

**REVOLUTION FROM AFAR:
MOBILIZATIONS FOR HOMELAND REGIME CHANGE AND
THE MAKING OF THE FILIPINO DIASPORA, 1965-1992**

by

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From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, Filipinos in the U.S. and the Netherlands became key players in international efforts to overthrow an oppressive regime and institute democracy in the Philippines. When Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law on September 21, 1972, Filipino student and political organizations in the U.S. immediately convened in San Francisco and launched a national campaign to oppose authoritarian rule. In less than a year, the movement spread as new organizations of diverse political orientations emerged and took root in long-established Filipino communities in the U.S. Activists focused on lobbying Congress for the withdrawal of military and economic support to Marcos. In the Netherlands, Filipino exile and solidarity organizations in Europe organized the Permanent People's Tribunal on the Philippines in 1980 to expose and isolate the Marcos dictatorship and recognize the national liberation movements as the genuine representatives of the Filipino people.

While much is known about why migrants maintain homeland ties, information on how they become engaged in organizations involved in political struggles remains scant. Through a comparative case study of homeland-directed activism among Filipinos in the U.S. and the Netherlands from the period of authoritarian rule (1965-1986) to the early years of democratic transition (1986-1992) in the Philippines, the project analyzes how political structures in both the host and home societies, resources in the migrant communities, and formation of oppositional consciousness interact and influence mobilization.

Research findings show that variations in the emergence, growth, and outcomes of the movement in the two countries were due to dissimilar host-country conditions and the manner by which the interaction of economic, political, and social structures in the homeland and hostland provided opportunities and disincentives for mobilization. However, similar mechanisms and processes occurred in both the U.S. and Netherlands, although these differed with regard to actors and outcomes, depending on the historical context. Overall, the formation of diasporas is a consequence of strategic social construction by political entrepreneurs in periods of heightened contention in the homeland such as during dictatorship and regime change. Thus, diasporas are *outcomes*, rather than causes or agents, of transnational mobilization.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAM	Asian American Movement
ALAB	Alay ng Bayan (Serve the People)
AMLC	Anti-Martial Law Coalition
ANPA	American Newspaper Publishers Association
AWOC	Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee
BEC	Basic Ecclesial Communities
CAMD	Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship
CAMDI	Committee to Advance the Movement for Democracy and Independence
CAMP	Campaign Against Militarization in the Philippines
CAWIU	Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union
CDA	Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal)
CFMW	Commission on Filipino Migrant Workers
CFP	Co-Financing Program
CPN	Communistische Partij van Nederland (Communist Party of the Netherlands)
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
DPA	Dutch-Philippine Association

EO	Executive Order
ESM	European Solidarity Movement
EU	European Union
EVP	Exchange Visitor Program
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FFP	Friends of the Filipino People
FGN	Filippijnengroep Nederland (Philippine Group Netherlands)
FLU	Filipino Labor Union
FWC	Far West Convention
HSPA	Hawaii Sugar Planters Association
ILO	International Labor Organization
ILWU	International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KDP	Katipunan ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Union of Democratic Filipinos)
KM	Kabataang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth)
KMU	Kilusang Mayo Uno (May First Movement)
KSP	Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino (Filipino People's Committee)
MBA	Military Bases Agreement
MFP	Movement for a Free Philippines
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MPC	Moro People's Committee
NAFUS	National Association of Filipinos in the U.S.

NAJFD	National Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy
NAM	Ninoy Aquino Movement
NCRCLP	National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines
NDF	National Democratic Front
NGO	Nongovernment Organization
NPA	New People's Army
NSM	New Social Movement
ODA	Official Development Aid
OFM	Overseas Filipino Movement
OFW	Overseas Filipino Worker
PACE	Pilipino American Collegiate Endeavor
PHILCAG	Philippine Civic Action Group
PND	Philippine National Day
PPT	Permanent People's Tribunal
PSAP	Philippine Seafarers' Assistance Program
PSP	Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij (Pacifist Socialist Party)
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party)
SEIU	Service Employees International Union
SNV	Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (Foundation of Netherlands Volunteers)
TWLF	Third World Liberation Front
UC	University of California

UW	University of Washington
VVD	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)

PREFACE

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1.0 INTRODUCTION: DIASPORAS AND REGIME CHANGE

We are aware of the role of German and Australian “Croats” in speeding the violent collapse of Yugoslavia; of British and Canadian “Tamils” in supporting the murderous Tigers of Jaffna; of Massachusetts “Irish” in aid of the IRA; of segments of American Jewry behind right-wing extremism in Israel. But there are millions of other long-distance ethno-nationalists who are by no means necessarily committed to fanaticism and violence. Filipinos, Khmer, and Vietnamese in California, Algerians and Moroccans in the Midi, Ukrainians in Ontario, Cubans in Miami, Albanians in Ravenna, and so forth. But, in different degrees, they share something with the extremists: they live their real politics long-distance, without accountability.
Benedict Anderson (1992)

From February 22 to 25, 1986, over two million Filipinos held demonstrations in the capital of Manila, which led to the overthrow of Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos. The struggle against his two-decade authoritarian rule transpired for years, and Filipinos expected a protracted and violent revolution to bring down an entrenched dictatorship. Yet, unlike other sultanistic or neopatrimonial regimes¹ that were defeated by a revolutionary movement or ousted by a military coup d'état,² nonviolent protesters dethroned the Marcos regime.³ Instead of a common political

¹ Sultanistic regimes, according to Chebabi and Linz (1998), are authoritarian regimes based on personal ideology and personal favor to maintain the autocrat in power; there is little ideological basis for the rule except personal power. Snyder (1992) refers to this type of rule as neopatrimonial. But Chebabi and Linz argue that while some sultanistic tendencies are present in neopatrimonial regimes, the circle of clients is wider and the discretion of the ruler is less extensive in the latter. The regimes of Batista (Cuba), Duvalier (Haiti), Marcos (Philippines), Pahlavi (Iran), Somoza (Nicaragua), and Trujillo (Dominican Republic) are considered sultanistic.

² Scholars of revolution have argued that sultanistic or neopatrimonial dictatorships are especially vulnerable to overthrow by revolutionary movements, as shown by the cases of Cuba, Iran, and Nicaragua (Dix 1983; Farhi 1988;

ideology, a moral indignation founded on basic distrust of the government held together the largely middle-class militants (David 1985; Mendoza 2009; Neher 1981; Overholt 1986; Wurfel 1977).

Named after the urban space in Manila where this historical watershed occurred, the EDSA⁴ “People Power” Revolution was the first democratic transition in Asia during the so-called “third wave of democratization” (Huntington 1991). It initiated a powerful demonstration effect and inspired activists in Burma/Myanmar, China, and countries in Eastern Europe to try to overturn their authoritarian governments with nonviolent action (Ackerman and Duvall 2000; Mendoza 2009; Schock 2005; Thompson 1995). It also raised questions on the dialectical relationship between the nature of regimes and forms of resistance.

The People Power Revolution has been the subject of studies on revolutions and democratization, often compared to the mobilizations in Iran and Nicaragua that led to the toppling of the Shah and the Somoza dynasty respectively (see Parsa 2000; Steinmetz 1994). Scholars ask why the Philippines only achieved regime change and not social revolution like these two countries. They explain the success of People Power in the Philippines in instituting regime change by focusing on the breakdown of the state, especially administrative and intramilitary conflict and withdrawal of external support; the interplay between regime and opposition, particularly patterns and styles of state repression and the complexities of movement response; and the relationship between civil resistance and armed struggle, specifically the

Parsa 2000; Selbin 1999; Wickham-Crowley 1992). In situations where segments of the armed forces have not been thoroughly divided and coopted by the dictator, such as in Haiti and Paraguay, a military coup may remove the dictator and block the possibility of civilian control (Snyder 1992).

³ For an analysis of the social origins and fall of the Marcos regime, see Bonner (1988), Hawes (1987), Rodriguez (1985), Rosenberg (1979), and Thompson (1998).

⁴ EDSA is the acronym for Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, the longest and the most congested highway in the Metro Manila. It was named after Epifanio delos Santos, considered one of the best Filipino literary writers in Spanish of his time.

tactical mistakes of the communist movement, the maneuvers of the democratic elite opposition, and the mobilization of the Catholic Church (Boudreau 2004; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Foran 2005; Lee 2015; Nepstad 2011; Schock 2005; Thompson 2004). Yet, despite the inclusion of international actors such as states and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in the analysis of Philippine regime change, the role of Filipino exiles and migrants has remained theoretically overlooked.

Shain (1994/95:830) considers the anti-Marcos campaign of Filipinos in the U.S. as “one of the most successful and multifaceted diasporic efforts to unseat a nondemocratic regime.”⁵ Reflecting on his downfall in 1986, Marcos stated that his negative reputation in the U.S. was due to the activities of “the articulate and well-financed representatives of anti-Marcos expatriates residing in North America” whose attendance at “the hearings in the U.S. Congress were given the widest circulation by the American press” (Marcos 1989:94). Anderson (1998:74 [italics in the original]) cites the involvement of substantial numbers of Filipinos “not from *political* exile” in the struggle against Marcos as an example of non-extremist long-distance nationalism. Much is known about why migrants and exiles maintain ties to their native countries. However, information on how they become involved in homeland political struggles remains scant. The dissertation focuses on this question.

⁵ Korean-Americans opposed to the authoritarian rule of South Korean President’s Chun Doo Hwan in the 1980s adopted the model of the anti-Marcos movement in the U.S., particularly the coalition-building and lobbying efforts of the exiled elite opposition (Tolchin 1986).

1.1 THEORETICAL TENSIONS

Diasporas⁶ have played important roles in political and social change in their homelands, from the Russian socialists that toppled the tsarist regime in the twentieth century to the Chilean émigrés that campaigned against Augusto Pinochet (Shain 2005; Wright and Oñate Zuñiga 2007). More recently, the activities of expatriates have been crucial in the waves of protests advocating for democratic reforms in the Middle East and North Africa (Moss, forthcoming). A common theme in the literature is the degree to which diasporas influence the conduct of their home governments by constituting themselves as a powerful interest group in foreign policymaking. While their effectiveness in instituting change in their homeland through ethnic lobbying in their hostlands remains contested, scholars acknowledge the ability of diasporas to pursue nationalist projects and make claims in mainstream political spaces (Cochrane 2007; DeWind and Segura 2014; Koinova 2013; Lyons and Mandaville 2012; Saideman 2001; Shain and Thompson 1990; Smith 2000).

Often able to take advantage of opportunities and resources in liberal democracies, diasporas connect with state and civil society actors in their country of settlement, whose opinions are less likely to be ignored by the regime in power in their country of origin (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Waldinger 2014). They attempt to discredit their home governments in the international community, especially when the regime is extremely dependent on the patronage of foreign powers, as the cases of Fulgencio Batista, Ferdinand Marcos, and the Pahlavi and Somoza dynasties and their reliance on the United States illustrate (Farhi 1988;

⁶ In this research, I use a definition by Shain (2005:51-52) who describes diaspora as, “a people with a common national origin who regard themselves, or are regarded by others, as members or potential members of the national community of their home nation, a status held regardless of their geographical location and their citizenship outside their national soil.” I provide a discussion of the development of the concept in chapter two.

Snyder 1992). By creating awareness among citizens of external sponsors and providing alternatives to the regime, they apply pressure on patrons to withdraw support and modify foreign policy.

The use of divergent, competing, and, at times, opposed approaches has hindered systematic generalizations on how migrant communities become involved in politics in their homelands. Using a “long-distance nationalism” perspective, scholars in international and area studies attribute the continued participation in homeland politics among migrants and subsequent generations to the persistence of affective ties and national loyalty to their ancestral land (Anderson 1998; Safran 1991; Shain 2005; Tölölyan 1996). According to Sheffer (2003), diasporas organize politically for two main reasons: to promote the well-being and ensure the continuity of their communities in their host countries, and to increase their ability to extend support to besieged homelands and to other members of the diaspora in other countries. They can participate in a wide range of political activities because the direct consequences of their actions cannot reach them (Anderson 1992; Koinova 2010).

Due to extensive focus on successful, often overdetermined, cases such as the Cuban, Irish, and Jewish immigrants in the U.S., lobbying or other forms of state engagement often serves as a point of departure in these studies, whereby migrants and exiles have already constituted themselves as diasporic actors prior to mobilization. Thus, the assumption that diasporas are pre-political objects in a natural state of existence is a weakness of the long-distance nationalism perspective (Adamson 2012). By selecting groups with high levels of homeland political involvement such as stateless and conflict-generated diasporas, studies employing long-distance nationalism often essentialize and reify socially constructed categories such as ethnicity and nationality.

Scholars in migration and transnationalism studies argue that migrants' involvement in homeland politics can best be explained as a process by which migrants forge and sustain social relations that link together where they live and where they are from in transnational social fields⁷ (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994; Bauböck 2003; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999). Their membership in dense economic, political, and social networks points to the malleability and permeability of borders and rootedness that have been central to theories on nationalism. Compared to diasporas which have intense feelings of belonging to a nation-in-exile scattered around the world, transmigrants⁸ identify only with their communities of origin and its broad network (Bruneau 2010).⁹

The modern migrant elites that political transnationalism gives rise to often demand inclusion and recognition in the existing sociopolitical order through the realignment of power; however, they do not struggle for radical change (Itzigsohn 2000). The transnational organizations that they form become vehicles for individual transmigrants to obtain and reinforce their social positions, a chance for public approval and recognition both within their host society and country of origin (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994). The identities forged

⁷ "Transnational social fields" refer to a single field of social relations rather than fragmented experiences (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994). Since its inception, scholars have refined and extended the concept. Glick Schiller and Fouron (1999:344) bring power into the conversation by arguing that "the social relationships that form the substance of transnational social fields include egalitarian, unequal, and exploitative relationships that often encompass immigrants, persons born in the country of origin who never migrated, and persons born in the country of settlement of many different ethnic backgrounds." Levitt and Glick Schiller (2007) differentiate between ways of *being* in a social field as opposed to ways of *belonging*, with the former denoting relations and practices, while the latter referring to concrete, conscious actions that enact identities.

⁸ Transmigrants refer to the mobile subjects that create and sustain the transnational social fields (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994).

⁹ Although it has become a common practice to treat diaspora and transnationalism as fungible concepts, Faist (2010) recommends the proper use of the terms to explain distinct sets of actors, events, and occurrences. Both diaspora and transnationalism acknowledge the importance of multiple localities in social processes. They also emphasize migrants' intense connections to national or local territories. Diaspora almost always refers to community or group that orient itself towards an external homeland. On the other hand, transnationalism refers to *processes* and thus "appear[s] to describe more abstract phenomena in a social science language" (Faist 2010:13 [italics supplied]). In essence, transnationalism is a broader term than diaspora, such that transnational communities encompass diasporas, but not all transnational communities are diasporas (Faist 2010). For a detailed discussion, see the edited volume by Bauböck and Faist (2010).

“from below” are not inherently subversive, for they are no less essentialized than the constructions of nation-state that legitimize the dominance and oppression of certain groups in the imagined community (Faist 2010; Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). While the migrant transnationalism approach has been cogent in describing the ways by which transmigrants both challenge and contribute to hegemonic projects, it has been limited in explaining *how* migrants simultaneously frame their identities in terms of particularistic and parochial loyalties *and* liberal and universal goals.

To address the shortcomings of these two dominant frameworks, scholars from sociology and political science have advocated the use of a social movement framework in the analysis of diaspora mobilization (Amarsingam 2015; Lyon and Uçarer 2001; Sökefeld 2006, 2008; Wayland 2004). Koinova (2013) conceptualizes “diaspora mobilization” as a dynamic process by which political entrepreneurs¹⁰ deploy resources, frames, and identities at certain conjunctures to make claims about homeland political issues. Thus, like other social movements, diaspora activism occurs through the interaction and combined influence of the shifting political environment, constellation of actors and organizations, and construction of collective identity (Adamson 2012; Koinova 2013; Landolt 2008). Studies, however, have focused mostly on the political conditions and organizational resources in the host society, overlooking elements in the homeland that affect cross-border activism.

This dissertation overcomes the limitations of each approach by drawing on their respective strengths to explain the conditions and mechanisms through which migrants, exiles, and their descendants become involved in the movement for homeland regime change, and, thus,

¹⁰ In collective action, a “political entrepreneur,” often part of a privileged group, is an individual willing to bear the costs of social action irrespective of the position taken by others who are also interested in the action’s outcomes (Olson 1965).

mobilized as a diaspora. I use social movement theory to examine how the combination of resources, opportunities, and threats at particular time periods shape activism. From the field of transnationalism, the study applies ideas about overlapping boundaries of membership in geographically separate polities and, thus, examines how the interaction of political structures in the homeland and host countries impact on activism. The research also analyzes how organizational resources and community infrastructure that are formed transnationally influence mobilization. Lastly, the project looks at the construction and transformation of migrant identities. I apply long-distance nationalism's ideas on sentiments of belonging to explain how activists define, question, and re-interpret ethnicity, nationalism, and democracy.

I argue that diasporas are *outcomes*, rather than causes or agents, of transnational mobilization. The research regards the formation of diasporas not as a result simply of boundary crossing and dispersal, but as a consequence of strategic social construction by political entrepreneurs in periods of heightened contention in the homeland such as during dictatorship and regime change. It calls into question the conventional practice of treating diasporas as independent—rather than dependent—variable in studies of contemporary inter- and intra-state conflicts (Adamson 2012). Without an adequate analysis of diasporas as political projects, we undervalue the role of discourse, ideologies, and interests in transnational processes.

1.2 EMPIRICAL PUZZLE

The mobilization of Filipino migrants and exiles in traditional and nontraditional countries of destination—U.S. and Netherlands respectively—offers an interesting case in explaining diaspora construction through political mobilization. The population of Filipinos abroad is one of

the largest in the world (Asis 2006; Guevarra 2010; McKay 2007; Rodriguez 2010). At the end of 2004, an estimated 3.2 million Filipinos were living permanently outside the Philippines—mostly in the U.S. and Canada—while about four million labor migrants or overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) were working temporarily in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East,¹¹ Europe, and Oceania, without the possibility of attaining residency status or citizenship. After the enactment of an official Philippine labor export policy in 1974, deployment of OFWs has grown from 36,035 in 1975 to 933,588 in 2004, funneling over eight billion U.S. dollars in remittances back into the Philippine economy (Asis 2006).

In the U.S., Filipinos constitute one of the oldest communities, with migration dating back to the early twentieth century. In contrast, Filipinos only started going to the Netherlands in large numbers after the Marcos government implemented a formal labor export policy in 1974, which facilitated the migration of Filipino professionals and unskilled labor to both old and new countries of destination. In the early 1970s, there were fewer than 500 Filipinos in the Netherlands with status as permanent denizens (mostly Filipinas married to Dutch and other European nationals) and temporary residents (i.e. factory workers, nurses, seafarers and government-sponsored students).

The Philippines has the most institutionalized labor migration process, with the state instituting a transnational bureaucracy to export migrants and promoting discursive practices that construct OFWs as “new heroes,” willing to sacrifice family and relationships as well as the protective environment of the homeland to serve the nation (Rodriguez 2010). A culture of migration has become so ingrained such that overseas employment is believed to be a “projection of national power and prestige,” essentially reformulating the Philippine state’s weakness in

¹¹ Saudi Arabia, alone, has one million Filipino workers in 2004.

national development as an expression of Filipino strength in the global economy (Carmoux 2009:53). To ensure that Filipinos maintain its dominance in niche markets such as nursing, caregiving, and seafaring, state and private institutions formulate discourses that allude to Filipinos' innate abilities and cultural suitability in these jobs (Guevarra 2010; McKay 2007).

However, with the exception of a few Asian-American scholars in ethnic studies,¹² theorists of diaspora such as Robin Cohen, Gabriel Sheffer, and Milton Esman have largely ignored Filipinos in mainstream literature on contemporary or modern diasporas,¹³ despite the size and geographic dispersal of Filipino communities, parallel processes of assimilation in the host societies and homeland return, and established role in nation building. It can only be surmised that the case of Filipinos do not fit neatly into early conceptualizations of diaspora, which emphasize forced dislocation. Comprised of state-brokered temporary economic workers and permanent immigrants from different migration waves, Filipinos belong to a universe of cases of non-conflict-generated movement of people, whose collective experience is not rooted in ethnic or religious persecution, banishment, and trauma.

From a constructivist perspective, diasporas must be discursively invented (Bauböck 2010). This means that for diasporas to come into existence, categories, discourses, and symbols—whether based on trauma from war, political persecution, or economic hardship—need to be created to tie together scattered but intertwined social networks (Adamson 2012). The existence of conflict in the homeland facilitates diaspora construction. However, unlike mobilizations concerning the integrity and sovereignty of the ancestral homeland in which the

¹² These include Ignacio (2004), Manalansan (2003), Mendoza (2002), Okamura (1998), and San Juan (1998). Aguilar (2015), however, doubts the existence of a Filipino diaspora based on the experience of Filipino permanent immigrants in the U.S., which has dominated the literature. In contrast, despite limited intellectual attention, the global migration of Filipino temporary workers is favorable to diasporization.

¹³ For a discussion of the exclusion of Filipinos in recent works on twenty-first century diasporas, see Camroux (2009).

conflict between “us” and “them” is obvious, pro-democracy struggles—whereby national interest and loyalty are interrogated—may deter participation from migrants in discursive processes (Shain 1994/95). Filipinos thus offer a compelling case for examining the dynamics of diaspora construction through political mobilization at a period in Philippine history when out-migration became an official state development policy and when the transnational networks of Philippine national liberation movements and nationalist oligarchic elites rallied to overthrow an entrenched dictatorship. The differences and similarities in political opportunity structures and migrant community infrastructure in the Netherlands and the U.S. offer theoretical insights into the role of national context on diaspora mobilization.

1.3 RESEARCH GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The goal of the dissertation is to undertake analytic or theoretical generalization (Snow and Anderson 1991), wherein I infer to propositions and not to populations. I use previously developed theory as a template against which to compare the empirical results of the case study. The research imports social movements theory into diaspora and transnationalism studies that benefits both fields. It contributes to the former by introducing the complexity of considering home and host country conditions, and to the latter by identifying multiple conditions and overlapping processes at various levels. My dissertation extends existing theoretical formulations in the social movement literature to new or different social categories, contexts, or social processes.

This project contributes to the distillation of social movement theory, which has offered cogent explanations and comparisons of national movements but has failed to address patterns of

transnational mobilization that involve citizens belonging in two or more political communities. The objective is to modify prevailing theoretical perspectives, or aspects of it, with new case material. I accomplish this by focusing on a single migrant group in two countries with notable differences and similarities in their political structures and by combining positivist and interpretivist approaches to process tracing. The dissertation demonstrates that the study of diasporas must depart from the treatment of migrant groups as homogeneous units and consider personal stories and discursive processes. At the same time, I anchor individual histories in the social contexts in which they are located (e.g., organizations, networks, communities) and look at their interaction with macro-structures and institutions, which can either stimulate or discourage mobilization.

1.4 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION

Following this introduction, I evaluate the applicability of a social movement approach in explaining the process of diaspora construction through transnational political mobilization. Particularly, chapter two surveys the literature on political process theory and mechanisms and processes of contention relevant to the study of diasporas. It also draws from long-distance nationalism and migrant transnationalism perspectives, especially in specifying the parameters of concepts and relationships. Chapter three presents the research design and methodology of the study.

Chapter four, entitled “From Wards of the Outpost to ‘World-Class Workers’: A History of Filipino Migration to the United States and the Netherlands,” situates Filipino global migration in the Philippine nation-building project and in the increasing global economic

integration. I discuss the creation of Philippine labor export policy, the discourse that normalizes out-migration, and the waves of Filipino migration in the traditional and nontraditional countries of destination. I also analyze changes in immigration policies as well as citizenship norms in the U.S. and the Netherlands, which facilitated the growth of the Filipino community in the two host societies. I illustrate how processes related to colonization, restructuring of capital, and geopolitical transformation shaped the resources for cross-border political activities of Filipinos. With each wave, I describe the relocation of resources for mobilization from the homeland to the country of settlement and explore the maintenance and reproduction of political and social relations.

Chapter five (“Activist Streams and Movement Waves: Mobilization for Philippine Democracy in the United States”) focuses on the mobilization of Filipinos in the U.S., where I illustrate how the U.S. movement against the dictatorship in the Philippines grew from the convergence, diffusion, and spillover of four activist streams in the 1960s among Filipinos and Filipino-Americans: the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements, which introduced second-generation Filipino youth to activism; the identity movement among Third World peoples, which organized strikes for ethnic studies in universities in the San Francisco Bay Area and participated in the struggle of migrant communities against gentrification and urban renewal projects in the West Coast; the labor movement among farmworkers in Northern California and among cannery workers in Washington and Alaska; and the underground student movement in the Philippines, which had ties to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)-National Democratic Front (NDF)-New People’s Army (NPA). I show how the U.S. government’s support of the Marcos dictatorship was both an opportunity and a threat for mobilization that defined the strategic frames and collective identity of the activists.

Chapter six (“Transplanting and Incubation of Philippine Revolutionary Work in the Netherlands”) examines the movement in the Netherlands, where Filipinos lacked the advantages of organization and community embeddedness compared to their counterparts in the U.S. I argue that in cases where migrants lack pre-existing economic, political, and social ties in the host society, established social movements serve as migration bridges and movement incubators. Solidarity groups provide a legitimating base for challenging the status quo to migrant groups until the latter is organizationally ready, political opportunities have become available, and collective consciousness has developed. I show how the dominance of the Christian Democrats in Dutch politics, the extensive network of religious groups in the solidarity movement, and the chain migration of exiles with the Communist Party of the Philippines-National Democratic Front combined to advance Filipino mobilization in the Netherlands.

Chapter seven identifies recurring patterns, mechanisms, and processes and other systematic features in diaspora mobilization based on the two cases. I carry out two levels of comparison, spatially and temporally. I contrast mobilization in the Netherlands and the U.S. to explain the role of location and national context in shaping the political actions of migrants. I also compare migrant mobilization in two periods—authoritarian rule (1965-1986) and democratic transition (1986-1992)—to analyze movements in their historical context. My last chapter encapsulates the key findings from each case and from the comparative analysis, sketches the main original contributions of the study on the social construction of diasporas, and identifies themes and topics for further investigation.

2.0 A SOCIAL MOVEMENT APPROACH TO DIASPORA MOBILIZATION

Long-distance emigrant politics...reflects the paradox of migration, which while inherently entailing mobility, is impelled by the unequal, territorial containment of resources, a feature of social life that both gives the migrants new found leverage over states and peoples left behind and constrains their capacity to maintain cross-border connections.

Roger Waldinger (2013)

The use of a social movement framework in understanding the nature of diasporas remains a recently developed practice. It emerged largely in response to the dominance of the analysis of diasporas as actors of transnational processes—from financial donors of armed groups or neutral third parties in the prevention and resolution of violent conflicts, to agents of democratization and development in their homeland through participation in elections (Baser 2016; Byman et al. 2001; DeWind and Segura 2014; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Lyons and Mandaville 2012; Sheffer 2003; Smith and Stares 2007). Although these studies have contributed to theory development, they have largely understated the social construction of a transnational “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) that is central to the formation of diasporas. Boundary crossing and dispersal of migrants are insufficient to explain the politicization of identity categories rooted in the homeland (Sökefeld 2006). From a constructivist perspective, exiles and migrants become a diaspora through the discursive and framing processes by political entrepreneurs (Adamson 2012; Faist 2010; Koinova 2013).

In view of the strengths and weaknesses of existing theoretical approaches in the study of exiles' and migrants' involvement in homeland politics mentioned in chapter one, this chapter evaluates the application of a social movement framework in diaspora construction. I use the dominant canon of the political process theory, which was developed primarily based on the reform movements of U.S. citizens in the 1960s onwards. Since the dissertation focuses on the making of diasporas through political mobilization, I also discuss mechanisms and processes that recur across a wide range of contentious politics, in the tradition of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) and other scholars that have advanced the research agenda of *Dynamics of Contention*.¹⁴ As stated in the previous chapter, due to the limitations of social movement theories in explaining mobilizations that challenge nation-state-based citizenship, I incorporate ideas from long-distance nationalism and migrant political transnationalism to account for a full range of variations within social movement concepts.

2.1 DIASPORA AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION¹⁵

Diaspora often refers to religious or national groups living outside an imagined homeland (Faist 2010). From a political science perspective, Shain (2005:51-52) describes diaspora as “a people

¹⁴ For criticisms of the *Dynamics of Contention* project, see “Book Symposium: Focus on Dynamics of Contention” (Mobilization 2003). Weaknesses identified include obfuscation of mechanisms and processes by not showing precisely how they worked and what appropriate methods to use in documenting them. A special issue of *Mobilization* (2011) built on the shortcomings of *Dynamics of Contention* to further advance a mechanisms-oriented approach in the study of contentious politics.

¹⁵ In surveying the literature on diaspora, it is important to be cognizant of the “diaspora” diaspora (Brubaker 2005), a dispersion of the meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual, and disciplinary space. In recent years, the term has appeared in both academic works and journalistic accounts to refer to nearly every migrant group. This is mainly due to its metaphorical usage (Bruneau 2010) and the conflation of diaspora as a social form and diaspora as a type of consciousness (Sökefeld 2006). Brubaker (2005:3) warns, “the universalization of diaspora, paradoxically, means the disappearance of diaspora.”

with a common national origin who regard themselves, or are regarded by others, as members or potential members of the national community of their home nation, a status held regardless of their geographical location and their citizenship outside their national soil.” Cohen (1997) claims that the idea of a diaspora varies greatly. However,

all diasporic communities settled outside their natal (or imagined natal) territories, acknowledge that “the old country”—a notion often buried in language, religion, custom or folklore—always has some claim on their loyalty and emotions. That claim may be strong or weak, or boldly or meekly articulated in a give circumstance or historical period, but a member’s adherence to a diasporic community is demonstrated by an acceptance of an inescapable link with their past migration history and a sense of co-ethnicity with others of a similar background. (Cohen 1997:ix)

Early discussions of diaspora emphasize forced and traumatic dispersion, homeland orientation, and strict boundary maintenance as constitutive elements (Brubaker 2005; Bruneau 2010; Safran 1991; Tölölyan 1996). Dislocation occurs not only by being “out of place,” when one leaves a particular place and lives elsewhere; rather, the uprooting takes place due to coercion and thus emphasizes unintended action (Sökefeld 2006). Thus, involvement in homeland politics does not appear unusual; rather, it is expected since they regard their ancestral homeland as their true and ideal home, to which they or their descendants would eventually return when conditions are suitable. This is because, according to Tölölyan (1996:13), “diasporas are displaced but homogeneous and established ‘ethnies’ that, while still in their homeland, were already endowed with protonational social and cultural characteristics.” Political activity is also much higher among stateless diasporas compared to other types, especially if they share a

common goal of secession or if an ongoing conflict prevails in the homeland (Baser and Swain 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001, 2003).

Recent literature, however, has foregrounded the process of *becoming* a diaspora through the strategic mobilization of constituencies around a homeland political issue on the basis of shared ideas and collective identities (Baser and Swain 2010; Bercovitch 2007; Bruneau 2010; Koinova 2014; Shain 2005; Sökefeld 2006). Scholars critique the failure to engage the question of human agency in migrants' intentions and argue that "objective" circumstances must include a subjective interpretation in the formation of a diaspora. Sentiments of belonging and attachment to a homeland do not make a diaspora since they only provide the codes for which a diaspora is imagined (Sökefeld 2006). Central to the imagination of community are discourses on shared identity that catalyze or hinder mobilization and, at the same time, are also products of the mobilization process. Hence, emphasis on mobilization avoids the trap of essentialization and groupism and recasts the research problem on why and how discourses that become the foundation of a diasporic identity arises among a certain group of people across time and space.

To explain the construction of diasporas through political and social mobilization, scholars have used and advocated the use of social movement theory, which requires examining the interaction and combined influence of the shifting political environment, constellation of actors and organizations, and construction of a diasporic consciousness (Adamson 2012; Amarasingam 2015; Fair 2005; Koinova 2013; Landolt 2008; Lyon and Uçarer 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Sökefeld 2006; Wayland 2004). Like all types of mobilization, the making of a diaspora hinges on the ability of political entrepreneurs to galvanize existing networks of migrants and refugees and to draw on resources in response to opportunities (Adamson 2004; Moore 2002). Often, these leaders gained experience from earlier forms of

collective action, such as political exiles, who, prior to their departure, were engaged in movements to overthrow the existing homeland government (Shain 1994/95). They carefully select mobilizing issues and formulate them in a language that appeals to migrants.

In pursuit of a political goal, a key task of these diaspora entrepreneurs is “to construct or deploy ideologies and categories that can be used to create new political groups out of existing social networks...and frame the experiences of those who have subjectively experienced dislocation and marginalization” (Adamson 2004:49-50). This is because migration does not entail the mere transfer of identities from the country of origin to that settlement, but rather a recreation in a new context. To foster mobilization, political entrepreneurs may draw upon highly parochial or particularistic ideas, articulated in the language of national loyalty and attachment to a territorial homeland (Lyons and Mandaville 2012). They may also use universalist frameworks such as liberalism to advance the goals related to their homeland (Adamson 2004; Koinova 2010). For example, both Jewish- and Arab-Americans have portrayed their commitment to Israel and Palestine respectively as an extension of their allegiance to American democratic values and strategic interests (Shain 1994/95).

In sum, diaspora as a social construction suggests attention to the discursive and political practices of elite actors often during contentious events and episodes, which render more visible a transnational imagined community. In essence, like other social movements, diaspora mobilization as a transnational political project stems from the interplay of opportunities and threats, resources in the community, and strategic deployment of ideologies and identities. Unpacking the underlying processes and mechanisms that lead to different pathways and trajectories is central to the analysis of diaspora formation.

2.2 POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY

Despite criticisms,¹⁶ the political process theory, pioneered by Doug McAdam, remains the hegemonic framework in social movement scholarship (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). It focuses on the interaction between movement attributes, such as organizational structure, and the broader economic and political context. It proposes that the likelihood a social movement develops along with its subsequent trajectories is contingent upon three sets of conditions: expanding political opportunities, mobilization of resources, and cultural framings and shared identity (Goodwin and Jasper 2012; McAdam 1988; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 2011). Like its predecessors such as collective behavior, Marxist, and relative deprivation theories, the political process theory attempts to account for both external and internal factors that influence social movement emergence and outcomes. External variables, which are often referred to as political opportunity structures, include elites' party affiliations and alliances, existing laws and policies, regime type, and relations among states. Internal variables include collective identity, ideology, financial resources, leadership, and organizational structure.

2.2.1 Political Opportunity Structures

The prospects for groups and individuals to advance particular claims, mobilize resources, and shape outcomes depend on the political environment in which mobilization unfolds (Kriesi 2004; McAdam 1996; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Gamson and Meyer (1996) and Meyer (2003) argue that political opportunity variables range from stable (i.e., institutional structures)

¹⁶ For a comprehensive critique of the political process model, especially on its static treatment of structures and culture and the lack of focus on dynamic interactions, see Goodwin and Jasper (1999); McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001); Meyer (1999); and Polletta (1999a, 1999b).

to volatile (i.e., issue salience and public opinion). The stable elements are useful in comparing mobilization across space especially in differences in movement activity and relative success in different countries. When the focus is on change over time, the volatile elements are more central to the analysis. Research has identified four volatile elements that are important for the emergence and growth of social movements: the relative openness of the institutionalized political system, the stability of the broad set of elite alignments that typically uphold a polity, the presence of elite allies, and the state's capacity and propensity for repression (Jasper 2012; McAdam 1996; Tarrow 2011). These features of the political opportunity structure remain paradigmatic in social movement studies. Meyer and Minkoff (2004), however, suggest distinguishing between general changes in the political context (e.g., state breakdown) and issue- or constituency-specific factors (e.g., immigration legislation).

For individuals and groups involved in homeland politics, a distinct type of transnational activism, analyses must take into account the political opportunity structures in the homeland *and* host country and how they interact. As (Bauböck 2010:316) argues, “analysing diaspora from an agency perspective requires examining not only the group's elites and their projects, but also their opportunity structures shaped by other agents, including governments in the country of settlement and the external homeland.” The political environment in both homeland and hostland influence the possibility, nature, and trajectory of transnational activism (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Issues pertaining to the nature of regimes, for instance, are crucial in the analysis of diaspora mobilization since incentives and constraints originate from the polity in their host country, often democratic, but the target of their actions is their homeland government, most likely authoritarian.

Extant theories suggest that consociational and multicultural democratic states such as the Netherlands provide opportunities for diaspora mobilization (Lijphart 1977). Recent studies, however, have yielded contradictory results. A system of government that combines politico-denominational segregation of society and minority polity, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, can both promote and discourage homeland political activity (Fennema and Tillie 1999, 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001). Thus, stable political structures in the host states alone cannot explain diaspora mobilization. Volatile issue- or group-specific opportunities, such as immigration, integration, and foreign policies, are more crucial in the analysis.

Immigration laws determine the demographic composition of ethnic communities in the hostland and the networks for mobilization, while integration policies influence the ties within and outside the communities and their relationship to the host state and society. In countries with immigration policies that combine liberal and open asylum systems, guest worker programs, family reunification, and permanent immigration, the migrant community exhibits diversity in terms of age, class, gender, citizenship, and political socialization. In addition, in states that promote assimilation such as the U.S. or France, migrants occupy a delicate position in their host societies because of the social pressure to become American or French. Participation in social movements for homeland political issues may be misconstrued as a lack of loyalty to their adopted country (Klandermans, Toorn, and Stekelenburg 2008).

Opportunities for mobilization, however, are not found solely in formal political institutions. Koopmans and Statham (1999) and Koopmans et al. (2005) broaden the notion of the “political” by focusing their analysis of collective action on the relationship between models of citizenship and identities expressed in the public sphere. They introduce the framework of “discursive opportunity structure” to help analysts explain the consequences of discursive

constructions, derived from national conceptions of citizenship, on the collective identities that become the basis for claims making and the condition of migrants to membership in the political community.

Discursive opportunities determine which collective identities and substantive demands have a high likelihood to gain *visibility* in the mass media, to *resonate* with the claims of other collective actors, and to achieve *legitimacy* in the public discourse. (Koopmans et al. 2005:19 [italics in the original])

For instance, in Britain, migrants are racially categorized, compared to France's *immigres* (immigrants), Germany's *Auslander* (foreigners), and The Netherlands *etnische minderheden* (ethnic minorities) (Koopmans et al. 2005). Thus, the prominence of race in Britain offers an opportunity for migrants of African descent to obtain presence in the public sphere and put them in a privileged position compared to other minorities. These constructions also cultivate transnational tendencies. Traditional, exclusionary, and segregationist citizenship regimes allow migrants to retain strong material and emotional ties to their homelands (Koopmans et al. 2005).

Linkages between the host and homeland states constitute the most important element of the political opportunity structure for claims making. Foreign policies can shape diaspora mobilization by identifying a specific target and opening access to the institutionalized political system and elite allies in the host society. The growing literature on state relations and diasporas has focused on the conditions that enable migrants and exiles to influence the policy of their host government towards their homeland through ethnic lobbying. However, Koinova (2014:1047) observes that state-centric theoretical approaches merely "capture institutional and policy variation, not their implications for transnational diaspora politics."

While no consensus exists on the scope and nature of diasporic influence on foreign policy, scholars agree that contextual and attribute-based factors shape the ability of groups to achieve their goals (Rubenzer 2008). Contextual factors consist of convergence with the hostland's short- and long-term strategic interests (DeWind and Segura 2014; Grugel and Kippin 2007; Shain 1994/95; Uslander 1998), ideological compatibility with the executive (Haney and Vanderbush 1999), government permeability to ethnic influence (Heindl 2013; Moore 2002), and favorable public opinion (Watanabe 1984). Equally important are qualities of the diaspora related to political unity and organization strength (Haney and Vanderbush 1999), demographic size (Smith 2000), assimilation in the host society (Ahrari 1987), and financial resources among others (Rubenzer 2008).

Because of the importance given to foreign policy lobbying as the key strategy by which migrants and exiles engage in diaspora politics, the literature has been unable to explain how the nature and strength of relations between the host and homeland states shape mobilization patterns—including channels of engagement; organizational capacity; political entrepreneurship; and activation of discourses, symbols, and frames. To be sure, the official posture of the hostland toward the home government significantly affects the propensity for diaspora mobilization (Shain 1994/95). Foreign policies can shape opportunities for migrants and exiles by identifying a specific target, opening access to the institutionalized political system, and connecting to elite allies in the host society. All these make ethnic lobbying a productive pursuit.

Yet, diaspora mobilization might not center on influencing hostland policymakers through institutional routes, especially if the hostland's foreign policy is not important to the homeland or if spaces for state engagement are closed. Diasporas rarely have clearly unified agendas. They are actors that engage strategically in homeland projects, with aims and interests

that are manifold and mutable in different periods (Baser and Swain 2010). The changing nature of the conflict and the political systems in both homeland and host countries influence the behavior and strategies of diasporas (Cochrane 2007; Sheffer 1986).

With the help of transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), diaspora entrepreneurs may seek other venues of engaging state actors and the public such as regional or supranational institutions. Koinova (2014:1045) argues that two variables need to be considered together to explain different mobilization patterns: the host state's foreign policy stance towards the homeland's goal and diaspora positionality, which she defines as "the relative power diaspora entrepreneurs perceive as deriving from their social positions in a transnational space between host state and homeland." Her findings suggest that activists seek transnational channels when the hostland's foreign policy stance is closed to homeland goals. However, a diaspora that draws its social support predominantly from the hostland may still prefer state-based channels through ethnic lobbying, despite the absence of institutional access.

Homeland states that combine democratic and authoritarian elements may nurture the desirability of armed revolutionary groups because the government has subverted the principles and institutions of democracy through corruption, fraudulent elections, and violations of human rights. In this case, migrants may be engaged in two or more forms of political contention, such as funding of alternative political parties, conspiracy for coup d'état, and lobbying other states to withdraw support for the regime. They may also choose to fund homeland opposition parties and insurgent movements to help bolster their ability to depose the regime in power (Bolzman 2011; Byman et al. 2001; Fair 2005). In post-conflict situations or transition to democracy, diasporas mobilize to rebuild democratic institutions, strengthen civil society, and promote justice, truth, and reconciliation (Bercovitch 2007).

Sending governments' policies to their former citizens overseas are also decisive in the analysis. For instance, Turkey is a "strategically selective state" that encourages certain forms of transnational participation and regulates the type and form of migrant activities (Mügge 2010). Some home regimes attempt to discredit exiles and migrants by portraying them as subversives, foreign agents, or traitors to the nation and framing their exploits abroad as acts of treason or conspiracies to national interest (Shain 2005). An example is Augusto Pinochet's response to the political activities of Chilean exiles, by fabricating stories of a "golden exile," a comfortable, even luxurious existence that contrasted harshly with the economic hardship faced by many Chileans at home" (Wright and Oñate Zuñiga 2007:35).

2.2.2 Resource Mobilization

Social movements do not develop without linkages between groups and individuals, material resources, and larger societal support (Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Piven and Cloward 1979). Contemporary scholars such as Bob (2005), Diani (2004), Dyke and McCammon (2010), Klandermans (1992), Morris and Staggenborg (2004), Polletta (1999a), Rucht (2004), and Staggenborg (1986, 1998) advanced concepts like coalitions, competition, free spaces, leadership, international support from non-government organizations, multi-organizational fields, networks, professionalization, and movement communities, which are all relevant in explaining diaspora mobilization. A point of departure, however, is demographic shift in the migrant population.

Different migrant cohorts bring with them various resources. In general, age, education, gender, income, political socialization, length of stay, migrant status, and reason for migration influence involvement in collective action (Mügge 2010). The key in the analysis is to treat

diaspora communities as ever shifting and adjusting to political and social contexts. Because of demographic evolution, the politics of exiles and migrants is likely to diversify to accommodate parallel processes such as assimilation and return.

For instance, exile communities are often demographically homogeneous, as they constitute, for the most part, members of the opposition to the ruling party or activists who are targets of the dictatorship due to their actual or suspected political views and actions. Changes in the population occur as the home regime loosens its grip on the movement of its citizens. Later on, as the case of Chilean exiles shows, the community becomes an assorted mix of actors and groups, which include left-wing parties, trade unions, guerrillas, students, professional associations, and community organizers, engaged in various forms of political activities from human rights work to revolutionary mobilization (Wright and Oñate 1998; Wright and Oñate Zuñiga 2007).

Network structures are essential in connecting individuals to each other and thus increasing their chances of becoming involved in social movements, building social capital, fostering civic and political participation, and nurturing collective identities (Diani 2004; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008). A related concept is the multiorganizational field (Curtis and Zurcher 1973), which enables researchers to look at the embedding of a movement in its wider organizational environment and to identify alliance and conflict systems that promote or inhibit mobilization (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Klandermans 1992). This field can expand and contract over time for different types of movements.

Studies show that among migrants, dense family and village networks become the foundation for transnational social fields (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994;

Boccagni 2010; Levitt 2001; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999). It is likely that hometown associations, cultural societies, and ethnic business groups predominated in the multi-organizational field of migrants. An interesting question is the degree to which the homeland resources are transplanted, replicated, and/or adapted in the host societies that created favorable conditions for diaspora mobilization. The politicization of pre-existing networks and fields, especially with older migrant communities, is also an invaluable resource for social movements.

Polletta (1999a:1) highlights the significance of free spaces—“small-scale settings within a community or movement that are removed from the direct control of dominant groups”—in generating counterhegemonic ideas and identities by providing an institutional anchor for cultural challenges that pave the way and support political struggles. While they do not necessarily imply physical or social separation and isolation from mainstream institutions, they do require small size, intimacy, and rootedness in enduring communities with their own sets of beliefs, values, and symbols (Polletta 1999a). In the case of migrants, ethnic enclaves often serve as “sequestered social sites” outside the control of governing elites, where a shared autonomous discourse—the “hidden transcript” of resistance—develops (Scott 1990).

The importance of social ties for diaspora mobilization prompts an analysis of leadership and brokerage. Diani (2003) and Nepstad and Bob (2006) conceptualize leadership in relational terms since the making of a leader occurs through a dialectical interaction with a mass base. It rests on both personal traits of particular individuals and the recognition and attribution of this status. Morris and Staggenborg (2004) argue that social movement leaders tend to come from privileged class backgrounds that have endowed them with cultural and social capital to pursue strategic goals. These “political entrepreneurs” have often gained experience from earlier forms of collective action (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

A key task of leaders of exiled groups and organizations, especially those that predated the period of displacement, is the preservation of their political identities, organizational apparatus, and symbols of resistance, especially in the face of rivalry (Shain 2005). Homeland politics among migrants are not devoid of political divisions and competition since even those who share common ethnicity or ideology hardly possess a unified agenda. These conflicts often emanate from alliances with different homeland political parties or ideologies. Thus, leaders carefully select mobilizing issues and formulate them in a language that appeals to migrants.

2.2.3 Discourses, Strategic Frames, and Collective Identity

The cultural analysis of social movements involves both products (e.g., artifacts, beliefs, customs, emotions, narratives, rituals, symbols, and values) and the interactive processes (e.g., consumption, everyday conversations, and major historical events). Johnston and Klandermans (1995:12-13) look at movement culture in two ways: systemic, which emphasizes “description in order to trace the role of culture in group integration and longevity or in patterning social relationships;” and performative, which conceptualizes culture as “a stock of knowledge that allows a person to perform as a competent member of a society.” The core of culture in social movements, therefore, concerns meaning construction in relation to structures.

Two processes have been dominant in this literature: framing and collective identity formation. In social movements, collective action frames are not merely cognitive constructs or aggregations of individual attitudes or perceptions; rather they are negotiated, shared sets of beliefs and meanings that organize experience and guide action (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson 1992; Snow 2004). They are also created and changed in the process of contestation (Zald 1996). Collective action frames not only identify problems, attribute blame, and define

solutions (injustice frame), but must also motivate action (agency frame) and express a collective identity (identity frame), all of these circumscribed within shared societal definitions (Gamson 1995). Snow et al. (1986:467) propose a variety of mechanisms through which social movements align their claims with the dominant culture. One is frame bridging or the “linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem.”

Scholars employing the framing perspective have generally approached it from a strategic perspective that revolves around the deliberate manipulation of symbols for micromobilization and media influence (Ayres 2004; Benford 1993; Bob 2005; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; McCarthy, Smith, and Zald 1996; Rohlinger 2002). Steinberg (1998), however, advocates the investigation of the discursive fields within which the framing process takes place. For him, discourse is dialogic and essentially a terrain of conflict fraught with underlying ambiguities and contradictions. On the other hand, Oliver and Johnston (2004) bemoan the conflation of frame and ideology, which has led to the dilution or neglect of the systems of ideas and worldviews that guide collective action, in favor of the potency of communicative persuasion. They recommend bringing ideology back in by analyzing the origins and logic of beliefs about society and their intersection with structures of power.

For members of a group to become engaged in contention, an oppositional consciousness¹⁷ must develop (Morris and Braine 2001), and in the process of collective action and political contestation, social movements “transform cultural representations, social norms—

¹⁷ Morris and Braine (2001:21) defines oppositional consciousness as “an empowering mental state that prepares members of an oppressed group to act to undermine, reform, or overthrow a system of human domination. Minimally, that mental state includes identifying with a subordinate group, concluding that the mechanisms that have produced at least some of the groups inequalities are unjust, opposing the injustice, and seeing a common interest within the subordinate group in eliminating the injustice.” Not all subordinated groups, however, develop oppositional consciousness.

how groups see themselves and are seen by others” (Polletta and Jasper 2001:284). This is particularly relevant to social movement organizations among migrants, whose identities were politicized through the experiences of relocation and settlement and whose culture as a boundary marker expands and contracts as the community to which they are embedded undergoes transformation. Wald (2008) argues that a politicized ethnic identity is less likely to develop among cohorts or groups formed by voluntary migration in search of economic opportunity, compared to those forced out of their home country by political upheaval.

Incorporating frames and collective identity in the analysis of mobilization for homeland politics prompt us to regard the migrant community as a discursive field for the conflict-riven process of meaning making by various, often opposed actors. In particular, migrants interrogate ethnicity and nationality as foundations for collective identity within this field. Discourses pivot not only on their common culture but also on interpretations of national history, especially the social and political forces that have shaped their home society. These discourses are prevalent in everyday conversations in the workplace or the household, ethnic media, myths, and narratives passed on to subsequent generations, business transactions, and social gatherings.

In the discursive construction of collective identity, exiles and migrants often wrestle with charges of national disloyalty, which generate feelings of anxiety, bitterness, and guilt (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1998; Shain 2005). They are compelled to exhibit their standing as national loyalists for strategic mobilization and defense of their continued belonging to the homeland. Through sustained performances of their national identity, they counter the fear of being forgotten and the guilt of becoming too contented in their host country with the passing of time. The difficulty rests on the portrayal of their struggle from afar to depose a native home regime as a patriotic mission, especially since they are detached from the day-to-day suffering of

the people whom they claim to represent (Anderson 1992; Koinova 2010; Wright and Oñate Zuñiga 2007).

Affective bonds, couched in the language of loyalty to the nation, are particularly crucial not just in homeland-oriented migrant mobilization, but also in day-to-day coping with disenchantment, homesickness, and marginalization in the host society, and regret at leaving the homeland. The motherland becomes an “identity reservoir,” a reference to one’s earlier life and as “a source for nostalgia and as an implicit standard according to which one makes sense of values, habits, and life experiences in the context of immigration” (Boccagni 2010:188). Thus, a cultural approach on homeland-oriented activism among migrants is grounded on the salience of national identity and persistence of affective bonds as members of the imagined community.

