Vacationing in the Cold War: Foreign Tourists to Socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain, 1960s-1970s

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My dissertation examines the politics and effects of international tourism in socialist Romania and Francoist Spain in the postwar era. Despite the sharp economic and political differences between the two dictatorial regimes at the time of the Cold War, I argue that significant similarities existed in the way that they aimed to take advantage of international tourism in order to improve their image abroad and to acquire hard currencies, which were sorely needed as both states wanted to pursue a process of economic modernization. This dissertation also attempts to provide an explanation for why, by the end of the 1970s, the two countries achieved rather different results in terms of tourism development, despite the fact that both shared many features in the 1940s and 1950s. Most English-language scholarly literature examines relations between and transfers from western to eastern Europe, but pays little attention to the relationships between southern or eastern parts of the continent and the “West.” Moreover, most scholarly work silently integrates, often by implication, southern Europe into the amorphous “West.” This study takes a different approach. By comparing the rise and evolution of international tourism in two countries on different sides of the Iron Curtain, it reassesses the geopolitics of postwar Europe by showing the developmental similarities between eastern and southern Europe. It thereby suggests that the Cold War view of a bipolar Europe needs refining.

The bulk of my dissertation analyzes the two governments’ policies—and the discussions and debates leading up to those policies—regarding tourism, how and why the policies were
implemented, as well as the anticipated and unanticipated results. To provide a more in-depth analysis of the ways in which tourists, their behaviors, and their preferences (be they in attire, morals, diet and the like) influenced policies, I compare the Romanian Black Sea coast and Spain’s Costa del Sol during the 1960s and 1970s. I focus in particular on the interactions between foreign tourists and locals, and how intended policies were applied and received.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACNSAS-Arhivele Consiliului Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității (The National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives)
ANIC- Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (National Historical Archives)
AGA-Archivo General de Administración (General Administrative Archives)
ATE- Administración Turística Española (Spanish Tourist Administration) (1958-1975)
CC of PCR-Comiterul Central al Partidului Comunist Român (Central Committee of the Romania Communist Party)
Caudillo- Francisco Franco
CGM- Confederația Generală a Muncii (General Working Confederation)
COMECON- The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CENTROCOOP- Uniunea Națională a Cooperației de Consum (National Union of Consumer Co-Operatives, Romania)
EEC- European Economic Community
GDR- German Democratic Republic
OEEC-Organization for European Economic Cooperation (1948-1961)
OSA- Open Society Archives (1996-present)
IATA- International Commercial Aviation Cartel
IBRD-International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
INI-Instituto Nacional de Industria (National Industry Institute) (1941-1992)
IMF- International Monetary Fund
GATT-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
NTO-Carpathians- Oficiul Național de Turism Carpați (National Tourism Office-Carpathians)

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

UCECOM- Uniunea Națională a Cooperației Meșteșugărești (Romanian National Associations of Handicraft and Production Co-operatives)

TAROM- Agenția Română de Transport Aviatic (Romanian Agency of Air Transportation)

TGD- Tourist General Direction, Spain (1958-1975)

WTO- World Tourism Organization
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With this joyful announcement, the 1968 film *El Turismo es un Gran Invento* [Tourism is a great invention] directed by the Spanish Pedro Lazaga began. The movie’s plot centers around Sr. Alcade, a relatively well-to-do villager, who wants to turn his village into a tourist resort. In order to do so, he convinces his fellow villagers to fund his trip and that of the village’s secretary to Marbella, a resort on the Costa del Sol, to learn from that region’s experience. “What was Costa del Sol, or Costa Blanca, or Costa del Azahar before tourism? A godforsaken corner of Spain,” he tells his fellow citizens. Seduced by the mirage of tourism, the male villagers agree on the benefits that tourism would bring to their forgotten village and support Sr. Alcade’s plan. Together with the village’s secretary, Alcade takes the bus to Marbella and checks in at the Don Pepe Melia Hotel, one of the biggest and most luxurious hotels on the Costa del Sol. The two visitors are dazzled by the appearance of the hotel with “moving doors” and bathrooms, women in bikini and

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1 I like to be a tourist/It’s something stimulating/It’s an exhilarating /Way to learn/ [...] Relax on the beach/Flirt a little bit/And leave the sun /To tickle your skin

2 A Spanish comedy produced in 1968 and filmed in Malaga and Terremolinos on the Costa de Sol.
short skirts, and of everything they saw. Nothing resembled their home village. Similarly, a 1979 Romanian movie touted the benefits of tourism. *Nea Mărin Miliardar* [My Uncle, the Billionaire] tells the story of Nea Mărin, a peasant from Oltania (a region in southern Romania), who visits his nephew, an employee in one of the modern hotels in Mamaia on the Black Sea Coast. Although the hotel is booked to full capacity, the nephew manages to keep Nea Mărin for a night in the presidential suite with the help of the receptionist, also an Oltanian. Although physically separated by the “Iron Curtain,” which places them in different political and economic systems, and more than 2,000 miles apart, the locations depicted in the two movies strongly resemble each other. Both places are dotted with modern hotels with pools and fancy amenities; both are populated by women in bikinis and men in swim trunks uttering words in either English or German, the languages of most foreign tourists in the two areas. Both Sr. Alcade and Nea Mărin are shocked by this diversity and behave clumsily, as they have seldom seen foreign tourists before. But both movies suggest that the modernity brought about by international tourism in Marbella on the Costa del Sol and in Mamaia on the Black Sea Coast might extend to any “godforsaken” place in Spain and Romania in a distant, or not so distant, future.

Although both films are comedies, they also reflect new social and economic realities in both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain, and the two states’ interest in developing international tourism. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the governments of both countries became aware of the advent of international tourism and the potential advantages that it could bring to their economies. Yet originally, international tourism was not a priority for either state, as heavy industry for

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3 Alcade remarked that back in the day in order to see a woman’s legs you had to marry her.
4 The movie was made in 1979 and the plot centers around Nea Mărin, an Oltanian who comes to visit his nephew, but he is mistaken for an American billionaire.
5 Nea Mărin even plans to build an airport at Băilesti, his home-village in Oltania.
socialist Romania and the mining and the chemical industries for Franco’s Spain were believed to be the most promising economic sectors because they fit within the economic model that the two governments deemed successful. Developing, prioritizing, and turning international tourism into a profitable business (Spain) or partially successful economic sector (Romania) was a lengthy process in both countries. This dissertation examines this process and how, throughout it, the physical and human landscapes in tourist resorts like Mamaia on the Black Sea Coast and Marbella on the Costa del Sol came to resemble each other, despite their location on different sides of the Iron Curtain. Furthermore, it examines how foreign tourists set in motion forces that forced the two dictatorial regimes to take new approaches to consumption and how ordinary people in socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain took advantage of the foreign tourists’ arrival to serve their own ends and to acquire a space of their own in relation to their respective state.

1.1 SETTING THE CONTEXT: THE ADVENT OF TOURISM IN POSTWAR EUROPE

In the 1960s, as the sociologist John Urry put it, travel became “almost a matter of citizenship, a right to pleasure.”6 The number of European tourists increased from thirty million in 1955 to one hundred million in 1966.7 A number of circumstances led to the popularity of tourism during this time. First of all, paid vacations became a generalized practice in Europe; all European states offered at least two weeks of paid annual leave, while Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and France

even granted three weeks. Second, a new mentality that linked taking vacations and sun bathing to a healthy lifestyle made most Northern Europeans want to travel to sunnier destinations. Third, vacations became more affordable with the introduction of the charter flights and package tours in the 1960s.

Paid vacations were first introduced in the aftermath of the First World War in a number of European countries. Before the war, children and women working in factories were granted (theoretically in most cases) a week off as of 1901. Beginning in 1919, French print workers and bakers received a one-week paid annual leave; by 1925, this practice was extended to other six European countries, including some in central and eastern Europe. Yet the progress was slow. In France, the first country to offer paid annual leaves to all workers, the law regarding paid vacations was passed only in the 1930s. As a result, in August 1939, 350,000 people took a vacation. In the 1930s, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany also developed projects that advanced workers’ leisure. According to Victoria de Grazia, the author of a monograph on workers leisure in Fascist Italy, the purpose was to build a “corporatist mentality” rather than a tourist mindset. Similarly, in Nazi Germany, the government used tourism and vacations to shape the “new man,” a physically fit individual who was supposed to prevail against other human races. But those taking these vacations, many of them workers, ascribed their own meanings to their experiences, and acquired

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11 Stavri Cunescu, *op. cit.*, p.47.
a taste for vacations and travel. Hence the workers of the 1930s and their children became the tourists of the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1950s, the length of the workday fell to 42 hours all over Europe and paid vacations became part of any worker’s contract. In the 1970s, the number of working hours fell further to 38-40 hours as trade unions increased their leverage over the governments and business owners in the context of the oil crisis. This allowed for more time for vacations, particularly for international travel.

“Being a tourist” became the social norm in the 1960s. When travelling, people looked for specific tourist destinations, which either their travel agent or tourist brochures suggested as being more rewarding. One pattern that most tourists followed was to seek sun, sea, and beach during summer, and snow coupled with skiing in the winter. As many European tourists only had two weeks of vacation, the majority chose to spend it during the summer and thus beach destinations became more popular. Medicine played its part, as most doctors recommended sun as therapy for the overworked Europeans. In addition, advertisements, television, and magazines popularized sunnier destinations and a new approach to the body. All these served to build a tourist mentality among the middle and working classes.

Most importantly, taking a vacation became less expensive. In the 1930s, with the exception of government-sponsored programs, most tourists were well-to-do individuals in search of so-called authentic experiences. Tourism abroad was a matter of class and of social status. Airline travel was prohibitively expensive, while only socially exclusive trains, such as the Orient Express, connected the European continent. This began to change in the 1960s with the advent of charter flights. Charter flights were first introduced at the end of the 1950s and connected Great Britain to the Mediterranean. In the 2000s working hours fell to 35-38 in some European states.

14 Dan Stone, op. cit., p.433.
15 Ibidem, p. 434. In the 2000s working hours fell to 35-38 in some European states.
16 Orient Express traveled from Paris to Istanbul.
Britain and southern France. Until the 1970s, charter flights became a standard type of traveling and their routes spread out to the United States and Eastern Europe. In 1969, a charter flight was introduced between the United States and Europe and the price beat any competition: while a round ticket for a regular flight between Atlanta and Paris ranged between 656 to 925 dollars, a charter flight cost only 390 dollars. In addition, package tours changed the definition of tourism itself. From an activity that involved individual exploration or recovery of health, tourism became a collective pursuit of pleasure and relaxation. Group tourism prevailed over individual travel because it was more affordable and did not involve special preparations beforehand. Tourist agencies carefully included a set of pre-established activities in tourists’ packages. Because of this, some scholars of tourism have accused tourists of acting like sheep and argue that this form of tourism led to a standardization of experience. But, in fact, this was part of the process of modernity as MacCannell’s *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class* and John Urry’s *The Tourist Gaze* have successfully shown. Regardless of the meaning that the tourists ascribed to the places they visited, one thing is certain: more people could afford this experience and a democratization of tourism took place in Europe and elsewhere. Among these were the tourists who visited both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain.

18 Eduard W. Bratton, “Charter Flight to Europe,” *South Atlantic Bulletin*, vol. 34, no.3, (May, 1969), p.32. Although popular and much less expensive, charter flights were feared by some as unsafe because of the number of incidents that were involved.
When writing an integrated history of Europe, most scholars limit their discussion to postwar capitalist Western Europe, while socialist Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region are included only as subsidiaries.  

This dissertation aims to change this perspective by examining two of postwar Europe’s peripheries through the lens of tourism. A democratization of tourism occurred in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region as well as in Western Europe. The number of tourists to these countries soared and, although fewer in number, they also started to visit other countries. Socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain were part of this general European and global trend, but the tourist phenomenon was shaped by the specific political context in the two countries. The two very different types of dictatorships determined the process of tourism development in light of their own political and economic structure. Yet strikingly, they also shared some similarities. These similarities resulted from Romania’s and Spain’s overall similar paths in the twentieth century. Both sought to modernize their societies, and in doing so, they vacillated between the “European model” and their own version of modernity. To a certain extent, this situation gave birth to similar mentalities that regarded the European core as desirable, privileged nationalism and masculinity, and favored an ambiguous relationship between citizens and the relatively weak states in socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain. When it came to designing and implementing tourist policies in the two countries, these similarities prevailed over ideological differences.

23 “European Tourism on the Increase” in World Travel, 63, April 1964, pp. 3-17. A survey of European tourism with data from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and USSR.
1.2 TWO VERY DIFFERENT REGIMES: SOCIALIST ROMANIA AND FRANCOIST SPAIN

Postwar Europe was politically divided between the socialist East, controlled by the Soviet Union, and the capitalist West, supported by the United States. This is the kind of narrative any history textbook teaches its students. Yet certain realities of postwar Europe did not always conform to this clear-cut binary division. By the end of the 1950s, the tension between the two political blocs eased somewhat and to a certain degree this reflected changes that occurred at the level of domestic policies as well. Socialist Romania and Francoist Spain are two cases in point.

Romania became part of the socialist camp in March 1945 when Petru Groza, the chairman of Frontul Plugarilor (Ploughmen’s Front), a political party close to the Communist Party and sanctioned by the Soviets, became Prime Minister. The Communist Party of Romania moved quickly to consolidate its influence and power with Soviet support. On 30 December 1947, King Michael I abdicated and in February 1948, the Communist Party of Romania merged with the Social-Democratic Party. With this union, the newly formed Romanian Workers’ Party (after 1964 the Romanian Communist Party) became the only political party in Romania. The party dominated all state structures and membership in the Communist Party became a pre-condition for any public position. Initially, the Romanian Workers’ Party followed Moscow’s line but it had little popular support because, according to public perception, it was run by non-Romanians or individuals who were fully loyal to the Soviet Union. In 1952, the leadership Romanized, when Gheorghe-

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24 Two of the four Politburo’s members were viewed as being of non-Romanian origins: Ana Pauker was a Romanian-born Jew and Vasile Luca was an ethnic Hungarian. Given the powerful anti-Semitic and anti-Hungarian sentiments of Romanian population inherited from the interwar period, the party lacked popular sympathy.
Gheorghiu Dej, an ethnic Romanian who had not spent time in Moscow, became the general-secretary of the Romanian Workers’ Party. Throughout the 1960s, Dej and his successor, Nicolae Ceaușescu, adopted a nationalist policy and took a relatively independent stance towards the Soviet Union. Against the background of party’s “nationalization,” both men enhanced their personal power within both the party and the state. A nationalist stance along with a gradual liberalization of society increased the Romanian Communist Party’s popularity at the grass-roots level. Scholars have pinpointed three main stages of Romanian communism: the Stalinist period (1948-1963), a more liberal face of socialism (1963-1971), and Ceaușescu’s personal dictatorship (1971-1989).

Yet, in the analysis of tourism and consumption, this periodization is misleading because the economic liberalization of international tourism continued well in the 1970s. In fact, both the Communist Party and Ceaușescu became unpopular among ordinary people only in the 1980s, in the context of consumer goods shortages and degradation of the everyday life.

Putting forth a crisp and agreed upon definition of the Romanian socialist regime has proven rather difficult for scholars. While the regime defined itself as a national communist government, which involved a blend of Marxism and nationalist rhetoric, in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, it became an oligarchy centered around Nicolae Ceaușescu and his family.

Political scientist D.N. Nelson considered Romania under Ceaușescu a “modern autocracy” and

25 At first the leadership was collective and included four members: Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu, and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.
labels political practices as “autocratic populism.” Nelson argues that Ceaușescu’s popularity steamed from an enforced adulation rather than from genuine popular sentiments. According to Nelson, the excessive manipulation and extensive reliance on the secret police, Securitate, completed the image of the socialist Romanian regime. Although Nelson has formulated this definition based on the relationship between the regime and the people, he paid less attention to how access to consumer goods affected the regime’s legitimacy. In his 1981 article Workers in a Worker’s State, Nelson regards the socialist state as strong, although he anticipates further tensions between “the Party and industrial labor.” Katherine Verdery, on the other hand, employed the concept of “weak state” in order to explain the functioning of socialist states. Verdery grounded her theory on what she called the socialist entrepreneurs’ manipulation of annual plan’s numbers. Allegedly, the socialist entrepreneurs would report lower numbers than the established plan in order to ask for more resources. As those resources never came through, this provided an excuse for not fulfilling the annual or five-year plans, which became a fictional reality for both the state and the socialist entrepreneurs. Although to a certain degree true for the last years of the communist regime in Romania, this explanation is incomplete because it overlooks both the realities of 1980s socialist Romania and the intricacies of everyday life. Moreover, it does not focus on the times

30 Ibidem, p. xvi.
33 As a proof that the expectation to fulfill the plans was real, the salaries of workers and managers were lowered when this expectation was not met. The workers attempted to cope with both the shortage and the wage lowering by burglarizing their work place. See for instance: David Kideckel, “The Socialist Transformation of Agriculture in a Romanian Commune, 1945-1962” in American Ethnologist, vol. 9, no. 2, (May, 1982).
of economic growth like the 1960s and the early 1970s. As Nelson wrote before 1989 while Verdery published her book in the early 1990s, both of them were influenced by their respective timings. On the one hand, Nelson did not (and in fact he could not) anticipate the political and economic crisis of the 1980s Romania, followed by a complete de-legitimization of the communist regime. On the other hand, Verdery attempted to find explanations for the dramatic end of the communist regime in Romania. Both authors and in fact most literature on Romanian communism have ignored the issue of consumption. In their attempt to define the communist regime Nelson and Verdery lost sight of the informal/silent negotiation between the Romanian socialist state and its citizens. While in the 1960s, this ‘informal negotiation’ promoted official consumption, in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, it made possible an underground economy and a systematic burglarizing of the work place along with setting a network of “friends/connections.” This dissertation hopes to shed light on this process while examining the interactions between foreign tourists and Romanian tourist workers.

Francoist Spain grew out of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) with the victory of nationalist forces led by Francisco Franco over the Popular Front composed of socialists, republicans, communists, and anarchists. Because of Franco’s wartime alliances with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, Spain was a pariah state in postwar Europe and the United States until the 1950s. In the early 1950s, Spain re-entered the arena of international politics on the side of the United States. At the height of the Cold War, Spain’s anti-communist stance was its trump card in its attempt to overcome isolation and procure capital for its shattered economy. Yet Francoist Spain was neither capitalist nor democratic like the other countries in the Western bloc. Throughout the 1940s, Spain was a semi-fascist dictatorial state. The Falange, a para-military group with a strong fascist orientation was the main political group. In support of Franco’s government, it mobilized
all social strata by creating political organizations of youth, women, or workers.\textsuperscript{34} But in the early 1950s, the nature of the Spanish government shifted into a personal dictatorship of Francisco Franco supported by the Spanish Catholic Church and the military.\textsuperscript{35} Only in 1958, did Falangists lose their political influence to Opus Dei, a secretively group within the Catholic Church, which formed the government. But the shift could not resolve the deep economic problems that had afflicted the Spanish economy since the end of the civil war. In the mid-1950s, the regime was confronted with workers’ protests, but also with a powerful economic crisis. In response to these political and economic challenges, the government agreed to the Stabilization Plan of 1959, which allowed for foreign capital to be invested in Spain and ended the country’s economic isolation.

The nature of the Francoist state has been an issue of continuous debate. While according to the Marxist school, Francoist Spain was a fascist state, most contemporaries argued that the regime’s reliance on the Catholic Church and a thin economic and military elite does not qualify it as fascist. In the 1960s, the sociologist Juan Linz coined the term “authoritarian regime,” as opposed to “totalitarianism,” to describe the Francoist state.\textsuperscript{36} He defined authoritarian regimes as:

\ldots political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate or guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor extensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits, but actually quite predictable ones.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{34} Nigel Townson, \textit{Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959-1975} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp.2-3. In the 1940s-1950s, 50,000 political prisoners were executed.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 291.
While some scholars embraced the new terminology, others rejected it as incomplete because it ignored the social sphere and domestic class dynamics. In the 1980s, Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán augmented Linz’s theory and coined the term “modern despotism,” which they defined as: “a mode of class domination in which power is exercised on behalf of the dominant class by a despot or small elite.” Recently, historians like Paul Preston and Julián Casanova have reiterated the “fascist model” and have completely rebuked Linz’s terminology. But in relation to tourism, the Francoist regime proved to be less politicized and class oriented than in other areas, although these aspects are still important. This dissertation does not focus on a particular label to describe the Francoist regime, in part because it examines the state through the lens of international tourism, a focus that necessitates paying attention to the way that the regime was received and adjusted to at the everyday level.

By comparing the policies and impact of international tourism in two different types of dictatorship, this dissertation attempts to provide working definitions for both socialist Romania and Francoist Spain that take into account the intricacies of everyday life in both countries and the relationship between state and citizens. For this dissertation, the state is defined as a nexus of institutions and individuals centered around the government and supported by either secret police as in socialist Romania, or the Spanish Catholic Church and military, as in Franco’s Spain.

39 Julian Casanova, Julia Casanova, La Iglesia de Franco (Barcelona: Critica, 2001).
On 10 February 1985, the Telejurnal (TV journal), the main news program of Romanian Television, updated its viewers on the dire situation of UK miners’ strike and reported on a car crash in the United States. These two catastrophic events contrasted with the more buoyant news about the recent accomplishments of Romanian industry. The contrast was obvious: whereas the West was dealing with strikes and catastrophic events, socialist Romania was thriving under the careful guidance of the Communist Party. Yet while the newsreels shown on the Romanian Telejurnal strived to portray capitalist West as facing an imminent collapse, the foreign tourists coming from these Western countries conveyed a different message. Like these newscasts broadcast by Romanian television, Spanish newspapers throughout the 1940s and 1960s portrayed the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in Eastern Europe as the enemy ready to strike at any time. A 1959 article in the SUR, the main newspaper in Malaga and Costa del Sol, went as far as to call for the defense of the West. However, this stance gradually changed. In the mid-1960s, SUR included in its pages articles that took a more neutral tone about socialist countries. Tourism and some direct contacts played a significant role in smoothing out the relationship between Spain and socialist Eastern Europe.

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40 Romanian Television Archive, Telejurnal, 10 February 1985.
41 “Estamos llamados a defender el Occidente” in SUR, 15 July 1959, pp. 1, 5.
42 A first article about Romania and the possibility to develop tourist relations was titled “Turismo con Guardia” and appeared in SUR, 1 July, 1962, p. 19.
This dissertation examines this process by taking a bottom-up approach to those Cold War relations that pitted socialist East against the capitalist West. It does so by examining the ways in which the everyday interactions between citizens of Western countries, Spaniards included, and Romanians turned the Iron Curtain into a more porous border. It also studies the relations established between Spaniards on the one hand, and officials and tourists from socialist countries on the other. In the 1960s, against the background of both the youth and women’s movements, E.P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, and other Marxist historians argued that examining history from below, from the perspective of the ruled classes, could be more valuable than studying it from the point of view of the ruling classes alone. This dissertation is not a social history study as Thompson, Hobsbawm and others employed it because no study of international tourism can ignore the important role played by the state. After all, the state set the policies that sought to develop and foster international tourism. But neither can it ignore the citizens of Romania and Spain because the growth of an international tourist industry put many of those citizens into direct or indirect contact with international tourists, who brought with them an array of material, social, and cultural values that differed in substantial ways from those that socialist Romania and Francoist Spain believed to be appropriate for the respective cultures. This study examines the ways in which state policies, in both states, produced intended and unintended consequences.

44 The history of taking a bottom-up approach to historical events harks back to the end of the 1960s in the framework of Annales School in France and the Anglo-Saxon “new social history” pioneered especially by historians like E.P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm and other Marxist historians. It referred to examining historical events from below, respectively from the perspective of working class. See Miles Taylor, “The Beginnings of Modern British Social History” in History Workshop Journal, no 43 (Spring 1997), pp. 155-176.

among their citizens, consequences that affected these states’ tolerance for a degree of autonomous behavior by citizens.

This study also differs from mainstream scholarship in its approach to the Cold War. Most scholars have approached the history of the Cold War from the perspective of political and diplomatic history, an approach that emphasizes the division between the socialist East and the capitalist West. Yet lately a number of studies have not only challenged this perspective but have also shown that the Iron Curtain was more porous than previously thought. This dissertation supplements this recent literature and illustrates how socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain, despite their locations on the different sides of the Iron Curtain, not only shared an interest in international tourism but also followed similar paths of development until the early 1970s, when an aging Franco began to lose his grip over Spain and a rising Nicolae Ceaușescu took a more authoritarian and autarkic stance in both the political and economic realms in Romania. Both Spain and Romania sought to attract Western tourists because such tourists brought with them coveted hard currencies, which both countries needed in order to modernize their economies. Both countries also developed their tourist industry practically from scratch and capitalized on the wealthier Northwestern Europe, from which most of the tourists were coming. Such a development suggests how international tourism reconfigured in some measure the geopolitical landscape of postwar Europe. In this study, the ideological and political division between socialist East and capitalist

West is not central because Eastern and Southern Europe shared certain economic aspirations to move towards the center of the European and world system. International tourism offered this opportunity. To a certain extent, Franco’s Spain performed better at this task than did socialist Romania. Yet the reasons for this difference were not ideological, but rooted in the economic performance of each country and their ability to promote themselves on the external market.

Besides providing an alternate perspective on the Cold War, this dissertation illustrates how contacts with foreign tourists and the opportunities that came out of such contacts provided ordinary people in both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain with a private space, or in Alf Ludtke’s terms, “a self-willing distancing from authority.” While in Romania such contacts helped the “little” women and men to overcome the consumer goods shortage, in Spain these connections helped them to adapt the Francoist system in ways that ranged from tax evasion to embracing mores and ideas that went against the principles of the conservative Spanish Catholic Church. These interconnections offered ordinary people a certain independence in relation to the political system in the two countries, connections that served to challenge the aspirations of both dictatorships to define a wide range of citizens’ personal behaviors. Another consequence of international tourism is that in both countries, but most notably in Romania in the 1980s, the black market successfully rivaled official control of the market. Yet as long as the communist regime,

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and especially its officials and agents benefitted from this challenge to the system of state socialism, one surprising effect of the parallel markets was that it helped the regime stay in power, despite its lack of declining popular legitimacy. In Spain, tourism brought about a liberalization from below, which the Francoist regime could not stop. The number of tourists was too high and the overall advantages of international tourism to the Spanish economy were too enticing to induce the state to halt this process. As a result, during this process ordinary people adopted new consumption patterns and acquired new ideas about sexuality, which the Francoist state had no option but to mildly tolerate.

Furthermore, the increasing separation of citizens from the state in both countries created an odd state of “normality,” which allowed them to limit state involvement in their daily lives. Borrowing Paulina Bren’s concept of “normalization,” I show how international tourism, particularly the interactions with foreign tourists, in socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain sparked a liberalization of everyday life in both countries. Moreover, it created a common culture of the everyday that involved both enjoyment and coercion (sometimes self-imposed). This became a routine for both tourists and locals on both the Romanian Black Sea Coast and the Costa del Sol, two areas to which foreign tourists flocked.

By focusing on the politics and impact of international tourism in socialist Romania and Francoist Spain, this study offers a comparative perspective on the socialist and capitalist

economic systems, and the way they functioned at the grassroots. I argue that, in the case of international tourism, the distinction between the two economic systems became increasingly blurry, as socialist countries also relied on market driven mechanisms in order to render their tourism sector profitable. Numerous studies published in the 1970s by Romanian specialists of tourism made use of terms such as “market,” “marketing,” “profit,” or “management.” This suggests a pragmatic approach to international tourism and the intention to run this activity for profit, which was similar to the goal of any Western capitalist enterprise. A comparative approach such as this one sheds light on the actual functioning and mechanisms of international tourism in a state owned enterprise, as opposed to a private one, by examining the decision-making process and economic efficiency.

This comparative approach also reveals not only how the two systems operated in relation to international tourism but also to what extent ideology played a role, if any, in the process of developing international tourism both at the level of high politics and everyday life. Such an approach runs counter to an existing literature that has overemphasized the role of ideology in the

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51 Some previous attempts have been made. See Fred Block, “Capitalist versus Socialism in World-Systems Theory” in Review (Fernand Braudel Center), vol. 13, no. 2, (Spring 1990), pp. 265-271. The article argues against Wallerstein’s assumption that socialist system was built within a capitalist world economy, so it could never totally be detached from this order. See Immanel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts and Comparative Analysis” in Comparative Studies in Society and History, XVI 4, Sept., pp. 387-415. Block denies that the concept of socialism exists all together as he argues that even in a planned economy, such as socialism, individual choices prevail.

case of socialist societies by suggesting that ideology was deeply entrenched in every aspect of the society. The Romanian case has been arguably the most publicized from this point of view. Moreover, after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, few studies have compared socialism and capitalism, as socialism vanished from the political scene while liberal capitalism seems to have prevailed. However, after twenty-six years, liberal capitalism has shown its own limits, and the question why socialism failed is more pressing than ever. One possible answer is tied to state-socialism’s economic performance and its inability to deliver access to consumer goods. By comparing international tourism in repressive dictatorships that held different attitudes towards individual consumption, I examine the role of tourism and consumption in fostering change from below. While Francoist Spain did not suppress the consumption of foreign goods and the Spaniards interactions with foreigners, the socialist Romanian state strived to control these interactions and to limit access to such foreign commodities. A thread that runs through this dissertation is to what extent these divergent stances played a role in the different ends of the two dictatorships and their aftermaths.

Finally, this dissertation makes an important contribution to the literature about tourism in authoritarian regimes, especially state socialist regimes. Tourism studies developed in the 1970s, but it was only in the 2000s when historians started to be interested in analyzing tourism. While in Romanian historiography, tourism has received little attention, the Spanish literature, although still

under-developed, has benefitted from the insightful work of Sasha Pack. In their analysis of the socialist regime in Romania or Franco’s regime in Spain, scholars have focused on issues like political repression, the role of elites, or international relations, silencing social and cultural developments at the level of everyday life. The very few studies that tackled ordinary people’s practices and way of life have focused, in the case of Romania, on queuing, economic shortages, housing, but they have ignored the importance of holidaymaking and tourism for a socialist regime. In addition, for Spain, other than the work of Sasha Pack, whose work focuses on the impact of international tourism on the nature of dictatorship in Franco’s Spain, there have been no attempts in the English-language literature to study leisure and tourism practices from below.

Until recently, historians have regarded tourism as an “unserious” business, which should be the object of study of anthropologists or sociologists. Scholars from these latter disciplines were in fact the first to pay attention to tourism in the late 1970s. For Dean MacCannell, a sociologist considered to be the founder of tourism studies, tourism is both a product of modern consumerism and an attempt to reduce everything to a commodity. He examines tourism through the lens of modernity, arguing that “the expansion of modern society is intimately linked to modern mass leisure,” and that the study of tourism can explain the transformation from an industrial society to a modern one. MacCannell writes against the prejudice embedded in academia and public consciousness in the 1970s that tourists are outsiders and therefore superficial or ignorant observers who cannot really understand the societies and cultures that they explore. He underlines

54 Until now, tourism in Romania was approached only from an economic point of view. One of the most recent studies that paid attention to tourism is that of Bogdan Murgescu, Romania si Europa. Acumularea Decalajelor Economice, 1500-2010 (Iasi: Polirom, 2010). Sasha Pack, Tourism and Dictatorship, Europe’s Peaceful Invasion of Franco’s Spain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

55 Pavel Campeanu, op. cit.

56 Dean MacCannell, op. cit, p. 3.

57 Ibidem, p. 6.
that the tourists’ involvement with the societies to which they are travelling is a part of their motivation to travel in the first place. However, he downplays the accuracy of tourist experience when he says that, for tourists, it is not the act of sightseeing that is important but “the image or the idea of society that the collective act generates.”

Another scholar of tourism, John Urry, argues that tourism is a force of democratization, characterized by the search for novelty rather than for authenticity. For Urry, what defines the touristic experience is the gazing at places and objects that are out of the ordinary; this comes “from a logical binary division between the ordinary/everyday and the extraordinary.” Although, I agree with him that tourist experiences presuppose distinct types of mental and physical circumstances, I deem that the sharp distinction that he makes between the everyday and extraordinary components of tourist activity loses sight on tourism being part of everyday life. This is what sociologist Adrian Franklin in his *Tourism: An Introduction* argues as well. According to Franklin because of modernity and globalization “the everyday world is increasingly indistinguishable from the touristic world.” But the question is to what extent this assumption applies to the 1960s as well? When did modernity and tourism become inseparable? This dissertation argues that this phenomenon happened in the late 1950s, and involved not only highly industrialized societies, but also the more peripheral socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain.

Historians caught up late with tourism. It was only in the 2000s when some cultural historians became more interested in studying this phenomenon. The acknowledgement of the importance of examining tourism came from a historian of France, Ellen Furlough, and of

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58 Ibidem, p. 10.
59 Ibidem, p. 15.
60 John Urry, op. cit., p.12.
Germany, Shelley Baranowski. The two authors point out that, “Tourism is not only a formidable economic force but has also been operated by various types of governments as an instrument at the juncture between ideology, consumption, social harmony, and national coherence.”63 In a more focused study on tourism and dictatorship in Franco’s Spain, Sasha Pack regards mass tourism as a component of international relations. He argues that tourism played an important role in changing the nature of Franco’s regime from a harsh authoritarian one to a more liberal one and in “Europeanizing” Spain.64 However, Pack takes a more top-down perspective. Notwithstanding that, his assumption that mass tourism changed the nature of the Franco’s regime is important for my argument. I examine the impact of international tourism on Spanish society by looking at it from both state policy and from the bottom up – from the level of the ordinary citizen.

A more convoluted discussion arises when focusing on tourism in socialist societies. Anne Gorsuch and Diane Koenker contend tourism was too important to be left to the private sector alone, both in socialist countries and in those with other types of political regimes. In their Introduction, they make the argument for tourism as a feature of modernity, stating that “socialism too was part of the modern world, and socialist tourism also reflects the ineffable tension generated by traveling in groups, or according to officially arranged itineraries, in order to produce individual meaning.”65 When discussing the intricacies of domestic tourism - an issue that is not central to my dissertation but is a part of the official vision on consumerism in socialist Romania – Gorsuch and Koenker contend that socialist tourism created Soviet citizens and targeted a middle working

64 Sasha Pack, op. cit., pp.5, 191.
class.66 This is similar to what John Urry describes as having happened in Western societies during early twentieth century with the introduction of paid vacations in certain countries such as France, Great Britain or Italy.67

Gorsuch and Koenker acknowledge the different approaches to tourism between 1920-1989 in the Soviet Union and socialist Eastern Europe. Referring to the Soviet Union, they emphasize a difference between the definitions of tourists between the 1930s and the 1960s. In the 1930s, the tourist was the person who “embarked on a purposeful journey, a circuit (tour) using one’s own physical locomotion” that was supposed to “involve work, the enhancement of one’s intellectual and physical capital, not leisure.”68 During the 1960s, a tourist became “anyone who followed a leisure travel program of visual, cultural and material consumption.”69 Their perspective on tourist consumption in the Soviet Union and socialist Eastern Europe is incomplete because Gorsuch and Koenker highlight that what was consumed during socialism were experiences and not goods.70 They argue that, although socialist states strived to adapt to the consumerist demands of their citizens, they remained anxious about associating tourism with shopping and they kept sight on “the dangerous proclivity of women in particular to elevate their desire for fraternal socialist things over fraternal socialist comradeship.”71 I deem this tension between material and “spiritual” consumption to be quintessential for the socialist regimes’ approach to consumption. In addition, for my research, this perspective can shed light on the

69 Gorsuch and Koenker, op. cit., p. 3.
70 Ibidem, p. 6.
71 Ibidem, p. 6.
relationship between state and citizens, as well as on the power relations and privileges within this society that international tourism triggered as opposed to domestic tourism alone.

In relation to the above-mentioned studies, I deem tourism to be a form of consumption in which tourists seek the authenticity of tourist sights and social experiences, and the citizens of the country visited seek to satisfy their own needs. Tourism has both an economic and cultural (identity) component. In the case of Franco’s Spain and Ceaușescu’s Romania, beyond the proposed definition, tourism also acts as a form of negotiation between the two regimes’ ambitions of gaining economic and political recognition within postwar Europe and the ordinary Spaniards’ or Romanians’ desires to gain access to the modern lifestyles epitomized by consumer goods, Western pop culture or simply vacations. Thus, ordinary people took advantage of the presence of Western tourists not only to overcome shortages of consumer goods, especially in the Romanian case, but also to borrow from these tourists a new vision of taste and consumption of time.72

1.4 A NOTE ON PRIMARY SOURCES

Given its comparative and international approach, this dissertation necessitated research in five countries. My main archives and research sites were, however, in Romania and Spain. In Romania, the Central Committee Collection (Chancellery, Economic, Propaganda, Administrative, and External units) from the National Archive (Arhivele Nationale) helped me to pinpoint the role of international tourism in Romanian politics and economic policies. This collection houses the

materials produced by the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, the most important resource for the study of the communist period in Romania.\textsuperscript{73} In addition, the Council of Ministers Collection, also from the National Archive, offers key information on the official perspective on international tourism, especially in its inchoate stage. Materials from the archives of former Securitate (Romanian secret police) provide the official perspective on the interactions between Western tourists and Romanians, but also offer valuable information about the tourist industry.\textsuperscript{74} The archive contains both surveys and reports about tourism as well as some of the tourist workers personal files. As the creator of this archive was Securitate, all these documents have to be treated with caution. As a matter of fact, a large part of the documents are informative notes that colleagues gave about each other. In addition, tourist magazines, such as \textit{Holidays in Romania} published in English, French, Spanish, German, Russian, and Yiddish, mirror the way in which the socialist state promoted itself as a tourist destination and the type of image that it wanted to project abroad. Tourist brochures and fliers published for a foreign audience provide insightful information about available tourist services in socialist Romania and consumption patterns.

\textsuperscript{73} The Central Committee was one of the leadership structures of the Romanian Communist Party together with the Secretary office (composed of six individuals) and the Political Bureau. The Chancellery Unit comprises the discussions about the overall development of tourism within the Secretary Office, which was in fact the decision-making body within both the party and socialist state. The Economic Unit comprises reports about the economic situation, plans for development, etc. to be approved by the Central Committee. The Propaganda section includes materials about tourism advertising, strategic plans, etc. also to be approved by the Central Committee. The Administrative Unit contains various internal documents about the Communist Party and in relation to tourism a variety of documents about the resorts or hotels run by the party. The External section includes reports on the visits of and meetings with foreign officials.

\textsuperscript{74} This archive abounds in informative notes about informal interactions between Western tourists and Romanians, personal files of tourist workers who were under surveillance because of these interactions, and of those who reported on Western tourists. The archive includes information on the formal education of tourist workers, criteria for selecting these workers, and their everyday lives. It also gives details about smuggling activities, which were common especially among West German tourists who were primarily visiting their relatives in Transylvania.
In Spain, I used General Archive of Administration (Archivo General de la Administración) Tourist Office (Dirección General del Turismo) sub-collection75 to examine how international tourism became a priority for Franco’s Spain and how the tourist industry was run and promoted abroad. These documents offer insight into how the Spanish state dealt with any negative influences that tourists might have had on its citizens’ customs. In addition, I use the Spanish Tourist Institute (Instituto de Turismo de España, Turespaña) archive, which abounds in studies about the economic efficiency of international tourism, reports of main tourist congresses, or promotion materials. Furthermore, it houses the archive of the World Tourism Organization, a touristic body that reunited all countries interested in developing tourism, regardless of their political regime and economic system. Local and national newspapers from the Spanish National Library and Malaga City Archive as well as tourism magazines from the National Tourist Office provide a glimpse into day-to-day life of Spaniards in the 1960s-1970s. These sources are familiar social science sources and they are invaluable to my research, but my work is not simply a study of policy.

I supplement these sources with oral interviews with a variety of people who worked in the tourism industry in both countries, as well as with domestic and international tourists. I conducted thirteen interviews in Romania and five interviews in Spain with tourist workers and domestic tourists. In addition, I interviewed three foreign tourists to Romania and two foreign tourists to Spain. These interviews help me explore the human and subjective dimensions of international tourism and thereby enrich my study. I treat these interviewees as experts who can bring a valuable perspective into the more traditional archival documents. Tourist workers proved to be an excellent source for understanding how tourism worked at the grassroots. They described how a hotel or

75 Dirección General del Turismo is part of of Cultura Collection.
restaurant was managed, what resources they had at their disposal, or how they used the interactions with foreign tourists to enhance their social position. Interviews with domestic tourists illustrated how contacts with foreign tourists took place, what would they buy from foreign tourists, and what it meant to own those goods in the context of socialist Romania’s economic shortages. Although at times the interviews with foreign tourists who visited Romania reproduced a colonial discourse that originated mostly in the post-1989 period, these interviews offer insightful information. They shed light on the type of available services, what tourists wanted to see in Romania, and, most importantly, these interviews revealed transnational connections between young people from eastern and western Europe, despite the different political regimes. For Spain, interviews with domestic tourists revealed the initial cultural shock of interacting with a different culture after years of isolation and the transformation process that ordinary Spaniards underwent because of the arrival of more libertine foreign tourists. Foreign tourists’ memories on Franco’s Spain look striking at first sight. To the two American tourists whom I interviewed in Pittsburgh, Franco’s Spain looked welcoming and ‘normal’ despite the dictatorial regime.76 As they built their recollection in light of the present situation, some of the negative impressions might have disappeared all together throughout time. This type of recollection shows the limits of oral history and I am vividly aware of these limits.77 Yet when treated with caution and combined with other types of sources, oral history interviews can provide valuable insight into everyday life practices as related to tourism and consumption, practices that official sources might silence.78

76 Bill M. and Kazuo M., personal interview, Pittsburgh, April 2015.
78 On remembering in post-communist /post-authoritarian societies see Esbenshade S., Richard, “Remembering to Forget: Memory History, National Identity in Post-War East-Central Europe” in
At the same time, archival materials are also shaped by specific contexts. Working with state-created archives in Romania and Spain, I could observe how the studied materials reflected the nature of the two dictatorships. Whereas in Romania, reports and discussions within the Secretary office and the Central Committee predominate, in Spain most documents are in fact letters between various state officials or between entrepreneurs and state bureaucrats. The format of these documents reflects different decision-making processes in socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain. While in the Romanian case, this shows a process centered around one major governing body and later one person, the personal letters illustrate the importance of personal relations and networking in Spain. Yet the cohesive decision-making process in socialist Romania can prove deceptive if one only examines one archive or collection. For instance, the ordinary people’s bargaining ability surfaces in the denunciatory notes that clog the former Securitate’s archive. Although morally questionable, these notes are attempts to manipulate a state that is hungry for information. Yet these notes’ authors had their own agenda when following what appeared as a simple format. It often involved seeking to compromise someone else’s position while establishing a relationship of outward trust with the regime, which might help them climb up the social ladder. At times, even Securitate officers acknowledged this situation and the precariousness of received information, but they too were caught in the system.79 Far from wanting to suggest that socialism was intrinsically bad,80 this scheme illustrates the power that ordinary citizens had to leverage in

79 Katherine Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of Romania’s Secret Police (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014).
80 Secret services of non-socialist countries are believed to operate in the same ways but unfortunately their archives have not been opened yet.
relation with the regime. Similarly, the Spanish practice of exchanging letters reflected the subjectivity of decision-making and the bargaining power of state functionaries in relation to the dictatorial regime.

1.5 STRUCTURE

This dissertation consists of five chapters as well as an Introduction and a Conclusion. Whereas the first two chapters examine the politics of international tourism in socialist Romania and Francoist Spain from the perspective of high policies, the third chapter studies how the state in socialist Romania, as opposed to the Francoist state, attempted to establish tourist connections mostly beyond its political bloc; chapters four and five take a bottom-up approach. The fourth chapter studies how foreign tourists contributed to changing consumer practices in both countries while the fifth chapter focuses on how international tourism shaped the physical and human landscape on the Black Sea Coast and the Spanish Costa del Sol, and how this new landscape affected everyday life patterns.

Chapter one presents the institutional and policy foundations upon which the dissertation builds. It examines the reasons why socialist Romania and Francoist Spain shifted their priority from domestic tourism to international tourism in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, and how the main institutions charged with administering tourism in each country were created. I argue that in this initial phase, socialist Romania and Francoist Spain had similar approaches to international tourism and that, in both countries, it was external factors (e.g. other socialist states’ orientation in the Romanian case, the interest of American and British tourists to vacation in Spain, the World Bank report) that led to its development.
The second chapter examines geography and how the two countries highlighted their unique geographical location and features to position themselves (from the point of view of developing tourism) within Europe and the world. This chapter also studies the countries’ different approaches to building a tourist infrastructure (more state controlled in Romania, less so in Spain) and the limits of growth in both cases. The purpose of this chapter is to show that the major difference between the two cases stems from the ways in which the policies were implemented, and to explore some of the successes and flaws of each state’s approach rather than a simple socialist-capitalist/east-west dichotomy. Despite rapid tourist growth in both countries, but especially Spain, there were structural and political constraints in both countries. The last section of this chapter addresses those constraints as well as their long-term effects. The second chapter contributes to the existing literature on tourism and consumption by showing the various ways in which the two countries developed similar policies and institutions to enhance international tourism, thereby suggesting that pragmatism was more decisive than ideology.

The third chapter examines how Romania and Spain used international tourism to create political and economic networks beyond their respective political bloc (socialism and capitalism). As a result, Romania became a tourist destination for Western tourists while Spain also welcomed some tourists from socialist countries. I show that while in Romania it was the state that pursued such policies, in Spain it was mostly the private sector that took an interest in tourism with socialist countries and in establishing networks across the Iron Curtain.

The fourth chapter focuses on the tension between the two states’ intentions to develop international tourism and their fear of “foreign contamination.” Groups within each government harbored substantial fears about the smuggling of goods (in Romania) and religious or moral disturbances (in Spain) that would result from the influx of international tourists. International
tourism did indeed help locals and tourist workers to build informal networks that went beyond the authority of the state. I explore the nature and implications of official fears and of some of the informal networks in both countries.

The fifth chapter uses two case studies--the Romanian Black Sea coast and the Spanish Costa del Sol--to examine the development plans of international tourism, but also how these plans transformed the tourist landscape and shaped people’s lives and identities in each area. Beach tourism was a focus of both governments and coastal regions in both countries benefitted from substantial investments. I argue that foreign tourists significantly reshaped both coastal areas despite the different political and economic systems. Besides the building of modern hotels, the arrival of foreign tourists helped to give rise to a cosmopolitan society where a variety of languages were spoken, where new fashions were disseminated, and where tourists and locals developed relations and lifestyles that had previously been impossible. These similarities suggest that we need to refine the existing literature’s portrayal of state-driven socialist system as strictly opposed to the market-driven capitalist development. Finally, the Conclusion sums up the research hypothesis of this dissertation and offers an explanation for Spain’s better performance with international tourism in comparison with Romania.
CHAPTER I. FROM DOMESTIC TO INTERNATIONAL TOURISM: POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF TOURISM IN SOCIALIST ROMANIA AND FRANCOIST SPAIN IN THE 1950S-1960S

Romania has an extraordinary rhythm of development. Your seaside, your resorts from Mamaia to Mangalia exemplify what a fast pace of development means. I come here [to Romania] every year together with my family because we feel so good and so enticed by the Black Sea, folklore, and your culture, in general.\(^{81}\)

This note by a British tourist in *Vacances en Roumanie*, a travel magazine published by the National Office for Tourism–Carpathians (ONT-Carpathians) might sound like an official attempt to make Romania an attractive tourist destination. It was that, but it also reflected the pace of development of Romanian tourism during the 1960s.

Although Romania was a member of the Council of Economic and Mutual Assistance, (COMECON), when it came to tourism the sources of inspiration went beyond the socialist bloc, as in time the country’s main goal came to be attracting tourists from capitalist countries as well.\(^{82}\) As early as 1964, Romanian tourist specialists travelled to France to get training in hotel and restaurant management and related issues; in 1968, Nicolae Bozdog, the director of the National Office for Tourism Carpathians, visited Spain to study and learn from that country’s tourist experience. While the connections between Romania and France had been strong since the mid-nineteenth century, Spain seemed an odd choice for a partner in tourism, given the nature of its

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\(^{81}\) “La parole est aux tourists” in *Vacances en Roumanie*, 1971, no. 51, p. 62.

\(^{82}\) Romanian National Archives (ANIC), CC of PCR Collection, Economic Unit, file no. 244/1981, f.14.
right-wing regime. However, as a country situated on the western European “periphery” and not yet fully “European,” as it promoted itself, Spain epitomized the prototype of a successful tourism industry from the early 1960s. Moreover, unlike France, Spain was not a traditional holiday destination, but a country that took full advantage of the postwar tourist boom. This was precisely the situation that Romanian tourism found itself in the 1960s. In these ways, Romania was quite like Spain, as it too was a country on the European periphery that sought to profit from the postwar tourism boom. Despite their different ideological orientations, Francoist Spain and socialist Romania shared a common goal and saw tourism as a means to reach that goal. Both countries aimed at developing their tourist industry and becoming an attractive tourist destination for Europeans and world travelers (mostly North Americans) in search of sun and distractions.

The role and importance of international tourism within a socialist economy can be best understood when compared with an inchoate capitalist economy, such as the one of Francoist Spain in the 1960s-1970s, rather than to its COMECON partners. After all, socialist planners compared their countries with such economies, and the goal of economic plans was in fact to outpace the Western countries’ economies, as competition was ingrained in socialist societies to the same extent (but in a different form) as it was in the capitalist ones. Yet, comparing Romania to more developed industrial countries such as France and West Germany can be less fruitful for comparative research, as Romania lacked the mature capital of such countries. By contrast, comparing Romania and Spain is much more useful as both were seeking to develop and diversify their national economies, and both sought to funnel their limited funds to that end. Although not

fully integrated in the “West,” Spain offers a good comparison precisely because of its outstanding success in using international tourism to generate capital for development.

This chapter’s purpose is to lay the foundation for the rest of the study by conveying the overarching economic and political policies, and the realities that defined how and why tourism, especially international tourism, gained prominence in Romania and Spain. It also introduces the various institutions and organizations that administered tourism in each country. Because each of the above issues will be discussed in more precise terms below, the discussions in this chapter are of an introductory nature; their purpose is to set the stage. Most importantly, this chapter examines how and why socialist Romania and Francoist Spain shifted from domestically focused tourism in the 1940s-1950s to international tourism in the 1960s.

The chapter addresses the following questions: how and why did international tourism become a priority for the Romanian and Spanish governments? How did international tourism play out within the broader economic and political contexts of the two countries? How similar were the two governments’ policies and to what extent did they have the same reasons for developing international tourism? What do the various tourism strategies and goals tell us about the nature and aspirations of the two very different regimes: the communist regime in Romania and Franco’s personal-centered right wing dictatorship in Spain?
2.1 SETTING THE SCENE: PLANNED ECONOMY VERSUS MARKET ECONOMY

Traditionally, scholars have long regarded socialist planned and capitalist market economies as distinct entities that can be best explained precisely by contrasting them.\(^{85}\) Although these two types of economies functioned differently, the interconnections between them became stronger starting in the 1960s, despite the different political regimes and the Cold War rhetoric.\(^{86}\) Furthermore, neither socialism nor capitalism can be regarded as monolithic, and a careful examination of their economic practices reflects a more nuanced landscape of the pertinent economies, and how the specific conditions in each country affected each system. From this perspective, the functioning of international tourism in socialist Romania and Francoist Spain provides an illustrative case. The key issues in both cases are the role of the state in the development of tourism and the degree of centralized planning in developing this sector.

In Romania, the State Planning Commission set the path for the economic development of Romania when it drew up the economic plans of 1949 and 1950. The Commission’s focus was on the development of industry, as the newly established socialist regime wanted to transform Romania from an agrarian country (*tară eminamente agricolă*) to a fully industrialized one. Following the Soviet model, Romanian communist officials believed that this was possible only through careful economic planning. The immediate result of the economic planning was the restoration in 1950 of the industrial output to the wartime levels of 1940-1945.\(^{87}\) However,


\(^{86}\) Recent literature talks about socialist market economy but only in relation to contemporary developments in China or Vietnam. See for example: Janos Kornai, Yingi Qian, *Market and Socialism- In the Light of Experiences of China and Vietnam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

although industry received the largest share of investments, the amount did not sustain an ascending trend. The economic plan of 1949-1950 directed 53.8 percent of investments to industry, but for the plan of 1950-1951, the share of industry decreased to 44.9 percent while the funds for agriculture, housing and local government (among two of the most immediate problems for the government) increased to 17.3 percent and 18.8 percent respectively.\(^88\) The amount of investment devoted to industry exceeded 50 percent only during the 1966-1970 five-year plan.\(^89\) Romanian government officials considered tourism to be part of industry in the early 1960s, however it is unclear what was its share of the total industrial investments. It was only towards the 1970s that tourism was rebranded as a “service.”

