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Three Essays on Information Economics

Kang, Jae W. (2015) Three Essays on Information Economics. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. (Unpublished)

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This dissertation is a collection of three essays on information economics.
The first essay, “Budget Constraint and Information Transmission in Multidimensional Decision Making,” illustrates how a constraint on a receiver’s actions impedes information transmission from multiple senders. The constraint causes an endogenous conflict of interest between the senders and the receiver, preventing truthful revelation. Nevertheless, information can be at least partially transmitted in terms of grids in perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The second essay, “Delegation and Retention of Authority in Organizations under Con- strained Decision Making,” analyzes the relationship between constraints on decision making and optimal decision making structure–centralized or decentralized decision making. Con- straints on feasible decisions induce a conflict of interest between a principal and agents even if they have common preferences. The centralized decision is beneficial to the principal when the constraints weakly restrictive. However, delegation can more than compensate the principal for loss of control by exploiting the agents’ information when different prior beliefs
disrupt information revelation or the agents have difference preferences.
The third essay, “Tenure Reform and Quality Gap between Schools,” discusses tenure reform for primary and secondary education in the United State from a game-theoretical point of view. To analyze the effect of the reform, a continuing contract (tenure) is compared with a non-continuing contract (non-tenure) based on performance evaluation. The welfare is improved after the reform, but the gap between a good and bad school becomes wider. This increased gap is caused by a unilateral transfer of qualified teachers from the good school to bad school.


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Item Type: University of Pittsburgh ETD
Status: Unpublished
CreatorsEmailPitt UsernameORCID
Kang, Jae W.jwk31@pitt.eduJWK31
ETD Committee:
TitleMemberEmail AddressPitt UsernameORCID
Committee CoChairBhattacharya, Souravsourav@pitt.eduSOURAV
Committee CoChairWilson, Alistairalistair@pitt.eduALISTAIR
Committee MemberHafalir,
Committee MemberRawski, Tomastgrawski@pitt.eduTGRAWSKI
Committee MemberVesterlund, Lisevester@pitt.eduVESTER
Date: 26 September 2015
Date Type: Publication
Defense Date: 16 July 2015
Approval Date: 26 September 2015
Submission Date: 1 July 2015
Access Restriction: No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately.
Number of Pages: 78
Institution: University of Pittsburgh
Schools and Programs: Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics
Degree: PhD - Doctor of Philosophy
Thesis Type: Doctoral Dissertation
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: strategic information transmission, cheap talk, multi-dimensions, budget constraint, tenure reform.
Date Deposited: 27 Sep 2015 01:09
Last Modified: 15 Nov 2016 14:29


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