2.3 DYNAMICS OF CONTENTION

While political process theory explains the conditions and determinants of protest, it neglects to capture mechanisms and processes that link variables to outcomes. To complement variable-based explanations to the emergence, growth, and outcomes of social movements, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) developed a relational approach to contentious politics. Among its arguments is widening the focus of episodes of contention to include multiple social actors, not just challengers and authorities. As the empirical cases in the dissertation will show, locating diaspora mobilization within a broader field of agents, mechanisms, and processes can explain its occurrence in spite of contextual disadvantages.

Three types of mechanisms combine in complex cycles of contention. One is dispositional, such as the attribution of opportunity or threat. The sequential model of threat and

opportunities in protest waves, especially in authoritarian settings, suggests the importance of perceiving and interpreting cues from the opening or closing political environment and devising organizational and tactical adaptations (Almeida 2003). Gamson and Meyer (1996) have argued the importance of movement framing of opportunities in justifying strategic choices. For instance, activists can create rather than wait for opportunities by generating controversy in mainstream mass media to make their issues salient. The twin mechanisms of certification (“validation of actors, their performances, and their claims by external authorities”) and decertification (“withdrawal of such validation by certifying agents”) (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001:121) also shape collective attribution by signifying the existence of a set of concerns and the recognition of a constituency around it (Furuyama and Meyer 2011).

Another mechanism is environmental, which include population growth or resource depletion. Generational processes, for example, affect social movement continuity, not only in terms of recruitment and personnel, but also in ensuring political commitment through the internalization of a collective identity across time. Whittier (1997:775) contends that “the extent to which cohort turnover produces change within social movement organizations also depends on organizational memory, or the effectiveness of information storage and retrieval that allows later activists to learn from their predecessors’ experiences.” As the movement participation of long-time militants decline with biographical change, replenishing the ranks entails both cohort replacement, shift in organizational structure and culture, intergenerational redefinition of movement identity.

Lastly, relational mechanisms facilitate interaction and establish connections among individuals, groups, and networks. Kolins Givan, Roberts, and Soule (2010) have identified three main pathways by which contention diffuses: relational, or the transfer of tactics and frames

through direct contact; indirect, often through global media communications; and mediated, whereby a third actor act as intermediary between two unconnected activists groups. Contention may also spread vertically through scale shift, wherein activists move claims from one site or level of the polity to another (Tarrow 2005; Tarrow and McAdam 2005).

Although protest stems from the unique political and cultural context in which it is rooted, movements can affect the mobilization of other actors by shaping the terrain upon which challengers with different issues or in distinct periods pursue their struggles (McAdam and Rucht 1993). McAdam (1995) introduces the concept of “initiator” and “spin-off” movements to explain the emergence of ideologically and temporally proximate movements within a particular cycle of protest. Often, it is the “early risers” (Tarrow 2011) or initiator movements that supply the critical political organizational context within which later movements develop. It is also possible that “the ideas, tactics, style, participants and organizations of one movement often *spill over* its boundaries to affect other social movements” (Meyer and Whittier 1994:277 [italics in the original]). Furthermore, in between upsurge in mobilization, the structures created by early organizations—pre-existing activist network, an extant toolkit of goals and tactics, and a collective identity that could justify eventual opposition—can shape movements in the distant future (Taylor 1989). We see these mechanisms and processes transpire in the mobilization of Filipinos in the U.S. and the Netherlands for homeland regime change.

2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Diaspora mobilization entails traversing two distinct cultural, economic, political, and social systems, with different constructions of citizens’ relationship to the nation-state. Using social

movement theory, analysis must explain the dynamic interaction of political opportunities and threats in both sending and receiving states; the relocation and reproduction of cultural, political and social resources from the homeland to the host society, as well as their maintenance; and the discursive construction of loyalty to the homeland as a foundation of collective identity. Because opportunities and constraints emanate from two polities, migrants and exiles may engage in two or more forms of contention.

The theory also stresses the important role of resources, which, in the case of diaspora mobilization, are dependent on the sociodemographic characteristics of migrants, their embeddedness in networks, and their cultural and social capital. These also change in time, as different cohorts of migrants arrive, with their own material and symbolic resources. Waves of migration and parallel processes of assimilation and return continuously transform the type and density of ties and social relations that lay the foundation for mobilization. This raises the question: Does the physical relocation of migrants also entail the transplanting, en masse, of cultural, political, and social resources for mobilization?

Lastly, culture and identity lie at the heart of homeland-oriented migrant mobilization. What are the circumstances in which imagined community remains meaningful? Loyalty to the nation in both cognitive and emotional sense, which is often expressed in the language of democracy, defines the subjectivities of migrants who are engaged in such type of political activities. This, however, does not necessarily involve a counter-hegemonic logic that challenges identities rooted in particularistic attachments. Nonetheless, a collective identity is continuously constructed and negotiated within the discursive field of the migrant community.

3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

A transnational methodology has to consider both deterritorialized elements in the form of intense flows across the borders of states and territorial elements in the efforts of states and organizations to control such flows and establish criteria of membership for persons.
Thomas Faist (2012)

The goal of the dissertation is to undertake both descriptive and causal inferences using comparative historical analysis, a methodology concerned with analyzing causal relationships and explaining processes over time through systematic and contextualized comparisons (Mahoney 2004; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Ragin 1987). Adopting a processual view of cross-border phenomena (Faist 2012), the research is fundamentally concerned with identifying and explaining the mechanisms that produce the major outcome of interest, which is the construction of the Filipino diaspora through mobilization for homeland regime change. I intend to do this by providing nuanced historical interpretation of my cases and identifying recurring patterns and other systematic features, determining junctures that explain causal relationships and mechanisms, and specifying pathways through which conjunctions or configurations produce the outcome.

This project goes beyond the mere application of social movement framework to a historical event or process. Rather, the theoretical problem that the dissertation addresses is the process by which a group of mostly permanent immigrants and temporary economic workers

become a diaspora through contention. The main research questions of the study are: How do organizations in migrant communities mobilize to oppose authoritarian rule and institute democracy in their homeland? How does mobilization vary across different countries of settlement and time periods? What accounts for the differences across national contexts and junctures?

3.1 CASE STUDY RESEARCH AND PROCESS TRACING

Typical of small-*n* qualitative research, I derive from within-case analysis the main leverage for causal inference (George and Bennett 2005; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Scholars use within-case analysis to locate the intervening mechanisms linking a hypothesized explanatory variable to an outcome. It entails a focus on specific events and processes taking place over time within each individual case to understand how these lead to certain outcomes and not others.

To locate the causal mechanisms and processes linking my explanatory variables to the outcome, I utilize process tracing, a technique that centers on sequential processes within a particular historical case (Bennett 2010; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Bennet and Elman (2006) argue that a process-tracing explanation is more persuasive than large-*n* studies for exploring the processes by which initial conditions are translated into outcomes because it links a story from the beginning to the end. Scholars employ process tracing in studies of social movements where the focus is on *how* rather than *why* questions (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). It offers an alternative way for making causal inferences when it is not possible to do so through the method of controlled comparison (George and Bennett 2005).

Since I am concerned with the construction of diaspora through political mobilization, I

combine positivist and interpretivist process tracing, wherein I focus on determining whether a particular factor can be traced and linked to another while at the same time evaluating the “preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their goals, their values and their specification of the situations that face them” (Venesson 2008:233). Different variants of the process tracing method exist (see Collier 2011; George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney 2012). Based on my research goals and questions, I use a mix of explaining-outcome and theory-building approaches. The former focuses on formulating “a minimally sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific historical case,” while the latter seeks to “build a generalizable theoretical explanation from empirical evidence” (Beach and Brun Pedersen 2013:3).

3.2 CONCEPTS, VARIABLES, AND MEASURES

Drawing from social movement theory, my dependent variable is *diaspora mobilization*, which I measure as the participation of predominantly Filipino organizations in transgressive and contained contention for homeland regime change. I have two sets of explanatory variables. The first one encapsulates aspects within the external environment (political opportunity structures) and the other captures organizational- and community-level factors (resources and identities). For the former, I look at volatile, issue- or group-specific opportunities. These are immigration policies, citizenship norms and practices, and homeland-hostland state linkages. The internal variables central to explaining diaspora mobilization are network structure and multi-organizational field, leadership, and collective identity.

3.2.1 Immigration Policies

Immigration policies constitute the degree of openness and regulation of entry and exit for permanent immigrants, temporary foreign workers, and refugees. They determine who will constitute the migrant community and the networks for mobilization. In countries with immigration policies that combine liberal and open asylum systems, guest worker programs, family reunification, and permanent immigration, the migrant community exhibits diversity in terms of age, class, gender, citizenship, and political socialization. They produce rich and extensive ties and encourage the formation of organizations and imbrication of networks. These are important as the processes that transform opposition into action take root and crystallize in voluntary social relationships and institutions that promote community and civic culture.

3.2.2 Integration Policies

Citizenship norms and practices influence the ties within and outside the migrant communities and their relationship to the host state. They shape how migrants are integrated into the receiving society. Multiculturalism guided the Dutch state, in contrast to the U.S.'s assimilationist framework. This is particularly relevant for diaspora activism because of the centrality of political socialization in the course of integration into the receiving society. While countries guided by multiculturalist framework may encourage participation in social movements for homeland political issues, assimilation can expand the social ties and networks of migrants beyond their communities, allowing them to participate in the same civil society as native citizens. This increases their pool of resources for mobilization.

3.2.3 Homeland-Hostland State Linkage

Since the aim of the overseas movements of Filipinos against the Marcos dictatorship was to influence democratization processes through international pressure, I adopt Levitsky and Way's (2010) conceptualization of linkage as encompassing the myriad networks of interdependence that connect individual polities, economies and societies to each other. Six dimensions of linkage are important: economic (flows of trade, investment, and credit); intergovernmental (including bilateral diplomatic and military ties); technocratic (share of the homeland's elite that is educated in the hostland); social (flows of people across borders); information (flows of information between the homeland and hostland); and civil-society (especially transnational activist networks). Differences in the U.S.'s and Netherlands's density of ties and cross-border flows to the Philippines offer theoretical insights into the role of foreign relations on strategic choices of political entrepreneurs. Since the Dutch and Philippine states were only minimally connected in three areas (economic, intergovernmental, and social), I characterize their linkage as weak, compared to the relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines forged through decades of colonialism and thus comprised all six elements in significant degrees.

3.2.4 Network Structure and Multi-Organizational Field

Diani (2003b:6) defines networks as "set of nodes, linked by some form of relationship, and delimited by some specific criteria." While the project examines how connections among social actors and institutions lead to diaspora mobilization, it does not identify specific structural patterns and explain their influence on the independent variable, commonly associated with social network analysis. Rather, I assess the relations formed in transnational social fields and

their impact on the mechanisms of diaspora activism. I also explain the creation and evolution of a movement community through the processes of migration, settlement, and contention and the ways by which they transform social and political ties.

3.2.5 Leadership

Since homeland politics is fraught with competition among various organizations to win the support of the overseas community, leaders become important interlocutors of the common goals of migrants as valuable members of the nation-state. Leaders of migrant organizations are pivotal to the analysis and interpretation of the situation in the homeland and to the recasting of the individual migrant experience to a collective and political adversity. I look at how they produce meaning and articulate reflexive knowledge and convert this analysis into political activism.

3.2.6 Collective Identity

I investigate the construction and negotiation of collective identity by looking at discourses within the social movement organizations and the migrant community that encourage continued participation in homeland politics. I analyze how activists, through narratives and practices, interrogate ethnicity and appeal to sentiments of belonging using other identity categories. Lastly, I examine the invocation of various *leitmotifs* in Philippine history, the appropriation of the rhetoric of resistance, the mobilization of nostalgia to justify the diasporic struggle for regime change.

3.3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The data for this research come from a wide range of sources, including archival documents; interviews; and published historical accounts. Data collection was conducted in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, The Hague, Leiden, Nijmegen, Rotterdam, Tilburg, and Utrecht) in July 2012 and in October to November 2013; in the Philippines (Quezon City) from February to April 2014; and the U.S. (Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco Bay Area, and Seattle) in June to August 2014. Through cross-referencing and triangulation, I exercised caution and critical reflection in collecting and evaluating historical data, especially with regard to authenticity, credibility, and representativeness.

The primary data sources consist of 1,282 pages of written records of social movement organizations (minutes of meetings, position papers, press releases, flyers, official correspondence, and newsletters such as *Ang Katipunan*, *FFP Washington Report*, *MFP Newsletter*, and *CTF Bulletin*); unpublished personal accounts of activists (autobiographies, diaries, letters, memoirs); government documents (communiqué, official reports, policy papers, transcript of hearings); and news accounts in ethnic and mainstream press (*Philippine News*, *The New York Times*, and *The Washington Post*) in mostly English and Tagalog. These were gathered from the personal archives of activists and the various collections on the Philippines at the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam, the Daniel Boone Schirmer Collection of the University of the Philippines-Diliman Main Library in Quezon City, the Suzzallo and Allen Libraries of the University of Washington in Seattle, and the Asian American Studies Center of the University of California, Los Angeles. A Filipino key informant, who is proficient in the Dutch language, translated a few documents in from Dutch to English. Analysis of archival data situates the deployment of resources, development of strategies and actions, and unfolding of

debates in the organizations within the political and social environments in which diaspora mobilization took place.

A challenge in establishing causal sequences in process tracing using movement records is the absence of dates in a few of the documents. To supplement archival data, especially where historical documentation is missing, I also conducted 53 in-depth semi-structured interviews, averaging 75 minutes each, with movement participants. I selected my key informants using snowball sampling, which is commonly used for members of a population that have not all been previously identified and are more difficult to locate. This is especially the case for Filipino activists who worked clandestinely in both the Netherlands and the U.S. I interviewed until I reached a “saturation” point, that is, when no new information was being elicited. The bulk of my data from interviews coalesce around remembrances, analyses, and interpretation of the current state of affairs when diaspora mobilization took place. Specifically, interview data allow me to account for seizure of political opportunities among leaders and members of the organizations, the decision-making processes in light of changes in the opportunity structures, and the construction of collective identity.

Using an interview schedule (see Appendix B), I had face-to-face conversations with 52 key informants. I interviewed 10 former activists in the Philippines, 25 in the Netherlands, 17 in the U.S., and one through Skype, an application that provides video chat and video call services. I conducted the interviews in English and Tagalog, depending on the key informant’s preference. My Filipino informants often switched languages in the middle of the exchange. I used a digital voice recorder and hired a professional transcriptionist to transcribe the interviews verbatim. Three of my informants did not agree to audio documentation, so I took extensive notes of their responses. Before the interview commenced, I asked their oral permission to be cited, which they

stated on record. Sampling sought to maximize variation in the sex, legal status in the host society, and migrant generation of the informants (see Table 1).

Table 1. Key Informants' Characteristics

Descriptors	Place of Residence During Mobilization	
	Netherlands	United States
Sex		
<i>Male</i>	15 (48%)	15 (68%)
<i>Female</i>	16 (53%)	7 (32%)
Solidarity Activists (Non-Ethnic Filipinos)	8 (27%)	1 (5%)
Migrant Status of Ethnic Filipinos in the Host Country		
<i>Stateless</i>	1 (3%)	1 (7%)
<i>Nonresident alien (e.g., student visa)</i>	--	1 (7%)
<i>Refugee</i>	17 (55%)	5 (23%)
<i>Permanent resident</i>	--	6 (27%)
<i>Citizen</i>	5 (15%)	9 (41%)
Immigrant Generation of Ethnic Filipinos		
<i>First</i>	23 (74%)	14 (64%)
<i>Second</i>	--	7 (32%)
TOTAL	31 (100%)	22 (100%)

I also collected data on the Filipino migrant population from the U.S. and Dutch Census Bureaus and the Philippine Embassy in the Netherlands located in The Hague. The secondary sources for the dissertation include authoritative academic studies, especially historical accounts and theoretical analysis done on my empirical cases, on the Philippine democratic struggle, and on Filipino migration to the Netherlands and the U.S. My objective was to exhaust existing materials that could provide me with published data and analysis (Mahoney and Villegas 2008). Secondary sources were useful in identifying Filipino organizations that were involved in the movement for homeland regime change. For each study on Filipino-American mobilization during the dictatorship, I listed organizations mentioned and selected those that were commonly identified as significant. I used this as proxy for consensus among scholars of the organization's

historical importance. In contrast, studies on Filipino migrants in the Netherlands are scant and I depended primarily on the opinion of Filipino and Dutch scholars in the selection of organizations. I crosschecked the information they provided with a list¹⁸ provided by the embassy.

Process tracing is also a data analysis method for identifying, validating, and testing causal mechanisms within case studies in a specific, theoretically informed way. I coded my archival and interview data using MaxQDA software. I focused on both detailed chronology and snapshots of specific moments and turning points that permit a good interpretation of change and sequence in diaspora mobilization. After constructing a narrative that purports to throw light on how diaspora mobilization came about, I converted this chronicle into an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms.

Archival data will be deposited in and made publicly available through the Special Collections of the Suzzallo and Allen Libraries of the University of Washington. The long-term strategy for the maintenance, curation and archiving of the data will be implemented when the data and associated research are migrated to the university. Interview transcripts and data from the archives of organizations and activists, with appropriate precautions to protect participants' privacy and confidentiality, will be made available to researchers upon request.

¹⁸ The embassy's most recent record, dated 2002, lists a total of 94 Filipino organizations in the Netherlands, with 43 religious, 22 business, and 20 social clubs. The rest are considered advocacy organizations.

4.0 FROM WARDS OF THE OUTPOST TO ‘WORLD-CLASS WORKERS’: A HISTORY OF FILIPINO MIGRATION TO THE U.S. AND THE NETHERLANDS

We arrived on Seattle on a June day. My first sight of the approaching land was an exhilarating experience. Everything seemed native and promising to me. It was like coming home after a long voyage, although as yet I had no home in this city.
Carlos Bulosan (1943)

The Philippine economy will, for the foreseeable future, continue to be heavily dependent on overseas worker remittances... And this is part of our motivation for strengthening bilateral relations with countries which host large numbers of Filipinos... the work and reputation of the overseas Filipinos confirm to the world that indeed the Philippines is the home of the great Filipino worker.
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2002)

Two years after the declaration of martial law, Marcos issued Presidential Decree 442, creating the Labor Code of 1974 and officially instituting the Philippine overseas employment program, to address the country’s rising unemployment and to take advantage of the opportunities created by the oil boom in the Middle East in the 1970s (Asis 1992; Guevarra 2010). The executive order shifted the locus of international migration from the U.S. to new destinations around the world, such as East Asia, the Middle East, and Western Europe. It also changed the socio-demographic composition of overseas Filipinos, with male, semi-skilled, contract-based workers—bound for the Arabian Peninsula to seek employment in infrastructure and development projects—dominating the migration flow during that period. The new policy gave the Philippine government the authority to engage in the training and hiring of Filipino workers as well as

regulation of private recruitment agencies.¹⁹ It also enabled the development of a transnational state apparatus to control the activities of migrants in their host countries (Rodriguez 2010).

Migration has played a central role in the Philippine nation-building project and in the country's integration into the world economy. From the circular movement of Filipinos between the colony to the *metropole* in the early twentieth century to the contemporary mass exodus of emigrants and temporary workers to new countries of destination, migration has shaped Filipinos' way of life and aspirations (Guevarra 2010). The Filipino population in the U.S. and the Netherlands from the mid-1960s to early 1990s was an outcome of processes related to colonization, geopolitical transformation, restructuring of global capital, and normalization of migration, whereby the Philippine state plays a central role in facilitating the relocation and re-incorporation of its citizens.

Different motivations and home- and host-country laws in various periods governed the movement of Filipinos in the two countries. For example, the U.S. colonial government's policy of benevolent assimilation stimulated the migration of Filipino elites in the 1900s, while the demands of a neoliberal U.S. economy and family reunification provisions in the Immigration and National Act of 1965 fueled the growth of the Filipino migrant communities in the U.S. since the 1970s. On the other hand, bilateral ties, state brokerage, and labor shortages in niche markets facilitated the entry of Filipinos in the Netherlands.

This chapter is divided into two parts. I first discuss the flow of Filipino migrants into the U.S. and the Netherlands, focusing on how migration shaped the material and symbolic support for cross-border political activities in each country. With each wave, I describe the transplanting

¹⁹ The 1974 Labor Code created three state agencies responsible for the development, promotion, regulation, and implementation of the labor export program—the Overseas Employment Development Board, the Bureau of Employment Services, and the National Seaman's Board (Rodriguez 2010).

of resources for mobilization from the homeland to the country of settlement and explore the maintenance and reproduction of political and social relations. The second section examines the evolution of Philippine nationalist discourse, particularly as the state grapples with the intensified cross-border movement of its citizens.

4.1 COLONIZATION, CAPITALISM, AND MIGRATION TO THE U.S.

The beginning of Filipino immigration to the U.S. is tied to the narrative of colonialism. Thus, it does not fit neatly into contemporary theories of international migration or the dominant model that explains the waves of Asian immigrants entering the U.S. (Fujita-Rony 2003; San Juan 1994). The Philippines is a special case among countries in Asia owing to its former colonial relationship with the U.S. Among the Asian subgroups in the U.S., the Filipinos were the only nationals who paid allegiance to the U.S. in their own homeland.

To develop an American-style democracy in the archipelago, the colonial government gave priority to education and established the public school system, with English as the medium of instruction (Baldoz 2011). Through the colonial education system, the process of “assimilation” or Americanization started within the borders of the Philippine nation-state.²⁰ This enabled young Filipinos to possess a sense of familiarity with American life and imagination of U.S. as a home to which they had never been (Fujita-Rony 2003).

²⁰ With the use of U.S. textbooks, “young Filipinos began learning not a new language but a new culture. Education became miseducation because it began to de-Filipinize the youth, taught them to regard American culture as superior to any other, and American society as the model par excellence for Philippine society” (Constantino 1994 in Espiritu 2003).

Filipino presence in the U.S. started during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, before the founding of the American nation (Bonus 2000). The first known Filipino Americans were seamen who the Spaniards referred to as *Indios Luzones* (Luzon Indians) after the main Philippine island of Luzon. They served as laborers in the Spanish galleon trade that sailed every year between Manila and Acapulco, Mexico (Borah 1995/96; Pido 1997). In 1587, they were aboard a Spanish vessel that landed in Morro Bay, California.²¹ Due to harsh treatment from the Spaniards, they eventually abandoned their ship and set up communities in Barataria Bay south of New Orleans in 1763, a year after Spain gained possession of what later became the state of Louisiana (Cordova 1983). The bayous inhabited by these “Manilamen” in Louisiana are believed to be the oldest continuously settled community in the U.S. (Okamura 1998).

4.1.1 First Wave of Migrants, 1906-1934: Educated Elite and Indentured Workers

Political and economic developments connected to U.S. expansionism opened the doors to the arrival of Filipinos in the U.S. (Baldoz 2011). In 1903, Governor General of the Philippines William H. Taft passed the *Pensionado* Act, allowing qualified Filipino students—mostly from the elite in Philippine society—to obtain their college, graduate, and professional degrees in the U.S. at the expense of the colonial government. The objective of the program was to train future Filipino administrators and bureaucrats who would later govern the Philippines in American fashion. Between 1903 and 1907, about 200 students—mostly men—were studying higher education, law, medicine, and politics in the U.S. Roughly 100 students were sent to universities

²¹ On October 21, 1995, national, state, and chapter officials of the Filipino American National Historical Society, as well as civic officials of Morro Bay, California, celebrated the first landing of Filipinos in what is now the United States of America, in Morro Bay, California, in 1587 (Pido 1997).

in California, while others matriculated at schools in Seattle and Chicago. Upon graduation, most returned to the Philippines and became legislators and ministers under the administration of Manuel Quezon, the first president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines (Fujita-Rony 2003; Ngai 2004; Posadas and Guyotte 1990). News of *pensionados*' success spread and fueled immigration by many self-supporting students (Habal 2007). However, many of them were unable to complete their studies, forcing them to join the ranks of agricultural laborers and unskilled workers (Cordova 1983).

The U.S. military bases in the Philippines served as recruiting stations for the U.S. Navy and, thus, became another gateway to the U.S. for many young Filipino men. Since Filipinos were the only foreign nationals who were allowed to join the U.S. armed forces, the Navy enlisted them primarily as stewards and mess boys—positions previously assigned to African-Americans (Espiritu 2003; Quinsaat 1976). Starting with nine Filipinos in the U.S. Navy in 1903, the number grew to around 6,000 by World War I. By 1930, approximately 25,000 Filipinos were in the U.S. Navy (Cordova 1983).

In 1906, the U.S. government began formal recruitment of Filipinos as stewards of naval installations of the U.S. armed forces and as agricultural laborers to work on plantations in Hawaii and the mainland's West Coast. American colonial policy granted the status of "U.S. national" to Filipinos, which allowed for the freedom of movement within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. (Ngai 2004). Although they arrived with U.S. passports because of the Philippines' status as a colony, they were ineligible for citizenship and were legally barred from voting, establishing a business, holding private and public office, and owning land and other property (Bonus 2000).

The Hawaii Sugar Planters Association (HSPA) facilitated the intensive labor recruitment in the Philippines, following the enactment of the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908,²² which curtailed Japanese immigration and created labor shortage. The HSPA also needed an alternative pool of workers to neutralize the growing political organization of Japanese workers (Baldoz 2011). Most of the Filipinos hired—called *sakadas*—were unmarried young men from rural villages in the Ilocos region,²³ with little to no formal education. Between 1907 and 1919, over 24,000 Filipinos went to Hawaii, and by 1922, they constituted the largest ethnic group (41 percent) in the plantation workforce (Ngai 2004; Okamura 1998). In order to create tension among ethnically mixed laborers and thus preclude organizing across ethnic boundaries, a stratified system of employment by race was put in place. Filipinos were usually paid the lowest, lived in grossly inadequate plantation housing, and performed the most difficult tasks (Bonus 2000).

In 1924, demand for Filipino labor in Hawaii decreased. After the passage of Immigration Act in the same year,²⁴ which excluded entry of certain Asian and other groups into the U.S., Filipinos, who initially worked at the plantations in Hawaii, began to arrive in significant numbers in the West Coast. During World War I, shipbuilders in San Francisco and Philadelphia also imported Filipino carpenters, machinists, and coppersmiths (Ngai 2004).

²² In this informal agreement, the Empire of Japan stipulated agreed not to issue passports to Japanese emigrants to the U.S., except for the wives, children, and parents of current Japanese residents in the U.S. In return, President Theodore Roosevelt agreed to urge the city of San Francisco to rescind an order by which children of Japanese parents were segregated from white students in the schools.

²³ The Ilocos region in the Philippines is located in the northwest of Luzon, the biggest and most populous island. It is home to the Ilocanos, the third largest Filipino ethnolinguistic group.

²⁴ The Immigration Act of 1924 limited the number of immigrants allowed entry into the U.S. through a national origins quota. The quota provided immigration visas to two percent of the total number of people of each nationality in the U.S. as of the 1890 national census. It completely excluded immigrants from Asia.

In 1924, an estimated 6,000 Filipinos, most of them Ilocanos, were in the mainland U.S.; by 1930, their number grew to 30,000 (Okamura 1998). According to 1930 census, 45,208²⁵ Filipinos were in 48 mainland states, with 30,470 in California; 3,480 in Washington; 2,011 in Illinois; 1,982 in New York; 1,066 in Oregon; 787 in Michigan; 614 in Pennsylvania; 518 in Louisiana; and 472 in Arizona (Cordova 1983).

Unlike the *sakadas* in Hawaii who were rooted in one plantation, the Filipinos in the mainland were seasonal workers. They traveled the West Coast for most of the year—in the spring and summer, some worked in the salmon canneries of Alaska and Puget Sound in Washington, while others harvested asparagus and lettuce in Salinas Valley in Northern California; in the fall, they picked apples in Yakima Valley, also in Washington; and during winter, they moved to Los Angeles, Portland, San Francisco, and Seattle to work at hotels and restaurants as bellmen, cooks, dishwashers, and janitors (Fujita-Rony 2003; Ngai 2004; Okamura 1998). Filipinos in the agricultural fields of California worked under contract or piecemeal labor at least 10 hours a day for 26 days a month for less than minimum rates. In the canneries, the Filipinos—called “Alaskeros”—were confined to the lowliest positions, with no avenues open towards promotion (Cordova 1983).

The itinerant lives of most Filipinos in the mainland prevented the establishment of a place of ethnic concentration. However, in response to racist attacks, they set up community centers and organizations in cities and towns where a large number of Filipinos lived—in Salinas, Seattle, Stockton, New York, and Yakima (Cordova 1983). These served as a surrogate family and support network for the thousands of single men (Mabalon 2013). Filipinos also joined other Asians in the Chinatowns of San Francisco and Seattle, a space “designated for

²⁵ Cordova (1983) argues that this figure is debatable since the official counts overlooked the Filipino American descendants of “Manilamen.”

people of color, white transients, and other people considered ‘undesirable’ by the dominant population” (Fujita-Rony 2003:122). Chinatown functioned as a safe haven against racial violence and a way station for new immigrants (Liu and Geron 2008). In San Francisco, Filipinos occupied rooms at the International Hotel, or I-Hotel, a luxury accommodation built in 1907 in the city’s center for visiting dignitaries and later transformed into a residence for Asian male laborers. The neighborhood of the I-Hotel eventually housed the first Filipino community in San Francisco (Habal 2007).

Filipinos regularly attended religious activities, which offered both spiritual and material help to community members (Fujita-Rony 2003). Social life among the disproportionately male population centered on pool and taxi dance halls. Filipino agricultural workers congregated in pool halls to relax and gamble after working long hours in the fields. In the 1930s, these spaces served as refuge from anti-Filipino violence, following the Watsonville riots,²⁶ and a meeting place to plan labor strikes (Mabalon 2013). One of the primary institutions that allowed Filipino men to interact with Americans—specifically white women—was the taxi dance hall in urban areas such as Los Angeles and Chicago. Due to forced bachelorhood and imposed asexuality, Filipinos frequented these venues to assert and perform their repressed masculinity (Burns 2013; España-Maram 2006). Parreñas (1998:117-118) argues that through the taxi dance halls, alliances between white working class women and Filipino men formed and “enabled them to turn their qualitatively different subordinations into tools for alleviating, but not subsuming, each

²⁶ In January 1930, hundreds of white men armed with pistols and clubs roamed the streets of Watsonville for five days, beating Filipino fieldworkers. The assaults culminated in the murder of 22-year-old Fermin Tobera. DeWitt (1980) attributes the Watsonville riots to increased nativist hostility towards Filipino laborers due to perceived labor competition; myths concerning Filipino social, sexual, and health habits; and opportunism from local politicians.

other's oppressions." Some of these encounters eventually led to romantic relationships and marriages (Catapusan 1938).²⁷

Once settled in the U.S., segregation, miscegenation laws, and exclusion from the possibility of naturalization and access to opportunities in American society confronted the young Filipino men. Because there were so few who could vote, Filipino immigrants have used labor organizing to advance their political and economic interests (Okamura 1998). According to Fujita-Rony (2003:170), unionization was an opportunity for Filipino "not only to connect with other groups of color but also to interact with the European American population, whether in confrontation or in alliance." It was an important site where a sense of belonging based on class developed and where members addressed issues related to ethnicity, gender, and race. The unions also served as mutual aid organizations that provided economic, political, and social support for its members. Although wage increase and favorable working conditions were important issues to Filipinos, they deemed active ethnic unionization as a vehicle to counter overt racism from the majority white population. Thus, labor militancy among Filipinos intensified in the San Joaquin Valley and Salinas-Watsonville area where vigilante mobs operated (DeWitt 1980).

In Hawaii, the Filipino Federation of Labor, Hawaii's first Filipino ethnic union founded in 1911, organized numerous strikes at the sugar and pineapple plantations beginning in the early 1920s (Cordova 1983). In 1933, Filipino farmers in Salinas Valley formed their own union—the Filipino Labor Union (FLU). With 2,000 active members, FLU organized the Salinas Lettuce Strike of 1934, which pointed to the growing strength of ethnic labor movements during the Great Depression (San Juan 1994). In the same year, the American Federation of Labor chartered

²⁷ Catapusan found evidence of 1,778 intermarriages with Filipinos in the 1930s from official records and publications of various Filipino organizations.

the Cannery Workers' and Farm Laborers' Union Local 18257, which was originally founded by Filipino men in June 19, 1933 in Seattle (Chew 2012; Fujita-Rony 2003). Filipinos also led prominent leadership positions in the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) and participated in ILWU Local 142's first strike against the sugar industry in 1945 (Okamura 1998). Most of the strikes that the Filipino unions organized were successful, but companies eventually blacklisted many Filipinos, forcing them to go elsewhere (Bonus 2000).

Through the unions, Filipinos earned the reputation of being committed and skillful activists and gained recognition as important actors in the ethnic community. In the 1930s, cadres of the Communist Party of the USA in the West Coast acknowledged the Filipinos as the most militant of California's workers and actively recruited them into the party ranks (Baldoz 2011). In 1933-1934, Filipinos joined the Communist-led Cannery and Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union (CAWIU). However, they never fully embraced the ideology of the Communist Party, due to suspicions that the CAWIU organizers were merely using Filipino labor to advance their cause, without regard for Filipino interests (DeWitt 1980). During this period, class oppression became a lived experience for Filipinos primarily through national and racial subjugation (San Juan 1994).

While fighting for labor representation and rights in the U.S., Filipino unions and community organizations strived to forge and maintain a national consciousness (Fujita-Rony 2003). A key instrument to achieve this was newspapers, which featured news from the Philippines and reports from Filipinos in different sites of the diaspora. Hometown and mutual aid associations also proliferated in the 1930s and formalized the process by which goods could be sent to the Philippines, thus facilitating transborder exchange (Mabalon 2013).

However, Filipinos in the U.S. at that time did not have a strong sense of nationalism. Their colonial relationship to the U.S. largely defined their identities (Basch, Glick Schiller, Szanton Blanc 1994). Moreover, linguistic and regional differences complicated the forging of a national identity. Noted farmworker, labor organizer, and author Carlos Bulosan (1943:98) observes critically that a “tribal” orientation “had obstructed all efforts toward Filipino unity in America.” With Philippine national language only emerging after World War II, the early Filipino immigrants in the U.S. spoke a variety of languages and dialects, hindering the formation of bonds through communication (Mabalon 2013).

In 1934, the U.S. Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which initiated a ten-year transition period towards full Philippine independence (Baldoz 2011). The legislation also reduced the quota of Filipino immigrants of fifty persons per year, ending the large-scale migration of Filipinos to the United States. The outcome was the creation of a Filipino bachelor society that persisted for three decades (Habal 2007).

4.1.2 Second Wave of Migrants, 1946-1965: War Veterans and Brides

Despite formal independence from American rule in 1946, Filipinos continued to immigrate to the U.S. By 1946, U.S. government had extended the rights of naturalization and full-immigration to Filipinos, as a reward for their “good behavior” during the war and in light of the delayed independence to the Philippines (Daniels 2004). Congress also passed the Luce-Celler Bill, which increased the annual Philippine quota from 50 to 100²⁸ (Espiritu 1995). Sovereignty

²⁸ The act provided a quota of 100 Filipinos and 100 Indians to immigrate into the United States per year. As the Philippines became independent from the United States in 1946, Filipinos would have been barred from immigrating without the act.

paved the way to the start of the Philippine state's brokerage of labor migration (Rodriguez 2010).

Post-World War II ushered in the “second wave,” which included war veterans, who were conscripted to provide workers to the U.S. mobilization efforts against the Axis Powers. The U.S. government promised automatic citizenship to Filipino war veterans, and between 1946 and 1965, about 34,000 Filipinos entered the U.S. (Bonus 2000; Pido 1997). With the War Brides Act of 1946 in effect, almost half comprised the wives of American servicemen, including Filipino Americans, who had served in the Philippines during the war. The post-war immigration, thus, reduced the skewed gender ratios of the first half of the century. In 1940, the census only counted 5,327 married Filipinos; this figure increased to 17,616 in 1950 (Mabalon 2013).

The granting of independence to the Philippines officially ended the active recruitment of Filipino nationals to the U.S. Navy. However, a provision in the 1947 Philippines-U.S. Military Bases Agreement (MBA)²⁹ allowed the Navy to continue with the practice. The onset of the Korean War in the early 1950s facilitated the enrollment of up to 2,000 Filipinos per calendar year for four to six years in the U.S. Navy (Espiritu 1995). These recruits eventually gained U.S. citizenship after continuous service and, along with their wives and children, would join the Filipino World War II veterans in the U.S. Home to the largest base of the Navy, San Diego has been a prominent area of settlement for many Filipino Navy men and their families. The dominance of the Navy influenced the formation of ethnic infrastructures—the first Filipino

²⁹ Signed on March 14, 1947, the MBA granted the U.S. “the right to retain the use” of 16 bases in the Philippines and to use seven other bases if Washington decided that “military necessity” required such action. Access to these 23 specifically named bases was provided rent-free for a period of 99 years (until the year 2045).

organization in San Diego was the Fleet Reserve Association and the first community center was the Filipino American Veterans Hall (Espiritu 2003).

The Filipinos who arrived after World War II did not settle in the rural areas and Chinatowns where the early Filipino migrants established their community. Instead, as better housing became available, they set up home in suburban neighborhoods where other minority families already lived (Habal 2007). Due to favorable structural and institutional conditions, this group of Filipino immigrants lived modestly but comfortably compared to the Filipino workers of the previous wave. They possessed U.S. citizenship, families, government jobs, and military benefits that assured stability as they assimilated into American society. Like the early Filipino migrants, they also forged national consciousness. The war effort facilitated the emergence of a pro-U.S. and pro-Philippine nationalism that transcended the ethnolinguistic solidarity and regionalism of the first wave (Mabalon 2013). According to journalist Rene Cruz,

...it was a nationalism that incorporated loyalty and gratitude to the American “liberators.” The Second Wave brought with it therefore, a colonial mentality that was sowed during the Commonwealth period and brought to full bloom by [General Douglas] MacArthur’s return. Having served in Uncle Sam’s imperial forces, Second Wave community leaders flaunted this mentality with even more passion.³⁰

In 1948, the U.S. Congress passed the Information and Exchange Act, authorizing the State Department to establish the Exchange Visitor Program (EVP). In the context of the brewing Cold War, the EVP intended to educate professionals from other countries about American democracy and then to return them to their homelands (Habal 2007; Rodriguez 2010).

³⁰ Rene Cruz, “The KDP Story: The First Ten Years,” *Ang Katipunan (Special Supplement)*, Vol. IX, No. 8, September 1983, p. 1.

Through the EVP, the U.S. government authorized Filipino nursing graduates to combine postgraduate study with practical experience in U.S. hospitals, with the condition that they go back to the Philippines to improve the healthcare system (Daniels 2004). Although the Philippines was not the sole participant of the EVP, Filipino nurses dominated the program with over 11,000 of them between 1956-1969. Because of post-World War II nursing shortage in the U.S., especially in public hospitals, Filipino participants of EVP were able to obtain permanent residency and remain in the U.S. as employees (Choy 2003).

The lifestyles and orientations of the war veterans and nurses differed completely from the Filipino agricultural and cannery workers. Determined to achieve the “American dream,” the second wave eschewed antagonizing the dominant group in American society. In contrast, labor organizing persisted among the laborers of the first wave, despite an end to their migration. In 1948, at the height of asparagus season, Local 7 of the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers of America, founded in 1940, held the first major agricultural work stoppage after World War II. More than 4,000 workers joined the strike that led to mass arrests (Mabalon 2013). Anticommunism impeded further unionization. After the asparagus strike, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service targeted the leaders of the Local 7 for deportation (Vera 1994). Despite failure of deportation attempts, the passage of Taft–Hartley Act³¹ in 1947 quelled Filipino radical unionism throughout the 1950s.

In 1959, led by Larry Itliong, the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC), a multiethnic but predominantly Filipino union, was formed and chartered by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. Demanding wages equal to the

³¹ The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, better known as the Taft–Hartley Act, restricts the activities and power of labor unions. A key provision of the law is to require union leaders to take an oath stating that they were not communists.

federal minimum, AWOOC organized the Delano Grape Strike of 1965, which lasted for five years. After a week, the National Farm Workers Organization headed by Cesar Chavez joined the Filipino farmworkers, eventually merging and giving birth to the United Farm Workers in 1966 (Ganz 2009; Scharlin and Villanueva 2000).

4.1.3 Third Wave of Migrants, Post-1965: Skilled Professionals and Families

The sociodemographic characteristics of the Filipino population in the U.S. changed significantly when U.S. President Lyndon Johnson signed the Immigration Act of 1965. Also known as the Hart-Celler Act, it abolished the national origins quota system and gave rise to two distinct chains of migration: one based on family reunification and the other on meeting the labor needs of the U.S. economy. Foreign professionals and skilled workers filled the labor shortages that accompanied the post-war economic boom in the U.S, as global capitalist restructuring shifted production and manufacturing to the developing countries and concentrated financial and service industries in the developed world.

The immigration of Filipinos to the U.S. after 1965 was due to “a combination of factors stemming from family obligations, colonial history, economic conditions, images fostered by the media, and an overall quest for prosperity” (Vegara 2009:6). Within five years since the immigration law took effect in 1968, the U.S. granted entry to more than 7,300 Filipino accountants, doctors, engineers, nurses, scientists, and teachers under the third preference category, labeled as “professionals of exceptional ability” (Okamura 1998). Unlike the first and second waves, the post-1965 immigrant community came from the urban middle class in the Philippines, who were largely influenced by American consumerist and individualist values

(Habal 2007). But similar to the second wave, women dominated the Filipino immigrant population.

Because of the family reunification provisions of the Act, family members of Filipinos who had arrived in the U.S. before 1965 joined these white-collar workers (Bonus 2000; Liu, Ong, and Rosenstein 1991). Between 1976-1988, the family members outpaced the professionals, as the entry requirements tightened for skilled workers while the proportion of family-reunification preference immigrants rose to about 80 percent. As a result, more than 221,000 Filipinos immigrated to the U.S. in 1981-1985, compared to fewer than 16,000 in 1961-1965 (Espiritu 1995). Next to Mexico, the Philippines became the second largest source of all immigration (Espiritu 1995; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). The Filipino American community exhibited more class diversity than it did in the past.

Table 2. Total Number and Percentage of Occupational-Preference and Family-Preference Immigrants from the Philippines from 1966 to 1985

Year	Occupational-Preference Immigrants	Family-Preference Immigrants
1966-70	30,350 (49.5%)	31,090 (50.4%)
1971-75	49,606 (51.5%)	46,610 (48.4%)
1976-80	19,035 (19.3%)	78,605 (79.8%)
1981-85	18,470 (19.0%)	78,431 (80.9%)

Source: Cariño et al. 1990

The destination of professional immigrants depended on employer sponsorship rather than on the presence of preexisting communities; thus, they tended to be more dispersed throughout the country compared to agricultural and unskilled laborers (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). This was expected since they frequently went to the U.S. only after securing job offers from employers. Health-care workers such as nurses, physicians, and doctors were recruited to

replenish the shortage of medical personnel in older metropolitan areas in the Northeast—such as Washington D.C., New York, and New Jersey—and in the Midwest, mostly in Illinois. Outside of occupational immigration, kinship and social networks, rather than availability of work, influenced geographic settlement (Okamura 1998). Family reunification revitalized the established Filipino communities in California, Hawaii, and Washington (Espiritu 1995). According to the 1970 U.S. Census, 138,859 Filipinos resided in California, 33,450 of whom were in Los Angeles County and 15,069 in San Diego County (Bonus 2000).

Filipinos who migrated to the U.S. through the occupational chain had minimal ties to their pre-1965 compatriots. Settling in suburban neighborhoods such as Glendale, Cerritos, Long Beach, and West Covina in Southern California, they tended to form their own communities and organizations, which catered primarily to their class interests and needs (Bonus 2000; Espiritu 1995). In San Francisco, they avoided or were unaware of “Manilatown,”³² where the I-Hotel was located and where the elderly bachelors of the first wave spent the remainder of their lives (Habal 2007). Class cleavages surfaced even among the third wave of Filipino immigrants. The lives of the middle-class professionals of the occupational chain hardly intersected with those who came through family sponsorship. The former often resided in affluent, predominantly white neighborhoods, while the latter shared apartments in working-class communities with relatives who came to the U.S. before 1965 as unskilled laborers (Espiritu 2003).

By the 1960s, the Filipino community also comprised of a burgeoning second generation, who was coming of age at a time of global social upheaval and political struggles. Born in the

³² Unlike Chinatown, Manilatown was not in any map of San Francisco, and a majority of locals were unaware of its existence. During its heyday, Filipinos referred to it as “Filipino town” or simply as “Kearny Street.” From the 1940s to the early 1960s, the Kearny Street neighborhood was a bustling community with businesses that served the needs of Filipino workers to domestic servants and culinary workers, from merchant seaman and sailors to war-industry workers and military personnel, and from migrants to retired workers (Habal 2007).

U.S., the children of migrants from the two previous waves considered themselves Americans, with attachment to the Philippines only through kin and food. But racial categorization and subjugation from the dominant group forced these Filipinos to empathize with other people of color—especially African Americans, Native Americans, and Latinos—and to adopt an Asian American panethnic consciousness that superseded an identity based on primordial origin (Okamoto 2003; Espiritu 1995). Thus, unlike their parents' generation, their community lives and social networks encompassed broader segments and groups in American society, which allowed for the formation of multi-class and inter-ethnic alliances beyond the pursuit of group interests.

4.2 BILATERAL TIES, LABOR EXPORT POLICY, AND MOVEMENT TO THE NETHERLANDS

Migration of Filipinos to the Netherlands began in the early 1960s when entrance of foreign workers to the country was still permissive.³³ Although records show the presence of Filipinos in the Netherlands immediately after World War II, complete and reliable figures on their numbers do not exist. Until the mid-1990s, the Dutch census subsumed Filipinos under the “Asian nationalities” category due to their small number (Muijzenberg 2001). As a result, the Dutch government did not afford them minority status. Filipinos were not considered a specific target of the Dutch *allochtonenbeleid* (policy on the entrance and integration of foreigners) and were subject only to general policies towards immigrants. When the census finally counted them as a

³³ According to Padilla (2007), up to the 1960s, anyone could come to The Netherlands and work without the need for a work permit. A tourist could simply go to the Foreign Police and apply for a residence permit.

separate category in 1996, there were 7,736 Filipino nationals,³⁴ most of them women, concentrated in three Randstad provinces—Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam (Maas 2011).

4.2.1 Migration Flows

Factory and health workers—particularly midwives and nurses—comprised the first group of Filipino migrants. Catholic institutions served as brokers and supervisors of these flows (Muijzenberg 2001). After World War II, the Netherlands had a shortage of hospital staff. When Princess Beatrix visited the Philippines in 1962, she noted the large number of English-speaking nurses in the country. With the princess's recommendation, the Netherlands pursued an agreement with the Philippines to import Filipino nurses and employ them in Dutch hospitals for three years, with the condition that they return to their country after fulfillment of their contracts. Facilitated by Wilhelmina Gasthuis (Hospital) in Amsterdam, small groups arrived in 1964 to work in Leiden, Rotterdam, and Utrecht. From 1968 to 1969, 60 nurses—30 arriving each year—were in Amsterdam, Eindhoven, Bussum, and Heerenveen, while 100 were in Apeldoorn in 1976.³⁵

Most of the nurses, however, regarded their entrance to the Dutch labor market as a first step towards permanent immigration to Canada, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., especially since the tasks they performed in Dutch hospitals were confined to housekeeping (Maas 2011). Eventually, they asked to be released from their contracts and left for other countries. To replace

³⁴ Muijzenberg (2003) argues that this figure is even disputed, since most Filipinas married to Dutch men assumed their husbands' names and dropped their original nationality.

³⁵ These figures are based on estimates provided by Samahan in its undated document entitled "Filipinos in the Netherlands."

the nurses, the hospitals changed their recruitment targets to midwives. When the economic condition of the Netherlands changed in the early 1970s, the hiring of Filipino nurses and midwives stopped, and those who stayed behind married Dutch men and acquired citizenship. A few went back to the Philippines (Flores-Valenzuela 2007; Padilla 2007).

The stream of Filipino factory workers to the Netherlands consisted of 62 women who were selected in Manila by the Dutch Catholic organization, Social Communication Center. Coming in batches of 10 in 1966, they were assigned to work as seamstresses for three years at the Berghaus textile factories in Amsterdam, Gendringen, Ulf, and Wehl. Berghaus provided food and lodging to the workers and assigned each arriving group a social worker. Many of the women were young college graduates from different parts of the Philippines. While working at the factories, they were not obliged to learn Dutch; rather, they gave English language lessons to their Dutch colleagues. By early 1973, approximately 300 Filipino women were working at Berghaus. When their employment ended in February 1974, most of them stayed in the Netherlands through marriage with a Dutch citizen, while around 60 acquired work permits to Canada and the U.S. Only a few returned to the Philippines (Flores-Valenzuela 2007; Padilla 2007; Muijzenberg 2001).

Economic recession hit the Netherlands in the 1970s, prompting the government to discontinue the recruitment of foreign medical and factory workers and to tighten migration policies. With these developments, the *au pair* arrangement³⁶ became a popular way for Filipinas to enter and work in the Netherlands legally in the 1980s. Middle- and upper-class Dutch families began to turn to the *au pair* program as solution to the poor institutional development of

³⁶ The *au pair* management originated in Europe among middle- and upper-class families who decided to send their daughters abroad to develop a broader view of the world. This was accomplished through attendance of part-time courses and living with a host family. In return for the accommodation that the hosts provide, the *au pair* performs light domestic work, including taking care of young children.

child care, in light of the increased participation of Dutch women in the labor force (Muijzenberg 2001). Unlike the midwives, nurses, and seamstresses of the previous waves whose tasks were clearly stated in their contracts, Filipino *au pairs* were “employed” by families through a cultural exchange program and, thus, were vulnerable to abuse and exploitation³⁷ (Padilla 2007).

Filipinos also entered the Netherlands as seamen. The Netherlands is one of the major commercial shipping flag states in the world and home to the largest port in Europe, located in Rotterdam. Due to their English-language training and certifications based on American standards, they began to dominate the market for low-level jobs in the seafaring industry (McKay 2007).³⁸ In the 1980s, an estimated 3,000 Filipino seamen and 300 officers worked on board ships owned by Dutch companies or on Norwegian, German, and other European ships that pass through Rotterdam each day (Padilla 2007). It is also involved in the development of the North Sea oil and gas deposits. To guarantee a regular supply of crew for the Dutch fleet, some employers have supported nautical schools in the Philippines (van den Muijzenberg 2001). During this period, the first batch of Filipino offshore workers, recruited directly from the Philippines, obtained jobs in the North Sea mining industry as oil rig workers. The Filipino seafarers and oil rig workers lived in run-down areas in Rotterdam occupied by a mixture of ethnic minority groups, including Moroccans, Turks, and Cape Verdeans. Unable to speak Dutch, they relied only on other Filipinos for social support and friendship (Sampson 2003).

Bilateral ties between the Philippines and the Netherlands also stimulated flows through educational and cultural exchanges. Through the Netherlands Fellowship Program, an average of

³⁷ In 1994, the Dutch newspaper, *NRC Handelsblad*, featured an article on Filipino *au pairs* in the Netherlands. According to the report, they worked 50-60 hours a week, with an allowance of 600 guilders a month, and received no social premiums from their employers. A Dutch domestic worker who works 40 hours a week, on average, would cost 4,000 guilders, with high social premium (Muijzenberg 2001).

³⁸ Colonization played a role in this ethnic labor niche. In 1899, the American colonial government helped set up the Philippine Nautical School, creating a maritime training curriculum taught in English (McKay 2007).

