THE CHARM OF RHETORIC:
GEORGE SANTAYANA AND THE AESTHETICS OF RHETORIC

By
Brita Jeanne Anderson
BA, University of Minnesota, 2007
MA, University of Pittsburgh, 2009

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
The Dietrich School of Arts & Sciences in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh
2016
Copyright © by Brita Jeanne Anderson
2016
This dissertation aims to place George Santayana within the rhetorical tradition, arguing both that rhetoric helps illuminate his philosophy and that his philosophy extends rhetoric beyond its typical persuasive or oppositional frame. After situating Santayana within rhetoric’s purview and providing justification for this move, I highlight Santayana’s aesthetics as the means to view rhetoric in this novel way. In so doing, Santayana, I argue, permits us to view rhetoric aesthetically, extending its scope to achieve harmony among disparate parts. Such harmony could occur vis-à-vis beauty, which serves as the aesthetic principle underlying rhetoric.

Chapter One sets out to offer an overview of Santayana’s aesthetics, focusing on his treatment of the true, the good, and the beautiful. Santayana uniquely shows an interrelationship between these concepts that has an effect on the ways in which we view relationships within and among individuals and communities, particularly as the relationship occurs as a result of their discourse. Chapter Two examines the relationship between individual and community more thoroughly, showing how an early goal of individual life was merely survival but necessarily transformed into value-laden communities. Due to the use of symbols in attaching value and meaning to objects and actions, this chapter also examines the rhetorical concept doxa. In light of circulating
and competing interests, I also reconsider both dissoi logoi and phronesis because of Santayana’s comments. In Chapter Three, I focus on the imagination, emotion, epideictic rhetoric, and form. Emotions and passion influence the preferences of individuals, but so too do they connect people and experiences. In effect, rhetoric acts as a harmonizing capacity, but it also serves an instrumental purpose whereby it provides form to thought and emotion, both engendering and making articulate the imagination and the emotions. Chapter Four concludes my project, summarizing both it and Santayana’s contributions. In light of these discoveries, I ask scholars, especially rhetoricians, to consider rhetoric beyond their own rhetorical doxa, a rhetoric that departs from the focus on division and debate and encourages harmony within a beautiful life of reason.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## PREFACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.0 INTRODUCTION: RECASTING RHETORIC: GEORGE SANTAYANA, RHETORIC, AND AESTHETICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 1.1 CHAPTER SUMMARIES


1.1.2 BODY CHAPTER TWO: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COMMUNITY: VALUES, EXPERIENCE, AND THE LIFE OF REASON

1.1.3 BODY CHAPTER THREE: AESTHETIC RHETORIC’S POSSIBILITY: THE ASCENDANCE OF IMAGINATION, EMOTION, AND HARMONY

1.2 CONCLUSION


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.1 AESTHETIC RHETORIC: BEYOND STYLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.2 THE TRUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.3 THE GOOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.4 THE BEAUTIFUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.5 THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE TRUE, THE GOOD, AND THE BEAUTIFUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2.5.1 CONDITIONS OF BEAUTY: MATERIALS, FORM, AND EXPRESSION

2.6 CONCLUSION
### 3.0 CHAPTER TWO – FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COMMUNITY: VALUES, EXPERIENCE, AND THE LIFE OF REASON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>INTERESTS</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>EXPERIENCE &amp; DOXA</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>DISSOI LOGOI</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>DISSOI LOGOI: THE NEW DIALECTIC</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>ACHIEVING PHRONESIS</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.0 CHAPTER THREE – AESTHETIC RHETORIC’S POSSIBILITY: THE ASCENDANCE OF THE IMAGINATION, EMOTION, EPIDEICTIC, AND FORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>THE IMAGINATION – PHILOSOPHER, POET, AND RHETORICIAN</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>EMOTION</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>RISING EPIDEICTIC</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>FORM</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.0 CHAPTER FOUR – CONCLUSION: BEYOND OUR DOXA: AESTHETIC RHETORIC AS CRITICAL AND CREATIVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>SANTAYANA SITUATED</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>RHETORICAL DOMAINS</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>RHETORICAL DOXA</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>AESTHETIC RHETORIC</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

Page 219
PREFACE

As a new graduate student, I worried that I was immediately supposed to know precisely what I wanted to do and how to do it. This caused undue anxiety since the University of Pittsburgh provided a number of excellent professors that encouraged thoughtful exploration of ideas. As it turns out, most of the other graduate students that I met along my way had similar anxiety. These fears-in-common, not to mention an incredible cohort, helped to create an environment that fostered friendship and spirited exchanges.

My gratitude for the help, camaraderie, and encouragement that I have received runs deep. I apologize to those whom I do not mention explicitly, for there are probably many who deserve it. In particular, though, I would like to thank Joseph Packer who on innumerable occasions provided encouragement and support and Joseph Sery for adventures, vent sessions, philosophizing, sing-a-longs, and friendship.

For George Santayana – Your eloquence, wit, and erudition are truly worth preserving.

For Don Bialostosky – Thank you for your kindness, wisdom, and ability to provide balance in your critiques that elegantly and graciously permit me to see how to improve without wanting to give up.

For Gordon Mitchell – With every claim or idea, I hear whispers challenging my position. The question, “How would Gordon respond to this and how would I answer his challenge?” haunts my writing and hones my skills. Thank you, too, for the backpack you gifted me years ago; it enabled me to type while carrying a heavy load.

For John Lyne – You are both wise and witty, a rare gift, especially in academia, and I am grateful to have experienced both on regular occasion.

For John Poulakos – Santayana once claimed that there was too much mediocrity in the world and that “We live in intellectual slums.” You are a fine exception. Thank you for teaching me to reject mediocrity and seek something more and something better. Thank you for encouraging me not to submit to adversity but rather make the attempt to mold it into something beautiful. Thank you for introducing me to Santayana.

For my family –

For my mother and father who encouraged me and expressed pride in my achievements, small and big. To my sisters and brothers – all nine of them – thank you for explicitly and implicitly challenging my views and requiring me to cultivate kairos and the ability to respond with passion.

For Cordelia, my beautiful, spirited girl. You have been a participant in this dissertation journey from the moment you came home from the hospital. Wise beyond your years, you keep me on my toes. You keep me smiling, laughing, and with a burning desire to be a better person.
For Ramsey, my sweet little Norwegian, you are a force to reckon with. You keep me strong. Physically. You love me so much that I had to hold you while I typed revisions. Your sweet smiles make everything better.

For Ethan, without you this would not be possible. Your example in spirit, in humor, and in life get as close to Santayana’s version of ideal as, I think, possible. Your patience, help, and guidance were too often, I fear, unacknowledged. Santayana once said, “The family is one of nature’s masterpieces,” and I am so thankful that you chose to create our masterpiece with me (GS Reason in Society – 1905, Scribner’s, p. 35).
INTRODUCTION
RECASTING RHETORIC: GEORGE SANTAYANA, RHETORIC, AND AESTHETICS

[Scholastic] philosophy was not experimental physics: it did not trace the movements of matter on their own plane; it studied rather the functions that things might have in the life of reason, as classical rhetoric and morals had defined that life."
– Santayana 1972c, 510

In a conversation about Santayana, which took place in 1959, Corliss Lamont posed the following question: “Does Santayana have a place in history?” Horace Kallen responded thus: “I think anybody’s place in the history of philosophy is a matter of accident.” Somewhat skeptically, Lamont asked if Kallen really believed his own statement. Kallen steadfastly claimed, “Somebody gets picked up; he has vocal and persuasive disciples; a school gets set up; reports are written – they may be forgotten and lost altogether, or they may be carried on by organizations of power, the way Shakespeare is carried on, the way the Bible used to be carried on.” Kallen ultimately argued, then, that any number of thinkers may be in vogue, but only because “Somebody chooses to push the damn thing. The Madison Avenues of the world keep working.” Lamont, however, pointed out “there has to be something to push,” to which Kallen replied, “Well, of course there’s something to push. But the place is made by the pusher, not by the pushed.” After a bit of laughter, Herbert Schneider suggested that one of Santayana’s works (Skepticism and Animal Faith) would have a place in history. Again, Kallen spoke up and argued that a place in history could only be reserved because Schneider is “assigning it a place in history. Whether it will have the place you assign it is in the lap of the gods; and the gods have
an awfully wiggly lap.” Lamont intervened, “Well, but here you have the added quality of a remarkable literary style which is a factor in making a writer live, surely; and on this ground Santayana would presumably live longer than Dewey.” Kallen responded, “Then Hegel would have died long ago and F.C.S Schiller would have been much more alive; Kant would never have been born; and Hume would have signified in an extraordinary way” (Lamont 1959, 88-93).

Aside from both the grumpiness and wit expressed in this exchange, other important implications of the discussion warrant consideration. For one thing, we might ask why should Santayana still live? Santayana’s contribution to the study of aesthetics has made a remarkable impact on the way that we understand the relationship between concepts of truth, goodness, and beauty. While aesthetics in general has a plenteous and complex history, Santayana fits nicely within the contours of this history, even while, throughout his works, making challenges to, tweaking, and finessing the ideas others forward. ¹ Anything beyond a brief look at the history of aesthetics goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, though I do place Santayana in the tradition of aesthetics writ large and address his place in relation to others in Chapter One. I aim to show how he fits in such a history and how these ideas of truth, goodness, and beauty crop up throughout his philosophical inquiries and works. Scholars have particularly taken notice of Santayana’s writings on aesthetics, one of his earliest and most sustained interests throughout his works. Therefore, this dissertation makes use of Santayana’s remarks on aesthetics with particular emphasis on what I call the rhetorical thread that he weaves throughout his works. More specifically, this dissertation attends to the aesthetic dimension of rhetoric. In other words,

¹ Ashmore remarks that Santayana’s “antecedents…left marks discernible in Santayana’s work and to that extent contributed to the tone of contrariety emanating from his thought” and even his “famed materialism” is not forthrightly corporeal after the manner of Hobbes and Democritus but is equivocally a naturalistic ideal after the manner of Aristotle” (1966, 3). These comments show that Santayana’s aesthetics are influenced by his understanding of materialism, but also resembles and deviates from many of the thinkers before him as well as his contemporaries.
the projects asks: In what ways might we view rhetoric anew by considering its end not only as persuasion but also as harmonization? This project presents the consequences of viewing rhetoric as a means of harmonizing opposing ideas and beliefs by availing ourselves to its capacity to charm. This connection between aesthetics and rhetoric raises another significant question: Why is rhetoric a suitable subject for Santayana’s reanimation?

Despite his many and varied contributions, and in comparison to prominent thinkers like John Dewey and William James, Santayana remains overlooked as a notable and scholarly figure in philosophical traditions and while rhetoric was not his primary focus, Santayana assigns, I argue, rhetoric an important role in aesthetics.\(^2\) The connection between aesthetics and rhetoric has not gone unnoticed. In 1993 Steve Whitson and John Poulakos argued for the priority of the aesthetic over the epistemic dimension of rhetoric by reference to Nietzsche’s understanding of communication. Since then several other scholars have examined the relationship between rhetoric and aesthetics. For example, Miguel Tamen writes about the rhetoric of the aesthetic drawing on Schiller and Wittgenstein, especially culling from Schiller’s letters the notion of “beautiful communication” (1995). Poulakos makes a persuasive case that in its earliest inception German aesthetics as a new discipline relied on basic rhetorical concepts initially articulated by Aristotle (2007, 335). More recently, Ethan Stoneman establishes, in his study of Cicero and Jacque Rancière, a political relationship between rhetoric and aesthetics (2011). In a co-authored piece, Stoneman and Joshua Reeves use Heidegger to consider aesthetic rhetoric’s

---

\(^2\) One potential reason for this oversight is that while thinkers like Dewey and James received fame for their positions within pragmatism, Santayana set himself apart from this label. Cf. *Santayana’s Aesthetics*, Singer 1957, 6-8. Not only did Santayana distance himself from the label, but so too did he criticize Dewey’s specific pragmatism: “The master-burden of his philosophy, which lends it its national character, is a profound sympathy with the enterprise of life in all lay directions, in its technical and moral complexity, and especially in its American form, where individual initiative, although still demanded and prized, is quickly subjected to overwhelming democratic control. This, if I am not mistaken, is the heart of Dewey’s pragmatism, that it is the pragmatism of the people, dumb and instinctive in them, and struggling in him to a laboured but radical expression” (1936a, 217).
constraints and potential as a direct extension of the earlier Whitson and Poulakos piece (2014). However, despite these efforts, scholars appear to remain skeptical, an issue I take up in Chapter One. Santayana, however, seems especially qualified as a nonpartisan author to shed light on the connection between aesthetics and rhetoric. It is in this vein of scholarship that this dissertation is written. In effect, this dissertation aims at a further clarification of the relationship between rhetoric and aesthetics in the light of Santayana’s work. In the words of Kallen, this project works to “push the damn thing.” What, then, does it mean to push an idea or to act as a pusher? Why should we make Santayana into “the thing pushed” and who benefits?

We often view rhetoric as the ability to promote, to advocate, and to advance; in the case of this dissertation it is also means “to push.” Yet, simply saying that rhetoric is a means to push does not do justice to the tasks and goals of discourse. All writers and speakers are in some ways pushers, attempting to advance, advocate, and promote opinions, beliefs, and attitudes that, in their minds, matter. Santayana himself pushed ideas, though perhaps more gently, which is not to say less persuasively, than many. What he pushed then matters now. In order to breathe life into those ideas, and to demonstrate their significance, we must make Santayana live. So I am a pusher. I seek to place Santayana within the history of rhetoric by virtue of his mostly implicit perspective on rhetoric. While the success or failure of my work is indeterminable, Santayana’s need not be.

This dissertation presents Santayana as a worthy contributor to rhetoric. The rhetorical aspects that influenced his wide body of work are often nuanced and only implicate rhetorical resources rather than forward explicit claims about rhetoric. The lack of rhetorical scholarship on Santayana reinforces the notion that he is not considered a prominent figure within the study of
rhetoric. However, this lack does mean that he does not address rhetoric or that his own commentary and words are not themselves rhetorical. Santayana did not compartmentalize himself or his philosophy, which instead focuses on the human and her environment and the relationships that result from their interrelations. In the following pages I show that he does and by attending to his works we can further our understanding of rhetoric. While all of his works are worth reading, his discussions of aesthetics bear particular significance on understanding his vision of rhetoric.

---

3 A recent exception, although outside of the rhetorical discipline, is Jessica Wahman’s article, “Literary Psychology and Philosophical Method.” In it, she argues, “In short, the controversy behind the claim that philosophy, and all knowledge, involves narrative and dramatic elements can be tied to the historical bifurcation of rhetoric and argument, with the not-to-be-trusted emotions on one side and the always-reliable reason on the other. Philosophers want arguments, it is believed, because emotion leads people to propaganda, and logic deals with ‘just the facts.’ But if this is a false dichotomy, if all knowledge – as I will argue – involves the kind of imagination, creativity, and drama that stirs our ratio-emotional complex of cognition, then the problem for philosophers is to consider how rhetorical style functions in explanations so that we can better assess when it works well and when it leads us astray” (2013, 31-32). Wahman helps place a greater significance on rhetoric, particularly when relating to Santayana’s concept of literary psychology (which I address in a later chapter), arguing, “While rhetoric can be intentionally misleading in cases where it means to distract an audience from relevant information, it can also be an essential element of storytelling that puts otherwise isolated facts into a meaningful context and inspires us to things from a different perspective. Nowhere is this art more appropriate than in describing the experiences of other people” (2013, 32).

4 Santayana’s philosophy captures this focus on humanity both in his life as professor and philosopher. As a professor at Harvard, then President Charles Eliot asked Santayana how his course was proceeding. Santayana replied that the course would soon be progressing from Plato to Aristotle, to which Eliot responded, “No, no Santayana, what I meant by my enquiry is, how many students have enrolled for your lectures?” (McCormick 1987, 96). This exchange exemplifies one of the many reasons Santayana felt bitterness toward institutions – academic and others – that evinced “anti-humanist” tendencies that emphasize numbers over standards. Irving Singer argues, however, “In the past few decades, the danger to the humanistic spirit has accelerated greatly. As a reminder of what we have had, and as a model from what we may yet regain as a supplement to the achievements on which we can rightly pride ourselves, Santayana’s books merit the renewed study that some scholars are now giving them” (Singer 2000, 3). The tendency to create insular departments within insular institutions also gave rise to Santayana’s distaste for academia in particular. Wilfred M. McClay characterizes this growing distaste and subsequent departure to Europe as Santayana’s escape: “By 1911, he would finally come to the conclusion that the circumstances of American intellectual life would always be unpromising for a thinker like him, and he began plotting ways to make his escape. Finally, in 1912, after his mother’s death had freed him of family obligation, Santayana left the United States, and Harvard, never to return again” (2009, 135). This disdain, coupled with Santayana’s general learnedness, was likely one of the reasons Santayana featured a wide variety of topics and themes from a wide variety of subjects and sources to articulate his ideas. While his philosophy developed over time, some calling his earlier work immature, Santayana largely remained consistent even if achieving more sophistication with time. These philosophical ideas are expressed through his novel, poetry, essays, letters, and philosophical works, revealing his attempt to collapse arbitrary lines of demarcation, like the division between philosophy and poetics or critical and creative expression.
Santayana focused much of his work on aesthetics, even when addressing other topics. He was a prolific writer. My goal in this dissertation, however, is not to discuss his corpus in its entirety. I consider only those of his works that have a bearing on the relationship between rhetoric and aesthetic. More specifically, I consider those works in which Santayana discusses key terms from the rhetorical lexicon, terms such as reason, emotion, imagination, pleasure, judgment, prudence, expression, etc. Pragmatically, this means examining closely such works as, *The Sense of Beauty*, *Reason in Art*, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* and shorter essays like, “What is Aesthetics?” and “The Mutability of Aesthetic Categories.” Of course, other works will be referenced selectively so as to illuminate the topics at hand.

In order to give meaning to Santayana’s implicit and explicit remarks on rhetoric, I also pay particular attention to the classical rhetorical tradition, which influenced Santayana. Specifically, I focus on Aristotle with particular emphasis on his *Rhetoric*, *Poetics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics* to establish an understanding of key rhetorical terms and ideas and point to the traces of Aristotle within Santayana’s overarching ideas. To a lesser degree, I include some ideas from Aristotle’s other works – e.g., *On the Soul* and *Metaphysics*. I also call on Plato and some of his dialogues to demonstrate a relationship between truth, goodness, and beauty in particular, though I do bring up Santayana’s relationship to Plato in other ways as well. I occasionally make use of Isocrates, especially attending to his notion of phronesis and beauty, by incorporating his ideas from *Against the Sophists*, *Antidosis*, *Helen*, and *Panegyricus*. While Santayana does not always have favorable opinions of the sophists, his commentary on Protagoras is particularly illuminating when discussing Protagoras’ fragments bringing to bear the import of truth and doxa as they relate both to Santayana’s ideas and to rhetoric. Simply, to
understand Santayana’s aesthetics and rhetoric one must understand his aim to achieve the life of reason by means of harmonization, a notion that has origins in classical rhetoric.

Santayana remarks that classical rhetoric sought to articulate the function that things might have in the life of reason. And even though he does not state what that function is, he does provide enough commentary from which we can make warranted inferences. Irving Singer goes as far as to say that Santayana “was not particularly interested in the principles of rhetoric,” Singer’s claim, however, reduces rhetoric to tropes and figures. (2000, 128). To be sure, tropes and figures have been an important part of the history, study, and practice of rhetoric. Nevertheless, to suggest that rhetoric’s purview does not extend beyond tropes and figures ignores the richness of the rhetorical tradition. While viewing rhetoric as tropes and figures would certainly simplify the study of rhetoric, it simply is not the case. Santayana, fortunately, helps to disabuse people of this notion, whereby he actually expresses a disinterest in rhetoric as mere tropes and figures. His understanding of rhetoric accounts for both persuasion in the Aristotelian sense, and tropology. But his scope extends beyond these all too familiar ways of viewing rhetoric. How, then, might we understand rhetoric beyond its persuasive and tropological dimensions? Santayana’s conception, which finds its influence in the classical rhetorical tradition, is that rhetoric can most profitably be understood as a means of harmonization.

In this new frame, Santayana’s most significant contribution to rhetoric becomes clear: we may view rhetoric as the means to provide form to emotions and ideas. To be made meaningful, emotion and ideas must be made articulate even before persuasion (as we typically understand it, e.g., vis-à-vis Aristotle) can take place. Capturing the essence and import of my claim, Santayana asserts boldly: “verse is a form of rhetoric, as is all speech and even thought; a
means of pouring experience into a mould which fluid experience cannot supply, and of transmuting emotion into ideas, by making it articulate” (1923, xi).\footnote{Kenneth Burke might be favorable to this position considering he advanced more explicit sympathies with a relationship between rhetoric and poetics and discussed rhetoric as symbolic action that supplements persuasion.} Perhaps, and charitably, we might say that Singer was correct that Santayana was indifferent to rhetoric, but only so far as rhetoric is conceived as the reduction to tropes and figures. If only from Santayana’s above assertion, one can see that he does have interest in rhetoric when its conceived and considered in all the complexity that characterizes it.

Raw experience is not intelligible and requires formal articulation to be understood and communicated. Rhetoric, for Santayana, is the means by which experience is shaped by poetry, speech, and thought. More specifically, experience, as protean and intricate as it can be, needs something to arrest our attention in order to consider and manage it. Rhetoric, then, shapes emotion and experience into forms communicable to ourselves and others, but it also functions on both a micro and macro level. In this rendering, Santayana echoes Richard McKeon where rhetoric’s architectonic function keeps structures with various parts working in concert together. Rhetoric, then, serves as a means to provide forms – points of articulation – to emotion and experience that create and maintain the structures in which it circulates. Rhetoric also functions to make meaningful those expressions, namely meaning as a result of the values that necessarily are associated with language and experience. Nevertheless, these values also necessarily create points of tension because not everyone shares the same values and beliefs. Further, because we are often constrained within material circumstances, rhetoric also accompanies the imagination to conceive of alternative possibilities, created or found in unconventional sources (e.g., drama, poetry, literature, etc.). In fact, while Singer argued, perhaps inappropriately, that Santayana was not interested in rhetorical principles, he also went on to say, “What excites the muse in
[Santayana], and what makes his criticism so exciting, is rather an understanding of the human significance in literature – the way in which it can be used to communicate a sense of what is real and important” (Singer 2000, 128). Thus, whether “real” or imagined through literary genres, rhetoric provides the form that expresses the significance of human experience. Regardless of the location, though, rhetoric negotiates the friction that results from competing constraints, expressions, values, and goals within human experience, any of which may include persuasion and influence, but more importantly, must or ought serve the ends of harmony, by way of aesthetics.

While Santayana may not use the specific vocabulary to which rhetoricians are accustomed, his relationship to rhetoric manifests when reading him alongside classical rhetoricians like Aristotle, Plato, and the sophists. He, like Aristotle, emphasizes reason and rationality. And while he avails himself to the Aristotelian modes of persuasion (ethos, logos, and pathos), he parts company with Aristotle in several ways. First, Santayana does not necessarily or always use the same rhetorical vocabulary as Aristotle. Second, he does not hierarchically arrange the terms in the same way that Aristotle does. For example, Santayana does not share Aristotle’s aversion to the volatility and transience of emotion. While Aristotle stipulates that the emotions are a necessary part of rhetoric, this necessity is born out of the fact that they are part of the human condition, not out of a desire to include emotions in a rhetorical project. Santayana also acknowledges that the emotions are an integral part of the human condition but celebrates them even while recognizing that they may be used non-rationally. Finally, Santayana extends the scope of rhetorical concepts beyond persuasion, aiming toward harmony instead, though they remain in the service of discourse, reason, and human well-being. Further, and in Platonic fashion, Santayana regards the sophists as superficial, yet nevertheless
appreciates their emphasis on eloquence and style as important to communicability. Moreover, Santayana deems the distinction between knowledge and truth in a similar way as the sophists: rhetorical engagement creates what we understand as doxa, which may have the strength of numbers behind it but it nevertheless remains relative and pliable. In his characterization of the sophists, even while raising some criticisms, Santayana acknowledges that “Whatever depended on argument might be challenged by an opposed cleverer argument; whatsoever depended on usage, faith, or preference might be reversed by a contrary pose; so that every man remained free to think and do what he liked, and to deny all authority. This, though with a different moral tone and intention, was also the position of the Sceptics” (1972a, 533). Santayana likens the skeptics to the sophists, and, as a proponent of skepticism, shares the desire to liberate minds from dogmatic positions of truth. He, like the sophists, was accused of moral relativism because he considered values as creations and contingencies, rising out of material circumstances. Santayana departs from the sophists, however, in his emphasis on harmony within a life of reason as opposed to contest and persuasion for persuasion’s sake.6 While Santayana both resembles and deviates from his Greek predecessors, he is not reducible to any of them.7

As a prolific writer of philosophy, poetry, essays, a Pulitzer Prize nominated novel, and gracing the cover of Time magazine in 1936, Santayana is best known as a philosopher, biographer, traveler, poet, novelist, and critic. At a time of increased specialization, all of these labels confine Santayana into a narrowly conceived intellectual spaces best studied within minute

6 Isocrates is another key classical Greek figure, but Santayana does not make use of Isocrates’ ideas – negatively or positively. Thus, while Isocrates’ emphasis on the necessity of rhetoric as a way to cultivate a good life through sound judgment and wisdom resembles Santayana’s project of the life of reason, it remains distinct. Isocrates attends to rhetoric as a way to participate in civic engagement, and while Santayana absolutely addresses politics and civic life, it is not his aim to make the life of reason about civic engagement.

7 Addressing the various ways scholars conceive of rhetoric “contemporarily” extends beyond the scope of this project.
subdivisions of particular disciplines. Notably, rhetorician does not fall on this list, and as far as I can tell no one has treated him as a rhetorician as I do in this dissertation. In the tradition of rhetoric, I treat him as a learned generalist best studied as a man of letters. This treatment finds its warrant in Aristotle’s edict that rhetoric has no subject matter of its own, which I take to mean that it is equipped to address any topic whatsoever (1991, 1355b). This not only makes Santayana a fitting subject, and not arbitrarily so, but also legitimates using his various characterizations and works as rhetorical resources. Broadly, to treat an author as a rhetorician means to look at his or her corpus with an eye to his or her explicit and implicit comments about the ways in which language and discourse work, especially in regards to its impact on audiences. Or, in an Aristotelian vein, rhetoricians attempt to discover in what ways their discourse might impact their audience, whether those ways consist of ethos, logos, or pathos. Yet, while Aristotle may have focused on particular groups of people whom he characterized as rhetoricians (e.g., the sophists, rhetoric teachers, etc.), contemporarily being a rhetorician is not tied to those who address the topic of rhetoric; rather, it includes all authors and speakers, since all are looking for an audience and all are looking to have some impact on that audience.

With this view of a rhetorician in mind, this project seeks to demonstrate Santayana’s significance to rhetoric. More specifically, I show that his work contributes to and extends our understanding of rhetoric; conversely, the rhetorical tradition as formulated early on in Greek thought (e.g., the sophists, Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates), illuminates Santayana’s work for the modern student of rhetoric. Although Santayana uses the word rhetoric infrequently, he does make specific references to it. Yet rhetoric is not at play only when mentioned explicitly.

---

8 Frank Noxon, in “College Professors who are Men of Letters: Harvard” praises Santayana’s eclectic intelligence, remarking “There is about the atmosphere of Mr. Santayana’s lecture-room a rarity in which some of the men at first find it difficult to breath: a perception of another and still yonder Thule of honesty which is still to be attained” (1903, 131).
Santayana does not need to use the term rhetoric explicitly at all times because he, as I show, extends rhetoric’s aim to one of harmony, which encompasses an intricate collection of ideas, terms, and concepts, collected under notions of the true, the good, and the beautiful. What is more, Santayana makes general use of the term discourse and language (and other comparable terms) to describe what we might consider rhetoric in contemporary usage. With this in mind, reading Santayana requires a certain patience and willingness to tease out the complexity of his thought. In so doing, his conception of rhetoric—both explicit and implicit—emerges. This new understanding of rhetoric, I argue, transforms rhetoric’s scope to include a means of enlivening the imagination, attending to the senses and emotions, and providing form to thoughts and ideas that originate in the individual. However, once formed these thoughts and ideas spill into communities—the collective. The reverse also obtains; as such, this alteration enables rhetoric to make use of its persuasive appeals by fashioning arguments. Before, however, it does so, it takes into account a host of conflicting ideas and beliefs which it tries to harmonize by means of its often overlooked relationship to aesthetics. Santayana claims our “function is precisely to feel and to confront all values, bringing them into relation, and if possible harmony” (1904, 327).

9 For example, Vico, Burke, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyceta, and Knoblauch all feature language in their definitions, though in slightly different ways. Vico argues for the combination of eloquent language, appropriately contained and disseminated in common opinion. Vico says, “What is eloquence, in effect, but wisdom, ornately and copiously delivered in words appropriate to the common opinion of mankind?” (1990, 78). We might sum up Burke’s definition by pointing to his emphasis on symbolic action, identification, and the “symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols” (1969b, 43). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyceta, similarly to Vico’s emphasis of rhetoric circulating within common opinion, says of rhetoric that “All language is the language of a community, be this a community bound by biological ties or by the practice of a common discipline or technique. The terms used, their meaning, their definition, can only be understood in the context of the habits, ways of thought, methods, external circumstances, and traditions known to the users of those terms” (1969, 513). And C.H. Knoblauch refers to rhetoric as a process and study of language to organize and express experience. For him, “Rhetoric is the process of using language to organize experience and communicate it to others. It is also the study of how people use language to organize and communicate experience” (1985, 29). Moreover, Lloyd Bitzer characterizes rhetoric as a means to modify reality through the creation of discourse. Bitzer argues that rhetoric is “a mode of altering reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action” (1968, 4). Gerard Hauser says that rhetoric behaves instrumentally in the service of this type of modification so long as it serves some social change, suggesting that rhetoric is instrumental but in the service of social action: “Rhetoric, then, is concerned with the use of symbols to induce social action” (2002, 3).
Doing so asks that we view rhetoric more holistically – more as a synthesizing enterprise rather than an analyzing one.

Other scholars have called attention to problems of fragmentation—pertaining both to the discipline becoming more specialized (i.e., fragmented) and attending to rhetoric in its particulars. What has not yet been addressed is the effect that these particulars of rhetoric fail to encompass a more holistic creative and critical rhetoric. So, for example, Michael Calvin McGee, who famously argued that fragmentation was indeed a problem, suggests that fragmentation relates to a historical condition, namely the post-modern condition. However, unlike McGee, my argument suggests this fragmentation has little to do with a historical condition but understands it as a human condition that confronts us beyond space and time, transcending any historical condition. Consequently, McGee argues, rhetorical criticism begins to dissolve because, at least in part, attempts to improve rhetorical criticism also dissolves rhetoric into philosophy or literary criticism. Santayana, on the other hand, encourages the interconnection between these otherwise considered disparate disciplines. That is to say, literature, philosophy, and rhetoric are parts of a whole. Considering these parts more fluidly and holistically provides a more synthetic understanding of rhetoric, but also of literature and philosophy though those are not the focus of this project. McGee would likely disagree with Santayana in this vein because McGee considers harmony a way of homogenizing rather than a means to make whole, rational, and beautiful. McGee remarks, “Discourse practices reflected the presumed homogeneity of western cultures. Rhetors invested a great deal of effort to insure that

---


11 McGee says, “Where has rhetoric gone? The term "rhetorical criticism" invites us to Black's emphasis on critical practice. The term "critical rhetoric" (McKerrow 1989) invites emphasis on rhetorical practice. "rhetoric is what rhetoricians do." With Black's accent, rhetoric is too easily submerged in philosophical and/or literary thinking” (1990, 275). McGee goes on for several pages about the problems with this dissolution – see 1990, 275-278.
their discourses appeared to be ‘harmonious,’ whole, ending with allusion to their beginning” (1990, 285). To be sure, we may understand attempts to connect beginnings and ends as part of harmonious project, but McGee’s view, though common, fails to raise the question of how we might view harmony as more than simply connecting beginning, middles, and ends within a homogenizing process.

To disparage harmony as homogeneity fails to see its possibility as a means of intertwining distinct and potentially oppositional values and beliefs into something durable and beautiful. Today’s age expresses a tendency to encourage plurality, consisting of the forced appearance of harmony among difference. Yet, this goal cannot circumvent the problem of, as McGee says, conceiving of harmony as homogeneity. Otherwise put, to view harmony as homogeneous implies that all the parts become the same rather than existing as different but congruent. Thus, the two opposing views run up against each other and fail to move beyond the opposing conceptions of harmony. However, when considering Santayana’s project, we may view harmony as a rational congruity, reminiscent of the ancient Greeks. In this rendering, rationality is both the goal and the means toward progress conceived of as understanding the senses, experience, and values, and by connecting them “such congruity would render a being stable, efficient, beautiful” (Santayana 1921a, 224). Moreover, in this way, what Santayana does not explicitly claim but nevertheless allows for, is to conceive of rhetoric as a mode of realizing the aesthetic potential within the individual and community as a way to create such harmony. Santayana’s aesthetics, and, what I aim to include, his rhetoric, allows for each individual’s experience and judgment as valid despite any contention with another or within a community. What, then, is the role of the individual in an age where most emphasize the collective? As Ashmore observes, Santayana is concerned with the individual: “For Santayana the interests of
the collection of individuals comprising a social group reduce to fundamentally separated individual interests. It is the single human organism that is the point of contact with value, with reason, and with happiness” (1966, 5). The idea is not, therefore, to make a more homogenous society, but to account for individuals within society. Even while some may argue against Santayana’s emphasis on the individual, he fully understands the relationship between the individual and society, understanding in fact that the individual cannot exist apart from the collective. His philosophy, and what he claims philosophy should be in general, “consists of the exposition and clarification, in the light of experience (‘a fund of knowledge gathered by the living’) of the basic principles and practices pertinent to the existence of highly complex organisms – principles and practices, that is, which cannot be ignored without probably tragic consequences for the individual and society” (Arnett 1955, 6). Moreover, if the individual harmonizes disparate elements or arguments, then she tries to bring them into a coherent whole. Likewise, the individual as speaker must bring the audience into agreement with herself and each other. Taken in this way, we do attend to the collective but always with consideration of the individuals that make up that community.

Nevertheless, this focus on the individual may give rise to criticisms. Timothy Sprigge, for example, suggests that Santayana in some sense focuses too much on the individual, arguing, “It seems to be a just criticism of Santayana’s philosophy that it is in some sense too individualistic. For all his emphasis on the biological foundations of knowledge and consciousness he leaves its social context very little explored. Nonetheless most of his main tenets are compatible with a fuller realization of this side of things” (1974, 62). At times this seems like a fair argument, yet looking across Santayana’s work we may view his main tenets as compatible within a social context and see how he brings the social into consideration. However,
Santayana makes sure to place emphasis on the individual’s role within the social without dissolving her significance. Santayana, in fact, critiques Dewey of this tendency: “In Dewey…is a pervasive quasi-Hegelian tendency to dissolve the individual into his social functions, as well as everything substantial or actual into something relative or transitional” (1936a, 217).

Moreover, Santayana acknowledges that Greeks generally were given to public speaking. With regard to the public, then, speakers always had to consider the individuals as part of the public:

> They might cast ridicule on all reported knowledge, and raise a laugh: they could hardly expect to carry their audience with them, if they denied the existence of that audience, or the intimate shrewd ratiocinations of each man in the crowd, hugging his own thoughts and his own interests. Therefore the unchallenged and unexpressed presuppositions of all criticism in this school must be the existence of conventional human society and the intelligent egoism of each of its members.

(Santayana 1972a, 532).

Despite the emphasis on the individual, it is necessarily an individual within society. Likewise, when we consider rhetoric in its various parts – including how rhetoric operates with respect to the individual and the community – we must consider those parts in relation to how those parts work within a larger system, not as a means to elevate the part over the whole but rather to illustrate how various parts can work harmoniously together within a coherent whole.

Like Santayana’s refrain from attempting to create some universal system of aesthetics, the goal here is not to create a universal system for rhetoric. Even while I argue that rhetoric, similar to McKeon’s architectonic rhetoric, functions at a macro level to keep a structure intact, that structure is pliable and made up of contingent, variable, parts, equally legitimate from the perspective of the individual. Rhetoric, according to McKeon, is a system that structurally
organizes its various parts. McKeon claims, “If rhetoric is to be used to contribute to the formation of the culture of the modern world, it should function productively in the resolution of new problems and architectonically in the formation of new inclusive communities. Rhetoric can be used to produce a new rhetoric constructed as a procutive art and schematizes as an architectonic art” (1987, 2). Conceived as such, rhetoric is inventive, productive, and resituates dialectic within its province. While McKeon describes this rhetoric as universal and subjective, applications of it should prioritize the present and the particular. McKeon suggests that rhetoric, as a productive art, requires revision in light of the technological progress of society. As such, technology becomes a service to rhetoric rather than the other way around. Santayana’s take on rhetoric, like McKeon in some ways, suggests that rhetoric may function as management (at the top). However, it can also function as the substratum, whereby we use all of our faculties to identify, to clarify, and to arrange parts into a harmonious whole. Thus, Santayana’s view resembles McKeon’s, yet Santayana would part company with McKeon here, insisting that rhetoric is more anthropological. That is to say, rhetoric is not only a tool for management but also – and more importantly – the generative root of human creativity. In this way, Santayana provides a more holistic approach to rhetoric, which consequently provides a counter balance to the fragmentation of contemporary culture, of thought and idea, of disciplines, and of rhetoric itself. Real development or progress (in Santayanian terms) asks that we see these fragments as co-present. The unification of opposites is important and applies both to aesthetics and to rhetoric, but the thinking for either or both has never really connected. Santayana allows us to

---

12 McKeon defines architectonic as “an art of constructing systems” (1987, 10).
13 McKeon makes clear that, “In a technological age all men should have an art of creativity, of judgment, of disposition, and of organization. This should be adapted to their individual development and to their contribution to forming a common field in which the subject of inquiry is not how to devise means to achieve accepted ends arranged in hierarchies but the calculation of uses and applications that might be made of vastly increased available means in order to devise new ends and to eliminate oppositions and segregations based on past competitions for scarce means” (1987, 24).
make this connection clearer. Opposition, particularly in rhetoric, typically suggests a debate model, whereas in Santayana’s view we may see in rhetoric a possibility of synthesis of opposites that initiates a more creative and critical rhetorical subject.

Rhetoric, as Santayana might conceive it, is rational, formal, and significantly –lays claim to an aesthetic principle of beauty, which both elevates expression, attracts and influences the psyche/mind, and allows for the harmonization of various interests, genres, and subject positions, all the while giving renewed attention to the imagination, the emotions, and the epideictic genre of rhetoric. While epideictic rhetoric is often devalued or subordinated to its counter genres, Santayana enables us to view epideictic as both an antecedent and a means to make possible deliberative rhetoric. As a challenge to the pervasive idea that deliberative rhetoric is and ought to be prioritized, Jeffrey Walker advances two important counter-statements. First, by looking at classical poetry, he argues that epideictic rhetoric historically precedes deliberative rhetoric, writing, “what comes to be called the art of rhetoric, technê rhêtorikê, in fact originates not from the pragmatic discourse of the fifth-to-fourth century rhêtôr but from an expansion of the poetic/epideictic realm to include, first, various kinds of epideictic prose and, ultimately, epideictic imitations of pragmatic prose” (2000, 18). Second, and as a result of his first claim, Walker argues that epideictic rhetoric is not inferior to deliberative rhetoric, but equally as important. For example, epideictic poetry is an argument itself, thus while we may conceive deliberative rhetoric as the traditional domain for argument, Walker attempts to magnify the import that epideictic rhetoric has by treating it as deliberative rhetoric. He argues that, “epideictic is the ‘primary’ or central form of rhetoric and poetry is the original and ultimate form of epideictic (or is understood as such), poetry is also the original and ultimate form of rhetoric,” particularly important when considering the polis that emphasizes rational deliberation
(2000, 41). However, reading Santayana alongside conceptions of the epideictic rhetorical genre illustrates that epideictic rhetoric not only historically precedes deliberative rhetoric, but it also conceptually precedes it.

If epideictic is a conceptually antecedent to deliberative rhetoric, this asks rhetoric scholars to renegotiate the relationship between epideictic rhetoric and its counterparts, especially deliberative rhetoric but also forensic rhetoric. While epideictic rhetoric may contain, for example, deliberative aspects, it is unnecessary to treat it deliberatively in order to take it seriously. Moreover, the aesthetic connection to epideictic rhetoric, and epideictic rhetoric’s relationship to deliberative and forensic rhetoric, suggests that not only is epideictic rhetoric aesthetic, but so too are deliberative and forensic rhetoric, an argument that I take up with more depth in Chapter Three. Because the emotions are typically associated with the epideictic genre and thus also underestimated, this reconsideration also brings to light the possibility of a renewed emphasis on the emotions and passions that are necessarily part of an aesthetic rhetoric.

Aesthetic rhetoric relates to the idea of techne, extending this concept beyond the Greek’s understanding of techne as a craft to one of aesthetic sensibility. Classics scholar W.K.C. Guthrie remarked that techne refers to “every branch of human or divine skill, or applied intelligence, as opposed to the unaided work of nature” (1977, 115). While this definition broadly incorporates both fine art and technique or technological dimensions of art, Santayana emphasizes more on sensibility. Santayana understands art as a capacity for expression that transcends material and formal properties through the imaginative creation of ideals. However, art “used in a broad sense, signifying the techniques and methods by which man alters his environment in order to make it more congenial to his life and interests” (Arnett 1955, 26). Liberated from material constraints, these conceptions of ideals enable us to view art as encompassing rhetoric as one
such technique in order to consider *that which could be otherwise*.

Without this first step into imagined possibility, no argument about circulating interests or ideas could even be possible. The synthesis of conflicting interests can only occur through the harmonization of opposites, the domain of art and rhetoric. Further, as I demonstrate in Chapter Three, Santayana makes an important contribution to rhetoric by taking the view that rhetoric is an instrumentality, like in the early *techne* sense, but extends rhetoric beyond this view in two significant ways. First, emotion experienced by an individual is itself an instance of rhetoric. Second, rhetoric is also an instrument by which we transform emotion and passions into ideas. This focus on emotion calls into question in what way emotion relates both to rhetoric and aesthetics, and, further, why that relationship needs attending to more than others have done.

Santayana’s emphasis on the emotions seems to have been influenced both by Plato and Aristotle, but Santayana both extends and departs from their influence. Santayana’s perspective deviates from the Platonic influence that suggests emotions get in the way of reason, and as such should be suppressed. Likewise, it stands in marked difference to the Aristotelian view that the emotions, if used at all, should only be placed in the service of persuasion. Despite his deep interest and respect for both Plato and Aristotle, Santayana departs from their vision in the way he treats emotion as a spring of energy and insight. Yet emotion, on its own, does not lend itself

---

14 Because art attempts to overcome environmental constraints as a means to make life more congenial, it necessarily must concern itself with beauty, “or the production of aesthetic pleasure, only because beauty is one of the fundamental needs of man” (Arnett 1955, 26).

15 Burke’s idea of consubstantiality and identification resembles this type of unity between interests and the struggle to unite them. However, for Santayana the substances must first occur in the individual before it can attempt to unite with others. Moreover, the creative force that harmonizes has some similarity with the union of the Apollonian and Dionysian impulses that Nietzsche articulates in *Birth of Tragedy* and the aesthetic impulse Schiller names as the Play Drive in his *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*.

16 There is an interesting parallel here to Heidegger’s lectures on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (see Martin Heidegger’s *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, 2009) Daniel Gross, in fact, claims that “Aristotle’s rhetoric is the discipline that allows Heidegger to establish logos as a derivative mode of construing the world, a mode grounded in everyday pathetic situations… This is a fundamental reversal of the philosophical hierarchy inherited from Plato, in which particular human dispositions and momentary passions only obscure the logic of good judgment” (2005, 6).
to understanding. To be made meaningful, it must first be made articulate and given form. Santayana’s intervention requires us ultimately not only to harmonize individual with communal interests in order to live the good life – the life of reason – but, so too, we must also harmonize the way in which we conceive of the genres, subject positions, and principles of rhetoric.\textsuperscript{17}

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

The remainder of this introduction outlines this project’s chapters, pointing to the ways in which I use Santayana to demonstrate his works’ rhetorical possibility. These chapters begin to illustrate the relationship between rhetoric and aesthetics that emerges when viewing the two as necessarily interconnected. With Santayana’s aesthetics in mind, we can also see the way in which his conception of rhetoric arises from his aesthetics.


This chapter examines the questions surrounding the relationship between aesthetics and rhetoric. Each area’s discipline claims authority over concepts such as truth, goodness, and beauty, but when viewing the concepts alongside a connection emerges among both the concepts and between aesthetics and rhetoric. This chapter reviews, in brief, the ideas of aesthetics and rhetoric. The historical portrait of rhetoric includes much contention and argument when it comes to the study and participation in rhetoric. Santayana, I show, offers us a new possibility, renewing the position of critic, spectator, and judge with consideration of both aesthetics and

\textsuperscript{17} Willard E. Arnett says, “The good life, consequently, is conceived and expressed largely in artistic and aesthetic terms: it is a work of art in so far as it is something to be made from given materials; and it is aesthetic in so far as it is an ordered and harmonious whole, which is contemplated as a perfection achieved, pleasing to man as a man because of its affinity to his psyche and its needs, but potentially pleasing to any free spirit whose sympathies are always with wholeness and harmony” (1955, 10). Additionally, “Reason, in a very fundamental sense, is a means to harmony in the life of a creature that has conflicting desires and aspirations” (Arnett 1955, 4). Thus, reason is a means to harmony, but it is also a means to discover the individual and the community’s good, not justified by merely existing (Arnett 1955, 9).
rhetoric. Taking this possibility to heart, we begin to answer in what sense he has “a rhetoric.” For example, Santayana’s emphasis on harmony resists the focus on difference and contention as the two notions of dispute (in rhetorical terms, what we might call dissoi logoi). Some rhetoricians have made the attempt to incorporate beauty into their discussions of rhetoric, but it has largely failed or faded from conversation. Therefore, another impetus of this chapter seeks to re-establish beauty as an important and necessary concept within rhetorical theory. However, because conversations about beauty both fail to highlight its significance in a lasting way and neglect to view it alongside its counterparts of truth and goodness, I examine Santayana’s articulation of the true, the good, and the beautiful alongside each other. This move reveals three pertinent consequences of viewing these concepts together. First, Santayana enables us to explore in depth each concept individually, and in ways that do not attempt to dismiss others’ claims to authority. Further, examining Santayana’s understanding of the true, the good, and the beautiful equips us to compare how rhetoricians have made use of these concepts. Second, after examining the individual parts with an aim to understand them more precisely, I unite the terms into an operational whole vis-à-vis Santayana, rather than leaving the discussion in fragments. Finally, while each part has its individual function, Santayana’s aesthetics discloses the binding properties of beauty that create interrelationships between the concepts of the true, the good, and the beautiful while still highlighting beauty itself.18

The true, the good, and the beautiful each have been articulated in a variety of ways, but Santayana not only attends to each of them as parts, but also unifies them in a cooperative harmony. Truth, for Santayana suggests a subjective, contingent, and creative function by means

---

18 To be clear, I am not claiming that manifestations of beauty equate to concepts of the true, the good, and the beautiful. Beautiful things derive from the beautiful and it is in those instances of beauty that help make the concepts overarching categories of the true, the good, and the beautiful function together.
of symbols comprising individual preference that give rise to value assignments and evaluation. The good consists of unending potential and means to create and seek ideals with the ends of the Ultimate Good, or reason, as the paramount goal. Within this trajectory, desire and impulse give rise to perception of particular goods which accompany the creation of morals, colored by aesthetic sensibility. Finally, beauty exists, but only in perception. Perception as such must elicit pleasure. For Santayana, the intuition is pleasure’s object and beauty acts as a “vital harmony.” Beauty so conceived requires the perceiver’s susceptibility of senses and pleasure to evoke the feeling of the beautiful. Beauty, also, therefore may influence through its formal properties which elicits and reinforces the sense of beauty. Beauty is immediate, good, pleasurable, and underlies all human values, which circulate in a world of appearances. Thus, the true, the good, and the beautiful, while functioning independently, are nevertheless interdependent concepts, whereby beauty also acts as the binding agent between them. This suggests, I argue, that an aesthetic principle of beauty exists necessarily in relationship to rhetorical principles. Thus, this first chapter aims to set the foundations for the possibility of aesthetics as fundamental to rhetoric.

