

WAYS OF APPEARING
EXPERIENCE AND ITS PHENOMENOLOGY

by

Miloš Vuletić

BA, University of Belgrade, 2005

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
the Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial
fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh

2015

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

This dissertation was presented

by

Miloš Vuletić

It was defended on

December 11, 2014

and approved by

Anil Gupta, Alan Ross Anderson Distinguished Professor of Philosophy

John McDowell, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy

Karl Schafer, Associate Professor of Philosophy

Peter Machamer, Professor of History and Philosophy of Science

Dissertation Director: Anil Gupta, Alan Ross Anderson Distinguished Professor of
Philosophy

Copyright © by Miloš Vuletić
2015

WAYS OF APPEARING
EXPERIENCE AND ITS PHENOMENOLOGY

Miloš Vuletić, PhD

University of Pittsburgh, 2015

Perceptual experience is an invaluable guide to our cognition of the world: (i) experience helps make thoughts about mind-independent objects possible, and (ii) experience helps make thoughts about mind-independent objects reasonable. My dissertation aims to answer the question: how should we account for experience if we are to do justice to its rational role in cognition? I argue that neither of the two dominant contemporary models of experience is satisfactory: experience as representation and experience as acquaintance. Experience should be understood as a matter of various items being present to the experiencing subject. Crucially, I propose an account of perceptual error in terms of the presence of unreal sense-images (in hallucination) and presentational tropes (in illusion).

First I argue against treating experience as a representational state. I show that such treatments require a strong relation to obtain between experience and content; I argue that the strong relation cannot be sustained. I show, in particular, that experience is not best understood as a state in which properties are attributed to objects or in which concepts are employed. Experience should instead be treated as a matter of a relation of subjects to objects and their properties.

Next, I argue against the acquaintance-based relational approaches to experience. These accounts do not treat illusion plausibly; they cannot sustain two basic facts: that an object can exhibit different appearances and that different objects can exhibit identical appearances. In response to this problem I posit a weaker perceptual relation: in experience certain items are present to the subject. Presence does not entail knowledge of items present.

Finally, I offer an improved relationalist approach to perceptual error. I endorse the idea that in hallucination there are items—unreal sense-images—present to the subject. However, I reject the proposal to treat illusions in the same way: presence of sense-images in illusion makes the presence of misperceived objects redundant. Instead, I propose that presentational tropes are present in illusion. Presentational tropes are relational particulars that require both a subject and an experienced object for their existence.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	viii
1.0 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Relationalism and Representationalism	1
1.2 The Argument from Looks	8
1.3 The Plan	12
2.0 REPRESENTATIONALISM: SEEING AND SEEING AS	17
2.1 Siegel’s Argument from Appearing	17
2.2 Phenomenology and its Relation to Properties	26
3.0 REPRESENTATIONALISM: EMPLOYMENT OF CONCEPTS	28
3.1 Schellenberg’s Argument	28
3.2 Concepts and Phenomenology	34
3.3 Conclusion	39
4.0 RELATIONALISM: ONE OBJECT–MANY LOOKS	42
4.1 Phenomenology and Acquaintance	42
4.2 Campbell on Transparency	46
5.0 RELATIONALISM: ONE LOOK–MANY OBJECTS	55
5.1 Brewer on Visually Relevant Similarities	57
5.2 Genone on Appearance Properties	66
6.0 PHENOMENAL CONTENT AND THE GROUNDING INTUITION	80
6.1 Introduction	80
6.2 The Grounding Intuition	82
6.3 Edenic Properties and the Phenomenology of Experience	85

7.0 PHENOMENOLOGY AND PRESENTATIONAL TROPES	96
7.1 Phenomenology and Presence	96
7.2 Presentational Tropes	109
8.0 CONCLUSION	122
BIBLIOGRAPHY	130

PREFACE

This work would not have been possible without the help of my advisor, Anil Gupta. Philosophical debts I owe to Anil will be clear to anyone who reads the text below. But Anil's influence on this dissertation and myself as a philosopher go well beyond his own work. Anil believed in this project and supported me even at times when I myself had doubts. Most of all, I owe thanks to Anil for being an exceptionally generous mentor, capable of creating a space of quiet encouragement and support in which thinking about philosophical problems can become a truly wonderful collaborative endeavor.

I wish to thank other members of my committee: John McDowell, Karl Schafer, and Peter Machamer. John in particular supported me generously in the final stages of my work on the dissertation. He was also the source of numerous exceptionally perceptive and probing questions, objections, and comments during all the stages of my work on this project. I strongly doubt he was satisfied with my responses, but my work was always better for trying to come up with them.

Thanks are due to all those who offered helpful comments, criticisms, and questions on parts of my dissertation in various stages of its development: Ori Beck, David de Bruijn, Anja Jauernig, Tyke Nunez, Raja Rosenhagen, Susanna Schellenberg, Jonathan Surovell, and Timothy Williamson.

I would like to thank my undergraduate advisor, Miloš Arsenijević, who first convinced me I could be a writer of good philosophical texts, and who encouraged me to pursue a Ph.D.

I thank my parents, Mirjana and Vojislav, and my brother Pavle for their unconditional love and unwavering support. Last but by no means least, I thank my wife Jelena, with whom I shared every single day of working on this project. She has never been anything

but kind, patient, and encouraging, and her love and support have seen me through all the challenges I had to face.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 RELATIONALISM AND REPRESENTATIONALISM

1. Perceptual experience serves as an invaluable guide to our cognition of the world. Specifically, perceptual experience (a) makes thoughts (or at least certain kinds of thoughts) about mind-independent objects possible, and (b) makes (or at least helps make) thoughts about mind-independent objects reasonable.

Consider two examples of the role of experience highlighted in (a). First, many of the concepts we employ when we think and judge about items in our environment acquire their content—at least in part—from experience. The content of the concept SHARP, as well as one’s grasp of this concept, is largely dependent on experience of objects to which it applies. Second, experience makes demonstrative thought about external objects possible. By way of illustration, consider the following case. Suppose you are looking at a group of people seated around a long table. If someone were to ask you “what is that person doing?” your very ability to understand the inquiry and competently respond to it will depend on your knowledge of what ‘that person’ refers to. And for this to be possible—even in the light of a description of the person in question—you need to visually single out the referent of ‘that person’.¹

Perceptual experience does not just supply content to concepts and give occasion for thoughts about objects; it also contributes to the logical task of making judgments and beliefs about objects reasonable—experience plays a role in providing us with reasons for beliefs and judgments about the world. Suppose I make the judgment ‘that cleaver is sharp’ while pointing at an object on my kitchen table. The judgment may turn out to be unreasonable:

¹This point is emphasized in Campbell (2002a), 2.

it could be the case that I make such an utterance whenever I enter a kitchen, hoping I will thereby keep evil demons at bay, regardless of whether I see a cleaver or not; or it could be that I have been temporarily blinded and that I am making random judgments about objects in my environment. But the judgment could also be reasonable. When this is the case, it is so in large part due to the fact that an experience of a certain kind had occurred. It should be noted that a perceptual judgment may be reasonable even though it is not true. The object appropriated by my use of the complex demonstrative ‘that cleaver’ may turn out to be a knife, or to be completely dull.² Yet the perceptual judgment might still be reasonable.

Experience can be examined and accounted for with an eye on one or more of its many aspects and roles. We may be interested in perceptual experience as a natural phenomenon: for example, we may want to explore the physical and neurological processes that underlie perception, or its structural relation with action. On the other hand, experience can be examined from the point of view of epistemology and logic: the interest here may be in experience as a source of knowledge, or in experience as reason for belief. The present inquiry belongs to the latter kind of examination into the nature of perceptual experience. The goal of this inquiry is to propose an account of perceptual experience; in particular, the goal is to account for perceptual experience in a way that allows us to accommodate and explain the rational role of experience, where this rational role is exemplified by (a) and (b).³

2. One promising way of approaching our problem would be to make use of an observation about the way in which experience relates us to objects. Intuitively, it seems as though experience puts us in an intimate relation with items in our environment. What happens when we visually perceive, we might say, is that we look at objects around us and their features, and that objects themselves are simply there for us to observe from various directions, angles, and distances. When we touch objects, we feel and handle *them*, without any apparent

²Following Glanzberg and Siegel (2006), I use ‘appropriation’ to refer to cases in which a complex demonstrative is used and the speaker succeeds in demonstrating an object even though the object fails to satisfy the nominal of the complex demonstrative; see also, e.g., Lepore and Ludwig (2000), 211.

³In what follows, I will mostly be concerned with *visual* perceptual experience, but not exclusively. The focus on visual experiences is largely due to the fact that vision tends to receive disproportionate amount of attention in philosophy of perception. I take it that my own proposal can be applied to other sensory modalities as well, but I do not argue for this claim.

mediation and even without any spatial separation between ourselves and the objects of our tactile perception. Experience gets us as close as we can hope to get to an immediate and direct contact with the world around us. If experience can be accounted for in terms of a direct relation between experiencing subjects and experienced objects, we might be in a position to explain the role of experience in making thought about external objects possible. Experience, a general proposal of this sort might go, makes thought about objects in our environment possible in virtue of some suitable, direct perceptual relation that obtains between us as perceivers (and thinkers), and objects around us. By being perceptually related to the elements of our surroundings we acquire access to them and we, as it were, take them in; thus it becomes possible for us to have thoughts about them.

This is all well as far as it goes, but such a simple proposal cannot be fully satisfactory. From the point of view of the inquiry we are engaged in, it is an essential feature of perceptual experience that there is a subjective aspect to it, and that this aspect, i.e., the phenomenology of experience, is highly important for the contribution experience makes to the rationality of perceptual judgments and beliefs. How things appear from the point of view of the subject of an experience need not be of great importance, say, to an investigator interested in a particular aspect of information processing in the visual cortex. However, when we wonder about the rational role of perceptual experience, we need to concern ourselves chiefly with the subjective character of experience, with how things are from the viewpoint of the subject. Whether a perceptual judgment is reasonable or not depends (at least in part) on the subjective character of experience: for one to be reasonable in judging that the bird before her eyes is red, the experience in question must be a certain way *for the subject*, or from the subject's viewpoint. If this is granted, as I think it should be, the above proposal proves to be inadequate. The proposal is this: experience performs its rational role by way of placing us in an immediate relation with objects. On the other hand, we have observed that it is experience as it is for the subject that is to be credited with the rational role we are interested in. How well do the two claims fit together? It appears that there may be a significant disconnect between the phenomenology of experience and any relation the subject of the experience might bear to the objects of perception. After all, at any given time we enter many different relations with objects in our environment: it may happen that one is

standing next to an object, or that one is taller than the object. Such relations do not, in themselves, have any obvious connection with the way the object might be *from the subject's viewpoint*. The perceptual relation should be different; it should be such that it can be used as an element in a proposal that demystifies and clarifies phenomenology.

One way of resolving the difficulty would be to say that the phenomenology of experience should be explained in terms of a special relation that obtains between the subject and the objects of perception. The idea would be that the phenomenology of experience is simply a matter of being suitably related to mind-independent objects of perception. This idea has some intuitive appeal. The objects we perceive seem to be of essential importance for the phenomenology of our experiences. When I look at the sheet of paper before me, it is the sheet of paper, that particular object itself, that I am visually aware of, and it is the sheet of paper that plays a crucial role in fixing the phenomenology of my experience. Had I looked at my wallet instead of the sheet of paper, the phenomenology of my experience would have been significantly different.

This line of thought can be developed in a number of different ways. The crucial choice points are fixed by questions such as: What is the domain of objects one is related to in experience? What is the relation that obtains between the subject and the objects perceived? What is the relation between items perceived and the phenomenology of experience? Arguably, the most influential contemporary approach of this kind is *Relationalism*. According to the proponents of Relationalism, perceptual experience is to be explained in terms of a relation that subjects bear to ordinary, mind-independent objects (and, in some cases, their properties). The phenomenology of experience is viewed as being *constituted* by mind-independent objects; these objects *shape* the phenomenology of our experience.⁴ The relation between the subject and the objects is that of *acquaintance*: when we perceive objects, we acquire a special kind of *knowledge* of these objects; in Russell's words, we acquire *knowledge of things*, where knowledge of things is different and more basic than knowledge of truths.⁵ A Relationalist acquaintance-based approach is thus suitable for an explanation of the rational role of experience: in virtue of the obtaining of the fundamental, epistemic relation

⁴See, e.g., Fish (2009), Campbell (2002a), Brewer (2011), Martin (2004), Logue (2012).

⁵Russell (1957/1911); Russell (1959/1912).

of acquaintance, we are in position to, as John Campbell puts it, “reach all the way” to the mind-independent objects themselves.⁶ Acquaintance is thus supposed to make it possible for us to have thoughts about objects and to provide us with grounds for an explanation of the role of experience in making thoughts about objects reasonable.

3. The Relationalist line of thought has a significant challenge to face: perceptual experiences are sometimes (often, perhaps) illusory—sometimes we have experiences in which the purported direct contact with objects and their properties happens to mislead us, or is altogether absent. A subject looks at an object and judges that it is round, unaware that a distorting lens has been inserted between herself and the object. Or even worse, the object is not there at all since the subject is having a full-blown hallucination. Yet in both cases it may be perfectly reasonable for the subject, from her own point of view, to judge that the object is there and that it is round. From the subject’s perspective, the hallucination of the round object and an ordinary, veridical experience of a round object may be identical. Mind-independent objects thus do not seem to be essential for one to have an experience characterized by a specific phenomenology. And experience can, apparently, perform its rational role even though no fundamental epistemic relation of acquaintance obtains between the subject and a mind-independent object.

Proponents of Relationalism need not abandon their approach on the strength of these difficulties. Indeed, I will have more to say on the ways in which they attempt to deal with issues brought up by non-veridical experiences (see Chapters 4, 5, and 7). For now, let it be registered that a plausible account of experience should be capable of explaining the rational role of experience while accommodating the phenomenon of non-veridical experiences.

4. Relationalism takes it that external, mind-independent objects are essential constituents of our experiences. Non-veridical experiences raise doubts about this claim. In fact, the most widespread and influential explanatory framework in contemporary philosophy of perception can be usefully described precisely as taking this challenge to our relationalist intuitions quite seriously. In light of non-veridical experiences, it seems that external, mind-independent

⁶Campbell (2002a), 6.

objects are not essential constituents of experience after all. The dominant way of giving a philosophical account of experience has it instead that experiences are *representational states*; that in experience, much like with other representational states (say, beliefs), one represents something as being thus and so even though nothing—at least nothing in the subject’s environment—need in fact be thus and so. Experience, on this approach, should be explained in terms of its *representational content*, and the phenomenology of experience should be viewed as grounded in this content instead of in the relation of acquaintance.⁷

This approach—*Representationalism*—is quite widely accepted and has long enjoyed a status close to that of an orthodoxy in philosophy of perception. This is well illustrated by the fact that it was endorsed without much argument in works as different as Evans’s *Varieties of Reference*, Searle’s *Intentionalism*, and Peacocke’s *A Study of Concepts*. Representationalism can be encountered in an almost bewildering variety of versions. For one thing, representationalists propose different views of the representational content of experience. Most commonly, it is claimed that the content is *propositional*; but there are those who argue that the content of experience is best viewed in terms of property-complexes.⁸ Further, some representationalists construe the contents of experience as object-involving, Russellian propositions (e.g., Speaks (2009)), or as Kantian intuitional contents (McDowell (2008)), while others endorse contents that exclusively involve properties—whether it is a highly restricted set of properties that enter the content (Pautz (2010); Chalmers (2006)) or a more liberal one that includes even natural kind properties (Siegel (2006); Bayne (2009)). Further divisions among representationalists concern the relation between the content of experience and the phenomenology of experience. Some think that the phenomenology supervenes on content (see, e.g., Schellenberg (2011a), Dretske (2003)), while others think it’s the other way round (see, e.g., Chalmers (2006), Horgan and Tienson (2002)). Representationalists also take a variety of positions on the particular way in which experience performs its rational role. Yet all the proponents of Representationalism, regardless of the particulars of their proposal, can be taken to agree on the fundamental idea that perceptual experience is

⁷Not all representationalist proposals will agree on the exact way in which the content of experience is related with the phenomenology of experience. I will have more to say about this once I turn to discussing specific representationalist accounts of experience.

⁸For a helpful overview of theoretical options see Pautz (2010).

fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way, and that experience has content assessable for accuracy.

Arguably, Representationalism, unlike Relationalism, does not owe its popularity to intuitive appeal. Nevertheless, it can be backed up by some strong motivations. For one thing, Representationalism provides an elegant way of dealing with non-veridical experiences. Once we rid ourselves of the idea that concrete, mind-independent objects are essential constituents of experience and replace it with the thesis that experience is representational, we can easily explain non-veridical experiences: they are cases of experiences with false (or inaccurate) contents. Further, Representationalism can use its basic thesis to account for the rational role of experience. For instance, if experience has representational content and it somehow manages to convey this content to the subject of the experience, it should not be difficult to explain how it is that an experience can make a belief reasonable—logical relations that obtain between the content of the experience and the content of the belief should suffice. Finally, the popularity of Representationalism is in no small part due to the fact that the view allows perceptual experiences to be neatly incorporated into certain popular research programs. For one thing, the representationalist account of experience allows a seamless integration of perceptual experience into an overall intentionalist approach to consciousness. If beliefs, desires, and even sensations like pain are to be explained in terms of their representational properties, it should not be surprising that perception's being treated in a similar fashion is welcomed by philosophers of mind with intentionalist leanings. On the other hand, if experience is a representational state, there is reasonable hope that the seemingly intractable problem of incorporating the phenomenology of experience into a *naturalist* scheme might be solved.⁹

5. The opposition between the proponents of Representationalism and Relationalism has dominated recent debates in philosophy of perception—or, at any rate, the debates that are concerned with the nature and subjective character of experience. In this inquiry I will proceed by engaging critically with some of the most prominent recent contributions to this debate. The reason for this methodological decision is the following. Representationalism

⁹See, e.g., Dretske (2003).

and Relationalism certainly do not exhaust the range of theoretical options on offer in the philosophy of perception.¹⁰ However, Representationalism and Relationalism are the two most highly developed research programs in the discipline; they promise to help us find our way with the fundamental problems posed by perceptual experience: the phenomenology of experience, the rational role of experience, and the phenomenon of perceptual error. This being the case, it is virtually impossible to make a move in the examination of perceptual experience without treading the ground previously covered by theories belonging to one or the other of the two explanatory frameworks. It is therefore imperative to engage with the two views.

While engaging with Representationalism and Relationalism may be unavoidable, it should also be noted that I will not aim here for a comprehensive overview of either approach. Representationalist literature is vast and ever growing, and Relationalism has seen a significant rise in popularity in recent years. Not only would it be almost impossible to pay due attention to each and every version of the two competing proposals, it would also not be helpful. Instead, I propose to proceed in the following way. I will pick up the debate between Representationalism and Relationalism at one particularly significant point in its development and from there engage with a selection of proposals relevant to the current project. Exploring the arguments and theses of the proponents of the two approaches will help us bring sharply into focus the desiderata for a plausible account of experience and thus allow us to carve out such an account using the resulting constraints.

1.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM LOOKS

6. Representationalism, we have seen, can be persuasively motivated; it is also in many quarters considered uncontroversial. Such is the confidence of contemporary representationalists that some even claim that their position is as uncontroversial as a philosophical position can

¹⁰Prominent alternatives include the sense-datum theory, the qualia views, the theory of appearing, and the adverbial theory. The sense-datum view was recently defended in Robinson (1994), while Alston (1999) puts forth a case for the theory of appearing. Block has been a staunch defender of a version of the qualia view (see, e.g., his “Mental Paint”). Breckenridge (forthcoming) attempts to lend plausibility to the adverbial theory.

be:

The notion that a subject's *perceptual experiences* represent the world to be a certain way—the way the world *perceptually seems* to the subject—should be no more controversial than the notion that a subject's *belief state* represents the world to be a certain way—the way the subject *takes* the world to be. (Byrne (2001), 201)

Yet the arguments for Representationalism have been few and far between. Both friends and foes of Representationalism have noted that hardly any arguments are offered in support of this view and that it is often presupposed in discussion from the outset.¹¹ This observation, together with Charles Travis's influential challenge to Representationalism, has prompted a number of prominent advocates of Representationalism to offer arguments for their view.

The relative lack of arguments for Representationalism need not have been surprising since it is not difficult to give a brief, intuitively appealing argument for Representationalism. Consider, respectively, Tye's and Chalmers's exposition of this line of reasoning:

As I view the scene before my eyes, there is a way the world looks to me. If the world is that way, my visual experience is accurate; if not, my experience is inaccurate. My visual experience, then, has correctness conditions: it is correct or accurate in certain circumstances; incorrect or inaccurate in others. Visual experiences, like beliefs, are *representations* of how things are. Accordingly, visual experiences have representational content. (Tye (2006), 504)

It is plausible that perceptual experiences are assessable for accuracy, in virtue of their phenomenology. Intuitively, by virtue of their phenomenal character, experiences present the world as being a certain way (...) The world can be such as to satisfy the constraint imposed by the phenomenal character of the experience, or such as to fail to satisfy the constraint. This is to say that the phenomenal character determines a condition of satisfaction for the experience, one that is shared by any experience with the same phenomenal character. This condition of satisfaction will be a phenomenal content. (Chalmers (2006), 51)¹²

This argument—let's call it The Argument from Looks—establishes the key Representationalist thesis: experience is a matter of representing the world as being a certain way. Experiences have accuracy conditions, and it is specifically the phenomenology of an experience that determines these accuracy conditions.

¹¹Travis (2004) and Byrne (2009) make this observation. In all fairness, there *were* authors who argued for Representationalism not long before Travis and Byrne made these remarks. McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999) are important examples. McDowell's argument, as well as Brewer's, is rooted in observations about the epistemology of experience; perhaps Travis and Byrne have lamented the lack of arguments from observations about phenomenology of experience.

¹²Siewert (1998) provides a thorough discussion of this argument.

The Argument from Looks proceeds in two natural, *prima facie* plausible steps. First, it is claimed, roughly, that every visual experience is characterized by the way the world looks in it. As I look at my computer screen, a portion of the world looks to me a certain way—say, it looks to me that there is a bright computer screen in front of me. Turning my head to one side and gazing at the wall to my right, I have a different visual experience, one in which it looks to me that there is a white wall over there. Insofar as we have a grasp of the aspect of experience with respect to which these two experiences are different, we have a grasp of the claim that in every visual experience the world seems or appears to its subject to be a certain way. Susanna Schellenberg nicely points out the theoretical neutrality of this minimal reading of the claim:

The thesis that the world seems a certain way implies only that it seems this way, rather than that way. To give an example, right now I am aware of a desk not a chair. Were I aware of a chair, the phenomenology of my perception would be different. (Schellenberg (2011a), 721)

Second, it is claimed that this way the world looks in an experience can be accurate or inaccurate: the world can match the way it looks in an experience or fail to match it. Experiences, in virtue of their phenomenology, have accuracy conditions. This claim too is easily motivated, according to representationalists. The motivation comes from the distinction between *veridical* and *non-veridical* experiences. The following kind of example serves to help us recognize the distinction and its relation to accuracy. Consider an instance of having an ordinary visual experience while sitting in a kitchen. Say, you are looking at two mid-sized objects: an apple standing next to a cup. Arguably, you could undergo an experience which is subjectively identical to this one even though the circumstances under which you are having the experience are significantly altered. In one case, you have an experience while actually sitting in your kitchen and observing the two objects (under normal conditions); in the other case, you have an experience as of an apple standing next to a cup while sitting in a room with no apples, cups, or other mid-sized objects in it: you are having a full-blown hallucination. In the former case your experience is *veridical*, while in the latter it is *non-veridical*. Examples of this sort are not hard to catch on to—certainly not to philosophers, most of whom have had one too many opportunity to encounter a skeptical argument that takes off from such examples. Once recognized and acknowledged, cases of

this sort serve as grounds for a bottom-up characterization of the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experiences. Veridicality can then be explained in terms of accuracy conditions. Veridical experiences are the ones whose accuracy conditions are satisfied by how things are in the world.¹³ And insofar as experiences have accuracy conditions, they are contentful states.¹⁴ The Argument from Looks thus seems to establish Representationalism.

7. The Argument from Looks, at least as formulated by Tye and Chalmers, is not a satisfactory argument for Representationalism. To see why, consider some of the ways in which the thesis that experience has representational content can be interpreted. As noted earlier, there are many different accounts of experience that can be classified as representationalist. These views can differ, among other commitments, on what kind of *content* they ascribe to experience and on what kind of *relation* they take to obtain between this content and the experience. For instance, representational content can be conceived as either conceptually or nonconceptually structured; it can be identified with a Russellian proposition, a set of possible worlds, or a Fregean sense, and so on. On the other hand, the experience-content relation can be identified, as will be discussed below, with a propositional attitude-relation, or with a relation of indication, association, etc. The variety of notions of content at play need not worry Representationalists. After all, the contents of beliefs can also be construed in all these different ways without abandoning the spirit of Representationalism about belief or making the view trivial.

Things are different in this respect with the experience-content relation. On some construals, this relation may be so weak that the claim that experience has content is compatible with just about any account of experience. This is precisely what we find to be the case with the Argument from Looks: the conclusion of the Argument from Looks is compatible with exceedingly weak relations obtaining between experience and representational content; consequently, the Argument from Looks only establishes a version of Representationalism

¹³Accuracy of experiences comes in degrees, according to all representationalist views I am aware of. This helps to accommodate illusions, experiences that fall, with respect to their veridicality, somewhere between full-blown hallucinations and fully veridical perceptions.

¹⁴This presentation of the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experiences and its role in motivating the claim that experiences are accurate or inaccurate largely follows the discussions in Siegel (2006) and (2010), and in Pautz (2009).

that is neither substantial nor interesting.

To see what the problem is, consider the possibility that perceptual experience is only *associated* with representational content. Representational content can be associated with an experience without *belonging* to it in any interesting sense. Take the following example: a picture is an item that bears the weak relation of association to propositional content. Arguably, realistic pictures are representational and can be accurate or inaccurate. We can express this representational content by using sentences that say how things are according to a picture. This, however, does not mean that the picture *has* propositional content. We can describe pictures by using sentences expressing propositions, but this does not entail the claim that these propositions are the content of a picture.¹⁵ Similarly, the surface of a river can be associated with propositional content in virtue of its reflecting of a row of houses built on its bank, but it does not follow from this that the surface of the river *has* propositional content. Finally, by analogy, it could be the case that the content ascribed to an experience is merely associated with it—such is the relation that an experience bears to contents that describe it, or to reports of how things seem to its subject—rather than belong to it in a sense strong enough to sustain a non-trivial version of Representationalism. If experiences have representational contents in the same sense in which reflecting surfaces do, then any of the prominent views of perception can be compatible with Representationalism. Proponents of Representationalism must argue for a view on which the experience-content relation is stronger.

1.3 THE PLAN

8. My discussion will commence with an investigation of Representationalist arguments that aim to establish the claim that experience is strongly related to representational content. Specifically, I will look into arguments recently proposed by Susanna Siegel and Susanna

¹⁵Crane (2009) draws attention to this point; Schellenberg (2011a) is an example of a representationalist who recognizes that Representationalism should be established as a claim about the obtaining of a strong relation between experience and representational content.

Schellenberg. Both have argued for strong representationalist theses and devised arguments that purport to establish that perceptual experience bears a relation to propositional content sufficiently strong to uphold a substantial representationalist thesis.

Siegel argues that *attribution* of properties to objects occurs in experience; representational content is generated by attribution that takes place specifically in experience. In Chapter 2 I will show that Siegel's argument is not successful. I will argue that Siegel does not rule out the possibility of devising an account of experience as a matter of certain items being present before the consciousness of the experiencing subject. Any attribution of properties to objects, this alternative proposal would go, takes place "downstream" from experience, in perceptual judgment and in thought in general.

Schellenberg attempts to establish a version of Representationalism on which *concepts* are operative in experience. There is a suitably strong relation between experience and content because experience is a matter of concepts being employed in a peculiar way; this employment of concepts results in attributive content being generated. I will argue in Chapter 3 that Schellenberg's view faces a grave difficulty: Schellenberg misconstrues the relation of experience and thought; she has no resources to explain how experience can play a vitally important role in our grasp of certain concepts.

The upshot of the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 is twofold. The immediate conclusion is that recent attempts to argue for sufficiently strong versions of Representationalism are not satisfactory. The more interesting and consequential point is that strong representationalist theses are not properly supported by observations about perceptual phenomenology. Both Siegel and Schellenberg argue from general claims about phenomenology, yet their proposals ultimately fail because they do not succeed in accounting for phenomenology appropriately. Attribution, employment of concepts, and, in general, the generation of content in experience may serve well to explain non-veridical experiences—it is very tempting to explain perceptual error in terms of inaccuracy. But when it comes to ordinary veridical experiences, explanations that employ the idea of content-generation in experience are not particularly appealing.

9. Intuitively, it seems that when it comes to veridical experiences, explanations in terms of perceptual relations with mind-independent objects have an advantage over Representation-

alist proposals. This is not to say that *any* relation between the subject and items presented will do equally well. Relationalists commonly invoke the relation of acquaintance in their accounts of experience, and limit the domain of the relata of this relation to conscious subjects, on the one hand, and mind-independent objects (and, in some cases, properties these objects instantiate) on the other. In Chapters 4 and 5 I assess the Relationalism of John Campbell, Bill Brewer, and James Genone. I argue that, unlike their Representationalist rivals, Relationalists have great difficulties explaining *non-veridical* experiences.

At this point in the inquiry, we will have established that experience should not be accounted for in terms of a strong Representationalist relation with content, nor in terms of a strong, epistemic relation to mind-independent objects. Instead, I propose that a weak relation of presence should be preferred. Before further developing the positive proposal, however, I address one final alternative account of experience. In chapter 6 I assess the views of Adam Pautz and David Chalmers. Pautz and Chalmers defend an approach that may be viewed as a hybrid of Representationalism and Relationalism. On the one hand, they take it that experiences have representational content assessable for accuracy. On the other hand, they think that, in experience, perceivers are related with certain properties in a special way: the properties in question are *conveyed* to subjects, subjects are *en rapport* with properties, and in virtue of this relation they are able to have beliefs involving these properties as constituents of representational content. I reject the view of Pautz and Chalmers on the following grounds: phenomenology of an experience cannot be explained in terms of a relation to a set of specific properties—phenomenology of an experience does not, by itself, fix the individual elements that it is made up of.

10. In the final chapter, I develop a positive account of perceptual experience. Experience, I argue, should not be explained along the representationalist lines: phenomenology never fixes, by itself, unique accuracy conditions; in addition, the rational role of experience is better accommodated by the positing of a relation obtaining between the subject and certain items that the subject perceives.

