THE REPRESENTATIONS OF INDONESIANNESS
IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA (1998-2016)

by

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This study’s central question is how is nationalism defined and reproduced after the collapse of Suharto’s New Order in 1998? This study focuses specifically on the contested official narratives in post-Suharto Indonesia during its transition and consolidation to democracy. I argue that there are more than one narrative of the nation emerging in the post-New Order official narratives. Using narrative analysis in selected citizenship education textbooks published between 1998 and 2016 in Indonesian higher education, I found three narratives of the nation: 1. state-centered, 2. citizens-centered, and 3. ummah-centered narratives. The three narratives revise, counter, and offer a different insight from that of the New Order militaristic narrative. The three narratives, outlined above, redefine the meaning of the first principle of Pancasila to emphasize the piousness of the nation and Pancasila’s fourth principle to underline Indonesian new democracy. Whereas the state-centered narrative calls for the implementation of Pancasila democracy, the citizens-centered narrative emphasizes the building of democracy. In addition, the ummah-centered narrative underscores a truly Muslim society.

I also argue that the process of reproducing nationalism in post Suharto Indonesia needs to take account of its transition from authoritarian to more democratic context. Using thematic narrative analysis, I generated information from in-depth interviews with publishers, authors, educators, and students to highlight textbook reproduction and usage. My study further shows that the three narratives are shaped within the intertwining dualism of national education, a complex process, in which actors collaborate and compete; existing ideas are rejected as well as adapted; textbooks’ writing and publication follow market demand while at the same time pay attention to government regulation; and students’ stories are fluidly shaped not only by their reference to textbooks in educational setting, but also to diverse sources of information in their everyday interactions. In a broader sociological discussion, the three contesting official narratives reveal not only tensions in citizenship education, but also mark the emergence of a new nationalism in post New Order Indonesia.
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PREFACE

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 NATIONALISM IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA

Although modern national institution is not immune to global and local challenges, there is still no strong evidence that it is withering away in a foreseeable future. The proliferation of nation-states in the last two hundred years (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010) and the perpetuation of the myth of nationalism through commemoration, rituals, and narratives (Bouchard 2013) indicate the enduring modern nationalism in the current digitalized global age. The persisting current nation-states, however, face different challenges from their older versions and “the ideological and symbolic centrality of the nation-state” is hardly unchallenged (Eisenstadt 2000:17).

Mary Kaldor (2004) identifies three characters of global challenges that affect the emergence of new nationalisms. First, the increasing information-based economy has lessened the earlier “territorially based industrial production” (2004:166). Consequently, the marginalization of the “classic industrial worker”, who previously was the main supporter of the nationalist ideology, intensifies. Second, massive changes in economic mode of production are accompanied by the emergence of “new global virtual communities” and “local communities” (2004:166). The later suggests that new multiple sources of information may work to shape a new way of imagining communities. Finally, two main forms of “the revival of nationalism” or
new nationalism, that include new militancy and cosmopolitanism, have replaced “an ideological vacuum” following the collapse of the blocs (2004:167). Whereas cosmopolitanism combines “humanism with a celebration of human diversity” (2004:174); the new militancy emphasizes exclusivity, embracing both modern and anti-modern, of which organization and strategies are both transnational and local. These features can be seen in “terrorism, ‘new wars’, American high-tech wars” (2004:167), and in the ideology of the global Islam\(^1\), in which the use of symbolic violence (2004:170) is accompanied by the central strategy of eliminating or exterminating the ‘other’ (2004:171).

The emerging new nationalism, however, does not seem to suggest the vanishing of modern nationalism. Studies have highlighted changes in at least two features. First, as a political and cultural form, nationhood is institutionalized among and within states (Brubaker 1998:16). Besides its capability to maintain its authority within the global order (Sassen 1998), the national governance still works as “a sorting device”, and as “a basic operator in a widespread system of social classification” in an extensive system of social arrangement (Verdery 1996: 4997 to 5001 of 7466, kindle edition). In short, as Bouchard (2013) suggests, the nation “…still possesses an amazing ability to redefine itself and to adapt to new environments” (2013:285).

Second, one of the enduring myths, that the state\(^2\) and the nation\(^3\) should overlap, is constantly being reproduced. For example, as Anderson puts it, whereas the nation finds in the

\(^1\) Kaldor identifies three elements that mark this ideology: “the global character of the discourse…, the focus on spectacular violence…, much more preoccupied with political mobilization than with specific goals” (2004:172). Kaldor further highlights insecurity and frustration characterizing actors of this new nationalism resulted from dramatic structural changes across the globe.

\(^2\) Adopting from Giddens, I understand the state as “…a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries, its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence” (Giddens 1985:120 in Billig 1995:20).

\(^3\) I also borrow from Anderson, the notion that the nation is an imagined community. It is limited, as the boundaries of a nation is drawn distinct from other nations (Anderson 2006:6). Also, in this image, the community is
state an instrument for its autonomy, the state fills its need for its modern legitimation in the nation (2004:477). By politically utilizing “the symbol nation through discourse and political activity” and mobilizing people sentiments to respond to the use of the symbol, the nation is a central tool for linking the state to its subjects within its national boundaries (Verdery 1996: location 5017 of 7466, kindle edition). Charles Tilly (1994) specifically highlighted the myth of the inevitable linked between the state and the nation as the following:

“…nations — large, culturally homogeneous, connected populations of common origin and destination — exist, and states should correspond to nations. Such a correspondence can form in two different ways: through a state's creation of a nation, or through a nation's acquisition of a state. State-led nationalism advocates the first path, …State-seeking nationalism advocates the second path…” (Tilly 1994:251).

As in other parts of the globe, modern nationalism in Southeast Asia is not only possible, but also enduring (Reid 2010; Brown 2006). Besides closely linked to the role of print capitalism that altered the understanding of time and the “modes of apprehending the world” that made possible the thinking about the nation (Anderson 2006:22); its emergence in the region was marked by “the revolutionary alchemist” (Reid 2010: 212 of 6883 in kindle edition). By this, Reid refers to the request for the immediate building of the modern nation state within the imperial borders, that was accompanied by the demand for the “sovereignty of the people”, always conceived of as “a deep, horizontal comradeship”, despite perhaps its members never known each other and despite the existing inequality and exploitation (2006:7).
which necessitated “the equality of citizens under a unified and centralized state” (Reid 2010: 212 of 6883 in kindle edition).

Several studies have identified types of nationalism fostered in Southeast Asia. Reid (2010) identifies four different types: ethnie nationalism\textsuperscript{4}, state nationalism, anti-imperial nationalism, and outrage at state humiliation (OSH). Other authors outline three different kinds, ethnocultural, civic, and multicultural nationalisms, that are not mutually exclusive as nationalist contestation is more and more focused on “the tensions between civic, ethno-cultural and multiculturalist constructions of national identity” (Brown 2006:470).

Informed by the previous discussions on nationalism, this study focuses on the reproduction of modern nationalism in Indonesia. Amidst the process of changing a global landscape that calls for the erosion of the authority of the state while at the same time necessitating the operation of international regime through the nation-state itself (Sassen 1998), Indonesia has entered a more democratic political system since 1998, and soon followed by regional autonomy in 2000. As the home for around 633 major ethnic groups\textsuperscript{5}, who reside in more than 13,000 islands; the issue of fragmentation and the break of Indonesia during the democratic transition, has prompted the reemerging quest for Indonesian nationalism. As such, this study makes the effort to understand the reproduction of the changing nationalism in the democratic Muslim majority nation-state, focusing on the emerging contested official narratives

\textsuperscript{4} Following Smith, Reid proposes to “…avoid the term ‘nation’ except as used by its advocates, as too profoundly emotive and ambiguous to be helpful in analysis. I will follow Smith in labelling a group which imagines itself kin as an ethnie and its political assertiveness as ethnie nationalism. By contrast the strong identities which modern states have been able to evoke through education, state ritual and the media I will call state nationalism” (Reid 2010: 267-273 of 6883 kindle edition).

of the nation in post-Suharto\textsuperscript{6} Indonesia during the transition and consolidation to democracy between 1998 and 2016.

1.2 THE QUEST FOR REDEFINING NATIONALISM IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA

Democratic movements, internal fragmentation in Suharto’s inner circle (Hadiz 2000:21), and an economic crisis in 1997 led to Suharto’s early resignation\textsuperscript{7} as the president of the Republic of Indonesia on May 21, 1998, after more than 30 years of his militaristic authoritarian rule. The political deed was a surprise for most Indonesians as well as foreign observers. Despite various movements for democracy since the mid-1990s, increasing disappointment among many Indonesians, and the estimate of political analysts that Suharto would eventually step down from power; only a handful foresaw Indonesian’s transformation to democracy (Kunkler 2013; Liddle 2001). As Liddle (2001) puts it, the successor government was more likely a renewed authoritarianism led by the armed forces than democracy. Such account is also expressed by Tornquist (2001) in August 1998:

“The more likely outcome, therefore, is rather a military supported ‘bad guy democracy’, within which incumbent bosses on various levels are able to survive, pull in military and business allies, co-opt some dissidents, and mobilize mass-

\textsuperscript{6} In this dissertation I use the term post-Suharto and post-New Order interchangeably. Both refer to the period after the regime change in 1998, when Suharto, after more than 30 years in power, stepped down following democratization movement since the early 1990s.

\textsuperscript{7} Suharto announced his stepping down from power only a year after his fifth appointment in office. He transferred his power to BJ Habibie, his vice president, who acted as the ad-interim president for only a year until the 1999 general election for a new president.
support through Islamic populism—all well before genuine democratic activists
and ordinary people manage to organize themselves” (Tornquist 2001:66).

Three groups identified as the possible forces to potentially overthrow democratic transition are the military, violent Islamists and territorial secessionist (Künkler and Stepan 2013). Despite such pessimism, however, the shift of power from Suharto to the vice president BJ Habibie seemed very promising for democracy in Indonesia (Kunkler 2013; Liddle 2001). The resigning of Suharto was soon followed by constitutional changes, replacement of the centralized authoritarian regime by a democratic political system, substitution of administrative decentralization by regional autonomy, limiting of the role of military in politics and civil society, increasing freedom of the media, and the forming of more than a hundred new political parties. Concerning the later, from only three political parties during the New Order regime, there were about 180 political parties named by early 1999, 150 later registered, and 48 met the requirements for the first democratic elections in June 1999 (Hadiz 2000:16). At the same time, not only did the elites of Golkar, the semi-state political party dominating the political arena in New Order regime, agree to equally join the contest in the genuinely democratic election in 1999; but armed forces leaders also accepted to withdraw their influence on Golkar (Liddle 2001:2). The democratic transition was accomplished by 2005, and there were good signs of democratic consolidation in 2011 (Kunkler 2013). The 2014 presidential and legislature elections further have convinced many that the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia has taken place.

At least three indicators make up the feature of what democratic post-New Order Indonesia looks like. First, the post-New Order has witnessed the re-emerging debates on the relationship between religion and the state. Soon after Suharto stepped down from power in
1998, in the first national assembly meeting (MPR), \textit{Pancasila}\(^8\) was preserved as Indonesian national ideology. Later, in 2002, prior to the national assembly meeting, the United Development Party (\textit{Partai Persatuan Pembangunan}, PPP), the Crescent Star Party (\textit{Partai Bulan Bintang}, PBB), the Daulatul Ummah faction (PDU), and the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) brought the old demand for an Islamic state. They attempted to insert the seven words “with the obligation for adherents to implement the shari’ah Islam” in the article 29 of the Constitution (Raillon 2011:101). Yet, \textit{Golkar}, PDIP, the military representatives, and two major Muslims organizations --Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah-- dismissed this attempt before the annual session began (Raillon 2011; Mujani 2009; Picard 2011:18; Liddle 2013).

Secondly, despite the Islamists’ attempt to win public support, the results of the national legislative assembly and presidential elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014, indicate that Indonesian Muslims support more secular parties and presidents. The votes for the Islamist parties (PPP and PKS), for example, decreased from fifteen in 2004 to thirteen percent in 2009 and 2014. The same trend is visible among the Islamic organization-based parties (PKB and PAN). Their votes decreased from seventeen percent in 2004 to only eleven percent in 2009 and thirteen percent in the 2014. In addition, support for the moderate Islamists (PBR and PPP) decreases from around nine percent in 2004 to almost seven percent in 2009, and around ten percent of voters support radical Islamist parties (PKS and PBB) (Barton 2010; Fiona 2015). In contrary, support for more secular parties slightly increased (Barton 2010, Mujani 2009) from forty-eight percent for Golkar, PDI-P, and PD in the 2004 parliament national election to forty-nine percent in 2009 (Mujani 2009). In 2014, the numbers again increased to fifty-six percent for PDI-P, Golkar, Gerindra, and PD. In addition, in the 2009 presidential election, none of the six pairs of

\(^8\) Pancasila means five principles, including the belief in God, humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice.
candidates nominated for president and vice president were from Islamic parties (Mujani 2009). The same preference is visible in 2014, when Joko Widodo, who was hitherto the major of Solo and then the governor of Jakarta (the capital city of Indonesia), won the election from his rival, Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, once a son in law of Suharto. As Fiona and Nyoto-Feillard (2015) note, both candidates represented voters’ polarization in their support for new versus old power as well as between supporters of a more Islamic society and a more secular one. Apparently, the rivalry continued during the 2017 governor election, in Jakarta, before Subianto’s supported candidates Anis Baswedan and Sandiago Uno won the election from their competitors, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama and Djarot Saiful Hidayat. The victory of the prior candidates would not be possible without their success in mobilizing people’s sentiments along the binary opposition of Muslim vis a vis non-Muslim and native vis a vis non-native.

Finally, during the transition to democracy, it became very obvious that support for democracy came from moderate Muslims leaders and thinkers (e.g. Nurcholis Majid, Amin Rais, Abdur-Rahman Wahid, etc.), and organizations (such as Nahdathul Ulama) (Kersten 2015, Barton 2010, Eliraz 2004, Heffner 2005). The fundamentalist and radical groups\(^9\) did exist, yet they were considered a minority and thus, did not gain popularity among moderate Muslims (Barton 2010, Eliraz 2004, Heffner 2005, Heffner 2011b).

The three political features above seem to support the argument that the pendulum of Indonesian politics swings in a more secular direction (Barton 2010). Yet, post-New Order Indonesia is also marked by the implementation of sharia at the provincial level in Aceh (Salim 2008) and the enactment of sharia-based law at national as well as sub-national levels (Raillon 2011).

\(^9\) These groups include Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, Islamic Group or community), Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Dependent Front), Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian Jihad Fighter Council), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, Indonesian Party of Liberation) (Liddle 2013:32).
The failure to influence the implementation of sharia at the national level through the amendment of the constitution has led the focus of Islamizing society at the local level (Hefner 2011a). Several studies reveal that religion serves as an important factor influencing local attitudes to support local – and national leaders (Aspinall 2011; Hauser-Schäublin 2011; Karim 2008; van Klinken 2003). Such undermining of the secular state “from below” (Raillon 2011) inevitably marks the shifting in the national government policy from what was considered a more secular to a more accommodative to Islamists’ demand. Sharia enforcement on public behavior at district level in Indonesia has already taken place due to the attempts of Islamists such as Hizbut Tahrir, Mujahidin Council (MMI), and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (Raillon 2011) as well as supports from more secular parties (Hefner 2011a). As Picard (2011) notes, there was a shift in their tactic, “While in the past the aim of the Muslim parties was to set up an Islamic state, now their strategy appears to be to take over the state by establishing an Islamic society” (2011:18).

Moreover, the National Commission for Women (2010) has classified the implementation of 154 sharia-based local regulations among which thirty-eight criminalize women, twenty-one control women’s bodies, nine limit the freedom of religion for Ahmadiyah followers, eighty-two regulate religion-based activities, and four rule migrant workers (the National Commission for Women 2010). More precisely, besides, fifty three of 470 districts in Indonesia implement sharia norms for banning alcohol, gambling, women in public area after dark, and regulating the closure of public roads during Friday prayers, dress codes for women, and Koranic literacy for candidates in local election and for couples before married (Hefner 2011a, Raillon 2011).
In addition, the official council of Islamic group’s (MUI) fatwas, an organization that was supported by the New Order regime, among other things has prohibited pluralism, liberalism, and secularism in religious teachings in 2005 (Künkler and Stepan 2013; Raillon 2011). The legislation has also passed the 2003 education law, that explicitly regulates religious education nationally (Sterkens and Yusuf 2015) and Pornographic Bill (Raillon 2011; Buehler 2015), that raised concerns from many groups. The Pornographic Bill was supported not only by Islamic forces, but also by Golkar, a party that people associate with seculars and nationalists (Raillon 2011; Buehler 2015). As Raillon (2011) notes, Megawati presidency, who was considered secular and from a very popular more secular party (PD or Democratic Party), formulated a presidential decision to form a council consisting of several ministries and local governments to act against pornography.

Since the early 2000s, Islam was more visible in the public sphere. The more Islamic appearance in post-New Order Indonesia, in the early years of the transition to democracy, was combined with various ethnic and religious conflicts partly as the legacy of Suharto’s New Order (Bertrand 2004, Colombijn 2003, Heffner 2005, van Klinken 2003). Bloody conflicts in several provinces and cities were also accompanied by the identity politics at national and sub-national levels (Aspinall 2011a, Aspinall 2011b) and the decentralization of power to a regional/local level of governance (Hadiz 2010, Nordholt 2003, Nordholt 2008). For instance, Means (2009) shortly describes these troubling conflicts as follows:

“[M]ass violence erupted in East Timor involving army operations and army-backed militia units mounting operations to crush the East Timor independence movement led by the Fretlin movement. In Ambon, Muslim and Christians communities became entangled in open conflicts in November 1998 that became
[deadlier] when some police and army units joined with Muslims militia forces to attack Christian communities and their militia forces in Maluku and Poso”

(Means 2009:292)

In more neutral terms, Indonesian democracy witnesses the enhancement of religion-based expression and practices. On the one hand, as a survey among 1500 university students in Ambon and Yogyakarta on support for ethno-religious violence in Indonesia reveals, that “religious identification is stronger than ethnic identification” (Subagya 2015:224). On the other hand, religion is also considered central to bridge the “cross-ethnic coalition building and appeals” (Aspinall 2011:53). As Muslims make up most of the population10, Islam may become a more important source of values for defining Indonesia, suggesting the important role of Indonesian Islam for democracy (Heffner 2000).

A deeper analysis on public opinions and on what took place behind legislations processes provide a more nuanced picture of Indonesia’s transition and consolidation to democracy. The surveys on public opinion among Indonesian Muslims suggest that there is a dilemma between support for a more inclusive system and commitment to sharia. For example, in a 2006 survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) at the Hidayatullah National Islamic University of Jakarta, among 940 Muslim educators and 1000 Muslims, the majority (86 percent and 72 percent respectively) supported democracy and civil rights; yet, respondents also agreed with the campaigns for implementing Islamic law (64 percent of Muslims educators and 56 percent of Muslims) (Hefner 2010). Similarly, at the broader level, an earlier report by Gallup World Poll on Islam and Democracy reveals that while Indonesian

Muslims support an inclusive political system, 68 percent of the respondents supported sharia (among which 14 percent agreed that sharia must be the only source of legislation, while the other 54 percent support sharia as a source of legislation although not the only one) (Mogahed 2006). A later survey by Pepinski, Liddle, and Mujani (2012) suggests further that support to the Islamic parties, among other things, is related to whether favorable economic policy is available.

Indeed, among Muslim thinkers in Indonesia, competing ideals, values, and ideologies are not new (Kersten 2015; Abdullah 2013; Assyaukanie 2009). Conflicting demands for more secular vis-a-vis more Islamic visions of society are highly visible in discourses on the relation between religion and the state. They have highlighted the defeat of Islam in the early years of the nation state (1945-1955) (Abdullah 2013); the “domestication of Islam” (Brenner 2011) during the first twenty years of Suharto New Order regime (1971-1980s); the return of Islam in Indonesian politics particularly in 1990s (Assyaukanie 2009, Effendy 2003, Liddle 1996; Ramage 1995); and the increased visibility of Islam in post-New Order Indonesia’s public sphere (Abdullah 2011, Brenner 2011, Effendy 2003, Rinaldo 2010; Hadiz 2010).

Not surprisingly, emerging fundamentalist Islamic groups after the collapse of New Order regime raised various responses from analysts. Some described it more as merely additional groups that color the proliferation of conflicting ideas to the existing modernist (or reformist) and traditionalist Muslim organizations (Abdullah 2011, Hefner 2011a). Another author conceives their contested views as the clash of civilization among Muslim groups:

“The liberal and the moderate may continue to preach the idea of tolerance but the radical and the fundamentalists have become more restless in facing the growing pluralities in the style of life, social behavior and naturally the attitude toward life and religion. They could hardly let any symbol and sign of pluralities
of whatever form and function are simply taken as what they are without controversy, how mild it may take” (Abdullah 2011:222).

In addition, there is a concern that a “conservative and rigid interpretation of Islam” is employed by various forces to ideologically justify their struggle to power (Hadiz 2010:140 of 3255 kindle edition). Liddle also notes, in promoting pro-sharia agenda, the more radical groups “have become skilled at persuading otherwise moderate Muslims that the Islamist position on a given issue is one that all Muslims must accept as Islam” (2013:42).

Among Indonesians, the unprecedented changes during the transition to democracy have consequently raised concerns about the future of the nation, prompting the quest for redefining who we are as a nation. As nationalism is an inherent part of Indonesia’s identity and political tradition (Aspinall 2016; Leifer 2000; Morfit 1984; Morfit 1981), the question is no longer whether Indonesian nationalism persists, but instead, how in post-New Order Indonesia it is re-defined and what kind of nationalism it would be.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Indonesia’s transition to democracy since 1998 has opened political opportunities for social and political organizations to articulate and express their visions. The new cultural and political junctures have broadened venues for more diverse state and non-state actors to shape discourses of the nation. Between 1998 and 2001, Habibie’s and Wahid’s government respectively lifted press suppression and cancelled the banning of books (Watson 2005). Although the openness of the media is still debated, it is difficult to deny that the media currently
operates in a far more unperturbed atmosphere (Nyman 2006). Mass cultural productions, including popular books, newspapers, and magazines also increased. The publications of ‘the classic works of the left’ and critics about the New Order regime and its cronies are in abundance (Heryanto 2007). In addition, religious publications were unprecedentedly proliferated, particularly by the Islamic publishers that shifted their policy from merely focusing on Islamic-related content to broader areas of discussions (Watson 2005).

Thus, the emphasis on the role of the state in controlling culture particularly in language policies and education becomes an exaggeration (Kaldor 2004). Although the nation-state is still a central “vehicle of myths” (Bouchard 2013:285), it is now difficult to see it as the only key actor in the reproduction of nationalism. Others include the political parties, the private or business organizations (Schudson 1994:72), and intellectuals (Wood 2013; Eyerman 2011), who embrace a social role for “articulating ideas, including problems and their solutions, in public discourses” (Eyerman 2011:455). As Brown suggests, nationalism is deployed both by state and non-state actors (2006:461).

I set this dissertation to understand the process of reproduction of nationalism in the educational sphere, where the official narratives of the nation and of the ideal citizen have changed substantially post-1998. As national textbook remains a significant medium through which nationalist narratives are conveyed (Lerch, Russell, and Ramirez 2017), it provides insight of how the nation is represented. In addition, textbooks convey messages about what a society should recognize as legitimate and truthful, thus shaping a major reference point for what knowledge, culture, belief, and morality really are (Inglis, 1985:22-23 in Apple 1992: 5). In addition, unlike in self-narratives, moral meanings articulated in written narratives are deliberately inscribed for readers with the expectations that the latter would know, understand,
and embrace the intended “insights about the world” (Hinchman and Hinchman 1997 in Rodriguez and Fortier 2007:7). Thus, the entire curriculum can be seen as "both the text and context in which production and values intersect; it is the twist point of imagination and power” (Inglis, 1985:142 in Apple, 1992:7).

Under the New Order rule, texts on national ideology were only published by government institutions; whereas in post-New Order period, not only does the government simplify the process of publishing textbooks, it also encourages government and non-government-funded publication of textbooks. As such, in response to the task of understanding the reproduction of nationalism in post-New Order Indonesia, this study sets the following research questions:

(1) How do textbooks represent the nation and the ideal citizen in post-Suharto Indonesia?

(2) How do educators, writers, publishers, and students shape discourses of Indonesianness?

(3) How do multiple representations of the nation and the ideal citizen emerge in official narratives in post-Suharto Indonesia?

This dissertation aims to demonstrate the contested meanings of the nation in post-New Order Indonesia’s official representations of the nation. In broader sociological discussions, the aim of this study is to highlight the work of cultural memory in elucidating the emerging new nationalism in a Muslim majority nation-state during its transition and consolidation to democracy.

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11 The government funds individuals and team of authors, that make possible the availability of numerous textbooks of various subjects at all levels of education. Many of these publications are available both in print edition and accessible online at the ministry of education website.
The dissertation consists of six chapters and after this introduction, chapter two outlines the significance of theories of cultural memory for understanding the reproduction of nationalism. Chapter three includes a discussion of the methodological issues of conceiving the nation as a narration. Central in this chapter is a discussion concerning the rationality of focusing on official narratives and how citizenship education textbooks in higher education are the appropriate source of data for understanding official narrative of the nation. Moreover, this chapter includes discussion on the methods for data collection and analysis, as well as issues concerning the quality of this study. In chapter four, the discussion centers on multiple narratives in post-New Order Indonesian Citizenship Education textbooks. Chapter five elucidates the enduring dualism of education within the political and cultural contexts that shape multiple narratives in post-New Order Indonesia. The concluding chapter outlines gaps in the previous discussions on nationalism in post-Suharto Indonesia and the novelty of this study, before highlighting venues for further studies.
2.0 THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE NATION

Contextualizing the current study within the existing sociological theoretical landscape, this chapter outlines the discussions on the significance of theories of cultural memory for understanding the process of meaning-making in reproducing nationalism. Various studies have discussed what makes possible the persistence of nationalism. Among other things, these include war (Tilly 1995; Marvin & Ingle 1999 in Wimmer 2014), state’s political socialization, political discourse, and the reproduction of nationalism in everyday lives (Billig 1995; Ichijo and Ranta 2016). In the following discussion, I highlight the reproduction of nationalism, shaped and conveyed through narratives, where narrative itself is a representation (Hall 1997, Hashimoto 2015). Focusing on the political and cultural shifts in Indonesia, I demonstrate the limit of perceiving nationalism as an ideology, and alternatively propose to conceive nationalism as a narrative of the nation. I later demonstrate the significance of the theory of cultural memory in understanding the shifting meanings of Indonesian nationalism.
2.1 REPRODUCING NATIONALISM: CULTURAL MEMORY AND THE NARRATIVE OF THE NATION

The concept of memory can be traced back to Durkheimian tradition, particularly developed by Maurice Halbwach (1992). Accordingly, the work of memory is central in the process of reproducing society, binding individuals and their society (Halbwachs 1992). When individuals remember, what they recall is “an image of the past which is in accord, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society” (Halbwachs 1992:40). Thus, remembering is a social activity; individual only remembers when others do: “…it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories” (Halbwachs 1992:38). Thus, as Misztal highlights, what individuals remember “is always a ‘memory of an intersubjective past, of past time lived in relation to other people’” (Misztal, 2003:6). It is through collective events, rituals and ceremonies that the key values in society are symbolically affirmed (Eyerman 2004; Schudson 1994). They provide “a cognitive map” for individuals and collectives to help them orient “who they are, why they are here and where they are going” (Eyerman 2004:161). In this sense, through social recalling of the past, individuals find their location in society (Halbwach 1992).

In the modern nation-state, memory ensures “the reproduction and cohesion of a given social and political order” (Misztal 2010:28). For example, elections are intended not only to legitimate state power but also to “reaffirm the intimate connections of individuality to the society as a whole and to the state” (Schudson 1994:74). Memory also allows the understanding of “…the world and a set of values and beliefs about the world” that make possible the shaping of collective identities and boundaries, including national, cultural, ethnic or religious identities (Kaldor 2010:27-28). More specifically, memory works can “…articulate or consolidate identity,
validate or deny the identity of others, celebrate or mourn past events, or establish claims to
agency, justice, or nationhood—serving both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ causes, resulting in triumphant and

As an active social process of “sense making through time” (Olick and Levy 1997:932 in
Misztal 2010:27), remembering can be seen as “the ways in which people make sense of the
present by recalling and engaging with the past” (West 2016:455). Thus, “The acts of memory”
is significant in constructing and reconstructing identities, through the process of “remembering
who one was and by setting this past Self in relation to the present Self” (Erll and Ansgar
2010:6). Because it provides a narrative frame that “unifies the group through time and over
space” (Kaldor 2004:161), allowing the construction of past experiences that are meaningful for
the present-day, memory is significant in the process of manufacturing collective identity.

Yet, in memory studies, remembering is not the only process that is deemed significant
for the construction and the preservation of national solidarity and identity, reconciliation, and
for creating equality in democratic society (Misztal 2010:32-33). Perhaps the most striking view
on the significance of forgetting for the nation is Ernest Renan’s (1990) claim: “Yet the essence
of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten
different meanings of forgetting and their purposes. One is a repressive erasure, closely related to
totalitarian regimes, which may repudiate historical rupture and convey a historical break
(2008:60). Another is forgetting, that is considered “to be in the interests of all parties to the
previous dispute” and (2008:61) the act of forgetting that may be publicly acknowledged to
avoid revenges that may occur in response to remembering the past. The third type is forgetting
that is constitutive in “a set of tacitly shared silences” for constructing newly shared memories
(2008:63) for the formation of a new identity. The fourth, the structural amnesia, refers to a situation when “a person tends to remember only those links in his or her pedigree that are socially important” (2008:64). The fifth meaning is forgetting as an annulment, when the storing of memory is possible yet there is a need to discard it (2008:65). The sixth is forgetting as planned obsolescence, formed into the capitalist system of consumption (2008:67). Finally, forgetting as humiliated silence, when the horrendous and humiliated past are “covert, unmarked and unacknowledged” (Connerton 2008:68).

Thus, rather than positioning remembering versus forgetting, memory studies have highlighted the importance of the dialectical relation of remembering and forgetting (Misztal 2010). As Misztal puts it, balancing solidarity and cohesion in a democratic society sometimes does not only require “the generosity of forgetfulness” but also “the honesty of remembrance” (Misztal 2005:1328). By taking account of the significance of forgetting and remembering, memory is better equipped for explaining the process of the reproduction of nationalism, particularly in assigning meanings upon ‘who we are’ as a nation as well as for highlighting the idea of the nation as a way of constructing meanings (Hall 1996:612 in Wodak 2009:22).

National memories are inevitably the product of the internal catastrophe of the state in the age of globalization (Levy and Sznaider, 2006 in Misztal 2010:40). Thus, although as the conveyors of globalization, the nation states take the responsibility to guarantee the continuity of national memories, these memories are also shaped in the context of denationalized memories (Misztal 2010). Here, the use of cultural memory for understanding the reproduction of nationalism entails the assumption that memory battles are possible, recognizing the existing multiple perspectives on the past (Zerubavel 2003: 2243 of 2555). Thus, as Hashimoto posits, “memory work does not produce a monolithic and consensual culture but a divided public
discourse” (Hashimoto 2015:2618 of 5481 kindle edition). In addition, the past does not automatically impose the present, nor vice versa, but instead, the shape of cultural memory involves “a continuous negotiation between past and present” (Olick and Levy 1997:937).

The concept of cultural memory also allows one to highlight strategies that narrators use in constructing their narratives. Through narratives, narrators reveal conceptions of themselves, their relation to others, their view of the world, and where they localize themselves in it (Bruner 1991). Ricoeur (1991) has used the concept of narrative identity, referring to “the kind of identity that human beings acquire through the mediation of the narrative function” (1991:188). Thus, it is understandable that narrative includes various kinds of self-representations from everyday oral storytelling Riessman 2008), autobiography (Bruner 1991), individual self-stories (Polkinghorne 1991), history (White 1980, White 1987, Wood 2005), to fictional narratives (Bhabha 1990, Bhabha 1994).

Referring to narrative as “every text that tells a story” (Brockmeier 2002:32), that has “moral tales - how the world should be” (Riessman 2008:1), nationalism can also be seen as “a way of constructing meanings which influences and organizes both our actions and our conception of ourselves” (Wodak et. al. 2009:23). In defining a nation as a narrative, Homi Bhabha (1994) writes:

“In the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative. It is through this process of splitting that the conceptual ambivalence of modern society becomes the site of writing the nation” (Bhabha 1994:146).
Accordingly, the “incompleteness of signification” of the nation makes possible the negotiation of the meanings assigned by cultural and political authority (Bhabha 1990:1-2). This conception provides the possibility to highlight “the cultural boundaries of the nation”, containing “thresholds of meaning that must be crossed, erased, and translated in the process of cultural production” (Bhabha 1990:1-2) through which “the narrative of the nation is remembered, reoriented, and reproduced” (2015:1863 of 5481). Bhabha also briefly mentions “counter-narratives of the nation” (1994:149), referring to the movement that “continually evoke and erase” both the totalizing boundaries and the essentialist ideology of the nation. Conceiving the nation as a narrative also allows the acknowledgement of narrative’s ambiguity that provides a study on nationalism with a useful analytical tool to interrogate the process of meaning making of what is so called nationalism and national identity.

Most importantly, in the narrative of the nation, the use of the past is not only limited to defining the meaningful present, but also the future. Here, the concept of myth is relevant, and it can be defined as:

“…collective representations conveying a large array of meanings, and more precisely, a set of ideals, beliefs, and values expressed in symbols (object, places, events, individuals). The core attribute of those representations is to be endowed with a kind of sacredness and to a large extent, to impose themselves on the mind” (Bouchard 2013:277).

12 Concerning this Wodak et al (2009) highlight, “National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about the nation with which we can identify; these are contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present with its past, and imagines which are constructed of it” (2009:23).
Bouchard (2013) suggests the significance of mythmaking in the process of reproducing “state-seeking nationalism” and “state-led nationalism” (Tilly 1994:251). Myth does not only function to shape the story of “where we came from”, but it can also work as a compass, pointing to “where we are heading” (Anderson 2004:160). In the following discussion, I direct the attention to how the framework of nation as narrative is useful for highlighting post-Suharto Indonesia’s official narratives of the nation, and how the work of cultural memory is significant for understanding the representation of the nation in post-New Order Indonesia.

2.2 THE SHIFTING CONTEXTS OF THE NARRATIVE OF THE NATION

The unprecedented and unpredictable fundamental political and cultural changes beneath the apparent success of the transition from Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime to post-New Order democratic rules since 1998 raise concerns among political analysts and elites in Indonesia. Riswanda Imawan (2003), for example, pointed to the emerging communalism and social disorder, the use of collective violence for political bargains, disintegration, and ethno-nationalism that endanger the spirit of the Indonesian nationhood and challenge the building of civil society. He also expresses his concern about the implementation of the law No. 22/1999 on local government that has limited the mobilization of local elites to the national stage, which may ultimately cause the return of military power into politics. According to Imawan, despite public aversion to the military in the early reform movement, the hitherto social and political dynamics would drive people to perceive military as their heroes (2003:5). This particular angst is partly due the fact that “the military "territorial structure", which allows military to intervene in governmental affairs at all levels including the villages, remains unscathed (Crouch 1999 in
Hadiz 2000:18), making it a dormant structure that potentially can be used for controlling and mobilizing people.

In addition, there is a concern pertaining to the process of re-organizing power at local level through the decentralization of policy and the works of local electorate democracy in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Hadiz (2010), for example, perceives this process as “problematic and contentious” (Hadiz 2010:173 of 3255 kindle edition). He identifies four groups of elites that work as the main old local players in the post-Suharto Indonesia, including former New Order elites (old bureaucrats and local entrepreneurs), gangsters, and political operators. Hadiz’s concern is that decentralization process may produce domains for contesting local elites for controlling institutions and resources. Consequently, rather than empowering local people, they instead operate as “local predatory coalitions of power” through money politics and political violence (2010:1226 of 3255 kindle edition).

The sign of apprehension is also palpable among military and other Suharto’s supporters. One source of this fear is the possible returning issues of the 1965 killings prior to the emergence of Suharto’s New Order regime. The anticipation for “a reopening of this past” has already taken place in the late New Order period visible from the attempt of Military and NU circles, that “had begun to moderate the previously celebratory tone in publications canvassing their respective roles in the killings” (McGregor 2009:203). Of course, as Hadiz (2006) notes, long repressed voices including the communist’s suspects, their children, former leftist military officers and their families, have stepped forward to tell their stories of the 1960s that challenged the New Order’s official narrative (2006:555).

In addition, another concern emerges in response to shifts in values and ideology. As Susan Brenner (2011) eloquently describes, democratization in Indonesia: “…raises pressing
questions about the values that the nation should embrace; the laws, institutions, and practices that it should foster or condemn; and the ideal type of citizenship that it should endorse—all of which involve morality at some level” (Brenner 2011:486-487). The observation is not an exaggeration. Nordholt (2006) has noted the sense of uncertainty from his interviewed in North Sumatera in 2005:

“During the New Order life was relatively easy. The government was responsible, and we were told what to do and what to think. That was not very democratic, but it was safe. That is no longer the case. Today, democracy forces us to think for ourselves and to take our own responsibility. That is new, difficult and sometimes frightening” (Nordholt 2006:3).

