

**DOES SOCIAL AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY INCREASE INTOLERANCE?
PREDICTING LEVELS OF ANTI-SEMITISM ACROSS 101 COUNTRIES**

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Anti-Semitism, hostility towards or the maltreatment of Jews, is one of the oldest forms of intolerance. Scholars from a variety of traditions have examined anti-Semitism and its drivers. This project interrogates the drivers of anti-Semitism in a new way. It looks at how anti-Semitism is related to an under-examined variable, country stability. I hypothesize that feelings of instability will drive individuals and groups towards espousing anti-Semitic attitudes. Particular attention is paid to political instability as manifested in immigration levels, regime duration, conflict and terrorism. Three hypotheses are tested through the use of OLS regression and a dataset that brings together 2014 cross-national data on anti-Semitic attitudes with country-level variables that act as indirect indicators of political instability. Major findings include statistically significant impacts of (1) a country's presence in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region (2) a regime's duration and (3) terrorism outside of the MENA region on levels of anti-Semitic attitudes. This research has implications for understanding the ongoing study of the drivers of anti-Semitism, particularly country-level drivers.

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PREFACE

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

All societies experience intolerance expressed at individuals and groups deemed inferior or different because of their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity or religious beliefs. Intolerant beliefs often translate into bigoted actions that include discrimination, prejudice and violence. Anti-Semitism, hostility towards or the maltreatment of Jews because of their faith, is one of the oldest forms of intolerance. It is entangled in issues of nationality, religion, race and class. From individual attacks to mass exterminations, the Jewish people have been targeted for thousands of years.

Scholars (Bilewicz et al. 2013, Cohen et al. 2009, Dinnerstein 1994, Dinnerstein 2004, Evans 1952, Frenkel-Brunswik and Nevitt Sanford 1945, Laqueur 2008, Porat 2005, Tausch 2014, Wistrich 2004) have examined anti-Semitism, its history and its causes from a variety of perspectives. The present project interrogates the drivers of anti-Semitism in a new way. It looks at how anti-Semitism is related country-level factors to an under-examined influence, country-level social and political instability. Particular attention is paid to indicators of instability as manifested in immigration levels, regime duration, armed conflict and terrorism and whether those indicators associate positively with levels of anti-Semitism. In the sections that follow, I give an overview of pertinent sociological and social psychological theory and original argumentation regarding the importance of studying anti-Semitism and how indicators of political instability correlate with anti-Semitic attitudes. What follows is a description of the

study's data, methods and findings. A concluding section analyzes major findings and discusses implications for future research on the drivers of anti-Semitism.

2.0 THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS

It is important to study anti-Semitism as it is a particularly complex and pernicious form of hatred that does not align with better-understood forms like racism. Part of the complexity of anti-Semitism is that its perpetrators simultaneously advance a set of myths and conspiracy theories that polarize Jews with contradictory accusations. Perceived as a religious and racial group both inferior and disproportionately advantaged, Jews around the world have been caught in a historic and enduring double bind that positions them as worthy targets and scapegoats for the suffering of others. Michael Curtis (Curtis 1986:4) elaborates on the contradictory nature of anti-Semitic tropes, explaining:

“..no other group of people in the world has been charged simultaneously with alienation from society and with cosmopolitanism, with being capitalist exploiters and agents of international finance and also revolutionary agitators, with having a materialist mentality and with being people of the Book, with acting as militant aggressors and with being cowardly pacifists...with upholding a rigid law and also being morally decadent, with being a chosen people and also having an inferior human nature, with both arrogance and timidity, with both individualism and communal adherence, with being guilty of the crucifixion of Christ and at the same time held to account for the invention of Christianity.”

Among the inherent contradictions that have paradoxically undergirded anti-Semitism for thousands of years are the simultaneous charges that Jews, cast as an opaque and mystical people, refuse to assimilate into their surrounding communities *and* have such an embedded, widespread presence that they control communal, national, even global institutions. This contradiction coexists in the widely-held anti-Semitic charge is that Jews are engaged in a covert plot for world domination. Though there have been attempts to cast Jews as conspirators for global control for thousands of years (Laqueur 2008), this myth has some of its most clear and causal roots in the authoring and prolific dissemination of the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* (Dinnerstein 1994). The *Protocols* is the alleged physical blueprint of the Jewish plot to secure world control. Anti-Semites claim that Jews met in secret at the First Zionist Congress in 1897 to draft the document (Landes and Katz 2012). Though these claims have been proven false, the *Protocols* have been translated into several languages, published in various countries, and disseminated as factual by influential figures. One of the most notable disseminations was from American industrialist Henry Ford, who released the *Protocols* in his Michigan newspaper under the title *The International Jew: The World's Foremost Problem* (Ford 1948). The almost two-year run of the *Protocols* in Ford's newspaper gave the document its international prominence. Anti-Semites continue to base their hatred on its alleged truth. The second most popular anti-Semitic charge that casts Jews as clandestine agents of control is the allegation of the existence of the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG), a charge that Jews ("Zionist" is not used to refer to supporters of a Jewish state of Israel but is rather code for "Jews") control the United States and other Western governments. Dual charges of self-imposed separateness and covert control over global governments, financial institutions and the media undergird feelings of instability among anti-Semites, who claim to fear and seek to fight this alleged control, which

Jews arguably exercise from afar and within. This presents further reason to think that anti-Semitism will appear when people are insecure, such as when they view Jews as competitors for control over societal institutions.

All this would imply that anti-Semitism would be strongest when Jews are a significant portion of a population. However, we know that anti-Semitism is also strong when there is a notable lack of Jewish presence; indeed, because Jews currently comprise less than .2% of the world's population, they constitute a significant minority in most countries. These seeming contradictory tendencies make anti-Semitism a worthy topic of study. I seek to understand more about anti-Semitism and how it varies around the world. More specifically, I am interested in how anti-Semitism relates to feelings of insecurity. It is relatively straightforward to measure the number of Jews, but insecurity is difficult to measure. One way to measure it is to examine factors likely to engender feelings of insecurity, such as rapid social change and violence. My study looks at relationships among macro-level factors including social changes, violence, and anti-Semitism on a societal level. But the mechanisms by which social changes and violence affect whether people will hold higher or lower levels of anti-Semitism take place through individual processes and social interactions. My main objective is thus to understand how we can explain the variation in this complex and contradictory form of bigotry around the world and what drives it. I do so by looking at whether indicators of political instability lead to higher levels of anti-Semitism by creating feelings of insecurity in the non-Jewish population. Specifically, I pose the following research questions:

1. Which country-level factors explain the variation in anti-Semitic attitudes in 101 countries as measured in 2014?

2. How do country-level indicators of political instability impact anti-Semitism?
3. How do these factors vary inside and outside of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region?

I argue that indicators of instability will matter broadly when explaining the variation in anti-Semitic attitudes around the globe. My argument hinges on the tendency of people to feel insecure and unstable when large societal changes are happening around them. This insecurity drives them to espouse intolerant views and engage in intolerant behavior towards groups they deem different and inferior. This theoretical assertion tries to capture more complex, individual level processes in an aggregate way, blending individual and macro-level factors.