The relation in question is the relation of *presence*. Presence is conceived as a relation weaker than acquaintance; it does not have the epistemic import that acquaintance has:

an object can be present in an experience without the subject's having knowledge of it. I can thus stake a claim to the motivating considerations that make Relationalism *prima facie* plausible: the rational role of experience in making thought about mind-independent objects possible can be explained in terms of presence of such objects in experience (i.e., the rational role (a) of experience). Still, it may seem that there is no real difference between the view I will propose and Relationalism. But the difference is important and substantial. The respective views on non-veridical experiences show the difference most clearly.

Relationalists tend to hold that veridical experiences and hallucinations cannot have any "common factor," that they are mental states of fundamentally different kinds. This leads virtually all relationalists to disjunctive views of hallucination (and, in some cases, illusion). The move to disjunctivism is prompted by the thought that, should veridical experience and hallucination have an experiential factor in common, both kinds of experiences will have to be explained in the same way, thus making it impossible to include mind-independent objects in an account of experience. But this line of thought assumes the following claim: if there is a common factor shared by veridical experiences and hallucinations, then there must be a common *explanation* of the two kinds of experience. I reject this claim. Veridical and non-veridical experiences can have identical phenomenology; they can be identical from the perspective of the experiencing subject, i.e., they can be *subjectively identical*. Consequently, subjectively identical veridical and non-veridical experiences have the same rational force: they contribute to the reasonableness of the same set of perceptual judgments. At the same time—and this is the point I wish to push against Relationalism—this does not mean that these experiences need to be explained by positing the same relata in both cases (as sense-datum theorists would do, for instance) or by abandoning altogether the relational approach to experience (as representationalists would do).

Phenomenology of experience is what we need to explain if we want to make sense of the role of experience in making perceptual judgments and beliefs reasonable (i.e., the rational role (b) of experience). Phenomenology can be identical in veridical and non-veridical experiences. Yet this does not force us to commit to an identical treatment of hallucination and veridical experience: subjectively identical phenomenologies can be fixed by the presence of different items under different circumstances. In veridical experience, but not

in hallucination, ordinary, mind-independent objects will be present. In hallucination items other than ordinary objects will have to be posited as present. I argue for this conclusion by showing that in at least some cases perceptual judgments involving demonstratives are *true*. In non-veridical experience the items present are unreal sense-images (as proposed in Gupta (2012)) and, I maintain, *presentational tropes*. Sense-images are used in accounting for hallucination, whereas presentational tropes are deployed as an indispensable element of the presentational complex of illusions.

2.0 REPRESENTATIONALISM: SEEING AND SEEING AS

11. In this chapter I will examine a version of the Argument from Looks more promising than the one presented in §6. The focus will be on Susanna Siegel’s so-called Argument from Appearing. Siegel’s argument for Representationalism can plausibly be read as an attempt to establish a version of the view on which experience bears a relation to content stronger than mere association. As such, the Argument from Appearing is an improvement over the Argument from Looks discussed above. However, I will argue that Siegel’s argument does not fare much better than the Argument from Looks; it ultimately fails to establish a strong representationalist thesis.

I will proceed by presenting Siegel’s position and the Argument from Appearing (§§12–16). I will then argue that, in order for Siegel’s argument to establish a sufficiently strong version of Representationalism, it should be read as relying on the claim that in experience there is always *attribution* of properties to objects (§15). I will go on to show that Siegel’s argument fails to rule out views according to which both properties and objects feature in the phenomenology of experience even though no attribution occurs in experience itself (§§15–16). Finally, I will provide a rough sketch of such an alternative view (§§17–18).

2.1 SIEGEL’S ARGUMENT FROM APPEARING

12. Susanna Siegel’s argument for Representationalism is supposed to establish the following claim:

(CV) All visual perceptual experiences have contents.

Siegel's take on Representationalism can be more closely specified by further elucidation of the notions used in stating (CV). First, the class of visual perceptual experiences¹ is conceived of as containing veridical experiences, illusions, and hallucinatory experiences.² Second, and more importantly, contents of experiences are understood as having to meet two constraints:

- (i) Contents of experiences are true or false.
- (ii) Contents of experiences are conveyed to the subject by her experience.

The initial characterization of experiences as having contents that meet these constraints places them among other sources of information, such as maps and newspapers (Siegel (2010), 28). In a way similar to that in which newspapers convey certain claims assessable for truth or falsity, experiences also convey contents that can be true or false, according to Siegel. Moreover, there is a similarity between contents of beliefs and contents of perceptual experiences: both kinds of content *determine the conditions* under which corresponding beliefs and experiences are correct. However, experience-states are different from belief-states insofar as they are not true or false, but rather *accurate* or *inaccurate*. Accuracy, unlike truth, comes in degrees, and the fact that experience-states are assessable for their accuracy sets them apart from beliefs. Accordingly, contents of perceptual experiences describe their *accuracy conditions*, rather than truth-conditions (the latter being case with beliefs and their contents). The notions of accuracy and accuracy conditions turn out to be crucial for understanding Siegel's view.

Accuracy is construed as having two key aspects: first, it is understood as freedom from error; second, it is a property of token experiences *relative to a situation*. If, for example, we have a situation in which there is a blue ball standing next to a fishtank, we can make a distinction in terms of accuracy between an experience in which a subject perceives a blue ball standing next to the fishtank and an experience in which a subject perceives

¹Henceforth, I will use "perceptual experience" or just "experience" instead of Siegel's "visual perceptual experience."

²Not all proponents of Representationalism are on board with Siegel in this respect; for instance, Byrne in his "Experience and Content" does not include hallucinations in the same class of experiences to which veridical perceptions and illusions belong.

a *red* ball next to the fishtank. Given these descriptions, the latter experience is more erroneous than the former (which happens to be completely error-free), and thus the former experience is more *accurate*. On this conception of experience as potentially erroneous, there are numerous respects in which an experience can err, and thus be inaccurate—location, shape and color of the objects perceived are some of them. The more of these aspects of an experience fail to match the situation in which the experience is had, the less accurate the experience is. The exact conditions under which an experience is accurate relative to a situation are its *accuracy conditions*. In the above example, accuracy conditions would, presumably, require an accurate experience to present a blue ball as standing to the left of a cubical fishtank and, perhaps, at a certain distance from the subject undergoing the experience.³ Different respects in which an experience can match the situation in which it is had—such as the round shape and the color of the ball, its position relative to the subject and to the fishtank, etc.—fix the corresponding accuracy conditions, and the accuracy of the perceptual experience is determined by the fulfillment of these conditions. Associating a multitude of accuracy conditions with a single experience provides Siegel with a simple way of capturing the observation that accuracy comes in degrees—the degree to which an experience is accurate depends on the number of accuracy conditions that are fulfilled.

Let us sum up briefly the main points of Siegel’s overall account of perceptual experience. Perceptual experiences have contents which are true or false. An experience-state is not true or false, but rather accurate or inaccurate relative to a situation in which it is had. Accuracy of experiences comes in degrees, and it depends on the truth and falsity of contents, since the contents describe the accuracy conditions for each token experience and a corresponding situation.

13. In order to establish (CV), Siegel develops the so-called Argument from Appearing. The goal of the Argument from Appearing is to establish that experiences have accuracy conditions *and* that these accuracy conditions are suitable to be contents of experience. The Argument from Appearing proceeds as follows:

³The problem of specifying which properties are represented in experience is not particularly important at this point. Siegel holds a controversial view according to which high-level properties, including natural kind properties, are represented in experience. See Siegel (2010).

1. Premise (i): All visual perceptual experiences present clusters of properties as being instantiated.
2. Premise (ii): If an experience e presents a cluster of properties F as being instantiated, then

necessarily: things are the way e presents them only if property-cluster F is instantiated.
3. Premise (iii): If, necessarily, things are the way e presents them only if property-cluster F is instantiated, then:

e has a set of accuracy conditions C , conveyed to the subject of e , such that: C is satisfied in a world only if there is something that has F in that world.
4. Premise (iv): If e has a set of accuracy conditions C , conveyed to the subject of e , such that e is accurate only if C , then:

e has a set of accuracy conditions C^* , conveyed to the subject of e such that e is accurate iff C^* .
5. Conclusion: All visual perceptual experiences have contents. (Siegel (2010, 45).)

The Argument from Appearing might seem, at first blush, quite similar to the Argument from Looks. It starts with an observation about the phenomenology of experience—i.e. Premise (i)—and proceeds to establish, on the basis of that observation, that experience has accuracy conditions and, consequently, representational content. Yet the two arguments are substantially different, as the ensuing discussion will show. Let us look more closely into the Argument from Appearing.

Premise (i) of the Argument from Appearing is the only one that is strictly and exclusively concerned with experience and its phenomenology. The other premises are instances of more general claims that are not exclusively about experience and whose plausibility is independent of any views on experience. Premise (i) is thus the crucial step in the Argument from Appearing: if Premise (i) expresses a truth about experience, then Siegel’s case for (CV) is pretty straightforward and, apparently, not very controversial. If experience really presents us with clusters of properties as instantiated—and we will have to get clear on what exactly this means—then the fact that a relevant cluster of properties is instantiated

will be a truth-maker for a content determined by the cluster of properties. Premise (ii) establishes this connection between an experience involving a cluster of properties and an instantiation of those properties in a world, while Premise (iii) establishes the further claim that this instantiation is an accuracy condition for the experience. Premise (ii) is an instance of a general claim about representational states, and Premise (iii) is an instance of a general claim about accuracy conditions of such states; similarly for Premise (iv). As such, Premises (ii)–(iv) are not strictly about experience or its phenomenology. I will argue that Premise (i) should not be accepted, and that, consequently, the Argument from Appearing should not be deemed sound. In order to achieve this goal, I first need to zero in on a plausible reading of Premise (i).

14. How should we understand the claim that, in experience, clusters of properties are “presented as being instantiated”? The claim is specifically about phenomenology of experience; Siegel explicitly motivates it with an observation about perceptual phenomenology. In experience, Siegel observes, we are never presented with anything like bare particulars, i.e., objects stripped of all of their properties; properties are always a part of the phenomenology. And properties figure in phenomenology in a specific way:

When we see (or even when we merely seem to see) ordinary objects, such as a cube, bare particulars do not figure in visual phenomenology in any way. Properties enter the picture as well. For you to see a cube at all, *it must be part of your visual phenomenology that the cube has certain properties*: having a certain number of facing edges and surfaces, having a certain color, location, and so on. (Siegel (2010), 46; my italics)

Phenomenology is not a matter of being simply related to objects: it is always a part of our visual phenomenology *that* objects have properties. So, according to Siegel, in experience we are always presented with objects *as* being one way or another. Siegel’s view falls into the tradition of views that, to use a slogan, take all seeing to be *seeing as*. One early formulation of such a view—together with a similar motivation—can be found in the works of G. N. A. Vesey:

“All seeing is seeing as.” In other words, if a person sees something at all it must look like something to him, even if it only looks like ‘somebody doing something’. (Vesey (1956), 114)

Whenever we see an object it looks like something, or looks to have some quality. But its looking thus is not to be identified with our judging it to be what it looks like. (Vesey (1956), 123–4)

Both Siegel and Vesey arrive at the conclusion that experience is assessable for accuracy (truth, in Vesey’s case) via the claim that perception is always a matter of being presented with something *as having* certain properties, as being some way.

Moreover, Vesey links the characteristic “seeing as” aspect of experience with how things look to a subject of an experience. In similar spirit, Siegel takes it that the notion of *presentation* is closely related to the notion of an object’s looking a certain way to a subject:

In cases of seeing objects, properties that are presented in visual phenomenology are properties that objects look to the perceiver to have when she sees them. (Siegel (2010), 52)⁴
Premise (i) of the Argument from Appearing, like the descriptions given earlier (...) all use *look*, *present*, or cognates. (Siegel (2010), 59)

But now it becomes increasingly difficult to see how the Argument from Appearing is different from the Argument from Looks. It seems that there is not much difference (if any) between Siegel’s Premise (i), i.e., the claim that in experience we are always presented with certain properties as instantiated, and the claim upon which the Argument from Looks is built, i.e., the claim that in experience objects always look a certain way. Both arguments proceed to derive from these initial premises the conclusion that experience has accuracy conditions. We have already seen that the Argument from Looks fails because it does not establish a sufficiently strong relation between experience and content. Can Siegel’s Argument from Appearing do better?

15. There are good reasons to think that Siegel intends her Premise (i) to be interpreted in a way that would make it sufficiently strong to uphold a substantial representationalist thesis and thus improve on the Argument from Looks (in case the Argument from Appearing turns out to be sound, of course). Recall again that Siegel’s Premise (i) is a claim about what is *presented* to subjects of visual experiences; for example,

⁴It might be observed that Siegel intends this remark to be limited to cases of *seeing*, where seeing is understood as a factive state. Closer reading shows that this is not the case. For instance, Siegel asserts that observations about phenomenology which motivate her Premise (i) “apply equally to cases of merely seeming to see objects” (see Siegel (2010), 48). Elsewhere she also treats ‘seeing’ and ‘seeming to see’ on a par.

Suppose you see a cube, and it looks red and cubical. Here your experience presents it as being the case that there is a red cube before you. (Siegel (2010), 48)

Properties are presented *as instantiated*. In experience, it is presented *that* objects have properties. It is essential for Siegel’s understanding of the phenomenology of visual experience and its relation to content that the presence of a property in an experience “is a part of a visual experience that (...) attribute[s] properties to objects.”⁵ Properties figure in *all* perceptual experiences, and they figure in a specific way: they are always attributed *by the experience itself* to some object. Siegel’s Premise (i) thus asserts that a strong relation obtains between experience and representational content: it is *in experience* that properties are *attributed* to objects. If Siegel is right about the obtaining of this strong relation between experience and content, the Argument from Appearing would establish a suitably strong version of Representationalism.

The question now is why we should think that any attribution occurs specifically in experience. The idea that experience is essentially attributive is problematic. For one thing, it models experience too closely on thought. On Siegel’s view, experience has the following in common with thought (judgment, in particular): it attributes properties to objects. In addition, Siegel talks about mental states like beliefs and suppositions as states in which it is *presented* that something is the case (Siegel (2010), 50). If attribution and presentation are characteristic of both experience and thought, it might prove difficult to isolate the attribution that occurs specifically in experience and distinguish it from attribution in thought. We find that this exact problem arises for Vesey. Vesey thinks that perceptual judgment is a good guide for establishing the way an object looks to a subject in an experience. How an object looks in an experience can be captured by “what the subject would take it to be,” absent defeaters:

What an object looks like to somebody is what, on looking at it, that person would take it to be, if he had no reason to think otherwise. (Vesey (1956), 110)

Another way of expressing the point that all seeing is seeing as is to say that perceptions, like judgments, are either true or false. They are true when what the object looks like to somebody, that is, what on looking at it the person would take it to be if he had no reason to think otherwise, is what the object is; false otherwise. (Vesey (1956), 114)

⁵Siegel (2010), 47.

But how the subject takes things to be, or how the subject would be inclined to judge that things are on the basis of an experience is not a good guide for establishing how things look in that experience. What “it is natural” to judge on the basis of experience is always heavily influenced by the background views, beliefs, and conceptual apparatus that the subject brings to bear on the experience. Perceptual judgment alone cannot indicate how things look to the subject of an experience because perceptual judgments are always determined by the contents of background views, beliefs, concepts, *and* by experiences. It may be natural for someone to take it that the animal in front of her looks like a one year old Herring Gull, but this can be so only if the subject has views about, among other things, different plumage patterns in gulls as well as some practice in identifying birds. It cannot be simply inferred, on the basis of the fact such a judgment would be natural for the subject to make, that the property of being a Herring Gull is attributed *in experience* to the object perceived. The judgment may well have been a product of the subject’s applying *in judgment* of the previously acquired classificatory concept.

Siegel recognizes this point and parts ways with Vesey. Siegel does not commit herself to the view that properties presented in experience are the ones that would naturally occur in perceptual beliefs or judgments:

Since we bring plenty of standing representations to bear on perceptual beliefs, one can’t infer from the fact that one believes that (say) somebody is Franco that the property of being Franco is presented in visual phenomenology. But what is at issue here are inferences in the other direction: if a property is presented in visual phenomenology, then it is natural to attribute that property to something one sees. (Siegel (2010), footnote 22 at p. 52.)

But even if Siegel is right in denying that perceptual judgment is a poor guide in determining which properties are attributed in experience, the similarity of experience and thought that is apparently posited by her view poses a further, more serious problem.

In short, the problem is this: if experience and thought are as similar as Siegel’s view seems to imply, we cannot confidently ascribe to experience any attribution of properties to objects. For any given experience, the objection would go, the property (or set of properties) identified by Siegel as being presented in the experience—and thus, according to Siegel, *attributed* in experience to an object—may be claimed to have been attributed to an object only in a judgment “downstream” from the experience. Suppose a subject undergoes an

experience in which the property of squareness is presented. According to Siegel, in such an experience we see an object *as square*; the experience attributes the property of squareness to an object. In order for this account to be established, the following possibility should be ruled out: squareness is attributed only once the subject takes the object to be square, where this taking is a matter of subject's judging, or thinking, or otherwise entertaining the thought that the object is square.

16. Siegel thinks that a persuasive case can be built for the claim that attribution of properties of objects occurs in experience. According to Siegel, we should recognize as true the following observation about perceptual experience:

(a) Properties figure in the phenomenology of all perceptual experiences.

The thesis (a) entails, Siegel holds, the following claim:

(b) Properties that figure in the phenomenology of experience are attributed to objects in experience itself.

Siegel makes the case for the entailment by arguing that one cannot plausibly hold (a) while rejecting (b). The rejection of (b) would amount to the rejection of the highly plausible thesis (a)—in order for one to claim that properties are not attributed in experience, one would have to abandon altogether the claim that properties figure in experience. As a consequence, one would be forced to explain the phenomenology of experience either in terms of Reidian raw sensations, or in terms of objects as sole constituents of the phenomenology (this is the “Pure Object View” of Bill Brewer).⁶ Siegel goes on to argue that neither of the two property-free accounts of experience account for phenomenology adequately.⁷

While Siegel's criticism of Reidian views and the Pure Object View may be correct—I do not think that is particularly important for my discussion—there is still room for a more plausible alternative to Siegel's representationalist view. We can produce a view of experience which will accommodate the presentation of properties in experience without conceding that properties are attributed in experience. Next I will sketch an outline of such a view.

⁶See Brewer (2006).

⁷Siegel (2010), 66 ff.

2.2 PHENOMENOLOGY AND ITS RELATION TO PROPERTIES

17. The goal now is to show that a view of experience can be constructed such that it retains the idea that the phenomenology of experience involves properties, while denying that attribution occurs in experience itself.

The simplest way of doing this is by modifying the Pure Object View: instead of limiting the range of items one is related with in experience to objects, we can expand the relation to include properties among its relata. Among the relationalists this kind of view is well established. John Campbell, for instance, holds that experience is to be explained in terms of the relation of awareness, such that we are aware both of objects and properties:

On a Relational View, the phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, such as colour and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one another and to you. (Campbell (2002a), 116)

On Campbell's view, we are aware both of objects and of properties, but this nevertheless does not mean that the properties we are aware of are attributed to the objects we are aware of. One need not be entirely on board with Campbell in order to recognize the possibility of accounting for experience in terms of a relation with objects and properties. Gupta (2012) and Frey (2013), for instance, posit a different relation—relation of *presence*—as obtaining between a subject of an experience and both objects and properties. Both approaches—the one favored by Campbell, and the one favored by Gupta and Frey—are built on the idea that experience should be accounted for in terms of a relation, where this relation is an intentional relation more fundamental than thought about objects (and their properties), and radically different from thought insofar as it does not involve attribution nor any other strong relation to representational content.

Choosing to account for perceptual experience in terms of a relation to objects and properties naturally forces one to push any and all content-yielding attribution downstream from experience. For all Siegel's argument claims to establish about experience, it does not rule out a view according to which phenomenology is simply a way of being related to a tract of one's environment, including both objects and properties. In experience, one is simply presented with certain objects and properties. Only once one judges that things in the envi-

ronment are thus and so, only once one takes things to be a certain way, does one generate content that can be evaluated for accuracy.⁸

18. The mere observation that phenomenology of experience does not present us with objects shorn of all properties does not suffice for the conclusion that there is attribution of properties to objects *in experience*. Nevertheless, a different kind of consideration might be better suited for a similar representationalist thesis to be established. Suppose there is a way to show that experience is best explained as involving the employment of *conceptual capacities* of some sort. If this claim can be established, it would give us a good way of understanding why it is that “all seeing is seeing as”: something’s looking a certain way is a matter of objects (or property-instances) being subsumed under concepts employed in experience. In other words, an argument for the claim that experience is fundamentally a matter of concept-employment would enable us to establish the strong Representationalist thesis that content is generated in experience. Susanna Schellenberg offers such an argument, and I will discuss it in the next chapter.

⁸Naturally, there are many issues that such an alternative, broadly relationalist, view of experience would have to face. The most pressing of those is the problem of accounting for perceptual error. I will address this problem in Chapters 4–7.

3.0 REPRESENTATIONALISM: EMPLOYMENT OF CONCEPTS

3.1 SCHELLENBERG'S ARGUMENT

19. Susanna Schellenberg has recently offered a valuable contribution to the debate between Relationalism and Representationalism. She defends a view on which major insights of both approaches to experience are taken seriously. Schellenberg thinks that the relationalist insights about the important role of mind-independent objects in perceptual experience can be accommodated without abandoning Representationalism. She develops an argument for the representationalist view of perception; it is an argument to the best explanation, and the upshot of the argument is that only a representationalist view which incorporates the plausible relationalist insight can properly account for perceptual phenomenology. Moreover, the argument is important and valuable because it explicitly aims to establish that experience is strongly related to representational content.

Below, I will proceed according to the following plan. Schellenberg's argument is divided into two stages. In the first stage, Schellenberg responds to two objections that are supposed to show that Representationalism is false. In the second stage Schellenberg presents the positive case for her version of Representationalism. This stage relies on Schellenberg's positive view of experience and I will closely examine Schellenberg's proposal. I will show that Schellenberg's representationalism is prone to some serious difficulties. In particular, and most importantly, I will argue that Schellenberg's view misconstrues the relation between perceptual phenomenology and (at least some) perceptual concepts. Ultimately, I will argue that Schellenberg's view should be rejected; the difficulties this approach encounters will also serve to point in the direction of an important desideratum for a plausible account of perceptual experience.

20. Schellenberg sets out to build a case for the “Content Thesis”—the claim that “perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way” (Schellenberg (2011a), 714). In the first stage of the argument Schellenberg defends the so-called Master Argument. The Master Argument is supposed to establish that experiences have contents and that these contents have accuracy conditions. Schellenberg does not think, however, that the Master Argument provides sufficient support to the Content Thesis. Only if content is understood along the lines she proposes in the second stage of her argument can the Content Thesis be established.

I will focus on the second stage of Schellenberg’s argument and on the representationalist proposal she develops in the course of defending it. It should be clarified, however, why it is that the Master Argument does not suffice for establishing the Content Thesis even though its conclusion is that experience has representational content with accuracy conditions.

Schellenberg uses the Master Argument in order to deflect two objections leveled against Representationalism by Charles Travis and Bill Brewer. The two objections aim to show that perceptual experiences do not have content, i.e., that Representationalism is false. Both goals of the Master Argument can thus be seen as clearing up a path for an argument for the Content Thesis understood as a strong representationalist thesis.

The conclusion of the Master Argument, according to Schellenberg, does not suffice for the Content Thesis to be established: the reason for this is that the argument does not show that perceptual experience has content in a sufficiently strong sense. Recall that according to the content thesis experience is *fundamentally* a matter of representing the world as being a certain way. Not just any kind of relation between experience and representational content will fit the bill. And Schellenberg acknowledges that the Master Argument is compatible with experience standing with representational content in a very weak relation of *association*. As we saw earlier (§7), establishing that the relation of association obtains between experience and content does not suffice for a sufficiently strong version of Representationalism to be upheld.¹

¹See Schellenberg (2011a), 720.

21. As mentioned above, the second stage of Schellenberg’s overall argument aims to establish that perceptual experiences stand to certain representational contents in a relation sufficiently strong to uphold the Content Thesis. Schellenberg helpfully sums up the argument of the second stage:

I qualified the notion of perceptual content established by the Master Argument with the aim of showing that content is not merely associated with the relevant experience, but that experience has content in that experiencing subjects represent and misrepresent. By arguing that the phenomenology of experience is best explained in terms of employing concepts in a sensory mode, I showed that it is part of the fundamental nature of perceptual experience to employ concepts. I argued moreover that the content of experience ensues from employing concepts. If it is part of the fundamental nature of perceptual experience to employ concepts and if the content of experience ensues from employing concepts, then experience has content insofar as subjects represent or misrepresent their environment. So perceptual experience has representational content. (743–4)

We can now formulate Schellenberg’s second argument for the content thesis:

- (P1) Phenomenology of perceptual experience is best explained in terms of employing concepts in a sensory mode.
- (P2) Employing concepts in a sensory mode is a part of the fundamental nature of perceptual experience.
- (P3) Content of experience ensues from employing concepts in a sensory mode.
- (P4) If employing concepts is a part of the fundamental nature of experience *and* the content of experience ensues from employing concepts in a sensory mode, *then* experience has content insofar as subjects represent or misrepresent their environment.
- (P5) Experience has content insofar as subjects represent or misrepresent their environment.
- (C) Experience has representational content.

Schellenberg takes herself to have shown that the content thesis is true by establishing that, in experience, subjects represent or misrepresent their environment (P5). In order for this argument to improve on the Master Argument and amount to a defense of the Content Thesis, the relation of representation must be stronger than that of association.² Indeed, this

²Schellenberg takes it that one of the choice points for every representationalist trying to build an account of perceptual content concerns the decision “how to understand the relationship between the experiencing subject and the content of her experience” (Schellenberg (2011a), 716). The three options open to the representationalist at this choice point, according to Schellenberg, are the relations of association, representation, and awareness.

is precisely what (P1) and (P3) are meant to establish. According to Schellenberg, perceptual phenomenology is best explained in terms of employment of concepts in a sensory mode (P1), and this specific kind of concept-employment—as we will see, this includes at least the subsumption of objects and properties under concepts, albeit *in a sensory mode*—results in representational contents that are, as it were, generated in experience (P3).

The focus of my discussion will be on (P1). I will show that it is not the case that perceptual phenomenology is best explained in terms of employment of concepts in a sensory mode. Schellenberg’s proposal construes perceptual experience as very similar to thought, threatening to make the distinction between experience and thought insubstantial, and misconstrues the relation between the phenomenology of experience and perceptual concepts.

22. According to Schellenberg, perceptual experience has representational content; it is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way. In particular, the phenomenology of experience is to be explained in representationalist terms. More specifically, phenomenology is *grounded* in *conceptual* content. At the same time, the content of perception is construed in such a way that it allows for the recognition of the role of individual, mind-independent objects in shaping experiential phenomenology. On Schellenberg’s view, the perceptual relation to external objects is built into the notion of content: the experiential content is *relational*. According to Schellenberg, phenomenology of an experience supervenes on its content (Schellenberg (2011a), 728).³ More specifically, phenomenology of perceptual experience is accounted for in terms of the *employment of concepts in a sensory mode* (Schellenberg (2011a), 744). The notion of *employment* of concepts, as used by Schellenberg, denotes at least the *subsumption* of items—objects or property-instances—under concepts. This kind of subsumption is to be distinguished from the kind that occurs in judgment and thought by the addition of the qualification that, in perception, concepts are employed *in a sensory mode*, a special mode of concept-employment characteristic of sensory experience:

When a subject perceives, the objects or property-instances to which she is perceptually related are subsumed under the concepts employed (Schellenberg (2011a), 733).

³In Schellenberg (2011b), Schellenberg makes the stronger claim that the phenomenology of experience is *identical* with employing concepts (Schellenberg (2011b), 13–4).

The phenomenology of an experience is, according to Schellenberg’s supervenience thesis, fixed by the concepts that the subject employs in the appropriate sensory mode at the time of the experience: “On the suggested view, any experience in which the same concepts are employed in the same sensory mode will have the same phenomenology” (Schellenberg (2011a), 733).

It is a virtue of this way of accounting for perceptual experience that it can easily handle non-veridical experiences. In a hallucinatory experience which is subjectively identical with a veridical experience of a sheet of paper, the same concepts are employed; in the latter, an object (i.e. the sheet of paper) and property-instances (the sheet’s shape, color, etc.) are subsumed under these concepts, but in the former these same concepts remain empty. Illusions and hallucinations are experiential episodes in which at least one of the concepts whose employment determines the experiential phenomenology fails to refer.

23. Schellenberg incorporates the relationalist elements into her position in two ways. First, the phenomenology of experience is, ultimately, explained in terms of *perceptual relations* to mind-independent objects and property-instances. Second, the content of experience depends, in part, on *whether* there are particular mind-independent objects in the subject’s environment as she undergoes an experience and on *which* objects there are. I will proceed to explain the two relationalist aspects of Schellenberg’s view in turn.

24. Phenomenology supervenes, according to Schellenberg, on concepts employed in a sensory mode. The concepts employed in perception are analyzed in terms of the conditions of their possession. Concept-possession is understood thus: “to possess a concept is to have the ability to refer to the mind-independent objects or property-instances that the concept is of” (Schellenberg (2011a), 732). To possess a concept, one must be able to refer to objects that fall under the concept. This ability crucially depends on the ability to *discriminate* between items that fall under the concept in question and those that do not. Schellenberg maintains that this discriminatory ability ultimately depends on perceptual relations to objects, relations of acquaintance or awareness (Schellenberg (2011a), 733). Although experiential phenomenology is grounded in concepts, these concepts are inevitably anchored in percep-

tual relations to mind-independent objects and so “we can recognize the (...) relationalist insight that the phenomenology of perceptual experience can and should be explained in terms of perceptual relations to the very external, mind-independent objects and property-instances that the experiencing subject is aware of” (Schellenberg (2011a), 734).

25. In addition to its role in explaining phenomenology, the involvement of objects in Schellenberg’s account of experience has another dimension. The epistemic role of experience, its role in supplying knowledge of individual objects, leads her to think that individual objects must figure in the *content* of experience. The content of experience should be distinguished from the concepts employed—the content *ensues* from the employing of concepts in a sensory mode (Schellenberg (2011a), 729), and the concepts employed in an experience stand to its content in a type-token relation. For instance, while the same content-type (i.e. the concepts employed) is shared by a veridical experience and the matching hallucination, the two experiences have different contents; the two contents are different tokens of the same type.

