CONTENTIOUS WATERS: THE CREATION OF PACIFIC GEOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE IN BRITAIN, 1669-1768

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This dissertation examines how the Pacific—covering one third of the world yet relatively new to Europeans—was portrayed prior to the famous voyages of Captain Cook. Although Pacific exploration has been extensively studied from the late eighteenth century onward, the period prior to 1770 has been largely ignored. Furthermore, exploration is usually investigated within national perspectives. This project offers a corrective to these trends; it adopts a transnational focus to investigate how societies integrated new spaces into existing geographic imaginaries. In the century prior to the Cook expeditions, the British were the main conduit of Pacific geographic knowledge to the rest of Europe. This was not because they mounted the most expeditions but because of their prolific publishing market and their particular geographic knowledge community. The Admiralty, Royal Society, and private mapmaking industry forged informal, interdependent ties to provide each other with the information necessary to make useful maps—that is, maps that could be used by navigators in foreign seas and could circulate widely. From their first commissioned expedition to the South Seas in 1669 to the first Cook expedition in 1768, the Admiralty increasingly involved themselves in the publication of voyage accounts and charts. They did so to manage their public image, but also to authenticate imperial claims. By the 1770s, exploration had become dependent on publication for its legitimation in the eyes of international diplomacy and the intellectual community. However, precisely how to create the
optimum voyage account for diverse audiences was still a matter of considerable debate. Despite efforts to the contrary, the Admiralty could not monopolize Pacific geographic knowledge entirely. The resulting print wars between sailor-authors, savants, geographers, and publishers combined with geopolitical events marked the Pacific as a daunting, watery desert to be endured by Europeans. It was a place filled with giants and wandering islands and a far cry from the exotic paradise it would later become. The assimilation of geographic knowledge was just as, if not more, contentious in 1768 as it was a century earlier.
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INTRODUCTION

Of Winds, or Weather, good, or bad,
Or whether Calms, or Storms we had,
Or whereabouts these Lands we made,
Some may conjecture well.
Let homebred Travellers, as they please,
Whose Book’s their Helm, their Ship and Seas,
Perplex their Thoughts. To such as these,
O Muse forbear to tell.1

In 1768, a member of the crew commanded by Captain Samuel Wallis of the Royal Navy wrote the above stanza chronicling the Dolphin’s second circumnavigation. Wallis’ voyage, which included the first recorded European contact with Tahiti, was part of a trio of voyages to the South Seas, or the Pacific, which the British Admiralty commissioned after the Treaty of Paris in 1763. First Byron, then Wallis and his separated escort ship commander Carteret, and finally Cook set out to see what the Pacific region might offer to an empire on the rise. Why did the author and his publisher think “homebred Travellers” would be interested in an ocean few would ever see and which had only recently been added to European geography? Who might “conjecture well” the locations of islands and why would they wish to do so? What, if any, was the connection between exploration, publication, and imperial politics? This dissertation sets out to answer these questions. It analyzes the production and circulation of geographic knowledge about the Pacific region by Britons in the century prior to the more-famous voyages of Captain

Cook, in order to recover the social and political relationships which conditioned the creation of the modern globe. In doing so, it (re)places the Pacific in early eighteenth-century European history, a region largely lacking from current discussions of the period’s politics and material culture. The area served as a salient, if not quotidian, topic of discussion that informed debates about overseas expansion, diplomacy, and the effective management of geographic knowledge and print culture in early modern imperial states. Returning the Pacific to European, particularly British, history broadens the scope and scale of early modern scholarship from an emphasis on the Atlantic and Indian Ocean basins to the entire world as understood by the literate population at the time.

After a century’s hiatus following Francis Drake and Thomas Cavendish’s circumnavigations, English ships re-entered the Pacific with the 1669 Narborough expedition; this was also the first expedition executed by the Royal Navy. Naval vessels funded by the state continued to seek an adequate geographical understanding of the region well into the nineteenth century but reached their zenith in terms of international recognition with the three voyages of James Cook between 1768 and 1779. These expeditions helped to make the Royal Navy the main

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1 A notable exception is Paul W. Mapp, *The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). Mapp is now working on a book examining the role of the Pacific in the American Revolution.

2 The literate population of Britain in the eighteenth century is a matter for debate, but is usually quoted at 60% for men and 40-50% for women. This population was more metropolitan in focus, thus was usually higher in cities like London and lower in rural areas. Carey McIntosh, *The Evolution of English Prose, 1700-1800: Style, Politeness, and Print Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 171. Felicity A. Nussbaum and her collaborators try to follow early modern actors to their global extent, thus widening the geographical lens of historical inquiry in *The Global Eighteenth Century* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2003). For an especial focus on how encounters with new peoples and cultures were communicated via print or material form, see Benjamin Schmidt, “Mapping an Exotic World: The Global Project of Dutch Geography, circa 1700,” in ibid, 21-37; Joseph Roach, “The Global Parasol: Accessorizing the Four Corners of the World,” in ibid, 93-106.
arbiter of global exploration and laid the foundations for the large-scale exploratory scientific surveys which the Royal Navy still carries out today.4

British interest in the Pacific was also extraordinary in that the relations between the most interested groups—the Royal Society, the geographic publishing industry, and the Royal Navy—were conditioned by the growing British fiscal-military state’s usage of non-governmental institutions.5 Unlike France and Spain, the British state did not consistently fund or direct scientific bodies. In addition, Britain lacked central control over map publication and geographers, whereas Spain had the Casa de Contratación and France numerous geographes du roi as well as the Dépôt des Cartes et Plans de la Marine.6 Instead, the British Royal Navy formed one pillar of an informal, yet interdependent, community which worked together to supply navigators as well as a more general reading public with geographic knowledge about the largest ocean in the world. Although British mapmakers were not the most technically skilled, their access to the latest geographic findings from Admiralty-sponsored and merchant voyages made Britain the main supplier of Pacific geographic knowledge from the late-seventeenth century to the mid-eighteenth century.

4 In January 2012 Royal Navy personnel led the British Service Antarctic Expedition to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Scott expedition.
Over the course of this century (1669-1768), the Royal Navy shifted from relative
disinterest in the publication of voyage accounts and charts to close regulation of the publication
process. They learned to harness geographic knowledge to manage their public image. Rather
than rely on a closed archive, like the Spanish, the British commoditized their geographic
knowledge in book and map form sold on an open market. Diplomats used the recent
publications to make imperial claims that competed successfully with those of rivals France and
Spain. It was not the possession of geographic knowledge that mattered, but its circulation.
Thus, the nascent British Empire in the Pacific was not simply reflected in print culture, it was
made within its pages.

Rivalry is not the only context in which to understand the production of geographic
knowledge, however. Scholarship of early modern overseas empires has tended to focus on the
competition between states, yet the compilation process at the center of the mapmaking
process—the careful comparison and synthesis of all available sources—meant that geography
texts and charts from across Europe were combined into composite depictions of Pacific space.
Despite attempts to the contrary, men and maps transcended borders, marking the body of Pacific
geographic knowledge as trans-imperial and its production a result of competitive collaboration.

7 The Spanish and French states attempted to singularize their Pacific geographic knowledge, i.e. to make it non-
exchangeable and reserved for state use. Britain took the opposite approach, commoditizing their knowledge in
material form and making it widely available. The terms commoditization and singularization are taken from Igor
Cultural Perspective, ed. Arjun Appadurai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); 64-91. See also Jeffrey
Wigglesworth, Selling Science in the Age of Newton: Advertising and the Commoditization of Knowledge (Farnham, UK:
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010); Katherine Bootle Attie, “Selling Science: Bacon, Harvey, and the
Commoditization of Knowledge,” Modern Philology 110, no. 3 (2013): 415-40. Commodification, in the Marxist sense,
refers to the “subordination of both private and public realms to the logic of capitalism,” that is the valuing of
concepts and things monetarily, not intrinsically. Dino Felluga, “Terms Used by Marxism,” Introductory Guide to
Commodification is used here to refer to the process of transforming knowledge from manuscript and oral form to
print objects which could be exchanged for the market price of the object.
This is not to deny the fact that such collaboration was often indirect or inadvertent. Indeed, texts with diverse source material could be made to serve nationalistic purposes in translation from state to state. In addition, published accounts and charts were characterized most by their interpersonal squabbling. Such contestation over Pacific geography contributed to the portrayal of Pacific space as a dangerous, watery desert, devoid of civilization and populated, when indigenous peoples were contacted, by humans of mythic proportions. A far cry from the later cultural construction of an exotic, sexualized, paradise of man in nature, the Pacific prior to Cook was a very different seascape, one marked most of all by contention—a contention born not only of shipboard and beach encounters, but also a result of the process by which geographic knowledge was created and disseminated.

**Historiography: Imperial encounters, chronological lacuna, and the social-cultural history of knowledge**

The main impetus for this study grew from a desire to challenge the existing historiography of the European imperial encounter with the Pacific with regard to its emphasis on cultural encounters, its chronological limitations, and its nationalized study. Historians of South Seas exploration and encounter have examined voyages of discovery to determine how knowledge was created at the site of encounter. Scholars like O. H. K. Spate, K. R. Howe, and J. C. Beaglehole considered how Europeans imagined and incorporated the Pacific through direct contact as recorded in exploration journals or as portrayed in published accounts. They and their

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8 O. H. K. Spate, “Seamen and Scientists: The Literature of the Pacific, 1697-1798,” in Nature in its Greatest Extent: Western Science in the Pacific, eds. Roy MacLeod and Philip F. Rehbock (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1988); O. H. K. Spate, “$\text{\textquoteright}$South Sea to \textquotesingle Pacific Ocean,$\text{\textquoteright}$” in Science, Empire and the European Exploration of the Pacific, ed. Tony
successors have investigated how European preconceptions of native peoples shaped encounters with indigenous peoples and environments. A focus on the agency of both the European and indigenous sides of encounters has served to highlight the constructed nature of cultural knowledge, as has the literature on cultural go-betweens. Studies of the history of knowledge have mapped the many mechanisms by which knowledge was transmitted within Europe and the Atlantic world, as well as how Europeans conceived of indigenous peoples and cultures from the Americas to Asia. Existing scholarship has thus far shed less insight on how actors shaped...
knowledge of the Pacific from Britain. This London-centric sphere of exploration determined subsequent British expeditions, and conditioned the planning of voyages by imperial rivals. Since the majority of readers received geographic descriptions from a limited number of men who had access to the findings of the voyages, it is necessary to understand who had such access and how they used it to incorporate the South Seas into British culture.

The focus on indigenous/European encounters has also had an effect on the chronological scope of Pacific exploration study. Although there were certainly such encounters prior to the 1760s, their frequency, duration, and profile in European culture drastically increased after initial interaction in Tahiti. Thus, the majority of scholarship has concentrated on the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This chronological emphasis has led to historiographical interpretations that elide earlier developments and limit understanding of how the Pacific came to be integrated into European epistemological systems. Studies of the French and British Pacific empires tend to mark Bougainville and Cook’s voyages and the penal colony of Australia (the beginning of settler colonialism) as the official start to European imperial power in the region. Earlier imperial

projections are portrayed as false starts and weak attempts. This study argues that the Pacific was part of British imperial projections earlier than is commonly assumed, even if the actual presence of Britons in South Seas waters was limited.

The study of James Cook is an industry unto itself, with more publications than any other subject in the field. However, as Jane Samson has pointed out, “Cook’s voyages ushered in a new era of greater scientific rigor, to be sure, but why should this be driving the academic agenda so strongly in these postmodern and postcolonial times?”


only recent scholars to survey the diverse British activities in the Pacific prior to Cook, remarks, “the privileged position of certain voyages, especially those of Captain Cook, seems to have gone largely unnoticed…Perhaps nowhere else is this better exemplified than by the Great Navigator’s long shadow over the Pacific world.”

This study will avoid this long shadow by querying how the Pacific was represented prior to Cook, focusing on the network of individuals and groups who commodified the region for domestic and European consumption and made subsequent voyages, like Cook’s, possible.

Historians of science too are affected by the chronological emphasis of the larger field. Scholars have argued that a close partnership between natural philosophers, instrument makers, and savants made the exploitation of various parts of the Pacific region possible. Most such studies focus on the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, when the emerging British scientific community and the growing British Empire consolidated their relationship.

For example, Michael Bravo astutely describes how Arctic explorer and whaler Martin Scoresby managed to call on scholarly and social contacts to break into the Royal Navy-dominated world


of Arctic exploration at the turn of the nineteenth century.17 While he traces a fascinating
conjunction of individuals and institutions working together to name and claim the icy Arctic, his
article assumes the Royal Navy as the main engine of exploration. This assumption omits a
century-long process of trial-and-error that gave the Admiralty its place of primacy. It was in the
Pacific that the Royal Navy became the master of exploration and it did so only with a variety of
non-military assistance. Therefore, it is important to trace the early interactions between the
expanding imperial state and the network of natural philosophers, mapmakers, and sailors which
coalesced to claim the Pacific as a British sphere of influence.

For the past half century, “the ‘transnational’ dimension seems to have found little
traction in the Pacific context.”18 More recent works, however, have sought to knit together the
complex imperial relations that underlay the European penetration of the Pacific. An example is
Rainer Buschmann’s study of the Spanish conceptualization of the Pacific from the sixteenth to
the nineteenth centuries. Buschmann highlights how multiple overseas empires influenced each
other, usually in a competitive manner.19 Paul Mapp, in his investigation of how geographic
ignorance about the American West affected the political decisions of French, Spanish, and
British officials, paints a similar picture of inter-imperial competition, although he also
highlights the shared anxieties that crossed borders.20 In this study I too find that attempting to
outflank imperial rivals was a major motivator for new expeditions and publications; however, I
also note the extraordinary amount of collaboration, perhaps unintentional, that went into the
creation of maps and travel accounts which in turn informed future voyages.

17 Michael Bravo, “Geographies of exploration and improvement: William Scoresby and Arctic whaling, 1782-1822,”
19 Buschmann, Iberian Visions.
20 Mapp, The Elusive West.
By showing knowledge practices in motion and across space, I can better illustrate the construction and contingency of knowledge in a trans-imperial setting. Such an approach is conditioned by the field of Atlantic History, which highlights transnational networks and connections that underline movement, agency, and ingenuity by a variety of historical actors with varying relations to power.\textsuperscript{21} However, in practice Atlantic History has created an admittedly porous yet still durable boundary around the Atlantic Basin, at the expense of tracing peoples and materials to the extent of their geographical circuits. Thus, my project seeks to bridge Atlantic and Pacific History, and to highlight the latter field’s works that have been less integrated into mainstream academia than Atlantic History’s.\textsuperscript{22}

Definitions

In the interest of adequately capturing the specificity of knowledge creation, it is necessary to offer a few definitions. In the broadest terms, this project seeks to analyze the social relations involved in the production of knowledge about space. I understand knowledge production as a dynamic, reciprocal, and complex process embodied in both material products—books, maps, globes—and intellectual products—ideas. Knowledge also has a spatial


\textsuperscript{22} By invoking the term “Pacific History,” I wish to point out that it is only recently that Atlantic historians have sought to apply their methodology to other regions of the globe. However, Pacific History has long flourished in universities in the Pacific in the shadow of the hegemonic US academy. For an overview of the historiography, see Matt Matsuda, “The Pacific,” \textit{American Historical Review} 111, no. 3 (2006): 758-780; David Armitage and Alison Bashford, “Introduction: The Pacific and its Histories,” in \textit{Pacific Histories}, eds. Armitage and Bashford, 1-28; Munro and Lal, \textit{Texts and Contexts}. 
component. According to spatial theorist Henri Lefebvre, space is produced by and facilitates social relations. Space is organized and governed via a specific ideology, a political use of knowledge which dictates how space is perceived, conceived, and lived. Individuals and institutions fashion space—and knowledge about space; it is a “precondition and result of social superstructures” navigated by historical actors. Space, then, is understood here as the product of a socially-constructed, relational process conditioned by material resources and routines. The process creates specific representations and practices—i.e., knowledge—that reflect the ideology with which they were created. As each society crafts its own spaces, producing knowledge about space is a historical process that can be studied. In the case of Britain, Pacific geographic knowledge was taken from informants in the Pacific, transported on ships to the Thames, commodified into voyage accounts and maps within the streets of London, then sold on an open


24 For Lefebvre, the dominant ideology is capitalism, which reflects his focus on twentieth-century urban space. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991), 83, 85, 94. The perception of space is a society’s spatial practice, which is the socially-constructed organization of space and objects within space. The conceptualization of space is achieved via representations of space: buildings, parks, signs, maps and plans, and transport and communication systems. Finally, the lived experience of people within a spatial practice is the navigation of representational space. Ibid, 38, 42, 233. Harvey agrees that space is socially constructed and representative of social power relations, particularly the exploitative and unequal relations of capitalism. Ibid, 6, 112, 241. However, an understanding of space as socially-constructed does not exclude the materiality of space as lived experience. Space is not pure discourse. To examine only discourse at the expense of the materials and modes of production which create space and of which space is a part would be limiting. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 37, 62. Harvey also disdains the focus on discourse to the exclusion of material processes and objects, which is why he seeks a dialectical theory based on historical-geographical materialism. Harvey, *Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference*, 8, 10, 26, 83, 110-112, 211, 228, 290, 308.

25 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 85.

26 Ibid, 46, 110; Harvey, *Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference*, 210. The specific historical space that Lefebvre and Harvey are interested in is the space of capitalism. Harvey seeks to theorize how the spatial-temporal frameworks of capitalism have produced a geography of difference that results in inequalities between people around the world. Both theorists believe that although the spatial ideology of capitalism has become globally hegemonic, it need not be, and should not be, permanent. Other spatial-temporal frameworks (Harvey’s term) or differential spaces (Lefebvre’s term) are possible. Ibid, 170, 175; Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 363, 411. The theorists offer different (but not mutually exclusive) ways to achieve alternative concepts of space. Lefebvre wants to focus on spaces that have been appropriated from dominant capitalistic spaces, whereas Harvey calls for a focus on the imaginary—thoughts, fantasies, and desires. Ibid, 373, 410; Harvey, *Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference* 112-113, 306.
market—the violent ideology of imperial expansion and nascent capitalism are deeply implicated in representations of Pacific space, stamped in them less obviously but no less durably than an engraving.

Defining what any geographic entity is or was may seem obvious but is in reality highly subjective. Thus, the geographic definitions utilized here are determined by the understandings of the region by early modern peoples, not modern geographers. Based on contemporary descriptions, the Pacific or South Seas, as used here, refers to the waters surrounding the Patagonian Peninsula, as well as the coastal waters of South America north to what is now California. The region extends west to the Marianas Islands, typically called the Ladrones by eighteenth-century sailors and geographers, and the Philippines. The East Indies, although frequently mentioned in the voyage accounts under examination here, are usually included only briefly. They are described in passing, signaling that the ships have returned to more familiar territory, for both readers and sailors. The northern Pacific was one of the last regions to come into geographic focus for Europeans, although the areas that now form Alaska and Northeastern Russia will be discussed in chapter five.

The study of space and geography has flourished in recent years because scholars have found the early modern period in general, and the eighteenth century in particular, germane to understanding how an increasing proportion of society incorporated spatial techniques as part of their quotidian epistemological frameworks.27 Eighteenth-century geography entailed the study of places as external and internal to the subject, as well as geographical definitions of identity, power, and jurisdiction. The study of space and geography has flourished in recent years because scholars have found the early modern period in general, and the eighteenth century in particular, germane to understanding how an increasing proportion of society incorporated spatial techniques as part of their quotidian epistemological frameworks.27 Eighteenth-century geography entailed the study of places as external and internal to the subject, as well as geographical definitions of identity, power, and jurisdiction.
of the spatial differentiation of the terraqueous globe.\textsuperscript{28} It was not a specific discipline, but rather a subject that enhanced comprehension of human difference and history. As Stern explains, geography “encompassed an ecumenical set of terrestrial concerns.” It included both physical and moral issues, lending a vocabulary of precision to compress space and place to allow classification and collection as part of the larger Enlightenment intellectual project.\textsuperscript{29} The practice of geography was primarily textual, embodied in the proliferation of large, descriptive geographical atlases and travel accounts.\textsuperscript{30} As geographic acumen signaled participation in polite, commercial society, the genre was immensely popular; works targeted diverse audiences including gentleman scholars, merchants, women, and children.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{28} Michael Heffernan, “Historical Geographies of the Future: Three Perspectives from France, 1750-1825,” in Geography and Enlightenment, eds. Livingstone and Withers, 152.

\textsuperscript{29} Quote from Philip J. Stern, “Exploration and Enlightenment,” in Reinterpreting Exploration, ed. Dane Kennedy, 54. See also ibid, 56; Mayhew, Enlightenment Geography, 30-31; Livingstone and Withers, “Introduction: On Geography and Enlightenment,” in Geography and Enlightenment, eds. Livingstone and Withers, 3.


\textsuperscript{31} According to books borrowed from the Bristol Lending Library between 1773 and 1784, the most borrowed genre of books was History, Antiques, and Geography. Of 13,497 total withdrawals, 6,121 were from this genre, showing an intense interest on the part of readers in the world beyond their day-to-day existence. Paul Kaufman, Borrowings from the Bristol Library (Charlottesville: Bibliographical Society of the University of Virginia, 1960), 57. Examples of the diversity of targeted audiences include Daniel Defoe, A general history of discoveries and improvements, in useful arts, particularly in the great branches of commerce, navigation, and plantation, in all parts of the known world. A Work which may entertain the Curious with the view of their present State; prompt the indolent to retrieve those Inventions that are neglected, and animate the diligent to advance and perfect what may be thought wanting. To be continued Monthly. Numb. 1. for October
Due to its wide audience and perceived benefits, geography increasingly became an important vehicle by which readers organized information about their world.32 In examining geography as a subject of study, Withers has explained how eighteenth-century peoples developed a “set of intellectual practices” meant to apply spatial knowledge to life and examine it as “an object of science, art and wonder.”33 These practices are the basis of the broader term used in this project, geographic knowledge. Emblematic of the contemporary hunger for geographical knowledge, maps proliferated as decorative accents in boxes, as standing globes, pocket globes, wallpaper, screens, wine coasters, and jigsaw puzzles. This prevalence suggests that historians should pay special attention to the practices surrounding the production and reception of geographic knowledge, the most important of which was exploration.

As Adriana Craciun astutely explains, the “explorer” did not become “a distinct species” until the nineteenth century.34 Neither was “to explore” or “exploration” in common parlance prior to the end of the eighteenth century. The activity commonly referred to as exploration was less formalized in the early modern period. The closest word contemporaries might have

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32 As Stern explains, geography served as a model and a metaphor for early modern intellectuals. Stern, “Exploration and Enlightenment,” 57. Jonathan Scott argues that an early modern political misrepresentation that called on geographic language to present England as an isolated island strongly shaped the development of a unique sense of nation. Overseas empire was a central component to this (mis)representation. However, this discourse of isolation had no basis in geopolitical fact or practice. Jonathan Scott, When the Waves Ruled Britannia: Geography and Political Identities, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

33 Withers and Mayhew, “Geography: Space, Place and Intellectual History,” 446.

employed would be “navigation” or “making a discovery.” Richard Hakluyt’s title of his 1599 collection is instructive, *The Principal navigations, voyages, traffiques and discoveries of the English nation.* Voyages anachronistically labeled as “exploratory” were not mutually exclusive of other motives such as trade, privateering, or combat; indeed, exploration is almost always tied to nationalistic gain in some way. Thus, in this dissertation the term exploration will be employed to indicate European voyages to the South Seas that had the gathering of new geographic knowledge as a major, but far from the only, motive.

While such voyages are not unique to Europeans, “exploration is a concept and a practice that carries a particular set of cultural, social, and political valences, and they originate in the European historical experience.” It is for this reason that European, particularly British, voyages are the focus of this work. Although Russia, Spain, the Netherlands, and especially France all sent voyages to the area, the British dominated the production of material objects conveying Pacific geographic knowledge from the late seventeenth century onward; it was through London that most Europeans learned of the region. An inquiry focused upon the British dimension—while staying attuned to the numerous transnational ties of communication, commerce, and imperial rivalry—keeps the project to a manageable scale in terms of geography and chronology.

While diplomats fought and sea captains menaced each other, mapmakers and editors eagerly sought whatever information they could access, usually giving the compiled information a nationalistic slant and sometimes hiding a source’s origins. However, if we peel back the layers

35 The full title of the second edition, (London: George Bishop, Ralph Newberie, and Robert Barker, 1599) is: *The Principal Navigation, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, made by Sea or overland, to the remote and farthest distant quarters of the Earth, at any time within the compasse of these 1600 yeres: Divided into three severall Volumes, according to the positions of the Regions, whereunto they are directed.*

of information, we find that there were so few voyages over the course of three hundred years that no scrap, no matter its origin, could be ignored. Thus, I use the term trans-imperial competitive collaboration to describe the process by which actors across Europe braided together geographic knowledge—stolen from secret repositories, traded in negotiations, or intended for popular consumption—to shore up the impression of the possession of knowledge, and by extension power, at home and abroad.

Methodology and sources

Previous works on exploration tend to focus on voyages and their material representations as separate subjects of analysis from politics and the print industry. This project approaches the creation of geographic knowledge by analyzing not only the sources which resulted from voyages but also the production and dissemination of those sources as material objects. The logistics and politics of planning missions, the gathering of data, the encountering of new peoples and places, and the multi-stage publishing process all contributed to the finished representations of the Pacific, as well as to who would see such representations first and most often. The production of such material representations was and is governed by interpersonal

relationships as much as by markets, hence my emphasis on the social relations of geographic knowledge production and circulation.

The history of the book provides rich scholarship as to why and how to link text, object, and reader. Adrian Johns views print culture as the product of social relations by which knowledge is made through numerous, sustained encounters with print; via such encounters authority is conferred on books as objects and the information they contain became truth.\footnote{Adrian Johns, \textit{The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 2. Johns is largely responding to what he sees as the technological determinism of Elizabeth Eisenstein’s groundbreaking work, \textit{The Printing Press as an Agent of Change} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Johns objected to the facile way in which books were presented as credible without any explanation of the intense intellectual and cultural work that went on to normalize books as authoritative objects. See Johns, \textit{Nature of the Book}, 10-14, 37-38, 373-374.} In interacting with texts, readers create meanings that may differ from the author’s intended meaning.\footnote{Wolfgang Iser, “Interaction between Text and Reader,” in \textit{The Book History Reader}, eds. David Finkelstein and Alistair McCleery (New York: Routledge, 2006), 392.} Roger Chartier’s seminal \textit{The Order of Books} lays out a three-part research agenda based on similar ideas: first, recover how the same texts can be read differently; second, reconstruct the networks of reading practice; and third, attend to form and production from the authorial intentions to print shop practices.\footnote{Roger Chartier, \textit{The Order of Books: Readers, Authors, and Libraries in Europe between the Fourteenth and Eighteenth Centuries}, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 9. For more on the text-object-book triangle see ibid, 2-3, 10. Robert Darnton describes book production as a circular cycle with many inputs; however, reception is not a part of his cycle. Robert Darnton, “What is the History of Books?,” in \textit{The Book History Reader}, eds. Finkelstein and McCleery, 22.} Such an agenda situates investigations in localized interpretive communities and demonstrates that no hard line exists between the description and interpretation of books, i.e. their form and reception.\footnote{Chartier, \textit{The Order of Books}, 23.} Chartier’s inclusive approach informs this project.
However, as studies of reading and reader reception proliferate, they have tended to focus on imaginative literature, especially the novel, or on works about the natural world. The focus on the novel especially has led to the study of the author as a singular entity, while voyage accounts point to a more collective form of authorship. I agree with Claire Pettit when she writes, “Attending closely to the publication histories of travel and exploration accounts can illuminate the moments of ‘knowledge transfer’ when new meanings are created.” Such attention to the publication process can illuminate not only these new meanings, but also shed insight on the more general social construction of credibility and authorial authority as conditioned by material culture.

Although geography primarily relied on printed texts, maps increasingly gave readers a visual understanding of written descriptions. The history of geography and cartography have benefited immensely from the cultural turn, wherein the “focus of historic inquiry shifted from causation and social processes to meaning and identity as revealed through culture.” Historians of cartography and historical geographers now analyze maps as objects laden with the symbolism and assumptions of the culture of the mapmaker, in the manner that cultural

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44 Craciun, “What is an Explorer?,” 33.
historians and historians of the book approach their objects of study.\textsuperscript{47} However, despite the similarities in analytical approach, historians usually treat maps separately from other material objects.\textsuperscript{48} This practice creates a false separation. Text, object, and visual representation constituted a combined experience for eighteenth-century readers. Maps and texts need to be considered as intertextual discursive practices; both form integral parts of the primary sources for this project.

Mapmakers have received less attention from scholars than authors of geographical collections and travel accounts in the study of Pacific voyages.\textsuperscript{49} Excellent histories of British Enlightenment geography exist, but they have tended to focus on land and coastal surveys of the British Isles, North America, and India.\textsuperscript{50} With regard to the South Seas, prior studies of geography and cartography have again privileged the three expeditions of Cook.\textsuperscript{51} An exception

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{47}{For Harley’s classic articles on the biases of mapmakers and subjective nature of maps, see Brian Harley, \textit{The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography}, ed. Paul Laxton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).}
\footnotetext{48}{This is partially due to the compartmentalization of specializations within the history discipline. However, cultural historians and literary scholars are attempting to integrate maps into their work and theory. A good example is Ricardo Padrón, \textit{The Spacious Word: Cartography, Literature, and Empire in Early Modern Spain} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).}
\end{footnotes}
is Camino’s *Producing the Pacific* (2005), in which she examines how sixteenth-century Spanish mapmakers processed and changed geographic knowledge about the Pacific in their representations for an elite and limited audience of Spanish government officials. However, her *Exploring the Explorers* (2008) focuses more on Spanish-indigenous encounters. It moves away from her previous emphasis on the interaction of mapmakers with the limited information brought back from Pacific encounters. Building on her slim yet intriguing earlier monograph on three sixteenth century Spanish expeditions and subsequent map production, I return the mapmakers to the intellectual conversation in what Camino terms the “re-enactment” of Pacific exploration two centuries later by the British.52

Finally, these sources shed light on the larger cultural project of empire. In linking books and maps with imperial space, I embrace the analytical insight of Hofmeyr and Burton: “If empire was not a coherent whole but an assemblage—a far flung, reticulate, and vascular patchwork of spaces joined by mobile subjects of all kinds—the book itself was often also just such an assemblage.”53 In tracing the production of voyage accounts and maps from the Pacific to Europe, I capture some of the mobility—of peoples, but also of books and maps as they passed from manuscript to printed object to object in translation across space—that went into the creation of Pacific representations as extensions, however tenuous, of imperial spheres.


Outline

Printed books, maps, and globes, supported by institutional records, private and official correspondence, and manuscripts, are analyzed in six chapters. The first chapter outlines European engagement with mapping the Pacific prior to the mid-seventeenth century, stressing the trans-imperial collaboration which occurred despite intense rivalries to claim that space. It uses prominent examples of charts and printed maps to argue that the emphasis of modern scholars on the march toward more “correct” maps is misplaced. Rather, early modern cartography was characterized by, not plagued by, uncertainty about geographic coordinates and features. It was up to the individual mapmaker to register this uncertainty in a variety of ways; how he chose to do so would decide his reputation amongst consumers, but also would affect how the South Seas came to be represented.

The second chapter sketches the major groups that brought the Pacific to the printed page—the Admiralty, Royal Society and the private mapmaking industry—and which then formed an interdependent yet informal geographic knowledge community centered on London. In the early eighteenth century, it is from this community that new information about the Pacific primarily flowed to the rest of Europe. This is of particular interest because the dependence of the British state on the open market for its geographic information was unique amongst European governments where highly secretive, centralized map repositories were the norm. Such dependence on, and preference for, openly accessible information led to diplomatic debates not so different from today’s discussions about open access in the digital context. Thus, studying the politics of Pacific geographic knowledge sheds light on themes of central importance to the history of the fiscal-military state: intelligence gathering, the value of secrecy, and government-private sector relations.
The second half of chapter two through chapter six follow the course of Pacific geographic knowledge via the major publications that resulted from various forays into the Pacific by the Admiralty, privateers, and merchants. These start with the first Admiralty-sanctioned expedition to the South Seas, the 1669 Narbrough expedition and continue to Cook’s first voyage in 1768. By focusing on the often rancorous production of specific maps and books, these chapters reveal the trans-imperial politics and socioeconomic relations that shape material objects. Those lucky enough to sail to the South Seas realized the value of their knowledge and were eager to put their experiences into print; however, the personal motives for doing so led to heated battles between crewmates, captains, and investors, all played out in the public sphere. The numerous disagreements painted the Pacific as a mercurial space for readers, one that shifted over time from a dangerous place of plausible promise (ca. 1700) to a satirical landscape (ca. 1720s) to a region ripe for imperial expansion (ca. 1740) to an exotic, exploitable paradise (ca. 1770). Together they formed a durable, yet still small, canon of geographic knowledge which navigators would call on until well into the nineteenth century.

By connecting individual and institutional interactions and networks to the creation and reception of material objects portraying the Pacific in lexical and visual texts, this project casts new insight on the creation of geographic knowledge while also bringing disparate historiographies into conversation with each other. In the eighteenth century, geographic knowledge was of especial interest, yet also an especially fraught subject due to its ties to imperial politics and personal reputation. The Pacific was not a well-defined space to Europeans, but rather an enormous repository for a variety of hopes, dreams, schemes, and fears. It plays a similar role today, although the precise nature of those dreams and fears have evolved. A new fear that must be faced is the loss of some of the islands that proved so elusive to European
navigators. Global climate change threatens nations such as Kiribati and Tuvalu as sea levels rise and international diplomacy stalls. Just as in the mid-eighteenth century, Europe’s role in the Pacific is still a matter of debate. If we can learn anything from the voyage accounts and maps of the South Seas, it is that it is easy to silence Pacific voices in favor of European fantasies; if we continue to do so today, we face a world of refugees with a state, yet no territory. They will be cast adrift, forced to add new spatial imaginaries to the legion of other constructions of Pacific space.
CHAPTER 1: THE MANAGEMENT AND PRESENTATION OF PACIFIC GEOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE, 1475-CA. 1650

The Antipodes, opposing yet fascinating Europeans, underwent substantial focus and cartographic alteration in the early modern period, due in part to changes in cartographic practice and the development of institutions charged with the management of geographic knowledge. In its focus on European voyages and the publications that resulted from them—the raw materials and finished products that fixed the Pacific in the European geography—this chapter will analyze the exploratory expeditions and geographic knowledge management systems of European states from the sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, when the English began state-sponsored expeditions to the region.

States with interests in overseas expansion—Portugal, Spain, France, the Dutch Republic, and England—attempted to control access to Pacific geographic knowledge yet, paradoxically, circulation of that knowledge was key to learning more about the region. Although states seem to have eclipsed each other in pursuing the promises of Pacific space, early European engagement with the Pacific should not be seen as a succession, but rather as a layering of participants who borrowed geographic knowledge from each other, despite attempts at secrecy. Imperial power in the Pacific was not challenged with ships and troops; rather, it was contested by the possession
and, increasingly, the circulation of geographic knowledge within Europe. Unlike the Spanish, Portuguese, and in some ways the Dutch and the French, English geographic knowledge was public and for sale. Whereas local relations underwrote the English geographic knowledge community, their sources and motives were dependent on imperial rivals. The story of bringing the Pacific to the European world map is thus a trans-imperial one of competitive collaboration—a globilocal phenomenon that sheds light on the knowledge politics and practices of empire.

Early mapping of the Pacific

Accompanied by a more general rise in map consciousness, maps became more authoritative, and closely guarded, tools of empire. European states and their subjects began to view the world less in terms of religious symbolism with an orientation toward heaven, and more in terms of a bounded, terrestrial space that marked out supposedly civilized areas from those that were wild and open to expansion and control.¹ It should be noted that the shifts in map consciousness and cartographic practice were far from complete by 1800. Whereas the world maps of the eighteenth century are vastly different than those of the sixteenth, there was no smooth transition from one form to another, but a slow, jerking, often resistant move toward a precise and accurate—both subjective terms undergoing changes in definition—reflection of available geographic knowledge.²

¹ Francesc Relaño, The Shaping of Africa: Cosmographic Discourse and Cartographic Science in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2002), 73. ‘Map consciousness’ is the term used by the contributors to Buisseret, ed., Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps.
Increased map consciousness in European populations developed between roughly 1450 and 1750 for a variety of reasons. First, the cultural movement of the Renaissance stimulated a genteel interest in the wider world, as seen in the vogue for elaborately printed geographic tomes full of descriptions and, increasingly, maps. Scholars placed increased emphasis on first-hand observation, as well as began to question certain medieval authorities in light of the rediscovery of ancient texts.\(^3\) In the 15\(^{th}\) century, the artistic turn to realism led artists and artisans to create works that more precisely mirrored observed objects, especially in the Low Countries and France, which were also early mapmaking centers.\(^4\) The seventeenth-century Scientific Revolution also encouraged elite, amateur natural philosophers, academics, ministers, and some artisans to prefer representations and descriptions of the natural world as experienced through firsthand observation and experimentation. This was a further departure from the dependence on scholasticism of the late-medieval period, as well as marked a realization that the world as early modern Europeans knew it no longer fit into the mold recorded by medieval scholars and religious experts. Edney agrees with the importance of these intellectual shifts in spurring map literacy, but also cites increased proto-capitalist consumption and developing print technology.\(^5\)

Within maps themselves, it is possible to see a more general cosmographic shift in the emphasis on scripture to a reliance on empirical methods in understanding the world order. Medieval T-O projections, like the example in Isidore of Seville’s *Etymologiae* printed by Gunther Zainer in Augsburg in 1472 (figure 1.1),\(^6\) usually portray Asia at the top of the world,

\(^3\) Relaño, *The Shaping of Africa*, 185.
with Europe and Africa splitting the bottom half. The Nile and Tanais Rivers intersect with the Mediterranean which placed Jerusalem at the geographic center of the world and heaven at “the limit of the known world…the furthest edges of Asia.”\(^7\) In the late medieval period, mapmakers inserted more and more secular details into their projections. These more complex yet still religiously-oriented manuscripts are the famous *mappemundi*. With the information brought back from the voyages of exploration and trade starting in the late fifteenth century, even the richly detailed *mappemundi* were not able to hold all the information about the known world.

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\(^7\) However, the center of Isidore’s T-O projection is Cyprus, where Christian rulers were exiles, not Jerusalem. Jerusalem is the center of the Hereford *mappemundi*. Christopher Wortham, “Meanings of the South: From the Mappaemundi to Shakespeare’s Othello,” in *European Perceptions of Terra Australis*, eds. Scott et al., 65. See also Jerry Brotton, *Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 29; Padrón, *The Spacious Word*, 34.
Unsure how to fit the increasingly unruly amount of geographic knowledge onto the religious picture jumble of the medieval period, mapmakers received unexpected methodological aid from the European rediscovery of Ptolemy’s *Geographia*, first printed in 1475, and with maps in 1477.\(^8\) Ptolemy had known only of inhabited parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa, the

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\(^8\) It should be noted that the geographic ignorance suffered by Europeans was not the case in Arab areas, where mapmakers had long had knowledge of more geographic regions and had not lost touch with ancient texts. Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 15-17. Ptolemy’s atlas was known as both the *Geographia* and *Cosmographia*. Ptolemy, *Cosmographia* (Vicenza, 1475). The first edition with was Ptolemy,
*oikoumene,* but he surmised that other lands may lay beyond this area. Ptolemy’s maps employ a northern orientation, unlike the eastern orientation of T-O projections, and reckoned longitude eastward.⁹ All of these concepts would affect early modern geographers, who used Ptolemy’s theories but also had to innovate as the world they lived in extended far beyond the *oikoumene.* Most important for the future of cartography was Ptolemy’s use of geometry to plot space on a two-dimensional plane. His use of a grid of longitude and latitude would revolutionize cartographic methodology and allow mapmakers to add newly encountered lands by simply adding lines to the grid.¹⁰

Early modern cartography was in large part more a matter of compilation than of direct observation. The selection and type of sources, along with the precision of one’s placement, would shift drastically between the late-fifteenth century, when Ptolemy was first printed, and the late-eighteenth century, when updates of his works were still being sold.¹¹ As will be seen,

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¹⁰ Brotton, *Trading Territories,* 25, 32; Padrón, *The Spacious Word,* 35; Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration,* 20; Relaño, *The Shaping of Africa,* 188; J. B. Harley, “Maps, Knowledge, and Power,” in *The New Nature of Maps,* ed. Laxton, 58. Edney prefers to call the grid a graticule because grid has been used by cultural studies scholars to posit unlimited space, whereas graticule denotes a finite space. However, as early modern cartographers, especially before the eighteenth century, did not know exactly how large the world was, grid seems appropriate for this thesis. See Edney, *Mapping an Empire,* 17-18, note.

¹¹ There were fifty editions of the Ptolemaic atlas printed between 1477 and 1730. Alan Frost and Glyndwr Williams, “*Terra Australis:* Theory and Speculation,” in *Terra Australis to Australia,* eds. Alan Frost and Glyndwr Williams (Melbourne: Oxford University Press Australia, 1988), 4. For a bibliography of these editions, see Eames Wilberforce, *List of Editions of Ptolemy's Geographia* (New York, 1886). The Strasbourg edition of 1533 was the first to separate
mapmakers were loath to jettison Ptolemy entirely, especially his suggestion of a southern continent. When other sources failed, Ptolemy was often the preferred reference. The Pacific was a site of particular contestation amongst geographers; how to wrestle the ocean into Ptolemy’s grid would be one measure by which European mapmakers could show their prowess, or their folly.

The Pacific appeared on maps before it was officially encountered by Europeans. The adoption of Ptolemy’s ideas barely predated Columbus’ first expedition in 1492. By the early sixteenth-century, mapmakers were drafting their first attempts to include the Americas on world maps. Martin Waldseemüller’s “Universalis Cosmographia” (1507) (figure 1.2) is widely credited as the first map to use the term “America.” Waldseemüller’s world does not contain Ptolemy’s insular Indian Ocean, for the mapmaker had heard of Portuguese navigator Bartholomew Dias’ rounding of Cape of Good Hope in 1488, as well as Vasco de Gama’s ancient and modern maps into separate sections. J. B. Harley, “The Map and the Development of the History of Cartography,” in History of Cartography, vol. 1, eds. David A. Woodward and J. B. Harley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 7. Updates of Ptolemy, with the latest discoveries, were popular with students at Oxford and Cambridge between 1550 and 1650. Cormack, “Good Fences,” 308.

12 The idea of the Antipodes, a place opposite Europe on the globe, has persisted since ancient times. Hiatt argues that the Antipodes have always been used as a creative reflection on Europe, while Douglas explains how assumptions about the Pacific as the fourth and later fifth part of the world colored how indigenous peoples were perceived by Europeans. Alfred Hiatt, Terra Incognita: Mapping the Antipodes Before 1600 (London: The British Library, 2008); Bronwen Douglas, “Terra Australis to Oceania,” The Journal of Pacific History 45, no.2 (2010): 179-210. Stallard labors to underline that the ancient Greeks did not believe in continental balance theory and that the idea of the Antipodes can be traced to Crates of Mallos (c. 180-150 BCE). Avan Judd Stallard, “Origins of the Idea of the Antipodes: Errors, Assumptions, and a Bare Few Facts,” Terrae Incognitae 42 (2010): 45. Despite the lack of evidence to support an ancient continental balance theory, early modern geographers ascribed to the theory and thought it indeed had ancient origins. Alfred Hiatt, “Terra Australis and the Idea of the Antipodes,” in European Perceptions of Terra Australis, ed. Scott et al., 30.

voyage to India in 1497-9. The map does, however, show a long peninsula in Southeast Asia, a holdover of Ptolemaic geography that keeps the Indian Ocean somewhat contained. Waldseemüller’s main source for new information was Amerigo Vespucci, an Italian navigator who sailed for Spain and Portugal.\textsuperscript{14} By adding the American continents, Waldseemüller also split the Atlantic Ocean in two. Although he underestimated the width of the new body of water, Waldseemüller and his contemporaries were actively reconfiguring the known world.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} Wroth, \textit{Early Cartography of the Pacific}, 119-21. Vespucci supposedly sailed on four voyages. The first (for Spain to the New World, 1497-8) and fourth (for Portugal to Brazil, 1503-4) are disputed due to questions as to the authorship of the only available source, a letter to Soderini. The second (for Spain to the mouth of the Amazon, 1499-1500) and third voyages (for Portugal to Brazil, 1501-2) are confirmed. One of the latest scholars to weigh in on the veracity of the voyages in Felipe Fernández-Armesto, \textit{Amerigo: The Man Who Gave his Name to America} (New York: Random House, 2007).

\textsuperscript{15} Waldseemüller’s Pacific is only 80° at equator. Padron argues that this narrow Pacific, with the island of Zipango serving as a convenient stepping stone, was meant to keep the Americas close to Asia, perpetuating ties with the East Indies trade. Such a Pacific tying Asia to America was the cartographic creation, and dream, of Spanish mapmakers working for the Spanish state, although Waldseemüller was German. Ricardo Padrón, “A Sea of Denial: The Early Modern Spanish Invention of the Pacific Rim,” \textit{Hispanic Review} 77, no. 1 (2009): 10.
Eight years later Vasco Núñez de Balboa would name this new sea *Mar del Sur*, the South Seas. However, it was the Portuguese Magellan whose exploits in the service of the Spanish crown would not only increase the known size of the new sea, and the globe, but also name it the Pacific, or peaceful, Ocean. Magellan’s service record is but one example of how individual mobility, in the face of simultaneous institutional centralization, led to the circulation
of peoples, charts, and ideas; geographic knowledge spread via the porous nature of early modern empire. Magellan left Spain in 1519, traveled through the Straits that now bear his name, and then set out across open sea, landing on the Ladrones Islands, today the Marianas. Magellan was killed in the Philippines, leaving his pilot, Juan Sebastián Elcano, to command the return journey.\textsuperscript{16} News of the \textit{Victoria's} arduous voyage spread across Europe via published accounts and personal correspondence. The first publication, by Maximilianus Transylvanus, used interviews of survivors taken by Christopher de Haro and appeared in Cologne in 1523.\textsuperscript{17} The second, and more famous, was the work of Antonio Pigafetta, supernumerary on the voyage and one of the 18 survivors of an original crew of 270. His \textit{Relazione del primo viaggio intorno al mondo} was composed in Italian and included 23 maps.\textsuperscript{18}

Mapmakers accordingly started to alter the South Seas on world projections, drawing on sources old and new. For example, in \textit{Theatrum Orbis Terrarum} (Antwerp: 1579), Abraham Ortelius provided an updated look at the world. His was the first systematically-compiled printed atlas, in its 24\textsuperscript{th} edition by 1598 and translated into Dutch, French, German, and Spanish.\textsuperscript{19} Basic information for the planisphere, \textit{Typus Orbis Terrarum} (figure 1.3), came from a Mercator

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\item[\textsuperscript{16}] The Ladrones, or thieves, Islands were thus named because Magellan’s skiff was stolen while he moored there. This was not the only time that violent encounters would tinge the toponyms of the Pacific. The willingness or lack thereof to trade and provide food to Europeans would condition the printed descriptions of Pacific islanders, most notably in the division of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. Melanesia, specifically, means dark-skinned. For more on this division, see Douglas, “From \textit{Terra Australis} to Oceania;” Epeli Hau’ofa, “Pasts to Remember,” in \textit{We Are the Ocean: Selected Works} (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 60-79. Willingness to trade also affected how represented cultures would be in museum collections, with Polynesia disproportionately present. Jennifer Newell, “Irresistible objects: collecting in the Pacific and Australia in the reign of George III,” in \textit{Enlightenment: Discovering the World in the Eighteenth Century}, ed. Kim Sloan with Andrew Burnett (London: British Museum Press, 2003), 248.
\item[\textsuperscript{17}] Maximilianus Transylvanus, \textit{De Moluccis insulis}, (Cologne, 1523).
\item[\textsuperscript{18}] Camino, \textit{Producing the Pacific}, 73. The account was partially published in Paris in 1525. Antonio Pigafetta, \textit{Relazione del primo viaggio intorno al mondo}. Portions of this manuscript, which does not survive, were printed in French (Paris, 1525).
\item[\textsuperscript{19}] Hiatt, \textit{Terra Incognita: Mapping the Antipodes Before 1600}, 232. In 1587, Ortelius added the Solomons based on Mendaña’s discovery in 1567-9. Douglas, \textit{“Terra Australis} to Oceania,” 190.
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projection of 1569.20 The Pacific is a bit wider than Waldseemüller’s, around 110° at the equator, with North America extending across the whole of the north of the ocean. Ortelius includes the Strait of Anian, first depicted by Giacomo Gastaldi ca. 1561, which connects the North Atlantic to the North Pacific—the long-sought Northwest Passage. The Estrecho de Magallanes is labeled, depicting a narrow passage between South America and a gigantic Southern Continent, Terra Australis nondum Cognita, which radiates from the South Pole. Other labels in this unknown continent are Beach, Lucach, and Maletur, which he cites from Marco Polo’s travels.21 South of the Cape of Good Hope on the Southern Continent he added Psitacorum regio, describing it as, “the region of the parrots, so called by the Portuguese because of the unbelievable size of the birds which they saw there.”22 Ortelius, considered a master amongst his peers and one of the most widely-distributed geographers of his day, chose to call on recent expeditions like Magellan’s, Ptolemaic theory, medieval texts, and the work of contemporaries Mercator and Gastaldi.

20 “Nova et Aucta Orbis Terrae Descriptio ad Usum Navigantium emendate . . .” (1569). This Mercator chart is most likely the first loxodromic projection.
21 Misprints in the Paris and Basel editions of Marco Polo’s travels (1532) led Gastaldi, Mercator, and Ortelius to create a land mass to accommodate Polo’s Beach and Maletur; the continent could also imaginatively contain Java Minor. Helen Wallis, “A Portuguese Discovery? The Enigma of the Dieppe Maps,” in Studies from Terra Australis to Australia, eds. John Hardy and Alan Frost (Canberra: Highland Press in association with the Australian Academy of the Humanities, 1989), 83. See also Thomas Suarez, Early Mapping of the Pacific, 85.
Ortelius continued to revise his atlas in later editions; he also added certain maps including a stand-alone map of the Pacific, the first of its kind. Ortelius titled the map, “A very new description of the peaceful sea, commonly called South Sea with the regions lying around it,
and its islands, scattered everywhere” (figure 1.4). These islands are not randomly scattered, rather they are meticulously placed based on the information available to Ortelius in 1589. However, the techniques for measuring longitude were still imprecise and first-hand accounts were few. Furthermore, many sources were kept secret by states eager to protect their expansion from the interference of rivals. For this map, Ortelius used not only reports of Magellan’s circumnavigation, but also 25 Portuguese manuscript charts by Bartolomeo de Lasso in the possession of fellow Dutch mapmaker, Plancius. English travel writer Richard Hakluyt also provided Ortelius with place names from recent discoveries in North America, unpublished as yet for political reasons.


24 Plancius was involved with planning expeditions around the world and especially to seek northern passages to China. Günter Schilder, “Development and Achievements of Dutch Northern and Arctic Cartography in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Arctic 37, no. 4 (1984): 493-514.
Figure 1.4. Abraham Ortelius, “MARIS PACIFICI, | (quod vulgō Mar del Zur) | cum regionibus circumiacentibus, insulisque in eodem | passim sparsis, novissima description,” 1589.

Printed. Image courtesy of Wiki Commons.

Ortelius’ use of recent travel accounts as informed by ancient geographic theory reveals his practice of composition via critical, comparative compilation tempered by necessary speculation where sources were scarce or contradictory. On the map, the viewer’s eye is immediately drawn to a large ship which dominates the open water of the Pacific. It is Magellán’s *Victoria*, lending a historical scale to the map as well a geographical one. Tierra del Fuego, first sighted by Magellán, is the tip of a southern land, *Terra Australis, Sive Magellancia,*
Nondum Detecta, which extends westward in an ascending slope toward a large, insular Nova Guinea. As in his world map, Ortelius thought of the southern continent as nondum, “not yet” detected. He guessed at its boundaries but seemingly did not doubt its existence, most likely from his firm grasp of Ptolemaic worldview which postulated lands in the southern hemisphere, perhaps as a counterbalance to northern lands.\(^{25}\) The overall visual is of a large but not overwhelming space rimmed with lands and inevitably to be dominated by European sea power. Precision, especially in the Pacific region, was a moving target, yet a target many European states thought worthy of pursuit at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

A geographer’s sources depended upon his personal correspondence network, contacts with foreign pilots, and circulating voyage accounts—recent and less so, in manuscript and, increasingly, in print. Then as now, geographers preferred original, credible, and recent works upon which to base their representations, scarce as these sources might be.\(^{26}\) However, this is not to imply that mapmakers were on a linear journey to mathematical precision; early modern maps comfortably situated eyewitness evidence, geographic theory, and myth side by side.\(^{27}\) For the Pacific, this combined strategy was a necessity, as so few ships had journeyed there by 1589, when Ortelius made his stand-alone Pacific map. This scarcity of information and eagerness to better understand what the Pacific had to offer—a combined geographic ignorance and enthusiasm\(^{28}\)—created a sense of competition yet also collaboration amongst mapmakers,

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\(^{25}\) Oronce Fine was the first geographer to use the term Terra Australis in a 1531 map. Mercator preferred Magellanica, falsely believing the land had been discovered by Magellan in 1519-21. For more on continental balance theory and its origins, see note 12 above.

\(^{26}\) For more on what makes a so-called good map, see Pedley, *Commerce of Cartography*, ch. 6.


\(^{28}\) Here I am playing on the term “geographic ignorance” used by Mapp, *The Elusive West*. Mapp used it to describe the tension resulting from expanding empire into unknown territory. The Pacific was also a place of ignorance for
intellectuals, and early modern states alike. Those states who sponsored or hosted expeditions to the Pacific often held the most geographic knowledge about the region. However, differing approaches to the management of cartographic materials and geographic knowledge conditioned the degree to which people and information circulated. The quest to allay geographic ignorance waxed and waned, passing the torch of expeditions and Pacific cartography back and forth across Europe, adding partnerships and broadening the exchange of Pacific geographic knowledge in the process.

Consolidating sources of Pacific geographic knowledge

It is significant that Ortelius decided to position Magellan’s ship so prominently on his map of the Pacific. More importantly, he chose to have the ship fly the standard of Magellan’s native Portugal, not Spain, who sponsored the expedition. Not only does this visual cue de-Castilianize the Pacific, as Ricardo Padron argues, but it also underlines the central role that the Portuguese played in the early navigation and charting of the Pacific. Portuguese mariners set up Europe’s first entrepôts in the lucrative East Indies. Portuguese pilots also drew some of the earliest and most accurate charts of those islands, as well as Africa and parts of the Americas.

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Europeans, cooling possible imperial ambition. Ignorance of Pacific waters played into expansion on the North American continent, the subject of Mapp’s book. He deals with the Pacific throughout, but specifically in Part II. I use geographic ignorance not in a pejorative way but to note a lack, a lacuna, but one could be filled creatively or left empty.

30 They did so at the behest of locals, not through sheer force. Elizabeth Mancke, “Early Modern Expansion and the Politicization of Oceanic Space,” Geographical Review 89, no. 2 (1999): 229. They also were able to expand across open ocean thanks to the development of astronomical sailing, i.e. Jacob’s staff and astrolabe. Portuondo, Secret Science, 49; Luisa Martín-Merás, “Las enseñanzas náuticas en la Casa de Contratación de Sevilla,” in La Casa de la Contratación y la navegación entre España y las Indias, eds. Antonio Acosta Rodríguez, Adolfo González Rodríguez, and Enriqueta Vila Vilar (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2003), 667.
The contents of these charts was of political and economic import, for Spain and Portugal both contested the location and extent of their nascent empires at the turn of the sixteenth century. In 1494, Spain and Portugal agreed in the Treaty of Tordesillas that lands west of a meridian 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, the Line of Demarcation, belonged to Spain; those to the East to Portugal.\textsuperscript{32} As the world’s only source at the time for nutmeg and cloves, the Moluccas touched off another dispute over world hegemony, this time cutting through the Pacific. A wider-than-assumed Pacific and lack of a reliable method by which to calculate longitude meant that the anti-meridian of the Line of Demarcation was uncertain. Elcano, Magellan’s successor, arrived at the Moluccas Islands from the east in 1521, whereas the Portuguese had established a trading fort at Ternate in 1512, sailing from the west. After the return of the \textit{Victoria}, Charles V of Spain sent García Jofre de Loaísa to colonize the islands and establish a fort there. In 1529, the Treaty of Zaragoza set the meridian 297.5 leagues east of the Moluccas as the antipodean Line of Demarcation. Portugal was to control the coveted Moluccas, but it had to pay Charles V for the privilege.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, the first European treaty regarding the

\textsuperscript{32} The exact position of the line of demarcation continued to be an issue of contention. For example, Alonso de Santa Cruz, \textit{cosmographo-mayor}, wrote of his opinion as to the proper ownership of the Philippine Islands in 1566. BL Add. MS 17625, f. 96. The Line of Demarcation and the anti-meridian are marked on a Portuguese map, n.d., BL Add MS 17647a. The lines are also on Franciscus Monachus, \textit{Monarchus hemispheres} (Antwerp, 1527). See BL Maps C.107.bb.17.(1.), and on the maps in Herrera’s \textit{Décadas} (1601), which are based on manuscript maps by López de Velasco, \textit{cosmografo mayor}, BL 601.k.12-15. Maps from Northern Europe did not tend to include the lines, as non-Catholic states did not recognize the Treaties of Tordesillas or Zaragoza.

Pacific had a Southeast Asian orientation; the goal of all European states was passage to the East Indies and China.

Pacific space was politicized not only by meridians decided in treaties, but also on official maps held in Europe. In order to protect and maintain their global interests, there needed to be a centralized mapping and geographical body. In Portugal, there is evidence that such a body existed by 1496, when Bartholomew Dias, the famous navigator, served as its head. The *Armazém da Guiné*—later the *Armazéns da Guiné, Mina e Indias* and led by the receiver of stores (*almoxarife*)—oversaw the upkeep of the master chart (the *padrao de el-Rei*), distribution and return of charts, training of pilots, and management of the content of charts. For example, a royal charter from King Manuel issued November 13, 1504 disallowed Portuguese charts from having information about navigation below the river Congo and lands below 8°S in South America; non-compliant charts were to be brought to the *Armazém* for correction. The same charter forbid the construction of globes. The regulations of 1592 for the post of *cosmografo-mor*—a post created in 1547 to work in tandem with the receiver of stores—decreed that the *cosmografo-mor* had to inspect all maps ordered by private citizens. If the charts did not conform to the *padrao*, they could not be released. Not only was some information kept secret, therefore, but the Portuguese Crown also did not want to disseminate false information. The information they did release into circulation had to be approved by experts who worked from the latest, and usually secret, sources.

By the seventeenth century, regulations had relaxed somewhat. The *Armazém* approved the printing of *rutters*, books of written sailing directions. However, surviving materials about

34 Mota, “Some Notes of the Organization of the Hydrographical Services in Portugal,” 54.
Portuguese mapmaking are limited. The *Armazém* was destroyed in the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 and did not revive until the creation of the *Sociedade Real Maritima Militar e Geografica para o Desenho, Gravura e Impressao des Cartas Hidrograficas, Geograficas e Militares* in 1798. By this time, the Portuguese hold over the spice trade had declined. No printed maps from the eighteenth century survive, while only a few manuscript charts are scattered throughout Europe.

In terms of early modern mapping, Portugal’s influence is most evident in the use of pilots as sources, such as in the Ortelius map of the Pacific. Individuals and individual charts could escape the close censor of the *Armazém*, and the institution itself could be breached, for the right price. This is precisely what happened with the Cantino Planisphere, the oldest surviving nautical chart to correctly place West Africa in terms of latitude. The Duke of Navarra sought information about the New World discoveries and sent Alberto Cantino to Portugal to steal geographic secrets. Cantino paid someone privy to the *padrao* in the *Armazém* 12 golden ducats to create the chart. In another example, it is likely King Manuel’s 1504 charter regulating the publication of maps and globes was in response to Amerigo Vespucci, a Florentine, defecting from Portuguese patronage back to Spanish. In 1508, Charles V appointed Vespucci pilot-major of the Spanish equivalent of the *Armazém*, the *Casa de la Contratación*. Those who possessed navigational knowledge, as well as the ability to record it, were in high demand. Whereas the *Armazém* and the *Casa* could serve as vaults for cartographic documents,

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37 Mota argues that the Casa was patterned after the Portuguese example, which is likely. Mota, “Some Notes of the Organization of the Hydrographical Services in Portugal,” 54.
controlling the movements of cartographers eager to gain royal patronage proved much more difficult.

**Attempts to close a porous sea in print**

Spanish voyages of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were the main sources for further information about the South Seas, but a conservative approach to the management of geographic knowledge limited the circulation of such knowledge. As part of their burgeoning bureaucracy to manage global colonies, the Crown founded the Casa de la Contratación in 1503. Created to regulate commerce and navigation with overseas possessions, the Casa was to act as tax collector, judicial overseer, and travel regulator to the East and West Indies. The Casa required information in order to manage the sea routes and those people and goods that traveled upon them. Founded in 1523, the Consejo de Indias took over the political and judicial administrative duties for the colonies. Both Consejo and Casa were pragmatic institutions that actively sought new information about the realities of overseas possessions.\(^38\) However, their centralized status in Spain limited their ability to control pilots and colonial officials, making their near constant requests for descriptions of the geography of colonies a frustrating endeavor.

In 1508 Ferdinand II appointed the Casa’s first piloto mayor, the aforementioned defector Amerigo Vespucci, who was to maintain the master chart of the Carrera de Indias, the padrón real.\(^39\) While it is true that the padrón real was kept in a chest locked with three keys,\(^40\) it

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39 González Sánchez, “La Casa de la Contratación y la historia cultura,” 546, 563. For more on the examination of pilots, see Martín-Merás, “Las enseñanzas náuticas en la Casa de Contratación de Sevilla,” 667-693. For more on how knowledge was transmitted to new generations of pilots, see Buttinger, Rivera, and Buttinger, “Mateo Jorge.”
is more accurate to characterize the geographic knowledge collected by the Casa as closely monitored, not truly clandestine. Pilots in training circulated manuscript manuals and theoretical treatises to augment their educations, which also required six years of service in the Carrera de Indias. Some pilots transcribed portions of these manuscripts in order to create their own copies. Control of circulation, in manuscript or print, was vital. In 1510 the Casa received instructions to keep navigational rutters secret. To prevent rivals from gaining geographic knowledge, the Casa banned foreign pilots from owning navigational charts in 1527. Under Phillip II (r. 1556-1598), cartography was codified, to use Portuondo’s term. Reforms in the 1560s mandated that pilots list their rutters and charts, as well as give notarized copy of their log book to a cosmographer and the piloto mayor of the Casa, who would then forward them to the cosmographer at the Consejo. Pilots were required to turn over their original rutter whether they left the profession or died and had to swear to cartographic secrecy before going abroad. A formal order of September 21, 1556 prohibited the printing and sale of any book dealing with the

Portuondo explains how the piloto mayor later shared some duties with Consejo cosmographers. Cosmography is a mix of cartography, geography, ethnography, natural history, history, and part of astronomy. The work of cosmographers working for the Casa and its administrative counterpart, el Consejo de Indias, led to a flowering of the field, as well as to a split in the sixteenth century between mathematical cosmographers (cartographers) and descriptive cosmographers (chroniclers). Portuondo, Secret Science, 1, 9. There were also some disputes between pilots (practitioners) and cosmographers (intellectuals). Ibid, 278-9, 282-3; Martín-Merás, “Las enseñanzas náuticas en la Casa de Contratación de Sevilla,” 674.

40 “Ya se os escribió que enviase a los oficiales de Sevilla la descripción patrón que traio Sarmiento de las costas y navegación del Estrecho y así lo habréis, previniéndoles para que con todo secreto y recato y en presencia de Diego Florez hagan que el cosmógrafo tome la razón de todo ello, y ponga en las cartas haciendo solas aquellas que fueren necesarias para que esta armada las lleve, y sin quedarle ninguna otra se meta el patrón en la arca de tres llaves, y cuando vuelva esta armada se recobren las que llevan y se guar den.” AGI, IG-739, N.306, “Consulta del Consejo de Indias sobre expedición de Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa al Estrecho de Magallanes,” March 1, 1581, Madrid; quoted in Portuondo, Secret Science, 99.

41 Martín-Merás, “Las enseñanzas náuticas en la Casa de Contratación de Sevilla,” 676.

42 This practice continued into the early seventeenth century. Ibid, 667-693; Buttinger, Rivera, and Buttinger, “Mateo Jorge,” 639-668.

43 Portuondo, Secret Science, 7.

44 Ibid, 131-2.
Indies if not examined first by the *Consejo de Indias*.\(^{45}\) Just as in the Portuguese case, such restrictions were not absolute; the printing order had to re-issued several times throughout the sixteenth century.

Although Spain exercised a state monopoly over geographic publications, some books were indeed published and circulated throughout Europe.\(^{46}\) Cosmographers at the *Casa* pioneered the genre of the navigational manual, two of the most famous being Pedro de Medina’s *Arte de navegar* (1545), printed in 20 French editions, and Martin Cortes’ *Breve compendio de la esfera y de la arte de navegar* (1551), printed in 6 English editions between 1561 and 1630. During the reign of Phillip III (r. 1598-1621), cosmographers were encouraged to publish their works, although such publications had to undergo a careful vetting process.\(^{47}\) Under Phillip III’s patronage, information flowed more freely, representing a “radical reconceptualization of the strategic value of geographic knowledge.”\(^{48}\) This radical reconceptualization peaked with the publication of Rodrigo Zamorano’s *Regimiento de navegación e hydrografia* (Madrid: 1606), a printed navigation manual containing the latest version of the *padrón real*.\(^{49}\) The Spanish Crown had not only changed its policies regarding secrecy, it had also realized that printed charts could be re-produced more quickly and uniformly.

\(^{45}\) Ibid, 105. Spanish officials also monitored books being shipped to the Americas. See González Sánchez, “La Casa de la Contratación y la historia cultural,” 543-566.

\(^{46}\) Portuondo, *Secret Science*, 53. Books were also published elsewhere. In 1558 Stephen Borough was invited to the *Casa* and given Martin Cortes, *Breve compendio de la esfera y la arte de navegar* (Sevilla, 1551). Borough brought it to England where it was translated by Richard Eden in 1561. Buttinger, Rivera, and Buttinger, “Mateo Jorge,” 663; Peter Barber, “England II,” 65.

\(^{47}\) For example, the maps Herrera, chronicler major of the *Consejo*, used in his *Décadas* were twenty-year old maps by Velasco, who had been forbidden from publishing them. They were out of date when Herrera asked to use them, thus were allowed. Portuondo, *Secret Science*, 295-7. The Spanish state kept out of print those books that did not match their evangelizing mission or had geostrategic information. Thus, better navigation manuals than those that got printed existed in manuscript.


Geography, in chart or text form and carefully edited and reviewed, could be used to trumpet the power and majesty of Spain’s worldwide empire. Printed works also showed off the prowess of its considerable body of technical experts, the chroniclers and mathematical cosmographers of the Casa and Consejo. However, authorship was limited for the most part to these experts, employees of the Crown; censorship still reigned and would continue to do so into the eighteenth century.

Furthermore, by the seventeenth century much of what the Spanish sought to keep hidden—the locations of mines, settlements and the routes of treasure galleons—was no longer a secret. French, Dutch, and English ships hassled their holdings from the West to the East Indies, most famously with Francis Drake’s circumnavigation (1577-80). Members of international religious orders skirted publication restrictions and spread information about missions, especially on the Asian frontier. Phillip III’s push to publish information was not a benevolent outpouring of intellectual rapprochement, but rather a shrewd reaction to a shift in geopolitics.

