

**WHERE DO HUMANITARIANS CONNECT TO FIND DATA? A STUDY OF  
ACCESSIBILITY IN ONLINE INFORMATION ABOUT ADULT REFUGEES IN  
EMERGENCY EDUCATION**

by

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There are more than 15 million refugees registered with UNHCR and an unknown unregistered number of refugees worldwide. Among these refugees are scholars, academics and adult professionals. In 2010 for instance, the largest group in the Iraqi refugee populace in Jordan, was adults 18-59 years old. Thirty percent of these adults were university graduates. Yet, according to the dominant narrative, refugees are women and children, unskilled and traumatized, terrorists and vigilantes, ineligible and queue-jumping or short-term and freeloading. Thus, refugees are framed in ways that minimize their capacity and underscore a dependency upon or threat to the host state and aid community. Subsequently, compliance tasks have precluded aid for INGOs, which in turn, have “responsibilized” refugees through ever-restrictive eligibility criteria and rules. Adult education and livelihoods have been limited and some refugees have been denied services. As a result, the people with the least resources have been apportioned a disproportionate amount of responsibility, for an environment in which either few relevant services were provided or no accountability relationship was afforded.

INGO-donor networks have published online data to increase accountability, yet it has been examined most often quantitatively. Therefore, through network perspectives and the conceptual framework of downward accountability, I analyzed program reports from humanitarian activities implemented from 2010-2015, for Iraqi and Syrian refugees in Jordan. In an open data repository, I reviewed more than 1,800 program profiles and 47 documents were selected for content analysis. The analysis suggests emergency education decreased tensions, raised awareness about diseases and hygiene, achieved child protection and gender-inclusion goals and remediated noncompliance. The information however, was most often in regard to local beneficiaries, refugees with the least skills and refugees highly dependent upon humanitarian aid. Thus, there was minimal reporting of links between accountability policies, outcomes and the livelihoods aspirations of the refugee/scholar/professional.

Recommendations encompass educational policies and practices such as requalification, continuing education, professional development and certification, because they lead to sustainable livelihoods. Through comparative qualitative research, this study problematizes accountability information in open data and underscores the Iraqi and Syrian crisis as an adult education emergency – a circumstance not often associated with refugeehood.

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## **PREFACE**

This dissertation was a great journey. The journey was possible in part, because of the encouragement and friendship of many colleagues and mentors. I am enriched and will keep thoughts of you in my heart, closely guarded like treasure.

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

The movement of uprooted people in host communities is a major challenge in the aid arena. In fact, “refugee flows- and the civil and ethnic conflicts that cause them- are likely to remain among the most severe and intractable problems faced by the international community” (Makinson, 1999). In 2009, ten years after the quote above was published, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was caring for at least 42 million people, including 14 million refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2009a). In addition, in just a few years, the number of uprooted people has increased. For instance, UNHCR was caring for over 54 million in 2014, close to 58 million in 2015 and is expecting a population of over 60 million uprooted people in 2016 (UNHCR, 2015f).

The movement of refugees especially, may be engendered by social unrest, political instability and other destabilizing factors (Midgley & Eldebo, 2013; Winthrop, 2009; Kibreab, 1997). Thus, they have become a concern for dozens if not hundreds of nations. While these nations do not all encounter the same dilemmas, most have permitted international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), non-profit and community-based organizations to help manage the flow of goods and services to those in need. This large-scale process requires coordination among nations, donors, organizations and aid beneficiaries (Crisp, Garras, McAvoy, Schenkenberg, Spiegel & Voon, 2013; Vandemoortele, 2009; Stephenson & Kehler, 2004; Schweizer, 2004; Woodward, 2001). However, Serrato cautioned, “transparency and

quality standards are weak and coordination is difficult to ensure” (2014, p. 4). Moreover, staff or supervision may be especially low in aid arenas (Jawahar, Stone & Kisamore, 2007; Salama, 1999). In fact, there are usually just a handful of staff “driving humanitarian communication efforts” and “best practices and lessons learnt are not normally institutionalized, and therefore hardly influence their own organizations and/or other humanitarian settings” (Quintanilla, 2012, p. 15).

When lessons learned are not leveraged, actors may not remediate the challenges which render aid less accessible. For instance, humanitarian assistance has been focused on camps more than urban settings, children more than adults and relief more than recovery (Kapyla & Kennedy, 2014; Serrato, 2014; Healy & Tiller, 2013; Collinson, Elhawary, & Muggah, 2010; MSF, 1997). Moreover, while valuable information exists in grey literature such as lessons learned, it may be difficult to find (Seybolt, 2009; Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009). For example, Maiers, Reynolds & Haselkorn advised, “the typical reality in disaster response is that existing information is either outdated, hard to find, scattered among different sources, or unreliable for political or other reasons” (2005, p. 89). Wessells (2008) concurred, claiming multiple organizations implemented psychological services in Kosovo however, there were separate coordination activities, actors were not involved in information sharing and the coordination groups did not know of one another’s existence. Additionally, Lumbert, DeBot, Wang, Brekelmans & Yang maintained, “academics have generally acknowledged the importance of information-sharing, reflection, and documentation of refugee programs, yet there is little evidence that this has made its way into practice” (2012, p. 2). This information gap is particularly critical in the area of education. For instance, Mark Bray, Director of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) contended,

knowledge in education - in an emergency context - is not being leveraged. Indeed, he claimed it could be lost entirely, because of the “dispersion and disappearance of documents” and “high turnover” (Kirk, 2009, p. 7).

This challenge is particularly evident in the field because the documents are drafted by numerous agencies and stakeholders and the guidelines among them can be quite different. The length, certification, enrollment requirements, subject and associated curricula can vary widely (Talbot, 2013; Kirk, 2009). Subsequently, there has been less analysis of adult education and livelihoods activities, particularly in relation to a comparative examination of content. Thus, in this study, I conducted a comparative document review of adult education and livelihoods activities.

## **2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW**

This study is focused upon the public information about adult education and livelihoods programs for refugees in emergencies. Chapter 2 is based upon a literature review and is concerned with the following inquiries: the constraints to participation in the generation and sharing of information; how information is channeled through emergency education programs; how networks and competing interests affect the access to and quality of aid information in adult education; and how compliance information limits accountability in emergency education.

This analysis is centered upon emergency education programs in multiple sectors, including livelihoods, hygiene, health, sanitation, child protection, community-based protection and gender inclusion. Education is therefore comprised of formal and non-formal interventions that provide opportunities for refugees to gain and/or enhance knowledge and skills. This composition of education serves as a working operational definition, by encompassing many programs in the aid context, with different timelines, curricula, enrollment criteria, pedagogical methods and teacher qualifications.

A main finding in the literature review was the temporary schema in emergency aid, which permeated the coordination of adult education and fulfilled the priorities of critics, along with political or economic imperatives to decrease threats and costs through compliance. This finding is significant for at least two reasons. First, information flows in education and training were limited, because they were centered upon short-term activities and legitimacy tasks.

Second, recovery for adults could not be achieved in part, because it was deemphasized as a temporary problem.

## **2.1 WHAT CONSTRAINS PARTICIPATION IN AID INFORMATION?**

Power differentials and irregular funding are particular constraints to participation in the generation and sharing of aid information. Power differentials (Herrhausen, 2007) and irregular funding (OECD, 2012) are important to underscore, because they narrow opportunities for multiple perspectives to influence humanitarian aid and limit comparative, cross-sectoral data examinations. As a result, the objective of aid programs and the accountability activities, are constructed in an environment that is both asymmetrical and indeterminate. This setting is not recovery-oriented. Rather it is a liminal platform for care-seekers with no other alternatives.

In this section, I focus upon the power differential between international and local organizations and between international organizations and refugees. Next, I describe irregular funding and the implications for adult education and livelihoods programs.

### **2.1.1 Power differentials**

Though there are many actors in humanitarian aid, the priorities of donors and aid agencies often drive activities. National actors are at times subordinated, because human resources may not be developed in the bustle to plan and implement a crisis response. Alternatively, local staff with relevant skills are given jobs in INGO offices (Audet, 2011; Herrhausen, 2007). This power over human resources “often depletes those structures that do exist locally and, in that way, it

undermines the building up of sustainable local administrations” (Herrhausen, 2007, p. 16). Field expertise is also diminished, because programs are structured autonomously, by staff who make assumptions without inputs from those with local or specialized knowledge. For instance, information and technology and logistics departments are typically left out of the proposal development process (Maiers, Reynolds & Haselkorn, 2005). These departments are usually described as ‘overhead’ and the potential of these departments to streamline processes and increase efficiency is minimized.

The need for these departments is usually underscored in rapid onset emergencies, where it is more difficult to establish effective modes of communication and conduct the training needed to support the utilization of new software or adherence to new communication channels/standards. As a result, there are long-term implementation challenges because of “inaccurate project budgets and unrealistic expectations” (Maiers, Reynolds & Haselkorn, 2005, p. 85). Moreover, the costs associated with purchasing and transporting equipment and time required to manage the supply chain are underestimated.

The diminution of local knowledge is particularly recognizable in the refugee imaginary. For instance, refugees do not control their own narrative (Marlowe, 2010). Indeed, refugeehood (the circumstance and position associated with a person who is a refugee) is largely framed with the information generated and shared by donors and INGOs. By virtue of their authority and power over resources, the information they generate and disseminate denotes a power differential (Shrestha, 2011). Indeed, Seeley (2010) claimed, “the political priorities of the givers rarely coincide with those in the places where the aid dollars land.” For instance, refugees are not decision-makers (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). They do not construct identity in aid projects. Rather, Zetter claimed, their “stereotyped identities are translated into bureaucratically assumed

needs” (1991, p. 39). However, while they position themselves as experts on refugee matters (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999), aid actors are “largely ignorant of affected people’s views about the assistance being provided” (Hofmann, Roberts, Shoham & Harvey, 2004, p. 32).

In addition, because assumptions are made, there may be fewer interactions between organizations and refugees. For example, Medecins Sans Frontieres contended, “refugees should participate in the coordination process to the maximum possible extent” (1997, p. 229). However, the people most affected by crisis do not usually participate in coordination meetings (Stockton, 2002). When meetings are facilitated, “humanitarians provide but do not listen, that field staff leading meetings are not senior enough and meetings with providers are unproductive” (Serrato, 2014, p. 6).

Moreover, Martin noted, aid beneficiaries are “least able to influence aid agencies and thereby least able to hold them accountable” (2010, p. 6). Therefore, whether as the outcome of minimal decision-rights or myopic identity construction, aid participation decreases. Consequently, the public may have access to the donor-INGO vantage point and be unaware of other perspectives. Untested assumptions may not be problematized and progress in accountability may be difficult to recommend and study, because the accessible information in relation to accountability accomplishments is obscured. For example, the “most common planning tools, reporting formats and information systems do not capture the quality of accountability in relationships between NGOs and their constituents, nor do they actively enable learning and improvement” (Keystone, 2006, p. 4).

Accountability to donors (upward accountability) has been an important part of information sharing (Rubenstein, 2007), yet accountability to beneficiaries (Keystone, 2006) including refugees (downward accountability) has been less prominent. Thus, disentangling

decision-rights and downward accountability from donor-INGO reports, could be an important focus of aid scholarship. Indeed, resources are needed to examine reports and develop recommendations in the humanitarian arena which have implications for accountability and emergency education. Support for this endeavor has been insufficient in part, because of irregular funding.

### **2.1.2 Irregular funding**

Humanitarian support for refugees is often mitigated by bilateral and multilateral trade, armed conflict, debt relief and structural adjustment. Therefore, the preferences, alliances and grievances among various states and donors directly impact the resources allocated to those in need (Winthrop, 2009; Goodwin-Gill, 2008; Schweizer, 2004), which makes aid irregular. In addition, structural adjustment in particular, has minimized international support for education in many countries to facilitate myriad resource allocations in other sectors (Oketch, McCowan & Schendel, 2014; Weidman, 1995). Thus, international aid has been relative to mutualisms, inasmuch as it has been to teaching and learning.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012) surmised, much of humanitarian aid is fragmented and unpredictable. The issue of predictability is particularly important to underscore because in this uncertain setting, the value of aid is often reduced by 15-20% (OECD, 2012). This environment impacts the information generated and shared between and among donors, organizations and researchers. For instance, Makinson (1999) argued, “the field of relief and humanitarian assistance remained rather ad hoc in its approach, with high staff turnover, almost no professional training, scant attention to research and virtually no established research and training institutions that could ameliorate this situation.”

Staffing problems in particular, affect the information which can be generated and shared between and among agencies. Indeed, the World Health Organization (WHO), International Medical Corps (IMC) & United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) claimed information sharing was mitigated, in part, because focal points in Jordan could not be reached “even by phone to verify information due to their heavy workloads” (2012, p. 7). Indeed, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partners maintained, “to date registration capacity has not been able to keep pace with needs” and local institutions are also operating well beyond their limits (OCHA, 2009, p. 60). In addition, in Jordan and other nations, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded, staff shortages, access to people in need and, “the lack of reliable data have challenged State’s efforts to ensure that projects help the intended beneficiaries” (2009). The paucity of data is especially concerning, because the conditions for refugees from Iraq are poor and education, training and employment opportunities in the formal sector are hard to find. Indeed, Marfleet and Chatty maintained, “most have so far enjoyed basic physical security but face serious problems in relation to income, employment, housing, health and education in the host countries....where they are regarded as temporary guests or visitors” (2009, p. 2).

These formidable conditions in host communities may encourage more demand for INGO education and training programs. Thus, there is a need for information about Iraqis’ skills and learning aspirations, as well as scholarship which examines how their learning needs are addressed in humanitarian aid programs. These endeavors may not have been prioritized because of limited resources. For instance, UNHCR claimed funding for education was “narrow” and “late” (OCHA, 2011, p.55).

The Iraqi refugee crisis is especially significant, because one-third of registered adult Iraqi refugees in Jordan, is comprised of university alumni (OCHA, 2010; UNHCR, 2009d). UNHCR and its partners also described Iraqi refugees as “highly educated” (OCHA 2011, p. 49; OCHA, 2010, p. 38, 45). I did not find precise and disaggregated figures of the Iraqi refugee workforce. However, in the *2011 Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees*, UNHCR noted 40-60% of the adult population were working informally and 29% of registered Iraqi refugees had work permits (OCHA, 2011, p. 49). There were nearly 31,000 UNHCR-registered Iraqi refugees in Jordan in 2010 (OCHA, 2011, p. 43) however, UNHCR did not disaggregate the population in this report. In the *2010 Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees* however, there were nearly 47,000 registered refugees in Jordan in 2009 and the population data was disaggregated. Significantly, more than 60% of this population was between the ages of 18-59 (OCHA, 2010, p. 38). According to UNHCR, “the majority of the registered caseload (29, 039 individuals) is between 18-59 years of age” (OCHA, 2011, p. 38). Indeed, continuing education, professional development and certification, are activities relevant to highly educated adults (Talbot, 2013; Kirk, 2009). Therefore, the displacement of Iraqi refugees and their subsequent asylum in Jordan, was both a tragic circumstance and an adult education emergency. Moreover, Iraqi refugees in Jordan comprised the majority of the UNHCR-registered refugee population in 2009 and 2010 (OCHA, 2011; OCHA, 2010). Thus, the refugee crisis in Jordan was to a large degree, fertile ground for adult education and livelihoods programs.

Donors have been concerned with the mechanisms needed to prevent an inferior form of K-12 education in humanitarian aid (DFID, 2014). Therefore, projects have been planned to provide a K-12 education that is comparable to the education in host communities. However, the premise that adult education and livelihoods training could also be based upon what is customary

for citizens, has not received nearly as much demand, because donors and states were preoccupied with the costs and threats of refugeehood. Adult refugees were therefore underserved. In fact, in another regionally-focused report, UNHCR conceded “there is a consensus among stakeholders that the situation of Iraqi refugees in terms of livelihoods has reached a crisis point” (OCHA, 2009, p. 73).

### **2.1.3 Costs of refugeehood**

Refugeehood is viewed in the context of potential threats and costs, which minimize support for aid interventions. For instance, in a seminal study Ward (2014) examined UNHCR urban refugee policies to understand the refugee context in Jordan in 2009. Ward maintained donors viewed refugeehood in the context of their own security interests. Security interests undergirded the policy environment and priority for integration and repatriation, undergirded aid allocations.

Indeed, through phenomenology, classical budget theory and burden-sharing frameworks, Ward (2014) recognized funding as a mechanism to deter irregular movements to the North. Thus, once the likelihood of undesired refugee flows decreased, there was a corresponding decrease in humanitarian aid. As a result of donor and host priorities, as well as funding shortfalls, services were framed as time-limited and temporary. While tensions between UNHCR and the host government were challenging, Ward claimed the most significant constraint to implementation, was the decrease in donor support. Moreover, UNHCR and its partners could no longer operate their own centers and were increasingly reliant upon national organizations and agencies to support refugees. However, national agencies did not have the capacity necessary to respond to the demand for goods and services, therefore refugees were underserved. Thus, the

services refugees seek in the aid arena may not be accessible at the national or INGO level. This circumstance has been particularly prohibitive for skilled and refugee adults.

Through working groups in education for children (Save the Children & UNICEF, 2010; UNICEF & Save the Children, 2010), organizations share information and develop mechanisms to offset funding declines. However, I could not identify an ‘adult education working group’ for refugees in Jordan. Moreover, humanitarian education programs were documented by UNHCR and its partners however, this information has been dispersed in multiple disciplines. Indeed, education for adults has been conducted in community-based protection, mental health, nutrition, water-sanitation-hygiene (WASH) and health focused interventions (OCHA, 2010; OCHA, 2009). Therefore, the data is scattered and separated from the field of emergency education. Adult learners therefore, may encounter funding constraints alongside comparatively less coordination.

It is critical therefore, to examine the channels in which adult education and livelihoods information is disseminated and the degree to which it could be studied and leveraged to inform best practices. Thus, in the following section, I describe the distinct ways in which information about adult education and livelihoods is channeled and the implications for scholarship in emergency education.

## **2.2 HOW IS INFORMATION CHANNELED?**

Information is channeled through emergency education via networks and competition. Networks are important to analyze in part, because they generate and disseminate information (Shiffman, Quissell, Schmitz, Pelletier, Smith, Berlan et al., 2015) in which refugeehood is framed. In

addition, the positions network members are afforded are significant determinants, shaping the policies and preferences which are implemented in the aid arena. Network positions are not constructed serendipitously. Rather, they are constructed through competition between and among organizations, states, noncitizens and citizens in the workforce (Coston, 1998).

In INGO programs in particular, information is generated to comply with donor requirements (Seybolt, 2009). As a result, INGOs may generate and share more information related to donor or host country priorities, than they disclose data which demonstrate how refugees' education and livelihoods priorities informed aid interventions. Resources allocated to comply and compete may not be distributed to examine and incorporate lessons learned. Therefore, the focus of this section is upon the networks in the humanitarian aid arena and the competition which minimizes adult education and livelihoods in emergencies.

### **2.2.1 Networks**

The information generated and shared by members of aid networks is especially important to the public, because “networks shape how issues are understood” (Shiffman, Quissell, Schmitz, Pelletier, Smith, Berlan et al., 2015, p. 7).

Seybolt (2009) examined aid coordination through the conceptual framework of systemic network theory. He viewed the humanitarian community as an adaptive system which consists of a set of units that interface to effect specific outcomes. As a type of system, humanitarian actors operate as a network, but do so inconsistently because of divergent interests, market-driven conflicts and poor information flows.

In this context, adult refugees are overshadowed by the conflicts between and among members and the parameters of disclosure in their information. For instance, Clark-Kazak (2009)

examined UNHCR appeals and reports published from 1999-2008. Her examination of photographs and texts was conducted through textual analysis and social age analysis. This longitudinal review allowed Clark-Kazak to observe how UNHCR socially constructed refugees through different life stages. Clark-Kazak determined that adults were most often represented in the photographs of UNHCR reports, yet least often represented in the text. Thus, the issues in the aid arena may be understood as child protection issues. In the context of education, K-12 issues could be subsequently predominate, based upon the text which underscores the needs of refugee children.

The roles within the network are also critical. For instance, roles are so critical to program outcomes, they engender inquiries about “whose policy preferences are pursued, implemented and delivered on the ground” (Ohanyan, 2009, p. 476). Roles can reflect humanitarian, as well as political interests. For example, Souter claimed, “in practice, of course, UNHCR’s work has been inescapably political and durable solutions have been put to the service of numerous other political, economic and strategic goals, some of which are incompatible with their humanitarian rationale” (2013, p. 172). Indeed, INGOs may struggle to achieve goals and maintain neutrality. Thus, the structures suited to NGO autonomy have been an object of research in the aid arena. For example, through interviews and document review, Ohanyan (2009) examined NGO-donor networks to determine the setting most conducive to the preservation of NGO autonomy and the characteristics that made it possible to align policy preferences with policy outcomes. Through the network conceptual model, Ohanyan provided a typology of network types through which NGO-donor interactions could be viewed. Ohanyan concluded that NGOs were, “best situated to further their preferences relative to those of their donors in networks in which no single donor is dominant” (2009, p. 477). Moreover, NGOs

could preserve their autonomy and decision-making discretion in settings where there were multiple and even opposing policy preferences among various donors and constituents. Thus, it appeared the diversity of perspectives among network members served to reduce the potential for individual donors to exert unilateral control of NGO operations. In this setting, organizations were more engaged with beneficiaries and enjoyed a greater degree of grassroots support. However, Ohanyan cautioned networks were inherently political and supported policies and beneficiary groups based upon a specific set of values. Thus, NGO autonomy or the lack thereof, does not alter the potential for aid actors to divide communities and support interventions that have unintended consequences. In addition, though there are many variables involved in humanitarian outcomes, the ties between aid actors are critical. For instance, Ohanyan posited, the “internal institutional composition of NGO-donor policy networks are significant determinants in shaping opportunities for NGOs and in giving both NGOs and donors leverage over the policy process” (2009, p. 475). Thus, the ties between network members helps shape the discretion they can utilize to promote their policy objectives. In the case of adult education and livelihoods, these ties are especially significant, because concerns about competition for labor inform policy objectives and narrows roles for refugees to protect the local workforce.

### **2.2.2 Donor and host country competition**

There are competing international and national policies which reduce opportunities to promote self-reliance at the INGO level (Karsetter, 2014; Stevens, 2013; Kumin, 2004; Knudsen, 1991). For instance, Hasenfeld and Garrow argued, “local communities compete with each other to attract desirable constituents (e.g. business entrepreneurs) and repel undesirable constituents (e.g. poor immigrants)” (2012, p. 305). This competition can be viewed in welfare/human services,

tax, labor and education, where decision-makers “attempt to gain advantages by using policy-making discretion” (Hasenfeld & Garrow, 2012, p. 305).

In the humanitarian regime, this competition is between host states and donor states. In fact, Napier-Moore (2005) argued, host states pressured the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in order to prevent people from crossing the border or contain people who have crossed the border in camps. Indeed, Karsetter cautioned, the refugees’ right to work may not be affirmed by host states, as “local policies and practices often ignore the guidelines set by [the] international legal framework and make it difficult for refugees to earn income” (2014, p. 68). Additionally, MacDougall argued, “...local policies define refugee communities in different ways and thus enable different sorts of livelihoods” (2011, p. 38). These definitions inform the parameters for income generation and has engendered limitations for refugee livelihoods (ILO, 2015). As a result, “the economic needs of refugees have not been addressed in any meaningful or explicit fashion” (ILO, 2015, p. 5).

Policies may also be enacted to restrict refugees’ movements and promote their repatriation even when it is not preferred by refugees (Mountz, Coddington, Catania, & Loyd, 2013). Meanwhile, donor states direct their resources toward interventions that will either integrate refugees in the host community or likewise, encourage their repatriation. Thus, host states and donor states engage in “active refugee-prevention” and containment policies (Napier-Moore, 2005, p. 6). Napier-Moore therefore surmised, “no state is necessarily responsible for their asylum” (2005, p. 4).

This competition is especially deleterious, because a main challenge in emergencies is to find a livelihood (Karsetter, 2014; Norwegian Refugee Council, 2012; AMES, 2011). Though refugees encounter varied life issues, “the biggest problems facing refugees can be decreased

through the development of sustainable employment and livelihood opportunities...” (Karsetter, 2014, p. 74). Therefore, from the view of refugees, education and livelihoods programs are a necessity, because they increase employability and access to the marketplace. Indeed, without education programs in emergencies, there may be no safe or cost-effective way to address one’s economic needs and become self-reliant (HAP International, 2013; Crisp et al., 2013; Talbot, 2013). Yet, education in emergency settings is often underfunded and much of the literature is situated in a K-12 milieu (Talbot, 2013; Winthrop, 2009; Ratcliffe & Macrea, 1999). Indeed, Winthrop claimed, “there is a large focus on primary education, especially in refugee contexts” and “the educational needs of displaced youth, as well as adults, typically receive less attention” (2009, p. 13). Though some education and training opportunities are provided, they are not according to the priorities of refugees. For example, Winthrop noted the types of educational projects afforded, often have not met “the current or long-term needs of community members, especially with regards to the livelihood skills development” (2009, p. 13). Thus, competition in the aid arena minimizes the response to needs in adult education.

While these forms of competition are between and among states, non-citizens and citizens, the competitive arena is also prevalent between and among organizations, often between staff in headquarters and emergency environments. Thus, the pressures from divergent interests in the aid arena are both external and internal to the organizational context. This form of competition is described in the following section.

### **2.2.3 Competing and divergent interests in organizations**

There are competing positions and divergent interests between and among aid actors in organizations. Through the conceptual frameworks of policy coherence and organizational

theory, these differences have been conceptualized as a lack of alignment and an inadequate network interface. For instance, Herrhausen noted, “field staff often complain the HQ sets policies which are ill-suited to the situation on the ground and HQ accuses field staff of failing to see the big picture” (2007, p. 37). Additionally, competing interests discourage coordination. For example, Gregorian & Olson posited, “everyone is for coordination though no one wants to be coordinated by others who do not share their values, principles or operating modes” (2012, p. 4-3). There are also tensions between military and humanitarian organizations which obscure the purposes of workers in the field and complicate the ability of NGOs to appear autonomous in an increasingly interrelated aid environment (HAP International, 2013). In fact, Stockton admitted coordination can be noted as a “pejorative, referring to a time consuming process of pointless meetings and inconsequential discussions” (2002, p. 9). While Medecins Sans Frontieres (1997) asserted that coordination is one of the top 10 priorities in the humanitarian response, the NGO cautioned it was also one of the priorities most often neglected or inadequately performed. As a consequence, Seeley (2010) concluded, “aid seldom does quite what it was intended to do.” Seybolt also claimed, the humanitarian assistance system has failed to become a “fully integrated network” (2009, p. 1028).

Competition for donor resources may be a constraint to coordination in aid networks. Therefore, I focus upon competition for resources in the next section.

#### **2.2.4 Competition for donor resources**

Competition in the network is especially important to examine because it underscores multiple perspectives in the aid arena, while revealing a vertical interface that causes aid to be less accountable. For instance, donors impose conditions upon their funding, which restrict “when,

where, and how relief organizations can respond” (Seybolt, 2009, p. 1032). The activities planned and conducted must uphold these conditions and in some cases, they have “reflected the donors’ political interests more often than they reflected the needs on the ground” (Seybolt, 2009, p. 1042). In addition, aid organizations are not automatically provided with funding because of their mandates (Coston, 1998), good intentions or standards (The Sphere Project, 2014). Indeed, donors establish competitive processes and arrangements based upon the thematic and geographic areas they endeavor to engage. The control and power over resources is essentialized through this authority and support is not guaranteed from one year to the next. Thus, organizations engage in perpetual competitions to attract donors and guarantee their sustainability (Herrhausen, 2007; Schweizer, 2004; Stockton, 2002). Thus, the information in the aid arena is a function of the competition between and among aid actors, inasmuch as it is a disclosure about crisis response. As a consequence, the access to and quality of aid information relative to beneficiary needs and priorities is minimized.

Adult education and livelihoods were described as major refugee needs and priorities (Karsetter, 2014; Talbot, 2013). Therefore, in the following section, I examine the impact of divergent interests and competition in aid networks in the context of adult education and livelihoods.

## 2.3 AFFECTS OF NETWORKS AND COMPETING INTERESTS




Figure 2.1: The mitigation of recovery in the aid context

Networks and competing interests effect the access to and quality of information in emergency education, by framing refugeehood unfavorably and consequently, minimizing refugee benefits. Through time-limited activities in particular, they render aid short-term (Ward, 2014; MSF, 1997). Moreover, organizations' priorities and containment policies decrease recovery opportunities, as noted in figure 2.1. In addition, by constructing a profile of some refugees as noncompliant (Olivius, 2013; Miller, 2004) or tragic (Baker & McEnery, 2005), they diminish donor and INGO responsibility for relevant adult education activities, based upon the view of refugeehood as temporary, refugee needs as psychosocial and refugee behavior as contrary. This view limits scholarship in adult education and subsequently, accountability assessments. It can

also be problematized because the information INGOs and donors disclose most often, is relative to the refugees who are most compliant.

In the following sections, I describe time-limited activities and noncompliance. Next, I examine the implications for scholarship and adult education in emergencies.

### **2.3.1 Time-limited activities**

Refugees' long-term goals such as permanent housing, adult education and training cannot be adequately addressed, since the aid environment in which they are situated is framed as temporary and time-limited. For instance, Medecins Sans Frontieres cautioned, "refugees are usually seen as temporary visitors to a host country, an attitude which results in a short-term planning approach that may be maintained for years after their arrival" (1997, p. 23).

Presumably, while refugees prepare to return to their home country (repatriation) or accept asylum in a third country (resettlement) humanitarian programs are framed as mechanisms which allow aid organizations to assist refugees in the interim. (Crisp et al., 2013; Audet, 2011; Hathaway, 2007). Yet, less than 1% of refugees are resettled to third-party countries (Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, 2013) and refugees may not repatriate, because of instability, security gaps, minimal services and costs of living which are prohibitive (MacDougall, 2011; Zetter, 2011; MSF, 1997). In addition, they "may not have the static conception of home that many might imagine them to have" (Souter, 2013, p. 176). Thus, refugees' needs in host communities are usually long-term. In contrast, the aid environment has been constructed as a setting for short-term interventions.