To explain how political instability could affect anti-Semitism, theories from social psychology are helpful. As a subset of sociological theory, social psychological theories suggest how the factors of political instability can be positively correlated with levels of anti-Semitism. For example, scholars have positioned Social Justification Theory (SJT) as an explanation for bigoted views and behavior resulting from anxiety connected to feelings of instability (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede 2006). SJT posits that people are inclined towards preserving the status quo of the social systems that surround them, even when such preservation comes at a personal cost. For example, by preserving the social order, individuals from both majority and minority groups buy into and justify the systems of discrimination and inequality that accompany it (Jost and Banaji 1994, Jost et al. 2003, Jost, Banaji and Nosek 2004). Members of disadvantaged communities not only accept – but even promote – the social systems that operationalize their oppression in service of sustaining a social order that they deem reasonable (Jost and Hunyady 2002, Tajfel and Turner 1979). This practice allows them to join

members of majority and advantaged groups in both preventing and minimizing the stress that accompanies upheavals in otherwise stable systems. When individuals feel the stress that instability brings, they can resort to stereotyping practices that target outgroups in furtherance of upholding the system (Jost and Hunyady 2002).

Similarly, Terror Management Theory (TMT) suggests that awareness of and existential anxiety over one's mortality brings about feelings of terror. Political instability can serve as one cause of said anxiety over one's mortality. When people feel unstable as a result, they seek solace in the cultures that surround them, which ultimately fuels intolerance towards those who are different (Cohen et al. 2009). In contrast, stability empowers people to find self-esteem, which in turn quashes the anxiety and intolerance that mortality salience conjures as people seek the company of others who share their worldviews and reject those who do not (Berger and Luckmann 1966, Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski 1991). When in close contact with people whose views differ from one's own, TMT posits that the sense of certainty is disturbed and can result in heightened feelings of mortality salience and expressions of intolerance towards those whose differing views brought about such a sense of uncertainty (Baka, Derbis and Maxfield 2012, Cohen et al. 2009, Schimel et al. 1999, Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski 1991). In these ways, political instability, as a cause of insecurity and source of heightened mortality salience, can drive increasing levels of anti-Semitic attitudes.

An examination of the pertinent theoretical literature concerning boundary-creation is also important if we are to arrive at an understanding of how these social-psychological forces, when driven by country-level political instability variables, may drive anti-Semitic behavior. There is a growing literature connecting the creation of symbolic and social "ethno-racial" boundaries with the "production of inequality" (Pachucki, Pendergrass and Lamont 2007). Work

on collective identity is especially important in this regard. Todd (2005:429) uses a Bourdieu-ian framework to investigate the relationships between social and political change, collective identity and meaning making. She posits that identity hinges on three variables: existing identity structure, power relations, and resources and argues that “when institutional changes are accompanied by changing self-perceptions...new institutions begin to create new dynamics of interact.” Therefore, during times of political instability and transition, “collective categories” and personal identities can undergo shifts such that identity hierarchies and moral order are resisted or become challenged to the point of overturn of the moral order (Todd 2005, Wimmer 2008). These changes have implications for individual and collective senses of dominance in relation to others within religious, ethnic and related group types (Todd 2005), arguably resulting in the demonstration of intolerance towards those deemed inferior, namely Jews.

2.1 INDIRECT INDICATORS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY

We do not have direct indicators of instability, but we can use indirect indicators as proxies and measures. As such, the project tests four indirect indicators of social and political instability – immigration, regime length, armed conflict, and terrorism – to determine whether they are associated with increased levels of anti-Semitism. Each of these indicators reflects instability that may pose a threat to a peoples’ sense of security.

2.1.1 Immigration

Immigration is the first indicator of social and political instability. This hypothetical connection rests more so on the *perception* of immigration as an indicator instability rather than an actual positive correlation between instability and immigration levels. In fact, emigration would probably indicate instability more so than immigration levels: increasing numbers of people exiting a country to seek residence elsewhere suggests instability in their countries of origin. However, xenophobic campaigns have rested on their perpetrators' scapegoating of immigrant communities for experiences of instability. Specifically, majority communities have blamed immigrants for threatening the dominant culture when they (immigrants) import new and different cultural practices and values (Gebremedhin and Mavisakalyan 2013, Marzorati 2013). Additionally, immigrants have been cited as the cause of various societal ills that reflect instability, including declining employment opportunities among majority communities, increasing crime rates, even lack of government territorial control (Gebremedhin and Mavisakalyan 2013, Lee, Martinez and Rosenfeld 2001). Consequently, I argue that higher immigration rates will be associated with higher levels of anti-Semitism, resting my argument on the complex process, explored further below, by which the feelings of insecurity resulting from the instability that higher immigration levels indicate, from the perspective of the perpetrators of bigotry, will drive intolerance towards minority groups, specifically Jews.

2.1.2 Regime Length

Regime length is a more straightforward indirect indicator of political instability. Research has demonstrated that regime change, particularly transition processes, can be politically

destabilizing (Goldstone et al. 2010). In addition to this causal connection, I argue that a change in regime, whether by peaceful, predictable means or by unexpected and potentially violent overthrow, can be an indicator of relative levels of instability. In the former case, when a regime is hypothetically replaced via free election and peaceful transition, such a shift can indicate minor (or the virtual absence of) political instability. In such instances, the desire among the electorate for regime change – achieved through peaceful means – can stem from hopes for efforts on the part of the new regime to ameliorate unstable conditions. On the other end of the spectrum, when regime changes result from violent overthrow, the change can indicate high levels of political instability that led to the regime shift. More frequent regime changes, which correspond with shorter regime durations, can therefore serve as indicators of political instability. As a result, I hypothesize that the duration of a government regime will negatively correlate with levels of anti-Semitic attitudes. The shorter the regime, the higher the levels of anti-Semitic attitudes. As explored further below, in politically unstable situations, intolerance towards minority and outgroups (such as Jews) increases. This occurs because feelings of instability correlate positively with feelings of insecurity. This insecurity drives perpetrators of intolerance to regain a sense of stability by both drawing closer to those they deem similar and rejecting those they deem inferior and different. This dynamic enables perpetrators to cast blame on others for their feelings of insecurity and thereby further intolerant and bigoted attitudes.

2.1.3 Armed Conflict

The third indirect indicator of political instability that this project utilizes is the number of armed conflicts a country experiences. One type of armed conflict, that which occurs between a country's government and an internal opposition group, is a clear indicator that the country's

political environment is unstable. Both in these situations, and when armed conflict between two or more countries occurs on a particular country's soil, it reflects instability both as a threat to domestic peace and to the populace's security in predicting the country's political future. In some circumstances, armed conflict can be used and incited as an ameliorative measure to existing political instability as perceived by heads of state. In such situations, armed conflict presents a uniquely attractive mechanism to combat political instability as it can pressure unity toward a cause, cast challengers as traitors, and redirect anxiety that has historically been utilized by a figurehead or chief who then accumulates more power through direct and indirect means. Broadly speaking, armed conflict, when used in this way, is both an indicator of political instability and can prefigure changes to an unstable body politic in a more authoritarian direction. As in the cases of the previous two indirect indicators of political instability, I hypothesize that the number of armed conflicts will be associated with global levels of anti-Semitic attitudes. Specifically, higher numbers of armed conflicts will correlate with higher levels of anti-Semitism. There is both empirical and theoretical support for this connection. "Indeed, attacks against Jews spiked during the Crusades, the Black Plague, in France following the Franco-Prussian War, in Russia in the years preceding the Bolshevik Revolution, in Germany following World War I, in the United States during the Great Depression, in the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and in South America during the transition from dictatorships to democracy" (Cohen et al. 2009:290-91). Further theoretical exposition, below, will highlight the process undergirding this correlation.

