COMMUNITIES OF RESISTANCE:

HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE DEVELOPED CREATIVE RESPONSES TO MARGINALIZATION IN LYON AND PITTSBURGH, 1980-2010

by

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Abstract

In the 1980s and 1990s, several riots erupted in suburbs, or banlieues in French, outside of Lyon, France, involving clashes between youth and police. They were part of a series of banlieue rebellions throughout France during these decades. As a result, to some French the banlieues became associated exclusively with “minority,” otherness, lawlessness, and hopelessness. Meanwhile, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in the 1980s and 1990s was reeling from a significant loss of manufacturing jobs, an exodus of population, a proliferation of vacant properties, and a widening wealth gap between white and black. Yet, out of this despair, citizens formed new organizations and initiatives to address the decline and negative images of low-income and minority communities, an expression of “social capital.”

This dissertation argues that social capital is a form of resistance used by marginalized people to control their communities in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Lyon, France, between 1980 and 2010. Motivated by transnational civil rights campaigns, Alinsky-style organizing techniques, and the formation of innovative associations this dissertation proceeds decade-by-decade, alternating between the experiences of those in Pittsburgh with those of Lyon, to
describe low-income residents’ responses to discrimination and economic and social deprivation. These dual narratives of resistance from marginalized communities framed against negative public attitudes about these communities created a tension that permeated both Pittsburgh and Lyon region in the decades between 1980 and 2010.

Though archival information, interviews with residents, and site surveys, this dissertation builds upon previous scholarship to show that neither American inner city neighborhoods or French banlieues are simply “ghettos,” “no-go zones,” or “breeding grounds of crime and terrorism,” as they are sometimes called. The reality is that many American inner cities, as well as France’s banlieues, have transformed profoundly within the last thirty years. In the period between 1980 and 2010, improvements in Pittsburgh and Lyon cannot be solely attributed to the efforts of political and corporate elites. As this study shows, residents on the social and economic margins fought back to establish their legitimacy and redirect capitalist intentions that would have otherwise ignored low-income and minority areas.
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Finally, I acknowledge the incomparable contribution of Moe Coleman (1932-2019), whom I interviewed in September 2017 for this dissertation (he was then the Director Emeritus of the University of Pittsburgh’s Institute of Politics). The *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* described him as “a social worker, policy maker, professor at Pitt’s Graduate Schools of Social Work and of Public and International Affairs, and founding director of Pitt’s Institute of Politics.”¹ To many, though, Moe was an inspiration. I am honored to have met him.

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Communities of Resistance: How ordinary people developed creative responses to marginalization in Lyon and Pittsburgh, 1980-2010

Figure 1. View of Lyon from Fourvière, June 2017.

Figure 2. View of Pittsburgh from Mt. Washington, September 2006. Both photos by author.
Motivations and Origins of This Dissertation

This dissertation originated on a train ride from Paris to Charles de Gaulle airport in July 2014. I had just finished three weeks of French language instruction, and as the train emerged from a tunnel I noticed the landscape changed dramatically from elegant 18th and 19th century historic buildings to utilitarian high-rises constructed within the last fifty years. These towers are France’s affordable housing, far removed from the tourist landmarks of central Paris. The suburbs, or banlieues, as they are called in France, are often compared to American inner city communities as crime-ridden ghettos, though I know they are not. How can my research challenge these negative perceptions?

When I first turned my attention to Lyon, I discovered a paucity of scholarship on the city, aside from its notoriety as a global foodie destination or its past as France’s silk capital. Most books focused on Paris (such as Loïc Wacquant’s *Urban Outcasts*, 2008, which compares Chicago and Paris, and Andrew Newman’s *Landscape of Discontent*, 2015) or Minayo Nasiali’s *Native to the Republic* (2016), which examines Marseille, France’s second largest city.² No scholarship existed that compared Pittsburgh with Lyon. I maintain that Lyon is a more apt city to compare with Pittsburgh than the megalopolis of Paris, despite the “P” in both names or Pittsburgh’s moniker as “The Paris of Appalachia.”³ My dissertation became an opportunity to uncover new research and establish novel perspectives on two cities not ordinarily on the radar of most historical researchers.

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My initial archival scan of Lyon uncovered a bounty of historical documents in the Rhône-Alpes Archives and Municipal Archives of Lyon that tell the story of the post-World War II development of the banlieues. But I soon realized that, like understanding American neighborhood dynamics, learning about the banlieues required an on-the-ground investigation.

The relationship that the University of Pittsburgh forged with Sciences Po Lyon and Jean Monnet University (in Saint-Étienne, near Lyon) enabled me to develop community contacts and speak with residents of the banlieues. I discovered that while there are many differences between Lyon and Pittsburgh, residents of both cities borrowed transatlantic concepts to utilize “people power” to challenge capitalist and government systems, assert their right to self-determination, and forge their own identity through creative and resourceful approaches to community reinvestment.

This study is motivated by my desire to give a voice to poor people, who have been pushed aside, literally and figuratively, in the name of “progress” as former industrial centers like Pittsburgh and Lyon remade their image into something antithetical to their past. It builds upon research conducted for my masters paper, my community development experience over the past twenty five years, and my status as a homeowner in Pittsburgh’s Friendship neighborhood, adjacent to Garfield, which is highlighted in this study. This dissertation provides an opportunity to break out of “Pittsburgh exceptionalism”—that the city of my youth is unequivocally America’s “Most Livable City”—by utilizing a comparative approach to, in the words of C. Vann Woodward, “suggest new ways in which our history relates to the history of

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other nations, but have often incidentally served to correct, revise or reinterpret our own history in significant ways.”

Another motivation is the opportunity to change perceptions about place. Popular views of low-income and minority areas are resoundingly negative in both the U.S. and France, despite profound physical, economic, and social changes which occurred over the last thirty years. For instance, in the build-up to the 2018 World Cup final match, which featured France vs. Croatia in Moscow (which France won), an article described the Paris suburb of Bondy, the hometown of French football great Kylian Mbappé, as having “a label that is both a euphemism and a stigma: places with large, working-class nonwhite communities, synonymous with riots and social strife, thought of as breeding grounds for crime and terrorism.” These communities were depicted comparably when France won the World Cup in 1998.

Similarly, the 2016 American presidential election featured candidate Donald Trump, who said of black communities in the U.S., “Our African-American communities are absolutely in the worst shape that they’ve ever been in before, ever, ever, ever. You take a look at the inner cities, you get no education, you get no jobs, you get shot walking down the street.” This is an example of what Loïc Wacquant calls “territorial stigmatization,” where residents of a particular

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7 “By the 1990s the average unemployment rate in banlieue areas was 20 percent (twice the national average), and in some cités the proportion was much higher, often reaching above 30 percent for young residents. Under such economic pressure, the ‘utopian experiments’ of the banlieue, often flawed in their conception from the beginning, unraveled, leaving behind grim, sterile, and depressing stretches of high-rise buildings.” Laurent Dubois, *Soccer Empire: The World Cup and the Future of France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 83.

area are discriminated against based on where they live, not just race or class.\footnote{Wacquant, \textit{Urban Outcasts}, 241.} Many urban communities throughout the United States, as well as France’s \textit{banlieues}, have experienced profound transformations within the last thirty years. This dissertation argues that neither American inner city neighborhoods or French \textit{banlieues} are simply “ghettos,” “no-go zones,” or “breeding grounds of crime and terrorism,” as they are sometimes called. I refer to them for what they really are: communities of resistance. In France, the low-income communities surrounding Lyon are sites of constant contestation between the utopian visions of the state promoting “social mixity” (otherwise known as income diversity) versus the more pragmatic aspirations of residents desiring to live without being harassed by police or profiled by employers.\footnote{Paul Stotuen and Herman Rosenboom, “Urban Regeneration in Lyon: Connectivity and Social Exclusion,” \textit{European Spatial Research and Policy} 20, No. 1 (2013): 97-117. See also, Katharina Schone, “Construction De Logements Sociaux Et Stratégies électorales Locales,” \textit{Revue économique} 64, No. 5 (2013): 833-56.} In the \textit{banlieues} of Lyon, construction cranes abound, along with a steady stream of foot traffic, school kids of many different ages, and an eclectic mix of people.

![Figure 3. “Resist” street graffiti in Lyon, December 2018. Photo by author.](image)
A similar story applies to Pittsburgh’s inner city neighborhoods, many of which are replete with new rental and for-sale housing, exciting business districts, and ongoing construction sites, the result of bottom-up activism since the 1970s, as well as federal-driven programs such as Hope VI in the 1990s. These neighborhoods reflect a dual reality: On the one hand, residents of both Pittsburgh’s inner city neighborhoods and Lyon’s banlieues have over the past thirty years suffered from income inequality, discrimination, and in recent years, gentrification. At the same time, these disappointments bolster a narrative of failure and decline that misses the ways communities develop creative responses to disinvestment and deterioration.

This dissertation is a comparative study of people on the economic, social, and spatial margins who built and used power from the ground up, known as “social capital,” to make capitalist and state systems work for them in both Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Lyon, France, in the three decades between 1980 and 2010. Low-income people and minorities faced a number of challenges during these decades, namely deindustrialization, disinvestment, urban outmigration, discrimination, and lingering poverty made worse by the Great Recession. But far less understood is how people fought back through the use of social capital to accumulate political and financial capital in order to achieve some measure of community control, albeit temporary in some cases. In Pittsburgh, social capital represents the ability of neighborhood residents to create community development corporations (CDCs) to control real estate, marshal financial resources, and organize fellow neighbors. In Lyon, social capital includes the efforts of French citizens of North African origin, many of whom are residents of high-rise social housing towers.

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12 Community development corporations are explained in greater detail in chapter 1.
in the low-income *banlieues*, to mobilize large numbers of low-income people to demand legal protections, require that the state invest resources into their communities, and declare themselves equal players in the national identity of France. These are the stories of resistance against powerful forces that conspired to make and keep people poor and marginalized.

This study shifts the narrative from one where poor people are the victims to one where they are the fighters, victors, and arbiters of their own destinies. The story of the victimized and marginalized is well known in both the U.S. and France. Some are intent to tell the story of crime scenes, where poor people are frequently victims. However, few authors have delved deep into the hopes, dreams, and aspirations of citizens not ready to give up.

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1.0 Introduction: Social Capital as a Form of Resistance

Kevin B. Wells has been a resident of Pittsburgh’s Larimer neighborhood since 1959. A graduate of Peabody High School in the early 1970s, he “did the streets” in the 1970s and 1980s, a lifestyle that involved drugs and crime. But Wells got clean in 1996 and has worked to improve his neighborhood through the Larimer Consensus Group. In 2014, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development awarded a $30 million Choice Neighborhoods grant to build new housing in Larimer, one of only four communities nationwide to receive the funds. And while residents like Wells were pleased to see the award, “the Choice Neighborhood grant was just a piece—a catalyst for development,” he explains. “We have been sitting at the table for 10 years. We don’t want gentrification. We are trying to control the process,” Wells says.14

Similarly, in Vaulx-en-Velin, a suburb of Lyon, community resident Jaafar Greinch joined the “conseil citoyen” or citizens council convened by the local government, to identify needs for the social housing community called Mas du Taureau, where he lives. A father of three young boys, Greinch is a manager of financial controls for Volvo Trucks in nearby Vénissieux. “I want better for my city,” he says of his participation on the citizens council. “I hope that can happen.”15 His input through the citizens council will yield a new “Médiathèque” multi-media center to be built near the city center on what is currently a grassy field. The experiences of Wells and Greinch underscore the central concept of this study, that “social capital” is a form of resistance used by low-income people to control spatial boundaries in marginalized communities in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Lyon, France, between 1980 and 2010.

14 Author’s interview with Kevin B. Wells, Pittsburgh, Pa., March 23, 2017.

1.1 Interrelated Threads

Three interrelated threads provide this study’s framework: the idea of social capital as people power, transnational expressions of racial and ethnic self-sufficiency, and ways in which people negotiate their right to community space amidst a capitalist system.\footnote{On “the right to urban life”, Lefebvre wrote, “Only the working class can become the agent, the social carrier or support of this realization.” But in my conception, this right is not a socialist utopia, but coexists within a capitalist framework. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas, Translators and eds., Henri Lefebvre: Writings on Cities (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 158. Italics in original. See also Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Donald Nicholson-Smith, trans.) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1991).} I place these three concepts—social capital, self-determination, and capitalism—within an Atlantic history frame of reference because it highlights the transnational cross-cultural sharing of ideas among African Americans in the United States and citizens of North African origin in France. To be sure, the transatlantic nature of information must not be overstated.

There are a number of trends shared by both Lyon and Pittsburgh that are coincidental in their timing, but the “smoking gun” that traces their origins is less clear.\footnote{Christopher Klemek makes a case for the “interlocking foundations” of the urban renewal order and its collapse in The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal: Postwar Urbanism from New York to Berlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). However, such linkages between Pittsburgh and Lyon are less obvious.} For instance, the decision by both Lyon and Pittsburgh to pursue demolition of public housing coincides in the 1990s without an obvious “push” from either America or France. The history of remaking public housing in both countries has a long history.\footnote{For more on this topic in France, see Kenny Cupers, The Social Project: Housing in Postwar France (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2014) and Anne Power, Hovels to High-rise: State Housing in Europe Since 1850 (London: Routledge Press, 1993).} Though, as Lawrence Vale argues, the push to demolish public housing in the United States since 1990 emanated from Washington, DC, in large part as a result of the findings of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing. In 1992, the Commission called for a “new federal program to redevelop the nation’s...
86,000 worst-case public housing units.” Congress appropriated funds for an “Urban Revitalization Demonstration” program during the final years of the Bush administration (the name was changed to Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere, or HOPE, under HUD Secretary Jack Kemp). But incoming HUD secretary Henry Cisneros, former mayor of San Antonio, reshaped the program into a public-private program designed to deconcentrate poverty and encourage mixed-income developments on the site of former public housing communities. In its first ten years of operation, Hope VI came close to achieving the goal established by the National Commission: “63,100 severely distressed units have been demolished and another 20,300 units are slated for redevelopment,” concluded a 2004 study.