The most significant event in Spain’s navigation of the Pacific was the 1565 voyages of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi and his pilot, Andres de Urdaneta. Together, these two voyages would solidify the routes of the Manila-Acapulco trade, the Carrera de Acapulco.50 Bullion would sail east, trade goods west, from 1566 to 1815.51 Alongside the annual galleon runs, there were several voyages to chart the western American coastline, almost entirely organized by the Viceroyalties of Peru and Nueva España. This underlines the insights of Buschmann, Slack, and

50 There had been previous attempts at this feat in the 1540s. Shaw, “Terra Australis—The Spanish Quest,” 59.
51 The route, dictated by the trade winds, was still not secure. Cavendish, Rogers, and Anson captured galleons and 30 ships were lost between 1565 and 1718. Mapp, The Elusive West, 116. The Spanish government attempted to keep tabs on this route, as evidenced by the reports in BL Add MS 17623-5.
Tueller that the Pacific was not so much a Spanish lake, to use O.H.K. Spate’s well-worn phrase, but a Hispanized area of cultural exchange.\textsuperscript{52}

Important among these New World expeditions were Francisco Cortes and Juan Ladrillero’s navigation from Pacific to Atlantic round South America in 1557-9. Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa repeated the venture in 1579-80, reaching Spain. Once in Spain, Gamboa would meet with Casa cosmographer Rodrigo Zamorano to discuss his experiences in the Straits of Magellan and to help build instruments and charts for a return voyage, this time to establish a fort that would keep out the French, Dutch, and especially the English. However, Gamboa’s 1581 expedition was a disaster. Gamboa returned to Spain nearly ten years later after founding two doomed austral cities, having been shipwrecked, rescued, and captured first by the English and then the Huguenots on his return home. As with so many who would attempt the Straits, inclement weather and currents thwarted any attempt to traverse it regularly. Gamboa’s efforts did not go unnoticed outside Spain, however. In Ortelius’ \textit{Mare Pacificum}, there is a small sign indicating a settlement in the extreme south of South America, with the description, “The fort Phillip II ordered to be erected here, anno 1582.”\textsuperscript{53}

Earlier in his career, Gamboa was also involved in the first of a series of Spanish expeditions whose goal was not to cross the Pacific, but to see whether it might be hiding resources or even an entire continent. Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa persuaded the Viceroy of Peru to send ships to look for Tupac Yupanqui’s mythical islands. The new Viceroy approved of the expedition, but gave command to his nephew Álvaro de Mendaña, who sailed west from


\textsuperscript{53} Original Latin: “\textit{Arx, quom rex Philip II exstrui curavit A/o 1582.” BL Maps C.2.d.3.
Callao in November 1567. By February 7, 1568, Mendaña and his men had arrived at Santa Isabel in the Solomon Islands. Mendaña managed to persuade authorities to finance another expedition to colonize the Solomon Islands 25 years later. He set sail in 1595 with 340 men, women, and children, as well as his brothers, wife, and a pilot named Pedro Fernandez de Quiros. After Mendaña died in Santa Cruz, his wife, Isabel Barreto, took command and led the group to the Solomons, where they set up a settlement for a number of months. Whereas three members of the first expedition submitted surviving manuscript accounts of the voyage, the only accounts of this second expedition come from Quiros.

News from the expeditions, however, quickly made it into cartographic form. For example, the world projection in Antonio de Herrera’s *Décadas*, originally drawn by cosmografo-mayor López de Velasco for his unpublished *Demarcacion y Division de Las Indias* (ca. 1574), shows both Santa Isabel and the larger Solomon Archipelago. The map also is careful to point out the Line of Demarcation and its anti-meridian, with a cartouche box in the Southern

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55 For the first Mendaña expedition there are several manuscript accounts. There is a long and short Mendaña account, one to King of Spain and the other to Governor of Peru. The longer is at the BRA; the short in the AGI. There is an account by Captain Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, written in treasurer of the fleet, Gomez Hernandez Catoira’s, hand. These accounts are available from the Hakluyt Society: Lord Amherst and Basil Thomson, eds., The *Discovery of the Solomon Islands by Alvaro de Mendaña in 1568. Translated from the Original Spanish Manuscripts*, 2 vols. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1901). Vol. I contains four narratives, two of them by or attributed to Mendaña’s companions, Hernando Gallego and Pedro Sarmiento. Vol. II contains three narratives, including one by Catoira. There are also two accounts by Hernando Gallego, pilot. The originals are at the Santa casa de Loyola (Guipuzcoa) and the AGI. A copy is at BL Add MS 17623.
56 Isabel Barreto was the first female Admiral and Governor (Adelantada). Camino argues that her historical role has been silenced or marginalized due to particular interests of historians and chroniclers. Being an admiral was exceptional, but being a woman involved in conquering was not. Camino, *Producing the Pacific*, 44-46.
57 There are two manuscript copies in Spain. A copy is included in Justo Zaragoza’s authoritative study of the voyage, *Historia del descubrimiento de las regiones austriales hecho por el general Pedro Fernandez de Quiros* (Madrid: Manuel G. Hernandez, 1867). The volume was re-issued (Madrid: Dove, 2000). See also Celsus Kelly, trans. and ed., *La Austrialia del Espíritu Santo / The Journal of Fray Martin de Munilla O.F.M. / and other documents relating to The Voyage of Pedro Fernández de Quiros / to the South Sea (1605-1606) / and / the Franciscan missionary plan / (1617-1627)* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1967).
Pacific explaining, “Between the two indicated meridians are contained the navigations and
discoveries that pertain to the Castilians.”\textsuperscript{58} The map covers the Pacific with Spanish legal
claims, declaring in the increasingly-authoritative medium of the engraved map that Spanish
sovereignty still reigned supreme from the Americas to the Philippines. Ortelius too includes the
Solomons and Santa Isabel in his 1589 \textit{Mare Pacificum}, although the claims to Spanish regional
sovereignty are underplayed on his map.\textsuperscript{59} The \textit{Décadas}, meant to showcase the history of
Spanish expansion, also sought to claim the Pacific as a Spanish possession under the terms of
the treaties of Tordesillas and Zaragoza and under the right of first discovery.

Disappointed by the limited findings of the second expedition, Quiros returned to Europe
to lobby for a third voyage to search for a southern continent. The Portuguese Quiros came to
serve Spain after the incorporation of Portugal in 1580.\textsuperscript{60} Sailing west across the Pacific, his
ships encountered what today are the Tuamotu, Line, and Cook archipelagos. Upon reaching the
New Hebrides, Quiros became convinced that this island was the tip of \textit{Terra Australis
Incognita}. In the course of several elaborate rituals,\textsuperscript{61} Quiros dubbed the island \textit{Austrialia [sic.]}
del Espíritu Santo and founded a city that would connect Spanish power from Lima to Manila, Nueva Hierusalem. Despite his grand plans, his officers forced him to leave. Quiros sailed back to America, while his pilot, Luis Vaez de Torres, set out for Manila, sailing the strait between New Guinea and Australia along the way. The lead-up and aftermath of the second Quiros expedition are particularly interesting in terms of the management and circulation of Pacific geographic knowledge. To shore up his reputation, Quiros advertised his cartographic and navigational skills across Europe. He was recognized as a superb mapmaker at Rome in 1601 and by the Spanish Council of State and the Consejo in 1603. These accolades, along with the maps, assured him the second voyage.62

After his return in 1607, Quiros lobbied even more vigorously for a third chance to return to his “earthly paradise.” As part of this effort, Quiros produced a large-scale world map, a 1610 treatise on navigation, as well as at least fifty memorials outlining his past work and future promises. Most of these memorials were dispersed in manuscript. Quiros also paid for fourteen of them to be printed at his own expense between 1607 and 1614.64 In a 1610 treatise, he lambasted the state of cartographic practice, especially as it related to the Pacific:

He [the pilot]…cannot be certain of giving the true positions as regard latitude, longitude, and shape…all the charts are defective and will remain so unless your Majesty sends a person of knowledge and experience with accurate instruments to observe and describe everything as he passes from one place to another.65

62 Quiros is said to have drawn more than 200 charts of the Pacific, the first 5 commissioned by Mendaña in 1595. For an exhaustive overview of the maps of Quiros’ expeditions, see Kelly, Some Early Maps Relating to the Quiéros–Torres Discoveries of 1606.
63 Quiros calls it a “Parayso terrenal.” BL Add. MS 13974, f. 184.
65 AGS, Estado K. 1631, c. 37, doc. 245, as quoted in Kelly, Some Early Maps Relating to the Quiéros–Torres Discoveries of 1606, 205.
Quiros was dissatisfied with the representations that Spanish cosmographers were producing. Relying on navigators’ calculations and first-hand accounts might work for well-traveled areas like the Atlantic route to the Caribbean, but for the Pacific the over-reliance on a handful of calculations led to erroneous charts. Only with repeated expeditions by a “person of knowledge and experience,” i.e. Quiros, could the Pacific became as well known as the Atlantic.

The *Eighth Memorial* sent to the Spanish Crown proved to be the most influential for Pacific geographic knowledge circulation. In it, Quiros re-counts his discovery of several islands and argues Spain should claim the southern continent as a Catholic land. He describes the islands he has seen as lands of plenty, with mild weather and many resources including spices, pearls, silver, and gold. The people he describes are gentle and pliable; they would be easy “pacificar y doctrinar,” to pacify and indoctrinate. The land he surmises is as wide as Europe, Asia Minor, the Caspian Sea, and Persia combined, “in its outline it quarters the entire Globe.” Furthermore, there is space for several provinces, and all this “without having to neighbor with Turks, nor Moors, nor with others of nations that usually worry and perturb agendas.” In Quiros’ words, his discovery could spare Spain problems with imperial rivals and create a world where Spain “continues being the center.”

Printed in Madrid in 1608 and Seville in 1609, the *Eighth Memorial* was reprinted in 1612 by Dutch cartographer Hessel Gerritsz in his *Detectio Freti Hudson*. Gerritz also created a

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66 Copy in BL Add MS 13974, ff. 184-6. Another memorial referencing his 8th and 16th memorial is at ff. 186-8.
67 BL Add MS 13974, f. 184.
68 Original: “La grandeza de las tierras nuevamente descubiertos, juzgado por lo´q yo vi, y por lo que el Capitã Luis Vaez de Torres Almirante de mi cargo aviso a V.M de buena razon su longitud es tanta como la de toda Europa, Asia menor, y hasta el Caspio y la Persia có todas las Islas del Mediterraneo, y Oceano, que en su contorno se quarta de todo el Glovo...y esto sin a vezindar con Turcos, no Moros, no con otras de las naciones que suelen inquietar y perturbar las agenas.” BL Add MS 13974, f. 184.
69 Ibid, f. 185.
map showing Quiros’ route. There were two French editions in 1617 and numerous manuscript translations. Purchas included it in his influential travel collection (1625) and Quiros’ account would be repeated in printed collections throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The circulation of written and printed word ensured that Quiros’ discoveries, especially Espiritu Santo and the Solomons, would be included in maps and travel accounts, although the exact location of his discoveries would vary greatly by geographer.

Indeed, the veracity of Quiros’ claims, especially as regards the Southern Continent, would become a topic of importance to cartographers and state officials for the next two centuries. For example, in 1670 Diego Luis de San Vitores sought support to evangelize Pacific islands with the Marianas Islands as his base. He republished Quiros’ *Eighth Memorial* to drum up support. The new viceroy of Nueva España, the Marques de Mancera reviewed Quiros’ work and decided that his findings were false and imprecise. Over time, sources of Pacific geographic knowledge would be re-evaluated, yet seldom jettisoned. The paucity of voyages and accounts until the end of the eighteenth century would create a durable canon of voyages and

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70 Beyond BL Sloane 333, the memorial is also part of source collections gathered in late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from Spanish archives and held at the BL. BL Add MS 17625 f. 144, f. 87; these documents are labeled as part of a collection on Pacific discovery. BL Add. MS 13974 contains a copy of the 8th memorial; these documents are “indorsed by, or sent to” Bernardo de Iriarte, member of the Consejo de Indias (see chapter 6). BL Egerton MS 902, ff. 2-23 has an overview of the Quiros expedition. The volume is a collection of voyages to the Americas gathered by Don Joseph Antonio de Armona Cavaill/ in 1772.


geographic entities that made up the idea of the Pacific. Quiros would serve as a pillar of this canon.

In contrast to Quiros’ general exposure across Europe, his second-in-command Torres,’ discovery of the Torres Strait between New Holland (Australia) and New Guinea would not be immediately integrated by geographers. The Torres Strait as a geographical feature only began to be known after 1762, when the English captured Manila and East India Company (EIC) hydrographer Alexander Dalrymple uncovered a report by Torres sent to the King of Spain, dated July 12, 1607.73 Several reports and four charts drawn by Don Diego de Prado y Tovar had been sent back to Spain after the expedition. However, these materials never slipped into more general circulation; it is not the existence of geographic materials that is central to the creation of knowledge, but the circulation of that knowledge.

After 50 memorials, Quiros was finally allowed to return to the South Seas. However, he died while preparing for the voyage in Panama in 1615. After Quiros, Spain lost its inclination to explore the open waters of the Mar del Sur. This is due to a variety of reasons including imperial overextension, the weakening of the Portuguese state under the Iberian Union, and the rise of maritime power in England and the United Provinces. The Viceroyalties of Nueva España and Peru also decided not to fund long-distance endeavors due to a lack of available ships and the threat to coastal waters represented by Drake’s voyage of 1577-80.74 Finally, whereas Spain and Portugal were undisputed leaders in navigation and exploration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they were not the leaders in another crucial field, print.

73 Wroth, Early Cartography of the Pacific, 182.
The printing industry in the Iberian Peninsula was dominated by foreign artisans and split between several major cities and two primary languages. The industry declined in the last quarter of the 16th century due to religious and civil censorship, royal privileges creating monopolies, and a general lack of materials and means.\(^75\) Whereas the presence of printing presses does not guarantee the free circulation of ideas the ability to share one’s ideas broadly is important to early modern geography. In a field dominated by the necessity to compare as many sources as possible, exchange of information was key. Without it, not only were ideas not read by wider audiences, but states were loath to risk ships and funds in long-distance exploration. Without textual or cartographic evidence, the Pacific was too remote for Europeans to risk its penetration. For individuals like Quiros, such reticence was unacceptable.

**In search of trade in the western Pacific**

While Spain was consolidating the Manila-Acapulco route from the east, the dominance of Portugal in the western approach to the East Indies was being contested by new trade powers. In response to the Dutch Revolt, Philip II closed the Lisbon spice market to Dutch and English traders in 1585, spurring both countries to seek direct trade with Asia. The EIC was founded in 1600, followed in 1602 by the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC). More heavily capitalized than its English counterpart, the VOC aggressively moved into areas of Portuguese influence. The Portuguese claimed the Indian Ocean as their exclusive purview under the Treaty of Tordesillas. However, the English and Dutch, as Protestant nations, had never recognized the Treaty as binding beyond Spain and Portugal; both northern European powers operated under the

idea of free trade on the high seas. To counter Portuguese claims, the VOC hired legal theorist Hugo Grotius to write a defense of free navigation and trade. He produced *Mare Liberum* (1608), which argues that no state can claim sovereignty over open waters. The sea is not like land; its fluidity marks it as a place of open transit and commerce.

This line of thinking suited the joint-stock companies which enriched Dutch and English merchants. Dutch voyages were funded by merchants and companies eager to open new markets. As part of their charter, the States General granted the VOC control over the Straits of Magellan and lands east of the Cape of Good Hope. The VOC kept manuscript maps and charts in the company’s archives; from 1619 they employed a closed policy similar to the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns. However, also similar to their Iberian counterparts, the VOC was subject to leaks. As Amsterdam was the center of atlas and waggoner publishing in the seventeenth century, Dutch voyages often appeared on maps quickly upon their return. In 1605 the VOC sent

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77 A map showing VOC territory had to be approved by the Herren XVII. Kees Zandvliet, “Mapping the Dutch World Overseas in the Seventeenth Century,” in *The History of Cartography*, vol. 3, ed. David Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 1433. For a corollary to VOC mapping practices, consider Visscher’s productive relationship with the West India Company (WIC), ca. 1600-1650. The WIC would commission or share information with Visscher, effectively turning his prints, sold on the open market, into propaganda for the WIC’s projects. Elizabeth A. Sutton, *Capitalism and Cartography in the Dutch Golden Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), chaps. 4-5.

their first expedition to explore the shores of New Guinea. The voyage made it into print in Hessel Gerritsz’s 1622 chart of the Pacific.79 Gerritsz was the cartographer of the VOC, showing the tension between company secrecy and the profits available to individuals from maps that contained updated information desired by an audience of navigators and merchants. In the 1610s there were several accidental encounters with the western coast of New Holland (Australia) by merchant vessels.80 Geographers gathered information about these finds via their personal networks in Amsterdam and farther afield; the VOC’s centralization worked against its closed cartographic policy.

Intrigued by the reports of the accidental discoveries, the VOC ordered more deliberate exploration to be carried out in order to elucidate the area and avoid shipwrecks. In 1622, the VOC instructed:

The main object for which you are dispatched on this occasion is…you will have to discover and survey all capes, forelands, bights, lands, islands, rocks, sandbanks, depths, shallows, roads, winds, currents and all that appertains to the same, so as to be able to map out and duly mark everything in its true latitude, longitude, bearings and conformation. You will moreover go ashore in various places and diligently examine the coast in order to ascertain whether or not it is inhabited, the nature of the land and the people, their towns and inhabited villages, the division of their kingdoms, their religion and polity, their wars, their rivers, the shape of their vessels, their fisheries, commodities and manufactures, but especially to inform yourselves what minerals, such as gold, silver, tin, iron, lean, and copper, what precious stones, pearls, vegetables, animals and fruits, these lands yield and produce.81

79 Hessel Gerritsz, Mar del Sur. Mar Pacifico (1622). BnF, GE SH ARCH- 30 (RES). Gerritz was also cartographer of the WIC.
80 All were on the western, southwestern, and southern coasts of Australia. In 1616 an East Indiaman hit Eendrachtsland, others followed due to new southern sailing route in Indian Ocean and poor longitude calculation. Also in 1616, the Eendracht was blown off course to new islands; its officers left no logs, but letters. Dirck Hartochsz, commander, left a plate. This plate was recovered by Willem Hesselsz de Vlamingh in 1697. In 1618, the Mauritius with Willem Jansz as supercargo reached the west coast of Australia; they left no log but Jansz reported the incident in Bantam. In 1619, the Dordrecht and the Amsterdam sighted a giant shoal and reported it in Bantam. Günter Schilder, “From Secret to Common Knowledge: The Dutch Discoveries,” in Studies from Terra Australis to Australia, eds. Hardy and Frost, 73-75.
81 BVOC 1070, ff. 26-7v, as quoted in Schilder, “From Secret to Common Knowledge,”75-6.
This was to be a fact-finding mission focused on navigation and trade. Postponed until 1623, the VOC expedition lead by Jan Carstensz discovered Arnhem Land and the Wessels Islands. The commander deposited a manuscript map with the VOC, yet an account appeared in print in 1625 and on charts starting in 1628. Another expedition followed in 1636, accompanied by other discoveries by shipwrecked crews. The area stayed in the public eye due to the sensationalized periodical coverage of the shipwreck, mutiny, and massacre of the Batavia in 1629. However, none of these expeditions offered anything of commercial value. A more wide-ranging expedition was necessary to see if there was anything for VOC merchants to exploit.

The VOC was not the only source of geographic information about the Pacific. Although they dominated the waters east of the Cape of Good Hope, there was a loophole in their holdings in the Straits of Magellan. Despite its depiction as part of a southern continent on many sixteenth-century large scale maps, not all navigators were convinced that Tierra del Fuego was a continent. In 1615, independent Dutch merchants sent Cornelius Schouten and Isaac Le Maire to see if they could steer around Tierra del Fuego and, thus, around the VOC monopoly of the East Indies. From 1615-1617, Schouten and Le Maire circumnavigated the globe, entering the Pacific via a strait that sent their ships around Cape Horn.

The fanfare around the Schouten expedition centered on the discovery of an alternate route to the Pacific than the treacherous and unpredictable Straits of Magellan. Schouten’s

82 Ibid, 73. For more on the Batavia, see Leigh T. I. Penman, “The Wicked and the Fair: Changing Perceptions of Terra Australis through the Prism of the Batavia Shipwreck (1629),” in European Perceptions of Terra Australis, eds. Scott et al., 247-72. It should be noted that the Dutch were also exploring to the northward in this period. See Schilder, “Development and Achievements;” J. Braat, “Dutch Activities in the North and the Arctic during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Arctic 37, no. 4 (1984): 473-80. For early Dutch, but also Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Indonesian interactions with Australia prior to the voyages of Captain Cook, see Graham Seal, The Savage Shore: Extraordinary Voyages of Survival and Tragedy from the Early Voyages of Discovery (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).
account of the expedition appeared in French in 1618, published with charts and figures by Guillaume Sanson in Amsterdam.\(^83\) The Pacific map insert just after the preface shows the Dutch stamp left by their first transit of the ocean, a cluster of Dutch-named islands that trail southeast of New Guinea. Near Cape Hoorn readers encounter Eylanden van Barnevelt and Strate van Le Maire separating Staten Land from Tierra del Fuego. Finally, the ship’s track runs across the Pacific. The cartographic Pacific was no longer exclusively Spanish in toponym.\(^84\) Translations and subsequent editions of the account proliferated with a Latin edition,\(^85\) another French edition,\(^86\) and an English version,\(^87\) all printed in 1619. The dedication of the English edition echoes the shock and pleasure brought by the “newe unexpected and never heretofore discovered Passage.”\(^88\) Despite a century of awareness by Europeans, the Pacific could still dazzle with unknown features. The inclusion of charts in most versions of the printed account also served to democratize the geographic wonder; all could in theory now pass through and

\(^{83}\) *Journal ou l’Admirable Voyage de Guillaume Schouten Hollandois. Comme par ley est docouvery vers le zud du destroict de Magellan un nouveau passage, pour parvenir en la mer du Zud, jauques a ce temps incogne. Quelles Terres, Isles, Gens & aventures estranges pay ley sont trouvez en la dicte Mer du Zud. Illustre de belles Cartes & Figures taillez en cuivre. A AMSTERDAM. Imprime ches Guillaume Sanson.* No date is listed, but the British Library catalogue dates the book to 1618. BL 1045.3.17.(1).

\(^{84}\) “Cartte vande Zuijdzee, vertonende way wech Willem Schouten door de zelbe gezeijlt, en wat landen en eijlanden bij hem aldaer genonden zijn,” in ibid. Also included is a larger-scale chart of Tierra del Fuego, between pages 18 and 19, and a chart of Nova Guinea between pages 64-65.

\(^{85}\) BL 1045.3.17.(2.), Latin edition (1619). Pepys owned a copy of this edition; at the end of his version are eight pages of hand-written translation, “A Transcript of so much of Original Dutch Edicon of Schouten’s Voyage into ye South-Sea, as relates to ye Double-Bottom-Vessels, or Double-Canoes, & here first by him discover’d ab’t ye Isle of Cocos, of ye 9,10,11,12&13\(^{th}\) of May 1616. In ord/r to ye bett/r judging of ye Translacons thereof in Purchas’s English, & in this Latin, & ye French Edicons of the sayd Voyage.” PL.1045.

\(^{86}\) *Journal Ou DESCRIPTION DU MERVEILLEUX VOYAGE DE GUILLAUME SCHOUTEN, Hollanois natif de Hoorn, fait es années 1615, 1616, & 1617. Comme (en circum-navigeant le Globe terrestre) il a discoverey vers le Zud du destoit de Magellan un nouveau passage, jauques a la grande Mer de Zud. Ensemble, Des aventures admirablees qui luy sont advenues en descouvrant de plusieurs Isles, & peuples estranges. A AMSTERDAM, Chez Pierre du Keere, Tailleur de Cartes, demeur anten la Calverstraet, a l’enseigne du temps incertain, 1619.* BL 1045.3.17.(3.).


\(^{88}\) Ibid, epistle dedicatory.
trade with the Pacific. Any vestige of a Spanish *mare clausum*, always a tenuous claim, was now shattered.

Meanwhile, the VOC prepared to mount their largest exploratory expedition to date. Governor-general Anthonie Van Diemen charged Abel Tasman to sail to the “partly known as well as the undiscovered South and East lands, to discover them and find some important lands, or at the very least some practicable passages to well-known rich places, to be used eventually to enhance and enlarge the general welfare of the company.”[^89] Also aware of the need for precise recorded information, Van Diemen ordered that Francois Jacobsz Visscher accompany the voyage to act as chronicler and cartographer. The expedition visited Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania), the west coast of New Zealand, Tonga, and Fiji. Van Diemen was disappointed that Tasman had seemed content to merely observe and quickly sail on, “Tasman has not made many investigations regarding the situations nor form and nature of the discovered lands and peoples, but has in principle left everything to a more inquisitive successor.”[^90]

The VOC gave Tasman another chance in 1644, this time telling him to, “take up seriously the further discovery of these South lands in the hope of achieving something profitable.”[^91] Van Diemen ordered Tasman to investigate the possibility of a strait between New Guinea and New Holland, as the Torres Strait was not included on contemporary VOC charts. He also wanted Tasman to explore the approach to Van Diemen’s Land. On the first count Tasman, like his Dutch predecessors, took the entrance to the Torres Strait for a shallow bay. As to the second count, the short cut to Van Diemen’s Land proved to be the Gulf of Carpentaria,

[^90]: ARA VOC 1142, ff. 7v, quoted in Schilder, “From Secret to Common Knowledge,” 80.
discovered in 1606 by fellow Dutchman Willem Janszoon. Tasman sailed along the entire coast of New Guinea but these results were even paltrier than his first expedition. Tasman’s failure in the eyes of the VOC was the death knell for Dutch exploration in the Pacific. Much like Spain after Quiros’ second voyage, the promise of the Pacific was not translating into returns fast enough. States and companies alike decided to consolidate their losses and focus on less difficult and more lucrative enterprises.

Just because Tasman was thought a failure by his employers does not mean that geographers did not include his voyages. The incomplete coasts of Van Diemen’s Land and New Zealand appeared on maps by mid-century. Cartographer of the VOC Joan Blaeu’s 1648 world map to commemorate the Peace of Munster popularized Tasman’s voyages and the outline of *Nova Hollandia*. It also omitted *Terra Australis*, yet it follows the seventeenth century convention of depicting California as an island. Maps of the sixteenth century, including those of Mercator and Ortelius, depicted California as a peninsula, yet once Dutch mapmakers started to show it as island in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, mapmakers across Europe followed suit. This points to the centrality of the Dutch in the map and atlas trade of the seventeenth century, as well as the mercurial nature of geographic knowledge.

Willem Jansz Blaeu, Joan’s father, offers an instructive example of the politics of South Seas cartography. The elder Blaeu intended to include the Straits of Le Maire in a book of his geographic work, but the VOC sequestered his source material because they feared it violated

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92 For example a reprint of Edward Wright, “A Chart of the World,” (1655), BL Maps C.2.a.4; Joseph Moxon, *Certain Errors in Navigation, Detected and Corrected* (1657), BL Maps C.31.e.25. This map has Van Diemen’s Land and lists Holandia Nova as “discovered 1644.”

93 For example, the 1613 portolan at BL Egerton MS 819 shows California as a peninsula. BL Maps K.MAR.1.(35.), Jan Jansonius, *MAR DEL ZUR Hispanis MARE PACIFICUM* (1652), shows California as an island. For more on California as an island, see “California as an Island.” Glen McLaughlin Map Collection, accessed November 25, 2014, [http://lib.stanford.edu/california-as-an-island](http://lib.stanford.edu/california-as-an-island).
their charter. Isaac Le Maire’s Australian Company, founded to underwrite his 1615 voyage, argued that they should be allowed to publish the discoveries. When the States General asked Blaeu to halt the publication of his book he decided to include the information on his 26-inch terrestrial globe instead. To avoid controversy, Blaeu produced state 1-b of the globe with the offending information omitted; Tierra del Fuego is erased and nothing is engraved in its place. State 1-c has the Schouten expedition findings including Cape Horn, the Straits of Le Maire, and the northern coast of New Guinea. However, he chose to omit the southern coast of New Guinea which had been in states 1-a and 1-b. Torres’s discoveries were too tenuous in their source material, especially in the face of the overwhelming coverage of the Schouten expedition in 1618, when state 1-c was struck. In the 1640s, the younger Blaeu updated the globe yet again. In order to include the shores of Nova Hollandia, the younger Blaeu removed an “Advice to the Reader” text box and a dedicatory cartouche. The Reader was assumed to prefer the latest geographical features to textual instruction as to how to use the globe. Blaeu also included the discoveries in North America of Baffin (1616) and Button (1612-3). California became an island on this later state, as well as shifted 20 degrees east. Via such globes and the atlases that the Blaeus began to publish in the 1630s, previously secret information of the VOC became public; the knowledge monopoly was trumped by the market.

The Blaeu globes’ development over time returns us to the discussion of the politicized space of the Pacific. By the time the VOC seized the Moluccas from the Portuguese in 1641, their dominance in the western Pacific was unquestioned by imperial rivals. Geographic

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knowledge was a valuable commodity in the United Provinces as it opened the door to the spice trade, not to mention book sales. As to the creation of an insular California and the omission of the Torres Strait, cartography was always changing in its representations, but that does not mean that the new depictions were progressively closer to a “real” Pacific. Each empire had their own reasons for entering the Pacific at specific times in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; their goal was never an objective map of the Pacific, rather they sought enough geographic knowledge to bend the space to their purposes.

**European mapmaking: compilers awaiting geographic knowledge**

The Blaeu workshop burned in 1672.95 Only four years prior to this, Nicholas Sanson d’Abberville published France’s first world atlas. Sanson and the geographers of Paris would capitalize on their own central position near a printing industry and the availability of court patronage to displace their Dutch counterparts by the early-eighteenth century, a position they would hold throughout the eighteenth century. Of course, mapmakers had been active in France for centuries prior to the second half of the sixteenth-century. For the Pacific, the most important was the Dieppe School, so named for the association of its practitioners with the northern French port.

A defining characteristic of Dieppe charts was Java-la-Grande, a cartographic innovation showing a large land mass in Southeast Asia, combining Java, Sumatra, and *Terra Australis Incognita*. Dieppe geographers credited the Portuguese with the discovery of the land mass,

although the Portuguese never corroborated this attribution. The suggestion of a southern continent with a northward thrust near the East Indies plays out in several maps from 1540 to 1570; a suggestion of coastlines which influenced cartographers into the eighteenth century. Of especial interest is the atlas held at Egerton MS 1513 in the British Library. This unfinished atlas, a late specimen of the Dieppe School style (1587), contains the most developed depiction of the Southern Continent on any map to date. The southern continent’s coast is outlined in astonishing detail, dotted with 49 place names, as well as a zoo of fanciful and mundane animals, European-style architecture, and some allegorical drawings. The Southern Continent takes up 18 of a total of 78 charts, nearly 25% of the whole. Although not yet confirmed, this mapmaker felt that a lack of source material gave him creative license to illustrate a geographical feature that was common knowledge, or at least common assumption, at the end of the sixteenth century.

A century later, the inclusion of large southern continents on maps was falling out of style. The Dutch discoveries dampened the enthusiasm of Amsterdam practitioners for including huge land masses at the South Pole, and other European cartographers followed suit. If a cartographer did choose to outline a Southern Continent, it was nowhere near as imaginative as Egerton MS 1513’s author’s musings. As previously mentioned, the first French world atlas appeared in 1658. At the time, its author, Sanson, was a geographe ordinaire d’roi, one of several geographers supported by the crown with an annual stipend. Just as the VOC employed

96 Wallis, “A Portuguese Discovery?,” 47. The Dieppe school interests cartography specialists because their work can be interpreted as suggesting the Portuguese discovered Australia before other Europeans. See Bill Richardson, Was Australia Charted before 1606? The Java la Grande Inscriptions (Canberra: National Library of Australia Press, 2006); Robert J. King, “Havre de Sylla on Jave La Grande,” Tene Incognitae 45, no. 1 (2013): 30-1.
97 For analysis see Campbell, “Egerton MS 1513.” For south land see BL Egerton MS 1513, ff. 16, 19, 20, 26, 29, 32-38, 43-47, 50. For fanciful creatures, see ff. 16 and 19.
98 The King had geographes du roi (100 to 400 livres/year after presentation of masterpiece map) and a premier geographe du roi (1200 livres/year). Pedley, Commerce of Cartography, 30.
cartographers, so too did the French crown—geography was an accepted, and even lucrative, profession for those who could gain the training and information network necessary to produce appealing charts.

French geographers, again like their Dutch counterparts, tended to be compilers who controlled publishing. They would consult all available sources—manuscript and print, old and new—to create a manuscript map. Judging by the titles of European maps, however, particular value was placed on recent European discoveries. This manuscript would then be sent to guild-trained engravers, printed, and sold under the compiler’s name. Employment by the King did not impede possible commercial gains. Just as Blaeu made manuscript maps for the VOC and sold printed materials based upon his access to secret information to the rich merchant class for a considerable profit, so too did French geographers maintain storefronts and take commissions to create wall maps, globes, and atlases. This hybrid role, state-employed yet answerable to a public market, points to the contested place that cartographic information had in the circulation of knowledge in the early modern period.

In contrast to the Spanish, the French map market thrived under state censorship, which was always more de juris than de facto. Mapmakers would seek a privilege for their works, in effect a monopoly on the publication and the information it contained. In 1704, an arrêt de conseil dictated that printed maps be reviewed by authorities. However, access to manuscript maps was not limited in France until 1773, and the French did not create their own version of the

99 Ortelius’ first map of the Pacific mentioned that is was a “new description.” As in the Schouten accounts mentioned above and in a 1630 chart showing Tierra del Fuego, the newness of the discovery is what made it so sensational. New information equated with accurate information, as seen in the 1630 chart title that reads, “Tabula Magellanica, quâ Tierrae del fuego, cum celeberrimis fretis a F. Magellano el I. Le Maire detectis novissima et accuratissima description exhibetur,” BL Maps K.Top.124. 81. A similar strategy is employed in BL Maps C.7.c.6., inset between pages 1 and 2: John Speed, “A New and Accurat Map of the World Drawne according to ye truest Descriptions latest Discoveries & best Observations t/y have beene made by English or Strangers,” (London: 1626).
Casa until the founding of the Dépôt des Cartes, Plans et Journeaux de la Marine in 1724.\textsuperscript{100} Their memoirs and maps would act as templates, or would be out-right stolen, by rivals.

In Sanson’s historic atlas, Cartes Generales de Toutes les Parties du Monde (1658), he promises charts of all areas of the world. In reviewing the charts he chose to include, toutes equates to those areas frequented by European ships—his is a commercial world dominated by sea travel. In the dual hemisphere map which begins the collection, the western hemisphere starts in the West with the Ladrones and New Guinea (figure 1.5). To the south is a lightly drawn line, signaling the reader that this is a tentative shoreline, unlike the darker outlines of the other continents. It denotes Terre Magellanique, Australe et Incogneue. Sanson combined all the names for the Southern Continent, displaying his command of the source bank but again signaling some discomfort at the lack of concrete verification of location. Tierra del Fuego is also incomplete; Sanson preferred to not make a definitive statement as to its outline and possible connection to a south land. Dotting the Pacific are those islands encountered by the Spanish in their coastal and Carrera de Manila voyages, as well as the more recent Dutch finds. The Isles de Isabella linger east of New Guinea, which also is exaggerated in width and has a ghost coastline. California is an island and it is overshadowed by a giant protuberance in northwest North America. The impression that comes from the Sanson world map is of a relatively cluttered Pacific, yet one that is plagued by lingering uncertainty and guess work necessitated by a lack of source material. This is not a playful celebration of the unknown as with the earlier Egerton MS charts, it is a confession of the limits of geography. Interestingly, the

\textsuperscript{100} Pedley, Commerce of Cartography, 84, 194. The papers of the Dépôt are held in the AN. As exemplified in the triangulation survey to map France starting in 1689, the French were at the forefront of cartographic innovation. For more on the triangulation survey, and the relationship between cartography and the state, see Josef W. Konvitz, Cartography in France: 1660-1848, Science, Engineering, and Statecraft (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
ghost coasts disappear on the smaller-scale map of South America, as does the conjectured coastline in the Pacific Northwest of North America. Sanson was willing to hypothesize more at a remove than on more detailed continental maps.101

![Mappe Monde ou Carte Generale du Monde](image)

**Figure 1.5. Nicholas Sanson, “Mappe Monde ou Carte Generale du Monde,” 1651.**

Printed. Image courtesy of Gallica.

The Egerton MS atlas shows ships contacting the southern continent, a hopeful reference to the flurry of voyages that characterized sixteenth and seventeenth century economic and

political life in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{102} France, however, did not send many voyages into the Pacific region prior to the eighteenth century, despite the presence of 19 French sailors in Magellan’s original crew.\textsuperscript{103} The French were more involved in probing the interior of North America than the waters of the South Seas. This did not prevent individuals from scheming as to ways to expand French influence further, such as the Abbe de Paulmier’s 1664 plan to convert the citizens of the Southern Continent. To bolster his request, Paulmier produced a pamphlet outlining the known geography of the area, which he enlarged in 1659 and published without authorization in 1663 and with authorization in 1664.\textsuperscript{104} Paulmier sent a dossier of documents, including maps of Tasman’s voyages, to Royal Historiographer Francois de Chesne.\textsuperscript{105} In addition, Paulmier attacked Dutch maps, especially Blaeu’s 1648 projection, for concealing geographic knowledge. He thought that Blaeu’s omission of the southern continent was a duplicitous move, not a cartographically conservative one. To argue that \textit{Terra Australis} does indeed exist, the Abbe cited Quiros’ petitions and the account of a French explorer, Gonneville, who had apparently sailed to a southland in 1503. If corroborated, Gonneville’s shipwreck on land south of the Cape of Good Hope would claim \textit{Terra Australis} for France by right of first discovery. The problem was, there was no prior mention of Gonneville before the Abbe’s 1654 petition, as Margaret Sankey’s work has shown. Nevertheless, Gonneville’s “discoveries” in the south Indian Ocean began to be incorporated into maps from 1661. Louis XIV approved of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{102} BL Egerton MS 1513, f. 36.  
\textsuperscript{104} Jean Abbe Paulmier, \textit{Mémoires pour l’establissement d’une mission christienne dans le troisième monde, Autrement appelé, La Terre Australe, Meridionale, Antarctique [sic], & Inconnue.} 1664.  
\textsuperscript{105} Letter to de Chesne and dossier: Recueil de plusieurs Relations tant anciennes que modernes, Voyages, Navigations, et Memoires, c’est a dire, La cinquième partie de L’Univers dépéintedans toutes les Mappes-monde, sous le tilter de Terres Australes Incognesüs pour Monsieur du Chesne Conseiller du Roy, Historiographe de France, en Advocate n tous les Conseils de sa Majesté (1659), BnF Ms NAF 7454.}
Paulmier’s venture, yet ire on the part of Lazarists in Madagascar over Paulmier’s title of Bishop of *Terra Australes* and Madagascar sidelined the expedition. Paulmier, along with Quiros, represents the zeal for discovery that existed alongside more measured approaches to the region taken by Sanson and other geographers. He also shows how readily available information was to those motivated enough to gather it, despite the best efforts of the VOC and centralized state repositories.

**Collecting and reflecting geographic knowledge**

Sir Francis Drake circumnavigated the globe in 1577-1580 to find riches along the coasts of South America. Sir Thomas Cavendish had similar goals when he sailed in 1586-8, and, like Drake, he captured a Spanish treasure galleon in the Pacific. Drake’s voyage, eventually recognized as advantageous to the Crown by a knighthood from Queen Elizabeth, was celebrated in material culture as it was the first English circumnavigation. A commemorative medal sold in London in 1589 depicts Drake’s track across both hemispheres, each making up one side of the silver medal. To the south on both sides is a huge southern continent. Drake was also popularized in ballads, plates, and maps. Via navigational feats like Drake’s and Cavendish’s, England was taking a place amongst the other powers of Europe precisely at a time when the maritime element of its identity was on the rise.

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106 Williams, *Great South Sea*, 20. Drake had to wait six months for crown approval due to his pillaging in peacetime. Cavendish, however, pillaged South America when Spain and England were at war, hastening his royal approval. Ibid, 20, 31, 41.

107 Nine examples of the medal are known to survive and the original is purported to have been engraved by Michael Mercator, grandson of Gerard Mercator. NMM MEC0005.

108 For more on the maritime aspect of English identity see Scott, *When the Waves Ruled Britannia*; David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), ch. 4. England also benefited from other states. They welcomed Sebastian Cabot, who served other states throughout his career. However, Jean Rotz
These early, privately-funded endeavors more closely mirror English exploration activity in Africa, India and Hudson Bay, which was dominated by traders and privately-funded investors focused on quick returns, much like the VOC. Eager to avoid clashes with imperial rivals but desperate for access to East Asian ports, the English focused their energies on seeking out the Northwest Passage in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. The thrust north coincided with the creation of settler colonies along the eastern seaboard of North America, a place where the right of first discovery would be hotly contested.

One of the ways Drake and Cavendish’s exploits reached a wider audience was through the work of Richard Hakluyt. Hakluyt meticulously gathered, corroborated, collated, and compiled his massive history of voyages for decades before its publication in one volume by George Bishop and Ralph Newberie in 1589. At the last minute, the first edition was altered to include an insert of six un-paginated leaves recounting the circumnavigation of Sir Francis Drake, who was again in the public eye for his part in the victory over the Spanish Armada the year before. The second edition of The Principal Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation, extended to three volumes, came out in 1598, altered slightly, and reissued in

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111 The first edition of 1589 was a one volume folio, dedicated to Sir Francis Walsingham; in addition, it had a preface, tables and index, and 825 pages of content.
Hakluyt’s work was the first in English to add a spatial organization to historical events. In the pages of Hakluyt, readers could enter the history of long-distance voyages, a history which he hoped England would continue to expand. In doing so, he was also constructing a unique version of the world that highlighted certain regions, as well as highlighted how little was known about others.

In his 1599 dedication to Lord Charles Howard, then Lord High Admiral of England and Ireland, Hakluyt laments the poor state of mariners’ educations in England. Hakluyt calls for lectures for seaman and, understanding the role international competition played in such matters, cites Spain’s system of examinations and instruction for pilots, “which is read to this day in the Contractation house at Sivil. The readers of which Lecture have not only carefully taught and instructed the Spanish Mariners by word of mouth, but also have published sundry exact and worthy treatises concerning Marine causes, for the direction and incouragement of posteritie.”

As an appendix, Hakluyt offers “briefe extracts of the orders of the Contractation house of Sivil

112 Quotes in this chapter are from the second edition, BL 683.h.5,6, (London: George Bishop, Ralph Newberie, and Robert Barker, 1599). The first edition is available at BL G.6604. The second edition includes an account of Essex’s victory at Cadiz (1596), commonly called the “Cadiz leaves.” These were withdrawn less than year after the first volume’s publication and the title page reprinted with a publication date of 1599. Despite the changes, a number of extant copies still have the Cadiz leaves. Those lacking them were re-supplied via reprints circa 1720 (paginated 607–620) and circa 1795 (paginated 607–‘417’). The second edition contains three volumes but is often bound in two. For more on the bibliographical details of the second edition, see “Hakluyt Census,” Hakluyt Society, accessed November 24, 2014, http://www.hakluyt.com/hakluyt_census.htm. See also, Daniel Carey and Claire Jowitt, eds., Richard Hakluyt and Travel Writing in Early Modern Europe, The Hakluyt Society Extra Series 47 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012).


114 Hakluyt says he was helped by “Geographie and Chronologie (which i may call the Sunne and the Moone, the right eye and the left of all history).” Hakluyt, Principall Navigations, vol. I, preface to the reader. Hakluyt’s nationalism has long been a subject of interest and contention to historians. For a taste of the debate, see Armitage, “The New World and British Historical Thought,” 52-75; Cormack, “Good Fences,” 652-3; Jacob Pollock, “The Geographical Compass: History, Authority, and Utility in the English Voyage Account, 1660-1730” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2012), 5.

115 Hakluyt, Principall Navigations, vol. I, dedication. Hakluyt mentions that Sebastian Cabot was given the position of Pilot of England, but that he turned his pension to personal, not national, use.
in *Spaine*” on their examination of pilots. Hakluyt lists the publications of Alonso de Chavez and Rodrigo Zamorano as laudable examples in the genre of navigational manuals.

In addition to Spanish sources, Hakluyt’s sources included “those two famous cosmographers,” Mercator and Ortelius, with whom he exchanged letters. Hakluyt traveled around Europe to collect information. For example, he encountered an exiled Portuguese in France who shared geographic information with him, as well as used Acosta’s *Historia natural y moral* (1589) which included a description of Drake’s voyage and the Straits of Magellan. However, use of foreign sources was not without always easy. In the dedication to Sir Robert Cecil of the second volume, Hakluyt recounts the trouble he had in printing a set of voyages to Florida in 1587. The four voyages had been kept from wider circulation for twenty years by “the malice of some too much affectioned to the Spanish faction.” When the book was published at Hakluyt’s expense in Paris, the Lord Chief Justice of France supposedly asked “in great choler,” “who had done such intolerable wrong to their whole kingdome, as to have concealed that woorthie worke so long?” The justices were upset that geographic knowledge that might have been to the benefit of the French Crown was not allowed to circulate. Hakluyt’s collection was meant to further spread the news of English voyages, in order to place England on equal footing with its imperial rivals.

Hakluyt granted the most authority to those accounts authored by principal actors in voyages. He privileges the type of account, eyewitness, recognizing that the credibility of an individual source may be called into question. At times, “where any country hath bene but seldom hanted, or any extraordinary and chiefe action occurreth,” he uses two journals for one

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voyage, “For commonly a soulider observeth one thing, and a mariner another.” Although he wished to highlight only English voyages, he realized that their experience in the Americas is sparse, necessitating his translation of French and Spanish documents. He has access to many of these in any case, “because since our warres with Spaine, by the taking of their ships, and sacking of their townes and cities, most of all their secrets of the West Indies, and every part thereof are falle into our peoples hands (which in former time were for the most part unkowen unto us,).” Of most interest in these secrets is the true breadth of the Pacific, the Manila-Acapulco route, and hints as to a large sea leading to a Northwest Passage north of California. Hakluyt saw the exposure of these documents as just and necessary for England to progress as a maritime power; a divergent strategy to that preferred by Spain.

Hakluyt organized his works by geographical region. The first volume covered expeditions to the northwest and northeast, signaling English interest in the possibilities of trading routes, fishing grounds, and contacts with Russia and other nations. The second, separated into two parts, dealt with lands to the south and southeast. The third covered “all parts of the Newfound world of America, or the West Indies, from 73 degrees of Northerly to 57 of Southerly Latitude.” Of especial interest is the title page to the third volume trumpeting, “the two renowned, and prosperous voyages of Sir Francis Drake and M. Thomas Candish [Cavendish] round the circumference of the whole earth.” Their skills in not only reaching America, but in crossing the Pacific as well, were thought of particular significance to potential readers.

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As a visual aid to readers, Hakluyt includes a world map in the second edition of 1598 (figure 1.6). The chart, by Edward Wright, improved upon Mercator’s use of graduated latitude lines. This loxodromic projection is useful as it allows mariners to calculate routes via straight lines, rhumbs, on the chart. Crucially, the reader is instructed in how to perform such calculations in a cartouche in the south of Africa. A cartouche southwest of South America explains that previous geographies of the Straits of Magellan have erroneously shown them trending to the northwest, when really they trend east by north. The Pacific is also wider than on previous world maps, 120° of longitude at the equator. The Wright map—based on the first English globe in 1592, compiled by Molyneaux and engraved by Jodocus Hondius—is notably devoid of ornament. The cartouches with text are simply adorned and uncompleted coasts are not hidden. There is no southern continent. The world is left to speak for itself, to be pored over by readers who can now calculate routes. This is an object to be used, not admired.

\[120\] The map mentioned in the preface of the first edition was a substitute, as the one prepared by Molyneux was not ready in time and was used in the second edition. For more on this map, see Garry D. Gitzen, “Edward Wright’s World Chart of 1599,” Terra Incognitae 46, no. 1 (2014): 3-15.
England’s participation in the discussion of Pacific geography prior to the late seventeenth century is best characterized as a distillation of previous attempts. Hakluyt is the most enduring, but another important collection from England is *HAKLUYTUS POSTHUMUS or PURCHAS HIS PILGRIMES* (1625) by Samuel Purchas. Purchas offered readers an update and expansion of Hakluyt, “Some left written by Mr. Hakluyt at his death More since added. His also
perused, & perfected."\(^{121}\) On the frontispiece, at bottom, is a dual hemisphere world map with Purchas’ portrait framed between the halves of the globe. He holds a book, showing the domination of text in geography. The left hemisphere has Asia and the west coast of America ringing the Pacific. These areas are considered less cohesive to Europe than the Americas and Africa, all joined in the eastern hemisphere. The Pacific includes two ships, one labeled as Candish [Cavendish], one as Drake. To the south is a large southern continent, ignoring its omission on the careful Wright projection. The textual organization of the world is also different in Purchas; he starts with the Old, Christian world, which includes circumnavigations, and then moves to Africa, the Red Sea, India and Persia, Asia, the East Indies, and, finally, “Ilands of and beyond the _Indies_.”\(^{122}\)

**Conclusion**

The differences in the organization of Hakluyt and Purchas underline the lack of certainty that characterized, not plagued, early modern geography. While it is true that geographers sought credible sources that would give their representations an edge in the map market—especially in the more open markets of Amsterdam, London, and Paris—the emphasis of modern scholars on the search for precision is somewhat misplaced. As seen in the changes highlighted in this chapter, not least in the choices made about the inclusion of some or all of a southern continent and the creation of California as an island, precision was a moving target based more on subjective cartographic decisions than on a progression toward an objective reality. The details that would became durable parts of Pacific representations in early modern Europe were more

\(^{121}\) Purchas, *HAKLUYTUS POSTHUMUS*, title page.

\(^{122}\) Ibid.
dependent upon the degree to which certain information circulated, in manuscript and, increasingly, in print. When a strong geographic management system was at work, as with the Armazém and Casa, important details such as the Torres Strait could be kept from more general use. However, no closed knowledge policy was secure, as the numerous leaked details in the case of VOC cartographers, who were also commercial printsellers, bears out. Lest we think of the Pacific as an entity slowly emerging at the hands of European mastery, remember that the Solomons were not fixed on maps until the late-eighteenth century, despite their discovery by Mendaña in 1567. Remember also the creative fictions employed by the Abbe de Paulmier and the obsessive search for a continent that drove Quiros. The Pacific was a geographical place, to be sure, and a highly politicized one. However, it also functioned as a useful abstract space upon which Europeans could project their hopes, dreams, and delusions. This function of the Pacific would not necessarily diminish as its cartography became more fixed.

For the Pacific region, two ingredients—expeditions and people able to translate voyages into books and charts—would prove crucial in shaping how the Pacific became entrenched in European geography. In the early modern period, maps were used as state weapons and guarded as state secrets; they were elite objects of power-knowledge. However, states were not able to keep cartographic materials locked away; circulation, intentional and less so, ensured that a growing body of geographic knowledge about the Pacific consolidated in the early modern period. Magellan, Quiros, Drake, Cavendish, and Schouten/Le Maire were all names that would continue to be considered authoritative by geographic knowledge producers, as would the works of Blaeu, Hakluyt, and Purchas. For the Pacific, geographic knowledge producers were not quick

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to jettison any scrap of information, rather to catalogue it in the hopes that new expeditions, when and if they sailed, might add to the corpus of European impressions of the world’s largest ocean. While retaining their nuanced status as power objects, cartographic information in the seventeenth century was also transitioning from state control to public commodity. The Pacific played an important part in this process.
CHAPTER 2: LOCALIZED PRODUCTION OF GLOBAL SPACE: THE LONDON GEOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, ITS AUDIENCES, AND THE NARBROUGH EXPEDITION (1669-1671)

The last chapter mentioned Hakluyt’s plea for a lecture in Navigation. His calls were echoed by Sir William Monson (1568?-1643), whose manuscripts circulated throughout the seventeenth century before reaching print in 1704 in the Churchills’ voyage collection. Monson explains:

Men of Learning more able to give light for the finding out of Longitude, and for the Discovery of New Lands or Passages which Experience must beat out when they have their Ground from Learned Men. Every Man in Travell and Journeying desires to find the nearest and Easiest Way for his rest and Gain of time to come to his Journeys End; And so ought the Mariner much the more, for the Sea is tedious, and much more difficult than the Land: The Land is firm and stedfast; The Sea Wavering & moveable, The land is known & Determined by marks, Signs and Limits; The Sea is vast, and no Mark to know it; The Land has Hills, Mountains, and Rocks, The Sea has Storms, Tempests, great Difficulties & dangers; & therefore the more need of help to Avoid the fearfull Perils and unlooked for Accidents that many are sure to meet withall in the wide and spacious Sea.¹

Although Monson’s own maritime experience was in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, his attitude toward “the wide and spacious Sea” applies particularly well to the European experience

¹ BL Add MS 30221, f. 83r. The first of Monson’s tracts to be printed was in Megalopsychy (1682). The Churchills printed all six volumes of his manuscripts in their 1704 collection, John and Awnsham Churchill, eds. Collection of Voyages and Travels, 4 vols, (London: John and Awnsham Churchill, 1704). The Monson materials also appeared in the 1732, 1744, and 1752 editions.
of the Pacific in the early to mid-eighteenth century, for never was a sea more “wavering & moveable.” To learn to navigate it would be the ultimate display of naval power, contributing to economic growth, national prestige, and strategic advantage over rivals. Yet, it would take more than technical prowess for a state to achieve this goal. It would also take the publication of geographic knowledge for mariners to sail more confidently toward the Pacific with a library of information. Building and circulating such a library would require the labor and sacrifice of seamen, but also the cooperation of Monson’s “Learned Men” who seldom left England.

Late seventeenth-century worries about the Navy and navigation would be partially allayed by new or reformed institutions dedicated in their own ways to a better understanding of the emerging globe—the Admiralty, the Royal Society, and the geography publishing industry. These institutions displayed considerable crossover in their interests and personnel; the interdependent, informal network they formed would forge the British representations of a space still relatively unknown, the Pacific. Thus, this chapter is about the importance of a place, London, in the creation of another space, the Pacific. It argues that exploration should be understood not only as a shipboard experience, but also as an administrative and text-based practice dependent as much upon the social and economic geography of the place producing representations as the space being penetrated. It first describes the major actors in the British geographic knowledge network. Then, the chapter shifts to the elusive audience for which this network produced works, showing that the Pacific was part of a larger public sphere increasingly interested in geographic knowledge in the long eighteenth century. Finally, the network’s initial interconnections are examined via the case of the first Admiralty-planned expedition to the Pacific, the 1669 Narbrough voyage. By analyzing the evolution of Narbrough’s manuscript
charts to printed objects, it is possible to see how geographic knowledge was molded from initial observation to printed object.

**Producing geographic knowledge: The Admiralty and the Royal Society—conduit and repository for information about the globe**

Britain was able to mount large-scale, long-distance exploratory expeditions, however sporadically, in the eighteenth century due to the development of the fiscal-military state. While Britain was not the only European power developing into a fiscal-military state at this time, it was unique in being the only state to focus spending so heavily on its navy. As Patrick O’Brien points out, it may be more apt to describe Britain as a fiscal-naval state, or as a fiscal-naval-commercial state. Sanchez argues that the goal of more effectively harnessing state spending to manage resources for war was based upon a desire to promote and protect trade. In what Daniel A. Baugh has called “blue water policy,” defense of the home island meant control of the Channel and North Sea. The Navy was the single highest expenditure of the state, and the funding of a world-class navy underwrote fiscal decisions that affected all levels of society in the eighteenth century. The expense of a large navy was managed via overseas trade and shipping,

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2 This term, coined by John Brewer and now much contested by historians, refers to a state successfully commanding the logistics, administration, and fundraising necessary to manage the resources for war. For Britain specifically, Brewer cites “a radical increase in taxation, the development of public deficit finance (a national debt) on an unprecedented scale, and the growth of a sizable public administration” as the methods by which the state became “the largest single actor in the economy.” [John Brewer, Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783](London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), xvii. For more on historiographical reactions to Brewer’s concept of the fiscal-military state, see [Rafael Torres Sanchez, “The Triumph of the Fiscal-Military State in the Eighteenth Century: War and Mercantilism,” in War, State and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth-Century, ed. Rafael Torres Sanchez (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, S.A. 2007), 14-20.](http://www.susieslakeside.com)


allowing minimal internal taxation and use of manpower.\(^5\) Whether trade was meant to underwrite a strong navy or the Navy was meant to safeguard trade expansion, the two components were intimately intertwined and contributed to Britain’s imperial expansion in the eighteenth century.

How does publication fit in with the fiscal-naval state? The Royal Navy was not only of value to the government, it was culturally valued as well, augmenting its power and social salience.\(^6\) Over the course of the long eighteenth century, administrators increasingly attempted to control the public perception of the Royal Navy, most notably in the development of the sanctioned voyage account. It is only with the reorganization of the Royal Navy from the later seventeenth century onward that a naval organization arose that could also encompass an array of peacetime activities, including exploration and publication.

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The most important reform that streamlined communication and centralized power within the Navy was the establishment of a permanent Admiralty Office. Previously the office of Lord High Admiral existed, but it was not institutionalized and was often awarded to a civilian with little naval experience. In the twenty years after 1689, the Admiralty became a “permanent bureaucracy” that served as the “authoritative centre of accumulated naval expertise.” The Board of Admiralty, made up of seven commissioners of which one was Lord High Admiral, were appointed by the crown and therefore subject to the system of patronage that still characterized many government positions. However, the Admiralty was one of the offices where skill did matter. Appointments were often based not only on social connections but also on expertise in naval affairs. As Secretary of State Henry Fox wrote in 1757, “Capacity is so little necessary for most employments that you seem to forget that there’s one where it is absolutely so—viz. the Admiralty.”

Although they were not entirely free to make command decisions due to their subordination to the Secretary of State, the Board of Admiralty still managed to effect many

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9 Fox was referring here especially to the position of Lord High Admiral. Quoted in Rodger, Wooden World, 31.
administrative reforms to better manage resources and expand their duties. The Board of Admiralty was a conduit; it relayed information between the various boards that made up the Navy, including the Navy Board in charge of ship building and maintenance, the Victualling Board, and, later in the century, the Sick and Wounded Board and the Marines. In 1724, the Admiralty took over all communication between the boards and Parliament, who decided how many funds to appropriate to the Navy on a yearly basis. One of the earliest departments of state to create a bureaucratic career structure, much of the Navy’s stability in the eighteenth century can be attributed to the competence and longevity of the civil servants at the Admiralty. The most famous of these remains the diarist Samuel Pepys, who would play a significant but indirect role in the early printing of the Pacific, as seen later in this chapter. Pepys served as a secretary to the Royal Navy from 1673-79, and again from 1684-89. Only four Secretaries of the Admiralty served between 1694 and 1794. This gave the Admiralty institutional memory

11 The Marines were incorporated into the Royal Navy structure in 1747. For more on the consolidation of authority over the Marines, see Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 296. It should be noted that the communication between boards, while following clear paths was not always smooth or amiable. The Navy Board often did not comply with Admiralty requests the first time and often had to be reminded or demanded to provide the needed information. See Baugh, Naval Administration, docs. 26, 27, and 38. However, the communication structure of the Navy was more streamlined than other branches of government, especially the diplomatic correspondence. Black, British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole, 67.
12 Baugh, Naval Administration, 453-454; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, 293. Parliament was very concerned with naval appropriation and increasingly called for the spending of appropriations to be reported more transparently. Black, British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole, 75-76, 89. Wilkinson gives a clear explanation of the processes of appropriating, spending and reporting on the use of government funds during the eighteenth century. See Wilkinson, British Navy and the State, chs. 2 and 3.
13 Rodgers, Command of the Ocean, 295. This is significant, as there were sixteen Secretaries of the Treasury and seventy-six Under-Secretaries of State during the same period, 1694-1794. For more on the professionalization of naval clerks, see Wilkinson, British Navy and the State, 19, 102; Baugh, Naval Administration, 8. See also the Admiralty minutes from Monday, September 9, 1745, doc. 23 in Baugh, Naval Administration for an order to the Admiralty clerks to attend the office on Sundays as well as the rest of the week.
which allowed the office to weather changes in leadership, as well as to manage a more diverse portfolio of projects beyond warfare.¹⁴

Not only Admiralty officials were better trained, but so were Royal Navy officers. The Lieutenant’s Exam was instituted via a Royal Proclamation of 22 December, 1677. The *Regulations and Instructions relating to his Majesties Service at Sea* were first printed in 1731. Officers had to be able to calculate and sketch a ship’s course and any land they encountered. Officers who apprenticed at sea also had to learn the naval skills of charting, keeping a log, and calculating latitude.¹⁵ Furthermore, lieutenants as well as masters were ordered to keep logs at sea, so that the Admiralty would be aware of ship-board decisions.¹⁶ In 1733, the Admiralty established the Portsmouth Naval Academy to oversee the education of young officers, particularly navigational training. Thus, naval education, practical training, and reporting created an efficient information loop, as well as placed value on navigational measurements and log entries as authoritative forms of knowledge.

Clearing such flows of information was key for early modern fiscal-military states.¹⁷ British naval communications were an improvement over rival France’s, which were not as

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¹⁵ *Regulations and Instructions Relating to his Majesty’s Service at Sea* (London, 1731), 32. Dickinson argues that the Portsmouth Academy was more effective than previous historians have thought, although the number of men trained was small. H.W. Dickinson, *Educating the Royal Navy: Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Education for Officers* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 2, 33. For ship-board training see Wilkinson, *British Navy and the State*, 2, 32, 44. Other countries also reformed naval education. See Aleksey V. Postnikov, “The Russian Navy as Chartmaker in the Eighteenth Century,” *Imago Mundi* 52, no. 1: 80.
¹⁶ Allen argues that the Admiralty suffered from an asymmetrical information gap as to everyday activities on board ship, with measures like the turning-in of logs from multiple individuals as a way of monitoring crews. Douglas W. Allen, “The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail,” *Explorations in Economic History* 39 (2002): 205, 223-4. I would argue that, however much escaped the Admiralty, the log requirements did create an effective reporting system, as well as one that placed value on empirical, non-narrative reporting of data.
centralized and relied on informal, personal communication lines. However, the overall efficiency of the Admiralty, or any government office, should not be exaggerated. It is more apt to think of the eighteenth-century state as a “sprawling uneven network requiring constant personal management, pulling, tugging, tightening, and patching up,” than as a sleek, well-oiled machine. To a considerable degree the Royal Navy, like the larger British government, relied on outside experts to fill gaps in resources and expertise.

One of the main groups the Admiralty partnered with was the Royal Society, founded in 1660. Fellows of the Royal Society were usually elite men interested in the investigation of the natural world based on the Baconian ideals of firsthand observation and experimentation. Fellows rejected old forms of intellectual authority and sought new knowledge, which would “increase the Powers of all Mankind,” and “free them from the bondage of Errors,” in the words of Royal Society historian Thomas Sprat. From its beginning, the Royal Society sought to

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understand the “whole fabrick” of the world by serving as a repository for books and artifacts brought to them from abroad, including travel accounts and descriptions of far-off lands. The Royal Society not only collected information, but disseminated it as well, albeit to a restricted audience of elite readers. It published the *Philosophical Transactions*, the world’s first natural philosophy periodical. The Society also used their contracted printer to release natural philosophy books, although lack of funding limited such ventures.

Whereas the Admiralty focused on discovering trade routes and ports, the Royal Society was interested in collecting and cataloguing a more complete understanding of the globe. The focus on natural philosophy allowed the Royal Society to maintain lively correspondence with savants and academies abroad, including the *Académie Royale* in France. Fellows were

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23 The *Philosophical Transactions* did reach a wider audience than just Fellows, as advertisements for reprints by printers other than the Society’s printers in the 1690s show. Wigglesworth, *Selling Science in the Age of Newton,* 21.

24 The contract for printers for the Royal Society is laid out in the second charter (1663). See: RS MS/388, f. 17. The first contract for printers is made November 2, 1663, RS CMO 1, f. 36. For subscription forms to encourage imprimeries of the Royal Society, see BL Sloane MS 4019, f. 192.

25 For example, geographer Jean-Nicolas Delisle wrote to Sir Hans Sloane of his publications on the longitude problem. BL Sloane MS 4056, f. 199r, 206r. Sloane discussed longitude with other correspondents as well, BL Sloane MS 4053, f. 82; 4055, f. 126. Sloane is a good example of the reach of Fellows’ correspondence, but so is the correspondence of Sir Henry Oldenburg. See Marie Boas Hall, *Henry Oldenburg and the Shaping of the Royal Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Henry Oldenburg, *The Correspondence of Henry Oldenburg,* eds. A Rupert Hall and M. Boas Hall, 13 vols. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965-86). Other examples of foreign
particularly interested in questions of navigation and seamanship, as much for the service such discoveries could do the nation as for the general advances in knowledge they could provide. In this vein, Fellows issued instructions to seamen and encouraged them to keep exact diaries and measures as they sailed and issues of navigation, seafaring, and longitude were frequent article subjects and topics of papers sent to the Society.26

Although there was never a formal contract between them, there was considerable cross-over between the Royal Navy and Royal Society. For example, of the five headmasters who served during the Portsmouth Academy’s active years (1733-1806), three were Fellows.27 Naval correspondence include, “Nouvelles Recherches pour determiner les Longitudes en Mer par les Mouvements de la Lune et par une seule Observation,” n.d., RS MS/157; “A Letter of Mr. Vernons to Mr Oldenburg giving an account of M. Picard’s book about the measure of the earth. Paris Jan. 9 1672,” RS LBO/5, ff. 99-117; “Letters from Sr Philib Vernatti in Batavia, ca. 1660s,” RS LBO/1, ff. 412-16; “Extract of a Letter of M. Huygens to M. Oldenburg concerning the publication of his laws of Motion, and that of his instructions about the use of Pendulums at sea, as also touching his Invention of a new way of Printing, &c.,” n.d., RS LBO/3, f. 80. In an undated letter (ca. 1680s) from William Molyneux to Edmund Halley, Molyneux asks after a rumor he’s heard of the Dutchman, Christopher Huygens, “I hear that Monsieur Hugens went with some shipping towards the latter end of last Summer for the Discovery of the long desired Northern Passage. Others say his Designe was to give a Proof of the Discovery of the Longitude by his Watches. If you hear anything of Him, pray let me know.” RS LBO 10, f. 320.

26 “Directions for Sea-men, bound for far-voyages,” RS Cl.P/19/7, ff. 9r-10v; “Directions for Sea-Men bound for farre Voyages, By. Mr. Hooke,” RS RBO/1/33, ff. 149-52. These directions were devised by Lawrence Rooke ca. 1662. The “Directions” were then published in the Philosophical Transactions in 1665, with a small introduction, most likely written by editor Henry Oldenburg. An un-attributed appendix appeared in the next issue, drawing on experiments which were made in the Thames using some of the instruments devised by Robert Hooke, as well as descriptions of the instruments by Hooke. In 1667, an extended edition was printed, most likely at the behest of Oldenburg. See also Robert Boyle, General Heads for the Natural History of a Country for the Use of Travellers and Navigators (London, 1692); John Woodward, Brief Instructions for making observations in all parts of the world as also, for collecting, preserving, and sending over natural things (London, 1696). These instructions were published in the Royal Society’s Philosophical Transactions, under the aegis of Robert Boyle, in 1666. See also “Usefull and necessary Instructions for Such as undertake long voyages at Sea, 1739,” RS MS/58; “Philosophical Inquiries on a voyage to the North Pole, 1773,” RS MS/102. Volume VII of the Royal Society Classified Papers, “Architecture, Ship-building, Geography, Navigation, Voyages, Travels; 1661-1695,” contains several examples of voyage instructions, including essay 36, “II. What a Compleat Treatise of Navigation should containe by Sr. William [Petty], Fellow of the Royal Society drawn up in the year 1685,” read March 24, 1685/6.

men were sometimes elected as Fellows and Fellows served in government-sponsored projects.\textsuperscript{28} The Admiralty, communication conduit, and the Royal Society, repository for natural philosophy, both actively sought and housed information, especially that having to do with geography and hydrography. Mariners occasionally captured maps, rutters, and sea charts which eventually joined the Admiralty’s hydrographic collection.\textsuperscript{29} However, in large part, officers were required to provide their own maps for voyages.\textsuperscript{30} Fellows also had to purchase their own materials and they did not regularly travel to remote regions, making them dependent on sailors and travelers for reports of England’s global contacts. As Matthew Edney explains, “The history of the use of maps for administrative purposes comprises a dialectic of desire and ability: the desire of some officials for maps and the ability of others to provide them.”\textsuperscript{31} The search for those who could provide maps shifts the focus of our geographic knowledge network from conduit and repository to producer, the geography publishing industry.

