaps even a deadly one. Tess notes the likelihood of Angel staying on the ground until morning, “chilled to certain death. She had heard of such deaths after sleepwalking,” (Hardy 195) an aside that suggests that Tess lives in a world of sleepwalkers and even ones who die from the habit. Again, Tess has Angel at her mercy, and ironically, her desire to save him is complicated by her equally strong desire to avoid waking him. She tries “persuasion,” whispering that they “walk on” while simultaneously tugging on his arm (196). Like Lucy, Angel is very open to persuasion and suggestion, responding to verbal direction. That Angel acquiesces to Tess’s desire is explained by a return to his dream-state, “wherein he fancied she had risen as a spirit and was leading him to heaven” (196). Hardy represents somnambulism as a state that it is easy to leave and reenter: it is characterized by fluidity. Like Collins and Stoker, Hardy demonstrates that there is no insurmountable barrier between sleepwalking and sleeping, for the sleepwalker himself or herself, despite the mental barrier which seems to be erected between conscious and unconscious experience. The sleepwalker moves easily between modes of existence, all of them unconscious and cut off from the conscious mind, though not unrelated to it, via a shared set of concerns. Angel wears himself out—he is not robotic, zombie-like, etc.—and somnambulism is a state from which he can move into “slumber” even though he is presumably already sleeping. Thus sleepwalking is considered a state of activity.\textsuperscript{142} Even though Angel recognizes Tess as present here, she is again figured as a creature of absence: a spirit, thus ethereal, unreal, not quite there. Here “a spirit” can be interpreted as a figure of transition, not just because it is a liminal ghostly figure, but also because she is “leading him to heaven” (196). She is an angel, and Angel himself is dead. Both are now dead in his fantasy, Tess having returned to him as an angel, he himself pulled from the grave to enter the Biblical paradise he
denies believing in, suggesting that the material world has not yet been purged of belief in the supernatural or spiritual. It is at this point that both Tess and the reader learn that Angel not only still loves Tess—a fact that he consciously questions at this point in the novel—but also that he has not quite shaken at least a partial belief in Christian mythology.

As I’ve established above, Angel is only able to show his wife affection by treating her as one who has died, and indeed she has “died” to him—the image of the pure and ideal Tess has been “killed” by a Tess who does not live up to Angel’s class-driven ideas of appropriate female virtue, who does not exist in a state that is accessible to Angel’s capacity of idealization. The implications of this scene seem similar to how in Dracula Lucy Westenra progresses through the cycle of “good Lucy” to “bad vampire Lucy” to “dead-and-thus-good-again-Lucy.” Jean Jacques Lecercle draws a similar connection between Tess and Dracula, arguing for the similarity of imagery between the two texts—“The themes of blood (with the symbolic use of the color red), of contamination and of the chase can also be found in Tess. She too is up against a group of men bent on her destruction…Ancestral tombs, rape in the autumn mist, unholy religious ceremonies (the baptism of the child): this is the world of Lucy the vampire” (Lecercle 16). The connection here suggests that fin-de-siecle narratives of gender and sexuality are also narratives of somnambulism and other trance states. In one way the connection seems obvious: watching or interacting with another person in a position of vulnerability—especially when that person is of a different sex—is erotically charged in a society whose mainstream ideas of morality suggest that such interaction is taboo. But Tess, the preyed upon woman in this text, is no sleepwalker like Dracula’s Lucy Westenra. That role falls to Tess’s estranged husband, suggesting that the use of somnambulism isn’t just about female sexuality, or at least that the relationship between the two is more complicated in a way that reveals much more about what each character values and
desires in their respective texts. Lucy wants the ability to be with multiple men as an easy way to exercise compassion and make everyone around her happy. Sleepwalking takes her out of the Victorian domestic sphere—the home—and places her in a public space—the graveyard—that signifies death as defined in a traditional and religiously conventional fashion. This movement to the public arena allows Dracula his first concrete physical access to her, and her sleepwalking fugues allow him continued access to her, which eventually leads to her transformation into a vampire. As a vampire Lucy is able to share her body with those three men she wanted to marry, uniting and placating them socially and interpersonally in a way she could not do previously while alive. Though Lucy herself is not then able to consciously behave compassionately toward these men once she has been vamped, her altered state provides the occasion for these men to feel that they are showing compassion to her (by staking her and restoring her to peaceful and holy death), and their joint destruction of her is a way to reestablish fellow feeling among her suitors, to assuage any hurt feelings, in a way not possible within the bounds of the socially approved institution of marriage as between one man and one woman. In this way, sleepwalking that leads to vampirism enables everyone to enjoy and experience the sexualized female body—Lucy—and makes sexual competition—which might interfere with male friendship—unnecessary or irrelevant.

It is not, then, entirely surprising that in *Tess*, sleepwalking is represented as something a man might do in response to knowledge about his wife’s sexual past, especially when, like Angel finds, one’s strictly materialistic world view fails to adequately provide a satisfactory plan of action. Alec and Angel each get to enjoy and experience the same sexualized female body—Tess—though never during the same period of time: in fact, as long as Alec lives, Angel denies himself access to Tess’s body. There is no male friendship within this scenario: Angel and
Alec are only sexual competitors, and thus Tess has no desire to use (symbolic) multiple partner marriage as a way to behave compassionately, save male friendship, or protect feelings. Angel does, however, attempt to suggest that Tess has been husbanded multiple times: to Angel, the incident(s) with Alec mean that Tess has a prior husband when she marries Angel. In this scenario it makes sense that it is Angel, not Tess, who sleepwalks as a “solution” to the marriage confusion and problem; in sleeping Angel splits Tess in “two”—the “good” and the “bad”—claims the good one (who is also the dead one) for himself and presumably leaves the “bad” one for Alec to claim (Angel clearly feels that Alec has already claimed that one anyway). In this scenario there are two husbands, two wives, two marriages: competition maintains its place within the social structure and the “problem” of the sexual woman is briefly “solved.”

The connection here adds a further dimension to my interpretation of how sleepwalking is used as a “stand-in” within literary symbolism: in these two texts the relationship between sexuality and sleepwalking is that the altered state provides a way of enacting—on a provisional level, either materially or metaphysically—the romantic scenario desired by the middle class sleepwalker, regardless of the biological sex of the somnambulist in question. That both ways of coping with the inadequacies of the waking world—especially in regard to how that world presents traditional romance—require recourse to death and the grave (especially as a literal location) suggests a strange relationship between the bedroom and the cemetery. The state of repose implied by death is perhaps more akin to sleepwalking than sex is, and the erotics thereof are more akin to necrophilia than to a more normative form of lovemaking, but there also remains the way that during literary sleepwalking the somnambulist is thought to reveal new or different facets of the self: this suggests a kind of multiplicity of rebirth which outside of
sleepwalking or other altered states can only be accomplished via rebirth or resurrection of the self more entirely or via different symbolism, such as the staging of death.

For Angel, love and belief are deeply intertwined and both hinge on Tess. Unfortunately, Tess does not yet understand this. When Angel does not appear to remember their nocturnal adventure the next day, Tess toys with the idea of telling him, but ultimately rejects disclosure because she misunderstands this revelation of Angel’s split self, linking it to drunkenness and therefore not perceiving either the continuity between his conscious and unconscious states or the primacy of the will and desires he betrays while sleepwalking:

Tess was on the point of revealing all that had happened; but the reflection that it would anger him, grieve him, stultify him, to know that he had instinctively manifested a fondness for her of which his common sense did not approve; that his inclination had compromised his dignity when reason slept, again deterred her. It was too much like laughing at a man when sober for his erratic deeds during intoxication. (197).

Here sleepwalking is characterized with words like “instinctively,” “manifested,” and “inclination,” then it is compared to a drunk’s state of “intoxication” (erratic). There are two parts to Angel in this discussion: the conscious daytime self, who is not in control during somnambulism, is associated with “common sense,” “dignity,” “reason,” and the necessary mechanisms for approval. The unconscious nighttime self has “instinct” on his side, but Tess assumes that his conscious choices—not his unconscious behaviors—best convey what he most desires. Later the novel reveals that Tess’s careful desire to protect Angel from his sleepwalking self is a tragic choice, for Angel’s sleepwalking “burial” of Tess is also a scene of the ritualized “resurrection” of Tess. This scene of resurrection is located at the center of a novel that draws a parallel between Tess’s desire to “regenerate” her sexual purity and Angel’s professed lack of belief in the Christian resurrection. Thus Tess’s resurrection in this scene is analogous to the
rejuvenation of Tess’s purity, though within a poetical pagan paradigm of renewal within life, not the Christian model that is renewal after death. This compromise and its importance to the text will be reflected in the last days of Tess’s life.

After Tess has killed Alec and reunited with Angel, the two wander about looking for shelter. Though they are “tending more or less northward,” (305) Hardy’s narrator characterizes their movements in language that evokes notions of figuratively sleepwalking through life: “But there was an unpractical vagueness in their movements throughout the day: neither one of them seemed to consider any question of effectual escape, disguise, or long concealment” (305). Tess repeatedly emphasizes to Angel that she could “walk for ever and ever” but her restlessness has no set destination. Eventually, as they ramble through the New Forest, they encounter the empty Bramshurst Court and take shelter there. In the dark night Tess finally “whispers” to Angel how “he had walked in his sleep with her in his arms across the Froom stream, at the imminent risk of both their lives, and laid her down in the stone coffin at the ruined abbey” (307). Like other pivotal moments when Tess reveals important information, this confession is told through indirect discourse: the reader is not presented with Tess’s exact words, so the reader has no idea about what Tess chooses to emphasize or de-emphasize about the experience. The narrator reminds the reader that Angel “had never known of that till now.” Angel’s response to this story reveals the misguidedness of Tess’s sense of fair play and reiterates the importance of the scene to the events of the novel. He begs, “Why didn’t you tell me next day! It might have prevented much misunderstanding and woe” (307). Angel here attempts to reassert continuity of self, and Tess’s choice of silence thus becomes another “if only” moment in a novel made up of such moments; the exchange suggests that it was a moment of decision that might have prevented much of the late tragedy in the novel. As Tess withheld information from Angel earlier, the
narrator still withholds from the reader Tess’s exact perspective on the matter. In this it parallels Tess’s decision to withhold from Angel information about her pregnancy prior to their marriage and the narrative’s subsequent move to withhold Tess’s direct explanation when she does tell Angel during their honeymoon. Laird has argued that the narrative maintains a protective distance around Tess when she shares with Angel her perspective on or views of particularly volatile or emotionally loaded events, and that in at least some cases this withholding occurs as part of Hardy’s project of idealizing Tess, but it is uncertain whether that is the case here with Tess’s revelation of Angel’s honeymoon sleepwalking. It is possible that Tess’s handling of the situation is one of her very clear missteps in the novel, and by not sharing her direct version, Hardy does not so heavily remind the reader of her faulty reasoning when initially choosing to hide the incident.

Tess’s revelation—“which might have prevented much misunderstanding”—is pivotal for Angel. Hardy has used sleepwalking to initiate an exploration of the unconscious: we have more in us than we know; that within us may sometimes counter what we think we feel; and sleepwalking displays our unconscious to other people (though not necessarily to ourselves). This does not guarantee, however, that those who witness the display will interpret it correctly: Tess sadly sees Angel’s behavior as more aligned with her parents’ irresponsible drunkenness than with her chosen, willful out-of-body experiences. But Angel’s awareness positions him to begin a reevaluation of his knowledge of self. His interaction with the “large-minded stranger”—briefly his companion in Brazil—has already primed him for this conversation with Tess. He has learned in Brazil that “the beauty or ugliness of a character lay not only in its achievements, but in its aims and impulses; its true history lay not among things done, but among things willed” (267): in other words, character lies within consciousness. With these revelations Angel is able to
accept that he still loves Tess. Tess’s subsequent account of the sleepwalking burial shows him that he is even more conflicted than he was aware, and aligns love for Tess with belief in rebirth.

From this perspective, to dismiss Hardy’s use of sleepwalking as part of a series of “grotesques” or “highly-charged expressionistic incidents” that he was occasionally fond of including in his work (Morrell 128) is to severely limit Hardy’s multivalent symbolism and close off a multitude of possibilities for the character of Angel Clare. As Morell contends:

Hardy risked the sleepwalking scene in Tess...because he saw [its] function as transcending [its] awkwardness and lack of realism...Read in [its] full contexts, [it] set chords vibrating through the whole novel. [In] the sleepwalking scene...the precariousness is a reminder that the happiness of both is in the balance; Angel’s placing of Tess in the coffin powerfully suggests that he is killing his love for her...It is Tess, indeed, who finally takes control...this is an indication that the salvation may be in Tess’s own hands. Through the very incident—if she tells Angel about it—may help him to clarify his feelings. (128, emphasis added)

Morrell handily highlights Tess’s responsibility and choice in the scenario, but though he suggests this incident “sets chords vibrating through the whole novel” he limits his discussion to the few lines I’ve quoted here. He does not put the scene in the context of the other uses of sleep and trance in the novel, and he completely ignores Angel’s first sleepwalking incident. Angel’s sleepwalking—thus represented—is curiously flat, diminishing his interiority and the liminality of the experience. Additionally, Morrell leaves out of this assessment Tess’s own desire for death: in this scene a “false move” on her part would be an intentional one. In this light, Angel placing Tess in the tomb actually stages her own desires as well as his own, but Morrell ignores Tess’s fatalistic motives and places the danger outside of her—coming from Angel—and not within her own whims.¹⁴⁹

Tess’s own assessment of her past choices differs from Angel’s, and represents a rejection of the progression of time as much as her earlier behavior represented a rejection of
linear space: “Don’t think of what’s past! I am not going to think outside of now. Why should we? Who knows what tomorrow has in store?” (307) In her willful limiting of perspective, her rejection of a larger sense of time and space, perhaps Tess has herself now adopted the stereotypical sleepwalker persona.

Because this protest effectively ends this line of conversation, the reader does not get further explanation of why Angel thinks that an earlier revelation of this event could have been important and why—precisely—he feels that it could have “prevented much misunderstanding and woe.” Angel’s question here also echoes his initial response to her wedding night confession: “And yet –’ He looked vacantly at her, to resume with dazed senses: ‘Why didn’t you tell me before? Ah yes – you would have told me – in a way; but I hindered you. I remember!” (178) Tess has spoken too late.

3.4 CONCLUSION

The way that Angel inhabits the position of the sleepwalker continually draws the reader’s mind to dichotomies, of internal truth versus external appearance, of the concerns of the mind versus the behaviors of the body. For the latter concern, sleepwalking is an idealized state within Tess, because there is only in those somnambulant moments a connection between the two for Angel himself. We are reminded of somnambulism’s wider cultural resonance when Tess’s fugitive wandering after Alec’s death eventually leads Angel and herself to Stone Henge, where Tess seeks rest and shelter despite Angel’s fears that stopping will lead to her arrest. In a discussion reminiscent of Angel’s sleepwalking fantasy—that the dead Tess has resurrected as an angel and is now leading him to heaven—Tess again questions Angel on his purported disbelief in the Christian resurrection. This moment draws a neat line from a sort of paganism to an
orthodox Christianity, as Angel’s mention of sacrifices to the sun reminds Tess of her questions concerning the resurrection and she looks to Angel for reassurance and comfort:

‘Did they sacrifice to God here?’ asked she.
‘No,’ said he…
‘This reminds me, dear,’ said she. ‘You remember you never would interfere with any belief of mine before we were married? But I knew your mind all the same, and I thought as you thought—not from any reasons of my own, but because you thought so. Tell me now, Angel; do you think we shall meet again after we are dead? I want to know.’

He kissed her, to avoid a reply at such a time.
‘O Angel—I fear that means no!’ said she with a suppressed sob. ‘And I wanted so to see you again—so much, so much! What—not even you and I Angel, who love each other so well?’

Like a greater than himself, to the critical question at the critical time he did not answer and they were again silent. (311-312)

In the last line the narrator draws a comparison between Angel and Jesus, specifically this moment in Matthew 26:62-63: “And the high priest arose, and said unto him, Answerest thou nothing? What is it which these witness against thee? But Jesus held his peace.” The scene is Jesus’s trial in front of the Jerusalem Sanhedrin, and two witnesses have just testified that Jesus has claimed that he could “destroy the Temple of God and rebuild it in three days” (Matthew 26:61). Hardy’s words are ambiguous here and his comparison ironic, but the silence reminds us of Angel’s new shift in consciousness. Tess assumes that Angel’s silence means “no,” but Tess is often wrong. As Damon Franke reminds us, “the novel constructs Angel as a non-believer who initially retains Christian morals despite his loss of faith. The pagan and ‘natural’ elements of Tess draw Angel near, but he does not recognize an alternative set of values regarding egalitarian love and premarital sex until they have grown estranged” (166). But the “non-believer” has now displayed, via somnambulant activity, a latent belief in resurrection, and has recently learned of this display. This is the cause of Clare’s uncertainty: it has been revealed to him that he cannot be certain of his own mind. Perhaps Tess did rejuvenate. Perhaps he was wrong to deny her a
symbolic virginity. Perhaps he was wrong to leave her. But Angel has hardly gotten further than this: denial of her question and her hopeful belief is problematic, but he’s still too conflicted to fully embrace the alternative.

This may go a long way to explaining Liza-Lu’s disturbing reappearance at the end of *Tess*. Tess’s fate—which has been interpreted as both a ritualistic sacrifice and as evolutionary progress—is death, but also renewal. As Hardy refers to the younger girl as “a spiritualized image of Tess…with the same beautiful eyes” (Hardy 313), Tess and Liza-Lu seem to have symbolically merged, however unsatisfactory that merging feels to the reader. Gillian Beer has observed that “in all other of Hardy’s works [except for *Jude the Obscure*] there is, as in Darwin, a strongly surviving belief in the ‘recuperative powers’ which pervade both language and the physical world” (241). Even the narrative’s characterization of Liza-Lu as “a tall budding creature” (Hardy 313, emphasis added) hints at this natural rejuvenation. But with Tess dead, the narrative ends as it does as a nod to Angel’s perspective and his inability to resolve the tension between his opposing worldviews. This is best demonstrated by the purposeful ambiguity that characterizes Angel’s final position to Liza-Lu. Before dying Tess asks that Angel, “watch over Liza-Lu for [her] sake” (311). While Angel readily agrees to this, he balks when Tess presses him to marry her younger sister, pointing out that Liza-Lu is his sister-in-law, presumably in reference to Canon Law’s prohibition on marriage between those related through marriage, and the Marriage Act of 1835 that made it illegal for a man to marry his dead wife’s sister. However, the last scene of the novel shows the two together, walking away from the location of Tess’s execution, and the narrative comment that, “As soon as they had strength, they arose, joined hands again, and went on,” (314) echoes the final lines of *Paradise Lost*, thus positioning Liza-Lu as Eve to Angel’s Adam, and recalling the way that on early mornings at Talbothay’s,
“The spectral, half-compounded, aqueous light which pervaded the open mead impressed [Angel and Tess] with a feeling of isolation, as if they were Adam and Eve” (102). Liza-Lu is clearly a stand in for Tess, but will Angel accept her as such? The ambiguity here ends the text on a note that draws attention to Angel’s liminal, somnambulant consciousness, and the inability of resolution.

“They reached the cloister-garth…,” Hubert von Herkomer, *The Graphic*, October 17, 1891.
4.0 “HE WAS EITHER DEAD OR ASLEEP, I COULD NOT SAY WHICH”: VAMPIRISM, SOMNAMBULISM, AND HYPNOTISM IN DRACULA AND CARMILLA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the late-Victorian changing scientific/psychiatric context, with its increased physiological basis and focus on discourses of degeneration, mainstream attempts to explain sleepwalking became simultaneously more codified and more banal. Consider, for example, Daniel Hack Tuke’s sleepwalking circular (1884), undoubtedly a useful tool for gathering information about the realities of sleepwalking, but nonetheless one that with its focus on such mundanities as what respondents had had for dinner each evening did little to maintain the sensational aura that had been built up around somnambulism. In contrast, texts of the later-Victorian gothic like Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897) and Sheridan Le Fanu’s Carmilla (1872) provide something of a metaphysical pushback, showing how being a sleepwalker is actually like being a vampire. By linking somnambulism and vampirism, Stoker and Le Fanu help to both reestablish the frightful potentials of sleepwalking while at the same time use its reality—its actual place in Victorian culture and society, epitomized by its strong showing in periodical literature—to suggest the potential truth of a vampiric presence in nineteenth-century Europe.

That LeFanu’s Carmilla was an important influence on Dracula has been critically acknowledged and explored, but connections between the two texts are not merely superficial, centering solely on a fascination with vampires. Both texts use somnambulism and the figure
of the sleepwalker to create a symbolic connection between humans and the undead, highlighting the way that certain liminal states can muddle previous conceptions about the boundaries of the human and human behavior. In *Carmilla* specifically, somnambulism acts as a placeholder, standing in for vampirism throughout much of the story.

In examining the sleepwalker’s significance in *Carmilla* and *Dracula* I will be considering the nineteenth century medical-historical context that surrounded these literary accounts around the time they were composed and published, and how the reader of these texts would have been informed by these contexts. The nineteenth-century reader is able to participate in the process of “detecting” vampires because Stoker and Le Fanu use cultural referents and allusions; a nineteenth century reader with a knowledge of common nineteenth century discourses of sleepwalking and mesmerism would be able to follow the path of detection in a specific way. Because sleepwalking was discussed in popular and public forms like newspapers and the theater, Stoker and Le Fanu cater to an audience that possesses these types of socio-cultural knowledge and thus both create the readers they want.  