The quest for re-orienting Indonesia as the result of the uncertainty during the democratic transition by 2005 and the democratic consolidation in 2011, prompted efforts to redefine national ideology. For example, Leifer (2000) reveals various sentiments of nationalism in Indonesia and identifies alterations in the ways in which nationalism is expressed in three regime changes. In 1960s, Sukarno’s romantic nationalism aimed to justify Indonesian’s confrontation to Malaysia and redefine the national boundaries. Later, in the case of the West New Guinea, Sukarno used nationalism to maintain his domestic power (2000:161). Under Suharto’s New Order, civic nationalism was deployed for politically undermining the Islamic groups’ version of national identity. Suharto also used ethnic nationalism in the attempt to incorporate East Timor to Indonesia’s territory (2000:159). Interestingly, in the early post-New Order Indonesia, nationalism re-emerged as a mobilizing tool for enhancing the significance of the state’s
economic viability in response to the international intervention by the IMF and other global companies (2000:166).

Indeed, Leifer (2000) is successful in capturing different tempers of Indonesian nationalism from civic, ethnic, to economic nationalism. His analysis reveals Indonesian nationalism, based on elites’ ideological shield, as a response to its domestic and international issues. However, this approach has not taken into account the possibility of several ideologies vying to emerge around the time he conducted his study. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, the transition to democracy shaped political currents that allowed the flourishing of Islamic parties and groups, suggesting contesting values that shape discourse of Indonesian nationalism.

Another study by Edward Aspinall (2016) focuses on the emergence of a new nationalism in post-Suharto Indonesia. By ‘new nationalism’ he refers to the nationalists’ mood that emotionally displays “deep insecurities among both the Indonesian elite and public” about Indonesia’s poor accomplishments within international arena (Aspinall 2016:80). Tracing the historical roots of nationalism to the earliest period in Indonesia’s modern history, Aspinall (2016) identifies continuities in the use of “…discursive style13” of what he calls new nationalism. Aspinall (2016), however, seems to perceive nationalism in a negative tone. Nationalism does not only involve “…amorphous ideas and disposition” but is also “typically linked to structures of feeling and emotion more than to the world of rationality and intellect” (Aspinall 2016:73). In his view, nationalists rarely pay serious attention to “the logical consistency or implications of their positions” (2016:73). While Aspinall highlights the

13 The discursive styles, according to Aspinall, reproduces the earlier nationalists’ tropes such as foreign threats and national dignity found in the three distinct arenas of nationalism, that include national territorial (territorial nationalism), national economy (economic nationalism), and national culture (cultural nationalism).
persisting nationalism in post-New Order Indonesia, his view of nationalism as a political ideology, however, is quite limited and consequently, it may hamper further understanding of nationalism in Indonesia. As in the following discussion demonstrates, ideology can be defined broadly, and nationalism can be seen as a narration of the nation.

2.3 DISCOURSES ON NATIONALISM BEFORE THE 1998 REFORM MOVEMENT

Indonesia is a novel concept, emerging in the early 20th century (Anderson 2004; Reid 2015). The concept of “Indonesia” was first invented by a German scholar in the late 19th century (Lane 2008) and only in 1920s “significant numbers of urban, educated natives refer to themselves as ‘Indonesians’…” (Anderson 2004:153). Despite this novelty, however, “Indonesia” soon became popular among young activists for mobilizing support to gain sovereignty from Dutch colonial rule. Indeed, as Anderson posited, Indonesian nationalism was supported by the invention and reinvention of two myths: a long existence of the nation (the ancient and continuing past of nations) and the “modern sacralization” of what later became known as national territories (Anderson 2004:151).

The readiness of the hitherto ‘Indonesian’ nationalists to set national territory based on colonial boundaries was shaped by the following factors. Besides print capitalism developed in the late 1870s that made possible the “unselfconscious frame of reference”, which allowed the colonial subjects to see themselves as part of a nation (2004:159); the grouping of people under the colonial rule placed them under one homogenizing category of inlander (pribumi) or natives. The colonial natives, consisting of hundreds of ethnic groups with their own unique languages, were also a pariah class in the social system under the white colonialists, middle-eastern and

Finally, the use of Malay as a lingua franca among the colonial inhabitants was also significant as a unifying factor. Malay, a language that is today known as “Bahasa Indonesia” (Indonesian language), was broadly used as a lingua franca in the Dutch East Indies territory (Groeneboer 1998). The use of Malay as a national language avoided any special privileges among the existing major ethnic groups at that time (Anderson 2004). Unlike other colonial rulers that imposed the use of their language in the colonies, the United East India Company (VOC) and later the Dutch colonial regime did not find it necessary to replace Malay with Dutch, but instead supported the formalization of Malay (Anderson 2004). For example, the first higher education institution introduced by the Dutch, School for Javanese Doctors (Sekolah Dokter Jawa) established in 1851 in Batavia, used Malay and Dutch as the languages of instruction (Tadjuddin 2007:770). Malay was further appropriated as a national language in 1928, when a group of students stated their pledge for one Indonesian territory, one nation of Indonesia, and one Indonesian language. It gained more significance when the Japanese armies promoted its use as the future of national language in the 1940s (Anderson 2004:157).

Prior to and during the early part of the 1945 independence, heated debates among national leaders occurred in search for a new state philosophy and national identity (Darmaputera 1988; Ramage 1995; Elson 2009). The Japanese occupiers formed BPUPKI (the Committee to Investigate Preparations for Indonesian Independence). In several of its meetings, three groups were involved in heated arguments searching for a new state philosophy and national identity (Ramage 1995). Whereas the first group preferred Islam as the basis for the new state, the second
one was in favor of a more secular basis for the state, and the third group proposed an integralistic state of Indonesia.

The opposition between the first and the second groups ended up in a deadlock in the parliament. To reach a compromise, in a BPUPKI\(^{14}\) meeting on June 1, 1945, Sukarno proposed “Pancasila”, that literally means five pillars or five principles. The five tenets that Sukarno proposed consisted of (1) Indonesian nationhood or Indonesian nationalism (2) internationalism/humanitarianism (3) unanimous consensus or democracy (4) social justice, and (5) the belief in one God. On June 22, 1945, Islamic leaders proposed to insert the later famous seven words “…with the obligation to carry out sharia among Muslims” after Sukarno’s fifth tenet of the “belief in one God” (Ramage 1995:14; Picard 2011:94). In addition, they demanded to include Pancasila with the insertion of the seven words, in a draft of preamble to the Constitution. The draft, known as the Jakarta Charter, was later accepted by BPUPKI (Elson 2009).

However, on August 18, 1945, a day after the announcement of the Indonesian independence by Sukarno, the groups of nationalists and non-Muslim leaders approached Mohammad Hatta, expressing their rejection to the additional sentence. Hatta later convinced PPKI, a small committee appointed by BPUPKI to omit the seven words from the final draft of the preamble and from the article 29 on religion in the constitution (Elson 2009:120).

As a result, belief in God, humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice were included in Sukarno’s final version of Pancasila. Around this time Pancasila was defined as “a common platform on which all competing ideologies could meet and yet not threaten the essential unity of the Republic” (Ramage 1995:12). As the concession to the Islamic groups for accepting the

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\(^{14}\) BPUPKI or the Independence Preparatory Committee (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*) is a body appointed by the Japanese military occupiers to prepare for the independence of Indonesia.
rejection of the Jakarta Charter, the new government established the Ministry of Religion in January 1946 (Picard 2011:13). Although at its inception the Ministry was intended to govern Indonesian Muslims, the institution later expanded its authority to administer six religions formally admitted by the state: Islam, Catholic, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism.

As post-colonial Indonesia continues to search for its national identity, Pancasila has been on several occasions re-defined. The acceptance of Pancasila for the new state does not necessarily mean that the debates on Pancasila or Indonesian nationalism ended. Instead, it marks the beginning of the later long-term disputes pertaining to the relation between the state and Islam in Indonesia. Later, the 1955 elected Constituent Assembly formulated a new Constitution for Indonesia. New debates on Pancasila re-emerged. Ramage (1995) notes three distinct groups involved in intense arguments. The first were Pancasilaists, who hold the original idea of Pancasila as a common platform. The second group conceived Pancasila as ‘the only political ideology guaranteeing national unity and suitable to the Indonesian personality, and therefore, the appropriate basis of state for Indonesia’ (Ramage 1995:18). The third group includes Muslim leaders, who demanded to re-insert the Jakarta Charter into the Indonesian constitution. As Elson (2013) highlights, “the Konstituante was deeply divided between the forces pressing for an Islamized state and those championing Pancasila” (2013:389).

Consequently, as the proponents of the Islamic state failed to gain significant support from the majority of the parliament (Intan 2008; Raillon 2011), the assembly was in deadlock. Sukarno, supported by the Commander of Armed Forces, General A.H. Nasution, announced his presidential decree as of 5 July 1959 to dissolve the parliament. It claimed the return to
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and implemented what he later called the guided democracy (Ramage 1995:18-19; Hadiz 2004; Elson 2013).

During Sukarno’s guided democracy (1959-1965), various secessionist movements took place, including an Islamic-inspired armed struggle against the central government. Condemning its involvement in the Islamic rebellions, the government banned Masyumi, the largest Islamic Party at that time. In addition, he rejected the existence of political parties, claiming that the party system was not in line with Indonesian democracy, which valued consensus (musyawarah-mufakat) (Ramage 1995:19). Pancasila during this time was “an ideological tool” to counter Islamic political demands for state recognition of Islam (Intan 2008; Ramage 1995:17).

Unprecedentedly, between 1963 and 1965, Sukarno’s Guided Democracy embraced the ideologies of Islam and communism besides Pancasila. The fusion of the regime’s three ideologies was abbreviated as Nasakom (Nationalism, Islam, and Communism) and supported by the alliance of several political parties, including the Nationalist Party (PNI), the Islamic Party (especially NU), and the Communist Party (PKI) (Song 2008). Manipol was “superseded (but did not replace)” Pancasila as the official state ideology (Douglass 1970:68).

Yet, during the last year of Sukarno’s rule, a deep polarization emerged between supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party on the left and the army and Islamic forces with their allies on the right (Aspinall 2016:80). The kidnapping and killing of six senior military commanders and generals on October 1, 1965 contributed to the fall of Sukarno’s rule. The communist party (PKI) was accused as the main actor behind the killing as part of its coup attempt. In response, Suharto—a Lieutenant general at the time—soon acted to suppress the effort. From October 1965 to the early 1966, suspected communist sympathizers were killed before the rise of Suharto’s New Order era (1967-1998). The officials estimated that at least up
to 500,000 victims were slaughtered (Ramage 1995:24). Ramage describes the bloody violence as follows:

“Intense, decades-long rivalries between Islamic, communist, and nationalist organizations and the armed forces all came to a head in a ferocious orgy of violence in the immediate wake of the coup attempt. Persons and groups suspected of communist affiliations were the prime targets of, especially, rural Islamic groups bent on taking revenge against supporters of ‘atheistic’ PKI who had advocated land reform (often to the detriment of the interests of Muslim landowners). Many of the attacks on suspected communist sympathizers were carried out with army backing. Often people and whole villagers were the victims of grudges not necessarily connected with communism but for which accusation of ‘PKI!’ was sufficient to warrant attack” (Ramage 1995:23-24).

Between 1965 and 1968, the fear of being identified as an atheist or communist forced around 2.5 million of abangan, or nominal Muslims, who were supporters or members of communist-related organizations, to convert to Christianity and Hindu (Guinness 1994; Intan 2008). Through the decision No. XX/1966, the temporary national assembly (MPRS) named Suharto to lead a new order. Comparable to Sukarno’s guided democracy (1959-1965), the Suharto’s New Order (1967-1998) claimed its political intention to implement the ‘authentic and consistent’ Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Song 2008).

The discussions on Indonesian nationalism in the early years of the New Order rule continued centering on the meanings of Pancasila. They highlight how national elites used the five tenets for rejecting the regime perceived enemies: liberal democracy, communism, and
political Islam. The New Order regime’s attack to these three enemies later became the standard narrative of the New Order definition of what Pancasila was not (Hadiz 2004). For example, the regime claimed that the liberal, parliamentarian, democracy was in contradiction to the Indonesian values and Pancasila. It also conceived that the existence of numerous political parties could cause national disunity and fragmentation within the society (Hadiz 2004:150). The New Order regime further perceived communism as an ideological threat to Pancasila. As Verdy Hadiz (2004) eloquently describes, “the communists were portrayed as national traitors and atheistic therefore un-Pancasila” (2004:150). Inherent in this narrative is the conception that the failure of Sukarno’s guided democracy was due to its Nasakom ideology, that deviated from Pancasila, and consequently the nation suffered from “the communist-inspired coup attempt” on September 30, 1965 (Ramage1995:26).

Unlike its rejection to communism and liberal democracy, Suharto’s New Order demonstrated ambiguity in its approach toward political Islam (Ramage 1995). During the transition period from the Sukarno guided democracy to the Suharto New Order in 1968, the Islamic groups renewed their demand to include the Jakarta Charter in the 1945 Constitution during a session of the general assembly meeting (MPRS). Some observers conceive this political move as a claim as reward for supporting Suharto’s army during the mass massacre following the 1965 event (Anderson 2004, Intan 2008, Picard 2011). Whereas in the 1940s and 1950s the demands were to insert the seven words, the obligation to carry shariah among Muslims, after the first principle of Pancasila and in the preamble of the 1945 constitution; the 1968 demand was to insert the seven words back in the article 29 of the Constitution. Again, this attempt was rejected. Such persistent effort, however, convinced the New Order military that “a
strong Islamic political coalition” could challenge the military role in the post-1965 political arena (Ramage 1995:28).

In the 1970s, Suharto’s New Order began to implement its conception of Indonesian democracy. The implementation consisted of political restructuring, floating mass strategy, and military dual function. Continuing Sukarno’s legacy, Suharto’s political restructuring in 1973 began to show its aversion to the oppositional parties based on the belief that the latter would cause political instability and turmoil just like in the parliamentary democracy period from 1950-1959 (Ramage 1995). Thus, adapting Sukarno’s “non-party, but politically organized groups” (Ramage 1995:28), Suharto combined the hitherto nine parties into three political parties. First, the United Development Party (PPP or P3), that consisted of Islamic-based political parties. Second, Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), that included the protestant, catholic and nationalist parties. The third political organization is Golkar, a party that specially formed to channel the interests of the New Order regime (Ramage 1995:28-29). Such restructuring of the political system made possible the implementation of New Order’s strategy to ‘de-politicize’ or ‘de-ideologize’ mass politics (1995:29) through the concept of the ‘floating mass’, that is, de-linking people from political parties, resulting in decrease of popular political participation (Mackie 1994).

The taming of political parties and the floating mass strategy were also complemented by the implementation of the New Order’s concept of *dwifungsi ABRI* or dual functions of military in national defense and society. The military dual functions emphasized that “…the Indonesian Armed Forces have permanent responsibilities in the fields both of national security and of social-political-economic development” (Anderson 1990:115). This was followed by the military’s massive penetration in the state apparatus and among civilians. Because the army was
an integral process in the revolution for Indonesian independence, the argument went, it consequently had the responsibility to participate in all aspects of national development (Ramage 1995:30). As a result, at least twenty thousand military personnel served in non-military positions, such as ministers, ambassadors, parliamentarians, senior executives in government corporations, bankers, senior civil servants, university rectors, provincial governors, sub-district heads, and village headmen (Jenkins 1984).

It is during such political circumstances that the regime provided a quite different meaning of Pancasila. Besides defining *Pancasila* to regulate “permissible political organization and behavior” (Ramage 1995:30), the regime also used *Pancasila* as a political tool to legitimize its rule and restrict its political enemies, particularly the Islamic parties. The New Order’s political interpretation of *Pancasila* conveyed a desire “for a less-confrontational, religious, and culturally tolerant society” (Ramage 1995:31).

In the 1980s, as Suharto’s New Order entered a different dynamic of national political economy, the official discourse on *Pancasila* shifted from *Pancasila* as a national ideology to *Pancasila* as the only national ideology of all Indonesians (Weatherbee 1984). This attempt was fully supported by the people national assembly (MPR) in 1978 through its approval of the presidential decree for providing the official interpretation of the centrality of *Pancasila*. This official interpretation was later known as the Guide to the full comprehension and practice of *Pancasila* (P4 program). The indoctrination of the official interpretation of *Pancasila* started from P4 courses among civil servants in the early 1980s. The program was also designed to reach all “functional and political groups of the society” and young Indonesians at all levels of education (Morfit 1981:838). The aim, among other things, was “to reconstitute Indonesians in a
new image, to create what the government came to call the Pancasila Person (Manusia Pancasila) or the Complete Person (Manusia Seutuhnya)” (Bourchier 2015:200).

Several studies\(^{15}\) have discussed the main reasons for the state’s rigorous indoctrination of Pancasila that cost a huge amount of time, expenditure, and energy (Bourchier 2015). Watson (1987 in Bourchier 2015), for example, suggests that this serious attempt indicated the centrality of the program to the New Order government itself. The national campaign is seen as its response to public criticism of the ways it conducted its administration, particularly in relation to corruption (Watson 1987:48 in Bourchier 2015:197-198).

Others underscore that the cause for the strong government support to the program is the regime’s own “growing insecurity” around that time (Morfit 1981:851). Again, the indoctrination program to impose Pancasila as the basis and sole ideology (azas tunggal) for all political parties and social organizations in Indonesia in 1985 is seen as a significant attack to Suharto’s political opponents (Morfit 1981; Bouchier 2015; Ramage 1995). These perceived enemies included the coalition of Islamic parties, NU leaders who opposed the government 1978 Pancasila education legislation, the military leaders who demonstrated neutrality instead of support to the government, and fifty prominent retired generals who expressed their critiques through a petition against some of the New Order’s policies (Ramage 1995: 33,187).

Finally, some studies highlight that the program was to address the government’s concern pertaining to its “continuing hold of leftist and Sukarnoist ideas” on Indonesian people (Bourchier 2015:199). In the hands of the New Order’s historians, the 1965 event became the solid evidence that the communists were “national traitors and atheistic therefore un-Pancasila”

\(^{15}\) There is also doubt about the efficacy of the P4 program. Michael Morfit (1981), for example, highlights that the program was limited in generating “a new, ideological vision for Indonesia” (1981:851) for the state’s interpretation of Pancasila lacked precise and detailed explanations of the past, present and future (1981:842). Thus, Pancasila - as understood in P4 - is no more than a “static ideology” (Morfit 1981:851).
(Hadiz 2004:156). It is not surprising that, Suharto’s New Order’s meta-narrative also denied the significance of Indonesia’s Left, including the Communist Party (PKI) in the anti-colonial struggle (Hadiz 2006:556). An important figure behind the official narrative of New Order is a military man and historian, Nugroho Notosusanto (McGregor 2005). Through Notosusanto’s16 history project started in 1972, the military’s historical image was created, aiming at public acceptance of the military’s dual function. The attempt culminated between 1982 and 1985, when Notosusanto held the position of the Minister of Education, during which he created the History of the National Struggle course (*Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa* or PSPB) into the national curricula. In PSPB he emphasized the significant role of military in the national revolution (2005:223). In McGregor’s assessment,

“Nugroho’s effort at promoting military values in school curricula were thus part of a broader New Order pattern of militarization. By means of these and other history projects Nugroho therefore attempted to reinforce the legitimacy of a military dominated authoritarian regime” (McGregor 2005:224).

In the late 1980s and 1990s, the regime altered its interpretation of *Pancasila* from the sole ideology of *Pancasila* to *Pancasila* as an open ideology. Within this new official interpretation, *Pancasila* was defined as a religious, non-Islamic, state ideology (Ramage 1995:189). This interpretation followed the government’s change in attitude towards Islam (Azra 2013, Effendy 2003, Hefner 2000, Liddle 1996). Although the Suharto’s New Order still opposed political Islam, its policies were more accommodative towards Muslim’ demands. The

16 The most important work of Notosusanto is his historical account of the 1965: The Failure of the G-30-S: October 1 – November 10 (40 Hari Kegagalan G-30-S: 1 Oktober – 10 November). It was published soon after the event and followed by the official English version in 1968. This official version of history “was consolidated, embellished, and repeated in school texts, a monument, a museum, and a film” (McGregor 2005:218).
government restored and strengthened the status and function of the Islamic religious court under the Department of Religion through the 1989 Religious Court Law (Cammack 1997). It also codified Indonesian Islamic family law and launched a new marriage regulation, which no longer allowed interreligious marriages (Liddle 1996). In addition, in 1993 the government annulled national lotteries in response to Muslim leaders’ opposition to this un-Islamic practice (Effendy 2003). It further imprisoned a tabloid editor accused of insulting the prophet of Mohammad (Liddle 1996). In the national education system, the 1989 Education Law stipulated that instructors of religion course in schools must have similar religious background with their students. The government policy in 1991 also allowed Muslim female students at the secondary level to wear headscarves in public school, a previously prohibited practice. Moreover, the government, through a joint decision between the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Home Affairs, issued a collecting and distributing agency to intensify the existing alms collection and distribution. The late Suharto’s New Order also supported the establishment of the organization of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), that marked the return of Islam in politics (Hefner 2000, Liddle 1996).

The late New Order’s policy toward Islam was significant to both Suharto’s regime and Indonesian Muslims. On the one hand, Muslims’ support was politically important for maintaining Suharto’s long-term reign in power amidst the quiet internal frictions among his generals and in the Golkar Party (Ramage 1995). The support was also significant for countering his political opponents, that is, the pro-democracy movements, which opposed several New Order’s policies (Hefner 2000). On the other hand, the change in the New Order’s policy toward Islam reinforced the sense of recognition among Indonesian Muslims, who were under the impression that Suharto’s policy toward this group was hostile in the past. Whereas for ICMI
intellectuals, this organization would potentially channel their access to government bureaucracy (Hadiz 2004), to many Indonesian Muslims, ICMI intellectuals symbolized Islam embracing “technological progress, modernity, and cosmopolitanism” (van Wichelen 2007).

However, as Ramage (1995) argues, Suharto’s support for Islam as ‘a spiritual and cultural force ‘in society does not necessarily mean that the New Order regime applauded Islam as a political force (1995:191-192). In addition, although Suharto’s voice in the 1990s or during the ‘post-asas tunggal era’ (Ramage 1995:187) was shifted from his 1980s commitment of Pancasila; the dominant discourse of Indonesian national identity still held the idea that “[m]uslims must be Indonesians before all else” (Wood 2005). Suharto’s New Order regime constantly endorsed “an Indonesian national ‘personality’ founded on harmony and group interests rather than conflict and individual rights” (Aspinal 2016:80). By emphasizing this harmony, it accused activists, who demanded for reform movement, of “deviating from Indonesia’s national personality” and hence, “national traitors’ (Aspinall, 2016:80). The New Order regime also perceived that ‘the proper tasks of government’ should include “indigenism, fostering national unity, implementing development and establishing political stability, as opposed to the Westernism, national disintegration, economic decay, and political instability” (Philpott 2000:171).

In the latest years of its reign in power, the regime faced challenges to its official interpretation. The responses to the New Order’s official interpretation have come both from state and non-state actors including military leaders, Muslim leaders, and secular nationalists (Ramage 1995). As military’s support to Suharto fragmented, the divided military leaders emphasized their main concern about national stability (1995:193). To counter their perceived enemies, which included the supporters of political Islam and liberal democracy (1995:187), they
conceived *Pancasila* as “an integralistic ideology” that prioritized “national interest over individual rights” (1995:193). Likewise, Muslim leaders took in their hands the interpretation of *Pancasila* for advocating their political Islam after reviewing their position vis-a-vis *Pancasila* hampered their attempt to get recognition in the national discourse (1995:193). In addition, other smaller groups of more secular nationalists referred to *Pancasila* to justify their opposition to Suharto’s authoritarian regime (Hadiz 2004:157) and to demand for “greater democratization and reduced military political dominance, while avoiding Islamization of government” (Ramage 1995:167). Thus, as Ramage suggests: “the ideology is appropriated both to negatively appraise the regime for allegedly contravening *Pancasila* and to inoculate criticism against the charge of being ‘anti-*Pancasila*’” (Ramage 1995:2-3).

The prior discussion on the New Order regime and its official interpretation of *Pancasila* emphasize the use of *Pancasila* as a political tool for maintaining elites power and countering their political foes (Morfit 1981, Watson 1987; Hadiz 2006, Liddle 1996, Ramage 1995). The Suharto New-Order regime is not the only actor molding the meaning of *Pancasila* (Bouchier 2015; Ramage 1995) and rather than opposing themselves to *Pancasila* as Suharto had accused, the non-state and state actors chose to join the government in defining what *Pancasila* should be. Within the New Order hegemonic power, which went hand in hand with its repressions (Hadiz 2004, Intan 2008, Leifer 2000, Picard 2011), anchoring political demands to *Pancasila* discourse provides legitimacy for political elites “to open political discourse in an otherwise highly restrictive political system” (Ramage 1995:4).

However, by conceiving *Pancasila* merely as a tool to respond to political foes, as the cloak for political legitimation, or as a mobilizing instrument for public support, the existing studies have the risk of putting too much attention on Indonesian political actors as the main
controllers of its definitions. In addition, analyzing nationalism as an ideology, as a political tool for justifying elites’ interests and policies, is inadequate for understanding the renaissance of nationalism after Suharto’s resignation in 1998. Defining ideology this way presents it as a too narrow concept to capture the complexity of either emergence or persistence of nationalism and limits the possibility to capture the dynamics of power and culture at work. Alternatively, Terry Eagleton’s (1994) concept of ideology is more appropriate:

“Ideology are commonly felt to be both naturalizing and universalizing. By a set of complex discursive devices, they project what are in fact partisan, controversial, historically specific values as true of all times and all places, and so as natural, inevitable and unchangeable” (1994:10).

Ideology, in this sense, then, works for reinforcing the naturalness of nationalism (Billig 1995). Referring to Terry Eagleton (1995:15), Billig further conceives: “[i]deologies are patterns of believe and practice, which make existing social arrangement appear ‘natural’ or inevitable” (1995:15). Informed by this conception, I discuss nationalism in post-Suharto Indonesia in the following section by conceiving Pancasila more than a mere ideological instrument.

### 2.4 TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND THE QUEST FOR NEW NATIONAL IDENTITY

As I have suggested earlier, among the political analysts, the most immediate question concerning Indonesian transition from Suharto’s militaristic and authoritarian rule to democracy is how to build democratic institutions in the post-authoritarian regime (Künkler 2013; Liddle
2013; and Liddle 2001). For many Indonesian intellectuals and elites, the problems also entailed the concern of how to preserve, re-define, and transform the values of Indonesianness amidst global, national and local changes.

Redefining the basis of the post-New Order governance with its national identity is the first issue, immediately resolved by the national assembly (MPR) after the collapse of the New Order regime. During its first meeting in November 1998. The MPR cancelled the New Order’s 1985 Law that imposed Pancasila as the sole ideology for all social and political organizations. It further decreed that as long as “they did not contradict Pancasila,” organizations were free to embrace other ideologies (Hadiz 2004:158). In the same year, Habibie’s government terminated the New Order P4 program and soon dismissed its Supervisory Body (BP7) (Abdullah 2013).

The cancellation of the mandatory Suharto’s P4 program did not necessarily signify the withering away of Pancasila as Song (2008) claimed. Nor did the vanishing New Order’s terms such as Pancasila democracy, Pancasila economy, and Pancasila industrial relationship from government discourses indicate the downgrading of Pancasila as Hadiz suggested (2004). Instead, in its first meeting after the collapse of Suharto’s New Order, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) reinstated Pancasila as the state principles and this decision marked the beginning of the post-New Order contested official discourses of Pancasila.

In 2002, before the national assembly meeting, the members of the Parliament from an Islam-based party (PPP) attempted to include the possibility to again discuss the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta), which would obligate Indonesian Muslims to follow shariah. However, the proposal failed to gain significant support from other parliament members and “was withdrawn

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17 P4 is the New Order compulsory political indoctrination program designed for all Indonesians, including students, civil servants, and various members of social, political, and economic organizations.
without a vote” (Liddle 2013:31). As a concession to the Islamists, the assembly (MPR) approved changes to the Constitution, that required the government, among other obligations, to increase ‘faith and piety’ in education through the Education Bill, later signed into the 2003 Law of Education\(^\text{18}\) (Yusuf and Sterkens 2015; Raillon 2011:94). The implementation of the 2003 Education Law later accommodated a more religious atmosphere for students in public schools\(^\text{19}\) at the various levels of education\(^\text{20}\).

The significance of Pancasila as the main reference for redefining national identity also emerged outside the government circle around the early 2000 when economic crisis was still underway, and when the 1999 regional autonomy was implemented. There was a concern about “the spirit of provincialism-ethnocism” (Hidayat 2003:3-4) and anxiety in the uncertainty of the direction that post-New Order led. Therefore, it is not surprising that the discourses about how to take the reign of the transition emerged among national elites and intellectuals.

In a national conference at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), for example, Komaruddin Hidayat (2003) called for a national leadership which could envision how to bridge plurality in

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\(^{18}\) Analyzing the process of the legislating of the 2003 education law, Yusuf and Sterkens (2015) highlight how Islamic values informed the plenary meeting of the national assembly (MPR). In their support, six out of nine political factions made explicit reference to hadith and Quran. Islamist parties, for example PBB, justify the importance of the parliament to approve the draft of the 2003 law, arguing that the draft “was consistent with and represented the national ideology of Pancasila and Constitution amendment 2002, particularly with regard to the need to include religious values” (2015:122). In addition, the spokesperson, K.H. Nadjih Ahjit, claims the importance of the national education to pay attention to intellectual aspects, religious commitment, religious devotion, and students’ noble character (2015:122). Interestingly, the second biggest party, Golkar—a commonly conceived as a more secular party—, and another influential party, PKB, also supported the draft. The spoke person of Golkar, Agusman St. Basa, highlighted that the objective of national education should develop the potentialities in intelligence as well as faith and piety. Likewise, PKB spoke person argued that “…providing students with religious education about their own religion is consistent with human rights…” (Khalilurrraham in Yusuf and Sterkens 2015:121).

\(^{19}\) As most students are Muslims, in many cases, more religious attitudes mean more explicit demand for the practice of Islamic values. In Lubuk Pakam—an hour ride from Medan, for example, a primary public school begins the class by praying in Islamic way despite some of its students are Christian. In Yogyakarta, it is quite common that the sixth-grade students are encouraged to come earlier to practice shalat dhuha together before school starts. In addition, a distinction between attributes for Muslims and Non-Muslims is visible from student’s uniform and there is a tendency that character building in post-New Order education cueicula are translated into more religious (Islamic) uptake.

\(^{20}\) This is particularly endorsed by the 2013 national curricula.
the spirit of *Indonesianness*. For this he proposed the appropriation of *Pancasila* as the only national ideology (2003:7). He argues that, whereas in the past, cultural and historical reality necessitated *Pancasila* as the only ideology, the post-New Order’s main agenda should be maintaining freedom in line with the rule of law, which requires a religious vision and emphasizes universality and respect. Likewise, Syafii Maarif (2003), an influential Muslim intellectual from Muhammadiyah organization, highlighted the important roles of ideology, morality, and education to create a better immediate future for Indonesia. He proposed educational reform for creating free, democratic, smart, pious, and caring Indonesians. He also highlighted the necessity to assess national education based on *Pancasila* informed by religious values.

Hidayat’s and Maarif’s reference to *Pancasila* suggests that not only the five tenets are relevant to Indonesian political and cultural changes, but they are also central for defining the nation and a new citizenship. Likewise, outside university seminars, a political movement to assign new meanings to *Pancasila* has taken place through a declaration on *Indonesianness (Maklumat Keindonesiaan)* (Raillon 2011). This declaration is the first governmental step in redefining *Pancasila* after its reinstatement as the basis of the state in the national assembly meeting in 1998. The new declaration of *Indonesianness (Maklumat Keindonesiaan)* on June 1\(^{21}\), 2006 made SBY as the first post-New Order presidents, who clarified the status of *Pancasila*. Not only was this event attended by three thousand guests, including many of his cabinet ministers; it also set a declaration of nationhood emphasizing the importance of re-accepting

\(^{21}\) The selection of the date, June 1, suggests an attempt to enhance this declaration as a significant national event. As McGregor (2002) notes, the June 1, is the same date to Sukarno’s famous speech in 1945 when he formulated the five principles that later known as Pancasila before BPUPKI). Since 1967, rather than commemorating the June 1 as the birth of Pancasila, the Suharto New Order government, invented and celebrated the October 1, as the day of the resurrection of Pancasila (Hari Kesaktian Pancasila). To Suharto’s regime, commemorating this day was important as a continuance reminder of his and his army success in dismissing his perceived communism coup d’état that took place in September 30, 1965 (McGregor 2002).
*Pancasila*. The declaration highlights that *Pancasila* was abused by Suharto and that the hitherto state is weak in responding to those who demanded the implementation of sharia (Raillon 2011:104).

Interestingly, discourses of the relationship between the state and religion among Muslim elites in Indonesia suggest that re-enacting Pancasila as national ideology does not necessarily mean that the ideology is in contradiction to Islamic values. This is visible in Luthfi Assyaukanie’s (2009) discussion, where he outlines three typologies of the relationship between Islam and the state. The proponents of the first model, Islamic Democratic State (IDS), strongly reject theocracy and secularism, yet embrace democracy with the belief that this system is rooted in Islamic tradition. The second model, Religious Democratic State (RDS), has two premises as its foundation: it accepts *Pancasila* as the basis of the state and rejects secularism as well as the Islamic state. This model demands the state to prevent secularism by intervening in religious matters. The third model, Liberal Democratic State (LDS), proposes secularization or the separation of religion and the state, and demands state’s neutrality concerning religious matters (Assyaukanie 2009).

Perhaps, the most unprecedented change in the post-Suharto Indonesia’s discourses of *Pancasila* is the People National Assembly (MPR)’s alternative view. The article 15 (1)(e) of the Law No. 27/2009 states that one of the tasks of the deputy speaker of the national assembly is to coordinate its members to circulate the assembly decisions, and most importantly to disseminate information about the 1945 Constitution, Pancasila, the United Republic of Indonesia (Negara

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22 The explicit challenge toward Pancasila, mainly comes from Islamist organization such as the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) that emphasizes the belief that Muslims can live in a just, pious and secure society only by the creation of an Islamic state (Raillon 2011:96). In 2017, however, the government has banned this mass organization and strongly prompts civil servants, who are the members of HTI, to choose staying in the government agencies or maintaining their memberships with HTI.
Kesatuan Republik Indonesia or NKRI), and the unity in diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). The deputy speaker of the assembly, Taufiq Kiemas\textsuperscript{23}, took the responsibility in his hands and conceived four concepts as “four pillars of statehood and nationhood” (empat pilar kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara) (Budiono 2014:10). MPR became the initiator as well as the most ardent disseminator through numerous national and local media. The socialization program reached various segments of society including teachers, high school and university students, ulamas, civil servants, and NGOs (Budiono 2014:15).

In response, ten citizens, as individuals and as a group, requested the Judicial Court to review the Law No. 2/2011 on political party, particularly article 34 (3b) (a), that requires political parties to socialize the four pillars of the statehood and nationhood. They argue that the four pillars that placed Pancasila in an equal position to the Constitution, the state, and the principle of unity in diversity have caused legal uncertainty and downgraded the significance of Pancasila itself. In their opinion, uprooting Pancasila from its previous position as the basis for the state dismisses the state itself. Their demand is to put Pancasila back to its original and authentic position, cancelling the 2011 Law. However, the judicial court decided that although the article above was in opposition to the 1945 Constitution, the phrase of the four pillars did not legally binding (Mahkamah Konstitusi RI 2013:87). Referring to this decision, the national assembly (MPR) continues its task to disseminate the four pillars and conceives their attempt as a part of a social movement aiming at increasing Indonesian nationalism (Budiono 2014:15).

Indeed, contesting discourses on Pancasila among state and non-state actors in post-New Order are not a new phenomenon. As I have discussed earlier, during Suharto New Order (1967-1998), the meaning of Pancasila for political elites is not singular (Ramage 1995). Not only is

\footnote{Taufiq Kiemas was also the husband of Indonesian fourth president, Megawati Soekarno Putri, the first daughter of Indonesian first president, Sukarno.}
Pancasila “basically a statement of human values”, which are difficult to refute at face value (Ramage 1995), but also “there is no common understanding of how it should be interpreted” (Raillon 2011:110). Interestingly, besides the contested discourses of Pancasila, the post-New Order also witnesses the emerging disagreements on the 1965 event. On the one hand, not only do military and New Order local and national bureaucracies and elites preserve the legacy of New Order narrative, they also find it necessary to preserve “the way in which the 1960s were remembered in the codified official history of the authoritarian New Order of Soeharto” (Hadiz 2006:555). Hadiz further posits:

“…whole generations of elites, national and local, civilian as well as military, were incubated by the New Order-as-social order. Long after the fall of Soeharto, they still ‘need’ to cling to the anti-communist New Order grand narrative to legitimise their personal histories, current position and political Actions” (2006:565).

