HOW AN ENTITY BECOMES A STATE:
TIBET, TAIWAN, PALESTINE, AND THE QUEST FOR RECOGNITION

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HOW AN ENTITY BECOMES A STATE:
TIBET, TAIWAN, PALESTINE, AND THE QUEST FOR RECOGNITION

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University of Pittsburgh, 2016

The question, "Why are some entities politically recognized as states while others are not?" is central to the conflicts faced by the peoples of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine, and indeed the entire world. It is a question whose answer defines the contours of the international arena and helps to decide the rights, obligations, and fates of people everywhere. Despite the plethora of research on the state, however, little is known about how the political recognition of states may operate as part of a larger international recognition structure. Such unknowns raise questions about the outcomes faced by entities like Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine. Why, for example, have Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine achieved the varying levels of political recognition that they have? How and why did opportunities to politically recognize Tibet (1913), Taiwan (1971), and Palestine (1948, 1988, and 2012) as states emerge when they did? And is there any validity to claims that there have been “missed opportunities” for Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine to have been politically recognized as states?

I address these questions using original comparative-historical data to conceptualize the “opportunity structure for recognition” as an overarching framework by which to synthesize the theory and practice of recognizing states and would-be states. In this way, recognition or non-recognition are more than the outcome of the complex interactions between states, would-be
states, the international system, and the sometimes-competing, sometimes-aligning interests and goals of each. I argue that “opportunities for recognition” tend to emerge during times when political opportunities and state interests are in strong alignment, favoring an entity’s political recognition as a state. The patronage of strong states can be a critical factor in the emergence and success of opportunities for recognition, but such patronage is not strictly necessary or sufficient to generate opportunities for recognition or for those opportunities to result in widespread recognition. Additionally, the study finds that claims about missed opportunities for recognizing Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine are without merit.
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On Sunday, May 27th, 2012, two Tibetan men walked onto a public street in Lhasa, doused themselves with gasoline, and set themselves on fire. Their protest in support of Tibetan recognition was the first time such a self-immolation had occurred in the holiest site in the Tibetan capital, and the thirty-seventh time such self-immolations have occurred since 2009\(^1\) (Whiteman 2012; BBC 2012a, 2012b).

While such a pronounced desire for recognition and autonomy has rarely been so moving and so desperate (Bradatan 2012), struggles for recognition continue to be waged all over the globe. In September, 2012, for example, the world watched with mounting apprehension as the Japanese Coast Guard fired water cannons onto fishing boats venturing near contested islands in the East China Sea. The situation there not only escalated the historically tense relations among China, Taiwan, and Japan, each of which claimed ownership of the islands (Hunt and Ogura 2012; CNN 2012), but also raised questions about whether or not Taiwan was making a bid for independent statehood. Two months later and some 5,000 miles away, following a speech by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas at the United Nations seeking international recognition of an independent state of Palestine (CNN 2012), the world watched with growing trepidation as Israel and Palestinians in Gaza exchanged rocket fire—which left at least eighteen

\(^{1}\) Tragically, this number increased during the writing of this chapter. Four more Tibetans set themselves on fire on November 7\(^{th}\), 2012, just hours before a key gathering of Communist Party leaders in Beijing (CNN 2012).
dead (Levs, Sidner, and Abu-Rahma 2012; BBC 2012d). With peoples’ lives on the line and international stability at stake, Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine exemplify just how critical a group’s political recognition as a state can be.

The question, “Why are some entities politically recognized as states while others are not?” is central to the conflicts faced by the peoples of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine, and indeed the entire world. It is a question whose answer defines the contours of the international arena and helps to decide the rights, obligations, and fates of people everywhere. Recognition effectively “furnishes the stage on which struggles over [resource] distribution... are played out... it tells U.S. who is included, and who excluded, from the circle of those entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition” (Fraser 2007: 21). Gaining political recognition as a state may assist peoples and their governments in establishing their identities, surviving, and may open doors for things like trade, military and economic aid, sovereignty, and rights (Peterson 1982: 328-329; Ringmar 2002: 118; etc.). Without full political recognition, a state’s citizens may be unable to access resources or basic rights, protections, or freedoms needed to provide for their material, economic, spiritual, and cultural needs.

For scholars, an explanation about why some states are recognized while others are not stands to contribute much to our understanding of recognition, the state, and the drawing of political boundaries. Despite the plethora of research on the state, however, little is known about how the political recognition of states may operate as part of a larger international recognition structure. The principle obstacle to this lack of research has been the absence of thinking across paradigms of recognition and the lack of cross-national data. Many of the benefits of state recognition have been advanced by politicians, concerned scholars, organizations, and activists as well as domestic and international social movements. But the first step in generating pressure
for change is documenting inequalities in recognition outcomes with reliable data. The data collected in this study will provide researchers and policymakers with the tools to advance the position of entities seeking recognition as independent states by drawing attention to their positions and to the factors contributing to different recognition outcomes. Considering the ongoing life and death struggles for recognition in Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine, this study highlights the importance of advancing our understanding of political recognition.

**The Argument**

*Thesis statement:* Why have Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine achieved the mixed levels of recognition as independent states that they have? I argue that political opportunities, alignment of interests, timing, and external patronage created political recognition outcomes observed for entities like Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine. Recognition outcomes took multiple forms and included opportunities for recognition as well as whether or not a state government recognized these entities as independent states. Despite claims, so-called “missed opportunities for recognition” did not occur and amounted, instead, to politicized claims that misrepresented the situations faced by leaders of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine. More broadly, I argue that recognition outcomes for the cases in question are shaped by a larger political structure that I describe as the “opportunity structure for recognition.”
In this study I argue that the practice of state recognition can be synthesized into an overarching conceptual framework I call an “opportunity structure of recognition” (O.S.R.). Briefly characterized, with a definition and elaboration that will be unpacked and explored in greater depth over subsequent chapters, the opportunity structure for recognition is a “political opportunity structure” pertaining to the recognition of states and entities seeking recognition as independent states. The O.S.R. extends the political opportunity structure concept from its typical focus on social movements to the broader actions of state governments in the

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2 In this simplified flowchart, the independent variables on the left can affect, singly or in complex combinations, recognition outcomes, shown on the right. The independent variables can interact in complex ways, sometimes pushing and pulling in the same or in competing ways, which can vary over time on a case by case basis. Those which are necessary or sufficient to produce outcomes are discussed further in the study.
international arena and to entities seeking recognition as states. The O.S.R. is a form of the Political Opportunity Structure (P.O.S.), and as such is comprised of the same components of the P.O.S. This means that the O.S.R., like the POS, includes components or properties outlined by other scholars on the P.O.S. concept (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 57), namely:

1. The multiplicity of independent power centers within a regime
2. The regime’s openness to new actors
3. The relative stability and instability of political alignments
4. The availability of influential supporters or allies for those who seek recognition
5. The extent to which a regime facilitates or represses collective claim making (such as for political recognition)
6. Changes to the above components.

In terms of the O.S.R., a “regime” is understood to be a state government, i.e., the government in power of a recognized nation state. It is the particular government that may extend or withhold recognition to an entity seeking recognized statehood. “New actors,” in present terms, are entities seeking recognition as states, especially their political leaders and organizations that variously make claims on behalf of the entity seeking recognition. It is also understood in present terms that seeking recognition is a form of collective claims-making.

In my conceptualization of the O.S.R., which will be elaborated upon in later chapters, the actions of state leaders have the ability to encourage or discourage challengers from making claims, and political opportunity structures within the state reflect the availability of influential allies, instabilities in extent political alignments, and the openness of a state regime to new actors.
(McCarthy and Zald 2002; Tilly 2006; Tarrow 2006). By “challenger,” I mean entities, such as Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine, seeking political recognition as independent states from one or more members of the international community of states. Such entities may be called “challengers” in the sense that they challenge the prevailing status quo, which necessarily excludes them when, where, and to the degree that they are not recognized as states. Challengers tend to be excluded from any significant participation in institutional politics because of overwhelming opposition from extant power holders within political opportunity structures. Changes in political opportunities, however, may lead to changes in how actors perceive and respond to costs associated with goal-oriented collective behavior. When political opportunity structures open to new actors, perceptions of hope encourages collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; McCarthy and Zald 2002). Thus, in order to gain political recognition as an independent state, nations, peoples, and their governments must successfully navigate among competing actors and interests in a complex, uneven, and ever-evolving international field. Those for whom there are greater opportunities to do so stand the greatest chance of gaining political recognition, while those who are opposed by extant political alignments and who lack political opportunities are then less likely to gain recognition as an independent state. As suggested by this conceptualization of the O.S.R., opportunities for recognition may not only vary in degree but are not always or necessarily uniform across the society of states. As such, an opportunity with one or more state governments for political recognition may not necessarily constitute or reflect an opportunity for recognition from others.

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3 By using the term “challenger,” it is my intention to draw upon the language of Sidney Tarrow (2006: 18) in describing the “political opportunity structure,” which is elaborated upon in my discussion of the O.S.R. in later chapters.

4 What this “navigation” entails is unpacked over the course of subsequent chapters.
The O.S.R. is not a “thing” that physically exists in nature and therefore cannot be measured in the normal sense of the word. It can be identified, however, through human discourse and behavior attesting to its existence. The political recognition of states does not happen haphazardly or randomly, but rather, as will be shown over the course of this study, tends to follow the patterns described by the O.S.R. concept. The O.S.R. is recognizable and identifiable by human discourse and behavior evidencing these patterns.

Brief Summary of Findings   As this study will demonstrate, opportunities for recognition can take multiple forms and be produced singly, as between one state when it recognizes another, or in combination, even in waves, such as when multiple governments recognize a state following the creation of an opportunity for recognition. How and why opportunities for recognition emerge when they do can be explained by comparing the historical trajectories of individual cases. As this study will show with the cases of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine, opportunities for recognition tend to emerge during times when political opportunities and state interests are in strong alignment, favoring an entity’s political recognition as a state. The patronage of strong states can be a critical factor in the emergence and success of opportunities for recognition, and as such is considered, like interests, to be part of the O.S.R., but such patronage is not strictly necessary or sufficient to generate opportunities for recognition or for those opportunities to result in widespread recognition. Additionally, the study finds that claims about missed opportunities for recognizing Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine are without merit. Instead, political leaders of entities seeking recognition of their independent statehood were outmaneuvered, outgunned, and otherwise fell victim to interests and circumstances that were beyond their control. What we have, then, is not an occurrence of genuine missed opportunities for recognition, but rather politicized claims about missed opportunities.
This brief introduction⁵ to the O.S.R. concept serves to help orient the reader to the present study and to draw attention to what appears to be an unexplored and un-theorized dynamic in the struggle for recognition: missed opportunities for recognition. Opportunities for recognition can be identified as when there is an opening or alignment of interests and actors favoring an entity’s recognition as a state. These may include a host of factors ranging, for example, from the support of Great Powers and the capacity to enter into relations with other states to the de jure recognition of an entity’s statehood by other governments. What may be called a “missed opportunity for recognition,” then, refers to instances where there were multiple factors favoring an entity’s recognition or signaling that there was an opportunity for recognition (i.e., an opening in the O.S.R.), but in which recognition was either not granted or not sought.

The central focus of the study is to theorize and empirically explore opportunities for recognition as well as missed opportunities for recognition, should they indeed occur. Because the potential for missed opportunities for recognition does not appear to have been previously examined⁶, the study stands to advance our understanding of the political recognition of states by generating an approach to state recognition that is robust enough to identify opportunities in the

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⁵ This brief introduction to the O.S.R. concept is unpacked more fully in subsequent chapters. Please note that this preface is intended strictly as a brief introduction to the study to come and that, as a preface, the ideas, concepts, relationships, etc. that are introduced here are unpacked more fully over the course of the study.

⁶ Readers familiar with the work of David S. Meyer will recognize that this is an application to the study of state political recognition of Meyer’s (2004) call for an approach to political opportunities that considers “missed opportunities.” Meyer argued that we need an approach to political opportunities that is robust enough to sense possibilities in the absence of political mobilization, that is “missed opportunities,” i.e., when activists could launch successful mobilizations and do not or when a particular strategy is more likely to be effective.
absence of it being granted or sought, and to deepen our understanding of which strategies for gaining recognition are most likely to be effective when considered together in concert.

**Organization of the Study**

The chapters to come present a historical and comparative analysis of the political recognition of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine. In Chapter 1, I briefly outline the theoretical literature on the political recognition of states and would-be states. This chapter is intended to locate the study in the broader scholarly literature and to give the reader a background understanding and context in which to better understand the nature of political recognition and, by extension, to better understand the results of the study. In Chapter 1 I discuss the methods used in the study and in Chapter 2 I develop the “opportunity structure of recognition” framework as a means to build on and extend existing explanations of the political recognition of states. In doing so, I show how a consideration of missed opportunities for recognition provides fertile ground for building new theory that helps to explain previously unexamined dynamics involved in the recognition of states and would-be states. These introductory chapters, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, are intended to orient the reader to understand the theory, context, and dynamics involved so that when the results of the study are examined in subsequent chapters they may be better understood in proper context. Chapter 3 briefly explains the production of opportunities for recognition across my three cases, examining how and why opportunities for recognition emerged when they did. Chapter 4 returns to the concept of missed opportunities for recognition. This chapter explains why missed opportunities were not observed in any of the cases examined and why what was found instead were instead claims about missed opportunities. In the final chapter, Chapter 5, I
comment on some of the findings of the study, their applications and implications, and I discuss some avenues for future research.

**What This Study Is Not**

Questions about the statehood, sovereignty, and the independence of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine are inextricably entangled with how they are perceived and consequently recognized, or not recognized, on the world stage. These questions continue to drive many heated debates in which the “facts” are hotly disputed. As such, and while I hold great hope that this study will ultimately help the peoples of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine in securing their rights and ways of life, the study does not seek to definitively answer questions about whether or not Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine are, or are not, states, territories, colonies, provinces, or autonomous regions. The study also does not presume to speak for the peoples or the many diverse opinions of those inside or outside of Tibet, Taiwan, or Palestine. It is also beyond the scope of the study to present a comprehensive history or analysis of each case examined, or to assess whether they have legal claims, are, or should be, sovereign or independent, or whether or not they or their citizens have, or should have, rights to independence, autonomy, recognition, or self-determination. This study instead focuses on interrogating why Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine have met with varying degrees of success in their bids to be recognized as states. This line of inquiry will help to reveal the larger patterning of state recognition, and help to explain instances where opportunities for recognition were missed. In this way, and while not claiming to represent the peoples concerned, the study aims to help make sense of the situations faced by Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine, in a
larger historical and comparative context, providing vital information for concerned laypeople, scholars, and politicians alike.

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My deepest thanks goes to my dissertation committee, professors John Markoff, Kathy Blee, and Scott Morgenstern, and especially to my dissertation chair, Mohammed Bamyeh, for their support and guidance over the years as this project was shaped and reshaped into its current form. This work has benefitted immeasurably from their kindness, generosity, and insight. I cannot thank you enough. My thanks also to the University of Pittsburgh for financial support to have come this far.
1.0 CHAPTER ONE
THE RECOGNITION OF STATES

As discussed in the preface, political recognition may assist nations in securing their rights and basic human needs. In the preface, I argued that political opportunities, alignment of interests, timing, and external patronage created political recognition outcomes observed for entities like Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine. I further argued that the practice of state recognition can be synthesized into an overarching conceptual framework I call an “opportunity structure of recognition.” But what is political recognition? What does it entail? And is there a method of analysis that can be used to validate the O.S.R. thesis outlined in this study?

In this chapter, I present a brief theoretical overview exploring what political recognition entails. I also make the case that comparative-historical analysis is a useful and appropriate means by which to validate the O.S.R. thesis. In doing so, this chapter, it must be understood, is itself not meant to validate the O.S.R. thesis. Such validation can only come about through careful analysis, which is reserved, as appropriate, for Chapter 3. As such, this chapter is meant to unpack what political recognition entails and to outline the methods used in the study with the understanding that this background is necessary to make sense of the comparative analyses among my cases and with external cases that is presented in subsequent chapters.
1.1 POLITICAL RECOGNITION

Political recognition (also called state recognition, diplomatic recognition, and international recognition) may be defined as the means by which the government leaders of a state use various criteria and means to politically identify and classify groups or entities as “states.” As should be clear from this definition, the entity or entities “doing the recognizing” that are of interest to this study are individual governments and their leaders acting independently or in concert with the governments of other states (e.g., through diplomacy between governments, such as through meetings between multiple diplomats, or through larger organizations like the United Nations which may serve as a forum for governments to interact and potentially recognize or not recognize other would-be states\textsuperscript{7}).

Thus, while political leaders may variously lobby for recognition on a state’s behalf, specifically what is recognized when speaking of political recognition is the state itself and that a “state” exists, i.e., that there are autonomous and enduring political institutions and that some group or entity meets certain criteria for being defined and treated as having a state, and this recognition may be offered to the government of a state on the behalf of its nation and people. Except in cases of political regime change--such as in the recent ouster of Muammar Gaddafi

\textsuperscript{7} In the case of the U.N., the form or type of political recognition of interest to this study would be the recognition potentially offered or withheld by constituent governmental members of the U.N., not the U.N. itself as an organization.

\textsuperscript{8} It should be noted that the United Nations, as an organization, does not itself recognize states but rather admits states based on recommendation from the Security Council that make it through the General Assembly. Thus, admission to the United Nations does not itself constitute recognition of a state, but rather implies recognition by member states that make up the United Nations (Al-Zoughbi 2015).
from power in Libya, in which the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom extended recognition to the National Transitional Council as the new and legitimate government of the state of Libya\(^9\) (CNN 2011b, 2011c)--these two aspects of political recognition tend to co-occur. That is, it is often in and through politicians identifying and classifying a people or nation as a state, and extending political recognition to the government of a state on the nation’s behalf, that it identifies the existence of a state and forges a political relationship with that state. The present study focuses on political recognition of states and would-be states, as in when a government’s leaders recognize the statehood or “state-ness” of an entity or group. The study does not attempt to explain how or under what conditions nations, states, or nation-states emerge,\(^10\) or whether or not nations necessarily preceded states, or whether nations, states, and nation-states might instead be co-producing and co-evolving. The study does not attempt to determine when statehood begins or ends, or if there is any “essential” core to statehood, independence, sovereignty, autonomy, or self-determination. The study does not seek to prove or disprove whether Tibet, Taiwan, or Palestine have some degree of independence, sovereignty, autonomy, or self-determination, or whether they are or should be independent, sovereign, autonomous, or self-determining already. The study also does not examine instances in which a government is simply recognizing a new government or alternative political body for an already existing, identified, recognized, and classified state.

\(^9\) Note that no argument is being made here about what state governments were first to recognize Libya, which has no bearing on the present example. The U.S. and the U.K. are used only as examples to illustrate that recognition was extended to the new regime of Libya, as illustrated by the cases of the U.S. and the U.K. No argument is made about other state governments recognizing or who was first. This is only an illustration.

\(^10\) For an excellent take on the origins of nation-states, see, for example, Philip G. Roeder’s *Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism.*
As suggested above, more specifically “who” does the recognizing is the leader or head of state, such as a president or prime minister, who acts on behalf of their state, nation, and government. Such recognition can, however, also be extended on behalf of a government leader by his or her representatives, such as when ambassadors, secretaries of state, etc., convey recognition on behalf of their government’s political leader or when chosen or appointed representatives sign a treaty with the representatives of a foreign state. While the primary political leader of a state government can extend or withhold recognition, it is understood that they may be variously lobbied, influenced, or pressured by a multitude of actors (individually or collectively) to act in ways that may be consonant with or in conflict with the wishes of the state leader in question, as will be examined later in the study.

**Figure 2.** Flowchart of Actors Influencing Recognition Decisions and Outcomes

Political recognition can take different forms and exist in differing degrees. Recognition may be termed “full,” for example, when the leaders of two states mutually recognize each other’s states as states and forge formal political ties. This “full” recognition entails recognition
of a state’s independence and autonomy, and may be said to exist in examples such as the formal recognition and political ties between nation-states like the United States, Japan, and China. Recognition may also be called “limited,” “partial,” or “contested” when a state and its government are not universally recognized as being a state or as being politically autonomous and independent, i.e., when a state’s government is recognized by the governments of some but not all the world’s nation-state governments (in keeping with the O.S.R. conceptualization of opportunities for recognition not necessarily being even or uniform across the society of states, as mentioned above). Illustrations of “would-be states” of this sort include cases such as Taiwan, which was once recognized by more governments but which is generally recognized as a part of China rather than as an independent nation-state\footnote{This can be said to make claims of or for a free and independent Taiwan a form of “contested” recognition as it is clearly opposed by China, which claims Taiwan as within the sovereign authority of its nation-state, and also making recognition of Taiwan also “limited” or “partial” in the sense that the governments of some nation-states do recognize Taiwan as independent while others do not.}, and Palestine, which is recognized by over 100 state governments around the world (Quigley 2010) but which is not a full member of the United Nations\footnote{Here again, the political recognition of Palestine can be said to be “limited” or “partial” as, like Taiwan, the governments of some nation-states, notably members of the Arab League, do recognize an independent state of Palestine. Such political recognition, however, is obviously “contested” by the governments of nation-states like the United States and Israel, which oppose recognizing an independent state of Palestine.}. While it is beyond the scope of the study to examine them further, additional illustrations also extend below the nation-state, including cases when a nation is not recognized as a nation-state, but rather as another type or form of nation, such as in the case of “peoples” and what are legally classified as “domestic dependent nations,” i.e., “tribes.” In cases such as these, governments may recognize some degree of limited autonomy or sovereignty (again
indicating that recognition is “partial” or “limited”), and may also allow the nation to exercise some limited form of self-government, but the peoples and domestic dependent nations are not viewed as having complete political independence from their “parent” nation-states and thus do not rise to the level of being classified as “nation-states.”

There are consequences which vary on a case by case basis for entities that remain unrecognized or which manage to gain only partial or limited recognition because “…in practice, unrecognized communities are exposed to ravages seldom visited upon the recognized” (Grant 1999: 26). Somaliland, for example, is a de facto independent state, albeit one who’s statehood is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Opportunity Structure</td>
<td>Relatively stable and institutional political cleavages, institutional structures, alliance structures, and prevailing strategies for social movements (Meyer 2004). Aspects of political struggles that encourage people to engage in contentious politics (Tarrow 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity Structure for Recognition</td>
<td>The structure of political alignments and opportunities involved with political recognition of states and entities seeking recognition as states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Recognition</td>
<td>An entity is universally recognized as an independent state by other state governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial Recognition</td>
<td>An entity is recognized as an independent state by more than one state government, but is not so recognized by all state governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Recognition</td>
<td>An entity is not recognized as an independent state by any state government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Descriptions above are brief, not exhaustive, definitions of concepts discussed more fully in the text.
contested, but without recognition as a state, this lack of recognition translates into lack of basic necessities like classrooms for children, healthcare, and street lighting (Daar 2004, cited in Coggins 2006). This also means that Somaliland is unable to assert itself in the international arena as a state and is therefore unable, for example, to enter into treaties, to bring grievances against other states for their transgressions, or to defend itself from invasion or to get loans from the World Bank (Coggins 2006).

There can be consequences for entities having limited or partial recognition as well, consequences which overlap with when states are not fully independent. Taiwan, for example, is recognized by about two dozen state governments and consequently is unable to maintain official diplomatic ties and embassies in the U.S. as a result of it not being officially recognized by the U.S., which effectively limits diplomacy between them to back channels, political innuendo, and suggestion and curtails the ability of Taiwan to enter into treaties with the U.S. Palestine has many more governments recognizing its statehood than does Taiwan, but the limited recognition means that Palestinian leaders must often expend considerable time and resources just getting to sit at diplomatic tables when they could be using those resources for other purposes, such as to build their economy and provide for the needs of their citizens. Another consequence of having limited or partial recognition, as with having incomplete independence, is that representatives of the same entity may be treated differently in one setting than in another. When visiting some countries, for example, representatives of a partially recognized entity may be welcomed as official diplomats but in visiting other countries their visits may need to be done in secrecy as a matter of unofficial business. This can greatly limit the ability of an entity’s representatives to engage in meaningful discussions and diplomacy, such as to build trade or to gain military support, all of which can severely hinder the survival of an entity’s population. Of course, some
unrecognized entities do not fare as poorly as others. The point here is only that entities typically fare better with recognition and that recognition brings with it both positives and negatives which vary on a case by case basis.\footnote{While recognized states typically fare better than unrecognized states, it is does not follow that all recognized states always and necessarily fare better than unrecognized states in all ways and at all times. Examples of this possibility are not readily available, but it is hypothetically possible for an unrecognized entity to fare better than another that is recognized in some ways. Also, some unrecognized or partially recognized states may do better than others. This, too, is an empirical matter to be examined on a case by case basis and is beyond the scope of this study.}

With such consequences to recognition in all its forms and degrees, it is important to understand which entities are recognized as states, when such recognition may or may not occur, and how the recognition of one state might affect the recognition another. More broadly, the term “state” masks a variety of political actualities, and this project therefore directly addresses why a range of entities ranging in size and form are granted or denied political recognition as “states.” As a complex dialectical system or relationship between two or more nations, emerging nations, etc., nation-states and other non-nation-state forms may or may not recognize one another, which can result in limited or partial recognition, as described above, when one or more state governments oppose the recognition of an entity as a state. As will be explored elsewhere in the study, state governments may variously support or oppose an entity’s recognition as a state for any number of reasons, too numerous to count, and a government opposing an entity’s recognition illustrates one of the means by which governments may attempt to prevent an entity from materializing into a fully sovereign and independent state. How states are or are not recognized by political leaders\footnote{The top political leader of a state government, such as a president or prime minister, is the person who ultimately decides on whether or not to recognize an entity as a fellow state. As with all political decisions, they may be} may or may not play a role in the decisions of political leaders.
of one state government to recognize another. Political recognition can therefore be an inter-state and intra-state relationship or process.

1.2 A PROLIFERATION OF TERMS

While the nature of political recognition is something that will be elaborated upon throughout the remainder of the study, the discussion thus far introduces a number of terms needing elaboration. Terms like “state,” “nation,” “people,” and “nation-state,” for example, are often used interchangeably by scholars and politicians alike. While it is beyond the scope of this study to elaborate further or to explore the evolving and often overlapping meanings of terms such as these, this can lead to a great deal of confusion and mask the true nature of the object of study, especially when such concepts are erroneously spoken about as reified “things” in the world, rather than as practical categories, discursive frames, projects, and ways of perceiving, interpreting, and representing the social world (Brubaker 2004; Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004).

For purposes of this study, then, the term “country” is used to refer to the physical land or territory of a state. In this usage, a country is a territorial and politically demarcated container, within which various groups or populations (such as different peoples, races, tribes, or ethnic groups) may be located. Groups or individuals located within a country need not necessarily be citizens of that country, such as when they are visitors to the country or when they are citizens of one or more other countries.
States, as Weber famously noted, lay “claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory” (Weber 2004 [1922]: 54). The state may also be viewed as an institution or set of institutions concerned with the enforcement of order (Gellner 2006: 4). States are generally expected to be territorially distinct, to have a single source of sovereignty, enjoy authority within their territorial boundaries, and its citizens may be viewed as constituting a single people (Parekh 2002: 41-42). States are also generally contiguous and are to varying degrees capable of exercising a monopoly on foreign and financial policy (Galtung 1972: 345).

While members of a nation may call themselves a racial, ethnic, or religious group, the “nation,” drawing on Anderson (2006: 5-6), Wimmer (2006: 334), and Smith (2009: 29), is conceptualized here for the sake of clarity as a named, imagined, and self-defining community of people or a relatively stable community of solidarity who typically, but not necessarily always, call or categorize themselves a “nation” rather than a racial, ethnic, or religious group. As Smith notes, “nations are repeatedly formed and re-formed, at least in part, on the basis of the symbolic processes of ethno-genesis such as naming, boundary definition, myths of origin and symbolic cultivation” (2009: 49). Nations may share not only a historic territory and can be viewed as named and self-defining communities, but also tend to share common myths of origin, a mass public culture, a single economy, and a sense of common rights and obligations or duties for the nation’s members (Smith 2000: 3; Smith 2009: 29, 49). Members of a given nation may share many cultural characteristics, such as language and past history (Galtung 1972: 345). The nation may also be conceptualized in terms of ineffable qualities, such as a soul or spiritual principle (Renan 1996: 52-53) that can evade the quest for a distinguishing mark by which to recognize it, but having a nation typically assumes also having a government (though, of course, there may be some notable exceptions), and one of the first conditions of a relationship being established
between states is the drawing of borders between them. Such borders generally serve as markers used to establish the recognizable limits of state authority and citizen rights (Fichte 2000: 227, 324-325). Furthermore, nations might be recognized as relatively stable communities of solidarity (Wimmer 2006: 334), but there might also be no single version of the nation—and because different communities may adopt different forms or narrations of the nation, this may lead them to conflict (Smith 2009: 33).

The “nation-state” is conceptualized in the sense of the nation and state being commensurate (Laitin 2007: 100), in which an entity with a territorial jurisdiction (the state) coincides with a given population or community (Roeder 2007: 12), i.e., nation. As Calhoun (2007: 3) writes, the hyphen connecting the “nation-state” connects the idea of a “people” together with that of a modern polity with military power and the capacity for effective internal administration. Nation-states are not conceived of here as being homogenous, a condition which is rarely achieved (Tilly 1994: 140), but rather include “a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries, its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence” (Giddens 1981: 190). In this study the nation-state is not conceptualized in Tilly’s terms to denote a state whose people necessarily share strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identities. While this may be the case for some nation-states, this study speaks about the nation-state more in the sense of what Tilly (1990) describes as the “national-state,” as coercion-wielding organizations that map the world onto their exclusive territories and which attempt to extend direct rule to their entire populations. These national-states are national in the sense that they attempt to integrate large populations and territories (Calhoun 1993: 217).
Of course, it makes very little sense to speak about states, nations, and nation-states without also talking about the peoples which animate them and in whose interests states may or may not serve. While “the people” may, in certain uses, refer to an entire polity or some subgroup within it, and while there are also no clear boundaries by which to demarcate a people, “the people” is here used to denote that ever-changing group of individuals that bear rights (e.g., to self-determination) and which can confer legitimacy on borders, policies, and governments who often claim to speak for the people. Peoples need not necessarily be nations, but peoples are understood here as the source of political authority by which governments operate (Canovan 2005; Wimmer 2006).

What I refer to in this study as a “nation” is not synonymous with an “ethnic group,” “race,” or “tribe.” By “ethnic group” I refer to what has been characterized as an “ethnie,” or a “named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the upper strata” (Smith 2009: 27). Ethnic groups are those groups that are generally seen, to varying degrees, as having a shared identity, a common history, and a traditional cultural heritage (Barth 1998: 5). Of course, as Barth notes, it is “the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses” (Barth 1998:15). Ethnic groups are therefore seen as social categories of ascription and identification by actors themselves, and have the characteristic of organizing interaction between individuals. The defining features by which an ethnic group may be known or which groups take into account are not the sum of objective differences or markers, but rather are those that actors regard as significant (Barth 1998; Eidheim 1998). “Ethnicity” is a method of classifying people, both others as well as the self, by means of a socially constructed origin (Levine 1999) and cultural
characteristics. While “ethnicity” may be conceived by some as reified and static, ethnic identities may emerge situationally and be fluid across time and social contexts, sometimes even to the point of ethnic switching and change (Sanders 2002).

Like “ethnicity,” “race” is conceptualized here as a mode of classification that makes use of exclusive categories so as to naturalize status differences (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov 2004; Gabbert 2001; Levine 1999). Unlike the “nation” and “ethnicity,” however, “races” are constructed around physical characteristics like skin color, perceived to be physically determined and to distinguish groups (Hudson 1996; Marx 1996), whereas “ethnicity” is constructed around beliefs, values, and other cultural characteristics. As Collins notes, “the actual racial categories of any given period matter less than the persistent belief in race itself as an enduring principle of social organization...” (1998: 65-66).

While “tribes” are not to be confused as “races,” the terms nonetheless do share some commonalities. Definitions of “race” historically emphasized the importance of notions of family lineage and “blood” ties (Collins 1998; Hudson 1996). The term “race,” however, traditionally rested on physical appearance and physical characteristics like skin color as well as biological classifications that were legitimated by science and sanctioned by law, while “tribes” are here viewed as smaller communities more akin to nations in that they typically share some sense or degree of political integration, common history, culture, religion or spirituality, and, in the U.S., are commonly, though not always, defined as “domestic dependent nations” and treated as “wards” needing federal protection, despite their sovereignty prior to European conquest\textsuperscript{15}. This study views tribes not as homogenous, bounded, fully integrated, or static communities speaking

\textsuperscript{15} For discussion of Native American tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” see, for example, \textit{Cherokee Nation v. Georgia}. 1831. 30 U.S. 1.
a single language, sharing a single culture or spirituality, but rather as complex and evolving sub-state and self-naming communities (but larger than the “band,” which may be viewed as a small association of residential and nuclear families typically numbering less than 100 individuals) with permeable boundaries that emerged in their present form through a process combining both internal drives as well as adaptation to external pressures imposed by the state as well as interactions with other tribes and non-tribal peoples (Hymes 1967; Dole 1967; Lewis 1967; Fried 1975; Cornell 1988).
In this formulation, a country may house within its socially constructed territorial boundaries a multiplicity of peoples, nations, races, tribes, and ethnic groups. Only states, their

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>The physical land or territory of a state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>A set of autonomous, enduring public institutions within a defined territory. Entity that lays “claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory” (Weber 2004 [1922]: 54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Those who occupy official positions of political power within a state at any given time. Example: all political officials serving in the U.S. in 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>A named, imagined, and self-defining community of people or a relatively stable community of solidarity who typically categorize themselves as a nation rather than a racial, ethnic, or religious group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation-State</td>
<td>An entity with a territorial jurisdiction (the state) coinciding with a given population or community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>A group of individuals that bear rights (e.g., to self-determination) and which can confer legitimacy on borders, policies, and governments who often claim to speak for the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>A group constructed around physical characteristics, like skin color, perceived or held to be physically distinguishing from other groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
<td>An “ethnie,” or a “named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td>A community smaller than a race and more akin to nations in that they typically share some sense or degree of political integration, common history, culture, religion, or spirituality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Descriptions above are brief, not exhaustive, definitions of concepts discussed more fully in the text.

16 It should be noted that race, tribe, and ethnicity are not the objects of political recognition in the same way as nations or states. Terms like “nationhood” and “peoplehood” are also sometimes conflated and treated as colloquial synonyms in modern times. Of course, none of these groups are concrete or “real” except when, where, and to the
governments, and their political leaders, acting on behalf of their respective nations and peoples, however, can enter into relationships with other states, such as to engage in international commerce, to forge treaties, etc (see, for example, Agnew 2005; Cohen 1961; the Montevideo Convention; etc.). A nation may or may not have a state associated with it, but the country is generally viewed as a territorial container, coterminous with the state and nation-state. That is, for any single country, there is generally a single dominant state or nation-state laying claim to its legal jurisdiction and to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within its territorial borders. The United States, for example, is a country with both a nation and a state within its territorial boundaries. The United States is thus a “nation-state” (a nation with a state), and the U.S. politically recognizes several hundred different nations within its territorial boundaries, namely those Native American tribes that often call themselves nations and which are legally and politically classified as “domestic dependent nations.” This makes the U.S. a country with multiple races and ethnic groups, a nation and a state, as well as what is, in effect, a “nation of nations.”

1.3 CONNECTING THE STATE, NATION, AND PEOPLE

Many of the complex relationships between the state, nation, and people reveal themselves when it comes to considerations sovereignty and autonomy. Sovereignty and autonomy are considered by many (e.g., Roeder 2007; Agnew 2005; Axtmann 2004; Smith 2009; Barkey and Parikh 1991; etc.) to represent major characteristics by which states, nations, and peoples are defined and extent they are recognized and treated as such, giving them a social reality despite their not being “things” in the world.
recognized, and without sovereignty or autonomy, the nations and peoples subject to the jurisdiction of the state may have their rights trampled upon. This is demonstrated by the life and death battles faced in the occupation of Palestine as well as by Tibetan self-immolations, as both groups are seeking to defend basic human rights denied to them—due in large part to their lack of political recognition. To better understand the stakes at play in the recognition of states, therefore, and to understand the relationship between the state, nation, and people, it is useful to briefly explore how they inter-relate through sovereignty and autonomy.

In practice, the terms sovereignty, autonomy, and independence are often used interchangeably, but in this study are treated as conceptually and analytically distinct. I define “sovereignty” as supreme power or controlling influence over a political body and freedom from external control. When I refer to “autonomy” or say that an entity is autonomous, I mean that an entity is to some degree internally self-governing. I also define “independence” as being free from external control and not requiring or depending on something else. Sovereignty, autonomy, and independence may overlap and co-occur, and it can be difficult, if not impossible, to discern where, when, and to what extent each may exist. While many would agree that a nation-state like the U.S. has sovereignty, autonomy, and independence, these qualities may exist to varying degrees and be highly contested. Taiwan, for example, possesses a government system distinct from China, is to some extent autonomous, but is not fully independent because its international personhood and relations are largely controlled by China. Though my characterizations of sovereignty, autonomy, and independence may appear concrete or absolute, and are often assumed to be when spoken about by scholars and politicians, reality is much more complex because sovereignty, autonomy, or independence may never be ever complete, absolute, mutually exclusive, or fully realized. There are, instead, degrees of sovereignty, autonomy, and
independence that may vary or evolve over time and emerge and potentially overlap in different forms in diverse contexts. In fact, “independence,” much like autonomy and sovereignty, is not an either/or phenomenon. States and state-like entities can have varying degrees of independence which can manifest themselves in varying forms over time and across different contexts. There can be varying degrees of “state-ness” just as there can be varying degrees of “independence” and “autonomy” for state governments to recognize or not recognize as they deem fit.

Thus, while a government’s recognition of an entity’s statehood may be argued to reflect little more than that the entity’s inhabitants have a right to independence and statehood rather than a recognition of actual statehood as may be argued to be the case for Palestine (Bamyeh 2015), this is not necessarily the entire picture. Governments may grant recognition as a way of showing political support for a right to independence of an entity that is not yet fully independent, but they may also grant recognition to entities that they deem to be states even if those states are not fully independent—such as when states are occupied or administered by foreign powers. Examples of such states include those that existed under mandate, the so-called “mandatory states” like Palestine which emerged out of the fall of the Ottoman empire (Quigley

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simplified Comparative Examples of Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Independence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
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</tbody>
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Note: Table presents a simplification of the text and is intended for illustration only.
In practice, it can be very difficult, if not impossible, to discern which the case may be—if a government’s recognition of an entity’s statehood reflects a belief in their right to statehood (without there being an actual state yet in place), or rather a belief in their actual statehood even in the face of incomplete independence\textsuperscript{17,18,19}.

\textsuperscript{17} It is beyond the scope of this study to more fully explore the existence of states without complete independence, or to resolve the issue of whether statehood begins at, or requires, full independence. It is worth noting that many state governments have recognized the statehood of Palestine even in the face of it lacking complete independence, such as when members of the Arab League recognized Palestine’s independence in 1948. For further discussion on this topic, please see, for example, Quigley 2010. Many, of course, view independence as a fundamental criteria for statehood, but this view is not universal. Of course, statehood without independence may mean very little on the world stage and can leave such states in a precarious position. It should also be noted that even states having more complete independence are not truly independent as they are still subject to international laws, customs, treaties, etc., all of which can be greatly constraining of independence, and even states that are viewed as independent may still have their sovereignty and territorial integrity violated, suggesting they are not perfectly and completely independent and able to maintain that at all times. For additional discussions of statehood that do not emphasize independence, see, for example, Kelsen (1941), and Grant (1999b) on the issue of independence as a requirement for statehood more broadly. It also bears noting that requiring complete independence as a requirement for statehood independence runs the risk of essentializing and reifying what are in fact continually moving and evolving targets (statehood, independence, sovereignty, etc.) and of privileging the position of states that have achieved independence over those that have not.