CHAPTER TWO: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COMMUNITY: VALUES, EXPERIENCE, AND THE LIFE OF REASON

In Chapter Three, I discuss the relationship between the individual and the collective, whereby an initial goal of preservation of human life transforms into ways of creating meaning associated with life.\(^\text{19}\) Largely this meaning-making occurs through symbol systems that initiate value creation and standards affixed to them – first to individual values and then subsequently in

\(^{19}\) Figures like Augustine exploited rhetoric in the service of Christianity and Biblical interpretation but do point to rhetoric as an interpretative or hermeneutic tool, useful as a means to articulate particular interpretations. Augustine says, “There are two things necessary to the treatment of the Scriptures: a way of discovering those things which are to be understood, and a way of teaching what we have learned” (1997, 1.1). While Santayana departs from a religious position, he does make use of rhetoric as an interpretive tool.
relation both to natural conditions and other people within those conditions and environments. This process begins with general human impulses that morph into values and value experience, out of which, interests arise and compete with one another. Humans actively and creatively generate goods, and because we have attached value to such goods, the values affixed elicit a moral economy from the preference for particular goods over others. Interests within experience, then, give way to constructed belief systems – *doxa*. Thus, this chapter explains the connection between interests, experience, and *doxa*, which also requires attending to the nature of appearances and perception. Moreover, the way we come to understand or know (or at least appear to), suggests for Santayana a particular way of approaching knowledge which results in a healthy skepticism. As a result of competing interests, beliefs, and ways of knowing, I turn to the rhetorical concept of *dissoi logoi*. However, while many scholars focus on this concept as a means to examine or perform debate, particularly within the deliberative model, I turn to Santayana to illuminate the potential within *dissoi logoi* as a means to harmonize, transcending the typically and narrowly conceived approach to *dissoi logoi*. Finally, we may achieve not only this enlightened version of *dissoi logoi*, but also a better understanding of *phronesis* vis-à-vis Santayana’s discussions of practical reason by way of a modified Platonic dialectic.

**CHAPTER THREE: AESTHETIC RHETORIC’S POSSIBILITY: THE ASCENDANCE OF IMAGINATION, EMOTION, AND HARMONY**

In the final body chapter, I focus on the imagination, emotion, *epideictic* rhetoric, and form. I give priority to these particular concepts in order to argue for a greater significance to the imagination and emotions within rhetoric. Because the *epideictic* genre is most frequently associated with the emotions and aesthetics, this chapter also pays particular attention to it as a way to renew its significance within the rhetorical discipline. However, my aim is not to restructure the rhetorical hierarchy of genres, but rather to eliminate the hierarchy by explaining
the harmonious relationship between the genres, bound together by beauty, which influences rhetorical activity. My focus on the imagination attends to the possibility of symbolic discourse that provides the capacity to create, seek, and disseminate alternatives, despite material conditions. Moreover, the emotions, in Santayana’s rendering of their role, become part of rationality. Emotions and passion influence the preferences of individuals, but so too do they connect people and experiences. In effect, rhetoric acts as a harmonizing capacity, but it also serves an instrumental purpose whereby it provides form to thought and emotion, both engendering and making articulate the imagination and the emotions.

CONCLUSION

In my final chapter, “Beyond Our Doxa: Aesthetic Rhetoric as Critical and Creative,” I provide concluding remarks about the project – where it came from and where it aims to go. I hope that in so doing, we as scholars may aspire to live a life of reason, emboldened by the beauty that lives within and around us. To get there, I must first provide, vis-à-vis Santayana, the means to the ends. With this in mind, I turn to Chapter One.
CHAPTER ONE

BEAUTY’S CO-ARTICULATING EFFECT:


“[There] will always be beauty, or a transport akin to the sense of beauty, in any high contemplative moment. And it is only in contemplative moments that life is truly vital, when routine gives places to intuition, and experience is synthesized and brought before the spirit in its sweep and truth.”

– Santayana 1951b, 21

Santayana provides us with a working definition of rhetoric, though to tease out that definition from his many works requires close attention to his views on aesthetics. Like rhetoric, people use the term aesthetics as a sort of “placeholder” term with an assumed definition or assumed shared function.1 Santayana, while often building on the ideas of his predecessors and contemporaries alike, forwards a nuanced understanding of aesthetics. In so doing, however, he also weaves into his ideas a theory of rhetoric, one that encompasses traditional understandings of persuasion, yet takes rhetoric beyond them whereby rhetoric can achieve harmonious ends. The focus on

---

1 In 1973 Robert L. Scott published an article titled, “On Not Defining ‘Rhetoric,’” remarking that “The problem of defining ‘rhetoric’ seems irresistible to rhetoricians,” and acknowledged that he himself was not an exception (Scott 1973, 81). He claims that for many years he believed he would “achieve nirvana, if in twenty-five words or fewer, [he] could complete the sentence, ‘Rhetoric is....’”(Scott 1973, 81). Having failed to achieve nirvana, Scott gave up on his problem and suggested instead that some universal definition of rhetoric is neither attainable nor advantageous. Because rhetoric is strategic, substantial, and dynamic, rhetoricians are better suited to avoid defining rhetoric in a universal and competitive sense; instead, we should view them as different (1973, 94-5). To be sure, defining rhetoric poses some challenge, yet, leaving it undefined, even while offering some “elasticity” to the concept, may pose as many challenges as it circumvents. Therefore, while it may be prudent to refrain from creating a static, universal, and too narrow or too broad definition of rhetoric, it is nevertheless necessary to have a working definition of rhetoric. Without it, I foresee several consequences – negative and unintended. First, without an operational definition of rhetoric the arguments, claims, and evidence forwarded lack a framework. Without such a framework, the topic almost becomes unmanageable due to the possibility of “what if” questions that arise outside of the framework. Second, the term rhetoric becomes vague and empty. It means everything, nothing, and anything in-between. Third, it assumes that the audience shares whatever sense of rhetoric one has and attempts to implicitly convey, leaving too much room for confusion. Likewise, Santayana contends that aesthetics is “a loose term lately applied in academic circles to everything that has to do with works of art of with the sense of beauty” (1904, 321).
harmony, or at least its possibility, suggests an aesthetic root in rhetoric. Rhetoric involves its own version of harmony, but within rhetoric it stands for arrangement. How we arrange things – either objects or discourse – invites balance and accord to achieve the ends we seek, whether the construction of material goods for artistic ends or immaterial goods for persuasive ends. In Santayana’s view, harmony goes beyond arrangement and also includes considerations of order, reason, and form. As we will see below, Santayana characterizes harmony as the condition for fulfilling reason and as the highest good. Harmony, then, points to such concepts and ideas but also, and especially, to beauty. When rhetoric aims at harmony in these ways, it also uses aesthetic means to create and maintain a healthy, just, and happy society.

Aesthetics reaches across many important figures and periods, a reach that includes Santayana and flexes back to at least antiquity. Santayana shares many of Aristotle and Plato’s views but, like others who share the Aristotelian and/or Platonic bent, he forwards perspectives uniquely his own. One such distinction is Santayana’s focus on harmony as the means and ends of a life of reason, which is to say an aesthetic life rooted in the true, the good, and the beautiful. Echoing Aristotle, for example, Santayana notes the way beauty consists of order and harmonious arrangement. Aristotle explains in the Poetics that “to be beautiful, a living creature,

---

2 See Aristotle’s Rhetoric in which he talks about the three parts of making a speech: the means of persuasion, style, and arrangement. Arrangement, for him, refers to the proper way of organizing parts to effect rhetorical ends.
3 To be clear, I do not intend to suggest an either/or scenario in this claim. Rather, I point out these possibilities as a way to distinguish between the man made or natural quality of both material objects and immaterial ones, which is to say, language and the invention of discourse.
4 While it took a long respite between antiquity and the 18th century, many important intellectual figures took up the concept in the modern development of aesthetics. Aesthetics as a discipline is generally considered relatively new. Eva Schaper remarks, “As a separate field of study, it [aesthetics] is young: under its proper name we cannot trace it back any further than Baumgarten’s Aesthetica of 1750” (1968, 9). However, merely because it was not named aesthetics should not imply that the questions taken up did not exist long before aesthetics was a formal discipline. In fact, going as far back as Plato, he offers us useful discussions of art and beauty in his dialogues. Each contributor, while influenced by others, has a distinct voice within the multivocal aesthetic conversation. Prior to Alexander Baumgarten, we did not have a specific name for the study of beauty and art, but aesthetics was the general idea that we respond by way of our senses – though whether beauty is located within those senses or within the object by which we sensed, was and remains a cause for dispute. Baumgarten, coinng or appropriating the term aesthetics, connects beauty to taste, particularly about art. One major change from classical poetics to modern aesthetics is a shift from an ontological object oriented approach to an epistemological/subjective approach.
and every whole made up of parts, must … present a certain order in its arrangement of parts” (1954a, 1450b34). Aristotle adds in the *Metaphysics* that “The chief forms of the beautiful are order, symmetry, and definiteness” (Aristotle 1952, 1078a36 -1078b1). His comments suggest a relationship between beauty and truth: because that which is ordered, symmetrical, and definite points to rationality and consistency we can derive a certain truth from such beauty. When beauty in discourse evinces rationality, consistency, and accuracy Aristotle might allow for such discourse to point to or express truth. It is through rhetoric, Aristotle claims, that truth is realized.⁵ Further, “Since order and definiteness serve to explain many facts” beauty becomes an essential factor for that realization; truth may potentially be contained within that beauty (Aristotle 1952, 1078b2). Moreover, like Plato, Santayana emphasizes unity as a part of beauty. However, Plato stresses more fully that beauty results from perfect unity.⁶ Santayana, regardless of his fondness for Plato, does not share the view that Beauty is a Form, objective, stable, and eternal.⁷ In Plato’s view, the Beautiful is something in which we may participate and in the act of participating become beautiful or at least imitate that which is beautiful. While Aristotle places a premium on discourse, enabling rhetoric (and beauty) to be instrumental, Plato rejects this idea believing Beauty is a Form and as such a value unto itself. In other words the *Beautiful* remains so independent of human opinion or belief of *beauty*. On this last point he and Santayana part ways because Plato rejects the idea of a psychological beauty, i.e., a beauty that exists in the eye of the beholder (1961h, 211a). Santayana, on the other hand, argues that beauty is both

---

⁵ Since truth is naturally stronger than its opposite, if discourse does not realize truth it must be the fault of the speaker. See Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 1355a21-24 or William M. A. Grimaldi’s “Rhetoric and Truth: A note on Aristotle. Rhetoric 1355a21-24.” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 11.3 (1978): 173-177. Others point to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* to suggest a correspondence theory of truth whereby truth is expressed by how accurate or close the words represent the thing (a more ontological approach to truth). Blake Hestir explains this approach and argues for a potential alternative (that Aristotle does not rely on a correspondence theory of truth in all cases) in, “Aristotle’s Conception of Truth: An Alternative View.” *Journal of the History of Philosophy.* 51.2 (2013): 193-222.

⁶ See, for example, *Symposium* 210a-211d (Plato 1961h).

⁷ See, among others, *Symposium* 210b-211e (Plato 1961h).
perceptual and subjective. These perceptual and subjective aspects contribute to how aesthetic (and rhetorical) concepts of the true, the good, and the beautiful are realized in individuals and societies. For Plato, this means we aspire and ascend to the Good and for Aristotle it means instrumentally using discourse in a way that inspires justice and truth. For Santayana, on the other hand, it means that the ends of aesthetics, and therefore rhetoric, is, or should be, harmony. Harmony in this capacity already encompasses the true, the good, and the beautiful. Beauty, then, in these configurations features prominently in discussions of aesthetics (even when not taking on the name aesthetics as such) and thus shows its presence in a wide array of discourse relating to philosophy, politics, literature, art, rhetoric, and beyond.8

Santayana expresses eloquently, even if a tad veiled, the aesthetic and rhetoric relationship of which I write in this dissertation and that the rest of this chapter begins to explore. Specifically, this chapter endeavors to consider rhetoric beyond both persuasion and style, as it has historically and contemporarily been contained within these functions. In this section I also point to a tension in considering a relationship between aesthetics and rhetoric, which largely contributes to the way in which some rhetoricians have attempted to isolate and prioritize the concepts of the true, the good, and the beautiful. Santayana, however, integrates the concepts purposefully and necessarily as the remainder of the chapter fleshes out. He creates an interrelationship between the true, the good, and the beautiful that establishes the complexity of each as individual concepts as well as the essential relationship between them for a more compelling aesthetic and rhetorical effect. The last sections of this chapter, then, examines Santayana’s complex understanding of each the true, the good, and the beautiful and their relationship to each other. This discussion will serve to set the stage for a more detailed

---

8 Featured, for example, in discussions of what would be called “poetics.”
application of the concepts to rhetoric in Chapter Three, demonstrating the aesthetic root within rhetoric.

AESTHETIC RHETORIC: BEYOND STYLE

When rhetoricians discuss the role of aesthetics in rhetoric, the conversation frequently dissolves into arguments surrounding the rhetorical-aesthetic concept that they favor in order to effect particular ends. Traditionally, the field of rhetoric has treated the aesthetic as a matter of style, attending to figures of speech and tropes. This view, for example, focuses on Aristotle’s treatment of style where he defines style as clearly and appropriately using language to treat particular topics (1954b, 1404b). Longinus’ *On the Sublime* is another example of treating rhetoric as a means to effect good writing through the use of descriptive and elevated language. A more recent example is P.J. Corbett’s *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student* (1971, 2nd ed.), still frequently used in rhetoric and writing courses, which focuses a third of the text on style. Style, however, has all along been thought to be subservient to such matters as non-fallacious argument, logical development, or fidelity to facts, etc. At the same time, style has been thought to be an accessory to language, a form of ornamentation that at best lends charm to discourse and at worst distracts the audience from more important matters such as the true, the good, and the beautiful.

When rhetoric takes into account matters of import like the true, the good, and the beautiful, it often considers one concept at the expense of the others. So, for example, if one aims to discuss morality in terms of rhetoric, the anchoring concept might be the good, which then frequently de-prioritizes the true and/or the beautiful. Similarly, if one views rhetoric as epistemic, then truth might play a more favored role. When rhetoricians view the aesthetic as
style, however, not only does this depreciate the value of aesthetics, but it also frequently leaves beauty to the wayside. In Santayana’s work, however, aesthetics (and by extension rhetoric) is more than an application to an idea and must use an approach that considers an interrelationship between the concepts. This individual yet related conceptual approach stems back to Plato. Plato abstracts beauty by identifying it in his conception of Forms. As such, it closely relates to his notion of Good – and Truth in some ways – yet each remain distinct in the abstract Forms. David Pugh, drawing largely from *The Phaedrus, The Symposium, and The Reublic*, writes that Platonic beauty is part of an all-embracing metaphysical system, arguing that, “Although one cannot point to a single resounding affirmation in Plato’s writings that the good, the true, and the beautiful are identical, their identity is nonetheless built into the system” (Pugh 1996, 92). Prior to Pugh, Lorenzo de’ Medici asserted the same sentiment: “The highest beauty and the highest goodness and the highest truth being the same thing, according to Plato, in true beauty there are necessarily goodness and truth, connect in such a way that the one is converted into the other” (de’ Medici, quoted in Nelson 1958, 50). Taken as such, we can begin to see a more harmonious and interdependent approach to the categories of the true, the good, and the beautiful.

The discordant use of concepts likely results from the quarrel between rhetoric and philosophy, where aesthetics is typically housed, exemplified in debates about conceptual placing within disciplines. This dispute is narrated by people like Brian Vickers (*In Defense of Rhetoric*) and Samuel Ijsseling (*Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict*), which produced a line of thought to be traced back to Plato, that rhetoric does not seek knowledge, only opinions and

---

9 For Plato, Beauty is the greatest good – art not as much, considering he kicks the poets out of his ideal community. Nevertheless, Santayana provides a different read on this ban (which I address in a later chapter) and it is also worth noting that Plato, in the *Republic*, only really censors poets or poetry that corrupt (especially the youth) (1961f, 377b–398b). Plato does show a relationship between beauty and good – both as distinct but equally necessary and as an equivalency to each other. See *Laws* 841c (1961c); *Philebus* 66 a-b (1961e); *Republic* 401c-d (1961f); *Symposium* 201c, 205e (1961h).
beliefs and that knowledge is superior to both. Which side one takes on this issue will have an affect on if one views rhetoric as epistemic or aesthetic and, consequently, which concept(s) get stressed and which get ignored. This preferential treatment may hark back to Plato, but it resurfaces in contemporary debate. For example, even while creating an upsurge of rhetorical scholarship, the rhetoric as epistemic versus rhetoric as aesthetic debate initiated by Robert L. Scott in 1967 spawned disputes over theories and concepts like epistemology, ontology, truth, belief, opinion, reason, etc. However, if we take seriously the claim that the true, the good, and the beautiful – even within Plato’s work – are interrelated, then I maintain we can cease to separate the concepts into distinct aesthetic or rhetorical functions and instead view them as operating in conjunction with each other.\[11\] The epistemic/aesthetic/rhetoric representative

\[10\] For additional comments, contentions, and considerations of epistemist rhetoric, both in support and critique of, see Bitzer (1978); Brummet (1976, 1981, 1982, 1990); Carleton (1978); Cherwitz (1977, 1983); Cherwitz and Hikins (1979, 1986, 1990); Croasmun and Cherwitz (1982); Farrell (1976, 1978, 1990); Gilman, Blair, and Parent (1989); Gregg (1981); Hikins (1981, 1983); Hikins and Zagacki (1988); Leff (1978); Lyne (1985); Nelson and Megill (1986); Orr (1978); Scott (1967, 1976, 1988); Simons (1985); Stewart (1986); Wilkie (1981); Whitson and Poulakos (1993). Moreover, as the debate slowly faded from rhetoric’s memory, Scott, a decade later, reignited the argument once again by recanting his earlier position. Scott’s reversal, however, prompted responses from both earlier critics and those who argued vehemently that the entire debate was misguided. Steve Whitson and John Poulakos, for example, asserted that the debate was, “Driven by a sense of academic inferiority and the wish to earn the respect of their other colleagues (i.e. philosophers) in the academy, Scott’s supporters and critics alike accepted unquestionably rhetoric’s link to epistemology and undertook to rearticulate it with renewed zeal” (1993, 133). Whitson and Poulakos’ critique reinforce the problematic tendencies of, like they say in the vein of Nietzsche, doxastic philosophy whereby “no intellectual project can escape its own rhetoricity” (1993, 132). Thus, rhetoricians were beholden to the doxa of their discipline and the result was a fierce dispute about the concepts that made up the dispute: truth, knowledge, belief, etc. See also Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hikins also claim that largely the reason for the increased attention and incorporation of epistemology is to advance a more legitimate position for rhetoric in the academic world, though Cherwitz and Hikins definitely depart from the Whitson and Poulakos claims about rhetoric as epistemic. Cherwitz and Hikins write, “Our objective is to render a rhetorical analysis of the implicit strategy underlying the field of rhetoric’s effort to employ epistemological claims in order to attain academic legitimacy and respectability in the contemporary era” (2000, 375).

\[11\] John Poulakos admits the distinction between aesthetics and rhetoric is merely a consequence of disciplines – see “From the Depths of Rhetoric: The Emergence of Aesthetics as a Discipline” (2007). As a result of the rhetoric as epistemic/aesthetic debate tempers flared up and arguments erupted about who had it right, rather than the effect of rhetorically conceiving of these categories. In the process, many scholars presumed the connection to epistemology was itself legitimate, precipitating new arguments about the theories (i.e. epistemic or aesthetic) and concepts/terms (e.g. truth, knowledge, belief, opinion, etc.) that “belong” to those theories. See also, for example, PRE/TEXT’s “Inter/View” series, Charles W. Kneupper interviewed Richard Cherwitz asking what was problematic about the theories in place when the epistemic rhetoric debate first began, or more specifically when Cherwitz moved from criticism to theory. Cherwitz responds: “The major problem I notes was a lack of clarification and definition” (1984, 202). In the attempt to save rhetoric’s reputation as the harlot of the arts, the questions, grounds, concepts, and
anecdote employs the use of the three big aesthetic and rhetorical categories: the true, the good, and the beautiful. When conflict arises over the specific meaning of, say, epistemology, there are implications for the various ways we understand, employ, and prioritize the true, the good, and the beautiful. In the epistemic/aesthetic/rhetoric case, we see how easily these disagreements over individual parts blind us from seeing the whole. Whereas Santayana prioritized the whole over the part, his privileging of the whole does not suggest a neglect of individual parts; when only focusing on the truth, for example, we not only neglect the other parts but we also neglect the whole. Santayana, to be clear, provides thorough, careful, and clear expositions of particulars. However, he cautions against leaving things in parts. The point is not to reignite the “old” debate, but rather to show how the true, the good, and the beautiful may operate together whether viewed from philosophy, aesthetics, or rhetoric (or any of their sub-disciplines). At least in the conversation that took place within rhetoric, rhetoricians related notions of truth to epistemology or ontology, notions of good or evil to morality and ethics, and beauty to style, conclusions “seemed equivocal if not confusing” (1984, 203). While scholars may agree, even Cherwitz’s detractors, that we need clarification and definition, Cherwitz’s claims to reality outside of language and his aversion to consensus making did not sit well with others invested in rhetoric as a way of knowing. For additional commentary, see respondents’ claims to Cherwitz in subsequent “inter/views” – Brummett “Professor Cherwitz in the Prison House of Language” (1986, 91-98) and Earl Croasmun “…to Cherwitz and Brummett” (1987, 273-77). The latter also raises concerns against Brummett’s position.

12 We can point to any number of “controversies” that spark interest, instigate debate, and then (mostly) fade away. For example, what is a rhetorical situation? This initially began with Bitzer’s seminal piece “The Rhetorical Situation” (1968) to which Vatz responded with “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation” (1973). Barbara Biesecker advances the opinion that each piece is slightly wrong and we should begin to attend to the notion of agency in “Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation from within the Thematic of ‘Differance.’” (1989). Another example popular in the 1980s-1990s asks, what is materialist rhetoric? See for examples, Mary Lay Schuster (2006); Dana Cloud (1996); Ronald Walter Greene (1998b). The point is, controversy is pretty consistent when scholars advance questions and ideas prompting phases: Neo-Aristotelianism, Methodological approaches, Textual Criticism, Neo-Classical, Post-Modernism, Deconstruction, Marxist, Psychoanalytic, Rhetoric is too big/Rhetoric is too small, Rhetoric of Science, etc.

13 We rhetoricians probably should have learned this lesson a long time ago. Plato cautions against leaving things in parts in the Phaedrus when he discusses dialectic’s function of analysis (taking things apart) and synthesis (putting things back together), and alerts us to problems that may arise when you only bother to take things apart (See esp. 265a-270a). Aristotle advances his understanding of the relationship between part to whole, remarking, “Since a definition conveys a concept, and every concept has parts, and since as the concept is related to the object, so the part of the concept is related to the part of the object, it may be asked on this basis whether the concept of the parts must inhere in the concept of the whole or not” (1952, 1034b20-22).
invention, and aesthetics, etc.\textsuperscript{14} The epistemic/aesthetic/rhetoric debates analyzed these various parts and pieces, but neglected to put things back together leaving the categories intact but the meaning of categories more polluted creating a difficulty in discerning what it means to be rhetorically true, rhetorically good, or rhetorically beautiful.

Examining Santayana’s ideas, especially those focusing on the aesthetic, along side rhetoric, offers an opportunity to elevate the way rhetoricians understand rhetoric as a harmonizing possibility. Because the true, the good, and the beautiful have significant impact on both rhetoric and aesthetics, these concepts prove a useful starting point to show how understanding them individually affects alternative ways of conceiving of and applying rhetorical categories with and to experience. Additionally, Santayana offers us the opportunity to seriously consider beauty’s role in rhetoric – a role that largely gets neglected in favor of prioritizing aspects of the true or the good. Finally, Santayana helps make possible a project capable of unifying these concepts, of exploring the multifaceted relationships between them, and of emphasizing a harmonious whole over a necessarily limited discussion concerning any number of specific parts. Each individual part will have specific aims or ends for subject’s to fulfill. In Santayana’s view, however, we do not have to differentiate between these positions.

Santayana’s approach enables us to dissolve the distinction between what it means in the subject positions of critic, judge, and spectator, as these are laid out in Aristotle’s \textit{Rhetoric}, especially because Santayana’s view of criticism requires a more nuanced incorporation of all of these positions in order to create any movement – in the individual or the public. He also requires the ability to include others’ thoughts and positions and test our own against them rather than

\textsuperscript{14} For Santayana, as Sprigge argues, epistemology, “For all its dwelling on sceptical doubts the upshot of his enquiry is not sceptical, but lies rather in the recommendation to develop our view of the world on the basis, not of some supposed elementary data of consciousness, but of everyday beliefs which it is dishonest to pretend we do not hold.” While, “Ontology, for Santayana, is an attempt to clarify our ordinary or daily viewpoint, and to make it more precise, not to replace it by another” (1974, 62-3).
assuming a monopoly on terms, concepts, principles, etc. Moreover, Coleman argues, keeping in mind Santayana’s attempt to understand the universe rather than to impose his philosophical principles on it, Santayana “did not impose his opinions on those who disagreed. Rather, since “critical principles are spontaneous and emerge of natural conditions, he was no more inclined to dictate his opinions to others than the universe” (2009, xxxix). Santayana’s position, admirable, yes, also suggests the fruitlessness of focusing on difference and imposing one’s own opinion of “truth” on others. Despite Santayana’s tendency to avoid the imposition of ideas, this should not imply avoiding conversations that might create or call attention to difference. Rather, it suggests that alternative ways of negotiating difference is possible, including allowing for different principles, terms, concepts, etc. that enable if not require judgment against other positions. This evaluation encourages possible alternatives that may allow for a more harmonious, which is also to say rational, ordered, and beautiful, whole.

Santayana enables us to circumvent a general sense of reluctance to consider aesthetics within rhetoric because in his view the terms are necessarily interrelated and function philosophically, aesthetically, and rhetorically together. Therefore, through the lens of

---

15 For example, a colleague, who I will leave unnamed for privacy’s sake, submitted a manuscript to *Philosophy & Rhetoric* in 2012 and one reviewer acknowledged this colleague’s attempt to ground philosophy of rhetoric in aesthetics. The reviewer advanced his or her opinion that the piece should not be published, largely based on the following comments: “The first problem with this essay is that there seems to be nothing at stake. The debate now has gone through several iterations involving the same authors, and I don’t see how an additional contribution is developed, or what implications it would have for rhetorical studies. If some reformulation of prior positions might be motivated by accepting the argument here, it is unclear what that would be and how it would matter, or whether anyone would really need to rethink their position, or how any changes might be of value to anyone else. The initial promise seemed to be that the author was going to derive a critical method from the recoupling of truth and art, but the result is disappointing: first, because the three-point protocol is not novel or articulated further, and, second, because the demonstration is so weak (more on that below). In addition, this whole approach to rhetorical theory strikes me as increasingly dated: what does it matter how much we valorize “truth” or “art” as long as the discussion is so abstract and so disengaged from the theoretical and critical vocabularies that are being used by most of the people in the field, including those talking about aesthetics, politics and aesthetics, etc.? The debates of decades past are getting musty, not least for want of influential applications.” This blind reviewer demonstrates several problems. First, the inability to acknowledge that treating aesthetics within rhetoric’s purview constitutes something “at stake.” Second, rather than allowing for the possibility to demonstrate what is at stake, the reviewer would rather cease to make room for the theoretical conversation. Third, and perhaps most importantly, s/he points to the how the...
Santayana, I aim to rearticulate the true, the good, and the beautiful (in their various possible meanings) in order to achieve a kind of rhetorical catharsis. Moreover, Santayana usefully and uniquely treats each concept rigorously on its own but weaves together a synthetic vision of the true, the good, and the beautiful, showing how they operate together to form a more coherent whole. Santayana emphasizes this interdependent relationship, writing, “We know on excellent authority that beauty is truth, that it is the expression of the ideal, the symbol of divine perfection, and the sensible manifestation of the good” (1955j, 11). While he stresses beauty, he understands that a concomitant and necessary relationship between the true, the good, and the beautiful does and must occur, and in such a way that has significant consequences for the way we understand the terms that make up the categories of the true, the good, and the beautiful, such as knowledge, morality, ethics, beauty, etc.  

Santayana’s complex understanding of aesthetics, therefore, will help reinforce and elevate traditional understandings of rhetoric in three ways. First, by putting these typically segregated terms and concepts in conversation with one another, we have the possibility of seeing how the true, the good, and the beautiful each have distinct effects or functions, but nevertheless affect each other. Second, though Santayana does not explicitly locate this synthetic view of the true, the good, and the beautiful within the purview of rhetoric, his implicit connections to rhetoric make possible a better (i.e. more comprehensive and nuanced) understanding of these foundational categories. Third, by exploring the relationship between

---

16 Singer argues that, unlike Plato where forms are hierarchically layered with the Good and the Beautiful at the top, “little of this idealism survives in Santayana’s conception. For him all essences are alike in being the content of a clarified intuition, and therefore each is a comparable revelation of possible reality as we experience it” (Singer 2000, 105). Although I agree with Singer that Santayana eliminates this sort of hierarchy of Platonic forms, creating a harmony among the true, the good, and the beautiful, I also would argue that the harmonizing capacity relies on beauty’s capacity to intertwine the concepts.
these categories, Santayana creates the possibility for viewing rhetoric – and the concepts and categories that more explicitly fall under its domain – more holistically and harmoniously. In other words, this chapter sets the foundation for exploring aesthetics as a grounding rhetorical principle. Specifically it examines these three categories – the true, the good, and the beautiful – vis-à-vis Santayana’s aesthetics so as to set the ground to explore more explicitly Santayana’s relationship to rhetoric.

THE TRUE

“Mind was not created for the sake of discovering absolute truth. The absolute truth has its own intangible reality, and scorns to be known. The function of the mind is rather to increase the wealth of the universe in the spiritual dimension, by adding appearance to substance and passion to necessity, and by creating all those private perspectives, and those emotions of wonder, adventure, curiosity, and laughter which omniscience would exclude”

—Santayana 1972f, xiii

Santayana differentiates between an absolute and a subjective understanding of truth. For Santayana, as he points out in a letter to Henry Ward Abbot, the absolute is “that which is self-existent – that which might exist if everything else disappeared,” and goes on to say that “only the universe is an absolute being” (2001, 1:43). Otherwise put, if humans were to disappear or language were to fail, the universe would still exist independent of humans or their descriptions of it. This perspective on the absolute also applies to understandings of truth. That is to say, “Each man’s standard of truth and worth was absolute – i.e. that it could exist without the existence of other standards” (2001, 1:43). Santayana’s claim suggests three important points. First, his emphasis on the universe is indicative of the naturalism that grounds his philosophy. Second, his “naturalism or, as he often preferred to call it, his materialism, by which he viewed the universe as vast beyond human comprehension and indifferent to human interests,” suggests that the only “real” absolute is one that is beyond our comprehension and thus we can only
consider that which is possible to understand (Coleman 2009, xxvi).\(^\text{17}\) In fact, Donald C. Williams maintains that Santayana, “often held that the different perspectives in which men see the truth are rather more interesting than the truth itself” (1954, 41).\(^\text{18}\) That is to say, we “may acknowledge absolute truth, an objective material world, and an ideal of breadth and depth of insight” but “For Santayana, honest philosophy requires acknowledgement of its idiosyncrasy; it aims at sincerity rather than omniscience” (Coleman 2009, xli). Finally, while each man’s standard of truth may be absolute, objective, or provide an individual ideal, in the sense that standards exist independent of the perspective one holds, this does not mean that his truth is absolute. If, “the truth has a superhuman status: so that an absence of true opinions or criteria would not in the least abolish it,” indicating that as absolute truth no presence or absence of opinions could affect its status (Santayana 1972a, 529). Each person has a standard for truth, at least potentially, but the truth – to which we have access or create – itself may change or, in fact, may not actually be “true.” Rather, these truths are subjective and symbolic within a human frame. Absolute truth, then, exists but only immaterially and as such is impossible to attain; consequently, the other facets of truth take on a more significant and symbolic role.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^{17}\) Beardsley says that Santayana taught a metaphysics that he called naturalism or materialism, favoring the latter term as he believed it was more exact. “In any case, metaphysics is not his goal. As with the ancient materialists – for example, Epicurus – the metaphysics is chiefly a way of setting man free from oppressive ontological commitments, clearing the air for the central things of life. In this sense, Santayana is primarily the moralist: not the moralist who lays down rules, but he who teaches man how to live” (Beardsley1966, 328-9). Santayana himself defines metaphysics as a “dialectical physics, or an attempt to determine matters of fact by means of logical or moral or rhetorical constructions. It arises by a confusion of those Realms of Being which it is my special care to distinguish. It is neither physical speculation nor pure logic nor honest literature, but (as in the treatise of Aristotle first called by that name) a hybrid of the three, materializing ideal entities, turning harmonies into forces, and dissolving natural things into terms of discourse” (1955i, vii). Moreover, Santayana argues that, “Speculations about the natural world…are not metaphysics” (1955i, vii).

\(^{18}\) Williams here responds to the question of whether we can categorize Santayana’s philosophy as one thing or another (Catholic or Atheist, Eastern or Western, etc.), asserting that Santayana would likely take exception to any categorization because “the truth itself” is not his real concern.

\(^{19}\) For Santayana, much like his understanding of essences and spirit, truth is immaterial (1955i, vii).
Beyond the distinction between subjective and absolute truth, Santayana further distinguishes truth between literal and symbolic truth, prioritizing the latter. He claims, “critical reflection has emancipated me from the horrid claim of ideas to literal truth” (1951b, 29). The adjective “horrid” stresses his distaste for the consideration of “literal truth.” For Santayana, this is analogous to understanding religion literally versus poetically:

[Just as religion, when seen to be poetry, ceases to be deceptive and therefore odious, and becomes humanly more significant than it seemed before; so experience and science, when seen to be woven out of essences and wholly symbolic, gain in moral colour and spirituality what they lose in dead weight. The dead weight falls back from sensuous images and intellectual myths to the material fatality that breeds and sustains them. (1951b, 29)]

Religion, when dogmatic and unyielding fails to perform its function as a sort of guiding and creative principle. So, too, Santayana believes, does language, when taken as literal and absolute, become deceptive, and unpleasant, losing its playful and creative possibility. Hence, Santayana regards an understanding or search of literal truth as not only fruitless but also irresponsible. Instead, Santayana argues we must recognize that language, and thus the truth it expresses, is symbolic and, while “The truth which discourse can achieve is truth in its own terms, appropriate description: it is no incorporation or reproduction of the object in mind” (1955f, 179).21

---

20 While Santayana is not religious in the sense of a worshipping believer of god or gods, he does believe that religion, when practiced within its intended purpose “is poetry become the guide of life, poetry substituted for science or supervening upon it as an approach to the highest reality. Poetry is religion allowed to drift, left without points of application in conduct and without an expression in worship and dogma; it is religion without practical efficacy and without metaphysical illusion” (1957a, 289). Practiced inappropriately, “Religion may falsely represent the ideal as a reality” (1957a, 284).

21 Burke argues that the rhetorical function of language is symbolic (1969b, 43). He also gives the definition of man as the “symbol-using, symbol-making, and symbol-misusing animal” (1966a, 7).
Otherwise put, the symbols through which we (critically) negotiate ideas do not directly correspond to ideas in the mind.

Although the disconnect between the way in which we experience an object and how we describe that object suggests both a lack of literalness and the necessity to deal with symbolism instead, it also points to a further distinction that Santayana makes about truth. That is, truth, as Santayana uses it, sometimes represents “facts” and sometimes represents agreed upon beliefs or accurate judgments. In the former, Santayana has in mind a more or less factual statement. For example, to say that Santayana was born December 16, 1863 is a truthful statement of fact. Santayana acknowledges that even in describing such a fact that we do so in symbols, meaning that even facts are not indubitable. However, although important, he does not rely on facts to speculate about the world. Certainly, Santayana is interested in the natural world, but he makes no claim to know what matter is, claiming instead that such a determination is for the scientist to decide. Alternatively, Santayana relies on (what he calls) animal faith that matter is matter and avails himself of public experience as warrant for his speculation (Santayana 1955i, viii).

Public experience, here, means “the stars, the seasons, the swarm of animals, the spectacle of birth and death, of cities and wars” (Santayana 1955i, x). Thus, while everyone may experience these common occurrences in some variety, the ways in which individuals or even groups understand or experience them change through time and space. Therefore, for our purposes, we accept that factual statements are possible, but speculation about the beliefs and judgments that people hold as truth, contingent as they are, are more relevant to our own experience.

Truth, then, is contingent, but it can nevertheless reflect accuracy in any given context. Truth is contingent because existence itself is contingent. Thus, “truth being descriptive of

---

22 This has striking similarity to Kenneth Burke’s distinction between motion and action. Where motion deals more scientifically with movement and we just accept that it is indeed moving. However, action shows movement with intention, a uniquely human quality when considering the symbolic action of humans. (See Burke 1969a, 14).
existence and existence being contingent, truth will be contingent also” (Santayana 1972i, 408).23 However, the description, while symbolic and thus disconnected from that which is described, can be better or worse than other descriptions. Santayana writes, “By the truth…I understand the complete ideal description of existence; and any part of this description will be a truth, that is, a part of the truth. The ideal complete description of an essence, on the other hand, or of the relations between essences…is simply that very essence and those very relations: it can be neither false nor true, but only articulate” (1972b, 420). The language choices we make to describe existence can reflect truths in a factual sense – i.e. factual statements about individual or public experience in existence – but can be more or less accurate at describing essences and thus more or less communicable. Essences, Santayana explains, “are precisely that which is clearest and most indubitably present in the brightest light. They are, in any ‘idea,’ all that can be observed, retained, recalled, or communicated” (1951a, 500).24 In other words, essences are a bit like the symbolic residue of the perceptions and interpretations of our experiences. Taken as such, we can see clearly how even “fact” is filtered through subjective and symbolically expressed experience, which makes its accuracy a matter of degree.

Despite a tendency to collapse the ideas of possessing the truth with having more knowledge, Santayana asserts that reaching this thing called truth is unnecessary to satisfy the need for knowledge or intelligence. Actually, Santayana claims, “intelligence is by nature veridical, and that its ambition to reach the truth is sane and capable of satisfaction, even if each

---

23 Santayana reinforces this view in a letter to Sidney Hook, stating, “The first chapter of my “Realm of Truth”, on which I am lazily at work now, is to be entitled: There are no necessary truths. All truths, in my use of terms, are eternal, but none are necessary; because truth is a synthetic view or description of existence, and all existence being contingent, all truth is so too” (2003, 5:270)

24 Schiappa differentiates essence from existence when examining Protagoras’ human measure fragment, questioning if “Protagoras [was] contending that humans are the measure of ‘how’ things are (essence), or that humans are the measure that determines ‘that’ they are (existence) (2003, 120). He concludes that he favors the ‘that’ “but without the existential baggage usually attached” (2003, 121). Cf. also W.K.C. Guthrie The Sophists, esp. 181-88.
of its efforts actually fails” (1955d, 9). His claim suggests two things. First, the pursuit of truth may be unattainable, but that one cannot attain does not equate to failure. Rather, the way in which one makes the attempt is important. Knowledge is not a matter of accumulating various bits of truth scattered around, nor is it about lazily accepting the various “truths” without evaluation. Second, knowledge or intelligence is itself truthful, at least potentially, in the sense that it coincides with the reality of one’s experience. Santayana reinforces these points, arguing, “What renders knowledge true is fidelity to the object; but in the conduct and fancy of an animal this fidelity can be only rough, summary, dramatic; too much refinement renders it subjective, as does too much haste” (1972f, xii). Thus, faithfulness to one’s object – in the attempt to know it and describe it – reveals a relationship to the object and potentially knowledge about the object. Taken to the extreme, however, it causes one to presume that an individual experience may represent that of a collectivity or may attain to the status of a universal experience. Therefore, knowledge is only possible to the extent that in the effort to know an object we recognize the limits of possible knowledge. In other words, our knowledge is only possible in parts. The failure to recognize such limits takes knowledge as permanent and universal, rather than contingent and subjective. These consequences extend to the ways in which truths become individual ways of knowing and thus believing, which accordingly affect the collective beliefs within a community. 

Truth again departs from the absolute, or even the “facts,” when considering it along side how belief and opinion contribute to notions of knowledge. To be sure, a relationship between truth, knowledge, belief, and opinion exists, but the relationship is grounded in human discourse –contingent and partial as that discourse may be. This grounding gives the appearance of specific knowledge, but as Santayana says, “When man first invented language and other symbols, or fixed in reflection the master-images of their dreams and thoughts, it seemed to them that they
were discovering parts of nature, and that even in those developments they must be right or wrong” (1955e, 263). Thus the invention of language suggests that in naming an object, the name would suggest a true name or true system to which the object belonged, as if the name reflected a core part of its nature. Regardless of the discipline, system, or object, these names “were assertions about alleged facts, they were either right or wrong” (1955e, 263). In other words, once a symbol is affixed to an object, we may agree that calling that object by another name would render our description incorrect. A simple illustration helps explain: if I were to categorize birds under the amphibian genus, I would be wrong. Likewise, if I were to categorize frogs under the amphibian genus, I would be right. We could, of course, argue that the naming and categorizing is itself wrong, but for the sake of moving forward, let us assume we have agreed upon these names and categories. This type of agreement is precisely Santayana’s point. Once we have agreed on the symbols, they can be right or wrong, but not true or false: “in so far as they were systems of essences, woven together in fancy, to express the instincts of the mind, they were only more or less expressive and fortunate and harmonious, but not at all true or false” (1955e, 263). Thus, while one’s expressions can be more right or more wrong, depending on the fixed symbol system in use, the expression is not true or false because we must assume that all expression attempts to articulate our individual instincts, but we have no way of judging them against an immutable truth outside of our own apparently fixed, but actually protean, symbol system. While beliefs stem from these types of contingent truths, beliefs also provide a calculus to judge something as true or false, but only in a specific sense: “a belief in things must actually

25 See also Plato’s Cratylus, which deals with the origins of language and naming objects, particularly by looking at the essence of a thing to determine its name (1961a). Santayana departs from Plato’s natural theory of language, whereby Plato suggests words reflect absolutes with fixed and stable meanings. See also Aristotle’s On Sophistical Refutations where ideally everything should have its own name so that we would not be speaking in metaphor, but there are more things than names, requiring us to adapt. For example, Aristotle writes, “For names and a quantity of terms are finite, whereas things are infinite in number; and so the same expression and the single name must necessarily signify a number of things” (1955, 165a 10-15). Aristotle, too, rejects Platonic forms arguing instead that language is ambiguous and malleable (See especially Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1952) Book 1, Chapter 9).
be either true or false, it is directed upon the present existence and character of these things, not upon its own truth” (1955e, 264). A belief in an object will be true or false depending on the belief’s present conditions, but the concept of truth applies only to those conditions rather than the belief itself.

Truth only applies to the material, present conditions that prompt beliefs, but a belief, since itself cannot be true or false, requires us to have a certain amount of faith in objects outside of our immediate experience.26 Much like Santayana claims disinterest in the make-up of matter, relying on a faith that it does indeed exist, we, too, have to depend on faith that material conditions, objects, events, etc., exist. Having such faith allows us to proceed in our exploration of the world, even when we do not have access or immediate experience to or with objects. This faith, too, allows for knowledge about ideas and the world. In fact, Santayana says, “Knowledge…is belief: belief in a world of events, and especially of those parts of it which are near the self, tempting or threatening it” (1955f, 179).27 Thus, by having faith in the possibility or actuality of events in the world, we also are able to know about them. In this way, we rely on our experiences: “knowledge is true belief grounded in experience…controlled by outer facts,” but we also have faith that outside of our direct experience other forces are at work (Santayana 1955f, 180). Santayana distinguishes between belief and opinion in order to reinforce this reliance on experience.

While beliefs are dependent on experience or faith in the possibility of experience, opinions are entirely arbitrary and dependent on a novel, empirical way of understanding the world. This novelty is not based on a fresh perspective or new way of looking; rather, it is a

26 We can argue that a belief may be more or less right or wrong, but before we can submit a judgment we need the process for evaluation, which I return to in a later chapter.
27 Singer concurs: “[Santayana] is a skeptic in epistemology, and he argues that what counts as knowledge is inevitably based on the mythological feeling he calls animal faith” (Singer 2000, 105).
result of viewing experiences independent of past events or future possibilities. This approach suggests that everything happens by chance, luck, or only in hindsight – considering or justifying consequences of willfully acting in a particular way. “No substance exists,” Santayana says, “according to their view, but only things as they seem from moment to moment; so that it is idle to contrast opinion with truth, seeing that there is nothing, not even things, except in opinion” (1955e, 265). Opinion, for Santayana, lacks a long-term or consistent set of beliefs or at least an adequate reflection on how those beliefs may propagate such fleeting opinions. This view, suggests that those who hold such an empirical view only consider “truths” of fleeting moments.\(^{28}\) The only time, Santayana argues, that an empiricist becomes aware of the truth is through deception (1955e, 266). For example, if someone were to tell a lie about me, then, assuming that I have self-knowledge of the “truth,” I would be able to contradict the lie about me. Santayana argues that as a consequence of awakening our sense of truth as a result of lying, “The being of truth thus seems to be first clearly posited in disputation” and “truth is often felt to be somehow inseparable from rival opinions” (1955e, 266). The disputes, however, are not a reflection of truths. This is not to say that Santayana does not reserve a place for appropriate debate. Santayana maintains that when advancing opinions, even if many agree in the moment, we neither consider the underlying assumptions or presuppositions involved, nor do we consider the historical or future impact of advancing those fleeting opinions and putting them in opposition with each other. As such, we may agree on opinions in the moment, but if we do not agree, according to Santayana we must consider what gave rise to opinion, its lasting impact, and how those opinions operate alongside or against other opinions. In this way, opinion may become something more like a sustained belief, but without attending to these other dynamics is

\(^{28}\) Santayana’s contention with the sophists, for example, reveals some negative consequences to equating opinion with truth. I return to both his treatment of the sophists and possible consequences in a later chapter. For his extended critique, see “Rational Ethics” (1921b, 241-244).
merely opinion. Moreover, Santayana asserts that in the practice of discourse, opposition of opinions insinuates that if there is a false opinion then surely there must be its opposite – a “true” opinion. But, for Santayana, opinions are not truths.

An opinion, even when shared by many, is not truth, but can potentially offer a true or false account of facts comprised within that opinion, though how inclusive that account is depends on the consideration of perspectives. The only way an opinion, according to Santayana, can broach truth is by “repeating or contradicting some part of the truth about the facts which they envisage” (1955e, 267). But these facts are merely descriptive and they lack the comprehensiveness required to be a real truth:

[This] truth about facts is the standard comprehensive description of them – something in the realm of essence, but more than the essence of any fact present within the limits of time and space, which that fact occupies; for a comprehensive description includes also all the radiations of that fact – I mean, all that perspective of the world of facts and of the realm of essence which is obtained by taking this fact as a centre and viewing everything else only in relation with it.

(1955e, 267)

Thus, while some truth is present in the mere description of a fact, we remain encumbered by our own symbol systems, while also needing to account for the evolution and relationships that account for that fact. Considering unlimited perspectives, although clearly impossible, allows for

29 Although Santayana does not make use of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, Santayana’s focus on interpretation resonates with Nietzsche’s ideas. For Nietzsche, perspectivism is the notion that there are no truths, only interpretations. In viewing the world this way, we must come to terms that we have only an aesthetic relationship to the world. There is no truth, “There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing;” and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe on thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity,” be (Nietzsche 2000, 3.12).
a more inclusive, comprehensive description of facts and relationships between facts.\textsuperscript{30}

Therefore, it is important to approach opinions “first from one quarter and then from another, expecting the reality to be not simpler than my experience of it, but far more extensive and complex,” even if we are unable to exhaustively survey all possible perspectives (1955\textit{i}, \textit{vi}). This perspectival approach to opinion and subsequent reflection may give way to knowledge, or as Santayana calls it, belief, but it also prompts us – not merely to accept that infinite perspectives exist, but rather to attend to the evaluation of the many possibilities, thus raising the question of how Santayana accounts for the evaluation of truths.\textsuperscript{31}

Associating “correctness” or “rightness” with truth (as fact) relates to Santayana’s conception of truth vis-à-vis judgment, but with the provision that a relationship between the fact and judgment exists.\textsuperscript{32} Just as any fact is impermanent due to the contingency of existence, so, too, are judgments. This means that at any given time one “must still ask whether any of those successive views were true, or whether the later ones were necessarily truer than the earlier: he cannot, unless he is a shameless sophist, rest content with a truth \textit{pro tem}” (Santayana 1951\textit{b}, 9).

Even while judgments are ephemeral and \textit{ipso facto} relative, Santayana cautiously resists aligning himself with what he labels shameless sophistry, which, for him, means arbitrarily

\textsuperscript{30} The ability to account for all perspectives and to completely describe them would be, for Santayana, absolute truth: “If views can be more or less correct, and perhaps complementary to one another, it is because they refer to the same system of nature, the complete description of which, covering the whole past and the whole future, would be the absolute truth” (1972\textit{f}, \textit{xv}).

\textsuperscript{31} Santayana argues that, not even the philosopher or philosophy itself, can disclose the absolute truth. He writes, “But is it credible that the absolute truth should descend into the thoughts of a mortal creature, equipped with a few special senses and with a biased intellect, a man lost amidst millions of his fellows and a prey to the epidemic delusions of race? Possession of absolute truth is not merely by accident beyond the range of particular minds; it is incompatible with being alive, because it excludes any particular station, organ interest, or date of survey: the absolute truth is undiscoverable just because it is not a perspective. Perspectives are essential to animal apprehension; an observer, himself a part of the world he observes, must have a particular station in it; he cannot be equally near to everything, nor internal to anything but himself; of the rest he can only take views, abstracted according to his sensibility and foreshortened according to his interests” (1972\textit{f}, \textit{xiii}). Not only, then, does Santayana emphasize the impossibility of procuring absolute truth – even if it is out there, somewhere – but he also highlights that humans are subject to perspectives and the constraints that accompany them.