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, industry continued to receive the lion’s share of the total investments. This prompted some economic thinkers, such as Vladimir Pasti, to assert that the allocation of most of the resources to industry and not to consumption went against people’s needs and weakened the regime.\(^90\) Pasti identified the imbalance between industry and consumption as one of the structural problems of Romanian economy under socialism.\(^91\)

The Romanian economy, however, continued to steadily grow throughout the 1970s and only entered into clear decline in the mid-1980s. Janos Kornai, a scholar of socialist economies, explains the initial growth of these economies as coming from the high rate of investments and the increase in the work force.\(^92\) Therefore, he argues that, when the number of people looking for work in industry decreased, the work force ceased acting as a source of growth.

\(^{88}\) Ibidem, p. 161.  
\(^{89}\) Ibidem, p. 161.  
\(^{91}\) Ibidem, p. 341.  
\(^{92}\) Janos Kornai, op.cit., p.181.
As many of these studies were written either just before or shortly after the collapse of state-socialism in 1989, they focused on providing explanations for the poor functioning of socialist economies and their subsequent collapse. However, this constitutes a methodological bias inherent in many of these studies. Much of this scholarship contrasted the frail economic structure of socialism with the more robust liberal economies of the capitalist world, in an attempt to legitimize the latter. The scholarship explaining the functioning of economic planning worked along the same lines. This study takes a different approach by focusing on the internal logic of the policies that addressed tourism.

Scholars of the political economy of socialism deemed the redistributive system as the main characteristic of the planned economy. They argued that in contrast to a capitalist economy that seeks to increase its surplus value, a socialist economy strove to enlarge its redistributive power. This meant that the role of plans was not to augment production, but to increase the bureaucratic capacity to allocate resources according to preset economic and ideological priorities of the regime. Following these hypotheses, Katherine Verdery has argued that the key to understanding how the socialist economy worked was the functioning of “bargaining” and “shortage” as well as the logic of bureaucratic allocation. By “bargaining,” Verdery means the state-owned firms’ overstating of their material requirements in order to meet the economic plans, which led to an “economy of shortage,” as oftentimes the plans’ values could not be met. The bargaining power of a given firm depended on its symbolic place within the socialist economy.


Contingent on this symbolic positioning, the state would supplement, or not, the available resources. Verdery and Kornai explain that the economy of shortage does not mean that resources were lacking altogether, but that they were allocated by strictly following central planning, and therefore not made available to the firms or economic sectors that needed them.95

Although this model provides a neat explanation for the overall functioning of the socialist planned economy, it only partially explains the dynamics of sectors such as international tourism. Given its reliance on foreign tourists’ demand (both socialist and capitalist), international tourism did not follow the inner logic of socialist planning alone. Hence, the rules of a market economy, such as the relationship between supply and demand, can shed light on the functioning and effects of international tourism in socialist Romania as well.

According to the socialist symbolic hierarchy, which emphasized heavy industry, international tourism should have played a limited role in socialist Romania. However, starting in the 1960s, Romanian economic officials viewed international tourism as providing a source for much needed hard currency in order to help the development of other economic sectors.96 The role of international tourism became even more important throughout the 1970s, as Romania intensified its efforts to shift to an industrialized economy and thus had to import more energy resources and mineral raw materials.97 In their study of the Romanian economy during communism, Ionel and Crișan show how the economic crises of 1973 and 1979 increased the prices of oil by 24.6 times while the prices of manufactured products rose only 2.9 fold.98 This deeply affected the Romanian

97 Ibidem, p. 7.
economy; in 1980, Romania imported 50.3 percent of the minerals and combustible materials that its industries used.\textsuperscript{99} Moreover, besides the oil price increase, Romania faced unfavorable conditions in the Western markets when trying to sell its products, as the economic crisis lowered the purchasing power of Western consumers as well.\textsuperscript{100} Under these circumstances, Romanian socialist planners placed increased emphasis on international tourism as a sector that could provide viable economic growth and improve the balance of payments.\textsuperscript{101} In the early 1980s, according to one tourism planner, “tourism has become a self-contained economic sector which is having a stimulating and multiplying effect on other services as well as on material production.”\textsuperscript{102} Thus, while in the 1960s international tourism was viewed as a sector that was supposed to help the development of the more important branches of the socialist economy, during the 1970s, it came to have a key-role within the Romanian economy. Nevertheless, this theoretical thinking about tourism was only partially validated by the realities of economic life. In 1975, international tourism provided 5 percent of the country’s export earnings as compared with 6 percent in 1971.\textsuperscript{103}

Besides serving as a source of hard currency and as a venue for Romania’s competition with the capitalist world, international tourism provided an opportunity for an inchoate form of private entrepreneurship. In 1967, Decree no. 862 issued by the Council of Ministers allowed Romanian citizens to rent their homes to both Romanian and foreign tourists, and even to build


\textsuperscript{100} On the amount of consumer goods Romanian exported see Murgescu, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 359. The amount of consumer goods Romania exported ranged from 18.2 percent in 1970 to 16.2 percent in 1980 and 18.1 percent in 1989.

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{103} Andras C. Tsantis, Roy Pepper, \textit{Romania, The Industrialization of an Agrarian Economy under Socialist Planning} (Washington DC: The World Bank, 1979), p. 361. In comparison, in 1988, the average export earnings for “developed market economies” were 6.99 percent, while the world average was 6.86 percent. Spain’s tourist share out of the export earnings was 25.8 percent. See Derek R. Hall, \textit{op. cit.}, p.103. Tourism accounted for 5 percent of Spain’s national product.
vacation houses regardless of their place of residence. Although, those interested had to register with the National Office for Tourism-Carpathians, they also received financial support from the state in order to modernize their houses and were given priority in having a phone line installation (regarded as a feature of modernity in 1960s-1970s Romania). Thus, by the late 1960s international tourism acquired its own place within the Romanian planned economy and at the same time offered some opportunities for private ownership and entrepreneurial activity.

Like socialist Romania, Francoist Spain shared the aim of moving from an agricultural to an industrial economy, but it shifted towards increasingly limiting the role of the state in the economy. Although in the 1940s, the role of the state in developing and organizing tourism was crucial, in the 1950s-1960s the role of the state gradually waned and private initiative became more important. This transformation reflected Spain’s shift from autarchy to a market economy.

In 1939, Franco’s political dictatorship embraced the concept of economic autarchy. After having reached an all-time economic peak between 1930 and 1936, the Spanish economy was devastated as a result of the Civil War (1936-1939). The outbreak of the Second World War and Francoist Spain’s alliance with Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy did nothing to improve the performance of the Spanish economy, despite the two countries’ initial victories and Spain’s neutrality in the war. Franco’s embracing of autarchy began shortly after the Civil War’s end when Spain decided to cut most of the country’s economic connections with the outside world. Then, in 1939, the Cortes (the Spanish Parliament controlled then by the far right–wing Falangists)

passed two laws that confirmed this policy.106 These two acts - “The law for the protection and development of the national industry” and “The law for the organization and defense of national industry” - set the basis for autarchy.107 This policy imposed severe restrictions on the amount of goods that could be imported and strict regulations for obtaining a license to allow a firm to import foreign goods. Also, the government not only limited the amount of foreign currency that could be exchanged, but strictly controlled the exchange rate for this foreign money.108

In addition to these two acts that enforced the state’s control over industry, a National Institute for Industry (INI) was established in 1941. This agency was directly subordinated to the government and its role was to “substitute for the private initiative when this was non-existent.”109 Industry was not yet a priority for the Francoist regime, as agriculture remained Spain’s main economic priority until the end of the 1940s.110 Yet, the creation of the National Institute for Industry (under the coordination of Juan Antonio Suanzes, Franco’s childhood friend) as a state-holding company had as its goal to “industrialize the nation, increase its military strength, and make Spanish industry less dependent on imported raw materials.”111 Much like the Romanian case in the 1950s, in the 1940s, INI’s focus was on heavy industry especially the mining, chemical fertilizers, and electricity sectors.

106 In June 1940, the Franco’s administration refused a $100 million loan from the United States. See R. J Harrison, op. cit., p. 125.
107 Ibidem, p. 150.
108 Tamanes Ramon, op. cit., p. 151.
109 Ibidem, p. 150.
110 This mainly happened because of the ideological priorities of Franco’s regime, which sought to achieve social stability in the countryside through the creation of the family farms (colonization) and the hope that an increase in the agricultural production would render Spain self-sufficient in foodstuff and agricultural raw materials. This policy proved unsuccessful as Spain struggled with famine in the mid-1940s. See R. J Harrison, op. cit., p. 127.
111 Ibidem, p. 130.
In the 1940s, the Spanish economy confronted famine, inflation, and isolation (both self-imposed and caused by outside factors). Inflation rose by 13.3 percent a year between 1941-1943, but increased to 16.1 percent in 1948-1949, and 23.1 percent in 1950.\textsuperscript{112} In addition to its economic problems, Spain’s isolation increased after the Second World War. In 1946, the United Nations instituted an economic boycott on Spain and, in 1947, the United States excluded Spain from the countries that benefitted from the Marshall Plan because of its WWII alliance with Nazi Germany.\textsuperscript{113} As a result of this isolation, in 1950 trade made-up only 5 percent of Spain’s gross domestic product.\textsuperscript{114} Isolation eased somewhat in 1953 when the US Congress approved an economic aid package of $625 million in exchange for Spain’s approval to host US military bases.\textsuperscript{115} In 1951, Franco appointed a new government, which although still dominated by the Falangists, abandoned autarchy as an economic strategy.\textsuperscript{116} Its priorities were to achieve “price stability, further increase in production, the regularization of imports, and a strengthening of Spain’s gold and foreign-currency reserves.”\textsuperscript{117} The external economic help and the change in the government’s economic policy led to an increase in the national income by 54 percent between 1950 and 1959, and helped to account for the migration of around one million Spaniards from the countryside to the towns during this decade.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{115} Pact of Madrid in Joseph Harrison, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 133.
\textsuperscript{116} Economic autarchy already eased in the early 1950s as Spain showed some interest in promoting itself as a tourist destination to American tourists and in 1953, the first Hilton Hotel in Europe opened in Madrid. Although this did not happen without difficulties, it shows that in some cases autarchy could be broken. See N. Rosendorf, \textit{Franco Sells Spain to America, Hollywood, Tourism, and Public Relation as Postwar Spanish Soft Power} (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 14. For the opening of Hilton Hotel see Hospitality Industry Archives, Hilton College, University of Houston, Castellana Madrid Folder, Box 10.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 132.
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 132.
However, this success was short lived. In 1956, Spain faced social movements unprecedented since the outbreak of the Civil War coupled with inflation and economic stagnation. Yet, the regime still exercised tight control over the society through censorship and the state remained the major economic player. In response to these economic and social crises, Franco reshuffled the government in early 1957. The new government included fewer committed Falangists and the key portfolios of Finance and Trade went to two technocrats, members of the reform Catholic group, *Opus Dei*. In 1958, the government succeeded in getting Spain included in some major international organizations, such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD). Nonetheless, Spain’s request to join the European Economic Community in 1962 was denied, a decision that reflected and reinforced Spain’s position as an outsider of key-European politics.

In addition, the country’s economic results were modest as the public debt continued to grow and the *peseta* (the Spanish currency) failed to strengthen its position (in the early 1959, 62.5 pesetas sold for one dollar on the black market). Against this backdrop and threatened with insolvency, the government adopted the so-called Stabilization and Liberalization Plan of 1959. The plan was in fact a memorandum to the International Monetary Fund and OEEC in the attempt to secure a loan. Although it set a path to economic liberalization, the plan did not bring political liberalization. Ultimately, the economic aid of the United States, IMF, and the World Bank stabilized Franco’s regime, warded off collapse, and enabled it to remain in power.

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119 In 1956 there were rumors that Spain’s gold reserve was as low as $40 million.
122 Joseph Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 140. The official rate hovered around 40 pesetas. See *Documenta*, no. 730, p.11.
International tourism became a factor that helped Franco’s Spain to overcome the economic crisis of the late 1950s. Initially regarded as an economic sector that should support the development of more important economic branches such as mining, metallurgy, and construction, international tourism gradually became an economic sector in its own right. In 1959, the Stabilization and Liberalization Plan noted that tourism is supposed to “help the development of other economic sectors. Among the industrial branches that can grow because of international tourism, we mention the construction industry.”\textsuperscript{123} But it was after the revenues from tourism covered 73.5 percent of Spain’s huge trade deficit between 1961-1969 that international tourism became a “productive sector” in its own right.\textsuperscript{124} In the early 1970s, the income that international tourism brought to the Spanish economy was so large that it surpassed the trade deficit. This ascendant trend only lasted until 1973 when the cost of oil imports climbed, leading to a further increase in the trade deficit. But the key point is that the 1959 Plan of Stabilization correctly anticipated the multiplier effects that tourism could have on other industries; construction and metallurgy were among the most privileged sectors from this perspective. For example, in 1968, 12.8 percent of new construction was in response to the necessities of the tourist sector.\textsuperscript{125} Put simply, international tourism contributed to the improvement of the Spanish economy and society. It opened the way for the modernization of the economy and gradually it increased the opportunities for the small entrepreneurs to grow their business. In the 1950s and early 1960s, in both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain the state was the main tourist entrepreneur. International tourism was hardly a concern for the Romanian state, while in the Spanish case both

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 155.
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Ibidem}, 9. 161.
the Falangists and the Opus Dei elites regarded international tourism as a temporary solution to overcome the economic crisis.

2.2 FROM DOMESTIC TO INTERNATIONAL TOURISM

In the late 1950s, socialist countries, including Romania, started meeting every two years to discuss ways of improving international tourism. At first, the discussions focused mainly on international tourism within the socialist bloc, but from the early 1960s onward, socialist countries became more and more interested in developing international tourism by encouraging tourists from capitalist countries. In the late 1950s, this new focus by COMECON countries had an impact on Romania’s vision on tourism. Nonetheless, although in the 1950s Romania was not a trailblazer in international tourism, in the mid-1960s international tourism became an important item on the agenda of the Romanian socialist state. But the path to developing international tourism was not always smooth.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Romanian socialist state focused more on educating socialist citizens on how to become tourists. Thus, in July 1949, *Popular Tourism*, the mouthpiece of the trade unions, pointed out that:

> In light of decision by the Politburo of the Central Committee, the goal of the General Working Confederation is to transform mass tourism into a large movement, to propagate among workers a love for sightseeing by explaining to them the benefits of this sport; to accustom workers to knowing and valuing the benefits of tourism and to teach them to practice it under the best possible conditions. (...) It is necessary to show to the working class that tourism is a school, which shapes personalities, creates good people,

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126 ANIC, (Central National Archives of Romania, henceforth ANIC) Council of Ministers Collection, file number 29/1961, f. 5.
develops a sense of orientation, courage and initiative, and strengthens solidarity and comradeship.\textsuperscript{127}

Derek R. Hall, an economic historian of East-European tourism, explains statements such as this by asserting that in socialist East-Central Europe in the 1950s, tourism was characterized by strong collectivism, and served as a tool of political and ideological control. He also adds that tourism was used as a means of rewarding those who embraced the values of the new society.\textsuperscript{128} But the importance of tourism in Romania extended far beyond that.

In socialist Romania, the process of transforming workers into tourists was the responsibility of the General Working Confederation, the association of trade unions. The General Working Confederation was responsible for distributing free or subsidized tickets to workers who wanted to go on vacation. The typical holiday ticket included housing, meals, and transportation in a health resort or a spa. However, workers did not equally benefit from these tickets. A February 1951 decision of the General Working Confederation mentioned that: “the sending of workers on vacations can be done free of charge or after paying a contribution of either 30 percent, or 50 percent, or even 100 percent out of transportation and meal expenses.”\textsuperscript{129} Salary and the size of the family (\textit{greutati familiale}) were the main criteria for determining the price that a worker had to pay for the vacation. However, political and ideological criteria at times outweighed social background, as Stakhanovite (shock) workers were the only category to be sent free of charge.\textsuperscript{130} Moreover, the decision to send a worker

\textsuperscript{127} “Un ajutor important în desvoltarea turismului de mase” (An important contribution to the developing of mass tourism) in \textit{Turismul Popular} (Popular Tourism), (July 1949, no.3), p. 5.
\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Indicații și Contraindicății pentru Tratamente Balneare} (Bucharest: Editura de Stat pentru Literatura Științifică și Didactică, 1951), p. 218.
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Ibidem}, 218.
on vacation to a health resort was not made by a doctor alone. It was rather a committee formed by representatives of the General Working Confederation (trade unions), party activists, and medical doctors that decided to whom a vacation would be granted. Despite these shortcomings, this policy led to a substantial increase in the number of domestic tourists, which reached two million by 1960.131 This inchoate domestic tourism also sparked the development of a tourist infrastructure.

The structure and overall goals of Romanian tourism in the 1950s, however, had little to do with the more commercial approach required by international tourism. Moreover, the arrival of foreign tourists from capitalist countries sent chills down communist officials’ spines, as they thought such visits would encourage espionage. In 1960, the Tulcea branch of the Securitate (secret police) decided to open a file to address the specific issue of Western foreign tourists. They justified their decision as follows:

Tulcea District has attracted a large number of foreign tourists among whom are citizens of capitalist countries such as: Americans, English, French, Germans, Belgians, etc. These tourists not only visited the Danube Delta, but also took part in hunting trips. Given the possibilities that the city of Tulcea and the Danube Delta offer, especially during the summer, the espionage services can easily slip in their agents. Starting from 1959, 384 tourists from the capitalist countries have visited the Danube Delta and Tulcea District.132

The arrival of two French students in Romania in 1959 triggered the same type of anxiety among the Romanian authorities. The two students, Claude Jacolin and Claude Costes, were suspected of espionage because they took photos of Chilia, a medieval fortress located in the northeast of Romania close to the border with the Soviet Union.

131 In 1966, the population of Romania was of 19,103,163 inhabitants while in 1956 this increased to 17,489,450.
On October 5, 1959, the French students Claude Jacolin and Claude Costes arrived in Romania as part of the educational exchange program set up between the Romanian and French Ministries of Education. (…) Both of them are part of the French diplomats’ espionage network in Romania. Thus, on October 10, 1959 the French students took a trip to Chilia, close to the Romanian-Soviet border without a travel permit and took photos, which were sent to France. As a consequence, border officers and Securitate put them under arrest. 133

Vacationing or traveling to Romania as a Western tourist at the end of the 1950s had the potential to be a stressful and, at times, even dangerous experience. Moreover, although central authorities became interested in developing international tourism, at the local level, Western tourists were often met with suspicion. Overall, at the end of the 1950-early 1960s, socialist Romania seemed to have been poorly equipped to welcome foreign tourists from capitalist countries. This situation gradually changed from 1960 into the 1970s.

In 1961, tourist organizations from socialist countries addressed for the first time the possibility of setting up tourism collaborations between socialist and capitalist countries. The tourist summit, which took place in Moscow, was the fourth meeting of socialist tourist organizations. The participants came not only from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but also from Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam. While the first point on the agenda touted international tourism as a vehicle for forging friendly relations between the socialist states, the next topics reflected a much more pragmatic approach. The second point on the summit’s agenda mentioned the “importance of developing international tourism between socialist and capitalist countries as a means of popularizing the accomplishments of socialist regimes and of counterattacking the unfriendly imperialist propaganda towards socialist countries.” 134 The

133 ACNSAS, Informative Collection, file no. 329,725, vol. 1, f. 4.
134 Ibidem, f. 6.
meeting agenda’s next point stated that tourist relationships between socialist and capitalist countries should start from the idea that socialist states could be attractive tourist destinations, as the prices for tourist services were lower than in southern or western Europe. The meeting also emphasized that socialist countries should find ways to promote themselves on the capitalist countries’ tourist market. In the socialist officials’ view, tourist relations with capitalist countries could not only counterattack unfriendly propaganda, but it could also prove that socialist reality was not as dull as the Cold War discourse in the West described it. Last but not least, international tourism was supposed to bring important revenues to socialist economies.

During the 1961 meeting, Romania was not the strongest voice in the discussion of tourist relationships with capitalist countries. Rather the Romanian delegates main concern was to secure the country’s relationships with the other socialist countries. As a result, Romania’s representatives presented a report that tackled the issue of “rest tourism” and the prospects for its development within the socialist bloc. Romanian delegates also used this meeting to sign tourist agreements with Intourist (USSR), URBIS (Poland), CEDOK (Czechoslovakia), IBUSZ and EXPRES (Hungary) for 1962. These actions mirrored the Romanian socialist regime’s perspective on tourism that still emphasized tourism’s role in helping workers to recover and regain their strength in order to become more productive at work. In 1961, Romania’s focus was on tourism with socialist countries as the tourist agreements and the abolishing of visas for tourists from socialist Eastern Europe and the USSR showed.

Only in the mid-1960s, did Romania start to clearly prioritize international tourism with the Western countries. In 1964, National Office for Tourism-Carpathians (NTO-Carpathians)

135 Ibidem, f. 10.
137 “European Tourism in the Increase” in World Travel, 63, April 1963, p. 10.
decided to send a number of tourist workers to get specialized training in France; then in 1967 it eliminated visas for tourists coming from capitalist countries for the International Tourist Year. The NTO-Carpathians sent tourist workers to France in the hope that these workers would get acquainted with the French cuisine and they would use this knowledge to improve the menus of Romanian restaurants. This effort was clearly meant to attract more foreign tourists. An internal note from the Economic Direction of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party recommended:

To boost commercial activities and the professional/technical level of commercial workers, it is necessary to send them abroad in order to get acquainted with the practices of commerce in other countries. Therefore, we recommend the following actions:

- To send 15 bakers, pastry cooks, butchers, and grill cooks to France for a one to three-month period.
- For the school year term 1964/1965 six students in tourism will study in a hotel/restaurant training school in Paris.
- We are in the process of negotiating with the International Hotels-Restaurants Association to send waiters, hotel workers, and chefs in various countries for six months.
- To invite French tourist specialists to visit Romania in the following months in order to train Romanian students and restaurant workers.

In addition to sending tourist workers to train in Western countries and welcoming Western tourists, a new definition of tourism started to crystalize at the end of the 1960s. Besides the

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139 ANIC, CC of PCR – Chancellery, file no. 15/1964, f. 47.
recuperative aspect of tourism, this activity started to encompass an economic dimension as well. Tourism ceased to simply be an activity that improved Romanian workers’ physical condition; henceforth it became a set of services designed to meet the needs of potential consumers.140 Oskar Snak, a high official in the Ministry of Tourism and a scholar of tourism, explained: “From an economic and social point of view, the development of tourism refers to the population’s growing demands for a better access to tourist services and consumer goods, which in the end stimulates both production and consumption.” Furthermore, Snak emphasizes that the growing number of “foreign visitors is beneficial for the development of certain tourist areas and of the Romanian economy in general.”141 More than that, he notes, “international tourism can positively influence a country’s balance of payments, capitalize on a country’s natural resources,” and act as “an invisible form of exporting services and products, which is very economically advantageous.”142

Similar changes were underway in Spain. Whereas throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, the main focus was on domestic tourism, in the mid 1950s, international tourism became a priority for the Spanish government. This change reflected the belief that tourism helped to promote “a politically correct opinion of Spain and spread out the most authentic knowledge on the history and development of the country among both domestic and foreign tourists.”143 Such a statement showed a change in the Spanish government officials’ mindset and announced the end of Spain’s political and economic isolation of the 1940s. However, although the government was welcoming foreign tourists, it did not want to leave to their imagination the task of construing an image about Spain and its regime. Nevertheless, as in the Romanian case, at the beginning of the 1960s, the

141 Ibidem, p. 29.
142 Ibidem, p. 29.
143 Rafael Esteve Secall, Rafael Fuentes Garcia, Economia, historia e instituciónes del turismo en Espana (Madrid: Ediciones Piramide, 2000), p. 56.
focus of Spanish tourism moved from a quasi-ideological dimension to a more pragmatic economic approach. In the 1960s, Spain’s government became more and more aware of the importance of international tourism in generating economic growth and in regulating the balance of payments. In 1964, an article in Hosteleria, a Spanish tourist magazine, noted that, “Tourism is not important only for economic life, but it plays an exceptional role as a means of payment within international trade.”

Nonetheless, the turn to international tourism in Spain was as hesitant as in the Romanian case. Although the profitability of international tourism was the main reason for developing this trade, at the beginning of the 1950s, Spain still struggled to overcome the harsh economic conditions and political perceptions that resulted from the international isolation of 1945-1950. This isolation partially ended only in 1953 when Spain signed an economic agreement with the United States. In 1955, Spain became a member of United Nations. The Economic Aid Treaty with the United States pressured the Spanish government to adopt financial measures in order to strengthen the peseta so as to help it regain international credibility and to eliminate the cartelization of the Spanish market.

Initially, tourism was but one part of this process of economic opening. Only in 1953, did the General Tourism Department (Dirección General de Turismo) emerge as a separate agency within the newly created Ministry of Information and Tourism. Nevertheless, as the name of the new ministry suggests, the Spanish government was more concerned with the “information” part of the institution than with the development of tourism. That preference aside, the Tourism Department together with the General Agency for Social and Economic Planning (Secretaria

144 “Turismo en España” in Hosteleria, March 1964, p. 32.
145 Rafael Esteve Secall, Rafael Fuentes Garcia, op. cit., p. 54.
146 Ibidem, p. 55.
General para la Ordenación Económica y Social) drafted Spain’s first plan for the development of tourism during Franco’s regime. The opening line of the plan reveals the very optimistic approach that Spanish officials had towards developing tourism in Spain; it also suggests the reasons for developing tourism, “We believe that the political and economic importance which tourism has for our country is an obvious fact which does not need any explanation.”

For Spanish officials, the advantage that came with the development of the tourism sector was first and foremost still connected with building a positive image of Franco’s regime, as tourism was deemed “one of the most effective means of propaganda.” The 1952 study for the Plan Nacional de Turismo listed the economic reasons as being of secondary importance: “On the one hand, it helps develop other industrial and commercial sectors, and on the other hand [tourism] is an important source of foreign currencies.” Moreover, in the beginning, Spanish officials did not regard tourism as an activity that could thrive independently, but only as a support for other economic sectors.

The study also outlined the sectors that Spain needed to improve in order to make the country more attractive for foreign tourists: easier and faster border control, better roads and railways, and enhanced tourist infrastructure. The mention of an easier and faster border control among the first measures to be taken suggests that the government was aware of the difficulty of welcoming foreign tourists in a country that suspected and restricted foreign contacts and influence.

149 Ibidem, p. 2.
150 Javier Tussel, Dictatura Franquista y Democracia, 1939-2004 (Barcelona: Critica, 2005).
Moreover, many Europeans had their own reasons for not vacationing in Spain. Many still remembered the negative image that the Civil War (1936-1939) and the victory of the nationalist forces led by Franco depended in good measure of Hitler’s and Mussolini’s support. Therefore, any plan to develop tourism could not go too far as long as the Francoist regime continued to cling to its policy of economic autarchy of the 1940s and the mid-1950s, and to avoid internal political reforms. In 1959, the Law from 27 July together with the Decree no. 2320 from 24 December allowed foreign firms to invest in Spanish economy. This new legal framework ended autarky and opened the Spanish market to foreign capital.\textsuperscript{151} As a result of this new legal framework, in 1968, the Governor of the Spanish Central Bank noted retrospectively that:

A simple look at the statistics regarding the economic development of Spain in the past eight years shows an impressive improvement in the balance of payments. Due to this increase in revenues, we were able to afford to buy foreign consumer goods and technologies in order to meet the burgeoning needs of the Spanish society. To sum up, we are moving from an economy of scarcity to an economic system that gradually opens to the outside world. (…) Needless to say, the 1959 plan of stabilization coincides with the development of international tourism in Spain.\textsuperscript{152}

Although, in Franco’s Spain, international tourism became a clear priority in the mid-1950s, only after the loosening of the autarchic policies of the Spanish government did this sector start to fully develop. As this survey makes clear, at the policy level, the Spanish government view on tourism was rather similar to that of socialist Romania, which evolved from a focus on domestic tourism to a more commercially driven international tourism in the mid-1960s.


2.3 THE INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF TOURISM

Whereas in the early 1950s trade unions coordinated tourist activities in socialist Romania, by the mid-1950s a special department, the National Office for Tourism (NTO-Carpathians) was created within the Ministry of Commerce.\textsuperscript{153} In the mid-1950s, NTO-Carpathians, “could sign agreements with foreign institutions and agencies, organize the arrival of foreign tourists to Romania, be in charge of all matters related to the arrival, staying, and departure of foreign tourists in Romania, as well as to organize the Romanian tourists trips abroad.”\textsuperscript{154} This was one of the first institutional measures announcing the Romanian state’s interest in developing international tourism both to and from Romania. However, domestic tourism was still under the authority of the General Working Confederation, newly renamed as the National Council of Trade Unions.

The National Office for Tourism-Carpathians, however, did not function well within the Ministry of Commerce. As a result, in 1959, it fell under the authority of the Union for Physical Culture and Sport. In addition to the old offices’ responsibilities, a new one was added: to popularize Romania as a tourist destination abroad.\textsuperscript{155} This affiliation with the Union for Physical Culture and Sport strongly suggests that the purpose of international tourism did not lay in the commercial realm and that the government still regarded tourism as a form of physical activity and means of improving citizens’ health. But change was afoot. The shifting definition of tourism is mirrored by the frequent reorganizations of the tourist agency. In 1962, a reorganization of the NTO-Carpathians took place and as a result it also became responsible for domestic tourism. As a

\textsuperscript{153} HCM no. 1781/ 5 September 1955, p.40.
\textsuperscript{154} HCM no. 1781/ 5 September 1955, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{155} Decision no. 86 in „Colecția de legi, decrete, hotărări și dispoziții,” (Collection of laws, decrees, and decisions) (Bucharest: Scientific Publishing, House, 1959) p.164.
consequence, the NTO-Carpathians was in charge of sending the “working people” to the health and spa resorts as well as organizing of domestic tourist activity. But, the most significant aspect of this reorganization was that it announced that henceforth tourism was a predominantly commercial activity. For this reason, NTO-Carpathians was transferred from the authority of the Union for Physical Culture and Sport to that of the Ministry of Exterior Commerce. The same decision gave NTO-Carpathians priority access to hotels, restaurants, and other tourist facilities as well as to the means of transportation for tourist purposes. Finally, the reform granted more autonomy and more money to NTO-Carpathians to organize both international and tourist activities. Nonetheless, it did not place all of the tourist infrastructure in this institution’s hands.

In 1966, an internal report by the NTO-Carpathians underlined that international tourism could not properly function and flourish as long as the organization did not have control of the entire tourist infrastructure. The NTO-Carpathians’ complaint was that although the organization of tourism fell under its responsibility, the tourist infrastructure (hotels, restaurants, and buses) operated under the authority of the Ministry of Interior Commerce. The report highlighted the recent success of international tourism in Romania. In 1965, 200,000 foreign tourists visited Romania, while the revenues from international tourism had increased from 34.4 million lei in 1960 to 117 million lei in 1965. Despite this sharp growth, international tourism still accounted for less revenue than did domestic tourism, which brought in 48.7 million lei in 1960 and 196

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158 ANIC, Central Committee- Economic Section, file no. 31/1966, f. 2.
159 Although there are no official estimates, the total amount (tourist packages and extra-services) obtained from international tourism was around 14.5 million dollars in 1965 and 10 million dollars from domestic tourism (calculated at a rate of 18 lei for one dollar).
million lei in 1965.\textsuperscript{160} However, as the report pointed out, the most economically beneficial growth was that of the hard currency income coming from Western tourists. While in 1960, Western tourists contributed 5.3 million lei to the Romanian budget, in the next five years, this amount increased sixteen fold, reaching 88 million lei in 1965.\textsuperscript{161}

The NTO-Carpathians report stressed that, in order for this trend to continue (a 420 million lei revenue from international tourism was planned for 1970), the organizational structure of tourism in Romania must change.\textsuperscript{162} First of all, according to the report, NTO-Carpathians would need to coordinate both the arrival of tourists and the infrastructure of tourism. This measure would make NTO-Carpathians the sole institution responsible for both the development of tourism in Romania as well as for possible setbacks. More than that, the reorganization of NTO-Carpathians promised to raise the economic efficiency of international tourism, to ensure better training of the tourist personnel, and to help resolve any day-to-day inconsistencies that might have occurred between the accommodation and food services.\textsuperscript{163}

In 1967, the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party agreed that a change was necessary and approved the reorganization of NTO-Carpathians. Decree No. 32 of the Council of the State granted NTO-Carpathians full responsibilities for “organizing, supervising, and coordinating tourist activities” in Romania.\textsuperscript{164} That same decree charged NTO-Carpathians with elaborating long-term plans for the development of tourism, its infrastructure, and expected revenues. NTO-Carpathians could sign tourist agreements with foreign agencies, but it also had to

\textsuperscript{160} ANIC, Central Committee- Economic Section, file no. 31/1966, f. 3.
\textsuperscript{161} Ibidem, f. 3. This meant that 80 percent of the total income was brought by Western tourists.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibidem, f.4.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibidem, f. 5.
\textsuperscript{164} Decree no. 32 regarding the establishment, structure, and functioning of the National Office for Tourism of the Socialist Republic of Romania in „Collection of laws, decrees, decisions and other normative acts”, vol. 1 (Bucharest: Scientific Publishing House, 1967), p. 33.
make sure that tourists received the services promised in their vouchers because it directly administered the accommodation and eating facilities. NTO-Carpathians was empowered to organize trips abroad and within Romania for foreign tourists, and to promote Romania as a tourist destination. Because the institution was also responsible for domestic tourism, Decree no. 32 reconfirmed that Romanian citizens could choose to book their vacations with NTO-Carpathians if they wanted a higher degree of comfort than what the less expensive trade unions offered. However, the main responsibility of NTO-Carpathians was to cater to international tourists whose hard currency the Romanian government coveted.

A further step to streamline international tourism was the creation of the Ministry of Tourism in 1971, which reflected the economic and political maturity that this sector had reached. Derek Hall deems this decision as part of the Romanian’s state policy to strengthen connections with the West and to attract both eastern and western tourists. The newly established Ministry of Tourism coordinated all tourist activity in socialist Romania split between its branches: National Office for Tourism-Carpathians and National Office for Tourism-Littoral. NTO-Carpathians based in Brasov and Bucharest was in charge of both domestic and international tourism in Transylvania, Northern Moldavia and the mountain resorts, while NTO-Littoral coordinated tourism activity in the seaside area. This change reflected the strong emphasis that Romanian officials put on the seaside tourism in the 1970s, in the attempt to follow the example of established beach destinations, such as Yugoslavia and Spain. At the same time, the new institutional framework

165 Ibidem, pp. 33-34.
166 “Hotărârea nr. 641 a Consiliului de Miniştri al Republicii Populare Române şi a Consiliului Central al Sindicatelor din Republica Populară Română cu privire la sistemul de calculare a contribuţiei salariaţilor şi pensionarilor pentru trimiterile la tratament balnear şi odihnă şi cu privire la stabilirea tarifelor pe anul 1960 în staţiunile balneoeclimatice” in Colecţia de Hotărâri şi Dispoziţii ale Consiliului de Miniştri al Republicii Populare Române, no. 18 from 1 June 1960, p.11.
167 Derek Hall, op.cit., p. 49.
reflected the state’s efforts to decentralize somewhat the organization of tourism in socialist Romania.

Nevertheless, this decentralized institutional framework of tourism was brought to a halt in the early 1980s. In 1984, NTO-Littoral lost one of its most important responsibilities, negotiating and reaching agreements with foreign partners, mostly private firms in Western countries. NTO-Carpathians Bucharest took on this task while NTO-Littoral only ran the day-to-day operations and reported to the central authorities in Bucharest. Before these reorganizations, the payments for the tourist services were made to NTO-Littoral directly; as of 1984, NTO-Carpathians Bucharest was the only institution able to run such operations. This shift in responsibilities echoed the Romanian government’s intention to exercise a more strong-handed policy in its attempt to streamline the collection of available foreign currencies. Decree no. 22 of the Council of Ministers emphasized that, “Negotiating and signing of external contracts for international tourism, including those regarding charter flights, will become the responsibility of a lone delegation formed by representatives of the NTO-Carpathians Bucharest, subordinated to the Minister of Tourism, and of TAROM Company, subordinated to the Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications.” International tourism and the commercial services associated with it became the responsibility of four institutions all based in Bucharest: Mercur, NTO-Carpathians Bucharest, Comturist Bucharest, and Publiturist. Mercur, subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation, was in charge of the import of foreign goods to be sold in tourist shops; NTO-Carpathians-Bucharest was responsible for all international tourist

operations for both foreign and Romanian tourists; Comturist Bucharest, subordinated to the Ministry of Tourism, coordinated the chain of tourist shops that existed in all large hotels and on the Black Sea Coast and sold their merchandise in foreign currencies, especially dollars and Deutsch Marks; finally Publiturism, the Agency for Tourist Publicity, produced and disseminated advertising materials (flyers, movies, tourist brochures, exhibitions, etc.) that promoted Romanian tourism.\footnote{Ibidem, pp. 178-182.}

The institutional organization of tourism in Spain underwent a similar process. At the end of the Civil War, Franco’s new government established a National Service for Tourism (\textit{Servicio Nacional de Turismo}) within the Ministry of the Interior. The mission of the National Service was mainly to organize the so-called “routes of war” (\textit{la rutas de la guerra}), which aimed at conveying the nationalist faction’s perspective on the Civil War. Four such routes tracking Franco’s victories spanned Spain. The first one was called the Northern route (\textit{la ruta de Guerra del Norte}) and spanned 43 miles from Oviedo to Santander; the second route linked Pamplona with Barcelona; the third included Madrid, while the fourth covered Andalusia.\footnote{Ana Maria Garrido, \textit{Historia del Turismo en España en el siglo XX} (Madrid: Editorial Sintesis, 2007), p. 150.} This program was opened mainly to the economically well-to-do Spaniards, as it included only luxury hotels and facilities. There were a number of restrictions on the few foreign tourists: tourists needed a passport and a visa to enter Spain, and they could not take photos during their trips. The program was far from being a success; for example, in the first such trip, only four tourists enrolled, three Catholic priests and one French leftist journalist who wanted to document the war.\footnote{Ibidem, p. 151.}
After the Francoist victory in 1939, tourism fell under the administration of the General Tourist Department (Dirección General de Turismo). This new structure was part of the Ministry of the Interior (Gobernación); its main role was to represent “the tourist interests of the Nation” as well as “to inform the public in Spain and abroad about travel possibilities, hotels, monuments, and holidays.”\(^{173}\) However, the institution was a hollow one, as Spain closed its borders to all foreigners except Germans and Italians, and the main bulk of tourist and transportation infrastructure was destroyed during the war. For instance, the Ritz, the oldest and the most luxurious hotel in Madrid before the civil war, had neither electricity nor running water and was full of cockroaches.\(^{174}\) On top of that, the new head of the General Tourist Department, Luis Bolín, was a former journalist, whose only merit was his loyalty to Franco; he had very little experience with tourism.

Besides the General Tourist Department, which was supposed to organize tourism activities in Franco’s Spain, another institution charged with coordinating the tourism sector was the Trade Union of National Tourist Workers (Sindicato Nacional de Hostelería). Established in 1942, this institution was a state-controlled agency that played the role of coordinating and controlling the relationship between the government and the private tourist sector. The National Trade Union of Tourist Workers split the tourist industry into three branches: hotels, restaurants, and cafés. At the local level, it established a coordinating structure (basically a provincial delegate with a small office) in charge of all three activities. The provincial delegate had to make sure that the trade union’s dispositions were properly implemented. He was supposed to pass the tourist venues owners’ and employees’ proposals and requests on to the central agency. Because it lacked

\(^{173}\) Ibidem, p. 152.

undertaking of the extent of the tourist industry, to assert its control, the Trade Union of Tourist Workers made an inventory of all tourist establishments. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed above, tourism was not a thriving industry in the 1940s.

As tourism become more popular in post-war Europe and the United States, Spain, with its long Mediterranean coast, started to look like an attractive tourist destination. However, the organization and infrastructure of tourism in Spain as well as its economic autarchy were clear obstacles to the development of tourism. The almost one million tourists that visited Spain in 1950 required a reaction from the Spanish government. As a result, in 1951, a Ministry of Information and Tourism was established in Franco’s Spain. However, as noted above, the new ministry was less concerned with the development of tourism than it was with propaganda and censorship. Indeed, tourism was but one of the six departments that comprised the new ministry; the others were the press, information, radio, cinema, and theater. Arias Salgado, a politician close to the Falangists and Franco, became the head of the new institution. Manuel Fraga, the future minister of tourism, described Salgado as having little interest in developing tourism: “He had received the addition of tourism to his ministry without enthusiasm, in the official correspondence he only mentioned ‘ministry of information’” The 1952 World Bank’s report confirmed this assertion and stressed that the Ministry of Information and Tourism in Spain “did not attend to tourists, but had other responsibilities and concerns.” Under Salgado, the main role of the new ministry was to strictly control the flow of information and to prevent inappropriate foreign influence from reaching the Spanish public.

175 Ana Maria Garrido, op. cit., p. 190.
176 Rafael Esteve Secall, Rafael Fuentes Garcia, op. cit., p. 55.
178 Ana Maria Garrido, op. cit., p. 195.
179 Rafael Esteve Secall, Rafael Fuentes Garcia, op. cit., p.55.
Only in 1958 did the Tourist General Direction (TDG), the structure within the Ministry of Information and Tourism devoted to tourism, develop a sustained plan of development. Its reorganization in August 1958 announced the Spanish government’s turn towards a more pragmatic view of tourism.\textsuperscript{180} The Decree of 8 August 1958 dictated that the Tourist General Administration be composed of a General Secretary, a Technical Secretary, and six distinct departments: Foreign Service, Private Tourist Activities, Hotels and Restaurants, Propaganda and Publications, Information and Documentation, and Inspections and Reclamations.\textsuperscript{181} In addition, the Tourist General Direction coordinated the newly formed Spanish Tourist Administration (ATE) and the Insurance Policy Agency.\textsuperscript{182} The ATE was in charge of the state tourist network and the sport tourist establishments, while the Póliza del Seguro (Insurance Policy Agency) had to make sure that tourists bought travel insurance when crossing the border.\textsuperscript{183} The prominence of the foreign service department at the forefront of the TGD showed the Spanish state’s increased interest in welcoming foreign tourists. However, the fact that advertising was still labeled as a form of propaganda, indicates that the ideological dimension of tourism had not completely died out.

From an economic point of view, 1956, 1957, and 1958 were dire years for Spain. Inflation rose and the balance of payments declined. Moreover, in 1956, the first major post-civil war strike challenged the political and economic structure of Francoism.\textsuperscript{184} In response to this situation, the government attempted to secure a loan from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In 1958, a thorough report detailing the economic situation of Spain and plans for reform was

\textsuperscript{180} “Decreto de 8 agosto 1958 por el que se reorganiza la Dirección General de Turismo” in Buletin Oficial del Estado, no. 218, p. 1601.
\textsuperscript{181} “Decreto del Ministerio de Información y Turismo de 8 de Augusto de 1958” in Información y Turismo, August 1958, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibidem, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{183} Ana María Garrido, op.cit., p. 198.
\textsuperscript{184} Rafael Esteve Secall, Rafael Fuentes Garcia, op. cit., p.98.
submitted to the World Bank. Only months later did the economic reform project (*ordenación económica*) turn into the Plan for Economic and Social Stabilization of 1959. That plan aimed at “lining up the Spanish economy with the economies of the Western European countries”\(^{185}\) The 1959 Stabilization Plan allowed for the infusion of foreign capital into Spain.

This new economic and political approach did not arise in isolation. Rather, as noted above, it resulted from the ascension of economic technocrats to government posts in the late-1950s, some of whom were members of Opus Dei, a Catholic reformist group within the Spanish government. This group increasingly challenged the more nationalist and militaristic Falange, and the need for change took on a more serious character.\(^{186}\) Nevertheless, the adherents of Opus Dei were not themselves full supporters of international tourism, which they regarded as a threat to Spanish social and moral values.\(^{187}\) Also, their friendship with Spanish industrialists convinced them that Spain’s prosperity lay in the advent of heavy industry rather than ”an invisible” revenue like tourism. In 1962, Opus Dei was, however, responsible for the replacement of the Falangist Arias Salgado with the more open-minded and reformist Manuel Fraga as the head of the Ministry of Information and Tourism. The appointment of Fraga made a significant difference in the development of tourism in Spain and opened the way for the gradual liberalization of this sector. The 39 year-old Minister of Tourism was driven more by his wish to pursue a career in politics rather than his allegiance to Caudillo.\(^{188}\) He came of age after the end of the Civil War, and, although a conservative, Fraga was convinced that Spain’s future was in the European ensemble. Fraga reshuffled the Ministry of Information and Tourism and a new generation of employees

\(^{185}\) Ana Maria Garreno, *op. cit.*, p. 227.
\(^{188}\) *Ibidem*, p. 106. Although should be noted that one of his previous positions was that of chief of state information services and censorship. S. Pack, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
replaced the rustier and more ideologically driven personnel. In addition, he replaced the old TGD with a Subsecretary of Tourism under the coordination of his long-time friend Rodriguez-Acosta, giving tourism a much higher importance within the Ministry of Information and Tourism. The Subsecretary of Tourism included a new department in charge with inspections of tourist activities (Servicio de inspección) as well as an Institute for Tourist Studies. On the one hand Fraga liberalized the tourist industry when repealing the rigid law of hotel prices, but at the same time he imposed a higher degree of coercion on tourism by enforcing the new regulations.

2.4 CONCLUSION

Both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain shared the goal of developing industry after the Second World War. Both the five-year plans and the Commission for Economic Planning in Romania and ANI in Spain were charged with setting the path for industrial development in their respective countries. Romania was primarily interested in metallurgy and mining, while Spain wanted to develop the construction, metallurgy, mining, and chemical industries. While the focus on heavy industry does not come as a surprise for Romania, which after 1948 followed the Soviet model of economic development, Spain’s interest in metallurgy serves to remind us that developing economies, be they socialist or capitalist, viewed the development of heavy industry as the means to a modern, developed economy. This shared communality between socialist Romania and

Francoist Spain challenges a common view in the historiography that places the capitalist and socialist economies in an uncompromised dichotomy.\textsuperscript{190}

When it came to tourism, both socialist Romania and Francoist Spain also underwent similar processes, as each gradually shifted from domestic to international tourism. While in the 1940s-1950s, social and nationalist discourses shaped the role of the specific institutions that dealt with tourism in each country, in the 1960s those institutions were re-shaped in order to meet the more commercial and internationalist goals of the two governments. In both socialist Romania and Francoist Spain, the initial impulse came from outside; in the Romanian case it was the tourist meeting of the socialist countries in Moscow in 1961, while in Spain, as we shall see, the interest of British and American tourists forced the opening of tourism, especially in the coastal areas.

Last but not least, the two countries also shared the same reasons for developing international tourism. Both socialist Romania and Francoist Spain wanted to develop international tourism in order to acquire hard currencies, particularly US dollars and Deutsch Marks, and to improve their external image. Nevertheless, initially both governments regarded tourism as a political and social tool; only later (Spain in the mid-1950s and Romania in the early 1960s) did the two countries focus on the economic dimension of tourism. Thus, tourism evolved from an economic branch that was supposed to help the growth of more important sectors, such as metallurgy and constructions, to an economic sector in its own right. This was a gradual process that did not happen in a void, but rather amidst the economic and political liberalization in both countries in the 1960s.

CHAPTER II. TOURIST POLICIES’ IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS IN
SOCIALIST ROMANIA AND FRANCO’S SPAIN

The front cover of the 1963 Neckerman catalogue, West-Germany’s leading travel publication, advertised both the Black Sea Coast in Romania and Costa del Sol in Spain alongside other beach destinations, such as the Dalmatian Coast and Tunisia.191 This tourist ad exemplified the new type of tourist destination that Europeans, and West Germans in particular, were looking for: inexpensive and sunny.192 Socialist Romania and Francoist Spain qualified on both counts. Indeed, from the 1960s, the governments of both countries prioritized international tourism by developing tourist infrastructure and training tourist workers. Tourism looked like a promising venture and became an important component of official economic policies in both countries, which sought to turn international tourism into a source of hard currencies, (valuta in Romanian and divisas in Spanish).

However, both countries remained ambivalent about developing international tourism. They wanted the money that tourists would bring, while trying to avoid any influence that these foreign tourists might have on local populations. When Franco appointed Fraga as a minister of

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191 Neckerman Catalogue, 1963, front cover. Neckerman (NUI) was one of the leading travel agencies in Germany, established at the same time with Cook travel agency in England.
Information and Tourism in 1962, Franco allegedly told him: “I don’t believe in this freedom, but we need the tourists in order to improve our economy.”

This chapter examines how socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain implemented international tourism policies and with what results. Although they started from similar premises and developed international tourism for the same reasons (i.e. to get foreign currency and improve their external image), the two countries reached different results in terms of the number of tourists that visited each country. This led to more revenue for Spain and, in the long term, to different levels of economic development and societal liberalization. The gap between the two countries became more obvious in the late 1970s, when in Romania, after continuous growth throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the number of tourists (especially Western) started to slowly decline, while in Spain the numbers continued to grow. The existing historiography on Cold War divisions explains this disparity by the fact that the two countries belonged to different political and economic systems, (socialist versus capitalist) or different geographical regions (East versus West). But in fact more complex factors were at play. The current chapter argues that it was the different approaches to decision-making (more centralized in Romania and less so in Spain), the role of individual actors, and last but not least the inconsistency of economic policies regarding international tourism in Romania that led to the sharp differences between the two countries.

This chapter addresses the following questions. How did the geographical position and the way that the two countries positioned themselves in the tourist market influence the types of tourists to each country? In what ways did the different approaches to decision-making impact the development of tourism in each country? How did each country develop its tourist infrastructure?

What were the specific results in terms of the number of tourists and the overall economic efficiency of tourism in socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain?

The chapter consists of four sections. The first part assesses the geographical advantages and limits of the two countries, and discusses how they positioned themselves on the tourist market and why. It then examines issues relating to the transportation network, as this was a part of the essential infrastructure required in order to develop international tourism. Both socialist Romania and Francoist Spain struggled with this issue, but the rise of charter flights aided both of them. As we shall see, this was one the domains where the Romanian case showed its first cracks; after having modernized steadily in the 1960s and 1970s, the development of transportation, and airfare in particular, stalled in the 1980s. The third section explores the different approaches to the development of tourist infrastructure in the two countries, while the last part assesses the limits of tourist growth in socialist Romania and Francoist Spain.

3.1 ASSESSING GEOGRAPHICAL ADVANTAGES AND LIMITS

Geography is obviously a variable that defines the two countries. Romania is located in eastern Europe, a region that Western historians have uncritically labeled as “backward” in relation to Western Europe. Maria Todorova has successfully argued that West Europeans’ stereotypes about Romania and other east European lands were and remain negative, paternalistic, and orientalist. Quite similarly, Spain, a former trans-Atlantic empire, had become in mid-20th century...
century a country that struggled to overcome its own and northern Europeans’ belief in its
economic “backwardness” and reintegrate into “Western Europe.” For both countries,
international tourism worked as a vehicle in their attempt to gain a more favorable position within
European politics and its symbolic geography.

Although Romania was part of socialist Eastern Europe, as of the mid-1960s Romanian
tourist planners had begun to claim some autonomy within the “socialist camp” and towards the
Soviet Union. This was part of a larger development that involved a political and economic rift
with the Soviet Union that started in 1964. Initially, Romania had acted as an obedient follower of
the Soviet Union, taking an active role in suppressing the Hungarian uprising in 1956. But in the
late 1950s, as more Western-oriented political leaders (such as Gogu Radulescu, Minister of
Interior Commerce as of 1956, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, foreign minister as of 1957 and prime
minister between 1961 and 1974, or even the younger Nicolae Ceaușescu) came to power,
Romania’s position in relation to the Soviet Union gradually changed as Romania started to seek
the attention of Western countries. A 1964 article in The New York Times informed its readers that,
“Romania widens rift with Soviets.”197 Besides criticizing Radio Moscow for misinforming
Romanian citizens about the country’s “economic independence” and relations with the West, the
Romanian government offered Western tourists a better currency exchange and relaxed travel
restrictions. Furthermore, to show its openness to the capitalist bloc, Romania applied for
membership in the non-aligned group of nations at the United Nations World Trade Conference in
Geneva and approached General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was mostly

197 “Romania widens rift with Soviets: Makes new Moves to the West and Scores Moscow Radio” in The
composed of capitalist countries. These bold moves aimed to show Romania’s overtures towards capitalist West, but also reflected a very pragmatic economic approach.

In the mid-1960s, Romanian tourist officials carefully observed the changes in the world tourist market. In 1966, a report by the Ministry of Exterior Commerce emphasized that the number of West German and Scandinavian tourists was on the rise in both Europe and Romania, and that Romanian tourist advertising should attempt to attract these particular tourists. According to Gheorghe Ionel and Caraba Crisan, two Romanian scholars of tourism, Europe was still the main international tourist destination, attracting 75 percent of world tourism. Ionel and Crisan recommended that Romania should take advantage of this trend, precisely because of its geographical proximity to Western Europe. But they noted, in order to attract these tourists, Romanian tourist planners should first understand the mentality of the modern tourist:

The tourists’ motivations for taking a vacation are continuously changing. The tourist developers will face a more and more demanding tourist for whom the physical recuperation will be less important than fulfilling her/his spiritual needs. For modern tourists, high quality lodging and tourist services are a must, but more importantly, it is the fulfilling of their social needs.