In this short-term context, refugees are positioned in the 'between' (Lacroix, 2004, p. 148). This person has but a temporary identity that is accepted grudgingly, to satisfy

organizations' requirements in exchange for the right to move forward. Piacentini acknowledged the "temporariness" associated with the refugee label, which denies heterogeneity and misrecognizes the priorities, concerns and objectives of refugees, which vary and develop over time (2012, p. 16).

The transitional nature of refugeehood and the way it is understood by the aid community, was noted by Baker & McEnery (2005). Through discourse analysis, they examined refugee debates and reports in 2003, based upon a set of newspapers and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) documents. In UNHCR documents, they concluded refugees were often constructed as tragic and temporary. Baker and McEnery also noted UNHCR documents contained assumptions about the extent to which refugees and asylum seekers were deserving. Refugees were not presented as heroes, fearless sojourners or compatriots. They did not construct their own identity and were not regarded as the experts on their conditions or entitlements. The tri-fold message of refugees as temporary, tragic and undeserving is significant because the public has come to understand refugees as transient more than resilient (Baker & McEnery, 2005).

The tri-fold message has permeated the policy environment, the jurisdiction of refugee livelihoods and the distinctions for income-generation. For example, a significant part of the refugee community in Jordan includes undergraduate students, whose studies were interrupted (Lorisika, Cremonini & Jalani, 2015; UNESCO, 2015; Atherton, 2014). Yet, only a few university scholarships have been awarded to refugees and education programs fall far behind mental health in terms of funding and implementation (OCHA, 2010; UNHCR's OSTs & DPSP, 2009; UNHCR, 2009b). In addition, aid workers have underscored the presence of many Iraqi refugee teachers and experts with strong academic backgrounds and livelihood needs in

Jordan (Labi, 2014; American Friends Service Committee, 2008; Duncan, Schiesher & Khalil, 2007). Non-formal education and training programs were implemented for Iraqi refugees in Jordan, however they were often provided for only up to three months, “in case attendees are resettled” (Stevens, 2013, p. 27). This short-term programming has been maintained, in contrast to research findings which concluded refugees do not intend to return home (UNHCR, 2009c) and resettlement options were applicable to the 1% (Bureau of Population, Migration and Refugees, 2013). In addition, Marfleet and Chatty surmised, “access to education and healthcare varies: in some cases UNHCR, working with local and international NGOs, has assisted with provision, but in some states Iraqis are effectively excluded from public services” (2009, p. 18). This limitation is especially significant, because it mitigates opportunities for refugees to construct a convincing counternarrative. As uninvited, these and other refugee populations are economically subordinated, then validate the dominant narrative as costs and inconvenience (Chauvin & Garces-Mascarenas, 2014). They are displaced for years (Muggah, 2005) in misrecognition (Marlowe, 2010), from which they receive a role or position, politically and procedurally constructed for non-citizens (Bauder, 2014; MacDougall, 2011).

### **2.3.2 Non-compliance**

The temporary schema decreases the aid to refugees and engenders specific counter-behaviors. For instance, refugees may select noncompliance as their primary form of interface in the aid community. Indeed, Medecins Sans Frontieres (1997) advised, refugees are known to inflate their numbers to gain advantages to larger amounts of goods and supplies. Therefore, though organizations value protocol and procedures, refugees may circumvent the rules when they embrace a different set of ideals. Moreover, program outcomes can be severely impacted by

refugees' perceived level of inclusion and "if refugees do not participate during the planning and implementation stages, assistance programmes may well fail in several ways" (MSF, 1997, p. 23).

In fact, the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) International noted that crisis-affected groups complained that their livelihoods, needs and priorities were not fully understood or integrated into program planning and service delivery. As a result, feelings of disrespect and lost autonomy resulted in "lower levels of participation and support" in aid programs (HAP International, 2013, p. 64). In addition, Kibreab (2004) argued, refugees viewed humanitarian aid organizations as outsiders with infinite resources who at times, fail to safeguard those resources and prevent corruption. Kibreab was perplexed by refugees, who contended they received a small proportion of the resources allocated and were obliged to act in deceitful ways in order to level the playing field. In order to gain access to food, employment and other resources, refugees registered family members as individuals or 'borrowed' family members from neighbors to increase disbursements. They would also abandon programs when other opportunities for advancement were presented. Thus, the circumvention of donor and organizations' rules through 'number fudging' and significantly, low retention, have become prevalent forms of counter or contrary behavior and noncompliance. These behaviors have significant implications for the access to and quality of aid information.

For example, Miller (2004) maintained refugees were treated with disregard by researchers and aid workers and responded in kind. Through "frontstage" and "backstage" behaviors refugees determined who to trust, what to say and what to withhold from the 'other.' Miller maintained that in both interviews and training sessions, refugees were polite and superficial because they were apprehensive. When refugees were asked questions, they

responded in ways that were expected and did not reveal their deeper feelings. For example, refugees provided positive feedback on a training session in public and later, privately revealed their disaffection for that same session. He claimed researchers tend to ignore trust and relationship building, which they deemed inconsequential. Yet, trust was a precursor to accessing the authentic beliefs, concerns and needs of refugees. Thus, when interventions are planned they may be based upon a contrived account. Furthermore, without opportunities for inclusion and clear social/economic benefits, refugees can view programs as unfair and disengage.

Refugees therefore limit the access to and quality of aid information, based in part upon how they view the aid context. Indeed, Hilhorst & Jansen posited, “the realities and outcomes of aid depend on how actors along and around the aid chain –donor representatives, headquarters, field staff, aid recipients and surrounding actors – interpret the context, the needs, their own role and each other” (2010, p. 1120). As a form of interface, their actions are critical to information because they impact if and to what extent educational activities can be reported. In the Iraqi and Syrian crisis, compliance and backstage behaviors in adult education have been particularly dominant in INGO reports. For instance, in a desk review of various reports (Dineen, 2013), there were “numerous” instances where NGO workshops for Syrian women were empty. While some organizations suggested transportation and fears about harassment were to blame, others argued refugees were not interested and therefore did not participate. Moreover, in a UNHCR (2012c) briefing, it was noted that Syrian refugees were reluctant to register and the number of registered refugees did not reflect the total refugee population.

In the *Joint Assessment Review of the Syrian Refugee Response in Jordan*, UNHCR, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) examined more than 100 reports published by its agencies and partners in 2012 and 2013 (UNHCR,

UNICEF & WFP, 2014). There were “numerous” reports of empty workshops and a reluctance to register. In addition, refugees perceived a lack of neutrality in aid and questioned the extent to which UNHCR registration was beneficial. In fact, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Jordanian Red Crescent conceded, “a sizeable proportion of JRC-registered refugees are not registered with UNHCR, due to their concerns around privacy and protection” (2012, p. 5). Indeed, Serrato cautioned, “refugees stated they have experienced exploitation and confusion over multiple beneficiary registrations” (2014, p. 4).

In an analysis of the Syrian refugee situation in Mafraq, Jordan, Mercy Corps noted refugees were critical of the aid response and the “overriding perception is that aid is not being managed or distributed in a fair manner” (2012, p. 6). Moreover, Syrian refugees “blame corrupt practices by local Jordanian organisations for the lack of assistance, claiming that these groups steal the money and food that is meant for the refugees” (Mercy Corps, 2012, p. 6).

In a participatory assessment, UNHCR (2012a) and its partners noted refugees’ mistrust and questions about neutrality. There were also arduous logistical matters which made the process of registration challenging. However, researchers admitted some refugees were not registered because their “needs are not met” and “do not see any use for registration with UNHCR” (UNHCR, 2012a, p. 17). Marfleet & Chatty also conceded, “today we find that many Iraqi refugees maintain their distance from the UNHCR, for reasons including loss of faith in the willingness of politicians and officials to assist them...” (2009, p. 1). Moreover, registration has also been challenging for UNHCR and its partners with Iraqi refugees in Syria. It was conceded however, that “vocational training for adults and youth,” “distance learning for high school graduates” and other needs for aid had not been afforded (Loughry & Duncan, 2008, p. 14). In addition, Loughry & Duncan admitted, “few initiatives identify the Iraqi population as

resourceful and empower and involve the Iraqi refugee population as active decision makers and implementers of services” (2008, p. 2).

Yet, when refugees interpret the aid context positively, they may attend education and livelihoods programs more consistently. For example, in 2010, the Heartland Alliance Refugee Health Programs (RHP) conducted an assessment to address pervasive low registration rates and disengagement in health and awareness programs with Iraqi refugees (Giese, 2010). The researchers acknowledged multiple organizations seemed unable to effectively recruit and retain Iraqis even when other refugee groups were engaged. Service providers claimed Iraqis viewed particular education programs and workshops unnecessary and redundant. They were concerned about Iraqis health status and health education needs. Thus, the purpose of the assessment was to identify those methods of outreach which were effective and scalable. The researcher also sought to highlight “strengths in the Iraqi refugee community that can be built upon to improve upon their health and improve their health knowledge” (Giese, 2010, p. 5).

Interestingly, one of the barriers to programming was the tendency for organizations to deny Iraqis opportunities to “speak to the issues they are experiencing with their health and share their own perspectives” (Giese, 2010, p. 19). In terms of best practices, the assessment revealed recruitment and retention rates improved when organizations achieved the following: incorporated culturally relevant information and activities into their programming; adapted programs in accord with refugee feedback; and cultivated strong, ongoing trust relationships. The researcher recommended more interactive educational sessions where information flowed from refugees as well as personnel, along with increased coordination between service providers and Iraqis. These findings are significant in part, because the burden of interface in this case was

shared more equally between refugees and the organizations, which decreased the power differential.

While this project was implemented in a resettlement environment, the data suggested a relationship between the generation and sharing of information and program outcomes. Thus, the extent to which organizations promote and incorporate information from refugees in an emergency arena, could be an important focus of study for scholars. However, scholarship in emergency arenas has been minimized by constraints for which the aid community has yet to resolve. I describe these constraints in the next section.

### **2.3.3 Less scholarship and research in adult learning**

In the temporary and competitive aid arena, aid jobs and aid services are short-term. The constant fluctuation and the pace of aid is prohibitive. For example, once funding for programs is no longer allocated or asylum seekers move elsewhere, aid workers oft move on to the next emergency (Jordanian Ministry of Health & Premiere Urgence Aide Medicale Internationale, 2014; Serrano, 2014; Randel, & German, 2013; Wessells, 2008). Moreover, the issues which get prioritized in disasters are not always those which address the social and economic conditions of affected populations (Ingram, Franco, Rumbaitis-del Rio & Khazai, 2006). In this fluid context, the roles that are afforded refugee adults in INGO programs may not be examined in relation to their aspirations. Likewise, the counter-behaviors may not be assessed relative to the power-differential. There may also be less scholarship in adult learning because the refugees and/or staff are not present long enough to generate and disseminate knowledge.




Figure 2.2: Conceptual frameworks in refugeehood

For example, the power differential has been a part of the scholarship, especially with respect to NGO-refugee relationships, as noted in figure 2.2. Indeed, the uninvited and their subordinate and temporary role in the aid sector has been lamented. The positions that INGO emergency education programs provide and the relationship between the positions and the refugees' livelihoods aspirations however, is part of the information gap that the turnover and pace of aid has helped to maintain. The conceptualization of refugees as tragic and traumatized has enhanced this gap, because it justifies a disproportionate allocation of resources to psychological activities (Marlowe, 2010), which reduce funding streams for teaching and learning. Thus, the limitations of short-term funding and competing interests are extended by a trauma narrative.




Figure 2.3: The impact of the trauma narrative

As a result, when education and education information are not limited by noncompliance and backstage behavior, they can be decreased by a focus upon pathology, as shown in figure 2.3. I describe the trauma narrative in the following section.

#### **2.3.4 Disproportionate resources toward psychosocial activities**

Comparable academic backgrounds and livelihoods aspirations suggest teaching and learning are relevant to refugee adults. However, they are deemphasized because it is assumed refugees must first be rescued and repaired. Education for adult refugees is consequently, separate from what is customary for any other learner. For instance, Talbot (2013) argued the aid community has been focused upon Education for All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) goals for children. Accreditation and certification have not been prioritized. Thus, refugees are often unable to produce a certificate deemed comparable to other applicants or document their accomplishments in a way that is meaningful to potential employers or formal educational

institutions. Moreover, education and training programs are not sufficiently linked to market demands for labor and/or entrepreneurship. Therefore, graduates of various humanitarian educational programs are often unable to use the training they received. Programs are therefore low in value, with regard to outcomes in self-reliance. These limitations may not be well-known because pedagogy is a counterintuitive response to trauma according to the dominant refugee narrative.

Refugeehood has indeed become what Marlowe posited, “a master status that defines a person above and beyond any other form of identity” (2010, p. 183). Moreover, refugeehood is interpreted according to a deficit model so pervasive, that the “media, politicians, and the general public have been saturated by the trauma discourse to the extent that all assume that more or less, all refugees are traumatized” (Papadopoulos, 2001, p. 409). This preoccupation has limited opportunities for the refugee to be recognized, via achievements s/he shares in common with the host community (Jordanian Department of Statistics & ICF International, 2013) and data that suggests not all refugees have mental health illnesses (Gammouh, Al-Smadi, Tawalbeh & Khoury, 2015; Wessells, 2008). In fact, Pierce and Gibbons cautioned, “it is important for the counselor to remain focused on the career rather than the potential trauma” (2012, p. 124). Yet, the traumatic characterization of refugeehood is enshrined in public information and discourse (Baker & McEnery, 2005). Therefore, Marlowe asserted, “unfortunately, the descriptors of poverty, conflict, chronic exposure to violence and destitution often become the public’s explicit and tacit understandings of refugee lives” (2010, p. 191). As a result, refugees are not peers. They are damaged people.

For example, extraordinary events and traumatic circumstances are assumed to decrease capacity. Thus, decision-rights, patterns of interactions and allocations of information central to

network coordination (SAS-065, 2010; Phister Jr., Allen, Barath, Brandenberger, Bruehlmann, Burton, et al., 2009; SAS-050, 2006) could be withheld or minimized because their competence has been a subject of doubt. Therefore, refugees may not be afforded roles relative to their livelihoods aspirations. Indeed, Miller (2004) discovered that refugees were denied access to specific training in health, based upon the trainer's view that they were illiterate and would practice certain medical techniques arbitrarily. Moreover, Olivius (2013) learned humanitarian organizations actively promoted the selection of women participants in non-formal training sessions because they believed women would be more likely than men to fulfill their expectations and transmit the knowledge gained and/or supplies distributed to the entire family. Framed as an exercise in gender equity, organizations deliberately targeted a disproportionate number of women in order to reduce their own levels of frustration, caused by refugee men who were presumed to be noncompliant. Men were denied access to aid and depicted as immoral, politically motivated and otherwise deviant. Thus, the uninvited may be pathologized - a practice which is less recognized - based upon an imaginary that associates refugeehood with incompetence. Incompetence in turn, makes refugees undesirable.

For instance, Hasenfeld & Garrow maintained, discretion is often utilized "to determine eligibility for entitled services and to discriminate between desirable and undesirable clients" (2012, p. 307). Desirable clients, they argue, are sought after because they require fewer resources to process and make it easier for the organization to achieve its outcomes. Aid beneficiaries can therefore be misrecognized.

Misrecognition is particularly significant, because it is embedded into institutional, social and political arenas (Schlosberg, 2012; Marlowe, 2010). In the aid context, it is the form of information that narrows opportunities to belong because the focus is upon if and when refugees

are leaving, the extent they are competent and capacity limitations. Less is known about refugees' livelihoods aspirations or how aid programs are responding to them. Thus, the lack of data in relation to their livelihoods goals could be a critical part of policy advocacy and scholarship. In addition, the misrecognition of refugees is particularly concerning, because accountability to incompetent and undesirable refugees may be practiced differently. In aid information for example, the focus of reporting may be on noncompliance and low participation may not be identified as area to examine, since the contrary or counter-behavior is a response that refugees are considered responsible for.

#### **2.4 COMPLIANCE INFORMATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

Compliance information in emergency education may limit accountability in part, because it can be utilized uncritically to make refugees responsible. Through the process of labelling and responsabilization in particular, refugee counter-behaviors and noncompliance are linked to their unmet needs. Therefore, deficits in service delivery may not be identified or corrected in instances in which refugees operate contrary to INGO and donor expectations. For instance repatriation was a main expectation of donors for Iraqi refugees. However, repatriation hopes were criticized by Terrill who claimed, "the United States has been so focused on dealing with Iraqi problems within Iraq that it has done very little to help Iraqis outside of their own country" (2008, p. 70).

Labelling is based upon an ontological recognition structure in which beneficiaries in the aid arena are classified. The ontological recognition structure is centered upon the subjective conceptualization of refugees as legal/illegal, entitled/unentitled, registered/unregistered,

eligible/ineligible and compliant/noncompliant. This structure enables a macro perspective or administrative vantage point of refugee positionalities and of state or INGO responsibility. The classification of beneficiaries is an iterative activity performed by organizations and other actors by enlarge, to release or withhold entitlements through beneficiary designations (Zetter, 1991). These designations correspond to specific entitlements. In addition, these entitlements at the micro level, are the outcomes. They are the aid and services afforded compliant refugees through internal labels or typologies (Napier-Moore, 2005). Responsibilization refers to the sustained concentration upon the centrality of responsibility for one's own affairs, alongside a contradictory set of communal values in regard to citizenship and belonging (van Houdt & Schinkel, 2014). This dichotomy is viewed through structural barriers to services and protection from the state, based primarily upon truth claims about the cost or risk that the 'other,' for example a noncitizen or deviant, may pose to the public. A main outcome of labelling and responsabilization is the minimization or denial of public support or resources, through a process of misrecognition in which the 'other' plays a subordinate role. Compliance is a significant part of this process. It is the measurement of belonging or legitimacy in which these resources are situated.

Labelling and responsabilization are not limited to the aid arena or to refugees. Yet, they are particularly relevant to refugees because of the way they inform how rules are interpreted and enforced and subsequently, how aid actors report services which they do not provide. For example, accountability is often assessed through the beneficiary relationship, which limits the public's access to information about persons to whom no relationship is given and connotes a low degree of deservingness for persons to whom no services are afforded. In this section, labelling is examined in relation to the UNHCR refugee typology, followed by an exemplar, vis

a vis the Iraqi refugee crisis in Jordan. I then explore the mechanisms in which Iraqi and Syrian refugees in Jordan may have been responsabilized. I conclude this section with implications for downward accountability.

#### **2.4.1 Labelling refugees in humanitarian emergencies**

Refugeehood must be structured to facilitate service delivery in the program context. This structure is centered around a refugee typology. Napier-Moore maintained, “UNHCR, states, and the entire refugee regime, including researchers, have found a convenience in typologising refugees” (2005, p. 9). This typology is comprised of myriad designations utilized to label new arrivals with an identity “which may or may not be theirs” (Napier-Moore, 2005, p. 9). Labelling is a coordinated act, in which refugees play a subsidiary role. For example, new arrivals are recognized as refugees by host countries, particularly when they are signatories to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and/or its 1967 Protocol. Yet, not all nations are signatories. Indeed, some of the states with the largest refugee flows, such as Pakistan and Jordan, are not signatories to the Convention. Those states that are either lacking resources, are against the Convention and its protocol or against integration often permit or designate UNHCR and its partner INGOs as responsible for new arrivals (UNHCR, 2012b; GAO, 2009; Goodwin-Gill, 2008).

As a part of their compliance procedures, UNHCR and INGOs collect information and engage in various status determinations where new arrivals can request protection in the form of asylum or refugee designations within the typology. Various procedures are also implemented to differentiate those who qualify for services from those who do not. When UNHCR operates to establish protection in the absence of state support or an endorsed international convention, new

arrivals are viewed as eligible for protection under its Mandate. In this scenario, new arrivals who are seeking protection and are awaiting the completion of the claimant process become known as “asylum seekers.” Those new arrivals who successfully complete the claims process and are granted refugee status may be referred to as “statutory” or “mandate” refugees (Simeon, 2010). This is in contrast to those new arrivals in host countries that are signatories to the Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol and/or express solidarity with particular refugee groups. In this instance, new arrivals are often referred to as “convention refugees.” New arrivals may also be recognized as convention refugees by the international community when it determines that the criteria set forth in the Convention have been met, regardless of whether the host community has done likewise (Goodwin-Gill, 2008). Refugee typologies are therefore a part of the policy environment and situate refugees within a spectrum constructed for noncitizens. The refugee is affixed to a role in the spectrum based upon additional bureaucratic processes that may be prohibitive.

From the frameworks of organizational theory, constructivism and Weberian approaches, Barnett & Finnemore (1999) lamented the categorizations of target groups such as refugees. They claimed organizations develop and apply rules and regulations to justify actions which are “identity defining, or even life threatening” (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 710).

Through the conceptual framework of labeling, Zetter (1991) examined the labeling process which he claimed is largely absent in the literature on policy for refugees. Zetter utilized the framework to underscore asymmetrical relationships where organizations designate new identities and utilize their power to control access to goods and services. This classification is not a passive encounter, rather “to classify is to engage in an act of power” (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 711).

Indeed, from the moment they cross the border new arrivals are subjected to a process where their reasons for entry are scrutinized, their credibility is debated and their bodies labeled (Keung, 2013; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). MacDougall asserted, “when an individual seeks services as a refugee, her identity, personal story, and physical health are all subject to interrogation by Western asylum-granting nations, and by intergovernmental agencies” (2011, p. 38). Moreover, the process of responding to refugee flows requires significant resources, which renders their care unappealing. Subsequently, the “political and economic interests of host governments anxious to divest themselves of protective responsibilities” informs the response to any poor new arrival (Hathaway, 2007, p. 6).

Political and economic interests may minimize the moral imperative in order to maintain a strict migration agenda (Zetter, 2011; Goodwin-Gill, 1999). Therefore, the aid allocated to refugees is relative to the political and economic setting inasmuch as it is to the needs of beneficiaries. Indeed, labels correspond to entitlements. Entitlements enable refugees to survive in host communities and access water, medical care and other public resources. Peers may be able to access these resources in a way that is more acceptable to host communities. Yet in some cases, refugees and other displaced groups are perceived essentially as queue jumpers, freeloaders, germ-carriers, job-stealers, terrorists, irregular/economic/climate migrants and squatters (Bauder, 2014; Guild & Moreno-Lax, 2013; NRC, 2012; O’Reilly, 2011; Leenders, 2010; Dun & Gemenne, 2008; Tober, Taghdisi & Jalali, 2006; van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002; Kibreab, 1997; Goodin, 1988). Their use of public resources can be resented (Midgley & Eldebo, 2013). In fact, Syrian refugees comprised 10% of the Jordanian population in 2013 and according to UNHCR, there has been “increasing tension with host communities over scarce resources, such as water” (2013b, p. 5). Indeed, “humanitarian organisations and government

need to think how their response and treatment of those in need is inextricably linked to community dynamics, and may inadvertently catalyse frictions, escalate tensions and increase negative perceptions of assistance” (Guay, 2015, p. 6). It is therefore more difficult to underscore the aid that may be owed to refugee adults, because refugees are not labeled as peers and the world’s attention is upon the damage they may cause (Leenders, 2010; Kumin, 2004; van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002). Therefore, adults may be accepted when it suits the mood of a media-tempered public audience (Karunakara, 2015; Hoijer, 2004) and consequently, the uninvited have access to “certain kinds of entitlements” (MacDougall, 2011, p. 38). For example, UNHCR noted, “a key concern remains maintaining a single approach for all refugees when levels of funding and resources, as well as Government policies, tend to result in varying levels of access to services for different nationalities” (2013b, p. 5). This narrow access to aid could limit accountability to refugees because their needs are juxtaposed with the aid others decide they deserve. In addition, differences between the labels accepted by UNHCR and its partners and host nations have become more challenging to resolve, as refugee numbers increase and refugee situations become protracted. The Jordanian refugee crisis is especially relevant in this regard.

#### **2.4.2 Labelling Iraqis in Jordan**

The post-2007 displacement of Iraqis fostered an estimated two million refugees. Thus, iterative dialogue in regard to labelling Iraqi beneficiaries and their entitlements could have significant social and economic consequences. Consequently, estimating the population was as crucial as determining the best label. However, there were varying and conflicting accounts for the number of Iraqi refugees in Jordan, in some cases reaching 450,000 (GAO, 2009; FAFO, 2007). In this

setting, informed decision-making was difficult for aid actors because it was impossible to know which estimate was correct and because large estimates engendered trepidation for any implied state responsibility. Indeed, labelling activities in Jordan were driven by the socio-political impact of asylum and the human and material costs associated with the refugee status determination. As a result, needs were overshadowed by a contentious process of legitimization constructed between the Government and UNHCR. For example, Stevens (2013) conducted interviews and a legal analysis to examine the labels associated with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and their benefits with respect to rights, services and protection. His research was centered upon the conceptual framework of labeling (Zetter, 1991), which was utilized to assess the tensions between stakeholders in such fields as education, health, resettlement, repatriation and livelihoods.

Stevens (2013) claimed the situation for Iraqi refugees in Jordan has been particularly precarious because Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol and does not have clear national legislation on refugee issues. Moreover, Jordan recognizes new arrivals from Iraq as “guests” which in most instances are not entitled to work permits and residency. Also recognized as “temporary visitors” and “temporary guests,” they are expected to register with UNHCR, which Jordan designated as responsible for finding a durable solution within a 6-month timeframe (OCHA, 2009; Marfleet & Chatty, 2009). In addition to resource constraints, ongoing conflict in Iraq and family separation made durable solutions unattainable for most refugees. Therefore, many refugees remained in Jordan well beyond the timeframe indicated on their entry visas. Refugees became known as ‘overstayers’ and were constantly worried about being deported. Moreover, UNHCR and Jordan disagreed on what

protection meant and how it should be implemented (Stevens, 2013). For example, tensions over how new arrivals from Iraq could be regarded as refugees resulted in multiple policy revisions.

Jordan maintained a refugee status determination should be conducted for Iraqis on an individual basis. Because of limited resources, UNHCR attempted several methods of group determinations, such as the “pan-national temporary protection regime” and the application of “prima facie” status. Ostensibly, these group determinations gave sweeping recognition to the community of Iraqis who arrived in Jordan. Group determinations had the advantage of non-

Ontology	Refugee Typology	Jordanian Refugee Typology
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legal</li> <li>• Entitled</li> <li>• Registered</li> <li>• Eligible</li> <li>• Compliant</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refugee</li> <li>• Mandate refugee</li> <li>• Convention refugee</li> <li>• Prima facie refugee</li> <li>• Asylum seeker</li> <li>• Person of concern</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overstayer</li> <li>• Arab brother or sister</li> <li>• Temporary visitor</li> <li>• Temporary guest</li> </ul>

Figure 2.4: Refugee recognition structures

refoulement, less resource requirements and greater access to services. Yet, there was opposition and criticism for any group determination procedure, which was deemed as in violation of agreements with Jordan and appearing to offer Iraqis something which was less temporary and conditional than what was intended. It was later agreed that UNHCR would provide registered Iraqis with an asylum seeker certificate and conduct individual refugee status determinations, yet

there were constant revisions in the way UNHCR chose to do so. There were also constant revisions regarding visa and passport requirements for Iraqis to enter the country and access public schools. Therefore, there were ongoing policy iterations on both sides. UNHCR and its partners continuously referred to new arrivals from Iraq as refugees in their reports and appeals, while Jordan broadly referred to Iraqis as guests or Arab brother or sister (Stevens, 2013; Ashbaugh, 2010; GAO, 2009). Thus, through ontological recognition structures and iterative refugee typologies, Iraqis were labelled and given access to humanitarian aid. With labels such as guest, temporary visitor, Arab brother or sister, asylum seeker, person of concern, and several classifications of beneficiaries and refugees, the things organizations did to support trauma healing, were linked to the measures they took to classify and count refugees. In the aid environment therefore, compliance information can limit accountability to the refugee because the education and livelihoods support s/he is provided could be based upon the typology not the need. In figure 2.4 above, many of the labels assigned in the recognition of refugees are presented.

### **2.4.3 Responsibilization**

Responsibilization is a process which could separate refugees from aid through noncompliance and subsequent delegitimization. Labels are a main component of this process. In fact, Stevens noted, beneficiary labels “have implications for treatment within Jordan, access to rights and to services, and options for the future of so many Iraqis” (2013, p. 17). Labels also play “a major role in the shifting identities of all Iraqis” (Stevens, 2013, p. 17). Indeed, in a recent United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) report focused upon Syrian refugees and other refugee groups, researchers noted “refugees must do a verification process every 6 months with UNHCR,

and an out of date card will not allow the holder access [to] services” (Dineen, 2013, p. 67). Though there could have been child care, transportation, finances and other obstacles which the noted in the report, refugees who either did not register initially or return and ‘re-register,’ found access to even basic services “would be very limited” (Dineen, 2013, p. 67). This process is significant in part, because refugees who return to UNHCR and re-register may be those who live in close proximity, have fewer responsibilities and more resources. In this instance, refugees with the most profound needs must weigh the perceived benefits of re-registering against the costs. Thus, those with the greatest needs may not be among the ‘beneficiaries’ of international organizations (Jordanian Ministry of Health & Premiere Urgence Aide Medicale Internationale, 2014). Yet, NGOs claimed Iraqi refugees in Syria who were not registered, “appear to have limited understanding of the role of UNHCR and the benefits that flow from registration, including information on services available” (Loughry & Duncan, 2008, p. 6). In this statement, there is an implied deficit in knowledge. This argument is a common reaction to undesired responses, whereas the failure to traverse the organizations’ legitimacy tasks is attributed to an immature rationality (Knudsen, 1991). This knowledge deficit connotes a level of irresponsibility, which may cause the public to link low registration to competence rather than other causes. The competence complaint is important to underscore because it illustrates a political environment and procedures that are subjective in their interpretation and application (Stevens, 2013; Simeon, 2010). The subjective allocation of resources and responsibilities have had significant implications in the aid arena. Indeed, Seybolt posited, “when the next humanitarian crises occurs, we should be surprised if many people do not suffer and die, instead of wondering why the pattern of displacement and death is so often repeated” (2009, p. 1037).