The response from residents to these changes was also similar in both countries—the demolition of living spaces in the 1990s and 2000s that disrupted social capital networks in both cities created resistance movements that continues today. In some cases, however, the transatlantic connection between events in the United States and France were more closely linked. Toumi Djaidja’s decision to march from Marseille to Paris in the fall of 1983 was inspired by Gandhi’s Salt March of 1930, depicted in the 1982 movie “Gandhi.” Likewise, in recent years, YouTube videos of Chicago’s Saul Alinksy motivated Samia Bencherifa, a social center manager in Vaulx-en-Velin, to train youth in her community. As this study reveals,


transatlantic comparisons between poor communities in Lyon and Pittsburgh are related to larger
global movements of people and ideas.22

The nature of organizational formation and action changed over time, particularly in
Pittsburgh, which has a longer and more durable nonprofit community development sector than
Lyon. Organizations which employed Alinsky-style tactics in the 1960s and 1970s to fight for
resources found themselves shifting to consensus in subsequent decades once the resources
became available. As Tracy Neumann argues, as government, corporate, and foundation funding
supported community-based organizations in the late-1970s and early 1980s, it created a
“durable partnership” that extended into subsequent decades (and has rarely been replicated
outside of Pittsburgh).23 As a result, many organizations sought collaboration in the 1980s and
1990s as more reliable and varied funding streams became available from such sources as the
Pittsburgh Partnership on Neighborhood Development (which channeled foundation funds into
community development corporations) and financial institutions.24 There were exceptions, of
course. The Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation, profiled in chapter 3, “retained a reputation for
vigorous advocacy, owing to the early influence of confrontational tactics inspired by Saul

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22 In particular, see Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill
of many of the book’s subjects owes much to the repression originally visited upon them: the violence of the stake,
the chopping block, the gallows, and the shackles of a ship’s dark hold. It also owes much to the violence of
abstraction in the writing of history, the severity of history that has long been the captive of the nation-state, which
remains in most studies the largely unquestioned framework of analysis.” Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The
Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston:

23 Tracy Neumann, Remaking the Rustbelt: The Postindustrial Transformation of North America (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 37.

24 John T. Metzger, “Remaking the Growth Coalition: The Pittsburgh Partnership for Neighborhood Development,”
Alinsky” to force action from the city or, later in the decade, from banks.25 Another exception was the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group, which in 1988 applied Alinsky-style tactics to gain the attention of banks. Yet, in the 1990s, conflict yielded to collaboration as bankers and community based organizations worked together to jointly craft loan programs and other market-based solutions for minority and low-income communities.26 An argument could be made that the consensus model of partnership in Pittsburgh “weakened” in the 1990s as economic regeneration slowed and population growth stagnated.27 However, the implementation of Hope VI as a community development strategy in the late-1990s and early 2000s, which involved partnerships among local and federal government agencies, political actors, banks, and community based organizations, reinvigorated the collaborative approach in Pittsburgh, even if the city and region did not experience a commensurate increase in population.28 In the Lyon region, community-based associations never achieved the degree of durability, funding, and professionalization as those in Pittsburgh, and therefore, no strong consensus model developed. Instead, the state drove development. As Herrick Chapman argues, “Although local citizens,


interest groups, and business leaders became more involved in the process of city planning, the initiative came from Paris and the authority to chart new directions remained with the state.29

But physical changes do not always equal positive social outcomes. The demolitions of social housing in both countries, coupled with construction of new housing units, did not provide a magic elixir for social problems, such as discrimination and racism. Furthermore, the “root shock” experienced by many low-income residents and minorities due to urban renewal in the U.S., banlieue protests in France in the 1980s and 1990s, and other minority-led protests in both countries shows the limits of top-down redevelopment.30 Lost in the history of urban transformations are the stories of minorities and economically disadvantaged people.

1.2 Three Key Arguments

This thirty-year period, 1980 to 2010, covers the rise of neoliberalism to the Great Recession, when grassroots initiatives launched in Pittsburgh and Lyon became national programs in their respective countries. During these years, both cities transformed their respective image into attractive knowledge centers in the name of “progress.” Through an examination of social capital, however, low-income residents and minorities become as much of the narrative of progress as elites.


30 Mindy Thompson Fullilove writes of “social loss” through the demolition of older neighborhoods and quotes former city councilman Sala Udin referring to Pittsburgh’s Lower Hill District of his youth, which was demolished in the 1960s under the federal urban renewal program. “‘The sense of community and the buildings are related in an old area . . . So, the physical condition of the buildings helped to create a sense of community . . . that kind of common condition bound us together more as a community. I knew everybody on my block, and they knew me. They knew me on sight, and they knew all the children on sight, and my behavior changed when I entered the block. And so, I think there was a very strong sense of community.’” Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurts America, and What We Can Do About It (New York: Ballantine Books, 2004), 61.
In this comparative analysis of people who live and work in low-income communities in Lyon and Pittsburgh I argue three points. First, I assign agency to marginalized people, not just as victims, but as resisters. I highlight the efforts of residents of low-income and minority communities who accumulated and utilized social capital in the struggle against economic, social, and spatial discrimination over the past thirty years. Rather than write about the police brutality, discrimination, and other negative attributes of American inner cities or French banlieues, I follow a similar argument as Michael R. Geenberg’s *Restoring America’s Neighborhoods* (1999), which details “street fighters” who “believe that their efforts to improve neighborhood quality will succeed.”31 I also draw upon Saul Alinsky to understand the struggle for power from below. “From the moment the organizer enters a community he lives, dreams, eats, breathes, sleeps only one thing and that is to build the mass power based of what he calls the army.”32 This “army” is the basis of social capital.

Second, local matters. The narrative is de-centered from major cities such as Paris and New York to illustrate the evolution of reinvestment initiatives or anti-poverty measures from the ground up in heartland cities such as Pittsburgh and Lyon. This study is not intended to compare national perspectives or federal programs, but is a transatlantic examination of how residents in two very different cities respond to and shape the federal context at the local level. “Local” is not just limited to cities, but encompasses metropolitan regions. It aligns with authors such as Allen Dieterich-Ward, who finds that the “overly simplified declension narrative”—of deindustrialization and stagnation in rustbelt cities like Pittsburgh—“is no longer adequate for

describing the multitude of economic and societal changes taking place ‘beyond the ruins.’”

Ward references the works of Thomas Sugrue (1996), Robert O. Self (2003), and Howard Gillette (2005) as examples of diverse, complex metropolitan histories that extend beyond traditional urban borders. But while larger systemic issues are given agency, such as the effects of federal and state transportation and housing policies, bank lending practices, and elite decisions made upon poor people, I examine how low-income people responded to these policies. These responses, in turn, shaped national policies.

I pick up where others’ temporal narratives have left off, such as John Metzger’s essay on Pittsburgh’s neighborhood revitalization in From Redlining to Reinvestment (1992) and Roy Lubove’s Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh (1969, 1996). In France, these analyses include Loïc Wacquant’s Urban Outcasts (2008), which relies on information from the 1980s and 1990s, and Badlands of the Republic (2007), by Mustafa Dikeç, both of which take a statist approach to their analysis. Much has happened in Pittsburgh and Lyon since the 1990s.

Finally, I offer an Atlantic comparison of these two cities to understand how individuals respond to impoverished or marginalized conditions in a context that follows Tracy Neumann’s


35 Herrick Chapman argues that the tension between state-driven versus people-driven policies in France trace their origins to the long reconstruction period, 1944 to 1962, and even have precedents in France’s post-Revolutionary period. Herrick Chapman, France’s Long Reconstruction: In Search of the Modern Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

Remaking the Rustbelt (2016) as a model. She compares elite decision-making in Pittsburgh and Hamilton, Ontario, “in which growth coalitions composed of local political and business elites set out to actively create postindustrial places,” within a North American framework. My story creates a narrative of how marginalized people formed coalitions, first against elites, then with elites, to actively control the destiny of their respective communities which are products of post-industrialism, outmigration, and discrimination. My inquiry is motivated by the extent to which the global movement of people and ideas provide valuable insights and lessons to shape more attractive, humane, and inclusive communities.

1.3 Advancing Social Capital

Resistance is more than riots and violent rebellions. Low-income people and minorities exercise economic and social strength through the development of associations and mutually dependent systems of trust and cooperation, as well as their ability to recruit human, political, and financial resources to achieve a sense of justice, community pride, and self-sufficiency. Iris Marion Young, who taught at the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and International

37 Other comparative studies examine two global cities within the same national context, as does Derek Hyra’s The New Urban Renewal: The Economic Transformation of Harlem and Bronzeville (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), about the revival of the Harlem and Bronzeville communities in New York and Chicago, and Wacquant’s examination of the “notorious” La Courneuve social housing estate in the banlieues of Paris in contrast to what he calls the “dark ghetto” of South Chicago.


Affairs from 1990 to 1999, argued that “justice is not in the first instance about the distribution of goods, but about the overcoming of oppression, including the oppression of social groups.” Jane Jacobs calls this forms of self sufficiency “neighborhood networks . . . a city’s irreplaceable social capital.” Eric Klinenber refers to these interpersonal connections within public spaces as “social infrastructure.” Put more simply by professor Al Condeluci in the University of Pittsburgh's School of Social Work, “relationships matter.” It is what brought Pittsburgh, and much of the nation, together for a brief moment in the aftermath of the tragic mass shooting at the Tree of Life synagogue in October 2018 in Pittsburgh’s Squirrel Hill neighborhood. This notion of social capital, then, is rooted in the physical places in which people live who share a common condition, which includes how the community functions as much as how it is discursively constructed.


Many American authors write about social capital as an expression of a healthy democracy, most notably Robert Putnam in *Bowling Alone* (2000). French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu was one of the first contemporary authors to explore social capital in *Distinction* (1984) and *The Forms of Capital* (1986). But in low-income and minority communities, I conceive of social capital as a response to systemic challenges, such as discrimination, economic deprivations, and physical isolation. Saul Alinsky’s *Rules for Radicals* (1971) is a core text that supports this perspective. “Change comes from power, and power comes from organization,” Alinsky wrote. While financial resources are scarce in low-income communities, the mobilization of people is their greatest asset. In this respect, social capital is people power or “community cement” that binds people together around a central nexus of resistance. Although my application of the term is used in this study as a reflection of low-income community’s responses to problems, Bourdieu reminds us that not all social capital is equal. In fact, he wrote,

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49 For a micro-analysis of social capital in the Russell Square area of South Chicago that describes youth delinquency in the 1930s, see Steven Schlossman and Michael Sedlak, “The Chicago Area Project Revisited,” *Crime and Delinquency* 29, No. 3 (July 1983), 398-462. It details some of Alinsky’s early work in Russell Square (435-346).
“social capital can be exclusionary.”50 People who live in poor communities often find their social and economic mobility is severely restricted based on where they live.51 In addition, wealthier communities have similar relationships as working class ones, but the poor lack access to the same networks.

Through people power, many of these connections can be reestablished, which was the goal of the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group (PCRG), detailed in chapters three and five. PCRG’s objective was not to challenge bank redlining practices for the thrill of protesting, but to develop working relationships with lenders so that low-income people and minorities can gain access to credit and capital to build wealth through homeownership. The resulting professional relationships between community leaders and bankers were often personal. One example occurred during the summer of 1995, when the son of Rhonda Brandon had been shot in a drive-by shooting in East Liberty. He died several days later. At the time, Brandon served as the executive director of the Manchester Citizens Corporation (MCC), a convening member of PCRG. As a result, bankers, community development leaders, and politicians like Mayor Tom Murphy, who, as a community organizer and then State Representative for Manchester in the 1970s and 1980s, developed a close working relationship with Brandon. When they learned of her son’s death, they came out in droves to attend the funeral. Mayor Murphy’s presence was not


51 In the Lyon suburb of Vaulx-en-Velin, France, one college graduate told a French researcher about the difficulties of finding a job with his address. He said, “Vaulx-en-Velin does a task on a résumé. Afterwards, we can meet recruiters who can say, OK, he comes from Vaulx-en-Velin, but he has succeeded in school, he is perhaps not like the others. Could this happen to me? Actually, I’m not sure. There is the will to succeed that plays in life. I feel strong in my head. Even if I live in Mas-du-Taureau, I want to succeed. I have friends who are like me but we are not the majority. They do not have the will because of the constraints they have around them.” Hacène Belmessous, “Résilience sociale et affirmation de soi à Vaulx-en-Velin: De l'impasse sociale à une trajectoire ascendante” (“Social resilience and assertiveness in Vaulx-en-Velin: From the social impasse to an upward trajectory”), manuscript by the author, December 2015.
uncommon. After all, Brandon was a constituent and a longtime friend. But the bankers who attended, along with the dozens of community development staff from other organizations in far-off neighborhoods, were there as friends to support Brandon and her family during that difficult time. Bankers do not get CRA credit for attending funerals; their presence was a sign that new relationships had been constructed through the organizing prowess of the Manchester Citizens Corporation and Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group. This is just one example of how social capital is used to stitch low-income communities back together.

In the examples that follow in this dissertation, social capital was not stagnant. Like financial capital, it grew, and residents cashed in. As I argue in my masters paper, neighborhoods such as Pittsburgh’s Manchester illustrates how residents who marshaled public and private resources to implement neighborhood transformation and maintained their core identity. Or in the case of Lyon’s Djida Tazdaït, she went from a local organizer in 1979 to serving on the European Parliament ten years later. In the cases of both Pittsburgh and Lyon, community leaders parlayed their achievements into political and financial capital to achieve their objectives.

1.4 Transnational Expressions of Self-Sufficiency

The concept of community self-sufficiency as a form of resistance undergirds minority social movements in both France (anti-colonial, pan-African identity) and the United States (Black Power). In Lyon, self-determination galvanized the small but growing French-Algerian

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community into action. Lyon-based activist Djida Tazdaït realized that “we had to invent new methods of protest,” she explained.53 Born in Algeria in 1957 and moved to France in 1964, Tazdaït lived in transitional housing until she was a teenager. She found her voice in the late-1970s and early-1980s when she formed two organizations dedicated to French-Algerian rights, Zaama d’Banlieue in 1979, and Jeunes Arabes de Lyon et de la Banlieue in 1985. “We had two goals,” Tazdaït said, “survival and respect. We managed to reveal the identities [the Arab identities of new French citizens] to the media,” she explained. Tazdaït said “we were a hidden generation.” In addition, the Lyon-based activist Toumi Djaïdja, who led the Marche Pour L’égalité et Contre Racisme in 1983, was inspired by the 1982 film “Gandhi,” featuring Ben Kingsley, and especially Gandhi’s Salt March of 1930.

Figure 4. Djida Tazdaït following European Parliamentary elections, June 18, 1989.

53 Author’s interview with Djida Tazdaït, June 27, 2017, Lyon, France.
In Pittsburgh, self-determination motivated the community development movement in low-income and minority neighborhoods (further elaborated in chapter 1). By the 1970s, when it came to real estate, community development corporations, led by charismatic leaders like Stanley Lowe and activist board members such as Betty Jane Ralph, took the lead in the physical reshaping of urban neighborhoods. It was important for Manchester to maintain a positive African American identity and at the same time promote interracial inclusion in order to attract people of all races and income levels back to the neighborhood. But the appeal of community control among CDCs was not entirely limited to African Americans, and as such fostered a multi-racial and self-sustaining movement that carried over into subsequent decades.

Particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, as the federal government withdrew from urban America, community development leaders such as Rick Swartz and Aggie Brose in Garfield embraced the notion of self-sufficiency. Lacking financial or political capital, community leaders employed organizing tactics to accomplish their objectives, borrowed from a long history of peaceful demonstrations for change. These sentiments reverberated across the Atlantic. Aggie Brose and Djida Tazdaït never met or even knew about each other, but the two women shared the ideologies of self-reliance, ethnic pride, and pride of place.

1.5 Making Capitalist Systems Work for Low-Wealth Communities

Many studies of impoverished communities are critiques of capitalism—that capitalist systems created poverty and kept poor people poor.55 But my inquiry examines how people with few financial resources assert, negotiate, and win their right to space within a capitalist framework. Increasingly since the Great Recession, free market systems are referred to as “savage capitalism,” or what Jacques Rancière calls “narcissistic consumerism,” an extreme form of avarice practiced by transnational corporations.56 Manning Marable (1983) argues that “Blacks have never been equal partners in the American Social Contract, because the system exists not to develop, but to underdevelop Black people.”57 Yet, this study argues that when minorities do participate more fully in the economy, it leads to greater development of black people in order for black people to fully participate in the capitalist economy. In the context of government withdrawal from urban America, low-income people advocated for market-based solutions, not more government involvement. By the 1980s, neighborhood leaders recruited additional financial support from banks, foundations, and other corporations.

Particularly in the fight to save the Community Reinvestment Act in the mid-1990s, low-income people marched on Washington and staged rallies in their hometowns to demand that banks simply treat them fairly. “Most poor people don’t understand capitalism,” remarks Stanley Lowe, former executive director of the Manchester Citizens Corporation. “They are used to

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55 Henri Lefebvre writes of social capital in The Production of Space (1974) as it pertains to how the state exerts power over physical, social, and mental space and the alienation of labor as a result of a capitalist society. Chris Butler discusses this interpretation more fully in Henri Lefebvre: Spatial Politics, Everyday Life and the Right to the City (New York: Routledge, 2012), 16, 84. Emphasis added.


dealing with one set of rules,” those of the government, “but not capitalist rules,” of banks, for instance. “Once people learn the rules of capitalism,” he explains, “they can make it work for them. After all, what other system is there?” Of course, the rules of capitalism do not always work for everyone, even those who understand it. But this perspective shifts the conversation from what the government will do for poor people and poor neighborhoods, to how community residents can be drivers of a community’s destiny.

1.6 Focus on Communities in Pittsburgh and Lyon

Through a transnational examination of Pittsburgh and Lyon, the similarities and differences of these two cities help illuminate the development and deployment of social capital among their respective residents. Most notably, Pittsburgh and Lyon are both inland river towns, far from their respective seats of government and finance, even if their histories are different. Lyon’s location in the southeast of France provides easy train access to Paris, Switzerland, Italy and the Mediterranean coast. As such, the city represents an amalgamation of French and transnational influences, which contributes to its post-World War II fame as a world food capital, thanks in part to star chef Paul Bocuse, who died in 2018.59

Figure 7. Looking toward Vieux Lyon (the “old city”) and the Croix-Rousse hillside community overlooking the Saône River, June 2017. Photo by author.

Historically, Lyon is an ancient city, founded in 43 BCE as “Lugdunum,” the Roman capital of Gaul, situated at the confluence of the Rhône and Saône rivers. A number of extant Roman ruins, along with Vieux Lyon (“Old City”), are protected French and UNESCO World

Heritage sites. Since the 1500s Lyon served as the center of French silk production. In 1831 and 1834, silk workers (known as *canuts* in French) staged revolts over wages and working conditions, reflecting the city’s early role in forming resistance movements. Lyon remained a major silk production center throughout the nineteenth century until artificial silk became commonplace in the early 1900s. Lyon also supported a number of other industries, including glass, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, though not as heavily industrialized as Pittsburgh (Lyon escaped comparisons to “Hell with the lid off” and other insults).

![Figure 8. A traboule in Lyon’s Croix-Rousse neighborhood, November 2017.](image)

*Photo by author.*

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61 *Discover Lyon and Its World Heritage* (Mirabel, France: IDC Éditions, April 2017), 84.

Lyon’s historic shipping port, Port Rambaud, located at the confluence of the Saône and Rhône rivers opened in 1925. It closed in 1995, and the site has been redeveloped as “Lyon Confluence,” a mixed-use area that features housing, recreation, and shopping. Lyon’s main landmark is the Basilica of Notre-Dame de Fourvière, a large Roman Catholic church atop a massive hill that overlooks the city, accessible by funicular, similar to those in Pittsburgh (except, the Fourvière incline mostly travels inside the mountain). As a result, Fourvière is nicknamed “la colline qui prie” (“the hill that prays”). The other hillside community, Croix-Rousse (Red Cross), where many silk workers used to live, is called “la colline qui travail” (“the hill that works”). In the 19th century many of the *canuts* organized strikes in Croix-Rousse, and the same neighborhood became a center of French resistance during World War II for its dense housing, tight streets, and secret passages, known as *traboules*.

![Figure 9. Lyon’s Rhône waterfront, June 2017.](image)
Like Pittsburgh, Lyon’s waterfront has been converted to recreational uses. Photo by author.

In Pittsburgh, Mt. Washington dominates the city’s geographic skyline much like Lyon’s Fourvière. From there, one can see the convergence of the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers to form the Ohio at Point State Park, which once held French Fort Duquesne (in 1754) and British Fort Pitt, established in 1758. It is easy to visualize the city’s strategic location in the War for Empire between France and Britain over colonial North America. Similar to Lyon, Pittsburgh is also far removed from major eastern U.S. cities like New York (an eight hour drive), Philadelphia (five hours), and Washington, D.C. (four hours). In this respect both Pittsburgh’s and Lyon’s physical distance from centers of power make them ideal examples of “metro sovereignty,” or the distinctiveness of urban areas outside of a global city paradigm like New York and Paris.64

Figure 10. View of Pittsburgh from Mt. Washington, 2006.
Photo by author.


22
1.7 Demographic Profile of Lyon and Pittsburgh

Both Pittsburgh and Lyon experienced a loss of residents in the late-1970s and early-1980s as a result of deindustrialization. Lyon’s population in 1962 was 535,746, but fell to 413,095 by 1982 (the reduction of immigration in 1974 also played a role). But since liberalization of immigration policies under French President François Mitterrand in the 1980s, Lyon has gained much of its population back and now supports half-a-million residents (515,695). Of these, 13% (66,498) were immigrants and 87% (446,777) were non-immigrants.65

Table 1. Lyon Immigration Status, 2015.66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lyon Immigration Status, 2015</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Immigrants</td>
<td>446,777</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>66,498</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population*</td>
<td>515,695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of 2015, Lyon’s largest cohort of immigrants (14,290 people, or 21% of Lyon’s immigrant population) is from Algeria, comprising 2.7% of the city’s total population. The next closest single source of immigration is Tunisia, with 4,864 people (7% of Lyon’s total), followed by Morocco, (4,348, 7%), and Portugal, 3,628, 5%).67 Although many immigrants face

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66 Note: Non-immigrants and immigrants do not add to the total population because citizens’ residence could not be determined for a small number of people (2,240).

discrimination in the workplace, housing, and education, they represent an important
demographic which contributes to the region’s growth.68

Table 2. Lyon’s Leading Countries of Origin, 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lyon’s Countries of Origin, 2015</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>14,290</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4,864</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4,384</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3,628</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>39,332</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Immigrant Population</strong></td>
<td><strong>66,498</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, Pittsburgh’s population of 302,407 in 2018 remains less than half of
what it was in 1950 (676,806). The city’s last decennial census of 2010 listed the following
racial composition: 66% white, 26% black, 4.4% Asian, and 2.3% Hispanic.69 See population
totals on next page.


69 “Pittsburgh City Demographics Overview,” Southwestern Pennsylvania Community Profiles, University of Pittsburgh Center for Social & Urban Research, accessed February 1, 2019, https://profiles.ucsur.pitt.edu/profiles/county-subdivision/4200361000/overview/. These percentages have changed slightly over the past eight years. Pittsburgh in 2018 was 66.6% white, 23.6% black, 5.6% Asian, and 2.9% Hispanic. U.S. Census Population estimates, July 1, 2018 (V2018), U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, accessed January 7, 2019, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/pittsburghcitypennsylvania#.
Table 3. Racial Composition of the City of Pittsburgh, 2010.\textsuperscript{70}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Composition of Pittsburgh, 2010</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>201,766</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>79,710</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>13,465</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic (can be of any race)</td>
<td>6,964</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population</strong></td>
<td>305,704</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Change in Population, Lyon and Pittsburgh, 1940s-2000s.\textsuperscript{71}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lyon Population 1946-2016</th>
<th>Pittsburgh Population 1940-2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
<td>NUMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>460,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>475,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>535,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>527,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>456,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>413,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>445,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>472,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>515,695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{70} Note: Total does not account for a small number (3,799) of other races, such as Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islanders and Native Americans.

Table 5. Lyon and Pittsburgh Change in Population, 1940s-2000s.
Within Pittsburgh, I focus on the Garfield neighborhood (a mostly black community with a 2010 population of 3,675) in the city’s East End and. I make reference to the neighboring communities of Bloomfield, Friendship, East Liberty, and Larimer (which have a combined population of 17,824), the Hill District, adjacent to Downtown (population 5,869), and Manchester, on Pittsburgh’s North Side (population 2,042).72

Figure 11. Map of Pittsburgh showing the Garfield, Hill District, and Manchester neighborhoods.

In the Lyon region, I describe the social housing communities of Mas du Taureau and La Grappinière in Vaulx-en-Velin (2016 population 48,497) to Lyon’s east, Les Minguettes, in Vénissieux (population 65,405) on Lyon’s southern border, and La Duchère (50,706 residents, of which 10,000 reside in social housing) in western Lyon.\textsuperscript{73} I also interviewed a planner in the commune of Bron (41,060 people), which has two social housing communities, Terraillon and Parilly. Although the communities of study in both Pittsburgh and Lyon are very different demographically and economically, residents who live there share discrimination and physical and social isolation—Wacquant’s aforementioned “territorial stigmatization.”\textsuperscript{74} See map and photos of the communities on the next two pages.


\textsuperscript{74} Loïc Wacquant writes a more detailed comparison between U.S. “ghettos” and French \textit{banlieues} in “French Working-Class Banlieues and Black American Ghetto: From Conflation to Comparison,” \textit{Qui Parle} 16, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2007): 5-38.
Figure 12. Map of the Greater Lyon conurbation showing the communities of study, La Duchère in western Lyon, and the suburban communes of Vaulx-en-Velin, Bron, and Vénissieux. Map adapted from Métropole de Lyon.
Figure 13 (left) New mixed-income housing in La Grappinière; and figure 14 (right) older social housing towers in Mas du Taureau in Vaulx-en-Velin, June 2017.


Figure 17 (left). Older housing block; and figure 18 (right) new, mixed-income housing at La Duchère, June 2017.

All photos this page by author.
In addition, several individuals are profiled who personify the narrative of struggle and resistance. My objective is to highlight individuals who have fought against systematic discrimination, isolation, and police brutality. Some individuals exist only in the historical record, such as Pittsburgh’s Frankie Mae Pace, Dorothy Richardson, and Ethel Hagler. Other individuals alive today in France, such as Jaafar Greinch and Samia Bencherifa of Vaulx-en-Velin, Younès Atallah of Vénissieux, and Lyon Councilwoman Djida Tazdaït, as well as in Pittsburgh Rick Swartz, Kevin B. Wells, Rhonda Brandon, and Ron Weathers each have unique stories to tell about their experiences living and working in marginalized neighborhoods. Their personal and professional struggles for recognition, justice, and redemption amidst a society that otherwise wrote them off symbolizes the period of study.

Despite federal efforts in both countries to address long-term poverty by replacing sub-standard dwellings with more adequate housing, socio-economic disparities persist among ethno-religious and racial minority groups. The U.S. and France share the fact that in the 1990s and early-2000s, both countries took great measures to demolish thousands of public housing units that were deemed outdated and obsolete in an attempt to address poverty, crime, and the stigma of “the projects.” In the United States the Hope VI program, implemented on a large scale in the 1990s through the 2000s, demolished and replaced hundreds of thousands of public housing units in cities across the country. During this time, Pittsburgh became one of the first recipients of Hope VI funding to totally reconfigure its public housing, with the demolition of units at Alequippa Terrace and Bedford Dwellings in the Hill District and in Manchester in the mid-1990s. A decade later, hundreds of additional public housing units were imploded in Garfield in 2005 and in Larimer in 2008, replaced by new, economically integrated housing.
Figure 19. Sequence showing demolition of the Garfield Heights Towers in 2005.
Source: Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh.
In France, the demolition and rebuilding of social housing also occurred during the same period. In 1994, for instance, in Vénissieux, a suburb to Lyon’s south, the government imploded hundreds of high-rise “social housing” units of Les Minguettes. It was followed in 2006 by another massive demolition of social housing towers in the Mas-du-Taureau housing community in Vaulx-en-Velin, an eastern suburb of Lyon, and, in 2010, a large tower in La Duchère in Lyon, which “marks the biggest implosion ever to occur in Europe.”

Demolition continued in subsequent years. As in the United States, the French demolitions were part of a wider, government-led program to eliminate “problem” housing estates across France—as many as 250,000 dwellings were destroyed, followed by the construction of 400,000 new ones under the National Agency for Urban Renewal.

Figure 20. “Démolition ‘barre des 200,’ la Duchère,” May 19, 2010.
Source: Bibliothèque municipale de Lyon, Photographes en Rhône-Alpes, P0989 001 00143.

75 Stouten and Rosenboom, 99.


And yet, despite these physical changes, inequality and discrimination persist. In the United States in recent years, violent reactions to police brutality, unemployment, and inequality occurred in Baltimore, Cleveland, and Ferguson, Mo., where unemployment and bank redlining have continued.78 As modern minority protest movements in both the U.S. and France show, redevelopment of physical spaces failed to create long-term, durable solutions to unemployment and marginalization. But to assume that the “only viable solution” for these areas is to “reestablish and/or expand state services so as to guarantee a minimally equitable provision of basic public goods across all urban areas,” as Loïc Wacquant asserts, does not take into account the importance of the private sector in facilitating the equitable distribution of resources in low-income neighborhoods.79 Moreover, an outsized role of the state ignores more innovative solutions from below, such as public-private partnerships, social enterprise ventures, and other grassroots initiatives.

