SAMARITANS AND PATRONS:
THE LONG ROAD TO CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

by

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Masters in Public and International Affairs

University of Pittsburgh
2015
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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In February 2014, nationwide protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were followed by a series of ‘plenums,’ grassroots gatherings of citizens issuing demands of their public officials. The novelty of citizen activism in BiH overshadowed a surprisingly stipulation of the plenums: the explicit exclusion of NGOs. This paper undertakes to explain the divide that has arisen between Bosnian civil society and the local population. Employing the analytic lens of the Samaritan’s Dilemma, which posits an inverse relation between the efforts of donors and that of recipients, we hypothesize that the presence of assured donor funds prompted recipient NGOs to exert lower levels of effort than they otherwise would have. We further hypothesize that lower effort will manifest as reduced organizational responsiveness to changing constituent needs. To test this hypothesis, the paper explores the process of NGO mission formation and evolution through qualitative interviews with a sample of six Bosnian NGOs. Secondarily, we employ a more macro approach by tracking the evolution of NGO projects by sector, using projects funded by the National Endowment for Democracy as a sample. Our findings disconfirm our hypothesis but reveal a plausible alternate explanation which we define as the ‘leaders without followers’ phenomenon. Our findings suggest that Bosnian NGOs lack two elements critical to their civil society function: a targeted beneficiary group and mechanisms by which to engage a public constituency. Consequently, our policy recommendations hinge on the introduction of ‘community integration’ as a criteria used by donors to evaluate potential grant recipients. In expanding their evaluative criteria beyond organization capacity and project viability, donors should aim to engage resource-poor, local NGOs in order to promote the dual growth of NGOs and civil society, rather than the former at the expense of the latter.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

In February 2014, a series of spontaneous protests erupted in cities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the initial violence died down, citizens of all ethnicities gathered to voice their frustrations, formulating lists of demands that included the resignation of local government officials, the establishment of an expert-led government and the reexamination of privatization deals. From the start, these gatherings, described by participants as “plenums,” explicitly prohibited the participation of NGOs. Given that NGOs are traditionally conceived of as the link between citizens and government, this exclusion clearly indicates that something is amiss with the development of civil society in the country.

The importance of civil society to democracy has long been emphasized by political theorists and development professionals alike; as Michael Ignatieff writes of Eastern Europe’s post-communist transition, “without civil society, democracy remains an empty shell.”¹ This assertion lies at the heart of the dual-pronged democratization strategies employed in post-communist Europe, which at once encompassed democratic institutions and a civil society. “A civil society strategy,” Ignatieff goes on to say, “starts with the search for partners outside the state, the leading parties, and the bureaucracy. A civil society strategy, in other words, assumes that formal democracy is not enough.”² In order to play the role of conduit between individual citizens and government institutions, civil society organizations must maintain the public’s trust.
Bosnian civil society appears to have lost the public’s trust. In a 2012 public opinion poll conducted by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), respondents were asked “Who do you believe may be the catalysts for positive changes in the country?” A mere 15.3% of respondents in the Federation and 7.9% in the Republika Srpska (RS) placed their faith in civil society organizations. These numbers display an even lower level of public trust in civil society than in government (16.9% & 28.5%) or politicians (17.5% & 20.8%). In a country where politicians are widely thought to be self-interested and government more of a bureaucratic hindrance than a help, this is a rather dire comparison. Tellingly, the largest majority placed their faith in ‘citizens in general’ (48.6% & 55.7%) and youth (69.8% & 55.1%). The high levels of trust in one’s metaphorical fellow citizen, concurrent with disillusionment with organizations that presumably represent those citizen interests, present us with a puzzle. From where does this disconnect between civil society and the local population derive?

1.1 DONOR FUNDING AND THE RISE OF THE NGO SECTOR

I posit that NGO disengagement from the public is a partial, albeit unintended, consequence of donor engagement. One cannot overstate the importance of the donor community in Bosnia’s post-war reconstruction. Between 1996 and 2014, the international community invested nearly 12 billion dollars into the reconstruction of Bosnia, meaning that the nation received more per capita aid than did any country under the Marshall Plan. They rebuilt roads and schools, trained elected officials in the basics of democratic governance and even dismissed obstructionist government officials. In their engagement with NGOs, the donors provided project funding,
training and exchanges, all in the hopes of planting the seeds of civil society in the embryonic nation. Numerically, the donors’ support of civil society produced staggering results: by 2009, there were a remarkable 12,189 registered organizations in the country.

Unfortunately, such a headcount is misleading. While abundant in quantity, the quality of NGOs – their sustainability, impact and the extent to which they address community needs – is a metric of far greater interest and relevance. In efforts to explain the shortcomings of Bosnian NGOs, international and Bosnian critics alike have enumerated the failures of donor strategy. Donor preference for funding individual projects, rather than providing core programmatic funding, is rightly perceived as an obstacle to organizational sustainability. Ever-shifting donor priorities require the NGOs to follow the money, jumping from project to project and sector to sector. Writing in 2002, McMahon offers a particularly scathing criticism:

Starting in 1996, the international community basically threw a lot of money into the field, with little thought behind what it was doing. Numerous non-governmental organizations were created, but because there was no coherent strategy, a great deal of money has been wasted, many of the local NGOs have since collapsed, and the remaining ones are vulnerable to the changing whims of donors. Because the international community wants to help but does not have a strategic vision of how to do so, NGO representatives in Bosnia are confused and frustrated in their effort to balance changing international priorities with local needs and interests. At least for the time being, local NGOs are forced to think about international priorities first and domestic needs second. Instead of creating a robust civil society that can facilitate democratization, the international community has fostered a dependent society that has little to do with domestic politics.5

Given the lofty nature of their goal, it seems nearly certain that donors have fallen short of aspirations. Individual strategies and levels of coordination are imperfect. However, the pervasive “the international community is to blame” rhetoric is not only more self-therapeutic than productive, it overlooks one half of the equation. We propose, therefore, to look at the other half of the problem, specifically the role of the NGOs in the observed disconnect. In this context,
we will examine in greater detail the behavior of the NGOs. We ask the following question: How have local NGOs altered their behavior in response to donor aid?

1.2 SOLVING THE PUZZLE: THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA

Our analytical lens is the Samaritan’s Dilemma, which posits an inverse relation between the efforts of donors and that of recipients. In other words, the donor, in an effort to do good, unintentionally changes the incentive structure of the recipient such that the recipient behaves differently than he otherwise would have. In the system of behavioral economics, donor and recipient face the following payoffs, in which 1 represents the outcome least desirable to the actor and 4 represents his optimal outcome. For example, the donor wants to achieve an engaged and active civil society (4) rather than an ethnically divided or apathetic society (1). Meanwhile, the recipient would most like to see meaningful change in his area of focus (4), as opposed to backpedaling on the issue (1).

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c}
& \text{High effort} & \text{Low effort} \\
\hline
\text{RECIPIENT} & & & \\
\hline
\text{DONOR} & & & \\
\hline
\text{No aid} & 2, 2 & 1, 1 \\
\hline
\text{Aid} & 4, 3 & 3, 4 \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]
Knowing that the donor will provide aid, the recipient faces the choice between exerting high or low effort. Given the payoffs outlined above, the recipient opts for the latter. Absent the donor (no aid scenario), the recipient faces the same choice: high or low effort? In this case, the recipient opts to exert high effort, thereby maximizing his payoff. The donor is faced with a quandary: assuming he is committed to giving aid (in accordance his good Samaritan tendencies), how can he incentivize the recipient of said aid to exert high effort? That is, how can he overcome the above incentive structure?

The Samaritan’s Dilemma has been used in policy debates to argue against social welfare benefits and charity. For instance, the claim that unemployment benefits discourage the recipient from seeking work relies on the behavioral logic of the Samaritan’s Dilemma. On a global scale, the argument has been applied to explain the failure of international aid to achieve its goals. If provided food aid, a local government has less incentive to invest in agriculture R&D or an improved national irrigation system that would boost yields and food security. Previous research has found that “unrestricted transfers induce people to diminish ex-ante protection activities (charity hazard) and to shirk responsibilities.”

Beginning in 1996, the international community sought to assure stakeholders of their long-term commitment to BiH through repeated statements and a heavy physical presence. Bosnia as a single, undivided state was a long-term, rather than temporary, solution. Ethnically minded Croat or Serb politicians who might contemplate division were warned to align their behavior with Western rhetoric. Even today, the secessionist threats of RS President Milorad Dodik are firmly rejected by representatives of the international community: The division of Bosnia will not be permitted. These public guarantees, made to keep national politicians in line,
effectively turned the donor/aid recipient relationship into a repeated game, one in which the recipients were confident that the donors would continue to provide aid.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

Unfortunately, we cannot travel back in time and remove the donors in order to see how NGOs would have behaved in their absence. Nor can we expect recipients to reveal that they have invested lesser effort in response to donor aid. As such, we must rely on other types of evidence to evaluate whether and how recipients have adjusted their behavior. For this, we turn to the concept of NGO mission evolution.

To illustrate mission evolution, consider an NGO initially created to support victims of wartime rape. As the initial need is met and/or new issues arise, the same organization is likely to either (1) shift or expand its activities to address other women’s’ issues (e.g., domestic violence); or 2) close its doors. Arguably, an NGO ought to be responsive to changing community needs. If the core problem it addresses is significantly reduced, the organization must either evolve or cease to be relevant. Mission evolution is a natural occurrence, particularly in the context of a rapidly changing post-war environment.

If the model of the Samaritan’s Dilemma is valid in the Bosnian case, I would expect NGOs receiving donor aid to change their behavior in response to the assured presence of said external funding. Specifically, I expect those NGOs to respond by exerting lower levels of effort than they would have absent donor funds. This behavioral shift would not necessarily be apparent in a reduced quality or quantity of programs, as greater access to resources would
obviously enable the elite NGOs to pursue programs of greater scale and visibility. I hypothesize that the NGOs’ change in behavior would be visible as a reduced responsiveness to changing constituent needs, which signifies a slower rate of mission evolution. It is through this lens that I will endeavor to explain the NGO-community divide visible in Bosnian society.