\textsuperscript{18} It is also beyond the scope of this study to explore what independence is or is not, when it begins, its centrality in statehood and recognition, etc. For present purposes, these are understood to be empirical matters which may vary between cases as well as over time and context. As evidenced by the numerous states recognizing entities like Taiwan and Palestine, full independence, whatever that may be taken to be, clearly is not necessary for political recognition. Also, independence, like rights to sovereignty, self-rule, etc., may be highly politicized. As such, entities that are independent or have some degree of independence may be claimed not to be independent or to have no right to independence or self-determination for political purposes.
While states may have jurisdiction over the peoples or nations within their geographical territories, the nation, state, and people are, in fact, interdependent. The people, for example, may be viewed as the primary source of legitimacy of the state, via consent of the governed (Wimmer 2006; Naastrom 2007), and statehood may be seen as an expression of the sovereign will of the people (Roeder 2007). Thus, a people may be regarded to possess an inherent sovereignty (Holm, Pearson, and Chavis 2003), not in the sense that peoples are necessarily always autonomous from states, but rather in the sense that it is through the will and consent of the people that both the authority of the state may be legitimized and from which the state’s sovereignty emerges. Furthermore, despite claims that the scope, relevance, and sovereignty of the nation-state has diminished in the face of globalization (e.g., Sassen 2003; etc.), the nation-state continues to be relevant in large part because states continue to define themselves in terms of nation-statehood and because of the of the nation-state’s unseverable link to the ideal of popular sovereignty based on the claim that the state derives its powers and sovereignty from the nation and the people (Roeder 2007).

The power and sovereignty of the state, therefore, is based not on the state itself, but derives first and foremost from the people, united as a nation, from which the state emerges and claims to represent. States and their leaders are dependent on the people and the nation. States,

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19 It can be argued that Palestine does not have a state or real sovereignty on grounds that it remains an occupied territory with limited autonomy. Palestine’s recognition as a state by numerous governments, as well as Palestine’s upgrade to non-member “state” in the United Nations, however, suggests that many governments view such characteristics as sufficient to grant recognition. This state practice suggests that statehood does not strictly require complete autonomy or independence, and that there can be varying degrees of statehood, independence, and autonomy, which may be sufficient for recognition to occur. Furthermore, some argue that Palestine does, in fact, meet the Montevideo criteria for statehood. See, for example, Quigley 2010 and Boyle 1990.
for example, have long relied on nations as their reason for being, and states finding their sovereignty and autonomy threatened often turn, in defense, to their roles as the representatives and defenders of their respective nations (Croucher 2003). State leaders may also endeavor to create nations so as to draw upon their nationalist sentiment in order to defend states against external threats (Wallerstein 1987). Once constituted, however, the state’s leaders may act for or against the people, such as by preserving lawfulness or by acting antagonistically against the people by ensuring that the common people do not ascend to power (Hegel 2010).

Beyond the consent and will of the people, the sovereignty of the state is also closely tied to territory. Territoriality, as in the use of territory for political and social ends, may be seen as a strategy for establishing the exclusive jurisdiction that is implied by state sovereignty (Agnew 2005). Sovereignty is founded largely on the occupation and possession of territory (Axtmann 2004), and provides the necessary geographical condition for a distinction between the state within its own territory and the anarchy beyond it (Agnew 2005). States are expected to enjoy autonomy and authority and their leaders are expected to regulate social relationships within their own state borders. States, thus, in what has been termed “negative sovereignty,” are generally seen in international law as having a right to non-intervention by foreign powers in their internal affairs (Axtmann 2004), with what is “internal” versus what is “external” being

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20 It is beyond the scope of this study to concretely distinguish between “intervention” and “non-intervention” as these terms can, of course, be highly ambiguous and subjective. Economic activity and aid, for example, can cross state boundaries and create venues for governments to gain some foothold of influence within a given state. Suffice it to say for present purposes that the delineation between what might constitute “intervention” or “non-intervention” is ambiguous, and that states, with their vested interests (e.g., in defending their borders, presenting an image of sovereign and effective control over their territories, etc.) may portray intervention and non-intervention may as more definite or concrete than may actually be the case at any given time.
demarcated by the borders of their national territories. Sovereignty thus provides a framework for states to be autonomous (Kumar 2008).

States may be sovereign or possess some degree of sovereignty that, at least for more democratic regimes, derives from the consent and will of the people (which is not assumed to be unanimous or homogenous), but state sovereignty is also something that is socially constructed as states interact in international society (Agnew 2005). States also possess what has been called “external sovereignty,” meaning that the state has over it no other authority than that of the rule of international law (Cohen 1961). Within the realm of international relations, states emerge and may be recognized as such within a set of relationships that define the rules or criteria for determining what may or may not be recognized as a “state.” Statehood may thus result not just as an emerging set of autonomous institutions (presumably, or at least claimed to be, based on the will and consent of the people), within the boundaries of a particular territory, but also by being recognized as such by other states (Biersteker and Weber 1996). Statehood thus emerges dialectically as the result of what may be competing and complimentary drives both internal and external to the borders that define a national territory.

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21 While it is beyond the purview of the study to examine sovereignty or the relationship between sovereignty and political form in detail, it should be noted that “sovereignty,” like other terms, can have multiple and contested meanings, and there is a great variety of opinion about the origins from which sovereignty springs. As Weber (1992) notes, sovereignty has been used to refer to democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes and what counts, functions, or is portrayed as “sovereignty” is not necessarily the same in all times and places. Thus, whether or not non-democratic regimes are truly sovereign depends on the definition or perspective one wishes to take.
1.4 EXPLAINING POLITICAL RECOGNITION

Explanations about why some entities are politically recognized as states while others are not typically begin with a combination of criteria, interests, and international norms. States, as outlined in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), may be defined as persons in the realm of international law when they exhibit a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Governments and their leaders are guided by international norms and laws that are shaped by these criteria, but retain the right to determine for themselves what entities do or do not qualify as states (Peterson 1997; Yamal 2012; Bell 1995; Murphy 1999).

Within this framework, government recognition of an entity’s statehood is neither a duty nor is it automatic (Peterson 1982; Yamal 2012). This is in large part because even though some governments may act in good faith, they may yet interpret the same reality differently because the “facts” about an entity’s meeting the basic criteria for statehood may not always be clear or definitive (Fabry 2010). This situation is compounded by competing interests that can give governments incentives to politicize and interpret the “facts” differently so as to further their own political, economic, and cultural interests (Whelan 1961; Hsieh 2007; Bell 1995; Ringmar 2002). Thus, even when and where certain criteria are enumerated, such as in the Montevideo Convention, an entity meeting the criteria does not guarantee its recognition because recognition remains a fundamentally political act, a choice that is inevitably affected by state interests.

Interests are a vital part of the O.S.R., but while state governments and their leaders may be tempted to use political recognition to further their own interests, they are not completely autonomous to freely do as they will because they are members of a larger society of states and
are subject to the socializing norms of international law and the institution of recognition (Ringmar 2002; Peterson 1997). Within this larger context, state representatives face a range of constraints on the actions available to them. The image of what the modern state should “look like,” for example, has become normative to the extent that the leaders of many entities are often compelled to mimic each other and to simulate or approximate the image of modern statehood in order to uphold or advance their international recognition and to make themselves more recognizable as states (Eriksen 2011; Fabry 2010; Ringmar 2002).

Thus, many actors have largely accepted the predominant idea of what statehood is or what it means, and many of their policies and institutions have been shaped on the basis of it (Eriksen 2011). Governments may try gain or extend influence by granting or withholding recognition, but such decisions are shaped by political and discretionary factors in accordance with customary international law (Roeder 2007; Fabry 2010; Peterson 1997). Furthermore, while they are not deterministic, norms and international law tend to shape and delineate government actions as well as setting the stage for the permissible circumstances under which recognition may occur (e.g., when recognition may be legitimately granted or withheld) as well as the forms it may take (Fabry 2010; Roeder 2007; Peterson 1997; Whelan 1961). Thus, not only may recognition decisions be influenced by other governments, but governments violating international laws and customs (e.g., by attempting to intervene in a state’s sovereign internal affairs) may face adverse consequences for their actions (Fabry 2010).

A brief example of these dynamics can be found in the U.S. position on Taiwan leading into its unseating from the United Nations in 1971. The United States, as a patron of the R.O.C.’s bid to join the United Nations alongside the P.R.C. could, hypothetically, have recognized the R.O.C. Such an action was clearly within the range of possibilities that could have been
undertaken by the U.S. president at that time. The president did not take such action, however, as it was well known that such action would have garnered that anger of the P.R.C. leadership and would have threatened U.S. relations with China. Such political and discretionary factors were themselves further shaped by the international custom of privileging the position of the parent state over and above that of entities seeking secession or independence. For the U.S. to have recognized the R.O.C. against the wishes of the P.R.C. leadership would have violated this international custom. Thus, even though the U.S. president could have recognized an independent Taiwan, headed by the R.O.C., the president’s choice was shaped by political factors and international norms.

While it is beyond the scope of this study to explore in greater depth, the recognition of states is understood to be shaped in a multiplicity of competing and conflicting ways by large-scale historical factors and processes like globalization, wars, the rise and fall of states and empires, and the dominance of particular countries at any given time. As shown in the table below\textsuperscript{22}, the break-up of states and empires, for example, is often followed by the emergence of new states. This happened, for example, with the break-up of the Ottoman empire, which was followed over time by the emergence from the Ottoman empire of the modern states of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine.

\textsuperscript{22} For sources, please see U.S. Department of State 2015c, Quigley 2010, United Nations 2015w, and Rice-Oxley et al. 2011)
Table 4

Examples of States Emerging From Political Collapse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure Collapsed</th>
<th>States Born In Aftermath</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
<td>Palestine*, Israel, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Latvia, Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRY</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents an illustrative set of examples of states emerging from the collapse of various empires and state structures. The table is not intended to be comprehensive. The SFRY is the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

*The state of Palestine remains contested.

Figure 3. Number of Nation-States Created Per Five-Year Period. Adapted From Wimmer and Feinstein (2010)
Within this larger political context, state leaders (and especially Great Powers\textsuperscript{23} like the United States, Britain, and China) may attempt to control and influence which nations get states by purposively extending and withholding political recognition (Roeder 2007; Coggins 2011, 2006). But how does such political recognition operate? What factors are involved? And, once granted, what form(s) might political recognition take?

Building on considerations of criteria, interests, and international norms, political recognition is further explained as the outcome of an evolving and dialectical interaction between states, would-be states, the international system, their leaders, and the interests of each. In the “bottom-up” view of state recognition, emerging states first establish authority and diplomatic control over a given territory, assert their sovereignty in the international arena, and are then, potentially, recognized as states by their peers. From this perspective, effective domestic control and authority over a territory are sufficient, but not necessary, to cause recognition, and any state recognition prior to the establishment of authority and effective control

\textsuperscript{23} This study focuses on Great Powers because they have the greatest influence on the entities seeking recognition that are examined in this study. This is evidenced, for example, in the Great Powers having veto power in the United Nations, a power through which they may block any applicant from admission to the U.N. (Berzak 2013). This focus is also necessary as a first step given the constraints on this study in outlining the theory offered here. The study is conducted with the understanding that future research is needed to build upon and flesh out the work begun here, notably extending the scope to examine dynamics involving a broader array of states that are not Great Powers. It has also been shown in other studies (e.g., Coggins 2011) that the recognition decisions of the Great Powers systematically mold and shape the recognition decisions of other governments. They do this by drawing upon their considerable military, economic, diplomatic and other resources to influence less powerful state governments, such as by offering economic or political incentives. Furthermore, because many governments do not have an interest in a recognition fight, coming to a recognition decision that is in line with the position of a Great Power can be a low cost means to generate favor with the leaders of Great Powers (Mirilovic and Siroky 2015).
is considered premature. This bottom-up view of recognition corresponds to the declaratory theory of state recognition, which asserts that a state’s legal personality emerges from the “bottom” (i.e., from within the emerging state itself) and exists as soon as the state exists and that political recognition as a state is simply the recognizing government’s confirmation and pledge of respect for the new state’s legal personality (Coggins 2006; Peterson 1997).

In the “top-down” view, however, recognition provides legitimacy to would-be or emerging states, supporting and solidifying the emerging state’s leaders’ claim to sovereignty. In this way, state leaders may act, by granting or withholding recognition, to also extend or withhold legitimacy as well as to suppress or bring forth emerging states. This view connects with the “constitutive” theory of recognition, in which recognition is not simply a consequence of statehood (as may be suggested by the declaratory theory), but that recognition actually serves to constitute new states, and argues that sovereignty is not achieved in international law until already sovereign states recognize claimants as legal persons with the sovereign rights and duties of a state (Coggins 2006; Fabry 2010; Peterson 1997).

Recognizing the limits of these dominant views, as well as the false dichotomy they may suggest, scholars have proposed a middle-ground perspective that combines these perspectives. In this synthesis, recognition is viewed as the result of both top-down and bottom-up processes. Emerging states may not only have legitimacy and sovereignty (or some degree of each) deriving from within the emerging states themselves, but would-be states may be helped or hindered in their emergence by the actions of already existing states and their leaders, such as when they decide to grant or withhold political recognition (Coggins 2006; Ryngaert and Sobrie 2011).
Would-be states whose leaders attempt to bring their states into the international system as states by working to have them recognized as such (e.g., through lobbying, forging political alliances, etc.) face a diverse constellation of factors that may help or hinder their causes. In a legalistic perspective, for example, state recognition may be viewed as being driven by considerations of empirical facts on the ground about whether or not a would-be state has achieved effective territorial control, sovereignty, and authority. These factors do indeed play some role in state recognition, but recognition remains more fundamentally a political act, driven more by competing state interests than by considerations of law and whether or not an entity meets any legal criteria (e.g., the Montevideo criteria) for statehood (Ryngaert and Sobrie 2011; Fabry 2010; Coggins 2006; Yamal 2012; Doukas 1937; Murphy 1999).

The interests shaping state recognition outcomes can take many forms and are shaped by an ever-changing political field. Broadly speaking, however, these interests can be split into four major categories, namely 1.) geo-strategic situation and international security, 2.) domestic security, 3.) systemic norms, and 4.) identity relations (Coggins 2006). The first of these, geo-strategic situation and international security, refers to recognition being granted or withheld in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Corresponding Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognition creates states.</td>
<td>Constitutive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States emerge and are then recognized.</td>
<td>Declaratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States emerge in tandem with recognition.</td>
<td>Synthesis of Constitutive and Declaratory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table presents a simplified representation of theories described more fully in the text.
accordance with a logic of friendship or animosity, whereby recognition may be used to shore up a state’s external security (i.e., in relation to other states), to express approval or disapproval, or to aid state allies or weaken state adversaries (Coggins 2006; Peterson 1982, 1997). Thus, when statesmen view recognition as having the potential to support the home state’s security, to forge useful alliances, or to assist already existing allies, they are more likely to recognize a would-be state (Coggins 2006, 2011).

Also within this category of interests is the relationship between the would-be state and its parent state (such as in the relationship between Taiwan and China). Foreign states have an interest in assessing the relationship between would-be states and their parent states so as to determine if the parent state favors or disfavors recognition of the would-be state. Extending recognition to would-be states against the wishes of the parent state or before the parent state itself grants recognition can be viewed as violating international norms by interfering in a state’s internal affairs, which could potentially upset the balance of power and relations not just between the parent and would-be states, but between the parent and the recognizing state as well. These effects of extending or withholding recognition can be quite strategic, even if they may be viewed by some as “premature” (Fabry 2010; Coggins 2006).

In the second category of state interests, recognition may be shaped by political leaders’ interests in domestic security. In this category of interests, political leaders may view recognition of other would-be states as having the potential to affect domestic security within the borders of the recognizing state government. Thus, in this logic, for example, a would-be state would have a higher probability of being recognized if recognition is supported by a powerful or influential domestic constituency within the recognizing state in order to maintain domestic security (e.g.,
by not fanning social or political flames that could otherwise embolden domestic discontents to take action against the recognizing state) (Coggins 2006, 2011; Whelan 1961).

Thirdly is the role played by *international or systemic norms*. Here, recognition may be shaped out of considerations about whether or not granting or withholding recognition is appropriate. This includes considering common state practice and the institutionalized aspects of recognition, such as international law, the Montevideo criteria, the principles of territorial integrity, inviolability of state borders, and non-intervention in a state’s internal affairs, etc. (Coggins 2006; Eriksen 2011; Sterio 2011; Closson 2011; Ryngaert and Sobrie 2011; Fabry 2010), so as to advance the recognizing state’s legitimacy and prestige among its peers or to advance coincident domestic beliefs (Coggins 2006, 2011). Thus, recognition may often follow a political path shaped by changing normative conditions (Closson 2011).

Finally there is the role of state interests as shaped by *identity relations* between them. This logic suggests that state leaders have not only an interest in establishing identities for their states, but also that leaders have a greater interest in helping those states that they view as more like their own states than they do those they view as different. The leaders of established democracies, for example, may have a desire to assist in the emergence of other democracies by extending recognition to them. In another example, leaders of states with ethnic connections to an emerging would-be state may be more likely to grant them recognition, both as a means of helping those they view more like themselves and so as to cater or play to their own domestic constituencies. This form of state interest in recognition not only helps those judged to be more like the "self," but also can be used as a means to affect the choice of government in another state (Coggins 2006, 2011; Peterson 1997; Whelan 1961; Ringmar 2002), potentially
influencing a state or would-be state’s internal affairs despite prevailing norms and the principle of non-intervention.

The alignment of interests being a major factor in the creation of opportunities for recognition begs the question, “When do interests align?” The short answer is that we don’t always know. Interests, as described above and elsewhere throughout the study, not only can take many different forms, but are also in a state of constant flux. Symbolically speaking, this makes interests similar to a flock of birds moving in the sky in the sense that interests, like the birds of a flock, might come together, disperse, and constantly change shape and direction based on the minute and also evolving actions and interactions they have with those around them. This situation is further compounded by the fact that every actor involved in the production of recognition outcomes may not only have different and competing interests, but they may, depending on their estimation of their goals, abilities, resources, and the field of actors around them, go to great lengths to conceal or misrepresent their interests so as to effect one or more desired outcomes. Thus, it can be said, in a very general sense, that interests align when, where, and to the extent that the goals, desires, and resources of one or more actors facilitate it. Interests may also align when, where, and to the extent that there is support for interests (with support being something that can take many forms, such as popular support, financial support, etc.), which is an ever evolving empirical matter. But, despite these broad generalities that do lend some ability to predict that interests may align, their ephemeral and potentially concealed nature makes it impossible to know precisely when and where they are in alignment. As with the flock of birds, one can really only observe that there is an alignment when the “flock” comes together and moves in a certain direction--as evidenced, in the context of this study, when an entity is recognized as a state.
Of course, while state interests may be a major determinant, interests alone are not enough to fully account for recognition. Recognition is also heavily shaped by the socializing effect of the international system as well as the role Great Powers play in that system. In the international system, state interests and identities and interests are not “given,” but instead vary by how states define themselves and others. Furthermore, interests and identities are continually shaped and reshaped by systemic cultures of which they are a part via mimicry and social learning through their interaction with other states and would-be states (Wendt 1999; Coggins 2006; Ringmar 2002).

Thus, state leaders may have self-interests and wish to act unilaterally in the international political field, but they quickly learn that if they wish to make their states more recognizable and avoid the wrath of their peers, they must also learn and are obliged to conform to the rule of international law as well as the customs of state practice (Ringmar 2002; Fabry 2010). This means that leaders have a special interest in the behaviors of other state leaders, and are obliged, out of self-interest, to observe and learn from the example of their peers. It also means that the interests of state leaders are to some degree constrained by the interests of their peers as well as by existing norms and customary practice. State leaders therefore have great incentive to avoid acting unilaterally when doing so would come at a cost. When it comes to political recognition, this means, for example, that unilaterally extending recognition could potentially upset the status quo. Unilateral recognition also does not guarantee that other states will do the same, making unilateral recognition a potentially risky play. Therefore leaders typically prefer to avoid unilateral recognition in favor of coordinated (also called “joint” or “collective”) recognition with other states whenever possible (Coggins 2006, 2011; Yamal 2012).
Of course, while states may be legally equal (i.e., in that they are recognized as states and have the rights and duties pertaining to states) and the actions of their leaders may be to some varying degree constrained by the social system of which they are a part, not all states are politically equal. Some leaders, namely those of the “Great Powers” like the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, attempt to influence which nations get states by extending or withholding recognition, knowing that they have greater power and influence than do other state leaders. The leaders of the Great Powers prefer to coordinate recognition so as to avoid upsetting the status quo, though they tend, by virtue of their material power and authority, to act as gatekeepers to the international community and can be influential enough to set precedent for other states to follow in their actions to grant or withhold recognition, even to the point of thwarting the recognition of a would-be state. This is especially the case when the Great Powers make up a critical mass\(^24\), which often leads to a “snowball effect” of smaller, less influential states following their lead (Coggins 2006, 2011; Fabry 2010; Roeder 2007). This can also be the case when there is disagreement among the leaders of the Great Powers about whether a would-be state should be recognized. In this situation, disagreement can result in inaction among smaller states, who look to the Great Powers for leadership and precedent. Agreement among the leaders of the Great Powers, however, is not enough to constitute a state or ensure that other states will recognize it (Coggins 2006; Fabry 2010).

In deciding whether or not to grant or deny recognition, the leaders of Great Powers and common states alike must decide whether it is in their best interests to extend recognition formally or informally. In formal (also called “express” or “explicit”) recognition, recognition

\(^{24}\) Just how many states are needed to constitute a “critical mass” is an empirical matter and may be open to variation.
may be granted and communicated through oral statements, treaty provisions, receiving or exchanging ambassadors, or joint declarations issued by state leaders. Formal\textsuperscript{25} recognition of this sort is exemplified by the frequent joint statements issued by leaders of the United States and China, in which U.S. leaders affirm that they recognize that there is but “One China,” of which Taiwan is a part (Roberge and Lee 2012; Chang 2000). This form of recognition is generally seen as both more definitive and more desirable than informal recognition as it typically leaves less ambiguity about external recognition and international acceptance (Peterson 1997; Adler 1995; Coggins 2006).

Informal recognition (also called “implicit,” “implied,” or “tacit” recognition) is equally valid in the eyes of state leaders, but is often more problematic for all involved. Informal recognition may be granted, for example, when a government acts in a way that is not consistent with non-recognition, but there is no consensus about which acts provide a reliable indication that an entity has been informally recognized as a state (Coggins 2006; Peterson 1997). Of course, without clear criteria or indicators that informal recognition has indeed been granted, exemplars of this form of recognition can only be grasped at. A potential candidate, however, is suggested by the relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Much to the anger of China, the United States can be interpreted as suggesting informal recognition of Taiwan by actions of its political leaders that are inconsistent with Taiwan being anything other than a state, such as the much disputed sale of military weapons to Taiwan by the United States to aid Taiwan in its military defense against China (Roberge and Lee 2009; Wang 2009; Ross 2006). Despite the highly problematic nature of informal recognition, it can be in the interests of the recognizing

\textsuperscript{25}Formal recognition may also be thought of as being “official,” but is spoken about more commonly in the literature as formal recognition.
government because, as suggested by the case of the U.S., China, and Taiwan, it is less obvious and therefore potentially less damaging as it allows governments to establish relations while not arousing the degree of disfavor that might otherwise come about were recognition granted formally (Coggins 2006; Peterson 1997).

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Less clear. Implied or suggested by acts inconsistent with non-recognition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Facto</td>
<td>&quot;In reality.&quot; Signals acceptance of facts that a state exists, but provides governments a means to revoke recognition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Jure</td>
<td>&quot;By right.&quot; A more permanent and more irrevocable form of recognition than de facto recognition. Signals having met legal criteria for statehood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premature</td>
<td>Recognition granted before entity meets characteristics of statehood or recognition granted before a parent state has consented to new state formation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional</td>
<td>Refers to a government deciding to recognize an entity as a state only once it has fulfilled some set of conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prolonged</td>
<td>Recognition that persists after a state has ceased to exist or when it has been annexed or conquered by another state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Descriptions above are brief, not exhaustive, definitions of concepts discussed more fully in the text.

Beyond considering the costs and benefits of formal versus informal recognition, state leaders must also decide whether recognition should be granted on a provisional or permanent basis. In the former, also known as “de facto” recognition (literally, “in reality”), state recognition signals the acknowledgement and acceptance of facts that a state exists, but provides governments with a means to reserve the ability to revoke said recognition, making it a type of
“wait and see” approach to recognition. This approach can be in the best interests of states when the facts on the ground about a state’s existence are still unfolding or are unclear (Doukas 1937; Peterson 1997; Yamal 2012).

In contrast to de facto recognition, “de jure” (literally, “by right”) recognition presents state leaders with a more permanent and more irrevocable form of recognition than its counterpart. De jure recognition governments is generally seen by scholars and statesmen as signaling not only that a state exists and meets the legal criteria for statehood (i.e., the Montevideo criteria), but also that there is a lawful governments with effective control of its territory. Despite any implications to the contrary, the “permanence” of de jure recognition is a matter of degrees as it is not absolute. This is because recognition can still be withdrawn, as, for example, when a state is annexed or conquered by another state (Doukas 1937; Peterson 1997; Yamal 2012).

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In practice, “informal recognition” gives the appearance of overlapping and being synonymous with “de facto” recognition while “formal recognition” gives the appearance of overlapping and being synonymous with “de jure” recognition. And, in practice, these types may
often overlap, as described. They differ, however, in that “formal” versus “informal” recognition speaks to questions of whether or not there have been explicit statements made about an entity being recognized as a state. “De facto” and “de jure” recognition get at something different, namely the question of permanency, as in whether recognition is permanent or not. “De facto” recognition, then, refers to recognition that may be informal, but more importantly is not permanent and is revocable. “De jure” recognition is typically viewed as much more permanent26 than de facto recognition (Peterson 1997). Thus, even though formal and de jure may seem to overlap in the way that informal and de facto might seem to overlap, they actually get at different things.

Lastly to be considered here, decisions about state recognition are shaped not only in terms of their form or type, but also by what may be larger questions of timing. Recognition granted before a state exhibits the characteristics of statehood, such as those prescribed in the Montevideo criteria, might be considered to be “premature” recognition27. Recognition may also be considered premature in instances where leaders of a parent state have not yet consented to the recognition of a new would-be state from within its sovereign territory. In some such instances, recognition may be “conditional,” referring to when a government decides to recognize an entity as a state only once it has fulfilled some set of conditions. Alternatively, recognition may be considered “prolonged” when a state has passed out of existence or when it has been annexed or conquered by another state. Much like the forms or types of recognition that may be granted or withheld, questions about the timing of recognition are also shaped by state

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26 This permanency, of course, is not absolute. Recognition can be revoked at any time. This discussion of permanency is more a question of degrees, perceptions, and typical state practice than actual permanence.

27 Premature recognition may also be thought of as being “presumptive,” but is described here as premature in keeping with language used most often in the scholarly literature on the topic.
interests. State leaders can, for example, use their timing or withholding of recognition in an
effort to resolve conflicts between emerging and/or existing states, to avert hostilities, to help
support emerging states, or to achieve numerous other goals deemed important for the
recognizing state or the larger society of states (Coggins 2006; Yamal 2012; Peterson 1997;
Fabry 2010; Bell 1995).

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premature</td>
<td>Recognition granted before entity meets characteristics of statehood or recognition granted before a parent state has consented to new state formation.</td>
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Note: Descriptions above are brief, not exhaustive, definitions of concepts discussed more fully in the text.

As shown in the tables above listing the different types of recognition, recognition can indeed take many forms. In fact, a single entity with partial recognition can, conceivably, have all the different types of recognition, such as one of each from different states. An entity, for example, can be recognized formally by some states, informally by others. The same entity can be given premature recognition from some states and conditional recognition by others. It would be a mistake, however, to view all these different forms as having the potential to co-exist for a single entity in its relationship with any other single state. A single entity, for example, cannot
have both formal and informal recognition from the same state any more than it can have both de facto and de jure recognition simultaneously from a single state government.

It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the various combinations and permutations possible of these different types of recognition, but having some types of recognition can co-occur while others cannot. Formal recognition, for example, can be granted prematurely or conditionally and thereby constitute both formal recognition and premature or conditional recognition, whichever the case may be. This is not always the case, however. Informal recognition, for example, does not make sense and cannot co-occur with de jure recognition because de jure recognition signals that a state is recognizing an entity explicitly and formally as an independent state.

Another factor in explaining political recognition which bears greatly on whether or not it is granted is the observation that recognition can bring with it many advantages and disadvantages for all involved. These advantages and disadvantages are not always clear and can vary considerably based on time, perspective, and context. They may also co-occur, emerge at one point only to vanish at another, and be unforeseen and unintended consequences.

On the plus side, citizens of entities that gain political recognition as independent states often find that it helps considerably with establishing their identities, assisting their cultural and political survival, and may open doors for things like trade, military and economic aid, sovereignty, and rights (Peterson 1982: 328-329; Ringmar 2002: 118; etc.). Recognized states enjoy autonomy and the authority to regulate social relationships and behaviors within their own

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28 It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt an exhaustive examination of these advantages and disadvantages. A handful of advantages and disadvantages are presented here only to further illustrate the complex dynamics involved in political recognition.
borders, such as by crafting and enforcing their own laws and regulations. States are generally seen in international law as having a right to non-intervention by foreign powers (Axtmann 2004).

While the potential benefits of recognition are very numerous, recognition can also bring with it certain costs. One of these costs can be found in the acquisition of recognition itself. Leaders of entities seeking recognition, for example, may engage in what has been called “checkbook diplomacy,” (Rich 2009) which refers to the use of financial incentive in the pursuit of diplomatic ends, in this case gaining recognition. An example of this type of diplomacy includes entities like Taiwan offering many millions of dollars in foreign aid in exchange for political recognition. Gaining recognition may also be very costly to the citizens of entities seeking it when they deem it necessary or useful to lobby for their causes, which can require considerable expenditure of time and other resources.

Another potential cost of recognition is that recognized states are subject to limitations by fellow members of the international system. State governments, for example, may be required or called upon to protect their citizens by engaging in war with other states, which can be extremely costly in terms of loss of life and financial expenditure. State leaders are also not completely free to simply do as they wish, but may be bound or limited by treaties and common practices and expectations of their fellow leaders in the international system, such as rules or regulations imposed by the United Nations and various international political conventions.

Recognition can also be very costly when it is partial or contested. The Vatican’s recognition of Palestine, for example, has been greatly debated and may pose a cost to the Vatican to the extent that it might damage its relationship with Israel, which strongly opposes any recognition of Palestinian statehood. Partial and contested recognition can also put an entity
so recognized in the difficult position of being treated as a state by some international bodies or in some contexts but not others. An entity recognized as a state by another state may, for example, enter into trade relations with that state, but if the entity is not also recognized as a state at the United Nations it does not have the same audience or potential allies to call upon as other members of the U.N. may have. These advantages and disadvantages, in addition to many others that may present themselves, may variously weigh on state leaders in their deliberations about granting or withholding political recognition.

Ultimately, state recognition is but one potential outcome of a complex interaction between the leaders and citizens of states, would-be states, and the international system. A diverse set of state interests, including advantages and disadvantages of recognition, may shape decisions about whether or not recognition is to be granted, how, when, and in what form. Some states have a disproportionate amount of power and influence and their leaders may to some degree serve as gatekeepers to international society, but the power of state leaders to act unilaterally may be checked to some extent by international law as well as competing interests and larger international norms. And when the decision to extend recognition is made, the timing as well as the different forms and types of recognition options available to political leaders helps to ensure the interests of states and international society are served to some degree at every step along the way.

As can be seen from the discussion above, there are a nearly infinite number of ways in which entities seeking recognition attempt to “navigate” their way to recognized statehood. As will be shown in subsequent chapters that examine the experiences of three entities seeking recognition, the “waters” of attaining recognition are often choppy, fraught with obstacles to be
overcome. Some entities are opposed and attacked along their route, some are helped, and the course is often unclear because there is no single map or path to their desired final destination.

1.5 METHODS

Fortunately, a method exists that enables the researcher to examine commonalities and differences between cases of political recognition and non-recognition so as to reveal a larger patterning to their production. Comparative-historical analysis, as that described by Skocpol (1979), Skocpol and Somers (1980), and Jeffrey M. Paige (1975) can be used to identify the historical paths and variables involved by which opportunities for recognition as well as missed opportunities for recognition may be produced, as well as to identify the commonalities and differences between these opportunities and missed opportunities. In this way, both opportunities for recognition as well as missed opportunities for recognition, should they occur, are dependent variables in the study. In addition to helping indicate the presence or absence of opportunities for recognition or missed opportunities for recognition, political recognition outcomes, referring to when a state government recognizes or does not recognize an entity as a state, is an additional dependent variable in the study as it indicates the outcomes of efforts by leaders of entities seeking recognition as states.

As outlined in the discussion above, and in discussion that will be further elaborated upon in Chapter 2, there are a multitude of independent variables that can interact in complex and sometimes competing ways so as to produce recognition outcomes. These include, but are not limited to, timing, the interests of leaders of state governments and entities seeking recognition, the opening and closure of political opportunities, external patronage, resources, identity
relations, Great Power politics, political power vacuums, economic influence, and more. All of these variables are understood to be in a state of constant flux and may push and pull on all involved in different directions and in different ways. Because it is impossible within the confines of a single study to examine every variable that may be at work, it is necessary to limit the study to a select few variables so as to explore their interaction and how they help to create recognition outcomes. Therefore, in this study I focus primarily on those independent variables that are most encompassing of the varied factors outlined above and which the literature and theory outlined in this study suggest are the most important in producing recognition outcomes, namely political opportunities, alignment of interests, timing, and external patronage. Within the Opportunity Structure for Recognition framework as will be further outlined in Chapter 2, this is to say that political opportunities, alignment of interests, and external patronage help to create and explain political recognition outcomes (including opportunities for recognition as well as missed opportunities for recognition, both of which are understood to be types of recognition outcomes) for entities seeking political recognition as states. How these variables might interact to produce recognition outcomes is outlined in this chapter as well as in Chapter 2, and is a topic explored further in the study.

Comparative-historical analysis has been used in other studies to trace the historical paths by which political practices and policies have been carried out as well as to identify historical preconditions giving rise to nation-states (e.g., Jansen 2009; Wimmer and Feinstein 2010; Hudson and Coukos 2005; etc.). Comparative-historical analysis enables researchers to examine and demonstrate how theoretical arguments might apply across multiple empirical cases in order to support or contradict a given theory, to highlight the generality of processes with which a theory is concerned, and to make causal inferences about macro-level structures and processes.
Comparative-historical analysis works by attempting to establish valid associations of possible causes with the phenomenon that the researcher seeks to explain (Skocpol 1979). Towards this end, Mill’s “Method of Agreement” is used, whereby the analyst attempts to establish that several cases with the phenomenon to be explained also have in common one or more hypothesized causal factors (Skocpol and Somers 1980). Mill’s “Method of Difference,” further enables the researcher to contrast positive cases in which hypothesized factors are present with negative cases in which the hypothesized factors or outcomes are absent (Skocpol and Somers 1980).

This is the approach used in this study to answer the following research questions:

1. Why have Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine achieved the varying levels of political recognition that they have?
2. How and why did opportunities to politically recognize Tibet (1913), Taiwan (1971), and Palestine (1948, 1988, and 2012) as states emerge when they did?
3. Is there any validity to claims that there have been “missed opportunities” for Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine to have been politically recognized as states?

In this study, I treat Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine as similar cases in which entities have sought political recognition as independent states. I will compare positive instances in which opportunities for recognition were produced by each of my cases so as to reveal any larger patterning behind their production. In a similar fashion, I will make use of external comparisons with select positive and negative cases in order to validate my argument. Thus, for example, I will compare the Tibetan declaration of independence in 1913 with the Palestinian declarations
of independence in 1948 and 1988 so as to reveal commonalities behind their production as opportunities for recognition. My explanation about why these opportunities arose how and when they did will then be validated by means of external comparisons with positive and negative cases to demonstrate that the explanation holds true across other cases. Selected slices of the historical trajectories of each of these entities will be used to strengthen arguments behind the production of opportunities for recognition as well as missed opportunities for recognition, should they indeed occur.

To answer the research questions above, I will draw systematic contrasts between individual cases with the aid of sensitizing questions such as:

1.) How might governments attempt to create “missed opportunities” for those seeking recognition as states?  
2.) How do political decisions interplay with the structural arrangements of recognition (O.S.R.) to effect “missed opportunities”?  
3.) Is there a patterning to the production of opportunities for recognition or for missed opportunities for recognition?

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29 These governments may oppose recognition and in this sense can be thought of as opponents of those entities seeking recognition. Additionally, the phrasing of the “creation of missed opportunities” is meant to align with the language used when various politicians and commentators suggest that opportunities were missed. Such “misses,” if they indeed occur, can be thought of as the product or end result of opposition, and therefore it makes some sense to discuss their “production” as something that can be politically engineered, which is suggested by the language surrounding “missed opportunities.” In lay terms, one may also speak about these opportunities as being “sabotaged” when they are the result of deliberate strategy by those opposing the recognition of entities seeking recognition.
4.) If missed opportunities for recognition do not occur, why might people claim they exist?

5.) Why do opportunities for recognition emerge when they do?

Addressing these questions and others that may emerge during the course of the study will be a central task of the study.

As suggested by one reviewer of the study, missed opportunities for recognition can be thought of in some respects as similar to “dark matter” in physics in the sense that, like dark matter, missed opportunities for recognition cannot be directly observed but can only be discerned because there is some observable phenomenon that suggests their presence. It is for this reason that the comparative-historical method used in the study incorporates a means for identifying and evaluating missed opportunities.

This method is briefly outlined here and in greater detail in Chapter 4, entitled “Dispelling the Legend of Missed Opportunities.” In a nutshell, missed opportunities for recognition, should they indeed occur, must follow in time after the presence of an opportunity for recognition. This means that the identification of missed opportunities requires that opportunities for recognition first be identified. These opportunities are exemplified by the opportunities for recognition presented when entities like Tibet or Palestine declared independence. Once such an opportunity for recognition has been identified, it will then be examined, using the systematic typology of missed opportunities presented in Chapter 4, to determine if there were any beyond reasonable faults made by political leaders attempting to gain recognition of their entity’s statehood. Such political or diplomatic errors that result in an entity

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30 Bamyeh, Mohammed. 2015. Email with the author. May 27.
not gaining recognized statehood after an opportunity for recognition was at hand would then be identified as missed opportunities for recognition.

Alternative methods to the comparative-historical approach could, of course, be suggested. Selected rich cases studies, for example, can be used to more fully analyze and explain the historical patterns, causes, and outcomes of political practices and decisions regarding particular recognition and missed opportunity for recognition outcomes. Case studies\(^{31}\), however, would not allow for the analysis of the entity types necessary for this study to examine whether missed opportunities for recognition do occur and how they might be structured across a diverse sample of cases than could be examined with case study analysis given the time constraints on this study. It must be stressed, therefore, that this study will, out of necessity, lack the richness and depth that one would expect to find in a project making use of case study methods. This is a necessary trade-off, however, given the larger purpose of the study as well as the time and space constraints in which the study was conducted.

*Level of Analysis* Much in the same way that it is necessary to limit the range of variables and cases, the *level of analysis* used in this study is also limited, otherwise the net cast would yield far too much data than could be usefully examined within the time and space constraints of a single study such as this. Political recognition outcomes, for example, are understood in this study as the cumulative and emergent result of factors operating both above and below the state or national level. Intra-national level support and opposition can come from

\(^{31}\)The use of comparative history in this study therefore does not and cannot achieve the same depth and comprehensiveness as may be more nearly approximated with case study methods. Readers interested in finer nuances in the histories, processes, ground level exchanges between politicians involved, etc., are encouraged to consult texts listed in the references section of the study. All such exchanges, processes, etc., are understood in this study as taking place within the confines of the O.S.R. described.
myriad sources, all acting in complex and ever evolving ways, pushing and pulling on state leaders to extend or withhold political recognition. For example, members of the U.S. Congress, influential business leaders, social movement leaders, and many more can, both individually and collectively, attempt with varying degrees of success to influence the U.S. president to support or oppose recognition of an entity as a state. These complex and evolving dynamics hold true within all states. An introductory study such as this, however, cannot possibly hope to analyze so diverse a set of actors across all levels because the dynamics they entail are far too complex to survey in a single study. Such a project as developing a comprehensive theory and framework can only emerge after many years of research and cumulative work of numerous scholars.\(^\text{32}\)

Therefore, because the explicit purpose of this study is to offer the beginning steps towards a more comprehensive theoretical project, this study’s level of analysis has been limited to select international level dynamics, as appropriate, as have been most important in shaping the recognition outcomes of the cases used in the study, such as the actions and interactions of presidents, prime ministers, etc., where appropriate (with the understanding that, out of necessity, the examination of intra-national level dynamics must be left to future researchers).