One main difference between the U.S. and France is the vast network of longstanding professional nonprofit organizations which exist in the U.S. that do not in France.80 Many of the community based organizations which once existed in France faded away; some were co-opted

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by federal government intervention, while others were dissolved as new generations arrived.\textsuperscript{81}

On the other hand, in the United States, long-term, staffed organizations, most notably CDCs and community development financial institutions (funded and capitalized from a variety of public and private sources), have operated since the 1970s and have demonstrably reshaped the financing and development of real estate in low- and moderate-income communities.

Citizen control over a neighborhood’s destiny is a critical component to not only reduce violence and crime in the community, but to increase its wealth and overall image. And while the federal government played a role in the regeneration of many low-income neighborhoods, the residents ultimately sustained the long-term vision for the community. No mandate from Washington can replace pride, organizing, and hard work from neighborhood residents. It is a story that plays out in many communities in Pittsburgh and Lyon profiled in this dissertation.

In many respects, Pittsburgh and Lyon rebounded from deindustrialization. They became clean, attractive cities for new residents and employers (though, Pittsburgh’s population declined since 1980, while Lyon’s increased). But this overall trend belies another reality: Reflecting international trends, housing prices in Pittsburgh and Lyon have increased substantially since the Great Recession, displacing many poor people and making it difficult for low- and middle-income families to rent or buy a home in the city. Since the 1990s, both cities have experienced an increase in suburban poverty and growing inequality between city versus suburb.

As the global economy became more intertwined in the 1990s, particularly after the formation of the European Union, the economic destinies of France and the U.S. shared the

calamity of the financial crisis of 2008. However, these large, sweeping trends of globalization, along with deindustrialization and massive population movements, set the backdrop for a detailed examination “from below”—the efforts of Pittsburgh and Lyon residents—to show how low-income people responded to these trends over the last three decades. Motivated by transnational civil rights campaigns, Alinsky-style organizing techniques, and international anti-racist movements this dissertation proceeds decade-by-decade, alternating between the experiences of those in Pittsburgh with those of Lyon, to describe low-income residents’ innovative responses to marginalization over the course of thirty years, 1980 to 2010.

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82 For more on this topic, see Adam Tooze, *Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crisis Changed the World* (New York: Penguin Books, 2018).
2.0 Prelude to the 1980s: Pittsburgh’s Promise of Housing

In 1967, an African American woman from Pittsburgh’s Hill District sat before a distinguished panel of U.S. Senators in Washington, D.C., and told them bluntly that Pittsburgh’s poorest black neighborhood needs federal funds. “‘Nobody told me what to say. I wouldn’t have come down here if they didn’t let me say what I know is so. And that is, we need that money restored that you cut back. You cut it back just when we were seeing results, just when we were beginning to hope,’ she said.” The activist was Frankie Mae Pace, who for decades was an outspoken advocate for her Hill District community and a pioneer of neighborhood self-help that became standard in low-income areas throughout the United States.

In the two decades following World War II, Pittsburgh became the site of a vast realignment of urban real estate in what was known as the Pittsburgh Renaissance. Dozens of buildings in the central business district were demolished to make way for shiny new towers for the city’s large companies, including the nation’s first all-aluminum skyscraper, headquarters of the Alcoa corporation. But the Renaissance also extended deep into the Lower Hill District, the historic core of Pittsburgh’s black community. Thousands of buildings were demolished, 451 businesses were displaced, and 1,551 people, mostly African American, were relocated in what Roy Lubove calls “an experiment in public paternalism.” Such massive physical and social disruption created a backlash in the black community that culminated in the late-1960s and early-1970s.

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Around the same time as Jane Jacobs rallied historic preservationists to fight urban renewal in older American cities, Pace organized African Americans in Pittsburgh’s Hill District into the Citizens Committee for Hill District Renewal as one of the first citizen-led neighborhood revitalization efforts in the United States.85 Pace was the forerunner of many such activists who came after her, often poor and female, who stood their ground and fought for the improvement of Pittsburgh’s low-income black neighborhoods, a story repeated across the country.

Featured in a 1960s photo by the acclaimed African American chronicler of mid-century black life in Pittsburgh, Charles “Teenie” Harris, Frankie Mae Pace stands stylishly defiant in a matching plaid skirt and jacket in front of the Citizens Committee for Hill District Renewal office.86 Owner of Pace’s Music at 2209 Centre Avenue, a gospel music emporium, she is described as “the reincarnation of Sojourner Truth . . . outspoken and committed and took her message to the mayor, governor and the White House.”87 A native of Clinton, Louisiana, Pace came to Pittsburgh in 1936 as part of the Second Great Migration. Although she resided at 2310 Centre Avenue in the Hill, Pace was active in the Rodman Street Baptist Church in East Liberty, about three miles east. According to her obituary from 1989, she “worked to improve housing conditions and government programs for the city’s poor for more than 50 years.”88 Mayor David Lawrence appointed Pace to a special committee to fight poverty in 1954; she later led


88 “Frankie Pace, 84, led efforts to help poor,” Pittsburgh Press obituary, November 20, 1989.
Pittsburgh’s efforts in the War on Poverty in the 1960s and helped develop the Model Cities Program in 1965. But in 1969, Pace and two other African American leaders in the Hill, Jim McCoy and Byrd Brown, erected a large billboard at the corner of Crawford and Wylie that read, “No Redevelopment Beyond this Point! We Demand Low Income Housing for the Lower Hill,” a symbolic rebellion of popular support against further redevelopment plans by the City in the Middle Hill. Their act of resistance was part of a nationwide grassroots movement to reclaim neighborhoods for residents, rather than outsiders’ visions of a community driven by elites.

In the 1950s through the 1970s, Pittsburgh was a center of citizen resistance to some of the nation’s first post-war physical and economic disruptions, such as urban renewal and deindustrialization. Low-income residents successfully challenged their respective growth coalitions and rejected mid-century conceptions of modernism that failed to adequately take into account the needs of poor people. They protested against elite-driven urban renewal plans, negotiated with political leaders, and developed alternative responses, such as community development corporations, that were bottom-up solutions to urban ills. In the decades after the 1970s, Pittsburgh’s neighborhood leaders continued to create innovative programs for the revitalization of inner city communities, but this time in cooperation with growth coalitions. As

89 Pace testified before Congress in March 1967, telling the Senate Education and Labor Committee as spending on the Vietnam War was accelerating, “‘Two-thirds of the people in my neighborhood have incomes under $3,000 a year. The housing is frequently sub-standard; the schools are not first class. If this country can spend billions destroying life, it can spend millions building it.’” When asked if she had been “rehearsed,” Pace told Vermont Senator Winston L. Prouty, “‘Nobody told me what to say. I wouldn’t have come down here if they didn’t let me say what I know is so. And that is, we need that money restored that you cut back.’” She continued, “‘We could do a lot more good in Pittsburgh, even with the money we have, if the local people were allowed to allot the money where it is most needed, instead of you people down here earmarking it.’” “On Poverty Program: Frankie Pace Talks Back to Senators,” New Pittsburgh Courier; March 18, 1967.

90 McCoy formed the United Negro Protest Committee in 1963 and Brown was president of the Pittsburgh branch of the NAACP. “Billboard inscribed ‘Attention: City Hall and U.R.A. No Redevelopment Beyond This Point! We Demand Low Income Housing for the Lower Hill, C.C.H.D.R., N.A.A.C.P., Poor People’s Campaign, Model Cities,’ at Crawford Street near intersection of Centre Avenue, Hill District,” 1969, Charles “Teenie” Harris Archive, Carnegie Museum of Art, Heinz Family Fund, Accession Number 2001.35.9463. This intersection would later be called “Freedom Corner,” a symbolic rallying point for many civil rights demonstrations.
Tracy Neumann argues, as government and foundation funding became available in the late-1970s and early 1980s, organizations “needed to ensure that their development development plans were compatible with the growth coalition’s vision for the city.”

During the 1960s and early-1970s some grassroots citizens movements utilized protest strategies developed by Chicago organizer Saul Alinsky. For instance, the Manchester Citizens Corporation (MCC) adopted the Saul Alinsky-style of organizing and packed public hearings at City Hall, jammed the phone lines of local elected officials, and protested in great numbers to change conditions in the neighborhood. In one protest against the Urban Redevelopment Authority and City of Pittsburgh Housing Authority in 1974, MCC board member Betty Jane Ralph told the *New Pittsburgh Courier*, “We’ve always been fighters, and this is no exception. In all our many battles with the city administration, we’ve been committed to not letting the city come over here, do just what they want, and not consider the needs of the people living here in Manchester.”

Though, as Roy Lubove argues, the Ford Foundation’s funding of urban extension programs in the Pittsburgh neighborhoods of Homewood-Brushton, Hazelwood-Glenwood, and Perry Hilltop in the early-1960s “marked the emergence of a new kind of community organization strategy, one that placed less emphasis than the Alinsky Industrial Areas Foundation upon conflict, but more emphasis on citizen participation than the Ford Foundation

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community action programs of the early 1960’s.”

Still, such approaches were driven by funders, not the people themselves. Organizations like MCC and individuals profiled below—who Alinsky calls “native or indigenous leadership”—continued to agitate for change.

Several women illustrate the fight against political and business elites in Pittsburgh at a time when charismatic male leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X commanded the national civil rights agenda. Behind the scenes, women were often the foot soldiers of the movement. At the neighborhood level, strong-willed, determined women achieved small but significant victories by influencing the moral agenda. In Pittsburgh in the 1960s, Frankie Mae Pace led the opposition against further demolition of the Middle Hill District. Dorothy Richardson and Ethel Hagler, humble, virtuous church-going ladies of the city’s North Side, led protests for affordable housing and ultimately conceived of Neighborhood Housing Services, which became a national model. Another Northsider, Betty Jane Ralph was a potent voice for Manchester as it beat back a massive road project and forged its own identity as an attractive black neighborhood. These women, along with a number of men who operated out of the spotlight at the local level, illustrate citizen resistance and control over an ethical, principled

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agenda which ultimately prevailed in community development. They also show the humble beginnings of movements and programs that became national models.

From the outset of urban renewal in the 1950s, Pittsburgh became a center for the implementation of innovative approaches to community development, in large part because African Americans like Pace, Richardson, Hagler, and Ralph tried to gain control over neighborhood initiatives of Pittsburgh’s elite-driven Renaissance. African Americans’ use of social capital in the form of political power, control over information, and organizing prowess enabled them to effectively voice their concerns and shape the city’s community development agenda, particularly as it pertained to the supply of affordable housing. This cycle of protest and negotiation between everyday residents and elites played out repeatedly from the 1950s through the 1970s. As a result, African Americans forged a sense of identity, asserted their right to civil society, and took greater control over the destiny of communities through property ownership.98 The results were uneven, as not all African American communities in Pittsburgh had the ability to respond to rapid changes. But in those communities which had the capacity, or had accumulated enough social capital to leverage political and financial capital, citizen-led development projects blunted the negative effects of renewal.99

The path was not always easy and came with immense losses through the displacement of thousands of residents under the federal urban renewal program, discriminatory bank lending practices, suburbanization, and deindustrialization. But these negative effects led directly to


what researcher Fidel Campet calls a “grassroots insurgency.” “From the mid 1960s into the early 1970s, African Americans and sympathetic white allies developed differing strategies to improve housing conditions in the city by engaging state institutions and emerging federal housing programs. Residents formed community based organizations (CBO) and grassroots protest organizations (GPO). . . . In all, these organizations became new sites of black self-determination and community development forcing the introduction of capital, civic institutions, and federal housing programs into the community.”100 This pushback from African Americans against further elite-driven renewal projects in the 1950s and 1960s laid the groundwork for community-driven planning and development initiatives in the 1970s and beyond.

2.1 Good Intentions

Homeownership has long been part of the American dream. John Bodnar, Roger Simon, and Michael P. Weber argue that in Pittsburgh “the purchase of a home was the most common form of wealth accumulation achieved by persisting unskilled workers and newcomers to the city.” Though, this form of social mobility was not shared by all races and classes. African Americans typically had homeownership rates much lower (8.4%) than whites (23.6%) in 1900.101 But the Depression undermined this objective for many working class Americans. In the late-1930s, government-funded housing was seen as the beginning of a well-intentioned plan to house the


101 John Bodnar, Roger Simon, and Michael P. Weber, Lives of Their Own: Blacks, Italians, and Poles in Pittsburgh, 1900-1960 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 153, 156. Even in the Hill District and Homewood, which had higher proportions of African Americans, black homeownership rates ranged from 0.5% in the Lower Hill to 13.2% in the Upper Hill and 12.5% in Homewood in 1930 (Bodnar, Simon, and Weber, 211). Even by 1960, black homeownership rates in the Upper Hill (10.7%) and Homewood (35%) were far lower than in white neighborhoods such as Polish Hill (58.3%), South Side (61%), Bloomfield (60.9%), and East Liberty (74.2%) (Bodnar, Simon, and Weber, 227). Part of this disparity can be explained through discriminatory lending practices and redlining.
poor and stimulate an economy still struggling to climb out of the Depression. Due to the lingering impact of the Depression which diminished the city’s industrial economy, Pittsburgh was selected as one of the first cities to receive thousands of much-needed new public housing units. In October 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt attended the dedication of Terrace Village in Pittsburgh’s Hill District neighborhood, constructed at a cost of $12.8 million and was the second largest low-rent housing project in the United States, designed to accommodate more than 2,600 families “of all races and colors.”

Thousands attended FDR’s visit, including Pittsburgh Mayor Cornelius D. Scully and George E. Evans, City Councilman and chairman of the Pittsburgh Housing Authority. The president spoke briefly to the audience, “You are doing a grand job—do more of it—and speed it up.”

Between 1937, when the Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh was formed, and the mid-1960s, Terrace Village was one of many public housing developments constructed throughout the city (including Garfield Heights, constructed in 1966, discussed in later chapters) as Pittsburgh leaders took advantage of ample federal funds for housing. The intent of public

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103 “Dedicatory Address by Roosevelt,” *The Pittsburgh Courier*, October 12, 1940.

104 “Here’s Text of Roosevelt’s Housing Project Speech,” *Pittsburgh Press*, Friday, October 11, 1940.

housing was to provide affordable housing options for low- and middle-income people of all races. Yet, with few other housing options, African Americans became increasingly concentrated in public housing. In the 1940s, African Americans comprised 42 percent of all public housing tenants to more than 70 percent by 1970.

From the 1950s through the 1970s, the city’s elite-led urban renewal program displaced thousands of low- and moderate-income African Americans with few housing options. As Trotter and Day explain, “African Americans found it hard to relocate from urban renewal areas to better housing in other communities within and outside the city limits.” As whites moved out of the city, blacks moved into areas that later became identified as majority African American, namely Central North Side, East Liberty, Garfield, Homewood, Larimer, and Manchester. Yet, the American dream of homeownership in the suburbs was realized mainly by whites; racially discriminatory lending and real estate practices prevented blacks from purchasing homes outside of the city.