In order to gauge mission evolution, we rely on multiple methods including interviews conducted with the leadership of the following six Bosnian NGOs: Centar za istrazivacko novinarstvo (Center for Investigative Reporting), Centar za okolišno održivi razvoj (Centre for Environmentally Sustainable Development), Centar za životnu sredinu (Center for the Environment), Centar za postkonfliktna istraživanja (Post-Conflict Research Center), PRONI Centar za omladinski razvoj Brčko (PRONI Center for Youth Development in Brčko) & Youth Initiative for Human Rights Sarajevo (YIHR). These organizations represent a range of sectors including environmental protection, post-conflict reconciliation, economic development and government transparency.

As an alternate measure, we trace the concentration of NGO projects by sector and over time, using projects funded by the National Endowment for Democracy as a sample. This approach endeavors to capture the evolution of NGOs’ focus on an aggregate, national level, as opposed to dissecting the micro-level internal process of an individual NGO.

The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows:

- Chapter 2 examines the goals and motives of our Samaritans, the international donor community, in funding Bosnian NGOs. We provide a brief history of the international community’s engagement in post-war BiH and trace the evolution of donor goals over time (1996 – present), as well as the mechanisms employed to reach said goals. We also
identify important trends in donors’ aggregate aid, shifting sectoral focus and the relative importance of different donors.

○ Chapter 3 identifies factors that generally shape an NGO at its founding, determining how Bosnian NGOs differ from the general pattern. The chapter proceeds by reviewing the factors that typically drive the evolution of an NGO’s mission and compares this pattern with the situation observed in Bosnia. The second half of this chapter contains the bulk of the paper’s analysis, exploring qualitative data garnered from NGO interviews and a sector-by-sector breakdown of National Endowment for Democracy funded projects, to evaluate the validity of the Samaritan’s Dilemma hypothesis and offer alternative explanations.

○ Chapter 4 summarizes research findings and offers policy recommendations for foreign donors and NGOs. Extrapolating from the Bosnian case, the recommendations provide models for creating donor/NGO partnerships that are well positioned to foster civil society in emergent democracies and authoritarian regimes around the world.

This research will evaluate the relevance of the Samaritan’s Dilemma in shaping the behavior of Bosnian NGOs. In so doing, my aim is to shed light on the underlying causes of the divide between Bosnian NGOs and the community they are ostensibly committed to serve. I will conclude by offering policy recommendations that promise to span the divide.

2 Ibid.
3 The country of BiH is divided into two geographic and governing Entities: the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS). The former is predominately populated by Bosniaks and Croats, while the latter is majority Serb. Bosniaks are generally accepts to be Slavic Muslims.


ASPIRANT SAMARITANS: DONORS MOTIVATIONS, VISION AND STRATEGY IN POST-WAR BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA

The Samaritan’s Dilemma devotes little consideration to the Samaritan’s motives. We assume that the Samaritan, by his very nature, wants to do good. While that may be the case on the scale of individual charity, states’ motivations are unlikely to be purely benevolent. Foreign policy is a mix of ideals and national interest. Powerful though the call to “make the world safe for democracy” is, international development policy is generally articulated in terms of national security and economic growth. The mission of the U.S. Trade & Development Agency, for example, is to “link U.S. businesses to export opportunities … while creating sustainable infrastructure and economic growth in partner countries.” The Bush administration defined U.S. National Security in terms of the three Ds: defense, diplomacy and development.

We can safely assert that national and international donors are not strictly Samaritans in the biblical sense. Nonetheless, they do want to achieve their development goals – building a stable democracy, protecting human rights, improving education – even if their reasons for doing so are a mix of philanthropy and self-interest.
2.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF DONOR ENGAGEMENT IN BIH: VISION AND GOALS

Initially, the donor community’s vision for Bosnia as captured in the Dayton Peace Agreement had two core components: military and civilian. Firstly, the international community sought to prevent Bosnia from relapsing into conflict, a task for which NATO was deployed. The second task was more multifaceted: to build an independent, functional and democratic system of government in a territory that has previously been a republic in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) began its mission on December 20.\textsuperscript{8} IFOR was tasked with implementing the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, in particular:

- To ensure the end of hostilities, armies in the territory of BiH were to be disbanded and weapons were moved to controlled sites under IFOR supervision.
- For the duration of its one-year mission, IFOR forces patrolled the de-militarized Inter-Entity Boundary Line and inspected sites containing collected weapons.
- IFOR’s activities also included the reconstruction of national infrastructure: the reopening of 2,500 km of roads, repair of 60 bridges and the reopening of Sarajevo airport.

When IFOR’s mandate expired a year later, on December 20, 1996, it was succeeded by a NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). The transition from IFOR to SFOR reflects the shift of donor attention towards BiH’s political environment. Although it retained responsibility for IFOR’s military aspects, SFOR was additionally tasked “to promote a climate in which the peace process
can continue to move forward [and] to provide selective support to civilian organisations within its capabilities.”

While IFOR/SFOR were tasked to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement, the parties of Dayton also recognized that post-war BiH had a number of civilian aspects to consider, including “continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as long as necessary; rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction; the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of free and fair elections.” To oversee the implementation of these civilian aspects, the Dayton Peace Agreement created the Office of the High Representative (OHR). OHR’s directive was somewhat broad: to “co-ordinate the activities of the civilian organisations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement. The High Representative shall respect their autonomy within their spheres of operation while as necessary giving general guidance to them about the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace settlement.”

In implementation, the OHR turned out to be an odd animal, a sort of modern day viceroy. Prior to the September 1997 elections, Bosnia was governed by a Joint Interim Commission chaired by the High Representative. Following the elections, OHR retained a very active role in the Bosnian government. In December 1997, the Peace Implementation Council authorized the High Representative to remove Bosnian officials from power and to enact laws when the elected legislature failed to take action.

Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement articulates a vision for Bosnia as a multiparty representative democracy. Annex 4 prominently features the values of the Washington
consensus: promotion of a market economy, recognition of human rights and freedoms, and democratic governmental institutions. It established a system of governance that, while excessively complex in the effort to accommodate ethnic demands, laid the groundwork for a bicameral national legislature, rotating executive position, Constitutional Court and Central Bank. The Dayton Peace Agreement also embraced a system of political decentralization (admittedly, to a degree that would later cripple efforts at national reform), dividing the country into two ethnically based entities. Power is then further decentralized to the cantonal and municipal level.\textsuperscript{13}

The 2003 Thessaloniki Declaration\textsuperscript{14} laid open the door of EU membership to Bosnia, asserting firmly that “the future of the Balkans is within the European Union.”\textsuperscript{15} Through this public commitment to extend EU membership to BiH, the European Union reaffirmed its vision for Bosnia: a market-oriented democracy.

\subsection{2.2 DONOR STRATEGY}

We now turn our attention to the tools and methods that the international community employed in Bosnia to achieve the above stated objectives. In large part, the specific programs and approaches employed in Bosnia reflected the development/democratization philosophies of the day. These, in turn, had been influenced by the democratization processes in Latin America and were now deployed in the newly independent nations of the former USSR and Yugoslavia.

The democracy promotion consensus hinged on two complementary strategies: creation of democratic institutions (free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, balance of powers
between branches, etc.) and the creation of a robust civil society that facilitates citizen participation. By the mid 1990s, this two-pronged strategy had established itself as the reigning theory of democracy promotion.

Our primary interest concerns the second objective: donor-led efforts to cultivate civil society. Civil society is, in a sense, akin to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s definition of pornography: I know it when I see it. We know it is important, yet we struggle to explain or define it. Elshtain describes civil society as the “a sphere of our communal life in which we answer together the most important questions: what is our purpose, what is the right way to act, and what is the common good. In short, it is the sphere of society that is concerned with moral formation and with ends, not simply administration or maximizing of the means.”

Robert Putnam, the man whose name is virtually synonymous with modern-day understanding of civil society, focuses on the participatory behaviors learned from associational life. Alternative definitions tend to mention some combination of the following: the voluntary nature of associations, provision of services, representation of citizen interests and social capital/trust.

Government aid agencies have whole-heartedly embraced programmatic support for civil society. USAID, for example, the United States’ central agency for democracy and governance (DG) work, clustered their work around 4 pillars: rule of law, governance, civil society, and elections & political processes. In 1999, the agency focused around 40% of its DG spending on Central & Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union ($288 million of a total $635 million). In 2013, in the effort to “replace a 20-year-old set of categories with a framework that describes what we are accomplishing, not what we are doing,” USAID released a new strategic framework. Of the four new Development Objectives (DOs), specified in Table 1, civil society is mentioned under three. On the topic of civil society, the 2013 Strategic Framework states:
“Citizen voice and civic expression are essential to building and sustaining democratic societies. Civil society organizations provide channels for citizen voice and can help citizens hold government accountable.”

Table 1 USAID Development Objectives 2013 Strategic Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Objective</th>
<th>Sub-objectives of greatest relevance to civil society promotion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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| DO 1: “Promote participatory, representative and inclusive political processes and government institutions.” | 1.1: “Assist civil society and government partners to advance civil and political rights, including the freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and access to information”  
1.2: “Promote politically engaged and informed citizenries, active civil society organizations, organized labor, independent and open media, and representative political parties” |
| DO 2: “Foster greater accountability of institutions and leaders to citizens and to the law.” | 2.2: “Support the ability of civil society and independent and open media to provide oversight and an informed critique of government” |
| DO 3: “Protect and promote universally recognized human rights.” | N/A |
| DO 4: “Improve development outcomes through the integration of DRG principles and practices across USAID’s development portfolio.” | 4.1: “Strengthen country-based mechanisms for participation, inclusion, and local ownership across all USAID development sectors”  
4.2: “Encourage host governments and civil society to employ legitimate and effective accountability mechanisms” |

The centrality attributed to civil society is echoed by USAID’s international counterparts. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) describes “a pluralistic, dynamic civil society as a complement to democratically elected institutions and a premise for democratic development.” One third of development cooperation funds at the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation (SIDA) are provided to civil society organizations (CSOs), which are described as “proposers of ideas, watchdogs of those in power and a
counterweight to and force for democratisation vis-à-vis the state.”