*Units of Analysis* This study makes use of several units of analysis to draw historical comparisons between cases. The first of these is the entities seeking recognition as well as their historical trajectories. *Entities seeking recognition* are nations or peoples that seek or have sought political recognition as independent states, such as Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine. *Historical trajectories* are the social, political, and structural or organizational paths such entities have

\(^{32}\) Indeed, any study such as this which offers a new theoretical framework is likely to raise many more questions than it can hope to answer. This is a necessary tradeoff in building new theories and models and is, in fact, a strength of the study as it helps to chart a path ahead for future research.
taken over time, such as Tibet variously changing over time from an empire to a state and finally into an autonomous region in China. Comparing and contrasting selected slices of these trajectories is used to explain the production of opportunities for recognition and to examine whether or not there have been missed opportunities for recognition.

*Opportunities for recognition* (ORs) as well as *missed opportunities for recognition* (MORs), should they indeed occur, are additional units of analysis, to be compared and contrasted to reveal and explain similarities and differences underpinning their production. *Recognition outcomes*, referring to the relative success or failure of the leaders of an entity or state to gain political recognition, are also compared and contrasted in an effort to explain opportunities for recognition. *Claims* about missed opportunities are also examined to evaluate whether they did indeed occur at various times in which they have been argued to have occurred.

As correctly pointed out by one reviewer33, states and entities seeking recognition do not themselves “act.” Rather, some person or group, such as elected political leaders, elites, leaders of social movements, etc. act on behalf of states and entities seeking recognition. It is not just the case that the units of analysis of interest to this study may change over time, but those acting on behalf of states and entities seeking recognition may also change over time, such as when political leaders are replaced or when an entity or state changes form (such as from an empire to a state to an autonomous region). Those acting on behalf of states and entities seeking recognition may occupy different and potentially conflicting roles (such as the Dalai Lama serving as both the spiritual and political leader of Tibet, a social movement leader being elected president, etc.).

*Data Sources*  Suitable data for the study were readily available in many forms. The main data sources were national and international newspapers, historical and political accounts, the

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33Bamyeh, Mohammed. 2015. Email with the author. June 10.
websites of national governments and international political organizations (e.g., The White House, www.whitehouse.gov; The United Nations, www.un.org; The Arab League, www.arableagueonline.org/; etc.), and other archival sources (e.g., televised news reports, federal and state laws, treaties, press statements, etc.), which provided a wealth of information regarding the statements and actions taken by political leaders groups to obtain recognition (e.g., whether or not recognition was granted, reasons why recognition was extended or denied, factors at play in decisions to grant or withhold recognition, etc.). These data sources also included details about the laws, policies, practices, and decisions of governmental bodies and representatives to extend or deny political recognition to a given people or nation. Data sources also included materials available through organizations such as Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO, http://www.unpo.org/), an international organization comprised of indigenous peoples, minorities, and un-recognized or occupied territories who are not represented at major international fora, such as the United Nations (UNPO 2011), as well as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR, http://www.cfr.org), a nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher that promotes understanding of foreign relations and examines the potential consequences of statehood (CFR 2011).

Cumulatively, these data sources provide details regarding decisions and the factors weighing in the decisions to variously grant or deny recognition, such as whether or not a government has established recognition criteria (e.g., a body of formal law and legal procedures to gain or petition for recognition), what those criteria might be (e.g., who is the perceived legitimate governing authority of a nation, a defined and recorded roll of citizens, etc.), and how a government, representative body, or official seeking recognition of its nation meets or fails to meet those criteria, whether the recognizing body or its representatives sees incentive in granting
or denying recognition, whether timing is a factor in extending recognition (e.g., more advantage to those granting recognition earlier rather than later), the roles of various recognizing bodies or governmental representatives in lobbying for or against the recognition of a given nation, etc. Thus, not only was there a wealth of data available to the study, but it was precisely the type of data needed to accomplish the study’s goals.

1.6 WHY TIBET, TAIWAN, AND PALESTINE?

In the preceding discussion, I have outlined the theory and practice of political recognition as well as a method of analyzing how opportunities for recognition and missed opportunities for recognition may be part of a larger opportunity structure of recognition. The study is directed specifically at determining whether or not missed opportunities for recognition occur and to explain how they might be produced. As state governments are the entities of interest that politically recognize or “do the recognizing” of other entities as states, the data appropriate to this study is delimited to the modern and historical policies and practices of national governments and the means peoples and nations use to gain such recognition and to influence and respond to recognition decisions and outcomes.

The study does not aim to provide an in-depth history or account of every opportunity or missed opportunity for recognition outcome or historical path to be examined, which would be impossible within the limits of a single study. While this study will therefore lack the richness of detail that could otherwise be offered by case study methods, this is a necessary trade-off in service of the larger purpose of the study to examine whether missed opportunities for recognition occur and how they might be produced over time. Comparative-historical analysis is
useful here in charting the larger “skeleton” of how opportunities for recognition and missed opportunities for recognition are produced, while case study and other methods would be more useful in follow-up studies to “flesh-out” the work to be started here. Historical comparative analysis is therefore better situated to enable the study to explore whether or not missed opportunities for recognition do occur, to identify the generality of the processes and mechanisms by which they might be produced, and to make causal inferences about different missed opportunity outcomes across a broader sample of cases than would be possible with alternative methods of analysis. In the chapters to come, I treat Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine as cases sharing in common that each has availed itself of the opportunity structure for recognition and as useful exemplars of the existence of the opportunity structure for recognition. It therefore makes sense to explain why these cases have been selected.

Purposive sampling as will be used in the present study is a useful means of ensuring inclusion of entities that are beyond the nation-state form as well as rare or liminal cases in which recognition is partial or contested that may otherwise be missed by other sampling methods like random sampling. A focus on such liminal cases as Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine will help improve the accuracy of the study results by generating results that speak not only to ongoing political struggles of entities seeking recognition, but also that explain and predict MOR outcomes across a broad array of cases ranging from the common to the marginal and contested. Purposive sampling therefore helps to increase the explanatory power of the study in ways that random sampling may not.

As state governments are the entities of interest that “do the recognizing” of other entities as states, the data appropriate to this study is delimited to the policies and practices of state governments and the means peoples and governments use to gain such recognition and to
influence recognition decisions and outcomes. As it is, of course, impossible to compare the recognition policies and practices of all the world’s governments in a single study, it makes sense to limit the field and purposely sample a select few governments that variously support or oppose the recognition of the entities included in this study.

Following this logic, this study analyzes a selection of three entities, namely Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine. While each of these cases has its own unique internal composition, history, and particular circumstances, cumulatively they share in common that they are currently or have recently been engaged in the process of obtaining or having been denied political recognition. Each has availed itself of the opportunity structure for recognition and has met with varying results, illustrated by the chart below showing how the recognition of each entity as a state has shifted over the past century. As these varying results may be indicative of each entity having experienced missed opportunities for recognition, this makes each worthwhile for inclusion in this study.

Figure 4. Number of Governments Recognizing Entities Over Time
As it is impossible within a single study such as this to survey the recognition policies and practices of all the world’s governments, there must necessarily be some delimitation regarding the governments and their leaders, or “who does the recognizing” of the entities of interest to the study. Towards this end, purposive sampling of governments that variously oppose or support the recognition of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine is an appropriate means of capturing many of the factors at play in generating missed opportunities for recognition for each. For this reason, the study will include the following governments or “who does the recognizing,” briefly outlined as follows:

![U.N. Applications and Membership Growth, 1946-2011](image)

**Figure 5.** U.N. Applications and Membership Growth, 1946-2011

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35 The reader may note that, as part of the purposive sampling, several of the governments “doing the recognizing” are “Western” governments like the United States and Britain. This is in part due to the greater availability of historical documents from these nations, the inclusion of which will greatly benefit the completion of the study, as well as the major role these the governments of these nations have played in the recognition of the nations of interest to the study. It should also be noted that other non-western nations have also been included, such as China, Russia,
The U.S., China, and the Recognition of Taiwan: It is well known that the government of China (also known as the People’s Republic of China, or P.R.C.) views Taiwan (also known as the Republic of China, or R.O.C.) as within its sovereign power, meaning that the Chinese government does not recognize Tibet or Taiwan as independent nations. The U.S. government once recognized the Republic of China (R.O.C.), but on January 1, 1979, the United States changed its diplomatic recognition from Taipei (i.e., recognizing Taiwan’s independent nationhood) to Beijing (i.e., withdrawing its recognition), “recognizing the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China” (US Dept of State 2011b). The larger factors at play behind this switch make the U.S. stance on Taiwan of interest to the study.

The UK, China, and the Recognition of Tibet: It is well known that China’s government (also known as the People’s Republic of China, or P.R.C.) does not recognize an independent nation of Tibet. As noted by Jayshree Bajoria of the Council on Foreign Relations, “[t]ensions between China and Tibet have persisted since People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. China says Tibet has been a part of China for many centuries now, a claim refuted by many Tibetans. Chinese authorities use this claim to support their sovereignty over the territory while proponents of the Tibetan independence point to periods in Tibetan history when it enjoyed self-rule… Experts believe the dispute over Tibet will persist as long as China refuses to speak to the Dalai Lama, who has been in exile in neighboring India since 1959” (Bajoria 2008). Prior to 2008, Britain recognized an independent Tibet, but after more than a century of such recognition,
switched its position to recognize it as part of China (Barnett 2008). These dynamics make the recognition of Britain and China useful to understanding the recognition of Tibet.

*The United States, Israel, and the Recognition of Palestine:* Palestine maintains observer status at the United Nations, but recognition of Palestine is opposed by Israel’s government with support of what is perhaps its greatest ally, the U.S. (BBC 2011b; Barghouthi 2011). Opposition to the recognition of Palestine by the U.S., is not, however, absolute, and can be said to be somewhat supportive. President Obama, for example, visited Palestine and spoke with Palestinian people during his 2013 trip to Israel, but also pushed for a freeze on Israeli “settlements” and noted during his trip that the Israeli occupation of Palestine was unjust, inappropriate for peace, and that Palestinians deserved a state of their own (Cohen, King, and Yelling 2013; BBC2013). Including Israel and the United States allows the study to capture dynamics surrounding opposition to and some mixed support of Palestinian recognition.

As should be clear from the discussion above, this study does not seek to examine recognition of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine by the United Nations or the world at large. An in-depth examination of all the world’s governments and their decisions to recognize or not recognize Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine is simply impossible to accomplish within the confines of a single study. Out of necessity, this study therefore confines its exploration of recognition outcomes regarding which governments “do the recognizing” to those outlined above, namely China and the United States in relation to Taiwan, China and the United Kingdom in relation to Tibet, and Israel and the United States in relation to Palestine. As will be apparent to the reader, the state governments that “do the recognizing” in this study are therefore limited to a selection of Great Powers (China, the U.S., and the U.K.) and governments acting as parent states (China in terms of Tibet and Taiwan, Israel in terms of Palestine) for the cases in question. An
understanding of how non-parent states and non-Great Powers affect recognition outcomes is beyond the purview of this study and is out of necessity left to future research. Despite this inherent limitation of the study, this enables the study results to speak to dynamics involved in Great Power and parent state relations with entities seeking recognition, which, as outlined in the literature above, prove to be the most important determinants of recognition outcomes for entities seeking political recognition.

In this fashion, *opportunities for recognition, missed opportunities for recognition,* and *recognition outcomes* are all dependent variables to be explained by the current study. In particular, each will be examined within the confines of the triads listed above, namely Tibet relative to the United Kingdom and China, Taiwan relative to China and the United States, and Palestine relative to the U.S. and Israel.

As one reviewer of the study pointed out, the selection of these cases can be considered problematic as they appear to select on the dependent variable because each of the chosen cases appear to have met with the same outcome in that none were recognized by the state governments in question. That is, it may be argued, Tibet was never explicitly recognized by China or the United Kingdom, Taiwan was never recognized by China or the United States, and Palestine was never recognized by Israel or the United States. Choosing on the dependent variable refers to limiting a set of observations to cases in which the object of interest was observed and excluding from observation those cases in which the phenomenon was not observed. This can be problematic because it suggests that any causal inferences drawn from such observations will necessarily be biased because the observations did not include any cases that might invalidate the conclusions drawn from the selected cases (Dion 1998; Kahan 2013).

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36 Morgenstern, Scott. 2015. Email with the author.
This, of course, is a valid criticism of the case selection used in the study, which, as a matter of necessity, relies on a very small number of cases. However, as pointed out by scholars like Douglas Dion (1998), comparative studies often rely on selecting on the dependent variable and this remains an important method for gaining information when and where there is relatively little information. As there is very little known about the production of opportunities for recognition, and even less about claims of missed opportunities for recognition, this method is viewed as unavoidably imperfect but nonetheless suitable and appropriate to the goal of the present study. Furthermore, and as is well-known, choosing on the dependent variable is acceptable if the researcher is evaluating necessary conditions (Dion 1998), as done in this study through its examination of factors necessary to produce recognition of the entities in question as states.

The concern for any potential bias that might result from focusing on a small number of positive cases has been accounted for in the study design by the inclusion of external comparisons which are used to validate the observations and arguments made in this study. The use of external comparisons to cases with outcomes that differed from those selected in this study provides a reliable means to check arguments made in the study so as to validate the arguments offered here. In this fashion, biases can be controlled for and addressed and the results can be reliably validated. While the study therefore takes into account the concerns raised by selecting on the dependent variable, it becomes advisable for future research to use similarly draw upon external cases for validation. It is advisable for future researchers, operating with greater resources than are available to this study, to draw upon a greater number of cases, both positive and negative, to build upon the work begun here.
Another concern about the cases selected is the question that might arise as to why two cases, Tibet and Taiwan, may appear to be tied to China. This selection of cases may raise the concern, for example, that having two cases connected to one state, like China, might also bias the results of the study. A similar question can be raised about the United States relative to both Taiwan and Palestine. As a study whose explicit purpose is the generation and validation of theory and a conceptual model with which to understand the production of opportunities for recognition as well as missed opportunities for recognition, should they in fact occur, such concerns are misplaced. As an exploratory study, some imperfections must be allowed for. Moreover, the selection of these cases is not only a source of strength for the study, as discussed above, but also because, in having two cases connected to one, the study is able to examine whether there might be any differences in outcomes between these two cases. Thus, for example, the study interrogates not only how and why opportunities for recognition emerged for Tibet and Taiwan relative to China, but also how and why the outcomes for these two cases might have been similar or different despite being connected to a single state government. This gives the study ground for developing additional depth and scope that might not otherwise be possible were the cases selected all independent of each other.

Furthermore, because some states have disproportionate power and influence relative to other states (as is the case with China, the U.S., and Britain, all of which are Great Powers and have permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council), the overlap of a small number of very powerful group of states, like Great Powers, can be expected to play a role in the recognition or non-recognition of any number of entities seeking recognized statehood. This means that it is not at all uncommon for states such as these (i.e., Great Powers) to play a significant role in the recognition of multiple entities seeking recognition. Thus, their influence with and being
connected to more than one case, such as those included in the study, is not at all unusual and, in many ways, is to be expected.

Additionally, as with the concerns that may be raised by selecting on the dependent variable, the use of external comparisons used in the study provide a means to check and validate conclusions drawn in the study. In this fashion, and despite any imperfections that they may pose, the cases selected for inclusion in the study ultimately provide sources of strength for the study, giving it scope and depth that might not otherwise be possible while still accounting for the potential for bias that might creep in were the study to use alternative methods of sampling and analysis.

In the perspective offered here, political recognition outcomes are understood to be influenced in varying degrees by a multiplicity of actors ranging from the leaders of states and multinational organizations like the United Nations to social movements, organizations, and even individual citizens within state borders. Because it is impossible within the confines of a single study to examine comprehensively the myriad movements of all what may be many thousands of individual and collective actors as they push and pull state leaders in different and sometimes competing directions so as to affect the constantly evolving recognition outcomes that they may desire over time, it is necessary to further delimit not only the states and state like entities to be examined, as discussed above, but to also limit the field of actors within states examined. For this reason, the study focuses on national and international political leaders as appropriate, such as presidents and prime ministers. It bears repeating that this study’s purpose is to provide a *first step* in the larger project of a comprehensive exploration into, theorizing, and explanation of political recognition outcomes. Additional studies are needed to flesh these dynamics out further.
(such as to examine the roles and influence of intra-state politicians, like senators and members of congress, etc.) than can be started here.
2.0 CHAPTER TWO
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES AND THE STRUCTURE OF RECOGNITION

As discussed in the previous chapter, the usual explanations for the political recognition of states and would-be states emphasizes recognition outcomes as emerging out of a complex interaction of factors ranging from interests and norms to the ever-evolving and dialectical interaction between the leaders and citizens of states, would-be states, the international system. These explanations prove indispensable for theorizing and understanding the empirical realities of political recognition in that they help to identify and explain the broader patterning of the political recognition of states. Despite their utility, however, they lack a means to synthesize the disparate theories and factors into a single over-arching framework.

The opportunity structure of recognition offers a conceptual corrective to this oversight. In this chapter I develop the “opportunity structure of recognition” and “missed opportunities for recognition” concepts as a means to build on and extend existing explanations of the political recognition of states. In doing so, I show how a consideration of missed opportunities for recognition provides fertile ground for building new theory that helps to explain previously unexamined dynamics involved in the recognition of states and would-be states. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study being a comparative-historical analysis necessarily means that it will lack the richness and depth that one might expect to find in a project making use of case
study methodology. This is a necessary trade-off given the purpose of the study and the time and space constraints available. Given the time and space constraints on the study, illustrative examples (e.g., by means of external comparisons) and support for the accuracy of this study’s thesis are presented primarily in the comparative analyses of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine, as well as the external comparisons with Mongolia and Xinjiang, in Chapter 3. The primary purpose of this chapter is not to validate the study’s thesis, but rather to present the theory and background necessary to make sense of the comparative analyses and conclusions that follow. Validation by means of comparative analyses of my cases and external comparisons is saved for Chapter 3.

2.1 THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE OF RECOGNITION

A number of authors have conceptualized a “structure of recognition,” referring variously to syllogism and the structuration of recognition surrounding identity politics, personal disclosure, respect, inter-personal dynamics, law, rights, the politics of being, and U.S. recognition of Native nations (Macleure 2003: 3-21; Markell 2003: 105-119; Barker 2003: 36; Williams 1997:140; Jackson 1987:134; McNay 2008: 17, 22, 113-142; Redding 1996: 122, 148, 156; Tully 2001: 21-22). Though hinted at but unexplored by Tully, this “structure of recognition” can be expanded from the individual and group levels to describe what I call an “opportunity structure of recognition” (O.S.R.) that operates at the individual, group, national, and international levels.

37 Syllogism is defined (Merriam-Webster 2015) as “a formal argument in logic that is formed by two statements and a conclusion which must be true if the two statements are true. A deductive scheme of formal logic consisting of a major and a minor premise and a conclusion. Deductive reasoning.” An example of syllogism might read: “All ripe bananas are yellow; Jane has a ripe banana; therefore her banana is yellow.”
My conceptualization of the O.S.R. borrows from the social movements literature and what has been termed the “political opportunity structure” (POS), and to a more limited extent Go’s (2008: 213) conceptualization of the “opportunity structure for formal imperialism,” which draws on a similar literature. In the POS perspective, political opportunities are relatively stable and institutional and include the nature of political cleavages, institutional structures, alliance structures, and prevailing strategies for social movements (Meyer 2004). In this view, the actions of state governments and leaders are viewed as having the ability to encourage or discourage challengers from making claims, and political opportunity structures within the state reflect the availability and accessibility of powerful and influential allies, volatility in political alignments, and the openness of a state apparatus to new actors (McCarthy and Zald 2002; Tilly 2006; Tarrow 2006).

In this perspective, state challengers tend to be excluded from any significant participation in institutional politics because of overwhelming opposition from extant power holders within political opportunity structures. Changes in political opportunities, however, may signal the prospect for change, leading to changes in how actors recognize and react to costs related to goal-oriented collective behavior. When political opportunity structures open to new actors, change and action may be incentivized, challengers may become hopeful, and perceptions of hope may then encourage collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; McCarthy and Zald 2002; Almeida and Sterns 1998).

Taking up the latter, Go (2008: 213) similarly borrows from the social movements literature in conceiving the “opportunity structure for formal imperialism” (OSFI) as necessitating the need to understand how historical differences in field configuration impacted the strategies of states as they struggled to obtain capital. Go illustrates how historical
differences impacted imperial forms (i.e., formal versus informal). As Go illustrates, the leaders of sovereign states typically seized unrecognized territories in a “costly zero-sum game resolved only through purchase or war between sovereigns” (2008: 213). State leaders also drew upon pre-existing territories and networks held by recognized states to realize their economic and political goals (Go 2008: 213).

As Meyer (2004) notes, the context in which a movement emerges is of great importance because state challengers do not choose their goals, strategies, or tactics in a vacuum. Instead, political context tends to shape and set the grievances around which activists mobilize, creating an advantage or opportunity for some while imposing limits and constraints for others. Collective action may be driven by a combination of political opportunity and threat. Threat denotes the negative or converse side of opportunity associated with declining protest, namely the probability that benefits already obtained will be taken away or new harms will be accrued if a challenging group fails to act in concert (Almeida 2003). As a form of threat, repression can have both positive and negative effects, such as when repression results in human rights abuses but then prompts collective action and brings about progressive social change (Barnes and Connolly 1999).

In my conceptualization of the O.S.R., political recognition may be understood as both a negotiated, contested, and achieved event (e.g., as when it is formally bestowed onto a nation and its government) and process, and recognition is not necessarily and end in itself, but may be a means to something else, such as resources, rights, and economic and political equality (Young 1997: 156). Here collective actors (e.g., political leaders, movement leaders, social movements, etc.) seeking recognition for their states or would-be states are seen as agents who are not necessarily dependent on those from whom they may seek recognition. Instead, actors act within
typically dialectical and always evolving fields, in which the actors themselves may affect those from whom they may seek recognition, and vice versa.

The O.S.R. also does not assume any fixity in the form(s) actors might take, nor does it assume any commonalities or differences amongst or between recognized and unrecognized actors. Sensing the opportunity or potential for political recognition may encourage groups to continue fighting for or pursuing state recognition (Coggins 2011), but my conceptualization of the O.S.R. does not assume that opportunities are the only thing that matters when it comes to recognition, or that opportunities can be exploited only when recognizable (e.g., those actors who might seek recognition, such as movement or political leaders, do not need to be able to identify opportunities that might be available to them, actors might benefit from opportunities of which they might be unaware, and opportunities may variously emerge or dissipate with or without actor input and/or recognition or awareness).

Additionally, an actor’s form, practices, and other characteristics that may or may not be recognized at one point in time are not necessarily the same as those that an actor might take or which might help an actor be recognized or recognizable at another point in time. Thus, even though two or more actors may be recognized as being similar and they may also be called similar (e.g., by being given the same moniker, such as “state” or “nation-state”), actors may, in reality, be quite different and have very different histories, characteristics, goals, and trajectories—all of which are empirical matters (though they may be shaped by an actor seeking, gaining, refusing, or being denied recognition)
Furthermore, the leaders of entities seeking recognition may play various roles in their own recognition outcomes as well as the recognition outcomes of other actors. This includes, for example, not only the decision to seek or to accept recognition, neither of which is necessarily a given, but also interrogates how they may make their entities more “recognizable” as states in various ways (e.g., by changing themselves in whatever manner deemed appropriate—such as by changing their practices, etc.—to better conform to recognition standards and norms; by bargaining for recognition; by mobilizing other actors so as to support or compel recognition from those from whom they seek recognition, etc.), and actors may mobilize against the recognition of other actors (e.g., when federally recognized tribes seek to oppose the federal recognition of other tribes, etc.).
As a form of political opportunity structure, the O.S.R.\textsuperscript{38} thus takes into account that the goals and actions of governments and their nations and states may encourage or discourage actors (i.e., leaders of states and would-be states) from seeking recognition. The attainment or denial of recognition is not assumed to be a necessarily positive outcome; recognition instead is understood as having the potential to act as a double-edged sword, generating positive and negative outcomes, and many of these outcomes may be unforeseeable and unintended. My conceptualization of the O.S.R. also calls into consideration the relative stability of political alignments and the openness of nations and the international community to recognize nations. As with the POS perspective, changes in political opportunities may variously signal the openness or closure of the larger opportunity structure for recognition, and like the OSFI, this structure and the goals of actors operating within these fields may encourage or lead state governments and the

\textsuperscript{38} A simplified representation of the O.S.R. is provided above. In this simplified symbolic representation of the O.S.R., the leadership of an entity seeking recognition as a state can have multiple interests, represented by the ovals at the far left, pushing them in different directions to seek recognition as a state from one or more governments, symbolically represented by the ovals labeled Government 1, government 2, and Government 3. State governments may, of course, help or hinder them in their cause to join the society of states. The society of states is represented by the box, at right, which has a gradient reflecting the varying degrees of recognition (i.e., the number of governments recognizing a state as a state) that individual members of the society of states may hold. The gradient is intended only to symbolize that recognition can vary in the number of governments recognizing a state as an independent state, not that all members lay at the same point or at equal distances along the continuum that is possible. The gradient also is intended to reflect that membership is the society of states is not a matter of either/or, but a matter of varying degrees, with state governments helping or hindering entities in their causes, based largely on their interests and the structure of alliances, as described elsewhere in the study. In this simplified representation, arrows are unidirectional, but often, in reality, push and pull in many directions, sometimes forward, sometimes back, simultaneously.
international community to deny recognition or to opt for different forms, types, levels, and
degrees of recognition (e.g., formal versus informal recognition of nations, different levels and
types of recognition given to recognition-seeking nations, etc.).

Of course, opportunity structures for recognition, like political opportunity structures, are
conceptual constructs. They are not “things” that physically exist in nature or which can be
visibly observed. One cannot step outside and touch an opportunity structure of recognition. But,
because the presence of an O.S.R. has a discernible social and political reality, observable, for
example, in the actions and patterning of behaviors of leaders and governments of states and
would-be states, they can be said to be objective phenomena (Brockett 1991). Furthermore, the
O.S.R. may be conceptualized in both the singular and plural forms. That is, there may be a
single opportunity structure for recognition, or multiple opportunity structures for recognition,
depending on the size or scope of the net cast. At a global level, for example, there may be a
single opportunity structure for recognition if the net cast is broad enough to encompass all of the
states and would-be states in existence at any given time. Opportunity structures of recognition
can also be observed as operating at the intra-state, regional, or world-systems levels. The O.S.R.
is thus conceptually elastic enough to be applied at different levels, but it is also concrete enough
for empirical study as it denotes particular and distinctly observable phenomena.

While the O.S.R. incorporates and extends the concept of the “political opportunity
structure” to the realm of political recognition, its main utility and function is to provide a
convenient and overarching framework by which to synthesize the theory and practice of
recognizing states and would-be states. In this way, recognition or non-recognition are more than
the outcome of the complex interactions between states, would-be states, the international
system, and the sometimes-competing, sometimes-aligning interests and goals of each. The
dynamics of political recognition remain the same as those outlined in the previous chapter, but with the O.S.R. concept, recognition and non-recognition outcomes have an observable, explainable, and probabilistically predictable structure, here described as an “opportunity structure of recognition.”

Opportunities are not conceived as concrete or as being always or necessarily identifiable to states or would-be states. There are, instead, varying degrees of opportunities, which can sometimes be difficult to identify. Opportunities can take different forms, they may have varying degrees of permanence or impermanence, and they may sometimes push or pull in different directions, sometimes favoring and sometimes opposing those seeking recognition. As will be shown in later chapters, not all opportunities are necessarily equal. Some may have greater weight, influence, or importance than others. Furthermore, opportunities may be cumulative or even multiplicative. But, as a general rule, this perspective suggests that when there are a greater number of favorable interests, political alignments, etc., there can be said to be greater opportunity for a would-be state to gain recognition, and such a would-be state is then viewed as much more likely to gain recognition. Conversely, when opportunities are not present or are fewer in number, there can be said to be lesser opportunity for recognition. And when opportunities are mixed, recognition may be more likely to take alternative forms from the de jure standard, such as partial or de facto recognition.

The United Nations As a conceptual framework, the quest for recognition can take political leaders into many arenas, including the United Nations, which can serve as a venue or organizational structure in which larger contests over political recognition play out. As such, in the O.S.R. framework the U.N. is viewed as providing a significant venue or mechanism through which recognition from state members of the U.N. may be gained or denied. State and entity
leaders, for example, can and often do use the floor of the U.N. General Assembly to lobby for their respective causes. Great Powers like the U.S. can also wield considerable influence over recognition outcomes in the United Nations by employing veto power in the Security Council so as to block entities seeking recognition through admission to the United Nations. As such, and though the recognition that may occur through the U.N. is not a direct object of study in this project (and must, therefore, leave further examination to the future work of other studies), this study considers, when and where appropriate, the actions of entity leaders, as well as their support and opposition from recognized state leaders and their representatives, as the case may be, in the United Nations.

To give a brief outline, the United Nations is an international organization that was founded in 1945 which provides a forum for state leaders to engage in political dialog, interactions, and negotiations. In this way, the U.N. serves as a mechanism for governmental leaders to interact and potentially solve national and international problems together. Membership in the United Nations is limited to states, though, through practice, the organization also has permanent observers (e.g., The Holy See) and, since 2012, one non-member observer state (Palestine). The U.N. has a “General Assembly” currently comprised of 193 state members, a venue in which all members can have their voices heard, and which requires a two-thirds vote of all current members for important matters like admission to the U.N. The U.N. “Security Council,” comprised of fifteen members (5 permanent and 10 non-permanent) serves as the leadership of the U.N. and may impose sanctions, authorize the use of force, or even draw upon a special “veto” power held only by members of the Security Council to block votes and actions by the General Assembly, such as to prevent admission of an entity as a state member in the U.N. as may be voted upon by the General Assembly (United Nations 2015u, 2015v).
While admission to the U.N. may be taken by some as a form of recognition, it should be clear, strictly speaking, that the United Nations, as an organization, does not itself create or recognize states. Instead, the U.N. admits members based on votes by the General Assembly and the recommendation of the Security Council. The issue of recognition of entities as states is a matter in the jurisdiction of states and their leaders. Also, states do not need to be a member of the U.N. to enter into or ratify treaties under public international law (Al-Zoughbi 2015). In this fashion, political recognition of an entity as a state may be expressed in the halls of the General Assembly, such as by a vote to admit an entity into the U.N., but recognition remains fundamentally an act and choice exercised by state leaders, not the United Nations. Thus, there is no recognition by the United Nations 39, only by state leaders.

### 2.2 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR RECOGNITION

The conceptual utility of the O.S.R. lies not only in its ability to synthesize the theory and practice of recognition, as briefly outlined above, but also in its ability to be used to generate new theory and to reveal what appear to be previously unexplored and un-theorized dynamics in the political recognition of states.

One promising avenue of theorizing, which is the focus of the present study, is in how the O.S.R. framework opens up the possibility of “missed opportunities for recognition.” Where

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39 The complex structure and constantly evolving internal dynamics of the United Nations are well beyond the purview of this study to explore in depth. Readers interested in learning more about these dynamics may like to review any of the numerous sources that unpack these complexities at greater length, such as the U.N. website (http://www.un.org), Stanley Meisler’s *United Nations: A History* (2011), or Weiss et. Al’s *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (2013).
opportunities\textsuperscript{40} for recognition indicate positive factors and other openings in the O.S.R. that favor the political recognition of a would-be state, a “missed opportunity for recognition” may at first be difficult to operationalize. This is because many of the factors that may lend themselves to the recognition of would-be states can also be present in varying degrees or in different forms at times when the would-be state has not yet attained de jure recognition, so it can be argued that there is always some degree of opportunity for recognition. Thus, it is not enough to simply talk about opportunities for recognition, as some degree of opportunity may exist even when recognition is very unlikely or meaningless. Therefore, “missed opportunities for recognition” must therefore be conceptualized more narrowly to be made more useful and empirically identifiable. Thus, I define “missed opportunities for recognition” as referring to instances in which there were multiple factors favoring the recognition of an entity as a state during a given time period, indicating a larger than normal opening in the O.S.R. at that time, but where recognition was either not granted or sought due to errors made by an entity’s political leaders.

Because the literature is silent on the topic of missed opportunities for recognition, how such missed opportunities might come about, if they indeed are produced, can only be theorized. Evidence as to their existence can be suggested by the production of an opportunity for recognition, which a potential missed opportunity might then follow, an alignment of multiple factors favoring an entity’s recognition, or by discourse about a group having missed an opportunity to gain recognition. So, for example, the favorable alignment of an entity having gained de facto recognition from one or more governments, having the cultural, financial, political, or military support of a patron state (denoted, for example, by the entity receiving

\textsuperscript{40} An “opportunity” is defined as a favorable juncture or confluence of factors, circumstances, or conditions, indicating a good or better than normal chance for advancement or progress.
humanitarian aid, receiving weapons sales to defend the entity from encroachment, etc.), having the support of one or more Great Powers, having previously been recognized as an independent state, having declared independence, etc., can all be said to indicate that an entity may have an opportunity to be recognized as a state. For such an entity to not be recognized despite the alignment of multiple factors, then, would be termed a missed opportunity for recognition.

Of course, discussion of missed opportunities must also address questions about with whom or from whom such opportunities are claimed to have been missed. This is because missed opportunities for recognition, like opportunities for recognition, are not always or necessarily universal. An opportunity for an entity to be recognized by the government of one state is not necessarily an equal opportunity for recognition from another. Hypothetically, opportunities and missed opportunities can be produced by or between an entity and anywhere from one to all state governments that exist at a given time. Thus, having recognition from some state governments but not others may reflect a missed opportunity, or multiple missed opportunities, if there is a larger than normal convergence of factors between an entity and the state or states in question.

This conceptualization of missed opportunities for recognition also allows for empirical evaluation of public discourse surrounding opportunities for recognition. Some Israelis, for example, may talk about an entity like Palestine as having missed an opportunity for gaining international recognition, a case perhaps most famously made by Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, but such claims remain dubious without some means to evaluate them. Studying missed opportunities for recognition therefore provides a means to evaluate these claims, to see if there genuinely were missed opportunities, as claimed, or whether such claims were inaccurate (and potentially politically motivated).
If missed opportunities for recognition do indeed occur, how then might they come about? As some state governments have a vested interest in opposing the recognition of an entity, state government interests may then also include producing missed opportunities for recognition as a means to preserve the status quo, to preclude an entity’s secession, and to potentially advance an entity’s territorial reintegration. As evidenced by the 1982 Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (citing desire for respect of Chinese “territorial integrity” when it comes to Taiwan), and by the Chinese government’s numerous aggressive tactics over the years to prevent Taiwan’s separation from the mainland⁴¹, the government of China, for example, views the secession of Taiwan as a threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this context, China would have a strong state interest in keeping Taiwan from seceding and gaining recognition as an independent state by any means necessary—including, where it is advantageous, to cover up or close potential openings in the O.S.R. that might otherwise signal to Taiwanese statesmen that it could gain international recognition. Such dynamics, if they do indeed occur, would suggest that missed opportunities for recognition do not emerge randomly, only to be identified after the fact, but may instead be deliberately manufactured and produced.

If missed opportunities are not simply random occurrences, then there may be a larger patterning or structuration to their production. It may, in fact, be possible to identify structural conditions in the O.S.R. that are conducive to the production of missed opportunities for recognition. This would be an important advancement to understanding the practice of

⁴¹ This, of course, is only one example illustrating one of China’s interests in preventing Taiwanese secession. For additional discussions revealing China’s concerns for territorial integrity concerning Taiwan, see, for example, Chan (2009) and Chai (1999).
recognition because identifying structural conditions conducive to producing missed
opportunities would enable the leaders of would-be states to better predict when their strategies
and attempts to gain recognition would stand the greatest chance for success or failure, saving
them valuable time and resources needed to advance their causes.

Existing norms, institutions, resources, and political alignments would all help to provide
a means by which to produce these missed opportunities for recognition. Norms surrounding
rights to self-determination, for example, can be utilized by the leaders of Great Powers and by
would-be recognized entities themselves to frame an entity as having the right to be recognized.
This can help to create a favorable image of the entity, aiding in its question for recognition.
International law, as an institution, can be of help too, such as when an entity draws upon legal
precedents established by the Montevideo Convention to further its case for recognition. Great
Power alignments and patron state resources can also provide much needed support and signal a
favorable opening in the O.S.R. to an entity’s recognition. These and other factors can thus align
in different ways, but if any one or more of them are strong enough and aligned against an
entity’s recognition, or if they can be turned against an entity (e.g., by a government with vested
interests), missed opportunities for recognition become much more likely to emerge.

The leaders of would-be states, however, are not powerless bystanders. They, just like
leaders of recognized states, have an interest in furthering their causes and therefore can be
expected to also have an interest in identifying and proactively responding to missed
opportunities for recognition. They might, for example, respond by attempting to surmount the
missed opportunities for recognition by creating new opportunities. They might also choose to
wait, to regroup, and try again once the O.S.R. is more structurally conducive to their
recognition.
By structuring recognition and by drawing on a relatively stable (though still evolving, in the long-term) constellation of rules, norms, and institutions, the O.S.R. makes certain political actions more tenable to state governments at certain times and in certain contexts. Thus, while governments may choose to violate certain norms or conventions by acting unilaterally, the socializing and structuring effect of the O.S.R. tends to channel governments on the broad scale towards certain actions and inactions. By extension, the O.S.R. is also likely to channel how, when, where, and why missed opportunities for recognition are or can be produced. Missed opportunities for recognition therefore do not occur randomly or in a vacuum, but, due to the structuring and socializing effect of the O.S.R., are likely to exhibit some commonalities despite empirical differences among cases. That is to say that there is likely to be a pattern as to how missed opportunities for recognition are produced and the form that they take. Revealing what this pattern might be and what these commonalities might look like is one of the goals of this study.

2.3 IDENTIFYING THE “STRUCTURE” OF THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE OF RECOGNITION

An important question in determining the utility of the O.S.R. thesis lies in its ability to enable researchers to identify patterns or “structuration” that one would expect to see if the O.S.R. framework holds merit. That is to say, if the O.S.R. framework presents an accurate picture of the world of political recognition, what would one expect to see when it comes to the political recognition of states and would be states? Because the nature of politics, along with the actors themselves engaging in politics, is constantly changing, a simple, single, and comprehensive
answer to this question is impossible. That said, however, some preliminary steps towards an answer can be given, with the understanding that what constitutes a state, an entity seeking recognition as a state, any criteria involved, etc., may be subject to change and interpretations that vary over time. Outlined below are some preliminary markers that scholars can use to identify the O.S.R. in the real world, presented with the hopes that future scholars will build upon the work begun in this study.

Social and political structures, like the O.S.R., are evident from the existence of patterned relationships. Actors, like state leaders and the leaders of entities seeking recognition as states, for example, do not act in a vacuum, chaotically, wherever their whims might take them. Instead, they are shaped by the circumstances, norms, habits, resources, existing sources of support, political alignments, etc., as they exist at the time. These norms, etc., furnish the basic underlying structure of political recognition. To use a house as a symbolic metaphor, they provide the walls, roof, doors, and windows. Some actors may try to enter the house (e.g., entities seeking recognition), while others may try to keep them out (e.g., state leaders who oppose them). In and around the house, actors can do any number of things. They can, for example, lobby for recognition, move to keep others out, come and go, etc. But, fundamentally, the actors’ choices and actions take place within the house. This house is the underlying structure that probabilistically shapes all actions and actors, and their choices (such as with whom to align, whether to grant or withhold recognition, etc.), within it. This house\(^{42}\) is the “opportunity structure for recognition.”