\textsuperscript{32} Santayana concurs, saying, “‘Truth’ is often used in this abstract sense for correctness, or the quality which all correct judgments have in common” (1955\textit{e}, 267).
accounting for mere opinions and judgments. However, even while taking the sophists to task, he, perhaps unwittingly, articulates a basic sophistic insight. Specifically, the differences between Santayana and the sophists are of degree, not kind. Although a more thorough comparison between Santayana and the sophists will follow later, we need only look at Santayana’s initial remarks about Protagoras in order to examine a potential relationship between truth and judgment. Santayana recites Protagoras’ famous maxim that man is the measure of all things and remarks that it “will serve admirably for the first principle of humanism. Humanism begins in the moral sphere, with the perception that every man’s nature is, for him, the arbiter of values” (1972a, 531). While Santayana finds fault with Protagoras’ maxim, he does agree that at its core the maxim suggests that humans create values along with the criteria for evaluating those values. Thus, we may take as truth (or fact) that judgments take place and that as a consequence values emerge. The emergence of values notwithstanding, the value itself is not necessarily a truth or even more or less correct due to the contingency and flux of human nature. Values, in other words, are grounded in the contingency of human nature and any judgment about those values must also suggest a possible relativity within a changing context.

We must, then, consider truth on, what Santayana refers to as, a human scale, whether it relates to the creation of values or the evaluation of values. The creation of values belongs, as Santayana says, to the moral sphere. He defines morality as:

[Actual] allegiance in sentiment and action to this or that ideal of life; while the history of such allegiances, and of the circumstances and effects involved, would form a descriptive science to be called ethics or the science of manners. Truth in ethics would then be like truth in any other part of natural philosophy, and particularly rich and discoverable: because it would not require us to investigate
the mysteries of physics or biology, but would accept large material and historical facts on the human scale. (1972d, 473-74)

From this, we first see that Santayana provides a working definition for morality and ethics, summarized as commitment in both feeling and actions to a particular ideal and the evaluation of those commitments, respectively. Second, although he attributes a system of evaluation of those commitments to ethics, he really means the evaluation of a *system of judgment* rather than an individual or community’s choice between various interests, beliefs, values, etc. Third, and as a result of the second, ethics belongs, by and large, to science because it is descriptive of that which has taken or is taking place. Certainly, we may make the caveat that any terms that comprise the description suggests that we are advancing claims of what to include or not in the description. Nevertheless, this pushes us into the realm of morality rather than ethics. When considering truth in ethics we are really discussing facts, meaning that we only have the opportunity to discover whether a judgment occurred, *not* its cause or place within the system of ethics. Santayana explains further when writing, “In… *moral* judgment…it is hard to see how there could be any truth. The only truth concerned would be that such a judgment was passed, that it was more or less general and lasting, and more or less passionate” (1972d, 474). That is not to say that these topics are uninteresting or cannot take place; however, it does suggest that it is not part of the same conversation with regard to truth. Additionally, when we do make a decision or judgment, it may only be moral if we can integrate all or most of our interests.33

Finally, and this point underscores the other facets of his statement, we must understand truth not

---

33 Singer says, “Santayana devotes all of his five-volume book *The Life of Reason* to the thesis that the good life can be attained only through the harmonization of the various impulses that naturally conflict within the human animal” (Singer 2000, 24). Thus, we must make choices, and they may be considered moral in so far as they create harmony among interests, but in order to do that we also require the use of practical reason in order to facilitate good decisions.
in any absolute way, but always in relationship to the human scale, which must account for various choices and preferences that are grounded in an inconsistent environment.

These contingencies in a material environment help influence our preference for certain values and, as a consequence, invites moralists to take the mistaken view that preference equates to truth. Santayana highlights morals as a fusion of truths about fact and preferences that moralists hold as truth. In other words, they confuse the truth that some preference was made with the truth of the preference. For example, in our environment we learn that certain fish, like the fugu (puffer fish) are poisonous and if eaten or prepared improperly will cause death. Any way of describing the illness or death of an individual who ingests this fish does not, in fact, change the outcome of illness or death. Nevertheless, in Japan the fugu is a delicacy and many make the choice to try it and hope the chef prepared it properly. I may prefer or choose to eat or not a poisonous fish, and that choice is a result of evidence that I could die. Thus, a relationship exists between the environment and preference, but the preference itself is not truth. We are only able to look at the preference as having occurred. When asserting the truth of subjective matters, we complicate the difference further. For example perceiving that a man with more courage than necessary is rash (Santayana 1972d, 473). However, the confusion arises when the moralist, in observing and documenting these facts, “adopts or asserts in his own person the preference implied in those eulogistic or disparaging terms” (Santayana 1972d, 473). In the example of the courageous/rash man, this means that the moralist assumes that an agreed upon amount of courage is indeed a virtue. This, despite conventional agreement, is faulty logic because “the

34 Aristotle’s influence on Santayana’s remarks is clear when reviewing Aristotle’s comments in the Rhetoric: “One should assume that qualities that are close to actual ones are much the same as regards both praise and blame: for example, that a cautious person is cold and designing and that a simple person is amiable or that one who does not show anger is calm; and when praising one should always take each of the attendant terms in the best sense; for example, one should call an irascible and excitable person ‘straightforward’ and an arrogant person ‘high-minded’ and ‘imposing’ and speak of those given to excess as actually in states of virtue, for example the rash one as ‘courageous’” (1991, 1.9.28-29).
nerve of moral judgment is preference: and preference is a feeling or an impulse to action which cannot be either false or true” (Santayana 1972d, 473). Thus, in order to avoid falling into a tautological trap, in which we value something because we value something, we must acknowledge the relationship between preference and morals rather than emphasize truth in morality. This personal preference shows up in the public conscience as well, but even when the individual and community concur on a particular value, any judgment passed can only be morally true in the sense that “it will express the bias of human nature,” not that the value itself is a truth, suggesting that Santayana’s notions of truth are not confined to the individual but can extend to the collective (Santayana 1972d, 480).35

Santayana’s complex understanding of truth helps eliminate what truth is not and yet preserves characteristics of truth that are fruitful for considering symbols and discourse. We know that Santayana believes in absolute truth, but for him we could almost replace Nature for Truth in this absolute sense.36 In any case, such an absolute is irrelevant because we can never attain it.37 We also know that a search for literal truth is fruitless because we must communicate within symbol systems, always leaving us removed from the literal. While truth is at times regarded as factual, correctness, or accuracy, we accept this only in part. That is, we can accept that some statements may be regarded as factually correct or accurate, but we nevertheless accept that fact as an act of animal faith in the natural world. To that end, even within the natural world

35 Santayana stresses the point that the public conscience may reflect what the individual believes, but it is in the individual where “actual preference has its only possible seat” (1972d, 481).
36 Santayana, in reference to the absolute order of nature, claims that, “Absolute order, or truth, is static, impotent, indifferent” (2011a, 24).
37 For Plato, the True, the Good, and the Beautiful are objective values independent of perception. This is in stark contrast to someone like Protagoras, whose fragment “man is the measure” suggests that perception shapes our values of truth, goodness, and beauty, which Plato would consider relativism. In Plato’s Republic he outlines who could possibly attain these objective values, concluding that it only philosophers “who are capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging, while those who are incapable of this, but lose themselves and wander amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, are not philosophers” (1961f 484b). Also see Republic 484d, 485c-d, 486d and Book VII for distinctions between Truth/truth (Truth vs. appearance, opinion, etc.).
we must still acknowledge different vantage points. Otherwise put, truth must allow for perspectivalism. For perspectives are not mere opinions but must deal with belief. Beliefs give way to morals, which must be considered at the individual level, even if coinciding with the social, which carries consequences for truth in judgments in the sense that we must distinguish between a true judgment – one that took place – and the imposition of individual standard on others, which may not be morally true. In sum, having eliminated the impossible, inconsequential, or inaccurate approaches to truth, we have a subjective, but not arbitrary, understanding of truth that deals within symbols. As a result, we must consider these truths as contingent, which provokes many possible moral positions that influence how we understand “the good.”

THE GOOD

“In embracing the greater good, the soul abandons some, or all, of its former affections; it therefore abandons some forms of the Good; and the notion that all good can be found in one moment or in one object is merely rhetorical.”
—Santayana 1972k, 771

Similar to his detailed undertaking of truth, Santayana carves away at “the good” in order to advance an operational understanding of the way in which people comprehend, use, and aim toward the good. In doing so, he differentiates between four basic categories of the good: Universal good, various types of goods, Ultimate goods (which acts as one of the types but has a very specific function), and the evaluation of goods. Universal good exists, but like the unattainable Absolute Truth, it is impossible to fulfill. The impossibility notwithstanding, Universal good exists as a sort of promise: “Universal good, then, the whole of that to which all things aspire, is something merely potential” (Santayana 1936d, 293). Otherwise put, our pursuit of the Good provides a conception of an ideal. The ideal, while impossible to achieve, is
nevertheless possible to conceptualize. The conception of an ideal allows us to continually desire for something better even while only experiencing the good in parts or in moments. Rather than universally experiencing the Good in all space and time, we undergo partial experiences that both contribute to the overall sense of the Good while allowing the Good to act as a goal or ideal to which one aspires. Arnett explains that by its very nature, human existence does not allow for a complete realization of Universal good. He writes, “The Good is a universal realization or consummation in which all action, all functions are perfectly fulfilled; and though such Good is rendered forever impossible by the very nature of existence, it remains, nonetheless, as a spiritual ideal to be contemplated, a vision of perfection to be caught and enjoyed aesthetically” (Arnett 1955, 16). Although the Universal good exists only in perfection, consisting of accumulated moments in which we aspire to the good, it is within these partial moments that the good takes on other significant manifestations.

The first significant conception of good, vis-à-vis Santayana’s understanding of the pursuit of some impossible-possible Universal good, characterizes goods as desire. Santayana asserts that what humans desire are goods. This conception of desire and good further justifies why we can never realize a Universal good because it is impossible to account for every desire, fulfilled or not, in every person at every moment. Moreover, desires rarely work together

38 John Poulakos writes that one type of opposition informing sophistical rhetoric is contention between actuality and ideality. Actuality “refers to the way thing are in the world” and ideality “refers to the way things ought to be” (1995, 67;68). However, a third alternative exists, namely, possibility, which “refers to things that are not but can be. Possible things are so by virtue of their absence and most people’s proclivity to give primacy to what lies at a distance from their immediate grasp. When speaking from the awareness of possibility, the orator favors the there, the then, and the can be. As such, (s)he underscores the fluidity, the elusiveness, and the malleability of human experience” ultimately demanding of their audience to go beyond boundaries and recognize the capacity in themselves to become something better (1995, 68).

39 Santayana further emphasizes this point when saying, “The universal good by which the spirit, in its rapt moments, feels overwhelmed, if it is not to be a mystical illusion, cannot fall short of being the sum of all those perfection, infinitely various, to which all living things severally aspire. A glint or a symbol of this universal good may be found in any moment of perfect happiness visiting any breast: but it is impossible unreservedly to love or worship anything, be it the universe or any part of it, unless we find in the end that this to itself, and unless at the same time it is beneficent universally, and a friend to everything else” (1936d, 291).
smoothly, if at all. “The objects of human desire,” Santayana writes, “until reason has compared and experience has tested them, are a miscellaneous assortment of goods, unstable in themselves and incompatible with one another” (1921a, 231). Setting aside the notion of reason and comparison, to which we will return later, we see that humans, as a result of a variety of desires, have a hodgepodge of goods. Desire, however, does not or cannot always overlap with the ability to fulfill desire. Although anyone can have a number of desires, the capacity to fulfill those desires limits available goods, but simultaneously reveals possible goods to pursue. Coleman attributes these constraints and possibilities to how we characterize or assign symbolic meaning to existence. He explains, “The essences one assigns to existences reveal one’s capacities; and these in turn indicate one’s goods, that is, the tendencies of one’s perfection or what one is good for” (2009, xxix). The type and way in which we attach symbolic meaning to any “existence,” then, discloses the degree to which we might reasonably fulfill any potential good. Thus, we must account for the capacity and tendency to fulfill a good (desire) in any given moment. Any desire, though, primarily attempts to satisfy an Ultimate good, which for Santayana means happiness, harmony, freedom and the like.

A second conception of the good ties together instrumental goods with the fulfillment of an Ultimate good. This connection suggests that Santayana creates a sort of schematic for the

40 Richard Weaver emphasizes tendency within rhetoric. For example, he writes, “Since language expresses tendency, and tendency has direction, those who differ over tendency can remain at harmony only in two ways,” namely, complacency or reference to first principles (1970, 39). Moreover, he argues, “rhetoric deals in depth and tendency” (1970, 180). He also notes that the term “good” is a term of tendency (1970, 73).

41 As Coleman relates, Santayana provides these few examples as what he names ultimate goods: “…ultimate goods in the Life of Reason, such as happiness, harmony, and freedom” (2009, 262). He also notes that, “ulterior propitious things is called happiness, love, or religious rapture” (1951b, 20). This suggests that if one is aware of real possibility, capacity, or tendency, the result is a better chance of fulfilling an ultimate good. As Ashmore explains, reason is not the same thing as when we think of math, science, law, etc., but says Santayana uses reason to mean something self-contained: “character traceable to its properties of harmony, sanity, and integration” and “it is not mediate or discursive; it is its own object of thought” (1966, 4). Reason is a practical goal and “is at the same time itself and the object of human experience” and the consequence of reason is happiness – a perfection of living (1966, 4-5).
good. At any given moment, one may feel any number of desires (goods) that may or may not exist compatibly with each other. Yet, even if desires (goods) were compatible, we, as humans, would be incapable of fulfilling each and every desire (good). Consequently, we must determine which desire (good) to pursue in alignment with our own capacities and with a view to the possible; at the same time, however, we must also consider the Ultimate good that we wish to satisfy. Santayana cautions, however, that, “an ultimate good is chosen, found, or aimed at; it is not opined” (1913, 144). Thus, we should not confuse seeking to fulfill a desire or good in the service of an Ultimate good with dominating opinions. We cannot, in other words, presume that our pursuit of a particular desire or good in service of an Ultimate good, equates to a universal perception of that Ultimate good. Mere opinion, which for Santayana is capricious and inconsiderate of the past and future, does not make room for reason. Consequently, Santayana emphasizes reason as both the process of choosing goods and the umbrella term for good under which all goods fall, claiming that, “Life of Reason…is simply the unity given to all existence by a mind in love with the good” (2011a, 29, emphasis in original). Thus, in our desire for the good, but with an ability to only perceive the good in parts, we must use reason to unify and choose amongst any number of instrumental goods that put us closer to an Ultimate good. Coleman bolsters Santayana’s claim when asserting that, “Reason, or the love and pursuit of the good, is a better form of interest because it is ultimately more assured, being concerned not with the

---

42 Arnett explains that “Vital animal desires and impulses…combined with peculiarly human needs and characteristics in their relation to the environment, are the foundation of all the goods man can pursue” (Arnett 1955, 4).

43 This sort of juxtaposition of particular and universal echoes Kenneth Burke’s notion of God Terms, which he defines “As for a unitary concept of God, its linguistic analogue is to be found in the nature of any name or tile, which sums up a manifold of particulars under a single head (as with the title of a book, or the name of some person or political movement). And such summarizing word is functionally a “god term” (1961, 2-3; 33). Similarly, my interpretation of Santayana that indicates pursing a good in service of a bigger term, yet the definition or particulars that make up the “god term” changes for individuals, communities, and over time. In my example, we see how people tend to agree that democracy is a wonderful thing, but the particulars that make something a democracy will change.
shifting material flux but rather with ideals (2009, 261). Hence, on the one hand, reason allows us to pursue – rationally – an Ultimate good by enabling the selection between instrumental goods that service this Ultimate good. On the other hand, reason is also the one true (Ultimate) good that gives unity to existence.  

Reason, Santayana’s key term throughout his body of work, shares a close relationship to harmony. Although Santayana identifies harmony as an Ultimate good, reason’s function is to harmonize, and harmony simultaneously reveals reason. Thus, while reason is the Ultimate good, harmony creates the conditions for reason’s fulfillment. Santayana praises Plato in the latter’s explanation of harmony’s relationship to the good, stating that, “Plato was right when he said harmony was the first condition of the highest good. The good man is a poet whose syllables are deeds and make a harmony in Nature. The poet is a rebuilder of the imagination, to make a harmony in that. And he is not a complete poet if his whole imagination is not attuned and his whole experience composed into a single symphony” (1957a, 287). A poet has the ability to create with language a harmonious reflection of her experience within nature. Likewise, this capacity exists within anyone communicating in symbol systems. Our various selections of language that contribute to the ordering of our experiences can simultaneously give harmony to those varied experiences and provide exemplary models. What we learn here, then, is that harmony is not only an Ultimate good, but also the condition for the highest good: reason. Conceived in this way, reason provides order and consonance to a world constantly and consistently in flux. Therefore, reason, harmony, and the good go hand in hand. On the one hand, harmony allows the merger or reconciliation of individual conflicting interests – with each other,

44 Santayana informs us that he sought to determine how “the free mind could disentangle its true good, and could express it in art, in manners, and even in the most refined or the most austere spiritual discipline,” and, after reading Plato and Aristotle, “the composition of The Life of Reason was the consequence” (1951b, 13). In other words, the Life of Reason, perforce is the one true good, but we can nevertheless use reason in any number of ways to achieve it.
with the environment, or with other’s who undergo the same process. On the other hand, this very process is the condition for reason, in the sense that it prompts us to make rational choices in the service of the good. Both harmony and reason, then, are in some ways synonyms for the means and ends of the good.\textsuperscript{45} We have, now, harmony as a way to achieve a life of reason, and reason as a means of achieving harmony. The various goods from which we choose, find, or aim, remain, while self-knowledge about those goods contributes to the capacity to fulfill them.\textsuperscript{46}

The third category Santayana explains is a multiplicity of goods that take shape in many forms. The goods are definitive of the individual and contingent on material circumstances. The “forms of the good are divergent” and will take shape based on the material circumstances of individuals and once identified our ability to know and understand the goods suggests a finality for the individual (1986a, 170).\textsuperscript{47} This finality does not mean, however, that circumstances, value assignment, or goods cannot change. Rather, Santayana argues that if there were such a thing as a neutral spectator, then she would observe each identified good as equally valid.\textsuperscript{48} These sorts of goods are based in nature and our own animalism. Only when we add biased language to the assortment of goods, affixing meaning to goods, does dispute occur over which does or should

\textsuperscript{45} Jerome Ashmore in Santayana, Art, and Aesthetics asserts that reason is synonymous of the good, stating, “Reason is something partaking of life, synonymous of the good, and productive of happiness” (1966, 6).

\textsuperscript{46} Arnett also notes that reason is the means to find out an individual’s good (and the community’s good), not otherwise justified by mere existence (1955, 9).

\textsuperscript{47} Also see Herman J. Saatkamp 2014,105.

\textsuperscript{48} Obviously, as social animals who rely on biased language to communicate, we cannot find such a neutral observer. However, Santayana is not suggesting that is possible. Instead, \textit{nature} herself is the “observer” and makes no distinctions between classes, individuals, or goods, viewing them all as equal. “Nature,” he writes, “was laughing at us all; the wise man considered his fate and, by knowing it, raised himself a measure above it. All things pursued the greatest happiness they could see their way to; but they were marvelously short-sighted; and the business of the philosopher was to foresee and pursue the greatest happiness that was really possible” (1910, 29). He elsewhere states, “They would have done well to laugh, if they had laughed at themselves; for those who will not laugh with nature in her mockery and playfulness, turn her sport first into delusion and then into anguish” (1925b, 45). Finally, he writes, “Nothing can happen that will not be good or bad in a thousand directions. When all living souls are considered, the cross-lights and conflicts of these values spread an impenetrable tangle, through which it is impossible for mortal eye to see the ultimate balance of benefit and injury. But nature laughs at this perplexity” (1972d, 483).
take precedence over others. Typically, this type of dispute often takes shape under the guise of ethics and morality as a means to provide criteria for goods.

Evaluating a moral good largely depends on understanding how a particular meaning is affixed to that good. Santayana poses the following questions regarding the good:

Is the good, we may ask, what anybody calls good at any moment, or what anybody calls good on reflection, or what all men agree to call good, or what God calls good, no matter what all mankind may think about it? Or is true good something that perhaps nobody calls good nor knows of, something with no other characteristic or relation except that it is simply good? (1921a, 214)

Santayana’s distinction between ethics and morals already suggests an answer. While ethics attempts to answer whether a thing is good or not, a matter concerning nature and thus belonging to the domain of science, “once the moral or dialectical attitude has been assumed, means not what is called good but what is so; that is, what ought to be called good” (Santayana 1921a, 216). This “ought” adds value to any particular good, but does not arise from nature or her conditions. Rather, the value attached to any moral good emerges from a biased, morally driven humanity. Nature’s disinterestedness and contingency gives rise to morality as a result of humans desiring to impose order on the instability that nature creates. Santayana argues that, “Life itself exists only by a modicum of organization, achieved and transmitted through a world of change: the momentum of such organization first creates a difference between good and evil, or gives them a meaning at all” (1951b, 11). Nature has no concern with the meaning attached to events, concerning herself only with natural actions and reactions. The human (mis)understanding of this disinterest gives rise to order in an effort to offset a natural chaos, precipitating – as a means to
understanding – the positive or negative valuation of the various elements that comprise the imposed order.

Order, suggestive of both harmony and beauty, indicates a final aspect of the good, one that deals with the aesthetic value of the good. A good emerges from our own interests, and the value experience, attached to that good, “arises from the self’s vital impulses,” though those impulses are themselves irrational (Ashmore 1966, 9). Although irrational, the impulses allow the self to identify possible and equally valid goods. Determining whether a good that is both possible and reconcilable with other goods (individuals or communities) requires the making of rational choices vis-à-vis any number of different, possibly competing, goods. Santayana makes clear that harmonizing these various interests and goods fulfills happiness and acts according to a life of reason. Harmony also, however, has an aesthetic principle that colors all goods, interests, impulses, and values. Santayana explicitly tells us that “aesthetic and other interests are not separable units, to be compared externally; they are rather strands interwoven in the texture of everything. Aesthetic sensibility colours every thought, qualifies every allegiance, and modifies every product of human labour” (1962d, 125). Thus an aesthetic good is not a separable value and therefore “it is not realizable by itself in a set of objects not otherwise interesting” (Santayana 1904, 323). This underlying aesthetic principle does not create beauty in every object, thing, or idea. On the contrary, “Things partially evil or partially ugly may have to be chosen under stress of unfavourable circumstances, lest some worse thing come; but if a thing

49 Cosmos, from the Greek κόσμος, means order, ornament, world, or universe. Pythagoras, writes Alexander von Humboldt, “was the first who used the word Cosmos to designate order that reigns in the universe, or the entire world” (1860, 69). Von Humboldt goes on to explain that, cosmos, “in the most ancient, and at the same time most precise, definition of the word, signified ornament...it implied the order or adornment of a discourse. According to the testimony of all the ancients, it was Pythagoras who first used the world to designate the order in the universe, and the universe itself” (1860, 69n*).

50 Harmony is an aesthetic principle and “is also the principle of health, of justice, and of happiness” (Santayana 1951b, 20).
were ugly it would \textit{thereby} not be wholly good, and if it were \textit{altogether} good it would perforce be beautiful” (Santayana 1962d, 121-2). Thus, aesthetic and other interests are bound together and indicate the degree to which we may attribute value to any object, thing, or idea. As Santayana says, if something is entirely good it must be beautiful, but if something is ugly it cannot be \textit{wholly} good. Consequently, we may parse out the degree to which some aspect of something is good or bad. This matter of degree, however, emphasizes the contingency that we navigate within the contours of nature and her material circumstances and constraints.

Notwithstanding the tightly knit relationship between aesthetic and moral values, the two remain distinct categories. Simply, we conceive of aesthetic values positively and moral values negatively. In fact, aesthetic value is the \textit{only} positive value. Although impossible and difficult to even imagine, Arnett argues that, “only aesthetic values would remain in a world from which all problems, conflicts, and evil had been removed” (1955, 28). Removing problems, conflicts, and evil would leave creation, beauty, and harmonious agreement, which suggests that humans would have no need to avoid any object, thing, or idea in particular, since then anything could contribute to the overall good. Morals, on the other hand, are associated with the formulations of methods, principles, or ideals that \textit{avoid} ills and are thus value negative (Arnett 1955, 28). As Ashmore argues, the location of values is isolated and before we can examine an aesthetic value we must distinguish it from a moral value: “This required discrimination is accomplished by limiting moral values to the characteristics of negation and instrumentality, leaving a remainder of pure aesthetic value” (Ashmore 1966, 8). Ashmore reinforces Santayana’s characterization of a value positive aesthetics and the value negative characterization of morals, but he also intimates that aesthetic values are intrinsic. Stripped, by means of aesthetics, of the negative
moral value from the aesthetic, we are left with something pleasurable, pure, and beautiful – but also something not of this world.\textsuperscript{51}

In sum, then, Santayana characterizes four basic categories of goods: Universal good, Ultimate good, a multiplicity of goods that take different forms, and finally the aesthetic relationship to the good. The Universal good while impossible to fulfill, acts as a potential and provides exemplar ideals to pursue or guide us toward. In other words, it provides necessary ideals towards which humans act. These ideals are categorized as Ultimate goods, recognized by their generic titles: happiness, freedom, etc. These Ultimate goods remain in the service of a life of reason, and yet reason is also the ultimate Ultimate good that all others fall below and simultaneously use to accomplish reaching that good. Desires and impulses prompt us to conceive of a personal good and those goods can take many forms, including moral goods and aesthetic goods. Moral goods are instituted by imposing order on nature, which takes no interest in human activity and has no bias toward individuals or communities. By imposing such order, we as humans attempt to rationalize a non-moral nature from a human perspective, consequently affixing meaning and value to goods, giving them a sense of morality or immorality. Despite this tendency for humans to emphasize morality, Santayana also recognizes aesthetic goods and he highlights the importance of aesthetic sensibility, namely, beauty, in the sense that it colors all values that are attached to the characterization of the good.

\textsuperscript{51} The way that beauty is perceived and experienced will be addressed in the next section.
THE BEAUTIFUL

“[It] was horror at the abandonment of all creative virtues that brought Plato to conceive them so sharply and to preach them in so sad a tone. It was after all but the love of beauty that made him censure the poets; for like a true Greek and a true lover he wished to see beauty flourish in the real world.”
— Santayana 2011b, 12

In *The Sense of Beauty*, Santayana advances his famous definition of beauty as “value positive, intrinsic, and objectified...Or, in less technical language, Beauty is pleasure regarded as a quality of the thing,” suggesting that beauty is a result of the spectator’s subjective pleasurable experience derived from a quality perceived to exist within an object (1955j, 31). Santayana’s definition, Arnett argues, creates the notion “that beauty does not exist in the object apart from the pleasure that is experienced by some observer, that the object, by stimulating the sense or imagination of an observer, causes a feeling of pleasure, and that the observer attributes the cause of the feeling entirely to the object which he calls beautiful” (Arnett 1955, 29). Santayana refers to this association of beauty with an object as objectification, according to which he attributes aesthetic experience to perceiving beauty as “belonging to an object” (Singer 1957, 41). Santayana’s definition relies on an empiricist theory of perception, whereby perception of some element is sensation; however, he later rejects this theory and embraces critical realism, suggesting that the sense of beauty is deceptive in the sense that we perceive beauty as a quality of an object, when, in fact, it has no existence outside of our perceptions (Singer 1957, 42). In other words, our sensations contribute to our perception, but we cannot attribute that sensation to

52 Santayana’s *The Sense of Beauty*, written in 1896, was his first scholarly work and his first work specifically focusing on aesthetics and beauty. It received glowing remarks. In the Modern Library edition, Philip Blair Rice writes, “To say that aesthetic theory in America reached maturity with *The Sense of Beauty* is in no way an overstatement” (1988a, ix). Moreover, Arthur Danto claims, “The exaltation of emotion and the naturalization of beauty — especially of beauty — imply a revolutionary impulse for a book it takes a certain violent act of historical imagination to recover” (1988b, xxviii). Santayana extends these contributions throughout his works, particularly in *Reason in Art* (1905), *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (1900), and his essay “What is Aesthetics?” (1904). Well-read and appreciative of philosophical and literary texts throughout eras and cultures, we see many influences in Santayana’s own conception of aesthetics. Nevertheless, his approach remains novel and unique.
the result of some quality existing within an object. Because he wanted to offer not a narrow
definition of beauty, but rather only the sense or conditions under which the perception of beauty
might occur, Santayana emended his definition of beauty.

Though Santayana never meant to define beauty – claiming that it is itself indefinable –
he does clarify the conditions for the sense of beauty. Irving Singer points out that this confusion
is due to a lack of polish in Santayana’s early work, saying that “Despite an unfortunate misuse
of language in his first book…Santayana never attempted to give a definition of beauty” (Singer
1957, 34). Santayana did, however, delimit aesthetics and focused on the identification of the
conditions for and experience of beauty to occur. The emended definition occurs in an extended
footnote, in which Santayana makes clear specifically that he had not intended for objectified
pleasure to serve as the definition of beauty. The note, although rather lengthy even when only
considering the applicable parts, nevertheless deserves closer attention:

Pleasure therefore does not need to be objectified in order to be fused into an
image felt to be beautiful: if felt at all, pleasure is already an object of intuition;
and the beautiful image is never objective in any other sense. Nevertheless I am
far from disowning my old view in its import. I was making an honest effort, with
the categories then at my command, to express accurately what happened within
me whenever I felt that anything was beautiful. Nor was the phrase ‘objectified
pleasure’ a definition of beauty, a visionary essence utterly indefinable: it was an
indication of the conditions and manner in which the momentary apparition of

53 Singer also points out that “…whenever Santayana uses terms like ‘the definition of beauty,’ ‘the nature of
beauty,’ ‘the materials of beauty,’ etc. in the Sense of Beauty, he is being unrigorous in a way that he might not have
been fifteen years later” (1957, 34). Singer also, however, denies that there is any indefinable quality of beauty and
provides a four-part argument to prove his case – see Santayana’s Aesthetics 1957, 47. Moreover, Gilbert and Kuhn
remark that “Santayana’s esthetic was sketched in early, and did not so much change as the years went by as acquire
‘buttresses and supports’ with the growth of his philosophy of nature and of essence” (1954, 557).
beauty arose and vanished. If I tried now to give such an indication I might perhaps say that beauty was a vital harmony felt and fused into an image under the form of eternity. (Santayana 1925a, 284n2)

We learn from Santayana, then, several important qualifying factors with regard to his early “definition” of beauty. First, he does not disavow his earlier characterization of beauty, but does acknowledge that it perhaps lacks some finesse. The confusion stems from the difference between the conditions of beauty versus the definition of beauty. Whereas the latter is indefinable, much like the true and the good, the former reveals beauty’s dependence on an individual’s subjective experience and thus we may only consider what possible conditions allow for that sense of beauty to occur. Second, to understand pleasure as an object of intuition means, “If the thing is beautiful, this is not because it manifests an essence, but because the essence which it manifests is one to which my nature is attuned, so that the intuition of it is a delightful exercise to my senses and to my soul” (Santayana 1972l, 7).54 In other words, even if the thing were ugly, then it does not necessarily follow that the thing in question does not have an appearance and present the essence of that appearance to my intuition. Both that which I perceive as ugly and beautiful will present an appearance, but because I regard the thing as beautiful suggests a pleasurable sense experience.55 Moreover, sensuous observers require a susceptibility

---

54 As a reminder, essences “are precisely that which is clearest and most indubitably present in the brightest light. They are, in any ‘idea,’ all that can be observed, retained, recalled, or communicated” (Santayana 1951a, 500). Furthermore, “The priority of the realm of essence is therefore not temporal or dynamic. It is an infinite field for selections” (Santayana 1972l, 15). And, finally, an “acquaintance with essence I call intuition, whether it be passive, aesthetic, and mystical, or on the contrary analytical and selective, as in reasoned discourse; because at every point demonstration or inference depends for its force on intuition of the intrinsic relation between the given terms” (Santayana 1972l, 4).

55 Singer clarifies Santayana’s position saying, “Having suggested that beautiful things are those we intuit with delight, Santayana makes it clear that to say this is not to give a definition of beauty: ‘the beautiful is itself an essence, an indefinable quality felt in many things which, however disparate they may be otherwise, receive this name by virtue of a special emotion, half wonder, half love, which is felt in their presence. The essence of the beautiful, when made an object of contemplation itself, is rather misleading: like the good and like pure Being, it requires much dialectical and spiritual training to discern it in its purity and in its fullness.’ And he warns against
to the particular senses as they relate to the object that gives rise to those sensations. Finally, because this regard to something as beautiful delights my senses and acts as a “vital harmony,” it also reveals a feeling of rightness about the object considered beautiful. As we have seen, if something is wholly good, then it must also be perceived as beautiful: so, too, perceived as beautiful and as good, it thus must also be right or correct. Beauty, Arnett says, is “a supremely sympathetic appeal by an object to natural and ultimately inexplicable feelings of rightness or correctness, whether it be the pleasurable stimulation of the senses by line, color, or sound, or the stimulation of the imagination by associations and the expressions of ideals” (Arnett 1955, 29-30). Our sense of beauty, then, arguably suggests a relationship between that which we determine beautiful with what we determine right or correct, along with the subsequent beliefs that stem from that feeling.

The relationship between beauty, or the sense of beauty, and rightness or correctness, indicates a relationship between beauty and meaning. We know from Santayana’s comments on aesthetic and moral values that the aesthetic is interconnected with other interests, goods, and values. Santayana, despite Ashmore’s claim that in order to analyze aesthetic value we must separate it from moral value, says that, unless arbitrarily like academic disciplines, he cannot distinguish between moral and aesthetic values:

[Beauty], being a good, is a moral good; and the practice and enjoyment of art, like all practice and all enjoyment, fall within the sphere of morals – at least if by morals we understand moral economy and not moral superstition. On the other

 burying the essence of the beautiful under ‘heavy descriptions of the occasions on which perhaps it appears’” (1957, 35) (Singer is quoting Santayana from Realm of Essence).

56 This susceptibility is very similar to Aristotle’s discussion of perception in On the Soul – see especially Book 2, Chapter 5, 416b33-34, where Aristotle asserts that perception is between two appropriate agents, one acting and one whose senses can be affected.

57 Singer argues that Santayana’s revision means that “beauty occurs wherever two essences are combined, one a pleasure or ‘vital harmony,’ the other an image” (1957, 44).
hand, the good, when actually realized and not merely pursued from afar, is a joy in the immediate, it is possessed with wonder and is in that sense aesthetic. Such pure joy when blind is called pleasure when centered in some sensible image is called beauty. (1951b, 20)

Thus, over against disciplines or scholars’ tendency to lay claim to definitions, implying a certain moral authority, Santayana argues that aesthetic values influence all interests, impulses, goods, and values. This influence, then, requires us to consider beauty alongside morality. This consideration, however, of beauty and morality must take place in a very specific manner. Contemporarily we might assign morals to the domain of religion, but a religious moral sphere does not interest Santayana. If we are to take religion seriously, Santayana believes, we must only conceive of it poetically. That is, religion as a creative guide toward ideals. Contemporary religions, on Santayana’s view, lead to superstitious, mystical dogma, departing from an original vision for art, creativity, and guidance without moral authority. Santayana believes humans have succumbed to this sort of negative valued moral authority within their religions. Likewise, when humans do not recognize the poetic function of religion, they (mis)understand it as literal, real, and true. And, particularly important here, beauty exists only in the world of appearances:

You misconceive my philosophy if you suppose that I deny the beautiful or would madly forbid it to appear. Has not my whole discourse been an apology for illusion and a proof of its necessity? When I discover the substance of the beautiful is a certain rhythm and harmony in motion, as the atoms dance in circles through the void (and what else should the substance of the beautiful be if it has substance at all?) far from destroying the beautiful in the realm of appearance my discovery raises its presence there to a double dignity; for its witchery, being a
magic birth, is witchery indeed; and in it is parent nature, whose joy it is, proves her fertility. I deny nothing. (Santayana 1925b, 56)

Dogmatic religions suggest that beneath appearances exists a Truth we can attain if we can get past the appearances. However, the nature of appearances may allow us to peel away layers, but it happens indefinitely. That is to say, the only truth that we arrive at is one that we have created and one that we have assigned value. Moreover, if we peel away that layer, another truth with an assigned value is ready to take its place. While Santayana dismisses religion, at least in this dogmatic sense, he accepts that science is suited to seek truth, and can even be beautiful in the sense of rhythmic atomic dances and order; nevertheless, inasmuch as science attains to the beautiful, it does so without any consideration of the good. Thus, while aesthetics may color these other spheres, “the arts seem to provide man with an avenue to a dimension or area of experience and the world that would otherwise remain utterly dark and inexplicable” (Arnett 1955, 45). Art and beauty, then, open up possibilities that religion or science cannot, largely because religion dogmatically asserts moral authority, while science attempts to construct a world without values, one ultimately lacking the good. As Ashmore puts it, “[If] the apprehended world is to be ‘any good,’ emotion must enter it” (1966, 13). Beauty exists, but only in our own perceptions in the realm of appearances, which rely on symbols that we have created to describe our sensuous and emotional experiences with objects. This should not suggest that beauty is itself an illusion, but it does suggest that beauty exists within our own inconstant perceptions and is expressed in a variety of more or less stable symbol systems.

Beauty as a moral good means creating harmony among any number of goods and truths that change in an inconstant world of appearances. Beauty as a moral good in this very specific sense also suggests that beauty itself is a value. As a value, “[The] experience of beauty signifies
a harmony with the environment and in the soul, it teaches man in this way what his greatest good is, and is an instance of the highest pleasure” (Arnett 1955, 27). Perceived in a world of appearances, this sense of beauty is thus grounded in Santayana’s humanism. That is to say, because humanism is a theory of values, aesthetic values are just as humanly centered as any other type of value (1954, 557). Santayana further emphasizes this centering and proposes that aesthetics, namely beauty, is the underlying principle of all human values. Beauty itself, then, functions as a theory of values because it influences our attention to some things over others and simultaneously allows for the harmonization of various interests, desires, goods, etc. with the material, natural environment. Part of our natural environment contains all the potential the environment outside of natural constraints has to offer, not excluding art. Coleman tells us that Santayana emphasizes that, “Art is not an escape from reality; rather it is a realization of the potentials of nature, including the potential for human happiness. Art absorbed into the Life of Reason endows all activities with beauty and makes all works into works of arts” (2009, 262). Therefore, art becomes another manifestation of beauty. At the same time, when infused with beauty other things become art, requiring us to exercise our senses to become more susceptible to the possibility of beauty.

To exercise our senses, and feel the influence of beauty, we must account for how the senses primarily deal with appearances, or, more specifically, our perceptions of appearances. Santayana addresses all five senses, though he prioritizes sight and sound. Other primitive functions may also contribute. For example, sexual instinct can make us feel tenderness or concern, while social instincts – not as art or skill, but as ideas and associations – can cause us to value certain things over others. Citing patriotism, Arnett says that it might ensure approval of

---

58 Aristotle, in On the Soul (De Anima), treats all five senses, while most philosophers predominantly focus on sight and hearing. See Book 2, Chapter 6 -12.
music with a patriotic theme even if the music itself is not great.59 Similarly, Santayana gives the example of “home.” Whereas the idea of home is abstract, “it becomes materialized in a cottage and a garden becomes an aesthetic concept, becomes a beautiful thing” (1955j, 41). Santayana acknowledges that humans are predominantly social – political, really – animals and these types of social needs are centrally important; however, because they often exist verbally or abstractly, they become, for us, beautiful only when grounded in something material.60 The lower senses – touch, taste, and smell – may also contribute to the sense of beauty, but are not ever as powerful as sight and sound.61

Even while the lower senses may contribute to the sense of beauty, Santayana argues that the eye and ear contribute most to the experience of beauty. For Santayana, sight is “perception par excellence, since we become most easily aware of objects through visual agency and in visual terms” (1955j, 47). In order to conceive of something, “the idea of these things had to be constructed out of the materials already present to the mind” (Santayana 1955j, 47).

Nevertheless, while relying on our own experience to imagine or conceive of any possibilities, we are able to receive help with these conceptions, even outside of our own experience, through sound. Santayana argues, “The world of sound is certainly capable of infinite variety and, were our sense developed, of infinite extensions; and it has as much as the world of matter the power to interest us and to stir our emotions” (1955j, 45). Therefore, despite Santayana’s assertion that sight strikes us most easily and immediately, sound can, when done well, have the effect of

59 For further discussion on these primitive or rudimentary functions, see Arnett’s Santayana and the Sense of Beauty 1955, 33. Additionally, for a more complete discussion of the materials of Beauty, see Santayana’s Sense of Beauty (1955j): 35-51.

60 This, again, is an example of Santayana’s objectification, whereby we are objectifying the happiness associated with the beautiful object. However, we know that beauty is not really within the object, even according to Santayana, and thus it exists in the perception of beauty in the object and the way we understand the object to relate to our happiness.

61 See Santayana’s Sense of Beauty 1955j, 42-44, for more details on the lower senses. For an interesting reversal of this claim, see Schiller 1982, 195.
provoking images, ideas, and emotions in varying ways and degrees, elevating our own experience or allowing us to imagine outside of actual experience.

Our senses, then, provide the conditions under which we might experience beauty, and the experience of beauty itself commands a powerful rhetorical influence. As Santayana remarks that “[The] love of beauty has to justify itself not merely intrinsically, or as a constituent part of life more or less to be insisted upon; it has to justify itself also as an influence” (1962d, 125).

Beauty, now understood both as a value and a good, but it is also a source of persuasion for two reasons. First, it draws our attention to some things or ideas over others. Beauty alone, however, cannot do this since it needs something in which to take form. Santayana points to discourse as the answer: “since before external facts can be studied they have to be arrested by attention and translated into terms having a fixed intent, so that relations and propositions may be asserted about them; while these terms in discourse, these goals of intent or attention, must in turn be borne along in the flux of existence, and must interpret its incidental formations” (1904, 322).

Second, it provides exemplary models that require more beauty to fulfill. Thus, as an influence, we hold as a proposition that beauty begets beauty. In other words, “[The] more beauty there is the more there can be, and the higher one artist’s imagination soars the better the whole flock flies. In aesthetic activity we have accordingly one side of rational life: sensuous experience is dominated there as mechanical or social realities ought to be dominate in science or politics” (Santayana 1962d, 118). Because we attempt to create order out of chaos in the natural world – and that which is orderly we conceive as more beautiful – we can see that we are more likely to create and be drawn toward a harmonious arrangement of beautiful things, whether objects or ideas, than beauty’s opposite. That is, beauty influences our attention and creation over against the things we perceive as less beautiful, but also less good or less true. Because beauty influences
the ways in which we understand what is good or true, it follows that we will not be as
influenced by ideas of truth or goodness if we do not perceive them as beautiful. This aesthetic,
and rational, rendering of sensuous experience deals with the primary elements of beauty and
arranges them in such a way as to generate more beauty, hence beauty as a demand for more and
better beauty. Beauty colors all things and ideas, elevating the ordinary to more and better
beauty. In aesthetic activity sense experience dominates and thus the materials of beauty,
particularly sight and sound, are the roots of this experience. Such experience is often reflected
in art, and particularly fine art, which, “as in all things, imitates the method of Nature and makes
its most beautiful works out of materials that are themselves beautiful” (Santayana 1957a, 252).
However, this same principle applies to words and ideas: “So that even if the difference between
verse and prose consisted only in measure, that difference would already be analogous to that
between jewels and clay” (Santayana 1957a, 252). Santayana intimates how elevated language,
and for him this means something rhythmic and measured like verse, has more beauty than mere
prose. However, he neglects the possibility and significance of his own metaphor: clay may lay
shapeless and bland, but in it exists a potential to become a more charming piece of art. If indeed
beauty is a good, and a Universal good existing only as potential, then we must assume that
beauty, too, contains potential and possibility. This potential vis-à-vis discourse suggests the
possibility of influence when made beautiful: “[The] beauties of discourse which commonly
attract attention are merely the beauties of objects and ideas signified” (Santayana 1957a, 253).
Thus, in order for discourse to be a source of beauty, it must take a beautiful form.63

62 Beauty does exist as an ideal, so it seems strange to suggest that beauty itself can be better. But the idea, here, is
to suggest that if we are attracted to beautiful things or ideas and we perceive one thing or idea as beautiful, we begin to
raise our standards for other things to fit within our perception of beauty.
63 Form is a significant and vital concept in Santayana’s ideas. I will return to the idea of form at length in a later
chapter.
Nevertheless, beauty has an influential quality that draws, even commands, if powerful enough, our attention.

Because we are humans who, as Santayana grants, are social and political at our core, we must cooperate, compromise, and harmonize not only within our individual interests, beliefs, and values, but also within communities. This cohabitation requires sacrifice. Sacrifice is not only necessary, but, for Santayana, can also be beautiful:

Certainly absolute freedom would be more beautiful if we were birds or poets; but co-operation and a loving sacrifice of a part of ourselves – or even the whole, save the love in us – are beautiful too, if we are men living together…Mankind must make a painful and a brave choice…The necessity of rejecting and destroying some things that are beautiful is the deepest curse of existence. (Santayana 2009a, 119)

The destruction of beautiful things, then, does not imply or require a lack of beauty. Instead, the sacrifice of beauty takes the form of an oblation, but rather than an offering to the Gods it is an offering to the good. That is, it is a way in which to live a harmonious, rational life of reason. So long as what is destroyed is in the service of compatible interests and ideals, “such congruity would render a being stable, efficient, and beautiful” (Santayana 1921a, 224). Although efficiency is not the primary goal it can be a positive consequence when beauty is both a factor of and direction toward harmony, congruity, and stable order.

Beauty, then, is the way to achieve a harmony of various impulses, interests, etc., and is equivalent to harmonious, rational order. Hence, it is also both a need and a good. The good, while originating in an individual’s impulses and desires to fulfill some need, does not entail that

---

64 Efficiency cannot be the only requirement or effect. Santayana reminds us, in light of Plato’s dialectic, that, “if the good has been identified with efficiency in a military state, it can have no justification” (1962d, 121).
a need is automatically a good in and of itself. “A need is not a good”, Santayana writes, but “denotes a condition to be fulfilled before some natural virtue can be exercised and some true good thereby attained. To feel needs is to feel separated from the good by some unfulfilled prerequisite to possessing it” (1995c, 40). By fulfilling a need we exercise the capacity to fulfill a good and the values that the particular good embodies. By extension, we can also assume that simply desiring something does not necessarily mean that the desire is a good. Otherwise put, a need must be fulfilled before we can derive any good from it, but simply having the desire does not equate to its potential fulfillment. When selecting which impulses and desires to pursue, we must consider the influence of beauty, but also the capacity of our choice to fulfill the potential of beauty as a harmonious ordering within a life of reason. “Beauty,” Arnett says, “is one of the fundamental needs of man” because, as a value, it contributes to human welfare by “[signifying] a harmony with the environment and in the soul, it teaches man in this way what his greatest good is” (1955, 26-27). Thus, beauty acts as a guide toward the good, but we can also conceive of beauty as a good when harmonizing or providing order to other various goods. As a need, a desire, a value, and a good, we can see that beauty simultaneously is a good and works with the good in order to guide humans in recognizing the potential of some greater good: “Beauty gives men the best hint of ultimate good which their experience as yet can offer” (Santayana 1962d, 118). However, because beauty only exists in perception, certain materials help stimulate the senses that will provoke the sense of beauty.

As we know, those materials that stimulate our sight and sound will be most influential in allowing us to visualize an Ultimate good. This relationship between beauty and the good is “aesthetic in so far as it is an ordered and harmonious whole, which contemplated as a perfection

---

65 Santayana writes, “The harmony of natural goods becomes a spiritual good called the beautiful” (1972k, 770). This union of the soul (the individual) with the good, Santayana refers to as the Classical understanding, once again expressing the influence of the Greeks, particularly Plato, had on Santayana’s thought (1972k, 769).
achieved, pleasing to man as a man because of its affinity to his psyche and its needs, but potentially pleasing to any free spirit whose sympathies are always with wholeness and harmony” (Arnett 1955, 10). Santayana’s impression of aesthetics and the good are comparable to the sentiment in Quintilian’s statement about the orator who is “a good man, skilled in speaking” or, the good man speaking well (1920, 12.1.1). The good man speaking well expresses the virtue of the good equating to, or at least expressed within, eloquent or beautiful speech. For Santayana, however, the virtue of the good is expressed in harmony and order, including the discourses that express the various interests, values, ideals, etc. that comprise such harmony. That beauty exists within our perceptions does not mean that the act of perceiving is itself a beauty; rather, it suggests that pleasure exceeds that which is good and becomes for refined minds a symbol of total excellence (1904, 326). It is neither enough to perceive things in general nor to perceive that which attracts us if left without meaning. Instead, we must allow our perceptions to experience the sense of beauty and acknowledge its exemplary status as an eternal goal for something better. Beauty and the good are intertwined to such a degree that, even while beauty is itself a good, it also has this influential capacity to propagate more and more beauty over that which is merely good, or good unadorned. While Santayana acknowledges our social and political natures as humans, he also acknowledges that in those roles we must at times choose between things or ideas that issue competing demands. Even within these choices, he stresses the relationship between the good and beautiful acknowledging that we may choose things that are part ugly or part evil because the conditions that encumber us requires it. Nevertheless, this ugly or evil thing could not be, on the whole, good. However, if it were wholly good, then it would necessarily follow that it would be beautiful (Santayana 1962d, 121-2). Hence, even though forced to accept something ugly or evil at times, we must learn to recognize
that those things are not altogether good. But, if something is altogether good, then it must necessarily be beautiful.\(^\text{66}\) When social and political creatures confuse opining about what constitutes the good with certain truth, confusion also arises between the good, the true, and the beautiful. While a relationship does exist between these concepts, Santayana clarifies both their distinctions and connections, while allowing his readers to do so as well.

**THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE TRUE, THE GOOD, AND THE BEAUTIFUL**

Beauty, truth, and goodness are interrelated through aesthetics, whereby beauty is an aesthetic good that can also be a moral good and truth is a moral good that can only sometimes be aesthetic. Only in specific cases does the aesthetic bind together the true, the good, and the beautiful. As a moral good, beauty must have the capacity both to harmonize goods and guide us toward a greater good. Truth, while a moral good, has only three ways, according to Santayana, in which it also is an aesthetic good. First, “The true is akin to the beautiful when it means ‘true to type’” (Santayana 1972c, 521).\(^\text{67}\) This type of truth contains the possibility to enact some latent potential within it. Santayana offers the example of a “true friend,” in which we have to discern or even come to expect the possibility of perfection, at least within our perception or understanding of what or how to define “true friend.”\(^\text{68}\) Consequently, this suggests that beauty

---

\(^{66}\) Santayana also admits that as social creatures we may only be able to select the most good or the least evil: “In society the greatest good is only the least of evils” (1972k, 814).

\(^{67}\) Santayana asserts, “Truth, in spite of what Platonists and poets might say, is not at all the same as beauty. Truth does not arrange or idealize its subject-facts. It can eliminate nothing. It can transfigure nothing, except by merely lifting it bodily from the plane of its existence and exhibiting it, not as a present lure or as a disaster for some native ambition, but as a comedy or tragedy seen as a whole and liberating the spirit that understands it. In other words, truth is a moral, not an aesthetic good. The possession of it is not free intuition, but knowledge necessary to a man’s moral integrity and intellectual peace” (1972c, 520-21).

\(^{68}\) Santayana elaborates: “Such affinity as there is between truth and beauty has various sources. When the word truth is coloured idealistically, to mean the types or potential perfections of things, as when we speak of a true friend, evidently if this latent “truth” could only be brought out and raised to actual fact, it would also realize the beautiful. Love and charity are quick to perceive the latent perfections of the imperfect; and if we call this (perhaps
and absolute truth are incompatible because absolute truth would reveal the perfection of the thing rather than merely allow for the discernment of a perfection or idealized type. Even if the two were compatible, then we would be unable to recognize the compatibility as such since absolute truth remains unattainable.

Second, when we recognize the truth of nature, and its disinterestedness vis-à-vis our attempts to impose order over nature’s “chaos,” we feel a sense of catharsis in the destruction of the beautiful. Santayana claims, “Even this partial chaos and mutual destruction, when we see it to be the truth, for the very reason that we are interested in the beauties destroyed, has a cathartic effect. It is sublime; and if we call the sublime a part of the beautiful, the truth, even when distressing and ugly, will be horribly beautiful to us” (1972c, 522). Truth and beauty, here, relate to an existential outlook on the human condition, or, in other words, the making of beauty – or at least of a beautiful outlook – out of the very flawed existence we must endure. Santayana likes the sophists to the skeptics in his characterization of this sort of existential crisis, writing, “For both schools, then, there was an unspoken truth: namely, that life was a treacherous predicament in which they found themselves without a reason, and that they were determined, whether nobly or nimbly, to make the best of it” (1972a, 533).

But, it also suggests a more negative consequence, in that a person may destroy beauty in the service of “truth.” In so doing, the repulsive and disorderly bamboozles the truth-seeker into seeing beauty and order.

The third way truth and beauty relate is in the possibility of liberation, that is, in the possibility of overcoming the trials of one’s own existence in a material environment. However, “In the case of beauty this deliverance is spontaneous and innocent…But the deliverance that comes through truth comes through sorrow” (Santayana 1972c, 523). In this way, both beauty and truth may similarly offer freedom, but while this freedom through beauty is good and happy, imaginary) potentiality in truth, we indeed divine the principle of beauty also; of that beauty which the organic impulses of nature would bring to light if they had their way and did not interfere with one another” (1972c, 521).

Also see Nietzsche: On joy by means of destruction (“metaphysical delight”) (1999a, 80).
the freedom through truth requires something far colder. Liberation through truth “is redemption by the cross. The more inhuman the truth turns out to be, the more dismal or cruel, so much greater is the self-conquest involved in facing it, in casting away false hopes, and entrenching ourselves impregnably in our insignificance” (Santayana 1972c, 523). The difficulty or displeasure of this freedom notwithstanding, the very act of facing our own insignificance in the natural world, “if sincere and not a mask for new claims,” could remove “the sting of that insignificance” (1972c, 523). This final point intimates the contribution that language makes in creating or masking truths and beauties. Unable to locate some Absolute Truth, we rather concern ourselves with the values that we create and affix with meaning, which then circulate as truths. Upon recognizing the mutability and appearance of such truths, we can either pervert them further in order to feel better about some revelation that may shake our worldviews, or we may discard truths that do not subserve the good and the beautiful. Knowledge in this sense, too, can be beautiful. However, when we conceive of truth as knowledge of fact it is made to obey some specific utility or purpose, and too often, at least for Santayana, in the service of morality. However, he points out that, “[When] the truth has no further practical utility it becomes a landscape. The delight of it is imaginative and the value of it aesthetic” (1955j, 20). Moreover, in “practical exigencies, in calling forth the arts, give them moral functions which it is a pleasure to see them fulfill. Works may not be aesthetic in their purpose, and yet that fact may be a ground for their being doubly delightful in execution and doubly beautiful in effect” (Santayana 1962c, 142). When in Santayana’s comment he references moral functions, he does not mean the moral function of truth; rather, he means a moral function in the beautiful sense of creating ideals and exemplary guidance to fulfill the good. Thus, even if some practical demand did not intentionally contribute to the beautiful and the good, i.e., – it was not specifically aesthetic in purpose – it
nonetheless fulfills an aesthetic purpose and the possibility for beauty is even greater. It stands to reason, then, that even when a concept like truth is used for some moral end, beauty becomes possible when truth opens into a landscape rather than a deceptive end. These relationships notwithstanding, Santayana argues that forcing the relationships can be detrimental, writing:

False views are often called truth, in order to make the truth more consoling; and on the other hand moral and aesthetic values are often distorted by being torn from their roots in an animal soil and stretched on a rack of cosmic dimensions…The truth, then, is often, in many ways, interesting, beautiful and sublime: but it is not identical with beauty either in quality or extension or status.

(1972c, 522-23)

The distinction between truth, beauty, and even the good, does not detract from their overarching interrelationship: despite differences between the individual concepts of the true, the good, and the beautiful, the relationships are both possible and necessary.71 Moreover, beauty is the strand that binds the concepts to one another, even while the beautiful remains distinct from the others because of its conditions for fulfillment.

CONDITIONS OF BEAUTY: MATERIALS, FORM, AND EXPRESSION

Santayana identifies the three types or conditions of beauty: materials, form, and expression, which allows for the possibility of the better experience of beauty. The first type is material, which consists of the senses, or human functions. He states, “The beauty of material is thus the groundwork of all higher beauty, both in the object, whose form and meaning have to be lodged in something sensible, and in the mind, where sensuous ideas, being the first to emerge, are the first that can arouse delight” (1955j, 51). The second type – form – Santayana argues, is “the

---

71 This interrelationship is reminiscent of Aristotle’s criterion for the unity of plot. As he writes, “From what we have said it will be seen that the poet’s function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, i.e. what is possible as being probably or necessary” (1954a, 1451a36-39).
most remarkable and characteristic problem of aesthetics” (1955j, 53). Beauty in this sense, however, is not reducible to form because that would give rise to the notion that all forms are equally beautiful. Regardless, it is in form that gives rise to the charm we feel about an object, the relation of its parts, and the unity, symmetry, and harmony it embodies. Importantly, Santayana also argues, “It would be an error to suppose that aesthetic principles apply only to our judgments of works of art or of those natural objects which we attend to chiefly on account of their beauty. Every idea which is formed in the human mind, every activity and emotion, has some relation, direct or indirect, to pain and pleasure” (1955j, 69). Thus, while we may consider rhetoric an art and thus easily apply Santayana’s understanding of beauty to it, rhetoric reaches beyond this simple inclusion. From Santayana’s view, every thought and idea, which he explicitly includes rhetoric, has a relationship to aesthetics and, more significantly, to beauty.72 Moreover, Santayana also points to form in language. That is, “The main effect of language consists in its meaning, in the ideas which it expresses. But no expression is possible without a presentation, and this presentation must have a form” (Santayana 1955j, 103). Thus, form offers the capacity to provide unity to parts and exists in every possible activity through the very symbolism of the action. Otherwise put, language makes possible form and the invention and selection of its arrangement heightens its beauty. The form, then, may exist within the mind in thought or in articulated thought.

This articulated thought leads to Santayana’s third type — expression — of beauty. Through our ability to name and classify things we are better equipped to communicate. Nevertheless, form itself is not equivalent to expression despite the strong relationship between them. Expression, specifically, “may thus make beautiful by suggestion things in themselves

72 To be clear, however, all pleasures are valuable but not all are related to the sense of beauty; in order to discern the aesthetics we must eliminate physical pleasures: “Aesthetic pleasures give us the illusion of immateriality and spiritual freedom, but the physical pleasures draw us back to the clay of which we are made” (Singer 1957, 41).
indifferent, or it may come to heighten the beauty which they already possess” (Santayana 1955j, 120). Form and expression are not always easily differentiated because we have a tendency to spontaneously attribute emotion and value to a particular thing or fact in the moment rather than trace (if tracing is even possible) the various relationships within our memory between the thing and its emotion or value (Santayana 1955j, 120). Moreover, Santayana says, “if expression were constituted by the external relation of object with object, everything would be expressive equally, indeterminately, and universally” (1955j, 121). Perhaps even more significantly, Santayana forwards the idea that thoughts go unexpressed if the words do not arouse the interlocutor, and that “expressiveness of everything accordingly increases with the intelligence of the observer” (1955j, 121). Thus, expression, though distinct, requires form. It is value-laden by our own accord and, as such, contains within it infinite possibility. Through expression, we have the capacity to make things appear beautiful or more beautiful depending on the very way in which we express some thing or idea. While Santayana does not explicitly call on rhetoric to forward his conception of beauty, we can see how his remarks on aesthetics, namely art and the conditions of beauty (material, form, and expression) lend themselves to rhetoric and vice versa.

CONCLUSION

I have shown, then, how Santayana argues distinct functions of the beautiful, yet nonetheless beauty also secures a relationship between all three concepts of the true, the good, and the beautiful. Beauty itself is indefinable and thus we may only identify the conditions for a sense of beauty. This sense of beauty largely depends on objectification, which deals with appearance and perception grounded in individual experiences. These experiences rely on the materials of beauty, primarily sight and sound, to provide the possibility of visualizing either through
physical objects or conceptual descriptions. Our sense of beauty creates or reinforces circulating values and understanding of good and truth. Beauty, too, in this sense is a positive value because it not only has the possibility to harmonize these goods and truths, but also harmonizes humans with their environments – a harmonization that is then reflected in a community’s art and discourse. In fulfilling these functions, we feel aesthetic satisfaction, which, because of beauty’s influential capacity, “comes to perfect all other values; they would remain imperfect if beauty did not supervene upon them” (Santayana 1904, 326). These values spring from our understanding of the true and the good, which result from the impulses, desires, and needs within an individual set of material circumstances. In order to work effectively within these circumstances we attempt to impose order on nature. If instituted positively, leading to harmonization and happiness, we find ourselves on the path to leading a life of reason. In this way, “Aesthetic values everywhere precede and accompany rational activity” (Santayana 1962d, 128). Beauty, then, in the service of and making possible the life of reason, must prompt and guide our impulses that give rise to choices and simultaneously coexist with such impulses and choices in order to move toward this life of reason.

Santayana impresses upon on the significance of viewing the concepts of the true, the good, and the beautiful alongside one another and as part of a whole. Each concept has its own individual function but nevertheless work harmoniously together, connected through the underlying principle of beauty. Santayana also recognizes beauty’s significance to rhetoric,

---

73 “Sense,” Santayana writes, “is the native element and substance of experience” (1962d, 126).
74 Santayana argues that beauty, as a value, is positive, intrinsic, and immediate. He says, “Evidently all values must be ultimately intrinsic” (1955j, 19). Things of the imagination (the domain of aesthetics) have intrinsic value; they constitute “one of the sources of all worth” and values are reducible to immediate appreciations, to sensuous or vital activities (1955j, 20). Aesthetic goods are thus established as “the only pure and positive values in life” and thus liberated from practical entanglements. One consequence is that morality is a means not an end, not intrinsically valuable. The various satisfactions which morals are meant to secure are aesthetic (Santayana 1955j, 19-20).
75 For additional discussion on this argument see Santayana’s remarks on the attempt to separate aesthetics from other interests, especially those things that we deem “practical” and how they inevitably “fall prey to aestheticism” (1904, 325-26).
though he does not always use the term rhetoric to identify this connection. He claims beauty’s
principle is “the art of assimilating phenomena, whether words, images, emotions, or systems of
ideas, to the deeper innate cravings of the mind” (1957, 272). We can see comparable aims
within rhetoric, which is to say that rhetoric, as an art of persuasion and identification endeavors
to integrate interests with words, images, emotions, and ideas. The similarities notwithstanding,
beauty is not identical to rhetoric. Beauty, rather, binds together rhetorical concepts as it binds
together the concepts of the true, the good, and the beautiful. Thus, while striving to look at each
concept on its own attempts for a deeper understanding of the concept, we must use caution in
leaving the ideas in “parts” without considering the effect on the whole. While this project does
not aim to resuscitate the old debate traced back to Plato, it does aim to breath air into beauty,
reviving its significance and articulate it as a significant principle of rhetoric, even while
allowing for the various parts of rhetoric to have their own individual functions, though
potentially necessitating some rearranging of our rhetorical priorities. I focused first on the
individual functions and relationship between the true, the good, and the beautiful to identify
some points of emphasis that overlap with rhetoric. The truth that we can and must address is a
subjective one, created and disseminated in a world of symbols, which we understand as *doxa.*
The good derives from personal impulses, desires, and preferences that affix meaning and value
to those symbols. The beautiful influences and attracts us to certain truths and goods but can also
be viewed as the higher good we seek in exploring and making rational those various truths and
goods. These varieties and endless possibilities require choices for the good of an individual and
the good of the community. Thus, the next chapter considers how impulses and desires transform
into interests that circulate as the truths and goods and rhetoric’s role in this process.
CHAPTER TWO

FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COMMUNITY:

VALUES, EXPERIENCE, AND THE LIFE OF REASON

“But if these plain facts were all I had to go on, how did I reach those strange conclusions? What principles of interpretation, what tendencies to feign, what habits of inference were at work in me? For if nothing in the facts justified my beliefs, something in me must have suggested them.”
– Santayana 1955k, 4

“Expression is a misleading term which suggests that something previously known is rendered or imitated; whereas the expression is itself an original fact, the values of which are then referred to the thing expressed.”
– Santayana 1957a, 264

“But value lies in meaning, not in substance; in the ideal which things approach, not in the energy which they embody.”
– Santayana 1957a, 284

As I have shown in the previous chapter, rhetorically conceived, the true, the good, and the beautiful operate together while eliminating extraneous aspects of their categories (i.e. universal, absolute, etc.) and, while exhibiting unique individual attributes remain harmoniously connected. Truth rests on contingency, made stronger with belief, yet still accounts for multiple perspectives. Natural instinct and impulse produce preferences, which influence belief and give rise to moral standards and communities. The preferences we have are largely based on sensuous, and therefore aesthetic, experience through which beauty influences and attracts.

While the beautiful exists as its own category, beauty itself also has an influence on the way in which we understand both truth and goodness. Thus when conceiving of these categories rhetorically – as symbolic expressions of individual preference – it is necessary to consider how
they interrelate. Moreover, we now have a starting point from which to explore the idea of individual preference and the individual’s relationship to her community where beliefs circulate to reinforce or modify principles of action – both symbolic and practical. Thus the relationship between individuals and communities has significant rhetorical possibilities, significant for an aesthetic perspective on rhetoric for at least two reasons. First, the way in which individuals come to their beliefs has strong ties to beauty as an influencing factor. Second, individuals are starting points but they remain connected to their communities and therefore require us to examine the reciprocal relationship of influence and belief between individuals and communities. While the notion of individuals and communities itself is not unique, when viewing the relationship vis-à-vis Santayana we gain a different perspective of how rhetoric operates in the relationship. This chapter proceeds, then, by looking first at the relationship between the individual and the community. Second, because impulses and preferences within an individual create value assignments, disseminated within the community, I examine the relationship between interests and value. Third, I attend to Santayana’s understanding of experience – examining how it connects both to skepticism and knowledge as well as how it operates within appearances – in order to explain experience as a source of belief. Fourth, the circulation of belief that arises from experience requires that we (re)examine rhetorical concepts, specifically showing how Santayana enables us to reconsider the concepts of doxa, dissoi logoi, dialectic, and phronesis as constitutive elements within the individual, among the community, and between the individual and community. As a result, and despite individuals at odds with changing beliefs both internally and externally, harmony remains possible.
INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES

As human animals, we are born into a world of natural order that we often perceive as chaos, making attempts to organize it in ways that aid in preserving our life within that environment. This view may be considered a sort of rational chaos whereby we attempt to achieve internal order within individuals and apply that order externally within communities. Marcus Aurelius captures this sentiment when writing, “An ordered world or a mishmash. But still an order. Can there be order within you and not in everything else? In things so different, so dispersed, so intertwined?” (2002, 4.27). Even when things appear as chaos nature itself constitutes it as order, despite a human tendency to attempt to control her environment. Likewise, Santayana’s commitment to materialism influences this understanding of order and chaos, leading him to characterize nature both as continuous and as something containing its own tendencies toward complexity and beauty. “Order,” he writes, “is accordingly continual; but only when order means not a specific arrangement, favourable to a given form of life, but any arrangement whatsoever” (2011a, 23-4). Nature is only interested in her own tendencies, not that of human’s desire to control her. Because we are not always able to understand nature’s version of order, we at times perceive it as chaos. When we do understand it (as order), we are drawn to it, appreciating it as beautiful and rational. Understood or not, life requires that we navigate what nature doles out to us. Thus, a human tendency imposes a conception of order on the environment. As Coleman explains, “On Santayana’s view the universe consists of matter, which is dynamic and in flux, making existence thoroughly contingent. The material universe has produced living creatures with sensitivities that can be employed to satisfy natural impulses. All impulses are originally innocent, and from its own standpoint each one has an equal right to fulfillment” (2009, xxi – xxii). Although we recognize the need to exist within a particular environment, nature has
endowed us with natural abilities to satisfy the impulses for survival in that environment. Santayana calls this human domain the psyche, its concern being the material welfare of the living organism (Coleman, 2009, xlvii). Nevertheless, because we are at once endowed with and constrained by language, our tendency to explain and understand our existence in nature suggests that the impulse for preservation and meeting basic needs translates into attempts to navigate nature as well as a desire to make it meaningful.

Our ability to communicate within symbol systems prompts us to attach meaning to life through the various possibilities of the descriptions (essences) that we use. Santayana argues that “Life begins to have some value and continuity so soon as there is something definite that lives and something definite to live for” (2011a, 27). Consequently, humans do not simply attempt to preserve life; they also affix value to the life being preserved. With this value in place, humans are equipped to live their lives better or worse according to their established value criteria. That is to say that our natural instincts or impulses for survival are transformed into specific interests as a result of preferences that would allow a better or worse life, but one in line with the moral value we attach to what we deem better or worse. Santayana argues, “The root of morality is animal bias” (1972d, 483). Glenn Tiller further explains that, “The psyche establishes the ultimate criteria of preference for the individual and, for Santayana, morality is grounded in preferences—preferences as determined by the psyche with its system of physical predispositions and innate interests. Thus the psyche is the key to everything moral” (2000, 240). Moreover, while Santayana emphasizes the material roots and constraints that give rise to morality, he also attaches the cultivation of preference to aesthetics. “Taste,” Santayana writes, “is formed in those moments when aesthetic emotion is massive and distinct; preferences then grown conscious, judgments then put into words, will reverberate through calmer hours; they
will constitute prejudices, habits of apperception, secret standards for all other beauties” (1962c, 132). However, whereas individuals form preferences in consequence of their material circumstances, taste expresses an aesthetic sensibility for something better, or more specifically – more beautiful – within actual experience. The perceived beauty and order of the materials within our environment, then, influence our standards for good or bad, better or worse. Only after a standard is in place may we turn preferences into expressions and judgments, which elicits potential tensions between various expressions and judgments. “Collections of impulses,” Coleman attests, “manifested in living organisms inevitably conflict – both internally to the organism and externally with those of other creatures” (2009, xxxi-xxxii). Coleman’s comments, here, underpin the notion that, indeed conflicts can arise out of an array of possible interests. However, because the origin of preference resides in the individual, competition between preferences – and the ideas that result from those preferences – may only occur following the formation and articulation of such preferences within the individual.

The individual as a starting point should not suggest that external factors have no influence on any particular interests. At this level, humans have merely moved from needing to survive to surviving well based on a standard of living, one that they themselves put in place. This standard is the basis of value and of the meaning attached to interests, which subsequently give rise to or condition the emergence of a social and moral community. Santayana reminds us that as “moral individuals, we exist as persons, only imperfectly, by grace of certain essences kindly imputed to us by our own thoughts or by the thoughts of others” (1951b, 26). These essences, or ideas that can be communicated, exist both within the individual consciousness and externally in the sense that they can be communicated in symbolic form.¹ However, “The point

¹ Essence does not actually exist, but it does “exist” ontologically before existence. Essence “is what it is.” Whatever its character, it exists prior to existence whereby existence only instantiates that character. Cf. Schiappa
of chief speculative interest,” he continues, “is that morality, like health, is determined by the existing constitution of our animal nature, and the opportunities and denials that materially confront us; so that we are much deeper and more deeply bound to physical reality than our wayward thoughts and wishes might suggest” (1951b, 25). Individual material circumstances, then, provide both boundaries and possibilities. These circumstances affect thought and action, particularly because individuals will more often than not make preference for that which will make circumstances better and improve existence. Circumstances and preference, as a result, influence our judgments of morality – good or bad. Each individual claims right to this same process, which helps explains any possible conflict or harmony within or among individuals and groups depending on preference and evaluations. As an individual “the recognition of the material world and of the conditions of existence in it merely enlightens the spirit concerning the source of its troubles and the means to its happiness or deliverance” suggests that, “It is in the interests of life to become more intelligent and to establish a harmony also with the environment and the future” (1951b 13; 1951b, 23). Santayana’s articulation of the meaning attached to

---

for his distinction between essence and existence (2003, 120-21). Donald C. Williams expresses both Plato and Aristotle’s understanding of essence, remarking, “Plato, for example, taught that the essences are eternal prototypes, an ethereal aristocracy of ideals, laid up in heaven as pat- terns to be distantly imitated by the things that exist here below. Aristotle taught that the essence of a thing is its inner principle, its ontological soul which preserves and improves it, explains it, and makes it what it is, in contrast with the rest of its properties, which are merely accidental” (1954, 36). These characterizations are in contrast, Williams says, to Santayana’s own understanding: “Santayana saw with rare exactitude that the logic and ontol-ogy of essences are independent of the moral load laid upon them, and can be kept all the better when the latter is removed. The main error of the old theory was that it required of analytic ontology a discrimination between ‘essential’ properties and unessential ones which it could not provide” (1954, 37).

2 A similar, though not identical, sentiment exists in Burke’s notion of metabiology, whereby "Above all, the search is for arguments whereby Purpose may be restored as a primary term of motivation. Such a project is called a ‘Metabiology.’ The term is justified insofar as each biological organism has ‘purposes’ intrinsic to its nature (a specific nature which aims at some kinds of ‘good’ rather than others)” (1954, 168).

3 Moreover, Santayana writes, “Spirit – the voice of the inner nature in so far as it is already formed and definite – accordingly suffers continual defeats, by the defeat of those animal impulses which it expresses; and if these impulses become confused or exhausted, it sinks with them into vice or discouragement. It would not soon perish altogether, and annul the moral problem which its existence creates, unless in some way a harmony could be re-established between the individual and the world. This may be done in society at large by some firm political and moral regimen; or it may be done religiously by the discipline of the inner man” (1972l, 12). Both the communal
human life, within the conditions of material bases of that human life, implies the construction of moral value to idea and action. Not only must humans understand their own natural environment, they must also understand their own position in relation to others within that environment and with respect to future possibilities.

INTERESTS

Santayana rejects the question of why an individual values something and instead suggests that we should make inquiries into how goods are arranged hierarchically. Relegating the former concerns – origins of interests – to physics, he argues that the interpretation and meaning of the hierarchy of goods belongs to the domain of the philosopher. However, the philosopher is not confined to her academic limits; rather, she is a reflective and active participant in the theoretical and practical concerns of discourse and its effects. Santayana remarks, “The hierarchy of goods, the architecture of values is the subject that concerns man most” (1921a, 217). While we are bound in many ways to our material environment, our impulses merely to preserve life become

---

4 Santayana says, “Why any one values anything at all, or anything in particular, is a question of physics; it asks for the causes of interest, judgment, and desire. To esteem a thing good is to express certain affinities between that thing and the speaker; and if this is done with self-knowledge and with knowledge of the thing, so that the felt affinity is a real one, the judgment is invulnerable and cannot be asked to rescind itself” (1921a, 214). While relegating the origin of value to physics, cause of value belongs in a more interpretative realm. Preference and judgment of what is good (or otherwise) points to a rhetorical relationship between discourse and belief. Because discourse is not inherent but rather reflects preference and one’s environment, this intimates construction (and its reverse). When interpreting such construction of value and belief, then, we would be right to look to how or what influenced (or persuaded) the belief and if it is a dominant circulating belief (i.e., doxa).

5 In a similar vein, Isocrates suggests education provides training to apply theoretical notions practically, saying, “study will show you the way, but training yourself in the actual doing of things will give you power to deal with affairs” (1966e, 35). He later continues, arguing that “the well-educated man must, as the result of his training in whatever discipline, show ability to deliberate and decide” (1966e, 52). T. Poulakos echoes this interpretation, claiming that Isocrates recognized “that any feasible conception of political speech would have to come to terms with the ambiguity of doxa,” and points to the remedy for Isocrates, which is education (Poulakos 2004, 48-49). Moreover, Isocrates’ attempt to appropriate philosophy, naming it philosophia, for rhetoric shows the integration of philosophy and rhetoric. David Timmerman refers to this as Isocrates’ “fourth-century battle with Plato over the definition of philosophy” (1998, 145). Also see Isocrates’ Panegyricus 1-6; Isocrates’ Nicocles 5-9; Timmerman 1998, 152.
broader and transform into desires to live a better life. “Vital animal desires and impulses,” Arnett says, “combined with peculiarly human needs and characteristics in their relation to the environment, are the foundation of all the goods man can pursue” (1955, 4). While we are necessarily bound within our material environment, according to Santayana the psyche concerns itself with material preservation whereas the spirit is an immaterial consciousness. Because it does not have to concern itself with material preservation, it enables an awareness of the true, the good, and the beautiful. Spirit does this by prompting reflection and encouraging clarity, both of which assist in the production of ideals or in Santayana’s terms, eternal possibilities (Santayana 1962c, 136).

Ideals are influenced by material circumstances but born out of spirit, and therefore serve the true, the good, and the beautiful as symbolic disclosures of possibility – or, in Aristotelian terms, symbolic disclosures of that which could be otherwise. While some ideals we pursue because of our material limitations (e.g. preservation of life), the imagination helps to disclose to us possible ideals despite and beyond our given natural conditions.6 Ideals, in other words, are essences that provide eternal possibilities. As Santayana describes them, essences are “the whole of what is actually visible, audible, imaginable, or thinkable” (1951a, 502, emphasis in original). The pursuit of these ideals, what we perceive to be good in light of our preference and desire, is itself the Good. The Good comprises perfectly conceived ideals to pursue. Ideals need “a material basis, a soil and situation propitious to its growth” and subsist “as an eternal possibility” (Santayana 1962c, 136). Thus, impulses stimulate value experience and promote particular interests, out of which we choose interests to pursue or sacrifice in order to fulfill the ultimate goal of human happiness. All interests are somewhat related, even when considered

---

6 While the imagination is also essential in this description, I further attend to the concept of imagination in the following chapter.
incompatible, because humans create the idea of what is good and make judgments, about which interests to pursue and what values to promote, accordingly.

Santayana highlights the imprudence of isolating one interest from any others: “[To] pride oneself on holding a single interest free from all others, and on being lost in a specific sensation to the exclusion of all its affinities and effects, would be to pride oneself on being a voluntary fool” (1904, 325). When one prioritizes one interest over others – even when perceiving that interest as good – does not mean that there are not potential consequences of that choice. Moreover, because we cannot isolate an individual interest from others, so too we cannot abstract aesthetic interest from other interests: “To divorce in a schematic fashion one phase of rational activity from the rest is to render each part and the whole…irrational; such a course would lead in the arts, if it led to anything, to works with no subject or meaning or moral glow” (Santayana 1904, 325). Not merely a matter of recognizing an underlying aesthetics of interests, but rather, Santayana suggests, aesthetic interests are interwoven with general interests. As a result, we imbue meaning into rational holistic action that otherwise would be irrational, partitioned, and meaningless.

The creation of goods is an active, creative process. Santayana argues that we seek the good because it has power, but a “good…is good only because, at each point, life and aspiration are spontaneously directed upon it” (Santayana 1951b, 22). Thus, we may say that humans value and pursue the good actively and willfully, but how circulating goods are arranged hierarchically give rise to potential choices and conflicts within individuals and communities. These potential conflicts require us to consider why humans arrange the various goods as they do. As active and reflective participants in a community, humans subscribe to particular systems of value that seem
more amenable to their preferred arrangement of goods.\footnote{Again, Santayana defines the philosopher as anyone who has theoretical and practical concern about the discourse and its effects. Thus, anyone, including rhetoricians or those outside academia, who are invested in discourse constitutes this idea of philosopher and philosophy.} Not only do we prefer that which we find good, we are attracted to that which appears more beautiful than not. This attraction shows, in part, how aesthetics is part interests, but also how rhetoric and discourse influence the ways in which we create, preserve, or change the hierarchical arrangement of goods within individuals and communities. Moral sentiment invents fables: “For that which creates morality is not facts, nor the consequences of facts, but human terror or desire feeling its way amid those facts and those consequences” (Santayana 1972d, 478). Moral tendencies within communities do not rest on immutable facts or conditions, but rather a collection of preferences. These preferences produce myths and moral tales that function tautologically to justify the production of those myths and tales. This in turn produces various systems which humans may subscribe – religion, science, philosophies etc. Santayana, however, says that to become a philosopher without becoming a heretic means, “confessing that a system of philosophy is a personal work of art,” renouncing “all claim to be a system of the universe,” and concentrating “all its attention on personal experience, personal perspectives, personal ideals” (1936b, 100-01). In this context, the philosopher again is an active, reflective participant in her world. Thus when subscribing to a system, individuals should recognize that it is their own system – not a universal, absolute system applicable to others, much less everyone. Consequently, we should focus on personal experience, personal perspectives, and personal ideals. In this way, “Every man, in moral reflection, is animated by his own intent; he has something in view which he prizes, he knows not why, and which wears to him the essential and unquestionable character of good” (Santayana 1921a, 219). Tension and potential conflict surfaces, however, when individuals fail to account for these personal perceptions and instead assume shared sentiments.
While the individual should only account for her personal experiences, perspectives, and ideals, she has the tendency to assume a shared belief system. This assumption, though largely unsafe, particularly on a large scale, suggests that, although our beliefs are anchored in a contingent world and engenders the imposition of order, we have a strange relationship to stability. Santayana claims, “[Every] living body is mad in so far as it is inwardly disposed to permanence when things about it are unstable, or is inwardly disposed to change when, the circumstances being stable, there is no occasion for changing” (1925b, 41). While on the one hand we have a tendency for order and stability when faced with the opposite, on the other hand when things are perceived as too stable we have a tendency to provoke change. Although Santayana characterizes this as madness in individuals, it does not account for the possibility of time and/or cognitive development. In other words, if our environment remains stable, but, for example, the capacity for understanding that environment changes, it has consequences. It could enlarge our perspectives to the degree that we notice things in the environment that are not actually as stable as once thought or we may perceive the conditions, though stable, to be not as good as they could be. Even if the tendency is a lack of satisfaction, this tendency does not itself necessarily prevent rationality or the imposition of (new) order.

While each individual’s feelings and passions are her own, she acts as if others share those feelings and passions. As a result, she becomes more susceptible to those feelings. “All feelings,” Santayana argues, “in their living actuality, are private feelings, and all passions private passions; but by animal sympathy and contagion, the sense of each single feeling or passion sweeping through a crowd may possess each member of that crowd” (1995d, 343, emphasis in original). If, then, I believe others believe with me then I am more likely to strengthen that belief. Accordingly, individuals possess feelings and passions, but under the
assumption that other’s share those passions and feelings we become more impressionable to those others. As a result, both our own passions and the assumption that others share them are reinforced. Nevertheless, according to Santayana, “The individual…has a memory as the public has not” (1995d, 343). Otherwise put, the individual’s memory may only account for her private feelings and passions in a way that a public may not – since a public is an aggregate of the various individuals and their experiences that make up its community, suggesting that individuals will regularly confront conflict between their assumptions and actual circulating beliefs within the public and require choices between possible and competing interests.

Interests, then, originate in the individual but have influence on the community and the community in turn has influence on the individual. Individuals, bound to their material environments, have impulses to survive within that environment but those impulses transform into preferences that enable individuals to live better lives. These preferences are rooted in aesthetic sensibility, influenced by beauty, which produces conceptions of the true and the good within our moral and social communities. The imagination allows the capacity to envision ideals – possibilities – that reach beyond our environment. While this enables the creation of greater and better goods, it also means a created moral standard of better or worse affixed to these possibilities. Entrenched in moral value, individuals create and/or subscribe to various systems that are in line with these standards. When individuals, however, are within communities that have conflicting beliefs or belief systems we see persuasive attempts to make certain goods appear better than others in order to preserve or change prevailing doxa. Nevertheless, assumed shared beliefs may influence and reinforce preferences. Negatively, this assumption merely creates what Santayana deems opinion. Positively, however, this assumption cultivates one’s aesthetic taste because when communal values are good it strengthens our attraction (born out of
what appears to us as beautiful) to that which is good. Santayana’s understanding of what constitutes beliefs and opinions that arise in his discussions of interests strongly correlate to his understanding of experience because, for Santayana, beliefs correspond to and help shape experience.

EXPERIENCE & DOXA

Despite his distance from the rhetorical tradition and its jargon, Santayana points to the ways in which truths are rhetorically constructed and become part of the doxa of a community. Because our individual interests are influenced by our attraction to certain ideals, it makes sense that those interests would guide us toward or away from certain experiences. Those experiences operate within a world of appearance, suggesting that, if we accept Santayana’s claims about beauty, we are more influenced or susceptible to something’s persuasive capacity when we perceive its appearance as beautiful. The appearances that make up our experience, however, are perceived as real. Santayana claims experience, “at its very inception, is a revelation of things; and these things, before they are otherwise distinguished, are distinguishable into a here and a there, a now and a then, nature and myself in the midst of nature” (Santayana 1955a, 189, emphasis in original). To overcome the illusory nature of appearance, we construct beliefs as if they are truths, but once put into relation with other “truths,” they circulate and compete with other beliefs and values within our social experience, moving once again from individual to

---

8 Even as a discovery of things, experience requires an idea in the mind before we can deem it an experience: “[If] idea means expectation, or consciousness having intent, and if sensation means aesthetic contemplation of data without belief, then idea precedes sensation: because an animal is aware that something is happening long before he can say to himself what that something is, or what it looks like” (Santayana 1955a, 188-9). Santayana suggests, here, that as humans we are aware of something that transpires before we sensuously experience it and before we articulate that it happened. Thus, even if we accept something at face value, our capacity to translate that occurrence from mind to expression is limited to available symbolic articulations of that experience. Otherwise put, we may attempt to express as eloquently or precisely as possible, but we will still always be removed from anything real and dwelling in the realm of appearances. Santayana says, “Existence seems to re-establish itself in the very world of appearances” (1955h, 44).
Although we may take things as fact, our perceptions of those facts change with time and space, largely influenced by the symbols we use to give form to the ideas within our consciousness that, when expressed, come up against other expressed ideas. We construct these beliefs out of the very essences (communicable ideas) that we perceive. As Coleman argues, “To make its way through the natural world, the animal requires only symbols of material existence…essences – illusory as they may be – perform this symbolic function successfully enough” (2009, 82). Thus, in attempt to circumvent or elude illusion, we symbolically create beliefs that, once expressed and following their circulation, can influence the beliefs of others, also known as common belief or opinion (doxa).  

Rhetorical relationships to truth and knowledge have largely been influenced by Plato’s early statement that the sophists do not forward true knowledge, but rather mere opinion, what he referred to as doxa.  

Plato denigrated doxa and those who accepted it, arguing that it was not simply accepting opinion, which Plato views as unstable and not grounded in truth, but accepting the very notion of contradictions. Doxa, most commonly translated as opinion, common opinion, or shared beliefs, broadly refers to the realm of appearance in contrast with episteme, which emphasizes truth, knowledge and certainty. Early on, Havelock characterizes doxa as a

---

9 Singer argues that, “Insofar as ordinary experience is immediate, we are confronted by a determinate datum whose presence cannot be doubted. Insofar as our experience is mediate we interpret the datum in terms of other data and construct beliefs which are inevitably fallible” (1957, 13). This echoes Nietzsche’s understanding of truth, which is merely interpretation insofar as all language is metaphorical and does not correspond to actual things. See esp. “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” (1999b).

10 Ethan Stoneman states the transformation of perceptions is related to the aesthetic relationship to rhetoric, which “attempts to foreground the aesthetic capacity of rhetoric to create, sustain, and transform perception via the symbolic manipulation of appearances.” Although he does not specifically mention doxastic effects, the manipulation of appearances to alter perceptions contributes to the influence and strengthening of beliefs (Stoneman 2011, 130). Also see for aesthetic relationship to rhetoric: Farrell 1993; Whitson and Poulakos 1993; Vitanza 1997; Greene 1998b. For additional commentary on doxa, see Poulakos Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece (1995), Schiappa Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric (2003).

11 Cf. Plato’s Sophist 233c (1961g).

12 See Havelock for his commentary on contradiction as disease in Preface to Plato (1963, 248).

13 Cf. Havelock’s Preface to Plato (1963) for additional commentary on the contrast.
mental condition, faculty, or state of mind, challenging Plato’s depiction of *doxa* as “mere opinion” (1963, 235-239). Moreover, *doxa*’s relationship even in the position that they are opposite (e.g., Plato), to knowledge and truth, contributes to moral or ethical ways of viewing rhetoric.¹⁴ These conceptions of rhetoric and *doxa*, however, emphasize the social at the expense of considering how an individual affects or positions herself within a community. While obviously rhetoric should be concerned with communal affairs given its capacity for social influence, the way individuals come to ideas and express those ideas symbolically have potential consequences for rhetoric. Such consequences might include overlooking how an aesthetic rhetoric originates within individuals. Rhetoric, however, that lingers in epistemic roots becomes constraining. We create a rhetorical *doxa*, which constitutes the vocabulary and theory that we use to examine and critique rhetorical possibility. However, while theory and criticism strive to help break free of constraint it ironically has the potential, like all *doxa*, to stifle such attempts because of the limits of any one set of beliefs.¹⁵

Rhetoric as an epistemic operation relies too much on indubitable claims, particularly when considering that rhetoric treats the probable and the contingent rather than moving about in

---

¹⁴ Even after Scott advanced his assertion that rhetoric is epistemic – a form of knowing or certainty – which related to early discussions of knowledge and truth (e.g. Plato), many years passed before scholars had a renewed interest in *doxa* and its various possibilities. For example, *doxa* as social knowledge that contains relationships of status and rank (Hariman 1986, 1991a), unfettering rhetoric from the Platonic stranglehold, in the move to a doxastic conception of rhetoric (McKerrow, 1989), or a doxastic vision of rhetoric coupled with prudence as a means to evaluate the critic and move from epistemic views to moral/ethical views (Kuypers, 1996). See also Jasinski’s commentary on Cox’s conception of *doxa*: “In Cox’s (1987) view, rhetorical scholars and practitioners must engage what he termed ‘the scandal of doxa’ (Cox 7). Rhetorical discourse often attempts to generate something new or something that has not existed before” (Jasinski 186). But when attempting to generate something new, we are still constrained by the current accepted positions, beliefs, and opinions. “The solution to the dilemma, Cox suggested, would be to uncover the creative and critical potential of memory” (Jasinski 186); Farrell, T.B. (1993) *Norms of Rhetorical Culture*, in which Farrell advances *doxa* as a social rhetorical knowing; Swearingen, C.J. (1991) *Rhetoric and Irony: Western Literacy and Western Lies*; Poulakos (1995); Schiappa (2003).

¹⁵ It is likely the case that rhetoric that overlooks the individual would be constraining in general, attached or not to epistemology. The irony, in particular, with rhetoric as epistemic is that epistemology, which focuses on the faculties of the individual, generates such non – even anti – individualistic tendencies.
the realm of certainty. While some beliefs remain relatively stable, the context in which they arise always at least has the possibility of changing which then would require the beliefs to adapt, at least potentially and in order to maintain harmony, as well. The construction of beliefs occurs via an appeal to aesthetic sensibility grounded in individual experiences. This experience provides, at best, only an illusion of certainty. “Images and feelings,” Santayana asserts, “do not arise without a certain vital enthusiasm in forming or affirming them. To enjoy them is in some sense to hypostasize them and set them up as models to which other images and feelings should conform…Sensation, which makes the foreground of what is called experience, is thus raised by innocent faith to the level of truth” (1972c, 508-9). In other words, “Sense and fancy preempt belief” (Santayana 1972c, 508). While doxa, as communal belief, certainly provides models for ideas and behavior to the social world, it is our individual aesthetic sense that generates such ideas and this aesthetic sense originates within individual experience. Those sense experiences give rise to ideas taken as models and circulate as given truths. Even while Santayana prioritizes knowledge, his conception of knowledge is a type of belief, one that “precedes all deliberate use of intuitions as signs or descriptions of things” (Santayana 1955f, 179). Therefore, prior to the articulation and dissemination of communal beliefs, we had to create individual beliefs born out of our aesthetic sensibility. As Santayana argues:

[Knowledge] is true belief grounded in experience…controlled by outer facts. It is not true by accident; it is not shot into the air on the chance that there may be something it may hit. It arises by a movement of the self sympathetic or

---

16 Aristotle writes, “The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning. The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities: about things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this natures wastes his time in deliberation” (1954b, 1.2.12). Moreover, Aristotle writes, “A Probability is a thing that usually happens; not, however, as some definitions would suggest, anything whatever that usually happens, but only if it belongs to the class of the ‘contingent’ or ‘variable’” (1954b, 1.2.15).
responsive to surrounding beings, so that these beings become its intended objects, and at the same time an appropriate correspondence tends to be established between these objects and the beliefs generated under their influence.

(1955f, 180)

Belief and therefore knowledge originate in the individual and may become strengthened within a community as a response to surrounding beings, but, more importantly, that experience is shaped by the ways in which we symbolically express beliefs. Consequently, the way in which we understand discourse is both the most significant and the most adequate kind of knowledge humans have: “Knowledge of discourse in other people, or of myself at other times, is what I call literary psychology. It is, or may be, in its texture, the most literal and adequate sort of knowledge which a mind is capable” (1955f, 173-4). Individual experience, according to Santayana, is the substance of this type of knowledge. On this view, aesthetic sensibility gives rise to particular attachments to that which we perceive as good or beautiful, thereby creating models or standards for individuals and consequently communities. These standards, once articulated in the community, become beliefs that we understand as knowledge, or rather an attempt to understand the discourse that shapes the standards within the community. Knowledge, then, is not a matter of epistemology – of certainty or of science – but as part of individual and social experience we might recognize “the poetic quality of experience is more fundamental than its scientific value” (Santayana 1972f, x). Knowledge, as Santayana makes clear, has a relationship to aesthetically grounded experiences, which gives rise to discourse that disseminates beliefs and resulting values. Further, those beliefs and values necessarily work within appearances and contingencies. Thus, it follows that science, which attempts to deal

---

17 Santayana refers to knowledge of discourse as literary psychology, but also states that, “human experience is the stuff of literary psychology” (2009c, 54).
within certainties, has less of an impact than the poetic quality of experience and how that poetic quality influences what we perceive to know, even when such discourse might pose contradictions.

Santayana, despite an aversion to contradiction accepts a doxastic world, believing that disagreement or difference does not necessarily suggest contradiction.\(^\text{18}\) This belief about the constitution of disagreement or difference is born out of his conception of doxa, which results from his interpretation of Protagoras’ maxims.\(^\text{19}\) Santayana translates one maxim as “Man is the measure of all things, of that which is, that it is, and that which is not, that it is not,” arguing that this maxim acts as the first principle of humanism (1972a, 530). Taken as such, “Humanism begins in the moral sphere, with the perception that every man’s nature is, for him, the arbiter of values” and asserts that, “Nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so” (Santayana 1972a, 530; 531, emphasis in original). In the first place, then, Santayana emphasizes a moral sphere that instigates value meaning and within it humans have aesthetically influenced experiences. These morally backed experiences reinforce the perception that individual beliefs and actions are the right ones. Viewed as correct, these beliefs and actions also provide the criteria for moral

\(^{18}\) Santayana claims, “The disarray of intuitive ethics is made painfully clear in the conflicts which it involves when it has fostered two incompatible growths in two centres which lie near enough to each other to come into physical collision. Such ethics has nothing to offer in the presence of discord except an appeal to force and to ultimate physical sanctions. It can instigate, but cannot resolve, the battle of nations and the battle of religions” (1921a, 221). Otherwise put, although socially and sometimes grounded in systems incapable of doing justice to all people, we nevertheless need criteria for good or bad because the alternative is to use force. We should, however, recognize that the criteria is relative and with that recognition avoid the dogmatic assertion that one is more right than the other. Nevertheless, “Agreement is sweet, being a form of friendship; it is also a stimulus to insight, and helpful, as contradiction is not” (Santayana 1972f, xvii). Santayana was often charged with accepting relativity due to these views. He also accepted that charge, but insisted that relativity is not a bad thing. Relativity is not the same thing as arbitrary, which would in fact lead to trouble. Relativity, however, for Santayana, may actually resolve the problems of difference. Coleman remarks that, for Santayana, “Without a criterion of good and bad with actual relevance to life, nothing but force could settle differences among values; but acknowledging the relativity of values would eliminate contempt for opposing views and introduce greater justice into social relations” (2009, 410). Friedrich Schlegel has a concise fragment (Number 74) that captures this sentiment: “It’s impossible to offend someone if he doesn’t want to be offended” (1971, 152).

\(^{19}\) Santayana is unconcerned with the historical question of Protagoras’ maxims and says explicitly that he cares not how they were used in that historical context, stating, “I take them as public property, to be turned to the best uses of which they are still capable” (1972a, 530).
judgment of others’ behaviors. Second, Santayana makes clear that that good or bad does not really exist until thinking makes it so. However, for Santayana, “thinking” is merely another way to describe discourse itself: “Thinking is another name for discourse” (1955b, 291). Thus, while individual experiences have the potential to influence others, it is discourse that creates notions of good and bad and evaluative criteria for judgment. This understanding of discourse denies the possibility of a “true” nature and “ultimate” interests. If we tried to accept any such immutable truth, we would confuse, Santayana argues, human interests with human wishes. Thus, “Humanism, so understood, will have disintegrated humanity, declared all passions equally good and proclaimed moral anarchy” (Santayana 1972a, 531). Individual desires do not necessarily equate to morally backed ideas of good within a particular community. Such truth claims cause potential disintegration of the moral sphere, viewing each desire equal to any other. Even while we use a scale of degree – better or worse, not kind – good or bad, we should be leery, Santayana suggests, of changing it whimsically based on wishes or desires for the short-term rather than long-term principles of value.