2.1.4 Terrorism

This project tests terrorism as the final indirect indicator of political instability. Individuals and groups may view politically unstable conditions as prime opportunities to carry out terrorist actions, with political institutions as particularly vulnerable during unstable times/conditions. Further, terrorism as an indicator of instability can come about through more direct means, as “certain forms of domestic political instability (say, guerrilla warfare, riots, and civil war) provide for the honing of military, tactical and organizational skills needed to carry out terrorist acts...” (Campos and Gassebner 2013:43). Additionally, during times of political instability, people may use terroristic means to make political statements that they believe will have a greater likelihood of effecting change than during times of political stability. I hypothesize that as numbers of terrorist incidents in a country increase, levels of anti-Semitism will correspondingly increase. The next section will more fully explain how and why I argue for this connection and the similar, previously hypothesized correlations.

2.1.5 Control Variables

In addition to the above indicators of political instability as independent variables, the project includes four control variables: gross domestic product (GDP), democracy, religion and region. I chose to control for these factors as they all have the potential to significantly impact peoples’ feelings of insecurity. Concerning GDP, it is important to control for the fact that higher GDP may be associated with higher feelings of security than lower GDP. Indeed, “higher degrees of political instability are associated with lower growth rates of GDP per capita” (Aisen and Veiga

2013:151). GDP and the presence of democracy are also significant factors in how people experience regime change, one of the independent variables. For example, regime change leads to less insecurity in societies with high GDPs than in societies with low GDPs. Regarding religion, we know that levels of anti-Semitism are higher and lower when correlated with specific religious traditions, as explored in more depth below. Finally, concerning region, this variable is used to compare MENA to non-MENA areas, as well as to look at difference among regions outside MENA. Anti-Semitism is higher in MENA when compared to other regions, and it is possible that the drivers of anti-Semitism may differ inside and outside of the region.

3.0 HYPOTHESES

This project's main argument and supporting theoretical literature tell us that in unstable situations, people feel unsure, and as a result, they create defenses and build status by othering. When people create a collective identity under these conditions, they imbue negative characteristics in the other group that makes their own group seem more positive. I explore whether the othering that occurs in unstable conditions may result in anti-Semitism. Though the data is only able to look at the relationship between instability and levels of anti-Semitism, the literature demonstrates the mechanisms that lead me to hypothesize that there is probably a positive relationship between country-level instability and anti-Semitic attitudes. Specifically, I test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Greater social and political instability in a country is associated with higher levels of anti-Semitic attitudes, such that:

H1a: Higher levels of immigration are positively associated with anti-Semitism;

H1b: Longer regime lengths are negatively associated with anti-Semitism;

H1c: Greater numbers of armed conflicts are positively associated with anti-Semitism;

and

H1d: Greater numbers of terrorist incidents are positively associated with anti-Semitism.

Hypothesis 2: Anti-Semitism will be higher in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region than in other parts of the world.

Hypothesis 3: There will be differences in the relationship of political instability measures to anti-Semitism in MENA vs other regions.

4.0 DATA AND METHODS

Though we know that anti-Semitism varies by place, we do not have a body of literature that quantitatively examines the variation in anti-Semitism across the world except for one study (Tausch 2014), addressed below. This dearth of scholarship has been due to the relative lack of data that measures anti-Semitism around the globe. Anti-Semitism is difficult to quantify because there is not a single measure that can encompass the large and complex phenomenon. As discussed, anti-Semitism exhibits differently in different places at different times. Therefore, any measure will be subject to legitimate criticism of its ability to be sufficiently thorough.

4.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The project's dependent variable is anti-Semitism, measured as anti-Semitic attitudes held by adults in 101 countries. The source of this data is the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), which, in 2014, released the Global 100 Index of Anti-Semitism. The Index measures attitudes towards Jews held by over 53,000 adults in 101 countries and the West Bank & Gaza. I use the ADL data as the dependent variable to test how the aforementioned variables are associated with levels of anti-Semitism globally. There are weaknesses associated with using this measure, both due to its source and the nature of what it measures. ADL is an activist organization with what many describe as a controversial agenda, especially concerning what is widely considered a pro-Israel

position. As a consequence, skeptics may look upon the data with suspicion. One reason is that the ADL name may have impacted the ways in which informants responded to the survey. It is possible that upon learning that ADL was the organization behind the survey, respondents – depending on their views of the organization – may be more or less inclined to report their feelings towards Jews than they would if a more neutral organization had administered the survey.

Finally, as above, anti-Semitism manifests in different ways among its perpetrators, namely in their attitudes, speech, and criminal and non-criminal activity. Therefore, anti-Semitism can be measured in a number of ways: through self-reported attitudes, in the number of non-criminal incidents with anti-Semitic motivations or in the number of anti-Semitic hate crimes, so no single measure, such as the ADL survey, will adequately account for the breadth of manifestations of anti-Semitism.

Despite these limitations, the ADL data remains the best measure of global anti-Semitism and the best dependent variable for this study. First, it is the only measure of its kind. Second, it is also the most extensive measure of global anti-Semitism that has ever existed. Finally, there has been a scholarly attempt to utilize the data to examine the drivers of anti-Semitism (Tausch 2014), but this study seeks to push ADL's data further through a more extensive use of multivariate OLS regression.

The ADL Global 100 Index was created from the first global survey of anti-Semitic attitudes, spanning 53,100 respondents aged 18 and over in 101 countries plus the West Bank and Gaza, surveyed between July 2013 and February 2014. Interview participants were selected at random, and were interviewed via phone or face-to-face. Most country samples are nationally representative, and in countries that presented security or logistical challenges, sample weights

were used to “ensure the country’s interviews were reflective of the national population on key demographic measures other than geography” (ADL 2014: 51).

ADL codes an individual as holding anti-Semitic attitudes if he or she responded that 6 or more of 11 negative stereotypes about Jews were “probably true,” rather than “probably false.” The stereotypes are:

- 1) Jews are more loyal to Israel than to [this country/the countries they live in].
- 2) Jews have too much power in the business world.
- 3) Jews have too much power in international financial markets.
- 4) Jews don’t care about what happens to anyone but their own kind.
- 5) Jews have too much control over global affairs.
- 6) People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave.
- 7) Jews think they are better than other people.
- 8) Jews have too much control over the United States government.
- 9) Jews have too much control over the global media.
- 10) Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.
- 11) Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars.

Individual attitudes are then aggregated to the country level such that each country’s score estimates the percentage of a country’s population with anti-Semitic attitudes. For example, Estonia’s score is 22 because 22% of its adult population is reported to hold anti-Semitic attitudes. The Global 100 Index ranges between 0.2 and 93.0 percent with a mean of 37.3 percent.¹ All countries in this analysis, along with their Global 100 Index scores, are presented in Appendix A. With the data’s strengths, it is important to recognize potential

¹ When the West Bank & Gaza are omitted as a case, as they are in this project due to missing data across the independent variables, the Index mean is 36.8.

limitations of the survey. For example, respondents do not always accurately report their views. Additionally, the survey's findings would have most likely been different had a different metric (say, agreeing with 5 or 7 stereotypes rather than 6) been used to measure whether someone held anti-Semitic attitudes.