\textsuperscript{28} Such government-funded positions were few, however, unlike in France. Pedley, \textit{Commerce of Cartography}, 5; Buisseret, “Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps in France,” 112; Crosland, “Relationships between the Royal Society and the Académie des Sciences in the Late Eighteenth Century,” 27. For a contemporary comparison of the French and British academies, see “Proposals for the advancement of ye R. Soc,” n.d., RS DM/5/12.

\textsuperscript{29} This was the case with an early-seventeenth century Brazilian rutter showing the coast of South America from the Amazon to the Plate Rivers. TNA ADM 7/857. Admiralty maps joined the King’s Topographical Collection at the British Museum in 1844. Peter Barber, “King George III’s topographical collection: a Georgian view of Britain and the world,” in \textit{Enlightenment: Discovering the World in the Eighteenth Century}, eds. Kim Sloan with Andrew Burnett, 162.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Regulations and Instructions}, 94.

Chasing precision for public utility and profit: London’s emerging geography publishing industry

England did not have a notable domestic mapmaking industry until the late seventeenth century, specifically until after the Restoration and the Great Fire of 1666. French Huguenots and Dutch immigrants moved to London and installed themselves in the print industry, where there were opportunities for those specializing in producing geographic materials. Sarah Tyacke, bibliographer and biographer of the London mapsellers of this era, estimates that 35 such businessmen were active from 1650-1710. For the period 1655-1720, at least 29 mapsellers’ catalogues survive, and there were 412 advertisements for maps in the London Gazette for the same period. However, this fledgling core of mapmakers were dependent on the larger industries of Amsterdam and Paris to learn their craft and to provide resources. British mapmakers tended to be engravers, while their continental counterparts would create manuscript maps that would be sent to guild artisans for engraving. British practitioners, by contrast, taught themselves the details of cartography and compilation as they produced maps for the market.

33 Pedley notes that most of those fleeing to London settled in the Soho area. She also notes that map communication and production in Europe tended to be metrocentric. Pedley, Commerce of Cartography, 3, 13.
34 The London Gazette had a circulation of 6,000/issue, this compared to 3,000/issue for nearest-competitor the Post Boy. Sarah Tyacke, “Map-sellers and the London Map Trade c. 1650-1710,” in My Head is a Map, eds. Wallis and Tyacke, 63-67. Unlike French geographers, no British mapmakers left collections of their papers; all that is left are advertisements and finished maps—a market-defined occupation indeed. The advertisements published in the London Gazette can be found in Sarah Tyacke, London Map-Sellers 1660-1720 (Tring, Hertfordshire: Map Collector Publications Limited, 1978). A sampling of sales catalogues are available at BL Harley MS 5946, f. 186, 188v, 199; 5947 f. 60, 61, 66, 72. A French example is at BL Maps CC.5a.191.
35 Pedley, Commerce of Cartography, 32, 34. Only 9 of the 35 active mapsellers from ca. 1650-1710 were Stationers. Tyacke, “Map-sellers and the London Map Trade c. 1650-1710,” 67. As engraving was not a guild-controlled activity,
For example, mapmaker William Berry used French geographers the Sansons’ work so often that he was referred to as the “English Sanson;” Berry benefited from the Sansons’ international reputation and detailed compilation work, which he re-printed in English. Thus, the nascent London map market was metropolitan in transmission and location—without the circulation of geographic knowledge in Europe, London’s map industry would have never begun.

This dependence on other European markets was due to the high costs of the map production process. Making a map from scratch involved surveying, referencing existing maps and geographic descriptions, drafting manuscripts, copperplate engraving, and, finally, printing and coloring. The entire process could cost £1000. For example, an original survey of England and Wales cost £1441, 5 shillings; it cost £850 to incorporate an old survey. Just the engraving of a small county map could cost £8, with total print production at £20. Typically, maps sold for roughly 6 pence uncolored, a shilling colored. Thus, a mapmaker would typically need to sell 400 colored impressions to make a profit, but print runs averaged only 200-300 copies.

Many mapmakers sought ways to cut the cost of production. Whereas the French Crown employed numerous geographes du roi whose maps were subsidized by and created for the state, England had only one Royal Geographer whose projects were not guaranteed royal patronage, much less parliamentary funds, forcing them to seek out patrons or advertise subscription

mapsellers were of diverse backgrounds, including the Drapers Company, the Clockmakers Company, and others. While not a particularly educated group, some did attempt to advertise education as a way to sell wares. See BL Maps C.38.e.1.


For example of the compilation method of a master, see Guillaume Delisle’s notes on a map of Spain in AN 3JJ 442, item 8.

Estimations of map pricing comes from Pedley, Commerce of Cartography, 70.

schemes. Some chose to avoid surveying and instead depended on descriptions from other maps. For areas that could not be directly surveyed, like the Pacific, mapmakers turned to published voyage accounts, or specialized periodicals like the Royal Society’s *Philosophical Transactions*. Another cost-saving measure was to re-use plates, which a mapmaker could inherit or buy. An engraver could bang out imperfections, change names, and update small faults. However, larger problems could not be changed without a new plate and many hours of labor. Thus the pursuit of lower production costs often led to the persistence of older geographic errors.

Mapsellers fought for credibility in the public sphere via periodical advertisements and sales catalogues. For example, John Overton (1640-1713) promoted in a catalogue (ca. 1670s) that he, “scorns to sell any thing pittyfully done, and he hath more then [sic.] ten times the choice and stock that R.W. hath, though he vapors that he is the oldest man. It was formerly Mr. Peter Stents shop the Antientest and Chiefest of that way in England.” Overton was referencing fellow printseller Robert Walton, whose catalogue (ca. 1670s) announced, “And this R.W. is the oldest in London of this way, and J.O. and several others are but Intruders into that they were never brought upto, and to employ simple people as understand little, either of Arts or Reason in their work.” Overton, a printseller and publisher, attracted customers with his breadth of stock and ties to successful printseller Peter Stent (ca. 1613-1665). Stent had used the economic upheaval of the Civil War to purchase over 1,750 engraved plates, including the only county

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40 Pedley, *Commerce of Cartography*, 13, 34; Buisseret, “Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps in France,” 106.
41 As just two examples, see “PROPOSALS For the last general Sale of Mr. OGILBY's Books, Maps, Roads, &c. intended to be opened on the 23th Day of March 1690/1 by Robert Morden...” BL Harley MS 5946, f. 186. Moses Pitt uses his access to the plates from a Jansson atlas as a way to gain authority. “PROPOSALS FOR PRINTING A NEW ATLAS. MOSES PITT of London, Bookseller,” BL Harley MS 5946, f. 191.
42 Overton’s catalogue is at Bodleian Gough 46, item 228, f. 158. Stent’s catalogue of 1662 is included in the same collection, item 230.
43 Ibid, item 240, f. 169.
maps with roads, which he re-printed. He sold the business to Overton, who profited further from re-issuing prints.44 Walton, who has the honor of creating the first surviving printed map catalogue (1655), disapproved of re-printing others’ plates, hence his annoyance at employing “simple people” and cutting corners for an easy profit.45

Overton and Walton’s feud show the high stakes involved in producing geographic objects for a competitive market. There was little formal regulation of the map market and plagiarism was common, if not totally accepted.46 Within these conditions, mapmakers had to exercise self-control, lambasting those who created comparatively faulty or obscure representations. A mapmaker’s reputation amongst his peers was based on his detailed, balanced, and consistent representation that preferably contained original information.47 Within such professional parameters, precision was a relative term, based on available sources and engraving skill. Success in business was tied not only to the products one engraved, but also the connections one could forge with other mapmakers. Thus, despite professional rivalry, selling maps depended on cooperation and circulation of existing plates as much as on engraving skill, conditions which would affect how spaces like the Pacific were represented.

46 Britain would not grant copyright to maps until Hogarth’s Act (1766) protected all engravings. Copyright for maps in France came about due to a sensationalized case of plagiarism, the Delisle-Nolan case. For an overview of the proceedings, see Petto, “From L’État, c’est moi to L’État, c’est l’État,” 60-1. For records of the case, see BnF GE DD 2782; BnF Ms. fr. 6348, 21733, 22119, 22186, 22951.
47 Pedley, Commerce of Cartography, 173, 175.
A Pacific Paradox

A prominent figure in the early London geography market and prime example of the overlapping, interdependent geographic knowledge network was Joseph Moxon (1627-1700), map and globe maker. Partly due to a few years of work in Amsterdam, Moxon was one of the first English mapmakers to gain wider recognition for his original work; although he died in 1700, international visitors still searched for his shop as late as 1710.48 His work gained him the nominal title of Royal Hydrographer in 1670 and he was one of the few artisans to be named a Fellow of the Royal Society. Moxon created his own maps, but also reissued previous works, such as Edward Wright’s *Certaine Errors in Navigation* discussed in chapter one. In the dedication of his 1657 update of Wright, Moxon explains that Wright’s concerns with navigation “have found a current vent.” Moxon thought Wright’s work still relevant 50 years later, being “to the Profit of the Printer, the benefit of the Buyer, and the general profit and benefit of the whole Art of Navigation.” 49 Moxon’s additions to Wright, of which there are 20 items, are chiefly educational materials about how to calculate distance and read charts. Moxon wrote for a less-specialized, broader audience than Wright—geography had growing breadth of interest as well as depth of topical salience to Londoners. To this end, Moxon also wrote tutorials for those interested in geography, sensing that his customers wanted not only to own maps as display items, but to use and understand them. Most significantly for this study, Moxon made a chart of

the Pacific, ca. 1672, but this remained in manuscript. Indeed, Moxon had an abiding interest in English exploration, as seen in his *A Briefe Discourse of a Passage by the North-Pole* (1672).\(^{50}\)

In terms of Pacific cartography, another English mapseller merits mention. John Seller, instrument maker and chart/bookseller, joined Moxon in the title Royal Hydrographer in 1671, as well gained a rare royal privilege to produce atlases. Seller tried to compete with the Dutch by creating some of the first atlases printed in English. However, financial limitations forced him to use the very Dutch maps he hoped to undermine, as well as to join into publishing combines with fellow mapsellers which could result in the re-shuffling of engraved plates when ventures dissolved. However numerous and dubious were Seller’s business ventures, he did produce one of the first English maps of the Pacific as part of his *Atlas Maritimus* (1675).\(^{51}\)

“A Chart of the SOUTH-SEA By John Seller Hydrographer to the Kings most Excellent Majestie” shows the entire Pacific—the watery expanse is the central focus (figure 2.1). While a few islands dot the waters between insular California, South America and the barest outlines of Nova Guinea, Japan, and the mysterious Land of Eso, the chart is largely blank. Space is filled instead with rhumb lines and three small ships under full sail, suggesting the ocean is indeed navigable—that is, if the two sea monsters patrolling the waters are avoided. The decorative ships and sea monsters are much larger than the islands; imagination loomed larger than dubious geographic fact. Spanish discoveries trail west off of New Spain and a cluster of Dutch-named

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\(^{50}\) BL 792.d.8. The second edition came out in 1697, it is available at BL 792.d.9.

islands are east of Nova Guinea, proof of the spread of Tasman’s discoveries. These islands mark the northwest-most part of a long series of islands that trail diagonally southeast from near Nova Guinea to the latitude of the Straits of Magellan, which lie roughly 600 English leagues to the east, using the scale in the southwest corner. The island chain, conspicuous for its size and length relative to other islands, bears the following description, “Those Islands are affirmeth Hernand Galego who was sent by the King of Spain to discover those parts in Anno 1576 doe in a continual tract reach from New Guinea to the Straits of Magellan.” Although they are indeed islands, a reader is reminded forcefully of a coastline—the suggestion of the elusive Southern Continent lives on. What also lives on is geographic information from other European maritime powers; the lack of voyages to the region made a map compiler’s task difficult as so few sources had to fill so large a region.
There is more trans-imperial transmission at work than at first meets the eye. Seller’s Pacific chart relies heavily on a map of the Pacific by Jans Jansson from 1652 (figure 2.2). Part of the cartouche, three Asian men surrounded by gold objects, is the same, as are most of the islands. Seller’s map shows less detail north and south. Most likely, Seller copied Jansson’s map,

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making small additions like Tasman’s discoveries and the sea monsters, and replaced the text about Galego with an English translation. Most interestingly, Seller chose not to include a large landmass in the North Pacific shown on Jansson’s work; such a place was too hypothetical for Seller. Jansson’s map also bears a strong resemblance to Abraham Ortelius’ *MARIS PACIFICI, (quod vulgó Mar del Zur)*, discussed in chapter one, which was itself based upon a 1569 chart of Gerard Mercator’s. In Ortelius’ representation, the diagonal line of islands is the firm coastline of a huge Southern Continent, *Terra Australis, Sive Magellancia, Nondum Detecta*. Whereas Seller and Jansson both are less grandiose in their prediction of south lands, they still seem convinced that something lies in the high southern latitudes; *Terra Australis* remained *nondum*, not yet, detected, in the late seventeenth century.
Figure 2.2. J. Janssonius, “*Mar del Zur Hispanis Mare Pacificum*,” Amsterdam, 1652.

Printed. Image reproduced with permission from Barry Lawrence Ruderman Antique Maps. Inc.

Seller’s distillation of others’ work is indicative of the contradictory collaborative competition that defined map production in the long eighteenth century. British mapmakers relied on the work of rivals and allies alike to verify their own placement of features while creating products for an open market. Map consumers, including Fellows of the Royal Society,
naval officers, and Admiralty officials, were conservative. If a mapmaker added fanciful, uncorroborated details to a new chart, it could lead a voyage astray, not to mention ruin the artisan’s reputation with customers. Geographic knowledge was a rare, valued commodity subject to considerable scrutiny, yet its very scarcity also made those interested in global expansion more likely to trust in dubious sources—a Pacific paradox.

**Audience: the final and most elusive part of the geographic knowledge network**

If intellectuals, artisans, sailors, officials, and officers combined resources to seek and produce information about the Pacific, who precisely were they producing works for? Who, besides naval officers and Fellows of the Royal Society, made up the market for travel accounts and geographic objects? The first requirement of a wider audience for Pacific maps and travel accounts is literacy, a fraught subject amongst social historians and historians of the book. Scholars disagree over precisely how to trace literacy, whether signing one’s name is sufficient proof, whether numeracy and literacy should be separated as skills, and whether literacy implies active reading.\(^{53}\) Despite these important questions, scholars agree that literacy rose across

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Europe since the mid-seventeenth century; more and more people were reading a greater variety of materials in more places. Based on signature rates, adult male literacy in Scotland rose from 25 percent in 1643 to 65 percent in the mid-1750s. English males went from 30 percent to 60 percent for the same time period and English women signed at 35-40 percent in the mid-eighteenth century. Readers had ever more places where they could access printed material, and for lower prices. Books were increasingly printed on cheaper paper and in smaller sizes, making them more available to less-wealthy readers. While the existence of so many books people encountered print more often in the eighteenth century, in standardized forms, for example. James Raven, “Forms of Jobbing: Innovative Print in the Eighteenth Century” (presentation, Forms and Formats Conference, Oriel College, Oxford University, September 9, 2014).


55 James Van Horn Melton, The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 82. Fox also uses signature rates, but he stresses that such a metric means his is most likely an underestimate, as people often learned to read first, then learn to write. He estimates 30% male/10% female in 1642 rose to 45%/25% in 1714. See also Fox, Oral and Literate, 22. Wilson records literacy rates for trades/craftsmen rose from 60 to 85% from 1700-1760, while female literacy rose from 30-50% over the same period. Kathleen Wilson, The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 29-31. Baten and van Zanden estimate total English literacy (including Wales, excluding Scotland and Ireland) ca. 1750 at 50%. Baten and van Zanden, “Book production and the onset of modern economic growth,” 22, fig. 2.

56 The size of a book was designated by how many pages were printed on one sheet of paper. A folio had two pages printed on one sheet, a quarto four, and an octavo eight. Richard B. Sher discusses that a smaller book, especially a duodecimo, meant a lower price, and also mentions that authors did not always appreciate when their works were reduced in size. Richard B. Sher, The Enlightenment & the Book: Scottish Authors & Their Publishers in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Ireland, and America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 82. See also Raven, “New Reading Histories,” 281.
does not equate with those objects being read, it is undoubtable that familiarity with printed materials was commonplace by the early-eighteenth century, in London at the very least.

In addition to books, maps were produced for a broader audience who turned to geography as a way to rationalize and organize large amounts of information. This is due in part to the increased awareness of Copernican theory, Newton’s laws of gravitation, and the interest in longitude brought on by augmented overseas trade.  

As Katy Barrett has shown, the deep cultural awareness of longitude as a social, mental, and visual problem is but one example of the ways in which questions about space and distance were implicated in the lives of Londoners. Like maps, travel accounts were becoming increasingly empirical in presentation, which encouraged readers to participate in the language of the new sciences that were popular within urban lecture halls, coffee houses, and salons. Thus, maps were part of a larger cultural shift in the valuation of types of information—material evidence of an increasing awareness of natural philosophy broadly, and geography specifically, as a credible system of knowledge. Although it is difficult to accurately gauge the extent of a genre’s readership, scholars generally agree that the middling sorts and the aristocracy were the primary audience of geography at mid-century,
although smaller, less-detailed globes and maps, hack copies, and pirated editions made geographical objects available to a much larger audience.\textsuperscript{61} Knowing about the wider world was germane to the emerging middling sort whose jobs as clerks, officials, and merchants brought them into contact with Britain’s global ties.

One way to gauge a wider awareness for geographic knowledge is to see how artisans chose to advertise themselves to their customers. William Berry, the globe and mapseller who used Sanson’s maps, traded under the sign of the Globe. Christopher Browne, map and print-seller who took over Robert Walton’s shop, also took over Walton’s sign, the Globe and Compass(es). Joseph Moxon worked first under the sign of the Sugar-loaf before choosing the more trade specific sign of the Atlas. John Seller, of the \textit{Atlas Maritimus}, started work as a compass maker at the sign of the Mariners Compass and hour Glass. This was later altered to the Mariners Compass and Globe, a clear indication that sailors and those in maritime trades were also important parts of the market for geographic goods. Finally, George Willdey, mapseller and spectacle maker, attracted customers with his sign, the Archimedes and Globe.\textsuperscript{62} It seems that the globe was a widely recognized symbol for geographic goods, while more educated customers would be more likely to identify Archimedes and more specialized buyers, like naval officers, would be drawn to a compass.

Trade cards were also a way for shopkeepers to advertise their wares. In an early example from 1664, Stationer Arthur Tooker chose to depict a heavily decorated cosmographical standing


globe, with the description, “The Picktuer Shope from the Ould Bayly are to be sold by Arthur Tooker Stationer, at the Globe in the Strand and over against Salisbury hous.” Tooker thought it prudent to advertise his sign as an indication of his shop’s location, rather than show a variety of his prints.63

Instrument maker Thomas Tuttell’s trade card (ca. 1695) has four men in the corners, each illustrating the use of a separate instrument: cross staff, measuring compass, sextant, and globe. At center are two angels embracing a coat of arms, which rests on a dual hemisphere projection. The eastern hemisphere shows Eurasia, while the Western includes the Americas and the thin outline of “The land of Parrots or Terra Incognito Australis.” Tuttell is using geographic features, especially parts unknown, as an impetus for people to buy his instruments.

Taking a different approach, George Wildey’s trade card (ca. 1707-12) includes rows of globes, telescopes, compasses, and navigational instruments, along with a richly-dressed Native American. In English and French, indicating an international and multi-class audience, Wildey “defies all the Artists and Pretenders in the Universe to make better Spectacles, Reading-Glasses, all sorts of Telescopes, and Perspective-Glasses, and other Curiosities of these Kinds, than his are: Nor can any Person shew better Choice or sell more reasonable.” He also offers, “large, beautiful and correct two-sheet Maps, for 9 d. each, as good or better than those sold by others for 1 s. & 18 d.”64

Elizabeth Griffin, one of only a few female print and mapsellers, used an overlapping print medley in the background of her trading card (ca. 1750), including a map of England. In the text above the print, Griffin offers, “All sort of Maps both Foreign & English… filleth up Gent. halls, or Large Rooms w[i]th Maps or Print on Rolers.” This is a shop where “Merchants, or Sea Commanders, Country or Town Chapmen may be supplied w[i]th Quanteties [sic.] of the above Goods, at the most reasonable Rates, for Exportation &c.” 65

Elizabeth Griffin’s ideal customer is clearly male, employed in commerce or with an interest in it, and at least aspiring to gentility. However, the market for geography did not exclude women and children. At the Gresham School at Holt, Fellow of the Royal Society John Senex produced a pair of table globes as part of a library overhaul by the Fishmonger’s Company in 1729. The table globes were used in geographical performances, wherein the globes were placed on a table, flanked by sheet maps by engraver Herman Moll. Young men presented their reports with indication to pocket globes in their hands, made by Cushee (a trained surveyor) and Senex. 66 Wealthy women too were part of the targeted audience for geography, as indicated by tutorials like The Young Ladies Geography, or Compendium of Modern Geography and Geography Made familiar and Easy to Young Gentlemen and Ladies. 67 Despite such caveats, the target audience for the most part seems to have been upwardly mobile professional or elite males with disposable income.

65 “trade-card/print,” The British Museum, accessed January 31, 2015, http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details/collection_image_gallery.aspx?assetId=704322&objectId=3138643&partId=1. Elizabeth was most likely in business with Peter Griffin, who used the same trading card previously. His card, ca. 1737-48, mentions the Overtons, indicating that he may have acquired some of his prints and plates from the Overton mapselling family of John (father), Henry and Philip (sons).
For most, basic books and maps, much less folio-sized atlases, would have been a significant investment. According to Moxon’s 1679 catalogue, he sold a pair of globes with 20-inch diameters for £20 the pair or a 6-inch globe for £1; “A large Map of the World, 10 Foot long, and 7 Foot deep, pasted on Cloth and coloured” cost £2, while “A small Map of all the World, with Descriptions, on one Sheet” went for 6 pence.68 In England in the first half of the eighteenth century, a sheet map cost between six pence and one shilling, later increasing to between one and three shillings. A multisheet map cost four shillings (for roughly two sheets) and ten shillings six pence for 4-9 sheets.69 A volume of essays valued at two shillings six pence could buy a month’s supply of tea and sugar. In the 1770s, a triple decker novel with paper cover would cost a female laborer in the London trades her entire weekly salary.70 According to the Old Bailey Online, a domestic servant earned only two to three pounds a year, plus food, lodging, and clothing. Artisans, providing their own food, needed to make 40 pounds a year to keep a family, while the middling sort needed at least 100 pounds to keep up with societal expectations, of which books were a part.71 Real wages rose in the first half of the eighteenth century.72 Although those able to spend discretionary income on printed materials regularly expanded, significant portions of the population were still excluded. Thus, while recognition of

68 Moxon’s catalogue is at the end of Roger Palmer, Earl of Castlemaine, The English globe being a stabl and immnobl one, performing what the ordinary globes do, and much more (London: Joseph Moxon, 1679), BL 531.i.34. Samuel Pepys had a copy, PL.1252.
69 Pedley, Commerce of Cartography, 89.
72 English wages fell in the second half of the eighteenth century, yet were still among the highest in Europe. Baten and van Zanden, “Book production and the onset of modern economic growth,” 223, fig. 3.
the symbols of geographic study were probably widely known throughout the social scale, actual possession of geographic objects would have been limited.

If there were more customers able to afford geographic objects, there were also plenty of mapsellers eager to gain their business. Beyond signs and trade cards, advertisements were a common scheme by which to gain customers, either in periodicals or as inserts in printed books. Mapsellers, like booksellers, sometimes ran advertisements to gain subscriptions so that they could raise money to complete an expensive work. As just one example of a specific audience for geographic knowledge, let us examine the subscription list of Herman Moll’s *Atlas Geographus* (1711-17). Herman Moll, émigré to England from Bremen, was an engraver who worked in London from the 1680s until his death in 1732. He associated with many in the geographic network in London, including Fellows of the Royal Society Robert Hooke and John Locke, writers such as Daniel Defoe and Jonathan Swift, and navigators like William Dampier and Woodes Rogers. One of Moll’s many projects was the *Atlas Geographus*, a monthly magazine that ran from 1708 to 1717 that would eventually be published in five bound volumes. Throughout the compilation and publication of the magazine, Moll sought subscription payments to subsidize the cost of creating over 100 new maps. He also asked subscribers for any source

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73 A sampling of geographic adverts: BL Harley 5935, f. 58, 73; BL Harley 5946, f. 51-2, 114-5, 116, 117, 121-3, 124, 191r, 199, 202r, 202v, 204, 205, 206; BL Harley 5947, f. 61, 64, 75, 98-99, 101, 125, 127, 134, 146, 153; BL Harley 5986 f. 74, 84, 127; BL Harley 5996 f. 49; BL Add MS 4413, f. 181r.

74 Whereas subscription schemes existed across Europe, they were particularly popular in England. Raven, “New Reading Histories,” 277. Pedley agrees that subscription was more common for English mapmakers than French. Pedley, *Commerce of Cartography*, 89. Pre-1700, less than 100 books were published by subscription. There were 40 in the first decade of eighteenth century, 91 in the second decade, 270 in the third; the average thereafter that was 250 per decade. From the 1720s, only half of proposals became books. Hugh Reid, *The Nature and Uses of Eighteenth-Century Subscription Lists* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2010), 15-16, 37.

75 For more on Moll’s life, see Reinhartz, *Cartographer and the Literati*. 

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material they might possess.\textsuperscript{76} Moll enticed possible subscribers by promising to cite and summarize geographical texts “of the best Reputation, and the best Editions…the Books only (besides many other Helps) that are made use of, cannot be purchas’d for 200 l.”\textsuperscript{77} Moll stresses not only the economy of subscription, but the extreme utility of his new information. The fact that that his new engravings are “more for Use than Ornament” is meant to appeal to his target audience, businessmen who need geographic information to make smarter transactions. Throughout the advertisements, Moll refers only to “gentleman,” reinforcing the male-dominated nature of geographical study. Moll stresses that the “Work will be of great Use for Schools, for the better understanding the Classic Authors, Universal History, and Geography.”\textsuperscript{78}

If learned gentlemen and future learned gentlemen were his target, who actually paid to subscribe? First it must be noted what subscription lists reveal. Just because one subscribes to a print project does not mean that one ever will read, or even intended to read, the work. Subscription lists do not offer a complete picture of the readership of a certain book, rather they offer a glimpse onto those who thought a particular project was significant enough to patronize. They show relative purchasing power, not reading practices.\textsuperscript{79} Scholars can only guess at the motives that individuals might have had for subscribing, but it is still useful to analyze the lists for what they can tell us about who thought it worthwhile to participate in atlas production, as well as to see the wider community it took to bring a book through printing to public consumption. Subscription lists are acts of social definition, as Reid points out,\textsuperscript{80} but they are

\textsuperscript{76} BL Harley 5946, ff. 51-2, 114-5; BL Harley 5986 f. 127; BL Harley 5996, item 49.
\textsuperscript{77} BL Harley 5946, 51v.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Reid, Nature and Uses of Eighteenth-Century Subscription Lists, 4-5.
also an act of social advertisement. Those who gave their support to Moll had some say in what information about themselves to include, thus framing their presentation in print.\footnote{While this is true in large part, I assume that some did not submit their information personally or had it drafted for them. Be that as it may, someone was still managing the presentation of those individuals, tailoring them so as to appear a certain way in print.}

In the first volume to be released, Europe, Moll included a subscription list with 836 names. Only three of those were females who used the prefix “Mrs.,” two of which were booksellers. 15 carried a noble title, 170 were reverends, 8 doctors, 5 captains, and 448 used the prefix “Mr.” Overall, 6.5% indicated some form of university education. By occupation, 10.5% held religious positions, 3.3% were in trades, 3.4% in government bureaucratic work, 4.4% in education, 1.9% in commerce, and 1.4% in legal professions. Many subscribers did not include a specific profession, which explains the low percentages. 8.7% identified themselves as part of the book trade. They could be using the list as free advertising for their shops, where geographical texts such as Molls could be purchased. Regardless of consistency, the jobs that were listed are diverse; the list included the elite, professionals, and artisans from the Lord Marquis of Beverly to a carpenter.

Certain communities were highly represented, indicating perhaps an individual who was able to solicit subscriptions amongst his neighbors or expressing a particular interest within a group for this product. For example, there are seven subscribers who lived in or near Aylesbury, a large number for a small town in Buckinghamshire. Perhaps they were affiliated in some way with the notable Aylesbury Grammar School? Similarly, seven merchants and seven academics from Glasgow signed up, suggesting that news of the project passed through personal networks. Although the subscription list spawns as many questions as it answers, it clearly illustrates that
the production of geographic knowledge was a communal act largely dependent on attracting a specific audience. Subscribers sought to put their best selves forward in a bid to gain credibility and social standing via association with geographic knowledge. Moll’s assurances of the newest, unadorned, and most transparent information appealed to over 800 individuals enough for them to invest their money and wait years for the final product—geographic knowledge carried social cache.

Consumers were interested in geography as a commodity, as a way to think about their world, and as a way to get ahead in their own localized worlds. The reading public, although not central to the planning of expeditions, was an audience for geographic knowledge that had to be attended to by those who wished to profit from the new appreciation of precise, credible, and useful knowledge. New sources of such knowledge was trickling into the Pacific cartographic archive at this time. In John Seller’s *Atlas Maritimus* there is another map of a Pacific region, “A Chart of the Sea Coast of BRAZIL. From Cape St. Augustine, to the Straights of Magellan, & in the South Sea.” This Chart was based upon the first Admiralty-planned expedition into the South Seas—their first tentative steps into exploration.

**Narbrough’s expedition: limited exploration and imperial rivalry**

On August 30, 1669, Sir John Narbrough received the following instructions, “The Designe of this voyage one which you are sent beinge to make a discovery Boath of the seas and Coasts in that parte of the world and if it be possible to lay the foundation of a Tread [trade] there…” Narbrough was being sent to the Chilean coast in the *Sweepstakes* with the express purpose of assessing the trade possibilities of “that parte of the world,” a part controlled by the
Spanish and assumed to be as rich as Peru to the north. Spain did not allow its imperial rivals to trade with its colonies and geographic barriers made the western South American colonies particularly isolated. Narbrough’s instructions were modest. He was to stay near the coast of Chile, not risking the open waters of the Pacific, and turn back as soon as he found a rich trading port or came to Valdivia, whichever came first.

This modesty of purpose partially explains the paucity of scholarly attention paid to Narbrough’s expedition. Narbrough, well known for campaigns in the West Indies and the Mediterranean, brought back no riches and did not break the Spanish trade monopoly. In light of recent archival acquisitions, scholars are slowly starting to reassess the Narbrough expedition. It is important here as it is the first Royal Navy expedition to the South Seas, one of the first non-galleon voyages in the Pacific since Tasman in the 1640s, and because it left a large imprint on Pacific geographic knowledge. Narbrough built upon earlier expeditions, English and Spanish, while also providing new first-hand observations. Although it took over twenty years for the account to be printed, charts and rumors about the voyage circulated almost immediately upon his return. Narbrough is the first in a century of Royal Navy expeditions that changed the way exploratory voyages were planned, executed, and presented to an audience.

Narbrough sailed out of the Downes on September 26, 1669, after a summer of planning. As part of his preparation, Narbrough met with the cream of London society, who also dominated naval affairs at this time—the naval reforms described above were not yet in full

82 “Instructions for Captain John Narbrough,” BL Add MS 88980 A.
83 BL Add MS 88980 was formerly held in the Kent County Archives. It was bought by the British Library in 2010. Now the journal and attendant documents are being edited for a facsimile special edition by the Hakluyt Society. Capt. Richard Campbell, ed., John Narbrough: Journals of a Voyage to the Strait of Magellan (London: Hakluyt Society, n.d.). Narbrough has not been entirely ignored by scholars. See Williams, Great South Sea, 77-82; Peter T. Bradley, The Lure of Peru: Maritime Intrusion in the South Sea, 1598-1710 (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd. 1989), ch. 5.
effect. Those that contributed to his orders included the future James II, then Duke of York and Lord High Admiral; Prince Rupert, privy councilor and naval officer; first earl of Arlington, secretary of state of the south; and the first earl of Sandwich and sixth earl of Ossory, both politicians and experienced naval officers. In addition, King Charles II was well aware of the venture and on August 29, “his Majesty was pleased to guive homeige to the voyage.”

Narborough reached Valdivia in December, 1670 and returned to England via the Straits of Magellan in June, 1671, wherein he hastened to pay his respects to his royal patrons. Thus, although the Royal Navy provided the ship and personnel for this voyage, it was a plan hatched by King and Council. The opening of trade routes was the intended goal, with basic geographic information as one of the stated outcomes.

Part of making the unknown known is naming geographic entities after familiar objects and shared experiences. Not only were the men (re)naming sites, they were also chronicling past naming acts. Captain John Wood was particularly schooled in the history of voyages to the Straits, remarking that Cavendish named Port Desire when he came through in the 1580s, as well as rechristened the doomed Spanish settlement as Port Famine. Wood also notes that Cape St. George dates to Drake’s voyage, but the Spanish moniker of Cape St. Blanco is more commonly used. While Magellan’s designation of St. Julian lives on, it is identified for Wood by more than physical description, but by grim historical detail as well—it is the place where Magellan hanged mutineers, Drake ordered one of his men beheaded, and where two of Drake’s men were

84 August 29, 1669, BL Add MS 88980 A, f. 8.
85 Examples of naming in BL Add MS 17484, f. 96v, 98v; BL Sloane MS 819, f. 8r.
86 Port Desire: BL Add MS 3833, f. 15v; BL Sloane MS 46A, f. 140. Port Famine: ibid, f. 163.
87 BL Sloane MS 46 A, f.139.
killed by local peoples.\textsuperscript{88} Wood provides a map with the death sites included, indicating that Wood’s journal was meant to be an interactive reading experience. The impression is that one is lost without the history of a geographical location. Narbrough too depends on the stories of those who traveled before him. He guesses his position based on descriptions, “as is Reported by Mr. Hakluyt’s Bookes of Mr. Candish voyage this way: And alsoe this country is apte to sudden gusts of winds out of the sea.”\textsuperscript{89} Newfound observations fit in with previously logged geographic knowledge; Narbrough and his men were building on a small, yet vitally important, library that colored their present experiences. References to a paper Pacific studied before embarking to Patagonia reinforce the importance of the circulation of geographic knowledge about the region. Without these references, the crew would not have been able to pinpoint location, estimate distance, or decide upon the best place to winter. Prior study also made them critics of existing information. Wood looked in vain for a bay mentioned on “Plane Mercators Charts,” concluding, “whether there be any such [bay] I know not.”\textsuperscript{90} Without chronicling their adventures and locations, their own experiences would be useless to those that might come after—to navigate the Straits was an intertextual experience.

Upon return in 1671, Narbrough and Wood would be the main figures to attempt to share the knowledge gathered in the high southern latitudes. Wood is a particularly interesting character, as he successfully interacted with the three pillars of the geographic knowledge network. Wood was trained as a surveyor, which explains the many views and charts in his journals, and gained a commission as a captain in the Royal Navy in 1660. After sailing with

\textsuperscript{88} BL Sloane 3833, f. 20r.  
\textsuperscript{89} Feb. 2, 1670, BL Add MS 88980 A, p. 72.  
\textsuperscript{90} BL Sloane MS 46 A, f. 146.
Narbrough, Wood led an expedition to find the Northeast Passage in 1676 during which he lost his ship, the Speedwell. In 1680 he was elected as a Fellow of the Royal Society upon the recommendation of Moxon. The two had previously collaborated on the publication of Wood’s adventures in the north, *A collection of some attempts made to the North-East, and North-West...Captain John Wood’s present search of a passage by the North-Pole, &c.* Although explorer did not yet exist as an occupation, Wood was able to profit from his specialized training and travels via relationships that spanned the social terrain of London’s geographic knowledge network.

As for Narbrough, he had diligently attempted to fulfill his patrons’ instructions, “Take observations with as much accuracy as you can” of geographic features, currents, natural resources, and indigenous peoples. Such instructions coincided with the overall goal of the mission, which was to expand trade. However, the desire for information, especially charts and descriptions of coastlines, underlined the constant need of a maritime power for accurate geographic knowledge. Similar requests would repeat, in varying degrees of specificity, in the instructions issued to other commanders headed for the South Seas. Geographic knowledge was valuable, whether to a natural philosopher, a merchant, or the Admiralty. Wood and Narbrough’s journals, with their sketches of coastlines, are ample proof of fulfilling this aspect of their mandate. Narbrough also developed more detailed charts, such as “A draught of Port S. Julyan in Patagonia in the South East coast of America,” “A Draught of Port Dissier: Harbower: Latitude:

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91 *A collection of some attempts made to the North-East, and North-West, for the finding a passage to Japan, China, &c.: As also somewhat relating to the satisfaction of all inquirers into Captain John Wood’s present search of a passage by the North-Pole, &c. By Joseph Moxon, Hydrographer to the King’s most excellent Majesty. London: printed by J. Moxon, and sold at his shop on Ludgate-hill at the signe of Atlas; and by James Moxon, in the strand near Charing-cross, right against King Henry the Eighths-Inne, 1676* (London: printed by J. Moxon and sold by Joseph and James Moxon, 1676).

92 “Instructions for Captain John Narbrough,” BL Add MS 88980 A.
In a cartouche on the latter, Narbrough describes sounding measurements, testing for salinity, and descriptions of Spanish fortifications. None of these activities could have been carried out without the diligent labor, intellectual and manual, of Narbrough’s officers and crew. This one cartouche underlines the communal nature of the gathering of geographic knowledge, not to mention the silencing of contributions that often occurs in mapmaking. Narbrough’s name is below the cartouche, but the map rests on the shoulders of the indigenous informants, ordinary seamen, and young officers who toiled with their captain.

Upon returning to England, Narbrough’s top priority was to share his charts with his patrons. First, at Deal Castle, Narbrough came ashore to show his work to the commander, where he encountered Lord Digby, Earl of Bristol. Bristol “came a Board the Sweepstakes to see my Draughts & discoursed with mee concerning Magallan Straits.” Ten days later, on June 28, 1671, Narbrough wrote, “I went to Mr. Wren I showed him my Draughts and Journall: Mr Wren: carried me to His Majesty & R. Highness at BarksShire house: I had the honour to Kise his Majestys and R. Highnesses hands it was his Majesty & R. Highnesses Pleasure to have my Draughts and to Discours of my voyage: for two houers time.” The draughts were Narbrough’s great pride as he finished the business of his South American voyage. They are also the objects that seem to carry the most weight with his patrons; geographic knowledge could buoy one’s

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93 BL Add MS 88980 B, C, D respectively.
94 June 18, 1671, BL Add MS 88980 A, p. 230.
reputation as a naval officer, although few officers got an opportunity like Narbrough’s until the late-eighteenth century.

Despite the intense interest of the naval elite, these men were not sufficiently connected to the print industry to manipulate how publications portrayed the Narbrough expedition—nor did they seem too interested in the task at the time. Such work was left to entrepreneurial publishers, including John Seller. In the same *Atlas Maritimus* (1675) that included his doctored map of the Pacific, Seller chose to dedicate a map of Brazil and the South Atlantic, “To that Valient and Worthy Comander, Capt. John Narborough, who Passed & Repassed the Streights of Magellan, in the year 1670.” Seller was basing his own reputation as a maker of useful updated charts on the achievements of Narbrough, whose exploits must have been well known by 1675. In the text preceding the maps, Seller explained that, based on the immense wealth Drake brought back, “there is great expectation of an English Traffick with the Inhabitants.” Seller underlines that the expedition was hatched at the highest political level and set out with trade in mind. Seller also exemplifies the common geographic understanding of the Pacific as dangerous—largely because English vessels tended to approach via the turbulent Straits of Magellan—yet also tantalizing, for the Spanish only “have the command thereof as far as the reach of their Guns.” ⁹⁶ The legacies of Drake, Cavendish, and now Narbrough claimed the Straits as particularly, and recently, English. Seller’s included a small-scale map of Patagonia in his atlas, followed by the map of the entire Pacific analyzed above; if the entrance to the Pacific was becoming well known to English navigators, the rest of the Pacific still beckoned.

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The politics and perils of making a map

Not everyone was as impressed with Narbrough’s draughts as the Earl of Bristol. Samuel Pepys, naval secretary and Fellow of the Royal Society, recorded the following:

Mr. Evelyn, from the rudeness of Sir John Narbrough’s drawings extant in the Book of Voyages I sent him, observes to me the expectations he has of the effects on our mathematical boys’ educations in Christ’s Hospital upon that head, and gives me a very proper hint towards illustrating the usefulness of drawing in a navigator from the scandalous instances of the want of it visible in Sir John Narbrough’s original draught he gave me of the Magellan Streights, and the drawings therein of men and beasts done by his own hand.97

As a civil servant working at the Admiralty, Pepys was well aware of the debates about the navigational skills of England’s seamen. Not a sailor himself, Pepys carried out a career-long quest to educate himself on all things maritime, including chart reading.98 The “scandalous instances” Pepys referred to were in the presentation copy of “The Land of Patagonia, &c. The Draught of Magellan Straits Drawen by Captain John Narborough, Annø 1670, On Board His Majestis Ship Sweepstaks as I passed and repased the straits.”99 A large work (6’ X 2’7”) drawn on vellum, the chart chronicles the events and places of Narbrough’s voyages at a large scale (4 inches to the mile). Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego, while unlabeled, each have a Union Jack flying proudly; the illustrated act of possession is reinforced with the words, “possession taken.” Sounding depths line the Straits, showing the progress of the ship, which is also marked with a line of red dots and several pictures of the Sweepstakes. Other drawings, the ones that so annoyed Pepys, also give life to the adventure, including whales, guanacos, ostriches, penguins,

98 This explains his impressive personal cartographic collection. Pepys’ collection is held at his alma mater, Magdalene College, Cambridge. For more on his map holdings, see John Stevens, Sarah Tyacke, and Rosamond McKitterick,, Catalogue of the Pepys Library at Magdalene College, Cambridge, volume IV: Music, Maps, and Calligraphy (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1989).
and a variety of indigenous peoples, along with native canoes and huts. Pepys seems bothered by
the imprecision in the drawings; they lack scale, are scattered around the draught, and obscure
the coastline in places.

Perhaps to make up for this lack of precision, various short labels narrate Narbrough’s
experience. Many are in the first person and reference events such as indigenous encounters and
hunting trips, making the map an extension of his journal. Following his orders to investigate the
peoples of this area, Narbrough noted where he saw them, as at South Ulster, “Many People in
this Land: By the Many Fires which we Saw.” The rest of the labels refer to navigational
instructions. Also included are latitude measurements in the border, a table of island names, and
variation readings for the entrances to the Straits. The chart contains two large blocks of text,
one describing the tides and the other the lifestyle of the indigenous peoples. This second block
of text is particularly interesting for the transmission of geographic information. Magellan had
named the region Patagonia on seeing a giant footprint; from then on rumors of giants haunted
descriptions of the area. In his journal and on the map, Narbrough is conscious of the interest in
this topic and reassures his audience that the people he saw were of, “a Medle Statuer, not taller
than Generally English men are.” Narbrough’s other descriptions of the indigenous peoples
would not have been encouraging to a trading nation like England. Although interested in
English goods, the indigenous peoples have little to share themselves—no industries, little
agriculture, and no permanent dwellings. Worse, reports communicated via sign language
indicated gold near Port Famine, but “I could never finde any” (one wonders if he misread the
sign language). Despite such perceived detractions, “these People would Easely be Brought to

100 Narbrough makes similar remarks on the stature of indigenous peoples in his journal. BL Add MS 88980 A, ff. 91,
92, 127, 130, 175.
Understanding & Knowledge with Civill Usage.” Such expository statements mark Narbrough’s 1670 map as a personal object; idiosyncrasies spill out onto the official document.

Pepys would have most likely preferred a more exact, less loquacious draught of the region. Seemingly aware of such criticisms and eager to prepare the map for print, Narbrough created a more formal presentation copy of the Straits, ca. 1673. This chart includes rhumb lines, making it more useful to navigators, as well as a grid pattern (although only latitude is marked on both drafts). At nearly double the scale and half the size (3.7 X 2.8 ft.), this chart did not need to answer to the same level of detail that Pepys would have expected in the larger map. Narbrough also reduced the number of drawings, with one indigenous man and woman, rather than ten. The large flags are gone, but a new label assures readers that, “Noe Spaniards inhabit this Land nor in the Streights of Magelan nor on the South Land.” Cartoonish animals, canoes, and huts are still included, but in less obtrusive places. The narrative labels still exist, indeed they are more numerous and descriptive as to Narbrough’s personal exploits and observations. However, they are also more uniform in style. The table with island names has been moved discretely to a corner. Narbrough clearly thinks the natural historical information he gathered is important, yet also grasps that the main focus of a chart should be clear communication of navigable features.

This second draft would form the basis for a printed version, published in 1673 by John Thornton, cartographer of the EIC, who likely had input on the presentation copies as well. An advertisement in the London Gazette of 31 March-3 April, 1673 offered, “A new Mapp of

101 BL Add MS 5414.29. Peter Barber suspects that both K.Top.124.84 and Add MS 5414.29 were made close together in time as presentation copies for various patrons, both with the aid of John Thornton. Personal communication, March 3, 2015.
102 BL Maps * 88665.(9.). A colored example is at BL C.8.d.4.
Magellan Straights, (described by Captain John Narbrough, Commander then of His Majesties Ship the Sweepstakes (in the year 1670) as he sayled through the said Straights, shewing all the depths of Water and Anchorage, shoulds, and places of danger.”103 Thornton thought it important to advertise the navigational aids included in the map. In the finished product, longitude has been added at top and bottom, along with a map of the whole of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego. The illustrations of huts, guanacos, ostriches, and ships have been diminished and sharpened by the engraving method. Place names have been differentiated from narrative labels with the use of italics for the latter, while the overall number of narrative comments has been reduced to those that have to do with navigation, with only two mentions of indigenous peoples. The only personal pronoun left is at Parraketto Bay, “for here we see green birds like Parrakettos.” The drawings of the indigenous man and woman have been incorporated into a cartouche containing the title and scale; Thornton made editorial choices that preserved some of the natural history of the voyage, yet also made the animals and people conform to cartographic standards. Narbrough’s sloping mountains have been reduced, the better to highlight coastal contours, sand bars, and shoals. The table of island names, tucked into the lower right corner, is ornamented with a knight and Charles II’s coat of arms; traditional signs of power are literally guarding the new discoveries of the Royal Navy. Thornton’s chart offered a wider audience than Admiralty administrators one of their first detailed glimpses of the Straits they had heard so much about since the time of Drake. It was a world with exotic animals, strange people, difficult terrain, yet one which carried familiar English names and was bound within cartographic convention.

The next evolution of the map would accompany the first printed account of the Narbrough expedition, and was the product of a particular convergence of the English geographic knowledge network. In 1694, printers to the Royal Society Samuel Smith and Benjamin Walford released *An Account of Several Late Voyages & Discoveries to the South and North Towards the Streights of Magellan, the South Seas, the vast Tracts of Land beyond Hollandia Nova, &c also Towards Nova Zembla, Greenland or Spitsberg Groynland or Engrandland, &c.* Behind the compilation and publication of the book were three prominent Fellows of the Royal Society, Tancred Robinson, John Ray, and Hans Sloane. The three had corresponded on natural history books before. Only the previous year they published another voyage collection, *A Collection of Curious Voyages & Travels*, containing voyages to the Levant and Near East.104

Their 1694 work set its sights on the latest discoveries in the extreme north and south. The text starts with the southern accounts, which Jacob Pollock argues reveals the compilers’ suggested itinerary by which to catalogue the unknown regions of the globe.105 First is Narbrough’s journal, whose “Observations and Draughts are the most judicious and exact of any that went before him.”106 Narbrough is given primacy not only due to the geography he sailed

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104 John Ray, *A Collection of Curious Travels & Voyages* (London: printed by Samuel Smith and Benjamin Walford, 1693). A copy is at BL 978.g.1. AN ACCOUNT Of Several LATE Voyages & Discoveries TO THE SOUTH and NORTH TOWARDS The Streights of Magellan, the South Seas, the vast Tracts of Land beyond Hollandia Nova, &c. ALSO Towards Nova Zembla, Greenland or Spitsberg, Groynland or Engronland, &c. BY Sir JOHN NARBOROUGH, Captain JASMIN TASMAN, Captain JOHN WOOD, and FREDERICK MARTEN of Hamburgh. To which are Annexed a Large Introduction and Supplement, GIVING An Account of other NAVIGATIONS to those Regions of the GLOBE. The Whole Illustrated with Charts and Figures. London: Printed for Sam. Smith and Benj. Walford, Printers to the Royal Society, at the Prince’s Arms in S. Pauls’ Churchyard, 1694 (London: Samuel Smith and Benjamin Walford, 1694). For an example of Sloane and Robinson sharing and correcting books, see BL Sloane MS 4036, f. 30.

105 Voyages to the South were to encourage expansion, those to the North to encourage knowledge. Pollock, “The Geographicaill Compass,” 60. For a more detailed publishing history of *Account of Several Late Voyages*, see ibid, ch. 2.

106 *Account of Several Late Voyages*, xii
within, but also for the types of knowledge he brought back; his status as a trustworthy observer, never before published, makes him the major draw of the title. This is followed by translated extracts of Tasman’s 1642 journal, whose reports of “the South Terra Incognita is the most considerable, in that ‘tis the Discovery of a New World, not yet known to the English.”¹⁰⁷ Then comes John Wood’s failed attempt at the Northeast Passage. The final account is that of Frederick Marten, who sailed north “to satisfie the Commendable Curiosity of the Royal Society, which he has done with admirable Diligence.”¹⁰⁸ Bringing these four voyages together was a way for the Royal Society to fulfill its goal of managing the world’s knowledge and knowledge about the world.¹⁰⁹

One method by which Account of Several Late Voyages appealed to readers was by offering new charts and figures. The largest of these inserts, to be bound prior to the title page according to the printer’s instructions, was not entirely new. Rather, it was a revised state of Thornton’s 1673 map, rendered even more precisely than the previous printed version. The shoreline of the new map is drawn more exactly, with tighter, darker, thinner, lines denoting the craggy coastline. The large font of the titles is reduced. All drawings are gone in the new version; there are no animals, ships, or, most significantly, indigenous peoples. Even the knight cartouche protecting the island table is gone, giving way to an unadorned list accompanied by the scale. The overall affect is one of solemn mastery.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, xxvii.
¹⁰⁹ Unusually for a Fellow, Sloane did travel, to Jamaica, which allowed him to gather specimens for his Natural History of Jamaica (1707) and to build his credibility and correspondence network. Robinson wrote to Sloane while he was in Jamaica. December 6, 1687, BL Sloane MS 4036, f. 30r; April 8, 1688, ibid, f. 32r. For more on Robinson’s rather extraordinary ideas about exploration as expressed in his introduction, see Parker, “The Savant and the Engineer.”
Such control is undermined, however, by the reappearance of the narrative labels from Narbrough’s second manuscript draft.\textsuperscript{110} It is clear that the mapmaker studied the manuscript and incorporated details that Thornton had deleted. In the form of these labels, the indigenous presence is marked, but only through Narbrough’s voice. The wretchedness of the land is also mentioned, “The land of desolation all Craggy on which is perpetually Snow” and “A Rocky Mountainous desolate land, the top of the Mountains covered with Snow continually, the Aire Cold.” While the map is engraved in such a way to draw attention to those areas that Narbrough successfully sounded, if the viewer focuses more broadly, the empty spaces are revealed. The inset of *Patagonum Regio* covers interior Patagonia, but also the inner shores of western South America, which were unexplored by Europeans. More empty space is filled by the island table and large title cartouche, while rhumb lines suggest navigation even though its execution would have been difficult. A mariner would know this if only they had seen the earliest manuscript version of the draught, the one which contained Narbrough’s paragraphs on tides and sailing. Their omission, however, leaves the impression that such notes are unnecessary, a confidence subtly contradicted if one leans closer and reads the labels or indeed proceeds to read the abridged journal within. The textual narrative weakens the certainty conveyed in the visual discourse of the map.

One ornament dominates the insert map and interrupts its simple sophistication, a large title cartouche in the upper right corner. Four cherubs support a frame topped with the coat of arms of Samuel Pepys. The title reads, “To the Hon/ble Sam: Pepys Esq/r. This Mapp of the Streights of Magellan Drawn by Sir Jo/n Narbrough is humbly Dedicated by Sam Smith and

\textsuperscript{110} Add MS 5414.29.
Benj. Walford.” Seemingly ironic in light of Pepys opinions of Narbrough’s draughts, the dedication of this later state is nevertheless appropriate. Pepys was a prominent member of the Royal Society, serving as its president from 1684-6. The reasons for dedicating the map to Pepys are multiple, as becomes clear in the dedication by printers Smith and Walford:

The Design of this Dedication is neither to flatter, nor to beg; but barely to present you with a simple and hearty Acknowledgment of your Kindness and Generosity to the Publick, in communicating your exact Memorials, in advancing the Progress of Useful Knowledge, and encouraging Men of Letters, or Invention: which Noble Endowments of Mind render’d you most Worthy of those High Stations, wherein you have been Eminent, as well in the Chair of Philosophy, as Navigation; and the same will preserve you through all Ages in the good Esteem of the best parts of Mankind. No Revolution, no Storm, no Time, can shake such Foundations.111

As a Fellow and long-serving Secretary to the Navy, Pepys earned the respect of the printers for his sponsorship of the proliferation of useful knowledge. As a member of the Council, Pepys may also have had a hand in getting Smith and Walford appointed as the Society’s printers. However, the last phrase of the dedication, “No Revolution, no Storm, no Time, can shake such Foundations,” points to a more political rationale for dedicating the book, and map, to Pepys. As a naval secretary in the government of James II, Pepys lost his position at the Admiralty in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. He had been arrested several times and was only beginning to recover his formerly prodigious public profile in 1694, the year of publication. The map therefore serves a purpose beyond conveying navigational information, it is a political tool which those behind its publication could use to highlight the careers of those they wished to support.

In the second edition of Account of Several Late Voyages, published in 1711, the map appears unchanged except for one crucial alteration. The title cartouche now reads, “To the R. Hon’ble Robert Earl of Oxford & Mortimer, Baron of Wigmore, Ld High Treasuer of Great

111 Account of Several Late Voyages, epistle dedicatory.
Pepys died in 1703, making a dedication to him empty in terms of political capital. In rededicating the chart to Oxford, Smith and Walford hoped to attract a vibrant patron who was involved in contemporary debates surrounding the South Sea Company and a possible expedition to the Pacific. Altering the cartouche effectively erased Pepys’ legacy, reorienting the book from a Royal Society project to a more general account of voyages positioned to sell copies at a time when the South Seas were once again of particular cultural salience. Whereas the scarcity of geographic information about the Pacific and the Far North continued to be relevant, the political context of its creation was not.

**Conclusion**

This salience, and the various publications that accompanied it, is the topic of the next chapter. The present chapter has sought to outline the major players that collaborated to plan, execute, and present the Pacific, as well as the audience for whom these materials were made. The Admiralty, Royal Society, and private mapmakers forged informal, interdependent relations to bring books and charts to a literate audience of professionals and elites. Such relations exemplify the kinds of extra-governmental partnerships that characterized the emerging fiscal naval state. They also reflect the growing interest on the part of consumers in geography as a way to understand the global extent of Britain’s overseas commerce. This information could only be accessed via interactions with print culture; circulation of geographic knowledge through London’s streets and Europe’s cities was key to an increased awareness of Pacific space.

In the Narbrough expedition, it is possible to see the overlapping resources of the geographic knowledge network at work. Samuel Pepys and John Wood are but two examples of
the many individuals who had ties with all three groups. The several versions of Narbrough’s map remind readers that maps are mediated objects; the conditions of their production change their presentation and reflect changing political priorities. Over the course of the map’s publication, Narbrough’s presence is formalized and contained, but preserved as the narrator of direct observations. His role as drafter is minimized until, in the 1694 version, it is erased entirely. The map becomes about Narbrough, not by him. Other people’s presence, specifically indigenous Patagonians and Fuegians, are blotted out, reduced from paragraphs and drawings to mere labels that incorporate their actions into Narbrough’s personal story. They are effectively silenced in favor of Narbrough, privileging his form of knowledge—maps and ordered journals—brought back for learned scrutiny. Their silence would continue in the next phase of the development of Pacific print culture, which was to be dominated not by naval captains and Fellows of the Royal Society, but by privateers and pirates.
CHAPTER 3: FROM ATLANTIC TO PACIFIC: PRIVATEERS, BUCCANEERS, AND PUBLISHING, 1680-1730

The Pacific took shape for Britons not in isolation, but with reference to the concerns of an expanding commercial empire. The cultural salience of the Pacific at the turn of the eighteenth century was potent because it was connected to the larger issues which characterized the Atlantic world: commerce, finance, warfare, and, especially, piracy. Pirates and privateers—titles separated only by sometimes-dubious letters of marque—took advantage of lacunae in state sovereignty as it stretched over oceans. They seized ships and traded clandestinely, often with the approval of the English crown. Simultaneously, a few of these men supplied an eager market with new geographic observations about their travels. Pirates and privateers were so numerous in the Caribbean in the late-seventeenth century that some sought less-crowded waters, crossing the Isthmus of Panama into the South Seas. Once returned to England, many found that their Pacific geographic knowledge was even more rare and, therefore, valuable.

The voices of the Atlantic buccaneers, as mediated by publishers, conditioned English involvement in the South Seas until the mid-1720s. Their testimonies and accounts inspired the Admiralty to support two voyages to the region. They also underwrote the formation and reception of the South Sea Company. The new experts on the South Seas did not come from the
elite, by and large, although they were privileged in terms of literacy. These were men who saw
the Pacific not only as an avenue to riches, but as a chance to gain freedom, patronage, and fame,
as seen in the examples of Bartholomew Sharpe, William Hacke, and William Dampier. The
Pacific emerged from 1680 to 1712 as a space characterized by enduring challenge,
navigationally as well as inter-personally, yet one also full of opportunity; that is, if one could
master the tricky rhetoric of credibility and command. By the 1720s, however, the South Sea
Bubble had burst, the South Sea Company had failed to explore their chartered territory, pirates
were avidly hunted by the Royal Navy, and numerous print squabbles had changed the Pacific
from a region associated with promise to one which represented folly; it became a space where
satirists saw fit to set their criticisms of a maritime, commercial society.

Piracy and privateering in the South Seas: an extension of Atlantic political economy

One commentator who was acutely aware of the incursion of “Naciones Estrañas [sic],”
foreign nations, into Spain’s “Nuevo Orbe,” new sphere, was Captain Don Francisco de Seixas y
Lovera.¹ Seixas, who sailed through the Straits of Le Maire three times, wrote Descripción
Geográfica, y Derrotero de la Region Austral Magallanica (1690), a navigational aid that
included the history and geography of the Straits of Magellan in a plea to the Spanish Crown to
better protect the crucial western entrance to the Pacific. Seixas saw the Pacific as a closed space,
but not a sealed one. It was porous, and foreigners were finding ways to infiltrate the land his
countrymen had worked so hard to claim.

¹ Don Francisco de Seixas y Lovera, Descripción Geográfica, y Derrotero de la Region Austral Magallanica (Madrid:
Antonio de Zafra, Criado de su Magestad, 1690).
Seixas points out that pirates attacked Spanish holdings “por ambos Mares,” by both seas, in South America.\(^2\) The spread of piracy and privateering from Atlantic to Pacific has a specific history. First, a clarification of terms is in order. Piracy was an act more than a person. One turned pirate when one attacked another ship without cause; piracy was indiscriminate, privateering discriminate.\(^3\) Privateers had permission to attack certain ships in wartime, as long as they followed rules set out by the country of sponsorship. Captains who wished to profit from taking prizes needed to obtain a letter of marque from a government that legitimated taking ships in conflict with that state. Letters of marque usually stipulated the duration of privateering ventures, as well as which states’ ships could be taken. Of course, once at sea letters of marque were often altered or neglected, blurring the line between legal and illegal raiding. In wartime, privateering boomed, while in peacetime many continued raiding even though their letters of marque were no longer valid. When war began again, “The pirates became patriots again.”\(^4\) In effect, privateers and, until the late seventeenth century, pirates were outsourced labor, hassling English enemies in a larger area than the Royal Navy could operate.

English culture of the early modern period was defined by overseas expansion and the warfare it engendered, thus piracy and privateering were viable occupations for mariners seeking a profit. An able seamen on a Royal Naval vessel earned 24 shillings (£1.20) per lunar month in

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\(^2\) Seixas, Descripción Geográphica, Prologo al Lector.


1686. As this rate did not increase until 1797 in the wake of large-scale mutinies, it is understandable why sailors might seek more lucrative maritime employment. Merchant vessels paid far more by comparison, and privateering voyages offered fabulous wealth if they were successful. Crewmembers on merchant and naval ships were entitled to prize money, but the cut was low compared to what one could gain in a privateer. In the case of the South Seas privateers, some captains and crews decided to abandon their original instructions in favor of possible financial gain, which often resulted in court cases upon their return to England. However, the stain of a claim of piracy was not as persistent as one might imagine, as will be shown in the cases of Bartholomew Sharpe and William Dampier. In their situations, privateering, and at times piracy, was a way to gain a favorable public image and employment, even if they had to later re-frame their piratical experiences to meet social expectations. Thus, this chapter will use the term privateer to indicate government-sanctioned raiding voyages and buccaneer when legality was mixed or in dispute.

By the late-seventeenth century, state and private commercial approval of piracy began to wane as they extended strict legal regimes to their overseas empires. Merchants and governments alike no longer saw the pirates as allies in commerce, a shift from what Peter Earle

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7 For more on the advantages of piracy and the need to dissemble about it in print, see Hasty, “Piracy and the production of knowledge,” 47. Although the differences between pirate and privateer were solidifying at the turn of the century, “they were still fluid enough for men like Dampier to move between them.” Ibid, 44. This is not to imply, however, that that pirates were an accepted part of society. They were quite the opposite. For more on the cultural understanding of pirates, ca. 1720, see Marcus Rediker, Villains of all Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005).
8 For more on the roles of pirates in the extension of state sovereignty over their empires, see Benton, Search for Sovereignty, ch. 3.
calls piratical imperialism to more regulated trade. In 1670 England signed the Treaty of Madrid with Spain, a crucial part of which required England to reign in piracy. In 1684 the French and Spanish agreed to no longer employ piracy against each other. These treaties only began to be enforced in the 1680s and were more a reflection of the problem piracy had become for trade, particularly in the West Indies. This combination of competition and fear of authorities drove some buccaneers to the South Seas, part of a wider pirate diaspora that saw pirates prey on ships of all nations, not just the Spanish. The Nine Years War (1689-97) led to a return to privateering for many, as did the War of Spanish Succession (1701-14), after each of which there was a spike in piracy. Marcus Rediker stresses that the crackdown on piracy was part of the monopolization of violence by the state, which viewed pirates as representatives of an insurgent, alternative social order to that ordained by capitalism. As Rediker explains, although pirates ultimately “lost the clash with the rulers of their own day,” they nevertheless “captured the good

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9 Earle, Pirate Wars, xi.
10 Privateers were not listed on Navy Office Shipping Lists and therefore their exact numbers are hard to estimate. Toshikazu Kasai, “English Smuggling Activities in the Official and Private Documents: The ‘Spanish Trade’ and the Logwood Trade from Jamaica in the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries,” Hermeneutic Study of Textual Configuration (HERSETEC) 3, no.1 (2009): 169, 171.
11 Piracy has attracted many scholars in recent years, with contradictory interpretations. Rediker frames his study of the Golden Age of Piracy (1710s and 1720s) as “A Tale of Two Terrors,” the terror of those wishing to defend the existing hierarchical social order and the terror of those fighting for a more egalitarian, alternative order. It was the terror of above threatened by the terror from below. Rediker, Villains of All Nations, ch. 1. See also Marcus Rediker, Outlaws of the Atlantic: Sailors, Pirates, and Motley Crews in the Age of Sail (Boston: Beacon Press, 2014), ch. 4. Earle offers a more conservative view of the naval pursuit of pirates worldwide, referring to buccaneers as terrorists and the Royal Navy as (sometimes inefficient) heroes of law and order. Earle, Pirate Wars, xi, xii. This section has drawn on the works of Rediker, as well as Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); Tim Beattie, British Privateering Voyages of the Early Eighteenth Century (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2015); Richard Frohock, Buccaneers and Privateers: The Story of the English Sea Rover, 1675-1725 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2012); Margarete Lincoln, British Pirates and Society, 1680-1730 (London: Ashgate, 2014). For the earlier period, see Kenneth R. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering: English Privateering during the Spanish War 1585-1603 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964). To understand how pirates fit within a wider radical tradition in the revolutionary Atlantic world, see Marcus Rediker, “Hydrarchy and Libertalia: The Utopian Dimensions of Atlantic Piracy in the Early Eighteenth Century,” in Pirates and Privateers, ed. Starkey, 29-46; Linebaugh and Rediker, Many-Headed Hydra.
Piracy never failed to interest audiences, but their fame was contradictory—people would just as soon read of their exploits as attend their hangings. Thus, as views of piracy changed over time, so too did the connotations attached to the seas through which they sailed.

The various advantages of an “accompanying press corps”\textsuperscript{13}: Sharpe, Hacke and Dampier

1. Bartholomew Sharpe

The expedition to cross over the Isthmus of Panama in 1680 resulted in the most published accounts and had the largest cultural impact on Pacific geographic knowledge. However, it was far from the only privateering voyage to venture over the Isthmus or round Cape Horn. French voyages also sought spoils in the South Seas. Famous privateers such as Alexander Esquemelin and Ravenau de Lussan visited around the same time, while in 1695 Jean-Baptiste De Gennes sailed with some government support, only to turn back in the Straits of Magellan. Two natural philosophical voyages set out for South America, Louis Feuillet in 1707-1711 and Amédée-François Frezier in 1712-17. The majority of vessels, however, were funded by private merchants, many from St. Malo. During the War of Spanish Succession (1701-14), the French were allied with the Spanish and allowed to trade with western South America. The \textit{Compagnie royale de la mer pacifique} was founded with a thirty year privilege to trade in un-occupied (by Europeans) Pacific islands. By 1705 there were up to five French ships trading in the Pacific at once. Despite a formal ban passed in July 1712, the French continued to trade, until Spain forced its ally to cease in 1716. In all, 168 French voyages traveled to the Pacific between 1695 and

\textsuperscript{12} Rediker, \textit{Villains of All Nations}, 175.
\textsuperscript{13} Williams, \textit{Great South Sea}, 86.
1725, with 117 returning, 26 sold in America, 12 wrecked, and 13 captured. Despite an increased presence in the region, only three voyage accounts came out of these expeditions, one each from Feuillet and Frezier, as well as an account of the De Gennes expedition. By contrast, six accounts came from the four English voyages to the South Seas between 1700 and 1725. Williams argues that this could be due to the sensitive diplomatic situation within which the French traders operated, or due to the “mundane nature of the trade”; either way, “The number of French voyages to the South Sea in this period was not matched by published accounts of their achievements, adventures and misfortunes of the kind that accompanied the English voyages.”

The first of the English voyages to the South Seas is known as the Sharpe expedition of 1680-82. Bartholomew Sharpe learned his piratical trade in the Caribbean, having participated in Henry Morgan’s sacking of Panama in 1671 and the attack on Portobello in 1679. Calling it the Sharpe expedition is slightly misleading, however, as Sharpe was not the leader for the entirety of the voyage.