Recognizing the construction of beliefs as a matter of degree suggests a difference between appearance and illusion, as well as how that distinction relates to doxa. Santayana explicitly comments on doxa when interpreting another Protagorean fragment. He translates it as, “True is what appears to each man at each moment.” While Santayana above pointed to the problems with capriciously changing values or the moral calculus from which we judge values, he also understands that any given moment what appears to individuals appears as a truth. Differentiating appearance from illusion, however, allows the recognition that doxa can change while simultaneously requiring rigid standards to determine how or when it should change. This dual recognition aims to avoid merely following fashions of a time that could cause irreparable
Santayana translates δοχεῖ as “appears,” which may also mean “seems true” or “is thought to be true” (1972a, 531). Santayana argues that it is as if we regard truth as omnipresent: “revealed by every thought or perception…capable of entertaining no appearance without regarding it as a description, and thinking it true” (1972a, 531). Otherwise put, in each moment because we take what appears to us as correct and true, we articulate it to others as a true and right description of our experience within our worlds. Santayana translates the word as appears because, “when that which appears is thought true the appearance becomes an illusion; and that this appearance is true only in the sense that it verily appears: in which sense all appearances are true equally” (Santayana 1972a, 532). As we see from Santayana, then, the only truth in the appearance is that it does indeed appear. If we fail to recognize our movement within the world of appearance then we operate in illusion, deceived by the appearance and possibility of constructing or reconstructing our ideas with our thoughts, or as Santayana puts it, our discourse. We always perceive things within appearances. In order to avoid illusion, Santayana defines appearance to mean “an adaptation of facts to the scale and faculty of the observer” (Santayana 1972f, xii). Such facts, of course, are not indubitable; rather, our perceptions of what we deem descriptions of fact are influenced by our attraction to what appears beautiful within our experience. The felt preference encourages the strengthening of certain beliefs, values, or attitudes, but overcoming the illusion that those beliefs, values, or attitudes are stagnant means accepting that the nature of appearances – and the contingencies that necessarily comprise those appearances – is always perceived from a human scale that can change from moment to moment, but nevertheless has constitutive principles that help guide how those changes occur.20 Even

20 Thus, while we may alter our judgments or measurements, we may nevertheless give an account of the “facts” as precisely as possible: “All experience yields some acquaintance with the realm of essence, and some perspective of the material world; and this would always be a true perspective (since things seen at that angle and with that organ really look like that) if the appearance were not stretched to cover more than it covers in reality. Of such true
while a strong interrelationship exists between personal experience and communal belief, they remain distinct. In other words, individuals manage internal interests, but once making those interests articulate, must also manage the possible resulting conflicts.

Confronted with the many different impulses and interests to preserve life and make it better, humans must make choices: to sacrifice some interests in order to pursue others. While our impulses generally make the attempt to protect the psyche, both natural and material environment concerns affect our capacity to create and to select interests with more or less variety. Moreover, additional limitations exist by what individuals perceive as beautiful. In other words, we will more likely pursue what appears to us as beautiful, strengthened when in pursuit of interests also underpinned by some greater good. Beardsley remarks that, “We have a lot of interests that are sometimes favored, sometimes not, in the world into which we were born. However, our job is to harmonize those interests into a whole whereby we give our lives character and quality, and also realize some central or dominant good (1966, 329). In order to harmonize conflicting interests, Santayana claims, humans must create and preserve “the happy marriage of two elements – impulse and ideation – which if wholly divorced would reduce man to a brute or to a maniac. The rational animal is generated by the union of these two monsters. He is constituted by ideas which have ceased to be visionary and actions which have ceased to be vain” (2011b, 4). In other words, we uphold the impulse for preservation but do so with a mind to how ideas further benefit individuals and communities. The imbalance of interests, however, causes conflict and destruction in or of the moral world.

perspectives the simplest and most violently foreshortened may be as good as the most complicated, the most poetical or pictorial as a good as the most scientific, not only aesthetically but even cognitively; because it may report the things concerned on that human scale on which we need to measure them, and in this relation may report them correctly” (Santayana 1972f, xiv).
Because preferences originate in the individual, and beauty is both the means and ends of interests, we must cultivate good taste in order to rationally make choices that affect both the individual and the community. As Coleman puts it, “good taste has a social aspect and a sense of broader human satisfactions beyond the personal and subjective” (2009, 320). This requires, Santayana argues, a rational severity – “weeding the garden” and thus expressing “a mature aesthetic choice [that] opens the way to supreme artistic achievements. To keep beauty in its place is to make all things beautiful” (1962d, 129). Beauty’s place, in other words, is its influence and expression in all things, requiring the union of the individual and the community, in both types of life, “commonly led in the world in well-nigh total separation, one a life of impulse expressed in affairs and social passions, the other a life of reflection expressed in religion, science, and the imitative arts” (2011b, 3). Without such union, interests based in preference do not demonstrate a cultivated taste, causing conflict rather than harmony. While each individual’s preference develops in a contingent world of appearances, and all are potentially different from another, they remain equally valid. That is to say, each preference has an equally valid existence even if rated on a scale of better or worse. Therefore, when such difference has the right to exist but not the pleasure of being equally good, the goal is to find a way to harmonize different interests – either within oneself or among others. Santayana tells us that “experience and reason may teach [us]…how to make…self-assertion well balanced and

---

21 David Hume endeavors to give treatment to the idea of an aesthetic rationale. In his essay, “Of the Standard of Taste,” he writes, “It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision afforded, confirming on sentiment, and condemning another” (1910, 217). The problem of course, is that while, for Hume, people with truly great taste are far and few between, revealing the issues of changing opinion, education, and standards that make it difficult to achieve a universal principle of taste.  

22 Santayana maintains, “So the notorious diversities which human taste exhibits do not become conflicts, and raise no moral problem, until their basis or their function has been forgotten, and each has claimed a right to assert itself exclusively” (1962c, 131).
successful” (Santayana 1962c). Moreover, Santayana explains, we might preserve our tastes but learn to justify them:

In the same way taste is bound to maintain its preferences but free to rationalise them. After a man has compared his feelings with the no less legitimate feelings of other creatures, he can reassert his own with more complete authority, since now he is aware of their necessary ground in his nature, and of their affinities with whatever other interests his nature enables him to recognise in others and to co-ordinate with his own. (Santayana 1962c, 131)

While preferences and interests originate in individuals who have the potential to cultivate the task of making choices so as to achieve or maintain harmony among self-interests, the question becomes how to harmonize those interests when confronted with others doing the same thing, that, when such preferences and interests strengthened among numbers, become part of conflicting belief systems within communities.

Just as individuals must cohabitate with others, so too must their ideas, which inevitably leads to the possibility of conflict. Nevertheless, Santayana argues that this cohabitation requires cooperation.23 “Ideas, like men, live in society,” Santayana claims, “Not only has each a will of its own and an inherent ideal, but each finds itself conditioned for its expression by a host of other beings, on whose co-operation it depends. Good taste, besides being inwardly clear, has to be outwardly fit” (1962c, 136). Thus, it is not only a matter of cultivation of taste for the mere pursuit of interests and ideals, but refinement for the capacity to articulate such ideals, carry them out, and allow others to do the same. To anticipate aesthetic taste is the end of rhetoric, if only for the sake of harmony and cooperation. If communities pursue ideals for the sake of the

---

23 This focus on cooperation enters Kenneth Burke’s territory. Burke defines rhetoric as “symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols” (1969b, 43).
good, comprised of various beliefs, then they act on this inclination as a “demand to be carried out, [but] when once an idea has become articulate it is not enriched but destroyed if it is still identified with its contrary” (Santayana 1962c, 135). Even while Santayana recognizes potential difference among articulated and disseminated beliefs he still shifts the focus from conflict to harmony. Even more interesting, however, is his emphasis on a personal (individual) aspect to belief:

The cry, *How beautiful!* or *How good!* may be sincere, and it may be applauded, but it is never true. If sincere such a cry is also never false, even if not re-echoed by the public conscience; because the public feeling that contradicts it can also never be true, but at best also sincere. Where sentiment is diffused and unanimous, if one person utters those exclamations, all the rest may no doubt murmur, *How true!* And indeed, to that extent the judgment will then be *true morally*: that is, it will express the bias of human nature. (Santayana 1972d, 479-90, emphasis in original)

Such belief, even when echoed among many, may only be true in a subjective, contingent sense. While we may live in a moral world, any cries of true, good, or beautiful merely indicate the predispositions or partiality of human perspectives, *not* a universal truth to which we must subscribe – or to which we would be justified in imposing on others. Even though we may strengthen belief through a multitude of people echoing similar sentiments, an echo that influences a moral dynamic of a community, the numbers behind an idea nevertheless do not constitute a “truth.” Santayana emphasizes two important things regarding the moral community and belief when stating, “But social morality – and all morality is deeply social – is necessarily divided at home and threatened from abroad. Invective and propaganda are instruments in this
animal warfare; they are useful in maintaining discipline, in breaking the enemy’s spirit, and in
capturing as many loose ambient forces as possible to the support of your particular regimen”
(1972d, 482). First, he explicitly argues that all morality is social. The reverse logic applies as
well, that is, all society is moral: because we live along side others, we need a moral calculus for
judgment to evaluate beliefs and actions. Nevertheless, just because judgment is the natural
tendency of communities, it does not necessarily follow that an evaluative necessity equates to an
appropriate judgment. Second, and related, because communities assume a deep moral cohesion,
when such cohesion is threatened either from within or abroad there arises a strong tendency to
censure or use critical language to support a belief system while simultaneously opposing
another.24

The “divide and conquer” mentality may certainly work effectively, but the more
important component of Santayana’s emphasis is that as part of our animal faith we believe we
are cohabitating with others who think and feel similarly. Santayana suggests this tendency to
believe that others will react and act identically is the result of a “common madness:” “For when
kindred bodies have the same habitat and the same arts they also have the same illusions; and
their common madness gives to each a perfect knowledge of the other’s mind” (1925b, 48-9).25

Because of common situations or environments, then, humans have the tendency to believe, as a
matter of self-deception really, that they have the capacity to know others’ minds and also act or
react based on that illusion. Beauty and language influence these types of presumptions.
Santayana remarks that, “The beauty of truth is not great enough to attract the eye for its own
sake. The truth is often ugly or terrible, and almost always less simple and unqualified than our
love of eloquence would wish it to be. Discourse instinctively deviates from the truth, to set forth

24 What Santayana describes is comparable to Kenneth Burke’s notion of identification and its implication of
division. See A Rhetoric of Motives (1966b, 45).
instead something more manageable, more rhythmical, more flattering (1936b, 96). Thus, while many pay lip service to seeking the “truth,” discovering it as in some way unbecoming shatters the illusion that this type of truth offers. Our discourse veers from the truth so as to make things more manageable and beautiful – at least apparently so – helping to create systems of belief that we accept or stubbornly hold close. Santayana, however, also acknowledges discourse as a solution, “by giving to everyday beliefs a more accurate and circumspect form” and by “[laying] siege to the truth only as animal exploration and fancy may do so, first from one quarter and then from another, expecting the reality to be not simpler than my experience of it, but far more extensive and complex” (1955i, vi).²⁶ By cautiously approaching “truth” from multiple perspectives and expressing subsequent beliefs and judgments of belief with an understanding that these actions are grounded in a contingent and apparent world, we are working within our own capacity of sound reason.

While humans have the capacity for such reason, emotive powers may trump rational belief. “The brute necessity,” Santayana claims, “of believing something so long as life lasts does not justify any belief in particular” (1955d, 9-10). While we need to believe in something, that need does not require us to believe in any one thing over another. Many beliefs circulate within a community, but this does not mean we should arbitrarily select any particular belief over another.²⁷ Nevertheless, some spheres of discourse produce a higher probability of acceptance because the illusive truth exists more powerfully in those spheres. Unsurprisingly, these are the

²⁶ Form is an important concept, for Santayana, for aesthetics, and for rhetoric. However, I address at length its relationship to aesthetics and rhetoric in the next chapter.
²⁷ In many cases, we associate these beliefs as fact as a means to avoid criticism of our belief systems. Santayana argues, “In the tangle of human beliefs, as conventionally expressed in talk and in literature, it is easy to distinguish a compulsory factor called facts or things from a more optional and argumentative factor called suggestion or interpretation; not that what we call facts are at all indubitable, or composed of immediate data, but that in the direction of fact we come much sooner to a stand, and feel that we are safe from criticism. To reduce conventional beliefs to the facts they rest on – however questionable those facts themselves may be in other ways – is to clear our intellectual conscience of voluntary or avoidable delusion” (1955k, 3).
aesthetic, the moral, and the political, all of which have a consubstantial relationship with each other and influential relationship with individuals and communities, i.e., beauty as the perceived substance and the influencing agent in each. Santayana writes:

Aesthetic, moral or political sentiments, for instance, because they arouse a certain enthusiasm, are proclaimed as truths; individuals and parties entrench themselves within those maxims with all the ferocity of hatred and fear: hatred and fear of the besieging reality, that would prove that no such feelings can express any objective truth, but only the life of some biological or political organism. (1972c, 511)

The capacity to arouse such powerful emotion, then, creates the persistence with which we subscribe to the beliefs that make up those spheres. When individuals presume, as part of their own “madness,” that other individuals hold the same beliefs (“truths”), the possibility to strengthen belief system occurs or the possibility for opposition arises, instigating discourse.28

While many rhetoricians approach the opposition within doxastic beliefs as a cause for dispute, Santayana attempts to obviate popular opinion that difference requires debate.

**DISSOI LOGOI**

The rhetorical concept *dissoi logoi* stems from Protagoras’s fragment of the same name and *Dissoi Logoi*, an anonymous ancient Greek text, both of which forward the idea of opposing

---

28 Consider Richard Vatz’s argument in “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,” when he advanced the claim that language (which is always value laden) creates a rhetorical situation. In the process of advancing his argument, he is also reversing the Bitzer position that situations invite discourse. Thus, we may perceive rhetoric as creating or making salience: “This [is the] *sine qua non* of rhetoric: the art of linguistically or symbolically creating salience. After salience is created, the situation must be translated into meaning” (1973, 160).
arguments or “two-fold arguments.” According to Rosamond Kent Sprague, *Dissoi Logoi* is “an anonymous sophistic treatise written in literary Doric at some time subsequent to the Peloponnesian War” (1968, 155). The text frames contrasting ideas in order to explore possible arguments for different sides. For example, *Dissoi Logoi* opens with “Concerning Good and Bad” stating, “Two-fold arguments concerning the good and the bad are put forward in Greece by those who philosophize. Some say the good is one thing and the bad another, but others say that they are the same, and a thing might be good for some persons but bad for others, or at one time good and at another time bad for the same person” (Sprague 1968, 155). The text goes on to examine the seemly and the disgraceful, the just and the unjust, etc. While characterized as “two-fold arguments,” what we really see are *polloi logoi*, or many arguments.

On the view that *dissoi logoi* means many positions, we might see how the concept exists in any of the rhetorical genres, yet the concept of *dissoi logoi* generates its own *dissoi logoi*. To illustrate, the good and bad antithesis above reveals that no absolute category of good and bad exists; rather, the idea of good and bad are merely degrees of better and worse dependent on the position of those who must characterize good and bad in comparison with some other thing, person, or position. Edward Schiappa analyzes Protagoras’ Two-Logoi fragment, translating it to mean, “Two accounts are present about every ‘thing,’ opposed to each other” (2003, 100). Schiappa argues that the fragment claims a relationship between language and the things of reality (2003, 98). However, focusing on the relationship between language and the “things of reality” implies that such a reality exists, when, in fact, discourse itself is responsible for creating

---

29 See “The Art of Debating” in *The Older Sophists* (Sprague 1972, 21) for fragments concerning Protagoras’ commentary of argument and *dissoi logoi* and *Dissoi Logoi* in *The Older Sophists* (Sprague 1972, 279-293) for the complete sophistic treatise.


31 Cf. Protagoras’ fragment Man is the Measure in “Truth or Refutations” in *The Older Sophists* (1972, 18).
or at least co-creating that “reality.” John Poulakos helps to clarify this latter claim, maintaining that in a world of discourse dissoi logoi admits of at least two possibilities “rather than consisting of “a singular, real logos awaiting to be discovered” and furthermore that dissoi logoi are human linguistic creations in unceasing contest with one another (1995, 188). If the notion of dissoi logoi is “the essence of deliberation,” between multiple choices within discourse, it follows that rhetoric plays an important role within that deliberation and the choices made based on that deliberation. However, while the other genres of rhetoric have equal affinity for enabling dissoi logoi within their domain, the deliberative genre of rhetoric, perhaps implicitly and because of its self-identified role of “deliberating,” gets emphasized as the dominant genre capable of producing and managing dissoi logoi.

Within each genre of rhetoric deliberation occurs. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle famously divided rhetoric into three familiar categories or genres: deliberative (political), forensic (legal), and epideictic (ceremonial) (1991, 1.3). And since Aristotle, the latter genre is often neglected and considered minor or inferior vis-à-vis the other two. Thomas Farrell, for example, argues that, “In the Rhetoric, the least complete and – many would argue – least rhetorical form of discourse under discussion is the discourse called ceremonial, or ‘epideictic,’ the form that bears closest resemblance to the genres of Poetics” (1993, 118). However, more recently, Jeffrey Walker has challenged the assumption that, “the ‘primary’ and most essential form of ‘rhetoric’—and the form in which it originates from the traditional, ‘preconceptual’ or predisciplinary discourse practices of archaic Greek society— is the practical oratory of political assemblies and courts of law” (2000, 4). Deliberative rhetoric, significantly, would fall under this primary and essential form of rhetoric. Even in the Rhetoric, Aristotle prioritized politics as
rhetoric’s most important domain. In the contemporary era, the focus on deliberative rhetoric maintains this emphasis and extends it to the popular notion of civic engagement. More specifically, scholars like Gerard Hauser or J. Gastil and W.M. Keith make rhetoric a primary tool for debate, argument, or judgment, often in the service of “deliberative democracy.” Even “deliberative democracy,” however, attracts ancillary debates with regard to its objective. Do we deliberate to create dialogue, to further a struggle in some common way, or attempt to find consensus? There are several basic assumption that undergird these questions: 1) deliberative rhetoric is most often associated with politics; 2) deliberative rhetoric deals with debate and argument in the service of politics; and 3) regardless of the nomenclature, deliberative rhetoric aims to achieve political consensus. These suppositions also circulate or argue using specific “god terms,” which uphold the common doxa of rhetorical discourse. Using such doxa helps preserve the notion that rhetoric, as persuasion, aims for particular ends within the doxastic expectations of a community. Yet, what is left unexamined is the possibility that rhetoric may not only be conceived of as something beyond persuasion, but something beyond persuasion within those doxastic expectations. This view, however, would require breaking from the tendency to avoid examining the principles that undergird our own speculations.

---

32 In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle examines what is “worthwhile to analyze” and says we may reduce deliberative discussions to finance, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws. However, he then concludes, “But all these subjects belong to politics, not to rhetoric” (1991, 1.4.7; 1.4.12).

33 See, for example, Gerard A. Hauser and Chantal Benoit-Barne’s “Reflections on Rhetoric, Deliberative Democracy, Civil Society, and Trust” (2002) and J. Gastil and W.M. Keith’s “A Nation That (Sometimes) Likes to Talk: A Brief History of Public Deliberation in the United States” (2005). These examples are hardly extensive since deliberative democracy, deliberation, etc., have become a topos in rhetorical scholarship; many references would work comparably well.


35 These assumptions, however, are not without exception or challenge, which I take up further in the next chapter.

36 Cf. Kenneth Burke’s notion of “god terms,” which helps to uphold and stabilize ideology through unification and stabilization vis-à-vis identification. Yet, identification may also divide especially to justify certain acts or beliefs. See esp. Burke 1969b, 19-29; 55-59.
Santayana complicates the emphasis on *dissoi logoi*'s role in deliberative rhetoric as a political genre, marked by debate, to achieve consensus. While the latter, and more traditional, focus ignores possible productive alternatives, Santayana’s view allows for harmonization among and between varying rhetorical possibilities. Moreover, even if we should achieve consensus, common ground, or even “common struggle,” those triumphs are necessarily provisional. If we are to consider something rhetorical, then we must consider Aristotle’s claim that in any instance of rhetoric, regardless of genre, certain things “admit of issuing in two ways.” Thus, deliberation may lend itself to achieving particular ends, but the ends themselves are only temporary because they are potentially grounds for further rhetorical acts. Rhetoric is not stable, nor is it about finding the only end; rather, it manages the possibilities that lay before us. This necessarily means, however, that the creation of possibilities must occur before deliberation about the possibilities. Finally, deliberation, then, need not focus on debate for some particular end but is obliged to consider how we might harmonize those possibilities. While he acknowledges that harmony does not presuppose the elimination of disagreement, Santayana reminds us that disagreement originates in the individual. Deliberation, therefore, may occur first within an individual and then within a community. The individual must accept or pursue particular ideals and goals that grow out of individual preference. As Coleman remarks,

---

37 Aristotle says, “we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question” (1957b, 1.2.12) or “one should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question” (1991, 1.2.12). See also John Poulakos’ *Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece* for an extended discussion, esp. 57-58 (1995).

38 See also Isocrates’ *Nicocles* 5-9, also known as the “Hymn to Logos.”

39 Michael Billig in *Arguing and Thinking* remarks that “The rhetorical implication is that different societies will possess different stocks of common-places, locating the seemly in different places” and later goes on to point out that “Values, like common-places, express generalities, rather than particularities” (1996, 239). Billig’s statements suggest confirmation of my interpretation of Santayana, which is to say that because of the relative nature of values and the possible claims that arise from those values, deliberation about them takes place after values are already in place.

40 In typical Santayana charm, he remarks that, “Truly the debating society has its idols, no less than the cave and the theatre” (1913, 144).
“disagreement was not condemnation of others’ views but rather expression of one’s own” (2009, xxxviii). The act of expressing one’s beliefs, then, suggests that the expression marks a reinforcement of an already circulating view or an attempt to modify or replace a belief.

Nevertheless, the potential competition between beliefs does not entail the castigation of another with opposing views. On the contrary, “Santayana thought moral pluralism more conducive to social harmony than absolutism” (Coleman 2009, 452). As Santayana puts it, “I cannot help thinking that a consciousness of the relativity of values, if it became prevalent, would tend to render people more truly social than would a belief that things have intrinsic and unchangeable values, no matter what the attitude of any one of them may be” (1913, 151). Thus, while much of the thought on dissoi logoi suggests a greater emphasis on debate, Santayana contrarily argues that the absence of such debate would elicit a more social (i.e., harmonious) community.

Moreover, deliberation is or should be used to achieve the conditions of reason and harmony.

Santayana believes that reason and harmony are possible if we consider transcending disputation as a functional means to promote a liberal democratic sensibility, or any particular political doxa that might hold sway in a given community. He declares, “The age of controversy is past; that of interpretation has succeeded” (2011b, 19). Controversy does not disappear altogether; rather, our focus on it as the means to achieve some political end does and he replaces it with interpretation. This emphasis on interpretation proposes the elimination (or at least the reduction) of refutation: There is no need of refuting anything, for the will which is behind all ideals and behind most dogmas cannot itself be refuted; but it may be enlightened and led to

---

41 Santayana relays a convincing analogy to express his position on relativity of values, specifically in his criticisms of what may be conceived as good or bad, which largely depends on the subject perceiving. He writes, “Food and poison are such only relatively, and in view of particular bodies, and the same material thing may be food and poison at once; the child, and even the doctor, may easily mistake one for the other. For the human system whiskey is truly more intoxicating than coffee, and the contrary opinion would be an error; but what a strange way of vindicating this real, though, relative distinction, to insist that whiskey is more intoxicating in itself, without reference to any animal; that it is pervaded, as it were, by an inherent intoxication, and stands dead drunk in its bottle!” (1913, 146).
reconsider its intent, when its satisfaction is seen to be either naturally impossible or inconsistent with better things (2011b, 19). This position presupposes that our responsibility to construct ideals stops with the individual and avoids attempts to construct ideals for communities. Instead, we should, according to Santayana, make use of the available ideals within a community for evaluative purposes. These judgments apply both to the conditions that give rise to ideals and assessment between competing ideals. “One ideal,” Arnett says, “can be judged, if at all, only in terms of a more inclusive or larger ideal” (Arnett 1955, 28). Ideals, then, are not (or should not, following Arnett), judged using a standard form of measurement, but rather again other ideals that may be more fitting with our own belief system(s). Indeed, this is precisely what Santayana means by human measure in the absence of some sort of absolute, all encompassing truth, which requires an ongoing reflection on and interpretation of the ideals to which we align. This form of interpretation asks that we consider the natural or environmental constraints imposed on individuals that put limits on attainable ideals. If such conditions produce ideals unfavorable to a community, then changing the conditions is a more prudent choice than merely refuting the ideals that were born out of those conditions.42 Although expressing one’s individual beliefs from one’s perspective contributes to the competing ideas circulating in a community, this should not give cause for debate as a means of eliminating alternatives. Reconciling alternatives within one’s own consciousness, as well as with respect to environmental conditions and others, requires knowledge. However, the knowledge required to achieve this type of reconciliation is

Coleman contends that Santayana has a “long-held belief that ideas exert no material influence but rather reflect material circumstances” (2009, 461). To a certain extent this is accurate. That is, the beliefs that accompany ideals that arise from material circumstances cannot, maybe by luck or accident, change the conditions. For example, I may not have a lot of money, but believing in the idea that hard work offers prosperity will not make it so. The conditions that prevent – individual and communal constraints – me from wealth must change first. Moreover, if we can change those conditions, it is probably the ideal of wealth will take on a different relevance (or irrelevance) as well. Santayana maintains, “Material conflicts cannot be abolished by reason, because reason is powerful only where they have been removed. Yet where opposing forces are able mutually to comprehend and respect one another, common ideal interests at once supervene, and though the material conflict may remain irresponsible, it will be overlaid by an intellectual life, partly common and unanimous” (1921b, 235).
belief grounded in experience and sympathetic to people’s social nature Santayana understands this idea as practical reason, a concept that shares some similarities with the more familiar rhetorical term *phronesis*, but extends a unique understanding of dialectic in order to achieve it.

**DISSOI LOGOI: THE NEW DIALECTIC**

Santayana departs from epistemologists in his discussions of knowledge because he believes both that knowledge is rooted in individual experience and that – due to the moral nature of social organisms – human beings often act (or assume to act) in common. On the one hand, individual experience, including that of the constraints of one’s environment, plays a large role in the beliefs one holds. The environment offers limited choices, from which we opt for the best and most attractive option available. These choices exist for particular beliefs as well. That is, individuals may find beauty in certain belief(s) over others. Beauty remains a subjective proposition, which explains why “the nerve of moral judgment is preference: and preference is a feeling or an impulse to action which cannot be either false or true” (Santayana 1972d, 473). So, even while moral and aesthetic judgment remain distinct, they are related because both are species of preference. The beauty we perceive in some thing influences our preferences. Whether that thing is an object, course of action, political belief, etc. is irrelevant, because, according to Santayana, all of those things are already steeped in morality. That is to say, our perceptions already contain human bias. Through our perceptions we judge objects, actions, or beliefs based on the constructed standard of judgment, assigning value to that object, action or belief. The more beautiful we perceive that thing to be, however, the more attached to it we become or more moral value we assign to it.
On the other hand, we generally act with the assumption already in place that others in similar environments must also have preferences and perceptions similar to ours. This assumption potentially reinforces ideas of beauty because we are more likely to act on those preferences and perceptions when we believe them to have high moral value. At the same time, however, these assumptions give rise to potential conflict if confused as truth. In other words, if one perceives beauty and feels preference for that beautiful thing, the preference remains subjective and contingent, yet in an instance of animal faith, we, “As sensitive and rational creatures…have a brute faith that we are in the presence of others who think and feel as we do in similar circumstances” (Coleman 2009, xxxiv). One believes that her preference somehow coincides with others who live alongside her. Yet, this belief is mistaken, in Santayana’s words an illusion, since each person’s preference cannot be the same even while each person’s preference remains equally valid. Santayana’s version of non-arbitrary relativism helps reduce what appears at first as contradictory:

The contradiction disappears when, instead of considering qualities in themselves, we consider the things of which those qualities are aspects; for the qualities of things are not compacted by implication, but are conjoined irrationally by nature, as she will; and the same thing may be, and is, at once yellow and green, to the left and to the right, good and evil, many and one, large and small; and whatever verbal paradox there may be in this way of speaking (For from the point of view of nature is natural enough) had been thoroughly explained and talked out by the time of Plato, who complained that people should still raise a difficulty so trite and exploded. (Santayana 1913, 142)
We may reconcile the differences that are in contention when considering the human construction and description of qualities not when ruminating on the quality – or value – itself. Describing, for example, good or evil will largely depend on the perspective from which a person views those values. Each person submitting an individual belief may create conflict with other beliefs in circulation. However, “in expressing these private views, it would not become heretical, or conflict in the least with human orthodoxy; for human orthodoxy does not ignore the fact that men have different sorts of imagination and emotion, that their affections and apprehensions are various, and that they do not approach by the same paths even those points on which they agree” (1936b, 101). Therefore, submitting a belief into the communal idea kitty (i.e. sensus communis) should allow for a greater variety of evaluation between the individual’s beliefs and those that oppose them in order to provide a deeper understanding of the belief and an opportunity to reinforce or alter that belief. This interpretation of dissoi logoi reduces the possibility within dominant interpretations to, perhaps implicitly, condemn others’ views in opposition to one’s own. Moreover, Santayana places emphasis on the relativity of perspective and the arbitrary nature of belief itself. As he observes, “What religion a man shall have is a historical accident, quite as what language he shall speak. In the rare circumstances where a choice is possible, he may, with some difficulty, make an exchange; but even then he is only adopting a new convention which may be more agreeable to his personal temper but which is essentially as arbitrary as the old” (1905a, 5). Choices, of course, exist. Nevertheless, and regardless of the which choice, belief systems are always relative to the environment in which we are born which was a matter of luck. In place of a recalcitrant adherence to any one belief or another, Santayana argues for the more prudent pursuit of ideals that promote the good of the
individual and her community.\footnote{Santayana wittily describes the difficulty individuals have in relinquishing their illusions, particularly when challenged by those who do not share the same beliefs, when saying, “The philosophy of the common man is an old wife that gives him no pleasure, yet he cannot live without her, and resents any aspersions that strangers may cast on her character” (1955f, 11).} In this way, Santayana argues, “There is no ideal \textit{a priori}; an ideal can but express, if it is genuine, the balance of impulses and potentialities in a given soul. A mind at once sensuous and mobile will find its appropriate perfection in studying and reconstructing objects of sense” (1962d, 124). Objects of sense, then, influence our perceptions and the resulting preferences, ideas, and ideals that guide us toward the good.

We are drawn to beauty, viewing it as a contributor to our perceptions of order and harmony, which suggests that beauty has a great persuasive capacity. Otherwise put, when we view objects of sense as beautiful those objects have the potential to have more influence on us. Knowledge and understanding include a cultivation of taste that elevates one’s sense of beauty, despite beauty’s subjectivity. This cultivation, notably, includes the capacity to understand one’s own and others’ discourse: “[Knowledge] is rooted in material interaction, not intuition. Knowledge is not intuition of ideas but faith in existing objects and intuited essences that function as better or worse symbols of those objects” (Coleman 2009, xliv). For Santayana, knowledge is not a matter of some specific expertise or authority, but of things in general and those things that attract our attention.\footnote{We see Aristotle’s influence on Santayana here. Santayana declares, “The object of this tentative knowledge is things in general, whatsoever may be a work (as I am) to disturb me or awake my attention” (1955f, 181). Aristotle opens his \textit{Rhetoric} by claiming that rhetoric is the counterpart to dialectic because “both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defined science,” or what we might call a generalist (1991, 1.1.1).} Beliefs circulating as doxastic truths can function as better or worse symbols that influence and attract our attention. This attraction affects (potentially, at least) an individual’s preference. Nevertheless, there are those people who may add additional persuasive reinforcement to those beliefs. Typically, they are the so-called (and so-perceived) experts. Santayana argues, however, that, “A moralist who rests in his intuitions
may be a good preacher, but hardly deserves the name of philosopher. He cannot find any authority for his maxims which opposite maxims may not equally invoke” (1921a, 231). In other words, any proposed set of values or systems of beliefs can be put in opposition or substituted with others just as legitimate due to the arbitrary nature of beliefs grounded on material (and uncontrollable) factors combined with subjective preferences transformed into beliefs contingent on and springing from those facts. The fear of illusion, Santayana claims, drives minds to skepticism and acts as a corrective or method for circumventing illusions that confront us in a world of appearances (i.e., doxa or belief). More specifically, “Scepticism is a suspicion of error about facts, and to suspect error about facts is to share the enterprise of knowledge, in which facts are presupposed and error is possible” (Santayana 1955d, 8). He argues that only three alternatives are possible, the first – the easiest but less likely – is death. Death may resolve or reconcile any potential illusions, but since we cannot modify it via discourse it is more of a facetious way of pointing out the impossibility of avoiding appearances and illusions altogether.45

In contrast to death, the second alternative, which Santayana identifies as correcting errors of perception and substituting one belief for another, proves more rhetorically interesting, especially as it relates to doxastic beliefs and predominant understandings of dissoi logoi,46 While dissoi logoi purports to put beliefs into positive opposition, largely it only manages to contribute to disputation among “experts” (moralists) regarding established, yet contingent,

---

45 Bitzer, for example, argues that a rhetorical situation contains three parts: exigence, audience, and constraints. The exigence, he claims, is “an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be” and “An exigence which cannot be modified is not rhetorical” citing death as an example (1968, 6).

46 The second option highlights what “regular” rhetoric does. That is, in the service of persuasion for particular ends, like consensus or deliberative democracy, the move to “correct” an individual or community’s perceptions in order move from one belief to another is merely a substitution without reconciliation or harmonization.
beliefs or belief systems. Santayana maintains that, “To settle the relative merits of rival authorities and of hostile consciences it is necessary to appeal to the only real authority, to experience, reason, and human nature in the living man. No other test is conceivable and no other would be valid” (1921a, 231). Thus, dissoi logoi’s tendency toward dispute or mere replacement of one belief with another is insufficient, relying on the “expert” to guide rather than the capacity for one’s own reason as the principle evaluative tool. He cautions that, “[A] conscience which is irreflective and incorrigible is too hastily satisfied with itself, and not conscientious enough,” but forwards the solution to this conscience claiming, “it needs cultivation by dialectic” (1921a, 231-32). This sort of cultivation through dialectic leads to the harmonious use of reason within an individual that significantly carries with it the possibility of influencing the beliefs of a community. Alternatively, the absence of reason carries the possibility of the inefficacy of condemnation masquerading as debate.

Santayana’s dialectic, deriving from Plato’s conception of dialectic as a corrective to the sophistical traditions of his time, is his third alternative to illusions and relies on skepticism. Santayana advocates for, but also cautions us, that skepticism is not a worldview, but a means of creating the conditions for appropriate criticism:

[Scepticism] is an exercise, not a life; it is a discipline fit to purify the mind of prejudice and render it all the more apt, when the time comes, to believe and to act wisely; and meantime the pure sceptic need take no offence at the multiplicity of images that crowd upon him, if he is scrupulous not to trust them and to assert

47 Aristotle argues that we generally believe people who appear to have ethos – or credibility and character – more than others. “There is persuasion through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent more quickly than we do others on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person” (1991, 1.2.4).
nothing at their prompting. Scepticism is the chastity of the intellect, and it is
shameful to surrender it too soon or to the first comer. (1955c, 69)

Skepticism not only chastens the intellect, but it also helps to avoid analyzing experience as
some sort of epistemological goal of understanding knowledge. Skepticism, alongside rhetoric,
avoids the pitfalls of assuming knowledge and instead attempts to create an understanding of
experience as the construction and acceptance of beliefs which circulate as knowledge, even if
only apparently so. Santayana argues that non-deceptively believing only occurs when
recognizing, but not submitting to, illusion:

“[To] entertain the illusion without succumbing to it, accepting it openly as an
illusion, and forbidding it to claim any sort of being but that which it obviously
has; and then, whether it profits me or not, it will not deceive me. What will
remain of this non-deceptive illusion will then be a truth, and a truth the being of
which requires no explanation, since it is utterly impossible that it should have
been otherwise. (1955c, 72-3)

Although Santayana’s thought overlaps with Plato’s view of dialectic in the way we strip
discourse of illusions to arrive at truth, he deviates from Plato by combining elements of dialectic
and dissoi logoi.

Santayana maintains that discourse operates in a world of appearance – distinct from
mere illusion – and departs from the idea that dialectic can produce capital-T Truth. As we have
seen, dissoi logoi means two arguments or double arguments, suggesting that for any one
argument (at least) another contrasting argument may counter it.48 Plato, committed to reason

48 Protagoras’ two – logoi fragment reads, “There are two logoi in opposition about everything” or “Of everything,
two contrary accounts can be given.” This fragment coupled with his stronger-weaker fragments which says one can
“make the weaker argument stronger,” gives the impression that disputes are playful and often forwarded for
and the Good, suggests this type of practice of *dissoi logoi* centers too much on the rhetorical practices of the sophists, countering this “rhetoric” with dialectic. In the *Republic*, Socrates, in his comments to Glaucon, says of dialectic, “When anyone by dialectic attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible” (1961f, 532a-b). Moreover, dialectic is the “only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there” (Plato 1961f, 533c). Finally, it is the dialectician who seeks truth, not the eristic, who “misuse it as a form of sport, always employing it contentiously, and imitating confuters, they themselves confute each other. They delight like puppies in pulling about and tearing with word all who approach them” (Plato 1961f, 539b).

Ultimately, Plato’s comments indicate that he reserves dialectic for those in a position to perceive the absolute Good, discovers it through reason alone, arrives as first principles, and seeks truth rather than amusing contradiction, which are lofty standards to fulfill. Santayana, on the other hand, borrows key elements from Plato but enables a more common (and perhaps, rhetorical) use for dialectic vis-à-vis *dissoi logoi*.

Santayana’s appropriation of Plato significantly places a rhetorical emphasis on dialectic that consequently affects the way in which we can `consider *dissoi logoi*. As Santayana observes, “The Socratic method is the soul of liberal conversation; it is compacted in equal measure of sincerity and courtesy. Each man is autonomous and all are respected; and nothing is brought forward except to be submitted to reason and accepted or rejected by the self-questioning heart” (1921b, 241). We find in Santayana’s comments respect for Plato and his employment of

---

amusement. For example, Gorgias writes in his *Encomium to Helen*, “I wished to write a speech that would be Helen’s celebration and my own recreation” (1999, 20).
dialectic, yet Santayana’s esteem for Plato does not equate to accepting the latter’s version in full. First, Plato reserves for philosophers (or philosopher kings) the capacity, at least theoretically, to arrive at the absolute Good. Not only does Santayana regard the Absolute Good as impossible, he allows for any discourse-using individual the capacity for dialectic. We see this in particular in Santayana’s emphasis on the individual and her relationship to the community. Each individual forwards beliefs that she must reconcile with other beliefs, inwardly or externally within a community and by using dialectic we have the potential to serve reason in a way that Plato reserves for the elite.

Second, Santayana departs from Plato’s explicit rejection of the assistance of senses to navigate opposing or multiple beliefs the latter relying on reason alone as a means to serve the Truth and the Good. Santayana, however, not only stresses the necessity of sense perception, and the accompanying effect the senses have on the passions, but he also emphasizes understanding the way in which reason operates to effect harmony. Santayana explains that:

> Human ideas had, accordingly, a symptomatic, expressive, and symbolic value: they were the inner notes sounded by man’s passions and by his arts; and they became rational partly by their vital and inward harmony – for reason is a harmony of the passions – and partly by their adjustment to external facts and possibilities – for reason is a harmony of the inner life with truth and with fate.

(1951b, 14)

Sensuous experience, emotion, and natural conditions serve reason when combined harmoniously. Reason, and therefore dialectic, does not eliminate the passions, or the sense stimulation that brings them about; instead, we call on reason to help harmonize our sensuous experience external things, actual or possible.
Third, Santayana deviates from Plato’s focus on first principles, claiming we must “plunge in media res.” (1955k, 1). Santayana argues that if we begin in the middle, then “we still begin at the beginning of something, and perhaps as much at the beginning of things as [we] could possible begin” (1955k, 2). Moreover, Santayana also applies this “plunging-in-the-middle” to the idea of first principles in discourse:

They can never be discovered, if discovered at all, until they have been long taken for granted, and employed in the very investigation which reveals them…it is not by the deduction of first principles, arbitrarily chosen, that human reasoning actually proceeds, but by loose habits of mental evocation which such principles at best may exhibit afterwards in an idealized form. (1955k, 2)

Our discourse may only join in with other discourse, as critique or as buttress for preferred beliefs. Otherwise put, only after discourse has been given form can we forward ideas or respond to them. Nevertheless, whichever middle into which we plunge, we view as some beginning. These “beginnings,” however are arbitrarily chosen almost rendering them, at least as “beginnings,” irrelevant and certainly reinforcing the impossibility of absolute truth.49 Neither the dialectician, nor the eristic may arrive at Plato’s truth, not even by means of reason. At best we are in command of contingent beliefs viewed as truths at any given moment, whose ground can never really be secure because that ground is constructed from appearances.

Finally, while Plato’s dialectic urges the deployment of a series of questions and answers to eliminate contradiction for the sake of truth, Santayana argues that we may only reduce contradiction and that contradiction may actually prove productive. Of course, Santayana stresses the necessity of recognizing and acknowledging contradictions in order for them to act.

---

49 Even if we examine a particular controversy within a particular context, we could always find something before it that might have had influence on the controversy. Hence, where we “plunge in” is essentially arbitrary but could be relevant in revealing bias in communicators.
productively. Moreover, it is necessary to modify contradictions rather than leave them “as is.” On the one hand, because Santayana espouses an unmistakable aversion for contradiction and inconsistency, obviously favoring harmony, dialectic advantageously brings these tensions to light in order to reduce them. On the other hand, contradiction or inconsistency, according to Santayana, remains acceptable within one’s own set of beliefs so long as the individual attempts to correct them. That is, if my current belief buts against another belief in opposition, I could not, or should not, on Santayana’s view, ignore the contradiction. Rather, I would need to explore the tension between the beliefs in order to find harmony between beliefs. Each belief has its own legitimate right to exist, but because we can view them on a scale of better or worse, we can apply dialect to explore how a particular belief requires modification in ways to make it consistent within a belief system or to discard it if not possible. Thus, Santayana’s appropriation of dialectic is in the last instance a more prudential version of dissoi logoi. Santayana asks, “What is the requisite for living rationally?” and responds, “I think the conditions may be reduced to two: First, self-knowledge, the Socratic key to wisdom; and second, sufficient knowledge of the world to perceive what alternatives are open to you and which of them are favourable to your true interests” (1986b, 542). Although dissoi logoi is frequently associated with eristic practice or debate, Santayana forwards the notion that the alternative position is one of possibility, though leaves intact the possibility of identifying and replacing opposing arguments, in the service of harmony. In either way, Santayana reconceives both in such a way that creates a relationship between dissoi logoi and dialectic.
The combination of *dissoi logoi* and dialectic strips both concepts of their more contentious aspects while preserving the capacity to encourage rational living and harmony among opposing beliefs vis-à-vis enacted *phronesis*. While Santayana does not use the term *phronesis*, his conception of practical reasoning closely resembles, while simultaneously elevating, the idea of *phronesis* as it is discussed in rhetoric. To date, Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* remains the best work on the subject of *phronesis*. In it, Aristotle claims that “Prudence must be a state grasping the truth, involving reason, and concerned with action about human goods” (1999, 1140b 21-22). Moreover, this type of action avails the subject “to deliberate finely about things that are good and beneficial for himself, not about some restricted area – about what sort of things promote living well in general” (1999, 1140a 26-29). Lois Self’s early treatment of *phronesis* attempted to invigorate its importance to rhetoric because at the time she was writing it had not gained much traction. She argues, “[The] art of rhetoric both requires *phronesis* and provides the means of its social dissemination” (1979, 136). Moreover, Self notes that Aristotle’s ideal practitioner of rhetoric embodies the *Phronimos* (“man of practical wisdom”), and that both rhetoric and practical wisdom, “function in the domain of the ‘variable,’ in the realm where human deliberation or calculation results in probable truth about contingent matters” (1979, 131-32). Within deliberative rhetoric, even, or perhaps especially, the wise must acknowledge and confront probabilities and contingencies. Despite Self’s treatment of deliberation in her description of *phronesis*, she points out that, “The *phronimos* does not exist in isolation. He deliberates well not only about private matters but with a view of what is good, what leads to *eudiamonia* or well-being for men in general, and the public’s acknowledgement of this ability

---

50 Hariman concurs, though focuses on the political response: “Phronesis, or prudence, designates the capacity for effective political response to contingent events” (1991b, 26).
testifies their collective wisdom or inclination toward truth when persuasively presented” (1979, 135). Thus, the phronimos must be equally capable of pursuing private matters alongside the collective. Frequently translated as practical wisdom, phronesis is often associated by scholars with deliberation, likely as a response to Aristotle’s explicit inclusion of the phronimos’ capacity to deliberate.51

The association of phronesis with deliberation notwithstanding, exceptions in pivotal works on phronesis point toward a coupling of rhetoric and aesthetics when considering the concept. These exceptions are united in their focus on the performative aspects of phronesis, which de-emphasizes deliberation, at least as other scholars have deployed the idea. For example, Steve Schwarze challenges this emphasis on deliberation when looking at an Isocratean notion of phronesis, claiming, “Aristotle’s emphasis on deliberation rarely gets problematized; it is understood as a foundation dimension of phronesis rather than as a particular response to competing conceptions of phronesis that were circulating within Greek culture” (1999, 80).52

Takis Poulakos extends this idea of particular responses within a particular culture by relating phronesis to doxa: “phronesis was a way of exercising one’s doxa, the process of directing one’s conjectures about future through the past” (2001, 73). This suggests that while phronesis and doxa have technically distinct definitions, they are closely related under the heading of rhetoric because of the assumption of shared beliefs and values that elicit particular and appropriate responses. Moreover, Robert Hariman in “Prudence/Performance,” argues that “Prudence becomes the master code for successful performance within a community, and the use of prudence as a norm becomes a means for maintaining the community’s traditional alignment of

52 T. Poulakos also remarks, “By phronēsis Isocrates indicated not a discernable cognitive capacity (as Aristotle did) but a context-bound convergence of wisdom with statesmanship and oratorical eloquence” (2004, 58). See also Isocrates’ Antidosis 271; 277.
its social practices” (1991b, 29). Hariman differentiates prudence from a merely cognitive ability to one that is exemplified in the act of performance:

Prudence is a performative concept to the extent that prudential thinking typically assumes a performative context. This context often is implicit, since prudence also denotes practical action by ordinary decision-makers possessing common knowledge and conventional skills; in short, one can speak of prudence only when general assumptions about the mode and manner of conduct don't have to be specified. Nevertheless, prudent conduct will be conduct that relies on shared expectations regarding how and how well one might act out one's decision.

(Hariman 1991b, 27)

Further, he argues that, “by claiming that the prudent speaker is one who thinks gesturally and acts by artistic improvisation upon conventions of display” we can better understand the nuances of prudence as it relates to political discourse and performance (1991b, 35). Schwarze also supports the relationship between display and phronesis arguing, “phronesis depends on more than deliberative skill; it also relies on perception of and response to displays of beauty” (1999, 92). Schwarze importantly emphasizes not only the relationship of phronesis to performance, but also the relationship of phronesis to beauty. The combination of prudent conduct (under consideration of shared expectations) with the appeal of beauty attracts and moves to action.

Santayana’s articulation of practical reason weds the ideas of wisdom, deliberation, and beauty. In effect, his conception of practical reason harmonizes the various possibilities that others who treat the concept phronesis say it offers. This unity reveals the fusion between reason and passion, reason and art, reason and wisdom, and reason and deliberation. Santayana exposes the aesthetic principle of the rhetorical functions of a reasoned life. For example, in Aristotle
*phronesis* means wise decision-making and judgment, while in Isocrates *phronesis* means the merger of eloquence and action. Santayana, however, unites Aristotle and Isocrates, suggesting that reason is the province of wisdom, of action, of judgment, and of eloquent expression. 

Reason, in part, Santayana defines, as the human capacity not only to learn to adapt to circumstances, but also to use circumstances to modify and profit from those conditions. He provides the following commentary when discussing what it means to have reason:

> Instead of pushing for ever against a stone wall, [people] learn to go around it or over it. This plasticity, even when not under pressure, may take to play and experiment; toys are made which may become instruments; and the use of sounds as signal may enable the talking animal to recall absent things and to anticipate the future. Moreover, many animals mimic what they see; they transpose themselves dramatically into the objects surrounding them, especially into other animals of the same species. This transposition gives a moral reality, in their own spirit, to all the instinctive coaxing, deceiving, or threatening of one another. Their mind begins to conceive and to compare mere possibilities; it turns to storytelling and games; life becomes a tangle of eager plans and ambitions; and in quiet moments the order of merely imaginary things grows interesting for its own sake. There is a pleasure in embracing several ideas in a single act of intuition so as to see how far they are identical or akin or irrelevant. (1931, 59)

---

53 Aristotle remarks that, in contrast to wisdom, which is “the most exact form of scientific knowledge,” prudence is “about human concerns, about things open to deliberation. For we say that deliberating well is the function of the prudent person more than anyone else; but no one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise, or about things lacking any goal that is a good achievable in action. The unqualifiedly good deliberator is the one whose aim accords with rational calculation in pursuit of the best good for a human being that is achievable in action,” not only with concern to universals, but it “must also acquire knowledge of particulars” (1999, 1141a 17-18; 1141b 10-14; 1141b 15-16).
His comments have a multitude of implications for both reason and rhetoric, the first suggesting that reason supplies us with the ability to adapt to given circumstances. Thus, even if one is born into an environment that does not promote the easiest or best means to pursue the true, the good, and the beautiful, our capacity to modify those circumstances uses both our physical self—i.e., it enables us to go around or over the wall instead of pushing against it—and our mental powers of language and discourse to persuade others to help us remove the wall. Discourse’s influential capacity, in this way, results from a creative and imaginative experimentation, which may consequently produce instrumental tools to further our aims. This instrumentality applies to tangible objects (e.g., Santayana’s example of recognizing toys that can be adapted into tools) and applies to how we refine our ability to use language for particular ends (the conscious animal’s capacity for memory and future-oriented discourse). In the act of living alongside others, we begin to “mimic” or act in like-minded ways, not only strengthening any circulating beliefs within a particular community, but also stimulating the possibilities of making it or parts of it better by comparing and contrasting with others who possess the same power of thought. Finally, “intellectual synthesis,” or the ability to unify different or conflicting ideas, works alongside and inspires action to change circumstances with consideration of probability and possibility for successful outcomes:

Such a power of intellectual synthesis is evidently the mental counterpart of the power of acting with reference to changing or eventual circumstances: whether in practice or in speculation, it is the faculty of putting two and two together, and this faculty is what we call reason. It is what the idiot lacks, the fool neglects, and the madman contradicts. But in no case is reason a code, an oracle, or an external sensor condemning the perceptions of sense or suppressing animal impulses. On
the contrary, in the moral life, reason is a harmony of the passions, a harmony which perceptions and impulses may compose in so far as they grow sensitive to one another, and begin to move with mutual deference and a total grace.