This distinction is motivated by the epistemic role of experience. In particular, Schellenberg considers cases like the following. In experience e_1 , the subject is perceptually related to the object o_1 . In experience e_2 , the subject is perceptually related to the object o_2 . The two objects are qualitatively identical but numerically distinct. The two experiences are identical from the subject’s point of view, but nevertheless different insofar as o_1 and o_2 are distinct. This difference is not to be passed over easily since significant epistemic stakes can be on the line. For one thing, it might be reasonable for the subject to believe—given the identical phenomenologies—that the object she is aware of in e_1 is the same one she is aware of in e_2 . This belief could even amount to knowledge if (together with the obtaining of some other conditions) she were indeed perceptually related to one and the same object in both experiences. But if there are two distinct objects—as there are in our example—involved in the two experiences, the claim to knowledge would fail. So how can the difference between e_1 and e_2 be captured? Schellenberg considers a relationalist solution (that the difference is somehow to be in the phenomenology of the experiences after all) and a representationalist

solution (that the difference is causal) and rejects both.⁴ Instead, she argues that the difference must be a matter of different *experiential contents*.

26. The picture we arrive at is the following one. Content-type determines the phenomenology of experience. The phenomenology is *fixed* by the concepts employed in a sensory mode. This element of an experience is *not* dependent on the subject’s environment and can remain unchanged even if there are no objects that fall under the concepts employed. The content of the experience, on the other hand, is a token of the phenomenology-fixing content-type; it is partly dependent on the environment and varies depending on *whether* there is an object that falls under the concepts employed and *which* object that is, if there is one. According to Schellenberg’s fully developed view of experiential content, experiential contents are “potentially gappy Fregean modes of presentation”:

[I]f I perceive the white cup o_1 , the token content of my perceptual experience will be: $\langle MOP_r(o_1), MOP_r(P) \rangle$, where $MOP_r(o_1)$ is a *de re* mode of presentation of the cup o_1 and $MOP_r(P)$ is a *de re* mode of presentation of the property P that this object instantiates. (Schellenberg (2011a), 742)

In the case of the subjectively indistinguishable experience e_2 of the object o_2 , the token content will be $\langle MOP_r(o_2), MOP_r(P) \rangle$, and in the case of the subjectively indistinguishable hallucination the token content will be $\langle MOP_r(---), MOP_r(---) \rangle$, where both the object- and the property-concept are empty.

3.2 CONCEPTS AND PHENOMENOLOGY

27. The claim that experiential phenomenology is best explained in terms of the notion of employing concepts in a sensory mode is at the very core of Schellenberg’s view. It is in this claim that, in virtue of Schellenberg’s account of concepts, the relationalist insight meets Representationalism. In addition, the claim is central to Schellenberg’s defense of Representationalism in Schellenberg (2011a)—only once the fundamental nature of experience is revealed as essentially involving concept-employment can a suitably strong version of

⁴See Schellenberg (2011a), 735–36.

Representationalism be defended (Schellenberg (2011a), 744). In what follows I will argue that Schellenberg's claim misconstrues the relation between phenomenology and perceptual concepts.

Perceptual experience provides our concepts (at least some of them) with content. Moreover, it is experience whose role is indispensable in enabling our grasp of certain concepts. Take for example concepts like RED, SHARP and OVAL. They acquire their content—at least in part—through experience. If that is so, we might worry that an account of experience in terms of concept-employment cannot sustain an explanation of the role of experience in supplying these concepts with content. If experience is a matter of employing concepts, we cannot—on pain of circularity—invoke experience in explaining how these concepts are furnished with their contents.

Schellenberg addresses this worry. She argues that “we need not choose between perception providing us with concepts and perception being a matter of employing concepts as long as the very concepts that are employed in perception are understood to be grounded in perception” (Schellenberg (2011a), fn. 5 at p. 745). I will argue that Schellenberg's response is not satisfactory, and that her account of phenomenology prevents her from adequately accounting for this role of experience.

28. Schellenberg's response turns on her understanding of concepts. As we saw above, on this view concepts are analyzed in terms of conditions of their possession. The possession of a perceptual concept is, in turn, analyzed in terms of the ability to refer to external, mind-independent objects and property-instances that the relevant concept is of (Schellenberg (2011a), 732). This ability to refer involves the *capacity to discriminate* between items that fall under the concept and those that do not. Finally, the discriminatory capacity in question is based on perceptual relations of awareness or acquaintance to such mind-independent objects and property-instances (Schellenberg (2011a), 733). The resulting view posits perceptual relations to objects and property-instances as fundamental in explaining perceptual experience—these relations ground the concepts whose employment in a sensory mode then accounts for the phenomenology of experience:

While I have argued that phenomenology corresponds one-to-one with employing concepts

in a sensory mode, these concepts have in turn been analyzed in terms of perceptual relations to external, mind-independent objects and property-instances: possessing a concept is having the ability to pick out the objects and property instances that the concept is of. So on the account presented, the phenomenology is explained in terms of perceptual relations to the objects and property-instances that the employed concepts pick out. (Schellenberg (2011a), 734)

Schellenberg can thus claim to have achieved two important explanatory tasks: she has explained concept-possession in terms of perceptual relations *and* she has explained phenomenology of experience in terms of concept-employment. The former preserves the role of experience in furnishing our conceptual apparatus, while the latter upholds Representationalism about perceptual experience. A third result follows from the above two: the phenomenology of experience is ultimately explained in terms of perceptual relations to objects and property-instances.

29. The initial worry concerning explanatory circularity remains nevertheless. Schellenberg limits the role of experience in our grasp of concepts to the contribution of perceptual relations of awareness or acquaintance. While this might seem to resolve the initial complaint that Schellenberg’s account of the explanatory relation between concepts and experience is circular, the core problem is not addressed. The *phenomenology* of experience cannot, on pain of circularity, play any role in Schellenberg’s explanation of our grasp and possession of concepts. But, arguably, the phenomenology of experience plays a key role in our grasp and possession of concepts. Schellenberg may be right that “we need not choose between perception providing us with concepts and perception being a matter of employing concepts”—if, for example, ‘perception’ is construed so as to include awareness and acquaintance relations—but we must choose between explaining the phenomenology of experience in terms of concept-employment and explaining concept-possession in a way that will acknowledge that the phenomenology of experience makes a key contribution to it.

To see this, consider again Schellenberg’s account of concept-possession. Possession of concepts crucially involves the ability to pick out objects or property-instances that fall under the concept. In the case of the concept RED, for instance,

[A] subject who possesses say the concept RED must be able to use it to pick out red things. This will involve discriminating red things from things that are not red. (Schellenberg

(2011a), 732)

This discriminative ability does not presuppose any successful applications of the concept:

The thesis is rather that one needs to have the *ability* to successfully apply a concept to count as possessing the concept (...) [O]ne may never have been in an environment that contains the objects and property-instances that fall under the concept and nonetheless possess the concept that grounds the ability to refer to such objects and property-instances. (Schellenberg (2011b), 19; see also Schellenberg (2011a), fn. 29 at p. 747)

It appears that two different abilities are necessary for possession of a concept: the ability to pick out items that fall under the concept and the ability to successfully apply the concept. Successful application of a concept need not have anything to do with perceptual experience: a concept can be successfully applied in judgment—for instance, when judging that blood is red, or that water is not. The discriminatory ability, on the other hand, seems to be closely tied to experience. Blind subjects can successfully apply the concept RED in judgment, but cannot discriminate red things from non-red things precisely because of the lack of visual experiences of relevant objects. Of course, Schellenberg may just be using two different descriptions for one ability, and ‘successful application of a concept’ should be taken as ‘successful application *in experience*’, or perhaps what Schellenberg has in mind is the application of concepts in the sense of ‘sensory concept-employment’. Be that as it may, the main point to observe is that we seem to be able to get a grip on the discriminatory ability only by referring to experience. At the same time, the discriminatory ability is, on Schellenberg’s account, explanatorily prior to the phenomenology of experience. So if the ability to discriminate between red and non-red things is to be an ability to so discriminate *in experience*, it has to be grounded in something other than the phenomenology.

Schellenberg proposes that *perceptual relations* such as awareness or acquaintance are to do the required work. But it does not seem that these relations will suffice. Mere visual awareness of a red tomato placed in a basket full of green tomatoes is not sufficient for discrimination: a color-blind person may be visually aware of each of the tomatoes without being able to pick out *the red one*. What seems to be required for the discriminatory ability in question to be exercised is the presence, in the subject’s experience, of the tomato’s *redness*. Similarly with acquaintance: for this relation to ground the discriminatory ability, the subject would have to be acquainted with the redness of red objects present in experience.

Schellenberg, however, cannot resort to invoking the redness of red objects as grounding the discriminatory ability without thus invoking the phenomenology of experience. Insofar as this is the case, the initial circularity problem still haunts her account of experience.

This way of linking perceptual experience and concepts seems to put the explanatory cart before the horse. A significant part of what an account of experience should help us understand is how perceptual concepts (e.g. shape and color concepts) are grasped, and how experiential phenomenology contributes to concept-possession, as it surely must. If the phenomenology of experience itself is explained in terms of concepts, the explanatory role of experience in the acquisition of concepts becomes obscured.

30. The above objection points to a fundamental problem with Schellenberg's proposal. Perceptual experience seems to be, on Schellenberg's view, modeled too closely on thought. Saying that experience is fundamentally a matter of employing concepts—albeit in a special mode, one that is different from how concepts are employed in thought—threatens to make the distinction between experience and thought insubstantial.

Schellenberg tentatively endorses (see Schellenberg (2011b), 23) the thesis that the difference between experience and thought is the difference in modes of concept-employment. In experience, concepts are employed in a sensory mode, while in thought these same concepts are employed in a different mode (or modes). This response would be natural because the characteristic phenomenology of perceptual experience appears to be the most salient ground for distinguishing between experience and thought, and concept-employment in a sensory mode is what Schellenberg's account of phenomenology is based on.

But the notion of employing concepts in a sensory mode seems insufficiently clear for the explanatory role it should perform. What exactly might employing concepts in a sensory mode amount to? One intuitively appealing reading would be that certain concepts are employed in a sensory mode when elements of the phenomenology of a subject's experience are subsumed under these concepts. For instance, when I look at a red and round tomato, I employ concepts RED and ROUND in the visual sensory mode by subsuming the object present to my consciousness, because of its redness and roundness, under the concepts RED and ROUND. This, plainly, cannot be what Schellenberg has in mind since concept-employment in

a sensory mode is used in her account of phenomenology. The notion of concept-employment in a sensory mode remains insufficiently clear and it seems it amounts to no more than a placeholder for a substantive explanation of the difference between experience and thought.

3.3 CONCLUSION

31. Schellenberg's Representationalism is admirably sensitive to some important relationalist insights which are incorporated into the overall account of experience in a highly original manner. Nevertheless, the way Schellenberg construes the explanatory relation obtaining between perceptual phenomenology and perceptual concepts is implausible. The role of the phenomenology of experience in furnishing perceptual concepts with content must be recognized. This can be achieved only if phenomenology is accounted for without invoking concepts. A concept-independent account of experiential phenomenology would also have a better chance to succeed at drawing a clear distinction between perceptual experience and thought.

32. Some of our concepts—for instance, concepts of proper and common sensibles—acquire their content, at least in part, through experience. Not only that: experience seems to contribute to the content of these concepts in virtue of its phenomenology. This is why, for instance, we may be inclined to withdraw an attribution of possession of a particular color concept in case of a color-blind person who fails at distinguishing objects of the relevant color from other objects, no matter how proficient they may be in employing this color concept in thought. Their experiences offer no grounds for distinguishing objects with respect to their color precisely due to the nature of the phenomenology of their experiences. A representationalist account of experience should, on pain of implausibility, make room for this role of experiential phenomenology. If so, representationalists should be wary of proposals that reverse the required order of explanation and attempt to account for phenomenology in terms of concepts.⁵

⁵I should register that a similar worry is put forward by Richard Heck, but in a different context, and on

33. Siegel and Schellenberg have offered important arguments for Representationalism. In both cases, it is argued that experience generates representational content. And in both arguments this strong representationalist thesis is supposed to be derived from claims about the phenomenology of experience. I hope I have shown that neither argument is successful. Observations about the phenomenology of experience do not force upon us the conclusion that representational content is generated in experience. On both Representationalist accounts I have examined experience is modeled too closely on thought; observations about phenomenology simply do not bear this out.

There is room for an alternative approach to experience. Instead of positing representational contents as the best way of capturing the nature of experience, we can revert to the initial intuition and think of experience in relational terms. Siegel and Schellenberg do not succeed in ruling out the idea that in experience we are simply related to certain items; rather than viewing experience as a state assessable for accuracy, we can view it as a primitive relation to items perceptually presented to us.

Moreover, the general relational orientation promises to prevent us from modeling experience too closely on thought. If experience is not a representational state, it can be clearly distinguished from judgment, belief, and thought in general. And the fact that in experience we can be related to objects and property-instances in our environment can help us explain how it is that experience plays an indispensable rational role in supplying empirical concepts with content and in our grasp of these concepts.

It is worth emphasizing that my case against Representationalism is limited. I did not intend to argue against *all* versions of Representationalism, and I do not take myself to have succeeded in doing so; I am far from certain that one can even plausibly expect such an argument to be possible. On the other hand, I do hope my discussion has bolstered the following claims. First, for Representationalism to be a substantive view, it must uphold the obtaining of a sufficiently strong relation between experience and its representational content. Second, Representationalism according to which representational content is *generated* in experience is not satisfactory—at least not in its versions we find in Siegel and Schellenberg—

grounds that do not fully align with the ones offered above. See Heck (2000).

berg. Representational content is not generated in experience by attribution of properties to objects, nor by employment of concepts in a sensory mode: phenomenology of experience does not lend plausibility to either of the two ways of construing a strong experience-content relation. Representationalists can still try to argue that content is generated by experience in some other way, or propose a different construal of the strong relation between experience and content, or abandon altogether the idea of arguing for Representationalism on the basis of observations about phenomenology and opt for a different argumentative route. These are all legitimate options, and the merits of possible attempts of pursuing them would have to be treated on a case-by-case basis. However, I hope that my discussion has shown not only that two specific representationalist proposals are not viable, but rather that representationalists have a much more difficult task and a heavier burden of proof when trying to establish their account of experience than what is commonly thought.⁶ Specifically, we should be alerted by and skeptical of any attempts to establish a strong experience-content relation on the basis of claims about experiential phenomenology.

34. Several important questions are yet to be answered. We have not settled on the nature of the relation that perceiving subjects enter with perceived objects. This will be the topic of the discussion of Relationalism in the next two chapters. We have also yet to see how to account for non-veridical experiences, i.e., illusions and hallucinations. If Relationalism has an edge over Representationalism when it comes to accounting for the phenomenology of veridical experiences, the same can hardly be said in relation to non-veridical experiences. I will argue that Relationalism cannot in fact successfully accommodate non-veridical experiences, and in chapter 7 I will make an alternative proposal.

⁶Recall again Byrne's assessment of the plausibility of Representationalism, cited on p. 12.

4.0 RELATIONALISM: ONE OBJECT–MANY LOOKS

35. In this and the next chapter I will discuss Relationalism, the major alternative to the representationalist theories of perceptual experience. Relationalism has of late received plenty of attention, and it seems safe to say that it has gained in popularity. My goal in this chapter will be to critically assess Relationalism as it appears in the works of John Campbell, Bill Brewer, and James Genone. The views of these three authors are representative of Relationalism insofar as they share the central commitments of the view. The differences between their views mostly concern the way they treat illusion and hallucination and I will highlight them where appropriate.

In 4.1, I will present the main commitments of Relationalism. In 4.2 and in Chapter 5 I will discuss the Relationalist treatment of non-veridical experiences and argue that relationalists are ultimately unable to offer a plausible account of illusions and hallucinations.

4.1 PHENOMENOLOGY AND ACQUAINTANCE

36. The defining commitment of Relationalism is the claim that perceptual experience (typically, relationalists are concerned exclusively with visual experience) is a matter of relation of *acquaintance* obtaining between a subject and an object. In Brewer's words,

Perceptual presentation irreducibly consists in conscious acquaintance with mind-independent physical objects. (Brewer (2011), p. 94)

The relation of acquaintance is borrowed from Russell. It is an *epistemic* notion, and it denotes a basic intentional relation to certain objects. The major difference between the

Russellian notion and acquaintance as relationalists understand it has to do with the domain of items one can be acquainted with. Russell thought that subjects of perceptual experiences are acquainted with sense-data. Relationalists, on the other hand, think that we are acquainted, in experience, with ordinary mind-independent objects (and, perhaps, their properties). The reason for this shift can be found in the overall motivations for relationalist views.

Brewer, for instance, wishes to preserve the position he calls *empirical realism*, the core of which is made up of the following two claims:

- (1) Physical objects are mind-independent.
- (2) Physical objects are the direct objects of perception.

Brewer thinks that a view on which experience is a matter of direct relation to physical objects has the best shot at preserving the conjunction of (1) and (2). The relation of acquaintance, in Brewer's opinion, is a good fit for this role.

Campbell is primarily concerned with the rational role of experience in grounding thought about objects. In order to perform this role, experience of objects must be more basic, more fundamental than thought. Russell's notion of acquaintance provides Campbell with a working model for such a view of experience:

Russell thought of acquaintance as a cognitive relation more primitive than thought about an object, which nonetheless, by reaching all the way to the object, made thought about the object possible. I will argue that this provides a model for the way in which we think of conscious attention to an object. It is a state more primitive than thought about the object, which nonetheless, by bringing the object itself into the subjective life of the thinker, makes it possible to think about that object. (Campbell (2002a), 6)

Acquaintance, or knowledge of *things*, is what provides subjects with the most fundamental "epistemic contact" with referents of demonstratives. If experience is a matter of being acquainted with objects, its explanatory role can be accommodated straightforwardly: what one is acquainted with just *is* what fixes the reference of a demonstrative;¹ having cognitive contact with objects that is of a kind more primitive than thought about objects makes thought about objects possible and grounds our propositional knowledge, or knowledge of

¹Campbell (2009), 4.

truths.² Objects and their properties enter our “subjective life” by way of acquaintance; only once we get acquainted with them do they become available to our thought. It is important to keep in mind that acquaintance is an *epistemic* relation; to be acquainted with an item is to have a certain kind of knowledge of it. As Genone puts it, experience acquaints a subject “with the way things actually are in her environment,” i.e., with the objects in the environment and their properties (Genone (2014), 349.).

37. According to relationalists, acquaintance with objects (and properties) is what accounts for the phenomenology of experience. Campbell holds that the phenomenology of experience is *constituted* by the objects perceived and their properties:

On a Relational View, the phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, such as colour and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one another and to you. (Campbell (2002a), 116)³

Similarly, Brewer thinks that what the subject of an experience is acquainted with is what constitutes the phenomenology of the experience, but he limits the relation of acquaintance to objects:

The basic idea [of Brewer’s view] is that the core subjective character [of experience] is given simply by citing the physical object which is its mind-independent direct object. (Brewer (2008), 171)

According to relationalists, then, perceptual experience is a matter of a subject’s being acquainted with certain objects (and, perhaps, their properties), where acquaintance is understood as a kind of fundamental, non-propositional knowledge of things. The objects of acquaintance are not to be understood just as elements of the metaphysical nature of experience—they also constitute the *phenomenology* of experience, the subjective character of experience.

38. Accounts of experience as acquaintance with mind-independent objects face the following initial problem. If experience provides us with knowledge of how things really are, how can

²Campbell (2002b), 130.

³See also Fish (2009) for a discussion of the idea that objects and properties *constitute* the phenomenology of experience.

it be the case that we can have subjectively different experiences of one and the same object without the object's undergoing any changes? For instance, consider Hume's example of different ways a table can look when viewed from various angles and distances. The table itself need not undergo any changes—it may retain all the same properties from one experience to another—yet the phenomenology will not remain the same. How can this be the case if the table (and its properties) constitute the phenomenology of experience? Call this the “one object–many looks” problem.

Relationalists respond to the “one object–many looks” problem by construing acquaintance as a *three-place* relation. The third relatum—the subject and the object (and its properties) being the first two—is typically a complex of subject's perspective and relevant environmental conditions. According to Brewer, the third relatum includes the subject's point of view, circumstances of perception and sensory modality.⁴ For Campbell, the third relatum is the *standpoint* which includes sensory modality, subject's position, orientation, and distance.⁵ Genone cites point of view and attention as making up the third relatum.⁶ Once the third relatum is added, relationalists argue, the “one object–many looks” phenomenon can be accommodated: an object exhibits different looks because a subject is acquainted with it from different viewpoints, or under different circumstances, or via a different sensory mode. Any case of, say, a subject looking at a table will be a matter of the subject's being acquainted with that particular object (and its properties) from a particular perspective, and in specific environmental conditions. The addition of the third relatum of the relation of acquaintance seems poised to solve the “one object–many looks” problem.

39. The third relatum of the acquaintance relation cannot be employed to deal with all cases of the “one object–many looks” phenomenon. There are cases in which an object exhibits quite different looks despite there being no change in the sensory modality, perspective, or the environmental conditions. For example, one and the same object can exhibit different looks when experienced by two subjects, one of whom is color-blind. All the elements of the third relatum can be fixed: the perspective from which the object is observed, the

⁴Brewer (2011), 96.

⁵Campbell (2009), 20.

⁶Genone (2014), 351.

environmental conditions, the sensory modality, etc.; yet the object will not look the same to the two subjects. And in order to avoid any potential complications brought about by the fact that the example requires two different subjects, we can suppose that it is the same subject who undergoes the two experiences: imagine that the subject is initially not color-blind but undergoes an intervention which renders him color-blind while he is looking at the object. The third relatum, as specified by relationalists, is of no help here, so how can relationalists deal with this kind of case?

An attempt to respond to this problem can be found in Campbell. Although Campbell does not address the issue explicitly, we can be confident that he was aware of the issues in the vicinity of the present problem. In order to fully appreciate Campbell's response to the difficulty at hand, it will be helpful to set the stage with a brief exposition of Campbell's position.

4.2 CAMPBELL ON TRANSPARENCY

40. Campbell's "Relational View" is motivated by the intention to design an account of perceptual experience that will respect an important explanatory role of experience. A plausible account of experience, according to Campbell, should show how it is that experience of objects makes demonstrative thought about these objects possible.⁷ Elsewhere, Campbell puts the point in terms of experience's role in explaining our *knowledge of reference* of demonstrative terms.⁸

In particular, Campbell attempts to solve the problem of characterizing the phenomenology of experience—its subjective character, or "phenomenal content" as Campbell himself puts it—in a way that will respect and account for the explanatory role of experience. Two crucial ideas shape Campbell's solution: Russell's view of acquaintance as knowledge of things, and Moore's thesis that perceptual experience is *transparent*.⁹ We have already seen how the former idea is articulated in Campbell's work, so I will now only discuss the latter.

⁷Campbell (2002a), 116; Campbell (2010), 202.

⁸Campbell (2010), 193; Campbell (2009), 7; Campbell (2002a), 2.

⁹Moore (1959/1903), 20.

Campbell needs Moorean transparency in order to be able to fully account for the rational role of experience. Acquaintance helps with explaining the rational role of experience, but it is not clear that it can get us all the way to such an explanation. How is it exactly that acquaintance “brings objects into the subjective life of the thinker”? What exactly is the connection between acquaintance with objects and the conscious, subjective character of experience? Unless we can explain the role of the *subjective character* of experience in enabling our thinking about objects, acquaintance might as well be fully confined to sub-personal workings of the information-processing systems in our brains. Here Campbell makes the crucial move of invoking Moorean transparency.

Campbell’s gloss on Moore’s famous discussion of transparency boils down to the following claim: whenever we attend to our experiences, we attend to objects (and their features), *not* to intrinsic properties of the experience itself.¹⁰ When a subject undergoes an experience, when there is some way things are for the subject, they are so solely in virtue of the objects of the subject’s awareness having certain properties (the relation of awareness is Campbell’s take on Russellian acquaintance). When I gaze upon the red ball in the corner, how things are with me as the subject of the visual experience in question is a matter of an object of my awareness—the ball—having certain properties (color, shape, size, location, etc.). And in cases where there are subjectively distinct experiences, they are different solely in virtue of differences between the subject’s respective objects of awareness (or their properties).

The upshot of the explanatory framework arrived at is twofold: first, awareness is a relation whose various exercises can only be differentiated in virtue of differences between objects it relates subjects to, and as such it is clearly a good candidate for the role of the basic cognitive relation to objects, one that can ground thought about objects; second, experience as transparent in Moore’s sense provides a viable way of explaining how objects themselves are brought into a perceiver’s subjective life—the subjective character of experience is simply *constituted* by objects perceived (and their properties):

On a Relational View, the phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects

¹⁰Campbell (2009), 8. How exactly we should understand transparency is a matter of some controversy in the current literature; those differences of opinion are of no relevance here (see Frey (2013) for an insightful overview of different ways in which transparency can be construed).

are there, their intrinsic properties, such as colour and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one another and to you. (Campbell (2002a), 116)

Campbell quite emphatically points out that the Relational View *depends* on the idea that “qualitative properties [of experience] are in fact characteristics of the world we observe.”¹¹ And it is worth noting that Campbell appears not to think of awareness of *objects* as prior to awareness of properties: experience is conceived on the Relational View “as a matter of a relation holding between a perceiver and a macroscopic qualitative feature of the world.”¹²

The two foundational ideas of Campbell’s Relational View—Russellian acquaintance and Moorean transparency—together give rise to an account of the subjective character of experience that is well positioned to meet Campbell’s explanatory requirement. Now the question is how this account will deal with the “one object–many looks” problem when the third relatum of the relation of acquaintance is of no help.

41. Campbell does not address the problem at hand explicitly, but we can be confident that he was aware of the issues in the vicinity of the present problem. It will be useful to discuss Campbell’s response against the background of a specific example.

Imagine Ann, an ordinary perceiver, observing a red tomato placed on the table in front of her. On Campbell’s Relational View, the subjective character of Ann’s experience is constituted by the tomato, its color, shape, position relative to her standpoint, etc. Ann’s experience is the way it is because the tomato, as Campbell would put it, brings its properties into the phenomenology of the experience.

Now consider Fred, a color-blind person, standing at the same spot and looking at the same tomato, under the conditions of Ann’s earlier experience. We might be inclined to expect that Fred’s experience will be just like Ann’s. But it is not. Fred’s experience does not feature the tomato’s redness. The Relational View has it that the tomato, together with its properties, constitutes the phenomenology of Ann’s experience. The roundness and the redness of the tomato, for instance, constitute the phenomenology of her experience; the roundness experienced is the round shape of the tomato itself, the redness experienced is

¹¹Campbell (2010), 206.

¹²Campbell (2007), 14.

the red color of the tomato itself. On the face of it, this is how things should be with Fred's experience as well. But here the red color of the tomato does not feature in the phenomenology of the experience. The tomato may well *be* red, but the color red does not enter Fred's "subjective life" when he is perceptually related to the tomato. Why would this be so, and how can Campbell's Relational View explain it? More specifically, a proponent of the Relational View should be able to come up with a plausible account of the phenomenology of Fred's experience and with a plausible explanation of the difference between Fred's experience and Ann's experience.

Campbell does not discuss the case of color-blindness directly, but what he says about another case in which peculiarities of the subject's visual processing apparently affect the phenomenology of her experiences is indicative of what his response to the case of a color blind person might be.

When trying to show that the Relational View is a viable alternative to a representationalist account of experience, Campbell argues that the Relational View is not "undermined by the fact that the idiosyncrasies of the perceiver may affect the phenomenal content."¹³ Campbell attempts to show that the Relational View is compatible with such influence of the subject's idiosyncrasies by advancing a particular way of conceiving of visual processing. He proposes that we think of visual perception as analogous with viewing the world through a pane of glass. The analogy is supposed to provide us with a way of thinking about vision that can accommodate the role of visual processing while leaving room for a non-representationalist approach: vision always happens to be mediated by visual processing (a pane of glass), but this does not force the representationalist view on us (what we see through the glass need not be represented on the glass itself). The analogy cannot be this simple, though; the underlying visual processes are never fixed and unchanging the way a pane of glass is. So Campbell instead proposes the following analogy: visual processing is like a medium which *can* be transparent—much like glass—but is highly volatile and requires constant calibration and adjustment in order to be transparent under different circumstances.¹⁴ Campbell then uses this model to handle a case similar to the case of Fred's experience:

¹³Campbell (2002a), 119.

¹⁴Campbell (2002a), 119.

If we think of visual processing in this way, we can, of course, acknowledge that the adjustment and recalibration may not always yield full transparency. You may, for example, be looking at the world with a jaundiced eye, so that everything you see seems to have a yellowish cast. In that case your visual experience would not have exactly the same content as the visual experience of an ordinary observer looking at the same scene. But this point (...) is entirely compatible with the Relational View. The scene through a pane of yellowish glass will be different to the scene from a pane of purely transparent glass. (Campbell (2002a), 119)

A subject affected with jaundice, supposedly, experiences her environment as tinged with yellow.¹⁵ The Relational View can explain this by acknowledging that visual processing affects the phenomenology—in the case of jaundice, ‘the medium’ is not calibrated so as to be fully transparent.

There are at least two ways of reading Campbell’s analogy. On a strong reading, Campbell intends to say that the scene viewed through a yellow pane is different from the scene viewed through a transparent pane of glass because the pane of glass, together with its properties, is *an element* of the scene, is one of the objects that constitute the layout of the scene before the perceiver.¹⁶ The jaundice case would then, according to the analogy, be different from an ordinary experience in virtue of there actually being something like a yellow pane of glass before the subject; the difference would be in the objects and properties the subjects are perceptually related to in the two cases.¹⁷ This explanation would clearly be compatible with the Relational View. It would not, however, work in Fred’s case. Fred and Ann view the same scene, under the same conditions, and there is no good sense in which there is anything like a pane of glass through which Fred observes the tomato such that it could reasonably be included into the scene itself; it is certainly not the case that Fred’s visual processing contributes to the phenomenology of his experience in virtue of the relation of *constitution*—the brownish color of the tomato in Fred’s experience cannot coherently be ascribed to processes in his brain.

¹⁵There appears to be no evidence that jaundice affects eyesight in this way. Burnyeat (2012) traces this philosophical myth to Cyrenaic skeptics, and notes that Lucretius, Descartes, Berkeley, Russell, and Chisholm, among others, are guilty of perpetuating it. For the sake of discussion, I will go along with a myth of such distinguished history.

¹⁶Note that Campbell does not say that the scene will *look* differently when observed through a yellow pane of glass, but will *be* different.

¹⁷After all, the long-standing appeal and intuitive plausibility of the jaundice case seems to stem, at least in part, from the fact that the eyes of some patients affected with jaundice turn yellow—hence, presumably, also the analogy with the yellow pane of glass.

