FEELING DIFFERENTLY AT THE FIN DE SIÈCLE: REPRESENTATIONS OF EMOTION AND CULTURAL CHANGE IN GERMAN LITERATURE, 1890-1901

by

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This dissertation examines the representation of emotion in German literature of the fin de siècle, which I identify as a period of rapid cultural change when emotional codes and social mores were disputed. Compassion, honor, shame, love, pride, and pity were topics of contested public and intellectual debate around 1900, and I argue that the renegotiation of these emotional codes happened in part through literary works and other media. Building upon Bakhtinian discourse analysis and informed by current history of emotions research, my dissertation contributes the theoretical concept ‘heteropathia,’ which I define as the co-presence of differing ways of feeling represented in a single literary work or cultural object. I propose a methodology of reading for heteropathia that considers three aspects of a novel: the narrative situation, the depiction of emotional styles, and the reference to theoretical models of emotion. Chapter 2 analyzes compassion and honor as emotional antipodes associated with different moral systems in Theodor Fontane’s Effi Briest (1895). Although the novel depicts honor as an emotional practice that has lost its relevance in late nineteenth-century society, it ultimately admits the need for both compassion and self-regulatory emotions. Chapter 3 examines the subversion of nineteenth-century gendered emotional imperatives of feminine shame and romantic love in Lou Andreas-
Salomé’s *Fenitschka* (1898). *Fenitschka* champions self-realization and validates alternate ways of feeling and gender roles, albeit not without admitting the difficulty in challenging familiar cultural narratives. Chapter 4 reads Thomas Mann’s *Buddenbrooks* (1901) as a critique of a range of emotions, from unreflective bourgeois pride to life-negating decadent sensibility, across four generations. Through its figure of the young writer Kai, who exemplifies both life-affirming pride and artistic sensibility, *Buddenbrooks* self-reflexively refers to its own mediation of emotions and thus highlights the role of literature in renegotiating emotions and social mores. I conclude that these three novels feature a heteropathic impulse that recalls the transitional status of the *fin de siècle*. These works acknowledge emotional alterity yet resist embracing any way of feeling uncritically. Instead, they mediate between diverse affective perspectives and create spaces for critical analysis and dialogue.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Already over a century before the recent ‘emotional’ or ‘affective turn’ in academic disciplines, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) called for a genealogy of emotions in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882):


Here, Nietzsche argues that, in order to study moral questions properly, it is necessary to research ‘all kinds of passions’ among different peoples and through historical periods. By recognizing that this would be an arduous but important task, Nietzsche essentially rejects the commonly held philosophical assumption that emotions are simple, involuntary affective
responses, and, as such, unworthy of serious study.¹ His remarks also imply that emotions are not purely innate, but culturally and historically conditioned—an idea that conflicts with many deep-rooted beliefs about emotions in Western societies, not to mention with contemporary claims of affective neuroscience and evolutionary psychology.² Do emotions have a history, as Nietzsche seemed to suggest? A growing number of researchers, including literary scholars, historians, philosophers, and social psychologists, are now exploring answers to this question.³ Supposing that emotions do have a history, how has literature imagined, participated in, and shaped that history?

This dissertation examines emotions and their literary representations in the context of the social upheaval and rapid modernization that characterized Wilhelmine Germany at the fin de siècle. Inspired by Bakhtinian discourse analysis and interdisciplinary research on emotion, I contribute a new approach for interpreting the literary representation of emotion through German cultural history. In German studies, the perceived antithesis between emotion and reason continues to inform the manner in which literary and cultural periods are understood. Studies of Empfindsamkeit, Sturm und Drang, and German Romanticism have generally treated emotions

¹ In The Social Construction of Emotions (1986), Rom Harré (ed.) attributes the lack of in-depth studies of emotion before the 1970s and 1980s to “the predominance, since the seventeenth century of a philosophical conception of emotions as simple, and non-cognitive phenomena, amongst the bodily perturbations” (2).

² Evolutionary psychologists claim that emotions are not learned, but biologically based responses, which evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with universal human challenges. Paul Ekman and his supporters considered happiness, fear, surprise, anger, sadness, and disgust to be the six ‘basic’ emotions that exist across cultures, but the list of universal emotions now includes many other emotions, such as guilt, pride, contempt, embarrassment, and shame (Ekman “Basic Emotions”).

³ Interdisciplinary centers for emotion research have been established at the Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung in Berlin, Queen Mary University of London, and five universities in Australia (Adelaide, Melbourne, Queensland, Sydney, and Western Australia).
as irrational, that is, as reactions against Enlightenment rationality.\(^4\) The limited critical consideration of emotion in late nineteenth-century German literature in particular stems from the impression that German realism, when described as the antithesis to romanticism, a literary movement commonly associated with the expression and valuation of strong feelings, is comparatively ‘unemotional.’\(^5\) I consider this a misrepresentation, however, and my approach challenges the simplified construal of each German cultural period as one in which either emotion or reason was valued. Emotions have long been a critical component of the Western concept of the self, and, as such, they infuse nearly every aspect of human life and history. The premise that emotions are socially and culturally conditioned and thus historically variable invites the question of how literary works of different periods have represented certain emotions and influenced the emotion discourse of their time. Thus, rather than discussing emotion through cultural history merely in terms of emotional (non-)expression or intensity, this dissertation examines how, for which reasons, and to what effect literary works represent emotions. My application of this new approach to German novelistic prose published at the \textit{fin de siècle} not only leads to fresh interpretations of canonical texts, but also elucidates how changes in

\(^{4}\) See, e.g. Arnold Hauser, \textit{The Social History of Art: Volume 3: Rococo, Classicisim and Romanticism} for a critique of Romanticism as ‘irrational and escapist […] all disguised and more or less sublimated forms of the same feeling’ (qtd. in Solomon, \textit{The Passions} 53). Compare the view of Robert C. Solomon, who considers Romanticism a movement that emphasized the passions, albeit without excluding reason (\textit{The Passions} 54).  

\(^{5}\) This view of German Romanticism is evident, for example, in Jürgen Barkhoff’s account: ‘\textit{The cultivation of emotion in the age of sentiment}, the celebration of unbridled passion in the Storm and Stress, the practice of minute self-scrutiny that emerged from pietism […]—all these tendencies paved the way for the later, more radical Romantic explorations of the soul’ (219). Although Barkhoff traces a continuity in the cultivation and celebration of emotion from \textit{Empfindsamkeit} to German Romanticism, he considers sympathy with the irrational and pathological to be a distinguishing feature of romantic tales (219). In contrast to German Romanticism, German Realism is typically discussed in terms of emotional restraint or repression. According to Russell Berman, ‘Realism in German literature had, in effect, always represented an effort to control, to bridle, and to dismiss the romantic legacy of the beginning of the century…’ (339). For Robert C. Holub, ‘Realism involves the maintenance of an order without passion, without desire…’ because the absence of emotion and valorization of reason are associated with truth-telling (44).
emotional practices and social mores coincide with larger cultural shifts and how emotions are renegotiated through literature.

1.1 WHAT IS AN EMOTION?

First, we must ask: what is an emotion? William James (1842-1910) posed this question in his seminal essay thus titled in 1884, and contemporary answers vary widely due to the diverse, interdisciplinary nature of emotion and affect studies. Although this dissertation responds to the recent ‘affective turn’ in the humanities and social sciences, the definition of emotion that I offer here clearly departs from notions of affect inspired by the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Theories of affect currently popular in media and cultural studies treat affects as pre-discursive, unconscious, and non-rational intensities that transfer between bodies, not unlike contagion. Dissatisfied with discourse studies and post-structuralism, affect theorists have attempted to go beyond issues of representation and discourse, yet I find the usefulness of affect theory to literary studies, particularly to studies of literary realism, to be limited. Moreover, questions of the representation and social negotiation of emotions through history are central to my project. My theoretical approach to emotion has instead been influenced by Bakhtinian discourse analysis, narrative theory, and research in the emerging field of the history of


emotions. Thus, I understand emotions to be embodied, discursive social practices that result from social encounters between the self and others or the self and one’s environment.8

The premise that informs my discussion of emotion in this dissertation is this: emotions are always-already social. Accordingly, if emotions arise in social and institutional contexts (e.g. family, education, politics, work, organized religion) that change over time, I argue that emotions do have a history.9 At first, it might seem easy to refute these claims. Western societies have typically treated emotions as inner feelings that express an individual’s personality, and, consequently, the relational nature of emotion becomes obscured. Yet what emotion can one genuinely experience independently of interactions with others or one’s environment? For example, we might experience jealousy if we know that another person possesses something that we would like to have, or if we perceive new social circumstances as a threat to a valued friendship or relationship. Similarly, we might feel pride in response to a perceived rise in social status, such as an achievement that earns us the respect of others. Even emotions evoked by simple sensory cues are relational. Sensory cues (e.g. hearing a meaningful song, seeing a certain color, smelling a familiar scent) trigger emotions because they call to mind memories of people and events in the past. By underscoring the social embeddedness of emotion, I am not arguing in

8 Social psychologist Ian Burkitt understands emotions similarly and critiques theories of emotion contributed by affective neuroscience (e.g. Antonio Damasio), affect theory, and evolutionary psychology (i.e. Paul Ekman’s ‘basic emotions’). See Burkitt, Emotions and Social Relations, (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014) 1-24.

9 Focusing on modern German history, Ute Frevert presents a strong case for the argument that emotions have a history and shape history in Vergängliche Gefühle, (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2013) and in Emotions in History—Lost and Found, (Budapest: Central European UP, 2011). Burkitt, who refers to history of emotions research (i.e. Elias, Reddy, Rosenwein), maintains that one would expect emotions to vary through history as social relations change (25). He emphasizes, however, “how emotions are embedded in social relations and how emotion is a complex phenomenon that also involves the body and various feelings, not just the discursive understanding of emotion as it changes between historical periods and across different cultures” (Burkitt 22).
favor of a purely social constructivist view.\textsuperscript{10} Some emotions, including the examples of jealousy and pride, may be experienced very similarly across different cultures and through history, and, because there is evidence to support this, it is problematic to assert that emotions are entirely socially constructed. Although I agree more with pure social constructivism than evolutionary psychology’s ‘universalist’ theories of ‘basic’ emotions that exist across cultures, I find Jesse Prinz’s assertion that emotions are both evolved and constructed most persuasive and probable.\textsuperscript{11} If all emotions are at once part of human nature and culturally determined, then there can be no truly universal or ‘basic’ emotions; historical and cultural contexts will always be important.

Just as language is fluid, as demonstrated by the changing meaning and usage of words, I regard all emotions as likely to change over time and vary across cultures. Following Jesse Prinz, I consider intensity, incidence, form (i.e. expression or bodily response), and content the four primary aspects of emotion that can be shaped by culture (83). In other words, emotions such as love and grief can vary in terms of how deeply and how frequently they are felt, how the body responds, and how they arise, depending on the different socio-cultural environments in which they emerge. To this, I will add that the meaning and social, political, or moral value of an emotion, as well as the words used to describe that emotion, can change through history.\textsuperscript{12} One

\textsuperscript{10} See Jesse Prinz, “Which Emotions Are Basic?” (2004), for a concise treatment of the two main perspectives on the origins of emotions: evolutionary psychology and social constructivism. Arguing that emotions are “neither fixed bioprograms, nor cognitively mediated scripts,” Prinz positions himself between these two sides of the nature-nurture debate (81). Compare William Reddy, who offers a critique of “emotional constructionism” and proposes a solution to the issues of agency and relativism associated with the constructivist view (“Against Constructionism” 327-340).

\textsuperscript{11} Prinz, dissatisfied with attempts to divide emotions into two categories (‘basic emotions’ and culturally constructed emotions), reasons that “Emotions are evolved and constructed” (69).

\textsuperscript{12} In twenty-first century political, religious, and humanitarian discourse, ‘empathy’ or ‘compassion’ is preferred over the close synonyms ‘sympathy’ and ‘pity.’ The older German feeling-words, \textit{Empfindung} and \textit{Gemütsbewegung}, have declined in use and been replaced by \textit{Gefühl} and the very recent \textit{Emotion}. 

could find evidence, for example, that honor and shame have undergone a loss of meaning and value that these emotions still had in nineteenth-century German society.¹³

I do not suggest that, given the cultural and historical variability of emotion, it is impossible to relate to the emotions of people from other cultures or those who lived during an earlier historical period. A process of emotional translation may be necessary, however, to decipher the lost meanings and cultural values associated with a particular emotion.¹⁴ Whether through letters, diaries, journals, photographs, newspapers, or literary works, we only have access to past emotions through texts—in other words, “past” or “distant” emotions are always mediated and require interpretation. Literary texts and other cultural products provide insight into shifting thought-patterns and emotional practices—they can offer clues as to how certain emotions were perceived, experienced, expressed, and valued in different societies throughout history. Moreover, I find that the power of art and literature derives in part from the capacity to vividly depict and acquaint audiences with past ways of feeling—even if we ourselves have not directly experienced the despair and pain of Laocoön, medieval courtly love, or eighteenth-century feelings of binding friendship and Geselligkeit.

Emotions are an essential feature of literary works, even if they have not yet received the critical attention they deserve in German literary studies. One only needs to think of a few well-

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¹⁴ Mark D. Steinberg, for example, emphasizes the need to account for what is lost in translation when studying the history of emotions: “...we must recognize that the evidence of emotion is already a translation—between, for example, bodily affect and culturally shaped emotions, between their past and our present” (77). Margrit Pernau describes the translation of emotions from one context into another as “not the finding, but rather the creation of equivalence,” and emphasizes that this process takes place not only across cultures and languages, but across everyday social boundaries, such as gender, age, and class (Frevert et al., Learning How to Feel 254).
known examples, such as Werther’s melancholy, Tony Buddenbrook’s bourgeois pride, Geert von Innstetten’s honor, and Gregor Samsa’s guilt. Literature does much more than merely depict different emotions. It can propagate emotional styles and social mores that are customary or desirable in a given culture or imagine and validate alternate ways of feeling. Thus, even the most ‘realistic’ literary works should not be read as mirrors of society that simply show how people ‘really felt’ during a given period in history. As clearly demonstrated by the ‘Werther Fever’ that Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen Werthers inspired after its publication in 1774, literature has the potential to shape the emotions and cultural practices of readers. Yet this does not imply that literature furnishes emotional scripts, which passive readers then simply imitate—the meaning and emotionality of a literary work are constructed through the interaction between the text and the reader. Critical and affective responses to a literary work vary according to the individual reader, but these also change over time. Werther presents an extreme example, but all literary works, by virtue of the way they affectively engage readers, are apt to crystallize readers’ emotions, negotiate between differing ways of feeling, and help readers clarify their views on life.

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15 I refer here to the most striking emotions of figures in four canonical German literary works: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (1774), Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks (1901), Theodor Fontane’s Effi Briest (1895), and Franz Kafka’s Die Verwandlung (1915).

16 Like Goethe’s Werther, Henry Mackenzie’s sentimental novel Man of Feeling (1771) resonated with eighteenth-century bourgeois readers. When a later edition of Man of Feeling appeared in 1886, however, it became clear that the emotional styles depicted in the novel had fallen out of fashion. This is evident in editor Henry Morley’s introduction to the 1886 edition and ‘Index to Tears,’ which lists all passages of the novel that reference crying and humorously notes that “Chokings, &c., not counted” (Mackenzie 110-111).
1.2 EMOTIONS AND CULTURAL CHANGE AT THE FIN DE SIÈCLE

Imperial Germany (1888-1918) during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II presents a significant case of shifting emotional styles and social mores. After the German victory in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), military ideology left its impression on German society. Enforced patterns of behavior and values included discipline, order, principles, character, strength, and the repression of feelings, all of which defined the masculine ideal and shaped the public sphere. In contrast to the Enlightenment view that, in order to be considered whole, a man must also cultivate his feelings, the late nineteenth-century imperative required men to demonstrate self-control and mastery over their emotions. The social consensus assigned separate roles, proper spheres of activity, and distinct emotional and intellectual traits to men and women: men dominated the public sphere, whereas women, who were believed to be naturally submissive, emotional, and nurturing, occupied the private sphere (Jefferies 19). Due to rapid modernization in the late nineteenth century, old and new social structures and values lived on in juxtaposition. Wilhelmine society, commonly described as “pillarized,” consisted of many sociocultural groups that determined cultural practices, and this pluralization had a destabilizing effect (see Fulbrook 140; Retallack 269).

Although the Prussia-dominated modern German nation-state endured great political and social tensions after unification in 1871, it was especially after Bismarck’s resignation in 1890 that writers recognized its social conflicts. Referring to this period, historian Friedrich Meinecke famously wrote: “In ganz Deutschland ist um 1890 nicht nur politisch, sondern auch geistig etwas Neues zu spüren, und zwar beides zueinander in umgekehrter Kurve. Politisch ging es abwärts, geistig wieder aufwärts” (Meinecke 111). Industrialization, urbanization, and the decline of the aristocracy introduced large structural changes and social leveling in society. As a
result of this democratization, different views of how society should proceed and apprehensions about these changes emerged. The fin-de-siècle women’s movement championed women’s rights and equality, but, at the same time, the destabilization of familiar nineteenth-century gender distinctions caused anxieties about gender roles and identities to deepen. Wilhelmine Germany witnessed both religious revival and secularization—tensions between religious confessions persisted after Bismarck’s Kulturkampf, yet the decline of worship attendance, the possibility to legally declare oneself ‘konfessionslos,’ and the rise of the openly secular SPD to the status of a mass party signaled a simultaneous process of gradual secularization (Clark 101-105). The new forms of art and cultural practices that emerged at the fin de siècle were met with enthusiasm from some and moral indignation or fear of degeneration from others.17

In light of these modern developments, I identify the fin de siècle in German society as a period of rapid cultural change when emotional codes and social mores were disputed. In particular the ‘social’ emotions compassion, honor, shame, love, pride, and pity were topics of public and intellectual debate around 1900. Debates about honor, for instance, were tied to arguments for or against the practice of dueling.18 Print publications of the 1890s, including the satirical journal Simplicissimus, exposed honor codes and dueling as archaic, barbaric practices. A satirical cartoon by Josef Benedikt Engl conveys this message forcefully through its depiction of the outcome of a duel taken to the extreme (see Figure 1).

17 One of the best-known works to decry the changes in modern society and art at the fin de siècle is Max Nordau’s Entartung (1892). Friedrich Nietzsche, Henrik Ibsen, Oscar Wilde, Emile Zola, and Leo Tolstoy are among the writers whom Nordau denounced as decadent and dangerous to society.

18 The inclusion of the publication “Für oder wider das Duell?” (1896) as the first volume of a series called Brennende Tagesfragen and satirical cartoons in Simplicissimus attest to the significant role that honor played in public discourse of the time.
Yet the question remained how reputation and masculine identity could be established if honor was lost. While the fin-de-siècle sexual revolution and women’s movement challenged double standards and the imperatives of feminine shame and modesty, it also presented a new challenge, because a woman’s personal honor was upheld through sexual purity.¹⁹ Calls for compassion and charity increased under the auspices of social reform movements and aid organizations, such as the Innere Mission and Deutscher Caritasverband. Yet especially influential at the fin de siècle were the works of Nietzsche, who rejected pity as a morality of weakness inimical to power and

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¹⁹ Feminist Marie Raschke stressed the fact that female honor was based on sexuality in Die Frauenbewegung 3 (1897): “Während die männliche Ehre sich hauptsächlich nach dem Beruf bemißt und ein Ausfluß der bürgerlichen Sonderrechte des Mannes ist, wurzelt nach den willkürlichen Einrichtungen unserer Zeit, welche der Frau jede bürgerliche Ehre versagt, die weibliche Ehre hauptsächlich im Geschlecht. Darum wirkt jeder Angriff auf das Geschlecht vernichtend auf die persönliche Ehre” (Raschke qtd. in Meyer-Renschhausen 102).
human flourishing. I find that these social emotions were debated so intensely around 1900 because structural changes in Wilhelmine society demanded renegotiations of power and status. Emotions crystallize groups, regulate unethical/undesirable behaviors, motivate ethical/desirable behaviors, and maintain or dissolve social bonds. Public debates and philosophical discourses concerning these social emotions attest to the existence of differing emotional styles and competing visions for the future of society.

Accepting the premise that emotions are historically and culturally conditioned and that literary works renegotiate emotional practices and social mores, this dissertation examines how emotions were perceived and represented in literature published during this period of unprecedented cultural change in German society. Focusing primarily on compassion, masculine honor, feminine shame, romantic love, bourgeois pride, pity, and decadent sensibility, I argue that literary works of this period renegotiated emotional codes and social mores. In the following chapters, I demonstrate how Theodor Fontane’s Effi Briest (1895), Lou Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka (1898), and Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks: Verfall einer Familie (1901) juxtapose, subvert, and validate differing affective perspectives and provide opportunities for readers to reflect critically upon their own emotions and values. Each work demonstrates a deep engagement with extra-literary discourses and focuses on different emotions and social questions that were of special concern at the fin de siècle. Together, these novels provide insight into how writers perceived shifts in emotional codes and social mores as coinciding with the late nineteenth-century Kulturwandel. My approach to analyzing the representation of emotion in novelistic prose is outlined below.
The term that I have coined to describe the co-presence of different ways of feeling represented in literature is ‘heteropathia.’ At first glance, one might too easily make the etymological connection to ‘pathology’ or ‘pathological’ and assume that an analysis using the concept heteropathia treats emotions as irrational or disruptive in a given cultural context. This is unfortunately part of the baggage that the word ‘emotion’ has carried with it since its introduction into English in the mid-sixteenth century, when it signified “political agitation, civil unrest; a public commotion or uprising,” a definition that persisted until the late eighteenth century according to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (“Emotion” def. 1a). Of course, it is not my intention to classify emotions as disruptive, irrational, or pathological. Rather, I seek to analyze different orientations to emotion represented in literature and elucidate how writers engaged with and shaped the emotion discourse of their time through their works.

With its Greek roots (*hetero-*,- different; *-pathia*, feeling), the English equivalent of heteropathia could be rendered as ‘different-feelingness.’ Russian philosopher and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept ‘heteroglossia,’ which describes the conflict between different types of speech in a novel, inspired the development of this term. In his essay “Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin defines heteroglossia incorporated into the novel as “another’s speech in another’s language, serving to express authorial intentions but in a refracted way” (324). This artistic blending of a diversity of social speech types and individual voices, together with their links and relationships, is a defining feature of the stylistics of the novel (262-263). Heteropathia expands the focus of traditional Bakhtinian analysis and examines not the unity of diverse
utterances, but the narration of and interaction between distinct ways of feeling as they are presented within a single literary work.

Heteropathia informs my interpretations of a social novel (Effi Briest), a novella (Fenitschka), and a generational novel (Buddenbrooks) in the following chapters. This means that, in the present study, I will restrict my application of the concept to novelistic prose. The reason for this is threefold. First, compared to works of other genres, a novel, by virtue of its length, number of characters, and diegetic levels, has the greatest potential to represent a plurality of differing affective perspectives assembled into an aesthetic whole. Second, the length and openness\textsuperscript{20} of the genre make novels particularly well suited to engage with extra-literary social and emotional discourses. Third, my method of reading for heteropathia would need to be modified before it can be applied to non-novelistic genres. By no means do novels have a monopoly on emotions—poetry, drama, and film enact differing ways of feeling in meaningful ways. Thus, I open up the concept heteropathia for the study of other literary genres and visual culture, albeit with the qualification that, because of their distinguishing characteristics, non-novelistic genres may require interpretive approaches different from the one outlined here.

1.3.1 Narrative Situation

When analyzing heteropathia in a novelistic prose text, it is important to consider three aspects: the narrative situation, the depiction of emotional styles, and the framing of the narrated events

\textsuperscript{20} Bakhtin privileged the novel over other genres because of its openness and future-oriented ‘unfinalizability’: “[The novel] is plasticity itself. It is a genre that is ever questing, ever examining itself and subjecting its established forms to review. Such, indeed is the only possibility open to a genre that structures itself in a zone of direct contact with developing reality” (“Epic and Novel” 39). Additionally, Bakhtin noted that the novel, because it “makes wide and substantial use” of other literary and non-literary forms, “often crosses the boundary of what we strictly call fictional literature” (33).
through one or more theoretical models of emotion. Although examining the narrative situation has long been common practice in narratology and other areas of literary criticism, it is especially crucial when studying the literary representation of emotions. The narrative situation determines whose emotions are communicated to readers, how they are shared, and what level of familiarity the narrator has with the thoughts and feelings of the characters. The more traditional terms used to describe narrative point of view (first-person, third-person limited, third-person omniscient) blur the lines between what Gérard Genette called ‘narrative voice’ (“Who speaks?”) and ‘focalization’ (“Who sees?”) (189-194; 244-252). I prefer Genette’s terms because they are more precise and provide the language needed to account for the frequent shifts in perspective that may occur in a narrative. For my literary analysis in each chapter, I draw on Genette’s narrative theory and treat narrative voice and focalization as the two elements of narrative situation that are essential for discussing the representation of emotions in literature.

Narrative voice concerns itself with the issue of who narrates, and from what position. In order to address the first question, Genette distinguished between three types: homodiegetic, heterodiegetic, and autodiegetic narrators (245). A homodiegetic narrator is also a character in the story being told, while a heterodiegetic narrator is not and exists somewhere above it. If a homodiegetic narrator is the protagonist of the story he or she tells, then the narrator is also autodiegetic. Introdiegetic and extradiegetic refer to narrative levels or the origin of the narration, that is, whether the narrative voice is located inside (introdiegetic) or outside (extradiegetic) the story being narrated (Genette 248). In other words, an introdiegetic narrator speaks on the same level as the characters, while an extradiegetic narrator tells a story at a higher level and brings together all embedded narratives and focalizers within a text (Genette 244-252). Both introdiegetic and extradiegetic narrators can be either homodiegetic or heterodiegetic. The four
paradigms Genette identifies are therefore: extradiegetic-heterodiegetic, extradiegetic-homodiegetic, intradiegetic-heterodiegetic, and intradiegetic-homodiegetic (248).

Following Genette, we can also identify three types of focalization: zero focalization, external focalization, and internal focalization (189-194). In the case of zero focalization, we are dealing with a non-focalized narrative with an omniscient narrator who knows more than the characters. External focalization means that a narrator mimics a camera lens; he or she knows less than the characters and cannot read their minds. Internal focalization implies that the narrator sees from the perspective of a focal character. Variations may occur with internal focalization; an event may be narrated from the perspective of one character alone or switch between perspectives (Genette 189-190).

How do emotions fit into this discussion of narrative voice and focalization? Literary works that feature a homodiegetic-autodiegetic narrator typically provide limited information about the thoughts and feelings of characters other than the narrator. Albert Camus’s *The Stranger* (1942), for example, features the autodiegetic narrator Meursault, who gives an account of his own feelings and perceptions but makes little attempt to comprehend the thoughts or emotions of the other characters. Another work that features an autodiegetic narrator is Arthur Schnitzler’s *Leutnant Gustl*, which employs stream of consciousness narration to show how the protagonist perceives and emotionally responds to incidents as they happen. Heterodiegetic narrators of zero focalization typically describe the emotions of more than one character. In this type of narrative situation, a narrator may convey unspoken feelings of characters through thought report or free indirect speech. If a work features external or internal focalization, it is likely that the narrator can only report his or her own feelings or those of a select character directly. In this case, the narrator may describe facial expressions and other physical emotional
signs, which can allow readers to make inferences about the characters’ feelings. A homodiegetic narrator often proves to be more biased than a heterodiegetic narrator due to his or her own involvement in the narrated events, but even a heterodiegetic narrator can show signs of partiality to one character over another, depending on which type of focalization is used. These examples show that attending to the narrative situation can help determine whose emotions are revealed (and whose are not) in what manner and to what effect. A more thorough discussion of how narrative voice and focalization affect the representation of emotion will follow in each chapter.

1.3.2 Differing Emotional Styles or *Fühlweisen*

The second main feature to consider when examining heteropathia in novelistic prose is the representation of what I will call differing ‘emotional styles’ or ways of feeling [*Fühlweisen*]. At present, historians of emotion commonly use one or more of the following three terms to describe the characteristic patterns of feeling of a particular period: emotional regimes, emotional communities, and emotional styles. As proposed by William Reddy, an ‘emotional regime,’ a necessary part of a stable political regime, is a set of emotional norms and the official practices that express and inculcate them (*Navigation of Feeling* 129). The term ‘emotional regime’ implies that an elite group with political power dictates normative emotional practices of ordinary people in a society. This idea can lead one to overlook the range of diverse emotional subgroups that may have existed during a given period.

Barbara Rosenwein introduced an alternate term, ‘emotional communities,’ which she defines as “groups in which people adhere to the same norms of expression and value – or devalue – the same or related emotions” (*Emotional Communities* 2). The emphasis on
communities reflects the view that emotions are social and relational. Compared to ‘emotional regime,’ ‘emotional communities’ are less monolithic and make more room for variation, yet the concept presents challenges of its own. It is unclear, for example, whether people can belong to several emotional communities simultaneously and whether emotional communities simply emerge from pre-established socio-cultural groups, as Rosenwein suggests (see “Worrying” 35). Despite their limitations, ‘emotional communities’ and ‘emotional regime’ are both useful concepts in the discipline of history; however, literary studies require a more accommodating term, namely, ‘emotional styles.’

The term ‘emotional style’ is most suitable for literary studies because the term’s plasticity enables one to consider not only the emotions of real, historical individuals or groups, but also modes of literary expression and fictional representations of emotion. In historical studies of emotion, the term ‘emotional style’ is commonly used, albeit in different ways. Some historians apply it diachronically21 to successions of characteristic patterns of feeling through history, while others call attention to the synchronic relations between diverging emotional subcultures at a given time. According to Benno Gammerl, ‘emotional styles’ involve “…the experience, fostering, and display of emotions, and oscillate between discursive patterns and embodied practices as well as between common scripts and specific appropriations” (163). Gammerl notes the similarity between this notion of ‘style’ and the sociological understanding of ‘habitus’ but emphasizes that, unlike habitus, emotional styles maintain a greater degree of plasticity and can be more easily pluralized (163). Out of the three aforementioned terms, I prefer ‘emotional style’ due to the flexibility it affords. The polysemy of the word ‘style’ allows

21 For example, in American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style (1994), historian Peter Stearns describes two differing emotional styles: a nineteenth-century Victorian emotional style based on passion and a twentieth-century emotional style that emphasizes informality and coolness in expression.
one to consider emotions in relation to hierarchical structures (i.e. dominant and marginal),
socio-cultural groups, and individual experience as well. Moreover, ‘emotional style’ bridges the
disciplinary boundary between history and literary studies because ‘style’ refers to literary forms
and the manner of artistic expression characteristic of an author, literary group, or cultural period
(“Style” def. 13a).

In the discussions of heteropathia in the following chapters, I use ‘emotional styles’ and
‘ways of feeling’ [Fühlweisen] synonymously. An emotional style represented in a literary text
may be characterized by one dominant emotion (e.g. Baron Geert von Innstetten’s honor in Effi
Briest) or a cluster of emotions (e.g. Hanno Buddenbrook’s decadent sensibility, fear,
hopelessness, shame, and pity in Buddenbrooks). When put in dialogue, contrasting emotional
styles may lead to conflict or misunderstandings between characters, as evident in the
interactions between Max and Fenia in Fenitschka and the servants Johanna and Roswitha in Effi
Briest. Narrative techniques such as internal monologue communicate the narrator’s
acknowledgment of, if not alignment with certain affective perspectives, and narrative irony
indicates critique, skepticism, or a deliberate attempt to create distance. Mann’s empathetic-
ironic narration in Buddenbrooks best demonstrates these techniques and reflects a multifaceted
assessment of the figures’ emotional styles. Studying the interaction between emotional styles
represented at the intradiegetic and extradiegetic levels of a text provides new insight into
possible interpretations of that text and the social and cultural contexts that inspired it. During
periods of transition and cultural transformation, such as the fin de siècle, it is common to see at
least two conflicting emotional styles represented in a novel or novella.
1.3.3 Theoretical Models of Emotion

Finally, the third component of heteropathia to consider when analyzing a novelistic prose text is the framing of the narrated events through one or more theoretical models of emotion. Numerous individuals from a variety of disciplines throughout history have contributed insights into emotional life, including Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Aquinas, Spinoza, Hume, Lessing, Darwin, James, Nietzsche, Freud, Dewey, psychoanalysts, neuroscientists, evolutionary psychologists, and social constructivists. Thus, rather than include an exhaustive list of all known theoretical models of emotion here, I will provide examples of some recent and historical models.

One theory that has permeated thinking about emotion in Western societies is the ‘hydraulic’ model. This model of emotion postulates that if emotions remain suppressed for too long, they will demand to be released, often causing an individual to lose control. The hydraulic model is found as early as Descartes, and the perceived antagonism between feeling and reason, which has characterized much of Western thought since Plato and Aristotle, explains the ubiquity of this model. A hydraulic model of emotion is implicit in much of the thinking of Sigmund Freud and Norbert Elias, two early twentieth-century theorists of emotion who contributed influential master narratives based on this model. Contemporary emotion research questions the accuracy of the hydraulic model; however, the ordinary language and metaphors (e.g. ‘bottling up anger,’ ‘venting frustrations,’ ‘fuming with rage’) that people often use to talk about feelings reflect the cultural embeddedness of this model even today.

22 The notion of a ‘hydraulic’ model of emotion can be traced back to the work of philosopher Richard C. Solomon (see The Passions 77-88).

23 Solomon considered the hydraulic model of emotion a “misleading metaphor” and noted that it inspired Freud’s most frequently disputed psychoanalytic theories (True to Our Feelings 142). Barbara Rosenwein identified a hydraulic model of emotion behind the master narratives of Johan Huizinga and Norbert Elias and challenged the view that “the history of the West is the history of increasing emotional restraint” (“Worrying” 827).
The interdisciplinary field of emotion studies now recognizes a number of more recent theoretical models of emotion, including the cognitive appraisal, constructivist, and performative theories. The cognitive appraisal model challenges the notion that emotions are irrational and pre-cognitive (see Plamper 241-243; Reddy 14-15). Instead, this model contends that emotions are signs of cognitive judgments, that is, that specific emotional reactions occur in response to cognitive evaluations or appraisals of events. The constructivist model attempts to erode the binary of individual versus culture and claims that emotions are socially constructed products of education (see Plamper 116-128; Reddy 35-50). According to the constructivist model, what matters are not questions of emotional ‘authenticity,’ but the social meanings and functions of emotions, which are thought to vary across epochs and cultures. The performative model of emotions, a specific type of constructivist model, insists that emotions can be willed and performed (McNamer 11). No longer viewed as stable categories, emotions are treated as practices or performances that are always in flux, yet are often made to seem natural. This recent understanding of emotion as a ‘practice’ or ‘performance’ recalls a parallel shift in gender studies and emphasizes what one does rather than who one is (Shields 6). Although these theoretical models of emotion did not yet exist in name during the late nineteenth century, I nonetheless find precursors—to both the hydraulic model and more recent theories—in German literature around 1900.

When studying the representation of emotion in literary works from an earlier cultural period, however, it is essential to take note of the theories of emotion that were influential at that time in history. Even if writers did not intentionally engage with a particular conception of emotion in their work, it is likely that they inadvertently took up or modified theoretical models of emotion that were then in circulation. Since vocabularies of feeling have changed over time in
many languages, it is also necessary to consider past indicators of what we now call ‘emotion’ (e.g. words like Empfindung, Leidenschaft, and Gemütsbewegung), as well as emotion metaphors no longer in use. Theoretical models of emotion can be found throughout history in a variety of discourses and fields of study, including but not limited to philosophy, theology, aesthetics, medicine, evolutionary theory, psychology, and psychoanalysis. For example, William James’s psychophysiological model of emotion was highly influential in the late nineteenth century. The influence of Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche was even more pervasive at the fin de siècle, and they are still well-known today for their writings on compassion (Schopenhauer) and pity, ressentiment, guilt, and bad conscience (Nietzsche).

In a literary text, a single emotional model may dominate, as in Gerhart Hauptmann’s Bahnwärter Thiel (1888). Hauptmann’s novella operates on a hydraulic model of emotion. The characters occupy a deterministic diegetic world, and the protagonist, Flagman Thiel, becomes a victim of his own emotions after suppressing them for a prolonged period of time. Yet it is possible to find evidence for multiple, even contradictory models of emotion that structure a narrative, as I demonstrate in Chapter Three on Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka. The final scene of Fenitschka demonstrates a movement from an essentialist model of emotion to a performative one, a shift that coincides with the homodiegetic narrator’s acknowledgment of the title heroine’s agency. One can identify theoretical models of emotion in the organizational structure of a work, at the level of narration, or through the actions and speech of the characters themselves.

In summary, heteropathia refers to the co-presence of and tension between differing emotional perspectives represented in novelistic prose. Its unique manifestation in a text becomes apparent if one examines the narrative situation (voice and focalization), representation of emotional styles, and theoretical models of emotion. An analysis using this concept shows
how methods of narrating and staging emotions in a diegetic world produce different outcomes. For example, a novel can support or challenge dominant cultural narratives, subvert previously unquestioned emotional codes, preserve or reimagine status and power hierarchies, or envision new orientations to emotion and patterns of social relationship, depending on how differing ways of feeling are represented in the text in question.

1.4 CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In the following chapters, I analyze the manifestation of heteropathia in three novelistic prose works written in the realist mode: Theodor Fontane’s *Effi Briest* (1895), Lou Andreas-Salomé’s *Fenitschka* (1898), and Thomas Mann’s *Buddenbrooks: Verfall einer Familie* (1901). My chapters are organized chronologically based on the publication date of the main literary work discussed in each. I made these selections from among other German novelistic prose works written during the 1890s based on two criteria: first, the impact of these authors and works at the *fin de siècle* and, second, the engagement with questions of emotions and social mores in the context of the late nineteenth-century *Kulturwandel*.

In general, the impact of a literary work derives largely from its capacity to move readers affectively. Literature can offer readers models, outlets, and provocations for their emotions. *Effi Briest, Fenitschka*, and *Buddenbrooks* are noteworthy in this regard. As we know from Theodor Fontane’s letters, a majority of historical readers of *Effi Briest* sympathized with Effi but rejected Innstetten and his propriety. 24 *Effi Briest* does indeed model compassion for its title heroine;

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24 Fontane expressed his surprise and concern with his readers’ responses to *Effi Briest* in a letter to Clara Kühnast dated October 27, 1895: “Ja, Effi! Alle Leute sympathisieren mit ihr und Einige gehen so weit, im Gegensatze dazu,
however, Fontane was surprised to learn that his character Innstetten filled readers with loathing. Less is known about historical readers’ responses to *Fenitschka*; however, it is well documented that Lou Andreas-Salomé’s image of women in her writings incited criticism from some of her contemporaries, including German feminist Hedwig Dohm, who called “Frau Lou” an “Antifrauenrechtlerin” (Dohm 280).²⁵ I take up an analysis of *Fenitschka* because, although Andreas-Salomé was a highly influential thinker and writer of her time, her literary works have largely been neglected in scholarship until recently. After its publication in 1901, *Buddenbrooks* outraged residents of Lübeck, including Thomas Mann’s family members. Some considered the novel a scandalous *roman à clef* because Mann used real-life models for many of his figures, and early twentieth-century critics accused Mann of being a “kalter Künstler” [cold artist] due to his ironic narrative style and social criticism (see Mann, *Briefe an Otto Grautoff und Ida Boy-Ed* 150; Muth 614-616). Mann’s ‘double optic’ nonetheless contributed toward the novel’s broad appeal to both educated elites and the masses, and *Buddenbrooks* remains Mann’s bestselling novel.

Regarding my second criterion, I find that *Effi Briest, Fenitschka,* and *Buddenbrooks* demonstrate a deep engagement with questions of emotions and social mores in the context of the social upheaval and rapid modernization that characterized the fin de siècle. Written during the 1890s and published within five years of each other, these works articulate the authors’

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²⁵ It is in response to Andreas-Salomé’s essay “Der Mensch als Weib” (1899) that Hedwig Dohm writes: “Und nun Frau Lou Andreas-Salomé? “Auch Du, mein Sohn Brutus!” dachte ich betrüb, als ich ihre Schrift “Der Mensch als Weib” gelesen hatte. Frau Lou (ihr voller, viel zu langer Name frißt zu viel Manuskript) Antifrauenrechtlerin!” (Dohm 280). Dohm still admired Andreas-Salomé even though she considered some of her views anti-feminist.
concerns with some of the most pressing issues of the time, including the women’s movement, decadence, morality, shifting social relations, and transformations in business and family life. Emotion is both an end itself and the means by which Fontane, Andreas-Salomé, and Mann represent and negotiate between differing perspectives on these social questions. Each work focuses on specific emotions and social contexts and resonates with distinct theoretical models of emotion. Yet all three point toward a strong correlation between broad cultural shifts and the emergence of new ways of feeling. *Effi Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks* depict societies undergoing the structural changes of modernization and destabilize emotional practices associated with nineteenth-century social hierarchies, such as honor codes, imperatives of female shame, and notions of bourgeois pride. Through the depiction of alternate emotional styles, such as compassion, modern understandings of love and marriage, and decadent sensibility, these novels express an awareness that changing social relations necessitate shifts in emotions and social mores. This acknowledgment of other forms of feeling in these works parallels the social leveling and democratization that was taking place in late nineteenth-century Wilhelmine Germany. Yet these novels do not advocate the reliance only upon new paradigms. Their open endings and heteropathic representation of differing affective perspectives foster a sustained dialogic interaction between viewpoints.