\(^{42}\) To reiterate for the sake of clarity, the structure is not wholly or completely deterministic, but rather pushes and pulls on actors within it in complex and ever evolving ways. Also, much like a house, the O.S.R. is itself not frozen in time but is also subject to change over time. The numerous implications of the theoretical framework offered here cannot, due to time and space constraints, be adequately explored or unpacked in a single study such as this. As
If the O.S.R. thesis holds true, then one would expect to find such patterns underling political recognition as described above. To reiterate these patterns, one would expect to find political recognition of states and would be states to operate along the lines of the political opportunity structure. Stability and instability of political alignments, for example, would be expected to be important in shaping political recognition outcomes. The availability of supporters and allies would also be expected to play an important part in recognition. If, however, the O.S.R. thesis is not true, then one would expect to find the opposite, namely political chaos, a lack of observable patterns not conforming to the patterns of the POS and O.S.R. described here.

It is possible to name some of these patterns more concretely, to operationalize them so that they are more readily identifiable. If there is a structuration to recognition, for example, one would expect to find certain norms of behavior surrounding who or what is recognized, or is recognizable, as a state. Such norms would also be expected to tend (though not necessarily determine) to shape decisions about whether to grant or withhold recognition. And, as it so happens, there are such prevailing norms. The Montevideo Convention criteria, for example, provide state leaders with a widely endorsed set of criteria by which to judge entities seeking recognition as states. These criteria provide evidence of what is expected and judged to be normal and expected in evaluating what is or is not a state. While state leaders may judge the criteria differently to suit their interests, and even though the criteria are by no means completely objective or legally binding, the criteria nonetheless help to give shape, a pattern, to what is judged to be a state or not a state.

such, they are necessarily left to future studies to unpack and explore further. As mentioned earlier, this study seeks only to begin this larger theoretical project.
Additional evidence as to a patterning of political recognition can be found in the observable stratification between entities seeking recognition and states already holding recognition. Entities seeking recognition, for example, do not have the same access or influence in the United Nations as do already existing and recognized members of the U.N. Palestine, for example, as a non-member observer state, is unable to vote in the General Assembly, making it quite unlike the United States and Israel, both of which are full members. This means that the leaders of Palestine are denied access and representation in the U.N. that is otherwise afforded to members of the General Assembly.

More patterning of recognition can be observed in how recognition is granted or denied. Already recognized states, for example, occupy positions of considerable power and influence, far in excess beyond entities seeking recognition, in that they are the ones who may choose to grant or deny recognition to those seeking it. This puts the leaders and representatives of recognized states in the enviable position of being able to extract concessions from those seeking recognition—a choice, shaped and influenced by their position in the O.S.R., that they may exercise when, where, and to the extent possible that they choose. It also enables recognized states to have considerable influence over which entities are recognized or denied recognition, as well as which are admitted or denied admission into international organizations like the U.N. The United States, for example, has used its privileged veto power in the U.N. Security Council to block the admission of Palestine. Furthermore, it demonstrates the patterning or structuration of recognition in that entities seeking recognition are seeking to change the existing status quo (e.g., by gaining recognition and admission to the U.N.) while states that are already members and recognized may, at their choosing, help them along the way (e.g., by voting in their favor) or by moving to block them (e.g., voting against them in the General Assembly).
Further evidence of structuration or patterning supported by the O.S.R. thesis is the normative practice that typically privileges parent state interests over and above those of entities seeking independence and recognition as states. As mentioned above, parent states, as a matter of common international practice, exert effective control and sovereignty over territories within their borders. As such, political leaders typically (though of course not always, depending on their estimate of the risk and benefits involved) do not, as a matter of common practice, go against the wishes of parent state leaders by recognizing entities seeking independence. This shows that their choices and actions are shaped by the O.S.R. because to do otherwise, to make choices that fly in the face of expectations and established convention, would risk meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, an act which may draw the rancor and reprisal of leaders from a parent state so offended. This pattern helps to explain why, for example, the leaders of the United States did not simply recognize the R.O.C. after the P.R.C. took over China’s seat in the United Nations. To do so would have meant violating customary international practice as well as potentially undermining the U.S. alliance with the P.R.C.

Another pattern, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, is that opportunities for recognition typically follow a pattern with respect to the conditions tending to give rise to their production as well as to the timing of their production. Opportunities for recognition, for example, tend to come about during times of state weakness or when existing state structures collapse completely. This is demonstrated, for example, by the Dalai Lama declaring Tibet’s independence, following the collapse of the Qing empire, in 1913. Other opportunities for recognition can be said to have come about when the U.S.S.R. collapsed because from the breakup of the Soviet Union, like the fall of the Ottoman empire, came the emergence, and recognition, of numerous new states.
These are just a handful of the ways that we know that there are observable patterns to the institution and practice of political recognition. These patterns will be explored further over the course of the study.
CHAPTER THREE
PRODUCING RECOGNITION OPPORTUNITIES
IN TIBET, TAIWAN, AND PALESTINE

This chapter seeks to briefly explain the production of opportunities for recognition across my three cases. In this chapter I examine how and why opportunities for recognition emerged when they did, briefly examining each of my three cases in turn. As mentioned in the methodology section earlier, this study does not make use of case study methodology and I stress that the exploration into dynamics involved in the production of missed opportunities is necessarily brief as an exhaustive and more in-depth analysis is not possible within the confines of this study. More in-depth accounts and analyses can be found in the more detailed sources from which this study draws. Also, as the reader will recall from the methods outlined in Chapter 1, I focus on discrete comparative clusters around each case explored, so that, for example, Tibet is examined in relation only to the United Kingdom and China (and not also the U.S.), Taiwan is examined in relation to China and the U.S. (and not also the U.K.), and Palestine is examined in relation to the U.S. and Israel (and not also the U.K. or China).

Following my examination of the production of opportunities for recognizing Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine, I then turn to explore whether or not there is a larger pattern to the

43 Note: A exhaustive or comprehensive exploration of how each opportunity for recognition emerged is beyond the purview of this study. Such work is best done in one or more case studies building upon the work outlined here.
production of opportunities for recognition. Towards this end, I draw upon the “Method of Agreement” and the “Method of Difference” to compare and contrast my cases. As discussed in Chapter 3, Mill’s “Method of Agreement” entails the analyst attempting to establish that two or more cases have a common causal factor that results in some case to be explained (Skocpol and Somers 1980), such as the recognition of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine. The use of comparative methods also enables the study to draw upon Mill’s “Method of Difference,” whereby the researcher contrasts positive cases in which hypothesized factors are present with negative cases in which the hypothesized factors or outcomes are absent (Skocpol and Somers 1980). Negative cases are provided in this study by comparing the cases to each other as the study will attempt to account for why peoples or governments met with mixed results for political recognition.

Lastly, I draw upon external comparisons to validate my conclusions. Mongolia is a useful and appropriate case for external comparison because it is a member of the United Nations and, like the cases used in the study, has gone through a period in which it was not recognized as a state only to later gain recognition. This means that it, like other recognized states, gained recognition after the production of an opportunity for recognition. The state of Mongolia is also useful because of its relationship with both Tibet and Taiwan, having itself once been part of the state of China. The Xinjiang autonomous region of China provides another useful external comparison for similar reasons. Like Tibet, it, too, is classified as an autonomous province of China. Unlike Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine, however, Xinjiang did not achieve any political recognition from members of the international community when it declared independence in 1933 and again in 1944. The states that emerged in Xinjiang during these time periods therefore serve as negative cases by which to validate my argument. They also help to demonstrate that political recognition is not best conceptualized as an “either/or” dichotomy, but rather along
gradations or a continuum, with cases like Xinjiang at one of the continuum, the United States at
the other, and entities like Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine at various points in between.

3.1 OPPORTUNITY FOR TIBET

When the Dalai Lama declared independence from China in 1913, he created an opportunity, a
structural opening, for the Lamaist state to be politically recognized on the world stage. The
seeds of this opportunity for recognition, however, predate the 1904 British invasion of Tibet,
and trace back to the ninth century, when China first set its eyes on annexing Tibet (Sloane
2002).

At that time, the Tibetan empire entered into a treaty with the Tang dynasty, the Sino-
Tibetan treaty of 821/823. In order to facilitate peace and political alliance, the treaty provided
that

“Both Tibet and China shall keep the country and frontiers of which they are now in
possession. The whole region to the east of that being the country of Great Tibet, from
either side of that frontier there shall be no warfare, no hostile invasions, and no seizure
of territory… According to the close and friendly relationship between Nephew and
Uncle the customary courtesy and respect shall be practised. Between the two countries
no smoke or dust shall appear.” (Sino-Tibetan Treaty 821/823, full text in Tibet Justice
Center 2013 and in Richardson 1978)
This treaty language as agreed upon by representatives of China and Tibet established borders between China and Tibet. The treaty also helped to establish what would be known as the chö-yön relationship between Tibet and China. In the chö-yön (priest-patron, or nephew-uncle) relationship, the priest, Tibet’s political and spiritual leaders, agreed to help provide for spiritual guidance of the patron, China, in exchange for protection. In this relationship, which helped give a normative and structural form to relations between Tibet and China, both treaty signatories retained their independence, forging what was viewed as a military and peaceable alliance between them (Tibet Justice Center 2013; van Walt van Praag 1987).

This mutual political recognition between the Tibetan and Chinese empires helped lay the basis for claims about future relations between Tibet and China. The 13th Dalai Lama, for example, implicitly cited the treaty and its recognition of the chö-yön relationship between China and Tibet when issuing his Tibetan declaration of independence in 1913. In the declaration, the Dalai Lama said,

“Tibet and China cooperated on the basis of benefactor and priest relationship. A few years ago, the Chinese authorities in Szechuan and Yunnan endeavored to colonize our territory. They brought large numbers of troops into central Tibet on the pretext of policing the trade marts. I, therefore, left Lhasa with my ministers for the Indo-Tibetan border, hoping to clarify to the Manchu emperor by wire that the existing relationship between Tibet and China had been that of patron and priest and had not been based on the subordination of one to the other.” (Tibet Justice Center 2012).
The 14th Dalai Lama has also cited the 821 Sino-Tibetan Treaty in his famous autobiography, *Freedom in Exile* (1990: 42-43) and in his other public discussions about the basis for Tibetan autonomy and independence from China (H.H. Dalai Lama 1990).

With an interest in extending their empire, and later the size of the Chinese state, Chinese leaders have laid claim to Tibet since at least the 13th century. Tibetan nationalists counter, however, that the Chinese empire at that time was Mongol or Manchu, and that Tibet was a protectorate, not part of China, because of the chö-yön relationship that maintained the independence of both despite Tibet being protected by China. In taking control of the foreign relations of Tibet, Chinese officials instituted a “forbidden land” policy that closed Tibetan border, especially to the British and Russians. With an interest in protecting their ways of life, Tibetans were led to believe that this was in their best interest, that Tibetan religion would be put in danger if foreigners were allowed inside (van Walt van Praag 1987; Bajoria 2008; Lixiong and Shakya 2009).

The relationship between China and Tibet supports the O.S.R. thesis. The cho-yön relationship demonstrates one means by which the interactions between China and Tibet was structured around a priest-patron relationship. Tibetan leaders taking on China as a political ally demonstrates the importance of political alliances, which is also suggested by the O.S.R. framework. China’s instituting a “forbidden land” policy was yet another means, this time by their external patron, for China to structure relations between Tibet and the outside world—in this case, to favor consolidation of China’s control and influence over Tibet.

Before the borders of Tibet were closed in the late 1700s, the government of Britain managed to create contact with Tibetan authorities. This was seen as beneficial to British trade relations, especially with regard to the East India Company. While the forbidden land policy was
initiated by the Manchus, it also became an important part of Tibet’s own foreign affairs and defense policy. Many Tibetans came to view the British with suspicion, and, with British efforts successfully bounding the Himalayan states through a series of wars, annexations, and political agreements, feared an invasion from the British was imminent (van Walt van Praag 1987).

Owing in large part to its geographic isolation, as well as the forbidden land policy discussed above, Tibet, in comparison to other countries, was politically isolated. By the late 1800s, however, the United Kingdom sought to open trade relations with Tibet via Tibet’s suzerain, Beijing. Chinese officials did not warm to this idea because they viewed any European involvement in Tibet as giving foreigners a base from which they might attack the Chinese empire (van Walt van Praag 1987). Officials in China, Tibet, and the UK eventually entered into a series of treaties to establish peaceable relations between their respective states, to provide for trade, and to make it clear that the British would not seek to annex Tibet (van Walt van Praag 1987), which, with a strong interest in trade, it saw as providing a possible backdoor entry into a Chinese market that was otherwise closed to Westerners (Anand 2009).

British officials, however, ignored these agreements and went on to invade Tibet in 1903-1904. This invasion brought Tibet to the forefront of security concerns for those in China. In 1910, Chinese officials sent an army into Lhasa in order to make Tibet a Chinese province and to prevent further encroachment from the UK (Bajoria 2008; Lixiong and Shakya 2009; van Walt van Praag 1987). A letter was sent to the Dalai Lama promising that his spiritual authority over Tibet would be retained, but no mention was made regarding his secular powers as head of the Tibetan state. From inside the Potala Palace, the Dalai Lama convened a meeting with his ministers. Having heard that the Chinese troops were under orders to capture the Dalai Lama, he decided to flee Tibet for British India. In India, the Dalai Lama met with British representatives
in an attempt to assuage their fears that he was entering into relations with Russia (which the British leadership opposed in their attempt to gain dominance in the area) while he was deposed and his title was stripped by the leaders of China. The Dalai Lama declared that his government still represented the people of Tibet, even though the Tibetan government was now in exile. The 1910 Chinese invasion signaled a dramatic change in the historic relationship between China and Tibet as the chö-yön relationship was now at an end (Van Schaik 2011; van Walt van Praag 1987).

This change in the relationship between China and Tibet was soon followed by dramatic changes within China that would set the stage for the Dalai Lama to declare Tibetan independence in 1913. In October of 1911, following a string of mutinies, the Xinhai Revolution, led by Sun Yat-sen, led to the Chinese overthrow of the Manchus in China (Van Schaik 2011; Shakabpa 1967). Chinese soldiers in Lhasa quickly mutinied and attacked the local amban (Chinese official). Some soldiers began looting the city of Lhasa and some Tibetans fought them. Upon hearing of what was happening, the Dalai Lama immediately sent one of his ministers to assist with the uprising. A British official, Charles Bell, conveyed warning from the British government that the Dalai Lama should not get involved and should not encourage fighting in Tibet. To this the Dalai Lama replied, “We must fight for the religion and our own freedom.” (Shakabpa 1967: 190).

In early 1912, Chinese troops were defeated and expelled from Tibet. About a month prior to issuing the Tibetan declaration of independence, the government of Tibet entered into a treaty with Mongolia, which was signed at Urga. In the treaty, governments of both Tibet and Mongolia declared themselves to be free from the rule of China and to be separate and independent of China (Shakabpa 1967; van Walt van Praag 1987). Not long after the treaty
was signed between Tibet and Mongolia, the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet after terms of surrender had been agreed upon and the Chinese had left. Three weeks later, in February of 1913 and in keeping with the O.S.R. thesis stressing the importance of opening political alignments and structures to the production of opportunities for recognition, the Dalai Lama issued a proclamation marking the independence of Tibet from China (Van Schaik 2011). In his declaration, the Dalai Lama referenced the historic chö-yön relationship between China and Tibet, noting

“…During the time of Genghis Khan and Altan Khan of the Mongols, the Ming dynasty of the Chinese, and the Ch'ing Dynasty of the Manchus, Tibet and China cooperated on the basis of benefactor and priest relationship. A few years ago, the Chinese authorities in Szechuan and Yunnan endeavored to colonize our territory. They brought large numbers of troops into central Tibet on the pretext of policing the trade marts. I, therefore, left Lhasa with my ministers for the Indo-Tibetan border, hoping to clarify to the Manchu emperor by wire that the existing relationship between Tibet and China had been that of patron and priest and had not been based on the subordination of one to the other. There was no other choice for me but to cross the border, because Chinese troops were following with the intention of taking me alive or dead…

“On my arrival in India, I dispatched several telegrams to the Emperor; but his reply to my demands was delayed by corrupt officials at Peking. Meanwhile, the Manchu empire collapsed. The Tibetans were encouraged to expel the Chinese from central Tibet. I, too, returned safely to my rightful and sacred country, and I am now in the course of driving out the remnants of Chinese troops from DoKham in Eastern Tibet. Now, the
Chinese intention of colonizing Tibet under the patron-priest relationship has faded like a rainbow in the sky…

“Tibet is a country with rich natural resources; but it is not scientifically advanced like other lands. We are a small, religious, and independent nation. To keep up with the rest of the world, we must defend our country. In view of past invasions by foreigners, our people may have to face certain difficulties, which they must disregard. To safeguard and maintain the independence of our country, one and all should voluntarily work hard. Our subject citizens residing near the borders should be alert and keep the government informed by special messenger of any suspicious developments. Our subjects must not create major clashes between two nations because of minor incidents…” (Tibet House US 2015; Shakabpa 1967: 246-248).

As if to underscore their independence, the Dalai Lama soon introduced a new Tibetan paper currency, silver and gold coins, and postage stamps (van Walt van Praag 1987; Shakabpa 1967), themselves symbolic markers drawing on prevailing international norms, as suggested by the O.S.R. thesis, of proper activities for independent states. Following the declaration of independence, Tibet continued to operate as a de facto independent state until the Chinese revolution in 1949-1950 (Lixiong and Shakya 2009; van Walt van Praag 1987; Narangoa 2009; Sloane 2002; Anand 2009).

The Dalia Lama could, hypothetically speaking, have declared independence at any time prior to 1913. What made 1913 particularly appealing to the Dalai Lama were events in China. The Xinhai revolution bringing about an end to the Qing dynasty, collapsing the Chinese state, created a political vacuum in China. The years prior to the Xinhai Revolution, 1905-1911, for
example, witnessed the invasion of Tibet by both the British and the Chinese coupled with the exile of the Dalai Lama from Tibet. This time period in which the Dalai Lama’s power and authority in Tibet were weakened were not an auspicious time to declare independence because such a declaration would have meant very little without the Dalai Lama having effective control over Tibet. That situation changed, however, with the Xinhai Revolution, which created a vacuum of power in the hold of China over Tibet (U.S. Department of State 2015; Wilson 2008; Schell 2003) that enabled the Tibetan troops to expel Chinese soldiers and return control of Tibet to the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama recognized this, and seized the opportunity to declare that Tibet was, and always had been, an independent state. In this way, and in keeping with the O.S.R. thesis, the weakening of Chinese control coupled with Tibetan interests in freedom in their own lands coincided to create a political opportunity that was favorable to the Dalai Lama declaring Tibetan independence.

Of course, the Tibetan declaration of independence did not result in recognition from the leadership of the R.O.C. and its president Yuan Shikai. As one might expect, this outcome did not result from any lengthy series of steps or great debate between Yuan Shikai and the R.O.C. government. Nor need it have. As described in the O.S.R. thesis, opportunities for recognition are not always or necessarily uniform, and Tibet entering into a treaty of mutual recognition with Mongolia, as it did just a month prior to the Tibetan declaration of independence being issued, does not necessarily mean that Yuan Shikai and the R.O.C. administration would necessarily have followed suit. This is because even though the Dalai Lama issued a declaration of independence, this declaration did not change the interests or position of Yuan Shikai and the R.O.C. leadership, which still and fundamentally were pushing for the integration of Tibet into the R.O.C. as part of the Chinese empire. Without this change of interests or political alignments
with a strong interest in, and ability to successfully pressure, Yuan Shikai into recognizing Tibetan independence, non-recognition of Tibet by Shikai and the R.O.C., as suggested by the O.S.R. thesis, was, for all intents and purposes, a foregone conclusion. Debates and lobbying to secure this outcome from Shikai and the R.O.C. were not necessary because their strong position opposing any move towards Tibetan independence, including but not limited to politically recognizing Tibet, were already long since established by the time of the Tibetan declaration of independence. Instead of politically recognizing Tibet, the Chinese government, under Shikai’s leadership, acknowledged (without accepting, validating, or endorsing) the Dalai Lama’s declaration of independence while expressing the “disapproval” of the R.O.C. and refusing to recognize Tibet (van Walt Van Praag 1987; Upadhya 2012). This position only reiterated Shikai’s statement the previous year, despite the declaration of independence and Chinese forces being expelled, that Tibet was still a part of China. Shikai said,

“No now that the Five Races [Chinese, Manchus, Mongolians, Tibetans, and Muslims] are joined in democratic union, the lands comprised within the confines of Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan all become part of the territory of the Republic of China, and the races

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44 Speculation about whether the Dalai Lama would have known this prior to issuing the declaration or having motives beyond gaining recognition are beyond the scope of this study to explore due to time and space constraints. Suffice it to say that because the position of the R.O.C. was already well-known to the Dalai Lama that he most likely would have expected continued opposition from Yuan Shikai and the R.O.C., including their refusal to politically recognize Tibet. Even with this expectation, however, such a declaration may have been one step towards bringing about Chinese political recognition of Tibet in time.

45 It is not evident from the historical records examined for this study that there were any voices of support for Tibetan independence and political recognition from within the ranks of the R.O.C. during this time period.
inhabiting these lands are all equally citizens of the Republic of China” (Tuttle 2005: 63; van Walt Van Praag 1987: 51).

In this way, Shikai and the R.O.C. simply reiterated their established policy by promoting their preferred interpretation of events and refusing to politically recognize Tibet.

The British response to the declaration was more complicated than that of the R.O.C. Fearing a strong presence of Chinese forces around their imperial borders, Sir John Jordan was directed to make formal protests with the Chinese government (van Walt Van Praag 1987). John Jordan subsequently accused the R.O.C. of “arrogat[ing] to [China] a position in Tibet which conflicted with the international obligations it had inherited from the Manchus and with the autonomy which the country had always enjoyed” (van Walt Van Praag 1987: 52). Jordan informed Shikai that the British wanted there to be an autonomous Tibet between the lands of Great Britain and China for they always maintained that Tibet was independent from China. Towards that end, the British had conveyed to Shikai that while they had accepted and recognized the suzerainty of China over Tibet, they were not willing to accept or recognize Chinese rights to interfere in Tibetan internal affairs, including rejecting Shikai’s notion that Tibet was on equal footing with other Chinese provinces (van Walt Van Praag 1987). The British viceroy further wrote that British interests in maintaining Tibet as a buffer between itself and China (van Schaik 2011) “would be best served by opposing inclusion of Tibet in China proper” (van Schaik 2011: 194). The British government further supported Tibetan independence by making it a precondition of their recognition of the R.O.C. (van Walt Van Praag 1987).

As the British and Chinese discussed their respective positions on Tibet, Shikai’s government pressured the Dalai Lama to enter into negotiations. The Dalai Lama responded by
demanding an end to hostilities from China that had arisen in eastern Tibet. After this, the Dalai Lama suggested a meeting on neutral ground, to which he later invited the British. These activities gave rise to a conference between representatives of Tibet, China, and Great Britain at Simla in 1914.

At Simla, the Tibetan delegation reiterated the cho-yon relationship between China and Tibet and maintained that Chinese soldiers and colonists would not be allowed in Tibet in order to maintain peace between Tibet and China. The Chinese delegation, however, claimed to have extended their sovereignty over Tibet in the late 1700s after China had protected Tibet from foreign invasion. Each side then went about making claims and counter-claims, all supporting their respective positions. The British delegation proposed a compromise between Tibet and China that would divide Tibet into an inner and outer zone, with autonomy for outer Tibet and Chinese control over inner Tibet. The Chinese and Tibetan delegations rejected the British proposal. Keeping with their interests, the Tibetans refused to accept Chinese overlordship that would deny them their recently established independence while the Chinese, also holding to their interests, refused to accept a proposal that maintained a position of only nominal Chinese suzerainty that fell short of sovereignty over Tibet (van Walt Van Praag 1987).

After further talks, a note was added to the proposal maintaining that Tibet would form a part of the Chinese territory in exchange for concessions from China that it would be excluded from interfering in Tibetan internal affairs. The cost for Tibet was the establishment of nominal Chinese suzerainty over the area to be designated as Outer Tibet, an agreement understandable in consideration of Chinese military advances and their fear of a total invasion they expected they could not defend against. In this way, the Tibetan delegation hoped to maintain their independence by securing their borders in eastern Tibet and by excluding all Chinese influence.
in Central Tibet. Within a day of these agreements, however, Shikai’s government disavowed the delegation’s actions and refused to accept the convention. The British and Tibetan delegations were not ready to make further concessions and indicated that if the government of China would not agree that Britain and Tibet would do so independently after changing the convention to suit their interests (van Schaik 2011; van Walt Van Praag 1987).

After further negotiations, the Simla conference resulted in a 1914 convention between China, Great Britain, and Tibet. In the convention, signed at Simla, the respective governments maintained that

“…Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognizing also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa” (Council on Foreign Relations 2015).

In the convention, the signatories further agreed to Tibetan boundaries and that China would not seek to convert Tibet into a Chinese province and that Great Britain would not attempt to annex any portion of Tibet. This agreement to Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, which, from the Tibetan perspective was not unlike the long-standing cho-yon relationship Tibet had previously embraced, provided for Chinese protection without interference in Tibetan internal affairs. While the British and Tibetans ultimately ratified the treaty, Shakai did not because he refused to accept the limited role of China in Tibet (van Schaik 2011; Goldstein 1989).
The Simla Convention, agreed to by representatives of Tibet and Britain, left the status of Tibet hopelessly entangled. Tibet was never able to gain recognition from any of the major world powers, including Britain. The British did not go so far as to explicitly recognize Tibet as an independent state, settling in the Simla convention instead on suzerainty under China that maintained Tibetan autonomy with respect to its internal affairs. The question about Tibet’s international status soon faded into the background as world powers shifted their focus with the rise of World War I (Christie 1976; Lixiong and Shakya 2009).

Specifically why the British government did not take the step of explicitly extending political recognition to Tibet during the Simla conference given its interest in an autonomous Tibet as a buffer in the region and as a source of trade may seem curious, even contradictory. British hands, however, were tied with respect to extending Tibet political recognition by a 1907 treaty between Russia and Britain. In the Anglo-Russian treaty, the Russian and British governments agreed not to intervene in the internal affairs of Tibet and not to engage in direct relations with the Dalai Lama and the government of Tibet except through China as a suzerain power (Christie 1976). In this way, and even with the British government having an interest in extending political recognition to Tibet, it could not do so without violating their treaty with Russia. British non-recognition of Tibet was therefore a foregone outcome from the Simla conference unless China, as the suzerain power and Tibet’s effective parent state, first gave consent. This, of course, was the polar opposite of what Shikai and the R.O.C. government wanted. Thus, Tibet remained unrecognized by both the British and Chinese governments because, as foreseen by the OSR thesis, political opportunities and interests were fundamentally aligned against either the British or the Chinese from politically recognizing Tibet.
United States officials recognized first the Republic of China (R.O.C.) on May 2, 1913 (Guoqi 2014; Nimmo 2001). This recognition came following the Xinhai Revolution, which saw the overthrow of the imperial Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 (Bajoria 2008; Sloane 2002; Lixiong and Shakya 2009). This opportunity for recognition followed after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the rise of the R.O.C. as the new sole legitimate government and sovereign representative of the people of China. This recognition of the R.O.C., and the new state of China, can be understood as recognition of facts on the ground which demonstrated that the R.O.C. was the sole legitimate representative of all of the state of China. The U.S. government, in fact, was the first to recognize the R.O.C.; other governments did not begin doing so until October, 1913 (Guoqi 2014; Kan 2014).

In time, U.S. explicit recognition of the R.O.C. subsequently changed, being seemingly switched from the R.O.C. (which it attempted to seat in the U.N. in 1971) to the P.R.C., whose admission to the U.N. the U.S. had previously opposed (Roy 2003; Clough 1993). As will be shown below, efforts to have the R.O.C. seated alongside the P.R.C. in the U.N. demonstrate that the U.S. had a strong interest in creating a new Chinese state, one in which sovereignty and jurisdiction would be reduced from what was once the entirety of China to the island of Taiwan. As U.S. officials fought for dual representation at the U.N. for the P.R.C. and the R.O.C., this indicates that an opportunity was at hand for Taiwan, not only to be recognized by members of
the U.N. General Assembly, but also to be explicitly recognized as a new state\(^{46}\) (with jurisdiction no longer covering the entirety of the Chinese mainland, but rather limited to the island of Taiwan) by its most powerful ally at the time, the United States.

This opportunity for recognition was a long time in the making. Taiwan, an island off the coast of China, fell under Chinese control during the Ching Dynasty and was made a province of China in 1885. Following the defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese officials entered into the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan in 1895, ceding Taiwan to the Japanese. After the Second World War, Japan released Taiwan under terms of the Cairo Declaration of 1943 which required that Taiwan be returned to the Republic of China—the Chinese Nationalist Party, which had overthrown the Ching Dynasty in 1912 (Hsieh 2006; Manthorpe 2005; Chai 1999).

After the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party, the CCP proclaimed the establishment of a new state, represented by the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.), in 1949. At that time, there were two claimants of sovereignty of all of China, the P.R.C. and the R.O.C., both of which maintained themselves to be the sole legitimate government representing China. The P.R.C. effectively drove the R.O.C.\(^{47}\) off the mainland, leaving representatives of the R.O.C. little option but to hole up in Taiwan with the

\(^{46}\) This was not just a matter of the recognition of a government, the R.O.C., but rather also the recognition of a new state, governed by the R.O.C.. The U.S., along with the R.O.C. and their combined allies, was attempting either to create a new and independent state or to recognize one they believed already existed.

\(^{47}\) Note that the terms “People’s Republic of China” (P.R.C.) and “Republic of China” (R.O.C.) initially referred to separate governments within the state of China, not to separate states. Both governments, the R.O.C. and P.R.C., have claimed jurisdiction over the same state, the state of China. It was not until the R.O.C. on Taiwan, with the support of the U.S. and its allies, sought to be seated alongside the P.R.C. at the United Nations that the R.O.C. was making claims to represent a state separate from China, the state of Taiwan.
goal of one day retaking the mainland. The R.O.C. government, headed by Chiang Kai-shek as leader of the Kuomintang, took refuge in Taiwan with the support of the U.S. administration at the time, implicating the U.S. as having a role in the support of the R.O.C. in Taiwan. Over the next two decades, the R.O.C., operating from its new base in Taiwan, represented the “Old China” and enjoyed diplomatic recognition as the government representing the state of China by most state governments. The R.O.C., one of the founding members of the U.N., also held China’s seat at the General Assembly. The P.R.C. was not recognized by most of the world’s states and its entry into the U.N. was blocked for many years by one of its most powerful adversaries, the United States (Roberge and Lee 2009; U.S. Department of State 2011; Rich 2009; Chang and Kok-ui 1996; Hickey 1997).

In June of 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. This invasion was seen by leaders in the U.S. as a threat, part of a potential campaign by the communists to extend their sphere of influence and control. In an effort to end the R.O.C. attacks on the mainland, the U.S. deployed the 7th fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent the P.R.C. and R.O.C. from attacking each other. President Harry Truman’s intention was to prevent the P.R.C. from using the Korean War as a pretext for invading Taiwan. As Truman said in a statement, “In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa [Taiwan] by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States performing their lawful and necessary function in that area” (Manthorpe 2005: 195). The U.S. Seventh Fleet being deployed into the Taiwan Strait was also intended to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from retaking the mainland after he and the R.O.C. had

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48 Though seats may be occupied by different governments, U.N. membership is limited to states. Therefore the P.R.C. occupying China’s seat at the U.N. does not mean that the P.R.C., as a government, was a state, or that the P.R.C. was a member of the U.N., but rather the P.R.C., like other governments, served as the seat-holder and representative for the larger state of China at the U.N.
become holed up in Taiwan, which Truman saw as having the potential to drag the U.S. into a war with China (Manthorpe 2005).

Truman’s efforts present another illustration of the structural conduciveness to opportunities for recognition envisaged by the O.S.R. thesis. Sending in the 7th fleet suggests Truman saw the R.O.C. attacks as having the potential to create an opening in the existing political environment through which the R.O.C. might emerge victorious in retaking the mainland. Truman sending in the 7th fleet presents the U.S. as a critical ally for the P.R.C. in maintaining the status quo and ultimately blocking what might have given way not only to an R.O.C. success in retaking the mainland, but also, as a consequence if the R.O.C. had proven successful, in producing an opportunity for the R.O.C. to be politically recognized in place of the P.R.C.

In time, Taiwan became an important part of U.S. interests in containing communism. To President Eisenhower, trade and diplomatic ties with China made sense. The problem, he said in 1954, was that “so many members of Congress want to crucify anyone who argues in favor of permitting any kind of trade between the free nations and Communist China.” Eisenhower viewed this position as shortsighted because trade with China could reap economic benefits, even incentive for people to rise up against their Communist oppressors and thereby weaken the ties between Soviet Russia and Communist China (Tucker 2005). In 1954, the leadership of the U.S. and the R.O.C. also agreed to a mutual defense treaty, which functioned to safeguard that relations between the U.S. and China would not remain hostile for long (Bush 2005; Manthorpe 2005). Once political leaders in the U.S. determined that an occupation of Taiwan by the Chinese Communists would threaten American interests in the Pacific, the U.S. government began sending civilian and military aid to Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang government
started hoping that they would soon be able to retake mainland China and expel Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese Communists (Manthorpe 2005).

For two decades, the R.O.C. and its allies, chief among them the United States, successfully blocked the P.R.C.’s efforts to take control of the R.O.C.’s seat at the U.N. This demonstrates, in keeping with the O.S.R. thesis, the importance of political allies and how such alliances can be useful to maintaining the structure of the existing status quo in blocking the P.R.C. From 1951 to 1960, the R.O.C. and its U.S. and other allies argued that the P.R.C. failed to meet U.N. charter prerequisites that members must be peace-loving states. Starting in 1950, socialist governments raised challenges in the General Assembly of the U.N. led to questions as to whether the P.R.C. or the R.O.C. should occupy China’s U.N. seat. A low point for China occurred in 1952 when only 12 percent of the U.N. General Assembly supported seating the P.R.C. This was based on the Communist Party of China (CCP) maintained effective control over mainland China and that the people of China followed the rule of the CCP. The P.R.C., furthermore, had been criticized by the U.N. as an aggressor state and was therefore seen as not worthy of membership (Roy 2003).

This situation began to shift noticeably in the 1960s, and this shift further demonstrates, in keeping with the O.S.R. thesis, the importance of shifting political alliances and cleavages. During this time, with decolonization, the world saw an influx of new states, many of which were sympathetic to the P.R.C. (Roy 2003; Bush 2005). As support for the P.R.C. began to

49 Due to time and space constraints, and for present purposes, I do not more fully explore the means by which U.S. efforts worked to block the P.R.C. from U.N. membership. As noted here, these efforts included arguing that the P.R.C. did not meet U.N. membership criteria and the U.S. move to have the issue of P.R.C. admission in place of the R.O.C. classified as an “important question,” effectively blocking the P.R.C. Readers interested in greater detail are encouraged to see other sources that explore these dynamics further, such as Tucker (2005).
climb, signaling a shift in the structure of political alliances (also in keeping with the O.S.R. thesis), U.S. leaders shifted tactics. In 1961, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1668, which declared, with U.S. urging, that any proposed change to the representation of China at the U.N. was an “important question.” This classification meant that any change would need a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly (Hickey 1997; Roy 2003). The administrations of Kennedy and Johnson also urged Chiang Kai-Shek to pursue a pragmatic approach that would enable the P.R.C. to enter into the U.N. on the condition that the R.O.C. would also remain. In a move not unlike the P.R.C.’s later insistence that governmental leaders could only recognize the P.R.C. or R.O.C., not both, Chiang Kai-Shek rejected the “two-China” suggestion (Bush 2005).

In 1970, an Albanian resolution to expel the R.O.C. and to admit the P.R.C. in its place received over half the vote of the U.N. General Assembly for the first time. The P.R.C. leadership took advantage of the increased international support by announcing that it would accept a seat in the General Assembly only with the expulsion of the R.O.C. This move was designed to help sway governments that felt the P.R.C. should be seated in the U.N. but which did not desire to see the R.O.C. expelled (Hickey 1997; Roy 2003).

With alliances changing, U.S. officials pushed to have both the P.R.C. and R.O.C. seated at the U.N. as representatives of two separate states, China and Taiwan. This idea was not without historical precedent. Support for dual representation at the U.N. was an idea that had been favored by Esienhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, who was convinced that the repeated Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s were evidence of Chiang Kai-shek attempting to manipulate the U.S. into a war with China. By the mid-1960s, polling results suggested that there was substantial support for dual representation of China in the United Nations (Tucker 2005). This would have meant a dual representation scenario of what was once one Chinese state not
unlike that previously seen when Germany split into East and West Germany or when Korea split to become North and South Korea. R.O.C. officials opposed this measure, but U.S. leaders countered, saying that it was the only way for the Nationalist government to avoid being ousted. Chiang Kai-shek agreed to the new tactic on the condition that the U.S. would use its considerable influence to ensure that the R.O.C. maintained its seat on the Security Council. Prior to the key vote, however, U.S. officials conceded that it would accept giving the R.O.C.’s seat to the P.R.C. if member states would allow the R.O.C. to stay in the General Assembly (Roy 2003).

As support for the P.R.C. began to shift, so, too, did relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C. A period of Sino-American rapprochement came about in the late 1960s, leading into 1970-1971, resulting largely from the desires of both countries’ political leaders to gain support against their common enemy, the U.S.S.R. This move towards rapprochement was opposed by leaders in Taiwan, but was largely beyond their control. President Nixon desired to improve U.S. relations with the P.R.C., but did not want to alienate or abandon the R.O.C., and therefore signaled continued support of the R.O.C. even as he warmed to the P.R.C. (Roy 2003). This desire to warm to the P.R.C. also explains why Nixon did not unilaterally extend recognition to the R.O.C. because doing so would have meant alienating the P.R.C., which, like the R.O.C., insisted that governments recognize only the P.R.C. or the ROC, not both, and threatened to terminate relations with any government that recognized both. Thus, the U.S. government unilaterally recognizing the R.O.C. would have jeopardized its relationship with the P.R.C. as a source of trade and as a political ally against the U.S.S.R.50 Nixon reassured leaders in Taiwan

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50 Additionally, as mentioned earlier in the study, extending recognition to would-be states against the wishes of the parent state or before the parent state itself grants recognition can be viewed as violating international norms by
that the relationship between the U.S. and the R.O.C. would not be affected (roy 2003; Tucker 2005). He told Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Taiwanese president Chiang Kai-shek, during a visit to the U.S. in early 1970, for example, that “I will never sell you down the river” (Roy 2003: 131). Despite these assurances, the U.S. continued warming to the P.R.C. without consulting the R.O.C. (Roy 2003). Secrecy was needed in order to protect opening relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C. from attack by leaders in the R.O.C. U.S. officials withheld larger varieties of information in order to deprive the leadership of the R.O.C. of awareness that the warming relationship between the U.S. and the P.R.C. was growing and to prevent such knowledge from leading to conflict or sabotage (Tucker 2005).

Warming relations between the U.S. and China, combined with the P.R.C. having control of the mainland, signaled to R.O.C. allies that the P.R.C. had effective control over the Chinese state and that R.O.C. allies no longer needed to oppose entry of the P.R.C. in the U.N. This created a shift in the existing structure of political alliances, in keeping with the O.S.R. thesis, in that it allowed some states to recognize the P.R.C. without damaging their relations with the U.S. (Atkinson 2011). Understandably very angry at U.S. duplicity, the R.O.C. ceased

interfering in a state’s internal affairs, which could potentially upset the balance of power and relations not just between the parent and would-be states, but between the parent and the recognizing state as well. Thus, another reason why the U.S. did not extend recognition may have had to do with the fact that the U.S. was not the parent state and that U.S. leaders did not want to come across to the leadership of the P.R.C. as meddling in their internal affairs. And, even if the U.S. had decided to abandon its interests by unilaterally recognizing the R.O.C., it never would have mattered nearly as much as the position of the P.R.C. because the P.R.C., occupying China’s seat in the U.N., effectively maintains the position of a parent state status over Taiwan and the R.O.C. Thus, the views and actions of the P.R.C. leadership will always matter more than and outweigh the views and actions of other governments, including the U.S., because it is the parent state of the R.O.C. and Taiwan.
coordinating its U.N. strategy with the U.S. and insisted that U.N. member states must choose between the R.O.C. and P.R.C. as they would not tolerate both being seated (Roy 2003).