The World Bank stresses consultation and engagement with CSOs such that, in 2011, 82% of Bank funded projects included CSO involvement. The Bank also provides financing to CSOs through funds such as the Development Marketplace and The Social Development Civil Society Fund.

Despite the importance placed on civil society by nearly every donor, it remains very broadly defined by the development community. UNDP notes that “over time, almost all donors have moved from a restrictive definition of civil society (initially equated with non-governmental organizations, or NGOs) toward a much more inclusive understanding of the term, encompassing other associational forms such as trade unions, faith-based groups, and community groups and wider objectives, including advocacy agendas.” UNDP goes on to note that CSOs serve one (or more) of several purposes: providing services, advocating for human/social rights or supporting social processes.

Donors’ preference for specific aid modalities, in Bosnia and elsewhere, has evolved over time. In a 2004 New York Times op-ed, Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary General, called for Bosnia to shift “out of the era of Dayton and into the era of Brussels.” Although the transition implied an increased local ownership, donors continue to use NGOs as a vehicle to advance their own objectives in BiH. Historically, the aid modalities employed in BiH have preferred formalized organizations as recipients. Leaderless, horizontal movements, while valid incarnations of public sentiment, simply do not align with donor engagement structures: who would sign the memorandum of understanding? In a fiercely competitive grant environment (the World Bank received 530 proposals for the 2010 round of The Development Marketplace for
Latin America and the Caribbean Region, of which only 14 were selected\(^{29}\), only CSOs with professional grant writing experience stand a realistic chance of receiving funding.

Everywhere from Afghanistan to Kosovo, Western donors have embraced NGOs as the surefire path to participatory citizenship, both through funding of local NGOs and partnerships with international NGOs. To be sure, this relationship has not been free of criticism. This is aptly captured by Keith Brown in his description of the civil society syllogism:

> “Wider participation = civil society
> civil society = democracy
> democracy = the good.”\(^{30}\)

Brown goes on to note that such an oversimplification preserves a “neo-Tocquevillean world of civil society’s promise.”\(^{31}\)

Nonetheless, the promotion of civil society, in particular through the funding and training of local NGOs, was and remains a cornerstone to advancing donor objectives in post-war Bosnia. In Chapter 3, we examine in greater detail those NGOs in whom donors placed such great hopes.

### 2.3 DONOR MOTIVATIONS

Cold War era international aid had been, while not devoid of philanthropic intent, motivated explicitly by strategic and security concerns. Values were of lesser concern, as evidenced by U.S. support of dictatorships in Haiti, South Korea, the Philippines and elsewhere. The 1990s truly
were a new world order: the United States found itself, suddenly, the world’s undisputed superpower. Democracy had triumphed. It was an era of confidence in American values, as the third wave of democracy sweep across Latin America, Asia Pacific and the formerly communist countries of Europe. Europe, reunited, faced a new future, and the European Union took the preliminary steps in expanding its scope towards political union through the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The humanitarian disasters of the decade – Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia – posed an opportunity to rethink aid outside the Cold War paradigm.

Yet, the American approach to foreign intervention in the second half of the 1990s was also marked by caution. Following the death of 18 U.S. service members in Somalia, the Clinton administration became increasingly risk-averse. Reflecting on the future of humanitarian aid in 1996, *Foreign Affairs* cited an April 1994 policy directive issued by President Clinton “that implied a sharp curtailment of American involvement in future armed humanitarian interventions and that marked a retreat from his administration's earlier rhetoric of assertive multilateralism.”

Arguably, this caution discouraged Western transatlantic leadership from taking a more active or earlier role in ending the war in Bosnia. Eventually, circumstances drew in a reluctant U.S. and, in the late winter of 1995, the international donor community faced the dual challenge of enforcing the peace and rebuilding a war-torn society. The most readily available source of insight into the motivations of the international community during this era comes from the words of international leaders themselves. The speeches and press statements from the period are heavily value laden, stressing a commitment to human rights, democracy, peace and unity. Speaking on the occasion of his approval for U.S. troop participation in SFOR, President Clinton noted that “by helping the Bosnian people build a peace that is self-sustaining, SFOR will also help advance our fundamental goal of building a Europe that is peaceful, undivided and
Speaking in April 1996 at the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), then High Representative Caryl Bildt stressed:

Our commitment to human rights and democracy is a commitment throughout the region … in political terms we must aim at an ‘entry strategy’ for Bosnia as well as for Croatia and Serbia into the structures and possibilities of European and international integration and co-operation. Every step towards human rights, democracy and economic reform is a step in this direction … integration is the key to peace and stability, but that integration must be based on a free society and a free economy.

Money followed such rhetoric in abundance. Official development aid (ODA) to Bosnia peaked in 1998 at 1.28 billion USD. In the first post-war years, the U.S. was consistently the largest single donor, contributing 216 million USD in 1998. Aid from EU institutions the same year totaled 133 million USD. Individual members of the Peace Implementation Council also gave generously: in 1998, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands each sent more than 40 million USD worth of aid to BiH.

Briefly, it is worth noting that while macro-level aid decisions are governed by strategic foreign policy priorities, the importance of individual decisions should not be discounted. National and agency leadership provide guidance, but even in the context of government bureaucracy, mid-level managers in a Western aid agency have a fair degree of latitude in deciding what projects to fund or programs to sponsor. In that sense, the mid-career USAID (SIDA, EU, etc.) bureaucrat assumes the role of small-scale Samaritan, acting on behalf of his government. Indeed, his decisions are more likely to be driven by the desire to do good, especially if he lives in the recipient country, interacting with the intended beneficiaries.

In these immediate post-war years, the target areas of donor spending were guided by the so-called Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (PRRP). A joint product of the Bosnian
government, European Commission, World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the PRRP was designed to span three to four years and totaled a sum of 5.1 billion USD. In the three-year timeframe of 1996-1998, 4.2 billion USD was committed. Of that sum, 58% was directed towards physical infrastructure, 18% to ‘Economic Re-start’ and 16% to ‘Transition: Fiscal Support/Government Institution Building.’ A more detailed breakdown of component spending in each of these three sectors is provided in table 2 below.35

Table 2 Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (PRRP) spending breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1996-1998 firm commitments, % share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Physical Reconstruction</strong></td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Power &amp; Coal</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Revival</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Heat &amp; Gas</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landmine Clearance</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Sectors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Economic Restart</strong></td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry &amp; Finance</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Generation</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Transition: Fiscal Support/Government Institution Building</strong></td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal/Government support</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition TA</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As evidenced by sector spending, the donors’ predominant focus was on repairing the physical destruction of the war. The war had destroyed more than 2,000 km of main roads and 70 bridges. Electric generating capacity had dropped by more than 50%, while coal production had fallen from 18 million tons to 1.5 million. 33% of housing in the Federation and 29% in the RS had been damaged. As such, the first years of reconstruction and donor aid concentrated on rebuilding the physical infrastructure that would serve as the foundation for national economic development. Concurrent with the institution building underway throughout the country (a less costly, but also less tangible task than that of building roads and bridges), donor spending in the second half of the 1990s can be characterized as targeting physical institutions and government institutions.

With the dawn of the 21st century however, donor-giving patterns in BiH began to shift in several important ways. Most notable is the downward trend in aggregate aid, as seen in figure 1. As memories of the war faded further into the history books, Bosnia dropped on the global agenda, while the American War on Terror rocketed to the forefront. In 2001, ODA dropped to 640 million USD. In the years since, it has hovered around 600 million USD annually.

Figure 2, meanwhile, captures the variability present in donor aid by comparing the amount of aid received in a given year with that received the previous year. Beginning in 2000, ten of the past fourteen years display a negative percent change, indicating the BiH received less ODA than in the previous year. While the year-to-year data shows some variability (the floods of 2014, though not capture in the data here, will likely produce a spike in aid), the overall trend points to a gradual and ongoing reduction of ODA.
Figure 1 Official Development Aid (ODA) to BiH
Figures 3 and 4 (below) divide donor spending by sector. While the categorizations are a bit broader than we would like, we can still discern shifting donor priorities. Transportation and Communication, which received large amounts of donor money in the immediate post-war years, received only 10 million USD in 2005 and less than 1 million in 2013. Likewise, water supply and sanitation received 10 million USD of ODA in 2005 and $14 million in 2013, significantly down from the $213 million spent between 1996 and 1998. Beginning in 2006, humanitarian aid dropped to negligible amounts.

Intuitively, this makes sense. In the immediate years following the war, the country was physically devastated and the embryonic government lacked the capacities or resources to provide basic public services. The international donors stepped in to fill the gap. As government
capacity grew and reconstruction goals were met, donor priorities naturally evolved. Moving into the 21st century, donors turned their attention (and their money) to education, promotion of free media, judicial independence, etc.

Figure 3 2005 ODA by Sector
Figure 4 2013 ODA by Sector

Finally, the post-2000 data on ODA shows a clear trend away from the United States as the primary donor and towards the EU as the top donor. By 2012, EU institutions supplied a full 55% of total ODA, surpassing the United States’ all time high in 1998. The same year, the U.S. supplied only $38 million USD, roughly 7% of total ODA. Although the United States and European Union have presented themselves as allies in Bosnian reconstruction, there are nonetheless variances in their tactics, objectives and processes. In particular, the EU views assistance to Bosnia through the lens of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). The
EU’s Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) for 2007-09 articulates the EU’s objective in BiH as follows: “to help Bosnia and Herzegovina to face the challenges of European integration, to implement the reforms needed to fulfill EU requirements and progress in the Stabilisation and Association Process and to lay the foundations for fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership.” This transatlantic reversal, as such, has relevance for the dominant donor agenda in BiH.