4.2 INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES

I test four measures of social and political instability: immigrant population change, regime length, armed conflicts, and terrorist incidents. Because the dependent variable is measured between 2013 and 2014, independent and control variables are sourced from 2012 or in years prior. *Immigrant population change* is the percentage increase in the number of immigrants in a country from 2005-2010 (UN 2009a, UN 2009b). *Regime length* refers to regime length in years as of 2003 and backdated to 1960. These data are captured by the Authoritarian Regimes Dataset (Teorell and Hadenius 2007, Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius 2013). *Armed conflicts* counts the total number of armed conflicts a country experienced between 1989 and 2012 (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, (Allansson, Melander and Themnér 2017, Gleditsch et al. 2002, Program and International Peace Research Institute 2017). All conflicts are counted, including extrasystemic, interstate, internal, and internationalized internal (Program and International Peace Research Institute 2017). *Terrorist incidents* measures the number of terrorist attacks each country has experienced from 2010-2012, measured by the Global Terrorism Database (START 2017). START defines a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-country actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through

fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START 2017). The data do not include terrorist attacks that are country-sponsored.

I also control for geographic region, religious adherents, democracy, and economic development. *Region* is coded with 6 dummy variables measuring the following geographic areas: Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean; the West (including Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand); Asia and the Pacific Islands; Eastern Europe and Western Asia; and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Given the especially high levels of anti-Semitism in MENA, I also created a dummy variable flagging countries in the MENA region.

Measures of religious adherents in 2010 come from the World Religion Dataset in the Association of Religion Data Archives (Maoz and Henderson 2013). I include two general measures – *percent Christian* and *percent Muslim* – and disaggregated measures of *percent Protestant*, *percent Eastern Orthodox Christian*, *percent Roman Catholic*, *percent Sunni Islam*, and *percent Shi’a Islam*. In auxiliary analyses, I also test effects of the share of the Jews in the population, logged to reduce skew. However, numbers are extremely small and, even after logging, the variable is highly skewed, which can cause statistical problems in small samples. Therefore, I do not include Jewish population share in the main analyses.

Democracy is measured in 2010 and is from the Authoritarian Regimes Dataset (Teorell and Hadenius 2007, Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius 2013). In the results presented below, I use a dummy variable measuring whether the regime in power is democratic. Substituting a measure of democracy levels from Freedom House does not affect the results presented. In auxiliary analysis, I also test for differences across a broader set of regime types (democracy, monarchy,

military party, one-party regime, multi-party regime, no-party regime, and other). Notable results from these analyses are footnoted below.

Economic development is measured as *logged GDP per capita* in 2008 and come from the Maddison Project (Bolt and van Zanden 2014). Maddison's data had the best country coverage of all available sources of data on economic development. Drawing from prior research (Tausch 2014), I tested both linear and non-linear specifications of economic development.

In auxiliary analysis, I tested several alternative measures of my predictors and control, including immigrant share of the population (UN 2009a, UN 2009b), each type of conflict when isolated (Allansson, Melander and Themnér 2017, Gleditsch et al. 2002, Program and International Peace Research Institute 2017), the type of terrorist incident (START 2017), and the target of terrorist incidents (START 2017), a more nuanced category of regime type including dummies for democracies, monarchies, military party, one-party regime, multi-party regime, no-party regime, and other (Teorell and Hadenius 2007, Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius 2013), and political rights and civil liberties (*ibid.*). I also included additional control variables, including income inequality (Solt 2016) and adherents of other religious traditions (Maoz and Henderson 2013). Notable results from these auxiliary analyses are reported below.

4.3 ESTIMATION STRATEGY

Given our limited understanding of anti-Semitic attitudes around the world, I begin with descriptive analyses, considering how levels of anti-Semitism vary regionally. Then, I use OLS regression analysis to explore cross-national variation in the share of the population that are anti-Semitic. A common rule of thumb concerning OLS analysis is that it will tolerate one predictor

for every 10 cases. My models fit within that parameter. Cross-national studies where the units are countries often contain 100-150 cases, and my models are not much different in size from that research.

I begin building a baseline model by testing factors I expect to influence anti-Semitism: level of economic development, the presence of democracy, the share of Christian and Muslim adherents in the population, and residing in the Middle East or North Africa (MENA). Building on these results, I next test for effects of social and political instability, stepping in each of the four measures: immigrants' population share, regime duration, armed conflicts, and terrorist incidents. In a final set of models, I consider whether the effects of these forms of instability differ inside and outside of MENA.

I investigated a wide range of alternative model specifications, including curvilinear effects and interactions. Notable findings that go beyond the scope of the present study are presented in the Appendix or are reported in footnotes below. I also tested the robustness of the models below to outliers. Further, I tested all models for multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity, and I performed outlier analyses on all models. I used a combination of statistical diagnostic tests as well as plots. Notable findings from these analyses are presented in the Appendix or are reported in footnotes below.

A small number of countries drop from the analyses due to missing data. The West Bank and Gaza are excluded due to a lack of data for all independent variables. Iceland and Turkey are dropped from the data because of missingness in logged 2008 GDP per capita. There is complete case coverage for the democracy dummy variable, the religion variables and the MENA dummy variable.

5.0 RESULTS

5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The share of people with anti-Semitic attitudes varies greatly from one country to another. Across the 101 countries in my analysis, Laos has the lowest levels of anti-Semitism with just 0.2% of the adult population holding anti-Semitic attitudes, whereas Iraq scores the highest, with 92% of the adult population holding anti-Semitic attitudes. The average score is 36.7, suggesting that 37% of adults in the average country hold anti-Semitic attitudes.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of values of the Global 100 Index across the 101 countries in the analyses. The distribution is, by and large, positively skewed with an exception depicted by a cluster of countries with high index scores. These countries are mostly located in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and they score between 74% and 92% on the index.




Figure 1. Global 100 Index Values Across 101 Countries

Next, I break down the Global 100 Index into four quartiles, where the 1st quartile is the quarter of countries with the lowest scores and the 4th quartile is the quarter of countries with the highest scores. Table 1 presents a bivariate statistics and frequencies, including the distribution of countries across these four quartiles by region. Anti-Semitism is lowest, on average, in the West, which averages 20.3% of adults holding anti-Semitic attitudes. Sixty-two percent of countries in the West are in the lowest quartile, and another 29% are in the second quartile. Only France and Greece rank among the half of countries with the highest levels of anti-Semitic attitudes. Moving up slightly in its average score on the anti-Semitic index are countries in the Asia and Pacific region, which score an average of 24.7 on the anti-Semitism index. The majority of countries in this region, 54%, are in the lowest quartile, and interestingly, 23% of the region’s adults score in the second quartile and in the fourth quartile, with 0% in the third quartile. This somewhat polar representation includes high-scoring countries like Malaysia (61%) and Laos (.2%), the lowest scoring country in the entire sample. Sub-Saharan Africa

averages 29% on the index, and most of its countries are found in the first (thirty-six percent) and third (forty-five percent) quartiles. Senegal (53%) is the highest scoring country in the region, and Tanzania (12%) is the lowest scoring. The Latin America and the Caribbean region averages 31.7% on the index, with most of its countries falling in the second (39%) and third (44%) quartiles. Panama (52%) is the highest scoring country in the region, and Brazil (16%) scores the lowest. Countries in the Eastern Europe and Western Asia score, on average, 34.4% on the index, representing the second-highest scoring region. As with Latin America and the Caribbean, most countries score in the second (43%) and third (43%) quartiles. Finally, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region is home to the highest levels of anti-Semitism, averaging 79.5% on the index. The sixteen highest-scoring countries in the sample are all located in MENA, the highest being the West Bank and Gaza (93%) and Iraq (92%). All countries in this region are located in the fourth quartile.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Distribution of Global 100 Index by Region