4.2 THE SCIENCE OF SLEEPWALKING AND THE AUTOMATIC SELF IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND

Explicitly gothic accounts of sleepwalking make it both mystical and mechanistic—portray somnambulists as mysticized automata, if you will—as a part of their projects of re-sensationalization. We might contrast these to the variety of representations we see in Collins’s work, juxtaposing the clearly gothic scenes of automatic behavior in *No Name* with later Collins texts that attempt to humanize and centralize sleepwalker psychology. Representations in Stoker
and Le Fanu, however, focus on “automatic,” unconscious abilities and movements contributed and to a larger cultural atmosphere that both fetishized and feared the reflexive, mechanical body.

In *Mysteries of the Vital Element: In Connection with Dreams, Somnambulism, Trance, Vital Photography, Faith and Will, Anesthesia, Nervous Congestion and Creative Function; Modern Spiritualism Explained* (1870), Robert H. Collyer both legitimizes and banalizes the phenomenon of sleepwalking. Works such as this one sought to identify the mental states that people in the past assumed to be supernatural or fraudulent and discover the natural causes for them (at the same time as literary texts such as *Dracula* and *Carmilla* resensationalized this sort of phenomena). He observes,

> the brain cannot produce, under any circumstances, phenomena incompatible with the sources of supply. On the other hand, does not the brain receive multitudinous impressions of which it is not cognizant, and which are only recognised when the organ is in an abnormal state? Does not the dreaming state of the brain form its own exclusive source of connective associations, a kind of double consciousness? (Collyer 60)

While Collyer draws a connection between somnambulism and less abnormal states such as dream states and waking life, suggesting that the function of the brain during sleepwalking is similar to that of the brain during “normal” states, but also arguing an understanding of the brain is also extremely compartmentalized: parts hidden from each other, like there are walls or vaults between certain parts of the brain which contain distinct kinds of information. This model of the mind anticipates the Freudian model of the unconscious.

This growing view of the “mechanical” human body has been considered elsewhere in literary criticism. In his survey of the legacy of *Frankenstein* Chris Baldick devotes considerable space to exploring important nineteenth-century uses of the language of galvanism, automata,
and involuntary action, focusing specifically on the works of Thomas Carlyle and Charles Dickens. Baldick draws connections between nineteenth-century fears over possession/death and technological progression—the connecting factor found in cultural speculation over galvanism—eventually commenting “For Carlyle the nineteenth century was to be defined not just as the Machine Age—as if technology were the end of the problem—but more fully as a Galvanic World in which the inward sanctuary of organic human authenticity has been abandoned to the rule of the corpse” (Baldick 105). Here Victorian culture is presented as a world of the living dead, ruled—like Dracula—by desire but empty of self-possession. In a text fascinated by modern technologies—especially those related to the production of narrative—and where Seward complains “How I miss my phonograph! To write diary with a pen is irksome to me; but Van Helsing says I must” (Stoker 330) and Mina takes her traveling typewriter on their hunt for Dracula, mechanical objects become extensions of the human body, ones that question and disturb the organic continuities of that body. *Dracula* is a text that acknowledges—whether directly or indirectly—that there may be something wrong with the modern human body and mind. Although Baldick does not address *Dracula* in this particular chapter, his observations about “the rule of the corpse” bear a fascinating resemblance to that text, for on two different levels the vampire Dracula and the sleepwalking Lucy provide late Victorian metaphors for Carlyle’s mid-nineteenth century fears: just as Dracula represents a “madness of activity, a mania of unceasing desire” (Craft 117)—both of which lead him nowhere but to an eternity of repetition—Lucy represents the “normal” human as ruled by desire—although whose?—but empty of self-possession.

While the characters of *Carmilla* are not as reliant on recent technological advances in order to “beat” the vampire, Carmilla herself embodies this same type of listless activity. Laura
describes her as “slender, and wonderfully graceful. Except that her movements were languid—very languid—indeed, there was nothing in her appearance to indicate an invalid” (Le Fanu 263, emphasis Le Fanu’s). Of course, by the end of the story, the revelation that Carmilla is a vampire serves to explain this sort of dreamy behavior, but for Laura there is initially no explanation for this slow and absentminded movement. Indeed, the early descriptions of Carmilla come from a chapter entitled “Her Habits – A Saunter,” suggesting both that Laura will describe the girl in leisurely, rambling fashion, and that Carmilla’s habits are best characterized by this sort of leisurely, rambling movement though without any clarification as to cause. That Carmilla seems like an invalid without actually being one, and that her movements can be characterized by a certain kind of purposeless, rambling movement establishes a basis for the other characters’ later surmises that she must be a sleepwalker; at the same time, for a reader who keeps in mind that the story is fiction, these characteristics also invoke the restlessness of the Undead.

Laura’s descriptions go further, detailing Carmilla’s sudden fits of tumultuous passion and agitation (which Laura calls “unintelligible”), when “after an hour of apathy” Carmilla would be so roused that “her dress rose and fell with [her] tumultuous respiration” (264). After the two girls watch a passing funeral, Carmilla is so overcome that she appears to have a type of fit.

Her face underwent a change that alarmed and even terrified me for a moment. It darkened, and become horribly livid; her teeth and hands were clenched, and she frowned and compressed her lips, while she stared down upon the ground at her feet, and trembled all over with a continued shudder as irrepressible as ague…at length a low convulsive cry of suffering broke from her, and gradually the hysteria subsided. (267)

Carmilla has clearly lost control of her body here, with “irrepressible” shudders and “convulsive” cries: her body seems both mechanical and possessed. To contextualize this, Laura reminds the
reader of how little her family knows of Carmilla—her origins, her family, her upbringing—and thus the girl becomes shrouded in the atmosphere of the unknown and the unexplainable. Her movements and behavior have no motivation that Laura can identify; thus, they stand alone, automatic yet mysterious.

Stoker’s use of sleepwalking and vampirism suggests a complicated relationship between the two states of being. Lucy’s sleepwalking predates—and thus is not caused by—her initial encounter with Dracula; instead, her dead father also suffered from frequent sleepwalking, which suggests the problem runs in the family. Thus, it is passed on via blood\(^\text{156}\), and unsurprisingly, Stoker portrays the behavior as dangerous and rather creepy on its own. Mrs. Westenra express worries that Lucy will come to a bad end while wandering senseless in the night, and Mina observes that Lucy’s mother “has got an idea that sleep-walkers always go out on roofs of houses and along the edges of cliffs, and then get suddenly wakened and fall over with a despairing cry that echoes all over the place” (Stoker 93). Here, Mrs. Westenra’s views depict the more sensationalistic representation of sleepwalking in nineteenth-century culture, and are perhaps the result of too many trips to the theatre.\(^\text{157}\) Attempting to be more rational and scientific (or at least more helpful, by creating a record of the events), Mina observes that “Lucy has not walked much in her sleep the last week, but there is an odd concentration about her which I do not understand; even in her sleep she seems to be watching me. She tries the door, and finding it locked, goes about the room searching for the key” (94). This staring, concentrating somnambulist calls to mind nineteenth-century images of automatons I mention above, of unnaturally mobile individuals brought to life by mechanics or galvanization.\(^\text{158}\) The sleepwalking appears to be a metaphor for the “restless dead” and/or vampires, but even without this relationship, contemporary cultural discourse suggests that the nineteenth-century reader could interpret
literary sleepwalking as generally sinister—or at least suspicious or alarming. Mina notices that “as soon as [Lucy’s] will is thwarted in any physical way, her intention, if there be any, disappears, and she yields herself almost exactly to the routine of her life” (107). Later, “she seemed, even in her sleep, to be a little impatient at finding the door shut, and went back to bed under a sort of protest” (113). Though Mina continues to lock her in their bedroom, Lucy “gets up and walks about the room, and sits at the open window” (115). Mina notes: “last night I found her leaning out when I woke up, and when I tried to wake her I could not; she was in a faint. When I managed to restore her she was as weak as water…” (115) Soon her day self and night self begin to merge; the day of the funeral for the Demeter’s captain, Lucy is “restless and uneasy all the time,” similar to the way that Mina has previously described sleepwalking Lucy (107). Her nighttime activities—whatever they may be—are encroaching on her conscious experience, though not on her conscious mind.

Mina’s account of Lucy’s somnambulistic episodes brings to mind two different discourses: the Freudian uncanny and nineteenth-century case studies of habitual sleepwalkers, which I will discuss in the following paragraph. When surveying the examples I’ve assembled in the previous paragraph, one may notice that while sleepwalking Lucy always moves to the door or to the window, trying to find an opening in the parameter of the locked room. Eventually “her” desire is to allow Dracula into the room, but her behavior generally mimics that of the trapped and befuddled man who Freud uses as an example in “The Uncanny”: he continually searches for a way out of the dark room but can find neither the door nor the light.

However, this type of repetitious behavior is characteristic of more than just the Freudian subject. Mina keeps an orderly and detailed account of Lucy’s behavior over several nights, similar to the way that a doctor or observer might record the nocturnal activities of a patient
being treated for somnambulism. Stoker’s description is comparable to an article published in *The British Medical Journal* ten years after the publication of *Dracula, “A Case of Hysterical Somnambulism, Showing Abnormal Acuity of Vision in the Somnambulistic State.”* The account concerns “a girl, aged 21, a teacher, typewriter, and now a student of music,” who is sent to Birmingham General Hospital with a complaint of habitual sleepwalking. Like Lucy, the young woman lives with a female friend, and the latter gives the doctors a detailed rendering of her observations. The young woman had a habit of “turning out” her drawers during the night; roaming around the locked room the two women shared, trying to open the door; writing letters and ripping them up; and sitting in a corner of the room either reading or crocheting (619). During the day the young woman is fatigued and complains of frequent headaches.

These similarities suggest several points of interest. The first is the possibility that Stoker was acquainted with medical accounts of somnambulism and was directly influenced by said accounts. This is somewhat likely, considering the pervasiveness of somnambulistic and mesmeric discourse within Victorian culture. The second possibility is that the writers of such case studies were influenced by Stoker—and other novelists and poets—in the language and detail of their articles. The first suggests that the sleepwalking scenes could have possessed a great deal of importance to Stoker, especially if he was making direct reference to phenomena his readership was already acquainted with; the second suggests the importance of literature in shaping medical discourse.

These connections also indicate something of the experience of Stoker’s first readers. If Lucy’s somnambulistic behavior is remarkably like that of real life sleepwalkers, the observational information Mina provides actually further confuses the line between empirical science and supernatural mysticism. It is unclear when Lucy’s sleepwalking begins to be affected
by Dracula’s influence; her desires may or may not be her own. With this kind of uncertainty, Stoker is also able to manipulate superstitions surrounding the subject of sleepwalking.

4.3 READING CARMILLA AS ANTECEDENT

Le Fanu’s *Carmilla* has been called “the first really successful vampire story” (Geary 19), but it is also the first literary use of sleepwalking as a cover story for vampirism. By suggesting that Carmilla’s languid and mechanical behavior, and her unusual sleep habits and tendency to disappear in the night could, collectively, signify either state, the story hints that just as sleepwalkers were everywhere in Victorian culture, so might be vampires.

The text tells of Laura, the daughter of an English civil servant and his—now deceased—Styrian wife, and Carmilla, the mysterious, beautiful, and terrifying young woman who visits Laura’s family at their home in Austria. Carmilla is a languid yet seductive vampire who feeds solely on other women, and over the course of her stay with Laura, she woos the young woman (who responds to these advances in an ambivalent fashion), feeds on her, and is eventually discovered and destroyed by the male protectors and “experts” of the surrounding area.

At two different points prior to the eventual revelation of her vampiric nature, Carmilla’s hosts almost discover her otherness. Both times she is saved by the fact that her habits and behaviors (that of a vampire) resemble the habits and behaviors of a somnambulist. The first incident occurs when a dreaming Laura sees a vision of a blood-drenched Carmilla, and runs to the other girl’s room, “possessed with the one idea that Carmilla was being murdered” (Le Fanu 283). Laura’s screams wake other members of the household but when the gathered assembly forces the door to Carmilla’s bedroom, they find the room empty despite the door being locked.
from the inside and the windows also secured. When Carmilla eventually appears the next day, she claims “My sleep was uninterrupted, and, so far as I know, dreamless; but I awoke just now on the sofa in the dressing-room there, and the other door forced” (285). Because the situation is so unusual Laura and her father give some thought to making sense of the perplexing state of things. Laura’s father eventually reaches what he feels is a satisfactory and logical conclusion, asking Carmilla “Have you even been suspected of walking in your sleep?” (286) Carmilla’s answer is contradictory, as she first says “never,” followed by “since I was very young.” The old man is smug, declaring,

Well, what has happened is this. You got up in your sleep, unlocked the door, not leaving the key, as usual in the lock, but taking it out and locking it on the outside; you again took the key out, and carried it away with you to some one of the five-and-twenty rooms on this floor…She came [to the dressing room] after [Laura] had searched it, still in her sleep, and at last awoke spontaneously, and was as much surprised to find herself where she was as anyone else. (287)

In *Our Vampires, Ourselves*, Nina Auerbach reads the first part of this scene as support for her argument that focuses on the way that Carmilla offers to Laura “a sharing self,” (38) a kind of generous friendship that is impossible in other nineteenth-century literary vampires (generally because these vampires are male). As an introduction to an argument which focuses on the identification between predator and prey, Auerbach first rather naively takes Laura and Carmilla’s “shared dream” at face value:

Carmilla and Laura do dream the same dream at the same time. As a child, Laura dreams of a caressing young lady entering her bed and biting her breast. When Carmilla comes to the castle years later, they recognize each other’s faces from their common childhood dream…[Carmilla’s] enchantment is her familiarity. (42)

While I agree that part of Carmilla’s attractiveness to Laura is her seemingly “known” quality—the way that she seems an exact mirror of Laura in her dream experience—a superficial acceptance of Carmilla’s account of a childhood dream seems more like Auerbach’s attempt to
bend the details of the story to conform to her interpretation of seamless identification.

Carmilla’s account of shared experience is a lie, a kind of false identification that serves to protect her from Laura’s initial repugnance. That Laura believes Carmilla’s story is, I agree, important, but this identification is one-sided, the possession of the prey but not of the predator. Additionally, Carmilla portrays herself as feeling the same sort of vulnerability as that which Laura felt as a child—the fear that an intruder will enter one’s bedroom, one’s inner sanctum—and thus “masquerades as a potential victim—as opposed to victimizer—by requesting that she be allowed to lock her bedroom door while she sleeps” (Thomas 49). The identification Auerbach notices is not as far-reaching as she suggests.

Although Laura’s famous dream—in which she sees Carmilla drenched in blood and hears her own dead mother say, “Your mother warns you to beware of the assassin” (Le Fanu 283)—and Laura’s misinterpretation of it appear to provide additional fodder for Auerbach’s account, it is important to attend to how the rest of scene unfolds, as I have described above. When Laura runs to her room, the vampire’s absence means that her true nature is nearly exposed, and though this revelation is deferred until later in the story, the discovery that Laura and her father think they make reveals more differences than similarities between the two young women. Laura has never been known to sleepwalk, while Carmilla’s “somnambulism” stands in for her vampirism at this point in the text.

The blurring of boundaries and the substitution of one thing for another are at the heart of both sleepwalking and vampire narratives, and here we can see the way that somnambulism works similarly in Carmilla. I’ve argued the former throughout this dissertation, and, in a rather singular treatment of the role of masquerade in Carmilla, Tammis Elise Thomas suggests “disguise and deception are at the core of vampiric ontology. While the vampire is among the
living, it takes on most of the qualities associated with that state” (42). However, the Stoker and Le Fanu vampire takes on the characteristics of a very specific type of human, the somnambulist whose liminality most approaches the boundary violations of the undead.

A visit from General Spielsdorf, an elderly friend of the family whose niece Bertha has recently died, further confirms that the habits and behavior of the vampire can be mistaken for the habits and behaviors of the sleepwalker. As Spielsdorf narrates the events leading up to Bertha’s death he speaks of a guest who resided at his castle at that time, a beautiful young woman whose description strongly resembles Carmilla. The general’s retrospective assessment of his guest Millarca includes her eccentricities, such as how

she was undoubtedly sometimes absent from her room very early in the morning, and at various times later in the day, before she wished it to be understood that she was stirring. She was repeatedly seen from the windows of the schloss, in the faint grey of the morning, walking through the trees, in an easterly direction, and looking like a person in a trance. This convinced me that she walked in her sleep (304).

The absences in the night—the failure to be asleep or in bed like any normal person—along with the appearance of being in a trance suggest the connection to the people in the text who observe Carmilla. Are we to suspect that all so-called sleepwalkers are vampires? In *Carmilla* these connections do create a certain level of suspicion surrounding those who are not in their beds when they “should” be, especially when seen in the light of Carmilla’s earlier professed fears that robbers break into her home in the night. If we are to not assume that all sleepwalkers are vampires, at the very least the text seems to suggest the possibility of vampirism is comparably likely to the possibility of somnambulism (which, as I mention in my introduction, was discussed in many major cultural mediums throughout the 19th century). Additionally, if we believe that Carmilla really did sleepwalk as a child this may suggest that natural sleepwalkers have some
sort of innate tendency toward vampirism, or that at the very least they make the easiest victims (a detail that foreshadows Lucy’s vampiric downfall in *Dracula*). After all, when Carmilla says that she somnambulated when she was “quite young,” that could mean any time during her mortal life. The implication here is that she ceased to sleepwalk once she became a vampire, but vampirism is not exactly a cure for somnambulism: it instead represents its most malignant or terrifying possibilities.

In the reactions of Laura’s father and General Spielsdorf to Carmilla’s nighttime absences, we can see an example of what Robert Geary describes as the ideological movement of the characters in the text. After the General’s revelation of Carmilla’s true nature, “the story’s initial ethos has been overturned: what seemed at first ‘reason’ is shown to be dogmatic denial of evidence; and what had passed for superstition or obsession now stands as a sensible willingness to admit realities outside the rationalistic paradigm” (27). This movement from proud disbelief in vampires – accompanied by a stubborn “rationalizing away” of any strange or uncanny events – to a more humble acceptance of a larger purview that includes the supernatural, is one that can be traced in the evolution of the discourse on sleepwalking or other night activities. The general’s accruing of “clues” that “prove” that Carmilla sleepwalks are—while still somewhat narrow—much more logical than the way that Laura’s father blandly decides on sleepwalking as the solution to the mystery at hand. As the general works with evidence and eyewitness accounts of Carmilla’s behavior, he sets up the discoveries and conclusions drawn at the end of the story: when Carmilla is eventually proved to be a vampire, General Spielsdorf’s empiricism—although it initially led him to the wrong conclusion—serves not only as a model for detection of the Undead but also one for reading, suggesting that though interpretations may need to be revised, it is the willingness to revise them that leads one to the correct conclusion.
Even what appear to be the most unlikely or improbable details contribute to the impression that Carmilla is a sleepwalker, including Carmilla’s vacillating materiality and seeming ability to move through walls or doors. General Spielsdorf asks “How did she pass out from her room, leaving the door locked on the insider? How did she escape from the house without unbarring door or window?” (311), echoing Laura’s own confusion about how the strange figure in her room opened the door which moments later appeared locked, and how Carmilla herself escaped her bedroom though all the doors and windows were secure. It is the question of Carmilla’s solidity that makes her easily conflated with the sleepwalker: the latter is solid, material, yet a figure that in the nineteenth century was portrayed as being capable of confusing and provoking behavior, being where he or she should not when he or she should not be there. Consider, for example, the confusion of and domestic detection required by a family whose 10 year son knocked on their locked door in the middle of the night, after he’d—apparently—jumped out a second story window while sleepwalking.\(^{167}\)

Although Auerbach argues that a description of Carmilla is “breathtaking [in its] freedom from convention…[that] there is…no mesmerism” (45), the statement is largely inaccurate. Laura’s reactions to Carmilla’s amorous advances are characterized by the former’s sense of enthrallment, the inability to move away when she wants to and the sense that her will is not her own. That this could be interpreted as Laura’s denial of her own desire for Carmilla, her inability to admit that she wants the lovely vampire just as badly as it wants her, does not change the fact that Le Fanu must reach for the language of hypnosis to depict the ambivalent feelings.\(^{168}\)

Carmilla’s vampirism is able to avoid detection for the majority of the novella: on the level of basic plot structure, this detail creates suspense. But because her vampirism remains unnoticed through its easy conflation with somnambulism, the story does cultural and symbolic
work that suggests that sleepwalking is a convenient cover story for vampirism. Le Fanu uses sleepwalking to lead us more deeply into the reality of vampirism. In *Dracula* we’ll see this further develop via three characters—Lucy Westenra, Jonathan Harker, and Mina Harker—whose experiences with sleep and trance reveal the unstable boundaries between sleep and consciousness, and death and life, as epitomized by the sleepwalker.

### 4.4 *Dracula’s* Lucy Westenra: Sleepwalker or Streetwalker?

That Dracula gains access to Lucy Westenra while she sleepwalks establishes in *Dracula* an early connection between the sleepwalker and the vampire, and symbolizes how as a cultural figure, the somnambulist represents a conduit for the supernatural to gain access to “normal” society (and vice versa). Lucy is the only character in *Dracula* who is represented as going from completely human to completely vampire within the time period covered by the events of the novel, a transformation which suggests how uniquely situated she is within the text. The ambiguities of her character—her ability to be both vulnerable and threatening and to be these things simultaneously—hinge on her preexisting liminality as a somnambulist, revealing that as a character Lucy is unsettling less because she is sexual and more because she is a sleepwalker.