President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, thus being convinced that the P.R.C. would not tolerate dual representation, decided that they should withhold support for this (Tucker 2005). Nixon remarked to Ambassador McConaughy that the R.O.C. being kept in the U.N. Security Council was “why the whole two China thing is so really rather ridiculous (Tucker 2005: 128). Officials within the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council, however, believed that a majority in favor of dual representation could be managed if the U.N. Security Council awarded a seat to the P.R.C. while leaving a seat for the R.O.C. in the General Assembly. This, they believed, would be better than being held responsible for the ouster of the R.O.C. (Tucker 2005). This loss of face was, however, not the sole reason for keeping the R.O.C. in the UN. President Nixon, despite having withheld some support for seating the R.O.C. at the UN, nonetheless had an interest in keeping the R.O.C. in the General Assembly in order to maintain geopolitical leverage against the Soviet Union. Additionally, some 62 percent of American citizens opposed the removal of the R.O.C. from the U.N. (Tucker 2005). Keeping the R.O.C. in the U.N. therefore was in the interest of most of the American public as well as in the interests of President Nixon in the Cold War. In support of seating the R.O.C. in the U.N. alongside the P.R.C., U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers made a statement in August of 1971 that

“Representation in an international organization need not prejudice the claims or views of either government. Participation of both in the United Nations need not require that result. Rather it would provide governments with increased opportunities for contact and
communication. It would also help promote cooperation on common problems which affect all of the member nations regardless of political differences. The United States accordingly will support action at the General Assembly this fall calling for seating the People’s Republic of China. At the same time, the United States will oppose any action to expel the Republic of China or otherwise deprive it of representation in the United Nations” (Kan 2014: 35)

U.S. lobbying ultimately failed, however, to secure the representation of the P.R.C. and R.O.C. Kissinger discounted the effort as “essentially doomed rearguard action” that was undertaken primarily because it was the “only piece of the action on China under State Department control” (Tucker 2005: 129). The U.S. administration ultimately declared it would not threaten to use its veto power in the Security Council nor would it withhold financial support in order to keep the P.R.C. out of the U.N. (Tucker 2005).

George H.W. Bush and other members of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. in 1971 worked hard through the weeks leading up to the vote before the U.N. on seating the P.R.C. Bush argued that the R.O.C. exerted effective control over 14 million people and that the R.O.C. should not be ejected from the U.N., especially because membership would ultimately have no bearing on the resolution of the R.O.C.-P.R.C. dispute. Bush fought a hard campaign on what he understood to be the orders of President Nixon, though he did so without knowing that he would be undermined by the White House. Just days before the final vote at the U.N., Kissinger altered a speech by Secretary of State William Rogers so as to remove references to U.N. universality and the fact that the population of Taiwan exceeded the population of two-thirds of the member
states of the U.N. (Tucker 2005). This weakened Taiwan’s case for being seated alongside the P.R.C.

In months of political strategizing and maneuvering, Chiang Kai-shek convinced representatives from the U.S. to exert political pressure in an attempt to build a strong and unified position. But with the leadership of the R.O.C. insisting that Taiwan was part of China and was the capital of all of China, it undermined assurance of the R.O.C.’s grasp of reality because the R.O.C. was no longer in effective control of the mainland. Additionally, demands from the R.O.C. that other governments should choose between the P.R.C. and R.O.C., rather than both, convinced some U.N. delegates that there was little sense in trying to keep both in the General Assembly (Tucker 2005). Some U.N. delegates also viewed the expulsion of the R.O.C. from the General Assembly as a means to strike back at the United States and other powers they viewed as imperialist (Hickey 1997), again demonstrating the importance of political alliances and interests in the O.S.R. thesis.

Political efforts to seat both the P.R.C. and R.O.C. thereby failed, resulting in Taiwan walking out of the U.N. on the eve before it was to be ousted, with the P.R.C. being declared as a successor state to the R.O.C. in 1971 (Roy 2003). The opportunity for the R.O.C. to be recognized by governments in the U.N. had passed.

Following its ouster at the U.N., Taiwan’s political position on the world stage continued to fall. More and more governments withdrew recognition from Taiwan in favor of the more economically and politically powerful China. Between 1971 and 1979\(^5\), over forty states

switched recognition to the P.R.C. This included, in perhaps the final death blow, the U.S., which had fought diligently on Taiwan’s behalf, switching recognition as well in 1979 (Rockower 2011). The P.R.C. had proven to be too powerful. It has used its economic lure and political clout to outmaneuver the R.O.C.

While the recognition of the P.R.C. is not a direct object of interest to this study and deserves its own separate study, the events described above, namely the outmaneuvering of the R.O.C. by the P.R.C., combined with warming relations with the U.S. and growing support from new states following de-colonization, helps to explain not only how the P.R.C. was able to gain recognition on the world stage at the expense of the R.O.C., but also how and why it was different than the R.O.C. The P.R.C. had a greater alignment of interests in its favor along with greater political opportunities. This is evidenced by the shifting structure of alliances in the U.N. in favor of recognizing the P.R.C. over and above the R.O.C. and the number of government recognizing the P.R.C. that grew over the 1960s while the number dropped for the R.O.C. This demonstrates that, as a system, the U.N. became more open to the entry of the P.R.C. over time and less open to maintaining the R.O.C. in China’s seat. Ultimately, these factors resulted in greater support and eventual seating of the P.R.C. at the United Nations in place of the R.O.C.--even without having a strong external patron to champion its cause, unlike the R.O.C.
Hypothetically, Taiwanese leaders could, of course, have declared independence in 1971, separating Taiwan from mainland China and becoming a new, separate state—the state of Taiwan. To have done so, however, would have meant abandoning their primary goal of retaking the mainland and reestablishing the R.O.C. as the sole legitimate representative of China. That, in short, was not a strategy they were willing to consider as it would have meant abandoning their goals and self-interests as they existed at the time.

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52 Considering that the P.R.C. was also unwilling to abandon their interests or to consider a Chinese state that excluded Taiwan, meaning that both were effectively using the same tactic and that this tactic, by being used by both, was therefore endorsed as appropriate by both given their interests and abilities at the time, it would be inaccurate to describe this as a mistake or missed opportunity on part of the R.O.C.

53 This is not to say that it was completely impossible for representatives of the R.O.C. to have abandoned their goals, interests, or principles. There may be many scenarios in which this could have occurred, such as if the interests of R.O.C. political leaders shifted so that other interests came to take precedence. Realists, for example, might argue that states cannot afford to be moral and will necessarily pursue their interests by whatever means...
This, however, is not to say that those in Taiwan never had an interest in independent statehood with jurisdiction and sovereignty limited to the island of Taiwan, but rather that those interests had changed dramatically by the time of the R.O.C.’s ouster from the U.N. in 1971. Taiwan, for example, existed as an independent republic for five months just prior to Japanese invasion in 1895. During this time period, on May 21, 1895, representatives of Taiwan declared Taiwan’s formal independence in Taipei54 (Manthorpe 2005: 157-161; Hung 2000: 172). Part of the text of the declaration of independence said that “The leaders of the People of Taiwan, in council, have decided to constitute Taiwan, a republic state, and all administration, henceforth, will be in the hands of officials elected by the People of Taiwan.” (Manthorpe 2005: 161; The China Post 2015; Hung 2000: 172). Taiwan’s governor, T’ang Ching-sung, who was inaugurated as the president of the Republic of Taiwan, communicated messages to China that the new necessary, even when they violate established principles (Ahrendorf 1997). They might further argue that states are guided primarily by self-interest, above and beyond principles, but that such principles help set the shape of political action even though they are filtered through circumstances as they exist at any given time and place (Behr and Heath 2009; Ahrendorf 1997). One could further say that interests, goals, and principles might be held in a hierarchy in which some take precedence over others, with there being a mix and trade-offs when it comes to various objectives (Gilpin 1981). In fact, following the R.O.C.’s ouster from the U.N. in 1971 and the international position of the R.O.C. had deteriorated, the R.O.C. took on a new policy of pragmatism in international relations and subsequently renounced its claims to representation of mainland China. This action enabled the R.O.C. to establish diplomatic relations that maintain relations with the P.R.C. and further allowed Taiwan to upgrade political relations with a range of governments informally (Han 1995; Hickey 1997; Feng and Gong 1994).

54 It is not known how many state governments may or may not have recognized the Republic of Taiwan during this brief period. As it happened prior to 1900, it is beyond the purview of this study.
Taiwanese republic would be a vassal state, suzerain to China\textsuperscript{55} (Manthorpe 2005; Hung 2000), but the Republic of Taiwan came to an end when it fell into the hands of the Japanese when they invaded in October, 1895 (Hung 2000).

Thus, U.S. interests in independent statehood for Taiwan, and in seating the R.O.C. in the U.N. alongside the P.R.C., was not purely a foreign interest of the U.S. imposing itself in the internal affairs of Taiwan. Instead, U.S. interests were in alignment with already existing and historical stands of interests and precedents that had already been present in Taiwan. Those interests in independence had simply changed by 1960s and 1970s because the R.O.C. had been in a position of power as the sole recognized government and legal representative of all of China. The U.S. urging the R.O.C. to seek being seated alongside the P.R.C. therefore not only advanced U.S. interests, but also helped to reawaken and bolster a strand of interests that had already been present among the Taiwanese themselves. This suggests that U.S. officials were not trying to create a new state where one did not exist, but rather that they were attempting to support a state believed to have already existed in 1971 (a state of Taiwan, with effective control recognized to be held by the R.O.C.), or to reawaken a state that had previously existed in years prior (the Republic of Taiwan, which had declared its independence and existed as an independent state in 1895).

U.S. efforts in support of seating the R.O.C. in the U.N. General Assembly indicate two forms of opportunity for political recognition relevant to the present discussion. The first is the political opportunity the United States helped bring further\textsuperscript{56} into being by its efforts to have the

\textsuperscript{55} This suzerainty appears similar to that of the relationship between Tibet and China in that Taiwan and China would also retain their independence, regardless of Taiwan being suzerain and a vassal of China.

\textsuperscript{56} This was not, strictly speaking, an opportunity engineered entirely by the US. Taiwan’s prior independence and existing interests in independence from the mainland, no matter how low those interests may have been in relation to
R.O.C. seated alongside the P.R.C. in the U.N. The second is the implicit recognition of Taiwan as a new and independent state, separate from China and the P.R.C., contained within American efforts on Taiwan’s behalf in 1971.

The first of these is easiest to explain. The U.S. fighting to have the R.O.C. seated in the U.N. alongside the P.R.C., while simultaneously opposing entry of the P.R.C.\textsuperscript{57} in the U.N., as described above, helped to create a political opening at the U.N. in which other states with similar interests could band together in support of Taiwan and the R.O.C. (Roy 2003). Had U.S. leaders and their allies been successful, the R.O.C. could have been recognized by other states and have been admitted to the General Assembly. This shows that efforts of a powerful state can garner support, and can ultimately lead to an opportunity for recognition of other states and their governments. The political rise of China, however, changed the tide, and the R.O.C. was subsequently ousted from the United Nations in 1971 (Hickey 1997; Roy 2003).

But what created the initial opportunity for the Taiwan to be recognized as a new and independent state by the U.S. in 1971, even if such recognition was only implicit? Did U.S.

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\textsuperscript{57} It is interesting to note that the P.R.C. may not have originally had an interest in joining the United Nations. In a comment on Chinese representation before the General Assembly in 1967, the P.R.C. declared, "Speaking frankly, the Chinese people are not at all interested in sitting in the United Nations, a body manipulated by the United States, a place for playing power politics, a stock exchange for the United States and the Soviet Union to strike political bargains, and an organ to serve the U.S. policies of aggression and war." (Kim 1974: 301-302).
officials recognize Taiwan and the R.O.C. in 1971? And why did U.S. representatives fight for the R.O.C. to be seated in the U.N. in 1971 rather than some other year?

In the years immediately leading up to 1971, the U.S. was warming to the P.R.C. (as described above) as a new source of trade and as an ally in the Cold War against communist Russia. To maximize their gains, U.S. officials wanted to keep their alliance with the R.O.C. while also creating new ties by which to benefit from the rising P.R.C. What happened at the U.N. was that they decided against a new state, the R.O.C., and decided instead at the U.N. to maintain a unified China, albeit one in which the government had been replaced by the communists. Recognition of the state of China did not change. There still was a state of China. All that changed was who held China’s seat, in terms of governmental representation, at the U.N. U.S. efforts in support of the R.O.C., going so far as to attempt to create a new state, a separate China in the R.O.C., along with U.S. efforts for so long to keep the P.R.C. out of the China seat at the U.N., is why Chinese officials remain suspicious of the U.S. and why they continue making the annual statements about there being one China—because the U.S., and others, had wanted to see two Chinas. Not just two governments, but two separate states, both economically and politically allied with the U.S. (Roy 2003; Chiang 2004).

Not incidentally, this also explains why the American president did not simply take unilateral action by explicitly recognizing the R.O.C. Taking that kind of unilateral action, though well within the U.S. rights, would have angered the leadership of the P.R.C. and jeopardized its relations there because the P.R.C. leadership had explicitly said that governments

58 Of course, here my argument is only about the relationship between the U.S. and China with respect to Taiwan. China’s claims on Taiwan extend far beyond the position of the United States.

59 As of 2014, Taiwan ranked as the 28th wealthiest country in the world. In 2012, trade between China and Taiwan was valued at $121.5 billion (Meltzer 2014).
must choose between the P.R.C. and the R.O.C. and refused to enter into relations with any government recognizing both. Thus, had the U.S. explicitly recognized the R.O.C., it may have lost what it was seeking to gain (e.g., trade, political alliance, etc.).

The influence of the U.S. also mattered less than did the P.R.C. with respect to Taiwan because, as is custom among state governments described earlier, the leaders of parent states tend to have ultimate say about the fate of their states’ constituent parts because, for as long as they are so recognized, such entities are part of their state’s sovereign territory. Extending recognition to would-be states against the wishes of the leaders of the parent state or before the parent state leaders grant recognition can be viewed as violating international norms by interfering in a state’s internal affairs, which could potentially upset the balance of power and relations not just between the parent and would-be states, but between the parent and the recognizing state as well. (Fabry 2010; Coggins 2006). Thus, recognizing an entity as a state before the leader of the parent state does so stands the risk of angering parent state leaders, potentially jeopardizing relations between the governments in question as well as regional stability should the leadership of the parent state feel the need or desire to go to war to exert their sovereignty over what is, from their perspective, part of their territory. Furthermore, state leaders recognizing an entity as a state before such recognition is granted before the parent state run the risk of parent state leaders exerting greater control over the entity seeking independence, bringing it back into the fold, so to speak. This can result, for example, in a military crack-down, even all-out war. It also runs the risk of being a moot point should the leaders of the parent state re-exert control and bring the entity back more firmly within their control. Recognizing an entity as a state when opposed by
the parent state is thus a very risky move, an ever evolving choice that not all state leaders are not comfortable making.

The attempt to seat the R.O.C. at the U.N. happened in 1971 because of events largely external to Taiwan. By 1970, rapprochement with China had begun to shift the U.S. government’s position on China so that American leaders no longer opposed entry of the P.R.C. at the U.N. (again, demonstrating as suggested by the O.S.R. thesis, the importance of shifting political alliances in producing opportunities for recognition). Moreover, aggression from the Soviet Union at the time made China a more appealing potential partner to the US. China, as a rising power, therefore offered not just a new trade market, but also a way to potentially thwart the growing threat of Soviet Russia, which had invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, proclaimed the right to violate the sovereignty of other states under the Brezhnev doctrine that year, and thereby put the security of nearby China at risk (Kim 1974; Tucker 2005; U.S. Department of State 2015).

Thus, the U.S. supporting the P.R.C. made sense in many ways. But the U.S. government did not want to alienate or lose its alliance with the R.O.C., who it had long supported (Rockower 2011; Chang and Kok-ui 1996; Roy 2003; Chiang 2004). These factors help to explain why U.S. official sought to have the R.O.C. seated alongside the P.R.C. in the U.N., because that option would have provided the U.S. with a win-win outcome. Thus, the U.S. and its allies sought to create a new state, a second China. But these efforts ultimately failed due to the rising power and influence of China, and in the end the R.O.C. was ousted from the U.N.

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60 It is beyond the scope of this study to explore the myriad reasons state leaders may or may not favor taking such risk beyond that discussed in Chapter 1, where discussion is given to the factors weighing in on decisions to grant or withhold recognition.
this way, the opportunity for Taiwan to be recognized explicitly passed from the world stage. And when U.S. officials eventually shifted recognition to the P.R.C. in 1979, this signaled that the opportunity for Taiwan to be recognized explicitly by the U.S. as a new and independent state had passed as well.

But did the United States government recognize Taiwan as a new and independent state in 1971, or between 1971 and 1979, when the U.S. derecognized the R.O.C. and recognized the P.R.C.? This is an important question because if the answer is affirmative it would mean that efforts to seat itself at the U.N. were at least partially successful in the sense that they resulted in a successful opportunity for recognition of a state of Taiwan to be recognized by the United States. Alternatively, if U.S. officials did recognize a sovereign and independent Taiwan, it would also suggest that there may have been a missed opportunity for recognition when U.S. representatives de-recognized the R.O.C. and recognized the P.R.C., beginning on January 1, 1979 (a question to be taken up in the next chapter).

Because of the strategic ambiguity of U.S. officials in their maneuvers and political discourse surrounding Taiwan, it is impossible to answer this question with any certainty. The United States government recognized the R.O.C. in 1913, and this recognition was not changed by the P.R.C. being seated at the U.N. in 1971. It also did not change until U.S. leaders recognized the P.R.C. in 1979. This suggests that U.S. officials recognized the R.O.C. between 1971 and the end of 1978. This recognition was more than just the recognition of a government, however. Because only states can be members of the U.N. American efforts to seat the R.O.C.

61 While the U.N. limitation of membership to states is a subject beyond the scope of this study, this is not to say that there have not, on occasion, been anomalies that were brief exceptions to this rule. Belarus and Ukraine, for example, were original members of the U.N. despite being Soviet republics at the time. With the independence of Belarus and Ukraine, these exceptions were driven out of the U.N. system. Another exception was found in the
at the U.N. suggest that the U.S. government recognized not just the R.O.C., but that the U.S. government also recognized the creation of a new and separate state, independent of China—the state of Taiwan.

That U.S. officials did not explicitly state recognition of a Taiwanese state separate from China and the P.R.C. makes political sense considering U.S. interests at the time. Given that U.S. officials had already recognized the R.O.C. in 1913, representatives of the U.S. state may not have seen any necessity to re-recognize the R.O.C. and the new Taiwanese state because the R.O.C. was already recognized and this fact was not changed by the P.R.C. being seated at the U.N. U.S. government actions to seat the R.O.C. in the U.N. made it very clear that U.S. officials recognized a state of Taiwan, otherwise U.S. efforts to seat the R.O.C. in the U.N. would have been futile and made no sense because only states can be members of the U.N.

The U.S. government not making its recognition of a Taiwanese state explicit also makes sense in consideration of its rapprochement with China. Had U.S. officials explicitly recognized a state of Taiwan, this would have angered the P.R.C. and threatened U.S. interests in building its political and economic ties with the P.R.C. in the Cold War against the U.S.S.R. Keeping quiet on their recognition, allowing it to be more implied by U.S. political actions rather than be known more clearly through explicit discourse, gave U.S. officials wiggle room in which to maintain their relationship with the R.O.C. while still warming their relationship with the P.R.C. This gave U.S. officials a front to maintain their face to China and the P.R.C. because U.S.

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslave (SFRY). Security Council resolutions affirmed that the state no longer existed, but the U.N. General Assembly tolerated the continued membership of this extinguished state almost a decade after its demise due to political reasons. These examples, though beyond the scope of this study to explore further, illustrate that there have, on rare occasion, been exceptions to the rule that the U.N. is comprised solely of states (Vidmar 2013). See Vidmar (2013) for further discussion.
officials were not coming out and saying that they had recognized the R.O.C. and a state of Taiwan. It also gave the U.S. a front by which to maintain ties with the R.O.C., to maintain the perception that U.S. leaders had not abandoned the long-time ally they had found in the R.O.C. This strategic ambiguity, engineered in the years leading up to the P.R.C. taking over China’s seat at the U.N. in 1971, would come to typify U.S. relations with Taiwan for decades to come, with actions and statements contradicting themselves as to whether or not the U.S. recognized Taiwan as a state independent of China. It also explains why Chinese leaders have continued to press the U.S. to make regular declarations about there being “One China” and that Taiwan is a part of China. This gives Chinese leaders a means to rein in U.S. officials, to keep the U.S. on a leash, so to speak, and thereby meets Chinese interests in maintaining the image that Taiwan is, always was, and always will be, part of “one China.”

3.3 OPPORTUNITIES FOR PALESTINE

Palestine’s elevation non-member state status in the United Nations was a major victory for Palestinians in 2012. The vote in favor of Palestine at the U.N. signaled what many state leaders had long already recognized, that Palestine is a state and is therefore entitled to all the rights and privileges thereof. This opportunity for recognition of the Palestinian state was one step along the path to Palestine’s admission to full-member state status at the U.N., and was a long time coming. How this opportunity unfolded supports the O.S.R. thesis not only in giving evidence as to the patterning or structuration of political recognition (described above), but also in stressing the importance of aligning interests, timing, patronage, and political opportunities, as these proved critical to Palestine in the efforts to gain it political recognition.
3.3.1 1948: Palestine’s First Declaration of Independence

The birth of the Palestinian state traces back to when the entity was still part of the Ottoman Empire. Prior to the fall of the Empire, there were no Palestinian people from which to build a state; there were, instead, Arab Ottomans and an Arab national movement. This came to an end when the Empire fell in 1917. The area known as Syria under the Ottomans was then divided into four areas, Syria and Lebanon, which were ultimately dominated by France, and Palestine and Trans-Jordan, which fell under the British control (Khalidi 2007; Nassar 1991; Zanotti 2010; Quigley 2010).

1917 became a critical moment in Palestinian history owing in larger part to the issuance of the Balfour Declaration that year. The Declaration, issued by British officials, set forth the beginnings of what would become part of a larger plan by which to displace Arab people in the Palestinian territory in order to create a national home for Jewish people (Nassar 1991).

The British mandate of Palestine lasted from the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1917 until the British termination of the mandate in 1948. Despite being under the yoke of Britain, this time period witnessed the birth of Palestinian nationalism and of a Palestinian identity. Unlike their Jewish counterparts, Palestinians, under the British, had little significant access to state power and little context in which their nascent nationhood could be expressed. Strong structural constraints were imposed on Palestine by the British, putting them in an “iron cage” from which escape was difficult, if not impossible (Khalidi 2007).

Where the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in 1917 helped pave the way for the emergence of a Palestinian national identity, it was Israel’s declaration of independence, following years of Western-supported state building in 1948, which proved to be a key moment
in the history of a state of Palestine. In 1947, the U.N. had developed a partition plan in anticipation of the British mandate being terminated. Israel’s declaration, on May 14 that year, came at a time when Palestinians had little appreciable control over the Palestinian territory. Britain, by then, had terminated its mandate, leaving the U.N. to decide what to do for the people of Palestine (Quigley 2010; Khalidi 2007; Zanotti 2012; Nassar 1991).

Arms of the Arab League states invaded Israel the day following the formation of the Israeli state. Termination of the British mandate did not create a vacuum of sovereignty, but in governance, as British officials were leaving without administrative structures left in place, which representatives of the Arab League sought to create. Fighting continued, however, and organizing an administration for Palestine in opposition to Israel proved to be more than the Arab League could manage. There were few Arabs left in the areas taken that were loyal to the All-Palestine Government, which had been established by the Arab League Council. By late summer, the IDF (Israel Defense Force) occupied most of Palestine, with the rest held by Egypt and Jordan (Quigley 2010; Beinin and Hajjar 2014).

From this brief history, the timing of the declaration of independence in 1948 by the All Palestine Government, which served as Palestine’s provisional government in Gaza (Quigley 2010: 108), can be seen as a strategic response to actions taken by Israel that year. By declaring itself a state in May of 1948, Israeli officials had managed to one-up the Palestinians by beating them to the finish line of declaring statehood. This was made possible for Israel in no small part by the strength of Israeli power on the ground at the time, the Haganah, a paramilitary group which would later become the Israel Defense Force (IDF). The Haganah had tens of thousands of trained and armed members, which were stronger than Arab forces and were able to repel them when Israeli statehood was declared (Scharfstein 2006; Finkelstein 2003). This was also made
possible by pro-Israeli, anti-Arab bias of the British, which effectively held Palestine back from doing the same. The British ending their mandate created a political opening for the Palestinians, as their European overseers were no longer present following the mandate being terminated, but the political opportunity was one which could not readily be acted upon because Palestinians lacked effective territorial control of Palestine as well as the infrastructure, support, and resources available to Israel (Khalidi 2007; Quigley 2010).

During the months following the creation of the Israeli state, leaders of regional Arab states lent much needed support to strengthen and fortify the position of Palestine. This support included the organization of a provisional assembly and government, on September 22, 1948, in Gaza by the Arab Higher Committee. The Arab League’s agreement on the creation of the All Palestine Government had several intended functions. One was to placate public opinion among the Arab people. Another was to create a governing political body that would claim and exercise control and sovereignty over the Palestinian territory. This, it was hoped, would also provide an alternative to international recognition of Israel and would help prevent Arab governments from recognizing the Jewish state. It was also born out of the desire to transfer responsibility for the continuation of the war against Israel onto the shoulders of the Palestinian people, thereby giving Arab states a means to exit the war and for the government of Palestine to take up the cause for the Palestinian people (Tal 2004: 353).

This creation of a governmental structure, the APG, even if only a provisional political structure at that, was a step in birthing a Palestinian state. As the declaration of independence said,
“Acting on the basis of the natural and historic right of the Arab people of Palestine to freedom and independence… We, members of the Palestinian National Council, meeting in the city of Gaza, proclaim on this day, October 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1948, the full independence of the whole of Palestine… as well as the establishment of a free and democratic sovereign State.” (Quigley 2010: 108).

The All Palestine Government was intended to serve as the government for Palestine and had the desire to one day have effective control over the entire Palestinian state. A significant interest beyond establishing Palestine’s independence, explained by the APG foreign minister in a telegram to the vice consul of the United States in Jerusalem, was for “Palestinian Arabs [to] have a legal position vis-à-vis Arab League and as evidence [of] determination to continue [to] fight against Jews.” (Quigley 2010: 108). A constitution for Palestine was soon drafted, passports were issued, and a Palestinian flag was created (Quigley 2010).

Independence for Palestine was also an interest of many of the people of Palestine’s desire to avoid the Palestinian territory being annexed by King Abdullah of Transjordan. While Abdullah’s interests were supported by some Palestinians, Abdullah was strongly opposed by the rank and file Palestinians and by the APG in Gaza. Palestinian critics argued that Abdullah was guilty of treason and that his “land grabbing” machinations would cost them what little had remained of Palestine. Palestinian and Arab opposition to King Abdullah thereby provided another component to the establishment of the All-Palestine Government and for the APG’s declaration of independence in 1948 (Tessler 2009: 277; Plascov 1981: 7-8).
3.3.2 1988: Palestine’s Second Declaration of Independence

Between 1947 and 1949, an era commonly called the Nakba, or “catastrophe,” some 700,000 Palestinians were driven from their homes, with many ending up in neighboring states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. Palestinian national identity grew stronger in the years following the 1948 Palestinian declaration of independence, especially after Israel’s conquest and occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967. In the six Day War, Israeli forces defeated those of the Arab states and seized East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, thereby gaining control over the entire area that once made up Palestine under the British mandate. This created buffer zones between Israel’s main Jewish population centers and those Israelis hold to be their Arab antagonists, zones which remain an important element of Israeli political strategy even today (Zanotti 2010).

Assistance for Israel from the U.S. government began in 1949 with a $100 million loan, which was followed over subsequent decades with additional aid. In 1962, the Israeli government purchased its first advanced weapons systems from the U.S. In 1968, just one year after the Six Day War, the administration of President Johnson, with support from the U.S. Congress, approved sales of Phantom aircraft to aid in the military protection and security of Israel. These sales helped to establish precedent for U.S. support of Israel in what would later become referred to as the Israeli “qualitative military edge” over its neighbors that the U.S. government pledged to ensure. This qualitative military edge, or QME, reflected the commitment of the U.S. government to maintain Israel’s edge over other countries in the region, including Palestine (Sharp 2015; Zanotti 2012; Dermer and White 2012). This U.S. government interest in promoting Israel over and above others in the region are based in no small part on an agenda,
rooted in the Cold War, viewing Israel as a strategic asset through which the U.S. government hoped to gain influence in oil-producing regions in the Middle East (Khalidi 2007). Thus, the U.S. interest in helping Israel was based on a multitude of factors including its interest in helping a fellow democracy and to use that to gain a strategic foothold in an area containing resources desired by the U.S.

Israeli conquest of Palestine allowed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to emerge in 1964 and become recognized as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In 1974, the P.L.O. gained non-member observer status at the United Nations, a move which strengthened Palestine’s position as now Palestine could more readily interact with other world governments and make its needs known on the world stage. Accords at Camp David, in 1978, helped outline a framework for peace in the Middle East, including limited autonomy for Palestine. This helped create precedent, building on earlier plans dating back to the British mandate period that called for a Palestinian state side by side with an Israeli state, for Palestinian autonomy (BBC 2012c)\(^62\).

In 1987, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza revolted against the Israeli occupation in what has become known as the First Intifada, or “uprising” (Zanotti 2010). The First Intifada helped to raise awareness of the Palestinian people and helped bring world attention to the Israeli occupation. The intifada was a critical period for Palestine in that it helped create the social and

\(^{62}\) One could argue that the Palestinians missed several opportunities, because if they had accepted offers from the U.S. and Israel, they could have had a state. Why this is not the case and, in fact unfairly privileges Israel and the U.S. while discounting facts on the ground, is examined in Chapter 4. As shown in that chapter, there have been only three significant opportunities for recognition of Palestine, none of which were followed by missed opportunities.
political environment in which Palestine was to issue its second declaration of independence, in 1988 (Nassar 1991).

The First Intifada helped to reignite resistance to the Israeli occupation and sent a clear message that called for the end of the occupation and for the creation of an independent state of Palestine, one promised to the Palestinian people since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the British mandate period (Nassar 1991). The intifada helped to shift the balance of political power towards forces inside occupied Palestine and also helped to increase the role of civil society and mass organization (Hammami and Tamari 2000). What remained to be done, at the outset of the intifada, was to make it known in no uncertain terms that the P.L.O. had the function of a government (Quigley 2010).

Protests in Gaza and the West Bank continued from 1987 into 1988 and led to proposals for a declaration about the status of Palestine, namely that Palestine was a state and that the P.N.C. and P.L.O. were governmental structures that would administer the Palestinian territory if the situation with Israel could be resolved. Tensions in Gaza and the West Bank in the summer and fall of 1987 helped to increase the determination of the Palestinian people and to unite them in purpose. A meeting of the P.N.C. in April of 1987 helped to reconcile Fatah, the Palestinian liberation movement, and factions that had challenged Yasser Arafat’s leadership in the Palestinian movement. These and other actions undertaken by the P.N.C. helped reduce factionalism among the Palestinian people in the territories occupied by Israel. These actions also helped pave the way for a unified leadership structure to come about in 1988 to sustain and direct the intifada (Tessler 2009: 683).

Through the intifada, many Palestinian people sought to send a message to Israel that there could be no peace so long as the occupation continued. But through the intifada many
Palestinians also sought to send a message that a more viable and preferable alternative could be had, that they did not seek the destruction of Israel but rather were seeking a two-state solution of peace. In the past, Palestinians had indicated their openness to recognizing the state of Israel within its pre-1967 borders. Support for a two-state solution had been significant since the 1970s and been a mainstream interest of the P.L.O. since the early 1980s. Many Israelis argued, however, that the intifada was not directed at peace, but rather at the destruction of Israel. Some officials in Israel even argued that the intifada had nothing to do with adverse conditions experienced by Palestinians in the occupied territories (Tessler 2009: 719-721).

Within this larger context, a number of Palestinian leaders decided that it was necessary to put forth a clear and resounding message about their openness to recognizing and making peace with Israel. As noted by Tessler (2009: 720), such views had been expressed by many prominent Palestinians in the territories occupied by Israel and by high ranking P.L.O. officials in Tunis. Many agreed, in the words of one Palestinian scholar, that “the situation demanded a moderate position and a practical program capable of capitalizing on, and dealing with, the changes and dynamics unleashed by the intifada” (Tessler 2009: 720). This resulted in Palestinian attention being shifted to strategic objectives and conditions by which peace with Israel could be attained (Tessler 2009).

Further illustrating the importance of political alignments as described by the O.S.R. thesis, political leaders of U.S.S.R. also used their influence to urge the P.L.O. to move towards peace with Israel, publicly encouraging the P.L.O. to accept U.N. Resolution 242 without any preconditions in order to foster a meaningful dialog with the United States. Then Soviet General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, also encouraged the P.L.O. to recognize the right of Israel to exist, urging Yasser Arafat on this issue during his visit to Moscow in April of 1988. Leaders
from the U.S.S.R. also persuaded George Habash and Nayif Hawatmeh, important leaders of the Popular Front and the Democratic Front, as well as being two of Yassir Arafat’s most important critics within the ranks of the P.L.O.’s Executive Committee, to go along with the Palestinian peace program they viewed as “realistic” and “flexible” (Tessler 2009: 721; Remnick 1988).

In early 1988, international lawyers were consulted and a memo was drafted that recounted the basis for Palestinian statehood. This basis included Palestine’s status as a Class A mandate under the British and the preservation of Palestinian rights under charter of the United Nations (Tessler 2009: 721-722; Quigley 2010). To further support the Palestinian cause, the king of Jordan, on July 31, 1988, renounced his claims on the territory in the West Bank. Palestinian efforts to effect a lasting peace with Israel led to an emergency meeting of the P.N.C. in Algiers. After several days of this meeting, Yasser Arafat, seeing the alignment of interests (e.g., between the Palestinian people, the Palestinian leadership, and external support from the U.S.S.R. and Jordan, all supporting peace and an independent and recognized Palestinian state) and the type of political opportunity envisaged by the O.S.R. thesis, took advantage of the intifada’s success and issued the second Palestinian declaration of independence on November 15, 1988. Additionally, the P.N.C. declared its readiness to negotiate with Israel on the grounds outlined in U.N. resolutions 242 (outlining the withdrawal of Israeli forces and respecting sovereignty of every state) and 338 (calling for a ceasefire and for peace) (United Nations 2015a), with the condition that there be mutual recognition between Israel and Palestine and that the government of Israel should recognize the rights of the Palestinian people (Smith 2007). The declaration of independence recounted significant events along the history of Palestine’s emergence as a state, including recognition afforded it by the 1924 Covenant of the League of
Nations and the 1923 Treaty of Laussanne, and affirmed that Palestine was a peace-loving state (Quigley 2010; Tessler 2009). As noted in the declaration,

“…the prevailing balance of power in the local and international arenas excluded Palestinians from the common destiny, and it was shown once more that it was not justice alone that turned the wheels of history. The deep injury already done the Palestinian people was therefore aggravated when a painful differentiation was made: a people deprived of independence, and one whose homeland was subjected to a new kind of foreign occupation, was exposed to an attempt to give general currency to the falsehood that Palestine was ‘a land without a people.’” (Quigley 2010: 153).

The declaration was meant in part to help direct the intifada and to respond to strategic needs of improving relations with other states, most especially the United States (Pappe 2006). By early 1989, some 100 state governments recognized Palestine as a state (Quigley 2010), demonstrating that the second declaration of independence was an opportunity that resulted in a massive wave of recognitions. In the U.S., the Reagan administration argued that Yasser Arafat and the P.L.O. did not sufficiently demonstrate their readiness to recognize Israel and to make peace with the Israeli state. Americans also charged that the P.L.O. was guilty of supporting terrorism. In this climate of American hostility towards Palestine, Yasser Arafat was denied a visa request to enter the U.S. so that he might address the U.N. General Assembly (Tessler 2009).
The second Palestinian declaration of independence\textsuperscript{63} could, hypothetically, have been issued at any time following the first declaration in 1948. What made 1988 particularly appealing was the shift in the Palestinians’ position brought about in large part by the intifada (Nassar 1991). The intifada helped to raise awareness, to mobilize people, and to unite them behind a common cause. The king of Jordan releasing claims to Palestine also helped as it created a political opening in which the Palestinians could more fully emerge and make their independent state known, something which was not as possible with multiple claimants (Israel and Jordan) over the Palestinian territory (Nassar 1991; Hammami and Tamari 2000; Pappe 2006). Thus, with lessened pressure on Palestine (with the release in claims by Jordan), and with greater mobilization and nationalism (brought by the intifada), Palestinian leaders were in a stronger political position than it they been previously. It was a political opportunity that Palestine’s leaders seized by issuing the second declaration of independence.

3.3.3 2012: Palestine’s Statehood at the United Nations

Palestine’s position on the world stage continued to strengthen following the declaration of independence in 1988. As a way of acknowledging the declaration, the U.N. changed the designation of the P.L.O. in the U.N. to “Palestine,” though without going so far as to declare it a state (Berzak 2013). After diplomatic government to government talks with Israeli officials in

\textsuperscript{63} An exploration of why a second declaration of independence was viewed as necessary is beyond the purview of this study. Suffice it to say, for present purposes, that the first declaration of independence likely was not seen as valid in some political circles (most especially those who were anti-Arab, or pro-Western) because Palestinians lacked a cohesive government as well as effective control over the territory to which they laid claim.
secrecy, the P.L.O. recognized Israel’s right to exist in 1993, and following a series of talks known as the “Oslo Accords,” managed to gain limited self-rule for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank (Zanotti 2010). The Oslo Accords symbolize a period in which Israel implicitly recognized the statehood of Palestine because only states can enter into treaty relations with other states (Khalidi 2013). Israeli leaders also went so far as to formally recognize the P.L.O. during the 1993 talks in Oslo (Khalidi 2013), an unprecedented gesture in Israeli-Palestinian relations, but Israeli leaders never took the next step of extending formal recognition to Palestine.

While the 1993 handshake between Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on the White House lawn was hailed as a historic step in the creation of a lasting peace, the Oslo Accords in many ways undermined Palestinian statehood. The Accords safeguarded Israeli security interests and ensured that Israeli “settlers” could impede the exercise of Palestinian authority. The continued underwriting of Israeli practices of land grabbing and consolidation resulted in discontiguous Palestinian territory (Burgis-Kasthala 2014). Because territorial continuity is vital to the operation of a successful state in that it facilitates, among other things, the movement of people, resources, commodities, and other goods (Barzel 2002), this fracturing of Palestine hurts the Palestinian state and inhibits Palestinian leaders from strengthening Palestine’s position relative to Israel.

A number of factors, including violence, rejectionist movements (e.g., Hamas), the continued Israeli occupation, and increased Israeli “settlements” being constructed in Palestinian territories led to the failure to complete the Oslo process of creating peace between Israel and Palestine. A second intifada, from 2000 and 2005, saw violence in Israel and actions by Israeli security forces that undermined much of the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority (Zanotti...
and Browne 2015). During the second intifada, efforts by the U.S. and others to restart the peace process did not gain traction. After the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004 and his succession by the current president of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, the Israeli military withdrew settlers and military forces from Gaza. The limited self-rule of Palestine by the Palestinian Authority came to be undermined by the legislative victory of Hamas in the 2006 election and from its takeover of Gaza in 2007. To many, these developments have created a sense of confusion regarding the question of who governs Palestine, its territorial integrity (being broken into many discontinuous pieces under occupation), and its prospects for recognized statehood (Zanotti and Browne 2015).