![US & EU Institution aid to BiH, 1995 - 2012](image)

Figure 5 US & EU Aid to BiH, 1995-2012

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9 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Only the Federation, not the RS, includes cantons.
14 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro – all potential candidate countries as of 2003 – were all party to the Thessaloniki Declaration.
20 Ibid.
23 Pluralism: Policy for Support to Civil Society in Developing Countries Within Swedish Development Cooperation. MFA Information Services and the Department for Development Policy. 2009. http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/13/13/60/8c589318.pdf
25 The Development Marketplace is described as “a competitive grant program that identifies and funds innovative, early stage development projects that are scalable and/or replicable, while also having high potential for development impact.” Since 1998, it has provided $60 million in grants to 1,200 projects.
The CSF was created in 1983 and operated until 2012. During the time, it directly funded CSOs in more than 50 countries. In 2012, its portfolio was incorporated into the Bank’s new Global Partnership for Social Accountability.


2010 Regional DM - Latin America and the Caribbean: Youth Development Opportunities. Development Marketplace,


Ibid


The OECD ODA database defines Social Infrastructure and Services as “efforts to develop the human resource potential and ameliorate living conditions in aid recipient countries.” It includes spending in the health sector. Economic Infrastructure and Services is defined as “assistance for networks, utilities and services that facilitate economic activity.”

3.0 THE NGO PERSPECTIVE: THE MIXING OF MONEY AND MISSION

With an improved understanding of the donor’s motivations, vision and strategy, we now turn our attention to the recipients of donor monies: the NGOs. Our interest revolves around NGO behavior, in particular how they may have reactively changed their behavior in light of donor funding. As noted earlier, NGOs will not openly admit if they changed their behavior in response to the presence of donor money. They may not even realize they have done so. As such, we focus on the process of mission evolution as a proxy, proceeding under the assumption that mission evolution is characteristic of an organization responsive to the changing needs of its constituencies.

Both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations have missions. However, the core goal of for-profit organizations is to make money; the mission placed on corporate letterhead simply elaborates on how they will meet that goal. That is not to say that moral values and standards found in corporate mission statements are insincere; companies pursue their missions in the belief that doing so will generate profit. Proctor & Gamble’s mission statement captures the ‘win-win’ attitude towards mission and profit: “We will provide branded products and services of superior quality and value that improve the lives of the world’s consumers. As a result, consumers will reward us with leadership sales, profit, and value creation, allowing our people, our shareholders, and the communities in which we live and work to prosper.”
As non-profits are not in the business of making money, the mission assumes singular centrality in the organization’s behavior and identity. The mission is, as McDonalds describes it, the raison d’être of the organization. Money is a necessary means of achieving the mission, but profit is not pursued for its own sake.

The literature provides ample discussion, if not consensus, on the process of non-profit mission formulation and evolution. Mission formulation occurs in the early stages of an organization and captures the personal passions and life experiences of the founders. Put another way, organizations “come into being and exit primarily to give expression to the social, philosophical, moral or religious values of their founders and supporters.” Bart and Tabone note three core functions of the mission statement: to guide and focus decision making, to motivate and inspire employees and to create balance between interests of different stakeholders. As seen in the sample presented below, the mission statement articulates the organization’s target beneficiaries, the core problem it wants to address and the impact it wants to achieve.

- **United Way** improves lives by mobilizing the caring power of communities around the world to advance the common good.

- **The American Red Cross** prevents and alleviates human suffering in the face of emergencies by mobilizing the power of volunteers and the generosity of donors.

- **Lydia’s Place** mission is dedicated to helping female offenders and their dependent children rebuild their lives and to become productive members of the community.

- **Big Brother, Big Sister** provides children facing adversity with strong and enduring, professionally supported one-to-one relationships that change their lives for the better, forever.
Missions, however, are not set in stone. A case study of the San Francisco-based Career Action Center identifies a number of external events that may prompt a shift in mission: changes in one’s client base, the entrance of new donors, direct requests from clients, a growth in available funds or a need for revenue. Schmid furthers this list, noting that changes in an organization’s identity may occur as a result of 1) changes in the task environment, 2) internal pressures (from staff and/or volunteers) and 3) expectations imposed by agents or constituents.46 Much of the literature on mission evolution focuses specifically on the phenomena of mission drift: abandoning one’s original mission to please or entice donors and stakeholders. An especial concern is how different sources of funding can induce mission drift. In an analysis of resource dependence, Froelich evaluates the pressures associated with private contributions, government and foundation funds and commercial activities. She finds mission drift (or goal displacement) to be more likely in instances of private contribution or foundation grants, with the latter able to exert pressure on NGO activities simply by setting thematic funding priorities. Interestingly, she finds government funding to be associated with lesser risk of mission drift, although it comes at the expense of bureaucratization: more time spent on documentation, compliance and government processes. Lastly, Froelich finds that revenue from commercial services is the most flexible of possible non-profit revenue sources, although questions remain as to how engagement in commercial activity might damage the non-profit’s legitimacy.47 Despite the negative connotations of mission drift, however, mission evolution can have good results and ensure the continued relevance of an organization, if it is undertaken strategically and intentionally.
3.1 NGO FORMATION AND MISSION EVOLUTION IN POST-WAR HERZEGOVINA

If mission formulation captures the values, life experiences and beliefs of founders, Bosnian NGOs formed in the years following the war had no shortage of problems from which to choose. The war had created some 1.2 million refugees. A year and half after the cessation of hostilities, 750,000 refugees were living within BiH, while thousands resided temporarily in Germany, Croatia and Serbia. Dayton demobilized 425,000 soldiers, creating a class of veterans carrying the physical and mental scars of war. As of 1999, there were an estimated 30,000 minefields in the country, affecting a monthly average of 49 victims in 1996. Economic damage associated with the war was estimated by the World Bank to value between 15 and 20 billion USD, with a full one third of housing destroyed.

Yet, we would be idealistic to assume that the motivations of all newly minted NGO leaders were 100 percent pure. Unemployment in the post-war years was enormous. People needed jobs and livelihoods. Old companies (if they had survived) likely were not hiring, but there was a huge influx of foreign aid: $869,130,000 in 1997, $934,830,000 in 1998 and an all-time high of $1,403,810,000 in 1999. In the context of the post-war economy, any enterprising individual will go to where the money is: in this case, the NGO sector. Sterland writes that the “high NGO registration also reflected a high degree of opportunism from those seeking an income rather than a vehicle to pursue a social mission.” This concern has been echoed by others in the NGO community: a 2004 independent assessment of Bosnian civil society, based upon interviews and focus groups with government officials, journalists, donors and domestic NGOs noted that “most stakeholders viewed the high number of inactive NGOs and those ‘more
interested in money than mission’ as adversely affecting the image of the sector and, in the case of the later, diluting precious resources.53 This was repeated in one of our NGO interviews, wherein the interviewee recalled an anecdote wherein a cohort of NGOs had refused to share data for advocacy purposes. The interviewee speculated that a spirit of self-preservation was at work – to ensure their continued funding and relevance, the organizations concerned treated the data as proprietary. In this particular case, the use of data as a bargaining chip turned the NGOs into an obstacle, rather than a vehicle, for progress.54

We do not want to give the impression that all NGO leaders were in it for personal gain, nor that their aims were purely altruistic. The truth of the matter likely lies somewhere in the middle, with variation between organizations. What is apparent is that all NGOs and donors operate in an arena with perverse incentives: an individual’s economic need to secure a source of income coexists uncomfortably with his desire to bring positive change. NGO staff have, at a minimum, two priorities: to advance their organizational mission on the basis on personal conviction and to ensure organizational longevity (and, thereby, job security). Faced with these incentive structures, NGO founders, leaders and staff will respond accordingly. To summarize a disclaimer issued by Cooley and Ron in their study of international NGOs, we ought not make accusations of immorality when the problems are institutionally conditioned.55

3.2 BOSNIA’S 99 PERCENT (OF NGOS)

Before we proceed in our discussion of the NGO community in BiH, several distinctions are necessary. As noted earlier, the Bosnian non-profit ‘market’ is awash in NGOs. The first
distinction of note is between the active and inactive NGOs. The Bosnian system for NGO registration operates on a one-time basis – NGOs never reregister. As such, the registries are certain to include many paper NGOs – organizations that are now defunct. Additionally, the decentralization of the NGO registration process (organizations may choose to register at the national, entity, cantonal or municipal level) creates the possibility of double counting organizations.

It is difficult to know what percent of the 12,000 plus registered NGOs are active. The EU Special Representative places the number between 500 and 1500. A 2009 study of civil society in BiH, funded by the European Union and jointly conducted by Kronauer Consulting and HTSPE, attempted to establish contact with a representative sample of registered NGOs. The researchers successfully established contact with 536 of the 988 sample registered NGOs they contacted, from which they estimated that 6620 organizations were active nationwide.

The second division of importance is the distinction between what we will term ‘elite’ and ‘marginal’ NGOs. Whatever the number of active organizations, only a small fraction of NGOs fall into the elite category. These NGOs receive the vast majority of available foreign funding and hence conduct the majority of programs. This elite status is self-perpetuating: grant writing skills and an insider’s understanding of donor objectives ensure continued access to funds.

On the other hand (or, outside the international donor gravy train) is a much larger group of NGOs. These marginal NGOs generally lack resources and capacities and are very limited in geographic scope. The above-cited Kronauer Consulting/HTSPE research found that 75.8% of surveyed NGOs had no donor strategy. As such, it is not surprising, that 60.45% of NGOs did not secure funds for 2009. A full 53.7% had no formal employees and relied exclusively on
volunteers, significantly impairing organizational capacity.\textsuperscript{58} For NGOs stuck in the marginal category, a lack of funding, staff and donor know-how creates a catch 22: you cannot gain access to donor funds without knowledgeable staff, but you cannot hire staff without funding.