To ensure aid to those in need, the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) recommended, “registration and outreach efforts should be better used to identify vulnerable cases that need special assistance. In addition, the needs of those that remain unregistered should be addressed” (2012, p. 4). Healy and Tiller lamented however, “only a handful of humanitarian organisations are willing to do such work” (2013, p. 24). Thus, registration decreases may not be problematized.

In sum, because refugees are held responsible, their failure to comply with the registration process delegitimizes access to services, since they are not recognized as aid beneficiaries.

#### **2.4.4 Responsibilizing refugees in reports**

Population information in INGO reports is comprised in part, of data in regard to registered refugees. The access to and quality of this information is limited therefore, by the extent to which INGOs retain refugee beneficiaries. For instance, in the *Iraq and the region: 2009 Consolidated Appeal*, there were slightly more than 54,000 Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR in Jordan in 2008. According to this Appeal, registration was challenging in part, because the refugee population was scattered and transient. The report acknowledged many refugees in Jordan were not registered and plans were underway to conduct more outreach to encourage registration (OCHA, 2009).

According to the *Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees 2010*, the number of refugees registered with UNHCR had decreased to approximately 46, 700 in 2009 (OCHA, 2010). While UNHCR claimed it successfully resettled more than 4,600 refugees and repatriated 204 refugees, 5,700 refugee files were deactivated because refugees were out of contact with the

agency and its partners through October of that year (OCHA, 2010, p. 38, 39). According to the *Statistical Report on UNHCR Registered Iraqis* (UNHCR, 2011), a grand total of 13,598 refugees were deactivated in 2009. There were 500-900 new arrivals per month however, the total number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR decreased significantly in one year (OCHA, 2010).

In the *Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees 2010*, UNHCR and its partners posited, “the overall number of Iraqis is expected to decrease slightly in 2010, mainly due to resettlement...” (OCHA, 2010, p. 54). However, by December 2010, only 31,476 Iraqi refugees were registered with UNHCR, a loss of more than 20, 000 refugees (UNHCR, 2011). This decrease was explained as the result of refugees who were resettled and again, deactivated (OCHA, 2011). Yet, the deactivated totals were especially high. For instance, totals for Iraqi refugee resettlement and repatriation were 3,444 and 107, respectively, while 11,334 refugees were deactivated in 2010 (UNHCR, 2011). This deactivation of thousands of refugees in Jordan was not problematized in part, because of assumptions. Indeed organizations posited, “we also agreed with the RRP [Regional Response Plan] assumption that the most vulnerable Iraqi children are registered with UNHCR” (UNICEF & Save the Children, 2010). Thus, organizations linked vulnerability to registration data. For example, UNICEF maintained, “the majority of vulnerable Iraqis in Jordan are registered with UNHCR and total some 30,700 as of August 2010” (2011, p. 1). Thus, organizations implied refugees who were not registered were for the most part, less vulnerable. Put another way, organizations assumed that the majority of unregistered refugees were less vulnerable than the majority of registered refugees. Unregistered and deactivated refugees were largely excluded from strategic policy documents and though noted in meetings, (Save the Children & UNICEF, 2010) they were still held responsible.

UNHCR and its partners implemented their programs and requested support from donor agencies based predominantly upon refugees who were registered or anticipated in the upcoming year (OCHA, 2010; OCHA 2011).

#### **2.4.5 Responsibilization and downward accountability**

Education, training and livelihoods are critical to recovery. Yet, accountability is measured in compliance. It is not measured in recovery. According to Dowling & Pfeffer (1975) organizations must strive for legitimacy through transactions based upon resources and/or information. In the aid architecture these transactions are usually framed as transparency and accountability initiatives which require organizations to legitimize themselves through compliance. Compliance is usually managed through numerical, financial and operational procedures that are easy to measure. Long-term improvements and impact are more difficult to quantify and are often overshadowed in performance measurements (OCHA, 2013). Thus, organizations can be legitimized without ever fostering a sustainable recovery for the people on the ground. Yet, since legitimization by donors is necessary for survival, organizations have focused less upon other matters, such as accountability to refugees and affected groups.

Regulatory compliance requirements however, may not guarantee accountability to refugees. For instance, the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) is a tool to examine and rank good donor practices and promote greater transparency, effectiveness and accountability (DARA, 2010). The United States (US) is the leading bilateral donor both globally and in Jordan, where a large population of Iraqis have sought refuge (IATI, 2011b; OCHA, 2010; Sharp, 2010), yet according to the HRI, it was “only ranked 19th, indicating it needs to do much more to apply humanitarian principles and good practice in its humanitarian aid” (DARA, 2010, p. 1).

Moreover, the US received one its lowest scores for accountability to beneficiaries (DARA, 2011, p.227, 230).

Significantly, beneficiaries may not interpret donor legitimization as a success story. Thus, there may be serious contradictions with regard to views of program performance. In fact, Zetter surmised, “what has meaning to the refugees cannot be interpreted by the kinds of data which focus on programme output and normative policy assumptions” (1991, p. 42, 43).

Regulatory compliance has also advanced the differences between organizations and decreased allegiances to potential partners who do not support the funding process. Indeed, humanitarian organizations “compete for resources in a self-interested way, just like other organizations” (Seybolt, 2009, p. 1033). Vital information may not be shared or publicized among agencies (Seybolt, 2009; GAO, 2009; Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009). As a consequence, time and resources are squandered (Wessells, 2008), assessments and strategies are misinformed and the interventions that could be most impactful for refugees are not implemented (Maiers, Reynolds & Haselkorn, 2005).

Self-interest, competing priorities, minimal coordination and information gaps have particular implications for aid allocations. For instance, largely because of these issues, “the aid community as a whole fails to invest systematically where aid is expected to have the most impact” and those in need may be underserved because “aid allocations are still driven by factors other than need and merit” (Rogerson & Steensen, 2009). For instance, the Government Accountability Office maintained it was unclear if support would be forthcoming from Iraq and might be held “because improving refugee conditions in neighboring countries may discourage refugees from returning to Iraq” (2009, p. 4). Indeed, funding for vital services was based in part, upon where refugees were relative to where the state determined they should have been - though

poor asylum situations do not necessarily engender repatriation (Sa'Da & Bianchi, 2014). Thus, there is a compliance orientation and legitimization process that is enshrined in the aid network. Aid services are situated in this process. Aid services are accessible most often for those who traverse the legitimacy task through compliance with donor-INGO assumptions and preferences, upon which they are responsabilized. Therefore, compliance precipitates aid to refugees.

When the focus of aid is not compliance-centered it is mitigated by national interests. For instance, donors and host states support activities that address the priorities of citizens and assuage critics who argue that refugees and noncitizens have a negative impact upon their communities. Indeed, long queues for entitlements, enclaves and/or diminishing public space (Midgley & Eldebo, 2013; Tuck, 2011; Mann, 1993) can fuel resentment among locals. Thus, the integration of refugees and migrants is contested. Although locals may express concern for refugees, the problems of noncitizens may be viewed as comparatively irrelevant in a state with its own unmet needs and expenses (Leaning, Spiegel, & Crisp, 2011; Barbou des Places, 2004). Therefore, when migrants and refugees are not threats and risks they are constructed as costs (Midgley & Eldebo, 2013; Hellgren, 2012; Zetter, 2011). Indeed, Medecins Sans Frontieres advised, “the refugee image has evolved” (1997, p. 19). Notwithstanding the valor associated with refugeehood decades ago, refugees are now “undesirable” (MSF, 1997, p. 19, 265) and “uninvited guests” (MSF, 1997, p. 265). Thus, refugees are constructed according to a deficit model of intervention (Souter, 2011; van Gorp, 2005), where considerable attention is given to the ways in which they are different and inconvenient. For many, refugees are essentially, defective goods in public spaces. When belonging is afforded, they are situated in a larger group of deviants and care-seeking invalids known to Provan and Milward (2001) as public problems. As the problem *du jure*, the standard set for refugees is lowered (Tuck, 2011; Park, 2008).

In sum, people who cause problems do not drive aid in emergencies. Therefore, aid is often a product of the compliance-centered policy environment and level of inconvenience refugees cause donor and host states. Ostensibly, if the needs and perspectives of refugees do not drive humanitarian assistance, then accountability is upward. This short-term, compliance-centered environment and the construction of refugees based upon a deficit model are main findings in the literature review. These findings are particularly significant because they contrast the accountability commitments INGOs and donors have made (INEE, 2014; The Sphere Project, 2014; HAP International, 2013) to operate in settings where beneficiaries have substantive opportunities to influence aid.

In the following section, I utilize the conceptual framework of downward accountability and network perspectives to inform a qualitative method of research. Indeed, I describe the processes in which I examine adult education and livelihoods activities which were disclosed by a donor-INGO network. The method I utilize is especially important because access to aid services and compliance activities are main focal points and have implications for downward accountability.

### **3.0 METHODOLOGY**

In this section I present the means by which I endeavor to examine information about refugee adults in the public domain and subsequently, advance the knowledge in refugee and migration studies and particularly, education in emergencies. I begin with a focus upon the refugee crisis in Jordan.

The refugee crisis in Jordan includes a large community of Iraqi and Syrian refugees. In 2010, Iraqi refugees were among the top five largest refugee groups registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Jordan served as a main transit and asylum location for approximately 25% or 450,000-500,000 of the larger population of close to two million refugees (Stevens, 2013; UNHCR, 2010a). Though this total has decreased, there remains a large community of registered and unregistered Iraqis settled in Jordan (UNHCR, 2016; UNHCR, 2015b; Stevens, 2013).

As a result of recent instability the refugee population has increased and also includes a Syrian population. This population represented the largest refugee group registered with UNHCR in 2016, at close to five million worldwide (UNHCR, 2016). Moreover, Jordan is host to more than 700,000, or approximately 15% of the registered Syrian refugee population and many more which have not registered with UNHCR (UNHCR, 2016; Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2015). Thus, this large-scale crisis is relevant to studies of public information about refugees.

Situated within this crisis, I developed research questions and a qualitative method of research upon which this study is centered. The research questions were informed by the literature review and are posed in order to close a gap in public information in relation to the education of refugee adults. The qualitative method of research for this study is content analysis, which I selected because it is an important tool for researchers assessing public records (Berg, 2008). Thus, this chapter is centered upon the questions that directed a study of public information relative to the Jordanian refugee crisis and the processes upon which public information was examined. These processes included a view of refugees as peers in education in emergencies and leveraged the conceptual frameworks of network perspectives and downward accountability, through the phases of content analysis. I also review the domain in which documents were gathered and the strengths and limitations therein.

### **3.1 THE JORDANIAN REFUGEE CRISIS**

The local conditions in Jordan are not static (Ward, 2012). Iraqis continue to seek asylum in Jordan and have been surpassed in number by a growing Syrian refugee community. While there are many possible periods in which the data about the aid to this community could be examined in this study, I focused on the timeline from January 2010 to October 2015. This focal point is particularly relevant because it coincides with the time period aid actors submitted much of the data in the online repository in which documents for this study were collected.

Remarkably, the Iraqi and Syrian population in 2015 included more than 600,000 refugees registered with UNHCR and its partner INGOs in Jordan (Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2015; UNHCR, UNICEF & WFP, 2014). Refugees

have settled in primarily urban locations and consist of approximately 10% of the Jordanian demographic, estimated at 7.5 million (Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2015; USAID, 2015c). Academics, scholars and educators are included in this figure, along with refugee students separated from tertiary education (Labi, 2014; American Friends Service Committee, 2008; Duncan, Schiesher & Khalil, 2007). Along with other refugee adults they comprise a significant population of skilled and unskilled job seekers. Many of these job seekers struggle to find employment or training opportunities in the local marketplace and enroll in INGO activities (CARE, 2014). Yet, information about these activities is dispersed among myriad agencies and programs are implemented in varied disciplines (Kenny, 2015).



Figure 3.1: Map of Jordan, Source: the Royal Jordanian Geographic Centre, 2015

Lessons learned, based upon assistance to refugee professionals and academics in particular, is scattered and hard to find. This information gap complicates assessments of accountability for organizations who fund or implement programs for job-seeking adults. An examination of the education and livelihoods information is thusly, a part of resolving the information gap and enabling a study of accountability to refugee job seekers.

### **3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The aim of this study is to examine the access to and quality of information in regard to humanitarian adult education and livelihoods programs for refugees in Jordan. First, I will examine: If and to what degree donor agencies and INGOs are leveraging their new networks to disclose information pertaining to their humanitarian education and livelihoods interventions? This inquiry is important because it assesses the data the public can access and the extent to which the data informs the public about adult learning and particularly, skilled refugee job seekers. Second, I will analyze: If and to what extent the information donor agencies and INGOs disclose through their new networks can be utilized to examine downward accountability through access, compliance and outcomes in the adult education and livelihoods arena? This analysis is critical in part, because the focus is upon education and livelihoods activities in relation to refugees' education and livelihoods aspirations. This focus illuminates the level of alignment between humanitarian needs and emergency education opportunities. It is also centered upon the view of adult refugees as peers and as such, people who could have access to humanitarian education activities which reflect their needs as much as the activities in local or national

education institutions reflect the needs of adult learners. I detail this view in the following section.

### **3.3 ADULT LEARNERS AS PEERS**

The questions which drive this study are based upon the perspective that adult refugees are peers. Therefore, refugees should be afforded with the education and livelihoods training customary for other adult learners. From this perspective, accountability can be relative to refugees' education and livelihoods aspirations. Thus, the sort of INGO education programs they have access to, the degree to which these programs increase their employability or income and the inclusion of their academic achievements in reports and open data, are relevant foci of interest. Second, a strengths-based model of refugeehood could justify opportunities to exercise a measure of control, discretion and ownership over aid services and policies because the refugee is presumed as rational as any other decision-maker. Therefore, the services and policies in which refugees have been given power, the information they generate and share in relation to these services and the degree to which eligibility criteria and rules for services correspond to power they share, are relevant because these focal points evidence their position in the aid network. Thus, the research questions are undergirded by the depiction of refugees as peers and the comparative analysis of their decision rights and educational opportunities, with what is customary for their peers, vis a vis other adult learners.

This chapter is therefore centered upon the conceptual frameworks and qualitative methods which frame the examination of information about adult refugee job seekers, from an educational perspective and peer outlook.

### 3.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

Network perspectives are important conceptual frameworks in the aid enterprise because they can be leveraged to address coordination problems, especially information dissemination between various donor-INGO networks. Networks are “capital structures” which through investments, including association and interaction, may minimize economic risk and enhance returns (Huggins & Thompson, 2015, p. 104). Indeed, the goal of most studies based upon network theory is often to “identify how the structure of the network affects efforts to coordinate or cooperate” (Enemark, McCubbins & Weller, 2012, p. 1). Network perspectives were integral in this study because “coordination problems arise largely from the structure of the humanitarian enterprise” (Wessells, 2008, p. 7). In fact, aid actors have at times, tried to “solve the coordination problem by introducing ever new coordination structures” (Herrhausen, 2007, p. 31). Indeed, Herrhausen maintained, “coordination in networks should be further investigated” (2007, p. 13).

Demonstrating coordination depends heavily upon the information generated and shared between and among the actors in the network. Moreover, networks are a vital mechanism organizations utilize to gain access to knowledge (Huggins & Thompson, 2015). In fact, “a primary function of connections in a network is to disseminate information” (Enemark, McCubbins & Weller, 2012, p. 1). Through network perspectives, I analyzed the online information donors and INGOs disclosed. This analysis contributed to the literature by augmenting existing knowledge about the structures which facilitated and/or mitigated the coordination of adult education and the consequent access to and quality of information disclosed in the public domain.

Network perspectives were selected over other conceptual frameworks because they help researchers to examine the ties between nodes or actors within the network. Actors in networks are examined in part, based upon the information they control, direct and/or broker between other members of the network and the structure in which these flows are sustained (Burt, 1997; Uzzi, 1996). Thus, from a network perspective I analyzed the refugees' position in the aid network, their role in generating and disseminating information and the structures which mitigated and/or facilitated the information about their education.

The connections between and among people in aid could be examined alternatively, with frameworks that focus upon organizations and their constituents, such as stakeholder theory or refugees and their positions, vis a vis social exchange theory. Stakeholder theory and social exchange theory are juxtaposed with network perspectives in the following section.

### **3.4.1 Stakeholder theory and social exchange theory**

Stakeholder theory is concerned with the relationships between organizations and others in both an internal and external arena, including how organizations manage the interests of those who are affected by its actions (Cragg, 2002). Stakeholder theory could be especially relevant to examinations of NGO activities, since NGOs are active across varied social and public policy issues (Utting & Zammit, 2009; Doh & Guay, 2006). However, the decisions and information generated by their stakeholders – in this instance refugee beneficiaries - might be less prominent. Thus, stakeholder theory may be suited for the analysis of INGO decisions relative to donor or refugee interests, however it may be unsuitable to explore the refugees' decision rights relative to donor and INGO rules. In addition, the information generated and controlled by the actors in the organization's network is not paramount, insomuch as the actors' priorities have been fulfilled.

The positions within the network are therefore, far less malleable in stakeholder theory. For example, positions of stakeholders can be categorized based upon their interests in the organization, rather than their capacity to connect two or more other actors. Thus, there are less opportunities for researchers to categorize and juxtapose different positions, as the positions in stakeholder theory have already been determined.

Social exchange theory is centered upon the investments people make with one another and with organizations based primarily upon their estimation of the cost versus the benefits (Majiros, 2013). It has been critical to the analysis of retention and employee ties with organizations. These ties are evolving and conditional (Holm, Eriksson & Johanson, 1996), requiring a constant assessment to maintain the interaction. Therefore, the positions refugees maintain with INGOs could be understood as a product of logic and as such, this theory elevates the refugee from the trauma narrative and adds complexity to the role of aid recipient.

This theory can also be an important way to analyze the aid strategies upon which refugees have access to specific positions. Since some refugees have been conceptualized as undeserving, tragic and temporary, decision-making and educational opportunities were minimized, limiting the roles refugees had access to (Olivius, 2013; Marlowe, 2010; Miller, 2004). However, stakeholder theory is less relevant in an analysis of the generation of information by the refugee and the distribution of information between and among refugees and INGOs and this task might not be prioritized by position holders in their cost-benefit analysis. For instance, refugees may accept/apply for a position with an INGO because it is accompanied with subsidies, skills development or recognition, rather than because it involves greater influence over aid information flows. Information flows are integral to this research. Thus, the theory was not selected. However, the opportunity to exercise a measure of control, discretion or

influence over information flows is prevalent in the conceptual framework of downward accountability. The roles and constraints in information generation and dissemination illuminated through network perspectives, can enhance assessments of downward accountability in the aid arena and therefore increase the access to and quality of aid information. I describe the conceptual framework of downward accountability in the following section.

### **3.4.2 Downward accountability**

Downward accountability has not been authoritatively defined. However, there are organizations which have developed networks, frameworks and benchmarks (ALNAP, 2015; INGO Accountability Charter, 2015; HAP International 2013, Keystone, 2009), which have been leveraged and/or implemented in conjunction with emergency standards (INEE, 2014; The Sphere Project, 2014). These frameworks can be utilized to assess accountability in humanitarian assistance.

Downward accountability has been posited as both a process and product based upon ensuring beneficiaries are informed of their rights and responsibilities and the responsibilities of organizations entrusted with service delivery. It also incorporates maintaining feedback and complaints channels without reprisal for complainants; measures to avoid, detect and address conflicts of interest and/or misconduct; and a transparent way of disclosing information on the objectives and accomplishments of activities (INGO Accountability Charter, 2015; HAP International, 2013, Keystone, 2009).

Downward accountability is also undergirded by the inclusion of beneficiaries' priorities in program development, implementation and evaluation and the opportunity to maintain a

degree of control, ownership or discretion over how services are delivered and items distributed (Crisp et al., 2013; HAP International, 2013; Keystone, 2006, MSF, 1997). This study contributes to the literature in part, by utilizing the conceptual framework of downward accountability to assess the extent refugee adults informed program development, implementation and evaluation in humanitarian education. In addition, because education and livelihoods are high priorities among refugee adults (Karsetter, 2014; Loughry & Duncan, 2008), this study contributes to the literature by advancing knowledge about their access to training and employment. It is also important because of the way in which it integrates accountability and education standards.

### **3.5 DATA ANALYSIS**

This section is focused upon the process upon which data for this study was selected and examined. Content analysis is the method of research I selected. Content analysis is first presented, followed by the repository in which documents were identified. I then present the procedures for content analysis in relation to the selected documents.

#### **3.5.1 Overview of content analysis**

Content analysis is a part of the document review methodology, which is a systematic investigation of documents that involves reading, coding and generating categories to illuminate and make sense of phenomena (Elo & Kyngas, 2008). Content analysis has been selected to investigate various education and training programs (Halpern, 2008; Chapman & Jester, 2008)

and provides the researcher with specific advantages. Indeed, content analysis is a particularly relevant method of research, as it allows for many types of documents to be collected and examined. For instance, researchers can examine organizations' reports from interviews, surveys and focus group discussions, factsheets, program evaluations, contracts and program procedures. The incorporation of a wide, cross-section of materials offers a view into the operational, reflective and relational process of disclosure from multiple vantage points.

This depth of information could be otherwise unattainable, in keeping with the time constraints of interviews and surveys. In addition, a number of interviews with both refugees and organizations have already been conducted (Stevens, 2013, Ward, 2014; Hutton, 2011; IMC & WHO, 2011). It may also be challenging to locate staff and conduct meetings with informants. Therefore, research based upon surveys and interviews could be prohibitive in a fluid humanitarian environment. Indeed, staff turnover and human resource limitations have made data collection and reporting in the Iraqi and Syrian refugee crisis more difficult (WHO, IMC & UNICEF, 2012; GAO, 2009). Interviews may also be prohibitive because informants may not have knowledge about the policies, interventions and impact of other INGOs. For instance, regarding Iraqi refugees in Syria, "there is limited information sharing between Church and other humanitarian organizations, UNHCR and other relevant UN organizations" (Loughry & Duncan, 2008, p. 2). Thus, libraries, clearinghouses and other repositories, may offer more information from multiple perspectives. The focus of data collection is also upon public information, rather than public figures or personnel. Therefore, a systematic review of documents is most relevant and subsequently, online data clearinghouses and libraries are vital arenas for document review. In particular, the internet is a main platform for donors and INGOs to disseminate and maintain varied documents in the public arena. Additionally, donors and organizations have cited the

provision of data through the internet, as integral to their accountability and transparency endeavors (Publish What You Find, 2011; IATI, 2011a). Thus, content analysis was preferred over other methodologies, because it is a method “for assessing events or processes in social groups when public records exist” (Berg, 2008, p. 259).

### **3.5.2 Repositories of aid information**

Repositories that are centered upon financial, rather than narrative disclosure (for example, FTS, 2015; ForeignAssistance.gov, 2015), engender quantitative research. In addition, multiple networks of INGOs and donors (ACEVO, 2015; Bond, 2015; ICVA, 2015; INEE, 2015; HAP International, 2013) foster discourse, information sharing, training and technical assistance. Country-wide and comparative analysis of data has been limited however and could not be performed through qualitative research relative to the Iraqi and Syrian crisis, via these channels. However, the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) was developed to improve aid effectiveness, promote data comparison and increase coordination and accountability through disclosure about international development and humanitarian aid programs via the internet (UNDP, 2015; IATI, 2011a).

The IATI is a joint action taken by donor agencies, INGOs and development actors, in relation to the commitments of the 2008 3<sup>rd</sup> High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra (IATI, 2011a). Thus, more than 350 organizations are connected through a common repository (Castell, 2015). The repository includes such clearinghouses as the IATI Datastore and IATI Dashboard, which support their endeavors to become more accountable and transparent. In addition, IATI data is published to multiple libraries such as Open UNDP, IATI Registry and the Open Aid Search (Open Aid Search, 2015; Publish What You Find, 2015; UNDP, 2015). The

libraries and portals are accessible through the internet. Thus, there is a low-cost way for the public to view information on aid programs and perform a comparative qualitative analysis. Moreover, the information includes multi-sector interventions and agreements (Open Aid Search, 2015; Publish What You Find, 2015; UNDP, 2015; IATI, 2011a) which illuminate the policy environment in which emergency aid is situated.

Files are uploaded by participating agencies on a regular basis in order to provide information which is both current and comparable. Comparisons of aid activities can be made between agencies and countries. Files contain data related to spending as well as strategy, outputs and outcomes. Examples can include, annual reports, lessons learned, impact assessments, evaluations and memoranda (IATI, 2011a; IATI, 2011b).

The Open Aid Search was selected as the arena to view public documents. There are currently more than 330,000 distinct entries in the Open Aid Search library. The Open Aid Search is a collaboration between an opendata / data visualization company and nonprofit organization focused upon open source software (Open Aid Search, 2015). Their aim was to establish a data repository which could be utilized by a lay audience, in contrast to the IATI Registry and Dashboard, which may be challenging to query for users without an information and technology background. The Open Aid Search contains all of the raw data from the IATI Registry without any adaptations. The public can view documents in the Open Aid Search through its homepage: [www.openaidsearch.org](http://www.openaidsearch.org). The Open Aid Search is one of the few repositories which allows for programs from myriad donor agencies and international organizations to be compared through key documents, such as program descriptions, contracts, quarterly and summative reports and a number of variables, such as country, region, sector, budget and reporting organization - which increases accessibility. In fact, the Open Aid Search

publishes IATI data exclusively, including narrative information from humanitarian education programs.

### **3.5.3 Search method**

The data collected for content analysis consists of documents from the ‘Jordan’ portal in the Open Aid Search. The ‘Jordan’ portal was selected over other variables in the menu such as region because this study is concerned with humanitarian education programs in Jordan. Indeed, searching according to country is also pragmatic for users who may not be aware of every sector or grantee and require a complete listing generated by the search engine in order to achieve a comprehensive search result. Thus, there were several items the user could select for each entry, including description, financial, documents and RSR/Local Projects. The descriptions were very brief therefore, the researcher selected the document item, where narrative data was provided through summaries, profiles, reports, stories and other documents. I did not find information in the RSR/local project item.

I did not select the budget variable or financial option, in order to collect data which is qualitative rather than quantitative. Indeed, the research questions for this study were focused upon the narrative information and thus, could not be addressed through a focus upon spending. While financial data is integral, the narrative data was most informative in regard to the roles refugees were afforded and the structures upon which these roles were sustained. Narrative data is also most suitable to assess the activities which were accessible to refugees, relative to their training and livelihood aspirations. Financial data can not offer this degree of insight or access to aid interventions and the impact they may have had for refugee livelihoods.

The review of the documents took place according to a timeline. The timeline for review was October 1, 2015 to October 16, 2015. Any information updated in the Open Aid Search outside of this timeframe was not a part of the analysis.

#### **3.5.4 Review of documents**

The online library, [www.opeaidsearch.org](http://www.opeaidsearch.org), contained 1,831 entries within the Jordan portal. The researcher reviewed entries one by one, selecting the 'documents' item among the list of options. The process of document review was centered upon the conceptual framework of downward accountability and in particular, access, compliance and outcomes. This review was conducted based upon the process of content analysis recommended by Elo & Kyngas (2008) and the examination of accountability described by Pallis (2006). In the following sections, I describe the data related to these concepts and the phases in which content analysis was accomplished.

#### **3.5.5 Codes**

The codes selected for this study consisted of access, compliance and outcomes. Access, compliance and outcomes are relevant to and structures for which accountability can be analyzed. For instance, Pallis claimed, "the principles of access, outcomes and the ability to promote compliance with relevant standards are used as analytical springboards to suggest changes which could be made to create greater participatory accountability" (2006, p. 888).

In this study, access to education is centered upon geographic location, eligibility, specialization and certification. These areas are related to access in part, because they can evidence where programs were in relation to refugee learners and which groups of refugees

benefited from INGO programs. These latter components in particular, can advance the knowledge in humanitarian aid by disentangling open data in order to find evidence indicative of an accountability relationship in an educational setting. For instance, they are useful to discover how refugees may have been informed about education and livelihoods programs, the tracks or content areas in which they could develop and enhance skills and the documents provided to recognize refugees' completion of the course.

Compliance information is also an important component of the accountability relationship, as it relates to the policy preferences which were pursued and the extent to which these preferences evidenced refugees' decision rights. In this study, compliance was examined based upon the decisions and discretion in the network, which were leveraged to uphold rules or criteria for beneficiaries. Access and compliance are integral focal points that relate to the implementation of INGO education programs. However, to view accomplishments relative to refugees' aspirations it is vital to examine program outcomes. Therefore, this study also incorporated an analysis of the data in regard to program accreditation and teacher certification. Program linkages to jobs and income-generation for refugee graduates were also included in the data analysis. With the view of the accountability relationship that these focal points provide, it is possible to identify the roles refugees were afforded and the beneficiaries to which the program roles were relevant.

Thus, data was sorted by geography, eligibility, specialization and certification of learning attainments, in order to examine the extent to which refugees could access adult education and livelihoods relative to their aspirations. Under compliance, the examination included the decisions and discretion donors and INGOs utilized to uphold rules and criteria for

beneficiaries. Outcome information comprised qualification issues such as teacher certification and accreditation as well as job placement / income-generation.

These structures were related to the research questions because of the way in which they could comprise and/or foster accountability to refugees (Pallis, 2006) and because donors and organizations have publicly declared accountability and information access, is or will be an inextricable component of their international aid projects (UNDP, 2015; HAP International, 2013; IATI, 2011a; Publish What You Find, 2011). Thus, access, compliance and outcomes are relevant structures to examine the information they disclose. Moreover, one's role in information access, generation and dissemination is integral to downward accountability and network perspectives – conceptual frameworks for this study. Network perspectives are also useful in an examination of IATI information, because they acknowledge the “key reason why firms build or enter networks” is to gain better access to knowledge (Huggins & Thompson, 2015, p. 106).