100 Filipino students and early bureaucrats a year, since the late 1970s, have pursued postgraduate study and professional training in the Netherlands. Dutch-Filipino pen pal clubs, conceived as a way to learn about each other's customs and lifestyles, also gave rise to marriage migration, which intensified in the 1990s with the dawn of the Internet. The 1990s also saw the rise in the number of undocumented Filipino domestic workers and victims of sex trafficking (Padilla 2007). Maas (2011:91) characterizes the present-day Filipino population in the Netherlands as

...the product of demand-driven and regulated migration, changing migration regimes, and the creativity of established immigrants to get around the entrance regulations. Despite the fact that Philippine migration to the Netherlands started with contractual labor arrangements, this country never became a prominent site for deployment of Filipino workers.

4.2.2 Associational Life

Given the small number of Filipinos in the Netherlands, community infrastructure was initially built to alleviate estrangement and longing associated with the migration experience and to forge ties with the Dutch population. The Catholic Church was the principal venue where Filipinos—regardless of migrant status, occupation, and place of residence—regularly met, which catalyzed the formation of ethnic organizations. In 1965, the Philippine Nurses Association of the Academisch Ziekenhuis (University Hospital) was formed in 1965 in Leiden. Operating as a cultural and social club, it provided a space exclusively for Filipino nurses to fraternize outside of the work environment.

In the 1970s, Dutch-Filipino friendship associations became a popular venue for Filipino migrants to learn about Dutch culture and society, in light of the absence of official integration program for temporary workers. The Dutch-Philippine Club was established in 1973 in Gendringen, where one of the Berghaus factories that employed Filipino seamstresses was located. Six years later, the Dutch-Philippine Association (DPA) was formed in Utrecht. DPA spearheaded discounted cultural trips to the Philippines for Dutch citizens and formal social gatherings with support from the Philippine Embassy.

As the Filipino population in the Netherlands grew in the 1980s, the number of organizations expanded. The main goals of most of these groups, however, remained the same—to promote friendship and cultural understanding between the Dutch and Filipinos and to provide material and emotional support to migrants, especially the new arrivals. Groups such as Barangay sa Holland, Filipino Sports Club of The Hague, United Filipino-Dutch Association, and the Filippijnse Arbeiders Vereniging Nederland (Filipino Workers Association Netherlands [Samahan]) organized sports festivals, religious events, and cultural heritage celebrations rooted in the Philippines. They also offered a site for migrants to maintain links to the homeland, through charity work, disaster relief, and development projects. A major joint activity of these organizations is the annual Filipino community picnic to celebrate the Philippine Independence Day on June 12 (Flores-Valenzuela 2007; Padilla 2007).

With changes in the demographic composition of the community, the needs and problems of Filipinos in the Netherlands became varied, often based on their structural location in Dutch society. While some Filipinos who migrated in the 1960s and became Dutch citizens through marriage were preoccupied with integrating and building intercultural families, most were still concerned about precarious work and poor living conditions. The Philippine Seamen's

Assistance Program, established in 1981, was one of the few organizations set up to empower Filipino workers to fight for wage increase, benefits, and acceptable accommodations in the ports. By the end of the 1980s, Filipino organizations offering assistance to trafficked women and undocumented workers were beginning to proliferate.

4.3 OVERSEAS MIGRATION AND PHILIPPINE NATIONALISM

To early nationalists, the Philippines was imagined in a field of nations and not just in relation to an Other (Schumacher 1991). During the American colonial period, however, other nations faded in relevance as the Philippines became tied to the only other nation that mattered—the one hegemonic power in the world-system for most of the twentieth century. The United States became the Philippines’ Other, by which it saw and defined itself (Aguilar 1996). Their experience as colonial subjects of the U.S., therefore, shaped early Filipino immigrant subjectivities (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994).

Rodriguez (2010) argues that even before the enactment of the Philippine labor export policy in 1974, the state had begun introducing ideas about nationalism that normalize out-migration. Rooted in colonial and religious narratives, the term *bagong bayani* (new hero)—used to describe Filipino labor migrants—evokes the suffering and martyrdom of Jose Rizal, the “first Filipino” exiled in Spain, and to Jesus Christ, both of whom “forced to undergo humiliation at the hands of alien forces” (Rafael 2000:211). State institutions and their discourses reinforce these cultural understandings of sacrifice for the family and the nation, often naturalized as innate Filipino qualities and as a source of national pride (Guevarra 2010; McKay 2007).

Thus, to ensure that migrants remain attached to the Philippines nation despite being located outside its geographic territory, the state has reconfigured the meaning of citizenship, wherein membership is increasingly construed as requiring employment overseas and maintenance of links to the homeland—what Rodriguez (2010) calls *migrant citizenship*. The heroism that underpins this framework for belonging captures the state’s gratitude for the migrants’ sacrifice and celebration of their contribution to the country. In the neoliberal economy, heroism also imbues Filipinos with the capacity and obligation to globalize the ethos of labor migration (Guevarra 2010).

Public consensus around the notion of migration as an expression of Filipino nationalism was not always achieved, and interlocutors often made distinctions between Filipino contract workers and emigrants. For some, leaving the Philippines to permanently settle in countries like the U.S. was tantamount to a betrayal of sorts, a non-fulfillment of an obligation to contribute to the nation. Those who migrate, with no intention of return, to pursue material wealth and class fantasies the U.S.—such as the post-1965 Filipino immigrants to the U.S.—were considered traitors (Vergara 1996). In contrast, unable to take up residence in their host countries, Filipino labor migrants in the Middle East or Western Europe, whose lives are fraught with “loneliness, deprivation, and abuse,” are the exemplary sacrificing new heroes of the Philippine nation (Rafael 2000:2010).

4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown how global capitalist development, host- and homeland immigration laws, and the discursive constructions of migrants’ position vis-à-vis the nation-state have

shaped the demographic composition of Filipino immigrants in traditional and new countries of destination. Focusing on the reproduction and adaptation of social relations in the host societies with each migration wave, we saw how migrant groups and communities are in constant change, shifting and adjusting to structural and cultural forces. The discussion on the associational lives of migrants in the U.S. and the Netherlands demonstrates the ways by which organizations formed in the transnational social fields exhibited dynamics of their own to accommodate parallel processes of assimilation in the host society and continued involvement in the homeland.

In the U.S., laborers, with status as U.S. nationals, comprised the majority of Filipino immigrants in the early nineteenth century. They were confined in the same physical spaces and experienced the same level of exploitation; thus, they had a common grievance as racialized indentured colonial workers. Racial violence reinforced ethnic solidarity among Filipino men from various ethnolinguistic groups. They established safe spaces and social networks aimed to alleviate their feelings of marginalization in the country where they thought they belonged. Minority discrimination in the workplace prompted the intermittent formation of interracial class alliances and the cultivation of a working-class identity, which allowed for the growth of unionization among Filipinos to advance their interests.

Starting in the 1970s, immigrants have largely been geographically dispersed and filled in different rungs of the segmented labor market; thus, they had differential experiences as foreigners. The influx of highly-skilled Filipinos in the third wave of immigration led to the creation of significantly different types of networks and organizations, whose goals were to validate the class status of migrants in the homeland and improve their economic and social positions in the host society. For the first time, the Filipino migrant community revealed cleavages and contradictions and challenged notions of Filipino ethnicity.

Comprised mostly of temporary workers in certain occupational niches, Filipinos in the Netherlands exhibited less heterogeneity than those in the U.S. With no intention of settling in their host society, they formed organizations not to advance their interests in the Netherlands, but to attenuate homesickness, remain connected to the cultures and traditions of the Philippines, and develop friendship with the native population. Demographic change in the community in the 1980s, as a result of the increase of undocumented and trafficked Filipino female migrants, gave rise to political organizing around migrants' rights and labor conditions.

In the succeeding chapters, I will show how the evolution of grievances, resources, and identities in the Filipino migrant communities has provided the infrastructure for the transnational mobilization for homeland regime change. In particular, past narratives and protest repertoires helped pro-democracy activists connect their contentious activities with prior struggles of Filipinos. I will also demonstrate how social movement organizations both relied on and countered the discursive construction of migrant identities, which hinged on their attachment and belonging to the Philippine nation-state.

5.0 ACTIVIST STREAMS AND MOVEMENT WAVES: ANTI-MARCOS MOBILIZATIONS IN THE U.S.

*If I was to live an effective life of exile, I should be near
the two centers of American power—New York City and
Washington, D.C., just as a century ago the Filipino
propagandists of our revolution against Spain had chosen to be
around Madrid and Barcelona.*
Raul Manglapus (1986)

*In the process of developing a better understanding of
the struggle for national democracy in the Philippines and the
socialist revolution in the United States, we could see that the
two movements are integrally related as part of an international
struggle against U.S. imperialism.*
Katipunan ng Demokratikong Pilipino (1973)

On April 13, 1973, seven members of the Anti-Martial Law Coalition (AMLC)³⁹ staged a sit-in at the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, demanding the release of political prisoners in the Philippines. Four years later, when the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University accepted a \$1.5 million grant from the family of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos in October 1977, more than 250 students and faculty members began a series of demonstrations that culminated in the provocation of Marcos's wife and Governor of Manila,

³⁹ Established in November 1975 in New York City, the AMLC was an alliance of major Filipino organizations in the U.S., which sought to put an end to the dictatorship of Marcos in the Philippines. The group that came to be known as AMLC 7 consisted of Reverend Lloyd Wake (Glide Memorial Church), Sylvia Kimura (American Friends Service Committee), Deborah Kaufman (World Association of Law Students), Steve Wake and Walden Bello (Friends of the Filipino People), Wilma Cadorna (Katipunan ng Demokratikong Pilipino), and Vee Hernandez (AMLC-San Francisco). Their refusal to leave the consulate led to their apprehension by the San Francisco Police Department and indictment for trespassing, disturbing the peace, and resisting arrest.

Imelda, when she visited the campus (Knight 1977). While thousands of Filipinos marched festively in Manila to protest the fraudulence and violence that marred the snap elections on February 23, 1986, Filipino Americans held a rally in front of the White House, carrying signs that read “Duvalier is out—You’re next, Marcos!” and yelling, “Reagan, don’t miss the bus!” (Barker 1986). These are just two examples among many.

How did Filipinos opposed to the dictatorship of Marcos mobilize in multiple spaces and sustain public contention for more than a decade in a country that consistently backed the regime? This chapter traces the emergence, growth, and changing trajectory of the U.S. movement for democracy in the Philippines, which started in the mid-1960s and declined a few years after the fall of the dictatorship in 1986. I show how mobilization initially sprung from the convergence, diffusion, and spillover of four activist streams in the 1960s among Filipinos and Filipino Americans: the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements, which introduced second-generation Filipino youth to activism; the identity movement among Third World peoples, which provided conceptual and physical spaces for oppositional consciousness to flourish; the labor movement among farmworkers in Northern California and among cannery workers in Washington and Alaska, which gave young Filipinos a historical connection to previous mobilizations; and the underground student movement in the Philippines, which tied the fight against Marcos to the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggle for national democracy.

The exile of Marcos’s elite opposition to the U.S. changed the alliance structure, social class dimension, multi-organizational fields, and ideologies and interests of the early movement the against dictatorship, leading to inter-organizational competition and conflict. In the course of contention, activists formed organizations and built coalitions to seize opportunities and respond

to threats, stemming from unanticipated policy proposals, critical events, and media attention given to the conflict (see Appendix A).

I also explain how the economic and political relations between the Philippines and the United States shaped the strategic choices of the movement. Steadfast U.S. support for the Marcos regime—from the administration of Lyndon Johnson to that of Ronald Reagan—provided Filipinos in the U.S. an accessible institutional target and opportunities to take advantage of elite cleavages. U.S. involvement in Philippine politics allowed activists to pursue ethnic lobbying and appeal to national interests. Shifts in discourse on U.S. foreign policy in the former colony, particularly in relation to the maintenance of the military bases, also permitted the use of master frames that connected domestic concerns to external affairs. The strategy of foreign policy lobbying and the rhetoric of national loyalty, thus, facilitated the construction of the Filipino diaspora based on identity categories rooted in the colonial relationship between the Philippines and the U.S.

I begin this chapter with the political socialization of diaspora political entrepreneurs during the escalation of the Vietnam War, a time that provided the conditions for Marcos's rise to power. The next section describes the consolidation of the regime through martial law. This forced members of the elite opposition and the radical student movement to relocate to the U.S., bringing with them cultural, political, and social resources from the Philippines. Pre-existing and transplanted networks and protest infrastructure in the U.S. intersected and facilitated the formation of movement organizations. The availability of elite allies also offered activists access to U.S. Congress. Section three focuses on the ebb in mobilization due to global events that discredited human rights as a framework for U.S. foreign policy. Next, I chronicle the upsurge in movement activity due to the assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr., the

subsequent international media attention given to the Marcos regime, and the withdrawal of U.S. elite support to the dictator. The last section explains how overwhelming support of the Filipino community to the new Philippine president, Corazon Aquino, led to the demobilization of early anti-Marcos groups and the rise of organizations of Filipino professionals keen on homeland reconstruction.

5.1 DEEPENING U.S.-MARCOS RELATIONS AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF SECOND-GENERATION FILIPINOS (1965-1969)

The 1960s was a period of global political and social tensions that paved the way to an increase in protest activities around anti-imperialism, civil rights, and decolonization. The children of farmworkers, cannery laborers, and war veterans of the first and second waves of Filipino migration to the U.S. were coming of age during this era of turmoil, uprising, and transformation. From 1961 to 1974, nationalist movements in Portugal's African colonies fought for independence through guerilla warfare. On March 8, 1965, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam by deploying the first group of U.S. Marines for ground combat. In May 1966, Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in China. On the other side of the globe, Argentine Marxist revolutionary and a key figure in the Cuban Revolution Ernesto "Che" Guevara was captured and eventually executed in Bolivia on October 9, 1967.

In the U.S., immigrant communities were in the midst of unrest. In large metropolitan cities such as San Francisco and Seattle, urban renewal and redevelopment projects threatened neighborhoods where a sizeable Filipino population resided. For instance, many Chinese and Japanese buildings and businesses at the Chinatown-International District in Seattle were

destroyed for the construction of Interstate 5. To expand San Francisco's downtown business sector, the I-Hotel, a low-cost residential guesthouse in Manilatown that was the home of seasonal Asian laborers in the 1930s, was targeted for demolition. The suburbanization in Central Valley, California saved only two blocks of Little Manila in Stockton.

In the Philippines, newly-elected Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos was working to guarantee U.S. support for his administration. The enlargement of the war in Vietnam provided favorable circumstances for Marcos to press for more expansive bilateral relations and increased aid. By the end of his first term and re-election in 1969, Marcos had cemented his position as the champion of U.S. foreign policy in the region or as Johnson called him, "my right arm in Asia" (Ang 2010; Lee 2015).

The 1960s, thus, marked a convergence of political opportunities and threats at the global and local levels, which fomented the crystallization of grievances and creation of mobilizing structures among Filipinos in the U.S. It also provided activists with shared and ubiquitous protest repertoires and symbols of resistance. The war in Vietnam, in particular, simultaneously offered Marcos the necessary U.S. endorsement and infrastructure to advance his rule that would last for twenty-one years and served as a fulcrum for Filipino Americans to develop contentious identities that would become instrumental to the formation of the movement against Marcos in the U.S.

5.1.1 Emergence of Oppositional Consciousness and Protest Infrastructure Among Filipino Americans

With the civil rights movement and resistance to the Vietnam War as initial mobilizing factors, the political socialization of Filipino youth transpired in campuses and ethnic enclaves in the

West Coast. Second-generation Filipinos who grew up in predominantly white neighborhoods of New York, San Diego, and Seattle and in ethnically-mixed and segregated communities of California's Central Valley encountered each other at institutions of higher education. Through the Educational Opportunity Program and special admissions for disadvantaged students, these Filipino-Americans—who were the first to attend college in their families—went mostly to state schools that were hotbeds of dissent and rebellion such as San Francisco State College (SF State), University of California (UC), and University of Washington (UW). Coincidentally, these colleges and universities were also situated in cities undergoing intense gentrification. As a result, campus activism around the Vietnam War was linked to community resistance to urban revitalization (Habal 2007).

Because of their spatial and historical location, Filipino-American students were introduced to a range of interconnected issues and a web of activist networks across the political spectrum. Their alienation from the predominantly white mainstream anti-Vietnam War groups prompted them to seek organizations of other minority students or create their own. They formed the Pilipino American Collegiate Endeavor (PACE) at SF State and the Pilipino American Alliance at UC Berkeley to provide a space for Filipino Americans to explore their ethnicity in the context of global social change. Those who went to colleges with a small Filipino-American population became members of Mexican-American organizations, where they first learned about the life and teachings of Emiliano Zapata before those of Filipino revolutionaries.⁴⁰

Others established pan-racial alliances. At the time of the Vietnam War, the Asian American movement (AAM) was in its infancy. In UC Berkeley, Asian Americans from different ethnic backgrounds, socioeconomic classes, and immigrant generations came together

⁴⁰ Lillian Galedo, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Oakland, California, USA, August 21, 2014.

and formed the Asian American Political Alliance.⁴¹ In Seattle, UW students founded the Asian Coalition for Equality and the Asian American Student Coalition in 1969 (Maeda 2012; Wei 1993). The ideological underpinnings of the AAM combined anti-racism and anti-imperialism that did not fit into the “Bring the Boys Home!” mantra of established anti-Vietnam War groups. Asian Americans expressed solidarity with the communists in Vietnam, who, in their view, were defending their struggle for independence and self-determination. Because of their articulation of racial commonality with the Vietnamese, they challenged the prevailing demands and narratives of traditional peace groups and found allies among other minorities, who were also demanding self-determination rather than integration (Maeda 2009; Liu, Geron, and Liu 2008; Espiritu, Y. 1992).

The political atmosphere in Berkeley, Oakland, San Francisco, and Seattle had a radicalizing effect on Filipino Americans, who began to identify with the oppression of African Americans, Cubans, and Vietnamese. The Vietnam War encouraged the young activists to study and analyze the historical relationship between the Philippines and the U.S. and to re-examine the migrant community’s formation using this lens. They regarded the Second Indochina War as a continuation of U.S. racist imperialism in Asia that started with the colonization of the Philippines in the twentieth century. They discovered affinities between their people’s revolutionary struggle against U.S. annexation to the armed resistance of the Vietnamese and the Cuban revolt against the U.S.-backed authoritarian government of Fulgencio Batista. They also learned of racial abuses during the American settlement of the archipelago—similar to the enslavement of Blacks in southern U.S.—and of the opposition of African-American soldiers to

⁴¹ AAPA was the first student organization to use the term “Asian American” in their name, as proposed by one of the founders, Yuji Ichioka. Many of AAPA’s members possessed extensive political experience as organizers for the United Farm Workers, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and the Black Panther Party.

the occupation of the Philippines. This historical connection and identification was a strong impetus for Filipino Americans to be involved in the struggles of other minority groups.⁴²

While the Vietnam War served as a springboard for the emergence of an oppositional consciousness among Filipino Americans, the Third World strikes and the mobilization against the destruction of the I-Hotel cemented a radical identity. From November 6, 1968 to March 21, the Third World Liberation Front (TWLF)⁴³ mobilized thousands of students at SF State in the longest student strike in U.S. history to demand the teaching of the histories, struggles, and triumphs of people of color on their own terms.⁴⁴ They demanded the establishment of a school of ethnic studies with a faculty and curriculum to be chosen by their communities, along with open admissions for all non-white applicants (Rojas 2007; Umemoto 2007). In support of TWLF's call, PACE issued a statement expressing solidarity with Third World peoples.

We, the Filipinos, have come to the realization, along with our Third World brothers, that the struggle for self-determination is the struggle of all the Third World peoples; that the neutrality, a neutrality which for the most part kept our community from progressing in this racist society, can not be tolerated or practiced any longer. There have been too many situations in which our people have denied to themselves the rights and opportunities to determine their future. There have been too many situations in which our people were given jobs as busboys, clerks, and janitors, even though they may have had college degrees. It

⁴² Bruce Occeña, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, San Francisco, CA, USA, August 13, 2014; Catherine Tactaquin, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Oakland, CA, USA, August 15, 2014; Cynthia Domingo, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Seattle, Washington, USA, July 24, 2014.

⁴³ The TWLF was a coalition of the Black Student Union, Mexican American Student Coalition, Latin American Student Organization, Pilipino American Collegiate Endeavor, Intercollegiate Chinese for Social Action, and Asian American Political Alliance.

⁴⁴ The suspension of George Mason Murray, a graduate student in English and part-time instructor in the Educational Opportunity Program who was also the minister of education of the Black Panther Party, triggered the strike.

is therefore evident to Filipinos at SF State that racism is not only leveled at our Black brother, but at us as well, when we consider the prevailing inadequacies (small number of Filipinos in college, opportunities denied to Filipino professionals in this country, exploitation of Filipino farm workers in Delano working for a few dollars a day).⁴⁵

Asian-American students who joined the TWLF countered the state's hegemonic construction of their racial group. Their message—that Asian Americans were victims of institutional racism, like their African-American, Latino, and Native-American comrades—challenged the media-hyped “model minority”⁴⁶ myth that pitted them against other people of color. To support the TWLF, the inchoate AAM drew resources from the students' ethnic communities—the *Nihonmachi*s (Japantowns), Chinatowns, and Little Manilas (Liu, Geron, and Liu 2008). The enclaves were not just centers of commerce and cultural hubs for new immigrants. Possessing a concentration of material and symbolic resources, they were historical spaces where dense social ties existed among people who shared a common fate as racialized minorities.

Young Filipino-American activists were at the forefront of community struggles against urban renewal projects that led to the destruction of these ethnic enclaves. The most famous was the mobilization against the eviction of elderly tenants of the I-Hotel. At that time, the revolutionary philosophy of Mao Zedong influenced political groups and alliances in the U.S.

⁴⁵ Official website of the San Francisco State University Pilipino American Collegiate Endeavour, <http://www.pacesfsu1967.com/#!aboutus/c22j5>, accessed on April 10, 2014.

⁴⁶ The image of Asian Americans as model minority originated in the mid-1960s in the wake of the Watts riots and growing discontent among blacks and other minorities. Articles celebrating the success of Asian Americans began to proliferate, the first of which written by sociologist William Peterson entitled “Success Story, Japanese-American Style.” It was published in *The New York Times* on January 9, 1966. In the article, Peterson praised the ability of Japanese-Americans to overcome their adversities better than any other group in American society, including native-born whites (Suzuki 1977).

such as the Red Guard Party, the Black Panther Party, and the AAM. “Serve the People” became a rallying call that inspired Filipino Americans to join the anti-eviction movement, especially since most of the tenants at I-Hotel were Filipino. PACE at SF State was among the first student organizations to be involved in the movement through its community outreach and action programs (Habal 2007).

After the TWLF strikes, Filipino-American activists established themselves at Kearny Street, the heart of Manilatown. Organizations such as the Asian Community Center, Chinese Progressive Association, Kalayaan (Freedom) Collective, Chinatown Cooperative Garment Factory, Everybody’s Bookstore, and Kearny Street Workshop built their homes around the I-Hotel (Habal 2007; Maeda 2012). Kearny Street, which earned the moniker “Red Block,” became a thriving movement center for the radical left of the AAM, where ideas that guided the national liberation struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America circulated (Liu and Geron 2008).⁴⁷ In this space, Filipino Americans were introduced to a radical reading of Philippine history through the writings of Filipino nationalists José Rizal, Andrés Bonifacio, and members of the Propaganda Movement⁴⁸ as well as of left historian Renato Constantino and founder of the CPP José María Sison. These works inspired the young militants to immerse themselves in the local community.

It just seemed imperative for us to go back to the countryside, which basically meant to quit school and go do community organizing... Now where the Philippine comes in... as we began to figure out what we’re going to offer in

⁴⁷ These included the works of revolutionary intellectuals like Frantz Fanon, Amilcar Cabral, Che Guevara, Malcolm X, and Mao Zedong (Umemoto 2007).

⁴⁸ In 1872, Filipino émigrés studying in universities in Europe formed the Propaganda Movement, a cultural organization which campaigned for recognition of the Philippines as a province of Spain, equal status for both Filipinos and Spaniards, Philippine representation in the *Cortes Generales* (Spain’s legislature), and secularization of Philippine parishes among others.

these ethnic studies classes that were now given, so began my introduction to the whole intellectual history of nationalism and the progressive current in understanding Philippine history. That coincided with the Diliman Commune in the University of the Philippines. For me, personally, I was focused on the Cultural Revolution, the war in Vietnam, Cuban Revolution and pleased to find this comparable tradition in the Philippines.⁴⁹

In Kearny Street, Filipino Americans also learned, for the first time, the long history of Filipino radical activism in the U.S., including protest repertoires and a rich oppositional culture nurtured by the previous generations. The *manongs*⁵⁰ residing in the I-Hotel told tales about their hard lives in the Philippines before they left for the U.S., the trauma of being uprooted and trying to make it in America despite racism, the solidarity forged with other ethnic and racial groups due to shared fate, and the hope and contradictions of collective resistance through union organizing. Upon learning the life stories of the *manongs* affected by the eviction, the young Filipino Americans discovered “the ancestral roots of their own radical impulses, allowing them to recover their own sense of historical connection” (Habal 2007:58). They traveled to Delano, California on weekends to investigate the problems that the farm workers confronted and to understand further the history of struggle of Filipinos from the first wave.

In Seattle, Filipino-American students also participated in community activism and coalitional politics to create better living conditions to residents of the Chinatown-International District. Home to Chinese, Filipino, and Japanese laborers who settled in the early twentieth century and to poor whites and African Americans who migrated to Seattle during World War II,

⁴⁹ Occeña, interview.

⁵⁰ Filipinos and Filipino-Americans refer to every male immigrant of the first wave as *manong*, which means “older brother” in Ilocano language.

the neighborhood was in danger of deterioration, especially after the construction of Interstate 5 freeway. Second-generation Filipino Americans felt an attachment to King Street in Chinatown-International District, where their parents and ancestors sought sanctuary upon first arrival in the U.S. To them, preserving I-District was not just to protect a physical space from its decay, but more importantly, to save their people's history from being erased and forgotten (Maeda 2012).

In 1970, young Chinese-, Japanese-, and Filipino-Americans mobilized to oppose the proposal to build the King County Multipurpose Domed Stadium or Kingdome⁵¹ adjacent to the Chinatown-International District. Although Asian business organizations supported the project due to perceived economic gains, the student activists were determined to prevent construction, engaging in confrontational protests that drew media attention. The resistance against the Kingdome was an important politicizing event to second-generation Filipino Americans in Seattle, who were first introduced to activism in Chinatown-International District.⁵²

Union organizing was another venue for political socialization, especially among second-generation Filipino men in Seattle whose fathers came to the U.S. to work at the Alaska canneries in the 1930s. As teenagers, these Filipino Americans spent summers in Alaska doing low-paying jobs like other Asian immigrants who had come before them, despite their families' achievement of middle-class status.⁵³ Through this "rite of passage,"⁵⁴ they witnessed and encountered directly racial and sexual discrimination, dangerous working conditions, and widespread corruption in the unions. The experience shaped their lifelong commitment to union organizing (Chew 2012; Domingo 2010).

⁵¹ The Kingdome was a multi-purpose stadium in Seattle, Washington, best known as the home of the Seattle Seahawks of the National Football League, the Seattle Mariners of Major League Baseball, and the Seattle SuperSonics of the National Basketball Association. It was demolished by implosion on March 26, 2000.

⁵² Odette Polintan and Dave Della, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Seattle, Washington, USA, July 24, 2014.

⁵³ Domingo, interview.

⁵⁴ Polintan and Della, interview.

In sum, the political turmoil and social revolution in the 1960s fostered the emergence and growth of oppositional consciousness among second-generation Filipino Americans, who would later become political entrepreneurs in mobilizations for regime change in the Philippines. The presence of autonomous spaces—college campuses and ethnic enclaves—allowed for the circulation of alternative discourses and narratives. In these physical and ideological spaces, movements intersected, diffused, and spilled over, which enabled the linkage of issues, strengthening of a collective identity, and formulation of common protest repertoire. They provided an institutional base for Filipino Americans to connect with other oppressed groups, learn about the forgotten histories of their people, find their radical roots, and reject the cultural codes that reproduce power relationships. From their first foray into activism through the anti-Vietnam War mobilizations to their habitual interaction with the tenants of I-Hotel in Kearny Street or cannery workers in Alaska, the young Filipino-American activists developed multilayered, rich, and textured identities that were rooted in discourses on nationalism, panethnicity, Third World liberation, and working-class solidarity as well as linked to families, neighborhoods, and historical events.

5.1.2 American War in Southeast Asia and U.S.-Philippine Relations

At the same time that second-generation Filipino Americans were being politicized in the U.S., Marcos was capitalizing on the escalation of the Vietnam War to ensure U.S. support of his presidency. When he was elected as president eight months after the first combat units arrived in Da Nang, the U.S. wanted his commitment to send Filipino troops to fight in Vietnam. Marcos was aware of the U.S.'s need for his assistance, materially and symbolically, and he exploited this to its fullest potential. At his inauguration on December 30, 1965, attended by U.S. Vice

President Hubert Humphrey, Marcos vaguely expressed endorsement of the war and American policy in the region, but avoided using the word “Vietnam” in his speech (Bonner 1988).

Despite his equivocal support, the U.S. yielded to his demands to ensure the presence of a Southeast Asian leader as key ally and to guarantee continued use of the U.S. bases in the Philippines—particularly Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base—for the war. During his first state visit to the U.S. on September 14-16, 1966, Marcos addressed the joint session of the U.S. Congress, where he extolled Johnson’s escalation of the war and proposed the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire* around China after the defeat of the communists in Vietnam. In the end, the Philippine president secured \$45 million in economic assistance, \$31 million in settlement of Filipino World War II veterans’ claims, and \$3.5 million in Special Education Funds. He also signed an agreement to negotiate a new 25-year lease term for the bases (Bonner 1988; Fuentecilla 2013).

To placate Johnson, Marcos dispatched Filipinos to Vietnam in six phases through the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG), a military unit consisting mostly of security battalions, medical teams, engineering and construction crews, and propagandists. Mostly volunteers, they enlarged the scope and amount of the already existing program of Philippine aid to Vietnam. Although they were not trained as part of a fighting unit, they were combat-ready and prepared to defend themselves and their operations against an armed attack (Bernad 1968). However, they did not constitute what the U.S. government wanted from Marcos—that is, an infantry primed to battle the communists.

On October 24-25, 1966, the leaders of seven nations in the Asia-Pacific region⁵⁵ held a summit conference in Manila to review the military and political situation in Vietnam. Although

⁵⁵ These were Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, U.S., and South Vietnam.

Johnson disliked Marcos for the latter's modest support of the Vietnam War and excessive stipulations, he publicly referred to Marcos as his main ally in Asia, boosting the recently-elected president's image in the region. At the end of the conference, the heads of states signed a joint communiqué outlining their aims and objectives in Vietnam that included a demand to North Vietnam to stop its aggression and a pledge to defend South Vietnam through "any avenue which could lead to a secure and just peace, whether through discussion and negotiation or through reciprocal actions by both sides to reduce violence."⁵⁶

When Richard Nixon was elected U.S. president in 1968, Marcos was gearing up for his re-election. Despite a burgeoning movement against U.S. imperialism in the Philippines, Marcos knew that Nixon's endorsement would win him votes, especially since no Philippine president after independence had two terms in office (Bonner 1988). With the Vietnam War still raging, Nixon embarked on a world tour in July 1969, making Manila his first stop. Before the trip, he issued the Nixon Doctrine in Guam, which emphasized the limits of U.S. involvement in Asia, except in the event of a threat from a major power involving nuclear weapons.

Marcos was concerned about the repercussions of the doctrine to U.S.-Philippines relations and to his candidacy (Ang 2010). On his arrival in Manila on July 26, 1969, Nixon remarked: "This mission, which begins here, is in the quest of peace, peace in the Pacific, peace in Asia, peace in the world. I come here because the Philippines—the leaders of this country have played and will play a great role in bringing that peace... We went through World War II together. We have gone through Korea together. We now have a war in Vietnam. And when we look at the possibilities of potential war, down to the end of this century, perhaps we would have

⁵⁶ Department of External Affairs, Joint Communiqué, Declaration on Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific, Goals of Freedom, Manila Summit Conference, October 24-25, 1966.

to say that *the greatest danger exists in Asia and in the Pacific* (italics supplied).”⁵⁷ Along with reassurance from Vice President Spiro Agnew of the Philippines’s central role in U.S. foreign policy in the region, Nixon’s speech affirmed the special alliance between Marcos and Washington.

The nature of this relationship, however, became controversial. On September 30, 1969, the Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad held hearings to examine the conduct of the war in Vietnam, specifically the role of other countries in supporting military operations. In the sessions on the Philippines, members of Congress learned for the first time that Washington secretly paid the Marcos government to send Filipinos to Vietnam—at least \$39 million for the equipment and training of PHILCAG, which ended up in the president’s overseas bank accounts (Bonner 1988). Although Marcos denied the allegations, the hearings created doubts among U.S. legislators on the direction of U.S. policy in the Philippines. In his exchange with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance and Sales Lieutenant General Robert H. Warren at the hearings, chair of the Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Committees Abroad Stuart Symington remarked:

The truth of the matter is that the principal threat to the government of the Philippines comes from the Filipinos who do not agree with the government of the Philippines... Yesterday we had testimony that the external threat to the Philippines was very little. Today we have testimony that the United States support for counterinsurgency was minimum. What, therefore, is the real purpose

⁵⁷ Nixon, Richard, “Remarks on Arrival at Manila, the Philippines,” July 26, 1969, The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2143>, accessed on June 20, 2015.

of this military assistance? Doesn't it come down to *quid pro quo* for the bases and a means of contributing to the Filipino government? ... Isn't this really a means of keeping the government satisfied?⁵⁸

Despite his unpopularity among U.S. representatives after the hearings, Marcos was aware that the U.S. executive was on his side. Amid allegations of massive electoral fraud, he was proclaimed Philippine president on November 11, 1969. U.S. Vice President Agnew attended Marcos's inauguration in Manila, signaling Washington's full support of his administration. Violent demonstrations regularly took place in the Philippines—from Marcos's State of the Nation Address in January 1970 to the last week of March. During this period, dubbed "First Quarter Storm," the militant bloc of students associated with Kabataang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth [KM]) grew rapidly, and Marcos publicly threatened to declare martial law.

5.2 REGIME CONSOLIDATION, TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION, AND MOVEMENT FORMATION (1970-1978)

Public displays of militant opposition to the government persisted and intensified in the first two years of Marcos's second term, in which protesters targeted both Marcos and the U.S. When Marcos officially imposed martial law, the White House and the State Department endorsed his actions. Amid the Watergate scandal, Nixon feared the possibility of a foreign policy crisis in a country where the U.S. bases were being used for the Vietnam War, should he not support

⁵⁸ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: The Republic of the Philippines*, Hearings, September-October 1969, p. 245.

Marcos. It was also consistent with Nixon and Henry Kissinger's tacit support for military dictators in Asia⁵⁹ and elsewhere who served U.S. economic and political interests.

Marcos assured the U.S. that martial law would not interfere with the functioning of the bases and of the American business community. Without telling the Filipino people, he authorized nuclear-powered warships and planes transporting nuclear weapons to dock at the Subic Naval and Clark Air Bases. He also sanctioned the construction and administration of an electronic spy station. Lastly, he eliminated taxes on capital gains and stock transfers and offered foreign oil companies full access to the country's natural resources (Bonner 1988). From 1970-1978, the heyday of mobilizations against Marcos, Filipino Americans and Filipino nationals in the U.S. targeted the economic and political foundation of the regime and the ties that bound the Philippines to the U.S.

5.2.1 Self-Exile of Elite Opposition and Migration of Student Militants

Forced to flee the Philippines due to repression, anti-Marcos activists and opposition leaders went to the U.S. through two channels. One was family reunification, of which some middle-class members of the Philippine student movement—mostly minor children of naturalized U.S. citizens—took advantage. For instance, Carol Ojeda-Kimbrough, who dropped out of the University of the Philippines-Diliman to join the underground movement, went to the U.S. through a derivative visa when personal circumstances would not allow her to continue radical activism in Manila.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ These include Lon Nol of Cambodia, Thanom Kittichakorn of Thailand, and Park Chung Hee of South Korea.

⁶⁰ Carol Ojeda-Kimbrough, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Los Angeles, CA, July 19, 2014.

Others like Rene Ciria Cruz and Rodel Rodis left the Philippines due to pressure from parents. Rodis was active during the First Quarter Storm as president of the National Union of High School Students. Cruz was a member of the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (Democratic Association of the Youth) who was arrested at a demonstration in front of the U.S. embassy during Vice President Spiro Agnew's visit in 1969. Cruz went to Italy and, from there, migrated to the U.S through family-reunification preference.⁶¹ Both Cruz and Rodis settled in the Bay Area.

The other channel was through exile with temporary non-immigrant status, as in the cases of Filipino graduate students in the U.S. as well as prominent politicians and bureaucrats opposed to Marcos. Walden Bello, who would become one of the well-known leaders in the mobilizations against Marcos, went to the U.S. in 1969 to pursue a doctoral degree in sociology at Princeton University. He spent months in Chile studying political mobilization in the shantytowns. When he returned to the U.S. in 1973 to defend his dissertation, he shifted his focus on the incipient anti-martial law movement in the U.S.⁶² Enrique dela Cruz, on the other hand, moved to the U.S. in 1968 to obtain a PhD in philosophy from the University of California in Los Angeles. When news about the arrest and disappearance of his friends in the Philippines reached him, he asked the Rockefeller Foundation to extend his fellowship, and by 1974, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services granted him political asylum.⁶³

Economic and political elites in Philippine society—such as 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate Heherson Alvarez, lawyer and human rights activist Charito Planas, and the family of former senator and secretary of foreign affairs Raul Manglapus—escaped

⁶¹ Rene Ciria Cruz, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, San Francisco, CA, August 21, 2014.

⁶² Walden Bello, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Quezon City, Philippines, March 3, 2014.

⁶³ Enrique dela Cruz, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Los Angeles, CA, August 1, 2014.

clandestinely, through the southernmost islands of the archipelago that led to Sabah, Malaysia (Fuentecilla 2013). They made their way to New York and Washington, D.C. with the help of friends in the U.S. The first group of exiles would provide information on routes to their networks, decreasing the direct costs of subsequent migration and settlement.

While the Filipino student activists who entered the U.S. through the family reunification channel automatically acquired permanent residency and the rights and protection associated with it, the others struggled with temporary legal status granted by a government sympathetic to Marcos. In the 1970s, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, denied asylum to immigrants who espoused political ideologies opposed to American principles, such as communism. Although most of the exiles were not directly connected to the communist movement in the Philippines, their opposition to the U.S.-backed Marcos regime made their applications for asylum difficult.⁶⁴ Some escaped without passports and access to their funds in the Philippines. Thus, they depended on their social network for short-term accommodations, housing, and employment (Gaerlan 1999). Others experienced lowered social class position as they joined the unskilled American workforce (Fuentecilla 2013).

The student radical activists and elite opposition leaders gravitated to different circles. The latter interacted with elite members of the Filipino community through their professional associations. In contrast, the former, who were mostly in California and Washington, encountered each other and sought out their Filipino-American counterparts at universities and enclaves, such as Kearny Street and the I-District. Some met at cultural gatherings and markets

⁶⁴ For example, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service denied the application for political asylum of Heherson Alvarez and his wife, Cecile—prominent critics of the Marcos regime in the Philippines—in 1975. The couple used a refugee document given by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees during their stay in the US.

frequented by Filipinos. Both groups, however, became involved in the movement for regime change in the Philippines upon arrival in the U.S.

5.2.2 Overlapping Resources and Variegated Frames and Identities in the Anti-Martial Law Groups

In 1971, Filipino-American activists from the anti-war and identity movements and recently-arrived Filipino student radicals came together and founded an anti-imperialist newspaper collective called *Kalayaan International*. The newspaper took its name from the official organ of the revolutionary organization established by peasant leader Andrés Bonifacio during the anti-colonial struggle against Spain—the Samahang Kataastaasan, Kagalang-galang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (Supreme and Most Honorable Society of the Children of the Nation).⁶⁵ The collective that ran *Kalayaan* linked their struggle to the past and called for a Second Propaganda Movement through decolonization of Filipino national consciousness and community support for the Philippine revolutionary movement, particularly the CPP and the NPA⁶⁶ (Habal 2007; Mangaoang 1994).

The *Kalayaan International* is today's answer to the need of the overseas Filipino to be aware of the multi-faceted problems of his people, both here and back home. Like its predecessors, it hopes to serve as the vanguard of truth and dissent, where truth is shielded by ignorance and dissent intimidated into silent discontent. We see the need for *Kalayaan* to be an important part of the Second Propaganda

⁶⁵ Rene Cruz, "The KDP Story: The First Ten Years," *Ang Katipunan (Special Supplement)*, Vol. IX, No. 8, September 1983, p. 2.

⁶⁶ Founded by Bernabe Buscayno (also known as Commander Dante) on March 29, 1969, the NPA is the armed military wing of the CPP. The NPA conducts guerrilla struggle based on the Maoist strategy of protracted "people's war."

Movement to educate the people and to learn from the people. In the United States, this need becomes more acute as we realize the intricate workings of the American system and the Philippine experience.⁶⁷

Other organizations focusing on politics in the Philippines also emerged on the East Coast. New immigrant professionals and students from New York, New Jersey, and Washington D.C. formed the National Association of Filipinos in the U.S. (NAFUS) to serve as a forum to discuss events in the Philippines. In New York, the Support Committee for a Democratic Philippines also functioned as a venue for Filipinos and Americans to analyze and debate political developments related to the Marcos regime. A similar group, Samahan ng Makabayang Pilipino (Association of Nationalist Filipinos), also existed in Chicago (Gaerlan 1999).

The movement prior to 1972 was small, largely unorganized, and broad in focus. Although they were all concerned about the excesses and abuse of power of Marcos, they had not articulated a call for regime change. They also had not coalesced around common issues, despite shared resources. Marcos's imposition of martial law offered a favorable opportunity for the expansion of the movement by invigorating pre-existing activist networks and evoking discourses on democracy, human rights, and nationalism.

The teachings of Mao Zedong and José María Sison influenced Kalayaan collective, which, during that time, was the only organization whose membership included significant numbers of both U.S.-born Filipinos and Filipino immigrants (Choy 2005). Kalayaan had two interrelated and parallel foci: one was to struggle for a socialist society in the U.S. and the other was to support the revolutionary movement in the Philippines (Mangaoang 1994). It established itself on Kearny Street, which provided a visible space for recruitment. As Filipino Americans

⁶⁷ "Editorial: An Emerging Alternative," *Kalayaan International*, June 1971, p. 1.

became involved in Kalayaan and developed close relations with the student radicals from the Philippines, their political identities slowly veered away from their panethnic roots and moved towards Filipino nationalism (Habal 2007).

5.2.2.1 Human Rights and the NCRCLP

Coincidentally, on September 22, 1972, representatives of Filipino community, political, and student organizations around the U.S. were meeting in San Francisco at a congress organized by the Kalayaan collective. The original objective of the conference was to draft tentative plans to coordinate nationwide efforts to oppose authoritarianism in the Philippines. When news of the declaration of martial law reached the activists, they united around the goal of protesting Marcos's actions on human rights grounds and formed the National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines (NCRCLP). The limited attention to civil liberties, instead of a comprehensive call for Marcos's overthrow or for radical social change in the Philippines, was a strategic choice to seize the opportunity presented by the imposition of martial law. It was also based on their assessment of the political circumstances and available resources for mobilization.

What is the most appropriate response for martial law? Being based in the United States and understanding what kind of support that the US government could give to the Philippines, I think it was important to try to unite the broadest cross-section of the Filipino community against the dictatorship. We knew there were those who supported the dictatorship. We also recognized that, based on our history in organizing the community, there was still a lot of conservatism—a lot of patriotism towards the US who would support whatever the US posture was towards the dictatorship... We recognized that we needed to have a broader

approach to build consensus in the Filipino community to oppose dictatorship and that was to have it pitched to civil liberties.⁶⁸

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⁶⁸ Tactaquin, interview.

approach to build consensus in the Filipino community to oppose dictatorship and that was to have it pitched to civil liberties.⁶⁹

NCRCLP activists held synchronized demonstrations in Philippine consulates and embassies, countered the propaganda of the government on the positive aspects of martial law, and established chapters within the prevailing networks and organizations in the Philippine community.⁷⁰ They protested the disappearance, murder, and torture of Marcos's dissidents; the detention without trial of political prisoners; the abolition of congress; and the curtailment of press freedom (Gaerlan 1999). Building on movement discourses on U.S. foreign policy at the height of anti-Vietnam War mobilizations, NCRCLP raised concerns on the possibility of U.S. military intervention in another Southeast Asian country, should the regime in power become untenable. The organization used the "Philippines as another Vietnam" frame to draw historical continuity and extend the critique of U.S. foreign policy.

The danger of a future large-scale military involvement in another Asian country can be seen in the striking parallels in the conditions imposed in South Vietnam by the unpopular Ngo Dinh Diem and those created in the Philippines by the Marcos authoritarian regime, and the similarities in the initial U.S. response to such conditions.

As in the case of the Philippines, the United States had had a measure of involvement in Vietnam prior to Diem's rise to power... Like the Diem dictatorship's "witch hunt," Mr. Marcos's "martial law" and mass arrests have left no other choice to the opponents of an unpopular regime, *whatever their political coloration*, except to go into exile or pass into armed clandestine struggle... As in

⁶⁹ Tactaquin, interview.

⁷⁰ Occeña, interview.

the case of Diem when he came to the realization that he had lost his popular base and could only depend on an overarmed military and police for survival, Mr. Marcos has at this point called for increased American aid...

Is the United States thus at that critical phase of a Vietnam-type involvement with respect to the Philippines, as historian Gabriel Kolko, among other noted Americans, has warned? This possibility is not at all remote, not only because we have no assurance that the misconceptions which led to Vietnam have been totally eliminated from U.S. foreign-policy thinking, but also because *a measure of U.S. involvement is already present* (italics in original).⁷¹

One of the major campaigns of NCRCLP that appealed to Filipinos in the U.S. was the fight against the payment of Philippines income taxes by Filipino citizens overseas.⁷² In its plea, NCRCLP deployed injustice, identity, and agency frames to convey the power of migrants to change the status quo.

To pay your taxes is to support the Marcos dictatorship. Your hard earned dollars will be used to kill our Moslem brothers, maintain political prisons, repress students and teachers, draft your twenty-year old brothers and cousins to fight in Mindanao, maintain the Marcos households in England, Switzerland and California, crush the peasant and labor movements, and in general support and prop up Marcos's rule. Let us not be cowed by the threats of the Marcos agencies

⁷¹ "Report of the National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines," Appendix 11 in Rosenberg, 1979, pp. 278-281.

⁷² According to a new regulation imposed by the Marcos regime, all overseas Filipinos must pay taxes according to the following schedule: gross income not over \$6,000, one percent; over \$6,000 but not over \$20,000, two percent; and over \$20,000, three percent.

abroad. There are 350,000 of us in the United States. If we unite and refuse to pay taxes, the Marcos dictatorship cannot do anything to us.⁷³

For nine months, NCRCLP was the only vehicle for resistance among Filipinos. However, in the summer of 1973, NCRCLP began to fracture as many of those who joined the organization were not just against Marcos's despotic rule; they were also for the radical transformation of the structures of American and Philippine societies based on anti-imperialism.⁷⁴ They considered a human rights and civil liberties framework for action as ideologically restrictive. While it served the purpose of uniting Filipinos and Filipino Americans to register opposition to Marcos, in light of the favorable opportunity provided by the proclamation of martial law, it was insufficient in its form and substance to support the national democratic revolution in the Philippines. In July 1973, some members of the NCRCLP—most of them part of Kalayaan collective—left to establish the Katipunan ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Union of Democratic Filipinos [KDP]).

5.2.2.2 Class Struggle, Dual Strategy, and the KDP

During its founding on April 24, 1973, the NDF of the Philippines released a call for international support for the Philippine revolution: "...To the American people, we issue a special appeal: Resolutely oppose the leaders of U.S. imperialism for supporting and abetting the Marcos fascist regime. Stop them from converting our country into another Vietnam."⁷⁵ Simultaneously, the CPP and the NDF sent messages to Filipino nationals in the U.S. who were former members of KM, Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan, and the underground communist

⁷³ NCRCLP, "Why Pay Philippine Taxes?" *Kalayaan International* Vol. II, No. 9, May 1973, p. 1.

⁷⁴ "Getting Together Interview with Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino," *Getting Together*, September 14-October 4, 1973.

⁷⁵ The Preparatory Commission of the National Democratic Front, "Appeal for International Support for the Philippine Revolution," *Kalayaan International*, April 24, 1973.

movement in the Philippines on the need for a united front organization in the U.S. to support the revolutionary struggle.⁷⁶ Through the leadership of Cynthia Maglaya, Bruce Occeña, and Melinda Paras, about 70 Filipino and Filipino-American young radical activists formed the KDP in Santa Cruz, California on July 27, 1973.

The combined leadership of Maglaya, Occeña, and Paras was crucial in setting KDP's principles and political program. Maglaya was an immigrant from the Philippines and a member of KM, who personally received instructions from the CPP-NDF on revolutionary formation.⁷⁷ She founded *Kalayaan International* and worked as a Tagalog instructor at UC Berkeley's Asian American Studies Program. A biracial Filipino/white native of Brooklyn, New York, Occeña originally went to the University of Hawaii for college, where he was involved in the first occupations against the war in Vietnam in the state.⁷⁸ He later transferred to UC Berkeley, joined the Venceremos Brigade,⁷⁹ and went to the first organized trip to Cuba (Habal 2007). Occeña participated in Marxist study circles in the San Francisco Bay Area and became a central figure in the propagation of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thinking among Filipino Americans. Paras, also of mixed Filipino and white ancestry, was born and raised in Wisconsin and became active in the anti-Vietnam War protests in high school. Like Occeña, she traveled to Cuba through the Venceremos Brigade and then to the Philippines to organize and recruit American soldiers stationed at the U.S. bases into the anti-war movement. Paras became a member of KM, and after being arrested shortly after martial law was declared, she was deported back to the U.S. and banned entry into the Philippines (Espiritu, A. 2009; Gaerlan 1999).

⁷⁶ Occeña, interview.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ The Venceremos Brigade is an organization founded in 1969 by members of the Students for a Democratic Society and officials of the Republic of Cuba. Its goals are to show solidarity with the Cuban Revolution and to challenge U.S. foreign policy on Cuba.

With principles similar to Kalayaan, KDP adopted a dual strategy that integrated the revolutionary movements in the Philippines and in the U.S. against a common enemy—U.S. imperialism (Choy 2005; Habal 2007; Toribio 1998). The organization recognized the need to confront the racial discrimination and social injustices against minorities in the U.S. through the establishment of socialism. At the same time, it also advocated the institution of genuine national democracy in the Philippines through the CPP-NDF-NPA. Central to this dual approach were the mobilization of the working class and the development of consciousness around class politics.