(Santayana 1931, 59-60)\(^\text{54}\)

Not only, then, might we live a life of reason while making use of our sensuous experiences and our passions, but such experience and passion actually elevate reason to its highest capacity, enabling a harmony that mere debate, ordinary ways of viewing *dissoi logoi*, or *phronesis* neglect. In this way, Santayana makes use of rhetorical tools to forge a relationship between rhetorical concepts in ways that inspire new ways of viewing rhetoric in its aesthetic, and therefore its sensuous and emotional, possibilities.

While Plato, and to some degree Aristotle, may devalue and separate the passions and emotions from reason in their emphasis of deliberative – i.e. political – rhetoric, Santayana departs from their conception insofar as he claims a far more valuable role for emotion. Reason can synthesize and harmonize passions in such a way that they manifest themselves in *phronesis*. *Because* of the human capacity for emotion and art, ideas have symbolic value. Harmonization occurs through inward conceptions, synthesis, and harmonization of the emotions and then as outward adaptations to possibility, to truth, and to fate. Within the “poetical mind,” this results in, according to Santayana, wisdom. As a poetic quality, however, it is not limited to what we might ordinarily categorize as subjective, as in art or poetry. On the contrary, this poetic quality even exists within something perceived as more objective, like science. Santayana reminds us that, “Wisdom lay rather in taking everything good-humouredly, with a grain of salt,” and even that which we deem “strictly scientific and true” involves “a close and prosperous adjustment to

\(^{\text{54}}\) Santayana again emphasizes the relationship between reason and passion when writing, “Reason is not a force contrary among the passions, but a harmony possible among them” (1972g, 339).
the surrounding world, at first by its origin in observation and at last by its application in action. Science [is] the mental accompaniment of art” (Santayana 1951b, 14). Even what we might consider cold science cannot escape a poetic rendering of the world around us, filled with emotion and beauty, at least insofar as we want to achieve the wisdom required to harmonize the various, and possibly contentious and contradictory, ideas within our environment.

Nevertheless, when scientists attempt to solve scientific contradictions, problems, or equations, it is in their best interest to resolve them, whereas in our regular experience such contradiction adds richness to our landscapes. Santayana reminds us that, “dealing with a science…contradictions would have to be instantly solved and removed; but when we are concerned with the poetic interpretation of experience, contradiction means only variety, and variety means spontaneity, wealth of resource, and a nearer approach to total adequacy” (Santayana 1905a, 13). Moreover, “art is prima facie and in itself a good cannot be doubted. It is a spontaneous activity, and that settles the question” (Santayana 1962d, 115). Art serves as a guide toward and the ends of the good in a seemingly uncooperative world restricted by natural rules and constraints. For Santayana, one’s use of art is nature’s gift to navigate through these constraints while opening up the possibility to conceive of how to use, modify, or transcend such constraints. He steadfastly argues,

Art…needs to be absorbed in the Life of Reason. What might bring about this consummation would be, on the one side, more knowledge; on the other, better taste. When a mind is filled with important and true ideas and sees the actual

---

55 Santayana emphasizes this capacity to overcome constraints, remarking that nature, even while disinterested in human affairs, is not so cruel as to not provide ways of overcoming constraints. He writes, “It is as if Substance said to Knowledge: My child, there is a great world for thee to conquer, but it is a vast, an ancient, and a recalcitrant world. It yields wonderful treasures to courage, when courage is guided by art and respects the limits set to it by nature. I should not have been so cruel as to give thee birth, if there had been nothing for thee to master; but having first prepared the field, I set in thy heart the love of adventure” (Santayana 1955a, 191).
relations of things, it cannot relish pictures of the world which might wantonly misrepresent it. Myth and metaphor remain beautiful so long as they are the most adequate or graphic means available for expressing the facts, but so soon as they cease to be needful and sincere they become false finery. (1962c, 144)

Art is the means to synthesize knowledge (beliefs) with the cultivation of taste, to elevate the expression of our beliefs, sincerely, necessarily, and beautifully. In so doing, art helps us, Santayana maintains, become wise participants in the life of reason, seeking deliberately the good for both the individual and for the community.\textsuperscript{56} As the chastity of the intellect, skepticism performs the function of suspending the idea of direct or assumed knowledge, “and instead it bestows intuition of ideas, contemplative, aesthetic, dialectical, arbitrary” (Santayana 1955c, 70).\textsuperscript{57} We have a fusion, then, of typically dissociated areas working together and guided by individual intuition. When the various possibilities arise, to be wise means “knowing what goods to sacrifice and what simples to pour into the supreme mixture. The extent to which aesthetic values are allowed to colour the resultant or highest good is a point of great theoretic importance, not only for art but for general philosophy” (Santayana 1962d, 115). Thus, practical reason is wisdom in seeking the good, influenced by aesthetic value – beauty – which functions as a guide to evaluate and to select goods in order to achieve the good, which for Santayana is the life of reason.

\textsuperscript{56} Santayana specifically defines wisdom as “the deliberate and impartial pursuit of all good” (1905a, 10).

\textsuperscript{57} Santayana also remarks that “transitive knowledge, though important if true, may always be challenged, intuition on the contrary, which neither has nor professes to have any ulterior object or truth, runs no risk of error, because it claims no jurisdiction over anything alien or eventual” (1955c, 70). Significantly, this points to a difference between knowledge and wisdom in the sense that knowledge, when applied to direct objects or taken as assumption exists only as circulating and accepted beliefs, but wisdom consists of the ability to synthesize and judge appropriately. Both are necessary, but not exclusive to rhetoric. Moreover, Coleman said when, “Considering skepticism, Santayana saw that it left intuition deprived of any existing thing, and hence any intuitions taken as knowledge are always illusory” (2009, 82).
While Santayana’s emphasis on and definition of practical reason closely resembles Plato, his characterization of the evaluation and selection of goods follows Aristotle. Santayana uses Aristotle’s definition of deliberation, but rather than adopting it in full, Santayana extends deliberation to include an aesthetic principle which functions to harmonize the various possibilities – means or ends – that exist within any deliberative moment. Aristotle says of deliberation: “We lay down the end, and then examine the ways and means to achieve it” (1999, 1112b 16-17). However, the ends must be a good (1999 1142b 20). Santayana adds that deliberation occurs for the good; and to achieve it, we must examine the various possibilities available to us. Moreover, for Aristotle, making a rational choice between these available means is a combination of calculation and desire (1999 1139a 20-23). Likewise, Santayana recognizes that desire, in combination with needs, acts as the foundation for possible human goods. Moreover, the human impulse for survival accompanied by desire allows for human adaptation to circumstances in the external world, for hypothetical thought, and for consideration of the future. Even though capable of considering things that are absent (i.e. hypothetical thought) and thereby exercising intelligence, “intelligence and reason are often merely potential, as in habit, memory, institutions, and books: they become spirit only when they flower into actual consciousness” (Santayana 1951b, 26). Thus, while anyone may have this potential, actualizing it requires consciousness; that is to say, it requires the enactment of thought vis-à-vis discourse given form. To perform a judgment on things present or absent requires formulating those conscious thoughts into appropriate discourse. On the one hand, “What ought to be done is that which, when done, will most nearly justify itself to all concerned,” suggesting a practical

59 This is particularly important to account for the many variations since “it is impossible for the mortal eye to see the ultimate balance of benefit and injury,” suggesting that we must rely on possibility and probability (1972d, 483). Also see Aristotle on possibility and probability (1991, 2.19).
component to any judgment. At the same time, Santayana writes, “Practical problems of morals are judicial and political problems. Justice can never be pronounced without hearing the parties and weighing the interests at stake” (1962d, 125). Further, Santayana argues, “any rational judgment on the beautiful must be a moral and political judgment” (1962c, 133). Thus, while Aristotle and his rhetorical followers emphasize the political in deliberative rhetoric, in Santayana we see the opportunity to harmonize the practical, the moral, the judicial, with the beautiful, the aesthetic. By the same token, with the beautiful fully fused into these other spheres, it follows that we consider an emphasis on refined taste in deliberation: “A criterion of taste is, therefore, nothing but taste itself in its more deliberate and circumspect form. Reflection refines particular sentiments by bringing them into sympathy with all rational life” (Santayana 1962c, 132). In order to conceive of a sound judgment, one must have the capacity “to revert to elementary beauties [to] test that judgment remains sound” (Santayana 1962c, 134). Thus, while Santayana focuses on reason and rationality, he departs from the traditional Aristotelian classical understanding of rationalism, what Noel O’Sullivan describes simply as “converting logical principles of explanation into material causes of physical change” (1992, 35). For Santayana, such “conversion” does not, however, account for passions, experience, or the articulation and understanding of that passion and experience. Santayana’s notions of reason, on the contrary, not only accounts for it, but also necessitates it, providing a unity among the various genres in which emotion and experience are articulated by arguing for the aesthetic principle that unites the different ends and means of the genres and spheres.
CONCLUSION

On Santayana’s view, we ought to consider reason and harmony together, whereby reason is a faculty of the mind and harmonization is the process informed by reason. Individuals and then communities may effect harmony through practical reason, creating a constant balance between achieving the good in one’s environment with that which is possible – hypothetically or realistically. Santayana holds that we balance achieving the good in our own conditions with the potential ideals that we create through our capacity to envision alternatives. The psyche, Santayana writes, “directs my outer organs, reacts on external things, and shapes the history and character of the individual animal that bears my name. In this sense I am a physical being in the midst of nature, and my knowledge is a name for the effects which surrounding things have upon me, in so far as I am quickened by them, and readjusted to them” (1955f, 164). Thus, Santayana tends to the practical constraints to which we are entangled by luck or nature’s design, but he also provides the means to navigate through those constraints vis-à-vis practical reason. Practical reason, as Santayana envisions it, allows for the harmonization of conflicting and opposing interests born out of a specific normative environment, much like T. Poulakos’ description of doxa and phronesis. Moreover, as Self argues, that for Aristotle, “The man of practical wisdom continuously balances the good and the expedient, the ideal and the possible” (1979, 133). The balance, or in Santayana’s terms, the harmony allows for the participation in the good life. The good life, as Santayana describes it, is the life of reason, which constitutes such balance: “This Good, as we learn ultimately, is harmony, to be established by the perfect definition and mutual adjustment of all natural functions, both in the individual and in the State. Nothing could be soberer, more hygienic, more politic” (Santayana 1972k, 770). What Santayana offers is a vision that combines the balance of ideals and possibilities, environmental conditions and goods, the
creation of awareness, reflection, and ultimately clarity of the true (*doxa*), the good (as means and ends), and the beautiful (as influence and unity) that originates within the individual. The individual who gives ideas form may circulate them within a community. Santayana’s understanding of the individual within her community reveals how *doxa* rises from individual interests born from desire of that which is beautiful and good. Perceptions of beauty have great affect, then, on our beliefs, attitudes, values, all of which are rhetorically negotiable and prompt our resulting actions based on that which appears possible.
CHAPTER THREE

AESTHETIC RHETORIC’S POSSIBILITY:

THE ASCENDANCE OF THE IMAGINATION, EMOTION, EPIDEICTIC, AND FORM

“My philosophy is justified, and has been justified in all ages and countries, by the facts before every man’s eyes; and no great wit is requisite to discover it, only (what is rarer than wit) candour and courage. Learning does not liberate men from superstition when their souls are cowed or perplexed; and, without learning, clear eyes and honest reflection can discern the hang of the world, and distinguish the edge of truth from the might of imagination.”

– Santayana 1955i, x

“The intention of my philosophy has certainly been to attain, if possible, such wide intuitions, and to celebrate the emotions with which they fill the mind. If this object be aesthetic and merely poetical, well and good: but it is a poetry or aestheticism which shines by disillusion and is imply intent on the unvarnished truth.”

– Santayana 1951b, 21

“What novelty my versions of things may possess is meant simply to obviate occasions for sophistry by giving to everyday beliefs a more accurate and circumspect form. I do not pretend to place myself at the heart of the universe nor at its origin, nor to draw its periphery.”

– Santayana 1955i, v-vi

In the previous chapter, I discussed how values that circulate within communities originate within individuals, born out of preference and self-interest, with an eye to how aesthetics, namely beauty, functions as a persuasive influence in this process. As a result of examining the relationship between individual and community, I focused on the significance of discourse as a central factor in creating a sort of moral calculus for individuals and communities to institute and make judgments about beliefs and actions. When viewing this process vis-à-vis Santayana, particularly his emphasis on harmony, questions arose as to how we might elevate our negotiations about communal belief, i.e., doxa. What we have seen, in light of Santayana’s
commentary on beauty and aesthetics, is a reconsideration and revision of our typical understanding of the rhetorical concepts *dissoi logoi*, dialectic, and *phronesis*.

The previous discussion addresses how perceptions of beauty have great affect on rhetorically negotiable *doxa*, prompting us to consider all that which is possible; however, it leaves out the question of *how* we discover or create that which is possible. This question, central to any understanding of rhetoric and aesthetics, I address in this chapter. Santayana’s entire project guides us to the life of reason, which comprises all that we conceive and construct as true, good, and beautiful in balanced harmony. “The Life of Reason,” Santayana says, “is the seat of all ultimate values” and “is an ideal to which everything in the world should be subordinated” (1905a 6-7). Part of its function, however, is “emancipating man from his personal limitations” (Santayana 1905a, 7). This emancipation requires something beyond adapting to individual and material constraints. Although Santayana acknowledges these material binds, he also recognizes that something less tangible occurs to allow the capacity for humans to break free of them. Santayana points us to the significance of language and discourse and its boundless capacity, writing:

Discourse is not a chemical compound; its past formations are not embedded in its present one. It is a life with much iteration in it, much recapitulation, as well as much hopeless loss and forgetfulness...It is a living, a perpetual creation; and the very fatality that forces me, in conceiving my own past or future, or the animation of nature at large, to imagine that object afresh, with my present vital resources and on the scale and in the style of my present discourse – this very fatality, I say,
reveals to me the nature of discourse everywhere, that it is poetry. But it is poetry about facts, or means to be. (1955g, 261)

As a living and perpetual creation, discourse serves to represent the complex variety of circulating beliefs, values, and attitudes that exist within individuals and communities in order to enable the communication of those ideas. Discourse does so for the past, present, and future:

“The priority of the realm of essence is therefore not temporal or dynamic. It is an infinite field for selection” (Santayana 1972l, 15). We may borrow ideas from the past, attempt to understand the present, and project possible meaning or action into the future with unlimited and boundless language. While accounting for a probable outcome, the future may include any number of alternate possibilities due to the imaginative capacity of the mind. As such, the imagination takes on a central role in aesthetic rhetoric, empowering the individual in two specific ways. First, while we cannot understand the mental life of others through direct intuition, we do have the capacity to use our imagination to aid in interpreting and assigning meaning to others’ thoughts.

Imagination allows for the use of one’s own essences (the infinite field of selection) to identify with others. This capacity to identify with others vis-à-vis interpretation of the mind of another obviously has potential ramifications in as much as one might inaccurately or incompetently perform the interpretation. Relying on interpretation, then, would thereby create the necessity for understanding, appropriate taste, and elevated expression in the creative production of discourse. Nevertheless, the second possibility for imagination lies in the promise of considering alternative ideas and actions outside of one’s material constraints, a consideration that entails borrowing

---

1 Cf. Bakhtin’s “The Problem of Speech Genres,” in which we see an example of his characterization of speech as a living thing – an utterance (which is inclusive of any literary genre) exists only in relation to other utterances, “a link in the chain of communication” (1986, 69; 84; 91). Also see Don H. Bialostosky’ “Architectonics, Rhetoric, and Poetics in the Bakhtin School’s Early Phenomenological and Sociological Texts” which addresses Bakhtin’s contribution to the relationship of rhetoric and aesthetics vis-à-vis rhetorical interactions (2006).

2 Coleman 2009, 104
from the storehouse of common belief and opinion so as to construct loftier ideals in the pursuit and/or production of novel ways of being, doing, and saying.³

With these considerations in mind, this chapter proceeds in five stages. First, I give shape to Santayana’s concept of the imagination in conversation with other theorists who dwell on the concept. Second, I argue for the relevance of emotion in a way that does not render emotional life subservient to rhetoric or reason but treats it as a necessary component of both. Third, I relate this emotional significance to the epideictic genre of rhetoric, elaborating on the genre’s importance to rhetorical thought and practice vis-à-vis the other two genres (deliberative and forensic), showing ultimately how such revaluation culminates in a rejection of the paradigmatic hierarchy of rhetorical genres. Fourth, I argue how rhetoric provides form to ideals by way of articulating thought and emotion. Finally, I offer concluding remarks on how each of these parts presents a more unified, or in Santayana’s language, harmonized, whole that discloses the aesthetic dimension of rhetoric.

THE IMAGINATION – PHILOSOPHER, POET, AND RHETORICIAN

The concept of imagination reaches far back into history and has persisted as a point of interest for philosophers, rhetoricians, and poets alike. Philosophers began to discuss the imagination, or what the Greeks called phantasia (translated as “imagination” or “appearance”) directly or tangentially, often in relation to knowledge.⁴ Aristotle, for example, attends to the concept phantasia, and, after eliminating what imagination is not (i.e. knowledge or opinion), concludes that imagination “would be a motion coming about as a result of the being-at-work of sense

___
³ Enacted through phronesis as illustrated in Chapter Two.
⁴ Ned O’Gorman, for example, writes, The word phantasia in Aristotle is often translated "imagination" (and phantasma, "image"), and sometimes "impressions," "outward show,"or "appearance" (2005, 17).
perception, and corresponding to it” (2001, 428b 30 – 429a 3-4). Plato, although tangentially referring to *phantasia* in various works like *The Timaeus* and *The Sophist*, largely does not engage it. Longinus, interestingly, applied imagination to rhetoric when asserting that the imagination allows for the creation of images and for the communication of such images via elevated language, which serves to rouse the audience’s imagination: “Would you not think that the poet’s mind itself travels along in the chariot and shares the perils of that winged team’s flight? If it had not followed them on their heavenly journey, he could not have thus depicted it” (1991, 25). The spirit of the poet – that is, rhythmic and beautiful language – not only stimulates the imagination, but also produces it, moving the audience through the speaker’s rhetoric.

Other non-traditional rhetoricians, like Giambattista Vico and Francis Bacon, have taken to explicitly relating the imagination to rhetoric, both in its persuasive capacity and its ability to express judgments. Vico, for example, introduces the concept *ingenium*, which collates a variety of concepts, including the imagination. He observes that “*Ingenium* is the faculty that connects disparate and diverse things” (1988, 96). Vico, although influenced by Descartes, rejected the mathematical or purely logical approach to understanding human affairs, emphasizing instead the rhetorical and artistic dimensions of persuasion that play a central role in human communication.

---

5 This cursory glance at Aristotle’s understanding of *phantasia* was meant to provide a brief commentary in order to demonstrate how Santayana shows traces of Aristotle, then moving on to discuss more thoroughly Santayana’s contributions to the ideas of the imagination. Others have done an excellent job of relating the significance of *phantasia* as a concept and Aristotle’s understanding of it. See for example, O’Gorman 2005 and Krisanna M. Scheiter 2012.

6 Other well known figures have advanced the significance of the imagination. For example, Immanuel Kant, without imagination we could have no knowledge (1998, A97-A105). However, these basic introductory remarks serve as the contextual basis from which we may begin to see how Santayana aligns or departs from common notions of the imagination. I address additional understandings of the imagination and Santayana’s relationship going forward.

7 L.M. Palmer, Vico’s translator of *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians*, discusses the problems of translating *ingenium*, saying it means “ingenuity, inventiveness, mother wit. Together with *verum* and *factum*, *ingenium* is one of Vico’s most difficult expressions to render in appropriate English.” Accordingly, she decides to translate it as “‘wit’ and ‘mother wit’ rather than the usual translation of ‘ingenuity,’” offering the reason that wit “is the customary term used in many treatises of the period to denote an original mental activity distinguishable from understanding” (Palmer 1988, 96 n5).
Ingenium for Vico takes the position of connecting ideas and persuading people in a way that does not rely on Cartesian logic. Vico argues that because of our wit (ingenium), “we can see the symmetry of things and recognize what is apt, fitting, beautiful, and ugly” (1988, 97). While Vico extends the capacity of the imagination to include judgment, he also recognizes that sometimes people apply their evaluations poorly, suggesting that recognition does not equate to synthesis, appropriate judgment, or understanding. In so doing, he raised questions of knowledge as they relate to ingenium (1988, 98). Likewise, Bacon, recognized the importance of the imagination, but emphasized rhetoric in a manner that would help to rationalize it. Bacon writes, “The duty and office of Rhetoric is to apply Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the will…Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as Logic is to the understanding; and the duty and office of Rhetoric, if it be deeply looked into, is no other than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to imagination, in order to excite the appetite and will” (Cited in Wallace 1943, 27). Although making a connection between rhetoric, reason, and imagination, Bacon suggests that imaginative speech induces people to action in specific moments. So, too, does the imagination move people within the poetic by extending the imagination as a means to transcend constraints.

8 For a recent discussion on Vico and rhetoric, particularly his use of ingenium, see Michael Mooney, Vico in the Tradition of Rhetoric 1985, 135-69.
9 In Alessandra Beasley Von Burg’s “Caught Between History and Imagination,” she looks at Vico’s concept of Ingenium “for understanding how new practices become persuasive through imaginative language” largely to demonstrate a need for reconsidering notions of citizenship and community out of political practice by reframing citizenship’s grounds into a philosophical and practical context. Beasley Von Burg focuses on imagination despite the difficulty Palmer emphasizes in translating ingenium as such. Beasley Von Burg defines ingenium as the “capacity ‘to perceive the analogies existing between matters lying far apart and, apparently, most dissimilar,’ the original and natural faculty all humans share, allowing them to engage in “a productive and creative form of knowledge’…the ability to connect ‘disparate and diverse things’ that enables one to recognize not only what is apparent but what requires vivid and acute imagination” (2010 28). On the one hand, Beasley Von Burg articulates the Vico/rhetoric connection that often goes neglected and offers a new way to consider imagination. On the other hand, she takes liberties by defining ingenium as imagination in order to argue for its political importance, once again stressing rhetoric’s deliberative and political role at the expense of its epideictic and artistic function that could flourish in a rhetorical imagination.
Although not of the rhetorical tradition proper, poets of the imagination like William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Ralph Waldo Emerson’s treatments of the imagination in their poetry and philosophy demonstrate how imagination may be effective as a means to use rhetorical discourse to overcome constraints. These poets extend and complicate conceptions of the imagination that came before them. For example, Wordsworth, in his Preface, defines imagination as “the link between the visible and the invisible world” (Cited in Stallknecht 1937, 835). Coleridge, largely in response to Wordsworth’s Preface differentiates fancy from imagination, suggesting that the former is a memory aid while the latter is true inspiration. In a reference to Emerson, Santayana remarks that, “Imagination, indeed, is his [Emerson’s] single theme” (1957b, 220). Santayana praises Emerson’s imaginative theme, commenting, “His constant refrain is the omnipotence of imaginative thought; its power to make the world, then to understand it, and finally to rise above it” (1957b, 221). Santayana, in fact, expresses his appreciation of the poets and philosophers who emphasize the imagination throughout his writings. However, he stands in marked difference to these kindred spirits. For although his speculative writing on the imagination largely centers on the imagination’s relationships to knowledge and opinion (i.e., doxa in its various applications), he also draws out the imagination’s capacity to become a source of great possibility. That is to say that even on the

---

10 “The Imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary Imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate: or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.

FANCY, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites. The fancy is indeed no other than a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and space; while it is blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word Choice. But equally with the ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association” (Coleridge 1907, 202).
subject of the imagination Santayana demonstrates his commitment of dialectically considering
the part as it relates to the whole and, vice versa, the whole as it relates to the part.\footnote{Singer begins to point out this dialectical relationship when saying, “The relationship between imagination and idealization is both organic and dialectical. The creation of ideals that awaken our imaginative faculties is fundamental in our species; and yet without imagination, ideals could not exist” (Singer 1996, 99).}

This dialectical consideration enables Santayana to recognize the potential pitfalls of people governed solely by the imagination, but also to counter those dangers with its possibilities. Santayana claims, “Men are ruled by imagination: imagination makes them men, capable of madness and of immense labours. We work dreaming” (1967b, 122). Independent of one’s class or creed, all humans are governed by imagination. Yet, “Nothing could be madder, more irresponsible, more dangerous,” Santayana says, “than this guidance of men by dreams” (Santayana 1967b, 123). Santayana’s remarks point to concerns that humans governed solely by the imagination fall victim to flights of fancy, leaving them ungrounded in reality. David Hume follows suit, arguing that, “Nothing is more dangerous to reason than flights of the imagination, and nothing has been the occasion of more mistakes among philosophers” (2000, 1.4.7).

However, Santayana counters this danger when he claims:

> What saves us is the fact that our imaginations, groundless and chimerical as they may seem, are secretly suggested and controlled by shrewd old instincts of our animal nature, and by continual contact with things. The shock of sense, breaking in upon us with a fresh irresistible image, checks wayward imagination and sends it rebounding in a new direction, perhaps more relevant to what is happening in the world outside. (1967b, 123)

Thus, although Santayana and Hume begin at a point of agreement, Hume, unlike Santayana, characterizes the imagination as posing a danger to the faculty of reason, while Santayana suggests that \textit{because} our imagination is grounded in materiality it may actually aid reason by
disclosing un-thought possibility. In some ways, then, Santayana echoes Bacon’s understanding of the relationship between reason and the imagination. Santayana praises and emphasizes the imagination as a central feature of the life of reason. Every person, on this view, shares in the capacity to imagine beyond her material anchors, yet those same material circumstances work to ground the imagination: “We fail in practical affairs when we ignore the conditions of action and we fail in works of imagination when we concoct what is fantastic and without roots in the world” (Santayana 1962a, 150). The imagination amplifies possibility, while materiality provokes sensations that both prevent imagination from becoming irrational and, at least potentially, guides us toward relevant details, which allows for “an adaptation of fancy and habit to material facts and opportunities” (Santayana 1951b, 14). Irving Singer further supports Santayana’s characterization of imagination when saying, “By extrapolating beyond the goods that are actually available in nature, humankind brings ideals into existence as part of its struggle with the environment. By means of imagination, which Santayana emphasizes throughout, we envisage possibilities that would endlessly delight if only they could be had” (Singer 2000, 84). Therefore, ideals, while without substance, are created through the imagination and “emerge as goals that organisms create in the process of adapting to their environments” (Singer 2000, 101).

This adaptation underscores the combined emphasis on experience, doxa, phronesis, and dissoi

12 Both adaptation and amplification are key rhetorical terms. According to Aristotle, “it is not enough to have a supply of things to say, but it is also necessary to say it in the right way, and this contributes much toward the speech seeming to have a certain quality,” impressing on us the necessity of adapting to the needs of the audience (1991, 3.1.2). So, too, is adaptation implied, or at least taken for granted, when Aristotle discusses the emotional states and types in Book 2. “Amplification, with good reason, falls among forms of praise; for it aims to show superiority, and superiority is on of the forms of the honorable…amplification is most at home in those that are epideictic; for these take up actions that are agree upon, so that what remains is to clothe the actions with greatness and beauty” (1991, 1.9.39-40). Further, “a common feature of all speeches is the matter of magnitude; for all use diminution and amplification when deliberating and when praising or blaming and when prosecuting or defending themselves” (1991, 2.18.4).

13 Even while the imagination provides alternatives, when taken as “ideal,” they remain as perfections unattainable and replaceable with other ideals. Thus, “According to Santayana…these perfections must always remain unattainable. They are merely essences that lead us on; they cannot be realized and would not be perfect if they were. In effect, the ideal objects are but the product of aspiration itself” (Singer 2000, 84). As Arnett puts it, the power of the ideal is “the power to enrich, to enlighten, and to inspire” (Arnett 1955, 11).
logoi. The emphasis reveals influencing factors in the way we use the imagination to shape ideals for the good of both individuals and communities, making conscious that which could be otherwise. Tracing the various contours of the imagination expressed historically reveals the extent to which Santayana’s conception of the imagination is in part an eclectic synthesis of what came before. But it also indicates his desire to remove the established and unproductive boundaries between philosopher, poet, and (implicitly, perhaps) rhetorician.

Unlike his predecessors’ speculations, Santayana’s philosophy asks us to consider the unavoidable material constraints that conscious and contemplative animals face and how beliefs, principles, and ideals are formed and articulated in everyday discourse. “Systems of philosophy,” Santayana says, “are the work of individuals…Viewed from a sufficient distance, all systems of philosophy are seen to be personal, temperamental, accidental, and premature” (1936b, 94). In other words, humans create philosophy for individual improvement or satisfaction, but all systems of philosophy necessarily have the potential for human error. Created in a sociopolitical ever-changing context suggests the probability of error because we judge or measure from a human standpoint. Such perspective, at least since Gorgias’ *On Non-being*, we know to be necessarily limited and deficient in scope. Nevertheless, Santayana maintains that philosophy is not merely the work of an individual, but also the imagination at work:

Does not modern philosophy teach that our idea of the so-called real world is also a work of imagination? A religion – for there are other religions than the Christian – simply offers a system of faith different from the vulgar one, or extending beyond it. The question is which imaginative system you will trust. My matured conclusion has been that no system is to be trusted, not even that of science in any
literal or pictorial sense; but all systems may be used and, up to a certain point, trusted as symbols. (1951b, 8)

Philosophical systems enter as competing systems of belief, and philosophy – genuine philosophy for Santayana – *is* the life of reason, so long as its chief concern is, “happiness or deliverance, the supervening supreme expression of human will and imagination” (Santayana 1951b, 13). Thus, even when accounting for potential errors or the doxastic concerns that gave rise to systems of philosophy, we may still consider philosophy a creative and productive activity when its ends are human happiness and expression. While no system of belief will ever offer a complete picture of the world in space or time, all may be used instrumentally as sufficient means to accomplish particular ends. For that reason, systems of belief must persuasively articulate the beliefs, principles, and ideals they embody, while those same beliefs, principles, and ideals must simultaneously appear to express the doxastic beliefs of a community.\(^{14}\)

Philosophy, then, makes the attempt to express and reflect on beliefs, principles and ideals in competition with other philosophical systems. According to Coleman, Santayana believes that “the ideal philosopher would be one who, after mastering human opinion, could construct a broad and evenhanded system of ideas that would deepen understanding” (2009, xxxvii). Such mastery implies the ability to navigate through the various beliefs, values, and attitudes that comprise the principles circulating as doxa within a community at any given time. Consequently, to create or sustain the ability for such navigation, formal articulation and communication of those principles needs to occur.

The requirement for formal articulation of beliefs, principles, and ideals strongly links rhetoric with philosophy. Santayana writes, “Now in philosophy there is a medium which plays a

---

\(^{14}\) Not only would the systems of belief demonstrate the doxastic beliefs of a community, but potentially it and the individual’s who make it up, bias since all philosophy originates, according to Santayana, within the individual.
great part, namely thought… It identifies, connects, and describes its objects not according to their intrinsic natures but according to their names or images in discourse, and to the dialectical relations of these names or images” (1936c, 197). Santayana argues that the capacity for measuring beliefs, principles, and ideals relies on language, or thought, because “Thinking is another term for discourse” (1955b, 291). If thought is another term for discourse, then we are left with two important considerations. First, epistemology is an apparently inappropriate lens through which to view rhetoric. Santayana asserts that much of philosophy fell into this epistemological trap when, “it ceased to be the art of thinking and tried to become that impossible thing, the science of thought” (1955g, 254). Otherwise put, when attempting to force the case for discourse (thought) as science, we delimit the aesthetic possibility of discourse as a creative, productive, and artistic endeavor.\(^{15}\) The second consideration closely relates: “Thought can be found only by being enacted” (Santayana 1955g, 254). Thus, thought – or discourse – must be given form by being made articulate. Santayana’s characterization of philosophy and thought reveals that while anyone may have internal discourse, when given form – i.e. expressed or made articulate to another – the ideas then enter in the competing *doxa* of a community, carrying with them the capacity to produce rhetorical effects vis-à-vis various beliefs, principles, and ideals.\(^{16}\) At the individual level, once these ideas are made formally rhetorical – once they are *rhetoricized*, so to speak – we are presented with alternatives from which to judge our own

\(^{15}\) Santayana’s disparagement of modern philosophy here also echoes the idea that philosophy, rhetoric, and poetics may function distinctly, but are all part of a greater whole. Thus, his comments on philosophy ceasing to be the “art of thinking” whereby “Thinking,” according to Santayana, “is another name for discourse” (1955b, 291).

\(^{16}\) Arnett, gathering and interpreting Santayana’s understanding of form, defines form as “the quality of an object which makes it a whole and distinguishes it from other objects, and to the organization and unification which are congenial to the perceptual distinction of the various elements in a perceptive experience” (1955, 34). He also remarks that form assists, “To organize, to unify, to formulate is to modify either the perceived or the perceiver, so that the relation between them, their common destiny, is clear and congenial” (1955, 35). This latter statement reflects and parallels the rhetorical relationship between speaking subject and audience, whereby rhetoric’s function is to organize the subject matter through speech, create identification between speaker and audience, and modify or reinforce the beliefs in order to make clear the intended purpose of the speech.
positions and conditions. And this, in turn, may or is likely to prompt the imagination to conceive of unconventional ideals that we may or may not choose to pursue in an effort to transcend previous positions and conditions. At the collective level, discourse given form has the influential capacity to transform underlying principles that reinforce or preserve beliefs. Not all expressions are equal. We are more attracted to beautiful form, Santayana maintains, and thus poetic and elevated literary qualities produce resources for the imagination to create more possibilities.

In particular, the appeal of poetry discloses its capacity both to contain a resemblance to our own experience and to provoke examination and reflection about alternatives to those experiences.\textsuperscript{17} As I have shown in the previous chapter, individual experience has great impact on communal \textit{doxa}, suggesting that poetry offers us a space within which to articulate and create imaginative possibilities. As a space to reflect on experience, an author creates a poem or narrative, opening up possibilities:

\begin{quote}
The possibilities of love or glory, of intrigue and perplexity, will be opened up before us; if he gives us a good plot, we can readily furnish the characters, because each of them will be the realization [sic] of some stunted potential self of our own. It is by the plot, then, that the characters will be vilified, because it is by the plot that our own character will be expanded into its latent possibilities.
\end{quote}
(Santayana 1957a, 280)\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{17} I use poetry here as a means to concisely capture poetry, literature, and/or drama as Santayana often does throughout his works. Indeed, Santayana makes a point of writing that poetry as only a literary form is limiting: 
“[I]f we drop the limitation to verbal expression, and think of poetry as that subtle fire and inward light which seems at times to shine through the world and to touch the images in our minds with ineffable beauty, then poetry is a momentary harmony in the soul amid stagnation or conflict, – glimpse of the divine and an incitation to a religious life” (1957a, 289).

\textsuperscript{18} Santayana also remarks that the emphasis on plot encourages the imagination and appropriately Aristotle concerns himself to stress plot’s pivotal function: “Thus it seems that Aristotle was justified in making the plot the chief element in fiction: for it is by virtue of the plot that the characters live, or, rather, that we live in them, and by
The recognition of character flaws within the plot, as it unfolds, allows us to connect or identify with those characters. But at the same time, it also enables us to see an opportunity for correction—a reason and a way to pursue an alternative. In this latter sense “flows the greatest opportunity of fiction. We have, in a sense, an infinite will; but we have a limited experience, an experience sadly inadequate to exercise that will either in its purity or its strength. To give form to our capacities nothing is required but the appropriate occasion; this the poet, studying the world, will construct for us out of the materials of his observation” (Santayana 1957a, 279). The poet’s role therefore requires the audience both to spectate and to create. The spectator, too, has only limited experiences, but by using an active and artistic language, the imagination can generate new ways of expressing experience, which not only reveals potential alternatives, but also engenders more imaginative thinking. Nevertheless, Santayana asserts, “Poetry is not at its best when it depicts a further possible experience, but when it initiates us, by feigning something which as an experience is impossible, into the meaning of the experience which we have actually had” (1957a, 284). Authentic poetry, for Santayana, does not attempt to depict a further experience. Yet, Santayana’s narrow view of poetry in this sense suggests he fails to recognize that making imaginary (literary) experience meaningful to one’s own actual experience does not forego the possibility of also suggesting new possibilities. Otherwise put, if others provide form to their experience, then we are able to borrow from that experience. While this may hold true for any experience, poetry is particularly useful because it provides a more beautiful form that attracts us to its many possible articulations, enabling us to make meaningful our own experiences through the author’s rendering of experience, as well the comparison of possible alternatives, stimulating the imagination once again. Santayana argues that conceiving of alternatives necessitates the virtue of the plot accordingly that our soul rises to that imaginative activity by which we tend at once to escape from the personal life and to realise its ideal” (1957a, 280).
imagination of alternatives, arousing interpretation that gives meaning to experiences personal or imagined. Accordingly, this suggests that poetry carries with it the capacity to provoke interpretation and meaning of experience but that poetry cannot function optimally when isolated. “The function of poetry,” Santayana writes, “can only be fulfilled by the conception of harmonies that become clearer as they grow richer,” pointing both to the harmony of experience and to the harmony of the roles that poetry and philosophy play within those experiences (1957a, 283).

Both poetry and philosophy appear to have separate functions, but each requires a third consideration: rhetoric. Philosophy provides systems of belief and the capacity for reflection, while poetry contains experiences that align with or suggest alternatives to an individual’s experience, as well as its potential for meaning making of and between those experiences. Belief systems contain the capacity to disseminate, reinforce, and preserve the values, beliefs, and ideals within doxastic communities. When Santayana says, “The poet makes the fable; the sophist carries it on,” he echoes Plato’s mistaken view that the poet and sophist are distinct (1905b, 56). Nevertheless, his commentary on the imagination reveals how an aesthetically considered rhetoric, one that engenders the imagination, functions to create like the poet and to reflect like the philosopher by giving form to thought. For that reason, aesthetic rhetoric is consubstantial with poetry and philosophy. This is a radical re-description of the domain of rhetoric but one that is made possible vis-à-vis rhetoric operating within both the general and particular simultaneously. Rhetoric, then, alongside philosophy and poetry discloses possibility, echoing Santayana’s understanding of “moral philosophy:”

19 For example, even while skepticism is the chastity of the intellect, Santayana writes that “the philosopher, when he is speculative only, is a sort of perpetual celibate; he is bent on not being betrayed, rather than on being annexed or inspired; and although if he is at all wise he must see that the true marriage of the mind is with nature and science and the practical arts” (1955c, 70). Hence, philosophy, when unaccompanied by poetics and rhetoric, inspiration and practical arts, is left “unfulfilled.”
[Opening] before us the prospect of a moral philosophy that should estimate the various values of things known and of things imaginable, showing what combinations of goods are possible in any one rational system, and (if fancy could stretch so far) what different rational systems would be possible in places and times remote enough from one another not to come into physical conflict. (1913, 139-40)

In this view, then, rhetoric may operate on both the macro and micro dimensions. At the macro level it functions to keep a larger structure intact, while remaining pliable on account of the contingent possibilities working within the micro level(s). These contingent variables – the doxastic particulars – of a community change via the influence and persuasion conditioned by the beauty of a particular ideal or greater good. Once articulated by an individual and circulated within a belief system, the larger system itself may then modify its overall doxastic structure.

Nevertheless, rhetoric’s dual-level artistry relies on the experiences that individuals express and use to base their aims toward goals or ideals. Santayana claims that literary psychology is the knowledge of discourse in other people and that its make up is human experience. However, he maintains, that we can never really come to know another’s discourse. The attempt at such knowing, Santayana writes, belongs to science:

Scientific psychology is a part of physics, or the study of nature; it is the record of how animals act. Literary psychology is the art of imagining how they feel and think. Yet this art and that science are practiced together, because one characteristic habit of man, namely speech, yields the chief terms in which he can express his thoughts and feelings. Still it is not the words, any more than the
We can only assume this knowledge through our own imagination, which necessitates giving form to thought – the discourse of sense and feeling. The possibility of persuasion thus hinges on this assumption, which is grounded in the common sense of the real material and social environment in which we communicate. Independent of human desires and goals, rhetoric at once communicates through symbols while simultaneously making possible the articulation of those symbols. As Coleman states, “Taking intuited essences as symbols is a function of the imagination, and the fitness for symbols is action in a material environment existing independently of human aims and desires (2009, xxvii – xxviii). However, rhetoric acting under this assumption may also consider the suitability of particular symbols at particular times for particular ends to make more likely the persuasive exchange of symbols. “If any mind hopes to address another (or even itself) persuasively,” Santayana remarks, “it must assume a single system of events to which both minds are responsive, and which includes their respective bodies and actions. Assuming such a common world, it is easy to see how animals may acquire knowledge of it and may communicate it” (1972f, vi-vii). Moreover, as Coleman argues, “Understanding of the mental life of another is impossible through direct intuition; instead the observer imaginatively interprets the mind of another by ascribing his or her own essences to the other person” (Coleman 2009, 104). Obviously imaginatively interpreting the mind of another based on one’s own experiences has the potential to go awry. Nevertheless, it is at this micro level that rhetoric has the capacity to evaluate the kairos (timeliness) and decorum (appropriateness) required to make possible the compatibility of one being’s essence with that of another.
Taken together, the philosopher, the poet, and the rhetorician, remain distinct in name only. Although each may appear to function apart from the other, in order to perform well, they must work in harmony. Coleman argues that “Santayana’s conception of the ideal philosopher converged with his idea of the rational poet: both would deepen understanding by prompting human imagination to systematic expression of meanings, ideals, and beliefs about the universe” (Coleman 2009, xxxvii). However, we also know that in order for either philosopher or poet to perform this task, she must master human opinion. Santayana differentiates between the poet and the philosopher but also expresses a requirement for understanding through comprehension of communication, suggesting another vital dimension for the ends of harmony. It is my argument that rhetorical discourse is the third dimension to this harmony. Coleman, in fact, explicitly calls attention to discourse, saying, “The commonality required for understanding can be achieved by means manufactured and adaptable, namely by language” (2009, xxxiv). Not only does this suggest that our language choice and use contributes to the conditions of commonality, but also points to the creative act and malleability required of these conditions and choices. The creative and pliable discourse discloses the aesthetic undercurrent running through Santayana’s philosopher, poet, and rhetorician, an undercurrent whereby, “art…renders the world of matter into ideas and is a rehearsal of a life not yet realized. The power of art lies in its rejuvenation of imagination and the life of ideas” (Coleman 2009, 262). The question still remains, however, how the philosopher, poet, and rhetorician holistically enact this artistic rendering of the life of ideas.
Santayana’s understanding of language as instrumental symbolic exchange grounded in appearance and sense recasts his conception of language, and, as I am arguing, of rhetoric, as both practical and artistic. We understand essence to mean that which can be communicated, and as such it “[disclaims] all knowledge of fact. Nature, history, the self become ghostly presences, mere notions of such things; and the being of these images becomes purely internal to them; they exist in no environing space or time; they possess no substance or hidden parts, but are all surface, all appearance” (Santayana 1951b, 18). Language, then, is immaterial but nevertheless capable of articulating and giving form to the ideas that emerge from a community’s stable yet changing complex of appearances.20 “Taken as essences,” Santayana says, “all ideas are compatible and supplementary to one another, like the various arts of expression; it is possible to perceive, up to a point, the symbolic burden of each of them, and to profit by the spiritual criticism of experience which it may embody” (1951b, 18). Arts of expression, which we can (and should) extend to include rhetoric, rely on perception in a contingent world of flux. The burden of symbols is to recognize that our perceptions are enmeshed in appearances rather than in indubitable fact. Santayana enhances this point, arguing, “The articulation of language, however, can never be the articulation of things. Language is a by-product of animal life which may eventually serve as a record or as an instrument; it helps to summarize, classify, and analyze

---

20 Although rhetoricians have addressed materiality vis-à-vis rhetoric, they do so against the traditionalist forms of rhetorical action as persuasion and as grounded in humanism, that is to say grounded in something human rather than something material. The materialist rhetoric discussions distinguishes their contributions from others like public discourse, narrative, close reading and rather focuses on vernacular as modes of power or language as a consequence of power. Four distinct strands of materialist rhetoric results. First is the notion that objects and structures interact with rhetoric to create meaning. For example, the way a classroom is set up reveals how the instructor is privileged within a certain power dynamic (See for example, Schuster, 2006). The second conception considers rhetoric as material, whereby rhetoric is inscribed and not ephemeral (See for example, Blair, 1999). Third, views rhetoric as hermeneutic to demonstrate discourse as related to class and ideology (See for example, Cloud, 1996). Finally, material rhetoric in this strand is a state of being whereby rhetoric discourse permeates every aspect of our lives – the purpose, here, is not to reveal power but to “map” power (See for example, Greene, 1998b).
man’s contact with the world, reducing things to human perspectives on a human scale” (1936c, 189). Therefore, language and its articulation are instrumental in assisting the documentation of human interaction or of making communicative efforts, but it always operates within the human perspective and the human scale. This reiterates Santayana’s emphasis on Protagoras’ maxims, which I discussed in Chapter Two, and underscores discourse as the creator and arbiter of values. Likewise, as argued in Chapter Two, this again highlights how our own sense experiences influence circulating truths vis-à-vis our tendency toward the good and the beautiful within a human evaluative scale, a scale that evolves from sense and emotion.

For Santayana, the emotions, or passions, influence our sense experience and our expression of that sense experience. Aristotle understood that the emotions are a human condition and even while we use them to create or forward judgments, we should not only use the emotions. Nevertheless, humans sometimes use emotion rather than purely rational argument. Thus, while for Aristotle the emotions are not entirely irrational because one can cultivate them in order to align with a virtuous character and provide sound judgments, they can be volatile and thus not necessarily part of a rational rhetoric. Santayana, like Aristotle, believes that the emotions have a role in human behavior but more fully and consistently embraces their role in a life of reason. Emotions, on Santayana’s view, offer a “natural joy in thinking freely, and the self-assertion of each mind against all others” (1972c, 509). And this sort of freedom, he maintains, relies on individual intuition, which by means of liberating the senses from fact, liberates eloquence, poetry, and beauty from the passions while liberating truth from the known world (1972c, 523-24). This natural capacity for intuition guides our experience while helping to enable assertions about that experience’s contribution to belief and action. Still, Santayana cautions, we must not rely on intuition alone. The moralist could be a good preacher, he says, but
a philosopher could not. On Santayana’s view, contrasting, yet equally valid, maxims circulate and thus philosophers cannot (or should not) take the dogmatic approach of sole authority or advocate of a solitary position. Relying on individual intuition alone would place too much stock in individual experience, negating other possible (and better) alternatives of belief and action. The solution, for Santayana, combines intuition with contemplation and reflection in order to make better judgments about circulating alternatives. Santayana declares, “To settle the relative merits of rival authorities and of hostile consciences it is necessary to appeal to the only real authority, to experience, reason, and human nature in the living man. No other test is conceivable and no other would be valid” (1921a, 231). Santayana makes very clear that intuitions originate from preference, a fact for him that suggests three important observations.21 First, because intuitions stem from preference we cannot rely on intuition as a measure for authority or validity. An individual may express her maxim more persuasively than another, but that does not necessarily equate to authority or expertise. “Proverbs,” Santayana reminds us, “depend for their truth entirely on the occasion they are applied to” (1921a, 218). This not only suggests reliance on common but relative truths (doxa), but it also reinforces the need to recognize the importance of occasion, a standard consideration in the rhetorical lexicon.