Global 100 Index Quartiles	West	Asia and Pacific	the Sub-Saharan Africa	Latin America Caribbean	Eastern & Europe W. Asia	& MENA	Total
1 st	62%	54%	36%	11%	5%	0%	27%
2 nd	29%	23%	9%	39%	43%	0%	26%
3 rd	5%	0	45%	44%	43%	0%	23%
4 th	5%	23%	9%	6%	10%	100%	25%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Mean	20.3	24.7	29.0	31.7	34.4	79.5	36.8
(St. Dev.)	(14.2)	(19.1)	(13.6)	(8.9)	(9.2)	(8.4)	(23.3)

5.2 OLS MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Table 2 presents the results of the first six multiple regression models predicting global anti-Semitism levels with economic, regime, religious and regional variables. These models progress towards building a baseline model. Model 1 tests effects of logged GDP per capita and the presence of democracy. Although GDP has no significant linear effect on anti-Semitic attitudes, democracy shows strong significant effects ($p < 0.001$). Countries classified as democratic score, on average, 21 percentage points lower on the anti-Semitism scale than non-democratic countries, when controlling for GDP.² This model explains 18% of the variation in anti-Semitic attitudes across 99 countries.

² Using a more nuanced categorization of regime type shows further differences. For example, monarchies score 51 points higher on the anti-Semitism index, on average, than democracies. One-party regimes score 22 points lower than democracies, on average. Multi-party regimes score 14 points higher than democracies on the anti-Semitism scale, on average. Military regimes are not significantly different than democracies. However, these differences are highly unstable, changing both substantively and significantly from model to model. I therefore use the reduced measure of democracy. Including the more nuanced categorization of regime type does not alter the main results as presented.

Table 2. Baseline Regression: Economic Development, Democracy, Religion, Region (Middle East and North Africa)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Logged GDP per capita 2008	0.48 (2.34)	2.29 (1.74)	2.24 (1.64)	2.80 (1.80)	-0.38 (1.29)	39.19 ⁺ (21.48)
Logged GDP Squared						-2.30 ⁺ (1.24)
Democracy (dummy)	-21.35 ^{***} (4.65)	-3.08 (4.27)	0.26 (4.14)	-4.07 (4.36)	5.34 ⁺ (3.21)	4.89 (3.18)
% Christians		0.17* (0.07)		0.15* (0.07)		
% Muslims		0.60 ^{***} (0.07)	0.60 ^{***} (0.06)		0.24 ^{***} (0.07)	0.23 ^{***} (0.06)
% Protestants			-0.06 (0.10)		-0.07 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
% Eastern Orthodox			0.26 ^{***} (0.07)		0.27 ^{***} (0.06)	0.24 ^{***} (0.06)
% Roman Catholics			0.18 ^{**} (0.06)		0.15 ^{**} (0.05)	0.13* -0.05
% Sunni				0.59 ^{***} (0.08)		
% Shi'a				0.55 ^{***} (0.12)		
Middle East / North Africa (dummy)					43.52 ^{***} (5.27)	41.51 ^{***} (5.32)
Constant	45.32* (2.34)	-5.48 (1.74)	-4.53 (1.64)	-6.69 (1.80)	17.97 (1.29)	-148.68 (21.48)

Table 2 (continued)

	(20.04)	(16.31)	(15.08)	(16.89)	(11.79)	(91.07)
Number of Observations	99	99	99	99	99	99
Adjusted R-square	0.18	0.55	0.60	0.53	0.77	0.78

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$; standard errors are in parentheses

Model 2 adds shares of religious adherents, specifically percentages of Christians and Muslims in each country. Both measures of religious adherents are statistically significant, but once included, the democracy dummy loses statistical significance. When GDP per capita, democracy and percent Muslims are controlled, a 10 percent increase in the share of Christians is associated with a 1.7 increase in the share of people in a country that hold anti-Semitism attitudes. The same 10 percent increase in the share of Muslims in a country is associated with a much higher increase in anti-Semitic attitudes – 6 percent. This model explains 55% of the variation in anti-Semitic attitudes across a sample of 99 countries.

Given the statistical and substantive significance of religion, I proceeded to measure how the percentages of the major types of Christian adherent categories influence anti-Semitism levels in Model 3. I disaggregated Christians into the percentages of Protestants, Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christian adherents, again still controlling for GDP per capita and democracy. Generally, the findings are the same, except we are able to see meaningful differences across Christian denominations. Increasing the share of Eastern Orthodox Christians by 10 percent is associated with a 2.6 percent increase on the anti-Semitism scale. Similarly, a ten percent increase in the share of Roman Catholics is associated with a 1.8 percent increase on

the anti-Semitism scale.³ However, the share of Protestants has no significant effect on anti-Semitic attitudes.

In Model 4 I take a similar approach, but now breaking out Islamic practice into Sunni and Shi'a. Unlike in the case of Christians, the effects of Sunni and Shi'a adherents are similar. A ten percent increase in Sunni Muslims is associated with a 5.9 percent increase in the measure of anti-Semitism. Similarly, a percentage increase in Shi'a Muslim adherents is associated with a 5.5 percent increase on the anti-Semitism scale. Because the measures of Islam are similar and the model fit slightly declines with this specification, I carry forward the more general measure of Muslim adherence, grouping together Sunni and Shi'a practitioners.

Model 5 continues to build the baseline regression by adding a dummy variable that accounts for a country's presence inside or outside of the Middle East and North Africa region. In this model, logged GDP per capita, democracy, and the share of Protestant adherents are not statistically significant predictors of anti-Semitism. However, larger shares of Eastern Orthodox Christians and Roman Catholics continue to be positively associated with anti-Semitism. Although the size of the effect of Muslim adherents is cut in half when including the regional effect of MENA, it remains statistically significant. Yet, even controlling for Islam, the regional effect of MENA is strong: countries in MENA score 43% higher, on average, than all other regions. Adding the regional dummy also improves model fit, pushing the adjusted R-square up to .77.⁴

³ In auxiliary analysis, I also tested whether the effect of increasing the share of Catholic adherents is different inside and outside of Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, I find a marginally significant interaction effect. For each percent increase in the share of Catholics, the size of the gap between Latin America and the Caribbean and the West increases .5 points. The figure in Appendix E visualizes this interaction. Overall, this result suggests that Catholicism in Latin America and the Caribbean may be more strongly associated with anti-Semitic attitudes than Catholicism elsewhere in the world.

⁴ Many of the remaining models will have similarly high adjusted R-square values. I believe that this is driven by the presence of the MENA region (which, as mentioned, has the highest levels of anti-Semitism around the globe), by multicollinearity (tested and addressed in detail elsewhere) and because this project's data is in the aggregate.