On the other hand, the post-New Order Indonesia inevitably encounters intricate situations in its transition from an authoritarian militaristic regime to a democratic one. Although Hadiz is right in capturing the persisting collective memory of the 1965 event among the post-Suharto’s local and national elites, who still share the legacy of New Order’s systematic erasure of the left in the 1960s (Hadiz 2000, 2006), his analysis omits contested narratives that take place outside government circles. In addition, the departure of the New Order made it the next target of “calculations and rationalities” (Philpott 2000:171). There is the possibility, that “the hegemonic memory narratives” are challenged not only on the ground that they exclude particular groups
from the narratives but also because they remain silent about “the atrocities done to certain groups” (Langenhol 2010:171).

Attempts to revisit the 1965 event through rituals, memorial spaces and publications on the event emerge unprecedentedly although with unpredictable outcomes (Vickers 2010). It is true that “identifying the victims of the 1965 killing and the responsibility of the perpetrators remains extremely difficult” (Vickers 2010:57), partly because the backlash from the military, police, and other groups that use Islam for mobilizing support. However, contested discourses concerning the 1965 event emerge at various sites and almost immediately after the collapse of the New Order regime. As MgGregor (2005) notes, in only a few days after Suharto stepped down from power, Lieutenant-Colonial Latief, a political prisoner convicted of involvement in the 1965 movement, stepped forward. He publicly countered the New Order’s narrative on details concerning the murder of six generals, that he had forewarned Suharto about. Despite this warning, however, rather than preventing the act, Suharto instead decided to wait until the coup took place. Likewise, Arif Budianto, a member of the investigating autopsy team who analyzed the bodies of the six generals, contradicted almost three decades of the official history in its detail, that” the penises of the victims were cut off or that, their eyes had been gouged out” (MgGregor 2005:227). These public expressions were also followed by the publication of Saskia Wierenga’s thesis on Gerwani24 in Indonesian language, that directly countered Suharto’s New Order myths about it (2005:227).

Discussions on the 1965 events including the mass killing, emerged in various venues, including book and film discussions, book festivals, personal blogs, new magazines (e.g.

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24 Gerwani was the biggest women organization in 1960s. Suharto banned this organization on the ground of its affiliation to the Communist Party (PKI), that was accused of master planning the killing of the six generals and the coup. In the New Order narrative, members of Gerwani were depicted celebrating the killing by dancing and mutilating the bodies of the six generals.
Bhinneka), and films about the 1965 event are flourishing. In many cases, they result in protests, banning, similar forms of symposium and/or book publications, to slash back the emerging effort to open public eyes of the 1965 event. An intergenerational memory on the erasure of communists is also palpable among young activists, who do not have any direct experience pertaining to the 1965 event yet have grasped the perpetuate injustices experienced by the marginalized survivors (McGregor 2013). As McGregor (2013) posits, they might challenge, perhaps even counter, the official demonizing meta-narrative of the New Order.

Finally, such contesting narratives of the past are also visible in debates on re-thinking the future of Indonesian national history. Taufik Abdullah, a senior historian, has openly criticized the official New Order history written by Nugroho Notosusanto, pointing that the previous history that was mainly about the 1965 coup, aiming merely at “exacting revenge” (McGregor 2005:227) and directed to the communist participants. Another historian, Asvi Warman Adam has suggested that national history should represent “multiple versions of 1965” in the future history textbooks (2005:227).

The persuasion, however, is not necessarily followed by any alteration in government policy concerning the past although the minister of Education Sudarsono has proposed a more objective history that is free from regime bias (Gatra 17 October 1998, in McGregor 2005:228). Besides debates among historians pertaining to the controversial historical contents (materi sejarah kontroversial) of the 1965 event are still underway (Wasino 2015:9), there is also a strong opposition to the attempt for providing alternative narratives. It is not surprising that the

\[\text{For example, supported by ex-military involved in the abolishment of the 1965 communist coup, ulemas in East Java have protested the deletion of the word “PKI” –the abbreviation of the Indonesian Communist Party— in the discussion of “the 1965 Tragedy” (“Tragedi 1966”) in the content of 2004 national curricula history textbook (2015:8). The 2004 curricula were then replaced by the 2006 national curricula. Partly in response to the aforementioned protests, in the later curricula, the New Order famous word G30S/PKI is reused (Wasino 2015:9).}\]
militaristic discourse\textsuperscript{26} of the past persists in the current history textbooks (Purwanta 2017). Thus, although the political system has been significantly altered and the New Order’s discourse on \textit{Pancasila} has been challenged and countered, discussing the 1965 event is still a taboo in the public sphere (Vickers 2010). As Vickers further highlights:

“Identifying the victims of the killing as victims, let alone discussing the responsibility of the perpetrators, remains extremely difficult. Because the political situation distorts and even stifles public debates, the meaning of such rituals and their acknowledgement in a wide political sphere are not yet part of Indonesian public discourse” (Vickers 2010:57).

Consequently, disagreement concerning “demilitarization and de-Suharto-isation” (Wasino 2015) makes history class discussion on the 1965 event a complicated task for teachers\textsuperscript{27}.

The contesting discourses on Pancasila and the 1965 event in post-Suharto Indonesia suggest the quest for re-defining \textit{who we are as a nation} is not an easy and linear process As Timothy Ashplant has suggested: “the past is not automatically passed between generations but must be actively transmitted so that later generations accept that past as meaningful” (in Hashimoto 2015:2415 of 5481). In addition, the shape of collective memory involves “…the incessant interplay of contested pasts and problematic futures through uncertain collective action” (Tilly 1994:253). The contesting views may “include and exclude, voice and silence, conditioning what can be seen and said and by whom” (Eyerman 2004:162). Consequently, a

\textsuperscript{26} Conducting critical discourse analysis, Purwanta (2017) focuses on two events in Indonesian history: the August 1945 Indonesian Independence and the December 1949 Dutch Recognition of the Indonesian Independence. Implicitly he considers these events as the most glorified happenings for military, despite the 1965 event served as the most important element in militaristic history.

\textsuperscript{27} In one of my interviews in Medan –North Sumatera—in January 2013, a citizenship education teaching staff has explicitly avoided discussing the 1965 event in his class.
single narrative of the nation is not possible. The rivalry for control over memory is entrenched “in the conflict and interplay between social, political, and cultural interests and values in particular present conditions” (Hashimoto 2015:180 of 5481).

As a regime change “generally causes a confrontation with the previous regime” (Meyer 2010:173), the pressing need to articulate and express identity by revisiting the past, is inevitable. Comparable cases can be found in Europe, during which the transformation from communist to post-communist in Europe was “accompanied by discoveries of many ‘blank spots’ and attempt to settle wrongs that were committed during the Communist era by the state and its agents” (Misztal 2010:28). In the transition from authoritarian to democratic order, particularly in the critical first stage, society deals with the issue of “how the institutional ‘transition from authoritarianism’ can be secured (Meyer 2010:164). In many cases, it pushes groups the return to the legal state and the process of how to deal with “the macro-crimes in a legal perspective” (Langenohl 2010:166). Within these contexts, the call for the memory may be inevitable when “politically pragmatic and juridical-morality just ways of addressing the past…” are in contradiction (Meyer 2010:163). Informed by these discussions, in the following chapters I discuss the emergence of multiple contesting narratives of the nation in post-Suharto Indonesia, particularly during and after its transition from authoritarian to a more democratic political system.
3.0 METHODOLOGY: UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF MEANING-MAKING THROUGH NARRATIVE

In this study, I conceive nationalism as a discourse which emphasizes the inevitable link between the state and the nation and the narrative of the nation as a story about what a nation is. Narrative consists of several elements, including selected events, emplotment, and narrative closure (Maines 1993:469; Ewick 1995:472). The selected events refer to “selective appropriation of past events and characters” (Ewick 1995:200), necessary “for purposes of focus and commentary” (Maines 1993:21). Others conceive these selected events as “the ordering principle”, that leads a narrative to assign “meaning to an otherwise meaningless life” (Bamberg 2007:5). Thus, narratives or stories can be defined as “…discourses with a clear sequential order that connects events in a meaningful way for a definite audience, and thus offer insights about the world and or people’s experience of it” (Hinchman and Hinchman 1997 in Rodriguez and Fortier 2007:7). By selecting the most relevant events and linking these selected events in meaningful ways, narrators may use a narrative to justify their life experiences or the life of people they narrativize (Brockmeier 2002, Ricoeur 1980).

The second element of narrative, emplotment, refers to the quality of narrative that requires the selected events to be presented in ‘relational of parts’ to transform selected events into story elements (Ewick 1995:200). Emplotment is significant to make sense of “…a series of historical events by molding them into a plausible story to produce meaning” (White 1980:4).
Using emplotment, stories convey a central theme, and as Maines (1993) puts it, “when this element is competently used by a storyteller, the story can become engrossing and even persuasive” (1993:21). Narratives can strategically be constructed to inspire, move, or influence others for political purposes (Riessman 2008, Ewick 1995, Van der Veer 1994). It is understandable that in many cases narratives are also political (Maine 1993:21), as “[they] allow us to contemplate the effects of our actions, and to alter the directions of our lives” (Richardson 1990:117).

The third element is closure. The narrative closure is “a statement about how and why the recounted events occurred” (Ewick 1995:200). This meaning-making in narratives is what makes narrative— a narrative. As Hayden White (1987) emphasizes, “…a narrative is not a narrative unless it provides “the moral principle”, that is, “[t]he demand… for moral meaning, a demand that sequence of real events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral drama” (1987:24).

The three elements, particularly the third one, make central the process of meaning making through narrative. It allows the accessibility of identity construction through narrative (Ricoeur 1991a). Thus, narratives may provide new meanings over previous interpretations of selected events, which allows the emergence of various and contested meanings over the past in defining and re-defining identities of the present self of individuals, collectivities, group, organization, community, and a nation (Brockmeier 2002, Hashimoto 2015, Richardson 1990, Ricouer 1991b, Wood 1991, Wood 2005).

Informed by the above framework, highlighting the process of meaning-making through narrative, I focus on narratives of the nation in the education sphere. There are several sites of contestation of discourses where the dissonant ideals of citizenship collide. Education is an arena
for this (Apple 2004), and textbooks’ production is only one example among many (Hashimoto 2011). Taking account of this limitation, the next part of this chapter is devoted to explaining why and how I have selected textbooks and conducted textbooks’ narrative analysis before further outlining how I deal with the issues of quality in this study, the limitations entailed in conceiving textbooks as written narratives, and, finally, the best ways to overcome pitfalls and benefits from selecting data collection and analysis for this study.

3.1 TEXTBOOKS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE NARRATIVE OF THE NATION

National curricula are very important sources for understanding the representation of the nation. As Philpott emphasizes, “… school text and the physical space of the school are sites at which identity is produced” (Philpott 2000:159). Whereas curricula define what students should learn, national textbooks convey the content of “what is to be learned” (Ross 2000:9) and offer “frames of reference” (Naoki 2001:189). For example, textbooks may persuade students to embrace the “positive identification with the nation by highlighting heroic national achievements” (Hashimoto 2015). In addition, national textbooks are the useful media for describing, defining and communicating a national identity (Wood 2005:4). As Hardwick et. al. (2010) further argue:

“National curricula were created to perpetuate, and in many cases manufacture, national myths for the twin purpose of grounding national consciousness in some kind of legitimizing historical tradition and garnering the allegiance of people in the existing political status quo” (Hardwick et al 2010: 253).
Besides providing insights of the normativity of the national and whether the latter includes or excludes particular groups (Assman 2008:70), national textbooks are useful reference for understanding how “a national imagination” for unifying “population’s discourse and collective remembering” (Greenwalt 2009:497) are fashioned. Studies on discourses in textbooks have revealed variation across countries of what an ideal citizen looks like, what kind of national identity students should aspire to, and the shifting boundaries of what is conceived of as the nation-state (Banks 2004; Castles 2004; Dragonas 2005; Durrani 2010; Green 1997; Hahn 2010; Hardwick 2010; Kennedy 2008; Ong 2004; Soysal 2000). Through textbooks, the uniqueness of national identities can be highlighted\(^ {28}\) (Hardwick et. al. 2010) as textbooks may provide various dimensions of nation-state identity boundaries\(^ {29}\) (Soysal 2005). Textbooks may also suggest multiple representations of citizenship and national identity within the nation-state (Abowitz 2006; Kennedy 2008), sometimes contradicting to the history of the state (Rosser 2006), suggesting that education is an arena of conflicting ideas about what kind of knowledge students should be taught and evaluated (Apple 2004).

History, social science, citizenship education, and geographic textbooks are usually vital for representing identity boundaries as well as the meaningful link with the past, the present, and the future of the nation (Greenwalt 2009). History education (or textbooks), for example, has two goals. The first is to explain why the past conflicts between groups in a society occurred, the

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\(^{28}\) In this study, whereas the US national identity is “conflated with personal identity and the importance of the individual,” Canada’s national identity is defined as related to “becoming an active citizen in both Canada and the world” (2010:264).

\(^{29}\) These include the valorization of the nation (the nature of values, ideals, loyalties, and civic duties); the celebration of the region of Europe (the coverage and emphasis given to values attributed to Europe such as progress, environment, and human rights); and the recognition of diversity (the degree to which cultures and histories of ethnic, religious, and regional minorities are incorporated into the representation and definition of the nation) (Soysal et al 2005:12).
second is to convey a new narrative that may amend group’s past differences and build social cohesion (Cole 2007:15 in Drake and McCulloch 2013:278). It is not surprising that content of history textbooks may be molded by politicians to guarantee their status quo (Rosser 2006:191; Wood 2005).

Whereas history textbooks are perceived important to maintain a continuity in national memory, civic textbooks are “deliberately written with the future in mind: they aim to construct responsible individuals in their anticipated collectivities” (Soysal 2005:12). Moreover, citizenship education textbooks may construct the ideal ways for balancing unity and diversity within and beyond national boundaries (Banks 2004), as well as “forming social and political identity and giving young people the tools, they need to become active citizens” (Castles 2004). Citizenship education plays an important role for inculcating civic nationalist sentiments in the hearts and minds of the younger generation (Faucher 2006). There are two sides of citizenship education that commonly feature its implementation across the world. One is its role for producing “a culturally and nationally homogeneous labour force,” and the other is its significance as “a means for promoting active democracy premised on the building of autonomous, critical citizens” (Bénéi 2005:9).

This study focuses on the narrative of the nation represented in citizenship education textbooks written for university students. The character of higher education in Indonesia provides two important characteristics that make it unique in comparison to the other strata of education. First, the myth about university students as the “national saviors” is still powerful (Aspinall 2012:176). Thus, among education policy makers and campus intellectuals, university is an important site for preserving Indonesian nationalism.
Second, Indonesian higher education is administered by two governmental institutions: The Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education (Menristekdikti), that runs more secular and general schools, and the Ministry of Religion (Kementrian Agama), which manages religious based school, including Islamic universities and higher institutions. This dual administrative supervision suggests variations in the expectation of knowledge and values that students should aspire to. For example, many Educational State Universities in Indonesia position themselves as character building institutions. In addition, more Islamic higher education institutions under the Ministry of Religion are explicitly announcing their support to Pancasila, whereas state owned universities under the Ministry of Education, such as Gadjah Mada University, reinstate their position as Pancasila university.

Finally, university students in the past have been actively involved in national politics. They have buttressed as well as involved in toppling regimes in power through their activism. I assume that forging their characters through citizenship education is not only aiming to create good citizens who love their country and understand their rights and obligations, but also to mold obedient citizens who support national policies.

3.2 FIVE DATASETS

I have analyzed several datasets in this study, among which citizenship education textbooks serve as the main source of data for gaining insight into multiple narratives of Indonesianness in post-New Order Indonesia. As officially selected, organized, and transmitted knowledge, the national textbooks are “indispensable to the explication of public representations of national collectivities and identities” (Soysal et al 2005:12). They, however, are a result of
contest and consensus. Conceiving citizenship education textbooks as written narratives allows not only the apprehending of multiple and contesting narratives on the nation, but also continuities and changes in the ways textbooks define *Indonesianness*.

Besides citizenship education textbooks, I have gathered additional data sets to provide relevant information to understand the shaping process of the content, publication, distribution, and use of textbooks. These additional datasets are very important to highlight both the potential and limitation of the use of citizenship education textbooks in post-New Order Indonesia.

### 3.2.1 Dataset#1: Citizenship education textbooks in higher education

The main data in this study consists of selected citizenship education textbooks for undergraduate students published between 1998 and 2016. This data set is central to address the research question of how the representations of the nation in post-Suharto Indonesia are shaped. For this purpose, I have selected only national textbooks, that is, textbooks and modules written, printed, and published for national circulation and available in various cities. I identified these textbooks by browsing the online national catalogue at the Indonesian national library website using the key words of “citizenship education” (pendidikan kewarganegaraan) and found 465 records of civics related books. I looked up each of the records dated after 1998 and identified 141 citizenship textbooks specifically for university students. Each record detailed ISBN number, author(s), and the title of books, publishers, subjects, book’s descriptions, and sites of the library in Indonesia where the books were available.

In reading through the online book records, I found cases where the same textbooks were recorded more than once. In 2013, this national data system was based on the self-report records by the national, regional, and local libraries in Indonesia. Unfortunately, there was a
multiplication of numbers of books because the library recorded a book available in several local and regional libraries as different individual items, and this is also the case for the library collection printed in different years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Writer</th>
<th>Zainul Ittihad Amin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Pendidikan kewarganegaraan/penulis, Zainul Ittihad Amin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publisher</td>
<td>Jakarta : Universitas Terbuka, 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book Description</td>
<td>vi, [532] hlm. ; 21 cm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Perpustakaan nasional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3.1.** The 2013 online national catalogue at Indonesian national library

Despite that the book records do not necessarily reflect the number of citizenship textbooks published after 1998, the online national catalogue provided sufficient information for categorizing books as the national textbooks for this study. I identified fifty-eight books of citizenship education textbooks for higher education students, published only once and available only in one city, and twenty-two textbooks, published more than once and/or available in several cities in Indonesia. I refined the latter list by checking the ISBN and earlier printed version of the hardcopy of the latest textbooks and found that some books were updated several times in different editions and, in some cases, the book was published in updated editions by different publishing house with new ISBN numbers.

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30 [http://kin.pnri.go.id/result.aspx?keyword=pendidikan%20kewarganegaraan&category=0&location=](http://kin.pnri.go.id/result.aspx?keyword=pendidikan%20kewarganegaraan&category=0&location=) (downloaded at 5/19/2013 10:45:00 AM), using key words of *pendidikan kewarganegaraan* or *citizenship education*.  

59
I finally narrowed down the list of twenty-two to nine national textbooks. However, during in-depth interviews with citizenship education authors and teaching staff, I identified two other textbooks. The first additional item is an online module published by the Higher Education of the Ministry of Education on February 2013. The second is written by a team of writers at the University of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta. Finally, the third additional textbook published by the Open University (Universitas Terbuka), fully funded by the government.

At the beginning, I examined only twelve textbooks and one module. However, a closer look at the content of the latest publications in comparison to their earlier versions provides a profound insight on changes and continuities in not only books’ themes but also in moral meanings that they are intended to convey. Thus, rather than limiting this study to the latest publications, I also included the earlier versions of the books. I paid attention to information concerning authors and publishers, whether the current book had earlier versions, the immediate context in which textbooks were written and published, purposes of textbooks, readers intended, and the possible content’ shifts in both the earliest and latest publications.

Consequently, although my focus is on the post-Suharto Indonesia textbooks (1999-2016), I extended the time frame to Suharto New Order period as this strategy allows me to highlight similarities and differences in the content of textbooks in comparison to their earlier publications. For example, in analyzing the textbook written by Sumarsono et. al. (2008), I found that the current textbook is the updated version of its earlier publications in 1980 and 1990, published by Suharto’s New Order. The constant comparison provides insight on how authors maintain and revise the main themes while at the same time preserve and put new meanings of who we are as a nation and what characters good citizens should possess. In total, I analyze thirty-two books and two online modules for narrative analysis (see Appendix A.1.).
Textbooks as written narratives are different from spoken narratives in several ways. Referring to Riessman (2008), the existence of narrative texts take place prior to an analyst’s decision to encounter the texts. Written narratives are shaped by the purpose of addressing a particular imagined audience, authors’ decisions concerning the content, and circumstances around their production. Consequently, it is necessary to take account of the targeted audience and the objective of the narrative, why narrators link selected events, cultural references that inform the narrative, the ways in which the narrators link events and their meanings to the audience or readers, how they narrativize incidents, and whether there is a possibility of a “preferred, alternative, or counter narrative” (Riessman 2008:11). Thus, besides the main data of citizenship education textbooks in higher education, I also include the following additional datasets for allowing a more comprehensive understanding of the text and the context, but also informing a better process for drawing conclusion from the main data.

3.2.2 Dataset#2: National policy documents concerning citizenship education

This data set consists of thirty-five policy-related documents that inform the university regulations concerning compulsory citizenship education. Dataset#2 is indispensable to trace changes in education, higher education policy and national curricula, and their influence in shaping discourses on nationhood and citizenship. From 1998 to 2016, the position of citizenship education within higher education curricula has been shifting, partly as a response to the demand for creating a new citizenship for more democratic Indonesia. For example, between 1998 and 2005, the government required university students to take citizenship education course, whereas in the following year it further regulated the list of themes that citizenship education textbooks should include. Six years later in 2012, the Ministry of Education re-inserted Pancasila as an
additional course and regulated citizenship education as a compulsory subject. In February 2013, the Ministry of Education published a free access online module for university students as a national reference for material discussed in class. In 2016, it published a new online module replacing the earlier one. Thus, dataset #2 will inform this study of how changes in discourses of nationhood and the ideal citizen as represented in the citizenship education textbooks are partly shaped by changes and continuities in national curricula (see Appendix B.1.).

3.2.3 Dataset#3: in-depth interviews with publishers and writers

The roles of publishers and authors are crucial in shaping discourses of nationhood and the ideal citizen. Potential market and book distributions may inform authors’ decision in shaping the books’ themes and discussions. Dataset#3 will include data generated from the in-depth interviews with selected publishers and/or authors concerning how textbooks are published and distributed. The authors in this study are also educators, who write their own textbooks and modules. This suggests that not only do teaching staff have a measure of autonomy in shaping the content of their teaching materials, they are also involved in shaping the production and circulation of textbooks and modules.

This dataset includes interviews with five writers and a group discussion with Muhammadiyah authors and officials. They are identified from the author information page available on the textbooks and I contacted them via email and phone as well as visited them at their university office. In addition, I conducted one face-to-face interview and three phone interviews with the staff of local and national publishers. All the interviews took place between 2012 and 2016 in three cities: Medan, Yogyakarta, and Malang. This data set will highlight the
ways in which discourses on the nation are shaped by the process of textbook production and circulation (see Appendix C.1.)

3.2.4 Dataset#4: in-depth interviews with educators

The selected educators in this study teach citizenship education for two main groups of undergraduate students: general students, who are required to take either two or three credit citizenship education course, and education students, who also take the course in addition to other courses as part of their academic program to become citizenship education teachers at the primary and secondary levels of education. I have conducted the in-depth interviews with twelve educators from four universities (UDA, UNIMED, USU, UMSU) in Medan and three from UGM and UNY in Yogyakarta. All the interviews took place at the university sites between 2012 and 2016, with the duration of 45 minutes to two hours. This data set provided information concerning the roles of educators in shaping current discourses on nationhood and the ideal citizen. Besides the Ministry of Education guidelines and regulations, their decision to use textbooks may be guided by whether the approaches of the books match their perspectives; fit the curricula in their institutions; or were relevant to the current development of discourses of citizenship education. Thus, dataset#4 informed this study of the selection and use of the textbooks and/or modules (see Appendix D.1.).

3.2.5 Dataset#5: in-depth interviews with students and alumni

As the intended audience for the citizenship education textbooks, I assumed that how students (or former students) shape discourses of the nation might be different from the content
of textbooks as expected by policy makers, authors, and educators. Thus, to understand their perspectives pertaining to citizenship education I conducted three group discussions with twenty-five students from three universities in Medan, UMSU, UDA, and Unimed in 2014. Additionally, I interviewed eleven students and alumni between 2014 and 2017 in Medan and Yogyakarta. All interviews took place at the university’s sites with the duration between 30 minutes to two hours (see Appendix E.1.). Prior to the interviews, I set up a meeting with the directors of the citizenship education program who later scheduled the interview as well as selected students for discussion.

For all interviews I conducted, besides the memo of appropriateness and research permits from the local government as required by IRB (Institutional Review Board), I prepared supporting letters from two institutions: Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Utara (UGM) dan Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM). Either in face-to-face interviews or interview by phone, I asked the teaching staffs, students/alumni, and authors for their consent to record the interviews to include part of their statements as quotation in my report. In some cases when they disagreed to be recorded, I took note of our conversations.

3.3 NARRATIVE ANALYSIS AND THEMATIC (NARRATIVE) ANALYSIS

Narrative analysis has been widely used as an object of inquiry, a method for inquiry, and a product of inquiry (Ewick 1995). The idea that “[n]arrative is both a mode of reasoning and a mode of representation” (Richardson 1990:118) suggests that not only do people understand the world narratively but they also can articulate about the world narratively (1990:118). Important
for these two modes of reasoning is the assumption that time is important as a reference for interpreting self and identity through narrative (Richardson 1990:124).

There are at least three ways to understand the position of narratives in sociology (Ewick and Selby (1995). First, narrative can be seen as an object of inquiry and explanation, on which narrative analysis focuses on “how stories are produced” with the emphasis to “denote processes by which people construct and communicate their understandings of the world” (Ewick and Selby 1995:202). The second way is to perceive narrative as “a method or means of studying social life” (1995:202). The underlying assumption is that “narratives provide a lens or window through which we can best study social life” (Ricoer 1980 in Ewick and Selby 1995: 03). The third way to understand narratives is by conceiving them as stories told by scholars (Ewick and Selby 1995:203). This conception suggests the role of intellectuals as constructing “narrative representations of the world” (Ewick and Selby 1995:203), which consequently calls for the issues of “coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure” (White 1987 in Ewick and Selby 1995:204).

Although the three positions of narrative cannot be separated in such rigid ways, a narrative analysis in this chapter refers mainly to the third conception, which positions narrative as a method of interpreting written texts as “a storied form” (Riessman 2008:11). Conceiving narrative analysis this way allows this study to treat textbooks as a “memory text” (Brockmeier 2002:24). I conceive that the citizenship education textbooks, analyzed in this study, possess the “storied form”, which includes the following elements: (1) selected past, present, and even future events (Brockmeier 2002); (2) plots or emplotments that link events and explain how and why the events/happenings took place (Ewick 1995); and most importantly, (3) a moral meaning
fabricated through the interpretations of why the selected events are important (Ewick 1995, Polkinghorne 1991, Ricoeur 1991a, White 1987).

I conducted the following steps of narrative analysis for analyzing textbooks and modules (see appendix B.1. on narrative analysis of dataset#1). First, I used the thematic narrative analysis for scrutinizing the content of the text by paying attention to central recurring themes and concepts that textbooks develop, and what authors emphasize in relation to these concepts. As Riesmann highlights, thematic narrative analysis emphasizes “thematic meanings and ‘point’” (2008:62), allowing analysts to gain “specificity” (2008:64). Selected citizenship education textbooks in post-New Order Indonesia discuss several themes including democracy, human rights, civil society, citizenship, national ideology, national identity, etc., that are common in citizenship education texts around the world. Using thematic narrative analysis, emphasizing what is said, written, and shown (Riessman 2008:53), I paid careful attention to the “thematic meanings and ‘point’” (2008:62), discussed by the authors. My aim is to gain specificity (Riessman 2008:64) if the authors code similar meanings of these concepts by taking into account the words, terms, metaphors, and statements in articulating these meanings.

Second, I conducted structural analysis to highlight “the way a story is told” by focusing on “how a teller by selecting particular narrative device makes a story persuasive (Reissmann 2008:2-3). As Ricoeur writes:

“A story is made out of events to the extent that plot makes events into a story. The plot, therefore, places us at the crossing point of temporality and narrativity: to be historical, an event must be more than a singular occurrence, a unique happening. It receives its definition from its contribution to the development of a plot” (1980:171).
In analyzing stories told (Bruner 1987:5), the coherence of narrative is essential because it enables one to locate the self with a beginning, middle and end (Mackie and MacIntyre 1981:5). Likewise, in written narratives, I pay close attention to the ways authors build the coherence of their narratives. Here the focus is on how textbooks persuade their readers of their claims by revisiting selected events in national pasts as well as how they highlight and obliterate the roles of particular actors and groups pertaining to these selected pasts.

In addition, paying close attention to the emplotment, the linking of the relevant past to the present and even the future, allows this study to not only build a default past that textbooks share in narrating Indoensianness, but also to understand the contested meanings that authors code over how and why the selected pasts are important for the present. Thus, this second strategy leads this study to identify the ways in which authors highlight, erase, and rewrite the narratives of Indoensianness.

Third, I pay attention to what shapes standard content of textbooks in order to link the texts to their contexts. Apple (1992) refers to this as regulation or liberation of the text production in textbook industry and “the changing of ideological climates” about “what should be taught in school and on how it should be taught and evaluated” (Apple 1992:6). Two quite distinct yet interrelated contexts can be categorized: the context of texts in reference to its production and its intended readers. Moreover, in analyzing texts, it is necessary to pay attention to “the complex power relationships involved in their production, contexts, use, and reading” (1992:4). All these call for, among other things, information drawing from various sources, which include national policy documents on citizenship education (dataset#2). Using thematic narrative analysis, I select relevant information from policy documents between 1954 and 2016,
and national curricula that shape the practice and the content of citizenship education in higher education (see Appendix B.2.). I read through the documents, and by constantly comparing themes of what are expected from universities, textbooks, educators, and students, I describe the shifts in the government representations of the nation and ideal citizen.

In addition, there are intellectuals writing the narratives. Ewick and Selby (1995:203), for instance, see narratives as the stories told by scholars, suggesting the larger role of intellectuals in constructing “narrative representations of the world” (Ewick and Selby 1995:203). Textbook productions, for example, are informed by those whose knowledge is deemed “official” and who have authority to decide “what is to be taught” and how to evaluate the teaching and learning (Apple 2004: vii). In empirical words, this dynamic is embedded in how authors refer to national regulations, the values of the social and educational organizations, the potentials and limitations in publishing textbooks, and the authors’ visions of Indonesianness. Using thematic narrative analysis, I selectively drew from the in-depth interviews with the publishers and writers (dataset#3), the factors that contribute to the circulation of textbooks and shape the content of the citizenship textbooks in higher education (see Appendix B.3.). From this data, I found it sufficient to record the interview and took note only on relevant additional information concerning the narrative analysis of textbooks.

Another crucial point in contextualizing the text is the role of teachers and students in encountering knowledge and values, as conveyed in the texts (Apple 1992). Stuart Hall (1993) has posited what is encoded in texts does not guarantee that the message will be decoded exactly the same way and result in the same meaning when the messages are encoded. Teachers may selectively “…accept, reinterpret, and reject what counts as legitimate knowledge” (Apple 1992:10). In addition, students are not always passive receivers, instead they are “active
constructors of the meanings of the education they encounter” (1992:10) through three possible responses to texts: dominated, negotiated, and oppositional. Whereas in the dominated reading of a text students accepts the messages at face values, in a negotiated response they may dispute a particular claim but accept the overall tendencies or interpretations of a text. Finally, in an oppositional response, readers may reject the dominant tendencies and interpretations (Apple 1992).

I follow that “text involves coded information” (Luke 1989) and that textbooks are written and edited intentionally to transmit particular tradition of values, and belief besides selected knowledge and competencies (Williams 1976 and 1977, in Luke 1989: 54). Thus, the dynamic among texts, educators and students in class at its immediate context suggests that besides its potentials as the main reference for their readers, they might not be understood in the ways that authors have intended. Thus, what is encoded does not guarantee that the message will be decoded exactly in the same way and resulting in the same meaning when the messages are encoded (Hall 1993:90).

Using thematic narrative analysis (Riessman 2008), I selectively generated information from the in-depth interviews with the educators concerning their rationalities in selecting and using certain textbooks for their citizenship education classes (dataset#4), and with students about their perspectives pertaining to the citizenship education subject (dataset#5). Comparable to datasets#3, I have not transcribed the whole conversations. Thematic analysis pertaining to this data set is accomplished by paying attention to the relevant information during the recorded interviews. I transcribed only the thematically relevant part of the interview.

The second attempt to link text to its context refers to the construction of texts within their political and cultural contexts. Concerning this, I locate texts in a broader site beyond
education by taking account of discourses on national identity in academic venues as well as in public discourses. This position, consequently, requires the following up discussions by attending several national seminars on citizenship education and history education-related discussions. In addition, I checked other citizenship education textbooks (outside textbooks selected in dataset), papers, newspapers, magazines, and Facebook pages as well as selected YouTube videos on nationalism and citizenship. Besides participating in five international conferences on Indonesia between 2012 and 2014, I also attended the Annual Meeting of the Association of Citizenship Education (AP3KNI) in Malang in October 2015.

Additionally, I joined two discussions on the history lesson and on the book discussion concerning the 1965 victims. I also followed public discussions concerning Indonesian nationalism since 1998 on selected books, papers, newspapers, magazines, and social media platforms, including YouTube and Facebook. Following issues through these various media outlets allows the locating of the multiple narratives of Indonesianness within the cultural and political contexts of post-New Order Indonesia. However, because these data are intended to support the understanding and later explaining the textbook narratives, I selected and analyzed only the most relevant contents and information.

31 Discourses on post-New Order national identity has exploded in social media since 2014, before the presidential general election, and peaked currently in 2017 when two candidates, Ahok—a Christian and Chinese descendant—and Anis Baswedan—a Muslim and an Arabic progeny, competed for the seat of the governor of Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. More than the 2014 presidential election, the 2017 provincial election vastly developed to become one of the loudest national issues, involving various political and religious actors nationally and internationally. More than before, the 2017 governor voting was deeply colored by identity politics that explicitly emphasized on the one hand, religious identity, and on the other hand, the nativity of Indonesians.
3.4 ISSUES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS AND CORRESPONDENCE IN NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

Understanding narrative calls for consideration of the methodological approach to understanding the data. In response to this concern, two positions of interpretation are identified: verstehen and hermeneutics (Polkinghorn 2007). In verstehen, analysts conceive that text as “an object that can be understood as the author intended,” and that it is possible for analysts to transcend or break out of their historical settings for reproducing “the meaning or intention of the actor” through their emphatic understanding (Schwandt 2000:192 in Polkinghorn 2007:483). In hermeneutics, analysts understand that their encounters with a text are informed from within their ‘prejudices’. Thus, the process of interpreting data resembles “a conversational dialogue through which meaning is a product of interaction…one cannot transcend one’s own historical and situated embeddedness; thus, textual interpretations are always perspectival” (Polkinghorne 2007:483-484).

Adopting the second perspective, I conceive this study from a narrative point of view. Concerning this view, Riesmann (2008) has identified three levels of text as narrative:

“…stories told by research participants (which are themselves interpretive), interpretive accounts developed by an investigator based on interviews and fieldwork observation (a story about stories), and even the narrative a reader constructs after engaging with the participant’s and investigator’s narratives” (Riesmann 2008:6).

The issues concerning the quality of the first and second points above are relevant to this study and I respond to these issues by considering the discussions on ‘validity’ in studying
textbooks as written narratives. Here, I refer ‘validity’ to the credibility of description, conclusion, explanation, or interpretation, which maintains the work as trustworthy (Corbin and Strauss 2008, Maxwell 2005). It also refers to whether researchers’ claims or conclusions are “well grounded” (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:171).

Because narrative analysis involves two performances, the collection of evidence and the analysis or interpretation of evidence, researchers “need to argue for the acceptance of the validity of the collected evidence and the validity of the offered interpretation” (Polkinghorne 2007:478), or as Reissmann (2008) suggests, two levels of validity can be understood as two levels of trustworthiness and correspondence. Adopting the assumption that narrative researchers need to seek “narrative truths” rather than “historical truth” (Spence 1982 in Polkinghorne 2007:479) and following Reissmann’s first and second levels of text (Reissmann 2008:6), I emphasize the significance of two distinct levels of trustworthiness and correspondence in this study. The first issue is how to clarify “what the storied text is intended to represent” (Polkinghorne 2007:479) or “the meaning making of narrator” (Reissmann 2008:188). Concerning this, I have earlier discussed the appropriateness of selecting citizenship education textbooks and the use of narrative and thematic analysis to describe what is represented in texts and how authors code their meanings of the nation and the ideal citizens.

The second issue is concerned with how to ensure the trustworthiness of the interpretation drawn in a narrative study. Informed by Kvale’s (1996) suggestion that researchers can continually check, question, and theoretically interpret their findings, I conducted the following back and forth comparisons. First, concerning textbooks’ representations, I constantly compared the three narratives of *Indonesianness* that I have drawn from the selected textbooks to
several citizenship education textbooks for university students available in various libraries, book stores, or from various interviews, public discussions, and personal conversations.

Moreover, while the final judgement for the claim of trustworthiness in this study would be in the hands of the readers, I found it necessary to provide information about the research process (Ritchie 2004:272) of how the narratives of the nation are constructed in this study (Riessmann 2008:188). This demand calls a narrative researcher to show his/her audience “…as much as possible of the procedures that have led to a particular set of conclusions” (Seale 1999:158 in Ritchie 2004:271). In response to this, I have used first NVivo 10 and then NVivo11 software to assist with the data management. However, although NVivo software provides important tools for checking and rechecking the data analysis in this study, it also has some limitations. One of these limitations is in reading data in the Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia). Consequently, the internal data consists of notes in English on the original texts. Specifically applied for the main data (citizenship education textbooks), the data analysis proceeds from initial coding and focused/selective coding through initial, summary, and integrative memos, to theory construction.