Chapter Two applies the concept heteropathia to the representation of emotion in Theodor Fontane’s social novel *Effi Briest* (1895). As a novel of adultery, *Effi Briest* proves to be especially conducive to examining the relevance and limitations of emotional practices that were debated in Wilhelmine Germany at the fin de siècle. My analysis demonstrates how the novel presents two of these emotional practices, *Ehre* [honor] and *Mitleid* [compassion], as emotional antipodes associated with different moral systems and views of society. On the one hand, we find
the nineteenth-century aristocratic and bourgeois emotional code of *Ehre*, which preserves social hierarchies and defends retributive justice, and on the other hand, we have *Mitleid*, which implies solidarity and the softening of social mores. The tension between these two ways of feeling, although most apparent in the servants’ responses to the news of Effi’s adultery, manifests itself throughout the entire novel. By critically examining and subverting the emotional imperatives of honor and shame, *Effi Briest* makes room for compassion in a society undergoing modernization. But this is not to say that Fontane’s novel envisions a society driven only by compassion. Fontane was influenced by Schopenhauer’s *Mitleidsethik*, the theoretical model of emotion that structures his novel; however, Fontane adapts the philosopher’s ethics of compassion to fit his own worldview. The novel’s open ending allows the dialogic negotiation between these differing ways of feeling to continue. Thus, while *Effi Briest* depicts *Ehre* as an emotional practice that has lost its relevance in late nineteenth-century society, it ultimately admits the need for both *Mitleid* and self-regulatory emotions.

Chapter Three analyzes the co-presence of differing emotional styles represented in Lou Andreas-Salomé’s *Fenitschka* (1898). Through the interactions between the protagonists, Fenia and Max, the novella reveals the impact that large cultural shifts had on emotions and social mores in *fin-de-siècle* European society. Andreas-Salomé’s novella regards the women’s movement as the major force that transformed relations between the sexes and introduced new orientations to emotion. Written against this historical background, *Fenitschka* focuses on notions of nineteenth-century romantic love, masculine honor, and feminine shame, passivity, and sexual purity. The novella contributes to the *fin-de-siècle* emotion discourse by subverting these previously undisputed social mores and gendered emotional imperatives. At the same time, it also recognizes that the familiar narratives associated with them were difficult to abandon. A
sober acknowledgment of the confusion and frustration brought about by the destabilization of familiar cultural practices is articulated through Max, the novella’s co-protagonist and extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator. Readers see from Max’s perspective and observe his thoughts and feelings in response to his encounters with Fenia, a New Woman-like figure who thwarts his attempts to categorize her. Narrative techniques convey Max’s struggles to come to term with shifts in emotional practices and the implications that these have for his own gender identity and relationships. Although it is difficult to escape the late nineteenth-century male bourgeois view embodied by Max, *Fenitschka* makes room for new emotional styles and a liberating definition of love. It does not call for the naïve acceptance of a single ideology; instead, it encourages mutual understanding through dialogue, exemplified by Fenia’s character. *Fenitschka* advocates freedom of self-realization through its validation of new emotional styles and opportunities for individuals in modern society, yet it remains sensitive to the difficulty of integrating new meanings and values into existing structures of feeling.

Chapter Four examines the roles that emotions play in Thomas Mann’s *Buddenbrooks: Verfall einer Familie* (1901). The multigenerational family saga structure of *Buddenbrooks* sets the novel apart from *Effi Briest* and *Fenitschka*, both of which feature fewer characters and cover a much shorter span of narrated time. This chapter demonstrates how, by depicting the gradual deterioration of the Buddenbrooks’ ‘bourgeois’ emotional code and transition to other, ‘unbourgeois’ ways of feeling [*unbürgerliche Gefühle*]26 in the course of four generations, Mann’s novel offers critical assessments of a range of emotional styles through its empathetic-

26 ‘Unbourgeois’ is the translation I use to preserve the polysemy and ambiguity of the term ‘unbürgerlich’ reflected in the following passage: “War der verstorbene Konsul, mit seiner schwärmerischen Liebe zu Gott und dem Gekreuzigten, der erste seines Geschlechtes gewesen, der unalltägliche, unbürgerliche und differenzierte Gefühle gekannt und gepflegt hatte, so schienen seine beiden Söhne die ersten Buddenbrooks zu sein, die vor dem freien und naiven Hervortreten solcher Gefühle empfindlich zurückschreckten” (*Buddenbrooks* 283, emphasis added).
ironic narration. In the diegetic world of *Buddenbrooks*, established emotional codes and social mores become increasingly difficult to preserve. With the social leveling and rise of the *nouveaux riches* depicted in the second half of the novel, the Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois pride becomes increasingly ironic. Decadent sensibility emerges as an alternate form of feeling and escape from the ever-increasing work tempo in a rapidly modernizing world. I suggest that Mann draws on a Nietzschean genealogical approach in *Buddenbrooks*, but, rather than advancing a single ideological viewpoint, Mann uses genealogy to find a middle ground between the unwavering bourgeois pride and self-confidence stimulated by German programmatic realism and the decadent sensibility that became fashionable at the *fin de siècle*. Through its figure of the young writer Kai Graf Mölln, who exemplifies both life-affirming pride and artistic sensibility and acts as a structural metaphor for the mediation of emotions in the novel, *Buddenbrooks* self-reflexively highlights the role of literature in renegotiating emotional codes and social mores.

Taken together, the following chapters demonstrate that Fontane’s *Effi Briest*, Andreas-Salomé’s *Fenitschka*, and Mann’s *Buddenbrooks* feature a heteropathic impulse that recalls the transitional status of the *fin de siècle*. These literary works acknowledge emotional alterity yet resist embracing any way of feeling uncritically. Instead, they negotiate between diverse affective perspectives and create spaces for critical analysis and dialogue. I suggest that *Effi Briest*, *Fenitschka*, and *Buddenbrooks* attend to a crisis in emotional practices and social mores that pervaded German culture around 1900. Each work expresses an awareness that established social codes were losing their value and effectiveness in modern society and that the needs, desires, and *feelings* of people were changing. Although overt references to the larger historical and structural changes (e.g. the decline of the aristocracy, the women’s movement, urbanization, industrialization) in *fin-de-siècle* Wilhelmine society remain somewhat in the background of
each work, these novelistic prose texts depict signs of social leveling and modernization as coinciding with or necessitating shifts in affective perspectives. As I show in the following chapters, *Effi Briest*, *Fenitschka*, and *Buddenbrooks* do not prescribe how to feel or what to think, but rather engage readers in critical reflection about their own emotions and values and create spaces for them to *feel differently*, which is why these works remain highly relevant today.
2.0 “DAS BESTE, WAS WIR HABEN, IST MITLEID”?: NEGOTIATING BETWEEN HONOR AND COMPASSION IN FONTANE’S EFFI BRIEST (1895)

Since the publication of Theodor Fontane’s (1819-1898) Effi Briest in 1895, Effi’s fate has evoked strong affective responses in readers and incited criticism of late nineteenth-century Wilhelmine society.¹ Fontane provides models for such affective responses through the narrator, who sympathizes with his ‘arme Effi,’ and the servant Roswitha, who also reacts with compassion after reading about Effi’s affair and Major Crampas’s death in the duel with Baron Geert von Innstetten: “‘Ja,’ sagte Roswitha. ‘Und das lesen nun die Menschen und verschimpfieren mir meine liebe, arme Frau. Und der arme Major. Nun ist er tot’” (Effi Briest 291). Yet Fontane also gives expression to a contrasting style of social feeling through the servant Johanna, who vehemently rejects the idea of compassion for Crampas and upholds the nineteenth-century Prussian honor code: “Was heißt der arme Major! Der ganze arme Major taugte nichts…. Und wenn man immer in vornehmen Häusern gedient hat…dann weiß man auch, was sich paßt und schickt und was Ehre ist…” (Effi Briest 291-292). This argument between two of the novel’s important but less commonly studied figures reflects conflicting

¹ The historical inspiration for Fontane’s Effi Briest was the Ardenne affair, a love affair between Elisabeth (Else) von Ardenne and Emil Hartwich, who died of severe injuries four days after a pistol duel with Armand von Ardenne in Berlin on November 27, 1886 (see appendix to Effi Briest 353-358). Although Fontane indicated in letters that he was aware that Else started a new life as a nurse after her divorce, he tells a different story in Effi Briest (see appendix to Effi Briest 358-362). The fate endured by Effi, whose physical and emotional decline and early death bear little resemblance to Else’s new opportunities and long life to age 99, inspires compassion and brings under scrutiny the gender double standards, practice of dueling, and cult of honor that persisted through the 1890s.
social responses to the misfortunes that occur after Effi’s adultery and Innstetten’s duel: a reaffirmation of the need for honor [Ehre] on the one hand (Johanna) and an appeal to compassion [Mitleid] on the other (Roswitha). Thus, heteropathia in Effi Briest manifests itself as the staging of tension between Mitleid and principles of Ehre and Sittlichkeit. Yet this tension is not a pure literary invention. In Effi Briest Fontane responds to greater social concerns and renegotiates the space between two important social feelings\(^2\) that were part of the emotional repertoire and occupied the forefront of cultural debates in late nineteenth-century Wilhelmine Germany.

By taking this key scene between Johanna and Roswitha in Chapter 29 as its starting point, this chapter considers Fontane’s Effi Briest in its historical context and examines the way in which the novel represents changing social perspectives on the emotions Ehre and Mitleid around 1900. Psychophysiological theories of emotion\(^3\) predominated in the second half of the nineteenth century. But, rather than merely representing emotions as physiological responses to one’s environment or individual subjective experiences, Effi Briest reveals that emotions are also shaped by and acquire meaning through social relations. The processes of modernization, industrialization, and Kulturwandel transformed social relations at the turn of the century, and changes in emotions and their meanings coincided with these broad cultural shifts. Of course, this does not imply cultural uniformity or a smooth transition from one range of emotional styles

\(^2\) During this historical period characterized by rapid modernization, industrialization, and Kulturwandel, social feelings were of great value. Hermann Boeschenstein writes that the increasing demand for social feeling at this time “lag zum Teil in der Entwicklung der Gesellschaft begründet, in den dunklen Schatten, die das industrielle Zeitalter warf” (153).

\(^3\) Two prominent examples of these theories include Charles Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) and William James’s “What is an Emotion?” (1884), both of which circulated widely in Germany in the last decades of the nineteenth century. For an overview of nineteenth-century affective psychology, see Harry Norman Gardiner, Ruth Clark Metcalf, and John G. Beebe-Center, Feeling and Emotion: A History of Theories, 1937 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1970) 276-335.
to another. Instead, as I argued in the introduction, emotions and social mores were renegotiated, and this happened in part through literary texts and other media. Debates about *Ehre*, for example, were tied to arguments for or against the practice of dueling from the nineteenth to the early twentieth century. The inclusion of the publication “Für oder wider das Duell?” (1896) as the first volume of a series called *Brennende Tagesfragen* attests to the significant role that *Ehre* played in public discourse of the time. Published a few years after *Effi Briest*, Arthur Schnitzler’s (1862-1931) *Leutnant Gustl* (1900) provides another literary examination of the code of *Ehre* and practice of dueling. *Mitleid* entered public discourse around 1900 through a variety of channels, including German Naturalist literature and theater, Arthur Schopenhauer’s and Friedrich Nietzsche’s writings on *Mitleid*, and social aid organizations, such as the Mädchen- und Frauengruppen für soziale Hilfsarbeit (1893) and the Deutscher Caritasverband (1897). During the women’s movement, suffragettes showed compassion for ‘fallen’ women and brought to light gender double standards, including the fragility of feminine virtue and the policing of female sexuality. Written against this historical background, *Effi Briest* depicts a society in which emotional styles are shifting. Fontane’s protagonists, Effi and Innstetten, face essentially the same psychological struggle: to confront and manage their guilt and other emotions in the face of emotional codes that no longer seem in tune with modern ways of life. Fontane portrays the figures’ inability to have “das richtige Gefühl,” or what late nineteenth-century Prussian aristocratic society would consider the ‘proper emotions’ in their situations and thereby alludes to the declining relevance of the emotional imperatives of masculine honor and feminine shame and the need for different, more humane styles of social feeling (*Effi Briest* 259).

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5 See Meyer-Renschhausen 116-119.
Effi Briest contributed to the turn-of-the-century emotion discourse by establishing Mitleid as the emotion that could provide stability and a new point of orientation during this time of rapid social and cultural transformation. Nevertheless, this brand of Mitleid is not the same as the eighteenth-century conception of Mitleid tied to Enlightenment optimism, ideals of Bildung, and the bourgeois theater. In Fontane’s novel, the emotion Mitleid is associated with cultural pessimism rather than Enlightenment optimism. It stands in opposition to Ehre, an influential emotional code in aristocratic and bourgeois circles that determined one’s place in the social hierarchy. By contrast, Mitleid in Effi Briest transcends social stratification and is even extended to those who transgress social and moral boundaries. The novel indicates that some may have perceived this emotion as a threat to the established social hierarchy and institutions due to the tolerance, social leveling, and softening of social mores that Mitleid implies.

Ehre and Mitleid can both be considered social emotions, yet the novel presents them as emotional antipodes. Fontane’s symbolic association of Mitleid with nature and Ehre with society emphasizes the tension between these two social emotions. As in Arthur Schopenhauer’s ethics, in which Mitleid is conceived as the ‘wahre Grundlage der Moral,’ Mitleid in Effi Briest manifests itself as ‘natural’ social feeling or compassionate love. The narrator reveals that the figures who cling to Ehre often do so for self-seeking reasons, and, by comparison with Mitleid, Ehre represents a self-regarding ethical system devoid of “rechte Liebe” (Effi Briest 348). The association of the ‘Naturkind’ Effi with nature and Roswitha, who embodies Mitleid or what Schopenhauer calls reine Liebe, explains why readers since 1895 have tended to identify with

6 As clarified in the introduction, I consider all emotions always-already social. Although the term ‘social emotions’ might seem redundant given this understanding of emotion, the modifier ‘social’ stresses the important role that these particular emotions play in facilitating social interaction, i.e. in regulating power, status, and group cohesion or dissolution.
Effi rather than Innstetten. Yet, as Fontane’s letter to Clara Kühnast dated October 27, 1895, suggests, to call Innstetten an “Ekel,” as many of his contemporaries did, would be missing the point:

Ja, Effi! Alle Leute sympathisieren mit ihr und Einige gehen so weit, im Gegensatz dazu, den Mann als einen ‘alten Ekel’ zu bezeichnen. Das amüsiert mich natürlich, giebt mir aber auch zu denken, weil es wieder beweist, wie wenig den Menschen an der sogenannten ‘Moral’ liegt und wie die liebenswürdigen Naturen dem Menschenherzen sympathischer sind. [...] Denn eigentlich ist er doch in jedem Anbetracht ein ganz ausgezeichnetes Menschenexemplar, dem es an dem, was man lieben muß, durchaus nicht fehlt. Aber sonderbar, alle korrekten Leute werden schon bloß um ihrer Korrektheiten willen mit Mißtrauen, oft mit Abneigung betrachtet. (Dichter über ihre Dichtungen 452)

From these comments, it is evident that Fontane had intended his character Innstetten to be read more positively than most cared to see him. Fontane laments the devaluation of morality that he identifies in readers’ overwhelming sympathy for Effi and disgust with Innstetten, and he assumes that readers find Innstetten repulsive precisely because of his propriety. Before her death at the end of the novel, Effi insists that Innstetten acted appropriately but remarks that he lacked “rechte Liebe” (Effi Briest 348). Effi’s acknowledgment of Innstetten’s good character reflects Fontane’s own unwillingness to imagine living in a society that has relinquished all guiding moral principles evident in this letter. By validating ethical principles and social mores guided by rechte Liebe in Effi Briest, Fontane adapts Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik to fit his own worldview. Although Fontane’s narrator of Effi Briest is drawn more to Mitleid, especially for
the title heroine, the novel opens up a space for the co-existence of and dialogue between both styles of social feeling during a period of unprecedented social change.

**2.1 EMOTION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM IN FONTANE’S NOVELS**

Fontane’s critical examination of *Ehre* and *Mitleid* and appropriation of the nature-society motif constitute his style of social critique in *Effi Briest*. Most celebrated for his Berliner *Gesellschaftsromane* and their sharp criticism of German society during the Bismarckian and Wilhelmine eras, Fontane began his career as a *Romancier* late in life. Born in Neuruppin in 1819, he collected a variety of experiences through his frequent travels to England and various positions as an apothecary, journalist, and theater critic. Fontane made Berlin his permanent residence in 1844 and became a member of the literary society ‘Tunnel über der Spree,’ in which he continued to develop his conversational tone and the attention to detail characteristic of his realist style. He was not immune to the influence of philosophical pessimism and the discourse of decadence and decline that left its mark on late nineteenth-century Europe. As a keen observer of society, Fontane viewed the changes he witnessed critically and grew increasingly

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7 Helmuth Nürnberger wrote the following about Fontane’s literary works overall: “Fontanes Dichtung entlarvt die Unnatürlichkeit, die Herzlosigkeit, die Veräußerlichung der geltenden moralischen Konventionen mit jeder nur wünschenswerten Schärfe” (142). Although Fontane’s novels are certainly critical of late nineteenth-century Wilhelmine society, Nürnberger’s assessment essentializes nature and posits a binary in which social conventions are evil and nature is good. I find that Fontane’s contemplation of the social and ethical implications of *Ehre* and *Mitleid* in *Effi Briest* complicates a straightforward correspondence between good/evil and nature/society.

8 Isabel Nottinger considers the potential influence that Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Max Nordau might have had on Fontane and his work but rightly emphasizes his critical distance from their views. Fontane’s critical distance holds true especially in the case of Nordau, one of the staunchest critics of decadence at the turn of the century. While Nordau diagnosed degeneration as a widespread disease that needed to be overcome in order for society to progress, Fontane saw potential in decline, which he considered to be as much as a part of life as growth and development (see Nottinger 82-84).
pessimistic in the last two decades of his life. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that he was most prolific during this time. After Fontane turned toward the literary portrayal of late nineteenth-century society and published his first Berlin social novel \textit{L´Adultera} in 1882, his career as a novelist flourished, with novels appearing with regularity until his death in 1898. Among Fontane’s literary works published between 1882 and 1898 are four adultery novels—\textit{L´Adultera} (1882), \textit{Graf Petöfy} (1883), \textit{Unwiederbringlich} (1891), and \textit{Effi Briest} (1895)—works indicating that the topic of adultery occupied him for over a decade. A scandalous yet popular literary genre in late nineteenth-century Europe, the novel of female adultery was especially conducive to the examination and social critique of the state of culture and politics that so deeply concerned Fontane. The transgressive nature of adultery and the emotional codes associated with it enabled him to explore the social relevance and limits of \textit{Ehre}, \textit{Scham}, and \textit{Mitleid} in \textit{Effi Briest} in particular, where as in his other social novels, he responds to the notion common in the nineteenth century that modern society is antithetical to individual autonomy. Frequently drawing on the themes of conflict between the individual and society or nature and culture, Fontane’s works paved the way for the later development of genres known in German as \textit{Gesellschafts}- and \textit{Zeitroman}.

Conflict between the individual and society is a recurring theme in Fontane’s oeuvre, yet emotions, mental phenomena in which individual biology and subjectivity and socio-cultural influences intersect, have received surprisingly little scholarly consideration. By no means does this only describe the state of research in Fontane studies. Critics have tended to read emotion in studies of late nineteenth-century German literature overall in terms of emotional restraint or repression with little elaboration. Russell Berman, for instance, describes the diegetic world in \textit{Effi Briest} as “a world where emotions are as orderly as a well-tended garden, even if one’s only
child is buried in it” (339). Berman refers specifically to the novel’s final scene in the garden at Hohen-Cremmen after Effi’s gravestone is laid, but, by arguing that Effi Briest marks the end of literary realism, he implies that this ‘orderly’ depiction of emotions characterizes nineteenth-century German realist fiction in general. Even if one were to agree with this assessment of nineteenth-century German realism, the perceived absence of strong emotions in literature should prompt inquiry rather than dismissal. Writers have drawn on emotions at every point in German cultural history, but the literary form that emotions take varies considerably, depending on how society viewed them at the time. Thus, even ‘unemotional’ works represent feelings and elicit affective responses in readers.

One of the first Germanists to recognize the significance of emotions in Fontane’s work was Hermann Boeschenstein, who, due to the large scale of his project of tracing the German Gefühlskultur from 1770 to 1930, does not go into detail about Fontane’s novels. Because of the powerful way that Effi Briest portrays the maturation of its title figure, however, Boeschenstein calls it a “Bildungsroman der Gefühlskultur,” thereby acknowledging that Fontane’s novel represents an important contribution to the late nineteenth-century German emotion discourse (167). Uta Schürmann puts Fontane in dialogue with William James’s (1842-1910) nineteenth-century peripheral psychophysiological theory9 of emotion and argues that the numerous indicators of temperature (i.e. Wärme and Kälte) in L’Adultera produce the characters’ emotional states and communicate these to readers (60). Although there is evidence to suggest that Fontane uses temperature and humidity metaphorically to hint at individual emotions and social climates

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9 Schürmann presumes that Fontane was aware of William James’s theory of emotion because, in the second half of the nineteenth century, general public enthusiasm for popular psychology abounded outside the university (58). Carl Stumpf (1848-1936), a German philosopher and psychologist, helped make William James a household name in Germany, but the connection to Fontane is relatively weak because Stumpf did not join the philosophy faculty in Berlin until 1894, well over a decade after the publication of L’Adultera in 1882.
in *Effi Briest* as well, such meteorological details appear much less frequently than in *L’Adultera*. It is the social negotiation of the emotions *Ehre* and *Mitleid*, I contend, that takes center stage in *Effi Briest*.

Other scholarship on *Effi Briest* speculates about the extent of reader identification or sympathy with Effi and Innstetten, yet the representation of emotions does not emerge as a concern. Traditionally, the common critical reaction is to judge Innstetten’s character harshly (see Lukács 305; Müller-Seidel 370). This view echoes the initial critique of Innstetten’s character to which Fontane responded in 1895. Walter Müller-Seidel attributes Effi’s suffering to Innstetten’s “Leidenschaftslosigkeit,” thereby overlooking signs of his affection for her and interpreting “rechte Liebe” as passionate or romantic love rather than feeling for humanity (compare Müller-Seidel 370; *Effi Briest* 348). Taking their cue from Fontane’s bewilderment over his readers’ disgust with Innstetten, some critics foreground his suffering or show that he is able to love (see Krause; Miller; Schneider). Yet others reject the conclusion that Innstetten falls prey to the “uns tyrannisierende[s] Gesellschafts-Etwas” and argue that he maintains control of his actions (*Effi Briest* 278). Although critics generally agree that Effi’s story is presented in greater detail than Innstetten’s, Dieter Krohn attempts to fill in details about Innstetten’s inner life and assumes that his decision to duel is motivated not only by social norms, but by personal feelings, which he tries to deny (162). But critics who attempt a more even-handed interpretation

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10 Two men from Berlin talk about Hofprediger Kögel after Effi and Innstetten’s wedding: “Freilich, ein Mann in seiner Stellung muß kalt sein. Woran scheitert man denn im Leben überhaupt? Immer nur an der Wärme” (*Effi Briest* 40, emphasis added). In her letter to Innstetten, Effi mentions the temperature at Bad Ems immediately after describing her conversations with Frau Zwicker: “Dazu kommt noch, daß Ems in einem Kessel liegt. Wir leiden hier außerordentlich unter der Hitze” (*Effi Briest* 266). *Wärme* or *Hitze* implies impropriety and unconventionalism in both examples.

11 Sabine Hotho-Jackson reminds us how “Fontane argues … that human beings are free agents and have to accept responsibility for their actions…” (274; see also Brinkmann 96). Birgit Stolt pushes the assertion that Innstetten maintains control over his actions even further and uses discourse analysis to show that he plays a role in driving Effi to commit adultery (244).
cannot help but notice the narrator’s disproportionate treatment of Effi’s and Innstetten’s predicaments. The narrator’s own alignment with his “arme Effi” facilitates greater reader identification with the novel’s title heroine (compare *Effi Briest* 79, 345; Hamann 431; Krohn 157).

A few key studies focus on the role of particular emotions in *Effi Briest*. Brian Tucker, for example, provides a brief historical account of the boredom and exclusion that aristocratic and bourgeois women experienced as a result of late nineteenth-century social change and relates *Effi Briest* to other adultery novels in which feelings of *Langeweile* play an important role. Tucker then shows how the novel’s performance of boredom by way of *erzählte Zeit* and *Erzählzeit* explains why readers typically side with Effi (194). Although Erwin Kobel primarily intends to clarify how Effi becomes an adulteress, which leads him to analyze the novel’s treatment of fear. Kobel refers to Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) writings on fear and trembling and claims that Major Crampas uses Effi’s *Angst* to attract her like a magnet (261). My approach has more in common with Waltraud Wende’s and Ute Frevert’s studies, which emphasize the meaning of emotional codes and social contexts. Wende thus identifies the intersection of old and new models of love and marriage in *Effi Briest* (148). Frevert’s discussion of a special case in the twentieth-century reception of *Effi Briest* argues that emotions change through history (*Vergängliche Gefühle* 18; *Emotions in History* 10, 82). Informed by recent historical studies of emotion, this chapter demonstrates how Fontane’s *Effi Briest* enacts the heteropathic representation of *Ehre* and *Mitleid* by analyzing the novel’s narrative situation, its presentation of different emotional styles, and its contextualization of a philosophical model of emotion.
The narrative situation of *Effi Briest*, which features an extradiegetic-heterodiegetic narrator, yields a complex, realistic picture of late nineteenth-century society and provides insight into the thoughts, emotions, and motivations of a wide array of figures. The narrator’s position outside of the diegetic world maintains a certain emotional distance from the figures and narrated events. Rather than seeing only from the perspective of one figure narrating his or her own story, readers are invited to observe the speech and actions of the characters from the privileged position of the narrator. They therefore gain information that no single figure possesses, including knowledge of the unspoken thoughts and feelings of the other characters. On first glance, it might seem that this largely non-focalized narrative would enable readers to judge the characters and uncover the impetus for the social crises depicted in the novel, but the novel resists such monocausal explanations, which scholars typically dismiss as “unfontanisch” (see Krohn 158). Fontane delivers social critique in *Effi Briest*. Yet, by depicting a society in all of its complexity, he contests the simple reduction of social problems and questions, which is often held to be a strength of his social novels (see Wende 157).

Although *Effi Briest* conveys a wider variety of voices and perspectives than a homodiegetic narrator could communicate, the novel’s narrative situation does not generate an impartial, objective portrait or straightforward historical representation of Bismarckian society. Fontane frequently employs narrative irony as both a vehicle of social critique and an element of his realist strategy of *Verklärung* (see Nottinger 16-17; Preisendanz 292). Readers can easily recognize Fontane’s narrative irony in the characterization of Sidonie von Grasenabb, a member of the aristocracy who obliviously exhibits behaviors she finds detestable in others. In Chapter 19, for example, Sidonie deplores the lack of discipline in society, considered by some to be a
sign of the times, and asks Pastor Lindequist to intervene in the education of youth: “‘Eingreifen, lieber Pastor, Zucht. Das Fleisch ist schwach, gewiß; aber…’ In diesem Augenblicke kam ein englisches Roastbeef, von dem Sidonie ziemlich ausgiebig nahm, ohne Lindequist’s Lächeln dabei zu bemerken” (Effi Briest 179). Pastor Lindequist’s smile, an expression of amusement, renders the social critique in this scene visible, lest readers miss the narrative rendering of Sidonie’s ‘weakness of the flesh’ or lack of restraint at the dinner table immediately after proclaiming the importance of discipline and mourning its decline. As demonstrated by Pastor’s smile, commonplace gestures and facial expressions often hold significance, provide insight into emotions and opinions of characters, and accentuate the social-critical impulse of the novel. This passage and others like it show that Effi Briest is not a direct reflection of an external social reality, but an artistic creation that skillfully uses focalization and narrative irony to render certain aspects of society visible for social critique and to encourage readers to engage with the text and reflect.

Even though the narrator of Effi Briest preserves distance to the figures and narrated events, however, he is neither aloof nor unempathetic. An analysis of the narrative situation brings to light the narrator’s emotional attachment to Effi in particular. Narrative techniques give readers more intimate access to Effi’s thoughts and feelings than to those of any other figure in the text. These include non-focalized narration, the occasional use of internal focalization, and Effi’s letters to her mother, where she articulates feelings that she does not communicate to Innstetten. Shifts from zero focalization to internal focalization convey Effi’s private thoughts and feelings and allow readers to see through her eyes more directly, as in the following scene: “Das war die erste lange Trennung, fast auf zwölf Stunden. Arme Effi. Wie sollte sie den Abend verbringen? Früh zu Bett, das war gefährlich, dann wachte sie auf und konnte nicht wieder
einschlafen und horchte auf alles. Nein, erst recht müde werden und dann ein fester Schlaf, das war das Beste” (Effi Briest 79). Perhaps the clearest indication of the extradiegetic-heterodiegetic narrator’s own emotions is his expression of compassion, “Arme Effi,” which appears a second time in the final chapter of the novel (compare Effi Briest 79, 345). Following this first obvious moment of sympathetic identification with Effi, the narrator shifts to internal focalization, or, more precisely, to free indirect speech. Free indirect speech in the passage quoted above blurs the distinction between the perspectives of the narrator and the character and enables readers to comprehend Effi’s feelings of restlessness and boredom12 during Innstetten’s absence. The narrator’s repetition of “Arme Effi” at the end of the novel expresses compassion for her just before she dies:

*Arme Effi, Du* hattest zu den Himmelswundern zu lange hinaufgesehen und darüber nachgedacht, und das Ende war, daß die Nachtluft und die Nebel, die vom Teich her aufstiegen, *sie* wieder aufs Krankenbett warfen, und als Wiesike gerufen wurde und sie gesehen hatte, nahm er Briest beiseite und sagte: “Wird nichts mehr; machen Sie sich auf ein baldiges Ende gefaßt.” (Effi Briest 345, emphasis added)

Although the apostrophe “Arme Effi” in this passage occurs without any subsequent transition to free indirect speech or internal focalization, an interesting slippage occurs with the personal pronouns. Fontane makes his narrator’s presence known to readers here by employing the “Du” form, with which he addresses Effi directly. Through this familiar, direct form of address, the

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12 Brian Tucker also cites this passage to emphasize Effi’s boredom here, but he does not claim that Fontane uses free indirect speech, just “a question posed in the third-person that nonetheless invites the reader to share in her predicament” (191).
narrator voices compassion for Effi and a desire to change her fate before shifting back to the more impersonal style of third-person narration.

While the narrator follows Effi’s story closely through the entire novel, from her first meeting with Innstetten at Hohen-Cremmen to the grave, readers learn little about Innstetten’s private thoughts and feelings. This discrepancy in Effi Briest has fueled critical debates about the two characters’ guilt and motivations, as well as inquiries into the possibility of identifying with Innstetten (see Krohn 157). Because Effi’s emotions are shared more directly and in greater detail through the voice of the narrator, readers past and present may have found it easier to identify with her, in spite of her adultery. Additionally, the decline of Ehre and the honor code may have made it more difficult for readers since 1900 to understand the motivations behind Innstetten’s actions. Effi Briest undeniably raises ethical questions about the actions of its figures, some of whom verbally acknowledge their own guilt, but an examination of the narrative situation reveals that Mitleid is an important structural element of the novel and an emotion expressed directly by the narrator.

As Fontane scholarship has long recognized, Fontane is a master of conversation and consistently employs it in his social novels (see Neumann; Nottinger 97-99; Stolt 231). In Effi

13 The Aristotelian definition of Mitleid requires that, in order to be an object of Mitleid, an individual must have done nothing wrong and have something in common with the sympathizer (Aristoteles Rhetorik 88; The Rhetoric of Aristotle 89-90). According to this logic, Effi would not have been a viable object of Mitleid because she committed adultery. The conceptualization of Mitleid in Effi Briest resonates more with eighteenth- and nineteenth-century interpretations of Mitleid, especially Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik, which locates Mitleid in the common bond of humanity rather than with superficial similarities or moral goodness (compare Hume 369; Rousseau, Social Contract & Discourses 198; Schopenhauer, WWV I §67).

14 Frevert cites actress Hanna Schygulla’s response to the filming of Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s Effi Briest (1974), in which she stated that the emotions and conflicts depicted in the novel were foreign to her. Based on Schygulla’s response, Frevert concludes: “Was 1895 den Nerv der Zeitgenossen getroffen hatte, rief achtzig Jahre später Schulterzucken hervor” (Vergängliche Gefühle 18).
Briest, emotions are a frequent subject of such conversations.\textsuperscript{15} The list of instances in which the figures scrutinize their own emotions or the emotions of others includes the Briests’ discussion of Effi’s ability to love (43-44), Effi’s conversation with Johanna about her longing and fear (85-88), Wüllersdorf and Innstetten’s debate about the honor code (278-280), and Effi’s question to Roswitha about her past trauma and guilt (264-265). As a constant matter under discussion, then, emotions in Effi Briest are not merely individual expressions or physiological responses to the environment, as late nineteenth-century affective psychology claimed, but social practices that are related to other discourses. By drawing attention to the communicative function and dialogic negotiation of emotions, the novel shows that emotions organize and motivate actions in society and determine relationships between individuals and groups. Innstetten’s reference to “jenes…uns tyrannisierende Gesellschafts-Etwas” may be interpreted as a monolithic ‘social something’ that causes oppression and sets limits on individual autonomy (Effi Briest 278). But Fontane does not portray a homogenous society with one set of social and emotional codes. Instead he shows cultural codes in flux and renegotiates them through dialogue. The narrator facilitates the mediation of emotions by framing conversations in which the figures discuss their rights and duties to feel a certain way, and thereby draws particular attention to these passages, emphasizing the discursive construction of individual emotional experience.

\textsuperscript{15} Emotions are also common subjects of conversation in Fontane’s other social novels, for example, in Irrungen, Wirrungen (1888). Harald Tanzer has noticed this and argued that authentic feeling is only expressed when there is no direct speech about it (46). Speech about emotions in Effi Briest functions differently: even emotions that might seem more ‘natural’ (e.g. Mitleid and Mutterliebe) become topics of conversation and debate, thus suggesting that all emotions are socially negotiated and historically variable.
Tension between conflicting ethical systems based on the social emotions *Ehre* and *Mitleid* manifests itself throughout *Effi Briest* and provides a new way to interpret the novel. Although it might seem that Fontane’s novel takes up issues that had already been resolved before the *fin de siècle*, masculine *Ehre* and the practice of dueling fueled public debates into the 1890s and continued to do so in the early twentieth century.¹⁶ In the nineteenth century, masculine *Ehre* was determined by a man’s social roles and achievements. Feminine honor or virtue, by contrast, was upheld through a woman’s sexual purity. Yet masculine *Ehre* and feminine virtue were intimately connected. A husband had a duty to guard his wife’s virtue, for its loss would damage masculine honor and the good name of a family. Since masculine *Ehre* was not rooted in expectations of chastity or marital fidelity, the reputation of a family did not suffer if a man committed adultery. If a wife lost her virtue due to adultery, however, a husband had the right to take action and initiate a duel in order to restore his lost honor and masculinity (Frevert, “Mann und Weib” 218-219). Unlike masculine *Ehre*, feminine virtue could not be restored even after a duel. Women had no opportunity to recover their virtue after a misstep (Meyer-Renschhausen 109). As we see in *Effi Briest*, female adultery simply provided an occasion to duel, but dueling to restore lost *Ehre* remained a predominantly male issue.

The militarization of German society after the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) popularized an ideology of heroic masculinity. In order to preserve his honor, a man had to

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demonstrate bravery and strength; by showing signs of weakness or cowardice, he risked losing the respect of his fellow men (Frevert “Mann und Weib” 204). Thus, the value of masculine Ehre increased in the late nineteenth century, and this social emotion continued to motivate the practice of dueling for a variety of offenses, including but not limited to adultery. Dueling with deadly weapons was officially outlawed in §201-§210 of the 1871 Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich [Criminal Code of the German Empire]. Prison sentences listed in §201-§210 ranged from two months to a maximum of ten years, depending on the specific violations (e.g. dueling without seconds or killing one’s opponent) that occurred during a duel (Strafgesetzbuch 45). Nevertheless, in certain social circles, particularly among the elites of the military in the Offizierskorps and the aristocracy, dueling still offered men an opportunity to defend their Ehre, often with little punishment. Writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, Georg Simmel (1858-1918) considered Ehre, with its deeply personal guise, a highly effective device for preserving the cohesion and status of social groups, which suggests why members of elite groups felt compelled to observe honor codes even at the fin de siècle. With the social leveling that accompanied modernization, the gradual individualization of definitions of honor and dignity, and the enforcement of stricter regulations on dueling in the early twentieth century, however, masculine Ehre ceased to play a significant role in society, and, along with the practice of dueling, honor codes gradually declined (see Frevert, “Mann und Weib” 221-22).

At the time when Fontane was writing Effi Briest, the question of masculine Ehre and dueling united people as much as it divided them. For some, a strongly developed sense of Ehre was a sign of cultural advancement, while others considered the practice of dueling to defend

17 “So bildet die Ehre, nicht trotz, sondern wegen der rein personalen Form ihrer Erscheinung und ihres Bewusstseins, eine der wunderbarsten, instinktiv herausgebildeten Zweckmäßigekeiten zur Erhaltung der Gruppenexistenz” (Simmel, Soziologie 537).
Ehre a vestige from the Middle Ages that should be eliminated (see von Below 6). In 1902, two anti-dueling leagues were established: the Deutsche Anti-Duell-Liga and the Allgemeine Anti-Duell-Liga für Österreich.\footnote{See Die Allgemeine Anti-Duell-Liga für Österreich: Ihre Mitglieder, Ihre Statuten, Ihr Ehrenrat, Ihre Zweigvereine, nach dem Stande vom 15. Mai 1908 (Wien: Selbstverlag der Allgemeinen Anti-Duell-Liga für Österreich, 1908).} A call for new members published by the Deutsche Anti-Duell-Liga welcomed all who opposed dueling, “einerlei ob sie aus religiösen oder aus Gründen der Vernunft das Duell als Mittel zur Wiederherstellung verletzter Ehre verwerfen.”\footnote{See Deutsche Anti-Duell-Liga, ed., German Anti-Dueling League Call for New Members (1919) n.p.} Liberals and socialists were among some of the strongest opponents of dueling, but others, including German Catholics, objected to dueling for religious reasons. Karl Bachem, Reichstag delegate of the German Center Party, referenced the Catholic Church’s intention to excommunicate any Catholic who provoked, accepted, or declined to prevent a challenge to duel in a report to the Reichstag on November 17, 1896 (Stenographische Berichte 3303). Bachem, a Catholic himself, presented a case for tougher governmental sanctions against the practice by appealing to a common Christian (i.e. Protestant and Catholic) law and morality (Stenographische Berichte 3304). The influence that anti-dueling leagues and political or religious conscientious objectors had over the cult of Ehre was still rather limited at the fin de siècle, however. As Frevert has observed, the Deutsche Anti-Duell-Liga did not force its members to decline a challenge to duel (“Mann und Weib” 178). Even some German liberal and socialist leaders who campaigned for a modern, egalitarian society reportedly participated in duels; thus, political leanings were not entirely reliable predictors of one’s position on honor codes and dueling (Frevert, “Bürgerlichkeit und Ehre” 162). The question of how to defend masculine Ehre was a complex political and ethical issue for which there was not yet a clear alternative to the duel. Fontane’s Effi Briest not only participates in
these late nineteenth-century debates about masculine *Ehre* and dueling, but also explores the possibility of feeling *Mitleid*.

### 2.4 A BRIEF HISTORY OF *MITLEID*

The importance given to *Mitleid* in the novel demands a discussion of the history of the *Mitleidsdiskurs* from its prominence in eighteenth-century ethics and aesthetics to its resurgence and reconceptualization around 1900. The turn to empiricism in philosophical anthropology initiated a shift from reason to nature, which resulted in a reexamination of the senses and the affective nature of humans in the mid-eighteenth century.\(^{20}\) *Mitleid*, which was considered a ‘natural’ emotion, bridged the divide between ethics and aesthetics and became a much-debated topic in both discourses. In his *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* [*Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Mankind*] (1755), more commonly known as his “Second Discourse,” Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) identifies *pitié* [compassion; *Mitleid*]\(^ {21}\) as the only natural virtue [“la seule virtu Naturelle”] and the foundation of ethics (*Discours* 68). Rousseau attributes this instinctive emotion specifically to the human in the state of nature [*l'état de Nature*] and argues that it precedes any form of reflection, and, for that reason, even animals show signs of *pitié/Mitleid*\(^ {22}\) (compare *Discours* 69; 72).

\(^{20}\) See Riedel 18-21 for a concise discussion of the “anthropologische Wende” and its meaning for moral philosophy.

\(^{21}\) In German editions of Rousseau’s Second Discourse, *pitié* is translated as *Mitleid* (see Rousseau, *Abhandlung über die Ungleichheit* 141-145). Although it is unclear whether Fontane had read Rousseau in French or in German translation, Fontane at least would have acquired a familiarity with Rousseau’s understanding of *pitié/Mitleid* through his studies of Schopenhauer.

\(^{22}\) “Je parle de la Pitié…; vertu d'autant plus universelle et d'autant plus utile à l'homme, qu'elle précède en lui l'usage de toute réflexion & si Naturelle que les Bêtes mêmes en donnent quelquefois des signes sensibles”
Schings 21-33). What distinguishes humans from animals, Rousseau argues, is the faculty of perfectibilité [perfectibility], or the capacity of humans to improve themselves and adapt to their environment in order to survive (Discours 55; Social Contract & Discourses 180). Although life in civil society had contributed toward an increase in egoism and a weakened sense of pitié/Mitleid in humans, Rousseau attempts to rehabilitate the natural faculty of pitié/Mitleid found in the pure state of nature and posits it alongside the faculty of self-improvement (see Discours 69-76; Social Contract & Discourses 193-196).