On a weaker reading, Campbell's point is that the medium is responsible for the difference between Fred's and Ann's experiences not in virtue of its modifying of the scene itself, but in virtue of its modifying the *look* of the scene; one and the same scene can look differently on occasions when the medium is not adjusted appropriately. The visual processing affects the phenomenology of experiences by somehow modifying the colors of objects in the environment of the subject suffering from jaundice. The difference between the jaundice case and an ordinary experience of a scene would then be explained in virtue of a difference in visual processing; the difference would be located not in the object or standpoint, but in the remaining relatum: the subject. Intuitively, this seems like a more promising way of explaining Fred's case; surely the explanation of the fact that he experiences the same object as Ann does, from the same standpoint, but in a way different from the way in which she experiences it must be tracked back to some difference between the two of them. The problem is that this solution cannot be easily reconciled with the Relational View. Once we allow that the phenomenology of Fred's experience is a joint product of the tomato and some internal processing which modifies the tomato's color into the color which is present in Fred's experience, the distinctive claim of the Relational View is all but abandoned: the tomato's color does not constitute the phenomenology of Fred's experience. The redness of the tomato is not present in Fred's experience; it does not enter Fred's subjective life, and so it cannot be viewed as being a constituent of the phenomenology of Fred's experience.

42. It may be observed that Fred's case, even if the above discussion is plausible, does not pose much of a threat for Campbell's view. For one thing, the Relational View does acknowledge the subject as one of the relata of the perceptual relation; if subject's standpoint can affect what properties of the object perceived enter the phenomenology of an experience—a round manhole cover viewed from a particular angle will appear elliptical, for instance—then why would it be problematic if subject's constitution were to affect phenomenology in a similar way? Just as the manhole cover constitutes the phenomenology of an experience by importing, among other properties, a particular shape *when viewed from over here*, so does the tomato constitute the phenomenology of an experience by importing, among other things, a particular color *when viewed by Fred*. Perhaps macroscopic properties we

observe are subject to two kinds of relativity, not just the one Campbell accommodates by the addition of the third relatum.

The problem with this line of response is that the second kind of relativity does not sit well with Relationalism. It is not clear what is left of the idea that it is the world that we all share that constitutes our experiences: the color of the tomato does not seem to constitute the phenomenology of Fred's experience, and the color of that particular object is not an aspect of the world that Fred and Ann can share. We can see how the shared world constitutes our experiences even if the objects in that world can be viewed in different ways: to both Fred and Ann the table on which the tomato is placed will look the same provided that both view it from a particular spot, given a particular orientation relative to the object, etc. But this commonality is lost if the phenomenology of experience is relativized to a perceiver (and her constitution). The shared world cannot be what *constitutes* both Fred's and Ann's experience of the tomato, because even if the conditions of perception are identical, the color which enters their respective subjective lives will not be the same.

In Campbell's defense one could point out that there is still a reasonable sense in which the color of the object constitutes the phenomenology of experience: were it not for the object's intrinsic color-property, neither Fred's nor Ann's experience could have the phenomenology that it does. The object's color fixes the phenomenology of both experiences; it just happens that in one case the medium of visual processing is calibrated so as to ensure transparency, whereas in the other it is not.

This is a legitimate move for the relationalist to make, and I do not think there are any straightforward ways of ruling it out. But in the absence of a fully worked out proposal that uses a weakened notion of constitution, it remains unclear to what extent the idea that "the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the qualitative character of the shared world we perceive" (Campbell (2007), 2) can be reconciled with only occasionally achieved transparency. There is evidence of significant intersubjective variation in color perception.¹⁸ If this means that only some people, some of the time, get the colors (intrinsic properties of objects, according to Campbell) of objects right, then what exactly is the import of the claim that what constitutes our experiences is the qualitative character of the world that we share?

¹⁸See, e.g., Kuehni (2004) and Webster et al. (2000).

43. The relationalist solution to the “one object–many looks” problem is thus not without its difficulties. But even if relationalists can successfully resolve all the issues highlighted above, there are further problems for the view, ones that, I think, ultimately undermine the relationalist approach. In fact, it is, in a sense, the “one object–many looks” phenomenon that leads to these more serious difficulties.

To see how the new problem emerges, consider again the fact that relationalists concede that a single object can exhibit multiple different looks. An object’s looks can vary with the variations in the environmental conditions, and with the variations in subject’s position, perspective on the object of perception, etc., and, presumably, with the variations in a subject’s visual processing. This is the case, it is safe to assume, with all perceptible objects. But surely this means that we can tweak the relata of an acquaintance relation with the object o_1 and the relata of an acquaintance relation with a different object, o_2 , in such a way that *identical looks* (i.e., identical phenomenologies) are produced. The simplest example of such a case would be a case of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct objects (e.g., two drops of water) as objects of two different experiences: two qualitatively identical drops of water can surely exhibit identical looks. Objects need not be qualitatively identical for this problem to arise; similar phenomena can occur with, say, tweaks in environmental conditions. A red object in plain daylight may look exactly the way a white object of the same size and shape looks under a carefully selected red illumination. Once it is allowed that individual objects of acquaintance can exhibit different looks, it appears that doors are open for the possibility that different objects can exhibit identical looks.

However, the idea that different objects can exhibit identical looks is an idea that is in stark opposition with the relationalist approach to experience. If different objects can indeed look the same, then *acquaintance* with an object—i.e., a kind of *knowledge* of a thing, a relation that requires *that specific object*, or a specific set of properties, as a relatum—cannot be what accounts for the phenomenology of experience. I call this the “one look–many objects” problem. I will look into two relationalist attempts to deal with this problem. While my discussion will not exhaust all the options that relationalists can resort to, I believe it will go a long way toward showing that Relationalism cannot successfully deal with obstacles

raised by the prospect of the possibility that different objects might look exactly the same.

5.0 RELATIONALISM: ONE LOOK–MANY OBJECTS

44. Relationalists tend to respond to the “one look–many objects” problem by resisting the claim that experiences of different objects can ever have identical phenomenologies. There is no such thing as “one look–many objects” phenomenon; what we take to be identical phenomenologies across experiences with different objects are at best different phenomenologies that happen to be *subjectively indistinguishable*, i.e., such that it is not possible for the subjects who have these experiences to tell them apart. Here is Brewer’s take on this issue:

[C]onsider visual experiences of two numerically distinct but qualitatively identical apples from corresponding points of view and in the same perceptual circumstances. [Brewer’s account of experience] characterizes these as relations of conscious acquaintance with distinct objects, yet surely the experiences are identical? Absolutely not! Just as the apples cannot possibly be distinguished by looking, so the visual experience cannot possibly be distinguished by introspection either; and just as their visual indistinguishability does not entail that the apples are one and the same, so it does not follow from their introspective indistinguishability either that that the experiences are one and the same. Just because a person may be unable to distinguish two experiential conditions it absolutely does not follow that these have to be characterized as one and the same experiential condition. (Brewer (2011), 98)

There are two important observations to be made here. First, it will escape no one that the “one look–many objects” phenomenon is closely related with non-veridical perception. Illusion is commonly characterized as a kind of perceptual experience in which an object looks *F*, yet it is not in fact *F*. If we take it that ‘*F*’ characterizes a way of looking—say, something’s looking red—then it is clear that cases like the one with the white object in red light and red object in plain light will naturally be qualified as illusions.¹ Illusions and hallucinations

¹The notion of illusion is not a tidy one; as a matter of fact, even the more general notion of misperception is far from being clear-cut. The notion is, crucially, heavily influenced by context. An ordinary experience of a blue sky is usually not taken to be non-veridical even though there is no such thing in the world as a colored dome encircling the horizon. Moreover, such an experience would, arguably, be deemed positively veridical

pose a problem for Relationalism precisely insofar as they seem to involve the possibility of pairs of experiences (one veridical, one non-veridical) that share the phenomenology, but that cannot both be characterized in terms of acquaintance with identical relata. Next, note that the “one look–many objects” problem can be generated independently of any talk about illusion and hallucination. Simply by allowing that any object can exhibit many different looks, and by multiplying the number of factors relative to which looks of objects can vary, relationalists open the door for the threat posed by the possibility that the looks of different objects may be identical.

Relationalists who reject the possibility of different objects having identical looks owe us an account of looks that accommodates and explains this apparent identity. Simply pointing out that the apparent identity is nothing other than introspective indistinguishability will not do. For one thing, the outright rejection of the very possibility of different objects having identical looks would seem arbitrary and dogmatic. Again, if we allow that a single object can exhibit many different ways of looking and relativize looks to a host of different factors, why could it not be the case that two qualitatively distinct objects happen to be capable of exhibiting exactly the same way of looking? Moreover, limiting the response to subjective indistinguishability is a move characteristic of the negative disjunctivist treatments of hallucination.² It may be appropriate to use negative disjunctivism to deal with hallucination (although I have strong doubts about this), given the radical difference between veridical perception and hallucination, i.e., visual experience in which there is no perceptual relation

when compared with a subjectively identical total hallucination as of a blue sky. An ordinary experience of a piece of furniture would not commonly be taken to be non-veridical because that physical object does not have the shape-property it appears to have when viewed from a particular angle and distance. An ordinary experience of railroad tracks stretching into distance is not considered non-veridical because the tracks, contrary to the appearances and as a matter of fact, do not converge. An experience of two railway sleepers on those same tracks would not be considered non-veridical even though they appear to be, contrary to fact, of different lengths. But we think of the Müller-Lyer diagram as an illusion precisely because two objects appear to be, contrary to fact, of different lengths. A color-blind person’s experience of an object in direct sunlight would be considered as non-veridical because it does not involve phenomenal redness, but the same object, when viewed at dusk by a person of normal sight would not be so classified, even though the two experiences may be exactly alike. For my purposes, these notions do not need to be clear-cut—the objections I wish to raise against Relationalism can be discussed in terms of the “one look–many objects” phenomenon, and this can be discussed independently of any attempts to classify experiences into veridical and non-veridical ones.

²Negative disjunctivism is the view that most we can say about hallucination is that it has the *negative epistemological property* of being indiscriminable from veridical perception. The view is thoroughly discussed and defended in Martin (2004) and (2006). For further discussion see papers collected in Byrne and Logue (2009) and Haddock and Macpherson (2008).

to any ordinary objects. But the problem here is to account for “one look–many objects,” i.e., pairs of experiences in both of which a perceptual relation to ordinary objects undoubtedly obtains. The very description of these cases, even when cashed out in relationalist terms, pushes the characterization further from mere introspective indistinguishability. So now the question for the relationalist is this: how is it that experiences with different objects (or properties) as the relata of acquaintance can have subjectively indistinguishable—yet not identical—phenomenologies?

Brewer and Genone offer further developments of the relationalist account of illusion—and, consequently, of the (apparent) “one look–many objects” phenomenon. I will proceed to discuss each proposal in turn.

5.1 BREWER ON VISUALLY RELEVANT SIMILARITIES

45. Brewer’s account of how things look in experience is fully externalist; looks are not to be understood as internal representations or “mental paint” but instead as features—broadly speaking—of mind-independent objects. Here is Brewer’s official characterization of the notion of looks:

[T]he basic idea is that a mind-independent object, o , looks F to a subject, S , in virtue of the fact that S is consciously visually acquainted with o from a point of view and in circumstances of perception relative to which o has visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of F , where *visually relevant similarities* are similarities of the various kinds to which the physical processes enabling visual perception respond similarly, as a result of both their evolutionary design and their development over the course of our lives. (Brewer (2011), 118)

The major elements of Brewer’s account of looks are the following: (i) o ’s looking F is explained in terms of certain *similarities* that are shared by o and objects that are F ; (ii) the similarities in question are not just any similarities—they are “visually relevant similarities”; (iii) for o to look F it must have visually relevant similarities with select F ’s: only visually relevant similarities with *paradigm exemplars* of being an F will suffice for o ’s looking F .

With this proposal in place, Brewer takes himself to be in a position to explain how it is that objects that are not F can look F . For example, here is how a white piece of chalk can

look red when illuminated with red light:

From the viewpoint in question, and, most importantly in this case, given the relevant perceptual circumstances—especially, of course, the abnormally red illumination—it has visually relevant similarities with a paradigm red piece of chalk, of just that size and shape. Their visually relevant similarity consists in the similarity of the light reflected from both. (Brewer (2011), 106)

Brewer’s proposal is naturally extended to experiences which are commonly classified as illusions: e.g., the Müller-Lyer diagram. In the Müller-Lyer case, the two lines presented in the experience look unequal in length although they are in fact equal in length. The lines look so, according to Brewer’s view, in virtue of their *visually relevant similarities* with paradigm exemplars of inequality in length.³

46. Brewer distinguishes between different senses of ‘looks’. In particular, he makes the distinction between *thin* and *thick* looks.

An object *thinly* looks *F* if and only if it is the direct object of a visual experience from a point of view and in circumstances relative to which it has visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of *F*. It *thickly* looks *F* if and only if it thinly looks *F* and the subject recognizes it as an *F* (Brewer (2011), 121–2). Recognition of an object *as* an *F* is thus a “genuinely *phenomenological* affair” (Brewer (2011), 121), not a matter of judgment. For example, in the Müller-Lyer case, the lines *thickly look* unequal in length to a subject who possesses the requisite concept, but the subject need not judge that the lines are unequal (Brewer (2011), 124).

The thin notion of looks is the fundamental one—it is thin looks that are characterized in Brewer’s official account of looks.⁴ If objects can look a certain way without the need for them to be recognized as looking so, Brewer can accommodate some *prima facie* troublesome consequences of his view. Namely, objects will bear visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of numerous different kinds. The white piece of chalk illuminated by red light can simultaneously bear visually relevant similarities to a paradigm red object as well as to a paradigm scarlet object. Moreover, since it is itself white, it will presumably

³Brewer dubs his account of perception “the Object View”; I will occasionally refer to it using this title.

⁴See first of the two quotes in §45.

bear visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of whiteness as well—so there is a sense in which the white piece of chalk in red light will *look white*. Brewer thinks that the distinction between thin and thick looks allows him to make sense of these consequences of his general account of looks (Brewer (2011), 125 & ff.). An object will thinly look many different ways: the white piece of chalk in red light will thinly look red as well as white-in-red-light, for instance. But for the white piece of chalk to look *thickly* white-in-red-light, according to Brewer, a great deal of stage-setting is required—we would need to imagine circumstances in which, say, an attempt is being made to decide which piece of chalk is a white one out of a selection of pieces of chalk we know are illuminated with red light.

An object viewed under a particular set of circumstances will always have multiple *thin* looks; this is simply a matter of its having visually relevant similarities with other objects. How the object in question looks *thickly* will depend on the wider circumstances and on the subject of the experience. Brewer takes it that the potentially alarming proliferation of ways a single object can look in an experience can be handled using the distinction between thin and thick looks.

47. Brewer’s account of looks is still prone to some formidable difficulties. I will now proceed to present these difficulties, showing that each of the major features of Brewer’s account (i.e., (i)–(iii) listed in §45) gives rise to serious problems.

According to Brewer, *o* looks *F* in virtue of its visually relevant similarities with certain objects that are *F*. This raises an initial puzzle: how can an object’s satisfying of one predicate (i.e., ‘*x* looks *F*’) be explained by the object’s similarities with objects that satisfy a different predicate (i.e., ‘*x* is *F*’)?

Brewer motivates the explanatory method in question by using an analogy; according to resemblance nominalism of the sort he is inclined to accept,

o satisfies the predicate ‘*x* is *F*’ in virtue of the fact that *o* sufficiently and appropriately resembles the paradigm whose association with the predicate plays a significant role in determining its meaning (. . .) Similarly, I claim, if *o* has certain visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of *F* relative to a given spatiotemporal point of view and specific circumstances of perception, then *o* itself *looks F* in a perceptual experience of conscious visual acquaintance with that very object from that point of view in those circumstances” (Brewer (2011), 119–20).

But the analogy does not help with showing how Brewer's account can elucidate an object's *looking F* in terms of its similarities with objects that *are F*. Brewer compares two cases of explaining an object's satisfying of a predicate in terms of similarities with other objects. In the first case, an object's satisfying of '*x is F*' is explained in terms of the object's similarities with other objects that satisfy '*x is F*'. In the second case, an object's satisfying of '*x looks F*' is explained in terms of the object's similarities with objects that satisfy '*x is F*'. The two cases are not analogous; an analogy would hold if Brewer were to explain *o*'s looking *F* in terms of its similarities with paradigm exemplars of '*x looks F*'.

Let me make clear that I do not think Brewer's account of looks is somehow doomed by this puzzle; there could be ways in which it can be dealt with. At this point, I only wish to highlight that it is not entirely clear how we are to read Brewer's official account of looks. This issue will arise below as well. Perhaps Brewer does think that an object's satisfying '*x looks F*' should be explained in terms of the object's similarities with other objects that look *F*, and perhaps this explanation can be plausible and informative. There even may be a sense in which Brewer's explanation in terms of similarities with objects that *are F* is a good one. Finally, even if his analogy does not hold, Brewer can appeal to other elements of his account of looks in order to show its explanatory potential. For instance, explaining an object's looking *F* in terms of its similarities with objects that *are F* may be useful and successful in case there is something particularly illuminating about *visually relevant* similarities that obtain between objects that look *F* and objects that *are F*. It is to this notion that I will now turn.

48. Visually relevant similarities are similarities among objects, relative to specific circumstances of an experience. Two objects have visually relevant similarities (under specific circumstances) if they share a sufficient number of properties involved in visual processing. Visually relevant similarities are "those that ground and explain the ways that the particular physical objects we are acquainted with in perception look" (Brewer (2011), 103). The relevant properties will include, for instance, surface spectral reflectance properties—roughly, two objects will have visually relevant similarities with respect to color if, under specific circumstances, both reflect light of the same (or sufficiently similar) wavelength:

Objects have visually relevant similarities when they share sufficiently many common properties amongst those that have a significant involvement in the various processes underlying vision. Thus, and very crudely, visually relevant similarities are identities in such things as the way in which light is reflected and transmitted from the objects in question, and the way in which stimuli are handled by the visual system, given its evolutionary history and our shared training during development. (Brewer (2011), 103)

Consider again Brewer's example of a white piece of chalk illuminated with red light. The white piece of chalk looks red in virtue of its visually relevant similarities with paradigm red objects.⁵ In particular,

Their visually relevant similarity consists in the similarity of the light reflected from both. Thus the white chalk looks red. (Brewer (2011), 106)

The visually relevant similarity is similarity of the light reflected by the two objects; the two objects are similar with respect to a surface spectral reflectance property. The property in question is indeed a property that, in one important sense, "grounds and explains" the way the white chalk looks in red light: it is because of the way in which the human visual system responds to a stimulus partially fixed by the property in question that we have experiences of redness.

The notion of visually relevant similarities is problematic. To begin with, for many *F*s, there will be numerous different visually relevant similarities the obtaining of which will secure an object's looking *F*. In the case of color, the phenomenon of metamerism clearly shows this. An object can look yellow if it reflects light that is normally seen as green, provided that the light falls on the periphery of the retina.⁶ An object can look yellow if it reflects light that is normally seen as gray, provided that the gray surface is surrounded by a blue surface.⁷ Neither of these two objects will be similar with a yellow object with respect to the light reflected, yet they all may look to have the same color. Metamers are one of the major reasons why physicalists tend to define color not in terms of individual surface spectral reflectance properties, but in terms of types of such properties.⁸ But for a surface spectral reflectance property to belong to the type that defines, say, the color yellow, it must

⁵Brewer actually narrows paradigm exemplars to "a paradigm piece of chalk, of just that size and shape." It is an interesting question why the relevant exemplar of redness must be of a particular size and shape, but we need not concern ourselves with it now.

⁶See Hering (1964).

⁷See, e.g., Whittle (2002).

⁸Byrne & Hilbert (2003).

be such that it produces, under suitable circumstances, experiences of the color yellow. So the criterion for the inclusion of a physical property into the type which defines a color is a phenomenological one. When it comes to color, a gray surface surrounded by a blue surface, a green surface that reflects light onto the periphery of a retina, and a regular yellow surface are thus not similar with respect to anything but the way they look to a perceiver. And that is not a similarity that can ground or explain the way any of these objects look to a perceiver.

Brewer could make the following response. He does say that among visually relevant similarities there is also “[identity] in (...) the way in which stimuli are handled by the visual system, given its evolutionary history and our shared training during development” (Brewer (2011), 103). It may be argued that the similarity of metamers with respect to looks is a matter of the visual system’s identical “handling” of the stimuli produced by the metamers. But this does not really help: given how different the metameric stimuli can be, it is far from clear that the “identity of the handling of the stimuli” can be anything other than the identity at the level of the final product of the visual processing, i.e., the phenomenology of experience. This, of course, is unacceptable for Brewer who thinks that different objects cannot have identical looks. Moreover, it should be reiterated that Brewer’s account of looks would not give much of an explanation of looks if it were to account for an object’s looking F in terms of the *phenomenological* similarity (if not identity) that obtains between the object’s looking F and other objects’ way of looking.

Finally, Brewer’s notion of the visually relevant similarities does not fit well with his epistemological commitments. Brewer’s account of how experience constitutes a source of empirical knowledge relies on the idea that subjects can register visually relevant similarities among the objects perceived:

[C]onscious acquaintance with o in vision (...) normally makes application of ‘ F ’ in judgment *evidently* correct for a subject who grasps the concept ‘ F ’ and is viewing o from a point of view and in circumstances that enable her registration of the appropriate visually relevant similarities between o and the paradigm exemplars of F that are central to her understanding of that concept. (Brewer (2011), 143)

When a subject is acquainted with a mind-independent object o that is F , the acquaintance itself is the ground for an application of the concept ‘ F ’ in judgment; further, the subject is

reasonable in judging that o is F because of the *recognition* of visually relevant similarities of o with paradigm exemplars of F :

In noticing, recognizing, or *registering*, its visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of F , in the absence of countervailing evidence, application of ‘ F ’ therefore strikes [the subject] as correct in the light of those paradigms’ involvement in her acquisition and understanding of that concept. (Brewer (2011), 144)

Finally, the registration of the visually relevant similarities is an essential element of Brewer’s account of perceptual knowledge:

[A]ccording to the epistemological account that I offer (...) perceptual knowledge that o is F comes to be (...) out of two components. First, experiential acquaintance with o in perception: simply seeing that particular object in our case. Second, registering its visually relevant similarities with the paradigm exemplars of F that play a central role in understanding the predicate ‘ F ’, and judging that o is F on that basis. (Brewer (2011), 155)

The problem this aspect of Brewer’s account faces is the following: if visually relevant similarities are similarities with respect to properties such as surface spectral reflectances, or “the way in which visual stimuli are handled by the visual system,” how can we talk about subjects *noticing* and *recognizing* such similarities? Surely one’s judgment ‘this apple is red’ can be reasonable, and can even constitute knowledge, without one’s noticing and recognizing—and perhaps even without one’s being *capable* of such noticing and recognizing—that the apple in question is similar with paradigm exemplars of redness with respect to some surface spectral reflectance property. After all, such judgments were reasonable, and, arguably, constituted knowledge, well before anyone was aware of the existence of surface spectral reflectance properties.

49. For an object to look F , it must have visually relevant similarities with *paradigm exemplars* of F . Paradigm exemplars of F are instances of F that are partially constitutive of our understanding of the terms denoting the concept of F (Brewer (2011), 104). Paradigm exemplars of F have an essential role in our “acquisition and application *with genuine understanding*” of F (Brewer (2011), 105; emphasis is Brewer’s); they are appropriate to use in “manifesting or acquiring” the concept in question (Brewer (2011), 107).

Initially, it is important to ask why Brewer needs similarity to obtain between objects of perception that look F and *paradigm exemplars* of F . Why not visually relevant similarities between objects that look F and *any* object that is F ?

Reply. Paradigm exemplars play a special role in the acquisition and understanding of concepts. For a subject to recognize an object as an F , she must recognize similarities between the object in question and objects that have played the important role in the process of her acquiring the concept ' F '.

This reply is not satisfactory. As we saw, Brewer draws a distinction between *thin* and *thick* looks, where thin looks do not involve any recognition—an object can thinly look F even to a subject who does not possess the concept ' F '. It is unclear why similarities with paradigm exemplars, and not with just any exemplars, should figure in the account of thin looks.

But even if there is a good reason for favoring paradigm exemplars over all other exemplars in an account of thin looks, Brewer's choice of paradigm exemplars is problematic. In his discussion of the Müller-Lyer illusion, Brewer claims that the two equal, parallel lines of the Müller-Lyer diagram do not "constitute a paradigm case of lines that are equal in length" because they "would certainly be an inappropriate exemplar to use in manifesting or acquiring the concept of equality in length" (Brewer (2011), 107). I confess that I fail to recognize the inappropriateness of Müller-Lyer lines for the purpose of acquiring and manifesting the concept of equality in length. If anything, the Müller-Lyer lines are as good and legitimate exemplar of this concept as are the sides of a square or a pair of skis. After all, the Müller-Lyer lines *are* equal in length. Showing the Müller-Lyer diagram, along with several other examples of equality in length, to someone who does not possess the concept of equality in length seems like a perfectly reasonable thing to do, especially if one is aiming to impart a "genuine understanding" of this concept, which is precisely the role of paradigm exemplars as Brewer conceives them. Arguably, genuine understanding of equality in length will include the recognition of the peculiar fact that lines that are in fact equal in length sometimes do not *look* as though they are equal in length (or at least do not always look the way we may expect them to). The only problem with Müller-Lyer lines is that they do not *look* the way equal lines often do. But that only makes them inappropriate as paradigm

exemplars for the concept ‘looking equal in length’. If anything, the Müller-Lyer lines would be much more appropriate as paradigm exemplars of the concept ‘looking unequal in length’ than of the concept ‘looking equal in length’. The two equal lines of the Müller-Lyer diagram appear to be perfectly appropriate as paradigm exemplars of the concepts ‘looking unequal in length’ and ‘being equal in length’ but much less so of the concept ‘looking equal in length’.⁹

It seems, again, that it would be better for Brewer to account for ‘x looks F’ in terms of similarities with paradigm exemplars of *looking F* instead of paradigm exemplars of *being F*. Sometimes it seems that he does indeed have something like that in mind, even if he does not say so explicitly—the remarks on the appropriateness of the Müller-Lyer diagram for the acquisition of the concept of equality in length suggest as much.

50. Let us take stock. Brewer accounts for an object’s looking *F* in virtue of its visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of *F*-ness. Visually relevant similarities are objective, mind-independent properties. Paradigm exemplars of *F* are objects that are *F* and are also appropriate for acquisition and understanding of the concept ‘*F*’. Brewer’s proposal is fraught with difficulties. The employing of objective, mind-independent properties like surface spectral reflectance properties makes Brewer’s epistemological proposal implausible. On the other hand, Brewer’s insisting on similarities with paradigm exemplars is problematic and seems entirely arbitrary in the case of thin looks.

Brewer could try to avoid both problems by explaining an object’s looking *F* in virtue of its visually relevant similarities with (paradigm) exemplars of *looking F*. But the phenomenon of metamerism suggests that the only visually relevant similarities that obtain between various objects that *look F*, where *F* is a color property, might be the similarities with respect to the phenomenology of experience—similarities in the way objects look to subjects. Brewer’s account would, on this reading, purport to explain how objects look in terms of similarities with other objects’ ways of looking. This would not amount to an explanation of the notion

⁹Although things are not straightforward; in the spirit of Austin’s remarks (Austin (1964), 29) one could note that the way the Müller-Lyer lines look is precisely the way equal lines look under certain circumstances, which would make them paradigm exemplars of looking equal *under those circumstances*. Brewer does not relativize the paradigm exemplars to circumstances so it remains unclear whether he could help himself to the Austinian notion.

of looks but, at best, to a highlighting of an important aspect of the notion of looks—an aspect that is itself in need of an explanation.

5.2 GENONE ON APPEARANCE PROPERTIES

51. Next I will discuss James Genone’s take on looks. Genone’s main goal in Genone (2014) is to construct a relationalist account of *perceptual appearances*. It is safe to say that with ‘appearances’ Genone denotes what I have been calling ‘looks’. In particular, Genone sets out to explain *misleading* appearances, those perceptual experience in which we are inclined to observe that *things are not as they appear to be*. Commonly, such experiences are referred to as *illusions*.

Genone’s overall strategy consists in two major moves. First, he defends the claim that appearances are mind-independent properties of objects in the environment, not properties of psychological states. Second, he explains perceptual error—perceptual illusions in particular—using a doxastic account: illusions are explained in terms of false judgment. When combined, the two claims allow Genone to explain how a relationalist about experience can deal with the phenomenon of misleading experiences.

52. On Genone’s relationalist view, epistemic and phenomenal features of perceptual experiences are to be explained entirely in terms of the relation of *direct sensory awareness* that obtains between subjects and mind-independent objects together with their properties (Genone (2014), 345). Experience *acquaints* a subject “with the way things actually are in her environment,” i.e. with the objects in the environment and their properties.

Like Campbell and Brewer before him, Genone construes acquaintance as a three-place relation, where the third relatum is *point of view*:

As Campbell conceives it, perception is a three-place relation involving a subject, perceived objects, and a point of view (...). In addition, I am emphasizing the idea that perceived properties also figure in the perceptual relation, and also that which objects and properties enter into the relation is partly determined by what the perceiver can and does attend to. Although a subject may perceive more than she attends to, what she attends to will partly determine how perceived objects appear to her. (Genone (2014), 351)

The following point should be noted: it is the *constituents* of the perceptual relation of awareness that are affected by subject's attention and point of view; how objects appear depends, in part, on how the subject is positioned relative to objects in the environment and what the subject attends to.

Genone allows that in certain uncommon cases—experiences suffered under the influence of drugs, or as a consequence of certain clinical conditions—the phenomenology of visual experience can be partly explained in terms of properties of the experience itself (Genone (2014), 368). Even in such cases, though, a part of the explanation of the phenomenology will invoke properties of mind-independent objects.

53. *Appearances* are, in Genone's view, mind-independent properties of objects. They are *relational properties* that objects have “in virtue of their intrinsic properties and various environmental conditions” (Genone (2014), 357). Genone takes the relevant intrinsic properties to be observable: size, shape, and color are among them. These intrinsic properties yield, together with the environmental conditions like illumination and the medium of light transmission, appearance properties which are “entirely mind-independent” (Genone (2014), 357). A white wall bathed in yellow light has a specific appearance property—it looks yellow—and this property is an objective one, a part of reality just as the object's size and shape are. Consequently, in the case of seeing a straight stick partially submerged in water, what is experienced is the stick exactly as it is, “for the appearance is a property that belongs to the stick in virtue of its shape and given its partial immersion in water” (Genone (2014), 363).