Finally, I returned to some of my informants and discussed my preliminary findings with one of the educators as well as the author of the citizenship education textbook in order “to see if the meaning or interpretation assigned is confirmed by those who contributed to it in the first place” (Ritchie 2003:276). In addition, I compared my interpretation to other studies, which used other sources of data such as a history textbook by focusing on changes and continuities in post-
New Order textbooks. This strategy is useful not only for ensuring the plausibility of the multiple narratives drawn from the data, but also to identify the novelty of this study.

In summary, Indonesian higher education is the suitable site for grasping the contested ideals of *Indonesianness* and the citizenship education textbooks are an appropriate source of data for understanding official narratives of the nation. I have outlined methods of data collection and analysis significant for understanding narratives of *Indonesianness* as well as how to deal with the issues of quality by taking account of the importance of trustworthiness and correspondence in studying textbooks as written narratives. Finally, I have discussed the limitations in conceiving textbooks as written narratives and in conducting analysis for generating theory, and the best ways to overcome pitfalls and benefits of data collection and analysis methods.

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4.0 THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVES OF THE NATION IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA

As part of the attempts for Indonesianing Indonesians, Civic education has evolved through several regulations from Civics between 1957 and 1962; *Pendidikan Kemasyarakatan* (Social Education), which integrated history, geography, and citizenship since 1964; *Pendidikan Kewargaan Negara* (Citizenship Education) from 1968 to 1969; Citizenship, Civics, and Law since 1973; *Pancasila Moral Education (PMP)* from 1975 to 1984, and *Pancasila and Citizenship Education (Pancasila dan Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan or PPKN)* started in 1994.

In the higher education curricula, the Manipol and USDEK, Pancasila and the 1945 constitution course in the 1960s (Ubaedillah 2012) were complemented with students military training (known as *Wajib Latih Mahasiswa (Walawa)* (Lemhanas 1992). During Suharto’s New Order regime, during 1973-1974 academic year, students were obligated to take the Philosophy of Pancasila (*Filsafat Pancasila*). In 1983, the government added patriotism education (*Pendidikan Kewiraan*) as a compulsory course (Jackson 2007:45), supplemented by a program called defending the state (*bela negara*). The New Order regime also launched the P4 program, through which university students must attend one-week lectures and discussions.

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33 In Gadjah Mada University, for example, this program was translated into, among other things, students’ camps, through which students were grouped for several joined activities that made possible the interaction among fellow students from all over Indonesia.
34 The guide to the full comprehension and practice of Pancasila
intended to strengthen their sense of nationalism and improve their understanding of Pancasila before starting their bachelor’s studies.

After the collapse of the New Order regime, in the early 2000s, citizenship education was transformed from the militaristic indoctrination style to a new citizenship education, which emphasizes democracy and human rights. In this chapter, I discuss in detail contending narratives of the nation emerging in post-New Order Indonesia. Contextualizing the transformations in citizenship education within cultural politics since the early independence, I later demonstrate that despite the government guidelines to homogenize the content of citizenship education textbooks—by including themes of democracy, human rights, national identity, the amendment of the 1945 constitution, national resilience, and the national way of seeing—three narratives diverge in defining what these concepts mean. Unlike in the New Order’s ‘master narrative’ (Heryanto 2007:596), post-New Order narratives selectively delete, revise and counter some of the prior account of Pancasila and the 1965 event, suggesting continuities as well as changes in the official narratives of Indonesianness.

4.1 THE NARRATIVE OF THE NATION BEFORE THE 1998 REFORM MOVEMENT

What is currently known as citizenship education in the Indonesian education system was introduced as early as the beginning of the guided democracy era in 1959 (Douglass 1970). It was implemented through a rigorous indoctrination program following Sukarno’s presidential speech on the Independence Day that year, later known as the Political Manifesto, or Manipol. The speech became the source of inspiration for the first of the five basic principles of education
- “promotion of love of nation and fatherland, and of national, international, and religious ideals” (Douglas, 1970:68). The 1964 education plan further emphasized *Pancasila* as the national philosophy to support Indonesian socialism.

Despite Sukarno’s nationalist thunder, the practice of the indoctrination program was limited (Douglas 1970). In 1963, the material supply for the learning and teaching process of the civics was inadequate; the government required several years to publish the limited number of the three volumes intended as student textbooks and teachers’ main reference (1970:69). In addition, the university students were stuffed with the similar courses they had already taken in their previous education. The introduction to *Pancasila* had started at the elementary level of education; it was taught again in junior high school, complemented by the introduction to Indonesian socialism. In the senior high school, not only did students learn the similar previous material, they also had to study the Guided democracy and *Manipol Usdek*. Finally, at the university level, students were expected to re-learn all the earlier content and add *Manipol-Usdek* as a required full-credit course (1970:72-75).

Thus, according to Douglas (1970), many of the literature references for university students included the same textbooks listed for high school students. The only reference, which was not listed for the lower level of education, was *Seven Basic Indoctrination Materials*, resembling *Men and the New Indonesian Society* for elementary level (Douglas 1970:69). Douglas (1970) also has observed:

“The content of the political ideology which high school and universities were supposed to transmit was amorphous and flexible –more conducive for superficial memorization than to the development of a set of
fundamental orientation toward political objects and standards of political behavior” (Douglas 1970:151).

Consequently, students had little confidence in explicating concepts that Sukarno had invented, and teachers tended to “refrain from attempting explanations of doctrine” (1970:69).

The teaching took place within the context in which the Indonesian universities in the early 1960s were marked by a transition process from free-study to guided-study style (Thomas 1963). The free-study style was common in Indonesian universities as the legacy of the Dutch colonial education system. However, the lack of “staff, books, laboratory equipment, classroom buildings, and student housing” (Thomas 1963:258) went parallel to students’ considerable freedom in deciding when they had to take their courses and exams. Consequently, their performance was questionable as they frequently took extended time for finishing their studies, and when they finally did, the number was only handful. In response to the situation, in 1962 the government urged universities to adopt a new guided-study style. Students were required to attend lectures and complete their bachelor’s within a certain time period (1963:259). This new policy was met with considerable resistance. Both students and teaching staff found it difficult to adapt to the transition.

It was within the transition that civics curriculum included “the requirement of organized marching in the 1963-64 and 1964-1965 academic years” for students (Douglas 1970:76). Many students interviewed by Douglas argued that the required practice demonstrated that “the political leadership is stupid and inconsiderate” (Douglas 1970:76). Douglas also has revealed that the political sensitivity informed the deference of particular symbols in class: “teachers and administrators alike preferred not to commit their political hands by dealing with the sensitive
(although officially promulgated) idea of Nasakom” (1970:74); or when teachers thought that a topic was “remotely political”, they tended to “stick to the book” (1970:79).

The indoctrination program during Sukarno’s guided democracy (1959-1965) was shaped in line with his political move to secure his position vis-à-vis his political rivals. Since 1959, the leftist element was very aggressive in influencing campus life (Ibrahim 2016). For example, Ibrahim (2016) notes the dismissals of teaching staff, who were considered as unsupportive of Sukarno’s fusion of Nationalist, Communist, and Islam (Nasakom) ideologies. Apparently, the Nasakom mostly benefitted the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and its affiliated institutions such as People University (Universitas Rakyat) and Aliarcham Academy (Akademi Aliarcham). In addition, the leftist student movement by CGMI, IPPI, HSI and Serikat Pekerja Pendidikan were also competitive and active (Ibrahim 2016).

Following the 1965 killing of the six generals and mass killing of at least 500,000 communist members and sympathizers, the Ministry of Education closed sixteen PKI related higher education institutions and the student organization, CGMI (Ibrahim 2016). Since then, the universities screened their students and staff suspected as communist sympathizers by involving the military and university screening teams. As the result, at least 597 staff and 6,928 students were identified and another 1000 of GMNI ASU at the Indonesian University (UI) were expelled (Ibrahim 2016). According to Ibrahim (2016) the screening process, known as a special assessment (penelitian khusus or litsus), continued until 1987.

For the non-leftist students, 1965 was a time when they could play the central role in “bringing the downfall of President Sukarno and his regime, and in supporting the establishment of the New Order” (Aspinall 2012:158). A group of these students formed the Indonesian

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35 There were thirty-nine states-owned and 228 private universities in 1965 (Ibrahim 2016).
Student Action Front (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia or KAMI*) and prepared large protests with their allies, which consequently legitimized the army’s taking power and stripping Sukarno off his power. Later, these students became known as the 1966 generation (*Angkatan 66*) (Aspinall 2012). A large anti-communist student group in the 1950s and 1960s, who compromised with accommodated the regime, survived during the New Order rule (Aspinall 2012:162). They included the association for Catholic students (PMKRI), Protestant students (GMKI), nationalist students (GMNI), and student Islamic group (HMI). These groups were important for the New Order and the numbers of HMI alumni, for instance, reached around 200 of the 500 of the national parliament in 1997 (Aspinall 2012:172).

Both student’s activism and citizenship education changed under Suharto’s New Order (1967-1998). Prior to the 1970s, patriotism education (*pendidikan kewiraan*) replaced Sukarno’s Civic Education with the compulsory course of *philosophy of Pancasila* in the state universities (Bourchier 2015). Political socialization in Suharto’s New Order was later designed and implemented more coherently than during Sukarno’s guided democracy. Like his predecessor, Suharto’s New Order paid serious attention to patriotism education at all levels of education, including the university level. The role of the military in deciding the shape of and the curricula for patriotism education became central. The debates on student military training (*wadjib latihan mahasiswa or walawa*) in mid-1967 showed how keen the military leaders were to the idea that university students should participate in 1,500 hours of student military training (Douglas 1970:195).

Unlike Sukarno’s *Nasakom* program, the New Order centralized a more systematic and widely affected program by appointing two primary institutions: the Ministry of National Defense, which later relegated the responsibility to the National Defense Institution (*Lemhanas*),
and the Ministry of National Education, then transferred the task to the Directorate of Higher Education (Dikti). The two government institutions collaborated to prepare new curricula, provide training for teaching staff, and formulate the required citizenship modules and textbooks. In 1981, the Ministry of Education provided guidance for a higher education core curriculum and, in 1982, it introduced a patriotism program in neighborhoods and schools through the Introduction for Defending the State Education or *Pendidikan Pendahuluan Bela Negara* (*PPBN*). The educational courses were divided into two distinct levels: the beginners, which included students from kindergarten to high school, and the advanced level for university students (Sumarsono 2008).

The government’s indoctrination program in education particularly intensified when Nugroho Notosusanto became the leader of the Ministry of Education in 1983 (Bourchier, 2015:207). The implementation of the 1984 national curriculum made it explicit that Citizenship Education was instrumental for the indoctrination of *Pancasila*, the national ideology. Soon, this policy was followed by a more comprehensive two-weeks compulsory program as a part of the first-year student’s curricula at the university level. The national indoctrination program became known as the training of guidelines for understanding and experiencing *Pancasila* (*Penataran Pedoman Penghayatan Pancasila* or *P4*).

Finally, in 1985, the government complemented its P4 indoctrination program by requirement of all social, religious, and political organizations to accept Pancasila as the only ideological basis (Ramage 1995:3). In the same year, the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Education signed a joint decision outlining a patriotism course for university students. This joint decision was soon followed by the forming of a permanent working group, consisting of personnel from the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Education.
The Institution of National Defense (Lemhanas) later assigned a group from the two institutions to monitor and evaluate modules for citizenship courses at all levels of education in Indonesia, including the official compulsory citizenship education textbook for university students (Lemhanas 1992). Later, the Law No. 2/1989 endorsed the 1984 national curriculum and reemphasized the importance of citizenship and patriotism (Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan/Kewiraan) for students.

Through the P4 program, Pancasila course, and citizenship education textbooks, the government became the only interpreter, producer of teaching materials, and controller of the writing on Pancasila. In addition, it implemented direct or indirect censorship\(^3\), when the textbooks and related reading materials were printed and distributed only through the government channels (Shiraishi 1995:178). Concerning this policy, Seung-Won Song (2008) describes:

“the state strictly censored the publication of Pancasila-related books. Many books, therefore, were never published as they did not meet state requirements. People and institutes involved in making materials had to get through various strict checks. Once a book was written, it was sent to a group of advisors and authorities to check if the content of the material was correct. Next, it was sent to a group of university lecturers and teachers to check its writing and editing. Then,

\(^3\)Relatively strict censorship was also extended to the media as “vehicles for the creation of a ‘national culture’” (Sen 2000:11). The state provided guidelines on “what to say, what not to say and who could speak in which medium” (Sen 2000:11). It curbed the media with its strong corporatist control (Boudreau 2002) by authorizing a representative for each media organization to be responsible for implementing the government instructions and prohibitions (Sen 2000). Through this practice, the government eliminated undesirable participants and suppressed any conflict in industrial relations or in news media reports. In history education, the state shaped the past to legitimize the emergence of the New Order regime, to justify its interest in maintaining the holistic unity of the territory, the nation, and the state, as well as to achieve stability and social harmony (Wood 2005). Such official dominant narratives of the nation overflowed the public through the government textbooks, films, music, advertisements, speeches, ceremonies, museums, etc.
it was sent to the Ministry of Coordination of Politics and Religion, the State Secretary, the Minister of Information, the chair of BP-7, and … the general director of the elementary and middle school level, to check its propriety. Finally, it was sent to the Ministry of Education and Culture for final approval” (Song 2008:156).

The main goal of the P4 program, among other things, “…was to reconstitute Indonesians in a new image, to create what the government came to call the Pancasila Person (Manusia Pancasila) or the Complete Person (Manusia Seutuhnya)” (Bourchier, 2015:200). In his analysis of P4 in the early 1980s, Morfit (1981) also identifies the commitment of the New Order government “to a concept of national development that envisions no fundamental change in the social order and that this preservation of the existing order is to be guaranteed by the military” (1981:846).

The New Order’s P4 cost lavish time, spending, expenditure, and energy (Watson 1987). Indeed, studies have discussed several rationales for the government campaign. Besides partially a response to public criticism of the ways the government conducts its administration, particularly in relation to corruption (Watson 1987:48 in Bourchier 2015:197-198); the program was also the tool of the New Order government in its attempts to delegitimize Islam, following Muslim opposition to some of its policies (Morfit 1981:850). In addition, the program was to anticipate “the continuing hold of leftist and Sukarnoist ideas had on the population” (Bourchier 2015:199).

It is also highly likely that the government’s citizenship education and its implementation of the P4 program among university students were partly intended to domesticate these young
citizens due their up and down relationship with the government. As Aspinall (2012) posits, despite their support of the New Order regime following the 1965 movement, students’ relations with the new government were not always on good terms. They did not hesitate to initiate and joint protests to challenge the government unpopular policies. For example, in 1974 after the Malari event, the government detained many students and other protestors (Aspinall 2012:162). In 1978, the government’s repression became more intense as “troops and tanks raided campuses and hundreds of students’ leaders were arrested and dozens put on trial” (2012:162). Later, as Aspinall describes, the Suharto New Order:

“systematically tried to depoliticize campuses once and for all by way of a so-called normalisasi kampus or campus normalization policy through which student representative bodies and media were either proscribed or placed under the control of campus administrator” (Aspinall 2012:162).

The central role of military during Suharto’s New Order is visible in the designing of national curriculum for citizenship education. On paper, Lemhanas and Dikti were two collaborative organizations planning the new curriculum, formulating citizenship textbooks (and modules), and training teaching staff. In practice, however, Lemhanas acted as the prominent institution shaping the content of the official patriotism textbook and hosting various citizenship education trainings for teaching staff at all levels of education throughout Indonesia. Those completing the course were conferred certificates, signifying their qualification to teach citizenship education. Yet, due to the close selection and limited seats for participants, the program was unable to quantitatively meet a high demand of patriotism educators in the country. Consequently, the available teaching staff had to teach long hours and large classes. Perhaps, in
response to this issue, *Lemhanas* sent military personnel and/or military pensioners to fulfill the teaching positions for citizenship education at the university level.

Like in any other textbook in the New-Order regime, the single dominant narrative that represented the nation is the militaristic narrative. By this term I refer to the story that emphasizes the centrality of military in the nation-state. In this study, I have generated militaristic narrative based on New Order citizenship education textbook in higher education citizenship education. The earliest version of textbooks was produced by *Lemhanas* in 1972 (*Pengantar Geostrategi and Pengantar Geopolitik*) and 1974 (*Pokok-pokok Usaha Pengisian Wawasan Nusantara*). Two years later, between 1976 and 1977, the government published several textbooks written by a few appointed staff of the Ministry of Education and universities’ teaching staff. The Ministry of Education further revised national curricula, including the introduction of Pancasila as a compulsory subject and the required P4 course.

In 1977, the Ministry of National Defense evaluated its modules and prepared a new draft of a patriotism textbook. The earlier module was filled with military technical concepts, whereas the new module attempted to translate these military terms with more popular descriptions (*Lemhanas*, 1980:v). The revision was published in 1979 and in 1980 it became the first New Order’s citizenship education textbook for university students. The book, *Patriotism for University Students* (*Buku Kewiraan Untuk Mahasiswa*), was reprinted every year until 1987 (*Lemhanas* 1987). It was revised in 1988 under the new title of *Citizenship Education (Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan)* reissued every year until 1996. In the following year, *Lemhanas* updated the book by adding a new introduction, cover, and size, and the book was reprinted yearly until 2000 (*Lemhanas* 2000).

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37 *Lemhanas* is the abbreviation for The Institution of National Defense
In the span of twenty years of its publication, the content of the book was almost without any meaningful change. This suggests that the New Order story of the nation continuously and obstinately conveyed to the youth, stayed consistent over the years. Emphasized in its narrative of the nation is the centrality of the military and its dual functions. This imagined nation-state is clearly visible in New-Order citizenship education textbooks published between 1980 and 2000. In detail, its militaristic narrative centers on several underlined points as the following.

First, the New Order’s main objective of citizenship education was to equip students with patriotism sentiments, measured by love to the Republic of Indonesia, the belief in Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and the willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the nation-state (Lemhanas 1992:6). Despite its title –Citizenship Education—it is the concept of citizen itself that is strikingly missing from all the editions. The only reference to citizen can be found merely in the passage on the right and the obligation of citizen to defend the state (1992:113). Instead of using the concept of citizen (warga negara), the the book implements the concepts of the people of Indonesia and the nation of Indonesia (masyarakat dan bangsa Indonesia).

Moreover, the militaristic narrative conceives Indonesian people both as the objects of national development and docile subjects willing to defend and sacrifice for the nation-state. It applauds the participation in the people-based national defense (hankamrata), a program for mobilizing Indonesian people under the military leadership to defend the countries in response to the intensification of its perceived internal and external threats (1983:237). Accordingly, the ideal Indonesian man/woman (Manusia Indonesia) is conceived as a defender of the nation-state (1983:155) and a ‘man/woman of development' (manusia pembangunan) (1992:112), who should possess characteristics suitable for and supportive of the national development.
Second, Lemhanas underlines that the emergence of the New Order regime was for correcting wrongdoings in the past, i.e. the practices of the previous two kinds of democracy: the liberal (1950-1959) and the guided democracy (1959-1965). Whereas the liberal democracy hampered the process of national development, the guided democracy dissuaded Indonesian people and the nation from achieving their national goals (1983:114). In this militaristic narrative, the two kinds of democracy were not only incompatible to the character and the culture of Indonesia, but also engendered national stability. As such, serving as the alternative to the liberal and guided democracies, Lemhanas (1991) claimed that the most suitable democratic system for Indonesian culture and character was Pancasila democracy (Demokrasi Pancasila) (1991:100). In this militaristic narrative, it is a system of democracy generated from the five principles of Pancasila: “collective work (gotong royong) for enhancing people’s welfare, religious belief rejecting atheism, and harmony in the relationships among individuals, God, and society” (1991:101). In this Pancasila democracy, the decision-making process was based on the consensus and voting was strongly discouraged.

Lemhanas further reminds students of the dangers of communism, claiming that in the past it had infiltrated almost all aspects of the nation-state and attempted to challenge the philosophy of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Accordingly, it was exactly in response to these attempts that the supporters of Pancasila spontaneously demanded the return to the national ideology and goals, hence, the centrality of the emergence of the New Order in 1966. In this Lemhanas account, it is only by returning to the real Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution that the nation-state could create a long term national stability for accelerating the process of national development to achieve the national goals (Lemhanas 1983:114).
Perhaps the most striking Lemhanas’s myth of the nation is the holistic unity of the nation and the state, that highlights the transformation of the nation into a nation-state (bangsa yang menegara). It depicted the emergence of the holistic unity of Indonesia through the following three stages. First, the nation had existed in the golden age of the Kingdoms of Sriwijaya and later Majapahit in the seventh and fourteenth centuries, respectively. Second, the nation later suffered for centuries under the cruel rules of the colonial regimes of the Portuguese, Dutch, and then Japanese. Finally, it reached a new stage of revolution that transformed the nation into a new 1945 modern nation-state, in which the role of military is intensely emphasized. The book further accentuates the holistic unity of the nation-state in terms of territory, ideology, economy, social, cultural, national defense and security, and psychology (1992:27-28,36). The basis for the integrated-holistic unity (manunggal) is the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila (Lemhanas 1992:36). Underlining the holistic unity of the people, the nation, and the state, Lemhanas also invented two interlinked concepts: the national resilience (ketahanan nasional) and the national way of seeing (wawasan nusantara). The two concepts later functioned as the framework to direct the course of the New Order national development.

Within the holistic unity of the nation and the state, Lemhanas positions the military as central, claiming its inevitability for national defense and security, and its necessity to intervene in the processes of national development. The military’s indispensability in all aspects of national lives is enhanced by the concept of the military dual functions (dwifungsi ABRI), which justify military involvement in national defense and security, as well as in social and political affairs (1992:195-196). Employing this concept, Lemhanas required that the military responsibilities were extensively and deeply entrenched in all aspects of the national, including (but not limited to) destroying the remnants of the communist movement (G30S/PKI), securing
the implementation of the five-year national development plan, preventing and overcoming obstacles in security and national development, and setting the foundations for people’s active participation in national defense and security (1992:170).

Critiques of the militaristic narrative have arisen from outside government circles. The top-down and indoctrination styles as conceived did not fit in the modern education. In its implementation, the dominant role of the military and the internal scrutiny among civil servants limited teachers/educators’ roles merely as the conveyors of government messages. At the same time, educators themselves were also the objects of the government indoctrination program through the Pancasila seminars and courses that they had to follow to get the qualification as citizenship educators. The involvement of ex-military individuals as teachings staff for this course likely made it difficult for civilian educators to develop discussions beyond what was written in textbooks. Consequently, whereas students tended to see the compulsory course as boring and merely wasting their time, educators found that they were tied to develop interesting discussions in their large classes with the limited time.

As I discuss in the following section, the initiative to formulate a New Citizenship education emerged in 1999, only a year after the collapse of Suharto’s New Order in 1998. Despite the cancellation of P4 and Pancasila education as a compulsory subject in the early transition to democracy, the teaching of Pancasila continued in citizenship education and many teaching staff were still referring to P4 in their attempt to discuss the best way to understand Pancasila. Further, in 2011, the Directorate of Higher Education under the Department of Education required all public and private universities in Indonesia to teach Pancasila Education either as a single subject, or as a part of the citizenship education course. Finally, the government reinstated Pancasila as a compulsory subject at all levels of education in 2012. Amidst the
changes in the curricula, three contesting official narratives of the nation in post-New Order Indonesia emerge: state-based, citizen-based, and ummah-based narratives of the nation.

4.2 CONTESTING NARRATIVES OF THE NATION IN POST-NEW ORDER INDONESIA

The existing discussions on citizenship education in Indonesia reveal conflicting views on the content of the new citizenship education, and the position and roles of Pancasila in post-New Order national curricula. Song (2008), for example, argues that unlike in the previous regime, citizenship education in the post-New Order focuses on a new national view of liberal democracy. It articulates plurality in terms of democracy and human rights and how to increase citizens’ participation in politics. In addition, the post-Suharto’s textbook forges homo politicus in a democratic society. Song identifies the adoption of the Western democracy and captures how, in the post-Suharto era, the New Order is perceived as “deviating from liberal democracy” (2008:371). Song (2008) also notes the return of post-Suharto regimes to Pancasila and highlights that civic education after 2004 provides a new interpretation of Pancasila, which emphasizes a new national view based on liberal democracy. Pancasila is no longer the only basis of the nation, but “it remained as just the symbol of national unity” (2008:369).

Similarly, Fearnley-Sander and Yulaelawati (2008) note the persistence of Pancasila and argue that, despite the deletion of Pancasila as required subject in the national curricula, its central position is maintained in official documents. More specifically, they argue that, despite the significant changes in the national curriculum, the five principles of Pancasila still serve as the foundation of national education. By the end of 2000, the government incorporated a new
approach to citizenship education, but also re-emphasized *Pancasila* as the source of Indonesian state philosophy, civic values, and national identity (Fearnley Sander and Yulaelawati 2008:115). Fearnley Sander and Yulaelawati (2008) argue that “…in the post-New Order era, civic agency has been foregrounded in the citizenship curriculum through its organization around competencies for citizenship, and that it is decentralization that is steering the communitarian traditions of Indonesian citizenship in the direction of democratic citizenship” (2008:113). Fearnley Sander and Yulaelawati identified this trend as “a move away from communitarian citizenship” which refers to self identification with the state (2008:113), although the concept of citizenship is “still strongly organised around the collective pursuit of a common goal”, it is understood in terms of “the democratic goal of citizen’s self-government” (2008:113).

Unlike studies by Song (2008) and Fearnley-Sander and Yulaelawati (2008), Jackson and Bahrissalim (2007) focus on the theme of Islam, civil society, and the state. They compare two citizenship education textbooks written by authors from two Islamic institutions: the Islamic State University (UIN) and Muhammadiyah university. Their study reveals, that despite their reference to the western theories of civil society, the textbooks propose two different views:

“While the state Islamic university text takes as its primary reference point Western social science theories on civil society, the orientations of the Muhammadiyah text is to Islamic scholarship on the structure and nature of society and its relationship to the state. This scholarship is based on the model of the Muslim community at Medina during the time of the prophet” (Jackson and Bahrissalim 2007:50).
Such conflicting views on the content of the new citizenship education and the position and roles of Pancasila in the post-New Order national curricula call for further inquiry. The first step would be to identify the sources of data and analysis, on which these studies are based. While providing a sign of shifting interpretation of Pancasila in post-New Order Indonesia curricula, Song (2008), for example, generated her argument merely from a book published in 2003 by a team of authors from the ICCE of the Islamic University of Jakarta (UIN Jakarta). Had Song taken account of the citizenship education textbooks published by Lemhanas and Dikti since 2001 or the books written under the Muhammadiyah organization since 2003, she would not have overgeneralized that the return to Pancasila was in tandem with the state’s reinforcement of the institution of liberal democracy. She would also have not claimed that the new civic education after 2004 provided a new interpretation of Pancasila, emphasizing a new national view, based on liberal democracy. Such limitation in data sources have hindered Song’s study from capturing the possibility of several emerging narratives in post-Suharto Indonesia and prevented the study from emphasizing the importance of the value of Islam in the new citizenship education.

Similarly, Fearnley-Sander and Yulaelawati’s (2008) analysis merely focused on government documents pertaining to citizenship education in Indonesia. The selective data source, while providing insight of changes in the official national curricula, unfortunately misses the emerging alternative narratives within other state institutions, for example, the Indonesian Islamic University (UII) and the non-state or private educational institutions (the University of Muhammadiyah). Consequently, this study merely highlights the persistent role of the old players within the government institutions, without taking into account the emerging new actors involved in the reproduction of nationalism in the post-New Order Indonesia.
Indeed, the study by Jackson and Bahrissalam (2007) not only illustrates the emerging narratives different from the previous militaristic narrative, but also suggests that the alternative narratives are not singular. However, Jackson and Bahrissalam (2007) does not capture the persisting role that Lemhanas and Dikti play in reproducing and shaping the official narratives of the nation and the ideal citizens. Like the previous studies by Song (2008) and Fearnley-Sander and Yulaelawati (2008), Jackson and Bahrissalam (2007) are yet to discuss how several emerging narratives of Indonesianness are represented and shaped in post-Suharto Indonesia.

Bridging the gap in the current studies, I demonstrate below how the three contending narratives - state-centered narrative, citizen-centered narrative and ummah-centered narrative – have emerged in post-New Order Indonesia. I argue that the three contesting narratives do not only provide insight of diverse ways in which the nation and the ideal citizens are represented, but most importantly they mark the emergence of new nationalism during the transition and consolidation to democracy.

4.2.1 State-centered Narratives

Brubaker (1998) proposes distinction between “state-framed and counter-state understandings of nationhood and forms of nationalism” (1998:300). He explains further: “[i]n the former, ‘nation’ is conceived as congruent with the state, as institutionally and territorially ‘framed’ by the state; in the latter, it is conceived in opposition to the territorial and institutional frame of some existing state or states” (1998:300). In this study, my emphasis is on the myth that the nation and the state is congruent. By state-centered narrative, I refer to the narrative that highlights the centrality of the state and demands citizens to place the interest of the state above
their own. It also depicts the transition from the New Order regime to the post-New Order period as a normal process and suggests that despite huge changes having taken place before and after the New Order, these vicissitudes are without any significant disruptions. The state-centered narrative is further characterized by its departure from the militaristic discourse, while at the same time preserving some of its core values.

The following discussion on state-centered narrative is drawn from the narrative analysis of eight textbooks published or reprinted between 1998 and 2016. The first book *Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan* (Citizenship Education) is written by a team of fifteen authors from Lemhanas and Dikti. The book is well known as the “red and white book” or “Lemhanas’ book” among the educators, indicating its connection to its earlier editions in the New Order period. *Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan* was first published in September 2001 (Sumarsono 2001) and reprinted eight times by 2008 (Sumarsono 2008). In 2016, the book was still widely used in various Indonesian universities. Although the 2001 edition (or the 2008 reprinted version) is no longer available in the bookstores, it is purchasable from various street vendors, either second-hand or newly printed. Considering the weak practice of law enforcement on copyrights in Indonesia, it is highly likely that the 2008 printed version has been reproduced illegally in response to the students’ high demand.

The second book is an online module published in 2013 and written by four authors appointed by Dikti. Three of the writers - Udn Sarifudin Winataputera, Sapriya, and Dasmin Budimansyah - are from Universitas Terbuka (Open University) and Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia (UPI or The Indonesian University of Education), whereas the fourth author, Dwi S. Winarno, is a teaching staff at the State University of Surakarta. The module is free downloadable at Dikti’s website and its publication suggests the increasing role of Dikti in
defining the official narrative of *Indonesianness* in post-Suharto Indonesia. In 2016, *Mensristekdikti*\(^{38}\) published a new version, titled *Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan untuk Perguruan Tinggi* (Citizenship Education for Higher Education). The publication is based on the government regulation, *Permenristek Dikti* No. 44/2015 on the national standard of higher education that required courses on Religion, Pancasila, Citizenship Education, and Indonesian Language for higher education students. Unlike the 2013 online module, the 2016 text is written by twelve authors: the prior four authors and the additional eight writers from the *Mensristekditi* and the Ministry of Economic Coordinator. Unlike the 2013 edition, the later publication is more explicit in departing from militaristic narrative. For example, whereas in the earlier module the emphasis on unity include four dimensions of integration in economic, politics, social-cultural, and security and defense, the 2016 deletes the last point (Nurwardani et.al. 2016:60).

The third book, written by Dwi S. Winarno, is titled *Paradigma Baru Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan: Panduan Kuliah di Perguruan Tinggi* (The New Paradigm of Citizenship Education: Guidance in Higher Education). Its first edition was published in 2006, the second edition was launched the following year (Winarno 2007) and reprinted every year until 2011. Closely referring to the 2006 government instruction, the second edition retained themes of the first edition, but included new discussion of the state and constitution (Winarno 2011). The third edition was published in 2013 and reissued five times until 2016. Taking account of the Law No. 12/2012, the 2013 and 2016 editions incorporate the discussion on *Pancasila* in all its chapters.

The fourth book is *Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan untuk Perguruan Tinggi* (Citizenship Education for Higher Education) was written by Kaelan and Zubaidi, the teaching staff at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. The first edition was published in 2002 (Kaelan 2002). After *Dikti*\(^{38}\) (Higher Education Directorate) was later transformed to *Menristekdikti* (the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education).

\(^{38}\) *Dikti* (Higher Education Directorate) was later transformed to *Menristekdikti* (the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education).
regulated the content of citizenship education textbooks for higher education in 2006. Kaelan and Zubaidi (2007) published another book under the same title as the first edition and reprinted once or twice a year until 2011. The latest 2012 edition (Kaelan 2012) was reprinted until 2016 (Kaelan 2016). The 2002 and three other editions were published by Penerbit ‘Paradigma’ Yogyakarta, a publishing house owned by the first author, Kaelani. A closer look at the contents of the 2007, 2010, and 2016 editions shows that, except the book’s cover, the contents of the books are identical, suggesting the book’s consistency in its narrative of the nation and the ideal citizens.

The fifth book is written by Noor Ms. Bakry, teaching staff at Gadjah Mada University. The book, Citizenship Education (Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan), was first published in 2009 (Bakry 2009), and reprinted in 2011, 2012, and 2014. In 1996 he also authored a textbook titled Citizenship Education: The National Way of Seeing, National Resilience, and National Politics and Strategy (Ikhtisar Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan: Khusus Materi Wawasan Nusantara, Ketahanan Nasional, Politik dan Strategi Nasional) (Bakry 1996). Like other textbooks published after 2006, the author takes into account the Dikti’s guidelines about the content of Citizenship Education textbook for university students. Thus, in comparison to the 1996 edition, which covered mainly the themes of the national way of seeing, national resilience, and national politics and strategy, the 2014 book maintains these themes and adds the discussions typical for the post-Suharto citizenship education textbooks. It includes themes such as the introduction of citizenship, Pancasila philosophy, national identity, the state and constitution, Indonesian democracy, human rights, and Indonesian geopolitics and geostrategic.

The sixth book is written by CST Kansil and Christine S.T. Kansil (2006). The first writer has been prolific since the 1960s with, at least, sixty-nine publications including the
subject of *Pancasila* and Citizenship Education for various levels of education published under the New Order period. Their post-New Order book was first published in 2003 and relaunched in 2005. Updating the earlier versions, the third 2006 edition adds discussions on *Pancasila*, with the new title of *The Module of Pancasila and Citizenship (Modul Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan)*. The book is written for a wider audience to include teachers at secondary level of education rather than only university students (Kansil and Kansil 2006). Unlike other textbooks in this study, Kansil and Kansil shape the content of the book in the format of questions and answers. Their authoritative tone dictates to its readers what they should understand pertaining to all themes in the book. They do not only direct readers to focus on matters at hands, but also strongly prevent them from questioning the book’s discussions. Unlike the 2006 book, the 2011 edition emerged in new shape and content. Not only do the title change into *The Four Pillars of Nationhood and Statehood (Empat Pilar Berbangsa dan Bernegara)*, suggesting the authors adoption of the concept proposed by the Nasional Assembly (MPR); the structure of the content of the book is also no longer in ask-and-answer format.

The next textbook is written by Syahrial Syarbaini, teaching staff and coordinator for the compulsory subject of *Pancasila and Citizenship Education* at the *Universitas Esa Tunggal*. He also teaches similar subject at three other universities: Mercu Buana, Universitas Budi Luhur, and Universitas Negeri Jakarta. He has participated in courses hosted by the Higher Education Institution or *Dikti* in 2005 and 2006, and Lemhanas’ training (TOT) for teaching staff in 2014. Although the 2014 book, *Citizenship education for Higher Education: Implementing the Values of the Characters of the Nation (Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan untuk Perguruan Tinggi: Implementasi Nilai-Nilai Karakter Bangsa)*, was printed as the first edition, the author has
published three earlier citizenship education textbooks in 2010\textsuperscript{39}, 2006\textsuperscript{40} and 2001\textsuperscript{41}. In my analysis, I focus mainly on Syarbaini’s 2014 printed edition in comparison to the 2010 publication in order to gain insight on the solidifying narratives and themes emerged in the 2014 book\textsuperscript{42}. As other textbooks in my study, the two books take account of government rules and guidance\textsuperscript{43}. However, the current book is unique as it devotes a special chapter to a discussion of democracy and civil society and a closer look at the content, however, highlights the importance of Pancasila in shaping the book’s narrative.