In aesthetics, the moral purpose of the genre of tragedy became the focal point of the Mitleidsdebatte initiated in the correspondence between Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781), Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), and Friedrich Nicolai (1733-1811) in 1756. Influenced by Rousseau’s ethics of pitié, Lessing emphasizes the importance of Mitleid in the theater more than Nicolai or Mendelssohn, and, like Rousseau, he considers Mitleid to be the source of all morality. Lessing’s reinterpretation of the Aristotelian notion of catharsis attests to the value of Mitleid in moral education. He claims that a tragedy should inspire, not purge, the emotions of Mitleid and Furcht, if it is to contribute to the moral betterment of its spectators: “die Bestimmung der Tragödie ist diese: sie soll unsere Fähigkeit, Mitleid zu fühlen, erweitern. Sie soll uns nicht blos lehren, gegen diesen oder jenen Unglücklichen Mitleid zu fühlen, sondern sie soll uns so weit fühlbar machen, daß uns der Unglückliche zu allen Zeiten, und unter allen Gestalten, rühren und für sich einnehmen muß” (Lessing, Gesammelte Werke 42). Lessing’s theory concentrates on the subject, that is, on the virtues and moral education of the sympathizer:

(Rousseau, Discours 69). [I am speaking of compassion…; by so much the more universal and useful to mankind, as it comes before any kind of reflection; and at the same time natural, that the very brutes themselves sometimes give evident proofs of it” (Social Contract & Discourses 193).]

23 See Schings 35-47 for a more in-depth treatment of the eighteenth-century Mitleidsdebatte, specifically the dispute between Lessing and Mendelssohn.
“Der mitleidigste Mensch ist der beste Mensch, zu allen gesellschaftlichen Tugenden, zu allen Arten der Großmuth der aufgelegtesten” (Gesammelte Werke 42, emphasis added). The use of the superlative in this assertion points to a moral hierarchy wherein the spectators who are most moved to sympathize with a sufferer are deemed the most virtuous. Yet this moral hierarchy is not static—it reflects a continuous process of Bildung.

Two aspects of the mid-eighteenth-century conceptualization of Mitleid in aesthetic and ethical discourses stand in sharp contrast to the rekindling of Mitleid in the late nineteenth century. First, the emotion Mitleid was intertwined with eighteenth-century Enlightenment optimism and ideas of progress, as evident in Rousseau’s faculty of perfectibility and Lessing’s conviction that the theater becomes a vehicle for continuous moral betterment by making spectators feel [“fühlbar machen”] (Gesammelte Werke 42). Second, in the 1750s Mitleid became associated with the emerging bourgeois class in particular. In the bürgerliches Trauerspiel developed by Lessing, the sufferers or objects of sympathy among the dramatis personae were members of the bourgeoisie. Since bourgeois norms and values were propagated in the bürgerliches Trauerspiel, the theater became an institution associated specifically with bourgeois class-consciousness.

An examination of Mitleid in the context of Fontane’s Effi Briest and Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik shows that the manner in which this emotion was theorized and practiced in the late nineteenth century differs in some ways from its conceptualization in eighteenth-century ethical and aesthetic discourses. Although Schopenhauer’s theoretical writings on Mitleid first appeared in §65-68 of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung in 1819 and in §14-20 of “Über die Grundlage der Moral” in 1840, these works, which enjoyed their greatest impact in the late nineteenth
century, \textsuperscript{24} associated \textit{Mitleid} with cultural pessimism. For Schopenhauer, who inextricably links suffering and the human condition, \textit{Mitleid} is an everyday phenomenon. \textsuperscript{25} He defines it as the “ganz unmittelbare, ja, instinktartige Theilnahme am fremden Leiden” that moves a person to prevent or eliminate the suffering of another and lifts the boundary between ego and non-ego, the difference at the root of all egoism (\textit{Über das Mitleid} 101). The origin of \textit{Mitleid}, Schopenhauer claims, “beruht nicht auf Voraussetzungen, Begriffen, Religionen, Dogmen, Mythen, Erziehung und Bildung; sondern ist ursprünglich und unmittelbar, liegt in der menschlichen Natur selbst…” (\textit{Über das Mitleid} 83). Grounding \textit{Mitleid} in human nature rather than in culture permits him to conclude that \textit{Menschenliebe}\textsuperscript{26} has always existed, even though it was first formally theorized as a virtue in Western Christianity. Because Schopenhauer considers \textit{Mitleid} the basis of all morality, he sees little need for other social codes or ethical principles. According to this \textit{Mitleidsethik}, egoism motivates all virtues that do not spring from \textit{Mitleid}, and even politeness \textit{[Höflichkeit]} only serves to conceal egoism.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, Schopenhauer equates \textit{Mitleid}, the moral driving force and only counter to egoism and spite, with what he calls \textit{reine Liebe}\textsuperscript{28} (\textit{caritas},

\textsuperscript{24} Schopenhauer, whom Rudolf Eisler called a “Modephilosophen” [fashionable philosopher] in 1895, reached the peak of his posthumous fame in Europe during the 1870s and 1880s (Eisler 287). During the 1890s, Nietzsche had the greatest impact on German society and achieved international influence because his philosophy was consistent with the global \textit{fin-de-siècle} mentality (see Aschheim 17-22).

\textsuperscript{25} In §16 of “Über die Grundlage der Moral,” Schopenhauer calls it “das alltägliche Phänomen des Mitleids” (\textit{Über das Mitleid} 77).

\textsuperscript{26} Schopenhauer distinguishes between two cardinal virtues, \textit{Gerechtigkeit} and \textit{Menschenliebe}, both of which are rooted in \textit{Mitleid}. “Verletze niemanden” [harm no one] is the maxim of \textit{Gerechtigkeit}, the more passive virtue, while “Hilf allen, soviel du kannst” [help everybody as much as you can] is the maxim of \textit{Menschenliebe}, the higher, more active virtue (compare \textit{Über das Mitleid} 84, 101).

\textsuperscript{27} “Die Höflichkeit nämlich ist die konventionelle und systematische Verleugnung des Egoismus in den Kleinigkeiten des täglichen Verkehrs und ist freilich anerkannte Heuchelei: dennoch wird sie gefordert und gelobt; weil was sie verbirgt, der Egoismus, so garstig ist, daß man es nicht sehen will…” (Schopenhauer, \textit{Über das Mitleid} 63-64).

\textsuperscript{28} In order to lend further support to his argument, Schopenhauer incidentally notes that the Italian word \textit{pietà} means both \textit{Mitleid} and \textit{reine Liebe} (WWV I 512).
ἀγαπη becomes: “alle wahre und reine Liebe ist Mitleid, und jede Liebe, die nicht Mitleid ist, ist Selbstsucht” (WWV I 511).

2.5 ADAPTING SCHOPENHAUER’S MITLEIDSETHIK: THE THEORETICAL MODEL OF EMOTION IN EFFI BRIEST

Fontane’s letter to his daughter Mete dated August 24, 1893, indicates that he had been contemplating Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik while writing Effi Briest, which in its first installment of the advance copy appeared in Deutsche Rundschau just over a year later in November 1894. In the following passage we see how Fontane’s own thoughts about Mitleid resonated with, yet diverged from, those of Schopenhauer:

Schopenhauer hat ganz recht: “das Beste, was wir haben, ist Mitleid.” Mitleid ist auch vielfach ganz echt. Aber mit all den anderen Gefühlen sieht es windig aus. Trotzdem brauchen wir sie, brauchen den Glauben daran, wir dürfen sie nicht leugnen, einmal weil sich sonderbare Reste davon immer wieder vorfinden und selbst wo gar nichts ist, müssen wir dies Nichts nicht sehen wollen; wer sein Auge immer auf dies Nichts richtet, der versteinert. (Briefe IV 284)

At first, Fontane follows Schopenhauer closely and grants Mitleid a position of utmost importance in relation to all other emotions,29 which he finds questionable. Although it is unclear whether Fontane accepted Schopenhauer’s claim that Mitleid has existed through time and space

29 While Fontane speaks directly about Mitleid and other emotions (Gefühle) here, Schopenhauer calls Mitleid a moral driving force and Gerechtigkeit and Menschenliebe, the two degrees of Mitleid, cardinal virtues rather than emotions.
because it is part of human nature, his use of the word ‘echt’ does imply that *Mitleid* has some ‘natural’ or ‘genuine’ qualities. Yet, despite his partiality towards *Mitleid*, Fontane also admits that these other emotions and the belief in their validity are necessary, and it is here that he most clearly departs from Schopenhauer’s *Mitleidsethik*.

While I do not claim that Fontane accepted Schopenhauer’s entire *Mitleidsethik* or worldview, I find sufficient textual evidence to suggest that Fontane’s concept of *rechte Liebe* in *Effi Briest*, reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s definition of *reine Liebe*, corresponds to the emotion *Mitleid*. Since the word *Mitleid* only appears twice in *Effi Briest*, the critical role that this emotion plays in the novel might be overlooked. The word itself first appears in Chapter 10, when Effi asks Instetten why they must remain at the house in Kessin and assures him that Alonzo Gieshübler would help them move: “Gieshübler würde uns gewiß dabei behilflich sein, wenn auch nur um meinetwegen, denn er wird Mitleid mit mir haben” (*Effi Briest* 91). The suggestion of Gieshübler’s *Mitleid* here contrasts with Innstetten’s unsympathetic refusal of Effi’s request on the grounds that moving because of the suspected Chinese ghost would damage his professional reputation. *Mitleid* appears a second time in Chapter 31. After reading the newspaper report about Effi’s affair and Innstetten’s duel with Crampas, Sophie Zwicker writes the following in a letter to her friend: “Übrigens bin ich voll Mitleid mit der jungen Baronin und finde, eitel wie man nun mal ist, meinen einzigen Trost darin, mich in der Sache selbst nicht getäuscht zu haben” (*Effi Briest* 305). Here, Sophie Zwicker’s compassion for Effi stands in direct contrast to the letter that Effi receives from her mother, who coldly informs her of the pending divorce and her banishment from both her Berlin apartment and parental house at Hohen-Cremmen. If one were to locate the numerous characters in *Effi Briest* on a spectrum

30 The word *Mitleid* appears twice, whereas *Ehre* appears 17 times, excluding adjectival forms and compounds.
between *Ehre/Sittlichkeit* and *Mitleid*, these passages represent Alonzo Gieshübler and Sophie Zwicker, like Roswitha and the narrator, as more inclined to feel *Mitleid* than, for example, Innstetten or Luise von Briest. Aside from these two appearances, *Mitleid* is referenced indirectly (e.g. as *rechte Liebe*) or demonstrated in the speech or actions of the characters. It is enacted by the narrator through the expression “arme Effi,” an utterance also taken up by the Briests and Roswitha, and shifts to internal focalization that enable readers to see from Effi’s perspective and identify with her emotions. Significantly, Roswitha’s feelings of *Mitleid* are not discriminatory—her compassion extends not only to “die arme Frau,” but also to “der arme Major” Crampas (*Effi Briest* 291). In contrast to *Ehre*, which the novel exposes as an egoistic emotion that drives a man to seek retributive justice and duel if his honor is lost or threatened, *Effi Briest* establishes *Mitleid* as an emotion that motivates one to respect the humanity of all individuals and prevent or alleviate the suffering of another, as in Schopenhauer’s *Mitleidsethik*.

### 2.6 COMPETING EMOTIONAL STYLES: JOHANNA’S DEFENSE OF *Ehre* AND ROSWITHA’S *MITLEID*

In *Effi Briest*, *Ehre* and *Mitleid* or *rechte Liebe*—two social emotions that were central to public and intellectual debates in turn-of-the-century Wilhelmine Germany—are pitted against each other. An analysis of the narrative situation and staging of these two contrasting emotional styles reveals that the narrator allies himself more with the practice of *Mitleid* than with the defense of *Ehre*. While the novel exposes *Ehre* as an emotion that has entered a state of decline, it naturalizes *Mitleid* and presents it as a type of social feeling that transcends forms of social stratification. In *Effi Briest*, the observance of *Ehre* and principles that are not moderated by
Mitleid or rechte Liebe may result in unnecessary cruelty and suffering. In the absence of this feeling for humanity, such principles can be misappropriated or used to further selfish interests. Although the novel asserts the impossibility of living in a state of nature removed from culture and society, Mitleid in Fontane’s Effi Briest functions as social glue, the last hope of social unity and stability in the face of changing social and emotional codes. This concept of Mitleid introduces a softening of social mores, which some may have perceived as a threat to existing values and social practices. Even though Fontane portrays Mitleid as a more ‘natural’ or ‘genuine’ emotion free of the pretenses of class-based Ehre and Sittlichkeit, his novel exhibits a balance not found in Schopenhauer’s ethics. Effi Briest makes a strong argument for the introduction of Mitleid alongside self-regulatory emotions like honor and shame, thus enabling the heteropathic negotiation between these opposing social emotions to continue.

By focusing primarily on the protagonists Effi and Innstetten, critics have failed to notice the important role played by Johanna and Roswitha, whose emotional styles and responses to the crises form the hidden crux of the novel. The suppression of details about Effi and Innstetten’s wedding and Effi’s affair with Major Crampas further suggests that Fontane himself wanted to direct the reader’s attention away from the protagonists and their romantic relationships in favor of attending to broader social concerns. An excerpt from Fontane’s letter to Friedrich Stephany dated July 2, 1894, supports this observation: “Liebesgeschichten … haben was Langweiliges –,

31 Nottinger cites Fontane’s correspondence with Georg Friedlaender in which he diagnoses the decadence that pervades not only social classes like the bourgeoisie, but also moral institutions like the church to support her point that “Werte sind nicht mehr unabhängige Entitäten, sondern werden zunehmend utilisiert und willkürlich zu egoistischen Zwecken missbraucht” (65).

32 The reference to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s state of nature [l’état de nature] is deliberate. Rousseau posits a state of nature but admits that it is only a hypothesis, not an experience, and that it probably never existed and never will exist (see Hamburger 11-12). The conversation between Innstetten and Wüllersdorf in Chapter 35 expresses a similar conflict that became more prominent in the nineteenth century: the idea that modern society is antithetical to individual autonomy, but that it is not possible to live in an ideal state of nature (compare Zuberbühler 11).
aber der Gesellschaftszustand, das Sittenbildliche, das versteckt und gefährlich Politische, das
diese Dinge haben, … das ist es, was mich so sehr daran interessiert” (Briefe IV 370). Here,
Fontane explains that the social and political contexts of love stories intrigue him, not the
romantic relationships themselves. Due to the public acknowledgment and social norms that
accompany marriage, one can easily see why Fontane repeatedly takes up the motif of marital
conflict and adultery in his novels as a way of analyzing and critiquing society and politics.

Typically in Fontane’s social novels, the peripheral characters play critical roles, as the
writer himself admitted in a letter to Maximilian Harden on August 20, 1890: “Es ist richtig, daß
meine Nebenfiguren immer die Hauptsache sind” (Briefe IV 57-58). Until recently, however,
Fontane scholarship had largely overlooked their importance in Effi Briest. In his insightful
essay on Roswitha, however, Theo Buck reasoned that this character’s sense of humanity and
defense of her “natürliches Wesen,” despite her traumatic past, deserve recognition (268). Rolf
Zuberbühler likewise views Roswitha positively, and identifies in her character a natural ideal in
his study of the dog Rollo as a representation of “das Natürliche” in Effi Briest (65). Zuberbühler
maintains that Fontane’s figures exist in a state of constant tension between nature and culture
and counts Rollo, Roswitha, Alonzo Gieshübler, and Briest as characters who, in contrast to
others, embody some natural principle (Zuberbühler 10, 66). This method of classifying the
minor characters as representatives of either nature or society risks overgeneralization, however.
None of these figures is purely ‘natural’ or ‘social.’ All, in fact, inhabit social spaces within the
German Empire during the Bismarck Era, exercise some degree of freedom, and face social
norms or limitations depending on his or her position in society. If figures like Roswitha,

33 Müller-Seidel, for example, focuses only on the protagonists, Effi and Innstetten.
Gieshübler, and Briest seem more ‘natural,’ it is because they demonstrate an emotional style that the novel represents as more natural or ‘echt,’ i.e. *Mitleid*.

Johanna and Roswitha are both servants at the Innstetten household and belong to the same social class, but they have been socialized differently. Readers learn through Innstetten’s introduction of the servants that Johanna is Effi’s compatriot from the Pasewalk region of the Mark Brandenburg (*Effi Briest* 56). Rumor has it that her beautiful blonde hair and attitude of superiority can be traced back to a prominent officer of the Pasewalk Garrison (*Effi Briest* 243). Johanna, in fact, prides herself in having served good families, which means that she likely associates more with the emotional practices and values of nineteenth-century bourgeois and aristocratic circles. Although it is not stated directly, we can reasonably assume that she is Protestant, like Effi and almost all the other figures in the novel. By contrast, Roswitha, who comes from Eichsfeld in Thüringen, is less tied to the Mark Brandenburg and Hinterpommern regions of the Bismarckian nation-state than is Johanna. Her connection to a region outside the primary setting of the novel, together with her Catholic socialization, thus conveys a sense of ‘Otherness.’ Although she calls herself a ‘lapsed’ or ‘bad’ Catholic, she still identifies with her faith to some extent and experiences hardships because of it: “Und das Kattolsche, das macht es einem immer noch schwerer und saurer. Viele wollen keine Kattolsche, weil sie so viel in die Kirche rennen” (*Effi Briest* 131). The narrator reveals that Roswitha’s association with Catholicism motivates Effi to take her into the house in Kessin: “Effi war fest protestantisch erzogen und würde sehr erschrocken gewesen sein, wenn man an und in ihr ‘was Katholisches entdeckt hätte; trotzdem glaubte sie, daß der Katholizismus uns gegen solche Dinge ‘wie da

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34 Even in the Baltic town Kessin, a culturally diverse liminal space, a Catholic church is a fairly new addition, as evident in Innstetten’s description to Effi: “Ja, Kessin nimmt sich auf. Es hat jetzt auch eine katholische Kirche” (*Effi Briest* 54).
oben’ besser schütze; ja, diese Betrachtung hatte bei dem Plane, Roswitha ins Haus zu nehmen,
ganz erheblich mitgewirkt” (*Effi Briest* 134). Effi hopes that Roswitha’s Catholicism will offer
more protection from the Chinese ghost than her own Protestantism, but what Roswitha really
offers Effi is companionship, nonjudgmental understanding, and, through *Mitleid*, relief from
fear and other negative emotions. The historical background of the *Kulturkampf* clarifies why
Fontane’s narrator gives special attention to Roswitha’s religious socialization. Her association
with Catholicism indicates not her ‘naturalness’ but ‘Otherness’ in a mostly Protestant Prussian
society. In the novel’s dramatization of social emotions, Johanna upholds the tradition of *Ehre*
and Roswitha demonstrates *Mitleid*, which, despite its roots in eighteenth-century philosophical
anthropology and aesthetics, introduces an ethics removed from Enlightenment ideals and
optimism.

In Chapter 26, the narrator sets the stage for the dispute over the emotions *Ehre* and
*Mitleid* that later takes place between Johanna and Roswitha in Chapter 29. Just before Innstetten
discovers Crampas and Effi’s correspondence, the narrator goes to great lengths to show how
well Johanna and Roswitha get along, despite their different socializations. He informs readers
that the rapport between the two women was a favorite topic of conversation among houseguests:
“Diese Freundschaft der beiden Mädchen war ein Lieblingsgespräch zwischen den
verschiedenen Freunden des Hauses…” (*Effi Briest* 266). The narrator also assures that Johanna
and Roswitha both love Annie equally and share the responsibility for her upbringing, which
“ganz besonders für Frieden und gutes Einvernehmen sorgte…” (*Effi Briest* 267). What
facilitates this cooperation and prevents conflict, the narrator adds, is that the division of
household labor is “fest gewurzelt” in their individual competencies and personalities: “Roswitha
hatte das poetische Departement, die Märchen- und Geschichtenerzählung, Johanna dagegen das des Anstands…” (Effi Briest 267).

Yet the narrator’s knowledge of Johanna’s thoughts and emotions communicated through internal focalization also points to a latent conflict. Johanna, who wears an expression of victory [“Siegermiene”] on her face and carries herself with poise and propriety [“Haltung und Anstand”], lives “ganz in dem Hochgefühl, die Dienerin eines guten Hauses zu sein…” (Effi Briest 267).35 Her familiarity with aristocratic values and social practices, along with her history of having served good families, gives her a strong sense of superiority over Roswitha. Johanna’s firm belief in her superiority allows her to smile even at times when she notices that Roswitha receives preferential treatment from Effi. The reference to Effi’s fondness for Roswitha, dismissed as “eine kleine liebenswürdige Sonderbarkeit der gnädigen Frau,” however, suggests restrained jealousy and a lack of understanding for Effi’s attachment to the “halb bäuerisch gebliebene Roswitha” (Effi Briest 267). After reporting Johanna’s reflections through thought report, the narrator shifts out of internal focalization and, in reference to the preceding statements, notes: “Das alles dachte sie, sprach’s aber nicht aus. Es war eben ein freundliches Miteinanderleben” (Effi Briest 267). By emphasizing Johanna and Roswitha’s peaceful coexistence at the Innstetten house, while at the same time pointing out their differences and disclosing Johanna’s private thoughts and feelings, the narrator foreshadows and draws the reader’s attention to the impending conflict between the two women.

35 The characterization of Johanna with descriptions of her ‘Haltung und Anstand’ here and throughout the novel recalls the Knigge or etiquette manuals that were continuously written, revised, and reprinted by various authors in the late nineteenth century. Fontane’s ironic portrayal of Johanna, who exudes the kind of propriety taught in these etiquette manuals, reveals that often very little exists behind such surface displays of good manners. Compare, e.g., Berger, Der gute Ton: Buch des Anstandes und der guten Sitten (1886); Rocco, Der Umgang in und mit der Gesellschaft (1898).
In Chapter 29, Innstetten returns to the Berlin apartment after fatally wounding Crampas in the duel and notifies Johanna that Effi will not return. Johanna and Roswitha then learn exactly what had just happened by reading an article in the paper, which reports the news of the affair, the duel, and Crampas’s death. The differences between Johanna and Roswitha and the tension between two ethical systems based on *Ehre* and *Mitleid* then become evident in their initial responses to the news and the debate that follows.

The word *Mitleid* never appears directly in this scene, but Roswitha’s immediate response to the news undeniably demonstrates compassion: “‘Ja,’ sagte Roswitha. ‘Und das lesen nun die Menschen und verschimpfieren mir meine liebe, arme Frau. Und der arme Major. Nun ist er tot’” (*Effi Briest* 291). Roswitha’s utterances in this passage echo the narrator’s “arme Effi,” which also signals understanding, compassion, and fondness for Effi. Roswitha expresses sympathy for both Crampas and Effi, despite reading the news, “daß Beziehungen zwischen ihm und der Rätin, einer schönen und noch sehr jungen Frau, bestanden haben sollen” (*Effi Briest* 290). For Roswitha, Crampas and Effi’s violation of social and marital mores does not make them undeserving of compassion. Even though they chose to commit adultery, each endures great suffering: Crampas dies in the duel with Innstetten and Roswitha senses that Effi will have to endure taunting and exclusion from society. Just because Roswitha sympathizes with Effi and Crampas, however, does not mean that she lacks feeling for Innstetten or thinks that he should have died in Crampas’s place, as she responds to Johanna: “‘Nein, Johanna, unser gnäd’ger Herr, der soll auch leben, alles soll leben. Ich bin nicht für totschießen und kann nicht mal das Knallen hören’” (*Effi Briest* 291). Roswitha’s powerful statement of nonviolence (“alles soll leben”) also communicates the view that all people are connected through the common bond of humanity and that no lives are worth more or less than all others.
As we can easily see from Johanna’s own emotional response to the ethical question at the heart of this debate, Roswitha’s expression of *Mitleid* and rejection of the practice of dueling are not accepted as self-evident. Johanna first tries to blame Roswitha for the discovery of the letters, but, after she takes back that accusation, her own assessment of the situation becomes evident: “Nun, ich will es nicht gesagt haben, Roswitha. Nur Sie sollen mir nicht kommen und sagen: der arme Major. Was heißt der arme Major! Der ganze arme Major taugte nichts; wer solchen rotblonden Schnurrbart hat und immer wribbelt, der taugt nie ’was und richtet bloß Schaden an” (*Effi Briest* 291). Interestingly, Johanna never directly addresses the possibility of *Mitleid* for Effi in this scene, but she clearly rejects the idea of sympathizing with Crampas. To be sure, Fontane presents Major Crampas as a figure of dubious reputation who is constructed to provoke an emotional response, as evident in the resemblance of the name ‘Crampas’ to that of St. Nicholas’s legendary demonic companion, ‘Krampus.’ Johanna’s statement about Crampas’s red hair and mustache twirling in the aforementioned passage casts him as a villainous character by invoking widespread cultural myths that redheads are exceptionally libidinous, morally degenerate, and soulless. On the one hand, this passage reminds readers of the damage incurred because of Crampas’s disregard for social codes. But, at the same time, Johanna’s argument is fallacious because she appeals to fear of moral degeneration and conflates myth and reality in order to ground her position. Through her mimicking of Roswitha’s expression “der arme Major,” Johanna scoffs at Roswitha’s view and maintains that people like Crampas are good for nothing, and, therefore not worthy of compassion. Instead of supporting an ethical system driven by *Mitleid*, as Roswitha does, Johanna refers to the social practices with which she is familiar and upholds the code of *Ehre*. 
Assuming that Roswitha knows nothing of the practice of dueling and the importance of *Ehre* in nineteenth-century aristocratic and bourgeois circles, Johanna proceeds to lecture her:

“Und wenn man immer in vornehmen Häusern gedient hat… aber das haben Sie nicht, Roswitha, das fehlt Ihnen eben…dann weiß man auch, was sich paßt und schickt und was Ehre ist, und weiß auch, daß, wenn so ’was vorkommt, dann geht es nicht anders, und dann kommt das, was mann eine Forderung nennt, und dann wird einer totgeschossen” ([Effi Briest](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effi_Briest) 291-292). As in Chapter 26, Johanna’s comments demonstrate a sense of superiority that she believes to hold over Roswitha. She identifies ‘vornehme Häuser’ as spaces of propriety in which certain social and emotional practices are adhered to and understood by all members and counts herself among those who observe these social mores of polite society. Rather than acknowledging *Mitleid* as an acceptable emotional response, Johanna assumes that Roswitha’s different background means that she does not properly comprehend the ritual of dueling or the valuation of *Ehre*, which for Johanna symbolizes cultural advancement and distinction. Johanna’s language (“dann geht es nicht anders”) insists on a lack of alternatives to the current emotional codes. While Johanna appeals to the emotion of fear in the case of adultery, she describes the practice of dueling to the death matter-of-factly, as if it were a routine occurrence, and uses the passive voice, which further depersonalizes the practice (“und dann wird einer totgeschossen”). In response to Roswitha’s protest that the affair happened a long time ago (“so lange her”), Johanna claims that “wenn der gnäd’ge Herr nichts getan hätte, dann hätten ihn die vornehmen Leute ‘geschnitten.’ Aber das Wort kennen Sie gar nicht, Roswitha, davon wissen Sie nichts” ([Effi Briest](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effi_Briest) 292-293). Here Johanna asserts that Innstetten would have been cut off from polite society had he not conformed to tradition and dueled with Crampas, and, once again, uses this knowledge to distinguish herself from Roswitha.
Characteristic of a work of Fontane that uses heteropathia as a literary technique, *Effi Briest* portrays neither Johanna’s justification of *Ehre* and dueling nor Roswitha’s argument in favor of *Mitleid* as completely unproblematic. It is logical to find this type of ambiguity in the novel because Fontane does not construct his figures as stereotypes or ideal types. Instead, his concept of art aims to depict ‘average’ humans or “Durchschnittsmenschen” who are neither entirely good nor entirely evil (see Nottinger 18). In this scene in Chapter 29, the positions of both Johanna and Roswitha are subverted to some extent, whether through the figures’ own speech or that of the other character or narrator. Roswitha rejects the honor code and practice of dueling in part because the affair between Effi and Crampas “ist ja nun schon eine halbe Ewigkeit her” (*Effi Briest* 291). Johanna tries to dismiss this argument by noting that Roswitha always tells everyone the old story of her father who threatened to kill her with a red-hot iron bar, an event that also happened ‘long ago.’ Even though the adulterous act in question occurred six years ago, the news and emotional wounds are still fresh for Innstetten, and, as Johanna remarks, it is unfair to expect him to take such news quietly. Moreover, Johanna’s objection reflects a historical truth, namely, that a husband who tolerated his wife’s adultery lost all respect, especially since the value placed on masculine *Ehre* increased with the militarization of late nineteenth-century German society.36 While Johanna points out the inconsistency of Roswitha’s response to two different events that happened ‘so lange her,’ she does not fully succeed in subverting Roswitha’s position. Roswitha’s constant repetition of her story becomes tiresome for some of the other figures,37 and, as a result, readers may gain the impression that

36 For a detailed discussion of the expectation that a man must take action to restore his lost honor, as well as the connection between adultery and honor, see Frevert, “Mann und Weib” 181-222.

37 Even Effi interrupts Roswitha and replies “Ich weiß schon, Roswitha…” when she begins to retell the story of her trauma in Chapter 32: “Als mein Vater damals mit der glühenden Stange auf mich loskam…” (*Effi Briest* 313).
she is indeed a “komische Figur” (*Effi Briest* 135). Yet the reliance upon humor in these passages shows that the narration of Roswitha’s past trauma is an important example of the realist technique of *Verklärung*. Fontane’s *Verklärung* in the form of humor renders Roswitha’s trauma narratable and urges readers to reflect upon social problems and see the violence behind the humor.

While Johanna’s speech undermines Roswitha’s plea for *Mitleid* in this scene, the subversion of Johanna’s position occurs through the narrator’s involvement, which again suggests that Fontane’s narrator is more drawn to *Mitleid*. The narrator provides details about Johanna’s unexpressed thoughts and emotions that prompt readers to question her unconditional acceptance of *Ehre* and the cultural practices associated with it. When Innstetten returns home after the duel, he gives Johanna the following instructions regarding Annie: “Das arme Kind. Sie müssen es ihr allmählich beibringen, daß sie keine Mutter mehr hat. Ich kann es nicht. Aber machen Sie’s gescheidt. Und daß Roswitha nicht alles verdirbt” (*Effi Briest* 289). These words fill Johanna with pride: she stands before Innstetten “ganz wie benommen” and kisses his hand (*Effi Briest* 289). Typically, the narrator reports Effi’s thoughts and feelings through internal focalization or thought report in order to reveal her boredom, fear, and guilt and inspire sympathetic identification with her. In this scene, however, the reporting of Johanna’s thoughts and emotions through internal focalization has a subversive rather than identificatory effect. Upon leaving Innstetten, Johanna is “von Stolz und Überlegenheit ganz erfüllt, ja beinahe von Glück” (*Effi Briest* 289). Johanna’s emotions contrast sharply with those of Innstetten, who is described as “ganz erschüttert” just moments before (*Effi Briest* 289). The narrator continues: “ohne daß es ihr an gutem Herzen und selbst an Teilnahme mit der Frau gefehlt hätte, beschäftigte sie doch, über jedes andere hinaus, der Triumph einer gewissen Intimitätsstellung
zum gnädigen Herrn” (Effi Briest 289). Although the narrator does not venture to say that Johanna lacks goodness of heart, he reveals that she attends most to her own feelings of triumph and delights in her newly acquired level of intimacy with Innstetten. If she feels concern for Effi, it remains unexpressed, because the narrator does not mention Johanna’s compassion. With this knowledge of Johanna’s feelings and motivations and Fontane’s choice of the word “Intimitätsstellung” in this passage, one can conclude that Johanna’s defense of Ehre and Innstetten’s actions results less from a firm ethical conviction and more from her possible romantic attraction to Innstetten, as Roswitha insinuates. This suggestion of intimacy between master and servant renders Johanna’s speech and actions suspect because, by virtue of the honor code and propriety that she professes to uphold, she is precisely the one who should reject such a relationship.

As evident in Johanna and Roswitha’s debate, Ehre and Mitleid, presented here as opposite social emotions, are associated with different views of society and moral systems. Ehre in Effi Briest implies a type of superiority that must be defended. If the honor code is broken, then it is common practice to duel in order to reestablish lost honor. By contrast, Mitleid in Effi Briest does not generate any social hierarchy. Those who feel Mitleid do not seek to punish or compensate for wrongs, but, by recognizing the common suffering of humanity, are inclined toward compassion regardless of other factors. Roswitha most clearly sees the barbarism in traditional nineteenth-century practices associated with Ehre and advocates Mitleid as an alternative. Yet this type of Mitleid also represents a more tolerant attitude toward the softening
of social mores, something that Johanna and other characters\textsuperscript{38} in the novel are unwilling to accept.

\section*{2.7 SENSING THE DECLINE OF DUELING AND THE CULT OF EHRE}

Already in Chapter 27, where Innstetten asks Wüllersdorf for advice after learning about Crampas and Effi’s affair, doubt is cast on the appropriateness of dueling to restore Innstetten’s lost \textit{Ehre}. In this scene, too, emotions become the primary topic of discussion. Innstetten describes his current emotional state to Wüllersdorf as follows: “Es steht so, daß ich unendlich unglücklich bin; ich bin gekränkt, schändlich hintergangen, \textit{aber trotzdem}, ich bin ohne jedes Gefühl von Haß oder gar von Durst nach Rache” (\textit{Effi Briest} 277, emphasis added). Innstetten’s inventory of his own feelings in this passage indicates that he does not feel hatred toward Effi or Crampas. Although he says that he is deeply unhappy and hurt, he feels inclined to forgive Effi out of love: “ich liebe meine Frau, … ich bin so sehr im Bann ihrer Liebenswürdigkeit, eines ihr eignen heiteren Charmes, daß ich mich, \textit{mir selbst zum Trotz}, in meinem letzten Herzenswinkel zum Verzeihen geneigt fühle” (\textit{Effi Briest} 277, emphasis added). Yet Innstetten’s phrases “\textit{aber trotzdem}” and “\textit{mir selbst zum Trotz}” express some degree of surprise over the absence of feelings of anger and the need for revenge, as if loving and forgiving Effi in spite of everything defies reason and his own will. Innstetten attributes his lack of anger to the passage of time, which proves to affect human emotions more powerfully than he ever could have imagined: “Ich hätte nie geglaubt, daß die \textit{Zeit}, rein als Zeit, so wirken könne” (\textit{Effi Briest} 277).

\textsuperscript{38} Other characters who fall into this category include, for example, Baron von Güldenklee and Sidonie von Grasenabb, whose intolerant attitudes are nonetheless exposed and subverted by the narrator through narrative irony (see \textit{Effi Briest} 179-182).
Innstetten convinces himself and Wüllersdorf of the necessity of upholding the honor code even though he lacks the anger and the thirst for vengeance that typically motivate the practice of dueling. He first justifies his view by emphasizing his lack of choice in the matter: “Man ist nicht bloß ein einzelner Mensch, man gehört einem Ganzen an, und auf das Ganze haben wir beständig Rücksicht zu nehmen, wir sind durchaus abhängig von ihm. … jenes, wenn Sie wollen, uns tyrannisierende Gesellschafts-Etwas, das fragt nicht nach Charme und nicht nach Liebe und nicht nach Verjährung. Ich habe keine Wahl. Ich muß” (Effi Briest 278). With these words, Innstetten disregards his love for Effi and the impact of the passage of time (Verjährung) and concedes power to a ‘social something,’ a normalizing force that limits human autonomy by determining how individuals should feel and act. As if to compensate for the reliance upon hyperbole used to express the extent of the power of social norms over his actions, Innstetten further justifies the need to duel by pointing out that he has already suffered a serious blow to his honor by seeking a confidant, a fact that Wüllersdorf cannot deny. Wüllersdorf reluctantly yields authority to the nineteenth-century Prussian honor code in his response to Innstetten, but he simultaneously undermines it through metaphor: “die Dinge verlaufen nicht wie wir wollen, sondern wie die andern wollen. … unser Ehrenkultus ist ein Götzendienst, aber wir müssen uns ihm unterwerfen, so lange der Götze gilt” (Effi Briest 280). Like Innstetten, Wüllersdorf recognizes that individual wishes often conflict with social mandates or collective interests. By dismissing Ehre as a cult, a form of idolatry, Wüllersdorf exposes its status as a ritual, if not archaic, social practice and thus destabilizes it through metaphor. Although Wüllersdorf sees the problems with the Ehrenkultus he describes, he does not venture to defy it, because it is still in effect and he sees no alternative that could take its place in society. This conversation between Innstetten and Wüllersdorf renders the code of Ehre suspect even before Johanna defends it in
her argument with Roswitha. If we take these two scenes together, Mitteleid manifests itself as a possible alternative to the practice of dueling to restore Ehre, not to mention as the emotional code that lines up more with what Innstetten reports that he really feels: love for Effi and an inclination to forgive her.

Innstetten first convinces himself and Wüllersdorf that, because the individual is not autonomous, but dependent on the society as a whole, social mores must be observed. At the beginning of Chapter 29, after shooting Crampas to death in the duel and seeing his resigned yet friendly facial expression, Innstetten’s perspective changes: “Wenn ich mir seinen letzten Blick vergegenwärtige, resigniert und in seinem Elend doch noch ein Lächeln, so hieß der Blick: ‘Innstetten, Prinzipienreiterei…Sie konnten es mir ersparen und sich selber auch.’ Und er hatte vielleicht recht. Mir klingt so ’was in der Seele” (Effi Briest 287). The phrase “Mir klingt so ’was in der Seele” applies to the knowledge that Innstetten could have spared both Crampas and himself, had he not been such a stickler for principles, and suggests that he experiences a change of heart. While Innstetten pursued Ehre as a matter of principle and because he believed that he had no other choice, he now doubts that he made the right decision: “So aber war alles einer Vorstellung, einem Begriff zu Liebe, war eine gemachte Geschichte, halbe Komödie. Und diese Komödie muß ich nun fortsetzen und muß Effi wegschicken und sie ruinieren, und mich mit...” (Effi Briest 287). In this monologue, Innstetten questions Ehre, the abstract concept that guided his decision. He regrets that his actions were not motivated by actual rage or vengeance but by this abstract idea, and he thus considers everything contrived or artificial, akin to play-acting. Aside from the scenes in which Innstetten confides in and discusses Ehre with Wüllersdorf, this is one of the rare moments in the novel in which readers are informed of Innstetten’s otherwise
Innstetten’s speech resembles Effi’s monologue in Chapter 24, in which she bemoans her inability to have the ‘proper feelings.’ The two emotions that torment Effi are fear (“Angst, Todesangst und die ewige Furcht”) and shame for her lies (Effi Briest 258). She does not deny that she is guilty; however, her lack of shame for her guilt worries her: “Ja, Angst quält mich und dazu Scham über mein Lügenspiel. Aber Scham über meine Schuld, die hab’ ich nicht oder doch nicht so recht oder doch nicht genug, und das bringt mich um, daß ich sie nicht habe” (Effi Briest 258). In other words, Effi is troubled because she senses that she does not feel the right type or appropriate amount of shame expected of her for committing adultery. The ethical-emotional imperative that haunts her is Pastor Niemeyer’s warning that she remembers hearing as a child at Hohen-Cremmen: “auf ein richtiges Gefühl, darauf käme es an, und wenn man das habe, dann könne einem das schlimmste nicht passieren, und wenn man es nicht habe, dann sei man in einer ewigen Gefahr, und das, was man den Teufel nenne, das habe dann eine sichere Macht über uns” (Effi Briest 259). According to Pastor Niemeyer’s counsel, the right emotions can protect one from harm, but, in the absence of such feelings, one becomes susceptible to evil. Although what “ein richtiges Gefühl” denotes is never fully clarified, in this context, the reader can take it to mean shame, guilt, honor, i.e. self-regulatory emotions that moderate social behaviors.

The narrator reports Effi’s private thoughts and feelings more directly and more frequently than those of Innstetten. Occasional shift from zero focalization to internal focalization and the narrator’s utterance “arme Effi” also demonstrate sympathetic understanding with Effi, despite the otherwise distant, reserved quality of the narrative voice. If we compare the representation of emotions in Effi’s monologue in Chapter 24 and Innstetten’s monologue in
Chapter 29, however, we notice some common features. In both passages, the narrator provides few descriptions and instead allows the figures to verbalize their own thoughts and feelings. Readers hear Effi and Innstetten speak through direct quotation and see from a non-focalized narrative point of view. The absence of narrative irony and the minimal involvement of the narrator in both monologue scenes imply that readers should take Effi’s and Innstetten’s words seriously. Additionally, the parallel narrative organization of these scenes demonstrates the unwillingness of Fontane’s narrator to sympathize with the situation of one figure over another.