Second, our intuitions, grounded in individual preference, cannot serve as the focus or basis of genuine (i.e., productive) debate. Otherwise put, we cannot persuade someone as a result of debate or rational argument to have a subjective taste that they do not have. Nevertheless, Santayana, like Aristotle, understands that individuals are more attracted to beauty and the good than their opposites, suggesting that if a common understanding of beauty or the good exists, that

---

21 Specifically, he writes, “The ultimate intuitions on which ethics rests are not debatable, for they are not opinions we hazard but preferences we feel; and it can be neither correct nor incorrect to feel them,” even while we may assert these preferences “fiercely or with sweet reasonableness, and we may be more or less incapable of sympathising with the different preferences of others” (1913, 144).
may influence individual preference and resulting perceptions of beauty and of goodness. A simple, yet effective example: If I believe blue is the most attractive color and someone else believes red is the most beautiful color and provides rational arguments about why red is indeed more beautiful than blue, regardless of their rational arguments the other person is unlikely to persuade me. As a result, any debate about the “best” color will not be productive. However, if the doxa of my community shares in the belief that red is a lovely color, then this shared belief might influence my perception of beauty. However, even if such doxastic belief exists, it remains unlikely that rational argument can persuade me to believe that red is beautiful; rather, it is more probable that I am persuaded by the relational factors involved with the color. If, say, red is associated with democracy, and I participate in a democratic community, then the notion of democracy might be more influential as a representative of red over against influence of argument of my subjective taste. This helps explain, for example, why certain cultures might have different standards of beauty and goodness. For example, certain African and Asian tribes wear neck rings to give the illusion of elongated necks, which are markers of beauty, wealth, and prosperity, while other cultures perceive this tradition strange and unseemly. These same principles can apply to other ideas that communities perceive as beautiful or good, too, such as political ideals and principles, because of the relationships of preference in particulars with common beliefs in general. Rooted in subjective taste and preference, then, arguments without consideration of this subjective quality proceed into a more dogmatic line. Thus, when Santayana criticizes the sophists, he does not mean neither sophists specifically, nor rhetoric in general; rather, he means the individual who speaks (preaches) without reflection or without appropriate concern for the effects of speech. While Santayana claims that the emotions help us to think more freely, which includes the right to create and express individual preference, this does not
mean that each preference is equally valid, good, or beautiful. The task of speech – formed thought – should aim to make beauty and goodness more profuse in our communities, a difficult if not impossible task if we are merely battling amongst subjective tastes. Santayana maintains that it is emotion that helps shape the intuition that prompts us naturally toward that which is good and beautiful:

Knowing how our passions and purposes watchfully realize their avowed ends, may we not reasonably assimilate obscure events to these deliberate actions, the causes of which seem clear to us and intimately confessed?...Must not some idea, seen under the form of the good, guide and attract every movement in nature? Yes: that is the normal way of speaking, the rhetorical or poetical way of describing nature in human terms from the human point of view. (1972h, 311-12)

Emotion, as Santayana tells us, is not only a natural component of human speech, but it is both the rhetorical and poetical rendering of human ideas. One may express emotions irrationally, like anything taken to extremes, but for Santayana the emotions are part of the life of reason. So much so, in fact, that he describes emotions as the means to identify and create connections that prompt and enable us to rhetorically express such sentiments. Emotions are components of rationality, order, and beauty; they guide us toward the good.

Third, and even more radical, Santayana suggests emotions pre-exist any deliberation that may follow from such outward experience. Felt emotion, say anger, is itself already a deliberative engagement with the world, albeit and perhaps obviously, at a preconscious level, which is not to say an un-thought level. For all thought, as Santayana claims, is rhetoric and is composed of essences, all that are or can be communicated. I explore this understanding of

22 See also Santayana’s critique of sophistry in “Rational Ethics” 1921b, 241-44.
emotion as it relates to the *epideictic* genre of rhetoric more fully in the next section; nevertheless, it bears mentioning Santayana’s noteworthy understanding of emotion since it enables us to understand emotion as a constitutive rhetorical moment that precedes any outward (and secondary) deliberative experience.

As a solution to the problem of individuals’ conditions preventing alternative possibilities within experience, Santayana turns to art, emotion, symbols, and, perhaps most importantly, to communication. Humans create possibilities and conditions of meaning by giving form to experience and then disseminating those possibilities. Rhetoric, in its turn, acts as a mode for the realization of these disclosed and disseminated possibilities, whether or not the possibilities are ever realized in the material world of custom and practice. It takes, however, the imagination to move individuals to conceive of possibilities outside their own experience, which as we know is one of the aims (and sophistic insights) of *dissoi logoi*. Rhetoric, then, by enacting thought – i.e. giving form to discourse – enables individuals to conceive of such alternatives and to compare them both to their individual experiences and the experiences of others as manifested in and through their discourse. Because our experiences originate in preferences informed both by our emotion and our perception of beauty, appraising this connection between emotion and beauty helps to reveal the aesthetic quality of rhetoric’s effectiveness.

Emotion, Santayana argues, accompanies perception and in doing so revitalizes the possibility of enjoyable creation while stimulating the imagination. Santayana argues that we draw from our experiences in order to articulate ideas but that when elevated above the constraints of convention (as in the case of the poet), we may adorn and thus beautify conventional ideals by means of combining emotions and perceptions. This attachment creates a pause in which we are able to enjoy the image that we have created and to rekindle (again and
again) the inner workings of the imagination: “The love of beauty which made him rhyme them, reappear in his imagination and make him select there also the material that is itself beautiful, or capable of assuming beautiful forms. The link that binds together the ideas, sometimes so wide apart, which his wit assimilates, is most often the link of emotion” (Santayana 1957a, 263). The desire for beauty initiates an orderly and pleasing form, whereby the emotions secure and assemble ideas in the service of the imagination. On the whole this artistic endeavor is “the art of intensifying emotions by assembling the scattered objects that naturally arouse them” (Santayana 1957a, 263). Moreover, the emotions provide the very substance of life, because, argues Santayana, “the passions are the chief basis of all interests, even the most ideal, and the passions are seldom brought into play except by the contact of man with man” (1957a, 276). For that reason, emotions do not merely influence individual preference; they also gain in strength when and where they originate in an intersubjective space – an inter-experiential field – that binds together people’s ideas and thus preserves the ties of the community.

Santayana prioritizes the emotions in a life of reason even while understanding the human tendency to use emotions irrationally. Indeed, Santayana expresses two specific ways in which emotions become irrational. First, he argues:

[We] have learned to look for a symbolic meaning in detached episodes, and to accept the incidental emotions they cause, because of their violence and our absorption in them, as in some sense sacramental and representative of the whole. Thus the picture of an unmeaning passion, of a crime without an issue, does not appear to our romantic apprehension as the sorry farce it is, but rather as a true tragedy. Some have lost even the capacity to conceive of a true tragedy, because
they have no idea of a cosmic order, of general laws of life, or of an impersonal religion. (Santayana 1957a, 282-3)

Santayana implicates the force of making connections between unconnected matters and the residual emotions that each may cause. This force, he argues, merely gives the illusion of a particular emotion as a synecdochal representative of the whole without actually attending to the whole. One of the consequences of such mis-representation is that our ability to identify and understand an authentic tragedy diminishes. For example, an armed thief who robs and commits violence may evoke tragic responses of, say, pity, or perhaps even fear and anger. However, our emotions become merely incidental in such a scenario. As such, the emotions help stimulate a tragic response, but are left unused or applied to the real tragedy: the conditions that underwrite the violent theft (poverty, crime, etc.). These peripheral emotions allow for a rise in debate about the issues that incidentally caused the emotions without facilitating an understanding of the underlying principles and conditions that provoked them. This, in turn, points to the second way emotions are irrational: “Incompetence, when it flatters the passions, can always find a greater incompetence to approve of it. Indeed, some people would have regarded the Tower of Babel as the best academy of eloquence on account of the variety of oratorical methods prevailing there” (Santayana 1957c, 173). That is to say that the amount or variety of argument is irrelevant, and irrational, so long as the arguments employed only attempts to appease emotion as opposed to expressing emotion within an authentic experience.

Emotion, Santayana notes, is rational or may be made rational by considering fundamental conditions and principles that give rise to passion. Certain events may arouse particular emotions that actuate reason: “the conflict of life and the shocks of experience seem to bring us face to face with an alien and overwhelming power, reflection can humanise and
rationalise that power by conceiving its laws; and with this recognition of the rationality of all things comes the sense of their beauty and order” (Santayana 1957b, 221). Reflection in this sense powerfully overcomes the irrationality of emotion because, just as we are prone to emotion, we are drawn to beauty and order. This is why, according to Santayana, “beauty is a rival object of passion in itself” (1962d, 117). This does not mean that beauty and emotion are pitted against one another at the other’s expense. On the contrary, as Santayana avers, reflection and emotion help to elicit a greater sense of beauty and order. However, if the emotions remain irrational, we may consequentially trivialize the emotion at the expense of beauty. The combination, therefore, of emotion and reflection helps transcend the temporary and illusive emotion brought about by an apparent, but inauthentic, tragedy. Moreover, emotion coupled with reflection offers the opportunity for more thorough consideration and deliberation of the real grounds of the emotion. As Santayana argues: “The expression of emotion should be rationalised by derivation from character and by reference to the real objects that arouse it – to Nature, to history, and to the universe of truth; the experience imagined should be conceived as a destiny, governed by principles, and issuing in the discipline and enlightenment of the will” (1957a, 288). Not only, then, do we feel and experience emotion, which may induce deliberation about its underlying cause, but we also tap into imagination as a means to evaluate alternatives. This use of imagination exists within the individual as a capacity for imaginative thought and as a way of borrowing from others’ who have already expressed and circulated those ideas. Once expressed, these imaginative ideas “become an interpretation of life and not merely an irrelevant excursion into the realm of fancy, multiplying our images without purpose, and distracting us from our business without spiritual gain” (Santayana 1957a, 288). Art forms help us not only to create such interpretations of life, but also to express them.
Remarkably, art offers us the ability to express meaning outside of ordinary experience governed by constraining conditions. Santayana prioritizes poetry because of its capacity to express and evoke emotion, and we can see how this function may insinuate itself into other artistic genres – visual, literary, prose, etc. – if made and used well. Accordingly, “art in general is a rehearsal of rational living, and recasts in idea a world which we have no present means of recasting in reality. Yet this rehearsal reveals the glories of a possible performance better than do the miserable experiments until now executed on the reality” (Santayana 1962d, 119). This artistic function prompts the imagination to consider that which could be otherwise, to conceive of possibilities external to our conditions and ourselves. Particularly, art that requires language draws our attention to how rhetoric enacts dissoi logoi in such arts as poetry, drama, and literature. Without these tensions, conflicts, or pressure points there is precious little to inform human activity that would facilitate the achievement of something better. 

Pace, Protagoras, Aristotle, and others’ views that dissoi logoi performs for one side’s triumph to the other side’s loss, Santayana offers a new way to understand dissoi logoi, that is, as a way to harmonize such tension, conflicts, and pressure points. For as Santayana says, “Reason cannot stand alone; brute habit and blind play are at the bottom of art and morals, and unless irrational impulses are kept alive, the life of reason collapses for sheer emptiness. What tragedy could there be, or what sublime harmonies rising out of tragedy, if there were no spontaneous passions to create the issue, no wild voices to be reduced to harmony?”(1967a, 137). In this way, emotion combined with the deliberative potential in dissoi logoi gives rise to issues that demand attention. Art, in other words, encourages the emotions and the imagination by allowing us to articulate ideas in ways that draw from common conditions and rehearse various actions and consequences,
without, however, reducing ideas to what is merely common. Such artistic rehearsals, however, must not trivialize or only act fanciful. Rather, it must offer relevance and interpretation:

The higher plane is the sphere of significant imagination, of relevant fiction, of idealism become the interpretation of the reality it leaves behind. Poetry raised to its highest power is then identical with religion grasped in its inmost truth; at their point of union both reach their utmost purity and beneficence, for the poetry loses its frivolity and ceases to demoralise, while religion surrenders its illusions and ceases to deceive. (Santayana, 1957a, 290)

Imagination, fiction, and interpretation allow for the possibility of ideals beyond our ordinary experiences. Accordingly, poetry in its elevated expression promotes ideals and guides us toward the good in a similar way to that of religion – but without the dispirited deceptions that sometimes accompany contemporary religious practice.

Rhetoric has historically been conceived as a means for the creation, deliberation, dissemination, and evaluation of ideals, though typically contained within specific genres for specific ends. By focusing on the imagination, language, and emotion, I have shown how Santayana enables us to reduce or remove any constraints posed by generic labels. He does so by creating a more holistic role for the poet, the philosopher, and the rhetorician, who in turn creates, contemplates, and critiques. As a result, we understand the roles in an interconnected way, an aesthetic strand binding them together. But, just as the roles that we typically assign to those studying or performing poetics, philosophy, and rhetoric wither away, so, too, do the boundaries that Aristotle and his followers create for rhetoric.
RISING EPIDEICTIC

One of Aristotle’s primary contributions to the study of rhetoric was to divide the art into three distinct genres. Although he held that each genre makes use of the available means of persuasion, the ends of that persuasion, Aristotle argued, are based on the receivers of discourse. That is, the person addressed “determines the speech’s end and object” (1954b, 1.3.1). This audience may take on three roles: the critic, the judge, or the spectator. As a critic, the listener is situated within the deliberative genre, required to make choices about future events and their expediency. As a judge, she is positioned within the judicial or forensic genre, making evaluations about past guilt or innocence in the name of justice. Finally, as a spectator, Aristotle states that her role is merely to observe the display of ceremonial or epideictic discourse.23 Even at first glance we see Aristotle downplaying the importance of the epideictic genre, favoring instead the deliberative.

Aristotle privileges the deliberative genre because, like the tradition that precedes him (e.g. the sophists, Plato, etc.) he believes the apparent end of deliberation is political expediency, an end that involves influencing the critic to make judgments on actions that would preserve an apparently healthy political state. On Aristotle’s view, the goal of politics is the good life. Hence, the very notion of politics implies a distinction between the polis and the citizen, a distinction whereby the citizen serves the state (the thing that, in essence, is bigger than any individual). In order to contribute to the vitality of the state, an individual must deliberate about the things that contribute to a healthy state. Nevertheless, in each rhetorical genre, Aristotle assumes an

23 Nevertheless, a spectator has the capacity both to view and to reflect, depending on how we use or translate Aristotle’s theôria. For example, Werner Jaeger writes of the ambiguity of the word theorein, “which means both watching a spectacle and contemplation and research in the ‘theoretical’ sense” (1962, 432). Also cf. Ekaterina V. Haskins’ Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle, in which she refers to the theôros as spectator (2004, 58; 61).
underlying principle, if abided by, that preserves a thriving state. In deliberative (political) rhetoric the principle is expediency, by means of which consideration is given primarily to matters of practicality and efficiency. In forensic rhetoric, the principle is justice. A just person, so the thinking goes, will also be a virtuous one; so, too, a just state will also be a virtuous state. In epideictic rhetoric, the principle is honor. The individual – the doer of good deeds – is made to appear to be an honorable person, one whose deeds appear to contribute to the overall good of the state. Because changing *doxa* undergirds our perceptions of a successful (good) state, perceived as a beautiful and orderly one, in all three genres, we see the good coinciding with the effective.

The epideictic genre, however, is almost a default genre in the sense that we needed a genre to capture any leftover rhetoric not belonging to the deliberative or forensic genres. Epideictic rhetoric does not, apparently, deal with political affairs as conceived by Aristotle. Nor does it guide us toward answering the question what *is* the honorable or just thing to do. Thus, in the *analytical* move to divide the three genres, Aristotle made the genres distinct in order to carefully determine what each genre may have to offer in terms of rhetoric. What is left unaddressed, however, is how we might view the rhetorical genres *synthetically*. When we perceive of rhetoric synthetically, we make the attempt to put the parts back together to form a whole and to discover what it is that is common to all three genres. In other words, what is it that unites expediency, justice, and honor?

What Santayana has shown us throughout his works, is that the answer to such questions is to be found in aesthetics – that the most productive way to approach them is by means of beauty. That is to say, that expediency, justice, and honor are not separate parts, but concomitant with one another in the same fashion as the true, the good, and the beautiful. For example, in the
Gorgias, Plato never really defines justice; rather, he expresses that he would rather be wronged than to commit a wrong. The Greek prefix “eu,” like kalon, can mean both beautiful and good, which reveals how these categories or genres are underwritten by an aesthetic principle. Take, for example, Aristotle’s joining of kalos with virtue, and his characterization of it as, “an ability for doing good” (1991, 1.9.4). With that in mind, then, we first turn to contemporary commentaries on the epideictic genre and then to Santayana to see how his understanding of aesthetics improves upon our notion of epideictic, elevating its status vis-à-vis the other genres as a means of creating harmony between the principles of rhetorical discourse.

We extend the epideictic genre’s significance when considering Aristotle’s remarks about it alongside how other scholars challenge the predominant conception that the epideictic is rooted in only the principle of honor. Aristotle describes epideictic broadly as one that is associated with ceremony and display. He acknowledges that the epideictic is the most literary of the three genres, which suggests that it is the genre most often associated with the aesthetic (or poetics) (1991, 3.12.5). Several scholars support this association, pointing to the literary and poetic resources of epideictic as a means to complicate either the genre itself or its ends. For example, Kenneth Burke, challenges the distinction between poetics and rhetoric, asserting that because epideictic is an art of display we should reconsider the division between poetics and rhetoric (1966b, 295). Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca argue for the connection

---

24 Aristotle writes, “Now kalon describes whatever, through being chosen for itself, is praiseworthy or whatever, through being good [agathon], is pleasant because it is good [agathon]. If this, then, is the kalon, then virtue is necessarily kalon; for it is praiseworthy because of being good [agathon]. Now virtue is an ability, as it seems, that is productive and preservative of goods, and an ability for doing good in many and great ways, actually in all ways in all things” (1991, 1.9.3-4).


26 See also Burke’s Counter-Statement (1968).
between *epideictic* and literature that surpasses even argumentation: “The *epideictic* genre of oratory thus seemed to have more connection with literature than with argumentation,” though perhaps due to a flawed conception of persuasion itself (1969, 48). Following this spirit of revaluation, Dale L. Sullivan argues that *ethos* plays an important role in the genre, writing, “Epideictic rhetoric, then, is not determined by a ‘constellation of forms,’ but a constellation of purposes: preservation, education, celebration, and aesthetic creation” (1993, 116). Gerard Hauser, too, argues for the significance of *epideictic* rhetoric, claiming that it allows for a common language of value and belief, from which deliberative rhetoric draws its own arguments (see Hauser 1999). Moreover, Jeffrey Walker argues not only that *epideictic* rhetoric is itself a form of argument, but also that it affects and, perhaps effects, practical decision making (Walker 2000). And more recently, Ned O’Gorman links *epideictic* and *phantasia*, but for civic ends, claiming that, “Rhetoric is for Aristotle an art that may shape opinion and direct the affections through the creation of images” and “emotional appeals depend on the ability of the speaker to activate the capacity of the auditor for *phantasia* and to lead him or her to an opinion” (2005, 25). O’Gorman suggests that the rhetor initiates the capacity for imagination and does so in a way that draws our attention to style and the selection of words: “In the *Rhetoric*, epideictic—the rhetoric of “showing forth”—is the most lexical of the rhetorical species,” although, “It may also be Aristotle’s least favored rhetorical practice (2005, 26). Each of these contributions suggests that the *epideictic* genre has more potential than Aristotle explicitly stated.

Santayana complicates the way we may think of the *epideictic* in light of his discussions of the true, the good, and the beautiful. Santayana, remember, only considers truth as subjective and represented by image and symbols – fixed yet mutable – in a world of appearances. The good, alternatively, results from a collection of individual impulses, desires, and preferences that
assign and preserve meaning to value. Beauty influences and attracts us to certain goods, real or imagined, and guides us toward a higher good – i.e., toward the harmonization of all three that activates the human capacity to live a life of reason. Thus, when viewing epideictic from Santayana’s aesthetic lens, we can see how recent scholarly contributions, while providing important insights into the nature and possibility of epideictic, cannot quite capture or fully appreciate the potential impact of epideictic to radicalize rhetoric along aesthetic lines.

Broadly, five themes emerge from these contemporary reappraisals of epideictic’s significance within rhetoric: history, literature/poetic, style, imagination, and telos. Dissoi logoi is often attached to the notion of rational argument and debate within the deliberative sphere, where the prevailing assumption is that rational argument precedes or outranks epideictic rhetoric and its stylistic, exhibitive concerns. However, as Santayana argues, “The essential organic tropes, passions, and powers of man must have been first firmly rooted in the race, before anyone could conceive a project, or be able to execute it as conceived” (1972h, 321).27 We can infer two significant consequences from Santayana’s declaration. First, emotions and powers (i.e. capacity for consciousness, language, and reason) are intimately connected. Second, not only is emotion firmly rooted in rationality, but it is also an antecedent to any potential conception or execution of argument. This is particularly important in light of the tendencies to conceive of emotion as tied to epideictic rhetoric and to eliminate emotion (at least theoretically) from rationality, a rationality used to effect efficacious political ends in the deliberative sphere. This second observation suggests that the epideictic genre precedes deliberative possibility, and consequently requires us to consider it as on a par with deliberative rhetoric’s importance. This

27 Santayana sometimes defines a trope as an essence of an occurrence or an “event” (1972j, 293-94) and in other instances describes it as methods (of action), dominating every scene (1972h, 311). This usage is different than the rhetorical tropes we are accustomed to considering. For criticism on Santayana’s usage see Donald C. Williams’ “On the Elements of Being: I” in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Sep., 1953), pp. 3-18
reinforces the re-conception of aesthetic rhetoric, where an aesthetic thread binds together the rhetorical genres. This aesthetic thread is a result of the grounding of emotions and reason in preference affected by our own sense of beauty. Moreover, this sense of beauty is articulated and exists not only within our doxastic community, but also within the literary as a means to step outside of our own experience.28

Artistic endeavors, Santayana has already made clear, draw from experience and emotion to encourage the imagination to conceive of and to create alternatives. As the most literary of the rhetorical genres, epideictic, as I have shown, contains within it the space for poetics as a means to complicate our perceptions of the constraints posed, which it accomplishes by firmly dividing poetics, philosophy, and rhetoric. So, too, it offers the possibility of argument, as we have seen, through the tensions that dissoi logoi provides to the literary and poetic. One of the benefits of literature is that, “the charm which a poet, by his art of combining images and shades of emotion, casts over a scene or an action, is attached to the principal actor in it, who gets the benefit of the setting furnished him by a well-stocked mind” (Santayana 1957a, 264). In other words, while rhetoric may never be omniscient and may only work within the realm of probabilities, literature offers a higher version of omniscience.29 Although not really omniscient, literature enables the production of possible ends by a creator who has the capacity to imagine beyond real or material constraints. This provides a sort of test-run for possible courses of action in real or imagined occasions. A second benefit helps to mark off literature from something like history. For

28 Further evidence of this line of argument stems from Coleman’s comments that there are “prerational grounds of moral judgments” arising from a desire for harmony, and his emphasis that “Santayana believed that ethics rested on felt preferences wholly conditioned by the constitution of the valuing animal” (Coleman 2009, 409; 410). Moreover, and more importantly, “Rational ethics consists in taking any sincere human value judgment and determining the dialectical relations of the judgment” (Coleman 2009, 409).
29 This sentiment echoes Aristotle in his Poetics when he claims, “Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars” (1451b5-8).
example, because literature has the capacity to compare alternative actions and ends, Santayana argues that, “Literature and literary philosophy are nevertheless the most natural and eloquent witnesses to the life of the psyche. Literature is conserved speech, speech is significant song, and song is a pure overflow of the psyche in her moments of free play and vital leisure” (1972g, 346). \(^{30}\) \(^{31}\) In other words, literature offers an eloquent witness, not purporting to act or document objectively, to the material life of humans in the artistic moments of play and leisure. Thus, when Coleman argues that, “Dramatic readings of existence may distort facts, but they express something about the forces guiding human action and experience,” we can understand this to mean that the possibilities contained in literature are not simply preserving some action in word, but work toward enabling one’s ability to see the \textit{tendencies} behind action and experience (2009, 231).

To be sure, rhetoric prides itself in the use of language to accomplish particular ends, but its focus on tendency also relates to motives of style to achieve those particular ends. O’Gorman suggests that emphasizing \textit{lexis} – the showing forth through words and images – entails focusing on \textit{epideictic} in order to see how this function activates the imagination in its hearers. Santayana, too, points to this relationship but stresses the underlying sense and emotional perception within the style and language selection: “This supreme function of poetry is only the consummation of the method by which words and imagery are transformed into verse” (1957a, 271). It is not only a matter of transforming thought into word in order to “bring it before the eyes” as Aristotle

\(^{30}\) Santayana distinguishes spirit from psyche: “By spirit I understand the actual light of consciousness falling upon anything – the ultimate invisible emotional fruition of life in feeling and thought…by the psyche I understand a system of tropes, inherited or acquired, displayed by living bodies in their growth and behaviour. This psyche is the specific form of physical life, present and potential, asserting itself in any plant or animal; it will bend to circumstances, but if bent too much it will suddenly snap” (1972g, 331).

\(^{31}\) Santayana also claims that poetry is more philosophical than history, writing, “If poetry in its higher reaches is more philosophical than history, because it presents the memorable types of men and things apart from unmeaning circumstances, so in its primary substance and texture poetry is more philosophical than prose because it is nearer to our immediate experience” (1957a, 258).
would say, but also of creating a particular rhythmic quality to the word (1991, 3.10.7). Santayana writes, “poetry is metrical and euphuistic discourse, expressing thought which is both sensuous and ideal” (1957a, 289). Although this view of poetry moves beyond metered expression in the traditional poetic sense, it still acknowledges the importance of the metrical quality of an aesthetic language in terms of measure of degree and scale. Moreover, “As verse breaks up the prosaic order of syllables and subjects them to a recognisable and pleasing measure, so poetry breaks up the whole prosaic picture of experience to introduce into it a rhythm more congenial and intelligible to the mind” (Santayana 1957a, 271). While the poet may work in rhymes or meter, for Santayana, the rhetor can be both poet and creator, because, on his view, “The highest poetry…is not that of the versifiers, but that of the prophets, or of such poets as interpret verbally the visions which the prophets have rendered in action and sentiment rather than in adequate words,” reinforcing the idea that though distinct, some overlap can exist and the poet, the philosopher, and the rhetorician are parts of the same whole (1957a, 284-5). And this, in turn, recasts Santayana’s dictum, discussed earlier, that “the poet creates the fable, the sophist carries it on.” Rather than designating separate domains of action, Santayana implicitly argues that the poet and rhetor are, by nature, engaged in a conjoint and cooperative undertaking, insofar as both are demonstratively concerned with the action and sentiment accompanying elevated language use, i.e., insofar as both poet and rhetor are deserving of those titles. As Santayana

32 Longinus also makes a similar comment when discussing notions of imagery, forms, and metaphors as a way of using language. He writes, “In the general sense, any thought present in the mind and producing speech is called imagination, but in its now prevailing sense the word applies when ecstasy or passion makes you appear to see what you are describing and enables you to make your audience see it” (1991, 24).

33 Yet, poets – authentic poets, that is – “where poetry rises from its elementary and detached expressions in rhythm, euphuism, characterization, and story-telling, and comes to the consciousness of its highest function, that of portraying the ideals of experience and destiny, then the poet becomes aware that he is essentially a prophet” (Santayana 1957a, 286). In so doing, the poet expresses what she sees in reality or in possibility. Thus, the authentic poet is also simultaneously the rhetorician and the philosopher since in this highest function we combine the functions of contemplation, beauty, and form to express conditions and possibility. If one of these functions is left out, then “They have been willing to leave their world ugly as a whole, after stuffing it with a sufficient profusion of beauties” whether those beauties be mere poetry or mere sophistry (Santayana 1957a, 286).
argues, “[If] the rendering of reality is to remain artistic, it must still study to satisfy the senses” (1962c, 145). The role of the rhetorician, in other words, is to create, poetically, an interpretation of reality – that is, the given existence of interaction with the environment or other people – and to do that he or she must gratify the senses and emotions that those conditions arouse.

Rendering reality in a particular way does not merely create fanciful ways of conceiving conditions, but rather helps to provide possible alternatives, chiefly by stoking or inspiring the imagination. As Santayana puts it, “When the veil of convention is once removed from our eyes by the poet, we are better able to dominate any particular experience and, as it were, change its scale, now losing ourselves in its infinitesimal texture, not in its infinite ramifications” (1957a, 266-7). This insight is not entirely unheard of in the rhetorical tradition. Aristotle, for instance, recommended that the rhetor make the familiar seem strange through language (1991, 3.2.3).34 Santayana adds, however, the argument that the cloak of conventionality works to laminate the appearance that conditions and constraints are stagnant, unchanging, always requiring us to deal with the consequences of given reality. Alternatively, when we strip convention of this power, we open vistas of rhetorical possibility. Within this aesthetic rendering of rhetoric, we can mend such consequences:

The great function of poetry…is precisely this: to repair to the material of experience, seizing hold of the reality of sensation and fancy beneath the surface of conventional ideas, and then out of that living but indefinite material to build new structures, richer, finer, fitter to the primary tendencies of our nature, truer to the ultimate possibilities of the soul. Our descent into the elements of our being is then justified by our subsequent freer ascent toward its goal; we revert to sense

---

34 See also Aristotle’s *Poetics* 1954, 1458a18-58b5
only to find food for reason; we destroy conventions only to construct ideals.

(Santayana 1957a, 273)

Through sense and emotion we not only remove the banal and dampening effects of convention, but, in capturing the sensuous possibilities that lie beneath such convention, we also create possibility through the reflection, understanding, and dissemination of better and fitter ideals.

With better and fitter ideals in mind, the final aspect of epideictic concerns its telos, or the ends of epideictic. We tend to view rhetoric as useful in points of tension in order to consider that which could be otherwise, within the boundaries of specific genres. Santayana, however, allows us to conceive of a rhetoric that preserves the possibility of discourse for these ends while adding to it his idea for an aesthetic rhetoric, which blends and harmonizes genres and effects while keeping individual functions intact, i.e., we can recognize them as distinct parts of the same whole. Thus, while common notions of rhetoric suggest that deliberative rhetoric effects expedient actions and choices after reasoned consideration of arguments from multiple sides, epideictic is left to the relatively marginalized task of praising or blaming for the ends of honor or dishonor. O’Gorman challenges this conception by suggesting that the ends of epideictic rhetoric include civic engagement. However, while this may be accurate in some cases, it only points to, once again, a part of the whole. This stands in contrast to Santayana’s radical vision of the life of reason, which promises to harmonize the various ends and to create ideals largely influenced by the true and the good and the beautiful. Each ideal contains its own possibilities as well as its own ends, but possibilities and ends that aim for the encompassing ideal of the good, where the underlying sensuous good merges with the imaginative possibilities producing aesthetic charm (Santayana 1904, 324).
A brief look at the example of Helen of Troy helps to express this harmonization of genres and ends. Both Helen and the Trojan War are common themes in Homeric times through the present.\(^{35}\) If we apply Aristotle’s forensic genre, in which the ends are guilt or innocence in the service of justice, to Helen’s case, then we can conclude that Helen simultaneously receives praise and an innocent “verdict” when viewing the “case” through varying accounts of the events. Gorgias, however, writes an *apologia*, or defense, of Helen, though he titles it an *encomium*, offering four alternative reasons (the gods, force, persuasion, or love), leaving Helen an innocent victim.\(^{36}\) Even while criticizing Gorgias’ mislabeling of his account of Helen, Isocrates acknowledges that the discussion is an important one bearing further attention, and thus takes his turn creating an eloquent and “authentic” *encomium*.\(^{37}\) Both accounts required deliberation, judgment, and ultimately evidence for their praise. We may easily say that rhetorical scholars have already exposed the fluidity of generic rhetorical boundaries, and this example reinforces the inability to maintain rigid boundaries. However, this example also reveals that a connection, namely beauty, exists between the genres. That is, Helen’s beauty was not only a worthy and viable topic, but the influence of beauty in general gave rise to the unification of the ideas, discourse, judgments, and praise of the subject. Thus, while rhetoric may emphasize a deliberative-rational model, reason, as Santayana puts it, can never diminish aesthetic judgments: “Reason may well outflank and transform aesthetic judgments, but can never undermine them. Its own materials are the perceptions which if full and perfect are called beauties. Its function is to endow the parts of sentience with a consciousness of the system in which they lie, so that they may attain a mutual relevance and ideally support one another”

\(^{35}\) Details of Helen as the instigator of the Trojan War are discussed in Homer’s *Iliad*, Euripides’ *The Trojan Women*, Gorgias’ *Encomium of Helen*, and Isocrates’ *Helen*.

\(^{36}\) The *encomium*, I suggest, is actually a praise of rhetoric’s capacity to perform dissoi logoi by presenting alternatives to commonly held opinions, while the *apologia* is directed at Helen’s role in the Trojan War.

\(^{37}\) Cf. Isocrates’ *Against the Sophists* and *Helen*. 
(Santayana 1962d, 126). Beauty is powerful enough to create contention and division, but, more importantly, it is powerful enough to unify. When considering Helen, we see that her beauty was strong enough to unify even the most formidable men in competition for her hand in marriage. As Isocrates makes clear, beauty is a significant topic signaling to us that aesthetic ideals are at the heart of culture and the *polis* (Isocrates 1966c, 12). 38

The *telos* of an aesthetic rhetoric is not truly an end, but an ongoing beginning, one that widens the possibilities of rhetoric. 39 The real possibility of aesthetic rhetoric lies in the harmonization of all three genres and their various and distinctive attributes. Such harmonization does not render them the same or homogenous; rather, harmonization provides the synthesis of what we frequently view as disparate parts. Santayana’s vision of aesthetics allows us to rework generic “boundaries,” in order to give prominence to the emotions as well as to the imagination. In so doing, we simultaneously become critic, judge, and spectator – united together through the underlying aesthetic charm of rhetoric, which encompasses the true, the good, and the beautiful. Santayana captures the consequences of momentary persuasion without this aesthetic thrust in place, saying:

To be bewitched is not to be saved, though all the magicians and aesthetes in the world should pronounce it to be so. Intoxication is a sad business, at least for a philosopher; for you must either drown yourself altogether, or else when sober again you will feel somewhat fooled by yesterday’s joys and somewhat lost in today’s vacancy. The man who would emancipate art from discipline and reason

38 Extending far beyond superficial topics like “bumble bees and salt” (Isocrates 1966c, 12).
39 Moreover, Santayana claims that, “In human society teleology takes a special and conscious form: it becomes art,” again drawing our attention to the idea that within a moral society – and all communities are moral by nature of the symbols we use and values we attach to said symbols – the ends of those symbolic exchanges are aesthetic (1972h, 311). Moreover, while discourse does not mirror nature, its ends – art – is a part of nature: “Art is a human, marginal, not indispensable extension of natural teleology” (Santayana 1972h, 321).
is trying to elude rationality, not merely in art, but in all existence. He is vexed at conditions of excellence that make him conscious of his own incompetence and failure. Rather than consider his function, he proclaims his self-sufficiency. A way foolishness has of revenging itself is to excommunicate the world. (1962d, 116)

By reclaiming the aesthetic viability and necessity underlying rhetoric, we preserve its creative possibility, releasing the binds that attempt to separate rhetoric, philosophy, and poetics. We preserve the emotional function of *epideictic* while simultaneously expanding that significance within a rational model, reconceived not with deliberative rhetoric at the head of the hierarchy, but alongside and inseparable from the *epideictic* and forensic genres. We preserve the imaginative capacity of *epideictic*, and this in turn prompts the reconceptualization of ideals outside of the storehouse of common belief and opinion, while stripping convention and re-clothing it with an aesthetic charm capable of guiding us toward those ideals.

**FORM**

As we have seen, aesthetic rhetoric has the capacity not only to reconcile the various genres and subject positions associated with those genres, but it also gives form to thought and emotion. Santayana, however, when writing about poetry and rhetoric, did not merely imply that rhetoric has a more complex capacity than its reduction to tropes and figures. He also points our attention beyond rhetoric in the service of or equation to persuasion. His argument bears repeating: “[Verse] is a form of rhetoric, as is all speech and even thought; a means of pouring experience into a mould which fluid experience cannot supply, and of transmuting emotion into ideas by making it articulate” (Santayana 1923, xi). Rhetoric as thought and emotion has impact
on the thinker and her interlocutor. If we are made susceptible to impact, then thought has influence on us either through things or images and words, particularly when those words help to display or evoke images. More specifically, when we make conventional language more beautiful, it has the capacity to give presence and to bring images before the eyes. In order for this impact to occur, however, rhetoric must make such experience articulate internally before making possible the transmission of ideas and ideals to others:

Art and happiness come together through intelligence, which consists in self-knowledge and an understanding of nature’s laws. The harmonies made or discovered between humans and nature are the source of happiness and liberation from superstition and convention. The artist, no longer merely a tool or an observer of nature, becomes creative and so capable of honest expression and clearer articulation of human ideals. (Coleman 2009, 262)

So conceived, creativity and clarity prompt reflective and elevated articulation of ideals. In so doing, this elevation can help to create both understanding and harmony between individuals and nature and to test already existing ideals via their juxtaposition with possible alternatives:

Among minds forming a moral society, and able to compare their several opinions, this enlightenment in the expert is coercive over the layman also, because the same facts confront them both. Did not the same facts confront them, communication would be impossible between them, or if communication was reputed to exist by magic there would be no possible conflict or progress among their opinions, because they would not refer to the same events. Even if each declared himself competent and prosperous in his own world, he would know nothing of the world of his neighbours. (Santayana 1972f, vi)
Therefore, because all society is moral, we are within our capacity to evaluate beliefs and opinions, but we must also enable the communication between people by avoiding coercion and making ourselves amenable to the possibility that different beliefs and opinions are legitimate in their own right. That is to say, different beliefs and opinions are legitimate in the sense that each individual has as much right to express them as any other. Nevertheless, the beliefs and opinions are created and evaluated within and again criteria of standards, which means that while a belief or opinion may be legitimate it may be better or worse than another. This should not suggest that we have to find consensus in differing beliefs, only that possible conflict does not necessarily equate to necessary conflict. Rhetoric instrumentally provides form to thought and emotion, which shapes experience. Aesthetic rhetoric has the capacity to become an instrument of harmony vis-à-vis language.

Though the relationship between influence, language, and rhetoric is not unusual in discussions of rhetoric, what Santayana provides – what he enables us to see – is an understanding of rhetoric’s capacity to endow thought with form. This form encompasses emotion and sense perception, placing a greater emphasis on an aesthetic principle of rhetoric, that is to say rhetoric’s relationship to beauty. “The stuff of language,” Santayana attests, “is words, and the sensuous material of words is sound; if language therefore is to be made perfect, its materials must be made beautiful by being themselves subjected to a measure, and endowed with a form” (1957a, 252).40 While we sensuously experience something before we can articulate the experience, our language, too, provides a sensuous experience that reinforces those perceptions post-articulation. We can make attempts to select the words that best “symbolize”

40 Moreover, Santayana argues, “Measure is a condition for perfection, for perfection requires that order should be pervasive, that not only the whole before us should have form, but that every part in turn should have a form of its own, and that those parts should be coördinated among themselves as the whole is coördinated with the other parts of some greater cosmos” (1957a, 252).
and “harness” any number or combination of sensible things, but ultimately our attempts are always removed from the actual thing. Santayana reminds us that, “Discourse is a language, not a mirror,” whereby language is not part of nature, but rather our ascription of a name to or sign to the various things we encounter or feel in our environments (1955f, 179). In so doing, we are better able to communicate. At the same time, we are unable merely to exist and experience a genuine happiness or force of emotion (beauty), because that experience is always mediated. He writes: “That beauty which should have been an inevitable smile on the face of society, an overflow of genuine happiness and power, has to be imported, stimulated artificially, and applied from without; so that art becomes a sickly ornament for an ugly existence” (1962a, 148). Like the Greeks, Santayana suggests that art has the capacity to make beautiful a flawed existence but only by means of an appropriate measure and consciousness.

Although each human, equipped with language, has any variety of essences from which to choose her articulations, a certain fitness to those expressions is necessary in order to achieve appropriate or effective communication. If we only relied on intuition, then we could merely accept all the essences as they present themselves to us in our environments. However, Santayana makes clear that, “[For] a wakeful animal they are signals. They report to his spirit, in very summary and uncertain images, the material events which surround him and which concern his welfare. They may accordingly become terms of knowledge if interpreted judiciously, and if

---

41 Santayana explains by comparing logic and language, and different languages and their translations: “Logic, like language, is partly a free construction and partly a mean of symbolizing and harnessing in expression the existing diversities of things; and whilst some languages, given a man’s constitutions and habits, may seem more beautiful and convenient to him than others, it is a foolish heat in a patriot to insist that only his native language is intelligible or right. No language or logic is right in the sense of being identical with the facts it is used to express, but each may be right by being faithful to these facts, as a translation may be faithful” (1955i, vi).

42 It is important to acknowledge, as Ashmore points out, that is possible to experience sensation without experiencing beauty. Ashmore says the crucial test of beauty for Santayana asks: is the valuing organism aware of the totality of elements it is perceiving? If not, then it is merely experiencing a sensation. If yes, then the organism is experiencing a perception of form. Not only does this relay the importance of beauty from form, but it also reveals why one individual might view an object as beautiful when another may not, reinforcing the notion of evaluation within human measure and experience (Ashmore 1966, 15).
interpreted injudiciously they may become illusions” (1972f, viii). Thus, alertness about one’s own position in her material world helps facilitate the possibility of knowledge and its evaluation in lieu of illusion. At its base, however, this “seeing” or realization may only occur through symbols, which are for Santayana always equally arbitrary: “as to the terms of sense and discourse, they are all from the very beginning equally arbitrary, poetical, and (if you choose) mad; yet all equally symptomatic” (Santayana 1972f, ix). The unending possibility of expression that language affords prompts us to use it and to use it creatively. Moreover, Santayana reminds us that art colors human happiness and expresses the mind’s internal habit more influentially than anything else.43 Because our internal habits of mind are encompassed in thought, which Santayana makes equal with rhetoric, it is safe to conclude that rhetoric, too, contains these characteristics of art. Further, if this is the case, then it must be made beautiful at its most influential. “The choice of those visionary essences,” Santayana claims, “which meantime visit the mind, though regular, is free; they are the transcript of life into discourse, the rhetorical and emotional rendering of existence, which when deepened and purified, becomes poetry or music” (1972f, ix). It is not so much that rhetoric and poetry are distinct, but that when rhetoric articulates the emotional rendering of our conditions and existence it attains to the height of creative and influential possibility, becoming equivalent to a poetic or aesthetic translation of life into discourse.

This aesthetic envisioning of rhetoric not only translates life into discourse, but it also emphasizes particular ways of seeing and valuing our environments or events within our conditions. Our own human impulses stimulate certain value-experiences that then foster a preference for some interests over others in service of human happiness. A poetic rendering of

43 He specifically states, “There is consequently nothing fitted to colour human happiness more pervasively than art does, nor to express more deeply the mind’s internal habit” (1962d, 124).
such value, imbued with emotion, helps overcome stagnant perceptions within the world. As such, “Forms of poetry are forms of human life. Languages express national character and enshrine particular ways of seeing and valuing events. To make substitutions and extensions in expression is to give the soul, in her inmost substance, a somewhat new constitution” (Santayana 1962d, 123). This poetic rendering of life into discourse stimulates an on-going creation and evaluation of ideals to which we are drawn. Largely based in the senses, this rendering has emotive power, but when given form, its force increases:

An aesthetic bias is native to sense, being indeed nothing but its form and potency; and the influence which aesthetic habits exercise on thought and action should not be regarded as an intrusion to be resented, but rather as an original interest to be built upon and developed. Sensibility contains the distinctions which reason afterward carries out and applies; it is sensibility that involves and supports primitive diversities, such as those between good and bad, here and there, fast and slow, light and darkness. (Santayana 1962d, 126)

Thus, while emotion and sense may seem “intrusive,” they actually provide a potent rhetorical thrust (and corrective), giving form to the emotions and the capacity to judge values and meaning affixed to symbols and ideas in the world of appearances.

Perceiving and comprehending such appearances is of the upmost importance in a rhetorical project, for it allows the now formed expression of emotion and sense to become useful. Santayana writes, “To have grasped such an appearance, to have embodied a form in matter, is to have justified for the first time whatever may underlie appearance and to have put reality to some use” (1962a, 148). As a naturalist, Santayana believes that nature – even our own positions within nature – is random, arbitrary, and contingent on nature’s whims. He argues, “For
if essences, or possible terms of thought, are infinite in number and variety, it follows that every particular fact is contingent, arbitrary, and logically unnecessary, since infinite alternatives were open to existence, if existence had chosen to take a different form” (1972i, 407). Nevertheless, the very appearances that we are made to deal with through our ability to name and provide value to appearances allows for us to make use of those conditions and contingencies by endowing them with form and therefore meaning. Indeed, “To impress a meaning and a rational form on matter is one of the most masterful actions” (Santayana 1962c, 143). We not only carry this as an ability, but also as a responsibility – obliged to recognize the imaginative possibility contained within the act of giving form to thought and emotion and refusing to allow them to become pedestrian and stagnant. Santayana emphasizes this point:

[The] human mind had long before settled its grammar, and discovered, after much groping and many defects, the general forms in which experience will allow itself to be stated. These general forms are the principles of common sense and positive science, no less imaginative in their origin that those notions which we now call transcendental, but grown prosaic, like the metaphors of common speech, by dint of repetition. (1957b, 219-20)

Stripping form of convention requires us to renegotiate the very doxa from which we create such general forms. Certain general categories may always persist – e.g. as topoi or common topics of invention. Nevertheless, “The closer we keep to elementary human needs and to the natural agencies that may satisfy them, the closer we are to beauty. Industry, sport, and science, with the perennial intercourse and passions of men, swarm with incentives to expression, because they are everywhere creating new moulds of being and compelling the eye to observe those forms and to recast them ideally” (Santayana 1962a, 151). In other words, how we shape these forms enables
us to remain connected to the underlying beauty of form, while simultaneously strengthening the
capacity to make the categories more fluid and compatible with others. While material and
formal beauties are experienced because of a subject’s relationship to the object, Arnett makes
clear that, “Expressive beauty…is the result of an interaction between a subject and an object
*that is modified* (in the experience of the subject) *by a relation or association with other objects*,
and the consequent suggestion of this further object, image, or experience” (Arnett 1955, 40).
Arnett suggests, then, that beauty also holds the capacity to *modify* associations between subjects
and objects through the very form it takes. In its capacity to provide new molds, the beautiful
form simultaneously has the capacity to make categories more fluid and compatible with others.

An aesthetic rhetoric provides form both to thought and emotion, prompted by our own
sensuous experiences. Coupled with the imagination, the possibilities are virtually limitless.
Santayana insists that, “Poetic, creative, original fancy is not a secondary form of sensibility, but
its first and only form” (1972f, x). We cannot detach aesthetics from sense, but so too we cannot
detach rhetoric from aesthetics: rhetoric provides the form to make sense articulate and thus
expressible and communicable. Rhetoric makes decisions and judgments about expediency,
justice, and honor, but does so as a result of the *doxastic* beliefs that bring about the arguments
within these categories. Doxa exists because of the underlying aesthetic preferences and
sensibilities that we experience. While we have choices to make, we attempt to adjudicate based
on probability and tendency – markers of rhetoric – contrasting them to those that came before or
to possible alternative outcomes. As Santayana claims:

> Of course a will can have no being in the absence of realities or ideas marking its
direction and contrasting the eventualities it seeks with those it flies from; and
tendency, no less than movement, needs an organised medium to make it possible,
while aspiration and fear involve an ideal world. Yet a principle of choice is not deducible from mere ideas, and no interest is involved in the formal relations of things. (2011a, 27)

Thus, merely having choices or even examining the tendencies of things, does not necessarily mean that we thereby positioned to deliberate over such choices. First, we need to provide form based in and inspired by the passions, even when used irrationally (or even non-rationally). Santayana goes on to argue:

All survey needs an arbitrary starting-point; all valuation rests on an irrational bias. The absolute flux cannot be physically arrested; but what arrests it ideally is the fixing of some point in it from which it can be measured and illumined. Otherwise it could show no form and maintain no preference; it would be impossible to approach or recede from a represented state, and to suffer or to exert will in view of events. The irrational fate that lodges the transcendental self in this or that body, inspires it with definite passions, and subjects it to particular buffets from the outer world – this is the prime condition of all observation and inference, of all failure or success (2011a, 27-8).

In so doing, we are capable of arresting the attention at particular points of impact in a world of flux and appearance, of making those points relevant and measurable – contained within a life of reason – prior to deliberation. The conventional will not work to interrupt the ordinary; it will merely blend in. Instead, form given beauty causes us to stop and pay attention and enables us to feel the beauty embodied in such rhetorical form.

---

44 We should also remember that “Absolute order, or truth, is static, impotent, indifferent” and “the immediate is in flux (Santayana 2011a, 24; 26).
Santayana, as we have seen, finds inspiration in the ancients, especially Aristotle and Plato, and suggests they point to form as the capacity to display and feel beauty through rational and orderly form, consisting of beautiful content and expression. Like Aristotle and Plato before him, Santayana characterizes beauty as rational and orderly as a way to make beauty of primary importance. Aristotle, in the Poetics, argues “to be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, must...present a certain order in its arrangement of parts” (1954, 1450b34-36). In the Metaphysics he claims, “The chief forms of the beautiful are order, symmetry, and definiteness” (1952, 1078a36). Not only do these passages parallel (and reflect) Santayana’s own priority of a whole comprised of beautifully ordered parts, they are also suggestive of a type of harmony among those parts necessary for the beautification of the whole. Santayana regards this type of harmony as being of the upmost importance, much like Plato depicts beauty in the Symposium when beauty very nearly becomes a principle of unity (1961h, 210a-211d). Beauty for Santayana, resides in the aesthetic quality of poetry exemplified in the ancients. He observes, “The ancients found poetry not so much in sensible accidents as in essential forms and noble associations; and this fact marks very clearly their superior education. They dominated the world as we no longer dominate it, and lived, as we are too distracted to live, in the presence of the rational and the important” (1957a, 276). But these qualities of the poetic do not only exist in poetry. As Santayana writes, “[There] is a cumulative fecundity in those goods which come not by increase of force or matter, but by a better organisation and form” (1962d, 118). Thus, the content of ideas so articulated can be expressed with a poetic quality so as to make beautiful the very goods such content represents.