Another book is Citizenship Education (\textit{Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan/MKDU 4111}), written by Zainul Ittihad Amin (2014), teaching staff at the Open University (\textit{Universitas Terbuka Indonesia}). This is a state-owned university, which provides long-distance learning for undergraduate and graduate students from all over Indonesia. Built in 1984, the number of students reached 299,317 by 2016 amongst its four schools: Economics, Social and Political Sciences, Math and Science, and Education. The book was first published in 2008, reprinted twice or thrice a year; it has been reprinted nineteen times by 2014. The book is intended exclusively for the students of the Open University and, unlike the rest of the books listed in this study relatively available in various bookstores or accessible online, this book is only

\textsuperscript{39} The Implementation of Pancasila through Citizenship Education (\textit{Implementasi Pancasila melalui Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan}).
\textsuperscript{40} Character Building through Citizenship Education (\textit{Membangun Karakter dan Kepribadian melalui Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan}).
\textsuperscript{41} Citizenship Education (\textit{Pendidikan Pancasila di Perguruan Tinggi}).
\textsuperscript{42} Comparing the 2014 to 2010 publications is useful for identifying the persistence of the book in its discussion of civil society. In addition, although a drastic change can be identified from their chapters’ theme, it is palpable that the content of the 2014 evolves from the 2010 book. The 2010 book centers on the notion of Pancasila in six of its twelve chapters (Syarbaini 2010), while the 2014 book discusses the notion of Pancasila only in one sub-section in chapter two of its ten chapters and adds two new themes of national integration and regional autonomy (Syarbaini 2014). In addition, the latest book preserves themes that are highlighted in the earlier book, including Indonesian democracy, human rights, national Identity, rights and obligations of citizens, Indonesian geopolitics and geostategic, and civil society (masyarakat madani).
\textsuperscript{43} Whereas the 2010 book refers to the law No. 20/2003 on national system of education, the 2014 book forms its chapters in reference to the law No. 12/2012 that revised the 2006 guideline (SK Dikti No. 43/Dikti/Kep/2006) for the content of citizenship education textbook for university students.
purchasable through the Open University bookstore in Jakarta. A closer look at the earlier publication in 1998\textsuperscript{44} by the same author (Amin 1999) shows a continuation of the content of the current edition as all six chapters of the earlier publication are included in 2014 edition.

The final book is written by three authors, Srijanti, A. Rahman H.I. and Purwanto S.K., all teaching staff at the Universitas Mercu Buana (Mercu Buana University), a private university in Jakarta. The book’s title is Etika Berwarganegara: Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan di Perguruan Tinggi (Ethics of Citizenship: Citizenship Education in Higher Education) (Srijanti 2009). The first edition was published in 2006 and partially as the response to the Law No 12/2006 about citizenship education in higher education; the second edition was published in 2007 with updated topics for students’ discussions (Srijanti 2007). The third edition was published in 2009 (Srijanti 2009) with a slightly changed in the title: Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan di Perguruan Tinggi: Mengembangkan Etika Berwarganegara (Citizenship Education in Higher Education: Developing Ethics of Citizenship).

These eight textbooks share the following themes: the repositioning of military in post-New Order Indonesia, the centrality of Pancasila as the national ideology and the main source of national identity, and the recognition of citizens’ rights and obligations. Yet, as the subsequent discussion will demonstrate, the textbooks’ interpretations of Pancasila vary and disagree about the role of civil society in a more democratic Indonesia. In returning to the selected past to build the coherence of their arguments, most authors are silent about the militaristic narrative’s account of the 1965 event that preceded the emergence of the New Order rule. In the following, I describe in detail how these textbooks represent the nation and ideal citizens, centering on four central themes: repositioning military’s role in post-New Order Indonesia, redefining national

\textsuperscript{44}Patriotism Education (Pendidikan Kewiraan/MKDU 4105)
identity through *Pancasila*, defining Indonesian democracy referring to New Order’s *Pancasila* democracy, formulating new citizenship by embracing a new relation between the state and civil society.

**De-militarizing the Nation**

In the state-centered narrative, the most urgent issue is to preserve the unity of the nation-state in politics, national development, social-cultural dimensions, and security and defense based on *Pancasila* as one national ideology (Nurwardani et.al. 2016; Kaelan 2015; Winarno 2013; Kansil and Kansil 2011). At the surface, this issue is comparable to the New Order’s official narrative. Yet, in re-drawing the imagined community, the authors obliterate the concept of military dual functions (“*dwi fungsi ABRI*”) and in its place, for example, Winarno (2013) coins the concept of civilian dual roles (“*dwi-fungsi sipil*”) (2013:232). The latter emphasizes that security and defense are not only military tasks, but it is the right and obligation of Indonesian citizens (2013:232). Referring to the law No 12/2006, military is conceived as ordinary citizens and grouped in the same category as farmer, entrepreneurs, for example. (Nurwardani et.al. 2016). Military is still necessary but only when it is required (Sumarsono 2008:131).

The government’s rule on the content of citizenship education for higher education makes the two New Order’s military concepts—*wawasan nusantara* and *ketahanan nasional*—compulsory in textbook’ discussions. Most textbooks, interestingly, adapt the two concepts to the current context by broadening their earlier meanings. The first concept, the national way of seeing (*wawasan nusantara*), is redefined as Indonesian geopolitics (Kaelan 2015; Rahayu 2009; Winarno 2016; and Nurwardani et.al. 2016:69). Winarno (2013:177), for example, underscores that the concept is at the core for unity among the territory, the state, and the nation, whereas
Minto Rahayu adds the unity of diversity in all aspects of life (2009:207). Kaelan and Zubaedi (2015) emphasize the importance of security and defense as well as national welfare. Unlike Lemhanas that emphasizes students’ willingness to sacrifice for their country, some authors replace this patriotism with the obligation of paying taxes and as a new kind of patriotism (Nurwardani et.al. 2016:273; Kansil and Kansil 2011).

Re-defining the New Order’s concepts, interestingly, does not mean textbooks leave behind the legacy of New Order government. Textbooks continue to accentuate the military’s historical heroic appeal. They describe military roles in several important events in the past, for example, in liberating the nation-state from colonialism, preserving the independence of the nation-state from the internal threats of communist movement (PKI) and radical Islamist (DI/TII), and in the claiming back Papua (Irian Jaya) as part of the unified Indonesia (Sumarsono 2008, Winarno 2013). Some authors highlight the role of the military behind the concept of the national way of seeing (wawasan nusantara) (Syarbaini 2014:118) and the national resilience (ketahanan nasional) (Syarbaini 2014:137). Others pass the long-standing New Order’s foes to the post-Suharto Indonesia, that include the “twin bugaboos” (Weatherbee 1984) of communism and radical Islam, as well as liberalism (Bakry 2014, Kaelan 2015, Amin 2015; Kansil 2006).

However, acknowledging military roles does not necessarily suggest that the militaristic discourse is still dominant in post-New Order Indonesia as Purwanta claims (2017). In contrary, what takes place instead is the de-militarizing of the New Order’s narrative of the nation. This is particularly visible from the way in which the online module revisits the 1945 Indonesian revolution by erasing military central role pertaining to the event. Thus, rather than preserving military’s account of the 1945 as a revolution that underlines the centrality of military, the book
signifies the event as *revolusi integratif*, that is, a revolution through which divided nations became a unified modern nation-state (Nurwardani et.al. 2016:69).

**Re-defining Pancasila**

The textbooks representation of *Pancasila* provides insights into how in their imagined nation-state, the New Order’s interpretation of the centrality of *Pancasila* is adapted. Textbooks preserve the centrality of *Pancasila* for the nation-state as the militaristic narrative suggests. For example, textbooks maintain *Pancasila* as the guiding principle, the source of motivation for all actions in everyday life, and the basis for state practices (Kaelan 2015). *Pancasila* is a common denominator, the ideology of the nation-state, and the source of national identity (Winarno 2013:29; Kaelan 2015:189). In addition, textbooks preserve the notion of *Pancasila* as the only ideology for the nation, state, and society (Amin 2014).

Despite the apparent similarity to the militaristic narrative, state-centered textbooks signify a different meaning of *Pancasila*. For example, following the national assembly’s new notion, Kansil and Kansil (2011) conceive Pancasila as one of the four pillars of nationhood and statehood. Most importantly, the post-New Order textbooks subtly put more emphasis on piety in their reading of the first principle of *Pancasila*. As *Pancasila* is conceived of as the result of the consensus of the representatives of people, guided by the values of religion(s), humanity, unity, and justice (Bakry 2014); the imagined society that the state-centered narratives signify is one that is characterized by the centrality of the values of piety, family-based (*kekeluargaan*), harmonious (*selaras*), and peoplehood (*kerakyatan*) (Kaelan and Zubaidi 2015: 189). A subtle shift from the militaristic narrative is only visible when textbooks, referring to the article 31 of the constitution on national education and the 2003 national education law, state that the state accommodates religious view and that the aim of the national education must be achieved
through fostering students piety\textsuperscript{45} (2016:139). For example, Nurwandani et. al. (2016) argue that the first principle is hierarchically served as the basis for the other four principles of \textit{Pancasila}, thus the belief in God must be understood as the basis for the other four tenets (2016: 137-138). Unlike the militaristic narrative, the state-centered discourse of the nation swings the pendulum from a more secular to a more religious imagined community. As the following discussion further demonstrates, for some authors the latter also means it is a nation-state informed by the values of Islam.

\textit{From Pancasila Democracy to a more Religious Pancasila democracy}

Textbooks preserve the myth that \textit{Pancasila} is rooted in Indonesian cultural tradition for hundreds of years (Sumarsono et. al. 2008:113). Revisiting \textit{Pancasila democracy} allows authors to build a narrative, that underscores the relevance of \textit{Pancasila} to the current democratic era while at the same time detaches \textit{Pancasila} democracy from Suharto’s New Order. For example, essentializing \textit{Pancasila} as basic values and norms of Indonesia, Kaelan and Zubaedi (2015) posit that Suharto’s New Order used \textit{Pancasila} only to legitimize its centralized and militaristic power despite its claim that \textit{Pancasila} and the 1945 Constitution were the basis of its rule (2015:47).

Although authors praise the positive development of democracy after the collapse of the New Order regime, they later consider it unable to provide better social and economic conditions and wide access for public participations (Kelan 2015). In addition, as the argument goes, the collapse of the New Order regime with the transition to democracy was accompanied by oligarchy and vertical and horizontal conflicts (Nurwandani \textit{et. al.} 2016:127-128). Accordingly,

\textsuperscript{45} As the online module underlines: “\textit{Maknanya adalah bahwa untuk mencapai tujuan Pendidikan nasional, yaitu mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa, harus dilakukan dengan meningkatkan keimanan dan ketakwaan serta akhlak mulia}” (Nurwandani \textit{et. al.} 2016:139).
authors suggest the return to *Pancasila* democracy (Sumarsono 2008; Winarno 2013) to balance people’s position both as individuals as well as social beings. Unlike the liberal democracy, *Pancasila* democracy, places individual freedoms within the frame of the common goal (Kaelan 2015:68; Sumarsono 2008). The current narrative prefers deliberate consensual democracy (*musyawarah mufakat*) (Bakry 2014) as the best practice as this does not only reflect the values of communitarian or family-hood (*jiwa kekeluargaan*) but also the Indonesian character and tradition (Kaelan 2015). Thus, voting is recognized as the last option (Amin 2014:6.27) while oppositional parties or groups are undesirable (Bakry 2014:226; Amin 2014:6.21).

In addition, more than the militaristic narrative would emphasize, the state-centered narrative explicitly underscores the centrality of the religious dimension of *Pancasila* democracy. *Pancasila* democracy must emphasize piety, value humanity, preserve unity, prioritize consensus, and create justice (2014:82). Authors in the state-centered narrative also suggest that the belief in one and only God should be inherent in the practice of democracy in Indonesia (Bakry 2014) and that the practice of democracy must be accountable both to people and God (Winarno 2013). Thus, *Pancasila* democracy is conceived of as a democracy that informs a democratic religious state (Bakry 2014) or a religious democratic system of governance (Kaelan 2015, Winarno 2013).

Most importantly, unlike the New Order’s narrative that underline state’s neutrality in its relation to any of recognized religions in Indonesia, there is more emphasis on the significance of Islam as the source of Indonesian democracy (Nurwandani *et. al.* 2016). This is visible, for example, when the book discusses three references in its attempt to demonstrates how democracy is part of Indonesian tradition:
“At least three sources that inform the visions of democracy in the heart of the nation of Indonesia: collectivism generated from village consensus; Islamic teachings that demand God’s truth and justice and solidarity/relationship among humans as the creatures of God; as well as humanity of Western socialism that had attracted the national movement leaders for independency” (Nurwandani et. al. 2016:157).

Referring to Islam, the book further emphasizes monotheism (tauhid) and examples of democracy generated from the prophet of Muhammad in Madina (2016:159-160).

**Defining New Citizenship**

Unlike the militaristic narrative, which conceived Indonesian citizens merely in terms of their right and obligation to defend the country and to participate in national development (Lemhanas 1983, 1992, 1997, 2000), the state-centered narrative offers a new way of defining the relationship between the state and citizens in post-New Order Indonesia. Besides paying significant attention to citizens’ rights and obligations, the state-centered narrative underscores the obligations of the state to its citizens (Sumarsono 2008).

In recognizing universal human rights, the authors persuade students to understand their human rights, yet they also re-emphasize the boundaries of citizens’ loyalty within the frame of the national interests\(^{46}\). This refers to rights and obligations as recognized in the Indonesian 1945

\(^{46}\) For example, after more than twenty pages describing human rights based on the thirty articles of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a resolution of the United Nation on December 10, 1948; Sumarsono et. al. (2008) close the discussion in only four sentences claiming, that despite the importance of these rights, students must remember the centrality of the state and their obligations.
amended constitution and the national law No. 39/1999 on Human Rights (Kaelan 2015). The nationalizing of human rights this way is also accompanied by the narrative’s instruction to balance citizens’ human rights and their responsibilities (Sumarsono 2008:33-43; Bakry 2014; Syarbaini 2014).

*Embracing a New Relation between the State and Society*

In the militaristic narrative, the holistic unity of the people, the nation, and the state was the core concept. The roles of active citizens and civil society are missing from its discussion. Unlike this New Order official narrative, the state-centered narrative makes a distinction between the state and society. Civil society, however, is discussed by only three textbooks. Amin (2015), for example, makes it necessary to remind his readers that the concept of civil society does not necessarily refer to the dichotomy of civilian versus military. Civil society includes at least the free public sphere, democracy, tolerance, pluralism, and social justice. He argues that the notion of civil society makes possible a respect-based consultative relationship between the state and citizens. Only by acknowledging citizens’ rights and obligations, is the state capable to treat its citizens fairly and justly, and that civil society might exert control over the state (Amin 2014:1.20-21).

Unlike Amin (2015), Srijanti et al. (2009) prefer to use the concept of *madani* society instead of civil society. Different from the concept of civil society, *madani* society is defined referring to: “…all of the movements of Indonesian society are based on the belief in God…and *madani* society is based on this morality” (Srijanti 2009:221). According to Srijanti et al., the 1998 reform movement demanded to replace the New Order regime with a *madani* society (2009:207) characterized by: (1) the independency of individuals and groups of people from the state; (2) public freedom to discuss and decide political practices; and (3) the ability of *madani*
society to limit state’s power (2009:216). In addition, madani society must recognize pluralism, tolerance, and the enactment of the principles of democracy (2009:212). To build the future Indonesian madani society, Srijanti et al. suggest the following steps: (1) providing religion learning among students in early education and obligating education institutions to provide religion lessons; (2) implementing religious values and placing religion as the basis for morality; (3) guaranteeing the freedom of expression of society in line with religious values; and (4) providing proper prayer facilities for Indonesian citizens (Srijanti et. al. 2009:221).

Similarly, Syarhial Sarbaini proposes the practice of democracy to develop a madani society for the success of national development (2014:83). He highlights the significance of the values of Islam in informing the everyday practices of civil society in Indonesia, including the values of moderate attitudes (tawassuth), in which students are expected to be open-minded to understand changes, justice (I’tidal) to create solidarity, tolerance (tassamuh), and balancing (tawazun) their beings as God’s and as social creatures (2014:90).

Overall, the state-centered narrative drawn from the eight textbooks illustrates the continuities yet also changes from the militaristic narrative. In accommodating the new paradigm of citizenship education with the new themes of democracy, human rights, and regional autonomy, it adapts the most notable notions of the New Order discourse of Pancasila: Pancasila democracy, national identity, the national way of seeing, and the national resilience. In this effort, the state-centered narrative detaches these concepts from the New Order regime, by blaming latter as deviated from Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

Reworking the New Order official narrative while at the same time erasing the role of Suharto from the narrative allows authors to adapt the legacy of the past into the current context. Authors suggest that the current post-New Order era is the appropriate time for a better
implementation of the core tenets of *Pancasila*. Moreover, in line with the 2003 Education Law, textbooks adopt a more religious-based interpretation of *Pancasila* and emphasize the significance of the values of Islam in the nation-state. This is visible in textbooks’ discussions of the first principle of *Pancasila*, the belief in God, for defining post-New Order national identity and national ideology. A similar tone is also palpable when textbooks discuss Pancasila democracy (*demokrasi Pancasila*), underscoring a *de-liberal* and religious democracy.

### 4.2.2 Citizen-centered Narrative

As part of the attempt to formulate more progressive curriculum materials (Azra 2007), the State Islamic university, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (UIN Jakarta), initiated a new paradigm of citizenship education (Kraince 2007; Pohl 2009) to replace the outdated New Order’s patriotism education (*Pendidikan Kewiraan*) (Ubaedillah 2012) and its P4 program. The UIN Jakarta is part of the modern Islamic higher education institutions in Indonesia that comprise at least fifteen percent of the national higher education enrollment (Buchori 2004, Kraince 2007). The Islamic universities have provided Indonesian schools with Islamic teachers nationally. Many of their graduates become *ulemas*, teaching staff in traditional Islamic boarding schools (Kraince 2007) and in various private and government institutions.

The UIN Jakarta first initiated its civic education program that “combines Islamic and Western notions of democratic pluralism and civil society” in 2000 (Jackson and Bahrissalam 2007). Funded by the Asia Foundation, the program included a pilot project, new curriculum, and publication of a citizenship education textbook. After training 170 citizenship education instructors and teaching around 8000 students, the new paradigm of citizenship education was implemented in 46 out of 47 campuses of Islamic higher education by September 2001 (Kraince
The textbook became the main reference for teaching staff and their students. This program was a success and, in 2002, the Ministry of Religious Affairs decided that the civic education was a compulsory subject in state-funded Islamic higher education, including the Islamic Universities, IAIN, and STAIN.

The following discussion of citizen-centered narrative is drawn from the citizenship education book titled *Citizenship Education (Civic Education): Pancasila, Democracy, and Corruption Prevention (Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan (Civic Education): Pancasila, Demokrasi dan Pencegahan Korupsi)* published in 2015 (Ubaedillah 2015) in comparison to its earlier editions published in 2000 (Ubaedillah 2000), 2003 (Ubaedillah 2008), and 2010 (Ubaedillah 2012). Achmad Ubaedillah, the writer, is teaching staff at the UIN Jakarta. He was trained as an historian, completed both the master’s and doctoral degrees respectively at the Ohio University and University of Manoa, USA.

The current book, first published in 2015, has evolved from the earlier versions that were part of the UIN Jakarta’s initiative since 1999. The first 2000 version of the book was later updated in 2003 and reprinted eight times by 2010. The revised edition appeared in 2012 with A. Ubaedillah and Abdul Rozak as the collaborative authors. Comparing the earlier editions to the 2015 publication provides insights of the persistent themes that the current book retains and alters. Resonating from the earlier versions, the 2015 book provides a new paradigm for civic education to replace the outdated content of the New Order Lemhanas’ citizenship education, conceived as undemocratic, indoctrinating (Ubaedillah 2012:25) and militaristic (Ubaedillah 2015:3). The comparison also demonstrates several alterations in the content of the books. First, unlike the 2000 and 2003 publications, which were intended particularly for students of the Islamic universities, the 2010 and 2015 editions are published with a broader audience in mind,
taking into account the readers whose concern is to develop democracy in post-New Order period.

Second, unlike in the earlier publications, the 2012 edition adds “Citizenship” to the title of “Civics and Citizenship Education” and discusses *Pancasila* in a separate chapter. The 2015 book later updates this earlier discussion. In this new section, the 2012 book also underscores *Pancasila* as “a tie that binds” and as “a common platform” for Indonesian plurality, hence, the need for “revitalizing *Pancasila*” (2012:34). The 2015 edition replaces the concept of revitalizing with “re-actualizing *Pancasila*” (2015:29), suggesting a more immediate urgency to implement the values of *Pancasila* in the current time. Most importantly, the 2012 book discusses the concept of “the four pillars of nationhood” (2012:191), unavailable in the earlier editions. Within this concept, *Pancasila* is positioned as one among the other three elements of nationhood. As I discuss later, the concept of the four pillars marks a fundamental difference from both the militaristic and state-centered narrative in this study.

Third, unlike the earlier ICCE/UIN textbooks that provided only short discussions on themes of the national way of seeing (*wawasan nusantara*) and national resilience (*ketahanan nasional*), the 2015 devotes more discussion to the two topic themes. The growing attention to discuss *Pancasila* in length and in-depth indicates that the author takes account of the 2012 government regulation, which prescribes to include *Pancasila* in the content of citizenship education textbook in higher education.

Moreover, the 2015 edition solidifies the theme of building civil society, a discussion that limitedly discussed in state-centered narrative. Concerning this discussion, while the 2012 authors preferred to use the concept of *madani* society (*masyarakat madani*), the current 2015 book uses the concept of civil society more frequently.
On the surface, the changes in the themes discussed in the earlier and 2015 textbooks demonstrate that the 2015 book is more responsive to government rules and regulations on the content of citizenship education textbooks for higher education. Most importantly, a closer look at the narrative that the books build reveals the subtle shifts in its narration from a more Islam-oriented to a more nuanced vision of Indonesianness. Unlike the earlier two narratives, not only does the citizen-centered narrative highlight the collapse of the New Order’s regime in 1998 as a political opportunity for a better Indonesia, it also questions the core issues in the militaristic narrative and disagrees with some of the state-centered narrative’s account of Pancasila.

Re-actualizing Pancasila within the Frame of the Four National Consensus

Unlike the militaristic and state-centered narratives, which conceive Pancasila as the foundation of the state and the main reference of national identity, the citizen-centered narrative places it as one among the four national consensuses consisting of Pancasila itself, the 1945 Constitution, unity in diversity or multiculturalism (Bhineka Tunggal Ika), and the United Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) (Ubaedillah 2015:10). The citizen-centered narrative rejects the attempt to return to the New Order hegemonic interpretation of Pancasila (2015:30), arguing that it was mainly a legitimation device for the undemocratic New Order regime to act anarchically against its citizens (2012:10). The New Order’s interpretation aimed to maintain the power of its elites and silenced alternative understandings of Pancasila (2015:43).

Ubaedillah (2015) further argues that Pancasila should be an open ideology, allowing critical thinking and alternative interpretations beyond that of the government (2015:32-33). The book further highlights that the emergence of Pancasila before the independence of Indonesia was shaped by a desire of liberation from colonialism and from the trap of liberalism and communism. As such, Pancasila was a creative synthesis of capitalist ideology represented in
the Declaration of American Independence and communist ideology (Communist Manifesto) (2015:52). Because *Pancasila* is belonging to people, multi-interpretations of *Pancasila* are acceptable as long as they preserve and advance the four pillars of Indonesian nationhood (2015:46).

The citizen-centered narrative further underscores the significance of re-actualizing the values of *Pancasila*. Ubaedillah conceives that *Pancasila* represents the values of spirituality that entail tolerance, family-hood (*kekeluargaan*) and togetherness. *Pancasila* also underlines the centrality of harmony, which requires the willingness to understand and accept multiculturalism and peoplehood (*kerakyatan*), a commitment to the interest of the people and justice for all Indonesian people (2015:52). Like other citizenship education textbooks after the 1998 event, Ubaedillah supports the obligation of the nation of Indonesia “to be religious in a civilized way, by upholding the value of tolerance” (2015:63).

**Redefining the National Way of Seeing and National Resilience**

Distinct from the earlier ICCE/UIN textbooks that provided only short discussions on themes of the national way of seeing (*wawasan nusantara*) and national resilience (*ketahanan nasional*), the 2015 book introduced two new subsections discussing the concepts. Yet, unlike the 2008 *Lemhanas*’ book, Ubaedillah refers to the 2012-2014 government document of the Master Plan for Strengthening the National Outlook (*Desain Induk Pemantapan Wawasan Kebangsaan*). This reference allows the book to make a distinction between the national way of seeing (*wawasan nusantara*) and the nation way of seeing (*wawasan kebangsaan*).

The distinction makes it possible for Ubaedillah to define the national way of seeing beyond the territorial boundaries. Whereas New Order’s national way of seeing puts emphasis on the unity based on the territorial boundaries, the nation way of seeing highlights the values
inherent in the four pillars of national consensus (2015:64). Thus, while acknowledging that both concepts share the same goal of shaping the sense of unity, pride, and love for their country (2015:64), the citizen-centered narrative also provides a new meaning of the national resilience in terms of national safety and sustainability. This new meaning positions the citizens as equal partners to the government, highlighting the importance of people’s participation both in national development and building the culture of dignified democracy (berdemokrasi secara bermartabat) (2015:67).

**Fashioning Religious, Democratic, and Civilized Global Citizen**

The citizen-centered narrative idealizes civilized citizens (warga negara Indonesia yang berkeadaban), who are active citizens, critical thinkers, problem solvers (2015:12), and well informed about their rights and obligations (2015:19). It emphasizes the importance of balancing rights and obligation, underscoring the state's obligation toward its citizen, including its guarantee of security and public space for its citizens (2015:147). Unlike the militaristic and the state-centered narratives, which emphasize citizens’ loyalty to the nation-state, the citizen-centered narrative envisions citizens not only belonging to the national but also to the global society. Thus, nationalism in the sense of the willingness to defend the country alone is deemed no longer relevant to the current generation. Instead, the text calls for cosmopolitan nationalism (nasionalisme kosmopolitan), persuading the fighting spirit and patriotism within the context of the global values, such as humanity, equality, and justice (2015:73).

In comparison to the prior narrative, the citizen-centered narrative is more explicit in discussing the relations between the state, religion, and citizens (Negara, Agama, dan Warga Negara). Ubaedillah outlines three current visions. The first claim for an Islamic state is based on the argument that religion (din) and the state (dawlah) are not mutually exclusive. The second
one emphasizes that although the state and religion are distinct, mutual relations between religion and the state are possible. In this case, the state can be a significant instrument to preserve and develop religion, and religion can provide morality, ethics, and spiritual values for the state (2015:150). The third view demands the distinction and the separation between religion and the state.

Opting for the second view, Ubaedillah subtly suggests that the relation between religion and the state in Indonesia should be seen in the light of a dynamic balance between secularism and theocracy. In other words, there is indeed the separation between matters of religion and that of the state (2015:160-161). Thus, Ubaedillah disqualifies the notion of an Islamic state and the discourse of *khilafah*. He argues that Quran and hadith do not directly deal with the issues of political governance and that the concept of *dawlah* that exists in Quran (*Surah al-Hasyr* 59:7) does not necessarily mean “the state” (2015:149). Ubaedillah views both Islam and *Pancasila* as significant sources of values for the nation-state and encourages the readers to decide the best system they aspire to as long as it guarantees the equality of its citizens (2015:20).

**Building the Culture of Democracy**

According to Ubaedillah, democracy in post-New Order should be understood as a system that is in line with the values of *Pancasila* and Islam. He highlights that, not only is *Pancasila* the result of the agreement between Muslim national leaders and the secular nationalists, but also, Islam has the internal instruments for democracy through *syura, ijtihad,* and *ijma*. Like the earlier publications, the book exemplifies the prophet Mohammed and the Madinah charter to demonstrate the significance of the values of Islam for shaping the spirit of democracy and respect to human rights (2015:49). Emphasizing the importance of substantive democracy, Ubaedillah further argues:
"Substantive democracy must be marked by civilized attitudes of political and civil society actors. Both components of the nation must realize that democracy must balance the fulfilment of political and economic rights of the people based on the values and principles of justice and togetherness" (2015:97).

Generating from the 1945 Constitution, Ubaedillah emphasizes the values of democracy, including sovereignty of the people, freedom of expression, and equality in the legal system (2015:52). Important in this conception is the significance of a good governance to accommodate interactions of the government, citizens, civil society, and business actors (2015:254-255). In short, the book emphasizes the inevitability of building the culture of democracy for upholding the four consensuses of Indonesian nationhood and in response to the insistence to return to Pancasila democracy, Ubaedillah argues,

“Those who are not patient and disagree with democracy as the best way for Indonesia, easily accuse liberal democracy as the cause for its lack of progress. They claim that all the problems concerning nationhood are caused by neglecting Pancasila. The solution they offer is the return to Pancasila like it was in the New Order period, without clarifying how to conceive and practice it in the current democratic era. On the other line, there are those who believe that democracy is the right choice and conceive that what is going on is a normal process for the nation and state building. They value Pancasila in line with the principles of democracy and human rights. As a common platform, Pancasila substantially is not in contradiction to democracy that emphasizes the process of statehood that based on the principle that democracy is from, by, and for the

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people. For this group, the history of the unity of the republic of Indonesia highlights the importance of *Pancasila* and the latter is still relevant for the journey of democracy in Indonesia. Rather than returning to the hegemonic interpretation of *Pancasila*, re-actualizing or re-vitalizing the values of *Pancasila* in line with the reform spirit is urgent. As the best choice, as the result of the reform movement, democracy opens a wide opportunity for all national elements to re-actualize the values inherent in *Pancasila*" (2015: 29).

Ubaedillah (2015) ultimately proposes a democracy without any adjective, which places people as the core component in the mechanism and practice of democracy. The post-New Order discourse of democracy is inevitably linked to the empowerment of civil society and the upholding of human rights (2015:92), informed by the values of *Pancasila* and religion (2015:105).

**Building Indonesian Civil Society**

Unlike the militaristic and state-centered narrative of *Lemhanas’* textbooks, Ubaedillah highlights the necessity to make a distinction between the state (*negara*) and those it governs, hence the necessity of civil society in Indonesia. The comparative analysis of the 2015 edition to the earlier versions of ICCE/UIN textbooks reveals several changes that demonstrate the solidifying argument concerning this issue. Whereas in the 2012 book, for example, Ubedillah and Rozak used the concept of *madani* society (*masyarakat madani*), the 2015 book uses the concept interchangeably with civil society. Drawing from the western discourses of civil society and Muslims intellectual’ discussion on *madani* society, the *citizen-centered* narrative defines civil society as a social system based on the morality that balances individual freedom and social

Three requirements in supporting the building of such civil society are also defined. First, democracy needs a certain level of citizens’ nationalism, because without this aspect democracy would only be understood as freedom without boundaries and might end in anarchist acts, potentially leading to social, economic, and political chaos (2015:258). Second, building democracy entails the need for economic development and democratic political institutions (2015: 259). Third, given that the state has the potential to become a threat to democracy as it did in the past (2015:159), Ubaedillah emphasizes the importance of the independency of civil society from the state (2015:259). This entails the need to educate citizens to practice democracy and to generate the middle class to control the hegemony of the state (2015:259). Important in this regard is the role of social movements and non-governmental organizations for advocating changes accommodated by good governance (2015:254-255).

4.2.3 Ummah-centered Narrative

Unlike the state-centered and citizen-centered narratives, the textbooks in the ummah-centered narrative envision the future Indonesian nation-state and Indonesianness, exclusively based on the values of Islam. They mostly generated their arguments on Quran and hadith as the main legitimate source of knowledge for describing the rights of Muslim citizens. The following discussion on the ummah-centered narrative is drawn from two textbooks written by two teams of authors under the wings of the Muhammadiyah organization.
Muhammadiyah is the largest modernist Muslim organization in Indonesia, established in 1912. It opened its first university in 1963 (Jackson 2007:44). In addition to 169 Muhammadiyah universities throughout Indonesia, the organization currently operates at least 2,896 elementary, 1,713 secondary, and 509 tertiary schools. In total, Muhammadiyah claims to contribute to at least 10 percent of education enrolment at all levels of education in Indonesia (ibn Chamim 2012: xix). It perceives itself as the civil society organization (CSO) and some of its leaders are appointed to serve in the presidential cabinet. Under the Muhammadiyah organization, the Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (UMY) is one of the biggest Muhammadiyah universities in Indonesia. Conceiving civic education as central for preparing students to respond to local, national, regional and global changes⁴⁷, the organization finds it necessary to take part in the process of teaching, socializing, and actualizing democracy at the various levels of education.

Between 2002 and 2003, the university evaluated the existing citizenship education program at universities under the wings of the Muhammadiyah organization. At first, the Muhammadiyah textbook (Cipto 2002) adopted the curriculum for civic education developed by UIN Jakarta, but then designed their own version of citizenship education (ibn Chamim 2003). Supported by the Muhammadiyah organization, the institution planned its own curricula, published Muhammadiyah’s version of citizenship education textbook (ibn Chamim 2003, 2006, 2010), and a guidance for its teaching staff (Jackson 2007:47). In 2014 the Muhammadiyah organization extended its program to the secondary level of education, suggesting the significance of this program for the Muhammadiyah organization and students.

⁴⁷ The main concerns behind the publication of its citizenship textbook is the withering away of the values of democracy in society; the diminishing of the values of community; the lessening of the values of tolerance; the decreasing of the values of honesty, politeness, and self-help; the declining of family values; the (prevalent) of the practice of corruption, collusion, and nepotism in governance; the destruction of economic life; and the violation of the values of nationhood (Ibn Chamim 2010).
The *ummah*-centered narrative is generated from two textbooks inspired by the guidance of Islamic ways of life for the members of Muhammadiyah. The first citizenship education textbook, *Citizenship Education (Civic Education): Pancasila, Democracy, and Corruption Prevention (Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan (Civic Education): Pancasila, Demokrasi dan Pencegahan Korupsi)* or the 2010 PKDB book, is written by eight Muhammadiyah authors. The book was published by two organizations, the Muhammadiyah organization and the Asia Foundation, the same non-profit institution which had supported the program of civic education at the UIN Jakarta, including the publication of its civics textbooks. In 2014 the Muhammadiyah organization extended its program to the secondary level of education, suggesting the importance of citizenship education for Muhammadiyah organization and students. However, despite the top-down initiative and implementation (Jackson and Bahrissallim 2007), my interviews with the teaching staff of the Muhammadiyah University (UMSU) in Medan, for example, suggest that the educators are relatively free to select the relevant materials for their classes.

The 2010 PKDB book evolved from the 2001 first edition. This earliest publication was later revised in 2003, when the Muhammadiyah organization made it mandatory for all its universities to teach citizenship education (Kraince 2007). The revised edition was further reprinted in 2006, 2008 and 2010. Comparing the latest printed edition to its earlier versions allows insight to the changes of its content as well as the persisting themes and moral values emphasized in the book. Besides changes in the front and back covers, a closer look at the content also reveals that almost all captions and quotations in the 2003 book do not appear in the 2006 and 2010 versions. The additional sentences on national identity were added in 2006 and maintained in the 2010 edition. Despite these alterations, there are no significant changes in the narrative of 2010 PKDB’s and its earlier editions.
Despite the alterations, there is no significant change in the narrative of 2010 PKDB’s and its earlier editions. The 2010 PKDB book focuses on themes typical in post-New Order citizenship education textbooks for higher education. They include discussions on democracy, human rights, and national identity. Yet, in addition to the content of citizenship education regulated by Dikti (later Menristekdikti), the textbook introduces the discussions and chapters on civil society, globalization and people-based economy (ekonomi kerakyatan). It proposes to develop democratic, civic and community values, good governance, national identity, social cohesion, self-cultivation, economic life, and family values (2010: xxiii).

The second version of the Muhammadiyah citizenship education textbook was published in 2009 (Taniredja et al 2009). It reprinted four times, and later updated in 2014 (Taniredja et al. 2014). The book, The Citizenship Education for Muhammadiyah University (Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan di Perguruan Tinggi Muhammadiyah) or 2014 PKPTM, was written by a team of nine authors, specifically intended for students at the Muhammadiyah University of Purwokerto. There is no change in a layout, cover, and the content of the 2014 PKPTM from its earlier versions.

Overall, the 2014 PKPTM provides discussions on democracy, transforming the values of Islam in the family and society (including Islamic economic and the principles of leadership in Islam), human rights, and nationalism. Arguing that the content of citizenship education for higher education regulated by Dikti puts more emphasis on the aspect of patriotism (bela negara) for national defense, the book proposes to put more emphasis on developing the values of democracy, obedience to the law, and social discipline (2014:19-30).
The ummah-centered narrative that I discuss in the following section is drawn from the comparison between the 2010 PKDB edition to its earlier versions (2003, 2006, and 2010 editions) as well as to the 2014 PKPTM.

**Islam for Preserving the Unity of the Nation**

The integration of nation-states within the global system is central in the 2010 PKDB’s discussion of current global processes. Taking account of the paradox of globalization, the book notes a dilemma between the "blessing" of globalization (2010:122) and its pitfalls (2010:123-124). In response to the paradox, the 2010 PKDB proposes to increase capacity building to guarantee pluralism, peace, inclusivity, sustainable environment, justice, empowerment, and human dignity. It also pays close attention to the importance of people-based economy (ekonomi kerakyatan). All of these should take place within the transformation of the values of Islam.

In addition, the 2010 PKDB view of national character or personality (2010:93) refers to three ideologies: pluralism for national integration, Islam, and Pancasila (2010:104-107). Accepting pluralism makes it possible to minimize and prevent conflicts. It is central for creating harmony among religious groups in the building of a new society that promotes "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" or unity in diversity (2010:95). Referring to Qur’an (Al-Hujurat, 49:13), the author highlights the significance of multicultural society as well as piety among Muslims (2014:162). However, pluralism should not lead to relativism and syncretism, and that the followers of religions should maintain their strong faith (2010:105).