Although their respective situations differ—Innstetten senses that his principles have caused others and himself unnecessary pain, and Effi agonizes over her inability to feel the ‘proper’ emotions—these monologue scenes show how both figures endure similar psychological conflicts. The novel depicts Effi and Innstetten as they contemplate ethical questions and emotional codes, as well as how they struggle to bring their own feelings in alignment with these. Contrary to Pastor Niemeyer’s warning about “ein richtiges Gefühl,” the outcome of Effi Briest indicates that ‘proper’ self-regulatory emotions alone cannot prevent bad things from happening. When read together, these two monologue scenes actually suggest that the nineteenth-century social imperatives dictating that a man should defend his Ehre and a woman should feel Scham could actually result in their further suffering. Frevert notes the importance of Schamhaftigkeit as a nineteenth-century feminine virtue, especially for women from bourgeois and petty bourgeois families: “Junge Mädchen wurden ihrerseits auf Schamhaftigkeit getrimmt, nach dem Motto: Eine Frau ohne Schamgefühl sei eine Frau ohne Ehre” (Vergängliche Gefühle 20). This historical background elucidates why Effi Briest features two monologue scenes in which Innstetten struggles with Ehre and Effi with the wrong kind of Scham. These passages offer a critique of the emotional codes that require men to defend their
Ehre and women to feel Scham and depict these codes in a state of decline in the modern society portrayed in Fontane’s novel.

In the scenes featuring Innstetten’s conversation with Wüllersdorf and Effi’s and Innstetten’s monologues, the self-evidence of traditional nineteenth-century bourgeois and aristocratic social mores and emotional codes, represented by Ehre and Scham, is challenged. Johanna upholds the necessity of Ehre and Sittlichkeit in her argument with Roswitha in Chapter 29, and, until Innstetten duels with Crampas, he perceives no alternative to allowing the Ehrenkultus to determine his choices and emotions. Initially, Innstetten praises Johanna and snubs Roswitha, whom he considers less intelligent than the former: “Sie wissen schon alles; Roswitha ist dumm, aber Johanna ist eine kluge Person” (Effi Briest 288). Innstetten entrusts Johanna with privileged information after the duel and the task of telling Annie that she no longer has a mother. As time progresses after the duel with Crampas, however, Innstetten’s dissociation from his original estimation of the honor code corresponds with a shift in his former alliance with Johanna, as evident in this passage:

Wenn die Johanna eintritt, ein sogenanntes Juwel, so wird mir angst und bang.
Dieses Sich-in-Szene-setzen (und Innstetten ahmte Johanna’s Haltung nach),
diese halb komische Büstenplastik, die wie mit einem Spezialanspruch auftritt, ich weiß nicht, ob an die Menschheit oder an mich – ich finde das alles so trist und elend, und es wäre zum Totschießen, wenn es nicht so lächerlich wäre. (Effi Briest 238-239)

The more Innstetten questions the cult of Ehre and the rectitude of his actions, the more he becomes disgusted with Johanna’s posturing. Like Johanna’s “Sich-in-Szene-setzen,” which
Innstetten imitates disparagingly, the ethics of *Ehre* that Johanna advocates is represented here as phony.

2.8 ACKNOWLEDGING A NEED FOR COMPASSION AND SELF-REGULATORY EMOTIONS

During Innstetten’s final conversation with Wüllersdorf in Chapter 35, the two figures come to a realization that resembles Fontane’s own insight, “Schopenhauer hat ganz recht: ‘Das Beste, was wir haben, ist Mitleid’” (*Briefe IV* 284). Innstetten receives two letters in this scene: the first is a bureaucratic letter from the Minister congratulating him on his promotion, and the second letter displays “eine glückliche Unvertrautheit mit den landesüblichen Titulaturen” and is written in a “Schriftzüge von sehr primitivem Charakter” (*Effi Briest* 337). These initial descriptions of the second letter serve to differentiate it from the Minister’s letter even before the narrator reveals its writer, Roswitha, or its contents. In her letter, Roswitha requests that Innstetten send Rollo to Hohen-Cremmen so that he can accompany Effi on walks and ease her fears. Wüllersdorf’s reaction appears in quotes after the reproduction of the letter on the page and influences the reader’s evaluation of Roswitha’s character and the emotional style that she embodies. He judges Roswitha to be a cut above himself and Innstetten with his candid statement, “die ist uns über,” a sentiment that Innstetten echoes (*Effi Briest* 339). While Roswitha’s letter appears inferior on a superficial level, because she is unfamiliar with writing conventions and titles, her request demonstrates compassion, selflessness, and a disregard for what society might think of her for remaining loyal to her mistress. Innstetten’s and Wüllersdorf’s response to Roswitha’s “schlichte Worte” shows that they recognize her compassion and integrity, which once again drives
Innstetten to reevaluate his own practice of abiding by his principles and the honor code (*Effi Briest* 339).

If we consider the previously discussed passages of the novel to be a continuation of the *Ehre-Mitleid* debate between Johanna and Roswitha, it might seem that the novel completely invalidates *Ehre* and *Scham*. Despite the critique of nineteenth-century notions of *Ehre* and *Sittlichkeit* evident in *Effi Briest*, the novel takes a more moderate position and admits the need for self-regulatory emotions (e.g. shame, honor, guilt), not an ethics based solely on compassion. At the end of Chapter 35, Innstetten continues to question his actions and blames culture and the social emotion *Ehre* for everything:

> weg von hier, weg und hin unter lauter pechschwarze Kerle, die von Kultur und Ehre nichts wissen. Diese Glücklichen! Denn gerade das, dieser ganze Krimskrams ist doch an allem schuld. Aus Passion, was am Ende gehen möchte, thut man dergleichen nicht. Also bloßen Vorstellungen zuliebe…Vorstellungen! … Und da klappt denn einer zusammen, und man klappt selber nach. (*Effi Briest* 340-341)

Innstetten envisions Africa as an ideal sanctuary, a kind of Rousseauian state of nature, in which the natives are happy and unbound by social and emotional codes. Instead of rejecting the code of *Ehre* and adopting another emotional style, Innstetten believes that he must become one of the ‘pechschwarze Kerle,’ an exotic, foreign ‘Other,’ in order to escape the emotional imperatives of Prussian society, because the concepts of culture and *Ehre* would be unfamiliar to them. He assumes that the passions that move people in this natural state are both less dangerous and more justified than the abstract concept, *Ehre*, that motivated his actions and that he now dismisses as
‘Krimskrams’ and holds responsible for his unhappiness. Wüllersdorf, who discourages running away from culture and society, dismisses this fantasy. With his rhetorical question “Wer ist denn unbedrückt?” he assures Innstetten that he is not the only one who feels this way or has a psychological burden to carry (Effi Briest 341). Referring to the wise saying of a master builder, Wüllersdorf suggests that, rather than abandoning the culture he blames for his situation, Innstetten must look for “Hülfskonstruktionen” (Effi Briest 342). The precise meaning of ‘Hülfskonstruktionen’ is not stated directly, but the context implies anything that helps make the burdens and sorrow of daily life more tolerable. Since this conversation occurs immediately after Roswitha’s intervention on behalf of Effi, one possible interpretation could be support and compassion from others. Rather than locating this form of social feeling in an ideal state of nature, Effi Briest uses Roswitha to show that compassion can be practiced in modern society without abandoning culture because “es geht überhaupt nicht ohne ‘Hülfskonstruktionen’” (Effi Briest 342).

This balanced viewpoint becomes especially clear if we pay attention to Effi’s change of heart and last words at the end of the novel. At first, Effi expresses her contempt for Innstetten’s principles after her distressing reunion with her daughter, Annie:

O, Du Gott im Himmel, vergieb mir, was ich gethan;…ich will meine Schuld nicht kleiner machen, … aber das ist zuviel. Denn das hier, mit dem Kind, das bist nicht Du, Gott, der mich strafen will, das ist er, bloß er! Ich habe geglaubt, daß er ein edles Herz habe und habe mich immer klein neben ihm gefühlt; aber

39 The word ‘Krimskrams’ appears twice in Effi Briest. In Chapter 19, the antisemitic and patriotic Prussian Baron von Güldenklee dismisses Lessing’s Ringparabel and its message of tolerance as ‘liberaler Krimskrams,’ but Fontane’s use of narrative irony undermines Güldenklee’s view. Innstetten’s use of the word ‘Krimskrams’ in Chapter 35 recalls the earlier passage; however, here the emotional code of Ehre, not progressive politics, is called rubbish (compare Effi Briest 181, 340).
jetzt weiß ich, daß er es ist, er ist klein. … Ein Streber war er, weiter nichts. –
Ehre, Ehre, Ehre … und dann hat er den armen Kerl totgeschossen, den ich nicht
einmal liebte .... Mich ekelt, was ich gethan; aber was mich noch mehr ekelt, das
ist Eure Tugend. (Effi Briest 325-326)40

Effi’s monologue begins as a prayer for forgiveness (“O, Du Gott in Himmel, vergieb mir…”)
and admission of guilt (“…ich will meine Schuld nicht kleiner Machen…”), but it ends as an
accusation and expression of disgust for Innstetten and Annie’s empty virtue (“Eure Tugend”).
The repetitions of ‘Ehre’ and ‘er’ convey the extent of Effi’s distress after her visit with Annie.
She holds Innstetten’s loyalty to his principles and Ehre responsible for her estrangement from
her daughter and for Crampas’s death. Ehre is shown here as an object of contempt, not a social
emotion or virtue worthy of admiration. Effi’s final words, spoken just before her death in
Chapter 36, express more understanding for Innstetten’s actions and principles, however. She
admits to her mother “daß er in allem recht gehandelt. In der Geschichte mit dem armen
Crampas – ja, was sollt’ er am Ende anders thun? … er hatte viel Gutes in seiner Natur und war
so edel, wie jemand sein kann, der ohne rechte Liebe ist” (Effi Briest 348). Effi no longer
condemns Ehre or denies that Innstetten possesses noble qualities. She takes responsibility for
her own guilt, affirms that Innstetten had acted correctly, and hopes that her conviction of his
righteousness will comfort him. Yet her words retain an important element of critique, namely,
that Innstetten lacks “rechte Liebe” (Effi Briest 348). As with Pastor Niemeyer’s insistence upon
a vague “richtiges Gefühl,” the meaning of “rechte Liebe” opens itself up for debate. While

40 My examination of Fontane’s original handwritten manuscript of Effi Briest has alerted me to significant and
telling revisions that Fontane made to passages that allude to the emotions Ehre and Mitleid, including the passage
cited here. A separate essay analyzing Fontane’s deletions and insertions in key passages of the manuscript is
currently in preparation. Fontane’s changes to the manuscript provide further support for my argument that the novel
negotiates between Ehre and Mitleid and that the representation of these social emotions was of great concern to
Fontane at the time.
critics have taken this to mean that Innstetten lacks Zärtlichkeit\textsuperscript{41} or feelings of romantic love, the critical thrust of the novel goes beyond the telling of a story of an ill-fated marriage and adultery as the consequence of an absence of romantic love between spouses. Instead, I interpret “rechte Liebe” as a more inclusive fellow feeling for humanity,\textsuperscript{42} i.e. compassion or Mitleid. With this closing assessment of Innstetten’s character, the novel as a whole does not call for the relinquishment of nineteenth-century bourgeois and aristocratic social mores or self-regulatory emotions. It does however articulate the need for an accompanying style of social feeling based on rechte Liebe or Mitleid. The novel represents this emotion as able to provide stability in a modernizing world at a time when other emotions and values are declining in relevance.

2.9 EMOTIONS AND THE NATURE-SOCIETY BINARY

Fontane’s staging of Ehre and Mitleid as opposing social emotions in Effi Briest raises important questions about the perception of these emotions and the nature of emotional experience in general at the turn of the century. The binary of nature versus society, which scholars find in Effi Briest and other works of Fontane’s oeuvre, brings up the nature-nurture question at the heart of many debates related to the study of emotions. Does the novel’s association of Ehre with society and Mitleid with nature imply that Germans around 1900 viewed Ehre and Scham as culturally determined emotions and Mitleid as inherently natural? Because there is evidence indicating that the emotions that societies consider ‘natural’ or ‘basic’ change over time, this is not an unreasonable question. Additionally, following Schopenhauer, Fontane admitted that “Mitleid ist

\textsuperscript{41} Compare Müller-Seidel 370; Stolt 242-244.

\textsuperscript{42} Compare Wende, who considers “Humanitas” the only possible meaning of rechte Liebe (157).
auch vielfach ganz echt,” a statement that ascribes to the emotion a sense of genuineness or realness (Briefe IV 284). Yet emotions as represented in Effi Briest, just like Fontane’s figures, exist in a constant state of tension between two poles. Furthermore, the manner in which the novel stages debates between its figures on the topic of Ehre and Mitleid already implies that both emotions are subject to social negotiation and, therefore, that each emotion has a unique history.

Instead, I read Fontane’s alignment of Ehre with society and Mitleid with nature in Effi Briest more as a literary device that enacts the tension between these two emotional styles than as an explicit statement about their origins or historical variability. Fontane’s use of the nature-society binary to bring to light this tension enables readers to make two observations. Firstly, by aligning Ehre and Sittlichkeit with society, the novel shows how strict social codes regulating the practice of emotions could inhibit certain ‘natural’ feelings and have a negative impact on human relationships. When Effi visits the Ministerin and requests permission to see her daughter, the Ministerin responds with compassion because, as a mother, she identifies with Effi’s situation and can summarize the reason for Effi’s request in terms of emotions: “Sie finden sich selbst in der Haltung Ihres Herrn Gemahls zurecht und verlangen nur, daß einem natürlichen Gefühle, wohl dem schönsten unserer Gefühle (wenigstens wir Frauen werden uns darin finden), sein Recht werde” (Effi Briest 320, emphasis added). In this passage, the Ministerin refers to Mutterliebe [motherly love] as something natural and beautiful. Since she values this emotion herself, she does not deny Effi’s request but promises to do everything she can to convince Innstetten to grant her visitation rights. Even though Innstetten reluctantly consents, the Ministerin knows that he is “ein Mann, der nicht nach Stimmungen und Laune, sondern nach Grundsätzen handelt” and that what he judges to be right may be hard for Effi’s heart (Effi Briest
Although the narrator never reveals whether Innstetten or Johanna is responsible for training Annie to respond to Effi’s questions with “O gewiß, wenn ich darf” during her visit, it is clear that Annie, whose best subject in school is religion, is constrained by a rigid Sittlichkeit that leaves Effi’s desire to be reunited with her daughter and experience the natural feeling of Mutterliebe unfulfilled (Effi Briest 324). Similarly, Luise von Briest, who feels bound by social conventions and fears being cut off from society, experiences temporary estrangement from her daughter until Dr. Rummschüttel intervenes by invoking the Briests’ feelings of parental love: “was Ihrer Frau Tochter Genesung bringen kann, ist nicht Luft allein; sie siecht hin, weil sie nichts hat als Roswitha. Dienertreue ist schön aber Elternliebe ist besser” (Effi Briest 327, emphasis added). With two simple words, “Effi komm,” the Briests invite Effi back home to Hohen-Cremmen and reestablish their emotional and familial bond (Effi Briest 328). By replacing an unforgiving Sittlichkeit with compassion, familial love is restored in the case of the Briests.

Additionally, by invoking the nature-society binary and associating Mitleid with nature, the novel acknowledges that some Germans around 1900 may have perceived an ethics of Mitleid as a threat to established values and institutions. The novel gives particular expression to the fear of what would happen to religious and moral institutions if compassion were extended to those who, like Effi and Crampas, commit adultery or violate other social mores. On the evening of Effi’s engagement to Innstetten, Briest analogizes his ‘Naturkind’ Effi and Geert, a ‘Mann von Prinzipien,’ using the following image: “Geert, wenn er nicht irre, habe die Bedeutung von einem schlank aufgeschossenen Stamm, und Effi sei dann also der Epheu, der sich darum zu ranken habe” (Effi Briest 19-20). This powerful image at the beginning of Effi Briest associates Effi with nature and Innstetten with culture, an idea that guides the reader’s interpretation of the
novel and its protagonists. Ivy reappears later in the novel, and, most notably, twice in Chapter 33, where it is found growing on the church across from Effi’s Berlin apartment on Königgrätzerstraße. The narrator reports how Effi and Roswitha imagine the plant’s growth: “nächstes Jahr würden die Fenster wohl ganz zugewachsen sein,” and Effi subsequently explains to Annie during her visit that the process has already begun: “die Fenster sind schon halb von Epheu überwachsen, als ob es eine alte Kirche wäre” (Effi Briest 322, 324). Ivy, a symbol of wild and free nature, contrasts with the image of the church, a religious and moral institution, and Annie’s trained obedience. Mitleid, represented as a ‘natural’ emotion in the novel, can also be associated symbolically with the ivy that threatens to overtake the church. Effi’s remark that the wildly growing ivy partially covers the windows and makes the church look old suggests the declining relevance of the particular social and emotional codes that the church represents in modern society. Additionally, the first statement by the narrator (“nächstes Jahr würden die Fenster wohl ganz zugewachsen sein”) could be read as a prediction that Mitleid will continue to compete with Ehre and Sittlichkeit until it is integrated into the social codes and values represented by the church.

Another passage invokes the nature-society binary in order to examine the political implications of and possible resistance to an ethics based on tolerance and Mitleid. In Chapter 19, Baron von Güldenklee gives a toast to Oberförster Ring: “viele Ringe giebt es, und es giebt sogar eine Geschichte, die wir alle kennen, die die Geschichte von den ‘drei Ringen’ heißt, eine Judengeschichte, die, wie der ganze liberale Krimskrams, nichts wie Verwirrung und Unheil gestiftet hat und noch stiftet. Gott bessere es” (Effi Briest 181). Although the “Parable of the Three Rings” to which Güldenklee refers dates back at least as far as the Middle Ages, Lessing retold it and gave it a place of importance at the center of his drama Nathan der Weise (1779).
The *Ringparabel*, which evokes the Enlightenment *Toleranzdiskurs*, is known for its message of religious tolerance, equality, and familial love. German readers of the time would have surely associated it with Lessing, whose name also calls to mind the eighteenth-century *Mitleidsdiskurs*. As we see from Johanna’s rejection of Roswitha’s compassion for Crampas in their debate about *Ehre* and *Mitleid*, feelings that the novel presents as ‘natural’ are not accepted by all. Like Johanna, Güldenklee thus rejects this other type of social feeling and dismisses the *Ringparabel* and everything it represents as liberal ‘Krimskrams,’ blaming it for causing confusion and misery in society. ‘Natural’ human feeling and the social progress it implies are perceived as a threat to Prussia in this scene, and the guests in attendance express their patriotism by collectively singing the “Preußenlied” following the toast. The narrator undermines this view, however, by revealing that Innstetten, “der von solchem Patriotismus nicht viel hielt,” does not get swept up in the collective singing. While the narrator does not reveal whether Innstetten shares Güldenklee’s disdain for progressive politics, this comment sets Innstetten apart from the other characters in the scene. It shows that he remains devoted to his principles and does not act in response to emotional appeals, whether for *Mitleid* or for patriotism, as we see here. Nonetheless, by conveying the sense that ‘natural’ social feeling could be perceived as a threat to the established order, the novel indicates potential obstacles involved in promoting tolerance and *Mitleid*.

**2.10 CONCLUSION**

*Effi Briest* contributes to the turn-of-the-century emotion discourse by putting nineteenth-century aristocratic and bourgeois ideals of *Ehre* and *Sittlichkeit* in dialogue with a different type of social feeling based on *Mitleid*. By associating *Mitleid* with nature and *Ehre* with society in a
rhetorical gesture rather than as a statement about the origins of these emotions, Fontane’s novel dramatizes the tension between these competing systems of social feeling and attempts to reconcile them. It does not, however, locate *Mitleid* outside of society in an imaginary state of nature or advocate exclusive reliance upon ‘natural’ feelings. Instead, it critically examines and subverts the emotional imperatives of *Ehre* and *Scham* in order to make room for more compassionate emotional codes in a society undergoing modernization. The novel’s open ending, which makes a compelling case for both abstract guiding principles and human compassion, takes a cautiously progressive approach that enables the dialogic negotiation between the two viewpoints to continue. The recognition of different emotional styles and, moreover, the invitation to continue the dialogue do not just inform Fontane’s *Effi Briest*, as I demonstrate in the next chapter on Lou Andreas-Salomé’s *Fenitschka* (1898). That is to say, by staging *Ehre* and *Mitleid* as opposing social emotions in *Effi Briest*, Fontane invites us to connect his novel to other literary works that engage with issues of emotions and ethics around 1900.

If *Effi Briest* voices awareness for the impact that social codes can have on an individual’s life and emotions, it also admits the necessity of such regulations. The problem lies in how such social and emotional codes are imagined and internalized. In the novel, Effi is conscious of her fears, shame, and guilt, but not of herself as the subject of those emotions. The protagonists are oppressed because they let society dictate their emotional practices, not realizing their own ability to shape them, and, therefore, their feelings. Fontane proposed his own vision of how a society might achieve this balance: “So gewiß die Gesellschaft das Recht hat, diesen *Ich-Standpunkt zu korrigieren, so gewiß hat das Ich ein Recht, den Gesellschaftsstandpunkt zu korrigieren*” (*Aufzeichnungen zur Literatur* 359). His *Effi Briest* accomplishes precisely this. By questioning the self-evidence of emotional practices and social mores, validating alternative
emotional styles, and using the affective power of narrative fiction to move readers, *Effi Briest* made a key contribution to the emotion discourse of its time.
3.0 “DANN SIEGTE EIN ANDRES GEFÜHL”: SUBVERTING FEMININE SHAME AND LIBERATING LOVE IN ANDREAS-SALOMÉ’S _FENITSCHKA_ (1898)

Lou Andreas-Salomé’s (1861-1937) novella _Fenitscha_ (1898), published three years after Theodor Fontane’s _Effi Briest_, takes a different approach to addressing the crisis in emotional norms and the rapid cultural change of fin-de-siècle Europe. On the one hand, _Fenitschka_, like _Effi Briest_, is reserved in its approach, using realist narrative techniques to expose and critique the constraints placed on individuals by nineteenth-century social and emotional codes. Yet while Fontane inspires compassion through the narration of the social isolation, physical decline, and death of his passive title heroine, Andreas-Salomé constructs an active heroine who rejects the social mores of her class and gender and defines her own emotional style. Heteropathia in _Fenitschka_ manifests itself as the tension between differing orientations to the emotions of feminine shame and love, which the novella puts in dialogue through its title heroine, Fenia, and extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator, Max. Although _Fenitschka_ admits the challenges involved in assimilating new models and redefining the self in the face of modernity’s changes, its subversive power derives from its gradual revealing of the failure of conventional narratives to account for the diversity of individuals and relationships in a modernizing society. It does not promote uncritical acceptance of old or new cultural paradigms, but urges readers to look beyond their preconceptions and aim for critical thinking and dialogue, which in turn will lead to progress, greater understanding, and acceptance.
This chapter brings together two contrasting trends in interpretations of *Fenitschka*. Scholarship has yielded different insights into the novella’s meaning and actual object of narration since about 1990, when Andreas-Salomé’s novellas finally began to receive the scholarly attention they deserve. A majority of critics has treated Fenia, the title heroine, as the novella’s central figure of interest (see Eigler; Deiulio; Haines; Martin). More recently, however, others have examined the narrative situation and argued that *Fenitschka* reveals more about its co-protagonist and narrator,¹ Max Werner (see Cormican; Whiting). While readers can profitably approach Andreas-Salomé’s *Fenitschka* from either point of view, the concept heteropathia provides a new interpretative approach that reconciles the two ways of reading the novella and more precisely illuminates how Andreas-Salomé portrays differing affective perspectives at the *fin de siècle*.

One glance at the novella’s title suggests that its primary purpose is to tell the story of its heroine, the young Russian doctoral student, Fiona Ivánowna Betjagin, who more commonly goes by the nickname Fenia or the diminutive Fénitschka. Fenia, who resembles other New Woman figures commonly found in *fin-de-siècle* European literature, certainly proves to be a fascinating object of narration. Like them, she resists simple categorization and does not conform to the nineteenth-century social mores of her class or gender. She earns a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Zürich, the first European university to accept female students, and speaks in support of women’s education. Her beliefs about love and marriage, which she shares during her debates with her co-protagonist, Max, are unconventional and challenge the cultural narratives

¹ Critics have not explicitly argued that the character Max is identical to the narrator, but they have suggested that the narrative events are told from his perspective. Since there is strong textual evidence to suggest that the narrator is actually Max reflecting on his encounters with Fenia, I refer to Max the narrator and Max the character in this chapter using the following shorthand forms: Mⁿ and Mᶜ.
with which he is familiar and comfortable. Recalling the inner struggles faced by the heroines of Henrik Ibsen’s (1828-1906) dramas, \(^2\) Fenia must either choose to marry her lover and give up her professional goals or reject his proposal and preserve her freedom. Fenia ultimately leaves her Russian lover and ends her friendship with Max in the final pages of the novella. The veiling of her facial expressions and emotions after these separations creates an open ending that leads readers to wonder whether she made the right decision and what her emotional response, if revealed, would say about the challenges and opportunities facing the New Woman at the turn of the century.

Another way to read *Fenitschka* requires shifting attention to the co-protagonist, Max Werner, and the process of narration. Max, an Austrian doctoral graduate in psychology, first meets Fenia at a Parisian café and encounters her a second time in St. Petersburg, where they begin to establish a friendship and engage in conversations about love, marriage, religion, gender, and women’s education. Thought report and free indirect speech convey Max’s feelings of irritation and anxiety in response to his interactions with Fenia. His inability to categorize this New Woman frustrates him greatly, and her rejection of gendered social mores threatens his masculinity. Readers become aware of his insecurity and futile attempts to secure a position of authority for himself because Fenia destabilizes the dominant cultural narratives that grant him a privileged status as an educated bourgeois male. After Max leaves Fenia’s hotel room in St. Petersburg, the narration concludes, and the question of Max’s overall development remains open for debate.

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\(^2\) As Andreas-Salomé’s analysis in *Henrik Ibsen Frauen-Gestalten: nach seinen sechs Familiendramen* (1892) demonstrates, Ibsen’s protagonists, such as Hedda in *Hedda Gabler* (1890) and Nora Helmer in *A Doll’s House* (1879), are forced to choose either love and family duties or freedom. Out of all of Ibsen’s heroines, Ellida Wangel in *The Lady from the Sea* (1888) exemplifies an ideal because she achieves this balance between duty and freedom (Andreas-Salomé, *Henrik Ibsen Frauen-Gestalten* 12-14).
Focusing on the heteropathic representation of emotion in Andreas-Salomé’s *Fenitschka*, I demonstrate in this chapter that the novella shifts its reader’s attention between the two objects of narration, Fenia and Max (i.e. both Max the character [Mᶜ] and Max the narrator [Mⁿ]). *Fenitschka* sets up dialogues at the intradiegetic and extradiegetic levels and subverts Max’s (Mᶜ) perspective, while at the same time underscoring the instability and uncertainty that accompanied modernization at the turn of the century. The novella’s open ending raises more questions than it answers when read from either of the two viewpoints (Fenia as object of narration vs. Max as object of narration). When read in terms of heteropathia, however, its final scene indicates that Max (Mᶜ) no longer tries to categorize Fenia according to the nineteenth-century emotional codes and social mores of her class and gender. Instead, the narrator (Mⁿ) shows that he (Mⁿ) has grown to accept Fenia’s unconventional, highly individual emotional style and acknowledge her agency.

Situated against the background of European society around 1900, *Fenitschka* provides insight into fin-de-siècle emotional life and makes room for new emotional styles during this period of swift cultural change. The novella’s co-protagonists, Fenia and Max, are more than just representatives of their respective genders—they embody differing orientations to emotion. Max assumes that all bourgeois ladies feel the same: they desire sensation, pursue love that leads to marriage, and feel shame if their virtue is threatened. Fenia questions the ‘naturalness’ and universality of these emotions, however. Rather than conform to these emotional scripts, she defines her own emotional style, in which love means freedom and gratitude, and feminine shame is unnecessary. Critics have reached different conclusions about Andreas-Salomé’s feminism and support for the women’s movement, and, while I do not consider *Fenitschka* a first-wave feminist text, its narration from a male perspective functions subversively and
undermines the nineteenth-century gendered social and emotional codes to which Max unreflectively subscribes. With the women’s movement and better opportunities for women’s education and employment, established gender roles and social mores were gradually becoming passé in modern society. Max’s (Mⁿ) skepticism toward women’s education, unconventional gender roles, and alternative understandings of love and marriage suggest that the familiar narratives associated with these social mores were difficult to abandon, however. The novella questions the nineteenth-century bourgeois male worldview represented by Max (Mⁿ), but, more generally, it asks readers to think critically before accepting any cultural narrative or ideology that aims for simplicity in categorizing others. Through both its title heroine and extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator, Fenitschka ultimately champions self-realization and validates alternate ways of feeling. Moreover, the novella’s dialogues and open ending facilitate a sustained negotiation between viewpoints, thereby drawing readers into its debates about emotions and social change.

3.1 EMANCIPATION OR SELF-REALIZATION? ANDREAS-SALOMÉ AND THE WOMAN QUESTION

Already during her lifetime Russian-born German writer, thinker, and psychoanalyst Lou Andreas-Salomé acquired various names and identities. Sigmund Freud famously dubbed her the “Dichterin der Psychoanalyse” and told other colleagues that she was a “Frauenzimmer von gefährlicher Intelligenz” (“Freud/Lou Andreas-Salomé” 147; Decker 272). Her friendships and intellectual exchanges with figures like Nietzsche, Rée, Rilke, and Freud earned her the reputation as a philosopher’s muse. Some biographers have also construed Andreas-Salomé as a
femme fatale, the real-life counterpart to figures like Frank Wedekind’s (1864-1918) Lulu and the biblical figures of Judith and Salomé, who dominated the artistic and literary imagination at the fin de siècle (Martin, Woman and Modernity 21). Andreas-Salomé has fascinated biographers and scholars and even inspired novelists and filmmakers to explore her unconventional life. Like her heroine in Fenitschka, Andreas-Salomé herself became an indicator of the possibilities of other forms of social expression available to women in a modern world.

Louise (Lou) von Salomé was born into a wealthy family of Huguenot-German descent in a German-speaking colony in St. Petersburg in 1861. She was the youngest and only daughter of six children, and growing up with five brothers shaped her interactions with men during her adult life. Much to her mother’s disappointment, Lou did not conform to the social mores of her gender. Instead, she traveled to Switzerland to study art history and the psychology of religion at the University of Zürich in 1880 (Salber 25). Lou contracted hemoptysis, which forced her to end her studies in Zürich not even a year later. For the rest of her life, she would remain an autodidact, who became a central contributor to the intellectual discussions of her time. She developed close connections to Paul Rée (1849-1901) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) after leaving Zürich for Rome in 1882. Salomé declined the marriage proposals of both Rée and Nietzsche but in 1887 married the Orientalist Friedrich Carl Andreas (1846-1930). She mingled with the circle of Naturalist writers in Berlin and began publishing essays, stories, and reviews in Die Freie Bühne and other influential journals of the time in 1890. Although Andreas-Salomé continued to write and publish well into the last decades of her life, the 1890s remained the most prolific period of her career. Her first novel Im Kampf um Gott appeared in 1885, but it was her

3 Andreas-Salomé is featured in a number of recent films and novels, including Cordula Kablitz-Post’s biographical film Lou Andreas-Salomé - Wie ich dich liebe, Rätselleben (2016), Liliana Cavani’s drama film Al di là del bene e del male [Beyond Good and Evil] (1977), Irvin Yalom’s novel When Nietzsche Wept (1992), and William Bayer’s novel The Luzern Photograph: A Noir Thriller (2016).
thoughtful analysis of the female protagonists in Henrik Ibsen’s dramas that launched her successful writing career in 1892. Andreas-Salomé’s travels during these years took her to Paris, Russia, Munich, and Vienna. She developed an intense friendship with Rainer Maria Rilke (1875-1926) in 1897 after meeting him in Munich and became a source of support and literary inspiration for the rest of his life, even after their separation in 1900. In Vienna, where psychology and literature became central topics of the Jahrhundertwende, Andreas-Salomé conversed with Arthur Schnitzler (1862-1931) and other writers of the Wiener Moderne. A later trip to Vienna in 1911 enabled her to meet Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and develop a close friendship with his daughter, Anna, marking the period of her active involvement in the field of psychoanalysis. Andreas-Salomé remained engaged in the writing of psychoanalytic essays and in her practice as a lay analyst until shortly before her death in Göttingen in 1937.

Understandably, Lou Andreas-Salomé’s biography has interested scholars for a variety of reasons, not least of all for her interactions with Nietzsche, Rilke, and Freud. Biographies of Andreas-Salomé continue to appear, but the past three decades have witnessed an increase in critical attention given to her theoretical essays and literary works as well. Despite the growing scholarly interest in her works, however, references to the writer’s contributions to the German literary and cultural landscape of the late nineteenth-century have remained curiously absent from German literary histories, which are predominantly male-centered. Such neglect notwithstanding, Andreas-Salomé’s works were very popular during her lifetime. Her first novel, *Im Kampf um Gott* (1885), explores the human psyche, the status of women in society, the meaning of religion, and the complications of love, all themes that she continued to develop in her later essays and literary works (Salber 37). *Henrik Ibsens Frauen-Gestalten: nach seinen sechs Familiendramen* (1892), which analyzes six heroines from Ibsen’s late nineteenth-century
dramas (including *Ghosts* [1881] and *Hedda Gabler* [1891]) demonstrates a serious engagement with the Woman Question, particularly the issues of marriage, freedom, and gendered emotional codes.

Despite her concern with the Woman Question, which occupied the center of social and aesthetic discourses around 1880, some early feminists, including Hedwig Dohm (1831-1919), accused Andreas-Salomé of being a privileged anti-feminist because they found her theoretical writings on gender and women essentialist (Martin, *Woman and Modernity* 16, 21; Whiting 465). In the essay “Reaktion in der Frauenbewegung” (1899), for example, Dohm questions Lou’s loyalty to the feminist cause and even calls her an anti-suffragette [Antifrauenrechtlerin]: “Und nun Frau Lou Andreas-Salomé? ‘Auch Du, mein Sohn Brutus!’ dachte ich betrübt, als ich ihre Schrift ‘Der Mensch als Weib’ gelesen hatte. Frau Lou (ihr voller, viel zu langer Name frißt zu viel Manuskript) Antifrauenrechtlerin!” (Dohm 280). According to Andreas-Salomé’s construction of femininity, which diverged from Dohm’s, woman was complete in herself; she did need to imitate man or become dependent on a man or child in order to be a whole person (Martin, *Woman and Modernity* 6). She never became politically engaged, however, or let herself be confined to one belief system but thought that feminists’ attempt to negate differences between the sexes was misguided. Instead of demanding women’s emancipation, she emphasized the importance of their self-realization (Salber 97-98).
3.2  *Fenitschka* Through Different Lenses: Gender, Feminist, Bakhtinian, and Emotion Studies

Scholarship has tended to focus on constructions of gender in Andreas-Salomé’s literary works and essays, but a more general awareness of the crisis in nineteenth-century emotional codes and social mores at the *fin de siècle* is also evident in her work. Established social structures and institutions had begun to show signs of instability in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Cultural mores like clearly defined gender roles and the belief in God’s existence, which were assumed to be self-evident, were now being questioned. There arose the need to create spaces for different lifestyles and ways of feeling for people in modern society. Andreas-Salomé’s novellas, especially those written in the 1890s, depict the structural changes that European societies underwent at the *fin de siècle* and look forward to a future with new possibilities, including the freedom of self-realization.

Out of all of Andreas-Salomé’s novellas, *Fenitschka* continues to be the best-known and most commonly discussed in the critical literature. David Midgley describes two features that make it an exemplary text:

One is the clarity with which it presents the problems faced by a young woman who would like to be as free … in her relationships as men are able to be, but who experiences the constraints imposed upon that ideal by social convention and the attitudes of men themselves. The other is the way it uses a male observer as the medium through which the woman’s situation and experiences are reflected….

(116)

Here, Midgley indirectly suggests that the novella includes two objects of narration, the co-protagonists Max and Fenia, each with his or her own story to tell. Some readings of *Fenitschka*...
have analyzed Fenia’s story more closely (Eigler; Deiulio; Haines; Martin). Friederike Eigler, for example, argues that *Fenitschka* is about “…a young woman who, because of social norms and gender specific mores in a patriarchal society, attempts unsuccessfully to combine her private and professional lives…” (198). Other, more recent, scholarship maintains that *Fenitschka* actually focuses primarily on Max (Cormican; Whittinger). Cormican, for instance, shifts emphasis away from Fenia’s predicament, arguing that Max is a more central character than has typically been recognized by other critics (136).

Whether critics focus more on Fenia or Max as the object of narration depends on their theoretical approach. Biddy Martin views the plot and details of *Fenitschka* as highly (auto)-biographical (*Woman and Modernity* 176-190). Unwilling to suppress the writer’s biography in her interpretations, she argues that *Fenitschka* is “…all the richer for its resonance with the stories of her encounters with Frank Wedekind and Friedrich Nietzsche” (*Woman and Modernity* 178). Even though Andreas-Salomé recognized her own tendency to blur the lines between life and literature,4 however, biographical readings of *Fenitschka* are by no means the only possibility. In fact, a number of critics have distanced themselves from biographical approaches to Andreas-Salomé’s fiction, almost certainly in resistance to what Muriel Cormican calls the “cult of biography” that came to surround the author and her work (2).

Feminist and Bakhtinian readings of the novellas, including *Fenitschka*, have been the two most common approaches up to this point (see Allen; Eigler; Haines). In her feminist reading, Brigid Haines explores the contradictions and anti-feminist ideas that early critics such as Dohm attributed to Andreas-Salomé’s writing. While Haines acknowledges that contemporary feminists did not approve of Andreas-Salomé’s understanding of gender identity as innate rather

4 Andreas-Salomé admitted that all of her works, including her literary texts, theoretical essays, and memoirs, are both autobiographical and fictional (Martin, *Femininity Played Straight* 208).
than socially constructed, her close reading of Fenitschka demonstrates how the novella reaches beyond essentialism and depicts a radical social reality in which gender is a product of competing forms of subjectivity (417). Friederike Eigler makes a more direct connection between feminist theory and Bakhtinian analysis. Using Eine Ausschweifung (1898) as her case study, she expands upon Haines’ method and proposes that Bakhtin’s concept of a “multi-voiced narrative” can help critics who want to connect feminist theory with the close reading of literary texts (198). Although an understanding of the dialogic aspect of Fenitschka and other novellas is implicit in Haines’s and Eigler’s reference to Bakhtin’s heteroglossia, Julie Doll Allen further examines the dialogues between Max and Fenia and situates these conversations in their historical and cultural contexts. Allen reads Fenitschka as symptomatic of the debates surrounding the women’s movement and the struggle to develop a feminine identity independent of men at the fin de siècle (479).

Two other recent interpretations of Fenitschka shift attention from Fenia toward Max and the act of narration. Raleigh Whitinger, for example, shows how Fenitschka, which uses Max’s perspective to invoke the Bildungsroman and Liebesroman, actually subverts their conventions to become a forerunner to the twentieth-century “female Bildungsroman” (464, 469). Muriel Cormican agrees with such feminist readings, which analyze the novella as subverting the late nineteenth-century anti-feminist position. But she also finds evidence for the negotiation of male identity in Andreas-Salomé’s works and argues that Fenitschka exposes the inadequacy of social discourses imposed on men as well as on women (137, 10).

My approach to the novella is indebted to the scholarly work done during the past three decades. I echo critics who consider Fenitschka an example of what Catherine Belsey called an “interrogative text,” one that raises more questions than it intends to answer and seeks to engage
readers in its debates (Haines 419; Midgley 120). While previous scholarship has largely focused on gender relations and feminist discourse, however, this chapter offers an analysis of the literary representation of emotion as it relates to the women’s movement and the larger social context of cultural change at the fin de siècle.

3.3 THE HETEROPATHIC REPRESENTATION OF EMOTION IN FENITSCHKA

The fin de siècle in European society is typically described as a period of rapid Kulturwandel and modernization during which old and new structures and value systems overlapped. Through its innovative narrative techniques and depiction of differing emotional styles, Fenitschka places readers at the center of debates about emotions and social change around 1900. Wilhelmine German society witnessed major cultural shifts and the emergence of differing emotional styles at this time, and, despite her reliance upon a single extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator, Andreas-Salomé succeeds in putting different affective perspectives into dialogue in Fenitschka. Internal focalization permits readers to see from Max’s (M‘) nineteenth-century bourgeois male worldview, but Fenia’s character and the narrative structure as a whole question the ‘naturalness’ of his perspective and undermine it. The embodiment of differing emotional styles in the novella’s two co-protagonists suggests one way of viewing the Jahrhundertwende: as a transitional period characterized by tension between shifting ways of feeling. My interpretation highlights such heteropathic representation and validation of ways of feeling in Fenitschka, which, as summarized in its pithy statement, “Dann siegte ein andres Gefühl,” is the novella’s most compelling contribution (Fenitschka 18).
3.3.1 Max as Narrator of *Fenitschka*

Generally speaking, the narrative situation of a novelistic prose work determines whose emotions are reported and from which perspective. Critics have identified a third-person narrator in *Fenitschka* and noted that the narrative events are recounted primarily through the eyes of co-protagonist Max Werner (see e.g. Allen 483; Haines 419-420). There is room, however, to use narrative theory in order to analyze the narrative voice and focalization more precisely. While we are dealing with an extradiegetic narrator in *Fenitschka*, it is not immediately clear whether he is homodiegetic or heterodiegetic. In spite of this, I find evidence that the novella features an extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator, i.e. a narrator in the first degree who tells his own story (Genette 248). Without yet discussing focalization to support this claim, I simply turn to the novella’s conclusion: “Stumm schritt er durch das Wohnzimmer und ging hinweg, wie sie es gewünscht hatte, ohne sie zu beachten oder anzureden. Zwei Tage später reiste er aus Rußland fort, ohne Fenitschka wiedergesehen zu haben” (*Fenitschka* 67). These two sentences link Max’s final departure from Fenia and St. Petersburg at the end of the novella with the narrator’s inability to continue narrating the life of its title heroine. This suggests that the narrator is actually the co-protagonist Max because he has no more knowledge about Fenia and her future than Max does at this point.