The analysis leveraged Atlas.ti software, a qualitative research tool which categorizes and presents data. Atlas.ti (2016) is especially relevant to this study because it utilizes terms which are intuitive to a lay audience, such as “families” and “neighbors,” to help users navigate the tools. Atlas.ti was chosen over other software because it is particularly helpful to users without prior information technology experience and its terms help users recognize and report relationships between data with common meaning. Therefore, documents selected for content analysis were read and the relevant content sorted according to access, compliance and outcomes, which were codes.

### **3.5.6 Procedures for content analysis**

The content analysis was guided by the work of Elo and Kyngas (2008). Content analysis is a research methodology utilized in the assessment of written, verbal and/or visual communication materials. It refers to the way in which researchers interpret content “through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). It is a way to “enhance understanding of data” in part, through new insights and representations which can inform action (Elo & Kyngas, 2008, p. 108).

Elo and Kyngas (2008) posited, content analysis involves three essential steps or phases: preparation, organizing and reporting. In the preparation phase the unit of analysis is selected. Secondly, the researcher organizes the data through an inductive or deductive method. Data is subsequently reported, via conceptual maps, models or categories. I describe these phases in the following sections.

### **3.5.7 Preparation phase in content analysis**

I began this study by reading and re-reading the documents. The process of re-reading documents was deemed necessary by Elo and Kyngas (2008) in order to immerse myself in the information. The process of repeated review ensured familiarization with the material and as a consequence, facilitated categorization. An electronic folder was established in Atlas.ti, to contain all primary documents. Additionally, I selected each sentence as a unit of analysis, fulfilling the preparation phase.

### **3.5.8 Organizing phase in content analysis**

As part of the organization phase in the content analysis I selected a deductive method of examination. This method was selected because the study is influenced by the work of Pallis (2006). Pallis recommended access, compliance and outcomes as springboards to analyze UNHCR's inclusion strategies with regard to participatory accountability to refugees. Pallis' concepts were related to a camp setting and focused upon refugee status determination. Thus, access, compliance and outcomes were selected as codes to deductively test his concepts. Through content analysis, I can assess the extent to which they can be applied to an urban refugee setting, while situated in the field of education. For instance, Elo and Kyngas maintained, deductive analysis is often used to "retest existing data in a new context" and can involve the retesting of categories, models and theories (2008, p. 111). The deductive analysis was not focused upon implications or latent content. It was centered upon the manifest content, via recurrent and/or deliberate positions in the aid environment and concrete details about aid interventions.

The manifest content was coded in relation to access, compliance and outcomes. For instance, information relating to geographic location, eligibility criteria, specialization and certification of learning attainments for adult students, were coded under 'access.' The actions taken by organizations to uphold rules and criteria were coded under 'compliance.' Information related to accreditation, certification processes for teachers, employment and income-generation was coded under 'outcomes.' The coding process was accomplished by opening the 'code manager' feature and 'tagging' the sentences selected for each code. All of the codes were arranged within the Atlas.ti Hermeneutic Unit (HU), which maintains the selections made by the researcher.

The coding process illuminated several critical roles for beneficiaries, constraints in the aid arena and education objectives. I developed categories based upon this information and validated the categories through a review of documents by IATI and non-IATI members, which were not linked to the selected documents in the Open Aid Search. Categorization is particularly relevant to content analysis. For example, the outcome of content analysis is typically, “concepts or categories describing the phenomenon” (Elo & Kyngas, 2008, p. 108). Content analysis complimented the network conceptual framework because insights from patterns and themes can inform a larger phenomena (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). For example, network perspectives involve an examination of patterns and/or structures “of relations among a set of actors” (Casciaro, Barsade, Edmondson, Gibson, Krackhardt & Giuseppe, 2015, p. 1164). In addition, Elo and Kyngas claimed the “key feature of all content analysis is that the many words of the text are classified into smaller content categories” (2008, p. 109). These categories offer new insights based in part, upon patterns and themes in the refugee-donor-INGO accountability relationship.

Thus, through a deductive method, coding, categorization of data and links in the wider literature, I completed the organization phase.

### **3.5.9 Reporting phase in content analysis**

The third or reporting phase of content analysis involves the reporting of results (Elo & Kyngas, 2008). In this phase, I presented 5 beneficiary roles, 4 constraints and 3 education objectives. I also highlighted their implications for network perspectives and downward accountability.

### 3.6 STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE

There are strengths and limitations to data collection through the Open Aid Search. The main strengths are in relation to the consistency between the study's research questions and the IATI's objectives. Indeed, the IATI is centered upon remediating information gaps and increasing the accessibility of timely, comparable data (IATI, 2011b). Thus, this examination and comparative analysis of IATI data, particularly via access, is both relevant to IATI members and related to the gaps they endeavor to close.

IATI members also represent a large, cross-section of the aid community. Therefore, the data in the IATI-related libraries may be more indicative of the activities in the larger aid network than the data in other repositories. For instance, there are more than 330,000 program entries within the Open Aid Search library. In addition, there are more than 1,800 entries accessible through the Jordan portal. Indeed, there is substantive information on humanitarian activities for refugees. IATI members are considered the primary audience for this research and therefore, an analysis of the content they disclose has both utility and relevance to this group.

Main limitations are in regard to members' reports and the differences between them. For instance, while there are more than 350 organizations in the IATI, narrative information has not been uploaded on all of their humanitarian education programs. In addition, there are INGOs as well as local or community based organizations which are not registered with IATI. Donors and organizations also provided information which was not standardized. For instance, quarterly reports were in varied formats and disclosed in some instances and not others. Thus, the IATI is limited by the voluntary orientation of its membership and the standards by which their narrative program data is disclosed.

Donors and organizations may have also preferred to disclose particular information in other arenas, rather than an accessible public domain. Therefore, the Open Aid Search while important, is not the only arena where information can be found. Information on specific beneficiary communities may also be difficult to disaggregate. For instance, humanitarian education data on Iraqi refugees may not be available apart from information which encompasses Syrian refugees and other displaced populations. In fact, many humanitarian education programs registered diverse groups of refugees into the same beneficiary cohorts, therefore INGO programs may not have offered an Iraqi-specific intervention or Syrian-specific activity. Though efforts may have been made to localize activities and appeal to cultural minorities or women, program reports may not include information in relation to specific subgroups of beneficiaries. This particular limitation may be common to any repository and not specific to IATI information or the Open Aid Search.

Other limitations are related to the scope of this inquiry, rather than to the Open Aid Search. For instance, the researcher examined documents which detailed activities on or after 2010 and were written in English. Additionally, the examination was centered upon those documents which were focused upon: the Iraqi or Syrian crisis in Jordan; humanitarian education, training and/or livelihoods for adults; and provided narrative data related to strategic planning, intervention, monitoring or assessment processes. This timeline encompasses the period where United Nations agencies and INGOs – as IATI Members - encountered low registration and retention rates in Jordan alongside a dramatic increase in the refugee population. Thus, the research will not reflect the accomplishments in humanitarian education which occurred prior to 2010. However, this study will support the examination of key IATI members' endeavors in accountability alongside key challenges.

This research does not incorporate the education programs which were implemented primarily to enhance Jordan's education sector because they were not specific to the refugee situation (i.e. Jordan Competitiveness Program, 2015; SIYAHA, 2015; Matar, Sitabkhan & Brombacher, 2013) and/or benefited refugee children apart from the disclosure of adult learning (USAID, 2015b; Development Coordination Unit, 2013). Indeed, the focus of this study is upon education and livelihood programs implemented by INGOs for adult learners, in response to the Iraqi and Syrian refugee crisis. Programs which registered refugee adults or Jordanian adults specifically to increase their capacity to support refugees, were examined. Yet, programs unrelated to the Iraqi and Syrian crisis and programs where no clear benefit to refugees was disclosed were not examined.

The study does not incorporate documents from the Government of Jordan because Jordan was not included in the list of countries which published to the IATI at the time data was gathered and therefore, may not be held to the level of accountability in its aid information as members. In addition, local organizations, including government institutions, may be focused mainly upon their non-refugee constituents. In particular, Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. Thus, the Government does not have the level of commitment to this international framework as many of the IATI members, including to refugee livelihoods that the framework recommends. It is also important to note that Jordan and other host countries hold training programs, tertiary education and livelihoods activities at the national level that are often inaccessible to non-citizens. Indeed, residency and work permits may be prohibited and adult education can be far away, high-priced or accompanied with strict eligibility requirements (UNESCO, 2015; Stevens, 2013; CARE, 2014; Kirk, 2009). Thus, it is imperative to promote, implement and scale adult education and

livelihood training at the INGO level, because this may be the area where the largest total percentage of refugee adults can be enrolled. However, the Jordanian perspective may be understated in this study as a result of its lack of representation in the IATI. The primary audience however, is IATI members. This research is also qualitative and centered upon social processes therefore, documents which were focused upon procurement were not examined.

## 4.0 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

This section is centered upon the process by which documents in the Open Aid Search were selected for content analysis and the findings which this process engendered. These findings relate to the first research question: If and to what degree donor agencies and INGOs are leveraging their new networks to disclose information pertaining to their humanitarian education programs? The main findings presented in this chapter are in relation to the degree of education and livelihoods data in selected documents, the extent to which the data addresses IATI goals and the policy environment in which adult education was enacted. This environment was disclosed by INGOs and donors, vis a vis the roles they afforded refugees and the constraints they encountered, thereby advancing the knowledge in the aid network about adult education and livelihoods for Iraqi and Syrian refugees in Jordan.

First, I define areas in which information gaps in adult education and livelihoods minimize access to IATI data. Next, I focus upon the documents in relation to the number, aid actor and format. The information INGOs and donors disclosed relative to the codes of access, compliance and outcomes is then detailed, through a description of the content and the roles and constraints in this open data.

#### 4.1 INFORMATION GAP IN THE ONLINE REPOSITORY

Files in the Open Aid Search library which are related to the Iraqi and Syrian displacement are accessible and attached to specific organizations. However, I did not find reports which encompasses a comparative and/or content analysis of the narrative information. Therefore, there is an information gap concerning the access to and quality of narrative information in humanitarian education for adult refugees. For instance, when the user selects the Jordan portal, no integrated and country level reports or studies on adult education and livelihoods for Iraqi and Syrian refugees were included in the list of data entries. Moreover, the entries in the portal encompass humanitarian and development interventions, which add complexity to queries that are directed toward one or the other. Subsequently, the user could not acquire data on the humanitarian education and livelihoods interventions for adult refugees in Jordan in one file. Thus, while the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) has been lauded for its capacity to deliver current information, education data for refugee adults is relatively dispersed across the Jordan portal. In addition, beneficiary data was not often disaggregated, which minimizes studies based upon program evaluation, because impact information between programs could not be compared. Comparable data is a critical goal of the IATI (IATI, 2011a), thus information about program impact should be more accessible.

Indeed, Simpson and Hancock argued, “even in the most organized context of emergency response, computer information systems have a mixed reputation for success” (2009, p. s136). In fact, in large scale disasters decision-makers may have data collection instruments and standard methodologies, yet “incomplete information” (Simpson & Hancock, 2009, p. s136). In addition, although computer information systems and decision-support systems (DSS) are an important part of decision making in real time, they have been the source of numerical computations and

complex forecasting ill-suited to the disaster setting, which is marked by unforeseen events. Its utility may also be limited because it does not support the interdisciplinary response to communities with needs that span various sectors. As a result, the “quality of data entered into emergency management DSS often degrades as the incident grows larger, thwarting the value of this technological support” (Simpson & Hancock, 2009, p. s134). Thus, in order to “cope with the complexities particular to disaster logistics” (Simpson & Hancock, 2009, p. s134) the quality of and access to real-time information should be improved to a greater extent. In the following sections, I assess this multi-sectoral information and the extent to which IATI goals for timely and comparable information were upheld in the context of the Iraqi and Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan.

#### **4.2 NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY**

The researcher reviewed 1,831 entries. There were entries which did not have content in the documents item and other entries which had one or more files. In addition, there were entries which were uploaded with many documents.

English is the language utilized most often by IATI members to share information through the IATI platform. The selected documents in this study were focused upon: the Iraqi or Syrian crisis in Jordan; humanitarian training, education and/or livelihoods for adults; and narrative data related to strategic planning, intervention, monitoring or assessment processes. Selected documents were written in English yet, a few documents included English text and text in another language. In these instances, only the text in English was analyzed because this study

is focused upon the information which INGOs and donors disclosed in English and much of the information published to and by the IATI is in English (IATI, 2011a; IATI, 2011b).

Thus, I opened all files, yet did not take further action with documents that were not written in English. However, in most instances, donors and organizations provided files in English. Files were either actual attachments which could be read without further action, or links to donors and organizations' online sites away from the repository. When links to external sites were provided, the researcher opened the link in a new web browser. When links were program-specific, the researcher copied the selected content and pasted it into a Microsoft Word (MS Word) document. The MS Word document was then uploaded to the Atlas.ti software. When links were not program-specific, no further action was initiated and the browser was closed.

In some instances, particularly with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the links were not connected to actual reports or other documents. Thus, program-specific information could not be readily accessed. Rather, these links usually directed the user to an external site for the organizations' main portal, with infographics of its activities worldwide or an error occurred. This accessibility challenge should be remediated, because access to data is a main IATI goal (IATI, 2011a). However, it did not minimize the scope of the study. For instance, UNICEF data could be examined from the information disclosed in its partners' entries. For instance, the Government of Canada and World Food Programme (WFP) provided data on activities which were implemented through coordination with UNICEF (Government of Canada, 2014b; Government of Canada, 2013b; WFP, 2013). This information was utilized in the content analysis. Additionally, information from UNDP was utilized to validate the information in selected documents in section 5.3.

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), World Food Programme (WFP), Islamic Relief and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) were especially forthcoming, with files available through the documents item that required no further action or external links for the user to follow. In most instances, the files uploaded to the library were in Portable Document Format (PDF) or Microsoft Word and once accessed, were entered into the Atlas.ti software. These files included myriad program strategies, modifications, reports, descriptions and profiles, from which information in regard to access, compliance and outcomes could be gathered and analyzed. Therefore, while there were many documents in the Open Aid Search which were not selected for content analysis, the process of selection would likely be similar in other information systems because they often have data that is incomplete (Simpson & Hancock, 2009). Thus, I may have gathered as many documents in another information system as I gathered in the Open Aid Search. In addition, part of the utility of this study, is that it quantifies the amount of adult education and livelihoods data which has been disclosed. Therefore, recognizing information gaps in the repository is indeed a critical finding. In fact, by quantifying what the public has access to, this study could promote subsequent actions by IATI members who may not have recognized the gaps in the adult education and livelihoods information in the data they submit. Selecting an alternative information system may have minimized this opportunity for lessons learned and improvements in the quality of adult education reporting.

In the following section, I therefore quantify the adult education and livelihoods information. In particular, I provide findings in relation to the percentages of access, compliance and outcome information coded in Atlas.ti. I also focus upon the categories generated from the data these members disclosed and the process upon which the categories were validated. These

results are examined within the context of the phases of content analysis, upon which this section is outlined. The phases of content analysis are preparing, organizing and reporting.

### **4.3 RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS PHASE 1**

In this section I focus upon the first or preparing phase of content analysis. Thus, the section is centered upon the number of documents included in this study and the details each donor emphasized. In addition, this section underscores the sort of information users in the Open Aid Search have access to and the degree to which the data is indicative of an adult learning environment. For instance, donors and INGOs have outlined their program goals and strategies, synergies with other organizations and affiliations with working groups and consortiums. Thus, the user is informed about the organizations relative to their networks and the methods they planned to utilize in support of education and livelihoods. Those users with a particular interest in policy and organizational behavior may find these documents especially relevant. However, summative information and outcomes were not often reported. Therefore, users with an orientation toward program evaluation may find the information incomplete. This information gap minimizes evidence of accountability, because the grades, test scores, diplomas and other customary education activities were not disclosed.

I begin this section with a quantitative presentation of the documents and next, focus upon the disclosure of education and livelihoods information and its significance for country-level and comparative analysis.

### **4.3.1 Selected documents by organization**

In the first or preparing phase of content analysis, I gathered the documents for this study. Indeed, there were nearly 130 documents which were initially selected, as they contained narrative data for humanitarian programs in Jordan from January 1, 2010 to October 16, 2015. Next, the documents were systematically reviewed. Roughly 29 documents noted the refugee crisis, yet were focused entirely upon development rather than humanitarian assistance. These documents outlined programs which targeted Jordanian locals and/or were disclosed without benefit to adult refugees and were not a part of the content analysis. Nearly 50 documents were centered upon humanitarian assistance for refugees, yet were focused exclusively upon children and youth or internal procedures such as financial audits and itemizations. There were also documents which were focused upon refugee adults, yet did not disclose narrative data related to their education or livelihoods. These documents were not selected for content analysis. Thus, forty-seven documents were selected for content analysis and uploaded into the Atlas.ti software. These documents are included in the Appendix and Bibliography.

Twenty documents by the Government of Canada and ten documents from Japan Emergency NGO (JEN) were selected for content analysis. In addition, I selected five documents each from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Islamic Relief and two documents each from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Reclaim Childhood, MADRE and the International Committee of the Red Cross provided one document each. The donors and INGOs are presented in figure 4.1 below, with the respective number of documents selected in this study.



Figure 4.1: Number of documents in the content analysis

I focus upon the forms of the documents and the activities these organizations highlighted in the following section. The forty-seven documents were gathered from nine total donors and international nongovernmental organizations. These documents were focused upon programs from the years 2012-2015.

#### 4.3.2 Format of selected documents

INGOs and donors disclosed information about their adult education and livelihoods activities through many forms. For instance, the documents were comprised of applications, profiles and other forms which described their activities. In most instances, the information in these forms was strategic and encompassed accountability activities. The diversity of forms in the Open Aid

Search is a strength, since access, compliance and outcomes are relevant to various program activities and reporting procedures. Yet, there were multiple timelines and data which were disclosed in some instances and not others. Thus, the diversity of forms decreases the opportunities for program evaluation.

For instance, the Government of Canada, JEN, NRC and Sida, provided the most information in relation to funding, accountability activities and diverse beneficiary groups. Thus, the quality of aid information was enriched by these actors.

The Government of Canada disclosed its activities through program profiles. Canada described its strategy and expected outcome for many of its projects, along with its implementing partners. Significantly, the profiles often included a wide range of activities across myriad sectors. However, several profiles did not disaggregate beneficiaries in its regional programs (for example, Government of Canada, 2013b; Government of Canada, 2013h), which makes it hard for users to identify the level of participation for beneficiaries in Jordan. When totals for Jordan were disclosed, data was not usually disaggregated for refugees and members of the local community (for example, Government of Canada, 2015a; Government of Canada, 2014a). In addition, in most instances, outcomes were not disclosed by the Government of Canada. Therefore, the user is informed about Canada's endeavors, yet subsequently left unaware of its impact in the refugee populace.

JEN described its activities with success stories and field notes. JEN's notes and stories were most often summative, which illustrated its strategy and accomplishments. In particular, JEN included the processes upon which feedback and involvement from its partners and beneficiaries were delivered (Nagatsuka, 2014; Hamasaka, 2014a). JEN (Hamasaka, 2014c) also presented the challenges to program implementation and the impact of these challenges for both

education and health. Yet, JEN did not disclose the frameworks or guidelines for accountability upon which it could have relied. In contrast to the WFP (2013; 2012), Islamic Relief (2014b), International Committee of the Red Cross (2014), NRC (2014c) and Sida (2014), the information JEN disclosed is not situated in the context of a larger accountability mechanism. A comparative analysis of accountability policies between JEN and these IATI members is subsequently more difficult because the relevant policies were inaccessible through the Open Aid Search.

Sida is a donor organization and the NRC is its grantee. The information disclosed was in regard to their partnership, including the program development and implementation components. They disclosed agreements, modifications, memoranda, annual plans and applications. In addition, they described myriad constraints and challenges in the aid arena. In particular, they situated themselves in a larger network of actors who were committed to accountability and transparency (Sida, 2014; NRC, 2014c). The information they provided was diverse and multi-layered, which engenders a critical analysis of strategy and network roles. However, there was limited data in regard to outcomes, which places limitations upon the boundaries of this analysis.




Figure 4.2: Positionality of organizations in the data

The Islamic Relief (2015), World Food Programme (WFP) (2012), MADRE (2015), International Committee of the Red Cross (2014) and Reclaim Childhood (2015) disclosed information that to a large extent, related to their history, partnerships with local actors and depth in terms of the geographic locations in which they conducted activities. This enriched aid information and situated these organizations in the aid network as embedded in the communities in which they operated. I present these positions in the aid network in figure 4.2 above.

In addition, IATI members included information about their capacity building activities with local organizations, agencies and practitioners (for example, Islamic Relief, 2014d; Government of Canada, 2013e). In particular, the WFP (2013; 2012) described linkages with projects implemented by the Government of Jordan, local partners and United Nations agencies. Many of these actors are situated alongside refugees in urban and rural locations and could leverage newly acquired knowledge and skills to support the ongoing crisis response. Thus, these

actions could evidence a trust relationship with local actors and augment aid effectiveness through staff development and improved access to services.

The WFP (2013; 2012) disclosed information through its emergency operations and recovery plans. These plans provided a program summary and significantly, a view into the accountability relationship it constructed with beneficiaries. Yet, the paucity of outcome data, like other IATI members, decreases the capacity for program evaluation.

Islamic Relief disclosed information through program proposals and quarterly reports. The information in these reports was summative and strategic. It allowed a view of the relevant education activities through various reporting cycles and in particular, the specific accountability achievements (Islamic Relief, 2014d; Islamic Relief, 2013). Islamic Relief disclosed constraints to its programs and evidenced a capacity to modify programs based upon lessons learned (Islamic Relief, 2015). However, along with MADRE (2015), the International Committee of the Red Cross (2014) and Reclaim Childhood (2015) less information was disclosed about adult learning, particularly in relation to continuing education which could enhance existing refugee skills.



Figure 4.3: Forms of documents by organization

Thus, contractual, summative, strategic and cooperative information was disclosed with respect to humanitarian education and livelihoods programs. I present these forms of documents in figure 4.3 above. These documents were gathered and entered into the Atlas.ti software and re-read to immerse myself in the data. Next, I selected sentences as the unit of analysis. These actions accomplished the first or preparing phase of content analysis (Elo & Kyngas, 2008).

#### 4.4 RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS PHASE 11

In the second or organizing phase, I selected a deductive method of analysis, completed the coding process and validated the codes in the aid literature (Elo & Kyngas, 2008). In this section,

I present the results of the coding process, in regard to the following three codes: access, compliance and outcomes. The manifest data in relation to these codes as well as recurrent positions on policy issues in the aid arena, led to the development of categories. Therefore, I follow the description of the coding process by presenting the categories and the sources upon which the categories were validated.

#### **4.4.1 Coding with qualitative software**

I coded a total of 300 units of analysis through the following codes: access, compliance and outcomes. One-hundred eighty (180) units or approximately 60% of the total units coded, were in relation to access. The majority of the information in relation to this code was regarding the primary objectives and activities donors and INGOs planned and/or implemented for refugee adults. This information was relevant to the area of specialization, which was a main point of inquiry in the research questions. The information regarding this code also incorporated their eligibility criteria and the geographic location in which activities were conducted.

The Government of Canada (2014h; 2014b), JEN (Hamasa, 2013c) and Reclaim Childhood (2015) provided the most data in relation to teacher/coach education, which comprised a substantive part of the data in regard to specialization. The NRC (2015), Islamic Relief (2014c) and the WFP (2013; 2012), were particularly explicit in relation to their eligibility criteria. Moreover, the Islamic Relief (2014c; 2014b) provided the most disaggregated eligibility and geographic information.

Seventy-two units (72) or approximately 24% of the total units coded, were in relation to compliance. The main issues in this information centered upon the food and cash vouchers

provided to refugees and other beneficiaries by the Islamic Relief (2014d; 2014b; 2013) and WFP (2013; 2012).

Forty-eight (48) units or approximately 16% percent of the total units coded, were in relation to outcomes. Livelihoods and job support were the outcomes INGOs and donors disclosed in selected documents. The Government of Canada, WFP (2013), JEN (Hamasa, 2015c), MADRE (2015) and Reclaim Childhood (2015) disclosed the majority of information in regard to these areas.

The data generated from these codes was utilized to develop categories based upon common meaning, deliberate and recurrent positions and concrete education objectives. The categories were then validated. This validation process can be performed in several ways, including intercoder/interrater reliability, illustrative quotes from the content, linking the researcher's categories to the wider literature and figures/illustrations (Pfeil & Zaphiris, 2009; Elo & Kyngas, 2008). Thus in figure 4.4 below, I illustrate the data from selected documents in relation to the three codes. I also present the specific actions accomplished in the validation of the categories in the next section.




Figure 4.4: Access, compliance and outcome data in selected documents

#### 4.4.2 Validation of categories

In the second phase of content analysis, (Elo & Kyngas, 2008) the validation process can incorporate quotes to illustrate the categories and citations from the wider literature in which these categories are also associated. It can also include intercoder/interrater reliability. The presentation of direct quotes is particularly vital because it offers a link between the categories and the content in selected documents. I utilized quotes and integrated linkages to the wider literature in this phase. However, intercoder and/or interrater reliability involves two or more coders and iterative dialogue in order to minimize the inconsistencies between their results. This process has been a debatable method of validation. For instance, Elo and Kyngas asserted, researchers “interpret the data according to their subjective perspective” (2008, p. 113). In addition, it is most vital for addressing issues that are not present in this study, such as large data

sets, latent content and complicated coding procedures/protocols, because there is often less consistency between the findings of different coders (Campbell, Quincy, Osserman & Pedersen, 2013; Brank, Fox, Youstin & Boeppler, 2009).

Processes have been developed to resolve disparate findings between coders and increase the credibility of the researcher's reporting based upon evidence that others recognize the categories or themes in the data in similar ways. However, it may be hard to remediate unitization problems because these issues comprise the specific sections of text coders consider part of the unit of analysis. Thus, just because different coders recognize categories and themes in similar ways, does not mean they select or tag similar text. Indeed, coders may include slightly less or more text in relation to a specific theme and relevant section to which there is agreement. These approximations decrease the consistency between the coders' results, upon which agreement is measured. Intercoder processes such as negotiated agreement, can also be subject to a power differential and do not in any way substitute or absolve the investigator from the immersion and re-reading of the data, which is needed to validate the codes (Campbell, Quincy, Osserman & Pedersen, 2013). Thus, throughout the following sections, I provide citations from the content to which data was coded. Yet, intercoder reliability was not chosen to validate study findings.

Alternatively, I examined the reports, research and communication materials of other aid stakeholders, which were disclosed to the public through web-based repositories, homepages and information-sharing platforms on the internet. These stakeholders included IATI Members not linked to the 47 selected documents, in addition to networks of international organizations, research centers and scholars, with members not currently registered with the IATI. This process ensured I could explore the degree to which study findings could be representative of the larger

IATI membership and scholarship in humanitarian aid in the public domain. I also have greater access to the potential categories related to access, compliance and outcomes in humanitarian adult education, than I would in the case of additional coders. Therefore, through direct citations from the data, comparisons of study findings to data from IATI members not linked to the selected documents and with data from non-IATI members, I can determine the extent to which study findings have been validated with a greater degree of confidence.

#### **4.4.3 Agencies and donors in the validation process**

There were 39 donor agencies and INGOs which provided reports that confirmed the categories of roles, constraints and education objectives. The organizations are listed in figure 4.5 and 4.6, below, based upon how they were cited in the reports and their position in the aid network. In figure 4.7 and 4.8, the list is centered upon their position in the IATI Registry. For instance, I did not find a membership list for IATI members. Yet, the IATI provides a list of organizations which have published information in its repository. The list can be viewed through the internet. Therefore, organizations which the IATI recognized as publishers in the IATI Registry as of April 7, 2016, (via <http://iatiregistry.org/publisher>) are recognized in figure 4.7 as IATI-registered. The organizations which the IATI did not list in the Registry, are recognized in figure 4.7 as unlisted.

There are instances where a country is listed in the IATI Registry, yet the agency that implements its humanitarian programs or produces reports is not listed in the IATI Registry. For example, the United States is listed in the IATI Registry. The Department of State, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Bureau of Population, Refugees and

Migration (BPRM) are not listed in the IATI Registry. Therefore, the figures may not reflect the entire IATI engagement of the countries upon which the documents in this study were accessed.

In another example, I validated the data in selected documents via documents from the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) and House of Commons, International Development Committee. The DFID is listed in the IATI Registry. The House of Commons, International Development Committee, is not listed in the IATI Registry. United Nations agencies are also implicated. For instance, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are listed in the IATI Registry. However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is not listed in the IATI Registry. Thus, there are cases in which governments and organizations are listed in the IATI Registry through some of their departments and not others. Moreover, there are instances in which governments and organizations reported to the IATI through some of its offices and not others. The IATI Registry could be improved and ostensibly more user-friendly, with the addition of these departments. Yet, approximately half of the organizations which disclosed information that validated the categories were in the IATI Registry. Therefore, the categories presented are relevant to both a large segment of the IATI membership and a substantive sample of the network of organizations in the field of humanitarian assistance.

In addition to these organizations, I utilized approximately 10 reports and studies from periodicals and policy institutes. Thus, the categories were validated in the discourse of a wide, cross-section of the aid literature.