The arbitrary and contingent nature of language suggests that each articulation represents only a part of any whole. The form rhetoric provides to such parts increases the productive
capacity of any good represented in the ideas expressed, so long as we attend to beauty and expectations. Moreover, as one of the major rhetorical canons, arrangement also helps to organize the parts into an effective piece of discourse. Santayana extends the idea of arrangement beyond that of effectiveness, emphasizing how arranging the different parts appropriately and beautifully gives presence to ideas and provides unity among them. He writes: “To embody or enact an idea is the only way of making it actual; but its embodiment may mutilate it, if the material or the situation is not propitious. So an infant may be maimed at birth, when what injures him is not being brought forth, but being brought forth in the wrong manner” (1962d, 116). Deviating from normative (doxastic) expectations would constitute one way of bringing about in the wrong manner. We do not need to avoid challenges to potential alternatives or even the doxa that gives rise to expectations. Indeed, the opposite holds true in the sense that so long as we bring forth the idea in the right way, at the right time, for the right reasons (as Aristotle would have it), we provide for the possibility of increasing the goods represented in thought and word. Moreover, because doxa contains the various apparent and contingent truths that embody such expectations, if we do not make challenges, then we leave things without meaning:

The word true in such a case is unmeaning, except perhaps as a vague term of praise, a mere reiteration of some automatic impulse, as if we cried Amen. Such repetition might seem harmless; yet verbal self-confirmation, coming to one’s notions as it seems from nowhere or from above, tends to fanaticism. Language then becomes an accomplice and a sanction of the will: and from honest

---

45 See Aristotle’s Rhetoric 3.13-19 and Cicero’s De Inv 1.7 and De Or 1.31.143.
46 Aristotle remarks, “But having these feelings at the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and best condition, and this proper to virtue” (1999, 1106b 22-23).
opposition to our enemies in battle, we pass to envenomed refutation of their feelings as false. (Santayana 1972d, 474-75)

Consequently, challenge or opposition itself is not necessarily detrimental and can in fact lead to the revelation of additional possibilities, whereas the alternative, leads to a stagnant way of perceiving the world and at its worse may, as Santayana tells us, lead to fanaticism. We must not merely create and re-create the repetitive forms already in existence, even if we may use them as guides or measurements. Instead, “[The] purest prose is a mere vehicle of thought, verse, like stained glass, arrests attention in its own intricacies, confuses it in its own glories, and is even at times allowed to darken and puzzle in the hope of casting over us a supernatural spell” (Santayana 1957a, 256). Otherwise put, rhetoric provides form of thought in order to stop us long enough to reflect and to act expediently, justly, and honorably. But to do so – in order for us to take notice – the expression must transcend convention and repetition of ideas or ways of expressing those ideas. We see in this emphasis of elevated expression and articulation a potential reason why Santayana avoids using the term rhetoric in favor of poetry, yet weaves an aesthetic rhetoric into these various functions of language, ideas, and roles. Santayana writes, “If great poets are like architects and sculptors, the euphuists are like goldsmiths and jewelers; theirs work is filigree in precious metals, encrusted with glowing stones” (1957a, 257). To give rhetoric this poetic capacity to make things beautiful, both significant content and form are important.

Beauty provides style which attends to standards of the times and communities, but also offers something beyond mere stylistic pleasure. On the one hand Santayana makes clear that style without compatible content is vulgar, like “An old woman in a blond wig, a dirty hand covered with jewels, ostentation without dignity, rhetoric without cogency, all offend by an inner
contradiction” (1962c, 134-5). On the other hand, the style itself can provide a means of influence apart from the influence of content: “arrangement of words is still undetermined, and by casting our speech into the moulds of metre and rhyme we can give it a heightened power, apart from its significance” (Santayana 1957a, 255). The point, then, is that each part requires precision and attention, but only insofar as it contributes to the whole of rationality, order, unity – in a word, beauty. Consequently, “Logic, when once its foothold in fat has been secured at any point, has a moral part to play, and this in two directions. It humanizes the world, since we now can think and reason about it with some relevance; and it vivifies speculation, by allying the furthest reaches of it with real life” (Santayana 1972b, 422). Logic, here, accompanies rhetorical form. Accordingly, the combination of “grammar, rhetoric, and logic enrich enormously the phenomenon of being alive. They embroider every image with a thousand latent analogies and concordant rhymes; and they enshrine this image in the ideal world to which, after all, every image belongs…The world which was but a too familiar fact suddenly becomes beautiful: and at the same time the idea, only a graphic pattern before, now touches the heart and becomes poetical” (Santayana 1972b, 423). This juxtaposition, even while lending “it a tragic force,” also fills life with possibility insofar as we have the capacity to render our existence freely, beautifully, poetically (Santayana 1972b, 423).

CONCLUSION

What this chapter has shown is that Santayana paves the way for a greater emphasis on the role of the imagination, emotions, the epideictic genre, and form that develops an aesthetic rhetoric. This aesthetic rhetoric’s ends lie in harmony, rather than on-going debate or conflict. In so doing, we may view rhetoric as an on-going source of possibility that champions the
imagination, the emotions, and our sensuous experiences born out of beauty. The imagination promotes the transcendence of material conditions by way of conceiving of better alternative ideals. Our capacity for reflection and creation stimulates our imagination and simultaneously encourages its continued articulations. The imagination shows up within the discursive modes of literature, poetics, and philosophy. Conceived as such, the imagination unifies the roles of philosophy, poetics, and rhetoric and nurtures sense and emotion. Emotion’s significance relies on its capacity for creativity and production, but also its inclusion of rationality and human experience. This importance gives rise to a heightened importance to the *epideictic* genre, denying the hierarchal structure often associated with the three rhetorical genres. This reconceptualization of the genres not only provides harmony to the genres but also requires us to consider how rhetoric also functions to give form to the emotions and ideas, that is, to how it arrests our attention and focuses it on relevant matters, i.e., those requiring discourse and discussion. Thus, even in giving priority to *epideictic* and the emotions, Santayana’s philosophy of aesthetics does not change the hierarchy of genres; rather it eliminates a hierarchy altogether, revealing how each part can work in harmony with the others even while enabling beauty a centralized significance that helps to amplify each of the various parts that make up this unified whole.

Harmony, on Santayana’s view, does not exclude the potential for disagreement. Instead of focusing on rhetoric as the point at or through which we debate disagreements, it functions as a way to provide form to emotions and to thought. In so doing, rhetoric may not only create new possibilities, but also harmonize them within individuals and communities. Santayana, in a letter to Charles Augustus Strong, remarks, “Of course, I like agreement, it warms the heart, but I don't expect it; and I like disagreement too, when it is intelligent and carries a thought further, rather
than contradicts it *a priori*, from a different point of departure. These different points of
departure make discussion futile and unpleasant” (2004, 6:268). Thus, as much as Santayana
advocates for agreement, he does not suggest that agreement always occurs or that disagreement
never occurs. Rather, he states:

> Life is a form of order, a great rhythmic self-responsive organization in parcels of
matter: but it arises in a thousand places and takes a thousand forms. If reason or
spirit or any mystic influence whatsoever attempted to impose on each living
creature the contrary impulse of all the others, it would induce to universal
harmony but universal death. It would solve the moral problem only by dissolving
all goods, all arts, all species and all individuals. (1972d, 477)

Different conceptions of the world, of our environments, and of our ideas circulate to such a
degree and in such a way that disagreement is impossible to avoid. Nevertheless, imposing those
same things in hopes that disagreement will create some efficacious end will only eliminate our
moral problems by eradicating all of the parts that make a harmonizing whole possible. Yet,
“Even the most general and tolerant of moral standards – harmony – is not a good in itself. There
must be actual will directed upon harmony in order to render harmony a good. Harmony
demands many a sacrifice” (Santayana 1972e, 483). Santayana helps show us that form –
rhetoric – is the will directed on harmony in order to render it a good. Form articulates the
emotions and the senses that embody ideas and ideals. Essences, we know Santayana
understands, are a huge catalogue of possible symbols and arrangements that have no power over
the existing world. Thus, something – and it is my argument that this something is indeed
rhetoric – needs to give those essences power – form – in order to grant a modicum of control
over events and order. Although this sometimes requires sacrifice, it always requires cooperation for any authentic act of expediency, justice, or honor. As Santayana argues, “In the realm of matter, this harmony is measured by the degree of adjustment, conformity, and cooperation which the part may have attained in the whole; in a word, it is measured by health. In the realm of truth, the same natural harmony extends as far as do capacity and pleasure in understanding the truth: so that besides health we may possess knowledge” (1936d, 288). Moreover, this knowledge and this health may only exist when the parts unify the true, the good, and the beautiful, guiding us harmoniously, rationally, and beautifully within and toward the Life of Reason.

47 Santayana says, “What I call essence is not something alleged to exist or subsist in some higher sphere: it is the last residuum or skepticism and analysis. Whatsoever existing fact we may think we encounter, there will be obvious features, discernible in sense, thought, or fancy, are essences; and the realm of essence which they compose is simply the catalogue, infinitely extensible, of all characters logically distinct and ideally possible. Apart from the events they may figure in, these essences have no existence; and since the realm of essence, by definition, is infinitely comprehensive and without bias, it can exercise no control over the existing world, nor determine what features shall occur in events, or in what order” (1951b, 28-29).
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION

BEYOND OUR DOXA: AESTHETIC RHETORIC AS CRITICAL AND CREATIVE

“[Not] one, except the orator, might ever have found those words to represent or to transform his feelings nor, without those imposed words, might any one of them have ever felt that irresistible and glorious passion.”
– Santayana 1995d, 343

“Good taste in such matters cannot abstract from tradition, utility, and the temper of the world. It must make itself an interpreter of humanity and think esoteric dreams less beautiful than what the public eye might conceivably admire.”
– Santayana 1962c, 137-38

“Aesthetic activity is far from being a late or adventitious ornament in human economy; it is an elementary factor, the perfection of an indispensable vehicle. Whenever science or morals have done violence to sense they have decreed their own dissolution. To sense a rebellious appeal will presently be addressed, and the appeal will go against rash and empty dogmas. A keen aesthetic sensibility and a flourishing art mark the puberty of reason. Fertility comes later, after a marriage with the practical world. But a sensuous ripening is need first, such as myth and ornament betray in their exuberance. A man who has no feeling for feeling and no felicity in expression will hardly know what he is about in his further undertakings.”
– Santayana 1962e, 113-14

This project set out to situate George Santayana within the purview of rhetoric, demonstrating how his discussion of aesthetics reveals the importance of considering an aesthetic rhetoric. My introduction presented prefatory remarks about George Santayana and the impetus to consider him and his philosophy in rhetoric’s domain. More specifically, Santayana’s work on aesthetics enables us to understand rhetoric’s aesthetic principle, which effects harmonizing rather than (only) oppositional ends. Santayana not only skillfully and clearly provides a philosophical understanding of aesthetics, but he also permits us to understand a relationship to rhetoric that modifies traditional conceptions of rhetoric and its ends. Santayana makes corrections to the
ways that traditional rhetoric might, for example, exclude or devalue the emotions from a rational rhetoric; prioritize deliberative rhetoric to the detriment of the other rhetorical genres, especially *epideictic*; not utilize the power of the imagination; confuse the relationship between individual and community; focus on persuasion rather than harmony. Overcoming the latter, holding particular significance, aims toward harmonizing which provides better opportunity to understand concepts, genres, ends, subject positions, etc., less hierarchically, more inclusively, and in terms of Santayana, more beautifully.

Chapter One provided an overview of Santayana’s understanding of aesthetics and how that understanding relies on an interrelationship between the true, the good, and the beautiful. The individual concepts are made useful in rhetoric yet are given priority differently depending on what a specific author or trend desires as an outcome. I look at the true, the good, and the beautiful, as Santayana understands the concepts, as interrelated in order to understand their function in both individuals and communities, which moves us to the next chapter (Chapter Two), explaining the relationship between individual and community. An early goal of individual life was merely survival and necessarily transformed into value-laden communities. Due to the use of symbols that attach value and meaning to objects and actions, this chapter also examined *doxa*—circulating beliefs within a collective. However, because, as I argue vis-à-vis Santayana, these beliefs originate from individual preference, we must also consider how interests compete with one another and become successful beliefs. Moreover, this understanding of preference, interest, and belief enables us to view an alternative function of the rhetorical concept *dissoi logoi*. Namely, unsuccessful beliefs (e.g., unpopular or not part of the general communal belief systems) do not necessarily disappear or get replaced by the better argument and still might exist harmoniously with more popular beliefs. This alternate understanding of
dissoi logoi also permits different ways of knowing and of understanding how different
knowledge claims and belief contribute to our individual and community relationships. Thus, I
also examined the concept of phronesis and its possibility via Santayana and a modified Platonic
dialectic.

Santayana offers us a vision that combines a balance of ideals and possibilities,
environmental conditions and goods, the creation of awareness, reflection, and ultimately clarity
of the true (doxa), the good (as means and ends), and the beautiful (as influence and unity) for
the individual, which affects the community when made articulate. Moving beyond material
constraints requires this articulation, i.e., rhetoric, which transitions to the final body chapter –
Chapter Four, the culminating rhetoric chapter. Co-articulating these different concepts and
making them harmonious, Santayana makes clearer his interesting and unique take on rhetoric.
This perspective opens new possibilities for rhetoric and how we view its different parts, e.g.,
emotions, epideictic, etc. In this last body chapter, I focused on the imagination, the emotions,
epideictic rhetoric, and form, giving priority to these ideas in order to argue for their greater
significance within rhetoric. Because the epideictic genre is most frequently associated with the
emotions and aesthetics, this chapter also paid particular attention to epideictic as a way to renew
its significance within the rhetorical discipline. However, my aim was not to restructure the
rhetorical hierarchy of genres, but rather to eliminate the hierarchy by explaining the harmonious
relationship between the genres, bound together by beauty, which influences rhetorical activity.
My focus on the imagination attends to the possibility of symbolic discourse that provides the
capacity to create, seek, and disseminate alternatives, despite material conditions. Moreover, the
emotions, in Santayana’s rendering of their role, become part of rationality. Emotions and
passion influence the preferences of individuals, but so too do they connect people and
experiences. In effect, rhetoric acts as a harmonizing capacity, but it also serves an instrumental purpose whereby it provides form to thought and emotion, both engendering and making articulate the imagination and the emotions.

SANTAYANA SITUATED

George Santayana’s philosophical project sought to express what it means to live a life aimed toward human happiness, celebrating the imagination and the emotions that he included within a life of reason. His work embodies various domains of experience and philosophical themes. In his five-volume work The Life of Reason: The Phases of Human Progress (1905-06), for example, Santayana elaborates on a life of reason as it relates to common sense, society, religion, art, and science. In other works like the four-volume The Realms of Being (1942), Santayana focuses on metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology. His last major work, Dominations and Powers (1951), offers a sustained analysis of human life in society, paying particular attention to the possibilities and pitfalls of politics. These works, even though only a small sampling of his writings, reveal Santayana’s prolific contributions. Despite the aims, precision, eloquence, variety, and depth to his philosophy and critiques, Santayana often, like beauty itself, gets left to the wayside.\(^1\) Santayana, however, embodies a learnedness that transcends arbitrary divisions, whether those divisions are applied to topics, genres, or institutions. As such, he offers us significant resources, particularly when considering our aims as rhetoricians to examine how communication plays important roles in these philosophies and domains of experience which help to reveal connections between otherwise fragmented ways of thinking and experiencing.

\(^1\) Thankfully, some scholars are making the attempts to revive and remind others of Santayana’s importance. For example, Indiana University houses the Santayana Society which, “is an international and interdisciplinary organization, founded in 1980, to further work on The Santayana Edition specifically and to promote Santayana scholarship generally.” (See http://iat.iupui.edu/santayana/). MIT Press is also making available Santayana’s correspondence for the first time in an eight book, five volume set, as well as publishing new editions of his works.
Participation in one discipline, for example, does not warrant ignoring the rest. Despite the extensive nature of his subject matter, Santayana’s breadth allows me to ground these subject matters within his works and use him as a practical point of refraction in order to contribute to rhetorical studies in a novel way. As Irving Singer points out, “Santayana served as a model of the literary philosopher trying to overcome his alienation from a world that has become increasingly oblivious for its need for the humanities” (2000, 199). Perhaps we can now extend the moniker to include rhetoric, Santayana serving as an exemplary model of the rhetorical literary philosopher.

Culture and society have always contained narratives disseminated and reinforced vis-à-vis communication, which necessitates a critical, and perhaps more importantly, creative examination of this process and its effects. Through this consideration of Santayana’s aesthetics, I hope to have created the possibility where we might begin to imagine how to eliminate arbitrary distinctions and conceive of rhetoric as the capacity to reflect like the philosopher and create like the poet. Not only has this project worked to breathe life into Santayana and his importance, but it has also served to reveal how his work extends rhetorical thought, namely by considering rhetoric not only as a tool to serve instrumental ends, but also as the propagator of human creativity. In this way, Santayana offers us a genuine counterbalance to the fragmentation of contemporary thought by emphasizing, if not demanding, that we consider the use of all human faculties in order to harmonize competing and opposing interests in our aim to live a beautiful life of reason.

Santayana’s efforts to reconcile competing interests appear in his own life when viewing some of his important life events. Born in Spain, he spent the first part of his life in America, yet retained his Spanish citizenship and passport. He attended Harvard for college and later would
go on to teach there, where he would earn a tenured position from a reluctant Harvard president. Santayana retired at the early age of forty-eight to travel Europe, finally settling in Rome (1941) where he died (1952) at the Clinica della Piccola Compagna di Maria, a clinic run by Catholic nuns. Although he was raised Catholic, Santayana was likely an atheist despite remaining a Catholic until his death. These brief biographical events point to Santayana’s tendency to be both insider and outsider simultaneously and yet harmonize the seemingly contradictory positions. While embracing Catholicism, Santayana rejected religion in general. His attachment to Catholicism was not out of guilt, but rather because he adamantly believed that religion allowed a poetic capacity to create ideals, ideals that allowed for genuine progress (i.e., beautiful art bettering our existence), even if the ideals remained out of reach. According to Santayana, religion no longer functions in this way: ideals were replaced with institutions (e.g., churches) and extreme fragmentation as a consequence of religious dogma. Asserting that religion masks itself as reason in order to free humans from their limitations, Santayana says religion actually deviates from its original purpose by substituting attempts to know what cannot be known through modern forms of “reasoning.” In this way, religion serves as a symbolic means of representing human experiences. As I have shown in the project, Santayana also rejects philosophies of epistemology that became popular during his time, which has similar functions to “knowing” in this religious sense, the university or academia writ large, for example, representing its institutions. Santayana maintains that religion and poetry are actually more similar to one another, when conceived of appropriately, than religion and “reason.” Because poetry can function to express ideals within material constraints, it opens up possibility beyond

---

2 Santayana even requested to be buried on unconsecrated ground, which at the time the only land like that was reserved for criminals. As a compromise, “the Spanish Consulate at Rome provided the “Panteon de la Obra Pia espanola” in the Campo Verano cemetery reserved for Spanish citizens, but no religious ceremony took place (1987, 504).
something more literal. Not only does this express Santayana’s positive attitude towards the
aesthetic over against traditional models of rationality, but it also alludes to rhetoric’s underlying
aesthetic principle as a means to harmoniously articulate and express experience, emotion, and
ideals that emerge from individual interests.

RHETORICAL DOMAINS
Santayana provides useful ways in which to consider rhetorical domains and objects of study. By
domains I understand typical areas of rhetorical thought and by objects I refer to specific focal
points of criticism and analysis within those domains. Rhetorical theorists and critics concentrate
critiques and analyses within the domains of common sense, society (including politics),
religion, art, and science. Because Santayana makes use of these spheres extensively in his
discussions, we gain insight into Santayana’s philosophical trajectory and its rhetorical
possibility by examining these domains alongside one another. When attempting to view these
domains rhetorically, we also have to consider how rhetoric itself has been divided. For example,
Daniel Gross summarizes rhetoric’s division in four ways: as practice (“mere rhetoric”),
practitioner (rhetoricians), discursive qualities (rhetoric of X), and theory (e.g. Aristotle’s
Rhetoric). While practically the division is useful, what Santayana shows us is that these
divisions are untenable if we want to capture the complexity of human relationships in a material
world. Santayana, however, does acknowledge that different parts may have different functions,
but nevertheless operate together, or at least should operate together if functioning at a higher
level. So, for example, even “Between the spiritual life and the life of reason there is accordingly
no contradiction: they are concomitant: yet there is a difference of temper and level, as there is

between agriculture and music. The ploughman may sing, and the fiddler at times may dig potatoes; but the vocations pull in different ways” (Santayana 1951b, 27). That is to say, while each division may precisely accomplish something or some end, we also need to encompass all parts for better understanding. The same holds true for rhetoric and its function within human discourse, created and maintained through symbols. Thus, by looking at Santayana, we not only see how rhetoric functions within particular subject matter, but also how his theories extend rhetoric as a means not to divide for particular ends, but rather to harmonize among different means and different ends.

E.M. Cope once remarked that when Aristotle characterizes rhetoric as an art, it suggests that rhetoric provides a way to discover means of persuasion and not simply successful ends of persuasion (1867, 33). Although we may largely agree with Cope now, in 1867 his comments advanced a novel approach to the study and use of rhetoric. Since then, many have followed suit and make attempts to discover the available means of persuasion, encompassing a variety of objects to use and to analyze, which enlarges rhetoric’s scope even while preserving a reluctance to include particular objects or resources as a way to maintain a sense of rhetoric’s specialization. Moreover, scholars have made various attempts to expand rhetoric’s spheres by including an assortment of different philosophical approaches in combination with rhetoric. Each attempt has given rise to new arguments and debates about the relevance and problems associated with forwarded definitions and uses (or abuses) of rhetoric. This project does not

---

4 For example, a resistance to the use of literature and literary genres exist within the field, likely due to some residual tensions left behind from establishing rhetoric as a distinct field of study, practice, and application. Where we look for or apply our conceptions of rhetoric has much to do with when and where we “see” it, including particular objects of study such as literature. This, more specifically, has to do with the scope of rhetoric, which scholars have addressed, and continue to address, extensively. On the one hand, the split with English departments encouraged the growth of rhetoric as a field of study; but, on the other hand, it also forced the field to consider questions about our scope and function. Otherwise put, we are required to constantly ask how we define ourselves as a field in order to create a unique disciplinary identity. Cf. Edwin Black and Lloyd Bitzer’s The Prospect of Rhetoric (1971) and more recently Stephen Mailloux’s Disciplinary Identities: Rhetorical Paths of English, Speech, and Composition (2006).
attempt to wipe the slate clean; even if such a *tabula rasa* were possible, this would eliminate many of the contributions made to the rhetorical discipline that are insightful and interesting. Nevertheless, even in this broadened scope this tendency focuses on available means of persuasion for persuasive ends. What is more, those persuasive ends are typically in the service of conventional, and (relatively) short-lived, beliefs. Yet, rhetoric as an art – *a techne* – suggests something beyond persuasive ends.

This project has made the attempt to reconsider rhetoric with the following broad questions in mind: why have rhetoricians focused on some theorists more than others, some objects more than others, and some means and ends more than others? Additionally, in what ways might we consider rhetoric beyond persuasion? I have shown that these issues lend themselves to the theme of harmony. More specifically, when considering rhetoric as a means to create and preserve harmony, this project has called into question the role of aesthetics, vis-à-vis Santayana, as an underlying factor in rhetoric. With this in mind, I have looked at the possibility of harmony among notions of the true, the good, and the beautiful, where beauty often gets left to the wayside. As opposed to following this trend, I have shown that beauty is not only a necessary and influential concept on its own, but also within rhetoric because it binds together the main themes of the true, the good, and the beautiful. In so doing, I have also pointed to the possibility of considering rhetoric not solely as the means and ends of persuasion, but as unifying possibility, conceiving of traditional rhetorical concepts and theories in new ways. Namely, these novelties relate to our ways of understanding *doxa, dissoi logoi, dialectic,* and *phronesis,* particularly as a means to appraise notions of value, experience, and reason both within the individual and the community. Herman J. Saatkamp, when considering Santayana’s insights, comes to the conclusion that, “we can live together, even in harmony, without agreeing on the
underlying principles of our values, except the cosmopolitan universal value of living together. Understanding one another and living together does not require agreeing with each other. Conversation is not so much an effort to persuade as it is an effort to understand and learn from others” (2014, 101). This conversation does not necessarily lead to consensus, but rather insight into how we use our imagination and emotions to construct and maintain values. In light of this reconceptualization and the consideration of unity, this project extends the views of harmony to argue for the possibility of an aesthetic rhetoric that gives priority to the imagination and the emotions, which revises the hierarchical structure of rhetorical genres and subject positions.

RHETORICAL DOXA

While this juxtaposition promises to yield a rhetoric that departs from the focus on division and debate and encourages unity and harmony within a beautiful life of reason, it does require us to consider the traditional and typical rhetorical milieu within which we review, observe, and evaluate subject matter. When Thomas Farrell considered the task of rhetoric, he wonders, “[May] rhetoric be liberating? May it, in other words, put us in touch with a range of issues and experience outside our normalized, received opinion, our doxa?” (1993, 231). This question significantly puts us in touch with the idea that everyone, including rhetoricians, creates and makes use of discourse that emerges out of the common belief of our times. However, considering Farrell’s question alongside the questions that I have raised also necessitates us to attend to a more specific type of doxa, namely what I call rhetorical doxa. That is, how does our own rhetorical doxa – whether we realize it as doxa or not – constrain or make possible the liberation from our own biases within our disciplines, our subject matter, and our evaluations?

5 When Aristotle prescribes how to successfully praise or blame, he recalls Socrates’ saying “it is not difficult to praise Athenians in Athens” (1.9.30). This then raises the following question: are rhetoricians merely praising the
Moreover, we must make inquiries into its sustainability. It is my contention that rhetoric has the tendency to become stuck in the quagmire of its own *doxa*, creating a need to, not simply to rid ourselves of the history and rich contributions already made within this tradition, but to reconceive rhetoric as untethered to the *doxa* that constrains its potential and possibility. However, this should not suggest that all rhetorical scholarship makes unreflective choices. On the contrary, working within the constraints of our own rhetorical *doxa* also suggests that we are constrained by the conditions of our own time. These constraints, often bound to contemporary fashionable and powerful god terms, pose (at least) two consequences. First, some rhetoricians have come to the conclusion that not much more can be said about ancient texts. Others may question using classical texts because of the socio-political context of ancient times and its exclusionary tactics to marginalize classes and groups of people. Thus, a second consequence provides an apparent impetus for scholars to turn to new thinkers and concepts as a way to be or, at least to give the appearance of being, progressive or contemporarily relevant. However, within the constraints of rhetorical *doxa*, the consequential rhetorical analyses tend to point to the same terms that they describe and employ to others like-minded? And if taken as such, does this take the place of revealing the biases within our critiques?

6 As I have argued, democracy is frequently the discourse that we work within and toward in our critical analyses. Thus, this key term could be considered a constraint if we are unable to view the possibilities of alternatives.

7 We see this in differing scholars. For instance, Dilip Gaonkar and his well-known attempt to diffuse the trajectory of “big rhetoric” in response to the idea of a rhetoric of science. This attempt suggests we need a new vocabulary in place of the Aristotelian concepts to which we are allegedly so beholden, and, at least according to Gaonkar, would thus avoid the trap of making rhetoric everything and therefore nothing. Ironically, Gaonkar points to Kenneth Burke, who has indeed made enormous contributions to rhetoric, but is also deeply indebted to Aristotle. Others, though, have challenged Gaonkar. See *Rhetorical Hermeneutics: Invention and Interpretation in the Age of Science* for a compilation of essays, in which Dilip Gaonkar’s essay, “The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science,” is the focal point. Gross and Keith point out that Gaonkar is not so much attempting to question if our field has understood science properly, but rather if we understand rhetoric properly. Gaonkar’s essay has four main concerns: traditional classical rhetoric, agency, “thin” rhetoric, and globalization, to which others respond by detracting or extending the argument (1997).

8 For example, Robert N. Gaines proposes to create a “corpus conception” of ancient rhetoric, whereby we would view a variety of “texts” so as “to open up inquiry into the subject matter” which would authorize “a wide range of intellectual activities that have recently been positioned in opposition to the canon conception of ancient rhetoric,” covering women’s contributions and marginalized genders, races, classes, and cultures (2005, 67).
ends, creating division, argument, and distractions from the conditions that give rise to the problems to which we appear to attend.

Both of these consequences carry serious implications for the way in which rhetoric is used and conceived. First, perhaps the particulars of the classical tradition are not all suited to or applicable to today’s events or discourse. Nevertheless, certain categories, genres, topoi, etc. are sufficiently malleable to accommodate the changes long after ancient Greek discussions about rhetoric. Simply ignoring the resources available to us because the context of the time or location does not match our own current expectations of decorum would erase the very foundations of rhetoric. Thus, the second implication concerns whether such “old” rhetoric applies now in its particulars, which recalls the assumption that what has been said is all there is to say. This assumption potentially allows for failure to view the possibilities within existing rhetorical texts containing rich resources regarding discourse – its creation, analysis, and dissemination. Additionally, whether “they” got it wrong then or what “they” said no longer applies, is almost beside the point. Eliminating alternatives – past, present, or future – reduces the scope for possible evaluative comparisons to continue to make improvements. Making comparisons between beliefs is necessary for the measurement of what could be better. Third, rhetoricians begin to select fashionable topics, attractive and in vogue, yet have the capacity to forego the preservation of an authentic legitimate study of rhetoric and its objects. In some cases, this may lead theory to stagnate and to create criticism that could comparably be found in opinion pieces.

---

9 Santayana insists that circumstances are contingent, but discussions arising from those times and contingencies may somewhat remain pertinent. For example, in the preface to *Dominations and Powers*, Santayana remarks that he sketched out society, inspired by Plato and Aristotle. However, “Plato and Aristotle spoke with authority for the ancient city then in its decline; their precepts are still pertinent to the art of government; but they hardly consider non-territorial powers, such as universal religions, nor the relation of the State to the non-political impulses of human nature” (1995b, xvi). As we can see here, “old” texts still contain significance on relevant topics, but we must view them freshly in order to see what their authors might have missed in their own contingent lives.

10 This is far from a unique or new complaint. For example, see Marie H. Nichols’ “The Tyranny of Relevance,” (1970). Her piece makes the case that the communication and rhetoric field is held down by the tyranny of the relevant, replacing scholarship as a means to establish “I have ideas that matter,” with “I want to be relevant.”
In other instances, while looking at certain cases may prove interesting, the result is commensurate with fixing a deep wound by covering it with a Band-Aid and taking an aspirin. In other words, it may appear to slow infection and distract from the pain, but it does not correct the underlying conditions that gave rise to the problem. In either case, the result is often divisive and fragmented. Finally, just as rhetorical objects are made temporarily relevant, so, too, are “new” theorists. Many theorists and critics go overlooked or unremembered, even if they may indeed be more relevant or durable, in place of in vogue theorists.

This should not suggest that we only look to traditional theorists or even avoid the consideration of theorists and philosophers outside the general purview of rhetoric. It would certainly be ironic if this project suggested that as a course of action. On the contrary, we should indeed find and make use of such thinkers. The problem associated with the trend of selecting a popular or new thinker is that theory becomes replaceable with any other theory, seemingly requiring no justification for its use other than popularity. Moreover, the new thinkers are used to accomplish the same ends, and in a contemporary context that trend is democracy, civic engagement, consensus, etc. This does not mean that raising questions about, for example, democracy is inappropriate or unwarranted. Indeed, these are important questions; however, the implications necessitate earnest consideration of the principles of rhetoric that we deploy to raise and answer such questions. In other words, challenging the assumptions of our own rhetorical doxa that might promote certain theories, rhetorical objects, and rhetorical ends.\footnote{For example, Nathan Crick writes about John Dewey and makes a case for why we should conceive Dewey as part of the rhetorical tradition. This move resembles my own justification for using Santayana in so far as Dewey, like Santayana, often only implicitly attends to rhetoric yet has a strikingly rhetorical project. Nevertheless, Crick also suggests that Dewey’s significance furthers the ends of a democratic life and participation. This again shows the tendency of rhetoric both to adhere to rhetorical doxa and become trapped within societal conditions that reinforce that doxa. The difference, I argue, is that Santayana not only conceives of rhetoric differently – for the purpose of harmony – he also makes attempts to help strip us of our doxa by considering knowledge as belief and skepticism as a means to consistently attempt to make those beliefs more reflective, honest, and precise. See Crick’s “John} Santayana, on
the other hand, clearly makes possible the examination of, for example, politics, within the wider scope of rhetoric, but in a way that extends beyond the current societal doxa that favors liberal democratic political systems and our own rhetorical doxa influenced by social norms that aims to analyze political objects with those same ends in mind. For example, *Dominations and Powers* offers a sustained critique of democracy even while still attending to the theme of harmony and beauty’s role in the various discourses, objects, and events that make up society. This type of rich analysis can be found throughout Santayana’s works and is representative of his attempts to blend creative and critical interpretation and evaluation.

**AESTHETIC RHETORIC**

When Santayana raises concerns about how to answer the question “What is Aesthetics?,” we see comparable concerns for rhetoric. In other words, much of his commentary and analysis applies to the way in which we conceive of rhetoric and the rhetorical discipline. Santayana argues that all questions can be divided into two classes: soluble (trivial) and insoluble (important) questions. He goes on to say that answering the question, “what is aesthetics?,”

---

12 In a somewhat lengthy excerpt, we see how Santayana’s analysis might invite the rhetorician to consider her analysis: “Public opinion is therefore a most real thing, and often a dominant power; many individuals habitually and all individuals occasionally embrace opinions together, under a common provocation and expressed in the same words. This public opinion is a distinct psychological event in each person, with a different intensity, duration, and field of suggestion; and this seems public opinion to each only in the measure in which its special character in himself is not distinguished. Nothing is heeded except some public action, sentiment, or words in the midst of which that personal opinion arose, with a powerful sense of being backed or borne forward by an irresistible persuasion, at least momentarily unanimous. The force of such public opinion in the private mind comes in no way through argument or evidence; for even if some eloquent phrase or the report of some crucial fact as occasioned it in each person, the public force lies entirely in the social blast that carried it, with magic conviction, into many minds at once. If the argument or evidence that rationally justifies this conviction is considered separately, coolly, and reflectively, the opinion so revised becomes a purely private opinion, independent of the character and number of the people that may happen to agree with it. Only if the prevalence of that opinion is expressly made the ground for accepting it, as in the maxim *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, does public opinion still govern the private mind; and we shall probably find on examination that the society so clothed with authority is strictly limited and congenial to the man who adheres to it, and contrary to prevalent opinion of mankind at large and in most ages. Under criticism, such a trust in unanimity becomes a private preference; the man respects a public authority because that particular authority teaches what he likes to believe” (1995d, 341-42).
would be soluble in so far as “we wished merely to fix the relation of an aesthetics arbitrarily defined to other sciences of our own delimitation” (1904, 320). However, considering that we impose our own boundaries on the labels of sciences and disciplines, “our classification would absolve itself from any subservience to usage, and would ignore the historic grouping and genealogy of pursuits” (Santayana 1904, 320). This characterization, Santayana claims, is a “learned game” but does not really contribute to knowledge or understanding. Instead, if we are to make aesthetics important, we must reconceive aesthetics as the “art and function of criticism” (Santayana 1904, 320; 324). Moreover, part of aesthetics is to utilize the imagination, and in order to do that we must provoke the senses to stimulate reaction and engage attention (Santayana 1904, 323). To conceive of aesthetics as criticism, Santayana understands it as “a reasoned appreciation of human works by a mind not wholly ignorant of their subject or occasion, their school, and their process of manufacture” (1904, 324). To elevate criticism, critics should consider various factors in relation to their objects and “must look impartially to beauty, propriety, difficulty, originality, truth, and moral significance in the work he judges” (Santayana 1904, 324-5). Taken as such, each object, “by its existence and influence, radiates effects over human life, it acquires various functions and values, sometimes cumulative, sometimes alternative. These values are the moral philosopher’s business to perceive and to combine as best he can in a harmonious ideal, to be the goal of human effort and a standard for the relative estimation of things” (Santayana 1904, 325). Not only do we see Santayana combining, in his conception of aesthetics and criticism, the positions of rhetorical critic, spectator, and judge, but also his characterization of the moral philosopher lends itself to

---

13 Santayana gives an example in Benedetto Croce’s *Estetica*, in which Croce characterizes aesthetics as the science of expression in which expression is defined “as to be identical with every form of apperception, intuition, or imaginative synthesis,” including theories of speech and all attentive perception, but has nothing to do with art, beauty, or preference (1904, 320).
rhetoric. That is, the moral philosopher reflects, creates, expresses, and evaluates the interests, beliefs, and values of a community.

This project has already established that Santayana’s depiction of philosophy and philosopher is part of a larger whole, namely the interconnection between philosophy, rhetoric, and poetics, interconnected by means of aesthetics. Thus, considering these positions as intertwined, it follows that we consider the critic, spectator, and judge as a harmonious whole when functioning at its best or most efficacious, regardless of the typical genre to which we may attach those positions (i.e. critic/deliberative, spectator/epideictic, judge/forensic). Santayana claims, “what ought to be done is that which, when done, will most nearly justify itself to all concerned. Practical problems of morals are judicial and political problems. Justice can never be pronounced without hearing the parties and weighing interests at stake” (1962d, 125). Thus, despite Santayana’s tendency to avoid debate, this aversion should not suggest that the various points of view should not be considered in order to discover the real effects on moral, practical, judicial, and political problems and how those effects are interconnected.14 Beyond this connection, Santayana also points out that “any rational judgment on the beautiful must be a moral and political judgment” (1962c, 133). This judgment necessarily applies in the reverse, which is to say that moral and political problems are related to ones of aesthetics if we are to conceive of them rationally. Moreover, if we want to conceive of both moral and applicable laws and principles, they must “represent the interests over which [they] would preside” (Santayana 1962c, 136). For Santayana, our judgments, laws, and morals stem from politics absent of mythology. He says that they were “supplied by politics. The family and the state had a soberer antique religion of their own; this hereditary piety, together with the laws, prescribed education,

14 C. I. Lewis says, “[Santayana] felt that philosophic understanding was not a thing likely to be advanced by debate. One offered one’s own insight. Others would see what one pointed to, or – well, it would strike no spark, and in that case comprehension would be little served by dilating upon this failure of communication” (1954, 30).
customs, and duties” (1921a, 224). Thus, what we see is an interrelated set of systems of belief that influence the ways in which humans conduct themselves. The distinct domains of human experience, whether they be political, religious, legal, etc., all work within a familiar symbol system that requires a combination of roles, namely philosophy, poetics, and rhetoric, for a sustained and elevated creative and critical commentary on these relationships.

Although to be sure scholars continue to raise important questions in the rhetorical discipline, it is my contention that these questions continue to surface within the status quo of rhetoric, leaving rhetoric’s potential dogma unexamined. Santayana relays a comical anecdote from Plato that, despite its jest, points to the seriousness of becoming more reflective about our own positions within the doxa of our communities and disciplines:

Plato reports the humorous saying of Socrates that dogs are philosophical because they bark at strangers, thereby showing how much they prize knowledge. Intentionally or unintentionally there is a play here upon the word knowledge. This name is given at once, and sophistically, both to familiarity and to understanding; so that fondness for what we happen to know and hostility towards what we happen not to know are identified with the love of truth. Yet in fact they are the exact opposite. What we and the dogs love is our safety, our home-thoughts, our illusions and our undisputed confidence in habit. (1972c, 511-12)

In other words, while what we know is familiar, it may in fact also be wrong, but out of habit and aversion to the unfamiliar, we tend to believe the opposite. Overcoming the fear of unfamiliarity suggests that we begin to examine rhetoric rhetorically, and that also means considering the

---

15 This critique should not, and from my end of this, does not imply a wholesale disregard for rhetorical criticism. Such a universal claim would easily dissolve by finding notable exceptions of rhetoricians who make attempts to circumvent what I call rhetorical doxa. Nevertheless, my contention is for the tendency to remain constrained within such rhetorical doxa that has inevitably shaped our use of theory and critiques, our means and our ends.
aesthetic principle that binds together rhetoric’s various parts. That is to say, we must attend to the various parts of rhetoric with the whole in mind, questioning the very principles of rhetoric to which we are indebted. However, we must extend that examination into the principles that lie just beneath their surface in order to create and avail ourselves of the available means of rhetoric, not simply in the service of persuasion, but rhetoric as a *techne* and what that means and offers.\textsuperscript{16}

Aesthetic rhetoric has the capacity both to harmonize and to provide form to emotion and ideas, both creatively and critically. The increased fragmentation of our disciplines and our communities lead to the deterioration of this creative and critical function, but Santayana guides us toward regeneration. As Singer comments:

[Santayana] recognized the life of the mind, above all in the humanities, becomes stunted when artificial barriers are reared between philosophy and literature or between philosophy and history or, in different dimension, between creative and critical insights. Ideally these would not be separated from one another. To the extent that they establish a harmonious interpenetration, they enrich each other.

(2000, 2)

Aesthetic rhetoric provides a pliable system that contains pliable parts contributing to this enrichment in the sense that it provides the means to express more articulately the relationships that make up the system and simultaneously the means to evaluate and change the conditions that gave rise to the system.

\textsuperscript{16} While a strong tendency exists to equate rhetoric to persuasion or the service of persuasion, significant exceptions exist. For example, Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin’s “Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric,” which grounds rhetoric in “feminist principles of equality, immanent value, and self-determination”\textsuperscript{2} or Sally Miller Gearheart’s “The Womanization of Rhetoric,” which argues for a less patriarchal type of communication. Yet, these examples also support the sort of tendency to create insular disciplines. For example, Virginia Woolf’s, *A Room of One’s Own* blurs the distinction between fiction and politics. Often heralded as an early feminist literary critic, Woolf deserves attention from literary and rhetorical critics alike. Woolf’s own text is an act of criticism directed toward traditions governed by patriarchs, yet neither article aforementioned mentions Woolf despite the valuable support texts like hers offer.
While this project turned to Santayana, particularly his contributions to the idea of aesthetics, it has also availed itself to classical understandings of rhetoric even while attempting to broaden its scope. As Santayana claims, “The best men in all ages keep classic traditions alive. These men have on their side the weight of superior intelligence, and, though they are few, they might even claim the weight of numbers, since the few of all ages, added together, may be more than the many who in any one age follow a temporary fashion” (1962c, 139-40). While scholars may have helped spark interest in particular areas within rhetoric by use of such temporary fashions, I, alongside Santayana, find it more fitting to make use of deep-rooted traditions in order to preserve the traditions yet nevertheless view them afresh in order to elevate our own understandings of rhetoric and its genres, instruments, and positions, making harmonious the creative and critical goals of rhetoric.

Throughout Santayana’s works we see his effort to synthesize creative and critical tendencies. In so doing, the rhetorician becomes part of a more holistic way of viewing the world. That is to say, the emphasis to reflect like the philosopher and create like the poet requires a third component, namely an aesthetically conceived rhetoric. Rhetoric in this view helps to influence and guide toward interests, but also may assist in changing the very nature of the way in which we conceive of those interests. This amalgam accounts for both individual and communal experience, while simultaneously celebrating the imagination and the emotions, which all contribute to the way in which values are produced and perceived. Santayana’s “work offers a philosophical vision of human values without superstition. This vision reveres truth with courage and sincerity. These values diverge from – without condemning – the love of celebrity, possessions, and power prominent in popular alternative visions of human life” (Coleman 2009, xxx). Beyond his endeavor to view values untethered to illusion, “[Santayana’s] philosophy
includes values from science, art, religion, and political institutions in a synthesis that is remarkable during an age of specialization, for its width of interest and sympathy” (Arnett 1955, vii). Santayana makes this effort to harmonize these values and demonstrates the possibility of such unity among genres, disciplines, interests, etc., specifically because those “different systems of science, different forms of art, religion, and social organization, were the different forms taken by man’s effort to live wisely and well, that is, in harmony within himself and his various interests” (Arnett 1955, vii). In Santayana we have begun to tease out an understanding of aesthetic rhetoric that creates harmony between it, philosophy, and poetics. In so doing, we may also view Santayana’s work as not simply a way to identify, create, or unify values and experience, but as an extensive commentary on human life – as individuals alone and as individuals who cohabitate with others. As Coleman says, “Santayana’s philosophy makes “an attempt to articulate the inescapable conditions imposed by a material universe on creatures capable of consciousness and contemplation, and so of spirituality. These principles are deeply embedded in everyday opinions, though they might be poorly expressed and inconsistently understood” (2009, xxxiii). Thus, despite being chained to material circumstances, Santayana gives us a way to creatively envision alternatives. But beyond the alternatives, Santayana provides us the means to evaluate the conditions that give rise to certain common opinions and the discourse that expresses such doxa.

As both critical and creative, Santayana juxtaposes the traditional aims of philosopher, poet, and rhetorician. While the overarching goal of humans is to live a life of reason, that “rational life consists in those moments in which reflection not only occurs but proves efficacious” (Santayana 2011b, 2). Reflection for Santayana aspires to “[gather] experiences together and [perceive] their relative worth; which is as much as to say that it expresses a new
attitude of will in the presence of a world better understood and turned to some purpose” (Santayana 2011b, 2). The reflection and gathering must endeavor toward a purpose, but more specifically an efficacious one. While efficacious might suggest a number of things, Santayana argues, “A philosopher could hardly have a higher ambition than to make himself a mouth-piece for the memory and judgment of his race” (2011b, 1). However, this philosophy that behaves as a mouthpiece, at its best, must be authentic and “A philosophy is not genuine unless it inspires and expresses the life of those who cherish it” (Santayana 2009b, 4). Not only should the philosophy attend to the beliefs, values, emotions, interests, and experiences of the people that created and believe it, but it also must be understood. Aesthetic rhetoric has the capacity to harmonize these various functions but also to make them articulate: “Thus the Life of Reason is another name for what, in the widest sense of the word, might be called Art. Operations become arts when their purpose is conscious and their method teachable. In perfect art the whole idea is creative and exists only to be embodied, while every part of the product is rational and gives delightful expression to that idea” (Santayana 2011b, 4). Aesthetic rhetoric, then, is the artistic – creative and critical – means to provide delightful expression to ideas.

This project has viewed Santayana and his various works as an attempt to understand how philosophy, poetics, and rhetoric may function harmoniously together, including all of the various parts that work within each of these traditionally distinct categories, under the banner of aesthetics. This perspective initiated a pause to review some of the trends within the rhetorical discipline, but also the tendencies of rhetoric in general. Ashmore claims that Santayana’s “work has to point to an aesthetic theory rather than expound one” (1966, 3). In other words, Santayana does not want to present a universal aesthetic theory, he is just showing tendencies. Likewise, I do not aim to present a full rhetorical theory but rather show the tendencies involved in
“traditional” rhetoric and how those may be supplemented and modified by viewing rhetoric aesthetically. In some ways, the typical tendencies have functioned to make rhetorical studies less imaginative than its capacity would otherwise allow. Santayana made a similar criticism of philosophy: “What has happened is that the hereditary philosophy has grown stale, and that the academic philosophy afterwards developed has caught the stale odour from it” (2009b, 4). Rhetoric has much potential as both critical and creative, but its fragrance, perhaps, is not as aromatic as possible. It is not so much that we should avoid drawing from the resources available to us, but that we also need to be reflective about those resources and what is really at stake in our own commentary. Like Henry David Aiken remarks, discourse operates in a very complex system requiring us to look at the relationships between critics and audiences, critics and other critics, critics and objects, and experiences and objects – past, present, and future (1950, 493). In this complex set of relationships we might find a grain of truth in any theory, but “What is wanted…is a more flexible and pluralistic approach to the problems of critical evaluation which asks not what criticism is, but what it does, what its aims are, and how many distinctive types and functions of aesthetic judgments are required to realize these aims” (1950, 493-94). The aim is not perfection, which would always remain out of reach, but to aim toward perfection so as to continually advance better critiques, creatively and articulately.

Santayana is a model theorist, critic, poet, philosopher, and though not traditionally labeled as such, a rhetorician. Morris Grossman says that people arrive at aesthetics from different routes and Santayana enjoyed taking many different routes to avoid fragmented ways of reflecting, thinking, and expressing. Grossman goes on to point out that Santayana, “was an obvious literary artist in his poetry and fiction, but he was a poet-philosopher all the time, even when he was a metaphysician. While he wrote about art intermittently, particularly in The Sense
of Beauty and Reason in Art, he sought to be artful in all of his writings, including his
‘theoretical’ ones” (1992, 375). Thus, not only do we have the guidance for a more creative and
critical rhetoric, but we have an example in Santayana who espoused his own guidelines and
made steadfast attempts to make theories, discourse, relationships, experiences, and emotions
articulate, and beautifully so.
Bibliography


Woolf, Virginia. 1929. *A Room of One’s Own.* Orlando, Harcourt.