When adding a variable that accounts for presence inside or outside of MENA, I am introducing moderate levels of multicollinearity (VIF of 3.02) that may be inflating the adjusted R-squared. However, research demonstrates, as do the descriptive statistics, that anti-Semitism is different in the MENA, and thus it is important conceptually to control for it. Excluding it is likely to be a more serious problem because it would create omitted variable bias. Multicollinearity only impacts estimates of those variables involved in the multicollinearity, so moving forward, those estimates may be implicated.

The final model in Table 2 changes the specification of GDP to be curvilinear. As previously research suggests (Tausch 2014), GDP has a nonlinear effect on anti-Semitism, with countries in the middle of the scale ranking higher on the anti-Semitism index than countries on the lower and higher ends (see Figure 2). This effect is marginally significant. When GDP is included as a nonlinear term, democracy and percent Protestant remain insignificant. Percent increases in Eastern Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics and Muslims are still associated with higher levels of anti-Semitism in statistically significant ways, and presence in the Middle East North Africa region is a statistically significant predictor of higher anti-Semitism levels by an average of 42 points. Model 6 explains 78% of the variation in the share of the population with anti-Semitic attitudes.⁵

Testing of aggregate data generally results in much higher R-square and adjusted R-square values than the use of individual-level data.

⁵ The logged Jewish population share, when added to this model, has negative effects, but the measure is only marginally statistically significant ($p < .10$).




Figure 2. Nonlinear Effect of GDP on Anti-Semitism

Given the small population of 101, the baseline model including 9 predictors is already approaching capacity. Therefore, from here, I step in each of the measures of instability one at a time, as represented in Table 3. Model 6 is repeated in this table to ease comparison. Model 7 adds the percentage increase in the number of immigrants in each country from 2005-2010. This effect, when controlling for all other variables in the baseline model, is insignificant. In this model, the percent of the population that adheres to Islam and the variable measuring a country's presence inside or outside of the MENA region are collinear, but only marginally so.

Model 8 adds in regime duration, which – consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2 – has a marginally significant negative effect on anti-Semitic attitudes. Each additional year that a regime is in power is associated with an average drop in anti-Semitic attitudes by .18 points.⁶ Logged GDP loses significance, however.

⁶ In auxiliary analysis, the effect of regime duration shows some evidence of curvilinearity such that after a regime has been in place for about 30 years, levels of anti-Semitism drop.

Model 9 steps in the total number of armed conflicts that each country has experienced from 1989-2012, which has no statistically significant effect. All other variables are relatively undisturbed. The final model in the table, Model 10, incorporates the sum of terrorist incidents within each country from 2010-2012. This measure, statistically insignificant, causes the democracy dummy to lose marginal significance. Iraq emerges as an influential outlier in Model 10, an effect more fully explored in Models 14 and 15. Other effects remain about the same. Generally, the fit of all of these models is similar to the baseline, with an adjusted R-squared hovering between .77 and .78.

Table 3. Anti-Semitism explained through Baseline, Religion, Region (Middle East and North Africa), Immigration, Regime, Conflict and Terrorism

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Logged GDP per capita 2008	39.19 ⁺ (21.48)	39.13 ⁺ (21.64)	31.63 (21.64)	43.36* (21.46)	39.35 ⁺ (21.63)
Logged GDP Squared	-2.30 ⁺ (1.24)	-2.29 ⁺ (1.25)	-1.75 (1.27)	-2.56* (1.25)	-2.30 ⁺ (1.25)
Democracy (dummy)	4.89 (3.18)	4.89 (3.20)	5.33 ⁺ (3.20)	5.44 ⁺ (3.17)	4.85 (3.20)
% Protestants	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
% Eastern Orthodox	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)
% Roman Catholics	0.13* (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)
% Islam	0.23*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.07)	0.21** (0.07)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.07)
MENA (dummy)	41.51*** (5.32)	41.47*** (5.45)	43.69*** (5.39)	41.12*** (5.28)	41.42*** (5.38)
% Immigrant Change 2005-2010		0.00 (0.07)			

Table 3 (continued)

Regime Duration				-0.18 ⁺	
				(0.09)	
# Conflicts, 1989-2012				-0.12	
				(0.08)	
# Terrorist incidents, 2010-2012				0.00	
				(0.00)	
Constant	-148.68	-148.47	-118.28	-163.32 ⁺	-149.63
	(91.07)	(91.73)	(91.61)	(90.77)	(91.77)
Number of Observations	99	99	98	99	99
Adjusted R-square	0.78	0.77	0.78	0.78	0.77

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$; standard errors are in parentheses

The final set of models, presented in Table 4, tests whether the effects of instability are the same inside and outside Middle East / North Africa region. The only significant interaction involves effects of terrorism, shown in Model 14. The main effect of terrorism shows that outside of the Middle East and North Africa, increasing numbers of terrorist incidents are associated with lower levels of anti-Semitism. For each additional terrorist incident, the share of adults with anti-Semitic attitudes decreases by .01. Yet, the effect is the reverse inside the Middle East and North Africa. Indeed, the interaction term shows that for each additional terrorist incident, the gap between countries inside and outside of MENA increases by .01 on the anti-Semitism scale. The interaction is shown visually in Figure 3.⁷

However, outlier analysis suggests that the positive association inside the Middle East and North Africa is driven by Iraq, an outlier. When Iraq is removed from the equation, as reported in Model 15, the interaction loses significance. However, the main effect – showing a negative relationship between terrorism and anti-Semitism outside of MENA – remains statistically significant.

⁷Adding this interaction generated multicollinearity. Mean centering the interacted terms addressed this problem and did not impact substantive findings.

Table 4 The Impact of Country-Level Instability Variables on Levels of Anti-Semitism When Interacted with Presence Inside and Outside of MENA (Middle East North Africa)

	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
% Protestants	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)
% Eastern Orthodox	0.24*** (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)
% Roman Catholics	0.13* (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)
% Islam	0.23*** (0.07)	0.21** (0.07)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.22** (0.06)	0.21** (0.06)
Logged GDP per capita 2008	39.98+ (21.76)	33.37 (21.99)	43.74+ (21.68)	49.63+ (21.55)	49.52+ (21.64)
Logged GDP squared	-2.29+ (1.26)	-1.86 (1.29)	-2.58* (1.26)	-2.91* (1.25)	-2.90* (1.25)
Democracy (dummy)	4.95 (3.23)	5.19 (3.22)	5.42+ (3.19)	4.80 (3.13)	4.74 (3.14)
% Immigrant Change 2005-2010	-0.01 (0.08)				
MENA (dummy = 1)	41.12*** (5.69)	46.99*** (8.32)	40.82*** (5.58)	38.86*** (5.36)	38.39*** (5.48)
Interaction: Inside MENA and % Immigrants Change 2005-2010	0.03				

(0.15)

Table 4 (continued)