Given that our interest revolves around the interaction of donor presence and NGO behavior, our focus will remain on the elite NGOs, as they have regular and direct interaction with the donors. We will return to the fate and potential of the marginal NGOs in the final chapter.

\section*{3.3 METHODOLOGY}

The core data was drawn from six interviews conducted with the following local NGOs: Centar za istrazivacko novinarstvo (Center for Investigative Reporting), Centar za okolišno održivi razvoj (Centre for Environmentally Sustainable Development), Centar za životnu sredinu (Center for the Environment), Centar za postkonfliktna istraživanja (Post-Conflict Research Center), PRONI Centar za omladinski razvoj Brčko (PRONI Center for Youth Development in Brčko), and Youth Initiative for Human Rights Sarajevo (YIHR). This sample of NGOs, while small in number, provides geographic diversity (covering Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Brčko), as well as thematic variety (environmental protection, post-conflict reconciliation, economic development and government transparency). Details concerning the interviewed NGOs are summarized in table 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
<th># of staff/volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centar za istraživacko novinarstvo (Center for Investigative Reporting)</td>
<td>Investigative journalism / transparency</td>
<td>“To provide fair and unbiased information, based on evidences and solid proof, to BiH citizens who need to make educated decisions.”</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>20 paid staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centar za okolišno održivi razvoj (Centre for Environmentally Sustainable Development)</td>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
<td>“To promote the values of civil society through education, public awareness and strengthening human resources in the field of environmental protection, and cooperation with similar regional and international centers, promoting and applying the highest international standards in this field and thus contribute to environmentally sustainable development in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>No paid staff 5 supervisory board members (unpaid) + ad hoc volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centar za životnu sredino (Center for the Environment),</td>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
<td>“To protect and enhance the environment, to advocate for the principles of sustainable reservations and for greater public participation in decision making about the environment” (translated from Bosnian language)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>No paid staff 5 unpaid steering board members + ad hoc volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centar za postkonfliktna istraživanja (Post-Conflict Research Center),</td>
<td>Post conflict reconciliation / peacebuilding</td>
<td>“To cultivate an environment for sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the greater Balkans region using creative multimedia projects that foster tolerance, moral courage, mutual understanding, and positive change.”</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11 part-time staff, unclear how many are paid vs. volunteer basis Varying number of unpaid interns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRONI Centar za omlađinski razvoj Brčko (PRONI Center for Youth Development in Brčko)</td>
<td>Youth engagement / peace building</td>
<td>“To promote the development of a democratic society through: protection and promotion of human rights, youth work in the community, social education, peace building, cross sector cooperation, support of youth initiatives, and promotion of EU integration.” (translated from Bosnian language),</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>10 paid staff 90 volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Initiative for Human Rights Sarajevo (YIHR)</td>
<td>Youth engagement</td>
<td>“To enhance youth participation in the democratization of the society and empowerment of the rule of law through the process of facing the past and establishing new, progressive connections in the post-conflict region of former Yugoslavia”</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2 paid staff + ad hoc volunteers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above NGOs were identified via personal contact of the researcher and via online research of donor-funded projects. The interviewees were self-selecting in that they responded to email requests to participate in an interview. In that sense, we should acknowledge the presence of section bias: the interviewed NGOs are all part of the ‘elite’ category (an intentional criteria, as those are the NGO that interact with donors). Additionally, in agreeing to be interviewed, we ascertain that these NGOs were confident enough in the quality of their portfolio to publicize their work. Interviews were conducted via Skype, in English, in February 2015. The analysis is supplemented by the author’s firsthand experience in Bosnia from September 2013 – July 2014, which included time as a volunteer at the Post-Conflict Research Center (one of the interviewees) and as an intern at the UNDP Country Office, the latter of which provided indirect exposure to donor activities.

Secondarily, we look at projects funded by the U.S. Congressionally-funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to gauge shifts in relative importance attributed to NGOs to various sectors. Our sample consists of projects funded in four years, strategically chosen to represent changes in 1) donors’ treatment of Bosnia and 2) domestic need.

- **1996**: This marks the first full post-conflict year in which all donor priorities were governed by the Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program. Immediate needs included service provision to refugees and wartime victims, demining, right of return, etc. International NGOs predominated during this time.

- **2002**: Seven years following the end of the conflict, needs would have evolved to include anti-corruption measures, programs to strengthen the judiciary system, job creation, etc. Meanwhile, the terrorist attacks of 9-11 drove a shift in U.S., and
perhaps to a lesser degree European, development priorities, with increased spending on security cooperation.

- **2008**: In 2006, the Peace Implementation Council noted that “the time for transition from the OHR [Office of the High Representative] to an EUSR Office is approaching.” In February 2008, the PIC followed up with the 5+2 agenda, the conditions that must be met for the Office of the High Representative to closes its doors. Although the conditions of 5+2 have yet to be met, OHR has increasingly passed the mantle of international leadership to the EU Special Representative since 2006. With that shift comes a shift in donor priorities, with a heavy focus on the reforms necessary to acquire EU candidate status (with the eventual, if distant, goal of EU membership). Donor aid priorities in this period would be geared towards the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which includes three priority areas for all potential candidate countries: political requirements, socio-economic requirements and European standards.

- **2012**: Owing to a lag in data availability, 2012 will serve to capture current NGO sector activities. By 2012, donor fatigue and withdrawal was well underway: in 2011, Spain, the UK and the Netherlands closed their aid operations in BiH.

This four-year sample of NED funded projects captures 58 projects. Accounting for repeat organizations (several organization received multiple NED grants), this represents 42 different grant recipients. Per NED’s specification, all recipients are “nongovernmental organizations, which may include civic organizations, associations, independent media, and other similar organizations.” The chosen sample is prone to several potential sources of error. In particular, recipients include both international and local NGOs. International NGOs are more
prominent in the 1996 list of recipients and shift largely to local NGOs in the following years. Additionally, as the sample only includes projects selected by NED to receive a grant, there exists an element of donor selection. It would be worthwhile to consider a list of all projects that applied to NED in a given year; unfortunately, such data is not publically available (furthermore, it would complicate matters in that many of the applicant projects were never funded/implemented). There is also a strong likelihood that grant applicants/recipients design projects to match donor priorities, thereby increasing their chance of receiving a grant. This risk is somewhat mitigated by NED’s relatively broad, non-country specific priorities. Nonetheless, grant applicants/recipients may well have been noted what projects previously received funding and geared their proposal accordingly (isomorphism).

NED’s annual reports include lists of organizations funded, the grant amount and a short description of the project’s purpose and intended outputs/outcomes. Using the project descriptions, I classify each project by sector, allowing for multiple classifications where appropriate. For example, if a project concerns youth education around elections, the project would be classified as both ‘Education/youth’ and ‘Electoral democracy.’ The sector categories were identified based on themes observed in the projects themselves.

Acting on the assumption that the number of projects conducted in a sector is an indicator of the importance the NGO community attaches to said sector, I rank order the sectors to indicate reflective importance.
3.4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

In conversations with NGO leaders, organizational mission proved a challenging concept to nail down. We have identified three general models for mission evolution that encompass the extent and cause of change. In brief, the models are: 1) organizations whose present mission closely mirrors their original missions, 2) organizations that consciously adapted their mission to align with donor priorities and funding criteria and 3) organizations whose founding mission was so broad and all encompassing that one cannot identify mission drift or fulfillment.

3.4.1 STAYING THE COURSE

Articulating a clearly defined and specific focus at an organization’s founding is critical to mission success. It enables the NGO to focus its limited resources and thereby maximize impact. Possession of a well-defined mission at the start also increases the likelihood that an organization will stay the course, adhering to the same mission over the course of its organizational lifetime. This model was observed with both the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIN) and Centre for Environmentally Sustainable Development (COOR). CIN’s initial mission remains unchanged: to educate citizens through the use of investigative journalism. The organization’s capacity to achieve said mission has expanded as staff gained experience and expertise. As a consequence, the volume and depth of topics CIN covers have grown, such that its extensive online coverage now includes spending by political parties, government salaries and government issued pardons. In the case of COOR, the interviewee noted that the initial mission, to reestablish connections between Bosnian citizens using environmental issues as a framework, was unchanged. In
discussing the process used to evaluate potential projects with partner organizations, the interviewee specifically noted that they would proceed “if an initiative is in line with our mission.” Such a comment is indicative of using mission as a filter, a tactic that Dolnicar et al. identify as a critical safeguard against mission creep. COOR has also displayed the capacity to consciously and intentionally adapt its tactics to changing circumstances. This is on display in the organization’s changing relationship with the government: in the late 1990s, COOR worked as a partner to government, collecting and sharing information about environmental protection. As the government grew in capacity, COOR increasingly assumed an advocacy role towards the government. Such tactical adaptability ensures continued relevance.

Notably, both COOR and CIN appear relatively secure in their relationship with donors. CIN stated that they rely on 10-15 international donors and expressed confidence that donor money would continue to be an important source of revenue in the future. The professionalization of the organization (20 fulltime staff) speaks to a fairly reliable cash flow. Undoubtedly, this was aided by the organization’s beginnings as a USAID project. Although CIN registered as a local organization in 2005, its USAID roots no doubt provided entry to the donor cohort.

COOR’s financial resources are far less than those of CIN, as evidenced by the fact that all staff participates on a voluntary basis. However, in the course of the interview and when asked about challenges facing the organization, the interviewee made no mention of insufficient financial resources, a common complaint amongst the NGO community.

The ‘staying the course’ model relies upon continued access to donor funds. Absent that, the organization would be forced to shift its own priorities to match donor priorities (discussed below in the Reluctant Evolution model). We are, however, reluctant to speculate that continued
access to donor funds has permitted to COOR and CIN to metaphorically rest on their laurels. To the contrary, need surrounding their initial (and continued) missions remains high. CIN has increased its internal capacity and COOR demonstrates responsiveness to external events, adjusting its tactics accordingly. Both of these behaviors are indicative of high effort. Further, CIN has been proactive in exploring commercial revenue sources that would diversify their funding base.

