Kang, Jae W.
(2015)
Three Essays on Information Economics.
Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on information economics.
The first essay, “Budget Constraint and Information Transmission in Multidimensional Decision Making,” illustrates how a constraint on a receiver’s actions impedes information transmission from multiple senders. The constraint causes an endogenous conflict of interest between the senders and the receiver, preventing truthful revelation. Nevertheless, information can be at least partially transmitted in terms of grids in perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The second essay, “Delegation and Retention of Authority in Organizations under Con- strained Decision Making,” analyzes the relationship between constraints on decision making and optimal decision making structure–centralized or decentralized decision making. Con- straints on feasible decisions induce a conflict of interest between a principal and agents even if they have common preferences. The centralized decision is beneficial to the principal when the constraints weakly restrictive. However, delegation can more than compensate the principal for loss of control by exploiting the agents’ information when different prior beliefs
disrupt information revelation or the agents have difference preferences.
The third essay, “Tenure Reform and Quality Gap between Schools,” discusses tenure reform for primary and secondary education in the United State from a game-theoretical point of view. To analyze the effect of the reform, a continuing contract (tenure) is compared with a non-continuing contract (non-tenure) based on performance evaluation. The welfare is improved after the reform, but the gap between a good and bad school becomes wider. This increased gap is caused by a unilateral transfer of qualified teachers from the good school to bad school.
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Details
| Item Type: |
University of Pittsburgh ETD
|
| Status: |
Unpublished |
| Creators/Authors: |
|
| ETD Committee: |
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| Date: |
26 September 2015 |
| Date Type: |
Publication |
| Defense Date: |
16 July 2015 |
| Approval Date: |
26 September 2015 |
| Submission Date: |
1 July 2015 |
| Access Restriction: |
No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately. |
| Number of Pages: |
78 |
| Institution: |
University of Pittsburgh |
| Schools and Programs: |
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics |
| Degree: |
PhD - Doctor of Philosophy |
| Thesis Type: |
Doctoral Dissertation |
| Refereed: |
Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: |
strategic information transmission, cheap talk, multi-dimensions, budget constraint, tenure reform. |
| Date Deposited: |
27 Sep 2015 01:09 |
| Last Modified: |
15 Nov 2016 14:29 |
| URI: |
http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25533 |
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