Tensions between Israel and Palestine remained unresolved over the years that followed. In 2010, widespread discontent led to anti-government protests in Tunisia. In what has become known as the “Arab Spring,” these protests soon spread into Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine, among others (Douglas et al. 2014). The Arab Spring helped rekindle the desire for statehood by many Palestinians (Berzak 2013; Mustafa 2015). Following the failed attempt to gain recognized statehood after the 1988 Palestinian declaration of independence, which resulted primarily from strong opposition from the United States and Israel, Palestinian leaders decided to change tactics and pursued a “multifaceted approach” (Berzak 2013: 4) to achieving recognition of a Palestinian State from the United Nations.

On September 23, 2011, Mahmoud Abbas, president of Palestine, took Palestine’s application for U.N. membership to New York in hopes for a positive outcome recognizing the state of Palestine within the 1967 borders (Burgis-Kasthala 2014; Quaker United Nations Office 2015; Eden 2013). In the application, addressed to Ban Ki-Moon, Abbas cited the original 1947 partition plan for Palestine, which promised the Palestinians an independent state, as well as the 1988 Palestinian declaration of independence (Eden 2013). On September 28, 2011, the
President of the Security Council, following established U.N. protocol, forwarded the application to the standing committee that handles new admissions. The application stalled due to the Security Council being unable to reach a unanimous decision. Some weeks later, as part of their multifaceted approach aimed at building ever greater basis for recognition and membership in the U.N., Palestine was successful in achieving full membership in UNESCO. This gave Palestine full access to U.N. agencies like the World Health Organization. Immediately after the vote, however, the United States retaliated by withdrawing needed funding from UNESCO due to legislation passed in the 1990s (following the second Palestinian declaration of independence) in the U.S. requiring it to stop funding UNESCO if a body or institution of the U.N. recognized Palestine. U.S. officials called the vote at UNESCO “regrettable, premature, and undermines our shared goal of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East” (Eden 2013: 234).

This withdrawal of funding from UNESCO came after a Congressional freeze of $200 million that had been earmarked for the Palestinian Authority. After the UNESCO vote to admit Palestine, Israel similarly suspended $100 million in transfer tax payments designated for the Palestinian Authority, which had constituted two-thirds of the Palestinian Authority’s annual revenues, though it later recanted following pressure from U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-Moon (Eden 2013; Quaker United Nations Organization 2015). Israel further retaliated against the people of Palestine by announcing the accelerate building of over 1,000 new housing units in East Jerusalem and the West Bank (Eden 2013; Zanotti and Browne 2011).

With the application before the Security Council, an affirmative vote by nine of the Council’s fifteen members, including all five permanent members, was needed in order to make a recommendation for admission. This rule of “Great Power unanimity,” which is also called the “veto” power, allows any single permanent member of the Security Council to block admission
if they so choose. Because the decision is a choice to be made by Security Council permanent members, an entity being eligible for admission to the U.N. and meeting any criteria for being classified as a state does not necessarily mean that they have a “right” to membership and will necessarily advance through the application process to become full members. Thus, admission to the U.N. requires a unanimous vote by all five Great Powers that are permanent U.N. Security Council members (Berzak 2013; Page 2014).

Abbas’s application for U.N. admission of Palestine was expected to meet with failure. This is because U.S. opposition to seating Palestine was long since established, and because U.S. representatives announced that they would not support initiatives they deemed to be unilateral (Berzak 2013: 8) from Palestine. President Barack Obama, for example, voiced the opinion that the U.S. believed that a state of Palestine could only come about through negotiation with Israel. Obama stated, for example, that “Peace will not come through statements and resolutions at the United Nations—if it were that easy, it would have been accomplished by now” (Spillius 2011).

This framing of efforts to seat Palestine at the United Nations despite opposition from Israel was likely an effort to justify U.S. opposition and to wrangle Palestine back onto the playing field where the U.S. interests (in maintaining their foothold in the region via advancing Israeli strength and position over others like Palestine) could thwart Palestine through use of the U.S. veto power as it implies that the Palestinians were being unreasonable for trying to circumvent the opposition they faced from the U.S. and Israel. Such a “unilateral” effort by the leadership of Palestine, implicitly supported, not unilaterally but by over 100 members of the U.N. through their recognition of the Palestinian state, however, made tactical sense given the established opposition from the U.S. and Israel and the Palestinian need to bring an end to the illegal occupation. Some argued, given the surety of failure due to U.S. opposition in the
Security Council, that the Palestinian efforts to be seated at the U.N. was really not due to an expectation of success but rather was part of an effort to win a “moral victory” over the U.S. and Israel (Mcgreal 2011; Page 2014)⁶⁴.

Not unexpectedly, divisions and opposition to Palestine’s application within the Security Council (led by the U.S.) led to a stalemate and no vote was ultimately taken on the 2011 Palestinian application for U.N. admission. In an effort to circumvent this failure to achieve admission, Palestinian leader Abbas, in 2012, pursued an upgraded status for Palestine to elevate the entity to the position of a non-member state. Unlike full member status, the status of non-member state can be granted by a majority vote in the U.N. General Assembly. As Palestine had already been recognized by more than half of the General Assembly members, this move likely would have been expected by President Abbas to have met with greater support than full membership. Given the explicit opposition from the U.S. and its announcement that it would veto admission of Palestine, it is possible that this elevation in status was the real goal of the 2011 application to the U.N. This is because, though it would not entail full membership, it would nonetheless entail a form of recognition as a state, a status which strengthens the Palestinian position relative to the U.S. and Israel and which, cumulatively as part of a long game, helps move Palestine one step closer to full membership in the United Nations. Elevation to non-member state further meant that Palestine would be able to participate in General

⁶⁴ To what ends such a moral victory might be beneficial can only be guessed at, though could prove useful towards the goal of recognized statehood. A moral victory, for example, could undermine the U.S. and Israeli position, thereby weakening the strength of their opposition to Palestine and potentially creating an opportunity to advance their cause even further. It could also have helped to elevate the perceived legitimacy of the Palestinian cause. Thus, even a symbolic victory has the potential of garnering much more than symbolic results in the long term if it advances the Palestinian cause.
Assembly debates and to accede to international treaties and conventions, thereby strengthening the position of Palestine even further (Page 2014). With over 100 countries already recognizing Palestine as a state, the status upgrade to non-member state was not a great leap. Palestine, by then, had already built up considerable support and recognition of its statehood around the world. When the status upgrade was voted upon, it subsequently passed the U.N. General Assembly by a vote of 138 to 9, with 41 abstentions, in Palestine’s favor on November 26, 2012 (Page 2014; Burgis-Kasthala 2014; Quaker United Nations Office 2015).

The upgrade to non-member state was attributed in U.N. Resolution 67/19, “Status of Palestine in the United Nations,” to a lengthy series of changes in Palestine’s position in the political field. Specifically enumerated are resolution 181, citing the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force (implicitly censuring the illegal Israeli occupation of Palestine), referring to the illegal annexation of East Jerusalem, which is not recognized by the international community. Also cited is resolution 43/177 of December, 1988, by which the U.N. acknowledged the 1988 Palestinian declaration of independence. The status upgrade is also supported by the 1993 mutual recognition between the government of Israel and the P.L.O., which denoted government to government recognition, albeit a recognition that fell short of statehood recognition. The upgrade is also supported by Palestine’s membership in U.N.E.S.C.O., Arab League, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the O.I.C., and the Group of 77, and by positive assessments denoting the readiness of Palestine to assume statehood by the World Bank, the IMF and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee Chair conclusions of 2011 and subsequent conclusions that the Palestinian Authority is above the threshold for a functioning state. Most convincing of all, perhaps, was Palestine being recognized, at the time of its status upgrade, noted in U.N. Resolution 67/19 of 2012, by 132 state governments around the world.
This accumulation of aligning factors in support of Palestinian statehood\textsuperscript{65} demonstrates that opportunities for recognition may operate separately or in tandem, with possible cumulative effects, as was the case for Palestine. These accumulated factors also help to explain why so many state governments voted in U.N. to upgrade Palestine’s status to a non-member state even in the face of U.S. and Israeli opposition. Quite simply, the ground had shifted in Palestine’s favor, creating a political opportunity that President Abbas seized.

Nevertheless, the dynamics by which the state of Palestine gained non-member observer state status in the U.N. in 2012 supports the O.S.R. thesis. As demonstrated here, again, the blockage of Palestine’s membership in the U.N. demonstrates that importance of state interests

\underline{65} As mentioned earlier, it is beyond the scope of this study to offer an argument about whether Palestine is or should be considered independent, autonomous, or sovereign. The sovereignty, autonomy, and independence of Palestine are highly contested and may be thought of as subjective matters of opinion. Because Palestine has a president and governmental body that is independent of Israel, I consider Palestine to have a degree of independence and autonomy, albeit it is incomplete and leaves much to be desired. And, because has a degree of control and influence within the Palestinian territories, I consider it to have a degree of sovereignty as well. Because Palestine also has a president and a governmental or political body, the PLO, which has been recognized by Israel, I also consider Palestine to have a degree of independence because it has the capacity to act independently of and against Israeli interests. It should be noted that I am not alone in this opinion. Scholars like John Quigley and others also consider Palestine to be independent, etc., and Palestine was recognized as independent by, just as example, some members of the Arab League in the 1945 Arab League Pact—though here, too, members of the Arab League also said that Palestine’s independence was not complete. Thus, in my view and that of others, sovereignty, independence, and autonomy can exist in degrees—much like political recognition—and are not necessarily and always absolute. Palestine’s upgrade to non-member “state” in the U.N. in 2012 further supports the position that Palestine has a degree of independence, autonomy, and sovereignty, without which it is unlikely to have been recognized by so many governments as being a state.
and political opportunities in creating not only opportunities for recognition but also why such opportunities do not fall evenly across the society of states. Much like the 1988 declaration of independence, the 2011 application for admission to the U.N. did nothing by way of altering the already long since established U.S. and Israeli interests in blocking Palestine’s statehood or recognizing Palestine as a state. As such, lengthy debates were not needed within the halls of the White House or elsewhere in order to create this non-recognition outcome. Because U.S. and Israeli opposition was already well-known and expected, non-recognition from the U.S. and Israel was very much a foregone conclusion.

3.4 COMPARISON OF CASES

A commonality between Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine is that all three have had some form of external political patronage or support. This is seen in the chö-yön relationship between China and Tibet, the protectiveness of the U.S. government over Taiwan in relation to potential aggressions from China (the U.S. going so far as to sell weapons to Taiwan in order to protect it from China), and members of the Arab League supporting the statehood of Palestine in the face of Western opposition.

Due to time and space constraints, it is well beyond the scope of this study to examine any traces of support for recognizing Palestine that may have been present within the U.S. and Israel. And even in cases in which there may have been support for recognizing Palestine from within the U.S. and Israel, such support clearly was not enough to change the larger and more fundamental interests of U.S. and Israeli political leaders, allied in their opposition to recognizing Palestine. Thus, either way it is taken, the non-recognition outcome for Palestine from the U.S. and Israel, like that of other cases examined in the study, supports the O.S.R. thesis stressing the importance of aligning interests and political opportunities in producing recognition outcomes.
In the case of Tibet, external patronage ultimately worked against Tibet because Chinese officials had imperial ambitions to annex its territory. The forbidden land policy, combined with its geographic isolation, helped in some ways to cut Tibet off from the rest of the world (van Walt van Praag, 1987; Bajoria 2008; Lixiong and Shakya 2009), making it more difficult for Tibetan leaders to call upon the support of other state governments in its bid for statehood when the Dalai Lama declared independence in 1913. This isolationism, imposed and reinforced by Chinese officials, may have cost Tibetan leaders the ability or opportunity to gain powerful external allies that could potentially have helped bring Tibet into a stronger position for more globally recognized statehood by supporting the Tibetan entity with much economic and military support when China’s military invaded Tibet during the Chinese Revolution in 1949.

With Taiwan, the patronage of the U.S. government was critical to creating an opportunity for recognition in the U.N. in 1971, but this patronage later shifted in form with the rise of China as a market for the US—seeing the U.S. go from a staunch supporter, fighting to seat Taiwan at the U.N., to a weaker supporter, seeking, by all apparent indicators, to solidify the position of Taiwan relative to China in order to further American trade interests.

External patronage for Palestine was different than that of Tibet and Taiwan in that it was more broadly based, notably coming from members of the Arab League (Quigley 2010).

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67 External support for Palestine has also come from developing countries. Nelson Mandela, for example, supported the PLO, which he viewed as a social movement akin to his African National Congress. Fidel Castro, leader of Cuba, also pointed to the Israeli occupation of Palestine as evidence of American imperialism. (Tharoor 2014). More recent examples include Chile and Paraguay joining with Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and others that have recognized Palestine (Keating 2011). There is, of course, no firm distinction between what may be called “support” versus what may be called “patronage.” Patronage may be considered a greater degree of support, and both patronage and support can take the same or differing forms over time and situation.
Members of the Arab League recognized the statehood of Palestine, even while also acknowledging that Palestine’s statehood existed without complete independence due to the illegal occupation of Israel. The 1945 Arab League Pact, for example, maintains that Palestine came to be a state in 1917 when it separated from the Ottoman Empire following the Great War. Palestine, according to the Pact, did not enjoy actual independence because of the use of force by Israel, which veiled outward signs of Palestine’s independence. This demonstrates that statehood can be recognized even without independence, meaning that complete independence is not universal prerequisite of recognized statehood.

External patronage of Palestine is also illustrated by volunteers and aid arriving in Palestine following the declaration of the Israeli state. Shortly after the government of Britain removed its last solder from the mandate territory, Arab armies entered the area in order to protect the Palestinian people. The offensive included military from Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia and led to the first Arab-Israeli War (Nassar 1991; Quigley 2010).

68 The issue of patronage can draw up many questions related to the present inquiry, such as “Why does the U.S.S.R. win sometimes and the US other times?”, “When does one power make it a serious issue?” and “When do they prefer to avoid conflict?” Such questions are best left to future research because they are evolving and highly empirical matters that require considerably more time and space than can be given within the confines of this preliminary study. One might expect, however, by way of a preliminary response, that government leaders will generally prefer to avoid conflicts and not make things an issue when they deem doing so to be costly and not supported by existing constituencies, political alignments, interests, and resources. In such cases, constantly evolving cost-benefit estimations are likely to guide decisions and actions. As with the production of recognition outcomes, a win for Great Powers is likely to be determined by existing political opportunity structures, notably existing interests held by actors involved and political alignments, including support or opposition, as they exist at any given time. Each of these questions, and indeed many others, is rich and complex enough to warrant their own separate studies.
This external support, in the form of recognition and military support from members of the Arab League helped to legitimate Palestine’s cause and strengthens its position relative to Israel and the broader society of states, although the Arabs eventually lost the war.

Another commonality between Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine, perhaps more important than external patronage, is the emergence of a political opportunity, a favorable shift in alignments and interests and a lessening of diplomatic and military opposition. This is demonstrated by comparing and contrasting the cases. A declaration of independence can be a form of an opportunity for recognition in and of itself as it may generate recognition from a single state or even a wave of recognitions all around the world. Such was clearly the case for Palestine and Tibet, as their governments’ declarations of independence were followed by recognition, albeit with mixed results. But such declarations, by themselves, may matter very little without an accompanying political opportunity in which interests and alignments favor recognition. That is why representatives of entities seeking recognition of their statehood do not randomly declare independent statehood. Otherwise, an entity’s representatives may declare the entity’s independence at any time. Instead, representatives of entities act strategically, waiting for when the timing appears most auspicious and in their favor, as calculating players in the game of recognition.

As shown by Tibet and Palestine, the breakup of existing state and empire political structures can create a political environment in which new states may emerge and be recognized. The fall of the Qing and Ottoman empires helped pave the way for Tibet and Palestine to emerge and for their political leaders to declare their statehood. Had these political structures not fallen, history may well have turned out very differently for Tibet and Palestine today.
Even though a declaration of independence may be or generate an opportunity for recognition, such declarations are not strictly necessary to produce results heading in the direction of explicitly recognized statehood. Representatives of Taiwan, in stark contrast with Tibet and Palestine, for example, did not declare independence, but Taiwan still managed to gain the recognition of dozens of states and to win the implicit recognition of the United States. What Taiwan needed, instead, was the support of a powerful ally, a Great Power like the United States, and enough resources to offer states willing to take a carrot in exchange for their recognition.

As with the U.S. warming to China as a potential ally in the Cold War, discussed above, other entities like the government of Taiwan may also be able to draw upon the same tactic in order to generate an opportunity for recognition. The Taiwanese government, for example, could have attempted, or even suggest it might have attempted, to align itself with Russia or some other potential ally in an effort to extract concessions from China or even to gain explicit recognition from the U.S., which could further strengthen the position of Taiwan and ultimately enable the Taiwanese government to declare independence. This example of the use of the Cold War context, in which entities might benefit by aligning themselves with one camp against another (Bamyeh 2015), illustrates that shifting political alignments in light of the larger historical and political context can be used strategically to aid in an entities’ political recognition.

The shifting of political opportunities demonstrates that there is a patterning behind the production of opportunities for political recognition. An opening of political opportunities creates a context in which entities seeking recognition can generate opportunities for recognition, often resulting in one or more recognitions. But why do such opportunities, when they arise, sometimes meet with mixed results? Why, for example, was Tibet recognized explicitly by the government of only one other state, Mongolia, in 1913? Why has Taiwan been able to gain
recognition from nearly two dozen state governments while Palestine has been able to gain considerably more recognition than Tibet and Taiwan combined? And why have none of these entities been explicitly recognized by the governments of Great Powers like the United States, China, and Britain, especially when such powers have at times demonstrated interest in these states by trading with them (such as the tens of billions of dollars in trade between the U.S. and Taiwan annually), giving them military support and aid (such as when the U.S. provided military protection for Taiwan during the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the U.S. giving foreign aid to Palestine), and sometimes even entering into treaty relations with them (such as when representatives of Israel and Palestine signed the Oslo Accords in 1993 or when the British entered into a convention with Tibet in 1904)?

A reason is that the opening of political alignments is not always uniform across the society of states. Doors open to some may not be open to others: an opportunity for recognition from one state government does not necessarily indicate an opportunity for recognition from all state governments. Tibet, for example, cannot be said to have had much of an opportunity to be recognized by China in 1913 as it did with Mongolia that same year. This is because the position of Tibet relative to these two states was very different. Mongolia had just split from China and was not obligated to support China’s imperial claims on Tibet. China’s position on the world stage had not yet risen to the point it had in the early 1970s, when the U.S. position on Taiwan shifted with the economic and political ascendancy of China.

But unlike Mongolia, Tibet did not have a major power, a patron, come to its defense and was then forcibly integrated back into China (Chung 2001). Initially, when Mongolia broke away from China, China did not recognize Mongolian independence and sent army to reoccupy it in 1919. The Chinese army was removed by White Russian forces in 1921 (Chung 2001). When the
Qing collapsed in 1911, the Mongols, as did Tibetans, sought to create their own nation state, arguing that they had been subjects of the Manchus but not of the Chinese. The Mongol government looked for help and recognition from Russia as well as other powers. Neither the government of Russia nor the other powers supported the idea of Mongol independence, nor recognized the new Mongol state: its only diplomatic success was a treaty with Tibet in 1913 (Narangoa 2009). Thus, Mongolia survived in large part because of its external patron, the Soviet Union.

The position of Tibet relative to China was thus very different than in Tibet’s position relative to Mongolia. In Mongolia, for example, Tibet found an ally much like itself, declaring independence from a common parent state (China). Both were also seeking to make political alliances to shore up their positions on the world stage as independent states. The peoples and governments of Tibet and Mongolia also identified with each other not just because of this common political parentage of China, but because both were home to Buddhist peoples, giving their peoples some degree of cultural and spiritual affinity. In 1912, for example, the 13th Dalai Lama was said to have underscored the friendly relations between Tibet and Mongolia and that the two “should help each other for the benefit of the Buddhist religion.” (Shatra 1913, cited in Mehra 1969: 5). As mentioned above, state relations can be greatly shaped by the identity relations between them. This is because, owing in large part to familiarity and alignment of interests and experiences, state governments tend to have a greater interest in helping and aligning with those they view as most like themselves (Coggins 2006, 2011; Peterson 1997; Whelan 1961; Ringmar 2002).

Thus, there were multiple factors aligning between Tibet and Mongolia that helped bring their governments together, resulting in their mutual recognition. This was not the case between
Tibet and China because the Chinese government had a strong interest in annexing the Tibetan territory into the Chinese empire. That interest was strongly opposed by many within Tibet, which put the two governments at strong odds with each other. Tibet and Mongolia were both Buddhist countries, giving the two a strong basis for cultural and spiritual affinity, a strong form of identity relations discussed above, for protection of the Buddhist faith and for mutual defense against external powers (Williams 1916; Friters 1937a) that was not present between Tibet and China. Thus, there was an alignment of factors favoring recognition between Tibet and Mongolia that were not present between Tibet and China. This demonstrates that opportunities for recognition are by no means universal or uniform, and an opportunity for recognition from one government does not necessarily imply an opportunity with other governments as well.
These factors—external patronage, political opportunities, and an alignment of state interests \(^{69}\)—cumulatively help to explain why opportunities for recognition emerged for Tibet.

\(^{69}\) As mentioned earlier, both patronage and interests are considered part of the O.S.R. as both get at the larger structure of alliances, which may variously suggest openings or closures that encourage or discourage entities from seeking recognition. Interests and patronage can also help bring opportunities for recognition into being, as discussed, and are another reason they are considered part of the O.S.R.
Taiwan, and Palestine when and where they did. They also help to explain the varying and mixed results that follow opportunities for recognition when they did occur. They also help to explain why Tibet has had so few recognitions of its statehood in 1913 (limited to Nepal\textsuperscript{70} and Mongolia), why Taiwan had comparatively more with about two dozen since the 1970s, and why Palestine has so many more, with over 100 following its declaration of independence in 1988. Patronage, political opportunities, and an alignment of state interests all exist along a continuum, and none, by themselves or in combination, is necessary or sufficient to guarantee an entity’s recognition as a state.

In addition to its geographical isolation, Tibet has had so few recognitions of its statehood because it, unlike Taiwan and Palestine, has lacked a strong external patron to champion its cause and come to its rescue with a preponderance of military and economic support. Other state governments also have had a strong interest in not alienating China, lest they lose access to China as a major trade market and political ally. And, unlike Taiwan, Tibet lacked the economic resources the government of Taiwan has used to engage in “checkbook diplomacy” (Rich 2009), offering economic aid in exchange for recognition. Thus, the self-interests of other states have steadily worked against the interests of Tibet, resulting in so few political recognitions of Tibet. If that were not the case, if a major power like Russia or the U.S. had given strong support to Tibet, it might well have been able to turn the opportunity for recognition in 1913, resulting in recognition from Mongolia, into a wave of recognitions across the globe.

\textsuperscript{70} Nepal recognized Tibet, being one of six countries with which it had entered into diplomatic relations. Nepal maintained full diplomatic relations with Tibet and recognized Tibetan independence (van Walt van Praag 1987: 139-140).
Taiwan, on the other hand, has had significantly more to offer other states. It is likely for this reason, based largely on economic incentive, that the U.S. government sought to seat Taiwan alongside China in the UN\textsuperscript{71} in 1971. This external patron gave much support to Taiwan’s cause. But Taiwan’s government, at the time, still had the stated goal of reclaiming control over mainland China. Thus, even with a strong external patron, the U.S., Taiwanese interests worked against it being seated at the U.N. Other states’ interests also worked against Taiwan because other state governments did not want to enter into relations with Taiwan for fear of alienating and angering China. Decolonization also caused membership in the General Assembly of the U.N. to swell, and many newly emerging states were more sympathetic to Beijing than Taipei. This support was something the Chinese government capitalized upon by announcing that it would not accept a seat in the General Assembly unless the R.O.C. was expelled, a move intended to sway governments that felt the P.R.C. should be seated but which lacked a strong desire to oust the R.O.C. (Roy 2003). As Cold War alignments shifted during this time period, the position of the R.O.C. began to fall. American efforts at dual representation eventually gave way to a measure sponsored by the Albanian government to seat the P.R.C., which the Albanian government saw as a measure to strike back at the U.S. and which it and some other

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item It is worth noting that China, like Taiwan, is not universally recognized by all the world’s governments. This is largely because China does not permit simultaneous recognition of itself and Taiwan. Governments that recognize Taiwan therefore do not also recognize China. This is not to say, however, that other all states and Great Powers necessarily have universal recognition. The lack of diplomatic ties between Cuba and the US, as well as between the U.S. and North Korea, suggests that these states do not recognize each other. These examples illustrate that many states are not universally recognized, even despite some of them being major powers and members of the United Nations. Thus, “mixed recognition” may be far more common, even more normative, than may be generally recognized.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
governments viewed as an imperialist power (Hickey 1997). This commonality of views about the U.S. as an imperialist power gave some governments grounds upon which to identify (Bamyeh 2015) with one another in opposition to the U.S. and its sponsorship of the R.O.C. being seated at the General Assembly. Thus, many state interests have worked against Taiwan being recognized as a state. But Taiwan’s government has managed to secure recognition from as many governments as it has due in large part to its growing economic strength, which enable it to offer a carrot to those who will recognize Taiwan as a state rather than China. Here, too, then, interests and opportunities, combined with resources, help to explain why Taiwan found comparatively more political recognition than Tibet.

Palestine, however, has succeeded in gaining political recognition in ways that Tibet and Taiwan have not, being recognized by over 100 state governments around the world today and now enjoying non-member statehood status at the United Nations. The leadership of Palestine has been able to accomplish this feat because of a greater alignment of interests, political opportunities, patronage, and resources than what was available for either Tibet or Taiwan. Palestine’s government, unlike Tibet and Taiwan, has also been more willing to engage in open military conflict with Israel than Tibet or Taiwan have been with their parent state, China.

As suggested by one reviewer of this study, one may wonder why the U.S. did not attempt to do with Palestine as the P.R.C. did with the R.O.C. by refusing to have political relationships with governments recognizing Palestine. Why did the U.S. not get what it wanted

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72 This strength had been developing for quite some time. Many people in the U.S. Congress opposed anyone favoring trade with China, but this opinion shifted in the decade following 1950 when more because aware that “Red China” would not collapse and was, instead, growing more influential and powerful (Tucker 2005).
with respect to Palestine? Additionally, why did the U.S. fear the P.R.C. while other
governments did not fear the U.S. with respect to Palestine?

While an answer to these questions is deserving of its own separate study, and is
therefore outside the scope of this study to answer definitively, a preliminary step towards an
answer can be offered. As the reader will recall, the U.S. position relative to Palestine was very
much unlike that of the P.R.C. relative to Taiwan and the R.O.C. because the U.S. is not the
parent state of Palestine. As such, the U.S. position regarding Palestine will always and
necessarily matter less and matter in different ways that that of the P.R.C. relative to the R.O.C.
because parent states are accorded greater consideration by other governments as a matter of
customary international practice (as described earlier in the study). Thus, even if the U.S. were to
have threatened to end relations with other governments in order to force non-recognition of
Palestine, such an action likely would not matter in the same way because the U.S. is not the
parent state of Palestine and therefore actions and threats from the U.S. would, as a matter of
customary practice, not matter in the same way that similar actions mattered from the P.R.C.

Beyond this difference in position, the U.S. was also on very different footing than the
P.R.C. during the 1960s and 1970s. Unlike the P.R.C., the U.S. had already and for a long time
been an established member of the United Nations. This meant that, unlike the P.R.C. at that
time, the U.S. did not have to fight to gain recognition in order to gain membership in the U.N.
As such, strong arm tactics like those used by the P.R.C. may simply not have been necessary
because the U.S. was already a member of the U.N.

It also would be a mistake to suggest that the U.S. did not get what it wanted with respect
to Palestine. This is because Palestine, despite having been elevated to the status of a non-
member state in the U.N. in 2012, remains today, as it was since the 1940s, not a member. A
major goal of the U.S., as discussed above, was to ensure a qualitative edge for Israel relative to Palestine. That does not mean that the U.S. had a goal of preventing any and all the world’s governments from recognizing Palestine, which would be an impossible and unreasonable goal. It meant, instead, that Israel would receive greater resources, a stronger political and military position, and greater preference on the world stage. Given that Palestine has remained on the outside of the U.N., perpetually looking in, this shows that the U.S. political leaders, in reality, have gotten exactly what they wanted.

Lastly, the position of the U.S. was very much unlike that of the P.R.C. at the time because, unlike the P.R.C., the U.S. already had long established relationships with foreign governments. Such was not the case for the newly founded P.R.C., which sought to create new relationships with other governments. As such, the U.S. had more to lose by threatening to terminate relationships that it already had long since established, relationships which were non-existent or in the early stages of being formed when the P.R.C. came onto the scene in the 1950s and 1960s.

Returning to the main discussion, the Tibetan, Taiwanese, and Palestinian cases illustrate opportunities for recognition sometimes meet with mixed results. One reason for this is that the political opportunities in which opportunities for recognition may be generated or seized upon are not uniform. They may vary in degree, such as when an opening in the alignment of political structures is relatively small or large, which can be highly subjective and difficult to quantify or identify. The greater the alignment of interests, the larger the opening, and the greater the odds are that an entity will be recognized.

What can create an alignment of interests and an opening in the political opportunity structure varies by time, place, and circumstance. Political opportunities may be defined as
relatively stable and institutional and include the nature of political cleavages, institutional structures, alliance structures, and prevailing strategies for social movements (Meyer 2004; Tarrow 2006), but political opportunity structures also have more volatile aspects as well, which are open to change. Changes can come from many sources, such as changes in strategy, policy, perceived costs and benefits of political action or inaction, political alliances, and the distribution of power and resources (Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Steil and Vasi 2014). Interests and the political opportunity structure are inter-related and may dialectically inform and co-create each other. A change of interests can lead to an opening in the political opportunity structure, but a change in the political opportunity structure can also shift and create new interests. Changes in constraints and opportunities can also generate openings (Tarrow 2006) that an entity seeking political recognition can take advantage of. Any of these changes can result in or coincide with a shift of political interests, which may or may not align in different ways and to varying degrees. Such openings can be affected by outside parties as well, such as when politicians and other political actors take actions to raise the stakes around an issue or action, or when they act to make an issue or political action more visible and salient, such as through use of the media, public protest, and speeches (Stanbridge 2002).

Of course, even when openings in political opportunity structures present themselves, with or without actors perceiving them, an alignment of interests is never a foregone conclusion. If an “interest” is defined as a want, desire, preference, advantage, benefit, or special concern, then it becomes apparent that interests, like political opportunities, often change with changing events and circumstances. Interests can vary in form and in the degree to which they are valued and perceived (e.g., as practical or in terms of their relative importance), and are by no means uniform amongst political leaders or their citizens.
Despite such variance, interests can be brought into alignment through many different means. The costs and benefits of an interest, for example, can be increased or decreased, such as by making an action more costly or more beneficial, real or imagined, or by affecting an interest’s perceived practicality. Interests can also be affected by trade and negotiation, such as when political leaders enter into bargaining or when leaders seek compromise. Interests may also be reflected in the direction of group pressure and are historically and socially defined (Benn 1960). As such, interests can be pushed and pulled in different directions, such as through group pressure or when the perception and definition of an interest is redefined. Interests, thus, are not isolated or monolithic, but are open to change and exist in a complex matrix of other interests.

An alignment of interests for a government that is considering recognition is critical because regardless of the facts on the ground, governments are not required to extend political recognition. It is a choice, and one that they are free to make or not make as they wish and see fit.

As is often the case, interests can be mixed, and there may be both advantages and disadvantages to granting or withholding recognition. Disadvantages can come in many forms, such as recognition implying or lending support to a political form of an entity’s government that the granting government does not approve of or otherwise opposes (such as the US, a democratic republic, recognizing China, a communist state). Advantages can also come in many forms, such as when recognition is used to shape an entity’s political structure to better suit the trade interests of the recognizing government or when recognition helps forge political and trade relations that benefit the recognizing government.

This implies a type of a rough mental calculus being involved when political leaders decide to grant or withhold recognition, an equation the likes of which both the nature and the
relative weight or importance of all the variables involved may be constantly changing. In making such decisions, political leaders may be subject to a diverse array of pressures, all pushing and pulling in different and sometimes conflicting directions. Political leaders are not necessarily or always rational actors, they do not necessarily always know what may be in their state’s best interests, and they are not necessarily aware of every variable involved or of every potential benefit or drawback to granting or withholding recognition. And, like any political action, recognition can have unforeseeable and unintended consequences (such as, hypothetically speaking, if recognition was key to an entity’s independence and gaining political strength, and later that entity came to annex the state government that originally recognized it).

Interests and political opportunities are not only inter-related, as described above, but, unlike patronage, are necessary to result in an entity being recognized as a state. Patronage can take many forms, but generally includes things such as a patron state providing political, military, or economic assistance to an entity that may or may not be seeking recognition as a state. Examples of this include the chö-yön relationship between China and Tibet as well as the United States and its relationship with Taïwan. Patron states may assume any number of roles, ranging from a protector to administrator or “helper” who provides different forms of assistance as needed and as available.

In addition to the similarities and contrasts presented above, a comparative index\textsuperscript{73} can be obtained by dividing the number of state governments recognizing an entity or state and dividing

\textsuperscript{73} An alternative index could be suggested in the form of a number of grades or a scale that represents “how much” of an entity is recognized, such as when a right to sovereignty or a right to self-determination might be recognized but which stops short of recognizing statehood. This type of index is not pursued in the study because these are distinct legs or facets of the larger object that is recognition that cannot be combined or collapsed. Combining them into a single number, though it would help in making comparisons, would also mask the larger reality that these
this by the total number of independent states at a particular time. This “recognition index,” with scores ranging between 0 and 1 (which can be easily converted to a percentage by multiplying the resulting number by 100), allows quick comparison between states and state-like entities. It also gives a snapshot of the alignment of support or opposition to an entity, serving as a rough indicator about the degree of openness of the O.S.R. to an entity’s recognition.

Figure 8. Recognition Index of State Governments Recognizing Entities as States

different facets get at very different things, but would also overlook that they can vary considerably over time and context. They can also mean very different things from one entity to the next. Even if considered as different legs (facets) of the same table (recognition), an entity, strictly speaking, does not necessarily need any particular number of “legs,” or combination of or arrangement of such legs, upon which to “stand” or be recognized as a state. Truly, the more legs an entity has, the stronger the case for its recognition, but the legs cannot be collapsed into one, a single number representing them all, because they are very different things.
In this fashion, Tibet in 1913, being recognized by only one other state, Mongolia, out of 54 other states in existence at the time, yields a recognition index of 0.018 (or 1.8%). Taiwan, at the time of its ouster from the U.N. in 1971, had an index of 0.424 (42.4%). Palestine saw its index increase, going from 0.103 (10.3%) in 1948 at the time of the first Palestinian declaration of independence up to 0.597 (59.7%) in 1988 at its second declaration of independence, and still higher, up to 0.683 (68.3%) when its status was upgraded from observer to non-member state at the U.N. in 2012. At first glance, these numbers are not that surprising. Tibet’s very low score is much what is to be expected of an entity that was both internally isolationist and externally shielded from the world by China’s “forbidden land” policy. Palestine, being recognized by most members of the Arab League in 1948, had comparatively more support than did Tibet, which is evidenced in its higher recognition index. This index rose, naturally, as support for Palestine grew, correlating with its status change from observer to non-member state.

Perhaps the most interesting thing about these figures is that Palestine had a higher index in 2012, as a non-member state in U.N., than did Israel when it was admitted to full membership in the U.N. in 1948 with a recognition index of 0.638 (63.8%). This shows that the index does not correlate perfectly with admission to the United Nations, that there are factors beyond the sheer number of governments recognizing an entity as a state that can greatly impact an entity’s standing on the world stage. A likely reason for this is opposition from the United States, which has been the leading and most politically powerful opponent of Palestine’s admission to the U.N. That said, however, the support or opposition of a Great Power is not strictly determinative of U.N. membership. Were that the case, U.S. support would have been enough to seat the R.O.C. alongside the P.R.C. in the U.N. in 1971.
If all else were equal, one might expect that the higher the index, that the more likely an entity would be to be recognized by other state governments. However, as shown by the case of Israel and Palestine, all is not always equal. A higher index may indicate a higher probability of recognition very generally, but governmental interests must still be taken into account.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Declaration</th>
<th>Patronage</th>
<th>Patron Champion</th>
<th>State Collapse</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>0.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>0.683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: As more fully described in the text, "opportunity" refers to political opportunity; "declaration" refers to entity leaders having declared independence; "patronage" refers to an entity having an external state patron; "patron champion" refers to an entity having an external patron state championing its cause for recognition (as in the case of the U.S. and Taiwan in 1971); "state collapse" refers to a state weakening or collapsing, as happened with the fall of the Qing and Ottoman empires; and "conflict" refers to members of an entity being willing to engage in open conflict, as was the case with Palestine; "index" refers to the highest recognition index achieved by the entity in question. Note that this table presents a simplification of more detailed nuances described in the text. As can be seen visually from this chart, and speaking in a general and probabilistic sense, the more columns marked "Yes," the higher tends to be the recognition index.

While external patronage, political opportunities, and an alignment of state interests help to explain why opportunities for recognition emerged for Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine when and where they did, they are not all necessary or sufficient to result in political recognition. Unlike interests and political opportunities, patronage is not strictly required. This is because an entity can exist as a state, but because recognition is fundamentally a choice, other state governments can recognize it as such regardless of whether the entity has an external patron. Therefore, while patronage can be critical to an entity’s survival and that entity gaining recognition, and even though patrons may exert considerable influence that can, itself, help to shift interests in an
entity’s favor, patronage, strictly speaking, is not necessary or sufficient for an entity to gain recognition. China’s government being a patron of Tibet, and the U.S. government being a patron of Taiwan, for example, did not result in either being recognized by all the world’s governments or being seated at the United Nations.

Properly aligned interests and open political opportunities, meaning those favoring an entity’s recognition as a state, are necessary for recognition because without them it makes little sense for a government to recognize an entity’s statehood. After all, why would a government recognize an entity if, in the big picture, the government’s interests suggested it would be better served by not granting recognition? Only a shift in interests that favors recognizing an entity can lead a government to recognize that entity as a state. The content of such interests, as described throughout the study, can of course take many different forms, namely geo-strategic situation and international security (e.g., to avoid war or to strengthen a state’s position relative to others, as happened with the U.S. ensuring an edge for Israel over Palestine), domestic security (e.g., the P.R.C. seeking to outmaneuver the R.O.C. so as to strengthen its position and consolidate power within its territorial borders), systemic norms (e.g., when state leaders follow the norms of

74 While beyond the scope of the study to explore more fully, the patron relationships between China and Tibet, Russia and Mongolia, and the U.S. and Taiwan demonstrate that patronage can take many forms, and some forms are more conducive to an entity being recognized than others. The relationship between China and Tibet was not ultimately conducive because China had imperial designs on annexing Tibet. Such designs were not present between Russia and Mongolia or the U.S. and Taiwan.

75 What is or is not a “proper” or conducive opening of the political opportunity structure, as well as what is or is not a useful alignment of interests that favors recognition is an empirical matter, unique in every time, place, and circumstance, that is beyond the scope of the present study to explore. Interests and opportunities can align in many ways, and there is no single “right” way or single path for an alignment or set of opportunities to result in recognition.
recognition by favoring the position of a parent state over that of an entity seeking recognition against the wishes of state leaders, as happened with the U.S. not unilaterally recognizing the R.O.C. in the 1970s), and identity relations (e.g., the U.S. favoring and supporting Israel as a fellow democracy with whom it shared cultural and religious affinities). Such interests, though they may sometimes escape perception or detection, indicate an opening in the structure of political opportunities. And such openings are necessary for an entity’s recognition, otherwise the entity will be shut out and remain unrecognized.