The principal ideological work facing revolutionaries in the U.S. is to bring the workers to a consciousness of their own conditions as a class as well as their revolutionary tasks. Such revolutionary consciousness would be achieved through concrete experiences in class struggle and through the study of the advanced theory of the working class... The struggle of the Pilipino people is a great contribution to the struggle of the international proletariat and the oppressed masses of the world against U.S. imperialism and all reaction.⁸⁰

KDP was the only anti-martial law organization that fought transnationally on two fronts: against the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines and against capitalism in the U.S. KDP members, especially the U.S. citizens, acknowledged the privilege that comes from their social position, which enabled them to condemn Marcos and to hold the U.S elites responsible for his power without deleterious consequences. The connection between authoritarian rule in the Philippines and monopoly-capitalism in the U.S. was a recurring trope that KDP deployed in

⁸⁰ KDP, “First National Congress of the Katipunan ng Demokratikong Pilipino,” July 28-29, 1973, p. 10.

justifying its ideological underpinnings. In an interview with *Getting Together*, the newspaper of I Wor Kuen,⁸¹ KDP asserted,

...our location in the U.S. gives us a particular advantage of being able to mobilize Pilipinos here to speak out about what's going on there [Philippines]. We also realize that it is not the American people, the working class, which is responsible for the aggression in the Philippines but only a handful of rich capitalists in this country who are responsible for that.⁸²

The duality, however, was strategic as much as it was ideological. KDP did not view the Filipinos in the U.S. as an exile community that would return to the Philippines once the political situation improved.⁸³ Permanent immigrants and a growing second generation, keen on settling or maintaining a home in the U.S., comprised a huge proportion of the total population of Filipinos in American society. In addition, the membership of KDP was disproportionately composed of U.S.-born Filipinos, who tended to be more interested in domestic rather than homeland issues (Habal 2007). Thus, movement resources also defined KDP's dual nature.

We needed to organize Filipinos on the basis of their problems here and strategically you can't say the solution is revolution in the Philippines. That won't be enough. That's part of the solution. But even if there's a revolution in the Philippines, their problems here of discrimination and inequalities still have to be resolved. And for that, the context of your analysis and proposals or resolutions has to be based on the United States. It is not dependent on the Philippines situation. That's why for the longest time we were able to reconcile those two

⁸¹ I Wor Kuen was a radical Marxist Asian American collective that originally formed in 1969 in New York City's Chinatown.

⁸² "Part II Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino," *Getting Together*, October 18-31, 1973, p. 5.

⁸³ Polintan and Della, interview.

things. We would organize Filipinos on issues in the United States and win them over to the national democratic position in the Philippines but also create a real left-wing, if not socialistic position, in terms of the United States. At least a progressive left view in issues like labor, discrimination, gender like that.⁸⁴

Because of its roots and link with the national democratic movement in the Philippines, KDP operated as a cadre organization, modeling itself to KM (Gaerlan 1999). The core organizers lived in a collective in Oakland, and the members adhered to a rigid cadre lifestyle (Toribio 1998). KDP also worked closely with the International Association of Filipino Patriots, which the U.S. committee of the CPP set up to organize a mass base of Filipinos in North America supportive of the revolutionary struggle.⁸⁵ Although most KDP activists had indirect ties with other party formations, the organization only allowed sole individual membership to the U.S. committee of the CPP (Habal 2007). Propaganda and movement expansion were fundamental tasks that defined the day-to-day operations of KDP. The former was accomplished through the publication of *Ang Katipunan* newspaper, which was sold in churches, groceries, schools, and public places that Filipinos frequented. KDP directly recruited members by tapping into Filipino youth programs and networks focusing on Filipino identity and cultural heritage.

The Far West Convention (FWC), an annual gathering of Filipino-American youth based in the West Coast, was a major arena for KDP to enlarge its membership.⁸⁶ Conceived in 1971 by the Filipino Youth Activities of Seattle under the leadership of Fred and Dorothy Cordova,⁸⁷ the convention provided a space for mostly U.S.-born Filipinos to learn about their history and

⁸⁴ Ciria Cruz, interview.

⁸⁵ Joel Rocamora, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Quezon City, Philippines, March 10, 2014.

⁸⁶ Florante Ibañez, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Los Angeles, California, USA, August 6, 2014.

⁸⁷ The Cordovas are community leaders in Seattle, who founded the Filipino American National Historical Society, an organization that documents Filipino-American history for succeeding generations.

understand the challenges they face in American society through workshops and cultural performances.⁸⁸ KDP activists utilized this gathering to purvey anti-capitalist ideas, introduce the work of the KDP, and identify attendees who had the potential to become members. They considered the FWC as their most intensive political work with people constituting the “most active middle forces West Coast wide.”⁸⁹

Within a year of its founding, KDP established chapters in Chicago, Honolulu, Los Angeles, San Diego, Seattle, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C. It attracted a representative cross-section of the Filipino community, especially second-generation Filipinos of working-class backgrounds. However, KDP’s revolutionary ideals and the youthful exuberance of its members alienated most middle-class high-skilled immigrants opposed to Marcos, who were drawn, instead, to the reform-oriented politics of the Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP).

5.2.2.3 “Middle-Ground” Nationalism and the MFP

Formed by Mangalapus, MFP attracted disenfranchised ex-political leaders who had fled the Marcos regime. It also appealed to immigrants who were concerned about assaults on democratic rights and enthusiastic about being associated with the oligarchy in the Philippines in addressing the situation (Bello and Reyes 1987; Gaerlan 1999; Geron et al. 2001). Mangalapus described himself as a social democrat and anti-interventionist. In his speech at MFP’s founding convention, he spoke about the significance of the formation of MFP just a few blocks from the

⁸⁸ In the first FWC held at Seattle University on August 18-21, 1971, workshop topics included “Street Life and the Forces Militating Against Filipino Youth Motivation,” “Our Colonial Heritage: The Making of a Happy (?) Second Class Filipino,” and “Various Shades of Brown: A Problem in Integrating the Recent Arrivals, the *Mestizos*, and Others Into One Brotherhood” among others. (FWC Brochure on the Young Filipino People’s Far West Convention with the theme “A Quest for Emergence.”)

⁸⁹ Internal Memo to KDP Activists from the National Executive Board on the Final Preparations for the Far West Convention, n.d.

White House, “where it all began 75 years ago,” referring to U.S.’s decision to annex the Philippines at the turn of the century.⁹⁰ He compared his exile in the U.S. to the past journey of Filipino propagandists to Spain (Manglapus 1983:xix). Thus, unlike KDP and its predecessor Kalayaan collective, who drew inspiration from Filipino revolutionary Andrés Bonifacio, MFP members saw themselves as the new *ilustrados*⁹¹—like Philippine national hero José Rizal—who were key to the development of Filipino nationalism.

Due to their command of the English language, knowledge of the U.S. political system, and extensive contact with U.S. officials, MFP members were confident of their ability to lobby key politicians. Manglapus launched a campaign to discredit Marcos in the American public by writing opinion pieces in newspapers, appearing in television news and talk shows, and offering testimonies in congressional hearings (Shain and Thompson 1990). MFP responded to Marcos’s actions and decisions and offered counter-narratives and proposals, in coordination with their Philippine allies (Fuentecilla 2013). In confronting the U.S. for its support of the regime, the exiles tapped into the American people’s commitment to the ideals of liberal democracy that they introduced in the former colony.

...in exile we discovered allies many of whom developed into true friends. Perhaps this is because, a [*sic.*] exiles, we are not really in politics but in the universal struggle for democracy and human rights... Our only real enemy in America is a state of mind—that myopic, condescending, indeed criminal notion that democracy and human rights are a Western invention which is sometimes unsuited to non-Western cultures and must be sacrificed for the sake of the brittle

⁹⁰ “MFP National Convention,” *Ang Katipunan*, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 1-15, 1973, p. 5.

⁹¹ The *ilustrados* (or the “erudite” in English) constituted the Filipino educated class during the Spanish colonial period in the late nineteenth century.

“stability” of dictatorships necessary for the military and economic interests of the United States of America. (Manglapus 1983:xxiv)

MFP espoused a “moderate” or “centrist” position and denounced the use of armed violence in dismantling authoritarianism (Fuentecilla 2013). In obtaining support from the Filipino community, MFP competed with other anti-martial law groups such as the KDP and NCRCLP, and thus defined itself not only vis-à-vis the Marcos dictatorship, but also to the left alternative. MFP consistently used the language of representative democracy and juxtaposed it to two political extremes—“fascist or communist totalitarianism”—in articulating its identity.

What is the people’s alternative to one-man rule and all the abuses and excesses that it nurtures and fosters? Is it Communism, which is being advocated by a well-organized and militant group? Or is it a return to the kind of democracy we had before, which was dominated by a privileged oligarchy for its own advantage? Our people are confused, torn between the defects of the older order, the gross injustices and abuses of one-man rule today, and the hazards of an ideology whose promises are repudiated by the record of intolerance and its absolutism.⁹²

Manglapus’s prominence enabled recruitment of members to MFP. By 1979, the organization had 79 chapters in California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Texas, and other states that had a number of Filipinos. Liaison offices were also set up in Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. MFP’s work captivated hometown associations and professional organizations of Filipino migrants, who invited Manglapus to deliver welcome speeches and keynote addresses at their social events. The *Philippine News*, the biggest U.S.-based Philippine newspaper in circulation, also offered

⁹² Movement for a Free Philippines, “The People’s Alternative,” September 24, 1977, p. 1.

favorable publicity for MFP to the Filipino community. MFP regarded the Filipinos in the Philippines as its most important audience. It urged Filipinos in the U.S. to send news clippings in their letters to their families in the homeland to inform them of the overseas resistance to the regime (Fuentecilla 2013).

5.2.2.4 “Duty as Americans” and the FFP

While NCRCLP, KDP, and MFP concentrated on mobilizing the Filipino community, the Friends of the Filipino People (FFP) rallied non-Filipino allies to oppose U.S. government support for the Marcos dictatorship. Led by Daniel Boone Schirmer, former secretary of the Communist Party of Boston, FFP was founded as an anti-interventionist organization in October 1973 by primarily East Coast academics, ministers, professionals, trade unionists, and social workers who had lived and worked in the Philippines. FFP voiced concern over the “increasing threat of another Vietnam in the Philippines.”⁹³ Schirmer argued that once it had become clear that the U.S. government was supporting Marcos, “the job of ending could not be left to the democratic-minded members of the Philippine community in the United States, but would have to be shouldered as well, and especially, by members of the non-Filipino majority” (Schirmer in Fuentecilla 2013:32-33).

FFP adopted four points of unity: termination of U.S. aid to Marcos; non-interference in the Philippines, militarily and politically; condemnation of U.S. corporate interests in the Philippine economy; and full independence and freedom to Filipinos. Renowned American activists and political figures—including Philip Berrigan, Noam Chomsky, Dorothy Day,

⁹³ Elaine Elinson, “Friends of the Filipino People Organization Founded: ‘...Our Duty as Americans...’,” *Ang Katipunan*, Vol. 1, No. 2, October 16-31, 1973, p. 5.

Frederick Douglass Kirkpatrick, George Wald, and Howard Zinn—endorsed FFP’s demands.⁹⁴ Although FFP did not take a position on the political future of the Philippines, it had a close relationship with the KDP. Activists moved between both organizations and provided material and symbolic support to each other.⁹⁵ FFP maintained offices in Boston and New York City and a Congressional Education Project in Washington D.C. (Gaerlan 1999).

In the inaugural conference, FFP identified American military and business interests as having an important stake in the survival of Marcos or other strongman rule. Thus, as Americans, FFP members felt an obligation to ensure that the public was aware of the direct support it was providing to authoritarian regimes. They also assumed responsibility for blocking official aid to the Marcos government by bringing grassroots pressure on the U.S. Congress.⁹⁶ Through a “taxpayers to dictators” frame, activists connected Marcos’s repression of Filipinos to the social problems in the U.S. and concerns of ordinary Americans.

We in the Friends of the Filipino People believe that it is time to change a U.S. foreign policy that has become too much identified with repression and dictatorship against Third World people for too long. We think it is indefensible to *send hard-earned U.S. taxpayers’ dollars to dictator Marcos*, the wealthiest man in Asia, no matter how friendly he is to U.S. multinational corporations. Far better to *allocate funds at home to health care, housing, and mass transit, to the poor, the minorities, elderly, and unemployed*. We say: not a cent of U.S. taxpayers’ money should go to rent or maintain U.S. bases in the Philippines,

⁹⁴ Friends of the Filipino People (FFP) Brochure, first printing 1977.

⁹⁵ FFP, “The Political Differences in the FFP Split,” n.d., p. 3.

⁹⁶ Andrew Siegal and Stephanie Brown, “The Development of the Grassroots Orientation of FFP: 1973-1979, n.d., p. 2.

since these bases bolster Marcos in his denial of Philippine freedoms (italics supplied).⁹⁷

Congressional lobbying aimed at cutting off U.S. military and economic aid to Marcos became the focus of much of FFP's work. To mobilize grassroots support to legislative amendments, FFP worked closely with KDP in collecting signatures for petitions and sending telegrams and letters to state representatives. Because FFP and KDP were also involved in other movement-related tasks, activists recognized the need to form a coalition with other anti-martial law groups. This would streamline lobbying efforts and provide a venue for joint activities and projects in common areas of work, while still maintaining their ideological autonomy.

5.2.2.5 Anti-Martial Law Coalition/Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship

On December 28-29, 1974, representatives of major anti-martial law organizations in the U.S. and Canada such as FFP, KDP, NAFUS, and NCRCLP met at the first National Conference of the Anti-Martial Law Movement in Chicago. The objectives of the congress were to facilitate information exchange and identify domains of collaboration. Participants created a coalition that would coordinate and implement similar programs across organizations, like the congressional lobby to cut U.S. aid to Marcos.⁹⁸ Due to concerns about working with left organizations, MFP did not join the Anti-Martial Law Coalition (AMLC), which was officially established in November 1975 (Fuentecilla 2013). Led primarily by KDP members, AMLC functioned differently in each city, depending on opportunities and resources. Eventually, it became an

⁹⁷ FFP Brochure.

⁹⁸ Bruce Occeña, "Groups United on Common Plan to Fight Marcos Martial Law Dictatorship," *Ang Katipunan*, Vol. II, No. 2, February 1975, p. 1.

independent organization and changed its name to Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship (CAMD) in 1981 (Gaerlan 1999).

5.2.3 Opportunities and Threats in Cross-Border Suppression

Although Filipino nationals in the U.S. lived outside the physical territory of the Philippines, they were still within the purview of its state. The dictator exercised his power over the dissident citizens through the Philippine consulates and embassies, the U.S. State Department, and community newspapers. According to a report on classified foreign intelligence operations in the U.S. prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Operations, the Philippine government had a liaison agreement with the Central Intelligence Agency to monitor opponents of Marcos in the U.S.⁹⁹ Beginning in May 1973, the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines began infiltrating the U.S. with secret agents assigned to neutralize political opponents of Marcos. The bodyguards of Marcos's daughter, who was studying at Princeton University, were disguised secret agents ordered to surveil anti-Marcos groups in the New York area (Anderson 1979). One of Marcos's spies reached out to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) office in San Francisco and offered to establish an information exchange on Filipino immigrants in the U.S. The FBI and the San Francisco Police Department, however, turned down the proposal. Marcos denied the existence of such operations.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ The subcommittee report examined cases of harassment and surveillance, as well as suspected assassination plots, against U.S. residents by intelligence agents of Chile, Iran, the Philippines, the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials have disclosed to Senate investigators that intelligence agencies of five foreign governments have conducted systematic campaigns inside the United States to spy on, harass and in some cases plan assassinations of their opponents (The Washington Post 1979).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

Compared to their counterparts in the Philippines, the Filipino nationals in the U.S. had recourse to freedom of speech and public opinion to expose and challenge Marcos's oppressive acts. Hence, while cross-border state repression initially threatened the movement, it became an opportunity for the activists to promote their agenda, especially since it created cleavages within Marcos's diplomatic corps. On May 18, 1973, Philippine Consul General of Los Angeles Ruperto Baliao resigned from his post and turned over to the *Los Angeles Times* confidential documents, including a blacklist of 150 supposedly anti-Marcos Filipinos in the U.S.¹⁰¹ Marcos instructed the consulates not to renew their passports.¹⁰² The list consisted mostly of Filipinos who were American citizens by birth or naturalization or Philippine nationals with permanent residency in the U.S. Most were writers and editors of Filipino-American newspapers critical of the dictatorship, such as *Kalayaan International* and *Niñas-Cogon*, and activists affiliated with KDP and NCRCLP, such as Occeña and Rodis. However, the document also included leaders in the Filipino community, who were not members of anti-martial law groups but were involved in activism on domestic issues confronting Filipinos in the U.S. such as employment and housing discrimination and access to social services. The exposure of the blacklist and the defection of Baliao—the first of a series of high-profile mutinies among Marcos's ambassadors and consuls¹⁰³—caused an uproar in the community and provided an opportunity for anti-martial law groups to advance their mission.

Philippine and U.S. state officials who remained loyal to Marcos went after the staunchest and most prominent critics of the regime. Bello, for instance, who was teaching at UC

¹⁰¹ *Philippine News* published the names of 150 Filipinos in the U.S. accused of being against the government of Marcos.

¹⁰² "Consul Baliao Denounces Marcos," *Kalayaan International Special Issue*, June 12, 1973, p. 1.

¹⁰³ Philippine Ambassador to Australia, Joselito Azurin, and Assistant to the Foreign Information Representative in the Philippine Consulate in Chicago, Prospero Gotladera, left their posts in 1978 and 1980 respectively and joined the MFP.

Berkeley and City College of San Francisco while participating in the anti-martial law struggle, was stateless after 1974 when the Philippine consulate in San Francisco confiscated his passport without explanation (Bello 2004). When Manglapus applied to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C., the State Department exerted its influence as member of the board and blocked Manglapus's nomination (Bonner 1988). The department's Office of Philippine Affairs stated: "It was deemed inappropriate for the U.S. Government to appear to be subsidizing a person who is actively engaged in activities directed against a government with which the U.S. Government enjoys friendly relations" (Fuentecilla 2013:12).

The Marcos regime also resorted to indirect repression and disinformation. Unable to control the press in the U.S., the Philippine government used a network of agents to discourage subscribers and advertisers from supporting *Philippine News* and the Chicago-based newspaper *Philippine Times* (Lachica 1979). It sponsored the New York-based newspaper, *The Filipino Reporter*, to publish favorable news and editorials about the economic and political situation in the Philippines.¹⁰⁴ Marcos also fostered return tourism through his *Balikbayan* (Homecoming) Program, launched in September 1, 1973 to showcase the accomplishments of the New Society and the benefits of martial law to overseas Filipinos, especially those residing in the U.S. *Balikbayan* also intended to attract migrants to maintain their links in the Philippines so that the state can tax them on their foreign earnings (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994).

The Marcos regime was unable to thwart the growth of resistance in the U.S. Instead of dissuading members of the Filipino community to support the movement, Marcos's attempt to isolate and suppress the activities of his critics offered evidence of his ability to extend his repressive reach. The resignation of a state official and ensuing disclosure of the blacklist sent

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

signals to activists of cleavages within Marcos's overseas emissaries and the presence of potential allies.

5.2.4 Human Rights, National Interest, and Ethnic Lobbying

Since their inception, anti-martial law groups worked to undermine the bedrock of Marcos's authoritarian regime—U.S. economic and military aid. By 1973, it was unquestionable that the dictator had the full backing of the newly-reelected U.S. president.¹⁰⁵ A classified National Security Decision Memorandum signed by Kissinger on March 27, 1973 specified the new official U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Philippine dictatorship.

The United States Government will continue to deal with the Marcos Administration as the effective Government of the Philippines. Assuming that the Marcos Administration will continue to be the effective government and given the U.S. interests in improved long-term stability in the Philippines, the U.S. government will continue security and economic assistance to the Philippine on the basis of continued operation from the Marcos Administration in our pursuit of fundamental U.S. interests in the Philippines and of implementation by the Marcos Administration of measures aimed at long-term stability for the Philippines. (Bonner 1988:138-139)

MFP launched its first lobbying campaign against the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. The group portrayed U.S.-supplied security forces as the chief instrument keeping Marcos in power. The exiles found an ally in Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota, who introduced

¹⁰⁵ According to Bonner (1989), the Marcoses contributed generously to Nixon's 1972 campaign.

amendments on the 1973 bill that would deny assistance to any country that imprisoned its citizens for political purposes and prohibit the use of aid for police, prisons, internal intelligence, and maintenance of security forces (Schneider 1979). The Senate, however, failed to pass the bill, and the two chambers approved \$91.5 million in military aid for the Philippines (Fuentecilla 2013).

The amount of U.S. assistance to the regime outraged American and Filipino activists. For the first time, representatives of KDP, FFP, MFP, NAFUS, and NCRCLP came together and issued a statement questioning the legitimacy of Marcos receiving U.S. aid for the Filipino people, especially since he ceased to be president on December 30, 1973 under the Commonwealth-era 1935 Philippine Constitution.¹⁰⁶ A few days after the ratification of the bill, 120 prominent Americans—who included U.S. Senator Alan Cranston, Father Eugene Boyle of the National Federation of Priests' Council, and Cesar Chavez of the United Farm Workers of America—demanded the restoration of “constitutional democracy” in the Philippines in a full-page advertisement in the December 18, 1973 issue of *The New York Times*.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Under the 1935 Philippine Constitution, which was modeled on the U.S. Bill of Rights, Marcos's legal tenure as president ends on December 30, 1973. But following his declaration of martial law, he organized citizens' assemblies tasked to vote upon the Marcos-drafted 1973 constitution. The Philippine Supreme Court, however, ruled that the constitution, was not “validly ratified.”

¹⁰⁷ “Resistance in U.S.: Anti-Martial Law Movement,” *Ang Katipunan Special Issue*, Vol. 1, No. 12, September 22, 1974, p. 10.

Americans Concerned Over Repression In the Philippines

"Peace and order without freedom is nothing more than slavery.
Discipline without justice is merely another name for oppression."

These words were spoken by Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., as he faced a military tribunal in the Philippines last summer. He has been held in solitary confinement since President Marcos imposed martial law on September 22, 1972, and thousands of other political prisoners share his suffering.

They include Senator Jose Diokno, who has not even been charged and whose only offense seems to be his militant nationalism. They also include students, lawyers, priests, nuns, peasant leaders, newsmen and other intellectuals, as well as many ordinary Filipinos both in Manila and in the far-flung provinces of that archipelago republic.

The voices of progressive church leaders have been raised for the return of civil liberties. But because the press and the media are controlled, the people of the Philippines do not hear them and the government can, therefore, conveniently ignore them.

We Americans have a deep concern for the welfare of the Philippines. The Filipinos had already established a republic with a democratic constitution when we instituted our rule over them. We fostered

their aspirations for democracy at a time when the democratic system existed nowhere else in Asia.

We believe that democracy can flourish in the Philippines and solve her problems of development. But as former Senator Raul S. Manglapus, who is in this country after having barely missed being imprisoned at home, has warned, the repressive Marcos dictatorship, by closing off the channels of free expression, threatens to provoke internal chaos and perhaps civil war. Because America's military and economic commitment to the Philippines is so large, we fear that a future upheaval there could involve the United States in another Vietnam-type situation.

Under the Constitution of the Philippines, President Marcos' term of office expires on December 30, 1973. We submit that he can best serve his interests as well as those of all Filipinos by observing that deadline and by taking the steps that will restore constitutional democracy to the Philippines.

We therefore hope that President Marcos acts in that sense so that the Philippine Republic is spared the turmoil that has disrupted other nations in Asia.

Prof. Michele Alcega, Smith College
Prof. Benedict Anderson, Cornell University
George Baker, former President, Overseas
News Agency
Dr. John Badley, Cornell University
Dr. City Bellard, University of California
at Davis
William Block, Publisher, Pittsburgh-Post
Gazette
Prof. Eugene Boyle, Director, Ministries For
Peace & Justice, National Federation of
Students Council, Berkeley, California
Fr. Allen Brown, Chairman, Diocesan Com-
mission on Justice & Peace, Brooklyn,
New York
Dr. Benjamin Brown, Harvard University
Robert Maclean Brown, Stanford University
Sydney Brown, staff member, New Ways to
Work, Palo Alto, Calif.
Ken Buehler, Journalism, Cambridge, Mass.
Dr. Richard Buresh, Loyola University, St.
Louis
Dr. Richard Buresh, University of New York
at Brooklyn
Sister Alice Callaghan, All Saints Episcopal
Church, Pasadena, Calif.
Glen Chavira, President, United Farm Work-
ers of America
Prof. Mary Carruthers, Case Western Reserve
University
The Rev. Al Cohen, Chaplain, California
State Univ., Los Angeles
Prof. Jerome A. Cohen, Harvard University
Prof. Paul A. Cohen, Wellesley College
The Rev. George Clements, Chaplain, Afro-
American Patrimony League
Bert Corona, Secretary of CABA, Prof. Cali-
fornia State Univ., Los Angeles
Barbara Darr, University Christian Movement
in New England, Cambridge, Mass.
The Hon. Alan Cranston, U.S. Senator,
California
Marc Gelfand, Associate Vice Chancellor,
City Colleges of Chicago
Dr. Richard Dente, Director of Interfaith
Activities, Fellowship of Reconciliation,
New York
Thomas A. Dine, Professional Staff, Senate
Special Committee on the Determina-
tion of National Emergency
The Rev. George Donay, Director of Social
Action, Diocese of Peoria, Ill.
Most Rev. John J. Dougherty, Auxiliary
Bishop of Newark, New Jersey

Most Rev. Carroll T. Dozier, Bishop of
Memphis, Tenn.
Prof. John K. Fairbank, Harvard University
Rev. Elmer S. Dalrymple, Assoc. Regional
Secretary, Pacific Area, United Church
Board For World Ministries
Dr. Raymond Gasit, Consultant, Battelle
Research Center, Seattle, Wash.
Henry Gidycz, Chancellor, New School
For Social Research
Prof. William Griffin, State University of
New York at Cortland
Prof. Jean Gonsky, Mount Holyoke College
Most Rev. Thomas J. Gumbelton, Roman
Catholic Diocese of Detroit, Mich.
The Hon. Michael Harrington, Congressman,
Massachusetts
The Rev. Wayne C. Hartman, Director of
National Farmworkers Ministry
Prof. Gregory Heutscher, Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy
The Rev. Douglas Hennessy, Director of
Religious Education, Diocese of Peoria, Ill.
The Rev. J. Brian Heile, Director of Division
of Justice & Peace, U.S. Catholic Con-
ference
Thomas Higgins, State Legislator, Iowa
Prof. Donald Hindley, Brandeis University
Los Angeles, Calif.
Rev. David Hunter, Deputy General Secretary,
National Council of Churches, New York
Mrs. Andrew Johnson, Editor
Prof. W. Paul Jones, St. Paul School of Theo-
logy, Kansas, Missouri
Leo Jordan, National Association of Laity
Prof. George Kalin, Cornell University
Stanley Karmow, Associate Editor, The New
Republic
Fr. Robert Kennedy, Director, Social Action
Dept., Diocese of Brooklyn, New York
The Rev. Joseph J. Keller, Director, Newman
Center, Illinois State University
Sr. Rosemary Kelley, Chaplain, Newman
Center, Western Illinois University
Diane Kennedy, Minister, Diocese of Christ,
Palo Alto, Calif.
Prof. Randall Kirkwood, University of Hawaii
Bishop John Wesley Land, The United Metho-
dist Church, Wash., D.C.

Rev. Donald G. Lohrey, Minister, The Com-
munity Church of Boston
Florence H. Lusk, Women's Int'l. League
For Peace & Freedom, Brookline, Mass.
The Rev. Daniel Mallette, Pastor, Valiation
Church, Chicago, Ill.
Prof. John Marquand, State University of New
York College at Cortland
Prof. Penny Martin, Mount Holyoke College
Prof. Thomas Malone, Illinois State University
David Mann, United Campus Christian Min-
istry, Stanford University
Rev. Robert E. Manning, S.J., Holy Cross
College
Robert McElwaine, Washington, D.C.
Irene Murphy, member of the family of the
last American Governor in the Philippines
The Rev. Thomas Murphy, President, Priests'
Synod, Diocese of Peoria, Ill.
The Rev. George Myers, Chairman, Women
in the World Commission, Diocese of
Peoria, Ill.
James Niles, Director, Military Service Coun-
selling, Los Angeles, Calif.
Lola Garner Noble, California State Uni-
versity at San Jose
The Rt. Rev. Lyman C. Ogilby, Episcopal Dio-
cese of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
The Rev. John Pappas, Director, Newman
Center, Univ. of California at Davis
The Rev. William D. Pavell, Chairman, Dept.
of Social Relations, Episcopal Diocese
of Los Angeles, Calif.
James Pino, Exec. Secretary, Friends Com-
mittee on Legislation, California
Dr. Richard Poethig, Director, Institute on
the Church in Urban Industrial Society,
Chicago, Ill.
Prof. Peter Poul, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
Prof. Lucian Pye, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology
Thomas Quigley, Assoc. Dir., Latin Ameri-
can Bureau, U.S. Catholic Conference
Joseph Randazzo, President, Sugar Workers
Council of North America
The Rev. John Reel, Director, Newman Cen-
ter, Western Illinois University
Sr. Marilyn Ring, Chaplain, Newman Center,
University of Illinois

Francis E. Rivkin, Judge of Civil Court of New
York (Retired)
Eva Murray Roman, New York City
Prof. I. Milton Sacks, Brandeis University
Dr. Daniel Boone Schinner, Cambridge,
Mass.
Rev. Leland K. Schuler, Exec. Dir., Council For
Christian Social Action, United Church
of Christ
Prof. Benjamin I. Schwartz, Harvard Uni-
versity
Neil Shackman, President of Student Senate,
Georgetown University
Caroline K. Simon, Former Secretary of State,
New York State
Carl Smith, Action Ministry, Palo Alto, Calif.
Edward Snyder, Exec. Secretary, Friends
Committee on National Legislation
Dr. David J. Steinberg, Brandeis University
Rev. Stuart, Author
Harry Stith, Inter-African Center, Wash-
ington, D.C.
Dr. Ross Terrell, Harvard University
Dr. James C. Thompson, Jr., Harvard Uni-
versity
Sr. Mary Luke Tobin, Sisters of Loretto,
Church Women United, New York City
Sr. Margaret Traylor, National Council on
Inter-Racial Justice, Chicago, Ill.
Barbara Truett, Pastor, First Presbyterian
Church, Palo Alto, Calif.
Dr. Wilford Uphouse, Chr., World Fellowship,
Inc., New Haven, Conn.
Pete Velasco, Third Vice President, United
Farm Workers of America
Philip Voss, Exec. Second Vice President,
United Farm Workers of America
Prof. Ezra Vogel, Harvard University
Prof. Ellen Wade, University of Massachusetts
Prof. Alexander Woodside, Harvard Uni-
versity
Dr. David Warfel, University of Windsor,
Ontario
Prof. Susan Woods, Hampshire College
George Wilson, Pastor, First Presbyterian
Church, Palo Alto, Calif.
Prof. Harry Wiley, Illinois State University
Dr. I. Roger Yoshino, University of Arizona
at Tucson
Dr. A. Mrs. Howard Zinn, Boston University
of Illinois

U.S. Organizations and Institutions are listed only to identify the signatories.

Americans, please write your Senators and Congressmen to suspend military and
economic aid to the Philippines until human rights are restored to the Filipinos.

AMERICANS CONCERNED FOR THE PHILIPPINES
P.O. Box 568 Madison Square Station, New York, N.Y. 10010

Figure 1. "Americans Concerned Over Repression in the Philippines,"
Paid Advertisement, *The New York Times*, December 18, 1973, p. 31

Legislative interest on the relationship between human rights and U.S. foreign aid persisted in 1974. Anti-martial law groups again lobbied the U.S. Congress to reduce aid to the Philippines, which was slated to receive \$78.3 million and \$25.4 in economic and military

support respectively.¹⁰⁸ Activists found elite allies in states where a large Filipino constituency existed, such as California, New Jersey, and New York. Senator George McGovern (D-South Dakota) and Representatives Donald Fraser (D-Minnesota) and Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) also endorsed the positions of the movement. When Abourezk attempted, for the second time, to ban military aid to governments with political prisoners, Cranston also proposed an amendment to the foreign assistance authorization bill to phase out all military aid to dictatorships by the end of fiscal year 1976. Both propositions were, however, rejected, and the Marcos regime received funds at a continually increasing rate.

Changes in the composition of the U.S. Congress in 1975 emboldened activists to strengthen lobbying efforts. With 291 elected to office, the Democrats, who were sympathetic to the anti-martial law movement, controlled the House of Representatives. More importantly, according to FFP's assessment of opportunities, the political climate and dynamics among the elite after the fall/liberation of Saigon and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam offered an auspicious moment for advocating an overhaul in U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia.

From the start, the dominant perspective on Congress work in the anti-martial law movement was that of exploiting contradictions within the ruling elite through mass pressure... During this period, the ruling class displayed less homogeneity than in normal times. There was debate in ruling circles over the thrust of US foreign policy after the disaster in Vietnam... Thus, during this period, *the area of maneuver for exploiting the contradictions within the elite in the field of foreign policy was slightly greater than in "normal times"* (italics supplied).¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ "U.S. Aid Will Continue for Marcos: Foreign Aid Bill Passed Hearings on RP Promised," *Ang Katipunan*, Vol. 2, No. 1, December 15, 1974, p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ FFP, "The Political Differences in the FFP Split," n.d., p. 4.

The convening of hearings on human rights in South Korea and the Philippines from May 20 to June 24, 1975 by the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House of Representatives' Committee on International Relations signaled to activists a transformed atmosphere for campaigns directed at U.S. foreign policy. For the first time, the U.S. Congress invited opponents of Marcos to testify on the political situation in the Philippines.¹¹⁰ A standard hearing turned into a media spectacle when news of the Philippine president offering \$50,000 to one of the key witnesses in exchange for the latter's nonattendance and silence in the inquiries became public (Anderson and Whitten 1975). After Primitivo Mijares—former chief media propagandist of Marcos and author of the book, *The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos*—exposed Marcos's attempt to bribe him, he went on to corroborate claims of Marcos's corruption and tyranny in U.S. Congress.¹¹¹

In the inquiries, the witnesses provided hard evidence and anecdotes of Marcos's violation of human rights norms through forced disappearances, mass incarceration, murder, and torture of his detractors. They also testified on the dire economic situation in the country due to foreign corporate control of industries needed for development. Throughout their sworn statements, they held the U.S. accountable for the egregious conditions in the Philippines, arguing that Marcos would not have the capacity to repress his people without aid meant to develop external defense for U.S. interests. In accusing the U.S. of acquiescence in Marcos's authoritarian regime, the witnesses put on trial America's commitment to Western liberal

¹¹⁰ These included MFP president Manglapus; Bruno Hicks, an American priest who worked in the Philippines for 10 years and was detained and deported after the declaration of martial law; Joseph O'Hare, also a cleric and associate editor of the Jesuit publication, *America Magazine*; Primitivo Mijares, a personal advisor to Marcos who defected and was living in the U.S.; Amelito Mutuc, former Philippine ambassador to the U.S.; and Gerald Hill, a lawyer for the Lopez family, one of Marcos's wealthy adversaries.

¹¹¹ In retaliation for his testimony, Marcos threatened Mijares's family, forcing him to go back to the Philippines. He was last seen in San Francisco International Airport on January 7, 1977. Although his whereabouts remain unknown, journalists and politicians speculate that his son was kidnapped and possibly tortured in front of Mijares. The body of Mijares's son was found mutilated, but Mijares's remains were missing.

democracy that it had introduced to the archipelago during its colonial rule. To the witnesses, it was in U.S. interest as a global leader and a champion of government by the people to uphold the tenets of democracy in its former colony.

MANGLAPUS: ...You have heard it said so often that there is a deep reservoir of good will for America among the Filipinos. But, more and more Filipinos are realizing the role which American arms are playing in the repression of their rights. It would be best to withdraw your military support and speed the inevitable reckoning with the people so that less, or even perhaps, no, blood is shed and good will for America is conserved.

If U.S. military aid is not withdrawn, that reckoning will eventually come, delayed and, I am afraid, perhaps bloody. *America will lose a great friend in Asia, one which only 30 years ago shed the blood of thousands of its sons and allowed its cities and countryside to be devastated so that the war might be kept from American shores and American democracy, itself, might survive.*

...

O'HARE: ...I find it ironic that in this country American spokesmen can easily dismiss the loss of freedom in the Philippines on the grounds that democracy was from the beginning only a foreign importation.

...

Our concern now for human rights in the Philippines goes much deeper than the naïve prospect of reproducing an American image in another part of the world.

In conclusion, I would like to recall how the link between the people of the United States and the people of the Philippines began.

In 1898, when Philippines revolutionaries accepted American assistance in the belief that the Americans would help them gain their independence from Spain, President William McKinley had a divine inspiration that convinced him that it was the mission of the United States to “civilize and christianize” the Philippines although the country at that time was predominantly Catholic.

After a bitter and bloody resistance to Mr. McKinley’s inspiration, the Philippines revolutionaries discovered they had only exchanged one master for another.

Now, after 75 years of American dominance, *for Americans to ease their conscience about the disappearance of constitutional government in the Philippines by the view that the will to self-rule was only a foreign American importation, this may be the ultimate condescension and the final betrayal* (italics supplied).¹¹²

Three months after the hearings, U.S. Congress passed the Human Rights or Harkin Amendment (Section 116) to the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits economic assistance to any country that commits gross human rights violations, unless it can be shown that the aid will directly benefit the poor and needy.¹¹³ Congress also required the State Department to issue a report each year on the human rights practices in countries that received aid from the U.S. Since

¹¹² Human Rights in South Korea and the Philippines: Implications for U.S. Policy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session, May 20, 22, June 3, 5, 10, 12, 17, and 24, 1975.

¹¹³ Harkin sponsored the amendment, which states, “No assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country which engages in consistent pattern of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.”

its enactment, Section 116 became the primary instrument that anti-martial law groups used in their lobbying efforts to dismantle the dictatorship.

The election of Jimmy Carter on November 2, 1976 further encouraged the activists, who considered the president's dedication to human rights and pledge to administer a foreign policy based on moral considerations as indication that the U.S. would no longer going to be friendly with dictators.¹¹⁴ As soon as Carter took office, MFP submitted a report on the status of human rights in the Philippines and on the illegal activities of Philippine government agents in the U.S. It alleged: "the Nixon-Ford Administrations contributed, to a great extent, to the destruction of Philippine democracy by supporting morally and materially the Marcos government."¹¹⁵

Shortly after Carter's inauguration in 1977, the U.S. Congress instructed representatives at multilateral banks to vote against loans to any country with unsatisfactory human rights record unless the assistance would be used to provide for "basic human needs" of the people. Legislators formed the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance—known informally as the "Christopher Group" after its chair, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher—to evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, bilateral and multilateral aid decisions and to ensure a unified government position on aid decisions. Despite Marcos's dismal performance in improving human rights, the Philippines fared well before the group and continued to receive significant amount of aid (Bonner 1988).

FFP activists recognized that appeals to eliminate or reduce the amount of U.S. aid allocated for the Philippines based primarily on America's commitment to democracy or human rights would earn limited endorsement from politicians. The promotion and protection of U.S.

¹¹⁴ Jorge Emmanuel, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Quezon City, Philippines, March 11, 2014; Barbara Gaerlan, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Los Angeles, CA, USA, August 6, 2014.

¹¹⁵ Letter to President-Elect James E. Carter, signed by Alex Esclamado and Steve Psinakis, November 18, 1976, pp. 1-4.

interests remained paramount in foreign aid. Marcos knew that the essence of U.S.-Philippines bilateral relations was the bases, and he used it to its full advantage as leverage for aid negotiations and as a defense against U.S. human rights policy. According to a classified national security memorandum in 1976, he wanted “some form of compensation for use of the bases, such as rent or a guaranteed level of military assistance” (Bonner 1988:207). Activists knew that as long as U.S. politicians considered the military bases crucial to national security, lobbying efforts would be futile.

Thus, the U.S. anti-martial law movement began to incorporate the campaign to dismantle the American bases in the Philippines. AMLC debunked the presence of an external threat to the Philippines, justifying the superfluity of the U.S. military bases. The organization argued that the bases “do not perform a critical deterrent role for the Philippines simply because a viable external threat to Philippine sovereignty does not exist” (Anti-Martial Law Coalition 1977:136). It also depicted the bases as inflicting economic and social costs to Filipinos such as inflation, prostitution, and illegal drug use that, combined, far outweigh the purported benefits. In essence, the bases had become a threat to the national security and integrity of the Philippines, and, thus, must be withdrawn for the interest of the Filipino people.

An enormous challenge for the activists, however, was portraying the bases as unnecessary for the protection of U.S. economic and military interests and inimical to development. U.S. military aid was not necessarily about threat, but the need to maintain friendly relations with the Philippines for geopolitical reasons (Steinmetz 1994). Guided by the doctrine that the Philippines was as an ideal military and political outpost in Asia, the Americans established the bases in the archipelago through the 1947 MBA. The MBA gave the U.S. rent-free use of “certain lands of the public domain” for a period of ninety-nine years. The bases

provided logistical support, staging areas, fuel and porting, repair and training facilities, and rest and recreation (Feeney 1984; Simbulan 1985; Yeo 2011).

As U.S. foreign policy evolved, the role of the bases in the Philippines also changed. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, they served as strategic camps for the deployment of U.S. forces. After the Second Indochina War, the Soviet Pacific Fleet established itself in the naval facilities of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and the airfields of Cambodia. In the context of the continuing Cold War, Subic and Clark became the most strategic among all overseas basing facilities, allowing the U.S. to project its forces into both Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.¹¹⁶ American politicians considered the bases in the Philippines as a crucial strategy in maintaining geopolitical and economic power in the whole Asian continent (Cottrell 1983).

However, since the suspension of bases talks during the Ford administration, public consensus on overseas military installations began to change. Academics, journalists, and former generals started to challenge the importance of the bases in providing security to the American people. Editorials, opinion columns, and news reports expressed consternation over the degree to which politicians would give in to Marcos's demands to keep the U.S. bases in the Philippines, at the expense of American taxpayers and the sovereignty of the Filipino people (see Lescaze 1977; Matthews 1976; The New York Times 1976, 1977 among others). The opening of discursive opportunities allowed anti-martial law groups to target the security and fiscal foundations of the bases.

FFP, whose main audience was the American public, used its taxpayer frame to discredit the benefits of maintaining overseas bases, in light of problems on the domestic front. It

¹¹⁶ U.S. forces were also marshaled from Subic Naval Base during the Iranian Revolution, the North Yemen-South Yemen border war, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The U.S. also used Clark Air Base as a staging point for the 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission (Steinmetz 1994).

portrayed the bases as a misappropriation of government funds that could otherwise be allocated to programs and services that directly benefit the citizens the U.S. military installations are supposed to protect.

In 1946, as the U.S. secured the bases from the Philippines after the grant of formal independence, the late Philippine Senator, Tomas Confesor, said: “Those bases are established for the sole purpose of protecting American investments in the Philippines.” Today U.S. multi-nationals like Ford Motor Company, Firestone Rubber, and Dole Pineapple establish plants and plantations in the Philippines to take advantage of cheap Filipino labor... The point is *whether the American people who suffer from the high prices, ecological damage, and economic exploitation perpetrated by the big corporations at home* (for gas, oil, food, etc) wish to have their tax money used to protect the profits of these same or allied corporations abroad, at the expense of Filipino working people.

For it is the U.S. taxpayer who pays the cost of these bases. It is estimated that these Philippine bases cost the U.S. taxpayer over \$200 million a year to maintain (that is, of course, before the payment of rent Marcos now demands). *In view of the crying need of the unemployed, elderly, and minorities, in view of the great need for government funds for the cities, health care, mass transit, could not these taxpayers’ dollars be put to better use at home?* (Friends of the Filipino People 1977:156-157 [italics supplied]).

In a hearing on aid to the Philippines by the House Appropriations Committee held on April 5, 1977, three members of FFP¹¹⁷ testified on the human rights situation in the Philippines, the continued importance of the U.S. bases, and specific program requests for the Philippines in the 1978 fiscal year. In their statements, they attempted to create further doubts among the political elite about the continued value of the U.S. bases by appealing to commitment to American stakes and principles.

Despite the Human Rights Amendment, the Carter Administration has exempted the Marcos regime from human rights consideration and the question remains: Do the U.S. bases in the Philippines serve U.S. national interests and do they constitute “overriding security considerations”?

...

Several prominent military analysts, including Dr. Earl Ravenal and retired Admiral Gene LaRoque, in private conversations with us, agree that these bases are not essential to U.S. interests and urge their withdrawal.

In February 1977, some 90 academicians and religious and civic leaders called for a rejection of any rent for the bases and their withdrawal from the Philippines. They noted that the bases are “springboards for the U.S. military” to other parts of Asia.

More recently, the U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia and former U.S. embassy counselor in Manila called for the withdrawal of these bases, stating that the effort

¹¹⁷ These were James Drew, a Washington lawyer; William Goodfellow, an associate of the Center for International Policy; and Severina Rivera, head of the Congress Education Project of FFP. The State Department objected to the inclusion of Rivera in the testimonies, arguing that she was a Filipino national.

and cost of maintaining them were not necessarily commensurate with their potential military benefits.

We believe that these distant installations are of no vital strategic importance and only serve to corrupt traditional American values by being pawns of the Marcos regime in its demands for more U.S. dollars in order to sustain itself.

Further, we believe that a foreign policy based, not solely on military supremacy, but on a respect for freedoms, sovereignty and human rights of other peoples best serves our long-term and genuine national interests (italics supplied).¹¹⁸

Although legislators were sympathetic to the demands of anti-martial law activists, Carter remained compliant to Marcos's stipulations. In October 1977, Representative Yvonne Burke of California proposed a bill to reduce Philippine military aid based on Section 502B¹¹⁹ of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It was passed in the House by roll-call vote but, eventually, blocked by Carter, citing the cuts "would have a serious impact upon important programs with a treaty ally which allows us the use of valuable military facilities."¹²⁰ With a few amendments in the Senate, the total military appropriations for the Philippines in 1978 amounted to \$26.9 million, instead of the \$41.4 million that Carter requested (Claude 1979). However, since Marcos managed to perform well before the Christopher Group, the Philippines received up to \$1.9 billion from fifty multilateral development bank loans from May 1977 to September 1980, with Carter's approval (Bonner 1988).

¹¹⁸ Statement on Behalf of the Friends of the Filipino People Presented by James Drew and William Goodfellow for the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations House Appropriations Committee, April 5, 1977.

¹¹⁹ Section 502B specifies commitment to and promotion of internationally recognized human rights in U.S. foreign policy.

¹²⁰ Executive Branch Position Paper on HR-7797 (Senate Amendment 74), October 18, 1977, quoted in Claude, 1979, p. 238.

Marcos not only leveraged the U.S. bases but also took advantage of loopholes in existing measures such as clauses on basic human needs. During the Carter years, the dictator released political prisoners and addressed allegations of torture to pacify the Human Rights Bureau and legislators intent on shutting off flows of assistance to the Philippines (Bonner 1988). Carter also appeared to be satisfied with Marcos's benign martial rule, and the U.S. president jettisoned any interest in Philippine human rights until the forging of a new bases agreement (Fuentecilla 2013). In September 1978, Marcos resumed negotiations, and by the end of the year, the two presidents signed a deal that gave the Philippine government nominal control of the U.S. bases and \$450 million in military aid for five years.

5.3 CRISIS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND CONTRACTION OF OPPORTUNITIES (1979-1982)

Global events in 1979 dramatically altered the political opportunity structures for the movement against Marcos in the Philippines and overseas. In January, the Iranian Revolution led to the overthrow of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and the installation of an Islamic Republic under the Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Six months later, the Sandinista National Liberation Front marched to Managua and ousted the Somoza regime, gaining full control of the government. In El Salvador, a coup d'état by moderate leftist military officers on October 15, 1979 ended almost fifty years of authoritarian rule. In Asia, the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency assassinated General Park Chung Hee, who had ruled South Korea for sixteen years.

The toppling of Pahlavi and Somoza raised questions on the possibility of Marcos being next, given the three sultanistic regimes' structural similarities—overdependence on a superpower benefactor, alienation of domestic political elites, and presence of highly organized revolutionary challengers (Chebabi and Linz 1998; Foran 2005; Parsa 2000). With the U.S. bases secure, talks about Marcos's human rights obligations began to dissipate, and the Philippine president used the fall of his fellow autocrats to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the U.S. executive and legislature. As Bonner (1988:258) observed, "it was not an environment for Carter to take on another right-wing dictator." In FFP's assessment of the atmosphere, the momentum created by the anti-war movement and the significant political splits due to the debacle in Vietnam had ended, and "'normal times' had returned for the ruling elite."¹²¹

The Philippine support movement was born in the midst of the great popular disaffection with U.S. foreign policy during the early seventies. Thus we found a substantial degree of popular openness to our work. While we might not have been able to gather a great number of hard-core activists, we nevertheless found most people averse to the U.S. policy of supporting repressive regimes.

The popular scene has changed. The recent events in Iran...provided an opportunity for a lot of backward sentiments to surface as a right-wing nationalist mass movement. Playing on people's anxieties, the U.S. elite has skillfully manipulated the Indochina refugee issue and the Iran crisis to promote an anti-Third World, anti-left, and anti-revolutionary definition of the sources of the troubles of the United States.¹²²

¹²¹ FFP, "The Political Differences in the FFP Split," n.d., p. 4.

¹²² FFP, "FFP Organizing in the 1980's: Some Suggested Guidelines." n.d., p. 9.

Continued lobbying efforts to cut aid to Marcos produced bleak results. Although the anti-martial law movement found new supporters in the U.S. Congress, Carter became more intransigent to its demands than ever before. Early in 1979, the AMLC and MFP approached Tony Hall, a Democrat representative from Ohio who was a member of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and requested support for their proposals. Hall introduced legislation to cut \$7.9 million from the \$95.7 million in military assistance that the Carter administration was requesting for the Philippines. But the U.S. executive lobbied the committee and key House members to defeat the bill.¹²³ Carter himself wrote a letter to subcommittee chairperson Lester Wolff, advising him to authorize and appropriate the full amount of security package to the Philippines.

As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, you know and appreciate the importance of those facilities in the Philippines—an importance which is not limited to the Western Pacific but which extends, as events of recent days have demonstrated, to much wider areas of the Indian Ocean and the entire Middle East.

Recent events in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East have raised doubts about the willingness of the United States to sustain support for its friends and to honor its obligations. I am determined to dispel such unwarranted doubts. This applies to the Philippines, with whom we not only have a newly revised agreement on use of military facilities but also a longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty and an unusually close relationship.

¹²³ “Carter Pushes Increased Aid to Marcos,” *Ang Katipunan*, Vol. VI, No. 7, April 16-30, 1979, p. 1.

...We do not believe a cut in grant MAP [Military Assistance Program] would serve overall U.S. interests in the present circumstances.¹²⁴

From 1979 to 1982, institutional arenas and channels became inhospitable to the anti-martial law movement. Every attempt by sympathetic allies to reduce the dictator's source of power was immediately quashed. Activists experienced demoralization and resentment, which enabled organizational tensions to escalate. For instance, due to the priority given to congressional lobbying, local FFP chapters and networks were transformed into letter-writing branches of the Washington D.C. office, and adherents were continuously promised that "the next Congressional amendment will definitely end U.S. support for Marcos" to sustain commitment to the cause.¹²⁵ With failures in the campaign to cut aid and a palpable ebb in public acts of opposition to the dictatorship, KDP activists turned to the local concerns of the ethnic community to sustain oppositional consciousness.

5.3.1 Migrants' Rights and Abeyance Structures

To implement its dual strategy of establishing national democracy in the Philippines and socialism in the U.S., a division of labor among its members existed in KDP, with one group of activists involved only in the anti-martial movement and the other on U.S. domestic struggles. However, in times of abatement of conflict in the homeland or a nonreceptive political environment for diaspora politics, migrant issues provided the requisite abeyance structures. To sustain commitment and promote a sense of purpose in cycles of decline, KDP activists involved

¹²⁴ Letter from President James Carter to Representative Lester L. Wolff, Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 21, 1979.