Despite embracing a modern thinking about international tourism, the performance of Romanian tourism remained modest in comparison with the neighboring Yugoslavia or more distant Spain, which had the advantage of an earlier start. After sustained growth in the 1960s and

\[\text{198 Ibidem, p. 8.}\]
\[\text{199 This was also part of the broader, but carefully calculated path of diverging foreign policy that Romania followed during this period, including: establishing relations with West Germany, not breaking relations with Israel after 1967 war, De Gaulle’s visit in Romania in May 1968, and Romania’s refusal to take part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 along with the rest of the Warsaw Pact’s countries.}\]
\[\text{199 ANIC, CC of PCR Chancellery, file no. 150/1966, f. 2.}\]
\[\text{200 Ibidem, f. 2.}\]
\[\text{201 Gheorghe Ionel, Caraba Crisan, op. cit., p. 9.}\]
\[\text{202 Ibidem, p. 10.}\]
early 1970s, Romanian tourism industry went into decline in the 1980s. Most of the foreign tourists visiting Romania headed to the Black Sea coast and some also visited the mountain resorts on the Prahova Valley and the health resorts. As part of the organized group tourism, NTO-Carpathians would offer guided tours of the entire country.

![Figure 1. Tourist Map Romania, 1966](image)

The success of tourism was obvious in the 1960s, as the number of foreign tourists increased sharply from 200,000 in 1960 to one million in 1965.\textsuperscript{203} That number continued to rise throughout the 1970s, and reached an all-time peak of seven million per year at the beginning of the 1980s. But it slowly declined thereafter.\textsuperscript{204} Nevertheless, the problem was not simply the decline in the number of tourists, but also the composition of tourists, where were they coming from, and especially how much were they spending during their vacations in Romania. Despite plans to attract more Western tourists, in the late 1970s their numbers comprised only 15 to 20 percent of the number of foreign tourists in Romania.\textsuperscript{205} This is somewhat baffling as Romania was in fact a quite inexpensive tourist destination. In 1978, a vacation in Romania with everything included would cost a Western tourist an average of twenty-eight dollars per day.\textsuperscript{206} The questions is, why did Romania not succeed in attracting more Western tourists, despite its inexpensiveness and its clear political orientation towards capitalist Western Europe? One possible answer is that the implementation of tourist policies was limited by the more rigid power structure that characterized Romanian socialism and by the rampant shortage of consumer goods. In the long term, this affected tourist services.\textsuperscript{207}

\textsuperscript{203}ANIC, CC of PCR, Economic Section, file no. 165/1981, f. 19. In the mid-1970s the number of foreign tourists who visited Romania was of about 6 million.
\textsuperscript{204}ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Section, File no. 244/1981, f. 25.
\textsuperscript{205}ANIC, Central Committee Collection, Economic Section, file no. 165/1981, f. 16.
\textsuperscript{206}ANIC, Central Committee Collection, Economic Section, file no. 102/1979, f.11
\textsuperscript{207}D.O, an American backpacker to Romania in 1967, praised tourist services in Romania as he was able to find a room in a hotel without pre-booking unlike the Soviet Union and Hungary, and he also appreciated that the urban landscape looked less grim than in the other two countries. By contrast, in 1981, Else H. a young Austrian who took a road trip to Hungary and Romania together with her boyfriend complained that in one restaurant the waiter was “wasted and messed-up the bill” while people they encountered during their trip in Romania would ask them if they do not have goods to sell. In Hungary, she though tourist services were more professional and the availability of consumer goods higher as reflected in the way people dressed and in the general landscape. See, D.O. personal interview, Pittsburgh, March 2016 and Else H., personal interview, Vienna, Austria, May 2013.
By contrast, Spanish tourist officials had a freer hand in guiding the industry. They too closely followed the dynamics of the European tourism. Because most of the northwestern European tourists sought to spend their vacations somewhere at the seaside, Spain branded itself as a Mediterranean country. A journal article from 1968 signed by Alchaide Inchausti, one of the leading statisticians of Franco’s era, evaluated the perspectives of the Spanish tourism and emphasized the importance of the Mediterranean region and Spain’s growing share of the tourist industry. The number of tourists visiting Europe increased from twelve million in 1950 to 58 million in 1965, while those vacationing in the Mediterranean region increased from 6.6 million in 1950 to 32 million in 1964. The proportion stayed almost the same in both 1950 and 1964; slightly over half of these tourists chose the Mediterranean as their destination. What did change, the article pointed out, was the number of tourists vacationing in Spain. While in 1950 only 750,000 tourists spent their vacations in Spain, by 1964 their numbers had increased to 11,691,000. Although this was a staggering performance, the article warned that Spain could lose this momentum, as some changes within the competitive Mediterranean tourist market were expected. Inchausti predicted that besides France and Italy, other Mediterranean countries, such as Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, could become important tourist destinations. He anticipated that these countries could have a two-percent annual increase if they adopted a “moderate aggressive policy” and even a four percent increase in the case of a “more aggressive” tourist policy.

This happened while the number of foreign visitors to France increased only two-fold and to Italy four times.
Alchaide Inchausti, op. cit., p. 48.
article warned that this prediction called for immediate measures from the Spanish government, which had to preserve Spain’s initial tourist growth.

Figure 2. Tourist Map Spain, 1955.

Source: The Illustrated London News, 29 May 1955 (Campaign: “Come to Sunny Spain”)

This brief comparison warrants three observations. First, what strikes the reader is the rapid growth of Spanish tourism from 1950 to 1964 in relation to its Mediterranean neighbors France and Italy. The explanation for this increase in the number of tourists lies in Spain’s inexpensive tourist programs and, to a certain extent, its exoticism and novelty in the eye of some European
and world tourists. Both factors transformed it into a desirable tourist destination. Secondly, Spain focused its attention on the countries or regions to which tourists flowed, whereas Romania focused on those countries that sent the most tourists. Here in lay a key difference in the way that tourism planning took place: while Spain was looking at its competitors and devised an aggressive policy in relation to those countries, Romania, mostly because of its location further away from the richer Western European tourists, chose to carefully plan how to attract these travellers. In the mid-1960s, the advent of charter flights partially resolved this inconvenience.

Third, in terms of post-war geopolitics, the inclusion of socialist Yugoslavia among the countries that could compete with Spain suggests a different geographical division of Europe, which went beyond the established idea of a capitalist West pitted against the socialist East (or vice versa). Rather it showed a division based on the tourist flow that connected northwestern Europe, acting as a sender of tourists, and coastal areas (Mediterranean and the Black Sea Coast in this case), playing the role of tourist-receiver.

A simple look at the number of tourists visiting each country and the ways in which socialist Romania and Francoist Spain positioned themselves geographically on the tourist market shows the divergent approach of the two countries. Despite the clear advantage of Spain’s geographical position in attracting the higher number of tourists, Romania’s planners displayed a different approach to the tourist market. This was particularly rooted in its attempt to create some political distance from the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union, in particular, and become attractive.

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212 Spain promoted itself during the 1950s-1960s with the slogan “Spain is Different.”
to Western tourists. Romania’s potential market was quite wide. Because of its geographical location in the coveted Mediterranean region, Spain’s focus was rather regional. However, one must note that neither country’s tourism officials were concerned with the ideological divisions between West and East. Their vision of tourist geography was determined by who their competitors were or from where the tourists were coming.

3.2 TRANSPORTATION AND INTERNATIONAL TOURISM

Although the geographical location was important, an efficient transportation network was a key factor for the development of international tourism; both Romanian and Spanish tourist officials were aware of this fact. In both cases, the state was the main entrepreneur, but the nature of decision-making and the allocation of funds worked differently in each country. While in Romania, the centralized system allowed for a clear prioritization and channeling of resources to designated economic sectors, in Spain, the Ministry of Tourism had to negotiate with the Ministry of Public Works and other government offices regarding the allocation of necessary funds. Although transportation was a hurdle that both countries needed to overcome, despite the advantages of a planned economy and after having showed a promising start in the 1960s, Romania deemphasized investments in the transportation sector in the 1980s.

Julian Hale, a British writer who visited Romania in 1967, wrote that, “Touring Romania by car I found out that I have a simple choice, I could take the asphalted main roads, keep my temper and miss out the remoter places of interest. Or, I could, and indeed did, venture also on to the dent-making, ‘corrugated’ secondary roads, which are dusty when dry and treacherously muddy after rain. It pays to have a map which distinguishes between the two.”

If touring Romania by car at the end of the 1960s was often a less comfortable experience than many foreign tourists would have expected, reaching it from various corners of Europe was far from difficult. This was just a matter of time and personal funds, especially after the visa requirements for Western countries were eased in 1964. A 1967 guidebook of Romania lavishly presented the transportation choices that a potential tourist had at his disposal. First of all, Romania could be reached by plane, as it was connected with eighteen European cities, ten of which were in capitalist countries. In addition to TAROM, the Romanian national airline company, foreign airlines, such as Air France, Lufthansa, KLM, Austrian Airlines, MALEV (Hungary), AEROFLOT, and LOT (Poland), had daily or bi-weekly flights to Romania. Another way of visiting the socialist country was by train, and the 1967 guidebook listed eight possible tours that included Romania, five of them having stops in both socialist and capitalist countries. Romania could also be easily reached by car. Tourists could enter with their own car and drive for three months without any special documentation. Although not required by Romanian law, the 1967 guidebook recommended that drivers have their logbooks (official papers) when travelling to

218 It was established in 1964 and in 1966 they had their first transatlantic flight. http://www.tarom.ro/despre-noi/compania-tarom/istoric/, accessed March 16th, 4:44PM.
219 Peter Latham, op. cit., p. 46.
Eastern Europe in order to avoid unnecessary bureaucratic hassles.\textsuperscript{220} Finally, Romania could be reached by boat either on the Danube or through the Black Sea. Besides, a Romanian state-initiated boat trip on the Danube from Vienna to Hârșova, three regular cruises\textsuperscript{221} from Germany, Spain, or Sweden, included the Black Sea coastal city of Constanța in their travel itinerary.\textsuperscript{222} As the travelling options listed above show, in the late 1960s, Romania was part of the European travel network and could have been easily visited by both eastern and western European tourists. After all, the same 1967 guidebook informed British tourists taking a road trip to Romania that they could reach the Black Sea Coast in less than 48 hours.\textsuperscript{223}

If getting to Romania was not difficult, moving within Romania was a different matter, as Julian Hale noted. The domestic transportation network had significant flaws, which could have only frustrated tourists. This was, however, an issue to which the communist regime did try to attend. Improving the transportation infrastructure was a regular issue on the government’s agenda, and tourism was one of the main reasons for pursuing the modernization of railways and roads. In 1950, 14.9 per cent of the total national investments were directed towards transportation;\textsuperscript{224} in 1960, this percentage plummeted to 7.4 per cent. Despite the proportional decline, the amount of total state investments actually doubled.\textsuperscript{225} In 1980, the share of transportation out of investments increased even further and reached 11.2 per cent, only to slowly decline afterwards.\textsuperscript{226} Yet, the amount of investments was not reflected in the length nor in the quality of the railway or road

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{220} Ibidem, p. 49.
\item \textsuperscript{221} The boat trip was an initiative by the National Office for Tourism-Carpathians, and it was a regular trip from Vienna to Hârșova (Constanța County).
\item \textsuperscript{222} Ibidem, p. 47.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Ibidem, p.47.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Anuarul Statistic, [Statistical Yearbook, 1990] (București: Direcția de Statistică,1990), p.526.
\item \textsuperscript{225} “Legea planului de stat 1960” in Colectia de legi si decrete, 1960, pp. 232-240.
\item \textsuperscript{226} Anuarul Statistic [Statistical Yearbook, 1990] (București: Direcția de Statistică,1990), p. 526.
\end{itemize}
networks. In 1950, Romania had 6,743 miles of railway lines; by 1960, the figure had only increased to 6,823 miles; in 1970, it was 6,842 miles, a mere nineteen mile increase in ten years.\textsuperscript{227} Between 1950 and 1960, not a single mile of line was electrified, but one third of the lines were electrified between 1960 and 1989. Also, although the length of double-track lines reached 1,831 miles in 1989, this was less than one third of existing railway tracks.\textsuperscript{228} Travelling by rail in socialist Romania could be a time consuming experience.

An alternative, but not necessarily a more desirable one, was travelling by car. Not only did the road network not expand from the 1960s to the late 1980s, it actually decreased slightly from 47,244 miles to 45,245 miles. On the bright side, the availability of modernized roads doubled during this time, from 5,281 to 10,212 miles.\textsuperscript{229} The Romanian government chose to channel its investments into those parts of the country that were more likely to be visited by foreign tourists: Bucharest, the Black Sea Coast, and the mountain region of Prahova Valley. This was however insufficient to cope with the expectations of foreign and Romanian tourists, many of whom wanted to visit the whole country and not just the seaside area, or Bucharest and its surroundings.

To compensate for the lack of modernized roads, the officials encouraged tourists to travel by train. In the mid-1960s, a program called “traveling by train in circuit” offered both foreign and Romanian tourists the possibility of buying subsidized train tickets for going on vacation. The offer comprised eleven extended routes and six small tours, which covered many regions of the country. The circuits included Bucharest, or the Black Sea seaside, or a mountain region. The prices started at 90 lei (about five dollars) for a second-class ticket and reached 149 lei (about eight dollars) for the first class (the second class fare was the equivalent of almost 10 per cent of an

\textsuperscript{227}Ibidem, p. 548.
\textsuperscript{228} Ibidem, p. 526-527.
average salary in Romania in the 1960s). The cost varied according to the length of the circuit. The tickets, which were sold only to individuals, could be purchased at any Romanian railways travel agency, located in each town or city, as well as from the main railway stations. An individual could purchase a maximum of six tickets, which were valid for two months. The ticket allowed for layovers during the trip. The program attempted to make vacationing by train both economical and attractive to tourists as it introduced flexible routes and prices, a relative novelty for the Romanian socialist tourism. But such packages were primarily aimed at Romanians and tourists from socialist countries who had limited financial resources. They did not seek to attract the wealthier Western tourists, who had foreign currency to spend. A different option was available for them. In 1981, a special train, “Euxinus-80,” which only carried foreign tourists, was set up to connect Bucharest and Constanta. Although the train had no stops en route, services were upgraded to meet foreign tourists’ demands. This was a compromise in order to replace the air trips that required too much combustible fuel and, thus, became too expensive to support. On the other hand, the socialist state expected to earn one million dollars only from this special train, which had fares set in hard currencies.

In addition, tourists from Western countries were encouraged to rent a car and tour Romania by themselves, or with a guide from the National Office for Tourism-Carpathians. With

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230 The price was calculated using an exchange rate of 18 lei for a dollar. This was the standard exchange rate used for external transactions with capitalist countries, which was set up through a decree of the Council of Ministers.


232 Socialist countries did not have convertible currencies as most capitalist countries had; nor did Spain during the Franco period.

233 ACNSAS, Documentary Collection, file number 8850, vol. 23, f. 224. For instance, one possible upgrade was to serve alcohol for the whole duration of the trip, not just from 10:00AM.

prices pre-set in dollars, this option was by far the most economically beneficial for the socialist state. In 1976, a four-hour tour of Bucharest by car would cost $16.65, and a two-day trip to Poiana Brasov, a mountain resort in the Carpathians, was priced at $136. The same trips could have been taken in a mini-bus or in a coach for less than half those costs: $6.10 for the tour of Bucharest and $37.25 for the two-day excursion to the mountains. Undoubtedly, the Romanian government aimed at dealing in a capitalist way with capitalist tourists, as these prices were quite high, even for the presumably wealthier Western tourists. Furthermore, as we shall see, the communist government placed considerable emphasis on the amount of services that tourists had at their disposal, from modern motels and inns along the road, to the Romanian Automobile Association’s assistance in case of accidents or other unwanted troubles. Nevertheless, the tourists who hit the road by themselves, or those taking the buses, had to deal with the same problem: the lack of modernized roads that restricted their choice of destinations or made the trip a challenge.

One solution to overcoming the lack of modernized roads was to fly the tourists to their specific tourist destinations. The Romanian government directed a large amount of investments for the building and modernizing of airports. A common practice was the bringing into civil use of formerly military airports in order to make the provincial centers accessible to tourists. One airport was built at Mihail Kogalniceanu, a village 10 miles from Constanta, the main city on the Romanian Black Sea coast. The proximity to the Black Sea coast and the advent of charter flights,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{235} Services and Trips Offered by the Carpați, National Tourism Office Bucharest, (Bucharest: NTO, 1976), pp. 3, 7.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{236} ANIC, CC of PCR Economic Section, file no. 178/1980.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{238} Ibidem, p. 73.}\]
which began to reach Romania in the mid-1960s, made the place a good choice to build an airport. According to Gheorghe Constantin, the first commander of the airport, construction started in 1960 and the authorities chose that location precisely because of its proximity to the seaside; they hoped it would enhance the prospects of developing international tourism.239 Prior to the building of the airport, the village had been isolated as there was no proper road to link it to Constanta. It was the construction of the airport that propelled the modernization of the area. An asphalt road connected Mihail Kogălniceanu to the national highway that led to Constanta and a running water system was soon in place. However, as of the mid-1970s, because the airport was projected to operate only during the summer, it had neither heating nor hot water in the passengers’ waiting room.240 Delayed flights were a regular occurrence and airport personnel, overwhelmed in the summer months, often misplaced the tourists’ luggage.241

After a promising start in the 1960s and 1970s, the quantity of air traffic to and from international destinations slowly declined in the 1980s, as TAROM, the national airline company, sought to strengthen its monopoly over the foreign airline companies.242 This created tensions between the Romanian state and some international tourist firms, as well as national aeronautic agencies, in Western Europe. In 1981, French tourist operators made the signing of tourist contracts for that year conditional on the granting of the right for their charter flights to land at Bacau airport (in eastern Romania), where TAROM had full monopoly.243 The Political Bureau

239 Interview with Gheorghe Constantin in “Cuget Liber,” 18 January 2015.
240 Ibidem.
241 Ibidem.
242 Murgescu, op. cit., p. 386. For instance, 80% of the tourist charters were carried by TAROM, the rest by foreign companies. ANIC, CC of PCR-Economic Section, file no. 244/1981, f. 7.
243 Ibidem, f. 8.
of the CC of PCR and the Romanian Aeronautic Agency agreed to this demand as they estimated that the French tourists arriving in this part of the country could bring revenues of $700,000. \(^{244}\)

Although the Romanian state modernized the transportation infrastructure, this project did not cover the whole country; it gave priority to the regions that were more likely to be visited by foreign tourists. This led to a disparity between tourist destinations such as Bucharest and its surroundings, the Black Sea Coast, some Transylvanian cities, and the rest of the country. In the long term, this restricted the development of international tourism to those areas rather than to the whole country, as the tourist and party officials had initially planned. The change in plans was not a deliberate decision but rather the result of the state’s lack of capital and of tourist agencies’ policies, which would only book certain destinations in Romania.

Like socialist Romania, Francoist Spain also understood that having an efficient transportation infrastructure was the first step in attracting tourists. It too faced a number of obstacles, but the ultimate success of tourism and the involvement of charismatic ministers, such as Fraga, forced the development of transportation network. The first draft of the 1953 National Tourism Plan mentioned that the tourists’ first impression was formed at the frontier and, after entering, while traveling within Spain. \(^{245}\) Therefore, the modernization of both roads and railways should be one of the government’s priorities. But roads were crucial. Most of the half of the million tourists who visited Spain in 1951 preferred to travel by car. Wisely, the 1952 draft of the *Plan Nacional de Turismo* predicted that this type of transportation would offer more opportunities for the future, and therefore it should receive more attention. \(^{246}\) Although a decree for the modernization of road infrastructure had been issued in December 1950, the results had yet to

\(^{244}\) *Ibidem*, f. 9.  
\(^{246}\) *Ibidem*, p.3.
materialize. The 1952 draft of the Plan Nacional de Turismo, emphasized that, first and foremost, the government should modernize the roads, especially those used by foreign tourists. The plan also noted that for the well-to-do tourists, the airplane was still the preferred means of transportation. In 1952, around 86,000 tourists travelled to Spain by plane.\textsuperscript{247} Therefore, planners recommended that Iberia, the Spanish national airline, improve service and offer connections to various destinations within Spain and abroad, including the more exotic islands of Canaries and Baleares.\textsuperscript{248} These were ambitious goals and as the National Plan for the Development of Tourism would admit just one year later, there were notable obstacles.\textsuperscript{249}

Because tourism was not yet a priority for the Spanish government in the early 1950s, the tourist officials who authored the 1953 Plan had to first convince the Ministry of Public Works to include the frontier and the tourist areas, especially the coast, in the Plan for Modernization of Roads.\textsuperscript{250} The Plan asked for small improvements, such as traffic signs and a clear separation of the two sides of the road, arguing that these amendments would not cost much and they would make a positive first impression on tourists. In addition, it recommended the creation of parking lots, small recreation places with fresh water and, last but not least, gas stations near the freeway exit in each town.\textsuperscript{251} The issue of creating a favorable image was in fact a thorny issue, as tourists reaching Spain by car had to wait long hours at the border, a topic that the Plan for Development of Tourism only briefly listed among its priorities.\textsuperscript{252}

\textsuperscript{247} Ibidem, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{248} Ibidem, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{249} Plan Nacional de Turismo (Madrid: Ministerio de Informacion y Turismo, 1953), p. 18.
\textsuperscript{250} Ibidem, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibidem, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{252} On the topic of borderlines at the French-Spanish border see Sasha Pack, op. cit., p.93. Also, Plan Nacional de Turismo, (Madrid: Ministerio de Informacion y Turismo, 1953), p. 4.
The next item on the Plan’s agenda was the modernization of railways. As this was the second most popular means of transportation that foreign tourists used to reach Spain, the Plan outlined the long-term changes needed in order to improve this service. Among others, it recommended the buying of new carriages and locomotives, the setting of new routes to popular destinations, such as Madrid-Toledo or Madrid-El Escorial, as well as the maintenance, modernization and expansion of railway lines. Because these developments required investments, the Plan identified as immediate priorities the comfort, punctuality, and cleanliness of trains, as these were the issues that came up more often in tourists’ complaints. But recommendations and calls for investments did not yield immediate results.

Nonetheless, from the end of the 1940s to the early 1970s, the transportation infrastructure in Spain significantly improved. The road network increased from 68,560 miles in 1951, to 80,844 miles in 1960, and to 86,619 miles in 1969. Railway lines also increased from 6,951 miles in 1952 to 11,198 miles in 1960, while the length of electrified lines grew from 1,021 miles in 1952 to 1,765 miles in 1960. Nevertheless, the quality of railway vehicles did not improve at the same pace. In 1960, RENFE (the Spanish national railway system) had no Diesel locomotives in use; by 1975, it only had 715. In 1960, 2,544 locomotives were still propelled by steam; their numbers only decreased towards the end of the 1960s, reaching 308 in 1967. With less than 20 percent of the lines electrified and so many steam locomotives still in use, the performance

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253 In 1946 a complaint form was made available in trains in English and French. *Plan Nacional De Turismo*, p. 22.
254 Spain surface is 195,124 square miles.
256 *Ibidem.*
of Spanish trains was poor compared with France and Britain, but better than socialist Romania, which did not have a single mile of electrified railways in 1960.\textsuperscript{257}

Although significant, the advancements in road and railway transportation in Spain were not enough to keep up with the rapid changes that characterized the postwar period.\textsuperscript{258} Most of the first wave of tourists that visited Spain were French auto-motorists. Only towards the end of the 1950s did tourists from Britain and West Germany start to frequent the Spanish beaches.\textsuperscript{259} What made Spain a more accessible tourist destination for them was the introduction of charter flights, which made possible a trip from London to Malaga in just a couple of hours.\textsuperscript{260} Although IATA, the international commercial aviation cartel, did not fully liberalize rules governing charter flights until 1965 (because it wanted to preserve the advantage of traditional carriers), the popularity of this type of flight forced the airline industry to adopt it.\textsuperscript{261} Charter flights opened the door to airline travel for the middle classes in countries such as Great Britain, France, and West Germany, and transformed an otherwise elite type of travel into something accessible to the masses. While in 1959, a regular flight from London to Valencia cost around $115, a two-week all-inclusive chartered package to Mallorca could be as inexpensive as $125.\textsuperscript{262} The previously less connected regions, such as Malaga in southern Spain and the islands, strongly benefited from this type of travel. By 1962, charter flights accounted for 35 percent of all air traffic in Spain, but they reached 60 percent in places such as Mallorca.\textsuperscript{263}

\textsuperscript{257} Ibidem, \textit{Statistical Yearbook} (Bucharest, 1990), p. 468.
\textsuperscript{259} Secall and Garcia, \textit{op. cit.}, p.257.
\textsuperscript{260} For British tourists, it was also important that they did not need visas to travel to Spain as of 1961. See Sasha Pack, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.95-96.
\textsuperscript{261} Ibidem, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{262} Ibidem, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibidem, p. 97.
Nevertheless, the rise of charter flights would not have been possible without improvements in the airport infrastructure in Spain. One such example was the modernization of Malaga airport. The existing airport was small and unfit for landing bigger planes. This is why most of the tourist flights came through Gibraltar, a British overseas possession, and then by bus to Malaga.\textsuperscript{264} Spanish officials foresaw the economic benefits that would result from modernizing the airport in Malaga, but they also wanted to strengthen their position in relation to the British Gibraltar. The building of a second runway started in 1958; Informacion y Turismo, a local newspaper published by the Ministry of Tourism, prominently announced the event on its first page.\textsuperscript{265} The British were irked by this idea, as they feared economic decline for Gibraltar. As a concession, in 1959 Spanish authorities decided to eliminate tourist visas for the British tourists, except for those coming through Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{266}

3.3 TOURIST INFRASTRUCTURE

In socialist Romania and Francoist Spain, the state played different roles in developing and managing tourist infrastructure. First of all, there was a difference in how the two regimes envisioned the notion of property. While in Romania most of the tourist infrastructure belonged to the state, in Spain the majority of infrastructure was private; only a small portion (in particular, the paradores nacionales) was under the state’s administration. Yet, Spain also had a number of state-

\textsuperscript{264} Sasha Pack, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{265} Informacion y Turismo, February 1958, p.1.
\textsuperscript{266} Sasha Pack, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 95, p. 96.
financed programs that tried to influence and control the ways in which tourist infrastructure took shape.

Tourist infrastructure meant not only hotels or restaurants, but also the building of tourist spaces either as part of a larger city’s infrastructure or in some cases, as individual tourist towns. In both countries, such matters were the state’s responsibility. Furthermore, both Romania and Spain followed the so-called European model of urban development, which emphasizes improvements in the quality of life and urban culture, as opposed to the US model, which tended to build a standardized set of facilities in order to revitalize shabby industrial cities.267 Both the Romanian and Spanish cases involved either the modernization of a pre-existing infrastructure, such as the spa resorts, or the building of tourist cities from scratch, especially in seaside areas.

In 1966, the first plan to tackle international tourism in socialist Romania emphasized that a tourist infrastructure should be developed primarily at the seaside, but also in the rest of the country. The proposed goal was “to increase the number of tourist objectives, routes, and services at the disposal of foreign tourists in order to expand the tourist receipts per capita.”268 To accomplish this, the plan recommended the building of a large array of accommodations and eating establishments that would be accessible to low and middle-income tourists, as this was the tendency in countries such as Italy, Austria, Spain, and Yugoslavia.269

Put simply, in socialist Romania, tourist infrastructure was present in three main types of cities: tourist resorts (located either on the Black Sea coast or in the mountains, especially on the Prahova Valley), spa or health resorts (with a pre-existing older infrastructure located throughout

268 ANIC, CC of PCR, Economic Section, file. no. 31/1966, f. 28.
269 Ibidem, f. 28.
the country), and historic neighborhoods (old-city centers) within larger cities (mostly in Transylvania and to a certain extent in cities such as Bucharest, Iasi, and Constanta). Some of these tourist places became iconic for the development of international tourism in Romania to such extent that ordinary Romanians regarded them as epitomizing the “West.” Mamaia was the most popular tourist destination for international tourism on the Romanian Black Sea Coast, and the Hotel Intercontinental there was a landmark of foreign tourism in Bucharest.

In the late 1950s, the socialist state chose Mamaia, an older resort on the Black Sea Coast, conveniently located on the outskirts of Constanta, the largest city in the region, as the first location to develop beach tourism. Besides its proximity to Constanta, the resort was also known as a tourist site during the interwar period; for instance, in 1939, 10,506 tourists visited Mamaia alone. What made Mamaia especially attractive for tourist development was that it was an isthmus, surrounded on one side by the Black Sea and the other by a large lagoon.

To the existing interwar infrastructure of about 1,067 beds (one main hotel and a number of villas), a new hotel and a restaurant were built in Mamaia in 1957. Between 1959 and 1962, a new highway was built along the length of the isthmus and the seashore. The highway opened the way for the systematization of the resort and the building of new hotels. Most of the hotels were robust buildings, with eight to ten floors, which lined the seashore. In the mid-1960s, these hotels reached a total capacity of about 10,000 beds.

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270 When asked what places in Romania they considered most known for international tourism, my interviewees identified Mamaia and Hotel Intercontinental.
The construction of hotels went hand in hand with that of restaurants, commercial complexes, and places for spending free time. The City Theater opened its doors in 1963 along with the nearby “Perla” Commercial Complex. The number of hotels continued to mushroom throughout the 1960s and 1970s; the last hotel, the Mamaia Inn, opened in 1985. In 1968, a billiards room was opened and from 1971 tourists could spend their nights in Sunquest, one of the first discos. That same year the first swimming pools were built.\textsuperscript{274} Additionally, in the mid-1970s, a water-skiing trail, other discos, tennis courts, and the Mamaia Vacation Village opened to the public. In less than twenty years with substantial state investment, Mamaia became an important tourist attraction at the Black Sea for those in search of sun and fun for a moderate price.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{mamaia_1938.png}
\caption{Mamaia in 1938.}
\label{fig:mamaia_1938}
\end{figure}

Source: Postcard published by the ONT, personal archive.

\textsuperscript{274} Bercaru I, Botez M., \textit{Teoria si practica amenajării turistice} (Bucharest: Sport Tourism Publishing House, 1977).
The re-planning of the interwar era resort started in the late 1950s, when the socialist government designated Mamaia as the top priority tourist objective. At first, the state built a number of luxurious hotels that architecturally resembled the tourist constructions of the interwar, but it soon shifted to building inexpensive and large hotels more suited for the mass tourism of the 1960s. For instance, between 1967 and 1971, out of the planned 11,300 bed-places, 8,400 were placed in 3rd category hotels while 2,600 were in 2nd category and only 300 bed-places in 1st category hotels. Over the course of about ten years, Mamaia was practically re-thought as a tourist resort; not only were new modern hotels and restaurants built from scratch, but so too was the infrastructure of a whole tourist town. Spaces for shopping and spending the evenings were integrated into the broader network of hotels, turning Mamaia into a self-sufficient tourist town.

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275 ANIC, CC of PCR- Chancellery, 109/1967, f. 12. The equivalent of the 1st category were four-star hotels, 2nd category- three stars, and third category, 2 or one star hotels.
that could provide fun and relaxation, and the opportunity to shop, for both foreign and domestic tourists.

The spa resort was another type of self-sufficient tourist town. These attracted primarily Romanian tourists, as their visitors, spas or health resorts’ accommodation facilities were not as modern or numerous as those on the seaside. For example, a 1967 travel guide of Romania praised Eforie Nord (on the Black Sea coast south of Constanța and Mamaia) for its modern hotels, which had rooms with individual bathrooms and other updated facilities. It also noted that the spa towns of Herculane (located 150 miles from Timisoara in southwest of the country) and Sovata (in Northern Moldavia) each had only one major hotel at that time.276 Mamaia and Eforie Nord offered something most spa resorts did not—long seaside beaches.

The number of hotels in a health resort usually ranged from one to six. For example, in 1989, Covasna, a popular health resort in Eastern Transylvania, had six hotels, each of them with a large capacity, varying from 123 rooms in Hotel Căprioara (the Deer) to 496 rooms in Hotel Montana. Furthermore, each hotel had a restaurant, a conference room, and most importantly a cure installation in order for the medical tourists to receive therapeutic treatment.277 Nonetheless, health resorts were not very economically advantageous for the communist state. During a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Romanian Communist Party in January 1970, Vasile Patilinet, an old guard Communist Party member close to Ceaușescu, noted that, “it’s good to try to streamline tourism in health resorts, but the proposed measures are not the most effective ones: what the report recommends is an increase in prices by changing the resort’s classification from second to first category instead of taking concrete measures such as the reduction of the personnel, which is too

276 Peter Latham, op. cit., p. 103.
277 Ibidem, p. 102.
numerous in comparison with needs.” Poor and incoherent management was also blamed for the inadequate results. Mihai Dalea, another participant in the same meeting, mentioned the case of a mountain hut where three distinct managements were in charge. The Political Bureau meeting adjourned, after agreeing to ask local authorities (both party secretaries and city or village council) to better comply with their responsibility to report such problems to policy makers in Bucharest.

This approach did not bring the expected results; in 1973, the health resorts in Romania were still outside of the international tourism stream. In response to that, Niculescu-Mizil a Political Bureau member called for investing only in two or three well-known health-resorts, so that they could become as economically efficient as Mamaia and Eforie Nord on the Black Sea Coast. One of the proposed resorts was Herculane, which had the necessary pedigree, as it had been a tourist destination since the eighteen-century. Yet, Niculescu-Mizil’s proposal was met with skepticism as the Political Bureau anticipated other problems. One was that the actual task of erecting new constructions fell under the responsibility of the local township (consiliul popular), which had few resources to successfully carry on the task. And most of the time, the allocated funds were not spent because the local authorities reportedly could not find suitable constructors. The conflicting relationship between the central and local authorities, so obvious in the case of health resorts, reflects a key flaw of a centralized system where a central authority can set goals that local authorities cannot meet because they lack the necessary means to fulfill the

280 Ibidem, f. 27.
281 ANIC, CC of PCR0 Chancellery, file no. 88/1973, f. 42.
assigned tasks. Although some policy makers had hoped that health spas would attract foreign tourists, that hope came to naught.

Another approach to building tourist infrastructure was the erecting of hotels in the cities that presented some tourist potential. Hence, throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, at least one modern hotel was built in the capital town of every county, using both internal and external capital. The 1965-1970 plan for the development of tourism proposed the building of 29 such hotels with 6,700 rooms. The size of each hotel room was set at 150 square feet and all rooms had to have bathrooms. The differences in the degree of comfort came from the size and ornamentation of common spaces and hallways as well as from the services that the hotel provided. A hotel’s degree of comfort also varied according to the importance of the city. Cities such as Timisoara, Cluj, Iasi, Oradea, Sibiu, Pitești benefitted from larger investments - 90,000 lei (around $5000) per hotel room - while smaller urban settlements, such as Bacau, Făgăraș, Galați, Brăila, Hunedoara, Bîrlad, Tîrgu Mureș, Craiova, Ploiești, and Suceava received only 70,000 lei for a

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282 The health resorts mostly comprised hotels managed by the trade unions, while the hotels run by the National Office for Tourism/ Ministry of Tourism were sparser.
283 Ion Paraschiv, Trandafir Iliescu, *De la Hanul Serban Vodă la Hotel Intercontinental: pagini din istoria comerțului hotelier și de alimentație publică din București* (Bucharest: Sport Turism, 1979), ANIC, CC of PCR Economic Section, file no. 31/1966, f. 35.
284 ANIC, CC of PCR, Chancellery Section, file no. 31/1966, f. 35.
285 About the structure of different hotels see: Vladimir Ionescu, “Hotel Turistic la Oradea,” in *Arhitectura*, no. 5, 1969, pp.78-82; and Viorica Zărnescu, “Senatoriu cu 300 de paturi la Baile Felix” in *Arhitectura*, no. 5, 1968, pp.82-84. The hotel in Oradea was spread on seven floors each with 25 rooms, five two-room apartments, 18 single rooms, 147 double rooms, a reception, an ONT travel office for external services, a restaurant and a ball room of 200 seats, summer garden with 150 seats, and a bar with 30 seats, a hairdresser and artisanal objects shop, as well as a pool. The building was a modern one that was projected to fit the existing urban environment and natural landscape (Crisul Repede river). A terrace on the top floor with a bar completed the project and suggested the commercial-tourist purpose of the building. By contrast, the sanatorium in Băile Felix, although of impressive size (five floors and 300 beds), was more modest in terms of commercial amenities but well equipped for its purpose: it had one restaurant of 150 seats, a salon, and a bar of mineral waters as well as double rooms each with bathroom, balcony and in-wall closets as well as a medical point on each floor.
room (around $3,888). While Suceava is located in northeastern Romania, just a stone’s throw from the medieval monasteries in Northern Moldavia, which were important tourist destinations that the Romanian government wanted to promote, Bîrlad, located in central Moldavia, lacked any tourist potential. This discrepancy makes one question the logic behind the distribution of investments.

In addition to the ambitious plan of building hotels in each city, the socialist government wanted to develop a major hotel in Bucharest. A report about the development of tourism in 1966 complained that Bucharest’s hotels could not cope with the large number of tourists. For this reason, at times, National Office for Tourism-Carpathians had to remove Bucharest from tourist itineraries, refuse offers, or lodge tourists in student dorms. A solution to this crisis came in 1966 when Tower International Corporation, a subsidiary of Pan American World Airways, made an offer to the Romanian government to finance the building of a modern hotel in Bucharest. Besides resolving a dire accommodation shortage, the proposal presented the Romanian authorities with the opportunity to strengthen their connections with the West, the US in particular, and to possibly enhance their access to foreign capital.

Following deliberations among officials from the Ministry of External Commerce, the Ministry of Internal Commerce, the State Committee for Planning, the Council of Ministers and the National Bank of Romania, the Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist Party gave its final approval on the construction of Intercontinental Hotel on 14 February 1967. The Romanian state planned to re-pay the six million dollars loan received from Tower International

286 ANIC, CC of PCR Chancellery, file no. 31/1966, f. 36.
287 Ibidem, f. 25.
288 ANIC, CC of PCR Chancellery, file no. 20/1967, f. 134.
Corporation from the revenue that the hotel was supposed to bring to the socialist budget. The Romanians expected a 3.5 million dollar income in the first year and 35 million dollars over the next ten years, out of which 10 million dollars were to go to the American partner in order to cover for the initial credit plus the seven percent interest rate. The hotel welcomed its first tourists in 1971; a group of American tourists who were brought in cooperation with Pan Am. The twenty three-story building was indeed very modern and architecturally modernist (see Figure 3); it had a restaurant on the first floor and air conditioning in all 400 rooms. The architects who designed the building were Romanian, but the technology – such as the Otis elevators and the Samsung air-conditioning - and most of the furniture were imported. The Tower International Corporation also provided a hotel manager, a food manager and the training of the Romanian personnel. While some of the employees were sent abroad, most of the training took place on-site, as the Romanian officials deemed it was too expensive to transport them and pay for their training in the US. The hotel proved to be a successful business for the socialist state, as in the first three years it brought revenues of 13 million dollars. But its success rested upon something in short supply in Romania—capital, especially hard currency capital. Attracting such funds was a primary reason for Romanian state to develop parts of the country for international tourism. But luring international tourists proved more expensive than originally anticipated, as much of a hotel’s amenities or furniture and food (exotic fruits, seafood) had to be imported. This is why, for Dacia

\[289 \textit{Ibidem}, \text{f. 137.} \]
\[290 \text{ANIC, CC of PCR Economic Section, file no.9/1972, f. 18.} \]
\[291 \text{A team formed by Dinu Hariton, Gheorghe Nadrag, Ion Moscu, and Romeo Belea from the Bucharest Project Institute.} \]
\[292 \text{To a certain extent they might have also considered this move as politically dangerous because of the rising number of Romanians deciding to remain abroad, which was a constant concern of the communist government.} \]
\[293 \text{ANIC, CC of PCR Economic Section, file no. 9/1972, f.20.} \]
and România, two hotels built in the 1970s, N. Ceaușescu wanted to use only Romanian products. Yet, the design had to be modern, and *Arhitectura Magazine*, the most important publication of the Association of Romanian Architects, published in 1969 articles about the works of the American architect Franck Lloyd Wright and the German Walter Gropius, two of the best known proponents of modernist architecture.

Figure 5. Hotel Intercontinental (in the background) in Bucharest, 1970s.

Source: Postcard published by the NTO Carpathians, personal archive.

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Despite the regime’s considerable interest in developing a tourist infrastructure, specific legislation about the classification of tourist establishments only appeared in the late 1960s. The first attempt was an order issued by the Ministry of Tourism in 1973, but tourist establishments were firmly classified only in 1976. In Romania, there were six types of tourist establishments: hotels, motels, inns, villas, villas with apartments, and lodges (especially common in the spa resorts). The Romanian tourist accommodation did not follow the Western model of classifying hotels according to the number of stars. Hotels and villas were divided in four categories: luxury, and categories I, II and III. Motels and inns were classified in three categories (I, II and III), while villas with apartments were split into luxury, category I, and category II. Starting in 1968, the accommodation of foreign tourists was also possible in student dorms and private houses as well. This classification system, which survived until 1991, reflected the degree of amenities, such as bathroom facilities (shower or tub), a balcony, furniture, and others. Prices varied accordingly.

### Table 1. Prices of tourist establishments in Romania, end of the 1960s (in US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rooms only</th>
<th>Full board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxury</td>
<td>4.20-21.40</td>
<td>12-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1\textsuperscript{st} class</td>
<td>3.30-12.20</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd} class</td>
<td>3-10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student dorms</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation in private houses</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3-11 (1\textsuperscript{st} class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.20-7.70 (2\textsuperscript{nd} class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.60-6.60 (3\textsuperscript{rd} class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.20-2.40 (rural settlements)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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As the chart shows, it was significantly cheaper to vacation in Romania as part of an organized tour, which covered both lodging and meals, rather than as an individual tourist. As the society experienced only an inchoate liberalization at the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, which was nipped in the bud in the 1980s, the most inexpensive housing options (student dorms and private houses) were only available via the National Tourism Office-Carpathians. But in order for private individuals to become tourist hosts, they had to register with the NTO-Carpathians and with the local militia, which involved a certain degree of coercion.

Despite the state’s effort to exert a considerable degree of social control (see chapter four), tourism continued to grow in socialist Romania, as the increase in the number of tourist establishments shows. From 1970 to 1980, tourist accommodation expanded by 42.3 percent while the total number of bed places grew by 62.8 percent. During the same time, the number of hotels and villas increased by 42.3 percent and 17 percent respectively. The number of bed places in hotels grew at the most impressive pace, by 71.4 percent during the 1970s. Most of the infrastructure was concentrated on the Black Sea Coast with an accommodation capacity of 200 hotels and 155,000 beds places in the 1980s. At national level, in 1970, Romania had 497 hotels with 284,434 bed places, while in 1980, the lodging capacity increased to 707 hotels with 404,432 beds places. On the one hand, this dynamic reflects the large amount of money that Romanian government invested in tourism; on the other, it reflected the preference for building large hotels (as seen from the example of hotels built in the health resorts).

297 Cornelia Pop, op. cit., p. 71
298 Ibidem, p. 72.
However, the tourist growth of the 1970s was not sustained in the 1980s. From 1980 to 1985 the number of tourist establishments grew only by 4.4 percent and the number of bed places expanded by only 1.5 percent.\textsuperscript{301} But the growth in lodgings was not equally distributed. The number of hotels continued to grow (by 10.9 percent) as did bed places in hotels (by 10.2 percent), but the number of villas decreased by 4.4 percent. In the last half of the 1980s, the number of total tourist establishments decreased for the first time in twenty years. The number of tourist accommodation facilities shrunk by 3.5 percent and that of the bed places by 14 percent. Only hotels continued to expand, their number showing an increase of 5.9 percent.\textsuperscript{302} One explanation for this is the mindset of communist tourist planners who were quantifying modernity by the number of new built hotels. Yet, this may well have been an economic decision because such hotels were less expensive to build; sections of them were made of precast concrete and then quickly assembled.

The growth of tourist establishments clearly reflects the Romanian state’s interest in developing tourism along with its willingness to invest substantial funds in this sector. Between 1960 and 1970, 3.5 billion lei (around 1.2 billion dollars) were allocated to tourism while the 1970-1975 five-year plan announced a six billion lei (around 5.1 billion dollars) investment in tourism.\textsuperscript{303} However, by the mid-1980s, the amounts invested in tourist infrastructure declined significantly to 2.9 billion dollars. The generalized crisis of Romanian economy was the main

\textsuperscript{301} Ibidem, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{302} Ibidem, p. 73. It is worth noting that the amount of time between the decision to build a large hotel and to secure financing for it has to be taken into consideration when viewing the continued expansion of hotels. Unfortunately, the available sources do not shed light on this important variable.
\textsuperscript{303} Ion Cosma, Dezvoltarea turismului in Romania: Sarcini actuale si in urmatorii 5-10 ani (Bucharest: Terra, vol. 4, pp. 9-16. Similarly, see Clement Gabrilescu in Gheorghe Barbu, Turismul in Economia Nationala. Studii (Bucharest: Sport Turism Publishing House, 1981), p. 137, and ANIC, CC of PCR, Economic Section, 31/1966, f.28, (the dollar was calculated at 23,13 lei).
reason that led to this decision. Some scholars also argued that this also happened because international tourism stopped being a priority for the communist regime as it failed to deliver the expected results and exposed the population to a cosmopolitan influence. The available archival documents are contradictory in regard to this issue. On the one hand in the early 1980s, the Central Committee attempted to restart the growth of international tourism, especially with Western countries, while on the other hand the Securitate increased its surveillance of tourist workers and even of foreign tourists.

Overall, the planning of the tourist infrastructure during the 1960s-1970s did not go beyond the traditional tourist areas, such as the Black Sea Coast, Prahova Valley, and the health resorts. What had changed from the interwar period and the 1950s was the impressive amount of investments in tourism, and the resulting increase in the number of tourist establishments. However, the way in which tourist establishments were used varied from one place to another as it largely depended on the local authorities’ interest in tourism and the managerial abilities of those in charge. At the end of the day, only the Black Sea Coast and the large hotels in Bucharest proved economically profitable, which partially undermined the regime’s efforts to turn Romania into a successful player in the European or the world tourist market.

304 On the economic crisis that Romania underwent in the 1980s see, Constantin Ionete, *Criza de sistem a economiei de comandă și etapa sa exploziva* (Bucharest: Expert, 1993).
306 ANIC, CC of PCR, Propaganda, file no.60/1983, The file discusses the low performance of international tourism in 1982 and identifies the inadequate services, the failure to meet contractual obligations, the break with some traditional partners, and the low quality of advertising materials and strategies as the main reasons for the decline of international tourism. ACNSAS, Documentary File, Sibiu, file no.8663, vol. 22, possesses material on the surveillance of tourists who came to visit their relatives in Medias in 1983, ff. 5-7 and ACNSAS, Documentary Collection, file no. 19661, Foreign Tourists and Foreign Specialists Issue, Plan for 1981 summer season, ff.87-93.
Like Romania, Francoist Spain also had to plan and build much of its tourist infrastructure almost from scratch. But the Spanish approach was slightly different. Whereas in the 1940s and the early 1950s, the state held a tight control over tourism, in the 1960s, the private sector became the trailblazer of tourism development. The 1953 National Tourism Plan (*Plan Nacional del Turismo*) noted that, “it is important to attract the collaboration of the private sector, leaving to the state only those actions that cannot be performed by private investors.” Nevertheless, the state continued to play an important role, including reserving the right to control the prices in hotels and restaurants, a power it retained until the end of Franco’s regime in 1975. As late as 1972, hotel operators were asking the state to increase the prices for rooms by 70 percent in order to be able to attain the revenue levels of 1955.

In a nutshell, what characterized the Spanish approach to tourist infrastructure during Franco’s time was a continuous negotiation between the state and the private sector. Starting in the early 1960s, the state focused on creating the general public infrastructure that included transportation, sanitation, or urban systematization, while encouraging the private sector to build and manage the hotels, restaurants, and other local tourist installations or facilities. Towards that end, the state offered some financial assistance primarily in the form of the Hotel Credit program (*credito hotelero*, see below) as well as subsidized prices for those entrepreneurs investing in tourist establishments designed to accommodate foreign tourists and for the private businesses building hotels in the mountain regions. Initially not an area of interest for the Spanish authorities, the mountain areas became a priority only in the mid-1960s. The state investments

309 *Ibidem*, p. 239.
310 AGA, Cultura, Dirección General del Turismo, (03) 049.001, box 32569.
directed to this sector from the mid-1960s exemplifies the overwhelming importance of state policies and incentives in shaping, positively or negatively, tourism in Francoist Spain, a political regime that otherwise took pride in its newly adopted capitalist market and practices.

As in the Romanian case, the developing of a tourist infrastructure involved the modernization of existing settlements, often rural, in the seaside areas and later in the mountains as well as the building or renovation of hotels in larger cities. The most developed tourist area remained Madrid, but the most popular beach destination was the shoreline of Costa Brava. Located in northeastern Spain, Costa Brava refers to a stretch of 160-kilometres of Catalan coastline along the Mediterranean Sea. Tourism began to be of interest starting in the interwar period, but the civil war put an end to this. From the civil war into the 1950s, that region’s most important industries remained textiles and fishing. This situation changed in the 1950s when Costa Brava became very appealing to foreign tourists, especially French, many of whom would drive there, and British, in search of sun and inexpensive vacations.

Seemingly overnight, fishing settlements like Sant Feliu, Port Bou, Lloret, or Calella de la Costa turned into coveted tourist resorts. In Calella de la Costa, 2,000 bed places were added in just one year. In 1964, Costa Brava had 198 large hotels spread out over nine resorts. The average tourist population that these resorts could sustain in the mid-1960s was about 150,000 tourists a month, but it was common to have more than 600,000 people visiting the area during the peak of the season, from mid-July until the end of August. But Costa Brava did not develop evenly, particularly because of the state’s failure to make its presence felt. An important division in regard

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312 *Ibidem*, p. 92.
313 *Ibidem*, p. 108.
to the available types of accommodation was visible between the northern and the southern sections of the province. In the south, tourists were able to lodge in hotels, whereas in the north the hotel infrastructure was less dense and tourists primarily found lodging in private houses.\textsuperscript{314} In fact, in the 1960s, only half of the tourists to the region actually lived in hotels, the rest chose camping and tourist apartments (see Table 1).\textsuperscript{315} This marked a significant difference in relation to socialist Romania where foreign tourists predominantly lodged in hotels built with state funds. The difference reflected in part the distinct approaches of the two regimes to the interactions between foreign tourists and local populations. While the socialist regime in Romania sought to control these interactions, tourist officials in Spain wanted to welcome as many tourists as possible and paid little attention to the issue of “security” at this level, although as we shall see, there were powerful constituencies that voiced concerns about the risks of such fraternization.\textsuperscript{316}

\textbf{Table 2. Tourists’ distribution according to the type of accommodation in Costa Brava in 1965 (in percentages)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resort</th>
<th>Hotels</th>
<th>Guesthouses</th>
<th>Tourist apartments</th>
<th>Private houses</th>
<th>Camping</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port Bou</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calella</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sant Pol</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Estartit</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llloret</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pineda</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{314} Ibidem, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{315} Costa Brava, tourist leaflet published by the Subsecretaria de Turismo (Barcelona: Ministerio de Informacion Y Turismo, 1963). Tourists were advised to live in modern hotels but also in “some really wonderful private houses.”
\textsuperscript{316} Asi fue la Espana de Franco, documentary movie, accessed 4 March 2015. http://www.veoh.com/watch/v7073696K3z2WXn6?h1=Asi+Fue+La+Espa%C3%B1a+De+Franco+08+%28Turismo%2CInformacion+Y+Censura%29+%28DVDrip+XVID+MP3%29. Also the Francoist regime had a different approach in relation to the political opponents of the regime who emigrated after the Civil War, and who, for example, could not get a visa to travel to Spain. Informacion y Turismo, 1957, p. 3. The complex issue of the impact of foreign tourists on social relations with locals will be discussed in chapter 5.
Besides reflecting two different approaches to tourist infrastructure, the predominance of accommodation in private houses in Costa Brava speaks to the different roles of the state in postwar socialist Romania and Francoist Spain. While in the Romanian case, the state’s ability to control and allocate all of the necessary resources enhanced the rapid development of tourist infrastructure, in Spain, the state set the framework for the creation of this infrastructure, but was not in charge of building it. What is more, the Spanish state often lacked the necessary means to control the implementation of central policies. Thus, the task of erecting new and modern hotels was left to private developers. In the early years, this reflected one of the shortcomings of the inchoate
Spanish tourism policy. The private sector had its own priorities and did not always want to devote its limited capital to support the growth of tourist infrastructure. Only the revival of the Hotel Credit program under Manuel Fraga’s ministerial mandate in the early 1960s pushed for more investments in lodging infrastructure. Nevertheless, this did not significantly improve the overall aspect of tourist towns, especially the sanitation aspect.