Recognition of Lucy’s singular position within the text also serves to show that despite critical inclination to lump her in with either Mina or with the female vampires of Castle Dracula, Lucy is already differentiated from the other women of *Dracula*.

Lucy’s experiences with Dracula provide a link between the novel’s early exploration of Jonathan Harker’s experiences in Dracula’s castle and hypnotic scenes between Mina Harker and Van Helsing late in the text.\(^{169}\) Jonathan is a “normal” sleeper—not a somnambulist—but his account of his stay in Transylvania provides an early basis for the blurring between wakefulness
and sleep that is important to the Lucy section of the novel. Mina Harker is also not a somnambulist, but her hypnotic sessions with Van Helsing have an important root in Lucy’s sleepwalking, through nineteenth-century cultural discourses that linked hypnosis and somnambulism as distinct yet related trance states.

While previous critical interpretations of Lucy have often perceived her as overly sexual—suggesting Stoker first establishes her as such and then punishes her for it—I argue that her problematic position within the text is less a product of her wanton licentiousness and more the result of her somnambulism, which is dominated by the influence of two masculine figures: her dead father, from whom she has inherited her chronic somnambulism, and the vampire Dracula, who first uses her sleepwalking to enter her body and then uses it to enter her bedroom. Lucy’s sleepwalking and the other characters’ obsessions with monitoring sleep (strongly connected to the erotic possibilities of the unconscious body) are two main ways the novel is able to blur the boundaries between the human and the inhuman.

Because of the close relationship between sleepwalking and vampirism in Dracula, those who suffer from somnambulism are made inhuman in that novel. Part of this is wrapped up in Lucy’s inability to be a reliable narrator and contributor to the communal narrative. She can’t be the heroine of the story because she is a liability and loose cannon, and thus she must die in the first half of the novel. Her unreliability is the result of her sleepwalking. Her mobility while sleeping makes it difficult to keep her safe, and it means that in this most vulnerable human state she is able to be manipulated and used by the vampire even though she is supposedly unconscious. The sleepwalking also means that Lucy can’t make useful contributions to the group narrative because she simply cannot remember some of the most important things that occur to her (because she is asleep and therefore only partially present for these events). Those
things that she can remember she has difficulty translating into coherent speech that can be understood and analyzed by the people around her. This separates her from the human community in *Dracula*, whose success and survival are based on their ability to consult with one another and share information. Instead, her uncontrollable sleepwalking means that she participates in Dracula’s community of the unconscious.

Labeling Lucy as a figure of horrific and wanton female sexuality makes it an easy step to claiming that this is the reason Stoker must kill her off, resulting in blindness to the importance of her narrative reliability as it relates to her sleepwalking. Scholars often characterize Lucy’s death as Stoker’s punishment for her unbridled sexuality, concluding “Lucy’s sexual aggressiveness…will be seen as her greatest crime and will provoke a combined male assault and assertion of dominance” (Cranny-Francis 66) and “Lucy, who has collaborated with the enemy and herself become the other, can be repurified only in death” (Garnett 30). Garnett at least notes that “Frequently in Victorian novels female deviancy occurs at least in part as a consequence of failures or abuses of patriarchal responsibility,” (40) citing—in the case of *Dracula*—Dr. Seward’s failure to stay awake while guarding Lucy from the vampire.

Although, as I argue in my preceding chapter, Lucy’s exasperated comment “Why can’t they let a girl marry three men, or as many who want her, and save all this trouble?” (Stoker 80) has more to do with a compassion-driven desire to circumvent bourgeois romantic ideals, the comment is often used to support an idea of Lucy’s “latent sensuality.” Stephanie Demetrakopoulos asserts that “Several sequences make it clear that Lucy finally wants Dracula – is, in fact, excited by him from the beginning” (104). Despite this broad claim, Demetrakopoulos does not further expand on what sequences “make it clear” that Lucy wants Dracula (at least, not any more than any other potential vampire victim held in hypnotic thrall) or
that she is “excited by him.” In fact, Lucy’s main emotion during this section of the novel is fear. However, Demetrakopolous argues that Lucy and her death, along with the demise of the other vampire women (who also initially represent a kind of idealized femininity) reflects “a backlash against the wearisome vine of frailty that good and noble women represented” (108). Her later description of Lucy illustrates why this sort of woman would grow tiresome: “The most frequent adjective used to describe Lucy is ‘sweet’ and this comes to mean cloyingly saccharine, not very bright, hysterically emotional, and easily had” (109). She also notes “[Lucy] never attempts herself to resist Dracula; she must be rescued, transfused by the men” (109, emphasis hers). I suppose this is technically true, but in this Lucy differs not at all from the other would-be vampire victims in the novel: both Jonathan and Mina are saved by the intervention of others (the first by Dracula, the second by the Crew of Light [174]). Additionally, these two (at least eventually) have knowledge about what to fear. Lucy never does. Van Helsing draws the correct conclusions before Lucy’s death but he doesn’t share that information with her.

Van Helsing’s failure to provide Lucy with information is consistent with the other ways in which she is excluded in the novel, because her mind is perceived as too open to the enemy. It only when Mina Harker is attacked however, that we get a better sense of what sort of psychological relationship Lucy had with Dracula. Carol Senf has argued that “Remembering that Dracula had told her that their brains would be linked and her will subject to his, [Mina] offers to be hypnotized so that Van Helsing and his followers can trace Dracula’s escape back to Transylvania…” (48), while also noting that “Dracula represents the power of the isolated individual” (47). She supports this with evidence that the Crew of Light works as a group and that Dracula emphasizes his pride in his individualism with his “Here I am boyar…” speech (Stoker 45). But this is a misreading of what each of these forces represents, and in itself is an
unwitting acknowledgement of the different kind of community that Dracula creates: one of the mind and the will, not just of social ties. Mina brings Van Helsing into this community by letting him hypnotize her. In a way, she also brings Dracula into their group in these scenes. The Crew of Light is a group of individuals (all the men represent very different things: social institutions, classes, countries) and Dracula would destroy difference to make either an “uber-individual” or a more deeply connected group. His ties are not superficial or even voluntary. While many Victorian novels “allowed the family to eclipse civil society as the symbolic means of resolving social contradictions, Dracula turns the tables and allows a radically inclusive community to render the family obsolete, along with the liberal individual” (Armstrong 14).^{75}

Although Lucy’s relationship to sexuality and to “individualism vs community” have both been frequently misunderstood, her spectacular sleepwalking scenes have garnered little critical attention. Some scholars, like Christopher Craft, obliquely reference it. In “Kiss Me with those Red Lips’: Gender and Inversion in Bram Stoker’s Dracula,” Craft frequently discusses Lucy in terms of mobility and movement: her “aggressive mobility” in regard to the encasements of gender, the “mobilization of desire” which she needs to be saved from (121), her “dangerous wandering” (118). This is an implicit acknowledgement of Lucy’s somnambulism; he, I think, is considering it in regard to “change,” the way in which the women of Dracula are unstable signifiers, but the myriad of unexpected abilities shown by sleepwalkers suggests they are also unstable signifiers of fixed identity. Craft suggests that Lucy’s sleeping habits do not represent “the stillness appropriate to [Van Helsing’s] sense of her gender” (121) and to the Crew of Light, “A woman is better still than mobile, better dead than sexual” (122).

Senf is one of the few critics who does openly acknowledge that Lucy sleepwalks, which she cites as a sign of her hidden rebellious desire:
[Lucy’s desire to marry three men] also implies that Lucy is unhappy with her social role, that she is torn between the need to conform and the desire to rebel. Mina’s journal and its revelation of Lucy’s sleepwalking confirm this division. By day Lucy remains an acquiescent and loving Victorian girl. By night the other side of her character gains control, and Mina describes her as restless and impatient to get out. It is this restlessness which ultimately leads her to Dracula and to emancipation from her society’s restraints. (Senf 42)

As it is unclear when Dracula takes over and begins to influence Lucy’s sleepwalking, Senf’s conclusions fail to taken into account the supernaturalized psychological element present in the novel’s somnambulism. Restlessness and repetition of behavior can also be tied to the uncanny, not just a desire for social control, especially because Lucy and Mina linguistically conflate sleepwalking and dreaming. Additionally, Senf’s analysis attaches a false duality to Lucy’s character, as she notes “by night the other side of her character gains control.” Here, Senf seems to be conflating sleepwalking and vampirism in surprisingly unproductive ways: when Lucy is becoming a vampire, several characters note that she seems wanton and cruel, unlike her usual sweet self. During her sleepwalking, however, she is mostly acquiescent to Mina, a characteristic of her waking life, and one that suggests that whatever differences lie between the sleepwalking Lucy and the conscious one, they can’t be divided in a simplistic binary.

Lucy’s “difference” is not only from those of her gender, but from the other types of sleepers within Dracula (and, as I discuss below, even from other vampires). The various narrators of the novel examine, praise, and discuss each other’s sleeping selves, but it is in Jonathan Harker’s Transylvania journal that we are given an early counterpoint to Lucy’s abnormal sleeping habits. Harker’s position as a normative sleeper, the destructive effect of Dracula on his sleeping habits, and the disorienting consequences of the loss of routine in this area of Harker’s life provide a counterpoint to the non-normative sleeping in the Lucy section of the novel that follows it.
4.5 THE TROUBLED SLUMBERS OF JONATHAN HARKER

*Dracula*'s main discussion of somnambulism doesn’t arrive until the entrance of Lucy Westenra in her correspondence with Mina Murray and then in both women’s journal entries, but mention of the uneasy boundary between sleep and wakefulness comes much earlier, during Jonathan Harker’s stay at Dracula’s castle. Upon his arrival at the castle, Jonathan initially views sleep as “safe” and dreams as preferable to the reality of vampirism, but as his sleep schedule is increasingly altered and the Count hints that to be unconscious—ever—is to be vulnerable, Harker eventually comes to see sleep as a metaphor for death. Both of these developments provide a basis for my argument that *Dracula* uses discourses of sleep to blur the boundaries between human and inhuman states of being, and develop the connections between sleepwalking and vampirism in the next section of the novel.

From his first day at the Count’s home, forces Jonathan into an abnormal sleep schedule, which quickly leads to unreliability in Jonathan’s narration. He arrives in the middle of the night, and as he stands outside of the castle’s thick, immovable door, doubting whether or not anyone will come to let him in, he muses,

> I began to rub my eyes and pinch myself to see if I were awake. It all seemed like a horrible nightmare to me, and I expected that I should suddenly awake, and find myself at home, with the dawn struggling in through the windows, as I had now and again felt in the morning after a day of overwork. But my flesh answered the pinching test, and my eyes were not to be deceived. I was indeed awake and among the Carpathians. (40)

Harker’s adventure has already been such that he doubts that he is awake, believing that his mind is powerful enough to create such a vivid illusion. When Dracula does let him into the castle they commence a late night supper, which begins the pattern they’ll follow during the rest of Jonathan’s stay: meals and socialization in the middle of the night. He’ll begin to adapt to the
vampire’s schedule, sleeping during most of the day and wandering around the castle in the evening and night, his sense of reality blurring just as the boundaries shift between diurnal and nocturnal activities. When in the coach on the way to the castle, Jonathan’s bewildering ride is so illogical and frightening that he surmises that he must have been dreaming at least part of the time. The coach driver—Dracula himself, of course, since the vampire keeps no servants—is intimidating and mysterious, giving Jonathan no information of their whereabouts as he wanders off into the night and has bizarre encounters with wolves. Jonathan notes multiple times that “It seemed to me that we were simply going over and over the same ground again; and so I took note of some salient point, and found that this was so” (36). At one point the driver spots “a faint flickering blue flame” (38), halts the carriage, and disappears into the woods. Although he returns, Jonathan mentions “I think I must have fallen asleep and kept dreaming of the incident, for it seemed to be repeated endlessly, and now looking back, it is like a sort of awful nightmare” (38). Here we see Jonathan’s lack of reliability, as he is unable to discern whether or not events are real or imagined, and he stays in a state of perpetual uncertainty. For Harker, sleep represents a kind of safety: if he is dreaming of being in Transylvania, it means that he is actually back home in his own bed; if he is dreaming of the repetition of his carriage ride, it means that he did not spend hours of the night watching a man who can control wolves chase a moving blue flame through the woods. The suggestion of dreaming is one way for him to distance himself from what must have been a rather terrifying experience for him: better an “awful nightmare” than the reality of his life. Perhaps Harker finds the reality of the situation to be horrifying because it is so irrational, or because it represents a world where the power of the individual Englishman holds no sway, and he himself has absolutely no control.
Harker again alludes to the possibility that he has slept on his carriage ride when he notes that they were suddenly in front of a large castle. He says, “I must have been asleep, for certainly if I had been fully awake I must have noticed the approach to such a remarkable place” (39). But what if he has been awake? What does that say about the appearance of the castle? Or about Harker’s powers of observation? In a text that claims “all the records chosen are exactly contemporary, given from the standpoints and within the range of knowledge of those who made them,” (26) such failures stand out, highlighting the all too apparent limits of subjective experience and knowledge. Again, Harker reminds us that he is not the most trustworthy or reliable narrator.

The importance of the sanctity of sleep for Harker (and presumably the reader as well, for Harker is the character with whom he or she most identifies at this point in the novel) and how an alteration to that schedule proves detrimental to the sleeper is revealed through how easily Jonathan’s sense of reality is completely dismantled once Dracula is able to place him on a more vampiric schedule. The character loses this important touchstone by which he orients himself:

day reveals itself as not strongly demarcated from night, just as the borders between human and inhuman, life and death, also become blurred and unstable.

There is something so strange about this place and all in it that I cannot but feel uneasy. I wish I were safe out of it, or that I had never come. It may be that this strange night-existence is telling on me; but would that that were all! If there were any one to talk to I could bear it, but there is no one. I have only the Count to speak with, and he!—I fear I am myself the only living soul within this place. (49)

Even Dracula warns Harker that it is dangerous to sleep unprotected, suggesting being unconscious means being in danger. The young man dutifully records this in his diary:

Let me advise you, my dear young friend—nay, let me warn you with all seriousness, that should you leave these rooms you will not by any chance go to sleep in any other part of the castle. It is old, and has many memories, and there
are bad dreams for those who sleep unwisely. Be warned! Should sleep now or ever overcome you, or be like to do, then haste to your own chamber or to these rooms, for your rest will then be safe. (57)

Dracula’s warning suggests to Harker that it is dangerous to sleep unprotected, out in the open, in a place not sufficiently domestic, but it also highlights the way that to sleep at all, at any time—to be unconscious, unaware, not on guard—can also be dangerous, for the sleeper is always vulnerable, always ready prey. Harker understands the second, implicit warning, for he later places his crucifix over the head of his bed and states, “I imagine that my rest is thus freer from dreams” (57). This both indicates Harker’s faith in religious protection but also reminds us of Dracula’s earlier dislike of the crucifix (50): presumably Harker remembers this as well and intends to use it for his benefit.

It is, however, the first, more direct warning that Harker fails to comprehend and believe. He claims “I quite understood” but his resistance is apparent when he adds, “my only doubt was as to whether any dream could be more terrible than the unnatural, horrible net of gloom and mystery which seemed closing round me” (57). He takes Dracula’s warning of bad dreams too literally and assumes that Dracula is the only real thing he needs to be afraid of. Already the word “dream” has become a kind of code for the supernatural (a concept which will be later developed in the sections concerning Lucy and Mina) but Harker isn’t aware of this. In fact, later that night, after seeing Dracula exit through a window and crawl—like a lizard—down the side of the castle, Harker declares, “I shall not fear to sleep in any place were [Dracula] is not” (57). He makes good on this declaration, as a few days later he takes pleasure in disobeying Dracula’s warning (60). While exploring the castle he locates a portion formerly used but now apparently abandoned and he finds these rooms comforting, “better than living alone in the rooms which I had come to hate from the presence of the Count,” (59) and thus sits himself at a
small oak desk where he imagines that “in old times possibly some fair lady sat to pen, with much thought and many blushes, her ill-spelt love-letter” (59). Harker tires, noting “the sense of sleep was upon me, and with it the obstinacy which sleep brings as outrider” (60), and thus lies down on a sofa.

Here Harker continues to characterize dreams as safe, and his narrative of the encounter begins with a now characteristic note of confusion on his part: “I suppose I must have fallen asleep; I hope so, but I fear, for all that followed was startlingly real—so real that now, sitting here in the broad, full sunlight of the morning, I cannot in the least believe that it was all sleep” (61). Again, sleep seems to be invoked because that would make things better: dreaming suggests that whatever has happened is not real. However, it is important to note here that the characters of Dracula do not appear to dream. Those who speak of events which they think might be dreams—Jonathan, Lucy, Mina—are all actually victims of vampire attacks (although Dracula intervenes before the vampire women can complete their seduction of Jonathan—he is traumatized but unbitten). This substitution is another way in which the novel presents the unconscious mind as a gateway to the supernatural: whenever a character thinks his or her unconscious mind has been activated, he or she has actually encountered a vampire. Dreaming, like sleepwalking, draws us more deeply into the possible reality of vampirism. That these victims characterize their attacks in such a manner is provocative when considering Armstrong’s observation that “the fantasies peculiar to the uncanny provide one way of understanding what our relationships to one another might be like were we not to undergo the separations, identifications, and abjections that turn us into modern individuals” (145). As stated above, Freud compares the experience of the uncanny with the feelings associated with “certain dream-states.”
That Dracula purposefully participates in—even desires—Harker’s confusion is indicated as Harker watches Dracula intervene in the vampire attack in a kind of dreamy fear. Dracula enforces Jonathan’s uncertainty of the reality of the situation, as he tells the three female vampires “Now go! Go! I must awaken him, for there is work to be done” (63, emphasis added). This maneuver is less to indicate that Harker is actually sleeping and more a move to keep the Englishman in the dark until Dracula can secure Harker’s agreement to write the three letters confirming he has left the castle (64).  

The next morning Harker looks to his environment to confirm or deny the reality of the previous night’s adventure. He then “proceeds to read his room for signs,” the most significant being “he [finds]…that his watch is still unwound” (Holden 477). Holden notes that “a crisis has been superintended by discipline and the disciplinary process emerges from it strengthened, even if the subject is himself somewhat enfeebled” (477). Harker finds his proof in the form of the locked door which led to the other wing of the castle: “it had been so forcibly driven against the jamb that part of the woodwork was splintered” (Stoker 63). He thus concludes, “I fear it was no dream, and must act on this surmise” (64). It is only when Harker begins to reestablish a line between waking and sleeping reality, and to recognize that certain events are true, not the product of his dreaming mind, that he can really begin to plan his escape from Dracula’s castle and to reassert his role “as a man” (75) or individual.

Despite Harker’s earlier equation of sleep (especially combined with a dream element) with safety, by the end of his Transylvania journal he will make a different—and in some ways more accurate—connection with sleeping. As Harker prepares to escape the castle, aware that the only way to leave is by climbing out his window and scaling down the wall, he makes it clear that this danger is preferable to the threat posed by the three vampire women who will shortly
come for him. Faced with his death, Harker declares, “At least God’s mercy is better than that of these monsters, and the precipice is steep and high. At its foot a man may sleep—as a man. Good-bye, all! Mina!” (75) It is clear that sleep has evolved into a metaphor for death, and that at the same time the boundary between death and sleep is no longer clear, as when Jonathan sneaks a view at Dracula during the daytime and concludes, “He was either dead or asleep, I could not say which” (70).181

4.6 “AGAIN THE OPERATION; AGAIN THE NARCOTIC”: REPETITION AS CURE FOR THE OVERLY MOBILE BODY

In the next section of Dracula, Stoker will use the figure of the sleepwalking Lucy to develop ideas about sleep, and to combine those concerns with both vampirism and medical discourse, centering on Lucy’s illness and Van Helsing’s attempts to rehabilitate her. Seward’s comment “Again the operation; again the narcotic; again some return of colour to the ashy cheeks, and the regular breathing of healthy sleep” (149) beautifully summarizes this section of the novel, as Lucy’s condition fluctuates and “puncture for puncture the Doctor equals the Count” (Craft 126). The aforementioned “puncturing” affects Lucy’s neck and limbs, but most of the reader’s attention is directed to a very specific wound on her neck. The other characters’ observations on Lucy firmly situate the sleepwalking body as the medicalized body, and serve to distance Lucy from her body itself, transforming her from girl to corpse and creating a physical form that becomes more and more symbolic.