¹²⁵ FFP, "The Political Differences in the FFP Split," n.d., p. 3.

in the anti-martial law movement carved a niche for themselves in spaces where they organized and on issues that affected their constituents daily—language proficiency, workers’ rights, access to education, housing discrimination etc. According to Rene Ciria Cruz,

We were always waiting for something to happen in the Philippines. But there was a big ebb from the declaration of martial law until the Ninoy Aquino assassination... There was no upsurge. The movement was really trying to build its base because repression was severe. So, here, the approach was, while we would have periodic protests and programs, most of our day-to-day work was actually organizing Filipinos on the basis of democratic rights—police brutality, licensure discrimination, racism, stuff like that.¹²⁶

KDP local chapters carried out their own campaigns. For instance, in Los Angeles and Seattle, activists organized Filipino nurses to protest exploitative recruitment practices and discriminatory licensing examinations. They also reformed the Filipino American Community of Los Angeles and Filipino Community of Seattle respectively, which were both mired in conservatism and corruption.¹²⁷ In the Bay Area, the struggle to save the I-Hotel continued until its demolition in 1981. KDP members also became involved in helping recent Filipino immigrants confront prejudice and alienation in their neighborhoods and workplaces through the Filipinos for Affirmative Action.¹²⁸ Tracing the social inequalities that Filipinos face in the U.S. to the maldevelopment of the Philippines due to U.S. colonialism and intervention was a central theme in the local campaigns.

¹²⁶ Ciria Cruz, interview.

¹²⁷ Ojeda-Kimbrough, interview; Velma Veloria, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Seattle, Washington, USA, July 23, 2014.

¹²⁸ Galedo, interview.

The AMLC also undertook cultural activities and events that challenged Filipino elite discourses, beliefs, and traditions to ensure movement continuity, promote collective identity among its activists, and intensify the conflict within the community around the dictatorship. During the celebration of the Philippine Independence Day in June 12, Philippine consulates all over the U.S. organized galas with the Filipino and American elites to showcase the achievements of the community. KDP countered the discourses that the Philippine state propagated in the events by organizing an alternative, often thematic, commemoration called “Philippine National Day” or PND. In 1980, the fifth annual PND *barrio fiesta* paid tribute to three wave of Filipino immigration to the U.S. and highlighted the contributions of Filipinos to the American and Philippine nation building.¹²⁹ During Christmas holidays, KDP reached out to the majority of Filipinos through caroling, which offered an “opportunity to have discussion of the Philippine situation in the safety of their own home.”¹³⁰

*For the larger Filipino community, the strategy was, at the very minimum, keep the community divided on the issue of the dictatorship. Meaning, make sure the government’s position does not dominate the field by itself. There has to be a constant challenge... That’s why it was important to keep the polarization throughout the year... those were the things that we did to keep the contention (italics supplied).*¹³¹

¹²⁹ Philippine National Day Committee, “Fifth Annual Philippine National Day, Barrio Fiesta, a tribute to three waves of Filipino immigration, ca. 1980,” University of Washington Libraries, Cannery Workers & Farm Laborers Union Local 7 Collection, Accession No. 3927-001, Box 32/38, 1980.

¹³⁰ Memo from the National Executive Board to All Leadership Bodies on the Caroling/Ecumenical Service Campaign, KDP, November 2, 1977, p. 1.

¹³¹ Ciria Cruz, interview.

5.3.2 State Visit and Other Mobilizing Events

On April 23, 1980, the annual convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) in Honolulu presented an opportunity for the resurgence of large-scale public mobilization against the Marcos dictatorship. ANPA invited Marcos as keynote speaker in the gathering of editors and journalists in the U.S. It was Marcos's first visit to the U.S. in fourteen years (Fuentecilla 2013), and the anti-martial law movement seized the rare occasion to rally thousands of U.S.-based Filipinos to denounce the dictator. The AMLC organized simultaneous protests in Philippine consulates in Chicago, Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York, Sacramento, Washington D.C., and other cities.¹³² To project popular support for the regime, the Philippine diplomatic mission in Hawaii staged a grand welcome and countermobilization, appealing to the nationalist sentiments and regional loyalties of the predominantly ethnic Ilocano¹³³ Hawaiian-Filipino population.¹³⁴

Marcos lifted martial law in January 1981 to appease the Catholic Church before the visit of Pope John Paul II to the Philippines in February. Although martial law formally ended, Marcos still maintained all of the presidential decrees, legislative authority, and suspension of writ of habeas corpus. The movement expressed doubts about his intentions and ability to relinquish control over the economy, the press, the military, and government institutions (Bonner 1988). In fact, his cross-border repression of activists continued. Investigations implicated Marcos in the murders of Filipino-American labor activists Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes¹³⁵

¹³² Cathi Tactaquin, "Building A United Opposition to Marcos—Positive and Negative Examples," *Ang Katipunan*, Vol. VII, No. 8, April 25-30, 1980, p. 3.

¹³³ Born and raised in the province of Ilocos Norte in the Philippines, Marcos belonged to the Ilocano ethnolinguistic group.

¹³⁴ "Marcos Launches Hawaii Trip—On the Defensive," *Ang Katipunan*, Vol. VII, No. 8, April 25-30, 1980, p. 1.

¹³⁵ Domingo and Viernes were at the forefront of reforming Local 37 of the ILWU.

on June 1, 1981 inside the office of Local 37 of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) in Seattle. Prior to his murder, Viernes had just returned from the Philippines, where he met with organizers of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (May First Movement [KMU]), a militant labor federation with ties to the CPP-NDF. Domingo and Viernes were instrumental in passing an ILWU resolution to send an international team to the Philippines to investigate worker conditions and union repression under Marcos. To anti-martial law activists, the politically-motivated killings proved the entrenchment of the institutions of dictatorship and the deception in Marcos's repeal of martial law. KDP and community leaders in Seattle immediately formed the Committee for Justice for Domingo and Viernes to conduct investigation and coordinate legal work (The New York Times 1989).

The signing of an extradition treaty between the Philippines and the U.S. on November 27, 1981 further heightened activists' anxieties over Marcos's transnational repression. Although the treaty was still awaiting ratification in the U.S. Senate, Marcos had named his targets for extradition in the Manila newspaper, *Bulletin Today*. The list included 15 Filipino nationals, who were permanent residents of the U.S.¹³⁶ Within two weeks of the State Department's release of copies of the agreement, the anti-martial law movement formed the National Commission Opposed to the U.S.-RP Extradition Treaty and lobbied members of the U.S. Congress.

The biggest mobilization in the U.S. against Marcos occurred in September 15-20, 1982. After Marcos's re-election in June, Reagan—a longtime close friend—extended an invitation to the Philippine president to make an official visit to the U.S. In spite of ideological conflicts, groups opposed to the dictatorship united and formed the Ad Hoc Coalition to Oppose the Marcos Visit. They characterized the official tour as an attempt for the Philippine president to

¹³⁶ "Philippines Update: Extending Repression, Crackdown on the U.S. Anti-Marcos Movement," Brochure of the Philippine Solidarity Network/Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship, 1982.

show to the international financial community that his regime enjoyed the support of the Reagan administration in the face of widespread resistance among Filipinos and a negative public image.¹³⁷ The coalition held protests nationwide in the U.S. and Canada, with the largest demonstrations in San Francisco and Seattle.¹³⁸

Activists, journalists, and pundits seized the critical discourse moment of the state visit. They debated issues associated with the event and the Marcos dictatorship such as extensive preparations and lavish spending,¹³⁹ a rapidly deteriorating Philippine economy, the goals of sustained U.S. backing of the regime, Marcos's alleged heroism during World War II,¹⁴⁰ and the worsening health condition of the leader.¹⁴¹ The visit also coincided with Amnesty International's release of the report *Human Rights Violations in the Philippines: An Account of Torture, Disappearances, Extrajudicial Executions, and Illegal Detention*—the organization's major publication about the Philippines since 1976 that documented abuses since the lifting of martial law (Bonner 1988; Fuentecilla 2013).

Marcos's U.S. trip opened spaces in the media and public sphere for activist narratives about the Philippine situation. The "illegitimate president" as a master frame dominated, in light of the erosion of confidence over Marcos's capacity to govern his country. But for Reagan, his friend was the only viable leader who could protect U.S. interests amidst economic decline and political turmoil. This perception changed with the murder of former senator and elite opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr. in 1983.

¹³⁷ Ad Hoc Coalition to Oppose the Marcos Visit, "Letter to Friends and Supporters," September 20, 1981.

¹³⁸ "Villapando, Venny, "SF, Seattle Demos Were the Largest During the Visit," *Ang Katipunan*, Vol. VIII, No. 10, October 1982, pp. 6-7.

¹³⁹ Weeks before the Marcoses' arrival, the Philippine consulates spent \$410,000 for picnics for Filipino-Americans who would take part in the staged welcome (Bonner 1988).

¹⁴⁰ In the midst of the state visit, Filipino exile Bonifacio Gillego published in *Philippine News* an exposé claiming that Marcos's war medals were fake (McCoy 1999).

¹⁴¹ Before the scheduled state visit, Marcos spent days in the hospital due to complications of lupus (Wurfel 1988).

5.4 ELITE CLEAVAGES, COMMUNITY CONSENSUS, AND WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. SUPPORT (1983-1986)

Aquino's assassination catalyzed the chain of events that led to Marcos's downfall. In Manila, business leaders, institutional allies such as his technocrats, and some members of the military quickly withdrew their support (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). Massive capital flight pushed the Philippine economy to bankruptcy. Diplomats in the U.S. embassy, who knew of Marcos's involvement in the killing, began to reach out to the political opposition. Aquino's murder drew an immediate condemnation from the State Department and precipitated hearings in the U.S. Congress under the House Subcommittee on Asia (Bonner 1988).

5.4.1 Media Coverage and Movement Expansion

The increased attention given to the Philippines and Marcos by international press after the assassination was notable. Marcos's image underwent a negative transformation in the American press, resulting in a "devastating restatement of past wrongs, which, combined with damaging new revelations associated specifically with his alleged involvement in the Aquino assassination, led to his virtual demonization in American reporting" (Soderlund 1994:41). Amid Marcos's deteriorating legitimacy, coverage of violence and fraud from 1983 to 1988 put international pressure on the U.S. to change its policy towards the Philippine president (Bain 1986; Gonzalez 1988; Randall 1993).

With U.S. mainstream media's regular reports of events in Manila, the Filipino community, which was once divided on the Marcos dictatorship, gradually formed a consensus on the need for change in the Philippines. Demonstrations became a regular feature at Philippine

consulates, and Marcos was a frequent topic at informal gatherings, social meetings, and cultural events of Filipinos. Instead of sowing fear, Aquino's killing presented an opportunity that emboldened Filipinos in the U.S. to come out, express enmity towards Marcos, and make public claims and demands on behalf of their co-ethnics in the Philippines. While established groups like FFP, KDP, and MFP continued with their congressional lobbying to cut aid to Marcos and their campaign to derail ratification of the extradition treaty at the national level, new movement participants took part in information exchange and discussions in local spaces.

...on the very day [of the assassination], we were being chased [by Filipinos] because our newspaper [*Ang Katipunan*] happened to have a picture of Aquino. But we didn't know yet that he was going to die when he made the paper. The headline said, "Why is this man going home?" When people saw it, all our newspapers were immediately gone. We were always on our feet as cadres. We weren't lackadaisical. We organized a forum the next day and a lot of people came. It was like night and day. Before, it was like pulling teeth to get people. But after Aquino got assassinated, it was like people who you never knew or people who were peripherally active suddenly became organizers in their own ways.¹⁴²

The nationwide growth of middle class and elite resistance to Marcos in the U.S. in the aftermath of the assassination paralleled that of the Philippines. Filipinos and Americans, who were previously uninvolved in the movement, participated in campaigns to denounce Marcos. New opposition groups that appealed to formerly apolitical Filipino professionals emerged, such

¹⁴² Edwin Batongbacal, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Oakland, California, USA, August 14, 2014.

as the Ninoy Aquino Movement (NAM)¹⁴³ based in New York (Fuentecilla 2013). Devout Filipino Catholics also joined the Church Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines in Washington D.C. The assassination provided a new basis of unity for ideologically disparate organizations. They joined forces on three plans of action: protest Aquino's murder and assign blame to Marcos, support the boycott of Marcos's regional elections in 1984, and fight the proposed extradition treaty between the Philippines and the U.S. (Gaerlan 1999).

Aquino embodied the martyrdom of Filipinos, a narrative that resonated with a predominantly devout Catholic immigrant community. Candlelight protests, vigils, and masses became part of the repertoire of the movement that fused religious and political passions. On the occasion of Aquino's 51st birthday, New York Mayor Ed Koch proclaimed November 27, 1983 Benigno S. Aquino Jr. Day, which was celebrated through an ecumenical service and partisan benedictions. In 1984, the Ninoy Aquino Movement unveiled in New York a 10-foot bronze statue of Aquino as representation of his self-sacrifice and as a symbol of Filipino resistance to the dictatorship (The New York Times 1984).

The murder of Aquino particularly presented an opportunity for NDF-affiliated organizations to expand their operations in the U.S. just as the communist movement began to gain greater support in the Philippines. Ugnayan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya (Alliance for National Democracy [hereinafter Ugnayan]), which was set up in 1979 by NDF cadres in the U.S. after KDP severed its ties with CPP, shifted its focus on community organizing of Filipinos, rather than rebuilding the U.S. committee of the CPP. It considered the assassination as a turning

¹⁴³ Members of NAM included Lupita Kashiwahara and Teresa Oreta (Aquino's sisters), Alex Escalamado of *Philippine News*, and exiled former Philippine senator Jovito Salonga. Heherson Alvarez was the organization's founding president.

point in its overseas revolutionary work that entailed a tactical stress on grassroots mobilization, given the widespread outrage of the situation in the Philippines.¹⁴⁴

5.4.2 Communist Threat and U.S. Pressure for Reforms

Aquino's death widened cleavages among U.S. political elites, particularly the chasm between the legislative and the executive departments with regard to Washington's policy towards Marcos. As the crisis deepened, splits in the Reagan administration emerged, with one camp standing by Marcos and the other opting to replace him with a moderate elite, friendly to U.S. interests (Schirmer and Shalom 1987). The U.S. was concerned that if it did not intervene in Philippine affairs and stabilize the economic, political, and social unrest triggered by the assassination, the growing communist insurgency would dislodge Marcos and take power.

On June 9, 1984, a 76-page secret cable from Manila to Washington D.C. entitled "Communist Movements in the Philippines: Background, Present Status, Outlook" stated that the NPA insurgency now posed a serious threat, with 8,000 well-armed guerrillas and more than 100,000 supporters, especially in the rural areas; in fact, in some regions in the Philippines, the NPA had replaced the central government (Bonner 1988). For years, Marcos, the Pentagon, and the State Department considered the NPA as no more than a nuisance. But the dispatch written by James Nach, political officer of the U.S. embassy in Manila, concluded that without reforms, "ultimate defeat and a communist takeover of the Philippines" was "a very possible scenario" (Nach quoted in Bonner 1988:360).

¹⁴⁴ "Summing Up Our Overseas Revolutionary Work in North America (1983 to 1988)," n.d.

The American public recognized that the Philippines was starting to resemble countries in Central America. In the second Reagan-Mondale presidential debate on October 21, 1984, the situation in the archipelago was one of the major issues.

MR. KONDRACK: Mr. President, I want to ask you a question about negotiating with friends. You severely criticized President Carter for helping to undermine two friendly dictators who got into trouble with their own people—the Shah of Iran and President Somoza of Nicaragua. Now there are other such leaders heading for trouble, including President Pinochet of Chile and President Marcos of the Philippines. What should you do, and what can you do to prevent the Philippines from becoming another Nicaragua?

THE PRESIDENT: ...And what I have to say about this is, many times—and this has to do with the Philippines, also, I know there are things there in the Philippines that do not look good to us from the standpoint right now of democratic rights, but what is the alternative? It is a large Communist movement to take over the Philippines. They have been our friend since their inception as a nation.

And I think that we've had enough of a record of letting—under the guise of revolution—someone that we thought was a little more right than we would be, letting that person go, and then winding up with totalitarianism, pure and simple, as the alternative. And I think that we're better off, for example with the Philippines, of trying to retain our friendship and help them right the wrongs we

see, rather than throwing them to the wolves and then facing a Communist power in the Pacific.¹⁴⁵

Determined to hold on to Marcos, the Reagan administration pressed the Philippine president to institute economic, military, and political reforms. A National Security Decision Directive issued in November 1984 urged Marcos to end crony capitalism, disband monopolies, allow a free press, and conduct fair elections. It also gave an official mandate to U.S. officials in the Philippines to communicate with moderate critics and opponents of the Marcos regime (Schirmer and Shalom 1987). The instruction was the first high-level articulation of American policy in the Philippines in twelve years.

By the spring of 1985, Marcos was unable to fulfill Washington's demand to stymie corruption in the Philippine military and to professionalize its combat units so that it could fight and defeat the communists. The administration reached a consensus that the longer Marcos was in power, the worse it would be for the U.S. (Bonner 1985). To American politicians, Marcos had become a threat to U.S. interests (Steinmetz 1994). Yielding to U.S. pressure to hold elections to reestablish his authority, Marcos declared during a November 1985 interview on *This Week with David Brinkley* that Filipinos would participate in a "snap" election on February 7, 1986 (Lee 2015).

Upon announcement of the election, members of the elite opposition persuaded Benigno Aquino, Jr.'s widow, Corazon, to challenge Marcos for the presidency. With the exception of Ugnayan and other groups that supported the boycott of the election, in response to NDF's call, the U.S. movement for democracy in the Philippines mobilized the Filipino community to

¹⁴⁵ "Debate Between the President and Former Vice President Walter F. Mondale in Kansas City, Missouri," October 21, 1984, Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan, 1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/102184b.htm>.

support the candidacy of Aquino by calling their relatives in the Philippines to vote. Leaders of NAM and MFP as well as other exiled former politicians returned to the Philippines to participate in Aquino's campaign (Gaerlan 1999). It was an election intended for the American critics of the Philippine president, one that would spark an insurrection leading to the downfall of the Marcos regime in February 1986.¹⁴⁶

5.5 MOBILIZATION FOR HOMELAND RECONSTRUCTION, RECONCILIATION, AND UNITY (1986-1992)

With the Marcoses' departure from Malacañan Palace, the organizations that comprised the movement against martial law took on different trajectories. The activities of MFP and NAM, which relied on the leadership of self-exiled political elites, declined and eventually ended, as Alvarez and Manglapus left the U.S. and went back to the Philippines to serve under the Aquino administration. Anti-imperialist groups kept the pressure on Aquino to deliver on her campaign promises that included agrarian reform and cancellation of the lease on the U.S. military bases (Gaerlan 1999). The coalition AMLC/CAMD—now renamed Committee to Advance the Movement for Democracy and Independence (CAMDI)—persisted with its anti-fascist work to guarantee that the Philippines did not revert back to authoritarian rule. In contrast, Ugnayan and its networks resumed their party building in North America.

¹⁴⁶ Widespread violence, vote buying, and tampering of election results marred the election, held on February 7, 1986. The computer technicians of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) walked out to express opposition the deliberate manipulation of the tally to favor Marcos. The COMELEC and Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) declared Marcos in February 15 as winner amid controversy. This precipitated the People Power Revolution, as thousands of Filipinos refused to accept the proclamation of Marcos and amassed in the streets to protest the outcome of the election results. By February 24, the military defected, and protestors stormed the presidential palace on the evening of February 25.

To be sure, while Marcos loyalists in the Filipino community in the U.S.—mostly Ilocanos—continued to recognize the deposed dictator as the president of the Philippines, a vast majority registered overwhelming support for Aquino. In the wake of the People Power Revolution, movement groups seized the opportunity presented by U.S. elite and community endorsement of Aquino, as well as the overall jubilant mood of Filipino Americans towards the Philippines, to rally support for three immediate post-Marcos agenda items: homeland reconstruction, opposition to asylum in the U.S. for the former president and his family, and retrieval of Marcos’s ill-gotten wealth. In the long-term, the linchpins of the movement worked towards reconciliation and unity and the constitution of Filipinos in the U.S. as a political bloc that would continuously advance the interests of the Filipinos and the Philippines in American politics.

First, responding to calls by the Aquino administration to help rebuild their homeland, Filipino Americans encouraged the “repatriation of brain power,” especially among doctors, engineers, and scientists who left the country in the 1970s.¹⁴⁷ Filipino immigrant professionals formed nonprofit organizations such as Support and Help Aquino’s Rehabilitation Efforts to provide venues for raising funds to assist Aquino’s development programs and for providing volunteer services in business, health, and education projects in the Philippines (The New York Times 1986). Religious groups and hometown associations also organized donation drives and fundraising events in partnership with Philippine state agencies and nongovernment organizations. In the subsequent congressional elections in May 1987, CAMDI campaigned and

¹⁴⁷ “Editorials: New Politics in the Community,” *Ang Katipunan*, Vol. XII, No. 4, March 5, 1986, p. 2.

generated financial support for senatorial candidates who played a crucial role in the resistance to Marcos.¹⁴⁸

When Aquino visited the U.S. for the first time as Philippine president in September 1986, she earned the affection and respect of the American public. In her speech delivered before the joint session of U.S. Congress, Aquino encouraged the U.S. to support the freedom against tyranny for which Filipinos fought.

Yet to all Americans, as the leader of a proud and free people, I address this question: has there been a greater test of national commitment to the ideals you hold dear than that my people have gone through? You have spent many lives and much treasure to bring freedom to many lands that were reluctant to receive it. And here you have a people who won it by themselves and need only the help to preserve it.

Three years ago, I said thank you, America, for the haven from oppression, and the home you gave Ninoy, myself and our children, and for the three happiest years of our lives together. Today, I say, join us, America, as we build a new home for democracy, another haven for the oppressed, so it may stand as a shining testament of our two nation's commitment to freedom.¹⁴⁹

Second, social movement organizations fought for the denial of asylum to the dictator and his family to ensure the physical and political safety of the Filipino community. Activists feared the possibility that Marcos and his huge number of acolytes in Hawaii would orchestrate counter-revolutionary activities from the U.S., similar to the actions of Batista's supporters in

¹⁴⁸ CAMDI raised funds for the candidacy of NDF leader Horacio Morales Jr. and NPA founder Bernabe Buscayno.

¹⁴⁹ Aquino, Corazon, "Speech During the Joint Session of the U.S. Congress," September 18, 1986, Official Gazette, <http://www.gov.ph/1986/09/18/speech-of-president-corazon-aquino-during-the-joint-session-of-the-u-s-congress-september-18-1986/>, accessed on March 5, 2015.

Miami.¹⁵⁰ Concerned about the impact of Marcos's presence on Filipino community relations and the cost of providing security to the former president, Hawaii State Senator Duke Kawasaki introduced a resolution urging Reagan and the U.S. Congress to reject Marcos's application for asylum (Southerl 1986). With unanimous approval and bipartisan support, the Reagan administration granted refuge in the U.S. to Marcos, creating friction between pro- and anti-Marcos camps in the state (Shipler 1986). Concurrently, a group of U.S.-based Filipino and American lawyers began to look for ways to recover stolen public funds, in cooperation with the Presidential Commission on Good Government, a quasi-judicial agency that Aquino created to reclaim ill-gotten wealth accumulated by Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.

Lastly, mirroring post-Marcos events in the Philippines, Filipino Americans also sought reconciliation and unity in the community, which was divided on the dictatorship for fourteen years. Filipino activists, professionals, and elected officials met at a Filipino-American Unity Conference in San Francisco in September 1986 to restore friendly relations with each other and to build a unified leadership in the community. An outcome of the meeting was the establishment of the Filipino American Council, which the participants envisioned as the main institution representing Filipino interests in the American economic, political, and social arenas, similar to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples and the Japanese American Citizens League.¹⁵¹ Participation in the U.S. movement against Marcos allowed Filipino Americans to develop a network of elite allies and conscience adherents, acquire knowledge of the diverse problems of the communities where they organized, and gain experience in ethnic lobbying.

¹⁵⁰ "Editorials: New Politic in the Community," *Ang Katipunan*, Vol. XII, No. 4, March 5, 1986, p. 2.

¹⁵¹ Bello, Madge, "Pinoys Try to Build Power Bloc," *Ang Katipunan*, Vol. XII, No. 11, October 1986, p. 10.

As the participation of Filipinos in homeland politics increased and spread to mainstream sectors of the community during the transition to democracy, the involvement of activists from early anti-martial law groups, especially those from KDP, waned due to organizational and personal reasons. First, the disillusionment with the Maoist ideology, which began during the debates¹⁵² on the trajectory of the revolutionary struggle in the early 1980s, and severing of formal ties with the network of CPP-NDF-affiliated partners left the activists without a movement to anchor their homeland-oriented struggle. “If you have no counterpart in the Philippines, whom are you building a movement with? With whom will you strategize?,” expressed Cynthia Domingo. The CPP-NDF continued its international work in the U.S. through the Alliance of Philippine Concerns, an organization that spearheaded the campaign for the closure of the U.S. bases in 1991. The veteran activists of the anti-martial law movement, however, distance themselves from it.

Others, who were introduced to the problems of Filipino immigrants, began to focus full-time on organizing for migrants’ rights, especially with the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

I think it became clear during 1987, 1988 that the US movement had matured—that essentially this notion of vanguard organization was not the way. We need to create lasting and durable change and we had to make a shift to more transparent organizations that were more based in the issue in the communities... it was hard let go and have confidence that, in fact, we could still be relevant and meaningful

¹⁵² The debates that created tensions within the KDP included Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea, the Sino-Soviet split, and CPP-NDF’s strict adherence to the Maoist strategy.

without that kind of strategic infrastructure that we were wedded, not just politically but also personally.¹⁵³

Most continued with activism, specifically labor organizing for the ILWU and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU); migrants' rights mobilizations in California, New York, and Washington; and constitution of a new communist party in the U.S. through the Line of March.¹⁵⁴ A few engaged in local politics. For example, Velma Veloria, who was involved in organizing nurses and other medical professionals through SEIU, was the first Asian-American woman to be elected to the Washington State Legislature in 1992. Several began to focus on their personal lives. Family formation became a priority to some activists. Those who dropped out of college to work full time for KDP went back to school to obtain their university degrees and build their professional careers.

I decided it was time to find a career. I went back to school and later on got my master's degree in social work. There was nothing else to do. I mean, if I was in the Philippines, there was always something to do, but I was here [in the U.S.].¹⁵⁵

In sum, democratization in the Philippines created a less contentious relationship between Filipinos in the U.S. and the Aquino government. As spaces for participation in homeland politics opened up through the creation of service-oriented nonprofit organizations, Filipino immigrant professionals—with resources and skills deemed necessary for reconstruction—assumed a central role in diaspora mobilization. Aquino's popularity with U.S. political elites also facilitated institutional access for Filipino Americans in the U.S. policymaking arena on

¹⁵³ Tactaquin, interview.

¹⁵⁴ Line of March was an Oakland-based political organization founded in 1970 by Irwin Silber, a former member of the Communist Party USA. It maintained a theoretical journal, entitled *Line of March: A Journal of Marxist-Leninist Theory and Politics*. In 1987, the editorial board of the journal consisted of Linda Burnham, Max Elbaum, Silber, and three former KDP members—Bruce Occeña, Melinda Paras, and Catherine Tactaquin.

¹⁵⁵ Batongbacal, interview.

issued related to the Philippines. Finally, although the exile of Marcos in Hawaii posed a threat to community relations, the restoration of democracy offered a propitious environment for conciliation and consensus building among Filipino Americans, both of which were necessary for consolidating themselves into a power bloc in U.S. politics.

5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The case study on U.S. mobilization for regime in the Philippines shows that the strategic choices activists made in response to the changing political opportunities and resources in the migrant community enabled the construction of the Filipino diaspora based on discourses on colonialism, nationalism, and sovereignty, whereby the Filipino transnational imaginary is defined vis-à-vis the U.S. colonial experience. As a country with a huge population of Filipinos from distinct immigration waves, with each cohort bringing variegated resources, interests, and identities, the U.S. was conducive to the rise of multiple organizations and networks that channeled civic and political participation. Social movements among immigrants developed from this rich associational life. However, durable relations between the U.S. and the Philippines and the existence of a significant proportion of Filipino immigrants keen on putting down roots in the U.S. posed a challenge to mobilization for regime change in the Philippines, despite the presence of material resources, social capital, and collective identity necessary for movement formation and growth. Overall, then, the conditions for Filipino diaspora mobilization in the U.S. were unfavorable.

The escalation of the Vietnam War in mid-1960s simultaneously laid the foundations for the authoritarian rule of Marcos and created the circumstances for the emergence of oppositional

consciousness and infrastructure of protest among Filipino Americans. While Marcos was using U.S. fear of the spread of communism in Southeast Asia to build his military regime, U.S.-born Filipino activists were elaborating on discourses on U.S. imperialism, the interconnections of Third World nationalist struggles, and the nature of global capitalist development. Through the microprocesses of diffusion and spillover, the ideas, tactics, organizational structure, and membership of the anti-Vietnam War movement influenced subsequent mobilizations where a large number of Filipino Americans were involved, such as the movements to preserve historic Asian communities and to institute ethnic studies in American universities. These movements built on and enhanced the resources of earlier organizing efforts of Filipino farm and cannery workers and connected Filipino American activists to their predecessors.

Migration of dissent from the Philippines was also a key process in diaspora mobilization. Without it, the connection to the struggle in the Philippines would not have been strong, despite the presence of an infrastructure of protest in the U.S. As diaspora political entrepreneurs, Filipino Americans politically socialized in the late 1960s and Filipino immigrant activists and exiles contributed actively to transnational brokerage. Young militant leaders and cadres of the communist movement in the Philippines brought with them knowledge and experience of the Philippine situation, direct ties to Marcos's most organized opposition, and ideologies that anchored the movement against the dictatorship to national democratic revolution in the Philippines. Like the youth activists, anti-Marcos exiles also bore witness to the dictatorship. Their reputation and celebrity status helped augment resources for mobilization by drawing elites and professionals in the Filipino community into the movement. They also served as a channel to the moderate opposition, whose role in regime change became central towards the final years of the dictatorship and during the transition to democracy.

The U.S. national interests in the Philippines and the U.S. president's dominance in foreign policy decisions indicated a closed opportunity for the movement to influence the formal institutional arena, regardless of the political party in power. But activists recognized discursive openings and elite cleavages and interpreted threats in ways that emphasized opportunity rather than constraint. Creating controversy on Marcos's repression of Filipinos in the U.S.—a liberal democracy—and on the defection of his government representatives overseas enabled movement participants to turn threats into opportunities for media attention. In their lobbying efforts to decrease aid to the regime, activists adapted their strategies based on their understanding of the impact of shifts in the political composition of the legislature, global events, and changes in discourses that undergird foreign policy to U.S.-Philippines relations.

With the transition to democracy in the homeland, diaspora politics was no longer confined to contentious forms. Rather, a more collaborative relationship between Filipinos in the U.S. and the American and Philippine governments developed. In addition, biographical, institutional, and structural changes encouraged activists of the anti-martial law groups to shift their focus on other forms of political engagement. Although some Filipino organizations in the U.S.—particularly those which remained supportive to the revolutionary movement in the Philippines—maintained a critical stance on Aquino, the largely supportive atmosphere to the new administration pushed radical framing of homeland issues to the periphery.

6.0 TRANSPLANTING AND INCUBATION OF PHILIPPINE REVOLUTIONARY WORK IN THE NETHERLANDS

Utrecht. This small and charming Dutch city perhaps beats the world's great metropolises—New York, Tokyo, London and Paris—to the curious distinction of being the foreign city most often mentioned in Manila's lively newspapers. Utrecht, of course, is the base of the National Democratic Front international office, and the home of the irrepressible Jose Maria Sison, the Communist Party of the Philippines' founding chairman, a political asylum-seeker in The Netherlands... Barrio Utrecht is not really a place. It is a state of mind.
Nathan F. Quimpo (2007)

I started in 1983 as a Philippine political activist who came to Europe to help broaden the movement's international support. In the process I became aware of the problems faced by Filipino and other migrants, and thus developed the consciousness of a Filipino migrant... Being in solidarity with the struggles of other countries and peoples of the world was for me a natural thing to do, wherein I developed the consciousness of a "world citizen."
Maria Ophelia Butalid-Echaves (2007)

On September 21, 1987, to honor the victims of the Marcos dictatorship and protest the deteriorating human rights conditions in newly-democratized Philippines, approximately 70 Filipinos and Dutch solidarity activists gathered in Dam Square in Amsterdam. Carrying funeral wreaths and photos of slain Filipino student leader Leandro Alejandro¹⁵⁶ and singing patriotic hymns such as *Bayan Ko* (My People), the protesters staged a memorial service at the National

¹⁵⁶ Alejandro was a prominent activist during the martial law period, who ran for Philippine Congress in 1986, but eventually lost amid reports of electoral fraud. An unidentified gunman shot him on September 19, 1987, just after a failed military coup. No one was arrested for the assassination.

Monument. The landmark has symbolized the struggle against fascism during World War II in the Netherlands. The Filipinos at the event delivered speeches and answered questions from bystanders about the recently installed government of Corazon Aquino and the continued struggle for a “truly sovereign, just, and democratic society.”¹⁵⁷

In the early 1970s, such dramatic performance of collective claims making and active citizenship by Filipinos on issues in their homeland was uncommon but not impossible. Temporary workers and permanent immigrants comprised the small and isolated migrant community. They did not articulate a diasporic consciousness and their ties to and interactions with the Philippines were limited to the familial domain. Although economic ties between the Netherlands and the Philippines existed, to the Dutch public, the Philippines was invisible and irrelevant in the geographies of power. How do exiles and migrants engage in homeland-oriented activism when their country of settlement has a small and isolated ethnic community, their collective identity is not based on the experience of trauma and expulsion, and their sending and receiving states have weak relations? In short, how does diaspora mobilization occur given the unique and inhospitable circumstances of the population attempting to coordinate collective action?

This chapter provides a historical analysis of the movement for democracy in the Philippines that emerged and developed in the Netherlands—a non-traditional country of destination for Filipino migrants and exiles. I discuss the findings thematically and chronologically as I trace the unfolding of events and processes that led to diaspora mobilization. In analyzing the rise and evolution of diaspora movements in relation to and dependent on other actors in contention—such as solidarity groups, political parties, and nongovernment

¹⁵⁷ Filippijnenbeweging Amsterdam, Filippijnengroep Nederland, Commission on Filipino Migrant Workers, and Damayang Pilipino sa Nederland, “Silent Commemoration and Protest in Amsterdam,” 21 September 1978, pp. 1-2.

organizations—I provide insight into the development dynamics and causal sequence of mobilization.

The narrative begins with the expatriation of “organizational migrants”¹⁵⁸ (Lucassen and Smit 2016)—such as missionaries and development workers—to the Philippines in the 1960s. Social interactions and historical circumstances transformed these sojourners into adherents of the movement for democracy. This process created durable people-to-people ties, despite weak historical relations between the Dutch and Philippine states. Upon return to the Netherlands, Dutch missionaries and development workers became linchpins of the Philippine solidarity movement in the mid-1970s. These solidarity activists acted as “migration bridges” to the Netherlands for Filipino communist exiles and as “movement incubators,” creating political opportunities, establishing connections, and elaborating frames necessary for diaspora mobilization.

I further describe how Filipino diaspora mobilization in the Netherlands grew in the late 1970s from the institutionalization of the solidarity movement in Dutch politics, the delegitimization of the homeland regime and its supporters by a nongovernment human rights tribunal, and the chain migration of exiles to the Netherlands that internationalized the national liberation movement and politicized the pre-existing networks in the migrant community. The combination of national and world historical events provided a favorable opportunity for diaspora mobilization to flourish, which by the 1980s exclusively centered on the transnational revolutionary work of the CPP-NDF. Diasporic consciousness simultaneously crystallized in migrant spaces, which developed into discursive fields and contested sites for the antagonistic

¹⁵⁸ Lucassen and Smit (2016:6) define organizational migrants as “people (and their dependents) whose migratory behavior is primarily determined by the interests of the organization they have joined (voluntarily or forced).” These include soldiers, aid workers, and missionaries, corporate expatriates, and diplomats.

construction of ideas about ethnicity and nationalism and the continuous negotiation of identity. In the last section, I recount the recasting of diaspora mobilization in response to the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship and restoration of democracy in the Philippines in the late 1980s. Democratic transition in the homeland and political and social transformations in Europe eventually led to the decline in mobilization on Philippine issues and an upsurge in activities on Filipino migrant concerns in the Netherlands.

6.1 POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF DUTCH EXPATRIATES IN THE PHILIPPINES (1969-1977)

Research findings reveal that the roots of Filipino diaspora activism in the Netherlands can be traced to Dutch development cooperation and missionary work in the Philippines in the mid-1960s. Although initial contact between the Philippines and the Netherlands started during the Spanish colonization of the archipelago in the sixteenth century,¹⁵⁹ formal economic and political relations developed substantially, albeit slowly, under American occupation that began in 1989, in the form of diplomatic mission,¹⁶⁰ bilateral trade, and movement of persons. The Netherlands and the Philippines have been significant partners in the economic sphere since the 1960s, with the former as a major export destination for the latter's agricultural products such as copra and coconut oil and an important investor in the Philippines through Dutch multinational companies such as Unilever, Shell, and Philips (Muijzenberg 2001).

¹⁵⁹ In his study of Philippine-Dutch relations from 1600-2000, Muijzenberg (2001) traces the initial contact between the Dutch and Filipinos to the former's first circumnavigation of the globe, with the goal of inflicting as much damage as possible to the Spanish strategic and commercial position in the world.

¹⁶⁰ Despite sporadic commercial contacts in the nineteenth century, the Kingdom of the Netherlands maintained an honorary consulate in Manila from 1866 onward, which became a full diplomatic post in the 1930s.

6.1.1 Bilateral Aid as Resources for Mobilization

Deepening economic relations between the two countries precipitated bilateral aid. Since development aid in its nascent years was regarded as an instrument for overseas employment and export promotion, existing trade and other forms of commercial exchange played an important role in the selection of recipient countries (Hilhorst and Sideri 1995; Hoebnik 1999; Voorhoeve 1979). The Philippines became a beneficiary of Dutch official development assistance in the mid-1960s, with a general focus on poverty alleviation. Starting in the early 1970s, however, respect for human rights became a key criterion for the selection of recipient countries, aside from gross national product per capita and the presence of a redistribution policy¹⁶¹ (Brysk 2009; Hoebnik 1999). As the human rights situation worsened under the Marcos regime, direct support declined and aid was almost exclusively channeled through the co-financing program (CFP) (Eldik Thieme 1992). Development cooperation through this arrangement led to the initial forging of political ties between Dutch and Filipinos beyond the confines of state relations.

Four Dutch private development organizations received funds from the government, mostly for capital expenses, to undertake agricultural and rural development projects in the Philippines in partnership with Philippine NGOs. These were the Centrale voor Bemiddeling bij Medefinanciering van Ontwikkelingsprogramma (Central Agency for Joint Financing of Development Programmes), a Roman Catholic foundation; the Interkerkelijke Coördinatie Commissie Ontwikkelingshulp (Inter-Church Organization for Development Organization [ICCO]), which has its roots in Dutch-Protestant churches; the Nederlandse Organisatie voor

¹⁶¹ Because of this rule, the Dutch government discontinued official loans and arms sales to Chile and ended financial credits to Dutch companies doing business in the country, following the 1973 coup. In the same year, continued apartheid in South Africa compelled the Netherlands to cease Dutch government investment in South Africa and pushed Dutch private corporations to adopt voluntary codes of conduct (Brysk 2009).

Internationale Bijstand (Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation), the country's first politically independent and non-religious development organization; and the Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Humanist Institute for Cooperation) (Eldik Thieme 1992), established in 1968 by the Humanist Association in response to the dominance of religious organizations working in the field of development in The Netherlands. Since Marcos banned NGOs, the Dutch funding agencies relied on the basic ecclesial communities¹⁶² and network of Social Action Centers of the Catholic Church.

Starting in 1908, with the primary objective of replacing Spanish priests, the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart and the Society of the Divine Word assigned Dutch missionary priests to inaccessible villages and parishes, where they lived among impoverished, rural Filipinos. At the same time, the two missionary orders sent Filipino novices to the Netherlands to be trained for the priesthood (van den Muijzenberg 2001). With the spread of liberation theology in the 1960s, Dutch and Filipino ministers worked for the evangelization and “conscientization”¹⁶³ of members of their parishes and the mobilization of the poor for social change. They often got themselves into conflicts with local power holders. Missionaries also started Catholic schools, seminaries, and universities, where critical pedagogy guided their curriculum and where members of the clergy and their devotees were first exposed to Philippine politics and became critical of the Marcos regime. An Irish nun with the Columban Sisters, who worked in the Philippines from 1968 to 1976, recalled,

¹⁶² Basic ecclesial communities (BECs), also referred to as basic Christian communities, emerged as part of the concrete realization of the communitarian model of Church promoted by the Second Vatican Council. The communities considered the Church as part of the grassroots. The earliest BECs emerged in Brazil and the Philippines in the 1960s (Azevedo 1985; Nadeau 1999).

¹⁶³ In his book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, published in 1970, Brazilian education theorist Paulo Freire introduced the term “conscientization” or *conscientização* to refer to the process of developing a critical awareness of one's social reality through reflection and action. More popularly known as “consciousness raising,” the concept is grounded in critical theory that emphasizes in learning the perception and exposure of social and political contradictions.

Having lived in Olongapo¹⁶⁴, I was exposed to the latter part of Vietnam War as it was waged from the Philippines... I was still teaching in 1972 when Martial Law was declared. I could really see the strategy of Marcos to turn the schools into conveyor belts for his nationalist ideology. There were many impositions on the schools in terms of the curriculum... Security became a must in the schools, which was used for intelligence gathering. I was really looking for forms of resistance... There were many teach-ins that time in Manila... You could go to teach-ins on anything, from US imperialism to Mao Tse Tung thought... And when I transferred to Manila, I became involved with such organizations as Friends of the Workers and the first *La Tondeña*¹⁶⁵ strike... These were my first links to organizations that were part of the beginnings of resistance to the dictatorship.¹⁶⁶

Since Dutch funding agencies could only work with church-based NGOs, politicized religious workers, who were members of or had ties with the CPP-NDF, set the direction of development cooperation. Dutch aid provided the resources necessary to organize the grassroots through the establishment of cooperatives and the expansion of educational projects focusing on empowerment among indigenous peoples, peasants, and women. A significant proportion of funding went to the translation and distribution of José María Sison's *Philippine Society and Revolution*, Chairman Mao's *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung* and the writings of Karl

¹⁶⁴ Olongapo is a metropolitan city in the province of Zambales in the Philippines, where the Subic Naval Base was located.

¹⁶⁵ Established in 1902 by a Chinese-Filipino businessman, La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. is the country's largest distillery.

¹⁶⁶ Brida Brennan, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Utrecht, The Netherlands, October 14, 2013.

Marx and Antonio Gramsci, which the clergy incorporated into their catechist institutes.¹⁶⁷ Thus, the Dutch government's bilateral assistance to the Philippines through the CFP contributed to the burgeoning local opposition against Marcos by providing the needed infrastructure for recruitment and organizational expansion.

The involvement of Dutch citizens in the movement against the dictatorship expanded and intensified through the Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (Foundation of Netherlands Volunteers [SNV]).¹⁶⁸ In 1969, the first group of Dutch volunteers arrived in the Philippines. They were mostly in their early 20s and had recently graduated from college. Most of the men joined SNV to escape military service, from which volunteers were excused. Others wanted to start a career in foreign affairs and international development. A few enlisted "out of curiosity" when they saw an advertisement in the university, while several felt that they "needed to work on something meaningful somewhere that was not the Netherlands." Most of them did not know anything about the Philippines before assignment and preferred an African country due to the "stronger Dutch presence in the continent." With educational backgrounds in engineering, social work, community development, and health sciences, they were assigned to teach at trade schools and state universities and to set up facilities that would improve the health and livelihood of villagers. Since Dutch aid did not go directly to government programs, almost all volunteers worked in church-related organizations, which became an issue to some.

I arrived with a good friend. We were very stubborn that time. Young and innocent, 23 years old. We arrived in Manila and we were approached actually by

¹⁶⁷ Luzviminda Santos, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Quezon City, Philippines, March 10, 2014.

¹⁶⁸ Similar to the Peace Corps in the U.S., the mission of the government-run Dutch volunteer program, established in 1965 under the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is to provide technical assistance to developing countries and to understand the cultures of their people.

the government and asked to work for the Tondo¹⁶⁹ project of Imelda Marcos. Because we were both of Catholic background and had a very critical view of the church, we didn't want to work with the bishop at the diocese. We would like to work in the real thing, in the Tondo slums. We were received by the First Lady herself. But then, the guy in charge of the program called. They were waiting because we were assigned to Antique. So he said, "Either you take it or leave it. Either you go to Antique or you take a plane back home to Amsterdam because you are not going to work in the Imelda program. You do not want to do that."¹⁷⁰

Despite the Dutch government's disapproval of the Marcos regime, SNV enforced a policy of neutrality and non-intervention in domestic political affairs. In accordance with international law, co-financing agencies cannot support activities that aim to undermine the political independence of a state or to overthrow a legal government (Eldik Thieme 1992). Volunteers were advised to exercise distance and impartiality when dealing with local actors. However, having no previous knowledge of Philippine culture and society, the volunteers sought to integrate into the communities to understand the unique circumstances and particularities of their work. Like the missionaries, they developed close relationships with residents and, eventually, their embeddedness in the locale brought them into frequent contact with underground activists.

¹⁶⁹ Tondo is part of Metro Manila, known for being one of the poorest and most underdeveloped areas in the country.

¹⁷⁰ Dolf and Hanneke Hautvast, interview by Sharon Quinsaas, Utrecht, The Netherlands, October 8, 2013.

6.1.2 Development Workers as Movement Adherents

Since the volunteers were in the country before and shortly after the declaration of martial law, they witnessed the escalation of repression in the villages and the peak of political turmoil and social unrest. Coincidentally, most of the volunteers were assigned to the rural areas of Central and Southern Philippines, which were the stronghold of the NPA and thus were sites of intense military operations. Ignoring SNV guidelines, they offered temporary shelter to activists. Some like Dolf and Hanneke Hautvast learned about the existence of an organized, radical, underground movement and the extent of involvement of their Filipino colleagues through this provision of sanctuary.

We knew their opinions, but we didn't realize [at] that time how dangerous it would be for them during the declaration of the martial law. So then, people came to our house. "Can we stay here? Can you help us?" They were our friends. And they only had a toothbrush. We didn't know their relation [to the Communist Party], but we knew them. And there was a group, sort of [a] cell, already [at] that time in the movement.¹⁷¹

These encounters instigated the political socialization of Dutch volunteers into the Philippine struggle, as their homes were used for organizational meetings and teach-ins on topics that ranged from U.S. imperialism to Philippine peasantry. The volunteers' political identity slowly took shape through their interaction with Filipino activists and their direct experience of living under an authoritarian regime. As the volunteers gained further knowledge and better

¹⁷¹ Hautvast, interview.

understanding of the situation, they also developed an awareness of their social location. As a former volunteer recounted,

At that time, we met people who were involved in the movement, who were sometimes taken from their houses. We were opening our houses to people who would stay one or two nights and then leave again. We didn't know exactly what they were doing. They were talking a lot about the situation in the Philippines—why there was a movement, why there's poverty in the Philippines... I was really educated in the times... That was actually the start of my involvement. I needed to do something.¹⁷²

A number of volunteers who were stationed in trade schools petitioned SNV to be transferred to the Diocesan Social Action Center.¹⁷³ Upon relocation, they immediately became involved with village-level and sector-based organizing. This caused problems between the SNV program in Manila and the headquarters in The Hague, especially when some volunteers were arrested, detained, and interrogated due to suspected ties with the NPA.¹⁷⁴ A large proportion of male Dutch volunteers also married local activists and started to have children, making high-risk activism unfeasible. When the military heightened the surveillance of suspected foreign sympathizers, the volunteers, who only had two- to three-year nonrenewable contracts, decided to leave for the Netherlands for the safety of their families.

Thus, an unintended outcome of Dutch development cooperation through SNV was the enlistment of its citizens into the national democratic movement as movement adherents and sympathetic allies. The volunteers' participation in the Philippine struggle did not end with their

¹⁷² Dick Groeneveld, interview by Sharon Quinsaas, Utrecht, The Netherlands, October 10, 2013.

¹⁷³ Santos, interview.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with Jessica Kok-Ligan, interview by Sharon Quinsaas, Utrecht, The Netherlands, November 7, 2013.

departure from the country; rather, their activism was relocated and adapted to the Dutch setting. Through SNV, the movement was assured a steady supply of adherents.

6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS (1975-1978)

The first cohort of SNV volunteers assigned to the Philippines returned to their home country while it was undergoing political and social transformations. The first wave of mobilization among Dutch social movements was beginning to subside in the early 1970s. The upsurge started with the “cultural revolution” of the anti-authoritarian anarchist movement Provos¹⁷⁵ in the second half of the 1960s and peaked at the end of the decade with the student movement and the protests against U.S. involvement in Vietnam (Kriesi 1993). Second, the New Left gained control of the Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party [PvdA]) and reformed its agenda to adhere to socialist principles, which included support for social movements and adoption of extra-parliamentary activities as part of its repertoire (Andeweg and Irwin 2002). In its congress in 1973, PvdA officially became *actie-partij* (“action party”), a political bloc that is “not only oriented towards participation in government but also towards the provision of services and participation in movement activities” (Kriesi 1993:170). In the same year, a reform coalition under the social-democratic Prime Minister Joop den Uyl came to power, which had a demobilizing effect for social movements since extra-parliamentary mobilization no longer

¹⁷⁵ The Provos was a counter-culture movement that originated in Amsterdam in 1965. It became known internationally in 1966 when it disrupted the royal wedding of Princess Beatrix and German diplomat, Claus von Amsberg, by throwing smoke bombs at the procession. It further made international headlines when it participated in the construction workers’ revolt in the Netherlands also in the same year (Pas 2008).

appeared to be essential. Social movement organizations underwent a process of professionalization and received government subsidies for their work (Kriesi 1993).

6.2.1 Human Rights Frames and Party Sympathies

The rise of the socialist-oriented PvdA in Dutch politics provided a favorable opportunity for the formation of organizations focusing on Third World development and national liberation. As a continuation of their work in the Philippines and as a response to letters of appeal they received from Filipinos urging them to create awareness of the Marcos dictatorship in Western Europe, two former volunteers and two missionaries founded the Filippijnengroep Nederland (Philippine Group Netherlands [FGN]) in 1975.¹⁷⁶ For two years, FGN functioned as an informal working group where members met every week to discuss the situation in the Philippines and to create a platform for the popular dissemination of its analysis to the Dutch public.

Unlike the activists of the Central America and Chile solidarity movements in the U.S. who were veterans of the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War mobilizations of the 1960s and hence rooted in existing protest networks and other resources, members of FGN did not have a history of activism. The early years of FGN was thus devoted to expanding their organizational ties in Dutch civil society and educating the public about the Philippines and the Marcos dictatorship. FGN took advantage of the extensive network of religious organizations of the Dutch missionaries and built linkages with the movements to which they belonged. Registered as a

¹⁷⁶ The SNV volunteers were Dolf and Hanneke Hautvast and the missionary priests were Edgar Koning and Jan Schrama.

foundation, the FGN also received a subsidy from the Dutch government for its day-to-day operations.¹⁷⁷

With the initial objective of drawing attention to the escalation of human rights violations in the Philippines, particularly on the increasing number of political prisoners and disappearance of activists, FGN published a monthly magazine called *Filippijnen Bulletin* (Philippine Bulletin), which was circulated to their existing and incipient networks. In its first issues in 1976, FGN connected the dictatorship in the Philippines to the U.S. intervention in Asia: “After the defeat of the U.S. in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the Philippines has become one of the last bastions of American imperialism in Southeast Asia (translated from Dutch).”¹⁷⁸ It framed its formation as a contribution to the ongoing liberation struggle in the Philippines and linked this to conflict within Dutch society: “...the similarities between the Filipino people and Dutch to the extent that they both suffer under the same social [capitalist] system (translated from Dutch).”¹⁷⁹ FGN called for solidarity and stressed the experience of Dutch volunteers in the Philippines who bore witness to the struggle of Filipinos and who continued to have ties with people in the country.