Multilateral, Intergovernmental Agencies & Donors
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Australian Aid</li> <li>• Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</li> <li>• Belgian Development Cooperation</li> <li>• Centers for Disease Control</li> <li>• Commonwealth Secretariat</li> <li>• Department for International Development (DFID)</li> <li>• German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</li> <li>• House of Commons, International Development Committee, United Kingdom Parliament</li> <li>• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark; Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)</li> <li>• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Netherlands</li> <li>• Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)</li> <li>• United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</li> <li>• United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)</li> <li>• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</li> <li>• United States Agency for International Development (USAID)</li> <li>• World Health Organization (WHO), International Medical Corps (IMC) &amp; United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)</li> </ul>
Networks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disasters Emergency Committee</li> <li>• London 2016 Conference</li> <li>• Strategic Needs Analysis Project</li> </ul>

Figure 4.5: Multilateral and donor agencies in validation

INGOs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adidas Group</li> <li>• Amnesty International</li> <li>• American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA)</li> <li>• Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE)</li> <li>• Comic Relief</li> <li>• Concern Worldwide</li> <li>• Danish Refugee Council</li> <li>• Episcopal Relief and Development</li> <li>• Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)</li> <li>• HelpAge International and Handicap International</li> <li>• Konrad Adenauer Stiftung</li> <li>• International Catholic Migration Committee</li> <li>• International Rescue Committee (IRC)</li> <li>• Internews</li> <li>• Medair</li> <li>• Norwegian Church Aid</li> <li>• Oxfam</li> <li>• Save the Children</li> <li>• Sported</li> <li>• World Vision</li> </ul>

Figure 4.6: International organizations in validation

## IATI Registered

- Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- Belgian Development Cooperation
- Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE)
- Concern Worldwide
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark; Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)
- Department for International Development (DFID)
- German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
- Handicap International & HelpAge International
- International Medical Corps & United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- International Rescue Committee (IRC)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Netherlands
- Oxfam
- Save the Children
- Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- United States
- World Vision

## Unlisted in the IATI Registry

- Adidas Group
- Amnesty International
- American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA)
- Australian Aid
- Centers for Disease Control
- Comic Relief
- Commonwealth Secretariat
- Danish Refugee Council
- Disasters Emergency Committee
- Episcopal Relief and Development
- Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
- House of Commons, International Development Committee, United Kingdom Parliament
- International Catholic Migration Committee
- Internews
- Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
- London 2016 Conference
- Medair
- Norwegian Church Aid
- Sported
- Strategic Needs Analysis Project
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
- World Health Organization (WHO)

Figure 4.7: Agencies and organizations listed and unlisted in the IATI Registry

#### **4.5 RESULTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS PHASE III**

In the third or reporting phase of content analysis (Elo & Kyngas, 2008), the categories are reported. Indeed, I categorized roles, constraints and objectives. The main roles afforded INGO beneficiaries were the professional, caregiver, emissary, industrial and most vulnerable refugee. Narrow commitments, grey areas, minimum thresholds and access were categorized as primary constraints. Durable solutions, caregiving and child protection, social cohesion and conduct, were categorized as education objectives. These objectives were implemented through legal counseling, mine awareness, teacher education, hygiene education, sport and media, microfinance, food aid and repurposing. Thus, there were five beneficiary roles, four constraints and three education objectives. These categories may not be all-inclusive, as donors and organizations may be organized to address specific issues for which data is not accessible.

The reporting of these categories is especially significant. First, a main area of focus in this study, is in regard to the roles afforded refugees and the structures upon which these roles were sustained. Roles are the positions in which INGOs and donors provide access to aid for beneficiaries who are registered and eligible. The structures that sustain the roles are comprised of the discretion INGOs and donors leverage in information generation and dissemination and the resources they distribute including training courses and material aid. Indeed, power-sharing discretion in information dissemination and resource allocation could be critical accountability achievements. Additionally, the roles refugees are afforded in information dissemination are also relevant to a network perspective of the aid arena. In particular, constraints illustrate the degree

to which information generation and dissemination could have been minimized. Thus, constraints, roles and structures underscore accountability in adult emergency education and highlight the access to and quality of open data in INGO-donor networks.

Another area of focus is in regard to the activities accessible to refugees, relative to their training needs and livelihood aspirations. INGOs and donors disclosed information in these areas, therefore the Open Aid Search was a useful repository in the analysis of online information.

#### **4.6 BENEFICIARY ROLES**

Access to humanitarian education centered upon five primary beneficiary roles. Persons who were registered and/or eligible for participation in the humanitarian programs disclosed by donors and organizations, could be conceptualized as the professional, caregiver, emissary, industrial and most vulnerable refugee. The roles relative to potential benefits and limitations are presented in figure 4.8 below.

The refugee professional refers to entrepreneurs and persons training to work in a business environment (Government of Canada, 2015a; Government of Canada, 2014a). The relationships s/he has access to could include teachers and coaches, as well as parents, caregivers and school administrators. Additionally, the refugee professional may potentially gather resources either from the INGO or his or her investor. The professional could receive guidance from the INGO or a mentor and earn income through relations with customers. Thus, communication between and among these actors could be directed by the professional inasmuch as it can be mediated by the INGO. The professional is distinguished from other roles because of

Beneficiary Roles	Benefits	Limitations
Refugee professional	Increased Employability	May not Develop Materials or Obtain Certification
Refugee Caregiver	Build Relationships	Responds to Learning Needs of Others Not Their Own
Refugee Emissary	Participate in efforts to improve Conditions in the Community	Temporary & Low-Level Position in the INGO
Industrial Refugee	Paid Work & Increased Employability	Short-Term & Requires Physical Labor; May be a Difficult Transition for Professionals
Most Vulnerable Refugee	First in Line for Services	Placed in a Fixed Role Centered Upon Vulnerability

Figure 4.8: Benefits and limitations of refugees' roles

these multifaceted channels of communication and relations. Professionals can leverage this position to generate and share information and conceivably, reduce dependency upon the aid of INGOs.

The refugee caregiver role encompasses parents and school staff in the refugee community who meet regularly for the purposes of increasing child protection and K-12 enrollment (Reclaim Childhood, 2015; Islamic Relief, 2015; Government of Canada, 2014e; Government of Canada, 2014g; NRC, 2014c). The caregiver may establish a relationship with other parents and members of the community however, communication between these actors is often directed by the INGO. The skills of the caregiver may not be developed because the objective is to address the learning declines of children and youth. If skills are developed, they are in relation to the caregiving position more than refugees' learning and livelihoods aspirations.

Refugee emissaries are persons who either obtain volunteer or paid positions with INGOs to conduct needs assessments and increase messaging in the field (Nagatsuka, 2014). Refugee emissaries are not senior staff members and do not direct communication. They can develop skills in relation to the INGO project in order to fulfill a program objective however, skills extraneous to this objective may not be developed or applied. The INGO directs their communication and like the caregiver, retains control of most resources.

The industrial role is centered upon participation in sanitation and infrastructure projects. Industrials may volunteer or receive a form of remuneration (Hamasaka, 2014d; WFP, 2013). They may be hired for jobs including repairs and distributing goods. They may not enjoy as much communication as caregivers, emissaries and professionals, because the role necessitates physical labor and/or harsh conditions. This role may be prohibitive for those with physical limitations and medical needs. INGO support may be given to the industrial refugee for home-based or other income-generation (Hamasaka, 2015c).

The most vulnerable refugee refers to the beneficiary often designated by organizations as the primary target for humanitarian assistance (NRC, 2015; WFP, 2013; WFP, 2012). The most vulnerable refugee is set apart from others, because his/her needs are the most extreme and his/her chances for survival without humanitarian aid are the most unlikely. The industrial and most vulnerable refugees do not direct communication and may have few relations to leverage. The information disclosed in selected documents was to a large degree, focused on the refugee caregiver, emissary and most vulnerable refugee. As a consequence, there is greater access to data about refugees who have the least control over their aid and yet, are more dependent.

These beneficiary roles were promoted in response to cross-cutting development themes and objectives for durable solutions. The comparative education activities that correspond to these roles are presented in figure 4.9 below.

Most of these roles were designated either primarily for refugee women or incorporated specific mechanisms to increase women’s enrollment and participation. In fact, women’s vulnerability was underscored throughout documents in the Open Aid Search review process (Droggitis, 2013; Government of Canada, 2013d; Susskind, 2013a; Susskind, 2013b; Government of Canada, 2012). Activities explicitly developed for refugee men were rarely disclosed. While they were included in beneficiary pools, women and children were prioritized.

Refugee professional	Refugee caregiver	Refugee emissary	Industrial refugee	Most vulnerable refugee
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Business skills</li> <li>• Life skills training</li> <li>• Journalism training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Child protection Committees</li> <li>• Parent-teacher organizations</li> <li>• Teacher training</li> <li>• Coach training</li> <li>• School health committees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hygiene promoters</li> <li>• Assessment and awareness on K-12 registration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seasonal or short-term public works and sanitation positions</li> <li>• Repurposing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mandatory gender sensitivity training</li> <li>• Legal support, arbitration and awareness</li> <li>• Conditional food and cash</li> <li>• Mine awareness</li> </ul>

Figure 4.9: Refugee roles in the aid arena

Out of the nine organizations, JEN highlighted both the strategic targeting of and contribution from men in its activities. For instance, an awareness campaign to conserve water, “targeted males and females from three age groups: adults, teenagers and children” and different methods were used to reach each group (Hamasaka, 2015b). In addition, JEN (Hamasaka, 2014d) facilitated an awareness session for parents and teachers. JEN (Hamasaka, 2014d)

maintained, “to our delight, the turnout surpassed our expectations and what’s more, we were extremely pleased to see fathers and other members of the community we had not attempted to reach directly attending our sessions.” JEN’s capacity to foster participation from men and women is significant in part, since organizations such as the WFP characterized refugees as “families with children” (2012, p.4). It also conceded there was a large segment of single men in the refugee population.

The roles also accompany significant accomplishments in downward accountability. For example, donors and organizations’ strengths centered upon their capacity to reach beneficiaries in camp and noncamp settings (NRC, 2014c), establish multiple communication channels (Islamic Relief, 2014b) and target diverse groups (WFP, 2012). However, they often controlled the direction, intent and form of information sharing and while feedback was encouraged, refugee adults were not noted for their role in program evaluation. Therefore, INGOs and donors could do more to evidence their accountability commitments. In addition, progress in these areas might be measured through ongoing research.

#### **4.7 EDUCATION CONSTRAINTS**

Donor agencies and organizations are clearly interdependent and to a large degree, dissatisfied. In the Open Aid Search, a rich discussion of program constraints revealed they have acknowledged the internal improvements they could make. In addition, it has underscored their coordination processes as an interface among stakeholders in a system to which they have become resigned. Indeed, donors and organizations recognized the humanitarian context as the domain they do not control and the scale for which they are not responsible. As a result, there is

a level of support for adult education and training (London 2016 Conference Members, 2015; Talbot, 2013; Kirk, 2009) alongside an ontological argument, as to whether adult education is appropriate in a humanitarian environment (Sida, 2014). In addition, hesitancy around long-term obligations has been noted (Sida, 2015). Emergency education is minimized by the contradiction and in many instances, livelihoods has been allocated to local laborers or constructed as gender-based, by virtue of members' roles and constraints to access.

The main constraints in selected documents were categorized as the following: narrow commitments, grey areas, minimum thresholds and access limitations. The constraints donors and INGOs noted are in regard to the things needed to make programs more effective, complimentary and/or coherent and the barriers to their interventions. For instance, in the Open Aid Search the Japan Emergency NGO (JEN) in particular, noted the effects of climate upon its activities. Indeed, JEN claimed it had to distribute winter clothes and undertake other measures to mitigate the effects of cold winters and sandstorms upon the health of refugees (JEN, 2015; Hamasaka, 2015a; Hamasaka, 2014b). In addition, snow, wind and rain caused its staff and partner organizations to shift and adapt plans and strategies. For example, JEN (Hamasaka, 2015a) claimed, “the emergency team spent most of the day tying down water tanks that we had thought were too heavy to blow away, we had been wrong the wind was strong enough to take them.” As a result of relentless snow and unexpected wind, schools were damaged, streets were flooded, tents collapsed and the even the “protective tarp and part of the roof blew off” of JEN’s office space (Hamasaka, 2015a). JEN maintained staff worked well into the night, “nevertheless it wasn’t until almost a week later that all water was removed and the normal routines in the camp” could commence (Hamasaka, 2015a).

Although JEN (Hamasa, 2015c) noted, “in order to implement assistance promptly, adequately and efficiently based on grasping the needs correctly, it is necessary to cooperate with related agencies, such as the Jordanian government, UN and NGOs.” The cooperation indicated for adequate and prompt aid in education could not be conducted. Rather, time, human and material resources were distributed toward unexpected events. Efficiency was also minimized because operations were not initiated until after the damage had already occurred and/or after the storm arrived.

In this section, I first present the constraints reported in selected documents. Next, I list significant processes which were disclosed in selected documents, yet were not acknowledged as constraints. I then examine the implications of these constraints for accountability to refugee adults and the larger policy environment in adult education and livelihoods.

#### **4.7.1 Narrow commitments**

Narrow commitments are related to the marginal supply of prompt, adequate, financial and regulatory support for adult education and livelihoods. This constraint is especially critical, because it decreases access to recovery opportunities for adult refugees in the aid arena. For instance, the World Food Programme (WFP) (2012) concluded self-reliance was a challenge because of expensive work permits that refugees could not afford. Work permits were not generally offered by employers, leaving refugees with few options in the workforce to cover the costs of food and other basic needs. Additionally, the WFP conceded funding was an ongoing constraint and the response to needs was framed as, “ad hoc, depending on the availability of external funding” (WFP, 2012, p.7). The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) also conceded, “some of the originally proposed components have been cut

entirely and others reduced, due to Sida allocating SEK 2m while the proposal was for 4m” (2014, p. 3). Thus, the aid arena may not have had the resources appropriate to a comprehensive crisis response because of narrow commitments. This narrow commitment may not be specific to a Jordanian context. The wider United Nations (UN) programs worldwide may be affected. For example, Muggah noted, “protracted refugee situations within UNHCR is taking shape against a backdrop of broad budgetary constraints across the UN, growing donor intolerance of long-term refugee situations and a debate over the merits of linking relief and developmental approaches” (2005, p. 152). Indeed, Muggah contended, countries were “backing away from their responsibilities for refugees at the same time...refugee caseloads were growing” (2005, p. 153). However in Jordan, the narrow commitment has been critical in part, because it has implications for the largest community of displaced people in the world (Government of Canada, 2015c) – a group for which support has declined. For instance, the Department for International Development (DFID) (2014) maintained there was a reduction in donor support to refugees in Jordan and noted the problem of information deficits about long-term needs.

Donor funding has also been a constraint in terms of the time in which it was accessible. For instance, in selected documents, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (2015) concluded Sida and DFID provided an expedient reply to rapid response applications. However, their response time may have been the exception. In fact, the NRC argued, “very few donors have established systematic systems for emergency funds that can be released so promptly after the onset of a new disaster” (2015, p. 15). Thus, long waiting periods for program funding inhibits the organizations’ capability to reach people in need. This dawdling response time is alarming because people who seek help from INGOs may not be supported by community-based organizations (CBOs) and government institutions in a way that is comparable. For example, in

the wider discourse, organizations claimed, “CBOs, some of which are newly established, have been active in providing services to Syrians...however they have limited human resources and expertise” (WHO, IMC & UNICEF, 2012, p. 7). Limitations in the host country were also recognized in selected documents. Indeed, the WFP posited, “the government is not directly providing food assistance to the Syrians” beyond a “general subsidy on wheat and bread” (2012, p. 6).

The commitment to education is particularly narrow for refugee adults. For instance, in selected documents, the NRC (2013) consistently highlighted education as a right and framed refugees as rights holders. Indeed, the NRC maintained, “education is a right” and the “rapid provision of access to education is a priority emergency response” (2013, p. 18). Sustainable livelihoods were recognized as integral to recovery. Significantly, the NRC (2014c) also identified education as a need for both youth and adult refugees. In fact, the NRC maintained, “protection in countries of asylum necessitates equitable assistance to meet the specific needs of women, girls, boys and men, including in health, education, shelter and other sectors” (2014c, p. 81). The NRC however, did not target adults in its livelihoods activities in Jordan. Rather, the NRC noted, “NRC Jordan supports refugees through an integrated programming approach with education and livelihoods opportunities to children and youth” (2015, p. 6). The NRC also maintained the, “main objective is to ensure that children and youth’s right to quality education is upheld” (2014a, p. 24). Moreover, the WFP claimed its activities were planned in order to “protect livelihoods” (2012, p. 2). However, the WFP did not describe any opportunities for refugee adults in Jordan to generate income or work in its 2012 program (WFP, 2012).

Education in emergencies is especially precarious, because it is associated with a development rather than humanitarian context. For example, Sida maintained, “while education

can certainly be viewed from a resilience perspective, it could be argued on a case-by-case basis that some interventions are development oriented rather than humanitarian assistance” (2014, p. 4). Thus, funding may be reallocated to other priorities that network members determine are most relevant to humanitarian settings. Indeed, this prioritization process could have caused revisions in program planning. For example, NRC admitted that it modified its education strategy in Jordan. Education was decreased in the modification. The activities the NRC subsequently planned, were by enlarge centered upon the information counseling and legal assistance (ICLA) program. In fact, the NRC noted, “all education activities were removed from the proposal...it is now 100% ICLA” (2014b, p. 1). Sida also confirmed, “all except Jordan have education projects in both plans” (2015, p. 3).

In some instances, programs were also temporary and adult education and income-generation were framed as time-limited. For example, in its 2013-2015 program for locals, the WFP described its response to the “short-term food needs of targeted vulnerable populations” (2013, p. 10), while conceding the “socio-economic conditions in poor and food-insecure areas are not expected to improve in the short or medium term” (2013, p. 2). In fact, Sida claimed, “it is not a primary requirement in humanitarian assistance that the interventions should be sustained over time” (2015, p. 19).

This result is significant because it may evidence that recovery opportunities for adults were diminished in part, based upon ideological orientations and ontological presumptions. For instance, education for adults may be short-term and underfunded because donors do not believe it is necessary or appropriate to continue in a humanitarian setting, since education is framed as a development intervention. Significantly, accountability relationships may not be examined in relation to refugees’ learning needs and the lack of programming in this sector may not be

problematized as an accountability deficit. In this resource-poor context, there may be less reporting of academic achievements. Moreover, marginal adult education and livelihoods opportunities at the INGO level leave refugees with limited resources. As a result, they may traverse grey areas in the host community in order to cover the costs of living. I examine the grey area in the next section.

#### **4.7.2 Grey areas**

The utility of grey areas is based upon the movement of refugees in informal space. This movement is a counter-behavior, performed to increase access to paid work and human security. For example, in selected documents, the NRC (2014c), WFP (2012) and Islamic Relief (2013) claimed there were few work opportunities for refugees in the formal sector. The Islamic Relief asserted, “opportunities for paid work are scarce, as the Government has prevented Syrians to work” (2013, p. 4). Therefore, refugees often operated in grey areas, accepting low-wage positions in places where they were at-risk of exploitation. Indeed, the WFP asserted, “growing numbers of Syrian refugees in the border areas are impacting the labour market, where Syrians are competing for the limited labour opportunities at lower wages, thus raising already growing unemployment rates in border areas” (2013, p. 4).

Through their entry in the labor market and the unrest resulting from this entry, refugees have become a public problem in the aid discourse. Labor competition can minimize wages for local people and engender misrecognition of refugees as less vulnerable and/or less desirable (IRC, 2015). Because their work is not legal, infrequent, unreliable and at times, not remunerated, they are encompassed by an economic and regulatory system which is vague. They do not plan or anticipate what the next year will hold. In addition, they relocate habitually and

may elude the public, a strategy which decreases their capacity to access aid (IRC, 2015; Ward, 2014). This life in the shadows, in the grey area, has significant implications for aid programs because the information provided by beneficiaries could change rapidly (Kenny, 2015), necessitating continuous and costly modifications to activities.

It is challenging to leave an informal space, because the documents that local institutions, employers or education programs require were left behind or compromised in displacement (NRC, 2014c; NRC 2014a). Limited savings, income and opportunities in formal sectors has also left adult refugees unable to pay rent. In some instances, they could not locate affordable housing in close proximity to service providers. Therefore, they live in what is left. Thus, refugees may subsist in substandard, over-priced accommodations, with few protections from the elements. These dilapidated options can render proper hygiene and health care unfeasible. This circumstance increases the risk of disease and risks to the host society (Islamic Relief, 2015; Islamic Relief, 2013).

In addition to urban areas, camps may also be unsanitary. Refugees may not be dedicated to upkeep in places that they view as temporary. Conditions can be far below acceptable standards. For example, JEN (Hamasa, 2014c) implemented hygiene education sessions and its staff, “asked the community to participate in the campaign ... because some refugees do not view the camp as their permanent home, less attention is paid to the environment.”

Life in the grey area also complicates needs assessments. For instance, refugees who elude the public, move often or are unregistered, may not be recognized as beneficiaries of organizations or included in data they need in order to activate funding and deliver aid (Ward, 2014). Indeed, grey areas increase both liminality in the aid environment and the progress that could be made in education and livelihoods. Therefore aid may not be released in part, because

the life in the grey area inhibits access to the data needed to reach program thresholds. Thus, I examine the threshold in the following section.

### **4.7.3 Minimum thresholds**

Assistance for refugees may be initiated based upon a threshold, program indicator or understanding between donors and organizations. The processes necessary to activate them could take months or longer to complete. Access to education and other aid services are minimized in the interim. Aid may also be inaccessible, because of the selective allocation of resources to the areas in which the threshold, indicator and agreements are situated. For instance, the NRC claimed donors, “often prioritises similar areas throughout a year, directing attention to populations with the largest numbers of people in need” (2014d, p. 1). This schema is significant because it “oftentimes lead to certain areas being neglected, resulting in large gaps between needs and actual response” (NRC, 2014d, p. 1).

In selected documents, the WFP disclosed there were 88,000 refugees in the region who were either waiting to be registered and/or had been recognized as vulnerable by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partner organizations (2012, p. 2). Interestingly, the WFP (2012, p. 3) also claimed that while there may be unregistered refugees in Iraq, the total number of registered refugees was 3,000. Along with UNHCR, the WFP expected the refugee population to increase to more than 5,000, which would then “trigger WFP’s support with food assistance,” (WFP, 2012, p. 3) per an existing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UNHCR. As a result, the threshold to service delivery was a minimum number. Many services were also clustered in urban or the northern areas in Jordan. UNHCR therefore, had to facilitate transport to accommodate refugees from remote areas who also needed to register.

UNHCR conceded that some services for women and children “in the south of Jordan and in the Jordan Valley remained scarce” (2013b, p. 3).

The number of aid beneficiaries in INGO programs are also important for thresholds. For example, refugee adults make up a tiny part of the figures reported on the beneficiary populace in livelihoods programs. Low numbers are also reported in education. For example, in the *UNHCR-Jordan Assistance and Protection 2009 Mid-Year Report* (UNHCR, 2009b), it was reported that nearly 11,000 registered Iraqi refugees received health and psychosocial support. However, only 456 received training and 1,355 received access to education. Thus, only a portion of the refugee population was empowered to pursue the vision of mobility which education enables.

Moreover, there were well over three million Syrian refugees and 100,000 new asylum applications from Iraqis in 2014 (UNHCR, 2015d). A large percentage of this population sought asylum in Jordan. Significantly, there were more than six hundred thousand registered refugees in Jordan in 2014, including 21,499 Iraqis who registered in that year (UNHCR, 2014b). In fact, in 2015, Jordan hosted the sixth largest UNHCR-registered refugee population in the world (UNHCR, 2015f). Adult education is especially relevant to this group, because refugee adults comprised the largest demographic (UNHCR, 2015a; UNHCR, 2015b; UNHCR, UNICEF & WFP, 2014). For instance, UNHCR disaggregated the registered Syrian refugee population by ages. In 2015, Syrian refugees between ages 18-59 consisted of over 40% of the registered population, followed by the second highest group, which were children ages 5-11 at approximately 20% (UNHCR, 2015a).

In selected documents, INGOs included thousands of refugee adults in messaging campaigns and legal/durable solutions activities (NRC, 2014c; ICRC, 2014). However, when

refugee totals were listed, most livelihoods, coach training and train-the-trainer activities targeted less than 100 participants (Hamasaka, 2015c; Reclaim Childhood, 2015; ICRC, 2014). Business and life skills training were planned for just 400 refugees (Government of Canada, 2015a; Government of Canada, 2014a). Indeed, though the International Labour Organization (ILO) claimed, “as more time passes, the Syrian refugees’ need for gainful employment intensifies” (2015, p. 4), the support they receive was not in proportion to their needs (Jordanian Ministry of Health & Premiere Urgence Aide Medicale International, 2014). Access to education and livelihoods is therefore a significant constraint, to which thresholds were considerably high. Thresholds, indicators and agreements however, could have been impacted by circumstances that INGOs and donors claimed inhibited their capacity to make informed decisions and deliver aid. Therefore, I focus upon access in the following section.

#### **4.7.4 Access**

INGOs and donors disclosed constraints that decreased access to beneficiary populations, services and knowledge. The implications of access constraints are especially concerning, because they impact resource allocations based upon issues in the local context and host population, which INGOs and donors can not control. The needs in this context surpass their capacity and response strategies may be outdated by the changes in context, before they can make an impact. First I describe the access INGOs and donors were afforded to beneficiary populations. Second, I present the services that were mitigated in this environment. Next, I focus upon the extent to which knowledge deficits may have limited improvements in service delivery and lessons learned. The implications for downward accountability are then presented.

#### **4.7.5 Access to beneficiary populations**

The capacity of INGOs to deliver aid was constrained in part, by the access they were afforded to the refugee community by the Government of Jordan and the imperative to decrease social tensions between refugees and local citizens. For example, the WFP (2012) coordinated its efforts with other organizations, via regional strategic frameworks, in-country coordination meetings, task forces and inter-agency cooperation with UNHCR, through field, country and regional teams. The WFP also planned to participate in “Education and Protection Sector working groups” (2012, p. 9). With its partners, the WFP encouraged humanitarian principles and supported host country efforts with neutrality. The WFP endeavored to leverage this support in order to “build trust and ensure continued access” (2012, p. 19) to refugee communities. However, weaknesses in the social protection mechanisms of both host and sending countries mitigated the degree to which the WFP could respond. In Jordan, for instance, there were weak structures with regard to food security and social supports, livelihoods and self-reliance mechanisms in particular. In addition, the host country was also significantly affected by decreased trade relations with Syria (NRC, 2015; WFP, 2013) and subsequent price increases for commodities. The Government of Jordan could not adjust to the increased demand for services from refugees and requested support from the WFP for its citizens who were living along with refugees in low-income urban areas (WFP, 2013).

The WFP (2013; 2012) recognized the risk of insufficient humanitarian support as a condition that would drive more Syrian refugees into the informal labor market. It was concerned that competition with local citizens for jobs and resentment over humanitarian support, could be destabilizing factors. The WFP cautioned, “host communities could perceive that the refugees are being favoured with humanitarian assistance” (2012, p. 18). This perception is significant in

part, because “these tensions could create animosity, and erupt in violence” and “there is also a risk of politicization of the refugee population” (WFP, 2012, p. 18). Thus, the response to the refugee situation had to incorporate support to local Jordanians. Indeed, local beneficiaries were indicated, in order to “contribute to social cohesion between the two groups” (WFP, 2013, p. 2). In fact, in the WFP 2013-2015 Program (WFP, 2013), Jordanians were the primary targets for livelihoods activities and food aid.

Concern about vulnerable Jordanians and local capacities were also cited by the Government of Canada. In particular, Canada planned to address natural resource limitations and environmental concerns. The Government of Canada (2013e) outlined its strategic plans to increase the capacities of local municipalities to provide basic services through the construction of or repair to lights, roads or waste management systems. The plan was lauded for its potential to improve conditions for 800,000 Jordanians and 300,000 refugees, via increased service delivery. This amounted to 2.67 Jordanians for each refugee. Income-generating opportunities were anticipated via local projects, however Canada did not disclose if and to what degree these projects would include refugees. Indeed, 30% or more of the beneficiaries in international aid programs that addressed the refugee influx could have been Jordanian (Islamic Relief, 2013).

In addition to these selected documents, the evidence of Canada’s efforts to offset the impact of the refugee crisis for local workers and entrepreneurs was prevalent in the Open Aid Search. For instance, the Government of Canada (2013g) supported a program to mitigate the impact of the “Syrian displacement in Jordan” in part through economic and educational interventions such as support for small businesses, “vocational education and training” and “skills development.” The program was lauded for improving access to income-generating opportunities for Jordanians, particularly women, as vulnerable persons living in “displacement-

affected” populations. In one of its 2015 programs, (Government of Canada, 2015f) 10,000 vulnerable Jordanians in communities with large refugee populations were also the primary target for beneficiaries in a vocational training program. Therefore, aid resources were distributed to refugees, yet also targeted a local population that was at times the main beneficiary.

In addition, the demand for large numbers of local citizens in the beneficiary target has been recognized by other donor agencies and organizations (Mowjee, Fleming & Toft, 2015; World Vision, 2015). For example, in the *Regional Analysis of the Syria (RAS) conflict Part B Host Countries*, organizations lamented the Government of Jordan (GOJ), “informally requires NGOs providing assistance to Syrian refugees to also assist vulnerable Jordanians” (Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 2015, p. 15). The percentages of local beneficiaries in this report coincide with the figures in selected documents provided by the Islamic Relief (2013). For instance, “although there appears to be no written record, it is reported that GOJ has in the past asked for at least 30% of beneficiaries to be Jordanian” (Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 2015, p. 15). Therefore, access to the refugee beneficiary population was mitigated in part, by a Jordanian poverty that was arguably just as severe. As a consequence, there could have been a reduced amount of slots available for refugees in adult education and livelihoods programs and subsequently, less information about their academic achievements in INGO reports. Moreover, the more INGOs allocated resources to local populations, the less they were able to respond to the growing refugee influx. In addition, the more INGOs allocated resources toward host governments’ prerequisites, the less they were able to assess and enhance the protection space in which refugees were situated.

Indeed, in the discourse, INGOs claimed people in need can be hard to reach (Belgian Development Cooperation, 2015). In Syria and other conflict-areas, refugees and displaced persons are in the midst of brutal regimes with few if any savings or resources (Episcopal Relief and Development, 2015). These refugees are also settled in host communities (CARE, 2014) where in some cases they are exploited or abused. As a result, there may be more requests for aid, yet decreased access to services. I describe this constraint in the following section.

#### **4.7.6 Access to services**

Refugees may experience challenges obtaining services in part, because organizations are not capable of responding to unforeseen or increased demand. Indeed, the NRC acknowledged, “increased outreach capacity is needed to ensure that all persons of concern have access to information and counselling regarding their status and available services” (2014c, p. 81). Sida also noted the NRC was not able to keep up with “operational expansion” and as a result, the organization may have moved faster than the development of its systems and standards (2015, p. 14). Sida conceded donors’ orientation toward rapid response and tendency to raise funding ceilings also contributed to this expansion. Therefore, in selected documents, organizations admitted they were not always able to reach the capacity appropriate for implementing a rapid response. For instance, the NRC noted its capacity to address Syrian refugees was constrained by the “limited number of staff deployable on short notice, and the constant demand for their expertise” (NRC, 2014c, p. 101). Consequently, the development and/or modification of its systems were “less observed than initially planned” (NRC, 2014c, p. 101).