Several characters in the story engage in a rather repetitious reading of Lucy’s body. Mina, Van Helsing, and Dr. Seward each repeatedly attempt—and fail—to ascribe the appropriate meaning to the signs of her body.182 They observe and record as Lucy “gets weaker
and more languid day by day” (115), “crie[s] silently between long, painful struggles for breath” (115), and grows “ghastly, chalkily pale” as “the red seemed to have gone from even from her lips and gums” (136). Then, they watch her color and health return but only as a way for the cycle to begin anew. Seward’s documentation of the changes Lucy experiences also records his changing perspective on her, linguistically transforming her from young woman to corpse before Dracula’s physical transformation is finished. He says of her body, “Even the lips were white, and the gums seemed to have shrunken back from the teeth, as we sometimes see in a corpse after a prolonged illness” (143). The use of the definite article in the place of the possessive (only three days prior her lips and gums were her own) distances Lucy from her own body, symbolically handing her over to the vampire rather early on in her transformation. Despite Seward’s continued efforts with Van Helsing, his language here suggests that he has already given her up (as indeed he has—socially—for she has rejected his proposal of marriage). Lucy herself engages in self-diagnosis, noting in her journal “This morning I am horribly weak. My face is ghastly pale, and my throat pains me. It must be something wrong with my lungs, for I don’t seem ever to get air enough” (127). As time passes she will also comment on the cyclical nature of her health but mostly only in her diary, otherwise trying to be cheerful and hide the severity of her condition. The consequences both help to justify the group’s later insistence on collaboration as a means to successful vampire annihilation and foreshadow the vulnerability to which the men will expose Mina when they briefly exclude her from deliberations and the mutual exchange of personal documents.

All this worry and activity centers on the wound that Dracula has left (and continues to leave) on Lucy’s neck. Although Mina will also be bitten later in the adventure, her body will not be placed under the same scrutiny as Lucy’s. I argue that even in a state of vampirism, Lucy’s
body is treated differently from Mina’s because it is already a public body, a sleepwalking body. While under a threat from Dracula, Lucy seems much more like an invalid, in part because she is a somnambulist, already of an uncertain, “nervous” constitution before she even encounters Dracula. Logically, it is through the figure of the sleepwalker, who muddles expectations about what behaviors are acceptable in public and in private, that Stoker introduces the idea of public sleeping. The intense scrutiny of the body first comes through Mina’s descriptions of the wounds on Lucy’s neck. She initially calls them “two little red points like pin-pricks” (112) and later observes “the tiny wounds seem not to have healed. They are still open, and, if anything, larger than before, and the edges of them are faintly white. They are like little white dots with red centres” (115). Strikingly, Mina considers herself at fault for the wounds, for when Mina clasps her shawl around Lucy’s neck, “[Lucy] put her hand to her throat again and moaned” and Mina infers that she “must have been clumsy in [her] anxiety and pinched or pricked [Lucy] with [the big safety pin]” (111). When she later sees blood on Lucy’s nightgown and notices the two tiny wounds, she rationalizes them by concluding “I must have pinched up a piece of loose skin and have transfixed it” (112).

Mina soon leaves, called to Jonathan’s bedside in Eastern Europe, and her exit highlights a more “appropriate” location for Mina to direct her scrutiny and desire. Prior to the rediscovery of her husband, Mina shows a thorough interest in Lucy’s beauty and body, especially in that body’s relationship to sleep: “Lucy always wakes prettily, and even at such a time, when her body must have been chilled with cold, and her mind somewhat appalled at waking unclad in a churchyard at night, she did not lose her grace” (111); “Lucy is asleep and breathing softly. She has more colour in her cheeks than usual, and looks, oh, so sweet. If Mr. Holmwood fell in love with her seeing her only in the drawing-room, I wonder what he would say if he saw her now.
Some of the ‘New Women’ writers will some day start an idea that men and women should be allowed to see each other asleep before proposing or accepting” (109); “She looks so sweet as she sleeps; but she is paler than is her wont, and there is a drawn, haggard look under her eyes which I do not like…I looked at her throat just now as she lay asleep, and the tiny wounds seem not to have healed” (114). In the first of these examples Mina’s observation that “Lucy always wakes prettily” and “did not lose her grace” even when “waking unclad in a churchyard at night” is particularly notable in its seeming irrelevance and absurdity, in relation to both the social situation the ladies know themselves to be in and the danger the reader suspects they are in. And the other observations which Lucy’s unconscious body prompts from Mina are nearly as surprising, as the future Mrs. Harker muses on the advantages of having prospective spouses engage in premarital observation of each other’s sleeping bodies. That Stoker insistently returns the reader’s gaze to the unconscious—or nearly unconscious—Lucy creates a general interest in details related to her body, and a specific precedent for both the later records of her symptoms and the Crew of Light’s obsession with her vampiric beauty. The connection between sleeping and vampirism is initially established by the way that Lucy’s sleepwalking exposes her to Dracula’s attack and how Mina’s musings over Lucy’s sleeping beauty are mixed with observations like “she is paler than her wont” and “the tiny wounds have not yet healed.” The details of Lucy’s beauty are strange and seem frivolous because the two girls are in danger, but it encourages us to look at the sleepwalker, the figure of beauty here, and to examine and take note of her body.

If, as I have suggested above, collaboration is key to the Crew of Light’s success, Lucy’s extremely internalized experiences in sleepwalking would be seen as an obstacle to the group’s entire endeavor. As the text contains an emphasis on conscious choice and action—shown in the
necessity of turning unconscious thought into conscious thought—the sleepwalking Lucy is disturbing because she represents the behavior of the unconscious self. When Mina notes “there is an odd concentration about Lucy which I do not understand; even in her sleep she seems to be watching me,” (94) the effect is unsettling, perhaps because the source of this concentration is not apparent. Is this Lucy watching Mina or is this Dracula using Lucy as a vehicle to watch Mina? Her behavior suggests that of a zombie, robbed of free will and speech. She is simultaneously present and absent, similar to Mina’s hypnotic state but all the more frightening because we have not yet had the benefit of Van Helsing’s “rational” explanation to accompany the phenomenon. Unlike the hypnotic subject, there is no sense that the natural sleepwalker is under the control of a fully conscious authority. Adding to the disturbing nature of the event is its location: the bedroom the two girls share.

By the time the Crew of Light pursues Dracula in earnest, Lucy is already dead, but the vulnerability inherent in her sleepwalking—along with the problem’s apparent persistence—suggests that she would not have been a useful addition to the vampire hunters in the second half of the book. Unlike other characters—especially Mina—she cannot effectively record information concerning her actions because she simply does not remember part of them. This type of liability does not simply suggest that Lucy does not make an effective heroine in a fin-de-siècle gothic novel. Lucy’s somnambulism makes her untrustworthy at best—a “loose cannon”—and a tool of the enemy at worst.

Lucy’s lack of self-possession is outwardly represented by the neck wound upon which Lucy’s illness centers, and it is with this opening that she becomes an infinitely penetrable body, a body without stable boundaries, a body that only gets “sicker” in its “getting better.” The punctures on Lucy’s neck form a wound that won’t heal and Van Helsing keeps creating new
wounds in her body via injections and transfusions. But while these punctures and injections represent a removal—of blood, of cohesiveness—they also represent an addition. Again, of blood (that will be shortly removed again) but additionally in that the puncturing of the skin creates depth where previously there was only surface. It presents the possibility of getting inside the inside—getting beyond the external—allowing the inside to become the new outside, of the possibility of locating the hidden core where answers may be found—similar to the art of dissection as practiced by men like Seward and Van Helsing or literary exegesis as performed by the reader who approaches Dracula, for as much as Lucy is a body she is also a text.

The puncturing creates a wound which alters the surface of the body: as doctors, Van Helsing and Seward read the body, its surfaces and its symptoms. Like most other literary sleepwalkers, Lucy cannot consistently narrate her unconscious experience, so her body must instead tell her story. Dracula’s alteration of Lucy’s body—both within and without—alters what her body communicates to various readers, and by exacerbating her somnambulism, Dracula has further removed her ability to piece together and share a coherent narrative. When Lucy tries to recollect what has happened, her speech and facial expression are repeatedly described as “half-dreaming”—suggesting that the divide between her sleeping and waking lives is disappearing—and her explanation of her sleepwalking experience reveals more in its absences than in its content.

I didn’t quite dream; but it all seemed to be real. I only wanted to be here in this spot—*I don’t know why*, for I was afraid of something—*I don’t know what*...Then I have a vague memory of something long and dark with red eyes, just as we saw in the sunset, and something very sweet and very bitter all around me at once; and then I seemed sinking into green water, and there was a singing in my ears, as I have heard there is to drowning men; and then everything seemed passing away from me; my soul seemed to go out from my body and float about the air. (117, emphasis mine.)
This is the fullest account Stoker gives us of either somnambulism or the vampire’s thrall and bite and it is an account filled with qualifiers and the repeated insistence of “I don’t know” and that there was “something” there. The reader of the novel infers that the “something long and dark with red eyes” is Dracula but beyond that, the event itself is a surreal combination of desire, fear, sensory overload, death, and out-of-body experience. Lucy presents several key issues and images here, and they represent the divided self. She thinks that her soul has separated itself from her body and she self-identifies with the dead or dying (the drowning sailors), while the contradiction between her feelings and impulses recalls Laura’s similar struggles in Carmilla.

When Lucy admits to the insomniac Seward that she is reluctant to fall asleep, he replies “Afraid to go to sleep! It is the boon we all crave for” (141). Lucy, however, is not convinced: “Ah, not if you were like me—if sleep was to you a presage of horror” (141). He asks her to clarify her meaning but all she can say is “I don’t know; oh, I don’t know. And that is what is so terrible. All this weakness comes to me in sleep; until I dread the very thought” (141). Here we have two representations of sleep: “a boon we all crave for” contrasted with “a presage to horror.” Seward’s use of “boon” here recalls Harker’s earlier desire that everything horrifying be resolved by insisting that these events were dreams, not reality, but Lucy’s continued insistence that she has reason to fear sleep works against the characters’ desires to consider sleep a blessing and a human refuge from terror. Lucy’s comment that sleep is “a presage of horror” highlights what, for her, is an airtight connection between the two states: sleep leads to fright, weakness, and confusion.

Lucy’s later written attempts to communicate the details of a vampire attack are echoed in the actions of real life nineteenth-century sleepwalkers, coding Lucy’s behavior as a “natural” thing for a sleepwalker to do. Although she is able to record the events leading up to Dracula’s
attack, her account reaches a halt when she says “a whole myriad of little specks seemed to come blowing in through the broken window…and I remembered no more for a while” (157). The narrative resumes with Lucy recovering consciousness, though “dazed and stupid with pain and terror and weakness,” and ends with her determination to hide the written account within her nightgown, where it may be found when her corpse is laid out (158). But Lucy’s desires are confused enough that the next day –while apparently unconscious but under the control of Dracula—she takes out the paper and rips it in two. Even after Van Helsing has taken the two pieces from her hands, “she went on with the action of tearing, as though the material were still in her hands; finally she lifted her hands and opened them as though scattering the fragments” (165). As much as this recalls tales of somnambulant young women who wrote letters and then destroyed them—all while sleeping—Dracula’s influence over Lucy suggests that these so-called “natural” behaviors are actually controlled and prompted by the supernatural, yet another way that these texts “resensationalize” behaviors that some nineteenth-century scientists were attempting to explain and clarify as normative.

The intense scrutiny which given to Lucy’s body is shown to be a way of making sure the body is still human. Although Seward initially refuses to read the “story” Lucy’s body tells and must be convinced by Van Helsing’s verbal account (140), the group’s surveillance of each member’s physical processes does increase as the novel progresses. Members of the Crew of Light watch one another sleep, encourage each other to eat, and comment on each member’s overall physical well-being. This surveillance and encouragement are arguably the results of close quarters and a desire to keep the group in good condition for the vampire hunt, but also hints at the necessity of a paranoid vigilance to ensure the naturalness of the body and its behaviors. In the last few days of their Carpathian journey, Van Helsing records that Mina eats
very little and sleeps much more (354-363), the behavior of a newly born vampire. His observations on Mina’s well-being are accompanied by journal entries that begin with such hopeful lines as “This is to my old and true friend John Seward…in case I may not see him again” (354) and “I am at least sane. Thank God for that mercy at all events, though the proving it has been dreadful” (360). Van Helsing uses Mina’s violated and damned body as a vampiric weathervane, watching her for signs of excitement or distress as a way of detecting their proximity to Dracula’s castle.

These attempts at bodily scrutiny are complicated by the Undead body, of which the novel gives us several examples, because it clearly adheres to different behavioral rules than the living body, or adheres to no rules at all. Instead, like somnambulism “Undeath” is a liminal state, straddling two seemingly opposed states and muddling the boundaries between them, while not exactly destroying those boundaries. Because of this simultaneous—or alternating—occupation of these apparently opposing categories, “Undead” has qualities of both life and death and consequently of neither. Thus answering, for instance, the question of why the fang marks disappear from Lucy’s neck—while Dracula and Mina bear scars—poses more questions than it resolves. Against what standard can we logically judge how the vampire body “should” behave?

In a somewhat garbled attempt to explain why Lucy is even more beautiful in Un-Death than in life, Van Helsing sets Lucy apart not only from other women or from the Crew of Light, but also from other vampires.

Here, there is one thing which is different from all recorded: here is some dual life that is not as the common. She was bitten by the vampire when she was in a trance, sleepwalking…and in trance could he best come to take more blood. In trance she died, and in trance she is Un-Dead, too. So it is that she differ from all other. Usually when the Un-Dead sleep at home…their face show what they are, but this so sweet that-was when she not Un-Dead she go back to the nothings of
Thus, unlike Carmilla—who may have ceased to sleepwalk when she became a vampire--Lucy’s state as vampire cannot be separated from her state as sleepwalker: Van Helsing presents her as sleepwalking through Un-Death, showing how his plan of repetition-as-cure has ultimately failed his patient. And unlike Dracula, his female vampire companions, and even Mina, Lucy’s body and soul are governed by different rules: in repose, she is as innocent and nonthreatening as a regular human corpse, at least in part because her trance state—while succumbing to Dracula’s attack—means that she was never fully aware and thus never consciously consented. But while Van Helsing’s explanation expunges Lucy of guilt, it does not make her a less socially threatening figure; in fact, it may very well increase the threat that she represents. Because she was turned while sleepwalking, when at rest she does not reveal what she is, “so it make hard that [Van Helsing] must kill her.” Here we see that Lucy’s all-too-public somnambulistic body is deceptive, hiding that she is now a part-time fiend, and signaling that it is necessary for the Crew of Light to find a less visually oriented method for combating female vampirism. To demonstrate this, Stoker turns our eyes toward—and then quickly away from—the strangely absent body of Mina Harker.

4.7 MINA HARKER’S UNVIEWABLE HYPNOTIZED BODY

Dracula’s attempt to transform Mina Harker into a vampire in the last half of the novel becomes an occasion for Stoker to not just heighten suspense and provide the Crew of Light with an opportunity to rectify past failures; in the trance symbolism of the text it also establishes and explores a relationship between somnambulism and hypnotism that defies the close connection
some nineteenth-century discourses drew between the two. Although the text shows that each has a relationship to vampirism, these relationships can greatly differ from each other, showing that via the mental connection inherent in Dracula’s bite, the sleepwalker can only be exploited, whereas the connection itself can be exploited by the hypnotizer, via the hypnotic subject. The somnambulist is ultimately a damned figure, whose state is outside human control and can thus be directly conflated with vampirism. On the other hand, the hypnotic subject can provide access to the vampire, but even as the combination of hypnosis and vampirism erases mental boundaries between individuals, as a state of being hypnosis’s own boundaries remain intact. Mina’s trances only last for short amounts of time, for example, and Van Helsing can open and close the link at will:

Before sunrise and sunset, however, she is very wakeful and alert; and it has become a habit for Van Helsing to hypnotize her at such times. At first, some effort was needed, and he had to make many passes; but now, she seems to yield at once, as if by habit, and scarcely any action is needed. He seems to have power at these particular moments to simply will, and her thoughts obey him. (328)

Van Helsing’s apparent control over the situation—along with Mina’s stationary, protected location—establish a crucial difference between the somnambulist and the hypnotized subject, with the hypnotist acting a as a protective mediator who attempts—with some success—to establish a boundary between the human and the vampire.

This exploration of boundaries maintains its importance in the last act of the novel, further developing how the sleepwalker’s indulgence in public sleep shakes our understanding of public and private behaviors. This can be seen through the contrast that non-sleepwalker Mina provides. Dracula is able to invade her temporary bedroom at the asylum (though not her actual home) and attack her but the fact that he must go to her—unlike Lucy who wanders outside to him—is significant. The location of the attack is logical, as the asylum is already a place where
observation of supposedly private states is the norm, while Mina’s status as a married woman seems to represent a certain protection and stability that is denied to the unmarried Lucy.

Most significant is the way these details lead us to regard Mina’s body. Although Stoker’s characters frequently discuss Lucy’s superficial appearance the reader is rarely given explicit details about Mina’s body. Mina is the first character to comment on Lucy’s oft-mentioned neck wounds, but Mina’s own marked neck is never described to the reader. We do not see the teeth marks on Mina’s body but we do see signs or symptoms that we associate with the violation, thanks to our previous experience with Lucy: after their encounters with Dracula both women have blood on the collars of their night gowns. There is “a drop of blood” on the band of Lucy’s nightdress (112) and Mina’s “white nightdress” is “smeared with blood” (283). Since the reader can interpret this detail, she may not need to have the wound described in order to know that it is there and understand its implications. It is blood from this wound that stains Jonathan’s shirt and prompts Mina to wail “Unclean, unclean! I must touch him or kiss him no more” (285).

Our attention is instead drawn to another of Mina’s wounds: the red mark on her forehead where Van Helsing pressed the Host to her face (295). Instead of mirroring Lucy’s wound, Mina’s mirrors that of Dracula: he, too, has a red scar on his forehead, though his is the result of an encounter with Jonathan and his shovel (74). Mina hides this disfigurement by “pulling her beautiful hair over her face, as the leper of old his mantle” (296), but the symbolism is jarring: that Mina’s identifying scar mirrors that of Dracula—not of Lucy—suggests that the Count may actually be a “safer” choice as a locus of identification for Mina, and that having Mina’s body compromised in the same way as Lucy’s could make it irredeemable (for the reader). This tie is forged between the complex levels of sympathy and psychological identifications on display in
the hypnosis scenes. Much critical attention has been paid to this part of the novel, with Seed asserting, “And Mina even goes to the lengths of converting herself into a text to be studied when she examines the transcript of her hypnotic trances” (75) and Luckhurst summarizing:

However much Lucy is punished for her somnambulistic eroticism, and Renfield killed for his passive receptivity, the coding of Mina’s susceptibility to trance is different. Like Majorie Lindon [of The Beetle], her trance-states and telepathy work for the powers of modernity and progress, doubling the effectiveness of the information systems that trap the Count... The abuliae of somnambulism, insanity, and moral weakness are abjected, but hypnosis is also regarded as a potentially curative force, and one that opens onto vast possibilities beyond the limited determinist dreams of positivist science. (165)

Whereas earlier the sleepwalking Lucy was a conduit for blood, the hypnotized Mina becomes a conduit for information, who can “by our hypnotic trance, tell what the Count see and hear” (Stoker 319). The first reminds us how Lucy is naturally “othered”—her sleepwalking is hereditary, inherited from her father—but the second is the product of conscious collaboration that stands in opposition to the community of the unconscious inhabited by the vampire.

However, Van Helsing reveals his suspicion that information travels through the conduit in both directions, suggesting that if Mina can be hypnotized to provide information to the Crew of Light, “is it not more true that he who hypnotize her first, and who have drink of her blood and make her drink of his, should, if he will, compel her mind to disclose to him that which she know” (319). Dracula is posited as a rival hypnotizer, battling with Van Helsing over the mind of Mina Harker, and later events in the novel reveal that Van Helsing’s suspicions are correct. But Dracula is not simply a past hypnotizer; in the scenes were his mind is linked with Mina’s, his openness suggests his part in a larger, linked hypnotized figure.

The “public-ness” of Mina’s hypnotic displays is a false one: despite the audience present, Mina’s hypnotic trances almost always take place in her bedroom or hotel room (or in
isolated wilderness with Van Helsing later in the novel), and the audience only ever includes the Crew of Light. This is still a very private performance in very private spaces, unlike Lucy who takes her somnambulistic self out onto the streets of Whitby. Both the private-ness of Mina’s trances and the clear hierarchy of power between Mina and Van Helsing seem to set these scenes apart from the actual staging of hypnotic spectacle in the nineteenth-century. Normally a public body (like the somnambulistic body), the hypnotized body is here more protected and hidden from view. This is, in part, because access to Mina’s half-vampirized body and mind isn’t really the point of the exhibition: access to Dracula is the goal, and it is through Dracula that hypnotism’s potential for subversive power struggle is restored within this text. While Stoker continues to deny readers access to a visual element of the trance—all Mina ever sees is “darkness”—shows how the sympathetic mental exchange made possible is just that: an exchange, with information flowing in both directions, regardless of whatever hierarchies the hypnotizer—Van Helsing or Dracula—tries to impose.

Yet while this exchange provides Dracula with useful information about the Crew of Light’s plans and locations, it is still preferable to Lucy’s opaque somnambulism, suggesting why the master vampire is for Mina a less threatening double than Lucy. Van Helsing and Seward actually anticipate the possibility that Dracula is using Mina to gather information about their activities, proving once again the predictability of the vampire’s behavior. Much of the Crew of Light’s strategizing and discussion is devoted to systematizing Dracula’s behavior—establishing rules and precedents that govern Dracula’s activities—and thus ultimately re-naturalizing his supernatural existence. On the other hand, Lucy as human sleepwalker is much more difficult to wrangle than Dracula as vampire, and even if Lucy is more predictable in Un-Death than in life, her “true death” requires a more elaborate ritual than Dracula’s, as noted in
nearly every critical work concerning this novel. This elaborateness is almost as frequently attributed to Lucy’s first latent, then aggressive, sexuality, but I maintain this is not the case. Mina—in her desire for mixed sex sleeping—is hardly less sensual than the human Lucy, and while Dracula’s three female vampire companions are certainly as sexual—if not more so—than the vampire Lucy, their deaths are as anticlimactic as Dracula’s. Instead, Lucy’s ultimate otherness, her unrelatability, centers on what Van Helsing has already identified as making her “differ from all others”: her chronic somnambulism which haunts this text obsessed with who sleeps how or where or when, and which ultimately worries that some are “either dead or asleep” but it “cannot say which.”