Since appearances are objective and mind-independent parts of reality, the very question of whether objects are as they appear to be in an experience does not even arise on Genone's view:

The ways objects appear, on the present account, are among the ways the objects are, and there is no conflict between appearances and the intrinsic properties of objects. If any conflict does arise, it is between the ways objects are, including how they appear, and the judgments we make about them. (Genone (2014), 371)

Finally, the identity of appearances depends on intrinsic properties of the objects that display the appearances in question: two appearances are identical only if they are produced by the same underlying intrinsic properties. If two objects perceived by a subject have dif-

ferent intrinsic properties, the appearance properties the subject is acquainted with when observing the objects will be different. While one might think that a yellow wall in white light and a white wall in yellow light might instantiate the same appearance property, this *cannot* be the case on Genone's view since the two objects have different intrinsic properties (Genone (2014), 362). The identity of appearances here is only apparent.

54. Genone's account of illusion is founded upon a distinction between misleading appearances and perceptual error. In illusion there is actually no *perceptual* error. Perceptual experiences are relations to objects and their properties—including relational properties like appearance properties—and as such cannot be erroneous; we always see the world as it is, even when we are misled by experience (Genone (2014), 362). The only error involved may be error of judgment. The error we are pre-theoretically inclined to pin on perception is in fact *doxastic*: it is a matter of mistaken judgments we are inclined to make on the basis of experience.

Consider a case we might qualify as an illusion—say, viewing a white wall in yellow light. The wall has a certain appearance, given its intrinsic properties and environmental conditions. This appearance may be *misleading*; it may lead the subject of the experience to judge that the wall is yellow. Whether the appearance of the wall will in fact be misleading—that is, whether the subject will judge erroneously—depends on the subject's familiarity with and understanding of the relationship between appearances and specific environmental conditions (Genone (2014), 363). Someone who knows that a yellow light is switched on and that a white wall may appear to be yellow in such lighting conditions will not be inclined to judge that the wall is yellow. In such case, the appearance of the wall would not be misleading.

It is important to emphasize that Genone adopts a doxastic account of the notion of *misleading* appearances only. Appearances as such are not, on Genone's view, explained in doxastic terms: appearances (i.e., appearance properties) are not accounted for in terms of judgment or inclination to judge things to be a certain way but as mind-independent properties of objects. That appearance properties can be misleading is what is explained in doxastic terms. An appearance property is misleading just in case the subject acquainted

with it is inclined to make an erroneous ascription, in judgment, of a property to the object of the experience.

55. To assess Genone's relational view, let's observe it at work in accounting for a specific case of misleading appearances. Genone discusses the case mentioned earlier—that of a white wall's misleading appearance in yellow light. Call this case White Wall:

The fact that conditions in the environment can contribute to objects appearing in ways that lead us to believe that they have properties they lack fits well with the idea the appearances are objective and that perceptual error is a matter of mistaken judgment. To illustrate this, consider the example of a white wall illuminated by strong yellow lighting. The appearance of the wall is one that a perceiver may not be able to discriminate from that of a yellow wall in white lighting. What it means to say that these situations involve distinct appearances is that the appearance of each wall depends on its intrinsic properties and environmental conditions, which are different in the two cases. What is important is that the relational view can claim that in both cases, the subject sees how the world is, for in each case she sees a property instantiated by the wall in relation to its surroundings. This is not to deny that the illusory case can be misleading. A subject who sees a white wall in yellow lighting may very well judge on that basis that the wall *is* yellow, but she need not do so if she is sufficiently familiar with the effects of the lighting, as a cinematographer or painter might be. (Genone (2014), 362)

An appearance of a white wall in yellow light can be misleading. What this means is that a subject who attends to this appearance property of the white wall may be inclined to judge, on the basis of the experience, that the wall is yellow. The environmental conditions—yellow lighting in particular—contribute to the wall's appearance in such a way that the subject may be led to believe that the wall has the property of being yellow when it in fact does not. The experience itself is not in any way to be blamed for the error; there is no *perceptual* error here. The subject sees the world as it is—after all, the subject is, on Genone's account, acquainted with an objective, mind-independent property of the wall. The fault lies squarely with the subject and her erroneous judgment. Finally, Genone seems to suggest that the erroneous judgment is a result of the subject's inability to discriminate between the appearance of a yellow wall in white light and the appearance of a white wall in yellow light.

56. According to Genone, appearances are objective, mind-independent properties of objects. They are *misleading*, according to Genone's doxastic account of misleading appear-

ances, only when they lead us to false judgments, like the one that the wall is yellow in White Wall. Genone thus endorses the following explanatory claim: misleading appearances should be explained in terms of erroneous perceptual judgments made on the basis of those appearances; in short, (i) appearances are misleading when they lead us to make false judgments.

The erroneous judgments of the requisite kind are made due to the lack of knowledge, or proper understanding, of the environmental conditions, of their interaction with the intrinsic properties of the objects perceived, and of the relation between intrinsic and appearance properties under different environmental circumstances:

[W]hat determines whether or not a subject can judge accurately on the basis of an experience is her implicit understanding of the relationship between appearances and the intrinsic properties of objects in various environmental conditions. (Genone (2014), 363)

In White Wall, the subject lacks knowledge both of the environmental conditions at the time of the occurrence of the experience, and of the effect such environmental conditions can have on colored surfaces. Due to this lack of knowledge, the subject cannot make an accurate judgment as to the color of the wall. Genone thus endorses the following explanatory claim as well: the error in perceptual judgments is explained in terms of lack of understanding of or familiarity with the environmental conditions and their interaction with intrinsic properties in the production of appearances; in short, (ii) appearances lead us to false judgments when we lack proper understanding of or familiarity with the environmental conditions.

Claims (i) and (ii), taken together, produce a view according to which the misleading character of appearances is ultimately explained in terms of lack of understanding of environmental conditions and their influence on how objects with particular intrinsic properties appear in experience:

[W]hether or not a perceived appearance is misleading depends on the subject's understanding of the relationship between appearances and intrinsic properties in different contexts. (Genone (2014), 364)

In White Wall, the perceived object instantiates, under the circumstances at the time of the occurrence of the experience, certain appearance properties. The subject bears a direct perceptual relation to these properties. Due to the subject's lack of knowledge of environmental

conditions and their effect on the intrinsic properties of the wall, the subject is led to judge erroneously that the wall is yellow. Hence one of the wall's objective, mind-independent appearance properties is misleading.

57. Now consider another case; let's call it New House. Suppose you are about to enter a house for the first time. An otherwise reliable source informs you that some of the walls in the house might appear not to be white, but that you should pay no heed to the appearances: the walls in question are in fact white. You walk into the house and see what appears to be a yellow wall in front of you. Having no reason to doubt the testimony of your interlocutor, you are inclined to judge that the wall is white, despite the appearances. But the wall, as it happens, really is yellow; there is, as a matter of fact, no funny lighting playing tricks on unsuspecting visitors.

The error committed in New House is of the kind Genone describes when characterizing misleading appearances: an erroneous judgment about an object of perception is brought about by a visual experience and as a consequence of the subject's lack of proper understanding of the environmental conditions in which the object of perception is encountered. In both cases, White Wall and New House, an erroneous judgment about a wall's color is reached: in White Wall, the subject judges that the wall is yellow when it is white; in New House, the subject judges that the wall is white even though it is yellow. The subject of New House *is* insufficiently familiar with the environmental conditions affecting her experience of the wall, and she may well lack understanding of the relationship between appearances and intrinsic properties in different contexts. Consequently, it seems we ought to treat New House on a par with White Wall—i.e., as a case involving misleading appearances.

Yet, intuitively, it seems that New House should not be described as a case of misleading appearances (or as a case of perceptual error, for that matter). There is a perfectly natural sense in which the appearances in New House are not misleading: the wall appears to be yellow and it is yellow. If there is anything that is misleading in this case, it is the testimony of the informant.

Alternatively, consider White Wall₁, a case which is like White Wall in all respects except for one difference: the subject judges that the wall is *red* due to a profound misconception

about the relationship between appearances and intrinsic properties in different contexts—say, the subject believes that all walls, regardless of how they appear, are red during the day, but turn green at night. Here too we have, at least *prima facie*, a case involving misleading appearances according to Genone’s criteria. But again, intuitively, this case should fail to qualify as one involving misleading appearances.

58. White Wall is significantly different from New House and White Wall₁. In White Wall, but not in the other two cases, it is intuitively appropriate to say that, to a first approximation, it is the experience of the wall that misleads the subject who judges erroneously. In New House, it is testimony that does the misleading, and in White Wall₁ misconceptions about color properties of objects are to be blamed. Genone’s account of misleading appearances apparently blurs the line that separates White Wall from the other two cases insofar as it explains the misleading character of appearances in terms of lack of knowledge of a particular kind, similarly to what we find in New House and White Wall₁. One might take this to be sufficient for a *reductio* of Genone’s account of misleading appearances, but this conclusion could be too quick. After all, why would we prefer the intuitive notion of appearances of which, at this point, we have only a weak grasp? I will argue that the intuitive notion of misleading appearances performs an important explanatory role; Genone’s notion of misleading appearances cannot perform the role in question. I will highlight the explanatory role of misleading appearances, and then proceed to argue against Genone’s account of misleading appearances.

59. The intuitive notion of misleading appearances shares at least this much with Genone’s notion: it countenances the idea that misleading appearances somehow lead to erroneous perceptual judgments. Erroneous judgments, even perceptual ones, can be *reasonable*; both in White Wall and New House, for instance, it may be reasonable for the subject to judge erroneously. Misleading appearances have a crucial role in the rational grounding of reasonable, erroneous perceptual judgments. Arguably, the intuitive notion of a misleading appearance is useful precisely as a tool for marking the characteristically experiential rational grounds of an erroneous judgment. An appearance *misleads* when it is specifically experience that

makes it reasonable for a subject to be inclined to judge erroneously.

60. Misleading appearances can lead to erroneous judgments; misleading appearances, that is, can contribute to the reasonableness of some erroneous perceptual judgments. In general, when trying to identify what leads, in this sense, a subject to make a specific judgment, we are looking to get to a *reason* for the judgment being made.

There are different ways in which we can go about trying to identify the aspect of experience that performs this role. For one thing, there is a difference between giving a reason for making a judgment and giving *the subject's* reason for making a judgment. Suppose a subject looks at a modified Müller-Lyer diagram—say, one in which there are squares instead of the more common hashes at the ends of two parallel lines—and judges (or is inclined to judge) that the two lines on the diagram do not have the same length. We can explain why the subject has judged so by saying that, although the subject is well acquainted with the usual Müller-Lyer diagrams with hashes at the ends of parallel lines, she was not aware that the same visual effect can be elicited by equal lines that have *squares* of different sizes at their ends, just like the lines in the diagram she has just examined.¹⁰ While this answer does give a reason for the making of the erroneous judgment, it does not give us a reason for the judgment *from the subject's perspective*, it does not tell us what reason *the subject* may have had for judging so. The point is this: there is a further kind of explanation of the subject's erroneous judgment and a different kind of reason for it. Simply put, the subject has judged that the lines are unequal *because they looked unequal to her*. Each of the two answers satisfies a particular need for an explanation, but the explanations that they provide us with are significantly different.

The above distinction between different senses of reasons for a judgment draws on the distinction between different senses of reasons for belief, as discussed by John McDowell and Hannah Ginsborg.¹¹ Ginsborg's discussion provides a systematic framework that can

¹⁰Although it has long been known that the Müller-Lyer illusion can be elicited with equal lines adorned with many different adornments—and, indeed, even without the two equal lines being drawn—discussions of this case are commonly limited to the standard diagram with arrow-like hashes being added to the lines. The fact that all these different Müller-Lyer diagrams can be drawn all but rules out the widespread opinion that the explanation of the illusion offered in Gregory (1966) is the correct one. For a review of various Müller-Lyer diagrams and opinions on how the illusion should be explained see, e.g., Howe and Purves (2004).

¹¹McDowell (1994), 163 & ff. Ginsborg (2006) and Ginsborg (2011).

be useful for highlighting the distinction. Ginsborg works with the notion of reason as a consideration that counts in favor of a belief.¹² At least three different senses of this notion can be distinguished.

First, there are reasons₁, or reasons for belief in the sense of considerations that the subject who holds the belief in question would appeal to in favor of the belief. For example, my reason₁ for belief that it has rained outside is the fact that the streets are wet—this is what I would appeal to if asked to provide a reason for my belief. Next, there are reasons₂, or reasons for belief in the sense of considerations required for assessing the intelligibility of someone else’s belief in the light of what the subject herself has to go on. For example, someone interested in the rational grounding of my belief that it has rained outside could cite my *belief* that the streets are wet as a reason₂ for my holding of the former belief. Finally, there is also a third sense in which something can serve as a reason for a belief. The rational linkage here is of the sort that obtains between an item assessable from the standpoint of rationality and an explanans that shows “how it is that the explanandum is as it should be from the standpoint of rationality.”¹³ To illustrate this sense of a reason for belief, McDowell invokes an analogy with a skilled cyclist’s movements as he navigates a bending road:

A satisfying explanation might show how it is that the movements are as they should be from the standpoint of rationality: suited to the end of staying balanced while making progress on the desired trajectory. (McDowell (1994), 163)

McDowell notes that this kind of explanation, while genuinely helpful for certain purposes, does not provide us with the *subject’s* reasons for belief. Ginsborg dubs the third sense of reason for belief ‘external’, while the former two are ‘internal’. Internal reasons, unlike the external reasons, are the ones that help explain why a belief is rational (“as it should be from the standpoint of rationality”) *from the subject’s perspective*—either as considerations the subject herself would invoke in favor of her belief (the first sense), or as considerations cited by an interpreter interested in making the subject’s belief intelligible *given what the subject has to go on* (the second sense).¹⁴

¹²The notion comes from Scanlon (1998), 17.

¹³McDowell (1994), 163.

¹⁴Upon making the distinction, Ginsborg argues further that experience can be reason₂ for belief only if it has representational content. I do not think this claim is plausible. The discussion of Ginsborg’s case for representationalism need not be conducted at this point: I take it that her distinction between senses of

61. We can now see that in the Müller-Lyer example the first explanation of the erroneous perceptual judgment—the one in terms of the subject’s lack of familiarity with certain kinds of Müller-Lyer diagrams—provides us with an *external* reason for the judgment: it tells us how the error had occurred and why things have gone wrong from the standpoint of rationality, but it does not help us with understanding why the judgment was reasonable from the subject’s perspective. The situation with Genone’s account of misleading appearances is quite similar. Insofar as Genone’s explanation of misleading appearances is conducted in terms of a subject’s lack of knowledge of some sort, it cannot provide us with the *internal* reasons for the subject’s judgment. Lack of knowledge is never *the subject’s* reason for a perceptual judgment: it is neither what the subject would cite as her reason for judging that things are a certain way, nor is it a consideration that would be appropriately invoked by an interpreter interested in what makes the subject’s judgment reasonable from the subject’s own perspective.

Misleading appearances as conceived by Genone do not even fare much better as an *external* reason for a reasonable erroneous perceptual judgment. To make the point conspicuous, consider the following variation of White Wall, call it Blue Wall: the subject observes a blue wall under a yellow lighting and judges that the wall is green. The subject lacks relevant knowledge of environmental conditions and how they may affect the appearance of a wall with specific intrinsic properties. This, in a sense, explains *why* there is error in judgment, but this explanation is in no way specific to the case in question: it does not help us understand why the subject judged erroneously the way she did. Why was it reasonable for the subject to judge that the wall is *green* rather than blue, red, or orange? For all Genone’s account tells us, any of these alternative erroneous judgments *could* have come about because of the subject’s lack of knowledge of environmental conditions and their interaction with the object’s intrinsic properties. But only the inclination to judge that the wall is green actually arose under given circumstances. To explain why the subject was so inclined, from the standpoint of rationality, it is not sufficient to cite the subject’s lack of

reasons for belief is useful for getting a better grip on what goes wrong in Genone’s account of misleading appearances and that for present purposes we need not decide on the plausibility of Ginsborg’s additional representationalist commitments.

knowledge of some sort. Further assumptions must be in place: for instance, we may need to say that the subject took *the appearance* of the object at its face value, and that greenness is in some way closely tied to the experience—perhaps in virtue of being somehow involved in the phenomenology of the experience. We should expect from an external explanation to clarify not how it is that the judgment is erroneous (or rather: how it is that the subject is inclined to judge erroneously) but rather how it is that *that specific judgment* may be as it should be from the standpoint of rationality. Genone’s notion of misleading appearances simply does not help with this explanatory task. Lack of knowledge of environmental conditions and their effects on the objects in the subject’s environment is not suitable for the role of a reason for erroneous perceptual judgment in any of the senses distinguished above.

62. The reason why Genone’s notion of misleading appearances forces different verdicts in cases like New House and White Wall₁ from those arrived at using the intuitive notion of misleading appearances is now clearly visible. It is the hallmark of the intuitive notion that appearances are misleading only if they are the subject’s reason for an erroneous perceptual judgment. When the subject has a different reason for a judgment—say, a testimony, or some fundamental misconception about her environment—then it is not appropriate to classify the case as involving misleading appearances. Genone accounts for the misleading character of appearances by invoking lack of knowledge of a specific kind. This makes it possible to treat cases in which the reason for a mistaken perceptual judgment is far removed from experience as though they involved misleading appearances.

Ultimately, Genone’s account of misleading appearances fails because it does not provide the resources needed for a plausible explanation of the rational role of misleading appearances. The way things look in an experience can be misleading—i.e., it can have a crucial role in making an erroneous perceptual judgment reasonable. We cannot come to understand this role of experience if we take, with Genone, appearances to be mind-independent properties of external objects.

63. Brewer and Genone fail to offer an appealing account of experiential phenomenology. The specific shortcomings of their accounts of looks are instructive. Among other problems,

Brewer's account of looks cannot be squared off with his own empiricist view of perceptual knowledge. Genone, on the other hand, accounts for phenomenology in a way that prevents us from making sense of the role of experience in making perceptual judgments reasonable. These criticisms—the latter one in particular—lead to a larger point that I would like to press against Relationalism.

64. Recall again Blue Wall: an experience in which a blue wall is observed under a yellow illuminant, producing a greenish appearance of the wall. Consider also an experience of the same wall, now painted green and perceived in plain daylight. Let the two experiences be alike as much as possible. The look of the wall in Blue Wall contributes to the reasonableness of the perceptual judgment 'that wall is green'. The same goes for the experience of the green wall in plain daylight. But now let us ask the following question: how is it that the two experiences help make that specific judgment reasonable?

In the case of the experience of the green wall, relationalists can invoke acquaintance with the wall and its green color. But why would it be reasonable for the subject in Blue Wall to judge, on the basis of the experience, that the wall is specifically *green*? After all, there is nothing green for the subject to be acquainted with. The relationalist might try an explanation along these lines: the experience of the blue wall in yellow light is subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical experience of a green wall. The subject is unable to make the distinction between her being acquainted with a wall that is blue-in-yellow-light and a wall that is green; hence the subject mistakenly attributes greenness to the blue wall in yellow light.

This explanation will not do. What we are looking for is, as we saw, an account of *the subject's* reason for the judgment, both in the veridical case and in Blue Wall. The most natural explanation for why it is reasonable for the subject to judge that the wall is green in the two cases is this: the rational force of the two experiences is the same. The relationalist response thus gets that much right—insofar as the two experiences are indistinguishable for the subject, both will have the same rational force *for the subject*. But if this is so, then an account of the role experience plays in rationally grounding perceptual judgments cannot be built on the relation of acquaintance. The subject is acquainted with a blue-in-yellow-

light object in Blue Wall, and with a green object in the veridical counterpart of Blue Wall. The subject cannot tell—both in Blue Wall and in its veridical counterpart—whether she is acquainted with a green object or with a blue-in-yellow-light object. The rational force of the two experiences is the same. It appears, then, that the rational force of each of the two experiences is independent of acquaintance. Acquaintance should be dispensed with when trying to account for experience with the intention to explain its rational role.

I take it that the above point naturally extends to hallucinations: it may be reasonable to judge erroneously that things are thus and so on the basis of a hallucination. This is so because experience has the same rational force for the subject and helps make it reasonable to judge that things are thus and so both in the hallucination and in the matching veridical experience. Subjective indistinguishability of hallucination and veridical perception does not do much to help with demystifying the rational role of hallucinatory experiences. However, I take it that the case I have built against acquaintance-based views of experience is sufficiently well established with the preceding discussion of illusions and the notion of looks.

65. So far I have argued that, in order to explain the rational role of perceptual experience, we should opt for an account of experience in terms of a relation to objects of perception. The relation in question should not, however, be the relation of acquaintance. What should then the appropriate relation be?

The requirements for the relation are the following. The relation should be such that it is primitive, or at least more basic than thought about objects. Further, it should be a relation that can accommodate the fact that experiences in which one is related to different relata can nevertheless have the same rational force. The relation should, in this sense, be insensitive to differences in items (minimally: objects and their properties) one is perceptually related to. The idea is that we should be in the position to say that, for instance, both the experience in Blue Wall and its veridical counterpart make the same rational contribution to the reasonableness of the judgment ‘that wall is green’, and that they do so, in part, in virtue of the presence of phenomenal greenness. In both experiences, when the subject points at the wall and attributes greenness to the object in front of her, the subject is reasonable to so judge (if, in fact, the judgment is reasonable) in part because the subject’s

demonstration appropriates something that looks green. The perceptual relation need not discriminate between environmental conditions and features of objects in the environment that underlie the look of the object of perception—it may turn out that the wall is in fact green, or that it is blue but illuminated with yellow light.

Perceptual experience, I wish to propose, makes certain items *present* to our consciousness. I adopt this notion of presence from the work of Gupta (2012) and Frey (2013). The fact of an object’s being present before a subject’s consciousness does not mean that the subject has knowledge of the object. The greenness that is present in an experience can be a matter of a subject’s having a visual experience of a green object or of a blue object in yellow light. No matter which of the two objects is present before the subject’s consciousness, the phenomenology of the two experiences is the same, as is, consequently, the rational force of the two experiences. At the same time, the items present before the subject’s consciousness may be different. The items present before the subject’s consciousness fix the phenomenology of experience; but the phenomenology of experience does not fix the items presented.¹⁵ I will develop the proposal more fully in chapter 7.

Before I proceed with that, I wish to address in chapter 6 an alternative view. The view in question is defended by Adam Pautz and David Chalmers. What Pautz and Chalmers propose is a view that employs elements of both Relationalism and Representationalism. Experience is representational insofar as phenomenology fixes the so-called “phenomenal content,” where this content is composed of properties. But the view also shares one important similarity with Relationalism: perceiving subjects are related to the properties that supposedly figure in the representational content of experience with a special relation that enables thought about these properties. The view thus stakes a claim to advantages of both Representationalism and Relationalism—the former’s treatment of non-veridical experiences in terms of inaccurate contents as well as the latter’s treatment of the rational role of experience in supplying our thoughts with content.

¹⁵See Gupta (2012).

6.0 PHENOMENAL CONTENT AND THE GROUNDING INTUITION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

66. So far I have argued against representationalist views that rely on the idea that experience in some way generates representational content and against Relationalist views according to which experience is a matter of acquaintance with ordinary, mind-independent objects and their properties. Now I will examine a view that has elements of both Representationalism and Relationalism. Briefly put, the view is this: perceptual experience is identical with an intentional relation that obtains between a subject and a representational content composed of properties. Adam Pautz has discussed and defended a view of this sort quite thoroughly, and I will focus on his case for it. In the second part of the chapter I will discuss the related position of David Chalmers.

67. Pautz is primarily concerned with answering the following question: what determines the phenomenology of visual experience?¹ He proposes to answer this question by providing a plausible characterization of what he calls *experience properties*, properties instantiated by subjects while undergoing perceptual experiences.² Arguably, experiences with identical phenomenology can be had under different circumstances—a subject could undergo two

¹Pautz is concerned exclusively with visual perceptual experience; consequently, I will drop this qualification and assume in what follows that ‘perceptual experience’ should be taken to refer to visual perceptual experience.

²In reconstructing Pautz’s view I will rely on the following papers of his: “Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence,” *Philosophical Perspectives*, **21**, 2007: 495–541 (henceforth: IPP); “What are the Contents of Experiences?” *The Philosophical Quarterly* **59**, 2009: 483–507 (henceforth: WAC); “Why Explain Visual Experiences in Terms of Content?” in *Perceiving the World*, ed. Bence Nanay: 254–307 (henceforth: WE); “Can Disjunctivists Explain our Access to the Sensible World?” *Philosophical Issues* **21**, 2011: 384–433 (henceforth: CD).

visual experiences with identical phenomenologies when seeing a red and round tomato under normal conditions and when undergoing a total hallucination with no red or round objects in her environment. According to Pautz, the subject instantiates in these two scenarios the same experience property, and the problem of explaining the phenomenology of experience can be viewed as the problem of characterizing experience properties.

Pautz claims that experience properties are *wholly* identical with standing in relations to contents.³ In particular, the relation through which subjects of perceptual experiences are related to these contents is the intentional relation of *sensorily entertaining*. This is a primitive intentional relation, one that cannot be analyzed in terms of any more basic mental properties (WE, 276–7; 295–6). The relation of sensorily entertaining a content is a basic form of intentionality, one that can ground other forms of intentionality; e.g., it can ground the intentional relation of believing. The relation of sensorily entertaining should not be confused with any kind of *awareness* relation. According to Pautz, in having a visual experience one is not visually aware of any items (objects or properties).⁴

Next, Pautz takes it that the content one is related to in having an experience is a structure composed of *properties*. Pautz is neutral between the view on which contents are general Russellian propositions (i.e., Russellian propositions composed solely out of properties) and the one on which contents are complex properties. On the former kind of view, when having an experience of a red and round tomato one is related to a proposition—an entity that can be true or false—roughly of the form $\exists x(x \text{ is red} \ \& \ x \text{ is round})$. On the latter kind of view, one is related to a complex property, an entity that can be instantiated or uninstantiated

³Pautz’s view is thus stronger than alternative representationalist views that construe experience properties as only *partly* identical with relations to contents, as in Byrne (2001) and Dretske (1995), for instance.

⁴Here is Pautz on awareness:

I accept the Intentionalist view that in the hallucinatory case one “sensorily entertains” a proposition or a complex property. But I hold that there is nothing of which one is aware. One is not aware of the properties that enter into the proposition or complex property; nor is one aware of a sense datum or a Meinongian object (IPP, 510).

[Pautz’s view] only requires that [the subject] sensorily entertain propositions about the character of colors. This does not entail that colors are possible objects of *visual awareness*. Perhaps we no more see a property (an abstract object of some kind) when we sensorily entertain a proposition about it than we see the number two when we believe a proposition about it (IPP, 508).

(IPP, 498–9). Crucially, both views hold that the experiential content is constructed out of properties, and that the world can match or fail to match the content of experience, depending on whether the properties that comprise the content are instantiated or not.

68. Pautz’s reasons for adopting this brand of Representationalism are founded upon certain intuitions about the “external-directedness” of hallucinatory perceptual experience (WE, 266). Namely, Pautz takes it that there are certain plausible intuitions about the nature of hallucination according to which these experiences are directed at *external* properties, properties that are instantiated by external objects rather than by the experiences themselves. Pautz describes three such intuitions and builds arguments against rival views of experience on the basis of each of the three intuitions. Crucial among the three arguments is the one based on the so-called *grounding intuition*.⁵

6.2 THE GROUNDING INTUITION

69. The grounding intuition is a claim about the relation between experience—hallucinatory experience in particular—and the capacity to have beliefs involving external properties. The intuition establishes that there is a *necessary* connection between a subject’s instantiating of a hallucinatory experience property and the acquisition of the capacity to have beliefs about properties. Assume that *H* is the experience property one has when hallucinating a red and round tomato; then, Pautz tells us,

Intuitively, having *H* endows certain individuals with the capacity to have certain kinds of color and shape beliefs. Maybe a dog lacking the capacity for conceptual thought altogether might have *H* and yet lack the capacity to have such beliefs. And maybe having *H* does not endow individuals with the capacity to have singular beliefs about particular objects. But, intuitively, it is necessary that, *if* an individual who has the capacity to have belief at all has *H* (for a sufficient period of time), then he will thereby have the additional capacity to have a general belief that is true only if something or other is present that is red and a general belief that is true only if something or other is present that is round. He himself might express these beliefs by saying ‘something is that way’ and ‘something is this way’.

⁵I will not examine Pautz’s argument thoroughly. Suffice it to say that, should my objections to the grounding intuition prove to be successful, Pautz’s argument as a whole will fail at establishing his Representationalist view.

For these beliefs to be true, it is not enough that the individual's experience be a certain way: Items other than his experience must be a certain way. (WE, 266)

The grounding intuition is supposed to be a claim “that we have some pretheoretical reason to accept” (WE, 265). At the same time, the grounding intuition should be understood as a substantive claim about experience. For one thing, it is supposed to carry a significant explanatory load: Pautz argues for Representationalism on the basis of the claim that alternative views cannot accommodate the grounding intuition. This means that some weak readings of the grounding intuition should be rejected from the outset. For instance, it is compatible with any view of experience that normal humans who can otherwise have beliefs can also be in a position to have beliefs about, say, the color of red objects in their environment. A subject capable of having beliefs could, arguably, be capable of entertaining thoughts involving a description of an object's color; she could be capable of extrapolating that shade of red by using her imagination and colors she had previously encountered, and so on. If the grounding intuition does not amount to more than this, it will not be substantive enough to do the required work in Pautz's argument.

The grounding intuition has to be given a stronger interpretation. What the grounding intuition aims to capture is the distinctive role of experiential phenomenology in making color and shape properties available to our thought; it is supposed to capture that aspect of the phenomenal presentation of properties which makes it natural for us to say that someone who experiences a color for the first time “now knows what [that color] is like” (WAC, 503) and can compare that color with other colors presented in the experience.

In addition, it is very important that the grounding intuition is given a strong modal formulation. It does not merely state that having a particular experience *could* enable one to acquire the capacity to have certain beliefs—it states that this is *necessarily* the case.

Finally, there are two further features of the grounding intuition that are worth noting. First, certain restrictions are imposed on subjects and properties for which it holds. Second, the grounding intuition vests considerable epistemic power in hallucinatory experiences.

70. The grounding intuition is restricted to *certain individuals*; in particular, it holds only for “suitable concept-users” where this is understood along the lines of “not being cognitively

impaired in comparison with a normal human” (WAC, 500). Subjects who do not meet this condition are not such that having H will necessarily endow them with the capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness.