The Spanish state did however construct some hotels (paradores) that were supposed to work as models for the private ones, but these only amounted for 10 percent of the whole tourist infrastructure in Spain. One such example is the Hotel Compostela in Santiago de Compostela in Galicia, a province in northwestern Spain, one of the first paradores.317

![Hotel Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 1955.](source)

Figure 7. Hotel Compostela, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 1955.

Source: Santiago de Compostela, Tourist Flyer, 1955. (personal archive)

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317 Comisión Interministerial de Turismo. Anteproyecto de Ley Sobre el Plan de Albergues y Paradores de Turismo (Madrid, 1955), p. 9. The city is reputed to house the remains of St. James, one of the Jesus’s apostles. The cathedral, built on the site of the reputed grave, is reported to have been the site of many miracles. To this day, Catholic pilgrims visit the site.
A former medieval hospital, the building was turned into a luxury hotel in 1954 as part of the regime’s attempts to revive the Santiago de Compostela pilgrimage.\textsuperscript{318} The remodeling of the building took place in haste because of the officials’ plans to inaugurate the new tourist establishment on the occasion of the religious holiday of Santiago Apostle, which was Santiago de Compostelo’s feast day.\textsuperscript{319} The hotel had 175 rooms, of which there were 29 single, six double with a “matrimonial bed,” and 140 with twin beds. In addition, the hotel included two shared dormitories, with a capacity of 32 and respectively 48 beds, located on the third and fourth floors; the building did not have an elevator. Only fifty rooms had individual bathrooms while the rest of the establishment shared four bathrooms.\textsuperscript{320} However, even the tourists living in the rooms with bathrooms did not enjoy permanent access to running water. Given that just a quarter of the rooms had individual bathrooms, which were only occasionally functional, the conditions could hardly be described as luxurious. What is more, the hotel did not seem to have been designed for family tourism, given that only six rooms had matrimonial beds, but rather it was designed for groups or individual travellers. Because the city is a pilgrimage site, the hotel met some, but not all people’s needs. The newly open tourist establishment mirrored the transition from sheer religious pilgrimage to commercial tourism, as the place was physically designed to accommodate both the pilgrims and the tourists who only sought cultural enhancement. The hotel did not undergo any significant changes until 1993, when it was re-classified as a hostel.\textsuperscript{321}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{318} Patricia Cupeiro López, “Patrimonio y Turismo, La intervenció arquitectónica en el patrimonio cultural a través del programa de paradores de turismo el las diversas rutas jacobas. El Camino Francés” in \textit{Becas de Investigaciones, Caminos Jaceos}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, 2008.
\textsuperscript{319}\textit{Ibidem}, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{320}\textit{Ibidem}, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{321}\textit{Ibidem}, p. 32.
\end{flushleft}
The Spanish tourist planners themselves pinpointed the flaws of developing *paradores*. The 1955 commission that revised the 1953 law for *paradores* and hostels noted, "the absolute necessity to equip the new tourist establishment belonging to the State with new amenities and provide reparations, so that these establishments are independent units."\(^{322}\) Another problem was changing the capacity of these tourist establishments, as the 1953 law only required them to consist of eight rooms, four doubles and four single. As the number of tourists was growing, this approach was deemed unacceptable and an upgrade to twenty rooms was required. In addition, the rampant inflation of the mid-1950s rendered the funds allocated in 1953 insufficient. These difficulties threatened to halt the state’s initial program of hotel construction.\(^{323}\) As of the mid 1950s, because the state lacked the capital to build a reliable tourist accommodation network, it turned its attention towards the private sector choosing to retain only the role of supervising this activity.

Clear regulations regarding the classification of tourist establishments in Spain only came about in 1957. This happened in part because of the expansion of tourist accommodations that tried to cope with the increase in the number of tourists, but also because these establishments did not always provide the services that they were supposed to provide according to state mandated prices or their category.\(^{324}\) To address such problems, an order of the Council of Ministers from 14 June 1957 classified the tourist establishments according to their facilities.\(^{325}\) The order identified hotels, inns, guesthouses, hotels in spas, and private houses as the accepted types of accommodation. Hotels could have been of five categories, such as luxury, A type, and B type, which were divided into first, second, and third classes. Inns were classified into four groups. The

\(^{323}\) *Ibidem*, pp.11-12.
\(^{324}\) *Informacion y Turismo*, June, 1956. p. 3.
\(^{325}\) *Informacion y Turismo*, July 1957, p. 6.
hotels included in the luxury category were supposed to have bathroom facilities in each room and access to hot water; those in A category needed to have bathrooms in two-thirds of the rooms, while for those hotels in B type category (first class), at least 15 percent of the rooms were required to have a bathroom.\textsuperscript{326} To qualify as a hotel, the minimum requirement was that there be at least one bathroom with running hot water in the whole establishment and one telephone on each floor. Such mandated amenities were sparse and hardly qualified as inducements for international tourists.

Further regulations in 1962 and 1968 did not change the classification of hotels, but added new provisions concerning maximum prices and also updated the basic conditions for an establishment to fit in a given category.\textsuperscript{327} The decree from 7 September 1962 set up new maximum prices in order to make sure that these did not exceed the rates in other tourist destinations in the Mediterranean region (i.e. Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia). This pricing method serves as a reminder that Spanish tourism officials often defined their policies in relation to those of their Mediterranean competitors. To meet foreign tourists’ increased expectations and to adjust to the emerging new realities of Spanish tourism, the decree from 19 July 1968 set up new criteria for each category. It used three principles to differentiate between various tourist establishments: their overall capacity and number of rooms, the services and facilities offered, and the attention paid to the client.\textsuperscript{328} Besides the existing five categories for hotels and three for inns and guesthouses, the decree added a classification for tourist apartments, although in fact they already started to function in the early 1960s. In addition, it introduced a higher degree of flexibility in classifying each type of tourist accommodation, employing specific criteria for special locations,

\textsuperscript{326} Ibidem, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{327} Ana Moreno Garrido, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 243.
\textsuperscript{328} \textit{Codigo Turistico} and Rafael Estuve Secall, Rafael Fuentes Garcia, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 196.
such as in the mountain regions, at the beach, in the regional spas, and for the motels.\textsuperscript{329} Acknowledging that conditions in a popular beach region could be different than in a mountain or spa resort enabled tourist officials and hotel owners to adjust the prices and ultimately to better meet tourists’ expectations.

The number of tourist establishments was on the rise from the early 1950s to 1965. In 1952, there were 1,324 hotels in all Spain (25 classified as luxury, 208 A category, 358 B, 1\textsuperscript{st} class, and 733, B 2\textsuperscript{nd} class).\textsuperscript{330} But the increase was insufficient to cope with the number of tourists that visited Spain that year. Thus, the hotel infrastructure in Spain was short of 26,000 places in comparison with the capacity needed to accommodate all tourists.\textsuperscript{331} As the number of tourists increased, the deficit persisted, despite the increase in the number of hotels. For instance, in 1952 and 1953, ninety-eight more hotels were opened as compared with only 170 between 1945 and 1951. In 1960, there were 150,821 places in 2,551 hotels, most of them on the Mediterranean coast.\textsuperscript{332} Despite showing an increase of 8 percent annually, the hotels were still unable to accommodate all tourists, whose numbers grew by 16.4 percent annually.\textsuperscript{333} The tourist boom accelerated the construction of new hotels and in 1967 the number of bed places reached 384,000.\textsuperscript{334}

The expansion of hotels was the consequence of the Hotel Credit program (\textit{credito hotelero}), which although initiated in 1942, only began to produce results in the early 1960s. In

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{329} Ibidem, p. 197.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{330} Ana Maria Garreno, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 206.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{331} Maria Velasco, \textit{La politica turistica, Gobierno y Administración Turística en España, 1952-2004}, Tirant, 2004, p. 122.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{332} Ana Maria Garreno, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 253.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{333} Ibidem, p. 153.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{334} “International Tourism in Figures, 1950-1979” in \textit{Organizacion Mundial del Turismo}, February 1980, Turespaña Archive.}
January 1964, *Noticiario Turistico*, a magazine published by the Office for Tourist Promotion, touted the intention of the Spanish state to allocate fifty million pesetas for the Hotel Credit program.\(^{335}\) At the beginning of each year, the Ministry of Information and Tourism would decide on a certain amount that was allocated for the modernization, renovations, or construction of new hotels. Projects were selected on a competitive basis after the submission of an application. In the early 1960s, the Ministry of Information and Tourism would support about 200 such projects annually.\(^{336}\) Until 1965 the annual increase in accommodation capacity persisted, but after that year the construction of hotels stalled; the construction of tourist accommodations only regained their rapid growth in 1970. Compared to the 1950s, in the 1960s-1970s, the tendency was to build fewer but more expensive tourist establishments. In 1963, there were only 78 hotels included in the luxury category, while guesthouses (the official statistics counted 1,562 in the second category) predominated.\(^{337}\)

During the 1950s-1970s, both Spain and Romania built their tourist infrastructure from scratch. Overall, Spain had a larger accommodation capacity compared to Romania, but the socialist country built at a faster pace. While in 1967, Spain had 384,000 bed places, Romania had only 40,000.\(^{338}\) But the accommodation capacity soared in both countries; in Spain, the number of bed places increased to 657,700 in 1972 and then to 804,000 in 1977, while in Romania lodging capacity reached 99,100 bed places in 1972 and 124,400 in 1977. Despite the higher numbers in Spain, the increase in accommodation capacity in Romania was 19 percent as opposed to only 12

\(^{335}\) *Noticiario Turistico*, January 1964, no. 1, p.7.
\(^{336}\) “Los nuevos hoteles en Espana” in *Hostelería y Turismo*, 1963, año IX, no. 89, p. 11.
\(^{337}\) *Ibidem*, p. 253.
percent in Spain.339 Yet, the type of hotels the two countries built were notably different. Unlike the Romanian case where big hotels prevailed, in Francoist Spain, medium and small tourist accommodations thrived. At first sight, the intimacy of these establishments might have played a role in attracting more tourists than did Romania’s large and modern but impersonal hotels. But this was hardly the main reason why Spanish tourist entrepreneurs favored smaller tourist units. When it came to the size of hotels, capital was the decisive factor. Small and medium size hotels required less money, and this was what the hotel owners could afford to build.340 The Spanish state itself recognized this limit, as in the 1960s, the Hotel Credit program would support tourist establishments with as few as thirty rooms.341

3.4 THE LIMITS OF GROWTH

In 1966, the tourist department (NTO-Carpathians) within the Ministry of External Trade, together with the Ministry of Transportation, CENTROCOOP (National Union of Consumer Co-Operatives, Romania) and UCECOM (Romanian National Associations of Handicraft and Production Co-operatives) presented one of their first major plan about developing international tourism for approval to the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). In addition to these national organizations, the NTO-Carpathians consulted with the local RCP party secretaries and the municipal authorities in each county in order to adjust the plans to the local resources and to get a better sense of where to develop a tourist infrastructure.342

340 AGA, Cultura, (03) 119.000 box. 28306.
341 Ibidem.
The Introduction to the Plan emphasizes, “Because of the impressive economic results as well as its natural beauties and popular art, Romania has important possibilities to develop tourism. Given the country’s results with international tourism and the tendencies of the world tourist market, tourism should be a priority for our government.” The plan outlined five key aspects for the development of international tourism in socialist Romania. The first point asked for the improvement of tourist infrastructure. The second proposed offering increased facilities to foreign tourists, such as granting visa at the border, setting the exchange rate for one dollar at 18 lei instead of 15 lei, and offering a discount of 20 percent for some of the goods purchased in the tourist shops. The third point emphasized the importance of advertising, which until 1966 fell under the responsibilities of foreign partners. The fourth aspect tackled the issue of markets and of becoming attractive to West Germans and Scandinavians, as these tourists seemed to be most numerous and also looking for sunny destination. Finally the plan recommended the selling of more products and services in dollars outside of the tourist package. In various degrees, these five aspects shared a common goal – to attract more Western tourists and, hence, more hard currencies to socialist Romania.

The 1966 plan delivered some of the expected results. In September 1967, the government reported 8.7 million dollars in revenue just from the extra-services (such as day trips or shopping) provided to foreign tourists between January and August. That accounted for 103 percent of the established annual plan, yet four months remained in the year. The obtained income outpaced the expectations for both socialist and capitalist countries, although the revenues remained modest. Tourist exchanges with socialist countries brought an income that exceeded the planned figures by

343 Ibidem, f. 17.
only $144,444, while the revenues delivered by tourists from capitalist countries helped surpass the plan numbers by the modest amount of $111,111. The number of tourists also grew: 175,000 tourists visited the Black Sea Coast in 1967, which showed an increase by 27 percent in relation to 1966. This rise in revenues and number of tourists took place against the backdrop of regime’s investments in accommodation infrastructure as shown by the forty new hotels with 15,000 beds that were built between 1960-1965, which turned Mamaia and Eforie into international resorts.

Although low in comparison with other countries, the figures looked promising to the socialist regime and triggered further investments in tourism industry in the hope that Romania will catch up with its better off socialist neighbors, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as capitalist Spain.

A 1967 report by the NTO-Carpathians reflected the Romanian government’s high expectations in regard to international tourism. The report noted the ways in which the increase in the number of tourists and revenues could climb even more. The tourist planners acknowledged that some unexpected variables limited the grown in the number of tourists. While fewer tourists than anticipated arrived in organized tours from socialist countries, leaving some accommodation facilities unoccupied, more east European tourists arrived on their own and had troubles finding lodging. As those individual tourists chose to travel by car, some 69,000 automobiles carrying

345 ANIC, CC of PCR, Economic Section, file no. 24/1967, f. 9. The available materials do not indicate the total amount that the Plan anticipated receiving from these tourists. It only indicated how much money was gained beyond the Plan figures in order to show the profitability of tourism.
346 ANIC, CC of PCR Economic Section, 24/1967, f. 10.
347 ANIC, CC of PCR Economic Section, 33/1966, f.19.
348 For instance, Czechoslovakia obtained 45 million dollars from extra services. ANIC, CC of PCR Collection Chancellery, file no. 92/1969, f. 3.
349 ANIC, CC of PCR Economic Section, 45/1967, f.2. (about proposed investments in Mangalia, a resort close to the Bulgarian border).
350 Ibidem, f. 9.
300,000 tourists crossed the border into socialist Romania, the report recommended that the government should pay close attention to this type of tourism as well.\textsuperscript{351} Also, the increase would have been higher for tourists from capitalist countries had not one of the Neckerman’s planes, the main West German tourist agency with which Romania traded, crashed in an accident. In addition, a number of West German tourists were arrested in socialist countries for minor wrongdoings. Such events generated negative publicity and stirred up quite a bit of negative publicity in the West German media causing the number of tourists to plummet. In addition, the NTO-Carpathians customary trips to Athens and Cairo were canceled because of the war between Israel and the Arab countries in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{352} Yet, with the exception of West Germany, the number of tourists from Western countries continued to climb, especially for those taking individual vacations by car. In 1967, their numbers grew by 32 percent in comparison with 1966.\textsuperscript{353} Such growth suggested that socialist Romania was on its way to becoming a tourist destination for Western tourists as well.

But increase in tourism in the 1960s was short lived. Tourist growth leveled off in the first part of the 1970s, and then plummeted in the late 1970s. In 1976, the number of tourists on the seaside was still on the rise, but that was mostly due to an increase of Romanian tourists. That same year the number of foreign tourists decreased by 25 percent and that of tourists from Western countries (\textit{devize libere} system) by 27 percent.\textsuperscript{354} The NTO-Carpathians’ report to the Central Committee of the RCP that detailed this situation pinpointed a number of reasons to explain this shrinkage. The poor quality of tourist services in the previous year, the lack of entertainment

\textsuperscript{351} \textit{Ibidem}, f.10.
\textsuperscript{352} \textit{Ibidem}, f. 11
\textsuperscript{353} \textit{Ibidem}, f. 10.
\textsuperscript{354} ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Chancellery, file no. 81/1976, f. 11.
facilities, the limited impact of advertising, and the failure to accommodate all Romanian tourists on the Black Sea Coast were among the most important factors that turned 1976 into a disappointing year for Romanian tourism.

Besides these unquestionably valid reasons, there were also other factors that determined the low performance of Romanian tourism. Some were connected with domestic policies while others were tied into more global developments. The central government’s decision-making process was part of the explanation. Although initially the central power included local authorities in the decision making process regarding tourism, later the tendency was to ignore the local officials. For instance, the 1966 NTO-Carpathians plan failed to meet the demands by local authorities to include 254 million lei in the plan’s budget to cover their expenses with tourist infrastructure and services. In time, the partial exclusion of local authorities served as a brake on the coherent development of tourism in socialist Romania. The declining quality of tourism management was also a factor. In the late 1960s, the more consumer-oriented Nicolae Bozdog was appointed as chief of the NTO-Carpathians. He sought connections with the West and initiated the building of the modern resorts in the southern part of the Black Sea coast. In addition, most of the NTO-Carpathians employees were selected on competitive basis contingent on how many foreign languages one spoke and their training in tourism, rather than on one’s political association. As the percentage of party members within NTO-Carpathians hovered around twenty percent, this became one of the main Central Committee’s complaints. As a result, in 1969, a major reorganization took place within NTO-Carpathians. A rift in the management offered N.

355 ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Section, file no. 31/1966, f. 17.
Ceaușescu and the Romanian Communist Party the opportunity to replace some inconvenient members of the board with more politically obedient functionaries.  

The international context also played its part in the decline of international tourism in the mid-1970s. The 1973 oil crisis severely hit Western European countries and the number of tourists declined everywhere in Europe. In fact, Romania and Bulgaria were the only countries where the total number of tourists did not decline, but this was because tourists from socialist countries replaced the Western tourists. Recovery from the economic impact of the oil crisis proved to be slow. If Romanian tourist officials considered 1976 as a bad for tourism, 1977 proved to be even worse. An earthquake in March 1977 frightened foreign tourists, who decided to cancel their holiday plans in Romania for that year. Although 1978 and 1979 saw a slight increase in the number of tourists, the second oil crisis of 1980 brought another setback. To stem the decline, Romanian officials made several attempts to curb the decline in the number of tourists.

In March 1981, Emil Drăgănescu, the Minister of Tourism, had a meeting scheduled with the minister-president of Bavaria in order to increase the visibility of Romanian tourism. West Germans accounted for 30 percent of the tourists from capitalist countries visiting Romania; the Romanian state anticipated receiving 29.9 million dollars from the German tourists alone. Nevertheless, the West Germans’ arrivals in Romania did not look very promising for the summer of 1981, as the number of vacation packages that these tourists had purchased plummeted by 29 percent in comparison with previous year. Drăgănescu’s visit had only a limited success. Although the Bavarian minister-president promised to support the organizing of a Romanian Week

356 ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Chancellery Section, file no. 28/1974.
357 ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Section, 188/1981, f.54.
358 Ibidem, f. 53.
in Munich, the results were still below the Romanian officials’ expectations, in large measure because of their faulty planning.

Put simply, the Romanians lost sight of the economic situation of Western European countries themselves when putting forth the plans for 1981. The onset of the global recession hit the West European economies hard. The devaluation of both the Deutsch mark and the French franc versus the US dollar, which Romania used as a standard to set up the prices of tourist services, significantly increased the cost of vacation packages for European tourists in this country.359 The effect was that the tourist prices rose by 40 percent for tourists from West Germany or France. This was even more hazardous for the Romanian tourism as these visitors accounted for 80 percent of the total number of tourists vacationing on the Romanian Black Sea Coast.360 Moreover, Romania became slightly more expensive than Yugoslavia and Spain. While a fifteen-day holiday package to Romania that included lodging, meals and transportation sold on the French market cost 484 dollars, in Spain the same vacation cost French tourists 467 dollars, if they chose organized group tourism.361

The combination of the increase in prices and inadequate services turned dreadful for Romanian tourism in the early 1980s. In 1981, the number of days a tourist spent on the Black Sea coast was 26 percent lower than in 1980.362 By 1983, the crisis was already endemic. Only one new tourist objective was planned for that year, while the rest of the investments were directed to complete thirteen projects, which had begun in 1975 or 1976 but were not yet finalized.363 A dozen other projects, among which was the rehabilitation of Siutghiol Lake in Mamaia, were

359 ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Section, file no. 244/1981, f. 7.
360 Ibidem, f. 8.
361 ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Chancellery, file no. 61/1978, f.9.
362 Ibidem, f.7.
postponed. By the end of the 1980s, the investments stalled just when the modern tourist infrastructure of the 1960s was becoming obsolete. The reasons for halting investments in tourism are still a subject of debate, ranging from the regime’s fear that foreigners were a negative influence for Romanians to the assumption that tourism was not a profitable business for the communist state. The decision to not sustain the investment in tourist infrastructure seems even more puzzling as revenues from international tourism substantially grew from 132 million dollars in 1975 to 324 million dollars in 1980, despite global recession and resultant variations in the number of tourists. Yet, the stalling of investments produced negative effects throughout the 1980s when revenues from international tourism plummeted by 45.7 percent.

If in the Romanian case the tourist growth stopped and then spectacularly plummeted because of economic and political choices, in the Spanish case, the challenges were of a different nature. The rise in the number of tourists and revenue was continuous throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Although some groups at first regarded tourism with suspicion by some, international tourism became a key component of the Spanish economy once it proved useful in fixing the 1950s feeble balance of payments. The appointing of Manuel Fraga as a Minister of Tourism in 1962 opened the way for institutional and economic changes that transformed tourism into a priority of the Spanish government.

364 Ibidem, f. 948.
367 Derek Hall, op. cit, p. 102.
368 Sasha Pack, op. cit., p.109, Fraga called tourism “a crusade.” See also Ana Maria Garreno, op. cit., p. 245.
A report by the Trade Union of Hotel Workers (*Sindicato de Hosteleria*) emphasized that in 1964, the number of tourists grew by 30.5 percent compared with 1963, and that this figure exceeded the Plan of Development’s (*Plan de Desarrollo*) projections by 100 percent. 369 Similarly, the revenue generated by tourism increased from 444.1 million dollars in 1963 to 579.9 million dollars in 1964. 370 Yet, the report emphasizes that the increase could have been higher had the expansion of accommodation capacity kept pace with the increase in the number of tourists. But it did not and a 50 million dollar deficit in revenues occurred as a result. 371 By the mid-1960s, Spanish tourism found itself in the privileged position of becoming a profitable undertaking, even though the state invested little money in developing actual tourist infrastructure, such as hotels. The very different roles played by the state deserve note. In the Spanish case, most of the state resources went into the promotion of tourism, developing or upgrading rail lines, improving some aspects of the road system, and investing in other infrastructure. 372 In the Romanian case, the state’s infrastructure investment required investing in these areas and in hotel and restaurant construction. Each approach came with advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the Romanian state had to sustain the financial burden of developing and managing the whole tourist system, but it could choose its priorities and in which sectors to invest its resources. On the other hand, although the Spanish state took advantage of the growth of tourism in which it scantily invested, it had, in fact, little control on the actual pace of tourist infrastructure development and

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369 This was the second *Plan de Desarrollo*, which planned the economic development of Spain between 1964-1967.
370 AGA, collection Trade Unions (Sindicatos), (08)045.004, topographic signature 36/67.508.67.606, box 11050.
371 *Ibidem.*
372 AGA, Cultura, (03) 049.022, box 56758.
it struggled to make the private sector comply with the rules, as the following discussion makes clear.

One such example was the building and preserving of a good sanitation system. Together with other topics, such as infrastructure and tourist workers’ professional formation, sanitation was on the agenda of the National Tourism Assembly in 1964. The meeting emphasized that, “The sanitation issue is a problem of socio-economic infrastructure which has to do with the education, living standards and hygiene of every settlement.”\footnote{Asamblea Nacional de Turismo (Madrid, 1964), vol. 3, p. 352.} Besides the obvious issues, such as the lack of running water and a sewage system, the necessity to separate drinking and wastewater was a matter of concern.\footnote{Ibidem, p. 353.} In conclusion, the meeting asked that, “Every tourist village/town needs to comply with the sanitation requirements and to create a comfortable environment. Existing poor conditions have to be shrugged off and the sanitation plans need to be fully implemented.”\footnote{Ibidem, p. 354.} Tourists also complained about the lack of minimum sanitary conditions and standards of cleanliness. A British tourist sent the following letter to Franco in 1969:

Since 1955 I have been spending my holidays in Mallorca and have been very happy in all the hotels. This year I decided to go to Ibiza and my travel agent booked me a reservation at Hotel Nautico-Ebeso Ibiza. From the moment that I arrived, I tried to complain to the Hotel Manager, but he said he did not understand English and therefore could not converse with me. When I was leaving, I asked for the visitor’s book so that I could lodge my complaints, but the manager had given instructions to the receptionist that I was not to have access to it, and no amount of talking would induce him to let me have it. When I arrived home I wrote on the 5th August 1969 to the Spanish Tourist Office at Jermyn Street, London, and they replied that the matter was dealt with.

The following are my complaints:
The swimming pool was not usable as it contained dead fish and other rubbish and also the tiles were loose.
The bed linen was dirty and the towels were not returned to the room before 7:30 PM as they had been washed and were not dry. The room *stunk* [sic] at night and I could not sleep through this.

The food was disgusting, as salads contained dirt and slugs and the meat was always too hard to digest; dessert would consist of an unwashed banana. When we asked for ice cream, we had to pay at the table for this. On two occasions, the tea-pot contained *beetles* [beetles] [sic].

Paradoxically, the most significant limitation of the Spanish tourism came as a result of its speedy development. The hasty and at times disorderly rhythm of erecting new tourist establishments changed the landscape of many Spanish villages and towns. However, this was not always for the better. A report to the Minister of Tourism in 1973 emphasized that, “Our coast is dotted with hotels and guesthouses, all types of constructions, not always following the architectonic patterns of the area, or the rules of aesthetics. Our seaside became a swarming of buildings that have nothing to do with the ‘idyllic image’ of our coasts and villages.” Moreover, despite the large number of constructions, the room capacity was still insufficient and most lodgings did not meet the sanitation requirements. So inadequate were the sanitary systems that they posed “serious risks for the health of inhabitants.” Finally, the Spanish tourist planners agreed that the hasty and unaesthetic development of tourism facilities deprived Spain of its initial “mystery” and “emotion” that used to lure the tourists. The report noted that a lower number of tourists would, in the long-term, lead to a decline in revenues, increased unemployment of tourist workers, and ecological and cultural damages, such as the degradation of landscape and historical heritage. Although less dramatic than in the case of Romanian tourism, these limitations threatened to slow the rise of tourism in Spain. In response, the report called for measures, such as

376 AGA, Cultura, 23/66.603-69.301, box 42241.
377 AGA, Cultura, (03) 049.022, box 60751.
378 *Ibidem.*
379 *Ibidem.*
studies to determine the tourists’ satisfaction with the services offered, greater attention to tourism planning, the adjusting of prices in relation to quality, better coordination between the tourist demand and supply, and last but not least a limitation of local authorities’ power in issuing building permits in tourist areas. Although oil crisis hit Spanish tourism—Pez Espada one of the largest hotels in Torremolinos had to close its doors in the late 1970s—the impact was less noticeable. Spain’s focus on international tourism and less on heavy industry as in the Romanian case helped its speedy recovery.

3.5 CONCLUSION

Assessing their geographical positioning in the tourist market, success in modernizing transportation network and the challenges in creating a tourist infrastructure are essential to appreciating the development of international tourism in both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain. While at first sight it seemed that Romania’s location in Eastern Europe, further away from the wealthy northwestern Europeans, was a clear disadvantage in comparison with Spain, in reality this became less important with the advent of charter flights in the 1960s. Moreover, Romanian tourist officials kept their eyes open to the world tourist market, rather than focusing only on socialist countries. On the other hand, Spain took a more regional approach towards international tourism, as it paid attention exclusively to its competitors in the Mediterranean region. Such differences suggest that what separated the two countries’ tourism policies went beyond the classical Cold War divide between East and West and showed a more complex geographical

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380 Ibidem.
landscape, one that divided Europe between the tourists from northwestern European countries in search of sun and distractions, and their tourist destinations: the Mediterranean or the Black Sea Coast. Both the Mediterranean and the Black Sea Coast were emerging as attractive tourist areas against the backdrop of the West European postwar vacation boom. That shared reality is important to bear in mind.

Although Spain welcomed more tourists and gained more revenues out of tourism than did Romania, both underwent a modernization process when they embarked on developing international tourism. Setting an efficient transportation network and constructing a tourist infrastructure, sometimes from scratch, were both part of this process of modernization. The state attended to the reconstruction and improvement of transportation network in both countries. Yet, Romania and Spain had different mechanisms in place for the distribution of resources. In Romania, centralized planning provided a coherent development of both transportation and tourism, although to the extent that the modernization of transportation network was prioritized in select tourist areas. But in Spain in the 1950s, the Ministry of Tourism had to convince the Ministry of Public Works to include in its Plan of Modernization improving the roads in the frontier or coastal regions, which compared to central cities were peripheral from the government’s point of view. Until the early 1960, the Francoist government acknowledged the importance of tourism for financial reason, but only partially embraced it. It took a politician like Manuel Fraga to force increasing state investments in highways or airports.\footnote{One such issue was the modernization of the Malaga airport in the 1960s. The existing airport was too small and tourists landed in Gibraltar from where they were transported to Malaga and other destinations on the Costa del Sol. See Sasha Pack, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 95.}

Because of the different role that state played in the development of tourist infrastructure, the two governments had divergent approaches in regard to hotel construction. While in Romania,
the state managed most of tourist establishments, in Spain, the state limited its involvement to controlling prices and supporting hotel constructions through the Hotel Credit program. However, this approach did not play out in favor of tourism. The insufficient number of hotels was the major economic obstacle to the growth of Spanish tourism; in 1964 alone, this led to a deficit of 50 million dollars. Furthermore, the building of tourist establishments took place in a disorganized way, which put at danger the health and other aspects of tourist towns. The situation was so precarious that in 1973, the Spanish central government was thinking of limiting local authorities’ rights to issue building permits in tourist areas. However, this did not substantially affect the number of visitors. At the same time, the Romanian state invested heavily in tourist infrastructure in the 1960s and 1970s, but then sharply reduced the rate of investment in the 1980s. The lack of modernized tourist facilities, high prices and sometimes inadequate services (delays, excessive bureaucracy) contributed to a decrease in the number of tourists.

Table 3. Table summarizing the role of the state in regard to tourism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Role of the State</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing transportation infrastructure</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating the development of tourist infrastructure (granting building authorizations, financial support)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership over tourist infrastructure</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officially set prices</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100% (prices can vary by category)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of tourist employees</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editing and publishing tourist materials</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising abroad</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The question is why similar problems led to different outcomes in the two countries? Possible answers include the slip towards a personal dictatorship of Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania in the 1980s, which meant that all decisions regarding tourism had to be approved by him.\footnote{Including some minor decisions, such as keeping the restaurants open past 10:00PM, a favor that Greek tourists asked on the occasion of Easter celebration; N. Ceaușescu refused the request. See ANIC, CC of PCR Chancellery, 62/1983, f. 36.} At the same time, in Spain, the Ministry of Tourism gained more autonomy in the 1960s, and this enhanced Spain’s ability to adapt to the challenges of international tourism. Besides the political reasons, economic factors were at play as well. The unwise increase in tourist prices in Romania in the late 1970s as opposed to the adjusting of tourist establishments’ prices in Spain led to different evolutions of the number of tourists. In addition, the economic and political crises of the late 1970s highly affected the Romanian tourism, as the NTO-Carpathians customary tourist trips to Egypt and Beirut had to be interrupted.

Structural flaws in the Romanian economy in the 1980s also contributed to the decline of tourism investments and profits in Romania. One explanation for the Romania’s economic decline in the 1980s highlights the excessive rate of investments in heavy industry, especially the petrochemical processing industry. In the 1970s, the communist state took out important loans to build huge industrial plants, but in the 1980s, it lacked the necessary raw materials (especially oil) to use them at full capacity.\footnote{In 1989, the loss resulting from the unused industrial capacities was estimated at about 350-400 billion lei, which was half of the country’s national product. Constantin Ionete, \textit{op. cit.} (Bucharest: Expert Publishing House, 1993), pp. 74, 75, 76. About the context of the “oil shock” see Silviu Brucan, \textit{Generația Iroșită} (Bucharest: Univers and Calistrat Hogea Publishing House, 1992), p.150.} As the economic crisis worsened in the early 1980s, Ceaușescu, who was amassing more political power and was practically ruling by himself, decided to pay off all of Romanian’s debt rather than borrow from the USSR, which sharply reduced the state’s hard
currency reserves. Yet, international tourism required the import of goods for which payments in hard currencies had to be made. While each of these developments played a role in Ceaușescu’s decision to deemphasize tourism in the 1980s, it is difficult to identify a single or the most important cause.

At the same time, Spain benefitted from the more favorable international context and economic boom of the 1960s. As a consequence, the crisis of the 1970s had less of a negative impact because the Spanish economy was already oriented towards international tourism and was thriving because of it. Moreover, the decision making process involved a more autonomous Ministry of Tourism, with Franco only putting forth general recommendations. The differences in decision-making processes, the international context in which tourism reached maturity in both countries (end of the 1960s in Spain and the late 1970s in Romania), and last but not least, the competence of those who managed the international tourism industry led to the divergent paths of international tourism in the two countries, although they initially shared similar premises.

384 On the nature of Ceaușescu’s personal dictatorship see Vladimir Tismaneanu’s discussion about “sultanistic” regimes and “dynastic socialism” in Romania in Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Los Angeles, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).


386 In the 1980s, Ion Stănescu, a former chief of the Securitate (secret police), was appointed as a Minister of Tourism in Romania.
4.0 CHAPTER III. VACATIONING ACROSS THE IRON CURTAIN: WESTERN TOURISTS TO SOCIALIST ROMANIA AND SOCIALIST TOURISTS IN FRANCO’S SPAIN IN THE 1960S-1970S

In January 1966, the Spanish Tourist Agency YBARRA, one of the largest international tourism agencies in Spain, announced its intention to organize cruises to the Black Sea and to include the Romanian ports among their ships’ destinations. 387 The tours departed from Valencia and ended in Odessa after passing through Italian, Greek, Turkish, and Romanian ports. YBARRA’s plan was one of the first initiatives that would connect Franco’s Spain with socialist countries. This initiative was a novelty for Francoist Spain, but not for East European countries, especially Romania, which had shown a substantial interest in reestablishing connections with countries in Western Europe since the late 1950s. 388 In 1958, it signed a student exchange agreement with France, enabling three French students to study at the University of Bucharest for a year. 389 Although apparently insignificant, this occurrence triggered significant life experiences for those involved in this encounter and an opportunity for a degree of cosmopolitanism, which day-to-day

387 Archivo General del Administracion, Dirección General del Turismo, Cultura, 73/64.101-64.507, box 50073 (Paises socialistes). This was even more revolutionary as Soviet and Albanian ships were not allowed to anchor in Spanish ports as the members of their crews could not get a visa for Spain.
388 For instance, jazz music was a common presence in Eastern Europe in the late 1950s. For East German case see Ute Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Los Angeles, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 168. Romania moved from defining itself as a “socialist country” to a “socialist developing country.” In the years to come, Romania used its foreign policy to show its commitment to the West and to open up some political distance from the Soviet Union. For more on this issue see: Ronald Linden, “Romanian Foreign Policy in the 1980s” in Daniel N. Nelson, Romania in the 1980s (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 219-224.
389 ACNSAS, Informative Collection, File no. 329725, f.4.
life in socialist Romania hardly offered. The presence of the three French students not only allowed their Romanian colleagues to speak French, but also to listen to the newest American jazz tunes. The French students were also among the first Western tourists to socialist Romania. As part of their weekly routine, they would often leave Bucharest for a day trip to either the nearby Prahova Valley, or to the Black Sea coast. In the coming years, the contacts between the socialist government of Romania and capitalist countries increased. By 1966, Romania had commercial relations beyond the Soviet bloc with a diverse range of countries from both the West and the so-called Third World. A 1966 bulletin regarding Romania’s foreign trade detailed this situation. Socialist Romania had commercial relations with 39 countries including the United States, Australia, and Japan, and exhibited its products in five international trade shows alone in 1966. As a result of these policies, in 1974, the volume of trade with developed capitalist countries exceeded for the first time trade with COMECON states. Hence, when YBARRA proposed to include Constanta, Romania’s main port at the Black Sea Coast, among its cruise destinations, Romanian authorities could not have been more pleased. As it wanted to develop international tourism, socialist Romania not only welcomed YBARRA’s initiative, but despite Franco’s right-wing dictatorship it expressed interest in learning from Spain’s experience with international tourism.

This chapter examines how socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain sought to establish commercial and tourist relations beyond their political bloc and between each other, despite the

390 This happened despite the fact that they needed a special permission from the Romanian militia to travel to other parts of the country than that of residence.
391 ANIC, Central Committee Collection, Economic Section, 61/1966, f.35-45.
392 Ibidem, f.45-47.
Cold War divide. While in Romania, the state was responsible for initiating and approving such actions, in the Spanish case, it was the private sector that sought connections with the socialist bloc. These bilateral relations serve as a connective to showing ways in which socialist countries were more economically dynamic and open to the “West” than previously assumed. Furthermore, the tourist relationship between socialist Romania and Francoist Spain triggers interesting questions about views on classical Cold War relationships as Spain was a right-wing, anti-communist dictatorship, while Romania was home to and had welcomed some Spanish communists, who had fled Spain at the end of its civil war.

This chapter addresses the following questions: How did Romania become a holiday destination for Western tourists? How did Romania promote itself in the West? Why was Francoist Spain reluctant to welcome tourists from socialist Eastern Europe, and to what extent did Romania receive a different treatment? How did Spain’s position in relation to socialist countries change in the late 1960s and early 1970s? How do the tourist relations and networks established across the Iron Curtain by either Romania or Spain enrich the existing literature about the Cold War relations?

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394 Most literature still tends to see socialist countries as morally responsible for the Iron Curtain (see the discussion on Berlin Wall), while in fact socialist countries looked more interested in establishing relations with the capitalist countries than the other way around. For many socialist countries, relations with the capitalist countries meant access to a more advanced technology, hard currencies, and a market for their own products. Capitalist countries regarded Eastern Europe as a possible market. See Oscar Sanchez Sibony, *Red Globalization, The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

395 Most Cold War literature focuses on the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. By contrast, the tourist relationship between Franco’s Spain and socialist countries, Romania, in particular, is an example of the multifaceted relationship between the two blocs. See for example, Carole Fink, *Cold War: An International History* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2014).

396 Santiago Carrillo, the leader of the Spanish left in exile, was a good friend of Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, the prime secretary of Romanian Communist Party (1947-1965).
4.1 SETTING THE CONTEXT: COLD WAR RELATIONS IN THE LATE 1950S

The smoothing out of economic and political relationships between socialist Eastern Europe and the capitalist West in the 1960s was part of the de-Stalinization process, which started in 1956 in the Soviet Union and then spread to other socialist countries. The process began when Nikita Khrushchev, the general-secretary of the PCUS, denounced the ‘crimes’ of the Stalinist regime and announced the beginning of a new era.\textsuperscript{397} Although this did not trigger a genuine process of reforms in Eastern Europe, as the crushing of Hungarian revolution would show just months later, it signaled to the Western countries the intention to establish friendlier relationships. Moreover, Khrushchev was interested in a different type of competition than was his predecessor, Joseph Stalin. He wanted to prove that the Soviet way of life was in fact better than the American capitalist one.\textsuperscript{398} Against this backdrop, the East-West conversation went beyond political and diplomatic agreements, and began to include the topic of consumption and the availability of consumer goods. In 1959, Khrushchev agreed to the USSR’s participation in a consumer goods’ exhibition in New Work, while the American side exhibited their products during a similar event in Moscow. When the US vice-president Richard Nixon led Khrushchev through the American stand in Moscow, the Soviet leader started to rant against the so-called superiority of American consumer goods, and the conversation went beyond the usual diplomatic protocol.\textsuperscript{399} While such exchanges paved the way for a more consumer oriented society in the Soviet Union and socialist Eastern Europe, this event


\textsuperscript{399} Khrushchev did not understand the utility of a lemon squeezer, which was one of the pieces exhibited in the American Exhibition in Moscow, and questioned the practicality of having such objects around.
also reflected the different visions on consumption and utilitarianism of the two superpowers, and made clear the Soviet leader’s strong conviction that the world was divided between the Soviet Union and the United States. In a half joking tone, Khrushchev said that in case one country would decide not to comply to the US-USSR binary world, “we’ll tug their ears a little bit.” Despite Khrushchev’s view of the postwar world as bipolar, in fact, the division between sheer ideological camps diminished somewhat throughout the 1960s. Socialist Romania and Francoist Spain are two cases in point.

### 4.2 Socialist Romania Reaching Out to the West: From Tourism Within the Socialist Bloc to Tourism with the West

During the 1961 meeting in Moscow of tourist delegates from socialist countries, who discussed the future of international tourism and how these countries could attract tourists from the capitalist West, Romanian representatives did not act as trailblazers. In fact, the five members of the Romanian delegation came prepared to discuss only the perspectives of international tourism within the socialist bloc. Their agenda included issues like turning tourism into a mass activity and lowering tourist prices, which all delegates supported. At that time, the Soviet Union set the

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400 In the early 1960s, Khrushchev welcomed the idea of having a Hilton Hotel built in Moscow. The negotiations were brought to a halt when Khrushchev was ousted in 1964. See Hospitality Industry Archives, Hilton College, University of Houston, Conrad N. Hilton Collection, Moscow USSR Folder, Box 205.
403 ANIC, Council of Ministers Collection, file no. 29/1961, f. 6.
tone for the discussion and the rest of the participants still acted like disciplined followers. For example, the Soviet delegates were the ones to set most of the agenda and to assign tasks for the next meeting. But fifteen years later the conversation was slightly different. In 1979, during another meeting of tourist delegates from socialist countries that took place in Bucharest, the Romanian delegation was the one to push for a coordinated action of all socialist countries in order to attract more Western tourists. The mandate of the Romanian delegation mentioned:

The Delegation should emphasize that Romania, as a country that has a common border with the Soviet Union, is interested to develop a concrete collaboration with tourist organizations from the USSR and other socialist countries in order to attract a larger number of Western tourists. These programs should offer foreign tourists the possibility to take short trips to Romania and other socialist countries.404

The Ministry of Tourism in Romania clearly hoped to welcome more foreign tourists who might not otherwise consider a trip to Romania. As the customary Western tourists’ vacation packages to the socialist bloc included day trips to the neighboring socialist countries, this may have been a way of attracting even more foreign tourists to Romania. The mandate of Romanian Ministry of Tourism also reflected the Romanian government’s shift in priorities from tourism within the socialist bloc to tourism with Western countries. Furthermore, it showed a bolder approach on the Romanian side in relation to the Soviet Union. What happened between these two meetings is important for understanding the shift in policies regarding international tourism, how Romania began to advertise itself as a tourist destination for Western tourists, and last but not least how it aimed to create an alternative to COMECON and the Soviet Union.

404 ANIC, CC of PCR-Economic Section, 102/1979, f.7v.
Following the 1961 meeting in Moscow, as the above discussion makes clear, the Romanian government became more open about the possibility of welcoming Western tourists.\textsuperscript{405} In fact, immediately after the meeting, the Council of Ministers asked for a report about the prospects of developing international tourism with Western countries. More than anything else, this report reflected the Romanian government’s lack of experience with this sector.\textsuperscript{406} After having acknowledged the increase in the number of Western tourists who vacationed in socialist Romania, from 7,800 in 1957 to 40,000 in 1961, the report examined how other socialist countries welcomed Western tourists.\textsuperscript{407} Most examples were drawn from the Bulgarian case, Romania’s southern neighbor. While in Bulgaria, tourists were offered guided tours, which helped them familiarize with the history of the country and of the resort, in Romania tourists visited selected collective farms, which usually ended with a ‘comrades’ diner party.’

On the Bulgarian Black Sea Coast, tourist guides give tourists short historical information on the country and the Black Sea region, followed by a short presentation of the resort and of most important tourist objectives. […] For tourists who are visiting Mamaia [in Romania] we organize a tour of the local collective farms and we offer a common dinner that takes place in a comradeship environment.\textsuperscript{408}

Despite this dull itinerary, change was in the air. In 1962, the NTO-Carpathians and the government did not have a clear plan for developing tourism with Western countries, yet the quality of the advertising materials that promoted Romania as a tourist destination began to

\textsuperscript{405} ANIC, CC of PCR Chancellery, 92/1969, f. 20. This is a note about increasing the revenues in hard currencies. Among other it mentioned the plan to attract as foreign tourists more Romanians who emigrated abroad and to offer them the possibility to buy properties in Romania.

\textsuperscript{406} Until 1962, Romania attempted to attract socialist tourists as the elimination of visas for all socialist countries shows (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, the Chinese People’s Republic, the Korean People’s Republic, the People’s Republic of Mongolia, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. See World Travel, April 1964, p.13.

\textsuperscript{407} ANIC, Council of Ministers Collection, 29/1961, f. 46.

\textsuperscript{408} \textit{Ibidem}, f. 47.
Also in 1962, Romania took part in the Tourist Film Festival held in Paris where it won the golden medal for “Les Carpathes de L’Est” a film that promoted Romania as a tourist destination for Western audience. Just one year later, in 1963, another report, put together by the Propaganda and Foreign Relations Section within the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party, emphasized this progress:

If during the previous years the tourist propaganda and the advertising of our country abroad focused only on general information, in 1962 these advertising materials became more detailed. Both printed materials and the commercials advertised specific tourist destinations, including information about the travel conditions, prices, and where one can book a vacation to RPR [Romanian Popular Republic]. Some of the materials were printed in collaboration with the partner travel agencies from abroad, while others were made at the request of some foreign firms to be disseminated in their respective markets.409

The same report noted that in 1962 alone, 124 advertising materials were published with a circulation of 5.1 million copies. Additionally, 5.2 million postcards were made available to promote Romania abroad, while a television network from West Germany commissioned two promotional movies about Romania.410 A 1962 postcard [see figure 4] depicting Mamaia reflected this improvement.411 The image shows modern hotels lining the beach, with tourists casually laying in the sun or strolling the coast. Moreover, the postcard’s design successfully competed with that of similar materials from capitalist countries.412

By 1965, the growing advertising campaign brought some results, as the reactions of some Western tourists and the increase in the number of foreign tourists show. But there was still room

409 ANIC, CC of PCR Propaganda Section, 21/1963, f.3.
410 Ibidem, f. 4.
411 Although the year was not mentioned on the postcard, this was printed before 1963 when the spelling of the name of the country Romania, was changed from “î” to “â”, but not earlier than 1961 as the “blade razor hotels” Aurora, Meridian, Doina, Flora, and Victoria (built between 1960-1961) are shown in the image.
412 A 1960 postcard from Austria followed a similar pattern when it put together some iconic references for the country, such as Johann Strauss’s statue and various places where he lived and worked in Vienna.
for improvement. A 1965 letter by an Austrian tourist pointed out both the accomplishments and
the shortcomings of the emerging Romanian tourist industry. The Austrian tourist had decided to
visit Mamaia particularly because of “the strong advertising.”413 Although the trip was not fully
unpleasant, the tourist who previously visited “all summer resorts in Southern Europe,” felt
obliged to explain why Mamaia, the largest resort on the Romanian Black Sea Coast, was not yet
an international destination for tourists.

Because I want to consider your country, despite the 20-year rupture, as part of
the European civilization, I take the time to evaluate your tourism from the point
of view of the tourist. I want to show what could be done to bring the resort to
our standards, and Mamaia to become a truly international tourist destination.
[…]
-Flight attendants should speak some German.
-When tourists arrive in the hotel, at least someone from the management should
welcome them. Human beings become completely impersonal when they are led
like a crowd into the hotel. […] One never forgets she/he is just a number, an
object.
-There are no entertainment options in Mamaia. Build some restaurants with
Romanian food, wine, and music!
- It’s not good to make announcements in restaurants only in Romanian, like
they do for example at “Miorita” [a restaurant with Romanian cuisine and folk
music], where 90 percent of the clients are Germans.414

Far from dismissing it, the Romanian authorities took the Austrian’s tourist complaint very
seriously. Gheorghe (Gogu) Rădulescu, the chief of the Economic Office within the Central
Committee, a party office charged with supervising economic activities in Romania, recommended
that NTO-Carpathians pursue some of the Austrian tourist’s suggestions.415 This recommendation
alone illustrates the willingness of the Romanian state to learn from various sources how to
improve its international tourism and how it actually attempted to improve this sector.

414 Ibidem, f.16.
415 Ibidem, f. 15. Gogu Rădulescu’s note on the letter said: “I asked NTO-Carpathians to follow some of
these suggestions.”
As the Austrian tourist acknowledged, Romania’s promotion on the Western market was strong, despite the fact that on the ground tourist services did not live up to its promises. But from 1965, the NTO-Carpathians and the socialist government made the advertising of Romanian tourism in the West a top priority. Journalists from Western magazines would be invited to visit Romania at the expense of the Romanian state, and, in exchange, they wrote promotional materials. In 1968, “Auto Touring,” a Belgian magazine, not only informed its readers about specific tours and prices to Romania, but also published a well-informed article about this country. The article, titled “Invitation en Roumanie,” presented the Romanians as the “Romans of the East” and reminded its Belgian readers that French culture was very influential in this country before WWII. Also, the article informed its readers that one can easily spark a conversation in French while strolling around Bucharest.416 Also in 1968, a tourist guide published in France insisted that French tourists who were considering taking a vacation during the summer should choose Romania because “they would feel at home.”417 For those who might still have harbored some doubt, the guidebook put forth a careful explanation:

…But, but…you will say… it is too far. The 2,400 km could be done in four hours by plane and 36 hours if you are travelling by train. Nowadays, the distance can’t stop the tourist eager to discover new places, especially when sun and friendship awaits him.418

After challenging the tourists to discover a new tourist destination, the travel guide carefully addressed the issue of language:

…But you will say… I can’t make myself understood. You should know that if you don’t speak Romanian, Romanians do speak French. […]419

418 Ibidem, p. 12.
419 Ibidem, p. 12.
The last and most important reason for which French tourists might not have chosen Romania as their travel destination was that the country was behind the Iron Curtain. The French guidebook dealt with this issue as well and explained to less adventurous tourists that this was hardly a problem:

…But this is behind the Iron Curtain, isn’t it? Well, I assure you that you will not even notice this. You travel freely, like at home, and you will be pleasantly surprised by the degree of freedom in Romania. As long as you observe the laws, as everywhere else, you will not be bothered.\textsuperscript{420}

As the guidebook noted, the Iron Curtain was a political barrier that was not replicated at societal level in the Romanian case, especially when international tourism was involved. Foreign tourists could move freely (within the limits posed by the transportation network) and enjoy their vacations as anywhere else in Western or Southern Europe. If individual travel across the Iron Curtain posed some bureaucratic obstacles, travelling in organized groups became an easier undertaking in the late 1960s. In 1967, Romania was the first socialist country to abolish visa requirement for Western tourists who travelled in groups.\textsuperscript{421} Also luggage search was prohibited and tourists only had to give a custom declaration regarding any prohibited goods.\textsuperscript{422} The make-up of tourists travelling to Romania reflected these changes. While in 1965 Czechoslovak and

\textsuperscript{420} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{421} \textit{Touring Club de France}, no. 785, July-August 1967, p. 676. Visas were still required for those traveling on individual basis. It was, however, easy to get a tourist visa, which offered a 10 percent discount for the products bought in the tourist shops. Visas for tourists from the socialist countries that had no bilateral tourist agreement with Romania remained in place. As of 1970, Romania had reached tourist agreements with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and USSR, but not with Eastern Germany, which only signed an agreement with Romania in 1972. See also, ANIC, CC of PCR Chancellery, 47/1967.
Polish tourists predominated, in 1970 tourists from West Germany prevailed. This change in the make-up of foreign tourists visiting Romania mirrored the efforts of the socialist government in attracting more tourists from the Western countries.

Alongside a strong advertising campaign for Romanian tourism and relaxation of visa requirements for Western tourists, Romania also took an active role in various international tourist organizations. In 1969, Romania hosted the Third International Congress of “Loisir and Tourisme,” (Leisure and Tourism), which discussed the issue of “Individual and group vacations nowadays and in the future.” The Congress brought together participants from nine European countries. Romania, Poland, and Yugoslavia were the only socialist countries represented. The west European delegates came from France, West Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain. Oskar Snack of the NTO-Carpathians and a scholar of international tourism gave the opening remarks, while the proceedings of the congress were published in French and Romanian. Although this was an academic meeting that discussed the theory of tourism, the connections established among participants went beyond the scientific realm as most of them also held positions in their respective governments.