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14 Information for this paragraph comes from Dunmore, Visions and Realities, ch. 1; Gerhard, Pirates of the Pacific, chs. 4 and 5. See also Mapp, The Elusive West, ch. 4; Seymour Chapin, “The Men From Across La Manche: French Voyages, 1660-1790,” in Background to Discovery: Pacific Exploration from Dampier to Cook, ed. Derek Howse (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) 90; Daniel A. Baugh, “Seapower and Science: The Motives for Pacific Exploration,” in ibid. 18 The French Dépôt kept records of the French South Seas traders. See the lists of voyages in AN MAR/1JJ/109, item 6. AN MAY/1JJ/109, item 9 contains a journal of French voyages to the Mer de Sud, 1690. AN MAR/4JJ/47 contains journals from seven French voyages, 1698-1716. BL Add MS 52420 contains a copy of La Pallière’s journal of a St. Malo expedition, 1719-1723.


16 Williams, Great South Sea, 135-6.

of the voyage; he was voted in and out of power at the whim of his crew. Sharpe and 300 privateers, under the command of Captain Coxon at the time, trudged across the Isthmus of Panama in April 1680. Coxon eventually returned to the Caribbean and his successor, Sawkins, died in a raid, leaving Sharpe to suggest that his remaining colleagues sack the South American coast and return via Cape Horn. By the end of 1680 the privateers had worked their way south to rest on Juan Fernandez, famous for castaways, and left one of their own—Will, a Miskito. Early 1681 found the group swapping captains and sacking villages, causing the loss of 25 ships, 200 men, and four million pesos. The most significant of these prizes was the Santa Rosario, taken off Guayaquil, for it contained a Spanish derrotero, or book of charts, of the coast from Acapulco to the Straits of Le Maire. Sharpe then led his men on a six-month journey through open water, south of Cape Horn and around Staten Island to arrive in Barbados in January 1682. From there the men scattered, some returning to England, others joining crews in the Caribbean.

Sharpe arrived in England on March 25, 1682 to face accusations of piracy and murder. The Spanish ambassador to England, Don Pedro Ronquillo, made the charges based on the killing of Don Diego Lopez, captain of the captured Rosario. Sharpe had already spread the word that he had the derrotero, an invaluable piece of geographic knowledge at a time when Spain,

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18 Bradley, Lure of Peru, 126. Ibid, chs. 6-8 is one of the best sources for the South Seas buccaneers in English, alongside Williams, Great South Sea, chs. 3-5.
19 There is some indication that Henry Morgan captured a derrotero after sacking Panama in 1671, which was then in the possession of the Earl of Bristol, Lord Digby, who had been so eager to view Narbrough’s charts when the latter returned in the same year. Joseph Moxon, map and instrument maker and Fellow of the Royal Society, said he had possession of the derrotero for a time, but he returned it to the Earl. No more is known about the charts, although the waggoner at BL Harley MS 4034 may be a copy. The British Library’s Explore Catalogue identifies it as a Hacke atlas, ca. 1686, however. Wroth cites it as made between March and October 1682. Laurence C. Wroth, “William Hack’s Manuscript Atlases of ‘The Great South Sea of America,’” John Carter Brown Library Annual Report (1966): 4. For more on this derrotero and its possible derivations, see Derek Howse and Norman Thrower, eds., A Buccaneer’s Atlas: Basil Ringrose’s South Sea Waggoner, A Sea Atlas and Sailing Directions of the Pacific Coast of the Americas 1682 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 262-3.
20 Williams, Great South Sea, 84-93; Howse and Thrower, South Sea Waggoner, 25-6.
France, and England frequently had bellicose relations. The news caused quite a stir in high-government circles, as suggested in a letter from the Earl of Conway to Secretary of State Leoline Jenkins. Conway writes, “a Description of the South Sea and Spanish Sea Ports in cartes” is to be brought to the King “with all the Privacy you can, and his Majesty having received copies of those drafts, which are at present imperfect, will Deliver them to you, to get them perfected by that original with the secrecy that may be.” 21 The King, joined by the Duke of Albemarle, a longstanding patron of South Seas and privateering voyages, attempted to postpone the court-martial, but to no avail. Sharpe and associates stood trial June 10, 1682. One of their judges was none other than now-Admiral John Narbrough, representing the Navy Board as Comptroller of the Victualling. To the King’s likely relief, the privateers were acquitted by the petty jury. Aware that the English had a great advantage in gaining Spain’s closely guarded geographic information, yet not wanting to anger their imperial rivals, Jenkins wrote to Sir Henry Goodrick, English ambassador in Madrid, asking him to smooth over the verdict. Not for the last time would London officials try to coax Spanish counterparts into allowing for more open access to the Pacific. Now, as later in the century, the Spanish were not pleased. In a letter to Goodrick dated August 7, 1682, Don Pablo Spinola Doria expressed his outrage not only that the “Pyratas” were acquitted, but that the King himself seemed to have meddled in affairs. 22 In this case at least, being a “Pyrata” was deemed permissible as it resulted in a gain in intelligence.

Although Sharpe’s acquittal was not assured by his sharing of the derrotero, the capture of such clandestine information was seen as a great service to the nation. In return, the Admiralty

21 As quoted in ibid, 27.
22 TNA SP 94/67, f. 146. f. 146 contains a true copy of the letter in its original Spanish, while f. 147 has the English translation.
offered Sharpe a commission, which he did not take up. Instead, he choose to return to buccaneering in the Caribbean. Alternatively working as pirate-hunter and pirate, Sharpe was able to escape accusations of piracy twice more before being imprisoned on St. Thomas for attempting to flee with his family and slaves from creditors. Records of him end in the fort at St. Thomas around 1699. A piratical lifestyle, and especially the South Seas voyage, allowed Sharpe to live at the limits of state control and even garner state favor at times. However, his biography is more exceptional than representative, as many of his contemporary buccaneers were victims of state violence, not benefiters.

2. William Hacke

News of Sharpe’s voyage spread soon after his trial thanks to the extraordinary “accompanying press corps” that made up his crew. No less than six published accounts resulted from the journals and notes kept on board, which pales in comparison to the at least fourteen surviving manuscript journals. The first printed account to appear was that of William Dick, or W. D., which was printed along with an account of another privateering expedition as an extension of the second edition of the English translation of Exquemelin’s *Bucaniers of America* (May 1684). The second published account also appeared in May 1684. John Cox, a New Englander, is purported to be the author of the volume edited and published by Philip Ayres. Next came Basil Ringrose’s detailed narrative in the second volume of the English translation of

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22 Williams, Great South Sea, 86.
23 For a list of the surviving manuscript journals, see Howse and Thrower, South Sea Waggoner, table 1.
24 Philip Ayres, ed. *The Voyages and Adventures of Capt. Barth. Sharp And others, in the South Sea* (London: published by Philip Ayres, printed by B.W. for R.H. and S.T., 1684). For Cox’s journal, see BL Sloane MS 49, with a microfilm copy at NMM MRG/167. For Cox’s logbook, see NMM GOS/4, of which Pepys also had a copy, PL.2349.
Bucaniers of America, published in February 1685. The original Bucaniers was De Americaensche Zee-Rovers, published by Jan ten Hoorn in Amsterdam in 1678. This was followed by a German translation in 1679, Americanische Seeräuber (Nürnberg), and Dr. Alonso de Buena-Maison’s Spanish translation in 1681, Piratas de la America.27 It is this Spanish translation of the Dutch which was used for the first English edition, published by William Crooke in 1684. The second edition (1684) and the second volume (1685) contain the narratives of the South Seas voyage, which join other pirate stories including those of Henry Morgan.28 Thus the story of Sharpe and his men entered English print culture due to its proximity to other buccaneer tales. The interest in buccaneers as part of the larger Atlantic commercial world paved the way for a boom in Pacific travel accounts in the late seventeenth century, and their entry point was through the Caribbean.

William Dick mentioned in his published journal that he had seen a copy of the derrotero, translated into English, in Wapping. The Wapping location most likely referred to the chart shop of William Hacke, who worked “at the Signe of Great Britain & Ireland near Newstaires in Wapping” for most of his career.29 Hacke was one of the final, yet most well-known, members of the Thames School, which specialized in maritime cartography and is best known for portolan charts in the Italian or Mallorcan style.30 Another prominent member was John Thornton, who

28 For more on the lawsuits that came from Morgan’s estate in the wake of the English translations, see Frohock, Buccaneers and Privateers, ch. 3.
30 For examples of the inspiration of the Thames School style, see TNA 7/857 (Portuguese), Harley MS 3450 (Portuguese), Egerton MS 819 (Portuguese), BL Maps 9 TAB.36. (5.) (Malta).
helped to alter Narbrough’s draughts into printable charts. Like many of the Thames School, Hacke apprenticed in the Draper’s Guild starting in 1671, but there is no indication that he was ever made a free member of the guild. By 1682 he produced his first known chart and was already involved in the translation and copying of Sharpe’s South Seas derrotero. Recognizing the rarity and value of the find, it is likely the government enlisted the help of Hacke, just as naval officials enlisted Thornton a decade earlier.

Rather than rush into print as Dick and Cox (via Ayres) had done, Hacke was limited by an apparent moratorium on the printing of the derrotero. Hacke nevertheless saw an opportunity to net patronage via the limited circulation of copies in influential circles. Basil Ringrose also created a South Seas waggoner, which remained unpublished, and his work included areas north to California that Hacke’s would not. Two copies of Ringrose’s manuscript journals survive, which Howse and Thrower suggest was edited by or for Bartholomew Sharpe, with some help from Hacke. Hacke would continue to be interested in copying and editing South Seas journals,

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32 Ringrose’s account, however, was reprinted in 1699 and 1704, in particular offered some of the first visual depictions of the coasts he had helped to sack. Ringrose’s account includes 15 charts showing bays and ports, which he thought might be of use to future travelers. Others thought so too, as the charts were reprinted at least eight times before 1771. Howse and Thrower, South Sea Waggoner, 32.

33 The copy with a dedication from Hacke is at BL MS Sloane 48, f. 1. A microfilm copy is available at NMM MRF/160/2. It is this copy which was used as part of the second volume of Bucaniers of America (1685). The journals and waggoner are all in the same hand and would have been produced in the seventeen months Ringrose spent in England after returning from Sharpe’s voyage (March 26, 1682) and leaving for another South Seas voyage (October 1, 1683). The other journal is held at BL Sloane 3820 (microfilm at NMM MRF/160/2), also ca. 1682. Ringrose’s waggoner is at NMM P32. For more on the publication history of Sharpe’s voyage, and particularly Ringrose’s role
but for nearly two decades he also produced lavish presentation copies of the Sharpe derrotero, at least thirteen of which survive.

The first of these copies is dated 1682 and declares, “To the high and Mighty Monarch Charles the second King of great Britaigne, France and Ireland &c. This Waggoner of the Great South Sea is most humbly Dedicated & presented by your Ma/ts ever loyal subject Barth: Sharpe 82.” Hacke worked closely with Sharpe in producing the early copies. Sharpe had a lot to thank the King for, and this is most likely the copy the King ordered made during the trial. The first 93 pages of the atlas are a description of the geography, “translated out of the Spanish Originall for ye use of Your most Sacred Majestie by the care of Your most humble & ever Loyall Subjects, Phillip Dassigny/1682.” 264 pages of charts, with some text, allow a reader to visually travel from Acapulco south to the Straits of Le Maire. A 1683 copy held by the Free Library of Philadelphia is also dedicated to Charles II by Sharpe. Finally, a 1684 edition bears a dedication to the King by Sharpe, this time identified as B.S., and “Made by William Hack” with his shop information following. The choice of the King as an object of dedication is an obvious one. At this time, as shown in the case of the Narbrough expedition and Sharpe’s trial, the King was directly involved in maritime affairs and had at least a passing interest in the South Seas. From the inclusion of his shop information, it is clear that Hacke knew these objects would be viewed by a larger audience than just the King, offering him a chance to gain new customers of the highest social rank.

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within it, see Howse and Thrower, South Sea Waggoner, Introduction. The rest of the Howse and Thrower volume is a facsimile of Ringrose’s waggoner, the first time the volume has been published. For a comparison of the sources and styles in Ringrose’s and Hacke’s waggoners, see ibid, 264-5.

34 BL Maps 7.Tab.123. (K.MAR.VIII.15), title page.
37 BL Sloane MS 44, f. 1.
Kings and political configurations change over time; in 1685 Hacke presented a new copy to James II, adding to his “high & Mighty” title, “defender of the faith.”38 Interestingly, what had been Duke of York’s Island in the south of Chile was altered to “King James the 2nd his Isle,” although this alteration would be reverted in later editions.39 Just as the dedicatory cartouche in the map of *An Account of Several Late Voyages* changed between its first (1694) and second (1711) edition, so too did Hacke’s targeted approach to his luxury manuscripts. He was producing not for a mass market, but a very small, powerful one. This particular waggoner is one of the best preserved and most extravagant, making it a good indicator of Hacke’s goals in editing and copying rare information for elite eyes only.

Gold gilt paint adorns the title page where an angel with an upturned moon on her head, an image characteristic of Hacke, stands on a cartouche containing Hacke’s shop information. She holds a globe in each hand, one terrestrial and the other celestial, making this a universal project in terms of its importance. The following folio contains a map of western South America, depicting the South Seas as the privateers experienced them: coastal, with forays into the wider sea only to escape detection. Quarter compasses, also characteristic of Hacke, provide rhumb lines in three places on the map. As with all his previous waggoners, he starts at Acapulco and moves south, with occasional historical notes and narrative asides provided from Sharpe’s journal. The additions combine to give the atlas a sense of immediacy, or at the very least a certain utility if one were to travel to the shores depicted. However, there is no evidence that any of the waggoners were ever used afloat. While other travel accounts were put on board ship libraries, these waggoners, all folio in size and heavy, were not intended for actual navigation.

38 NMM P33, f. 1.
39 Howse and Thrower, *South Sea Waggoner*, 266.
They were, instead, Hacke’s way of navigating London’s elite classes to make work for himself and to establish a reputation as the mapmaker of choice for the maritime community interested in overseas expansion. He achieves this by confusing the first and third person in his waggoner, “if you find it [a watering hole] full of sand: dig down a little way & you will find the water soon rise (I did so”). Hacke certainly had not done so, he is paraphrasing Sharpe, but was also in effect giving his patrons the keys to a proxy experience of sailing the most distant shores without having to do more than turn a page.

Hacke’s later waggoners included new information garnered from Hacke’s maritime and publishing contacts. Most instructive in understanding how geographic knowledge was fixed and perpetuated is the invention of Pepys Island. Ambrose Cowley sailed on a South Seas voyage in 1684 as sailing master. After capturing a Danish ship, the crew headed for the Straits of Magellan. When the eastern entrance proved difficult to enter, they opted instead to round the Horn as Sharpe had, but in reverse. On the way south, in 47° 40’ S latitude, the crew spotted uncharted land. In his manuscript journal, Cowley saw many woods and a great harbor. He writes, “I would have had them stood upon a wind all night, but they told me they were not come out to go upon Discovery. Wee saw likewise another Island by this that night which made me think’o them to be the Sibble D’wards.” Interesting as the comment is as to the subject of discovery—that it is an indulgent act not for those in search of prizes—his comment on this

40 Ibid, f. 74.
41 The copy held in the William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan shows the coast of New Spain north of Acapulco, as well as Pepys Island. Microfilm of the Clements Library waggoner is at NMM MRF/144. The same geographic range is covered in a 1698 waggoner dedicated to his new patron Lord Somers, Lord Chancellor and one of the Lords Justices to administer the kingdom while William III was abroad. BL Maps 7.Tab.122. Lord Somers and the Duke of Albemarle are identified as patrons by Lynam, “William Hacke and the South Seas Buccaneers,” in Mapmaker’s Art, ed. Lynam, 102.
42 BL Sloane 54, f. 5v. Another copy of the journal is at BL Sloane 1150. It is in this journal that he admits to losing his journal that chronicled his adventures from August 4, 1683 to 1684. Ibid, f. 101.
island is most important, as it would give rise to a persistent geographic chimera. The islands receive no name in Cowley’s manuscript, but that would all change when Hacke got his hands on the journal.

Cowley returned to England in 1686. In 1687, Hacke released a map of the island sighted by Cowley, christened Pepys Island after the Secretary of the Navy so critical of Narbrough’s maps. In the title, Hacke claims that the island was named by Cowley, “who called it after this Name.” There is also an Admiralty Bay on one of the two islands depicted, perhaps a bid by Cowley for a commission or by Hacke for more orders. Hacke exaggerated Cowley’s favorable description of the island, doubling his estimate of the capacity of the harbor, “this Island is plentifully stored, with timber water inumerable & abundance of fish & on the NW part is a Curious Large Bay seeming fit to hold 1000 saile of ships at 2 Leagues dist.” Such exaggerations suggest that Hacke and his maritime collaborators were in favor of increased English traffic to the South Seas.

Whereas Hacke prepared presentation copies of luxury atlases for the elite, he also sold charts from his shop—his high-end atlases apparently were available for the astronomical sum of 70 pounds. By the 1690s, Hacke’s business seems to have been booming, and he looked to

43 It is likely Cowley sighted the Falklands and mistook the latitude because he wrote this portion of the journal from memory. Williams, Great South Sea, 93. For a more complete overview of the voyage, see ibid, 93-7.
diversify by entering into the world of publishing. Already experienced in editing with Ringrose, Sharpe, and Cowley’s manuscripts, Hacke released a voyage collection in 1699, entitled *A Collection of Original Voyages*. These voyages included:

I. Capt. Cowley’s Voyage round the Globe.

II. Captain Sharp’s Journey over the Isthmus of Darien, and Expedition into the South Seas, Written by himself.

III. Capt. Wood’s Voyage thro’ the Streights of Magellan.

IV. Mr. Robert’s Adventures among the Corsairs of the Levant… 46

The book was printed for James Knapton, who specialized in the production of South Seas accounts. Herman Moll drew the maps. Whereas Hacke’s foray into print was targeted at a much wider audience than his atlases, he still dedicated the work to his patron, Lord Somers. He explains that the volume only came “to Publick view, under the Patronage of your Great Name doubting but the same innate Goodness in your Lordship, that made it acceptable in the Manuscript, will render it no less so in the Print.” 47 The positive reaction of a small audience who saw the manuscripts encouraged Hacke to share the journals more widely. Cowley’s and Sharpe’s voyages come first, followed by Wood’s, whose work may be of use “to help out the Shortness of Sir John’s [Narbrough’s] Relation.” The final section, Roberts’, recounts his time on a Levant pirate corsair, which Hacke says allows a rare glimpse of the Greek Isles. Roberts, Sharpe, and Cowley all tie the collection to the popularity of privateering and pirating; the word with the most entries in the index is “buccaneer.” Wood’s inclusion, however, speaks to the

46 Hacke, *Collection of Original Voyages*. Copy available at NMM 910.4”16”:094. Pages 17-32 of Sharpe’s account are missing in this copy. The British Library copy, BL 978.d.34 belonged to Joseph Banks, with all the maps inserted into Cowley’s portion of the book, not according to their suggested pages.

Narbrough naval expedition, published in 1694, and Wood’s subsequent voyage to find the Northeast Passage. Hacke seems to cover all bases with this short account, playing into perceived interests in buccaneering and geographic novelty.

Of Cowley, Hacke claims that he has “published with very little alteration from the Original Journal, given my by Captain Cowley, but for the ease of the Reader, I have contracted it in such places as contained nothing but plain Sailing.” The same is said of Sharpe’s journal. Yet, both manuscripts show a much heavier editorial hand than Hacke claims. One example will have to suffice, an episode describing a storm while rounding Cape Horn. In his manuscript, Cowley writes:

we sailed until the fourtheenth of February, ther wee judged that wee had the Length of Cape horn lying in fifty seven Degrees and forty minutes south latitude and longitude three hundred and three Degrees and noe Minutes where wee met with a great current, roming from the North West; wee being very merry having that night fair weather and good punch, and chooseing Valentines, But the next day the wind round up at North West blowing very hard laying us under a Mayne Course, wee layd her head to the Southward and drove into sixty Degres and twenty Minutes south Latitude.

Cowley, via Hacke, describes the 1684 voyage south in the edited journal:

then hailing away S.W. we came abreast with Cape Horn the 14th Day of February, where we chusing of Valentines, and discoursing of the Intrigues of Women, there arose a prodigious Storm, which did continue till the last day of the Month, driving us into the lat. of 60 deg. and 30 min. South, which is further than ever any Ship hath sailed before South; so that we concluded the discoursing of Women at Sea was very unlucky, and occasioned the Storm.

While certainly more entertaining, Hacke corrected the latitude slightly and added a narrative anecdote not even hinted at by Cowley, beyond the mention of choosing Valentines. Such

48 Ibid, preface.
49 BL Sloane MS 54, f. 5v-6r.
50 Hacke, Collection of Original Voyages, 6-7.
emendations do not mean that Hacke was remiss in his editorial work; on the contrary he was typical of the mediation process that often took a journal from ship to printed sheet. Just as Narbrough had to consult Thornton to create a printable map, so too did sailors of all ranks have to consult editors and other gatekeepers of the print industry.

Sensing a lucrative opportunity to cash in on the interest in the South Seas caused by his and other buccaneer publications, Hacke advertised in the March 5-7, 1702 Post Man:

Whereas Proposals have been lately published by William Hacke Hydrographer, for Engraving all the whole Coasts, Islands, &c. from California to the Streights of Lemaire, in the South Seas of America, on 30 large Copper Plates...the whole to be done by Michaelmas next...the Originals were from a Survey ordered by the Council of Panama for the use of the K. of Spains Ships in those Seas...

Although Hacke cited another source from which to gain Pacific geographic knowledge, a Council of Panama survey, it is hard to believe that he would not bring his work with the Spanish derrotero to bear in the thirty proposed plates. How Hacke acquired this survey is unknown. Lamentably, Hacke disappears from official records around the time of this advertisement; the details of the end of his life are a mystery. Hacke is the quintessential example of a middle man in the production of geographic knowledge, one that could gain patronage from elites with a luxury manuscript, while also courting a more general audience with print projects. Both Sharpe and Hacke found their participation in the geographic knowledge community beneficial: freedom for Sharpe, professional reputation for Hacke.

51 Advertisement in the Post Boy, issue 939, March 5-7, 1702. Many thanks to Ashley Baynton-William for bringing this citation to my attention.
3. **William Dampier**

At the end of Hacke’s collection, there is a four-page insert from the printer, Knapton, advertising his other books for sale. The first three books listed are:


------------------ *His Voyages and Descriptions*. Vol. II. In Three Parts, viz. I. *A Supplement of the Voyage round the Word* [sic]…2. Two Voyages to Campeachy…3. A Discourse of the Trade-Winds…To which is added, A General INDEX to both Volumes. [1699]

* A new Voyage and Description of the Isthmus of America…By L. Wafer. Illustrated with several Copper Plates. [1699]52

Such listings not only underline the importance of maps and plates—visual material—to travel accounts, but also reveal the centrality of Knapton as a conduit similar to Hacke for entry into print for maritime adventurers. With Wafer’s description of the Isthmus of Darien and Dampier’s second volume published in the same year as Sharpe’s journal, there were now six retellings of the Sharpe voyage on offer to readers.

Over fifteen years after the first English South Seas privateers trickled back from the Caribbean their influence was still affecting English print culture, in large part due to the reception of one man’s works: William Dampier. Dampier had sailed with Sharpe, then with Cowley round Cape Horn before transferring to the *Cygnet* which crossed the Pacific in 1686.53 Dampier wrote *A New Voyage* upon his return to England in 1691, after visiting the shores of

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53 Lionel Wafer, a surgeon who sailed with Sharpe, also accompanied Dampier on this second voyage, until Wafer decided to part ways with those buccaneers who wanted to sail to the East Indies. Wafer’s publication (1699), which focuses mainly on his time with the Cuna Indians of Panama, makes frequent reference to Ringrose’s 1685 account and to Dampier’s *Voyage Round the World*. A second edition of Wafer’s account appeared 1704. Williams notes that Wafer’s ethnographic details have remained of interest to anthropologists until the present day. Williams, *Great South Sea*, 84.
New Holland and being marooned (by agreement) with two others in the Nicobar Islands. In a modified canoe, he and his mates made it to Sumatra, from whence Dampier gained passage home via the Cape of Good Hope with a “painted Prince,” Jeoly, in whom Dampier had bought a half-share while at Bencoolen. Although Dampier lost his share in Jeoly upon his return, the painted prince nevertheless gained a small degree of notoriety as an oddity in the early 1690s. At a time when the slave trade was on the rise, indigenous peoples could also serve as macabre additions to the popular culture of the South Seas in England.

It took Dampier several drafts and some editorial aid to create his published account, which appeared in February 1697. The main purpose of the volume was describing the various lands Dampier had visited in his multi-ship, eleven year circumnavigation. The work struck a chord with consumers and was in its third edition by the end of the year. By 1699, when Knapton advertised the book in Hacke’s collection, it was in its fourth edition and had been joined by vol. II, Voyages and Descriptions (1699), which included a supplement to the first volume, a

54 Dampier hoped to make money exhibiting Jeoly, but sold his share in the man soon after returning to England. Jeoly died shortly after landing in 1691, but not before appearing as an attraction in several side-shows and as the subject of pamphlets. For example, BL 10825.b.47, Thomas Hyde (?), An Account of the Famous Prince Giolo, son of the King of Gilolo now in England... (London: R. Taylor, 1692). For an advertisement of Jeoly’s exhibition, see BL N.Tab.2026/25. (2.). For more on Jeoly’s reception in London see Geraldine Barnes, “Curiosity, Wonder, and William Dampier’s Painted Prince,” Journal of Early Modern Cultural Studies 6, no. 1 (2006): 31-50.

description of logging voyages to Campeachy, a discourse on the trade winds, and an index to both volumes.56

Dampier is extraordinary amongst an already exceptional set of mariner-writers due to his lengthy and detailed descriptions of the natural history of the places he visited; he is often lauded as one of the first floating naturalists and is a crucial part of any history of natural philosophy and science in the early modern period.57 Other scholars have been interested in his status as the first Englishman to encounter Australia, with many careful to note the detrimental affect his pejorative description of indigenous New Hollanders has had on subsequent encounters with aboriginal peoples.58 Others like to discuss Dampier’s exceptional writing style.59 In the past twenty years Dampier has experienced a historical revival, not least in the changing of his portrait description—which hangs in the National Gallery in Trafalgar Square—from “pirate and hydrographer” to “circumnavigator.”60 His language and natural history have singled him out, in the minds of scholars, from his fellows. However, I would like to place him back in context in order to highlight his successful integration into the London geographic knowledge community,

56 New Voyage Round the World was in its fifth edition by 1703. Voyages and Descriptions was reprinted in 1705.
57 Indeed, Dampier is the first naturalist chronicled in Glyndwr Williams’ latest book, Naturalists at Sea: Scientific Travellers from Dampier to Darwin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).
58 For an overview of the process, and Dampier’s place within it, see Douglas, “Slippery Word, Ambiguous Praxis.” See also Bronwen Douglas, “Terra Australis to Oceania,” 29; Williams, Great South Sea, 108-10, 125, 130; Edwards, Story of the Voyage, 31;
60 Norris, The Buccaneer Explorer, iv.
his command opportunities gained from publication, and the subsequent printed quarrel which threatened his hard-won credibility.

Dampier’s book was indeed a success, opening many doors, due in large part to his self-presentation that defied stereotypes of privateers and pirates. John Evelyn, diarist, met Dampier at a dinner with Samuel Pepys on August 6, 1698. Evelyn recorded:

…where was Cap: Dampier who had ben a famous Buccaneere,…printed a Relation of his very strange adventures, which was very extraordinary, & his observations very profitable: Was now going abroad againe, by the Kings Incouragement, who furnished a ship of 290 Tunn: he seemed a more modest man, than one would imagine, by the relation of the Crue he had sorted with: He brought a map, of his observations of the Course of the winds in the South-Sea, & assured us that the Maps hitherto extant, were all false as to the Pacific-sea, which he makes on the S[o]uth of the line, that on the North, & running by the Coasts of Peru, being extremely tempestuous.61

This map, by Herman Moll, would appear in Dampier’s second volume, published in 1699.62 Pepys and Evelyn were getting a preliminary peek, although one hopes Pepys was more impressed than he was with Narbrough’s draughts. Charles Hatton also rubbed shoulders with the mariner, “I have discoursed with Dampier. He is a blunt fellow, but of better understanding than would be expected from one of his education. He is a very good navigator.”63 Both commentators took note of Dampier’s dubious background. However, this does not seem to trouble them in light of his ability to offer observations; indeed, it was Dampier’s very status as a privateer and sometimes pirate that allowed him to travel so widely and gather such abundant

63 As quoted in Norris, The Buccaneer Explorer, xiii. For more on Hatton, see Mitchell, Dampier’s Monkey, 7.
Dampier was able to overcome suspicions about his circumstances with his comportment in person and on paper.

Dampier rubbed shoulders with more Fellows of the Royal Society than Pepys. Hans Sloane, then Secretary of the Royal Society, commissioned Dampier’s portrait, painted by Thomas Murray, also in the National Gallery. The reviewer of Dampier’s book in the *Philosophical Transactions* wrote:

And he has the opportunity of visiting many Ports and places, scarce described in any Voyages, and for the most part unknown to English navigators, to the East or West Indies; so he was the more diligent in his Descriptions of their Situations, Soyls, Products, &c. the greatest part of which are made from his own Experience, and the others from particular information he received from credible and knowing Persons. His style is very Intelligible and Expressive.\(^{65}\)

Dampier’s careful, consistent observations, taken from his own experiences, brought new areas of the globe to the interested eyes of Fellows. Dampier had labored to present himself as a reliable observer in line with the premier intellectual body in the land, the Royal Society. He achieved this through his narrative style as well as by dedicating the book to then Royal Society president, Sir Charles Montague. With one well-received publication, Dampier had become the beating heart of the London geographic community.

Dampier had become the premier expert on Pacific and South American navigation, as shown by his summons, with fellow buccaneer-author Wafer, before the Board of Trade and Plantations in late 1697.\(^{66}\) Dampier’s appearance before the Board of Trade and Plantations is

\(^{64}\) Hasty, “Piracy and the production of knowledge,” 42, 47, 53.

\(^{65}\) *Philosophical Transactions* 19 (1695): 426. The reviewer might have been Hans Sloane, although Pollock says it was John Ray. Pollock, “The Geographicall Compass,” 67.

\(^{66}\) From the Board’s minutes, June 30, 1697, “Scotch E. India Company. Ordered that Mr. Dampier who hath lately printed a Book of his Voyages have notice to attend this Board on Fryday night; And that he give notice to Mr. Wafer (whom he names in his said Book) to attend also at the sametime; In Order to Enquire of them of the State of the Country upon the Isthmus of Darien where it hath been signififed that the Scotch East India Company have a design
indicative of wider changes in the approach to piracy by the English state. The Board was formed in 1696 to gather information and direct administrative efforts for the colonies. It represented an increase in state control of maritime trade, an effort also bolstered by the increased numbers of naval vessels stationed in North American and Caribbean waters in peacetime. The Board saw to it that officials who had harbored pirates were replaced. In 1700, the High Court Admiralty passed a law which changed how pirates were tried. Previously, pirates were tried in ports, many of which often contained communities sympathetic to the buccaneers who brought them trade goods. The new law dictated that a pirate could be tried anywhere where seven officials or naval officers could gather. Thus, the 1690s represented a shift in policy towards piracy, even if it took nearly 30 years to eradicate piracy on a large scale.67 Careful presentation in print and exposure to society within London’s geographic knowledge community allowed Dampier to capitalize on his travels, rather than to be punished for them in a time when piracy was increasingly suspect.

Dampier’s efforts attracted the attention of not only the Royal Society and the Board of Trade and Plantations, but also the Admiralty. The Board responded to Dampier’s proposal of a voyage “wherein I might be serviceable to my nation.” This is the voyage alluded to by John Evelyn at their dinner. Dampier presented an outline of discovery in the Pacific, with the main goal to search for the still-plausible yet ever elusive Southern Continent.68 While the Admiralty granted Dampier his voyage, they were still slightly wary of the buccaneer, or at least of his

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68 TNA ADM 1/1692/6, f. 3.
grand plans, for they granted him but one ship and only fifty of the seventy men he requested. Dampier had other problems in manning and preparing his ships and left the Downs later than desired, on January 14, 1699. Troubles did not abate at sea. Dampier quarreled with his officers, especially Lieutenant George Fisher, who accused Dampier of piracy and murder. Dampier left Fisher in Brazil, then sailed around the Cape of Good Hope, rather than Tierra del Fuego as originally planned, to New Holland. He coasted clockwise around New Guinea, named the island of New Britain before losing the Roebuck to a leak at Ascension. The crew returned home on an East India convoy, where Dampier had to face two courts martial, one for the loss of the Roebuck and the other for his harsh treatment of Lieutenant Fisher. He was convicted of the latter and found “not a Fitt person to bee employ’d as comd/r of any of her Maj/ts Ships.” Needless to say, he did not find Terra australis incognita.

The Admiralty took Dampier’s second court martial to heart and did not offer him another command. However, another voyage left at the same time as Dampier’s which shows Admiralty investment in learning more about the southern oceans. It also reveals their ties to the Royal Society. When Fellow of Royal Society and astronomer Edmond Halley proposed a voyage to carry out observations on magnetic variation and the longitude problem, the Royal Society sponsored the proposal, supported by the Lords of the Treasury and Queen Mary II and approved by the Admiralty. They offered Halley a new ship, the Paramore, for “making further

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69 Williams, Great South Sea, 122.
70 TNA ADM 1/1692/6, f. 30.
71 Ibid, f. 35. This letter sent from Bahia harbor, Coast of Brazil, April 22, 1699.
72 First court martial: TNA ADM 1/5262/14. The second court martial was for the death of the boatswain as well as Fisher’s treatment; he was cleared of the death but found guilty of harsh treatment. TNA ADM 1/5262, f. 287-351.
73 Ibid, f. 287.
discovery’s on ye Globe.”74 After five years of various delays, Halley set off in October 1698, two months before Dampier. Aware of his lack of naval experience, Halley had requested experienced commissioned officers to cruise with him, but he quarreled with his lieutenants nonetheless.75 Disappointed with the first cruise’s observations, Halley sent out for a second in the Southern Atlantic in September 1699. So unusual were such voyages with an astronomical mandate that an English servant of the Royal African Company in Pernambuco (Recife) took Halley prisoner under the impression he was a privateer. He was also taken for a pirate off the Newfoundland coast—indications of the British state’s crackdown on illegal trade.76

After a third cruise in the English Channel, Halley quickly put together a string of articles for the Philosophical Transactions and several maps.77 The maps proved of particular importance for later navigators, as well as for understanding contemporary views of Pacific


75 For Halley’s request of Harrison’s court martial, see TNA ADM 2/26, f. 34. Ironically, Harrison had submitted a longitude scheme to the Royal Society in 1694. For his commission and Halley’s mention of wanting a commissioned officer, see Thrower, ed., The Three Voyages of Edmond Halley, docs. 32 and 50, respectively.

76 Thrower, “Introduction,” in ibid, 46, 48.

77 Halley’s journals were not published until after his death. Alexander Dalrymple published the first two in Two Voyages made in 1698, 1699 and 1700 By Edmond Halley (London: printed by author 1773). They were also included in Alexander Dalrymple, ed., A Collection of Voyages Chiefly in The Southern Atlantic Ocean (London: printed for the author and sold by J. Nourse, P. Elmsly, Brotherton and Sewell, Jefferys and Faden, A. Dury, 1775). The journal of Halley’s third voyage was not published until Thrower’s edited volume, published for the Hakluyt Society, 1981.
cartography. Halley drafted “A New and Correct Sea Chart of the Whole World Shewing the Variations of the Compass” (1702) (figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1. Edmond Halley, “A New and Correct Sea Chart of the Whole World Shewing the Variations of the Compass,” London, 1702.
Printed. Image reprocuded with permission from Barry Lawrence Ruderman Antique Maps Inc.
Halley dedicated the map to Prince George of Denmark, then Lord High Admiral, perhaps as a nod to the Admiralty for their material support of his enterprise. Halley chose to split the projection just east of New Holland, leaving the Pacific intact to the left of center when one views the long, thin map. In the south Pacific, Halley includes a half hemisphere inset of the Arctic Circle. The North Pacific also has a decorative cartouche with Latin inscriptions, which pairs another such cartouche in the interior of northern Europe. The dedicatory cartouche is in northern Africa, while the title cartouche fills the interior of North America. These locations are mentioned to underline that only in the Pacific is maritime space filled with decorative elements.

Similarly, there is indeed something wanting on the chart: isogones swirl across the Atlantic and Indians Oceans, but stop between Japan and Tierra del Fuego. In the middle of this large, open space Halley placed a paragraph of text:

The curve lines which are drawn over ye seas in this chart, shew the variation of the compass in all the known seas, the double lines divide the tracts of east and west variation and under ym the compass stands true without varying. In any other place, the degree of variation is seen by the number on the line that passes over that place. I durst not presume to describe the curves of the South Sea wanting accounts thereof.78

The South Seas remained understudied as compared to the other oceans of the world. Despite the many publications that brought the South Seas to prominence in the 1680s and 1690s, its geography was still an enigma, with only the coasts and main trade wind routes relatively navigated. Calls for more knowledge about the South Seas, and plans for how to fill these gaps in knowledge, would characterize the early years of the eighteenth century.

Although Halley remains a formidable figure in the British history of science, it was Dampier who was to be identified with the South Seas in popular discourse. Through his

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78 Edmond Halley, “A new and correct sea chart of the whole world shewing the variations of the compass as they were found in the year M.D.CC,” (London: Mount and Page, 1702). A copy is available at NMM G 201:1/1 A and B.
considerable powers of observation, Dampier gained authority within the London geographic community by aligning himself more with the intellectual project of the Royal Society than with the maritime dominance of the Royal Navy.\textsuperscript{79} This was smart; his past experience with piracy did not conform to naval standards, as the accusations of Lieutenant Fisher bear out. The split between civilian and navy, captain and crew were fine lines within a matrix of credibility that characterized the complexities of print culture in the early-eighteenth century. Dampier was able to shoot to the heights of notoriety with his first publications, but such prominence would also open him to criticism.

\textbf{Disputing credibility: Dampier, Funnell, and Welbe}

The combined efforts of the Dampier and Halley expeditions caused quite a stir, no more so than at the Royal Society. Hans Sloane delighted in the observations delivered by both:

\begin{quote}
Captain Halley is return’d a great while since from his Southern Voyage, where in the Latitude of the Magellan Streights some Degrees Eastward of them, He found, and was hindered in this Voyage by many Mountains of Ice, tho’ he was in those Parts in Winter & their Summer. He has made many Observations of the Variation of the Needle, & several other things, which are hoped may prove of great Service to Philosophy, as well as Navigation, some of which are Printed in a Map he has made since his Return. Captain Dampier is likewise Returned, and has made many discoveries upon the Coasts of Nova Hollandia, where (in the places they touched at) they had never seen a Ship nor Gun, and were very much astonish’d at hearing the Report, and seeing the Effect of them. They wear Wooden Bodkins thrust thro’ their Nostrils, & are very Brutish in many of their Customs. They as well as the Inhabitants of Nova Hollandia are black, and have Wolly Curl’d Hair. Captain Dampier sailed round a great part of Nova Guinea, and designs to Print his Voyage, when he has leave, and is ready.\textsuperscript{80}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{79} This is not to say that Dampier does not play into the nationalistic themes of claiming British naval dominance, but that is not his primary strategy.

\textsuperscript{80} October 2, 1701, RS LBO 13, f. 216. Dampier’s descriptions of Australian aboriginal peoples in his books was to have a lasting, pejorative impact on the European imagination. See note 58 above.
As Sloane intimated, Dampier took his court martial in stride and released the first part of *A Voyage to New Holland* in 1703. By that time he had already sailed again for the South Seas, in command of a privateering squadron backed by London and Bristol merchants. His experience in the South Seas and ability to spread the news of it overrode any doubts that might have arisen from his multiple courts martial. Indeed, so great was his reputation as a navigator, if not a commander, that he had an audience with the Queen in April, 1703.81

The reason for Dampier’s new venture was war over the Spanish Succession. From the outbreak of hostilities in 1701, it became desirable again to raid French and Spanish ships, especially those French vessels carrying on a trade with western South America, and Dampier’s experiences with South Seas privateering placed him in high demand.82 Dampier set out in 1703 in the *St. George*, accompanied by the *Cinque Ports*, commanded first by Captain Pickering, who died, and then by Captain Stradling. Dampier had delayed the sailing of the expedition to wait for his privateer friend, Edward Morgan, who was in prison. On the *Cinque Ports* was Alexander Selkirk, while William Funnell and John Welbe sailed with Dampier. All three would prove crucial in shaping the presentation of the voyage and the South Seas.

Like the *Roebuck* expedition, trouble with command plagued Dampier from the outset. He placed his first lieutenant on shore in the Cape Verde Islands, a move reminiscent of his quarrels with Lieutenant Fisher. Stradling, who had his own command issues, fought with Dampier from the outset and they parted ways in May 1704. Stradling returned to Juan Fernandez Island in the *Cinque Ports*; Alexander Selkirk took this opportunity to maroon

81 Williams, *Great South Sea*, 136.
82 TNA HCA 26/17/168 shows the negotiation for the letter of marque from the prize court. On March 14, 1703 the Queen asked to delay the ships in order to examine a claim by the East India Company, but the EIC’s claim did not stop the ships leaving later in 1703. TNA ADM 1/4088, f.227.
himself on the same island where Will the Miskito Indian had been left by Sharpe rather than continue in an unsafe ship. Selkirk made a providential decision, as the Cinque Ports sank at sea and her surviving crew ended up in a Spanish prison.

Dampier continued to take prizes, but his ship too was deteriorating. John Clipperton, chief mate, chose to abandon the increasingly dismal mission in September. Dampier set out across the Pacific to take a Spanish treasure galleon, a bold decision in light of his diminished crew and honeycomb of a ship. The confrontation with the better-armed galleon was a failure, and Dampier’s questionable decisions and alleged cowardice during the battle angered his crew. Soon after, Dampier’s old friend Morgan decided to take his share of treasure and supplies and left with a prize and small crew. William Funnell accompanied him. Dampier, with a skeleton crew of his own, soon lost his ship, as did Clipperton and Morgan.

By 1707 the survivors had trickled back to England and the print skirmish began. Curiously, Dampier did not produce another voyage account. The only full-length explanation of the voyage to appear was by Funnell in 1707, printed by W. Botham for James Knapton. The publisher, still selling Dampier’s books, did not seem to mind a controversy amongst privateers as long as it brought him more business. Knapton knew what readers expected in such accounts and most likely provided editorial intervention to make the book more familiar in layout and style. Funnell’s title page uses novel geographic information as its main draw, offering descriptions of “several Islands in the Atlantick Ocean, the Brazilian Coast, the Passage round Cape Horn, and the Coasts of Chili, Peru, and Mexico.” As if realizing that this sort of information was not so new to his readership, it also advertises his voyage from Mexico to the East Indies, “passing by Three Unknown Islands, and thro’ a New-discover’d Streight near the Coast of New Guinea; His Arrival in Amboyna: With a large Description of that and other Spice
Islands.” Trying to repeat the success of Dampier’s journals, Funnell and Knapton were also sure to mention the maps, again by Herman Moll, and “Figures of Plants and Animals.”83 The reader cannot help but notice that the entire title page is framed around Dampier; his name is mentioned twice and the contents mirror Dampier’s publications.

Funnell cannot escape Dampier’s influence. Indeed, Funnell, again most likely at the suggestion of Knapton, patterned even his title after Dampier’s original 1697 work. In his dedication to Josiah Burchett, secretary to the Lord High Admiral, he writes, “…with a particular regard to the most material of Captain Dampier’s own Observations, formerly published, which I found by Experience to be True.”84 He continues in his preface:

The Voyages and Description formerly published by Captain William Dampier, have met with so good Reception and universal Approbation in the World; and there has been so general an Expectation of the Success of the present Expedition, under the Command of a Person so perfectly acquainted with those Parts of the World to which we were bound, and so well skilled in the Trade, Shipping, Customs and Designs of the Spaniards, against whom we were employed; that I presume there needs no Apology, for publishing the following Account.85

Dampier’s works are Funnell’s very excuse for his own publication. As the text unfolds, however, it becomes clear that the real novelty of his book is not so much the descriptions of places seldom visited, but rather the insights Funnell can offer as to Dampier as a commander. Funnell plays on his commander’s celebrity just as much as on his own geographic observations.86

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83 William Funnell, A Voyage Round the World. Containing an Account of Captain Dampier’s Expedition into the South Seas in the Ship St. George. In the Years 1703 and 1704 (London: James Knapton, 1707), title page.
84 Ibid, dedication.
85 Ibid, preface.
Funnell, while laudatory of Dampier’s “very extraordinary” natural historic descriptions, finds Dampier’s conduct as captain less praiseworthy. Most distressingly, Dampier did not make effective combat decisions, costing his men the Manila galleon, among other prizes. Funnell also finds fault with some of Dampier’s longitude calculations, as with his location of the “Sibbil de Wards.” Even the supposedly brilliant natural descriptions are not without fault. In the case of the shape of alligator eggs, Funnell found them round, not elongated as Dampier reported in Voyages and Descriptions (1699), the appearance of which “I suppose he took only upon Hear-say.”

Whereas the previous court martial barring him from command in a Royal Naval vessel may have been a blow, the results of the proceedings seemed not to have affected his carefully-crafted public image. Funnell’s words, however, had the potential to circulate more widely, if only because they so freely borrowed Dampier’s fame to further the narrative. Dampier quickly shot back with a pamphlet, Capt. Dampier’s Vindication of his Voyage to the South-Seas in the Ship St. George with some small Observations for the Present on Mr. Funnell’s Chimerical Relation of the Voyage Round the World… In it, Dampier attempts to rip Funnell’s credibility to shreds. However, as Funnell based his initial authority in print on his more famous commander, the effect is to make Dampier seem petty, far from the image he created for himself in earlier works. From the start, Dampier intends to impugn Funnell’s image as a reliable

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87 Funnell, Voyage Round the World, 13.
88 Ibid, 52.
89 William Dampier, Capt. Dampier’s vindication of his voyage to the South-Sea in the ship St. George. With some small Observations for the Present on Mr. Funnell’s Chimerical Relation of the Voyage Round the World; and Detected in Little, until he shall be Examin’d more at Large (London: Mary Edwards, 1707). In addition to the Mary Edwards printing (BL 566.e.24), there is also a J. Bradford printing (BL 566.3.23), suggesting that Dampier reprinted the original pamphlet.
observer, accusing him of robbery, plagiarism, and dishonesty.\textsuperscript{90} Over the course of eight pages, Dampier quotes Funnell and then counters with his own version of events, distilling far more effectively than Funnell his own failure to maintain shipboard relations.\textsuperscript{91}

Dampier also attacks Funnell’s qualifications in making geographic observations. Of Funnell’s observation that Dampier had miscalculated the longitude of the Sebaldines, Dampier accuses Funnell of not having seen the islands at all. With regard to Funnell’s comment that the ship surprisingly found itself to the east of Tierra del Fuego, when Dampier had thought they were to the west of it, “Now I look upon that to be a great Mistake, to take one side of the Land for the other, than ‘tis to be mistaken that we were Westward of the whole Island, and miss his Longitude, for that comes of course.”\textsuperscript{92} Attacking a sailor’s ability to know his location, a task crucial to his profession, is a clever strategy, yet Dampier’s garbled pamphlet suggests that he could not organize several paragraphs, much less report longitude correctly. He closes by disputing that he threw over the ship owners’ interests and ends on a sulking note, “that Buffoon Toby Thomas [sailor on the voyage] by name said, Poor Dampier, thy Case is like King James, every body has left thee: I must declare to the World then, and Always, the Doctor was the only Officer that stood by me in all my Adversities.”\textsuperscript{93} Despite his intentions to the contrary, by pointing out his inability to keep his crew’s loyalty, Dampier ultimately makes Funnell’s point.

In this rough, unedited pamphlet, Dampier promises to answer Funnell more fully later, but it was John Welbe, sailor on the \textit{St. George}, who would answer both. If Dampier’s \textit{Vindication} was acerbic in its accusations, Welbe’s letter is acidic in its counter-accusations:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, 1.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, 3, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, 8.
\end{flushright}
First, I can’t but smile at the Captain’s witty (otherwise foolish) Phrase, Mr. Funnel’s chimerical Relation, not having the least Thought of his ferraginous [sic.] Compendium, full of Enthusiasms and improbable Stuff, such as no Man yet could ever understand; no, not even the courageous Author himself.94

Welbe focuses his scorn not only on Dampier’s lies about his command style, but also his writing style, a harsh criticism for one whose entire reputation has been built upon his publications. Adopting Dampier’s numerical list format—but abandoning Dampier’s use of three different fonts and mixed third and first-person narration—Welbe paints a clear picture of Dampier’s shortcomings. To Dampier’s complaint that his men were disorderly, Welbe counters, “To which I answer, That the Miscarriage of the Voyage depends wholly on the Want of Courage and Conduct in the Commander.”95 Welbe sums up his opinion of Dampier, “For his Part, he was a great Pilot, and had been there before, but none of us ever had; and if he could have help’d it, never should; for then he would be sure none could give any Account of his Transactions and Conduct, but the World must have been amuz’d with his Stories.”96

As Greg Dening has pointed out in the case of William Bligh, and as Williams echoes with regard to Dampier, harsh shipboard utterances seem to have been Dampier’s most offensive act.97 In cursing and insulting his crew, Dampier violated the social contract of the wooden world; his conduct was unbecoming of the chain of command. Welbe shows that Dening’s argument also extends to conduct in print. Dampier’s overblown reaction to the mild criticism offered in Funnel’s account was as offensive to Welbe as if Dampier had insulted him directly.

94 John Welbe, An Answer to Captain Dampier’s Vindication...with particular Observations on his ungenerous, false, and barbarous Usage to his Ship’s Crew. By John Welbe, Midship-Man, on Board Captain Dampier’s Ship (London: B. Bragge, 1707).
95 Ibid, 2.
96 Ibid, 8.
97 Greg Dening, Mr. Bligh’s Bad Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Williams, Great South Sea, 141.
Dampier’s *Vindication* served to undermine his cultural credibility as a court martial could not have done. He offered his arguments to a larger public sphere and Welbe used that discursive space to blast back. It would seem that Dampier indeed should have kept to his amusing stories.

Although Dampier’s reputation as a commander was blackened, he nevertheless still demanded respect as Britain’s most experienced navigator in the South Seas. In his next, and final, South Seas voyage, Dampier would serve as pilot, not captain, in a Bristol-financed venture led by Woodes Rogers. Compared to the voyages of the *Roebuck* and *St. George*, the cruise of the *Duke* and *Duchess* was a relative success. They managed to capture a treasure galleon and also recovered Alexander Selkirk from Juan Fernandez Island. Two publications resulted from the voyage, Woodes Rogers’ *A Cruising Voyage Round the World* and Edward Cooke’s *Voyage to the South Sea, and Round the World*.

Rogers’ account reveals the extent of Dampier’s international reputation, both good and bad. A captured French captain told Rogers that the Spanish were aware that an English privateering fleet was on its way, which they assumed was commanded by Dampier. Rogers also noted his waning trust in Dampier’s skills, as Dampier miscalculated the distance to the Galapagos by over two hundred miles. When the ships found Selkirk decked out in goat skins on Juan Fernandez, the self-marooned castaway practically refused to come aboard when he heard Dampier was also in service. Despite pejorative insinuations, Dampier’s status was reflected when, upon the expedition’s return to

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98 The instructions from the financiers of the Duke and Duchess reveal that they thought Dampier’s experience absolutely vital in the venture, it was upon he “whose Knowledge in those parts we do mainly depend upon for Satisfactory Success.” As quoted in Williams, *Great South Sea*, 146. Copies of the instructions are at TNA C 104/36, Pr. II and C 104/160. See also Beattie, *British Privateering Voyages*, ch. 4.


100 Dampier’s reputation is discussed in Williams, *Great South Sea*, 150-2.

Amsterdam in July 1711, a British agent wrote to Lord Treasurer Robert Harley, “Dampier is alive.”

What Dampier thought of the voyage is unknown. Perhaps afraid of another print battle which could harm his public image further, or maybe because Rogers and Cooke released their accounts too quickly, Dampier did not write an account of the Rogers’ expedition. Having circumnavigated the globe three times, Dampier retired to St. Stephen’s Parish, London. There he died in 1715. More than anyone else, Dampier represents the advantages one could gain from sharing Pacific geographic knowledge. He used the geography and natural history of the region as a screen to obscure his buccaneering activities and to gain the support of Royal Society, Admiralty, and merchants alike. The success of Dampier’s works was enduring; every navigator to the Pacific who followed would study his books. However, his personal reputation was less impervious, especially when faced with rival publications from crewmates. More than any other author, Dampier is responsible for bringing the Pacific region to cultural prominence for Britons. That prominence was tied primarily to his still-famous natural historical descriptions, yet also to his shipboard squabbles and struggles to command sailors on the other side of the world.

102 As quoted in Williams, Great South Sea, 156.
South Seas in name only: the South Sea Company and South Seas geographical knowledge

The return of the Duke and Duchess, with their Spanish prize, was greeted heartily by the British government. The ships arrived home at a moment of particular South Seas fervor, not due only to their voyage, but also to the founding of the South Sea Company. The joint stock South Sea Company was the brainchild of Robert Harley and was a means to fund Britain’s unsecured debt, a debt that had grown alarmingly during the War of Spanish Succession. Although this goal had very little to do with the South Seas specifically, Harley thought it prudent to connect the company to the opening of the South Seas trade. The opening of such a trade was a popular subject amongst Britons connected to commerce. Funnell had mentioned the growth of French trading in the region, Rogers planned his privateering excursion in response to rumors of French profits, and others wrote to government lamenting the success of the St. Malo traders.

Printed September 8, 1711, the company’s charter stated it would be headed by a Court of Directors led by Harley, now the Earl of Oxford. From August 1, 1711, the South Sea Company was to have, “for ever, the sole Trade and Traffick to America,” a territory which

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104 It was greeted less heartily by the Bristol investors, who took Rogers to Chancery Court. Williams, Great South Sea, 158-160. Rogers’ complained that his payment was paltry, especially when compared to Dampier’s haul. This was likely fortunate for Dampier, as the owners of the St. George took him to court in 1712 over an estate issue. C 6/390/82. On this case, see B. M. H. Roger, “Dampier’s Voyage of 1703,” Mariner’s Mirror 10, no. 4 (1924): 366-381. In 1713, Dampier was also accused of dumping a cargo of shoes that he took to sea to sell. TNA C/6/401/45. He died in 1716, with his will at TNA C 11/2353/12. Rogers made out all right, as he later served as the Royal Governor of the Bahamas and plotted other trading ventures, this time to Madagascar. Sloane 4044, f. 155. For more on Rogers, see Foster M. Farley, “Woodes Rogers: Privateer and Pirate Hunter,” in The Human Perspective: Readings in World Civilization, vol. II, ed. Lynn H. Nelson (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1996), 106-118; Jason H. Pearl, “Woodes Rogers and the Boundary of Travel Facts,” Eighteenth-Century Life 31, no. 3 (2007): 60-75; B. M. H. Roger, “Woodes Rogers’s Privateering Voyage of 1708-11,” Mariner’s Mirror 19, no. 2 (1933): 196-211.

105 Funnell, A Voyage Round the World, 55; see also Williams, Great South Sea, 122-3. TNA ADM 1/3930, 3931, 3932 contain letters about St. Malo traders, revealing worries about the French getting ahead in global trade. They also detail a 1711 French voyage meant to sail for the Company of Peru. In 1698 one the most successful St. Malo traders, Noël Danycan, formed the Compagnie royale de la mer du Sud, which directed trade with the South Seas. Unlike its English counterpart, it did execute expeditions to the area.
stretched from the Arinoca River (near Rio de la Plata) to Tierra del Fuego, up the coast of western South America, to a distance of 300 leagues out to sea. Crucially, they also had control over all lands that would be found within their bounds and could commission voyages to explore those lands, if they saw fit. Practically from the day news of the company reached beyond Parliament the government and reading public were blanketed with proposals as to how best to take advantage of the region. Some of the more imaginative claimed that the English had the right to New Spain because of first discovery, thanks to a Prince of Wales that visited Mexico in 1190. Others’ ideas were more grounded but still grand, such as Thomas Bowrey’s suggestion of a post on the east coast of South America, as well as the taking of Valdivia to provide for a South Seas trade. Harley also consulted with experts regarding the new company, including Lionel Wafer, Woodes Rogers, and Edward Cooke. Woodes Rogers and Edward Cooke’s books, as well as the 1711 reprint of An Account of Several Late Voyages with the map dedicated to Oxford, were part of a print flood centered on the South Seas. All the petitions and pamphlets, print or manuscript, eagerly awaited a voyage to put the new trade in motion.

The South Sea Company did plan such a voyage, for a time at least. To prepare, they purchased South Seas volumes, including a Hacke waggoner, and received further proposals

106 BL MS LOAN 29/45C, “Abstract of the Chart of the Governour and Company of Merchants of Great Britain, Trading to the South-Seas, and other Parts of America, and for Encouraging the Fishery.”

107 BL Add MS 28140, f. 20.

108 Ibid, f. 32, 34. Bowrey, who knew Dampier in the East Indies, remarked of Patagonia, “This Coast has been very seldom frequented and y/e descriptions thereof very Imperfect...” Ibid, f. 32. For more proposals as to how to carry on a trade with the South Seas, see BL Add MS 70163.

109 Wafer: BL Add MS 70163, f. 16-21. Rogers and Cooke: BL Add MS 28140, f. 29-34. Rogers was also called before the Governors of the South Sea Company, March 19, 1711, BL Add MS 25494, p. 129.

110 The considerable Advantages of a South-Sea Trade to our English Nation. Humbly offer’d with other particulars, to the Consideration of this present Parliament, partly from the Information of divers French Officers, lately taken by one of Her Majesty’s Ships, and who had Sailed and Traded in those Seas (London: 1711?); Wren Library RW.68.12, A Letter to a Member of Parliament, on the Settling a Trade to the South-Seas of America (London: 1711); Wren Library RW.68.16, A True Account of the Design, and Advantages of the South-Sea Trade (London: 1711).
from the public. On January 31, 1712, Oxford received a letter from his fellow Directors explaining that it was vital for Britain to establish settlements, a project which needed state assistance. On June 20, 1712, the Directors received an affirmative answer to their petition to the Crown asking for three men-of-war to carry their cargo and provide a protective convoy. However, that is where the voyage stalls. By 1713, the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht granted the South Sea Company the *asiento*, or the African slave trade, for 30 years. This mandate permanently oriented the South Sea Company away from the South Seas; they would never again try to mount a serious trade with western South America. As Paul W. Mapp points out, although many private individuals jockeyed to provide input as to how their government should expand their overseas trade, “their power to shape the conduct of European officials was inconsistent.” In this case, European political and economic expediencies eclipsed the planning of voyages to the South Seas.

As part of their ultimately fruitless preparations, the Directors sought to learn more about the region they now nominally controlled. To this end, they commissioned Herman Moll to make a map and description of the South Seas (figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2. Herman Moll, “A New & Exact Map of the Coast, Countries and Islands within ye Limits of ye South Sea Company,” London, 1712.

Printed. Image reproduced with permission from Barry Lawrence Ruderman Antique Maps Inc.
Moll, having created maps for most of the privateer publications including Dampier, Funnell and Rogers, was uniquely equipped to pass judgement on the state of Pacific geographic knowledge. In the map’s memoir, Moll overviewed the state of published geographic knowledge about the South Seas, as well as situated himself as the premier expert on South Seas geography, displacing privateers like Dampier. He writes, “All the Voyages that have hitherto been published are imperfect to this end” of knowing the “Countries, Commerce and Riches” of the South Seas. He continues by critiquing his sources, including a recently translated Spanish manuscript, the *History of the Bucaniers* in English and French, and several missionary accounts:

None of ’em treat of the greatest part of the Eastern Coasts of the Continent within the Limits of the Act, from the River Aranoca to Port Desire: And Sir John Narbrough, who begins there, goes no farther than Baldivia in the South Sea, where the Gold and Silver Mines scarce begin. Wafer enlarges most on that Part of the Isthmus of Darien which is not in the Company’s Charter. Wood keeps to Narbrough’s Voyage. Dampier treats of Mexico, Campeachy, and other Places of the North Sea not within their Limits; and is large on those in the South Sea to the Northward of the Isles of Lobos only. Sharp, Cowly, and other Voyagers, say little of either side of the Continent, and what they do say is without Order. Funnell is the most particular, but then he follow’d an old Spanish Draught, which though it appears to be very regular in naming Ports, Harbours, Rivers and Creeks, yet it is not very certain. 115

Moll’s complaints are not unexpected; as a mapmaker, it behooves his profit margin to constantly complain that more knowledge is necessary to create better—i.e. newer—maps. His description performs a neat trick, in that it redefines the South Seas from areas described by the privateers and Narbrough to the geographic area that lies within the mandate of the South Sea Company. The Company, though uninterested in actually pursuing the myriad proposals for settlements, provided Moll with the opportunity to re-focus his maps and make more money from this purportedly “new” version of the South Seas.

115 Ibid, preface.
The map itself depicts coastal South America, with a dotted line demarcating the 300 leagues mark. Moll provides an inset of the Straits of Magellan and Tierra del Fuego, as well as Darien in the Isthmus of Panama, the two most common routes from Atlantic to Pacific. The map offers suggestions to navigators who might venture further, however. The insets of the Galapagos and Juan Fernandez Island offer hints of good watering stations, which a ship would need if planning to cruise west. The Galapagos and Pepys Island, both insets, also show Moll’s use of privateer sources, much as he may criticize them.

South of Cape Horn Moll includes a block of text complaining, “There is lately published a two sheet Map of South America, copied after a very erroneous French Map done at Paris in 1703, and to deceive ye world dedicated to Dr. Halley, and pretended in ye Dedication to be corrected by his own Discoveries.” Moll is most likely referring to a map of South America dedicated to Halley by Charles Price, Moll’s competitor.\(^{116}\) Moll is particularly aghast at the errors in the placement of Cape Horn, “this false Map differs from Dr. Halley’s and all other late Observations, in ye Lat of C. Horn and on ye Long between ye said Capes [Cape Horn and C. St Augustin] 18 D. and consequently makes our sailing to ye South Seas lest by above a Thousand Miles than really it is.”\(^{117}\) Beyond taking an open shot at a competitor, Moll is also offering a commentary on the availability of geographic knowledge. He is taking Price to task for offering erroneous information to consumers, even though the vast majority of his readers most likely would never need a practical map for navigational purposes. It is a matter of professional accountability to make calculations as transparent and accurate as possible, not to mention to...


\(^{117}\) Moll, “A New & Exact Map.”
avoid appropriating the names of geographic luminaries like Halley. Openly-available and critically-compiled geographic knowledge is a matter of national pride to Moll, a theme that he also developed in his *Atlas Geographus* introduced in chapter 2. The desire to share information for the furtherance of navigation generally coincided with the British state’s dependence on private mapmakers for the provision of maps and charts. This is not to say that geographic knowledge was not sometimes censored or amended, yet in the South Seas the trend was toward the demand for freely shared, and freely criticized, information, if only because Britain saw itself as lagging behind France and Spain in their access to the region.

**The geography of folly: the South Sea Bubble, the Shelvocke expedition and South Seas fiction**

With the failure of the SSC expedition in 1711 and the return of Rogers’ privateers in 1712, the prominence of the Pacific in British culture began to fade. In early 1720, South Sea Company share prices—tied to the national debt—began to rise. By autumn, they crashed. Although economic historians have shown that the crash was not as catastrophic as contemporaries imagined, the South Sea Bubble became synonymous with the economic and social dangers of investment. This perception was fed by the near-simultaneous Mississippi Bubble which swept the French economy.\(^{118}\) To investors, it seemed that these companies, which supposedly traded in the colonies but which were also tied to state finance, were mere covers for greed and vice.

Although the South Sea Company was associated with the geographic South Seas in name only, the association proved significant. The symbolism of the sea was fertile ground for commentators:

The Headlong Fools Plunge in SS Water  
But the Sly Long-Heads Wade with Caution after  
The First are Drowning but the Wise Last  
Venture no Deeper than the knees or Waist.119

Those who invested heavily got in over their heads with South Sea stock, while others managed to keep above the rising tide. In a similar vein:

Long Heads may thrive by sober Rules,  
Because they think and drink not,  
But Headlongs are our thriving Fools,  
Who only drink and think not.  
The lucky Rogues, like Spaniel Dogs,  
Leap into South Sea Water,  
And there they fish for Golden Frogs,  
Not caring what comes a’ter.120

Again, the juxtaposition of longheads and head longs, of the cautious and the impatient, is emphasized with the metaphor of submersion. Whether “South Sea Water” refers to the Pacific or not, the term was now a shorthand for folly.

While South Sea investors were under water, by 1720 the Royal Navy was making deadly progress in eradicating the world’s oceans of the pirates who proliferated after the Treaty of Utrecht. Between 1716 and 1726, at least 418 pirates were hanged, while hundreds more died in battle, from disease, or by other untimely means. As Rediker explains, “Premature death was therefore the pirate’s lot; his was most decidedly not a romantic occupation.”121 Piracy was no

120 “A South Sea Ballad,” included in ibid.
121 Rediker, Villains of All Nations, 163.
longer an alluring vocation but rather a dangerous, and often short-lived, lifestyle. The profession was entering into myth as it faded from reality, most prominently in the hyperbolized yet still reliable *A General History of the Pyrates* (1728), written by Daniel Defoe under the pen name of Captain Charles Johnson.\(^{122}\) Motely crews now fled naval vessels in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans; no longer did they enter the Pacific.

Whereas pirates had ceased to be the pioneers of Pacific navigation, one final South Seas privateering expedition under the command of George Shelvocene fitted out as part of the War of Quadruple Alliance (1719-20). Although Shelvocene’s investors gave him and his fellow captain copies of Rogers’ *A Cruising Voyage Round the World* as guides for successfully handling rough privateering crews, the voyage quickly descended into near anarchy. Shelvocene struggled with mutiny and shipwreck, finally managing to take prizes hardy enough to sail across the Pacific, from where he took an East Indiamen back to Britain in August 1722. Almost immediately the owners pursued Shelvocene for the lost ship and prize money he was rumored to be hiding, landing Shelvocene in King’s Bench Prison.\(^{123}\)

By 1724 Shelvocene gained his release and attempted to shift his image from that of a privateer—an undesirable position to have, now that peace reigned again—to a respectable naval officer. He attempted such reputation management the same way other South Seas sailors had for the past thirty years, by publishing an account. Shelvocene submitted a doctored journal to the

\(^{122}\) Defoe has long been assumed the author of this work, but that designation is also disputed. See Rediker, “Hydarchy and Libertalia,” in *Pirates and Privateers*, ed. Starkey, n. 8, 43.