4.8 CONCLUSION

In summary, for a nineteenth-century audience bombarded with newspaper snippets of the latest somnambulistic scandal or adventure; traveling lecturers and pamphlets demonstrating hypnotic phenomena; and cultural and literary discourses that positioned the reader as both amateur scientist and budding detective, gothic texts like Dracula and Carmilla represented the sleepwalker as a liminal figure with very strong ties to the supernatural, especially via the figure of the vampire. Analysis of these two texts shows the relationship to be complex and fluid; in Carmilla somnambulism offers a cover narrative for vampirism, as until a rather late point in the text, Carmilla could be either a sleepwalker or a vampire. That she is eventually revealed to possibly be both makes her victim and vampire, vulnerable yet predatory, and ultimately suggests that such naturally occurring phenomena as sleepwalking allows for the supernatural to remain undetected (or, at the very least, allows for some people to evade punishment for some very real indiscretions).
In *Dracula* the relationship is even more multifaceted: Lucy’s liminality—as sleepwalker and as vampire—is juxtaposed with both Jonathan’s sleep-related experiences at Dracula’s castle and Mina’s scenes of hypnosis late in the novel. The former provides a normative counterpoint to Lucy’s abnormality, but also establishes that normal sleep is both integral and sacred to human experience in the face of the supernatural, while simultaneously demonstrating that as that balance is dislodged, the commonalities between sleep and death are all the more apparent. The hypnosis section integrates sleepwalking back into a larger context of varied trance states, implicitly comparing the two types of trance phenomena as similar yet distinct kinds of altered states. The evidence of control and exchange apparent in the hypnosis scenes throws into greater relief the absence of both in the somnambulism scenes earlier in the novel, portraying the sleepwalker as a frightening and isolated figure. By connecting sleepwalking to vampirism, Le Fanu and Stoker are able to re-supernaturalize a natural phenomenon (sleepwalking), and naturalize a supernatural state (vampirism), suggesting that if anyone could be a somnambulist, anyone could be a vampire as well.
Kenneth Parks had a history of sleep-related problems and a history of gambling. He was anxious, having recently lost his job because of embezzling funds to cover his debts, and one evening, after falling asleep on the sofa, he traveled the 14 miles to his in-laws’ home. Once there, he stabbed his mother-in-law repeatedly—killing her—and nearly choked his father-in-law to death. Then, he went to the nearest police station and announced, “I think I’ve just killed two people,” before seeming to notice for the first time that his hands were bleeding profusely, nearly cut to the bone. Because Parks had no clear motive for violence toward his in-laws and had no memory of what had happened between falling asleep and arriving at the police station, authorities were baffled.189

Parks killed his mother-in-law in 1987—not 1887—but the case prompted many of the same legal and psychological concerns as the killing of Simon Fraser’s son in 1878, as well as startling similarities in the methods used to address Parks’ guilt or innocence, all of which suggests the continued relevance of the Victorian investment in and approaches to representing the sleepwalking self. Like Fraser, Parks was a young husband with an infant child, and like Fraser, Parks had family history of parasomnias: his grandfather had a tendency to cook while somnambulating and several men in the family had a history of bedwetting, which—to twentieth century medical science—indicated that the brain was unable to fully arouse itself from deep sleep (Randall). Gone was the language of “morbid tendencies” and “nervous disorders,” but
possible conclusions prompted by this case and others of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries of how to deal with sleepwalking violence are faint echoes of medical expert Dr. David Yellowlees’s suggestion that “it would surely have been much wiser and safer to have sent Fraser formally to an asylum, liberating him at once, subject to certain conditions of residence and supervision, and holding him liable to recall, should the conditions be neglected” (458).

Consider, for instance, that in 2002, regarding the Parks case, law professor Deborah Denno argued for a new legal category of “semivoluntary acts” and has suggested that, “Someone like [Parks] may need to be told, 'If for the next year you take your medication and keep out of trouble, we won't prosecute this crime'” (302).

Parks was Canadian, but his sleepwalking acts and their cultural resonance extended beyond Canada and have seen similar cases internationally (Wolf-Meyer 212). Most recently, in 2008 a Welsh man named Brian Thomas awoke to find himself choking his wife of nearly 40 years. Like Fraser or Esther Griggs (or even the hunter from Taylor’s Medical Jurisprudence), Thomas claimed to have been in throes of a violent dream that was inadvertently directed at a loved one. Like Parks and Fraser before them, he was acquitted of all charges, and told by the court, “I strongly suspect you may be feeling a sense of guilt. In the eyes of the law you bear no responsibility” (Randall). But like the legal system of Victorian England, while modern courts may be sympathetic to many sleepwalking defendants, there is no set framework for determining responsibility for sleep-related unconscious crime: in 1997, for example, Scott Falater—an American—was convicted of the murder of his wife, though he claimed that he had killed her while sleepwalking and though his defense included some of the very same sleep experts who had testified on behalf of Kenneth Parks ten years before.
The cases of Parks, Falater, and Thomas provide, in specific, a fitting coda to the issues of sleepwalking criminality that I discuss in chapter one but the relevance of Victorian sleepwalking—and, more broadly, the relationship between nineteenth-century psychology and nineteenth-century literature—have wider cultural ramifications in the 21st century. Not only are there continued problems of legality in dealing with current sleepwalking cases and continued confusion regarding insurance settlements in cases of sleepwalking suicide—also debated in the nineteenth-century—but medical science, even with neurological and psychological developments, still has an incomplete understanding of what actually causes some people to sleepwalk while others remain immune. A 2009 study in *Sleep* suggested, in explaining the mechanics of the phenomenon, that “There is an increase in blood flow to the posterior cingulate cortex (a hub at the base of the brain thought to help integrate information we receive), while at the same time, blood flow decreases in the frontoparietal associative cortices, areas thought to be critical to our ability to exhibit conscious awareness” (Randall). Normally, these parts work simultaneously during wakefulness, suggesting that in sleepwalking there is a disjunction in the brain, although this study was not able to reveal exactly why the disjunction existed. Other recent scholarship in *Sleep* has asked, “Our how far have we advanced [in the last 170 years] in understanding the relationship between sleepwalking behavior and the ‘mind’ during sleep?” (Pressman 1542).

Pressman’s question is a telling follow-up to physician William Alexander Hammond’s 1881 admission of medicine’s incomplete grasp of the causes of sleepwalking. He conceded ruefully, “Now, after this survey of some of the principal phenomena of natural…somnambulism are we able to determine in what their condition essentially consists? I am afraid we shall be obliged to answer this question in the negative,” claiming that despite extensive study throughout

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the 19th century, “we are not yet sufficiently well acquainted with the normal functions of the nervous system to be in a position to pronounce with definiteness on their aberrations” (30). Other psychiatrists, however, expressed hope that new scientific methodology and increased psychological expertise would clarify these concerns in the early 20th century. Daniel Hack Tuke’s awareness that the “evidence at [his] command is not conclusive” (20) was followed by the expectation those who followed him would surely build on his work with satisfactory results (45), leading me to ask how we might explain the disjunction between what Victorian psychologists expected and what Pressman reveals as the state of our understanding of somnambulism in the 21st century.

Although a recent Psychology Today article discussed the need for reform in the way we approach sleepwalking, both culturally and specifically in regard to legal concerns, its historical purview is strangely limited, perhaps suggesting a limitation in a contemporary mainstream psychology which does not often trace its antecedents back to anything prior to the Freudian interpretation of consciousness. The article argues for an understanding of the mind that does not divide it into a dichotomy of consciousness and unconsciousness, but instead perceives more liminal states in between the two. This model is placed in opposition to a modern understanding of consciousness as “an all or nothing affair,” as based on legal understandings from the 1950s, “when Freudian interpretations of consciousness were widely accepted and scientific understanding of sleep was rudimentary.”

Despite these frustrations with Freud, the article does not, however, trace the roots of this issue back to Victorian psychology or cultural representations, an approach which would shed light on how this topic was explored before, both legally and scientifically, but also in the cultural imagination. Advances in neuroscience, while attending to a wholly physiological
model, have perhaps flattened consciousness in a manner that makes liminal states such as sleepwalking continue to be problematic, suggesting that our models of sleepwalking are only as rich as our models of the unconscious. Due to this flattening, my sense is that sleepwalking’s importance to a cultural imaginary has dwindled, indicated, for instance, by its return to a metaphorical relationship to empty selfhood and automatism. Without even the gothic qualities that still animate zombies, sleepwalking is reduced to a mere curiosity: when we suggest that someone is “sleepwalking through life,” for instance, we mean that he or she is merely lacking conscious awareness, not revealing the multifaceted selfhood that the Victorians perceived as possible via somnambulistic display. And yet there are still current cultural portrayals of sleepwalking, with the possibility of even greater proliferation. Examples include the recent film *Sleepwalk with Me* (2012), neo-Victorian novels that include sleepwalking elements, such as two each called *The Somnambulist* (2007 and 2012), and contributions to the horror genre—*Paranormal Activity* (2007), for instance—that suggest that sleepwalking might happen in response to demonic possession.

Might our understanding of how to characterize and approach sleepwalking responsibility be informed by Victorian models? There are those in the psychological community who are beginning to say, at the very least, “maybe”: Pressman, for example, connects burgeoning studies of mentation and ideation in sleepwalkers—a model that is not strictly neurological—with methods and theories of nineteenth-century psychiatry, although he is understandably and unsurprisingly cautious about seeming to endorse methods based on “retrospective anecdotal reports” from “otherwise well-diagnosed patients” (1543). I would like to take Pressman’s suggestions a step further, however, pointing out that part of the strength and vibrancy of nineteenth-century approaches to the mind-brain connection lie in the ways that questions of
sleepwalking—and how they reveal issues about the connection of the unconscious to the conscious mind, alongside theories of the will’s status and self-control—spilled over the boundaries of what was then a voluminous field of discourse, creating both psychological discussions of the mind-body relationship and literary explorations of embodied selfhood. Perhaps then, we can take nineteenth-century fascination with a liminal state like sleepwalking as a productive model for the ways in which humanistic and scientific approaches might work in tandem to illuminate further how we might conceptualize the mind-brain relationship: not simply how scientific approaches could usefully inform consciousness studies within the humanities but also how the humanities could be better integrated and used by scientific theories of consciousness.
NOTES

NOTES FROM INTRODUCTION

1 All quotations taken from Binns, 136-7. The tale is similarly quoted in Taylor’s Apparitions; or, The Mystery of Ghosts, Hobgoblins, and Haunted Houses Developed (1815). Taylor attributes the story to “a gentleman of high respectability in the navy” (223) and gives it the title of “The Ghost on Ship-board.” Despite the sensational title for the tale, Taylor opens his collection by insisting the collected is “founded on fact” and each tale was chosen for “eradicating those fears, which the ignorant, the weak, and the superstitious, are but too apt to encourage for want of properly examining into the causes of such absurd imposition” (1).

2 Sally Shuttleworth has suggested that the repeated tales of psychological texts functioned within what might be likened to a monetary economy, “their scientific validity, or credit-worthiness, deriving entirely from their previous appearance in a scientific context, and from the narrative coherence of their presentation” (13).

3 The first quotation is taken from “Somnambulism Extraordinary,” which appeared throughout September 1866 in such publications as The Liverpool Mercury, Dublin Journal and Daily Commercial Advertiser, the Glasgow Herald, and Cheshire Observer and Chester, Birkenhead, Crewe and North Wales Times. The second comment appears in “Extraordinary Case of Somnambulism” from the July 21, 1855 issue of the Westmorland Gazette.

4 From Nussy’s 1871 account in Scribner’s Magazine, quoted in Chadwick. All quotations taken from pages 97-98.

5 Siddons had already achieved highly praised celebrity by the end of the 18th century, but her career continued into the 19th as well. Her famous “farewell” performance took place at Covent Garden’s Theatre Royal on June 29, 1812, in which she played—of course—Lady Macbeth. The audience refused to allow the play to continue after the sleepwalking scene, applauding widely and demanding to speak to Siddons. Terry’s turn as Lady Macbeth (1888) took place at Henry Irving’s Lyceum Theatre, where Bram Stoker was business manager. Both portrayals have been immortalized on canvas, Siddons’s work in George Henry Harlow’s Sarah Siddons in the Scene of Lady Macbeth Sleepwalking (1814) and Terry’s by John Singer Sargent’s Ellen Terry as Lady Macbeth (1889) and a second portrait Sargent did for the cover of Terry’s “golden jubilee” programme in 1906. For more on Siddons and Terry, see Campbell and Terry.

6 See the Illustrated Police News.

7 See, for example, Prichard’s discussion in “Animal Magnetism and Somnambulism,” page 21-27.

8 The Leicester Chronicle 12 June 1847, Saturday. The article was a reprint from an earlier notice in the Bedford Times, called “Singular Case of Somnambulism in Bedford.”
Winters includes extensive information on the O’Key sisters in chapters 3 and 4 of *Mesmerized*. See pages 60-108.

Specific examples of “extraordinary” sleepwalking servant girls used as test subjects include Tuke’s account of E. H., a natural sleepwalker who was also hypnotized and experimented with while institutionalized (51-59); “Nancy,” who sleepwalked from ages 10 to 16 and seems to have first appeared in Abercrombie’s *Inquiries Concerning the Intellectual Powers and the Investigation of Truth* (1830) but reappeared in Millingen, Binns, and Collyer; the famous Jane C Ryder—called “The Springfield Somnambulist”—whose story was imported from America and repeated throughout Great Britain; and a 16 year old Scottish maid, whose story is quoted by Binns but seems to originate in an account from [the one doctor’s medical paper given at a conference]. Occasionally a somnambulist did not need to be working class in order to be the subject of experimentation: young and female would do. Hammond details his extensive experimentation with a middle class young woman in both his *Sleep and Its Derangements* (1869) and *On Certain Conditions of Nervous Derangement: Somnambulism, Hypnotism, Hysteria, Hysteriod, Affections, Etc.* (1881).

Though my research is always ongoing, I have to date found well over 200 different sleepwalkers mentioned in newspapers and works of “mental science.” There are many more references to sleepwalkers, but some are mentioned several times across a variety of publications. I’ve looked for either names or identifying details or language to weed out repeated accounts. This number does not include representations of sleepwalkers from other types of Victorian media, such as illustration, fiction, poetry, and the theatre.


Tuke’s circular asked for information such as age, sex, and occupation before moving on to inquiries concerning areas such as family history, the sleepwalker’s experience of sensory data while somnambulating (including whether his or her eyes were shut), whether fatigue was experienced after sleepwalking, the relation the sleepwalker’s somnambulating had to “late supper” or illness, and what type of preventative or curative measures had been performed (47-50). He acknowledges the subjective nature of the data gathered—encouraging sleepwalkers to ask friends and family to provide information—and points out to respondents that “the value of the answers would be greatly increased if drawn up by a medical man” (47).

Quoted in Binns, 139.

Quoted in Binns, 139-140.

See, for example, Fournel 8-11.

See Morison.

An extensive discussion of the importance of Carpenter’s work in regard to Victorian literature can be found in Ryan’s *Thinking Without Thinking in the Victorian Novel*. She briefly mentions somnambulism but devotes little room to discussing Carpenter’s work on the phenomenon.

For more on this topic, see Kay Young’s *Imagining Minds: the Neuro-Aesthetics of Austen, Eliot, and Hardy*. Young argues that “the novel is an aesthetic map to and experience of the nature of the mind-brain” (9) and roots her discussion not in Victorian aesthetics and scholarship but also in the debates of 21st century neuroscience and consciousness studies.

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NOTES FROM CHAPTER ONE

20 See Oughton, 201-3.
21 The other two were the Bible and Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress.
22 For more on the penny dreadful and its cultural impact, see Haining.
23 The full text of the monk’s “great crime” is as follows:

Our illustration represents a scene which is vouched for by the Prior of a monastery in Italy, who had a narrow escape of his own life. It appears that one of the monks give indication of delusions and monomania. It was well known that he was in the habit of walking in his sleep. One night the Prior, who was on his couch, saw to his great surprise the door of the apartment slowly open; he sprang from his couch and crept into a dark corner of the room, hiding himself behind a massive piece of furniture. He beheld the monk, who was in his nightdress, and had neither shoes or stockings on his feet, creepy stealthily across the room. In his right hand he carried a dagger, and with his left he felt for the head of the Prior’s bed. Having reached this he raised his dagger and plunged it two or three times in the pillow. The Prior saw that he was in a state of somnambulism, but it was evident that his intents were more “wicked than charitable.” When the circumstance was narrated to him in the morning, he declared it could not be possible, as he was in his bed at the time. (Illustrated Police News (London), Saturday, May 19, 1888; page 2, issue 1266)

The illustration of the monk is on the first page of the edition, surrounded by illustrations entitled “Fatal Prize Fight,” “Child Killed by Ferret,” “Attempted Murder at Tottenham,” and the inexplicable “A Cat Worried by a Dog” (later revealed to be a case of compensation for property damage).

The illustration “Somnambulism at Wimbledon” is on page 4 of the December 8, 1984 edition of the IPN, though the accompanying text is located on page 7. The full text is as follows:

A young Wimbledon lady has just had an unpleasant adventure. About half-past one in the early morning of Saturday, a constable was on duty in Hartfield Road, when he suddenly saw a figure, draped in white, rapidly approaching him. He stepped forward and barred its progress, inviting the mysterious stranger to accompany him to the police-station. To this it demurred. “Stay me not,” it said, “I must away to Wimbledon Common, where kindred spirits await me.” The constable, however, at once seized the figure, which, uttering a loud shriek, fell senseless into his arms. He then discovered that the young lady was a victim of somnambulism, and clad in her night attire and an old pair of slippers, was traversing the neighbourhood to keep an imaginary appointment. (Illustrated
Police News (London), Saturday, December 8, 1894; page 7, issue 1608, emphasis added).

24 See Locke, p. 342-343: “But if it be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same Man would at different times make different Persons…[This] is somewhat explained by our speaking in English when we say that he is not himself, or is beside himself…The self same Person was no longer in that Man.” I am indebted to the work of Joel Peter Eigen for bringing this to my attention.

25 Here Foucault quotes page 45 of Bentham’s Panopticon.

26 See Goodlad, 543-545.

27 A famous mid-Victorian example of this type of literature is Samuel Smiles’s international bestseller Self-Help (1859), in which Smiles said of his working class audience “their happiness and well-being as individuals in after-life, must necessarily depend mainly on themselves—upon their own diligent self-culture, self-discipline, and self-control—and, above all, on that honest and upright performance of individual duty, which is the glory of manly character” (7). Such examples of injunctions of individual responsibility demonstrate a popular narrative of self-control that perceptions of the sleep-walker were able to complicate in astonishing ways.

28 Taylor, Principles and Practice, 1132.

29 Eigen’s work in Unconscious Crime has been an excellent resource for legal history, but Eigen’s comments on the connection between legal history and literature are extremely limited and do not address any actual examples of literary sleepwalking. Eigen briefly mentions, “Literature as well has proffered images of hidden selves, often in opposition to the host personality, throwing up an evil, in contrast to a moral, self. Such novels have been the subject of extended analysis, as have Freud’s views of repressed memories and long-delayed emotional reflexes” (4). However, Eigen does not consistently differentiate between various types of unconscious states and the different cultural reactions to these states. The “extended analysis” he refers to are literary studies of the double; not irrelevant, certainly, but not the first place I would look for literary explorations of unconscious states. But the novels that Eigen does briefly mention—Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray and Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde—are quite telling and clearly in the service of his overall argument that these crimes of unconsciousness are part of a prehistory of multiple personality disorder, which was first diagnosed in 1876. This interpretation overdetermines his reading of the trials and limits the cultural connection he makes between legal and literary history. For Eigen, his comments on sleepwalking cases are less concerned with tracing a Victorian understanding of and fascination with sleepwalking, and more about his MPD argument, which falsely imposes a duality on Victorian understandings of the mind.

30 From the Leicester Chronicle: or, Commercial and Agricultural Advertiser, March 23, 1833. Both of the boy’s employers sustained injuries but there were no fatalities. The account also includes note of a possible explanation which reveals an early example of the Victorian understanding of the connection between dreams and sleepwalking: the boy claimed that he had dreamed that “two men were attempting to kill him, and he was trying to defend himself.” His
innocence is perhaps supported by the deranged anxiety and remorse he experienced for days after the attack.

31 See, for example, “An Amusing Case of Somnambulism in Dundee,” in which a somnambulant elderly man is mistaken for a ghost by a large group of townspeople. The article closes by noting that “the occurrence has caused a good deal of amusement all over the west end of the town.” This amusement was perhaps both at the expense of the old man but also at the expense of the citizens themselves, for thinking the old man was a “spectral appearance” and stalking him across town while armed with pocket knives, “determined to be ready should the worst take place.”