In the 1960s, international tourism became a top priority for both capitalist and socialist countries, and academic or governmental meetings and associations reflected this interest. The

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424 Romania’s different stance in relation to the Prague Spring in August 1968 might have also played a role in gaining the sympathy of Western public. Romania was the only socialist state, except Yugoslavia, to not take part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia and N. Ceaușescu even delivered a public speech before more than 100,000 people in Bucharest in which he condemned the invasion. See *Scînteia*, 21 August 1968.
Balkan Tourist Association was such an organization. Launched in 1971 in Bucharest, it included Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania.\textsuperscript{427} The purpose of the association was to collectively promote the Balkans as an international tourist destination.\textsuperscript{428} During its annual meetings, the members of the association exchanged data about tourist statistics and practices and whenever possible proposed a common tourist policy, especially in regard to advertisement.\textsuperscript{429} To enhance the practical collaboration between the five Balkan countries, an Association of the Balkan Travel Agencies was created. Its purpose was to sell collective trips that would include vacations in more than one Balkan country.\textsuperscript{430} The Balkan Tourist Association, as well as its proxy, the Association of Balkan Travel Agencies, promoted concrete actions that did not fall into the Cold War division. In fact, these two associations followed the footsteps of various political organizations that brought together the Balkan countries during the interwar years.\textsuperscript{431} Furthermore, the Balkan Tourist Association’s undeclared goal was to counterbalance the more monolithic COMECON and European Economic Community.\textsuperscript{432}

\textsuperscript{427} ANIC, CC of PCR Economic Section, 244/1981, f. 13.
\textsuperscript{428} As part of this project, ONT-Carpathians organized trips for Western tourists to Istanbul and Athens.
\textsuperscript{429} \textit{Ibidem}, f. 15.
\textsuperscript{430} \textit{Ibidem}, f. 17.
\textsuperscript{431} The Balkan Pact was signed on 9 February 1934 by Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Romania, and it was an attempt to preserve the status quo in the region. One of the initiators was Nicolae Titulescu, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
\textsuperscript{432} At that time, Greece and Turkey, although capitalist, did not belong to EEC, although both were NATO members. Greece applied to become an EEC member in 1975, while Turkey only had an association agreement since 1963, but never joined EEC.
Figure 8. Promotion of Romania and Yugoslavia in Norwegian Tourist Leaflets, Summer of 1980.

Source: ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Section, file no. 205/1980, p.73.

The common promotion of Balkan countries produced some results. In 1980, a Norwegian travel agency decided to sell common tourist packages for Romania and Yugoslavia. The Norwegian travel agency advertised both countries as beach destinations, as most Scandinavian tourists sought to spend their vacations in such places. The title page of the tourist flyer [see figure 8] showed a group of tourists in bathing suits casually enjoying the sea. This image hardly suggested that these places were located in two countries behind the Iron Curtain. To further convince its readers, the tourist flyer featured the new hotels, Amfiteatru (Amphitheater) and Belvedere in Neptun-Olimp, a brand new resort on the Romanian Black Sea Coast. Both hotels struck the viewer as lavishly modern and looked like they provided all the comfort Western tourists would require.

The socialist regime not only advertised Romania as a place dotted with modern resorts, but also it adjusted its tourist discourse in order to meet the foreign tourists’ quest for exoticism and fun. One such example was inspired by the story of Dracula, alias Vlad the Impaler (1448,
1456-1462, 1467). In 1972, Raymond McNally and Radu Florescu published *In Search of Dracula*, a book that told the story of the ‘Transylvanian vampire.’ The book enjoyed some popularity in the US and triggered the curiosity of the American public. The same year, the New York based “General Tours” travel agency together with Pan-Am airline decided to develop a tour in Romania that focused on Dracula. Although the socialist regime in Romania did not explicitly mention Dracula in its promotion materials, it did include the Bran Castle, the place where allegedly Dracula lived, in the recommended tourist tours. Furthermore, in 1974, *Vacances en Roumanie*, a tourist magazine edited by the NTO-Carpathians, reported about a trip that 130 Americans took to Romania “to trace Dracula.” The 130 Americans were high school pupils who had earned a two-week excursion in West Germany and Romania. During the week they spent in Romania, they followed the usual tour, which included Bucharest, Snagov (where Vlad Tepes, a former prince of Walachia and the character that inspired the story of Dracula, was buried), Northern Moldavia, and finally Transylvania. Although the socialist regime might not have wanted to encourage an image of Romania based on mysticism and fantastic stories because it contradicted its rhetoric of modernity, it tacitly accepted this as long as it brought an increase in the number of Western tourists.

Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, socialist Romania attempted to become a tourist destination for visitors from capitalist Western Europe. In doing so, it started to promote itself as

434 General Tours had a long-lasting history in organizing tours in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union.
a country that had not interrupted its cultural ties with Western Europe, despite the Soviet influence in the postwar era. Moreover, the promotional materials denied the existence of an impermeable Iron Curtain, especially in regard to international tourism. Although partially successful, this policy did not fully meet the expectations of socialist officials. After an impressive spike in the number of Western tourists in the 1960s, in the 1970s the number of foreign tourists slowed. While in 1974, 666,635 Western tourists visited Romania, in 1979, their numbers had only increased to 743,279 tourists, despite the aggressive promotion of Romania in Western magazines.\footnote{ANIC, Central Committee Collection, Economic Section, 165/1981, f. 16.} While international tourism fell somewhat short of delivering on some of its expected results, some Romanian officials began to regard tourism more as an opportunity to show their distinctive stance. In 1973, Romania became the first socialist state to sign a special trade agreement with the EEC, in 1974, trade with capitalist countries exceeded trade with COMECON countries, and in 1976, it received Most Favored Nation (MFN) status from the United States. Among socialist countries only Poland had a similar status. Other examples of its distinctive position are Romania’s recognition of West Germany in 1967 and its stance during the Sino-Soviet dispute.\footnote{ANIC, Central Committee Collection, Economic Section, 165/1981, f. 16.} Although it is not clear to what extent the decision to pursue this foreign policy related with the arrival of West German tourists, it did not hurt. West German tourists were the most numerous tourists with

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\footnote{ANIC, Central Committee Collection, Economic Section, 165/1981, f. 16.}
\footnote{No other socialist, including Yugoslavia, recognized West Germany until 1972. See Ronald Linden, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 223. Romania re-oriented its trade policies towards the West because it as it faced the Soviet Union’s opposition towards the Galati steel mill project in 1960 and it needed to: “1) secure from the West the technology and equipment necessary to achieve rapid industrialization; and 2) to secure alternative sources of supply of raw materials crucial to that industrialization drive.” See: Ronald Linden, \textit{Bear and Foxes: The International Relations of the East European States, 1965-1969} (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, dist. by Columbia University Press, 1979), p.180. If in 1960, the West’s share of Romania’s technological imports was of 25.8 percent, by 1967 it reached 58 percent. West Germany was the leading western partner of Romania immediately after the Soviet Union, and between 1960-1965, Romania almost doubled its trade with West Germany. Similarly, on the relationship between the United States and Romania see also “Waiver of Trade Restrictions Against Romania” in \textit{Serial Set Volume} No. 13109-2, Session Vol. No. 1-2, 1975.}
hard currencies in socialist Romania. Although Ceaușescu and socialist officials did not abandon the idea of turning international tourism into a genuinely viable economic sector, in the late 1970s tourism with the West became more of a political and diplomatic initiative rather than an economically efficient enterprise.

4.3 RETHINKING EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP IN THE COLD WAR: SOCIALIST TOURISTS TO SPAIN

In 1965, 69.5% of the tourists who visited Spain came from the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC). However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the profile of vacationers in Spain became increasingly diversified. In 1972, only 64.8% of the tourists were from EEC and a mere 5% came from the United States and Canada. The remaining 30 percent came from Japan, South America, and, surprisingly enough socialist Eastern Europe. In 1974, Joan Cals, a historian of Spanish tourism, predicted that the make-up of the Spanish tourism would not change much in the 1970s and 1980s. However, he also noticed that there might be some potential change in the number of tourists coming from socialist countries. How did it come to pass that Spain under Franco, arguably postwar Europe’s most anti-communist leader, became more open to tourism from socialist societies? It is to this question that we now turn.

In January 1967, the Spanish Ministry of Tourism received requests from two travel agencies from Yugoslavia to be allowed to organize trips to Spain. Putnik and Kompas, the travel

440 *Ibidem*, p. 47.
agencies from Yugoslavia, inquired about the possibility of allowing Yugoslav tourists to visit Spain’s main cities. A couple of months later, in August 1967, Cedok, the Czechoslovak state travel agency, sought permission to allow Czechoslovak tourists to visit the Balearic Islands. To facilitate the process, five representatives of the two Yugoslav tourist agencies expressed their interest to visit Spain so as to reach an agreement with the Ministry of Tourism. Similarly, V. Holecek, the Czechoslovak consul in Madrid, addressed a letter to Jose Lopez de Letona, the Spanish General Director for the Promotion of Tourism, that stated: “I have the honor to communicate to you that the Cedok travel agency from Prague, in order to meet the request of the Czechoslovak public, studies the possibility to organize tourist trips to Spain. The place that most interests us is the Balearic Islands.” However, one serious problem threatened to hinder these initiatives. Francoist Spain had no diplomatic relationships with either Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia, both situated on other side of the Iron Curtain. Therefore, there were no clear regulations about how the citizens of these countries could travel to Spain. The first practical impediment was the lack of a local office to issue visas for possible tourists. Yugoslav tourists had to go to Milan, while the tourists from Czechoslovak had to visit Vienna in order to get a visa.

The lack of a Spanish consulate in these two socialist countries was not the only hurdle. The Spanish Embassy in Milan was baffled by the Yugoslav travel agencies’ requests. As a result, it did not answer in a timely manner and, ultimately, it denied visas to the five Yugoslav tourist officials who planned to visit Spain to set up a tourist agreement. This, however, triggered a reaction from the Ministry of Tourism in Spain, which was of a different opinion on this matter

441 Archivo General de la Administracion, Cultura Collection, 73/66.101-66.507, box 50073.
442 Ibidem.
443 Spanish officials used the term Iron Curtain in their correspondence about Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
444 Ibidem.
than was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior. Rodriguez Acosta, Fraga’s deputy, wrote to Luis Rodriguez Miguel of the Ministry of Interior, asking for an official position in regard to the visa denial for the five Yugoslav officials. He also attached to his request the letter from Ramon Sedo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who with no other explanations stated that, “after consultations with the Minister, we decided that visas for tourists coming from Eastern Europe cannot be granted.” Given the importance of international tourism for Spain, and for Fraga’s popularity, the Ministry of Interior reversed its position and agreed that collective trips could be allowed after careful verifications. As a result of the dispute, Ramon Sedo proposed that on the issue of visas for tourists from socialist countries, an agreement among the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Tourism had to be reached. He informed Rodriguez Acosta of the Ministry of Tourism that the criteria for granting visas to individuals from socialist countries will be simplified and access will be denied only in exceptional cases, which involved the security of the state. As the rest of capitalist Western Europe became more welcoming to tourists from Eastern Europe, Spain’s fear that its external image would suffer outweighed the government’s suspicion towards the Yugoslavs. Ultimately, in another letter to Rodriguez Acosta, Ramon Sedo acknowledged that, “this [the denial of visas to the five Yugoslav officials] can be detrimental to our international situation and can suggest that we are hindering the exchange of tourists among the European countries.”

Despite this progress, the Czechoslovaks’ request to visit the Balearic Islands a couple of months later did not prove successful. Although after long negotiations the Czechoslovaks obtained a visa for Spain, they were not able to visit Mallorca, their destination. An article

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447 Ibidem.
published in the Spanish daily *El Pais* noted how a group of Czechoslovak tourists left Spain without visiting Mallorca (the main island in the Balearic Islands) because the Spanish side refused to grant a visa for that particular tourist destination. The article pointed out the difficulties that Czechoslovaks had faced in order to obtain a visa for Spain: “For them, it is very difficult to visit Spain as the process of getting a visa is slow and complicated; in order to get a visa, one needs an invitation from a Spaniard who also has to take the responsibility for that respective Czechoslovak visitor.” Overall, this visa situation threatened to undermine the Spanish tourism from Eastern Europe, which was in theory opened to every visitor regardless of political orientation. While Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarded the tourists from socialist countries with suspicion, the Ministry of Tourism pushed for a more flexible attitude. In the end, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs both made some concessions, but the process of obtaining a visa remained slow until the early 1970s.

Whereas the Spanish state failed to recognize the benefits of international tourism with socialist countries, the private sector had a different view. In 1968, Viajes Montesol, a tourist agency from Barcelona, asked for official permission to initiate tourist exchanges with Yugoslavia. Yet the request came after the travel agency had already established commercial relations with the Yugoslav travel agency and had sent tourists “of various nations” to Yugoslavia. The agency sought legal permission because it wanted to send Spanish tourists to Yugoslavia as well. But for this to happen, the travel agency had to secure exit visas in order for a Spaniard to travel to a socialist country. Although it required considerable persistence, the insistence of private tourist

448 AGA, Cultura, 73/66.101-66.507, box 50073.
449 Ibidem. Don Juan Molist Codina from Montesol Viajes to Manuel Fraga, the Minister of Information and Tourism.
450 Ibidem.
agencies in Spain for relations with socialist countries delivered some results. In 1970, a direct flight was established between Warsaw and Madrid as well as between Prague and Madrid.\textsuperscript{451} The airline connection reflected the improvement of Spain’s relations with Eastern Europe and the increased demand for travel between these two regions. However, it was the socialist countries, not Spain, that initiated such relations, despite Spain’s right-wing ideological orientation. This suggests a much more pragmatic approach by socialist Eastern Europe, which did not exclude economic and tourist relations on ideological basis. Moreover, by establishing these relationships, some Eastern European countries attempted to go beyond the artificial divisions imposed by the Cold War and, ultimately, to get around Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe. By contrast, Spain’s policies in regard to Eastern Europe appeared to have been much more ingrained in the Cold War discourse.

4.4 LEARNING FROM THE SPANISH EXPERIENCE: BOZDOG’S VISIT TO SPAIN

Almost at the same time that Yugoslav officials and Czechoslovak tourists faced difficulties in getting a visa for Spain, Nicolae Bozdog, the chief of Romanian NTO-Carpathians, approached the newly appointed Spanish Consul in Bucharest with the request for a diplomatic visit to Spain. Although Spain’s tourist relationships with other socialist countries were problematic, Romania was in a better position, as it had established diplomatic relations with Spain in January 1967.\textsuperscript{452} The fact that in 1967 Romania was the first communist state to recognize West Germany improved

\textsuperscript{452} This happened during a meeting in Paris and it meant that Spain had an economic office in Bucharest while Romania had one in Madrid.
the country’s image in the West and created a basis for a partnership with the so-called capitalist bloc. As Spain itself aimed to become part of the ‘West,’ it may have regarded Romania as not fully integrated in the socialist bloc and therefore a possible partner in tourism. Despite this connection, the organizing of Bozdog’s trip did not go smoothly because of Spain’s restrictive visa policy towards socialist countries and its overall lack of information about Romania.\textsuperscript{453} Moreover, when the tourist officials from the two countries started to plan Bozdog’s visit, it was still unclear how this event might facilitate the negotiations and tourist exchanges between Spain and Romania.

The initiative for a meeting between the Romanian and Spanish Ministries of Tourism came from the Romanian side in the fall of 1967. Nicolae Bozdog expressed his wish to visit Spain in a meeting with Ricardo Gimanez-Arnau, the Spanish consul in Bucharest. During the meeting, Bozdog stated his desire to visit Spain as a way, ”to get acquainted with the Spanish experience in developing and promoting tourism.”\textsuperscript{454} Gimanos-Arnau discussed this request with officials from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These officials suggested that instead of making an invitation at the state level, it was better to send personal invitations to the members of the delegation. This proposal suggests that continued diplomatic ambiguity in the relationship between the two countries remained an important issue to overcome. Yet despite the more personal character of the visit, Gimanez-Arnau, the Spanish Consul in Bucharest, and Alexandru Petrescu, the Romanian Consul in Madrid, started to organize the meeting. Bozdog’s visit was planned to take place on April 15-23, 1968, and the two consuls scheduled activities “for an eight-day visit in order to allow the Romanian delegation to familiarize itself with Spanish tourism.”\textsuperscript{455}

\textsuperscript{453} In 1962, a first article about Romania was published in SUR, Malaga’s daily.
\textsuperscript{454} AGA, Cultura, 73/66.101-66.507, box 56753.
\textsuperscript{455} Ibidem.
The Romanians were interested in both the economic and social developments of tourism in Spain. Hence, the Spanish contingent agreed to provide informational materials about social tourism, tourist workers’ professional training, tourist propaganda, and the politics of tourism. There were also discussions of more concrete and technical issues. For example, according to the COMECON internal agreements, all socialist countries were supposed to purchase the Hungarian-produced Ikarus buses. Nonetheless, Romania wanted to buy tourist buses from Spain.\textsuperscript{456} Romanian delegates also asked to visit a number of resorts in Spain, and showed a particular interest in the accommodation, dinning, and entertaining facilities as well as the so-called hotel schools. They also wanted to meet with the representatives of the Hotel Workers Union in Madrid. In short, the Romanian delegation wanted to conduct a very thorough investigation of tourism and tourist facilities in Spain.

Spanish tourist officials, after observing that Romania’s tourist facilities had developed at an impressive pace from 1960 to 1968, were also very curious about Romanian tourism. Gimanez Arnau, the Spanish consul in Bucharest, appreciated that the upcoming meeting was going to be economically advantageous for both countries. He noted that Romania has: “A still unexploited tourist potential which could become very important within Romanian economy.” \textsuperscript{457}

Finally, after prolonged negotiations, in April 1968, the Romanian delegation led by Nicolae Bozdog visited Francoist Spain in order to get acquainted with the tourist industry there and to meet with Manuel Fraga, the Spanish Minister of Tourism. The nineteen members of the Romanian delegation arrived in Madrid on 15 April 1968. The schedule of the Romanian delegation included both official meetings and visits to different hotels, \textit{paradores}, and factories,

\textsuperscript{456} \textit{Ibidem.}

\textsuperscript{457} \textit{Ibidem.} Gimanez Arnau to Subsecretaria de Turismo.
as well as more entertaining activities that more or less turned the Romanian officials into tourists. In the first day of their visit, the Romanian delegation had meetings with various officials in the Ministry of Tourism, such as the directors of Tourism Advertising and Planning, of National Tourist Routes, and of Social Tourism. After these official meetings, the Romanian delegation went to the School for Hotel Workers in Alcalá de Henares to familiarize themselves with the training of tourist personnel. In the afternoon, they visited the Pegaso tourist bus factory, which was on their list of priorities. The second day was less hectic with a work session at the Direction for Tourist Enterprises in the morning and a visit at the Escorial monastery in the afternoon. The third day included only a meeting at the School for Tourism and a dinner at a highly rated restaurant in Madrid. During the next three days, the Romanian delegation travelled south to Malaga and Granada to visit the newly developed tourist region, Costa de Sol. In Malaga, they stopped at the National Golf Course and the Hotel School “San Nicholas.” In Granada, the Romanian delegation visited the Center for National Tourism. The Romanian delegation also wanted to visit Balearic Islands as well, but the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not issued them the essential visas for this visit.

Only on the last day of their stay, did the Romanians meet Manuel Fraga, the Spanish Minister of Tourism, as he was in the United States when the Romanian delegation arrived. Spanish newspapers highlighted the visit and photos of the two appeared on the first page of El País, one of the major daily newspapers in Spain. In a statement delivered to “Cifra,” the news press agency, Bozdog said: “This was our first contact with Spain and one of the first actions we need to take is to establish a direct airline connection between Bucharest and Madrid. However,
This falls in our country under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transportation, and once we will get back to Bucharest we will analyze the situation and come up with adequate solutions."\textsuperscript{459}

Both sides seemed to be pleased with the visit. The Spanish Consul in Bucharest met Bozdog at the airport so as to get first impression on the visit. Bozdog praised the Spaniards’ standards of living and his overall experience in Spain. During his visit, he had extended an invitation to Fraga to come on an official visit to Romania in the fall of 1968 or early in 1969. The Spanish side too appreciated the importance and benefits of the Romanians’ visit. Moreover, the Spanish authorities congratulated the “Pegaso” factory’s staff for the way that they greeted the Romanian delegation. Given that the Romanian delegation was interested in purchasing omnibuses from Spain, the visit to this factory was advantageous to both Romanian’s and Spanish’s sides. In response, a few weeks after the meeting, Fraga wrote a letter to Bozdog thanking him for the complimentary words about the Spanish tourism.\textsuperscript{460} The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that because of Spain’s developing relationship with Romania, it should benefit from a different visa regime than other socialist countries.\textsuperscript{461}

For their part, Romanian tourist officials were eager to learn from the Spanish experience and to intensify tourist exchanges between Spain and Romania.\textsuperscript{462} A meeting of the Political Bureau of the Romanian Communist Party in 1968 emphasized that the policy of socialist Romania was to establish relationships with all states and, therefore, cultural and tourist relationships with

\textsuperscript{459} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{460} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{461} Ibidem. This was a serious issue, as even the Romanian official delegation could not visit Mallorca because it needed a visa that did not arrive on time.
\textsuperscript{462} A School for Tourist Workers was established in Bucharest in the aftermath of the visit and soon tourist workers from the Middle East or African countries began to be trained there. Payments for these trainings were made in US dollars, which helped the Romanian communist regime’s goal to use tourism in order to acquire more hard currencies. See ANIC, CC of PCR, Economic Section, file no. 102/1979, f. 54. The costs for training a tourist worker (a chef or a maître d’hotel) would be as high as 1000 dollars a month.
Spain were part of this program. The seriousness of that act was soon made clear. For example, in 1968, a Spanish week was organized in Bucharest and an agreement between the Romanian and Spanish TV networks was set up.

Although the visit did not shed a significant amount of light on the practical ways in which the two countries could establish a tourist relationship, it did pave the way for further collaboration between Spain and Romania. If before Bozdog’s visit, the Spanish side had tried to make sense of the available information about Romania, after the meeting Spain became more interested in developing a tourist collaboration with socialist Romania.

4.5 SOCIALIST ROMANIA: A TOURIST DESTINATION FOR SPANISH TOURISTS

In January 1968, during the preparations for Bozdog’s visit, the Spanish Secretary of Tourism, Rodriguez Acosta, informally inquired if any Spanish or Portuguese travel agency operated in Romania. Unexpectedly, he received a very encouraging answer from Sun-Melia, which was one of the most important travel agencies in Spain. Sun Melia had had a tourist collaboration with NTO-Carpathians since 1967, and although it did not send tourists to Romania on a regular basis, it had a number of people interested in visiting socialist Romania. Rodriguez Acosta’s inquiry offered the tourist agency the opportunity to propose ways in which tourist traffic between the two

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463 ANIC, CC of PCR Chancellery, file no. 109/1968, f. 25. This declaration came in the aftermath of Prague Spring when Romania opposed the Warsaw Pact countries’ invasion of Czechoslovakia. Although this was an internal meeting, the aim to establish relations with all countries became part of the party rhetoric.

464 This travel agency still operates today and it is one of the most important in Spain and Europe. The agency was established in 1956 in Palma de Mallorca. See: [http://html.rincondelvago.com/empresa-hotelera-espanola.html](http://html.rincondelvago.com/empresa-hotelera-espanola.html), accessed April 12, 2014.
countries could be enhanced and integrated into the broader European tourist routes.\textsuperscript{465} In the late 1960s and early 1970s, other Spanish tourist agencies established commercial relations with NTO-Carpathians and sent tourists to Romania; Valencia Travel and Cliper were just two such agencies. The value of tourist transactions for each of them hovered around 200,000 US dollars annually, which was a substantial amount for the socialist state.\textsuperscript{466} Strikingly, it was the Romanian socialist state and the private sector in Spain that opened the way for Spanish tourism to Romania. Both parties regarded this partnership as a way of increasing their revenues. While it is unclear how many Spaniards were interested in visiting the countries behind the Iron Curtain, Romania showed a strong incentive to welcome these tourists. In contrast, the Spanish state stuck to its policies of welcoming tourists from the capitalist world while ignoring socialist Eastern Europe. This is one reason why advertising of Romanian tourism in Spain only began only in the early 1970s, despite the fact that Spanish tourist agencies had started to sell tourist packages to socialist Romania much earlier.

The first tourist presentation about Romania in Spanish tourist magazines did not appear until 1973, just two years before the end of Franco’s dictatorship in Spain. \textit{Recepción}, a travel magazine published in Barcelona, wrote about the 18\textsuperscript{th} Congress of Tourist Writers and Journalists that took place in Bucharest in October 1973.\textsuperscript{467} The Congress was a UNESCO initiative and included participants from both socialist and capitalist countries, such as Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, USSR, and Romania. The topic of the congress was “The Role of the Tourist Writer and Journalist in Promoting Modern Tourism.”

\textsuperscript{465} AGA, Cultura, 73/66.101-66.507, box 56753.
\textsuperscript{466} The annual number of Spanish tourists to Romania was about 20,000 people in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Section, 193/1978, f.18.
\textsuperscript{467} “XVIII Congreso en Rumania” in \textit{Recepcion}. 1973, p. 34.
Nevertheless, the article in Recepción focuses very little on the congress. Besides mentioning the title and the fact that no Spaniard got elected in the Executive Committee of the Tourist Writers Organization, the article devotes more time to describing Romania as a tourist destination. While the participants spent the first three days in Bucharest busy with the congress proceedings, over the remaining five days they toured Romania. Hence, the participants to the Congress of Tourist Writers became tourists themselves. Their first destination was the Romanian seaside where they visited both the newly built holiday resorts of Neptun, Saturn, and Jupiter, and the older resorts of Mamaia and Eforie Sud. The article in Recepción highlighted the growth of tourist infrastructure and the presence of modern and welcoming hotels on the Romanian seacoast. They visited the Danube Delta, a region north to Constanța, after which they headed to the north of the country to see the 16th century painted Orthodox monasteries in Bucovina. The article’s obvious goal was to turn Romania into an attractive tourist destination for Spanish tourists. It describes in detail the monasteries’ artwork and the ethnographical traditions in the area, aspects that could have been of interest to prospective tourists. The article also described Romanian food and drinks, mentioning, for example, tzuica, a type of local plum brandy. Next, the group of participants to the Congress of Tourist Writers visited Maramures, an area in the northwest of the country, known for its preservation of folk heritage and traditions. The description of tourism in Romania ended by highlighting a reference to the Romanians and Spaniards’ common Latin origins, and the observation that “these Latin people know above all things how to be friendly and hospitable.” The 1973 article undoubtedly aimed to promote Romania as a tourist destination for the Spanish public. In doing so, it focused more on tourist development (i.e. the new hotel developments on

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468 Ibidem, p. 35. The delegation from France was the largest.
469 Ibidem, p. 36.
the Black Sea coast) and various aspects of cultural heritage (i.e. artworks in the Orthodox monasteries, various folkloric rituals, and food). It remained silent about the socialist orientation of the political regime in Romania.

Although the 1973 article attempted to attract Spanish tourists to Romania, travel magazines did not publish concrete information about how to visit this country until after the death of Franco in 1975. An article from June 1978 in *Viajar*, a travel magazine published in Barcelona, strongly publicized Romania as a tourist destination and offered Spanish tourists concrete information about how to visit this country. In addition to a twenty-page presentation of Romania, the magazine presented various possible ways to visit the country, either as part of a European tour or as an individual destination. It called attention to a European tour that started in Lyon and continued through Geneva, Zurich, Munich, Salzburg, Vienna, Budapest, Cluj, and Brasov, ending in Bucharest. The two travel agencies that organized trips to Romania, *Espatur* from Barcelona and *Iberotours* from Madrid, invited future tourists to either discover the route of Count Dracula, or to visit Bucharest and the Black Sea coast. The trips cost 26,900 pesetas, approximately $336, and lasted for 15 days. The third proposed tourist activity focused on geriatric treatment that included both transportation and accommodation.

A twenty-page article, alluringly entitled “Rumania - La Ruta del Conde Dracula” (Romania - The Route of Count Dracula), completed the tourist presentation of Romania. The article opens with some of the notes that Spanish tourists left in the Bran museum’s book, including: “From Seville we came to see Count Dracula. …Where does he hide? Dracula, reveal

471 The exchange rate for one dollar was of 79.82 pesetas in June 1978. See http://fxtop.com/en/currency-converter-past, last accessed April 6th, 2014
yourself, do not be shy!"\textsuperscript{473} The article goes on to link Romania, particularly Transylvania, to a reference that would be familiar to most Western tourists: the Bram Stocker’s novel about the prince-vampire, Dracula. However, it was not the article’s author intention to stay only in the gray zone of fiction. Jose Antonio, the author, also mentioned the historical character that inspired the literary character of Dracula and showed how he was remembered in the Romanian official history in the 1970s: as a fighter against the Ottomans, who had been the common enemy of both Spain and Romania. Whether he intended to or not, highlighting Dracula’s struggle against Islam provided a common ground for Spaniards aware of their and Romania’s shared history.

Jose Antonio then suggests to Spanish readers a series of recommendations about where to visit in Romania. His itinerary had Bucharest as the first stop. Suggested tourist destinations ranged from cultural visits (two churches, the Athenaeum, the Museum of the Communist Party, and the Museum of Natural History) to shops, restaurants, and bars. His other recommendations included the Carpathians Mountains, the monasteries in the Northeastern Moldavia, the Black Sea coast, and the “merry cemetery” in Săpânța, a small village in the Northwestern of the country. The article then detailed the program of the trip to Romania that the two travel agencies offered. The tourists would spend the first day in Bucharest visiting the National Museum of History, the Museum of the Communist Party, and the tomb of Vlad the Impaler (Dracula) at the monastery of Snagov, near Bucharest. During the second and the third days, the Spanish tourists would head to Târgoviste and Curtea de Argeș (two former city-capitals of Wallachia). The fourth day was dedicated to Sibiu (Hermannstadt) and Sighișoara (Schässburg), while on the fifth day tourists would visit Târgu-Mureș, a town in Eastern Transylvania. Prospective Spanish tourists would spend the next two days visiting some 16\textsuperscript{th} century monasteries in northern Moldavia. For the

\textsuperscript{473} \textit{Ibidem}, p.20.
eighth day of their trip, Spanish tourists returned to Transylvania, visiting the Prahova Valley and Brașov, where he suggested dinner at a restaurant that offered Romanian traditional food and “folk dances.”474 The remaining days were to be spent visiting the Black Sea coast. The article also makes clear that Spanish tourists also had the choice of buying a trip to “Russia, Turkey, or Greece.”475 The advertised trip to Romania was scheduled to last for fifteen days during which, literally, the Spanish tourists would have toured the entire country. The promotion of Romania as a destination that offered tourists the possibility to explore historical heritage and folk culture, as well as the beaches, reminded Spaniards of the promotion of their own country in the West. This explains why this campaign sparked some interest among Spanish tourists for visiting Romania. The number of Spanish tourists doubled between 1974 and 1979, from 11,157 to 23,938.476 Against the backdrop of Bozdog’s visit in Spain and the improving of Spanish-Romanian relations, Romania became a tourist destination for Spanish tourists before the death of Franco in 1975. This event certainly influenced tourist relations between Spain in Romania as the spike in the number of Spanish tourists traveling to socialist Romania shows.

But the flow of tourists was hardly balanced. Despite Romania's interest in opening tourist relations with Spain, the number of Romanian tourists visiting Spain was much lower. In 1975, between May and November, 1009 Romanians visited Spain a large majority as tourists.477 Surprisingly the most crowded month was September with 276 Romanian visitors.478 This was mostly because of the difficult bureaucratic process that Romanian citizens had to undergo when

474 Ibidem, p. 21.
475 Ibidem, p. 21.
476 ANIC, Central Committee Collection, Economic Section, 165/1981, f. 16. By comparison the number of tourists from West Germany only slightly increased from 212,359 in 1974 to 247,127 in 1979. In 1979, 743,279 Western tourists visited Romania, while the total number of foreign tourists was 6,1 million.
477 ACNSAS, Documentary Collection, file no. 13165, vol. 2.
478 Ibidem, f. 74.
wanting to travel individually to capitalist countries and sometimes even to socialist ones. In 1968, 65,084 tourists traveled to capitalist countries and their numbers would increase in the next years. Yet this type of travel required special verifications. Among others, their supervisor had to guarantee their return. In addition, a special request had to be made to the Direction for Passports, Foreigners, and Border Crossings within the Ministry of Interior. This request was, however, evaluated by the Securitate, the secret police. The issues that caused this imbalance make clear that for Romanian leaders, it was the financial benefit that international tourists brought to Romania, rather than any political relaxation that drove the efforts to enhance travel relations with Spain.

4.6 CONCLUSION

In the early 1960s, international tourism between West and East gained momentum. The 1961 meeting of tourist delegates from socialist countries in Moscow was the first step in this development. Yet contrary to what the Soviet leader might have envisioned, in the late 1960s, it was socialist Romania that took the lead in establishing and consolidating relations with the capitalist West in order to develop its own industrial capacities and pursue more independent trade relations. As the Romanian government recognized the benefits that tourism would bring to the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{479} On the topic of Romanian citizens travelling abroad, see: ACNSAS, Documentary Collection, file no. 11750, vol. 32, f.15; ACNSAS, Documentary Collection, file no. 988, file no. 8789, vol. 389, file no. 8789, vol. 147.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{480} This was much to the surprise of the Soviet leaders who according to the Valev Plan assigned Romania the role of becoming an agricultural country and as a result paying less attention to industry and services. The so-called Valev Plan, named after its proponent Emil Valev, wanted to create an agricultural zone which included 100,000 km}\^2 \text{ in Romania, 38,000 km}\^2 \text{ in Bulgaria and 12,000 km}\^2 \text{ in the Soviet Union (Moldavia and Ukraine). The plan was strongly opposed by Romania. In June 1964, the economist Costin}\]

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socialist economy, it also realized that it could be an avenue for improving its image in the West. In 1962, Romania initiated a strong publicity campaign to promote itself on the Western market and by 1965, it succeeded in quadrupling the number of Western tourists visiting the country. The promotion strategy emphasized the Latin origins of Romanian language and Romania’s belonging to the so-called European culture as well as the strong cultural ties that Romanians still had with the West despite the Cold War. This rhetoric was so convincing that an Austrian tourist visiting Romania in 1965 involuntarily reproduced this discourse, although he showed his discontent towards the provided services on the Black Sea Coast.

Furthermore, the Romanian government sought ways to counterbalance the COMECON-European Economic Community (EEC) division by initiating tourist agreements with countries from southern Europe, which did not belong to either of the two economic blocs. The Balkan Tourist Association was one such initiative. Although the success of such organizations was limited, as it was not reinforced by a strong political cooperation and clear common policies, they did offer an alternative to the more ideologically framed COMECON and EEC. The ambiguous tourist position of socialist Romania and its attempt to establish strong relations with all countries interested in developing international tourism became obvious when it approached Francoist Spain for a possible tourist agreement. After having treated Yugoslav’s and Czechoslovak’s request for a visit to Spain with mistrust, Francoist Spain responded surprisingly well to the Romanians’

request and a visit by a delegation led by Nicolae Bozdog, the chief of the NTO-Carpathians took place in April 1968. The explanation for Romania’s better treatment could be found in the country’s ambiguous relation with the Soviet Union and in its desire to pursue its own economic policies.\textsuperscript{481} Romania’s commitment to establish a relationship with European Economic Community was shown by its request to obtain preferential trade status in 1972. Romania was the first socialist country to make such a request. Initially, France and the Netherlands opposed it, but this status was finally granted in 1973. In addition, Ceauşescu tried to establish a preferential relation with the United States as well. The relationship between international tourism and its foreign policies still needs to be examined.

The lack of clarity between foreign policies and international tourism is particularly illustrated by the Romanian tourist delegation to Spain. Although the visit did not go as smoothly as it could because the Romanian delegation had to travel on tourist visas, the effects of the visit were significant. The relationship between socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain improved and Spaniards started to visit Romania. Romania also became a familiar presence in Spanish travel magazines and the tourist accomplishments of this country were openly acknowledged. Despite Spain’s initial reluctance towards socialist countries, its position evolved because of several factors. On the one hand, the private sector regarded this as a business opportunity, especially because socialist countries looked like reliable clients, while the Ministry of Information and Tourism itself showed a more pragmatic approach than other institutions in Franco’s Spain. On the other hand, Spain did not want to project the image of a country that limits international travel, a sensitive issue in the 1960s-1970s.

\textsuperscript{481} Romania was the first socialist country to make such a request. France and the Netherlands initially opposed it, but this status was finally granted in 1973. See ANIC, CC of PCR External Relations, and https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/new-evidence-romania-and-the-warsaw-pact-1955-1989.
A 1960 cartoon published in *Gaceta de Barcelona* reproduced the dialogue of a Spanish aristocratic couple who had taken refuge on the top of their castle while tourists flocked into the fortress. As the man pointed a shotgun at them, his pragmatic wife jumped in to stop him and shouted, “Wait Enrique, think! They are the source of our income.” The cartoon indirectly addressed a thorny issue in Franco’s Spain: how to deal with the disruption of everyday life habits, while reaping the economic benefits of international tourism. At the same time, on the other edge of Europe, the communist regime in Romania shared the same dilemma. They wished to attract more tourists from capitalist countries while preventing them from befriending Romanians and acting as an incarnation of the alluring “West.” Both regimes found it more comfortable to tackle this dilemma by trying to shape their citizens’ mindsets rather than by pursuing a genuine liberalization of their societies. The key institutions of the two regimes -- the Church for Franco’s Spain and the *Securitate* (political police) for socialist Romania – took on this task. These two bodies were supposed to educate the Spaniards and Romanians on how to navigate the blurry boundary between working or casually interacting with foreign tourists while avoiding to adopt their way of life.

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482 Archivo General del Administración, Sindicatos, (08)045.004, box 23432, f.9. Revista Destino de Barcelona, “Enrique, por favor, piensa que gracias a ellos vivimos!”
The two states had not fully anticipated this dilemma when they opened the borders to tourists. Franco and Ceauséssescu were confident that their regimes had gained people’s allegiance to such extent that foreign tourists would not be a threat. Moreover, when giving the green light to international tourism, Spanish officials expected to welcome the ‘civilized’ elite type of tourist of the 1930s. Only later did they realize that they were living in the midst of a ‘social revolution,’ and that most of the tourists belonged to the middle or working classes. What was more, many of the tourists were motorized young people who preferred camping to luxury hotels. In the other European periphery, Ceauşescu and his supporters, believed that the demise of Stalinism and its careful replacement with nationalism and a policy of liberalization had won a substantial popularity for the communist regime. Nonetheless, the Securitate kept a keen eye on both the tourists and those Romanians who mingled with them. But in socialist Romania, once the number of tourists increased so too did the indirect challenges to the state’s authority.

Hence, in both socialist Romania and Francoist Spain, the large number of foreign tourists and their lifestyles challenged, albeit in incremental and indirect ways, the political legitimacy of both the newly branded image of Romanian national-communism and Francoism. The tourists’ better clothes, cars, perfumes, and so forth testified to a better material culture and, seemingly, a more prosperous economic system. Thus it seems that the flocking of foreign tourists into the two countries favored the citizens as much as the state. I contend that to some degree, this invasion brought about a normalization of everyday life in the 1960s and 1970s after the harsher 1950s.

Normalization is the concept that some scholars put forth to explain post-Stalinism, or in Vaclav Havel’s term ‘post-totalitarianism,’ in socialist East-Central Europe. In the Romanian

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483 M.E. Fisher, Ceauşescu. A Political Biography (Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1988); A. Cioroianu, Ce Ceausescu qui hante les roumains (Bucharest: Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2004).
484 Paulina Bren, op. cit., p.8.
case, from a political point of view, it refers to an autochthonous socialist society, which bred national and at times nationalist elites as opposed to the so-called Stalinist political elites in the late 1940s and early 1950s. At the societal level, this notion translated into a certain embourgeoisement and the rise of a middle class consisting of professionals who wanted access to a better material culture, more free time, and enhanced social and cultural opportunities. Spain, despite its location on the other side of the Iron Curtain, underwent similar developments in the 1960s. The 1959 Stabilization Plan opened the way for an economic liberalization that was soon followed by societal changes. Against the backdrop of foreign tourists' arrival, the regime encouraged domestic consumption, and advertisements in magazines familiarized Spanish citizens with an array of new consumption practices and technologies. As Justin Crumbaugh has argued tourism became the “linchpin of Franco’s dictatorship” that normalized Spain’s diplomatic relations to Western Europe as well as it brought domestic political stability. I argue that, more that, international tourism liberalized day-to-day life in Franco’s Spain from the bottom-up and that the consumerist society that developed following the arrival of foreign tourists could be branded “normalization.”

This chapter examines the role that foreign tourists played in contributing to the normalization of everyday life and consumption patterns in socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain in the 1960s-1970s. The arrival of foreign tourists accelerated the process of societal liberalization, as both Romanians and Spaniards were enticed by the promise of material comfort and the easygoing attitude that tourists ostensibly displayed. To some extent, both regimes resisted this

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liberalization. But while in the Romanian case the tension between the state and the citizens increased, the Spanish authorities relaxed their grip on “the little things”487 as tourism promised to deliver more divisas (foreign currency). Nevertheless, in both countries, ordinary people became fluent in the official rhetoric and used the two states’ interest in tourism to meet their own ends. This chapter addresses the following questions: To what extent did foreign tourists contribute to the “normalization” of everyday life in the two authoritarian societies by engaging in conspicuous consumption practices? How did “ordinary people” use international tourism to work around the strictures of central authority in the two states? What does the people’s ability to manipulate the system tell us about the relationship between state and society in socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain?

The first part of this chapter examines the changes in the everyday life that occurred throughout the 1960s-1970s in socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain with a particular focus on consumption and tourism. The second part examines how ordinary people used the presence of foreign tourists to challenge the state’s rules in the two countries, and what type of connections emerged between foreign tourists and tourist workers or domestic tourists in the two countries. The last section of this chapter addresses the link between tourism and new views on sexuality as well as the flourishing of prostitution, phenomena that further challenged the authority of the two states to govern morality.

487 The phrase here refers to day-to-day interactions between Spaniards and foreigners.
5.1 INTERNATIONAL TOURISM AND CHANGING PATTERNS OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE 1960S: THE ROMANIAN CASE

Most scholars of socialism assume that everyday life “under state socialism” was more politicized than “everyday life in capitalist societies.” As a result, a workshop about “Historicizing Everyday Life under Communism: the USSR and the GDR” held at the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung in Potsdam in June 2000 compared everyday life in these two former socialist societies but paid little attention to a comparison with capitalist societies in “the West.” Moreover, only briefly did one participant in the workshop, the German social historian Lutz Niethammer, question the expression “everyday life under communism,” stating that, “communism was not a reality but a projection” and asking why the same attention was not being given to capitalism as well. Since 2000, the topic of everyday life “under communism” has kept many scholars busy, but the issue of the over-politicized view of everyday life “in” or “under” socialism as opposed to capitalism has remained unresolved and for the most part unaddressed.

In fact, there is a solid ground for comparing everyday life in socialist and some capitalist European societies, especially when it comes to the 1960s. In both the socialist east and capitalist west, a generation that did not live through the horrors of the war came of age and demanded access to an enhanced material culture: better housing, better clothes, better food, cars, and vacations. The governments themselves were concerned with these demands and tried to come up with ways to help meet them. In many respects, for a while at least, socialist Romania and the developing capitalism of Franco’s Spain responded in quite similar ways.

489 Ibidem, p.74.
Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, the need to improve services in state commerce in socialist Romania became increasingly pressing. More goods were made available and inchoate advertising attempted to spur peoples’ desires. In the official rhetoric the “worker-buyers” slowly became “consumers,” and in some sectors the officially set prices were abandoned all together.\textsuperscript{490} In April 1964, the Council of Ministers in Romania received a report from the Ministry of Agriculture and Centrocoop (the Cooperative of Consumption/cooperativa de consum) that bragged about the accomplishments of socialist commerce in the first four months of the year, saying, “The socialist commerce did a better job than last year in fulfilling the consumers’ needs with necessary foodstuffs, and as proof the prices in the official shops became comparable to those in the farmers’ market.”\textsuperscript{491} Thus, a competition of sorts between the socialist shops and the peasants selling in the farmers’ market began to take shape, offering Romanian consumers some alternatives to the state commerce.\textsuperscript{492} While state officials followed this development, they did not put a stop to it, mostly because they came to understand that state commerce alone could not meet the consumers’ needs. Similarly, socialist authorities began to lend an ear to complaints regarding the commercial practices in clothing stores, especially in the provinces, and to pay more attention to consumers’ desires. A June 1964 report of the Economic Office within the PCR Central Committee sounded the alarm about these stores’ inability to adjust to the demand.

A visit to the clothing stores in Maramures and Crisana [two regions situated in northwestern Romania close to the Hungarian border] revealed that the

\textsuperscript{490} Colectia de decrete si legi, (Collection of decrees and laws), March 1962; the selling of bread was liberalized in rural areas as well.
\textsuperscript{491} ANIC, Economic Unit, 15/1964, f. 43.
\textsuperscript{492} A 1965 guidebook of 2,000 useful commercial addresses for fulfilling the consumption needs of the Bucharest population included services such as “housework performed at client’s house”, fashion for women, repairs of TV sets, music players, fridges, etc. as well as renting sport and tourist equipment. These activities were performed by self-employed individuals working within the Bucharest Town Union of Craftsmen. See law no. 14 from 15 May 1968 and 2000 Adrese Utile. Ghidul Cooperativelor Mestesugaresti din Orasul Bucuresti pentru Deservirea Populatiei, Bucuresti: UCMB, 1965.
clothing stores are not well supplied with summer clothes. In the retail stores in Baia Mare, Satu-Mare, Sighet, and Oradea fall and winter season clothes such as raincoats, winter men suits, etc. predominate while women summer dresses, light colored summer suits for men, or sport articles are in small quantities or lacking altogether […] Because of this, an unhealthy situation is occurring. The merchandise that consumers need for that season is not made available, and the goods that remained unsold in the previous season are stocked for the next one. This is unwise as most of them do not sell because they are already out of fashion and consumers do not want them.493

This report mirrored the Romanian socialist regime’s changing attitudes towards consumption and everyday life practices.494 Notably, it emphasized choice over needs: consumers were supposed to have options and not just purchase what was made available to them.495 Furthermore, Romanian officials did not choose the USSR as an inspiration for the country’s retail system, but rather looked to the “hated” West, where fashion came in seasons. The same report called for improvements in the training of personnel and proposed that a number of workers be sent abroad, mostly to France and West Germany, to learn from these countries’ experience.496 The report proposed using the reserve budget of the Council of Ministers as a source for covering the travel expenditures, a proposal that reflects the high priority that officials assigned to this undertaking.497

International tourism proved to be an important aspect of the process of liberalizing everyday life and consumption. Although not the spark that ignited the beginning of the process, it played a key role in its evolution. Without a dynamic and consumer-oriented economy, a country

493 *Ibidem*, f. 47.
494 Other socialist countries were experiencing similar changes, especially in regard to fashion. See Judd Stitziel, *Fashioning Socialism: Clothing, Politics and Consumer Culture in East Germany* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2005).
495 This perspective contradicts the general assumption in the Romanian historiography, which simply assumes that the regime was not interested in consumption.
496 ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Unit, 15/1964, f. 46.
497 *Ibidem*, f.46.
could not attract Western tourists, who could choose from a variety of tourist destinations. With policy changes underway, in the 1960s tourism promoters had a solid ground for presenting socialist Romania as a modern and welcoming place. Images of modern stores, restaurants, and cozy farmers’ markets appeared regularly in the advertising. For example, a 1967 guidebook of the Romanian Black Sea Coast written in English included references to shopping areas in its presentation of Constanta, the main city on the coast. According to this guidebook, Tomis Boulevard, the most important street in the town, was, “lined with numerous shops: a lacto-vegetarian restaurant, a self-service restaurant (Pescarusul/Seagull), a confectionary shop with refreshment bar, etc.” Additionally, other areas in the town were suggested as places where tourists could fulfill their consumerist desires. The guidebook called attention to Stefan cel Mare Street (Steven the Great St.) in the city center where, “The great number of shops makes it a convenient shopping area.” Foreigners, especially Western tourists, were promised the benefits of a more liberal approach to commerce if they chose Romania as their holiday destination.

Many commercial activities thrived in the framework of the new system that the Romanian socialist regime introduced in the 1960s. Although most of the stores were state owned, in the 1960s, private entrepreneurs could rent a state-owned shop and run it for profit. The “commissionaires” system was profitable for both the state and the “investors” until it was suddenly brought to a halt in the late 1970s. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, numerous newspaper ads asked for people with monetary resources to invest in commercial activities, especially in those that presupposed direct contact with the public. Although official documents

499 Ibidem, p. 23.
500 Gheorghe Florescu, Confesiunile unui cafegiu, Humanitas, 2008, Gheorghe Florescu was a commissioner.
are silent about these practices, individual memory is not. Ileana M, a French translator, remembers how a pastry shop run by a private entrepreneur in her neighborhood sold the best ice cream available on the market.\textsuperscript{501} The implicit sub-text of “commissionaires” system was that the regime acknowledged its lack of resources and people able to perform commercial activities, leading it to attract individuals who had previously worked in commerce but whose shops had closed at the end of the 1940s and early 1950s.\textsuperscript{502} These individuals’ skills and money contributed to a revival of commerce and thereby helped to foster the rise of consumerism in socialist Romania in the 1960s-1970s.

Despite the considerable improvements made in consumer services in the late 1960s, results were still unsatisfactory, especially when it came to attending to the actual needs of foreign tourists. On many occasions, Romanian authorities insisted on the importance of providing adequate consumer services to foreign tourists, and even attempted to create both the necessary framework and to educate the tourist workers in this respect. A report of the Economic Section of the PCR’s Central Committee from June 1964 proposed the following measures for improving such services in Mamaia and Eforie Nord:

1. The offering of specific training for the tourist workers hired in the summer months; the training should take place before the start of the tourist season and workers should receive a salary that equals 50 percent of the minimum wage for the specific jobs [for which] the worker receives training.
2. The provision of necessary numbers of qualified workers in hotels and public eating facilities (restaurants) by transferring them from similar units from the rest of the country.
3. The offering of material incentives to tourist workers, such as free meals within the limit of ten lei per diem [a full menu for tourists was 15 lei] and rewards for outstanding work.\textsuperscript{503}

\textsuperscript{501} Ileana M, personal interview, November 2015.
\textsuperscript{502} Nationalization of private factories and shops took place on June 11, 1948. See Law no. 119 from 11 June 1948 in Official Monitor.
\textsuperscript{503} ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Unit, 15/1964, f. 45.
These measures met the approval of the Committee for Work and Colonies, the Planning State Committee and most importantly, the Ministry of Finance, which was an assurance that they would be implemented and not relegated to a desk’s drawer.

However, while the 1960s marked a breakthrough in Romanian socialist commerce, this liberalization was not to last. Although rationing was abolished in the 1960s, in the late 1970s certain products became rationed again.\textsuperscript{504} The situation worsened in the 1980s. On October 10, 1983, the Council of Ministers passed a decree that prohibited ordinary Romanians from stocking foodstuffs, such as sugar, coffee, oil, rice, and flour that exceeded their needs for a month; the decree made such activities illegal.\textsuperscript{505} If discovered, individuals could be sentenced to jail for six months to five years. Sugar and oil were rationed nationwide, while meat, milk, and bread were rationed only in some counties. Rationing led to general shortages and thereby resulted in a minimum amount of available foodstuffs. At the same time, products that were not rationed were impossible to find. One example of such a product was coffee, which disappeared from grocery stores all together.\textsuperscript{506} Although some viewed the shortages as a deliberate process, the limited access to consumer goods had negative consequences for the socialist economy, as a 1985 report by the Workers Committee for the Control of Economic and Social Activity within the PCR made

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}[\textsuperscript{504}] \item “Decree no. 277 from July 25, 1979 regarding certain measures for the rationalization of fuel consumption and the economical distribution of automobiles,” in \textit{Official Bulletin}, 64 (1979), p. 86.
\item Pavel Campeanu, \textit{Ceauşescu, Anii Numaratorii Inverse} (Iasi: Polirom, 2002), p. 269.
\item \textit{Ibidem}, p. 269. Pavel Câmpeanu, a former member of the \textit{nomenklatura} and an analyst of the communist system in Romania, explained that supplying stores with necessary foodstuffs depended on the party first secretary. The party first secretary was the Romanian Communist Party appointee in each county whose responsibility was to run the county and report to the central structures in Bucharest. Yet against the backdrop of generalized shortages, the party first secretary’s task became more complicated. According to Câmpeanu, “if he gives less food than the directives require of him, he will be loved by authorities but despised by the people; if he tries to give more food, the central authorities will consider him incompetent. Every party first secretary approaches this issue in a different way, as the party first secretaries are not all alike. I was told that in Cluj and Piteşti the situation is horrible, in Sibiu and Vâlcea it’s just pathetic.”
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
clear. The report emphasized that the existing cash in the market was higher than the planned amount while the revenues from commercial activities were lower by 1.4 billion lei in comparison with the predicted plan values.\textsuperscript{507} This kind of imbalance threatened to fuel inflation, detrimental even in a centralized planned economy like that of socialist Romania.\textsuperscript{508}

Nonetheless, during the 1970s-1980s foreign tourists remained a priority for the socialist regime. What is more, against the backdrop of a generalized crisis, they played a role in balancing the socialist economy. However, for ordinary people who had contact with Western tourists, their role was much more important. The presence of foreign tourists provided a way to skirt the shortages found in the official shops. In order to preserve the tourist atmosphere, foreign tourists had the opportunity to buy goods from special tourist shops, which were specially designed stores that sold a large array of foreign and Romanian products for hard currency.\textsuperscript{509} Whereas in the 1960s, foreign tourists were not very interested in the special shops, as the usual stores sold plenty of goods and gave the tourists the chance to get a taste of ‘real’ Romanian products, in the 1970s-1980s, the tourists shops offered the only possible shopping experience for foreign visitors. This was not necessarily against the Romanian socialist state’s policies. The state sought to obtain more revenues in hard currencies and tourist shops offered a good possibility for doing so.\textsuperscript{510} But when foreign tourists started to buy things from the tourist shops for Romanians and turned this activity

\textsuperscript{507} ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Section, 169/1985, f. 39.
\textsuperscript{508} This was a common situation in socialist countries. Economists use the term “monetary overhang” to describe this situation. See Janos Kornai, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 257.
\textsuperscript{509} This was a common practice in communist Eastern Europe and the USSR. Romania opened its first shops in 1964, and the revenues that the country obtained from this activity reached 2.6 million dollars in 1969. This was less than what neighboring countries collected: Bulgaria got 4.5 million dollars while Czechoslovakia obtained 45 million dollars from selling goods in these shops to foreign tourists. See ANIC, file no. 92/1969 Central Committee Collection, Chancellery Unit, f. 3.
\textsuperscript{510} \textit{Ibidem}, f. 4.
into a business venture, the socialist state started to worry that this situation could compromise both its domestic authority and its image abroad.