\(^{123}\) Shelvocene, in the *Speedwell*, was supposed to sail in consort with Captain Clipperton, Dampier’s former crewmate, in the *Success*. For more on the Shelvocene expedition, see Williams, *Great South Sea*, 197-205; Frohock, *Buccaneers and Privateers*, ch. 7.
Admiralty, and then released an expanded version, *A Voyage Round the World*, in 1726.\(^{124}\) Unfortunately for Shelvocke, his account was challenged by a rival, crewmate William Betagh, in 1728.\(^{125}\) In a vindictive tone reminiscent of the Dampier-Welbe episode, Betagh took apart Shelvocke’s heroic account and injected doubt at every turn with accusations of sabotage, hidden treasure, and intention to defraud the owners. Taken together, the two accounts joined a literary tradition that was increasingly marked not by natural historical descriptions or thrilling adventures, but by petty disagreements. Such contention did not recommend South Sea voyages as likely investments for ship owners or merchants. There were some preliminary attempts to plan a voyage to the South Seas later in the 1720s, both public and private, but all of these foundered on the shoals of European diplomacy or impracticality.\(^{126}\)

Associated as it was with folly and conflict, the only voyages that did sail during this period were fictional ones.\(^{127}\) In 1726 the satirist Jonathan Swift released *Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World. In Four Parts. By Lemuel Gulliver*, which became known as *Gulliver’s Travels*.\(^{128}\) This parody of voyage accounts follows Gulliver to four fantastical

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\(^{126}\) Williams, Great South Sea, 202-3. For suggestions of English settlements and colonies to the South Seas by Woodes Rogers and Shelvocke, see BL Add MS 19034, ff. 19-21, 84-87. Woodes Rogers also submitted a piece to the Royal Society, “Obs/ns of Variation, in crossing the South Seas, 1710.” Nov. 16, 1721 *Philosophical Transactions* 368 (327). Listed in RS MS 704, Index of Papers read before the Royal Society, 1716-1741.  
locations around the Pacific, but the locations were integrated into the existing geography of the area with maps copied from Herman Moll, who frequently associated with Swift, Dampier, and publisher James Knapton in London society.\textsuperscript{129} The placement of the fantastical islands in the Pacific and southern Indian Oceans, whose own geography was still variable and a matter of debate, is significant. Lilliput (part I) is east of Van Diemen’s Land, while Houyhnhnms Land (part IV) is south of New Holland. These are likely places for islands as the eastern coast of Australia had been encountered by numerous Dutch voyages in the seventeenth century but the continent would not be circumnavigated until Flinders’ voyage in the early nineteenth century. Brobdingnag (part II) is an extension of North America north of Drake’s New Albion, a coastline that was usually left unfinished until the late-eighteenth century. The floating island of Laputa, along with Balnibarbi, Luggnagg, and Gluggdubdrib (part III) are supposed to be east of Japan, an expanse that often held the fabricated islands of Company’s Land, among others. While the maps were most likely a convention added by Swift’s editor, Benjamin Motte, Swift describes the locations in the text as well.\textsuperscript{130} In following Gulliver around the Pacific Basin, Swift uses uncertain geography to highlight the unreliability of his narrator. The Pacific’s geography is practically a character in the story, meant to symbolize the lack of credibility of those who traverse its waters.

\textsuperscript{129} For Moll’s social and professional ties, see Reinhartz, \textit{Cartographer and the Literati}. Swift later added an “Advertisement,” “A Letter from Capt. Gulliver to His Cousin Symson,” and a “The Publisher to the Reader.” In the second of these materials, Gulliver mentions his cousin Dampier, an indication that Dampier was still read over thirty years after his initial publication. For example, see the advert just after the title page in the 1735 Dublin addition.

By contrast, Defoe published *Robinson Crusoe* in 1719, based in part on the experiences of Alexander Selkirk. However, Defoe moved the location of the castaway’s island from the western coast of South America to the east, near the mouth of the Orinoco River. Edwards argues that Defoe may have put the island in the Atlantic rather than the Pacific to avoid the charge of plagiarizing Selkirk’s experiences directly. It is more likely, however, that Defoe wanted his readers to see his narrator as a realistic person, a tactic he also employed in *A General History of the Pyrates* (1724) and *The Life...of Captain Singleton* (1720). Just as Swift employed the Pacific as a nod to his readers that Gulliver is fantastical and untrustworthy, the location of Crusoe’s exile within the more plausible Atlantic world, and his experiences with the slave trade and pirates in Africa and South America, served to place Crusoe within a more credible frame of reference for readers. As Kelly explains, “Defoe’s crowning literary achievement as a writer of voyages was his ability to counterfeit an authentic narrative voice, culled from the study of other voyages.”

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131 Daniel Defoe, *The life and strange surprizing adventures of Robinson Crusoe, of York, mariner: who lived eight and twenty years, all alone in an un-inhabited island on the coast of America, near the mouth of the great river of Oroonoque; Having been cast on Shore by Shipwreck, wherein all the Men perished but himself. With An Account how he was at last as strangely deliver’d by Pyrates* (London: W. Taylor, 1719).

132 Edwards, *Story of the Voyage*, 180. Selkirk’s story had been widely reported in Rogers’ account, the periodical press, and in pamphlets like *Providence Display’d, or a very Surprizing Account of One Mr Alexander Selkirk, Master of a Merchant-Man call’d the Cinque-Ports; who Dreaming that the Ship would soon after be lost, he desir’d to be left on a Desolate Island in the South-Seas, where he liv’d Four Years and Four Months, without seeing the Face of Man, the Ship being afterwards cast away as he Dreamed* (London: Printed for J. Read, 1712?).

133 Charles Johnson [Daniel Defoe], *A general history of the pyrates, from their first rise and settlement in the island of Providence, to the present time* (London: T. Warner, 1724). Daniel Defoe, *The life, adventures, and pyracies, of the famous Captain Singleton: Containing an Account of his being set on Shore in the Island of Madagascar, his Settlement there, with a Description of the Place and Inhabitants: Of his Passage from thence, in a Paraguay, to the main Land of Africa, with an Account of the Customs and Manners of the People: His great Deliverances from the barbarous Natives and wild Beasts: Of his meeting with an Englishman, a Citizen of London, among the Indians, the great Riches he acquired, and his Voyage Home to England: As also Captain Singleton’s Return to Sea, with an Account of his many Adventures and Pyracies with the famous Captain Avery and others* (London: J. Brotherton, J. Graves, A. Dodd, and T. Warner, 1720).

134 Kelly, “Bordering on Fact,” 180. Not all authors found the South Seas an improbably setting for their stories, for example Peter Longueville, *The English hermit, or the unparalell’d and surprizing adventures of one Philip Quarll, who was
Pacific geography in their own fictional additions to the genre. They could take such license in part because the South Seas as a place had shifted in meanings the half-century since Bartholomew Sharpe’s men swarmed over the Isthmus of Panama. It had transformed from a region full of lucrative promise to one of folly, where only the “headlongs” would risk their lives and money.

Conclusion

Defoe and Swift’s books show the degree to which the Pacific had been integrated into wider popular culture. Through the exhibition of Jeoly, atlases, voyage accounts, and maps, the South Seas became a familiar, if still daunting, geographic entity between 1680 and 1730. The Pacific of the privateers and the South Sea Company—limited to the South American coast and a few islands—lost the veneer of the probable between Sharpe and Shelvocke to take on a well-worn narrative of castaways, isolation, distance, and shipboard quarrels. This narrative developed within the larger context of the Atlantic world, characterized by warfare, commerce, and piracy. The war on piracy as well as the South Sea Bubble contributed to the change in the ways in which the Pacific featured by the mid-1720s. Especially those in government were skeptical of any mention of the South Seas thanks to schemers and base disputes like those of Shelvocke and Betagh, Dampier and Welbe.

Thus, the region, associated initially with the exciting privateers, then for its association with the South Sea Company, did not enjoy linear or constant exposure within wider culture. Shelvocke was unable to take advantage of his Pacific geographic knowledge as productively as

lately found in an uninhabited island in the South Sea, near Mexico; where he has liv'd fifty Years unknown and remote from humane Assistance, and where he still remains and intends to end his Days (London: 1727).
Sharpe, Hacke, and Dampier had when buccaneering, investment, and the South Seas had different connotations within British society. Concerns about a commander’s conduct at sea, conflicting print accounts, and a writer’s credibility, all themes central to the privateering accounts, would condition the planning of later voyages and their subsequent accounts, making the turn of the eighteenth century a crucial tipping point for the production of Pacific geographic knowledge. The opportunities to enter into print as a source of geographic information would shrink over the course of century, largely because of the re-involvement of the Admiralty and the advent of the official account, which is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4: THE CLARION CALL AND THE BLUEPRINT—ANSON’S VOYAGE

ROUND THE WORLD

Once granted the asiento in 1713, the South Sea Company turned its attention entirely from the South Seas, but it also led to sustained conflict with Spain in its American colonies. Resentment smoldered over what Spain saw as a persistent, deliberate undermining of its colonial commerce and what Britain saw as a hindrance to trade and mobility in the lucrative West Indies. This resentment reached a clamorous peak in the late 1730s, when British periodicals printed salacious tales of Spanish guardacostas boarding British vessels and seizing British goods and tars. The most fantastic of these was the story of Captain Robert Jenkins, who purportedly lost his ear to a Spanish blade in 1731. In response to a bellicose clamor from powerful merchant interests, Tories and opposition Whigs, and an insatiable press, the government under Robert Walpole declared war on Spain in defense of its trade and sailors on October 22, 1739.1 So began a decade-long conflict that would be subsumed within the War of

Austrian Succession. Important as this period is for European and Atlantic history, it is also a watershed moment for British involvement in the Pacific.

Determined to hinder Spanish trade in every corner of its empire, the British Admiralty and government officials planned the largest naval expedition to the Pacific to date, to be commanded by Commodore George Anson. At first glance, this was to be a sanctioned privateering mission not unlike those of thirty years earlier, although the Admiralty would provide the ships and men rather than private merchants. In execution, however, the expedition became much more thanks to the ways in which it was presented in periodicals, magazines, and voyage accounts before, during, and after the ships’ departure. A flurry of publications about the voyage—one of the few triumphs in the war for Britain—brought the navigation of the Pacific to public awareness as never before. In particular, the publication and popularity of the official account of the expedition would change the discourse surrounding what long-range exploratory expeditions were, how and why they should be carried out, and who was authorized to write about them. New exposure to the Pacific region revealed a reliance on old sources and maps, yet also led to an intensified discussion of the utility of such dated sources to an expanding maritime nation in global conflict. What began as a belligerent effort to harass an enemy resulted not only in treasure and national pride, but also in new geographic knowledge and an important call for a more deliberate interaction with the Pacific that was to affect all of Europe’s overseas empires.

Something old, something new: the planning for the Anson expedition

Even before the official declaration of war on October 22, 1739, high-ranking government officials attempted to formulate plans to disrupt Spanish trade in its colonial holdings. These plans coalesced around two options: an attack in the Caribbean and an expedition to the Pacific. Havana or another strategic Caribbean port was the main priority, yet the possibility of taking a galleon, as Woodes Rogers had in 1712, made the Pacific a viable choice for a naval expedition. Both plans were only vaguely outlined by the autumn, but the Pacific expedition especially suffered from a lack of recent, reliable information about Spanish fortifications, numbers, and movements, not to mention the location of key islands and harbors. If naval vessels were to be risked in such distant waters, Admiralty officials and the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for the South and the central figure in government during the war, needed to know more in order to form a viable plan of action.

Due to the peace and the crackdown on piracy, practically no man serving in the Royal Navy had ever sailed the South Seas. Unlike Spain, Britain did not have a centralized archive of colonial information from which to draw. Rather, reports and maps were spread across various Boards and offices, or even held in individual hands, as was the case with members of the Board of Trade and Plantations. To better understand the area, Sir Charles Wager, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir John Norris, Admiral of the Fleet, mined the details of the French engineer

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2 The first mention of the South Seas expedition was June 3, 1739. BL Add MS 32993, f. 59. The best source of information about the early stages of planning is Sir John Norris’ journal, BL Add MS 28132. The relevant portions have been included by Glyndwr Williams in his edited documentation of the expedition. See Williams, Documents, doc. 1.

3 There had been plans in 1727 for an expedition to the Pacific, but it never materialized. Wager in particular seems to have been interested in a naval presence in the South Seas. Glyndwr Williams, The Prize of All the Oceans: The Triumph and Tragedy of Anson’s Voyage Round the World (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 4; Williams, Great South Sea, 203.

Frezier’s and the English privateers’ journals and papers. The ever-resourceful Shelvocke saw fit to send the Admiralty Commissioners a letter outlining his suggestion to take Chiloe, an island off the coast of Chile. Shelvocke referred the Admiralty to his 1726 account, which he rightly assumed was still available.  

Wager and Norris were interested in Shelvocke’s description of Chiloe but also in another privateer’s ideas, those of Woodes Rogers, who had died in 1732. In the same volume containing Shelvocke’s letter is “Capt. Rogers’ Acc’t of the South Seas,” which outlines a plan similar to the one ultimately sanctioned by Wager, Norris, and Newcastle. Rogers had suggested that a squadron first stop to water and wood at Brazil or St. Catherine’s Island, then to round Cape Horn, “it being a much better passage into the South Sea then to attempt going through the Streights.” Then, ships should rendezvous at Juan Fernandez Island, so well-known for castaways, but also as a good staging area for attacks on the Peruvian and Chilean coasts. Rogers recommended that such an endeavor be kept as secret as possible, “it may be given out the ships are design’d for the West Indies, they may be almost got to the South Sea before certain advice can reach the Spaniards in Europe but these are only loose thoughts wrote in a hurry.” Such hurried words were to greatly influence the proposed expedition.

Beyond printed sources and archival material, Wager knew that, “there are People proper to advise about such an Expedition.” These advisors turned out to be non-governmental actors who had first-hand experience of ports in the Americas and Manila—employees of the South Sea and East India Companies. Hubert Tassell was a South Sea Company factor who had served in

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5 BL Add MS 19034, f. 84r-86v.
6 Ibid, f. 70r.
7 Ibid.
8 BL Add MS 32694, f. 57v.
Havana. Henry Hutchinson, another factor, had worked in Portobello, Panama, and visited Lima. In addition, Norris and Wager consulted James Naish, former supercargo of the East India Company who had sailed to China and South-East Asia several times. Tassell and Hutchinson suggested a squadron of eight ships manned by 1,450 men and accompanied by 1,500 soldiers would round Cape Horn and incite rebellion against the Spanish. The squadron could then besiege Panama and search for treasure, or cruise for the Manila Galleon. They also recommended a settlement at Darien, as did others. To bolster this ambitious plan, Hutchinson also sent a list of the latitudes and longitudes of South Seas ports, along with annotations of the geography and inhabitants of each. In contrast to this eastern Pacific plan, James Naish offered a western counterpart. He advocated the overpowering of Manila with two ships and a supply vessel, which would then await the arrival of the Acapulco galleon. All three men eagerly offered to accompany the prospective expedition in anticipation of profits. They all saw the expedition as an opportunity not only for naval victory, but for personal gain.

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9 None of the three advisors worked for their Companies in 1739. Hutchinson was in a long-term dispute with the South Sea Company Directors over his accounts and Naish had just won a settlement from the EIC. For more, see Williams, Prize of All the Oceans, 6-7.

10 For example of a proposal to take Darien, see BL Add MS 32694, f. 9-15. For more on Darien proposals, see Mapp, The Elusive West, 274-6.

11 BL Add MS 19034, f. 88r-92v. The list of coordinates is at ibid, f. 98. Tassell and especially Hutchinson mounted a campaign to drum up support for a South Seas venture, much like Quiros and Welbe before them. See SP 42/88, ff. 37-41; Tassell and Hutchinson’s letter to the Duke of Newcastle, BL Add MS 32694, f. 47. Hutchinson also corresponded with the Earl of Egmont, in whose papers is a note, “Friendship with the Spanish Officers in the Spanish Indies of Importance,” dated August 20, 1739, which called for peaceful relations with Spanish officers to ensure profit. This very idea would be rejected by the Privy Council when planning the expedition. Egmont also had “Passage from the North to the South Seas,” dated the same. See BL Add MS 47014 C, ff. 10-12, 15-17. In ibid, ff. 49-154, Hutchinson, in writings dating from after 1742, discusses his role in the expedition and takes credit for its outline in a letter to the Earl of Granville, f. 73. In a missive that is not dated, but is probably from the early 1760s as he mentions the “late war” with the French, Hutchinson was still advocating for a settlement in the South Seas, f. 121-2. Egmont most likely kept these folios for use in planning the Byron and Wallis expeditions when he was Lord High Admiral in the early 1760s.
Norris’ journal reveals that Tassel and Hutchinson’s plan was thought too grand, especially in light of the Royal Navy’s manning crisis as they fitted out multiple fleets destined for the Mediterranean and Caribbean. Naish’s Manila plan was thought more attainable, and Walpole agreed when presented with the idea on October 19. Plans for the Manila expedition and a pared-down version of the South Seas expedition went ahead until December 5, when in a meeting of the Privy Council Walpole decided to shelve the Manila plan in favor of a smaller South Seas voyage. After several months of compiling and consulting sources old and new, a naval expedition was to be sent to the South Seas as complement to a larger Caribbean force. The Admiralty, rather than rely on a Dépôt de la Marine or a Casa de la Contratación, managed to gather geographic knowledge in a crisis thanks to its central role as the communication hub of the Royal Navy. In addition, the significance of London allowed for in-person meetings and efficient transmission of proposals that traveled between Whitehall and private dwellings.

**A well-known, clandestine mandate: The instructions of the Anson expedition**

If an expedition to the South Seas had been agreed to, exactly where and when the squadron should go was still a matter of debate. Early in the process of planning Wager named Captain George Anson as his first choice to command the voyage. Anson had previously served in the Carolinas as a deterrent to piracy, smuggling, and, later, to aid British vessels stopped by Spanish guardacostas. In 1735 he gained command of the Centurion, in which he cruised along the Guinea coast to monitor trade. By mid-November 1739, Anson had begun to attend planning

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meetings for the expedition. He had to wait, however, for the official orders to be drafted. Although the aims of the voyage shared a certain continuity with earlier forays into the South Seas, the instructions reiterate that different priorities underwrote this new voyage, priorities brought on by wartime expediencies, but also by a renewed appreciation of the Pacific as a viable sphere of influence.

Anson received his orders on January 31, 1740. In scope, they were a reduced vision of Tassell and Hutchinson’s original plans of conquest and settlement and the duo was granted the role of victuallers, putting them in the position to make money off the sale of goods. Anson was to proceed in the Centurion (60 guns) in company with the Argyle (to be replaced with the Gloucester, 50), Severn (50), Pearl (40), Wager (24) and Tryal (8) sloop to round Cape Horn or attempt the Straits of Magellan, whichever he thought best. Once off the Spanish coast, “you are to use your best endeavours to annoy and distress the Spaniards, either at sea or land, to the utmost of your power.” Anson was free to take or destroy any Spanish ships he might come across, as well as sack or burn any towns he could. If possible, Anson was to take Callao and then Lima, where he would create a manifesto like that suggested by Tassell and Hutchinson to incite revolt. Anson was even authorized to make a treaty with an independent South American government, should he help to create one. If Callao could not be attempted, Anson was to continue north to Panama. Once there, the ships were to attempt to meet up with the Caribbean

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14 Anson also received additional orders in June which negated the possibility of wintering in Rio de la Plata should he arrive too late in the year to round Cape Horn. See TNA SP 42/88, ff. 12-13.
15 The orders were drafted by Wager and corrected by Walpole. The Wager draft is in TNA SP 42/88, ff. 2-10. For a comparison of the two sets of instructions, see Williams, Documents, doc. 9, pp. 34-39.
16 Ibid, 34.
17 Anson did have a revised version of Hutchinson and Tassell’s manifesto. See BL Add MS 19030, 470r-472v; another copy is at BL Add MS 32694, f. 41-5.
fleet that was also readying to sail. If all else failed, Anson might go as far north as Acapulco to cruise for the galleon, and he could return home via either China or Cape Horn. Thus, the voyage was tentatively to be a circumnavigation, the greatest of all navigational feats, as well as a chance to extend British trade networks, political ideology, and influence to the Pacific region on a larger scale than ever previously imagined. The instructions were more bellicose than Narbrough’s trade-oriented expedition and more closely mirrored the goals of the privateers in seeking prizes and burning ports. However, the latter two were categorically different in tone and intention. This was a Royal Navy expedition seeking a military victory; although treasure was a real possibility, it was not the official motive (although it may have been for some individuals).

If treasure was but a bi-product of harassing the enemy, neither was trade explicitly an intended outcome. In the eventuality that Lima could be taken, Anson was authorized to seize control of commerce, but otherwise he was there to interrupt trade networks, not create them as Narbrough had been ordered to do. Norris seems to have been the main force in maintaining that trade was not a part of the instructions, although the final draft did allow Tassell and Hutchinson to trade certain goods to gain provisions for the ships. Norris had been suspicious of Tassell’s intentions, writing in his diary that he feared the “voyage to include some adventure I was not let into” and would become like that of the infamous Captain Kidd, “who with the Crown’s commission turned pirate, and lending a King’s ship to private adventurers must bring trouble to the ministers.” At a meeting of the Privy Council, the assembled decided that it would reflect badly on the King if his ships should carry goods to trade with the Spanish when they were supposed to be disrupting that very trade; such business was for “private adventurers on letters of

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18 Williams, Documents, doc. 9, p. 36.
19 Ibid, doc. 1, p. 12.
Far from disapproval of privateering, nevertheless Norris’ journal entries reveal a sense that Royal Navy expeditions, especially to far-off shores, were to be held to a higher standard. The disassociation of Pacific expeditions from trade, although not with claiming resources or territory, was to become a hallmark in later expeditions and, I argue, have some root not only in the supposedly disinterested search for knowledge associated with Enlightenment thought but in the desire to uphold the standards of a professional navy.

A constant refrain in the planning documents was secrecy. Until at least November 1, 1740, the records of the Royal Navy discuss the fitting out of the squadron as destined for the West Indies, as Rogers had suggested. However, Britain’s enemies were not fooled by such skullduggery. The Spanish knew of a possible South Seas voyage as early as September 1739, before war was officially declared. The British learned that their plans were known when, in June 1740, the *Worcester* intercepted a Dutch ship containing dispatches of the Viceroy of Mexico. They included letters outlining the plans of Anson’s squadron and news of the defenses underway in Peru and Mexico. The British periodical press also knew that a squadron was fitting out, although they were much more taken in by the West Indies claim. For example, the London Evening Post, in the September 20-23, 1740 issue reported that Anson and his squadron had sailed for the Great South Sea. The Daily Post of September 22, however, mentioned Commodore Anson and his “squadron for the West-Indies.” Thus, Anson’s voyage was a

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20 Ibid, 15.
21 TNA ADM 2/201, f. 313. For more on the preparation of the South Seas ships, see ibid, 315, 317, 323, 327, 329, 330, 348, 349, 354-6, 367, 376, 378, 379, 392, 393, 410, 411, 414, 417, 432, 435, 463, 481, 524, 528, 532, 534, 539, 544, 545, 553, 572, 588.
22 TNA ADM 1/1695, ff. 271-3; TNA SP 42/88, f. 61. Henry Hutchinson, in a letter to the Earl of Egmont dated post-1742, mentions that the Spanish knew of their venture from Spanish sources, most likely Spanish informants operating in southern Britain. BL Add MS 47014 C, f. 51, 53-6. See also Rivas, “Mobilizing Resources,” ch. 5.
23 Williams, *Documents*, docs. 38 and 39. For more examples, see ibid, docs. 28-37.
secret to neither the British public or European rivals. Both friend and foe highly anticipated news of the squadron, but with opposite hopes for its success.

**Losing men and ships, finding treasure: The Anson expedition and the application of geographic knowledge at sea**

Anson was anxious to sail in mid-summer, so as to round Cape Horn when the weather in high southern latitudes was less tempestuous. In addition, reports of a Spanish squadron under Admiral Pizarro preparing to intercept him made Anson all the more desperate to make some distance. However, he struggled to get his ships ready to sail. Plagued by the perennial problem of manning, Anson’s officers sought to recruit men, yet also had to press some to fill muster rolls. Instead of trained land forces, Anson was assigned 500 invalids from Chelsea Hospital and three companies of raw recruits. Many of these men arrived sick and others deserted in the face of a long voyage. One of these shows the degree to which voyage literature was a salient part of British culture: a William Robinson Crusoe, ordinary seaman, was recorded in the muster

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24 For the following section, I have used Williams, *Prize of All the Oceans* as a general guide to outlining the expedition. Anyone wishing to learn more of the details of the Anson voyage would do well to read this erudite, well-written book. In addition, I have benefited from personal correspondence with Dr. Glyndwr Williams, which has been invaluable. Information about the voyage has also been taken from the logs of the officers, nearly 20 of which survive. As a sample, see NMM ADM/L/C 301, NMM ADM/L/C 302, NMM ADM/L/C 303, NMM ADM/L/C 305 and 306. An abstract of some of the logs is available at TNA ADM 7/570. Details are also taken from the various published accounts, which will be discussed below.


26 For a Royal Proclamation for “Encouraging Seamen to enter themselves on Board His Majesty’s Ships of WAR,” September 25, 1739, see BL Add MS 28132. Manning was the main problem that faced the Georgian Navy, especially at the beginning of conflicts. Baugh, *Naval Administration*, xii; Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 312. As Baugh points out, the problem was general throughout Europe. Baugh, “Naval power: what gave the British navy superiority?,” 239. For a comprehensive overview of impressment in the eighteenth century, see Denver Brunsman, *The Evil Necessity: British Naval Impressment in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013).
list of the *Wager* as “R,” for “ran,” on March 31, 1740.\(^{27}\) The squadron sailed without him on September 18, 1740.

The experience of Anson’s ships in rounding Cape Horn demonstrates the limitations of relying on dated geographic knowledge. After watering and recovering at the island of St. Catherine’s, Anson crossed through the Straits of Le Maire with fine weather. Unfortunately, that “day of our passage was the last chearful day that the greatest part of us would ever live to enjoy.”\(^{28}\) Just as the ships were clearing the Straits, guided by the Frenchman Frezier’s map, the skies darkened and would not clear again for three months.\(^{29}\) After nearly a month at sea Anson ordered the squadron north into what he was confident was open ocean. To his horror, he found he was actually just off Cape Noir on Tierra del Fuego, a miscalculation of ten degrees longitude. The navigators had underestimated the strong current and nearly perished, as illustrated starkly in the map from the official account showing the presumed track of the ship and its actual position (figure 4.1).\(^{30}\)

\(^{27}\) TNA ADM 36/4456, f. 10r. For more on the impressment for the squadron, see BL Add MS 15855, f. 34v-35r, 38. For preparations of the ships, see TNA ADM 1/4108, item 103; TNA ADM 1/4109, items 12, 23, 42, 43; TNA ADM 2/55, f. 518, 572, 584, 585-587, 597, 601, 603, 616; ADM 2/471, 19, 230, 426, 526; NMM UPC/2, f. 36, 39. For orders and instructions, see TNA ADM 2/56, ff. 20-4, 26, 52-4, 103,110-1, 117, 144, 150, 157, 163, 179, 187, 216, 230, 234-5, 264, 270, 276-7, 281-2, 288, 302, 314, 359, 379-80, 395. For Anson’s commission, see TNA ADM 6/15, f. 87, 305. For the shuffling of officers in the ships of the squadron, see BL Add MS 15855, f. 41r-43v, 69v-71r, 73. For the arrangements of rendezvous points and formations, see ibid, 44r, 63r, 72v-73r.

\(^{28}\) Ibid, 83.

\(^{29}\) This was most likely the engraving in the English translation of Frezier. Monsieur Frezier, *A Voyage to the South-Sea, And along the Coast of Chili and Peru, In the Years 1712, 1713 & 1714* (London: Printed for Jonah Bowyer, 1717), planche V, description on pg. 33.

Figure 4.1. R. W. Seale, “A Chart of the Southern Part of South America with the track of the Centurion,” London, 1748.

Printed. Image courtesy of Scholar Commons, University of South Florida.
By the time *Centurion* tacked back down to southern latitudes to west sufficiently and then return north, the ship was alone and loaded with men suffering from scurvy. Insult was added to injury at the first rendezvous point, Socorro. John Narbrough described the island as sandy and welcoming in his 1694 account, yet the beach Anson found was not approachable in foul weather.³¹ Demoralized, Anson steered for another of the rendezvous points, Juan Fernandez Island. However, Anson’s instructions listed the latitude of Juan Fernandez erroneously by over a degree and, more importantly, claimed that the island was only 45 leagues off the coast of Chile. Anson had Shelvocke’s journal on board, which also listed the island northeast of its actual location. In reality it is 120 leagues out to sea, meaning that as Anson ran down the latitude in search of the island, tens more of his men perished due to faulty geographic knowledge.³²

The *Centurion* was soon joined by the *Tryal* sloop, but Anson worried that the voyage accounts might have again led his other ships astray. He thought that the missing ships may have mistaken the nearby island of Masafuera for their rendezvous, as it was “well stock’d with wood & water very different from the Discription of it in the Voyages, where it is mentioned to be a barren rock.”³³ Upon checking, however, no ships were found. Eventually, the *Gloucester* and *Anna Pink* made it to Juan Fernandez, but the *Pearl* and *Severn* had been forced to return to

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³¹ Anson had already been disappointed by Narbrough’s account. He sought out the Port of St. Julian’s for the salt Narbrough described, yet the results were minimal. Anson writes in a letter to the Admiralty, “I sent my Boat with An Officer to Discover the Salt Pond who having found it returned with a Sample, which was very bad, far from Answering the Account of Sir John Narbrough, all that the Boats could procure while I lay here not exceeding forty Bucheles.” December 16, 1742, TNA ADM 1/1439. The men of the *Wager*, however, relied on Narbrough’s account in their epic small-boat journey from western Patagonia through the Straits of Magellan to Brazil. See John Bulkeley and John Cummins, *Voyage to the South Seas in His Majesty’s ship the Wager in the years 1740-1741* (London: Printed for Jacob Robinson, 1743).

³² The instructions listed the latitude as 33°30’ S. In reality, the island lies in 34°47’ S. Shelvocke said the island was 275 miles east of Concepción, in latitude 33°25’ S. Shelvocke’s book was also used as the cipher for Anson’s coded letters—a clever way to recycle geographic knowledge indeed. Williams, *Prize of All the Oceans*, 54.

³³ BL Add MS 15855, f. 82r.
Britain and the *Wager* had disappeared entirely—wrecked on the shores of Patagonia. From Juan Fernandez, the much-reduced squadron began to take prizes and sacked the town of Payta in Chile. From one of these prizes Anson learned that Pizarro had followed them to Cape Horn; his five ship squadron had been battered even worse than the British, forcing Pizarro to return to Buenos Aires. After realizing that he had missed the treasure galleon at Acapulco, Anson ordered his squadron to cross the Pacific. The cross-Pacific journey proved another hell for Anson’s men, with many suffering from scurvy a second time and deaths every day. By the time the *Centurion* sighted Tinian in the Marianas or Ladrone Islands, there were barely enough men to man the decks, with most unable to leave their bunks. When the *Centurion* arrived to repair at Macao, it was the only ship left in the fleet and consolidation of men from other ships filled less than half its complement.

At Macao Anson was able to get in touch with Britain for the first time in nearly two years, although reports of his activities had been trickling overland from South America. Several men left the ship at this time, including Captain Charles Saunders with dispatches and new charts, chaplain Richard Walters, and Hubert Tassell. After several months respite and refueling, Anson supposedly sailed for the Straits of Malacca to return to Britain. In reality, he set course for the east coast of the Philippines to await the Acapulco treasure galleon’s arrival. Remarkably, considering the voyage prior to that point, the *Centurion* took the *Nuestra Señora de la Covadonga* with only light casualties. Immediately, the voyage turned from near-failure to wild

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34 For references on taking prizes and consolidating the squadron, see BL Add MS 15855, 87r-102v, 114v, 126v, 136v, 146; NMM UPC/2, f. 49.
35 The western Pacific charts on board the Centurion were also less than precise. Anson writes, “Note the Ladrones are many more in number than laid down in the Charts, and no danger among them, but what shews itself very plainly so that you may venter safely to run under or between any of them...” BL Add MS 15855, 162v.
36 On the taking of the galleon, see BL Add MS 15855, ff. 102v, 106r, 162v.
success. After a short trip to Canton, Anson steered for home via the Cape of Good Hope, completing a circumnavigation that had claimed three-quarters of his 1,900 men, five of his six ships, yet made his reputation and naval career.37

As hinted above, Anson and his fellow captains carried charts, instructions with calculations, and printed voyage accounts as guides to the unknown waters of the Pacific. The lives lost due to geographic errors reveal just how conjectural the state of Pacific geographic knowledge was in 1740. Even in using the most recently published information, the English translation of Frezier (1717) and Shelvocke’s account (1726), Anson and his men found the Pacific of those authors very different from the one he experienced. However, the frequent citations in the official and other accounts of the Anson expedition and the Wager wreck reveal a solidification of the status of certain voyage accounts, especially that of Narbrough, Dampier, Frezier, and Shelvocke. Although not perfect, the accounts nevertheless were helpful aids in triangulating between visual reality, charts and instructions, and received knowledge. Eighteenth-century sailors were skilled navigators; a detailed chart was useful, but not imperative. That said, seamanship was also tied to the review of all available sources prior to and during a voyage. Only a foolish commander would not have consulted other accounts and charts of an area. For the Pacific, however, the sources in Britain in 1739 were more limited than practically any other area contacted by Europeans. Thus, the publicity and publications surrounding the Anson expedition upon its return would serve not only to provide a harrowing

story of British triumph, but also would allow for a discussion as to the state of Pacific geographic knowledge.

A Pacific moment: reporting and response to the return of the Anson expedition

In a letter dated November 30, 1743 from his brother, Thomas, Anson received news of the angst his absence had caused, but also of the degree to which news of the squadron’s progress had circulated:

It would be in vain to attempt to say any thing of the various Anxietys, Fears, & Joys we have successively felt for you…the Generality of the World gave you up for lost. Those who were most skill’d in Sea Affairs were indeed of a different opinion; but it avail’d little to have ye Judgment convinc’d while the Heart was disatisfy’d…we rec’d several Accounts from time to time, by different chanals, of your proceedings in ye S. Sea, most of em plausible, & as appear’d afterwards, pretty exact….I own I gave entire credit to most of these Accounts but had ye Mortification still to hear of many unbelievers. At last the Arrival of Capt. Saunders & your first Letter…convinc’d the most Incredulous & silenc’d the most obstinate.38

Although Anson himself had been out of touch until he reached Macao in 1742, other sources like the crews of the *Pearl* and *Severn*, who turned back in the Straits, gave updates to family members and a wider audience. It was not just those “skill’d in Sea Affairs” who discussed Anson’s survival, as the *London Magazine* in April 1742 reported that the two ships, “suffered more by returning than he [Anson] did by proceeding.”39 These and other reports, repeated from paper to paper, served to update a public audience on a voyage in real time for the first time.40

Thomas’ letter reveals not only his own, but also a wider reading public’s obsession with the

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38 BL Add MS 15955, f. 28v-29r.
39 As quoted in Williams, *Prize of All the Oceans*, 75. Another source of information mentioned in Thomas’ letter was a cook. This cook was the Frenchman Louis Leger, who had served on *Centurion*, supposedly been captured by the Spanish in Chequetan, and returned to Britain to have his story serialized in the *London Gazette*. For more on Leger’s difficult passage back to Britain and untimely death in a bar brawl, see ibid, 151-2.
40 Williams, *Great South Sea*, 241.
developments of their voyage. The feat of staying alive despite overwhelming odds gained Anson admirers, according to his brother:

> The Public had given you immense wealth & seems concern’d to find the recompense fall so short of the Dangers, Toils, & merit of the service. But if you can content your self with the nobler Reward of Reputation & Fame, rest assur’d my Dear Comodore, of as large a share as you can wish or imagine to your self. The Captains of your Squadron have been sought for & pointed out in public Places as a Spectacle.41

Anson was quite literally the talk of the town. Anson’s fame was already assured thanks to crossing the Pacific, but Thomas did not know that his brother had also taken the *Covadonga* five months earlier. Anson and his men’s “Reputation & Fame” was only to increase and the “recompense” they earned was one of the largest hauls in naval history.42

*Centurion* reached Spithead on June 15, 1744 laden with the treasure of the Acapulco galleon, yet with only 188 of those who had originally sailed from Britain.43 The terrible mortality rate, roughly 73%, was mitigated by the excitement at the news of the capture of the *Covadonga*. Newspaper reports competed to guess the wealth within the ship’s hold, with estimates ranging from £500,000 to £1,250,000.44 On July 4, 1744, 32 wagons laden with

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41 BL Add MS 15995, f. 29r.
42 The division of the prize money was far from straight-forward. For an overview of the court disputes over prize money, see Williams, *Prize of All the Oceans*, 210-8; Williams, *Documents*, doc. 138.
43 These survivors were from the *Centurion*, *Gloucester*, *Anna*, and *Tryal*. There has been much interest in the effect that scurvy had on the squadron, both at the time and afterward. James Watt estimates that 1,355 men died out of the 1,845 who set out, most from scurvy. Although the benefits of fresh fruits, especially citrus were known to Narbrough and earlier sailors, Anson’s surgeons carried elixir of vitriol rather than citric acid. The disaster led to inquiry as to possible cures, wherein James Lind wrote a report, dedicated to Anson, as to the benefits of citrus. However, partially due to the influence of Scottish physician Sir John Pringle, the Navy adopted malt as a possible cure, before shifting to lemon juice thanks to Lind’s disciple, Sir Gilbert Blaine, in 1795. See James Watt, “The medical bequest of disaster at sea: Commodore Anson’s circumnavigation 1740-4,” *Journal of the Royal College of Physicians of London* 32, no. 6 (1998): 572-579. Williams estimates that over 1,900 men set out with Anson, and nearly 1,400 died. 4 of these deaths were from enemy action, several from accidents, and the rest from disease and starvation. Williams, *Prize of All the Oceans*, 202.
44 Williams, *Documents*, docs. 100 and 101, p 234. For more newspaper reports of Anson’s return, see ibid, docs. 102-115.
treasure and accompanied by the *Centurion* survivors delivered their bounty to the Tower of London.

Engravings and newspapers hailed the triumph, stressing especially the global nature of the voyage.\(^{45}\) A poem, “written extempore as the wagons loaded with treasure passed through the City of London,” exclaimed, “Her fierce Dominion, Asia Afric knew;/ But round the Globe her eagle never flew,/Thro every clime is Albion’s thunder hurled,/And Anson’s spoils are from a tribute world.”\(^{46}\) Thus, Anson’s triumph was tied not just to attaining a rare victory in a drawn-out war, but also to the fact that he had done so in a relatively unknown region. His voyage, to be celebrated as a successful circumnavigation, also added to the perception of far-flung British domination: the South Seas were cemented as an area of British influence, joining Africa, Asia, and North America.

With emotions running so high and information beyond newspaper snippets scarce, accounts about the voyage soon flooded bookstalls and stores.\(^{47}\) In fact, the pump had already been primed by survivors of the *Wager* wreck, as well as advertisements for publications that told the squadron’s story until it rounded Cape Horn or arrived at Macao.\(^{48}\) Of these, the most

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\(^{45}\) For an example of an engraving of the parade, see Williams, *Prize of All the Oceans*, 204-5. For newspaper mentions of the festivities, see Williams, *Documents*, docs. 110-115. For an order asking for protection for the treasure in its journey from Portsmouth to London, see TNA ADM 1440, June 27, 1744.

\(^{46}\) Williams, *Documents*, doc. 114, p. 237. See ibid, doc. 115 for a more critical poetic reaction to the frenetic celebration of Anson’s return. Still others poems lauded Anson’s heroism. See BL C.175.m.26, ff. 43-51.

\(^{47}\) There are also traces of the Anson expedition in wider material culture, not just print culture. For example, the lion figurehead from the *Centerion* was a gift to the Duke of Richmond in 1745, where it guarded an inn on his estate. In 1832, William IV installed the wooden beast on the Grand Staircase at Windsor and in 1836 it was sent to Greenwich. Now all that remains is a leg fragment, at the Anson estate, Shugborough Hall. Williams, *Prize of All the Oceans*, 219-220. In addition, Anson’s brother, Thomas, struck commemorative medals of the Admiral after his death in 1762. Parker, “Anson struck in gold, silver, and copper.”

\(^{48}\) Lieutenant Baynes, who left his captain along with Bulkeley and Cummins, had his version of events run in the September 1742 issue of the *Gentleman’s Magazine*. See an advertisement for a subscription list for an account “with the Proceedings of the Severn, Pearl, and Wager, after their Separation.” *Daily Advertiser* (issue 3820), April 15, 1743.
significant was *A Voyage to the South Seas* (1743), by John Bulkeley and John Cummins, gunner and carpenter respectively of the *Wager*. Written primarily by Bulkeley, the account was an apologetic for the authors, an attempt to vindicate them from accusations of mutiny. When other *Wager* survivors chose to publish in order to pursue their own motives, they mentioned the Bulkeley and Cummins volume, conferring primacy upon the first account despite the dubious legality of the acts it described.  

The books that chronicled Anson’s entire voyage came quickly on the heels of the triumphant parade to the Tower. In August appeared an anonymous *Authentic Account*, followed in September by *An Authentick Journal of the Late Expedition under the Command of Commodore Anson* released under the pseudonym of John Philips. The author of the latter seems to have had access to logs kept on the voyage, but no John Philips sailed with the squadron. The Philips account was pirated and at least four editions were released in 1744. The last of the

Another advertises “A Complete History of Commodore ANSONS's Voyage from leaving Britain to arrival at Macao,” with a “pathetick Dedication to the Publick.” *Daily Advertiser* (issue 3921.), August 12, 1743.

49 Bulkeley and Cummins, *Voyage to the South Seas*. Bulkeley emigrated to the American colonies after being cleared of the mutiny charges. There is a second edition of the account published in Philadelphia that includes additions and a subscription list. John Bulkeley and John Cummins, *A Voyage to the South Seas, In the Years 1740-1* (Philadelphia: James Chattin, 1757).

50 Alexander Campbell, a *Wager* midshipman accused of converting to Catholicism after being captured by the Spanish, released his account under the title, *The Sequel to Bulkeley and Cummins's Voyage to the South-Sea* (London: Printed for the Author and sold by W. Owen, 1747). There is another first edition published in Dublin by J. Kinnier, 1747.

51 *An Authentic Account of Commodore Anson’s Expedition* (London: Printed for M. Cooper, 1744); John Philips, *An Authentic Journal of the Late Expedition* (London: printed for J. Robinson, 1744); *An Authentic Account of Commodore Anson’s Expedition* (Dublin: Printed for J. Jackson, Z. Martineau, J. Esdall, 1744); *An authentic and genuine journal of Commodore Anson's expedition* (London: Printed for C. Whitefield, 1744); *A voyage to the South-seas, and to many others parts of the world. performed from the month of September in the year 1740...By an officer of the squadron* (London: Printed and sold by A. Merryman, 1744); *A voyage to the South Seas, and to many other parts of the world...By an Officer of the Fleet* (London: J. Plumb, 1744). Campbell also included a condensed version of Philips in his 1744-8 voyage collection. Campbell, ed., *Navigantium*, vol. I.
pirated accounts came out in 1745.\textsuperscript{52} To differentiate it from its predecessors, this account included an appendix detailing East India Company interactions in India and China. Clearly, the ties to Asia offered by Anson’s exchanges at Macao and Canton excited this anonymous compiler who thought they would also interest readers who had already heard of the voyage from other sources.

The most detailed of the Anson accounts released soon after the squadron’s return was by Pascoe Thomas, who had been employed on the voyage to teach mathematics. His account, \textit{A True and Impartial Journal of a Voyage to the South-Seas and Round the Globe}, offers insight into the intended audience, possible readership, and the importance of geographic knowledge to one’s reputation. Little is known about Pascoe Thomas beyond what he discloses in his account, viz. that he is a mathematics teacher. He reveals a lot, however, about who he is writing for and how he will attract this kind of a reader. In his prologue, Thomas differentiates between two types of reader, those that read for fun and those that read to educate themselves.\textsuperscript{53} Whereas many voyage accounts also mention this dual-readership, Thomas is adamant that he is only interested in readers of the latter sort. He is confident that he can instruct both a general and a maritime audience. Thomas points out mistakes that occurred on the voyage and gives his opinion as to how they could have been avoided. This is a bold strategy, especially from one who had few practical duties except when demanded by extreme circumstances. He also scolds the previous, anonymous accounts for their spurious lies such as that the sailors engaged in horse

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{A voyage to the South-seas, and to many others parts of the world. performed from the month of September in the year 1740} (London: printed and sold by R. Walker, 1745).

hunts. Unlike all previous accounts, Thomas choose not to retell the grizzly story of the *Wager* wreck, for that “unfortunate catastrophe is too well known.” Thomas would rather provide what he assumed is not known.

Lulls in the narrative are filled with historical descriptions of the various places the ship visited, with the primary sources cited as Antonio de Herrera, Thomas Salmon, Frezier, and the English privateers. The combination of these sources are aimed at an educated audience seeking to further their practical knowledge in global geography. He knows that most readers will not have read Herrera or Salmon previously, but hopes that they will come to his volume “govern’d by unibas’d Reason.” His goal, and what he feels he can uniquely provide to readers, is a destruction of fable in favor of the “Impartial” information mentioned in his title. He writes, “This I mention, only to destroy the Credit of other Fables of the same-kind; most of which are told with no other Design than to amuse the World, and please the Vanity of the Reporters.”

Thomas apologizes to those that have actually read Herrera and Salmon, but as those people tend to be of “Fortune and Distinction,” he hopes “they will have the Candour and Distinction to excuse them [Herrera and Salmon], and doubt not the Narrative Part will make them ample Satisfaction.” However, an analysis of the subscription list included in the account reveals that few people of “Fortune and Distinction” subscribed prior to publication. This could indicate that there was little interest on the part of elites, but more probably shows the limitations

\[\begin{align*}
54 & \text{Ibid, 64.} \\
55 & \text{Ibid, 29.} \\
56 & \text{Frezier and the English privateers have been discussed previously. Antonio de Herrera, *Historia general de los hechos de los castellanos en las Islas y Tierra Firme del mar Océano que llaman Indias Occidentales* (Madrid: Juan Flamenco and Juan de la Cuesta, 1601-1615); Thomas Salmon, *Modern History, or the Present State of all Nations... illustrated with Cuts and Maps*... by Herman Moll, 3 vols. (London: 1744-6). The Salmon citation is for the third edition of the serial publication.} \\
57 & \text{Thomas, *True and Impartial Journal*, 110.} \\
58 & \text{Ibid, 126.} \\
59 & \text{Ibid, prologue.}
\end{align*}\]
of the math instructor’s, or his publisher’s, social network. In stark contrast to Moll’s subscription list discussed in chapter two, there is no listed member of the peerage. Thomas’ subscription list is less detailed than Moll’s, making a direct comparison impossible. However, Thomas’ list reveals interesting caveats of its own. For example, 24.5% of subscribers chose to list an occupation, half the same figure for Moll’s list. 34 of the total 335 listed a job that was involved in maritime employment, including ship-carpenters, shipwrights, mariners, victuallers, and surgeons at sea. One can assume that many of those who did not list an occupation were also involved in maritime affairs. Typical of the period, there are only two female subscribers, revealing the purchasing power of females more than indicating a lack of interest in geography and voyages. Of most interest is the large percentage that hail from Gosport, 17.6% of the total. When the Portsmouth subscribers are added in, they make up 20.6% of the total, a surprising amount for a book trade so centered in London. Indeed, the majority who chose to identify location are not from the London area, although the printers were. Thus we see that Thomas and/or his printer was able to reach out to a provincial, maritime community to support his book. Perhaps Thomas himself was from the Gosport/Portsmouth area, or maybe community leaders like Gosport subscribers James Creighton, Attorney; James Cummins, merchant; Banister Hunt, merchant; William Elleston, attorney; or William Leffat, master of the free school, influenced their own local networks to support the project. This relatively educated yet not elite audience may have been just the type of reader that Thomas intimated he wanted, making the subscription list an extension of his writing philosophy of trite instruction.

A final detail of note in the subscription list is the number of former Anson squadron crew members who are listed. Nine identify as having lately been in one of the squadron’s ships (with three hailing from Gosport). This is a large number considering that only 400 men survived
from all six ships, of which many would have not been literate and others would not have remained on land to subscribe. A certain comradery seems to have existed between the men, or at the very least they knew enough about each other to get in touch. A standout on the list is a “William Bulkeley,” “Late Carpenter of the Wager.” John Bulkeley, gunner on the Wager, wrote the widely-publicized account of his and carpenter John Cummins’ experiences two years before. The mis-printing of his name and position puts the subscription list itself under suspicion. Were certain names added just to pad the list, using the lingering fame of the circumnavigators and mutineers to gain more subscribers and customers? Or did someone try to subscribe using the mistaken name, aspiring to identify with the now-famous few who survived? As usual, the subscription list raises as many questions as it answers, but at the very least it seems that Thomas was able to attract at least some subscribers that fulfilled his profile for desired readers.

As he could not directly criticize the now-celebrated naval officers, Thomas instead focused his acerbic comments on previous print and manuscript sources. Herrera aside, Spanish materials are suspect, as their calculations were found wanting by Thomas’ own measurements when the Centurion was near Acapulco. Thomas saves his most critical indictments for the English privateers, “Dampier, Rogers, Cooke, Cowley, and others.” Thomas blames their false reporting of the winds in the northern Pacific for their lengthy passage during which Thomas himself suffered from scurvy. By recording the winds as constant in the way they had experienced them, the privateers had endangered those that might venture across the Pacific at other times. Thomas explains his annoyance, “These are their Assertions, and had they made

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60 Although he comes quite close at times, Thomas always backs off openly blaming the officers for what he calls “our mistakes”. Ibid, 111. See also ibid, 65-6, where he questions officer conduct with regard to prize money.
61 Ibid, 105.
them only partial, and not universal, I should very readily acquiesce in them; but as they tell you it continues thus all the Year, I must beg Leave to differ from them, and that on the best Information, viz. Experience.”⁶² It is only a rational observer’s experience that should be trusted, not travel accounts that tend toward exaggeration or those that deal in absolutes.

In the attempt to gain credibility in print, Thomas also gave voice to a shift in the reporting and execution of long-range exploratory expeditions. Describing exploration of the far-northern Pacific, he writes;

How much this great Continent may extend itself farther to the North-westward is yet a Secret, and I am of Opinion will remain so, even with Posterity. The excessive Colds, the Mountains of Ice, the want of proper Harbours and Conveniences for wintering, and the great Distance from Naval Powers capable of undertaking to make Discoveries, with any Probability of Success; these, I say, joined to many other insurmountable Difficulties that attend the Navigation of those Seas, all conspire to render any farther Attempt of this kind abortive.⁶³

Throughout the narrative Thomas presents himself to future navigators who may come after, but here he grapples with the harsh realities of such later voyages ever coming to fruition. He is forced to admit that those with the resources and will to fund long-range, non-commercial (in the immediate future) voyages are “Naval Powers.” His off-hand observation intimating that exploration be a state-run activity, specifically a naval activity, would become a powerful argument in the official account of the Anson voyage.

Thomas mentions the official account, the first of its kind, in his narrative. At St. Catherine’s, off Brazil, Thomas complains that several of the Centurion’s officers take credit for his more accurate observations of an eclipse. Who he accuses of taking credit for his

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⁶² Ibid, 153. He also takes Dampier and Rogers to task for their failing to notice the abundance of fish in the northern Pacific. Ibid, 139.
⁶³ Ibid, 124.
measurements—more accurate by twenty Degrees in Longitude, “a wide Difference indeed!”—is “a certain Honourable Gentleman, who turn’d his Back on the Expedition” and who also spread the rumor that Anson was “founder’d in the Deep, and consequently irrecoverably lost.” Such a description would apply to the Hon. Edward Legge. However, Thomas also accuses this “Honourable Gentleman” of:

in conjunction with a Friend of his, and assisted by the Journals of some of our Officers, which they have lent them for that laudable Purpose, endeavouring to make a Monopoly of this Voyage, and to that end designs to publish by Authority; (an effectual Method to discourage others, and not unlike many arbitrary Proceedings on other Occasions.)

Legge was not the one who was preparing a “Monopoly” of the voyage, but someone was indeed benefiting from the papers of the officers to write an Admiralty-authorized account of the Anson voyage. Thomas was right to be leery of such an account. When finally published in 1748 the official account would have profound implications for who could and could not claim “Authority” in the reporting of South Seas voyages, as well as shape how South Seas voyages would be organized for the rest of the century.

A Voyage round the World: the global history of a bestseller

Although advertisements for “An Account of the late Expedition to the South Seas Compiled from Papers and Materials furnish’d by George Anson, Esq.; Commander in Chief and publish’d under his Direction,” appeared as early as November 26, 1744, the book itself was not released until May 1748. According to London Magazine, ‘The publick curiosity had not for many years been raised so high, and kept so long in suspense, by any other work expected from

64 Ibid, 11.
65 The advertisement first ran in the Daily Advertiser (issue 4397), November 26, 1744. It ran throughout December 1744 and January 1745. Daily Advertiser (issue 4448), March 8, 1745 lists a call for subscriptions for the first time.

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the press.'66 Readers wanted confirmation about certain details they had followed in newspapers and magazines; they circled the globe with Anson, he on a ship, they in the pages of periodicals. Now, four years later, they could have the complete story.

Compilation of Anson’s and his officers’ papers was entrusted to Richard Walter, chaplain of the Centurion who left the ship at Macao in 1742. The authorship of the account is deceiving, however, for in addition to Walter’s recognized contribution on the title page, Benjamin Robins, Fellow of the Royal Society and military engineer, also prepared large portions of the text.67 Robins reportedly received at least £100 for his labor.68 James Charnock, in Biographia Navalis (1796), said that Robins had ‘designed’ the text, and, ‘if he had remained in England, to have favored the world with a second part of it.’69 Robins, however, sailed to India as an engineer for the East India Company and succumbed to fever abroad.

A subscription list of 1,816 entries with 1,823 names and institutions supports the assertion of a broad general interest in the voyage, as subscribers range from the Duke of Argyle to various army officers to Mrs. Rebecca and Elizabeth Houblon.70 Of these, roughly 950 list titles, professions, or honorifics. Unlike both Moll’s and Thomas’ lists, trades and occupations are absent from this list, with the only professions included being members of the clergy,

67 Robins and Anson certainly corresponded, chiefly on the subject of naval artillery. See RS MS 213, 9 April, 1747; RS MS 139, f. 1.
69 John Charnock, Esq, Biographia Navalis; or, Impartial Memoirs of the Lives and Characters of Officers of the Navy of Great Britain, from the Year 1660 to the present time; Drawn from the most authentic sources, and disposed in a chronological arrangement. With portraits and other engravings, by Bartolozzi, &c. In four volumes, Vol IV (London: Printed for R. Faulder, Bond-Street. 1796), 129-30. For a complete discussion of the Robins/Walter controversy, which has raged since 1749, see George Anson, A Voyage round the World in the Years MDCCXL, I, II, III, IV, Glyndwr Williams, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), xxi–xxv.
70 Walter, ‘Subscription List’, in Voyage round the World. For Williams analysis of the subscription list, see Williams, ‘The making of a best-seller,’ 299.
barristers, and esquires. 7.71% of the subscribers include their degree as part of their identification. 3.19% are women, a still small percentage but a higher number than in other subscription lists, most likely due to the higher socio-economic status of many of the women subscribers and of the list in general. Schools and companies also subscribed, with the EIC signed up for 31 copies and nine Cambridge colleges included. Interestingly, no Oxford colleges subscribed, highlighting that subscription lists are better indicators of specific sub-sections of the social terrain of reading than examples of the breadth of British reading society at large.

The subscription list to the first edition portrays a different demographic from Pascoe Thomas’ provincial maritime subscribers. Location is not listed unless attached to title, so a geographic comparison is not possible. However, the network and connections of Anson and his publishers is clearly of a more elite nature than Thomas or Moll was able to manage. Anson was a national hero upon his return and already connected to the peerage through family and naval patronage networks. In 1747, after the First Battle of Finisterre he became Baron Anson, elevating his status even higher. His socio-economic advantage shows in the subscription list, but so does his naval background. By 1748, Anson was serving as an Admiralty Commissioner and he would be Lord High Admiral from 1748 until his death in 1762. Nearly 100 naval officers are subscribers, with many voyage survivors including Captain Cheap of the *Wager*, Colonel Cracherode of the Marines, and Anson’s lieutenants who had all been promoted after the voyage: Peter Denis, Augustus Keppel, Charles Saunders, and Philip Saumarez. However, these men do not advertise their association with the voyage as the sailors on Thomas’ list did. Thus, the prominence of the association with the voyage in Thomas’ list can be seen as ploy to attract

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71 With one brief interlude for a return to active duty in 1758.
72 Saumarez never received his copy, as he was killed in the second battle of Finisterre in 1747.
buyers; their presence legitimizes the account to audiences. Inclusion on the Anson list is more aspirational; it is a place to see and be seen, and it is more important as a list showing one’s links to Anson than an attempt to profit from the voyage itself.

All evidence points to an auspicious, or at least considerable, reaction to the account. Charnock exclaimed nearly fifty years after publication, ‘No performance ever met with a more favorable reception than lord Anson’s *Voyage round the World*. Four large impressions were sold off in a twelve-month. It has been translated into most of the European languages; and still supports its reputation.’ Charnock is correct, there were four editions in 1748, the first published in May in quarto with the second, an octavo version, released simultaneously. The third went on sale in June, the fourth in August, both in octavo. The printer of the work was none other than John and Paul Knapton, the sons of the printer of the privateer accounts thirty years before. The Dampier account had been one of the firm’s most lucrative publications ever, allowing them to sub-specialize in the production of travel accounts.

Upon release, the story ran in serialized form in *Gentlemen’s Magazine* for five months. It was in its fifteenth edition in 1776. A specious Dublin printing appeared marked 1748, with Boston editions in 1760 and 1761. Abroad, the account enjoyed considerable circulation. It was translated into Dutch, French, and German in 1749, Italian in 1756, Swedish in 1761.

73 Charnock, *Biografia Navalis*, 130.
74 The first edition was offered to subscribers in luxurious Royal Paper; those who ordered it were marked with an asterisk in the subscription list. The quarto first editions cost a guinea each, while the Royal edition cost a guinea and a half. 372, or 20.4% of total subscribers, paid for a Royal Paper edition.
75 Bankruptcy in 1755 led to an auction, wherein John Knapton was forced to sell his copyright to Anson and his remaining copies of Dampier. Donald W. Nichol, *Pope’s Literary Legacy: The Book-Trade Correspondence of William Warburton and John Knapton* (Oxford: Oxford Bibliographical Society, 1992), 184. For the annotated auction catalogue, see BL. C.170.aa.1(67). Dr. William Warburton, writer and Shakespeare editor to whom Knapton was indebted before the 1755 sale, wrote to the John Knapton on May 11, 1748, requesting a bound and gilt copy of Anson for himself and a Mr. Allen. BL Egerton MS 1954, f. 2r.
even a Russian edition, dated 1751. All told, there were at least 45 editions printed across Europe in the eighteenth century, and the book was not just sold, but read. Henry Legge, diplomat and brother to one of Anson’s officers, wrote to Anson from Berlin in 1749, “All people here who have the least smattering of English (and many have) are at work with Grammars and Dictionaries to read over your S. Sea Voyage.” Although there was no Spanish edition of the account published until 1833, there is a manuscript in the Real Academia de la Historia in Madrid which contains a translation from a French edition and commentary by Joseph Antonio de Aguirre, a priest. Aguirre applied for a license to print the work in 1752, indicating not only that Anson’s account had reached Britain’s imperial rivals soon after its initial publication, but also that the avenue by which works reached Spanish intellectuals was through French editions. Even the Spanish state’s conservative approach to the circulation of South Seas information did not entirely stop the spread of the Anson account.

The Pacific on paper: the state of Pacific geographic knowledge in text and map

In the introduction, Richard Walter follows Pascoe Thomas in splitting possible readers into two categories: those that read voyages for amusement, and the “more intelligent part of mankind” who understand that “the more important purposes of navigation, commerce, and

77 BL Add MS 15956, f. 211.
78 For the Aguirre manuscript, see RAH, signatura 9/2289. For more on the manuscript, see Torres, ‘Un bestseller,’ 22-3. For another critical Spanish response to the account, see AMN ms. 332, doc. 16.
national interests may be greatly promoted” by a detailed voyage account. Unlike Thomas, Walter welcomes both type of reader. Walter also reveals that he knows that the reading public is already familiar with the story he is about to tell. He offers not “rude, well-known outlines” but “a compleater and more finished delineation.” Such a delineation is dependent not only on a detailed narrative written with access to previously-unavailable manuscript sources, but also thanks to the numerous “views of land, sounding, draughts of roads and ports, charts, and other materials, for the improvement of geography and navigation.” These are of the “most importance too, as the greatest part of them relate to such Islands or Coasts, as have been hitherto not at all or erroneously described, and where the want of sufficient and authentic information might occasion future enterprizes to prove abortive, perhaps with the destruction of the men and vessels employed therein.” From the first pages, readers are alerted that this is not an ordinary account, but rather an authoritative corrective focused on clarifying the geography of the Pacific as well as on arguing for more concerted efforts to further national expansion overseas without risking the lives of valuable sailors.

Using the first edition as our example, what did the organization of the text say about the Pacific as a space? Book I takes the reader along with Anson as he prepares for the Pacific, underlining the remoteness of the region and the singularity of this expedition. Book II follows Anson as he rounds Cape Horn. Book III traces Anson’s crossing of the Pacific, interactions with officials in Macao and Canton, the capture of the Acapulco treasure galleon, and then quickly summarizes the return voyage. The bulk of the text takes place at the edges of the Pacific, with

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79 Walter’s name is listed at the end of the introduction, hence the credit to him when speaking of the introduction in this chapter. For the larger narrative, credit will be attributed to Anson, as it is his views that are expressed in the volume.

80 Walter in Anson, A Voyage round the World, 9.
less than 80 pages of 417 devoted to Atlantic and Indian Ocean proceedings. The open water of
the Pacific, however, is not a large part of the narrative. As Williams had argued, the Pacific in
the British global imaginary in the 1740s was still littoral.

As previously discussed, despite a close and constant referral to all available sources, Anson
found his ability to navigate hampered by false descriptions and omissions. The account
offered an opportunity to point out these limitations. At St. Catherine’s off Brazil, Anson felt he
had to correct Halley’s calculations of the trade winds. He found Frezier’s chart of St.
Catherine’s “sufficiently exact,” though it mislabeled several islands, but found the descriptions
of the island by Frezier and Shelvocke insufficient preparation for the changed government and
inclement climate to be found there.

After St. Catherine’s, “we left the last amicable port we proposed to touch at, and were
now proceeding to an hostile, or at best, a desart and inhospitable coast.” Rounding Cape Horn
signals a descent from civilized to uncivilized, from welcoming to hostile, from known to
unknown. The theme of the Pacific as lacking civilization would repeat throughout the account.
Once Centurion arrived at Canton, the crew:

once more arrived in an amicable port, in a civilized country; where the conveniencies of
life were in great plenty; where the naval stores, which we now extremely wanted, could
be in some degree procured; where we expected the inexpressible satisfaction of
receiving letters from our relations and friends…

81 Walter, Voyage round the World, book III, ch. I.
82 Williams, Great South Sea, 271-3.
83 Anson in Anson, Voyage round the World, 47. The article referred to is Edmund Halley, “An Historical Account of
the Trade Winds…” Philosophical Transactions xvi (1686-7): 153-68.
84 Anson in Anson, Voyage round the World, 55, 57.
85 Ibid, 67.
86 Ibid, 316.
The criteria of “civilization” is tied not to the peoples who lived between the longitudes of Cape Horn and Canton,\(^{87}\) rather civilization as used in the account refers to a connection to the home country and goods. It is a material definition of civilization conditioned by the inability to seek harbours and access fresh provisions after the squadron passed into the South Seas. In that sense, the Pacific was indeed a watery desert to the British sailors. This does not mean, however, that Anson and his men were not delighted by the places on which they did manage to land. At the Cape of Good Hope, Anson describes himself as:

> highly delighted with the place, which by its extraordinary accommodations, the healthiness of its air, and the picturesque appearance of the country, all enlivened by the addition of a civilized colony, was not disgraced in an imaginary comparison with the vallies of Juan Fernandes, and the lawns of Tinian.\(^{88}\)

Both Juan Fernandez and Tinian provided food and land to allow the squadron to recover from their two prolonged bouts of scurvy. Thus, their retrospective depiction is quite positive. The material deprivation suffered by the sailors in their voyage tinted the physical descriptions of Pacific geography.

However genial certain islands were found to be, Anson was predisposed to fear the starkness of the Pacific coast, especially in Patagonia, which he described as an “uncomfortable prospect” and “uncouth.” Tierra del Fuego, “had an aspect extremely barren and desolate, yet this Island of Staten-land far surpasses it, in the wildness and horror of its appearance…So that nothing can be imagined more savage and gloomy, than the whole aspect of this coast.”\(^{89}\) Tied to his difficulties on ship and with the weather, Tierra del Fuego became associated with hardship.

\(^{87}\) Of course, there was a discourse of civilization and civility that did apply to indigenous peoples and Spanish colonists in Oceania and elsewhere. See, as just two examples, Douglas, Science, Voyages, and Encounters; Frederic Regard, ed., British Narratives of Exploration: Case Studies on the Self and Other (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2009).
\(^{88}\) Anson in Anson, Voyage round the World, 371.
\(^{89}\) Ibid, 81-83. Anson would return to the subject of the difficulties of Cape Horn in book III, ch. XIV, “A brief account of what might have been expected from our squadron, had it arrived in the South-Seas in good time.”
and ill-health. Anson also prescribes what could have changed their experiences, “from which fatal accident we might have been exempted, had we been furnished with such an account of its situation, as we could fully have depended on.”

Despite these early instances of disconnect between report and experience, Anson still depended on the traditional sources of a seaman, chart and account, to shape his view of the landscape. He had no other choice. Thus, despite months of anxiety in fearing that the squadron was rounding Cape Horn at the wrong time of year, the officers “fully expected, in a very few days, to have experienced the celebrated tranquility of the Pacifick Ocean.” Anson’s account reveals the constant struggle between reference and observation; he is determined to correct previous sources yet is also conditioned by them. The paradox of being bounded by imperfect geographic knowledge is best explained by Anson of his experiences near Acapulco:

I cannot finish...without remarking how little reliance Navigators ought to have on the accounts of the Buccaneer writers: For though in this run of hers, eighty leagues to the eastward of Acapulco, she found no place where it was possible for a boat to land, yet those writers have not been ashamed to feign harbours and convenient watering places within these limits, thereby exposing such as should confide in their relations, to the risqué of being destroyed by thirst.

Anson, like Thomas, expected his trans-Pacific crossing to be as easy as the experiences he had read about:

Thus, on the 6th of May, we, for the last time, lost sight of the mountains of Mexico, persuaded, that in a few weeks we should arrive at the river of Canton in China, where we expected to meet with many English ships, and numbers of our countrymen; and hoped to enjoy the advantages of an amicable well frequented port, in habited by a polished people, and abounding with the conveniencies and indulgencies of a civilized life.

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90 Ibid, 115.
91 Ibid, 89.
92 Ibid, 252.
93 Ibid, 254.
In reality, the trade winds were not as reported and dreadful scurvy claimed many on the becalmed ships. Whereas navigators would continue to consult the buccaneers into the later-eighteenth century, Thomas and Anson’s skepticism of their utility points to the deceptively linear nature of exploration literature. As a new publication was released, each seemed to correct those which came before, making more recent voyages to the same places seem more authoritative. While navigators could not simply jettison earlier accounts, for multiple experiences of the same place may help to triangulate between text and experience, less specialized readers were less likely to continue to value older accounts for the same reasons. Different audiences gathered different lessons from the voyage accounts.

As the ships crossed the Pacific, they often surmised that there were nearby islands that were not easily reached due to the course of the winds. Although the British had criticized the Spanish for not exploring the region more thoroughly, Anson’s squadron experienced firsthand the difficulties in completing just such a task. Finding land across the ocean was no easy task either, as the Ladrones were often vaguely charted as lying in a straight line; the experience of sailing among them was not so ordered:

…our knowledge of these Islands was extremely imperfect, we were to trust entirely to chance for our guidance; only as they are all of them usually laid down near the same meridian, and we had conceived those we had already seen to be part of the them, we concluded to stand to the southward, as the most probably means of falling in with the next.95

Luckily, the squadron did fall in with one of the islands, Tinian, which is described as a tropical utopia: depopulated yet full of ruins and fresh fruit. Anson appreciated the breadfruit trees, and their fruit, so much that he commissioned a Chinese porcelain set emblazoned with a breadfruit

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94 Ibid, 269, 311.
95 Ibid, 275.
design. Before the paradise of Tahiti tantalized readers, Tinian offered a moment of peace within a larger geography marked by threat.