3.5 MONGOLIA AND XINJIANG AS EXTERNAL COMPARISONS

Mongolia and Xinjiang provide useful external comparisons with which to validate the argument presented above. The history of Mongolia is comparable to that of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine because, like these cases, Mongolia has gone through periods without recognition, only to later create an opportunity for recognition and to gain recognition. As a widely recognized state and member of the United Nations, Mongolia serves as a positive example of an opportunity for recognition resulting in widespread political recognition. As an “autonomous region” without political recognition as a state, Xinjiang serves as a negative example of recognition, a case in which opportunities for recognition were generated but which ultimately did not lead to recognition because it lacked an alignment of interests in its favor.
3.5.1 Mongolian Recognition

Mongolia and Tibet share a common political ancestry in that both were part of the Qing empire and thereby under the sovereignty of China in the early 20th century. Unlike Tibet, however, Mongolia managed to break free of China to be recognized as an independent state, complete with full membership in the United Nations. This impressive accomplishment can be understood by briefly examining key events in Mongolia’s history between the fall of the Qing Empire in 1911 up to China politically recognizing Mongolia as an independent state in 1946 and comparing this slice of Mongolian history with the historical trajectory of Tibet so as to reveal why these entities wound up evolving along markedly different trajectories despite their once shared political ancestry.

In the period before 1911, Mongolia, like Tibet, was part of the Manchu Qing dynasty (Chung 2001). Not long after the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and the rise of the Republic of China, which then governed all of China, Mongolia declared, on December 1, 1911, its independence (Mehra 1969). China did not immediately recognize Mongolian independence and, in 1919, sent troops to reoccupy it and bring it back under the mantle of China. Chinese forces were removed by White Russian forces, who themselves were later removed by Mongolian forces with the support of Soviet Russian allies. In 1924, the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) was officially created (Chung 2001, Friters 1937a).

For a period of some twenty-five years, between 1921 to 1946, the U.S.S.R. was the only state to recognize what became the MPR, which it had helped to establish. The government of China, the R.O.C., was unwilling to recognize Mongolian independence until it was forced to allow Mongolia to hold a vote for independence in order to secure the removal of the Soviet
Army from Chinese Manchuria following the end of the Second World War as China agreed before the vote to accept its outcome, which was nearly unanimous, the R.O.C. recognized Mongolian independence in 1946 (Chung 2001).

R.O.C. recognition of the MPR was withdrawn a few years later, in 1949, when Mongolia recognized the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.), which laid claims to the Chinese mainland. Stalin soon made P.R.C. recognition of Mongolia a precondition for concluding a peace treaty between China and the U.S.S.R., and in 1950 the P.R.C. re-recognized Mongolian independence (Chung 2001). When it recognized Mongolia, China cited not the situation with the U.S.S.R., but rather the spirit of “socialist fraternity” and “acknowledging reality” of Mongolia’s past recognition by the R.O.C. in China. Mongolia later joined the United Nations in 1961 after the R.O.C. on Taiwan let go of its objections to Mongolia’s entry in hopes of gaining US support to maintain the R.O.C. seat in the U.N. (Chung 2001).

Mongolia was able to secure its independence from the R.O.C. in China, and later the P.R.C. in China, in large part because of the military, economic, and political support of the Soviet Union to sustain Mongolia as a client socialist state (Chung 2001). This was in large part due to the destruction of the Chinese army of occupation in 1931, which was itself the result of the Russian Revolution (Friters 1937a). Soviet troops helped make it possible for Mongolian revolutionaries to enter into power in 1921. Between then and 1925, China and the Soviet Union came into an agreement in which the Soviets recognized Outer Mongolia as part of China, meaning that Mongolia fell, under this view, within the realm of Chinese sovereignty and suzerainty (Friters 1937a). This may have been a careful tactic on the part of the Soviets, however, phrasing their own recognition of Mongolia in terms of “autonomy” rather than
“independence” in order to give Mongolia room to maneuver, giving them space in which to create genuine independence, under the assumption that they would, out of fear of China and in thanks to the Soviets, remain friendly towards the U.S.S.R. (Friter 1937a). This would also have the effect of not offending China and helping to prevent direct relations between Outer Mongolia and other states (Friter 1937a).

In the grand scheme, Mongolian desires for independence may have existed before the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, but the empire’s dissolution created a political opening, a weakening of force and control over Mongolia by China, that Mongolia was able to capitalize on with the help of Soviet Russia (Friter 1937b, Tachibana 2014). In this sense, Mongolia’s declaration of independence bears similarity to that of Palestine in 1948 and Tibet in 1913. All three made declarations of independence, showing a similarity in form of how they went about the business of creating opportunities for recognition. Similarly, all three were born out of the dissolution of existing imperial state structures, which created political openings that the people’s within them, desiring of independence, capitalized on by declaring independence.

A major difference between these cases, however, is that Mongolia achieved independence, Tibet did not, and independence remains a hotly contested matter for Palestine even today. This is in no small measure due to whether or not these entities had a strong patron state to help them in achieving their interests. Tibet had no patron coming to its defense and it is therefore no great wonder that, even though it was able to create an opportunity for recognition by declaring independence in 1913, it remains unrecognized on the world stage today. Mongolia, on the other hand, like Palestine, did have external patronage, and this patronage helped provide critically needed support, support upon which these fledgling entities were able to build a real and lasting independence. Palestine, on the other hand, though having what amounted to a patron
in the form of support from members of the Arab League, remains in a contested state, having its independence unrecognized by a Great Power (the United States). This, however, does not in any way detract from the very real opportunities for recognition that Palestine has been able to generate and build upon by declaring independence in 1948, 1988, largely upon which it managed to gain an upgrade to statehood status (another opportunity for recognition) at the United Nations in 2012.

Of course, political patronage, though it may be critical to generating opportunities for recognition, is not always necessary or sufficient to actually gain recognition. The R.O.C. in Taiwan, as mentioned above, was able to generate an opportunity for recognition with the help of a patron, namely the United States, but even the patronage of a Great Power does not necessarily equate with mass recognition. That is part of why Taiwan was not able to secure its seat in the United Nations and today remains only partially recognized.

3.5.2 Xinjiang

The fall of the imperial Qing dynasty and the subsequent rivalries between China, Russia, and Britain saw the Xinjiang region of modern day China split by competing loyalties and fierce rebellions. It was also marked by the rise of two short-lived independent states, the Republic of Eastern Turkestan, which existed for only a few months in 1933, and the Eastern Turkestan Republic, which survived from 1944 to 1949 (US GPO 2002; Wang 1996). Despite both states declaring their independence on behalf of the Uyghur people, thereby creating opportunities to be recognized, neither managed to achieve recognition as an independent state from other members of the international community. The reasons for this can be found by briefly examining
events in Xinjiang’s history during the period leading up to its first declaration of independence in 1933 and following that history up to the demise of the second Uyghur state in 1949.

The Xinxiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), or East Turkestan, is a territory in western China. The region is one of the main conduits for economic and cultural exchange between the West and East, and is of strategic geographic significance to China as a buffer between China, India, and Central Asia (Elmer 2011). Xinjiang came under control of Chinese empire when the Qing consolidated control over the area in 1759 (Lee 2006; Uyghur Human Rights Project 2009). Uyghurs and other Muslim people launched a number of revolts against Chinese rule throughout East Turkestan and eventually ousted the Qing in the “Muslim rebellion” in 1864 (Lee 2006; Kim 2004). In 1865, military commander Yakup Beg took control of cities once ruled by Qing forces and established an independent state in the city of Kashgar. The Kashgar state eventually gained recognition as an independent state, evidenced by it signing trade treaties with Russia in the 1870s (Uyghur Human Rights Project 2009; London and China Telegraph 1874; D. Appleton and Company 1892).

The Qing empire brought the region back under its control and established Xinjiang as a province of China in 1884. The fall of the Qing empire in 1912 provided an opportunity for political forces in the XUAR to make a political move for independence (Elmer 2011). However, it was not until 1933 that Turkic rebels declared their independence and established the Republic of East Turkestan (RET), also called the Turk Islamic Republic of East Turkistan (TIRET) (Elmer 2011; Bhattacharji 2009; Dwyer 2005). Even before the entity was declared an independent state, its new prime minister, Sabit Damulla, attempted to gain the recognition of Islamic and Turkic allies by sending delegations to Afghanistan. Citizenship was offered in the new state in exchange for help in gaining recognition with the Turkish government. Sabit also
attempted to gain the recognition of the British government by highlighting both China’s oppression of the Uyghurs of Xinjiang and the presence of Communism in Xinjiang. Attempts to gain international recognition from Britain and Afghanistan, however, did not prove fruitful (Lee 2006; Yasushi 2009).

According to Lee (2006), one of the reasons the RET did not gain recognition was due to their goals appearing unclear to the British. Lee suggests that this ambiguity raised the costs of foreign powers in deciding if supporting the RET would incite retaliation from competing powers (L33 2006: 31). The Soviet Union disliked Uyghur nationalism and sent troops into the area to crush the local Muslim population, thereby contributing to the fall of the RET’s independence movement (Wang 2000). This external force from the Soviet Union was coupled with internal rebellions which did not help to bridge competing political, religious, and regional differences within the Turkic or Uyghur people (Gladney 2003). This convergence of internal and external forces helps to explain why the RET was short-lived and collapsed in only five months (Guang 2006).

Between the 1930s and early 1940s, Uyghurs and other Muslim peoples engaged in political movements intended to cast off Chinese rule (Uyghur Human Rights Project 2009). These movements eventually achieved success when, on November 12, 1944, Uyghurs founded a new Eastern Turkestan Republic following the defeat of Chinese forces. The Uyghurs had learned from their previous debacle in 1933 and this time managed to secure promises from the Soviet Union that it would not interfere with Uyghur plans to create an independent state. In a change of political strategy, the Soviet Union supported the new republic and this support was instrumental to Xinjiang declaring independence a second time in 1944 (Uyghur Human Rights Project 2009; Bhattacharji 2012; Elmer 2011; Shichor 2005).
Independence was the result of the Yili rebellion, which began in the autumn of 1944. The uprising gave the Soviet Union an opportunity to support Muslim people in Yili, Xinjiang. Soviet support, notably with supply of weapons and troops, helped to initiate the Yili uprising, which began on November 7, 1944. The newly established state, the Eastern Turkestan Republic, could have been defeated by Chinese forces in Xinjiang were it not for the assistance of Soviet military assistance (Wang 1996; Lee 2006; Bhattacharji 2012).

The Soviet Union functioned as a powerful external patron on behalf of the cause of East Turkestan in a fashion similar to that between the US and Taiwan and Russia and Mongolia. While external patronage is not by itself necessary or sufficient for recognition, it is not inconceivable, hypothetically, that such support might have helped bring East Turkestan to full independence and recognized statehood. Soviet support of East Turkestan ended, however, after leaders of the Soviet Union told R.O.C. leader Chiang Kai-shek that it would no longer assist East Turkestan, and that it would not assist Mao Zedong in the Chinese civil war, in exchange for China’s acceptance of Outer Mongolia’s independence along with Soviet privileges in Manchuria (UHRP). In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) again seized control over Xinjiang and declared it a province of China and classifying it as an “autonomous region” (Bhattacharji 2012; Xu and Bajoria 2014; Elmer 2011).

In the larger picture, independence of the state of Eastern Turkestan in both its 1933 and 1944-1949 iterations came during a time when Chinese power was weakening and the Great Powers like Britain and Russia were attempting to exploit political divisions so as to increase their influence. After 1949, however, following the shifting of power and the rise of the CCP, a new and stronger P.R.C. came into being and reasserted its sovereignty over Xinjiang.
reabsorbing the region and bringing it back into the fold as an autonomous region similar to Tibet (Castets 2003).

In both its 1933 and 1944-1949 iterations, the state of East Turkestan bears some notable similarities with other cases in the study. Like Taiwan, Palestine, and Mongolia, the 1933 and 1944 iteration of East Turkestan were born from political opportunities, specifically those created by the weakening of China. East Turkestan is also similar to Taiwan, Palestine, and Mongolia in that it, too, had the political and military backing of a major external patron state, the Soviet Union. East Turkestan is also similar to Tibet, Palestine, and Mongolia in the sense that it declared independence from its parent state, thereby generating an opportunity for its recognition on the world stage. Like Tibet, East Turkestan was also unsuccessful in its attempts to secure a lasting independence from China. Unlike any of these cases, however, neither of the 1933 and 1944-1949 versions of East Turkestan managed to gain any political recognition from other members of the society of states. Of those not already discussed above, two additional states bear discussion into why this might have been the case.

The first of these, China, is the easiest to explain. China had a strong interest in maintaining control over Xinjiang in order to consolidate its territory and maintain Xinjiang as a strategic buffer between itself, India, and Central Asia. For China to have recognized the independence of East Turkestan in 1933 or in 1944 would have meant abandoning Chinese state interests. It also could have given additional incentive in the form of precedence to Tibet to strengthen its push for own independence (Lee 2006).

The picture is much less clear as to why Mongolia did not recognize Uyghur independence in 1933 or 1944-1949. The push for independence would have born some
familiarity for those in Mongolia, after all, because Mongolia, like East Turkestan, was itself once part of China and could conceivably empathize with the Uyghur push for independence.

Timing is likely to be a significant reason explaining why Mongolia did not recognize East Turkestan. The fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 created a political opening that both Tibet and Mongolia did their best to seize. As both states were eager to gain recognition on the world stage, these two entities attempting to gain their recognition at approximately the same time, and from the same parent state, likely made them ideal candidates for mutual support and recognition. Helping to seal the deal even further, both Tibet and Mongolia shared cultural affinities as fellow Buddhist states.

Such was not the case for relations between the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the people of Mongolia. The Uyghur bids for independence did not come until 1933 and 1944, over two decades after the push for independence from Tibet and Mongolia. By the time 1933 and 1944 had come around, Mongolia was no longer in as dire a need for recognition and support because it had already gained recognition from Tibet and was gaining the support of Russia. And because the Uyghurs were predominantly Muslim rather than Buddhist, Mongolia shared no cultural affinity for those in Xinjiang, meaning that identity relations were not favorable here as they were between Tibet and Mongolia.

Had the Uyghurs been able to declare independence in 1913, around about the time that Mongolia was seeking to strengthen its own bid for independence, a state of East Turkestan would have then been more appealing to Mongolia, making recognition of an independent Uyghur state more in line with Mongolian state interests. If the Uyghurs had also been Buddhist rather than Islamic, this likely would have helped to seal the deal because then Mongolia would have recognized more of a cultural connection, even kinship, with those in Xinjiang—making
recognition even more in Mongolian interests to help others who were like themselves. Thus, timing and cultural affinity likely played a significant role, but they were subsets of larger interests which did not align in favor of recognizing East Turkestan.

The analysis above supports my argument about factors explaining the production of opportunities for recognition. As with other cases in the study, an opportunity was created in the wake of the fall of the Qing dynasty, which created a vacuum in control and governance that culminated in two separate declarations of independence being made on behalf of the Uyghur people. East Turkestan had the support of a powerful external patron, the Soviet Union, but this support proved to be less than sufficient to garner recognition. Ultimately, state interests did not favor recognizing East Turkestan as a state, and the entity was never recognized. This shows that the same holds true in explaining both positive and negative cases of recognition: interests and opportunities prove to be the decisive factors.

3.6 CONCLUSION

As shown in this chapter, opportunities for recognition can take multiple forms and be produced in a number of ways. Declarations of independence and admission to the United Nations, for example, are two of the major routes by which such opportunities are created, though they may meet with a variety of responses by state governments. Opportunities for recognition can also emerge singly, as between one state when it recognizes another, or in combination, even in waves, such as when multiple governments recognize a state following the creation of an opportunity for recognition.
How and why opportunities for recognition emerge when they do can be explained by comparing the historical trajectories of individual cases. As shown with Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine, opportunities for recognition tend to emerge during times when political opportunities and state interests are in strong alignment, favoring an entity’s political recognition as a state. This is demonstrated especially by moments of state crisis, during which existing state political structures are weakened to the point that entities seeking recognition are in a stronger political position relative to their parent or controlling states so as to capitalize on the opportunity that state crisis and dissolution offers.

The patronage of strong states can be a critical factor in the emergence and success of opportunities for recognition. Entities with strong patrons, especially Great Powers, stand in a better position to emerge and be recognized as states than those that do not. External patronage, however, is not strictly necessary or sufficient to generate opportunities for recognition or for those opportunities to result in widespread recognition. Collectively, this study suggests that there is indeed a pattern or structuration to the production of opportunities for recognition. This pattern, described above, helps to explain not just when opportunities for recognition might emerge, but also helps to explain and predict when such opportunities stand the greatest chance of success.
4.0 CHAPTER FOUR

DISPELLING THE LEGEND OF

“MISSED OPPORTUNITIES”

As discussed in Chapter 2, an “opportunity for recognition” (OR) is a non-routine event or action which generates a greater than typical opening or shift in political alignments favoring the recognition of an entity as a state. Such opportunities are observable through state and entity actions indicating a shift of political alignments has occurred. An entity declaring independence, such as happened when the United States declared independence from England in 1776, is a concrete example. Another example of an OR taking place is when one or more governments recognize an entity as a state, such as the multiple governments that recognized South Sudan in 2011 when it broke away from Sudan and was admitted to the United Nations on July 14, 2011.

Opportunities for recognition may take different forms, but these two are perhaps the best examples and are the focus of the present study because they are most clearly identifiable by entity and state actions. An entity declaring independence can take any number of forms, none of which are necessarily more appropriate or more legitimate than the other. A declaration of independence can be observed, for example, by public statements of a political leader or group.

76 What is “typical” is, of course, always evolving and is a matter of time, place, and context. A typical shift would include regular changes in the structure of power, such as when a new government or political leader comes to power following a regularly recurring political election.

77 For a list of current members of the United Nations, please see http://www.un.org/en/members/
declaring independence. It can also be observed when an entity creates a written document formally announcing its independence. In both instances, independence is made known publically and can therefore be readily identified and traced. Independence can, of course, be declared less publicly, even in complete secrecy, but such declarations may not be viewed with the same degree of legitimacy as public declarations (Rubin 1966, 1968) because they are not made widely known and are not as open for support or challenge, either of which are instrumental if an entity is to claim that it speaks for the people.\textsuperscript{78}

In many respects, the structure of opportunities for recognition can be viewed as analogous to a person (symbolizing an entity seeking recognition) standing outside of a building (symbolizing the structure of political opportunities for recognition) with many doors (the doors symbolizing different paths and means to gain state recognition). In this scenario, the person in question may be in a position to be able to observe several doors to the building and whether or not they open or close. The person can, for example, watch others come and go, in and out of the building. Upon seeing doors that can be entered, the person may decide to attempt to enter the building. At this point, someone in the building, a type of doorman or gatekeeper, may bar them

\textsuperscript{78} This is not to say, however, that there is any objective form that a declaration of independence “must” take in order to be real and valid. To give an admittedly extreme example, political leaders could choose to write a declaration of independence on the back of a cocktail napkin and keep it hidden from view. What makes it real or valid is not whether such a declaration was written (which the objective facts would support, even in this example), but rather whether it is recognized as such, such as by the political leaders themselves, the nation they claim to represent, and by the international community at large—all of which could, individually or in some combination, hypothetically recognize something written on the back of a cocktail napkin as valid if they so desired. In fact, if leaders feared what could be high costs (such as military reprisal), one could argue that under some circumstances there may be some reason or incentive to write a declaration of independence in secret and only make it public once the timing and circumstances are more conducive to doing so.
from entering. The person trying to get in might try to enter through other doors, with varying success. The person may find a way in, they may get partway through the door (symbolizing mixed recognition), or they may remain shut out. The person may even get in, only to be kicked out at a later point in time.

But even with these different scenarios, the person initially standing outside the building is not necessarily able to see every door to the building. The building may, for example, have hidden doors or be so large that the person wishing to enter simply cannot monitor every door and its movements. This means that doors beyond the person’s purview can, potentially, open or close without the person ever being aware of it. This analogy presents the perspective of entities seeking recognition. They may or may not be able to see or take advantage of every possible opening in the structure of opportunities so as to gain recognition. In fact, openings may exist whether they can see them or not.

If governments that may or may not grant recognition are similarly symbolized by the doormen or gatekeepers, then the same holds true when the analogy above is instead seen from the perspective of the doormen and gatekeepers. That is, the doormen are aware of when a door is opened, but they may not necessarily be aware of factors that may lead them to open or close the doors to the person in question in the first place. The doormen may, for example, not be aware that the person trying to get in has a strong friend coming to help them get in. The doormen may also not be aware that the person trying to get in may have a substantial carrot in their pocket to offer in exchange for entry. It is even possible that the doorman is unaware of accumulating subtle shifts in his or her interests so that the doorman’s resistance to admitting the person outside might potentially weaken or shift, resulting, potentially, in the person being admitted.
To continue the analogy above: one cannot gain entry into a building unless there is some door, window, or other opening through which to enter. This means that an entity cannot be recognized as a state without there first being some degree of opportunity for recognition to occur (see flowchart below). All acts of political recognition are therefore preceded by an opportunity for recognition. As such, the actions of one or more states granting recognition provide concrete evidence that an opportunity for recognition was at hand. This holds true whether an entity is recognized as a state by one state government or many. Even though opportunities for recognition do not fall evenly across the society of states, the number of governments recognizing an entity as a state does not alter the fact that an opportunity for recognition was at hand. An opportunity for recognition can therefore be identified as having taken place whether an entity is recognized by one state government, all state governments, or some mixture in-between these two extremes.

**Figure 9.** Flowchart of Potential Recognition Outcomes With Initial POS Opening
An initial opening of the opportunity structure can, as shown in the simplified flowchart above, results in a number of different outcomes. One such outcome is recognition being granted (Outcome 1, above). A second is recognition being granted, which, if followed by a closure of the opportunity structure (such as if a governments’ interests change), may lead to recognition being withdrawn (Outcome 2, above). Still a third possibility is recognition to be granted, for there to be a closure of the opportunity structure resulting in recognition being withdrawn, only for a new opportunity to present itself, starting the whole cycle again. This is but a simplified overview of the different outcomes possible with an initial opening of the political opportunity structure as there may be many such permutations, with recognition being granted, withdrawn, granted again, etc.

Of course, the structure of political opportunities may also initially be closed. The doors to gain entry may be initially shut. In this case, the steps and outcomes outlined above may be inverted, so that recognition is first denied, followed by a potential opening, resulting in recognition being granted, etc. As with the possibilities present with an initial opening in the political opportunity structure, an initial closing may also result in a wide variety of outcomes. This is shown in simplified form in the flowchart below.

79 Of course, to take the analogy even further, it can be suggested that there might be times when one or more “doors” into the building might be partially or half-way open, even though the structure of opportunities tends to be “more” open or “more” closed. This can be identified, for example, if one considers that in the pR.O.C.ess of doors opening and closing that there is a period when they are in motion, passing through varying degrees of openness and closure. It is also possible that someone may use something (e.g., political influence, leverage, or even a political carrot, such as a foreign aid package) to wedge the door open. Such scenarios can certainly occur, but they tend to be ephemeral. Examining such possibilities in greater depth is beyond the purview of this study.
Strictly speaking, opportunities for recognition need not be seized upon any time they are known to an entity’s political leaders. This is because not all opportunities for recognition are created alike. Some ORs may genuinely advance the needs and interests of an entity seeking recognition. Others may not.

What determines whether recognition or an OR is viewed as worth pursuing or accepting is an ever-evolving and empirical matter. Conditions and other costs are often placed on offers of political recognition. This is done for many reasons, not the least of which are to gain concessions, acquire resources, shape an entity into a form acceptable or favorable to those granting recognition, and to influence local or regional politics (Roeder 2007; Fabry 2010; Peterson 1997; Coggins 2006, 2011; Whelan 1961). Costs or preconditions attached to an offer of recognition can hardly be said to be in an entity’s interests, for example, if those costs and conditions greatly outweigh the benefits.
Examples of this may be seen when costs or conditions require the entity to put itself in an economically or militarily vulnerable position, to undermine an entity’s sovereignty, or to encroach upon the entity’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, governments may strategically attach preconditions to offers of recognition with the strategic intent that the offer will either be turned down, because the cost is too high to the entity in question. This can be done as a matter of political theater, in which political leaders go through the motions of diplomacy and making an offer of recognition in order to frame themselves in a positive light, all the while knowing full well that an entity cannot or will not accept the offer of recognition, because the costs to them are far too high.

Taken together, these factors help to illustrate that opportunities for recognition can vary greatly in how they are viewed, acted or not acted upon, and the degree to which they are, or are not, in an entity’s best interests. Those opportunities and offers of recognition that are too costly or which would undermine an entity’s larger needs and goals, (e.g., territorial integrity, economic and military security, etc.) are not genuine opportunities and should not be viewed as such. A “genuine” opportunity for recognition is actionable and to some degree or extent furthers the genuine needs and interests of the entity seeking recognition. It is not purely unilateral, intended to benefit only or overwhelmingly the government offering recognition. Of course, what makes an opportunity for recognition “genuine” can be both ever-evolving and highly subjective. It can be a matter of degrees and perspective, and is by no means always clear or absolute. It may require some degree of bargaining or trade. It may also require concessions on part of the entity seeking recognition, the government extending recognition, or both.
4.1 IDENTIFYING “MISSED OPPORTUNITIES”

These considerations help with the identification of opportunities for recognition, and are central to this study’s investigation into claims of missed opportunities. A missed opportunity for recognition, after all, must necessarily follow an opportunity for recognition in time. Missed opportunities cannot happen without opportunities first taking place.

As described in Chapter 2, “missed opportunities for recognition” (MORs) are instances in which there were opportunities for recognition, but where recognition was not granted, sought, or accepted due to some form of error or errors made by an entity’s political leaders. Calling an opportunity a “missed” opportunity implies that there was reasonable and greater than normal potential for recognition that was being sought to have been granted. Considering that not all opportunities are created equal, to label an opportunity as “missed” further suggests that the opportunity or offer for recognition did not pose costs or burdens so high on the entity so as to necessarily make it something impractical, unrealistic, or otherwise that could not be accepted. Labeling an opportunity as “missed” also suggests that there was necessarily some error involved by the leaders of the entity seeking recognition, otherwise recognition would have been granted.

To ignore missed opportunities is to invite replication of previous failed attempts to gain recognition. This would waste considerable time and resources, not to mention human life in the case of war and other violent conflicts, in the process. Therefore, given the stakes involved, entities can be expected to have a strong interest in identifying missed opportunities for recognition. This is necessary so as to learn from past mistakes and reduce the potential cost of repeated failure.

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The identification of MORs, however, is more complex than that of identifying opportunities for recognition. This is because where the ORs on which this study focuses can be identified through observable discourse and political behavior, the presence of MORs is suggested not by the presence of something observable, such as a declaration of independence or a wave of governments granting recognition, but rather by its absence. Nevertheless, MORs, if they were to occur, would be expected, like ORs, to have a discernible political reality. They would be observable through political discourse and behavior.

Because MORs must necessarily follow from ORs, the first step in identifying MORs is to identify the presence of ORs. Once ORs that did not result in recognition have been identified, they must then be evaluated to determine if political leaders made errors that resulted in an OR being missed. They must also be evaluated to determine if ORs not resulting in recognition were not the result of errors, but rather the result of strategy and interests. If an OR was missed due to error, then a MOR can be said to have occurred. If, however, an OR was allowed to pass, i.e., due not to error or failure but rather to deliberation and political strategizing, then a MOR cannot be said to have occurred. In that instance, what is observed cannot be termed a “missed” opportunity, but rather one that has been allowed to pass.80

The considerations outlined above can be summarized in Table 1, below, as follows:

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80 Indeed, if an opportunity is too costly, impractical, or unrealistic, it is questionable as to whether it could truly be called an “opportunity” in the first place.
While it is beyond the purview of this study to explore the various permutations and combinations that can be assembled from these criteria in greater depth, the argument thus far illustrates that ORs are not always clear or apparent to the leadership of entity’s seeking recognition. This is complicated by the observation that ORs can, and often do, vary in degree and form. In this sense, ORs can be just as difficult to identify and quantify, and just as hotly contested, as is the statehood of the entities seeking recognition. Thus, an event most clearly meeting all of the seven criteria above can be most readily identified as an OR, while

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria of Opportunities for Recognition (ORs) vs. Missed Opportunities for Recognition (MORs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OR</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Non-routine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Indicates the presence of a greater than typical opening or shift in political alignments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Favors the recognition of an entity as a state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. May take different forms and have different indicators (e.g., public statements or declarations of independence, status upgrades at the United Nations, recognition by one or more states, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Need not necessarily be accepted or acted upon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Are more than political theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Must be actionable and not so costly as to be unacceptable or impractical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: All criteria for an OR must occur before an MOR can be said to occur. MORs cannot exist without an OR first taking place.
circumstances meeting fewer criteria suggest a decreasing likelihood that something can be properly described as an OR.\footnote{1}

The table above also calls attention to the two key features of MORs. These are namely that the conditions of an OR must first be present in order for an event in which recognition was not sought, granted, or accepted to be termed a MOR. That is to say that a MOR cannot come into being, or be correctly claimed to have occurred, without there first being an OR. The table also draws attention to the second criteria necessary in identifying MORs, namely there must be errors or failures made by an entity’s political leaders.

As suggested by George and Holl (2000), “missed opportunities” can result from any one of several errors or failures made by political leaders. Their typology was crafted so as to aid in the identification of missed opportunities within the context of preventive diplomacy, policymaking, intelligence gathering, and analysis. As these topic areas have substantial overlap with the study at hand, and similarly speak to the question of how to identify missed opportunities, George and Holl’s typology\footnote{2} can be readily adapted for use in identifying MORs as shown in Table 12, below.

\footnote{1}{For the present purpose of theory construction, this study focuses on what are perhaps the most clear instances in which ORs can said to have been present, namely declarations of independence, status upgrades at the United Nations, and recognition of an entity by one or more state governments (e.g., “waves” of recognition, in which an entity was recognized by multiple governments in a short period of time). Future studies will be necessary to more fully explore the dynamics suggested above.}

Table 12
Typology of Missed Opportunities for Recognition (MORs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. No Response</td>
<td>Stems from no response by leaders or policy makers of a would-be state to indicators that recognition might be granted or stand a greater chance for recognition if a particular action were taken. Leaders have indicators that recognition might be achieved, but ignore these signs or view them, unjustly, as insufficiently reliable, too equivocal, or uncertain, and therefore they take no action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Inadequate Response</td>
<td>Similar to &quot;No Response,&quot; above, except that rather than taking no action in response to indicators that recognition might be achieved they rather do not take enough action. Leaders fail to take the necessary, appropriate, or needed response to secure recognition or make recognition more likely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Inadequate Analysis</td>
<td>Involves faulty analysis, forecast, or assessment of context or dynamics surrounding recognition, or of what is to occur or of indicators that recognition might be granted or stand a greater chance of being granted if a particular course of action were taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inappropriate Response</td>
<td>Involves actions or other responses to an opportunity for recognition that are misconceived, harmful, inappropriate, or exploitative to citizens of a would-be state. Example: Political leaders of a would-be state using an opportunity for recognition as a means to increase their personal wealth rather than achieving state recognition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Inconsistent Response</td>
<td>Opportunity for recognition being met with actions inconsistent with gaining recognition or strengthening chances for recognition. A more consistent response is called-for, appropriate, or would otherwise bolster case for recognition. Actions or statements may be contradictory to achieving recognition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Incomplete Response</td>
<td>Necessary actions, follow-through, etc., for being recognized are known by an entity's political leaders and are practical, but are not followed-through or carried-out, are ignored, not acted upon, or otherwise not put into motion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Contradictory Response</td>
<td>Efforts to secure recognition are undermined or contradicted by an entity's leaders. Example: Entity leaders make efforts to achieve recognition, but then claim the entity is not a state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: In all cases, an MOR cannot be said to have occurred if actions were strategic or deliberate, or if taking action to secure recognition were viewed as too costly, impractical, or otherwise contrary to an entity's interests. Note that these MOR categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may, at times, overlap or co-occur.
It should be pointed out that each of these cases involves errors, failures, and oversights in judgment, analysis, or action. As such, instances in which any necessary information was withheld, made secret, or was otherwise unavailable to an entity’s leaders cannot accurately be termed an error or oversight. Such information simply was not available and therefore cannot reasonably be expected to have been available to be factored into a leader’s decision making. Leaders can only act with the information available to them, information which is never perfect or complete, through no fault their own.

Leaders are also substantially shaped, sometimes even limited, to a particular set of goals and interests\(^{83}\). As such, actions and decisions that would substantially undermine those goals and interests cannot be accurately labeled as the result of errors or failures. They are, instead, the result of goal-oriented behaviors, the results of deliberation and strategy. And, because leaders can only act in the present, without the benefit of knowing how their actions will necessarily unfold, it is similarly inaccurate to make claims that something was a mistake or error when such a judgment can only be made in retrospect. To suggest the contrary in any of these contexts (i.e., that information was necessarily complete and available, that the future results of policies and actions could be predicted accurately, that leaders will take actions that necessarily undermine an entity’s larger goals and interests, etc.) is to engage in conjecture.

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\(^{83}\) This, of course, is not universally or always or necessarily the case in all instances. Leaders often have multiple and competing interests which may evolve or be abandoned over time given the right circumstances.
4.2 WAS THERE A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR TIBET?

The Tibetan declaration of independence in 1913 provides a useful starting point from which to evaluate potential missed opportunities for recognition. This is because the declaration, once issued, presented governments with the opportunity to recognize the entity as a state on the world stage. That most of the world governments did not recognize Tibet might be taken to suggest some error or failure on part of the Dalai Lama.

Such views, however, misrepresent the situation Tibet faced at the time. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Tibet was heavily isolated relative to other states before the early 20th century. This isolationism was brought about in part by its geographical isolation, being located in the remote Himalayan Mountains. Tibet’s geographical isolation was further supported by China’s effective imposition of a “forbidden land” policy on Tibet, through which Tibetan borders were closed to foreigners, especially the British and the Russians. China led Tibet to believe that this isolationism would help protect Tibetan culture and spirituality from foreign invasion and corruption. With a strong desire to protect their ways of life, Tibet embraced isolationism and called upon China to handle its external affairs and provide military protection. This relationship between China and Tibet has become known as a “chö-yön” relationship (van Walt van Praag 1987; Anand 2009; Smith 2004; Lin 2006).

The chö-yön, or priest-patron, is a special relationship between Tibet and China. In it, the patron state, China, provides military protection and handles the foreign affairs of the priest, Tibet. This is done in exchange for the priest attending to the patron’s religious and spiritual needs. Protection in this relationship does not imply superiority of the protector over the protected, and therefore cannot be easily categorized or defined in current international legal
terms. Instead, both parties in the relationship exist as equals, with neither being subordinate or superior to the other. It is this equality and the maintenance of independence by both parties that distinguishes the chö-yön relationship from its closest political counterparts, such as suzerainty, in which two states are not equal, with the more powerful being sovereign or overlord to the subordinate other (van Walt van Praag 1987; Smith 2004; Lin 2006).

Within this context, it is important to remember that until Tibet was invaded by Britain, and later China, Tibet’s foreign relations were confined to Britain, India, China, and Russia. Due in large part to the “forbidden land” policy imposed by China on Tibet, few governments beyond this small circle actually knew about Tibet’s existence, let alone its legal standing. (Sloane 2002; van Walt van Praag, 1987; Bajoria 2008; Lixiong and Shakya 2009). Because few governments knew much about Tibet, it not having been recognized by many world governments cannot accurately be interpreted as an indication that it lacked statehood. It was rather a reflection of the widespread ignorance about Tibet that prevailed at the time.

Thus, Tibet not being recognized by most of the world’s governments cannot be accurately labeled as a failure on part of the Dalai Lama to secure recognition. The Dalai Lama declaring independence in 1913 was, in fact, quite the opposite. The fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 gave Tibet an opportunity to evict the Chinese army and to operate as an independent state from 1913 to 1951 (Anand 2009). The Dynasty’s collapse also created a political opening in the opportunity structure of recognition, an opportunity the Dalai Lama seized by declaring independence. And the Dalai Lama’s actions were not without some measure of success. Following the declaration of independence, Tibet soon was recognized by the then nascent state of Mongolia, which had also declared itself a state in 1911 following the fall of the Qing dynasty in China that same year (Rubin 1968; van Walt van Praag 1987; Narangoa 2009). Tibet could not
have been recognized as a state by Mongolia without the opportunity for recognition first being present. Mongolia seizing the opportunity and exchanging mutual recognition with Tibet demonstrates that the opportunity was not lost, but was rather seized.

The Tibetan declaration of independence therefore presents an instance in which an opportunity for recognition was met with mixed results. The larger question that remains, however, is whether or not the Tibetan declaration of independence might still have been a missed opportunity for recognition with respect to China and Britain, the two states having what is arguably the greatest interest and investment in Tibet.

Express or de jure recognition of Tibet at the time of its declaration of independence was contrary to the interests of China and Britain. And it is on this basis that the Tibetan declaration cannot be correctly labeled as a missed opportunity.

British attempts to open trade relations with Tibet culminated in Britain invading Tibet in 1903-1904. At the time, Tibet had much to offer Britain. Tibet offered a potential backdoor entry into the Chinese trade market that was otherwise closed to Westerners. Tibet was also valuable in and of itself for trade and commercial purposes for the British. Thus, the British invasion was driven by economic self-interests on part of the British (Bajoria 2008; Lixiong and Shakya 2009; Anand 2009; van Walt van Praag 1987).

The British invasion weakened Tibet, breaking their power to resist China. This weakened position lead Tibet to seek assistance from China on the basis of their chö-yön relationship. China exploited Tibet’s weakened position, however, and responded to the British invasion by sending in troops and by attempting to increase China’s political control over Tibet. This was meant in part to support the Chinese empire’s long-held interests in annexing Tibet. It
was also meant to shore up Tibet, which Chinese officials saw as a strategic base from which Britain might invade China (Bajoria 2008; Lixiong and Shakya 2009).

In 1910, China sent an army into Lhasa with the hopes of making Tibet a province of China and to prevent further British encroachment. The Xinhai revolution the following year, however, led to the fall of the imperial Qing dynasty. Chinese troops were driven out of Tibet, and Tibet declared independence in 1913 (Bajoria 2008; Sloane 2002; Lixiong and Shakya 2009).

That China did not recognize Tibetan independence does not mean that Tibet missed an opportunity with China in 1913. This is because there was no failure on part of the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan government. The Dalai Lama cannot be said to have fallen prey to the error of “no response” because when the opportunity became apparent, the Dalai Lama acted swiftly and decisively to declare independence. Such a bold action is consistent with Tibetan goals of self-determination, and therefore cannot be considered to be an error of “misused opportunity” or “inconsistent response.” The timing of the declaration was also critical and came as soon as the opportunity arose. Had the Dalai Lama waited much longer, the opportunity might have passed. It therefore cannot be considered to have been an “inadequate analysis” or to have fallen prey to any of the other errors outlined in the MOR typology above because recognition from China would have been contrary to Chinese interests at the time. China, after all, was firmly interested in annexing Tibet, in consolidating control to a territory it had claimed for centuries.

Recognition from parent states and Great Powers often holds tremendous sway in how an entity is treated and whether or not an entity is recognized by other states (Coggins 2006; Kolstø 2006; Berlin 2014; Crawford 2007); therefore China recognizing Tibet as a state would have been the ultimate stroke in Tibetan recognition. Thus, had China recognized Tibet, it would have
meant strengthening Tibet’s political position on the world stage, giving Tibet a stronger position from which to resist Chinese annexation. Therefore, the Dalai Lama’s declaration of independence could not have stood a realistic chance of resulting in recognition from China. This was not due to failure on part of the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan government, but rather due to the interests of China.

Britain, like China, never formally recognized Tibet, but this response to the Tibetan declaration of independence is far more complex than it might at first appear. Because treaty relations can only be entered into between sovereign and independent states, Britain entering into a convention with Tibet in 1904 implies British recognition of a Tibetan state prior to the 1913 declaration of independence. This implicit recognition is further supported by a confidential memo authored by the British Foreign Office. The memo (van Walt van Praag 1987: 53) said that “His majesty’s government, while they have formally recognized the ‘suzerain rights’ of China in Thibet, have never recognized , and are not prepared to recognize, the right of China to intervene actively in the internal administration of Thibet.” The memo concluded that Tibet had, since 1913, enjoyed control over her internal affairs, and because Tibet had also been successful in entering into relations with foreign states, Tibet must therefore be regarded as a state. This implies recognition to the time of the Tibetan declaration of independence. It also suggests that the declaration was at least partially successful if it gained recognition, even if recognition was only implicit.