Ileana M., one of my interviewees, explained how this process worked. During a vacation that she took at the seaside in the early 1980s, she befriended a family of Belgian tourists. The husband, Francois, had been a tourist to Romania since the mid-1970s; he began visiting Romania to find a cure for his persistent back problems. As his health situation improved, he decided to come to Romania every year to follow the treatment. During this time, he not only learned some Romanian, but also witnessed the degradation of Romanian commerce. When asked, he did not hesitate to buy goods from the tourist shop for his acquaintances. Yet Francois was not doing this only because of his generosity; it also allowed him to make some extra money. While on the official market, the dollar was sold for 11-12 lei, Francois would sell it for 50 lei, thus quadrupling his profits.\textsuperscript{511} The tourist shops thereby became a source of revenue for foreign tourists and a way of overcoming shortages for some middle-class Romanians. Additionally, it worked to remind Romanians of the nascent embourgeoisement of the 1960s, which the state had promised but had failed to deliver.

The only region in the country that preserved some traces of the 1960s liberalization was the Black Sea coast, the most important tourist area in Romania. Despite struggling with a continuous crisis, the socialist state wished to keep the economy of the Black Sea Coast buoyant. This was the only area in the country where rationing was never introduced and where scarce products such as coffee and Pepsi (Coca-Cola was not present on the market) existed in relatively great variety at kiosks and in grocery stores.\textsuperscript{512} Furthermore, certain products, such as bread, were

\textsuperscript{511} Ileana M, personal interview, November 2015.
\textsuperscript{512} George S, engineer, personal interview, June 2011.
more diversified and of better quality than in the rest of the country. However, in order to preserve this relative well-being, special political intervention was needed. Constanta’s first prime secretary, various officials in the government, and/or the Ministry of Tourism had to lobby for a privileged treatment of the Constanta region. For instance, a 1975 note from Janos Fazakas, the Minister of Domestic Commerce, to Ceaușescu asked that between June 1 and September 15 bread products sold on the seaside contain a higher concentration of wheat, as in the previous tourist season foreign tourists regularly complained about the quality of bread. 513 Ceaușescu approved this recommendation; he also recommended an improvement in the consumer services on the seaside, services that he deemed as “unfit.” Other suggested measures included the extension of store hours to twelve business hours per day, along with extended working hours for the factories producing the goods to be sold. Because of Ceaușescu’s directive, all stores in the resorts and some in Constanta stayed open on Sundays and street commerce garnered more attention. 514 Yet against the backdrop of the lack of consumer goods affecting the other regions of the country, these measures were hardly enough to revive commercial activities on the seaside. In 1985, another report by the Central Committee of the PCR urged that necessary foodstuffs be directed to meet the needs of foreign tourists. 515 Although hotels and restaurants that mainly housed foreign tourists were well supplied, the lack of adequate consumer goods became obvious once tourists decided to leave the resort and to stroll the forlorn surroundings. In 1983, the number of individual foreign tourists from capitalist countries plummeted by 15 percent and the number of those tourists coming

513 ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Section, file no. 45/1975, f. 48. This kind of measure asked for an increase in the quantity of wheat allocated for Constanța County by 500 tons and an additional 20,000 tons of first quality wheat to be mixed with ordinary wheat so as to obtain a better quality of bread.
514 Ibidem, p. 51.
515 ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Section, file no. 218/1985, f. 137. This happened despite the fact that the available data showed that foodstuff was insufficient to cover peoples’ daily needs.
from neighboring socialist countries fell by 36 percent in comparison with the previous year.\(^{516}\) Although the statistics showed a slight improvement for the following years, it was clear that the region had lost its reputation as a desirable tourist area, especially when compared with the neighboring socialist countries. At the end of the day, the overall tendency to limit the buying of foreign goods and to replace them with less appealing domestic products affected the Black Sea region as well. In fact, beginning in the 1980s, some individual Western tourists who drove to the region brought their own foodstuffs with them.\(^{517}\)

In the 1960s, the consumption patterns in socialist Romania had shifted from autarchy to a “needs only” model that tried to meet consumers’ desires, especially when those consumers happened to be foreign tourists. Officials were aware that despite improvements, consumption services in Romania were still below western tourists’ standards and the government adopted a number of measures to change this situation. Nevertheless, consumption did not remain a top priority for the Romanian socialist government, especially for Ceaușescu and his team.\(^{518}\) In the 1980s, in the midst of a global economic crisis and against the background of a declining number of Western tourists, the regime eliminated the tourist sector from its list of priorities.

\(^{516}\) ANIC, CC of PCR Economic Section, 205/1984, f.13.
\(^{517}\) ACNSAS, Tulcea County Documentary Collection, file no. 19666, vol. 3, f. 62.
\(^{518}\) A 1981 Central Committee meeting discussing the consequences of the martial law in Poland put forth the proposal to help the “Polish friends” with consumer goods such as laundry detergents, even though the Romanian market lacked those products all together. When one of the participants in the meeting raised this problem, Elena Ceaușescu replied that Romanians do not even use laundry detergents but homemade soap. See ANIC, Central Committee Collection, 43/1981, f. 24.
5.2 FOREIGN TOURISTS AND CHANGING PATTERNS OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE 1960S: THE SPANISH CASE

As in the Romanian case, everyday life and consumption patterns in Spain gradually drifted from autarchy and scarcity to an inchoate form of “conspicuous consumption” in the 1960s. The 1959 Plan of Stabilization allowed foreign companies to infuse capital into the Spanish economy. This brought about a substantial increase in the number of foreigners visiting Spain. One of my interviewees, a former professor of tourism at the University of Malaga, described the following encounter between foreign visitors and the Spaniards as an example of “cultural shock.” 519 After the difficult years that followed the Civil War, Spanish citizens had been confronted with a different approach to material culture. Although the regime hailed private property and accumulation of wealth as desirable, the unequal distribution of resources created significant gaps between the upper and lower classes in Spain. Hence, while the economic and political elite lived like their peers in richer Western European countries, the working people, broadly defined, had to cope with the realities of economic autarchy and shortages, that is, until the mass arrival of foreign tourists in the 1960s significantly changed this situation. Everyday patterns of life that were common to the well-to-do gradually became accessible to some in the middle class as well. In the 1960s, more households were able to own a car or a TV or to have a telephone line installed. 520 Automobile ownership became of particular importance as it offered more opportunities for one could spend free time and a certain degree of individual autonomy vis-a-vis the Francoist state. The number of individuals who had a driver’s license (a stark majority of whom were men)

519 Louis C., personal interview, Malaga, June 2014.
520 J. Castillo, Societad de consumo a la española (Eudema, Madrid, 1987), pp. 54-60.
increased from 4 percent in 1960 to 12 percent in 1966 to 35 percent in 1971.\textsuperscript{521} Other consumer items also became more available, for example, the selling of body care products soared, suggesting a new approach to sanitation and esthetics of the body.

Moreover, advertisements for consumer products became a familiar sight in tourist guides and magazines. One 1963 tourist guide of Spain was entirely dedicated to promoting a car called Seat, the production of which started in 1950 in a state-owned factory run by the Spain’s National Institute for Industry (INI).\textsuperscript{522} The advent of the tourism industry also triggered the introduction of specific restaurant and hotel technologies. Modern kitchen products, such as refrigerators, stoves, and ice cream makers, were advertised in tourist magazines. \textit{Hosteleria y Turismo}, a magazine dedicated to the tourist industry, included in its pages articles about how to use a refrigerator: “One has to note that the use of a refrigerator does not improve the condition of foodstuffs, but only preserves its freshness.”\textsuperscript{523} More hi-tech products, such as dishwashers and ice cream makers, were also presented as technologies that any modern restaurant should own.\textsuperscript{524} But once in the market, such products seeped into daily lives. All of these new technologies had an impact on women’s lives, as in Spanish society they were the ones who performed domestic chores. Also, women’s lives were made easier by the selling of more efficient cleaning products. One advertisement for a window-cleaning product showed a woman wearing a working outfit while gazing at her spotless reflection in a freshly cleaned mirror and advising other women to buy

\textsuperscript{521} Pedro Sanchez Vera, \textit{La tercera etad ante el consume} (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 2003), p. 31.
\textsuperscript{522} \textit{Guia Turistica de Espana}, Calvo Sotelo, 1963, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{523} From the article titled “Reglas para la conservacion de los productos alimenticos mediante al frio” (Rules for preserving alimentary products by using a refrigerator). in \textit{Hosteleria y Turismo}, no. 87-89, January-February 1963, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{524} \textit{Ibidem}, p. 25.
the cleaning product, as it provides “a perfect image” (*doble perfecto*) and “it cleans and preserves the cleanliness” (*porque limpia y conserva la limpieza*).525

Yet the question remains as to whether average citizens could afford these products and where they could find them, as only large stores, such as supermarkets, had the available capital to purchase and commercialize such new and modern products. In 1958, the first supermarkets opened in Spain, but their success was limited. Despite having the government’s approval to function, before 1962 only 40 supermarkets had opened in Spain.526 Their limited success came particularly from the Spaniards’ lack of pecuniary means. A 1964 article discussing the situation of supermarkets in Spain noted that the well-to-do purchased goods through the courier system while the poor relied on credit.527 This suggests that the vast majority of newly available goods were purchased by the economic elites and that only during the 1970s did they become available to more consumers. Nonetheless, the growth in the number and variety of available consumer products reflected the economic opening that followed the 1959 Stabilization Plan, and it introduced a new vision on consumption. This new vision happened gradually, as it was the result of a long process of acculturation and economic accumulation.

However, economic liberalization did not extend to the political realm, as the Spanish government showed continued distrust towards the political regimes of both Western and Eastern European countries. Francisco Franco’s speech given on New Year’s Eve in 1963 about the “prospects of the future” hailed the superiority of “the Spanish model” over that of Western Europe’s liberal-democracies or the communist model of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe:

525 *Ibidem*, p. 2.
527 *Ibidem*, p. 23.
“The society of the future is not going to be capitalist and liberal as we know it, or materialistic and barbarian like the despotic Soviet society, but one that resembles our own.”528 Beyond attempting to manipulate the less informed Spaniards, Franco presented his dictatorship as an ideal form of governance. This reflected his unwillingness to extend the economic liberalization to the political realm and to allow for a more democratic society to arise.

5.3 FOREIGN TOURISTS AND UNDERGROUND CONSUMPTION PRACTICES IN SOCIALIST ROMANIA AND FRANCO’S SPAIN

Despite what the officials in Romania and Spain had planned for their respective citizens, these individuals had their own personal agenda. The liberalization of everyday life in the 1960s, along with the two states’ new approach to consumption, whetted the ordinary people’s appetite for a more comfortable and modern life. Yet the Romanian state could not keep up economically with its initial promises as its focus remained on heavy industry and production, while the Spanish state was often more focused on building a society that would meet the expectations of foreign tourists rather than of its own citizens. Consequently, ordinary citizens in the two countries started to use the states’ interest in tourism to meet their own needs, which were mostly economic in nature.

In Romania, foreign tourists helped to overcome the shortages in official commerce. Although in the 1960s, the socialist regime itself aimed to meet the consumers’ needs, it had limited resources to accomplish this because the over-centralized decision-making system and a

528 “Mensaje navideño del Caudilo a su pueblo” in Hosteleria y Turismo, no. 87-89, January-February 1963, p. 3.
lack of capital made it difficult for both government and local authorities to adjust policies to the market’s needs. This led to a proliferation of the “black market” in which some foreign tourists were active participants. Because of their day-to-day contacts with foreign tourists, tourist workers looked suspicious to the secret police. They suspected that tourist workers established informal relations with these tourists and used these encounters in order to transfer goods to the underground economy. One way of preventing tourist workers from befriending foreign tourists was to make use of a patriotic rhetoric, according to which tourist workers should fulfill their duties as socialist citizens. Tourist workers were periodically instructed how to defend themselves against the negative influence of “fake” tourists. A 1974 “Note on the counterrevolutionary preparations of tourist workers from Sibiu County” noted that, “tourist workers should report to their superiors any foreign tourists’ suspicious behavior within 24 hours” or they should even act themselves if they believed that those individuals could endanger national security. The note warned tourist workers that, on various occasions, foreign tourists had taken advantage of tourist employee’s weaknesses and offered them presents.

Most of the alleged wrongdoings related to consumption. What the note did not mention was that those gifts were Western commodities, which could not be found in Romanian shops. And the “dangerous” deeds referred to in the Securitate’s note were thefts or other wrongdoings, such as being illegally checked-in to a hotel (where the hotel employees did not register them as tourists, but still charged them for the lodging and took the money for themselves), buying goods from the tourist shops, or, in certain cases, prostitution. A Securitate report offered detailed examples about such activities: “We consider damnable the deed of T.I. and V.V., receptionists at ‘Saliște’ Inn,

529 ACNSAS, Sibiu Documentary Fund, D8663, vol.21, f. 262. Also there were three decrees issued between 1970-1980 that regulated the relationship between Romanians and foreigners.
[Tulcea County] who illegally checked-in numerous individuals, including foreign tourists. They improperly registered them, after which they misappropriated the payment and falsified the hotel records.”530 In another case that also happened at ‘Saliște’ Inn, T.I. “the director of the inn, instead of helping the militia, allowed the prostitutes to escape through the backdoor.”531 Clearly, the presence of foreign tourists helped tourist workers to acquire the coveted foreign currency by one means or another. In another such case, a watchman at ‘Lebăda’ (Swan) Cottage in Tulcea County (situated in the Danube Delta) “gave the foreign visitors rides with the cottage’s boat for which he charged them in Deutsche Marks, or invited tourists to have dinner at his house where he cooked fish dishes, thus gaining their trust.”532 Buying goods from foreign tourists became a daily occurrence. For example, I.N., a sailor on a motor launch boat, bought from some foreign tourists who stayed at ‘Delta’ Hotel, one of the main hotels in Tulcea, various objects, such as a wristwatch and clothes. He could have also bought gold jewelry, but he refused because he said “he had enough jewelry at home.”533 The Securitate only found out about this story from an informer who heard I.N.’s wife bragging about this occurrence.

The network of informal commerce was not limited to tourist workers. In 1976, a note from the Economic Service of Argeș Militia to the local Securitate office cautioned about the selling of goods by Polish tourists. The note read: “From the available data we know that on May 16, 1976, two Polish vehicles travelled to Mihăești village [a settlement in Argeș County] and sold clothes and jewelries to various villagers. Details about this could be obtained from Sima, the storekeeper of the local general store, who also bought some fabric for a men’s suit.”534 This was not an isolated

530 Ibidem, f. 264.
531 Ibidem, f. 265.
532 ACNSAS Tulcea Documentary Fund, D 19661, vol.4, f. 55.
533 Ibidem, f.77.
534 ACNSAS, Documentary File no. 988, Argeș County, f. 250.
case. In fact, the Polish tourists’ practice of selling goods was a widespread phenomenon. In 1976, the militia and the Securitate from Suceava County put together a file about the commercial transactions between Polish tourists and members of the Polish community in the north of the country. But these transactions extended well beyond the Polish community. For example, a set of photos showed a man in his 60s together with his grandchild buying Marlboro cigarettes, a highly coveted good in socialist Romania, from a car having a foreign license plate.\textsuperscript{535} Foreign cigarettes worked as a currency in informal relations within the socialist society.\textsuperscript{536}

![Figure 9. Informal transactions between foreign tourists and Romanian citizens in Suceava](source)

Source: ACNSAS, Documentary Collection Suceava County, File no.10325.

\textsuperscript{535} ACNSAS, Documentary Collection, file no.10325, Suceava County, f.58.

\textsuperscript{536} Anii 80 si Bucurestenii (Bucharest: Paidea, 2003).
The photo, taken by a Securitate officer, reflects the banality of such activities, as well as the state’s inability to deal with them. Because money had become less useful as there were few available commodities for purchase in the official commercial outlets. Money became valuable only in the framework of informal exchanges taking place on the black market.\(^{537}\) For the Polish tourists, Romanian lei were valuable as they could avoid buying it at a more expensive price on the official market. Furthermore, like the Romanian state, the Polish state protected its monopoly over the zloty, the national currency, and limited the amount that tourists could take out of the country.\(^{538}\) By selling goods to Romanians, Polish tourists supplemented their pocket money and became consumers in the Romanian socialist economy. However, the Romanian authorities, especially the secret police, did not follow this line of thought and regarded informal commerce as a practice that compromised and delegitimized the authority of the paternalist state.

The authority of the Romanian state was further compromised when informal commerce involved currency exchanges. Foreign currency was a state monopoly and owning only a few dollars or Deutsche Marks could land a Romanian citizen in prison.\(^{539}\) While foreign tourists were allowed to bring any quantity of hard currency into the country, they could not carry Romanian

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\(^{539}\) This was common to other socialist states as well. The more liberal Hungary also prohibited foreign currency possession. See the movie *Secret House Search* (Titkos házkutatás) about a secret search into a private house by the AVH (secret police) in order to find hidden objects, such as US dollars or western goods, while the owners were at a spa. (OSA, Budapest, Hungary). See Art. 37, Law 210/1960 published in Official Bulletin in no. 56/1972. According to this law, the failure to declare available foreign currencies could put one in prison from six months to five years.
currency over the border. A 1967 tourist guidebook published in English advised tourists that before leaving Romania to exchange their remaining Romanian currencies at “a bank, bureau de exchange, or the nearest National Tourist Office.” When arriving in Romania, tourists could exchange money at the “exchange bureau of the National Bank of Romania, in the big hotels, at airports, ports, and railway stations, as well as at all National Tourist Office agencies and branch offices in Bucharest and throughout Romania.” In the same locations, tourists had also the option to exchange travelers’ checks. To prove that they changed all available lei (Romanian currency) to the custom office when leaving the country, foreign tourists were instructed to save all their receipts.

In spite of these measures, the smuggling of both Romanian and foreign currencies became a routine activity in the 1960s. A 1965 secret police report noted that, “The cases that we have discovered prove that such illegal transactions [foreign currency smuggling] involve both foreign and Romanian currency.” Strikingly, Western tourists were active participants in the smuggling of Romanian currency, an activity that turned into a more or less profitable business. The same 1965 Securitate note emphasized that: “Some foreign citizens purchased and took out of the country Romanian currency with the purpose of selling it abroad at a better price or exchanging it for other currencies. The currency exchange took place not only through some exchange offices from abroad but also between private citizens. These individuals intend to visit our country and need Romanian lei.” Austrians and West Germans who had emigrated from Romania were the

540 Peter Latham, *op. cit*, p. 65.
541 *Ibidem*, p. 65.
543 *Ibidem*, p. 66.
544 ACNSAS, File no. 1877, vol.11, Brasov, f. 46.
545 *Ibidem*, f. 46.
main figures in such exchanges. This was the case with Ernst Fabritius from Austria, who coordinated illegal currency exchanges with his brother Richard Fabritius, a Romanian citizen living in Sibiu (Hermannstadt). In one case, Ernst Fabritius carried 200,000 lei (the equivalent of 12,000 US dollars across both Romanian and Hungarian borders. The case was discovered when a jealous neighbor informed on him. When finally caught by the Romanian authorities, Fabritius told them that he “only exchanged 80,000 lei and brought the rest of the money back to invest it in jewelry, as the currency exchange business was not that profitable.”

This was hardly an isolated case. Between 1963 and 1965, another Austrian tourist, Iosif H., sold various Western commodities, such as razors, markers, and table covers, so as to obtain important revenues in Romanian currency. He then used the Romanian money to buy goods from a Viennese store that accepted lei or sold it to prospective tourists to Romania. His ultimate goal was to exchange the Romanian money for dollars. The Viennese shop that accepted payments in lei officially sold Romanian folk artifacts, but in the background it actually operated an efficient network of currency exchange. Clearly the socialist state was not the only beneficiary of Romania’s opening to foreign tourists. In addition, some citizens of capitalist countries started to commercialize Romanian currency in the West. As a city in between the socialist and capitalist blocs, Vienna became a very important location in this network. At the end of the 1960s, a tourist delegate of a foreign firm in Romania noted that “…passing through Vienna I saw that there are large quantities of Romanian money that sell for 20-22 lei per one US dollar.” This suggested a

546 Ibidem, f. 47.
547 Ibidem, f. 47.
549 Ibidem, f. 50. This was a better price for tourists as in Romania one US dollar could be exchanged for 18 lei.
well-established network that dealt with smuggling of Romanian lei as well as the Romanian socialist state’s inability to bring this phenomenon to a halt.

Tourist representatives (known as delegates) of foreign firms that sent tourists to Romania showed particular interested in this illegal currency market, as they too sought to collect large amounts of Romanian money in order to exchange it for more attractive currencies. Besides taking care of all commercial relations between their firm and the Romanian state, they were also the ones who worked directly with both tourists and Romanian guides. One such tourist representative who worked for a Danish travel agency, Karen H., would ask the tourists in her group to sell her all remaining quantities of lei instead of going to the bank at the end of the sojourn. Afterwards, she would sell the lei to the next group of tourists. She even went so far as to discourage them from using official channels to buy the necessary Romanian currency.550 Two delegates of a Swedish travel firm are known to have done the same; although the secret police suspected the Swedish travel agents, it failed to gather enough proof against them and abandoned the case.551

Tourists themselves also seized the opportunity to supplement their revenues. For instance, a West German tourist, Hans B., bragged about the fact that he did not exchange Deutsche Marks when coming to Romania as he was able to buy lei at a more convenient price in West Germany where “one could find as many lei as s/he wants for 8 lei a Deutsch Mark.”552 Moreover, the West German tourist exchanged money with other tourists in his group. As he visited Romania every year, he taught Western tourists how to deal with the authorities and how to work around the system in order to make some extra money. It was the inflexibility of the Romanian socialist state that made possible such activities. By imposing an artificially calculated exchange rate, it made

550 Ibidem, f.51.
551 Ibidem, f. 51.
552 Ibidem, f. 49.
tourists search for alternative ways to obtain Romanian currency, thereby lowering the state’s profits from tourism. More market-oriented Western tourists applied capitalist practices and mentality to the socialist economy and discovered ways to circumvent the system.

Ordinary Romanians also partook in illegal currency exchange activities. Nic C., a tourist guide with the NTO-Carpathians, recalls how he used to buy Deutsch Marks from tourists who needed lei and wanted a better exchange rate than that available in the official exchange shops in the 1980s.

I went to the tourist and asked him ‘How much do you want to change?’ And the tourist told me, ‘200 Deutsch Marks.’ Then I told the tourist, ‘Go to your delegate (the representative of the firm which sold the trip in her/his home country) and give him the money, and then you will get the lei (Romanian currency) from him.’ This is how we were doing this.553

Tourist workers also used hard foreign currency (such as Deutsch Marks) either to sell to tourists from socialist countries who brought goods to Romania to sell or to buy goods from the hotel’s shop. An underground network also developed between Romanian tourist workers and tourists from socialist countries. Once they sold their merchandise, tourists from socialist countries acquired a large quantity of Romanian currency that was useless, as they could not carry it out over the border. Their only option was to look for possibilities to exchange this money with a more valuable currency, such as Deutsch Marks. Romanian tourist workers helped them to perform this transaction. Nic C. a tourist guide with NTO-Littoral used to make such transactions in order to supplement his meager income.

It was illegal. Yes, it was, but we were doing it. The Polish people used to come here (Romania) and they craved Deutsch Marks. So you would have

553 Nic C. 61, university degree, personal interview, December 2013. Similar cases are depicted in the Securitate archives. See ANIC, Network Collection, file no. R. 170533, vol. 1, f. 17.
charged them 10 lei for the Deutsch Mark that you bought with 8 lei, and you could make a lot of money out of that.554

In this way, the currency exchange system brought together tourists from capitalist and socialist countries, Romanian tourist workers, and Romanian citizens. Despite the Romanian socialist regime’s and the Securitate’s intentions to limit such private, illicit commercial activities, ordinary people living on the two sides of the Iron Curtain commonly exchanged goods and often obtained substantial profits as a result of these exchanges. Moreover, as more Romanians acquired a taste for consumption, they investigated how to acquire coveted, albeit forbidden, Western goods. An extremely peculiar situation occurred against this backdrop: when the secret police found someone engaged in such illegal activities, they used the evidence to either turn the arrested person into an informer, or they themselves became part of the informal network by demanding bribes or a certain share in the profits. On the one hand, the Securitate needed a large network of informers to justify its existence; on the other hand, Securitate agents also became frustrated by the mounting restrictions that the party imposed in the 1980s. In many instances, the Securitate’s agents not only tolerated the illegalities that mushroomed around tourist activities but took a share of it. This is the message that my interviewee, Nic C. clearly conveys:

Let me tell you one story. We had a guy who worked in the Romanian Embassy in Bonn and after he retired he came to NTO-Carpathians to work as a supervisor of tourist guides; he was our supervisor. And every week he was making his ‘rounds’ and stuffed his bag with cigarettes, perfume, and so forth, from what we were getting ...and I have to tell you that he had a big bag. So big that one of my colleagues joked and told him that we’d buy him a tiny bag when he asked what we were going to get him for his birthday.555

554 Ibidem.
555 Ibidem.
The ambiguous relationship between the lower ranking *Securitate* agents and the tourist workers or delegates of foreign firms speaks to the complexities of everyday life under socialism and calls into question the idea of “totalitarian” control that some scholars put forth to explain the Romanian communist regime. In fact, conspicuous consumption and the various means that individuals utilized to attain a certain lifestyle came to function as a form of banal resistance to the regime. The definition of the regime also changed in the last decade of the communist era in Romania. In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, it was Ceaușescu’s family and a close circle of apparatchiks who came to personify both the regime and the state. This led to a sharp decline in party members’ and rank-and-file secret police operatives’ allegiance to the leadership. Instead, these rank-and-file agents started to use their position to cope with shortages and to make ends meet. This became such a generalized practice that the socialist regime had little means to bring it to a halt. Corruption or a system based on personal networks was a generalized phenomenon, which affected not just petty day-to-day interactions in socialist Romania prior to the 1980s, but at times the functioning of the whole socialist economy and political system. For most citizens who engaged in such activities, it was a way of procuring food, clothes, and other necessities, but it also crept into the inner circle of the political elite (nomenklatura) and secret police. Some apparatchiks would use their position to obtain various economic advantages or to trade their services for monetary rewards when helping others. During the 1980s, corruption or *blat* system became so widespread that some scholars have regarded it as ingrained in the economic structure of state socialism. But as the following discussion shows, such practices were not confined to socialist states.

In Franco’s Spain, the situation was both similar and different. The advent of large-scale foreign tourism offered ordinary people and elites alike the opportunity to overcome isolation and economic autarchy. Unlike in the Romanian case, the Spanish state made no attempts to curtail Western style consumption. On the contrary, it openly admitted that tourism brought about important changes in people’s lifestyle, which ultimately modernized Spain.\textsuperscript{558} Yet both the regime and the Catholic Church attempted to control some of these changes so as to not compromise the authority of the Francoist state or the morality of the people. For example, they became less permissive when certain books, music, and newspapers forbidden in Spain were circulated by foreign tourists or when the Spanish youth or women adopted habits that the regime deemed inappropriate.\textsuperscript{559} Also, the Francoist state sought to impose a strict implementation of tourist regulations, to prevent increases in the state-regulated hotel and restaurant prices, and to eliminate illegal activities, such as tax evasion or clandestine tourist activities. Nevertheless, as in Romania, despite the official intentions, incidents such as these occurred frequently. Most importantly, before 1962, when Manuel Fraga Iribarne became Minister of Information and Tourism and more thorough verifications began to take place, this information came to light not because of the inspections of the Spanish authorities, but due to tourists’ complaints.\textsuperscript{560}

Much smuggling activity centered around Gibraltar, a British colony, which served as an entrance to tourists visiting southern Spain. Whereas Malaga, the main town in the area, was barely connected by flight to London, at the Gibraltar airport, three flights a day arrived from London.\textsuperscript{561}

\textsuperscript{558} AGA, Cultura, 72/11.401-11.404, box 049.013.
\textsuperscript{559} Mario C. personal interview, Seville, June 2015.
\textsuperscript{560} AGA, Cultura, 23/66.603-69.301, box 42241. Tourist complaints addressed to Franco.
Because of the large number of tourists arriving through Gibraltar, the border between Spain and Gibraltar had to stay fairly open, which allowed tourists and smugglers from either Spain or Gibraltar to freely cross the border. A 1954 article published in *Arriba*,\(^{562}\) the official newspaper of the Falange, openly accused Gibraltar and the British government of supporting smuggling activities in Spain.

Here you can see thriving under the suzerainty of the British queen a colorful population composed of thousands of functionaries and metropolitan employees, with their families, and billions of Jews, Indians, and exiled or renegade Spanish, Maltese and Cypriotes, all contrabandists, populating the small ‘city’ against the backdrop of this painful and unjust almost fictional reality.\(^ {563}\)

As in socialist Romania, the Spanish state sought to control the circulation of both the *peseta* and any foreign currency that foreign tourists brought to Spain. In the 1950s, the tourists could enter the country with 10,000 *pesetas* but exit with only 2,000 *pesetas*. Foreign money could be exchanged in special places marked with the inscription “tourism/turismo” and located only at banks, hotels, and tourist agencies that were “authorized to run such activities.”\(^ {564}\) As in the Romanian case, tourists were obliged to keep all receipts and to fill out a form detailing all transactions, which they needed to show at the border when leaving the country.\(^ {565}\) As the number of tourists increased and the authorities were confronted with more and more cases of foreign currency smuggling, they decided to relax the requirements; in the 1960s, they stopped inspecting

\(^{562}\) *Arriba* was the official organ of the Falange and a highly propagandistic newspaper, which was published between 1935 and 1975. Franco himself used to publish articles in this official daily newspaper.


\(^{564}\) *Documenta* no. 41, 20 December 1951, p.21.

\(^{565}\) *Ibidem*, p.21.
currency exchange receipts. Nonetheless, until the end of the Franco regime in 1975, foreign currencies could only be exchanged in special places authorized for such purposes.

The surge in the number of foreign tourists offered ordinary Spanish citizens the possibility of renting an extra room to tourists; later, many opened small bed and breakfast type accommodations or small hotels. Nevertheless, even for renting a room, private individuals had to be registered with the Provincial Delegations of the Ministry of Information and Tourism and to meet a number of criteria in order to host tourists. For opening a hotel, authorization from local authorities and the Ministry of Information and Tourism was required. In addition, according to the Ministry of Information and Tourism order from 19 July 1952, hotels had to list in all rooms and in the entrance hall the authorized prices, according to their category, in Spanish, French, and English. Furthermore, all tourist establishments had to inform their clients about the existence of a complaint book. The tips for the tourist workers were also limited to fifteen percent of the total price for luxury accommodations and twelve percent for the rest of accommodations. However, tourist workers did not follow this requirement very closely. One inhabitant of Malaga, who witnessed what he called “the questionable behavior of some tourist workers,” denounced this to the local newspaper in an anonymous letter:

Dear Sir, It is lamentable what happens with the hotel industry in our time, and I hope that this will make the tourists go to other places. These days, tourist employees have become accustomed to receiving tips, and if a tourist doesn’t offer them, he won’t get any attention or help from the hotel workers. I have seen tourists who carried their own luggage to the car, and nobody bothered to help him. It is very common to see tourists about to leave the hotel who are surrounded by hotel employees asking for tips. Are the hotel workers so badly paid that they humiliate themselves in front of the foreigners? In the north, announcements that call for tourists to not pay tips

566 In 1954, police discovered seven such cases in only one month. See Documenta, no. 747, August 1954, p. 435.
567 Decree from 5 June 1953 in Informacion y Turismo, no.1, January 1955, p. 2.
568 Información y Turismo, no. 4, April 1955, p. 4.
are placed in the dining room, at the entrance, etc., while here we humiliate ourselves like that. A foreign gentlemen told me that this only happens in Andalusia and in Spain.”

It was not just the tourist workers who adjusted to the newly available opportunities; so too did hotel owners. There were many instances in which hotels did not offer the promised amenities or charged more than their category. In 1959, a North American tourist complained about the room costs in the “Hotel La Perla” in Granada. An investigation showed that the hotel charged tourists higher prices than those for its declared category. Hence for a room that cost 712.30 pesetas, the owner charged 1023.80 pesetas. For the 311.50 pesetas charged extra, the hotel’s owner was fined 3000 pesetas, the equivalent of thirty US dollars. In another example, a major hotel in Barcelona, the Hotel Majestic, lacked signs with the approved prices in every room and a complaint book. Stealing from tourists’ hotel rooms was also a matter of concern. As he recounted the stealing of some personal belongings, a Swedish tourist inquired in a local newspaper about the hotel’s responsibilities regarding the stolen objects. He was told that the hotel was responsible for stolen objects, but not for lost ones, occurrences for which the hotel was cleared of any responsibility.

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569 *Informacion y Turismo*, no. 29, June 1957, p. 4. While the author made the distinction between “in Andalusia and in Spain,” Andalusia was and is part of Spain.
570 “Orden de 30 de noviembre de 1959 por la que se resuelve el recurso de alzada interpuesto por don Angel de la Plata Frias, propietario del Hotel la Perla de Granada” in *Informacion y Turismo*, July 1959, no. 50, p. 692.
571 One dollar was calculated at 60 pesetas.
573 The newspaper included a section where readers could write letters revealing various wrongdoings or putting forth complaints.
574 *Informacion y Turismo*, no. 17, April 1956, p. 5.
There were also many cases of private individuals who opened guesthouses without having previously obtained an authorization. This was the case of Jaime Gélida Miralles from Tàrrega, Catalonia, who opened a small hotel called “Pensión Monteserrat” and received guests for a number of years. When he received a visit from the Ministry of Information and Tourism’s representatives, the owner defended himself by saying that everybody knew about his business, including the mayor, the police (Guarda Civil) and many other local officials. Moreover, the pension had already been closed when the Ministry of Information and Tourism’s inspectors decided to pay him a visit. Despite its lack of authorization, the pension of Sr. Gélida Miralles seemed to properly function as he regularly presented to the Guarda Civil lists with the arrival and departure dates of his guests. Despite this, the Ministry of Information and Tourism’s inspectors decided to fine him with 1,000 pesetas, approximately sixteen US dollars, a relatively insignificant amount.

Cases in which local authorities knew about “illicit” tourist facilities extended far beyond this example. What is less clear is whether or not local authorities accepted remuneration for not reporting about such enterprises. In 1962, the local authorities in Cullera, a small village in northeastern Spain, in their attempt to take advantage of the tourist boom decided to allow a private firm to build tourist facilities on the beach. Within a couple of years, Cullera became a prosperous tourist resort, but without the knowledge of the Madrid authorities, who had never authorized the project. Only in the 1970s, did the Ministry of Information and Tourism in Madrid ask the resort to do what was necessary to meet the legal requirements. The lack of authorizations was in fact

575 “Orden de 30 de septiembre de 1962 por la que se resuelve el interpuesto por don Jaime Gélida Miralles contra resolución de la Delegación provincial de Lérida de 26 de mayo de 1962” in Documenta, July 1962, p. 738.
577 Sasha Pack, op. cit., p. 172, and AGA, Cultura, 03/49.13, box 53759, 72/11.401-11.404.
endemic, and very few tourist establishments were fully legal, despite the continuous outcry by some Spanish authorities about this situation.\(^{578}\)

The Spanish state did not always turn a blind eye to the lack of authorizations or other wrongdoings. After 1962, when a special department in charge of inspections was established within the Ministry of Information and Tourism, checkups did become more frequent. Yet, tourist business owners reacted to these inspections by invoking the importance of tourism for the Spanish economy and particularly for their respective communities. A hotel owner who was fined for not following the official prices wrote to Rodriguez Acosta, the deputy minister of Minister of Information and Tourism and asked for leniency, which was granted.\(^{579}\) Similarly, many times tourist officials acted like they did not want to enforce the law, as this might have run counter to the state’s tourist initiative, or in certain cases run counter to their personal interests. Personal connections were essential and used extensively in order to obtain an authorization license or other advantages. For instance, Rodriguez Acosta received a request from a friend to approve a hotel credit. The aspiring entrepreneur wanted to open a tourist and eating establishment in Tarragona, Catalonia, but he envisioned the twisted bureaucratic process ahead of him and attempted to avoid this situation by using his personal acquaintance with Acosta.\(^{580}\) Thus, as in Romania, informal business relations became a key component in the relationship between entrepreneurs and state authorities of tourism, both of whom benefitted.

However, not everyone in the Spanish government understood how tourism worked, and some regarded tourism simply as a source of state revenues. In 1964, the Madrid District, along with the Ministry of the Interior, decided to impose an extra tax on luxury hotels, although Manuel

\(^{578}\) *Ibidem*, p. 173.
\(^{579}\) AGA, Cultura, (03) 49.08/35222/22, box 44.101.
\(^{580}\) *Ibidem.*
Fraga, the Minister of Tourism, opposed this measure. Because of this new regulation, hotels in Madrid paid five times more in taxes than did a hotel of similar category in Barcelona.\textsuperscript{581} Despite a personal letter to Camillo Alonso Vega, the Ministry of the Interior, Fraga’s request to cancel this resolution was ignored and the decision went forward.\textsuperscript{582} The divergent views on tourism between the Ministry of Information and Tourism on the one hand and the Ministry of the Interior on the other reflected rather different attitudes towards tourism in Spain. More conservative groups close to the military and Church still disagreed with the policy that allowed for the influx of foreign tourists. Such people viewed tourism as a necessary, but temporary, solution to help Spain overcome its economic crisis.

Many of this latter group were convinced that the presence of foreign tourists encouraged criminality among the lower classes. In fact, such was not the case. In 1962, the police discovered a network of high functionaries of the Tétouan Civil Government in Morocco, a former Spanish colony,\textsuperscript{583} who together with Spanish functionaries in Malaga, forged passports that they sold to Spaniards.\textsuperscript{584} The article, published in \textit{SUR}, the main newspaper in Malaga, noted that the members of the fake passport network belonged to three very esteemed Spanish families in Tétouan. Hence, it was not the opening of Spain to international tourism that was responsible for this crime, but rather the state’s policy that did not allow all Spanish citizens to own a passport.\textsuperscript{585} Besides showing how the smuggling of goods and documents worked at the Spanish-Moroccan

\textsuperscript{581} AGA, Cultura, 49.09/38834/23 boxes 54.504 and 55.302.
\textsuperscript{582} \textit{Ibidem}.
\textsuperscript{583} The northern part of Morocco was a Spanish protectorate until 1956.
\textsuperscript{584} “Funcionarios del Gobierno Civil de Tetuan detenidos por traffic ilegal de pasaportes” in \textit{SUR}, June 8, 1962, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{585} The Spanish exiles involved in the Civil War on the Popular Front side were not permitted to enter Spain, while dissidents were not allowed to exit.
border, this occurrence illustrates that the illegalities were part of an intricate network that included member of both the Spanish and/or Moroccan elites.

This was not an isolated case. Spanish tourist entrepreneurs and local officials’ relations with central authorities in Madrid in many instances went beyond the established legal rules. Although there were attempts to bring errant tourist entrepreneurs to order, these undertakings met with limited success. Furthermore, both tourist owners and local bureaucrats learned to defend their position by manipulating the state’s interest in developing tourism. Indeed, the Spanish state’s attitude was ambivalent. Although some voices opposed tourism, the influence of Manuel Fraga and of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, along with the impressive revenues that international tourism delivered, ultimately prevailed. Therefore, the state allowed the process of societal liberalization to continue and despite the lack of political freedom, ordinary people were free to pursue their consumer rights.

In both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain, international tourism and the arrival of foreign tourists offered ordinary citizens the possibility to dissociate themselves somewhat from the ruling political regimes. By interacting or working with foreign tourists, ordinary Romanians and Spaniards engaged in day-to-day economic activities that implicitly challenged the authority of the two states. Although in both countries the open resistance towards the dictatorships was minimal, the economic maneuverings could be regarded as a form of opposition towards the regime. Moreover, the extra revenues and contact with foreigners helped tourist entrepreneurs and workers in the two countries to secure a more comfortable life and to become less dependent on
the state’s benevolence. Ultimately this allowed them to create a space of their own, which Alf Ludtke’s termed an “Eigen-Sinn,” “a self-willing distancing from authority.”

5.4 FOREIGN TOURISTS, SEXUALITY, AND PROSTITUTION IN SOCIALIST ROMANIA AND FRANCOS’ SPAIN

Both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain put women’s bodies on display in order to promote tourism. But when it came to sexual mores both states were suspicious of behaviors that went beyond established social norms. Both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain rejected young people’s desire for a more liberal view on sexuality. Additionally, they strictly forbade prostitution, which they defined not only as a remunerative activity, but as any type of extra marital sexual behavior involving women. The question is, however, how did foreign tourists, with their relatively easy-going attitude and, at times, their demand for prostitutes, get around official policies in socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain?

In Romania, despite the initial promises of socialist ideology, women’s sexuality was placed under the watchful eye of the regime. “She came with her boyfriend to the seaside but

587 *Litoralul românesc = The Romanian littoral: [album] / Hedy Löffler ; forward by Radu Boureanu ; poetry by Adrian Paunescu and for the Spanish case, Hosteleria, 10 July 1962, p. 28.
she was rooming with me, as they were not married. “This is how one of my interviewees, Ileana M., described the situation of her roommate during her vacation on the Black Sea Coast in 1981. Because of the accommodation scarcity on the Romanian Black Sea Coast and the preference for foreign tourists, single Romanian tourists had to share rooms with random people of the same sex, but not with their partner. When telling me about this case, Ileana M., a college graduate and translator of French, who used to do translation work for foreign tourists, dropped this information and suggestively winked at me, and then returned to her story without offering any explanation. This was, however, more than other sources conveyed. Hotels would not book two people of opposite sex in the same room, unless they were married, a rule that shows the conservative approach of the socialist regime in regard to women’s sexuality and its attempts to enforce “morality.” As this regulation only concerned Romanian tourists, it also worked as a way to prevent them from embracing foreign tourists’ more liberal approach to sexuality.

In the late 1940s, one of the first measures of the communist regime was to ban prostitution; the “new woman” was expected to be employed in the newly developed factories, where human labor was in high demand. But some individuals, including women, were still out of work from time to time, or refused to comply with the regime’s moralizing discourse. The rise in the number of foreign tourists and the desire to obtain hard currencies, along with the lack of professional opportunities, led some Romanian women to become sex workers. The regime attempted to bring this phenomenon to a halt; institutions like the militia and Securitate played an important part in this endeavor. Moreover, some individuals, who unquestionably adhered to the regime’s moralizing rhetoric but who also hoped for some personal gain, helped the state in its efforts to

589 Ileana M., personal interview, November 2015, Bucharest.
590 Ibidem.
control “prostitution.” Hence, an informative note by a tourist employee from “Casa Bucur,” a restaurant in Pitesti, Argeș County, spoke about an Austrian tourist, Erich Prohl, who was visited in his room by a local woman, Maria G., “an old client of the militia.” Although the militia warned the woman to not return to the hotel, she did so the next day at the invitation of the Austrian tourist, who gave her the key to his room. The Austrian tourist was not aware, but it was illegal for a Romanian citizen to spend the night in a hotel room with a foreign tourist. According to a 1974 Note Regarding the Access and Lodging in Accommodation Units, hotel personnel had to “ensure order and preserve morality” in their hotels. In order to do so, they had to make sure that hotel guests received visits only in the lobby of the hotel between 7:00Am and 10:00PM. Only in special cases and at the request of the guests, visitors could have visited the hotel rooms, but under no circumstances they were allowed to spend the night there, especially if they were visiting a foreign citizen. Despite this strict regulation, Romanians did spend time with foreign tourists in their hotel rooms or in the Romanian citizens’ houses. In September 1978, another informant alerted the Securitate about a young woman having “illicit relations” with foreigners. This time it was a Jordanian citizen. The note informed that, “the man, named Ali, came in the parking lot and after about 15 minutes, he was greeted by Elvira M, whom the Jordanian seemed to know. They took from the car’s trunk various objects, food and drinks, and headed to the woman’s house where they spent the night.”

591 A region in southern Romania.
592 ACNSAS, Documentary Collection, File no. 988, Arges, f. 219.
593 Ibidem, f. 219.
594 Prostitution was a delinquency according to the Romanian Criminal Law as of 1948.
596 Ibidem, f. 230.
597 ACNSAS, Documentary Collection, file no. 988, Arges, f. 300.
also as going against the moral principles of the quite conservative Romanian socialist regime.\footnote{At the same time, the same Securitate agents had no moral dilemmas when asking one of their female colleagues to befriend a West German tourist, whom they suspected of espionage. See ACNSAS, Documentary Collection, file no. 16629, vol.1, f. 3.}

In order to control these types of interactions, Securitate agents in Pitesti, a town in central Romania, put together a list of fifteen women whom they assumed worked as sex workers.\footnote{\textit{Ibidem}, f. 389-390.} But in most cases, these women were in fact state employees who were trying to get by and to cope with the consumer goods’ shortages. The secret police’s report confirms this assumption: “Our agents have been informed that C. Elena and S. Ioana, saleswomen at PECO (a state–owned store that sold gas and petroleum), had intercourse with foreigners, from whom they received a radio cassette player.”\footnote{\textit{Ibidem}, f.307.} Although the Securitate regarded such informal connections between foreign tourists and women with suspicion, in fact, many women who interacted with foreigners might not have been sex workers. That some received gifts (but probably not money) suggests that foreign goods worked like a currency. Also, it shows that access to foreign tourists was not reserved only to the educated strata of society, who in many instances had other means of procuring foreign goods, but also to low income women, who used these relations to cope with the shortages.

Similarly, in Spain, the Franco regime attempted to prevent the spread of more liberal views on sexuality, especially among young people and women.\footnote{On gender under Francoist regime see: Aurora G. Morcillo, \textit{True Catholic Womanhood: Gender Ideology in Franco’s Spain} (Northern Illinois University Press, 2000).} Two institutions played an important role in this endeavor: the Catholic Church and state censorship. In 1959, following the adoption of a Stabilization Plan, Arias Salgado, the Minister of Information and Tourism, advised Spaniards “to not subsume the spiritual and religious aspects of life to the material and pragmatic components.” For him, Spanish national identity was closely connected to adherence to Catholic
values. In addition, the Cinema Bureau within the Ministry of Information and Tourism imposed a strict censorship on movies shown in theaters and had a policy that denied people younger than twenty-one access to a number of movies. In fact, Rafael F., a former hotel director in Marbella, Spain, who started his career in tourism as a receptionist in the Hotel Santa Clara in Malaga, recalled his shock upon seeing the French actress Brigitte Bardot in person when she visited Malaga and Torremolinos as a tourist in 1956. Until he came of age, he was denied access to her movies, as they were deemed inappropriate for a young viewer. Carmelo Pellejero Martinez, a scholar of tourism in Costa del Sol, appreciated that the most important and long lasting changes that foreign tourists introduced into Spanish society were new everyday life habits and a more liberal view on sexuality.

But in the eyes of Spanish authorities in the 1960s, a more liberal view on sexuality and women rights looked like encouraging “immoral and anti-national” practices. This was the line of thought that an employee of the General Security Direction (Dirección General de Seguridad) in Baleares most probably followed when he evicted a woman from a local restaurant and accused her of being a “prostitute.” An anonymous letter addressed to Manuel Fraga complained about these acts:

Sir, the atrocities and brutalities that police commit in our town are unimaginable and similar to those committed by Nazis and Communists. A young policeman attacked an honorable woman, mother of five, who was sitting in a café and eating an appetizer, and yelled at her while pulling her out in the street: ‘Come prostitute. I know what you’re up to!’ A feeling of

602 “Discurso del Ministro de Información, senor Arias Salgado, en la clausura del Colegio Nacional de Prensa, en Salamanca” in Documenta, October 3, 1959, p. 46.
603 Información y Turismo, No. 49, June 1959, p.3.
604 A famous picture of Brigitte Bardot shows her walking barefoot in the streets of Torremolinos.
605 Rafael F, personal interview, Marbella, June 2014.
606 Carmelo Pellejero Martinez, personal interview, June 2014, Malaga.
607 “Discurso del Ministro de Información, senor Arias Salgado, en la clausura del Colegio Nacional de Prensa, en Salamanca” in Documenta, October 3, 1959, p. 47.
hate against police spread out in the town as many other cases like this have happened. A foreigner witnessing one of these scenes asked me if women in Spain are not allowed to work.608

Dozens more letters addressed to the Ministry of Information and Tourism described similar cases.609 Yet, the Ministry’s officials took no action against these practices and even considered that the special agent of General Security Direction was acting in accordance with his duty: “We received anonymous letters against this gentlemen [the special agent of the General Security Direction], a respectable individual, who has performed his professional duties efficiently, and who has limited himself to following the official directives against prostitution, which has economically plundered the Baleares’ cafes and pubs.”610 The Francoist state made no distinction between liberalization of women’s habits and prostitution, and many of its agents deemed the sheer presence of an unaccompanied woman in a café as an inappropriate act. And it was not just the state agents that considered the presence of a woman in a café inappropriate, but the public opinion as well. A 1963 editorial in Hostelería Y Turismo, a magazine of tourist workers, called attention to an article in a local newspaper that accused the women working as waitresses in a café of practicing prostitution.611 This case reflected the conservatism of Spanish society in regard to women and its resistance to change, despite the presence of more liberal foreign tourists. Hence, the foreign tourist’s question regarding the women’s right to work in Spain remained a pending issue. But what is perhaps more important is that authorities did not seem to recognize this as a matter affecting Spanish society.

608 AGA, Cultura, (03.) 49.08/35222, box 44101.
609 Ibidem.
610 Ibidem.
Romanian and Spanish officials shared the same opinion on women’s sexuality and their encounters with foreign tourists. In the eye of the two countries’ authorities, these women could be accused of prostitution, as the officials in both states did not distinguish between consensual relationships established over time that may or not involve a form of remuneration and sheer casual remunerated encounters when defining prostitution. Moreover, the specific conditions in each of the two countries influenced the motivations and meanings of such encounters. In Romania, the lack of consumer goods led some women to engage in sexual relationships with foreign tourists so as to help them cope with shortages, while in Spain a patriarchic society that made it virtually impossible for women to find a job was the main reason for such encounters. Both states failed to acknowledge these realities and gladly placed the blame on the women, portraying them as women who had succumbed to the negative influence of foreigners.

5.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the role of foreign tourists in implanting consumerist practices and mentalities into the relatively autarchic societies of socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain. Beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 1980s, the growing number of foreign tourists who visited the two countries brought about a different attitude towards consumption and foreign imports than that adhered to by conservative officials in the two countries. This translated into a growing availability of foreign commodities in Romania and Spain in the early 1960s. To a certain extent, this contributed to a “normalization” of everyday life as compared to the 1950s. In socialist Romania, the regime sought to meet consumers’ demands; party documents reflected this concern as many discussions on this topic took place in the PCR’s Central Committee. In Francoist Spain,
the 1959 Stabilization Plan opened the way for foreign goods and technologies. The newly established supermarkets sold these goods, but their availability was limited to an economic elite, as most working people had limited means to purchase these goods. However, the surge in the number of foreign tourists brought about economic prosperity to many citizens of Spain and soon some ordinary people could afford to buy an automobile, to take vacations abroad, or simply to consume more and better products. While in socialist Romania the availability of consumer goods ended in the mid-1970s, in Spain, the availability grew and consumption thrived. Moreover, the change of regime in 1975 in Spain removed restrictions on consumption. In contrast, in the Romanian case, the consumption goods shortage became widespread, and some goods were rationed from the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.