As the text traces the challenges caused by the existing body of geographic knowledge of the voyage, the area described at any one point in time is usually small. Representing the entirety of the region was achieved through a different medium, charts. The first (1748), fifth (1749), and ninth (1756) editions came illustrated with 42 copperplate engravings; these plates were sold separately for 7 shillings. Three of the 42 plates are charts engraved by Richard William Seale. Among other clients, he engraved for the Universal Spectator, in which the Anson expedition was serialized after it returned in 1744. Reinforcing the text’s portrayal of the Pacific as a space of imperial rivalry and geographic challenge, the illustrations are views of the entrances of harbors, plans of coastlines to aid navigation, and pictures of the ships of Europe, the Ladrone Islands, and China. With the exception of a sea lion, which the crew ate ‘under the denomination of beef,’ there are no drawings of the flora and fauna of the region, a major concern of later voyages. The charts provided readers with a chance to widen the visual lens described in the text, but also allow for readers to trace the progress of the ship, discover new islands, and chart their own courses. Charts made the book more interactive and allowed for personal responses from the reader.

96 A note in the fourth edition explains why the octavo editions did not include all 42 plates, ‘Advertisement. The Plates in the Quarto Edition being too numerous and large to be folded in an Octavo Volume, it has been thought proper to insert only two Charts, of the most general Use; together with an additional Chart, shewing the Track of the Centurion round the World: But the Reader is desired to take Notice, that the References to all the Plates are continued in this Edition; and compleat Sets of them are sold by J. and P. Knapton, in Ludgate-Street.’ This copy of the fourth edition is in the private collection of Mr. Colin Paul.
97 Williams, ‘The making of a best-seller,’ 296. Seale most likely received the commission because he had already worked on “A Map of South America with all the European establishments” (London: ca. 1745) for the Knaptons. For a biography of R W. Seale, see Worms and Baynton-Williams, British Map Engravers, 593-4. Arthur Pond, engraver and painter, also helped with the production of the engravings. For his accounts with Anson, who was his biggest customer ca. 1745-8, see BL Add MS 23724, ff. 120, 137v, 145v, 149v, 153v.
98 Walter, Voyage round the World, 122-4. See also plate XIX in ibid.
Walter describes in his introduction just why these charts are particularly valuable, revealing contemporary assumptions about what made a quality map, thus it is worth a long citation:

For they were not copied from the works of others, or composed at home from imperfect accounts, given by incurious and unskilful observers, as hath been frequently the case in these matters; but the greatest part of them were drawn on the spot with the utmost exactness... For as actual surveys of roads and harbours, and nice and critical delineations of views of land, take up much time and attention, require a good degree of skill both in planning and drawing, those who are defective in industry and ability, supply these wants by bold conjectures, and fictitious descriptions; and as they can be no otherwise confuted than by going on the spot, and running the risqué of suffering by their misinformation, they have no apprehensions of being detected; and therefore, when they intrude their supposititious productions on the Public, they make no conscience of boasting at the same time, with how much skill and care they are performed. And let not those who are unacquainted with naval affairs imagine, that impositions of this kind are of an innocent nature; for as exact views of land are the surest guide to a seaman, on a coast where he has never been before, all fictions in so interesting a matter must be attended with numerous dangers, and sometimes with the destruction of those who are thus unhappily deceived.

The charts in the Anson account were new, drawn by trained individuals “on the spot”—experience trumped the archive, although as explained previously, previous renditions of Pacific space were not discarded lightly. “Industry” is an attribute of the successful mapmaker, and those who lack it fall back on subterfuge and lies. This is dangerous as the only way to refute such deceits is to sail to those parts, a costly endeavor for the lives of sailors, as Anson’s heavy death toll exemplified all too well. The necessity of making high quality maps should be understood as a life-or-death activity, for those maps made with the goal of entertaining the untrained eye could, in practice, kill.

This points to the open market for mapping in Britain in the eighteenth century. As the Admiralty required officers to equip themselves with maps prior to sailing rather than routinely

supplying captains with charts from a centralized repository, naval men turned to commercial mapsellers for their cartographic materials. Thus, commentators like Walter thought maps had to be held to the highest standard for they were objects that were equally likely to grace a drawing room as a navigator’s table. In the mid-eighteenth century, there was little conception of a differentiation of map quality for different sectors of the market. Each map had to be of a high quality for it was difficult and costly to make maps of varying detail depending on the intended buyer. If a map was not meant for navigation purposes, it should transparently state as much, which Walter intimates when he explains that he will signal to the reader when any plate used in the Anson account was not made recently.

The first edition contained three pull-out charts, ‘A Chart of the Southern Part of South America,’ ‘A Chart of the Channel in the Philippine Islands’ and ‘A Chart of the Pacific Ocean, from the equinoctial, to the latitude of 39 ½ degrees North.’ Of these, the first and third offer particular insight into the concept of the South Seas as a space (figures 4.1 and 4.2). ‘A Chart of the Southern Part of South America’ shows Patagonia in detail. In book I, chapter IX, Anson explains the process by which he compiled this map of Southern Patagonia, with reference to his sources. He singles out the “two most celebrated charts,” Halley’s chart of magnetic variation and Frezier’s map from his account of a voyage to the South Seas. Anson takes Frezier to task for showing the Straits of Le Maire as eight to ten degrees farther east than he found them.

\[\text{100 Walter, } \textit{Voyage round the World}, \text{ plates 13, 26, and 41, respectively, as listed in the first edition.}\]

\[\text{101 Ibid, 99. Halley's map, “A New and Correct Sea Chart of the Whole World Shewing the Variations of the Compass” (1702), was discussed in chapter 3. Frezier’s map is included in his account. Anson could be referring to several of the maps in Frezier, but is most likely discussing either a map of South America, although perhaps he is referring to a chart of the Straits of La Maire. In the English translation, which Anson most likely used, the map of South America is used as the frontispiece and has been framed with an English title and engraved with English toponyms by John Senex. For the chart of the Straits of Le Maire, see Frezier, } \textit{A Voyage to the South-Sea}, \text{ planche V, p. 29.}\]
Halley is delicately criticized for placing the Straits of Magellan 50 leagues westward of their true position. Based on experience, Anson prefers the chart of the Straits of Magellan by Narbrough (and Thornton). Anson described Narbrough’s chart, most likely the version printed with the 1694 account, as “doubtless infinitely exacter in that part than Frezier, and in some respects superior to Halley, particularly in what relates to the longitudes of the different parts of those Streights.” Thus, Anson’s method consisted of comparing the most recent printed maps available to his and his officers’ calculations. However valuable his account is as a rare glimpse into mapmaking methodology, there are silences in this map as well. For instance, there is no mention as to which of his officers might have helped to make the sketches upon which Seale’s engraving was based, not to mention the many ordinary seamen who labored to steady the ship, help to take soundings, and otherwise create the conditions favorable to enable shipboard measurements.

102 Anson in Anson, Voyage round the World, 100.
103 The drawings that would be engraved in the account were by Lieutenant Piercy Brett. Several of the originals are available at NMM PAJ1971-2, 1975-80. However, there are other surviving manuscript maps from the expedition. For example, drawings of Brazil from Capt. Mitchell, BL Add MS 15536; unsigned draft charts and views, BL Add MS 57719; Captain Legge’s map of Tierra del Fuego, BL Add MS 19049; printed (?) BL Maps K.Top.124.71.
Anson’s chart, based on Halley, Frezier, Narbrough, as well as on testimony from the survivors of the *Wager* wreck and Spanish manuscripts, reveals its transnational source base in the mixed, yet Anglicized place names. For example, there is Port Famine from Cavendish, the Apostles from Spanish voyages, and Cape Noir from Frezier. Anson felt that his careful collation, or that of a helpful mapmaker, corrected the western entrance to the Straits, although it is still laid down “very imperfectly.”104 The shores of western Tierra del Fuego are marked as “This coast not well-known.” The zig-zag of the *Centurion’s* track reveals the extent to which adverse wind and western current affected sailing as it rounded Cape Horn. Despite the order of the map grid, the precision of the borders and even of the track itself, the overall impression is one of confusion, not dominance. Coupled with Anson’s gloomy description of the land and

104 Anson in Anson, *Voyage round the World*, 100.
weather of Tierra del Fuego, the most widely read description of the region to date portrayed it as unpredictable, daunting, and dreary. The eastern, and most used, entrance to the Pacific remained as a tricky barrier, not a welcoming passage.

‘A Chart of the Pacific Ocean’ is a long insert; indeed it is 886 x 275 mm. The vertical thrust of the pull-out, which requires the reader to physically move in order to view it, underlines the sheer size of the distances involved. It also plays with imperial rivalry by tracing the route of the treasure galleons, perhaps suggesting further harassment of the silver trade. Walter is especially proud of this chart, for it shared previously “secreted” information captured from the Covadonga.105 The Spanish were the first Europeans to establish regular traffic across the Pacific, yet due to their conservative geographic management systems, they had not published the majority of their charts and accounts for public consumption. This never ceased to enrage the British, later to launch Pacific voyages, for they worried that their mistakes could be prevented if only they could access Spanish archives. Their imperial competitiveness led them to desire a begrudging sort of collaboration in terms of sharing geographic knowledge, yet their Spanish counterparts were loath to participate for fear of continued disruptions by the likes of Sharpe and Anson. Thus, the capturing of the Covadonga marked a coup in the collection of geographic knowledge as important as Sharpe’s captured derrotero sixty years previously.

105 Walter in ibid, 12.
Expanding geographic boundaries, constructing literary barriers: Who and how expeditions should be conducted and reported

The Anson account is concerned not only with source critiques and Spanish cartographic secrets, but also with future missions that would uncover more about the Pacific than Anson had been able to manage. Walter thought it would behoove the British people:

in their public and private stations, to the encouragement and pursuit of all kinds of geographical and nautical observations, and of every species of mechanical and commercial information. It is be a settled attachment to these seemingly minute particulars, that our ambitious neighbours have established some part of that power, with which we are now struggling.106

If the public at large were more engaged with geography and navigation, there would be a wider pool from which to train skilled observers.

The force Anson saw as driving such training was the Royal Navy. Some officers, in Anson’s estimation, should be trained as engineers. Such men could accompany every man-of-war, taking notes, making observations, and furthering geographic knowledge at the same time the Navy was protecting British trade globally. Here Anson echoes in part the sentiments of Tancred Robinson, who in his introduction to the 1694 voyage collection called for more skilled observers to accompany vessels. Robinson, however, did not think it a naval officer’s place to do so, preferring gentlemen observers. Anson, on the other hand, wants to create a new sort of naval officer, styled on French military engineer Frezier, upon whom Anson so relied in his circumnavigation. Anson was aware that the creation of such an educated officer corps focused on intellectual pursuits would rankle some who believed it the Navy’s duty to protect, not collect. In the Introduction, Walter explains that such critics should not condemn “all literature

106 Ibid, 14.
and science as effeminate, and derogatory to that ferocity, which, they would falsely persuade us, was the most unerring characteristic of courage.”107 Gathering knowledge and winning battles should be valued equally as masculine pursuits. Anson saw the protection of sailors and the clarification of geographic confusion equally as vital to national security as firing broadsides.

The South Seas was especially in need of such naval engineers, as “the navigation to the South-Seas” was “encumbered” by “many perplexities and embarrassments.”108 Throughout the narrative, Anson hints at possible places for new voyages, arguing especially for a more precise mapping of western Patagonia, as well as the delineation of Pepys’ and the Falklands Islands as stopover points.109 In the future, it would be to Anson’s official and comprehensive account that officials would thumb to plan expeditions patterned on his suggestions.

As a final point, it is important to note that prior to the Anson expedition, a more diverse group of authors used their geographic privilege to print their stories, plea their cases, and maybe even make a bit of money. Young midshipman, warrant officers, and anonymous hack writers all cashed in on the cache of the Anson expedition in the early 1740s. However, with the advent of the official account sponsored by the Admiralty in 1748, alternative authors would have to shift their tone and rhetoric. The naval captain would retain primacy as the authoritative source for any voyage, but other members of the crew and wider public would find it more difficult to gain the necessary credibility to participate in the voyage narrative genre without a naval commission or advanced schooling in the natural sciences. Whereas critics like Anson and Walter demanded that all printed maps live up to the standard of being used practically, voyage narratives were

107 Ibid, 16.
108 Anson in ibid, 96.
starting to differentiate more and more along the lines of the readers delineated by both Walter and Thomas, those who sought entertainment and those that sought geographic instruction. There would always be space in the book market for the extraordinary story of maritime hardship and the pirated abridgement, but the likelihood of offering a larger voyage’s story to the reading public without official authorization and access to controlled documents was becoming more problematic. The voyage narrative, as far as the South Seas were concerned, was increasingly a regulated process.

Conclusion

Anson’s account was to serve as the clarion call and blueprint for further British interaction with the Pacific, in large part because Anson worked in a position at the Admiralty where he could begin to implement necessary reforms. Such reforms, and the geopolitical reasons why another voyage did not immediately follow Anson’s own, will be the topic of the next chapter. It has been the task of this chapter to explain how the planning and publication of the Anson expedition affected the state of geographic knowledge about the Pacific, how it shaped representations of the Pacific, as well as altered the discourse about long-range exploratory expeditions. Anson’s expedition was an important moment of transition in British interaction with the Pacific, as much for the galleon Anson took in Pacific waters as for the account he published from a London printing press.
CHAPTER 5: PACIFIC PAPER WARS: SOUTH SEAS PRINT CULTURE IN THE 1740S AND 1750S IN TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT

In 1738, when approached about a new voyage to search for the Northwest Passage, Charles Wager said “a Spirit of that Kind seems to have been asleep for many Years.” The Anson expedition, and specifically the carefully-curated official account, went a long way toward reviving such a spirit, although interest did not translate into immediate voyages due to inter-imperial politics and company restrictions. The Anson expedition was the most prominent, but far from the only, event that spurred discussion about the South Seas and exploration. The 1740s and 1750s witnessed a reassessment of Pacific geographic knowledge by mapmakers, editors, and intellectuals across Europe, as well as Admiralty officials and naval officers.

This chapter will examine the wider political and intellectual discourse concerned with European involvement with and representation of the South Seas. In effect, it puts the Anson expedition into a broader context, connecting it to other publications and negotiations which conditioned how and why Europeans interacted with the opposite side of the globe. Via an investigation of other voyages destined for the South Seas and the discussions about Pacific

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1 Admiral Sir Charles Wager to Arthur Dobbs, March 4, 1737. Letter is included in William Barr and Glyndwr Williams, eds., Voyages in Search of a Northwest Passage 1741-1747. Volume I The Voyage of Christopher Middleton 1741-1742 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1994), section I, doc. 14, p. 50. Although Wager seems to think that the 1730s were not ripe for South Seas voyages, at least some thought it was still a viable space for aggressive trade. See John Pullen, Memoirs of the Maritime Affairs of Great-Britain (London, 1732), 20 for a rehashing of ca. 1711 arguments about arresting French trade in the South Seas.
geography by mapmakers and savants, it is possible to see how the Pacific remained a physical space whose image was hotly contested, but also how it served as an intellectual arena in which to play out personal and political disagreements. By arguing over what the space looked like and who could cross it, Europeans appropriated the ocean into their geopolitical sphere even as fewer European ships sailed there as compared to the turn of the eighteenth century. When European overseas empires were again able to send ships into Pacific waters in the 1760s, they would carry with them a quarter century of contentious debate as cargo—the Pacific had transformed into a space ripe for not just for European incursion, but for correction and division.

**Pacific projections I: The Middleton expedition and the perils of a paper war**

Wager’s spirit-less comment above was written in response to proposals to explore the Northwest Passage by Irish MP and longtime promoter of colonial trade, Arthur Dobbs. In 1731, Dobbs penned “An Essay on the Existence of a Northwest Passage,” a memorial dedicated to explaining the lucrative possibilities of a region that had not been explored, to Dobbs’ knowledge, for over a century. He recommended that a voyage should be mounted by either the South Sea Company or the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), for “their trade would be vastly increas’d, and very adventagious to the Publick. Nor can I give my self leave to think, but the one or t’other company would Embrace the proposal, since the advantage is so obvious if successful, and the detriment so small, should it be otherwise.”² Not for the last time, Dobbs

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² JCB Codex Eng 15, 60. The JCB copy of the manuscript is a shortened version of the 79-page essay which Dobbs sent to high-ranking nobles in the British government. The JCB version is bound with "A Map of the North Pole with all the Territories that lye near it known to us &c. According to the latest Discoveries and most Exact Observations Agreeable to Modern History by H. Mooll [sic.] Geographer." This state of Moll's map was printed in 1744 by T. Longman for Thomas and John Bowles, map and print sellers. Moll had died in 1732. A state of this map also appeared in Salmon, *Modern history: or, the present state of all nations*, vol. VIII (London: printed for T. Wotton, J.
reveals a surprising optimism about the supposedly non-detrimental environment and climate of Hudson’s Bay, a place he never saw in person. Dobbs was unfazed by the South Sea Company’s failure to probe the seas west of South America. He was also seemingly unaware that the South Sea Company did not operate in the area, or of the HBC’s disastrous attempt for the Passage in 1719.3

In order to learn more about northwestern Hudson’s Bay, Dobbs contacted longtime HBC captain Christopher Middleton. When Anson described the ideal man to attend to long-range expeditions in 1748, he might have had Middleton in mind, for he was a skilled navigator, willing to try experiments at sea, and an expert in charting. Since 1721, Middleton had served the HBC with an attentiveness toward its northernmost holdings, as well as in testing magnetic variation. Such interests were largely unrecognized by the Company yet aligned him with the Royal Society, who were happy to receive rare geographic information about a place a traditional Fellow could not hope to visit. Middleton published his first article in the *Philosophical Transactions* in 1726 and worked with other Fellows such as Anson account author Benjamin Robins.4 Rare for one in maritime employment, Middleton was able to tap into the geographic

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3 For an overview of the 1719 expedition to find the Strait of Anian, led by HBC employee James Knight, see Glyndwr Williams, *Voyages of Delusion: The Quest for the Northwest Passage* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), ch. 1. This book explores English attempts to locate the Northwest Passage in the eighteenth century. For a broader history of Northwest Passage attempts, from the sixteenth to the twenty-first centuries, see Williams, *Arctic Labyrinth*.

4 Christopher Middleton, “A New and Exact Table, Collected from Several Observations, Taken in Four Voyages to Hudson’s Bay in North America from London: Shewing the Variation of the Magnetical Needle, or Sea Compass, in the Path-Way to the Said Bay, According to the Several Latitudes and Longitudes, from the Year 1721, to 1725,” *Philosophical Transactions* 34 (1726): 73-76; C. Middleton and Benj. Robins, “A New and Exact Table Collected from Several Observations Taken from the Year 1721 to 1729, in Nine Voyages to Hudson’s Bay in North-America...Shewing the Variation of the Compass According to the Latitudes and Longitudes Under-Mentioned,
knowledge community by feeding the demand for observations of remote lands, gaining him an elite readership that included Dobbs. Thus, it is due to navigational prowess, and absent significant social ties, that Middleton was named a Fellow in 1737.

Throughout the 1730s Dobbs courted HBC officials in an attempt to convince them to send a voyage north of their usual trading posts. After much skeptical hesitation the HBC ordered its ships to venture northwest, which they attempted in 1737, but the ships were unable to reach the high latitudes which Dobbs had suggested in his “Essay.” These disappointments left Dobbs angry at the conservatism and sluggishness of the Company, but more so at their unwillingness to share their coveted geographic information of the region, an accusation


5 The Royal Society recognized the value of his contributions, as compared to other fee-paying Fellows. The Council Minutes of June 19, 1735 excused Middleton his fees as thanks for “Services to the Society. RS CMO III, June 19, 1738. Of course, Middleton was not the only man in maritime employment to attempt interactions with the Royal Society. However, membership of such men was largely contingent on their successful delivery of new observations. The Council decided in 1734 to hold Captain Hall in arrears, as he had not been ordered to Barbados, “under which view alone it was he became a Member, thinking thereby to become serviceable to the Society.” Ibid, Nov. 7, 1734. The Hon. Edward Legge, who did have strong ties to Britain’s intellectual elite, had his observations from the Anson expedition published due to correspondence with a Fellow. Edward Legge and Jos. Atwell; “Extract of a Letter from the Honble Edward Legge, Esq; F. R. S. Captain of His Majesty's Ship the Severn, Containing an Observation of the Eclipse of the Moon, Dec. 21, 1740 at the Island of St. Catharine on the Coast of Brasil; Communicated to the Royal Society by the Revd Jos. Atwell, D. D. F. R. S.,” *Philosophical Transactions* 42 (1742): 18-19.

6 For an explanation of Dobbs’ lobbying of the HBC see Barr and Williams, *Voyage in Search of a Northwest Passage*, vol. 1, section I, 48. In addition, see ibid, section I, docs. 2-12.
reminiscent of those that had been aimed at Spain and the VOC. When the HBC refused to share one of its captain’s journals, Dobbs wrote to Middleton, “…that they were not inclinable that a Discovery shuld be made, tho’ the whole Tenor of their Charter shews, that the great Powers and Royalties granted to them was in order to their making the Discovery.” Dobbs was right, to a certain extent. The HBC’s Royal Charter, granted in 1670, recalled the 1668 voyage of the Nonsuch, and encouraged them to “proceed further in Pursuance” of more lands and trade. Middleton only confirmed Dobbs’ fears, “I believe the Company think it in their Interest rather to prevent than forward new Discoveries in that Part of the World; and for that Reason they will not suffer any of our Journals to be made public.” He continued, “It is my Opinion, that nothing will be done in it to any Purpose, unless the Government will give a sufficient Encouragement to some Persons of known Abilities to undertake it.” If Dobbs wanted to achieve his dream, he would have to pursue public entities.

In the late 1730s, precisely when antagonism with Spain was reaching a crescendo, Dobbs set his sights on Wager, who expressed interest tempered with realism. The Royal Navy was stretched thin, then preparing squadrons to attack the Caribbean and, as we have already seen, the South Seas. During this time, Wager wrote Dobbs an extraordinary letter that reveals much about the place of exploratory voyages within a maritime, imperial nation. He explains:

War may have perhaps prevented, in some Measure, and diverted Mens Thoughts from any Enterprize of that kind, and especially since I read your Manuscript of a Probability of a N.W. Passage to the South Sea, but I have found but very few that were willing to bestow any Thoughts about it. I remember Lord Granard and I have talk’d about it

7 Ibid, doc. 12, p. 46.
sometimes, but it was Talk, other Things and Business nearer Home has employed our Time and Thoughts too.\textsuperscript{10}

Wager reveals that whereas long-range exploratory expeditions may be advantageous to the nation, they had hitherto always been of low priority due to more expedient worries closer to home. Most of the time, the South Seas lingered just far enough away to deter those with the resources to expend on expeditions, unlike those who were sorely tempted yet unable to marshal the necessary support. Involvement in the Pacific was never out of sight of officials, per se—and certainly not out of print. Rather, the region was out of focus until it could be aligned with other objects. However, Wager was not so taken with “Talk, other Things and Business nearer Home,” to not see the potential, should a Northwest Passage be found:

\ldots if it should succeed, be better intitled to the Name of the NW or South Sea Company, than the present South Sea Company has to that Name, who are not permitted to trade in any one Place within the Limits of their Charter, which made such an Eclat at the first establishing it. If this should be once agreed on, and proper Persons be found to join in it, it may then be considered what Authority may be proper to obtain from the Crown, that the first that go and succeed, may not only beat the Bush, and others come afterwards to catch the Hare. For tho’ I do not much like exclusive Companies, where it is not absolutely necessary; yet I would not have the Advantages that may be found by some, be given away to others. As to Vessels being sent at the Public Expence, tho’ it would not be great, yet the Parliament may think, especially at this Time, that we ought not to play with the Money they give us, for other and particular Services. However, if Sir Robert Walpole, or other proper Persons, should think that the Government should attempt it at the Public Expence, I shall not be against it.\textsuperscript{11}

Wager expresses the disenchantment with the South Sea Company that lingered since the South Sea Bubble two decades earlier. Although met with promise at its founding, the Company never achieved its potential of trading within the Spanish monopoly of Western American waters. Although Wager still assumed that private companies are best for managing trade in new

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, doc. 14, p. 49.  
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, p. 50.
regions, he nevertheless echoed his colleague at the Admiralty, Sir John Norris, in his suspicion of such companies to find and report new discoveries. Rather, a voyage “at the Public Expence,” rare because that expense so seldom seemed justified to decision-makers hesitant to spend public funds in an openly frivolous way, might be the best avenue for finding passages into the South Seas.

Wager mentioned the proposed expedition to one such “proper Person,” namely King George II. The King was in favor of the expedition, clearing the way for the Admiralty to fit out a small voyage even as they prepared the Caribbean and South Seas squadrons. Middleton was to proceed to Ne Ultra in Hudson’s Bay, as suggested in Dobb’s 1731 essay. From there, in roughly 65°N latitude, Middleton was to search for a strait leading to the west. If found, he was to seek alliances with Indian nations and rendezvous with Anson, who had sailed three months previously. The voyage finally embarked on June 8, 1741, to considerably less periodical fanfare and international attention than Anson. The two vessels docked October 6, 1742 after wintering at Churchill and then unsuccessfully following the NW coast of Hudson’s Bay until ice forced them south. Middleton’s men were so weakened by scurvy that he had to leave many at the Orkney Islands as he sailed to Britain.

12 Middleton received his commission March 5, 1741. It was not until March 9 that the Admiralty confirmed the expedition, which is also the day that Middleton resigned his HBC position. Barr and Williams, Voyage in Search of a Northwest Passage, vol. I, section I, 69. For the mention of Anson, see ibid, section II, doc. 20, 88. Another similarity that Middleton’s voyage shared with Anson’s was difficulties in fitting out and manning the vessels. ADM 4110, item 1, May 20, 1741 and item 3, June 2, 1741; TNA BH 1/1648, f. 4; Barr and Williams, Voyage in Search of a Northwest Passage, section II, docs. 22, 26, 28-9.
13 The London Evening Post reported the voyage as seeking the Northeast Passage, while the Daily Post had Furnace and Discovery “bound to Russia.” Ibid, docs. 19 and 30.
Upon his return he sent his report to Dobbs, Wager, and the Royal Society.\textsuperscript{14} Despite his failure to find the Passage, the Royal Society was delighted with his detailed observations of temperature, latitude, longitude, and magnetic variation, awarding him the Copley Medal for 1742.\textsuperscript{15} Few were as pleased with his voyage as the Royal Society. The Admiralty, reluctant to have planned the expedition in the first place, were now unsure how to deal with its complications. For example, Middleton had employed two indigenous linguists while in the Bay. In a letter to the Navy Board, a confused Admiralty responded as to Middleton’s request to be reimbursed for paying the linguists, “the disbursements being peculiar to the service he went on, you cannot find any Precedent for them, not knowing of any such voyage having ever been undertaken in the manner this was, at the Publick Expence.”\textsuperscript{16} While the Admiralty had indeed executed publically-financed exploratory expeditions before, exactly how to categorize such voyages was still unclear.

None were so dashed as Arthur Dobbs. After an initial flurry of letters to Middleton and an inspection of his journal, Dobbs decided that Middleton had not ruled out the Passage, rather he had found it and not probed deeply enough into an inlet Middleton called Wager River, yet which Dobbs insisted was Wager Inlet. He also denied the existence of what Middleton called the Frozen Strait, a strait to the northeast of Roe’s Welcome that explained the tidal flow and how whales reached the western parts of the Bay. Dobbs’ consternation was fueled when he

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, section III, doc. 1, pp. 216-220. 14 men had died of scurvy at Churchill. For Middleton’s \textit{Furnace} journal, see NMM SAN/V/2; abstract journal TNA ADM 7/570, p. 45. For Lieutenant Rankin’s journal, see NMM ADM/L/F 109. For a longer version of Middleton’s journal see TNA ADM 51/379. For Middleton’s captain’s letters, see TNA ADM 1/2099, 2100, 2105.

\textsuperscript{15} Christopher Middleton, “The Effects of Cold; Together with Observations of the Longitude, Latitude, and Declination of the Magnetic Needle, at Prince of Wales's Fort, upon Churchill-River in Hudson's Bay, North America,” \textit{Philosophical Transactions} 42 (1742): 157-171. For the awarding of the Copley Medal, see RS CMO III, Nov. 8, 1742; BL Sloane 4057, f. 161r; RS MS 790, f. 124.

\textsuperscript{16} TNA ADM 2/206, f. 137. One of these indigenous linguists is identified by the name Coushe.
supposedly received two letters from a pair of pseudonymous authors raising suspicions as to Middleton’s conduct and veracity. The mysterious letter writers claimed, “The frozen Streights is all Chimera, and every Thing you have ever yet read or seen concerning that Part of our Voyage.” Dobbs brought the matter to the Admiralty’s attention, who it turn asked Middleton to respond to the allegations. Middleton did so by writing a lengthy treatise which he presented to the Admiralty. With the response, he also requested, “that your Lordships will be pleased to allow me the Liberty to print a Defence of my Conduct at large, in order to wipe off those Aspersions which Mr. D--- and his Abettors have industriously cast upon me, as well in publick as in private, to the very great Injury of my Character and Reputation.” So began what would prove to be a vituperative mudslinging campaign that spread across eight books and two years.

Whereas publishing could help to gain credibility in the public eye, it could also be a way to lose it, as we have seen in the cases of Dampier and Funnell, Shelvocke and Betagh. The complexity of managing one’s reputation in print is exemplified by Middleton’s multiple approaches to establish authority in the title page of his first book (figure 5.1). In rapid succession, Middleton references the august Royal Society and his membership in it, an association meant to impress and establish intellectual cache. He also is careful to display his rank and the fact that these arguments have been lodged with the Admiralty, another well-known institution. Furthermore, he highlights inclusion of primary documents. Readers need not take his

17 The letters were published in Arthur Dobbs, Remarks upon Capt. Middleton’s Defence: Wherein His Conduct during his late Voyage For discovering a Passage from Hudson’s-Bay to the South-Sea is impartially examin’d, &c. (London: Printed at the Author’s Appointment and sold by J. Robinson, 1744), 142-4.
18 Christopher Middleton, A Vindication of the Conduct of Captain Christopher Middleton in a Late Voyage on Board His Majesty’s Ship the Furnace, for Discovering the North-West Passage to the Western American Ocean (London: Printed at the Author’s Appointment and sold by Jacob Robinson, 1743), 4.
19 Middleton, A Vindication, titlepage.
word for his stances; they could make their own decisions. He is inviting the reader to be his judge, scrutiny he is sure he can withstand.

Figure 5.1. Christopher Middleton, *A Vindication of the Conduct of Captain Christopher Middleton* in a Late Voyage on Board His Majesty's Ship the Furnace, for Discovering a North-west Passage to the Western American Ocean 1743

(London: Printed at the Author's Appointment and sold by Jacob Robinson), title page.

Image courtesy of ECCO.
However, gaining authority is not as simple as professing qualifications. Inviting such scrutiny would also reveal the slipshod layout of the book, with many typographical and formatting errors. It would also show that certain of the primary documents had been edited heavily. In addition, Dobbs used similar appeals to authority in his tracts: the title Esq., quotations from earlier texts like Narbrough’s journal, historical arguments, and primary documentation of his own. The fact that the men mirrored each other’s strategies—they literally answered previous allegations paragraph by paragraph—served more to undermine rather than prove rationality and acumen for debate. For his first piece, Dobbs also used the same printer as Middleton, ensuring some profit for the sly printer but also exasperation for Middleton. The goal for Middleton and Dobbs was not to fortify “the impenetrable Bulwark of Truth,” as Middleton wrote. It was to appear more persuasive to an audience. As reputations and future expeditions were at stake, the authors turned to geography as proof of expertise for themselves and proof of fault for their foe.

The geographic arguments in the texts center on the existence of Frozen Strait. Dobbs, encouraged by the anonymous letter writers who turned out to be duplicitous officers on the Middleton voyage, insisted that Middleton had committed fraud by “forging a large Frozen

20 The best place to see such errors is in the table of contents for the appendices.
21 Christopher Middleton, A Reply to the Remarks of Arthur Dobbs, Esq; on Capt. Middleton’s Vindication of his Conduct on board his Majesty’s Ship the Furnace (London: printed for George Brett, 1744). Middleton’s later pamphlet, Forgery Detected, uses the allegorical figure of Truth as a woman to frame its narrative of Dobbs’ underhanded corruption. The writing style and tone of this and Middleton’s final pamphlet are different than his previous works, suggesting editorial aid or a ghost writer. See Christopher Middleton, Forgery Detected. By which is evinced how groundless are all the calumnies cast upon the Editor, in a pamphlet published under the Name of Arthur Dobbs, Esq (London: Printed for M. Cooper, 1745), dedication.
Streight.”

In his Remarks, Dobbs also included a draught of the strait, supposedly drawn by the gunner of the Furnace, George Axx (figure 5.2). This draught shows that the Frozen Strait was just a short passage on one side of a small island, not a large island as Middleton said, and that it was fed by another strait coming from the east. This map would prove fodder for multiple responses from Middleton.

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22 Dobbs, Remarks upon Capt. Middleton’s Defence, dedication. It is of little importance to the analysis at hand, but Middleton was correct. Edward Parry confirmed the existence of Frozen Strait on his expedition in 1821. See Williams, Voyages of Delusion, 119.

Figure 5.2. "The Draught," in Arthur Dobbs, Remarks upon Capt. Middleton's Defence: Wherein His Conduct during his late Voyage For discovering a Passage from Hudson's-Bay to the South-Sea is impartially examin'd, &c. 1744

(London: Printed at the Author's Appointment and sold by J. Robinson, 1744), 145.

Image courtesy of ECCO.
Middleton blasted Dobbs for printing what he considered a forgery, the Axx draught.\textsuperscript{24} Middleton thought that Axx may have been tricked by one of the officers working with Dobbs against him, but also explained that Axx’s forged chart only helped his case:

The Gunner’s Draught, which Mr. Dobbs imagines makes in Favour of him, has on the contrary, opened twice as much more room for the Tides and whales…I cannot but acknowledge the Designers of this Draught have shewn great Judgment, and have given the Public convincing Proofs of their Capacity; For instead of stopping up the frozen Straits, and leaving no Passage for Tides and Whales, they have given them two Channels round both Ends of the Island +, to run into one.\textsuperscript{25}

To illustrate his version of geography, Middleton also published his own map of the discoveries he made, careful to highlight Wager River, not Inlet, and showing Frozen Strait connecting back toward Hudson’s Straits (figure 5.3).\textsuperscript{26} It also shows the care Middleton took in measuring soundings, making the northwest of Hudson’s Bay the most detailed area on a map and marking Middleton as a skilled navigator.

\textsuperscript{24} Middleton, \textit{A Reply to the Remarks of Arthur Dobbs}, 18, 48, 122-3,
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, 48.
\textsuperscript{26} Christopher Middleton, “Chart of Hudson’s Bay & Straits, Baffin’s Bay, Strait Davis & Labrador Coast &c.,” (London: Christopher Middleton, 1743).
Figure 5.3. Christopher Middleton, “Chart of Hudson’s Bay & Straits, Baffin’s Bay, Straít Davis & Labrador Coast &c.,” London, 1743.

Printed. Image reproduced with permission from Barry Lawrence Ruderman Antique Maps Inc.
Dobbs responded with another map. In 1744, in addition to his first response to Middleton, Dobbs released a more general geography of Hudson’s Bay which served his agenda of undermining the HBC.\textsuperscript{27} \textit{An Account of the Countries adjoining to Hudson’s Bay} was a handsome folio which Dobbs personally distributed to government officials he thought might support his plan. The map credits French traveler Joseph la France as author; Dobbs had la France brought back from Hudson’s Bay on a Company ship so that he could interrogate him.\textsuperscript{28} Le France chose to depict a vast, empty land southwest of the Bay, filled with large lakes and a few indigenous groups. These groups are presented as possible trade partners, not barriers, as suggested in the appendix containing vocabulary in several local languages. The effect is to create a largely empty land, but also an accessible one. The accessibility is underlined to the north, where the western coast of North America curves northeastward, meeting Hudson’s Bay via several inlets, including Wager Strait. There is no Frozen Strait, only a tiny island near Repulse Bay that mirrors Axx’s draught. Just as in his 1731 essay, Dobbs was smoothing over geographic difficulties and disagreements in favor of his preferred vision: one where trade could flow freely through northern straits to South Seas. To this end, Dobbs also printed the HBC Charter, in the hopes that he could undermine their secrecy and gain supporters in demanding more open trade.

Middleton, of course, retorted with yet another set of remarks. This time he drastically shortened the text and dedicated it directly to Dobbs, not the King or Admiralty as in previous

\textsuperscript{27} Arthur Dobbs, \textit{An Account of the Countries adjoining to Hudson’s Bay, in the North-West Part of America} (London: Printed for J. Robinson, 1744).
\textsuperscript{28} Joseph la France, “A New Map of Part of North America,” (London: J. Robinson, 1744). The merchant William Bowman reported that he saw Dobbs and la France sketching the map on the floor of the Golden Fleece, New Bond Street, London. Le France also drew on lakes and features described in Lahonton’s part-fiction \textit{New Voyages}. See Williams, \textit{Voyages of Delusion}, 128-131. The map is also included in some copies of Dobbs’ \textit{Remarks upon Capt. Middleton’s Defence}, such as JCB D744.D632r, cop. 1 and the copy available on ECCO.
works; the feud had narrowed. The pamphlet focuses on the Axx draught, but also on Dobbs’ ability to read maps critically. Dobbs is not directly accused of forging the map himself, rather of being too eager to see to recognize the falsities before him. Dobbs had been, “imposed upon by too great a Confidence in his Informers Veracity, with their Assistance endeavoured to falsify my Chart.” Middleton must acquit Dobbs, “of all sinister Design in the Publication of this Draught, and attribute its Errors, to that of Men, whose Characters are not so well established; and to his own Credulity occasioned by his Concern for the Public Welfare, and Love of Justice.” The sardonic tone pities Dobbs who, unable to grasp the complexities of the evidence for Frozen Strait, is instead taken in by pretty pictures of geographic chimeras. By focusing on the map, Middleton is able to dent Dobbs’ armor of geographic knowledge donned in his Account of the Countries adjoining Hudson’s Bay. How could anyone know about Hudson’s Bay and its environs when they relied on disreputable persons for false charts?

The pamphlets became shorter and cheaper over time, perhaps in an effort to tempt readers to continue to follow events. Middleton wrote to the Admiralty in early 1744 that “this Paper War has cost Your Petitioner upwards of Two hundred Pounds to defend his Character” and requested a trial to clear his name and prevent further publications. He closed the letter by saying that all that mattered was his public reputation, “the Defence of which he will never abandon tho’ to the undoing of his Family.” Middleton did not abandon the effort, however, publishing two more invectives in 1745 with one more by Dobbs. For Middleton, the motives for entering into, although not necessarily for continuing so stubbornly, the paper war were clear. He needed another ship; command of a vessel was his only livelihood. When the Admiralty asked if

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29 Middleton, Forgery Detected, 6.
30 Barr and Williams, Voyage in Search of a Northwest Passage, vol. I, section IV, docs. 18-19, pp. 312-5.
Dobbs intended to finance a prosecution against Middleton, Dobbs exclaimed that he would not pay for a private suit, but would gladly testify at a court martial, with reference to his publications. Dobbs knew he had the upper hand. Unlike Middleton, the colonial administrator and future governor of North Carolina had no problem financing numerous publications. Furthermore, the inconclusive debate only served to keep his favorite subject, a Northwest Passage, in the public eye. Also, to have a former HBC employee struggle under accusations of bribery and misconduct helped his larger goal of undermining the HBC monopoly. For Dobbs, all publicity was good publicity.

The language of the books is, as might be expected, rather tedious and repetitive, and there is little evidence of a wide readership. What is of interest, therefore, is first, that they felt a need to offer their quarrel to an audience at all, and second, the ways in which they chose to attack each other. The appeal to what both men repeatedly call the “public” suggests that they considered exploratory voyages of sufficient interest and concern to British readers that they could gain a tactical advantage by printing their case. The Admiralty cleared Middleton in 1743, which makes his insistence to publish not one, but five books all the more puzzling. The specific manner in which they criticized each other, mainly by suggesting corruption but also by impugning that the opposition did not adequately understand the geography of Hudson’s Bay, further suggests that each author assumed that the comprehension of geography was central to their reputations. In addition, it implies that geography was legible enough to a sufficient number of stakeholders to be considered a viable tactic in gaining supporters.

31 Ibid, pp. 314.
Both men embarked on their paper-war not to share their expertise of the geography of Hudson’s Bay, but to leverage that expertise to gain their personal goals. They offered conflicting, yet well-documented, views of the geography of the area not because they thought the public would decide whose map was correct, but because the public sphere was the arena in which cultural authority, in geography as in other subjects, was granted and archived. Geography, specifically the geography of locations with likely trade benefits, was a matter of lively debate, and this debate was increasingly conducted in the pages of popular print culture. The debate was far from academic; for Middleton and Dobbs it was a matter of employment, finance, and reputation. While Middleton received another, smaller command in 1745, Dobbs continued to pursue the Northwest Passage. He was a major force in the creation of the Northwest Passage Act of 1745, which established a prize for the discovery similar to that offered for the longitude. Although a new voyage was “the Topic of common Discourse, and of almost universal Expectation,” Dobbs struggled to finance a follow-up to the Middleton expedition. He finally achieved it in 1746-7, without Admiralty support, but the expedition only bred further disappointment and disagreement in print.32

Pacific projections II: The aborted 1749 expedition and the perils of international diplomacy

Although there was fear of a French attempt from the South, there were few rivals in the Hudson’s Bay area to compete with or limit expeditions for the Northwest Passage. The viable passage round Cape Horn, however, remained a matter of considerable disputation. In the official

32 As quoted in Williams, Voyages of Delusion, 140 from Campbell, ed. Navigantium. For more on the 1746-7 expedition, see Williams, Voyages of Delusion, ch. 5.
account, Anson called for more long-range exploratory expeditions to the South Seas, accompanied by highly-trained naval engineers with hydrographic skills. What Anson may not have counted on was the degree to which his account would hinder his ambitious agenda. The Duc de Noailles, former ambassador to Spain and Louis XV’s advisor, “open[ed] and read the relation of the voyage of Admiral Anson to know the ideas and projects of the person who has today perhaps the greatest influence on the affairs of the British Navy.” 33 Both French and Spanish officials read the 1749 French translation of Anson’s account with trepidation; it was in their opinion a “public expression of the aggressive British sentiments” in the South Seas. 34 Anson’s book proved a lingering presence in attempts to reach the South Seas; his voyage remained a mere paper tiger, however, for although he prescribed more voyages, such voyages in peacetime could not be executed without Spanish approval.

In January 1749, Anson reported to his fellow Admiralty Board members that two sloops were to fitted out “to be sent on Discoverys in the Southern Latitude.” 35 By February, the Porcupine and the Raven were being prepared; in March, her intended commander, John Campbell, who had sailed with Anson, ordered further alterations to the vessels. 36 However, just as with the Anson expedition, the preparations were quickly detected by Spanish and French intelligence systems. The spy who sent word of the Porcupine and Raven’s activities was most likely Jorge Juan, a Spanish naval officer. Juan had been one of two Spaniards assigned to

33 As quoted in Mapp, The Elusive West, 294. French officials also discussed the ramifications of Anson’s account and countered with their own proposals, including a suggestion of a Patagonian Passage. See ibid, 287-92.
34 Ibid, 293.
35 TNA ADM 3/60, 19 Jan. 1749 as quoted in Williams, Great South Sea, 258. For a general overview of the events see ibid, 258-60. For many of the important documents reprinted in full, see Alan Frost and Glyn Williams, “The beginnings of Britain’s exploration of the Pacific Ocean in the eighteenth century,” Mariner’s Mirror 83 (1997): 410-18.
accompany French academicians in the Viceroyalty of Peru in the late 1730s and early 1740s. While measuring the arc of a degree of latitude, Juan and his fellow naval officer, Antonio de Ulloa, were called away to help fortify the Spanish coast against Anson’s squadron; Juan traveled to Juan Fernandez Island and round Cape Horn. The officers eventually published a highly-censored opus of their South American adventures, which received considerable attention from the European intellectual community, including the Royal Society. Juan and Ulloa were both named Fellows of the Royal Society and by 1749 Juan was in London using his academic status as a cover for more clandestine affairs.

Naval preparations were carried out in parallel with diplomatic ones. As explained in a letter from the Duke of Bedford, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, to ambassador to Madrid Benjamin Keene, the expedition would proceed in two phases. First, it was meant to enact the “full discovery of Pepys’s and Falkland’s Islands,” as Anson had suggested in his

37 The best work on the French geodesic expedition, and its Spanish attaches, is Saifer, Measuring the New World.
38 Juan and Ulloa’s account was not published until 1748, partially because of Ulloa’s capture when returning across the Atlantic and partially because the Spanish government wanted to vet their report before publication. Ulloa was captured by HMS Deliverance and paroled in Britain in 1746, when was admitted as a Fellow of the Royal Society. There he offered some preliminary reports to the Royal Society, which were translated in the absence of a printed account, which were read to the Fellows March 8 and 29, 1746. TNA ADM 7/839, “An Abstract of Don Antonio de Ulloa’s Journal of the observations made by the French Astronomers and himself in Peru.” For a letter requesting Ulloa’s parole from the Earl of Harrington, Fellow of the Royal Society, see TNA ADM 1/4116, item 44. For earlier Royal Society interest in the geodesic expedition, including Maupertuis’ expedition to Lapland, see RS MS/704, ff. 411, 416-8, 424, 426, 430-5, 437. Juan was admitted as a Fellow in 1749. Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Relación Histórica del Viaje a la América Meridional (Madrid: Antonio Marin, 1748). However, there was no English translation until 1758.
39 Mapp, The Elusive West, 321; Buschmann, Iberian Visions, 51. From the time of his return until his death in 1773 served as the premiere expert within the Spanish government on Pacific affairs. For example, Juan rejected Cosmographer of the Indies, Johannes Wendlingen’s 1757 proposal to sail to the Philippines via yet-to-be-found islands in the South Pacific. Juan objected because he, along with other Spanish intellectuals, had long ago abandoned the idea of substantial terrestrial discoveries left in austral waters. Buschmann argues that the Council of Indies denial of Wendlingen based on Juan’s remarks suggests that the Spanish viewed the Pacific as a protective barrier for their American empire stretching to the Philippines. Unlike France and Britain, the Spanish had ceased by the mid-eighteenth century to believe in chimeras like the Southern Continent. Ibid, ch. 1. For more on Juan and his Pacific ideas, see ibid, 35, 51-2, 89, 113. For Juan’s instructions from the Marques de Ensenada while serving as a spy, see AMN ms. 2162, doc. 2. For Juan’s views on Anson, see AMN ms.812, doc. 14.
account. This was to be followed by a refitting at Brazil for a trip, “into the South Sea, in order to make further discoveries there.” Bedford knew the Spanish would be wary of such plans, “an attempt of this nature may alarm the Court of Madrid, & give them suspicions, that His Majesty, tho’ at present in Peace with that Crown, is preparing to be ready to attack them upon a future Rupture, in a part where they are undoubtedly weak, and of which they must consequently be more than ordinarily jealous.” The Spanish, consulted in London via their ambassador Major General Ricardo Wall, were indeed suspicious, especially so soon after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Spanish Minister Dr. Joseph de Carvajal said that whichever passage the British chose, Cape Horn or the Straits of Magellan, “there is no more difference than the two doors of a single church that have different names according to the streets on which they are situated.” The Spanish wanted the Admiralty to drop the second part of the plan and restrict themselves to surveying Pepys Island and the Falklands. They feared the British would create a settler colony in Western South America, from which they could disrupt trade. Bedford denied this and stressed his intention to “cement more and more the Union and Harmony so happily established between His Crown and that of Spain.” Bedford intimated that the British were willing to give up the second phase, if they were allowed to continue with the first. Once Keene relayed British intentions, however, even this Atlantic stage came under intense scrutiny. Carvajal felt that the expedition was clearly an attempt to undermine the newfound peace and cause mistrust, “That neither He nor any one else could be a Stranger to the Rise & Intent of such an Expedition, since

40 Bedford to Keene, April 24, 1749, BL Add MS 43423, f. 78. Another copy of the letter can be found at TNA SP 94/135, ff. 177-9.
42 Bedford to Keene, April 24, 1749, BL Add MS 43423, f. 78.
it was so fully explained in the printed Relation of Lord Anson’s voyage.” Anson’s account, in the French translation, had been avidly read by Spanish officials, and his evangelical calls for further exploratory missions had caused alarm. Carvajal wanted to retain and protect his country’s imperial possessions, especially in light of superior British naval power.

Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, had written in an earlier letter to Bedford, “I should be concerned, if on a groundless apprehension, an entire Stop was put to the Expedition, that may conduce to the Advantage of other Nations as well as of our own and to the general Improvement of Commerce and Navigation.” Carvajal did not think his apprehensions groundless and he did not trust such lofty statements of transnational benefit. He told Keene:

That if We did not intend to make any Establishment there, what Service could this bare knowledge be of to us? We had no Possessions in that Part of the World, and consequently wanted no Passages, nor Places to refresh in: That he hoped We would consider what Air it would have in the World to see us planted directly against the Mouth of the Streights of Magellan, ready upon all Occasion to enter into the South Seas, where the next step would be to endeavour to discover & settle in some other Islands, in order to remedy the Inconveniency of being obliged to make so long a Voyage as that to China, to refit our Naval Force upon any Disappointment We might meet with in our future Attacks upon the Spanish Coasts, as had happened to My Lord Anson.

In a separate discussion with Spanish minister the Marquis de la Ensenada, Ensenada reminded Keene that an attempt on the South Seas would be seen as an attempt to strip Spain of her colonial possessions by Spain and neighbor France. Whereas Bedford saw increased trade as potentially beneficial to merchants from Britain and (perhaps) other nations, Carvajal saw it as an attempt to choke off Spain’s mercantile monopoly with its colonies’ trade.

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43 Keene to Bedford, May 21, 1749, ibid, f. 86.
44 According to estimates cited by Mapp, in 1754 Spain had 45 ships of the line, 19 frigates, and 30 more large vessels under construction. In 1755, France had 45 ships of the line and 30 frigates, while Britain had 90 and 70, respectively. Mapp, The Elusive West, 355.
45 Sandwich to Bedford, April 14, 1749, BL Add MS 43423, ff. 81-2.
46 Keene to Bedford, May 21, 1749, ibid, f. 87. For Carvajal and Wall’s discussion of the expedition, see their letters of May and June, 1749 in AHN Estado Legajo 4267, vol. 1.
Keene countered, “I told him [Carvajal] it would be difficult to take any Step for the Improvement of Navigation, in procuring a more perfect Knowledge of the World in general that might not be subject to twisted Interpretations, and imaginary Inconveniences.” Keene responded with what he probably thought was a measured defense by framing exploration as an objective, universally beneficial act. Spain was, in Keene’s view, a failure, as they had not capitalized on the opportunity of their Pacific holdings. What was worse, Spain to that time had not shared geographic knowledge with its counterparts, a policy that—from a British perspective—had held back European understanding of the wider globe, “They would keep their Possessions as mysteriously as they can, And think the Utility and Preservation of them depends upon their not being known, nor having any other Possessions or Competition in their Neighbourhood.” Of course, Spanish officials would have disagreed strongly with such an assessment of their approach to the Pacific. As Buschmann reminds us, by the mid-eighteenth century the Spanish had dismissed the Pacific as holding many new resources or lands, instead seeing it “as a barrier protecting the Spanish American colonies.” Any attempt to breach this barrier, no matter how cloaked in objective rhetoric, was a threat to Spanish control. Carvajal did offer, in exchange for the cancelling of the expedition, to show Keene some of the much-coveted archival documents in Spanish possession, but, alas, the diplomats were with the court in Antigiola, and the charts were in Madrid. In 1749, the fear of renewed hostilities trumped exploration; the Porcupine and Raven never sailed.

47 Keene to Bedford, May 21, 1749, BL Add MS 43423, f. 87.
48 Ibid, f. 88.
50 Keene to Bedford, May 21, 1749, BL Add MS 43423, f. 88.
This exchange represents the complex calculus of eighteenth-century imperial politics. In this exchange, Bedford, Sandwich, and Keene saw Britain as an empire of trade, wherein the free flow of knowledge and free range over the seas were interconnected concepts. In effect, their correspondence reveals an attempt to shift the definition of discovery from an emphasis on possession, to one focused on knowledge. This was somewhat disingenuous, however, as the unstated consequence of exploration was that whichever state first claimed an island—in the name of conversion, trade, or even (or especially) knowledge—would still get the chance to exploit it. Carvajal and Major General Wall were not fooled and were representatives of an empire that worked differently. They preferred a closed ocean with limited circuits of information that allow for greater centralization and control. Additionally, Pacific voyages did not occur in a vacuum. The planned expedition came on the heels of the Peace of Aix-la-Chappelle and at a time when Britain was still trying to renew their rights to the slave asiento; possible Pacific gains had to be weighed against conceivable losses elsewhere. Finally, Carvajal’s references to Anson’s recently published account reveals just how quickly geographic knowledge circulated around Europe, as well as the increasing impact of publications on imperial claims. Rhetoric, diplomacy, and publication were all aspects of a fundamental disagreement over how to classify Pacific space: an open ocean of promise vs. a closed protective barrier.

Empires, like individuals that make them, are in a constant state of flux, no more so than when setting out to penetrate little-known regions. In facing the unknown, imperial officials seek precedent and assurance. There was too little of both in this case for either Britain or Spain to risk another war for the gamble of Pacific discoveries. In a letter to the Reverend Aldworth on June 29, 1749 complaining about Spanish officials, Keene reveals the multiple registers in which exploration could be employed by state actors. In contrast to his previous rhetoric, he exclaimed,
“if they would vex us we have matter and ways to vex them in our Turns, without infringing our treaties, and one of my first steps should be setting out upon discoveries in the South Seas.”\textsuperscript{51}

The South Seas were as much a diplomatic weapon to be employed as they were a source of possible knowledge.

**Pacific projections III: new visions of the North Pacific and the a trans-imperial cartographic farce**

In June 1752, Joseph-Nicolas Delisle, astronomer and member of the Delisle geographic dynasty, and Philippe Buache, *premier géographe du roi* and *gèographe adjoint* to the *Académie Royale des Sciences* and Delisle’s nephew by marriage, published a map of the North Pacific (figure 5.4).\textsuperscript{52} It was based on a manuscript map and memoir presented to the *Académie* on April 8, 1750 and was published with the institution’s permission. In it, the geographers presented a view of the region never seen before.\textsuperscript{53} Instead of the tentative, shadowy coastlines or blank space often used to represent western North America, Delisle and Buache presented a landmass riddled with waterways. The dominant feature is a vast “*Mar ou Baye de l’Ouest,*” which stretches from 43° to 60°N. A series of lakes connects Baffin’s Bay to the *Mer du Sud,* while a tiny strait separates Asia from America. Although the coastline remains unconnected in some places, the two French geographers offered the most complete picture of the North Pacific to date. The sources they used to create such a picture would cause a trans-imperial scandal.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{51} TNA SP 94/135, f. 330.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} In addition, the map attempted to improve upon a stereographic projection. Rather than show meridians and parallels meeting in right angles, the chart includes the curve of the earth, with latitude lines radiating in an arc, making it possible to show more area. See “Avertissement” in the “*Carte des Nouvelles Découvertes.*”
\end{itemize}
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Printed. Image reproduced with permission from Barry Lawrence Ruderman Antique Maps Inc.
The map includes the tracks of several ships, including those of recent Russian exploration of Kamchatka and its surrounding seas in the two expeditions led by Vitus Bering (1728-30 and 1733-1743). Delisle was one of the first mapmakers to include the Russian discoveries, as he had served at the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences from 1726-47 and therefore gained access to materials and personnel, including Bering himself. In addition, his brother had sailed with and died on one of the two ships on the second expedition. Delisle received his brother’s papers and incorporated them into his text. However, as revealed in a pamphlet criticizing his memoir, Delisle had not seen all the journals, which made his chart erroneous in several ways, but especially in the truncated track of Bering’s St. Peter and the inclusion of strange lands at 75°N based on inflated newspaper reports. Furthermore, the author, identified as a “Russian Sea-Officer,” accused Delisle of taking credit for Russian work and concealing certain papers from the Academy, “This is a piece of jealousy utterly unbecoming a man of letters, but is greatly aggravated by his being a member of a learned society, where all discoveries ought to be common.” The author, German-born Gerhard Friedrich Müller, Secretary of the St. Petersburg Academy and translator between Bering and Delisle, mentioned that Russian colleagues were hard at work on their own map of the

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54 The first map and description of the first Bering voyage was printed in J. B. du Halde, Description géographique de la Chine (Paris, 1735).
55 His brother, de la Croyere, is credited with many observations by Delisle, yet that credit is wrongly placed, according to the A Letter from a Russian Sea-Officer, to a Person of Distinction at the Court of St. Petersburgh (London: J. Robinson, 1754), 3. de la Croyere was on the ship commanded by Alexsei Chirikov, which sought the chimerical Gama Land, Company’s Land, and Iesso Island at the expense of several crewmen. They searched based on Delisle’s recommendation, as the mapmaker was convinced of their reality. Williams, Voyages of Delusion, 244.
56 The author says that Delisle had heard newspaper rumors in 1742 and had gone so far as to assign those rumors a latitude, when in reality no land existed there. Letter from a Russian Sea-Officer, 25. For the French translation, see Lettre d’un Officier de la Marine Russienne à un Seigneur de la Cour concernant la carte des nouvelles découvertes au nord de la mer du sud, et le mémoire qui y sert d’explication publié par M. de l’Isle à Paris en 1752 (Berlin: Haude and Spener, 1752). For more on the letter, which was also published in German, see Williams, Voyages of Delusion, 259.
57 Letter from a Russian Sea-Officer, 4.
expedition, to correct Delisle’s falsehoods. However, the Russian version of events did not appear until 1758, 58 long after Delisle and Buache’s ideas had spread.

Müller was abashed that Delisle had not shared one particular source with the St. Petersburg Academy, a copy of two letters by an Admiral de la Fonte, from a purported voyage to the North Pacific in 1640. The letters were originally published in London in 1708 in two issues of *The Monthly Miscellany or Memoirs for the Curious*. More recently, the Fonte letters had been reprinted by Arthur Dobbs in his 1744 *An Account of the Countries adjoining Hudson’s Bay*. Delisle’s copy of the letters came from Lord Forbes, British ambassador to Russia.59 Forbes was none other than the third Earl of Granard, the same Granard mentioned by Wager as interested in the Northwest Passage prior to the Middleton expedition.60 An Irish peer who invested in Dobbs’ 1746-7 expedition, it is most likely Granard who brought the Fonte letters to the attention of both Dobbs and Delisle. The letters had also been discussed by Henry Ellis in his account of the 1746-7 expedition, while the first map with Fonte’s discoveries was included in Thomas Drage’s competing account of the same.61 The letters recounted that Fonte had found an

58 Gerhard Friedrich Müller, *Sammlung Russischer Geschicte* (St. Petersburg: 1758). The English translation did not appear until 1761, as *Voyages from Asia to America, for Completing the Discoveries of the North West Coast of America*. Another English edition was released in 1764, with a French edition it 1766. *Voyage et Découvertes Faites par les Ruses le long des côtes de la Mer Glaciale* (Amsterdam: Marc-Michel Rey, 1766). The map included in Müller’s account was first completed in 1754, as indicated in the cartouche.
60 Ibid, 57, 135, 141, 254.
61 Dobbs, *An Account of the Countries adjoining; Henry Ellis, A Voyage to Hudson’s-Bay, by the Dobbs Galley and California, in the years 1746 and 1747, for discovering a North West Passage* (London: Printed for H. Whitridge, at the Royal Exchange, 1748); Clerk of the California [Thomas Drage], *An Account of the Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage by Hudson's Straights* (London: Jonah Warcus, 1748-9), vol. II. For more on these publications and their ties to Fonte, see Williams, *Voyages of Delusion*, 133-5. Drage’s second volume (Feb 1749) discusses Fonte and uses his letters to connect the Strait of Anian and the Northwest Passage. To prove his point, he also uses longitude measurements captured from the Spanish and included in Pascoe Thomas’ appendixes, which would have made Thomas immensely happy. Ibid, 199. For secondary literature on Fonte’s maps and status as fictional, see Warren Heckrote and Edward H. Dahl, “George le Rouge, Vitus Bering, and Admiral la Fonte: a Cautionary Tale about "Cartographic Firsts"” *The Map Collector* 64 (autumn 1993): 18-23; Glyndwr Williams, “An eighteenth-century Spanish investigation into the
inlet near 53°N which led to a series of lakes. While sailing north east, Fonte eventually met with a Boston merchant ship, commanded by a Captain Shapley. One of Fonte’s captains, separated from the Admiral, reported he had found no strait between the Pacific and the Davis Straits, yet had reached 79°N, helped by local indigenous peoples. To the likes of Dobbs, Ellis, and Drage, Fonte’s letters were clear proof of a water network stretching from Pacific to Atlantic.

In his Explication, Delisle excitedly explains that the Fonte letters had a “surprizing conformity” with the Russian discoveries of a coastline in the high latitudes, as well to Buache’s theories for a nearly continuous landmass connecting Asia and America.62 He writes:

The lands and seas discovered by Admiral de Fonte fill up, as may be seen, the whole space which, after all the searches of the Russians, remained vacant for further discoveries, and terminate at the furthest known lands of North America, both towards Hudson and Baffins-bays, to the west of Canada, and the north of New Mexico and California, which throws so great a light on the discovery of a north-west passage to the South-sea, that I thought myself obliged to communicate them to the society.63

Significantly, Delisle also admits that there is little to no evidence to corroborate Fonte’s account. There is no Spanish original extant, which the Académie noted in its register, “There is a translation of an English manuscript, and its contents would be of very great importance, could its authenticity be made out.”64 Delisle himself was partially convinced of the reliability of the letters due to the “opinion in England,” based on the Ellis account, which assures “that there is nothing in Admiral de Fonte’s narrative but what is very credible.”65

62 Delisle’s letter is printed in English translation in the Letter from a Russian Sea-Officer. Quotes in this chapter will come from this edition, although corresponding page numbers in the French original will also be included. Delisle in Letter, 68; Explication, 10.
63 Delisle in Letter from a Russian Sea-Officer, 70; Explication, 11.
64 Delisle in Letter from a Russian Sea-Officer, 82; Explication, 18.
65 Delisle in Letter from a Russian Sea-Officer, 59; Explication, 3.
Other commentators, in Britain and France, did not share the opinion of Delisle and Ellis; nor were they as generous in their skepticism as the Académie. The first of these opponents was John Green, an Irish geographer. Green examined the chart eagerly but was put off by its dubious source material and the interpretation of those sources. He responded to the map in his Remarks, in support of the New chart of North and South America, a memoir to accompany his new six-sheet map of the Americas, published in 1753 by Thomas Jeffreys. The memoir is also an invective against shoddy mapmaking practices and, in particular, the well-respected French mapmakers Delisle, Buache, and Jacques-Nicolas Bellin, head of the Dépôt de la Marine.

In his opening Advertisement, Green admits that he only saw the map, not the accompanying Explication, prior to publishing his main text. However, since reading Delisle’s memoir, he is all the more assured of his arguments, which call the Fonte expedition apocryphal, but also state that Delisle and Buache changed the latitude of Fonte’s inlet from 53° to 63°N, completely undermining the “surprising conformity” between Fonte and the Russian discoveries. Worse, it seems that the copy of the memoir that Green read had been altered with ink to read 63°N, an alteration that smacks of duplicity. This led Green to conclude in the advertisement

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66 John Green is an alias for Bradock Mead. Mead published The construction of maps and globes (London: 1717), which was printed by a conger including John Knapton. Later, as Green, he translated du Halde’s Description géographique de la Chine into English, the volume which contained the map of Bering’s first expedition. He also worked on Astley’s voyage collection, which will be discussed below. From the 1730s, he worked periodically with Thomas Jeffreys, prodigious mapmaker and seller. For more on Green, see G. R. Crone, “John Green: Notes of a Neglected Eighteenth Century Geographer,” Imago Mundi 6 (1949): 85-91; G. R. Crone, “Further Notes on Bradock Mead, alias John Green, an eighteenth century cartographer,” Imago Mundi 8 (1951): 69-70.

67 John Green, Remarks, in support of the New chart of North and South America; in Six Sheets (London: Thomas Jeffreys, 1753), i-ii.
preceding his Remarks, “that Messieurs De L’Isle and Buache…were conscious the Discoveries ascribed to De Fonte were spurious, at the same Time they adopted them.” 68

Green felt it his duty to inform the public of the actions of Delisle and Buache, “two Persons of…Figure in Literature” to safeguard “the Security of Navigation, the Welfare of Geography, and my own Justification, three very important Motives.” 69 Such motives reveal the complex ways in which a map can embody more than information, but also the biases and agendas of their makers and societies. When mapmakers include dubious sources, Green feels, they threaten the lives of sailors who may depend on the charts, but also the livelihood of all geographers. If the public and patrons did not trust that maps are reasonably-close approximations of space, they would have no reason to invest in them as objects relevant for their everyday lives. Exactly what constituted a reasonably-close approximation, of course, is the debate that Green was entering into. Rather than “dazzle the eyes of the public,” Green wished that his fellow mapmakers would offer well-researched and transparently-cited maps. Thus, Green left a dotted entrance for Fonte’s “pretended” Rio del Reyes in his chart. 70

Green offers other advice as to the proper way to make a map, mainly that Britain should create a Dépôt de la Marine, much like France, and that the state should employ mapmakers to ensure their expertise and protection from the market, again, like France. Green freely admits

68 Ibid, iii. Perhaps due to Green’s criticisms, the Dépôt showed considerable interest in Green’s Remarks. There is a translation in the Dépôt’s papers. AN MAR3JJ/442, item 23. They also had an advertisement for Delisle’s Nouvelles Découvertes de l’Amiral de la Fonte. See ibid, item 1. Paul Mapp also mentions that another translation entered the French foreign ministry papers around 1755. Mapp, The Elusive West, 370.
69 Green, Remarks, ii, iv.
70 “Chart containing the Coasts of California, New Albion, and Russian Discoveries to the North, with the Peninsula of Kamchatka, in Asia opposite thereto; And Islands, dispersed over the Pacific Ocean, to the North of the Line,” in “A Chart of North and South America, including the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with the nearest Coasts of Europe, Africa and Asia” (London: T. Jefferys, Feb. 19, 1753). Green similarly marks the Juan de Fuca Strait. For the Fuca story, another tale of cartographic farce and geographic uncertainty, see Williams, Voyages of Delusion, 132-3, 200, 249, 272, 274, 288-9, 293, appendix I.
that France has “brought it [the Care of Geography] to greater perfection than any Nation in Europe,” thanks to their advanced training and consistent patronage. 71 That Green so admires the French geographic knowledge management system while lambasting France’s foremost geographers points to the universal vulnerability of mapmakers when it came to little-known regions. Green was not impugning all of Buache’s and Delisle’s maps, only their choices in particular instances and the boldness with which they presented them. As a complication, Green was no better at making such choices; he confidently included Pepys Island, an island that would be proven as apocryphal as Fonte’s lakes in the 1760s. 72 Furthermore, while Green rejected Fonte as a real voyage and denied that Hudson’s Bay could offer an inlet, he still advocated for a Northwest Passage. 73

No matter how he trained, a mapmaker’s representations were colored by cultural mores and dependent upon the circulation of sources. So few sources existed for the South Seas, and they were of such middling quality, that geographers were forced to fill in the gaps as best they could. Green explains:

Indeed the Relations of Voyages thro’ this Part of the Ocean are so few, and their Journals so imperfect as well as inaccurate, that they are of but little Use for rectifying the Charts. They frequently omit the Latitudes of Places; and seldom mark the Longitudes or Distances. The Relations of the first Navigators, such as Magellan, Gaeta, Mendanna, and indeed all in general through these Seas, are so confused as well as defective, that there is no plotting down the Course with any Certainty. 74

71 Green, Remarks, 3-4.
72 Green, “Chart of South America, comprehending the West Indies with the Adjacent Islands in the Southern Ocean and South Sea,” in “A Chart of North and South America, including the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with the nearest Coasts of Europe, Africa and Asia” (London: T. Jefferys, Feb. 19, 1753); Green, Remarks, 38.
73 Green thinks that there may be a strait over the poles, passing between Norway and Greenland and exiting via Bering’s Strait. Green, Remarks, 25. Green was generally a critical voice of fellow mapmakers, especially his French counterparts, yet he undermined his critique by sometimes obscuring his own sources, as in “Map of the Most Inhabited Parts of New England,” (1755). Matthew H. Edney, email message to author, December 9, 2015.
74 Green, Remarks, 23-4.
Certainty was an elusive quest when contradiction, or worse, silence, characterized the source material. Delisle had said that he believed Fonte true because of the conformity of the letters with the Russian discoveries. Fonte literally filled the gaps for Delisle, a fit he felt justified the inclusion of the information. Green, on the other hand, disliked such false comforts, concluding, “I shall venture, upon the whole, to say, that the Discoveries ascribed to Admiral De Fonte have no real Existence in Nature; and that however commodiously they may help to fill-up a Map of the North-West Part of America, they ought in reality to have no Place there.”