This massive demographic upheaval reinforced notions of community identity and gave rise to various community-based organizations, such as community development corporations,
which emerged in the mid-to late-1960s and which would ultimately delineate neighborhood control. But to elite, white city leaders, the demolition schemes unleashed by urban renewal, although conducted at the expense of thousands of poor people, were a necessary part of the city’s modern makeover. To the Urban Redevelopment Authority responsible for the demolition, “These problems aren’t caused by us. They’re merely uncovered by us,” or so the thinking went.110

2.2 “Progress Fetish”

In the post-war era, Pittsburgh’s civic leaders envisioned an urban utopia that would forever put the city’s dirty image behind them. Their inspiration: Europe. An image from 1953 shows the “Proposed Lower Hill Cultural Center” conceived of by architects Mitchell & Ritchey for Pittsburgh’s Lower Hill District with no citizen input, influenced by ideas from Swiss-French architect Le Corbusier’s Congrès internationaux d'architecture moderne (CIAM).111 In the architectural rendering, large slabs of buildings are arranged in a row like dominos extending the length of Centre Avenue into what was a dense Victorian neighborhood. In the middle is a circular “cultural center,” which ultimately became the Civic Arena (demolished in 2010). The vision included government-funded public housing to reflect “idealistic” and “democratic ideals” for working-class families. “Their egalitarian (some said Spartan) and repetitive architecture, consisting of low-rise, garden-apartment-style buildings, and shared outdoor amenities—such as

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courtyards, playgrounds, and drying yards for hanging laundry—were meant to foster social interaction and a culture of common identity among residents” laid out in “superblocks” that interrupted the existing street grid. More of the same was planned for the rest of the Hill. Had the master plan been executed, it would have wiped out not only the Lower Hill District, but also the Middle-Hill, the core of the community.

To architect and urban designer David Lewis, such images were more than just drawings. In the early 1960s, Lewis visited Robert Pease, director of the URA, in his office, which had a bird’s-eye view of the Lower Hill. Behind Pease’s desk was an image of the proposed high rises and the future of what many planners wanted the Hill to become. To Lewis, “this was not just a picture; it was policy. That was a mindset,” he said.

Critiques of these projects highlight the bland architecture, distance from urban amenities, and lack of citizen participation, particularly from minorities. Many of the public housing projects built in the post-war era in both the U.S. and France created communities isolated from centers of employment and disconnected from many other parts of society. As these new structures rose and the newness of them wore off, the cold detachment of modernism soured among the public. But for two decades after the end of World War II, the majority of new

112 Bamberg, 11.
113 “Ben Austen, “After the Towers: Since the 1990s, American cities have destroyed 280,000 units of public housing—and replaced them with a system in which the poor are increasingly left to fend for themselves,” New York Times Magazine, February 11, 2018, 39.
114 Author’s interview with David Lewis, September 29, 2017, West Homestead, Pa..
housing developments contributed to a narrative of cheery, post-war modernism that benefited everyone, what N.B.D. Connolly terms “progress fetish.” That is, until poor people spoke up.

2.3 From Support to Resistance

Throughout the 1940s, Hill residents staged frequent demonstrations to advocate for rehabilitation of the Lower Hill. But after World War II, as redevelopment of the Lower Hill became reality, support from the black community was swift. Pittsburgh’s first black city councilman, Paul F. Jones, became an ardent supporter of redevelopment in 1954. In addition, with the success of the public housing communities in the Middle and Upper Hill, the Lower Hill’s older housing seemed obsolete and significantly less attractive. However, support for these new developments among the black community did not last.

Less than a decade after Mayor Lawrence launched one of the largest and most ambitious urban modernization efforts in the United States residents of the Middle Hill pushed back against the constant demolition and displacement. In addition to Pace, Daisy Lampkin of the NAACP, Alma Speed Fox, and other prominent black Pittsburghers demanded a greater stake in the city’s


117 One demonstration, documented by photographer Teenie Harris in 1946, shows a crowd of African Americans in City Council chambers carrying signs that read, “Twenty year condemned houses must go,” “Delinquent homes mean delinquent children,” and, in a nod to returning World War II veterans, “From G.I. foxholes to Hill District rat holes.” In February 1946, black leaders in the Hill such as James Owens, owner of a clothing store; WWII veteran John Patton; Dorothy Guinn, executive director of the Centre Avenue YMCA; and Reverend Harold R. Tolliver, organized a Social Action Committee to advocate for better housing. Laura Grantmyre, “Conflicting Visual Representations of Redevelopment in Pittsburgh’s Hill District, 1943-1968” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2009), 148-149.

As a result, Hill residents formed the Citizens Committee for Hill District Renewal, an umbrella group for various Hill organizations, to challenge the city’s narrative of “progress.”

Less than a decade after the start of urban renewal, popular opinion quickly turned against redevelopment plans. Images of protest became more pronounced in the black press. Emboldened by national civil rights protests, demonstrations against Pittsburgh’s urban renewal became more militant. “In August 1965 police arrested eleven civil rights pickets outside the Civic Arena on charges ranging from disorderly conduct to inciting a riot and resisting arrest,” writes Allen Dieterich-Ward. One member of the United Negro Protest Committee exclaimed, “I swear to God that you will be sorry if any more of the Lower Hill is devoted to construction of housing for the affluent society.”

The narrative of blacks who supported urban renewal in the 1950s and early 1960s, then turned against it in subsequent decades was not true for all black neighborhoods. Some histories conflate urban renewal with public housing. But though they occurred during the same era, they were much different. Urban renewal was really about jobs, while public housing was seen as a

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119 Mark Whitaker, Smoketown: The Untold Story of the Other Great Black Renaissance (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018), 292. Lampkin was Pittsburgh’s NAACP leader and Vice President of the Pittsburgh Courier in the 1950s.


121 “As the 1960s progressed, the Courier increasingly criticized ‘urban renewal’ as ‘Negro removal’ and Hill residents formed the Citizens Committee for Hill District Renewal (CCHDR) to ensure that Hill residents had input in any future redevelopment plans,” writes Grantmyre (217-218).

much-needed affordable housing issue. As the 1960s and 1970s wore on, blacks found themselves in short supply of both jobs and housing.

Most African Americans supported public housing. After all, the new public housing developments constructed throughout the city were seen as a vast improvement over the older, blighted properties in many neighborhoods. As Trotter and Day write, “African Americans perceived public housing as their most viable option for obtaining access to new housing,” particularly since private housing options outside of established black neighborhoods were largely closed off due to redlining and racial discrimination.\textsuperscript{123} But not enough housing units were built to meet demand. As Allen Dieterich-Ward elaborates, “Among residents displaced on the Upper Hill, 78 percent of those in private housing rented substandard or mediocre housing at ‘comparatively high’ prices. At the same time, low-income families, thrust out of the Lower Hill, found their way to Homewood ‘because they were not wanted elsewhere,’ one report concluded in 1958.”\textsuperscript{124} Furthermore, black protests mounted in the 1960s around the lack of construction jobs. The Negro American Labor Council’s Pittsburgh branch agitated for African American employment at the $22 million Civic Arena constructed in the Lower Hill. Despite the protests and meetings with Civic Arena representatives, few jobs were made available to African Americans.\textsuperscript{125}

Similar agitation took place in the city’s Manchester neighborhood, where Three Rivers Stadium was built in 1969. As I describe in my masters paper, Manchester resident, James Williams, nicknamed “Swampman” by local residents as well as the press, was one of the

\textsuperscript{123} Trotter & Day, 78.

\textsuperscript{124} Dieterich-Ward, 177.

\textsuperscript{125} Trotter & Day, 55-57.
agitators for increased black ownership and participation in the 1960s and 1970s. As head of the Minority Construction Roundtable, Williams led a number of protests to increase minority construction jobs on big city projects, including the construction of Three Rivers Stadium in 1969 (along with Nate Smith and Jack Godfrey) and the Convention Center in 1977. Williams was a product of the Black Power Movement that advocated for black ownership of businesses and control over black neighborhoods (he also ran for City Council a number of times). “‘I’m not concerned with affirmative action,’” he told the *New Pittsburgh Courier* in 1978. “‘I’m concerned with Black contractors, Black businesses and total economic change.’”

In addition, African Americans also “expressed the pain of being uprooted from their old neighborhoods.” Neighborhoods which directly experienced displacement, or the threat of displacement, such as the Hill District and Manchester, became the black community’s centers of resistance against such upheaval. The Hill’s Frankie Mae Pace not only became a strong voice against development, she influenced the Model Cities movement, a precursor to the community

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128 Trotter and Day, 78.
development field. David Lewis remembers the influence she had on the national program. In 1967, the two of them found themselves in Chicago for a conference to discuss the initiative which would become the Model Cities program. As Lewis recalls, on stage in the plenary session were “distinguished” panelists, mostly white, male university types, pontificating on the civil rights movement. Pace, who had been seated way back in the audience, in the middle of a row, suddenly, made her way out into the center aisle and challenged the panelists. Lewis explains the exchange: “She marched down the aisle, shouting to them, ‘Which of you have ever been in a ghetto, far less which of you has grown up in a ghetto, and how do you have the voice of the people of the ghetto?’ It completely changed the whole dialogue. It absolutely dismissed the voices of the people who purported to speak for African Americans. She, by saying that, as a black woman from the Hill District, she immediately enfranchised herself.”

By the end of the decade, Frankie Mae Pace had become the face of citizen resistance against urban renewal plans gone awry.

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130 In 1963, Lewis had started one of the first urban design programs in the United States at the Carnegie Institute of Technology (now Carnegie Mellon University) and came across Pace during his work in the Hill District. In 1964, Pittsburgh was the first of ten cities to receive federal Community Action Programs funds as part of President Johnson’s War on Poverty. The following year, Sargent Shriver, director of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity, hailed Pittsburgh “as a national model for promoting the ‘maximum feasible participation’ of its citizens in combating poverty.” Kenneth J. Heineman, “Model City: The War on Poverty, Race Relations, and Catholic Social Activism in 1960s Pittsburgh.” The Historian 65, No. 4 (2003): 869.

131 Author’s interview with David Lewis, September 29, 2017. “I loved Frankie,” Lewis said. “She and I, we really grooved. She was a ball of energy.” Lewis said that her music store was very influential, “a hub of people committed to the black voice and black culture particularly as it was articulated in music.”
Agitators such as Pace and the Citizens Committee for Hill District Renewal were not just about protests. In November 1966, the group launched a demonstration project in collaboration with the Urban Redevelopment Authority that became “the first pilot project of self-help-renewal in the United States.”132 Facilitated in part by former mayor David Lawrence, the Citizens Committee announced plans to purchase a property on Vine Street in the Lower Hill to use it as a model for how property owners can renew their homes.133 In announcing the program Lawrence said, “It is imperative that people living in the Hill District express their needs and their wishes through a representative citizen organization.” It was to be Lawrence’s last official act. Later that evening, he collapsed while making a speech before a Democratic party meeting at the Syria Mosque in Oakland and died. The irony could not have been greater. For a man who once led the removal of thousands of black residents from the Lower Hill, he now claimed responsibility for their empowerment. “It has been recognized that no program of physical progress can move forward successfully unless the present residents have an effective and direct voice in determining the future of their community,” Lawrence remarked. More accurately, though, it was the citizens themselves who deserved the credit.

Another demonstration project that David Lewis helped facilitate took place on Crawford Street in the Lower Hill, at the border of the urban renewal zone where the Civic Arena had been constructed. Lewis credits a black contractor Chester Perkins, whom he calls “an unheralded hero,” with the idea. Perkins started United Skillcraft in the 1960s and worked in the Hill near


133 David Lawrence’s term as mayor ended in 1959 and he had last served as governor in 1963. At the time of the 1966 announcement, Lawrence served as chairman of the URA and chairman of the President’s Committee on Equal Opportunity.
Frankie Pace’s store. In 1967, Steve George, then-director of the URA, donated three sites on Crawford Street so United Skillcraft could conduct its demonstration project. Lewis persuaded banks to fund the construction. They built three units of housing, but Perkins wanted to do more. “‘Let’s do all of Crawford Avenue!’” Perkins exclaimed. Lewis and UDA designed the units, but fell short due to lack of funding. Before the project could get off the ground, Perkins died of a heart attack. Twenty years later, a design-build firm from St. Louis, McCormick Baron, came to Pittsburgh seeking projects. They used the original UDA drawings from Crawford Avenue in 1967 to form the basis of Crawford Square, the new “community refill” housing development that rose in the Lower Hill in the early-1990s. “Chester would have been so proud,” Lewis beamed. Projects like these show that citizens had shifted the agenda toward their needs.

Emboldened by the protests in the Hill, citizen unrest spread to other parts of the city in the 1960s and 1970s as more demolition plans were unveiled. On the city’s North Side, vocal citizen opposition emerged when plans became public to demolish Allegheny Center, including the venerated North Side Market House, and build a massive road project that proposed to wipe out most of residential Manchester. Inspired by Pace and other Hill leaders’ protest efforts, Betty Jane Ralph, president of United Manchester Redevelopment Committee (which later became Manchester Citizens Corporation), told the Pittsburgh Courier in 1974, “We’ve always been fighters, and this is no exception. In all our many battles with the city . . . administration, we’ve been committed to not letting the city come over here, do just what they want, and not consider

134 United Skillcraft represented black plumbers, carpenters, and bricklayers, who had been excluded from the union due to their race; as a result, they could not get certified.


136 Author’s interview with David Lewis, September 29, 2017.
the needs of the people living here in Manchester.”¹³⁷ Led by residents of the Hill, then Manchester, and eventually East Liberty and Homewood, the long, slow death of federal urban renewal program had begun. By the late-1970s, federal officials acknowledged the official end of big government demolish-and-relocate programs, once the hallmark of mid-century urban progress.¹³⁸ Citizens had successfully transformed their accumulated social capital into political capital and stopped further destructive urban renewal programs. But the question of how best to reinvigorate older urban neighborhoods remained.