This chapter identifies the narrator (M⁰) of *Fenitschka* as the figure Max (M⁰), who later recounts the story of his friendship and conversations with Fenia. In other words, the novella features an extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator who disguises himself as an extradiegetic-heterodiegetic narrator. The grammatical third person is used to refer to both Max and Fenia throughout the novella, and, thus, the narrator’s identity and relationship to the two co-protagonists becomes obscured. This uncertainty about the person (homodiegetic or
heterodiegetic) behind the narrative voice affects the reader’s experience of the text as a whole in two key ways. First, this type of narration conveys a sense of objectivity and authority; we might conclude that the narrator tells a story from which he is detached and not an account of his personal experiences. Since he neither uses the first-person pronoun nor identifies himself with Max, readers may even incorrectly assume that *Fenitschka* features an omniscient narrator. Second, this ambiguous narrative voice results in two central objects of narration: Max and Fenia.

Comparing the narration of Max’s thoughts and emotions with Fenia’s makes a striking disparity apparent. At no point in the novella do readers gain access to Fenia’s ‘inner’ feelings. Instead, they must deduce her emotions, worldview, convictions, and motivations for her behavior from her direct speech and the narrator’s descriptions of her gestures and facial expressions. Readers may be tempted to see such narrative assessments of Fenia’s feelings as authoritative, but the frequent use of “schien,” “wie,” and “als ob” [appeared, like/as, and as if] in descriptive passages points to a subjective, limited viewpoint. After two paragraphs of uninterrupted dialogue between Max and Fenia in which they discuss women’s emancipation and education rights, the narrator suggests a discrepancy between Fenia’s actions and her desires: “Obwohl Fenia gegen ihn stritt, so sah sie ihn doch ganz unverkennbar so an, als ob sie sich ganz gern widerlegt sähe” (*Fenitschka* 39, emphasis added). The word _unverkennbar_ [unmistakable] attempts to eliminate all other possible interpretations of Fenia’s behavior and disguise the subjective viewpoint presented here, but readers must not ignore the presence of the subjunctive mood followed by the _als ob_ construction. This and similar passages that employ internal focalization or thought report do not reveal Fenia’s true personality or desires, but expose Max’s
It is evident that *Fenitschka* features external focalization with respect to Fenia because the narrator has no direct access to her thoughts and feelings. Max (Mⁿ) is the focalizer of all perceptions. As Genette explains, however, “External focalization with respect to one character could sometimes just as well be defined as internal focalization through another” (191). This means that the ability to reveal the emotions of one character (i.e. Fenia) is limited if the text employs focalization through another character (i.e. Max). Consequently, external focalization with respect to Fenia is equivalent to internal focalization through Max. Readers only learn what Fenia *seems* to be feeling in response to her interactions with Max, but the narrative voice (Mⁿ) effortlessly articulates Max’s (Mⁿ) own observations, thoughts, and feelings about Fenia. In the following sentence, for instance, the narrator reveals a discrepancy between Max’s speech and his unuttered thoughts: “Während er so schön sprach, dachte er an etwas ganz andres: ‘Wer möchte dieser Mann sein? Ob er sie schon lange liebte?’” (*Fenitschka* 39-40). Despite Max’s (Mⁿ) apparently active engagement in his conversation with Fenia in this scene, his mind wanders as he becomes consumed with nagging questions about Fenia’s romantic relationship with her secret Russian lover. With Max as the focal character in *Fenitschka*, readers are invited to adopt his point of view and share in his struggles to understand Fenia. This greater access to Max’s inner life through internal focalization, direct thought report, and free indirect speech allows readers to ‘read’ his emotions that arise in response to his interactions with Fenia as their friendship progresses.

Why would a novella that features a female title heroine named Fenia invite readers to adopt the perspective of its male co-protagonist? The tendency to narrate from a male viewpoint
and convey the essence of woman as a sphinx or femme fatale was not unusual in fin-de-siècle literary works. Lou Andreas-Salomé, who wrote in her memoirs that she actually disliked her literary texts, criticized her own tendency to narrate from a male perspective. Biddy Martin notes, however, that it is precisely due to this male viewpoint that her works “succeed in exploring and even diagnosing masculine projections of femininity” (Woman and Modernity 176-177). In Fenitschka, internal focalization limits the scope of narration through the figure Max (Mⁿ). Through descriptions of Fenia’s physical appearance and stereotypical assessments of her emotions and desires, readers see Fenia through Max’s eyes. But that is not to say that the novella invites readers to identify uncritically with Max. The same narrative technique also prompts readers to question his views. Readers follow the development of Max’s thoughts and feelings about Fenia and become aware of his failure to understand or categorize her according to nineteenth-century gendered emotional codes and social mores. A discrepancy between what Max (Mⁿ) tells Fenia and what the narrator (Mⁿ) discloses to readers becomes apparent, as demonstrated above. In Fenitschka, the narration of Max’s fears, insecurities, and anger through internal focalization subverts his claim to authority. Consequently, the novella validates a plurality of affective perspectives, including the emotional style that Fenia embodies.

3.3.2 The Co-Presence of Differing Emotional Styles

The characterization of the novella’s co-protagonists and their perspectives on topics such as the women’s movement, love and marriage, and feminine shame allow us to view each figure not

5 Some examples of literary works that engage with this practice include: “The Sphinx Without a Secret” (1891) and Salomé (1893) by Oscar Wilde, “Die Fremde” (1902) by Arthur Schnitzler, and Erdgeist (1895) and Die Büchse der Pandora (1904) by Frank Wedekind.
just as a representative of his or her gender, but of different emotional styles. Max Werner and Fenia (Fenia) Iwánowa Betjagin have enough in common to suggest that the novella constructs them as parallel figures. As evident in the opening café scene in Paris, where Max and Fenia share the company of other “Herren und Damen,” both are members of the bourgeois intelligentsia (*Fenitschka* 7). They both earn doctorates in their respective fields, Max in psychology and Fenia in philosophy at the University of Zürich, and in Paris, both are outsiders. Max is Austrian, and Fenia hails from Moscow but has relatives living in St. Petersburg. Finally, Max and Fenia each has a secret romantic relationship: Max is engaged to a young woman of Northern German descent, and Fenia has a Russian lover who remains nameless in the novella. Although *Fenitschka* evokes the conventions of the *Liebesroman* at its opening, it subverts these expectations as the narration progresses (see Whitinger 464). Contrary to expectations, both romantic relationships remain only of marginal importance to the narrated events, and Max and Fenia’s platonic friendship and conversations increasingly become the focal point.

The similarities and parallels between Max and Fenia also highlight their different orientations to late nineteenth-century bourgeois emotional codes. Numerous passages indicate that Max embodies late nineteenth-century bourgeois values and lives in accordance with the emotional codes and social mores of his gender and class. As an educated bourgeois man, he is comfortable in the roles of guardian and protector of feminine virtue. The thought of acting as Fenia’s male savior by defending her reputation, for instance, puts him in a “heitere Stimmung,” and he stands up and asks Fenia’s uncle with interest, “da könntte ich am Ende noch hier für Fenia gegen irgendeinen sibirischen Drachen zu Felde ziehen?” (*Fenitschka* 31). Max’s reference to an imagined fight with a mythical Siberian dragon points to a disconnect between his thoughts and reality. Typical for his scholarly training in psychology at the *fin de siècle*, he
diagnoses Fenia’s feelings of horror [*Grausen*], anger, and sadness as nervous overstimulation [*“Nervenüberreizung”*], thereby placing her into the role of the hysterical woman that became an obsession during this period (*Fenitschka* 44). Yet Max (M) also responds with negative emotions when he feels that his masculinity or honor is threatened, as becomes evident when Fenia rejects his awkward attempt to seduce her in a Paris hotel: “Dann schwoll eine plötzliche Raserei in ihm auf, — ein blinder wütender Drang…” (*Fenitschka* 17). Max’s notion of love corresponds to the nineteenth-century bourgeois norm; he believes that it has “sozusagen die Tendenz zur Ehe,” an idea with which Fenia disagrees (*Fenitschka* 56). By contrast, Fenia’s definition of love is based on her own experience, but when she asks Max to explain his conviction that love is not true unless it leads to marriage, he can only reply sheepishly [*kleinlaut*]: “…ich hab es von andern gehört” (*Fenitschka* 57). In other discussions, Max tries to tell Fenia what she and other women should think and feel, but he again fails in his attempt to become an authority figure and make her conform. In summary, Max’s emotional style is based on a strong sense of conformity to late nineteenth-century social mores and emotional codes for an individual of his gender and class.

As indicated by Max’s failed attempts to categorize her, then, Fenia does not practice the emotions that he expects of nineteenth-century bourgeois ladies. In fact, she rejects feminine shame and marital love—the emotional codes deemed appropriate for her gender and class—because they impede her quest for self-realization. Fenia sees the experience of marital love for women in late nineteenth-century bourgeois society as confining and antithetical to her personal goals: “Nein! Ich kann es mir einfach nicht als Lebensziel vorstellen, — Heim, Familie, Hausfrau, Kinder, — es ist mir fremd, fremd, fremd! Vielleicht nur jetzt, — vielleicht nur in dieser Lebensperiode. Weiβ ich’s? — Vielleicht bin ich überhaupt untauglich grade dazu. — —
“Liebe und Ehe ist eben nicht dasselbe” (Fenitschka 56). For Fenia, love is synonymous with freedom and gratitude, not marriage. Unlike her cousin Nadeschda and Max’s fiancée, Irmgard, who both defer to the nineteenth-century emotional imperative of feminine shame, Fenia does not believe that she should feel ashamed or guilty on account of her clandestine relationship with her Russian lover. Nadeschda reacts with horror when she learns that a rumor threatens to damage Fenia’s reputation: “Mein Gott! daß du das so ruhig nehmen kannst!” murmelt Nadeschda, die neben Fenia saß, und langsam ihren Kaffee schlürfte, ‘ich war ganz außer mir, wie ich davon erfuhr’ (Fenitschka 32). When Max (Mᶜ) imagines how Irmgard would feel if a rumor threatened to sully her reputation, he confirms that just the thought of such a situation would cause her great suffering: “Unwillkürlich versetzten Max Werners Gedanken Irmgard in die gleiche Lage, und er sah, wie sie schon bei der bloßen Vorstellung um vernichteten Mädchenruf litt und blutete” (Fenitschka 33). These passages suggest that both Nadeschda and Irmgard share an emotional style that is distinguished by compliance with the emotional imperatives of feminine shame and fear for one’s reputation. Unconcerned about how others judge her, Fenia, by contrast, despises the fact that social mores require her to hide her love for the person who makes her happiest: “Ja, es mag notwendig sein, so wie die Welt nun einmal ist, aber es ist das Erniedrigendste, was ich noch je gehört habe. Etwas verleugnen und verstecken müssen, was man aus tiefstem Herzen tut! Sich schämen, wo man jubeln sollte!” (Fenitschka 38). Fenia objects to the double standard regulating female sexual behavior and aspires to express her love and happiness in her relationship as openly as men are able to do. She recognizes, but does not conform to, the emotional style expected of her gender and class. Instead, she presents an alternative to the categories and cultural narratives with which Max has
grown familiar by challenging the emotional imperative of feminine shame and proposing a new understanding of love.

3.3.3 Max’s Bildung: From an Essentialist to a Performative Model of Emotion

A different theoretical model of emotion corresponds to each object of narration in Fenitschka. Max \((M^c)\) subscribes to an essentialist model of emotion. In other words, for Max, emotions are natural and personal, i.e. they reflect an individual’s essence. This model ascribes certain characteristic emotions to a single person or an entire group of people (e.g. men, women, an ethnic group, a social class), and thus, it constructs a passive individual. Since it relies on fixed emotional attributes and implies that a person cannot act or feel contrary to their ‘essence,’ it sets limits on individual agency, self-realization, and social reorganization.

The essentialist model of emotion fails to help Max \((M^c)\) understand Fenia because she does not display the emotional style deemed ‘natural’ for a woman of her class. He assumes, incorrectly, that all women desire sensation and that refined ladies must find love in marriage, worry about their reputations, and be capable of feeling shame. Fenia, who questions the self-evidence of these emotional codes, represents other ways of feeling, with which Max must eventually come to terms.

The narrator \((M^n)\), by contrast, does not attempt to place Fenia into fixed categories, but rather distances himself from Max’s \((M^c)\) essentialist view. Since the novella provides no direct insight into Fenia’s unuttered thoughts or feelings, readers have no reliable indication of her interiority. Except when she talks to Max about her dream in the fifth section of the novella (see Fenitschka 61-62), her identity is revealed only through her speech and behavior. By denying Fenia the type of interiority given to Max, the novella declines to establish a fixed identity for its
title heroine, who is constructed according to a performative model of emotion and whose emotions are, therefore, always in process. Unlike Max’s (Mços) essentialist view, the performative model at the level of narration (Mⁿ) validates alternative ways of feeling and facilitates self-realization. The influence of Nietzsche’s *Lebensphilosophie*, with its emphasis on self-creation and ‘becoming who you are,’ is unmistakable in this regard. Furthermore, this shift from an essentialist model to a performative model that acknowledges emotional alterity constitutes Max’s (Mços) *Bildung* through the course of the novella, and it is Fenia who plays the critical role in this development.

3.4 THE LIMITS OF MAX’S EMOTIONAL ESSENTIALISM

From the opening scene of *Fenitschka*, readers are invited to see from Max’s (Mços) perspective. Yet already in the first section of the novella it becomes clear that this narrative gesture functions subversively and renders Max’s emotional essentialism suspect. After a brief description of Paris in September, the narrator (Mⁿ) directs the reader’s attention to Max Werner, the first character mentioned in the novella: “Max Werner flanierte nach Mitternacht über den Boulevard St. Michel, als er in eine kleine Gesellschaft ihm bekannter Familien hineingeriet” (*Fenitschka* 7). At this point in the text, the narrator does not yet reveal Max’s (Mços) thoughts or feelings; instead, narration with external focalization traces his promenade from a theater to Café Darcourt in the Latin Quarter. The choice of the verb *flanieren* [to stroll around] associates Max with the image of the nineteenth-century *flâneur*, typically characterized as an educated idler of considerable

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6 I refer here to §270 in Book 3 of Nietzsche’s *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*: “Was sagt dein Gewissen? – ‘Du sollst der werden, der du bist.’”
wealth and leisure. In addition to providing information about Max’s social status, the verb *flanieren* indicates that Max (M⁶) plays the role of observer in *Fenitschka* because, when employed as a literary device, the figure of the *flâneur* emerges as a chronicler who observes and comments on the sights around him. Setting up Max as the *flâneur*-chronicler from the outset allows the narrator (Mⁿ) to shift freely to internal focalization, thereby restricting what Genette calls the ‘field’ and compelling readers to see from Max’s (M⁶) perspective, not only in this opening scene, but also through the rest of the novella.

After Max is established as the *flâneur*-chronicler, readers immediately encounter groups of figures who are distinguished by their social class, nationality, and, later in the scene, emotional expressions. French working-class men and *grisettes* occupy the inside of Café Darcourt in the Latin Quarter, while foreigners, as well as men and women of the bourgeois intelligentsia, including Max and Fenia, are seated outside. Max, Fenia, and their entourage observe the mistreatment of a *grisette* by working-class men and women inside the café. A window, an important motif that reappears later in the novella, separates the two groups. The narrator recounts the escalation of the situation from Max’s (M⁶) perspective outside the café and describes how the young *grisette* becomes the object of abuse and ridicule as “brutale[s] Gelächter” spreads to the other tables of working-class men and women (*Fenitschka* 8). Inside the café “schallten die rohen Stimmen laut bis zu dem Tisch draußen hinüber, an dem es ganz still geworden war” (*Fenitschka* 8). The narrator (Mⁿ) characterizes the crowds on each side of the café window not only based on their very different levels of noise and inebriation, but also by their emotional responses. In contrast to the other *grisettes*, who taunt their competitor “mit lärmender Schadenfreude,” the bourgeois ladies sitting outside react differently: “Auf den

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7 See Walter Benjamin’s discussion of the *flâneur* in “Baudelaire oder die Straßen von Paris,” the sixth section of his essay “Paris, die Hauptstadt des XIX. Jahrhunderts” (170-184).
Gesichtern der Damen prägten sich deutlich Mitleid, Ekel, Entrüstung und eine gewisse Verlegenheit darüber aus, einer solchen Situation beizuwohnen; eine von ihnen knüpfte furchtsam ihren Schleier fester” (Fenitschka 8, emphasis added). Here, Max ‘reads’ the emotions of the Damen by way of their facial expressions and gestures. The bourgeois ladies sitting outside the café show signs of pity for the grisette, but they are not driven to active participation. They simply observe the situation with a combination of disgust, embarrassment, and fear.

Fenia, on the other hand, is filled with an intense sense of participation and empathy for the young woman in her state of suffering: “Jetzt aber wurde sie ganz sichtlich von einer so intensiven Anteilnahme erfüllt, daß sie zuletzt,—offenbar ganz unwillkürlich, wie außerstande länger passiv zu verharren,—sich langsam erhob und die eine Hand gegen die Lärmenden ausstreckte, als müsse sie eingreifen oder Halt gebieten” (Fenitschka 8-9). Fenia’s emotions, unlike those of the other ladies, move her to take action. The phrases “ganz sichtlich,” “offenbar,” “wie,” and “als müsse sie” show that Fenia’s feelings are not conveyed directly, but interpreted by the narrator (Mⁿ) via the character-focalizer, Max (Mᶜ). This becomes especially evident in the next sentence: “Im selben Augenblick ward sie sich ihrer spontanen Bewegung bewußt, hielt sich zurück, und errötete stark, wodurch sie plötzlich ganz lieb und kindlich, und ein wenig hilflos aussah” (Fenitschka 9). According to the description in the independent clause, Fenia’s instinctive gesture makes her blush. Given Fenia’s lack of concern for what others might think about her association with a grisette, I do not interpret her blushing as a sign of shame or embarrassment, but rather as an indication of her coming-to-consciousness of her capacity to act.

In the relative clause beginning with wodurch, however, it becomes evident that Max (Mᶜ) prefers to see Fenia in a certain light: he finds her more endearing while blushing because she looks almost childlike, helpless, and therefore more feminine and less threatening. The character-
focalizer (M⁶) is unable to preserve the image of a childlike, helpless Fenia, for the narrator goes on to describe the grisette’s “Stimmungswechsel,” which occurs when she catches sight of Fenia’s eyes, as “eine Hilfe, eine Liebkosung” (Fenitschka 9). After using internal focalization through Max (M⁶) to establish a social boundary, emphasized by the physical barrier of the window, the narrator (Mⁿ) describes the spontaneous gestures, smiles, and facial expressions of Fenia and the grisette once their gazes meet and they shake hands while standing together outside the café: “Einige Augenblicke lang standen sie da und lächelten einander an wie Schwestern, während alle verblüfft, interessiert, amüsiert um die beiden herum saßen” (Fenitschka 10). Fenia and the grisette are described “as sisters,” thus creating an emotional bond that transcends the divisions of nationality, social class, and space previously established through Max’s (M⁶) gaze. The adverbs verblüfft, interessiert, and amüsiert describe the reaction of the others in the crowd outside and suggest that Fenia’s intervention and this type of sisterly interaction between women of different social classes was unexpected and unusual.

Fenia’s emotional response to the treatment of the grisette contrasts with that of the Damen, but it resonates with the concerns of some late nineteenth-century feminists, who also demonstrated solidarity with and compassion for prostitutes and ‘fallen’ women.⁸ At the fin de siècle, issues like Sittlichkeit, sexuality, and prostitution divided many feminists, however. While some railed against the sexual double standard and advocated solidarity with prostitutes and ‘fallen’ women and girls, others associated with the Social Purity Movement and Sittlichkeitsvereine advanced a repressive sexual morality and campaigned for the abolition of prostitution.

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Inspired by the immediate social context of the nineteenth-century women’s movement and Social Purity Movement, *Fenitschka* represents dissenting views and puts them in dialogue through the direct speech of Max, Fenia, and the minor characters in the discussion that follows the encounter with the *grisette*. Instead of focusing on the positive outcome of Fenia’s gesture of friendship and solidarity, one of the ladies in the group focuses on the possible ramifications of her action: “Ja, chérie, eine ziemlich unerbetene und unbequeme Freundschaft! Sie könnte Ihnen eines schönen Tages recht peinlich werden, wenn dies Wesen Sie irgendwo auf der Straße wiederfindet und Sie auf das intimste begrüßt, -- zur Überraschung derer, die vielleicht mit Ihnen gehen” (*Fenitschka* 10). With this statement, the lady suggests that Fenia’s association with a *grisette* could cause her humiliation and even damage her reputation in the future. Fenia, however, remains unconcerned about her association with the *grisette* and how it could affect her reputation or image in her social circles. Max counters the lady’s concern, asserting instead, “die Französin würde es für eine schlechte Dankbarkeit halten, Sie eventuell dadurch zu kompromittieren. Das ist der französische Takt, -- der Takt einer alten Kultur, die allmählich bis in alle Schichten eines Volkes durchdringt und ihm seine fast instinktive Intelligenz gibt” (*Fenitschka* 10). According to Max, the French, even the working-class *grisettes*, possess a kind of innate sensitivity in dealing with others, a trait that he considers to be rooted deeply in the French people. He therefore dismisses the need for Fenia to worry about her feminine virtue, but he does this by referring to fixed emotional attributes. It is here that his emotional essentialism becomes more apparent.

Max’s emotional essentialism is evident in his discussion of class and nationality (French *grisettes* vs. ladies of rank), in which he emphasizes distinctions in the emotional attributes of
these groups. From this perspective, the grisettes and the French working-class men have no choice but to communicate in their usual manner, i.e. sensually:

denn Sie dürfen nicht vergessen, daß es sich dabei nur um eine diesen Wesen ganz geläufige Verkehrsform handelt, -- um eine so gewohnte und geläufige, daß sie in ihr unwillkürlich alles und jedes zum Ausdruck bringen, auch Seelenregungen der Freundschaft, Dankbarkeit oder Sympathie, die in die sinnliche Äußerungsform nicht genau hineinpassen. Es ist eben ihre Art von Sprache geworden. (Fenitschka 11, emphasis added)

Through the expressions “Verkehrsform” and “ihre Art von Sprache” Max (Mc) emphasizes the communicative function of emotions. Because these forms of social interaction have become so common for the French working-class people, Max argues, they should not be questioned. Verkehrsform, which appears twice in Max’s direct speech, brings to light his reductive, essentialist understanding of emotions and focus on eroticism: he assumes that the French grisettes express all emotions [Seelenregungen] with their sensuality, even feelings as different as friendship, gratitude, and sympathy. Additionally, the repetition of Verkehrsform draws readers’ attention to Max’s later claims to knowledge about women’s desires, sexual or otherwise. Max argues that it is rarer for refined ladies of his own class to show the ‘emotions of their gender.’ That is, he maintains that bourgeois and aristocratic women tend to hide their sensuality and real desires behind a mask: “Unsre Mädchen und Frauen werden so daran gewöhnt, mit den Männern ihrer Umgebung eine rein konventionelle, ganz unsinnliche Verkehrsform zu üben, daß sie in dieser Sprache auch das noch ausdrücken, was ganz und gar nicht so abstrakt gemeint ist” (Fenitschka 12). Max (Mc) assumes that all women feel the same
and that these emotions cannot be changed, only expressed or repressed. According to this essentialist view, the individual remains passive vis-à-vis his or her emotions.

This opening scene of the novella highlights two shortcomings of the essentialist model of emotion represented by Max. First, his view permits injustices to continue because it considers certain social practices, like the ridicule and shaming of the grisette in the café, normative and characteristic of certain sociocultural groups. Like Max, Fenia recognizes the communicative value of emotions as social signifiers, yet she firmly disagrees with Max’s belief that the grisettes express everything in the form of their sensuality or eroticism when she stresses the following: “wenn es auch ihnen die gewohnteste Sprache ist, worin sie alles und jedes ausdrücken,—alle Menschen haben verschiedene Bezeichnungen für total verschiedene Dinge” (Fenitschka 12). Unlike Max’s judgment about emotions, Fenia’s view resists oversimplifications and generalizations. She sees beyond the grisette’s surface expression of sensuality in her communication patterns and senses that she longs for something more: “O ich denke mir, ein solches armes Ding muß nach einer freundlichen, einfach menschlichen Berührung lechzen” (Fenitschka 11). Both in speech and in action, Fenia’s character challenges Max’s emotional essentialism and the practice of blindly adhering to the social and emotional codes deemed normative for certain sociocultural groups. Her empathetic gesture in the Paris café overcomes the rigid construction of spatial and social boundaries. This is not to say that the novella proposes compassion or solidarity as a solution to all social problems, but by exposing double standards and declining to conform to nineteenth-century gendered emotional codes and social mores, its title heroine opens new lines of communication and possibilities for alternate ways of feeling.
The second shortcoming of Max’s (Mᵉ) essentialist view is that his explanations fail him whenever he attempts to categorize Fenia based on the emotional style of women like Irmgard, Nadeschda, and the Damen. Fenia’s social class places her into Max’s second category, with the ladies of rank, who supposedly conceal their true feelings and sensuality as if wearing masks. But Fenia puzzles Max because she communicates her thoughts and feelings openly without fear or shame: “Dieser Grad von Unbefangenheit, womit sie über so heikle Dinge mit einem ihr ganz fremden Manne sprach, hier, in Paris, in der Nacht, in diesem Café, -- und dabei ein Ausdruck in ihren Mienen, als unterhielten sie sich über fremdländische Käfer. Waren Grisetten, junge Männer, Nachtcafês und Liebesabenteuer ihr wirklich dermaßen fremdländische Käfer?” (Fenitschka 11). Thought report in this passage reveals Max’s (Mᵉ) surprise and unease that Fenia can speak so freely with him about such sensitive subjects and with a serene expression on her face. After analyzing her black, nun-like clothing and comparing her with pre-Raphaelite figures, whose seductive surroundings in paintings betray their virtuous appearance, Max assumes that Fenia is wearing “eine höchst kluge und gelungene Maske,” and, like the ladies of rank, wants to hide her feminine sensuality (Fenitschka 13).

Max’s (Mᵉ) essentialist model of emotion cannot account for complexity and diversity, only the status quo. Max is drawn to Fenia, yet he cannot understand or categorize her. His simultaneous attraction to and uncertainty about her serve to express how late nineteenth-century European bourgeois society perceived ‘Others’ who rejected bourgeois ideals and values. Figures such as the New Woman, femme fatale, decadent, and dandy were viewed with both interest and suspicion (compare Ledger 22-25). They exemplified values and ways of feeling that challenged late nineteenth-century bourgeois emotional codes and social mores. Despite some of the apprehension they released, however, these figures also became objects of fascination and were
commonly depicted in fin-de-siècle art and literature. As a New Woman-like figure, then, Fenia introduces an emotional style that contrasts with the women in her social circles. Her new emotional style, which understands emotions as performative or in process, in fact allows her to move more freely between sociocultural groups, as already evident here in her interactions with the Damen, Max, and the French grisette.

3.5 CREATING SPACE FOR DIFFERENT EMOTIONS

If the novella subverts Max’s (Mⁿ) perspective and emotional essentialism, it does not, therefore, simply suggest that men have it all wrong and women have it all right. Andreas-Salomé recognized that the genders do not understand each other, and the Paris hotel scene, an early turning point in the novella, reflects this by depicting the misunderstanding between Fenia and Max. Instead, Fenitschka subverts Max’s male gaze and emotional essentialism in order to destabilize widely held cultural narratives of the day and open the door for self-realization and a plurality of emotional styles.

After leaving Café Darcourt, the Herren und Damen stop at the restaurant “Chien qui fume,” where Max learns about Fenia’s background and education from a Russian reporter acquainted with her family. The gentlemen escort the ladies back home after dinner, and Max becomes responsible for accompanying Fenia back to her hotel. During their early morning promenade, Max and Fenia discuss women’s education, an issue of central importance in public discourse of the time. Max, who has just completed his doctoral studies, cannot imagine why a woman would want to study and subject herself to such misery. Fenia, by contrast, considers education liberating: “wenn irgendetwas in der Welt einer Befreiung gleicht, so ist es das
Geistesstudium” (*Fenitschka* 14). According to Max, if a woman truly experiences education as something emancipating that she can pursue with her whole self [“mit dem ganzen Willen, dem ganzen Menschen”] and passionately [“voll von Gemütsbewegungen”] as Fenia claims, it is only because women lag centuries behind men: “‘Ja, wissen Sie denn, was das beweisen würde, wenn es wirklich so ist?’ *fragte er ärgerlich* und studierte dabei mit verliebtem Wohlgefallen den Ansatz des braunen Haares an ihren Schläfen, der eine reizende kleine Linie bildete; ‘es beweist einfach, daß *Ihr Geschlecht* zurück ist, daß es da lebt, wo *wir* vor Jahrhunderten standen’” (*Fenitschka* 15, emphasis added). Fenia’s support for women’s education and her positive assessment of her own experience as doctoral student anger Max because this challenges the gender roles with which he is familiar. He responds by making a distinction between men [*wir*] and women [*Ihr Geschlecht*] who study and uses this rupture to declare male dominance and superiority, while minimizing the enthusiasm and efforts of Fenia and women in general. Even if historical readers were inclined to sympathize with Max’s position and oppose the fin-de-siècle women’s education movement, Max’s (M⁶) own emotional response is impossible to ignore. The narrative techniques of internal focalization, free indirect speech, and thought report expose his anger, attraction to Fenia, and insecurities, all of which contribute to the subversion of his claims to authority.

Anxious to comprehend Fenia, Max takes a detour that leads further away from her hotel in order to extend their time together. Fenia would like a cup of coffee, but since the cafés are not yet ready to serve customers, Max proposes that they stop by the dining room at his hotel, which is conveniently nearby. Fenia’s willingness to join him “…*irritierte* ihn beinahe. Die mit ihr durchwachte Nacht hatte seine *verliebte Neugier* bis zu *nervöser Erregung aufgereizt* […] Eine Art von *stiller Wut* kam über ihn, seine Unklarheit über dieses Mädchen *quälte* ihn”
Free indirect style again reveals Max’s private thoughts and feelings in this passage, in which his amorous curiosity turns into nervous agitation, then silent rage and torment. A hydraulic model of emotion informs the narration of Max’s emotions in these sentences. His building anger and nervous irritation give the impression that he is about to explode. He is depicted as having relatively little control over his feelings, and the sentence structure in the passage reflects this. The sleepless night [“Die mit ihr durchwachte Nacht”], as the subject of the sentence, is held responsible for transforming Max’s simple curiosity about Fenia into nervous excitation. Furthermore, he does not become angry, but rage sweeps over him [“stiller Wut kam über ihn”] (Fenitschka 16). Emotions happen to Max. They are not phenomena that he can control because, as the Paris café scene suggests, he views emotions as natural and unchangeable. This effect of the narration actually shifts responsibility away from Max and draws attention to the instinctive appearance of emotions. Because Fenitschka constructs Max (Mᶜ) as passive in relation to his emotions, I argue that the text does not simply criticize him as a representative of men in general. Instead, it exposes the deep-rooted cultural narratives that many in late nineteenth-century bourgeois society perceived as natural and enduring.

Yet neither does Max (Mᶜ) escape criticism—the narrator (Mⁿ) playfully subverts his view on numerous occasions. After two paragraphs report Max’s (Mᶜ) thoughts and emotions as they arise using free indirect style, the narrator (Mⁿ) adopts a stance that highlights the dissimilarity between his perspective and Max’s (Mᶜ): “Ach, er war noch sehr jung damals! Die Weiber taxierte er ganz besonders noch ziemlich falsch, weil er Angst hatte, für einen leichtgläubigen Dummkopf gehalten zu werden” (Fenitschka 16-17). Here, the narrator effects a transition out of internal focalization and thought report in order to inform readers that the narrated events occurred in Max’s distant past, when he was young and foolish. These statements
are subversive because they draw readers’ attention to Max’s (M’ét) fear and insecurity and admit that he had judged women, especially intellectual women like Fenia, harshly and incorrectly. At the same time, however, the narrator shows some understanding for Max because the comments attribute his emotions and behavior to youthful folly. These statements, which again raise the question of the narrator’s identity, confirm the presence of a narrator who retrospectively narrates with knowledge of Max’s unexpressed thoughts and emotions, but with critical distance from his way of seeing. This suggests that the narrator of Fenitschka is Max himself, but a matured Max who has left behind his essentializing gaze so that he can now reflect more fairly on his encounters with Fenia.

Despite its surface understanding of Max, this scene also successfully undermines nineteenth-century bourgeois emotional codes and dominant cultural narratives in order to make room for new emotional styles. Genre markers that appear in earlier scenes (e.g. conversations about feminine sensuality, signs of Max’s attraction to Fenia, and Fenia’s agreement to follow Max to his hotel), give the impression that Fenitschka will turn out to be a typical Liebesroman (compare Whiting 467-468). At the hotel, Max nervously tries to seduce Fenia, to which she responds “Wie schade!” (Fenitschka 17). Fenia’s reaction, which immediately halts the possibility of any romance narrative developing between the two, sends Max into a rage. A “blinder wütender Drang” overcomes him and, only half conscious of his actions, he locks the door and puts the key in his pocket so that Fenia cannot escape (Fenitschka 17). At first, she does not know how to extricate herself from this threatening situation, and, in her moment of hesitation, the narrator reports that she appears helpless and childlike: “Einen Augenblick lang war etwas Hilfloses und Hilfeheischendes über ihrer ganzen Gestalt, wie über einem im Wald verirrten Kind” (Fenitschka 18). The narration of Max’s violent emotions [“eine plötzliche
“Raserei,” “ein blinder wütender Drang”] and Fenia’s defenselessness in this scene, which functions as an early highpoint of the novella, may lead readers to expect that the subverted Liebesroman will turn into a story of rape. The narrator’s (Mⁿ) repetition of “einen Augenblick” (“for a moment”), however, emphasizes the transitory nature of Fenia’s helplessness: “Nur einen Augenblick. Dann siegte ein andres Gefühl. Ihr Blick lief an ihm hinab, und ihre Lippen wölbten sich in einem unaussprechlich beredten Ausdruck des Ekels – der Verachtung –” (Fenitschka 18, emphasis added). Here, the verb siegen already points toward a different outcome. It indicates that a new, active emotion [“ein andres Gefühl”] helps Fenia overcome her passivity and transforms her expression of vulnerability into one of disgust [“Ausdruck des Ekels – der Verachtung –”]. For Fenia, the transition from a passive to an active emotion is empowering. She does not resort to violence or aggression after witnessing Max’s alarming behavior, yet her unexpected emotional response of disgust and contempt rather than fear changes the direction of the narrative, renders Max powerless, and leads him to hand over the key.⁹

Internal focalization through Max is incomplete at the end of the Paris hotel scene. Here, readers encounter the only detailed description of Max’s physical appearance in the entire novella, just as Fenia leaves the hotel in a carriage, with Max remaining behind: “Max Werner stand auf dem Straßendamm und fuhr mechanisch, mit düsterem Gesicht, nach seinem Kopf, um den Hut zu lüften – der nicht darauf saß” (Fenitschka 20). The sudden shift of focus to Max’s external appearance does not correspond to a reversal of Max’s gaze in this passage, as one critic

⁹ A similar misunderstanding transpired between Lou Andreas-Salomé and Frank Wedekind in Paris and provided the inspiration for this episode of Fenitschka. Andreas-Salomé reflects briefly upon the encounter in her autobiography: “Fast am meisten bin ich in Paris mit Frank Wedekind zusammen gewesen. Späterhin. Denn zunächst, nachdem wir uns bei der ungarischen Gräfin Nemethy kennengelernt und erst mit den andern vor Morgengrauen im Zwiebelsuppen-Restaurant gegenüber ‘Les Halles’ unsere eifigen Gespräche geendet, kam es hinterher zwischen uns zu einem Wedekindschen Mißverständnis, das er mit rührender Offenheit, ohne geringste Selbstbeschönigung, andern weiterzählte (und das ich gelegentlich als Novellenfüllung literarisch ebenfalls verarbeitet habe)” (Lebensrückblick 100).
has suggested (compare Allen 483). As Genette acknowledged, “internal focalization is rarely applied in a totally rigorous way. Indeed, the very principle of this narrative mode implies in all strictness that the focal character never be described or even referred to from the outside, and that his thoughts or perceptions never be analyzed objectively by the narrator” (192). This scene in *Fenitschka* serves as an example of what Genette describes. Although the novella features internal focalization through Max, like most other narratives in this mode, it does not employ internal focalization in any strict sense. Max (M°) is referred to by name throughout the novella, and the narrator (Mⁿ) interrupts strict internal focalization by commenting on Max’s emotions and behavior. The last two paragraphs of Section One of the novella feature external focalization, which means that the narrator provides no insight into Max’s or Fenia’s private thoughts or feelings. Here, a higher-level narrator (Mⁿ), the same one who intervened earlier to attribute Max’s behavior to the errors of his youth, describes only the physical appearance and expressions of the two characters as they part. The question that I find more interesting to ask about this scene is *who speaks* in the following passage:

Aber konnte sie den Garçon herbeilaufen und sich von ihm zu dieser Stunde in dieser Stube mit dem Fremden finden lassen? – Und in den Hof hinunterspringen konnte sie ja doch auch nicht. – Sie richtete ihre Augen, tief erschrocken, groß und fragend, auf ihn, grade als frage sie ihn danach, was nun zu tun sei. Einen Augenblick lang war etwas Hilfloses und Hilfeheischendes über ihrer ganzen Gestalt, wie über einem im Wald verirrten Kind. – Aber nur einen Augenblick. Dann siegte ein andres Gefühl. (*Fenitschka* 18)
One could argue that the first paragraph uses free indirect style to narrate Fenia’s thoughts, but the general nature of these reflections about Fenia’s options makes it more likely that these comments originate from the extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrative voice of Max (Mⁿ). In the second paragraph, the narration of Fenia’s emotions is limited to comments made by an outside observer with no immediate access to her interiority. The narrator interprets her emotions based on external cues, as demonstrated by the subjunctive [“als frage sie ihn danach, was nun zu tun sei”] and the use of simile [“wie über einem im Wald verirrten Kind”]. If we compare this passage to the one in which Max (Mⁿ) perceives Fenia as passive and childlike in Café Darcourt, it becomes apparent that he does not function as a character-focalizer here. “Dann siegte ein andres Gefühl” shows that the narrator (Mⁿ) sympathizes with Fenia, not Max. The verb siegen denotes a triumph and applies to Fenia’s changing emotions and capacity to act. At that moment, the character-focalizer Max (Mᶜ) would hardly use the verb siegen because, for him, Fenia’s rejection leads to embarrassment and defeat.

A comparison of the narration of Max’s and Fenia’s emotions reveals the two different emotional models that construct the figures: an essentialist model (Max) and a performative model (Fenia). The narration of Max’s emotions through internal focalization, free indirect speech, and thought report makes his interiority accessible to readers. By revealing his frustration, rage, and insecurities at key moments, the novella subverts his views and claims to knowledge and experience. Max (Mᶜ) is portrayed as largely passive vis-à-vis his emotions. In his Paris hotel room, for example, his emotions build up until they demand release, at which point he loses control and stands “zitternd vor Erregung über sie [Fenia] geneigt, ganz nahe über ihrem Gesicht, und im Begriff, sie mit beiden Armen zu umfassen” (Fenitschka 17, emphasis added). The verb umfassen used here is significant. It refers not only to Max’s attempt to
embrace Fenia but also to his efforts to fully comprehend or contain her, both alternative meanings of the polysemous verb *fassen*. Indeed, Fenia cannot be pinned down, because she lacks the interiority given to Max; the narrator (Mⁿ) only tells how her emotions appear. Fenia is not constructed according to an essentialist model. Her emotions, like her identity, are always in flux, and, for this reason, she embodies a performative model of emotion. Rather than conforming to the nineteenth-century emotional style of other women of her class, Fenia’s character problematizes these and makes room for new emotional styles, both in speech and in her narrated actions.

### 3.6 CONFLICTING CULTURAL NARRATIVES OF LOVE

*Fenitschka* exposes the fact that widely circulated cultural narratives and images reinforced certain nineteenth-century emotional practices, particularly those related to romantic love, masculine honor, and feminine shame, and made them seem self-evident. This holds especially true for popular nineteenth-century bourgeois cultural narratives of love. Walking through the streets of St. Petersburg, Fenia and Max stop to admire an illustration of Mikhail Lermontov’s famous poem “Demon” (1829-1839) on display in a shop window. Fenia smiles as she contemplates the illustration and performs an improvised German translation of the lines from the Russian poem, which describes Tamara’s temptation by the demon:

Zur Höhe des Himmels will ich mich heben,
Zur Tiefe des Meeres senke ich mich,
Alles Irdische will ich dir geben!
Nur liebe mich! liebe mich! (*Fenitschka* 28)
After Fenia’s recitation, a tension between two opposing views of love emerges: love as demonic versus love as the expression of freedom and gratitude. For Max, the painting depicts the reality of love as demonic, and he assumes that Fenia imagines love in this manner: “‘Rechte Bilder für ein junges Mädchen,’ bemerkte er, ‘haben Sie sich nicht auch die Liebe sehr dämonisch vorgestellt?’” (Fenitschka 28). He assumes that all Russian girls who have encountered such cultural images must view love as romantic and demonic. He then uses the third-person plural pronoun ihr [you] to group women together as one indistinguishable whole and insists that women all want the same thing in a romantic relationship, i.e. sensation: “Aber doch wohl noch etwas andres erwartet ihr davon: die große Sensation des Lebens, glauben Sie nicht?” (Fenitschka 29). As in the Paris cafè, Max (M⁵) makes generalizations about women’s emotions and desires based on gender stereotypes, which impede any true understanding.