Regime Duration			-0.16		
			(0.10)		
Interaction: Inside MENA and Regime Duration			-0.11		
			(0.20)		
# Conflicts, 1989-2012			-0.12		
			(0.08)		
Interaction: Outside MENA and # of Conflicts, 1989-2012			0.00		
Interaction: Inside MENA and # of Conflicts, 1989-2012			0.06		
			(0.36)		
# Terrorist incidents, 2010-2012			-0.01 ⁺	-0.01 ⁺	
			(0.00)	(0.00)	
Interaction: Inside MENA and # Terrorist incidents, 2010-2012			0.01 [*]	0.02	
			(0.01)	(0.02)	
Constant	-147.76	-125.78	-164.95 ⁺	-190.27 [*]	-189.94 [*]
	(92.28)	(93.10)	(91.73)	(91.18)	(91.60)
Number of Observations	99	98	99	99	98
Adjusted R-square	0.77	0.78	0.78	0.79	0.77

⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < .01$, ^{***} $p < .001$; standard errors are in parentheses




Figure 3. Interaction between terrorist incidents and levels of anti-Semitism inside and outside MENA

6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

This project is exploratory in that it does not build from a body of literature that has examined the drivers of global anti-Semitism. Therefore, I do not intervene in an established, ongoing debate. Rather, by utilizing mostly unstudied data and as the first cross-national, multivariate study of global levels of anti-Semitism, my findings have implications both for how we understand anti-Semitism around the world and how the academic community can direct future research in this understudied endeavor.

The quantitative analyses presented produce a number of findings both confirming and refuting the hypotheses. Because the hypotheses are interrelated such that they all speak to whether, how and to what extent indicators of political instability will drive anti-Semitism – and because statistical analysis adds interaction effects that, in one instance, significantly impacts results – this section will present results as they relate to the hypotheses collectively. To reiterate, Hypothesis 1 predicted that that immigration, regime length, armed conflict, and terrorism, as indirect indicators of political instability, would help explain the variation in anti-Semitic attitudes around the globe. Hypothesis 2 furthered the first hypothesis by predicting that the country-level, indirect indicators of political instability will associate with levels of anti-Semitism as follows: Immigration levels, the numbers of armed conflicts and the number of terrorist incidents will positively correlate with anti-Semitism, while the length of a government regime will negatively associate with levels of anti-Semitism. Finally, hypothesis 3 predicted the

existence of differences in the relationship of political instability measures to anti-Semitism in MENA vs other regions

Results of statistical analysis lent support to pieces of the hypotheses and rendered other parts of them unsupported. Broadly speaking, some indicators of political instability are associated with higher levels of anti-Semitism. For example, as predicted in hypotheses 1 and 2, regime duration negatively correlates with levels of anti-Semitism such that the longer a regime is in power, specifically after a 30-year duration (pictured in Appendix D), anti-Semitism levels correspondingly decrease. Additionally, the relevant pieces of hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are confirmed such that increasing numbers of terrorist incidents within MENA are associated with increasing levels of anti-Semitism. However, when Iraq is removed as a case, the correlation loses significance. This finding establishes an important area for further research. Future scholarly explorations into anti-Semitism should examine the Iraq case to determine why it is so influential.

The most robust and interesting finding was unexpected, negative and part of a larger finding contradictory in nature; it concerns the impact of terrorism on anti-Semitism outside of MENA. Specifically, increasing numbers of terrorist incidents outside of MENA are associated with declines in levels of anti-Semitic attitudes. This finding, while helpful in explaining the variation in anti-Semitism around the globe (hypothesis 1), refutes hypothesis 2's prediction of a globally-positive correlation and is contradictory with terrorism's positive association with anti-Semitism within MENA (when Iraq is included). It also establishes an avenue for future research. Why do heightened incidents of terrorism correlate with reduced levels of anti-Semitism outside of MENA? Researchers might examine government responses to terrorism to

determine whether the nature of the responses serve to increase sympathy for targets and, by extension, other minority groups.

That the most interesting finding was in fact negative, or a non-finding, speaks to the importance of reporting and learning from findings of non-significance. They, too, are interesting, especially when unexpected. Recognizing non-significance is not generally part of the normative process of reporting and publishing scientific findings, but it does constitute a finding and is worthy of attention (McBee and Matthews 2014). It is something that does not appear that we would expect to appear. Ignoring what are traditionally considered findings of non-significance can have deleterious impacts on research of this nature, as its underexplored past can only benefit from findings of all types. To that end, the failure of the hypotheses as they concern significant correlations between anti-Semitism and immigration, armed conflict and regime duration across the board, should not be cast aside but rather valued alongside findings of significance.

An additional interesting and contradictory finding emerged in auxiliary analyses. As highlighted in Appendix E, increasing percentages of Roman Catholics in Latin America is associated with increasing levels of anti-Semitism. The converse is also true; in regions outside of Latin America and the Caribbean, as the percentage of Roman Catholics increases, the levels of anti-Semitism decrease. This contradiction may be due to the former, official practice of the Catholic church in much of the region was to teach deicide as a principle of faith. Even though Vatican II repudiated deicide through *Nostra Aetate* and Latin America has introduced reforms in the official education concerning Jews as a result (Vann 2011), “in many of these majority Catholic countries, we know that the modern teachings of the Catholic Church rejecting the

religious-based anti-Semitic teachings of history have not necessarily filtered down into the pews” (League 2014).

Further concerning the contradictory nature of several of this study’s findings, the contradictions in findings of significance and non-significance are also largely rooted in regional differences. This points to the importance of examining phenomena like global anti-Semitism in a cross-regional way. To date, all studies focusing on the topic have been in-depth, in-country individual level analyses. While that research is useful, the broader context presented in this study is an important intervention because it brings the needed comparative lens. Future research can move beyond regional groupings in clustering variables for comparison.

This project faced several limitations. As discussed, it did not have a history of research upon which to rely and root theoretical underpinnings. Also, as discussed, the dependent variable is limiting as it both measures the outcome it seeks to explain and is sourced in an organization with what is for some a controversial activist bent. The dependent variable is also limiting because it provides us with only 101 countries and one point in time (2014) to examine. Further, I only had access to aggregate data, which is subject to aggregation bias; it would have been better to have had access to the individual-level data that the Global 100 Index collected. Additionally, the project only addresses one aspect of anti-Semitism, anti-Semitic attitudes. It does not measure the potential drivers of cross-national anti-Semitic acts, nor does it say anything about how political instability impacts other manifestations of intolerance. Future researchers might take a more comprehensive view of the ways in which anti-Semitism appears and attempt to test drivers that can explain more than one of its manifestations. Additionally, researchers can utilize data that tracks alternate forms of intolerance, like homophobia or

Islamophobia, to draw similarities and differences between drivers of those forms of hate and others, like anti-Semitism.