The inclusion/exclusion of information on a map was a fluid process that varied wildly between mapmakers and even within the maps of one person. Paradoxically, Buache and Delisle likely felt they were following the very system that Green advocated, the careful collation and annotation of sources on a map. Delisle read the letters and found them plausible based on everything else he had been exposed to, and from his position as a privileged French savant who made maps as intellectual objects to discuss, as well as to sell. He therefore marked Fonte’s discoveries as definitive in his map. Green read the same letters more skeptically, and saw an opportunity for publicizing his own work by criticizing those who were widely recognized as the most technically-skilled mapmakers in the world.

Green was far from the only dissident voice with regard to Fonte. Luminaries of French cartography also objected to the inclusion of the letters as sources, including Jacques-Nicolas Bellin and Robert de Vaugondy. Others, like Dobbs, had more than cartographic practice in mind when they examined Fonte. In his remarks published alongside the English translation of

75 Robert de Vaugondy, Essai sur l’Histoire de Géographie (Paris, 1755); J.N. Bellin, Remarques sur la Carte de Amérique Septentrionale (Paris, 1755). Interestingly, some of Vaugondy’s maps from the 1770s show the Fonte discoveries, their inclusion an exercise in hypothesis in an attempt to test various theories. For example, see Robert de Vaugondy, Mémoire sur les pays de l’Asie et de l’Amérique, situés au nord de la mer du Sud (Paris, 1774).
the *Letter from a Russian Sea-Officer*, Dobbs calls Delisle and Buache’s chart “fictitious” and derived from “an imperfect abstract of a journal, which at best appears doubtful.” This is a bit rich, as Dobbs himself printed the Fonte letters in his earlier work. In the *Russian Sea-Officer* remarks, he gave reasons for believing the letters to be true, if based on a bad abstract. Dobbs’ critique focused on the mistake of latitude described by Green, which connected Fonte’s lakes with Baffin Bay, not his preferred Hudson’s Bay. Dobbs explains:

> but the fallacy of this chart having been detected in London by Mr. Green, he [Delisle] found himself under a necessity to correct it, and sent a chart to the Royal-Society, wherein he had cut out all these new discovered countries he had laid down in his chart, and brought the whole farther to the southward by 10 degrees, which he had cemented to the remainder of his American and Asian chart, by which means he brought de Fonte’s straight de Ronquillo…to near 62 degrees in Hudson’s-bay.76

Dobbs is correct, Delisle did issue a new state of his chart in September 1752, which appeared before Green’s critique as evidenced by a postscript in his *Remarks*.77

In the September 1752 chart, drawn with help from Bellin, Delisle brought Fonte’s discoveries back to their lower latitude, as well as shrunk the *Mar de l’Ouest* considerably. He attributed the errors in the first map to Buache’s mis-reading of the manuscript letters, an accusation that ended their partnership. It is clear why the second map interested Dobbs; Fonte’s lakes seem to indicate an outlet into Hudson’s Bay. In comparing the two charts, Dobbs concludes, “it is evident he [Delisle] intended to have made use of that doubtful abstract …to prevent any farther attempts of a discovery of a passage to the western ocean from Hudson’s-bay, apprehending it was no advantage to France, whilst the trade and country around Hudson’s

76 Dobbs in *Letter from a Russian Sea-Officer*, 39.
77 Green knew of this new map when he published his *Remarks*, as he mentions the chart’s delivery to the Royal Society. See Green, *Remarks*, postscript.
Bay was given up by treaty to Britain." Just as Green was pleased to have the chance to criticize the highly trained French geographers, so Dobbs was ecstatic in having reason to undermine the Hudson’s Bay Company, whose monopoly he thought unfairly blocked discovery of a Passage. He was also pleased to raise alarm at possible encroachment by the French from New France. These remarks, published in 1754, would have fueled already-high tensions about French-British interaction in North America—the intellectual debate surrounding Fonte’s letters had melded with a larger political struggle for power across the Atlantic.

Delisle and Buache did not back down in the face of criticism. In 1753 both published individual tracts expanding on their geographies of the North Pacific, and both continued to rely on Fonte as a useful source. Buache, indeed, manufactured a complex argument for his continued placement of Fonte’s inlet at 63°N, saying that Fonte encountered the coast at 53°N and then continued north to the inlet. Also, possibly in an attempt to be the premier mapmaker to use Fonte, he backdated his original map to a 1748 manuscript, so as to precede the map included in the second volume of Drage’s account. It is in these publications that the curious could finally learn of the origins of the Mar de l’Ouest that filled both maps of 1752. Both men reveal that the sea was the creation of Joseph-Nicolas’ brother and Buache’s father-in-law, Guillaume Delisle. Guillaume had only ever written of the large inland sea in his manuscript notes, for he feared that if he published its existence than France’s enemies would attempt to find it. Buache and Joseph-Nicolas had no such qualms, rather they leveraged Guillaume’s considerable reputation as the best geographer in the world, a reputation that continued after his death in 1726.

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78 Dobbs in Letter from a Russian Sea-Officer, 39-40.
79 Philippe Buache, Considerations géographiques et physiques sur les nouvelles découvertes au nord de la grande mer...” (Paris, 1753), 13-20, Article III.
80 Delisle, Nouvelles...Fonte, 33-46
81 Williams, Voyages of Delusion, 249.
It is clear that these debates reached a wider audience, although some information that would have fueled further discussion was never allowed to circulate. The June 1752 map appeared in reduced form in the *London Daily Advertiser* in 1752 and *The Gentleman’s Magazine* published an overview of the disagreements in 1754.\(^2\) In Madrid in 1757 appeared *Noticia de la California*, by Padre Miguel Venegas with input by Padre Andrés Burriel.\(^3\) Appendix VII is a careful critique of the Fonte letters. Not only does the author query the issues of latitude as Green did, but he also explains that archival searches of the naval records in Madrid and Cadiz and the *Archivos de las Indias* in Seville, contained no mention of Fonte or his voyage. Furthermore, the authors point out the temporal impossibilities of Fonte and his ships covering as much distance as they claimed in a single season. This intervention, possibly enough to lay the Fonte matter to rest, was conveniently eliminated when the *Historia* was translated to English in 1759.\(^4\) As the English edition was used for the French and Dutch translations, the Spanish contribution to the Fonte debate was silenced. The reason for doing so became clear in the anonymous editor’s forward in the English edition, which is dedicated to supporting the existence of a Northwest Passage, “this is far from being a matter of idle speculation...as the subjects of a maritime power we have the greatest concern in it, since every discovery of this kind must affect our navigation and commerce.”\(^5\) For interested parties like this editor and Dobbs, the Passage had to exist, and they could not afford to eliminate any shred of supporting evidence and were not above silencing contrary evidence.


\(^{3}\) Miguel Venegas, *Noticia de la California* (Madrid, 1757), vol. III, appendix VI and VII.


\(^{5}\) Ibid, preface.
By 1759, France and Britain were at war and any search for the Northwest Passage would have to wait. However, that does not mean that the subject of the Northwest Passage was not still politically charged, especially when one was discussing cartographic representations. Green and other critics were dismayed by the Buache and Delisle maps not so much because they were wrong—for there was no correct geography—but because the selection of sources was not sufficiently rigorous. Part of this dismay stemmed from the fact that, as established savants of the French state, their maps were ensured reproduction. The fixity of certain geographic features depended as much on circulation as on credibility. Despite the reams of paper dedicated to questioning the Fonte account, it continued to be repeated in maps and books until the late-eighteenth century. Was it best to include all the possibilities for a region, or to leave those areas blank? How did one gauge the veracity of a source, especially when it was read in translation? Such methodological questions, when combined with the relative geographic ignorance about the South Seas, made the Pacific a particularly contentious subject. Fonte was not just a wayward story of interest to a few specialists eager to parse the finer points of a little-known area, rather he was a symbol of what could lie in wait for an empire who could harness ships, supplies, and adequate geographic knowledge. First, however, that geographic knowledge had to be vetted by stakeholders including scholars in France and Russia, but also by entrepreneurial mapmakers like Green, and scheming politicians like Dobbs.

Pacific projection IV: The Pacific in voyage collections—from peripheral region to central concern, yet still lost in translation

Beyond maps and voyage accounts, the Pacific was also portrayed within voyage collections that were released throughout the eighteenth century. Previously, we have discussed Hakluyt and Purchas’ views on the Pacific, as well as smaller collections which featured the South Seas prominently, namely An Account of Several Late Voyages (chapter 2). Such collections, big or small, served as vectors for geographic knowledge yet also manipulators of that information due to editorial input and limited space. To show these processes at work, two examples will be analyzed, one showing change over time in two editions of the same collection, the other change over space when a collection crosses borders.

Some voyage accounts and even smaller collections like Hacke’s, usually octavo in size, were taken to sea by mariners. They carried practical navigational information, yet also could give a reader pleasure, as discussed by Pascoe Thomas and Richard Walter. The dual, often overlapping, readerships for voyage accounts was also a feature remarked upon by editors of voyage collections, although they also knew that the large size (usually folio) and multiple volumes of their works precluded them from being brought to sea. Readership was also restricted by the higher price for collections as compared to individual accounts. However, the collections were not always prohibitively expensive. The Churchill’s four volume folio collection, Collection of Voyages and Travels (1704) cost a large sum, £3 10 shillings, but John Knapton offered John Stevens’ A New Collection of Voyages and Travels (1708-10) for only a shilling per
monthly installment. Thus, based on price and size, collections served a slightly different function than individual accounts. This function is explained by voyage collection editor John Campbell:

The peculiar Pleasure and Improvement that Books of Voyages and Travels afford, are sufficient Reasons why they are as much, if not more read than any one Branch of polite Literature…If we are delighted with the strange Things that are presented to us in Voyages and Travels, that Delight, when strictly examined, will be found to arise from learning what we knew not before; and, consequently, is a rational Pleasure. It is therefore a very happy Circumstance in this kind of Reading, that it charms us by a perpetual Variety, and keeps alive that Thirst of Inquiry, which we are apt to lose, when too closely confined to serverer Studies.

Following the example of Hakluyt and Purchas, collection editors sought to provide the reader with easily-digestible abstracts of voyages to all parts of the known world, an exercise that alleviated the tedium of single-subject volumes but also provided useful instruction for rational individuals. Voyage collections, therefore, fall within the larger European Enlightenment intellectual discussion of the search for system and order for the improvement of humanity. The collections were also a place in which their editors could push their own agendas with regard to the places the voyages touched upon.

There was a lull in the publishing of voyage collections in England after Hakluyt and Purchas’ contributions, due to domestic politics and the closed intellectual environment of the EIC and HBC. As Crone and Skelton explain, the Companies “were frequently more interested in developing trade than in promoting discovery, in the secretion of knowledge rather than in its

There was a revival in the genre following the many voyages of the privateers around 1700 and the translation of portions of an influential French collection by Thévenot. One of these new voyage collections was John Harris’ *Navigantium atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca* (1705). Harris was a clergyman, mathematics teacher, and Fellow of the Royal Society interested in disseminating knowledge of natural philosophy to a broader audience. Harris dedicated the work to Queen Anne, in which he argued that knowledge of the whole world serves to underline the superiority of Britain in comparison. He explains:

> And this I dare say, That when either a Man hath actually travell’d the whole world over himself, or carefully consider’d the Accounts which those give us that have done so, he will be abundantly convinced, that Our own Religion, Government and Constitution is, in the Main, much preferable to any he shall meet with Abroad.

This dedication reminds readers that while knowledge of the wider world may begat intellectual improvement, it need not diminish national sentiment.

Harris follows the dedication with a brief note to readers as to the contents of the book, which is arranged in two volumes. The first tells of voyages prior to 1625, i.e. prior to Purchas’ collection, and borrows much from Hakluyt and Purchas. It begins with the most impressive of all navigational feats, circumnavigations. The second volume is of more recent discoveries in Northern Europe, Asia, Africa, India, Europe, and America. A map in the first volume reveals Harris’ intentions to laud the superiority of English navigators, much as Hakluyt did. The world

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92 Harris, ed., *Navigantium*, vol. I, dedication.
map combines narrative with visual aid, marking the tracks of Drake, Schouten, and Dampier. The selection of these three shows how important Harris thinks English mariners were to the history of circumnavigation; two of the three on the map are English. However, the inclusion of Schouten, and the discovery on that voyage of Le Maire’s Strait, also reveals an inclination to laud those voyages that opened trade to more participants. This tendency would only be augmented in the second edition of the *Navigantium*, issued 40 years later by John Campbell.

In part due to the Anson expedition, there was another wave of voyage collections in the 1740s and 50s; like Harris, Campbell’s work had stiff competition. Also like Harris, Campbell issued his collection in two volumes; however, that is largely where the similarities end. Campbell was a historian who had worked on travel literature before. He jettisoned the pre- and post-1625 format and instead listed all voyages chronologically by region: circumnavigations, East and West Indies, Spitzbergen and Greenland, Northern parts of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. As with other voyage collections, the Pacific was not discussed as an autonomous region, rather it was wrapped into America or discussed as part of the

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91 “A New Map of the World, Shewing the Course of Sr. Francis Drake, William Schouten and Capt. William Dampier’s Voyages,” in ibid. Although no maker is listed, the style of the map and the signature of Herman Moll on several maps in the second volume suggests that Moll also prepared this piece. The maps in the second volume are marked as made by Moll and sold by Richard Mount and Thomas Page, Great Tower Hill, London.

92 The third edition of the Churchill collection came out in 1744-6, followed by another edition in 1752. Thomas Osborne, prolific book buyer and seller, compiled *A Collection of voyages and travels...library of the late Earl of Oxford* (London: Printed for and sold by Thomas Osborne, 1745). Osborne also released an edition of Campbell’s *Navigantium* in 1764. Campbell’s main rival was Thomas Astley who released *New General Collection of Voyages and Travels: consisting of the most esteemed relations, which have been hitherto published in any language, comprehending everything remarkable in its kind, in Europe, Asia, Africa and America*, 4 vols. (London: Printed for T. Astley, 1745-7). John Green is most likely the compiler of this collection. However, the expenses of publishing such a large project arrested Astley’s efforts; the final volumes never appeared. The same happened to Campbell’s collection, which never released the promised volume on Africa and America. In France, there was l’Abbé Antoine François Prévost, *l'Histoire générale des voyages*, 15 vols. (Paris: Didot, 1746-1759).

circumnavigations. As circumnavigations were the first voyages discussed in both Harris and Campbell, the South Seas featured importantly. Indeed, their association with the circumnavigations give them prominence as the completion of the globe, “We treat first of the Circum-Navigators, for this plain Reason, that as the Whole is greater than its Parts, so, among Travellers, those are certainly to be placed in the first Class, who have made the Investigation of the whole Globe their Aim, rather than the Discovery of particular Parts.”

Harris wrote during the War of Spanish Succession, hence his applauding of Schouten’s voyage which undermined the Spanish monopoly of the eastern entrance to the Pacific. Campbell labored in the shadow of the War of Austrian Succession. However, Campbell seems less concerned with European rivalries than the expansion of free trade, which he considers as the best way to strengthen a nation. In this vein, Campbell disdains the protective nature of the EIC and HBC, a policy wherein “each Company is to have its Right, and the Nation in general no Right at all.” Although not as bombastic as Dobbs, Campbell would also have preferred private, unincorporated interests to expand commerce. Rather than royalty, Campbell dedicates his collection to the “Merchants of Britain,” who create “the happy Effects of Commerce” which is “conducive to the common Benefit of the human Species.” He is far more explicit than Harris in his views on the need to expand trade; without aggressive commerce, Britain may wither in strength, as Campbell felt the Dutch had.

Commerce is intimately tied to naval power, Campbell explains, for “whoever was Master at Sea, must be Master at Land likewise.” Furthermore, Campbell encouraged voyages

97 Ibid, 334.
98 For just a few examples of this argument, see ibid, preface, xv, 65, 84, 149-50, 183-4, 317-8, 367.
99 Ibid, preface.
intended for discoveries of new lands as part of the expansion of trade. To attain information
about the commerce of other nations is “The great End of Voyages and Travels,” and the duty of
voyage collections to convey.\textsuperscript{100} To read of the great navigators of the past is to be inspired to
repeat such feats in the future. Although he does not agree with Anson that military engineers
should lead “such vast Designs,” he does agree that it would be for the good of the British nation
to organize voyages to distant places, in peace-time as well as war.\textsuperscript{101} Observations and
measurements, the main goal of Middleton and Anson, are bi-products for the pragmatic
Campbell. However, all the commentators of the 1740s converged on the idea that long-range
exploratory expeditions, however they were funded and commanded, should be prioritized,
intentional, and based on careful study of past voyages and new navigational methods.

The South Seas are discussed at length by the editor. He downplays the difficulties of a
Pacific voyage to highlight the possibilities of such voyages.\textsuperscript{102} Specifically, Campbell
prescribes a search for the Southern Continent, or continents, that he believes lies in southern
latitudes.\textsuperscript{103} To explain his confidence in the existence of \textit{Terra Australis Incognita}, Campbell
includes an appendix containing, “a very large Memorial of a Spanish discoverer, who not only
conjectured, that there were such Southern Countries, but actually saw, examined, and reported
what he met with in them, and what might be expected from a Trade carried on with their

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, xi.
\textsuperscript{102} Crone and Skelton, “English Collections of Voyages and Travels, 1625-1846,” 93. For example, the Shelvocke
expedition, largely seen as a failure by Admiralty, officials, and readers alike, could be viewed more optimistically,
Campbell argues. Rather than focus on its failure, readers should focus on its goals, and how they could be achieved
with a more skilled crew and better resources. Campbell, ed., \textit{Navigantium}, vol. I, 240. He makes a similar argument
with regard to Anson’s hardships, imploring readers to imagine the riches Anson could have captured if the Severn and
Pearl hadn’t turned back. Ibid, 364-5.
\textsuperscript{103} In the section on Tasman’s voyages, Campbell surmises that New Guinea, Carpentaria (land bridge between New
Holland and New Guinea), New Holland, van Diemen’s Land, and Quiros’ discoveries are one continent, with
another continent to the east of New Zealand. Ibid, 330-1.
Inhabitants.”104 Campbell was speaking of none other than Quiros. In a map of New Holland, which contains much blank space to convey only “actual” discoveries, a text box explains the confidence with which Campbell, with the help of mapmaker Emanuel Bowen, conceived of *Terra Australis*, “It is impossible to conceive a Country that promises fairer from its Situation, than this of Terra Australis; no longer incognita, as this Map demonstrates, but the Southern Continent Discovered.”105

How could commerce spread to the southern lands? Campbell suggests that a trade colony be set up on Juan Fernandez Island, a thought reminiscent of the proposals used to plan the Anson expedition. More importantly for South Seas commerce, Campbell argued forcefully, was the final discovery of a Northwest or a Northeast Passage. Such a passage would open new trade but also link British claims in Hudson’s Bay to purported claims on California by Drake. Supposedly, an Indian prince had given all his lands to Drake when he visited the area in the late sixteenth century. Harris had also mentioned the episode in the original collection:

> The Admiral accepted of this new offer’d Dignity, as Her Majesties Representative, in her Name, and for her Use; it being Probable, whether made in jest or in earnest, by these Indians, some real Advantages might hereafter redound to the English Nation…In this Country the Spaniards had never set footing, nor did they ever discover the Land by many degrees to the Southward of this Place.106

In a typical display of his expansive editorial style, Campbell repeated Harris’ text, yet added his own analysis at the end of the section on Drake that assumes the existence of a northern passage:

> The same Spirit led him to proceed farther North in America, than the Spaniards themselves had done; that is, to the Height of 38 of North Latitude, beyond which we know nothing with Certainty even at this Day. The Description he has given us of the Country and People is very exact; and his taking Possession of it, and bestowing on it the

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104 Ibid, 63. For more on the Southern Continent, see ibid, 62-5, 183.
Name of Nova Albion, was very prudent, and may some time or other be discovered by the North-west, the Spaniards can never dispute with us the Possession of this Country, which is probably the nearest to the Passage, even upon their own Principles; since they must allow us to have been the first Discoverers, and first Possessors; which gives us altogether as good a Right to that, as they have to any Part of their Indies.\textsuperscript{107}

Despite his pugnacious, nationalistic words, Campbell opts for a more appeasing tone elsewhere, where he explains that the discovery of a Passage would surely benefit the finder nation, but also Europe more broadly.\textsuperscript{108}

However conciliatory Campbell could be at times, his re-edited version of Harris’s collection augmented the nationalism already present, while adding strong opinions about South Seas exploration. The interim of 40 years had witnessed a waning of British involvement in the South Seas, a trend that Campbell hoped that the Anson expedition and collections like his could help to change. Other countries, like Spain, may treat Quiros’ discoveries as “absolute Romances,” but Campbell was convinced that a continent existed.\textsuperscript{109} In the face of such accounts as Shelvocke’s failure, the wreck of the \textit{Wager}, and Anson’s difficulties, Campbell saw only what might have been had the skies cleared, ships stayed whole, men not died. For the country with the vigor to seek it, and he hoped it was Britain, the South Seas offered near-infinite promise. Indeed, it seemed to offer more promise in 1744 than when Harris examined the same voyages in 1705, demonstrating the power of an editor.

Not only could editorial content shift over time, but also across linguistic and national borders. In 1756, Charles de Brosses, president of the Burgundy parlement and prominent intellectual, released the first voyage collection to focus exclusively on the South Seas. The two-

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, 183-4.  
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid, 65.
volume work, *Histoire des Navigations aux Terres Australes*, made important conceptual contributions to Pacific geography, as well as laid out a detailed agenda for continued exploration of the South Seas.\textsuperscript{110} He also connected the Pacific region to larger Enlightenment debates about human development.\textsuperscript{111}

de Brosses’ goal was to detail the discoveries of every explorer from Magellan to Anson to better delineate where new voyages might search. To organize the historical material, he split the South Seas into three distinct regions: *Magellanie*, *Polynésie*, and *Australasie*. The first refers to the waters near Tierra del Fuego, including the *Malouines* or Falkland Islands. *Polynésie* encompasses the numerous islands located roughly between the equator and the Tropic of Capricorn which stretch across the expanse of the *Mer Pacifique*. *Australasie* is New Holland (Australia) and the surrounding islands. For the first time, the Pacific was not divided primarily by ships’ tracks and galleon routes, but by ordered, if arbitrary, geographic regions. Simple, unadorned, yet detailed maps of each, by Robert de Vaugondy, assist the reader in understanding the boundaries of each region. By contrast, a long pull-out insert map shows the interaction of these now separate spaces, as well as links the Pacific to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans to show interconnections across the entire southern hemisphere. It also highlights how empty space might conceal more lands.\textsuperscript{112} de Brosses’ terms remained in use throughout the eighteenth

\textsuperscript{110} de Brosses, *Histoire des Navigations*.
century. His divisions would also inspire further splicing in the nineteenth century, most famously when Dumont d’Urville created his racially-inflected Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia.\textsuperscript{113}

The second aspect of de Brosses’s collection that should be highlighted is his aggressive call for further exploration funded by the French crown. The impetus for the collection came from de Brosses’ reading of Maupertuis’ \textit{Lettre sur le progress des sciences} (1752), which advocated for increased Pacific and Northwest Passage voyages.\textsuperscript{114} He suggests that the French crown, more powerful than merchants or companies, should lead the charge to search for southern lands; new place names, trade, expanded colonial holdings, and glory would be their reward.\textsuperscript{115} As a likely spot for directing trade between \textit{Magellanique} and \textit{Polynesie} and the East Indies, de Brosses recommends not Juan Fernandez, but New Britain, discovered by Dampier.\textsuperscript{116} French ships should carry out a slow census of islands, searching for new landmasses along the way and establishing outposts too.\textsuperscript{117} Although his books treat only the \textit{Mer Pacifique} south of the equator, de Brosses suggested that someone should prepare a similar program for the northern Pacific, divided into two regions for the waters near Tartary and those near North America. Such systematic analysis would answer “les fameuses questions des deux passages de

\textsuperscript{113} d’Urville also included a fourth division, Malaysia, but the racial hierarchy was tripartite with Polynesia considered the most desirable (and lightest). For more on the fascinating story of the names for Oceania, see Douglas, “\textit{Terra Australis to Oceania}.” Douglas and Ryan carried on a debate about the kinds of knowledge which shaped Pacific ethnography. In addition to the Ryan article cited in the previous note, see Bronwen Douglas, “Seaborne Ethnography and the Natural History of Man,” \textit{Journal of Pacific History} 38 (2003): 3-27; Tom Ryan, “On ‘Reflectivity,’ ‘Accuracy,’ and ‘Race’: A Note on an Underarm Footnote,” \textit{Journal of Pacific History} 39 (2004): 251-3; Bronwen Douglas, “Notes of ‘Race’ and the Biologisation of Human Difference,” \textit{Journal of Pacific History} 40 (2005): 331-8. Concerns raised in this debate are a major topic in Douglas’ recent monograph, \textit{Science, Voyages, and Encounters in Oceania}. Rainer Buschmann discusses the debate as one between revealed (Ryan) and encountered (Douglas) knowledge, which he then applies to the Spanish context in Buschmann, \textit{Iberian Visions}, see especially 5, 38-40.

\textsuperscript{114} De Brosses, \textit{Histoire des Navigations}, vol. I, i; 2.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, iv, x.


nord-est et du nord-ouest.” It was to encourage activities such as these that de Brosses prepared his erudite collection, which he hoped would bring “much glory to the nation, and great benefits to commerce.”

Tom Ryan argues that de Brosses’ carefully-edited work marks a shift in the nascent field of anthropology, “from a gaze dominated by the monstrous and the fantastic to another more deliberately rational and scientific.” While some of de Brosses’ readers, especially his fellow savants, were probably pleased with his broadening of the discussion of human development to include the fifth part of the world, others were equally, if not more, interested in his discussions of what riches further Pacific expeditions might offer a nation. One such reader was James Callander who published *Terra Australis Cognita*, based in large part on an English translation of de Brosses, in three volumes in 1766-9. In the process, he appropriated de Brosses’ arguments while shifting their benefits from France to Britain at a time when Pacific voyages had returned to the spotlight in both France and Britain. Callander, a Scottish antiquarian, elected to keep de Brosses’ format of five books: the first explaining the technical aspects of navigation, one book for each region, and one advocating further exploration and settlement. Interestingly,

118 Ibid, vol. I, x
119 Ibid, ii
120 Ryan, “Le Président des Terres Australes,” 248. For all his erudition and scholarly background, de Brosses was as unable to avoid possibly fraudulent sources as any other person examined in this chapter. He included the unverified account of Gonneville by Paulmier (chapter 2). See de Brosses, *Histoire des Navigations*, vol. I, 102, 117. However, de Brosses joined his mapmaker Vaugondy in condemning the Fonte account as apocryphal. See the discussion in Williams, *Voyages of Delusion*, 255-6.
121 There was also a German translation in 1767. Charles de Brosses, *Vollständige Geschichte der Schifffarthen nach den noch größentheils unbekanten Süßlaündern* (Halle: Bey J.J. Gebauer, 1767).
Callander cited Harris’ *Navigantium*, but it is likely that Callander actually used Campbell’s *Navigantium* based on numerous instances of verbatim copying.\(^{122}\)

Callander begins his preface magnanimously, graciously referencing his predecessors Maupertuis and “one of the members of the French Academy of Sciences,” de Brosses. He suggests that de Brosses’ two-volume work was important, for its “very great helps for prosecuting a discovery.” Such a discovery would elevate the navigator to the heights of fame, but would “also be productive of the greatest commercial advantages to his native country,” whichever country that may be.\(^{123}\) After that brief paragraph, however, Callander drops any pretense of openness and instead shifts to explaining why his native country, above all others, would be better to carry out the expeditions that de Brosses thought should be executed by the French crown. While the “French writer” had gathered together the materials on the South Seas, “it appears, to the honour of our country [Britain], that the best and surest accounts of the Terra Australis are deduced from our own navigators, Drake, Narborough, Cavendish, Dampier, and others.”\(^{124}\) Much like Campbell, Callander thought that his collection would serve to “awaken the attention of those who have it in their power to promote the naval empire of Great Britain, to

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\(^{124}\) Ibid, para. 2.
undertake the formation of settlements in a part of the world hitherto unoccupied by any European potentate.”\textsuperscript{125}

Callander freely admits that his French predecessor had similar intentions, but de Brosses wrote in 1756, when France was winning the Seven Years War. From Callander’s vantage point a decade later, France could no longer sustain such lofty goals. Rather, France’s aims should become those of a victorious Britain, now the dominant global maritime power. By offering de Brosses in English, Callander erased the French presence from the text. He replaced it, with support from strongly-worded editorial content, with his own country. Callander’s blatant appropriation was not an aberration, but a particularly prominent example of the changes that result when geographic knowledge circulates across linguistic and national borders. It is also indicative of the competitive way that the Pacific was discussed by editors, mapmakers, and diplomats from Russia, France, Spain, and Britain in the mid-eighteenth century.

Conclusion

By 1766, when Callander released the first volume of his translation, the controversies and debates that had percolated for the past quarter century were coming to a head. Where was the entrance to the Northwest Passage and who had a right to look for it? Was the southern continent lurking just beyond the next island, awaiting discovery? Were long-range exploratory expeditions to be planned by merchants, as Campbell argued, or by naval engineers, as Anson suggested? Pacific geographic anxiety had real affects not only for high-level diplomacy, as the aborted 1749 expedition shows, but also for the individuals involved in paper wars, as

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid, para. 3.
Middleton’s sad fate and Green’s fiery words illustrate. Voyages and their chronicles were always executed in the shadow of imperial rivalries; geographic knowledge was never objective in its gathering or dissemination.

This chapter has sought to highlight the ways in which the Pacific was present in the public sphere even as fewer European ships crossed Pacific waters. Whenever the South Seas featured in maps, voyage collections, periodicals, or diplomatic correspondence, it sparked controversy and engendered hostility. The Anson expedition, discussed in chapter four, was part of a larger current of European preoccupations with the Pacific, as Paul Mapp has argued in the context of political interactions between France, Spain and Britain. This chapter reveals that such preoccupations were intimately intertwined not only with European politics, but also in discussions of mapmaking practice, joint-stock companies, and the transnational circulation of printed materials. No one had an effective monopoly on Pacific geographic knowledge, yet no one seemed to have enough of it either. The Pacific as a printed commodity and as a tempting idea would only gain more prominence with a series of South Seas expeditions in the 1760s. These voyages were informed by Anson, Dobbs, de Brosses, and Campbell, yet also Narbrough, Dampier, and Hacke. They were intended to settle the geographic mysteries of the region once and for all.
CHAPTER 6: “A PROPER PERSON TO WRITE THE VOYAGE”: 1 COORDINATION, CONFRONTATION, AND CREATIVE PUBLISHING, 1764-1773

The 1760s are often viewed by scholars as the initiation of a more systematic, scientific European engagement with the Pacific, but this chronology minimizes the many ties the expeditions of Byron, Wallis, Carteret, and Cook had to previous voyages. These navigators are typically framed as correcting the errors of antecedents, but such a progressive analytical approach does not give credit to the persistent presence of Dampier, Halley, and Anson’s contributions in attempts to capture the specificity of a still unspecific waterscape. This is not to say that the 1760s expeditions were simply echoes of past voyages. Whereas the technical, natural historical, and natural philosophical innovations of the voyages have been studied in detail, 2 scholars have not discussed the corresponding experiments in publication in the same

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1 Fanny Burney, The early diary of Frances Burney, 1768-1778: with a selection from her correpondence, and from the journals of her sisters Susan and Charlotte Burney (London: George Bell & Sons, 1889), vol I, 134.
Admiralty Commissioners engaged in a decade-long attempt to control how the voyages were presented to European reading audiences, an effort threatened by objections from imperial rivals and competition from unauthorized publications. This chapter will examine the diverse print materials and the voyages from which they stemmed, culminating in what was supposed to be the Admiralty’s flagship publication, the Hawkesworth compilation of Byron, Wallis, Carteret, Cook, and Joseph Banks’ journals. By the time of the first Cook expedition, exploration had become dependent on publication for its legitimation in the eyes of international diplomacy and the intellectual community. While this connection between print and geographic claims was certainly solidified by the 1760s, precisely how to create the optimum voyage account for diverse audiences was still a matter of considerable debate, suggesting that the legitimation of geographic knowledge was just as, if not more, tenuous in 1768 as it was in 1669.

During the Seven Years War Britain gained considerable colonial concessions from France, but also took Manila from the Spaniards in 1762. Perched on the western edge of the Pacific, British officials saw this as a great opportunity to increase their commerce in the Indian Ocean and harm Spanish trade and pride. Alexander Dalrymple, hydrographer for the EIC and Fellow of the Royal Society, pushed government officials to also cast their eyes eastward,
suggesting they take a port in California to control the galleon route. However, British military leaders saw Manila as leverage, not a permanent settlement, and ransomed the city in 1764. By then, plans were already underway for British ships to enter the Pacific from the more traditional eastern route. In peace, the imperial gaze of Britain and France fell increasingly on the South Seas, much to the consternation of Spain. France, reeling from years of conflict, was unable to pursue this interest seriously. The British Admiralty, by contrast, took it upon themselves to organize a voyage to better know the geography and commercial possibility of the Pacific region.

Wielding and expanding the printed archive: the 1760s expeditions

1. Byron: Dueling archives and libraries, publications, and observations

On July 3, 1764, the *Dolphin* and its escort, the *Tamar*, sailed from Plymouth. Their commander, the Honourable John Byron, had served with Anson a quarter century previously as a midshipman in the *Wager*; he was one of the few survivors when the ship wrecked. Originally, the *Dolphin* and *Tamar* were intended for the West Indies, just as Narbrough and Anson had been. As recently as June 18, however, the ships’ destination changed to the East Indies, where Byron was to take possession of the fleet. Special preparations—including additional officers, promises of higher pay, and the prohibition of servants—paired with technical innovations—like copper sheathing and a trial device to purify “stinking” water—

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5 The latest treatment of the event, which includes many transcribed primary documents, is by Byron descendent Rear Admiral Kit Layman, *The Wager Disaster: Murder, Mutiny and Mayhem in the South Seas* (London: Uniform Press, 2015).
6 TNA ADM 2/234, March 9, 1764.
7 Whereas receiving third rate pay was not unprecedented, the double wages were a rare concession by the Admiralty. For the officer complement, see ADM 2/1332, June 17, 1764, ff. 48v-r. Some of the extra pay was meant to off-set the loss of the officers’ servants.
indicated that this was far from a typical voyage to the East Indies. The misdirection about the ships’ intentions was convincing, as the EIC and the Cabinet seemed to have been in the dark.\(^9\) Why the subterfuge? The answer to this question lies in the secret instructions carried by Byron to sea, “having got clear of the land, you are to open the inclosed sealed packet and follow such Instructions as are therein contained for your farther proceedings.”\(^10\) Inside the packet was an outline for a South Seas voyage of grand proportions: a search for the elusive Pepys Island, a survey of the Falklands, and a hunt for the Northwest Passage—this expedition was Anson’s aborted 1749 expedition paired with Dobbs’ dreams. Byron was to carry out the very expedition that had so angered the Spanish 15 years previously, and this required total secrecy.

Byron’s orders were heavy with rhetoric reminiscent of Keene’s arguments with Carvajal, or perhaps the works of Walter and Campbell. The instructions famously begin:

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Whereas nothing can redound more to the honor of this Nation as a Maritime Power, to the dignity of the Crown of Great Britain, and to the advancement of the Trade and Navigation thereof, than to make Discoveries of Countries hitherto unknown, and to attain a perfect Knowledge of the distant Parts of the British Empire, which though formerly discovered by His Majesty’s Subjects have been as yet but imperfectly explored.\(^11\)
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The goal of increasing trade was a constant in these orders as it had been in previous voyages, yet the desire for “perfect Knowledge” reveals a new construction of British imperial space, one which included the South Seas explicitly. Byron was to search for Pepys Island, then to establish a British presence in the Falklands. After provisioning, he was to systematically cruise the South Atlantic searching for other islands before proceeding to Drake’s New Albion, which “has never been examined with that care which it deserves, notwithstanding frequent recommendations of that Undertaking by the said Sir Fran/s Drake, Dampier, & many other Mariners of great Experience, who have thought it probable that a passage might be found.”

The drafters of the instructions, most likely Lord High Admiral Egmont and perhaps Lord Sandwich, now took seriously the myriad calls for further exploration that had previously inspired merchants. Once in the north, Byron was to search for the Northwest Passage, returning either via the Passage or by crossing the Pacific to China.

Byron’s instructions were intended to secure British footholds to and in the South Seas. First, he sought Pepys Island, Yet, he quickly became “certain there can be no island as mentioned by Cowley & laid down by Halley.” After the fruitless search, Byron led his ships to the Straits of Magellan to wood and water. In the precise spot where Byron calculated that the

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12 Gallagher, ed., Byron's Journal, “Secret Instructions,” 3. While en route to the Straits of Magellan, Byron was to search for Wager survivors, those men stranded on the east coast of South America by Bulkeley and Cummins. Williams surmises that the latitudes included for New Albion, 38° or 38°30’ North, indicate that the Admiralty was influenced by the controversial Buache/Delisle maps discussed in chapter 5. See Williams, Voyages of Delusion, 274.
14 December 7 and 10, 1764, NMM JOD/58. For more on the search for Pepys Island, see Chambers, “Where was Pepys Island?” Byron consulted not only Cowley and Halley onboard. He had also certainly read de Brosses before embarking and carried Bulkeley & Cummins’ Wager account. Anson’s voyage is cited (November 16, 1764, NMM JOD/58), as is Narbrough, though Byron found him confusing (November 18 and 19, December 20, 1764, ibid). Byron also kept several maps for consultation, as he mentions with regard to Sebald de Weert’s islands (December, 14, 1764, ibid).
Wager navigators had seen horsemen 25 years before, Byron also met with a large group of apparently very tall horsemen. He then sailed to the Falklands, where he planted a flag at Port Egmont and made several charts, thus claiming, in his mind, the territory. Unbeknownst to Byron, however, the Frenchman Bougainville had already declared the island a French possession earlier in the year and was soon to be in negotiations with Spain to cede the islands to the Spanish Crown. These rival claims set the stage for a long-burning imperial dispute.

They also reveal the renewed importance of Pacific access to late eighteenth-century imperial expansion. On February 24, 1765 Byron sent a letter to the Earl of Egmont via the store ship Florida, a letter Egmont received June 22, 1765. Byron’s letter told of meeting the tall Patagonians and his initial impressions of the Falklands, in which he erroneously claims “that We are the first Ships that ever have been there since the Creation.” Egmont shared this letter with the Duke of Grafton on July 20, marking, extraordinarily, the first time that anyone outside the King and a few Admiralty officials knew of the voyage. In his forwarding note, Egmont warned that the French were now attempting a settlement; news of Bougainville’s voyage had also reached Britain. Egmont urgently counseled Grafton to rally the Cabinet to order an expedition to safeguard the islands for Britain. To make his case more convincing, Egmont included with Byron’s letter and charts a dossier of extracts of all the printed journals that mentioned the islands since Hawkins’ initial contact in 1594. His sources included Harris’

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15 At the close of the Seven Years War, the French state was interested in, yet unable to fund, a search for new colonies. Private individuals took up this mantle, including Louis-Antoine de Bougainville. Bougainville sailed to the Falklands, or the Malouines as the French called them, named for the buccaneers of St. Malo. He established Port Saint-Louis in February, 1764. However, both the British and the Spanish objected to such a claim. To ensure harmony in the Family Compact, Bougainville negotiated a transfer of the islands to Spain in meetings in Madrid in April and September 1766. He formally returned the islands on April 1, 1767, before continuing on his circumnavigation across the Pacific. See John Dunmore, ed. and trans., The Pacific Journal of Louis-Antoine de Bougainville 1767-1768 (London: The Hakluyt Society, 2002), xix-d. For more on the French colonial context post-1763, see Mapp, The Elusive West, ch. 13.

16 Gallagher, ed., Byron’s Journal, appendix II, doc. 1, 156.
Navigantium, Dampier, Edward Cooke, Woodes Rogers, the English translation of Frezier, the Philosophical Transactions, Anson, and, of course, Hakluyt and Purchas. 17

Why did these islands merit such research? The Falklands were “the Key to the whole Pacifick Ocean,” explained Egmont, “It will render all our Expeditions to those parts most lucrative to ourselves, most fatal to Spain, & no longer formidable tedious, or uncertain in a future War…” In a throwback to Sir Charles Wager, Egmont hypothesized that the best way to harm their Spanish foe was to harass its trade in the Pacific. Thanks to Anson’s expedition and the Seven Years War, conflicts between imperial rivals were now assumed to be global affairs, marking the South Seas as a viable theater of operation. Egmont also had less bellicose plans for the region:

What Farther Advantage may be desired from discoveries in all that Southern Tract of Ocean both to ye East and West of the Magellanick Streights, it is not possible at present to foresee: but those Parts (now almost entirely unknown) will from such a Settlement be soon and easily explored—and a Trade may be probably carried on with Paraguay, the Brazils &c hereafter with great Facility, and great Profit from this Island, at wch in Time of Peace and War.

Egmont’s comment recasts an old concept: the incorporation of the region into a global trading network characterized by free navigation of the open seas. Whereas the waters “East and West of the Magallanick Streights” remained “almost entirely unknown,” Egmont was confident that British ships could soon discover the advantages likely to hide there. Reports from previous expeditions had made the Straits themselves “now well known,” as were the coasts of the Americas to present-day California. 18 The Pacific was solidifying geographically into known and unknown, but all was conceived as open to imperial reach.

17 The dossier and letters are in TNA SP 94/253. They are also transcribed in Gallagher, ed., Byron's Journal, appendix II, docs. 1-4.
18 All quotes in this paragraph from ibid, doc. 2, p. 161.
The Spanish persuaded Bougainville to give up his claim for France in April, 1766 and increased diplomatic pressure on the British. Both sides utilized their geographic knowledge to bolster their claims; at one point the Spanish ambassador to London, the Prince of Masserano, wielded a map of the South Seas, which showed the Falklands, Pepys Island, and Juan Fernandez Island, explaining, “There are many others [islands] that are not marked on English maps, but which are known and we traffic among them…to the Philippines…all of that ocean is ours, and no nation can navigate upon it.” This was a dispute over the form and availability of geographic knowledge as well as the freedom of navigation. The Spanish called on their closed archive of largely manuscript materials to reinforce their arguments. While a diplomat might periodically show a document as Masserano did, theirs was an archive they would not and did not think they should have to share with rivals. The British, with a shorter and less dense history in the South Seas, depended on their own information bank, but theirs was more comparable to a library as their materials were almost all printed and widely available. Duration of use and the quantity of voyages were not as persuasive to the British as they were to the Spanish; what mattered was the ability to prove the possession of geographic knowledge, not the declaration of

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19 See note 15 for details of Bougainville’s negotiations with the Spanish government. Captain McBride in the Jason arrived in the Falklands in January 1766, discovering the French settlement in December 1766. British naval officers defied first the French, then the Spanish before finally surrendering their own claim in spring 1770. However, they did not vacate their settlement until 1774. For an overview, see Gallagher, Byron’s Journal, xxxviii-xl.ii. The Falklands had long been known, or at least suspected to exist, as they were marked “I. Nouvelles pue commues” in a 1739 map of the French Atlantic. BL K.Mar.1.(32). British correspondence: TNA ADM 2/1332, 68r-73r, 76v-80r, 103r-105r, 139v-140r. 159v-162r; TNA SP 94/253, Letter from Egmont to Duke of Grafton, July 20, 1765; TNA PRO Pitt Papers 30/8/94/2, f. 219r-224r; TNA SP 78/272/43, February 12, 1767. For Spanish correspondence, see AGI Estado 44.n.61, August 8, 1767; AGI IG 412; AHN Estado 4259, vol 1, Masserano to Grimaldi, May 27, June 17, June 24, 1768. For a 1770 British map showing a smoothing-over of conflict, see BL Maps K.Top.124.88., in which the toponyms are practically all English, the tracks of the Jason and Carcass surround the islands, and the French are confined to their tiny settlement, marked in green.

20 For Masserano’s frustrating discussions about Byron with British ministers, see AHN Estado 4271, vol. 1, Masserano to Grimaldi, June 20, 1766; July 7, 1766; September 26, 1766 (use of map); October 2, 1766; November 13, 1766. Ibid, vol. 2, Grimaldi to Masserano, August 4, 1766. As negotiations continued, the matter of Falklands establishments became tied to continuing negotiations over the Manila ransom. AHN Estado 4269, vol. 1, Grimaldi to Masserano, January 20, 1767 (multiple letters); ibid, vol. 2 Maserrano to Grimaldi, April 11, 1767 (two letters).
its possession. They also felt that their public track record meant they should be free to pursue
more voyages, which the Spanish correctly interpreted as an attempt to challenge their imperial
sovereignty. Regardless of the philosophical stances of diplomats on knowledge management
and navigation, the British were to carry both points thanks to their victory in the Seven Years Wars. The recent conflict had left both Spain and France loath to enter into another clash without extreme provocation. It was not until 1774 that Britain finally turned over the key to the Pacific, but which time the lock had changed and the door was wide open.

Byron, however, knew nothing of this battle of archive and library. With his men suffering from scurvy and nervous about the condition of his ship, Byron elected for a fast passage across the Pacific; indeed, he completed the circumnavigation in a record 22 months.21 Upon his return to Britain, Byron’s documents were immediately seized.22 The general public, however, who had only recently learned of Byron’s voyage at all, would have to wait for the official story.23 His papers and those of all his officers were to be combined with those of another South Seas voyage that was preparing to sail. Byron, unable to discuss his most recent

21 He reached the Scilly Islands on May 7, 1766, 22 months into his voyage. For more on the return of the Dolphin and Tamar, see TNA ADM 2/236, May 13, 30, November 24, 26, 1766; ticket book NMM ADM/L/D/140A/1; Carteret’s signal book NMM HOL/20; watercolors of Juan Fernandez and Masafuera, among others, TNA ADM 344/2258; Signals for Dolphin and Tamar, Byron’s instructions, table of diplomatic code, ADM 1/4352 (bundle); TNA ADM 2/539, May 19, 1766; TNA ADM 2/540, July 18, 1766. For a discussion of Byron’s reputation as a discoverer, see Gallagher, ed., Byron’s Journal, xlv-lxii.

22 His own journal (NMM JOD/58) eventually ended up in the hands of longtime Royal Navy Secretary Stephens. Clearly the journal was a naval treasure of immense value to the men who possessed it. It contains the following inscription, “E libris Sandwich. July 1849. This book was given me by Rear Admiral Sir. W. A. Montagu at Ryde. Sir W/m had it from Lord Ranelagh who inherited it from Mr. Stephens formerly Secretary to the Admiralty.”

23 As late as May 3, 1766, the papers reported that the ships “intended to reinforce the Hon. Commodore Byron in the East-Indies have lately had their routs changed...” Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London, England), Saturday, May 3, 1766; Issue 11 589. Public Advertiser (London, England), Saturday, May 3, 1766; Issue 9827. By May 8, Byron’s return was announced. London Evening Post (London, England), May 8, 1766 - May 10, 1766; Issue 6011. By the end of May, the news of the circumnavigation was out. Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London, England), Tuesday, May 27, 1766; Issue 11 609. In June, the periodicals reported that, after receiving their extra pay, the Dolphin’s crew marched to the Tower to celebrate the King’s birthday and thank Byron for his “tenderness and humanity to them on their late voyage.” London Chronicle (London, England), June 5, 1766 - June 7, 1766; Issue 147. Lloyd’s Evening Post (London, England), June 6, 1766 - June 9, 1766; Issue 1391.
circumnavigation but eager to capitalize on interest in the voyage, chose instead to publish a memoir of his *Wager* experiences.\(^\text{24}\) The Admiralty was fine with Byron’s astute manipulation of the publishing market, as long as he did not interfere with their attempt to create a magnum opus of their most recent Pacific voyages. Despite their best intentions, though, the delay in releasing the authorized collection allowed others to frame the *Dolphin’s* story, and that framework would inspire rival Spain to counter British claims, this time not only in closed-door negotiations, but in printed works.\(^\text{25}\)

While Byron organized his memories of the *Wager* wreck, a more enterprising businessman hurried an anonymous account of the *Dolphin* circumnavigation onto bookshelves. In April 1767, J. and F. Newbery published *A Voyage round the World, in His Majesty’s Ship the Dolphin...By an Officer on Board the said Ship*, a work based on a journal that had escaped Admiralty seizure.\(^\text{26}\) Clearly word of the Admiralty’s publishing moratorium had spread, for several of the officers sought to absolve themselves of responsibility. They took out column space to clear their names:

We are authorised, by the under-mentioned Officers of the Dolphin Man of War, to assure the Public...that neither of us is the Author thereof; that we have not, nor will we presume to publish the Voyage, without obtaining Leave for that Purpose, and that the said Bookseller is entirely unknown to us.\(^\text{27}\)

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\(^\text{25}\) Buschmann, *Iberian Visions*, 86.


\(^\text{27}\) Quote from *St. James's Chronicle or the British Evening Post* (London, England), April 18, 1767 - April 21, 1767; Issue 957. Also in *Public Advertiser* (London, England), Wednesday, April 22, 1767; Issue 10132. The complaint was integrated into the book advertisement in *Public Advertiser* (London, England), Friday, April 24, 1767; Issue 10134. It was also reprinted in John Fransham, *The entertaining traveller; or, the whole world in miniature. Giving a description of every*
The declaration was dated April 15, 1767 and goes on to locate each of the officers, absolving any of the higher ranked commissioned and the warrant officers of responsibility. Scholars have typically attributed the work to Charles Clerke, midshipman. More important than the author’s identity, however, is the decisive action by the officers to present themselves publicly as aligning with the Admiralty’s publishing policies. They knew that if the Admiralty assumed they were behind the book they could lose out on future ship assignments, effectively ending their careers. Like Middleton, they realized it was not enough to present themselves in person or in letter to the Admiralty, as this would not counter the rumors flying at street level. Only a printed notice in prominent periodicals could combat the whispers that threatened their livelihoods.

The officers’ declaration did not stop the book from spreading. It was rushed to reprint in London in 1767, pirated in a Dublin edition of the same year, and released in a third edition in 1768. M. Cooper, publisher of previous hack voyage accounts, also released a condensed version, this time identifying a midshipman specifically as the author. Most importantly, it was quickly translated into German, Italian, and French for European reading audiences. The French edition is how the story of Byron’s findings reached Spanish officials.

thing necessary and curious, 2 vols. (London: printed for Henry Holmes, 1767). Fransham’s work was a reworking of The world in miniature: or, the entertaining traveler, 2 vols. (London: Printed and sold by John Torbuck, 1740).

28 The second edition of the Officer on Board account is also dated 1767, as is the Dublin edition printed for J. Hoey, Senior, et al. A third edition, dated 1768, was printed for Newbery and Carnan.

29 The Midshipman edition is only 104 pages, instead of 192. A Journal of a Voyage round the World in his Majesty’s Ship the Dolphin, Commanded by the Honourable Commodore Byron...By a Midshipman on Board the said Ship (London: printed for M. Cooper, in Pater-noster Row, 1767). Mary Cooper was also responsible for the anonymous An Authentic Account of Commodore Anson’s Expedition (London: Printed for M. Cooper, 1744).


31 The French edition is part of dossier of documents compiled in AHN, Estado 2860. Spanish Minister Aranda wrote Spanish diplomat Ricardo Wall, on December 5, “V. E. habrá leído, como yo, el viaje de Lord Anson, en que descubre nuestro débil de la América, sobre todo el de la meridional, el descuido en que teníamos los puertos útiles desde el Río de la Plata hasta el cabo de Hornos, y continuando el mar del Sur asta la California, hasta tenerlos deshabitados, y una isla como la de Juan Fernández, dominante toda la costa del Perú y Chile, fértel y templada, en igual abandono.” As quoted in Diego Téllez Alarcia, “Anson, Wall y el papel del ‘lago español’ en el enfrentamiento colonial hispano-
In a sharp departure from the previous policy of silence so as not to spread information about foreign incursions to a Spanish audience, the Crown instead approved of a Spanish translation of Clerke’s account. They commissioned Don Casimiro de Ortega to not only translate, but to counter the biased claims that the British author had made against Spain, especially as regarded Spain’s failure to locate the Solomons. In a second edition, de Ortega added an account of Magellan’s circumnavigation to compare with Byron’s, negating much of the novelty celebrated in the English account.\(^{32}\)

The translation was paired with another publishing effort to discredit the claims of the British. Diplomat and historical chronicler Bernardo de Iriarte had found Pedro de Sarmiento’s diary of his voyage in search of Francis Drake in the Biblioteca Real following Byron’s return. Iriarte found an ally in State Minister Grimaldi, who encouraged the publication of the journal to show that the Spanish had advanced geographic knowledge of the Straits of Magellan before the British interfered. The volume appeared in 1768, when it was quickly sent to Spain’s ambassadors in Paris and London. However, Masserano in London was too busy with the Falklands crisis to find an English translator, while the French translation foundered when the Conde de Fuentes and his translator could not secure a publisher.\(^{33}\) It seems that although Spain


\(^{33}\) Information about the publishing process for Iriarte’s volume can be found at AHN, Estado 2860. This Estado also includes an assessment by Jorge Juan of Iriarte’s work. Juan concludes that Sarmiento’s Straits voyage was important for Spanish honor, but did not present a counterclaim, as Byron and Sarmiento were not in the same areas. See ibid, Juan to Grimaldi, January 6, 1768. For Masserano’s initial promise to get the volume translated to English, see ibid, Masserano to Grimaldi, July 29, 1768. For letters on the French translation, see ibid, letters dated July 4, 1768; December 24, 1768; May 26, 1769. Many thanks to Rainer Buschmann for bringing both of these events to my attention in *Iberian Visions*, 85-93. However, I have to disagree with his assertion that, “Difficulties with finding a non-Spanish publisher notwithstanding, Sarmiento and Magellan’s revealed knowledge thus emerged as equal, if not superior, to the accounts of their British counterparts” (92). It is precisely the fact that the Sarmiento diary had trouble
was entering into the print wars that it had previously refused to legitimize, the flows of printed materials and the difficulties of publishing prevented their carefully researched attacks from reaching as wide an audience as the unauthorized Byron account. However, the very attempts to offer an alternative narrative underlines the importance of geographic claims to national pride and imperial politics.

Although Byron’s choice to cross the South Seas reoriented officials and general attention, temporarily, from the Northwest Passage, the part of the voyage that most interested savants and publishers was an old chestnut made new, the Patagonian giants. Contained within their debate were larger disagreements about the evaluation of first-hand observations. In his letter to Egmont, Byron explained that he found a group of 500 people near Cape Virgin Mary, in the Straits of Magellan. “The stoutest of our Grenadiers would appear nothing to them,” Byron reported, “We look’d like Dwarfs to the People We were gone amongst.”34 However, this letter was kept secret, known only to Egmont, Grafton, and a few government officials. The first periodicals reported on the giants in June 1766, a month after Byron had returned, citing that a gun of five feet only reached the giants’ waists.35 From there, and combined with the continuing negotiations about the Falklands, the giants became a potent rumor that excited interest in the South Seas and the secrets that could be hiding there.

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35 London Evening Post (London, England), June 12, 1766 - June 14, 1766; Issue 6026. Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London, England), Saturday, June 14, 1766; Issue 11625. Interestingly, when newspapers reprinted the news of the Dolphin’s voyage, several cut out the paragraph on the Patagonian giants, whether for column space or credulity is not known. For example, compare the Public Ledger (London, England), Saturday, June 14, 1766; Issue 2011 to those cited above.
Not everyone was taken in by the fantastic tale, of course. Horace Walpole, as S.T., wrote a typically biting critique of the giants craze in 1766, which was published as a pamphlet and partially reprinted in *The Monthly Review*. He satirically assures his “Friend in the Country” that he is not speaking of “a new-vamped edition of Swift’s Brobdignags,” but of a genuine race of Giants, who only come to the coast “to bob for Whales.” Aimed at the excitement in particular of antiquarians, Walpole surmises that the “Giant-tongue,” based on the one syllable Byron could remember, “is plainly Phoenician.” Walpole then takes his reader through a critique of British society, from the Methodists to chartered companies to imperial expansion. He uses the giants as a prism of ridicule, rendering all other subjects ludicrous in refraction. He closes with a plea to not exterminate the giants before they have been amply studied, and then plays with his supposed anonymity by promoting his Gothic novel, *The Castle of Otranto*, in a footnote. 36 Walpole’s work recalls Swift’s by more than just using his name; it reminds the reader that folly awaits those who dare to presume that they understand the geography and cultures on the other side of the world from garbled, second-hand reports.

The giant story found particular traction within Europe’s natural philosophical community. One of the most taken with the topic was Dr. Matthew Maty, co-secretary of the Royal Society, librarian, and physician. Maty had also served as foreign correspondent for the

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Royal Society and, as part of the Huguenot diaspora, had many contacts across Europe. Maty was one of those who discussed the matter at a Royal Society dinner in July 1766, after which he penned a report to Monsieur de la Lande, President of the Académie de Sciences. La Condamine, still an expert on South America, took it upon himself to quash these rumors before they enchanted more savants. In his August 1, 1766 response in the Journal encyclopédique, la Condamine expresses his surprise that Maty could be so fooled by rumors. La Condamine further surmises that the giants were a cover used by the British government to divert attention from their intention to exploit a mine in the region. Of course, they were not covering a mining operation, but their claims in the Falklands; as Masserano complained, whenever he asked where Byron’s ships had gone in the South Seas, “they [British ministers] always begin joking about the discovery of the giants.”37 Suspicious aside, le Condamine unequivocally rejected the existence of the giants, especially because Bougainville, who had visited the Patagonian coast around the same time as Byron—indeed Byron sighted him the second time he was in the Straits—found them of typical size. The French expert was ashamed that an august body like the Royal Society would even discuss the matter.38 Although latent national sentiments played a role in the discussion, what caused the most consternation was a disagreement over the levels of credulity to be assigned to the source material. For some, like Maty, rumors confirmed older reports and seemed credible. For others, like Condamine, review of all the recent reports from French and British sources seemed to point not to a strong case for giants, but rather argued for misgivings about the entire situation. Just as with John Greene and the Fonte letters, interpretation of the same sources could lead to very different conclusions.

37 AHN Estado 4271, vol. 1, Masserano to Grimaldi, June 20, 1766.
The Royal Society was to continue to discuss it, as midshipman Charles Clerke, the same man to whom the 1767 unauthorized account is attributed, submitted a letter affirming the rumors on November 3, 1766. It was read before the Society on February 12, 1767 and published in the *Philosophical Transactions*. Clerke discusses the “very tall men” he saw in Patagonia, typically of eight feet in height, while the women were slightly shorter. Although Clerke may have been attempting to trick the Society, his letter was taken by some at least as eyewitness proof of the giants’ existence.

Proof that the giants existed was a ploy other publishers used to convince readers to buy their products. The Clerke account prominently advertises the giants on the title page, as well as offers an appendix chronicling the history of the giants’ encounters with Europeans. This appendix is supposed to put “an end to the dispute, which for two centuries and a half has subsisted between geographers…of which the concurrent testimony of all on board the Dolphin and Tamer can now leave no room for doubt.” The frontispiece depicts an enormous Patagonian family—man, woman, and infant—towering over a European sailor who hands the woman a piece of hard tack (figure 6.1). The giants are twice as tall as the doll-like sailor. Two of the three engraved prints included with the book are of giants, while the one chart is of the

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40 *A Voyage round the World, in His Majesty’s Ship the Dolphin*, appendix, 182. Giants also formed a prominent part of the newspaper advertisements. See *St. James’s Chronicle or the British Evening Post* (London, England), April 16, 1767 - April 18, 1767; Issue 956. A reviewer was entirely convinced, “that a race of tall men exists near the Straits of Magellan, cannot now admit of a doubt.” *The Critical Review, or Annals of Literature* XXIII (London: Printed for A. Hamilton, 1767), 456. The review of *A Voyage round the World, in His Majesty’s Ship the Dolphin* is followed by another giants item, a review of the letter by the Abbé Coyer in response to Dr. Maty. Coyer’s letter is discussed below.

region where the giants live, Patagonia. Thus, the Patagonian giants are the starring attraction of this account, one of the only versions available due to the Admiralty’s moratorium. Clearly, the publisher assumed that the hook to get people to look into, and hopefully purchase, the account was not only the lure of new islands, but of the settlement of a centuries-long mystery about fantastic peoples—the Pacific could still hold fantasy as readily as fact, and the two frequently intertwined.

42 It seems, however, that the map had to be purchased separately, or was only in a later edition. In The entertaining traveller, a 1740 voyage collection re-printed in 1767 to capitalize on the Byron expedition, the editor complained, “It is to be wished that instead of one of them at least there had been a chart of the Straits of Magellan, and of the coasts of the principal places mentioned in the narrative; for, without this, the reader has so imperfect and confused a notion of the course, that his imagination cannot accompany the adventurers.” Fransham, The entertaining traveller, 259. Placing aside that such a map was available or soon would be, it is of interest that the editor thought it vital for readers to have a map in order to fully understand a circumnavigation. Maps are assumed to benefit all types of readers. Without them their “imagination” is too jumbled to learn or to be entertained, a compelling example of the saturation of map consciousness within the public sphere in the eighteenth century.
Figure 6.1. Frontispiece to *A Voyage round the World, in His Majesty’s Ship the Dolphin, Commanded by the Honourable Commodore Byron…By an Officer on Board the said Ship*

While some publications pointed out the hyperbolized importance of the giants craze, others sought to profit from the trend. For example, the publisher of *The entertaining traveller; or, the whole world in miniature* had no reservations about reprinting an extract from the Clerke account; the giant episode was included “word for word,” along with an overview of the islands Byron visited. Interest in the topic also inspired J. Spilsbury, London bookseller, to sell reprints of *The Hairy Giants: or, a Description of Two Islands in the South Sea, Called by the Names of Benganga and Coma, Discovered by Henry Schooten, of Harlem, In a Voyage begun January 1669, And finished October 1671.* The fictitious narrative added another link to the chain of European sightings for eager readers. Feeding upon the periodicals’ re-prints of the giant story and the conversation that likely ran from coffeehouse to tavern, these entrepreneur publishers saw opportunity in further saturating the market with South Seas stories, fabricated or otherwise.

The prints and reports certainly were of interest, but not all readers were convinced of the giant tale. In 1767 the Abbé Coyer wrote a satirical letter on the matter. Although less nasty than Walpole, Coyer still mocks how a learned man like Dr. Maty could cling to such ideas. Coyer closes his letter with a description of a Patagonian utopia, complete with a grand capital city. Influenced no doubt by Rousseau’s ideas, Coyer places the Patagonians as the closest to

43 Fransham, *The entertaining traveler*, for giants see 262-8; for islands see 259-262.
45 Abbé Coyer, *Lettre au docteur Maty, secrétaire de la Société royale de Londres, sur les géants* (Brussels: 1767). The letter was reprinted in English as *A Letter to Doctor Maty, Secretary of the Royal Society; containing an Abstract of the Relations of Travellers of different Nations, concerning the Patagonians...By Abbé Coyer, F.R.S.* (London: Becket and Hondt, 1767). The English translation received a negative review in *The Critical Review, or Annals of Literature* XXIII (London: Printed for A. Hamilton, 1767), 457. The reviewer concluded, “The only remark we shall make on this Letter is, that had an Englishman’s name been prefixed, the publication of it would not have defrayed the expense of paper and print.”
man in nature; they are less corrupt and therefore taller than their European counterparts. The construction of South Seas indigenous peoples as the noble savage originates from the long-running discourse about Patagonian peoples, although it would be utterly transformed once Europeans encountered Tahiti later in the decade. Such enthusiasm, and contempt, for the giants ensured that they would be a major part of any discussion of the South Seas.

2. Wallis and Carteret: From Patagonian giants to Tahitian paradise

Inspired by Byron’s 1765 letter, plans were already underway to send a second expedition to the Pacific. Byron arrived in time to hand over the *Dolphin* and to advise as to the possible location of new islands. Unlike its predecessor, this voyage could not be kept secret, although it was unclear exactly what its destination would be: the Falklands or the South Seas? Such uncertainties plagued Masserano, who plied British ministers with questions about the voyages. In a June 20, 1766 letter to Grimaldi, Masserano reports that he asked Lord Rochford, in London between embassy assignments in Madrid and Paris, about the destination of the two frigates then fitting out. The only reply he could gain was that the ships certainly would not threaten Spain. Masserano turned instead to Rockingham, Lord of the Treasury, who also dismissed his worries and boldly told the ambassador that “the English are the owners of the

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46 Coyer, *Letter au Docteur Maty*, 71-2. Not all saw Coyer’s letter as satire. The reviewer in *The Monthly Review*, thought Coyer “a thorough convert: and as the most convincing proof of his conversion, he addresses to his friend Dr. Mary this very sensible and spirited letter.” *The Monthly Review* XXXVII, 222-7, quote at 223. It is likely that Coyer was familiar with Rousseau’s ideas about man in nature, recently outlined in *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (Amsterdam: Marc Michel Rey, 1755).

47 Byron returned to London in May and by June 5, 1766, the Admiralty ordered the *Dolphin* made fit for foreign service. TNA ADM 3/74, June 5, 1766.

48 *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser* (London, England), Saturday, June 14, 1766; Issue 11625. This advertisement assumes that the voyage is bound for the Falklands, and that Byron is accompanying the ships. See also *Whitehall Evening Post or London Intelligencer* (London, England), June 21, 1766 - June 24, 1766; Issue 3140.
sea…that we [the Spanish] are of the land,” making all avenues to the South Seas, including the Falklands, open to British ships.49

Whereas British ministers could agree on stonewalling Spanish officials, they could not agree on the instructions to be handed to Samuel Wallis, commander of the expedition. Egmont was determined the ships should return to the Falklands, but the rest of the Cabinet, concerned about the French claim to the islands, scrubbed that portion of the mission. The more discussions continued, the less sure the ministers were of sending Wallis at all. Part of this discord was fed by domestic politics. Egmont was appointed Lord High Admiral in 1763 as part of Grenville’s ministry; he survived the collapse of that ministry and its successor, led by Rockingham. However, by August 1766, Egmont found himself at constant loggerheads with William Pitt’s, now Lord Chatham, administration, leading him to resign on August 12, 1766.50 One of Egmont’s final acts in office was to sign off on Wallis’ instructions on August 16, before his resignation was official.51 The Dolphin, accompanied by the Swallow, sailed five days later.