There are many persons in the Netherlands who have been in the Philippines and who have encountered the exploitation and oppression experienced by the majority of the Filipino people, and who feel that this should be ended. We receive urgent requests from the Philippines to spread information about the fascist actions of the Marcos regime, and to offer solidarity and support to the Philippine resistance (translated from Dutch).¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ At that time, all Dutch foundations focusing on issues of public interest were entitled to a small state subsidy.

¹⁷⁸ Filippijngroep Nederland (FGN), “Historisch Overzicht,” *Filippijnen Bulletin*, Issue Number 1, p. 5.

¹⁷⁹ FGN, “Filippijngroep Nederland,” *Filippijnen Bulletin*, p. 3.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

Since the Philippines was relatively unknown, FGN piggybacked on the prominence of Latin American dictatorships in Europe and inserted the Philippines into policy discourses on human rights and democracy that were gaining traction in the Netherlands. In contrast to the dictatorships of Augusto Pinochet or the Somoza dynasty, which the U.S. supported and thus gave American solidarity activists a target, the Marcos regime had limited political relations with the Dutch government. FGN, however, immediately gained allies from the left-socialist *Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij* (Pacifist Socialist Party [PSP]). The Marxist-Leninist *Communistische Partij van Nederland* (Communist Party of the Netherlands [CPN]) was reluctant to support FGN in the beginning due to the latter's association with the Maoist CPP-NDF. This eventually changed with the institutionalization of Philippine solidarity work. The FGN gained access to the Dutch government through the PvdA, which was in the majority from 1972 to 1977. PvdA condemned authoritarian regimes in the Third World and criticized the complicity of Western governments to dictators.

FGN held demonstrations at the Philippine Embassy, the U.S. Embassy, and the Dutch Parliament, all located in The Hague. In its first public event in 1977, FGN organized a protest at the consulate, where they presented an appeal signed by over 4,000 Dutch citizens demanding the restoration of democracy in the Philippines. Thereafter, activists marched to the parliament and met with Anne Vondeling, member of PvdA and president of the Dutch House of Representatives, and three other members of parliament who were members of left political parties. They also presented a petition requesting the parliament to exert pressure on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to withdraw controversial projects, such as the construction of the Chico River Dam, an electric power generation project which encroached upon ancestral lands of indigenous peoples and violated the human rights of local

residents. An outcome of the engagement was the petition's discussion in four committees of the parliament: foreign affairs, development aid, finance, and economic affairs.¹⁸¹

The fall of the reform government of den Uyl and the installation of a new coalition between the Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal [CDA]) and the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy [VVD]) in 1977 changed the political context for FGN in paradoxical ways. On the one hand, the caucus of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals was less progressive and sympathetic to the demands and issues of social movements. On the other hand, the social movements gained a powerful ally in the opposition party, PvdA, which was vehement in supporting their mobilization efforts. During this period, political protests intensified and ushered in the second wave of mobilization that was entirely the work of five Dutch new social movements (NSMs) focusing on ecology and anti-nuclear, peace, solidarity, autonomous, and women (Kriesi 1993; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rochon 1988).

Although the CDA-VVD coalition government was politically conservative, FGN considered CDA's Christian principles and organizational foundation as an opening to engage the Dutch state, especially since the Philippines was a predominantly Catholic country. CDA was receptive to appeals on human rights issues, but not on support for armed struggle.¹⁸² FGN seized this opportunity and members of the solidarity group who belonged to religious congregations used their support for the political party as leverage. Father Edgar Koning, a Dutch Carmelite priest with FGN, recalls an incident where they exercised their religious influence in dealing with CDA politicians.

¹⁸¹ FGN, "Now That's Enough, Marcos! Dutch Demonstrators Demand: Lift Martial Law!," n.d., pp. 1-2.

¹⁸² Edgar Koning, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, October 29, 2013.

We had a demonstration in The Hague and we had a petition [asking party to take action on enforced disappearances in the Philippines] to offer to the president of the Christian Democrats. The president of the party came to the front door and a major superior handed over the petition. First, he did not want to accept it and he left them waiting for a long time. She got very angry and said, “If you handle us this way, our sisters will not vote for your party again.” So he was afraid. The day after the demonstrations, he wrote a letter to the sister, excusing himself for the treatment.¹⁸³

6.2.2 Opportunities and Resources from New Social Movements

The NSMs also offered an auspicious environment for the growth and expansion of FGN. The organization reached out to two large and prominent NSMs in Netherlands: the ecology movement—including its radical branch, the anti-nuclear movement—and the peace movement. The Dutch political opportunity structure for the anti-nuclear movement has been favorable since the the government’s decision to build Dutch nuclear power plants in 1973 (Kriesi 1993). Through its campaign against the construction of the World Bank-funded Bataan Nuclear Power Plant¹⁸⁴ in Zambales, Philippines, FGN connected with anti-nuclear groups and capitalized on the opportunity for the movement. Because of its religious network, FGN also established ties with the Dutch peace movement, particularly its Christian current as represented by the

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ In response to the 1973 oil crisis, Marcos decided to build a nuclear power plant to meet the country’s energy demands and decrease dependence on imported oil. The government applied for a US\$2.5 billion loan at the World Bank and contracted the Westinghouse Corporation for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. The anti-nuclear movement in the Philippines criticized the project its potential threat to public health. The plant was located in an earthquake zone, where a volcano formation was found.

ecumenical Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (Inter-Church Peace Council) and the Catholic Pax Christi (Peace of Christ). FGN linked the Philippines to their issues related to nuclear weapons, cruise missiles, and militarism, highlighting the role of US imperialism in the Asia-Pacific region in its frames.

The political atmosphere also became more conducive to international solidarity against dictatorial regimes. Throughout the developed world, solidarity groups developed a common repertoire of contention. These consisted of exposing events and issues not covered by mainstream media, transforming public opinion, and providing alternative analyses and explanations through public outreach, educational campaigns, exposure trips (Green 2003; Nepstad 2001, 2004; Perla 2009; Power 2009; Smith 1996). The solidarity movement in the Netherlands¹⁸⁵ flourished, having the highest mobilization capacity throughout the second wave, compared to the other NSMs (Kriesi 1993).

Notable country-specific committees—such as those in support of the struggle of the Vietnamese and of national liberation movements in East Timor, Nicaragua, Palestine, and South Africa—made significant strides in developing a strong organizational infrastructure and in influencing public discourse on humanitarian and development aid. FGN developed relations with other solidarity groups, especially the committee on Nicaragua, as both noted similarities in the character of the Marcos and Somoza regimes as well as the evolution of an organized insurgency. Like other solidarity groups, FGN informed and appealed to the Dutch public by personalizing distant or abstract issues through life stories of ordinary Filipinos that spoke to a generalized abhorrence of the Marcos regime's behavior.

¹⁸⁵ Kriesi (1993) notes that the term “solidarity movement” in the Netherlands is an analytical concept that the Dutch public does not perceive as such. Rather, the public recognizes it through its branches—human rights, humanitarian and development aid (including country-specific committees), anti-racism, and political refugees—with the first two as the most important ones.

From Utrecht, FGN expanded to various provinces of the Netherlands, including North and South Holland in the northwest, North Brabant and Limburg in the south, Gelderland in the east, and Groningen in the northeast. Catholic church groups, students, and local Dutch activists who attended FGN events took the initiative to set up city, regional, and sector-based chapters. They operated as autonomous organizations, but established formal ties with and implemented the national activities of FGN.

6.2.3 Solidarity Groups as Migration Bridge and Movement Incubator

As Marcos intensified his campaign to quell the communist insurgency in the mid-1970s, the CPP-NDF began deploying cadres overseas both to escape persecution and to build diplomatic relations with socialist parties in Western Europe (Quimpo 2007). Due to slow progress in the two priority countries for CPP-NDF international work, China and the U.S., Western Europe became a strategic seat for forging relations with socialist and revolutionary forces and for organizing overseas Filipino. CPP-NDF softened its Maoist line and cultivated ties with pro-Soviet communists, social democrats, and other non-Marxist left parties (Quimpo 2008). It also constructed overseas Filipino workers as the “new proletariat,” central to the overthrow of Marcos and seizure of the state.

At the outset, compared to Southern European countries like Greece, Italy, and Spain, the Netherlands was not a priority destination for the CPP-NDF mainly due to its small population of Filipino labor migrants. However, restrictive immigration policies and a weak social welfare system in Southern Europe prompted Filipino exiles to explore other states. Through the help of religious congregations, Luis Jalandoni and Consuelo Ledesma—a former priest and nun

respectively who occupied top posts in the CPP-NDF—became the first Filipino political refugees in the Netherlands in 1976.

Dutch missionaries facilitated their escape from the Philippines and assisted their application for asylum. Upon entry to the Netherlands, Jalandoni and Ledesma received a *vergunning tot verblijf* (temporary residence permit) marked with the letter “A” for *asielgerechtigde* (asylum grantee). This status was changed to *toelating als vluchteling* (refugee) in 1978 under Article 1A of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention,¹⁸⁶ which was incorporated into Dutch law in 1957.¹⁸⁷ The refugee status gave Jalandoni and Ledesma the same entitlements as Dutch citizens, except the right to vote.

During this period, an exile community was already established in the Netherlands, composed mostly of Chileans who fled their country in 1973 after the death of Salvador Allende. Although Dutch asylum was permissive, the state had not instituted refugee centers, forcing Jalandoni and Ledesma to live temporarily with friends who were part of FGN.¹⁸⁸ The absence of Filipino organizations focusing on political issues in the Philippines encouraged Jalandoni and Ledesma to join FGN and eventually set up the CPP-NDF international desk in its office. At the time of their arrival, there were three other Filipinos in FGN—two were spouses of former SNV volunteers and also FGN members and one was Filipino expatriate based in the Netherlands. This common space led to the blurring of lines between FGN as an international solidarity

¹⁸⁶ The convention defines a refugee as someone who has “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

¹⁸⁷ Asylum-seekers are granted on either a finding of refugee status or a finding that compelling humanitarian reasons warranted. The Dutch government confers a permanent residence permit to an individual admitted as a refugee under the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention and a temporary residence permit (“A”) to asylum grantees (Fullerton 1988).

¹⁸⁸ Luis Jalandoni and Consuelo Ledesma, interview by Sharon Quinsaas, Utrecht, The Netherlands, August 3, 2012.

organization and CPP-NDF as a national liberation movement. The two shared resources, such as funds and personnel, and ultimately, the activists' commitments oscillated between FGN and CPP-NDF. Activists spun through the revolving door between the solidarity and diaspora movements.

With the informal establishment of CPP-NDF, a significant portion FGN's work shifted. In educating the Dutch public, it provided periodic reports on the economic, political, and social situation in the Philippines and propagated the idea that organized resistance exists and therefore must be supported. FGN portrayed the movement against the Marcos dictatorship as a continuation of the Filipino people's fight against domination that possessed deep historical roots.

The Filipino people have not let themselves be convinced by their country's tyrants. Whether it be Spanish priests, American businessmen, or their own golf-playing rich leaders, the Filipinos have consistently struggled to rid themselves of their various masters. They fought the Spaniards, the Americans, the corrupt Philippine government in the '40s and '50s, and shall continue to fight Marcos and his successors until the country has a just and democratic system.¹⁸⁹

FGN's activities centered on building an infrastructure of material and political support for CPP-NDF. These included disseminating propaganda to media, government, and other social movements; connecting CPP-NDF with Dutch political parties and left-oriented foundations and grant-giving bodies like XminusY;¹⁹⁰ and organizing meetings between CPP-NDF and exiled

¹⁸⁹ FGN, "Historisch Overzicht," p. 8.

¹⁹⁰ XminusY is an independent and progressive funding organization that supports grassroots social movements. It relies on donations from Dutch citizens. Actions supported by XminusY include demonstrations, occupations, and direct action. In 1978, NDF received support from XminusY for the organizational work of the NPA in the Philippines.

members of prominent national liberation movements.¹⁹¹ FGN provided a space for CPP-NDF in the Netherlands to mobilize before the latter could seize political resources in the host society to engage in diaspora mobilization. In essence, FGN incubated the diaspora movement while mobilizing structures were being transplanted, replicated, and/or adapted in the host societies and while creating and anticipating favorable conditions for mobilization.

Although the solidarity groups did not specifically target the Filipino community in the Netherlands in their campaigns, except indirectly during protests at the consulate, they earned notoriety among the 1960s wave of migrants who attended and openly criticized the organization's events. A FGN solidarity activist observed,

When we were invited somewhere to give presentations on the Philippines in the 70s up to the 80s, wherever there would be Filipinos, they would get very upset because we were very negative. They would say, "Why don't you talk about the nice and beautiful things about the Philippines?" We would respond, "Yeah, that's true, but we also talk about poverty, repression, human rights... These people are struggling for a better life and we want to support them and tell their stories."¹⁹²

Such reaction from the Filipinos in the Netherlands was expected since this migrant stream left the Philippines during the early years of Marcos when economic and political conditions were robust. Many of them clung on to romanticized ideas about the homeland to cope with their daily travails from living in a foreign land. Their persistent self-projection towards the country has much more to do with a few selected memories of it in the past than with

¹⁹¹ These included the African National Congress, Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front), and the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor).

¹⁹² Evert de Boer, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Utrecht, The Netherlands, October 8, 2013.

the present state of affairs (Boccagni 2010). FGN recognized that the movement for national democracy in the Philippines would not have the legitimacy and capacity to expand in the Netherlands without support from the migrant population. A pivotal step was to influence migrant discourses on their common culture and interpretations of Philippine history, especially the social and political forces that have shaped Philippine society.

In 1978, the Filipino female members of FGN created a collective called *Samahan ng mga Pilipino* (Organization of Filipinos), whose objectives were “to arouse self-awareness among Filipinos in Holland and to build an awareness of the Philippine situation; and to mobilize them for actions like petitions, financial support for the struggle, disseminate information on the Philippines, and to get involved in the struggle when they do get home.”¹⁹³ In its founding document, *Samahan* identified three groups of Filipinos on which organizing must be focused: permanent residents, most of whom were women married to Dutch citizens; temporary workers, such as nurses, entertainers (“girls in nightclubs”), and seafarers; and students, most of whom were funded by the Philippine government. A key strategy of *Samahan* was to utilize existing networks of Filipino cultural organizations such as the Dutch-Philippine Association and take advantage of events that draw massive attendance from the Filipino community, such as the Philippine Independence Day celebration and Christmas.

Most of the members of the Filipino community resisted *Samahan*’s initial efforts. They wanted to focus on assimilating in Dutch society and maintaining amicable relations with the Philippine Embassy. Some, who were critical of the dictatorship, considered public opposition to the Marcos government as inimical to the status of Filipino nationals in the Netherlands. The organizing of Filipinos was thus placed on the back burner until the convening of an

¹⁹³ *Samahan ng mga Pilipino*, “SAMAHAAN Report: Work Among Filipinos,” n.d., p. 1.

international opinion tribunal on the Marcos regime and the formation of a Filipino exile community.

6.3 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE AGAINST MARCOS (1978-1985)

6.3.1 Political Isolation of the Regime

In 1976, an idea emerged from the Philippine solidarity group in Italy¹⁹⁴ to organize a venue to hold the Marcos regime accountable in international law and to strengthen the legitimacy of and rally support for the national liberation movement.¹⁹⁵ Since governments had been slow to act in the application of legal rules to violations of human rights committed by Marcos, the NDF and solidarity activists decided to consider appeals to the public conscience through nongovernmental human rights tribunals that would serve as an arena to express the voice of concerned public opinion and to apply established rules and principles of international law.¹⁹⁶ In 1978, they filed a complaint against Marcos to the Lelio Basso Foundation's Permanent People's Tribunal (PPT) based on traditional legal standards and those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Rights of Peoples (also known as Algiers Declaration).¹⁹⁷ News of the victory of

¹⁹⁴ By 1976, Philippine solidarity groups existed in Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany.

¹⁹⁵ Brennan, interview.

¹⁹⁶ Consuelo Ledesma, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Utrecht, The Netherlands, November 6, 2013.

¹⁹⁷ The Declaration of Rights of Peoples, also known as the Declaration of Algiers after the city where it was proclaimed, was adopted in July 4, 1976 by a group of nongovernmental actors. In its preamble, the declaration states: "Aware of expressing the aspirations of our era, we met in Algiers to proclaim that all the peoples of the world have an equal right to liberty, the right to free themselves from any foreign interference and to choose their own government, the right if they are under subjection, to fight for their liberation and the right to benefit from other peoples' assistance in their struggle."

the Sandinistas in Nicaragua encouraged the NDF and solidarity activists to advance the revolutionary struggle. As Ledesma noted, “It was inspiring. If they can do it, then we can too.” However, since the Philippines was still far from a situation where an organized movement could overthrow the state, activists needed to create an opportunity that would make such condition possible.¹⁹⁸

The PPT, which grew out of the Bertrand Russell Tribunal II on Latin America¹⁹⁹ in the early seventies, is a permanent body composed of legal scholars and activists, policymakers and advocates, scientists and medical professionals, and creative artists, from which small groups are selected to hear specific cases. Lelio Basso, a socialist theoretician and leader of the Italian Socialist Party, transformed the second Russell tribunal into an ongoing structure for nongovernmental hearings (Blaser 1992). The PPT was formally inaugurated in Bologna, Italy on June 29, 1979. Before its session on the Philippines, the PPT had already held sessions on Western Sahara, Argentina, and Eritrea (Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino 1981).

From October 30 to November 3 in 1980, the PPT on the Philippines met at the University of Antwerp, Belgium to examine the appeals presented by the NDF and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)²⁰⁰ on behalf of the Filipino and Bangsamoro peoples²⁰¹ respectively. Like other nongovernment tribunals, international legal scholars, policymakers, scientists and medical professionals, creative artists, and religious leaders from different countries constituted the panel of PPT member-jurors.²⁰² The participation of non-lawyers was

¹⁹⁸ Ledesma, interview.

¹⁹⁹ The second Russell Tribunal, convened from 1973 to 1976, focused on the military dictatorships in Argentina and Brazil and the *coup d'état* in Chile.

²⁰⁰ Founded in 1969, the MNLF is a secessionist political organization in the Philippines that waged an armed struggle against the Philippine government to achieve an independent Bangsamoro land.

²⁰¹ Bangsamoro refers to the population of Muslims in the Philippines.

²⁰² The member-jurors were: Sergio Mendes Arceo, Archbishop of Cuernavaca, Mexico and a leading figure in the progressive wing of the Roman Catholic Church; Richard Baumlin, a legal expert and Swiss parliamentarian;

intended to weaken the barrier separating law from humanitarian activity and to create a broad human rights constituency (Blaser 1992).

The jurors evaluated more than 3,000 pages of secondhand comprehensive reports on the economic and political situation in the Philippines; personal testimonies of six witnesses from the Philippines—a peasant, a student, a writer, a union leader, a former civil servant, and a member of a tribal minority—and one from Italy—a domestic worker; and visual evidence gathered by the joint preparatory committees on the tribunal. An estimated 500 people attended the session, most of whom were members of solidarity groups in Belgium, Canada, England, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.S. (Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino 1981).

The legal brief accused Marcos and his military as guilty of “violation of the rights of peoples, violations of human rights, and crimes under international law including genocide” (Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino 1981:25). They also held on trial the U.S. government, the IMF and World Bank, and various multinational corporations²⁰³ for participating in transgressions against the Filipino people through its direct aid and loans. The tribunal informed the governments of the Philippines and the U.S of the charges against them through their embassies in Italy, where the PPT is incorporated, and in Belgium, where the session would take

Harvey Cox, professor of theology at Harvard University; Richard Falk, professor of international law at Princeton University; Andrea Giardina, professor of international law at the University of Naples; Francois Houtart, professor of sociology at the University of Louvain; Ajit Roy, renowned Indian writer for the *Economic and Political Weekly*; Makoto Oda, noted Japanese novelist and vice president of the Permanent People’s Tribunal; and Ernst Utrecht, fellow at the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam. Nobel Prize winner George Wald presided over the panel (Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino 1981).

²⁰³ These included Bank of America, Royal Dutch Shell, Mitsubishi, Dole, Goodyear, Pfizer, General Motors, and Cargill.

place. Both were invited to send representatives to the tribunal to respond to the allegations, but failed to do so.²⁰⁴

The tribunal considered the joint complaints of the NDF and MNLF separately, but framed the judgment in identical terms. In its final verdict, the tribunal found “that the Marcos regime by its reliance on ‘permanent’ martial law and numerous blatant abuses of state is *deprived of legitimate standing as a government in international society* and lacks the competence to act on behalf of the Filipino or Bangsa Moro people (Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino 1981:276-277 [italics supplied]).” The decision acknowledged and affirmed the authority of the NDF and MNLF as genuine representatives of their respective peoples, which have the right to enforce the rights of their people even through armed struggle. This recognition of the revolutionary movements enabled the two liberation fronts to legally receive assistance from established government and other international bodies.

5. The Tribunal condemns, also, the United States government for its role in sustaining, supporting and encouraging the Marcos regime to act on behalf of its economic and global strategic interests in violation of the rights of the Filipino and Bangsa Moro peoples and calls upon it to cease such activities in support of state crime forthwith, and to renounce all ‘right’ obtained by way of unequal treaties and *to respect from now on the full sovereignty of the country, including the status of the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) as legitimate representatives of their respective peoples;*

...

²⁰⁴ Four months after the tribunal, the Office of the President of the Philippines issued a ten-page response to the tribunal’s verdict. The Philippine Embassy in The Hague circulated the reply to newspapers in the Netherlands.

14. The Tribunal concludes that the armed struggle between the Marcos regime and the Filipino and Bangsa Moro peoples qualifies in international law as a condition of belligerency and that, accordingly, the parties should respect fully the provisions of the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war, an observation made necessary by numerous atrocities committed by the Marcos soldiers over the years;

15. The tribunal calls upon world public opinion, progressive governments, organizations and individuals, to lend their support to the struggle of the Filipino and Bangsa Moro peoples to achieve national self-determination, liberation from Marcos regime and the neo-colonial system of oppression. (*Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino 1981:229 [italics supplied]*)

The delegitimization of the Marcos regime and the endorsement of NDF and MNLF in the international community were important outcomes of the tribunal that presented a unique opportunity for expanding the movement for national democracy in the Philippines. In addition, the tribunal was a watershed in so far as contributing to the requisite infrastructure for diaspora mobilization. The network of movement adherents and constituents broadened through the PPT, which brought together, for the first time, existing solidarity organizations, political parties, national liberation movements from other countries, church groups, trade unions, and NSMs across Europe to lend support to the Philippine revolutionary struggle. Through their solidarity manifestations read in the plenary, they played an instrumental role in undermining the authority of the Marcos government in the international public sphere. The transnational web of support crystallized in the tribunal as more than 6,000 letters and petitions arrived in Antwerp from private citizens across Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific, calling for the

condemnation of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship and international recognition of the NDF and MNLF (Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino 1981).

The PPT also laid the foundation for Filipino organizations that would play central roles in implementing the programs of the NDF and in mobilizing the Filipino labor migrants in the Netherlands. In the lead up to the tribunal, the PPT organized two joint ad hoc committees—the Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino (Filipino People’s Committee [KSP]) and Moro People’s Committee (MPC)—to undertake preparatory work for the tribunal, which consisted of gathering written and visual evidence and coordinating communication between activists in the Philippines and Europe. KSP set up an office in the Netherlands, and members of FGN were involved in the tribunal arrangements. A few activists from the Philippines also came to assist.

The dominance of Europeans in the preparations for the tribunal and the lack of involvement of the Filipino community prompted a number of Filipinas in the Netherlands—most of them Dutch citizens married to Europeans—to organize a progressive cultural group that would appeal to Filipino migrants. Relying principally on friendship ties, they informally established Alay ng Bayan (Serve the People [ALAB]) to provide a venue for Filipino migrant women who were ambivalent about radical organizations such as the NDF and MNLF to participate in the tribunal. The founders of ALAB recognized that the only way to reach out to individuals and groups outside the Filipino exile community was to take advantage of cultural events, artifacts, and symbols that are familiar and enjoyable to migrants and give them a sense of attachment to the homeland. The organizers perceived people’s art as a political but “fun, non-confrontational, non-threatening” means of challenging the Marcos dictatorship that would not

alienate Filipino labor migrants.²⁰⁵ ALAB performed Philippine traditional dances and songs with political messages at the tribunal.

Thus, as a critical event, the tribunal made the issues of the movement for democracy in the Philippines more salient and altered the opportunities and resources. It normalized the discourse on the illegitimacy of the Marcos regime and afforded that status of belligerency to the NDF and MNLF. It also launched Filipino organizations such as KSP and ALAB as the faces of the struggle in the Netherlands, instead of solidarity groups.

While the tribunal propelled the Philippine conflict into the international public sphere, political conditions in the Philippines and in other parts of the world offered the impetus for the escalation of contention. Events in the homeland stripped the Marcos regime of its residual authority and unraveled the unity of the moderate opposition. Movement leaders in the Netherlands perceived the lifting of martial law in 1981 as a sign of Marcos's weakening power. When Philippine Congress amended the constitution and changed the system of government from parliamentary to semi-presidential, Marcos called an election and won. Despite Marcos's democratically-sanctioned extension of power, the activists saw the splintering of the Philippine elite and its gradual removal of support to the regime following the elections as an opportunity for the advancement of revolutionary work. The assassination and martyrdom of Aquino in August 21, 1983 finally fractured the elite opposition, which gave the NDF the standing of being the only viable actor that could topple the dictator.

Since 1981 some sections of the ruling classes have been drawn into tactical alliances within the broad united front. After the assassination of Aquino, the anti-dictatorship front has rapidly expanded. This has further increased the ranks of the

²⁰⁵ Malu Padilla, interview by Sharon Quinsaas, Utrecht, The Netherlands, October 22, 2013.

national united front. Since 1973, the NDF has gradually grown as a framework of cooperation of independent political forces fighting the US-Marcos dictatorship.²⁰⁶

Like in the U.S., Aquino's assassination attracted the attention of the European press. The coverage of Aquino's funeral had a snowball effect, as news agencies also began investigating U.S. involvement in the assassination, political excesses of Marcos's allies, and the dictator's deteriorating health. A Filipino activist in the Netherlands recalled how the global spotlight on the Philippines opened opportunities in the Dutch public sphere.

After Aquino died, the Philippines became famous... Before that there was totally no interest [from the Dutch public]. I mean, you would ask the people in the street, "Have you heard of the Philippines?" "No."... The people thought the Philippines is in Latin America... And our work in KSP before Aquino died was to put the Philippines on the map. Aquino dying did that... Aquino dying also made sure there were a lot of things coming in from the Philippines.²⁰⁷

Two years later, European news media again focused on the Philippines. During the commemoration of the thirteenth anniversary of martial law in September 20, 1985 in Escalante, Negros Occidental,²⁰⁸ members of the Regional Special Action Forces, Civilian Home Defense Force, local policemen, and unidentified armed civilians opened fire at demonstrators, killing 20 people and injuring more than 30 (Guanzon-Agpalisok 2011). The cooperatives that mobilized the farmers and workers in the Escalante protest grew out of the catechist networks of Dutch

²⁰⁶ NDFP, "Internal Paper No. OR. D.4: An Orientation Paper on Our Overseas Revolutionary Work (Third Draft)," July 1984, Annual International Meeting, p. 1.

²⁰⁷ Carlo Butalid, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Tilburg, The Netherlands, October 15, 2013.

²⁰⁸ Escalante is a coastal town in the province of Negros Occidental in the Visayas region. Uneven land distribution and marginal food production characterized the development of Escalante in the 1970s. Abuse from *hacienda* landowners and the failures and excesses of the political system created widespread poverty among sugarcane farmers and workers.

priests from the Order of Carmelites, who arrived in the region in the late 1950s. The government charged 21 individuals with sedition, including Nico Hofstede, a Dutch chaplain who sheltered the demonstrators in the church. FGN organized a petition urging the Dutch parliament and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to condemn the “Escalante Massacre,” as journalists referred to in mainstream media, and to press for the withdrawal of indictment against Hofstede.

While skewed elections, assassinations, and human rights violations questioned Marcos’s claim to legitimate authority, the crisis in Central America challenged the hegemony of Marcos’s benefactor and remaining source of influence. Movement leaders considered the U.S. government’s sponsorship of right-wing regimes in the region as an opportunity to challenge the imperialist foundation of U.S. foreign policy and to link the people’s struggle in Central America to Southeast Asia.

The socialist countries, national liberation movements, and progressive movements are intensifying their struggle against U.S. imperialism. In Western Europe, opposition to the US, and to the Western European governments and anti-imperialist and progressive political parties are stepping up their mass actions. At the same time, the governments themselves come into growing contradictions with US although their collusion with the US continues in varying degrees. The sharpening of the contradiction between the US and Soviet Union and the consequent war preparations of the US in Western Europe are serving to intensify the Western European people’s anti-imperialist struggles. The manifestation of this contradiction in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, however, is causing the

immediate hardening of the US position in the Philippines and is increasing the danger of massive intervention.²⁰⁹

6.3.2 Chain Migration of Exiles and Creation of a Movement Community

The asylum of Jalandoni and Ledesma and the international tribunal process initiated the chain migration of Filipino activists that led to the creation of a Filipino movement community in the Netherlands. Because social networks influence migration selectivity, all of the exiles that eventually received political refugee status in the 1980s were part of the CPP-NDF. This ensured the centralization of diaspora activism under NDF's overseas revolutionary work.

Dutch asylum policy in the 1970s, which was based on the 1965 Aliens Law, inadvertently facilitated the transplanting of resources for mobilization from the Philippines to the Netherlands. The act made no distinction between aliens (those who left their home countries for non-persecution reasons) and refugees (those fled their homeland because of oppression) (Walaardt 2011). Until 1977, the Netherlands admitted refugees based on ad hoc rules created for Ugandans, Chileans, Argentinians, Uruguayans, Brazilians and Vietnamese. The Dutch government implemented a quota system from 1977 to 1987, where “some 250 refugees were invited annually, together with some 400 people for family reunification and a very small number of medical cases” (Selm 2000:76).

Before 1987, the procedure for seeking asylum was uncomplicated and largely depended on the manner of arrival in the country. First, an individual entering legally based on a non-refugee status, such as a student or tourist, was required to apply for asylum with the local Aliens

²⁰⁹ NDFP, “On the Draft Orientation for NDF Diplomatic Work: Main Points and Interrelation with ESM and OFM Lines of Work,” July 7-10, 1983, Annual International Meeting 5, p. 1.

Service as soon as possible. Those who entered without being checked at the border were required to file an immediate asylum request with the local police. Lastly, an asylum-seeker stopped at the border applied immediately to the border police for asylum (Fullerton 1988; Walaardt 2011, 2013).

Due to a relaxed visa regime in Europe for Philippine nationals until the early 1980s, Filipino exiles used this route to enter the Netherlands. Most of them traveled officially to various European countries to attend the tribunal or to deliver talks at conferences and meetings of international human rights organizations. The NDF International Office also directly recruited cadres in Manila and assigned them provisionally to key countries in Europe to organize Filipino migrant workers. Some temporarily joined family members in Europe under false identities.

My sister came here first, because she is married to a Dutch [citizen], one of the volunteers to the Philippines. I asked her, “How can you help me?” We decided that I stay with her in the Netherlands for the time being. Just six months until the political situation [in the Philippines] changes. While I was here, my fellow activist, who was a nun, wrote to me. She said, “Don’t come back. They planted incriminating evidence in your office. They found weapons and subversive documents.” I was working for the government that time, as a collection agent for the Bureau of Internal Revenue. That’s when I applied for asylum, even if I didn’t really want to stay here permanently (translated from Filipino).²¹⁰

In the early 1980s, there were no *asielzoekercentra* (asylum seeker centers) in the Netherlands. Asylum seekers who entered the country had to find their own place of residence after reporting to the police (Ghorashi 2005). This gave the opportunity for Filipino exiles to live

²¹⁰ Fe Jusay, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, November 5, 2014.

close to each other in Utrecht, where almost all of the Dutch solidarity activists resided. Dutch social welfare provided the means for Filipino exiles to completely focus on revolutionary work. Asylum seekers were entitled to unemployment benefits equal to the amount received by unemployed Dutch citizens. They were not allowed to work until they had legal status as refugees (Ghorashi 2005). Even with the status, however, not all of the Filipino refugees sought employment. The social security they received from the government defrayed their living expenses, permitting them to work full time for the movement. Most of them received “A” status, which also entitled them to family reunification and thus avoid the burdens of transnational parenting.

We had no incentive to earn income... My husband and I were in social welfare and it was sufficient. We got something for the children until they were 18. And the Netherlands was cheap enough. We could live with just social welfare... We thought that the movement will win and we will go back to the Philippines in five years... Our life plans were based on that so we cannot really settle. We were not persistent in learning the language. We didn't have motivation to integrate (translated from Filipino).²¹¹

Liberal Dutch asylum policy, in this way, permitted the relocation of protest from the homeland to the host society. The exiles who moved and received refugee status were experienced activists with a long history of organizing communities. They brought with them knowledge and skills related to protest repertoires that were familiar and resonated with the Filipino population in the Netherlands. Almost all of them were from a middle-class upbringing and were enrolled in the top universities in Manila before dropping out to join the movement.

²¹¹ Yvonne Belen and Cesar Taguba, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Amersfoort, The Netherlands, October 11, 2013.

They represented different regions and ethnolinguistic groups and spoke a number of languages in the Philippines. This diversity was necessary in penetrating overseas Filipino communities that were often segregated based on provincial loyalties.

The settlement of exiles in Utrecht facilitated the creation of a movement community (Staggenborg 1998). The population of Filipinos in the Netherlands was too small to constitute an ethnic enclave nested within Utrecht. However, the city provided a physical and conceptual space where activists shared, nurtured, and maintained movement symbols, rituals, and ideology through everyday activities—from attending life-event celebrations to hosting political discussions in their homes. The offices of FGN and NDF became movement community centers, which also functioned as venues for mutual support. For both Filipino refugees and Dutch solidarity activists, their personal and political lives intersected in Utrecht.

However, the interactions of the refugees became limited to the movement community. The established Filipino community also isolated them and questioned their intent because of their connection with the CPP-NDF. Some Filipino migrants regarded the exiles as “parachute activists” who had no roots in the community and thus did not understand its needs. A few political refugees also shared this sentiment. “I felt like an arrogant intellectual. I didn’t know anything about them, yet I was supposed to organize them,” expressed one of them. The activists recognized that their middle-class status in Philippine society prior to exile made it easier for them to relate to the Dutch native population and political refugees from other countries rather than to their co-ethnics.

The Filipino community was also bifurcated, between those who had gained Dutch citizenship and had assimilated into the host society and those who had only been in the Netherlands for a few years and confined to unskilled contractual jobs. The two groups had

divergent concerns, with the former mostly involved in the promotion of Philippine culture among the Dutch public while the latter in the legal protection of migrants' rights.

Professional Filipinos also did not quite know how to position in relation to migrants. Generally, they might be sympathetic, but not involved in their struggles—for their rights, against deportation, to keep their children who were born here when they were undocumented.²¹²

The formation of boundaries based on class, ethnolinguistic group, and migrant status had contradictory outcomes. On the one hand, it promoted an increased awareness of a group's commonalities that was necessary for the formation of collective identity (Taylor and Whittier 1992). The alienation of refugees from other Filipinos reinforced affinity, loyalty, and solidarity. At the same time, the marking of social territories based on in- and out-group impeded diaspora mobilization. To navigate entry into the Filipino community, the activists adapted their organizing strategies and repertoires to the day-to-day realities of the different groups of Filipinos in the Netherlands.

6.3.3 Professionalization of Movement Organizations and Consolidation of Revolutionary Strategy

With the formation of a movement community, the NDF instituted three interrelated lines of work that it deemed necessary in advancing the revolutionary struggle in Europe. The first was the diplomatic work of the NDF. The second was to strengthen the pre-existing European solidarity movement (ESM) for the Philippines, and the third was to build an overseas Filipino

²¹² Brennan, interview.

movement (OFM) for the protection of the rights of Filipino migrant workers and for their involvement in political transformation in the Philippines.²¹³ The overarching goal of the ESM and OFM was to underpin the diplomatic work of the NDF, which was to secure political and material support.

Although NDF did not pursue mass recruitment of foreign nationals, it considered the creation of solidarity cells and committees, along with the strengthening of Filipino organizations, as the “broadest and strongest possible political and material support for the Philippine revolution.”²¹⁴ NDF framed the urgency of revolutionary work in Europe in the context of imminent or actual U.S. intervention, which would shift the principal arena of struggle in the international front.

Deterring or stopping US intervention means, for us here in Western Europe, principally helping create a powerful political atmosphere against it at all levels of the political forces with whom we relate. While NDF diplomatic work concentrates on the level of key political parties, key institutions, key NGOs, governments, and international forums, the ESM and OFM lines of work concentrate on the peoples and their mass organizations and movements, and on other political parties, other institutions and other NGOs.²¹⁵

In the official documents creating the three programs, the NDF situated its work within the international struggle for people’s liberation by identifying a common target: “Our basic strategy is to develop close, militant, and official relations with socialist countries, national liberation movements, progressive governments and political parties [and to] win over some

²¹³ NDFP, “On the Draft Orientation for NDF Diplomatic Work: Main Points and Interrelation with ESM and OFM Lines of Work,” July 7-10, 1983, Annual International Meeting 5, pp. 1-2.

²¹⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 7.

West European countries while neutralizing others to isolate our principal enemy, U.S. imperialism.”²¹⁶ Due to the existence of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines, the NDF framed the revolutionary struggle in the country as occupying a central role in challenging U.S. imperialism.

The principal contribution of the national democratic movement in the Philippines to this international struggle is its resolute fight to remove US imperialism from one of its strong bastions, thus weakening its power all over the world. Within its limited capacities, it also contributes by sharing lessons from its experiences and by rendering political and material support.²¹⁷

With the three interrelated lines of work laid out, social movement organizations took on the day-to-day tasks of implementing the broad agenda. The activists transformed the KSP from an ad hoc committee to a registered NGO responsible for coordinating activities of Philippine solidarity groups in Europe. The KSP followed a rigid hierarchical structure. A council composed of the KSP secretariat and representatives from each national democratic organization and chaired by the NDF was in charge of decision making and developing programs. A collective that consisted of a regular staff and members of FGN ensured the functioning of KSP’s daily operations.

The KSP council set the agenda of the ESM at the annual international meetings of Philippine solidarity groups in Europe.²¹⁸ These gatherings functioned as a general assembly, where the NDF and solidarity activists assessed national and global developments that could affect their work, identified common campaigns and country-specific activities, address existing

²¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

²¹⁷ NDFP, “General Program of European National Democratic Organizations,” n.d., p. 2.

²¹⁸ Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino (KSP), “The General Programme of the KSP,” n.d., p. 3.

and potential organizational problems, and defined the trajectory of the movement. For instance, a decision that emerged from the fifth meeting in 1983 was to adapt the solidarity movement to political circumstances in Europe.

An outstanding shortcoming still in our ideological work is our failure to develop a comprehensive situationer²¹⁹ of the economic and political situation in Europe. This is very necessary if we are to root ourselves firmly within the ongoing political developments and to discover the meeting points of the Philippine struggle and the Filipino people's struggle.²²⁰

An important Europe-wide project of the ESM that ran from 1981 to 1986 was the Campaign Against Militarization in the Philippines (CAMP). To anchor it on the mainstream agenda of governments in Europe, CAMP focused on human rights and humanitarian issues. In 1981, solidarity activists concentrated on the dismantling of military tribunals and release of political prisoners, particularly those who have been in detention and isolation for seven to ten years.²²¹ From 1982 to 1983, CAMP centered on the issue of strategic hamlets,²²² a strategy of mass militarization that became widespread by 1982 in several provinces of the country. The theme shifted to U.S. intervention in 1984, in light of the renewal of the Military Bases

²¹⁹ In the Philippines, this term is used to refer to a description of a situation or state of affairs.

²²⁰ KSP, "Internal Paper No. KR. K1: KSP Annual Report Prepared for AIM 5 (May 1982-June 1983)," n.d., p. 2.

²²¹ These included NDF members Fidel Agcaoili and Satur Ocampo, NPA leader Bernabe Buscayno, and CPP founder Jose Maria Sison and his four-month pregnant wife, Juliet Delima.

²²² The term "strategic hamlet" originated in the Vietnam War, as a means to combat communist insurgency by means of population transfer. Its precursor was the agrovillage program, which relocated the Vietnamese peasantry to areas outside the influence of the National Liberation Front. In the Philippines, Marcos implemented a strategic hamlet program to counter the strength of the New People's Army and Moro National Liberation Front in rural areas (Chenoweth and Stephan 2013).

Agreement between the Philippines and the U.S. This focus persisted until the overthrow of Marcos in 1986.²²³

Aside from shared campaigns such as CAMP, solidarity groups implemented action plans in their own countries. For instance, FGN targeted the indirect involvement of Stork B.V., a Dutch manufacturing company, in human rights violations in the Philippines. In 1982, using development loans from the World Bank and the Commonwealth Development Corporation,²²⁴ the Philippine government implemented a plan to convert 40,000 hectares of land in southern Mindanao to palm oil plantation. The plantation was a joint venture of the National Development Corporation, a government-owned company in the Philippines, and Guthrie Corporation, one of the largest multinational companies in Asia. The two firms employed the Philippine army and paramilitary groups to serve as security forces for the plantation (Caufield 1983).

Missionaries in the affected areas informed FGN that Stork B.V. supplied the machines used in the development of lands that had displaced over 6,000 residents. Through its ties with Member of Parliament Fred van der Spek of the PSP, FGN was able to pressure the ministries of finance and foreign affairs and the Lower House to investigate. In the end, however, the executive and the parliament failed to take action due to their positive assessment of the human rights situation in the Philippines.

The Ministers are attentively following reports on the human rights situation in the Philippines. We have noted that human rights violations have happened especially in places where armed conflict between the Philippine government and

²²³ KSP, "Increased Repression: KSP Information Kit, Campaign Against Militarization in the Philippines 1984-1985," n.d., pp. 1-3.

²²⁴ The Commonwealth Development Corporation is the British counterpart of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

various rebel groups are. Nevertheless, the Ministers conclude that there are signs that the human rights situation is improving (translated from Dutch).²²⁵

In contrast to the dynamism of the ESM, the OFM lagged behind. The organizations grappled with both ideological and organizational problems, stemming from the ambiguous role of Filipino labor migrants in the revolutionary struggle. The general task of the OFM was “to arouse, organize, and mobilize overseas Filipinos in Europe...to support and play an active role and have direct participation in the Philippine revolution.”²²⁶ But while the goal of both ESM and OFM was to develop overseas political and material support for the national democratic struggle in the Philippines, the NDF set boundaries on who to mobilize among Filipinos abroad.

Overseas Filipinos, both settled and migrant, are generally considered as potential internal forces of the Philippine revolution, *if they belong to one of the national democratic classes and if national identification with the Philippines is still principal to them* (italics supplied).²²⁷

To some of the exiles in the OFM, such strategy towards organizing overseas Filipinos was not grounded on economic, political, and social realities. One of organizers indicated that a challenge to mobilizing migrants for homeland-related concerns was their attitude towards protests in general, which was tied to their position in the home and host societies. As economic migrants who left the Philippines primarily to support family members back home, their objective was to earn income and save for their eventual return. In addition, they were fearful of

²²⁵ FGN, “Letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Van den Broek,” The Utrecht, The Netherlands, March 18, 1983.

²²⁶ NDFP, “Orientation Paper on ESMP Building,” p. 7

²²⁷ NDFP, “General Program of European National Democratic Organization,” p. 3.

the repercussions of their involvement to their status as migrants in Europe and to the safety of their family members in the Philippines.²²⁸

Unlike the political refugees who were protected by international norms and statutes, Filipino labor migrants were under the authority of the Philippine government through the embassies. For instance, seafarers were prohibited to unionize or strike. In instances where they had picketed, representatives of the consulate intervened and confiscated their passports and other official documents.²²⁹ In essence, compared to their exiled co-ethnics, overseas Filipino workers did not have the privilege of social class and migrant status that would allow them to participate in diaspora politics. An organizer claimed that the movement recognized this limited role of labor migrants due to their position in Dutch and Philippine societies.

In the documents, the organizing work on OFWs was not that specified. They were only seen mostly for financial and material support for the revolution. They are not really part of the revolution unless they become a member of the party.²³⁰

Although Filipinos in the Netherlands were ambivalent about joining the movement for democracy in the Philippines, their networks were easily mobilized on issues related to their status as migrants *and* workers in the host society. For instance, the Filipino migrant community and Dutch social movements provided support to Filipino seafarers who went on strike for six weeks at the port of Amsterdam in the winter of 1978, demanding fair wages and decent living conditions from their employer, Tropwind Trading. Other Filipino workers in the Netherlands, especially the nurses and factory workers, supported the seafarers and raised resources to maintain their daily needs. This led to the development of social movement unionism within the

²²⁸ Jusay, interview; Kok-Ligan, interview.

²²⁹ CFMW, "Press Report from Conference on Overseas Filipino Workers, Rome, Italy (November 30-December 2, 1984)," n.d., p.1.

²³⁰ Jusay, interview.

OFM, wherein Filipino migrant organizations were built principally to defend and promote their rights in the host country. At the same time, mobilization was directed to the long-term goal of participating in the Philippine revolutionary struggle.

The Commission on Filipino Migrant Workers (CFMW) spearheaded the implementation of the program of action on OFM. Filipino migrants and Italian missionaries created CFMW in Rome in 1979 to develop the capacity of overseas Filipino workers all over Europe, but especially in Italy in the United Kingdom, to organize themselves and campaign for their rights and welfare as migrants in light of the exploitation and racism in their host societies. CFMW formed ties with NDF in the course of its organizational development, realizing that the lives of migrants in Europe were transient and that they would eventually return to their countries of origin.

The CFMW organizational structure consisted of seven board members and four full-time office staff, two each in Amsterdam and Rome. Mobile organizers from the ranks of Filipino workers were spread across Europe. To protect migrants from possible deportation due to their political activities, CFMW activists kept undisclosed the role of the organization in the overseas revolutionary work and its link to the NDF. On March 15, 1985, CFMW established its international office in the Netherlands as a response to requests from incipient Filipino migrant organizations to coordinate activities.²³¹ However, despite the institution of OFM in the Philippine struggle, an exile observed,

In reality, the network of the movement was confined to the Europeans. Overseas Filipinos were rare, only those who were deployed. Like us, political refugees. Actually, when I looked at the documents we had, there was really no

²³¹ CFMW, "CFMW Opens Int'l. Office in Amsterdam," *Kababayan*, November-December 1985, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 3.

comprehensive plan to organize overseas Filipinos... For example, CMFW goes into migrant issues only to conscientize Filipinos for political mobilization. There were no expectations on them becoming an important actor in the struggle on their own.²³²

As political actors, Filipino labor migrants were in the periphery of the movement. The CFMW and the NDF believed that fighting for their welfare within a human rights framework was insufficient. For diaspora mobilization to occur, the promotion of a sense of responsibility among migrants to struggle for national liberation and democracy in the Philippines was necessary. Activists accomplished this endeavor by questioning the discursive foundation of Filipino ethnic and migrant identities couched in the language of loyalty to the nation-state.

6.3.4 Creation of Diasporic Consciousness through the OFW Identity

In the 1980 tribunal in Belgium, the plaintiffs showed in the legal brief and expert reports that the economic policies and actions of Marcos have led to the exploitation of migrant workers. In her testimony, Celia Soliman, a Filipina migrant worker and organizer in Rome situated the “untold pain, suffering and loneliness” within two systems of oppression: capitalism and authoritarian rule. She elaborated the connection between labor migration, the precarious situation of overseas Filipino workers in Europe, and the cultural, economic, and political repression in the Philippines.

The dream of finding better conditions abroad than in the Philippines becomes a nightmare... the hard work and the inner pain; the incomparable sadness; the

²³² Carlo Butalid and Maria Ophelia Butalid-Echaves, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Tilburg, The Netherlands, July 23, 2012.

separation from home and loved ones; the adjustment to a new culture and a new language; legal papers to worry about; anxiety about the police; the low and inadequate salary; the debts incurred to come and which have to be repaid...

From among the migrants, the seeds of their organization is [*sic*] already beginning. They realize that not only in *organizing themselves will they be able to fight to defend their rights*, to work for better working conditions and to be able to face the world with dignity and self-respect.

The roots of the problem remain, however. These are:

1. *Marcos' political and economic policies* which force thousands of Filipinos to go abroad to find jobs due to unemployment at home.
2. The policy of using migrant labor to get foreign exchange.
3. The collusion between the Philippine government and legal and illegal travel and employment agencies.
4. The inadequate information and protection given by the Philippine government to Filipino workers abroad

(Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino 1981 [*italics supplied*]).

The bridging of macro structures in the homeland and the daily ordeal that OFWs confront at the micro level provided a framework for the construction of diasporic consciousness necessary for mobilization. An internal document of the movement recognized the political constitution of a migrant worker identity through this macro-micro transnational connection.

They are not apolitical. The fact that they are here [*is*] due to and in reaction to the situation in the Philippines... There is growing anger because of their situation,

aggression because of the exploitation and abuse they experience, and their mentality as workers is being identified.²³³

CFMW elaborated on this OFW identity based on the specific characteristics of Filipinos in Europe. For instance, they were mostly women, who held professional jobs as teachers, civil servants, or bank employees in the Philippines. Although CMFW recognized that most of the Filipino labor migrants in Europe possessed the status of middle class in the Philippines, from the point of view of activists, the process of labor migration had “sub-proletarianized” the Filipino workers, doubly exploited, first by the ruling class in the homeland and then by the people in their host societies. At the same time, despite the hardship they and their families experienced in the Philippines, they still maintained affective bonds and expressed loyalty to the nation, often through the celebration of its culture. This construction of the OFW experience became the basis of strategy for organizing.

In their process of involvement, they can be easiest [*sic.*] mobilized on economic issues as overseas Filipino workers (in mutual solidarity with the national workers’ struggle), next on political, social and cultural issues as migrant workers: throughout this process, their level will be raised to participating in issues of the struggle in the homefront.²³⁴

However, physical spaces for collective grievances to crystallize and for a shared labor migrant identity to emerge were limited. The population of Filipino labor migrants in the Netherlands was small and dispersed. An important locus of oppositional consciousness was the Port of Rotterdam, where Filipino seafarers lived for a short time. Activists had built networks in

²³³ Commission on Filipino Migrant Workers (CFMW), “Initial Recommendations and Comments of the CFMW on the NDF’s Proposed Programme and Structure,” n.d., p. 3.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

these sites of antagonisms during previous episodes of mobilization, such as the Tropwind strikes of 1978. The Philippine Seafarers' Assistance Program (PSAP), one of the earliest port-based migrant organizations in the Netherlands, was born from these networks in 1981. The activities of PSAP ranged from providing humanitarian assistance to facilitating sociocultural activities to ease isolation.

CFMW and PSAP were at the forefront in mobilizations around Philippine Executive Order (EO) 857 in 1985, which required Filipino labor migrants to remit 50-70 percent of their basic monthly salary to their beneficiaries in the Philippines through the Philippine banking system.²³⁵ The issue of compulsory remittances resonated among Filipinos in Europe and appealed to the OFW identity for three reasons. First, migrant workers regularly dealt with exploitative banks that charged high fees, thereby reducing the actual remittance to their families. Second, compliance to EO 857 signified a curtailment of their right to personal income. Lastly, the mandatory character of the provision, with imposition of penalties for violation, implied the Philippine government's indifference to the economic difficulties that migrants encountered in foreign lands.