APPENDIX A

ADL GLOBAL 100 INDEX: COUNTRIES AND SCORES

West Bank and Gaza	93%	South Korea	53%	Romania	35%	Mongolia	26%
Iraq	92%	Panama	52%	Nicaragua	34%	Switzerland	26%
Yemen	88%	Indonesia	48%	Botswana	33%	Argentina	24%
Algeria	87%	Poland	45%	Croatia	33%	Mexico	24%
Libya	87%	Bulgaria	44%	Uruguay	33%	Trinidad and Tobago	24%
Tunisia	86%	Mauritius	44%	Bangladesh	32%	Japan	23%
Kuwait	82%	Serbia	42%	Bosnia & Herzegovina	32%	Côte D'Ivoire	22%
Bahrain	81%	Colombia	41%	Costa Rica	32%	Estonia	22%
Jordan	81%	Dominican Republic	41%	Georgia	32%	Portugal	21%
Morocco	80%	Hungary	41%	Kazakhstan	32%	China	20%
Qatar	80%	Belarus	38%	Bolivia	30%	India	20%
United Arab Emirates	80%	Peru	38%	Moldova	30%	Ireland	20%
Lebanon	78%	South Africa	38%	Russia	30%	Italy	20%
Oman	76%	Ukraine	38%	Venezuela	30%	Jamaica	18%
Egypt	75%	Azerbaijan	37%	Montenegro	29%	Brazil	16%
Saudi Arabia	74%	Chile	37%	Spain	29%	Iceland	16%
Greece	69%	France	37%	Austria	28%	Nigeria	16%
Turkey	69%	Guatemala	36%	Latvia	28%	Singapore	16%
Malaysia	61%	Lithuania	36%	Belgium	27%	Uganda	16%
Armenia	58%	Cameroon	35%	Germany	27%	Finland	15%
Iran	56%	Kenya	35%	Slovenia	27%	Ghana	15%
Senegal	53%	Paraguay	35%	Haiti	26%	Norway	15%

Australia	14%
Canada	14%
New Zealand	14%
Czech Republic	13%

Thailand	13%
Tanzania	12%
Denmark	9%
United States	9%

United Kingdom	8%
Vietnam	6%
Netherlands	5%
Sweden	4%

Philippines	3%
Laos	0.2%

Figure 4. ADL Global 100 Index: Countries and Scores

APPENDIX B

COUNTRIES BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION

Sub-Saharan Africa	Latin America and Caribbean	West	Asia + Pacific	E. Europe + W. Asia	MENA
Botswana	Argentina	US	Bangladesh	Belarus	Algeria
Cameroon	Bolivia	Canada	China	Bosnia/Herz.	Bahrain
Cote D'Ivoire	Brazil	Austria	India	Bulgaria	Egypt
Ghana	Chile	Belgium	Indonesia	Croatia	Iran
Kenya	Colombia	Denmark	Japan	Czech. Rep.	Iraq
Mauritius	Costa Rica	Finland	Laos	Estonia	Jordan
Nigeria	Dom. Rep.	France	Malaysia	Hungary	Kuwait
Senegal	Guatemala	Germany	Mongolia	Latvia	Lebanon
South Africa	Haiti	Greece	Philippines	Lithuania	Libya
Tanzania	Jamaica	Iceland	Singapore	Moldova	Morocco
Uganda	Mexico	Ireland	South Korea	Montenegro	Oman
	Nicaragua	Italy	Thailand	Poland	Qatar
	Panama	Netherlands	Vietnam	Romania	Saudi Arabia
	Paraguay	Norway		Russia	Tunisia
	Peru	Portugal		Serbia	Turkey
	<u>Trin. Tobag.</u>	Spain		Slovenia	UAE
	Uruguay	Sweden		Ukraine	Yemen
	Venezuela	Switzerland		Armenia	W. Bank/Gaza
		UK		Azerbaijan	
		Australia		Georgia	
		New Zealand		Kazakhstan	

Figure 5. Countries by Geographic Region

APPENDIX C

AUXILIARY ANALYSES

The dependent variable has significant variation across independent variable categories. I first ran simple regressions to determine the relationships between variables within each independent variable category and the dependent variable. Many of these variables will carry forward towards building a baseline regression model and assessing their impact on that model. Regarding regions of the world, I reclassified the countries measured in the index from grouping within ADL-determined regions to be in line with the United Nations-designated global regions as follows:

With West as the reference category, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean rank, on average, 11 points higher on the anti-Semitism scale, with statistical significance. Countries in Eastern Europe score, on average, 14 points higher than the West, with high statistical significance. MENA countries are highly statistically significant from Western countries, ranking an average of 59 points higher on the anti-Semitism scale. With marginal statistical significance, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are an average of 9 points higher on the anti-Semitism index. The only region with no statistically significant comparison to the West is Asia and the Pacific.

When regressing certain religious categories on the anti-Semitism measure, each percentage increase in the number of Christians is associated with a .14 increase on the ADL

scale. In other words, a 10% increase in the number of Christians leads to a 1.4 point increase on the anti-Semitism scale. Though this finding is statistically significant, it does not represent a huge effect. For each percent increase in the number of Muslims, there is a .6 increase on the anti-Semitism index, a much more impactful effect. The question presents itself as to whether the effects of the region and religion categories wash each other out, or if there are still effects when we control for each category.

When controlling for region, combining the two types of variables suggests that some of the findings concerning global anti-Semitism are related to religion. For example, when breaking out the type of Christian adherents, Christian Eastern Orthodoxy is associated with higher levels of anti-Semitism, as is general Islam. There are also regional effects such that countries in MENA and Latin America and the Caribbean are statistically significantly associated with higher levels of anti-Semitism than the West.

Continuing with the analysis of how region and religion impact levels of anti-Semitism, I ran interactions to determine the effect of religion on region. As discussed, the only other study to investigate the implications of the ADL Global 100 findings largely explained the MENA effect. When we take MENA out of the picture, are there still significant results? The first interaction speaks to this question. It asks whether the effect of increasing the share of Muslim adherents differs inside and outside of MENA. When controlling for regional presence inside and outside of MENA, the effect of the presence and increase of Muslim adherents is consistent inside and outside of the region. Where there are more Muslims, levels of anti-Semitism are higher. The interaction between the variable measuring presence inside and outside of MENA and Islamic adherence is not significant, however.

Another interaction determines whether the effect of increasing the share of Orthodox Christian adherents is different inside and outside of Eastern Europe. There is no combined additional effect of being in Eastern Europe and being an adherent of Orthodox Christianity. Increases in Orthodox Christian adherents in any region are associated with higher levels of anti-Semitic attitudes.

The next regression controls for both regime type and country location inside/outside of MENA. Here, there is an effect of regime duration, such that longer regimes are associated with declining levels of anti-Semitism. However, the MENA dummy variable alters the results concerning the regime variable's significance levels. It is important to exercise caution when attributing importance to the associations between regime duration, regime type, region and anti-Semitism because controls for MENA in this respect make a significant difference.

With this cautionary approach, I sought to test whether the effects of regime duration, regime type and region on anti-Semitism are linear. A visual plot of the regression results reveals that the effect of regime is non-linear. Because the confidence intervals measuring anti-Semitism during regimes lasting from 0-15 years are so wide, it is difficult to determine impact. However, we see that anti-Semitism levels are relatively flat during regimes that last between 15-30 years. Following 30 years of stability, anti-Semitism levels begin to decline. These effects withstand controls for a country's presence inside or outside of MENA and the type of regime that is in place.

APPENDIX D

REGIME DURATION AND ANTI-SEMITISM




Figure 6. Regime Duration and Anti-Semitism

APPENDIX E

CATHOLIC SHARE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN RELATIVE TO ANTI-SEMITISM LEVELS




Figure 7. Catholic share inside and outside of Latin America and the Caribbean relative to anti-Semitism levels

The chart demonstrates evidence such that increasing percentages of Roman Catholics in Latin America is associated with increasing levels of anti-Semitism. The converse is also true; in regions outside of Latin America and the Caribbean, as the percentage of Roman Catholics increases, the levels of anti-Semitism decrease. This is the only significant interaction between religion and region.

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