The grounding intuition is further restricted to *certain kinds of properties*; in particular, it holds only for color and shape properties. It does not, for instance, hold for natural kind properties. Pautz emphasizes that a subject’s having H need not necessarily endow her with the capacity to have beliefs involving the property *being a tomato*. It is possible to have H in a world in which there are no tomatoes; in such a world no capacity to have beliefs involving *being a tomato* would be forthcoming on the basis of H “because [the inhabitants of this world] would have no causal connection to this property” (WAC, 500). Not so for color and shape properties—here, causal connections to instantiations of properties are apparently not necessary for the capacity to have beliefs about them. In accounting for this difference, Pautz invokes his belief that most people’s grounding intuitions are very strong in the case of color properties, much stronger than in the case of natural kind properties (WAC, 502).

71. According to the grounding intuition, significant *epistemic power* is ascribed to hallucinatory experiences.

For one thing, a subject can acquire the capacity to have beliefs involving external properties even if, before having H , she had never before encountered or had any kind of acquaintance with the relevant properties. The capacity to have such beliefs is acquired *because* the subject has had H .

In addition, the grounding intuition holds for some quite complex beliefs. Consider Pautz’s example of having a hallucinatory experience as of a red ellipse, an orange circle, and a green square located next to each other. The experience in question will necessarily endow appropriate subjects with certain beliefs whose contents are much more specific and complex than the previously discussed beliefs of the form “something is like *this*”:

For some reason, suppose that you have never before encountered colors red, orange or green, nor elliptical, circular, or square shapes. Intuitively, having H , *no less than having its veridical counterpart V* , would endow you with the capacity to have certain *general beliefs*:

- (19) There is a red ellipse, an orange circle and a green square.
- (20) Red is more like orange than green.

(21) Ellipses are more like circles than squares.

Indeed, it is intuitively metaphysically necessary that, if an individual who is capable of having beliefs at all has *H*, he will have the additional capacity to have the specific beliefs expressed by (19)–(21), and he will have this additional capacity because he has *H*. Call this the *grounding intuition*. (IPP, 525)

The fundamental idea of Pautz’s view is that in perceptual experience we are related in a special way to certain properties. Having a hallucination like *H*, for instance, is, on Pautz’s view, identical with sensorily entertaining a content involving *being red* and *being round*. The relation of sensorily entertaining puts the subjects who instantiate *H en rapport* with these properties (WAC, 497) and it “already incorporates the links to redness and roundness required to have beliefs involving them” (WE, 272). Since the relation of sensorily entertaining is a primitive intentional relation, it is more basic than believing and can thus ground the capacity to have beliefs involving external properties (WAC, 497).

Pautz takes it that the grounding intuition is highly plausible and uses it to argue for Representationalism. The idea is that in experience shape and color properties are conveyed to us (as is the case in Siegel (2010)); that we are, by having an experience, placed in a position to take these properties in, as it were, and thereupon become capable of having beliefs about them. The properties in question make up the content of experience; depending on whether the properties are instantiated or not, the experience will be accurate or inaccurate.

I will now argue against Pautz’s grounding intuition. Against Pautz, I will try to show that experience, by itself, never suffices for the kind of epistemic access to specific properties that Pautz thinks it enables. Phenomenology of experience does not, by itself, suffice for the acquisition of the ability to have beliefs about specific properties.

6.3 EDENIC PROPERTIES AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXPERIENCE

72. One way of resisting the grounding intuition would be to argue that it is not necessarily the case that a hallucination can endow one with the capacity to have beliefs about what we might call *ordinary external properties*, where these are understood as properties instan-

tiated in the actual world by objects like tomatoes and snooker balls. Pautz thinks that the grounding intuition holds for ordinary color and shape properties. But it is highly questionable whether a hallucinatory experience as of a red and round tomato will, *in all possible scenarios*, put the subject of the experience in a position to have beliefs about redness and roundness.

Consider a subject who inhabits a possible world in which there are no red or round objects. It is far from clear how this subject could acquire through experience the ability to have thoughts that are exactly about redness or roundness—where redness and roundness are properties of objects in the actual world. The lack of both occurrent and potential causal relations to these properties makes it completely mysterious how the subject’s beliefs can be about these properties. Recall that Pautz himself uses in a similar scenario the lack of causal connections to argue that the grounding intuition does not hold for the property *being a tomato* (WAC, 500; see §70 above). Why would things be different in the case of color and shape properties? Invoking the alleged strength of our intuitions about colors and shapes will not do. It may well be the case that we naturally (and plausibly!) find color and shape properties in some sense more readily accessible on the basis of experience than natural kind properties. Still, this does not relieve Pautz of the burden of explaining why experience must ground belief about ordinary color and shape properties even in cases like the one above.

73. There are two ways for Pautz to try to avoid the above objection. One is to give up the commitment to the claim that ordinary external properties feature in the contents of experiences. Instead, Pautz can claim that, in experience, we are *en rapport* with some non-standard properties. The second reply would be to argue that the subject who has never had a chance to be in perceptual contact with instances of redness and roundness (nor, we might add, can he ever be in such contact) can nevertheless have experiences involving them. Chalmers (2006) argues that this is in fact so. I will discuss the two replies in turn.

74. Pautz indicates that the grounding intuition can be formulated both in terms of ordinary color and shape properties, but also in terms of their non-standard counterparts (WE, 267–8). There are several theoretical possibilities on offer here. Pautz himself has recently endorsed

the view he calls “neo-Galilean projectivism”; on this view,

[S]ensible qualities exist but are not instantiated by anything at all: they only live in the contents of our experiences (complex properties or propositions). So, for instance, colors exist and *appear* to be pasted on external objects, but in fact are not pasted on external objects. (...) [B]y contrast to the traditional Galilean view, the neo-Galilean view that I favor holds that the sensible qualities are not mental; rather, they are mind-independent abstract objects. (CD, 421)

Color experience is ultimately a matter of being related to uninstantiated properties. Alternatively, representationalists who harbor sympathies for the grounding intuition have the option of endorsing Chalmers’s idea that in experience we are aware of uninstantiated, primitive properties—the so-called Edenic properties (Chalmers (2006); Chalmers (2013), 304). Properties like these are still external properties, at least insofar as they are not instantiated by experience. At the same time, they are not “anchored” in the actual world in virtue of being instantiated by ordinary objects in that world; they are either perfect color or shape properties in a specific possible world (Chalmers), or mind-independent uninstantiated abstracta (Pautz). As such, they allow for a weaker reading of the grounding intuition. Instead of necessarily endowing subjects with the capacity to have beliefs involving redness and roundness, *H* can be viewed as endowing them with the capacity to have beliefs involving certain non-standard relatives of these properties.

The move to non-standard, uninstantiated properties as elements of the content of experience may prove to be too costly. It is far from clear how to understand the idea that we can stand in an awareness relation with *uninstantiated* Edenic properties, and whether we can make any metaphysical sense of it: for instance, the relation of awareness easily fits into naturalist accounts of conscious experience—until it is supposed to obtain between perceivers and uninstantiated properties.⁶ On the other hand, Pautz’s view explains experience in terms of a relation with uninstantiated abstracta; the fact that abstracta can be uninstantiated suggests a view on which abstracta are not dependent on objects instantiating them—ultimately, a Platonic view of properties.⁷ It is dubious how an account of experience in terms of relations with properties so conceived is supposed to help in understanding

⁶Johnston (2004) defends a view similar to what Pautz and Chalmers propose; Thompson (2008) argues against representationalist views that use uninstantiated properties to explain phenomenology.

⁷See Kriegel (2011) for a discussion of the representationalist views that trade in uninstantiated abstracta.

experience and its role in our cognition.

Moreover, we have seen that Representationalism is often motivated with the idea that it offers a good way of accounting for the pretheoretical distinction between veridical and non-veridical experiences. But if experiential content is composed of properties, and these properties are such that they cannot be instantiated by ordinary objects, then experiential contents cannot, strictly speaking, be accurate. Consequently, experiences can never be veridical. The distinction between veridical and non-veridical experiences is erased. To avoid this consequence, Chalmers distinguishes between two senses of veridicality: one for Edenic contents—perfect veridicality—and one for contents involving properties that *match* Edenic properties but, unlike Edenic properties, can be instantiated by ordinary objects—this he calls imperfect veridicality.

While this might help provide a way to preserve the pre-theoretical classification of experiences into veridical and non-veridical ones, the fundamental problem with the approach of Pautz and Chalmers remains: how is it that we can be *en rapport* with neo-Galilean uninstantiated abstracta, or aware of perfect Edenic properties, when we never have any kind of contact with instantiations of these properties? I will now turn to Chalmers’s attempt to respond to this problem.

75. Chalmers accepts that there are representations whose content requires that in the environment of the subject who is thus representing there are instantiations of the relevant property. In other words, these representations are subject to thought experiments similar to the Twin Earth thought experiment (Chalmers (2006), 83). But there are also representations that are not subject to Twin Earth thought experiments; the contents of such representations do not depend on the property in question being instantiated in the environment. According to Chalmers, in cases of the latter kind, the representation “comes not from instances of that property in the environment but rather from some form of internal grasp of what it would take for something to instantiate that property” (Chalmers (2006), 83). Chalmers thinks that representations of Edenic properties are precisely like this: their being uninstantiated in our world does not preclude us from having experiences in whose content Edenic properties figure. This is so, according to Chalmers, because we have “some

sort of internal grasp” of what it would be for some objects to instantiate these properties. But why should we think we have such grasp?

Chalmers’s answer appears to be the following. We have a grasp on what it would be for Edenic properties to be instantiated because Edenic properties most faithfully and directly reflect the phenomenology of experience:

[I]f we were simply to aim to take phenomenology of perceptual experience at face value, what account of content would we come up with? (...) The view of content that most directly mirrors the phenomenology of experience is primitivism. Phenomenologically, it seems to us as if visual experience presents simple intrinsic qualities of objects in the world, spread out over the surface of the object. (Chalmers (2006), 66)

[I]t seems that perceptual experience gives us some sort of grip on what it would be for an object to be perfectly red, or perfectly blue. It would have to be exactly like *that*, precisely as that object is presented to us as being in experience. (Chalmers (2006), 79).

Phenomenology of experience is best mirrored by representational contents involving primitive Edenic properties—that is, primitive properties that can be instantiated only in a possible world in which experiences represent the world as it really is. We can get a grip of what it would be for objects to instantiate Edenic properties simply by attending to the phenomenology of experience.

76. Why should we think that Edenic properties reflect the phenomenology of experience the best? The idea here is that the Edenic content is the content that is fixed by the phenomenology alone. Phenomenology of experience, the assumption goes, can be fully revelatory, by itself, of what a world (an Edenic world, i.e., a world in which things are exactly as they appear to be) would have to be like for the experience to be veridical. This is Chalmers’s notion of perfect veridicality: an experience is fully veridical when it reveals *exactly* how the world is. We are subject to the unfortunate circumstance that our experiences reveal only how Eden, and not the actual world, would have to be for these experiences to be perfectly veridical.

However, there are good reasons to think that Edenic properties do not actually reflect the phenomenology of experience in the way in which Chalmers thinks they do. To begin with, note that the notion of perfect veridicality leaves the subject of experience entirely out of the picture. Appearances of objects are, when encountered in Earthly experiences,

a product of the subject's constitution and position, the circumstances of perception, and the subject's environment. In Eden, where our experiences would be perfectly veridical, appearances of objects are simply a matter of how the environment is: the phenomenology of a perceptual experience in Eden can be fully accounted for in terms of primitive properties instantiated by the objects perceived. What appears to be the case is never conditioned by the orientation, attention, or internal constitution of the subject; instead, what appears to be the case is always simply how the world is: "In the purest of Edenic worlds, there are no illusions" (Chalmers (2006), 78). As we saw, the appeal of the Edenic content is supposed to be derived from its "phenomenological adequacy." But it is not at all obvious that phenomenology, taken at face value, is adequately captured by Edenic content. Consider spatial relations: what would it even mean for the Edenic world to be exactly the way things appear in an experience in which I perceive, say, through the branches of a nearby tree, a building far off in the distance? Does the phenomenology of my experience fix the Edenic content which is accurate if branches are pasted onto a very small building-shaped object? Or is the content in question accurate in case the building is quite large and at a considerable distance? In either case, does the Edenic content contain the relative position of the two objects: is it part of the content that the branches are *in front* of the building? But what is it to speak of distance of objects experienced, and of their relative positions, if phenomenology is to be fully accounted for by the world, without any contribution of the subject? For an object to be perceived at a certain distance, or for an object to be perceived as being in front of another object, phenomenology of experience must be relativized to a subject. Perceptual phenomenology is shot through with appearances which are heavily influenced by the contribution of the subject, even if the subject is not present in experience: perspective, relative spatial positions of objects, shifts in focus—these all depend, in part, on the subject of the experience. It is far from clear that we can make sense of experience if we take it that something like Edenic content is phenomenologically adequate.

More generally speaking, Pautz and Chalmers go wrong in thinking that phenomenology of every experience is partial to a certain set of properties, that it puts us *en rapport* with these properties, or that it fixes how the world would have to be in order to be exactly as it appears to be. Phenomenology is never so partial, it never favors a unique set of properties

as the contents of a perfectly veridical experience.

To show this, I will argue that experience never puts us *en rapport* with a unique set of properties, even if we put aside the above problem and allow that the subjective contribution can be eliminated from the analysis of phenomenology. Consider a subject who has never before encountered redness or roundness. According to Pautz, such a subject—assuming that he can have beliefs—would acquire the capacity to have beliefs about redness and roundness. He would be in a position to have beliefs of the form “something is like *this*” where ‘this’ picks out redness or roundness. But we may wonder why it is that exactly these two properties are necessarily picked out; why is it that *H* “necessarily brings with itself,” as Pautz puts it, precisely these two properties? The phenomenology of experience itself does not make this necessary. “Something is like *this*” could be one of the subject’s newly acquired beliefs, but ‘this’ may well pick out what we might call a primitive *color-cum-shape property* rather than a color property or a shape property. It is possible for the subject in our example to entertain an experience with the same phenomenology and end up acquiring the capacity to have beliefs about, say, a primitive property *being red-and-round*, or the capacity to have beliefs about the following properties: *being red*, *being a left hemisphere*, *being a right hemisphere*, *being joined at the middle*; and so on.

The phenomenology of experience also does not carry with itself any signs that indicate a *unique* way the world has to be for the experience to be veridical. Our subject can have *H*, gain the capacity to form a belief of the form “something is *this* way,” but there is nothing in the experiential phenomenology that fixes the state of affairs that would have to obtain for this belief to be true. *H* could be a hallucination of a red and round tomato, but it could also be a hallucination of two joined red hemispheres, or of a red-and-round object. A subject who does not have the conceptual repertoire of an average human being and is not used to thinking about objects in terms of ordinary color and shape properties might find himself in a position to form, on the basis of *H*, beliefs that are quite different from beliefs about redness and roundness. Or, to put the point in terms congenial to Chalmers’s proposal: conditions of perfect veridicality for *H* could be a matter of instantiation of properties other than Edehic properties—perhaps *H* is perfectly veridical if a primitive red-and-round property is instantiated, or when two red hemispheres are joined in the middle, etc. There is no reason

to suppose, simply on the basis of an analysis of phenomenology of experience, that Edenic properties reflect the phenomenology more faithfully than these other properties.

Conditions of perfect veridicality are never uniquely fixed by the phenomenology. An experience as of a round object could be matched by there being something round in the world, but also by there being two hemispheres joined in the middle. In both cases the world is exactly as it appears to be—insofar as the world, according to Chalmers’s assumption, itself fully accounts for the phenomenology of a perfectly veridical experience, both cases fit the bill equally well since both can produce the same phenomenology in a subject. To think that the former case is the only one in which there is an exact match is to fall prey to our inclination to *describe* experiences like those of tomatoes as experiences of *round* objects—but the phenomenology taken in itself, without any assumptions about the objects of experience, is not so partial to roundness. Similarly, an experience as of a corner of a room may be matched by there being a single angular object in the perceiver’s environment, but also by there being two flat surfaces meeting under an angle. Again, the world matches the phenomenology in both cases, regardless of our possible inclination to think that it would favor one over the other. Cases like these indicate that even when the subject’s contribution does not impact the phenomenology, the phenomenology need not convey a unique set of external properties as its content.

77. The grounding intuition should not be accepted. Pautz and Chalmers do not offer sufficient considerations for one to accept the claim that experiences—veridical or non-veridical—put us *en rapport* with, or convey to us, specific properties, where these properties make up the conditions of veridicality fixed solely by the phenomenology of experience. The following question still remains: where does the rejection of the Pautz-Chalmers proposal leave us with respect to the guiding problems of the present project? If experience does not, by itself, convey properties to us, how can we make sense of the rational role of experience? In particular, how can we make sense of the role of experience in making our perceptual judgments reasonable? And how can we explain the role of experience in making thoughts about external objects possible? The latter question has already been answered: it is in virtue of the relation of presence—a primitive intentional relation that obtains between per-

ceiving subjects and items that fix the phenomenology of their experiences—that we reach all the way to the objects and properties that can later serve as objects of thought. But the former question is still open. If experience does not, by itself, make unique proclamations on what the presented objects are like, then how can experience make only select perceptual judgments reasonable?

The clue to the answer is in the following observation. Whenever we judge or form beliefs on the basis of perceptual experience, the thinking is *prompted* by experience, but it is *rationalized* by experience only against the background of views, conceptions, and concepts that are already in place, that are already at the subject's disposal. For example, an auditory experience of a familiar and sharp repetitive sound might entitle a subject to the judgment "a vehicle is backing up." But the same experience may entitle the subject to this judgment given one background view and a set of beliefs about relevant circumstances, and yield no rational entitlement to that judgment in case the subject's view contained, say, the belief that she is currently sitting alone in a sound-proof room. The phenomenology of the two auditory experiences may be identical; it may be the case that, from the subject's point of view, things are exactly alike in the two experiences. Yet what the subject is entitled to judge shifts from one case to the other, and it so shifts in virtue of the changes in the antecedent view of the subject. The proposal then is that experience does not make perceptual judgments reasonable by serving us up with ready-made contents that are simply picked up by our thought, but that rather what we are entitled to, on the basis of experience, is always conditioned both on the phenomenology of experience *and* on the background view held by the relevant subject. This proposal has been developed and defended by Anil Gupta in his (2006) and I fully endorse it.

Gupta's proposal turns on the notion of the *hypothetical given*. If we take the total rational contribution of an experience to be *the given* in that experience, then Gupta suggests that this given is *hypothetical* in the sense that it yields entitlement to particular judgments only given a certain *antecedent view* held by the subject. The given in an experience establishes rational connections between views and perceptual judgments, much like valid forms of inference establish rational links between premises and a conclusion: if the view is correct, then the perceptual judgment must be true. On this kind of view, the representational contents

are put together only at the level of perceptual judgment; experience supplies referents—the objects and properties we are perceptually related to—and these elements are formed into particular contents for different antecedent views. Just as valid argument-forms can be seen as providing rational links between premises and conclusions, so too can experience be seen as linking antecedent views to perceptual judgments and beliefs. As such, the given in experience need not be seen as containing any kind of content since it serves as a sort of a (rational) link between two kinds of items that do possess content—antecedent views and resulting judgments and beliefs. Endorsing the hypothetical given thus leads to a view on which experience is not seen as an informant; it does not tell us what the world is like, and does not attribute properties to objects.⁸

78. Thus far, I have argued for the following constraints on an account of perceptual experience. First, experience should not be understood in terms of representational contents. Second, experience should be accounted for in relational terms. The relation in question should not be an epistemic one: instead of viewing experience as a matter of being acquainted with objects and their properties, we should insist on the claim that in experience certain items—ordinary objects and their properties, but perhaps other items as well—are *present* to the consciousness of the experiencing subject. The subject, it should be emphasized, need not be in a position to *know* these items. Finally, I have argued that experience does not contribute to the reasonableness of perceptual judgments by conveying properties (or, for that matter, representational contents of any sort—I take it that similar critical considerations will apply to alternative representationalist proposals). Instead, experience should be viewed as contributing to the reasonableness of perceptual judgments by providing rational links between antecedent views and perceptual judgments—the given in experience is hypothetical.

In the next chapter, I will develop the positive proposal more fully. In particular, I will tackle the problem of accounting for non-veridical experiences. We saw that non-veridical experiences raise especially thorny problems for Relationalism. I intend to show that a

⁸For discussion on the hypothetical given, see Berker (2011), McDowell (2009), Peacocke (2009), Schafer (2011), Gupta (2009), and Gupta (2011).

relational account on which acquaintance is replaced with the relation of presence, together with a more permissive view of the domain of items we can be related with in experience, can successfully deal with non-veridical experiences.

7.0 PHENOMENOLOGY AND PRESENTATIONAL TROPES

7.1 PHENOMENOLOGY AND PRESENCE

79. The aim of this inquiry is to propose an account of perceptual experience. In particular, the following requirement is imposed on the proposal: it should provide an account of experience that undergirds and elucidates the *rational role* of experience. The rational role of experience is its role in making perceptual judgments and beliefs reasonable. It is thus assumed from the outset that experience does play this important role: one way or another, perceptual experiences help make perceptual judgments and beliefs reasonable. To illustrate this point, consider a simple example. Suppose a subject sees a vehicle approaching her; under suitable conditions, the visual experience may make one or more of the following judgments reasonable: “That’s a Corolla,” “That car is going in the wrong direction,” “A red car is approaching,” etc. Whatever the exact account of what makes any of these judgments reasonable, the visual experience of the car must play a critical role in it. Were it not for the experience, the subject would not be in a position to make any of the judgments in question; moreover, if the judgments are reasonable, they are reasonable, in part, because the experience is such as it is. For the present purposes, it will be sufficiently uncontroversial to put this point in the following terms: how things have appeared to the subject in the experience has directly affected the selection of perceptual judgments that are reasonable for the subject to make.

This is not to say that other factors will not affect the selection: the subject’s memory and conceptual repertoire, for instance, can affect the reasonableness of all three judgments mentioned; the subject’s background knowledge will be a factor in making the second judgment reasonable, etc. It may not be reasonable for a subject who sees an approaching car

but does not possess the concept of a car—a small child, for instance—to judge that there is a car in front of her. The important point here is simply the following. Assuming all the factors that have a role in making perceptual judgments reasonable other than experience are kept fixed, then if things were to appear to the subject differently, it would be reasonable for her to make different judgments—to judge that a yellow car is approaching, or that there is a Camry in front of her, and so on.

80. Perceptual experience, then, provides perceptual judgments and beliefs with rational grounds. The aspect of perceptual experience that performs this rational role is *subjective*: it is how things appear in an experience *to the subject* of the experience that helps select perceptual judgments that are reasonable to make on the basis of the experience.

The reasonableness of perceptual judgments is grounded in the aspect of perceptual experience which is not only subjective but also *perspective-dependent*. Whether a perceptual judgment is reasonable will depend on the features of the subject's visual system, on the arrangement and properties of objects in the subject's environment, on the subject's location and orientation relative to these objects, what the subject attends to, and perhaps on other features of the subject's point of view. It may be reasonable for a subject to judge that there is a brown bird in the room in case there really is one and it is in plain sight; the same judgment may turn out to be unreasonable, although true, if the bird is in the room but occluded by a screen positioned between the subject and the bird; the judgment may be reasonable, but false, if there is only a red bird in the room and in front of the subject who perceives it but is color-blind and hence the bird looks brown to her; and so on.

Beliefs too can provide rational grounds for judgments and other beliefs, but these grounds—call them doxastic grounds—are importantly different from their experiential counterparts. There is a kind of perspective-dependence shared by the doxastic and experiential rational grounds. Insofar as reasonableness of one's beliefs and judgments depends on the beliefs one holds, one's conceptual repertoire, memory, conceptions of the world and oneself, and other background factors, we can say that there is perspective-dependence: the background factors jointly delineate a perspective. But the proper experiential perspective-dependence is not present in the case of doxastic rational grounds. A subject can be perfectly

reasonable in making a non-perceptual judgment that a certain state of affairs obtains without the objects in the subject's environment or the subject's position relative to these objects being of any import for the rational grounding of the judgment. For instance, a subject can be reasonable in judging that there is a brown bird in the room on the basis of reliable testimony; for this judgment to be reasonable it need not matter whether the bird is red or brown, whether it is in plain sight or hidden, how it is spatially positioned relative to the subject who made the judgment, or whether it (or the subject) is in the room at all. In fact, many of our reasonable non-perceptual judgments are grounded in this way: it does not matter for reasonableness of a great majority of our judgments and beliefs about geography, history, politics, or mathematics how we are positioned relative to the objects in our environment and their configurations—sometimes even when our beliefs are *about* the objects in our environment. Not so with perceptual judgments and beliefs, i.e., judgments and beliefs that are rationally grounded in perceptual experience. For these to be reasonable, our constitution and perspective on specific tracts of our environment is of essential importance.

81. The aspect of experience responsible for its role in rationally grounding beliefs and judgments is its *phenomenology*. The notion of phenomenology is weighed down by a heavy historical baggage, yet it ought to serve the present project well if it is understood as capturing the two characteristic features of the experiential grounds of beliefs and judgments. Phenomenology of an experience is *subjective*: it captures how things are from the subject's viewpoint at the time of the experience. Phenomenology of an experience is *perspective-dependent*: how things are from the subject's viewpoint depends essentially on how the subject is constituted, what the subject's environment is like, and how the subject is related to this environment.¹ Let me elaborate further on the intended notion of phenomenology as characterized by subjectivity and perspective-dependence.

In perceptual experience the world and the subject of experience come together in a

¹The notion of phenomenology so conceived is different from the notion of phenomenology that is supposed to capture “what it is like” for a subject of a mental state to undergo such a mental state. The “what it is like” of a mental state appears to be independent of the characteristically perspective-dependent nature of the phenomenology of perceptual experience. For example, seeing a particular painting can, at different times, elicit a range of responses—“what it is like” of the experience can be different—while experiences are subjectively identical. This should suffice for the present notion of phenomenology to escape the recent critical assessments of the notion of “what it is like” raised, e.g., by Sytsma and Machery (2010).

peculiar way. Take an ordinary visual experience; say, an experience of looking at a painting on a wall. For an experience with a specific phenomenology to come about, the environment in which the experience occurs has to be a certain way, and the subject has to be a certain way. The subject can look at the painting head on, while standing up straight, or she can look at the painting from a sharp angle while sitting on the floor. The two experiences would have different *phenomenologies*—that is, the two experiences would provide the subject with different perspective-dependent rational grounds for perceptual judgments and beliefs. The phenomenology can further vary with variation in other factors: the painting can be a realistic representation of a mountain glen, or it may simply consist of a uniformly colored red square; the lighting in the room may be the ordinary lighting of a clear summer morning, or it may come from a green fluorescent lighting fixture, and so on. With each of these changes in the factors broadly subsumed under the notion of perspective-dependence, a corresponding change in how things are from the subject's point of view can arise.

Some of the factors that may affect the phenomenology of an experience have to do with the subject herself: how she is positioned relative to the objects in her environment, what exactly she attends to in her visual field, how her visual system is functioning. Other factors are decidedly non-subjective: lighting conditions, properties of objects perceived, and the arrangement of these objects are all subject-independent (even if the subject is responsible for the choice of lighting as well as the selection and arrangement of the objects). Were the subject to exit the room, the facts about the objects and environmental conditions in the room that would otherwise affect the phenomenology of a perceiver's experience may remain the same.

Factors of both kinds conspire to produce experiences with specific phenomenologies. How things are in an experience, for the subject of the experience, depends on the contributions of the subject—the subject's position, orientation, and the relevant aspects of the subject's constitution—and on the contribution of the world—the properties and arrangement of objects, together with the environmental conditions. The product of the joint contributions has some peculiar aspects that seem to be definitive of perceptual experience as such. For one thing, the contribution of the subject to the phenomenology is seamlessly blended with the elements contributed by the world. Color perception provides most striking

examples of this: the same set of objects embedded in unchanged environmental conditions may conspire to produce radically different experiences, provided that the subjective contribution is sufficiently different. A painting may appear to have quite different colors when perceived by a subject who is color blind and when perceived by someone whose visual system is not so affected. An important point here is that visual phenomenology is such that the subject's contribution to the phenomenology of an experience cannot be recovered simply by attending to the experience itself. For instance, the color of the object, misperceived or not, unequivocally appears to be the color *of the object*; it appears, at least pre-theoretically, to be in no way a matter of the contribution of the subject's visual system. We should recognize the point stressed by C.D. Broad that phenomenology of visual experience is "saltatory," that it is in its nature to bridge, as it were, the ostensive gap that separates the subject from the objects she perceives; objects that, in experience, appear to be *over there* and separate from the subject.² At the same time, we should recognize that some of the visually appreciable aspects of the items the gap to which experience so bridges (and perhaps some of those items themselves) are to be traced back to the subject herself.³ How the subject is constituted and how the subject is positioned relative to the objects and the environmental conditions will be reflected in the phenomenology of experience even though it may seem, at least pre-reflectively, that these are contributed by the world rather than by the subject. A color-blind subject may point in the direction of a wall before him and pick out demonstratively the color of the wall ("*that* is my favorite color") fully convinced—perhaps with good reason—that he's referring to something located at a certain distance from himself, all the while the color present before his consciousness happens to be a product—in large part—of the idiosyncrasies of his own visual system. An account of experience that aims to take the rational contribution of experience seriously must account for this feature of the experiential phenomenology.

82. The present project aims at an account of experience which does justice to the rational

²Broad (1965), 30.

³Here and below I use 'item' neutrally, in order to cover members of any ontological category that can conceivably be perceived: objects of various kinds, properties, property instances, relations, tropes, events, facts, etc.

role of experience. It is imperative that such an account of experience should address the issue of perceptual error.

All perceptual experiences make some perceptual judgments reasonable. An unsuspecting subject who happens to undergo a particularly realistic hallucination may reasonably judge that his environment is a certain way, even though his environment is nothing like the way he judges it to be. Similarly with illusions: a subject who, for instance, sees a Müller-Lyer diagram for the first time may reasonably judge, on the basis of the experience, that the two parallel lines on the diagram are unequal in length. The judgments in both cases are erroneous but nevertheless reasonable; given the background views of the subject and the phenomenology of his experiences, it may be perfectly intelligible why the subject has made such perceptual judgments. A satisfactory account of experience should offer a plausible explanation of this rational role of illusions and hallucinations, just as it should plausibly explain the rational role of veridical experiences.

83. The preceding critical discussion of representationalist and relationalist approaches has issued in some general guidelines for a plausible account of experience. Representationalist views faced difficulties specifically when dealing with experiential phenomenology. We should be wary of, and ultimately avoid, the idea that experience somehow conveys to us, or puts us *en rapport* with specific properties of objects in our environment. Further, we should reject the idea that the phenomenology of experience is best characterized in terms of contents or their accuracy conditions. Finally, we should not account for phenomenology in terms of concepts employed in experience, but rather look for ways of understanding phenomenology that would help with clarifying the role of experience in supplying thought with content as well as the role of experience in our grasp of concepts. Relationalist views, on the other hand, have faced tremendous difficulties with the task of accounting for perceptual error. A plausible account of illusions and hallucinations cannot be grounded in epistemic relations to ordinary objects and their properties.