### 2.4 Pittsburgh’s Elite Respond to Citizen Protests

In response to the citizen unrest, the city’s elites put much effort into dealing with what Roy Lubove calls “the social dimensions of the Renaissance,” namely affordable housing, in the late-1950s and early-1960.¹³⁹ As a way of creating top-down social capital, the Allegheny Conference on Community Development, which orchestrated the city’s urban renewal plans, established ACTION-Housing in 1957 as a way to provide housing for moderate-income families.¹⁴⁰ Although it was not governed by neighborhood activists, ACTION-Housing created several community based organizations, such as the East Liberty Citizens Renewal Council in 1958, the Bluff Area Citizens Renewal Council in 1959, the Perry Hilltop Citizens Committee, Greg Mims, “Northside Citizens File Charges Against URA, Housing Authority,” *New Pittsburgh Courier*, February 2, 1974.


and in the early-1960s, the South Side Chamber of Commerce. The Homewood Community Improvement Association, formed in 1954, was given an infusion of capital in 1960 from ACTION-Housing, via the Buhl Foundation, to form the Homewood-Brushton Citizens Renewal Council “to develop its experiment in self-help” through citizen participation in neighborhood planning and the implementation of city services to improve the community.\(^{141}\) In 1961, the City Planning Department established the Community Renewal Program, led by Morton Coleman, and the following year, a Social Planning Advisory Committee.\(^{142}\)

But Pittsburgh “elites” were not a monolithic bunch. Some, such as Coleman, who was Mayor Joseph Barr’s assistant secretary for manpower in the mid-1960s, elevated the city’s profile before decision makers in Washington, as well as played a mediator role on the ground between Pittsburgh’s political elites and its black residents. When President Johnson announced billions of dollars in anti-poverty funding for cities as part of his Great Society Program in 1964, Coleman was one of the first to arrive in Washington to secure funds for Pittsburgh. As Coleman recounts in his memoir, “Within two months, I was chairing a planning committee, and [Gerson] Green, Jim Cunningham, ACTION-Housing’s Kiernan Stenson, and I were making frequent trips to Washington to keep tabs on the developing legislation and get direction for our local efforts. In fact, we became informal consultants to the executive branch staff who were working on the federal legislation, and they came to Pittsburgh to learn from us.”\(^{143}\) Therefore, when it came time to receive federal funds under President Johnson’s Great Society programs, cities such as

\(^{141}\) Ibid, 166.

\(^{142}\) Ibid, 161.

New Haven, Boston, Detroit, and Pittsburgh “were among the first in line for community action grants,” writes Alice O’Connor.\(^\text{144}\)

In 1968, Coleman calmed a potentially volatile situation in the wake of the riots after Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in April 1968. Coleman “was called on to defuse community problems—a rather tense assignment during the civil rights years, when we were always worrying about what incident might cause the city to erupt into rioting.”\(^\text{145}\) He huddled in Mayor Barr’s office with the mayor’s chief of staff, Al Colotti, Dave Craig, the Director of Public Safety, and Robert Pease, the director of the Allegheny Conference. When the riots started, Jim Slusser, the chief of police wanted to shoot to kill because so many people were looting businesses, and Barr was getting flooded with calls from angry, frightened merchants and property owners. Pease, Coleman, Colotti, and Craig talked Slusser out of it. “Pittsburgh will never recover if you start shooting people,” Coleman told the mayor. As a result, nobody was killed, though there was considerable physical destruction.\(^\text{146}\) Still, “the residuals from the riot [in Pittsburgh] weren’t as tough as Newark [1967], Watts [1964], or Detroit [1967],” Coleman reflects.\(^\text{147}\) These riots delayed, but did not derail, community-based rebuilding efforts that had begun a decade earlier.


In the wake of the uprising, police had arrested 929 people and property damage from more than 500 fires in the Hill was estimated to be in excess of $600,000. Steve Mellon and Julian Roth, “The Week the Hill Rose Up,” *Pittsburgh-Post-Gazette*, April 1, 2018, B4.

Author’s interview with Moe Coleman, September 5, 2017.
Pittsburgh History & Landmarks Foundation (PHLF) acquired and rehabilitated abandoned housing for low- and moderate-income homeowners in Manchester and the Mexican War Streets on the city’s North Side, a strategy that was unheard of at the time. Wary of urban renewal’s impact on the city’s architectural legacy, architectural historian James D. Van Trump and English professor, Arthur P. Ziegler, Jr., created PHLF in 1964. Their first task was to save Victorian row houses in Manchester as a first step toward community regeneration. Their actions garnered national attention. But while Coleman and groups like PHLF and ACTION-Housing channeled federal and philanthropic funds toward neighborhoods, they did not directly represent low-income residents. The residents themselves still clamored for a seat at the development table.

A North Side neighborhood activist, Dorothy Richardson, established a grassroots organization that would become a national model for neighborhood investment. Born in Manchester, Richardson lived on Charles Street, in the city’s Perry South neighborhood, since 1938. She became an influential North Side fixture as a member of the Mt. Carmel Baptist Church and the Pleasant Valley Community Council. Her church background and deep roots in the community provided Richardson with moral weight in leading protests against powerful individuals. In 1965, Richardson formed Citizens Against Slum Housing (CASH) and demonstrated at a housing conference on Pittsburgh’s North Side, in which David Lawrence delivered the keynote address. “The group used the demonstration to focus attention on the poor

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149 Campet, 341.
quality of privately-owned rental housing in low-income neighborhoods and on the inadequate relocation procedures of the Urban Redevelopment Authority,” writes John T. Metzger (1999).  

In 1967, another protest in which CASH participated focused on a North Side slum property owned by Edward Talenfeld of Squirrel Hill. Employing Alinsky-style tactics, Richardson and others picked up the trash in front of Talenfeld’s slum property, drove it to his Squirrel Hill home, and picketed out front. They then drove to Talenfeld’s Downtown office and dumped the trash there.  

It sent a clear message: we will not tolerate neglect of our community.

In 1968, Richardson helped establish another organization, Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS), which became a national model. Funded initially by the Sarah Scaife Foundation, NHS provided high-risk loans to revitalize historic homes in Pittsburgh’s Manchester and Mexican War Streets neighborhoods. Richardson had help from her friend, fellow North Side resident Ethel Hagler. A native of Dante, Virginia, Hagler came to Pittsburgh with her husband, William Spencer Hagler in 1931. She was heavily involved with Brown Chapel African Methodist Episcopal Church, the Garden Club of Allegheny County, and helped found the Central Northside Neighborhood Council. NHS started in a portable trailer at the

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151 Campet, 359.

152 These tactics were straight out of Alinsky’s handbook—“Ridicule is man’s most potent weapon” and “A good tactic is one that your people enjoy.” Alinsky, Rules for Radicals (1971)128. Italics in original. Richardson told the Pittsburgh Courier, “I’m more interested in the little people.” “Conference On Housing Is Defended,” Pittsburgh Courier, December 11, 1965.
corner of Arch and Jacksonia streets in the Mexican War Streets. The program soon spread to other cities.

By any measure, the rapid replication of the NHS model is remarkable. In 1970, the Federal Home Loan Bank copied the NHS program in other communities, and by 1975, NHS was in 45 cities across the country. In 1978, Congress established the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation to nationalize the NHS model (it became NeighborWorks in 2005). By 1980, NHS could be found in more than 100 communities across the country. In sum, Pittsburgh’s experiments with citizen input and support for self-determination initiatives in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s became a model for the rest of the nation, a pattern that repeated itself in subsequent decades.

2.5 Black Power

The self determination ideology that swept across the globe in the 1960s, known as “Black Power” or “Black Liberation” in the United States (whose origins can be traced back to Marcus Garvey and Pittsburgh’s own Martin Delaney of the nineteenth-century), is generally seen as a


positive influence on African American communities.\textsuperscript{155} Although Thomas Sugrue claims that “Nearly every current of black power played out in Detroit,” the same can also be said of Pittsburgh.\textsuperscript{156} The Black Power movement evolved from one focused more generally on equal accommodation laws to a place-based strategy tied to control over real estate. In the late-1960s and early-1970s, African American-led community-based organizations formed in the wake of King’s assassination in 1968 “became new sites of black self-determination and community development forcing the introduction of capital, civic institutions, and federal housing programs into the community,” according to Fidel Campet.\textsuperscript{157} Furthermore, he writes, “Efforts to improve existing housing in the black community meshed with a burgeoning black power movement.”\textsuperscript{158} Campet details a number of African-American ventures that aimed to promote black-owned businesses and properties, including the United Black Front (UBF) in the Hill District, the United Movement for Progress (UMP) in Homewood, and the Homewood-based Operation Better Block, formed in 1970, which continues to function today.\textsuperscript{159}

Community development corporations (CDCs), which emerged in the late-1960s and early-1970s, replaced these earlier development initiatives. CDCs were a cornerstone of President Johnson’s War on Poverty in the mid-1960s. Funded by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, one of the first CDCs in America was the Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation.


\textsuperscript{158} Campet, 393.

\textsuperscript{159} Campet, 403.
in Brooklyn; the Manchester Citizens Corporation (MCC) was one of Pittsburgh’s first CDCs, started in 1965. At the same time, Pittsburgh’s African American-dominated CDCs of the 1970s and 1980s held at their core many of the ideas from the Black Power movement, notably the control over capital, real estate, and racial and ethnic pride. The movement encouraged many activists to enter the community development field, such as Pittsburgh’s Stanley Lowe, who became an expert in real estate as a way to protect his neighborhood from government urban renewal schemes and private developers who would otherwise control the development process.

In 1977, MCC hosted a national housing conference and brought in Carl Westmoreland from Cincinnati’s Mt. Auburn neighborhood, an African American community that had begun a rebound around the same time as Manchester. Westmoreland told the *New Pittsburgh Courier*, “I take issue with those who say government hasn’t done enough for me. President Jimmy Carter cannot resurrect ‘The Dream.’ That died with the man (Dr. Martin Luther King). The Dream is where you are and you have to make it happen.” The following year, when the *New Pittsburgh Courier*, asked in a 1978 headline, “Can Manchester Area Remain Black?” Lowe responded, “[Blacks] must start projecting for the future and try to decide what their community will look like five to 10 years from now.” Black Power appealed to a minority population who rejected urban renewal, abandonment, and bank redlining.

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162 Ron Suber, “Black Homes are ‘Treasure,’” *New Pittsburgh Courier*, August 20, 1977. Westmoreland received the Crowninshield Award from the National Trust the same year as Ziegler, in 1993.

2.6 The Rise of Community Development Corporations

While many writers examine the breakdown of civil society through riots and violent disturbances during the late-1960s and early-1970s, the formation of CDCs demonstrate citizen attempts to wrest community control from a central governing authority and define their own narrative of progress. In the U.S., the first-generation organizations formed in the 1950s and early-1960s failed to address what many black activists saw as control over land and resources. Not until the establishment of resident-governed CDCs under the Johnson administration in the mid- to late-1960s did local citizen control over housing and commercial real estate begin.164

Once the smoke cleared from the rebellions of the 1960s, neighborhood rebuilding resumed in the 1970s. Furthermore, as the federal government pulled back from urban redevelopment under the Nixon and Reagan administrations, CDCs increased their power and influence over the development process. The number of CDCs grew from just a few hundred in the 1970s to between 3,000 and 5,000 by the mid-1980s.165 In addition, neighborhood rebuilding received support from other private sector partners such as banks and private foundations.

Beginning in the early 1970s, American CDCs, propelled by Black Power, a strong self-determination ethos, and populist Alinsky-style neighborhood advocacy tactics, gained control over real estate development in low-income areas, particularly those stung by the effects of urban renewal and deindustrialization.166 As Saul Alinsky writes in his popular handbook for

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166 Much of this history has been covered by my masters paper and other authors, such as James DeFilippis, “Community Control and Development,” in DeFilippis and Saegert, The Community Development Reader, 30-37.
community activists, “The first step in community organization is community disorganization. The disruption of the present organization is the first step toward community organization.”

Pittsburgh mayor Pete Flaherty acknowledged this power shift and aligned his agenda with those of the neighborhoods, a precursor to the Caliguiri administration of the late-1970s and early-1980s. Disillusioned with the Democratic party in 1968, “Flaherty changed the scope of redevelopment,” Morton Coleman explained, through the development of a neighborhood approach. Called a “fiscal populist” by Tracy Neumann, Flaherty “rejected the political legacy of the declining New Deal coalition and promoted instead new modes of governance that they saw as more consistent with their limited resources and emerging middle-class resistance to tax increases.” This repudiation of the New Deal order not only fueled Nixon’s “New Federalism” ideology, it foreshadowed centrist Democrats like Bill Clinton, who appropriated many ideas of the 1970s in his administration of the 1990s. For many first generation CDCs and community-based organizations they had no choice: the rollback in federal funding forced them to diversify their funding sources and give greater attention to the role that banks and private corporations play in neighborhood development.

As CDCs became more professionalized, they moved from being adversaries to partners with local governments. In Pittsburgh in the mid- to late-1970s, nonprofit organizations which had challenged elite leaders’ redevelopment plans now sought philanthropic and political support

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168 Author’s interview with Moe Coleman, September 5, 2017.


170 Allen Dieterich-Ward describes this process as the emergence of the “‘neoliberal city’” in which public services are scaled back or privatized, new financing instruments are developed, and new public-private partnerships are forged. Dieterich-Ward, 12.
more than ever as mills shut down, suburban outmigration from the city grew, and bank redlining undermined their work. Tracy Neumann writes that “CDCs did not challenge the growth coalition’s visions for postindustrial Pittsburgh, and neighborhood groups’ activities—historic preservation, commercial district business development, infrastructure improvement, and housing rehabilitation—were largely compatible with the growth partnership’s focus on quality of life issues.”171 Moe Coleman echoes this sentiment. “Many groups lose their adversarial role once they need resources for development,” he explained. “They move from organizing to cooperation.”172 Indeed, James DeFilippis notes that as advocacy organizations became CDCs, “they transformed themselves from being confrontational in their dealings with city governments, banks, etc., to cooperative in those relationships as they became more immersed in the structures they were originally protesting against.”173

Although the loss of a protest voice did not sit well with some, namely Frankie Mae Pace, it was an inevitable development as community based organizations transitioned from a mostly volunteer movement to a skilled sector with paid professionals. Pace told the Pittsburgh Courier in 1983 that “‘When you work for the government, whether it is local, state or national, you can’t say so much or you get a pink slip.’”174 But the momentum toward professionalization had begun. As the 1980s unfolded and CDCs grew, partnerships rather than protests defined the decade. Still, the grassroots nature of community based organizations did not fade.

171 Neumann, 62.
172 Author’s interview with Moe Coleman, September 5, 2017.

Although the federal government remained an important funder of neighborhood organizations and urban real estate development, activists increasingly realized the role of the private sector, namely banks, was critical to rebuilding American inner cities. But unlike politicians, banks did not naturally answer to neighborhood activists. Two federal laws passed in the 1970s enabled community based organizations to hold financial institutions accountable for neighborhood lending practices: the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA), which requires banks to disclose where mortgage loans were approved or denied, and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), which requires financial institutions to meet the needs of communities in which they operate.\textsuperscript{175} Bank redlining in particular had accelerated as a result of urban riots in the 1960s. Risk-averse banks and insurance companies avoided lending to areas they considered to be volatile, unstable, or in an advanced state of decline.\textsuperscript{176} While public funds and some limited philanthropic dollars were put to use in housing restoration and redevelopment projects, CDCs found that absent private capital, poor neighborhoods would never stabilize. In Pittsburgh in the early 1970s, NHS, which had set the national standard for recruiting bank support for lending to inner city housing, found itself fighting an uphill battle against reluctant lenders and


\textsuperscript{176} As Metzger writes in his dissertation, “many ‘first generation’ community development corporations were unable to prevent the large-scale redlining of their neighborhoods.” John T. Metzger, “Social Capitalism in American Cities: Financial Institutions and Community Development” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1999), 125.
government bank regulators who saw such investments as unwise.\textsuperscript{177} Successful challenges to financial industry practices came from Chicago, which, like Pittsburgh, has a long history of neighborhood organizing.