32 The first notable American use of the sleepwalking defense was in the 1845 case of Albert Terrill, who was charged with the murder of his lover Maria Bickford. Terrill was put on trial for murder and arson (as well as adultery, because he was already married) after he cut Bickford’s throat and then attempted to set on fire the room where her dead body lay. Though the defense, celebrated Boston lawyer Rufus Choate, only briefly tried to argue that Terrill did not commit these crimes (Choate initially suggested that perhaps Bickford had committed suicide), Terrill was acquitted of both the murder and arson charges on account of his sleepwalking (though he was imprisoned for three years on account of his adultery). Though there was ample evidence to suggest that he had committed the murder, Choate was able to successfully argue that Terrill was not conscious and therefore not responsible for his actions. Cultural anthropologist Matthew Wolf-Meyer has suggested that “in contemporary American society, he would have most likely been found guilty of both the arson and the murder, as these actions were quite clearly willful according to the evidence at hand” (Wolf-Meyer 209). Wolf-Meyer speculates that the acquittal could be attributed to Choate’s “boisterous and charismatic presentation” of argument and evidence, or, “quite possibly, the all-male jury of the day was more willing to detest the actions of Bickford as an immoral woman than they were willing to find the son of a well-respected local merchant guilty of the woman’s murder. The sleepwalking defense might have simply given the jury a justifiable way to find Terrill innocent of both the murder and the arson” (210). It is, I believe, also reasonable to suggest that the jury would have been interested in the novel defense of sleepwalking, especially considering the national interest in and exposure of Jane C. Rider, the celebrated “Springfield Somnambulist,” whose exploits had been making their way around the United States lecture circuit in the 1830s and 1840s. See Belden for more on Rider.

33 The most famous pre-nineteenth-century British sleepwalking case was that of Colonel Cheyney Culpeper, the younger son of nobility, whose trial occurred in 1686. While asleep Culpeper shot both a guardsman and the guardsman’s horse. At the Old Bailey Culpeper defended his actions by saying he had been asleep and produced nearly fifty witnesses to testify to the extraordinary things he had done in that state. Though Culpeper was initially given a special verdict of manslaughter, his sentence was never put into execution, and within weeks he had been pardoned. Though the case was ignored by contemporary law reports, it was often repeated throughout the nineteenth century, both in psychological and press accounts of sleepwalking. For an account of the role Culpeper’s trial had within legal history, see Walker, 167.

34 The case Taylor refers to is Rex v. Milligan, from the 1836 Lincoln Autumn Assizes.
When acknowledging Minchin's partial conviction, Taylor notes “There was an absence of motive, but, as it has been elsewhere stated, this alone does not create irresponsibility” (Principles 600).


Andrew Mangham perceives Minchin’s trial and its media representation as part of a larger cultural discourse of adolescent female violence threatening the class and gender boundaries of the bourgeois home. See pages 15-18.

From Times of London, January 5 1859, 11d.

Eigen uses Griggs as evidence that there may have been more sleepwalking defenses than ever formally came to trial: “the grand jury [may have] self-consciously acted as a gatekeeper to the trial court, as in this instance, refusing to let the case go forward when jurors were convinced that the accused was too pitiable to be prosecuted” (136). See my discussion of “Who Killed Zebedee?” below for an example of how this “gatekeeping” was represented in fiction.

HM Adv. v. Fraser (1878), quoted in Eigen, 137.

All quotations taken from OBSP, 1852-53, case 725, 8th session, 215.

See D. A. Miller’s The Novel and the Police: “The genre offers us one of the first instances of modern literature to address itself primarily to the sympathetic nervous system, where it grounds its characteristic adrenaline effects: accelerated heart rate and respiration, increased blood pressure, the pallor resulting from vasoconstriction, and so on” (146).

Nineteenth-century reviewers often accused sensation writers of taking their subjects straight from the newspapers, with novelist/critic Margaret arguing that Wilkie Collins had “given a new impulse to a kind of literature which must, more or less, find its inspiration in crime, and, more or less, make the criminal a hero” (564) and Mansel remarking, “If a crime of extraordinary horror figures among our causes célèbres the sensationist is immediately at hand to weave the incident into a thrilling tale, with names and circumstances slightly disguised”(449). Modern critics have also noted the connection between sensation plots and details and the stories of the Victorian press. In Black Swine in the Sewers of Hampstead (1989), Thomas Boyle writes of his surprise to find that a mid-nineteenth-century newspaper “was sensational to say the least, certainly not supportive of an image of domestic tranquility. The Times of January 3, 1857[…] featured an account of ‘The Double Murder of Children in Newington’; a lead article on ‘Robberies and Personal Violence’; an extended rendition of ‘A Week of Horror’ (3). This perception of the connection between literary sensation and the day-to-day life of Victorian London (at least as reported by the press), was also observed by Richard Altick: fiction “however sensationalized, could be regarded as a faithful transcript of contemporary life: there were the newspapers to prove it. They added verisimilitude to extravagance, and thus made the extravagant credible” (79). More recently Andrew Mangham has suggested that theories of
deviant behavior, newspaper reports of crime and courtroom scenes, and popular sensational narratives had a massive impact on one another.

46 Quoted in Baker, 26.

47 I work with a definition of sensation fiction that does not limit it to its “heyday” of the 1860s, but instead acknowledges that “sensationalism” was a strong and influential presence in the decades leading up to and following the 60s. Early scholars of the genre—such as Winifred Hughes and Patrick Brantlinger—argued for a more limited understanding of the length of the genre’s popularity, but more recent scholarship has suggested the accuracy of a view of sensation fiction which acknowledges its evolution across the nineteenth century.

48 *The Notting Hill Mystery* was published in a single volume in 1863, but had been serialized in eight parts in *Once a Week* beginning on November 29, 1862.

49 See Paul Collins, "The Case of the First Mystery Novelist.” However, at this time there is no published scholarship on *The Notting Hill Mystery*.

50 Alison Winter’s *Mesmerized: Powers of Mind in Victorian Britain* offers a fascinating and comprehensive overview of Victorian understandings of and fears about the power relations between mesmerizer and mesmerized. Though a survey of popular nineteenth-century British periodicals reveals that there was popular interest in sleepwalking prior to the mesmeric crazes of the 1840s and 50s, the two subjects were often linked during those decades. See my opening chapter for more information.

51 The third witness does not offer his account as it would only replicate the story of the second.

52 The other two witnesses to Madame R**’s “sleepwalking” are Susan Turner, maid in the boarding house where the Baron lodges, and Susan’s beau, John.

I could see [Madame R**] as she came through the door, because there was some sort of light in the hall…She went into the Baron’s place. The laboratory, I dare say it is; I don’t know. It was where the bottles are. John and me crept to the window and looked out. The window of the lumber-room looks right into the window of the back-room where the bottles are. You could see in quite plain. It was a bright moonlight night, and there is a sort of tin looking-glass over the back-room window to make more light like. We saw Madame go into the room and take a bottle from a shelf. She poured out a glassful and drank it. Then she put the bottle back in its place. It was the last on the second shelf. Then she went out again; and when we turned round we saw a light shining into the room from the kitchen-stairs. It stayed there till Madame had gone past our door again, and then it went up again. Just as it got to the top of the stairs I peeped out, and saw it was the Baron. Madame was close behind him. I said to John, ‘Why, John, there’s the Baron.’ He said he supposed he had come to look after his wife. After they had gone, John and me went into the bottle-place… (234-235)

Susan’s testimony largely serves to cast suspicion on the Baron, making clear that he has lied repeatedly by telling other boarders that his wife keeps sleepwalking into the kitchen, not into his laboratory.
Mr. Aldridge’s conclusions about the relationship between sleepwalking and vision are consistent with nonfictional material on sleepwalkers. See Prichard, *A Treatise*, 38-39 and Binns, 139.

In response to an inquiry from Henderson, Aldridge will later clarify that he did not actually see the Baron asleep and then wake in response to Aldridge’s knocking. He assumes that he has woken up the Baron because of the circumstances—it is the middle of the night and the Baron is not fully dressed—and the Baron does not disabuse him of this notion (230).

Though not as neglected at *The Notting Hill Mystery*, there has been little scholarship devoted to *The Mystery of a Hansom Cab*, which was a massive commercial success and at the time of its publication overshadowed Arthur Conan Doyle’s *A Study in Scarlet* (1887). Weaver’s “Reflecting the Detectives” traces the relationship between detective fiction and journalism in late nineteenth-century Australia. Weaver acknowledges the connection her work has to the “newspaper novels” of Collins and Mary Elizabeth Braddon. Pittard’s “The Real Sensation of 1887” argues that Hume’s immense success and popularity (and subsequent obscurity) calls for a reevaluation of the history of late nineteenth-century detective fiction that gives less prominence to Conan Doyle. Kipperman’s “White Man/Big City” focuses on the significance of Hume’s work in the context of the search for self-renewal and a fresh start within discourses of South Seas colonialism. Dixon’s “Can of Worms” reads the plot of Hansom Cab as indebted to Dickens’s *Bleak House* (1853). Other than Ian Ousby’s confusion at identifying why *Hansom Cab* would have been a best seller (37), these essays comprise the whole of scholarship on Hume.

We should assume that Hume’s inclusion of sleepwalking was likely a calculated move. In the preface to the second edition of *Hansom Cab*, Hume explains that after failing to attain material success as a playwright, he tried his hand at the mystery novel because he was told by a Melbourne bookseller that mysteries were the best sellers in his inventory. Because Hume is clear that he intended to make commercially strategic choices when choosing the subject matter for his novel, we can draw the conclusion that he perceived a sensational sleepwalking episode as something that would appeal to his audience and heighten tension in the last act of the novel.

Pittard argues the first is a detective who-dun-it plot, while the other is a typical sensation fiction plot (40). He devotes a substantial section of his argument to prove Hume’s close relationship to sensation fiction, and his indebtedness to Collins and Mary Elizabeth Braddon. His brief mention of the novel’s sleepwalking comes at this point when he observes that it is “a device that would have been familiar to readers of *The Moonstone* and *No Name*” (42).

Taken from Robert Ashley’s *Wilkie Collins* (1952), quoted in Thoms (2). Other early twentieth-century critics suggested that Collins’s plots reduced his characters “to automatons” and “merely puppets called upon to fulfill their function in the mechanical evolution of the plot.” While this commentary was clearly intended as negative, the language used actually reveals the rich and complex relationship Collins’s work had to nineteenth-century theories of human volition and automatic behavior.

See Thoms, David, and Roberts. My footnotes—here and below—are not intended to be exhaustive.

See Carens, Lapinski, and Free.
Carpenter first used the term in 1854’s *Principles of Human Physiology* to describe automatic mental action. Ryan notes that while Carpenter’s term was popular, no one term became dominant (17). For more on this topic see chapter 1 of this dissertation.

A notable exception to this statement Talairach-Vielmas, who includes chapters on not only *The Woman in White* (1860), *Armadale* (1866), and *The Moonstone* (1868), but also *Poor Miss Finch* (1872), *The Haunted Hotel* (1878), *Jezebel’s Daughter* (1880), *Heart and Science* (1883), *I Say No* (1884), and *The Legacy of Cain* (1889). Taylor covers *Man and Wife* (1870), *The New Magdalen* (1873), *The Law and the Lady* (1875), *The Fallen Leaves* (1879), *Heart and Science, Jezebel’s Daughter, and The Legacy of Cain* in a single chapter called “The Later Fiction,” but acknowledges that “to treat a selection of his novels written in the 1870s and 1880s in a single chapter…seems to make assumptions about the second half of his career that concur with overwhelming consensus on his later work”—the popular view that it represents a horrible decline in quality—and that “many of the novels deserve a fuller investigation than I have space to develop here” (208-9). Taylor does provide a fascinating overview of the changes in publication forms that affected Collins’s perspective on fiction in the 1870s and 1880s, and contributed to his evolving sense of who his possible audience was and what that meant for the scope of his fiction (209-11).

“Who Killed Zebedee?” was initially published as “Mr. Policeman and the Cook” in *The Spirit of the Times and Seaside Library*; republished as “Who Killed Zebedee?” in *Little Novels* (1887).

While surveys of Collins’s work occasionally acknowledge that this story exists, there is no substantial scholarship on it. Ousby mentions it merely as one example of a larger late-nineteenth-century suspicion of the police force, but claims, “Collins’s own later experiments with detective literature bear unmistakable signs of that decline which marks all of his later work” (128).

Andrew Mangham has convincingly suggested that “since the early 1980s many literary critics have held firmly to the assumption that Collins’s best-known works are subversive because they question the links between appearance and reality” but he insists that “if the main effect of Collins’s fiction was to reveal how hidden energies lurked beneath false appearances, his works could hardly claim to be subversive” because the inconsistency of externality and internality was already a “ubiquitous Victorian idea” (169). However, far from suggesting that revealing this inconsistency was Collins’s “main effect,” I argue in the last half of this chapter that Collins’s ultimate aim was to dismantle the very binary. Mangham’s work supports this interpretation.

*No Name* was brought out in three-volume form in 1863, but had previously been published serially in *All the Year Round* from March 15, 1862 to January 17, 1863. The sleepwalking episode was included in the December 20th edition, nearly a month after Adams’s *The Notting Hill Mystery* had begun to appear.

A brief summary of the novel’s rather intricate plot is necessary for the advancement of my argument.
Andrew Vanstone is the wealthy younger son of a landowning Somerset family; he inherits the family estate and fortune after his older brother is disinherited. Before he is named heir, Andrew joins the British army and is stationed in Canada, where he makes a horrible marriage to an unsuitable woman. When their marriage falls apart, Andrew returns to England but cannot obtain a divorce, instead paying off his wife with money from his new inheritance. In England he quickly forms an attachment with a young woman to whom he honestly acknowledges his marital situation; the two agree to live together as man and wife, successfully hide their secret from the rest of society, and eventually have two daughters: Norah and Magdalen. Shortly after the beginning of the novel Vanstone receives word of his first wife’s death; he quickly marries the mother of his two children. However, the Vanstones’ marriages nullifies the will that he had made naming Norah and Magdalen his heirs, while at the same time it does not automatically naturalize them. As a matter of course, his fortune goes to his wife after his sudden death in a railway accident, and when she dies—of shock, shortly afterwards, having never regained consciousness—the fortune goes to Andrew’s elder brother Michael, as the Vanstones are not recognized as having any legitimate children.

Their parent’s late marriage and Magdalen and Norah’s illegitimacy are the “Secret” of the first volume which Collins refers to in the Preface to the novel. After their uncle fails to provide for the girls financially, Norah—the older, more traditionally feminine sister—meekly becomes a governess; Magdalen—already characterized as fiery, mutable, and an excellent actress—vows revenge first on Michael Vanstone and then on his sickly son Noel, the latter of whom she ultimately decides to marry in order to regain the fortune she sees as rightfully hers and Norah’s. The bulk of the novel follows Magdalen as she first works as a professional actress in order to gain capital and then teams up with a distant relation of her mother’s—con artist Captain Wragge—in order to take an assumed name and seduce Noel. Magdalen is successful in her design of marrying Noel, but shortly after their marriage Noel learns of Magdalen’s deceit and intentions; he only has time to make a new will (disinheriting his wife) before he dies of shock. The last major act of the novel sees Magdalen adopt the disguise of a servant to infiltrate the home of Noel’s heir, the elderly Admiral Bartram.

Peter Thoms provides a fascinating account of these competing quest narratives in “From Dispossession to Repossession: The Quest Theme in No Name” (87-111).

The delightful Mrs. Wragge is an exception to this: she is often on the verge of sleep, so much so that even while awake her “eyes of mild and faded blue…looked straightforward into vacancy” and her husband often “shout[s] at her, as if she was fast asleep” (162). For extended analysis of Mrs. Wragge’s symbolic significance see Talairach-Vielmas (“Sensational Shoppers”) and David.

There is a certain amount of moral relativism in this (and other novels by Collins); when I state that Noel’s inheritance of Combe-Raven and Magdalen’s father’s wealth is “unjust,” I do not mean to suggest that it is patently illegal. I mean instead that the novel itself argues that the law’s support of Noel’s inheritance—enabled by the accident of a will—is in itself problematic: the novel encourages us to identify with Magdalen’s sense of outrage that the law would side with her unworthy cousin in depriving her of home and name. See Bolus-Reichert for more on No Name’s treatment of the importance of home in regard to Victorian notions of criminality.
Andrew Mangham devotes a few sentences to this scene, and asserts that Magdalen is here Admiral Bartram’s “shadow,” suggesting that “the dubious female figure is an image cast by men’s self-reflective suspicions” (196). I find Mangham’s interpretation a useful intervention, but his overall argument—which focuses on Collins’s portrayal of “dangerous” women—limits consciousness to being in the service of gendered constructions of selfhood. That is not my project here.

Though Bourne Taylor devotes a chapter to an extended discussion of the models of mind on display in No Name, her remarks on this scene are limited: “Hidden links of association, lost keys, dark and winding passages abound in this section, and Magdalen in ‘unconsciously’ put on the trail of the document by the somnambulant heir, so that the means by which she pursues her social self become more weird as her own subjective coherence disintegrates” (148),

This is discussed in Eigen, 137-8.

See Baker, 160.

Anna Jones quotes this as well in her discussion of Magdalen’s transgressions; Jones’s focus is on the role of masochism within the text, especially in regard to how this affects the reader’s experience of identification with Magdalen.

The Moonstone was published in three-volume form in 1868, but had previously appeared in serial form in All the Year Around, from January 4, 1868 through August 8, 1868.

Similarly, Lewis Roberts has suggested that Collins’s “critique of rationality” is not a refutation of reality, but instead “an insistence that the alien, the unknowable, the mysterious are necessary components in any realistic narrative” (168).

Like No Name, The Moonstone has an intricate plot and requires extensive summary in order to elucidate my analysis.

The multiple narrator structure of The Moonstone begins with a “Prologue” by an unnamed relative who records his account of John Herncastle’s theft of the Moonstone while both men were stationed in India at the end of the 18th century. It ends with an “Epilogue” by Murthwaite, a British explorer who vouches for the diamond’s return to India nearly 50 years later. In between, the novel tells of Herncastle’s subsequent dissolute existence, and how he leaves the Moonstone (and its dubious legacy of bloodshed and alienation) to his niece Rachel Verinder. The diamond, however, disappears less than 24 hours after she takes possession of it. Police Inspector Cuff—brought from London to the Yorkshire Verinder estate—initially suspects both Rachel and disabled former thief/current housemaid Rosanna Spearman, but after Rosanna’s suicide, the reader learns that both young women are (separately) convinced that Rachel’s cousin Franklin Blake is guilty of the theft. Both women, however, hide this information from Cuff because of their mutual love for Blake. The accusations are further complicated by Blake’s lack of memory of the crime. Through meticulous reconstruction of evidence and the intervention of the psychological theories of an ostracized, opium-addicted, mixed race doctor’s assistant, it is revealed that Blake took the diamond in a fit of opium-induced sleepwalking, and that he had, in the same somnambulistic state, given the diamond to his hypocritical cousin—and romantic rival—Godfrey Ablewhite. Franklin Blake and Rachel are married, but Rachel never recovers the Moonstone. Instead, the three Brahmin priests charged with protecting the diamond kill Godfrey and return the diamond to its shrine in India.
Though Jennings has proof of the validity of his theories, his is hesitant to share the results with Blake without some sort of assurance that Blake needs to see the results in order to clear his name. Jennings perceives his privileged access not as a freedom but as a responsibility, and reminds Blake of the importance of the privacy of the mind. “Put yourself in my position for a moment…Would you disclose to another person what had dropped unconsciously from the lips of your suffering patient and your helpless friend, without first knowing that there was a necessity to justify you in opening your lips?” (384) His position of medically ethical behavior separates him from doctors who the public might fear would reveal the information gained via their privileged access to the unconscious. And yet, for all of Jennings’ hesitation, Mr. Candy’s ramblings are revealed to both Blake and the reader, making public the childish desire for comeuppance that motivated the old man.

Even when faced with his own paint-stained nightgown—the smear proof that he was in Rachel’s room the night the diamond was stolen—Blake attempts to suggest that Rosanna Spearman has implicated him in the crime, suggesting, “How do we know she may not have smeared my nightgown purposely with the paint--?” (320) He proclaims himself “innocent,” though immediately confesses to feeling “a sense of self-abasement…which instinctively disinclined [him] to see any of [his] friends” (347-8); after Jennings and company confirm that Blake did indeed take the diamond while sleepwalking under the influence of opium, Blake appears to experience no discomfort or concern about his tendencies. He merely notes, “I have only to say that I awoke on the morning of the twenty-sixth, perfectly ignorant of all that I had said and done under the influence of the opium” (440). Though the other characters provide the details for him, he adds no other comment.

Mossman has little to say on Blake’s culpability for the diamond theft, but much more to suggest about Blake’s guilt as the possessor of what Mossman calls “the normalized gaze” which represents power and “defines” and disciplines the unruly and disabled bodies of Lucy and Rosanna (489).

Levy has asserted that Jennings is a character “who, because of his opium addiction and medical history of chronic pain, is traditionally identified with the author” (67). Ryan claims that the relationship between Jennings and Collins is similar, though based on an ideological and methodological identification: “In language not unlike Collins’s in his prefaces, Jennings repeatedly claims scientific validity by appealing to his sources” (34). Thoms claims that “like Collins,” Jennings “both creates and recognizes the need for significant design” (165).