Access to services was also decreased as a result of awaiting Jordan’s approval of project activities and enrolling Jordanian beneficiaries. Additional personnel were required to address

these challenges and coordinate efforts with school administrators (Islamic Relief, 2014b). The Islamic Relief also lamented the disproportionate amount of aid to refugees in camp environments although most refugees settled in urban areas (Islamic Relief, 2013).

In the aid discourse, there are also reports that depict access as a main constraint. For instance, the Norwegian Church Aid argued, “whereas international actors lack humanitarian access to Syria, the churches have responded to the crisis from day one” (2015, p. 7). In fact, the Danish Refugee Council posited, “DRC continues to be one of the only INGO actors with a consistent presence in the southern region of Jordan” (2014, p. 12). In addition, the International Rescue Committee (2013) underscored the neglect of Syrian refugees in Iraq, particularly in urban locations.

Regulatory and administrative tasks were also recognized as program issues. Indeed, in the literature, Coston lamented INGO activities may be minimized by the “restrictive process of registration and then to operations within a narrowly defined scope of functions subject to permission from the appropriate government ministry” (1998, p. 364.) In fact, organizations claimed, “in Jordan government approval of projects is a lengthy process and then will only agree to projects working with Syrian refugees if a minimum of 30% of the beneficiaries will be Jordanian” (Kenny, 2015, p. 10). Organizations were also concerned about achieving targets once programs were approved. For instance, “the churn of people in and out of the camps” was prohibitive because the needs, numbers and costs attributed to the intervention change relentlessly (Kenny, 2015, p. 6). Additional tasks were needed to enroll Jordanian participants and promote refugee livelihoods.

In this resource-poor environment, data may not be accessible, as staff with multiple tasks and competing interests respond to needs with what they have left. Therefore, they

conducted activities in settings constrained by limited access to knowledge and/or no way to integrate the lessons learned. I describe this constraint in the following section.

#### **4.7.7 Access to knowledge**

Access to knowledge about refugee needs and locations is necessary to plan and conduct activities. Migration and displacement however, is an iterative, ongoing process for refugees that can minimize access. For example, knowledge about where refugees are settled when INGOs initially survey the community, could be unreliable at the time INGOs open registration for new programs. In fact, in selected documents, Islamic Relief noted a program was modified, “following a relocation campaign conducted by the Government of Jordan to move Syrian refugees to other areas” (2015, p. 7). Thus, constraints to access have necessitated more human and material resources, which adds costs to aid programs.

Limited access to knowledge is also significant to underscore for at least two reasons. First, it has limited the quality of internal staff development and communication. Second, limited access to knowledge has reduced the evidence available for INGOs to develop interventions. As a result, there was less data and limited opportunities for donors and third party monitors to assess program strategies and guidelines. Indeed, Sida (2015; 2014) and the NRC (2015; 2014c) also expressed a need to ensure clear directions for staff in writing, in terms of exit strategies, do no harm principles and political constraints. Sida also cautioned the NRC to clarify its primary target beneficiary populations and provide staff with information on the meaning of durable solutions in each context. There were also directions, frameworks and institutional standards for conflict sensitivity, which Sida noted were not found among NRC manuals and handbooks. In one example, Sida cautioned, the “NRC does not yet have an explicit policy regarding how the

organisation approaches resilience in its operations” (2014, p. 16). Additionally, the NRC was also cited for not disclosing why and how it works with local partners.

Planning both in the field and at the regional level was also affected by information which was either unavailable, unspecified or not shared. For instance, tracking systems were upgraded, however disaggregating data was not always possible and double counting could have been an issue for refugees who registered for more than one intervention (Sida, 2014). Thus, the impact of aid may have been more difficult to assess for specific populations. In addition, the response to abused and/or neglected refugees was inhibited by the limited information on gender-based violence within the Syrian refugee population (NRC, 2014b).

Indeed, the aid to refugees in impoverished conditions may have been complicated by “gaps around sharing lessons learnt, good practice and coordination of cash based interventions at the regional level” (NRC, 2014a, p. 35). In fact, the NRC was dismayed by a competitive and politicized humanitarian community, which it argued operated without a strong evidence base. The NRC aimed to improve information sharing, complementarity and collaboration in the humanitarian community. Therefore, the NRC implemented the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) to strengthen coordinated humanitarian needs assessments in all phases of a crisis (NORCAP, 2015). According to Sida, “the aim of the ACAPS project is to promote a culture of coordinated and integrated information management and analysis” (2015, p. 4).

ACAPS was lauded for its potential to connect a diverse group of INGOs with myriad interests and assessment methods and link them together through a platform for information sharing. ACAPS participated in the Strategic Needs Analysis Project (SNAP) to improve situational awareness among organizations in the aid arena. Yet, ACAPS was the subject of knowledge gaps and dilemmas. For example, Sida noted there was some discussion about if

ACAPS should be positioned “with an NGO as is currently the case or whether it should perhaps be incorporated with OCHA” as well as how it was linked to SNAP, because there were “no SNAP-specific outcomes or outputs in the ACAPS results matrix for 2015” (Sida, 2015, p. 4).

Gaps in knowledge were also noted in the wider discourse. In fact, the World Health Organization (WHO), International Medical Corps (IMC) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) noted difficulties in information sharing with organizations in Jordan. For instance, data collection activities in mental health coordination were complicated because “some of the related information was lost” (WHO, IMC & UNICEF, 2012, p. 6). In addition, “data received was incomplete and inconsistent in form thereby making analysis of relevant data difficult” (WHO, IMC & UNICEF, 2012, p. 6).

Moreover, in selected documents, Sida described challenges applying the information obtained to aid environments governed by corrupt officials. For example, Sida cautioned, many external agencies such as local authorities “that would normally help to prevent and deal with corruption are often a huge part of the problem” (2015, p. 18). Sida also admitted, interventions are implemented in some of the most “corrupt countries in the world” (2015, p. 18). Moreover, the International Committee of the Red Cross (2014) also posited countries in transition may be powerless, slow and without the influence needed to reach vulnerable people or authority to engage in high-level decision-making. Effective civil societies may not be developed and local agencies may not have the capacity or technical skills to operate at high levels, particularly in rural areas. Strict regulatory environments and variations in rules and requirements may inhibit access to beneficiary populations or add logistical requirements which are also prohibitive.

These constraints counter the misconception that donors and their grantees are the stand-alone power-wielders in the aid community. Their perceptions are particularly relevant in

network literature, which is concerned with the roles and structures involved in the flow of information. Roles and constraints are significant in networks, shaping [in]actions and subsequently, mitigating the knowledge that is accessible (Uzzi, 1996).

#### 4.8 UNRECOGNIZED EDUCATION CONSTRAINTS

The conditionalities outlined in section 4.7 have thus far, been based upon the constraints organizations and donors disclosed and the policy environment in which adult education was minimized. There were also a number of processes INGOs and donors noted in selected documents, albeit not as constraints. For instance, the following measures could have served as constraints in adult education and accountability: a potential bias toward children and youth, minimal participation in curricula, limited decision-rights and ontological recognition structures.

##### Recognized

- Narrow commitments
- Grey areas
- Minimum thresholds
- Access

##### Unrecognized

- Potential bias toward children and youth
- Minimal participation in curriculum development
- Limited decision-rights
- Ontological recognition structures

Figure 4.10: Recognized and unrecognized constraints

Both the recognized and unrecognized constraints are listed in figure 4:10. The unrecognized constraints in particular, are important to note because they could have narrowed roles for adult refugees in the aid network and framed them as either unskilled or ineligible. Ineligible refugees in particular, may be denied an accountability relationship, because they are not recognized in donor-organization networks as beneficiaries. I describe the unrecognized constraints and the implications these constraints may have had upon downward accountability in the following sections.

#### **4.8.1 Potential bias toward children and youth**

Donors and organizations disclosed various constraints that limited access to beneficiary populations, humanitarian services and knowledge. These constraints, however, were not connected to a potential bias toward children and youth. Indeed, information in the Open Aid Search review was often child-focused and centered in a K-12 arena (for example, Islamic Relief, 2014a). In fact, the NRC noted, “young people are naturally the overwhelming majority of the education programmes” (2013, p. 36). Thus, the major objectives of and policies for INGO activities, openly regarded education and vocational training for youth as “natural,” without regard to family sustainability. As a consequence, the aid environment was either an unsuitable or ineligible arena for many adult learners. Moreover, donors and organizations disclosed scant information in relation to, grades/marks, attendance, test scores and certification for adult learners. Therefore, these rudimentary teaching and learning activities customary in education for the young were either not disclosed or available for adults. This constraint is especially important to underscore, because it positions adult education programs as “unnatural” and therefore, counterintuitive. This is disturbing. When programs are presumed to be

counterintuitive, refugee adults can not generate and share knowledge or exercise control and discretion in an educational setting. I examine this issue in the following section, with a focus upon participation in curriculum development.

#### **4.8.2 Minimal participation in curriculum development**

Participation in the development of curriculum is an important activity for refugees in part, because it evidences discretion over aid resources and influence in the generation and dissemination of knowledge. It is an accountability activity with few material and financial costs. However, INGOs and donors did not disclose this activity in their reports. For instance, JEN trained refugees to promote its hygiene messages in the camp and along with public school teachers, implement hygiene activities. While there were opportunities to influence the classroom activities in K-12 settings, JEN did not disclose refugees' input into the actual curriculum. Rather, JEN (Hamasa, 2013c) noted, "JEN trained teachers to give hygiene lessons to students using materials created by JEN." Thus, refugees were placed in the role of caregiver, where they helped JEN reach its targets. However, they were not brokers.

Additionally, the Government of Canada, (2014b), NRC (2014c) and Islamic Relief (2014d) described "training" activities for teachers. In most cases, however, they did not specify or disaggregate the number of refugee teachers in the beneficiary population or their inputs in the curriculum development process. Thus, in selected documents, refugees did not exercise much control or influence over strategy and resource generation. Indeed, knowledge was disseminated vertically from the organization to the refugee, who as a caregiver, transmitted information to the wider beneficiary group. However, participation for refugees and internally displaced persons can involve the process of curriculum development and issues such as certification and

accreditation. For instance, “refugee and IDP teachers and education experts should also be included in policy development related to accreditation and certification and have opportunities to use existing experience and capacity and develop their own policy materials” (Kirk, 2009, p. 25). In fact, the capacity of Syrian educators to increase the quality and impact of services has been noted (CARE, 2014). However, this role has not been solidified in the refugee vernacular. For example, there were no references to ‘adult learners’ and terms such as ‘trainee,’ ‘student’ and ‘instructor’ were rarely noted for refugee adults. Thus, refugees were selected for training. Refugees however, were not situated in the wider community of academics, practitioners and professionals. In the structure of teacher training, refugee adults were not situated as foremost, adult learners. In addition, there was scant evidence of the decision-rights either appropriate or customary to adult learners in educational settings.

### **4.8.3 Limited decision-rights**

Feedback was a regular component of interface, which led to regular enhancements in education for children. For instance, crafts, tailoring, electrical repair, welding and recycling courses were offered for youth, with subject changes every three months based upon “feedback, assessments and lessons learned” (NRC, 2014c, p. 89). Yet, there was scant information in selected documents, which evidenced decision-rights for refugee adults in relation to their courses and livelihood aspirations. Decision-rights were highlighted multiple times however, in regard to food/cash aid. According to the NRC, vouchers helped beneficiaries get the things they needed, “on their own terms” (2014a, p. 34). In the WFP program, “vouchers allow freedom of choice for the refugees” (2012, p. 16). The WFP also contended, “vouchers, rather than cash, can give women and girls a greater role in decisions, since they manage the household food purchases”

(2012, p. 16). In addition, Islamic Relief (2015) noted feedback from beneficiaries and focus group participants was utilized to modify program activities. In this instance, transportation fees were provided in order to help children get to school and a new “E-card payment system” was initiated to mitigate previous challenges in K-12 enrollment through rent assistance (Islamic Relief, 2015, p. 8).

Adult refugees were able to exercise a measure of decision-making power however, it was not related to their own learning and training needs. Rather, this power was afforded as consumption, to support the purchase of basic household items, pay rent and facilitate an increase in the enrollment and retention of child learners.

Indeed, INGOs exerted their power through securitization and correction education. For example, precautions were taken “to prevent copying” and “avoid [the] exchange or sale of vouchers” (WFP, 2012, p. 16). In addition, “sensitization and information sessions” were planned along with written communication products, in order to ensure refugees were aware of the foods they could purchase and the WFPs’ viewpoint on their entitlements (WFP, 2012, p. 16). The WFP did not divulge the reasons why food aid was or could be sold, such as to purchase heaters, blankets, medicine or other items, for which the refugee may have no other means to acquire (Olivius, 2013; World, Vision, 2013).

The opportunities given to refugees to make decisions, promoted their role as caregivers, yet limited their influence to program implementation – the part of the program that happens after major allocation decisions have been made. They were not for instance, taking part in food production, food cooperatives and bulk food acquisition. Rather, many of these opportunities were given to vulnerable Jordanians, including those in districts where large refugee communities were settled (WFP, 2013). Thus, while INGOs highlighted the ways they helped

refugees make their own decisions, little power was actually shared within this mechanism. Moreover, refugees were recognized as people for whom correction was needed. The structures in which recognition was enabled, are therefore critical areas for scholarship, because they justify compliance-oriented activities more than they enable accountability commitments.

#### **4.8.4 Ontological recognition structures**

Children are recognized as students in education in emergencies. The milieu in which they learn is a dominant focus of INGO discourse and financial resources. For example, high teacher-student ratios were problematized by the NRC (2014c). Indeed, the NRC maintained, that schools would be reconstructed and/or modified, “in areas with high levels of refugee settlement and with a high teacher to student ratios, so that education services may keep pace with the increasing number of children” (2014c, p. 84). Yet, INGOs and donors did not disclose endeavors to assess or remediate the classes and facilities in which adult learning was situated.

The milieu in K-12 education was so vital to the NRC that it noted these activities “will always be done in conjunction with the education programme” (2014c, p. 84). The child/learner role has been essential to this perspective. By contrast, the adult/learner role was deemphasized in open data, because aid reporting underscored the ontological frames of legal/illegal, registered/unregistered and eligible/ineligible.

The WFP claimed “Syrian refugees entering illegally are admitted into transit facilities” and “have restricted freedom of movement” (2012, p. 3). The WFP also targeted “refugees registered by UNHCR and/or identified by their partners” and “refugees awaiting registration and identified as vulnerable by agreed partners” (WFP, 2012, p. 11). A number of these refugees could be accepted into a subgroup for those persons who were especially vulnerable. For

instance, the WFP noted, “UNHCR has an on-going financial assistance programme operating through automatic teller machines for Iraqi refugees: this will also target 2,000 of the most vulnerable Syrians for their non-food needs” (2012, p. 8). As a result, refugees and most vulnerable refugees who were registered by agreed partners were eligible for WFP aid.

While it may be vital to establish rules and regulations, if recognition by registration is the singular method of access for services, refugees will be underserved. For example, the NRC conceded, “those that have not yet registered with UNHCR, are awaiting registration or have expired registration are at greatest risk of exploitation and major protection issues are increasingly coming to light” (2014a, p. 23, 24). Thus, it is important to underscore registration as an ontological recognition structure, because it is the “starting point” to access humanitarian aid (NRC, 2014c, p. 81). In fact, the WFP conceded “the number of displaced Iraqis who have returned to Iraq from Syria is undetermined, and no organization has identified them as in need of assistance thus far” (2012, p. 5).

Although organizations have recognized the vulnerability associated with the unregistered positionality, they have not explicitly problematized the requirement and prerequisite that refugees register to receive support. There are also contrasting processes of eligibility for registered refugees, thus while needs may remain severe, they may be eligible and ineligible according to the divergent criteria of myriad agencies. For example, the WFP claimed 14,000 refugees were noted as eligible for support by UNHCR and 35,000 refugees were eligible for support with the Jordan Red Crescent (JRC) and Jordanian Hashemite Charity Organization (JHCO) (2012, p. 4).

JHCO performed assessments through “household visits” (WFP, 2012, p. 11). Its assessments were utilized to determine if refugees qualified for services based in part, upon

family size and income. The WFP, however planned to rely upon a combination of “UNHCR guidance,” “market price surveillance,” “household surveys” and “food security monitoring” (2012, p. 10). Subsequently, aid was not delivered according to personal need, inasmuch as it was released through algorithms that engendered upward accountability.

Registration and its corresponding eligibility processes may limit downward accountability. For example, since organizations are often linked to accountability via their beneficiaries, refugees who are ineligible, illegal and/or unregistered, may not have access to a formal accountability relationship. They may be separate from the education customary to other adult learners because they do not have equal access to livelihoods programs and other services. This separation from education is alarming, because of INGO estimates in the wider discourse of large unregistered refugee populations. For instance, the *Regional Analysis of the Syria (RAS) conflict - Part B Host Countries*, “studies by multiple humanitarian and UN agencies suggest that between 15-30% of the refugees in Jordan may not be fully registered” (Strategic Needs Analysis Project, 2015, p. 17).

In sum, refugee adults may have had less access to education than children and youth beneficiaries, because the ontological recognition structures were a constraint to the accountability relationship. In addition, the facilities in which adult learners were situated may be neglected because the adult/learner role was so widely understated. Significantly, the open data focused disproportionately upon registration and eligibility, K-12 retention and cash/food aid. Adult refugees therefore, were not positioned as people who could generate or share knowledge. Indeed, in most instances, refugees were not framed as people who exercised discretion, power and control over their aid in settings where adult education and livelihoods

were promoted. The data disclosed in the Open Aid Search therefore, does not support or evidence accountability in adult education to the extent it could.

It is vital for INGOs and donors to assess the constraints to adult education and livelihoods. Indeed, Anderson (2004) asserted, “two issues in particular have come to the fore: how to ensure a certain level of quality and accountability in emergency education; and how to mainstream education as a priority humanitarian response.”

#### **4.9 NETWORK PERSPECTIVES, ROLES AND CONSTRAINTS**

Network perspectives are particularly important because through information flows, they foster an assessment of roles in the aid arena and the extent to which these roles could have minimized accountability activities. For instance, the concept of brokerage is a main component in network scholarship (Friedman & Podolny, 1992), referring to the individual(s) or organization(s) which provides linkages between groups through exchanges and in particular, information sharing. Brokers are particularly critical to organizations because they can recognize information gaps (Burt, 1997) that modify the structure of group relations. The structure is crucial because it may be a “manifestation of and constraint” upon all groups (Friedman & Podolny, 1992, p. 34). When the NRC and a consortium of NGOs developed ACAPS (NRC, 2014a; SIDA, 2014), they offered needs assessments and curricula to network members which decreased gaps in knowledge. Thus, other INGOs and donors benefited from these brokers (Vignola, McDaniels, & Scholz, 2013; Burt, 1997) because of the information flows that they directed in the aid arena. Yet the network was faced with a livelihoods crisis, cuts in financial support and narrow commitments in education for adult refugees in Jordan and no such broker emerged in the

selected documents for content analysis. Data remained dispersed, child-focused and compliance-centered. As a result, INGO and donor accountability commitments were not situated in the context of adult learning. Thus, the constraints described in section 4.7. were especially relevant because they either reduced their accountability activities or minimized their roles and responsibilities. Indeed, researchers can attend to the “advantages or constraints one has because of one’s position within the network” (Casciaro et al., 2015, p. 1165). Additionally, there is “extensive and compelling evidence that position within a network affects a person’s opportunities and constraints has given rise to investigation of how a person ends up in a given position” (Casciaro et al., 2015, p. 1166).

Examinations of accountability through network perspectives therefore, may be critical to developing best practices, because the roles, relationships and interdependencies that constrain activity can be disentangled (Galaskiewicz, 2007) – an otherwise challenging task in an analysis of dispersed and compliance-oriented information. In the following chapter, I extend the examination of beneficiary roles in the aid network, through INGO and donor education objectives.

## 5.0 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

In chapter four, five beneficiary roles were described. These roles included the professional, emissary, caregiver, industrial and most vulnerable refugee. In this chapter, I present the main objectives for education along with the activities INGOs and donors planned and/or implemented to fulfill these objectives. I categorize donors and organizations' objectives as: education for durable solutions, education for caregiving and child protection and education for social cohesion and conduct. These objectives were categorized based upon the direct and specific details donors and INGOs disclosed in the Open Aid Search, through the codes of access, compliance and outcomes.

Through the categorization of these objectives and a description of the subsequent activities, I analyzed refugees' roles in emergency education - relative to their learning and livelihoods priorities. In addition, I examine the platforms in which they could exercise a measure of control, influence or discretion. These two focal points are important benchmarks in accountability (The Sphere Project, 2014; HAP International, 2013). Thus, in this chapter, I present the results of the research, in relation to my second research question: If and to what extent the information donor agencies and INGOs disclosed through their new networks can be utilized to examine downward accountability through access, compliance and outcomes in humanitarian education programs for adult refugees?

The results suggest INGOs and donors evidenced their accountability commitments by enrolling registered and nonregistered refugees and beneficiaries in camps, urban and rural locations (Government of Canada, 2013e; Government of Canada, 2013h; Islamic Relief, 2013; WFP, 2013). They also leveraged myriad communication channels (Islamic Relief 2014b). Yet, feedback mechanisms and learning activities often evidenced the priorities of the host community and donors, more than the aspirations of adult refugee learners and skilled professionals. In fact, a main finding in the data, was the tendency for beneficiaries to be educated for others and not for themselves, with minimal platforms to exercise control or discretion in relation to their own learning needs.

I include INGO and donor education objectives in figure 5.1 below. In the following sections, I present the main programs that were planned or implemented in order to accomplish these objectives. Additionally, I will extend the examination of five beneficiary roles, in order to assess the level of accountability information in selected documents in relation to the forms of interface in which refugees were recognized.




Figure 5.1: Organizations and donors' education objectives

## 5.1 EDUCATION FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS

Durable solutions can incorporate resettlement, repatriation or integration. Resettlement is an opportunity for refugees to move from the country where s/he is seeking protection, onward to a different nation. Repatriation is qualified as the return of the refugee from the nation where s/he seeks asylum, to his/her country. In addition, integration is characterized by the long-term settlement in the nation where the refugee seeks asylum. (Amnesty International, 2012).

In selected documents, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (2014c) situated integration, repatriation and resettlement within the context of refugees' rights and access to legal information. In this context, the NRC described education as "a step to durable solutions" and a "long-term investment" (2014c, p. 82). Durable solutions were characterized as a challenging process in part, because many refugees were missing documentation and involved in tenant disputes. Refugees also lacked information. The NRC attempted to increase awareness of durable solutions among the refugee population and "deal with some of the more complex procedures required for refugee registration, identification and integration" (NRC, 2014b, p. 4).

Resettlement in particular, has been a complicated arena and a concern in aid discourse. For instance, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintained it provided for 14.4 million refugees of concern around the world in 2014. However, "less than one percent is submitted for resettlement" (UNHCR, 2015c). Indeed, UNHCR submitted a total of 103,890 resettlement applications in 2014. This total comprised 21,154 Syrian refugees and 11,778 Iraqi refugees. These applications related to refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and other nations. Thus, totals decreased when disaggregated according to country. In Jordan, UNHCR submitted 7,284 refugees for resettlement in 2014 (UNHCR, 2015d).

In terms of actual departures, UNHCR reported assisting in the resettlement of 73,008 refugees in 2014 (UNHCR, 2014a). In addition, 10,985 Iraqi refugees were included in this total (UNHCR, 2015d). Moreover, the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) estimated "around 10,000 Syrians departed" for resettlement in 2014 (Fischer & Hueck, 2015, p. 29). Less than half of this total, were comprised of departures from Jordan, though there were more than 600,000 registered refugees (Medair, 2015; UNHCR, UNICEF & WFP, 2014). Thus, resettlement departures can be conceptualized as exemplars of the narrow commitment outlined

in chapter 4. As so few refugees were able to depart for resettlement, host communities were obliged to accommodate more refugees than they may have otherwise and there have been arguments for an increased commitment (Baldoumas, Bassoul, Gorevan & Mosse, 2015; Hartberg, Bowen & Gorevan, 2015).

In the context of adult education, marginal support for resettlement amongst donor agencies has limited the focus of durable solutions education to integration and repatriation. Tyson (2014) was critical of this orientation. Indeed, Tyson claimed refugees in Jordan and other host nations would “likely struggle to obtain access to employment, healthcare, housing and education” because of strict regulatory environments and natural resource limitations (2014, p. 23). In Jordan, these limitations are so significant, that “integration will be unavailable as a durable solution to the vast majority of Syrian refugees” (Tyson, 2014, p. 24). Tyson also claimed the “minimal international response” and economic pressures in countries of asylum, led to an endorsement of repatriation (2014, p. 25). However, in selected documents, donors did not expect refugees to repatriate. For example, the World Food Programme (WFP) maintained Syrian refugees would not return “unless the security situation in Syria improves dramatically” (2012, p. 6). Thus, through the resistance to resettlement and integration, aid actors lamented the incompatibility of humanitarian principles and national policies (Amnesty International, 2015), because there were no durable solutions in the context in which Iraqi and Syrian refugees were situated. Indeed, refugees could not return home, were vulnerable and uninvited in Jordan and had few platforms available to go anywhere else. In this milieu, durable solutions programs included mine awareness sessions and the information, counselling and legal assistance (ICLA) program. I describe these programs in the following sections.

### 5.1.1 Mine awareness

Syrian refugees in particular, were targeted to prevent mine injuries pending a potential return. Adult learning therefore, was situated in the context of repatriation. For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross (2014) held awareness activities for refugees in Mafraq and northern communities centered upon mine awareness as well as the explosive remnants of war (ERW). According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (2014), more than 23,000 Syrian refugees participated in mine awareness sessions. In addition, refugees were afforded an emissary role, via a 4-day, train-the-trainer course. The course enrolled 15 refugees, in order to facilitate greater knowledge sharing about mine awareness within the community.

The Government of Canada (2013f) also planned to support an awareness program about mines, in conjunction with education and recreation events. Canada planned the campaign in order “to protect children.” The importance of mine awareness was underscored in part, (de Jong, Moorhouse, Plate, der Haar & Alpenidze, 2015; Australian Agency for International Development, 2009) because the effects of mines and ERWs are devastating, particularly for civilians. Yet, these activities were held based upon an expectation for repatriation that may not be fulfilled for many years. For instance, the Government of Canada (2015a) proclaimed, “the humanitarian situation in Syria continues to deteriorate as a result of the civil war and intensified violence in the country.” The social fabric has also been decimated, as indicated by the large-scale displacement, civilian death toll, civilian injuries and practice of torture (Oxfam, 2015; HelpAge International & Handicap International, 2014), which could dissuade returns in the short term. While there has been various trainings for Syrians to rebuild their communities when they return (USAID, 2013), it may be years before knowledge about mine awareness and other

sectors can be utilized in Syria. Mine awareness activities for Syrian refugees in Jordan therefore, may not encompass the information that can help them resolve issues while they are settled in the host community.

### **5.1.2 Information, counselling and legal assistance**

Information about the regulations in the host community and the frameworks in which protection from exploitation and abuse are upheld is often an unmet need. As a result, refugees may traverse grey areas where opportunities to access services and resolve issues are minimized.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) targeted refugees in camps and urban communities throughout Jordan (NRC, 2014b) particularly, “the most vulnerable refugees in host communities” (NRC, 2015, p. 6) for its information, counselling and legal assistance (ICLA) program. The ICLA program was administered in addition to a series of assessments and community mobilization efforts (NRC, 2014a; NRC, 2014b).

The ICLA program targeted from 150 to 1,200 beneficiaries (NRC, 2014c, p. 89) and was an important part of the NRC’s accountability evidence. For instance, the NRC claimed, “the initial target of the ICLA programme will be refugees residing in the Governorate of Irbid and will include a combination of registered and unregistered groups” (2014a, p. 24). Thus, the NRC afforded an accountability relationship to refugees who were not recognized as beneficiaries in the aid arena. These achievements notwithstanding, ICLA guidelines were also prohibitive. For instance, ICLA activities were focused upon dispute resolution in land, housing and property matters and support with identity documentation such as marriage certificates and civil identification. International and local frameworks were also illuminated to ensure refugees were aware of their rights concerning durable solutions, identity and status. These activities could

have encouraged refugees' integration, as they addressed vital and basic needs for shelter and protection. The provision of legal counselling and protection were also noted as critical interventions in the wider discourse (Medair, 2015; SDC, 2015). Yet, the NRC did not disclose activities centered upon refugees' right to work and obtain livelihoods in Jordan. Though livelihoods could resolve many refugee issues, it was not integrated into durable solutions education. Durable solutions education was therefore narrowed and less accountable to refugees. Indeed, there was scant evidence that adult refugees exercised control over durable solutions education for their livelihoods or leveraged ICLA resources to improve access to work in the formal sector. Thus, a main refugee priority was not addressed. In fact, the priorities of beneficiaries were not addressed in many contexts. For instance, Provan and Milward cautioned, "in the public sector, resources are often scarce, clients have multiple problems, service professionals are trained in narrow functional areas, and agencies maintain services that fit narrowly specified funding categories" (2001, p. 415). Unmet economic needs in host states however, are especially alarming. Indeed, in the wider aid community, donors and organizations have underscored the right to work and persistently unmet economic needs as conditions that foster human smuggling, early marriage, child labor and school dropouts (KAS, 2015; Mowjee, Fleming & Toft, 2015; Save the Children International, 2012). Thus, the vulnerability that results from inaccessible livelihoods, along with funding decreases for aid, has raised protection and legal concerns (KAS, 2015; Danish Refugee Council, 2014; CARE, 2014).