The international and domestic struggles that overshadowed the planning of the expedition also affected its fitting out. Like Byron, all servants were to be left behind, but unlike

49 Masserano continued to press, but was only told that the ministers “knew nothing of what had happened beyond that of Admiral Anson.” AHN Estado 4271, vol. 1, Masserano to Grimaldi, June 20, 1766. The ambassador was sure that part of this obstinacy came from the long-running dispute over Spain’s payment of the ransom for Manila. See doc. 12 in Helen Wallis, ed., Carteret’s Voyage Round the World 1766-1769, vol. II (Cambridge: Published for the Hakluyt Society at the University Press, 1965). Masserano also argued that the British had no right to sail in the South Seas as stated in the Treaty of Utrecht, but his British counterparts only scoffed at his literal reading of the treaty. See the letters of October 2, 1766, AHN Estado 4271, vol. 1; Wallis, ed., Carteret’s Voyage, vol. II, doc. 35; AHN Estado, vol. 1, Grimaldi to Masserano, January 20, 1767. The Spanish also attempted to steal information about the voyages, with the help of French intelligence. See AHN Estado 4271, vol. 1, Masserano to Grimaldi, July 7, 1766; ibid, vol. 2, Grimaldi to Masserano, August 4, 1766.


Byron there would be no extra pay for Wallis’ crew. Wallis did not have the political and institutional support that Byron enjoyed, thus he had to fight to ensure that his ship was speedily and adequately supplied. This issue was compounded for his subordinate Philip Carteret, who was to command the Swallow, having just returned from Byron’s circumnavigation. The Swallow was far from fit, but Carteret could not get the necessary repairs or the supplies from the Naval Dockyards or Wallis. Carteret at least sailed with several other Byron veterans—experience was to be the only privilege accorded the Dolphin and Swallow.

Compared to Byron’s, Wallis’ instructions were considerably less complicated, yet still ambitious. On August 15, 1766, Wallis received orders directing him to the Leeward Islands. On the 16th the Admiralty issued secret orders, although Wallis was still to tell any senior officers who might enquire that the ships were for the Leeward Islands. Both French and Spanish officials were sure that Wallis was headed to the Falklands. However, after a preamble nearly identical to Byron’s, Wallis’ secret orders called for him to search for new lands between Cape Horn and New Zealand.

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52 For the fitting out of the voyage, see TAN ADM 2/93, f. 300, 306, 308, 350, 354, 355, 359-60, 362; TNA ADM 2/236, 211-12, 219 (no special officers), 242, 251, 255, 256, 260, 273; TNA ADM 106/1151/57, item 57; TNA ADM 106/1161, f. 8r-9v; NMM ADM/B/178, May 10, May 23, May 27, June 6, June 20, July 11, 23, 1766; TNA ADM 106/1150, f. 56, 67, 69, 71, 73, 75.

53 In the Swallow was Alexander Simpson, master; Erasmus Gower, lieutenant; Thomas Watson, surgeon; and able-bodied seaman William Kerton. The Prince Frederick store ship that accompanied Wallis’ ships to South America was captained by another Byron veteran, Lieutenant James Brine, while master’s mate John Gore served in the Dolphin under both Byron and Wallis. Wallis, ed., Carteret’s Voyage, vol. I, 31.

54 Captain Brine, of the storeship Prince Frederick, was the only ship of the Wallis expedition to visit Port Egmont in the Falklands. Wallis, ed., Carteret’s Voyage, vol. II, docs. 32, 33, and 34 (secret instructions). The instructions are also part of the secret orders in TNA ADM 2/1332, ff. 146-52. The instructions were not as secret as the organizers wanted, as certain of crew knew the real destination. See, for example, Master George Robertson’s journal entries for June 24 and August 6, 1766 in Hugh Carrington, ed., The Discovery of Tahiti: A Journal of the Second Voyage of H.M.S. Dolphin…written by her master George Robertson (Cambridge: Printed for the Hakluyt Society at the University Press, 1948). For Carrington’s discussion of secrecy, see ibid, xxii. For the French and Spanish response, see Wallis, ed., Carteret’s Voyage, vol. II, doc. 35.
When Wallis reached the Downs on May 28, 1768, it was to announce that he had indeed found new islands. The *Dolphin* had stayed in consort with the slow, cumbersome *Swallow* through the Straits of Magellan, taking a laborious 115 days to clear the passage. At this point, Wallis lost contact with Carteret. The *Dolphin* struck out alone, recording several island groups. The single most important island they contacted was named King George’s Island, better known as Tahiti. Wallis spent five weeks there, enough time for the island’s climate and people to make a profound impact on the crew.

Like Byron, Wallis’ papers were seized upon return; far fewer publications leaked from the Admiralty’s moratorium this time. A notable exception is *The Dolphin’s Journal, Epitomiz’d in a Poetical Essay*, a self-published work by R. Richardson, most likely Rogers Richardson, able-bodied seaman and Wallis’ barber. Unlike other accounts which contained charts and tracked movement with the chronological organization of a ship’s journal, Richardson’s poem painted a lyrical track for readers to follow. Intended for a wide audience, the author begins with apologies for the rough language of a sailor attempting poetry, an apology that nevertheless argues for credibility from the experience of the author, not his education. Richardson also explains that he could not “have expatiated more largely on the Voyage,” for there were “some private Reasons which absolutely debarr’d me from it,” perhaps an allusion to the Admiralty having seized the more detailed materials. Nevertheless, it was the “Reception of my Superiors, more especially on Board the DOLPHIN” which “induced me to present it to the Publick.”

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55 For the aftermath of the voyage, see TNA ADM 106/1174/293, f. 293; NMM ADM/B/181, May 20, 1768; Molyneux journal, BL Add MS 47106; TNA ADM 2/94, May 23, 1768; TNA ADM 2/238, May 25, 1768. See also Carrington, ed., *The Discovery of Tahiti*, for the master’s journal.
56 Richardson, *Dolphin’s Journal, Epitomiz’d*. The author identification is from Wallis in Gallagher, ed., *Byron’s Voyage*, 191.
implying that Robertson and perhaps some of the *Dolphin’s* officers thought the moratorium unthreatened by the poetic form.\(^{57}\)

In his first stanza, Robertson succinctly summarizes the view of British ministers in their diplomatic tussles about the freedom of navigation:

> Let *Holland, France*, or haughty *Spain*
> Boast their Discoveries o’er the Main,
> And sing their Hero’s mighty Fame,
> Which now with Time decays.
> Britannia’s Isle, at length has found
> A Man who sail’d the Globe all round,
> Discoving Isles, till now unfound,
> And well deserves the Bays.\(^{58}\)

Richardson belittles attempts to reprint past feats, like Iriarte’s resurrection of Sarmiento, as they are, in his eyes, no match for Britain’s more recent showings. The poem lauds Wallis’ qualities as a “Hero brave,” signaling that circumnavigators, always celebrated for their navigational feats, are to serve as patriotic stand-ins for heroism in a country at peace.

While the poem traces the entirety of the globe, it dwells on two places: Patagonia and Tahiti. As an introduction to the former, Richardson writes:

> The well known Streights, we enter then,
> So fam’d for it’s [sic] Gigantick Men,
> Whose height from six Feet reach’d to ten,
> And safely anchor there.\(^{59}\)

When the *Dolphin* sailed in August 1766, the news of Byron’s giants was just beginning to circulate and was in full swing when the crew returned. Wallis had sent a log-book from Port Famine recording an encounter with Patagonians wherein he used rods to measure the people, whom he found, “the major part of them were from 5 feet 10 inches to six feet,” with a few

\(^{57}\) Richardson, *Dolphin’s Journal, Epitomiz’d*, “To the Reader.”
\(^{58}\) Ibid, 3
\(^{59}\) Ibid, 4. It should be noted that the author is referring to people 6’10” tall, not 10’ tall. Wallis noted the former height in his log, where he also copied the poem. Wallis, ed., *Carteret’s Voyage*, vol. II, 324.
taller.60 According to a letter from Carteret to Maty, “they were in general all from six feet, to six feet five inches, although there were some who came to six feet seven inches, but none above that.”61 Thus Robertson’s exaggeration of 6’10” was certainly example of poetic license to lure readers. Carteret’s letter never reached Maty, but others did which reported people of between seven and eight feet.62 Thus, despite the fact that Wallis and Carteret’s measurements tempered the size of the giants, the transmission of this information to Britain resulted in its exaggeration—the giants could not be easily brought down to size.

The rest of Richardson’s description of the Straits, however, was less fantastic. Harkening back to the desperate descriptions of Anson regarding the coastline approaching Cape Horn, Richardson described a landscape where winter “incessant reigns” and where only “A Savage Race of Human Kind” could dwell.63 Even if the Straits were more known, they and Cape Horn remained a dangerous greeting to the South Seas. The reader would be struck, therefore, by the contrast of the treacherous, dreary Straits to the next place Richardson’s poem illuminates, “GEORGE GREAT GEORGE” island.64 Richardson does not feel capable of recreating the “beauteous Scene, to Britons new.”65 After describing a triumphant skirmish between the islanders and the crew, the poem paints the territory as rightly won by Britons, a lucky find as the land is rich in fruit and fowl, for which the islanders are willing to part for only “an Iron Bar” or “rusty Nail.”66 The indigenous peoples are described as “much more polish’d

60 TNA ADM 55/35, December 17, 1766.
62 Wallis sent back his report of the giants, which is in BL Add MS 15499. Letters from the Dolphin’s carpenter announcing eight-foot giants arrived in London in May 1767. The letter was picked up by the papers and repeated in Spanish diplomatic correspondence. See Wallis, ed., Carteret’s Voyage, vol. II, 324.
63 Richardson, Dolphin’s Journal, Epitomiz’d, 4.
64 Ibid, 5.
65 Ibid, 6.
66 Ibid, 7.
far, Than other Savage Indians are,” and blessed for nature provides for all their wants. From initial contact with Tahiti, therefore, Europeans were enthralled by the land and the people. Bougainville, who had set out to claim Pacific islands for France in December, 1766 reached Tahiti a few weeks after Wallis; the descriptions provided in his 1771 printed journal and a published letter by surgeon Philip Commerson would solidify Tahiti as paradise, fundamentally altering European discourse about the Pacific in the process.

Robertson’s poem was targeted to a general audience whose basic geographic knowledge had been augmented in recent years by reports of battles from Canada to Bengal, as well as the Byron expedition. The author was careful to stick to what was prescient, Patagonian giants, and novel, Tahiti, while declining to describe other scenes that were not unique to his geographic privilege. When the *Dolphin* reached the Indian Ocean, Robertson felt no need to expand on his narrative for, “The India Seas, so well has Fame/Describ’d in every Realm.” Similarly, he skipped over the *Dolphin’s* time at Tinian, for “In Anson’s Voyage, they’re better far/Describ’d in Prose, than here I dare/Attempt to write in Verse.” Overall, Robertson saw himself as offering a tantalizing tale to “homebred Travellers, as they please,/Whose Book’s their Helm, 

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67 Ibid, 8.
68 Commerson reported about the paradise of Tahiti, with what could be the noble savages sought by Rousseuists. Bougainville’s account in turn questioned whether the Tahitians’ perfection had now been marred by contact with civilization. Philibert Commerson, “Post-Scriptum sur l’île de la Nouvelle-Cythère ou Taiti, par M. Commerson, docteur en médecine,” *Mercure de France* (November, 1769). Louis Antoine de Bougainville, *Voyage autour du monde...* (Paris, 1771). The second edition appeared in 1772, along with an English edition translated by J.R. Forster, also in 1772. See Dunmore, ed., *The Pacific Journal*, lxxi-lxxii. The Pacific as a site of earthly paradise or utopia had been part of the European discourse for centuries, most notably with Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis*. However, the discourse intensified post-1770 when the new voyages combined with Rousseau’s ideas and theories about human generation. See Charles W. J. Withers, “Geography, Enlightenment, and the Paradise Question,” in *Geography and Enlightenment*, eds. Livingstone and Withers, 67-92. The exoticization of island life and peoples continues to this day, most obviously in the tourism industry.
69 Richardson, *Dolphin’s Journal, Epitomiz’d*, both quotes from 13.
their Ship and Seas." These travellers would have to wait for the official account to piece together just where the islands described so fantastically in the poem lay.

Masserano reported Wallis’ return to Grimaldi, describing how Wallis had reported the discovery of his islands, sans longitude. This forced Masserano to consult his maps, where he unfortunately found few possibilities with which to establish a prior Spanish claim to Tahiti. Unable to learn details at Court, Masserano turned to periodicals, “If we should put our faith in the gazettes, he [Wallis] has given the principal (which is large, fertile, and very populous) the name of King George’s Land, and the others are Charlotte, Boscawen, Keppel, and Wallace [sic].” Eager to counter British advances as they had with the Sarmiento publication, Masserano and Pacific expert Jorge Juan both suggested that the islands Wallis described could be those found by Quiros two centuries before. Iriarte enlisted Manuel Santiago de Ayala, royal archivist, to review Quiros’ papers to assess if they could be published. After reading them, however, Ayala was dubious as to their veracity, leading to the abandonment of the plan. Quiros, as during his own lifetime, was still an intriguing, yet too tenuous, source upon which to base Pacific claims.

Masserano also reported that the Swallow was assumed lost. However, the Swallow was not lost, only slow. After watching Wallis sail away at the western entrance to the Straits, Carteret continued the mission alone, searching especially for Davis Land which, like Pepys

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70 Ibid, 11.
71 AHN Estado 4259, vol. 1, Masserano to Grimaldi, May 27, 1768. Thinking that Wallis stayed in the Straits so long so as to accurately chart the passage, Masserano endeavored to obtain a copy of the new chart of the Straits. See ibid, Masserano to Grimaldi, June 17, 1768. Masserano did manage to get a journal from a crewmember, as described in letters dated June 24, August 5, and September 23, 1768 in ibid; AHN Estado 4259, vol. 2, Grimaldi to Masserano, July 18, 1768. For more on the episode see Rainer F. Buschmann, “Peter Farron’s Wife: Romancing the Eighteenth-Century Spanish Lake,” Transnational Subjects 1, no. 1 (2011): 53-65.
72 See Buschmann, Iberian Visions, 93-5.
73 AHN Estado 4259, vol. 1, Masserano to Grimaldi, May 27, 1768.
Island, proved to be a cartographic chimera.\textsuperscript{74} While limping home from St. Helena in February 1769, Carteret met Bougainville.\textsuperscript{75} Bougainville reported having seen the Swallow, which Lord Harcourt, British ambassador to Paris, relayed, but the information arrived just after the Swallow finally reached London.\textsuperscript{76} Carteret’s papers and charts joined the growing archive of Byron and Wallis’ to await an official publication—there was little public fanfare at his return, which Swallow purser Edward Leigh called, “Our late meritable but unnoticed Voyage.”\textsuperscript{77} Carteret had also missed the launch of the most celebrated South Seas voyage to date, James Cook’s expedition to view the Transit of Venus.

3. \textbf{Cook: international cooperation and national motives}

The Transit of Venus occurs when Venus passes between a larger planet and the sun, appearing as a black dot as it crosses a portion of the solar disk. By recording the transit, astronomers can calculate solar parallax, used to estimate an object’s distance from the sun. Edmund Halley observed a Transit in 1676, but was disappointed to find that his measurements could not be collated to others. In order to triangulate cosmic distance accurately, Halley argued

\textsuperscript{74} Carteret was also a victim of cartographic confusion. Relying on John Green’s 1753 chart of the Pacific discussed in chapter 5, Carteret searched for S. Ambrose and S. Felix. However, the Green map incorrectly recorded the longitude of the islands. Carteret then decided to search for Davis Land, sighted in 1687, as it was supposedly in the same longitude. However, as he sailed he became convinced that Davis Land was nothing other than S. Ambrose and S. Felix. Bougainville came to the same conclusion when he passed through the area in 1768. Carteret similarly disproved his maps, this time Green’s and J.N. Bellin’s with regard to the Solomon Islands, whose location was disputed in Green’s text, not his map, which Carteret did not have on board. When he reached Batavia someone gave him maps of Dalrymple’s privately distributed \textit{An Account of the Discoveries made in the South Pacifick Ocean} (London: 1767), which located Santa Cruz, an island found by Mendaña and Quiros and on which Carteret landed. Mapmakers accordingly adjusted the location of Santa Cruz, as can be seen in the 1775 revised edition of Green’s 1753 map by Thomas Jeffries. For more on this episode, see Wallis, ed., \textit{Carteret’s Voyage}, vol. I, 52-59.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, vol. II, doc. 110. See also docs. 106-109.

\textsuperscript{76} Return of the Swallow: TNA SP 78/277/67, f. 174, 175v; TNA ADM/106/1163/154, f. 154; NMM ADM/B/182, March 27, May 15, 1769; TNA ADM 106/1176, April 17, 22, 1769; NMM CAR/5; TNA ADM 2/92, March 21, 1769; TNA ADM 2/238, March 21, May 18, 1769. Upon return, the crew petitioned for extra pay, but the Admiralty refused, saying this crew had more advantages in the form of geographic materials than Byron’s had. However, the officers did receive their servants’ pay. TNA ADM 2/238, June 30, 1768.

in a 1714 Royal Society paper, observations had to be made of the Transit from around the world. He also predicted that the next Transits, which occur in pairs, would appear in 1761 and 1769 and then not again for a century. Viewing them would require unprecedented international collaboration, allowing the Royal Society to participate directly in South Seas affairs for the first time since Halley’s voyages.

As 1761 approached, scientists from Russia to Scotland participated in the event, with a particularly robust French program designed by Joseph-Nicholas Delisle. However, cloud cover and confusion as to calculating start and end time of the phenomenon hindered the accuracy of the measurements. In addition, the Seven Years War hampered international collaboration. The Royal Society barely managed to get a few observers abroad due to late planning; they were determined to do better in 1769.

Free of the interference of a global war, the 1769 Transit promised to be the largest-scale intellectual event in European history. The English gained passage for an observer to California, but his Jesuit training barred him from entry due to the recent expulsion of the order from the

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79 This is not to imply that the Royal Society and the Royal Navy had not long collaborated on other projects, most notably the Royal Observatory and the Board of Longitude. They were not equal partners, however, as the Royal Society had to ask for funds and instruments. For example, see RS CMO IV, October 17, 1748; November 9, 1748.
80 For example, French astronomer le Gentil was sent to Pondicherry to observe the Transit; en route, he received news that the port had been taken by the British. Le Gentil instead observed the Transit from on deck a ship near the Isle de France (Mauritius). However, the movement of the ship affected le Gentil’s timing and he could not accurately calculate his longitude at sea. Rather than return home, le Gentil elected to stay in the Indian Ocean until the 1769 Transit, which he failed to observe from Pondicherry due to cloud cover. Upon his return to France 11.5 years after his departure he found his family assumed he had died and was dividing his estate, while the Academy had retired him. Guillaume-Hyacinthe-Joseph-Jean-Baptiste Le Gentil de La Galaisière, Voyage dans les mers de l’Inde... fait par ordre du Roi à l’occasion du passage de Vénus sur le disque du soleil, le 6 juin 1761 et le 3 du même mois 1769, par M. Le Gentil (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1779).
Although California was considered a good place to view the Transit, Jorge Juan quoted French astronomer le Chappe, who would lead a Spanish-French California expedition, as saying, “the most adequate site to achieve the most advantageous observations is on islands in the South Seas.” Juan continued, “all the French astronomers, as well as the English and those of other nations that have examined or performed the calculations deduce the same.”

Islands in the middle of the South Seas also had the advantage of being less threatening to Spain as compared to California. State minister Grimaldi begrudgingly admitted, “there is less reason to oppose ourselves to that [an island observation point] than to our oceans near the southern coasts in Peru.” Only two problems remained, to which island should a South Seas Transit expedition go and who would lead such a naval/astronomical expedition?

All uncertainty as to location vanished when Wallis returned with glowing reports of King George’s Island—the observers would sail for Tahiti. As for personnel, the Royal Society suggested Alexander Dalrymple, Fellow of the Royal Society and the EIC hydrographer who had advised the Admiralty on Manila. Dalrymple was happy to go, but only if he could command the mission. The Admiralty, recalling the command problems of Dampier and Halley, insisted that the commander be a naval officer. They settled on Lieutenant James Cook, who had gained significant hydrographic experience in Newfoundland after the Seven Years War—as near the embodiment of Anson’s military engineer as the Navy could find. The Royal Society also appointed Charles Green, with Cook as commander and secondary observer. To this

81 AHN Estado 4269, vol. 2, Masserano to Grimaldi, May 11, August 28, 1767. For more sources on both Transits, see the bibliography prepared by Rob van Gent, accessed October 1, 2015, http://www.staff.science.uu.nl/~gent0113/venus/venustransithb.htm.
82 Juan himself thought that California was a good enough alternative. AMN ms. 812, doc. 10, f. 37v, July 7, 1768.
83 AHN Estado 6561, Grimaldi to Conde de Fuentes, January 11, 1768.
84 For the Dalrymple and Cook debate, November 1767-April 1768, see RS CMO V, ff. 177, 227, 292, 299.
complement, the Admiralty requested that Sir Joseph Banks, Fellow of the Royal Society and “a Gentleman of large fortune well versed in Natural History,” join at his own expense.  

Although this voyage exemplifies a higher degree of Royal Society and Admiralty collaboration and certainly had a more intellectual rationale than previous voyages, it would be a mistake to see the first Cook expedition as anything but a government-sponsored attempt for national gain. As numerous scholars have shown, international scientific efforts in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were intricately tied to the larger goal of imperial expansion, expansion that could only be achieved at the expense of European rivals. Cook’s instructions, secret like Byron’s and Wallis’, reveal such motives. First, Cook was to observe the Transit from Tahiti, where he was to provide “a more Perfect Idea and description than we have hitherto received of it.” The Admiralty also gave Cook a sealed packet with “additional” instructions with a similar preamble to Byron’s and Wallis’, but concluding that Wallis had been near “a Continent or Land of great extent.” Cook was to sail south from Tahiti to find, and claim, such lands. If no continent could be found, Cook was to survey New Zealand and as many islands as possible. The voyage was not just about calculating the size of the solar system—it was about expanding the size of the British Empire under the cloak of a trans-imperial intellectual effort.

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85 TNA ADM 2/94, Admiralty Commissioners to Cook, July 22, 1768.
86 Just a small sample, with a Pacific focus, include Drayton, Nature’s Government; Gascoigne, Science in the Service of Empire; Ballantyne, ed., Science, Empire and the European Exploration of the Pacific. It was not only science that was tied intimately to empire, but also art, as shown in Hoock, Empires of the Imagination.
87 The Instructions are included in Beaglehole, ed., Journals of Captain Cook, cclxxix-cclxxi. In case Wallis’ coordinates for Tahiti were faulty or the island could not be found, the instructions included a table of limits of latitude and longitude within which the Transit would be visible. The instructions are also in TNA ADM 2/1332, 81v-85r. For more on the multiple motives behind the instructions, see Brian Hooker, “James Cook’s Secret Search in 1769,” Mariner’s Mirror 87, no. 3 (2001): 297-302.
88 Beaglehole, Journals of Captain Cook, cclxxii.
Cook sailed August 26, 1768 in the *Endeavour*, a converted coal collier he thought more fit for South Seas swells than frigates. Cook rounded Cape Horn and made Tahiti in April 1769, in plenty of time for the Transit on June 3. After a successful observation, Cook took the *Endeavour* south, finding no continent. He then steered west to survey New Zealand for six months—the first European to visit the island since Tasman 130 years before. Proceeding west, Cook charted and claimed the east coast of Australia, calling it New South Wales, before repairing at Batavia and sailing home. He arrived in the Downs June 12, 1771, having followed his orders more closely than either of Byron or Wallis. He also made significant territorial claims for Britain, backed by detailed charts. The first Cook expedition was remarkable not as a radical departure from previous expeditions, but as a particularly successful example of them. As Cook editor Beaglehole explains, his great achievement from 1768 to 1771 was to disprove and delineate. Byron, Wallis, and Carteret had done the same, but with less ability to stay in high southern latitudes due to disease and disrepair. Cook benefited from their experiences, most notably in Tahiti, and was to be celebrated as the culmination of a decade of British engagement with the world’s largest and most remote ocean. Whereas Cook was to continue his delineating and disproving, the Admiralty, most likely with some eye to the recently published Bougainville account, which recounted his time at Tahiti, thought it prescient to release the official account of the 1760s expeditions.

“…to make it another Anson’s Voyage” EJ: the Hawkesworth Account

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91 Hawkesworth to Burney, September 18, 1771. As quoted in ibid, 144.
The publication fell to Anson’s longtime friend and recently re-appointed Lord High Admiral, Lord Sandwich. One of Sandwich’s first duties in 1771 was to find someone to compile the voyage collection. Sandwich broached the subject with musician and newspaper collector, Charles Burney. According to Burney’s daughter, Fanny, Sandwich, “should be much obliged to any one who could recommend a proper person to write the Voyage.”92 Burney suggested Dr. John Hawkesworth, literary editor and writer most known as a member of Samuel Johnson’s circle, for his edited collection of Jonathan Swift’s works, and for the bi-weekly periodical The Adventurer (1752-4).93 Having confirmed Hawkesworth’s literary reputation with his friend, the actor David Garrick, Sandwich commissioned Hawkesworth to take on the task.94

At first glance, Hawkesworth seems an odd choice, if a highly recommended one, to write an official voyage account. Although editors typically ghosted or summarized unofficial voyage accounts based on journals and logs, Hawkesworth’s voyage collection would carry the weight of Admiralty sanction. Unlike its predecessor the Anson account, this account was to be written by someone totally unaffiliated with the voyage. While he had considerable editing experience with the Gentleman’s Magazine and other publications, Hawkesworth had served mostly as a theater and literary critic. He had never served on a ship and lived almost his entire life in London and Bromley, Kent. Part of the apparent mystery is explained by Sandwich’s

92 See note 1.
93 John Hawkesworth, The Adventurer (London: printed for J. Payne, at Pope’s Head in Paternoster-row, 1752-4), available in two volumes. Reprints of the periodical were in their fifth edition in 1766. Hawkesworth edited and released Swift’s works and correspondence from the early 1750s to 1766. For the process, see Abbott, John Hawkesworth, ch. 3. At the same meeting, Charles Burney also secured place for his son as a midshipman on the next Cook voyage. Burney, Early Diary, 133.
94 Abbott reports that there is a marginal note in Burney’s hand on The Morning Chronicle of Saturday, June 19, 1773: “it was Dr. Burney, who in recommending Dr. Hawkesworth to Ld Sandwich at Houghton, referring his Lordp to Garrick for a confirmation of the character wch he had given of Dr. Hawkesworth...” Abbott, John Hawkesworth, 144; Wallis, ed., Carteret’s Voyage, vol. II, 465. I tried to verify the marginalia; it is possible to see a written note in the Burney database, but the comment is partially omitted. I contacted the British Library but staff could not check the issue due to fragility.
involvement. Despite roughly four years of accumulated experience at the Admiralty from 1748 to 1771, Sandwich was not a naval man either; he usually deferred to Anson’s expertise when they served together. Sandwich was, however, an avid theater-goer and musician, inclining him to listen to recommendations from men like Burney and Garrick. Furthermore, the longstanding bias so often referenced by maritime authors themselves against seamen as writers certainly played a part. As Beaglehole states, “Literary men wrote the prose of the polite world; seamen did not.”

Hawkesworth’s commission, therefore, reveals not only biases about potential writers in the late-eighteenth century, but also allows insight into the intended audience for the work. A literary man was assumed to appeal to a wider audience than a maritime writer mired down by nautical jargon.

Whether qualified or not, Hawkesworth took on the task with gusto. Anticipation of the collection’s imminent popularity was high, as evidenced by the massive £6,000 Hawkesworth received for the copyright from publishers William Strahan and Thomas Cadell. Such anticipation was reflected more broadly in the publication of magazine articles, unofficial accounts, and updated reprints of previous works. For only two examples, in October 1771, just as Hawkesworth began his work, the papers ran advertisements for A Journal of a Voyage Round the World, in His Majesty’s Ship Endeavour, which included “a concise Vocabulary of the language of Otaheite.” That same month, an advertisement for a reprint of A New System of

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95 Beaglehole, *Cook the Writer*, 10.
96 This was by far the largest payment of its kind in the eighteenth century. By comparison, Robertson received £3400 for *Charles V*, Hume £1940 for the first two volumes of his *History*, Johnson £1575 for his *Dictionary*, and only £100 for *Rasselas*. Abbott, *John Hawkesworth*, 147. Strahan also published the second edition of the Newbery account. The awarding of the job to Strahan ended Garrick’s friendship with Hawkesworth, as the former had intended the printing to go to his preferred publisher, T. Becket. Becket would soon be one of the producers of the criticism leveled at Hawkesworth. Ibid, 147-8; Beaglehole, ed., *Journals of Captain Cook*, ccliii.
97 For the advertisements, see *Public Ledger* (London, England), Wednesday, October 2, 1771; Issue 3671. *London Evening Post* (London, England), October 1, 1771 - October 3, 1771; Issue 6824. The book referred to was: *A journal of a voyage round the world, in His Majesty's ship Endeavour, in the years 1768, 1769, 1770, and 1771; undertaken in pursuit of*
Geography was updated with “the latest discoveries, particularly those important ones made in the late voyage round the world in his Majesty’s ship the Endeavour.”

Hawkesworth was unable to halt all rival publications, but he did participate in a suit against one account which had gained its source material under dubious circumstances. Stanfield Parkinson, brother of Bank’s artist on the voyage, Sydney Parkinson, received his brother’s papers after Sydney died at sea. Before returning them to Banks, who had paid Stanfield and his sister for the artist’s loss and effects, Stanfield copied the documents. A Dr. Fothergill, Fellow of the Royal Society and member of the Parkinson’s Quaker Meeting, had overseen the transfer of the documents to Banks. Together, Fothergill and Hawkesworth brought suit in Chancery against Stanfield and gained an injunction against the latter. The Parkinson account did finally appear in 1773, but only after Hawkesworth’s own publication.

An Account of the Voyage undertaken by order of the Present Majesty for making discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere was advertised in early May, 1773. Despite last-minute delays due to problems with the engravings, Hawkesworth had seen the collection through to publication in barely 20 months, a monumental feat. On June 9, 1773, the first edition was

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99 A journal of a voyage to the South Seas, in his Majesty’s ship, the Endeavour. Faithfully transcribed from the papers of the late Sydney Parkinson (London: printed for Stanfield Parkinson, the editor: and sold by Messrs. Richardson and Urquhart, Evans, Hooper, Murray, Leacroft, Riley, 1773). See also, John Fothergill, Explanatory remarks on the preface to Sydney Parkinson’s Journal of a voyage to the South Seas (London?: 1773?). Fothergill bought the unsold copies after Stanfield’s death. They were re-released in 1784 by John Coakley Lettsom. Abbott, John Hawkesworth, 149-150; Beaglehole, ed., Journals of Captain Cook, cciv.

100 The Public Ledger of May 3, 1773 stated, “This work would have been published last Month, pursuant to a former Advertisement, if it had not been impossible to get the Engravings finished.” Sandwich wrote to Garrick on April 6, 1773 to say that Rooker, the engraver, was tarrying. Abbott, John Hawkesworth, 151.
available to readers in a three-volume quarto set. Even though the account was priced at a steep three guineas, the 2,000 copy run soon sold out, with a 2,500 second edition print run released in August. A Dublin and New York edition appeared in 1773, with French and German editions in 1774.\textsuperscript{101} Readers wanted to be familiar with the text, as evidenced by the fact that the account was the most borrowed item from the Bristol Lending Library between 1773 and 1784.\textsuperscript{102} For those without access to a lending or subscription library, or without three guineas to spare, the voyages were also published in weekly installments for a shilling each.\textsuperscript{103}

In his dedication, Hawkesworth cast the voyages as the triumph of a benevolent monarch’s pursuit of new knowledge—his account marks a high point in the moralistic rhetoric of Keene and the voyagers’ instructions which draped political and economic gain in the guise of the search for intellectual progress. In the dedication to George III, Hawkesworth claimed that other overseas empires lacked the ambition necessary for long-distance exploratory expeditions; when they did venture out, they did so only for selfish reasons. Britain, by contrast, set out with different motives in mind, “not with a view to the acquisition of treasure, or the extent of dominion, but the improvement of commerce and the increase and diffusion of knowledge, undertaken what has so long been neglected.”\textsuperscript{104} No one objected to Hawkesworth’s nationalistic interpretation, which effectively ignored other recent voyages like Bougainville’s. However, reviewers did object to practically everything else.

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\textsuperscript{102} Kaufman, \textit{Borrowings from the Bristol Library}, 39.
\textsuperscript{104} John Hawkesworth, \textit{An Account of the Voyages undertaken by the order of his Present Majesty for making Discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere} (London: Strahan and Cadell, 1773), vol. I, dedication.
\end{flushleft}
Hawkesworth knew the most palatable account upon which to model his work was Anson’s, which was still in print in the 1770s. As he wrote to Burney, “I would do my best to make it another Anson’s Voyage.” However, Hawkesworth made certain decisions that diverged from Anson’s account. As an editor, the most controversial decision Hawkesworth made was to write the voyages in the first person. In his introduction, he claimed “it was readily acknowledged on all hands, that a narrative in the first person would, by bringing the Adventurer and the Reader nearer together, excite an interest, and consequently afford more entertainment.” In entertaining the reader, he could also instruct them. Whereas other accounts had used the first person, including the Anson account, those accounts tended to be reprints of journals and logs, with editorial additions signaled with notes or italics. Hawkesworth, by contrast, rewrote all the journals in his own voice with his comments woven seamlessly throughout. In the case of the Cook expedition, he combined both Banks’ and Cooks’ papers into one story. Hawkesworth’s first person meshed the four voyages into an integrated whole—circumnavigations wrapping the globe in the Union Jack. On the one hand, this allowed Hawkesworth to sidestep the political rancor that had surrounded the voyages. He was able to “shape one of the deepest of national myths, that of the Empire itself and the role the brave British captains and their crews played in creating it.” Striking such a nationalistic, supposedly uniform tone no doubt was aimed to please Sandwich and other government ministers. However, the strategy proved “incongruous,” and left some readers “unconvinced, by the Doctor’s reasons, that it was altogether necessary to narrate in the first person.”

105 See note 91.
108 Wallis, “Publication of Cook’s Journals,” 171. The second quote is from the Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature for the Year 1773 (London: Printed for J. Dodsley, 1774), 267.
One of the most glaring examples of editorial intervention was the case of the Patagonian giants, to whom nearly half of the “General Introduction” is dedicated. As Gallagher points out, Byron’s manuscript journal stated, “These People whose size come the nearest to Giants I believe of any People in the World.” Hawkesworth altered the meaning to, “these people may indeed more properly be called giants than tall men.”

Similarly, he ignored Carteret’s tentative downsizing of the giants based on his and Wallis’ measurements. By 1773, Carteret’s lost letter to Dr. Maty had been recovered, read before the Royal Society, and printed in the *Philosophical Transactions*.

Hawkesworth ignored such evidence, preferring instead to cherry pick his own:

> Upon the whole, it may reasonably be presumed, that the concurrent testimony of late navigators, particularly Commodore Byron, Captain Wallis, and Captain Carteret, Gentlemen of unquestionable veracity, who are still living and who not only saw and conversed with these people, but measured them, will put an end to all the doubts that have been hitherto entertained of their existence.

The act of measuring and the direct observation reports were what made the giants believable, never mind that the measurements and reports had, in fact, limited the giants’ size. The “unquestionable veracity” of the captains was leverage for Hawkesworth to push his own agenda. Hawkesworth’s focus was infectious; the *Annual Register* review was also dedicated in large part to the giants. Thus, the giants remained a persistent part of the discourse of man in nature in the 1770s, even as his equally brazen interventions in the description of Tahiti fed the exoticization of that discourse.

The obscuring effect of Hawkesworth’s editorial interference was not lost on critics. The *Morning Chronicle* of June 28, 1773, called Hawkesworth a “fortunate stringer together of

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112 *Annual Register*, 268-72. The review itself runs from 266-273.
113 For the giant debate between de Pauw, Dom Pernety, and Thomas Pennant, see Wallis, ed., *Carteret’s Voyage*, vol II, 325-6.
written events” who wrote a “compilation which turns out to be all smoke and no fire.” Some did see fire in the account. A particularly strong cry went up at the presentation of Tahitian dances and behavior, which many readers found scandalous. Founder of the Methodist Church, John Wesley, was appalled. “Meeting with a celebrated book, a volume of Captain Cook’s Voyages, I sat down to read it with huge expectation,” he wrote in his journal, only to meet with “Men and women coupling together in the face of the sun, and in the sight of scores of people!”

The largest outrage caused by Hawkesworth’s account stemmed from his opinions on Divine Providence. Using the example of the Endeavour striking and then mercifully being blown off of a dangerous reef, Hawkesworth rejects that divine intervention had a role in the event. He asks why such intervention would not have prevented the ship from foundering in the first place and concludes, “expressions which imply that the mischief had one origin, and the remedy another; but such language certainly derogates from the honour of the great Universal Cause, who, acting through all duration, and subsisting in all space, fills immensity with his presence, and eternity with his power.” The anger this position inspired is expressed in a published letter directed to him and “the very learned deists,” which sold for a shilling. The author hoped to read of the voyages, not Hawkesworth’s unwelcome opinions, the inclusion of which rendered the entire book useless. He writes, “I could have been content, Sir, even to have read through three large Quarto Volumes without gaining any important information; and only have silently thought, it was pity [sic.] Dr. Hawkesworth should so lose his literary fame, and the

114 Abbott, John Hawkesworth, 151-152.
esteem of mankind.” Overall, the author is most abashed at the effect this work could have on those that read it for entertainment, and were met instead with an attack on religion. Similar worries were expressed by Wesley and his fellows with regard to the lascivious descriptions of Tahiti; female readers especially, who were assumed to be reading for entertainment and perhaps even education, could instead be led astray. While these critiques reveal much about the perceived weaknesses of certain types of readers and the threats of certain acts of reading to social order, it also provides insight into the perception of voyage accounts as part of the travel literature genre. Voyage accounts were expected to inform about geography—faraway lands and peoples—not to interfere openly in moral battles within Britain, something that Hawkesworth seemed to have misunderstood fundamentally.

Whereas the moral and religious objections to Hawkesworth were controversial enough, there was a further line of critique that lambasted not only Hawkesworth, but the Admiralty’s approach to publishing. In a letter in Baldwin’s London Weekly Journal, “Navalis” vented about the process by which the collection was created, arguing that the captains had been cheated in light of the huge sum Hawkesworth received for the work, money better given to the captains or to lowering the price of the book for consumers. He writes:

Captains of Ships…are not permitted to enjoy the Fruits of their long Labours for the Service of themselves and Families: Their Journals and Papers are seized by their Superiors; nor are they suffered to preserve the smallest Memorandum or Scrap of Paper relating to these Expeditions; nay, farther, they are enjoined, with the Spirit of a Tribunal resembling the Spanish Inquisition, an eternal Silence upon the Subject.

Why could the commanders, clearly men of great merit to have successfully prosecuted a circumnavigation, not write of their own experiences? Although Hawkesworth worried that he

118 A Letter Addressed to Dr. Hawkesworth, And humbly recommended to the Perusal of the Very Learned Deists (London: Printed for T. Payne, 1773), 2.
had “related the nautical events too minutely,” “Navalis” laments that the book diverged from earlier accounts, from the “plain honest Language of our old Voyagers.” In a testament to the enduring circulation of earlier voyage accounts, Navalis asks, “Are not Dampier and Wood Rogers still read and understood?” Again, it is clear that Hawkesworth’s interpretation of a voyage account was not delivering what was desired by audiences: geographic knowledge presented along with the progress of a ship in time and space.

Others also worried about the involvement of the captains in the writing process. John Frederick Schiller, translator of the *Account* into German, wrote to Joseph Banks on behalf of a German bookseller that they had heard rumors that the captains were displeased with Hawkesworth’s version of events. Schiller and Spener, the bookseller, worried about the implications of such accusations, “Since it is notorious that Dr. H’s work has been published for national purposes under the sanction of the Admiralty and of Government as being accurately authenticated by the repeated evidence and approbation of all the chief persons concerned in it.” If the captains had not reviewed the book as stated boldly in Hawkesworth’s introduction, the credibility of the entire project, and of the Admiralty, was compromised. Hawkesworth’s literary account was proving an unexpected public relations nightmare for the Admiralty.

The rumors Schiller relayed were not too far from the truth. Whereas Wallis and Byron kept quiet, or at least confined their remarks to private meetings, both Cook and Carteret were


\[122\] Hawkesworth, *An Account*, vi. While it seems that a review process took place, it is unclear to what extent the commanders were involved and how many of their suggestions were altered in the text. Hawkesworth says in his introduction that all captains saw the manuscript, but “a Seaman” in the *Public Advertiser* of July 17, 1773 says, “Dr. H. submitted his Papers to the Examination and Correction (not of Scribblers, Witlings and Women) of a select Number of the most able and intelligent Seamen of long Experience, great Service and high Rank in their Profession...saw it, considered it, and greatly approved of the Stile, Manner, and Contents.” Wallis, ed., *Carteret’s Voyage*, vol. II, doc. 126, p. 501. Wallis’ argues that it is likely Hawkesworth submitted the manuscript to Sandwich, who had other authorities, but not the captains, review it. Ibid, 468-70.
displeased with their voyage’s recounting. Cook wrote from St. Helena in 1775, “I never had the perusal of the Manuscript nor did I ever hear the whole of it read in the mode it was written, notwithstanding what Dr. Hawkesworth has said to the Contrary in the Interduction.” Carteret saw at least a partial manuscript at some point and his papers include notes on both manuscript and printed product. In his annotations he repeatedly expressed incredulity at the liberties Hawkesworth had taken with regard to location, chronology, and description—especially of indigenous peoples. Faced with the expropriation and distortion of his work, Carteret explained a compulsion to rewrite his journal:

I find myself under the disagreeable necessity lest my Silence should be construed into consent & approbation of publishing it myself not only in Justice to my own character that the whole of my voyage should appear together, but for the good of the Service, & Security of future navigators that they may have all the observations I made, many of which have been omitted.

Carteret was distressed not only for his own reputation, but because the collection was unusable by other navigators who depended on such accounts to list accurate coordinates and descriptions, not moralized approximations. He himself had consulted many accounts before sailing and relied on Anson, Narbrough and others while at sea. All voyage accounts are certainly objects of meditation, not direct reflections of lived experience. This is due to many factors including

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124 For example, Carteret thought that Hawkesworth had exaggerated how islanders reacted to a looking glass, “what they did when they looked at themselves in the Glass no more than what Contry People might do in England who are not often used, to view themselves in looking glass’s. but from what they did, they did not seem to been Strangers to a looking glass.” The quote refers to events in Hawkesworth, *An Account*, vol. I, 376. Quote from Wallis, ed., *Carteret’s Voyage*, doc. 130, p. 507. See also doc. 129 in ibid. The documents come from the treasure trove of materials related to Carteret’s reading practices, not just his reading of Hawkesworth, located in NMM CAR/5, 6, and 10a and b.
125 As quoted in Wallis, ed., *Carteret’s Voyage*, vol. I, p. 3. See vol. II, doc. 131 for the entire quotation. Carteret had apparently kept an Abstract of his original journal, despite Admiralty efforts (ibid, docs 120-1). He also had a Master Log, from which he made the new journal. In November of 1773, Carteret wrote a note on the Hawkesworth volumes (ibid, doc 131, 132). The new journal has a note from Carteret’s daughter, Elizabeth Mary, “The Whole is written by my Father being his own handwriting.” NMM CAR/10a. For more on how Carteret reconstructed his journal, see Wallis, ed., *Carteret’s Voyage*, vol. I, 98-99.
perceived audience expectation, technical limitations, and authorial/editorial intervention. For Carteret, the latter was too heavy handed in the *Account* to prove useful to the audience he thought most important: other naval officers like himself.

Another person who agreed that Hawkesworth’s presentation of geographic information was flawed was Alexander Dalrymple, the Royal Society’s rejected choice to command the Transit expedition. Dalrymple, a prolific mapmaker, had been hard at work on his own South Seas voyage collection, the first volume of which had been released in 1769. The main motive behind the collection was to popularize Dalrymple’s hypothesis of a southern continent, which he thought had to exist to counter-balance northern lands. While preparing the manuscript, Dalrymple solicited help from Carteret to correct his maps of the western Pacific. He needed no help, however, in preparing an all-out assault on Hawkesworth’s *Account*, which he delivered in the form of a 35-page “Letter from Mr. Dalrymple to Dr. Hawkesworth,” dated June 22, 1773. Dalrymple, anger from the Transit snub still (very) raw, felt compelled to answer what he thought were accusations by “implication” against his consistent championing of the Southern Continent. Dalrymple dissects Hawkesworth’s summaries of previous expeditions, particularly of Quiros and Roggewein, gleefully pointing out the numerous misstatements and contradictions, intoning, “I cannot think your Book is so well digested that one part is intended to support another.” In doing so, he hoped to contrast his mastery of South Seas geography with

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126 Dalrymple, *Historical Collection*. Dalrymple petitioned for more exploration in *Account of the Discoveries Made* (1767). For his relationship with Carteret, see Wallis, ed., *Carteret’s Voyage*, vol. II, docs 117, 120, 121, 122. For more on Dalrymple’s involvement with lobbying for exploration and involvement in the first voyage, see Beaglehole, ed., *Journals of Captain Cook*, ci-civ.


128 Dalrymple, *Letter from Mr. Dalrymple*, 12-13. Ironically, Dalrymple used many Spanish sources to repudiate Hawkesworth’s geography, sources Dalrymple came across in his travels to the East Indies. In the letter, he translates
Hawkesworth’s bumbling, implicitly arguing that he would have been a better choice not only to command the Transit expedition, but also to compile such an important publication. At the root of Dalrymple’s long-winded critique is disdain for Hawkesworth’s source craft; the literary editor did not pay enough attention to small details that, if properly compiled, could have led to the discovery of a southern continent.

Warming to his subject, Dalrymple next turns to the discrepancies between the charts and the narrative. Ignorance of nautical matters is no excuse for inconsistency, for “a man who presumed to write a Book of Architecture, when he hardly knew the difference between the pedestal and capital, would scarcely be excused by pleading his ignorance.” Worse, Hawkesworth committed the sin of omission, preferring words when views existed which convey “a more exact idea of the appearance of the Country than any words possibly can.” Dalrymple fumed:

I will take upon me to say that no man can lay down a tolerable chart, even of the Ship’s track, from all the nautical observations you have inserted. Had you reduced the Logs at sea to daily Tables, as Dampier and other Navigators have done, very few pages would have shewn the courses, winds, weather, signs of Land and other circumstances for the information of Navigators, who at present must be entirely disappointed, and also been satisfactory to such of your readers as take up your book for amusement, or instruction of a different kind, who at present erroneously suppose what is so very disagreeable to them, must be useful to the Navigator.

—an intelligence report of Spanish ships in 1770 landing on Rapa Nui (Easter Island), which Dalrymple assumes is the chimerical Davis Land. The Spanish were finally countering British claims, but once again via English print sources and not on their own terms. Ibid, 10, original Spanish 34-5. For more Dalrymple’s South Seas geography ideas, see Andrew Cook, “Alexander Dalrymple: Research, writing, and publication of the Account,” in An Account of the Discoveries Made in the South Pacifick Ocean, repnt. (Sydney: Holden House, 1996).

129 Hawkesworth’s Account contains a chart of the Pacific with the four tracks of the expeditions, along with 52 other engravings and charts. The larger charts were engraved by W. Whitchurch, with others by J. Russell, John Ryland, and J. Gibson and T. Bowen. Bayly engraved the famous New Zealand map in vol. II. The engravings were the work of at least E. Rooker F. Bartolozzi, J. Miller, James Roberts, Record, W. Woollett, J. Cheevers, William Byrne, and J. Hall. Several engravings are unattributed, such as the copy of Stubbs’ kangaroo. This inventory of names taken from the charts and engravings in the version of Hawkesworth’s second edition at the University of Pittsburgh’s Hillman Library Special Collection, HILL SPEC DARL q G420 H392 v.1-3.

130 Dalrymple, Letter from Mr. Dalrymple, 25.

131 Dalrymple, Letter from Mr. Dalrymple, 25.
Dalrymple echoes the two types of readers highlighted by Thomas, Anson, and many others: those who read for entertainment and those who read for instruction. Dalrymple recognizes that different readers come to a voyage account hoping to gain various experiences. However, those that would use this book for navigation, or even those who enjoy charting the voyages as they read, would be “entirely disappointed” in this case. In trying to appeal to a general audience, Hawkesworth had snubbed more specialized readers. He also insulted the general audience, by underestimating their tolerance for a few extra crucial pages of text. Like Carteret, Dalrymple felt that Hawkesworth had misunderstanding the task he had been set in creating a voyage account—to convey useful information that could both amuse and instruct, speaking to multiple audiences at once.

In the second edition of the *Account*, released in a three volume quarto set in August 1773, Hawkesworth added a short preface, the only response he offered to the tidal wave of criticism piled upon him. The preface is targeted specifically at Dalrymple’s letter, most likely because Dalrymple is one of the only detractors to have identified himself by name. In the piece, Hawkesworth shows that he is a man who can turn a clever phrase; he cuts Dalrymple down to size by comparing his obsessive disposition to that of an old woman acquaintance who imagined insults and then took her presumed assailants to court. Hawkesworth writes, “he is as sore upon the subject of a southern continent as the old woman was upon that of the law…I am very sorry for the discontented state of this good Gentleman’s mind, and most sincerely wish that a southern continent may be found, as I am confident nothing else can make him happy and good-humoured.”

As to the imposed slights to Dalrymple’s own published works, Hawkesworth

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explains they are unfounded for the simple fact that he never read Dalrymple’s works. Any mention of Dalrymple’s theories came from the captains themselves, which Hawkesworth simply copied, as he “was little more than an amanuensis for others.” He enacts a similar tactic in addressing the faults with the charts, for “the charts as I am informed were laid down by the several Commanders, or with their concurrence, from duplicates of the very papers from which I was at the same time drawing up that narrative...to see that the charts were faithful was not my province.” In his deflection from blame, Hawkesworth makes Dalrymple and Carteret’s point. The doctor did not see the fundamental importance of charts to voyage collections. To him, they were mere adornment, something to glance at between pages of the all-important narrative. However, such assumptions were not well founded.

This study has highlighted how crucial charts were to the voyage account. Without them, readers of all types could not understand the events in the text; they could not integrate the South Seas into a larger global imaginary. For a smaller subset of readers, the charts proved crucial tools in the planning and execution of subsequent South Seas expeditions. British naval officers and government ministers relied on these published works as navigational aids and diplomatic evidence; mapmakers compared other printed maps when making their own. Without a centralized map management institution, all British consumers relied on the South Seas voyage account to fulfill a variety of tasks, as such they are a particularly instructive example of the saturation of early modern map consciousness. Maps were understood as multi-purpose documents, something their makers knew very well. Many of those tasked with creating charts and voyage accounts felt a particular responsibility to convey as precisely and clearly as possible the geographic knowledge gained in distant waters; in that way, Dalrymple’s admittedly
hyperbolized rhetoric connects to the more measured calls for cartographic accountability by Greene, Middleton, Anson, Moll, and Pepys.

Dalrymple, never one to let another have the last word, replied to Hawkesworth’s preface with another letter in mid-September, 1773. He describes again how Hawkesworth broke an unwritten social contract with his readers, which forced Dalrymple to speak out. Hawkesworth had been entrusted with valuable information, information that was expected to have been shared in a certain way based upon previous, well-established examples like Anson’s. As a writer employed to perform this task, “the only merit such an author can have, is that of executing his task well, and if I had met any thing praise-worthy in Dr. Hawkesworth’s compilation I would not have passed it over in silence.”133 Silence was how this dispute ended. In a note at the end of the second letter, Dalrymple adds, “Some Friends, to whom the proof sheets were shewn, thinking there was too much asperity in this reply; the Publication was delayed so long, that Dr. Hawkesworth paid his last debt to Nature, which of course must prevent the Publication for ever.”134 Hawkesworth died November 17, 1773 after suffering months of fatigue. He is perhaps the most prominent victim of the Pacific paper wars.

The precise role of criticism in Hawkesworth’s death is unknown, but there is no speculation as to the success of his final work. The *Account* was a major bestseller and, as Beaglehole explains, “For a hundred and twenty years, so far as the first voyage was concerned, Hawkesworth was Cook.”¹ Edwards puts it more bluntly, “For over a hundred years his laundering of the actual record of the remorseless advance into the Pacific was all that was available.”² While there would be published accounts of later expeditions—those of Cook’s final two expeditions would be written in large part by the commander himself—they did not overshadow or contradict Hawkesworth’s Pacific. In fact, they added to the perception of the South Seas as a natural historical laboratory, filled with robust flora and fauna and sexualized Islanders who were closer to nature than their European visitors. Cook’s report on the possibilities of the Australian coast led to the establishment of a penal colony there, while his circumnavigation of New Zealand also marked those islands as ripe for British settlement. In one voyage, Cook consolidated centuries of voyaging and fixed the Pacific within the British imperial sphere. Anthropologist Nicholas Thomas explains:

…the six voyages undertaken by Wallis, Byron, Cook and Vancouver in the period from the 1760s to the early 1790s, together with those of their French and Spanish

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contemporaries, transformed the character and pace of European engagement in the Pacific, in a manner that was to have far-reaching consequences and that, in many respects, shaped the patterns of contact and colonization over the succeeding half-century.

Cook’s voyage departed from his predecessors only slightly in intention, but in execution proved qualitatively different. This is because “the investigative role was embraced with unprecedented energy” and proved more wide-ranging because of the duration of the voyage and the presence of Banks, Solander, and other civilian experts. Cook represents a “new level of western knowledge concerning the Pacific” which would accelerate for the rest of the century. This acceleration of face-to-face contact and growth of the imperial archive deserves, and has, books dedicated to its complicated story; thus, it also provides a stopping point for this narrative.

While this study ends with the particularly contentious publication of the Hawkesworth account, it in no way signals the end of the Admiralty’s attempts to publish their preferred version of exploratory expeditions. This pursuit would continue with Cook’s second expedition, wherein the Admiralty attempted yet again to seize all journals and manuscript materials to allow Cook to collate his own authoritative account. By the early nineteenth-century the Admiralty was overseeing all publications that came from authorized expeditions. For example, when Matthew Flinders finally returned to Britain after seven years imprisonment in Mauritius, the Admiralty underwrote the costs of his detailed atlas of Australia, even though it did not grant him back-pay or a pension. By the time of the nineteenth-century polar expeditions, the

3 Nicholas Thomas, “The Age of Empire in the Pacific,” in *Pacific Histories*, eds. Armitage and Bashford, first two quotes at 77, third at 79.
4 N.A.M. Roger, email communication, July 23, 2012. For more on Cook as a writer, see Beaglehole, *Cook the Writer*.
Admiralty had developed an efficient, prolific, censorious publishing machine headed by Second Secretary to the Admiralty Sir John Barrow. ⁶

Admiralty-approved accounts existed, as ever, alongside other books, increasingly those of civilians specialists like Georg Forster, the naturalist who accompanied Cook on his second expedition, or geographer Alexander Humboldt. Such scientific accounts used intellectual expertise as their authority and appealed to a more specialized audience than the Admiralty-sanctioned accounts. They also indicate that the consumption of voyage accounts was not only growing, but diversifying. The Admiralty’s control policies did not squeeze out rivals, it encouraged differentiation. Books had reduced in price and had been so accepted as the medium through which to transmit information that niche accounts could be targeted at specialized readers; no longer was it necessary for a voyage account to both entertain and instruct, although they certainly still could. By the mid-nineteenth century, exploration had become not only a culturally-recognized activity and vocation, but also a thriving enterprise.

Cartography also became a more regulated business in the nineteenth century. Building on the Ordnance Survey, with its origins in the repression of the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion, and with army surveying increasingly professionalized, the Royal Navy created the Hydrographic Office in 1795. ⁷ The Admiralty appointed as its head none other than Alexander Dalrymple, who was tasked with institutionalizing what had previously been an open system. He was to provide

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charts for the Royal Navy, as he already did for the EIC, ensuring that all officers used similar charts updated with the latest information—Britain had finally adopted the centralized map repository of its imperial rivals, although circulation, not sequestration, was still its preferred method of controlling geographic knowledge. Parallel to the government-takeover of cartographic distribution and production, large map firms also conglomerated, catering to the continuing public interest in maps as quotidian epistemological devices and aesthetic adornments.8

The mass marketing of exploration and maps, to general and specific audiences, would only increase in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Such interest was fed by the sale of representations of hyperbolized events such as Cook’s death in Hawaii and La Perouse’s disappearance and the eventual discovery of his shattered ships. Readers eagerly followed the trails and travails of Ross, Franklin, and Perry in the Arctic; Livingstone and Stanley in Africa; and the race to the South Pole. As the unknown places diminished, the fascination of exploration shifted from discovery of geographical features to human domination of such features, best exemplified by Hillary’s ascent of Everest and the flights of Lindbergh and Earhart.9 It also shifted to the stars, with space travel as the new “final frontier” of not only spatial exploration, but also as a utopia of peace and harmony as popularized in Star Trek’s United Federation of Planets. However, the space race of the Cold War nevertheless reminds us that exploration is never without political underpinnings. The glorification of a pure, apolitical spirit of exploration

8 Keighren, Withers, with Bell, Travels into Print.
9 For an overview of the changes to the imperial expedition from the late-18th to the 20th centuries, see Martin Thomas, “Introduction,” in Expedition into Empire.
is still a cherished cultural trope, as depicted recently in the Disney/Pixar movie “UP.”\textsuperscript{10} This study’s goal has been more modest than to tell the centuries-long epic of the intertwining of print culture and long-distance exploratory endeavors. Rather, it has been interested in the intertwining of several very specific stories as they pertained to European interaction with the Pacific region in the long eighteenth century. To this end, I must disagree with Thomas when he writes that official voyage accounts, “had represented, since Cook’s day, the supreme expression of a voyager’s accomplishments, indeed a monument in book form to them.”\textsuperscript{11} The evidence presented here shows Thomas’ chronology to be truncated.

Conclusion

Horace Walpole, upon reading Hawkesworth’s \textit{Account}, remarked, “The Admiralty have dragged the whole ocean, and caught nothing but the fry of ungrown islands, which had slipped through the meshes of the Spaniard’s net…They fetched blood of a great whale called \textit{Terra Australis Incognita}, but saw nothing but its tail.”\textsuperscript{12} While Walpole astutely points out the inter-imperial tensions inherent in European voyages and predicts what Cook would confirm on his second expedition—that there was no Southern Continent—he was not quite correct that the Admiralty had “caught nothing.” In fact, they had caught on to the importance of controlling their public image, specifically the role published accounts could play in promoting an enterprising, rational, organized Navy. Although never on par with combat, exploration offered the Royal Navy another avenue by which to promote their profile as defender of the empire. To

\textsuperscript{10} Pixar recently debuted a short to accompany “Inside/Out”, “Lava”, which contributes to the exoticization of the Pacific as a natural history utopia. Disney’s upcoming 2016 feature length animated film, “Vaiana,” is also set on Pacific islands and stars a Polynesian female.

\textsuperscript{11} Thomas, \textit{Islanders}, 131.

\textsuperscript{12} As quoted in Abbott, \textit{John Hawkesworth}, 154.
return to a quote from Anson’s account, Walter asked critics not to characterize “all literature and science as effeminate, and derogatory to that ferocity, which, they would falsely persuade us, was the most unerring characteristic of courage.”  Anson and Walter are not only trying to expand the definition of courage, they are also emphasizing that such definitions are decided in a public sphere in which commentators are in dynamic conversation with a literate public. Publishing was not only about profit or fame, both of which were rare and usually fleeting; it was also about the belief that a wider audience was necessary and qualified to referee the conferral of authority about complex concepts such as courage. As the Pacific print wars of Dampier and Welbe, Shelvocke and Betagh, Middleton and Dobbs, Dalrymple and Hawkesworth show, a reading audience was also thought sufficiently schooled to be the jury in disputes about reputation which rested on the interpretation of Pacific space. Decisions about what the Pacific was and what the region might mean to Britain were carried out not primarily behind closed doors, but in the pages of periodicals, voyage accounts, and maps. The link between print and authority is a lesson the Admiralty learned slowly; they showed relative disinterest with Narbrough, were inspired by Dampier’s success enough to commission him, created the first official account under the guidance of Anson, and then experimented, unsuccessfully, with Hawkesworth.

While the development of the official account is important to the cultural history of the Royal Navy, it is also integral to the study of eighteenth-century empire. No matter how insignificant Walpole thought “the fry of ungrown islands,” those very islands were of considerable interest to Europe politics in the eighteenth century. Spain had maintained a presence in the ocean since the early sixteenth century and considered the entire expanse a

13 Walter in Anson, *Voyage round the World*, 16.
protective barrier for their Manila-Acapulco trade. Spain not only sought a closed sea, but also
maintained a closed archive of geographic information. Britain and France bristled at this
exclusionary policy and expended considerable energy in trying to gain access to the relatively
unknown, to them, South Seas. More than an ideological disagreement, this was a difference in
the institutional organization of the empires. Britain relied upon a mobile library of books and
maps which transmitted knowledge from the private sector to public officials and intellectual
societies. Spain turned to their centralized archive of sources, some of which they periodically
released, yet which seldom were converted to widely-circulated print objects. France relied on a
series of governmental institutes and academies to supply and discuss knowledge germane to
empire, placing French savants under direct government control. Censorship existed on a
spectrum, from tightly monitored in Spain, somewhat regulated in France, to comparably relaxed
in Britain. In the case of the Pacific, the institutional relationships that underlay the creation and
circulation of geographic knowledge proved integral to exploration and subsequent imperial
expansion into the Pacific region. This was due to the paradoxical nature of Pacific sources
within early modern geography.

Compilation was the primary process by which mapmakers created maps and charts.
Geographers, no matter their origin or loyalty, required as broad an array of source materials as
possible to ensure that their representations were informed approximations of the spaces they
were depicting. This was not just a matter of professional pride, but of practical import, as charts,
even those in books, could be called upon by navigators in dangerous situations, as Moll, Anson,
Greene, and Dalrymple all explained. In the case of the Pacific, the problem was more acute, as
so few reliable—a debatable concept—observations existed for such a vast space. The repetition
of and dependence upon a few sources ensured that, while new information about South Seas
space might join the existing body of literature, little was jettisoned entirely. This is seen most clearly in the persistence of Fonte on maps, as well as in the periodic return to Quiros as a possible, if always flawed, source of inspiration. Individuals could also serve as fonts of information, and people were harder to control than paper, often defying secrecy statutes and crossing borders to serve other states. Despite official rivalries at the state level, the production process of geographic objects defied competition in its reliance on collaboration to create useful charts and accounts. The tools that officials, sailors, and diplomats used to claim Pacific space were conglomerations of European geographic knowledge, thus competitive collaboration is the best term to understand Pacific empire from the late-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century.

To emphasize constant, yet perhaps unintended, collaboration is not to deny that competition was the primary goal of almost every individual with interests in Pacific geographic discourse. Editors of voyage collections highlighted many expeditions, yet added commentaries with heavily nationalistic overtones. Navigators relied upon previous voyages, not matter their provenance, yet also criticized their predecessors. Diplomats particularly were at odds in a century in which European states were more often at war than peace. British diplomats wielded their growing library in negotiations and honed exploration as a rhetorical tool. Although bellicose in intention, the deliberate divorcing of the Anson expedition from trade—but not the search for trade and resources—was a departure from previous expeditions. Spurred by Anson’s call for further voyages, Bedford, Sandwich, and Keene all attempted to frame the aborted 1749 expedition as a search primarily for knowledge, not commerce, an objective goal with universal benefit. Although the Spanish saw through this thinly-veiled excuse, subsequent voyage instructions and accounts increasingly employed similar language to present exploration as a search for new knowledge in unknown waters. The combination of Cook’s first voyage with the
Transit of Venus further bolstered the ties between exploration and natural philosophy, a study whose practitioners also advocated the unencumbered circulation of information. The recasting of exploration as an intellectual pursuit provided an insidious mask for the violence and exploitation of imperial expansion in the Pacific from the late-eighteenth century onward, but it has roots in an earlier period. Before there were a significant number of boots on the ground in the Pacific to impose British control, there were books trumpeting imperial projections. By examining a particular constellation of these projections as represented in print culture, I have shown that the Pacific must be part of scholars’ considerations of British Empire earlier than the Cook expeditions. Empire, and the intimate ways in which it is tied to exploration, is a story that begins earlier and deserves more consideration.

The survey of Pacific accounts and maps in this study has revealed that the Pacific shifted in representation over time, if subtly. The dominating feature of any Pacific visualization was its sheer size—it was, and is, a daunting waterscape where the domination of blue overwhelms the few specks of green. Such distance in longitude gave mapmakers considerable latitude in their placement of islands and seas. While the Pacific was certainly a place ripe for satire and farce, of which Gulliver remains the most enduring example, it was seldom discussed in an openly fantastic way. Even sources which proved to be fake presented their versions of the Pacific in the cartographic and journalistic conventions of the time. Precision and accuracy were relative concepts, leaving gaps which geographers could choose to highlight or cover, and which satirists could exploit with clever words. Modern scholars should take care not to fall into those gaps and mistake them as evidence of ignorance or sloppiness when they are more fruitfully analyzed as indicators of contemporary intellectual practice.
Almost every writer from Dampier to Clerke is marked by a sense of awe when facing the vast Pacific, but it is awe tempered with caution. When ships reached the Ladrones or the East Indies, the accounts quickly wrap up—the return to the known is of less interest than the unknown. The sense of the Pacific as a dangerous obstacle, particularly the Straits of Magellan and Cape Horn, is a frequent feature. By extension, Tierra del Fuego and the Straits are one of the most mapped regions in the accounts. In addition, Patagonian peoples are the most frequently encountered group of people. Their descriptions as dexterous, dirty, and above all giant in size fed European desires to hear about an extreme sort of Other living in the extreme opposite part of the world. We learn far more about European expectations and views of civilization from such descriptions than we do about the realities of Patagonian cultures in the eighteenth centuries, cultures which now sadly are largely lost. European representations of Pacific space were intimately tied to European politics and economy, which explains its variable depiction as a long coast ripe for legal and illegal trade (ca. 1680), a deep sea of folly (ca. 1720), an imperial sphere of influence (1740s), and an open ocean ripe for European classification and categorization (1760s).

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By examining Pacific print culture prior to Cook, one gets a very different view of the Pacific than that offered in Hawkesworth and his successors. It is a less exotic, indeed a colder, sea; an intimidating, deceptive physical feature that is seemingly unpopulated. This is not to say that there are no encounters and that no hint of the tropical paradise comes through earlier accounts. Anson was quite taken with breadfruit at Tinian and Dampier’s pejorative description
of Australian aboriginal peoples is notorious. However, such tendencies are underplayed in the voyage accounts and maps prior to Hawkesworth. With the discovery of Tahiti the focus shifts from giants to sexualized Islanders—from frozen Straits to tropical beaches, from navigation to natural history. Overall, the changeability of the Pacific should be clear; the Pacific as a geographic entity was always a construction in flux, at the mercy of those whose reputation could be made, or lost, by writing about or depicting their version of Pacific space. Europeans did not take into account indigenous constructions of their homelands and waters but rather conformed the region to their existing intellectual, social, and political geographies. As such, the Pacific, somewhat surprisingly, proved to be a salient topic in early modern European discourse, one that spilled over into discussions of authority, imperial expansion, state centralization, cartographic standards, and the politics and utility of geographic knowledge. By following the contours of these debates, via the production of the materials which inspired them, we can more clearly grasp the complex socio-political relations that underlay the creation of our modern, very unequal, globe.
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Abbreviations

AGI Archivo General de las Indias, Seville, Spain
AN Archives Nationales, Paris, France
AHN Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Spain
AMN Archivo del Museo Naval, Madrid, Spain
BL British Library, London, UK
BnF Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris, France
ECCO Eighteenth Century Collections Online, Gale Cengage Learning, 2016
NMM National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, UK
PL Pepys Library, Magdalene College, Cambridge, UK
RAH Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, Spain
RS Royal Society, London, UK
TNA The National Archives, Kew, UK

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