3.4.2 RELUCTANT EVOLUTION

In the developed and developing world alike, there exists a fear that donors will coop NGOs, forcing them to abandon their original mission in favor of donor priorities. Faced with a mismatch of NGO/donor priorities, AbouAssi outlines four options available to the NGO, drawing on an amended version of Hirschman’s typology: exit, voice, loyalty or adjustment. We found some evidence of this donor-driven pressure in BiH, although the viability of the ‘exit’ option is questionable, given sector-wide reliance on foreign donor monies.

PRONI Centar za omladinski razvoj Brčko was founded in 1998 with close cooperation of a Swedish University to conduct conflict mitigation programs with young people. Employing a methodology developed in post-conflict Northern Ireland, the curriculum brought together Bosniak, Serbian and Croatian youth for a dialogue intended to achieve reconciliation and build peace.

PRONI readily acknowledged that its mission has migrated towards community engagement, youth entrepreneurship and employment in recent years, attributing the shift to declining donor interest in democratization, as well as shifting interests amongst its target
population. This appears a textbook case of donor-driven mission shift, albeit a case in which donor pressure moved the NGO into a high-need area. The interviewee acknowledged the relevance of economic needs, but also stressed the continued, unmet need for peace building and reconciliation.65

PRONI’s experience offers us several insights. First, donor driven mission drift can simultaneously divert an NGO from its original mission and guide it towards an in-demand sector. Community needs are met, with the donor acting as manager and the NGOs serving as staff. However, this hierarchy forfeits the on-the-ground insights into community need that a strong grassroots NGO can provide and forces the NGO into unfamiliar waters. The interviewee at PRONI commented: “I was invited into Swedish Embassy where we were planning because they took us as stakeholders … we all said young people, peace building, gender, equality, human rights are important for this country. But when they developed their strategic plan they completely kicked out that kind of democratization. I don’t know, it’s not up to us.”

In stressing the importance of continued support for peace building to the Swedish donors, PRONI was executing its voice option. When that failed, PRONI exercised adjustment, a conscious decision to shift its priorities to align with donors. Such a path is not without risks: losing touch with one’s mission, the upward movement of accountability and undermining one’s credibility with the public. While PRONI appears to have skirted these dangers, maintaining a high degree of community connection, the fact remains that donor priorities trump those of local players in the Reluctant Evolution model.
Whereas the aforementioned NGOs possessed a clearly articulated mission upon founding, said focus is not universal across the NGO sector. In other cases, the mission is excessively broad and all encompassing. In such cases, it is difficult to identify mission drift or, alternatively, mission fulfillment. This was most apparent in the case of the Post Conflict Research Center (P-CRC). P-CRC has conducted a range of diverse projects, all in the general field of peace building and reconciliation, but, to use the language of the donors, the aggregate theory of change is notable absent. Projects appear to be selected on an ad hoc basis. Each stands separately and does not build upon the goals and gains of prior projects.

The catchall mission might arise from one of several causes. It could be that the founders never narrowed down their vision, attempting to fit all their diverse passions into a single organization. Alternatively, an NGO may intentionally craft a mission broad enough that it can be stretched to encompass whatever priority of the day the donor has articulated. Whatever the driver, the dangers are the same: a grab bag of projects that require that staff to habitually build new skills and networks. An NGO with the Catchall Mission faces the metaphorical challenge of an inch deep, a mile wide.

Notably, P-CRC voiced heavy complaints about resource availability, noting the presence of “nepotism and corruption” in access to international funding. The interviewee placed blame with local embassy staff who were “in a position to influence how funding will be delivered,” as well as an exclusive club of donor-favored NGOs who control access to the donors. One’s access to funding, she stated, depended more on “connections” than organizational capacities or the virtues of a project. In spite of these complaints, donors listed on P-CRC’s website include a

It is hard to reconcile these various sentiments and behaviors. In an environment characterized by shifting donor priorities, a Catchall Mission NGO may actually be more likely to survive than an NGO with a singularity of focus, given its ability to remake itself according to donor demands. As a result, however, it is subject to an intensified version of the risks identified in the Reluctant Evolution model: upward accountability and low credibility with the public. Although the Catchall Mission NGO may be an effective implementer of donor-funded projects, its capacity to serve as a vehicle for civil society is questionable.

In a 1996 article, Ian Smillie warned against the donor habit of treating NGOs as service delivery agents in BiH. Following up in 2001, Smillie and Kristie Evenson observed that “channeling money through local organizations, [donors] could implement discrete projects with set goals. They could get a lot done with a little money. But this worked against the creation of an environment for long-term civil society sustainability.” Donor strategies have shifted since 2001 to address this concern. The 2005 Paris Declaration, in particular, identified priorities by which to increase aid effectiveness. Bilateral and multilateral donor alike have made recent efforts to provide core funding to replace the ‘project treadmill.’ However, as the example of P-CRC suggests, complicit NGOs can permit the endurance of the ‘NGO as service delivery agent’ model. NGOs with broadly defined missions are especially prone to, and arguably even financially benefit from, the project treadmill. This sort of constant mission shifting is not evidence of responsiveness to public needs; rather, it likely indicates an NGO out of touch with community need.
3.5 SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA AT WORK?

Armed with these insights, we return to our central question: did the guarantee of donor funding incentivize recipients to alter their behavior, specifically towards exerting less effort?

Mission evolution occurred to varying degrees across the six NGOs with whom we conducted interviews. Where mission shift did occur, it was conscious, but reluctant. We did not find evidence of the intentional and independent decision making that would point to responsiveness to changing constituent needs.

On the other hand, we have those organizations whose mission has remained largely unchanged. Our previous hypothesis rested on the assumption that failure to evolve one’s mission was evidence of unresponsiveness to changing social needs. Upon seeing NGO mission in practice however, this assumption requires revision. Steadfastness in mission may, in fact, indicate deep and continued need. The COOR interviewee stated that the government has made negative progress in the quality of environmental reviews. The CIN interviewee stated that “the [media] situation is not much better now that it was in 2004,” specifically stressing the obstacles that journalists face in gaining access to supposedly public information. The problems these NGOs confront lack quick fixes. Bolstered by either donors who are consistent in their support or by the capacity resist donor pressure, NGOs double down on their original mission.

Our limited qualitative survey suggests that, while the Samaritan’s Dilemma may take hold on a case by case basis, it is not sufficiently widespread to singlehandedly explain the observed disconnect between Bosnian NGOs and the public. For that, alternative, and perhaps complementary, explanations are needed. We turn briefly to a trend that emerged repeatedly in conversations with interviewees: the mystery of the missing constituency.
3.6 LEADERS WITHOUT FOLLOWERS

In her article on the impact of foreign donors on civil society organizations in Russia, Sarah Henderson notes that she had the impression she was meeting “leaders without followers.” “Few groups,” she writes, “had volunteers and even fewer had a clear concept of a core group of people that they claimed to represent.” 68

The interviews conducted with Bosnian NGOs yielded a similar impression, with one notable exception. When asked to identify their target beneficiaries, responses were very broad, including ‘Bosnian citizens’ and ‘youth.’ In conversations about the organizations’ strategic planning processes and priority setting, there were no mechanisms by which to engage a public constituency. These two observations are logically linked: when one’s target beneficiaries are all Bosnian citizens, the prospect of establishing a meaningful two-way dialogue is near impossible.

The extreme of this phenomenon is the NGO where a local constituency is not only absent, but considered unnecessary. The P-CRC interviewee described her vision for the organization as an “organization of young experts from all around the world … bringing change in society.” The key difference here is not in the end result (change in society, a clean environment, political transparency) but in the process. A corporation or a government is equally, if not more, capable of achieving those results. An NGO is distinct in that it achieves that change not only for society but with society. The entire process – from identifying the needs to implementing change – should be cooperative and inclusive.

All the interviewed organizations were providing praiseworthy services and displayed strong personal conviction in their work. Their projects aspired to protect national parks, exposure corruption and increase awareness of the handling electronic waste. However, it
appears that their projects were selected and designed by a small group of NGO employees, with minimal to no public consultation to gauge their needs.

The conduct of projects of social, political and economic value to BiH is a positive trend. However, the unique value of NGOs lays in their capacity to act as a conduit for and give voice to the public’s needs. If NGOs lack mechanisms to engage in dialogue with beneficiaries, their project selection, design and rationale lies on the assumptions of organizational leadership. The result, then, is a small number of individuals deciding what is best for society as a whole. The NGO, in other words, knows best.

Given the reoccurrence of this missing constituency in our interviews, we propose that this is a likely (if not exclusive) explanation for the observed NGO/society disconnect. The public does not necessarily reject the work of NGOs, they simply do not feel represented by those NGOs. The federal, entity, and municipal governments each pay lip service to acting in the citizens’ best interest. The foreign donors, World Bank and UN offer white papers and funds to move Bosnia forward. In the country’s 2014 national elections, 65 registered political parties, most of ethnic affiliations, claimed to represent the interest of Croats, Serbs or Bosniaks. Bosnians are not short on actors claiming to act on their behalf. NGOs devoid of a constituency are just another such actor.

Notably, the PRONI Centar za omladinski razvoj Brčko stands out in contrast to this trend. PRONI played a central role in creating the Youth Club network, a network of 26 clubs in the Brčko region. PRONI’s volunteer base includes 2 volunteers from each club, individuals who manifest the network linkages. In the past, PRONI had daily and weekly interaction with the clubs via program support, joint activities and provision of monitoring and evaluation expertise. In the past two to three years, however, the interviewee noted that PRONI’s ties with the network
have weakened. He admitted that current “connections and relations to the local society is questionable” and identified reengaging the network as one of PRONI’s top priorities. Despite the recent lapse, the Youth Club Network appears a standout, if exceptional, instance of grassroots dialogue, providing the NGO with a direct, two-way conduit to their beneficiaries.