CFMW situated the campaign against EO 857 within the broad movement against Marcos by connecting the labor export policy and compulsory remittances to deepening economic decline in the Philippines. The message was that millions of Filipinos are forced to work overseas because of abject poverty and rising unemployment in the Philippines society due to foreign control of the economy, unequal distribution of wealth, and institutionalized graft and corruption in government. In a report published in *Kababayan* and circulated to Filipino migrant workers, CFMW stated,

²³⁵ CFMW, "The Truth Behind E.O. 857," *Kababayan*, November-December 1985, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 4.

To alleviate the BOP [balance of payment] deficits, the government resorted to more external borrowings, which has serious consequences on the performance of the economy as a whole. These loans must be considered temporary inflows since they must be repaid, and with interest to boot, sometime in the future. To complement the borrowings, it has been a practice of the government to devaluation [*sic*] to encourage foreign investments to enter the economy. The other strategy is through the labor export program and workers' remittances. Overseas workers' remittances totaled US\$ 1B in 1983 displacing the country's traditional exports.

...Even if 100% of the remittances were coursed through official banking channels it would not readily mean solving the chronic payments problem. Deceptively, the workers' remittances are being used by the government to boost its dollar reserves in order that new foreign loans be granted. This would only further put the Philippines in deeper financial difficulties.²³⁶

In its stance to abolish EO 857, CFMW also drew on the narrative of sacrifice that captured OFW sensibilities.

We therefore call on all concerned authorities and friends to help and support us in our just demands for the abolition of Executive Order 857. By "abolition", we do not mean abolition of "remittances" per se (that's precisely why we left our homeland in order to be able to earn and send money to our loved [*sic*]) but abolition of Executive Order 857.²³⁷

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

While the OFW identity was activated during specific instances of mobilization, regular engagement in meaning production was undertaken to cultivate diasporic consciousness. This process transpired in the everyday cultural practices of migrants and in discourses that animate the celebration of Philippine traditions. Before the migration of Filipino exiles and the establishment of the movement in the Netherlands, cultural, professional, and religious associations were the only types of organizations in the migrant community. They often met to consume Philippine culture in the form of food, songs, dances, movies, and gossip. Through such practices, they maintained attachment to the homeland for they considered pride of culture as bedrock of their national identity. Because of this, an activist claimed,

Most activists approached migrants through culture. If you ask them to attend a demonstration, they will not come. Eating a Filipino dish, expressions of being Filipino, those they will go to. There is a challenge to give it a more political meaning [translated from Filipino].²³⁸

The politicization of Filipino cultural artifacts, events, and traditions entailed influencing their discursive constructions. For instance, activists subverted the mainstream sentimental definitions of pre-colonial Philippine dances and songs that Filipinos venerated and staged for foreign audiences. The cultural group ALAB, which gained popularity among migrant and movement communities in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands in the 1980s, foregrounded the political elements in Philippine culture based on contemporary circumstances. ALAB undertook this to achieve the movement's goal of forging a new national identity.

We believe that this cannot be found in the mere nostalgic love for the past or an idealized view of our traditions and history. National identity should be based on

²³⁸ Belen and Taguba, interview.

the present social realities and on a critical assessment of our national historic past so that we may trace the roots of those realities.²³⁹

Thus, ALAB performed folk songs such as “Ang Bayan” (The People), which echoed the patriotic sentiments of Filipinos. The group also staged the play *Oratoryo ng Bayan* (Oratory of the People) throughout Europe. The play is a musical composition about the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights that incorporated the literary works of Filipino artists and Chilean poet Pablo Neruda. It dramatizes the human rights situation and U.S. imperialism in the Philippines, interspersed with vignettes and traditional dances and songs.²⁴⁰ Furthermore, before performing a particular dance, ALAB also narrated its tribal origins and highlighted the history of struggle of the group, from the Spaniards to the Marcos regime.

For instance, when we perform the Igorot²⁴¹ dance, our background is the struggle of Igorots against the Chico Dam Project. We show how its construction would affect indigenous peoples. Displacement, assault on their culture. And what exactly their culture is about, which is tied to the land. We studied all these things before we even practice the dances. The Filipinas in our group who had no history of activism were learning these things for the first time and they really appreciated it. Because we looked down on these tribes back in the Philippines [translated from Filipino].²⁴²

²³⁹ Alay ng Bayan, Letter and Proposal for a Concert Tour, July 30, 1984, Tilburg, The Netherlands, p. 2.

²⁴⁰ In a chapter on Philippine radical theater, Barrios (2013:196) describes the subversive elements of the play: “When I look back at *Oratoryo ng Bayan*, what I remember most was the humor of the play—a woman singing of the “true, the good, and the beautiful,” while a group of male dancers dressed in tutus dance a mock ballet; actors wearing masks that eerily resemble the president and the first lady, students playing, and students singing and dancing. This in spite of the fact that we were talking about torture, corruption, poverty, and political struggle.”

²⁴¹ Igorot is the collective term for several Austronesian ethnic groups in the Philippines, who inhabited the mountains of Luzon, the archipelago’s biggest island.

²⁴² Padilla, interview.

CFMW and PSAP, on the other hand, cultivated the narrative of sacrifice central to the OFW identity during Philippine cultural celebrations, such as Christmas and Lent. The two migrant organizations held gatherings that promoted togetherness, against the backdrop of longing for the family and the homeland. On these occasions, the unity with other Filipino labor migrants becomes an “identity reservoir” that one cannot be stripped of despite difficulty in the country of settlement (Boccagni 2010:189). Feelings of nostalgia for people, places, and practices during holidays juxtaposed with ideas of sacrifice and oneness evoke the unbroken relevance of the homeland. This serves as a powerful mobilizing tool rooted in the OFW identity.

Working in another country is no picnic. It entails sacrifice. The biggest sacrifice is being away from loved ones for a long time. And the hardest challenge is facing a new culture, especially adjusting to the norms of foreigners. But more often, the problem of the majority is discrimination and the absence of rights of migrants.

In the face of all these, CFMW and *Kababayan* believe that unity accomplishes a lot to improve the condition of Filipino workers in other countries.

For example, Christmas is near. Every Filipino would be happy to spend it with his or her loved ones.

Nonetheless, even though one is far from the homeland and his or her loved ones, Christmas will be a wonderful one if celebrated with other Filipinos (translated from Filipino).²⁴³

By the end of 1985, the Philippine national democratic movement in the Netherlands had reached its goal of internationalizing the revolutionary struggle in Europe. The mobilization in the early 1980s was a product of a confluence of overlapping events and processes. These

²⁴³ CFMW, “Editorial: ‘Dear Kababayan,’” *Kababayan*, November-December 1985, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 1.

included the further delegitimization of Marcos among the elites in the Philippines and in the international arena, the formation of a movement community in the Utrecht, and the development of a diasporic consciousness through migrant-worker subjectivities.

6.4 RE-INSTITUTION OF DEMOCRACY AND THE WEAKENING OF DIASPORA MOBILIZATION (1986-1992)

The peaceful regime change in the Philippines changed the political landscape for diaspora mobilization in the Netherlands. The nonviolent conclusion to two decades of authoritarian rule and the relative absence of the national democratic movement in the “People Power” uprising challenged the standing of the Philippine Left as a significant political actor in the ongoing process of transformation in the country. Since international support for the CPP-NDF provided the anchor to the movement in the Netherlands, the CPP-NDF’s relegation to the sidelines in the sustained campaign of civil resistance that eventually toppled the Marcos regime raised questions on the direction of overseas revolutionary work.

Although the restoration of democracy in the Philippines and the absence of a main target for contentious collective action initially had a demobilizing effect on the movement in the Netherlands, the activists decided to carry on with the three lines of work. The necessity of continued mobilization was based on a shared belief that the largely middle-class revolt, which catapulted Corazon Aquino into the presidency, signaled the return to oligarchic democracy in the Philippines. In addition, the unity among the elite that emerged during the uprising immediately unraveled as the celebrations abated and the process of democratic transition unfolded. From the aftermath of the People Power in early 1986 to the end of the Aquino

administration in 1992, diaspora mobilization in the Netherlands transpired within the context of CPP-NDF's recovery of momentum, precarious democratization in the homeland, and radically changed circumstances in Europe.

6.4.1 “New Democracy” as a Discursive Threat and Political Possibility

Whereas discourses on human rights and democracy offered possibilities for mobilization during the dictatorship of Marcos, these had the opposite effects after the fall of the regime. European governments rallied around Aquino—who was voted as TIME Magazine's “Person of the Year” in 1986—and the image of the Philippines as “a new and young democracy” that must be supported. As an indication of political support for the Philippine democratization process, the two largest Dutch political parties—CDA and PvdA—distanced themselves from the NDF. Multinational corporations based in the Netherlands—such as ING Group, Philips, Royal Dutch Shell, and Unilever—also re-invested in the Philippines, spurring economic relations between the two countries.

Political ties were re-established, as the Dutch bureaucrats and politicians increased aid to the Philippines as part of its foreign policy that mandated support for new Christian democratic governments (Hilhorst and Sideri 1995; Hoebnik 1999). The premise that development cooperation would ensure smooth transition to democracy undergirded the expansion of assistance. Between 1987 and 1990, Dutch official development aid (ODA) went largely to macroeconomic programs through three categories of implementation: balance of payments that was converted into a countervalue fund, direct projects, and assistance channeled through Dutch co-financing agencies. When Aquino took power, the Netherlands pledged NLG 15 million in balance-of-payment aid, an outright grant not tied to Dutch imports, which symbolized

immediate support for democratization. The objectives of Dutch ODA during the first years of the Aquino administration were enhancement of economic growth, particularly in the rural areas; support for agrarian reform; and strengthening initiatives on birth control (Eldik Thieme 1992).

The “Philippines as a new and young democracy” discourse eventually led to the decline in resources that sustained the underground and legal organizations of the national democratic movement during the time of Marcos. In 1988, the Philippine government accused Dutch development agencies for “leaking” aid to the NPA and to the front groups of the CPP-NDF. The Dutch parliament organized an investigative mission, which found no sufficient proof that development money was channeled in support of the operations of the NPA and the CPP-NDF. However, the incident resulted in the discontinuation of funding for KMU, which received financial assistance from ICCO. It also reinforced the Netherlands’ position on severing any link to the NDF, as part of its commitment to strengthening democracy in the Philippines.

Liaisons with the NDF during the Marcos period, it was argued, was not a point of discussion, but under a new, democratically elected government, the NGOs should cut their ties with the NDF. In several documents of DGIS [Directorate-General for International Cooperation], it was explicitly stated that NGOs supported with Dutch ODA funds must be politically pluriform with a strong commitment to democracy, working in a strictly legal way, including an explicit declaration of non-involvement with the NDF. (Eldik Thieme 1992:31)

The restoration of electoral democracy also stripped the NDF of the status as one of the legitimate representatives of the Filipino people that the international community granted through the human rights tribunal in 1980. With democratization, the armed struggle between the government of the Philippines and the NDF and MNLF lost the condition of belligerency,

thereby making the rebel forces insurgents. In fulfillment of her electoral promise, Aquino pursued peace negotiations with the two liberation movements. Despite strong protestations from the military, she also released political prisoners including Sison and Buscayno as a gesture of national reconciliation and recognition for their role in resisting the Marcos regime. Sison joined his comrades in Utrecht as chief political consultant of the NDF.

After a period of inertia following the overthrow of Marcos, the release of Sison and the peace talks reinvigorated the Philippine solidarity and migrant groups in the Netherlands. Upon constitution of the NDF negotiating panel, chaired by Jalandoni, the peace talks became the pivot of the movement community. Although both the Aquino government and the NDF had no coherent and strategic view on the peace process and neither party accepted each other's proposals, the negotiations gave the NDF the opportunity to come out openly to the Philippine public and propagate its platform (Caouette 2004; Weekley 2001).

While a 60-day ceasefire was being negotiated in the last quarter of 1986, the government arrested and indicted Rodolfo Salas, CPP chair and NPA commander-in-chief from 1977 to 1986. During the same period, unknown perpetrators brutally tortured and murdered KMU leader Rolando Olalia. The two incidents caused the NDF to view the talks as part of a counter-insurgency program rather than a genuine attempt at political settlement (Weekley 2001). After major disagreements on the substantive elements of the new Philippine Constitution and the killing of 19 peasant protesters at a demonstration outside the Malacañang Palace, dubbed by the media as "Mendiola Massacre," the NDF formally withdrew from the peace process on January 22, 1987.

Hostilities between the government and the communist rebels resumed and Aquino engaged in a comprehensive program to defeat the CPP-NDF and NPA, with backing from the

U.S. under the doctrine of low-intensity conflict (McCoy 2009). On May 12, 1989, a few weeks after the killing of U.S. Colonel James Rowe by NPA guerrillas, the NDF International Office issued a message to the American people:

The National Democratic Front of the Philippines has repeatedly warned the United States government to stop meddling in the internal affairs of the Filipino people... A major policy decision of the Reagan administration, which dangerously set the course towards escalating US intervention, was the resolution of the US National Security Council in January 1987 to wage low intensity warfare in the Philippines...

...

For the American people, we have only feelings of respect, friendship and solidarity. We know that it is not their desire that their tax money be used to arm, train and “advise” the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] and the vigilantes. We are filled with admiration for the Kent State University students and the numerous draft-card burners who mounted militant protests against US aggression in Vietnam... we are enjoining US troops [in Subic and Clark] to oppose any move that will bring them closer to involvement in the low intensity warfare and the “total war” being waged against the Filipino people.²⁴⁴

The events leading to the breakdown of talks and the armed confrontations that followed created uncertainty on the ability of the Aquino administration to realize its promise of full democracy. The skepticism on the president’s democratic agenda, based on her approach with the national democratic movement, served as a fulcrum around which the Philippine solidarity

²⁴⁴ NDF International Office, “NDF Message to the People of the United States of America,” May 12, 1989, p. 2.

and migrant organizations in the Netherlands organized. The international media attention given to the Mendiola Massacre, the capture and prosecution of Salas, and the assassination of Olalia galvanized the movement community. The renewed interest on developments in the Philippines validated the continued relevance of CFMW, FGN, and KSP and functioned as political leverage for NDF. Other Filipino organizations that emerged after the overthrow of Marcos, such as Baranggay sa Holland and Damayang Pilipino sa Nederland, also monitored the talks and organized events such as “mass for peace” to express support for national reconciliation.²⁴⁵

Dutch political parties, NGOs, and religious groups sent letters of condemnation and appeals for continuation of the talks to Aquino, providing an opportunity for mobilization and for countering the hegemonic “new democracy” discourse when talking about the Philippines. A common theme in the messages and communiqué was the military’s durable influence on the decisions of the president. For instance, CPN wrote,

We can see that [*sic.*] the arrest of Salas and his companions only as a move to sabotage the peace talks. If president Aquino is not able to reverse this move, we can only conclude that those who have political power are not able to control the military forces.²⁴⁶

Movement organizations focusing on the Philippines took advantage of these discursive transformations and attacked Aquino’s democratic rhetoric by highlighting the maintenance of military power over Philippine politics. Since her ascension to power, the communist left was under assault from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which Aquino was unable to control. The president’s vulnerability to military actions became increasingly evident with three attempts

²⁴⁵ CFMW, “February-March OF’s Activities: Netherland,” *Kababayan*, March 1987, p. 4.

²⁴⁶ Communistische Partij van Nederland (Communist Party of the Netherlands), “Letter to President Aquino on the Arrest of Rodolfo Salas,” October 10, 1986, p. 1.

and threats of *coup d'état* by the end of January 1987. According to a solidarity activist, they framed the events before the collapse of the negotiations as

...reminders that even though the dictatorship was over, the change to democracy put the military in the defensive. The military leaders showed themselves capable of recycling themselves as democratic leaders, as we see in the case of Ramos and Enrile. These were features of Philippines elite politics that were quite difficult to understand and explain to an international public... while you had the democracy discourse gaining ground, at the same time, you had evidence that things were not well in the Philippines. You had coups. You had the assassination of Olalia, the persecution of the worker's movement, and the Mendiola massacre. There were many reasons to say that this elite democracy is not delivering for the people... There was quite a strong commitment to really continue the solidarity work through the latter part of the 80s up to the 90s.²⁴⁷

The drafting of a new Philippine Constitution before the end of 1986 and the expiration of the Philippine-U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1957 were also significant rallying points for the movement in the Netherlands. In May 1986, the KSP established an international liaison office of the Manila-based National Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD), which spearheaded a nationwide multisectoral campaign for a nuclear and foreign bases-free Philippines. The NAJFD wrote letters to members of the Constitutional Commission to include “nuclear-free” provisions in the declaration of principles. The NAJFD also mobilized KSP's solidarity network to ensure that an international constituency existed around the declaration of the Philippines and the Asia-Pacific as a zone of neutrality and the removal of U.S. bases. The

²⁴⁷ Brennan, interview.

activists considered the incorporation of policy statements on national interest and sovereignty²⁴⁸ in the final version of the constitution as victory.

In early 1988, the International Labor Organization (ILO) invited Aquino to deliver a speech on human rights and democracy the 75th ILO Conference in Geneva on June 14. Aquino's trip to Switzerland provided an opportunity for large-scale mobilization, as the president also intended to meet with Swiss state officials and representatives of the Filipino community in the country. The KSP initiated a campaign on Aquino's European visit, framing it as a public relations exercise to secure aid and reassure or persuade European governments, parties, businesses, NGOs, and the Filipino community of her commitment to democracy.

Pretending to address the broad issue of human rights, including social and economic rights, Aquino's message would be that the Philippines is a "newly restored democracy"—a country with a popular and capable government leading it to stability, on the basis of a sound programme for economic development and democratization, but whose young democracy is still threatened by destabilizing efforts of "terrorist communists" and remnants of the extreme right.²⁴⁹

Dutch and Filipino activists in the Netherlands drew attention to human rights violations by the military, vigilantes, and warlords with impunity. They also highlighted Aquino's failure to uphold social and economic rights as demonstrated by her policy of "total war" against the communists, her lack of political will to address agrarian reforms, and her compliance to IMF-World Bank impositions on foreign debt. Activists stressed the importance of Aquino's

²⁴⁸ These were sections 7 and 8 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

²⁴⁹ KSP, "Campaign on Human Rights (April to December 1988): Using the Occasion of President Aquino's Trip to Europe and International Human Rights Day, December 1988," Undated, p. 3.

European visit and framed it as an opportunity to influence international public opinion on her administration and the Philippines.

After the euphoria of the February revolution of 1986, more and more in Western Europe are coming to realize the real nature of the Aquino government as anti-national and anti-democratic. But by and large, the Aquino government has not yet been clearly exposed in the eyes of the European public and to the Filipino community here. Like the exposure of Marcos, the Aquino regime must also be exposed in order to get attention and support for the people's struggle in the Phil[ippines]. This campaign is a step towards putting, once again, the issue of human rights in the Philippines on the political map of Western Europe.²⁵⁰

6.4.2 Collapse of Communism and Contraction of Opportunities

As the Philippines was undergoing democratic transition, Europe was in the midst of sweeping social transformations. At the end of the decade, the Berlin Wall fell, ushering in German reunification in 1990. Throughout 1989, a wave of mostly nonviolent revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, called the "Autumn of Nations," resulted in the fall of communism. By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved into 15 independent nations, leading commentators to declare the end of its superpower status and, consequently, the conclusion of the Cold War. Some of the post-Communist states adopted varying forms of market economy and participated in European integration economic and social integration and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 4.

These developments in Europe affected the political opportunities for the CPP-NDF in two ways. First, ideological support for its work declined as the events rendered the foundation of its struggle obsolete. Dutch political parties, development aid agencies, and NGOs questioned the outcome of their continued support of the movement through material contributions. More importantly, to advance democratization and facilitate the enlargement of the European Union (EU), the Dutch government prioritized assistance to states and civil society within the former Eastern bloc.

Second, Filipino activists felt that the diffusion of civil resistance that led to the official transfer of power to non-communist governments in Europe and in other parts of the world weakened the allure of CPP-NDF.²⁵¹ The political discourse on resistance in the Netherlands drastically changed and NSM activists—even within the solidarity movements—no longer recognized the necessity of armed struggle, as protesters toppled dictators one after the other through nonviolent means. The NSMs, which offered favorable opportunities to the Philippine national democratic movement in the 1970s and early 1980s, began to focus on issues such as human security, globalization, and sustainable development at the European level.

Thus, the political conjuncture produced by the tide of revolutions and democratization had a demobilizing effect for the Philippine national movement because of its impact on EU policy priorities and on the discourse of armed resistance. As a result, the movement in the Netherlands modified their strategies to conform to the altered political landscape. However, radical changes in the external environment also heralded challenges to the mobilization of organizational resources and to the personal lives of activists.

²⁵¹ Ledesma, interview.

6.4.3 Biographical Changes and Organizational Adaptation

With democratization in the Philippines and structural transformations in Europe, justifying the continued existence of Philippine-oriented movement organizations to the Dutch public became progressively difficult. Except for project-specific small grants, financial support for FGN and KSP through the Nationale Commissie voor Internationale Samenwerking en Duurzame Ontwikkeling (National Committee for International Cooperation and Sustainable Development) declined. In addition, due to change in the political conjuncture, the solidarity and migrant groups' continued association with NDF posed as an obstacle to their work. Lastly, the flow of Dutch and Filipinos politicized in the Philippines subsided and the old-time activists in the Netherlands started to focus on the personal aspects of their lives.

After the fall of the Marcos regime, social movement organizations in the Philippines became legal. This enabled Dutch funding agencies, international nongovernment agencies, and European solidarity groups to work directly with them, rather than through Filipino and Philippine-oriented organizations based in the Netherlands. For instance, religious relief organizations such as Bread for the World, ChristianAid, and Vastenactie wanted partners focusing on foreign debt, labor rights, health, education, and sustainable development and sought NGOs in the Philippines that possessed on-the-ground experience and extensive networks. In essence, the restoration of democracy simultaneously decreased the resources for overseas mobilization and expanded the means for movement building in the Philippines.

Another resource that underwent dramatic reduction in the post-Marcos era was the stream of solidarity activists and exiles from the Philippines. In the 1980s and 1990s, due to change in country priorities of the SNV and religious congregations, the number of Dutch

volunteers and missionaries sent to the Philippines declined. Thus, the absence of a steady pool of potential recruits into the solidarity groups affected movement growth and continuity.

The shift in Dutch asylum policy from liberal to restrictive also downsized the group of Filipino asylum-seekers entering the Netherlands. The government introduced strict entry and reception policies due to public dissatisfaction about the growing number of potential refugees. Whereas before, asylum-seekers could choose their own place, in the 1980s, they had to first stay in asylum centers for a period of time; after which, the government distributed them throughout the country (Ghorashi 2005). Former journalist and member of the CPP Central Committee Antonio Zumel recounted his family's experience with the Dutch asylum process.

From the moment we filed our application for political asylum, the three of us were required to stay at a small run-down hotel which was converted into a refugee reception center in Breda in the southern party of the country. We were the only Filipinos in a group of applicants which included Yugoslavs from Kosovo, Romanians, Albanians, Bulgarians, Syrians, etc. After three months in Breda, we were transferred to an asylum camp for political refugees in Amersfoort, about 15 kilometers from Utrecht, and after a couple of weeks we were allowed to live out. (Maglipon 1999:244)

The NDF still received support from a few political parties, but affiliation with the group became less accepted. With Dutch foreign policy centered on support for new democracies, reception of Filipino communist exiles grew tepid. This lukewarm treatment was most evident in Sison's asylum process. Sison applied for asylum in October 24, 1988 after the Philippine government revoked his passport while he was traveling in Europe. In a speech at a public protest in Utrecht in December 13, 1997, Sison stated,

After failing to act promptly on my application for asylum from 1988 to 1990, the Dutch Ministry made its first negative decision on 13 July 1990. It cited a mysterious investigation and secret dossiers from the Dutch Intelligence Service (BVD) as the basis for the negative decision. It vilified me as the “auctor intellectualis” of revolutionary violence of the New People’s Army.

It made the false claim that I was not even a political refugee, someone without any well-grounded fear of prosecution, and that I merely faced prosecution and punishment commensurate to the charge of subversion.

...

In October 1992, the Raad van State [Council of State] heard my appeal. It was during the hearing that the representative of the Dutch Justice Ministry declared that to grant me asylum to the Netherlands would offend a third government friendly to both the Dutch and Philippine governments. This was said in connection with the argument that the Dutch state had to maintain its integrity and credibility to its allies. (Maglipon 1999:245-256)

Changes in the personal lives of activists also contributed to the further shrinking of the movement community towards the early 1990s. Filipino activists with children born and raised in the Netherlands began to confront the question of integrating into Dutch society, as their sons and daughters assimilated rapidly. Their children’s frequent and direct experiences with racism in Dutch institutions also prompted them to pay attention to Dutch national politics and play an active role in their local communities.²⁵² A few incorporated politically through the acquisition of Dutch citizenship and engagement in political activities such as voting and joining political

²⁵² Butalid and Butalid-Echaves, interview; Kok-Ligan, interview; Malu Padilla and Minda Groeneveld, interview by Sharon Quinsaat, Utrecht, The Netherlands, October 8, 2013.

parties (Butalid-Echaves 2007). While several Filipino exiles continued their activism on the Philippines, some started to feel burned out with social movement work and decided to focus on building their careers and families.

I had enough of it. I wanted to do something else. I attended a few meetings. But having two small children and a job, time-wise, I couldn't. I kept contact with the individuals, but not with the work. I got a new job focusing on India. So I was discovering a new country. My husband was still with the movement. We had two children at home. It was not possible.²⁵³

As a response to the contraction of political opportunities and resources, movement organizations overhauled their structure. The solidarity organizations gained more autonomy from the NDF, as they implemented their programs and projects with their own selected partners in the Philippines. FGN established a non-partisan organization—the Philippine Information and Documentation Center—to focus solely on research and education services without political links to the NDF. As country solidarity committees started to wane in the Netherlands, FGN and KSP struggled to keep interest on the Philippines afloat through their sector-based and issue-specific campaigns (e.g., environment, health, indigenous peoples, and women) and conferences.

Migrant organizations like PSAP and CFMW, however, seized opportunities provided by European unification and negotiations on the abolition of internal border controls and a common visa policy to raise issues confronting migrants in Europe. They built alliances and coalitions with other migrant and refugee groups such as the Committee of Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands. CFMW and ALAB also cooperated with service organizations in the Filipino community such as *Damayang Pilipino sa Nederland* (Damayan) to address the trafficking of

²⁵³ Mariet Mulders, interview by Sharon Quinsa, The Hague, The Netherlands, October 25, 2013.

Filipino women. Although the groups that belonged to the OFM in the 1970s to early 1980s still mobilized on Philippine issues, the post-dictatorship era saw a significant shift on collective action around immediate problems confronting migrants. Slowly, CFMW, PSAP, and ALAB implemented activities independent of the NDF as they took root in the migrants rights movement in Europe.

In 1992, internal conflicts within the national democratic movement in the Philippines and in Europe crystallized as the CPP engaged in a “second rectification movement” that reviewed and corrected erroneous errors in the revolutionary struggle. The debates first took place in meetings among party members in Utrecht. After which, Sison, under the *nom de guerre* Armando Liwanag, issued a document—“Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Carry the Revolution Forward”—that repudiated the deviations of leading party cadres in the country. The treatise provoked a split in the movement—between those who reaffirmed and rejected Maoist orthodoxy as elaborated by Liwanag.²⁵⁴ This division affected the solidarity and migrant organizations as individuals gravitated to each other based on ideological and personal loyalties. In the end, as government and public attention on the Philippines petered out and as activists strategically utilized pre-existing organizational and network structures for other mobilizations, the centralized Netherlands-based national democratic movement went into abeyance.

²⁵⁴ Assessing the party’s struggles from 1977-1990, Liwanag called for a reaffirmation of Maosim, especially the centrality of a protracted people’s war in the Philippine struggle. Some CPP members rejected this position, arguing that the conditions in the country rendered protracted guerrilla warfare, by itself, no longer appropriate. For a detailed analysis of the conflict and the subsequent splits in the Philippine left, see Abinales 1996, Caouette 2004, Rocamora 1994, Weekley 2001.

6.4.4 Reappropriation of OFW Identity

After the ouster of Marcos from power, movement organizations continued to appeal to the labor migrant identity using the narrative of sacrifice and expositions on the Aquino government's perpetuation of Marcos's manpower export program. In a communiqué to Aquino published in *Kababayan*, CFMW framed overseas Filipinos as important actors in the new Philippines due to their structural location in the economy.

We regret the fact that millions of our people are forced to work overseas because of the abject poverty and rising unemployment in our society brought about by foreign control of the economy, unequal distribution of wealth and institutionalized graft and corrupt in government.

...

Filipino migrant workers contribute millions of dollars to the government coffers to prop up the Aquino government's sinking economy. Hence, it is not only proper but justified that their welfare occupy [*sic*] a top slot of the list of the Aquino government's priorities.²⁵⁵

CFMW perpetuated migrants' attachment and responsibility to the Philippines through the publication of poems and stories written by migrant workers themselves. *Kababayan* became a venue not only for news and advocacy, but also for literary texts meant to arouse strong emotions and inspire overseas Filipinos to work hard for their families and the whole country. For instance, in a poem entitled, "Tunay Ka Bang Pilipino?" (Are You a Real Filipino?), the

²⁵⁵ CFMW, "A Communique to Pres. Aquino," *Kababayan*, January-February 1988, p. 8.

author—an OFW in Saudi Arabia—emphasized that service to the nation is at the core of being Filipino.

Katanungan na kay dali (A question so easy),
Di mahirap na sagutin (Not difficult to answer),
Tunay ka bang isang Pinoy (Are you a real Filipino),
Sa anyo ba o gawain? (In appearance and in action)
Na kay raming Pilipino (There are so many Filipinos),
Na sa bansa’y naging lider (Who became leaders in our country),
Ang gawai’y magpayaman (But all they did was to enrich themselves),
Ang kaban ay kurakutin (And steal from the coffers).
Ang tunay na Pilipino (A real Filipino),
Di sa dugo’t saka sa kulay (Is not through blood and color),
Hindi pagkat isinilang (Is not through birth),
Sa sariling tinubuan (In our own nation),
Tungkulin ng bawat isa (The responsibility of each),
And bansa mo’y paglingkuran (Is to serve the country),
Ng tapat sa iyong puso (With devotion in your heart),
Habang ikaw’y nabubuhay (While you live).
Ang lahi ng isang Pinoy (The Filipino race),
Ay may dugong matatapang (Is inherently brave),
Karamihan sa bayani (Most of the heroes),
May adhikang makabayan (Have nationalist aspirations),
May ilan din na nagtanggol (There were some who defended),

Upang laya ay makamtan (So freedom can be achieved),
Sa tala'y di natitik (But it was not written),
Ang ginawang kagitingan (This brave act).
Kung tunay kang isang Pinoy (If you are a real Filipino),
Masdan mo ang INANG BAYAN (Behold our Motherland),
Humahanap ng kalinga (Looking for care),
Upang siya'y mapayaman (So that she can be enriched),
Panahon ng magkabuklod (It is time to bond),
Tulong-tulong na lunasan (Together we can remedy),
Upang bansa'y maiahon (So that our country can break free),
Sa taglay na kahirapan (From its poverty).
Kaya Pinoy gumising ka (So Filipino, wake up),
Ikaw Pinoy ay gumising (You, Filipino, should wake up),
Panahon nang magkaisa (It is time to unite),
Yaong diwa at damdamin (In spirit and in emotion),
Kapag iyan ay natupad (If that is achieved),
Ang ligaya ay kakamtin (Happiness is obtained),
Ang bansa mo'y dadakila (Your country will be great),
Kahirapa'y magmamaliw (Poverty will diminish).²⁵⁶

However, as the struggle against the dictatorship ebbed, migrant organizations became more and more embroiled in problems unique to OFWs. These were the Schengen Agreement in

²⁵⁶ Amado B. Torio, "Tunay Ka Bang Pinoy?," *Kababayan*, February-March 1987, p. 7.

Europe,²⁵⁷ trafficking of women, right to representation of overseas Filipinos, and the continuation of the double taxation scheme.²⁵⁸ The last three issues did not necessitate changes to the OFW identity as constructed and elaborated during the Marcos period. However, the creation of a “Fortress Europe” required stripping the OFW identity of its nationalist tropes and overlaying it with cosmopolitanism. For instance, in his welcome address to an international conference of Philippine migrant organizations in 1991 that laid the direction of migrant mobilization for the decade, CFMW executive director Norberto Hacbang asserted,

...as Filipino migrants, we also see ourselves as integral part of the 16 million migrant, immigrant and refugee communities here in Europe, and feel the threat of the oppressive instruments being put in place for the Single Europe 1992. In common with all sections of the black community in Europe, we expect and indeed are already experiencing, [*sic*] restrictions on our freedom of movement and choice of work, as well as tighter racist immigration policies. *It is only in unity with the common struggle against racism, that we will ensure our rights and the future of our children.* (Hacbang 1991:6-7 [italics supplied])

ALAB, which became well-known in Benelux area owing to media coverage of its shows,²⁵⁹ changed its focus to migrant issues as its membership composition diversified. By the

²⁵⁷ The Schengen Agreement is a treaty that led to the creation of Europe's borderless Schengen Area. The area includes 26 European countries, which have abolished passport and any other type of border control at their mutual borders. CFMW, along with other migrant organizations in the Netherlands opposed the Schengen Agreement, because of its creation of a “Fortress Europe” that would entail a common and highly restrictive refugee and immigration policy. While the treaty would facilitate the movement of nationals in the European Community, for migrants’ rights activists, it would make it more difficult for foreigners from Third World countries to enter the wealthy nations in Europe to work or seek asylum.

²⁵⁸ In 1972, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 69, amending sections of the National Internal Revenue Code, including Section 21, which compelled non-resident Filipino nationals to declare their income and pay taxes to the Philippine government, in addition to paying taxes to their host countries.

²⁵⁹ In February 1987, ALAB was one of the guests in a weekly TV program, *Ver van Mijn Bed Show!* (Far From My Bed Show!), where it presented the Maranao dance, *singkil*.

late 1980s, Filipinos constituted a large proportion of trafficked women to the Netherlands through marriage migration. ALAB provided a space for these women to articulate their experiences and to advocate for their rights.

...at a certain point, we had members who were mail-order brides. They started talking about their trafficking experience. So for us, we thought, “Why do we keep just talking about the situation in the Philippines while what’s going on here is relevant?” We just read in the newspapers stories of those who were trafficked. But they’re right here with us. They trust us and share us their stories. Why not focus on their issues? Because the migrant struggle was not really an important issue in the NDF. Only later. It was just all Philippines.²⁶⁰

During the Marcos era, OFWs as victims of exploitation from the Philippine government and the global capitalist system was a frame that migrant organizations widely used in their campaigns. Although structural victimization was still a predominant theme, especially about trafficked women, the period of democratization saw a considerable emphasis on the agency of migrants and their capacity to mobilize on their own behalf. Thus, not only were migrant groups identifying problems and attributing blame typical of injustice frames, they engaged more in motivating action and articulating multilayered identities—as migrants, laborers, Filipinos, women etc. In addition, evidence pointed to “infrapolitics of the powerless” (Scott 1990:19), where migrants continuously pressed, tested, and probed the boundaries of the permissible within the workplace, such as using Filipino language or congregating in huge numbers in places largely dominated by natives.

²⁶⁰ Padilla, interview.

Unlike the Philippine migrant community in the early 1980s that was bifurcated based on ethnolinguistic group, migrant status, and social class the latter part of the decade saw increased fraternizing among different types of migrants. This intermingling facilitated the imbrication of activities and services on Philippines concerns, such that purely social and recreational events were no longer considered to be completely outside the domain of politics. Non-NDF-affiliated groups like Barangay sa Holland, Dutch-Pilipino Association, Damayan, and United Filipino-Dutch Association, and Samahan sa Netherlands attained a prominent role in the migrant community through their programs and projects in the Philippines focusing on construction and improvement of basic infrastructure, microenterprise and development, and disaster relief and recovery. Such initiatives appealed to Filipino labor migrants who want to improve the social conditions in their *barrios* and achieve status advancement in the homeland.

In sum, with unfavorable opportunities that included Aquino's popularity in the international community, absence of a single target for grievances and frustration, fall of communism, and European integration, the democratization period in the Philippines was a struggle for the national democratic movement to regain momentum. Political and social transformations in the Netherlands and Philippines also altered the availability of resources for mobilization, particularly financial support for revolutionary efforts and manpower base. Lastly, as labor migrants recognized and confronted the realities of settlement, they negotiated and transformed their collective identity in relation to structural and cultural changes in the home and host societies.

6.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The chapter shows the concatenation and interaction of events in different periods that led to the emergence, growth, and decline of diaspora mobilization in the Netherlands, a nontraditional country of destination for Filipinos. During the Marcos regime, Dutch development cooperation strengthened the nascent movement against the dictatorship in the countryside. It also paved the way to the political socialization of young Dutch missionaries volunteers to the Philippines, who later served as migration bridges to Filipino activists seeking asylum in the Netherlands and as incubators of the diaspora movement for homeland democracy. These actors, who were embedded in the communities they were assigned, eventually became movement adherents crucial to the internationalization of the Philippine revolutionary struggle.

Favorable political opportunities in the Netherlands combined with pre-existing network ties and cultural resources of the former Dutch missionaries and volunteers facilitated the rise of the Philippine solidarity movement in the country. The ascent to power of center-left political parties and the growth of new social movements enabled solidarity activists to draw public attention to the Philippines by influencing discourses on human rights and development aid in the Netherlands. However, diaspora mobilization did not materialize until the migration and settlement of Filipino communist refugees in the Netherlands. In this process, solidarity activists served as migration bridges to exiles with weak ties to the host country. This migration bridging allowed for the emergence of a movement community in Utrecht. The solidarity groups incubated the diaspora movement while mobilizing structures were being transplanted, replicated, and/or adapted in the host society and while creating and anticipating favorable conditions for mobilization.

Critical events offered propitious conditions for mobilization. They made the issues of the movement for democracy in the Philippines more salient and altered the resources and opportunities for diaspora mobilization. They normalized the discourse on the illegitimacy of the Marcos regime and fostered support for the national liberation movement in the anti-dictatorship struggle. They also became opportunities where diasporic consciousness could materialize. The experiences of relocation and settlement in the host society politicized the identities of Filipinos as migrants and workers. However, for diaspora mobilization to occur, the migrant community must develop into a discursive field and a contested site for the antagonistic construction of ideas about ethnicity and nationalism and the continuous negotiation of identity. This entailed the elaboration of narratives and cultural practices that connects the daily travails of migrants, by virtue of her structural location, to political developments in the homeland.

With the restoration of democracy in the Philippines and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, opportunities for homeland-oriented mobilization among Filipinos in the Netherlands waned. Diaspora and solidarity activists struggled to sustain the movement, which was confronting discursive challenges, a changed political landscape, and personal transformations of constituents and adherents. In the end, internal conflict led to fissures and dormancy. Activists utilized the mobilizing structures and reappropriated identities formed during the prior protest wave for other movements.

7.0 COMPARING THE CONDITIONS, PROCESSES, AND PATTERNS OF DIASPORA MOBILIZATION IN DIFFERENT NATIONAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS

The nature and range of diasporic involvement in the home country's affairs depend largely upon the size and diversity of the overseas community and are highly affected by the ability of diasporic institutions to generate and sustain a sense of communal identity.
Yossi Shain (1994/95)

The preceding chapters provided nuanced socio-historical interpretations of how the presence of transnational political opportunities, migrant community resources, and oppositional consciousness interact and lead to diaspora mobilization. Through a detailed examination of the individual cases, I was able to inductively observe the operation of causal mechanisms and identify the conditions that activate these mechanisms. Process tracing events in various movement episodes, the two cases offered a diachronic analysis, which allows me to determine specific junctures and chain of events that explain changes in conditions, processes, and patterns of diaspora mobilization. By not restricting the analysis to a single protest incident and treating structural and cultural variables as fixed, I capture the dynamics of contention and account for different pathways to the outcome.

But how does mobilization vary across the two countries of settlement and time periods? What accounts for the differences across national contexts and junctures? In this chapter, I

compare the two cases and explain similarities and variations in structural and cultural variables as well as causal mechanisms, depending on the spatial and temporal contexts. This allows me to understand how the same causal chains may lead to divergent patterns of mobilization and to identify recurring processes and other systematic features of diaspora mobilization. At the center of the comparative analysis is the social construction of contention, whereby strategic choices made by activists are products of interaction with other actors in complex and shifting arenas (Jasper 2012; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

7.1 MULTILEVEL OPPORTUNITIES, RESOURCES, AND IDENTITIES

Within-case analysis of Filipino diaspora mobilization in the U.S. and the Netherlands explains the role of shifting political environment, constellation of organizations and networks, and shared identity in contentious collective action. As chapters five and six have shown, variations in the emergence, growth, and outcomes of the movement in the two countries were due to dissimilar host-country conditions and the manner by which the interaction of economic, political, and social structures in the homeland and hostland provided opportunities and disincentives for mobilization. The case studies also illustrate how homeland regime changes the character of diaspora politics and strategies of contention among migrants and exiles. While mobilizations in the two countries and periods differed in many respects, I focus on the main structural and cultural elements that shaped divergent patterns of mobilization.

7.1.1 Global Processes and Transformative Events

While the cases demonstrate differences in the ebb and flow of contention, owing to homeland and hostland domestic-level opportunities and threats, they also show how common global political shifts and international events impact on territorially-bounded processes in similar ways. Meyer (2013:19) argues that international politics intrude upon domestic political opportunity structures because political institutions are “nested in a larger international environment which constrains or promotes particular kinds of dissidents within the state.” The cases show that world-historical events that transformed structures and empowered agents of change, thereby putting in motion social processes, served as critical turning points for the movement for democracy in the Philippines. These critical events sent signals to movement participants of changes in state positions or shifts in public opinion that created conditions for mobilization (Staggenborg 1993).

Anti-Marcos mobilizations in the two countries intensified with the escalation of the war in Vietnam in the mid-1960s, the fall/liberation of Saigon and eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops in Indochina in 1975, the civil wars in Central America in the 1980s, and the assassination of Aquino in 1983 as these contentious events provided openings in institutional arenas and the public sphere to challenge U.S. foreign policy. They also facilitated the diffusion of actors and protest repertoires and the development of shared discourses and master frames, which single-issue movements adopted and deployed in their campaigns. For instance, while the war in Vietnam provided Marcos—a staunch anti-communist—the infrastructure to advance his rule that would last for twenty-one years, it also created a generation of political actors that would challenge the foundation of his regime.

In contrast, the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions in 1979 affected the anti-Marcos movement in the U.S. and the Netherlands differently. In the former, the events discredited a human-rights centered U.S. foreign policy and created a hostile political environment for movements condemning U.S. government support to despotic regimes. In the immediate aftermath, public displays of protest against Marcos decreased and activists' criticisms of U.S. policy on the Philippines did not permeate elite circles and networks. Opportunities for congressional lobbying created by the dominance of the human rights discourse in criticisms of U.S. foreign policy also declined. With the U.S. bases secure, talks about Marcos's human rights obligations began to dissipate, and the Philippine president used the fall of his fellow autocrats to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the U.S. executive and legislature until the twilight of his regime after 1983.

This had the opposite effect in the Netherlands, where exiled national liberation movements such as the CPP-NDF drew inspiration from the Marxist groups in Iran and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua to foster a situation in the homeland that would allow the revolutionaries to increase their leverage. Thus, in the context of the collapse of the U.S.-backed Pahlavi and Somoza dynasties and massive opposition to Marcos in the Philippines, diaspora political entrepreneurs in the Netherlands focused on politically isolating the dictator in the international state system and thus threatening its remaining source of legitimacy. They also ensured that the two insurgencies that posed a high probability of defeating Marcos earned official recognition as legitimate challengers to state power and were granted material and symbolic support in their armed struggles. Although strength of resistance alone does not lead to the downfall of regimes, external forces and pressures on state institutions create revolutionary

political conditions by affecting economic development and administrative coherence (Goodwin 2001; Skocpol 1979).

7.1.2 Strong and Weak Homeland-Hostland State Linkages

The cases show that strong intergovernmental linkage between the U.S. and the Philippines—manifested primarily in the MBA, economic treaties, and cordial relations between Marcos and the U.S. administration—provided migrants and exiles an accessible institutional target for their claims making, thus promoting the pursuit of ethnic lobbying and appeals to hostland interests and values. During the dictatorship period, durable ties were both a resource for and target of mobilization. U.S. national interests in the Philippines and the U.S. president’s dominance in foreign policy decisions indicated a closed opportunity for the movement to influence the formal institutional arena, regardless of the political party in power. In addition, security alliance between the two countries constituted a threat to activists, as it facilitated direct and indirect cross-border repression and thus raised the costs of participation in anti-Marcos activities.

The mobilization of Filipinos in the U.S. supports the view that protest is most likely to occur “in systems characterized by a mix of open and closed factors” (Eisinger 1973:15), where there exists a curvilinear relationship between protest and political openness (Tilly 1978). While a conservative U.S. foreign policy in the Philippines indicated closed opportunities for influence, it did not preclude activists from pursuing ethnic lobbying. In the U.S., a coherent and unitary foreign policy is unlikely since Congress, which is permeable to constituency influence, has a crucial role in decision making (Shain 1994/95). Thus, although their goals diverged with U.S. strategic interests, as defined by the executive, activists were able to make proposals in areas that

required congressional involvement, such as cutting economic and military aid to Marcos in the Foreign Assistance Act.

Congress is an arena where activists can find allies and exploit cleavages within the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. In the context of the rise of U.S.-backed dictatorships in Latin America and the continued intervention of the U.S. in Southeast Asia, a group of disenfranchised representatives who were calling for a fundamental reorientation of U.S. policy toward the Third World existed. By consistently sponsoring bills aimed to reduce assistance to Marcos, these influential allies prevented the formation of elite consensus around the necessity of maintaining the authoritarian regime for U.S. national interests. Hence, the case study shows that opportunities are not completely closed since the state comprises many arenas, and activists can manipulate these against each other in the course of contention (Jasper 2012).

In contrast, the weak linkage between the Philippines and the Netherlands made the home regime not as susceptible to diplomatic and economic pressure from the hostland state. Foreign policy was unable to provide Filipinos with an established point of access into the institutionalized political system in the host society. This rendered lobbying an ineffective tool for Filipinos to challenge Marcos, despite openness of Dutch state institutions to anti-dictatorship movements and availability of sympathetic elites. Tenuous connections, however, encouraged activists to *create* opportunities for mobilization—often in the international public sphere—and to frame their claims and demands in the universal language of human rights.

Since the political culture in Western Europe was conducive to universalistic claims making, the activists sought channels of engagement beyond the confines of nation-states. Nongovernmental human rights tribunals provided an arena for activists to damage the reputation of the Marcos regime through naming and shaming. Thus, consistent with Koinova's (2014)

findings, engagement in transnational channels is not driven by blocked access to state institutions, as posited by Keck and Sikkink (1998). In diaspora politics, the effectiveness of international democratizing pressure determines the venue for claims making. By delegitimizing the Marcos regime, holding the U.S. accountable for its support of authoritarianism, and rallying support for national liberation movements, activists were able to leverage international public opinion to press for reforms in human rights at the minimum and to put Marcos and the U.S. under increased public scrutiny.

The case studies also demonstrate that homeland-hostland state linkages change over time and are both causes and consequences of diaspora mobilization. After the overthrow of Marcos in 1986, the U.S. and the Netherlands registered strong support for the Aquino government, which the international community viewed as an example of a successful transition from an unstable dictatorship to a friendly liberal regime (Bello 1988). The U.S. Congress gave Aquino full bipartisan support and bilateral aid flowed to the Philippines for economic development and reconstruction of democratic institutions. The Dutch government, which indirectly supported the growth of the NDF during the dictatorship period through NGO-channeled development aid, restored its direct ODA to Philippine state institutions and cut ties with organizations affiliated with the NDF. With the enormous flow of financial assistance and the state ill-equipped to implement programs and projects, civil-society organizations became a central actor in the transition to democracy.

Regime change thus strengthened the state linkages between the Philippines and the United States and the Netherlands and opened institutionalized channels for the participation of non-state actors in the democratization process. These led to the development of a collaborative relationship between Filipinos in the U.S. and the Philippine government and the proliferation of

service-oriented and professional organizations that provided a forum for mainstream sectors of the migrant community to become involved in diaspora politics. In both countries, social movements ceased to be the sole venue of political engagement. Party politics and state bureaucracy absorbed some diaspora political entrepreneurs, who possessed skills needed to rebuild democratic institutions in the homeland.

With the easing of restrictions to organizing immediately following the overthrow of Marcos, the “resurrection of civil society” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:26) transpired in the homeland. This encouraged migrants and exiles, who confined themselves to private pursuits during the dictatorship, to become more visible and participate in transnational political fields of Philippine governance. In the transition stage, right-wing and military leaders mobilized to produce a democratic breakdown and to revert to authoritarian rule. Cross-border coalitions among different actors ensured that continuous popular pressure and the flourishing of civil society would lead to successful democratic consolidation.

7.1.3 Movement Communities and Leadership

Homeland-hostland linkages, however, do not only provide opportunities and targets for diaspora mobilization. They also enable the flow of agents and ideas needed to challenge the homeland state. Mobilizing structures among Filipinos in the U.S. were a product of a long history of immigration that began during the U.S. colonization of the Philippines in 1901 and peaked after the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Waves of migration continuously changed the composition of the Filipino community—especially in the traditional cities of destination such as Hawaii, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and New York—and rendered visible class, ethnic, and gender contradictions. Along with demographic shift, economic,

political and social transformations in the U.S. enabled the development of these spaces—especially ethnic enclaves—into social movement communities, where commerce and culture meshed to advance the goals of actors in different periods of contention.

Interpersonal networks initially provided venues for collective action, but acting collectively also created networks beyond friendship ties (Tarrow 2011). Cycles of protest—from the farmworker and cannery labor organizing in the 1930s to the interracial and multi-ethnic student alliances in the 1960s—produced robust political ties, rich oppositional culture, and shared protest repertoires around opposition to class and racial oppression in the U.S. Overlapping membership among groups created strong bonds and created solidarity that endured the decline and regrowth of movements (Staggenborg 1998). With the exception of the MFP, the movement against Marcos in the U.S. tapped into these pre-existing networks, ideas, and practices that have developed with the demographic evolution with the migrant community. Chapter five shows how activists built on and appropriated the multi-organizational field that had expanded with each cycle of protest in order to seize and transform political opportunities for diaspora mobilization. For instance, the Filipino organizations established to oppose the Vietnam War and to campaign for the institution of ethnic studies were crucial to the emergence of FFP, KDP, and NCRCLP.

Diaspora mobilization in the U.S. also shows the important role of ethnic enclaves in providing resources to sustain contention and nurturing oppositional consciousness, especially during periods of abeyance. In chapter four, I described the function of traditional enclaves²⁶¹—

²⁶¹ According to Liu and Geron (2008), there are four types of enclaves. One is the *traditional enclave*, such as the neighborhood communities forged before World War II by the Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos, which were a means of protection and survival for recently-arrived unskilled immigrants. Another kind called *satellite enclave* developed after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 brought new immigrants in large numbers to urban centers. Examples include Richmond District in San Francisco, Sunset Park in Brooklyn, and Quincy in

like Manilatown/Kearney Street in San Francisco and Chinatown-International District in Seattle—in the lives of the first wave of Filipino immigrants. The enclaves protected them from hostile natives, offered temporary accommodation, supplied ethnic goods and services, and facilitated their participation in associational life within and outside their ethnic groups.