The ICLA program was highlighted as a mechanism to provide accurate and reliable information, which helped refugees arrive at "well-informed decisions" about durable solutions choices (NRC, 2014c, p. 84). Refugees however, were not targeted for what Keystone Accountability termed, "the substance of the discussion" (2009, p. 2), in regard to donor and

organizations' durable solutions strategy. For instance, refugees' decision rights around the criteria, mechanisms and thresholds for resettlement, repatriation and integration, were not reported. Indeed, refugees were not situated as people with discretion, influence or control – critical downward accountability indicators. Rather, in the Open Aid Search, they could learn about the policies which others established.

They were shut out of decision-making with network members. However, lateral discussions between and among refugees were promoted. As a result, refugees commiserated with one another about going home. For instance, the Japan Emergency NGO (JEN) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) created a magazine for Za'atari camp residents. Children and adults submitted nostalgic articles for publication and shared stories. In regard to one of the articles, JEN (Nagatsuka, 2014) surmised, “the name of the article is ‘Al Tarik’ or ‘The Road’ to symbolize the refugees’ journeys and convey that they will one day return to Syria.” Refugees were provided with a mechanism to communicate with one another, yet this form of interface was not in relation to policy dialogue. Other lateral communication platforms were also afforded refugees, in order to increase child protection in the host community. I describe these platforms in the following section.

## **5.2 EDUCATION FOR CAREGIVING AND CHILD PROTECTION**

Parents, teachers and coaches were enrolled in training, targeted for awareness campaigns and galvanized in committees in order to improve caregiving and increase child protection. These objectives were formed to reduce the rates of child labor and early marriage and address development goals for K-12 retention. For example, the NRC (2014c) and MADRE (2015)

claimed women and girls lived in insecure settings and girls in particular, may have to marry early in order to survive as refugees. In this setting, their rights may not be recognized and participation in the public sphere may be limited (Reclaim Childhood, 2015).

Education is also a challenge for unmarried refugee girls. Indeed, these girls may be kept at home as a protective response, because parents view their communities as unsafe places. Boys, may drop out of school to help the family increase income or because they can not overcome the myriad educational delays and barriers which developed in their displacement. There are also administrative rules and procedures that restrict enrollment and negative attitudes toward refugees that discourage attendance (Islamic Relief, 2014d). Many refugee children also take on adult responsibilities or are simply persuaded not to attend public schools. These coping mechanisms complicate the efforts of INGOs and donors to uphold international guidelines (INEE, 2014) for education.

Retention has also been a main challenge for schools with refugee students. Steady growth in the refugee population, along with infrequent attendance, has cultivated a fluid environment in public schools. This challenge has complicated estimations of refugee children and planning for remedial programs based upon the total number of dropouts. As a result, there are contradictory and/or outdated figures in INGO reports. For instance in selected documents, JEN claimed there were 29,000 refugee children in Jordanian schools (Hamasaka, 2013c). The NRC asserted, there were more than 730,000 Syrian refugee children out of school in the region and “Jordan has managed to enrol 5 per cent of Syrian children into public school” (2014b, p. 3). In the aid discourse, however, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) claimed there were 215,000 Syrian students in Jordan (2015, p. 1) and the “out-of-school number declined with over

50% children enrolled in formal education” (2015, p. 5). Thus, more than 100,000 refugee children were enrolled in school.

These achievements notwithstanding, education for refugee children continued to be a main challenge. Although the NRC posited, education is the “future security” of the person and of the larger society, the INGO also lamented, “education is often seen as a luxury in the time of crisis” (2014c, p. 82). Thus, while parents may aspire to educate their children, severe economic conditions and poor human security may limit their learning opportunities. It is important to underscore this challenge, because the majority of refugees are not expected to resettle or repatriate in the short-term. The scale of this education crisis and the prevalence of child labor and early marriage are indeed critical issues in the host community INGOs and donors in the aid network have organized to resolve (Adams & Starling, 2016; London 2016 Conference Members, 2015).

The child/learner role was therefore affirmed in INGO and donor objectives. In selected documents, the pedagogical methods, operational capacity and community supports indicated for academic achievement were highly prioritized. For instance, the NRC argued schools were overcrowded and, “teachers are not trained in classroom management for such high numbers nor are they able to deal with the psycho-social needs of children escaping conflict” (2014a, p. 24). Schools also lacked the capacity to address the basic hygiene needs of the local population. The addition of Syrian students in public schools, underscored structural deficiencies and added to public health concerns. Indeed, JEN (Hamasa, 2013c) noted, “as schools near the border exceed their capacity, JEN has found that the current water, sanitation, and hygiene facilities in many of these schools are inadequate.” Thus, the NGO planned hygiene education for refugees in schools, camps and in local communities (Hamasa, 2013a). In fact, refugee children

encountered unsanitary settings at home and in school (Hamasaka, 2014b), which alarmed donors and INGOs. For instance, JEN (Hamasaka, 2014c) established its education program to “decrease illnesses associated with poor hygiene.” In the wider literature, INGOs disclosed activities that provided critical health and preventative medical care to refugees with few resources in Jordan. These services included primary and secondary care, sanitation and hygiene interventions (Kenny, 2015; UNHCR, 2013b; Oxfam, 2013) alongside multilateral efforts to address the concerns of donors about communicable disease (CDC, 2015; International Development Committee, House of Commons, 2015; Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade & AusAid, 2015). The data in selected documents and the wider literature therefore confirms this categorization of an INGO-donor education objective.

In the next sections, I describe the training parents, teachers and coaches were afforded in caregiving and child protection. INGO training encompassed hygiene awareness, teacher training and sports, equality and media. Thus, these areas of specialization are the activities upon which the following sections are presented.

### **5.2.1 Hygiene awareness**

INGOs and donors recognized that refugee adults were central to remediating poor hygiene conditions in camps, urban areas and public schools (Government of Canada, 2015e). Thus, they were beneficiaries in INGO hygiene awareness, education and training programs. However, the information generated and disseminated in these programs was controlled by INGOs and donors and disproportionately centered upon children and youth. Downward accountability in hygiene awareness therefore, was limited for adult refugees. In this section, I describe the hygiene

awareness activities and the direction, form and control over information which they afforded refugees.

The Government of Canada disclosed strategies in support of regional training in gender based violence (Government of Canada, 2015e) and child protection that targeted 120 men and women in Jordan (Government of Canada, 2013a). Canada also integrated safety, protection and hygiene messages through promotions, training and interface with “child protection committees” (Government of Canada, 2014f; Government of Canada, 2014e; Government of Canada, 2013a). Aid was also planned through cash support to 450 refugee parents in order to increase K-12 enrollment (Government of Canada, 2014e). These activities targeted more than 70,000 refugee parents, local citizens, students and community members, including more than 200 teachers. Canada however, did not always list totals for refugee adults in teacher training activities or disaggregate the refugees in the larger regional and local beneficiary community in which they were situated. Canada did not report academic achievements in regard to activities such as the teacher and parent training. While the refugee caregiver role was integral to child protection objectives, the training which undergirded this role was deemphasized.

JEN rehabilitated public schools in Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa and established a magazine in Za’atari camp (Nagatuska, 2014; Hamasaka, 2013c). The magazine served as a vehicle for “communication between districts” in the refugee camp and a mechanism for “Syrian refugees to showcase their creativity and unique stories” (Nagatsuka, 2014). By mid-2014, the magazine was distributed to 200,000 homes and included messaging on healthy behaviors that JEN promoted with partners. Articles were written by children and adult refugees, including the “hygiene promoters” (Nagatsuka, 2014). Though Jordanian personnel were charged with performing coordination tasks and editing, JEN noted it hoped to offer refugees an opportunity to manage

the “magazine on their own,” beginning with training in journalism and other areas (Nagatsuka, 2014).

In addition, JEN (JEN, 2015; Hamasaka, 2014d; Hamasaka, 2013d) planned to increase awareness and promote healthy behaviors via “hygiene promotion” (Hamasaka, 2014b; Hamasaka, 2014a; Hamasaka, 2013b) “hygiene education,” as well as the distribution of supplies and the installation of “sustainable water sanitation facilities” (JEN, 2015). Refugee women volunteered with the program as “hygiene promoters” and facilitated awareness sessions (Hamasaka, 2015b). Moreover, community mobilizers (Hamasaka, 2014a) conducted household visits to support JEN’s program goals. JEN also established an emergency hotline, to encourage reports of unsanitary or harmful conditions from flooding.

These programs responded to vital needs in health and hygiene. The magazine and hotline especially, were likely important communication channels. However, JEN did not disclose efforts to use the hotline for purposes other than the identification of flooded areas. In addition, there were no indications that the magazine was leveraged to deliver program information from refugees to donors and organizations, vote on various camp issues or recommend specific program adjustments. Avenues to exercise a measure of control or ownership, were relegated to story-telling, rather than to areas such as coordination and program evaluation. It is also important to note refugee hygiene promoters operated in the field. JEN did not disclose any opportunities or strategies to target refugees for higher-level positions. Thus, as a hygiene promoter and participant in hygiene education, refugee adults were afforded roles as caregivers and emissaries. These roles were central to the promotion of behavior change, particularly for children and youth. Caregiver and emissary roles however, were situated in a

vertical information and communication structure that minimized evidence of downward accountability.

### **5.2.2 Teacher training**

In order to respond to the increase in the refugee student population, INGOs and donors planned to train teachers and school administrators (Hamasa, 2014a). The training was a vital component of their education in emergencies portfolio. However, the certification of this professional development and/or continuing education platform, was not disclosed and the numbers of beneficiaries who completed the program were not often disaggregated. Scholars may deem program evaluation as therefore more complicated, because it is difficult to estimate the access provided to refugees or the impact of the training for their employability. The training was also framed as a K-12 imperative. This context overshadowed the livelihoods aspirations of refugee parents and educators, rather than promote K-12 goals in tandem with adult education and livelihoods. In this section, I describe the teacher training platform and its relation to refugees' livelihoods aspirations.

The NRC aimed to raise the number of “children into local schools” and improve the quality of teaching (2014c, p. 83). Its targets for adult education included 900 youth, 20 teachers and school managers. JEN (Hamasa, 2014a; Hamasa, 2013b; Hamasa, 2013c) disclosed teacher training in relation to its hygiene education portfolio. For instance, JEN claimed its hygiene promoters were “active in conducting hygiene education sessions for parents and teachers of school children” (Hamasa, 2014d). There was also frequent collaboration between hygiene promoters and K-12 teachers. For example, JEN (Hamasa, 2014a) asserted, “the contents of the student sessions were developed by sharing various education methods between

JEN's hygiene promoters and the teachers.” In addition to training, hygiene promoters “organized focus groups with adults” to discuss ways to limit water consumption (Hamasaka, 2014c).

The Government of Canada planned to increase “protection for children and caregivers” and facilitate “reduced vulnerability” (Government of Canada, 2014b). Activities were supported in particular, to “educate and normalize the lives of conflict-affected children and their families” (Government of Canada, 2014e; Government of Canada, 2014f). Thus, a 2014 program (Government of Canada, 2014b) included the training of 500 teachers in several host countries with large Syrian refugee communities. In addition, 10,800 inexperienced teachers in Jordan were targeted for pre-service training activities (Government of Canada, 2015d). More than 1,000 school managers were also targeted, to prepare for roles as teacher mentors and coaches. There were also additional efforts to improve hygiene (Government of Canada, 2015c), such as “capacity building on hygiene practices for school health committees” as well as children, teachers and caregivers.

The teacher training activities may have provided valuable opportunities for trainees to reflect upon and improve their teaching practices. Cooperation between refugee hygiene promoters and teachers, likely helped to ensure standard hygiene messages in the camp and public schools. The training of school managers along with teachers and parents demonstrated donors and organizations’ commitment to improve academic outcomes. Notably, they have found ways to promote healthy behaviors in the classroom and in so doing, leverage existing resources to improve hygiene standards. However, donors and organizations did not disclose the percentage of refugee teachers, supervisors and managers in the targeted K-12 schools. This information gap is significant. For instance, if there were no refugees working in public schools,

then refugee adults would have participated in these activities as emissaries and caregivers but not professionals and academics. In addition, teacher training was explicitly framed as an effort to support the retention of refugee children, improvement of hygiene standards and achievement of national education reform objectives. The teacher training was not presented as a livelihood activity or as a step toward promotion. Teachers were situated as school personnel who required donor and organizations' support to become qualified and professional. Teachers however, may not have been provided with the certification that would have framed the training as a professional opportunity. As a result, the access to and quality of information is limited because refugees adults were presented as people with either no prior professional training or no pathway to improve their livelihoods.

### **5.2.3 Sports, equality and media**

Sport, physical activity and play were also integrated into the INGO and donor education in emergencies portfolio (Reclaim Childhood, 2015). Adults were targeted for training as coaches and teachers to leverage sport to promote K-12 education objectives. The coach training was situated as a livelihood opportunity, however there was no disclosure of adult academic achievements, certificates or retention data for refugee beneficiaries. In this section, I describe the teacher and coach training, the livelihoods opportunities it afforded and through comparative analysis, examine the implications for downward accountability.

Islamic Relief met with several organizations to examine the feasibility of incorporating sport into its K-12 retention project (Islamic Relief, 2014c). In addition, the Government of Canada planned to increase the capacity of Jordan's education sector and address the psychosocial needs of refugee children and youth in part, through sport and recreational activities

(Government of Canada, 2014g; Government of Canada, 2014h). Canada planned to increase the skills of 1,575 teachers and coaches through “learner-centered and participatory practices” and the “sport for development model” (Government of Canada, 2014h). Coaches were also tasked with leading life skills and activities that increase youth employability, along with community projects (Government of Canada, 2014g).

The sport for development and related sport models have been a significant part of the aid discourse in support of refugee children and youth (Adidas Group, 2015; Dudfield, 2014). Sport for development and related sport models utilize play, recreation and sport competition, to accomplish development objectives in areas such as education and health (Comic Relief, 2013a; Crabbe, 2012). The models have been a part of gender programs, life skills, social cohesion and employability activities for refugees (ANERA, 2014; Comic Relief, 2013b). In addition, sports have been utilized to promote sustainable development, mine awareness and provide relief aid (FIFA, 2015; Warshaw, 2014). In Jordan, refugee youth have enrolled in sport programs in Zaatari camp (UNHCR, 2013a). In addition, in 2014, the United Nations started an annual observance to solidify sport for development in peacebuilding (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015).

Sport was also a gender-based activity in the programs planned by Reclaim Childhood (2015). For instance, in selected documents, Reclaim Childhood claimed women are treated like “secondary citizens with limited rights” and women and girls are restricted by cultural traditions which determine their ‘place’ in the labor market and participation in sport. Thus, a sports program was established through after school activities. The program also integrated life skills and promoted women’s participation in the public sphere. For instance, Reclaim Childhood (2015) maintained, “by participating in RC’s regular basketball and soccer leagues, these girls

learn that equality, like sports, should be a right for all.” The project targeted 500 refugee female players and 15 female coaches. In addition, coaching was characterized as both a training and a livelihoods opportunity. According to Reclaim Childhood (2015), the project would “train and hire” women from the community. The project also provided a “stable income and crucial employment means for young women as coaches” and a platform for girls to develop “the confidence and drive needed to challenge society’s boundaries, shape their own identities and achieve their goals” (Reclaim Childhood, 2015).

Significantly, the training programs supported by Canada and Reclaim Childhood were noted as a participatory mechanism (Reclaim Childhood, 2015; Government of Canada, 2014g). For instance, the community projects completed by coaches and youth were underscored as interventions that would “bring value to local communities and build social capital” (Government of Canada, 2014g). Indeed, Reclaim Childhood (2015) also contended, “this project’s positive impact is sustained through our strong relationships with participants’ extended families, and local investment in everyone - from bus drivers to home cooks.” However, donors and organizations did not disclose if any refugees were involved as coaches. For example, Reclaim Childhood referred to its participants as “local young women,” which could connote the targeting of Jordanians (Reclaim Childhood, 2015). In addition, as in the teacher training activities, donors and organizations focused upon learning outcomes for children and youth. Though there were adult training sessions in these activities, donors and organizations consistently omitted references to their learning outcomes, including retention rates. The quality of the training the adult learners received was completely deemphasized as though it was a remote, unrelated factor in the subsequent performance of the teacher/coach role.

It is also important to question the framing of recreation as a mechanism to change the perceived deficiencies in the host community. While the right to play along with access limitations in sport and recreation can be highlighted, it can be argued that women should have opportunities to work or play because they enjoy doing so. Indeed, women and girls may not be involved in sports to redefine cultural norms and no assumptions should be made about their political inclinations. There is also an undercurrent of ‘ownership’ that donors and organizations endorse selectively. In this context, latitude was provided to challenge other society’s boundaries (Reclaim Childhood, 2015), to exchange information laterally (Nagatsuka, 2014) and to package/deliver aid supplies (Hamasaka, 2014d). Ownership was far less acceptable, in beneficiaries’ [mis]use of food/cash vouchers (WFP, 2013; WFP, 2012). Ownership was not reported in curriculum development in the context of adult learning and livelihoods (Hamasaka, 2013c). It is important to explore this issue. Anfara, Brown, & Mangione advised data analysis involves perceptiveness “to subtle undercurrents of social life” (2002, p. 31). I will thusly explore the issue of ownership in more detail, through the Islamic Relief K-12 enrollment project.

Islamic Relief implemented its education program in Irbid, engaging both students and parents (2014d). Activities were in support of enrollment increases for children and greater acceptance of child safety standards in the larger refugee community. Cash assistance and awareness activities on child-safety were also either planned or conducted.

Syrian refugees were given positions in the performance of household assessments (Islamic Relief, 2014c). The Islamic Relief posited, members of the refugee community might be the most appropriate persons to describe the project to refugee parents and present the most compelling argument for their children’s return to school. Thus, these caregivers were necessary

because they had access to the community and could discuss education from a culturally sensitive perspective (Islamic Relief, 2014d). Islamic Relief also conducted outreach through radio programs, which detailed the location, aim and criteria for enrollment.

The integration of media in its outreach could have improved accountability to beneficiaries, because it provided an additional access point to information (UNESCO 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2013). For instance, the wider discourse provides examples of other radio programs for refugees that were implemented in Jordan (UNESCO, 2014; Quintanilla, 2012). In many places, radio has been an important part of making information to refugees more accessible (Internews, 2016) and through integrating social media and mobile software, donors and organizations could augment outreach and promote greater engagement (Hilhorst, 2015; Yesayan, 2014) in their programs and awareness activities. For instance, media has been a part of outreach in the area of rights/protection for women and girls (Norwegian Church Aid, 2013). Yet, this project's parameters can also be questioned. For instance, its cash assistance for rent was available as a condition, based upon parents' capacity to ensure their children's attendance (Islamic Relief, 2014b). In addition, the cash payment was provided directly to the building owner rather than the refugee. (Islamic Relief, 2013). This action was a part of a system of procedures and supervision that the Islamic Relief reported to prevent the misuse of its aid (Islamic Relief, 2014c). Subsequently, refugees were given latitude to own and transmit the concept of K-12 retention. They were not however, allowed ownership over their own aid. Power was subsequently asymmetrical and decision-rights were limited. As a consequence, the program was less accountable to beneficiaries. In fact, Hilhorst (2015) posited, accountability is more than feedback and transparency. In addition, concern should be given to the power differential, which can make aid more or less effective. Thus, while Islamic Relief

held meetings to gather feedback and made subsequent modifications in the forms of payment, its conditional cash to building owners was upheld (Islamic Relief, 2015). Accountability actions could involve greater ownership of food or cash support in part, via unconditional cash programs and allocations directly to refugees.

In Lebanon for instance, the International Rescue Committee implemented a cash assistance program for Syrian refugees. In this program, beneficiaries handled aid directly through ATM cards. Though there was some spending on unintended items such as meals, researchers did not identify any evidence of corruption or malfeasance. Significantly, they reported increases in K-12 enrollment and decreased rates of child labor for refugees who controlled their own aid (Lehmann & Masterson, 2014). Thus, apprehension around direct refugee cash support may be unmerited.

### **5.3 EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL COHESION AND CONDUCT**

The WFP estimated Syrian refugees comprised 10% of the Jordanian population. Their presence has strained Jordan's infrastructure and led to tensions with locals over public services, jobs and environmental resources. In order to "contribute to social cohesion" (WFP, 2013, p. 2), the WFP planned a series of livelihoods activities for vulnerable Jordanians. Food support was also intended for refugees, whom the WFP claimed were practicing "negative coping strategies" (WFP, 2012, p. 2).

The Government of Canada (2014d) concurred and planned an "economic development and social cohesion" program. The program was implemented in communities where large refugee populations had settled and according to Canada, encountered subsequent increases in

poverty, unemployment, gender-based violence and labor competition. Therefore, donors and organizations endeavored to leverage education platforms, to promote social cohesion and positive coping strategies/conduct.

This objective is a major theme in the wider discourse on Iraqi and Syrian refugees in Jordan (Guay, 2015; USAID, 2015a; CARE, 2014; DFID, 2014). For instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is developing social cohesion programs across several Arab States. UNDP (2014) indicated, “deliberations also underlined the critical role of education and the media in fostering social connectedness and countering divisiveness, polarization and sectarianism, all of which are symptomatic of uncertainty that prevails at times of transition.” Social Cohesion was also a main objective of the Danish Refugee Council’s (2015) programs in Jordan, including livelihoods for displacement-affected communities. The Department of International Development (DFID) as well as the United States, Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) funded these interventions. This category was reported in selected documents and aid literature, as an integral objective for IATI members and non-members.

Data in relation to outcomes and impact in this area however, is limited. For instance, livelihoods programs were planned (WFP, 2013) yet, they were distributed to locals and accessible for small refugee beneficiary cohorts (Hamasaka, 2015c). The density in the beneficiary population and the focus on perceived negative behaviors, may have decreased the livelihood aid accessible to refugees in need and subsequently, the evidence of downward accountability.

First, I will describe the livelihoods activities planned through microfinance and food aid and the implications for downward accountability, via sensitization education and the decision-

rights refugees were afforded. Next, I will present the repurposing training and conclude the chapter by assessing the main achievements in downward accountability and the accomplishments INGOs and donors did not disclose.

### **5.3.1 Micro-finance and food aid**

The Government of Canada (2014d) planned promote social cohesion through income-generation. Through cooperation with community-based organizations (CBOs) and through community-wide activities, Canada intended to provide vocational training and “micro-credit loans.” It also noted a cash transfer strategy for Jordanian beneficiaries. Canada targeted more than 15,000 Syrian and Jordanian beneficiaries. Although Canada promoted interaction on a large scale, its beneficiary totals were not disaggregated. The impact of its aid for refugees was therefore more difficult to assess.

The WFP planned food aid to “protect livelihoods and help prevent the depletion of assets” for the most vulnerable (WFP, 2012, p. 2). The WFP assistance was focused upon “hot meals” and “food vouchers” (2012, p. 10). The WFP planned to provide vouchers to 35,000 refugees through a rapid emergency operation, then increase support to 70,000 refugees within a six month timeframe (WFP, 2012, p. 12). No livelihoods training was reported for adult refugees. In order to prevent the sale of vouchers or other forms of noncompliance such as exchange, the WFP maintained it would coordinate with partners to, “conduct sensitization and information sessions for refugees at the main voucher distribution centres” (2012, p. 16). Refugees therefore, had access to correction rather than livelihoods education in this activity.

The WFP also implemented activities to “enable the host communities to continue to support refugees” (2013, p. 2) Activities included food vouchers/cash transfers, “food for assets”

and “food assistance for training” (WFP, 2013, p. 10, 11). Training targeted Jordanian beneficiaries and in particular, provided a role for industrials and the most vulnerable. Indeed, the training was anticipated in the area of forestry, water management and farming. Efforts were also planned to introduce “land reclamation,” which through complementarity with ministry-led interventions, could promote “kitchen gardening” vegetable, olive and alfalfa farming and improve livestock and dairy operations (WFP, 2013, p. 11). Many of these opportunities could be seasonal and labor intensive, attracting more males and youth. The WFP therefore, planned to enroll women by “including preferential access for vulnerable female-headed households” (2013, p. 11). For the “most vulnerable” households in urban areas, a nine-month suite of activities in road maintenance and sanitation was planned. The WFP claimed other vocational training options could be supported in keeping with “market demand” (2013, p. 11). These activities involved urban and rural communities.

Through the food aid and food training activities, the WFP disclosed several measures that could have increased access to aid and accountability for beneficiaries. The WFP’s measures however, were limited by a series of corresponding restrictions. For instance, registration for its program included beneficiaries from government agencies and NGOs (WFP, 2013). Local participants in specific community projects could also be self-targeted. It was critical to include self-targeted participants to ensure people in need were not underserved. In addition, the WFP provided cash through a platform “made available to beneficiaries without necessarily opening an account” (WFP, 2013, p. 17). Yet, the aim of the program was to respond to “short-term food needs” (WFP, 2013, p. 10). It was also organized to “generate short-term income” (WFP, 2013, p. 11). Moreover, the WFP advised the “daily wage rate will be below the labour market wage” and the number of working days for beneficiaries was between only 8 and 90 per year (WFP,

2013, p. 13, 15). This limited time period may not have decreased their vulnerability over the long-term.

In addition, participation in evaluation has been noted as a main activity in accountability practices with beneficiaries in Jordan (Danish Refugee Council, 2015). However, the WFP claimed it will “establish accountability measures through participatory assessments during targeting and project implementation” (2013, p. 18). In regard to female beneficiaries, the WFP planned to “include them in project implementation to enhance their participation” (2013, p. 16). Participation in evaluation however, was planned for “technical experts” or a “self-evaluation” with other organizations (WFP, 2013, p. 17, 18). Therefore, program evaluation was not reported as a component for which beneficiaries were given access. Best practices and lessons learned may have therefore, been limited to the donor perspective. There were also a suite of corrective actions that could have minimized decision-rights. For instance, the WFP planned a “close consultation” with “community representatives” and “community-based organizations” in order to define specific activities for its program (2013, p. 11). Relations with its beneficiaries however, were largely centered upon sensitization (WFP, 2013; WFP, 2012).

For instance, the WFP reported plans to conduct “gender sensitization training” to ensure beneficiaries complied with the Project’s gender targets (WFP, 2013, p. 16). The WFP also planned to conduct “sensitization of beneficiaries on the importance of spending money on a balanced diet” and “sensitisation of the involved communities” pending program challenges in targeting and retention (2013, p. 18). A large part of the INGO-beneficiary interface was subsequently generated through correction or conduct education. The structure of sensitization was also advice-giving - a vertical form of interface. For instance, Friedman & Podolny (1992, p.

44) claimed, “trust relations tend to be reciprocal, whereas, advice relations tend to be asymmetrical.”

It is important to examine this setting in part, because it did not account for the process of reasoning refugees and other beneficiaries may have completed. For instance, Zaman asserted, refugees “interpret, re-interpret, and internalise continually their experiences while simultaneously acting on those experiences in order to access material and non-material resources” (2012, s126). Therefore, quick one-dimensional constructions of refugees as passive and unaware or alternatively, correctable, oversimplifies a complicated response to an extreme circumstance.

### **5.3.2 Repurposing**

JEN (Hamasa, 2015c) claimed, Syrian refugee women wanted to use their free time in a manner that made them feel “beneficial and useful.” In addition, JEN was disheartened by the limited opportunities for refugees to become creative and fulfilled. Thus, JEN initiated a recycling program with 30 refugee women. The program was derived from JEN’s observation of refugee women, who “know that they are very much productive human beings” (Hamasa, 2015c). To address refugees’ need to feel useful, the program promoted resource conservation via sewing carpets and bags with old textiles. The women could later use the finished products to wear as clothing or decorate their living areas. While JEN noted their interests in selling the items, particularly outside the camp, the project was not yet supportive of their need to be self-reliant. However, while this program was centered upon an industrial role, it may have been more accountable to beneficiaries because it placed more emphasis upon the refugees’ need to work than their need to be corrected. It was also one of the few activities disclosed in selected

documents that was not based upon a perceived deficit. Significantly, JEN (Hamasaka, 2015c) recognized the limitations in the refugees' environment and how the limitations had minimized the quality of refugees' lives. In so doing, refugees were not associated with misconduct or costs to others, insomuch as they were linked with an opportunity to activate skills.

## **5.4 ACCOUNTABILITY TO REFUGEES**

In response to the research question, there is evidence of accountability in selected documents, particularly in regard to access, compliance and outcomes. In the following sections, I examine the main downward accountability accomplishments disclosed in selected documents and the guidelines in accountability upon which no achievements were disclosed.

### **5.4.1 Main accomplishments**

INGOs and donor agencies disclosed information in relation to their accountability efforts. Significantly, accountability was often presented as a main objective and there were important achievements. Indeed, it is worth noting that donors planned to conduct awareness activities, in order to increase access to services for refugees (Government of Canada, 2015g). Donors and organizations also cultivated "integrated support networks" among Jordanian and refugee populations (Government of Canada, 2015g). In addition, the WFP wanted aid recipients to endorse its goals for gender participation. Thus, there was a concerted effort to link beneficiaries to service providers and simultaneously, establish an inclusive community.

There were also accountability achievements regarding ownership. JEN (Hamasa, 2014d) utilized the services of industrial refugees, “Syrian laborers, mostly vulnerable women” in Azraq camp, to help prepare packages of winter clothes for residents. In Zaatari camp, JEN also helped refugees keep warm in the winter. Indeed, JEN (Hamasa, 2014a) advised, “several meetings with the community groups in each district in the camp were held in order to increase the feeling of ownership of the distribution process and take responsibility in building their community.” In addition, “JEN has incorporated refugees in the target area into every step of distribution” (Hamasa, 2014a).

Other accountability mechanisms included plans for a hotline, suggestion boxes, brochures (Hamasa, 2014a; Islamic Relief, 2013) and radio broadcasts (Islamic Relief, 2014d). The Islamic Relief (2013) and WFP also planned to hold community meetings and/or conduct participatory assessments. Indeed, the WFP claimed, “particular attention will be paid to ensure that women and disadvantaged groups are aware that they are able to share feedback without negative consequences” (2013, p. 18).