The mystery of the missing constituency is a fruitful area for future research. In particular, research should explore the role of donor money and accompanying upward accountability in diminishing NGOs’ traditional downward accountability. Donor civil society strategy worldwide has moved towards encouraging networks between NGOs. These initial findings suggest, however, that in BiH, equal attention should be given to fostering networks that connect NGOs with the community. Future research also ought to examine existing networks, such as the Youth Center network, that link NGOs to constituents in more detail in order to evaluate their potential as models.

3.7 NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY FUNDED PROJECTS

Before considering the policy implications of these finding, we will briefly examine changes in NGO focus via the sample of NED funded NGO projects. First, we should note the varying volume of resources directed to Bosnia over the selected four-year period. As seen in Table 4, both the total amount of funding available to BiH and the number of recipient organizations increased threefold over the sample time period. International NGOs account for half (4 of 8) of the recipients in 1996. In the following three years, local NGO predominate. Given the smaller
sample size in 1996 and 2002, there is significantly less variation in the sector rankings than in the later years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4 NED Grants to BiH, Statistics</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1996</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount distributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average grant amount</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of grants distributed</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The rankings for sectors in which projects were funded are presented in Tables 5 – 8. Several trends are immediately apparent. First, the category of ‘Media/accountability/transparency/corruption’ ranks high across all four years, consistently ranked #1 or #2. The same is generally true of ‘Education/youth,’ with the exception of 1996. As noted earlier however, the small number of grants distributed in 1996 and 2002 urge us to be cautious in approaching those samples. In 2002, for example, two projects were funded in each of the #1 sectors (resulting in a four-way tie) and one project was funded in each of the #5 sectors. The difference between primary and secondary sectors, therefore, is rather small. Together, ‘Media/accountability/transparency/corruption’ and ‘Education/youth,’ are the clear focus of the NGO community across the surveyed time period.

Projects devote moderate levels of attention to ‘Electoral democracy/elections,’ and, to a somewhat lesser degree, ‘Democracy building.’ ‘EU Accession’ projects first appear on the radar in 2012, as one would expect (it is likely that projects targeting EU accession were funded in 2009/10/11, which are omitted from our sample). We might also find higher rates of projects
targeting EU accession were we to consider a sample of NGOs funded by a European organization or institution. Relatively low levels of attention are paid to ‘Women/Gender’, ‘Labor’, ‘Minority Rights,’ or ‘Human Rights’ in any of the four years.

From this NED sample, we cautiously note a generally static state of NGO project focus. Between 1996 and 2012, project focus has remained on ‘Education/youth’ and ‘Media/accountability/transparency/corruption.’ We were unable to identify any sectors that have either risen or dropped dramatically in importance. Acknowledging the potential sources of error previously identified, it appears that aggregate donor-funded NGO focus has been relatively unchanging. A larger sample of NGOs, especially for the early years when the low number of grants makes for relatively small differences between primary and secondary sectors, would increase the validity of this finding.

Table 5 NED funded projects 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media/accountability/transparency/corruption</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/youth</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy building</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral democracy/elections</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Accession</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic reconciliation/transitional justice/post conflict</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective local governance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil sector</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority rights</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women/Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 NED funded projects 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education/youth</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media/accountability/transparency/corruption</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral democracy/elections</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy building</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective local governance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic reconciliation/transitional justice</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women/Gender</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority rights</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU accession</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil sector</td>
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</table>

Table 7 NED funded projects 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2002</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education/youth</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media/accountability/transparency/corruption</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral democracy/elections</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic reconciliation/transitional justice</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy building</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women/Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minority rights</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU accession</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil sector</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective local governance</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


45 About Us. Big Brothers Big Sisters of America. [http://www.bbbs.org/site/c.9IIL3NGKhK6F/b.5962351/k.42EB/We_are_here_to_start_something.htm](http://www.bbbs.org/site/c.9IIL3NGKhK6F/b.5962351/k.42EB/We_are_here_to_start_something.htm) Accessed February 3 2015


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### Table 8 NED funded projects 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1996</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media/accountability/transparency/corruption</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy bldg</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral democracy/elections</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil sector</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women/Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority rights</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU accession</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/youth</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective local governance</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic reconciliation/transitional justice</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gregson, Kendra. “Veteran Programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” June 2000


https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_1st_SR_BiH_en.pdf


Civil Society Assessment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. USAID, June 2004.

Interview with P-CRC staff. February 5 2015.


Ibid.

National Endowment for Democracy, Applying for an NED Grant.

NED states that it seeks projects that: Promote and defend human rights and the rule of law; Support freedom of information and independent media; Strengthen democratic ideas and values; Promote accountability and transparency; Strengthen civil society organizations; Strengthen democratic political processes and institutions; Promote civic education; Support democratic conflict resolution; Promote freedom of association; Strengthen a broad-based market economy.

Interview with COOR staff. February 2 2015.


Interview with CIN staff. February 3 2015.
AbouAssi, Khaldoun. “Hands in the Pockets of Mercurial Donors: NGO Response to Shifting Funding Priorities,” *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* vol. 42 no. 3 pp. 584-602.

Interview with PRONI staff. February 10 2015.

Smillie, Ian & Kristie Evenson. “Sustainable Civil Society or Service Delivery Agencies: The Evolution of Non-governmental Organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”


For 2008 and 2012, the average grant calculation omits a National Democratic Institute for International Affairs project. In 2012, the project received $425,000, accounting for nearly one third of NED funding to Bosnia that year. In 2008, the project received. Given that NDI is best classified as an international NGO, and given the volume of the grant, it is removed as an outlier.
4.0 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

We began by asking if the Samaritan’s Dilemma might explain the levels of disconnect between the Bosnian NGO community and the Bosnian public. In other words, is there evidence that Bosnian NGOs changed their behavior, particularly by exerting lower levels of efforts, in response to donor presence? To gauge level of effort, we focused on mission evolution. We hypothesized that a ‘high effort’ NGO would modify its mission over time in response to changing public needs in a changing post-conflict environment. Conversely, a ‘low effort’ NGO would be unresponsive to changing community needs and could be identified by the presence of a rigid, unchanging mission.

By conducting qualitative interviews with six Bosnian NGOs operating in a diverse range of sectors, we identified three separate models pertaining to mission evolution. The first model (Stay the Course) describes NGOs whose mission has remained largely unchanged since their founding. The second model (Reluctant Evolution) captures NGOs who have consciously, but reluctantly, shifting their mission towards donor priorities in order to ensure access to funding. To use existing terminology, these NGOs experience donor driven mission drift, although the extent to which the decision to shift mission is a conscious one likely varies between NGOs. The third category (Catch All Mission) concerns NGOs that lack a clearly articulated mission and are therefore prone to a haphazard, ad hoc approach in designing and executing projects.
An analysis of NGO projects funded by the National Endowment for Democracy between 1996 and 2012, focusing on the frequency with which projects were undertaken in different sectors, revealed a consistent focus on two sectors: ‘Education/youth’ and ‘Media/accountability/transparency/corruption.’ However, in light of insights revealed by our qualitative data, we are hesitant to brand the lack of sector change as evidence of an unresponsive, low effort NGO sector. Evidence suggests that NGOs of the ‘Stay the Course’ model maintained their mission because levels of need in that area remained high. Additionally, they displayed growth in organizational capacity over time, as well as the ability to adapt tactics to changes in the external environment. Both of these characteristics suggest a highly capable organization, not one that has reduced its level of effort. Stay the Course NGOs are enabled to do so by dependable donor support – otherwise, they are likely to be forced into the ‘Reluctant Evolution’ model. Given these observations, we speculate that the NED sample reveals a continued high level of need in the ‘Education/youth’ and ‘Media/accountability/transparency/corruption’ sectors, a need that was recognized by NGOs and donors alike.

The largely qualitative methodology employed here is not sufficient to conclusively disprove the influence of the Samaritan’s Dilemma in the Bosnian NGO sector. Further research, employing different proxies to measure NGO effort, would be valuable to either confirm these findings or to expose evidence of reduced effort. However, based on the results uncovered here, we find that the Samaritan’s Dilemma is not a sufficient explanation for the observed disconnect between the Bosnian public and the local NGO community.

Analysis revealed the possibility of an alternative explanation: a missing link between NGOs and the public. Qualitative interviews found that most NGOs could not identify a target
beneficiary group. Likewise, for all their good intentions, NGO strategic planning lacked mechanisms by which to involve or solicit input from the public. In the most extreme case, NGOs identify as being part of a global civil society, completely negating the need for a local constituency. The result is a grouping of donor-funded NGOs that are ‘leaders without followers,’ ill equipped to play their ascribed role as a conduit for civil society.

Further research is needed to identify 1) the extent of the observed leaders without followers phenomena and 2) the underlying causes. Of particular interest is whether the creation and subsistence of follower-less NGOs has been facilitated by donor presence.