If Britain recognized Tibet, the question then becomes why Britain did so implicitly rather than explicitly. And the answer to this question can be found in British interests. From the British perspective, Tibet was very alluring. Tibet provided a potential market for Britain, giving the British an opportunity to expand their economic interests beyond neighboring British India.
Tibet was also very appealing to the British because it offered a potential backdoor by which they might enter into the Chinese market, a market that was otherwise closed to Westerners (Bajoria 2008; Lixiong and Shakya 2009; Anand 2009; van Walt van Praag 1987). If Britain had voiced explicit recognition of Tibet, this would antagonize their relationship with China, thereby endangering British economic interests. The Tibetan declaration of independence not resulting in explicit recognition from Britain was therefore not the result of error. Some degree of limited or implicit recognition might have been the best Tibet could have hoped for because recognizing Tibet, if only implicitly, enabled Britain to enter into relations with Tibet while also protecting their interests in China.

Thus, Tibet did not miss an opportunity to gain recognition from China because recognition would have meant endangering China’s imperial interests in Tibet. Tibet also did not miss an opportunity to gain explicit recognition from Britain because such recognition would have endangered British interests with respect to China and Tibet. And Tibet did not miss an opportunity with respect to other state governments because they were largely unaware of Tibet’s legal standing at the time.

4.3 WAS THERE A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR TAIWAN?

As discussed in the previous chapter, U.S. efforts in 1971 to seat the R.O.C. in the U.N. alongside China suggests that there was an opportunity at hand for Taiwan to be explicitly recognized as a new state by the United States. That Taiwan was not explicitly recognized by the U.S. in 1971 might be taken to suggest that the R.O.C. missed an opportunity for political recognition, an opportunity whose final death blow came when the U.S. de-recognized the
R.O.C. and recognized the P.R.C. on January 1, 1979. An examination of the facts reveals, however, that Taiwan not being explicitly recognized by the U.S. between 1971 and 1979 was not the result of errors made by the leadership of Taiwan. It therefore cannot be considered a true missed opportunity.

To begin with, the leadership of Taiwan did not make the mistake of “no response.” In the years leading up to 1971, the R.O.C. was well aware that the P.R.C. was making political gains in the U.N. at its expense, evidenced by the growing number of governments recognizing the P.R.C. while de-recognizing the R.O.C. That Taipei vocally opposed being seated alongside the P.R.C. in the U.N., both to the U.S. and others, for example, demonstrates action the R.O.C. was taking to oppose the P.R.C. gaining power at its expense. Had Taipei not voiced this opposition, it would have meant strengthening the P.R.C.’s hand, making their ouster all the more likely. When it became clear that the only way to retain a seat in the U.N. was to take the US’s suggestion of dual representation, the R.O.C. took again took action by agreeing with the U.S. and seeking dual representation. And when the R.O.C. was ousted from the U.N., largely due to U.S. normalization of relations with the P.R.C., the R.O.C. took action by ending its political coordination with the U.S. (Roy 2003)--which, it became apparent, had been used against them in an effort for the U.S. to have it both ways with the R.O.C. and the P.R.C. Given that the U.S. appears to have gone back on its word of supporting the R.O.C., to have continued coordinating with the U.S. would have meant helping the U.S. undermine the position of the R.O.C..

Even in the years following their ouster, the R.O.C. continued taking actions to strengthen its hand and regain control of the mainland and its seat at the U.N. The R.O.C., for example, continued trying to win U.S. support of its claims, arguing that U.S. support of the
P.R.C. would alienate them from their fellow democratic governments. The R.O.C. also considered improving relations with the U.S.S.R. in hopes that this flirtation would gain the attention, and help shift the position, of the United States in their favor (Roy 2003). Given that the U.S. saw China and the P.R.C. as a counterweight to the U.S.S.R. (U.S. Department of State 2011), this was smart thinking by the R.O.C. because it meant putting themselves in a position similar to that of China in terms of offering themselves as a potential counterweight to the U.S.S.R. Thus, as these examples illustrate, the R.O.C. did not make the fatal mistake of “no response” in the years leading up to or following their ouster from the United Nations.

But might there have been an “inadequate response” or “inadequate analysis” on behalf of the R.O.C. leadership that led to their loss of recognition? Might there also have been misused opportunities, inconsistent, incomplete, or contradictory responses? The answer to all these questions appears to be a resounding “no.” To stand up to scrutiny, a claim of inadequate response or inadequate analysis requires, first and foremost, that the necessary information to make a sound decision and response be available. Such was clearly not the case for the R.O.C.

The U.S. did not consult, much less coordinate, its warming relations to the P.R.C. with representatives of the R.O.C. (Roy 2003; Tucker 2005). President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were very much aware of the need to keep Taipei distracted without making commitments that would hamper relations with the P.R.C. As time progressed, U.S. officials withheld increasing amounts of information from the R.O.C. This was a move calculated to deprive the R.O.C. of a clear sense of their machinations, to disguise knowledge that Sino-American relations were gaining momentum (Tucker 2005). This is reflective of the strategic ambiguity that typified US-R.O.C. relations and is evidenced further by the U.S. not explicitly stating what it viewed the status of Taiwan to be in the US-P.R.C. joint communiqués of 1972.
and 1979 (Kan 2014). Without the information necessary to make informed decisions in its relations with the US, Taiwan was placed at a disadvantage by the US. This can hardly be said to have been the fault of R.O.C. representatives, and therefore R.O.C. actions in the years leading up to and following the expulsion of the R.O.C. in 1971 from the U.N. cannot be considered to be the result of inadequate response or inadequate analysis.

Efforts by the R.O.C. also cannot be rightfully labeled as misused opportunities, inconsistent, incomplete, or contradictory responses. To the contrary, the R.O.C. took every step it could to consistently secure and strengthen its position during the 1970s. During this time period, the R.O.C. took opportunity to strengthen and build diplomatic ties with the US. In addition to the political strategizing to strengthen ties with the U.S. by feigning warming R.O.C. relations with the U.S.S.R., mentioned above, the R.O.C. opened new consulates in the U.S. in 1973-1974 to help publicize the position of the R.O.C. and to build additional commercial ties between the U.S. and Taiwan (Bellows 1976). As frequently happens between allies, the R.O.C. also acted on its behalf by attempting to infiltrate the U.S. government in order to frustrate moves to de-recognize the R.O.C. and to counter the P.R.C.’s growing influence (Manthorpe 2005).

The R.O.C.’s efforts ultimately did not succeed, but this lack of success, as shown above, was not the result of failure on part of R.O.C. leadership. It was instead, as described above, due to events and circumstances beyond the control of the R.O.C. The R.O.C. could not have prevented the U.S. from using shady behind the scenes dealings and concealing vital information from the R.O.C. in order to warm its relationship with the P.R.C. The R.O.C. also could not have prevented the swell of countries gaining admission to the U.N. during the 1960s, nor could the R.O.C. have prevented them from warming to the P.R.C. as a new and growing political and
economic market. The R.O.C. also could not have known, without the benefit of hindsight, how its political strategizing would have panned-out so that they could, perhaps, have made different decisions. That means that the R.O.C. did not miss any opportunities that might have resulted in explicit recognition from the US. The R.O.C. could only do the best with what it knew and was capable of at the time, which it did at every turn.

4.4 WAS THERE A MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR PALESTINE?

Since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of a Palestinian national identity in the 1920s to 1940s, there have been several opportunities for the U.S. and Israel to recognize the statehood of Palestine. These include, most notable, the 1948 declaration of independence by the All Palestine Government (APG) (Quigley 2010: 108), the 1988 declaration of independence by the PLO, and the 2012 vote in the U.N. to upgrade Palestine’s status to a non-member state. One can determine whether or not these reflected missed opportunities to gain recognition from the U.S. and Israel by examining the interests of both, as well as the interests and position of Palestine, at the time of each of these occurrences.

To briefly summarize the argument to follow, the declarations of independence in 1948 and 1988, as well as Palestine’s 2012 status upgrade to a non-member state, do not amount to missed opportunities with respect to the U.S. and Israel because, throughout its history since 1948, there has been little that Palestinian leaders could have done, short of abandoning their interests to make themselves more appealing and “recognizable” to the U.S. and Israel. Even

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84 As with Taiwan, and indeed any other entity or state, this is not to say that it was completely impossible for representatives of Palestine to have abandoned their goals, interests, or principles. Hypothetically, there may be
Despite their giving some amount of economic and political support to Palestine, the interests of the U.S. and Israel, in the grander scheme, have been strongly aligned against Palestine. That means non-recognition from the U.S. and Israel is not the result of errors made by Palestine, but is rather due to U.S. and Israeli interests and actions aligning against them. This can be demonstrated through a brief examination of interlocking U.S. and Israeli interests which have undermined Palestine since 1948.

Broadly speaking, Israeli interests typically center on the desire to safeguard what many Israelis view as their national home for the Jewish people. Based on a history of genocide and discrimination, many Israelis are afraid that they will not survive as a state. And it is based in large part on these fears that many proponents of Zionism are willing to fight to maintain the “Jewish” nature of Israel (Rosner 2014; Gust 2008). Based on these fears and values, many Israelis view themselves as the victims of the Palestinians85, whom many view not as freedom fighters protesting to regain their homelands from a U.N.-recognized occupation, but rather as violent terrorists, not to be trusted. The Israeli government has been unwilling to divide Jerusalem, which it claims as its state capital. Israel also seeks to maintain their “settlements” and is against the Palestinian “right of return” for Palestinians and their descendants, now

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85Israelis hold a very diverse set of values, beliefs, and perceptions, and not all Israelis are necessarily anti-Palestinian. Some Israelis have supported Palestine’s bid for recognition and independence. These pro-Palestine supporters are represent a minority position in the landscape of Israeli voices.
numbering some 5,000,000 people (Zaidan 2012) who have been forced from their homes since the creation of the Israeli state in 1948.

U.S. interests tightly interlock with those of Israel. The U.S., much like Britain before it, has a lengthy history of privileging Israeli interests over those of Palestine. These interests are based in no small part on an agenda, rooted in the Cold War, viewing Israel as a strategic asset through which the U.S. hopes to gain influence in oil-producing regions like the Middle East (Khalidi 2007). And with Palestine being in a weak position relative to other well-established states, especially Israel, the U.S. can safely ignore and dismiss the rights and interests of Palestine because there is little Palestine can do about it and because Palestine has little to offer the U.S. that might sway American interests in their favor. The bond between the U.S. and Israel is further strengthened by close cultural and religious ties between the U.S. and Israel, to the point that many Americans view the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine as appropriate and coinciding with Christian prophesies. The U.S. also has strong economic incentives to support Israel over and above Palestine because Israel is one of the major purchasers of American military arms. This helps fuel the U.S. economy and provides the U.S. with a middleman through which to sell arms to other countries with which America does not want to do direct business. Based on these close cultural and religious affinities, as well as economic and political incentives, the U.S. has for many years sought to give Israel a qualitative military edge over other countries in the Middle East (Khalidi 2007; Nassar 1991; Zanotti 2012).

For the reasons briefly outlined above, Israeli and U.S. non-recognition of Palestine can be understood as an expression of the interests of both state governments. Israel does not recognize Palestine because to do otherwise would support Palestine’s bid for independence, which would strengthen Palestinian claims on what Israelis have come to view as their
homeland. And with Israel functioning in a role analogous to that of a parent state with respect to Palestine, recognition from Israel would likely be the final move in realizing true Palestinian independence and recognition as a state on the world stage. The U.S. similarly does not recognize Palestine because it does not want to antagonize its relationship with Israel or lose the economic and political advantages that close ties with Israel bring.

This strong political alignment between the U.S. and Israel against Palestine helps to explain why the U.S. and Israel do not recognize Palestine. It also helps explain why the Palestinian declarations of independence in 1948 and 1988, as well as the status upgrade in 2012, do not amount to missed opportunities made by Palestine to secure recognition from the U.S. and Israel.

In considering whether or not there were missed opportunities for Palestine to win recognition from the U.S. and Israel, it would be inaccurate to label the 1948 and 1988 declarations of independence and the 2012 U.N. status upgrade of Palestine as errors of “no response” or “inadequate response.” This is because declaring independence and fighting for a status upgrade in the United Nations is no small matter. They require considerable strategizing, careful timing, and effort. Contrary to being the result of no response or inadequate response, these actions were bold and strong moves. And, considering how they resulted in Palestine’s recognition by over 100 state governments, and built into a status upgrade at the U.N., one can say that the efforts of Palestine’s representatives have, cumulatively, been very successful despite the difficult circumstances and overwhelming opposition they have faced and continue to face.

It could be argued that the declarations of independence in 1948 and 1988, as well as the 2012 status upgrade, were the result of inadequate analyses and misused opportunities because
they were not arrived at sooner and did not result in statehood recognition from the U.S. and Israel. Such arguments, however, can only be made by overlooking the facts on the ground and the position of Palestine and its people at the time of each of these opportunities for recognition.

The situation of the Palestinian people in 1948 can hardly be said to have been favorable for gaining recognition from the U.S. and Israel. In May of 1948, Israel was able to emerge in a favorable position and declare its statehood because of overwhelming support received from the British (Khalidi 2007). Even with explicit promises from Britain that an independent state would be created for the Arab people emerging from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Israel occupied some 80% of Palestinian territory when it declared independence. Palestine was therefore in a weak position politically and militarily as compared to Israel. This was a position engineered by the British, which not only helped support Israeli state-building activities, such as developing governmental infrastructure, but also took official form in British foreign policy (Quigley 2010). Early on, the British voiced their support of a Zionist project in the land of Palestine. One letter from the British cabinet said, “His Majesty’s government view[ed] with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” (Quigley 2010: 14). This sentiment was later echoed in the Balfour Declaration (1924), in which “It was designed to enlist on behalf of the Allies the sympathy of influential Jews and Jewish organizations all over the world” (Quigley 2010: 14). The creation of an independent state for the Arab people was never even mentioned in the Balfour Declaration, a strategic omission reflecting racism against the Arab people, the desire to effectively write them out of existence, to weaken the position of those who remained in the region, and to benefit the ultimate victory of the Allies (Khalidi 2007; Quigley 2010; Krämer 2008).
Under such unfavorable circumstance, illustrated briefly above, it cannot be fairly said that the people of Palestine were in a good position to declare independence before Israel could do so in May of 1948. This was not the result of inadequate analyses or misused opportunities, but rather reflected the facts on the ground that had been strategically engineered against them. Despite these circumstances, however, the All Palestine Government rallied what resources it could and declared independence in October, 1948. This was a bold, strategic move (and one in which opportunity may not have been great but which was nonetheless seized), given the interests aligned against them, by which they made it known in no uncertain terms that the people of Palestine would fight for their right to statehood.

The next major opportunity for recognizing Palestine emerged in the wake of the 1987 intifada, or uprising, which helped raise national awareness of the people of Palestine. Protests over the occupation of Palestine led to proposals for a declaration of Palestine’s international status, which quickly saw the removal of claims made on the West Bank by the King of Jordan. King Hussein, on July 31, 1988, issued a declaration that he was removing himself from the West Bank and that the P.L.O. had responsibility for the area. This supported the representative nature of the PLO, and helped remove Jordanian claims on Palestine (Nassar 1991; Quigley 2010), thereby making it easier for the entity to make its bid for recognition and independence. The 1987 intifada helped shift the balance of power to forces inside Palestine (Hammami and Tamari 2000). In this way, the P.L.O. seized the opportunity created by the success of the intifada, declaring independence in response to the needs of the Palestinian people, the PLO, and its strategic needs to improve relations with foreign states, namely the U.S. (Pappe 2006).

The Declaration called for an independent state of Palestine that no longer sought the eradication of the state of Israel. This new strategy by the P.L.O. made Palestinian statehood
more appealing to many Palestinians and something that could be more easily supported by those in the U.S. and beyond—making it possible to be a supporter of Palestine without being viewed as anti-Semitic (Khalidi 2006). But even with this opportunity for recognition at hand, evidenced by approximately 100 governments recognizing Palestine’s statehood by early 1989 (Quigley 2010), U.S. and Israeli interests remained steadfast in their alignment against Palestine. Palestinians were still required, for example, by the U.S. and Israel to bring an end to their resistance to the illegal occupation of Israel as a precondition to negotiating for an end to the occupation (Khalidi 2006). This demonstrates that U.S. and Israeli interests were aligned against Palestine because they would not consider negotiating with Palestine unless it was on terms that would privilege their interests at the expense of the Palestinian people. In fact, ever since the time of President Woodrow Wilson, numerous U.S. political leaders have shown strong support and sympathy for the Zionist movement, a sympathy based on far-reaching cultural and religious affinities that united many in America with those in Israel, to the point that Palestinian rights do not matter to a number of political leaders in the U.S. (Khalidi 2013).

Concrete examples of this long-standing alignment of the U.S. and Israel against Palestine are numerous and well-known. In 1975, for example, Henry Kissinger made a secret deal with Israel, a Memo of Understanding, in which the U.S. committed to not “recognize or negotiate” with the P.L.O. until it had recognized Israel’s right to exist, without making any similar demand on the part of Israel to recognize the right of Palestine to also exist (Khalidi 2013: 2). Going further than this, such as labeling the P.L.O. as little more than an illegitimate terrorist organization and excluding Palestine from the Egyptian-Israeli 1978 peace talks at Camp David have enabled the U.S. and Israel to avoid dealing with Palestine in a meaningful way (Khalidi 2013: 10-13). The U.S. and Israel continued with their staunch opposition against
Palestine well into the 21st century. Israel, for example, advanced its occupation over Palestine, pushing for more and more “settlements” designed to push Palestinians out of their lands (BBC 2013). The U.S. also actively campaigned against Palestine in its bid for U.N. membership in 2011-2012 (Khalidi 2013). This reflects a deeper historical alignment against Palestine, which is brought into starker relief considering that President Obama, not a year later, would go on to encourage people to look at the world from the perspective of many Palestinian people when he said,

"It is not fair that a Palestinian child cannot grow up in a state of her own, and lives with the presence of a foreign army that controls the movements of her parents every single day. It is not just when settler violence against Palestinians goes unpunished. It is not right to prevent Palestinians from farming their lands; to restrict a student's ability to move around the West Bank; or to displace Palestinian families from their home." (CNN 2013).

This may well be another version of the type of strategic ambiguity, one might even say “strategic hypocrisy,” similar to that the U.S. has used in its relationship with Taiwan in that in both situations, with both Taiwan and Palestine, the U.S. has said one thing and then done another—all the while steadily advancing its interests at others’ expense.

Taken together, U.S. and Israeli efforts in 1948, 1988, and 2012 against Palestine reflect a long-standing opposition to the recognition of Palestinian statehood. With the overwhelming resources and influence of the US, including its veto power in the U.N. Security Council, it is not at all difficult to see why Palestine has had such a difficult time emerging as a fully fledged
independent state. Palestine has not missed any opportunities to advance its cause for recognized statehood. In fact, the leadership of Palestine have strategized and actively sought out new opportunities to gain recognition. It having been recognized by over 100 governments around the world is an impressive accomplishment considering that Palestine has been consistently outmaneuvered and out-gunned at every step by powerful alliances set against it.

4.5 DUBIOUS CLAIMS

As this chapter has thus far illustrated, a closer look at the facts reveals that missed opportunities did not come into being for Tibet, Taiwan, or Palestine during the time periods in question. In each of these cases, entities seeking recognition of their independent statehood were outmaneuvered, outgunned, and otherwise fell victim to interests and circumstances that were beyond their control. What we have, then, is not an occurrence of genuine missed opportunities for recognition, but rather claims about missed opportunities.

4.5.1 Tibet

Melvyn C. Goldstein, an anthropologist, raises one such claim of a missed opportunity in the second volume of his book, *A Modern History of Tibet* (2007). In discussing the Dalai Lama’s fleeing Tibet in 1950 during the invasion of China, Goldstein writes that “The Dalai Lama perhaps missed an opportunity to use going into exile as leverage to negotiate directly with the Chinese… but this option was never raised, because the Tibetan government was not ready to discuss anything” (Goldstein 2007: 156).
What Goldstein says was up for negotiation, had the Dalai Lama decided to do so, were various provisions of the 17 Point Agreement, signed in 1951. The Agreement was not reached through informed or mutual consent. It also held that Tibet was a part of China and gave China sovereignty over Tibet. The Agreement was signed by Tibetan officials under duress, was arrived at through coercion, and was signed without consultation with the Dalai Lama. This made the agreement null and void in the leader’s view (Bajoria 2008; H.H. Dalai Lama 2012).

As the Agreement touched directly on the legal and political nature of Tibet and its statehood, Goldstein’s claim that there was a missed opportunity has direct bearing on the recognition of Tibetan statehood.

Goldstein’s claim is dubious at best. China’s invasion of Tibet put the Lamaist state in a weakened international position. There was no opportunity least of all for recognition, at hand during this time because Tibet did re-declare independence or seek membership in the United Nations. The leadership of Tibet did attempt to retain control of their state, namely by seeking the support and assistance of other world governments and trying to defend itself militarily, but their actions were ultimately not successful largely because of the overwhelming force of China, Tibet’s own lack of resources (such as an army large enough and well-equipped to stave off the invasion) combined with other governments being occupied with the Cold War and the war in Vietnam (Sloane 2002; H.H. Dalai Lama 1990).

Thus, Goldstein’s claim is doubtful because an opportunity for recognition at during this time period, with the Dalai Lama fleeing Lhasa, was hardly at hand. And without an opportunity for recognition, a missed opportunity cannot take place. Goldstein’s claim is further weakened because he does not appear to suggest how or why the 17 Point Agreement might have been up for negotiation, or to what ends such negotiations might have been directed. The Tibetan leader
fleeing Lhasa can hardly be said to reflect a position of strength on part of the Dalai Lama, and a strong position surely would have been necessary to negotiate for anything with the Chinese, especially concerning Tibetan statehood. When combined, a weakened position and a lack of there being an opportunity for recognition demonstrates that there was no opportunity at hand, least of all for the political recognition of Tibet.

4.5.2 Taiwan

Claims of missed opportunities have been made with respect to Taiwan, as well. In an article published in the *News and Courier*, Philip Wagner (1971) argued that Taiwan and the Great Powers missed the opportunity to establish an independent state of Taiwan in the 1940s. By that time, he argues, a nationalist spirit and movement for independence had grown within Taiwan, which had a functioning government under Chiang Kai-Shek. But then, rather than being made independent, Taiwan was taken from Japan and returned to China in 1945.

A similar claim was made by Robert Madsen, a fellow at Stanford University’s Asia/Pacific Research Center. Madsen claimed in his chapter in Stephen Krasner’s *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities* (2001) that

> “the R.O.C. seems to have made a serious mistake when, in the middle 1950s, she forfeited a chance to establish herself as the sovereign government of Taiwan. This possibility arose after the strait crisis of 1954-1955, when Beijing sought an accommodation with the West and embarked on a series of negotiations with Washington… There is no way to know how much ground the P.R.C. was prepared to concede in these talks, but she hinted that she might attenuate her claims to Taiwan in
order to form an independent relationship with the United States. Washington would almost certainly have agreed to such a settlement as it would have permitted her to maintain parallel communications with both Chinese polities. The situation on the island was likewise auspicious. The KMT government had by now consolidated its power and enjoyed ambassadorial relations with a wide variety of other states. If at this point Taipei had abjured her ties to the mainland and sought recognition as the government of Taiwan, or as the ‘Republic of China on Taiwan,’ she may well have been embraced as such…” (Madsen 2001: 159).

Wagner and Madsen’s claims are both built on the idea that Taiwan, having a functioning government, could have been made an independent state between the 1940s and 1950s. These claims, however overlook the larger goal that the leadership of Taiwan had during that time. The R.O.C., it should be remembered, was recognized as the legitimate government of all of China up until the R.O.C. was driven out of the mainland during the Chinese Civil War. As the recognized government of all of China, the R.O.C.‘s central interest and goal during this time period, an indeed for many years after, was to retake the mainland and re-establish itself as the government of all of China. To have established itself as the government of Taiwan, with jurisdiction limited to the island, would have meant surrendering their primary goals and interests. This was not a mistake or a missed opportunity. The efforts and direction taken on part of the R.O.C. were deliberate and strategic, in keeping with their goals and interests. To claim that this was a missed opportunity is to misread R.O.C. interests and strategy at the time.
4.5.3 Palestine

In the histories of the cases examined in this study, one of the most famous claims of a missed opportunity came in 1978 when Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban said that “The Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity” (Ben-David 2002; Calder 2002; Jewish Telegraphic Agency 2002). The quote came after the P.L.O. rejected a plan for Palestinian control over the majority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which was part of the accords signed between Israel and Egypt at Camp David that year (Jewish Telegraphic Agency 2002).

Such a claim of missed opportunity, however, is yet another instance of the facts on the ground being misread and misinterpreted. M. Shahid Alam, professor of economics at Northeastern University, argued in a piece in the Palestine Chronicle that the “objective of these Zionist accusations is plain: blame the victims. In order to make their accusations stick, the Zionists have elaborated a false but imposing history of their movement. In that history, it is the Jews who have the original, historical, natural, eternal, God-ordained, and Biblical right to Palestine” (Alam 2008).

The 1978 Camp David accords cannot be said to have been in the interests of Palestine given that they promised no more than a five-year time period of “autonomy” controlled and regulated by Israel. And while the accords gave mention to “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their requirements,” (Quigley 2010: 146; Khalidi 2013: 5) they did not apply to the majority of Palestinian people, notably those driven out of the territory between 1948 and 1967. And, despite the accords having significant importance and affect on the future of the Palestinian people, the P.L.O. was excluded from the negotiations. As Middle East historian Rashid Khalidi wrote, “Such purposeful exclusions… constituted a reprise of the
systematic omission of the indigenous Arab people of Palestine from consideration of their own future” (Khalidi 2013: 5-11). Diplomatic talks during this time period were marked by an increase in the number of Israeli “settlements” in Palestine, and with the P.L.O. being excluded from Camp David in 1978, it is little wonder that the Camp David Accords seemed like a disaster to many Palestinians (Smith 2007: 355).

An “offer” of statehood and “autonomy” under circumstances such as these can hardly be considered a genuine opportunity for Palestine because accepting these terms would have meant accepting a false autonomy and creating a state that was, by design, subservient to the interests of Israel. Such an idea would be unthinkable to many, if not most, world leaders, not the least bit because it would have meant abandoning the very real needs and interests of the Palestinian people to have true independent statehood that protected their rights and interests. As such, the accords signed at Camp David did not represent a true opportunity for the Palestinian people. It was, instead, a poorly disguised attempt to create and codify an opportunity, and an advantage, for Israel—to have its interests protected at the expense of the Palestinian people.

4.6 RETHINKING MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

The concept of missed opportunities can be highly problematic. One may question, for example, if opportunities were actually missed or simply not perceived. In such a case, one might argue that the real question was not of missed opportunities, but rather of actors’ partial or limited knowledge. It is also useful to question whether claims of missed opportunities are better handled as rhetorical devices, as tools used in conflict to further particular interests of those asserting that opportunities were missed, rather than as a meaningful analytical category in and
of themselves. Lastly to be addressed here is the question of whether the real analytical challenge lies not in actors making claims about missed opportunities but in assessing such claims.

To such questions there are no easy answers. It is impossible to answer in a single study such as this the question of how to distinguish between opportunities being missed or unperceived. It is unavoidable to conclude that the number of possible actions entity leaders might have taken at any given time is infinite. Similarly, the number of possibilities actors might perceive is necessarily limited and shaped by things like their position, interests, experience, information available at the time, and a broad range of other factors. That actions possible are seemingly infinite, actors, being necessarily imperfect, are therefore bound (through no fault of their own) to miss most of what can be argued to be possible. All actors necessarily have limited and partial knowledge. The same necessarily holds true for the political leaders of the entities examined in this study. For this reason, it is unreasonable and unfair to suggest that an opportunity was missed when it was the result of information that leaders simply did not have through no fault of their own. Some actions, of course, are more seemingly plausible than others, and what seems plausible or implausible necessarily changes one moment to the next. This picture is further complicated by the possibility that actors may argue something to be more or less plausible, not because it actually was, but rather that because making such an argument might further their personal, biased, and highly subjective interests.

For these reasons, it is useful, as was done in the present study, to have a more narrowly defined concept of what it means when using the concept “missed opportunity” in terms of political recognition. This study’s definition of a missed opportunity for recognition as “instances in which there were multiple factors favoring the recognition of an entity as a state during a given time period, indicating a larger than normal opening in the O.S.R. at that time, but
where recognition was either not granted or sought due to errors made by an entity’s political leaders,” in combination with the list of systematic criteria by which to identify missed opportunities for recognition presented in Table 12 of this study, gives the term greater specificity. This definition and list of criteria makes the missed opportunity for recognition something that can be more readily observed and evaluated, were such a missed opportunity ever to occur.

These considerations, when combined with the findings of this study, suggest a useful lesson to shape and guide future research. Because missed opportunities were not found, and because claims of them are impossible to evaluate exhaustively owing to reasons outlined briefly above, it seems more useful for future research to treat “missed opportunities for recognition” not as analytical categories or as genuine social or political phenomena. It may make more useful sense, instead, to treat missed opportunities as rhetorical devices. Missed opportunities for recognition then become not genuine things that happened, but rather a signal that someone is calling on a tool with some particular interest or goal in mind. The real challenge therefore lies in assessing claims about missed opportunities, evaluating how, when, and why, as a rhetorical device, it might be used.

While it is beyond this study’s scope to explore how claims about missed opportunities for recognition might be employed in this manner, this findings presented in Chapter 4 suggest some preliminary steps in this direction. Goldstein suggests that his multi-volume work, A History of Modern Tibet, begun in 1989, is “neither pro-Chinese nor pro-Tibetan” (Goldstein 1989: xix). His claim that “The Dalai Lama perhaps missed an opportunity to use going to exile as leverage to negotiate directly with the Chinese...” (2007: 156), however, may be indicative of a pro-Chinese position in that it portrays the Dalai Lama as politically inept. John Powers makes
a similar observation when he remarks on Goldstein’s work as “the most balanced treatment of modern Tibetan history…” which nonetheless “betrays a bias in favor of the Chinese position” by portraying the Dalai Lama as devious and inept while portraying the Chinese as being forgiving and patient (Powers 2004: 17).

Goldstein’s deployment of the missed opportunity claim may be considered to be any one of multiple rhetorical devices. Portraying the Dalai Lama as inept can, for example, be an appeal to emotional reasoning as it calls upon others to overlook the facts and view the Dalai Lama in a necessarily negative light as one who is to be blamed for his own failure. For the same reason, it may also be viewed as a form of propaganda, designed not only to blame the victim but to also enlist sympathy for the implicitly benevolent leaders of the P.R.C.

A similar conclusion can be drawn from the use of the missed opportunity claims made against the R.O.C. and the leadership of Palestine. By drawing attention away from the explicit goals of the R.O.C. leadership in retaking mainland China, Madsen’s claim that the R.O.C. missed the chance to establish a separate government on the island of Taiwan in the 1950s might appear tenable. Madsen’s argument that “If at this point Taipei had abjured her ties to the mainland and sought recognition as the government of Taiwan, or as the ‘Republic of China on Taiwan,’ she may well have been embraced as such” not only blames the victim and overlooks the goals of the R.O.C., which was the recognized government of all of China, but suggests that the R.O.C. should have given up its claims on the mainland decades ago. This view strongly privileges the P.R.C. over the R.O.C. One can only wonder if Madsen would have arrived at the same conclusion had the R.O.C. been successful in retaking the mainland.

A similar use of the missed opportunity claim as a form of misdirection and propaganda can be seen in Abba Eban’s infamous claim about the Palestinians never missing an opportunity
to miss an opportunity. By making such an overgeneralized claim about the entire Palestinian population, not just its leadership (a claim that, like that used with Tibet and Taiwan may lead many readers to overlook Palestinian interests in defending the rights and needs of Palestine and in creating genuine and meaningful autonomy by not creating a state subservient to Israel), readers’ sympathies may be more easily directed to arrive at positions that support the status quo by privileging the interests and views of Israel and the United States.

Taken together, these deployments of the missed opportunity claim suggest its use as intentional political misdirection, ideological camouflage, even propaganda. Where it becomes less clear, however, is whether it may also be the result of genuine belief, prior exposure to propaganda, or some complex combination of these and beyond. Further research would be useful to tease these apart, to identify when they are in use, when they are most and least effective, and to determine how they can best be combated.

In sum, the concept of missed opportunities can be problematic. The list of missed opportunities criteria used in this study, however, prove useful as a means to identify and systematically evaluate claims about missed opportunities. That I did not find any evidence of missed opportunities in this study supports the conclusion that missed opportunities may not actually occur and may be nothing more than politicized claims. Combined with the unavoidable problems posed by the concept of missed opportunities, outlined above, the concept perhaps finds its greatest utility as a means to identify the use of rhetorical devices in support of the status quo and to prevent or otherwise undermine the position of those seeking political recognition.
5.0 CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this study I set out to examine how opportunities for recognition are produced and to determine if there was a patterning or structuration to their production. In keeping with the opportunity structure for recognition model, I found that there is such a pattern. Opportunities for recognition did not occur randomly. Instead, opportunities in the cases examined came during times when there was a convergence of 1.) interest (aligning with constantly varying desires and goals, as described elsewhere in the study) on behalf of political leaders\textsuperscript{86} of entities seeking recognition as independent states and 2.) a weakening\textsuperscript{87} of effective political control by an entity’s parent state, such as in the wake of state crisis or collapse. Also in keeping with the

\textsuperscript{86} This study does not seek to explore whether or not there may be one or more types of organization that foster state recognition. This is sociologically interesting, but is left to future research.

\textsuperscript{87} Here I am relating only what I found in the study. It should be noted that while state weakening was observed, as described, and that state weakness tends, probabilistically, to make opportunities for recognition more likely to emerge, thereby making recognition more likely, state weakness is not always or necessarily needed. As described in the study, recognition remains, fundamentally, a choice. It is a choice that can, hypothetically, be made at any time and under any and all circumstances, even during times of state strength. Any state government can grant recognition regardless of whether a parent state supports or opposes it, and whether a parent or controlling state is strong or weak at any time.
O.S.R. model, opportunities for recognition tended to be successful when there was a greater alignment of political interests favoring recognition of an entity as an independent state.

As mentioned at various points in the study (e.g., pages 97, 128, etc., where I discuss concessions and elsewhere noting that recognition can be used as a means to other ends), recognition can be used as a level to get movement from or to antagonize others. As such, the O.S.R. model does allow for outside interests as being relevant to recognition outcomes, most especially because they can be expected to have bearing on the opening and closures of political opportunities, can affect resources, and can shape the interests of state leaders, etc. Precisely how they interplay with the O.S.R. model and how they affect recognition outcomes, however, is beyond the scope of this study and is necessarily left for future researchers to explore more fully.

A central focus of the study was also to determine whether or not missed opportunities for recognition occur, as has been famously claimed by some politicians. I theorized that missed opportunities, should they occur, would not emerge randomly, but rather as a function of governmental interests and structural conditions, giving governments a means by which to advance their self-interests. Contrary to my predictions, missed opportunities for recognition did not occur for any of my cases surrounding the opportunities for recognition that I examined. This is a significant finding in context of political claims about there having been missed opportunities for the leaders of entities to have gained recognition.

This is an important finding that contributes to our understanding about political discourse surrounding the recognition of entities seeking recognition because it suggests that such claims about missed opportunities do not hold merit. What I found instead was that political leaders of entities seeking recognition of their independent statehood were outmaneuvered, outgunned, and otherwise fell victim to interests and circumstances that were beyond their
control. What we have, then, is not an occurrence of genuine missed opportunities for recognition, but rather politicized claims about missed opportunities. Such political claims likely find their utility as weapons or tools used to undermine the image of the leaders of entities seeking recognition and to weaken the political position of such entities more generally.

While results from this study do not support the political claims about missed opportunities, further research is needed to determine if missed opportunities for recognition ever occur or if, instead, they remain little more than claims presented as fact in order to further hidden political agendas. It is hypothetically possible, for example, that there may yet have been missed opportunities for the cases examined in this study, perhaps at time periods or under circumstances not examined here. It is also conceivable given the utility of missed opportunities to be used as a tool to further state interests that other states and state-like entities beyond those examined here have, or may yet in the future, experience missed opportunities for recognition. As the possibility for them to occur in the future cannot ever be completely ruled out, one might expect that political claims about their existence may continue to be made for years to come. This study provides a means to empirically identify such missed opportunities, should they indeed occur, and to systematically evaluate claims what may be no more than politicized claims.

The O.S.R. model’s utility in explaining the production of opportunities for recognition of Tibet, Taiwan, and Palestine raises questions about the generalizability of the arguments presented in this study. Can the model be applied to cases beyond the Tibetan, Taiwanese, and Palestinian cases? The O.S.R. model’s validation by external comparisons with disparate cases like Mongolia and Xinjiang suggest the answer is “yes.” Much in the way that Theda Skocpol (1980) said of social revolutions that ever-evolving world-historical contexts and diverging political histories and situations make it difficult to generalize about social revolutions, so, too, is
it difficult to generalize about political recognition. This point about generalizability is compounded when consideration is given to the nature of political recognition being based, fundamentally, on choice. Even though such choices can to some degree be patterned and shaped by factors like interests and political alignments, as shown in this study, such choices will necessarily vary according to timing, historical context, particular circumstances, and a host of other factors that are in constant motion. In some sense, this means that no two decisions to grant or withhold recognition, in any form or degree, are ever alike. Each recognition outcome and decision has a unique path and history. As such, other recognition decisions and outcomes need their own particular analyses. And, by providing a coherent framework for comparative analysis, the O.S.R. model contributes to the literature on political recognition by providing a useful starting point for this new research to begin.

Further research is also needed to expand the O.S.R. model to include opportunities for recognition of sub-state entities. One promising avenue of such research may include examining the similarities and differences between politically recognizing states versus recognizing domestic dependent nations like Native American tribes in the United States. Tribes in the U.S., for example, must undergo a formal process to become “federally recognized,” as in recognized by the U.S. federal government. Federal recognition can be a lengthy and very costly process, taking decades to acquire and costing many thousands of dollars for tribal members to legally meet established criteria set by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Interestingly, some of these criteria are more stringent than those set by the Montevideo Convention for what entities may be considered states, meaning that it is in some ways more difficult to be recognized as a tribe than it is to be recognized as a state. Federally recognized tribes, for example, must be able to legally document in external documents their uninterrupted existence as a tribe since the year 1900.
(Bureau of Indian Affairs 2015). Were a similar rule applied more broadly, states like South Sudan and Israel might not be recognized today as states because they did not exist as such prior to the year 1900.

An additional area of research connected to Native American tribes is to determine whether or not there is some overlap or linkage between the recognition of states and the recognition of tribes. It seems possible, for example, that states may define themselves in part by those they exclude, such as Native American tribes. As federally recognized tribes in the U.S. were once recognized as sovereign, independent, and capable of entering into foreign relations in a manner like that of modern states, evidenced by tribes signing into numerous treaties with the U.S. federal government, it also seems possible for the recognition of states and state-like entities to shift over time as a function of political interests. If Native American experiences are any indicator, the states of today may in the future find themselves in a position like that of Native nations—they may find their treaties ignored, their rights curtailed, and that, for political reasons, they are no longer recognized as truly sovereign and independent. Understanding how, when, and why these shifts might occur is critical to understanding the changing nature of political recognition as an institution.

The O.S.R. thesis gives scholars a coherent framework in which to understand when, why, and how political recognition outcomes and decisions come about as they do. When applied beyond the realm of theory to the real world of practice, it gives political leaders a tool with which to advance the position of those seeking recognition as independent states by drawing attention to their positions and to the factors contributing to different recognition outcomes. Results from this study suggest, for example, that not only must those seeking recognition lobby for their causes so as to create a favorable alignment of political interests in their favor, but they
may also be best served by strategically timing their political behaviors to periods when states are weak or in the process of collapse. They may also be well advised to seek external patrons to support their causes, but should not rely entirely on such patrons because patronage is not sufficient to generate recognition.
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