The second ideology, Pancasila, is conceived as a tie that binds the nation (2010:107). It is the vision of Indonesia, that the founding fathers believed and agreed upon (2010:107). Like the citizen-centered narrative, the 2010 PKDB rejects the single official interpretation of Pancasila by Sukarno’s Old Order and Suharto’s New Order regimes (2010:107). The book
underscores that the ideology of Islam provides a stronger ground for defining freedom, brotherhood, equality, humanity, and social relations than the previous two ideologies (2010:105). Thus, although Islam does not explicitly define statehood, it provides the ethical values for the existence of the state (2010:106).

**Making Democracy Islam**

The ummah-centered narrative highlights the significance and value of democracy. Interestingly, the two books, 2010 PKDB and 2014 PKPTM, diverge in the inclusivity of democracy that they discuss. The 2010 PKDB conceives that democracy is necessary for developing democratic governance, which embraces the freedom of expression, respect to others, equality, togetherness, competition, and trust (2010:39-50). Accordingly, it expects Muslims to maintain good relations with other members of society and urges students to respect other religious rituals and practices (2010:84). It further calls for the urgency to build a democratic institution and to implement the values of democracy, rights and responsibilities, and morality (nilai-nilai ahlak) and points to the central role of family (2010:78) not only for socializing Islamic values, but also creating the future leaders for ummah and the nation (umat dan bangsa) (2010:83).

Unlike the 2010 PKDB, the 2014 PKPTM explicitly sets the boundaries of its imagined community by excluding non-Muslims as the others. Such attitude is palpable in the 2014 PKPTM’s discussion on Pancasila democracy. Referring to the New Order’s national assembly decision (TAP MPR No.II/MPR/1978), the book emphasizes that the decision-making practice is not based on voting but only on consensus (2014:111). It further suggests that this implementation of democracy—consensus (musyawarah in the context of syura) --, is in line with the fourth principle of Pancasila (2014:114). It was practiced by the prophet and is strongly
encouraged in Islam. Moreover, the 2014 PKPTM claims, that direct democracy has limitations. Because direct democracy embraces voices of all people, including those who are not proper, such as criminals and the convicted (‘ahli maksiat, orang-orang fasiq’); the rule of the majority is not ideal for Indonesia (2014:115). Alternatively, the book prefers deliberate consensus, through which selected leaders make the best decision and calls for Pancasila democracy, characterized by “a deliberate consensus (musyawarah) among the ulemas (ahlul hal wal aqdi), pious people, who have good will” (2014:115). In addition, it underscores that the process for the consensus itself is limited only to matters which do not have clear references in the Qur’an and hadiths (2014:117).

The book further highlights that in democracy, one must prioritize the interests of the nation and society, not place pressure on others, put forward consensus for common interest, emphasize the values of togetherness (family-hood), and accept the result of the consensus. Democracy should be based on rationality and good will, be accountable to God, and value human dignity, truth and justice (2014:112).

However, the book’s discussion on the values of democracy is limited for Muslims only. It explicitly forbids students to elect non-Muslims (orang kafir) as their leaders (Taniredja 2014) and, if Muslims did otherwise, as the argument goes, they will be detached from and punished by God (2014:199). Most importantly, the 2014 PKPTM specifies that the ideal characters for Muslim leaders are males, who follow God’s path, pious, and preserve the unity in Islam (2014:196-213).

**Rooting Human Rights in Islam**

The ummah-centered narrative holds that the conception of human rights in Islam has been introduced earlier and is more comprehensive than Magna Charta (Ibn Chamim 2010:166;
Taniredja 2014:125). It roots the concept of human right in *tauhid* (2010:169), which emphasizes the acknowledgement of the one and only God and demands Muslims to be faithful to *Allah* (2010:169). Two events central to this narrative are the creations of Madinah Charter (622 M) and Cairo Declaration (in 1990). Whereas the Madinah Charter is revisited to define the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims and the unity among Muslims, the Cairo Declaration is relevant for detailing human rights from the perspective of Islam. The latter includes the freedom of religion, the freedom to affiliate with religious groups, and the freedom to be faithful to God. These rights necessitate tolerance among followers of different religions, the freedom to preach (*dakwah*) and practice religion, and individual right to live, which are inextricably linked to the obligation to guarantee the lives of others (Ibn Chamim et al 2010).

**Building Madani Society**

The *ummah*-centered narrative makes a clear distinction between the notions of civil society and *madani* society (*masyarakat madani*). Whereas civil society is laden with the Western historical background and identity (2010:23, 26), *madani* society or the prominent society (*masyarakat utama*), is understood as a truly Muslim society (2010:25) or "*khaira ummah*” (2010:24). In Muhammadiyah’s tradition, the concept of *madani* society was first conceptualized and accepted in its constitution in 1950. However, in 1985, as a response to the New Order’s pressure, which required all political and social organizations to accept *Pancasila* as the sole ideology, Muhammadiyah advanced the concept of *Madani* society by adding the words “just and prosperous” (*yang adil dan makmur*) and “is blessed by Allah” (*diridhai Allah Subhanahu wata’ala*) (2010:25). After the collapse of the Suharto’s New Order, at the 44th annual meeting in Jakarta in 2000, the Muhammadiyah returned to its 1950’s original concept of
"the truly Muslim society", that is, "a society in which prominence, welfare, and happiness are widespread" (2010: 25).

The 2010 PKDB identifies at least three main interpretations of the meaning of *madani* society (*masyarakat madani*) in Indonesia. The first understanding envisions *madani* society as a Muslim society based on sharia and the projection of Madinah state in the time of the prophet Mohammad. The second interpretation conceives it as a society, based on the values of Islam; and the third vision confines religion as a private matter (2010:27-28). The 2010 PKDB adopts the second vision and venerates *madani* society as a democratic, religious, and civilized society (2010:32). As such, it persuades students to create *madani* society and actively participate in building the civilized democratic political system (2010:30) to develop the truly Islamic society (*membangun masyarakat Islam yang sebenar-benarnya*) under one leadership informed by the values of Islam (2010:18).

Thus, unlike state-centered and citizen-centered narratives, the *ummah*-centered narrative demonstrates a more nuanced discussion of *Pancasila* from the perspective of Islam. It is very explicit in its visions of Indonesia as a Muslim nation-state. The two texts in this narrative embrace *Pancasila* as national ideology, yet, their interpretations of *Pancasila* are generated exclusively from Qur’an and hadith.

In general, the three contesting narratives demonstrate that, despite their references to similar policies\(^{48}\) regulating the citizenship education textbooks, their narratives on the nation vary considerably. In the state-centered narrative, the meanings of *Pancasila* as the national ideology for the integrated post-New Order Indonesia underscores that, despite regime changes, *Pancasila* continues to exist, and its values substantiate the existence of the nation. Signifying

\(^{48}\) These include the 2003 national education and *Dikti’s* Decision No. 43/DIKTI/Kep/2006 about the guidance for implementing character building education in higher education, including Citizenship Education.
Pancasila this way allows textbooks to highlight the continuing relevance of Pancasila and Pancasila democracy for the present and future Indonesia, suggesting a smooth continuation from the New Order period. Inherent in this imagined community are two characters that Indonesians should embrace: Indonesia as a religious democratic nation-state with its deliberal and religious democracy. Within this frame, the good citizens are religious, deliberal democratic, and patriotic citizens, willing to place the interests of the nation-states before their own.

Unlike the New Order’s militaristic and post-New Order’s state-centered narratives, the citizen-based narrative has emerged from within a state-owned Islamic institution. In the last fifteen years since the first version of the book was published, the content has evolved significantly. The earlier ICCE/UIN’s textbooks emphasized the centrality of the Islamic values and the significant role of Muslim leaders and intellectuals in building the nation-state. While preserving these aspects, the most current textbook redefines Pancasila as one of the four pillars of Indonesian nationhood. Within this framework, it proposes a more cosmopolitan identity, acknowledges the significance of Muslims’ contribution to the building of democratic and religious nation-state, the dynamic relations between citizens and the state, and highlights the prominence of civil society in fortifying the culture of democracy, in which the enactment of human rights is unquestionable.

Finally, with the intention to place the values upheld by the Muhammadiyah organization, the ummah-centered narrative of the Muhammadiyah persuades students to recognize Islam as the basis for the nation. The two textbooks underline the importance of dakwah, calling for goodness (amru bil ma’ruf), preventing depravity (nahyu ‘anil munkar), and persuading faith (tu’minuna billah) for the creation of the real ummah (khairu ummah).

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49 The four pillars include Pancasila, the 1945 constitution, unity in diversity or multiculturalism (Bhineka Tunggal Ika), and the United Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)
Chamim 2010). The two books, however, differ in how they conceive Muslims and the other (non-Muslims) within the current and future Indonesian madani society. While the 2010 PKDB does not explicitly extend its conception of leadership to non-Muslims, the 2014 PKPTM outright rejects the idea of non-Muslim leadership.

I now turn to illuminate how the textbooks strategically revisit the selected past to define who we are as a nation and what kind of good citizen students should be. The ways in which textbooks build the coherence of their narratives provide insight into how the moral meanings are crafted. Although many perceive that citizenship education textbooks direct readers’ attention mainly to the current and future society, the authors in this study demonstrate that in their attempts to signify moral meanings of their narratives, they frequently revisit the national past, through which they omit “irrelevant” event, while selecting, evaluating, and assigning (new) moral meanings to the most relevant and meaningful ones. This process of meaning making is palpable in the ways in which the textbooks explain how and why the values of human rights, Pancasila, democracy, and civil society are significant for the present Indonesianness.

4.3 NARRATIVE STRATEGY: REVISITING THE DEFAULT EVENTS IN THE NATIONAL PAST.

In their diverging and contesting stories of Indonesianness, the three narratives in this study share default events of the national past. By this term, I refer to selected events that the narratives revisit in their attempt to explain the significance of the values or the meanings of Indonesianness. The authors in this study do not share the exact similar periodization of the national past. While some authors refer to the period of 1945-1959 as the era of parliamentary
democracy (Amin 2014, Bakry 2014, Kaelan 2016), some highlight the 1950 and 1959 period for liberal parliamentary democracy. Similarly, some textbooks divide the period of 1960-1965 as the time frame for the guided democracy (Sumarsono 2008), whereas other books locate it in the period of 1959-1965 (Amin 2014, Ubaedillah 2015). Moreover, while several books prefer the term of Guided democracy, others maintain the Old Order period/regime, a term invented by the New Order regime (Kaelan 2016; Lemhanas 1992). Thus, rather than focusing on the overlapping and undecided periodization of the past, I instead focus on the specific past events that the textbooks use to build the coherence of their narratives. I pay close attention to how the authors use the past to explain why the values of human rights, democracy, Pancasila, and civil society are important for the present and future of Indonesia. In addition, while I in the previous section I have focused on the structure and themes of the textbook, the following discussion is drawn from the analysis on what the books are silent about, delete, add, and/or highlight from the selected past events.

In this study, the default events of the Indonesian past include the beginning of the nation state, the establishment of Budi Utomo, a modern national organization in 1908, the 1928 youth pledge, the 1945 Indonesian independency, the 1950 liberal parliamentary democracy, the guided democracy under Sukarno in 1959, the killing of military leaders and the genocide in 1965, and finally the 1998 event, when Suharto stepped down from power. Textbooks revisiting this shared national past does not necessarily mean that they bring back the similar meanings of Indonesianness to the present. Instead, they revise, avoid, or are silent about certain selected happenings. Through these processes of selective remembering and forgetting, they draw nuanced meanings of why particular values they convey are significant for the post-New Order Indonesianess.
In post-New Order official narratives, contesting meanings of the past are palpable in textbooks’ discussions on three events: the beginning of the nation, the 1965, and the 1998 events. The beginning of the nation is traced back to the golden age of empires. Albeit limited in the length of their discussions both the state-centered and citizen-centered narratives preserve the New Order’s myth of two kingdoms in the past: Sriwijaya (605-683) and Majapahit (1293-1525). Most authors in this study, furthermore, refer to Majapahit kingdom in their genealogy of the nation. Interestingly, whereas in the militaristic account these two entities exemplified the old nation-state (Lemhanas 1992; Lemhanas 1983), the post-New Order textbooks prefer to describe the two kingdoms as two old states, existing long before the nation (Bakry 2014; Sumarsono 2008), representing the old stage of nationalism (Kaelan and Zubaidi 2016; Kansil and Kansil 2006:30). The old states, however, were vulnerable to disintegration due to several factors, including their pluralism, geographical conditions (Amin 2014), the arrival of colonial powers - Dutch, Portuguese, and Japanese—that had weakened the nations (Srijanti 2009), and the lack of consensus among their subjects to create a nation under one state (Sumarsono 2008). All these factors suggest a moral meaning that the unity of the people is not only necessary but inevitable for the current nation-state.

The reference to Majapahit is also central for signifying the authenticity of Pancasila for the post-New Order’s Indonesia. Some authors traced the embryo of Pancasila in Mpu Tantular's Sutasoma, the book that outlined the five moralities during Majapahit empire (Srijanti 2009). However, unlike the New Order’s official narrative, the citizen-oriented narrative extends the origin of Pancasila beyond the Javanese worldview by contextualizing the values within the

\[\text{50The five moralities forbad violent action, stealing, jealousy, lying, and drinking.}\]
ethics of Islam in the Malay world (Ubaedillah 2015). The latter emphasizes that the principles of *Pancasila* were also shaped by Indonesian Muslim cultures (2015:36-37).

The second contested event is the killing in 1965. During the New Order regime, the government banned any interpretation of the 1965 September 30 communist movement (G30S/PKI), except written in its official history. As accounted in the *Lemhanas'* New Order textbooks (*Lemhanas* 1983, 1992), the communist movement on September 30, 1965 infiltrated almost all aspects of the nation-state, including national administration, economics, politics, social-cultural, defense and security. According to *Lemhanas*, the movement challenged the philosophy of *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. Consequently, the supporters of *Pancasila* spontaneously reacted to demand the return to *Pancasila* and the national goals. The emergence of the New Order in 1966 intended to provide new order to all aspects of the lives of the people, the nation, and the state by guarding the authentic or the real *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution. According to this militaristic narrative, the New Order is a total correction of the wrongdoings in the past. It created a long term national stability required for accelerating the process of national development (*Lemhanas* 1983:114; 1992:125-126).

After decades of producing such narratives, nothing is more intriguing than looking at the ways in which a team of writers from *Lemhanas* (Sumarsono 2008) and *Menristekdikti’s* online module (Nurwandani et. al. 2016) revisit the 1965 event in post-New Order era. Interestingly, whereas the online module avoids mentioning the 1965 event, the post-New Order *Lemhanas* textbook erases most of its earlier description although the trace of the event is still palpable as the book mentions briefly:

“To Leninism/communism, war or revolution all over the world was acceptable for the spread of the world communism. The G30SPKI was one of China’s export
commodities in 1965. The history has shown how communist ideology ended tragically like the fall of the Soviet Union” (Sumarsono 2008:58).

In other textbooks, the trace of the 1965 event is palpable in its brief description that the PKI actions caused conflict between the people and the president and consequently worsened the economic and political conditions (Srijanti 2009). Following these circumstances, the youth (including students) protested in front of the presidential palace, proposing three demands \textit{(tritura)}, that include the dismissal of PKI, the clearance of the cabinet from PKI influence, and the lowering of prices (2009:98). In response, the president (Sukarno) signed a letter known as the 1966 \textit{Supersemar} to Mayjen TNI Suharto \textit{(Pangkostrad)} to control the situation. Accordingly, “the PKI’s action that betrayed the state, the nation, \textit{Pancasila}, and the 1945 Constitution” (Srijanti 2009:97) prompted the temporary national assembly to dismiss the communist party and its mass organization in 1966 and in 1967 and appointed General Suharto as the president (2009:99). As Bakry (2014) puts it, this movement opened the opportunity for the constitutional democracy, that is, \textit{Pancasila} democracy.

Unlike some textbooks that resonate or neutralize the New Order’s narrative of the 1965 event, Zainul Ittihad Amin (2014) suggests a limited yet more nuanced account of the event. The textbook describes a more nuanced role of the military:

“…when civilian leadership failed to save \textit{Pancasila} from the communist party, again military (ABRI) stepped forward to save the beloved country. With the legality of its social and political functions, it gradually became more powerful. And after the failure of the communist movement, its power expanded, making it possible to influence the national policies on development process. Various
concepts and strategies were implemented, including the national way of seeing (wasantara), the national resilience (tannas), and the strategy of people defense (Strategi Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta or Sishankamrata). The concepts demanded a close and mutual relationship between the military and the people, hence the expansion of the military intervention in social and political lives of the people” (Amin 2014:9.107-9.108).

Yet, rather than referring to the six generals as the victims of the killing, Amin extends the category of victims to at least 500,000 people accused of members or partisans of PKI. He further categorizes the killing as the first among seven crimes against humanity in the New Order regime (2014:7.31.). Referring to Adnan Buyung Nasution, an influential activist of human rights in Indonesia, he posits that the New Order’s violations include crimes against human integrity, violation against civil, political and socio-cultural rights (2014:7.31.).

The most tangible process of writing, revising, and rewriting of the 1965 event can be found in Ubaedillah’s (2015) and Kansil and Kansil’s (2011) discussions. Ubaedillah perceives the 1965 G30SPKI event as the marker of the end of Sukarno’s rule and the emergence of Suharto’s presidential power. By the directive letter\(^5\), Sukarno appointed Lieutenant General Suharto (Panglima Kostrad/ Komando Strategis AD) to lead the process of the rehabilitation of national security and the elimination of all communist influence in Indonesia. The security task, supported by the temporary national assembly under General A.H. Nasution, brought Suharto in power as the next president of Indonesia in 1968. Ubaedillah explains, “with the slogan of consequently and purely returning to Pancasila, Suharto began his national leadership known as

\(^5\) known as Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (Supersemar).
the New Order, replacing the deviated Old Order from *Pancasila* and the 1945 constitution” (Ubaedillah 2015: 137-138).

The comparison of Ubaedillah’s earlier publication with Rozak (2012), and the earlier ICCE/UIN textbooks (2000, 2012) show that his 2015 book omits the earlier discussion on the 1965 G30SPKI. For example, while the 2000 book avoided any explanation pertaining to what took place before Suharto’s New Order, the 2008 and 2012 editions did not only discuss the process of what brought Suharto to power, but also provided a different account from that of the *Lemhanas*’ New Order publications. The 2012 textbook, for example, discussed how the guided democracy under Sukarno was marked by the presidential political domination, the spread of communism, and the widening roles of the military in the national political stage (2012:76). Sukarno’s unlimited power with his guiding democracy made possible the fusion of three ideologies: nationalist, communist, and Islam (abbreviated as *Nasakom*), represented by three political parties: PNI, NU, and PKI. The textbook further explained, despite the fusion, however, the military was outcast. Consequently, while the communists built a closer relationship with the president, the Islamic groups and the military formed an alliance (2012: 156-157). The guided democracy under the president Sukarno ended in the bloody event of the September 30 Movement in 1965, when the killing of several army leaders took place in *Lubang Buaya, Halim*, and *Jakarta*. In summary, this coup d’état was the result of a long ideological conflict between the communist party and Indonesian army (2012:76-77).

Erasing earlier discussion of the 1965 event can also be seen from Kansil and Kansil’s discussion (2011). Albeit limited, their 2006 book echoed the New Order’s meta-narrative and as the argument goes, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was the “responsible one behind the planned Coup d’Etat of G.30.S./PKI” (2006:78). This was quickly countered by the military
forces supported by the people: “…besides the successes of military operations to secure the army rebellion, the attempt to dismiss *Pancasila*, that was the soul of the people, was countered by the people themselves” (2006:36). The authors claim that the people’s demand to banish the communist party is because PKI had attempted to replace *Pancasila* in 1948 and 1965 (2006:78). Following these demands, in March 1966, Sukarno, through *Supersemar*, appointed Suharto to dismiss PKI and its affiliated organizations to constitutionally secure and implement the 1945 Constitution and *Pancasila* (2006:79). The textbook briefly mentions the victims then abruptly ends its discussion. The 2011 updated book erases the account and is simply silent about the event.

The third contending past is the 1998 event. Different from the contesting accounts on the 1965 event, authors’ revisiting the 1998 event can be grouped in two categories: the 1998 event as a marker for the continuity from New Order to reform periods and as a breaking point for making a distinction from the Suharto’s authoritarian New Order to a more religious democratic Indonesia. The first type is visible in *Lemhanas’* (Sumarsono et. al. 2008) discussion of three periods—the Old Order (1945 to 1965), the New Order (1965 to 1998), and the Reform era (1998-now)— in which it emphasizes that whereas the Old Order era had to deal with physical challenges, the New Order and Reform era share similar problems of non-physical trials (Sumarsono 2008). Palpable in its brief description is the continuity from the New Order period to the reform era, devoid any reference to the social and political junctures that shape the shifts from one period to the next. The smooth continuation of regime changes is palpable particularly in the discussions of democracy. In their assessment of the system of democracy in Indonesia, Kaelan and Zubaidi (2012) posit:
“the constitution rules the system of Indonesian democracy allows reformation in line with the aspirations of the people. The people are the supporters of the power of the state…during the Old Order we implemented multi-parties’ system, the New Order exercised two parties plus “Golongan Karya”. In the current reform era, multi parties are developed, demonstrating a truly guarantee freedom to organize and gather in line with the constitution” (Kaelan and Zubaidi 2012:75).

Likewise, in his discussion on the Constitution, Winarno (2016) simply posits that an outdated constitution would no longer function as the guiding principle for the practice of the current statehood without explaining the rationality behind the necessity to amend the Constitution. Others who do, implicitly suggest that the past implementation of the 1945 Constitution did not take place as expected, hence the necessity of reform, that called for the shifted in the leadership from Suharto to BJ Habibie (Srijanti 2009:100). However, as Winarno (2016) highlights, the New Order government played an important role in shaping the middle class that made possible the coming era of democracy. Perhaps the most striking element that highlights the continuance from the New Order to the post-New Order is when the textbooks discuss the concepts of a national way of seeing and national resilience, despite that the two concepts appeared last time in 1998 and were not adopted in the 1999 five years national plan (GBHN) (Amin 2014, Winarno 2016).

However, rather than emphasizing continuities, some authors prefer to highlight how the 1998 event marks the departure from New Order to a new Indonesia. The end of the New Order in May 1998 through the reform movement powered by the people, including students, made possible a better practice of Pancasila democracy (Nurwandani et. al. 2016; Bakry 2014;
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Winarno 2016), the enactment of human rights, the creation of civil society (Amin 2014; Srijanti 2009; Ubaedillah 2015), and the building of a more Islamic society (ibn Chamim 2010 and Taniredja 2014).

The existing studies focusing on the discourses of the national history in Indonesia have highlighted how history is written and rewritten in the attempt to shape national identity (Suwignyo 2014, Wood 2005). They elucidate how the New Order regime and its elites created a national past, suited their interests in securing national stability and harmony (Wood 2005:4). Wood’s study (2005) reveals two versions of history: the official New Order’s version written by its historians and the “official history in waiting” (2005:4) drawn by the Muslim intellectuals. Wood identifies one event that marks the distinction between the beginning of the nation in the first official and second versions. The New Order’s official history constructed a single coherent past, which included the beginning of the nation since the Kingdom of Majapahit, its evolution to the Islamic Sultanates, the Revolution, and the suppression of the G-30-S, to the emergence of the New Order regime (2005:195). Woods further points that “at the core of the past promulgated by the New Order was the empire of Majapahit” where “…happy citizens are cheerfully carried out the commands of the priestly and military castes” (2005:196). Unlike New Order’s official history, the second version, drawn by Muslim intellectuals, highlights an “ummat-oriented” history of Indonesia and emphasizes the arrival of Islam as the most important event in comparison to the palapa oath of Gadjah Mada (2005:152). Wood refers to this counter history

52 National history, according to Suwignyo, is “…a history that more or less authoritatively provides a standard version of events and timelines about the making of a nation-state” (2013:115). For further discussion, see Suwignyo, 2014, Indonesian National History Textbooks after the New Order: What’s New under the Sun?
53 Wood draws his discussion from “the history industry” including several government institutions and non-government affiliation authors, historical sites or monuments (cemetery, artefacts, etc.) and textbooks. See Wood, 2005, Official History in Modern Indonesia: New Order Perceptions and Counterviews.
54 Gadjah Mada was historically described as the prominent military leader of Majapahit Kingdom.
as the “official history in waiting” (2005:4), that is, “the product of an elite who would eventually like to assume the task of building a national ideology themselves, but who are presently marginalized politically” (2005:4).

Unlike Wood (2005), whose focus is on the writing of history in Suharto’s New Order, Suwignyo (2014) highlights the shift in the content of history textbooks before and after the 1998 event. His study confirms the diverging contested past in the post-New Order history textbooks. Two books, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia: Perpektif Baru* (SNI-PB) published in 2008 and *Api Sejarah* (AS) in 2009 and 2010 challenge the New Order’s version of history. The prior is an exemplary work of an “Islam-centric historiography” with the narrative attempting to justify the centrality of Islam in creating the nation-state (2014:126). Echoing Wood’s earlier finding, the book claims that “the Indonesian period of history…began from Islam” (2014:127) and the true Islam is the Sunni Islam (2004:127). In addition, the book presents its “own version of Islam as the main (and only) subject and actor of the historical arena and events” (2014:128). The second book, the Islam-oriented history book, counters the Indonesia-centric history, which downgraded the significance of Islam in the nation building (2014:129). It discusses “the role and contributions of Islamic or Islam-related events, leading figures, people, and institutions in the making of Indonesia and on being Indonesian” (2014:128).

In addition, Suwignyo’s analysis of the official national history textbooks (2014) also provides an insight of how history textbooks make sense of the 1965 event. He compares the content of *The National History of Indonesia (Sejarah Nasional Indonesia)*, a history book published in 1982 during the rule of New Order to its post-New Order’s revision in 2008. The 1982 book explains, that the Guided democracy was ended by the offensive PKI and the New Order started with the army success in crushing the PKI’s September 30 Movement. The 2008
revised edition moves the discussion on PKI under the Guided democracy period and begins its discussion of the New Order with the issuance of Supersemar, the Sukarno’s presidential letter that justified the transfer of his power to Suharto. According to Suwignyo, this revision “…gives the impression that Soeharto had nothing to do with the 1965 tragedy and that he merely took power after the issuance of the Supersemar, which seems highly unlikely” (2013:120).

The two studies by Wood (2005) and Suwignyo (2014) provide insight of how the writing of history involves the act of revising and rewriting the selected historical events in the attempts for defining the present and the future of national identity. In this study, I focus more on how the three narratives of Indonesianness code their meanings of the present by referring to the selected events in the past. As Hashimoto (2011) posits, the selected events in the past “…become more crucially significant than others, because we manage to make them more consequential in later years for our understanding of ourselves and our own society” (2011:30).

Comparable to Woods’ (2005) and Suwignyo’s (2016) discussions, the ummah-centered narrative in this study anchors its perceived Muslims worldview around the time of the prophet Muhammad in Madinah. The textbooks set the traditions of “Muslim society” and madani society at the time of the prophet of Muhammed (ibn Chamim 2010, Taniredja 2014) as the main reference for the ideal post-New Order madani society (masyarakat madani/al-mujtama’ al-fadhilah) (ibn Chamim 2010). This is comparable to Wood’s (2005) earlier study, that whereas for the New Order official narrative, “Majapahit, the Islamic Sulatanates, the Revolution and the suppression of G-30-S were all facets of a single coherent New Order past” (2005:195), for Muslim intellectuals, “the arrival of Islam in present-day Aceh” is more important than Majapahit Kingdom. My finding also echoes Suwignyo’s (2016), who argues that rather than countering “the Indonesia-centric history that has marginalized the position and role of Islam”
(Suwignyo 2014:129), the Islamic narrative instead centers the beginning of the nation within its Muslim worldview. Like the account of a “ummat-oriented” Indonesia in Wood’s work (2005) and the “Islam-centric historiography” in Suwignyo’s discussion (2015), the ummah-centered narrative in this study also suggests a cultural memory beyond the nation-state for an imagined ummah.

In addition, Suwignyo (2016) has identified a shift in the meaning of the 1965 event in post-Suharto Indonesia. Focusing on the official national history\textsuperscript{55}, he finds that while preserving similar time periodization of the Indonesian history, the more updated 2008 textbook revises its earlier account of “…the end point of the Guided Democracy and the legacy of the New Order” (2014:120). The placement of the 1965 event to end the discussion of the Sukarno’s guided democracy is also visible in the citizenship education textbooks in this study, although my study further highlights the tendency among the authors to avoid discussing the event in detail. This is obvious in Lemhanas updated version. Rather than revising its earlier discussion on 1965, it instead shows the effort of forgetting the specific element, that is, the roles of Suharto and his military men in the killings of the communist sympathizers and followers, which was the core theme in the New Order’s militaristic narrative. At the same time, it continues the past regime’s denial of the communists’ contribution to the process of nation building. Such a description demonstrates authors’ emphasis on continuity despite regime changes while avoiding any reference to the preceded and consequential conflicts.

Moreover, both the missing discussion and the deleting of the event reveal the avoidance to participate in the contradictory versions of the 1965 event. Indeed, as historians continue debating the controversial history materials, the 1998 reformation era has witnessed confusion.

\textsuperscript{55} Two textbooks on the 1965 event are Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (SNI)—published in 1982 (during the rule of New Order) and its revision in 2008 (in the post-New Order era)
among the history teachers pertaining to demilitarization and de-Suharto-isation (demiliterisasi dan de-Suhartoisasi) in the content of history lessons (Wasino, 2015:8). Ubaedillah’s (2015) and Kansil and Kansil’s (2011) deletion of their earlier account is likely to avoid new controversies about the perpetrators of the killing of at least 500,000 victims in the conflict between the military-Islamic groups and the Indonesian communist party. My interviews with teaching staff in 2014 in Medan, for example, found it uneasy to discuss the event and preferred not to discuss it in his citizenship education class\textsuperscript{56}. This uneasiness came from the uncertainty of which source of information he should refer to. Breaking away from the New Order’s meta-narrative may cause the risk of illuminating the roles of military and Islamic groups as perpetrators. As Hashimoto (2015) identifies, they chose “the strategy of staying above the fray by muting controversy”, which is common in civics texts (2015:2192 of 5481, kindle edition).

Finally, most textbooks in this study share a mutual understanding that the 1998 event, when Suharto stepped down from power and the transition to the next regimes, has opened new opportunity for a democratic political change. The state-centered narrative is optimistic about the implementation of Pancasila and Pancasila democracy, whereas the citizens-centered narrative highly values the spread of the culture of democracy for the building of democracy and Indonesian civil society. In addition, the ummah-centered narrative perceives the 1998 event has

\textsuperscript{56} It is important to note, however, that some alumni I interviewed in this study, described that official history taught at school is not the only source of reference available. As one of them reflects: "Stories in history lesson were repeatedly told from my primary, secondary, to high school. I knew more about the role of Muhammad Hatta, Sukarno, Tan Malaka, only in high school and later know more about history during my under-graduate study. From kinder garden to secondary school, on my way to school I passed the monument of Crocodile Hole (Lubang Buaya) every day. My question was, why the generals were badly treated? At school and at the village, there was this story, that the generals were killed by PKI. My father once told me, that what I have read and seen were not always true. He brought me to Sukarno’s cemetery in Blitar and Hatta’s house in Bukit Tinggi. When I was still in primary school, I heard about these bad things that communists have done even while I was buying ice cream. The defining moment was when I saw a movie, Ada Apa Dengan Cinta. There was a scene when the house of Rangga's father, one of the main character in the movie, was burnt. I began to think, maybe PKI was not always bad and that changed the way I think about what I have learnt in school" (in-depth interview with Jessica, in Yogya, in January 2017).
opened a new opportunity to create a truly Muslim society as exemplified by the Prophet Mohammed.

Interestingly, textbooks apply three differing strategies in making sense of the 1998 event. The first strategy is revising the New Order’s official narrative by significantly downgrading the role of military and detaching Suharto from the narrative of the nation. The second strategy involves the building of a new narrative by countering and replacing the New Order’s moral meaning with a new one. Finally, the third strategy is simply leaving the New Order’s official narrative behind and proposes a relatively new narrative of the nation.

The first strategy is visible in textbook discussions that revisit the past by focusing only on what took place before and after the regime change while avoiding any discussion concerning the 1998 event itself. Textbooks apply this approach in discussing Pancasila democracy, human rights, the amendments of the 1945 Constitution, and the national way of seeing and national resilience. For example, rather than mentioning any information concerning the state violations during the New Order period, textbooks simply suggest that although the national commission for human rights was formed during the New Order regime, no significant change took place during the New Order period (Kaelan 2015, Winarno 2016). Or, referring to the formulation of the 1999 law on human rights, that consequently called for the ad hoc trial of human rights violations in East Timor, another text highlights that the current state has continued the attempt to protect human rights of its citizens (Kansil 2006).

On the surface, the method suggests that the authors emphasize the continuity of the New-Order to the post-New Order Indonesia. Yet, a deeper analysis reveals that although the textbooks implicitly suggest the continuation before and after 1998 and subtly divert readers’
attention from the cause of the collapse of the New Order regime, these do not necessarily mean that authors dismiss the imperfection of the prior regime.

Such reflection of the past, however, is selectively drawn particularly for preserving the notion of Pancasila. Exemplary for this intention is in a textbooks’ account of the replacement of the Sukarno’s Old Order rule by the New Order regime. After highlighting the strong leadership of the general Suharto and the temporary national assembly to correct the deviating Old Order from Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Kaelan 2015), the book highlights the New Order failure. Accordingly, despite the claim that the basis of the New Order regime was Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (2012: 64), and that the regime was a democratic government; the regime, however, was a centralized and militaristic regime (2012:47). It used Pancasila merely to legitimize its power (2012: 64) and sacralized the 1945 Constitution to prevent any attempts of an amendment (2012:83).

Consequently, the New Order’s strong claim has shaped the misconception among many Indonesians that Pancasila was identical to the New Order regime (Kaelan 2015). The author suggests, that just like Sukarno’s Guided democracy that failed to its own promise to return to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the Suharto’s New Order was also unsuccessful to implement Pancasila. Detaching Pancasila from New Order regime this way allows the authors of the state-centered narrative to bring back the significance of Pancasila, particularly Pancasila democracy, into the post-New Order Indonesia. It also makes it possible to emphasize the continuity of the nation while saving them from providing long, detail discussions of regime changes and discussion of the difficult past. This strategy underscores the moral meaning, that regime changes take place peacefully and Pancasila democracy is highly relevant for maintaining the unity of Indonesia.
The second strategy involves the creating of a new narrative by countering and replacing the New Order’s moral meaning can be seen in a textbook written by Ubaedillah (2015). Indeed, *Pancasila* democracy offers three components of democracy: the enactment of rule of law, democracy in economic sphere that accommodates welfare for all, the acknowledgement and the protection of human rights as well as the practice of independence and impartial judiciary (Ubaedillah 2015:91). However, as Ubaedillah further demonstrates, the New Order’s implementation of *Pancasila* was a mere rhetoric for political purposes. In practice, the New Order regime was far from democratic as it was marked by the military (*ABRI*) domination, centralized bureaucracy and political decision making, the decreasing of the roles of political parties, government interventions in various political and public issues, mass floating politics, monolithic state ideology, and the incorporation of non-governmental organizations (Ubaedillah 2015:91).

Disagreeing with the state-centered textbooks on the significance of the 1998 event and their intention to adjust to *Pancasila* democracy (*demokrasi Pancasila*) in post-New Order Indonesia, Ubaedillah underscores that the continuing significance of *Pancasila* does not necessarily mean that it should be followed by the necessity to return to *Pancasila* democracy. Rather than detaching the New Order role and embracing *Pancasila* democracy, instead Ubaedillah argues, the 1998 reform is closely related to the people’s reform movement, demanding for the practice of democracy and human rights, which led to the collapse of Suharto’s New Order along with his *Pancasila* democracy. Alternatively, Ubaedillah proposes democracy without any adjective attached to the concept.

Finally, the third strategy is visible from the *ummah*-centered narrative. Rather than engaging with the New-Order’s official narrative of the nation, it simply leaves it behind and
proposes a relatively new narrative of the nation. Briefly, Taniredja (2014) and ibn Chamim et. al. (2010) mention the 1998 event simply as “unconventional collapse of the regime” (ibn Chamim 2010:107). In addition, they merge Sukarno’s guided democracy (1959-1965) and Suharto’s New Order (1967-1998) under one category of “not supportive to the process of democracy” (Taniredja 2014:55). This strategy allows the authors to underscore the moral meaning, that the 1998 signifies an opening opportunity for a more pious Indonesia, informed by the values of Islam.

As the policy makers and educators explicitly and systematically plan, implement, and evaluate the school subjects and courses, the analysis of the citizenship education textbooks may detect tensions both in the policy making process, the national curriculum content, and its implementation. Kennedy (2008) suggests that although most of the nation-states promote citizenship education, the functions, purposes, and contents vary, and competing ideologies are palpable within differing conceptions of citizenships. Thus, the differing content and assessment of citizenship curriculum are common across different countries.