4.1 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: EFFECTIVE NGO/DONOR PARTNERSHIPS

The central role accorded to NGOs in donor civil society development strategies presumes a strong linkage between the NGO and the community. Absent that link, the mechanism by which NGO funding fosters civil society is called into question. As such, our policy recommendations first require the donors to identify their core objective in NGO funding: support for civil society or service delivery. To increase the efficiency of donor aid in the former, we recommend that donors incorporate ‘community integration’ in the criteria used to evaluate potential grant recipients. Having identified NGOs with strong community linkages, donor funding practices should aspire to enable those organizations to follow the ‘Stay the Course’ mission model. This shift will likely bring the donor community into contact with the resource-poor marginal NGOs; while these organizations possess strong community linkages, donors should proceed cautiously so as to avoid undermining those ties.
This agenda returns us to the wider definition of civil society, of which formalized NGOs are only one part. To date, donors have made increasing efforts to broaden their conceptualization of civil society. This shift is apparent in a 2011 EuropeAid policy paper which drops the term NGO in preference of the term Non-State Actors (NSAs) and includes the mandate to “mov[e] beyond the ‘usual suspects’ (INGOs, NSA networks in the capital) and reach out to smaller NSAs at grassroots level.” Though reforms to policy and programs lag behind shifts in donor rhetoric, the broader definition of civil society is nonetheless significant. The existing literature on donor/NGO relationships draws a useful distinction between NGOs and membership-based organizations, the latter being “more traditional forms of civil society organizations such as social movements, political, or religious institutions, trade unions, cooperatives, small self-help groups.” MBOs are distinct from NGOs in that they are accountable to members (rather than staff) and employ a demand-side approach to program design. Clearly, there is a high degree of overlap between what we have labeled marginal NGOs in the Bosnian case and MBOs. Despite the difference in language, the NGO/MBO distinction is largely reflective of the scenario we observe in BiH, with the NGOs being (relatively) well-funded but lacking grassroots ties and the MBOs rich in grassroots ties but poor in resources and influence. Summarizing the existing literature, Banks, Hulem and Edwards offer a series of recommendations for increasing NGO effectiveness that call upon the NGOs themselves to reconceive of their role. By employing their preexisting strengths – including technical knowledge, political advocacy and relationships, and legitimacy – they facilitate a “stronger, more inter-connected civil society in which NGOs play a key bridging role between MBOs, local and national governments.”
Donors’ path forward depends largely on their objectives. NGO funding has traditionally been awarded on the basis of project criteria as well as the grantee’s technical and managerial capacity. Little effort has been made to assess the existence and strength of the recipient’s community integration. If the donor’s core interest is the service that a particular NGO provides, then donor funding is not misplaced. If, however, the donor’s ultimate goal is to foster local civil society, funding recipients should be selected primarily on the strength of the NGO’s community ties and only secondarily on the NGO’s programmatic outputs.

Decisions of this sort will likely be made on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps human rights watchdog organizations are deemed sufficiently foundational to Bosnian democracy to merit continued foreign funding, even absent representative ties between the recipient and the community. Arguably, the value of these organizations can be compared to the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) – as the public goods they provide are deemed fundamental to democracy, the U.S. government bears all or part of the expense. Some Bosnian organizations will be assigned this level of importance, others will not. However, in the interest of advancing Bosnian civil society, donors must be honest with themselves about which NGOs are and are not advancing that objective.

Where the core objective is to strengthen civil society, donors must develop a mechanism to identify NGOs that possess strong community ties. Drawing upon the interview script employed in this research, the specificity of an NGO’s reply about its beneficiaries is enlightening. Donors might also pose questions about whose voices are included in the NGO’s strategic planning process, as well as the criteria used in program design. Direct donor observation of these procedures may be necessary to verify NGO responses. The regular use of
processes to solicit feedback and opinions from the public is also a positive indicator of community integration.

Expanding the criteria used to evaluate grant applications to include community integration is likely to advantage small, local organizations as opposed to the national-level NGOs that donors have previously favored. This will include many of the ‘marginal NGOs’ that have previously been beyond the inner circle of donor funding. Reaching these NGOs requires special considerations, given that many lack the institutional know-how and English language skills requisite to complete a grant proposal. Were the donors to accept proposals written in the local language, that change alone would significantly expand the field of eligible NGOs. Increasingly, internal EU grants may be submitted in any of the official 24 EU languages; however, the EU Special Representative of BiH, like other foreign donors, requires that grant/tender applications are written in English. Additionally, foreign donors need to employ a more proactive approach in spreading information about available grants. Proactive donor outreach combined with simplified application procedures would break the monopoly that large, established NGOs have on information and boost applications from small NGOs that possess strong local ties but lack paid staff devoted to grant research and writing.

EU funding, which is notoriously bureaucratically onerous to navigate despite previous reform efforts, is especially in need of simplification. The manual entitled “Developing and Managing EU-Funded Projects” published by Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations (TASCO) in 2011 clocks in at 119 pages – hardly navigable for organizations lacking a single fulltime paid staff member. An NGO director in Serbia commented that “the formal requirements (of the EU) are extensive, and the procedures are demanding. But it is a skill like any other. The first time is tough, but when you understand the logic and system of project
proposal writing, each time will be easier. It should also be clear that for writing a well-researched, high-quality project proposal you will need at least two months – six months if you are a beginner.”71 Non-professional organizations of the sort most likely to have strong grassroots ties do not have the luxury of such resources. The existent donor-imposed barriers of entry bar the majority of organizations characterized by high levels of community engagement from consideration.

As they initiate engagement with marginal NGOs, the donor community must exercise several cautions. The first is to focus training (if deemed appropriate and beneficial) on measures that boost institutional capacity, as opposed to more superficial trainings such as those geared to writing mission statements and Logical Frameworks. The success of local NGOs in building civil society depends on public engagement, not upon their successful replication of Western development paperwork. Western NGOs may be better positioned than Western governments to oversee such substance-based knowledge transfer. A twinning program, linking successful local Western NGOs with aspiring Bosnian NGOs, could be established.

The second caution is that donors proceed in a manner that does not inadvertently weaken the existing linkages between the NGO and its constituent community. The introduction of upward accountability to the donor should not displace downward accountability. As Carothers and de Gramont note, there exists a real danger that “to the extent that aid actors support civil society groups with strong grassroots connections, their funding can cause these organizations to become increasingly responsive to the preferences and needs of donors at the expense of accountability to their grassroots members.”72 This scenario can be circumvented by providing recipients the freedom and flexibility they need to follow the ‘Stay the Course’ model. By providing grant recipients with the necessary latitude to adhere to their own priorities, even when
those are not a mirror image of donor priorities, donors can minimize disruptions to downward accountability. That is not to say that upward accountability must be neglected; rather, NGO-to-donor accountability should be reimagined such that an NGO’s success depends on involving local community members and responding to their needs.

By distributing funds on the basis of donor priorities, no matter how well designed and intentioned these priorities may be, donors create strong incentives for NGOs to switch to the ‘Reluctant Evolution’ model. In the short term, this may achieve the donor goal of delivering needed services. In the longer term however, it undermines donors’ civil society objectives by sacrificing the NGOs’ natural aptitudes and undermining local legitimacy. Donors have already begun to abandon the practice of unilaterally setting priorities in favor of local ownership, under which “developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.”73 A 2010 report on donors’ civil society policies and practices reported that “it is increasingly recognised that ‘national ownership’ of strategies need to be broader than ‘government ownership’, and CSOs are seen as crucial actors in bringing a broader notion of citizens’ needs and rights to the table.”74 If a process is in place to verify that recipient NGOs possess strong community linkages, donors can be more confident than NGO priorities reflect public needs and are less in need of donor instruction.

Before concluding, we turn briefly to the paths available to NGOs themselves. Those NGOs that have fallen victim to the leaders without followers phenomenon face an uphill battle. Constituencies are difficult to build retroactively. NGOs typically emerge in a grassroots fashion. As they grow, they run the risk of losing touch with their supporters, but there always exists the possibility of returning to said constituency. In contrast, the local NGOs profiled here began as leaders without followers; they advanced the agenda of a few in the name of societal good. More
often than not, the organizational mission was to the benefit of society, but public involvement was not sought. Acknowledging the value of their respective causes, the fact remains that leaders without followers are NGOs in name only.

Absent a veritable constituency, many elite NGOs are likely to collapse as donors continue their gradual withdrawal from BiH. This is not necessary a negative; the closure of such NGOs does not indicate the collapse of civil society, only its veneer. Such closures may even have positive spillover effects across the nonprofit sector: it will free up trained and educated staff who have long been in the employ of elite NGOs, some of whom will hopefully bring their program expertise to the NGOs struggling on the margins. Alternatively, some organizations that provide valued and tangible public services – such as CIN – may adapt to the changing circumstances by finding a way to monetize their product, perhaps even shifting to a for profit model.

In speaking with NGOs, one hears the refrain that the populace is apathetic and disengaged. The February 2014 protests and subsequent plenum movement suggests that this assessment overlooks latent changes in Bosnian society. Writing in 2009, CIN highlighted several examples that illustrate a frustrated public seeking change, even if they are unsure of the mechanisms by which to achieve said change. The article points to several spontaneous anti-crime demonstrations, as well as the citizen movement ‘Dosta’ (Enough), which played a key role in a campaign that led to the ousting of Federation Prime Minister Nedžad Branković on corruption charges.75 When bureaucratic bickering prevented newborns from being issued citizen ID numbers in summer 2014, thereby preventing them from accessing life saving medical treatment abroad, nearly 3,000 citizens staged a sit-in at the National Parliament.76
Claims that the events of February 2014 foretold a ‘Bosnian Spring’ were exaggerated. Nonetheless, these isolated events suggest that we would be errant to write off the Bosnian public as disengaged. In the wake of last year’s protests, *The Economist* wrote that “Bosnians are angry and frustrated with their rulers. They regard their politicians as crooks and thieves, and yet when presented with different options … they have not voted for it in significant numbers.”

Left adrift, this mounting public frustration is dangerous, likely to manifest in violence as it did in February 2014 when protestors set multiple government buildings afire. Mobilizing these citizens, especially amidst public suspicion of civil society organizations, is no easy task. That is the challenge facing the Bosnian NGO community. Success relies, not upon access to funding, but on organizations’ ability to earn and maintain the public’s trust.

Even as Western donors reduce their presence in Bosnia, they are scaling up in other parts of the globe. Whether in crisis zones such as Ukraine and Syria, or in longer-term engagement such as Russia and Turkey, civil society promotion is likely to remain a core component of democracy promotion strategies overseas. The findings presented here, therefore, have wide implications for Western support of nascent NGOs in fledging democracies and autocratic regimes. Based on aid outcomes in Bosnia, we see that those organizations self-identifying as NGOs do not necessarily possess the community ties commonly associated with that sector. As such, donor funding decisions based on organizational capacity, project viability and finances are insufficient. In order to maximize aid’s impact on civil society, community integration should be made a cornerstone in funding decisions. Despite its good intentions, international funding for foreign NGOs is a double-edged sword, one that risks not only sustaining, but actually fostering, the creation of NGOs detached from the communities they purport to serve.
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