84. The account of phenomenology I wish to propose is shaped by the following considerations. Experiential phenomenology should be understood in terms of the relation of *presence*.

In an experience, a specific segment of a subject's environment is present before the subject's consciousness. As I look in the direction of the sofa to my right, certain objects are present before my consciousness: the sofa itself, two pillows, and a brown dog napping lazily between the pillows. The intuitive notion of presence is far from an uncommon one in philosophical treatments of perception. It is endorsed, in some form, by philosophers whose views on experience otherwise differ significantly.⁴ As I understand presence, the following features characterize it.

First, subjects experience items present in experience—objects, as well as complexes of objects and properties—as *other* than the subject; objects presented to a subject's consciousness are typically experienced as exhibiting a peculiar spatial *over-againstness*.⁵ Presence of objects in experience institutes an opposition between the subject and the items present in experience.

Next, I do not follow Russell in identifying presence with acquaintance, insofar as acquaintance with an object implies *knowledge* of the object.⁶ The objects present in experience are not only present as *other* than the subject; they are also always presented in a particular manner, where this manner of presentation is a function of the perspective-dependence of experience. The respective contributions of the subject and of the environment to the phenomenology of an experience cannot be straightforwardly untangled and read off of an experience. Moreover, the presence of different items can result in subjectively identical experiences. Two experiences can be subjectively identical even if the objects present in the two experiences are different—for example, the objects can be two qualitatively identical but numerically distinct sofas. Nevertheless, things can be exactly alike, from the subject's viewpoint, in the two experiences. The two experiences, assuming that the subject's antecedent view is unchanged across the two cases will supply the same set of perceptual judgments with rational grounds. But the two objects need not be qualitatively identical for the two experiences to have identical phenomenologies. One sofa can be red, while the other white; for the two experiences to have identical phenomenologies it may be sufficient for the white sofa to be perceived while illuminated with red light. Precisely because of this possibility, we

⁴See, e.g., Price (1932), Searle (1983), McDowell (2008), Martin (2002), Alston (2005), Loar (2003).

⁵See Frey (2013); Smith (2002), 134.

⁶See, e.g., Russell (1957/1911), 202 and Russell (1959/1912), 46.

should refrain from saying that, for instance, in the experience of the red sofa the subject is acquainted with the sofa's color, or that the sofa's color is somehow conveyed to the subject. Presence is like acquaintance insofar as it is a basic relation with items in our environment (although, I hasten to add, I do not think presence relates us only to items in our environment), a relation that is more basic than thought about objects and can ground thought about objects; however, presence is an epistemically weaker relation than acquaintance: the obtaining of the relation of presence does not entail knowledge of any of the items present before the subject's consciousness.⁷

Items present in perceptual experience are always *actual* and *specific*. They are actual insofar as their presence in experience makes them available for the subject to pick out by demonstration. The subject need not be able to tell whether *that over there* is a pillow or a small animal lying next to the brown dog, but the presence of the object in the experience makes it available for the subject to pick out by pointing at it, or by intending to pick it out, and then by using a demonstrative in a judgment about the object. Objects of thought, on the other hand, need not be actual. We can think, or make judgments, about non-existent objects, about fictional objects, and about impossible objects. The selection of items experience supplies to thought is limited to actual ones. Similarly, the items present are always *specific*. A specific dog is present in my experience, lying on a specific sofa. Perhaps a bit more controversially, I take it that it is that dog's specific brownness that can be present in my experience, and that sofa's specific redness that can be present in my experience. In thought, of course, one can wish to buy any old green sofa, or to get any dog of a certain size and temperament.⁸

85. The above characterization of the notion of presence makes an account of experience based upon it similar to relationalist views in certain important respects. The motivation that prompts the view is similar: it is held that a plausible account of experience should

⁷See Gupta (2012, forthcoming).

⁸I take it that actuality and specificity of items present in an experience ultimately rules out the idea that *absences* can be present in experience, as proposed by Farennikova (2013). If one scans the shrubs, fearfully suspecting that a tiger might be lurking about, the absence of a tiger is not what is present in experience. An absence of a tiger has no specificity—any and all individual tigers simply fail to be present in the experience.

construe experience as more basic than thought, and as capable of enabling demonstrative reference to objects.⁹

Differences between relationalist views and the view I favor are quite significant and substantive. In experience, we are not related to objects and their properties by way of acquaintance. Rather, a less demanding relation of presence obtains. It is of equal importance that I do not subscribe to the relationalist treatments of perceptual error. In particular, I take it that we should account for *all* experiences in terms of presence—hallucinations and illusions, as well as veridical experiences. In hallucination, too, there are certain items present before the consciousness of the hallucinating subject.

Whatever the items present in hallucination, they would have to be much different from the items present in ordinary veridical perceptions. In viewing a dog on a sofa one may well have a tract of one's environment present to one's consciousness, but that cannot be said for someone who undergoes a total hallucination. Objects of hallucination would have to be extraordinary in some way, and the positing of such objects is commonly met with suspicion. Some will no doubt be repelled by the positing of such entities even if aware of the drawbacks of alternative proposals. I do not think proposals of this kind should be balked at, at least not simply because of the fact that they posit non-standard entities as present in perceptual experience, as long as the entities in question can be plausibly employed in an account of experience as rational ground for thought. So there are two pressing questions to be answered: Why is it that we should posit any items as present in hallucination? What is it that is present in hallucination? I will discuss these questions in turn.

86. There is a sense in which the positing of the objects of hallucination is far from radical, and could be seen as natural and intuitively appealing. H. H. Price famously claimed that there must be some object of awareness in hallucination; the claim was based on his confessed inability to doubt that, in hallucination, there is something—some particular—that possesses certain color and shape properties:

One thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of other colour-patches, and having a certain

⁹See Campbell (2002a).

visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is presented to my consciousness. (Price (1932), 3)

Smith (2002) endorses the intuition, but disagrees with Price, who was a sense-datum theorist, on the kind of object one is aware of in hallucination. Even some representationalists have accepted the idea that there are objects of awareness in hallucinatory experiences: Dretske (1995), for example, views hallucinations as experiences in which there is awareness of properties, rather than objects.¹⁰

The intuitive ground for the positing of objects of hallucination, though its *prima facie* plausibility can be persuasive, is not dialectically very strong. It is quite difficult to see how the intuition itself can be argued for or against, and there is certainly room for alternative views of perception to attempt to explain hallucination without accounting for the supposed data derived from intuitions. The positing of items present in hallucination requires a more substantive argument.¹¹

The case for the presence of certain items in hallucination comes down to two claims. First, at least some perceptual judgments (and, in particular, perceptual judgments involving demonstratives) made by subjects of hallucinatory experiences are reasonable. Second, at least some perceptual judgments that involve demonstratives and are rationally grounded in hallucination are true. The truth of such judgments is best accommodated by the positing of items that are present in hallucination. The first of the two claims has been assumed from the outset of the present inquiry. In the following sections I will address difficulties and objections that face the second, much more controversial, claim.

87. Even if it is granted that perceptual judgments based on hallucinations can be reasonable, it may be denied that such judgments can ever be true. I will consider two kinds of reasons for denying this claim. The first one comes down to the following: uses of demonstratives in judgments based on hallucinations are always empty and, as such, utterances of

¹⁰For an instructive and thorough review of views that include the claim that there is some sort of “item-awareness” in hallucination (where these items are either objects or properties), see Pautz (2007).

¹¹Johnston (2004) offers one such argument. According to Johnston, hallucinatory experiences make *de re* knowledge about certain properties possible. When having a hallucination as of a red object, the subject of the hallucination can acquire *de re* knowledge about the property of being red. I cannot accept Johnston’s argument because I take it that presence of property-instances in experience does not, in itself, suffice for knowledge of properties.

these judgments fail to express propositions; consequently, there is no good sense in which these judgments can be said to be true. The second objection is this: perceptual judgments based on hallucinations are about *the contents* of hallucinatory experiences, and as such at best express truths about these contents, not about some objects of hallucination.

(i) It should not be controversial that there are clearly defective uses of demonstratives. Glanzberg and Siegel (2006) give one such example; suppose a person points wantonly in some general direction and utters:

(3) That is a fine piano.

They diagnose the case as one in which no proposition is expressed by the utterance; they dub this sort of defect “p-infelicity”:

The reason [an utterance of (3)] inhibits communication appears to be somehow semantic (...) In this case, it appears the utterance cannot completely determine the conditions in which the item referred to by the occurrence of the demonstrative *that* has the property of being a fine piano. There is no such object, so we fail to determine the truth conditions in this sense. (Glanzberg and Siegel (2006), 15.)

The objection to the positing of certain objects as present in hallucinatory experiences could now be formulated as follows: all utterances of perceptual judgments involving demonstratives that are grounded in hallucinatory experiences are p-infelicitous.¹²

Glanzberg and Siegel go on to specify two tests for p-infelicity. First, an utterance is p-infelicitous in case we cannot make an “echo-assessment” of it without an obligatory repair. An *echo-assessment* occurs when a previously uttered sentence is repeated, preceded by a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’. So, in response to an utterance of (3), a hearer cannot simply say:

(4a) No, that is not a fine piano.

Instead, a repair must be initiated:

(4b) No, that is not a fine piano—there is nothing there at all.

The second test is the following: an utterance is p-infelicitous in case we cannot make an indirect speech report of the utterance without initiating a repair. Rather than simply

¹²To be sure, Glanzberg and Siegel do not explicitly endorse this thesis. I only use their framework because I find it helpful.

reporting “he said that that is a fine piano,” an indirect speech report would have to include a repair:

(5) He said ‘that is a fine piano’, but I don’t know what he was pointing at.¹³

For our purposes, it is the echo-assessment test that is of primary importance. Glanzberg and Siegel single it out as the test which “targets a proposition expressed by an utterance as the bearer of truth, which determines if the utterance is correct or not” (Glanzberg and Siegel (2006), 19). In case a judgment fails the echo-assessment test, it can be assumed that an assessment of its truth cannot be given.

However, there are cases in which a hallucinating subject’s utterance passes the echo-assessment test. Consider the following case. Suppose a subject is sitting in a sparsely furnished room and looking at a blank wall. Imagine further that a scientist has been conducting an experiment in which he induces hallucinations in the subject. Finally, suppose that the subject is aware that *some* of his experiences are highly realistic and convincing hallucinations: occasionally, the subject would be asked to open his eyes, and then he would either see an object placed in front of the wall, or else experience a hallucination as of an object positioned in front of the wall. Suppose now the subject is asked to try to tell whether his next visual experience is of a real object or a hallucination, and he, upon opening his eyes, utters:

(6) That is not a real object.

It seems clear that (6) easily passes the echo-assessment test. The hearer—that is, the scientist—could make an echo-assessment without initiating repair. In case the experience was veridical, he could say “no, that *is* a real object,” or in the case of hallucination he could say “yes, that is not a real object.”

It may be observed that, in case the speaker *did* undergo a hallucination, the supposed object of reference in (6) is not salient to the hearer, and so the hearer’s echo-assessment would still be somehow inappropriate without the initiated repair. In response, I would like to point out that while the hearer did not have access to the purported referent of the demonstrative in (6) of the kind that the subject himself did—i.e., the hearer did not undergo

¹³Glanzberg and Siegel (2006), 19.

an experience subjectively identical to the speaker's hallucination—the hearer nevertheless did have sufficient knowledge of the circumstances that allows him to competently assess (6): the hearer himself had induced the hallucination, he has knowledge of the subject's brain activity, and, let us suppose, no good reason to doubt the speaker's intention to participate in the experiment in good faith.

Discussions of empty uses of demonstratives are not always best suited for the purposes of untangling issues in philosophy of perception that are raised by hallucinatory experiences. Part of the reason for this is that intelligibility of utterances and appropriateness of certain responses to them depends to a great extent on the presupposition of a shared context of conversation. It may be inappropriate to respond to a capricious use of a demonstrative without initiating a repair, but that is so because otherwise the fact of a breakdown in communication would not be registered. With perceptual judgments grounded in hallucinatory experiences, there is no reason in principle why we should expect that the speaker—the subject of the hallucination—and the hearer would share the context: the hallucinatory case is characteristic precisely for the fact that (at least in most instances) the grounds for the judgment are *not* salient to the hearer, but only to the speaker. This is why it is important to distinguish between intelligibility of the utterance and the reasonableness of the judgment expressed by it: the former may be absent insofar as the hearer cannot make much sense of the utterance (witness the failure of the indirect speech test) all the while the subject *is* in possession of rational grounds for her judgment.

(ii) Pautz (2007) argues against the idea that the truth of sentences about hallucinatory experiences secures the conclusion that some sort of objects of hallucination must be posited. He considers sentences like

(7) There are exactly two hallucinatory objects of which Mabel is aware.

(8) Hallucinating a little green man, it looked to Mabel as if he was bald. (Pautz (2007), 509)

Pautz argues that the conclusion that there are objects of hallucination can be resisted by interpreting (7) and (8) as expressing truths about *the contents* of Mabel's hallucinatory experience, rather than truths about any objects of subject's awareness.¹⁴ Two different

¹⁴Again, Pautz is interested in showing that there is no item-awareness in hallucination. The relation of

kinds of readings are considered.

Pautz reads (7) as conveying the true conditional that, if Mabel's experience were veridical, there would be two objects of which she is aware. But this reading could not help with (6). There, we could not say that the utterance would be true if the subject's experience were veridical. On any common understanding of veridicality (and certainly on the understanding of veridicality Pautz assumes), in case the subject's experience were veridical, (6) would be bound to be false.

According to Pautz, (8) can be rendered as conveying "the truth that Mabel sensorily entertains a content (a proposition or a complex property) that disposes her to believe that there is a little bald man present" (Pautz (2007), 509). There are two objections I wish to level against this reading. First, Pautz's representationalist account of experience as identical with the relation of sensorily entertaining a content is not plausible.¹⁵ Second, regardless of the merits of Pautz's view, the proposed reading is not satisfactory. Mabel could be *disposed to believe* that there is a bald man present even if she were not hallucinating. The reading does not succeed in capturing the way in which it is specifically the hallucinatory experience that makes it reasonable for Mabel to believe that there is a little bald man before her.

The two objections are thus rejected. We can take it that (a) hallucinatory experiences help make certain perceptual judgments reasonable, and (b) these judgments can sometimes be true. These two claims can be best accommodated by the positing of certain items as present in hallucination. I will now propose how an account of experience based on the relation of presence should treat hallucinations and illusions.

7.2 PRESENTATIONAL TROPES

88. In hallucination, then, there is presence of certain items, just as there is in veridical perception. Naturally, items other than ordinary objects and their properties have to be

awareness need not be understood as I understand the relation of presence, but it is clear that opponents of item-awareness could object on similar grounds to the claim that there is something that is present in a hallucinating subject's experience.

¹⁵See Chapter 6.

posited to account for hallucinatory experiences. Hallucinations pose a difficult problem for views according to which experience is a matter of a subject's being related with ordinary, mind-independent objects and their properties. Clearly such an account cannot be straightforwardly applied to hallucinations—in hallucination there are no ordinary, mind-independent objects for the subject to be related with. Consider the following account of one of the earliest documented cases of a subject suffering from the Bonnet syndrome—a condition associated with ocular problems, but also with damage higher up in the visual system:

One day in August two granddaughters came to see [the subject]. [The subject] was sitting in his armchair opposite the mantelpiece, and his visitors were to his right. From the left, two young men appeared. They were wearing magnificent cloaks, red and grey, and their hats were trimmed with silver. “What handsome gentlemen you’ve brought with you! Why didn’t you tell me they were coming?” But the young ladies swore that they saw no one. (Draaisma (2009).)

The experience of the subject is one in which there are real objects present before the subject's consciousness, but these real objects do not suffice for a full account of the phenomenology. Certain items other than the real, ordinary objects in the subject's environment should be posited. I follow Gupta in calling the totality of items present in an experience *the presentational complex* of the experience.¹⁶ We should say, then, that in the presentational complex there are both real objects and “hallucinatory objects,” whatever the latter might turn out to be. What could these “hallucinatory objects” be? Relationalists commonly resort to some form of disjunctivism when addressing the problem of accounting for hallucination. I argued (see Chapters 4 and 5) that relationalist proposals are not satisfactory. Instead, hallucinations should be explained by invoking entities other than mind-independent objects as elements of presentational complexes. Although they are hardly popular in recent philosophy, there is no shortage of proposals that aim to answer this question: there are sense-data of Russell and Moore, Meinongian objects posited by Smith (2002), and unreal sense-images of Gupta's (2012) proposal.

It is Gupta's account of hallucination in terms of presence of unreal sense-images that I find most attractive. Sense-datum theories are unacceptable for two reasons. First, they

¹⁶See Gupta (2012).

posit the relation of acquaintance as obtaining between subjects and sense-data; I have already argued that experience should not be explained using the relation of acquaintance. Second, even if one were merely presented with sense-data rather than acquainted with them, the view would still hold that no objects other than sense-data can be present in experience.

Smith's Meinongian proposal is better than the sense-datum alternative insofar as it recognizes that real objects can also be objects of our experiences. However, the positing of Meinongian objects as objects of hallucination is far from appealing. According to Smith, objects of hallucination are ordinary physical objects *which do not exist*:

Hallucination, equally with veridical perception, presents us not with sensations, or sense-impressions, or sense-data, but with *normal objects*: normal *physical* objects to boot, in the sense that they are presented in three-dimensional physical space (...) [T]he only difference between a veridically perceived object and a hallucinated object is that the latter *does not exist* (...) When Macbeth hallucinated a dagger, he was (...) aware of (...) a dagger, located at some point in space before him, though one that was non-existent, or unreal. (Smith (2002), 234.)

Objects of hallucination are, according to Smith, different from ordinary physical objects only insofar as they do not exist. This, however, has some consequences that are quite unappealing. For instance, if the intentional, Meinongian object that is the object of a hallucination is indeed located in space—even though the object is non-existent—it should make sense to speak about spatial relations that obtain between this non-existent object and other physical objects. We could say, for instance, that the subject of a hallucination is closer to the hallucinated non-existent object than her friend who lives in a nearby town, or that the hallucinated object is two hundred feet away from the subject's car. But it seems thoroughly implausible to think of objects of subjective, hallucinatory experiences as entering into such relations with real objects. When we hallucinate, we do not thereby discover the whereabouts of intentional objects; rather, we have experiences in which we are presented with items that look, but are not real.

89. Unreal sense-images are only one kind of entities that can be present in perceptual experience. Ordinary objects such as stones, tables, and cats can also be present in experience. So can their properties and relations—an experience may present a subject with a presentational complex consisting of a sense-image of a young man next to the subject's

(real) granddaughter. Moreover, the phenomenology of this experience may be identical to the phenomenology of an experience in which the subject is presented with a real young man standing next to the subject's granddaughter. The two experiences may provide the subject with exactly the same rational grounds for the perceptual judgment "that man is standing next to my granddaughter." For two experiences to have the same rational force they should be subjectively identical, i.e., their phenomenologies should be identical; this does not mean that the same items must be present in the two experiences. The presentational complexes may be significantly different: one may consist of two real objects and their properties, the other of a real object and an unreal sense-image, together with their properties—and yet, two experiences with such different presentational complexes can have identical phenomenologies.

90. Gupta extends his account of hallucinations to illusions as well. Gupta illustrates his treatment of illusions using an example of a visual experience of two blue disks of unequal sizes present before a subject. The subject of the experience perceives one of the disks, d_1 , as if it is green even though it is blue; the appearance of the other disk, d_2 , is unaffected by whatever it is that alters the appearance of d_1 . This experience can be classified as an illusion because it is natural to describe it as a case in which an object has a certain color property (it is blue) but appears to have a different color property (it appears to be green). Among the elements in the presentational complex, according to Gupta, there is a green sense-image *of* the disk d_1 . The sense-image is invoked in order to account for the illusory appearance of the disk's color. Here I disagree with Gupta.¹⁷ Unreal sense-images are not appropriate as an explanatory tool when applied to illusions. Briefly put, the following problem arises for Gupta's account: in non-hallucinatory experiences in which sense-images are present (i.e., illusions), the supposed contribution of *real* objects to the phenomenology appears to become redundant.

91. Consider an example similar to Gupta's example with two disks. Suppose only disk d_1 is presented to the subject of a visual experience. Assume further that the illusion arises due

¹⁷It should be noted that Gupta is not dogmatic about the treatment of illusions involving sense-images. He is mainly motivated by considerations of economy. The alternative proposal I offer below should thus be seen as a friendly amendment, not a wholesale rejection of Gupta's approach.

to the environmental conditions, the disk and its properties, conspiring together with the constitution of the subject's visual system to produce the phenomenology of the experience—say, the disk's appearing green is a result of unusual lighting conditions. The disk is not green, but there is greenness of some sort present before the subject's consciousness. Should we explain this by positing a green sense-image of the disk? I do not think we should.

The worry here is that, in illusions, the supposedly present real object is *screened-off* by the unreal sense-image. In the above example, the disk itself seems to be entirely superfluous to the phenomenology of the experience. If we were to leave out the object from the presentational complex, there would be no difference to the phenomenology of the experience; the sense-image itself could account for the phenomenology perfectly well. In other words, the screening-off of the real object by the sense-image presents Gupta's account with the problem of providing grounds on which it could be claimed that the object makes a contribution to the phenomenology. The problem can be further sharpened by considering illusions in which *all* visually appreciable features of an object are misperceived: the object's color, shape, size, and location. We can imagine an object being observed under unusual lighting and through a lens that distorts not only its shape but the apparent location as well. Here it would seem that Gupta's reliance on sense-images would push the real object entirely out of the picture.

92. The above screening off problem should be distinguished from a somewhat similar concern discussed by Martin (2004). What Martin focuses on is a worry facing direct realist accounts that propose positive accounts of hallucination (as opposed to the more common opting for negative disjunctivist accounts). These accounts have to deal with the following problem: whatever it is that a hallucinatory experience and its veridical counterpart have in common will suffice to explain “all the relevant phenomena in the various cases of illusion and hallucination” (Martin (2004), 46). The worry is that, should this common element be sufficient for an explanation of hallucination, it would then be sufficient for an explanation of veridical experience as well. Whatever this common element might be, it will surely not be the foundational explanatory tool of contemporary direct realism, i.e., acquaintance with real, ordinary objects. Consequently, Martin argues, acquaintance with real objects would

turn out to be explanatorily redundant, or else there would be widespread overdetermination in the cases of veridical experiences.¹⁸

Martin's worry is that, on a direct realist account which posits a common element between veridical and non-veridical experiences, the common factor in question will suffice for an account of veridical experiences. This is not the problem that I raise for Gupta's view. According to Gupta, the phenomenology of experience is what veridical and non-veridical experiences can have in common. But phenomenology can be fixed by different presentational complexes, so there is no danger that somehow the account of hallucination in terms of sense-images will suffice for an explanation of veridical experiences. So Gupta's account is not threatened by Martin's worry. However, Gupta's account does have an issue to deal with when it comes to its explanation of *illusion*, and that is what I am pointing out.

93. If not sense-images, what else can help us account for the phenomenology of illusions? Illusions are here, as noted above, understood quite broadly: any experience in which an object appears other than it really is—with respect to its color, size, shape, or location—will be treated as an illusion. I wish to suggest that we need to introduce a new class of elements into the presentational complex to accommodate experiences of this sort. I will call these items *presentational tropes*.

It is a well-known truism that every perceptible object can produce experiences with significantly different phenomenologies. Change the subject's distance from the object, the angle or direction from which the object is observed, or shine lights of different colors on the object, and the object's appearance will alter. What does not alter with these changes is the fact of the object's presence. Yet the object exhibits, across these changes, many different appearances: the object's contribution to the phenomenology of a subject's experience alters, and with this alteration the phenomenology changes as well. I propose that this change in phenomenology should be traced to a difference in the presentational complexes of these experiences. When, in experience e_1 , a white object o is illuminated with yellow light it will exhibit a particular color-appearance a_1 ; when, in e_2 , we change the color of the light to red, the object will exhibit a different color-appearance, a_2 . The appearance a_1 is fixed by the

¹⁸Cf. Fish (2009), 84–5.

presence, in experience, of the object itself, the object's properties, and, I wish to suggest, a *presentational trope*—*that* particular yellowness. Similarly for a_2 ; the phenomenology of e_2 is different from the phenomenology of e_1 insofar as in e_2 a different presentational trope is present—*that* particular redness.

94. Some initial clarificatory remarks are in order.

(i) I remain neutral on the matters of ontology when tropes are concerned. Tropes are commonly invoked in discussions of ontology, where they are supposed to serve a role in solving some thorny issues concerning universals and particulars. I am not concerned with ontology; I do not subscribe to the view of D.C. Williams, one of the most notable modern trope theorists, who thought that “nothing is clear until [analytic ontology] is clear.”¹⁹ I do not, therefore, find it pressing to settle some of the common issues addressed in work on tropes: e.g., whether objects should be construed as bundles of tropes, or in terms of substrata with inhering tropes, or in terms of a nucleus of compresent tropes with other, non-nuclear, tropes “attached” to it. Still, presentational tropes should be viewed as belonging to the same broad tradition to which *individual accidents* of Aristotle and the Scholastics belong, as well as Husserl's *moments*, and, more recently, *tropes* proper in the works of G.F. Stout, Williams, Campbell, Peter Simons, and others.²⁰ It is significant that, historically, the intuition that only particulars (and not universals) are immediate objects of perception was a forceful motivation for trope theorists: Schaffer (2001) finds evidence of this motivating consideration as early as in Boethius, and D.C. Williams's contemporary reintroduction of tropes is also, in part, brought about by this kind of consideration.²¹

(ii) I am not concerned with defending or rejecting any kind of reductionist program in ontology. I allow the possibility that universals can be present in experience; this kind of permissibility is not incompatible with an affinity towards the employment of tropes in one's theory: Husserl is known to have made room for both tropes as particulars (moments) and universals (ideal species), and I see little reason, given the concerns of my project, to be

¹⁹Williams (1997), 112.

²⁰See Williams (1997), Simons (1994), Campbell (1997), Stout (1921), Bacon (1995), Lowe (2006), Ehring (2011).

²¹Williams (1953), 18.

opposed to such a view.²² Tropes simply serve the role of useful tools in accounting for an aspect of perceptual phenomenology which is highly delicate and difficult to accommodate by other means.

(iii) Presentational tropes will primarily and minimally be used to account for monadic, sensorily appreciable features of perceived objects such as the apparent color, shape, or size of visually experienced objects, the pitch of heard sounds, and the texture of felt surfaces. Later on, an extension to some relations will be discussed as well.

95. Tropes are sometimes characterized as particularized ways objects are (Heil (2003), 141). *Presentational* tropes, however, should not be so understood. If anything, presentational tropes have to do with how objects *appear*, where this is understood as standing in opposition to how objects are. Yet presentational tropes should not be *identified* with how objects appear either. Appearances of objects are elements of experiential phenomenology, while presentational tropes are elements of certain presentational complexes. Presentational tropes thus help in fixing appearances, but should not be identified with them. An appearance fixed, in part, by a presentational trope can be identical with an appearance fixed by different items presented to the subject in an experience. A coin viewed head on under a green light will exhibit a specific appearance; the appearance of the coin will be fixed by the object itself, by the object's shape, and by the presentational color-trope—that particular greenness. Identical appearance could be produced if the object were observed under different illumination, provided that, say, the subject's visual system is affected in a suitable way so as to contribute to the object's appearing green. The phenomenology would in this case be fixed by the presentational complex consisting of the coin, its shape, and a different presentational color-trope. Finally, a hallucination is possible subjectively identical to the previous two experiences. In the hallucinatory case, we would have a third presentational complex—this time, it would be a green, coin-shaped sense-image that would fix the phenomenology of the experience.

Presentational tropes have some similarities with tropes understood as particularized ways objects are: they too are dependent on objects. Tropes in general are conceived of

²²Cf. Simons (1994), 555.

as *dependent particulars*. A trope requires for its existence the existence of other particulars: either other compresent tropes with which it constitutes an object or some kind of substratum, depending on one's ontology. In this respect they are not unlike some other particulars—events, for instance.²³ *Presentational* tropes are peculiar insofar as they are *relational*; they require for their existence a subject of an experience and an object perceived by the subject. Think back to the example of disk d_1 's appearing green. For the greenness of d_1 to be present in a subject's experience, the subject must be a certain way (minimally, what matters is the subject's being positioned in a particular way, and being in possession of a visual system of a particular kind), and the object present in the subject's experience must be a certain way (the object should have a physical composition of appropriate kind, it should be positioned and oriented in a certain way, and embedded in an environment of a certain kind). In fact, it may be the case that a very complex relational nexus of a subject, certain objects and environmental conditions gives rise to a presentational trope. As an illustration, consider an object observed through a distorting glass and illuminated with a red light. Suppose further that two subjects look at the object from the same spot, and that one of these subjects is color blind. The environmental conditions, together with the object's features and the idiosyncrasies of the subject's visual system, will give rise to two different presentational color-tropes.

Presentational tropes are in this respect different from *appearance properties* as used by some relationalists: presentational tropes are not mind-independent insofar as they only exist when subjects are perceptually related with objects; that is, they only *exist as present in experiences*.²⁴ The particular greenness of d_1 that makes d_1 *look* green even though it is not in fact green, exists only as present in an experience. Presentational tropes are not, however, entirely mind-dependent; they are neither purely subjective mental entities like imaginings are—they require mind-independent objects to be related to a subject in a specific way.

96. The idea to utilize tropes in an account of perceptual appearances is not new. To further elaborate on the notion of presentational tropes, it might help to distinguish the approach I

²³Simons (1994), 557.

²⁴Appearance properties are invoked both by relationalists (e.g., Genone (2014) and Antony (2011)) and by representationalists (e.g., Schellenberg (2008) and Shoemaker (2006)).

am taking from some of the other trope-friendly views in philosophy of perception. Recently, such views were proposed by Uriah Kriegel and by Bence Nanay.²⁵

Nanay's proposal is a representationalist one. He argues that if perceptual contents are construed as being constituted by tropes, then Representationalism can avoid the charge of not being able to capture the particularity of perceptual experience (see, e.g., Nanay (2012), 7.). I do not find Nanay's proposal appealing because of the representationalist commitments that he takes on board. According to Nanay, tropes are "the properties represented in experience" (Nanay (2012), 8); we "perceptually represent objects as having tropes" (Nanay (2012), 7); perceptual content is the sum total of "perceptually attributed tropes" (Nanay (2012), 12). As I argue elsewhere in this work, commitments to experience as a representational state in which properties are attributed to objects should be rejected.