These shifts in consumption policies in Romania and Spain produced significant changes at the level of everyday life, especially in relation to foreign tourists. The encounters with foreign tourists offered ordinary people in socialist Romania and Francoist Spain the opportunities to engage in economic activities that at times bordered on the illegal. Although illicit, these activities helped the Romanian or Spanish citizens to overcome certain issues that disrupted their daily lives, such as the lack of consumer goods, thereby circumventing excessive bureaucratic control and, in Romania, the prohibition on the possession of foreign currencies. The relative economic prosperity that resulted from these activities provided ordinary people in the two countries with a degree of personal space, which provided an alternative to the very politicized official realm. From this perspective, these activities can be regarded as a form of informal resistance to the political regimes in the two countries.

Foreign tourism also had an impact on attitudes towards women and sexuality. Both socialist Romania and Francoist Spain held a conservative attitude towards women and sexuality,
but foreign tourists and their way of life encouraged a more liberal view on sexuality in tourist areas in both countries. Yet for unmarried women, it was compromising and potentially dangerous to be involved in relationships with foreigners or even to share a hotel room with their male partner. The authorities in both countries were suspicious of prostitution and many saw no difference between casual sexual encounters and paid sex. In fact, judging from the paucity of reports on this in the archives, paid sex appears to have been relatively rare in Romania. More commonly, it seems that Romanian women used relations with foreign tourists to overcome shortages of consumer goods and food. In Spain, because official society was reluctant to allow women to work, the cases that the state deemed to be prostitution were, as in Romania, quite ambiguous.

The Romanian and Spanish governments’ decision to encourage foreign tourism deeply affected many ordinary people’s perspective on consumption. Both official consumption and underground consumption turned individuals in the two countries into consumers of goods, ideas, and mores. To a certain degree, this was more than the socialist regime in Romania or the Francoist officials in Spanish had planned. Yet both societies became more cosmopolitan and more connected to the outside world through the various legal and illegal opportunities that arose because of foreign tourism.

In both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain, the state attempted to control the ordinary people’s day-to-day life, but this proved impossible. In both countries, the citizens’ interactions with foreign tourists were among the reasons that frustrated such efforts. The fact that Romania was part of the socialist bloc while Spain aspired to be part of the capitalist West brings us back to the discussion of everyday life “under socialism” or “in capitalist” regimes. These two case studies show a striking similarity in the ways in which the two states attempted to shape their citizens’ lives and the ways in which people circumvented the state’s efforts. This similarity asks for a
revisiting of the current literature that places everyday life in socialist regimes and everyday life in capitalist societies at different poles and that argues that it was mainly socialist regimes which imposed a certain degree of coercion on their citizens’ lives. Although daily life in socialist Romania was more restrictive, especially in the 1980s, everyday life in Francoist Spain involved a number of limitations as well. It is against this backdrop that a comparative study can show not only similarities and differences between these two cases, but also more broadly between the political and economic systems of which they claimed to be part.
We wearied by its daily course, the sun prepares to retire. The shadows blend into one another, while the red of evening already announces the morning, the new day full of light. But until morning? Evening sinks itself upon the countryside and stoops secretively to every ear: come with me! It is an invitation to visit the numerous resort towns on the Romanian Black Sea coast. (...) A broad inviting stretch of coast upon which beams a generous, glowing and warming sun, a warm and clean sea, neighbored by fresh water lakes of wondrous origin, hospitable hotels in the middle of rich vegetation, an atmosphere like it was designed for recovery and cure – these are the trump cards of the Romanian seacoast.  

In the 1970s, the Romanian Black Sea Coast (Romanian littoral) had become a popular tourist destination for tourists from both socialist and capitalist countries. The tourist flier quoted above, published in German, sought to lure German-speaking tourists to this area by promising an idyllic place, where they could sunbath and restore their energy.  

Beach tourism became fashionable starting in the mid-1950s and socialist states, Romania included, seized this opportunity in order to increase their stock of hard currencies. Tourist operators on the Spanish Costa del Sol along the western Mediterranean also sought to entice visitors with images of sports and sunbathing in their attempt to attract wealthy foreign tourists. This happened despite the very conservative Catholic mores of Franco’s Spain, which discouraged both contacts with non-Catholics and practices such as sunbathing in a bikini. In fact, bikinis were only allowed on Spanish beaches in 1959. Benidorm, a beach resort in Alicante, became the first Spanish resort to allow this outfit because

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612 Die Küste Bei Nacht, Romania (Bukarest: NTO-Littoral), 1970, tourist flyer advertising the Black Sea Coast.
613 Ibidem.
of Pedro Zaragoza, a former mayor of Benidorm who became the provincial head of the Franco’s National Movement (Movimiento Nacional). Part of the new Opus Dei movement, he signed an order that allowed the use of bikinis on Benidorm’s beaches. This triggered a reaction from the archbishop of Valencia who began an excommunication process against Zaragoza.\(^{615}\) As 1959 was the year when the Stabilization Plan was approved and Spain depended on external help to overcome its economic crisis, Zaragoza’s initiative gain momentum and the Spanish Church had to make concessions. Against this backdrop, a number of tourist ads targeted British, German, and Scandinavian tourists in particular. Although many of them were Protestant, the Spanish Catholic Church had to accept their presence as they had the financial means to afford a vacation. For their part, these tourists were in search of sunny and inexpensive tourist destinations like Spain and ignored the political and religious restraints there. Both the Romanian seacoast and Spanish Costa del Sol exemplify how political and religious disparities mattered less when it came to where one would go on vacation in the 1960s, which saw the boom of mass-tourism. Nevertheless, some tensions persisted. Both dictatorial regimes tried to keep certain realities out of the sight of foreign tourists who were presented a rather cosmeticized image. Yet, on both Romanian Black Sea coast and Costa del Sol the authorities had to make concessions in order to attract more foreign tourists. As a paradox, the presence of foreign tourists and their interactions with either Romanians or Spaniards triggered important economic, social, and cultural changes that ultimately contributed to challenges to the official establishment in both places.

This chapter examines how the Romanian Black Sea Coast and the Spanish Costa del Sol shifted to international tourism in the late 1950s and early 1960s, paying particular attention to the

way the Black Sea Coast came to rival the Mediterranean region of Costa del Sol. These two locations make for a fruitful comparison. Although both had started to welcome domestic and foreign tourists before WWII, only in the 1960s did they enter the competition for international and mass tourism boom and the advent of beach tourism. In addition, the outcome of tourism development was similar, as international tourism provided increased income for the state and opportunities for economic and social improvement to the local population.616

The crucial difference between the two regions lies in the number of tourists that each attracted. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Mediterranean region attracted one-third of the European tourists, while the Black Sea Coast was still a tourist destination in the making.617 The number of tourists was higher on the Costa del Sol for a couple of reasons: its geographical proximity to wealthier countries and to tourists (especially British and French) who developed a greater familiarity with the region. This difference in the number of tourists occurred only in the postwar period. During the interwar the two regions shared a similar pace of development. Moreover, in both places, during the interwar period, tourism was a peripheral economic activity and an elite phenomenon. Furthermore, after 1945, both regions underwent economic and political crises that temporarily halted the development of international tourism. The regime change in Romania in 1948 significantly altered how tourism policies were implemented on the Black Sea

617 In the 2000s, the Mediterranean region (broadly understood) attracted $134 billion a year, which accounted for 28 percent of the world’s tourist expenditures. See Carles Manera, Luciano Segreto, and Manfred Pohl, op. cit., p. 4. Nevertheless, some distinctions have to be made, as the Mediterranean region cannot be regarded as a whole. The coastal regions of France and Italy, along with Costa Brava in Spain had been popular tourist destinations since the interwar years, but regions, such as Costa del Sol or Mallorca were newcomers to the world tourism industry. See: Carles Manera and Jaume Garau-Taberner, “The Transformation of the Economic Model of the Balearic Islands. The Pioneers of Mass Tourism” in Carles Manera, Luciano Segreto, and Manfred Pohl, op. cit., p. 31.
Coast. The focus shifted from elite tourism towards social and trade union organized tourism. Similarly, in the case of Costa del Sol, it was the Civil War (1936-1939) and Spain’s international isolation throughout the 1940s that squelched international tourism. 618

Yet, beginning in the mid-1950s for Costa del Sol and the early 1960s for the Romanian Black Sea Coast, the political and economic obstacles that restricted international tourism lessened, and more and more foreign tourists showed up. In Romania, in the postwar period, tourists arrived via officially controlled channels, such as ONT-Carpathians, while in Spain private domestic and later foreign tour operators opened the way. Nevertheless, despite the different geographical locations and economic systems, the two coastal regions became cosmopolitan places where foreigners, domestic tourists, and the local population mixed to varying degrees. Furthermore, in both places, tourism altered popular mentalities and previously male-dominated societies became less conservative, if not by choice than by necessity. Women became the heart and soul of the hospitality industry, either by working in a hotel (the Romanian case) or by renting rooms in their own house (in Spain). This allowed them more economic independence. But this was far from putting women and men on equal footing. Males constituted a clear majority of the managerial positions in the tourism industry; women could hardly climb into a leadership position. Finally, foreign tourists brought about new views on sexuality and to a certain degree opened up the two regions to the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s.

This chapter examines these issues by addressing the following questions. How did the Black Sea Coast come to prominence as a vacation destination? What was the role of beach tourism in the general framework of tourism in each country and how did it evolve over time? How did

618 Ibidem, p. 209.
the socialist regime in Romania and the Francoist state frame the two regions as places of leisure? What was the economic and social impact of international tourism in the two coastal regions?

So as to set the stage, the first part of this chapter examines the beginnings of tourism in the two regions during the interwar period. The second section looks at territorial planning and the resort-building process on the Romanian Black Sea Coast and the Spanish Costa del Sol. In Romania, new resorts mushroomed throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, while in Spain, Costa del Sol emerged as a tourist denomination in the late 1950s but it took a while to develop. Finally, the chapter ends by examining the tension between how the two regimes wanted to present their respective coastal regions, and how tourists actually used those spaces.

6.1 BEACH TOURISM BEFORE MASS TOURISM ON THE ROMANIAN BLACK SEA COAST AND COSTA DEL SOL

The Romanian Black Sea coast stretches for 93.2 miles between Năvodari (a vacation camp for elementary and middle school students) in the north and Vama Veche, (known for its nudist tourism) in the south and just 10 miles from the Bulgarian border. During the interwar period, the length was greater, as between 1913 and 1940, the Romanian state also controlled the Cadrilater (Quadrilateral), a region in Southern Dobrudja, and the Romanian Black Sea Coast extended until Balchik.619 Yet despite the length, only two resorts, Mamaia and Eforie Sud (Carmen Sylva), were of interest to either domestic or foreign tourists.620

619 Queen Maria, the wife of Ferdinand I, built a summer mansion to assert the Romanian control over that territory.
620 In 1936, 104,427 foreign travelers visited Romania, out of which 29,462 were Polish, 15,665 were Hungarian, 15,665 were Czechoslovaks, 11,811 were Yugoslavs, 9,244 were Germans, 6,232 were
First of all, the influx of foreign tourists was limited by the lack of modern hotels. Only at the end of the 1930s did the National Office for Tourism begin to build large hotels, such as “Bellona” in Carmen Sylva (Efotie Nord) and “Rex” in Mamaia.621 “Rex,” with its 130 rooms, was the largest hotel on the Romanian Black Sea Coast, but there were only fourteen bathrooms in the hotel. This led Carol II, the well-travelled King of Romania, to note at the opening ceremony that, “they didn’t take my advice and out of the 130 rooms, there are only fourteen bathrooms. The smartasses like Sergiu Dumitre [then general–secretary in the Ministry of Interior] think that if you bath in the sea you don’t need to take a shower afterwards.”622

![Bellona Beach in 1937, Eforie](image)

Figure 10. Bellona Beach in 1937, Eforie

Source: Postcard published by the ONT, personal archive.

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Bulgarians, 5,479 were Austrians, 4,672 were Palestinians, and 4,480 were Turks; the remaining 3,019 came from other locales. Not all of them visited Romania as tourists; probably many of them were there for business. *Enciclopedia României*, (Romanian Encyclopedia) vol. IV, National Economy, p. 215.  
In the 1920s-1930s, tourism was not yet associated with the beach and sea bathing; both domestic and foreign tourists were more interested in spa and health resorts. The Romanian Black Sea Coast was dotted with places renowned for their thermal water and these installations attracted many of the first tourists. But there were other tourist sites in Romania that tourists frequented more. The 209 lakes, with either salt or sweet water, as well as the mud installations in Techirghiol (20 kilometers south to Constanta, near Eforie Sud) were part of the tourist package that the Ministry of Health promoted in the 1920s. In addition, many medical doctors recommended “heliotherapy” and encouraged patients to spend more time on the seaside.623 The official

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recognition of the Romanian Black Sea Coast as a tourist area came in 1938, when the newly published *Romanian Encyclopedia* noted that, “Romanian resorts on the seaside possess the same qualities as any other resorts abroad, and most importantly they have numerous mud installations.”

Along with the publication of medical and geographical treaties that acknowledged the role of tourism came the institutional organization of this sector in Greater Romania. In 1936, the government passed a bill regarding the development of tourism and the creation of the National Office for Tourism, as the first state-supported office to develop and manage tourist programs. The state’s support led to a further increase in the number of tourists. Whereas in 1931 in Eforie, only 3,850 foreign tourists were registered (2,250 Polish, 1,400 Germans, and 195 French and Italians), in 1939, Mamaia, the other major resort on the Romanian Black Sea Coast, hosted 11,050 tourists of whom one third were foreigners.

Last but not least, the state did not hold tourism in high regard so much for its economic prospects, but rather for its ideological content. The construction of “Rex” and “Bellona” hotels were an exception to primary motive for supporting social tourism. Paid vacations had just become a prerogative of the masses in countries such as France and USSR. Romania followed their example and began discussing the regenerative role of tourism (for the nation) and its patriotic meaning. Beyond a meager economic role, tourism conveyed a strong propagandistic message, which made it a useful tool for transmitting various ideologies. Under these circumstances,

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624 *Enciclopedia României*, (Romanian Encyclopedia), Chapter on “Economia Națională” (National Economy) (București, 1938), p.267.
625 *Ibidem*, p. 268. In addition to National Tourist Office, there were other tourist organizations, mostly dedicated to mountain tourism.
627 *Dopolavoro* in Fascist Italy and *Kraft durch Freude, KdF* in Nazi Germany, or Carol II personal dictatorship in interwar Romania.
beach tourism was still a luxury, which was accessible to very few. The Black Sea Coast was marked by strong contrasts between the rich tourists and the local inhabitants, who survived mostly on agricultural work.

Similarly, during the interwar period, Spain’s Costabella (later known as Costa del Sol) was a region marked by severe poverty where the main industries were fishing and olive oil production. Tourism existed only in an inchoate form and was only accessible to a small elite. As in the Romanian case, the lack of modern hotels restricted the development of any tourism activity. The few tourist establishments were amassed in Malaga, the largest city in the area, and in Terremolinos and Marbella, two villages at five and twenty kilometers respectively from Malaga. (see map of Province of Malaga) The first major tourist enterprises were the opening of Balneario Nuestra Senora del Carmen in 1918 and of the golf course in Terremolinos. The first major hotel only opened in 1930 when George Langworthy, an Englishman, decided to buy an old villa in Torremolinos and turn it into a hotel. The hotel, named Santa Clara, was actually more of a guesthouse and none of the rooms had individual bathrooms. The next major tourist establishment opened four years later in Marbella. The owner, an Italian woman, Carlota Alessandri, needed one year in order to obtain all the permits necessary to bring water facilities to her six-room villa, lavishly called “Parador Montemar.” This was the first hotel to meet the requirements of the more demanding foreign tourists. In 1930, the accommodation capacity in the entire Province of Malaga (Costabella) reached 1,505 beds. Malaga alone was visited by 12,313 travelers.

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628 As discussed below, the term Costa del Sol did not appear until 1955. Originally, the region known as Costabella.
The visitors were both Spaniards and foreigners; British visitors constituted the great majority of the foreign guests. These tourists showed the greatest interest in the region as evidenced by the numerous British nationals living in Malaga and in the surrounding villages on the coast. Besides the Costabella’s sunny location, it was its proximity to Gibraltar, a British possession, and its speedy communication network with that metropolis that spurred the British tourists’ curiosity about this region. Previous studies tend to romanticize this region by focusing on the presence of both domestic and foreign artists, while overlooking the virtual absence of communication between the rich Englishmen and the locals, most of whom were poor peasants and fishermen.

Figure 12. Map of Andalusia, including the province of Malaga, 1940s.

Source: Where Shall I Go To Spain, Tourist Leaflet Published by the DGT, Ministry of Information and Tourism, Madrid, Spain.
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 followed by the fall of Malaga to Nationalist and Italian troops in February 1937 halted the development of tourism in the area. In 1938, the only form of tourism in Spain were the trips tracking the so-called “rutas de Guerra” that the Nationalist side (supporters of the Falangists and Franco) organized for Spaniards and foreigners in order to instill in them the Nationalist vision of the Spanish Civil War.\footnote{Eva Concejal Lopez, “Las Rutas de Guerra del Servicio Nacional del Turismo (1938-1939)” in Visite España: La memoria rescatada (Madrid: Biblioteca Nacional de España y Museo Nacional de Romanticismo, 2014), pp.259-276.} To improve communication with southern Spain, a military airport was opened in Malaga in 1939. Despite its sheer military purpose, the airport was also used to fly in the tourists visiting the “war sites.” Nevertheless, both during and after the Civil War, which ended in April 1939, tourism in Andalusia and on the Costabella coast existed only in theory.

After the war, the first tourist establishment opened in Terremolinos in 1942. The owner, Luis Bolín, had just been appointed director of the National Tourism Department (Dirección Nacional del Turismo), the first state-run structure set up to deal with tourism during Franco. Bolín, a former journalist,\footnote{For a critical view of Luis Bolín’s role as a journalist and propaganda leader for the Nationalist forces (and a discussion of the fall of Malaga), see Arthur Koestler, Spanish Testament (London: V. Gollanz Ltd., 1937).} close to the Falange and Franco himself, believed that tourism could be Andalusia’s trump card. Under his mandate the first parador (a state-owned hotel) opened in Malaga in 1948. The Gibralfaro Parador, located in a twelfth century medieval castle, offered lodging and a daily menu for just 25 pesetas.\footnote{Historias del Turismo Español (Madrid: EPE S.A.), 2007, p. 10 This was more economical than what other restaurants in the area were offering, for example Club Montemar charged 32 pesetas.} As most of the paradores opened in monasteries and castles,\footnote{Documenta, no. 41, December 20th, 1951.} the Spanish officials showed an obvious preference towards religious and cultural tourism. In addition to its historical significance, Gibralfaro Parador benefitted from a spectacular

\footnote{633 For a critical view of Luis Bolín’s role as a journalist and propaganda leader for the Nationalist forces (and a discussion of the fall of Malaga), see Arthur Koestler, Spanish Testament (London: V. Gollanz Ltd., 1937).}
\footnote{634 Historias del Turismo Español (Madrid: EPE S.A.), 2007, p. 10 This was more economical than what other restaurants in the area were offering, for example Club Montemar charged 32 pesetas.
635 Documenta, no. 41, December 20th, 1951.}
location offering an impressive view; it was just a stone’s throw from the Mediterranean shore. Nevertheless, at the end of the 1940s, the parador was not promoted as a site for beach tourism. This type of tourism, although slowly starting to take shape on the coast, was completely ignored at the official level, mostly because of the Francoist regime strong association with the Catholic Church, which believed that practices such as going to the beach and laying in the sun could endanger the Spaniards’ morality.\textsuperscript{636}

Besides the reluctance to promote beach tourism, issues of property ownership were often uncertain in post-civil war Spain. As Spain was cut off from most connections with the outside world and foreigners were forbidden to hold property in Spain, a transfer of ownership over tourist establishments took place, many times under dubious circumstances.\textsuperscript{637} The former Parador Montemar, previously owned by an Italian, became the property of a rich landowner, Marquise of Najera, who was close to Franco’s circle.\textsuperscript{638} At the end of the 1940s, the only tourist enterprises in Malaga and the surrounding towns were linked with the “rutas nacionales de turismo” and the Gibralfaro Parador. The Francoist state together with its acolytes held ownership over the whole tourist infrastructure and there were literally no foreign tourists registered as visitors to the area. A sudden shift took place after 1951, when Spain accepted American aid and gradually began to give up its policy of economic autarchy.

\textsuperscript{636} Estuve Secall, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{637} Many of the Republican combatants’ properties were confiscated after 1939.
\textsuperscript{638} Victor M. Mellado Morales, Vicente Granados Cabezas, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 10.
A 1967 guidebook of the Romanian Black Sea Coast (litoral) described Mamaia as a “resort of international interest” and proudly announced the construction of two new tramlines, which thereafter would connect the furthest point of the resort with the railway station in Constanta, the main town in the region. The guidebook published in Romanian (an English edition was published one year earlier) emphasized that the enlargement of transportation and tourist infrastructure took place because the communist government wanted to turn Mamaia into a major resort, “one of the more modern in Europe and the largest on the Black Sea Coast.” To further convince its readers, the tourist handbook explicitly mentioned the names of the newly built hotels, mostly seven to ten story buildings, and their facilities, which ranged from lodging and medical care to dance rings halls and sport amenities. As a result of the governmental financing, Mamaia became not just an accumulation of hotels and restaurants but an urban space where modern art installations and green spaces harmoniously mingled here and there. Some architectural studies

641 Mihai Cristescu, I Ionescu Dunareanu, Dr. Gabriel Paraschivescu, Gh. Ionescu Baicoi, op. cit., p. 47.
643 Irina Bâncescu, Problematica Frontului la Apa. Aspecte ale Evoluției Litoralului Românesc în Perioada Comunistă (Bucharest: Universitatea de Arhitectură și Urbanism “Ion Mincu,” 2012, unpublished dissertation), p. 158. A survey of the Arhitectura magazine, the main publication of the Association of Romanian Architects maps the development of Romanian seaside: while in the early 1950s, socialist-realism dominated, in the mid-1950s, some elements of modernism began to be present as well. In the 1960s, the preference for functionalism and Le Corbusier’s influenced architectural style built hotels reflected the move towards a more cosmopolitan architecture. In the 1970s, hotels made out of pre-pressed concrete predominated, which allowed for a faster construction pace, while in the 1980s, the rhythm of hotel building considerably slowed down. For the 1980s, the articles published in the Arhitectura magazine predominantly discussed solutions to improve the existing buildings.
would call Mamaia “the park-resort” because of its large green spaces. In this case, modernity referred not only to buildings and landscape, but also to a different attitude towards the human body. In stark contrast to the regime’s official prudishness, the 1967 guidebook of the Romanian Black Sea Coast highlighted the existence of a beach for nudism, located in the northern part of the resort. Notwithstanding the inflated jargon of the official discourse, the guidebook presented Mamaia as an exquisite and cosmopolitan resort.

644 Ibidem, p. 203.
645 Mihai Cristescu, I. Ionescu Dunareanu, Dr. Gabriel Parascăvescu, Gh. Ionescu Baicoi, op. cit., pp. 50-53. The place was probably new, as the English edition of the Black Sea Coast guidebook did not mention it one year earlier.
Figure 13. Map of Romanian Seaside, 1967

Tourists were also impressed by Mamaia’s new look. A Romanian tourist described the resort as “clean, with green spaces; most hotels didn’t have a pool [like in Neptun] but all of them had lily ponds for plants. At first the resort was small, but later when they built more hotels it became a bit packed. One could also have fun. First of all you could go to the bar...there was back then Melody Bar, with the program starting only at 11:00PM. You would pay an entrance fee, which included one drink, it was music and dancing, and a variety program for about one hour. Everybody, women or men had to dress-up, they wouldn’t let you in otherwise.”

Mamaia’s developers had a specific public in mind when planning the resort. Mamaia was built as a modern space in order to welcome prospective foreign tourists, especially those coming from capitalist countries. Nic. C., a guide with ONT-Littoral in the 1970s recalled that it was impossible for Romanian tourists to find a room in a hotel in Mamaia, as “all of them were booked by foreigners.” This frustrated Romanian tourists. In the rare cases when they were able to find a place in a hotel in Mamaia, they had to deal with the state’s preference for foreign tourists. Marioara V., an accountant at “Electrofarm” Factory in Bucharest and a steady visitor on the Black Sea seaside from 1966, remembers how she and her party were asked to interrupt their sojourn, pack, and take an unplanned but free one-day trip to Delta Dunarii, a region located 80 kilometers north to Mamaia along the Black Sea Coast. This happened because a group of foreign tourists arrived but no rooms were available for them:

A large group of foreign tourists arrived and we were told to go to the reception [desk]. And at the reception desk we were informed that we are going to be checked out for one night and we will visit Delta Dunarii. They said that, “we are offering you a free trip!”

646 Marioara V., personal interview, July 2013.
648 The place was of exceptional natural beauty but lacked any tourist infrastructure.
649 Marioara V., technician, personal interview, Bucharest, July 2013.
Yet, our tourist, Marioara V. refused to follow this request and rushed into the hotel director’s office to make a complaint:

I put on my fancy hat and I went to the director. “Ma’am, let me explain to you…” he said. I started to play the fool. “What is that ‘Delta’? I don’t know any Delta. I came to the seaside! If you check me out from the hotel, you pay me the ticket and I go back to Bucharest.” Like I didn’t know where they wanted to take us! They were doing this quite often. They didn’t have enough space for foreign tourists and then the only solution they were left with was to kick out the Romanians.650

She was allowed to keep her room, but the rest of the group took the offer and spent the night in Delta Dunării. This almost comical occurrence illustrates the insistence of the Romanian socialist state to develop, almost exclusively, international tourism on the seaside in order to obtain capital. It also suggests a clear malfunctioning of the tourist planning system. Paradoxically, this episode reflects the unexpected power of a tourist, who refused to be kicked out, against a confused state system, which had to permanently cope with shortages.

International tourism in socialist Romania soared after the de-Stalinization process began in the eastern bloc and the slight improvement of East-West relationships at the end of the 1950s-early 1960s.651 Both processes coincided with the rise of beach tourism was in Europe and worldwide. International tourism had become a reality, which socialist countries regarded as a new opportunity to compete with “the west,” and to increase their economic performance. A 1961 meeting of the socialist countries (discussed in detail in chapter two) in Moscow discussed for the

650 *Ibidem.*
651 After 1955, both socialist and capitalist blocs made some attempts to normalize the relationship between them, although these were still very tense. Soviets withdrew their troops from Austria in 1955, but in 1956 the Warsaw Pact countries crushed the revolt in Hungary, triggering hostility in the West. In 1959, Soviets agreed to take part into a consumer goods exhibition in New York, while the Americans did the same in Moscow.
first time the possibility of welcoming tourists from Western countries, as these tourists could be an easy source of hard currencies. Romania responded positively.

This meeting in Moscow, the Romanian regime’s opening up to “the west” and the world boom of beach tourism led to a substantial investment program on the seaside centered on Mamaia and Eforie as of 1961. As a result, at the end of the 1960s, the communist regime bragged about its seaside’s hotels capacity, which could accommodate 120,000 people (equal to the 1967 population of Constanta). Alongside the hotel building process in Mamaia, the southern resorts of Eforie Nord and Sud developed their accommodation capacity at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s. Thus the lodging capacity increased from 500-600 beds in 1941 to 3,000 in 1957 and to 10,000 in 1965. The building of Hotel “Europa” in 1966 in Eforie Nord, a twelve-floor modernist building, suggested that both Eforie Nord and Mamaia would serve foreign tourists. But a new ideological dilemma arose after representatives of the trade unions complained that prices on the seaside became prohibitive for the Romanian tourists. As a result, Ceauşescu proposed lowering the prices in Eforie Nord and Eforie Sud, except for the Europa Hotel, and to sell the vacation packages mostly to domestic market and the trade unions.

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652 ANIC, Council of Ministers Collection, file no. 29/1961, f.3.
653 Mihai Cristescu, I. Ionescu Dunareanu, Dr. Gabriel Paraschivescu, Gh. Ionescu Baicoi, op. cit., p. 50.
654 Ibidem, pp. 58-63. In Eforie Nord, Hotel “Europa” was an impressive building of eleven floors built between 1965 and 1966 in a modernist style, and designed to house only foreign tourists. Unlike most hotels on the seaside, it was open all year long. Its facilities included a terrace on the top floor, an exchange office, and a restaurant on the ground floor. This hotel was part of the new construction wave in Eforie Nord that started at the end of the 1950s. The first major building erected after the war was restaurant “Perla” in 1959 and hotel Perla in 1959-1960. They were part of a complex consisting of six hotels with only three-four floors that housed 2,000 beds. It was located next to the railway station, but further away from the beach. By comparison, Hotel “Europa” was smaller with only 500 beds in 240 rooms but was much more modern, as the name itself suggested—“Europe”. Additionally, a major improvement in the resort’s aesthetics was the construction of Lake Bellona from 1963 to 1964; this was a former swamp transformed into an artificial lake. The artificial lake had its own beach, a solarium, lockers, showers, and a buffet.
655 ANIC, CC al PCR Collection, Chancellery Section, file no. 138/1971, f. 142.
656 Ibidem, f. 143.
domestic tourism coupled with an increasing number of foreign tourists meant that on the rise Mamaia’s hotel space could barely cope with the demand. Both the tourism and party officials became aware that in order to preserve the promising start, new resorts had to be opened on the seaside.

In 1966, the National Office for Tourism, the Ministry of Commerce and the local authorities in Constanta had been asked to put together a plan for the systematic development of the seaside. The plan mentioned the urgency of building a new resort in the southern part of the seaside, in the proximity of the Bulgarian border, but no concrete measures were taken. Only in 1968 did the National Office for Tourism come up with a concrete plan for building a new resort from scratch in Mangalia, a town located 37 kilometers south of Constanta.\footnote{ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Chancellery Section, file no. 176/1968. f.27.} This complex became the future Neptun-Olimp resort. As the plan had to be approved by the Central Committee, the NTO-Carpathians put forward a thorough report. The new seaside complex was to be built on 140 hectares, “mostly unproductive land that belonged to the nearby collective farm.”\footnote{Ibidem, f. 23.} The proposal outlined the advantages of the location “three kilometers away from Mangalia’s city center, but close to a forest, which increases the chances for successfully promoting the resort on the foreign market.”\footnote{Ibidem, f. 228.} Furthermore, the report stressed that the road between Mihail Kogalniceanu Airport and the area south of the seaside had to be improved in order to cope with the increased flow of tourists. The resort’s planned capacity was to be 18,000 beds, which was 6,000 more than in Mamaia. Most of the accommodation infrastructure consisted of two star hotels (C category) housing 8,400 beds, while only 300 beds were in a four-star hotel (A category). This configuration was chosen in order to improve the economic efficiency of the new resort and because these were

\footnote{Ibidem, f. 23.} \footnote{ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Chancellery Section, file no. 176/1968. f.27.}
the tendencies in the more developed tourist countries. Moreover a detailed study of the external market served as a basis for the planning of the further resort.\textsuperscript{660} Because of its anticipated enlarger capacity, the report emphasized that “no new resorts would need to be built in the future, which will allow for a more pragmatic use of available financial and material resources.”\textsuperscript{661} In this way, the planners attempted to follow Ceaușescu’s directives; a year earlier at another meeting discussing the building of Mangalia-Neptun resort, he pointed out that the construction work on the seaside should be kept at the lowest possible cost on the grounds that, “these hotels are not built in Bucharest, or in Brasov, or other places, they are built on the seaside where they stay unoccupied for eight months.”\textsuperscript{662}

The building costs of the whole resort were less than 62 billion lei (around 340 million dollars); the investment was supposed to be paid off in fifteen years. The Direction for Planning, Architecture and Organization of Territory, which was subordinated to the People’s Council ({	extit{sfatul popular}}) in Constanta, was in charge of putting together the project plan (systematization and hotel design), while the Ministry of Industrial Constructions was responsible for erecting the resort’s hotels and various buildings.\textsuperscript{663} Most of the materials and techniques were purchased from the domestic market, with just seven percent (furniture and various technologies estimated at 4.2 billion lei) bought from abroad. Almost half of the materials purchased from abroad were from capitalist countries.\textsuperscript{664} The NTO-Carpathians report to the PCR Central Committee emphasized that the building of Mangalia would be less expensive than that of Mamaia at the end of the 1950s-early 1960s. It projected that the cost to build a hotel room together with the different food and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{660} \textit{Ibidem}, f. 230.
\item \textsuperscript{661} \textit{Ibidem}, f. 230.
\item \textsuperscript{662} ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Chancellery Section, file no. 109/1967, f. 74.
\item \textsuperscript{663} ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Chancellery Section, file no. 176/1968, f. 234.
\item \textsuperscript{664} \textit{Ibidem}, f. 234.
\end{itemize}
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beverage outlets would not exceed 46,400 lei ($2,577), as compared to 55,000 lei for comparable construction in Mamaia.\textsuperscript{665}

When planning the resort, the tourist officials aimed at meeting “all tourists’ needs and demands.”\textsuperscript{666} Hence, the resort was dotted with commercial centers, cultural and entertainment spaces, sport facilities, clinics and pharmacies. The planners stressed that building a tourist facility from scratch gives one the freedom to harmoniously integrate lodging with other type of spaces. All hotels had a commercial area on the ground floor that sold products such as handcraft items, beach products, toys, cosmetics, etc. Various shops, like tobacco shops, soda kiosks, cafes, day bars, bakeries, Brasseries, haberdasheries, shoe and footwear stores, and photo, sport, and music shops were present in these hotels. The report mentioned that additional independent commercial areas would be built after 1970 “to cope with further demands.”\textsuperscript{667}

Building a resort from scratch presupposed the hiring of a large number of people. For the seasonal employees who just arrived at the seaside, the resort included a dormitory of 1,500 beds. Later, as some hotels remained open throughout the whole year, tourist workers who obtained permanent employment moved into individual apartments either in Mangalia or in the nearby Neptun.\textsuperscript{668} Thus, the settlement became a community, the residents of which formed specific bonds and identity, rather than a hollow resort, only open during the summer months.

Like Mamaia ten years earlier, Mangalia and the surrounding resorts, Neptun-Olimp and Cap Aurora, were built primarily for the foreign market. But as Doru B., a former bellboy at Hotel

\textsuperscript{665} Ibidem, f. 235.
\textsuperscript{666} Ibidem, f. 234.
\textsuperscript{667} Ibidem, f. 236.
\textsuperscript{668} Alexandra, tourist worker, personal interview, March 2013.
Doina in Neptun, now the director of the hotel, describes the resort as being divided between foreigners and Romanians.

It was filled with foreigners. Where I worked, at Doina, there were Belgians, French, and Germans. At “Belvedere” in Olimp were only Italians. Romanians were usually put in one star hotels, or C category, how it was back then, run by the trade unions. Further away from the beach and not that swell compared to the others.669

Despite this clear-cut official division, everyday interactions were common occurrences. The Romanians and foreigners would mix on the beach or in the dance clubs. Doru B. recalls that although the entrance fee in the discos was paid in dollars, the locals had free entrance simply because they knew the doorman. “Now, let me tell you this: the entrance fee was in dollars…it was three dollars for the top discos. But we were locals, and young, and the doorman, many times a friend or a neighbor, was letting us in…for free.” Asked if he interacted with foreign tourists, Doru B. nodded his head and replied: “of course, I had a lady friend from Norway, you know they would be the ones to come and hit on you!”670 His comment suggests two aspects worthy of note. The first is that despite efforts to separate foreign tourists and Romanians, relationships between them, sometimes intimate relationships, developed. This anecdotal evidence suggests that these were not uncommon. The other is Doru B.’s conception of the looser sexual mores of tourists, females in particular, from Western Europe. How common it was for female western tourists to “hit on” Romanians is not clear, but the more relaxed approach of some western tourists to sexual relations became a trope among hotel workers—and no doubt their friends—and offered new ways for Romanians to think about sexual mores.

669 Doru B, personal interview, July 2013.
670 Ibidem.
If young Romanians, locals or tourists, liked the new dance clubs and the opportunity of interacting with foreigners, tourists traveling with families were not of the same opinion. The resort looked “nice but unwelcoming” to a Romanian tourist who visited Neptun in 1979 together with her two little girls. She disliked the lack of commercial spaces, “fewer than in Mamaia,” and the long distance to the beach. “I had a three year old and imagine how hard it was to carry her to the beach.” As in Mamaia, green spaces and modern hotels sprang throughout the resort but unlike Mamaia, Neptun was also less accessible for ordinary tourists. The buses that connected Neptun with either Mangalia or Constanta were few and slow. “The closest railway station was in Mangalia and from there, if you could afford it, you could take a cab, or wait a couple of hours for the bus.”

The resort was isolated precisely because foreign tourists would arrive in the NTO-Carpathians coaches or by car, as most of them came in organized tours. Olimp and Cap Aurora, the nearby resorts, were likewise designed primarily for well-to-do tourists or those with automobiles, as public transportation was sparse. The advantage of these locations was, however, that the hotels were very close to, in fact lined-up along the beach. Throughout the 1960s-1970s, Romanian seaside resorts also created some divisions between tourists from capitalist countries on the one hand and those from socialist countries, including Romanians, on the other hand. Despite what one might expect, these divisions were not ideological but economic. Western tourists paid for tourist services at prices comparable with other low-cost tourist destinations while tourists from

\[\text{\textsuperscript{671}}\text{There was a commercial space, Neptun Bazar, located between Neptun and Olimp.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{672}}\text{Marioara V., personal interview, July 2013.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{Ibidem.}}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{673}}\text{\textsuperscript{Ibidem.}}\text{. Although Marioara V. did not know this was a concern of NTO Carpathians itself. In a February 1970 meeting discussing the institution’s performance, the two vice-presidents of the body acknowledged that they overestimated the lodging capacity and sold more places than existing on the external market in 1968. See ANIC, The Presidency of Council of Ministers Collection, file no. 80/1970, f. 41.}\]
socialist countries were charged based on the special agreements reached within COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). This led to substantial differences between the prices paid by tourists from capitalist countries and those from socialist ones, including Romanians. For instance, while a Romanian would pay 9 lei per diem, a Westerner paid 800 lei per diem. Part of this was explained by the differences in the quality of accommodation and meals.

Figure 14. Neptun-Olimp Map—Neptun Olimp Flyer, NTO-Carpathians, 1990.

Source: Tourist flyer (personal archive).

\[^{675}\] ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic, file no. 61/1978, f. 21. Prices planned for 1979 in international tourism. The plan was set at 1,470 million lei valută out of which 1080 lei valută from capitalist countries. This meant that most of the revenues (more than 70 percent) were supposed to come from Western tourists. (Lei valută= an indicator used by the communist government for exports instead of actual foreign currencies). Communist Romania had three official exchange rates: one official rate to convert foreign currencies into valută lei, which are accounting units; one separate exchange rate for foreign tourist, and one rate ["commercial rate"] to convert the values of commodity imports and exports to internal lei. See Marvin R. Jackson, Perspectives on Romania’s Economic Development in the 1980s in Daniel Nelson, op. cit., p.303. For tourism activities 1 US dollar was sold for 18 lei in 1970s and 12.5 lei in the mid -1980s).
But by the mid-1980s, the pace of construction work and investments on the Romanian Black Sea seaside had declined. A January 1981 report about the preparation of the upcoming summer season, which the Ministry of Tourism first sent for approval to the Securitate, reflected the state authorities’ deep concern for preserving the existing infrastructure.\textsuperscript{676} “The technical conditions and the existing amenities were checked and clear deadlines for the current maintenance work, technical revisions, sanitation works, amenities updates, small modernizations, comfort upgrades were set up in order to have the whole infrastructure ready by April 30, 1981.”\textsuperscript{677} Furthermore, the report pointed out that, “The necessary amount of supplies, raw materials, and merchandise for the maintenance and functioning of the existing infrastructure, for lodging and eating facilities, as well as adequate provisions of main agricultural products to ensure a proper and efficient supplying of restaurants and other eating-out places was made available.”\textsuperscript{678}

At the same time the report conveyed the official expectation that the number of tourists would grow in the summer of 1981 compared with 1980. The accommodation capacity was for 135,000 beds (15,000 more than in 1967) in hotels, villas, etc. plus 30,000 beds in private houses.\textsuperscript{679} This lodging capacity was large enough to accommodate 1.5 million Romanian and foreign tourists out of which 1.4 million were expected to visit during the high season (May 1st-September 30th). Officials predicted that the number of tourists would increase by 13 percent in comparison with 1980. Nevertheless, whereas in the 1970s similar reports emphasized the growth in the number of tourists from capitalist countries, this time the focus was on the tourists from the socialist region, whose numbers would increase by 40 percent.\textsuperscript{680} The higher proportion of the

\textsuperscript{676} ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 8850, v.23, f. 46.
\textsuperscript{677} Ibidem, f.50.
\textsuperscript{678} Ibidem, f.50
\textsuperscript{679} Ibidem, f. 48
\textsuperscript{680} Ibidem, f. 48.
socialist tourists on the Romanian Black Sea Coast in 1981 was clearly evident when it came to revenue breakdown. Tourists from capitalist countries (devize libere market) were expected to bring in revenues of 69.3 million dollars, an increase of 19.4 percent compared to the previous year, while tourists from socialist states were expected to spend around 19.5 million rubles, 46.1 percent more than in 1980. This mirrored a change in the number and the tourists’ spending availability on the seaside as tourists from socialist states were less likely to spend their meager resources on trips within Romania or nearby countries and they did not possess the coveted hard currencies. The social impact of the lower number of Western tourists was also important as it became easier for the state security to watch the relationships between Romanians and foreigners (legislation in this respect also became stricter). Despite the projected decline in the number of foreign tourists, the image of “the West” increased in the imagination of ordinary Romanians. The erratic contacts with Western tourists in the 1980s and the growing differences in material culture meant that those foreigners who vacationed on the Black Sea coast became not just prosperous, but exquisite in popular imagination.682

681 Ibidem, f. 48.
682 Alina B., personal interview May 2015 put it simply: “we [Romanians] could tell when one was a foreign or Western tourist. They smelled like Dove or other deodorants and perfumes that we did not have access to. You could “smell” the difference just looking at them on the beach.” Along the same line Marioara V. (personal interview July 2013) said that, “they had beach towels, big size beach towels which were not for sale in Romanian shops.”

At almost the same time, international tourism became the main industry on the Spanish Costa del Sol. Due to the influx of foreign tourists, many settlements transformed seemingly overnight from fishermen villages to tourist resorts. Although by the mid-1950s, the political isolation of Franco’s Spain had eased, the lack of proper and sufficient lodging facilities constrained the development of the tourist industry. Two types of accommodation predominated on the Costa del Sol in the 1950s: guesthouses and small hotels. As suggested by their names (e.g. Pension de Dona Elvira, Pension de Dona Carmen), most of the tourist establishments were in fact small houses run, in the vast majority cases, by middle-aged women. By contrast, the small hotels belonged to the local aristocracy, many of whom were closely connected with the royal family, or the emerging entrepreneurial elite, who were linked to Franco and the Falangists. This was the story of Hotel Marbella-Club, a 16-room hotel, opened in 1954 and owned by Prince Alfonso de Hohenlohe-Langenburg, the godson of King Alfonso XIII (1886-1931) and a notorious playboy. Hohenlohe-Langenburg, a “celebrated bon vivant, dancer-till-dawn, rally driver, hunter and sportsman,” according to his obituary published in *The Guardian*, invited his royal friends to spend vacations in Marbella, then a quiet, off-the-beaten-track fishing village. Hohenlohe’s success with Hotel Marbella-Club was undoubtedly helped by his personal relationship with Franco. He often bragged that: “his projects were immune from planning permission or labor laws.”

684 Ibidem.
685 Ibidem.
connections with Franco’s family played an important role in the emerging tourist industry on the Costa del Sol (even more so than in other regions as Franco himself was from Seville). Hotel “Los Monteros,” which opened in 1962 in Marbella, confirmed this trend. Despite being advertised as a family business, its owner, Ignacio Coca, was a rich banker and Franco’s brother-in-law.686

Besides members of the aristocracy and important financiers, another category of hotel owners came into being at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s. Part of the new business elite, they had the necessary resources to buy either land or the existing tourist establishments. Jose Luque Manzano, a native of Seville and the owner of a chocolate factory and olive oil mill, purchased “Pension de Dona Elvira” in 1956 for 300,000 pesetas, and a year later opened “Hotel Fuerte.” Although it had only 32 rooms, it was equipped with an elevator, the first one on the Costa del Sol.687 This hotel in Marbella laid the foundation of the further tourist business ventures that Manzano developed. He subsequently built a chain of six hotels, part of the “El Fuerte Group,” spread out along the Mediterranean coast. Another example is Jose Banús, a construction entrepreneur who, after having quadrupled his investment from building the state-subsidized neighborhood of “El Pilar” in Madrid, shifted his interest to tourist development on the emerging Costa del Sol. In 1962, Banús built a whole neighborhood in Marbella, suggestively called “Nueva Andalucia” (The New Andalusia), composed of apartment buildings for tourists to buy or rent.688

By the early 1960s, most hotels had two or three floors and did not exceed forty rooms. The architectural style followed the traditional Andalusian peasant homes featuring white painted houses with inner patios. On the one hand, this approach was ingrained in the ideology of

Francoism, which favored the preserving of traditional peasant values, as these epitomized the “essence of the nation.”

On the other, this building style reflected an elitist view on tourism, which was supposed to cater mainly to a small elite. The physical distance between Costa del Sol and countries like France, Great Britain, or West Germany, from which tourists came, coupled with the high prices of plane tickets, made it difficult for middle-class tourists to reach Costa del Sol. Yet it was the middle class that drove much of the tourist boom of the 1960s and hence Spain found that it required a different type of tourist establishment. Chain hotels run by large corporations became the solution to this shortcoming.

When it was opened in May 1959 in Torremolinos, *Pez Espada* left its viewers awestruck because of its size and excessive luxury. The seven-floor building had 138 rooms, seven apartments and three bungalows, and was staffed by 200 employees. Although not built to accommodate tourists from the working or middle class, due to its impressive size, it was the first hotel on the Costa del Sol to meet the criteria for a mass tourism establishment. Most of the tourist brochures that described *Pez Espada* highlighted the prominence of its guests. The hotel provided the famous guests with a space where they could easily preserve their day-to-day habits, untouched by the daily realities of Torremolinos. It had restaurants, gardens, a nightclub, pools, and its own beach.

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689 *Documenta*, no. 38, November 1951, pp. 8-14.
Two appointments in 1962 heralded a change for tourist development and the tourism industry. Following the appointments of Manuel Fraga as a Minister of Information and Tourism and of Rodríguez Acosta, a native of Málaga, as a head of the newly formed Sub-secretary of Tourism (it replaced the 1951 Dirección General del Turismo), mass international tourism soared on the Costa del Sol. New luxury and mass market hotels opened, but so too did campgrounds, as camping became a popular form of tourist lodging, especially for young and budget conscious tourists. The hotel “Melia Don Pepe,” part of the Melia Group, an up-and-coming Spanish tourist corporation, opened in 1964. The Hilton Hotel opened its doors in 1968 in Marbella.\(^{691}\) Other hotels that catered to upper middle class tourists also opened after 1962.

\(^{691}\) Victor M. Mellado Morales, Vicente Granados Cabezas, *op. cit.*, p. 12 and Hospitality Industry Archive, Hilton College, University of Houston, Conrad N. Hilton Collection, Marbella Hilton Folder, Box 245.
Campgrounds catered to a particular type of international tourist and the number of campers grew steadily from the early 1960s. Camping regulations had been in place since 1957, but only after 1962 were specific facilities set up. In terms of accommodation, Costa del Sol’s landscape displayed a stark contrast between luxury and more affordable hotels, and the tourists inhabiting them. The main hotels, erected both before and after 1962, were built to accommodate rich tourists, while the tourists from the middle or working class found lodging in guesthouses, private homes, or campgrounds. This physical separation among tourists reflected their wealth. But the sun and beaches were available to all.

While private entrepreneurs were quick to seize the opportunity to invest in tourism and were building hotels of various sizes, the state, especially local authorities, was slower to develop the urban infrastructure. In 1955, an addendum to the Plan Nacional de Turismo (National Tourist Plan) for the first time employed the concept of a “zone of tourist interest.” The document defined this as an area fit for tourism, where the Spanish state planned to offer some incentives in the near future. A couple of months later, a first Plan for the Tourist Promotion of Costa del Sol was put forward. This was also the first time that the name Costa del Sol was mentioned in an official document. The plan did not prove to be an effective document because complaints about the lack of any urban infrastructure continued to be a frequent occurrence. For example, in July 1959, inhabitants of Torremolinos wrote a letter to the city hall in Malaga and asked for a reliable garbage collection service, as garbage was spread all over the resort and threatened to start an epidemic. They also lamented the lack of water, especially drinking water, and a sewage system. The daily

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693 El Sur, 9 July 1959, p. 3.
694 Ibidem, p. 3.
newspaper *SUR* routinely devoted a special section for letters addressed to the municipality in an attempt to force the town’s leaders to solve the problems. Local authorities cited the lack of resources as the reason the limited success in turning the resorts into functional urban spaces. Their argument was not without merit. But other problems had different causes. A 1972 article in *Desarrollo* magazine authored by an official in the Ministry of Tourism indirectly acknowledged that authorities had closed their eyes to some misconduct in their push to develop tourism in Spain, “There was no other solution than building the hotel in the middle of the beach, without roads, sewage systems, or phones because there was no money to build a proper urban space.”

Even before 1962, the Spanish state worked on plans to develop the Costa del Sol region. The 1959 plan for “the systematization” of Costa del Sol aimed at, “efficiently organizing that space which allowed for the exploitation of one of the most important resources for obtaining hard currencies: international tourism.” Yet, the actual implementation of the plan stalled for three years. Despite the central state’s efforts to develop a tourist infrastructure, local authorities in Malaga expressed skepticism about the role of international tourism as being important for their region and declared this sector “a luxury which does not justify the involvement of the state neither socially nor economically.”

Following Fraga’s appointment, another study for the systematization of Costa del Sol was put together in 1963. The author was a Greek architect and engineer Constantinos A. Doxiadis, who ran Doxiadis Iberica S.A, a firm that had previously done similar work in Costa Brava.

697 Juan Gavilanes Velaz de Medrano, op.cit., p.40.
study cautioned about the dangers of unplanned development, “…if this extended development, which is expected in the coastal area, is not carefully planned [it] will cause a lot of shortcomings, which in the end will affect the area.”

Alongside these plans that attempted to systematize Costa del Sol, national legislation that sought to regulate the “areas of tourist interest” and of costal regions was enacted in 1963 and 1965 respectively. The distrust towards local authorities was obvious in the 1965 law for coastal regions, which mandated that, “land concessions or building permits on the beach has to be pre-approved by the Ministry of Information and Tourism.”

At the same time, local authorities began to realize that tourism could become a profitable business for Costa del Sol and they took some measures to improve the general aspect of the area. The List of activities performed by the City Hall of Malaga in Order to Develop Tourism, a 300-page publication, reflected this new attitude, but it also it also had elements of propaganda. The document praised the City Hall in Malaga for taking a number of actions to resolve issues such as cleanliness, poor quality of roads and pedestrian pavement, or street lightening in its attempt to enhance tourist circulation. Residential trash removal, long a demand of residents, was introduced but only after a swine fever epidemic hit the town in 1961. In addition public garbage bins were installed, and pavement and roads were redone, as the study carefully pointed out.

700 AGA, Cultura, 22.07/31808. Nota sobre Anteproyecto de Ley de Ordenamiento de la Zona Maritimo-Terrestre.
701 Memoria de Actividades Realizadas por El Excmo Ayuntamiento de Malaga en Orden al Fomento de Turismo en la Costa del Sol (Malaga, 1964), p.3.
702 Ibidem, p.4
703 Ibidem, p.53.
Despite these outward improvements, issues such as the lack of proper sanitation, poor infrastructure, and general underdevelopment lingered. In 1966, another team, consisting of an architect, an engineer, a lawyer, and an economist, worked for ten months to come up with a more
detailed plan for the tourist systematization and promotion of Costa del Sol. The study paid special attention to “economic, juridical, urban, infrastructural, and environmental factors” that affected the development of Costa del Sol. Addressing and improving these “factors” would only enhance the income potential of the region, which brought in six percent of Spain’s total tourist revenues. The fact that the region brought in more than 70 million dollars made it one of the most profitable areas for tourism in Spain; at the time, Costa Brava and Balearic Islands accounted for the most revenue. But the plan indicated that the disorderly construction building, the hazy legal status of past and present construction projects, and administrative inertia threatened these revenues. The message was clear—Costa del Sol had to improve its urban infrastructure and better plan its development if it was to compete for tourists and revenue with its rivals.