Moreover, the tensions over the citizenship education can be found even in the countries with “common domain descriptors” such as Germany and Finland (Kennedy 2008:486-487). Similarly, Kennedy (2008) reveals that in Australia with its changing ideology from “civic renaissance” to neo-conservatism, the competing ideologies emerge between neo-liberalism and radical democracy, liberal and republican, or between individual rights and collective responsibility. Likewise, in the Canadian civic education curricula “significant ideological tensions exist between global citizenship and national citizenship” exist (Richardson and Abbott 2009:377). This chapter demonstrates that such tensions are also palpable in the textbooks’ three narratives of Indonesianness.
The changes of the regime from the Sukarno’s guided democracy (1959-1965), New Order regime (1966-1998) to post-New Order Indonesia (1998-2016) provide contexts for the alterations in the national education policy pertaining to what makes the nation and how it is defined. During the Sukarno’s guided democracy, the Indonesian imagined community was framed within the three ideologies of nationalism, communism and Islam (*Nasakom*), and the ideal citizen was expected to hold the spirit of patriotism, demanding Indonesians to willingly sacrifice their lives for the interest of the nation. The Suharto New Order vehemently rejected the *Nasakom* ideology yet preserved Sukarno’s high demand of nationalism. As the militaristic narrative suggests, the holistic and integrated nation-state was only possible through the centrality of military dual function, *Pancasila* as the only national ideology, and the willingness of Indonesian people to defend the interest of the nation state before their own interest. For the Suharto’s regime, developing *Pancasila* identity became the priority of the Indonesian curriculum (Fearnley-Sander 2008) in response to its perceived modernity.

How to define *Pancasila* is a long-standing issue in Indonesia and its discussions in the citizenship education curricula provide insight of its continuity and changes. In post-Suharto Indonesia, modernity is defined as related to the idea of unity in democracy, and *Pancasila* is referred to as national identity to maintain this unity (Cribb 1999; Raillon 2011; Wahid 2001). The previous studies also reveal that *Pancasila* is still the source of Indonesian state philosophy, civic values, and national identity in the post-Suharto Indonesia (O’Shannassy 2010; Fearnley-Sander 2008). It still underlies all aspects of the curriculum (Gaylord 2008) and remains the symbol of national unity (Fearnley-Sander 2008; Song 2008).

Adding to the earlier discussions, the three narratives in this study highlight that modernity is embraced and the unity is preserved through the redefining of *Pancasila*. Within
this interpretation, Indonesian democracy is informed by spiritual and religious values. I further find the contesting interpretations of **Pancasila** in post-New Order Indonesia. Although the three narratives amenably anchor their interpretation to **Pancasila**, they are, however, diverging in defining the sources of values for more religious Indonesia. Referring to the first principle and 2003 national education law, the three narratives in this study underscore piety as an important appeal defining the nation and the ideal citizens. Whereas in the state-based narrative the main reference is the belief in one God, that acknowledges the state recognized six religions, in the citizens-based narrative the emphasis is on the spiritual aspect of the nation, including but not limited to the belief in One God as the six official religions should convey. To writers in the **ummah**-oriented narrative, there is no doubt that Islam is the main reference to build the religious Indonesia.

Most importantly, the three narratives vary in defining post-Suharto’s democracy. Indeed, the transition from the authoritarian New Order regime to a more democratic post-New Order makes democracy the most important discourse in Indonesia. Democracy, however, is not a fixed concept (Markoff 2011), and there is a sign that in Indonesia it has several meanings (Liddle 2013). The state-centered narrative defines democracy in terms of **Pancasila** democracy, that is, a democracy that informs a democratic religious state (Bakry 2014) or a religious democratic system of governance (Kaelan 2015, Winarno 2013). In this democracy, the deliberate consensus is preferred, while voting and oppositional groups are discouraged. Further, in the **ummah**-centred narrative, democracy is deemed significant to create the future **ummah** and the nation (**umat dan bangsa**) (ibn Chamim 2010:83). **Pancasila** democracy is defined as “a deliberate consensus (**musyawarah**) among the **ulemas** (**ahlul hal wal aqdi**), pious people, who have good will” (Tanureja 2014:115). Whereas in the state-centered and **ummah**-centered
narratives, liberal democracy is explicitly rejected, Ubaedillah’s vision of democracy in citizen-centered narrative is less oppositional. He highlights, in a democratic era, national awareness (*kewaspadaan nasional*) should be oriented to people’s participation in development through the culture of civilized democracy (*berdemokrasi secara bermartabat*) to create Indonesian civil society that values egalitarianism and state’s consistency in practicing *deliberal* democracy and human rights (2015:67). The citizen-centered narrative generated from the book by Ubaedillah (2015) holds a democracy, that balances “the fulfilment of political and economic rights of the people based on the values and principles of justice and togetherness” (2015:97).

There are at least four different ideas of Islam and democracy (Goddard 2002). First, democracy is seen as “anathema” or “in fundamental opposition to Islam” (2002:4). Second, democracy and Islam are considered incompatible (2002:6). In addition, Islam and democracy are seen compatible through (1) *ijma* (consensus) as a justification for elective democracy, and (2) *bay’a* (pledge of allegiance) that can “underpin and validate the electoral process” (2002:7). Finally, “Islam demands democracy” (2002:7).

Discussions on democracy in Muslim societies have shed light to the issue of under what conditions they can make democracy and Islam compatible (Bayat 2007). Similar approach can also be used to highlight in what ways Muslims intellectuals conceive civil society, and when they do, whether the notion is different from, adopts, or adjust the western notion of civil society. According to Hanafi (2002), at least three conceptions of civil society among contemporary Muslim intellectuals are visible. First, the notion of civil society is foreign to Islam; it is a secular, antireligious concept intended to Westernize Muslim societies. The second

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57 I follow Asef Bayat’s note that with the term ‘Muslim societies,’ “…the emphasis is not on Islam but on Muslims as agents of their societies and cultures, even if not of their own making. And ‘culture’ is perceived not as static codes and conducts but as processes that are flexible, always changing and contested” (2007:2).
notion conceives it is a universal and a global ideal regardless of its origin from the West. The third conception highlights the need for updating the classical Islam in modern societies through the creative reinterpretation—or ijtihad—of the basic ethical sources of Islam (Hanafi 2002).

In Southeast Asia, the notion of *madani* society was first introduced by Prof. Naquib Al-attas, an historian in Islamic civilization from Malaysia. The concept was later used by Anwar Ibrahim, the hitherto vice prime minister of Malaysia in his speech during his visit in Indonesia in 1996. Madani society is later articulated within Indonesian context by Nurcholis Madjid, a Muslims intellectual, the founder of Paramadina institution (Bakti 2005). Indonesian intellectuals use the term *madani* society referring to two distinct meanings: *madani* society as Indonesian translation of civil society and *madani* society (*masyarakat madani*) as a concept that has a distinct meaning from that of in Western civil societies (Bakti 2005). Both meanings were popularized in 1990s in various discussions seeking the possibility of building civil society in Indonesia. Whereas the first meaning of *madani* society is popular among broader groups of intellectuals including Nahdhatul Ulama’s supporters, the second meaning of *madani* society is supported by intellectuals from Muhammadiyah organization and Paramadina, an Islamic university led by Nurcholis Madjid. It is through Madjid’s discussions that the concept of *madani* society is problematized and became very popular in Indonesia.

According to Madjid, several related concepts make up a *madani* society. First, Madjid places “all religions on par with Islam” (Bakti 2005:493) through his notions of pluralism and tolerance. He also proposes “secularization”, defined as “the desacralization of (Islamic) religious texts, symbols, and beliefs” (2005:494). In addition, referring to the constitution of Madina during the time under the leadership of the prophet of Muhammad, he found democratic values in Islam through consensus (*musyawarah*) (2005:495). As Bakti (2005) underlines,
Madjid’s discussion suggests that *madani* society is “…parallel to but clearly different from civil society, in the promotion of human rights. *Masyarakat madani* seems to be a localized, contextualized civil society in Indonesia, while it may be applicable to the Muslim world” (Bakti 2005:500).

Interestingly, although previous studies have identified that in Indonesia Islam is conceived compatible with the idea of liberalism (Barton 1997; Barton 2010) and democracy (Azra 2007; Effendy 2003; Eliraz 2004; Hefner 1997; Mogahed 2006; Uhlin 1997; Wahid 2001; Wahid 2006), democracy and civil society are not singularly defined. Concerning the latter, two meanings of *madani* society (Bakti 2002) – Indonesian translation of civil society and a distinct meaning from that of Western civil society — exist. However, the three narratives in this study reveal that the two meanings of *madani* society emphasize a more religious civil society.

Finally, as I have argued earlier, the textbooks’ representation of the nation and the ideal citizen necessitate the remembering and forgetting of the selected historical events of the nation. This study demonstrates that, in coming to terms with the 1998 democratic changes, the attempts to revisit and resolve the trouble pasts are inevitable for defining the new post-New Order’s Indonesia. In defining and re-defining the nation and the ideal citizen, the authors inevitably select as well as discard particular historical aspects from the national past, in which the beginning of the nation and particularly, the 1965 event as the most difficult event to discuss. Adding to what has been discussed by Woods (2005) and Suwignyo (2016) and informed by the existing discussions of cultural memory, this chapter shows that in coming to terms with the 1998 event, textbooks build the coherence of their narratives by means of three narrative

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58 Elsewhere, a study by John Kelsay (2002) reveals the distinctions between the political context of discussions of civil society in contemporary Western and Islamic society represented by Khatami’s discourse in Iran. Whereas in the prior the focus is on citizen participation in organizations; in the latter context, the emphasis is on civil society, yet not for increasing the role of ordinary citizens.
strategies discussed above. These strategies underline that in reproducing Indonesian nationalism, textbooks revisit the selected past events, that entails either defining a new meaning or revising the existing meaning of the selected past, to represent the current Indonesian national core values.
5.0 REPRODUCING NATIONALISM IN THE NATIONAL EDUCATION

Studies on education in Indonesia have provided considerable rich findings on education related policies, changes in curricula, and the best practices of knowledge transmission to prepare students to embrace modernity. In the transition period from Suharto’s New Order to post-New Order Indonesia since 1998, attention has also been paid to demonstrate a shift in the values embedded in the national education system following the process of democratization. For example, there was a strong indication that the pendulum in education policy has shifted from militaristic and authoritarianism New Order style to a more democratic mode of post-New Order governance (Jackson and Bahrissalam 2007; Song 2008). This was soon followed by initiatives to build citizenship through a new citizenship education since 1999 (Azra 2007; Jackson 2007; Kraince 2007; Pohl 2009).

Amidst the change, there is enough to signal that national education has moved from more secular to more religious policies (Yusuf and Sterkens 2015). For example, not only does the 2003 Education Law regulate that religious education is compulsory and must be taught by instructors of the same faith with students\textsuperscript{59}, it also puts more emphasis on piety as one of the aims of national education as later implemented in the 2013 national curricula.

\textsuperscript{59} Because this practice is not new, the necessity to enact the law calls for two possible explanations. One is related to the anxiety among Muslim leaders pertaining to the practice in Christian schools that did not provide Muslim religious education for Muslim students. Although similar practices are not rare in numerous universities, there is a concern, that the law is directed mainly to push catholic and protestant schools to provide religion education for their Muslims students (Raillon 2011). Another possible explanation is linked to the attempt to govern
However, multiple studies have suggested that schools do not always take the national curricula for granted (Bjork 2002, Parker 2003). These studies demonstrate, that rather than rigidly conducting the compulsory flag ceremony, a school instead focuses on its own designed activities during the ceremony (Bjork 2002). Another study discusses how in response to the compulsory ceremony, students acted in a “quiet revolt” (Parker 2003:249). As Parker describes, “sometimes students disrupted the order of ceremonies: strategically placed knots in the long grass on the assembly field tripped up the flag-raisers on one occasion, and once a raucous fart at assembly triggered uncontrollable giggling” (Parker 2003:250). The studies suggest that there are many contributing factors that may shape the implementation of education policy, and this is also the case with citizenship education.

This chapter discusses in detail the context in which the narratives of the nation are reproduced. Taking account of the complexity of the Indonesian national education system may highlight the implausibility of a singular and uniform narrative of *Indonesianness*. The importance of the state and other institutions in regulating discourses on nationalism does not necessarily mean they are powerful in determining “all of the elements of discourse, or how they interact” (Jones 2013:22). Even when the state imposes its cultural activities and texts, “the actors involved can find ways of inserting their own interpretation” (Woods 2016:430). Thus, in the following discussion, I explain the intertwining of educational dualism in post-New Order Indonesia to highlight how the three contesting narratives of the nation are shaped in post-New Order Indonesia. Within the intertwining of educational dualism, I include discussions of how publishers’ representatives, authors, educators, and students’ views, shape the narratives.

citizens’ behavior, to keep them in line with their religious community. This is visible in the Government Regulation No. 55/2007 and the Regulation No. 16/2010 of the Ministry of Religious Affairs following the 2003 education law (Yusuf and Sterken 2015).
5.1 THE INTERTWINING OF EDUCATIONAL DUALISM IN INDONESIA

The national education system in Indonesia is characterized by dualism of education (Azra 2007, Buchori 2004, Sirozi 2004, Raihani 2014). This dualism consists of two coexisting administrations and types of education: a more secular education administered by the Ministry of Education and an Islamic-based education\(^{60}\) administered by the Ministry of Religious Affair. Both the government institutions administer all levels of education from basic (primary) level to higher education\(^{61}\). The Islamic education evolved from the traditional *pesantren*, Islamic traditional boarding school system. This was the main educational establishment for the native people prior to the establishing of national education (Buchori 2004). The Islamic schools were separated from the Christian schools funded by the VOC and later by the Dutch colonial regime (Groeneboer 1993). Islamic traditional institutions have become important providing students with Islamic religious instruction. Since the 1930s, many Islamic traditional boarding schools (*pesantren*) have included the government-recognized curricula. In 1970s, the combination of Islamic religious teachings and more modern based knowledge - such as science and math - took place (Lukens Bull 2001:353-354).

Whereas the Islamic based traditional education has emerged since the colonial time, the more general education was established through the formulation of the Ministry of Education shortly after the new state was announced in 1945. Adopting modern curricula, it focused more on knowledge and skills, preparing students to embrace modernity as well as national values. Albeit limited, this institution also provides a religious course as one of the required subjects.

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\(^{60}\) The Ministry of Religious Affair administers other religious-based schools from other five religions in Indonesia: Hindu, Budha, Catholic, Christian, and Kong Hu Chu

\(^{61}\) Currently, since 2015, a more general higher education is administered by the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education (*Menristekdiki, Kementrian Riset, Teknologi dan Pendidikan Tinggi*)
In 1950, the new government of Indonesia instructed the teaching of religion in public schools. This instruction did not authorize religious education as a compulsory subject till the mid-1960s when the New Order regime required it partly as an attempt to prevent communism and atheism. Further, in 1989, as the result of lobbying by the Indonesian Ulama (MUI) and Muhammadiyah organizations, the new education law did not only regulate religious instruction at all levels of education, but also required the Christian schools to provide Muslim religious

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instructors for Muslim students. However, the Christian circle rejected this demand and consequently, the government delayed the implementation and cancelled it in 1990 (Effendy 2003). It was only in 2003 that the Muslims groups successfully pushed the government through the 2003 National Education Law to obligate all schools to provide religious education and religious educators. Thus, given the fact that eighty-seven percent of total inhabitants in Indonesia are Muslim⁶³, the schools almost exclusively teach Islam in their religion classes.

The Indonesian dualism of education is later characterized by the tendency, that whereas the general and more secular schools include religion as a compulsory subject, the religious (Islamic) schools include more and more non-religious subjects. As Murray (1988) has highlighted almost two decades ago:

“Islamic topics have given way to greater amounts of basic communication skills, secular science and social science, and vocational studies. In addition, the source of most of what is taught in the nation's schools is not a supreme being's revealed truth, as reported in such works as the Quran and the Hadith; rather, the dominant sources are the writings of secular authorities, founded on empirical investigation and logical theory” (Murray 1988:914).

Currently, most of the Islamic institutions provide students with secular and modern science-centered education (Hefner 2010, Jackson 2007, Lukens-Bull 2001). For example, madrasah that administered by the Ministry of Religion also teaches non-religious subjects similar to general schools and madrasah’s students follow the national exams that designed by

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the Ministry of National Education (Parker and Raihani 2011). Besides the central role of the state, private and non-profit organizations build and develop two kinds of education in large numbers to meet the increasing demands, that the government does not respond to. They also uphold the diverse methods of teaching the youth which are not often available in the state education institutions.

After the rejection of the Jakarta Charters in 1945, the government established the first Islamic higher institution (STI) in 1946. There is an argument that the founding of this institution marked “the beginning of the competition” between Muslims and nationalists in the national education system (Buchori 2004:266). Change in the government attitude toward Islamic schools emerged after 1998. Not only did the government allow students from religious-based education and modern pesantren to enroll in more secular-general schools and universities, it also encouraged the institutional change from the Islamic institution under the Ministry of Religion to Islamic university under the Ministry of Education64.

The transition from Islamic institutes to Islamic universities took place since 2002. It started with Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic Institute in Jakarta (UIN Jakarta) in that year, followed by the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic Institute in Yogyakarta (UIN Yogyakarta) in 2004 (Jackson 2007:44). With the transition into university, the Islamic institution changes its structures, curricula, including the establishment of new departments, such as economic, engineering, and medicine (Azra 2007). The Islamic studies within the Islamic state university system include proselytization (dakwah), Islamic social studies (Adab), religious education (tarbiyah), Islamic philosophy (ushuluddin), and Islamic law (syari’ah) (Jackson 2007:43). Consequently, Islamic universities must refer to regulations and standardization, authorized by

64 Currently the higher institution is under the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education (Menristekdiksi)
both the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education (Menristekdiksi).

Thus, rather than rigidly separating two institutions, it is important to highlight that inherent in the concept of dualism of education is the link between two administrations. With the concept of the *intertwining of educational dualism*, I refer the competing knowledge and values, while at the same time capture the continuously negotiation of these two institutions, which also represents the process of interaction among actors, ideas, networks, and collaborations, that often expanding beyond the educational arena.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1. Indonesian Higher Education in Numbers in 2013/2014(^{65})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Numbers of Higher Institutions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under the Ministry of Education and Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under the Ministry of Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study by Rosidin (2013) provides a good example for the intertwining of educational dualism. He describes how a Salafi-influenced movement by *Rohani Islam* inserting its ideal for more Islamizing society among students in two secondary more secular public schools in Cirebon (SMAN 04 and SMAN 06). After several years of the organization activities in the two schools, Rosidin describes students’ everyday appearance as the following:

\(^{65}\) Adapted from BPS on Education, 2016, [http://www.bps.go.id/Subjek/view/id/28#subjekViewTab3|accordion-daftar-subjek1](http://www.bps.go.id/Subjek/view/id/28#subjekViewTab3|accordion-daftar-subjek1)
“Not a single female student wears short trousers and a majority wears a jilbab during physical education. Inside the classrooms, male and female students are separated and have different rows of desks. This is, of course, in contrast with the past, when male and female students would share tables” (Rosidin 2013:218).

Important in Rosidin’s finding is that the success of the Rohani Islamic movement in more secular public schools is due to the support from the school, students, school board and religious teacher’s element including “…outside dakwah movement networks” (Rosidin 2013).

Another study by Lukens-Bull (2001) on an Islamic boarding school (pesantren) in Malang demonstrates how an Islamic institution itself needed to create “a hybrid system of education” that combined the traditional religious teaching and modern “scientific and technical training” (2001:368). Rather than opposing modernity, the pesantren aimed to attract college students from more secular institutions (Lukens-Bull 2001) “to (re)invent a distinctly Islamic modernity for Indonesia” (2001:368) by (re)inventing its Islamic tradition. It is not surprising that students who are attracted to this idea also share a similar understanding of the world. As a student reflects, “we do not have to leave mysticism behind. However, Islam must be able to adapt to changing times” (2001:361). Likewise, Jackson and Parker’s study highlights, that “Islamic schools have been concerned to provide their students with access to ‘modern knowledge’, while at the same time containing it and subsuming it to the higher truth of Islamic knowledge” (2007:38). These examples bring light of how the intertwining of educational dualism in Indonesia informs the dynamics of knowledge and values-making and dissemination in the education site.
However, other studies also identify the rising tension about the curricula of the Islamic schools and universities on the adoption of the national ideology and modern-secular approach (Azra 2007, Hefner 2010). For instance, the educators in the Islamic state institution (IAIN) do not find it easy to reconcile curriculum changes, which attempt to combine “students’ academic exercises and advancement in religious knowing” and “students’ character and religiosity” (Azra 2007:259). In addition, in his study, Hefner (2010) identifies the strain in “a new breed of Islamic schools” in Indonesia. The Islamic Party *Hidayah* with a close ideological link with an Islamic party (PKS) emerged in 2000 and built 133 integral Islamic schools since 2007. In his interviews with some of the educators, Hefner reveals disagreement between schools’ educators claim that “for the time being, the bases of the state can be nationalist” (2010:136) and schools’ textbooks view on current democracy and nationalism as “un-Islamic” (2010:138).

The tensions bring back the old debates of Islam and the state. This is particularly visible from the argument against the transformation of the Islamic institutions (IAINs) into Islamic universities. Maintaining the religious mission, underscored in the establishment of IAINs, those who disagree to transform the Islamic institution into university claim, that:

“Islamic education would serve the needs of the government and community in accordance with the Jakarta Charter of June 22, 1945, which was initially intended to be an inseparable part of the 1945 Constitution. In other words, there was a religious mission underlying the establishment of this higher learning institution. IAINs are expected to produce quality human resources to staff the public religious bureaucracy and to serve as preachers. Consequently, as the argument goes, it would be more natural for IAINs to develop into institutes of Islamic studies, rather than into universities” (Buchori and Malik 2004:266).
Despite such tensions, however, some Islamic higher institutions play a significant role in promoting more secular democracy in post-New Order Indonesia (Jackson 2007, Kaince 2007, Pohl 2006, Pohl 2009). For example, Islamic university contributions in bridging various streams of Islam through campus’ affiliation (2007:349) and reaching broader communities through their involvement in various programs for civil society. Besides providing schools with Islamic studies teachers throughout Indonesia, its graduates also become staff in traditional Islamic boarding schools as well as staff in beauraucracy at various levels of government. Moreover, the Islamic higher education creates ulama, and its influence on society can be seen from the way it interprets Islamic teachings, promoting social cohesion (2007:349) by emphasizing “openness to the reinterpretation and contextualization of Islamic thought” (2007:351).

Contextualizing citizenship education textbooks within the Indonesian intertwining of educational dualism provides a better understanding of how and why textbooks contesting narratives are written and revised in the shifting direction and missions of higher education within the continuing project of nation building. The tension, inherent in the system, involves politicians and policy makers concerned what should be listed in curricula. It also includes textbook writers in how to translate the curricula into readable texts; educators, concerning the best way to convey the knowledge and values intended; and students, who may accept, negotiate, or reject the designed information. Within this framework, I now turn to the discussions of how the three narratives of Indonesianess are shaped within the intertwining of educational dualism, focusing on two government most influential rules as well as taking account of publishers’, writers’, educators’, and students’ perspectives.
5.2 CREATING GOOD CITIZENS THROUGH THE NEW CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

As I have discussed in the earlier chapters, the shift in the system of governance into a more democratic system since 1998 was soon followed by the transformation of citizenship education. Continuing the tradition in national education for nation building, not only has the Ministry of Education re-positioned civics as one component for the core curriculum (Mata Kuliah Inti/MKI) in higher education, it also intended to alter the approach and curricula in line with the political discourses of democracy, human rights, and regional autonomy. Whereas under the New Order regime the approach was militaristic, indoctrinatory, and emphasized teacher-centered methodology, the new citizenship education is expected to base on participatory teaching methodologies (Jackson and Bahrissalam 2007:46-47).

Besides transforming the approach and content, the government has also upgraded the qualifications of educators for citizenship education. While during the New Order regime completing Lemhanas' course was the main qualification for teaching citizenship education, in post New Order regimes, the government has encouraged various state and private universities to open citizenship education programs for undergraduate and graduate students to fill teaching posts across the country.
### Table 5.2. The Numbers of Citizenship Education Program, Teaching Staffs, and Students Enrolled at the Undergraduate and Graduate Levels in Indonesia in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Citizenship Education Programs</th>
<th>Teaching Staffs</th>
<th>Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate (Bachelor/S1)</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>28,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate (Master/S2)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate (PhD/S3)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most importantly, unlike the main institution for designing and implementing citizenship education under the previous regime, which was on the hands of the National Defense Institution (*Lemhanas*), the current responsible institution is *Dikti* under the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia. Teaching staff are commonly the graduates of the programs on citizenship education, social science, or law. Consequently, the supply for teaching staff is no longer dependent on military personnel or *Lemhanas’* training as in the New Order period. At least five public universities are regarded as the centers for citizenship education in Indonesia, including *Universitas Terbuka* (The Open University), *Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia* (The Indonesian University of Education), *Universitas Negeri*

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66 Unpublished data, the Center of Data for Higher Education (Pangkalan Data Pendidikan Tinggi/PDDikti), the Ministry of Technology and Higher Education (Menristekdikti) of the Republic of Indonesia, September 2017. These statistics are provided by the Center of Data for Higher Education (Pangkalan Data Pendidikan Tinggi/PDDikti), The Ministry of Technology and Higher Education (Menristekdikti) of the Republic of Indonesia, through email correspondence with Dr. Andika Fajar, the head of the data center on September 26, 2017.
Yogyakarta (The State University of Yogyakarta), Universitas Negeri Malang (The State University of Malang), and Universitas Negeri Jakarta (The State University of Jakarta).

The similar program is established in other various state-funded and private universities. In North Sumatra, one of the thirty-three provinces in Indonesia, the program on citizenship education is available at seven universities: five in Medan and two in Pematang Siantar (about a-four-hour drive from Medan). A closer look at the three universities’ core curricula in Medan, Universitas Negeri Medan (Unimed\(^67\)), Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Utara\(^68\) (UMSU), and Universitas Dharma Agung\(^69\) (UDA), illustrates that although they commonly refer to the same national curricula, varieties are not only palpable in the core courses but also in the distinct ideologies, values, financial resources, and leaderships. This feature suggests that in addition to the intertwining of educational dualism, under the same ministry, there are variations in delivering citizenship education.

\(^67\) Universitas Negeri Medan (Unimed) is a state funded university established in 1956, with most of its teaching staffs are civil servants. As other similar type higher institutions, this university views itself as a character building university and is oriented to produce teachers for elementary and secondary levels. Total numbers of students in academic term of 2010/2011 were 19,091, increasing almost twice than ten years before that.

\(^68\) Founded in 1957, Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Utara (UMSU) is a private Islamic university under the modern organization of Muhammadiyah. Students’ enrolment is not as selective as state universities like Unimed, and female students are strongly encouraged to wear Muslims attire.

\(^69\) Universitas Dharma Agung (UDA) is built in 1959. Owned, managed, and administered by a Christian (Protestant) group, this university defines itself as a national university.
Table 5.3. Variation in Core courses\textsuperscript{70} of the Program of Pancasila and Citizenship Education in Three Universities in Medan, Indonesia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Department of Pancasila and Civics</th>
<th>Department of Pancasila and Civics</th>
<th>Department of Civics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unimed</td>
<td>i. Pancasila Education</td>
<td>i. Pancasila Education</td>
<td>I. The Philosophy of Pancasila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii. The Philosophy of Pancasila</td>
<td>ii. The Philosophy of Pancasila</td>
<td>II. Curriculum and Civic textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iii. Civics</td>
<td>iii. Civics</td>
<td>III. Civics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iv. Planning for Teaching Pancasila and Civic Education</td>
<td>v. Planning for Teaching Pancasila and Civic Education</td>
<td>IV. Civics I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>v. Evaluation of the Learning Pancasila and Civic studies</td>
<td>v. Evaluation of Teaching Pancasila and Civic Education</td>
<td>V. Civics II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vi. Capita Selecta of Civics</td>
<td>vi. Capita Selecta of Civics</td>
<td>VI. Research on Civics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ix. English for Civic Education</td>
<td>ix. English for Civic Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x. Sociology of Citizenship</td>
<td>x. Sociology of Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMSU</td>
<td>t. Planning for Teaching Pancasila and Civic Education</td>
<td>v. Planning for Teaching Pancasila and Civic Education</td>
<td>IV. Civics I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>v. Evaluation of Teaching Pancasila and Civic Education</td>
<td>v. Evaluation of Teaching Pancasila and Civic Education</td>
<td>V. Civics II</td>
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<td></td>
<td>vi. Capita Selecta of Civics</td>
<td>vi. Capita Selecta of Civics</td>
<td>VI. Research on Civics</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDA</td>
<td>t. Planning for Teaching Pancasila and Civic Education</td>
<td>v. Planning for Teaching Pancasila and Civic Education</td>
<td>IV. Civics I</td>
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<td></td>
<td>v. Evaluation of Teaching Pancasila and Civic Education</td>
<td>v. Evaluation of Teaching Pancasila and Civic Education</td>
<td>V. Civics II</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vi. Capita Selecta of Civics</td>
<td>vi. Capita Selecta of Civics</td>
<td>VI. Research on Civics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like all levels of education, universities must provide four courses that include religion, citizenship, Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia), and Pancasila education. The Law No. 12/2012 about National Education conceives the four subjects as core subjects (Mata Kuliah Inti/MKI) in the national curricula, preserving the tradition that national education is for nation building as first formulated by the Ministry of Education in 1945.

\textsuperscript{70} preliminary interviews between November 2012 and January 2013 with the directors of Pancasila and Civic Education Program at Unimed, UMSU, and UDA.
Unlike the other three subjects, however, citizenship education is the most context specific course, which content is frequently re-formulated and re-shaped according to the shift in cultural and political settings. In the post-New Order, the transformation of citizenship education is parallel to the government policy of decentralization of education since 1994. This process is intended to increase the autonomy of schools and universities, including a design of their local curricula. The campus autonomy makes possible the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta to initiate a new citizenship education program following the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998. The private university, Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta under Muhammadiyah organization\textsuperscript{71} followed this step through a knowledge sharing with the team from UIN. The publication of citizenship education textbooks from both teams were also funded by the same international agency, the Asia Foundation.

In 2000, the Ministry of Education maintained Pancasila in higher education curricula, but not as a compulsory subject\textsuperscript{72}. The term Pancasila still appeared in 2002\textsuperscript{73} in the national curricula yet in the following year the term was deleted\textsuperscript{74}. In addition, Pancasila and Citizenship Education (PPKN) was changed to Citizenship Education (PKN). However, as Liem (2011) notes, the deletion of Pancasila in the subject title did not necessarily mean that it was completely removed from national education as its five tenets were still listed in the curriculum (Liem 2011:151).

In 2003, the government launched The Education Law No. 20/2003 obligating schools to provide religious teaching in accordance with students’ religious background. Since 2006, the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{71} the publication of citizenship education in various Muhammadiyah’s universities was followed by similar program for primary and secondary schools under its wings.
\textsuperscript{72} decision No. 232/U/2000
\textsuperscript{73} decision No.38/DIKTI/Kep/2002
\textsuperscript{74} the national education law No. 20/2003
\end{footnotesize}
government has also regulated the content of citizenship education textbooks\textsuperscript{75}. The Directorate of Higher Education (\textit{Dikti}) published its first online module complete with a detailed syllabus for university students and teaching staff in 2013 and again after \textit{Dikti} was placed under \textit{Menristekdikti}, a new module was published in 2016.

It was not until 2011 that \textit{Dikti} required all public and private universities in Indonesia to provide \textit{Pancasila Education} again either as a single subject or as a part of citizenship education\textsuperscript{76}. Further in 2012, the government reenacted \textit{Pancasila} as a compulsory subject\textsuperscript{77} at all level of education. Following up this regulation, the 2013 national curricula repositioned \textit{Pancasila} as a compulsory subject at all levels of education together with three other nationalism subjects: Indonesian language, Religion, and Citizenship Education.

However, unlike the New Order period when the government obligated students and teaching staff to refer only to the official citizenship education textbook, teaching staffs are currently allowed to use additional relevant sources to supplement the official teaching materials (Sumarsono\textsuperscript{2008: xi}). In addition, \textit{Lemhanas} is no longer the prominent state institution shaping the official narrative of \textit{Indonesianness}. \textit{Dikti} (and later \textit{Menristekdikti}) for example, has replaced \textit{Lemhanas} in determining the content of citizenship education course through the publication of the online module and the opening of citizenship education program across the country. It is important to note, however, the task of \textit{Indonesianing} Indonesians is not only in the hands of the Ministry of Education. Currently, many government institutions take on the

\begin{itemize}
  \item the Philosophy of Pancasila
  \item National identity
  \item Politics and strategies
  \item Indonesian democracy
  \item Human rights and rule of law
  \item Citizens’ rights and obligation
  \item Geopolitics
  \item Geo-strategy
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{75} to include (1) the Philosophy of Pancasila (2) National identity (3) Politics and strategies (4) Indonesian democracy (5) Human rights and rule of law (6) Citizens’ rights and obligation (7) Geopolitics, and (8) Geo-strategy.

\textsuperscript{76} letter No. 914/E/T/2011

\textsuperscript{77} through Law No. 12/2012
responsibility of creating good Indonesian citizens although their programs\textsuperscript{78} are not as direct, explicit and systematic as in the national curricula. The government regulations, particularly the 2003 National education law and the \textit{Dikti} circulating letter on the content of citizenship education textbook have shaped the ways in which authors narrate the nation in post-New Order Indonesia. Whereas the prior prompts authors to underline a more religious nation-state and citizens, the latter sets the focus that textbooks should discuss.

5.3 \textbf{WRITING AND PUBLISHING CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION TEXTBOOKS}

As I have discussed in the preceding chapter, authors, however, do not simply adopt the government top down regulations without question. Instead, in referring to the regulations, they decode the previous meaning of \textit{Indonesianess} and re-code it by revisiting the selected national past. All authors interviewed in this study\textsuperscript{79} are also teaching staff, convening citizenship education in their universities. For teaching staff, writing textbooks are institutionally rewarded either by \textit{Menristekdikti} or the university, where an author resides. In some cases, universities can influence what knowledge and values authors should emphasize in their books as can be seen from textbooks written by authors at the \textit{Muhammadiyah} University. They are expected to

\textsuperscript{78} Apparently, the need for building the nation and creating good citizens is responded by various institutions, including the Ministry of Religion, The National Defense Institution (\textit{Lemhanas}), and even the Ministry of Finance through its master and PhD scholarships (LPDP) that underlines, a demonstration of nationalism, as a measure for selecting its awardees.

\textsuperscript{79} As I have discussed in methodology chapter, I generate for this discussion, interviews with five writers and a group discussion with ten Muhammadiyah authors and officials. In addition, I conducted one face-to-face interview and three phone interviews with the staff of the local and national publishers. All the interviews took place between 2012 and 2016 in three cities: Medan, Yogyakarta, and Malang.
convey the Muhammadiyah’s vision of more Islamic society and citizens. Similar institutional influence is also visible in the UIN’s and Lemhanas’ textbooks.

Besides the institutional support and influence, a book publication may depend on several marketing issues. Citizenship education textbooks in this study are published by big publishers or a university publishing house. The giant national publishers, such as Gramedia and Erlangga, dominate the national textbook market. In Medan, the third biggest city in Indonesia, for example, there are three big publishers operating - Gramedia, Erlangga and Yudisthira. Together they have conquered the market and left local publishers struggling to maintain their production. As citizenship education textbooks are intended to specific readers, the most common question the publishing house would first ask the author is how many students the book may potentially reach. In some cases, marketing textbooks is an issue, which becomes a meeting point between interests of publishers and that of authors. On the one hand, publishers’ concern is whether textbooks would appropriately meet market demand, whereas on the other hand, authors have a concern whether their students can have access to the necessary materials.

Sometimes authors refuse to bend to publishers’ market cost and benefits rationality. As an alternative, the local and smaller publishing seems to be more promising. It offers more flexibility, which makes it easier for authors to update the content of books and at a reasonable price for students. In addition, as a teaching staff from Universitas Sumatera Utara (USU) in

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81 Based on contact numbers of publishers in Medan that were available on IKAPI’s website, I found and called sixteen publishers listed. Six did not answer my call and among the other ten publishers, none published citizenship textbooks. Apparently, citizenship education is published by big publishers or university publishing house. (A phone interview with the owner of Sastra Novela publisher, on May 24, 2013).

82 An interview with the leading writer as well as educator at UGM, December 29, 2014.

83 Phone interview on May 24, 2013 with a teaching staff in Medan. Her team selected USU Press to publish the citizenship education book written specially for their students.
Medan explained, selecting a university owned publisher is the best choice when the book is designed especially for the local students (“kalangan sendiri”).

In addition, the market cultural context is also a significant factor in shaping the content of textbooks. The textbook by A. Ubaedillah and Abdul Rozak (2012), *Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan (Civic Education): Pancasila, Demokrasi, HAM, dan Masyarakat Madani* was considered too “Islamic” by teaching staff in Medan. Partly in response to such critique, the 2015 edition omitted the Arabic characters in the earlier text. The author later also adds *Pancasila* in the title of the book in response to the latest national curricula that reinstated *Pancasila* as a compulsory subject. From the perspective of the publisher’s branch office\(^84\) in Medan, there is no doubt that the changes would make the book reach wider readers than its earlier versions.