Citizen advocacy for HMDA and CRA came not from groups most commonly associated with civil rights, such as the NAACP or the Urban League, but from Chicago’s Gale Cincotta, who Greg Squires calls “the mother of community reinvestment.” Cincotta is described as “a plainspoken mother of six who became a neighborhood activist and went on to help ignite the national debate over bank lending policies that discriminated against minority home buyers.”\textsuperscript{178} Cincotta and her colleague Shel Trapp, both disciples of Alinsky, were effective organizers. As head of Chicago’s National Training and Information Center (NTIC) and its parent organization, National People’s Action (NPA), Cincotta helped write the HMDA and CRA legislation. The federal disclosure of bank lending data was based on a local law passed by the Chicago City Council in 1974. It was part of a larger movement to enact similar ordinances at the local and state level.\textsuperscript{179} Within a year, HMDA became law, with CRA enacted two years later.

These two laws, along with the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, gave community based organizations new tools not only to challenge bank lending practices, but to forge new partnerships with financial institutions, though much of

\textsuperscript{177} Metzger, “Social Capitalism in American Cities” (1999), 128.


\textsuperscript{179} The legislative history of HMDA and CRA is detailed in Metzger’s dissertation (1999), 131-156.
the activism came in the late-1980s and early 1990s (addressed in a subsequent chapter).\textsuperscript{180} Credit is often given to Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire’s efforts to shepherd HMDA through to final passage, along with Henry S. Reuss, Proxmire’s Wisconsin colleague in the House, who sponsored the CRA legislation in 1977. The passage of HMDA and CRA acknowledged that the private sector was the key to community reinvestment, perhaps more than the government’s role.\textsuperscript{181} Critical of Johnson’s Great Society, Bradford and Cincotta write that the War on Poverty “tended to replace the private economy of capital investment with a government economy that was based on direct support for subsistence maintenance. . . . where the only dynamic was the management of the community into eventual abandonment.”\textsuperscript{182} The utilization of HMDA and CRA by community based organizations to leverage bank involvement in low-income areas marked a decisive shift away from government as the sole provider of anti-poverty programs to the private sector as an instrumental part of the wealth-building process. Most of the advocacy around HMDA and CRA, however, occurred a decade later as community based organizations developed the capacity (in the form of computer technology as well as trained researchers) to analyze home mortgage loan data and negotiate lending agreements with banks, all part of the transformation of the community development movement into an industry.


\textsuperscript{182} Bradford and Cincotta, 230.
2.8 Conclusion

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, as Pittsburgh’s low-income communities found themselves under assault from government urban renewal schemes, blight, and discrimination, people fought back. Women were often on the front lines, speaking truth to power in Washington, as well as to elected officials in Pittsburgh. Two decades before Jane Jacobs and Pittsburgh History & Landmarks Foundation rallied advocates to support the preservation of historic properties, grassroots community leaders such as Frankie Mae Pace agitated for community improvement from the ground-up. Pace’s efforts joined other leaders such as Dorothy Richardson, Ethel Hagler, and Betty Jane Ralph to repulse further government-funded mass demolition projects in their neighborhoods and set a national precedent for community-driven urban regeneration, in the case of Neighborhood Housing Services. Elites responded to these voices of dissent. ACTION-Housing facilitated affordable housing development in the city and organized several community based organizations in the 1950s and 1960s. In addition, some individuals connected to powerful politicians, such as Morton Coleman, became effective neighborhood advocates within the city and in Washington during the Johnson administration’s War on Poverty. Although elite-driven neighborhood projects failed to stem decline, they empowered neighborhood leaders and marked a departure from mass demolition as the only measure of “progress.”

As neighborhoods changed, so too did the nature of social capital. CDCs’ business-like real estate projects supplanted agitation tactics employed by Frankie Mae Pace or militant displays of power. By the 1970s, some CDCs, such as the Manchester Citizens Corporation, forged partnerships with local foundations and financial institutions to underwrite housing
restoration and construction. Although many CDCs became highly professionalized by the 1980s, Saul Alinsky’s disruptive methods did not entirely fade. Community based organizations continued to hold elite decision makers accountable to poor neighborhoods, even as equal partners. Alinsky’s *Rules for Radicals* reminds us that “The pressure produces the reaction, and constant pressure sustains action.” These rules would become even more invaluable as a citywide coalition of CDCs utilized their newfound power with HMDA and CRA in the late-1980s to encourage banks to meet the needs of low-income communities.

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3.0 Housing in Lyon Prior to the 1980s

In October 1958, Lyon Mayor Louis Pradel was seen riding a bulldozer to break ground for a new social housing development called “La Duchère” in the city’s western-most ninth arrondissement. A news article calls Pradel “Munatius Plancus”—Julius Caesar’s officer who established Lugdunum (Lyon) as the Roman capital of Gaul in 43 CE. It is no wonder: construction of La Duchère created an entirely new city. Built atop a former fourteenth-century castle and nineteenth-century fort, the site covers nearly a square mile.\(^\text{184}\) The photo of Mayor Pradel atop construction equipment is reminiscent of a similar image of Pittsburgh Mayor David Lawrence in 1956 initiating the demolition of more than 80 city blocks for the new Civic Arena.\(^\text{185}\) It is possible that Mayor Pradel modeled some of his ideas on Pittsburgh’s image makeover of the 1950s and 1960s, which attracted international attention. In 1958, the Allegheny Conference hosted a 60-person delegation of press writers for a tour of Pittsburgh.\(^\text{186}\) One of the visitors was Mrs. Hélène Bremond of the newspaper *Le Progrès*, based in Lyon, which undoubtedly generated publicity about Pittsburgh back in France.\(^\text{187}\)


\(^{186}\) Letter from Edward H. Litchfield, Chancellor of the University of Pittsburgh, to Park H. Martin, April 2, 1958. Allegheny Conference on Community Development Archives, Heinz History Center, Pittsburgh.

\(^{187}\) “1958 American Tour” (Press Tour of the United States), itinerary and delegate list, April 17, 1958. Allegheny Conference on Community Development Archives, Heinz History Center, Pittsburgh.
In the post-World War II era, many modernist notions were transnational in nature, with city-improvement ideas criss-crossing the Atlantic at an increasingly rapid rate.\textsuperscript{188} Transatlantic ideas of remaking cities shaped urban conditions in both Lyon and Pittsburgh. Concepts developed in Europe—specifically the idea promoted by Swiss-French architect Le Corbusier that “new” was preferable to “old”—influenced urban planners in the United States.\textsuperscript{189} Eager to change their dirty image and emerge from the shadow of more glamorous metropolitan centers, Pittsburgh and Lyon were some of the first cities to embrace modernization, which involved massive new construction often at the expense of a city’s older structures.

Lyon, like Pittsburgh, welcomed the new housing. After World War II ravaged the nation, France’s housing shortage was critical. But unlike the United States, France built most of its new housing in the sparsely populated suburbs. In the 1960s, cities like Lyon saw massive new housing towers rise in farmlands mostly to the east and south of the city. Mayor Pradel’s attempt to demolish much of Lyon’s old city (Vieux Lyon) in the 1960s was met with a wall of resistance similar to Pittsburgh’s reaction against urban renewal in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{190} But unlike the United States, French citizens did not develop community development corporations or a grassroots

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\textsuperscript{189} “The city is crumbling, it cannot last much longer; its time is past. It is too old” (xxiv). “Modern town planning comes to birth with a new architecture. By this immense step in evolution, so brutal and so overwhelming, we burn our bridges and break with the past” (xxv). “The architectural problem of old Europe . . . lies in the great city of to-day. . . . In two hundred years Americans will be coming over to Europe to admire the logical productions of modern France, while the French will be standing in astonishment before the romantic sky-scrapers of New York” (xxvi). Le Corbusier, \textit{The City of To-morrow and its Planning} (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1929).
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\textsuperscript{190} After the development of La Duchère, Pradel continued his city-modernization project, focusing on Lyon’s historic old section next. He tried to ram a major road through Vieux Lyon, but was thwarted by a grassroots petition drive by residents of the community. Vieux-Lyon became France’s first “safeguarded sector” under the “Malraux Law” (named for Cultural Affairs Minister André Malraux, with help from the “Renaissance du Vieux-Lyon” association) on May 12, 1964. It became a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1998. “Lyon Historic City, Project City. Historic Site of Lyon UNESCO World Heritage,” Genouilleux, Éditions La passe du vent, 2016, 10, accessed August 17, 2018, https://www.lyon.fr/sites/lyonfr/files/content/documents/2017-06/UNESCO_ANGLAIS.pdf.
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historic preservation organizations (the citizen movement to save Vieux Lyon was temporary). French city planners largely spared the core of historic cities. In Lyon, most new development was confined to the sparsely populated suburbs, where resistance was minimal. But that did not stop citizens from forming organizations in the 1960s and 1970s, fragile as they may have been (few associations had staff or adequate funding). After the oil shock of 1973, however, fear of the “other” increased as France wrestled with deindustrialization, foreign immigration, and a widespread negative stigma of banlieue communities.

### 3.1 Lyon’s Response to Postwar Slums

Immediately following World War II, France was desperate to rebuild a war-torn country and house thousands of those displaced by the war, as well as a rapidly growing industrial population. Long before mass government-sponsored social housing grands ensembles like La Duchère were constructed throughout France, many poor residents lived in makeshift shantytowns, known as bidonvilles, comparable to Depression-era “Hoovervilles” in the United States.\(^{191}\) Due to its location as a center for industry and rapid immigration, greater Lyon featured some of the most notorious bidonvilles in the country.

Archival photos of the Lyon area in the 1950s show large bidonvilles in Villeurbanne, just to the east of Lyon, occupied by 2,000 to 3,000 people, mainly immigrants from Spain, Portugal, Italy, Algeria, and France, as well as Gypsies from across Europe and the Levant.\(^{192}\) One


bidonville in Villeurbanne, Bidonville du Chaâba (which existed from 1954 to 1968), consisted of a “vast village of sheet metal, cardboard, a tangle of makeshift housing built with recycled materials” covering three hectares inhabited by 350 people. Another part of Villeurbanne, the “Tonkin District,” featured more than 700 inhabitants organized in a dangerously dense warren of temporary shelters. Dozens of these makeshift housing sites existed throughout Villeurbanne populated mainly by Algerians, but also Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, and French inhabitants. Several bidonvilles scattered throughout the Lyon region stood until the 1970s.

In the 1950s, the French state employed an interim strategy to provide temporary housing, known as cités de transit, in part due to the advocacy of Lyon-based Catholic activist Henri de Grouès, better known as Abbé Pierre. The cités de transit housed mainly men who had come in great numbers to work in the area’s factories, though women and children were also present. One of the nation’s first model cités de transit was constructed in Oullins, near Lyon, in 1957, which consisted of 300 temporary dwellings. In 1959, several hundred were constructed in Vaulx-en-Velin and other locations around greater Lyon. But it became clear that more permanent housing would be required for an expanding number of industrial workers.

As a result, the centralized government sponsored the construction of thousands of new, affordable housing units on the fringes of major French cities during the 1950s, 1960s, and

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1970s. It was no surprise, then, that the new housing options provided by the *grandes ensembles*, with indoor plumbing and other amenities, quickly became attractive alternatives to tar paper shacks. Initially, though, the production of housing units was inadequate to handle France’s two million immigrants that added to the already stressed housing supply. As Anne Power writes, “By 1953, only 325,000 units had been built since the war. The Minister of Reconstruction, Eugène Claudius Petit . . . said that rather than rebuild, France needed to build 14 million new units in the next twenty years.” The crisis was particularly acute in industrial centers like Lyon.

In Lyon, archival documents point to the desperate need for housing. One report notes that “It is necessary to construct, between 1954 and 1975: 82,000 + 65,000 = 147,000 large dwellings. However, [only] about 44,000 new homes will be built between 1954 and 1961” for a population of 773,000 residents in 1954, expected to grow to 1,034,000 people by 1975. The shortfall in Lyon was about 103,000 housing units. In order to keep up with demand, about 7,000 homes per year needed to be constructed over 15 years. Thus was set in motion the construction of mass housing on an industrial scale, quickly and at low cost. Between 1960 and 1980, more than nine million housing units were constructed throughout France, “nearly half a million units a year,” Power notes.

Unlike in American cities, new housing construction in France did not generate a massive wave of resistance, in large part because there was such a great need for housing. Starting in

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198 Power, 49.
1958, France accelerated its housing production such that 300,000 to 500,000 units were built in each subsequent year, peaking in 1972 with 546,000 dwellings, a “golden age of housing.”\(^{199}\) France constructed its social housing developments at a time when the country enjoyed the *trente glorieuses*, or thirty beautiful years, the period from 1945 to 1975. Factories employed thousands of mostly male workers, many of whom came from Algeria. The French government constructed hundreds of enormous high-rise apartments which sprawled across the landscape—known as *grands ensembles*—to be affordable housing options for this generation of industrial worker. Most of the new housing was constructed on cities’ fringes, or on adjacent farmland just outside the central city, by a quasi-public company known by its French initials SCIC (*Société central immobilière de la Caisse des dépôts*, or Central Real Estate Company of the Deposits and Consignments Fund). It was originally chartered in 1954 by the central government in Paris (at the time, only about 10% of housing was produced by the private sector). By 1974, a total of 250,000 housing units were constructed by SCIC.\(^{200}\)

Massive new construction projects to improve a city’s identity was a transatlantic phenomenon shared by cities in Europe, Canada, and the United States, as Christopher Klemek elaborates in *The Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal* (2011). In this respect, Lyon, like Pittsburgh, had a lot to gain from an image makeover in the post-war era. Mayor Pradel (who served from 1957 until his death in 1976), was a big fan of modernization, like many mayors at the time. He oversaw the construction of new housing and a new shopping center, Part-Dieu in central Lyon, as a way to reposition Lyon from a provincial town constantly in the shadow of

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200 Cupers, 141.
Paris to a major cosmopolitan region that could serve the interests of Europe. Most importantly, the new housing benefited those who had few other options. Social capital was embodied in the French unions or in religious organizations. One did not have any other identity other than French, and therefore, ethnic organizations were uncommon. This socialist-styled utopia worked well for a while, until the factories shut down and young people found themselves without jobs.