The rapid development of tourism on Costa del Sol had its negative aspects. Urban chaos was one of them. Because of the speculative prices of the land and the high cost of installing utilities, tourist establishments were jammed into just a couple of areas, while large portions of the coast remained vacant. Furthermore, tourist developers who managed to buy a piece of land would use every acre to build the hotel, but leave no room for green spaces and rarely followed any aesthetic criteria in designing the available space. This led to crammed urban clusters, visually and functionally unwelcoming to the tourists that did not fit with Andalusia’s traditional architectural style, which was one element of attraction in the tourist advertisers’ message. To the

707 Ibidem, p. 17. “…most of the terrains permanently remained unoccupied while the prices continued to rise.”
708 Ibidem, p.18.
cultural, aesthetic, and environmental problems were added legal ones. Most of the time, these hotels lacked proper building permits or failed to follow the mandated building plans or added extra stores at the expense of aesthetics and urban functionality. As the 1966 plan made clear, the continuous lack of oversight and enforcement by local authorities was blamed for this situation. Moreover, this situation occurred in spite of the myriad plans put together to reform the area. “Costa del Sol is, without doubt, one of the Spanish provinces for which the largest number of studies was put together by various departments. Sadly, none of these projects have ever been put into practice.”

In response to this chaotic development, in 1963 Costa del Sol became the first tourist region in Spain to be declared “area of tourist interest,” a designation that brought with it a number of potential benefits. But no significant improvements appeared. The region remained marked by underdevelopment; it was the least developed area in comparison with Costa Brava and Balearic Islands, the two main tourist regions in Spain. Only in the mid-1960s could the region be reached by plane in a decent amount of time, and that was a recent improvement. Only in 1958 was the Malaga airport modernized to allow large aircrafts to land. Another problem in the region was the high rate of illiteracy as well as the lack of an established population of tourist workers. Most of the tourist employees worked only during the summer and returned to the rural areas in the winter. This made it difficult for hotels and restaurants to retain and train these workers. After listing all these shortcomings, the 1966 plan proposed some generic solutions:

A. The region should be exploited according to its natural resources.
B. The most suitable plan of development should be identified and put into practice.

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710 Ibidem, p. 19.
711 Ibidem, p. 20.
C. This should follow the other models of development at national, and even, international level and in close observation of tourist predictions.
D. An organic structuring of current planning should take place at national level.
E. A stronger involvement of the state with regard to building and improving road and railway infrastructure in order to meet the tourists’ needs.
F. A complete study and implementation of public services is needed in order to enhance the living standards in the region, essential for the development of tourism.
G. The coordination, orientation, and control of private constructions, in the attempt to avoid illegal, or precarious constructions as well as frauds and outrageous prices.
K. The adoption of necessary measures in order to accomplish the protection of landscapes, forests, beaches, monuments, and places of public interest.
L. To increase the size of the tourist population.
M. To establish as soon as possible the necessary regulations in order to prevent the amorphous development of urban centers.\(^{712}\)

The plan clearly acknowledged the state’s failure on Costa del Sol and recommended a sharp change in policy, especially as regards greater oversight and regulation. The emerging tourist boom was taking place in the absence of the state, which only fueled chaotic development. Local authorities often showed considerable leniency towards tourism developers, some of whom were prominent people in the community and part of the intertwined network of political and business elites.

Finally, in the late 1960s, central authorities began to make their presence felt and measures such as establishing a special department to deal with “inspections and reclamations” within the Ministry of Tourism suggested a stronger future presence. Tourist developers did not necessarily approve of this new attitude and at times over the years strongly criticized the central authority’s role. As late as November 1972, a public letter written to the Minister of Tourism, exemplified some people’s displeasure with the state’s more prominent role: “I have to ask you Mr. Minister not to worry about the success or failure of tourist industry in general, and hotel business in

\(^{712}\) Ibidem, pp. 22-23.
particular. Neither Mr. Arias Salgado, or Mr. Fraga Iribarne, or Sanchez Bella had anything to do with the “tourist boom.” Together with their teams, they have been witnesses to and by-standers of an explosion [in tourism] and have done nothing to encourage or support this process throughout the years.**713**

Both Costa del Sol and the Romanian Black Sea Coast (littoral) emerged as beach destinations in the late 1950s and mid-1960s respectively. Although both regions developed in response to Western tourists’ high demand for beach destinations, they followed two different models of development. While the Romanian littoral resulted from the careful plans of the NTO-Carpathians and the PCR Central Committee, Costa del Sol grew in an unplanned manner until, in the late 1960s, the Spanish state began to assert some control over this development. In contrast to Romania, privately owned hotel corporations, which took over the majority of small local businesses in the late 1950s and the 1960s, were the ones whose construction projects served as magnets for international tourism. For better or worse, these private corporations controlled the way in which tourist landscape took shape on the Costa del Sol. The contrast in planning and development between the two regions could not be clearer. And the construction of an infrastructure to attract and house tourists was very different from the impact that international tourists had while on vacation in these regions.

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For both the Costa del Sol and the Romanian Littoral, tourist guidebooks published or supported by the two states both emphasized that each offered international tourists an alluring blend of tradition and modernity. Ideally, foreign tourists were supposed to enjoy the regions’ and countries’ ethnic or religious specificity. At the same time, guidebooks and tourist magazines offered plenty of information about sport activities, dance clubs, even gambling, that seemingly did not fit with the official ideology of the two regimes. Despite what Spanish and Romanian officials hoped, foreign tourists had their own ideas of how to enjoy their vacations, ideas that often challenged aspects of local mores and ways of life that the two authoritarian regimes had not anticipated. In neither case was the influx of foreign tourists a wholesale assault on local practices and attitudes, but their impact was often notable.

In 1976, *Vacances en Roumanie*, a Romanian tourist magazine published abroad, enticed Western tourists to spend their holidays on the Romanian “Riviera” of the Black Sea. “Roulette, jazz, beauty contests, night shows, music, projections, and cocktails” were all part of the vacation package that was supposed to energize and render Western tourists productive for the rest of the year. Indeed, according to a 1970s tourist flyer advertising Neptun, foreign tourists had various alternatives for spending their extra time. They could choose to: take a trip abroad to Istanbul, Athens, Cairo, Jerusalem, or Kiev; experience wine tasting and horse riding; or visit the Roman ruins and the Danube Delta. If they just wanted to spend a “pleasant evening,” they could eat in a “typical Romanian restaurant,” or a “restaurant with bands and dance floors,” or go to a night-club,

or a disco.\textsuperscript{715} Tourists could also go to spa centers or cruise the newly built Black Sea-Danube Channel, “a great achievement of Romanian builders.”\textsuperscript{716} Romanian tourist advertisers shaped their message according to the audience: while young tourists were invited to visit Costinesti, “the resort of youth,” retired people could undertake geriatric treatment and were advised to come either in the fall or spring when “specialized physicians closely follow up the prescribed cure or treatment, and tariffs are lower than in full season.”\textsuperscript{717}

Unfortunately offered services did always not match foreign tourists’ expectations. Food and service in restaurant was a constant disappointment. A West German tourist went as far as write to N. Ceaușescu and complain about service in restaurants on the Romanian seaside. He described how he went to a restaurant in Neptun and discovered that most of the entries in the menu were not available. Moreover, when he finally was able to order something, the service was slow and the tourist was left with no other option than to complain. “I came to your beautiful country because I wanted to relax, but waiting one-two hours to have a meal served does not have this effect,”\textsuperscript{718} he wrote to Ceaușescu. A commission went to Neptun in order to examine the case and decided to dismiss the director of the restaurant. But the case was hardly isolated. In 1976, a report of National Office for Tourism–Carpathians about the functioning of restaurants and hotels on the Black Sea Coast and Bucharest stated that although the five-year-plan’s targets had been met and even exceeded, there were still a number of deficiencies.\textsuperscript{719} First of all, the inspected restaurants often lacked foodstuffs such as meat, fruits, and vegetables.

The supplying of tourist facilities with alimentary products was under expectations between May 15 and July 15. For example, the quantities of fresh fruits and vegetables

\textsuperscript{715} Neptun, Romania (Bucharest: NTO-Carpathians, 1970). (tourist flyer)
\textsuperscript{716} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{717} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{718} ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Chancellery Section, file no. 28/1975, f. 58.
\textsuperscript{719} ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Chancellery Section, file no. 81/1976, f. 10.
were insufficient as well as those of meat and dairy products. Also, the restaurants had few supplies of mineral water, soda, Pepsi cola, beer, and ice.\textsuperscript{720}

The scarcity of alimentary products in restaurants was mainly the consequence of the centralized economy and the shortages commonly associated with it. This triggered a chain reaction that made restaurants deal in various ways with food shortages. While the official reaction was to acknowledge these deficiencies and report them to responsible institutions, one way in which restaurants dealt with shortages was to replace some of the ingredients in the original recipes. One example was that of substituting lemon with vinegar in the soup or not adding the corresponding quantity of wine and gravy in the \textit{mititei} (grilled minced meat rolls), which was one of the foods advertised as traditional.\textsuperscript{721} Replacing the original ingredients lowered the quality and affected the taste of the product, which thus became far different than what was advertised in the brochures about Romanian tourism.

The 1976 report chose to blame the tourist workers and poor management for such situations. It stated that the training of tourist personnel was problematic, services were inadequate and, in some cases, the normal rules of commerce were not applied. “In many restaurants, the costumer services are below standards, the personnel is poorly trained and there are multiple cases of professional misbehavior.[…] There are cases in which tourists do not get a check, the prices are not displayed, the schedule is not respected and the tourist workers’ outfit is improper.”\textsuperscript{722}

The vacation packages that the NTO Carpathians sold to foreign tourists were supposed to purposefully shape the tourists’ schedule. Regardless of their musical preferences, these packages included a Romanian folk evening. Doru B., former bellboy at Doina Hotel recalls “it was

\textsuperscript{720} Ibidem, f. 11.  
\textsuperscript{721} Ibidem, f. 21.  
\textsuperscript{722} Ibidem, f. 22.
mandatory...when they were handed the voucher, they were also getting a ticket to a Romanian evening, at “Calul Balan,” or “International,” or “Rustik.” According to the same interviewee, foreign tourists did seem to enjoy their vacations in socialist Romania, “they were all dancing and singing” but the atmosphere was not completely relaxed. Clear separations among Western tourists and tourists from socialist countries marked the hotels’ landscape. Marioara V., a Romanian tourist, described the restaurants of various hotels in Mamaia as being split between tourists contingent on their nationality.

They were making a difference. Both at “Jupiter,” where Mr. Dima was, and at “Doina” where my uncle was working- he was only given Swedish and British tourists because he knew English - there were some mini-saloons separated by green fences [of plants]...and on one side British were seated, on the other Swedish, or Russians. Romanians were seated in the center.

Not only were tourists physically separated, but they also received a different treatment. Often times tourists from socialist countries complained that, “they are treated with less consideration than tourists from the West.” The most obvious difference regarded food. As tourists were offered a relatively fixed menu, they could easily observe over the green fences what others were eating. Marioara V. described this disparity as follows:

For example, they [foreigners] would get two-three choices for breakfast that included tea, milk, coffee, bacon with eggs, cheese or Swiss cheese, salami, etc. For Romanians or easterners it wasn’t like that. You would get either tea or milk, in case you were with children, we wouldn’t get coffee and to eat we would only get a boiled egg and a piece of thick rosy sausage. [...] They would all get refreshments like Nectar and Pepsi and mineral water while we would only get tap water. For us everything was in smaller quantities and less diversified.

723 Doru B. personal interview July 2013.
724 Ibidem.
725 Marioara V., personal interview, July 2013.
726 ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 16629, vol.3, 1971, Prahova, f. 3
727 Marioara V. personal interview, July 2013.
Although the different menus had an economic explanation, tourists were not aware of that, but what they could observe they called a discriminatory practice towards Romanians and tourists from socialist countries. Coffee, which was an imported product in short supply in Romanian shops, was crossed out the menu even in vacation resorts. In addition, in popular culture, thick rosy sausages epitomized a cheap replacement for salami, another product difficult to find in regular shops. At times, Romanian tourists would manage to get a better treatment than officially prescribed because of “connections.” It was the case with Marioara V. whose uncle was a waiter in the hotel she stayed in and who would arrange for her to receive the same menu as the “Westerners.” But such informal practices were not at hand for tourists from socialist countries. They could only pursue “official channels,” which did not always lend an ear to their complaints. As tourists from Eastern Europe became a majority in the 1980s, tourist services declined sharply in the absence of finickier Western tourists.

Political surveillance, although veiled, was a practice common on the Romanian Black Sea Coast. The increased number of foreign tourists created the opportunity for a cosmopolitan way of life, which the Romanian socialist regime regarded with caution. Activities, such as smuggling of foreign currency, prostitutions, or illicit commerce, which the socialist state deemed “crimes,” thrived. To these mounting “hassles,” the state responded with increased surveillance. In 1977, a report by the Ministry of Interior noted that, “54 officers from the Foreign Language School were included among the tourist guides, or used in order to solve various problems in the security work. In addition, two surveillance teams, eight officers from the operative technique unit and 45 officers

728 See more about this in Gheorghe Florescu, *Confesiunile unui cafegiu* (București: Humanitas, 2008). Special shops that sold coffee were set for people in *nomenklatura*, but not sold in ordinary shops.
729 Marioara V., personal interview, July 2013.
specialized in economic and financial crimes [all of them subordinated to Securitate, the secret police] went to the seaside to help with the surveillance work.”

This mobilization of forces hardly delivered the expected results as the unwanted, even criminal activities, mounted. One Securitate’s report noted that “criminal activities” on the Romanian seaside had increased by 30 percent in comparison with the previous year. Thus, 2,000 people were charged with smuggling of goods or foreign currency, and 12 kilograms of gold and 28,000 dollars were confiscated. The value of illegal transactions within just a couple of months reached an impressive total of 2.6 million lei. Moreover the secret police complained that tourist workers temporarily employed for the summer were not thoroughly checked and hence “dubious elements suspected for smuggling and prone to various criminal acts” got hired by the Ministry of Tourism. Furthermore, the report added, when the militia or the Securitate succeeded in checking the employees, these verifications were shallow and there was little concern from the local office in Constanta to comply with the requests of the Bucharest headquarters. Little coordination within the secret police structures as well as between the Securitate and the Ministry of Tourism were to be blame for the limited success of surveillance on the seaside.

This situation hardly discouraged the regime, which only intensified its surveillance work in the 1980s. Every summer season a special plan for the surveillance of foreign tourists was put together. All connections between Romanians and Westerns that went beyond professional realm were deemed to be “suspect.” Furthermore a 1986 report by the Securitate and the Constanta Border Police announced that the amount of information obtained by using surveillance doubled

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730 ACNSAS, Documentary Fund, file no. 11487, 1977, f.235v.
731 Ibidem, f. 237.
732 Ibidem, f. 238.
733 Ibidem, f.238.
compared to the previous year. Securitate agents went as far as searching through the tourists’ personal belonging and discovering “compromising” phone numbers in their notebooks. The array of cases that Securitate followed included tourists who carried more goods than allowed by Romanian laws (presumably with the intention to sell them), possession of foreign currencies, or information about Romanian citizens who had informal connections with foreign tourists or employees of tourist agencies from abroad.

Despite the increased surveillance, informal relations between tourist workers and Romanian or Western tourists persisted throughout the 1980s. Among the most common of these relations were economic exchanges such as gift giving. Gifts are part of the ritualistic relationship between tourist workers and foreign tourists in many geographical settings and historical contexts. In the particular context of the economic shortages of socialist Romania, gifts played an important role in binding the relationships between foreign tourists and tourist workers. In socialist Romania of the 1960s-1980s, gift giving had both social and economic meanings, and was part of the intricate communication process between foreign tourists and tourist workers. Cristina, who was a tourist guide with ONT- Littoral remembers how tourists would ask her every year what kind of presents she would like to receive, "Perfume, what kind of perfume, champaign, what kind of champaign, cigarettes, what kind of cigarettes." Alexandra, who worked as a waitress in the restaurant of a three-star hotel in Neptun, remembered having the same type of

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736 Ibidem, f. 203.
738 Cristina C., age 61, university degree, personal interview, December 2013.
conversations with foreign tourists who would come back on a recurring basis to Romania. "Tourists would always ask: What should I bring you next year when I am coming back? And you would have said: Bring me some chocolate, or some tights, or some perfume, it varied according to each one’s preferences and needs." Tourists were all well aware of the difficulty of getting foreign goods in Romania so they used these gifts, in most cases inexpensive things, to get a better treatment or preferential services. Cristina, the tourist guide, assumed that, "They all knew, either because they used to come every year or because their friends who visited Romania told them. They were well informed. They were so accustomed to offering gifts that they continued to bring things after the revolution too, even when we didn’t need them so much." 

Besides gifts to individual tourist workers, a common practice at the end of each sojourn was for tourists to collect money from the group and buy goods from the shop (usually the type of store located in hotels that sold goods for German Marks or other foreign currencies) for all of the hotel personnel. Margareta T., a former waitress at "Doina" restaurant in Neptun nostalgically remembered these events: "At the end of the sojourn there was a festive dinner and each employee would get a small package from the tourists. They were all very nice people, mainly old people, already pensioners."

As Caroline Humphrey argued in her study about personal property in socialist Mongolia, material possession matters and it holds both identity and ritualistic significance in one’s life. Regardless of how insignificant the gifts that tourist workers received from foreign tourists were, they were extremely meaningful in the context of the consumer goods’ shortage in socialist

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739 Alexandra N. age 44, high school degree, personal interview, March 2013.
740 Cristina C. personal interview.
741 Margareta T, age 46, education: high school, personal interview February 2013.
Romania of the 1970s-1980s. For tourist workers, these goods opened a window on to a world that was not physically accessible to them, as they could not easily travel to Western countries. As many of these tourist workers were originally from rural areas, it was a common practice to send some of the received gifts to their extended family as well, given that the lack of consumer goods was greater in those areas. In late 1970s, fewer goods became accessible in regular shops, and increasingly special connections were needed in order to obtain more fashionable and better quality clothes, electronics, etc. In the early-1980s, the situation became even worse when Ceaușescu decided to pay the country’s entire external debt and to limit the import of “unnecessary goods.” A patriotic rhetoric was used in order to explain to ordinary citizens why those cuts were necessary, but the result was of rather different nature, as people started to resent the regime and those in power.

Besides economic and social connections between Romanians and foreign tourists, cultural relationships developed as well. The Romanian seaside was part of an extended network of hitchhikers that included youngsters from all Europe. Jan M., a truck driver from the GDR, recalled that as an East German he could easily travel to Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, but not to the more liberal Yugoslavia. This is why, in order to spend a couple of days on the seaside, each summer he would hitchhike across these countries and live for a couple of weeks in either Costinesti in Romania or Melnik in Bulgaria. These two places were among the meeting points for hitchhikers from socialist Europe who wanted to spend a couple of days on the Black Sea Coast, the only place suitable for sunbathing in the socialist eastern Europe, except for the Yugoslav

743 Doina, chef-de-maitre at Hotel Doina, in Neptun recalled how she would send chocolate and other sweets to her sister’s children who lived in a village in Moldavia. Doina, personal interview, high school degree, Neptun, March 2013.
Adriatic Sea. “Everyone in our group knew the place. There was a similar village in Bulgaria, Melnik; one year we would go to Melnik and one year to the place in Romania [Costinesti].”

Figure 18. Jan M. in Costinesti in 1979 together with his friends, hitchhikers from Romania and other socialist countries. (Source: personal archive).

The hitchhikers’ camp in Costinesti was not officially on the map. In fact, Jan M. believes that it was illegal because the militia would only let them camp there during the night; during the day they had to take their belongings and leave. The photos depicting Jan M. with his friends

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745 Ibidem.
show them at a terrace in Costinesti, a village 15 kilometers south of Constanta that communist
officials called the “resort of youth.” It was the location for several official student holiday camps
and the place where Romanians in their 20s and 30s would choose to spend their vacations.746 The
hitchhikers lived like in a “commune” type of settlement playing music, swimming, owning very
few belongings, and barely taking a shower. “The sea was close so we didn’t need one,” uttered
Jan M with a grin on his face. 747 As the hitchhikers would meet there every year, their group
worked as a network that exchanged music, ideas, and a way of life among young people from
socialist Eastern Europe and beyond. Communist authorities, hardly thrilled by the presence of
these tourists who did not bring money into the official economy and who acted like “western
punks,” tolerated them as long as they did not openly challenge the official power. “The Militia
used to raid our camp, but they weren’t taking any action against us as long as we followed some
rules (i.e. not making a fire),” explained Jan M.”748

With such daily and personal interactions, the Romanian Black Sea Coast incrementally
became a more cosmopolitan place where Romanians and tourists from the socialist countries
interacted with Western tourists despite the communist regime’s attempts to keep these
interconnections under control. Economic exchanges, personal relationships, intimate
relationships, each and all left their mark on more than people’s memories. It is impossible to
quantify the impact just as it is impossible to ignore the impact. But at least along the Black Sea
coast, there came into being a world between the prosperous developed economies of the west and

746 Claudia G., personal interview, university degree, March 2010, Focsani, Romania. “My husband and I
used to spend our vacations at Costinesti. Because it was hard to find housing, we would stay in the car or
find a host. But sometimes it was better in the car because one time we discovered that our rented room
served as a mortuary place probably just weeks or months before we stayed there…”
748 Ibidem.
those of the socialist east. Nevertheless, over time, the tendency was to move from a rather liberal regime in the 1960s-1970s to a more controlling one in the 1980s, when the state surveillance reached its peak, relationships were more strictly monitored, and foreign tourists found other locales for their vacations.

One of them was the Costa del Sol. There too the arrival of foreign tourists on Costa del Sol significantly changed the people’s mentalities and way of life. Yet, unlike the communist regime in Romania, the Francoist regime did little to discourage the interactions between foreign tourists and Spaniards. Rather it tried to channel tourists into activities that involved more ‘proper’ behavior and ‘dress’ so as to meet the moral requirements of the conservative Francoist regime. In fact, the slogan “Spain is different,” which Spanish promoters used in the 1950s and 1960s, aimed at attracting tourists with folk art and tradition rather than the avatars of modern civilization.

Figure 19. Postcard promoting tourism in Spain in the 1950s-1960s, published by the Spanish State Tourist Office. (personal archive)

Folk dances and music were part of the promotion program of the Spanish tourism. A 1960 tourist guide pointed out that, “In Andalusia, the act of singing and dancing is second nature; it is
as imperative as life itself." The tourist promoters went as far as to stage folk dancing in the streets. A photo taken in 1964 in order to show the progress of international tourism in Malaga depicted flamingo dancers performing in a public square in Malaga in front of a group of well-groomed foreign tourists. The performance even caught the attention of some schoolgirls studying at a nearby monastery, who climbed the wall and silently watched the dancers as well.

Figure 20. Spanish women performing folk dances for foreign tourists in the street, 1964.


This type of presentation of Spain as an exotic destination was alive and well even throughout the 1970s. A 1970 tourist guidebook of Costa del Sol published in English attempted

750 Memoria de Actividades Realizadas por el Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Malaga (Malaga, 1964), p.33
to draw in the tourists by presenting the region as a bucolic place where one could escape civilization. “A ramble along the beach is more than a mere relaxation. It is a window onto a world of fantasy that lends itself to contemplation, a joyful escape from weariness.”  

From the point of view of Spanish tourist authorities, foreign tourists should adjust to the local customs. A map from the end of the 1960s placed religious services first on the list while places such as supermarkets or information offices were only listed at the bottom of the list. Not surprisingly the religious services were marked as available mostly in the inland resorts while on the coast there were fewer churches. But even in the cases when religious services were available, the mass attendance was low, and this phenomenon constantly worried the Spanish authorities.

Figure 21. Services on Costa del Sol, 1964.

Moreover, officials expected tourists to wear appropriate outfits when going to the beach or visiting towns. These boundaries applied to women more than to men. The Spanish State Tourist Office in London recommended British female tourists to avoid wearing a two-piece bathing suit when going to the beach and advised all tourists to not wear shorts while walking in towns.

Although in some popular Mediterranean seaside resorts a two-piece bathing suit is not strictly prohibited, ladies are, nevertheless, requested to wear one-piece bathing suit. Slacks, jeans, shorts, etc. may be worn in seaside villages. [...] Both ladies and gentlemen are requested not to wear shorts while visiting towns. Although strapless sundresses may be worn on the beaches, it is advisable to cover the shoulders with jacket or stole in the towns. When visiting churches and other religious buildings, ladies should wear skirts and bear in mind that it is costumary to have the arms and head covered.

Spanish State Tourist Office
70 Jermyn Office, London 754

Noticeably, the note contains more restrictions for women than for men, as the Spanish state attempted to conceal their sexuality. The state and the Catholic Church in Spain regarded women’s exposed bodies as a threat to the established norms of a male dominated society. Foreign tourists, who were guests in the country, were not expected to challenge this moral and sartorial order but to silently accept it. Carmelo Pellejero, a historian of tourism on the Costa del Sol, appreciated the dilemma that the state and church faced: “in the 1960s most of the tourists came from the middle class, with a different type of life, customs, and a certain influence over the morality of the people which the Spanish state did not anticipate.”755

It was not just that Spanish men might be at risk of being seduced by the more progressive northern European female tourists, but Spanish women themselves might be at risk. To dampen this possible negative influence, Spanish women received a special education as part of their membership in The Feminine Institute, a Falange-controlled organization for women, coordinated

755 Carmelo Pellejero, professor University of Malaga, personal interview, June 2014, Malaga.
by Franco’s wife herself. Membership was mandatory for all employed women. From the state’s point of view, the more financially independent, the more “vulnerable” to cosmopolitan foreign influence these women were. The Feminine Institute aimed to offer them, “a political and religious education to shape them socially and to teach them to act as true Spanish women.” But this attempt proved rather unsuccessful. Carmelo Pellejero noted that women and young people were the first to embrace the transformation: “I mostly recall changes in the way of dressing, women picking up smoking…overall different habits that changed the Spanish society.” Sergio P., a hotel owner in his hometown of Ronda, a town 50 kilometers from the coast, remembered how he lived through this change when a student at the University of Malaga.

Because of the large number of foreign tourists in Malaga a striking difference between the coast and the interior occurred. Different values, ways of life…this is what tourists brought from their countries while Spain was a closed, backward society because of the political regime. When the country opened in the 1960s and tourists arrived, it was a shock. This influence tremendously changed the local population and brought about different mentalities, behaviors, and especially a different view on sexuality. And then the Malaga and the coastal region began to open very quickly. This became obvious to me when I was travelling back home to Ronda where tourists were fewer.

The Francoist regime had few alternatives to this “invasion” of tourists, which was otherwise beneficial to its economy. Carmelo Pellejero believes that the state had to choose between losing the tourists and the money that they brought with them and accepting the potential moral harm that tourists posed.

There were many politicians who feared the tourists and this change in mentalities. The choice however was between giving up the divisas (hard

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756 Maria F., school teacher, personal interview, Seville, June 2015.
757 “Los cursos de formacion de la Sección Femenina tienen un amplio alance para la mujer” in SUR, July 1st, 1959, p. 2.
758 Carmelo Pellejero, personal interview, Malaga, June 2014.
759 Sergio P., personal interview, Malaga, June 2014.
foreign currencies) and assuming the risks. It wasn’t easy but the idea of accepting tourism and the tourists won out. Slowly - you realize that at the end of the 1950s and well into the 1960s the Church would often [take a] position against the bikini, the long hair, and the customs that came from ‘outside’- the state’s resistance melted when the money showed up.⁷⁶⁰

The Spanish state chose to try to contain the potential corrosive influence of foreign tourists and convey the appearance of freedom as long as tourists did not engage in political activities or openly expressed their criticism of the Francoist regime. However, it did act in a paternalist way in relation to the Spanish citizens, who were told to refrain from imitating the foreigners and constantly reminded that this “invasion” was economically motivated. Despite the different political regime in Spain, this stance was quite similar to the one of the communist regime in Romania, which used paternalism, patriotism, and the needs of the socialist state as weapons to justify its surveillance over ordinary citizens. To both countries’ leaders the economic and political threats from the ‘decadent West’ were real and required that the state ‘protect’ its citizens.

6.5 CONCLUSION

The Romanian seacoast took advantage of the beach tourism boom to the same extent as the now more famous Costa del Sol in Spain. Because of the arrival of foreign tourists, the economic basis of both coastal regions shifted away from agriculture; glamorous tourist spaces dotted with modern constructions replaced the former farms. However, the different politics of the two regimes shaped this process and marked the tourist landscape of the two regions. In Romania the state employed

⁷⁶⁰ Carmelo Pellejero, personal interview, Malaga, June 2014.
central planning to design the hotels and subsequent commercial spaces; in Spain, private corporations, often informally connected to influential officials, initially played this role. Only later, after 1962, when various voices complained about how these early resorts shattered urban space did Spanish officials at the local and central levels take more seriously their responsibility to provide adequate urban infrastructure and regulate the quality of construction.

The way that each building process took place influenced the configuration of leisure space on both coasts. In both regions, the tendency was to build more rooms in less expensive hotels, which became symbolic of the shift in the 1960s to mass tourism. Yet, in the Spanish case, the nostalgia for the elite tourism of the 1930s lingered; the earliest large hotels welcomed mostly wealthy tourists as their cost made them prohibitive for middle class ordinary travelers, who in the 1960s constituted a substantial majority of visitors. Thus, clear-cut economic and political divisions occurred among tourists in both coastal regions. On the Romanian Black Sea coast, Western tourists occupied the best hotels and received better services on the grounds that they were charged more than Romanian and other tourists from socialist countries. To these economic separations were added political ones, as the Romanian socialist state did not want unfettered interaction between foreign tourists, especially westerners, and Romanians. On the Spanish Costa del Sol, the economic differences made it impossible for the ordinary Spaniards to lodge in the same hotels or visit the same restaurants or discos that wealthier American and Northwestern European tourists frequented.761 Although, unlike the Romanian socialist state, the Spanish

761 Rafael de la Fuente, director of Hotel Los Monteros in Marbella, personal interview, Marbella, June 2014.
authorities did not explicitly prohibit informal interactions between Spaniards and foreign tourists, it tried to limit the latter’s influence through educational and religious programs.\textsuperscript{762}

Nevertheless, as cultural studies research has shown, a given space is not an abstract notion but one that is constructed through the interaction between multiple actors.\textsuperscript{763} Hence, the configuration of tourist spaces on the two coastal areas cannot be regarded as a one-sided story. Despite the physical or cultural boundaries that the two regimes sought to impose by various methods, the Romanian seacoast and Costa del Sol in Spain displayed not simply a colorful landscape, but also an emerging cosmopolitanism. Tourists gave specific meaning to those spaces. In their interactions with locals and fellow tourists, many tourists pushed or ignored the boundaries set by the two regimes. Consciously or unconsciously, be it by the type of clothing they wore, their rather different sense of public morality, their gifts to locals, foreign tourists’ behavior was often at odds with the local customs or official discourse. In the end, the two tourist spaces exemplified a form of unspoken negotiation between the state on the one hand and tourists and tourist workers on the other.

Comparing the two regions allows one to appreciate how the politics of two different dictatorial regimes functioned at the grassroots level, and how the Black Sea Coast and Costa del

\textsuperscript{762} The “comic page” of \textit{SUR} mocked individuals who bragged about their interactions with foreign tourists. In one instance, it presents the dialogue between two young women: “Some time ago I went outside although I had laryngitis.” “Me too… I went out with a guy from abroad.” (“Hago unos días que salgo la calle con faringitis. Si, yo tambien hace unos dias que…salgo con un chico extranjero.”). Another local was taunted for forgetting his native language “Hablame usted en ingles…mi idioma no le entiendo…” See: “La pagina de humor de: Holanda Radio-Luz” in \textit{SUR}, July 1, 1962, p. 9.

Sol emerged as cosmopolitan tourist spaces in spite of efforts to assert political control. Moreover, it shows a map of postwar Europe where the beach areas of the Romanian seacoast and Costa del Sol became integrated into the larger European framework despite the ideological divisions between the capitalist west and the socialist east, and the political marginality of the two states. In this way, it encourages scholars of contemporary Europe to go beyond a monolithic view of postwar Europe as comprised of the two blocs—socialist and capitalist--and observe the similarities between southeastern and southwestern Europe in spite of the different political and economic systems.
7.0 CONCLUSION

In 1975, the International Peace Research Institute published a study that compared international tourism in six “southern European countries” (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria).\(^{764}\) The study claimed that these six “southern European countries” (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria) underwent similar changes because of international tourism in the postwar era. The study is puzzling for a number of reasons. First, it did not follow the customary postwar rhetoric that drew an ideological distinction between socialist east and capitalist west. The study described the six countries as “southern,” a geographical label rather than a geopolitical or ideological one. Second, the study recognized international tourism as a contributor to social change in different economic and political regimes. Although this 1975 study did not aim to place international tourism in a historical context, it offered an alternative way of examining postwar Europe beyond the Cold War and reflected the complexities of the Cold War era in Europe.

Recent literature has also questioned the clear-cut division of postwar Europe between socialist and capitalist camps and has argued that the Iron Curtain was more porous than previously thought.\(^{765}\) Joining this growing body of scholarship, this dissertation has shown that socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain chose to develop international tourism for similar reasons and that international tourism affected the two countries in relatively similar ways, despite their different political and economic systems, and their location on different sides of the Iron Curtain. This


\(^{765}\) Yuliya Komska, *op. cit.*, p.4.
dissertation has examined international tourism in the two countries both at the level of state policies and of everyday life. While both the Romanian and Spanish governments wanted to attract the revenues provided by international tourism, they also wanted to limit the impact of foreign tourists on Romanians’ or Spaniards’ way of life. Despite these similarities, the experiences of the two countries also showed puzzling differences. While it is unquestionable that both regimes used international tourism to pursue economic modernization, the number of tourists in Spain and the revenues that they brought were considerably higher than those extracted from foreign tourists to socialist Romania. The question is why did this happen? An explanation that only focuses on the capitalist-socialist explanation is unsatisfactory. While Romania tentatively adopted market socialism and the state continued to own all of the means of production, other factors, like timing, had an impact. Spain’s earlier start, Romania’s poor political decisions, and Ceaușescu’s increased squeezing of the economy are just several factors that led to the different results with international tourism. Comparing international tourism in Romania and Spain shows that the answer is much more complex than a simple state ownership versus private ownership dichotomy.766

Spain’s slightly earlier embracing of international tourism helps in part to explain its success. In April 1959, the *New York Times* assured its readers that vacations in Spain will not be affected by the rampant inflation that afflicted the Spanish economy.767 Spain’s attraction for international tourists was its sunny beaches; its unstable economic situation did not deter the arrival of tourists, in fact if anything it made the cost for tourists cheaper. While in the late 1950s, despite its economic and political crisis, Francoist Spain had already become an international tourist

destination; socialist Romania only grew interested in attracting Western tourists in the early 1960s. Socialist countries expressed their interest in welcoming Western tourists as early as 1955, but only in 1961 did the Moscow fifth meeting of the tourist delegates from socialist countries put forth concrete ways to strengthen tourism with the “West.” Following this meeting, the Romanian government shifted its interest towards Western tourists and in 1962, the NTO-Carpathians put together the first plan to advertise Romania in the West. It also began to earmark large-scale investment funds for tourist infrastructure, with a particular focus on the Black Sea coast and the mountain region of Prahova Valley. The initial results were spectacular: the number of Western tourists increased from about 40,000 in 1961 to 666,635 in 1974. Although the number of Western tourists was just 15-20 percent of the total number of foreign tourists in Romania, the hard currency revenues that they brought were in fact higher than those delivered by tourists from socialist countries. Moreover, most of the Western tourists visiting Romania chose the Black Sea coast as their holiday destination. Hence, in Mamaia, and later in Neptun, Western tourists predominated. The economic success that international tourism promised to deliver enchanted the Romanian socialist officials and accelerated their efforts to attract more Western tourists. The discussions in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party reflected these views, as well as the intention to turn the entire country, not just the Black Sea coast, into an international tourist destination.

Despite such investments, Romania’s relatively late venture into international tourism proved to be a handicap, which it was never fully able to overcome. This gap between Romania

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769 ANIC, Council of Ministers Collection, file no. 29/1961, f. 46, ANIC, Central Committee Collection, Economic Section, file no. 165/1981, f. 16.
770 ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Section, file no. 244/1981, f. 11.
and Spain widened even further because of the economic crisis of the 1970s. The 1973 oil crisis
did not significantly affect tourist movement in Romania. During 1973-1974, the number of
Western tourists declined everywhere in Europe.\textsuperscript{771} Still, Romania and Bulgaria were the only
European countries that did not witness a substantial decrease in the number of tourists.\textsuperscript{772} It was
the 1979 oil crisis along with inflation in Western Europe that made the number of Western tourists
in Romania plummet. While Western Europeans’ declining real income meant that vacations
became a luxury, Romanian state policy also contributed to the decline. In the early 1980s,
Ceaușescu attempted to extract as much revenue as possible from international tourism by raising
prices, despite the sharp inflation in Western Europe. This led Western tourists to choose other
destinations. Furthermore, the degradation of everyday life in socialist Romania and Western
media coverage about it and about violations of human rights contributed to a further decrease in
the number of Western tourists. Despite a brief revival in 1985, it became clear that international
tourism failed to provide the economic benefits that the Romanian socialist regime hoped so much
to attain.

In contrast, Francoist Spain fully benefited from the boom of mass tourism in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, before Romania entered the international tourism market. A combination of low
prices, geographical proximity to the wealthier northwestern European countries, and tourists’
craving for beach tourism turned Spain into a desirable tourist destination. Once foreign tourists
became accustomed to visiting Spain and charter flights became more common, the number of
foreign tourists climbed as well. Initially, many tourists came from France by car, but American,
British, German, or Scandinavian tourists were also numerous.\textsuperscript{773} Furthermore, Spain, despite its

\textsuperscript{771} In the mid-1970s, the number of foreign tourists plummeted in all European countries.
\textsuperscript{772} Tord Høivik, \textit{op. cit.}, p.8.
dictatorial regime and economic crisis, was on the ‘right side’ of the Iron Curtain. After being a pariah state for more than a decade following his ascension to power in 1939, Franco’s anti-communist stance earned Spain a secure alliance with the United States as of 1953 when US military bases were established on Spanish soil. Soon other Western countries reestablished diplomatic relations with Spain and the flow of tourists started to increase. Because of its anti-communist stance and validation by the United States, American and Western European tourists regarded Spain as part of a familiar world. For many Westerners in the 1950s, communist Eastern Europe was more frightening than was Franco’s right-wing personal dictatorship. This situation was to change however in the mid-1960s, especially in the Romanian case. Therefore, it was not necessarily the geopolitical locations of Romania and Spain on two opposite sides of the Iron Curtain, but more specifically, the stereotypes constructed about these locations that affected tourist results in the two countries.

But Spain’s earlier start, its proximity to wealthier northwestern European countries, and its privileged relation with the United States were not the only reasons for Spain’s success in international tourism compared to Romania, or to other Mediterranean destinations, such as Portugal and Greece. Concrete policies in socialist Romania and Francoist Spain also shaped the different outcomes of international tourism. One of these policies regarded prices in hotels and restaurants. Both Francoist Spain and socialist Romania controlled hotel and restaurant prices. Nonetheless, because of the hotel owners’ pressures, in 1962, the Spanish Ministry of Information and Tourism agreed to a liberalization of hotel prices, although it still did not grant the hotel and

774 This alliance resulted in the establishing of US troops on Spanish soil, despite the fact that Spain was not a NATO member. This agreement ended Spain’s diplomatic isolation, which lasted since September 1939.
restaurant owners full liberty in setting their own prices. The purpose was to keep prices as low as possible in order to attract more foreign tourists, as the advertising of Spanish tourism abroad stressed out Spain’s affordability. Regardless of the fact that this policy hurt the interests of hotel owners, it turned Spain into one of the most inexpensive tourist destinations in Europe. In socialist Romania, hotel prices had to be pre-approved by the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and, after approval, they became law. Initially, Romania, like Spain, attracted foreign tourists because it was a very inexpensive tourist destination. Yet as the regime wanted to increase the revenues from international tourism, it raised the prices in the late 1970s, because the actual income from tourism failed to meet the government’s growing expectations. For example, Romania became a slightly more expensive tourist destination than Spain, and its neighbors Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Raising costs at a time of recession and inflation in western Europe was ill-timed at best. Because until the mid-1980s, vacation prices were calculated in dollars or Deutsche Marks and not in the national currency of tourists’ country of origin, vacations in Romania became even more expensive when converted to Spanish pesetas or French francs. This is part of the explanation why the most numerous Western tourists to Romania remained the West Germans, as their prices were calculated in Deutsche Marks. The unrealistic pricing policy in socialist Romania, begun under Ceaușescu, halted what had been more than a decade of successful tourist development. When specialists from the Ministry of Tourism attempted to address this issue in the mid-1980s, their attempt was unsuccessful. And as the decade wore on, because of the

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777 This happened despite the fact the revenues from international tourism almost tripled between 1975 and 1980 from 132 million dollars to 324 million dollars in 1980. See Derek Hall, op. cit., p. 102.
778 Tord Høivik, op. cit., p. 10.
779 ANIC, Central Committee Collection, Economic Section, file no. 165/1981, f. 10.
degradation of everyday life in socialist Romania, the plummeting quality of tourist services, and
the negative reports on the Ceaușescu’s regime in the West, the coveted tourists from capitalist
countries found other destinations for their vacations.

The decision-making process in socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain also explains the
different outcomes of international tourism in the two countries. In socialist Romania, attempts by
party and state officials, like Nicolae Bozdog, who initiated a visit to Spain in 1968, were met with
partial success. As chief of the NTO-Carpathians, the state tourist agency, between April 1967 and
March 1969,\textsuperscript{781} he certainly succeeded in improving international tourism by making NTO-
Carpathians the sole coordinator of Romanian tourism. This gave NTO-Carpathians the ability to
supervise all tourist activities, put together plans to develop tourist infrastructure and the
promotion of tourism abroad, sign contracts, and provide coordinated services, such as
transportation, lodging, and meals to tourists. All these improved tourist services and, although
short-lived, this policy attracted more foreign tourists to Romania. To a certain extent, NTO-
Carpathians came to function like a capitalist enterprise, as its main goal was to be economically
profitable. Nevertheless, in 1974, Ceaușescu succeeded in replacing the more politically
experienced Ion Gheorghe Maurer as a Prime Minister with Manea Manescu, one of his followers,
hence, eliminating any substantial political debate or opposition.\textsuperscript{782} With Maurer gone and Ion
Cosma, a party apparatchik with no experience in tourism, as the head of NTO-Carpathians, and
Minister of Tourism as of 1971, politics trumped economics. He pushed for an increase in prices,
fewer funds for tourist infrastructure, and more surveillance by the \emph{Securitate} among tourist

\textsuperscript{781} Since March 1969, Nicolae Bozdog became minister of Interior Commerce.
\textsuperscript{782} On the dispute between Ceaușescu and Maurer see Emanuel Copilaș, “Politica Externă a României
employees in order to limit “embezzlement.” Yet this policy disregarded the interests of foreign tourists themselves, who refused to pay more for plummeting services. Ceauşescu came to regard international tourism simply as a source of quick hard currency income, not as a sector that required constant investments. Coming as it did during a global economic crisis, this change in policy and investment strategy helps to explain the sharp declined in international tourism in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In Spain, Franco was both the head of state and Prime Minister, but when it came to international tourism, he allowed the younger and more practical Manuel Fraga, to become the face of the Spanish tourism. Although not adept in the pursuit of full liberalization, Fraga succeeded in loosening the state’s grip on tourism. Besides the hotel owners’ ability to set the prices within the limits imposed by the state, bureaucratic rules became less of an annoyance as Fraga adopted a policy of not interfering in ‘local’ or business issues. Fraga replaced almost all of the older, more conservative cohort of tourist functionaries with newly trained public servants who were loyal to him and who put his ideas in practice. Although both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain had a top-down approach to international tourism, Fraga’s more liberal and flexible views and policies diluted Franco’s political authoritarianism. By contrast, in Romania, Ceauşescu prevailed over more liberal and consumer oriented officials, like Maurer and Bozdog, and imposed a policy of maximum currency extraction and a more suspicious view on tourists in Romania.

783 ANIC, CC of PCR Economic Section, file no. 196/1975, f.21.
785 “Orden de 7 Noviembre de 1962 por lo que se determinan los precios a percibir por la Industria Hotelera” in Boletín Oficial del Estado, no. 276, 17 November 1962.
786 Boletín Oficial del Ministerio de Informacion y Turismo, 31 August 1963, no. 99.
787 In a debate between Ceauşescu and Maurer regarded the use of the term “consumption,” Ceauşescu wanted to replace this term with “spiritual and material well-being” to which Maurer replied: “I would
Despite the different approaches to and results of international tourism in socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain, foreign tourists’ day-to-day interactions with ordinary people altered consumption practices and opened the way for a more cosmopolitan way of life in both countries. This dissertation has argued that international tourism contributed to a modernization from below in both socialist Romania and Franco’s Spain. While both regimes attempted to control the influence of foreign tourists on local population, this attempt was only partially successful. Foreign tourists helped some Romanians to overcome the consumer goods shortage, whereas in Spain they exposed ordinary people to new fashions, more cosmopolitan habits, and a broadminded stance in regard to sexuality.

In the 1960s, socialist Romania abolished rationing and promised to give more attention to consumption, in part because it wanted to attract more Western tourists. Better quality products became available and tourist guides included information about shopping in socialist Romania. The state allowed some forms of private entrepreneurship, including the commissioners’ system, where an individual would rent a small state-owned shop and run it for profit. But this phenomenon was brought to a halt in the mid-1970s; in the late 1970s, rationing was reintroduced for some products, including fuel. This had a dramatic impact on individual tourism with socialist countries because these tourists visited Romania by car. This measure forced tourists from socialist countries to pay the same price for gas as that paid by Western tourists. As a solution to this problem, the Romanian government proposed special deals, which allowed tourists from socialist countries to buy gas at subsidized prices in exchange for free agricultural or manufactured products.


products. The number of tourists from each socialist country that visited Romania served as a basis for calculating the amount of delivered products. All socialist countries except the GDR signed such agreements.\(^{789}\) Rationing affected Western tourists as well, because it forced them to buy goods only from tourist shops, using dollars or Deutsche Marks. This had the effect of charging higher prices for the same goods that had once been relatively cheap. This drastically limited the shopping experience of Western tourists visiting Romania. Coupled with rising prices for hotels and other services, Romania became less attractive to cost conscious tourists.

For many Romanians, the arrival of foreign tourists, from both socialist and capitalist countries, provided an opportunity for cosmopolitanism. Not only could they acquire goods that were not available in ordinary shops and speak foreign languages, they could also create social networks beyond the socialist realm. True, most of the goods were bought from tourists from socialist countries, which used this informal commerce to supplement their meager resources of Romanian lei, but western tourists too were sources of goods. Western tourists’ more fashionable clothes, beach bags and toiletries, and cars that testified to a richer material culture proved to be quite alluring to Romanians. As the Romanian tourist propaganda emphasized, Romanians did speak French and as the memory of the interwar period was not that distant, the arrival of Western tourists felt like a reintegration into the larger European culture. For some tourist workers and more industrious Romanians, contacts with foreign tourists meant an opportunity for entrepreneurial activity, despite its rather illegal nature. Smuggling of foreign currencies and lei became frequent. As a place in between Eastern and Western Europe, Vienna became a venue for these exchanges. Tourist guides used their connections to help tourists from socialist countries exchange lei for Deutsche Marks after they had sold their merchandise in Romania. All these

\(^{789}\) ANIC, CC of PCR Collection, Economic Section, file no. 102/1979, f. 57.
enabled some Romanian citizens to acquire some economic self-sufficiency in relation to the socialist state and function like a form of *Eigenn-sinn*, a personal space that challenged the official power. This suggests that we might qualify somewhat popular claims about the socialist Romanian state’s totalitarian power when it comes to its ability to control these underground developments.\textsuperscript{790}

In addition, these exchanges created some informal personal networks across the Iron Curtain between Romanian citizens, tourists from socialist countries, and tourists or tourist delegates from capitalist countries.

The development of international tourism in socialist Romania also contributed to domestic social change, as many of the new employees in the tourist sector came from the countryside. The sheer fact that these employees were exposed to a different way of life, fashion, and work habits significantly changed their mentalités. As one of my interviewees recalled about living through this change, “it was like living in a different world, like going outside [abroad].”\textsuperscript{791} Although Romanian citizens could not easily travel to capitalist countries, by interacting with and acquiring goods from Western tourists, they embarked on a form of virtual traveling. This made employment in tourism very attractive and sometimes various forms of corruption (including nepotism) were used in order to obtain such jobs. Although some tourist guides had connections with higher officials, most rank-and-file tourist employees came from modest backgrounds, and their jobs, and the access they offered in a closed society like that of socialist Romania, helped to enhance these employees’ social status.

\textsuperscript{790} On literature that has revisited the totalitarian approach see, Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), *Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe* (Budapest: Central European University, 2009).

\textsuperscript{791} Doina, chef de maître at hotel “Doina” in Neptun on the Black Sea coast, personal interviewee, March 2013, “era o alta lume, era ca afara” in Romanian.
The arrival of large numbers of foreign tourists also had a strong impact on the lives of ordinary citizens in Franco’s Spain. Changes in regard to status of women, although gradual, were most obvious. Throughout the 1940s and the early 1950s, the Spanish state along with the Catholic Church imposed sixteenth century customs on women. Spanish women could hardly get employment and their only role became that of raising children and taking care of their husbands. Open discussions of sexuality became a taboo issue for both women and men. Women were supposed to follow a conservative dress code in order not to arouse men’s sexual desires. In addition, unaccompanied women were not allowed in cafes or restaurants. The Catholic Church could (and did) go as far as excommunicating those who did not obey these rules, which led to social and political exclusion. Yet the arrival of large numbers of foreign tourists contributed to a change in this situation. In the 1950s and 1960s, when hotels were scarce, some women would rent a room in their houses to tourists; this provided them with an income and some economic independence. Women also found employment as tourist guides and interpreters, and they became the main working force in the new hotels. What is more, the sheer presence of female foreign tourists and their easy-going attitude provided an inspiration for Spanish women. Some would pick up smoking, regarded as a sign of independence and cosmopolitanism, or wore clothes that challenged the Church’s puritanical recommendations. Moreover, with the “bikini revolution” of the early 1960s, bikinis and other ‘inappropriate’ forms of attire became common among tourists in Spain. In 1959, Pedro Zaragoza, an official close to Francisco Franco, approved the appearance of bikinis on the beach in Benidorm, a resort not far from Valencia. Although the Church excommunicated Zaragoza, he appealed to Franco and managed to turn Benidorm in the first

793 *Boletín Oficial del Ministerio de Informacion y Turismo*, 31 March 1958, no. 53.
Spanish resort that allowed bikinis. Suecos, the Swedish female tourists, were the first to take advantage of this change. They were also the ones to astonish both Spanish men and women with their libertine sexual behavior, which popular culture generously referenced in the 1960s. Soon Spanish women, but also men, living in the tourist areas became much more accustomed with the foreign tourists’ broadminded sexual behavior and even started to imitate them. Although the state and Church attempts to halt this process, their success was limited, as repression could threaten to dwindle the number of foreign tourists.

The surge in the number of foreign tourists triggered not just changes in the status of women and sexuality, but also offered ordinary people enhanced economic opportunities. Although the most lucrative benefits of international tourism remained under the control of the upper classes, international tourism did offer some opportunities for social change and democratization. Many agricultural workers moved into the tourist resorts and got employment in a hotel or a restaurant. These new positions offered access to a world less constrained by the religious realm; they also offered a clean bed, and regular meals. And of course, in some cases, social mobility followed as many tourist workers rose from a bellboy to a hotel director.

When it came to issues of social migration, social mobility, and expanding social horizons, the development of international tourism in Spain and Romania was quite similar. And as noted above, many of the policies enacted to enhance international tourism and the influx of hard currency were also similar. What distinguished the outcomes of these policies and sealed the fate of international tourism was less the nature of the economic system than how that system was managed and how it was integrated into broader national economic policies.

794 Amor a la Española (1967) directed by Fernando Merino. One of the characters in the movie, Alfredo Landa, shouts out “Que vienen las suecas” (Here come the Swedish girls).
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- CC of PCR Collection, External Affairs Section
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**The National Council for the Securitate Archives, Bucharest (ACNSAS)**
- Documentary Collection *(Documentare)*, Bucharest, Brasov, Sibiu, Suceava, Arges, Constanta
- Informative Collection
- Network *(Retea)* Collection

**The Video Archive of Romanian Television, Bucharest**

**Open Society Archives, Budapest (OSA)**

**Archivo General de Administracion, Alcala de Henares (AGA)**
- Culture *(Cultura)*
- Trade Unions *(Sindicatos)*
- External Affairs *(Asuntos Exteriores)*

**Institute for Tourist Studies (Instituto de Estudios Turisticos, TURESPAÑA)**

**World Tourist Organization Archive (TURESPAÑA)**

**City Archive of Malaga**
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B.O. del Ministerio del Aire  
Codigo Turistico  
Colecţie de legi, decrete, hotărări și alte acte normative [Collection of laws, decrees, and decisions]  
Documenta  
Destino de Barcelona  
Desarrollo  
Dirhos  
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