In contrast to Max, Fenia sees beyond this widely promoted cultural narrative about love and sexuality. She recognizes the popularity of such Russian cultural icons, which she remembers from her childhood: “Diese Bilder treffen Sie hier in allen Häusern, — Photographien, Gipsstatuetten. — Ich entsinne mich ihrer so gut aus meiner Kindheit, auch wir besaßen sie zu Hause. Est ist traulich, sie wiederzusehen” (Fenitschka 28). Although the word “traulich” suggests that seeing the Lermontov illustrations again is a welcome reminder of Fenia’s native culture and childhood in Russia, they also remain a distant memory for her, and her idea of love no longer derives from them. She instead sees love as that which sustains life and compares it to other basic human needs: “Ich würde sie [Liebe] dann sicher mit den Dingen vergleichen, die am allerwenigsten dämonisch und romantisch sind. Mit dem guten gesegneten Brot [...] mit dem frischen erhaltenden Luftstrom...” (Fenitschka 29). Love is neither scandalous nor threatening according to Fenia’s view. This fluid experience of love (Luftstrom) allows her to
achieve a greater sense of peace and freedom. Fenia’s concept and practice of the emotion contrasts with Max’s assumption that she and all Russian girls regard love as romantic and demonic. Romantic love, when imagined as demonic, invites distinctions between vice and virtue and thus perpetuates sexual double standards and the virtuous-fallen woman trope. As an educated woman of Russian aristocratic descent, Fenia is not unaware of gendered emotional codes and sexual mores, but she calls these and popular cultural images into question and insists that an individual should have the freedom to determine his or her own emotions, views of love, and ways of being. The novella, which juxtaposes Fenia’s and Max’s cultural perceptions and personal experiences of feelings of love, ultimately normalizes the emotion by offering Fenia’s view as an alternative to the interpretation of romantic love and sexuality popularized in cultural narratives.

3.7 SUBVERTING THE MALE GAZE AND FEMININE SHAME

Although Fenitschka critiques sexual double standards and the virtuous-fallen woman trope in its consideration of the emotion love, it does so even more persuasively through its treatment of feminine shame. Shame was the emotion that aristocratic and bourgeois women were expected to feel in the nineteenth century and was regarded as the counterpart to the cult of masculine honor (see Frevert, Vergängliche Gefühle 17-27). Aristocratic and bourgeois women were obliged to feel fear in response to anything that could damage their feminine virtue, which was based solely on sexual purity, and to feel shame in the event of a misstep or impropriety. In Fenitschka, the subversion of Max’s (Mᶜ) essentializing gaze in particular calls into question this nineteenth-century emotional imperative of feminine shame. Internal focalization allows readers to see from
his perspective, but thought report reveals just how strongly gendered emotional codes affect his assessment of Fenia and himself.

At the family’s Russian estate, Uncle Mischa warns Fenia about a rumor alleging that people spotted her in St. Petersburg with an unknown man late one evening. The uncle, Fenia’s cousins, and Max all express deep concern for her reputation. At this point, Max is still unaware that Fenia has a Russian lover. After comparing her with his fiancée, Irmgard, Max (Mᶜ) realizes that Fenia finds her family’s concern embarrassing and despises being treated “wie zerbrechliches Glaszeug” (*Fenitschka* 33). Nonetheless, Max gives credence to the emotional imperative of feminine shame (as practiced by Irmgard, Nadeschda, and the Damen), which also alters his perception of Fenia. The narrator carefully describes Max’s (Mᶜ) observations through internal focalization while Fenia stands in front of a window with her back turned to the others in the room:

Irgend etwas trieb ihn, sich ihre ein wenig gezwungene Haltung gelöst zu denken, passiv geworden, -- er meinte vor sich zu sehen, wie ihre Hände den Vorhang zusammenfassen und vor das Gesicht ziehen, -- wie der Kopf sich tiefer und tiefer herabneigt in die schweren tieftrostschimmernden Falten, -- wie der Rücken gebeugt ist, -- die Schultern weiche, gleitende Linien bekommen, -- bis die ganze Gestalt in sich gesunken dasteht und, das Antlitz im Vorhang geborgen, weint. --

(*Fenitschka* 34)

In the narration that follows, readers discover that Max’s (Mᶜ) vision of Fenia’s passivity and tears was simply an illusion. She turns around and proves to be “ein Bild sorgloser Gesundheit und lächelnder Freude” (*Fenitschka* 35). Unlike her cousin Nadeschda and Max’s fiancée Irmgard, Fenia expresses neither shame nor concern for her reputation. It is secrecy that she
cannot tolerate. She wishes that she could share her secret with the world and openly proclaim her happiness and sense of peace in her relationship. Just as Fenia offers an alternative to the image of love as demonic, she also questions the emotional imperative of shame: “Ja, es mag notwendig sein, so wie die Welt nun einmal ist, aber es ist das Erniedrigendste, was ich noch je gehört habe. Etwas verleugnen und verstecken müssen, was man aus tiefstem Herzen tut! Sich schämen, wo man jubeln sollte!” (Fenitschka 38, emphasis added). The recurrent motif of the window has again become a symbol of social constraints and Fenia’s efforts to overcome them.

An analysis of Max’s (M²) false vision shows that he sees Fenia in terms of nineteenth-century gendered emotional codes and reads her emotions on her body. His perception proves to be less of a passive ‘looking,’ however, and more of an active ‘gazing.’ Narration through the ‘male gaze’ suggests that Max’s vision of Fenia becoming limp, collapsing into the curtains, and weeping corresponds to popular cultural narratives and reflects how he would like to see her: as a weak, passive woman in need of his protection. Fenia’s alternate concept of love and rejection of feelings of feminine shame present a challenge for Max (M²). While his vision contrasts with reality, it preserves the illusion that she also embodies the emotional style of the other refined ladies in his social circles.

As in Effi Briest, the emotions of feminine shame and masculine honor are intimately related in Fenitschka. Ideals of masculine honor still commonly held by aristocratic and bourgeois men at the fin de siècle influence Max’s understanding of himself. When he first learns that a rumor about Fenia is circulating in St. Petersburg, he enthusiastically offers to defend her.

10 Max and Fenia’s discussion here recalls similar ones in Theodor Fontane’s Irrungen, Wirrungen (1888) and Effi Briest (1895): “Die Sitte gilt und muss gelten, aber daß sie’s muß, ist mitunter hart (Fontane, Dichter über ihre Dichtungen 364). “[D]ie Dinge verlaufen nicht, wie wir wollen, sondern wie die andern wollen. … unser Ehrenkultus ist ein Götzendienst, aber wir müssen uns ihm unterwerfen, solange der Götze gilt” (Fontane, Effi Briest 280).
reputation: “da könnte ich am Ende noch hier für Fenia gegen irgendeinen sibirischen Drachen zu Felde ziehen?” (Fenitschka 31). Max demonstrates willingness to fight for Fenia, even though dueling, which was gradually becoming an outdated practice in fin-de-siècle Europe, could only restore masculine honor, not feminine virtue. His mention of a mythical Siberian dragon not only exposes his vision as removed from reality, but also indicates his desire to pursue heroic masculinity. The phrase “Irgend etwas trieb ihn…” attributes the source of Max’s vision to an unknown or unconscious impulse or drive. This suggests that the nineteenth-century emotional practices of masculine honor and feminine shame have become so ingrained in Max that they seem natural and unquestionable and, therefore, shape his perception. This becomes especially evident in a later passage in which internal focalization and thought report depict Max’s inner struggle to resist seeing Fenia in gendered terms: “Warum nur? Warum hatte er in beiden Fällen ihr Wesen so typisch genommen, so grob fixiert? fragte er sich. Es war ganz merkwürdig, wie schwer es fiel, die Frauen in ihrer reinmenschlichen Mannigfaltigkeit aufzufassen, und nicht immer nur von der Geschlechtsnatur aus, nicht immer nur halb schematisch” (Fenitschka 36). Although this passage shows that Max (M⁺) has begun to recognize his inclination to define Fenia as a type or attribute to her a fixed identity based on her gender, the repetition of the interrogative [Warum nur? Warum...] and the expression “wie schwer es fiel” emphasize that resisting these tendencies does not come effortlessly.

Fenia’s perceptive gaze contrasts sharply with Max’s (M⁺) “gewaltsame Vereinfachung” and reluctance to accept alternate ways of feeling (Fenitschka 36). Although the novella’s mode of narration never allows readers to assume Fenia’s perspective, the narrator describes her gaze using internal focalization through Max: “An Fenia fielen ihm [Max] nur die intelligenten braunen Augen auf, die jeden Gegenstand eigentümlich seelenoffen und klar -- und jeden
Menschen wie einen Gegenstand – anschauten…” (Fenitschka 8). I do not interpret “wie einen Gegenstand” [like an object] to be a negative qualification in this case but simply to mean gender-neutral, which contrasts with Max’s (M*) gendered perception (compare Allen 484). The adjectives seelenoffen and klar carry positive connotations and suggest that Fenia’s perception is not based on rigid methods of classification, but resists emotional essentialism and aims for a deeper understanding of others, as evident in the Paris café scene.

3.8 “SIE WOLLTE ES SO”: ACKNOWLEDGING FENIA’S AGENCY

How readers understand Lou Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka as a whole depends on its final scene and open ending. At the end of the novella, Fenia decides to free herself by rejecting her lover’s marriage proposal and returning to her “ganz andre Existenz” as a young intellectual (Fenitschka 66). Yet she finds it impossible to part from the man whom she loves. Since she cannot bring herself to say goodbye, Fenia promises her lover that she will return to him after a few days. A break in the narration reveals the final outcome of their relationship, however: “[Fenia] hatte sich in dieser Stunde für immer von ihm getrennt—getrennt aus einem unerträglichen Zwiespalt heraus, in den sie mit sich selbst geraten war, aber sie dankte ihm…” (Fenitschka 66). In choosing to be alone, Fenia preserves her independence and ability to determine her own path, but her expressions of thankfulness toward her lover—“Ich danke dir! ich danke dir!”—recall that, for her, love means peace, gratitude, and freedom. Max, who overhears the conversation during their final meeting from the other room, also sees Fenia for the last time. He enters the room after her lover leaves, and the narrator recounts how he observes Fenia standing in front of the window before he silently departs and returns to Germany to meet Irmgard: “Sie wendete
ihm den Rücken zu. Mit den Händen hatte sie in die Vorhänge hineingefaßt und ihr Gesicht darin verborgen. Er sah nur die gebeugte Rückenlinie, und es durchfuhr ihn das Gefühl, als hätte er dies alles schon einmal erlebt —. Aber er hatte nur in seiner Phantasie Fenia schon einmal trauernd und gebeugt gesehen” (Fenitschka 66-67). This image, which recalls Max’s (M²) earlier impression of Fenia staring out the window and weeping at her uncle’s estate, again features internal focalization through Max. Fenia’s back is turned, and readers do not learn her final thoughts, feelings, or expressions. This recurring motif of Fenia looking out a window, which calls to mind Caspar David Friedrich’s Frau am Fenster (1822) and Gustave Caillebotte’s double portrait Intérieur, femme à la fenêtre (1880), expresses a sober consciousness of the real social limitations that women still faced around 1900.

At the same time, it also points toward future possibilities that lie on the horizon of a modern world. The open ending has the effect that no single solution is foreclosed. Fenia is neither
demonized nor commended for her decision. Instead, Fenitschka leaves its ending open to various interpretations and invites readers to continue the dialogue that occupies the center of the novella.

As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, readers who focus on Fenia’s dilemma will likely wonder about her emotional state in the final scene. Such readers may be inclined to ask: Is Fenia happy to have freedom to pursue her intellectual aspirations? Or is she acting against her ‘true feminine nature’ and denying her desire to love because such love is not possible in her world outside the bonds of marriage? Does Max’s feeling of déjà vu suggest that the illusion he experienced weeks before has now become reality, or does the expression “aber nur in seiner Phantasie” dismiss this possibility altogether?

Readers who pay more attention to Max’s struggles throughout the novella, however, might ask different questions: Does Max experience growth or change by the end of the novella? Will he continue to judge others, especially women like Fenia, according to rigid categories? Since he is anxious to return to Irmgard and read “das Geständnis ihrer Liebe aufs Neue aus den Augen und von den Lippen” (Fenitschka 58), can he only find comfort in a relationship that does not challenge his understanding of nineteenth-century gendered emotional codes and social mores?

What largely deflects these types of questions, I find, is a careful reading of the novella’s last lines, particularly the final sentence as it pertains to both figures: “Zwei Tage später reiste er aus Rußland fort, ohne Fenitschka wiedergesehen zu haben. Sie wollte es so” (Fenitschka 67). This unassuming final sentence does not merely indicate that Max has fulfilled Fenia’s last request by departing without taking notice of her [“Aber wenn du hier wieder durchgehest, — beachte mich nicht”] (Fenitschka 64). “Sie wollte es so” expresses Max’s acceptance of Fenia’s
agency and striving for self-realization. A reconsideration of his final encounter with Fenia is revealing: “Sie wendete ihm den Rücken zu. Mit den Händen hatte sie in die Vorhänge hineingefaßt und ihr Gesicht darin verborgen. Er sah nur die gebeugte Rückenlinie, und es durchfuhr ihn das Gefühl, als hätte er dies alles schon einmal erlebt —. Aber er hatte nur in seiner Phantasie Fenia schon einmal trauernd und gebeugt gesehen” (Fenitschka 66-67).

Although Max is still the character-focalizer in this passage, he resists his usual tendency to read Fenia’s emotions on her body and project his desires onto her. The narrator (Mⁿ) reports that Max (Mᶜ) only sees the slight bend of Fenia’s back—he does not try to interpret her posture or make assumptions about her emotional state based on how nineteenth-century social mores determine that she ‘should’ feel in this situation.

The last sentences also indicate that the narrative voice, Max (Mⁿ), who reflects upon his friendship with Fenia after their parting, has accepted her and grown to understand himself in relation to her. His resistance to projecting emotions onto Fenia and assertion of her agency suggest that he recognizes her individuality and complexity and does not expect her to conform to nineteenth-century social mores and gender roles. He abandons the attempt to determine who Fenia ‘is’ because she cannot be pinned down, but is always in the process of becoming. Max’s (Mᶜ) Bildung is attested to by this shift from an essentialist to a performative model of emotion, as well as by his acceptance of Fenia and her pursuit of self-realization.

The idea that Max (Mⁿ) has come to terms with Fenia presents a new way of reading the novella’s unpretentious title, Fenitschka. As the Russian diminutive of Fiona or Fenia, Fenitschka signifies a bond of friendship between the narrator (Mⁿ) and the title heroine. This is, of course, not an invention of Andreas-Salomé’s, but a custom in Russian literature to use the diminutive forms of Russian names to reveal the closeness of relationships between characters at
certain points in the plot (Midgley 116). Conversely, the diminutive Fenitschka also reflects Max’s (M⁶) earlier compulsion to see Fenia as ‘smaller’ than she really is or passive and childlike, a habit that, by the time he leaves St. Petersburg at the end of the novella, he has overcome.

3.9 CONCLUSION

“Dann siegte ein andres Gefühl” marks a turning point in Lou Andreas-Salomé’s *Fenitschka* and encapsulates what the novella does as a whole: create a space for other ways of feeling (*Fenitschka* 18). Situated against the background of *fin-de-siècle* Europe, *Fenitschka* implies that emotions and interpersonal relationships change over time as social structures shift. It highlights Max’s and Fenia’s differing orientations to late nineteenth-century gendered emotional codes and traces Max’s evolving perception of Fenia and what she represents. On a larger scale, the novella brings to light the psychological impact of broad cultural shifts and the emergence of differing emotional styles around 1900. That is, it makes palpable the fact that the transition from nineteenth-century bourgeois morality to modernism witnessed a proliferation of differing ways of feeling. Emotional codes like feminine shame and masculine honor began to decline in modernizing societies at this time, but the familiar narratives associated with them were difficult to abandon, as Max’s (M⁶) emotional struggles reveal. Through narrative techniques such as thought report and internal focalization, *Fenitschka* articulates Max’s (M⁶) resistance to changes in emotional practices (e.g. a new concept of love, the decline of feminine shame and masculine honor, and the rise of empathy and solidarity across social boundaries). In this way, the novella represents the uncertainty and anxiety that many Europeans felt at the *fin de siècle*. It does not
advocate naïve compliance with established cultural narratives or new ideologies. Instead, Andreas-Salomé encourages critical thinking that leads to progress, acceptance, and greater understanding through dialogue, as exemplified by her novella’s inquiring and perceptive heroine. Cognizant of the challenges of self-realization, as in the case of Fenia, and of accepting social change, as in the case of Max, *Fenitschka* validates alternate emotional styles and imagines new opportunities for individuals in modern society.
4.0 “DAS WAREN GANZ BEHÄBIGE UND GLÜCKLICHE GENERATIONEN DAMALS...”: READING MANN’S _BUDDENBROOKS_ (1901) AS A LITERARY GENEALOGY OF EMOTIONS

Part V of Thomas Mann’s (1875-1955) multigenerational family saga, _Buddenbrooks: Verfall einer Familie_ (1901), introduces a concept central to the novel as a whole: emotional and cultural change over time. Mann’s narrator distinguishes between the representatives of earlier generations of the Buddenbrook family and Consul Jean Buddenbrook, who was “mit seiner schwärmerischen Liebe zu Gott und dem Gekreuzigten, _der erste seines Geschlechtes_ gewesen, _der unalltägliche, unbürgerliche_ und _differenzierte Gefühle_ gekannt und gepflegt hatte” (_Buddenbrooks_ 283, emphasis added). Mann’s narrator asserts that emotions previously unknown to the Buddenbrook family first find their expression through Consul Jean’s religious ecstasy. Although Jean’s children do not share his Pietistic sensibility, the narrative progression reveals that these so-called uncommon, unbourgeois, and differentiated emotions take unique forms in each generation of the family. How should readers interpret this striking reference to ‘uncommon, unbourgeois, and differentiated emotions’? Does Mann’s narrator imply that the assimilation of previously unknown forms of feeling brings about the decline of this semi-fictional nineteenth-century bourgeois family?

When read in the context of the novel’s subtitle _Verfall einer Familie_, this quoted passage hints that the integration of ‘unbourgeois’ emotions contributes to the Buddenbrooks’ decline. In
this way, Mann’s novel participates in debates about cultural pathology and decadence found in European literary, philosophical, and medical discourses at the fin de siècle. Yet other passages convey the impression that emotional and cultural change through the generations is not only inevitable, but also necessary. Moreover, even the committed attempts of figures such as Tony and Thomas Buddenbrook to conform to the family ethos and emotional code do not secure marital or financial success. On the contrary, the decisions that these figures make with the Buddenbrook ethos in mind ironically and tragically hasten the process of degeneration. *Buddenbrooks* therefore offers readers a more complex literary account of late nineteenth-century emotionality than the idea that ‘other’ feelings threatened and brought about the decline of high bourgeois emotions and values. It conceives of different ways of feeling as potentialities, i.e. competing emotional styles that struggle to emerge at a given point in history.

Even though the narrated time in *Buddenbrooks* spans the years 1835 to 1877, the novel’s mid-nineteenth-century setting should not deceive readers. In *Buddenbrooks* Thomas Mann tackles some of the major themes and questions that preoccupied other writers, philosophers, artists, and critics of his day. His earliest stories and novellas published in the 1890s depict outsider figures and artists as they undermine bourgeois values and experiment with unconventional roles in society. *Buddenbrooks* stands out among these early works because Mann does not just tell the story of a decadent young artist who rejects bourgeois values. Through the form of a family chronicle, he provides an account of how the outsider figure came to be. According to Mann’s own recollection of his plans for *Buddenbrooks*, the life of Hanno, the sensitive latecomer [“des sensitiven Spätling”] and last male representative of the family, played the fundamental role in the novel’s conception (see *GW* XI, 554; *Selbstkommentare* 67). Yet the novel does not open with Hanno’s story. Instead, by narrating the history of the family
through four generations and tracing the origin of the ‘sensitive latecomer’ as an emotional type, Mann creates a literary genealogy or history of emotions that introduces ‘uncommon, unbourgeois, and differentiated emotions’ alongside the Buddenbrook family’s nineteenth-century ‘bourgeois’ emotions and values.

Thomas Mann’s *Buddenbrooks* and the questions it raises about emotional and cultural change remain relevant—and now more than ever, given the current rise in historical investigations of emotions. As other examples will attest, the inclination to scrutinize the past and the concern with emotions in *Buddenbrooks* are not unique to the novel; these were two late nineteenth-century preoccupations. These trends converged in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who stressed the need to analyze changes in emotions and their cultural contexts over time. Nietzsche called for something akin to a genealogy or history of emotions in Book One of *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* (1882): “Bisher hat alles das, was dem Dasein Farbe gegeben hat, noch keine Geschichte: oder wo gäbe es eine Geschichte der Liebe, der Habsucht, des Neides, des Gewissens, der Pietät, der Grausamkeit?” (§7 “Etwas für Arbeitsame”). Here, Nietzsche proposed that researching emotions or ‘all kinds of passions’ [“alle Arten Passionen”] among different peoples and through historical periods is necessary for the proper study of moral questions properly. By tracing how certain social practices became moral values in *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (1887), he further highlighted the existence of alternatives to established principles, which he considered inimical to human flourishing, and heralded a ‘new’ morality expressive of the will to power. Along the same lines, a genealogy of emotions identifies alternatives to current emotional codes and suggests that emotions, too, are not constant but contingent. *Buddenbrooks*, which imagines changes in the emotional life of a nineteenth-century family of the Lübeckian patriciate, accomplishes precisely this and thus demonstrates an affinity
with Nietzsche’s way of thinking about the history of emotions and moral values. While I do not claim that Mann or Nietzsche presents an accurate or complete historical narrative, the genealogical method evident in *Buddenbrooks* and *Zur Genealogie der Moral* serves an important social-critical function in each work.

This chapter considers the extent to which we can read *Buddenbrooks* as a literary ‘genealogy’ or ‘history of emotions,’ as well as the implications that such a reading has for our understanding of Thomas Mann’s perspective on the shifting ways of feeling around 1900. Mann’s realist mode and psychological narration in *Buddenbrooks* affectively engage readers, and, not unlike Nietzsche’s critique of Judeo-Christian morality in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, the novel stimulates critical assessments of emotions and social mores that many assume to be unchanging and self-evident even today. Using genealogy, Mann traces the prehistory of the emotional type of the ‘sensitive latecomer’ and negotiates between ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ emotional styles. Despite its historicizing gesture and resonance with Nietzsche’s critical methodology, however, Mann’s *Buddenbrooks* departs from Nietzsche’s polemical genealogy. The Buddenbrooks’ ‘bourgeois’ emotional code, distinguished by an unreflective sense of pride, duty, honor, and the suppression of love and individual interests, is best represented by Johann the elder and his granddaughter Tony. As the narrative progresses, however, the family’s ‘bourgeois’ emotional style is increasingly ironized and represented as outmoded and difficult to sustain in the modern period. Yet Tony’s pride, although an object of irony, manifests itself as a powerful and life-preserving alternative to the decadent and life-negating ‘unbourgeois’ emotionality that culminates in the fourth generation (Hanno). An examination of the structure of *Buddenbrooks* as a ‘genealogy-of-emotions,’ together with its narrative situation and depiction of a range of emotional styles, will show that, while the novel
resists moral relativism, it does not entirely invalidate or uphold any single emotion or perspective represented in the diegetic world. Instead of advancing a single ideological viewpoint, then, I argue that *Buddenbrooks* employs heteropathia as an aspect of Mann’s poetic criticism [‘dichterischer Kritizismus’]\(^1\) to identify a middleground between the unwavering bourgeois pride and self-confidence of German programmatic realism and the decadent sensibility that became fashionable during the *fin de siècle*.

*Buddenbrooks* does not just mediate between differing affective perspectives (e.g. Tony’s life-affirming bourgeois pride and Hanno’s life-negating decadent sensibility), however. It also draws attention to its own act of artistic mediation. Exemplifying Mann’s concept of ‘Mittlertum,’ which refers to the mediating function of art and literature, the novel negotiates between different ways of feeling, both at the intradiegetic and extradiegetic levels. Mann’s empathetic-ironic narrator alternates between acknowledging and critiquing the figures’ ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ emotions, thereby implying a need for both ways of feeling and prompting readers to reflect critically upon the emotional structures of the late nineteenth-century bourgeoisie. This entire process of artistic mediation is mirrored by the figure Kai Graf Mölln. Like his best friend Hanno, Kai is a decadent artist who is sensitive to the ways of the world, but he also exhibits a powerful, robust masculinity and life-affirming pride and productively transforms his experiences through irony in the stories he writes. The sensitive, ironic writer Kai, and not Hanno, best embodies Mann’s vision of the modern artist and ideal of poetic criticism. And with his figure, a structural metaphor for the heteropathic mediation of emotion in *Buddenbrooks*, Mann imagines the artist as the one most capable of mediating between differing ways of feeling during periods of cultural change. Moreover, Mann locates the

\(^1\) Mann used the term “der dichterischer Kritizismus” to describe his Nietzsche-inspired blurring of *Kunst* and *Kritik* in his essay “Bilse und ich” (*Essays I*: 45).
freedom to evaluate and experiment with different emotional styles in the process of artistic creation and reception itself.

4.1 **BUDDENBROOKS—THE WORK OF A ‘KALTER KÜNSTLER’?**

Despite the novel’s status as a celebrated work of German and European literature, critics have judged *Buddenbrooks* harshly due to its ironic depictions of living persons by a supposedly cold, emotionally distant narrator. At the time of its publication in 1901, *Buddenbrooks* stirred up the emotions of its readers. It is well known that Thomas Mann, who was born into a bourgeois merchant family in Lübeck in 1875, based his multigenerational novel on the history of his own family and his childhood memories of growing up in the north German Hanseatic city. Readers and critics considered *Buddenbrooks* a *roman à clef* or *Schlüsselroman* because Mann used family members and other living subjects as models, and *Schlüssellisten* that attempted to decipher the models for Mann’s hundreds of named minor characters circulated widely in Lübeck at the time. Although *Buddenbrooks* was and continues to be Mann’s bestselling novel, the initial response of many in Lübeck was not particularly favorable. The case of Thomas Mann’s Onkel Friedel, the source of inspiration for the figure of Christian Buddenbrook, illustrates this. Friedrich Mann resented his nephew’s unflattering and ironic portrayal and reacted by sending him a postcard with the following note and maxim: “Dein Buch ‘Die Buddenbrooks’ haben mir viele Leiden bereitet. Ein trauriger Vogel, der sein eigenes Nest

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2 See Wißkirchen 301-321, for a comprehensive survey of positive and critical responses to *Buddenbrooks* in the novel’s early reception from 1901 to 1905.
beschmutzt! Dein Onkel Friedrich Mann.”

In 1906 Thomas Mann responded to similar disapproving sentiments and the accusation that he produced a scandalous Schlüsselroman or “Bilse-Roman” in his essay “Bilse und ich,” which defends the rights of authors to fictionalize the lives of living persons and provides the strongest statement of his concept of art during this early period of his creative work (see Essays I: 36). Mann enlists the help of Shakespeare and Goethe to support his position and asserts that true artists, “statt frei zu ‘erfinden,’ sich lieber auf irgend etwas Gegebenes, am liebsten auf die Wirklichkeit stützen” (Essays I: 39). Thus, for Mann, pure fabrication or invention does not give rise to great works of literature. Instead, he emphasized that an author should draw inspiration for his literary figures from reality but must creatively shape and animate this content to make it his own. A precursor to this view is already discernible in Buddenbrooks, where Kai, an aspiring young writer, exemplifies a similar concept of art: “Kais Geschichten waren anfangs kurz und einfach, wurden dann aber kühner und komplizierter und gewannen an Interesse dadurch, daß sie nicht gänzlich in der Luft standen, sondern von der Wirklichkeit ausgingen und diese in ein seltsames und geheimnisvolles Licht rückten…” (Buddenbrooks 572). As the final clause in this passage hints, however, and as Mann clearly states in “Bilse und ich,” an author’s subjective identification with his figures can lead to misunderstandings (see Essays I: 42-44). The creative process casts reality in a ‘strange and


4 With the implication that Thomas Mann had written a new, scandalous Schlüsselroman in the style of Prussian writer and lieutenant Fritz Oswald Bilse (1878-1951), the Lübeck attorney Enrico von Brocken disparagingly called Buddenbrooks a “Bilse-Roman” in 1905 (see Essays I: 36-38).

5 In “Bilse und ich,” Mann considers the act of Beseelung [animation, ensoulment] of reality, not Erfindung [invention, fabrication], the true skill of the poet: “Die Beseelung…da ist es, das schöne Wort! Es ist nicht die Gabe der Erfindung – die der Beseelung ist es, welche den Dichter macht” (Essays I: 41).
mysterious light,’ that is, the author introduces aspects of his own personality that are foreign, and, perhaps, offensive to the real-life models themselves.

Yet for Thomas Mann the danger of criticism stemmed not only from his reliance upon reality and real-life models for his work, but more generally from his ironic narrative tone, which critics have often interpreted as a coldness or indifference. Referring specifically to the narrative style in *Tonio Kröger* (1903), the critic Karl Muth called Mann a “kalter Künstler”6 in 1904, and thereafter Mann continued to face and defend himself against similar accusations throughout much of his life. He, of course, refuted these claims and privately alluded to his own sensibility in letters, as in this one to his patroness in Lübeck, the German writer Ida Boy-Ed (1852-1928), written on August 19, 1904:


In his essays, too, including “Bilse und ich,” Mann more publicly addresses the issue of artistic coldness. He claims that the artist’s view is both colder and more passionate [“zugleich kälter und leidenschaftlicher”] than that of the non-artist and considers it erroneous to view the two qualities as mutually exclusive: “Nichts unkünstlerischer, als der Irrtum, daß Kälte und

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Leidenschaft einander ausschlössen!” (Essays I: 46, 47). To some extent, however, the notion of
the ‘kalter Künstler’ still informs how Mann’s works are often interpreted.

Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks offers rigorous literary depictions of and keen insights
into emotion. Even critics who do not focus on the representation of emotion in the novel have
noted the skill with which Mann represents a range of human feelings, as, for example, Todd
Kontje: “Buddenbrooks also plays on the full register of human emotions, ranging at various
times from melancholy to sarcasm, farce to tragedy, philosophical contemplation to seething
rage” (26). Nevertheless, few critical studies of emotion in Buddenbrooks or Mann’s other works
exist. I attribute the limited scholarly attention to emotion in Buddenbrooks to the two
interpretive obstacles already discussed here: 1. the tendency to read the novel as a
Schlüsselroman and focus on biographical aspects, and 2. the reluctance to inquire beyond the
dichotomy of emotional warmth and coldness. While I recognize the biographical aspects of
Mann’s literary prose and the fact that he believed to be writing only about himself,7 I emphasize
that Buddenbrooks not only dealt with Mann’s own experiences but also addressed, and
continues to address, national and general human experiences and concerns, as Mann himself
was amazed to learn.8

The need to consider Mann’s oeuvre from an emotion studies perspective has recently
been recognized. In 2010, a group of young Thomas Mann researchers organized a conference in
Göttingen titled “Ein ‘kalter Künstler’? Emotionen und Aspekte von Emotionalität bei Thomas
Mann” and produced eight web-based articles that explore different aspects of emotionality in

7 In “Bilse und ich” Mann tries to dissuade readers from reading Buddenbrooks only as a roman à clef and assures
them that he writes only about himself: “Nicht von Euch ist die Rede, gar niemals, seid des nun getröstet, sondern
Umrissen, und gar niemanden stellen sie vor, wenn nicht mich selber” (Essays I: 50).

8 “Man gibt das Persönlichste und ist überrascht, das Nationale getroffen zu haben. Man gibt das Nationalste – und
siehe, man hat das Allgemeine und Menschliche geroffen…” (Selbstkommentare 71).
Mann’s works (Brockmeier and Schermuly). In an article on *Buddenbrooks*, Birte Lipinski aims to provide a more balanced reading of the young artist figure Kai and points out that, in spite of his skepticism and ironic use of language, Kai is a passionate and empathetic figure, not a “kalter Künstler” (par. 12). The other contributions, most of which also engage with the notion of the ‘kalter Künstler,’ study Gefühlskälte or particular emotions (*Liebe, Angst, or Ekel*) in Mann’s other works, including *Der Tod in Venedig* (1912), *Lotte in Weimar* (1939), and *Joseph und seine Brüder* (1933-1943). Since new approaches in emotion studies are still being developed and have the potential to challenge more conventional ways of interpreting the social contexts and textual construction of emotions in literature, the investigation of emotion in Mann’s works has by no means been exhausted.

Three recent publications raise interesting questions about and invite further investigations of the representation of emotion in *Buddenbrooks*. In the conclusion of his book on family life and social change in *Buddenbrooks*, Martin Swales draws attention to Mann’s literary construction of emotional experience by citing from Rainer Maria Rilke’s (1875-1926) “Fourth Duino Elegy” (1915): “Wir kennen den Kontur des Fühlens nicht: nur, was ihn formt von außen” (Rilke qtd. in Swales 113). Swales emphasizes that, while Mann shows us the outside forces that form human emotions in *Buddenbrooks*, he also represents the inner space of feeling as shaped by external pressures, that is, the ‘contour of feeling’ that Rilke’s “Fourth Duino Elegy” deems unknowable (113). His comments suggest that emotions as represented in Mann’s novel are not insulated from the outside world but, like other aspects of culture, are subject to change over time. Although he did not intend to make a key contribution to Thomas Mann scholarship, Lothar Pikulik opens his monograph *Leistungsethik contra Gefühlskult* (1984) with a discussion of *Buddenbrooks*, which he uses to explain the theoretical framework for his
survey of eighteenth-century *Empfindsamkeit* (16). Pikulik identifies various gradations of “Bürger” in *Buddenbrooks*, considers the role that emotions play in the “Entbürgerlichung” of the Buddenbrook family, and, consequently, asks how well the (eighteenth-century) bourgeois mentality tolerates sensibility as an aspect of class identity (57). Manuel Braun, too, briefly refers to *Buddenbrooks* at the beginning of his essay on medieval emotions. Braun contrasts the depiction of *Trauer* in the *Nibelungenlied* with Mann’s suppression of *Trauer* in the scenes that follow the death of Konsul Jean Buddenbrook, which leads him to inquire whether the study of literary history can provide insight into the history of emotions (53, 61). The fact that Braun and Pikulik both open their studies of emotions in other historical periods with a reference to *Buddenbrooks* calls for an in-depth analysis of emotion in the novel. In light of the novel’s narrative situation, staging of emotional styles, and resonance with Nietzsche’s *Genealogie*, my reading of heteropathia in *Buddenbrooks* will show that the text not only negotiates between differing ways of feeling, but also envisions the modern writer as the one best suited for the role of mediator.

### 4.2 THE HETEROPATHIC IMPULSE OF *BUDDENBROOKS*

#### 4.2.1 Mann’s Empathetic-Ironic Narrator

*Buddenbrooks* features an extradiegetic narrator who functions as the chronicler of a 42-year period in the history of a semi-fictional north German bourgeois family from 1835 to 1877. The experience of reading Mann’s generational novel, however, differs from the experience of reading an historical chronicle. In his essay “Thomas Mann’s *Buddenbrooks*” (1902), Rainer
Maria Rilke insightfully described Mann’s narrative style and distinguished between the traditional chronicler and Mann’s modern, innovative interpretation of that role. Rilke notes that, more than a calm reporter of events, Mann’s chronicler includes thousands of details, which grant the figures warmth and substance and contribute to the liveliness of his literary representation (8). To be sure, while the extradiegetic narrator of *Buddenbrooks* is situated outside of the diegetic world, he does not stand high above his own account or narrate from a single point of view as a traditional chronicler would. Frequent shifts from zero to internal focalization tend to blur the perspectives of the narrator and the figures, especially in the second half of the novel. Part X Chapter 5, for example, narrates Thomas Buddenbrook’s *Schopenhauer-Erlebnis*, one of the most famous scenes that features such focalization shifts, and blurs the narrator and character perspectives:


Thomas reads “über den Tod und sein Verhältnis zur Unzerstörbarkeit unseres Wesens an sich,” a chapter from Schopenhauer’s *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1818), and the narrator uses thought report to reveal Thomas’s unspoken perceptions and contemplations about life and death during his Schopenhauer experience (see *Buddenbrooks* 722). As in this scene, focalization shifts
throughout the novel bring the reader close to the figures and allow her to see through their eyes. Mann’s narrative style thus yields a kind of multiperspectivism, which, through its depiction of an assortment of figures with different emotional styles and worldviews, conveys an impression of a complex social reality and imparts a deeper understanding than one perspective alone would communicate.

The extradiegetic narrator of Buddenbrooks knows all: he tirelessly describes in detail the physical appearance, clothing, speech, posture, facial expressions, and unexpressed thoughts and feelings of the novel’s multitude of figures using zero focalization. Only on a few occasions does he choose to withhold details or relinquish his omniscience, such as when he supposes that Thomas “dachte wahrscheinlich an das kleine Blumenmädchen mit dem malayischen Gesichtstypus, die vor kurzer Zeit den Sohn ihrer Brotgeberin geheiratet hatte…” (Buddenbrooks 256, emphasis added). Thomas sacrifices his clandestine relationship with the flower seller, Anna, for the sake of the Buddenbrook family honor, but the narrator’s speculation hints that he still loves her, although his love, like the narrator’s overt comment in this passage, is suppressed.

An extended instance of limited narration occurs in Part X Chapter 5, in which readers, like Thomas and Hanno who stand outside of the music room door, never discover what actually transpires between Thomas’s wife, Gerda, and Lieutenant von Throta during the long, silent pauses that punctuate their ecstatic Wagnerian duets (see Buddenbrooks 712-716). Strategic use of limited narration heightens the dramatic effect of such passages and enables readers to develop their own interpretations. Mann’s Wagnerian leitmotif technique provokes a similar response. Repeated references to Hanno and Gerda’s blue-shadowed eyes, Thomas’s small yellow teeth, and Tony’s trumpeting sounds, for example, make these figures memorable and provide clues to their personality, health, and emotions, emphasizing changes over time. Many of
the novel’s leitmotifs foreshadow death and decline, either of the Buddenbrooks or other figures. Although the Hagenströms, the family’s rivals, achieve great economic and social success by the end of the novel, their move into the old Mengstraße house, along with repeated references to Moritz Hagenström’s jaundiced complexion and bad teeth, underline the similarities between the two families and hint that the Hagenströms will follow a similar downward trajectory.

Some critics may have considered Thomas Mann a ‘kalter Künstler’ for the ironic portrayal of his figures, but irony constitutes only one aspect of Mann’s narrative style in *Buddenbrooks*. Techniques such as internal focalization and interior monologue stimulate sympathetic identification or empathy with the novel’s figures rather than laughter. Hugh Ridley has argued that Mann’s *Buddenbrooks* aims to communicate knowledge, not empathy, but both pathos and irony work together in the novel as a means to knowledge and critical reflection (compare Ridley 70). Additionally, narrative irony and literary techniques that promote empathy have the potential to move readers to laughter or tears and, thus, intensify the humorous and melodramatic features of the novel that give it its broad appeal (compare Schonfield 107).

Inspired by the ‘double optic’ that Nietzsche identified in Richard Wagner’s (1813-1883) operas, Mann was determined to reach two audiences at once, as he made known in a letter to Hermann Hesse (1877-1962) dated April 1, 1910: “Nietzsche spricht einmal von Wagners ‘wechselnder Optik’: bald in Hinsicht auf die größten Bedürfnisse, bald in Hinsicht auf die raffiniertesten. […] Die Künstler, denen es nur um eine Coenakel-Wirkung zu thun ist, war ich stets geneigt, gering zu schätzen. Eine solche Wirkung würde mich nicht befriedigen” (see Kurzke 120).

Mann’s empathetic-ironic narrative style allows him to write for both audiences simultaneously: a general public and an educated elite. The constant alternation between the narrative
transmission of empathy and irony in *Buddenbrooks* at once engages and entertains the masses, and, at the same time, this narrative tension offers intellectual readers a sharp-witted critique.

Free indirect speech makes possible Mann’s empathetic-ironic narrative style in *Buddenbrooks*: it supports greater understanding of the figures’ perspectives and simultaneously draws attention to the narrator’s presence and distance to the narrated events. The narrator’s more detached, objective insights contrast with the figures’ subjective perceptions of events in the diegetic world, a discrepancy that generates narrative irony and interrupts the reader’s sympathetic identification with the figures. By revealing their perspectives through irony-charged free indirect speech, Mann’s empathetic-ironic narrative technique at once substantiates the figures’ emotions and values and opens them up for critical assessment.