### 5.4 SELECTING TEXTBOOKS

Studies focusing on education policy in post-New Order Indonesia reveal several issues concerning the implementation of new curricula in the post-Suharto regime. Among these, for instance, Bjork (2003) finds a lack of teachers’ enthusiasm for change. Rather than acting as educators, teachers are referred more as “civil service culture” (2003:202), by “confirming to the norms that guided the activities of government employees” (2003:252). They also did not perceive the increase in their authority to formulate and implement teaching curriculum as important and they tended to wait for the instructions about how to do their tasks from their

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\(^84\) Interview with a marketing staff in Medan, January 25, 2013.
superiors (2003:251). Another study revealed that teachers preferred to use the outdated teaching methods despite having updated information (Gaylord 2008). According to Gaylord, “teachers as mostly anxious about change, overworked, underpaid, and principally rewarded for improving test results. Democratization and creation of active citizens [were] secondary” (Gaylord 2008:165).

However, at the university level, some studies highlight quite a different picture (Kalidjernih 2005, Samsuri 2010). There are also changes in the ways teaching staffs view the role of citizenship education in shaping young people’s identities. It is true that teaching staff still must convene large classes for citizenship education classes. For example, the team of teaching staff of the philosophy department at Gadjah Mada University had to teach 7000-8000 students in December 2014 and in the following year, the number increased to around 9000 new students. Consequently, the teaching staff must teach six classes at the minimum yearly, consisting of 60, 80 and even 110 students. To meet the demand for teaching citizenship education in large classes, they invited their colleagues from other universities, such as the state Islamic University (UIN) and the state Yogyakarta University (UNY). Similar practice is also common in various universities in Medan.

Moreover, teaching staff in higher education have more autonomy to determine resources, textbooks, and modules for their students as they selectively use information from various national textbooks. One from an Islamic university in Medan, for example, referred to several national textbooks and among those, he selected *Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan untuk*

85 This discussion is based on in-depth interviews with twelve educators from four universities (UDA, UNIMED, USU, UMSU) in Medan and three from UGM and UNY in Yogyakarta 2012 and 2016.
86 An interview with a writer as well as educator at UGM, December 24, 2014.
87 Several interviews with four teaching staffs at UMSU took place between January 2013 to July 2014.
88 Muhammadiyah University of North Sumatera (UMSU)
*Perguruan Tinggi* (2006) by Kaelani, as he considers it offering broad discussions and is easy to read and comprehend. To complement the book, he also includes *Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan* by Dwi Winarno (2006) and *Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan* by Sumarsono (2006). For discussion on human rights, he referred to *Demokrasi, HAM dan Masyarakat Madani* (2008) by Ubaedillah and Abdul Rozak, which later became his main reference. In addition, to provide students with a more Islam perspective, he added *Muhammadiyah’s* textbook to his reading list. The similar combination of textbooks, except the last one, was also strategically selected by teaching staff from other universities\(^9\) in Medan regardless of their ideological background.

Besides weighing the content of textbooks based on their themes and information contained within, educators also take into account the credibility of writers. A teaching staff from the USU, for example, selected Dwi Winarno’s book (2010), as he considers the writer’s attendance in “suscardoswar”, a course for citizenship education staff organized by Dikti, as a good sign of his expertise. In addition, despite his disagreement with some parts of Ubaedillah’s (2012) discussions, the instructor still uses the book for its universal Muslim visions of citizenship.

Another educator from *Unimed* considers Winarno’s book, *Paradigma Baru Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan*, as the most appropriate text for his students. Not only did he consider the textbook providing the paradigm of good citizenship and conceiving civics as science, his acquaintance with the author also convinced him that the author’s perspective matches his own.

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\(^9\) *Universitas Darma Agung* is a private and more Christian university, *Universitas Negeri Medan (Unimed)* and *Universitas Sumatera Utara (USU)* are state funded universities and cater for more multicultural demand.
In addition, educators sometimes use their own published textbooks or modules\textsuperscript{90} as the main reference in class and may or may not suggest additional textbooks. When they do persuade students to include four or five additional references, students themselves may prefer using their professors’ textbooks or modules, as these sources are deemed to be the most useful learning materials for exams\textsuperscript{91}.

5.5 BECOMING INDONESIANS

All students and alumnae\textsuperscript{92} who I have interviewed in this study, had educational background from both more religious and secular schools. The students from the Islamic higher institution, for example, graduated from various public and private, religious-based and more secular high schools across the province. Likewise, the students of more secular private and state-own universities came from religious as well as more secular high schools. Since their enrolment, they have been exposed to various group identities, and being students in the highly diverse city, they found themselves in the continuing process of defining their own identity while at the same time adapting to the new sets of rules, expectations, and anticipation for gaining better opportunities in their lives. They find it necessary to use Indonesian language both at campus as well as in their everyday interactions. Their various activities and activisms also

\textsuperscript{90} My discussions with two teaching staffs at the program of Pancasila and Citizenship Education from Unimed and UMSU confirm this preference. In contrary, their counterparts at UDA were not allowed to use modules in class.

\textsuperscript{91} Some students of Pancasila and Civic Program that I accidentally met at the Civic laboratory of Unimed on January 2013 explained their rationality for referring only to modules written by their professors.

\textsuperscript{92} I have conducted three group discussions with twenty-five students from three universities in Medan, UMSU, UDA, and Unimed in 2014. In addition, I interviewed eleven students and alumni between 2014 and 2017 in Medan and Yogyakarta.
inform their understanding of their potential roles in a new broader milieu, distinct from what they were familiar with.

Confirming educators’ concerns, students and alumni mostly perceived the two-credit-course of citizenship education as boring, not offering new knowledge and insight, and deprived of the opportunity to have in-depth discussions on related matters. In general, they are very aware of the gap between what is thought in class and what is going on outside. This is particularly common among undergraduate students in citizenship education programs. During the interviews, many of these would-be teachers had already completed their undergraduate classes, had teaching experience in schools of various levels, and presented themselves more as young professionals than university students. Reflecting on their completed citizenship lessons, the students pointed to the necessity to improve the didactical methods in teaching of citizenship education. As young teachers, they already see the lack of enthusiasm among their students in learning the required citizenship education. Some expressed their own disappointment as university students for having repetitive information that they had to memorize and the lack of willingness among their educators to accommodate the class discussions. The limit in conveying intended knowledge and values through the citizenship education does not necessarily mean, however, that these students find the subject inconsequential.

To students and alumni\textsuperscript{93} graduated from more general programs, citizenship education at school and/or university was not always the most important source of information that shapes their knowledge to become Indonesians. In his reflection, Ahmad, a graduate student from

\textsuperscript{93}The interviews took place between 2012 and early 2017, including face to face interviews with eleven students and alumni and interviews with three groups of ten to fifteen undergraduate students. All groups interviews were conducted in Medan with students from Universitas Medan (Unimed), Universitas Darma Agung (UDA), and Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Utara (UMSU). In addition, face-to-face-interviews were conducted in Medan and Yogyakarta with students and alumni from the three previous universities and Gadjah Mada University.
Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Utara (UMSU)⁹⁴ in Medan, for example, points to his upbringing as the most important reference for his understanding of citizenship. His good memories of friendships with other children in his multi-ethnic and multi-religious neighborhood confirmed the value of tolerance and togetherness he learnt from his parents. His interest in several non-religious-based organizations later has shaped his conception of what being an Indonesian and a good citizen mean to him. Rather than focusing on the differences, he prefers to seek for a common ground that might help building respect and tolerance. In his reflection, the normative content in his citizenship education class was not balanced with the discussions about the implementation in reality. Consequently, what he learnt in the class failed to inform how he should solve everyday problems. As he further describes:

“usually there are issues concerning faith and how people from different religions should interact. For example, in Medan, we see Muslims praying and Batak-Christian death ceremony usually use loudspeakers. Very loud and disturbing. Yet, showing disagreement about these activities is almost impossible because it might cause violent responses from both sides. Obviously, we need the act of tolerance, but unfortunately, we can only find it in textbooks” (Ahmad, in depth interview in Medan, June 2014).

Bridging the gap is, indeed, still an unresolved issue. As an educator from Unimed⁹⁵ describes: "on the one hand, our effort is to cultivate honesty and the sense of justice as part of democratic principles. On the other hand, we face the real problems of ineffective rule of law, incompetent civil servants, injustice court processes, corruption, etc.”.

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⁹⁴ UMSU is a private Islamic university under the wings of Muhammadiyah organization.
⁹⁵ A personal correspondence by email from an educator from Unimed, October 2014
The gap between what is in the book and outside classroom discussions is, in some cases, filled by students’ first-hand everyday knowledge during their upbringing and their interactions with friends. These outside school interactions provide students with useful rules of how to become Indonesians. Jessi, a graduate student from Yogyakarta, describes her experience as such:

“I was in Jakarta since the day I was born until I was in the first grade at junior high school. Then my family moved to Serang, Banten, and I went to a school there for two years. My parents then sent me to a Catholic high school, Regina Pacis, in Solo before I went to Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogya. My father was graduated from The Indonesian Islamic University (Universitas Islam Indonesia) in Yogya. He was the only Catholic student in the Islamic private university at that time and he was required to prove his ability to read and memorize Quran and it became very difficult for him to finish his study. He was also an activist for a student national movement that made him under the surveillance of the government. When I was about to go to the Universitas Gadjah Mada, he reminded me not to become a Catholic-centered person. From my parents’ perspective, being Indonesians means being a Catholic at the same time and being a Catholic is also being an Indonesian. I am an Indonesian and I am also a Catholic. That is how my parents prepared me to the campus diversity” (Jessi, in-depth interview in Yogya, in January 2017).

96 In Indonesian language she said, “Indonesia ya Katholik, dan Katholik itu ya Indonesia”. She refers this statement to the writing of an Uskup: “100% Indonesia, 100% katholik”.

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Being exposed to dualism of education may also cause students difficulty to adapt, suggesting that, becoming an Indonesian is not a simple matter. Rahmat, a student brought up in a village in Lampung, found himself in a very difficult situation during his transition as a student from an Islamic boarding school to the Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogya. Retrospectively he describes,

“While I was in primary and junior high school (SD and SMP), we did not know exactly where we live, except that we were in Lampung. I went to a primary public school between 1997 and 2003, and later in a public junior high school in 2003 to 2006. It was in Lampung Utara, and we did not have the electricity until 2006. There was no television, nor any picture of the president in class. The school walls were made of bamboos, perhaps teachers thought there was no place to hang the picture of the president there. The only thing that I remember about citizenship education during my primary school is the importance of working together (gotong royong). That’s it. Then, my father sent me to a pesantren (an Islamic boarding school) to complete my high school, also in Lampung. But then, I went to Gadjah Mada University with a scholarship from the Ministry of Religion. So, before we were sent to UGM, the ministry provided a matriculation that included lessons of how to behave in a university setting. Apparently, it was not enough. There were many things that I found very confusing when I entered the university. In the forestry faculty where I registered as a student, I found that males and females were treated equally. It was quite a shock to me. Group assignments must be done together by males and females students, even until late at night. I was not used to it. I skipped classes for several years, during which I
went to live in a *pesantren* (Islamic traditional boarding school) in Yogya. Even there, everything was very different. Many of my fellow mates were also from universities and decided to stay there because the *pesantren* provided cheap food and room for only IDR 250,000 per-month\textsuperscript{97}. The ways the *pesantren* taught how to chant in reading Quran was also different from what I have had learnt. Even its disciplinary rules were very distinct from where I came from. In my old *pesantren*, physical punishments were common, while here they were considered unacceptable” (Interview with Atif, an alumnus from both undergraduate and graduate at Universitas Gadjah Mada, in January 2017).

From the students experiences above, it can be drawn that citizenship education classes are not the only reference for generating new knowledge and values of becoming Indonesians. What students do not acquire from their classes, they learn from somewhere else.

The call for forging more modern yet religious students within the intertwining of educational dualism clearly suggest that the state’s national and more secular curricula are not the only references for mass education in post-New Order Indonesia. Islamic education is also at the center of the Muslim experience because Islamic schools offer “a unique platform for addressing the question of how to carry Muslims forward into modernity at once plural and open-minded yet religious” (Hefner 2010:144). Yet, as Jackson and Parker remark (2008), “…modernity poses huge complex questions about authority and truth, about sources of knowledge, the role of divinity and faith, political legitimacy, the proper relations of the state and religion and how education mediates these two realms” (2008:46).

\textsuperscript{97} This amount is equal to $20
What can be learnt from the findings above is that the intertwining dualism of education is filled with the mixture of memory, crossing-boundaries of actors, and the meeting point of networks as well as tensions. The later involves both competition between the supporters and challengers for transforming society to more Islamic direction or to a more secular venue as well as collaboration and mutual recognition among educators, researchers, and students, institutionally and individually. The three narratives of the nations are shaped within these junctures. Under the continuing ideas of the unity of the nation-state in democracy and the maintaining of Pancasila as national ideology, there is a long-time tension of contested knowledge and values, including how the meanings of nation, democracy, ideal citizens, and Pancasila are defined and narrated. What makes possible the endurance of such tension, among other things, is the long existing of the intertwining dualism of national education.

In the Imaginary Institution of Society (2005), Cornelius Castoriadis introduces the terms of imaginary or institutional imaginary to highlight that the function of social institutions is not adequately explained merely by rationale and/or symbolic functions of institutions. He proposes the third aspect that is, “the imaginary component of every symbol and of every symbolism” (2005:127). With the concept he explains the persistence of social institutions in a society. Conceiving the concept of imaginary in a constructive way, Castoriadis defines imaginary capacity as “the capacity to see in a thing what it is not, to see it other than it is” (2005:127).

Imaginary signification provides answers for fundamental questions that a society rises: “who are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? Where and in what are we? What do we want; what do we desire; what are we lacking?” (Castoriadis 2005:146-147). Identifying oneself as a part of group or collectivity through a signifier “us,” includes two signifieds: quality or property of “us” that is “…not and cannot be either real or rational, but imaginary (2005:148).
The nation is an appropriate example for this. It relates signifier and signifieds by referring both to other symbols that unite collectivity to “another ‘reality’” (2005:148), as Castoriadis describes:

“The nation…. fills this function of identification by means of the threefold imaginary reference to a ‘common history’—three fold because this history is sheer past, because it is not really common, and finally, because what is known of it and what serves as the basis for this collectivizing identification in people’s consciousness is largely mythical. This imaginary characteristic of the nation nonetheless proves more solid than any other reality, as two world wars and the survival of nationalism have shown” (2005:148).

However, there are two insoluble problems with Castoriadis’ discussion. First, Castoriadis does not pay attention to the role of actors or individuals in inventing social institutions and imaginary. The “imaginary capacity” that he has in mind is to be found merely at the level of institution and society. He does not lengthen this capacity to individuals or actors. When he describes “choice” and “orientation,” for example, these are not individually decided. Instead, they are carried by “a system of imaginary significations” (2005:150). The second problem concerns the emergence of a new institution and social imaginary. Whereas Castoriadis provides insightful analysis of how social institutions persist, he does not, however, offer sufficient discussion on how a new institution and social imaginary emerge.

Unlike Castoriadis, Charles Taylor (2004) provides a more actor-oriented conceptualization of imaginary by highlighting “ordinary people” as an important agency in the emergence of Western modern social imaginaries. The latter is characterized by a particular
moral order that underlies backgrounds for people’s understanding in making sense of their relations to others and power (Taylor 2004). Like Castoriadis, however, Taylor conceives imaginary in constructive sense: social imaginary “is not a set of ideas; rather, it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a society” (2004:29 of 2189, kindle edition). Thus, the concept of social imaginary is convenient to reveal:

“...the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (Taylor 2004, 249 of 2189, kindle edition).

Taylor conceives that market economy, public sphere, and the sovereignty of people in a secular world function as the immediacy access for the moral idea of “modern individualism” (Taylor 2004). By tracing the paths of modern Western social imaginaries within more or less the “national” scope, Taylor is able to trace national distinctions of, for example, economic, public sphere, and democracy in France, England, Germany and North America. This modern social imaginary needs “new ways of telling its stories” (2004:1771 of 2189), and the most imperative narrative modes centers on the nation and nationalism that are based on the idea, that:

“[t]he people being led to statehood is thought to belong together in virtue of a common language, common culture, common religion or history of common action. The point has been tirelessly made that much of this common past is frequently pure invention” (1790 of 2189).
Referring to the concept of social imaginaries, Göle demonstrates that in Turky the dominant secular social imaginary is challenged by “Islamic social imaginaries” (Göle 2002). Göle draws this insight from the pro-and cons concerning the act of veiling performed in Turkish parliament\(^98\), emphasizing the dominant discourse that one cannot be a modern and Muslim at the same time. Unlike in Turkey, where the public sphere is institutionalized in the context of voluntary modernization and is implemented as a site for “a secular and progressive way of life” (Göle 2002), such secular social imaginary is not the dominant feature of post-Suharto Indonesia. Contemporary discussions on Islam in Indonesia reveal how actors and groups express various visions of who they are, how their political communities should be, as well as Muslims’ role in shaping their imagined communities (Heffner 2005, Hefner 1997, Hefner 2010, Hefner 2013, Hefner 2000, Lukens-Bull 2001, Rinaldo 2010). Indeed, Indonesian Muslims are seen to embrace modernity, incorporating the central ideology of the state into their political world view, and adapting democracy into their political system (Assyaukanie 2009, Hefner 1997, Hefner 2013, Mujani 2009). The modernist vision of the most influential assumption among Muslims in Indonesia is that “…one can have modernization and, indeed, rationalization, without secularization” (Brenner 1996). As this study demonstrates, how they embrace modernity, define democracy, and re-interpret Pancasila, is not singular nor without contest.

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\(^{98}\) Within this secular public sphere, veiling in public (in this case in Turkish parliament by a female Muslims, a deputy, and a citizen) is a symbolic way of announcing that this act defies “both traditional and secular ways of imagining self-emancipation and becoming public” (Göle 2002:188). This “Islamic public display” recovers a spectacle that has been suppressed by secularism.
6.0 CONCLUSION

This study examines the intricate changes in the narrative of the nation in post-New Order Indonesia from 1998 to 2016. The central question is how nationalism is defined and reproduced during democratic transition and consolidation in a democratic Muslim populous country. I have explored the reproduction of nationalism focusing on citizenship education textbooks in higher education.

6.1 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY

The previous studies of the representations of Indonesianness focus on popular culture (Weintraub 2010), policy documents (Yusuf 2015), state-initiated commemorations (McGregor 2002), official history (Purwanta 2017; Suwignyo 2014; Wood 2005; and McGregor 2005), museums (McGregor 2003), national curricula and textbooks (Jackson and Bahrissalam 2007; Song 2008; and Fearnley-Sander 2008), as well as political discourses (Aspinall 2016; Assyaukanie 2009; and Ramage 1995). This dissertation has specifically explored the official narratives of the nation as represented in citizenship education textbooks in post-New Order Indonesian higher education.

Earlier studies have already found the marginalization of narratives outside the official New Order’s account. Whereas Wood (2005) reveals two versions of history --the official New
Order’s version and the “official history in waiting” drawn by Muslims intellectual’s account of the past (2005:4), Suwignyo demonstrates the persistence of “Indonesia-centric historiography” that reproduced the massage of the official narrative (2014:114) and the emergence of “Islam-centric historiography” that attempts to justify the centrality of Islam in creating the nation-state (2014:126). Adding to the existing discussions, this study reveals three contesting official narratives of the nation—state-centered, citizen-centered, and ummah-centered narratives—emerging in post-New Order Indonesia.

Most importantly, the discourses on Indonesian nationalism in the past have underlined the centrality of Pancasila as the national ideology. One of the main challengers to this central ideology is generally conceived as emanating from the Islamist organizations (Hadiz 2004, Raillon 2011, Robet 2010, Song 2008), which tend to implement “a literal interpretation and understanding of Islam” (Azra 2013). Besides the vision for an Islamic state, Muslim leaders, however, are divided into two others models of polity, including those who support a Liberal Democratic State (LDS) and a Religious Democratic State (RDS), that conceives Pancasila is not contradicting Islam (Assyaukanie 2009). Such alternative meaning of Pancasila is not new. In the past, although the official narrative of the nation was mainly represented by the New Order militaristic narrative, alternative meanings were also existed, formulated by state and non-state actors (Ramage 1995:1-2).

Adding to the existing discussion on the official narratives of the nation, my study explores further the ways in which the three contesting narratives vary in redefining Pancasila, particularly on the first and fourth principles. Whereas the state-centered narrative imagines a religious Pancasila democratic nation-state, the citizen-centered narrative proposes a religious

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99 He finds three typologies of Muslim polity in Indonesia, that includes Islamic Democratic State (IDS), Religious Democratic State (RDS), and Liberal Democratic State (LDS) (Assyaukanie 2009:12-19).
deliberate democratic nation-state. In addition, the ummah-centered narrative emphasizes an Islamic-based democratic nation. This dissertation also highlights that in building the coherence of their narratives, the authors selectively revisit selected events in the national past and use three narrative strategies. The first strategy revises the New Order’s official narrative by significantly downgrading the role of military and detaching Suharto from the narrative of the nation. The second strategy involves the building of a new narrative by countering and replacing the New Order’s moral meaning with a new one. Finally, the third strategy departs from the New Order’s official narrative, proposing a new narrative of the nation.

Most importantly, the three contesting official narratives in this study do not only reveal tensions in citizenship education, but also signify the emergence of new-nationalism in the post-New Order Indonesia. Aspinall (2016) has discussed a new nationalism referring to the presidential election in 2014. This new nationalism is visible from the “bellicose rejection of alleged foreign interference in Indonesia’s affairs and in demands for greater international recognition of Indonesia’s power and status” (2016:72). Aspinall further notes that the “non-ideological” (2016:77) new nationalism is resulted from “deeper feelings of insecurity” about Indonesia’s economic achievements in its perceived growing insignificance in international interaction.

Unlike Aspinall’s conception of new nationalism in terms of psychological angst, I refer Indonesian new nationalism to the contemporary contesting meanings of the nation. The three narratives explored in this study provide the insights of how the nation and the ideal citizen are define contrarily. New nationalism, in this sense, refers to the emergence of the contending official narratives and the tensions entailed in shaping the cultural memory of the nation-state.
As the contesting visions continue, the myth of the inevitable relation between the state and the nation is reinforced through the contesting narrative of what kind of the nation Indonesia is.

Elsewhere, in response to Anderson’s Imagined Community, Chatterjee (2010) questions: “If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain modular forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?” (Chatterjee 2010: kindle edition location 4787 of 7466). Using Bengal as the case, Chatterjee shows how anti-colonial nationalism invented two domains of sovereignty. The one is the material or the “outside” where the West is superior. Another is the spiritual or an “inner” domain, where the colonial society places its “essential marks of cultural identity” (Chatterjee 2010: location of 4807 of 7466). What this anti colonial nationalism attempted to create is a modern, yet not western nationalism (Chatterjee 2010). Although the focus of discussion is the emergence of anti-colonial nationalism, Chatterjee’s argument however, opens broader discussions of what kind of nationalism is emerging as well as reproduced in other contexts. In post-New Order Indonesia, the collapse of the authoritarian regime has led to the transition to and then the consolidation of democracy. Apparently, the new nationalism that is reproduced within this context is the one that intended to preserves the unity of the nation characterized by piety, distinct from the secular liberal western societies.

6.2 THE LIMITATION AND VENUES FOR FURTHER STUDIES

The examined contesting narratives in this study do not necessarily reflect rigid typologies generalizing the existing narratives in post-Suharto Indonesia. The selected textbooks analyzed in this study are based on the list provided by the national library. There is a possibility
that a new or different narrative of the nation is available outside what I have discussed in this study. It is also important to note, that although this study captures tensions both in citizenship education and the intertwining dualism of Indonesian education, it does not yet capture whether tensions in knowledge and values between more secular and more Islamic views inherent in the system, is vanishing or intensifying.

In addition, I have discussed the role of cultural memory approach that informs the analysis of textbooks narratives. I have demonstrated how in building the coherent of their stories of the nation, writers revisit of the selected events in the national past. After almost twenty years of the collapse of Suharto’s New Order, the 1965 event still plays a significant role in the official representations of Indonesianness. The erasing and revising of the moral meaning related to the 1965 event, however, indicates that the official narratives in this study are yet to recognize the 1965 event as one of the Indonesian national and “cultural trauma”100 (Eyerman 2013:43). Thus, a study about whether textbook authors, adapting Eyerman (2011) phrase, would become the carrier group to transform “a traumatic incident” into “a cultural trauma” (2011:460) may better inform how the cultural memory of the nation works in Indonesia.

Finally, given that citizenship education is implemented nationally at all levels of education, further studies exploring the process of designing and implementing national curricula as well as schools’ everyday culture might inform a better practice in the process of empowering the young.

100 By cultural trauma Eyerman (2013) highlights, “The polarity and disparity between perpetrator and victim are what distinguishes cultural trauma as discourse. In this sense, cultural trauma is a contentious discursive process framed by a dichotomy between perpetrator and victim which is spurred by a powerful, unforgettable occurrence. What also characterizes cultural trauma as discourse is that an established collective identity is shaken, and its foundations called into question. It is a discursive process where the emotions which are triggered by a traumatic occurrence are worked through and an attempt is made to heal the collective wound” (Eyerman 2013:43-44).
## APPENDIX A

### TEXTBOOKS AND MODULES

#### A.1. LIST OF NATIONAL TEXTBOOKS AND MODULES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title of the citizenship textbook</th>
<th>City, Publishers, and year of publication</th>
<th>Locations where books are available in Indonesia</th>
<th>Selected books for thematic and narrative analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Editions/Print Details</td>
<td>Editions/Print Details</td>
<td>Language</td>
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<tr>
<td>10)</td>
<td>Dikti and Menristekdikti</td>
<td><em>Buku Modul Kuliah Kewarganegaraan (for university students)</em></td>
<td>Jakarta, Dikti, 2013 (available online) Jakarta, Dikti, 2016 (available online)</td>
<td>Published online, and free access</td>
<td>Two online modules, published in 2013 and 2016.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13)</td>
<td>Amin, Zainul Ittihad</td>
<td><em>Pendidikan Kewiraan. Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan</em></td>
<td>Jakarta, Universitas Terbuka, 1999 Jakarta, Universitas Terbuka, 2009</td>
<td>Used for Open University’s students only</td>
<td>Two books: the 1999 and 2009 editions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A.2. CODING BOOK FOR DATASET #1 NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF TEXTBOOKS

A.2.1. The structure of textbooks.

The structure of textbooks provides information concerning authors and publishers, the immediate context in which textbooks are written and published, purposes of textbooks, readers intended, and main themes discussed. This information particularly relevant to gain further insight concerning the reproduction process of textbooks as well as the possibility that a text might have published earlier, of which content was probably different from the current one. For example, this can lead to identify the shift in state-promoted textbooks from 1960s to that of in post-Suharto Indonesia.

A.2.1.1. The layout of textbook: Book’s information (year, book size and pages), the front cover, and the back cover

A.2.1.2. Authors and publishers

A.2.1.3. Information about the book

A.2.1.4. Intended audience/readers

A.2.1.5. Inside the book (main themes): Introduction/introductory remarks, list of content (the systematization of themes in titles and subtitles), themes in the list of content (Keywords/concepts/events/time references), chapters, instructions, questions, tasks for students, picture(s), and boxes for special themes.

A.2.1.6. The availability of the earlier versions of the textbooks

A.2.2. The Narratives of the Nation and the Ideal Citizen

In this study, I refer Indonesianess to textbooks conceptions of the nation and the ideal citizen. Two steps of analysis were conducted: (1) the thematic (narrative) analysis by paying attention to what authors mean by concepts they use to specify the character, attributes or the meanings of Indonesianess and (2) narrative analysis to understand moral meanings that textbooks convey.

A.2.2.1. With thematic (narrative) analysis, the focus is on what textbooks mean by specific concept they emphasize. The main concepts that are commonly discussed in citizenship education textbooks after 1998, among other things include:
democracy, human rights, citizen, citizenship, national identity, nationalism, nation, nation-state, Pancasila, the national way of seeing (*wawasan nusantara* or *wasantara*), national resilience (*ketahanan nasional*), the nation, the nation-state, religious, civil society, *madani* society, etc. Comparing books’ discussions of what they mean by these specific themes may highlight, that textbooks meaning of these concepts are not singular. This allows the categorization of meanings that further unravels the seemingly singular understanding of the nation and the ideal citizens.

A.2.2.2. Narrative analysis is conducted to understand moral meanings that textbooks craft by focusing on plot or emplotment. Thus, careful attention is paid to words, terms, metaphors, and statements that textbooks used in explaining actors, their roles, actions, and happenings. Moreover, the following coding system is built: (1) actors discussed in textbooks as heroes/enemies or good/bad citizens (2) imagined community: what kind of society textbooks idealize (3) plot/emplotment: the linking of selected events for explaining what is going on or happening(s), or what narratives are about (e.g. action, happening, etc.) (4) moral meanings that textbooks draw/emphasize from the plots—action(s) or happening(s)—they build can be generated from the following points: what should be learnt from the past, what should or should not happening in the present, what should be done in current time, and what should not happen or be avoided from happening in the future. These moral meanings can be drawn from: words and frames choices that textbooks used in explaining why actions and happenings take place the way they do or did and how desirable or undesirable the actions and happenings are. For example, good/bad citizen can be identified from the following points: words, phrases, sentences that demonstrate desirable/undesirable qualities, characters, and attributes to actors/people/group, what they did/do/should or should not do, and how/why it is so.

A.2.3. Narrative Strategies

In this aspect of narrative analysis, the focus is on how textbooks build the coherence of their narratives.

A.2.3.1. Intertextuality: sources/references cited in quotations/boxes emphasizing recurrent ideas and/or values (that are also mentioned/discussed in the other four datasets) in explaining or describing specific concepts or themes.
A.2.3.2. The ways in which textbooks build their plot/emplotment to reach narrative coherence. build common themes and link them to specific time and event in the past.

A.2.3.3. In creating moral meanings, textbooks may link the selected events or happenings in the past to the present, and even the future in their discussions and providing new meaning over the past to highlight the importance of specific ideas or values in the present. This process allows textbooks to erase, revise, rewrite, or correct the past to the purposes of the present. In emphasizing values or ideas that they support, the Post Suharto textbooks commonly selected the following default events as the past of the nation: (1) The age of Sriwijaya and Majapahit kingdoms (prior to the colonization) (2) The colonized “Indonesia” (prior to 1945) (3) The awakening of Indonesia (1928) (4) The independency of Indonesia (1945) (5) The Guided Democracy 1959 (6) G30S/PKI (1965) (7) The emergence of the New Order (1967) (8) The collapse of the New Order (1998), and (9) The return of democracy in Indonesia (1998-2016).
APPENDIX B

GOVERNMENT-RELATED POLICIES ON CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

B.1. LIST OF GOVERNMENT-RELATED POLICIES ON CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

B.1. The Law No. 29/1954 (29/1954) on the state’s national defense (Pertahanan Negara Republik Indonesia)
B.2. The Law No. 22/1961 on Higher Education
B.3. The Presidential Decision No. 1/1965 on the Prevention to Blasphemy
B.4. The Presidential Regulation No. 14/1965 on Higher Education Assembly
B.5. The Presidential Decision No. 19/1965 on Guidelines for Pancasila National Education System
B.6. The National Assembly Decision No. IV/MPR/1973 on the State Main Guidelines
B.8. The Law No. 20/1982 on Guidelines of the Security and Defense of the State of the Republic of Indonesia
B.10. The Law No. 2/1989 on National Education System
B.14. The Government Regulation No. 60/1999 on Higher Education.
B.16. The Director of the Higher Education Decision 38/DIKTI/Kep/2002 on Guidelines of Character Development in the Higher Education
B.18. The Director of the Higher Education Decision No. 26/DIKTI/KEP/2002 on the Banning of the Activities of Extra Campus Organizations or Political Parties in Campus Life.
B.19. The Law No. 20/2003 on the National Education System
B.21. The Law No. 14/2005 on Teachers and Teaching Staffs in Higher Education
B.22. The Director of the Higher Education Decision No. 43/DIKTI/KEP/2006 on Guidelines for The Practice of Character Development in Higher Education.
B.23. The Director of the Higher Education Decision No. 44/DIKTI/KEP/2006 on Guideline for Implementing the Group of Courses on Society (Matakuliah Berkehidupan Bermasyarakat di Perguruan Tinggi).
B.29. The Director of the Higher Education Letter No. 3118/E43/2011 on Training for Citizenship Education Teaching Staff in Higher Education
B.30. The Presidential Regulation No. 8/2012 on Indonesian National Qualification Framework
B.31. The Law No. 12/2012 on Higher Education
B.33. The Director of the Higher Education Circulation Letter No. 0854/E5.4/HP/2013 on Government Funding for Textbooks Writing in Higher Education
B.34. The Minister of Research, Technology and Higher Education National No. 44/2015 on National Standard for Higher Education

B.2. CODING BOOK FOR DATASET #2 GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

B.2.1. The nature of regulation: cancellation, information, persuasion, compulsory, etc.
B.2.2. Persons/individuals or institutions issuing the regulations and/or the laws.
B.2.3. The intended consequence of the law.
B.2.4. Changes in regulations before 1998 and after 1998:

B.2.4.1. The content of regulation/law: what the regulation/law is about (main issue(s)).

B.2.4.2. The object of regulation: students, teachers, principle, students and teaching staffs in higher education, and institutions or organizations (for example schools, universities, etc.).

B.2.4.3. What aspect of citizens and citizenship that the government regulations or policies emphasize

B.2.5. Broader political and cultural context in which the regulation and/or the law is produced

B.2.5.1. What event or happening around the time the regulations and the laws were introduced.

B.2.5.2. What groups, organizations, political parties, or individuals supported and/or against the process of decision making pertaining to the regulation and the law; how, and why.
APPENDIX C

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS

C.1. DATA SET # 3 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS

This dataset includes in-depth interviews with writers and publishers’ representatives between 2012 and 2016. The five authors included the national textbooks authors (Winarno from UNS, Kaelan and Zubaidi from UGM, Udin Winataputera and Supriya from UPI) and one group of Muhammadiyah writers (UMY). These authors were interviewed in Yogyakarta and Malang. In addition, I conducted in-depth interviews with three writers of citizenship education textbooks for students (internal use) at three universities in Medan between 2012 and 2014. In addition, I conducted one face to face interview with the representative of national publisher and three phone interviews with three local publishers in Medan.

C.2. CODING BOOK FOR DATASET #4 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH PUBLISHERS AND AUTHORS

C.2.1. Content of Textbook

C.2.1.1. Authors’ references for shaping the content of citizenship education textbooks: the government law/regulations, university rules, and specific values that authors refer to highlight the significance of citizenship education.

C.2.1.2. Publisher’s policy pertaining to the content of citizenship education textbooks.
C.2.2. Book production

C.2.2.1. Number of books printed/published for each printed edition, layout and covers of the books (E.g. Ubaedillah and Rozak’s book has a typical size and printed on yellow papers).

C.2.2.2. The procedure for publishing a textbook: the criteria for publishing and republishing a citizenship education textbook and the rationality for publishing textbooks more than once.

C.2.3. Books circulation

C.2.3.1. The rationality for marketing textbooks in some cities but not in others,

C.2.3.2. The strategy among publishers and authors to identify the potential market for textbooks.

C.2.3.3. Locations or places (e.g. stores, libraries) where textbooks are available.

C.2.3.4. The ways in which books are introduced (e.g. book discussion, book review, book displays on conferences venues, etc.).
APPENDIX D

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH EDUCATORS

D.1. DATA SET #4 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH EDUCATORS

In-depth interviews for this study were conducted with twelve educators from four universities (UDA, UNIMED, USU, UMSU) in Medan and two educators from UGM in Yogyakarta, took place between 2012 and 2016. The duration of the interviews ranges from 45 minutes to two hours and all interviews took place at university sites.

D.2. CODING BOOK FOR DATASET #4 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH EDUCATORS

D.2.1. Educators background: formal education, training (compulsory and/or additional) for teaching citizenship education, and experience in teaching citizenship education course.

D.2.1.1. Educators’ references for teaching citizenship education: the government law/regulations pertaining to the content of textbooks, university rules, and specific values that teaching staffs refer to underline the significance of teaching and learning citizenship education, etc.

D.2.1.1. Teaching staffs’ perception of government/university regulations concerning citizenship education and changes that influence the content of citizenship education curriculum/textbooks in the past years.
D.2.1.2. Teaching staffs’ approach in teaching citizenship education: challenges and solutions.

D.2.1.3. Compulsory and additional textbooks, modules, and/or sources for teaching and class discussion that educators suggest to students and for class discussion, the rationality and the process of selecting appropriate textbooks/modules.
APPENDIX E

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH STUDENTS AND/OR FORMER STUDENTS

E.1. DATASET#5 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH STUDENTS AND/OR FORMER STUDENTS

In-depth interviews were conducted with three group discussions of twenty-five students from three universities in Medan, Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Utara, Universitas Darma Agung, and Universitas Negeri Medan, in 2014. In addition, this dataset includes in-depth interviews with eleven students and alumni between 2014 and 2017 in Medan and Yogyakarta, with the duration of interview between thirty minutes to two hours.

E.2. CODING BOOK FOR DATASET 5# IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH STUDENTS AND/OR FORMER STUDENTS

E.2.1. Background: education, activities, family, etc.

E.2.2. The view or perception pertaining to citizenship education class, the content of textbooks/modules suggested in class; similarities and differences in themes and teaching practice between citizenship education at the university level and at primary and secondary school students/alumni have learnt in the past.

E.2.3. The roles of citizenship education in affecting students’/alumni’s understanding of their citizenship and identity and the roles of other sources of references that may shape this process.
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