Kriegel's paper is exploratory—he mainly focuses on the question of whether a trope-based metaphysical outlook provides viable grounds for a plausible account of appearances. Kriegel argues that it is indeed possible to adequately account for appearances of objects by introducing *phenomenal tropes*. Phenomenal tropes are in certain important respects similar to presentational tropes. Phenomenal tropes are "constitutively connected" to perceptual states of sentient beings. In addition, I am in agreement with Kriegel with respect to the claim that tropes can account for appearances without being posited as existing only in the mind of the perceiver (Kriegel (2004), 5).

I disagree with Kriegel with respect to his positing of appearances as *phenomenal individuals*. On his view, appearances—understood as real objects *qua experienced* (Kriegel (2004), pp. 5–6)—are themselves particulars (Kriegel (2004), 7). They are bundles of com-present phenomenal tropes (if we accept the bundle theory of tropes) or else bundles of tropes in which *essential* tropes are phenomenal (if we accept the nuclear theory of tropes). According to Kriegel, ordinary objects are composed of non-phenomenal tropes, while their appearances are composed of phenomenal tropes. Consequently, an object is always numerically distinct from its appearance (Kriegel (2004), 12). This allows Kriegel to accommodate the intuitive idea that an object can *be*, say, white, while it *appears* to be, say, red. Phenomenal individuals do not strike me as an indispensable element of a trope-involving account

²⁵See Kriegel (2004) and Nanay (2012).

of appearances. Perceptual phenomenology can be a matter of an immensely complicated interaction of objects, environmental conditions, and subjective constitution. Consider the following example: suppose you look at a white wall through a blue, transparent pane of glass. The wall may well appear blue to you, but I see no reason to say that *that* blueness which is present in your experience constitutes an object together with the wall's rectangular shape-trope. Even without such bundling into phenomenal objects, tropes that are present in your experience can do the required explanatory work.

An even more important point of disagreement with Kriegel concerns the nature of presentational tropes as I conceive of them. Kriegel's phenomenal tropes are not just constitutively connected to perceptual states; they are, in addition, brought into existence *whenever* an object is perceived:

Whenever an individual *I* is perceived to have a property *F*, this brings into existence a phenomenal trope, namely, the trope of *I*'s appearing *F* to the perceiver. (Kriegel (2004), 11)

A consequence of this claim is that how an object appears *must be* different from how that object is:

If nobody perceives *y*, then *y* appears to nobody—*y* does not appear. So the wall's appearing white is a distinct trope from the wall's being white. Phenomenal tropes are always different from their corresponding non-phenomenal tropes. (Kriegel (2004), 11)

Presentational tropes are also constitutively connected to objects present in experience and to subjects to whom those objects are presented. But this does not entail the further claim that *whenever* an object is present in an experience, a presentational trope must be present as well. There is no reason, in principle, why an appearance of an object could not be fixed by a property of that object rather than by a presentational trope. A white wall's property of being white can be present in an experience and it can fix the appearance of the wall in an experience; there is no need to posit a phenomenal trope to account for the appearance. Similarly, a coin viewed from a particular angle can bring about an appearance of ellipticality—in this case, what is present in experience is the coin and a presentational (shape-) trope; but when a coin is viewed head on and appears round, the appearance is fixed by the coin's *actual shape*, by a property that has to do with how the object in question occupies space,

and not by a presentational trope. Presentational tropes are conceived precisely as elements of presentational complexes in cases where it is *not* an object's property that is present in experience. Presentational tropes require for their existence the obtaining of the relation of presentation; the obtaining of the relation of presentation does not necessitate the existence of presentational tropes.

97. The screening off worry does not threaten the present proposal. Presentational tropes are dependent particulars; their very existence depends on the objects present in experience. In Gupta's example, the green disk d_1 looks blue; if we are to account for this fact about phenomenology in terms of sense-images, the contribution of the disk itself is pushed out of the picture. On the present proposal, the presence of a relational trope is responsible for the disk's looking blue, but the contribution to phenomenology of the green disk d_1 that looks blue is not screened off by the contribution of the color-trope—the presence of the trope itself is only possible as a consequence of the disk's presence.

Presentational tropes are also dependent on the subject of experience: they only exist in the context of something's being presented to a subject. Presentational tropes are thus not of a kind with appearance properties in case the latter are conceived as objective, mind-independent properties of objects.²⁶

Perceptual illusions are always a matter of the interaction between a subject and the subject's environment. This fact is reflected in the dependence of presentational tropes on both the subject and her environment.

98. Presentational tropes need not be limited to explaining monadic features of the presentation of objects in experience. As Gupta (2012) points out, certain relations obtain between objects present in experience that cannot be accounted for straightforwardly without recognizing a crucial role of the subject of the experience in the obtaining of these relations. Suppose in the example with disks d_1 and d_2 that the former appears *to the left* of the latter. But d_1 can be to the left of d_2 only relative to the subject of the experience. The relation of two objects present in experience is somehow dependent on the subject of the experience,

²⁶This is how Genone (2014) conceives of appearance properties.

and not just on where the two objects are located: were the subject positioned or oriented differently, the two disks may have been present in an experience in a way that would bring about a markedly different phenomenology—say, one in which d_2 appears to the left of d_1 .

Presentational tropes can be used to account for such relations. We might say, for instance, that what is present in a subject's experience are objects d_1 and d_2 , some of their properties (including, perhaps, monadic presentational tropes), and a *relational presentational trope* which fixes the objects' appearing in an arrangement that is captured by saying that d_1 is to the left of d_2 .

Relational presentational tropes naturally lead to the idea that presentational tropes can be dependent on *unreal* as well as real objects present in experience. Consider again the partial hallucination of the Bonnet syndrome patient. Let us suppose that the subject's experience was directed at a scene containing both real and unreal items. Let us suppose further that one of the hallucinated men seemed to stand to the left of one of the subject's granddaughter. Here as well we should posit a *relational presentational trope*; the nexus of the subject (whose visual cortex is affected in a specific way) and of the subject's environment conspire in such a way as to bring about a presentational relation of an unreal sense-image's *being to the left of* a particular real object. The relation obtains only in the context of the hallucinatory experience; the obtaining of the relation depends on the objects present—the sense-image and the person—and on the subject: in particular, how the subject is oriented relative to the real person present in the experience.

Finally, the positing of presentational tropes can be extended to total hallucinations as well. Unreal sense-images are quite different from ordinary, real objects we regularly encounter in our daily lives, but they are still similar insofar as they can both be present in perceptual experience. As such, both real objects and unreal sense-images may be related to the perceiving subjects so as to bring about specific presentational tropes—both monadic and relational ones.

8.0 CONCLUSION

99. In this work I set out to provide an account of perceptual experience—or at least to take some steps towards the construction of such an account. The goal was to determine what we ought to say about experience if we want (as I think we should) to accommodate its rational role in cognition. Were it not for perceptual experience, we could not make proper sense of the very capacity to have thoughts about mind-independent objects; many of our judgments and beliefs about mind-independent objects are rationally grounded only in the light of perceptual experience. The primary concern of this inquiry, then, is to understand what an appropriate philosophical account of experience should be if experience is to be recognized as having a significant role in making thought about external objects *possible* and in making it *reasonable*.

So conceived, the project of my dissertation belongs to the kind of inquiry concerned with the *logic* of perceptual experience.¹ The primary concern of the present inquiry was, therefore, not with experience as a natural phenomenon, nor have I attempted to produce an account of experience tailored to the requirements of a naturalist philosophy. I proposed, instead, to devise an account of experience which would be constrained by requirements set by the rational role of experience.

An inquiry concerned with the rational role of experience must address the problem of accounting for the phenomenology of experience. How things are from the point of view of the subject of an experience is the aspect of experience that is of paramount importance for explaining how experience makes our thoughts about the external world possible, and

¹Gupta (forthcoming) draws attention to an exceptionally useful distinction between logical and naturalist inquiries into experience. Questions about the logical aspects of perceptual experience are ancient; the careful distinction between the logical and naturalist inquiries is Gupta's valuable novel contribution.

how it makes these thoughts reasonable. The first two constraints on a plausible account of experience, from the perspective of the inquiry I engaged in, are thus the following: a plausible account of experience should explain how experience performs its rational role and, to this end, it should elucidate the phenomenology of experience.

100. The second source of constraints on a plausible account of experience I have derived from the discussion of relationalist and representationalist views on the nature of experience.

The first lesson of my critical discussion of Representationalism is that experience—its phenomenology in particular—*should not be modeled too closely on thought*. In order to amount to a substantive view of experience, a representationalist account of experience needs to establish that a strong relation obtains between experience and its representational content. One potentially promising way of construing this relation is by way of claiming that representational content is *generated* in experience. I reject two prominent representationalist proposals of this sort: experience should not be conceived as though attribution of properties to objects occurs in it; experience should not be conceived as being fundamentally characterized by concepts being employed in it. Explanation of experience in terms of attribution of properties is difficult to motivate given then contents that are allegedly generated by this attribution can easily be viewed as belonging to thoughts occurring downstream from experience. If experience is explained in terms of concept-employment, then we risk losing grip on an important rational relation between experience and thought. Arguably, both unfortunate outcomes can be traced to the fact that these representationalist accounts make experience a bit too much like thought: according to these proposals, in experience—as in thought—there is attribution of properties; in experience—as in thought—concepts are employed (albeit in a special sensory mode, as Schellenberg claims). If so, it is no wonder that the contents supposedly generated by experience cannot be told apart from the contents of judgments and beliefs. Similarly, it should be no surprise that concept-employment in a sensory mode obfuscates the relation between experience and thought precisely at the point at which the distinctive and peculiar contribution of experience—its phenomenology in particular—to our grasp and acquisition of perceptual concepts should be elucidated.

The importance of the venerable old requirement in philosophy of perception to account

for the difference between perceptual experience and thought is upheld: if we wish to explain the distinctive rational role of perceptual experience, we must steer clear of the tempting thought that the phenomenology of experience serves us up with ready-made contents.

101. If experience does not generate representational content and if it is important to carefully separate experience from thought, then how should we account for experience and its phenomenology? A tempting and, arguably, natural recourse is to invoke some sort of special relation that obtains between the experiencing subject and her environment as the basis of an account of phenomenology. I discuss two kinds of proposals that can be viewed as espousing this explanatory route. First, there is the relationalist idea that in experience we come to be acquainted with ordinary physical objects and their properties; in experience we come to *know* the items we are so related to. The second proposal is the representationalist one according to which experience puts us *en rapport* with, or enables us to acquire a special grasp of, certain properties that make up the experiential content.

(i) Acquaintance-based accounts of experience fail because they cannot plausibly accommodate perceptual error. The intuitively appealing idea that in experience we are perceptually related only to ordinary objects and their properties faces an initial difficulty when we recognize that one and the same mind-independent object can exhibit different looks under different sets of circumstances. To solve this, the perceptual relation is amended by the addition of further relata. If we take this line, the proliferation of the factors on which an object's way of appearing depends will lead to the natural idea that the ways of appearing of different objects might converge; that an object of veridical perception and of an illusion, say, might happen to exhibit the same appearance. Relationalists reject this. But this creates serious difficulties for their account of illusion. Relationalists must say more about how it is that illusions arise and how we may be misled by them. The proposals I have discussed cannot fulfill this explanatory task. Invoking visually relevant similarities or mind-independent appearance properties does not work: neither approach can explain why it is that a veridical experience and a matching illusion can make exactly the same range of judgments reasonable.

Illusions are thought to be problematic for relationalists insofar as they present us with

cases in which something looks F but is not F . Relationalists then engage with the project of accounting for the notion of an object's looking F , invoking notions like visually relevant similarities or mind-independent appearance properties. These accounts are, in themselves, highly problematic; I hope my discussion shows as much. But the following point should not escape our attention. The relationalist's problem with accounting for an object's looking F without itself being F becomes exceptionally difficult once we recognize that the the real difficulty here is to explain how a subject can be reasonable in judging, on the basis of an experience e , that an object is F even though the subject is not acquainted in e with anything that is F . We may imagine a subject who happens to spend her entire life encountering objects that look green but never has an opportunity to be acquainted with the color green (say, she somehow happens to only see green-looking objects when encountering blue objects in yellow light). How such a subject may be reasonable in judging that a particular wall in front of her is green is something that relationalists discussed above cannot explain. The green-looking objects that the subject encounters might well be visually relevantly similar with paradigm exemplars of greenness, and the subject may well lack knowledge of environmental conditions that bring about her experiences of green-looking objects, yet we would still be in the dark with respect to the following question: How is the subject reasonable in judging that green-looking objects are green? The notion of acquaintance is of no help here. Neither are the externalist explanations invoking similarities among objects and subject's falling short of possessing knowledge of some sort.

(ii) One way of dealing with this question is to say that, when a subject has an experience of an object that looks F , the subject is *en rapport* with, or a property is conveyed to him—a non-standard property, to be sure: an Edenic property, or a neo-Galilean property. This is the route chosen by Chalmers and Pautz. Accounts of experience in the vicinity of the ones offered by Chalmers and Pautz come at a great price: explaining perceptual experience in virtue of relations with properties that cannot be instantiated in our environment is dubious. More fundamentally, the views of Pautz and Chalmers rely on an implausible thesis about the phenomenology of experience. The claim is this: the phenomenology of each experience fixes a specific set of properties (that make up its content). But phenomenology, in itself, is never so partial to a specific set of properties. How things are with the subject

of an experience is always a matter of a complex interaction of a subject, some objects, and environmental conditions, such that different combinations of these factors can bring about subjectively identical experiences.

102. An account of phenomenology suitable for the purposes of the logical inquiry into the nature of perceptual experience ought to satisfy two conditions. First, phenomenology should be accounted for in a way that would accommodate its key place in a plausible view of the rational role of experience. What is reasonable for a subject to judge on the basis of an experience is critically affected by how things are with the subject of the experience, with how things appear from the subject's point of view. Second, the preceding discussion suggests that we should account for this role of experiential phenomenology while preserving what is ultimately a very thin notion of phenomenology. The phenomenology of experience is supposed to perform its substantive rational role without itself conveying specific objects, properties, contents, or knowledge thereof to the cognizing subject. Thick conceptions of phenomenology, we have seen, encounter one or more of the following pitfalls: they obscure the rational role of experience, they misconstrue the phenomenology of experience, or they fail to account for perceptual error appropriately.

We thus face a puzzle: how can a thin notion of phenomenology, one that eschews epistemic relations to the elements of the environment or strong relations of experience and content, figure in an account of experience designed specifically for the purpose of explaining the rational role of experience, where this role is viewed as robust and substantive? It would seem that if we want to stress the critical role of experience in helping make our beliefs and judgments reasonable, we need to utilize the explanatory resources of a thick notion of phenomenology, one involving acquaintance with objects and properties, or one involving strong relations to contents, or both. Yet we have seen attempts of this kind run into significant difficulties, typically precisely when called upon to shed light on the rational role of experience.

Still, no philosophical position should be rejected simply because there is a list of objections to it—or else all philosophical positions would be rejected; we need to be able to do better than the views discussed in Chapters 2–6. I believe we can indeed do better. We can

resolve the above puzzle by employing Gupta's breakthrough idea of the hypothetical given. Gupta's exciting contribution to the debate offers a novel way of thinking about empirical rationality, yet it remains firmly anchored in common sense. One of the key insights we need to keep in mind when thinking about the rational role of experience is a quite natural one: whatever we happen to judge or believe on the basis of an experience is conditioned (in some way further to be specified) by what we happen to believe, think, know, fear, or expect (etc.) prior to the occurrence of the experience. Experience contributes to the reasonableness of our perceptual judgments and beliefs, yet its contribution depends in part on our antecedent beliefs, judgments, concepts, etc. Gupta's proposal faces this interdependence head on and offers an elegant way of accommodating it. Simultaneously, the hypothetical given supplies a way of thinking about the rational role of experience that allows for a thin notion of phenomenology. If phenomenology serves as a logical mediator between contentful states in the antecedent view and the contentful states downstream from experience, then experience itself need not be burdened with content or with epistemically demanding relations.

103. The alternative I favor construes experience as involving a thin, non-epistemic relation of *presence*. Perceptual relation of presence is minimally characterized by the following features.

(i) Items present before a subject's consciousness are always presented as *other* than the subject.

(ii) Items present before a subject's consciousness are *actual* and *specific*.

(iii) The fact of an item's being present to a subject does not imply that the subject possesses any knowledge of the item in question; presence is not an epistemic relation.

(iv) In an experience, the perceiving subject can be related to items belonging to various categories: ordinary mind-independent objects and their properties, events, but also unreal sense-images and presentational tropes.

Items present in an experience make up the *presentational complex* of the experience. These items fix the phenomenology of the experience: the phenomenology of experience depends on the items present in experience. However, which items are present in an experience cannot be read off of the phenomenology of the experience: subjectively identical experiences

can be fixed by different presentational complexes.

The inclusion of non-standard items such as sense-images and presentational tropes into the presentational complex demonstrates a certain permissiveness. This permissiveness is motivated by the following two points. First, non-veridical experiences, ranging from ordinary perceptual illusions to highly unusual total hallucinations, can make certain perceptual judgments and beliefs *reasonable*; in fact, they can make the same judgments and beliefs reasonable, for a subject, as do their subjectively identical veridical counterparts. A relational view of experience cannot plausibly uphold this observation if the range of relata of the perceptual relation is limited to ordinary objects and their properties. Second, non-standard items such as sense-images and presentational tropes should be introduced among the relata of the relation of presence because perceptual judgments whose reasonableness relies (at least in part) on non-veridical experiences can be *true*.

This proposal succeeds where acquaintance-based Relationalism fails. With sense-images and presentational tropes, we have on board resources for plausible accounts of hallucinations and illusions. The latter case—that of illusions and presentational tropes—is of particular importance. Perceptual illusions bring forth with unmatched vividness the fact that the phenomenology of perceptual experience is a matter of joint contribution of a subject and her environment. An object appears to be green, yet it is blue, bathed in yellow light. An object is red, yet it appears to be brown, due to the subject's color-blindness. These ways of appearing are fixed, in part, by the object itself, but not just by the object (and its properties); the contributions of the subject and of the environment must be factored in as well. Not only that: the same way of appearing can be produced by different subject-environment combinations. A green object may appear green in ordinary light, and this way of appearing can be exhibited by a similar blue object in yellow light. To account appropriately for these ways of appearing, we need to recognize that different elements of presentational complexes may be responsible for bringing about identical appearances. The subject, the object, and the environment can contribute in different ways to subjectively identical appearances. In some cases, the presence of the object and its properties is sufficient for an account of the phenomenology; in others, I think we should embrace the idea that the subject and the object jointly contribute *presentational tropes* to the presentational complex

of experience. These particulars have their existence only within the presentational complex of an experience. A presentational trope is dependent on both the subject and the object of the experience in which it occurs. As such, presentational tropes are exceptionally well positioned to do the required explanatory work. They provide us with a way of explaining how it is that an object that is not F can nevertheless appear to be F in an experience: this way of appearing is a matter of an F presentational trope being present in the experience. Moreover, presentational tropes help us explain this without obscuring the fact that the object itself, which is not F , contributes to its appearing F .

Presentational tropes thus help us satisfy a very specific, and, I take it, important explanatory need. I hope that I have successfully motivated and supported the theoretical move of positing such non-standard items as entering the perceptual relation of presence. Further elaboration of the current proposal could be devoted to fleshing out in greater detail the ways in which different kinds of presentational tropes (e.g., color-tropes, shape-tropes, etc.) arise from the interaction of the subject, the object, and the environment; we might wonder how exactly we should think about the notion (or notions) of *dependence* when talking about the dependence of presentational tropes on both the subject and the object; what are the consequences of the positing of presentational tropes on how we should think about color, and so on. These questions are important, but answers to them fall beyond the scope of the present work.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alston, W. P. (1999) “Back to the Theory of Appearing.” *Philosophical Perspectives* **13**: 181–203.
- Alston, W. P. (2005) “Perception and Representation.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **70**: 253–289.
- Antony, L. (2011) “The Openness of Illusions.” *Philosophical Issues* **21**: 25–44.
- Austin, J. L. (1964) *Sense and Sensibilia*. Oxford University Press.
- Bacon, J. (1995) *Universals and Property Instances—The Alphabet of Being*. Blackwell.
- Bayne, T. (2009) “Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.” *Philosophical Quarterly* **59**: 385–404.
- Berker, S. (2011) “Gupta’s Gambit.” *Philosophical Studies* **152**: 17–39.
- Block, N. (2003) “Mental Paint.” In Martin Hahn and Bjorn Ramberg (eds.) *Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge*, pp. 165–200.
- Breckenridge, W. (forthcoming) *Visual Experience: A Semantic Approach*. Oxford University Press.
- Brewer, B. (1999) *Perception and Reason*. Oxford University Press.
- Brewer, B. (2006) “Perception and Content.” *European Journal of Philosophy* **14**: 165–181.
- Brewer, B. (2008) “How to Account for Illusion.” In *Disjunctivism, Perception, and Knowledge*, edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 168–180. Oxford University Press.
- Brewer, B. (2011) *Perception and its Objects*. Oxford University Press.
- Broad, C. D. (1965) “Some Elementary Reflexions on Sense-Perception.” In R. J. Swartz

- (ed.) *Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing*, pp. 29–48. Originally published in 1951.
- Burnyeat, M. F. (2012) *Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Byrne, A. (2001) “Intentionalism Defended.” *Philosophical Review* **110**: 199–240.
- Byrne, A. (2009) “Experience and Content.” *Philosophical Quarterly* **59**: 429–451.
- Byrne, A. & Hilbert, D. (2003) “Color Realism and Color Science.” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* **26**: 3–21.
- Byrne, A. and Logue, H. (2009) *Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings*. MIT Press.
- Campbell, J. (2002a) *Reference and Consciousness*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Campbell, J. (2002b) “Berkeley’s Puzzle.” In *Conceivability and Possibility*, edited by Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 127–43. Oxford University Press.
- Campbell, J. (2007) “The Metaphysics of Experience.” *Philosophical Issues* **17**: 1–15.
- Campbell, J. (2010) “Demonstrative Reference, the Relational View of Experience, and the Proximity Principle.” In *New Essays on Singular Thought*, edited by Robin Jeshion, pp. 193–212. Oxford University Press.
- Campbell, J. (2009) “Consciousness and Reference.” In *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*, edited by Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter. Oxford University Press.
- Campbell, K. (1997) “The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars.” In D. H. Mellor and Alex Oliver (eds.) *Properties*, pp. 125–139. Originally published in 1981.
- Chalmers, D. (2006) “Perception and the Fall From Eden.” In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford University Press.
- Chalmers, D. (2013) “Summary of *The Character of Consciousness*.” *Analysis* **73**: 303–4.
- Crane, T. (2009) “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” *Philosophical Quarterly* **59**: 452–469.
- Draaisma, D. (2009) *Disturbances of the Mind*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dretske, F. (1995) *Naturalizing the Mind*. MIT Press.

- Dretske, F. (2003) "Experience as Representation." *Philosophical Issues* **13**: 67–82.
- Ehring, D. (2011) *Tropes, Properties, and Mental Causation*. Oxford University Press.
- Evans, G. (1982) *Varieties of Reference*. Oxford University Press.
- Farennikova, A. (2013) "Seeing Absence." *Philosophical Studies* **166**: 429–454.
- Fish, W. (2009) *Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frey, C. (2013) "Phenomenal Presence." In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), *Phenomenal Intentionality*, 71–92. Oxford University Press.
- Genone, J. (2014) "Appearance and Illusion." *Mind* **123**: 339–376.
- Ginsborg, H. (2006) "Reasons for Belief." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **72**: 286–318.
- Ginsborg, H. (2011) "Perception, Generality, and Reasons." In *Reasons for Belief*, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjorn Stieglich-Petersen, pp. 131–57. Cambridge University Press.
- Glanzberg, M. & Siegel, S. (2006) "Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives." *Nous* **40**: 1–42.
- Gregory, R. L. (1966) *Eye and Brain: The Psychology of Seeing*. McGraw Hill.
- Gupta, A. (2006) *Empiricism and Experience*. Oxford University Press.
- Gupta, A. (2009) "Equivalence, Reliability, and Convergence: Replies to McDowell, Peacocke, and Neta." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. **79**: 490–508.
- Gupta, A. (2011) "Replies to Selim Berker and Karl Schafer." *Philosophical Studies* **152**: 41–53.
- Gupta, A. (2012) "An Account of Conscious Experience." *Analytic Philosophy* **53**: 1–29.
- Gupta, A. (forthcoming) *Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry*.
- Haddock, A. and Macpherson, F. (2008) (eds.) *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford University Press.
- Heck, R. (2000) "Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons"." *Philosophical Review* **109**: 483–523.

- Heil, R. (2003) *From an Ontological Point of View*. Clarendon Press.
- Hering, E. (1964) *Outlines of a Theory of the Light Sense*. Harvard University Press.
- Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002) “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.” In David Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. Oxford University Press.
- Howe, C. Q. and Purves, D. (2004) “The Müller-Lyer Illusion Explained by the Statistics of Image-Source Relationships.” *PNAS* **102**: 1234–1239.
- Johnston, M. (2004) “The Obscure Object of Hallucination.” *Philosophical Studies* **120**: 113–83.
- Kriegel, U. (2004) “Trope Theory and the Metaphysics of Appearance.” *American Philosophical Quarterly* **41**: 5–20.
- Kriegel, U. (2011) “The Veil of Abstracta.” *Philosophical Issues* **21**: 245–67.
- Kuehni, R. (2004). “Variability in Unique Hue Selection: A Surprising Phenomenon.” *Color Research & Application*, **29**: 158–62.
- Lepore, E. & Ludwig, K. (2000) “The Semantics and Pragmatics of Complex Demonstratives.” *Mind* **109**: 199–240.
- Loar, B. (2003) “Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content.” In Martin Hahn and Bjorn Ramberg (eds.) *Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge*, pp. 229–257.
- Logue, H. (2012) “Why Naive Realism?” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* **112**: 211–237.
- Lowe, E. J. (2006) *The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science*. Oxford University Press.
- Martin, M. G. F. (2002) “The Transparency of Experience.” *Mind and Language* **17**: 376–425.
- Martin, M. G. F. (2004) “The Limits of Self-Awareness.” *Philosophical Studies* **120**: 37–89.
- Martin, M. G. F. (2006) “On Being Alienated.” In *Perceptual Experience*, edited by Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 354–410. Clarendon press.
- McDowell, J. (1994) *Mind and World*. Harvard University Press.

- McDowell, J. (2008) "Avoiding the Myth of the Given." In Lindgaard, J. (ed.) *John McDowell: Experience, Norm, and Nature*, pp. 1–14. Blackwell.
- McDowell, J. (2009) "The Given in Experience: Comment on Gupta." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **79**: 468–74.
- Moore, G. E. (1959) "The Refutation of Idealism." Reprinted in his *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 1–30. Littlefield, Adams & Co. Originally published in 1903.
- Nanay, B. (2012) "Perceiving Tropes." *Erkenntnis* **77**: 1–14.
- Pautz, A. (2007) "Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence." *Philosophical Perspectives* **21**: 495–540.
- Pautz, A. (2009) "What are the Contents of Experiences?" *Philosophical Quarterly* **59**: 483–507.
- Pautz, A. (2010) "Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?" In Bence Nanay (ed.), *Perceiving the World*. Oxford University Press.
- Pautz, A. (2011) "Can Disjunctivists Explain our Access to the Sensible World?" *Philosophical Issues* **21**: 384–433.
- Peacocke, C. (1992) *A Study of Concepts*. MIT Press.
- Peacocke, C. (2009) "Perception, Content, and Rationality." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **79**: 474–481.
- Price, H. H. (1932) *Perception*. Methuen and Co.
- Robinson, H. (1994) *Perception*. Routledge.
- Russell, B. (1957) "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description." Reprinted in his *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 202–224. Doubleday Anchor Books. Originally published in 1911.
- Russell, B. (1959) *The Problems of Philosophy*. Oxford University Press. Originally published in 1912.
- Scanlon, T. (1998) *What we Owe to Each Other*. Harvard University Press.
- Schafer, K. (2011) "The Rationalism in Anil Gupta's *Empiricism and Experience*." *Philosophical Studies* **152**: 1–15.

- Schaffer, J. (2001) "The Individuation of Tropes." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* **79**: 247–257.
- Schellenberg, S. (2008) "The Situation-Dependency of Perception." *Journal of Philosophy* **105**: 55–84.
- Schellenberg, S. (2010) "The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience." *Philosophical Studies* **149**.
- Schellenberg, S. (2011 a) "Perceptual Content Defended." *Nous* **45**: 714–50.
- Schellenberg, S. (2011 b) "Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **83**: 1–40.
- Schellenberg, S. (2013) "Perceptual Content and Relations." *Philosophical Studies* **163**: 49–55.
- Searle, J. (1983) *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge University Press.
- Shoemaker, S. "On the Ways Things Appear." In *Perceptual Experience*, edited by Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 461–480. Clarendon Press.
- Siegel, S. (2006) "Which Properties are Represented in Perception?" In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford University Press.
- Siegel, S. (2010) *The Contents of Visual Experience*. Oxford University Press.
- Siewert, C. (1998) *The Significance of Consciousness*. Princeton University Press.
- Simons, P. (1994) "Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **54**: 553–575.
- Smith, A. D. (2002) *The Problem of Perception*. Harvard University Press.
- Speaks, J. (2009) "Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* **79**: 539–73.
- Stout, G. F. (1921) "The Nature of Universals and Propositions." *Proceedings of the British Academy* **10**: 157–172.
- Sytsma, J. and Machery, E. (2010) "Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience." *Philosophical Studies* **151**: 299–327.
- Thompson, B. (2008) "Representationalism and the Argument from Hallucination." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* **89**: 384–412.

- Travis, C. (2004) "Silence of the Senses." *Mind* **113**: 57–94.
- Tye, M. (2000) *Consciousness, Color, and Content*. MIT Press.
- Tye, M. (2006) "Nonconceptual Content and Fineness of Grain." In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford University Press.
- Vesey, G. N. A. (1956) "Seeing and Seeing as." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* **56**: 109–124.
- Webster, M. et al. (2000). "Variations in Normal Color Vision. II: Unique Hues." *J. Opt. Soc. Am.* **17**: 1545–55.
- Whittle, P. (2002) "Contrast Colors: A Powerful and Disturbing Phenomenon." In B. Saunders & J. van Braakel (eds.), *Theories, Technologies, Instrumentalities of Color*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Williams, C. D. (1997) "On the Elements of Being: I." In D. H. Mellor and Alex Oliver (eds.) *Properties*, pp. 112–124. Originally published in 1953.