Briefel has commented on the relative lack of importance placed on the diamond’s monetary value (143). This, I would argue, allows the question of the diamond’s theft to become an issue of guilt versus innocence, supported by the lack of recovery of the object. This is enabled by making the protagonist and romantic hero the central suspect, and by making Rachel Verinder (and later, Blake himself) very financially solvent.

Because Collins notes that “the foundation on which I have built this book” is “the conduct pursued, under a sudden emergency, by a young girl” (xxiii), we can infer that he means Rachel specifically, though the comment is equally applicable to Rosanna. However, this does not keep
the issue of “the effect of character on circumstances” or that of “conduct pursued” from applying to all characters in the novel.

91 *The Legacy of Cain* was published in three-volume form in 1889, but had previously been serialized in a number of Tillotson’s syndicated provincial newspapers, February 18, 1888 through July 7, 1888. Collins serialized his work of the 1860s and 1870s through London-based periodicals such as *All the Year Round, Cornhill Magazine, The Graphic, Cassell’s Magazine, Temple Bar and Belgravia Magazine*, but in the 1880s also began to use syndication as a means of reaching a wider provincial audience. He continued to publish in London weeklies as well.

92 Mangham sees a similar continuity here, arguing that *The Legacy of Cain* continues the earlier work begun in *Armadale* (1866). But in the later novel he suggests Collins considers “with much more blatancy” the same questions of hereditary criminal taint that he tackled regarding Ozias Midwinter (198).

93 For more, see Taylor, 211.

94 Maudsley’s entire comment is as follows: “Multitudes of human beings come into the world weighted with a destiny against which they have neither the will nor the power to contend; they are the step-children of Nature, and groan under the worst of all tyrannies—the tyranny of a bad organization” (42).

95 Again, a plot summary for greater clarity for my comments on the novel.

*The Legacy of Cain* makes use of a first-person narration by an elderly prison governor combined with excerpts from the diaries of the two young women, both raised as the daughters of a non-Conformist minister, an old friend of the governor. The “Prologue” begins in 1858, on the eve of the execution of a murderer who convinces the minister to adopt her infant daughter. Shortly after the story switches to 1875 (the story’s present) and the diary narration of the two girls, three things occur that propel the action forward: (1) the Rev. Gracedieu’s household is joined by Selina Jillgall, an impoverished cousin who does not know that her closest friend, Elizabeth Tugenbruggen, seeks to blackmail Gracedieu on account of his adopted daughter; (2) one sister, Eunice, travels to London, where she falls in love with the kind but weak-willed Philip Dunboyne, later revealed to be the nephew of the Prologue’s murderer (and therefore cousin to one of the girls); and (3) the Rev. Gracedieu’s health begins to decline and he is diagnosed as being “in a state of nervous derangement” (Cain 84). Circumstances are further complicated when Eunice’s beau Philip switches his affections to her sister Helena, and turmoil between the two young women—including Helena’s increasingly aggressive insistence that her father give his consent to her marriage to Philip—pushes Rev. Gracedieu closer to a nervous breakdown. In response to a desperate letter from the minister, the prison governor visits the family; the minister now seeks his advice as one of the few people who know that Eunice is the adopted daughter of a dead murderess. Now that the girls are of marriageable age, the minister wonders, should he tell them the truth of Eunice’s origins? Before he can do so, he completes his nervous collapse and attacks the prison governor with a razor. Meanwhile, a distraught Eunice has begun taking doses of her father’s laudanum-based “composing medicine,” which results in her sleepwalking confrontation with the ghost of her birth mother. The ghost urges her to kill Helena in revenge, but Eunice resists. However, when Philip switches his affections back to Eunice, Helena—under the guise of nursing him—attempts to poison Philip. Eunice and Philip
are married; Helena is imprisoned for two years and then travels to America, where she becomes
the leader of a religious cult.
96 For more on this topic, see Sage, xix-xx.
97 For more on degeneration theory in The Legacy of Cain, see Talairach-Vielmas, 196-7).
98 Talairach-Vielmas briefly acknowledges as well but he offers no analysis or commentary on
the connection. See page 200. Taylor only briefly mentions the presence in the novel of “an
artificially induced state of somnambulism” (239) and Pal-Lapinski simply calls it “a near
psychotic episode” (121).

NOTES FROM CHAPTER TWO

99 Tess of the d’Urbervilles, The Graphic, XLIV, July-December 1891.
100 Though not focusing on liminality within Tess, Miller repeatedly makes such observations as
“Each man, for [Hardy], is both identified with what is around him and yet free of it. He
participates intimately in his social and physical surroundings, is determined by them, and yet
they are alien to him and have nothing to do with his real life. Happiness might be possible if he
were either separate or wholly involved, but he is both within and without at once” (Distance
77), and “Tess dwells in both worlds, the natural and the social, and must suffer for their
incompatibility” (80), suggesting that these in-between states are responsible for much of the
existential suffering in Wessex. Law also briefly mentions the role of liminality in Tess,
observing

Tess appears to repudiate certain constructions of her body, sensing full well the
social destiny of female sexuality. In this light we can also read the notorious
association of Tess’s body with liminal spaces and moments—not only her
graphically depicted dusk and dawn rambles, but also her desire to prolong the
period of engagement with Angel—as her strategy for prying open and
maintaining spaces which, if not exactly unorthodox, nonetheless resist the
teleologies of orthodoxy” (“Blight” 254).

Raymond Williams, while commenting on the value of still reading the novels of Hardy,
beautifully summarizes the importance of liminality to Hardy’s work more generally: “The
Hardy country is of course Wessex: that is to say mainly Dorset and its neighbouring counties.
But the real Hardy country, I feel more and more, is that border country so many of us have been
living in: between custom and education, between work and ideas, between love of place and
experience of change” (98).
101 The figure of a nightgown clad young woman represents a variety of cultural and social
assumptions; it is worth reiterating here that white often signifies purity, innocence, virginity,
and vulnerability. Thus illustration becomes yet another opportunity for Tess’s physical appearance to be misread.

In an essay that emphasizes the shared sadism of Alec, Angel, and the narrator, James Kincaid observes that Tess—no longer a person as much as she is an emptiness—has been “replaced by the familiar white figure, which in turn is vaporized into an even more adaptable ‘pale nebulousness,’ a distant representation of a representation” (328). When viewed by either Alec or Angel, Tess is often reduced to a vessel, but one that bears resemblance to the sleepwalker, the ghost, the angel, the dream figure.

From chapter 17: “After fixedly regarding her for some moments with the same gaze of unmeasurable woe he bent lower, enclosed her in his arms, and rolled her in the sheet as in a shroud. Then lifting her from the bed with as much respect as one would show to a dead body, he carried her across the room, murmuring…” (Hardy 193).

Kramer notes that the important formal principles of Tess are “concepts of consciousness—concepts of the manner in which perception of experience shapes the meaning of the experience and, indeed, even constitutes its significance” (112).

Ironically, Irving Howe comments of The Return of the Native (1878) that “there are scenes in which the writing declines into a curious somnolence, as if it came from a novelist who sleep-writes the way some people sleepwalk. Except for Tess of the d’Urbervilles, this trouble will recur in all of Hardy’s books, with rich detail and perfunctory synopsis repeatedly jostling each other” (60).

Meisel remarks, “Clare’s selfish behavior toward his wife is an expression of his own divided self” (131).

A different interpretation of this is split is offered by Silverman, who remarks that “she is split less between the corporeal and the spiritual than between two compositional poles and their corresponding temporalities – between the figural and the non-figural. Because this opposition always implies a male viewer who does not himself pose any complications for vision, what it really entails are two contradictory notions of ‘the feminine,’ and the conflicting narratological desires behind those notions: woman as image or text, with fixed visual boundaries and formal coherence, and woman as undifferentiated, ‘intact’ terrain” (Silverman 23).

The exception to this is Kramer, who calls Angel’s sleepwalking “the most famous dream of the novel” (122). This, however, is the only mention he makes of the episode. Blake discusses the “marginlessness” of the characters in Tess, but does not mention Angel’s somnambulism (694).

See, for example, Ward, who while analyzing a case of hysteria goes on to ponder what other states might induce a state of “double-consciousness”: the list includes both somnambulism and drunkenness (also mesmerism). A perusal of titles also indicates this connection: On Certain Conditions of Nervous Derangement: Somnambulism, Hypnotism, Hysteria, Hysteriod, Affections, Etc. (1881); History of Dreams, Visions, Apparitions, Ecstasy, Magnetism, and Somnambulism (1855); and Mysteries of the Vital Element: In Connection With Dreams, Somnambulism, Trance, Vital Photography, Faith and Will, Anesthesia, Nervous Congestion and Creative Function—Modern Spiritualism Explained (1871), to simply name a few. These titles demonstrate the connections Victorian writers perceived amongst altered states, while also
showing the specificity they maintained between various types under that larger heading. In contrast, Dale Kramer—whose account of Tess as “a tragedy of consciousness” is otherwise a productive study—doesn’t even differentiate sleepwalking from dreaming.

Bernard Paris also assesses these states of consciousness, noting “Much of the mischief in Tess results from lack of restraint and the absence of alert consciousness, from dozing and dreaming and indulging in one form or another of intoxication…In every phase of the action Hardy develops the theme of dozing, dreaming, and intoxication; the consequences of abandoning consciousness and control are uniformly evil” (67). While many of these incidents do result in negative (I hesitate to say “evil”) consequences, a closer look at each of these types of altered state—“from dozing to dreaming and indulging in one form or another of intoxication”—provides greater insight into the novel’s ultimate investment in them, much more so than an assessment that simply elides the differences between them.

Boumelha mentions these but also includes “when the sleep-walking Angel buries his image of her” (Boumelha 121). As I discuss below, this is not the case. That Tess is awake for this and Angel is not, is an important departure from the usual state of events in the text.

In a moment that seems to confuse subject and object, Hornback asserts that “Tess’s tragic flaw is her seduction by Alec d’Urberville” (Hornbeck 111). Paris does not lay full responsibility on Tess but sees her momentary lapse of restraint—taking Alec’s offer for a ride and then dozing off—as part of a larger trend in the novel that causes “much of [its] mischief”: the absence of alert consciousness in many of the characters (Paris 67), while noting of the Prince episode that Tess does not exercise “adequate control” over her situation (68). Summers notes the role that Tess’s pride plays in her victimization (160).

Lecercle argues that far from being comically melodramatic, the death of the horse is actually the one major incident of the story that seems to happen at the “right moment” within a traditional tragic trajectory: the early journey from home, the chance meeting on the road, and the death of a creature with a royal title all parallel the early stages of the Oedipus story (4-5).

Elisha Cohn suggests that until the death of Prince—wherein Tess “regard[s] herself in the light of a murderess” (Hardy 24)—“Tess has yet to become fully individualized” (Cohn 510). Of course, the moment in which Tess sees herself as “a murderess” also clearly foreshadows the death of Alec late in the novel. Elliott B. Gose, Jr. sees the death of Prince—and Tess splashed with blood—as part of the ritualized symbolism of the novel: here Tess is initiated as the novel’s sacrificial victim.

Howe calls it “surely no rape,” (116); Paris refers to it as a “seduction” (62); Bernstein (143) and Lecercle (4) fall firmly on the side of rape, while Gregor and Lovesey settle for “both a seduction and a rape” (182) and a “seduc[tion]/rape” (920), respectively.

Miller objects to the question on the grounds that “immanent repetition” in the text functions precisely to frustrate our desire for a single explanatory paradigm (Fiction 117), while Rooney insists that to pose the question in those binary terms is to surrender to the dichotomies of phallocentric discourse. Silverman, Widdowson, and Shires all suggest that narrative/narratorial ambivalences leave the situation ambiguous.

When Tess’s drunken father—after learning of his d’Urberville blood—rides past the Marlott walking club’s Cerealia in a hired wagon from The Pure Drop Inn, Tess is “pained” by the
amusement of the other walkers who “bless [her] simplicity” when she attempts to claim that her father is just “tired” (7). Tess will take an early leave of the amusements, “anxious” about her father and “what had become of him” (11). Later when her mother suggests that she might ask “some young feller […] one of them who were so much after dancing with ‘ee yesterday” to drive the wagon of beehives to Casterbridge, Tess declares (“proudly,” the text notes), “O no—I wouldn’t have it for the world! And letting everybody know the reason—such a thing to be ashamed of!” (19) In his insightful analysis of the novel, Law credits Tess’s resistance to her refusal to recognize or participate in a sexual economy (“Blight” 253).

118 Even James’s language echoes Hardy’s: “Sobriety diminishes, discriminates, and says no; drunkenness expands, unites, and says yes. It is in fact the great exciter of the Yes function in man…it makes him for the moment one with truth” (387, emphasis added).

119 See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (1845), for a discussion of the lumpenproletariat, the lowest strata of the working class who will likely never reach class consciousness and therefore are actually an impediment to the goals of the revolutionaries.

120 When Angel first reenters England, the narrator notes, “You could see the skeleton behind the man, and almost the ghost behind the skeleton” (290).

121 Scott observes that “Few serious students of Hardy have failed to notice how frequently he associates the personal mood of a character with some massive, ominous ruin, like Stonehenge, thus creating a physical image which organizes and conditions the reader’s response” (Scott 366). This is a common technique in gothic fiction.

122 I am inclined to agree with Tess’s estimation that Angel’s change of heart is likely temporary. In an 1892 interview Hardy claimed that it was necessary for Tess to die, that her reconciliation with Angel would not have lasted because “he would have inevitably thrown her fall in her face” (Biyer 153).

123 Gillian Beer sees this passage as a moment of “completeness” in the novel, when Tess is “immersed in this sticky life-and-death, yet not in alienated consciousness of it” (239). Beer reads Tess as in complete harmony with the world around her—“all the separate time- and space-scales” are for a short while in accord: this scene deepens and expands on the earlier experience of the farm workers from The Slopes.

124 Tess’s sensitivity—especially to music—is established prior to the Talbothay’s section of the novel. What Tess regrets most about post-pregnancy judgments that dissuade her from attending Marlot’s church is the loss of the music: “That innate love of melody, which she had inherited from her ballad-singing mother, gave the simplest music a power over her which could well-nigh drag her heart out of her bosom at times…She thought, without exactly wording the thought, how strange and godlike was a composer’s power, who from the grave could lead through sequences of emotion, which he alone had felt at first, a girl like her who had never heard of his name, and never would have a clue to his personality” (66).

125 The critic who deals most directly with Angel Clare is Patrick Gatrell, who titles one chapter of his Thomas Hardy: The Proper Study of Mankind with “Angel Clare’s Story,” an attempt to tell Tess’s story through the eyes of Tess’s husband. Gatrell imagines Clare not as a fictional character but as an actual resident of Wessex, real name “Mr. Michael James” (109); he calls Hardy’s tale “half-fictional and half-biographical,” (127) and thus sets out to correct some
misconceptions, because as he comes closer to death “[he] worries that [his] grandchildren, and their children, may sometime read Mr. Hardy’s powerful and disturbing book, and [he] will not be alive to write it down for them” (109). While Gatrell’s project is an interesting one, having “Michael” differentiate between what Hardy got right and what he “got wrong,” I find his preceding chapter—“Tess of the D’Urbervilles”—much more helpful when undertaking a study of Angel’s character. Gatrell declares of Hardy “he is Angel Clare. As this character he loves, rejects, and finally protects, defends, comforts and more fully loves the girl. Less willingly he admits that he is also Alec d’Urberville who lusts for the girl and uses her, but before the close of his imaginings the girl has killed this aspect of himself, though at the cost of her own life” (102). That Hardy is Clare is by no means a universal critical standpoint. Both Paris and Bernstein identify him with Tess herself, as Bernstein works to trace “the extended metaphors of purity and pollution that conjoin the prefaces and the novel, the writer and the heroine” (Bernstein 150) and Paris argues “Hardy’s intense identification with Tess” results in both “an over-arching unity of feeling” and “a confused, inadequate treatment of theme” in the novel (Paris 79).

126 See Garson and Lodge.
127 See above comments on Morgan’s analysis. Bernstein notes how Hardy’s prefaces to the novel draw a parallel between his “butchered,” often censored manuscript, and Tess’s sexually violated, “un-intact” female body; Higonnet examines gendered and class-based elements in Hardy’s construction of Tess’s voice, and the relation of the narration to Tess’s ability to express herself and her story; Jacobus similarly focuses on the sexualization of the narrator’s relationship to Tess; Silverman analyzes the relationship between the female body as figure and background; Blake addresses how, in the character of Tess, Hardy “scrutinizes the sexual typing that plays havoc with a woman’s life” (701).
128 See the above note on Higonnet and Jacobus. While Brady does not focus on Tess, she does connect the narrative pose in the novel with Hardy’s larger body of work. Lercerle notes that the violence of the text is found in the narrator’s tone and style and that Tess is not only the object of violence but the subject of violence as well. Shires focuses on the way that the narrative style emphasizes the subjectivity of reality. Van Ghent explores how Hardy’s style is a combination of the magical and the natural. Boumelha maintains that “The narrator’s erotic fantasies of penetration and engulfment enact a pursuit, violation and persecution of Tess in parallel with those she suffers at the hands of her two lovers” (120). This is related to the critical step of identifying not only the narrator but Hardy himself with Alec and Angel (Gatrell).
129 Others include Lucy Westenra from Dracula (1897), Admiral Bartram in No Name (1862), and Mrs. Zebedee in “Who Killed Zebedee?” (1881), each discussed elsewhere in this dissertation.
130 Hardy’s references to Macbeth begin in the first pages of the novel, as the scene where Parson Tringham calls John Durbeyfield “Sir John” echoes the witches addressing Macbeth as “King of Scotland” in Act 1, Scene 3.
131 See Joe Fischer and Elisabeth Bronfen for readings that interpret the scene as a mock burial; Roy Morrell for the scene as a grotesque; Tony Tanner and Athena Vrettos for the scene as revelatory of Angel’s psyche; Helen Michie on the scene as a gothic parody of the sexual act;
James Kincaid for the episode as a murder playacted for sadistic pleasure (336); and Irving Howe on how the scene combines the best and worst of Hardy’s work.

Kincaid has also noted Angel’s provoking preoccupation with Tess’s position as a sexual being: “After her confession, Angel exposes his obsession with sex—or with Tess’s sexual past as a narrative he can play and replay in his own mind, really a form of pornographic fixation” (332).

However, Angel’s somnambulism is first hinted at earlier in the novel, as the narrator discusses Angel’s early adjustment to life at Talbothay’s Dairy, and his symbolically elevated apartment in the attic above the dairy: “Here Clare had plenty of space, and could often be heard by the dairy-folk pacing up and down when the household had gone to rest” (92).

The novel even suggests that Angel has attacked other men before, since after hitting the Trantridge man he reconsiders his action and “did what he usually did in such cases”: he hands over five shillings so the man can afford medical treatment (163).

An extreme example of this can be seen in F. W. H. Myers’ 1886 article on “multiplex personality,” wherein Myers discusses a patient—“Felida X.”—in whose case “the somnambulic life has become the normal life; the ‘second state,’ which appeared at first only in short, dream-like accesses, has gradually replaced the ‘first state,’ which now recurs but for a few hours at long intervals. But the point on which I wish to dwell is this: that Felida’s second state is altogether superior to the first—physically superior…and morally superior…For Felida’s normal state was in fact her morbid state…” (Myers 247-248).

See Laird’s extended discussion of the revisions of Tess.

See Luckhurst, 148. Tess’s composition and publication falls between the dates of 1882 and 1897, the perimeters of Luckhurst’s discussion.

Athena Vrettos, in her work on “displaced memory” in Victorian writing, has connected Hardy’s depictions of consciousness and the relationship between memory and history to the literary and scientific discourses of his day (205). Hardy transcribed quotations on various types of altered states from William James, Henry Maudsley, and F. W. H. Myers in his personal notebooks.

In the novel Angel’s “curiously careful tread” leads the two safely across a narrow plank that serves as a makeshift footbridge across a deep and violent portion of the river Froom, where Tess “had noticed from the window of the house in the daytime young men walking across upon it as a feat in balancing” (195). With Tess’s use of the word “feat,” clearly for Hardy this episode bears a relation to accounts of the fantastical skills of sleepwalkers. He had, however, altered the scene between serialization and the later publication of the novel. In the serialized version Angel’s feat is all the more remarkable:

Opposite to the spot to which he had arrived with her was such a general confluence, and the river was proportionately voluminous and deep. Across it, when the springs were low in summer-time, was a narrow foot-bridge; but now, after the autumn rains, only the handrail was above the water. It was of sawn wood, flat on the top, and Tess had noticed from the window of the house in the daytime young men trying to cross upon it as a feat in balancing. Her husband had possibly observed the same performance; anyhow, he now mounted the rail, and,
sliding one foot forward, advanced upon the rail with an undulating motion, as if upon a tide.

In the novel the handrail has merely washed away, leaving the footboard alone.

140 Morell makes a similar point when he observes that “It is Tess, indeed, who finally takes control, leading Angel back to safety; this is an indication that the salvation may be in Tess’s own hands. Through the very incident – if she tells Angel about it – she may help him to clarify his feelings” (128). Of course, Tess does not reveal this incident to Angel until days before her death (Hardy 307).

141 Bronfen interprets this event as part of the way that Tess’s “story becomes an allegory of the process of dying, an interplay of wounding and retribution that occurs at her body” (Bronfen 74).