Passages that feature internal focalization and free indirect speech already occur in the first parts of *Buddenbrooks*, albeit with less frequency and intensity than in the second half of the novel. In Part I Chapter 1, for example, readers observe a gathering of three generations of the Buddenbrook family in their newly acquired house on Mengstraße, but they receive little background information about them or the history and traditions of the family. This lack of narrative introduction assumes readers who are already acquainted with the Buddenbrooks and require no explanation regarding their history, values, or class standing. At the novel’s opening, the Buddenbrook family ethos is likewise unquestioned by the figures themselves. A notable exception occurs in Part I Chapter 7, in which free indirect style clues readers in to the private thoughts of the Buddenbrooks’ house doctor and family friend, Dr. Grabow, who does not wish to interfere and, therefore, suppresses his critique of the family’s lifestyle (see *Buddenbrooks* 39-40). Apart from the scene with Dr. Grabow, the early chapters of the novel feature dialogues and lengthy exterior descriptions of individual figures and scenes rather than interior monologues.
The gradual shift in narration, which stretches across 42 years of narrated time and over 800 pages, suggests that each successive generation of the family becomes more introspective\(^9\) and conflicted than those who came before.

Mann’s frequent and extended use of internal focalization and interior monologue in the final parts of the novel allows readers to ‘feel into’ \([einfühlen]\) the thoughts and emotions of the last two generations of the family in particular. Long, intense passages containing reflective free indirect speech\(^{10}\) convey the thoughts and emotions of Thomas and Hanno, and, to a more limited extent, of Tony. Thomas’s and Hanno’s interior monologues, which invite readers to hear their thoughts and feelings, reveal an inner tension and psychological struggles as they contemplate their individual and family identity, bourgeois values, and life and death. The blurring of the narrator’s perspective with the perceptions of Thomas and Hanno signals the narrator’s empathy with these figures in particular and betrays his own status as a ‘sensitive latecomer’ figure. Yet Mann’s narrator, like the young writer Kai, is also a master of irony, and narrative irony acts as a counterweight to sentimentalism and narrative empathy. The narrative situation of \textit{Buddenbrooks} thus moves readers to compassion or laughter by way of its empathetic-ironic style, and, by depicting changes through the generations, the novel treats the

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\(^9\)The gradual increase in the number of passages that employ free indirect speech or interior monologue is well-documented (see Furst; Hoffmeister; Ryan; Swales). Judith Ryan relates this shift in Mann’s literary portrayal to two nineteenth-century approaches to empirical observation: the ‘clinical’ or naturalizing approach and the ‘introspective’ approach evident in the emerging psychology of the 1880s and 1890s (125).

\(^{10}\)Werner Hoffmeister uses the paradoxical term “stille erlebte Rede,” which he also calls “erlebte Rede als Reflexion” (67). He regards Thomas, Hanno, and Tony as the central figures in \textit{Buddenbrooks} because reflective free indirect speech is reserved for these figures (69).
different nineteenth-century emotional styles and mentalities of its figures as the primary subject of narration.\textsuperscript{11}

4.2.2 ‘Bourgeois’ and ‘Unbourgeois’ Emotional Styles

The figures’ emotional styles and the changes they undergo through the generations become more apparent once readers identify the established Buddenbrook emotional code, which is based upon a sense of family honor, bourgeois pride, and the suppression of individual emotions and desires for the benefit of the whole (e.g., declining a \textit{Liebesehe} for a \textit{Vernunftiehe}). The house on Mengstraße, the \textit{Familienchronik}, the idealized memory of the elder Johann Buddenbrook, and the family motto\textsuperscript{12} and sayings that echo through the novel symbolically convey the status of the family’s values and emotional code. Beginning with Jean and ending with Hanno, the male heirs of the Buddenbrook family become increasingly introspective and exhibit emotional styles that increasingly conflict with the family’s ‘bourgeois’ emotional code. Significantly, in \textit{Buddenbrooks} Mann does not project the feelings that conflict with this emotional code, i.e. the ones the narrator distinguishes as “unalltägliche, unbürgerliche und differenzierte Gefühle,” onto ‘Other’ figures, as Gustav Freytag (1816-1895) does in \textit{Soll und Haben} (1855). Instead, ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ feelings intermingle, force the later generations to confront and resolve conflicting emotions, and shape the history of the Buddenbrook family. Mann’s depiction of different generational perspectives on politics, modernization, religion, philosophy, art, and emotional experience and expression suggests that

\textsuperscript{11} Compare Hoffmeister 160-169, who also considers the “Denk- und Fühlweisen” of characters both a means and subject of narration in \textit{Buddenbrooks} and the ‘modern novel’ in general (161).

\textsuperscript{12} “Mein Sohn, sey mit Lust bey den Geschäften am Tage, aber mache nur solche, daß wir bey Nacht ruhig schlafen können” (\textit{Buddenbrooks} 190, 530).
emotions and social mores change through history to reflect the needs and values of people in society. *Buddenbrooks* thus questions the notion of the intact bourgeois subject and undermines the assumption that a set of ideal and unchanging emotional codes exist.

Yet I do not read *Buddenbrooks* as a mere harbinger of the decline of nineteenth-century bourgeois emotional codes and the values that were once self-evident and undisputed in German programmatic realism. Mann’s narrative style also preserves a certain critical distance to the later generations’ decadent sensibility, introspection, and ‘unbourgeois’ feelings. For example, the narrator portrays Christian Buddenbrook’s shamelessness, lack of discipline, and nervous constitution ironically and critically in the novel, with little attempt to let readers see through his eyes via internal focalization or free indirect speech. Moreover, passages featuring free indirect speech demonstrate understanding for Tony and Thomas in their devotion to the family and firm and persistent attempts to conform to the Buddenbrook emotional code. Even Tony’s relentless class-based pride [*Stolz*, *Hochmut*], though an object of narrative irony, has redeeming qualities and provides a counter-narrative to the trajectory of life-negating degeneration that structures the novel. The effect of *Buddenbrooks* as an aesthetic whole is that it validates a variety of emotional styles, both bourgeois and unbourgeois, albeit not without a good measure of skepticism and humor.

### 4.2.3 The Genealogy-of-Emotions Structure of *Buddenbrooks*

A theoretical model of emotion that resonates with Nietzsche’s genealogical method organizes the narrative events in *Buddenbrooks*. According to Mann’s retrospective account, an ‘epic instinct’ compelled him to chronicle the prehistory of the Buddenbrook family in addition to the life experiences of the family’s last male descendant, the decadent young artist, Hanno:
Mann’s decision to open his social novel from the earliest possible chronological point in the history of the Buddenbrook family and firm has important implications. Not only does Buddenbrooks attempt to trace the origin of the ‘sensitive latecomer’ as an emotional type, but, in so doing, the novel also depicts subtle changes in the emotional life of the members of the family over time. Thus, the family saga configuration of Buddenbrooks gives rise to a fictional genealogy of emotions, in which nineteenth-century emotional styles are depicted as culturally contingent, not constant practices. By drawing attention to the genealogy-of-emotions structure of Buddenbrooks, I do not imply that Mann presents an objective, complete nineteenth-century history of the emotional life of the German bourgeoisie. Even the most ‘realistic’ literary works remain aesthetic constructions: they illuminate aspects of, but do not simply mirror reality. Instead, I emphasize that Mann’s Buddenbrooks, whose mobilization of genealogy recalls Nietzsche’s technique employed in Zur Genealogie der Moral, provides readers with a vivid literary interpretation of history.13

13 The historical accuracy of the narratives that Nietzsche provides in Zur Genealogie der Moral has been contested. Bernard Williams finds the Genealogie “infuriatingly vague” due to its perplexing relationship to history (157). Although Williams considers Nietzsche’s narratives of moral change to be fictions, he nonetheless attributes critical force to these accounts (159). Others like David Owen and Raymond Geuss instead accept the claim advanced by Alexander Nehamas in Nietzsche, Life as Literature (1985) that Nietzsche’s genealogical method is “history, correctly practiced,” that is, that the Genealogie gives truthful expression to the history of morality and gains its full critical force through this truthful expression (Owen 143).
The role of genealogy remains a topic of debate in Nietzsche scholarship: some argue that the genealogical method constitutes Nietzsche’s critique of morality (see, e.g., Angier 410; Katsafanas 191), while others assert that it destabilizes morality, yet does not itself achieve the revaluation of moral values (compare Janaway 10; Leiter 177). These varying assessments echo Nietzsche’s own ambivalence regarding the relevance of history for moral philosophy. On the one hand, Nietzsche cautions that a genealogy of morality is by no means identical with a critique of morality: “Die Frage nach der Herkunft unserer Werthschätzungen und Gütertafeln fällt ganz und gar nicht mit deren Kritik zusammen, wie so oft geglaubt wird…” (Der Wille zur Macht §254). Then again, Nietzsche refers to the three parts of Zur Genealogie der Moral as “Drei entscheidende Vorarbeiten eines Psychologen für eine Umwerthung aller Werte,” which implies that the genealogical method plays an instrumental role in laying the foundation for a revaluation of moral values (Ecce Homo, “Genealogie der Moral”). Although no clear consensus on the status of genealogy in Nietzsche’s work has been reached, the conclusions of recent scholarship, together with Nietzsche’s own comments on the Genealogie, suggest that, at the very least, the genealogical method sets Nietzsche’s critique of moral values in motion. The critical potential of genealogy is evident in Buddenbrooks as well. By imagining the origins of the ‘sensitive latecomer’ and his forbears through nineteenth-century history, Mann’s multi-generational novel exposes the contingency of emotional styles and moral attitudes. Thus, Mann’s Buddenbrooks and Nietzsche’s Genealogie employ similar genealogical methods that examine and subvert orientations to ways of thinking and feeling that may have previously gone unquestioned by readers at the fin de siècle: they historicize nineteenth-century emotional and moral codes, subject them to critical scrutiny, and envision alternatives.
In addition to the genealogical method, *Buddenbrooks* and *Zur Genealogie der Moral* exhibit rhetorical techniques that force readers to confront and question their own emotions and values. Mann accomplishes this by way of his empathetic-ironic narrative style and multiperspectivism and Nietzsche, through a range of rhetorical strategies that persuade, shock, or repel readers. Christopher Janaway, who has most compellingly argued that Nietzsche’s “emotive style” in the *Genealogie* warrants careful study, claims that, without Nietzsche’s rhetorical provocation of sympathy, antipathy, ambivalence, and disgust, readers would hardly be able to comprehend, let alone revalue their current moral values (4-5). Indeed, Nietzsche strove for the “Umwerthung aller Werthe,” yet he simultaneously recognized that only with great difficulty could individuals and societies transform their deep-rooted moral values and habits of feeling: “Wir haben umzulernen, – um endlich, vielleicht sehr spät, noch mehr zu erreichen: umzufühlen” (*GM* III §27; *Morgenröte* §103). Investigating the prehistory of moral attitudes in the *Genealogie* with the intention of revaluing them is “not a dispassionate exercise for Nietzsche, but includes an engagement of one’s own affects and prejudices” (Janaway 12). Only after working upon and dislodging his readers’ passions could Nietzsche hope to challenge their attachment to modern morality. Not just the genealogical method, then, but also narrative and rhetorical techniques thus constitute an essential aspect of Nietzsche’s and Mann’s critiques of emotions and values.

Although I highlight Mann’s and Nietzsche’s similar deployment of the genealogical method and narrative and rhetorical techniques in their respective works, the type of critique generated in *Buddenbrooks* diverges from the critique delivered in the *Genealogie*. As the subtitle of the *Genealogie* (“Eine Streitschrift”) elucidates, Nietzsche offers a polemic against a specific set of moral values. With the help of his genealogical method, which reveals modern
morality’s suspect past, Nietzsche refutes this value system and calls for a ‘new’ morality to take its place. The morality of the future that Nietzsche envisions requires the restoration of aristocratic or master morality [“aristokratische Werthgleichung (gut = vornehm = mächtig = schön = glücklich = gottgeliebt)”], which, according to his narrative in the *Genealogie*, preceded modern Judeo-Christian ‘slave’ morality [“Sklaven-Moral”] (GM I §7, 8). Nietzsche objects to modern morality primarily because he considers it inimical to human flourishing: by valorizing weakness, it encourages agents to limit their power.\(^{14}\) While *Mitleid* [compassion] occupies the center of Schopenhauer’s ethics, and likewise holds a place of importance in Paul Rée’s (1849-1901) *Der Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen*\(^{15}\) (1877), Nietzsche condemns *Mitleid* [pity], which, for him, exemplifies weakness and endangers ascending life. He considers *Mitleid* a symptom of the decadence that he diagnoses in late nineteenth-century European culture in the *Genealogie*: “ich verstand die immer mehr um sich greifende Mitleids-Moral, welche selbst die Philosophen ergriff und krank machte, als das unheimlichste Symptom unsurer unheimlich gewordnen europäischen Cultur…” (GM Vorrede §5). In addition to *Mitleid*, Nietzsche writes critically about love and *ressentiment*. Although he expressed the need to ‘feel differently’ *[umfühlen]* in *Morgenröte* §103, no particular emotion plays the central, positive role in his philosophy. As Robert Solomon has pointed out, however, for Nietzsche, who values the strength of the emotions, the will to power holds the place of a general “positive passion” in his philosophy (136). Nietzsche’s polemic, which strives for the revaluation of Judeo-Christian

\(^{14}\) Recent publications on *Zur Genealogie der Moral* describe Nietzsche’s central argument in his polemic against modern morality similarly. In other words, most critics agree Nietzsche rejects modern morality not only because of its revolting history, but due to its inverse relationship between actual and perceived increases in power. Compare, e.g., Janaway 3 and Katsafanas 171-173.

\(^{15}\) Following Schopenhauer and other *Mitleidsfreunde*, Paul Rée focuses on the virtues of (unegoistic) *Mitleid* and alternately refers to it as *Wohlwollen* [goodwill] and *Nächstenliebe* [charity]; “Also: Unegoistische Theilnahme am Schicksale anderer, mag man sie nun Mitleid, Wohlwollen oder Nächstenliebe nennen, existirt” (Rée 4).
morality, leaves little room for the coexistence of moral values or ways of feeling that are at variance with this concept of power.

Unlike Nietzsche in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*, Mann neither entirely condemns nor fully supports a single value system or emotional style in *Buddenbrooks*: the valorization of power and the polemical quality of Nietzsche’s model remain absent in the novel. Instead, while *Buddenbrooks* examines nineteenth-century emotional and moral codes, including bourgeois pride and decadent sensibility, it does not suggest the superiority of one perspective or way of feeling. Over 42 years of narrated time, *Buddenbrooks* represents the simultaneity of emotional styles in the nineteenth-century history of the family and admits the inevitability and necessity of emotional and cultural change over time. By showing the difficulty of preserving old ways of thinking and feeling in modern society, because cultural contexts are different, it breaks the mythology that a single set of enduring emotional codes exists. As I demonstrate in the following readings of key passages, different forms of ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ feeling are set against each other, and, as described in the novel, these emotional styles become objects of narrative irony and empathy. Yet Mann’s empathetic-ironic narrative style and the depiction of emotional change over time in *Buddenbrooks* do not mean that the novel weighs all perspectives equally or hesitates to raise ethical questions about the dangerous impact that certain emotional codes can have on individuals or society. Chapter 2 of Part 11, also known as the *Schulkapitel*, which depicts the authoritarian emotional regime of the Wilhelmine school system as Thomas and Heinrich Mann experienced it growing up in the *Kaiserreich*, provides the clearest evidence against reading moral relativism in the novel. Thus, *Buddenbrooks* aims for truth, but this truth is not embedded in one emotional style. By depicting the co-presence of distinct ways of feeling in the novel, *Buddenbrooks* both acknowledges and permits emotional alterity, while
simultaneously searching for the glimpses of a truth offered by each perspective. Additionally, it highlights the role of literature and the artist in mediating between these ways of feeling in search of truth.

4.3 EMOTIONAL CHANGE THROUGH FOUR GENERATIONS

The opposition of ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ emotions introduced in *Buddenbrooks*, together with the genealogical structure of the novel, recalls the pseudo-historical narrative of the ‘slave revolt’ in morality that Nietzsche provides in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*. ‘Bourgeois’ emotions, best embodied by Johann the elder and Tony Buddenbrook, are correlated positively with power and vitality, like Nietzsche’s aristocratic morality. ‘Unbourgeois’ emotions, which first find their way into the history of the family with Jean and conclude with Hanno’s rejection of the bourgeois world and denial of the will to live, are negatively correlated with power and vitality, and, therefore, correspond to Nietzsche’s slave morality. There is of course no one-to-one correspondence between Nietzsche’s and Mann’s genealogical narratives. Nietzsche critiqued Judeo-Christian bourgeois morality as a whole as a morality of weakness. He rejected bourgeois customs and principles because they required submission to ancestors or other authorities and limited freedom of self-realization. Thus, not just the life-negating emotions and decadent sensibility of the sensitive latecomer Hanno, but also the established Buddenbrook ethos, which was meant to ensure the continued success of the family, would have been an object of Nietzsche’s critique. Despite the lack of direct alignment between the two narratives, I nonetheless find Nietzsche’s genealogical method useful for an analysis of the tension between bourgeois and unbourgeois emotional styles in *Buddenbrooks*. By beginning his novel with
Johann Buddenbrook the elder and tracing the prehistory of the ‘sensitive latecomer’ Hanno, Mann depicts an alternative to the introspection, loss of vitality, and decadent emotionality that Nietzsche criticized in the *Genealogie*.

Although the adjective ‘unbürgerlich’ itself only appears in one passage of the novel, references to the Buddenbrooks’ bourgeois feelings including *Würde, Moral, Ehrgeiz, Strenge, Vornehmheit, Familiensinn, Ehre* and *Stolz* and values like *Arbeit, Erfolg, Erwerb, Macht, Reichtum, and Pflicht* abound and are easy to identify (see *Buddenbrooks* 426, 682). As a high bourgeois, or more precisely, a patrician merchant family of a north German Hanseatic town, the Buddenbrooks define themselves in terms of these emotions and values, which make up their class and family identity. The family chronicle and motto, two symbols of this identity referenced throughout the novel, serve to reinforce and impart these feelings and values to future generations. A passage featuring free indirect speech indicates that the Buddenbrooks’ class and family identity or *Familiensinn*, which Thomas conceives of as “…dieses ererbte und anerzogene, rückwärts sowohl wie vorwärts gewandte, pietätvolle Interesse für die intime Historie seines Hauses,” influences his thinking and determination to raise his son Hanno in accordance with his own bourgeois value system (*Buddenbrooks* 681). The adjectives ‘ererbte’ and ‘anerzogene’ emphasize the long history of these bourgeois feelings and values, and this *Familiensinn*, which unites past and future generations of the Buddenbrook family, is revered.

Some of the ‘bourgeois’ emotions and values represented in the novel can be traced back to the aristocracy, which entered a slow state of decline after the Revolution of 1848 and the rise of industrialization. The nineteenth-century bourgeoisie adopted aristocratic social practices and emotional codes like the *Vernunftehe* instead of a *Liebesehe*, as well as aristocratic attitudes toward social status evident in expressions of class pride and family honor. Mann takes great
care to depict the Buddenbrooks’ enforcement of these emotional practices. Out of all of the members of the later generations of the family, it is Tony who is most attached to these notions of class pride and family honor. She makes a direct link to aristocratic ways of thinking and feeling in a conversation with Thomas: “Ja, Tom, wir fühlen uns als Adel und fühlen einen Abstand und wir sollten nirgend zu leben versuchen, wo man nichts von uns weiß, und uns nicht einzuschätzen versteht, denn wir werden nichts als Demütigungen davon haben, und man wird uns lächerlich hochmütig finden” (Buddenbrooks 425). Tony emphasizes the sense of aristocratic distinction that she feels in relation to people of lower social classes and uses this to justify her decision to leave her second husband, Alois Permaneder, who leads an easygoing and unglamorous lifestyle in Munich, where Tony’s social status and family history are rendered meaningless. The Buddenbrooks’ patrician Familiensinn, which encompasses notions of class pride and family honor, thus manifests itself as an emotional code that needs to be defended continuously out of fear of public humiliation or a loss of social status.

‘Uncommon, unbourgeois, and differentiated,’ i.e. ‘other’ feelings are imagined as conflicting with these emotions and values that form the Buddenbrook family ethos. This dualistic tension between ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ emotions is complicated by the genealogical structure of the novel, which depicts gradations of this previously unknown emotional style as changes occurring with each generation. Jean Buddenbrook is the first in the family to dwell on his dreams, emotions, and religious convictions, which his father, Johann Buddenbrook the elder, dismisses as “idées” or “Sentimentalität” (see Buddenbrooks 26, 53). Unlike his father, who embodies Enlightenment skepticism, Jean exhibits strong Pietistic

16 Tony’s words recall a line from Zur Genealogie der Moral, in which Nietzsche emphasizes that “die Vornehmen sich eben als Menschen höheren Ranges fühlen” (GM I §5, emphasis added). Nietzsche finds evidence for the aristocrats’ feeling of power and superiority over others in their names for themselves, e.g. “die Mächtigen, die Herren, die Gebietenden” (GM I §5).
convictions and sentiments that influence his decisions and actions. Appealing to the human duty “die Gefühle eines Anderen zu achten,” for example, Jean tries to use his religious convictions to persuade his daughter Tony to marry Bendix Grünlich against her will (Buddenbrooks 160). Jean’s own inclination to feel and act upon emotions such as pity is described by the narrator as “die schwärmerische Ehrfurcht seiner Generation vor menschlichen Gefühlen, die stets mit seinem nüchternen und praktischen Geschäftssinn in Hader gelegen hatte” (Buddenbrooks 247). Although the narrator reveals that Jean occasionally becomes overwhelmed with feelings of mercy [Erbarmen], as he does during his meeting with Grünlich, the narrator assures that Jean quickly becomes “Herr seiner Gefühle” again (Buddenbrooks 243). Thus, despite his penchant for ‘unbourgeois’ religious sentiments and the Judeo-Christian ‘pity-morality’ attacked by Nietzsche, Jean regains his composure after such moments of vulnerability and ultimately acts with the best interests of the family firm in mind (see GM Vorrede §5).

Although Thomas Buddenbrook lacks his father’s religious sentiments, he has an even greater capacity for differentiated emotions and introspection, as the narrator’s frequent use of interior monologue to disclose his thoughts and feelings suggests. For that reason, Thomas perceives his brother Christian, who exhibits “diese ängstliche, eitle und neugierige Beschäftigung mit sich selbst,” as a danger to him because he senses his own similar inclinations (Buddenbrooks 290). Determined to bring honor to the Buddenbrook family and firm, Thomas, much like Tony, sacrifices his true love for the flower shop girl, Anna, for a marriage along class lines. He values and strives for “die Haltung, das Gleichgewicht,” that is, he tries to balance bourgeois and unbourgeois emotions (Buddenbrooks 290). These competing orientations to emotion contribute to Thomas’s inner conflict, which Mann illustrates using free indirect speech: “War er ein praktischer Mensch oder ein zärtlicher Träumer? Ach, diese Frage hatte er sich
The narrator suggests that Thomas’s constant attempts to regulate his emotions and behaviors to project an image of intactness and refinement, for which the novel employs the mask metaphor, brings about nervous exhaustion. With Hanno Buddenbrook, we see the culmination of these ‘unbourgeois’ emotions. In a passage that brings to mind Nietzsche’s valuation of power, the narrator reports that Thomas hopes he can turn his son Hanno into “einen echten Buddenbrook, einen starken und praktisch gesinnten Mann mit kräftigen Trieben nach außen, nach Macht und Eroberung” (Buddenbrooks 559). This notion of the ‘true Buddenbrook’ posits a fixed, narrowly defined view of the family’s identity to which neither Thomas nor Hanno can conform. Hanno’s alternate name, “der kleine Johann,” as well as the observation that he has “die Buddenbrookschen Hände,” nonetheless reflect the family’s hopes that Hanno will take after his great-grandfather Johann and secure success and honor for the Buddenbrook family and firm (Buddenbrooks 465-466, 551). Contrary to these hopes, Hanno epitomizes many of the qualities that Nietzsche detested in late nineteenth-century Europeans: weakness, mistrust of life, hopelessness, refinement, decadence, and introspection (see GM II §7).

In this narrative of the Buddenbrooks’ decline through four generations, the influence of Nietzsche’s genealogical method and diagnosis of cultural decadence on Mann’s thinking and writing is evident. The assimilation of ‘uncommon, unbourgeois, and differentiated emotions,’ along with the increased proclivity towards introspection correlate with the family’s decline. Although these previously unknown emotions take different forms in each generation, they
coincide with declining vitality, the most obvious sign of which is the progressively shortened lifespan of each male heir. The Buddenbrook emotional code, which was meant to secure the success of the family and firm, thus manifests itself as a kind of unattainable past ideal. Thomas, for example, contrasts his forefathers’ bourgeois practicality with his own introspective sensibility, and, perceiving their power to be greater than his own, concludes: “daß sie praktische Menschen gewesen, daß sie es voller, ganzer, starker, unbefangener, natürlicher gewesen waren, als er, das war es, was feststand!” (Buddenbrooks 517). Thomas, and to a greater extent Tony, remain devoted to upholding the Buddenbrook family honor and lifestyle, but the narrator demonstrates a more skeptical attitude toward the Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois emotions and values. Accordingly, Buddenbrooks is not merely a narrative of familial decline or a diagnosis of cultural pathology or decadence. Whereas Nietzsche traces the genealogy of modern morality and criticizes the sinister symptoms of modern late nineteenth-century European civilization in his polemic, Mann’s narrator is more accepting of the sensitive latecomer type and uses a genealogical method to examine and inspire critical reflection on both bourgeois and unbourgeois emotional styles.

4.4 MODERNIZATION AND THE NECESSITY OF ACCOMPANYING EMOTIONAL AND CULTURAL SHIFTS

The Buddenbrook ethos and emotional code are imagined as powerful, life-affirming ideals meant to stand the test of time, communicate the family’s status and history, and ensure its

17 The dates provided in the novel indicate that Johann Buddenbrook the elder (1765-1842) died at age 77, Konsul Jean Buddenbrook (ca. 1800-1855) at age 55, Senator Thomas Buddenbrook (1826-1875) at age 49, and Hanno Buddenbrook (1861-1877) at age 16.
continued success, but Mann’s narrator already undermines these high bourgeois values early in
the novel. Every Thursday the Buddenbrooks host a “ganz einfaches Mittagbrot” with friends
and family in the new Mengstraße house; however, the narrator’s detailed description of the
elaborate feast exposes the reference to the simplicity of the meal as a gross understatement
(Buddenbrooks 13). The narrator’s account actually conveys the stifling formality of the event
and the strict observance of etiquette, with the figures following the example of Johann
Buddenbrook the elder, who preserves “den feinsten Anstand” (Buddenbrooks 38). Christian
Buddenbrook cries out in discomfort due to indigestion at the end of the feast and is examined by
the house doctor and family friend, Dr. Grabow. Free indirect speech, although rarely used to
convey the thoughts and feelings of minor characters, allows readers to hear Dr. Grabow’s
suppressed critique of the family’s high bourgeois lifestyle in Part I Chapter 7:

Doktor Grabow lächelte vor sich hin, mit einem nachsichtigen und beinahe etwas
schwermütigem Lächeln. [...] Er, Friedrich Grabow, war nicht derjenige, welcher
die Lebensgewohnheiten aller dieser braven, wohlhabenden und behaglichen
Kaufmannsfamilien umstürzen würde. Er würde kommen, wenn er gerufen
würde, und für einen oder zwei Tage strenge Diät empfehlen, -- ein wenig Taube,
ein Scheibchen Franzbrot ... ja, ja -- und mit gutem Gewissen versichern, daß es
für diesmal nichts zu bedeuten habe. (Buddenbrooks 39-40)

While the family’s banquets of “schwere und gute Dinge” and sedentary lifestyle occupy the
center of Dr. Grabow’s contemplations in this scene, the word ‘Lebensgewohnheiten’ implies a
broader sense of the Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois habits and family culture (Buddenbrooks
39). Free indirect speech reveals that, on the one hand, Dr. Grabow is unwilling to question the
Buddenbrooks’ lifestyle and values. He accepts them as self-evident practices shared by other
wealthy merchant families. His usual prescription of a strict diet involving roast pigeon and French bread is only a temporary remedy, which does more to ease his conscience than it does for his patients’ long-term health, and, with his repeated lines, “Ein wenig Taube, --ein wenig Franzbrot…,” Dr. Grabow himself becomes an object of humor and narrative irony (Buddenbrooks 40). At the same time, Dr. Grabow’s indulgent and somewhat mournful smile foreshadows a future crisis and prompts readers to reflect upon his reluctance to intervene.

Introducing the themes of death and decline, this scene provides an alternative narrative to the claim that ‘unbourgeois’ emotions ultimately lead to the Buddenbrooks’ demise. It suggests instead that the unsustainability of the Buddenbrooks’ lifestyle and inflexibility of the family’s bourgeois values contributed to their decline. Dr. Grabow is the first character in the novel to observe and ‘diagnose’ potential problems with the Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois lifestyle, yet the withholding of his criticisms and the narrator’s ironic treatment of his character suggest that he is not well-suited for cultural critique or reform. When interpreted in the context of Buddenbrooks as a whole, this scene demonstrates that it is not the physician, but the ironic artist who is most capable of using creative means to expose social problems and to evaluate and negotiate between emotional and cultural codes.

First evident in Dr. Grabow’s suppressed critique in Part I of Buddenbrooks, the sense that old bourgeois-aristocratic ways of life cannot endure in modern society becomes clearer as the narrative progresses. In the second half of the novel, passages alluding to the rapid modernization underway in the north German Hanseatic town communicate the perception that the changing conditions of modern society necessitate different ways of thinking and feeling. When Thomas first takes over the family firm, the narrator reports that he is “ganz voll von dem Wunsche, der Firma den Glanz zu wahren und zu mehren, der ihrem alten Namen entsprach,
liebte es überhaupt, im täglichen Kampf um den Erfolg seine Person einzusetzen”

(Buddenbrooks 293). Already at this point, however, Thomas admits through direct speech that his need to show his personality and engage directly in business negotiations does not correspond to the recent trend because “das kommt leider allmählich aus der Mode, dies persönliche Eingreifen des Kaufmannes…” and he already fears that “der Kaufmann eine immer banalere Existen wird, mit der Zeit” (Buddenbrooks 294). Changing business relations and a constantly increasing pace of work over the years lead to what the narrator tellingly calls “das freudlose Tempo” in the family firm (Buddenbrooks 514). References to these accelerating business conditions and the joyless work tempo indicate that it has become increasingly difficult to fulfill the first part of the family motto, “sey mit Lust bey den Geschäften am Tage” (Buddenbrooks 190, 530, emphasis added). For Thomas, the experience of a rapid, joyless work tempo contrasts so much with the motto’s romanticization of merchant life that he mocks it on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of the family firm: “‘Ja, ja,’ sagte er plötzlich mit ziemlich spöttischem Accent, ‘eine ungestörte Nachtruhe ist eine gute Sache…’” (Buddenbrooks 530).

The broader effects of modernization and recent developments in the town, as well as the inevitability of shifts in mentality are the subjects in the following passage, in which Thomas speaks with his barber, Herr Wenzel:

Das waren ganz behäbige und glückliche Generationen damals, und der Intimus meines Großvaters, wissen Sie, der gute Jean Jacques Hoffstede, spazierte umher und übersetzte kleine unanständige Gedichte aus dem Französischen ... aber beständig so weiter konnte es nicht gehen; es hat sich Vieles geändert und wird sich noch immer mehr ändern müssen ... Wir haben nicht mehr 37000 Einwohner, sondern schon über 50, wie Sie wissen, und der Charakter der Stadt ändert sich.
Da haben wir Neubauten, und die Vorstädte, die sich ausdehnen, und gute Straßen
und können die Denkmäler aus unserer großen Zeit restaurieren. Aber das ist am
Ende bloß äußerlich. Das Meiste vom Wichtigsten steht noch aus….

(Buddenbrooks 396)

Here, Thomas Buddenbrook speaks directly and without the narrator’s intervention through
irony, which suggests that the narrator is in agreement with Thomas’s characterization of the past
and modernity. With references to the social realities of population growth, building projects,
urbanization, and the evolving character of the town, this passage contains one of the most
extended and detailed comments about late nineteenth-century modernization in the novel. It
illustrates a simultaneous yearning for an unattainable past ideal, yet also recognizes the need for
new ways of thinking and feeling in the present. Thomas’s identification of the generations
represented by Johann Buddenbrook the elder and his friend Jean Jacques Hoffstede as
“behäbige und glückliche Generationen” historicizes their calm, unreflective happiness as an
emotional style shaped by the eighteenth-century French Enlightenment. His assertion,
“…beständig so weiter konnte es nicht gehen,” indicates a perceived discontinuity between past
and present ways of feeling. Mann’s use of the town poet Hoffstede to signify this previous way
of life that has been lost is revealing. It not only signals a movement away from the unreflective
irreverence and playful joviality (“scherzhafte Heiterkeit”) typical of this generation, but also
alludes to a changing perspective on the artist’s role in society (Buddenbrooks 198). Reminiscent
of a court jester, the poet Hoffstede functions primarily as an entertainer and amuses his high
bourgeois audiences with poems and suggestive jokes translated from French, welcome
diversions from the propriety and practicality of bourgeois merchant life. Hoffstede’s
characterization contrasts with Thomas’s construal of modern poets as artists who can express
their privileged inner life with self-assurance and beauty, and thereby enrich the emotional world of other people.\(^{18}\)

4.5 NEGOTIATING BETWEEN ‘BOURGEOIS’ AND ‘UNBOURGEOIS’ EMOTIONS

The narrator of Buddenbrooks, not to mention Mann himself, is a writer who closely resembles the type of modern artist Thomas Buddenbrook describes. Yet more than merely enriching the emotional world of readers with beautiful expressions of a privileged inner life, Mann and his narrator provide insight into nineteenth-century emotional styles, and, through narrative empathy and irony, subject them to critical assessment. Notwithstanding the historicization and subversion of the Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois lifestyle and emotional codes in the two passages cited above, the narrator also preserves his distance to the later generations’ decadent, ‘unbourgeois’ emotions. This distance is evident, for example, in the ironic portrayal of Christian’s eccentric and neurasthenic qualities and in the ironic, detached narration of Thomas’s undignified collapse in the street after a molar extraction and the townspeople’s bewildered reaction to his death ‘from a tooth.’\(^{19}\) Diverging from Nietzsche’s polemical use of genealogy, Mann’s application of a genealogical method in Buddenbrooks makes possible both the acknowledgement and critique of different ways of feeling, which, despite gradations, the novel depicts as a dualistic tension between ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ emotions. That the narrator

\(^{18}\) “…Dichter, die ihr bevorzugtes Innenleben mit Sicherheit und Schönheit auszusprechen vermögen und damit die Gefühlswelt der anderen Leute bereichern” (Buddenbrooks 290).

\(^{19}\) “An einem Zahne…Senator Buddenbrook war an einem Zahne gestorben, hieß es in der Stadt. Aber, zum Donnerwetter, daran starb man doch nicht!” (Buddenbrooks 759).
of *Buddenbrooks* strives for a balance between powerful, life-affirming emotions and decadent, introspective emotions becomes most apparent in light of the narrator’s rendering of the characteristic emotions enacted by Tony and Hanno.

### 4.5.1 Tony Buddenbrook’s Bourgeois Pride

As the only member of the family present from the first to the final chapter of the novel, Tony Buddenbrook is one of the few figures who could claim main character status in *Buddenbrooks*. Tony is also the figure most devoted to preserving her family’s honor and high bourgeois lifestyle. In spite of the male heirs’ gradual resignation to ‘unbourgeois’ feelings and the concurring decline of the family, Tony’s emotions remain fairly constant and predictable. Some critics have argued that, because Tony retains many of her childlike qualities, she does not develop or, even worse, that she becomes a caricature in the second half of the novel (compare, e.g., Kurzke 78; Worley 204). From an emotion studies perspective, Tony deserves careful consideration because of her close association with the emotion pride. With *Stolz/stolz* appearing 40 times and *Hochmut/hochmütig* appearing 14 times, the German emotion words for pride are mentioned in the novel directly, but the narrator also refers to Tony’s pride indirectly through free indirect speech and descriptions of Tony’s gestures and expressions. The pride that Tony exemplifies relates specifically to her high bourgeois-patrician class standing and family history. Her duties to her family are a primary source of pride, as the narrator reports: “Sie war sich ihrer Verpflichtungen gegen die Familie und die Firma wohl bewußt, und sie war stolz auf diese Verpflichtungen (*Buddenbrooks* 115). Tony continues to perceive the Buddenbrooks as above others and to defend her class pride and family honor until the very end, at which point, given the decline of the family, her pride might seem unwarranted. Although Tony’s pride, which does not
correspond to the reality of the family’s state of affairs at the end of the novel, becomes an object of narrative irony, Mann’s narrator does not fully dismiss her pride, arguably the most ‘bourgeois’ emotion featured in *Buddenbrooks*.

In the depiction of Tony and her bourgeois pride, Mann’s narrator alternates between empathy and irony. Internal focalization and free indirect speech, which blend Tony’s perspective with that of the narrator, convey narrative empathy. When Tony reads the Buddenbrook family chronicle before becoming engaged to her first husband, Bendix Grünlich, free indirect speech discloses her thoughts and emotions in response to reading her family history:


This passage reveals that it is not Jean’s appeal to Christian duty or mercy, but Tony’s own pride, sense of familial duty, and desire to contribute positively to the history of her family that ultimately motivates her to marry Grünlich. Aside from the narrator’s remark that Tony’s
personal importance was a feeling that was familiar to her [“das Gefühl persönlicher Wichtigkeit, das ihr vertraut war”], the narrator avoids irony and does not dismiss her feelings of family duty and pride in this scene. Detailed descriptions of Tony’s physiological reactions (“Die ehrerbietige Bedeutsamkeit…stieg ihr zu Kopf” and “ihr Herz pochte feierlich”) give substance to the narration of her emotions, showing how much she is moved by what she reads. Exclamatory statements convey Tony’s excitement and conviction to do her part for her family by agreeing to a marriage of convenience, one of the few ways possible for a high bourgeois woman of her time to bring honor to her family. With the knowledge that Tony does not love Grünlich, readers can appreciate her sacrifice for the sake of her family’s honor. Only in retrospect, after Tony divorces Grünlich, does this scene take on a tragicomic effect.

In other scenes, Mann’s narrator expresses skepticism towards Tony’s unreflective bourgeois pride. He refers to Tony’s admission of her penchant for luxury, and asserts that she würde mit der gleichen Ruhe erklärt haben, daß sie leichtsinnig, jähzornig, rachsüchtig sei. Ihr ausgeprägter Familiensinn entfremdete sie nahezu den Begriffen des freien Willens und der Selbstbestimmung und machte, daß sie mit einem beinahe fatalistischen Gleichmut ihre Eigenschaften feststellte und anerkannte … ohne Unterschied und ohne den Versuch, sie zu korrigieren. Sie war, ohne es selbst zu wissen, der Meinung, daß jede Eigenschaft, gleichviel welcher Art, ein Erbstück, eine Familientradition bedeute und folglich etwas Ehrwürdiges sei, wovor man in jedem Falle Respekt haben müsse. (Buddenbrooks 222)

Recalling Dr. Grabow’s suppressed critique of the Buddenbrooks’ bourgeois-aristocratic lifestyle, this passage is highly subversive. The narrator hints that Tony’s acceptance of tradition
and strong sense of family [Familiensinn] have negative consequences of which she remains unaware. It becomes evident in this passage that the narrator values the capacity to self-reflect, distinguish between one’s positive and negative attributes, and correct undesirable qualities. His humorous assertion that Tony would have considered even her frivolousness, quick temper, and vengefulness [Leichtsinn, Jähzorn, Rachsucht] inherited traits worthy of respect highlights and ridicules her own inability to do so. Tony’s tendency to view all of her habits, both positive and negative ones, as part of her Buddenbrook family inheritance and identity, and thus as dignified and honorable aspects of her personality, prevents her from modifying her emotions and behaviors. Despite changing social economic conditions that diminish material differences between ‘old money’ families like the Buddenbrooks and ‘parvenu’ families like the Hagenströms, Tony continues to perceive her family as above others because of their family history and, as a result, she clings to her inherited emotional code and value system. Narrative irony reveals skepticism toward Tony’s convictions and already suggests the need for an understanding of emotionality and identity development that allows for change over time. Consequently, Tony’s pride is exposed as unreflective and inflated. As the narrator suggests here, this impairs her free will and limits her self-development, which is the most important critique of the Buddenbrooks’ ‘bourgeois’ emotions expressed in the novel.

The extent to which Tony’s pride is depicted in Buddenbrooks suggests the importance of pride in Mann’s thinking about emotion at the fin de siècle. When the word ‘pride’ does not appear directly, it becomes evident in the narrator’s description of her body language: “Tony ihrerseits zog ein wenig die Schultern empor, legte den Kopf zurück, suchte trotzdem das Kinn auf die Brust zu drücken und grüßte gleichsam von einer unabsehbaren Höhe herab…” (Buddenbrooks 383). Through their repetition, these phrases that Mann uses to describe Tony’s
pride lend a comic element to the narration. Structurally, these narrative descriptions act as leitmotifs, highlighting the tenacity of Tony’s pride in contrast to the Buddenbrooks’ decline. In spite of it all, the narrator reports that Tony “war gewillt, den Kopf hoch zu tragen, solange sie über der Erde weilte und Menschen auf sie blickten” (*Buddenbrooks* 833). Tony’s ability to withstand hardships may cause readers to overlook the misfortunes she endures because of her desire to contribute to the Buddenbrook family honor and history. The narrator mockingly calls Tony’s airing of grievances against those who have wronged her and her family “kleine Trompetenstöße des Abscheus” [little trumpet blasts of disgust], but he also notes the positive effects of her ability to express her emotions openly: “Ihr Magen war nicht ganz gesund, aber ihr Herz war leicht und frei – sie wußte selbst nicht, wie sehr. Nichts Unausgesprochenes zehrte an ihr; kein stummes Erlebnis belastete sie. … Sie wußte, daß sie bewegte und arge Schicksale gehabt, aber all Das hatte ihr keinerlei Schwere und Müdigkeit hinterlassen…” (*Buddenbrooks* 739). Thus, Tony’s pride is life-affirming—despite occasional stomach problems, she remains healthy, and, in the final scene of the novel, her family pride plays a role in keeping the Buddenbrook women together. She takes possession of the Buddenbrook family chronicle after Hanno’s death and suggests that the women gather weekly to read the family papers after dinner, which shows that Tony holds on to her sense of family pride and honor.20 The emotion is undoubtedly subject to scrutiny, but moments of identification with Tony, together with the novel’s conclusion, show that pride, like Nietzsche’s will to power, has an important life-preserving function.

