Sytsma, Justin
(2008)
Phenomenological Obviousness and the New Science of Consciousness.
In: Philosophy of Science Assoc. 21st Biennial Mtg: PSA 2008 Contributed Papers, 2008 - 2008, Pittsburgh, PA.
(Unpublished)
Abstract
Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? An increasing number of researchers not only hold that it is, but that its very existence is a deep mystery. That this problematic phenomenon exists is generally taken for granted: It is asserted that phenomenal consciousness is just phenomenologically obvious. In contrast, I hold that there is no such phenomenon and, thus, that it does not pose a problem for the brain sciences. For this denial to be plausible, however, I need to show that phenomenal consciousness is not phenomenologically obvious. That is the goal of this article.
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