142 This representation is consistent with some nineteenth-century psychological accounts of somnambulism. Consider this excerpt from John Addington Symonds’s pamphlet _Sleep and Dreams_ (1851):

I now return to the consideration of double consciousness. We have seen that the apparatus of speech may awake and act in correspondence with the ideas of the dream only, or with those suggested by sounds, the sense of hearing being also awake; and also that the locomotive apparatus may be in action without the sense of vision, as in the case of the somnambulist who comes in contact with outward objects; or with a complete power of vision. This latter state abuts immediately on the present topic. The person sees, hears, walks, has, in fact, the ordinary attributes of the wake state, and yet is not awake. He may pass form that condition into ordinary slumber, and then wake up like other people; or the transition may be from the morbid condition to the ordinary waking state without intermediate sleep…” (Symonds 48).

143 See also the passage early in the novel wherein the narrator notes that in The Chase—“a woodland…of undoubted primeval date”—“Druidical mistletoe was still found on aged oaks” and one find “enormous yewtrees, not planted by the hand of man” (26): this underlying mysticism is a part of the land of Wessex itself. Law similarly notes that both the characters and the landscape are marked by the phases of history, cultural and personal (“Sleeping” 247), and Franke notes that “Hardy…puts forth the theme of a latent pagan past that surfaces now and then to structure the course of the novel” (166).

144 Here we contrast Joan Durbeyfield’s view that “Many a woman, some of the Highest in the Land, have had a Trouble in their time; and why should you Trumpet yours when they don’t Trumpet theirs? No girl would be such a fool, specially as it is so long ago, and not your Fault at all. I shall answer the same if you ask me Fifty Times,” (150) with Mr. and Mrs. Clare’s conviction that in the list of preferences for their youngest son’s mate “a knowledge of a farmer’s wife’s duties came second to a Pauline view of humanity” (128). The phrase “pure and saintly” recurs often when Angel asks them what they want in a daughter-in-law. Joan would likely not find this surprising, having warned Tess that she herself “did not tell everything to your father, he being so proud on account of his respectability, which perhaps your Intended is the same” (150). Before his marriage Angel is convinced of “how much less was the intrinsic difference between the good and wise woman of one social stratum and the good and wise woman of
another social stratum,” (129) but his honeymoon with Tess will reveal a somewhat different view of the qualities and exchanges of femininity as it relates to class. He declares, “Different societies different manners” when Tess mentions that “my mother says that it sometimes happens so—she knows several cases when they were worse than I, and the husband has not minded it much” (182). Mitchell pushes this point even further, noting that if Tess had married Alec, her story would have “magically become ‘good’…in that circumstance she would have become a local heroine who had snagged a rich man, and Tess’s supposed transgression would have been forgiven” (Mitchell 199).

Angel states bluntly, “How can we live together while that man lives?—he being your husband in Nature and not I. If he were dead it might be different…” (190), and possibly plants the initial seed for Tess’s eventual murder of Alec.

Hardy has previously dealt with this question before—the limits and possibilities of nature’s ability to regenerate itself—in The Mayor of Casterbridge. Law notes the similarity between Tess’s desire that her virginty be rejuvenated, and Michael Henchard’s attempt to contest the irreparability of a spoiled grain harvest (“Blight” 248).

Franke does not refer to the incident as an attempt at “resurrection,” but he does similarly note the ritualized aspect of Angel’s actions, and, emphasizing the religious overtones, claims that “in placing [Tess] in ‘the empty stone coffin of an abbot’ during the sleepwalking episode, [Angel] has tried to make her an abbess, a gesture that feminizes a patriarchal religion” (171).

We may be able to infer Tess’s views here by considering how a few days later Tess tells Angel it is “too late”: “It is as it should be…Angel—I am almost glad—yes, glad! This happiness could not have lasted—it was too much—I have had enough; and now I shall not live for you to despise me” (312).

The very idea that choice even matters to Tess here is thrown into question by conflicting interpretations of the scene, such as that of Joe Fisher, who briefly mentions the scene while discussing Tess’s status as a scapegoat within the novel. As Fisher notes, Tess’s white dress and red hair ribbon in her introductory scene in the novel create an image that mirrors that of the traditional Talmudic scapegoat, who “is white with red wool wound around its horns. According to Talmudic usage the scapegoat is sent out into the wilderness on the Day of Atonement as a propitiation for the community’s sins to die amongst the bones of its ancestors” (Fisher 156). Consequently, Fisher reads the scene as revealing more about Tess’s place in the text than about Angel himself. His relationship to her is simply refigured as the machinery of a larger mechanism—he’s the first person who sees her with the red ribbon, so he is the person who “buries” her—and that he is somnambulant during the “burial” is not something that Fisher acknowledges.

The clearest image of the scapegoat dying among the bones of its ancestors, and therefore of the sacrifice of Tess’s life being accepted, is the point where Angel carries her from the room which contains the effigies of the dead d’Urberville ladies and enacts a mock burial. Because Angel is the first person to see Tess at the club-walking he is the first person to see her transfiguration from village girl to scapegoat; and so, ironically, he is the person who most disastrously misperceives her and therefore miscontracts with her. (156)
The meaning Fisher attaches to this is rather crucial: by the time Angel first sees her, Tess is already marked for sacrificial death. This would suggest that everything that occurs afterwards is meaningless in determining the occasion of her dying. Her fate would not be changed depending on what she chooses to tell Angel the morning after he “buries” her or depending on whether or not she gives in to Alec’s pressure to reunite with him. This interpretation also elevates the somnambulant Angel to a functionary of Fate or God, and his trance state becomes something solely mystical rather than at least partially psychological, which utterly ignores the connection this scene has to Angel’s previous sleepwalking episode and thus misunderstands the function of the burial in the novel.

See Franke, 174.

The Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act of 1907 removed the prohibition from a widower marrying his sister-in-law.

“The World was all before them, where to choose/Their place of rest, and Providence their guide/They hand in hand with wandering steps and slow/Through Eden took their solitary way” (Milton 12: 646-9).

NOTES FROM CHAPTER THREE

Frequently mentioned to support this assertion is Stoker’s short story “Dracula’s Guest,” first published in Dracula’s Guest and Other Supernatural Tales (1914). In the preface to the collection, Stoker’s wife Florence calls the story “a hitherto unpublished episode from Dracula,” adding that “it was originally excised owing to the length of the book” (16). The story has the hapless narrator stumble upon a tomb with the inscription “Countess Doligen of Gratz in Styria, Sought and Found Dead 1801,” followed by “The Dead Travel Fast,” (22) a phrase which will be familiar to readers of Dracula. The presence of a female vampire of Styria – recalling the titular character of Le Fanu’s text – has been acknowledged as Stoker’s homage to the earlier vampire story. An exception to this interpretation can be found in the work of Nina Auerbach, who takes the vampire countess – and her excision from the novel’s final version – as the evidence of “influence rejected,” (66) and “finds implausible” the hypothesis that the story was ever actually a part of Dracula (201). Whether or not the story is an excised chapter from the larger work is mostly irrelevant to me, as I find that evidence of connection between the two texts has more fertile ground elsewhere.

Philip Holden has also noted the pervasiveness of the occult in late nineteenth-century literature, commenting “it is difficult to find a late Victorian novel that does not in some way touch upon hypnotism, possession, somnambulism, or the paranormal” (471). This sea of occult novels contributes support to my assertion that nineteenth-century readers would have had the “appropriate” background with which to interpret the events and symbolism of Le Fanu and Stoker’s texts, while maintaining their significance: they are unique in creating a direct relationship between vampirism and somnambulism.
For other accounts of the possibilities—and limitations—offered by these new technologies, see Seed and Wicke.

Stephen Arata has suggested “Horror arises not because Dracula destroys bodies, but because he appropriates and transforms them. Having yielded to his assault, one literally ‘goes native’ by becomings a vampire oneself…if blood is a sign of racial identity, then Dracula effectively deracializes his victims” (630). However, Lucy’s sleepwalking—also related to her blood identity—somehow remains outside of this transformation; after the first time Dracula bites her, she continues to sleepwalk. Her somnambulism is the most consistent element of her character, neither caused by Dracula nor eliminated by him; he simply exploits it.

Hibberd cites several newspaper reviews which comment on the early nineteenth-century craze for sleepwalkers in the theater, including “It’s raining sleepwalkers. Soon there will not be room on the Paris rooftops to accommodate all the young women who wish to run across them” and “if you fear sleepwalkers will fall on your heads from the rooftops this week, take an umbrella” (112). As indicated by its title Hibberd’s essay primarily deals with French theatrical productions but many of the plays she cites were also produced in England in the nineteenth century. Whether or not the specific plays discussed by Hibberd were performed at the Lyceum while Stoker served as stage manager there, Stoker was clearly not unfamiliar with the spectacle of staged somnambulism. Luckhurst notes “As Henry Irving’s theatre manager, Stoker witnessed hundreds of performances of Irving’s most famous role, in The Bells” (163). Irving’s character in The Bells is placed under court order to be mesmerized so that he can act out the murder it is assumed he has committed. Notably, though Mina seems to regard Mrs. Westenra’s fears as somewhat ridiculous, Lucy’s sleepwalking does eventually lead her to the cliffs of Whitby. However, instead of falling, Lucy is fed upon by a vampire.

See Freud and Baldick for further discussion of these subjects.

As Lucy also does, writing down her account of Dracula’s attack and her mother’s death and then ripping the letter in two (Stoker 162).

Lucy’s behavior brings to mind that of other real-life sleepwalkers, especially young women whose post-somnambulant sobbing is emphasized in periodical accounts, and in particular a young woman from the Morning Chronicle whose “pulse, which [the doctor] cautiously felt, was regular, but rather frequent; and respiration was hurried, as in a person agitated by a dream. She resembled an automaton, of which one almost expected to hear the internal machinery in motion…She was much frightened [when she awoke] and afterwards wept for a long time.”

Martin Willis has based a highly informative essay on the text’s Austrian setting, along with Laura’s maternal Styrian heritage. Interpreting Styria as a metaphor for Ireland, Willis argues that Carmilla’s “narrative of infection” is particularly concerned with “theories of disease and their relationship to the cultural politics of Ireland” (111).

Other critics suggest that Carmilla’s “sharing” is much more malignant. See Stoddart.

Carmilla cannot be believed because her story contains chronological impossibilities. Carmilla’s childhood does not overlap with Laura’s, as the former has been an adult and undead since the 7th century (Le Fanu 273).
Thomas comes to the conclusion that the text refuses “to bring about a restoration of the patriarchal, heterosexist status quo,” which is “ultimately a refusal to shut down the masquerade” (60). Thus, among nineteenth-century vampire literature Carmilla uniquely represents a stage for the exercise of ultimately unchecked female power (Laura refuses to associate the Carmilla that she loves with the Carmilla who is a vampire, Carmilla’s mother/enabler is still at large, etc.). Similarly, Nancy Welter asserts that while Carmilla “presents intensely conservative views of Laura and Carmilla’s relationship,” it “challeng[es] itself with an ending that refuses to restore order among the characters” (138) and that “Laura’s feelings for her friend are entirely absent of the desire for possession. Laura, for all of her puzzlement at Carmilla’s ambiguous nature, is willing to accept Carmilla without limiting her personality” (146). Welter’s interpretation of female relationships in Carmilla is based on Luce Irigaray’s “Commodities among Themselves” from This Sex Which is Not One. Marilyn Brock sees less of a “revolutionary female community” in Carmilla, but does acknowledge that after Carmilla’s true death, “Laura never recovers, never marries…” (129), suggesting that Carmilla’s influence is outlasts her existence.

Laura states the case as such: “If human testimony, taken with every care and solemnity, judicially, before commissions innumerable, each consisting of many members, all chosen for integrity and intelligence, and constituting reports more voluminous perhaps than exist upon any other class of cases, is worth anything, it is difficult to deny, or even to doubt the existence of such phenomenon as the Vampire” (Le Fanu 315).

See “Somnambulism Extraordinary” in the Leicester Chronicle: or, Commercial and Agricultural Advertiser of January 18, 1862. The paper reports that “the next morning they traced the road he had taken in his moonlight rambles by the blood which had flowed from his nose and the cuts he had received in leaping from the window.”

An excellent example is found as Laura describes Carmilla’s habits: “From these foolish embraces…I used to wish to extricate myself; but my energies seemed to fail me. Her murmured words sounded like a lullaby in my ear, and soothed my resistance into a trance, from which I only seemed to recover myself when she withdrew her arms” (Le Fanu 264). Both Laura’s lack of free will and the importance placed on physical contact to sustain the effect suggest similarities to the characteristics of one under the effects of hypnosis. That Carmilla uses these techniques as a prelude to vampiric attack—and not in the midst of it—suggests an important deviation from the more famous vampiric model of Dracula, but the difference is more subtle than Auberbach would allow it to be. That the “hypnosis-during-attack” model is more famous could be attributed to the way that Dracula—unlike Carmilla—maintains more rigid boundaries between those who induce trances and those who experience them. Further discussion of the important differences between Carmilla and Dracula can be found in Benson Saler and Charles A. Ziegler’s “Dracula and Carmilla: Monsters and the Mind,” wherein extensive discussion is devoted to the ways in which “Stoker’s novel Dracula is more prototypical than Carmilla because its narrative features conform fully to the general structure of widely encountered monster-slaying stories, whereas that is not the case for Carmilla” (220).

Roger Luckhurst also connects these three episodes in the novel, citing Dracula’s “insistent use of trance states” (162): “There is Harker’s dreamy and disordered fantasy…Lucy Westerna [who] follows a rigorous pattern, from over-sensitivity due to an implied hereditary weakness.
from her father, through the development of somnambulistic trances, with attendant eroticism…echoed by Mina’s first hypnotization at the asylum, a sequence that rigorously moves Mina through Charcot’s three stages of hypnotic state” (162).

See, for example, Lucy’s description of Dracula’s first attack on page 117 of the novel, and my discussion of that scene later in this chapter.

See Garrett, Hustis, McKee, Richards, Seed, and Senf. Seed ascribes great importance to this textual collaboration: “Since understanding Dracula is a necessary precondition to defeating him, the exchange and accumulation of information literally is resistance to him” (73).

Even in the midst of a generally very insightful queer reading of Dracula’s symbolic potential, Judith Halberstam dismisses the women in the novel thusly: “Dracula is a perverse and multiple figure because he transforms pure and virginal women into seductresses, produces sexuality through their willing bodies” (344). A more unique interpretation has been put forth by Nina Auerbach, who notes that Lucy “becomes more virtuous after death than she was in life. Far from personifying a reversion to woman-hating in late Victorian men, Lucy raises the tone of female vampirism by avoiding messy entanglements with mortals, directing her ‘voluptuous wantonness’ to her fiancé alone” (79). However, Auerbach does not wax at length on the subject of Lucy’s virtuousness. Instead, she sees the vampire Lucy as much more decorous than the human Lucy, and her interpretation says nothing good about either: “As a vampire, Lucy the flirt is purified into Lucy the wife. The restless pet who had collected marriage proposals and complained, ‘Why can’t they let a girl marry three men, or as many as want her, and save all this trouble?’ (Stoker 78), the enticing invalid who had ‘married,’ through blood transfusions, those very three men (plus the smitten Van Helsing), ignores, as a vampire, ‘those others’ who bled into her adoringly: for the first time she wants her prospective husband and no one else” (80).

While I find in Auerbach’s more nuanced approach a more interesting interpretation, in the end she does participate in the critical tradition that foolishly dismisses the human Lucy Westenra as a slut; whether the critical standpoint is that Lucy’s vampirism exacerbates her “wantonness” or cures her of it, the concluding interpretation seems to end with a reaffirmation that Lucy’s fate is a punishment that she undoubtedly deserves.

I quote from Demetrakopoulos at length to show the kind of faulty critical moves frequently made in regard to the character of Lucy.

The term is taken from Craft, who uses the term to refer to the group of Van Helsing, Seward, Holmwood, and Morris, and eventually Jonathan and Mina Harker as well.

What Armstrong calls “the family” does not necessarily exclude the Crew of Light, despite the lack of blood relationships between the members. As husband and wife, Jonathan and Mina obviously form a conventional type of family, but the members of the group also refer to each other as “sister” or “brother,” and the family dynamics of the group have been much documented and discussed in the critical literature surrounding Dracula. For an example, see Richard Astle.

See Carol Senf’s work on Stoker’s “narrative technique in general and specifically on his choice of unreliable narrators” (160).

In some ways, Harker’s lack of reliability seems to mirror Lucy’s later inability to communicate events. The difference here seems to be that Lucy doesn’t properly record the
events that she cannot interpret. Harker does, which means that the group can later examine his
observations and make meaning out of them.

Like sleep, Harker also orders his days and experiences by the meals he takes. His narrative
is peppered with references to food and drink (27, 28, 31, 36, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51), which makes
his comment “It is strange that as yet I have not seen the Count eat or drink” (50) all the more
telling. However, this suggests that Harker’s relationship to sleep is somewhat different than
Lucy’s: for Harker it is part of the criteria for “human testing,” a reminder to the reader that
Harker is painfully normal. When Harker’s structures of regular meals and sleep times falls
apart, it is an indication of the nervous breakdown to come, a sign of impending madness, and it
makes him an even more unreliable narrator.

Holden interprets this scene as support for his assertion that Dracula is “stern, and
authoritative, very much the late Victorian paterfamilias who replaced the ‘relaxed and
approachable fathers’ of the 1850s and earlier” (475). He cites the work of John Tosh on such
late Victorian figures as Edward Benson, but while this characterization of the late Victorian
father may be consistent with actual, real life Victorian masculinity, it hardly holds with
depictions of fathers in the fiction of the time. However, to suggest that a foreign vampire
aristocrat becomes a potent example of British masculinity may be much more disturbing than
Holden allows it to be, since he concludes this argument about Dracula by suggesting that the
Transylvanian castle thus “becomes a bourgeois habitus” (478).

Several nineteenth-century medical sources record and repeat the story of a sleepwalking
Italian aristocrat whose behavior is beautifully evocative of the imagery we see in Dracula,
especially the sinister, exotic, yet highly rational portrait created of the Count: “Signor Augustin
was an Italian nobleman, dark, thin, melancholic, and cold-blooded, addicted to the study of the
abstract sciences. His attacks [of somnambulism] occurred at the waning of the moon, and were
stronger in autumn and winter than in the summer” (Prichard 23).

Eventually readers of the novel learn that Van Helsing has drawn the appropriate conclusions
as early as the 17th of September. However, as he does not share those conclusions with either
the reader or Dr. Seward until much later in the novel, these correct assumptions do not shape the
earlier part of a reading of the novel.

The characters’ frustration with the circularity is expressed when—just as Lucy seems to be
improving—Mrs. Westenra removes the garlic from the bedroom, allowing Dracula to again
attack. Van Helsing demands “What have we done, what has this poor thing done, that we are so
sore beset? Is there fate amongst us still, sent down from the pagan world of old, that such things
must be, and in such way?” (149)

In addition to Lucy’s tendency to sleepwalk, Mina notes that Lucy “is of too super-sensitive a
nature to go through the world without trouble” (Stoker 108). The impression given is that Lucy
is delicate, both physically and emotionally (hence her unhappiness when rejecting Seward and Morris as suitors).

185 My use of zombie is not intended to evoke images from George Romero films. I use it instead as the anglicized version of the Haitian Creole *zonbi*, a reanimated corpse controlled by a Vudou practitioner and bereft of speech, free will, etc.

186 A detail consistent with the novel’s general interest in who—or what—is in the bedroom, beginning with Dracula in Jonathan’s room at Castle Dracula and Jonathan in the lady’s boudoir.

187 In his argument concerning the narrative reflexivity of Dracula, Garrett notes the vagueness of Lucy’s accounts and that “in her unconscious, increasingly vampiric phase, Lucy also tries to destroy the memorandum she has written telling of her mother’s death and Dracula’s approach,” (125) suggesting that Lucy is never very dependable for verbal information concerning Dracula, though, as I’ve also noted, her body serves quite well as a text to be read. By calling this scene the novel’s fullest account of the vampire’s thrall, I do disagree with Garrett, who ascribes that title to the scene of Jonathan with the women. Because the attack on Jonathan is not completed I feel that there is something fuller to be found in Lucy’s description—she actually knows what the bite feels like, even if she is a bit fuzzy on the details—but I do find it interesting to consider Garret’s point that “only in Jonathan’s unconsummated passion can the novel clearly acknowledge the answering desire that is the most disturbing part of vampirism, that makes it more than an external threat” (126).

188 Seward does mention that from Mina’s “throat trickled a thin stream of blood” (283) but does not go into the sort of detail he used with Lucy, where he discusses discoloration of the skin and the “ragged edges” of the punctures.

NOTES FROM CONCLUSION

189 See Wolf-Meyer 212-13, and Randall.

190 See Randall, “Dangerous Dreamers.” Much of Randall’s commentary on the need for legal reform is based on Denno.

191 Freud theorized that sleepwalking was an attempt to fulfill unresolved unconscious desire. His ideas of sleepwalking, however, were completely subsumed to his work with dreams. He did, of course, theorize that somnambulistic “unconscious desire” was mainly sexual, and was surprised by the ability of subjects to move during dreams. For more, see his “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams.”


Cranny-Francis, Ann. “Sexual Politics and Political Repression in Bram Stoker’s *Dracula.*”


Taylor, Jenny Bourne. *In the Secret Theatre of Home: Wilkie Collins, Sensation Narrative, and