Donors and organizations also integrated technology into their interventions. For instance, INGOs leveraged technology to modify their cash and/or food vouchers and utilized a database to register (Islamic Relief, 2014d; WFP, 2013) and refer refugees for services. These actions could have been integral components of accountability because within these platforms, refugees could be informed of their rights and responsibilities and the objectives of the aid interventions for which they might be eligible. These platforms also facilitated the delivery of refugee feedback and complaints.

#### **5.4.2 Increasing downward accountability**

While there were accomplishments in downward accountability for which INGOs and donors described in detail, there were also areas for which downward accountability activities were not disclosed. For instance, donors and INGO were situated within a wide network of actors committed to accountability frameworks (for example, NRC, 2014c; Sida 2014). However, they rarely described their aid activities in relation to these frameworks in the Open Aid Search (for example, The Sphere Project, 2014; INEE, 2014; HAP International, 2013).

Assessments, surveys, evaluations and feedback mechanisms were noted (Islamic Relief, 2014d; Hamasaka, 2014a). Actual reports of interviews, feedback from the hotline and radio program however, were not included in their documents. Therefore, more outcome information is needed to address this gap.

Moreover, because the objectives for training and livelihoods were centered upon durable solutions, caregiving and child protection and social cohesion and conduct, closing the information gap in adult education necessitated more information about those activities that corresponded to refugees' education and livelihoods priorities. For instance, an unspecified number of refugees were given an opportunity to work for organizations in support of their humanitarian programs. There was no evidence however, of external direct-hire opportunities. Since many of these programs were short-term, the positions refugees were given in the field, would presumably expire along with the program. Other income-generating opportunities may have been accessible, yet they were not reported or reported with totals that included refugees and beneficiaries in the host community. Thus, while the refugee may have increased his/her employability, it is difficult to assess long-term self-reliance because data was either not disaggregated or situated within a temporary program.

In addition, the roles afforded refugee adults were dissimilar to the roles customary to other adult learners. For example, donors and organizations did not disclose activities that measured adult learning, tracked matriculation or certified learning achievements. Requalification and accreditation data were not reported. The disclosure of this data in the Open Aid Search, can be a part of INGO and donor activities to increase the access to and quality of aid information. In addition, refugee adults were educated in an aid environment constructed to resolve or correct, rather than to enlighten or evolve. Indeed, refugees were not presented as people entering humanitarian programs with technical backgrounds. Rather, they were often presented as people for whom training was needed either to support vulnerable children or decrease tensions with locals. Refugees were also characterized as people who could learn how to use aid according to organizations' expectations and endorse healthy behaviors while durable solutions were being identified. As a result, the rationality associated with education (Blaney, 2002) is far less prominent in these documents and refugees were presented as unskilled labor with bad behaviors. Therefore, refugees' livelihood priorities and training needs were deemphasized and as a result, donors and organizations were less accountable. This insight was a primary outcome of the content analysis and fills a gap in the literature.

In the following chapter, I present the main conclusions from this study and incorporate the gaps in accountability disclosure listed above, in a description of policy recommendations.

## 6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Through literature review and content analysis, the data INGOs and donors disclosed evidenced a selective form of downward accountability in an extreme and resource-poor operating environment. This form of accountability was least relevant to skilled and professional refugees. Education was multi-sectoral, accessible in rural and urban areas and in some instances, available to both registered and unregistered people in need. However, the international response to displacement is the product of wider political and economic state policies. In addition, it is an outcome of imperatives centered upon reducing political and economic threats. Coordination was minimized in part, because adult refugees were constructed as inconvenient, threats and costs and their training and livelihoods needs were overshadowed by other priorities. Emergency education and livelihoods were subsequently, limited and counterintuitive. Significantly, the traditional evidence of achievement associated with adult learning, such as grades, test scores and certification, was not a part of the information in selected documents. Therefore, the environment INGOs and donors constructed was not comparable to the setting provided to citizens and locals in the host community. Thus, adult refugees are not peers. They are “others.”

In this chapter, I present the conclusions of these research methods in regard to the codes of access, compliance and outcomes. I also underscore gaps in information that were not noted in selected documents and offer policy recommendations.

## 6.1 DATA IN RELATION TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The aim of this study was to examine access to and quality of information about humanitarian education programs for refugees in Jordan. The study was conducted through a content analysis, informed by the conceptual framework of downward accountability and via network perspectives. This section is centered upon the implications from the content analysis, related to access, compliance and outcomes.

The findings are significant in part for at least two reasons. First, this study focuses upon livelihoods activities in multiple sectors and for adult refugees. It encompasses the views and reports of donors and INGOs active in an entire country. Second, this study underscores access, compliance and outcomes as critical areas of accountability to refugee adults, in a setting that is mostly urban and noncamp.

Access, retention and outcomes such as job placement, are areas where aid scholars have problematized a lack of accountability to underrepresented students in educational institutions (Oketch, McCowan & Schendel, 2014; Jacob, Lee, Wehrem, Gokbel, Dumba & Lu, 2013). Retention rates for post-secondary education, vocational training (Hadfield, 2003; Belbin & Belbin, 1972) and resettlement programs (Feuerherm, 2013; Giese, 2010; Halpern, 2008) have also been relevant foci of interest, with regard to adult literacy, language acquisition, health and health education. Additionally, access to adult education and livelihoods for refugees (Harb & Saab, 2014; Dineen, 2013) certification (Kirk, 2009) and accreditation (Talbot, 2013) have been noted in aid settings and aid policy dialogue as necessary improvements. Yet, while there is an abundance of data about adult learners and adult refugees, this sort of country-wide and comparative information is uncommon in the education and aid literature, especially in urban and noncamp humanitarian contexts.

I describe the results of the content analysis through access, compliance and outcomes in the next sections.

### **6.1.1 Access**

The majority of the data reported to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) by donors and organizations concerned access. The research questions related to access, were centered upon geographical location, eligibility, specialization and certification. Donors and organizations generally provided details related to geography and specialization. Thus, they described the location of activities and the courses that they offered. The data revealed donors and organizations operated in the locations where the largest refugee communities were settled. Camp and urban refugees were involved in humanitarian education projects, with additional projects underway for rural beneficiaries.

Beneficiaries in INGO programs had access to the role of professional, caregiver, emissary, industrial and most vulnerable refugee. The beneficiaries most likely to influence and direct communication, as well as achieve self-reliance, were refugee professionals. Refugee professionals and academics could interface with a wide range of community members and develop skills in relation to his or her livelihoods goals. However, professionals and academics may not have received opportunities customarily afforded to other adult learners, such as the certification of their learning attainments. Moreover, refugee caregivers and emissaries could associate with potential beneficiaries and school staff, however their communications were directed by the organization. Their responsibilities were focused upon messaging, assessments and behavior change. These roles therefore, were not linked to their learning needs or to their educational aspirations. Industrial and most vulnerable refugees may have been prioritized in aid

programs and supported with a variety of activities. However, the aid provided was based upon their profound vulnerability. Industrials especially, were subject to tasks that necessitated physical strength and endurance.

Donors and organizations reported the most information in relation to the emissary, caregiver and most vulnerable refugee. Therefore, as it pertains to Jordan, the Open Aid Search provides the most information about refugees who have the least control over their aid and yet are more dependent. Additionally, disclosure with respect to eligibility concerned ways to identify and screen refugees via systematic assessments (NRC 2014a; NRC 2014b). This data also included cross-checking with the other organizations to avoid duplication (WFP, 2013) and querying the refugee assistance information system (RAIS) database (Islamic Relief, 2014d). Yet, donors and INGOs did not disclose how they may have weighed eligibility factors to enroll and prioritize participants.

There were also serendipitous processes that developed through the exchange of ideas, whereby refugees came to be involved in education activities. For instance, the Japan Emergency NGO (JEN) (Hamazaka, 2015c) claimed, “we proposed an idea to the women” and later, “the group of the women liked the idea” and began working well with each other. Thus, more eligibility and certification information is needed, to learn which refugees benefited from adult education opportunities and how their learning achievements were documented.

It is also important to note that aid was not afforded to poor people in general. Rather, aid was accessible for refugees who were registered (WFP, 2012) and for specific populations or persons who were “conflict-affected” (Government of Canada, 2015c). INGOs may have neglected Syrians or Iraqis who departed their countries prior to the recent violence, however can not return home. For example, the World Food Programme (WFP) (2012) noted Syrian refugees

were eligible for aid in part, if they arrived after March 2011. Other INGOs admitted, refugees from Syria have to present documentation that their arrival was after January 2012, in order to “evidence that they are indeed refugees of the current crisis, and not previous economic migrants” (IFRCRC & JRC, 2012, p. 33). Dissimilar criteria may be confusing to refugees who were in need, yet not eligible in some instances. Refugees may have also had their own views of when the crisis began and could select a timeline prior to the date set by organizations. Indeed, refugees may also determine that their needs, rather than iterative dialogue regarding their date of arrival, should drive aid allocations. In order to evidence downward accountability, donors and organizations could disclose feedback from refugees into the development of eligibility criteria. This action is important to avoid the neglect of people in need who may be “convention refugees” as noted in chapter 2, yet because of an algorithm, are not recognized by INGOs or afforded an accountability relationship. There are also Iraqis who are affected by the crisis, yet are not convention refugees. For instance, MacDougall (2011) underscored the vulnerability of Iraqi women who were separated and divorced from Jordanian men. These women had been residents in Jordan prior to the conflict in Iraq and did not register with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) until they separated from their Jordanian caregivers and local social support mechanisms. Through field work in Jordan, MacDougall learned that many of these women registered with UNHCR in part, because they could not gain Jordanian citizenship. Limited resources and violence in Iraq also minimized the options for repatriation. They were vulnerable and in crisis however, may not have been eligible for specific services because they could not satisfy the multifarious criteria of myriad organizations. Thus, Iraqis may be find it hard to access aid in Jordan and challenging to return home – a disabling status in which no state or organization is necessarily responsible. Moreover, other refugees were

excluded from aid, because they were not compliant. I describe this constraint to access in the next section.

### **6.1.2 Compliance**

Donors and organizations disclosed their compliance activities through food/cash voucher modifications, assessments and stakeholder sessions (Islamic Relief, 2015; WFP, 2013). For instance, the WFP (2012) endeavored to discourage the misuse/exchange of vouchers and food aid. In regard to food packages, the WFP planned to sensitize beneficiaries (2012) and cooperate with other organizations, “thus eliminating duplication and maximizing support for the beneficiaries, as well as reducing the probability of having WFP food sold on the market” (2013, p. 16). Additionally, the WFP lauded its decision to put “cash into women’s hands” to address the risk “that households receiving cash spend it for non-food expenditures” (2013, p.18). Thus, females were framed as the most compliant beneficiaries. This action may also evidence what Pupavac identified as a “feminized representation,” based upon the view of a woman as an “untainted” beneficiary (2008, p. 276). In this case, males who were viewed as less desirable, received fewer decision-rights and/or more correction, such as sensitization (WFP, 2013). The focus upon conduct and correction could have inhibited their capacity to exercise a measure of ownership over aid, subsequently enshrining a power differential in the accountability relationship. Additionally, donors and INGOs did not report the outcomes of their sensitization activities as more effective than other programs where resources were not allocated to conduct education and correction. This lack of comparative information is an important gap because there is no evidence that the methods these network members selected, were the most appropriate.

### **6.1.3 Outcomes**

The Government of Canada (2014f) endeavored to increase access “to a protective environment and strengthened community-based child protection mechanisms.” The protective environment involved remediating child labor and early marriage through K-12 enrollment and teacher training, as well as promoting healthy behaviors through hygiene education. It was the purpose donors and organizations cited most often in their education and training programs. As a consequence, adult refugees were tasked with helping INGOs achieve targets in this area. Though they were trained to accomplish program targets, adult education courses were not disclosed as accredited or facilitated by teachers whom the refugees could evaluate. Therefore, there was substantive information in the Open Aid Search in relation to the codes of access, compliance and outcomes. Yet, more information could be disclosed, in order to close critical gaps in knowledge about adult refugees in Jordan.

## **6.2 DATA GAPS**

Donors and organizations offered limited details about coordination with refugee skilled refugees, progress toward targets and outcomes. As a result, the information they disclosed, evidences accountability strategies more often than impact and is most relevant to unskilled beneficiaries. I present these gaps in the following sections.

### 6.2.1 Coordination with academics

It is important to note that much of the information upon which donors and organizations relied, was taken from their needs assessments – a method they wanted to strengthen (NRC, 2014d). This approach can be an important way of recognizing and responding to vulnerability. However, assessment tools based upon capacities within the refugee community may not have been leveraged. For instance, most program information omitted strategies that built upon the prior skills of refugee academics and practitioners. As a result, the public may come to situate these learners as unskilled if they depend upon selected documents for their information.

A counternarrative of refugees as scholars, however has been established. In fact, a part of the refugee adult population fleeing violence and instability in Iraq and Syria has been characterized as well-educated. They were also regarded by some members of the media as the ‘middle-class.’ For example, in *Fortune Magazine*, the Syrian refugee crisis was featured and retorted, “among the refugees attempting to get in are the remnants of Syria’s middle class: doctors, engineers, and teachers...” (Proctor, 2015). In the Iraqi refugee context, Sassoon (2008) maintained Iraq lost many, “professionals, academics, and artists, who are mostly from the middle class.” INGOs have also concluded the Iraqi crisis involved a tragic loss of intellectual capital. For instance, the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI) and Oxfam claimed, “the brain drain that Iraq is experiencing, is further stretching already inadequate public services, as thousands of medical staff, teachers, water engineers, and other professionals are forced to leave the country” (Kirkbride, Bailey & Omar, 2007, p. 3, 4). Indeed, Iraqi refugees’ needs often match those of people in developed nations, based upon their prior professional experience and former standard of living (Leaning, Spiegel & Crisp, 2011). The assistance adult refugees solicit, is often in regard to tertiary education, vocational training and requalification. In fact, Uehling

noted variance in the advice given to Iraqi and Bhutanese refugees by service providers. Uehling remarked, “Bhutanese are instructed on the proper use of a toilet and see demonstrations of disposable diapers, Iraqi refugees are briefed on matters like the possibilities for requalification in their professional field” (2015, p. 1003). Thus, there is a segment of refugee adults who have identified with a professional role. Needs assessments for these practitioners should be centered upon what they can do, rather than what they may need. Moreover, needs assessments could inform emergency education. For instance, education and livelihoods could be expanded to prevent the loss of credentials and specialized knowledge for skilled professionals.

Assessments centered upon what refugees can do may be an important complimentary form of data collection. This orientation has been utilized to a degree, with respect to refugees’ leadership skills in camp settings. For instance, JEN (Nagatsuka, 2014) noted the opening of the new Azraq camp as an opportunity that could, “help stabilize committees of refugees in charge of leading the population so that the Syrian refugees can one day self- manage and achieve self-reliance” (Nagatsuka, 2014). However, accredited training programs for these leaders were not disclosed. In another example, the Government of Canada (2013a) disclosed its anticipated outcomes as, “120 women and men trained in community-based child protection mechanisms in targeted host community and refugee populations” (Government of Canada, 2013a). However, there were no indications social workers and therapists within the refugee community were targeted. Thus, resources may have been directed to training refugees with no prior experience. In addition, while refugees obtained work with INGOs in assessment (Islamic Relief, 2014d), coaching (Reclaim Childhood, 2015) and hygiene promotion (Hamasaka, 2015b), the selection process for these positions was not always clear. As refugee emissaries and caregivers, adults were often described as people who would be first trained, then participate in the protection and

education of children. Thus, in regard to the emissary and caregiver roles, there is a connotation that refugees' capacities were developed through donor-INGO inculcation, as though they had no prior related skills.

Prior skills were disclosed in relation to the industrial refugee role. For example, JEN (Hamasa, 2015c) noted the refugee women in its repurposing activity already knew how to braid. Yet, there were some instances where donors and organizations presented refugees as without any prior knowledge in the topic whatsoever. Indeed, JEN (Hamasa, 2015b) conducted a hygiene session with refugee women and claimed the topic was, "so popular that many more women have asked to volunteer as Community Hygiene Promoters with JEN." JEN (Hamasa, 2015b) trained new volunteers and noted, "now they know the general topics of how to communicate, how diarrhea spreads, and how to hand wash properly." Thus, by implication, JEN trained refugees, whom prior to their enrollment, did not have knowledge on hand washing and communicating about hygiene. The researcher does not intend to suggest that the accomplishments were not noteworthy or that refugees who do not practice universal precautions should not be trained. Rather, it is important to identify and work with the doctors, engineers and teachers in the refugee community and provide avenues for continuing education with certification. It is also possible that many refugees were knowledgeable about handwashing and disease prevention, because it was a widespread practice in their families and workplace prior to arriving in Jordan. Thus, it is important not to characterize beneficiaries in ways that deny these capacities because the public could develop a narrow view of refugees as uneducated and support for requalification and accreditation may be more difficult to garner.

Massive open online courses (MOOCs) may be particularly useful in this regard (McClure, 2013). MOOCs are low cost platforms and support the registration of large student

populations simultaneously. MOOCs can be especially relevant to refugees, because they are less expensive than an average university education and along with other online learning options, are suitable for either standalone or degree programs. INGOs and donors could assess student learning and provide certification of their learning attainments through this platform. Opportunities such as these, could provide professional development and other forms of training, in order to frame refugees as educated people, rather than unskilled.

In sum, many refugee adults in Jordan are practitioners and academics with prior qualifications. The roles they were afforded in humanitarian aid may not have corresponded to their qualifications or enhanced them. If capacity-based approaches are not put forth, refugees in Jordan could be known as people who have no identifiable strengths. In terms of a gap analysis therefore, it is important to note how refugees were not framed and the identities for which the data does not support. For instance, in selected documents, refugees were not framed as experts, practitioners or scholars. As a lessons learned, programs could target this group and establish milestones in which progress could be measured. Significantly, progress toward targets was also a main gap in the information in the Open Aid Search.

### **6.2.2 Progress toward targets**

INGOs and donors did not report targets to measure the quality of their adult education and training activities or situate their downward accountability commitments in an adult education domain. Thus, when accountability mechanisms were disclosed, they were upward or unrelated to adult learning or academic achievements. This data gap is contrary to the objectives of IATI members (IATI, 2011a), which underscores the need for comparable, timely data. As a result, refugees' position as adult learners was overshadowed by their status as aid recipients. For

instance, the Government of Canada (2015b) detailed the grant recipient and offered content on the objective, beneficiary population, intervention and anticipated impact or outcome of its grants. Canada did not disclose information related to actual academic achievements. As a consequence, a comparative analysis of grants supported by Canada and other donor agencies, could have been conducted based upon strategy and in terms of sector and beneficiary (sub)group. A comparative analysis proved difficult at best, concerning issues such as test scores and retention. Outcome data was also limited in selected documents from MADRE, Reclaim Childhood and the WFP.

### **6.2.3 Outcomes**

INGOs and donor agencies disclosed mostly strategic and formative information. Information about outcomes was in relation to the beneficiary role for adult refugees, such as the caregiver vis a vis job linkages for coaches (Reclaim Childhood, 2015). However, there were no reports of accredited adult education and livelihoods programs. Significantly, there were no reports that measured INGO activities relative to refugees' livelihoods interests. This is important, because responding to the priorities of beneficiaries is a prominent accountability benchmark (The Sphere Project, 2014; Keystone, 2009). For instance, donors and organizations integrated quotes from refugee students in their reports and field notes (Hamasaka, 2014a). For instance, JEN (Hamasaka, 2013c) noted, "the response to this program was very positive and JEN was even invited back." However, actual monitoring reports based upon feedback and complaints mechanisms were not provided. This information gap keeps the user unaware of the full extent of the measures donors and organizations may have taken in order to include beneficiary perspectives and feedback into aid programs.

Accountability was a responsibility donors and organizations described in their procedures and affiliations, as well as feedback/stakeholder meetings (SIDA, 2015, Islamic Relief, 2014c). Therefore, accountability may have been enacted through these formalities. However, since meetings with refugees took place after most program strategies were planned, there were few substantive opportunities for refugees to yield power, influence and discretion in the aid arena. Moreover, there were few, if any opportunities for comparisons of achievements between prior and current programs, upward and downward accountability, which could have allowed the user to view progress over time. In sum, there was general agreement that accountability should be happening (NRC 2014c; SIDA 2014), but general neglect with respect to evaluating power-sharing opportunities.

To evidence downward accountability, INGOs and donors should describe their achievements, increasing refugees' participation in planning, implementation and evaluation activities. They should also disclose the degree to which these activities were related to refugees' livelihoods aspirations and the level of discretion or control they leveraged. Evaluations of downward accountability can be particularly relevant in this regard. It is also noteworthy that there was mention of the Arab Spring (NRC, 2014c) broadly, albeit this event was not depicted as a mitigating factor in aid programs. There could have been a higher demand for downward accountability from refugees in this post-Arab Spring aid arena. This issue was not explored in selected documents.

### 6.3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS

The Open Aid Search is comprised of data published from the IATI, a network of donors and INGOs. This network operates to increase accountability and coordination in part, through the disclosure of information in the public domain. Therefore, network theories and downward accountability are relevant conceptual frameworks, from which the data IATI members disclosed can be presented.

The data in the Open Aid Search can be examined to assess the access to and quality of information about adult education and livelihoods for refugees in Jordan. In addition, access, compliance and outcomes can be a part of the examination of upward and downward accountability in refugee adult education, urban humanitarian contexts and noncamp settings. Content analysis can be an integral method in this examination because it is a form of document review that enables the information donors and organizations disclosed to be systematically investigated. This information should be examined often, including as a part of program evaluations, in order to measure progress in the disclosure of adult education and livelihoods activities as well as accountability to refugee beneficiaries.

The data in the Open Aid Search, supports the findings in the wider literature, such as Winthrop's (2009) claim that humanitarian education programs do not reflect refugees' livelihoods aspirations. The data also evidences Seybolt's (2009) claim that aid may reflect donors' priorities more often than the aspirations and needs of refugees. This linkage is especially significant, because it demonstrates an aid relationship in which accountability is mostly upward.

In the context of adult learning and livelihoods for refugees, downward accountability was uncommon in the data INGOs and donors disclosed. Indeed, minimal opportunities were

disclosed that encouraged refugees to co-construct their education and address their needs. Yet, the most sobering link in the literature, is in regard to the framing of refugees as uninvited and tragic (Baker & McEnery, 2005) noncitizens, rather than peers. These public problems (Provan & Milward, 2001) were a cost to the host community (IRC, 2015) and their issues were destabilizing factors. For instance, in most instances, education was enacted to resolve or correct an unwanted problem for the donor, INGO and local population. The adult learner role was minimized in this setting and subsequently, the position of adults as wage-earners and breadwinners for their families was understated in reports. Livelihoods priorities were deemphasized and opportunities to exercise control, discretion and ownership were selectively enabled. Undesirable refugees were usually excluded from decision-making based upon ontological recognition structures such as noncompliance and skilled professionals were not acknowledged. Adult refugees, in most instances, were not educated for themselves. They were educated for others. Subsequently, donors and organizations coordinated to address correctable problems and unskilled refugees.

#### **6.4 PROGRAM DOCUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS**

This study included a review of nearly 2,000 documents in the Open Aid Search and additional documents in the wider literature. In the following sections, I examine the ways aid actors may increase the access to and quality of information in this repository. First, I describe the actors from which more data is needed in the Open Aid Search. Next, I present policy recommendations for both the disclosure of accountability and development of strategic policy for refugees in Jordan. The information in this section however, is not limited to the Jordanian

context. Indeed, it could be relevant to scholars and aid actors who work with refugees and/or other people in need in various fields.

#### **6.4.1 Organizations and donor agencies**

The Jordanian context includes a large percentage of the Iraqi and Syrian refugee community. In particular, Syrian refugees comprise the largest beneficiary population registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2016). Livelihoods, training and job linkages are main priorities to these uprooted people. Yet, there were no narrative program documents on humanitarian education and livelihoods for refugee adults in Jordan, from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States, Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) or United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition, there was no readily accessible information on adult education from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

In many instances, the documents selected for content analysis did in fact demonstrate partnership with UNHCR and United States grantee organizations. For instance, JEN (Hamasaka, 2015b) received materials for its hygiene awareness program from the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women). JEN (Hamasaka, 2013d) has also “worked together with UNICEF to establish [a] WASH committee all over the camp.” In addition, JEN was selected among more than thirty NGOs, to support UNHCR in its leadership of and operations in Zaatari camp. Therefore, water-sanitation-and hygiene (WASH) activities were underscored as critical service areas and cooperation with United Nations agencies was highlighted in JEN accomplishments. Thus, in many instances, the

programs reported in selected documents were linked to non-IATI members as well as donors and INGOs in the wider field of humanitarian assistance. These linkages by enlarge, however, do not inform the user of their downward accountability activities relative to adult refugees' livelihoods aspirations.

Significantly, documents from the UNHCR (2015c), United States (USAID, 2015a), Department for International Development (DFID, 2014), Danish Refugee Council (2015) and other donors and INGOs, including networks of INGOs, reported information that coincided with the data in the Open Aid Search. Social cohesion and child protection in particular, were main education objectives. In addition, concern was given to hygiene, food and cash assistance. These documents also evidenced gaps in learning outcomes for adult refugees and recognition for an overall need to improve the quality of aid information. Thus, the findings of this study are not limited to the data accessible via the Open Aid Search. Indeed, the categories in this study were based upon documents from nine donors and INGOs. They were then validated with data from thirty-nine organizations and/or networks and more than ten reports and publications, which was more than four times the number of agencies from which the data originated. Thus, the categories have implications for adult education for refugees in Jordan.

The results of this study are important to IATI and non-IATI members. However, in order to fulfill the IATI's goals of comparable and timely information (IATI, 2011a), more organizations could publish their aid reports in the IATI Registry and organizations that are registered, could report more information about adult education and livelihoods and downward accountability in an educational setting. The exclusion of these central aid organizations in the Open Aid Search minimizes access to aid data and makes it challenging for the public to find

information. It also contradicts the accountability commitments that many of these donors and INGOs have made.

In sum, the dominant narrative of refugeehood is based upon the view of refugees as threats, costs, inconvenient, tragic and temporary. Most significantly, there is scant evidence in the Open Aid Search that can be leveraged as a counternarrative. While aid actors recognize the refugee community is comprised of mostly families, including academics and peers, the information they report has not represented the family as a unit. Rather, the family was deemphasized through compliance information and correction education for deviants and undesirable people. Therefore, in the following section, I present policy recommendations which are relevant to IATI and non-IATI members and recognize the family as a unit by underscoring the needs of adult learners alongside children and youth.

#### **6.4.2 Policy recommendations**

I am a practitioner/scholar. My background incorporates more than ten years of work with non-profit organizations, INGOs and research agencies. It is centered upon improving conditions with and for people in crisis, including torture and trauma survivors, substance abusers and refugees. I have integrated asset and strengths-based concepts into this role, because most of the people in need I have seen, were either skilled, well-educated and/or embedded within a strong family or support system. In addition, many of the people who were most vulnerable, were those who were separated from their support systems and/or learners with unmet educational needs. Therefore, I have sought to promote recovery in part, through the provision of relevant educational programs in addition to social support.

This education and social work perspective can not be ignored as a point of potential bias. However, the data included in this study was comprised from multiple sectors and stakeholders and therefore, multiple perspectives. As a result, the study is about the intersections between education, social work, accountability and coordination. This study also examines accountability outcomes, through the manifest data that aid actors reported. Thus, potential biases notwithstanding, any recommendations I could develop are therefore centered upon what these actors have disclosed.

In this section, I do not list or itemize tasks for others to perform. Rather, I posit a course of action in the aid arena that is centered upon the reporting of downward accountability activities in an adult educational setting. First, refugees who are skilled and professional could be engaged to provide services for their refugee peers in exchange for livelihoods support and tertiary education opportunities. IATI members could also enhance their existing mechanisms to increase accountability through adult learning certificates. This action could include professional development courses and requalification opportunities. It could also involve distance learning platforms such as MOOCs, with feedback mechanisms that invite refugees' suggestions and decision-making, including the evaluation of teachers. To emphasize equality in education, courses could include grades, tests, diplomas, accreditation and other standards customary for any other adult learner.

These actions depend upon establishing partnerships with education providers. Thus, the network of actors in the aid arena could be augmented to include practitioners and organizations with relevant education expertise. University consortiums, international education institutes and global research networks may be relevant in this regard.

Interestingly, the researcher did not find IATI-wide accountability guidance documents in emergency education, particularly for adults. For instance, [www.openaidsearch.org](http://www.openaidsearch.org), - the Open Aid Search homepage - did not post any IATI-wide accountability reports in the data collection timeline of October 1-16, 2015. In addition, no IATI-wide accountability plans were included among the list of selected files and links in the Jordan portal. While the IATI itself, is a product of donors and organizations' accountability responsibilities (IATI, 2011a), there was no set of IATI-wide education standards for adults in the Open Aid Search homepage or reports based upon members' compliance. Thus IATI members' accountability commitments and activities are dispersed, which limits access to comparable data. Therefore, it is integral to enhance access to data about INGO and donor upward and downward accountability commitments, particularly in adult emergency education.

A regular system of IATI-wide reporting, in relation to the accountability achievements that were planned and ongoing, could also augment the data disclosed in the Open Aid Search. Reporting could be based upon IATI members' own views, policies, commitments and progress, along with the perspectives of their beneficiaries and any third party monitors. A Special Rapporteur for Accountability or related scholar could be considered, in order to administer ongoing and comparative content analysis of IATI data. The findings of these studies could be added to the IATI libraries, in order to promote the disclosure of accountability actions and impact in the public domain. There are also many recommendations in adult learning, particularly with respect to evaluation, certification and accreditation (London 2016 Conference Members, 2015; Kirk, 2009). A document review of the relevant recommendations could be performed, in order to identify if and to what degree they can be implemented in the context of the Iraqi and Syrian crisis in Jordan.

In sum, research customary in other adult learning settings, can inform the standards by which adult education in emergencies is performed and measured, in order to increase downward accountability achievements and reporting. It is through relevant adult education standards that refugees may find a setting oriented to their recovery needs and significantly, this setting could be more suitable to refugees who are skilled professionals, rather than environments centered upon compliance.

## APPENDIX

### SELECTED DOUMENTS FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

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