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20 “…solange ich am Leben bin, wollen wir hier zusammenhalten, wir paar Leute, die wir übrig bleiben…Einmal in der Woche kommt ihr zu mir zum Essen…Und dann lesen wir in den Familienpapieren-’ Sie berührte die Mappe, die vor ihr lag. ‘Ja, Gerda, ich übernehme sie mit Dank’” (*Buddenbrooks* 835).
4.5.2 Hanno Buddenbrook’s Decadent Sensibility

In many ways, Tony is a character foil to her nephew, Hanno Buddenbrook. Nowhere is this clearer than in the analogous scene in which Hanno reads the Buddenbrook family chronicle, as Tony had done years earlier: “Mit einem Bein auf dem Schreibsessel knieend, das weich gewellte hellbraune Haar in die flache Hand gestützt, musterte Hanno das Manuskript, ein wenig von der Seite, mit dem matt-kritischen und ein bißchen verächtlichen Ernst einer vollkommenen Gleichgültigkeit…” (Buddenbrooks 575). Unlike Tony, Hanno does not become filled with pride or the desire to assume the expected role in the family upon reading the chronicle; the narrator’s account emphasizes his apathy, if not contempt. For him, the Buddenbrook family tree is merely “das ganze genealogische Gewimmel,” not something with which he identifies (Buddenbrooks 575). While Tony exhibits a life-affirming sense of family pride and infatuation with the high bourgeois-aristocratic lifestyle, Hanno exemplifies life-negating pity, fear, and hopelessness and an aversion to the bourgeois world. With Hanno, ‘unbourgeois’ emotions reach their climax and the Buddenbrook family line ends.

Considering Nietzsche’s influence on Thomas Mann, it is probably not surprising that the ‘sensitive latecomer’ Hanno exhibits many of the emotions and qualities that Nietzsche diagnosed as symptoms of decadence, including pity, ‘emasculated’ emotions, pessimism, mistrust of life, hopelessness, diseased refinement, and introspection (see Nietzsche GM Vorrede §5, §6; GM II §7, §16). Although the figure Hanno is less psychologically complex than Thomas Buddenbrook, Hanno inspires more compassion, both from the narrator and readers, due to the blending of his perspective with that of the narrator and the detailed depictions of his suffering. The avoidance of narrative irony is another sign of the narrator’s alignment with Hanno, whose emotions and experiences are generally represented with greater intensity than those of the other
figures. This evidence suggests that Mann and his narrator demonstrate more acceptance of and identification with Hanno’s decadent emotionality than Nietzsche would have afforded. Even so, *Buddenbrooks* also registers the potential dangers of Hanno’s decadent sensibility—in addition to distancing techniques, as applied in the penultimate chapter, the *Typhus-Kapitel*, the other characters voice their concerns about Hanno, often in a very Nietzschean way.

Internal focalization and interior monologue are used to convey Hanno’s thoughts and emotions in most of the scenes in which he appears, and several of these depict Hanno’s reception or own performances of music or poetry. On the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of the Buddenbrook family firm, Hanno prepares to recite a poem, but his mother’s attempt to provide reassurance (“Keine Aufregung!”) inspires just the opposite reaction, which the narrator reports through free indirect speech and interior monologue:

> Er wußte wohl, was geschehen würde. Er würde weinen müssen, vor Weinen dies Gedicht nicht beenden können … weinen, wie es immer geschah, wenn man von ihm verlangte, daß er sich produziere, ihn examinierte, ihn auf seine Fähigkeit und Geistesgegenwart prüfte, wie Papa das liebte. Hätte nur Mama lieber nichts von Aufregung gesagt! Es sollte eine Ermutigung sein, aber sie war verfehlt, das fühlte er. Da standen sie und sahen ihn an. Sie fürchteten und erwarteten, daß er weinen werde…war es da möglich, *nicht* zu weinen? (*Buddenbrooks* 532)

Free indirect speech blends the narrator’s report with Hanno’s own thoughts and feelings in this passage, but the irony that commonly accompanies free indirect speech for other characters in *Buddenbrooks* is decidedly absent. Narrative irony is neither necessary nor possible because it typically operates on a discrepancy between reality and appearance or the ignorance of a character, and the narrator admits Hanno’s knowledge (“Er wußte wohl…“), not ignorance.
Hanno, whose introspection gives him an uncanny awareness of his own feelings and motivations and those of others, easily predicts what will happen next: he will cry before he finishes his recitation of the poem. Due to the blurring of perspectives, it remains unclear whether the rhetorical question at the end (“war es da möglich, nicht zu weinen?”) is Hanno’s own thought or a question posed by the narrator to readers. Either way, the passage as a whole suspends judgment and enacts empathy for Hanno’s situation.

Yet the same scene also conveys another perspective. Just as Hanno predicts, his father tests his abilities. Employing limited narration to heighten the emotional impact of the scene, the narrator notes that “die Wimpern hielt [Hanno] so tief gesenkt, daß nichts von seinen Augen zu sehen war. Wahrscheinlich schwammen schon Thränen darin” (Buddenbrooks 533). Thereafter, the narrator uses free indirect speech to communicate Thomas’s perspective: “Das war grausam, und der Senator wußte wohl, daß er dem Kinde damit den letzten Rest von Haltung und Widerstandskraft raubte. Aber der Junge sollte ihn sich nicht rauben lassen! Er sollte sich nicht beirren lassen! Er sollte Festigkeit und Männlichkeit gewinnen…” (Buddenbrooks 533). The blending of the narrator and character perspectives makes it difficult to distinguish whether the phrase “Das war grausam,” which undoubtedly refers to Thomas’s relentless demands of Hanno, reflects Thomas’s own admission of his cruelty or the narrator’s condemnation. Although the passages cited above demonstrate empathy for Hanno, Thomas’s thoughts, in this very Nietzschean moment, reflect a genuine concern for Hanno and the desire to teach him strength and resistance, so as not to allow others to rob him of his power. Significantly, Tony voices similar concerns in conversation with Hanno’s governess, Ida Jungmann, in another passage: “Aber ich will dir sagen, Ida, es ist nicht gut, ich halte es nicht für gut, daß ihm Alles so nahe geht. … Das Kind – so viel weiß ich schon – neigt dazu, Alle Dinge zu sehr zu Herzen zu
nehmen… Das muß an ihm zehren, glaube mir” (*Buddenbrooks* 510). The two women discuss Hanno’s tendency to cry so easily while reading poetry, and, although the narrator alludes to Tony’s lack of insight into her own emotions, she recognizes the danger of Hanno’s decadent sensibility. While Hanno is highly introspective, he lacks the resistance Tony possesses, which explains why she voices her concerns so clearly.

We find the most extensive use of internal focalization and interior monologue for Hanno in Part XI Chapter 2, better known as the *Schulkapitel*. The narrator’s empathy with Hanno in this chapter is especially evident in the critical depiction of Kandidat Modersohn, the English teacher on trial at Hanno’s school. Internal focalization and free indirect speech convey Hanno’s introspection and ability to see through the actions of Herr Modersohn, who singles Hanno out for his weakness and tyrannizes him, using him as a scapegoat when the other students misbehave. Alternating with free indirect speech, interior monologue conveys Hanno’s thoughts and feelings in response to his punishment:

Selbst das Mitleid wird einem auf Erden durch die Gemeinheit unmöglich gemacht, dachte Hanno. Ich nehme nicht daran teil, Sie zu quälen und auszubeuten, Kandidat Modersohn, weil ich das brutal, häßlich und gewöhnlich finde, und wie antworten Sie mir? Aber so ist es, so ist es, so wird es immer und überall sich verhalten, dachte er, und Furcht und Übelkeit stiegen wieder in ihm auf. Und daß ich Sie obendrein so widerlich deutlich durchschauen muß!...

(*Buddenbrooks* 814)

Recalling Nietzsche’s arguments against the modern ‘Mitleids-Moral,’ this passage provides an illustration of the potential danger of pity, which both Hanno and the narrator recognize here. Hanno demonstrates compassion for Modersohn, but the teacher only uses it to assert power and
authority over Hanno by mistreating him. Despite the perception that “Selbst das Mitleid […]
einem auf Erden durch die Gemeinheit unmöglich gemacht [wird],” compassion or pity is only
exposed as dangerous when it is applied to cruel (Modersohn) or dishonest (Grünlich)
individuals who try to exploit others. When Hanno shows compassion for his father, who
agonizes over the thought of Gerda’s unfaithfulness with Lieutenant von Throta, the narrator
describes its positive effect: the foreignness and coldness in their father-son relationship melt
away (see Buddenbrooks 716). Hence, the narrator of Buddenbrooks does not attack Hanno’s
decadent sensibility or pity, but, as we saw in the critique of Tony’s emotions, he values the
ability to distinguish between situations and modify one’s behaviors.

Focalized almost entirely from Hanno’s perspective, the Schulkapitel, which concludes
with the narrator’s comment “Dies war ein Tag aus dem Leben des kleinen Johann,” illustrates in
great detail how Hanno perceives the world (Buddenbrooks 828). The narrator’s use of the
indefinite article (“ein Tag”) suggests that this day, which begins with Hanno’s feelings of fear,
disgust, and sickness at school and ends with his melancholic retreat into the tragic and ecstatic
realm of Wagnerian music, is nothing out of the ordinary, but a common occurrence. Although
the Schulkapitel depicts only a single day in Hanno’s life, it is the longest chapter in
Buddenbrooks. Compared to the novel’s other chapters, which generally cover longer periods of
narrated time, the Schulkapitel slows down the narrative speed dramatically, thus intensifying the
narration of Hanno’s thoughts and emotions. Thus, Mann’s narrator does not dismiss Hanno’s
fears, suffering, and exhaustion, but gives them an even greater impression of reality.

The subsequent Typhus-Kapitel marks a shift in narrative technique. Utilizing the form of
an entry on typhus found in a nineteenth-century medical manual, the narrator reports Hanno’s
death indirectly in this chapter. A distanced, impersonal medical description of the different
stages of the disease that ultimately claims Hanno’s life serves to report his experience of the illness and final days. Hanno is not even mentioned by name in the *Typhus-Kapitel*; instead, ‘der Mensch,’ ‘der Patient,’ and the pronoun ‘er’ add to its impersonal, diagnostic tone (see *Buddenbrooks* 828-832). The conclusion of the chapter implies that it is possible for the typhus patient to recover, i.e. that the patient himself has the power to choose between life and death:

> Wallt es dann auf in ihm, wie ein Gefühl der feigen Pflichtversäumnis, der Scham, der erneuten Energie, des Mutes und der Freude, der Liebe und Zugehörigkeit zu dem spöttischen, bunten und brutalen Getriebe, das er im Rücken gelassen: wie weit er auch auf dem fremden, heißen Pfade fortgeirrt sein mag, er wird umkehren und leben. Aber zuckt er zusammen vor Furcht und Abneigung bei der Stimme des Lebens, die er vernimmt, bewirkt diese Erinnerung, dieser lustige, herausfordernde Laut, daß er den Kopf schüttelt und in Abwehr die Hand hinter sich streckt und sich vorwärts flüchtet auf dem Wege, der sich ihm zum Entrinnen eröffnet hat ... nein, es ist klar, dann wird er sterben. –

(*Buddenbrooks* 832)

Yet Hanno embraces the negation of the will outlined in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and, out of fear of and aversion to the “Stimme des Lebens” [voice of life], chooses death. Here, the life-negating potential of Hanno’s decadent sensibility is fully realized. In this way, by suggesting that the sensibility fashionable in late nineteenth-century European society could impair the will to live, the novel participates in the *fin-de-siècle* discourses of decadence and neurasthenia. As if to keep sentimentalism at bay and offset the narrative empathy shown in previous chapters, the *Typhus-Kapitel* reflects an attempt to create more distance between the narrator or readers and
Hanno. By way of its emotional restraint, however, the composed, detached manner of narration nonetheless appeals to empathy.

4.6 HETEROPATHIA AS EXPRESSION OF MANN’S ‘POETIC CRITICISM’

As illustrated by the examples of Tony’s bourgeois pride and Hanno’s decadent, unbourgeois sensibility, neither way of feeling is fully embraced or invalidated in the novel. Hence, the manner in which Buddenbrooks scrutinizes and historicizes nineteenth-century emotional codes is relativist in orientation, yet the novel does not fully defend a position of emotional and moral relativism. Mann’s empathetic-ironic narrative style is selective: it allows readers more fully to comprehend the emotions and motivations of figures like Tony, Hanno, and Thomas Buddenbrook despite skepticism toward their perspectives, while figures like Tony’s ex-husbands, Bendix Grünlich and Alois Permaneder, and Christian Buddenbrook are portrayed more critically. In order to claim that Buddenbrooks espouses moral relativism, one would have to overlook these partialities and the novel’s critical depiction of the emotional regime at Hanno’s school. Instead, the novel exemplifies Mann’s ‘dichterischer Kritizismus’ or poetic criticism, distinguished by its ‘relentless quest for knowledge through observation and its critical incisiveness of expression.’

In the Schulkapitel more than any other chapter of Buddenbrooks, Thomas Mann resists relativism and exposes troubling contradictions in the modern period. Early in the chapter, the narrator reports that the Gothic architectural style of the old monastery school, once attended by

21 “…die Rücksichtslosigkeit der beobachtenden Erkenntnis und die kritische Pragnanz des Ausdrucks…” (Mann, Essays I: 45).
Thomas and Christian Buddenbrook and now by Hanno, was preserved. The maintenance of the Gothic ribbed vaults contrasts with the efforts to modernize the school facilities after German unification in 1871:

Der Stil des Ganzen war gewahrt worden, und über Korridoren und Kreuzgängen spannten sich feierlich die gotischen Gewölbe. Was aber die Beleuchtung und Heizung, was die Geräumigkeit und Helligkeit der Klassen, die Behaglichkeit der Lehrerzimmer, die praktische Einrichtung der Säle für Chemie-, Physik- und Zeichenunterricht betraf, so herrschte der vollste Komfort der Neuzeit….

*(Buddenbrooks 780)*

The narrator catalogues these improvements in heating, lighting, and classroom equipment, all of which herald a ‘Neuzeit’ [modern period] characterized by rapid developments and greater comfort. Yet an ellipsis in the final clause suspends the narration and indicates that the narrator’s initial comments only tell part of the story. Focusing on these modern conveniences temporarily obscures a more significant change in the atmosphere of the school, namely, that “…ein anderer, ein neuer Geist in die alte Schule eingezogen [war]” *(Buddenbrooks 796)*. Mann’s telling choice of the verb *herrschen* [to dominate; to reign] in this passage already alludes to an oppressive emotional regime that is later shown to have transformed the school during the Wilhelmine Era.

Only 16 pages later, after internal focalization enables readers to observe through Hanno’s eyes the Wilhelmine authoritarianism and militarism instituted at the school, does the narrator resume his remarks about the changes that have taken place. Readers learn that when Prussian Direktor Wulicke takes over the school in 1871, the founding year of the *Deutsches Kaiserreich*, “Autorität, Pflicht, Macht, Dienst, Karriere,” together with the “kategorische
Imperativ unseres Philosophen Kant,” 22 become the key values and motto impressed upon students (*Buddenbrooks* 796). The following speculations of Mann’s narrator cast doubt upon these values and the progress and comfort of the modern period: “Allein es blieb die Frage, ob nicht früher, als weniger Komfort der Neuzeit und ein bißchen mehr Gutmütigkeit, Gemüt, Heiterkeit, Wohlwollen und Behagen in diesen Räumen geherrscht hatte, die Schule ein sympathischeres und segenvolleres Institut gewesen war...” (*Buddenbrooks* 796). Although the narrator avoids the direct condemnation of Direktor Wulicke and his authoritarian emotional regime in this passage, this follow-up to his initial comments complicates the reader’s first impression of the school and reflects a strong preference for pre-1871 conditions over the comforts of the modern period. Judged against the string of positively connoted substantives (“Gutmütigkeit, Gemüt, Heiterkeit, Wohlwollen und Behagen”), all of which signify good-heartedness or bonhomie, the expression “der vollste Komfort der Neuzeit” appears shallow and insincere (*Buddenbrooks* 780; 796). This passage implies that modern conveniences and technology contribute only in a superficial way to human well-being and comfort. Moreover, it cautions that modernization and the humanization of social and emotional codes do not always coincide. Thus, by raising such ethical questions about modernization in the *Schulkapitel*, Mann’s *Buddenbrooks* promotes the critical examination of emotional codes and social practices, not a moral relativism that tolerates malevolence. 23 Here, the ellipsis and rhetorical question

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22 The narrator’s reference to Kant’s categorical imperative in this context recalls Nietzsche’s comment about its cruelty in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*: “Und dürfte man nicht hinzufügen, das jene Welt im Grunde einen gewissen Geruch von Blut und Folter niemals wieder ganz eingebüßt habe? (selbst beim alten Kant nicht: der kategorische Imperativ riecht nach Grausamkeit...)” (*GM* II §6).

23 We find a similar reference to the limits of moral relativism or tolerance in a dictum from Mann’s *Zauberberg* (1924). Settembrini instructs Hans Castorp “Prägen Sie sich immerhin ein, daß Toleranz zum Verbrechen wird, wenn sie dem Bösen gilt” (*Zauberberg* Chapter 6, “Als Soldat und brav”).
(“Allein, es blieb die Frage, ob…”) do not convey the narrator’s uncertainty as much as they serve to open up a dialogue and involve readers in the search for an answer.

Mann’s narrator portrays the emotional regime at Hanno’s school unsympathetically and disapprovingly in the Schulkapitel. Since Buddenbrooks depicts both positive and negative aspects and outcomes of all other emotional styles, however, no single way of feeling emerges as completely unproblematic or exempt from critique. Instead, the novel negotiates between bourgeois and unbourgeois orientations to emotion and self-reflexively locates this act of mediation within the processes of literary creation and reception. Offering readers opportunities to identify with and distance themselves from the perspectives of the figures represented in the diegetic world, literary works permit the experimentation with and evaluation of contrasting emotional styles and value systems.

4.7 KAI GRAF MÖLLN: MODERN ARTIST AND STRUCTURAL METAPHOR FOR THE MEDIATION OF EMOTION IN BUDDENBROOKS

In Buddenbrooks, the figure Kai Graf Mölln best embodies this kind of artistic mediation, which Mann termed ‘Mittlertum.’ Like Hanno, the aspiring young writer Kai is sensitive to the ways of the world and possesses a highly developed critical gaze, which enables him to see through [durchschauen] individual motivations and social practices. Despite Hanno and Kai’s similar perceptive capacities, common status as decadent young artists, and mutual homoeroticism, the

24 For Mann, ‘Mittlertum’ or the mediation of the artist is the source from which irony arises. He discusses ‘Mittlertum’ in his Schopenhauer essay (1938): “Die vermittelnde Aufgabe des Künstlers, seine hermetisch-zauberhafte Rolle als Mittler zwischen oberer und unterer Welt, zwischen Idee und Erscheinung, Geist und Sinnlichkeit kommt hier zum Vorschein…. Dies Mittlertum ist die Quelle der Ironie” (GW IX 534).
two figures stand in sharp contrast to each other. While Hanno represents the last male heir of a declining bourgeois merchant family, Kai comes from an aristocratic family that has already seen its demise. The two friends also differ in their expression of masculinity, with Kai performing a “stürmisch aggressive Männlichkeit” that acts as a counterweight to Hanno’s subdued, refined manner (*Buddenbrooks* 569). The most significant difference between the two figures, however, is evident in their orientations toward emotion and artistic creation. The distinction between the two artists’ emotions is voiced most clearly in Hanno’s dialogue with Kai in the *Schulkapitel*:


Hanno’s self-characterization in this passage exemplifies exactly that which Nietzsche detests in modern society: weariness with humanity and weakness. He cites his all-encompassing fear (“Ich fürchte mich vor dem Ganzen”), denial of the will to live (“Ich möchte sterben…ich kann nichts wollen”), worries (“vielerlei Sorgen”), and hopelessness (“Ich habe gar keine Hoffnung). Hanno’s improvisations of Wagnerian music become the means by which to enact these
emotions and escape the bourgeois world. In Kai, Hanno sees the qualities that he himself lacks, namely, courage ("Du hast mehr Mut") and pride ("du … bist stolz"). These emotions, along with Kai’s sense of humor and desire to write, facilitate the artistic process. Unlike Hanno, Kai possesses a powerful will to live and to create, which allow him to productively transform his experiences through irony in his stories and produce beautiful works for the enjoyment of others.

Critics might consider Kai a minor character in *Buddenbrooks* because he only appears or is mentioned in five chapters of the novel, and only in scenes in which Hanno is also present. Nevertheless, I find sufficient evidence to make the case that Kai is the true stand-in for Mann’s vision of the modern artist. Kai has much in common with Mann’s narrator: he demonstrates a realist conception of art, mastery of irony, affection for Hanno, and fascination with the theme of decline, as his aspiration to write a story like Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher” reveals. Moreover, Kai essentially serves as a structural metaphor for the mediation of emotion in *Buddenbrooks*. This sensitive yet ironic artist figure highlights what Mann’s novel does as an aesthetic whole, namely, mediate between narrative empathy and irony at the extradiegetic level, and life-affirming pride and decadent sensibility at the intradiegetic level.

The details of Kai’s story prove significant for the understanding of Mann’s perspective on emotion, decadence, and artistic mediation (*Mittlertum*) around 1900. This characterization of Kai in the *Schulkapitel*, especially Hanno’s allusion to his pride (“du…bist stolz…Ich kann das

25 Kai appears in Part VIII Chapter 7, Part X Chapters 2 and 3, and Part XI Chapter 2 (*Schulkapitel*). In the final chapter of the novel (Part XI Chapter 4), his name is also mentioned once by the narrator, who recounts how before Hanno’s death “Kai hatte ihm [Hanno] unaufhörlich beide Hände geküßt” (*Buddenbrooks* 836)

26 “Kais Geschichten […] gewannen an Interesse dadurch, daß sie nicht gänzlich in der Luft standen, sondern von der Wirklichkeit ausgingen und diese in ein seltsames und geheimnisvolles Licht rückten…” (*Buddenbrooks* 572).

nicht”) invites a comparison with the narrative rendering of Tony’s pride. Alternately termed 
*Stolz* or *Hochmut*, Tony’s pride is life-affirming, but it derives entirely from her strong 
identification with her class identity and family history. Kai’s pride is not grounded in such 
narrow terms as social class or familial distinction, but in a more general concept of human self-
worth and the desire to contribute to society through his art. Significantly, Kai’s pride and will to 
create, in contrast to Tony’s class-based *Hochmut* and love of all things *vornehm*, do not become 
objects of narrative irony in *Buddenbrooks*. Consequently, while Mann uses the figure Kai, who 
shows the creative power of decadent sensibility and introspection, to problematize Nietzsche’s 
disseminate view of *fin-de-siècle* decadence, the novel suggests that powerful, life-affirming 
emotions like pride, courage, and a zeal for life are also necessary.

### 4.8 CONCLUSION

My reading of heteropathia in *Buddenbrooks* in this chapter demonstrates that Thomas 
Mann, much like Theodor Fontane and Lou Andreas-Salomé, addresses the *fin-de-siècle* 
dilemma of how to negotiate between emotional codes and social mores and find a new point of 
orientation in the course of rapid cultural change. Yet the multigenerational family saga structure 
of *Buddenbrooks* sets Mann’s novel apart from *Effi Briest* and *Fenitschka*, both of which cover a 
much shorter span of narrated time. Depicting the gradual deterioration of the Buddenbrooks’ 
bourgeois emotional code and transition to other, ‘unbourgeois’ ways of feeling in the course of 
four generations, *Buddenbrooks* offers critical assessments of a range of emotional styles through 
its empathetic-ironic narration. The narrator’s treatment of Tony’s bourgeois pride and devotion 
to the Buddenbrook family honor in contradistinction to Hanno’s decadent sensibility,
introspection, and pity best illustrates the novel’s negotiation between bourgeois and unbourgeois emotions. Mann draws on a Nietzschean genealogical method for this purpose, but his approach also contrasts with that of Nietzsche, who used genealogy to discredit modern morality and scorned the ‘effeminization of emotions’ [“Gefühlsverweichlichung”], diseased refinement [“krankhafte Verzärtlichung”], and introspection that he diagnosed in late nineteenth-century Europe (see Nietzsche *GM* Preface §6; *GM* II §7, §24). Rather than advance a single ideological viewpoint, Mann uses genealogy to find a middle ground between the unwavering bourgeois pride and self-confidence stimulated by German programmatic realism and the decadent sensibility that became fashionable at the *fin de siècle*.

With its figure of the young writer Kai, who exemplifies both powerful, life-affirming pride and decadent sensibility, *Buddenbrooks* imagines the artist as the one most capable of negotiating between differing ways of feeling. Kai’s irony and strong will to live and to create for the enjoyment of others sustain him, preventing him from suffering the same fate as Hanno. Thus, it is Kai, not Hanno, who best represents Mann’s vision of the modern artist and ideal of poetic criticism. To use the words that Mann put into the mouth of his figure Thomas Buddenbrook, “Es wird immer Menschen geben, die zu diesem Interesse an sich selbst, diesem eingehenden Beobachten ihrer Empfindungen berechtigt sind, Dichter, die ihr bevorzugtes Innenleben mit Sicherheit und Schönheit auszusprechen vermögen und damit die Gefühlswelt der anderen Leute bereichern” (*Buddenbrooks* 290). These words describe Thomas Mann’s own contributions as a writer—yet his debut novel, *Buddenbrooks*, does not simply enrich, but also provides insight into the emotional world of his readers, bourgeois and unbourgeois alike.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS

“We have to learn to think differently in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently.”¹

What does it mean to ‘feel differently’? For Friedrich Nietzsche in the above passage from §103 of Morgenröte, feeling differently is a necessary step toward achieving the transvaluation of all moral values. Although Nietzsche’s aphorism provided the initial inspiration for the title of this dissertation, my analysis has shown that the literary works discussed here represent positions that are more moderate. The authors of these works, particularly Lou Andreas-Salomé and Thomas Mann, were undeniably influenced by Nietzschean thought; however, these ‘heteropathic’ texts negotiate between differing affective perspectives, rather than call for a new morality or prescribe one way of feeling. In light of the analysis offered in the preceding chapters, “Feeling Differently at the Fin de Siècle” reflects three distinct insights: 1. that emotions have a history, 2. that differing emotional styles existed simultaneously at the fin de siècle, and 3. that literary works created spaces for readers to feel differently during this period of unprecedented Kulturwandel. These three understandings implied by my title summarize the primary contributions of my dissertation.

¹ “Wir haben umzulernen, – um endlich, vielleicht sehr spät, noch mehr zu erreichen: umzufühlen” (Nietzsche, Morgenröte Book II §103).

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As an intervention in the interdisciplinary field of emotion studies, my dissertation has taken up the question of the history of emotions. The premise that emotions are always-already social guided my discussions in each chapter. Since emotions arise in social and institutional contexts that change over time, I argued that emotions also have a history. In an attempt to build a bridge between the history of emotions and literary studies, my project investigated how literary works have represented emotions, taken up extra-literary emotion discourses, and contributed to the emotion discourse of their own time. Examples cited from literary and non-literary texts provided evidence that emotions such as compassion and honor have been conceptualized and valued differently through cultural history. In addition, my analyses have drawn attention to emotional practices that were part of the emotional repertoire in late nineteenth-century Wilhelmine society, i.e. decadent sensibility, bourgeois pride, masculine honor, and feminine shame, all of which have largely fallen out of fashion or declined in relevance since the early twentieth century.

By focusing on the fin de siècle, however, this project contributes primarily to scholarship on the literature and history of Wilhelmine Germany around 1900. After 1871, the Deutsches Kaiserreich became increasingly differentiated and pluralized, and this, together with the accelerated and irregular nature of modernization, had a destabilizing effect. Particularly the turn of the century in Wilhelmine society is often described as having been riddled by cultural tensions and contradictions (compare Marchand and Lindenfeld 1-6). My analysis of emotion in literary and non-literary sources of this period has offered new insights into these tensions. I have shown that emotional codes and social mores—especially the ‘social’ emotions of compassion, honor, shame, love, pride, and pity—were contested topics of public and intellectual debate around 1900. A co-presence of differing orientations to these emotions is evident in the fin-de-
siècle literary works analyzed in this dissertation, as my discussions of heteropathia in each chapter have attested.

The question of how writers have represented emotions in literary works written during periods of rapid social change guided this research and narrowed my focus on the fin de siècle, more precisely, the 1890s. Yet literature does not simply represent emotions. Nor does literature merely supply emotional scripts, which passive readers then imitate. Literary works, because of their capacity to affectively engage readers, can crystallize readers’ emotions and values, call these into question, negotiate between differing emotional styles, and imagine and validate alternatives. In the preceding chapters, I suggested that fin-de-siècle literary works negotiated between late nineteenth-century emotional codes and social mores and created spaces for readers to feel differently during a period of uncertainty and rapid cultural change. My readings of Effi Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks have demonstrated how these works juxtapose, subvert, and validate differing affective perspectives and provide opportunities for readers to reflect critically upon their own emotions and values.

Through these contributions, I have made the case for a more nuanced way of reading emotion in German literary and cultural history. The perceived antithesis between emotion and reason continues to influence how the German literary and cultural periods are taught and understood. This especially holds true for late nineteenth-century German Realism, which, when compared to German Romanticism, is often considered ‘unemotional’ or ‘repressed.’ It is an oversimplification, however, to say that each cultural period exalted or appealed more either to the emotions or to reason. In an effort to go beyond this tendency to dismiss emotions or describe them narrowly in terms of emotional (non-)expression or intensity, this dissertation has examined how, for which reasons, and to what effect fin-de-siècle German literary works written
in the realist mode represent emotions. Defining emotions as embodied, discursive social practices rather than simple, involuntary affective responses, has enabled me to focus on literary representations of emotion in relation to the socio-cultural contexts in which emotions arise and are given meaning.

For the purpose of my literary analysis, I developed the concept heteropathia, along with a method of reading the heteropathic representation of emotion in novelistic prose texts. Heteropathia refers to the co-presence of differing ways of feeling represented within a single literary work or cultural object. It expands the focus of Bakhtinian discourse analysis to examine not the unity of diverse utterances or social speech types in the novel, but the narration of and interaction between distinct affective perspectives as they are presented in a single text. In addition to Bakhtinian analysis, I have drawn on and adapted approaches in narrative theory and interdisciplinary research on emotion for this methodology. My analyses of heteropathia in Effi Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks concentrated on the three aspects of a novelistic prose text that significantly influence the mediation of emotion in the work as a whole: narrative situation (voice and focalization), representations of emotional styles, and references to theoretical models of emotion. My readings have broken new ground in interpreting these canonical texts because I investigated previously neglected aspects of these works, and, with the concept heteropathia, I have proposed an alternate and nonreductive way of analyzing emotion in German literary history.

In the preceding chapters, I explored how heteropathia manifests itself in three German novelistic prose works written in the realist mode around 1900: Theodor Fontane’s Effi Briest (1895), Lou Andreas-Salomé’s Fenitschka (1898), and Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks: Verfall einer Familie (1901). These works evidence a deep engagement with extra-literary emotion
discourses and social questions that were of central importance at the fin de siècle. They indicate the authors’ awareness of and concerns with the most pressing issues of the time, including the women’s movement, modernization, social leveling, decadence, gendered social mores, morality, shifting social relations, and changes in business and family life. Emotion is at once an end itself and the means by which these writers represent differing perspectives on these social questions. My analyses have revealed how each novel concentrates on different emotions and social contexts, and resonates with distinct theoretical models of emotion. Yet I have found that all three works attend to a crisis in emotional codes and social mores in European culture around 1900 and depict broad cultural shifts as coinciding with, or even necessitating, shifts in affective perspectives in modern society.

In Chapter Two, I demonstrated how compassion and honor are represented as emotional antipodes associated with different moral systems in Fontane’s Effi Briest. The nineteenth-century aristocratic and bourgeois emotional code of honor preserved social hierarchies and defended retributive justice. Mitleid or compassion, by contrast, implied solidarity and the softening of social mores. The tension between these two ways of feeling is enacted most vividly in the servants’ responses to the news of Effi’s adultery, Innstetten’s duel, and Crampas’s death, but this tension manifests itself throughout the entire novel. My interpretation has shown that Effi Briest makes room for compassion in a society undergoing modernization by critically examining and subverting the emotional imperatives of masculine honor and feminine shame. My analysis has confirmed that Fontane was influenced by Schopenhauer’s Mitleidsethik, the theoretical model of emotion that structures Effi Briest. Fontane’s novel does not imagine a society driven only by compassion, however. Instead, in Effi Briest Fontane adapts the philosopher’s ethics of compassion to fit his own worldview. The novel ultimately acknowledges
the need for both compassion and self-regulatory emotions, and its open ending enables the
dialogic negotiation between affective perspectives to continue.

Unlike Fontane’s *Effi Briest*, which inspires compassion for its passive title heroine,
Andreas-Salomé’s *Fenitschka* (1898) constructs an active heroine who pursues self-realization
and, in resistance to late nineteenth-century gendered emotional codes and social mores, defines
her own emotional style, as I have shown in Chapter Three. Written against the historical
background of the *Sittlichkeitsbewegung* and women’s movement, *Fenitschka* examines differing
views on nineteenth-century romantic love and feminine shame, passivity, and sexual purity. The
novella negotiates between differing orientations to the emotions of feminine shame and love,
which it places in dialogue through its title heroine, Fenia, and extradiegetic-homodiegetic
narrator and character focalizer, Max. The novella contributes to the *fin-de-siècle* emotion
discourse by critiquing gendered emotional imperatives and double standards through the
subversion of Max’s male gaze and attempts to categorize Fenia. Initially, Max assumes that all
refined ladies must feel the same: they desire sensation, seek love within marriage, and feel
shame and fear for their reputation. In her conversations with Max, Fenia questions the
‘naturalness’ and universality of these emotional practices, however. My reading of *Fenitschka*
highlights a shift from an essentialist model to a performative model of emotion that
acknowledges emotional alterity, a shift that corresponds to Max’s *Bildung* through the course of
the novella. Through both its title heroine and narrator, *Fenitschka* champions self-realization
and validates alternate ways of feeling, albeit not without admitting the difficulty in challenging
dominant cultural narratives.

As the longest of the three literary works studied in my dissertation, Mann’s
multigenerational novel *Buddenbrooks* stands apart from *Effi Briest* and *Fenitschka*. In Chapter
Four I demonstrated how the novel offers a critique of a wide range of emotional styles, from unreflective bourgeois pride to life-negating decadent sensibility, across four generations. Established ‘bourgeois’ emotional codes become increasingly difficult to preserve in the diegetic world of *Buddenbrooks*. The Buddenbrooks’ high bourgeois pride becomes ever more ironic in view of the rise of the *nouveaux riches* and other signs of social leveling depicted in the second half of the novel. In response to an ever-increasing work tempo in a rapidly modernizing society, life-negating decadent sensibility emerges as an alternate form of feeling. I suggested that Mann draws on a Nietzschean genealogical approach in *Buddenbrooks*, but, rather than advancing a single ideological viewpoint, Mann uses genealogy to mediate between these ‘bourgeois’ and ‘unbourgeois’ emotions. *Buddenbrooks* self-reflexively highlights the role of literature in renegotiating emotional codes and social mores through its figure of the young writer Kai, who embodies both life-affirming pride and artistic sensibility. Kai, who, in contrast to Hanno, represents the creative power of decadent sensibility and introspection, problematizes Nietzsche’s dismissive view of *fin-de-siècle* decadence. Yet, through its association of Tony’s and Kai’s pride with vitality, the novel suggests that powerful, life-affirming emotions like pride and courage are also important. Thus, Mann’s *Buddenbrooks* most clearly recognizes that which I have argued all three *fin-de-siècle* novels do, namely, negotiate among differing orientations to emotion, offer social critique, and validate alternate ways of feeling.

My interpretations of *Effi Briest*, *Fenitschka*, and *Buddenbrooks* have demonstrated that the heteropathic representation of emotion in these turn-of-the-century literary works evokes a sense of the period’s transitional status, contradictions, and social tensions. These novels feature literary techniques such as focalization shifts, free indirect speech, thought report, and narrative irony, all of which accommodate heteropathia and multiperspectivism. They represent differing
orientations to compassion, honor, shame, love, pride, and decadent sensibility, and they place these perspectives in dialogue with each other. I have shown that the novels’ representation of these differing affective perspectives and open endings foster a sustained dialogue between viewpoints. Through these open endings, readers are invited to continue the debates about emotions and cultural change. In other words, Effi Briest, Fenitschka, and Buddenbrooks do not teach readers how to think or feel, nor do they define one set of emotional codes and social mores. As we have seen, each novel blurs the lines between art and social criticism and raises its own ethical questions, but these works generally remain ambivalent about the ethical questions that they raise (e.g. Fontane’s famous expression, “Das ist ein (zu) weites Feld,” in Effi Briest). By representing issues from multiple viewpoints and declining to embrace any way of feeling uncritically, these works teach readers to question rather than impose values. Collectively, they acknowledge emotional alterity in a differentiated and pluralized society during a period of swift cultural change. While they offer no ‘new mythology,’ or single ideological approach to navigating the tides of social and emotional change around 1900, they promote dialogue, not only within the diegetic worlds, but also between readers.

My dissertation has focused on the representation of emotion in German novels published around 1900, but the concept heteropathia invites broader applications and comparative projects. Future research could expand the scope of this study to include analyses of texts of other genres and cultural periods. In the present analysis, I restricted my application of heteropathia to novelistic prose works. I reasoned that, compared to works of other genres, a novel has the greatest capacity to represent a plurality of differing affective perspectives because of its length, number of characters, and diegetic levels. Additionally, I maintained that the genre’s length and openness of form make novels particularly well suited to engage with extra-literary emotion
discourses. As I indicated in my introduction, the concept heteropathia is also applicable to visual culture and other literary genres. The method of reading for heteropathia must be adapted for other types of cultural objects, however. Drama, poetry, and film enact differing ways of feeling in meaningful ways, but these genres require interpretive approaches that address how their distinguishing characteristics shape the representation of emotion. Once heteropathia is adapted for drama and poetry as well as novelistic prose, a comparative project using this approach would yield a more complex picture of the literary and emotional landscape of the fin de siècle. Alternately, my approach could assess the representation of emotion in works across literary and cultural periods. Such an undertaking could lead to a clearer understanding of the relationship between emotions, historical and cultural change, and literary representations.

Another avenue for future research would be to address literary and extra-literary discourses on emotions that I did not discuss in detail in this dissertation. My project has focused primarily on ‘social’ or ‘moral’ emotions (i.e. compassion, shame, honor, love, guilt, pride). Although I consider all emotions always-already social and subject to variation across cultures and through history, these emotions in particular facilitate social interaction. They play a role in determining power or status and influence group cohesion or dissolution. Some examples of other emotions worthy of consideration in future research include fear, joy, sadness, surprise, anger, and disgust, the emotions that psychologist Paul Ekman and his supporters have considered to be universal and biologically basic. Analyses of these emotions and their literary representations in relation to their socio-historical contexts would give literary scholars and historians of emotion a stronger voice in current debates about the extent to which these ‘basic emotions’ are universal and biologically basic or culturally and historically determined.
Studying representations of emotion in literary and cultural history not only provides insight into past ways of feeling and questions of continuity and change, it also prompts us to reflect critically upon our own emotions and values and consider how they resemble or diverge from those of figures depicted in a diegetic world. Some of the emotions and debates at the heart of *Effi Briest*, *Fenitschka*, and *Buddenbrooks* might be unknown to twenty-first-century readers. For example, masculine honor has declined in importance since the late nineteenth century, and dueling to settle matters of honor is no longer practiced. Earlier notions of honor and personal dignity have reportedly been replaced by a new moral code, namely, a “victimhood culture” (Campbell and Manning 714-718). Additionally, the kind of bourgeois or class-based pride depicted in *Buddenbrooks* has largely given way to individual understandings of pride, personal achievement, and self-worth. Other emotions and debates represented in these novels might strike twenty-first-century readers as surprisingly familiar. Compassion, for example, continues to unite and divide people in contemporary politics, particularly now, as evident in national responses to the global refugee crisis. Romantic love and marriage continue to be reimagined and redefined, and different ideas about love exist simultaneously (e.g. love is a choice, love is a feeling). At the *fin de siècle* in Wilhelmine Germany, *Effi Briest*, *Fenitschka*, and *Buddenbrooks* created spaces for readers to feel differently and reflect critically upon their emotions and values during a time of contradictions and uncertainty. These works remain highly relevant for us today because, although I have repeatedly described the *fin de siècle* as a period of rapid cultural change, society is always changing. Thus, emotions and social mores will always need to be renegotiated. Literature and other media play a critical role in that process.


Caillebotte, Gustave. Intérieur, femme à la fenêtre. 1880. Oil on canvas. Private collection.


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