Through time, these enclaves, which hosted numerous grievances, concentration of resources, and discourses of resistance, transformed into social movement communities. Oppression from geographic segregation catalyzed the development of an oppositional culture and consciousness (Fujino 2008:59). Morris and Braine (2001:30) theorize that “the higher the degree of physical segregation, the greater the likelihood of a widespread mature oppositional consciousness.” Not only were the enclaves isolated from members of mainstream American society, they were also removed from the mechanisms of social control and policing of the mostly conservative, middle-class Filipino community from the second and third waves. Sheltering the most exploited group of Asian Americans, such as agricultural and cannery workers, the enclaves also housed a “constant stream of grievances,” thus offering activists “a great deal of material for working out ideological frames and messaging (Liu and Geron 2008:27). Thus, as free spaces, the enclaves made visible the dialectics of oppression and resistance.

Movement leaders in the U.S. came from various social locations and reflected the demographic composition of the Filipino migrant community. The elite and middle-class upbringing of the permanent immigrants and exiles appealed to the section of Filipino professionals whose post-civil rights migrant experience was marked by increased employment

Massachusetts. *New enclaves*, like Little Saigon and Little India in Westminster and Artesia respectively, both in California, are mostly developed by ethnic entrepreneurs and may not have a residential component. Lastly, *ethnoburbs* are suburban ethnic clusters of residential areas and business districts, strong ties to the global economy, in large metropolitan areas.

opportunities in the U.S. On the other hand, U.S.-born Filipinos from working-class backgrounds, who were politicized during the period of civil unrest in American society, attracted the expanding population of second-generation Filipinos and the segment of community that lacked the class advantages of the recent immigrants. These leaders framed issues in ways that appealed to different types of migrants, especially those keen on settling in the U.S. and did not see the relevance of politics in the homeland.

In the Netherlands, the migrant community was disproportionately composed of guest workers living in factories, hospitals, and harbors and, thus, isolated from each other. Interactions with co-ethnics and with institutions of Dutch civil society were limited, and social networks—confined to their profession, culture, and religion—were undeveloped. Unlike the U.S. case, resources for diaspora mobilization were largely formed and transplanted from the Philippines. The socialization of movement adherents and conscience constituents—Dutch volunteers and missionaries—into Philippine revolutionary politics in the 1960s and 1970s while working in the archipelago instigated the formation of the alliance system of the movement for Philippine democracy in the Netherlands.

With the return of these movement adherents in their home country and the subsequent establishment of a Philippine solidarity group, the alliance system expanded to include Dutch churches, political parties, and unions as well as communities of exiles from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The composition of this network changed in the course of the protest cycle. At the height of the Marcos dictatorship, it grew rapidly and encompassed both mainstream and nontraditional actors in Dutch civil society, especially after the human rights tribunal. It gradually contracted to a small network of radical actors sympathetic to the CPP-NDF during the transition to democracy, as events in the homeland and political developments in Europe

challenged the role of armed national liberation movements in democratization processes.

Unlike the movement leaders in the U.S. who represented the spectrum of interests and ideologies of the opposition to Marcos in the homeland, their counterparts in the Netherlands came from only one organization—the CPP-NDF. Thus, the movement community that developed in the Netherlands was essentially a transnational network of material and symbolic support for the Philippine national democratic revolution. In contrast to the competition for resources that ensued in the U.S. movement due to the heterogeneity of organizations, mobilizing structures in the Netherlands was exclusive to CPP-NDF's centralized overseas revolutionary work. Federated organizations assured a steady stream of resources to the movement, making reliance to isolated constituents less likely (McCarthy and Zald 1977). This centralized mobilization was appropriate to a small, homogeneous migrant population, especially after the human rights tribunal gave the NDF the status of belligerency.

However, along with the changed global landscape of contention, the peripheral role of the NDF during the fall of the dictatorship led to dispersal of migrant resources in the post-authoritarian period. The Dutch government's support for Philippine democracy also narrowed the movement's alliance system and flow of diaspora political entrepreneurs. The movement in the U.S. and the Netherlands shows that the institutionalization of diaspora politics, biographical changes among activists, and increased access to mainstream political arenas diminished the resources for contentious collective action.

7.1.4 National Loyalties, Cosmopolitan Frames, and Intimate Solidarities

Among migrants and exiles, nationalism can easily mobilize emotions such as love, loyalty, and pride, especially during high points of contention (Tarrow 2011). To foster diaspora

mobilization, movement leaders may draw upon highly particularistic ideas, articulated in the language of national loyalty and attachment to a territorial homeland (Lyons and Mandaville 2012). However, unlike mobilizations concerning the integrity and sovereignty of the ancestral homeland in which the conflict between “us” and “them” is obvious, pro-democracy struggles—whereby national interest and loyalty are tested—may actually deter political participation from migrants. Shain (1994/95:824) argues that “when the principal rivals in the interpretation of national loyalty are national contestants for power in the homeland, each vying to represent its own interpretation of the national interest, diaspora members may shy away from the home country’s politics.”

Thus, leaders may also employ universalist frameworks such as liberalism to advance the goals related to their homeland (Adamson 2004; Koinova 2010). The use of parochial and global frames is not mutually exclusive. Filipino organizations in the U.S., with the exception of KDP, have portrayed their struggle against the dictatorship as both an extension of their allegiance to American liberal democratic values and strategic interests and a commitment to Filipino nationalism. In the Netherlands, while the tribunal institutionalized and mainstreamed the discourse on universal struggle for human rights with regard to the Philippine situation, it also precipitated the shift towards a sectarian framing of the struggle by endorsing the agenda of the armed national liberation movements.

The cases show how movements can simultaneously use the global opportunity structure of human and migrants’ rights to increase their influence with Western governments and pursue nationalist projects (Koinova 2010). With the NDF at the forefront of organizing Filipino migrant workers, a class-based ideology reified and homogenized the ethnic identity of overseas Filipinos. An empowering mental state arose among Filipinos in the Netherlands from a fusion

of cosmopolitan ideals and nationalist sentiments based on the position of the Philippines in the world system. The construction of a Filipino migrant identity based on class allowed for the separation of the state from the nation and the imagination of a transnational community based on shared experiences of migration, separation, and exploitation, all of which were products of the capitalist system.

The availability of a state policy on overseas Filipino workers that activists can subvert also facilitated the construction of an oppositional consciousness among temporary migrants in the Netherlands. Movements often use the language of a dominant policy to change the public discourse and the stakes of the conflict at the same time (Bröer and Duyvendak 2012). Thus, in the linkages between the Netherlands and the Philippines flowed discourses that countered the “new hero” narrative of the Philippine state and rendered visible the oppression and agency of migrants as both Filipinos and workers in the global economy.

While public identity claims—whether based on nationalism or cosmopolitanism—separate movement participants from others, the solidarity of activists were based on shared social experiences and biographical identities (Tarrow 2011). For instance, their elite background in the homeland and lowered class status in exile were the foundation of solidarity among Filipino politicians who escaped to the U.S. In contrast, although individuals of different social upbringing composed the international network of support for the CPP-NDF in the U.S. and the Netherlands to support the CPP-NDF, they deliberately constructed a collective identity rooted in working-class culture and politics and reinforced this through a cadre lifestyle. Activists also negotiated a variety of identity claims and allegiances captured in Valocchi’s (2008) typology of collective identity: ideological, organizational and biographical. We saw this in how second-generation Filipinos, whose identities were rooted in the experiences of racism and

marginalization in the host society but shaped by the 1960s movement ideology, expressed loyalty to the dual approach of the KDP.

Throughout the course of struggle, movements constantly reinforced the multilayered identities of activists. At different periods of contention, one identity claim was more dominant than the others. In the U.S., after the assassination of Aquino, nationalist sentiments and religious outpouring in the migrant community became a basis for unity and coalition building among ideological disparate organizations. In the transition to democracy, however, when consensus around a common target became fragile, the solidarity of activists began to dissipate.

7.2 PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS OF MOBILIZATION

Political opportunities or mobilizing structures alone cannot account for the strategic choices that movement actors make. For instance, why did the movement in the U.S. focus on foreign policy lobbying, despite closed opportunities due to U.S. government's consistent backing of the Marcos regime, while its counterpart in the Netherlands pursued non-state channels? How did movement actors in the Netherlands engage in homeland-oriented activism when their country of settlement had a small and isolated ethnic community, their collective identity was not based on the experience of trauma and expulsion, the Philippines and the Netherlands had weak relations, and the homeland conflict was invisible in the uneven geographies of power? In the individual case studies, we saw how homeland-oriented mobilization of migrants and exiles intersected with other social processes, such as political socialization, migration and demographic change, and diffusion of contention to new sites and actors. In this section, I identify the mechanisms that

transpired in both countries but operated in different circumstances.

7.2.1 Political Socialization and Biographical Change

A key process that instigated diaspora mobilization is the formation of oppositional consciousness among the movement's adherents and constituents through individual and institutional socialization. Examined largely in the context of party politics, political socialization remains an understudied mechanism conditioning the social movement life course (Petrovic, van Stekelenburg, and Klandermans 2014), despite the close connection between social networks, socialization, and activism (Passy 2001). While the mobilizations for Philippine democracy in the U.S. and the Netherlands show that political socialization was most crucial for movement emergence, they also illustrate its role in abeyance periods and in times of decline and institutionalization. Furthermore, in diaspora mobilization, socialization occurs in multiple shifting transnational spaces influenced by global flows and processes. The activists whose parents were U.S. Navy personnel, for instance, developed political identities partly due to transnational family lives and practices as a result of traveling to and from the Philippines.

In the U.S., consistent with the findings of studies on the generation that came into political consciousness during the 1960s (see DeMartini 1983; Klatch 1999; Sherkat and Blocker 1994), the second-generation Filipino Americans that comprised the majority of KDP's membership became radicalized through their families, neighborhoods, communities, and schools.²⁶² To understand the process by which socialization takes place, these agents of

²⁶² However, as chapters four and five show, these traditional socialization agents can also inhibit rather than encourage involvement in protests.

socialization need to be analyzed as being situated in transnational social fields that mobile subjects create and sustain. Recurrent material cross-border circulations of people, goods, and ideas enabled second-generation Filipinos to constitute their fragmented experiences into a single field of social relations by linking their parents' country of origin and their own. Oppositional consciousness arose out of imbrication in dense economic, political, and social networks and the multi-stranded relations that resulted from these ties.

The continuous transformation of the Filipino migrant communities in global cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and New York enabled the exposure of second-generation Filipinos to multiple narratives about the Philippines and the Filipino experience in the U.S. Because of their role in America's capitalist development, these cities assured the regular flow of products and populations between the U.S. and the Philippines. Asia was essential to the formation of Seattle and the American West as a whole not only in terms of trade but also because of its labor supply (Fujita-Rony 2003). As a shipping and railroad hub, Seattle received a regular influx of new Filipinos. With migrant replenishment, the negotiation of ethnic boundaries was crucial to political socialization. Thus, political socialization in these transnational spaces means that the process of becoming an activist is inextricably linked to that of becoming a Filipino American.

In the case of the movement in the Netherlands, the political attitudes of missionaries and volunteers were not formed in their country of origin but in local places of assignment as organizational workers also during the crucial periods of identity formation. Most of them lived in heavily militarized areas with agrarian disputes that implicated multinational corporations such as Dole and Del Monte. They saw changes in the locality with the institution of martial law and the rise of the New People's Army. Their involvement in projects related to housing, public

health, and education brought them in frequent contact with local residents, government officials, military officers, and rebels. Transnational encounters in development aid endowed these actors, who developed various attachments to Filipino culture and people, with cosmopolitan orientations (Cook 2011) and access to resources necessary in the formation of the Philippine solidarity movement.

An important outcome of the volunteers' deployment to the Philippines was "eliciting emotions and channeling this affective energy into political action" (Nepstad 2004:135). Their experience brought meaning to their lives, and they returned to the Netherlands with strong feelings of solidarity and a personal responsibility to change the situation in the Philippines. The Dutch solidarity activists and missionaries were, thus, the quintessential "rooted cosmopolitans," who "mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with international allies" (Tarrow 2005:29).

The political socialization of movement constituents and adherents can be attributed to both objective and subjective dimensions. First, the people with whom they regularly interacted, the community where they were situated, and the historical forces they faced catalyzed them into activism (Klatch 1999). Their daily encounters allowed them to observe the power dynamics among actors and understand the constraints and opportunities that stem from the structural location and the historical context in which they operated (Nepstad 2004). Second, being in their late adolescence to early adulthood, the second-generation Filipinos and Dutch volunteers were at a "turning point"²⁶³ in their lives when they become predisposed to different roles,

²⁶³ According to Hareven and Masaoka (1988:272), turning points are "perceptual roadmarks along the life course. They represent individuals' subjective assessments of continuities and discontinuities over their lives, especially the impact of earlier life events on subsequent ones."

expectations, relationships, and understandings, signaling “cognitive and emotional availability” (Munson 2008). For those who join overseas volunteer programs to escape from the conventions imposed by their societies, expand their outlook about the world, and find a new direction for themselves, such service is an intentional turning point in their lives (Starr 1994). Free from emotional attachments and social pressures in Dutch society, they lacked the personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks associated with activism; to use McAdam’s (1986) term, they were “biographically available.”

Decline in movement activity during the transition to democracy was also a result of continuous political socialization and biographical change. As the activists grew older, they began to focus on aspects of their personal lives that they eschewed during young adulthood—such as family building and career development—to focus full time on activism. Through their involvement in diaspora politics, migrants developed associational life, acquired knowledge of the diverse problems of the communities where they were embedded, and learned the ropes of American and Dutch public policymaking. With their greater exposure to the domestic politics in their host countries, their participation in homeland politics lessened. Thus, an unintended outcome of diaspora activism is the establishment of civic and political life in their country of settlement, usually centered on issues associated with migrants’ integration into the host society (Miller 2001).

7.2.2 Migration of Diaspora Political Entrepreneurs

Another process necessary for diaspora mobilization is the migration of political entrepreneurs, who galvanized existing networks of migrants and refugees and drew on resources in response to opportunities. In pursuit of a political goal, a key task of these diaspora political entrepreneurs is

“to construct or deploy ideologies and categories that can be used to create new political groups out of existing social networks...and frame the experiences of those who have subjectively experienced dislocation and marginalization” (Adamson 2004:49-50). This is because migration does not entail the mere transfer of identities from the country of origin to that settlement, but rather a recreation in a new context. Lastly, as the mobilization in the U.S. shows, these actors also ensured that the migrant community was incessantly a site of conflict on the issue of the Marcos dictatorship, especially in the context of large-scale demographic change and immigrant replenishment starting in the 1970s.

The case studies show how immigration policies and citizenship norms in both the homeland and hostland shape the available resources for diaspora mobilization. Occupational preference and family reunification provisions of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 facilitated the migration of political entrepreneurs of diverse political persuasions and commitments to the Philippines. Among those who moved to the U.S. were young Filipinos, who have gained movement experience in different protest cycles in the Philippines, and oligarchic politicians who were part of the elite opposition against Marcos. The establishment of an alliance system in the Netherlands and a liberal Dutch asylum policy facilitated the migration of communist exiles in the country. Whereas exiles in the U.S. struggled with economic survival, precarious immigration status, and transnational repression, their counterparts in the Netherlands received rights and entitlements accorded by the 1951 Refugee Convention and thus were able to focus full-time on movement activities.

In both countries, the diaspora political entrepreneurs possessed social and cultural capital, acquired through their class upbringing and through a long history political participation in the Philippines. They were able to recognize and exploit cleavages among the elites in their

host countries as well as manipulate images and frame their issues in ways that resonated with the different publics. They also brought with them protest repertoires that the Filipino migrant population recognized.

In the Netherlands, the chain migration of cadres of the CPP-NDF and settlement in Utrecht facilitated the transplanting of resources and the creation of a movement community that gave activists visibility and a base for organizing and networking. In contrast, the student activists and political exiles who established themselves in key cities of destinations of Filipino immigrants tapped into pre-existing dense ties and networks that have been built with each migration wave. Migration, as an important process in diaspora mobilization, is linked to the mechanisms of diffusion, frame bridging, and attribution of threat and opportunities.

7.2.3 Diffusion and Scale Shift

The transnational movement for regime change in the Philippines illustrates how forms of collective action spread to places in which they are not native through relational and mediated diffusion. In both countries, contention crossed the borders of the nation-states through the activities of migrants, exiles, and solidarity activists. They served as intermediaries, facilitating the transfer of information between previously unconnected social sites. Second-generation Filipino radicals in the U.S. and Filipino migrant organizations in the Netherlands had weak links or no prior contact with movement actors in the Philippines before the migration and settlement of political entrepreneurs in their host societies. The cases show that the key position of these third parties in transnational social fields influences the content and reception of the messages that are communicated.

McAdam (2003) argues that contention that spreads through brokerage spreads more widely compared to that diffuses through relational means. This is due to the former's ability to transcend the segmented lines of interaction that characterize societies. We saw how this occurred in the Netherlands. Similar to the North American missionaries in the Central American solidarity movement in the 1980s, the vertical ties and horizontal connections of Dutch volunteers and religious workers enabled them to make the conflict in the Philippines visible and relevant to a public geographically removed from the Southeast Asian country. The social attributes of the solidarity activists, their structural position in Dutch society, and cultural knowledge allowed them to connect the movement for democracy in the Philippines to the burgeoning new social movements in the Netherlands.

Far from acting as mere transmitters of information, the Dutch solidarity activists initiated conversations and networking with state elites and transnational actors. These dialogues facilitated the adaptation of innovations from one social context to the other and the diffusion of contention to different levels of the polity. The case shows how actors often deliberately “venue shop” to find a level most favorable to them (Tarrow 2010). Through brokerage, upward scale shift occurred wherein the venue for challenging the Marcos regime and the coordination of collective action moved from the Dutch national state to international public forum. In this new site, actors encountered different sets of incentives and constraints.

While the Philippine solidarity movement emerged before diaspora mobilization in the Netherlands, the case shows that, through brokerage, the histories of diaspora and solidarity movements are interwoven as they interact and influence each other in the course of political contention. In host societies where exiles and migrants lack pre-existing ties, movement adherents provide an opportune environment and necessary resources for the mobilization of

actors to organically emerge and develop. Diaspora activism can grow from early riser movements, which alter the political terrain upon which diaspora mobilization emerges, permitting the promotion of certain claims and demands in the public sphere. Like spin-off movements, homeland-oriented contention developed within the formal organizations or associational networks of initiator movements. Solidarity groups can incubate foreign movements until the latter have developed organically from the communities in which they are rooted.

When communist exiles arrived in the Netherlands, the initial movement infrastructure—composed of trust networks of solidarity groups—has been set up, thus facilitating the relational diffusion of revolutionary work. For instance, homeland politics spread to migrant communities through the Europe-wide religious network of the Commission on Filipino Migrant Workers (CFMW), which was originally founded by Italian solidarity activists as a venue to address issues related to migrants' rights. With the institutionalization of the overseas Filipino movement as part of NDF's program, collective action diffused through the lines of interpersonal interaction among Filipino migrants who were part of CFMW.

In the U.S., student activists from the Philippines acted as “transnational hinges” (Tarrow 2005:190) that communicated messages of the CPP-NDF to radical second-generation Filipinos in the U.S. and carried the innovations of the Philippine nationalist youth organization, Kabataang Makabayan, to be adapted to new sites and situations. As transmigrants who retained political ties and continued to identify with their communities of origin, these brokers provided Filipino-American activists with access to organizational resources and information about the Philippines to strengthen their credibility in the Filipino migrant communities in the U.S. on homeland issues. Without the brokers who maintained the transnational political fields through

the cross-border network of the CPP-NDF, the link between the movement for national democracy in the Philippines and the campaigns for social justice among Filipinos would not have been established. Habal (2007) argues that if the Filipino student activists, radicalized during the First Quarter Storm in the Philippines, had not come to the U.S. and sought Filipino Americans in Kearny Street, the latter would have joined Marxist-Leninist Asian-American organizations. Thus, the U.S. case also illustrates that miscibility, aside from brokerage, also influences the spread of diasporic social movements; that is, contention spreads faster among groups that are compatible ideologically and are connected by interpersonal networks (Vasi 2011).

7.2.4 Attribution of Threats and Opportunities

Strategic decisions made by social movement actors are not based solely on the likelihood of success, but on an assessment of the combination of opportunities and threats (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). In various phases of contention, diaspora activists recognized discursive openings and elite cleavages and interpreted threats in ways that emphasized opportunity rather than constraint. Opportunities for mobilization and policy influence become meaningful only to the extent that activists perceive them as such; thus, “an opportunity unrecognized is no opportunity at all” (Gamson and Meyer 1996:283).

For instance, although U.S. foreign policy over time signaled an institutionalized political system closed to social movement claims, the movement pursued state engagement through foreign policy lobbying. Activists adapted their strategies based on their assessment of the impact of global events, change in the composition of U.S. Congress and agenda of the executive, and American public opinion on U.S.-Philippines relations. Diaspora political

entrepreneurs construed the continued involvement of the U.S. in Southeast Asia and the growing support to right-wing dictators in Central America in the 1970s to the early 1980s as a favorable opportunity for the movement against Marcos. Because the foundation of U.S. foreign policy was already under severe public criticism, political elites were available as allies, and activists exploited the conflict between the legislature and the executive over the direction of American relations with Third World countries. The election of Carter and his human rights program also indicated an auspicious environment for anti-dictatorship struggles and opened multiple channels of engagement. However, the goals of ethnic lobbying remained unrealized due to the movement's divergence with the U.S.'s short- and long-term strategic interests in Asia. Although attribution of threat and opportunities is an important mechanism, the case shows that opportunities for policy change are distinct from those for mobilization (Meyer 2004).

Activists in the same movement may also regard opportunities and threats differently. The assassination of Aquino changed the context of homeland politics not because of the event itself, but due to the behavior and courses of action that ensued based on the interpretations of all actors involved in the conflict (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). While the political entrepreneurs and solidarity activists in the U.S. saw Aquino's murder and its aftermath as an opportune moment to build strong links with other elements of the anti-Marcos movement in the Philippines and overseas, their counterparts in the Netherlands interpreted the crisis as the right set of circumstances for the intensification of class conflict, which reduced the likelihood of coalition formation. Activists perceived the fragmentation of the elite after the assassination of Aquino and the global media attention on the brutality of the Marcos regime as a power shift in favor of the broad left movement, but particularly the NDF. Aquino's death sent signals to the NDF leadership in the Netherlands of the moderate opposition's failure to remove Marcos

through conventional politics, thereby encouraging activists to expand their mobilization in the Philippines and overseas. The ideological homogeneity of the movement community in the Netherlands shaped the ways by which Aquino's assassination was discursively constructed and how a single interpretation about the homeland state of affairs dominated the field.

7.2.5 Certification and Decertification

As stated earlier, at the core of pro-democracy movements is the contest over interpretations of national loyalty (Shain 1994/95). Parties in conflict compete for support by describing themselves as the legitimate representatives of the people's interests. Unlike home governments, which usually enjoy the advantage of proximity to their citizens and control of communication channels, a challenge for migrants and exiles is depicting their long-distance struggle as a nationalistic act. In the case studies, certification of movement actors and decertification of the Marcos administration played a decisive role not just in diaspora mobilization, but also in regime change.

Chapters five and six show that the overseas movements for Philippine democracy benefited from the endorsement of the Filipino migrant community, hostland government and civil society, and transnational non-state elite actors. Certification becomes an effective mechanism to the extent that multiple certifiers express support at critical junctures over time (Furuyama and Meyer 2011; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). In the U.S., the Marcos dictatorship divided the heterogeneous population of Filipinos from different migration vintages. To manage a diverse and contradictory set of interests, the movement consisted of groups across the political spectrum, representing both narrow and broad goals. While the KDP advanced an agenda that spoke to the class and racial interests of its predominantly young, second-generation

constituency, the MFP formulated their claims in ways that were not hostile to elite members of the migrant community. As contention spread to states where a sizeable number of Filipinos resided, KDP and MFP chapters flourished, and immigrants turned to their respective newspapers—*Ang Katipunan* and *Philippine News*—as the voice of resistance to Marcos.

American authorities, mainstream media, and the general public also recognized and engaged the movement as legitimate political actors, signaling that “the social category the organization represents is meaningful and has a valid basis upon which to make claims” (Furuyama and Meyer 2011:104). The invitations to testify at congressional hearings extended to FFP and Manglapus, the publication of a statement of concern by 120 Americans in *The New York Times* on the human rights situation in the Philippines, the endorsement of FFP’s agenda by notable civil rights activists, and the U.S. television appearance of anti-Marcos militants signify the importance of the movement cause to American politics and society. After the assassination of Aquino, even local elite actors, such as New York Mayor Ed Koch, certified the movement and the narrative of sacrifice by political exiles in the U.S. through the proclamation of a Benigno S. Aquino Day. These numerous acts of certification by multiple actors in the hostland had material and symbolic effects on the movement, especially in the context of continued executive support to Marcos.

In Europe, an international human rights tribunal’s recognition of the communist and Muslim secessionist movements as genuine representatives of the Filipino advanced diaspora mobilization in the Netherlands and other parts of Europe. The tribunal was a “critical discourse moment” (Gamson 1992) that normalized and mainstreamed the discourse on the culpability of the Marcos regime based on international human rights norms. The inclusion of a migrant worker as witness in the tribunal also gave overseas Filipino workers the stature as not only

victims of the Marcos dictatorship but also as agents in the revolutionary struggle. The Permanent People's Tribunal (PPT) on the Philippines had a powerful certifying effect on diaspora actors in the organized resistance against the Marcos regime, since human rights tribunals target the legal community, the media, and international public opinion in transforming international law. In its highly-publicized verdicts and reports, the PPT acknowledge that "it is not individuals acting alone who will create a new "rule of law"; it is instead individuals acting through movements of solidarity with oppressed peoples" (Blaser 1999:364-365).

Decertification of Marcos in various arenas also signaled the gradual erosion of the leader's authority in representing the interests of his citizens and the ascendance of challengers to state power. The jurors of the PPT, who were influential international opinion makers, considered the regime as "deprived of legitimate standing as a government in international society" (Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino 1981:276-277). In 1985, Filipinos in the Netherlands withheld financial assistance to the Marcos regime by refusing to remit part of their salary to alleviate the ailing Philippine economy. Legislative criticism and distrust of Marcos started as early as 1969 in the U.S., with the Symington sub-committee hearings exposing the Philippine president's corruption and backroom deals during the Vietnam War. But the most forceful act of decertification was the U.S. government's withdrawal of support in the final years of the Marcos regime (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The dictator relied on the U.S. as its benefactor, and the U.S. government's courtship of the moderate opposition following the assassination of Aquino indicated the untenability of the Marcos government. In the last hours, Reagan disavowed support to Marcos, the ultimate instance of decertification.

7.2.6 Discursive Shifts and Frame Bridging

Since its emergence, the overseas movement for democracy in the Philippines used the process of frame bridging to connect its demands to dominant national and global state discourses (e.g., national interests, security, human rights) as well as to the grievances and claims of various social actors (e.g., interventionism in U.S. foreign policy, racial discrimination, migrants rights) within a particular period. This is because activists must work within the power structures and political cultures of their own countries (Tarrow 2005), often appealing to unsympathetic administrations and indifferent publics (Shain 1994/95). In the case of diaspora mobilization, framing entails navigating the structures of meaning in shifting transnational social spaces. The case studies show that, through frame bridging, diaspora activists both maintain and disrupt hegemonic discourses, especially those that rest on and valorize the concept of nationhood.

In the context of the Vietnam War, to align their claims with those of relevant publics, the nascent anti-martial law movement in the U.S. anchored its protestations to existing criticisms of U.S. foreign policy. It deployed a “Philippines as another Vietnam” frame by highlighting the structural similarities between South Vietnam and the Philippines under the Diem and Marcos regimes respectively, and the possibility of U.S. military involvement should Marcos fall like Diem. While the communist movement in the Philippines did not constitute a formidable force that could take state power in the early years of the dictatorship, the activists’ linkage of the Philippines to the ongoing intervention in Vietnam aimed to tap into the Gramscian common sense²⁶⁴ understandings of the current issues that surrounded the former colony and to facilitate

²⁶⁴ According to Antonio Gramsci, “common sense” is the “incoherent set of generally held assumptions and beliefs to any given society” (Gramsci 1971:323). When a culture becomes hegemonic, it becomes common sense for the majority of the population. Individuals often make sense of their world through the dictates of the common sense.

the condensation of targets of multiple movements advocating for change in U.S. foreign policy. By linking the Marcos dictatorship to an already “recognized issue, a perceived cleavage, or dominant framing and feeling rules” (Bröer and Duyvendak 2012), activists were able to appeal to American sensibilities.

Frame bridging was also crucial in responding to discursive shifts that influenced the decisions of institutional actors. At the beginning of their engagement with U.S. state officials in 1973, activists took advantage of the dominance of the human rights discourse in the legislative sphere when talking about the Third World to make a straightforward connection between Marcos’s repressive regime and U.S. economic and military aid to the Philippines. Ironically, during the Carter administration, due to the resumption of bases talks, the discourse of national security prevailed in discussions on U.S.-Philippines relations. Since interests are themselves constructed, activists engaged policymakers in defining the foundation of U.S. national interests in a language that celebrated American liberalism and democracy. In light of the decline and stagnation of the U.S. economy in the mid-1970s, activists used the taxpayer frame to link their opposition to the bases to domestic economic and social problems. In addition, using the narrative of colonialism, they also related the maintenance of U.S. bases in the Philippines to the corruption of America’s philosophical foundations.

U.S. colonization of the Philippines allowed activists to deploy symbols and activate narratives that alluded to the rise of the Marcos dictatorship as an outcome of American imperial ambitions, thus grounding their claims and demands for the U.S. to take responsibility for the situation in the Philippines. The result was the creation of a collective identity among Filipino nationals and Filipino-Americans in the U.S. based on discourses on colonialism and a binary opposition in U.S.-Philippine relations. This was evident in the use of anti-colonial tropes in the

issue frames of movement organizations and participants, such as references to Filipino national heroes and other actors central to the struggle for Philippine independence in the nineteenth century. Even in congressional hearings on appropriations and human rights, activists foregrounded the colonial narrative and connected this to policy discourses on U.S. national security and foreign relations.

In the Netherlands, frame bridging allowed for connecting the struggle for migrants' rights to the struggle against the structures that sustain the Marcos dictatorship. In the campaign to oppose mandatory remittance, migrants regarded the decree as an assault on their right to personal income and as an attempt of Marcos to bolster the declining economy for his own private interests. Thus, in mobilizing for their rights as Filipino workers in the global economy, they also subverted the Philippine state's discourse on migrants' role in the nation-state.

7.2.7 Institutionalization

After the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship, activists adopted more conventional and less disruptive forms of contention in homeland-oriented politics. This was most apparent in the U.S. case, whereby moderation of movement goals and institutionalization of diaspora participation in the democratization process accompanied the ascendance to power of Aquino. While the anti-martial law groups did not transform into service organizations or profit-making enterprises as purported in Kriesi's (1996) model, their antagonistic stance toward the home government dissipated, and they became channels for providing aid to the state in rehabilitation efforts. Furthermore, the involvement of Filipinos in the homeland pro-democracy struggle laid the foundations for organized and formal involvement in interest-based politics in the U.S., as illustrated in the establishment of the Filipino American Council.

In the Netherlands, a degree of institutionalization also took place with the return to representative democracy in the homeland, the pursuit of a peace agreement between the Philippine government and the communist insurgents, and the prospect of competition for organizational resources. Like in the U.S., new groups with moderate goals, often not aligned with the CPP-NDF, emerged and attracted the support of newly-arrived migrants. Although the movement continued to express hostility towards the government due to its oligarchic character, for the first time, it engaged various state institutions in defining a nationalist, pro-people agenda, such as in the drafting of a new constitution.

The simultaneous decrease in funding for national democratic organizations based in the Netherlands and rise in support for legal issue-focused NGOs (e.g., foreign debt, agrarian reform, women's rights) in the Philippines also resulted in the formalization of transnational partnerships and internal structures as well as professionalization of movement groups. While processes associated with institutionalization were outcomes of changes in political opportunities and resources for diaspora mobilization, in the case of the movement in the Netherlands, these were also strategic choices to maintain relevance in the host- and homelands in light of their marginalization in the episodes leading to regime change.

In sum, as in the analysis of other forms of transnational activism, examining the interaction of opportunities (and threats), resources, and identities at the local, national, and global levels captures the complexity of diaspora mobilization. A focus on the mechanisms at work allows us to see the connections and interactions among important elements of contention and the processes involving simultaneous actions of multiple actors in overlapping arenas (including the homeland, hostland, international state system, and transnational social fields). A

combination of recurrent mechanisms that started from different initial conditions led to divergent paths and produced the same outcome.

8.0 CONCLUSION: BEYOND ANTI-REGIME MOBILIZATIONS

One day, if we work for it, the Philippine government will develop an enlightened view of the Filipino diaspora just as the Indian government has of its diaspora... One day, there will be genuine overseas Filipino representatives in the Philippine Congress. One day, the Filipino diaspora will be seen by the Philippine government as an integral part of the Philippines and included in the programs of all the executive departments and not just of one governmental agency.

Rodel Rodis (2015)

In this dissertation, I investigated two central questions. Interested in the mechanisms and processes by which exiles and migrants become involved in the politics in their homelands, I asked: How do organizations in migrant communities mobilize to oppose authoritarian rule and institute democracy in their homeland? Second, how did the mobilizations create a Filipino diaspora out of predominantly permanent immigrants and temporary foreign workers? I explained the Filipino movement for regime change in the Philippines in two countries of settlement—the U.S. and the Netherlands—and different time periods—from the ascent to the presidency of Marcos to the martial law regime to the early years of transition to democracy.

The central claim of this study is that diasporas are products of transnational political mobilization. They are constructed through the strategic choices of political entrepreneurs during contentious periods in the homeland, when sentiments of belonging to an imagined community can be easily transformed into action. By focusing on the political and discursive strategies of organizations involved in the movement for regime homeland regime change, I demonstrated

how contentious politics lead to the formation of politically relevant identity categories—such as citizens, exiles, Filipinos, immigrants, and workers—necessary for the constitution of previously unconnected individuals and social groups into a diaspora. Without the mobilization of identities, a “transnationally dispersed collectivity” (Sokefeld 2006:267) may not imagine itself as part of a community rooted in a home nation, regardless of the conditions that led to uprooting and dispersal.

In chapter one, I stated that despite the large-scale migration to both traditional and nontraditional countries of destination, especially after the enactment of a labor export policy, Filipinos are hardly considered by mainstream scholars as a diaspora, comparable to that of the Jews, Irish, or Mexicans. Chapter three shows that this is largely due to the cultivation of transnational ties only in the private realm and to the dominance of ethnolinguistic communities in imagining the homeland. Scholars such as Waldinger (2015:95) argue that moving to a foreign country allows immigrants to envision themselves as “not simply members of the hometown ‘little country’ but also members of the larger ‘national’ community.” In the case of Filipino migrants in the U.S. and the Netherlands, identification with the Philippine nation necessitated the creation of political categories that transcended sectarian or tribal loyalties. The mobilization to oust a leader that purportedly represents the Filipino people prompted the rethinking of what “Filipino” means and entails as a national identity—a process necessary in the social construction of a diaspora.

The decertification of the Marcos regime in the international sphere and the certification of the overseas Filipino worker as a central actor in the political transformation of the homeland were also crucial in diaspora construction. To consider the migrant rank and file—who often had little premigration political experience and who—as performing a service to the nation not only

through economic remittances but also through participation in political processes that determine the future of their home country is both an invitation and acknowledgment of their membership in a national community. The activities of Filipino migrants to oppose the dictator were not only in support of the larger processes of democratization. It was also a form of contestation of the state's construction of their position vis-à-vis the nation—as so-called “new heroes.”

As the research on Filipinos in the Netherlands and U.S. has shown, diaspora invention entails crossing geographic and symbolic borders, touching down and putting roots, expansion and contraction of identity boundaries, and subverting and upholding national narratives. These processes often occur during periods of heightened contention in the homeland, when old and new political actors emerge to energize transnational social networks and stimulate action. Furthermore, migration and settlement, themselves, produce personal and political grievances, which can “be activated, diverted, channeled, and harnessed to the purposes of a transnational political movement through a well-constructed and articulated political ideology” (Adamson 2004:49).

This dissertation also suggests that diaspora as an outcome of transnational political mobilization must take into account physical and temporal locations, whereby each site assumes a different type of structured interaction (Landolt 2008). During the Marcos dictatorship, various degrees of active antagonism and hostility characterized the relationship between the homeland state and the activists in both the Netherlands and the U.S., and central actors in the conflict openly competed in winning over members of the migrant community and in defining national interests and loyalty in the public sphere. Thus, agents involved in diaspora construction mobilized discourses that question primordial solidarity and the tight intertwining of the nation- and state-building processes. In the transition to democracy, relations transformed into

cooperative and reconciliatory in the U.S., permitting the ascendance of discourses that celebrate pride and unity of Filipinos across the globe under the grand narrative of “people power.” Throughout, personal ties of migrants to their families and relatives left in the Philippines and the ideology of obligation (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1998) remained unchanged and served as the foundation for the continued relevance of the homeland.

Lastly, the research confirms that, like nation building, diaspora mobilization centered on regimes and states is essentially an elite political project. Itzigsohn (2000) argues that transnational political practices facilitate the social mobility of certain types of migrants and create modern elites who live abroad but invest in their homelands. The anti-Marcos activists’ pre-migration status has endowed them the economic, cultural, and social capital to engage in cross-border political activities on a regular basis. Their education, for example, allowed them to understand the implications of events in their home countries. Through their pivotal role in recognizing opportunities and threats, devising strategies and tactics for collective action, activating discourses, and constructing categories to create new political groups, they validated and reinforced their social location as well as maintained and reproduced class relations in the Philippines. The findings of the research, thus, provide evidence to the hypothesis in diaspora and transnationalism studies stating that migrants’ participation in the political affairs of their homeland is “associated with greater stability and greater resources brought from the home country” (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003:1230).

In addition, with the exception of activists in CPP-NDF’s international network of support, movement participants constructed a group narrative that emphasizes national as opposed to ethnolinguistic (e.g., Ilocano), regional, or hometown and village-level loyalties to mobilize migrants to oppose Marcos. References to national heroes such as Rizal and

Bonifacio—who belonged to the major ethnic group in the Philippines (Tagalog)—and their resistance to colonialism signified the dominance of a unifying historical narrative in diaspora mobilization. By privileging certain figures, stories, and symbols, homeland-oriented activism can endorse a nationalist elite agenda and legitimize the ruling forces in state and society.

Two important areas that need further research arise from this dissertation. One is to focus on so-called “negative cases”—migrants, refugees, and their respective organizations networks that do not participate in diaspora politics. Another domain to explore is the construction of diasporas through involvement in nonstate-centered or local mobilizations such as those around disaster relief and humanitarian aid. Overseas Filipino workers and permanent immigrants, for instance, were important actors in the immediate assistance and long-term reconstruction of towns and cities that Typhoon Haiyan devastated in 2013 (Esmaguél 2014; Khan 2013; Watts and Yung 2013). Can diasporas be formed solely through non-state avenues where human rights and humanist values are the codes through which the transnational community is imagined? More research is needed to explain how changes in the political and social context affect the participation of homeland politics and the diaspora that is created through this engagement.

Nonetheless, since the transnational mobilizations to institute regime change in the Philippines in the 1970s and 1980s, overseas Filipinos, especially those with dual citizenship,²⁶⁵ have been active in Philippine electoral politics. On October 12, 2015 at the Consulate General in Chicago, Walden Bello, ex-member of the CPP-NDF and one of the leaders of the anti-Marcos movement in the U.S., filed his candidacy for Philippine senator in the 2016 presidential

²⁶⁵ Passed on February 13, 2003, the Philippine Overseas Voting Act allowed citizens of the Philippines currently residing or working outside the country to vote in an election.

elections. News of his “electoral insurgency”²⁶⁶ spread, and within a month, the Filipino movement communities built during the mobilizations against the Marcos dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s rallied around Bello, who ran as independent. As Bello visited migrant communities in Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco Bay Area, and Seattle, former militants of the FFP and KDP organized public forums and fund-raising events, which were attended by Filipinos from different migration waves.

Second- and third-generation Filipino Americans, who did not know Bello, used social media to support his campaign by publishing his speeches and accomplishments as Chair of the Committee on Overseas Workers’ Affairs in Philippine Congress, articles on neoliberal globalization and democracy, and photos of his participation in global demonstrations such as in the 1999 Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization in Seattle and the 2001 G-8 Summit in Genoa. Although Bello finished 36th in the race, his senatorial bid reactivated the networks of anti-martial law activists in the U.S.

In the same election, Ferdinand “Bong Bong” Marcos, Jr., the son of the late dictator, was an independent candidate for vice president. Early in the campaign, the younger Marcos obtained the support of a large number of OFWs in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. His followers formed Facebook pages like “OFW’s for Bongbong Marcos (BBM 2016)” and “BongBong Marcos United for OFWs WorldWide.” In these spaces, they appealed to their compatriots to vote for Marcos Jr., conveyed longing for the “golden years” of the dictatorship, and galvanized hometown and village organizations to encourage Filipinos to go to the polls. Their endorsement of Marcos Jr. also stemmed from the argument, “*Ang kasalanan ng ama ay hindi kasalanan ng anak*” (The sins of the father are not of the son) (Dass 2016). Unsurprisingly, Marcos Jr. won in

²⁶⁶ Bello stated that he is “running to promote an electoral insurgency against politics-as-usual, injustice, inequality, and corruption,” <http://www.waldenbello.org/>, accessed on May 27, 2016.

the overseas absentee votes, surpassing his rival, Leni Robredo of the Liberal Party, in 49 out of 59 Philippine posts²⁶⁷ (Hegina 2016).

The May 2016 election also saw overwhelming diaspora support for and eventual victory of Rodrigo Duterte. Dubbed as the “Donald Trump of the Philippines,” he had no qualms calling himself a dictator and expressed admiration to the achievements of the Marcos regime in terms of economic development and crime prevention (Calleja 2016; Cardinoza 2016). The international network of CPP-NDF expressed support for Duterte, who was Sison’s former student. Upon election, Duterte invited former communist leaders to his Cabinet, promised to resume peace talks, and offered amnesty to Sison.

The recent polls had the highest turnout in overseas ballots in a decade, with 31.65 percent of votes cast (Hegina 2016). The Philippine Embassy in Ottawa noted a nearly 500 per cent increase in ballots cast in Canada, including 347 per cent in Toronto, 478 per cent in Ottawa and 656 per cent in Vancouver, where majority of Filipino Canadians reside (Pfeffer 2016). In Milpitas, California, a mall that Filipino Americans visit regularly opened polling booths for the 2016 Philippine elections. One of those who cast a vote—a dual citizen participating in the electoral process for the first time—said, “I want my home country to progress. I don’t want it to go down the dump” (Federis 2016). It remains to be seen whether this sentiment of belonging persists.

²⁶⁷ Robredo was the top choice of overseas voters in 10 posts: Agana (Guam), the U.S., Canberra, Jakarta, The Vatican, New Delhi, Yangon, Berne, The Hague, and Port Moresby.

APPENDIX A

**TABLE 3. PRINCIPAL U.S. ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE MOVEMENT FOR REGIME CHANGE IN THE
PHILIPPINES, 1965-1992**

Name and Period of Founding	Headquarters	Type of Organization	Main Chapters	Major Activities	Framing of Issues
<i>Pre-martial law (before 1972)</i>					
Kalayaan	San Francisco, CA	Collective	None	Publication of <i>Kalayaan International</i> Community outreach	Marcos regimes as part of U.S. imperialist project
National Association of Filipinos in the U.S.	New York, NY	Informal organization	None	Publication of <i>Niñgas-Cogon</i>	No data
Support Committee for a Democratic Philippines	New York, NY	Informal organization	None	Marxist study group	No data
Samahan ng	Chicago, IL	Informal	None	Marxist study group	No data

Makabayang Pilipino		organization			
<i>After declaration of martial law (1972 and onwards)</i>					
National Committee on the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines (NCRCLP)	San Francisco, CA	Formal membership organization	Boston Chicago Honolulu Los Angeles Philadelphia New York San Francisco Seattle Washington, D.C.	Publication of newsletters Demonstrations Community organizing Campaign against Philippine income tax on overseas Filipino	Human rights Philippines as the next Vietnam
Katipunan ng Demokratikong Pilipino (KDP)	Oakland, CA	Cadre/revolutionary mass organization	Chicago Guam Honolulu Los Angeles Oakland/East Bay Philadelphia New York Sacramento San Diego San Francisco San Jose Seattle Washington D.C.	Demonstrations Community organizing Publication of <i>Ang Katipunan</i> Multisectoral campaigns Networking with other revolutionary organizations Institutional support for the CPP-NDF-NPA	Anti-dictatorship as a struggle against U.S. imperialism
Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP)	Washington D.C.	Formal membership organization	Boston Chicago Detroit Jersey City Los Angeles New Orleans New York San Francisco	Demonstrations Lobbying in the U.S. Congress Community outreach Publication of <i>MFP Newsletter</i>	U.S. support to Marcos as against principles of Western liberal democracy

			Seattle St. Paul Toronto Washington D.C.		
Friends of the Filipino People (FFP)	Cambridge, MA	Formal membership organization	Boston Durham Honolulu Los Angeles San Francisco Bay Area New York Seattle Washington D.C.	Demonstrations Lobbying in the U.S. Congress Publication of <i>Philippine Information Bulletin</i> Community organizing	Antiwar and anti- interventionist Philippines as the next Vietnam No U.S. taxpayers' money to dictators
International Association of Filipino Patriots (IAFP)	Oakland, CA	Revolutionary mass organization	San Francisco Bay Area Montreal Toronto Vancouver	Institutional support for the CPP-NDF-NPA Alliance with other national liberation movements	Anti-dictatorship as a struggle against U.S. imperialism
Ugnayan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya	Chicago, IL	Revolutionary mass organization	No data	Community organizing Institutional support for the CPP-NDF-NPA Networking with solidarity groups	Anti-dictatorship as a struggle against U.S. imperialism
Anti-Martial Law Coalition/Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship (AMLC/CAMD)	San Francisco, CA	Multi-organizational coalition	Boston Chicago Guam Honolulu Los Angeles Montreal New York Philadelphia San Francisco Bay Area	Community outreach Demonstrations Lobbying in the U.S. Congress Publication of newsletter	Human rights U.S. support for Marcos as interference in Philippine affairs

			San Diego Seattle Toronto Vancouver Washington D.C.		
<i>After assassination of Aquino (1983 and onwards)</i>					
Church Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines (CCHRP)	Washington D.C.	Formal Membership organization	No data	Coordination of Campaign Against Military Intervention in the Philippines Campaign to release Philippine political prisoners	Human rights, humanitarian, and religious frames
Ninoy Aquino Movement (NAM)	Brooklyn, NY	Formal Membership organization	No data	Lobbying in the U.S. Congress Community outreach	No data
Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship/Philippine Solidarity Network (CAMD/PSN)	Woodside, NY	Multi-organizational coalition	Chicago Honolulu Los Angeles Montreal New York Sacramento San Francisco Seattle Toronto Vancouver Washington D.C.	Demonstrations Lobbying in the U.S. Congress Publication of <i>Taliba</i> and <i>Congress Task Force Bulletin</i> Community outreach	Marcos as illegitimate president U.S. support for Marcos as interference in Philippine affairs
<i>After overthrow of Marcos (1986 and onwards)</i>					
Alliance for Philippine Concerns	San Francisco, CA	Revolutionary mass organization	No data	Institutional support for the CPP-NDF-NPA Nationwide campaign against the U.S. bases in the Philippines	Defense of Philippine sovereignty

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW GUIDE TO SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

(Prior to the interview, I will have acquired basic information, if available, about the organization, such as its history, various programs and campaigns, constituents, funding sources, etc. I therefore proceed to questions on its participation in the Philippine struggle for democracy from 1972-1992. Due to the semi-structured nature of these interviews, interviews may include other, similar questions, or follow-up questions to elicit additional information on topics the participant has mentioned.)

A. General Questions on Involvement in Philippines Issues

1. When did the organization first become involved in Philippine issues?
 - a. What are these issues?
 - b. Why did the organization become involved?
 - i. Tell me about how the organization become involved in Philippine issues from its emergence.
 - c. What was your specific involvement?
 - i. Tell me about your roles and duties.
 - d. Why and how did you take these roles and duties?

B. Questions on Involvement in Philippine Issues during Authoritarian Rule

1. What were the organization's views on Marcos's presidency from his election in 1965 to his overthrow in 1986?
 - a. What conflicts, if any, were there regarding these views?
 - b. What actions did you take on issues confronting the Philippines during the Marcos presidency?
 - i. How did you organize these actions?
 - ii. Who played key roles in these actions?
 - iii. Tell me about these actions and their outcomes.
 - c. What was the reaction of the Filipino community <in the U.S./Netherlands> on your organizational positions and courses of action?
 - i. Did members of the Filipino community participate in these actions?
 - ii. How did they become involved?
 - iii. Did members of the Filipino community participate in activities of the organization, prior to said actions?

- d. Did you connect with other organizations in both the U.S./Netherlands and the Philippines during these actions? What about in other countries?
 - i. Which organizations were these?
 - ii. How did you become connected?
 - iii. What actions did you hold together?
 - iv. Tell me more about these actions you held together and their outcomes.
- e. Did you encounter problems during these actions?
 - i. What were these?
 - ii. How were these handled?
 - iii. Tell me more about these problems and their impact on your actions.
- f. How did the U.S./Dutch government and its people view your actions?
 - i. How did you know about their views?
 - ii. Did the U.S./Dutch government take measures because of your actions?
 - iii. Did your involvement in these actions affect your relationship with the U.S./Dutch government and its people?
- g. How did the Marcos government and the Filipinos in the Philippines view your actions?
 - i. How did you know about their views?
 - ii. Did the Marcos government take measures because of your actions?
 - iii. Did your involvement in these actions affect your relationship with the Marcos government and the Filipinos in the Philippines?

C. Questions on Involvement in Philippine Issues during Democratic Transition

- 1. What were the organization's views on Aquino's presidency from 1986 to 1992?
 - a. What conflicts, if any, were there regarding these views?
 - b. What actions did you take on issues confronting the Philippines during the Aquino presidency?
 - i. How did you organize these actions?
 - ii. Who played key roles in these actions?
 - iii. Tell me about these actions and their outcomes.
 - c. What was the reaction of the Filipino community <in the U.S./Netherlands> on your organizational positions and courses of action?
 - i. Did members of the Filipino community participate in these actions?
 - ii. How did they become involved?
 - iii. Did members of the Filipino community participate in activities of the organization, prior to said actions?
 - d. Did you connect with other organizations in both the U.S./Netherlands and the Philippines during these actions? What about in other countries?
 - i. Which organizations were these?
 - ii. How did you become connected?
 - iii. What actions did you hold together?
 - iv. Tell me more about these actions you held together and their outcomes.
 - e. Did you encounter problems during these actions?
 - i. What were these?
 - ii. How were these handled?
 - iii. Tell me more about these problems and their impact on your actions.

- f. How did the U.S./Dutch government and its people view your actions?
 - i. How did you know about their views?
 - ii. Did the U.S./Dutch government take measures because of your actions?
 - iii. Did your involvement in these actions affect your relationship with the U.S./Dutch government and its people?
- g. How did the Aquino government and the Filipinos in the Philippines view your actions?
 - i. How did you know about their views?
 - ii. Did the Aquino government take measures because of your actions?
 - iii. Did your involvement in these actions affect your relationship with the Aquino government and the Filipinos in the Philippines?

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