3.2 The Lyon Region’s Social Housing Developments

In greater Lyon, there were a number of social housing developments constructed in the 1960s through the 1970s, but for this study, I focus on three: La Duchère in Lyon’s western-most 9th arrondissement (5,400 units built between 1957 and 1966 for 30,000 residents); Les Minguettes in Vénissieux (south of Lyon), where 9,200 units for 35,000 residents were constructed between 1966 and 1973; and the 8,300-unit Mas du Taureau, built between 1970 and 1980 (in addition to La Grappinière, with a population of approximately 30,000) in Vaulx-en-Velin, east of Lyon. Taken together, the population of these three communities alone comprised nearly 100,000 low-income individuals.

Unlike the United States, in which most suburban development was privately managed with assistance from the federal government, centralized HLM organizations (Habitation à Loyer Modéré) constructed and managed the majority of new affordable housing in France. HLMs managed the social housing developments at the local level, but ultimately the Ministry of Reconstruction and Urbanism, located in Paris, oversaw development.201 The scarcity of housing in France during the 1950s necessitated the creation of special areas, called Zone à urbaniser en

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201 Originally called Habitations à bon marché, or “cheap dwellings,” the name was changed to HLM in 1950. Cupers (2014), 29.
priorité, or ZUP (“priority urbanization zones”) in 1958, which enabled the government to acquire land and develop large-scale housing developments, constructed by the HLMs. France declared one hundred and forty ZUPs win major cities throughout, including more than a dozen in the Rhône-Alpes region around Lyon.202

3.2.1 La Duchère

In Lyon, La Duchère was among the first built by the subsidiary of SCIC, called SACVL (Société Anonyme de Construction de la Ville de Lyon), created in 1954 by Edouard Herriot, who served as Mayor of Lyon from 1905 until his death in 1957.203 Construction drawings for La Duchère, drawn up in 1962, show the housing development scattered across the Duchère plateau, with the original nineteenth century fortress abutments preserved as the outline of the centre sportif, or sports complex for the residents (the original walls still surround it today).204 The social housing complex was designed by historian and architect, François-Régis Cottin, Construction was swift. A headline from February 1962 announced that “on April 1, 1963, 2,500

202 Power, Hovels to Highrise, 45-47.
204 Fort de La Duchère, was constructed between 1844 and 1851. “La Duchère du Fort à Zoom,” Passerelles, Department Développement Urbain, March 1997. Lyon Municipal Archives. There is also a Pittsburgh connection with SCIC, which built much of the social housing in Lyon. In 1973, the Allegheny Conference for Community Development hosted a number of officials from SCIC, including M. François Parfait, the president of SCET, a subsidiary of SCIC. The visit was coordinated by William Carpenter, a vice president with PPG. The French visitors were in the city to learn “about Pittsburgh Renaissance and [the Allegheny Conference’s] approach to urban renewal, low cost housing and community development,” according to a letter from William Carpenter to Bob Pease, then the director of the Allegheny Conference. The visitors’ bios indicate that they were in Pittsburgh looking at large urban renewal projects. Plus, SCIC had recently set up a U.S. subsidiary, an indication that the company was seeking development opportunities in various cities outside of France. It is probable that, given SCIC’s involvement in the Lyon region, Pittsburgh’s public housing model may have been incorporated into their French operations. International visits such as these, arranged by promotional agencies like the Allegheny Conference, were an instrumental part of how post-war ideas of modern housing made their way across the Atlantic back to Europe, and vice versa.
out of 6,000 dwellings will be inhabited.”

It was the beginning of massive housing construction in the still-rural areas surrounding Lyon.

Constructed between 1962 and 1966, La Duchère contained 5,400 dwelling units for 25,000 to 30,000 inhabitants, many of whom worked in factories in the nearby neighborhood of Vaise. The centerpiece is an 18-story high-rise apartment building with 330 housing units, Les Érables (“The Maple Trees,” also known as “Barre 250”), along with a 28-floor tower (“La Tour Panoramique”), constructed in 1963. Construction of the entire project employed thousands of people and housed a growing population in clean, modern apartments. The initial two thousand units were constructed between 1961 and 1963, filling an urgent need for new housing. By 1965, a third of the units were occupied by pied noirs who had been expelled from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia as these countries became independently governed. When completed La Duchère joined a growing number of large social housing developments throughout post-war France, considered to be “the new Versailles for the average man,” according to Kenny Cupers.

In Lyon’s La Duchère, a 1962 headline reads, “Un quartier où les hommes puissent vivre heureux” (“A neighborhood where men can live happily”), but described the sterile, newly built

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206 Vaise is an old industrial suburb in western Lyon, developed in the 19th century and during the first half of the 20th century. Worksites included a gas plant, slaughterhouses, warehouses, a bottling plant, and many other factories. Now part of the city, multiple bus lines connect the Vaise subway station with La Duchère.


208 Cupers (2014), 45.
high-rises to a wayward island: “Even if the desert island is La Duchère, the children must be able to play Robinson Crusoe,” the article observed. It also noted how some tenants missed the “nostalgia of the village . . . It is said that in the big cities of Morocco, women who come from the ‘bled’ [countryside] are against running water at home. She can not go chatting around the well anymore.”

In general, though, popular depictions of banlieues were positive in the 1960s and early-1970s. One news article about La Duchère from 1971 observed of the children in the development, “are they happy to live at La Duchere? In the unanimous opinion, one can answer ‘yes.’ They have room, can ride a bicycle without too much risk, but it would not be necessary to reduce the green spaces that are the [lungs] of the [neighborhood]. On Thursday, the children are not bored. Schools are open (not to learn, to play ...) and at the Social Center, many activities are planned for them.”

Another article from 1997, reflecting upon La Duchère’s early days, “evoked America . . . An America reminded them of every street corner: 8th Avenue, 25th at 31st Street. Louis Pradel, seduced by the United States, had transposed to La Duchère the name of the streets.” The article also compared La Duchère to Brazil’s modernist capital, “a little Brasilia, a city without soul suddenly emerged from chaos. In a classic neighborhood, when the newcomer settles, there is already a whole infrastructure and especially a spirit. Here nothing!”

Thus, large new communities teeming with thousands of displaced residents from far-flung parts of France and its former colonial satellites constructed on what once had been


211 “La Duchère a’Amérique à Ferrari,” Passerelles, Department Développement Urbain, March 1997. Lyon Municipal Archives.
farmland evoked a number of images, some nostalgic for the past, some with great regard for the future, and on the whole positive, at least while people had jobs and could pay the rent.

3.2.2 Les Minguettes in Vénissieux

Similar to La Duchère, described above, Les Minguettes was developed for a rapidly growing class of industrial workers. The development is the largest in the Lyon area with nearly 35,000 inhabitants housed in 9,200 apartments comprised of 62 towers, each 17 stories (189 feet) high, spread over 220 hectares in Vénissieux. Such massive construction employed more than 13,000 people. Les Minguettes was constructed by SERL (Société d’équipement de la région lyonnaise, a subsidiary of SCIC), between 1966 and 1973.

Once farmland, Vénissieux became industrialized in the 1920s. When first built, Les Minguettes was located in an area close to many factories. On the western edge of Vénissieux, fronting the Rhône River, is the community of Saint-Fons, home to a series of chemical manufacturers and refineries in an area called “Vallée de la Chimie” (“Chemical Corridor”). Lyon is known as the “birthplace of the French chemicals industry,” and today it


features familiar companies such as Bayer (Crop Science), Monsanto, BASF, and Sanofi Pasteur. Looking west from Les Minguettes one can still see the smoke and fire from the nearby factories. Heavily bombed during World War II, Vénissieux was targeted for new housing in the 1950s and 1960s due to the growth of postwar industry. The nearby factories provided thousands of jobs for unskilled laborers throughout the region, many of whom lived in the banlieues. More than half (55%) of the population had relocated from foreign countries between 1975 and 1982. Hence why it is harder to create social capital among immigrant communities. Friendships and other relations take time to build. Due to the large number of factories surrounding French cities, the banlieues were populated by members of the communist party, giving this area the moniker “Red Belt.” These developments were met with a mix of optimism and nostalgia for residents’ “homelands,” such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, when first built.

3.2.3 La Grappinière and Mas du Taureau in Vaulx-en-Velin

Vaulx-en-Velin’s social housing communities arose on farmland in the 1960s and 1970s, located east across the Rhône from Lyon. To accommodate this growth, agricultural land was declared a “priority zone” by the state in 1964, and as a result, fourteen high-rise towers, collectively known as La Grappinière, were built as affordable housing units between 1963 and 1965. Still more housing was needed, and 8,300 units comprising Mas du Taureau were developed between 1970

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and 1980, 90% of which contained social housing units spread across 200 hectares with a population of approximately 30,000 people. As a result of this development, the population of Vaulx-en-Velin increased from 37,866 residents in 1975 to 44,160 in 1982 (today, the population is 47,746).

Although Vaulx-en-Velin was known as an agricultural community prior to the construction of the *grandes ensembles*, it did have an industrial background. In 1925 a synthetic silk factory, *Soieries Artificielles du Sud-Est*, opened in the southern part of the commune. Renamed *Textiles Artificiels du Sud-Est*, or TASE, in 1935, it gave Vaulx-en-Velin the nickname “Silk Borough,” a name that is consistent with Lyon’s past as a silk-making center of Europe. Vaulx-en-Velin’s population doubled from 9,630 in 1954 to 20,726 in 1968 upon the construction of the housing estates to accommodate repatriated families from Algeria, as well as those who lived in the *bidonvilles* of Lyon and Villeurbanne.

One of these residents who arrived in 1954 was Bellache Hafid, whose father had come to work in TASE in 1935. In a June 2017 interview, Hafid explained that when he was two he came to Vaulx-en-Velin, just as the Algerian War for Independence had begun. During this period, his father shuttled back-and-forth between France and Algeria. For many years, Hafid’s

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mother stayed in Algeria, while he was raised by a neighbor in Vaulx-en-Velin, who was a Catholic priest, while his family was Muslim (his mother finally came to France in 1962). Thus, Catholicism and Islam influenced Hafid, which gave him “tolerant values,” but left him with “a double identity.” Hafid has good memories growing up—“it was like Algeria, with large fields and farms all around,” prior to the construction of Mas du Taureau.

When the TASE factory was running, it “took care of everyone” and “generated about 800 million francs in taxes per year,” Hafid recalls. “I was a child of the factory,” he said, though he did not work there; instead he became a mechanic. But in 1980, the factory closed. Hafid’s father did not want him to work for TASE due to the toxic work environment; many of his father’s friends got sick from working there, and his father died from working in the factory. His father “knew it was poison for life” to work in the factory, he explained. He recalls two rabbits in a cage placed inside the factory like a canary in a coal mine. When the rabbits got sick, the workers left the plant. When the factory closed in 1980, unemployment for Vaulx-en-Velin skyrocketed, a similar experience felt in other banlieues surrounding Lyon.219

3.3 The Fragile Era of Associations

For most middle- and upper-income French during the 1950s through the 1970s, associational life primarily revolved around unions and religious institutions. But for low-income residents of the banlieues, nonpolitical tenant associations formed the basis of social capital. Some of the first French organizations were formed as a way to organize laborers and protect the rights of immigrants, but they were very fragile and had limited success. None had staff or budgets, and

few lasted more than a few years. Furthermore, until 1983 it was illegal for immigrants to form associations. Not until the late-1970s and early 1980s did associations take on a greater advocacy role among first generation immigrants in France.

Despite the power of unions and associations of worship on French organizational life, residents of the banlieues sought more direct ways to address community concerns. Upon the construction of the grandes ensembles, tenant associations known as Les comités d’intérêt de quartier (CIQs) had no specific political agenda, but they did represent a form of community control. Increasingly, these tenant associations inserted resident needs, such as schools and playgrounds, into the design and function of the banlieues. Minayo Nasiali writes that “CIQs represented a new and different form of associational life, one premised less on the church or syndicalism [trade unions]—although these certainly remained important—and more on the role of residents gathering together to modernize their neighborhood spaces.”

These initial associations changed dramatically after the arrival of North African immigrants in the mid-1960s. “The newly arriving inhabitants created a different landscape of community,” Cupers writes, “which weakened the kind of solidarity at the basis of many initial inhabitant associations . . . . associational life continued to flourish, but it was increasingly organized around a multitude of small groups with culturally, religiously, and ethnically defined interests.” French associations did not achieve the same level of professionalization, durability, and funding as American CDCs, but the rise of community-based organizations in

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221 Nasiali, 58.

222 Cupers (2014), 164.
France represent an attempt by low-income citizens to gain control over substandard living and working conditions within their communities.

In banlieues around Lyon, tenant councils and social and cultural associations provided opportunities for resident interactions. In the mid-1960s in La Duchère, a Social, Family and Cultural Association known as ASSOFAC offered “more than twenty different evening classes . . . to the inhabitants. . . .” and sponsored “parent-teacher councils, neighborhood parties, and a newspaper, ‘Journal de La Duchère.’” A newsletter noted that “To meet more specific needs, works councils in the Borough and the City Hall of Lyon solicited, respond favorably and allow the opening of a crèche and an satellite of the municipal library, both services being animated and managed by local residents.”

Still, for newly arrived residents from North Africa, city living in Lyon presented a difficult transition. A community newsletter in La Duchère noted that in 1962, “For all the returnees of North Africa, this date is associated with their return to the metropolis; a difficult return, in very precarious living conditions and marked by a terrible feeling of loneliness. Some have agreed to discuss their first months in Lyon.” Quoting one resident, “We had the impression of being rejected by the local population, to be considered as foreigners or even worse. People did not understand the real uprooting we could experience. We had lost everything in a few days: house, furniture, profession, lifestyle. . . It was difficult to find oneself in an unknown city, without money or housing, or a trade with young children to raise, and a

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family all scattered.’” Social centers and tenant councils, therefore, became important sites for organizing community among newly arrived immigrants.

Outside of housing, many of the first-generation associations were products of immigration and labor activism, formed in France’s largest cities, such as Paris, Marseille, and Lyon, due to the large numbers of Algerian immigrants who poured into these cities at the conclusion of the French-Algerian war in 1962. One of the first organizations formed in France to fight racism was called *Mouvement national contre le racisme* (National Movement Against Racism), created in 1946 as a result of Nazi occupation of France. In 1972, it became the *Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l'Amitié entre les Peuples* (The Movement Against Racism and for Friendship between Peoples), or MRAP, and increasingly became involved in the plight of North African workers, who faced racism throughout the 1970s. But MRAP was focused on combating discrimination in the workplace. In housing, organizing residents was more difficult, with violence perpetuated by the very people whose duty it was to protect residents, the police.

Camille Hamidi writes of citizen mobilizations in France, beginning with immigrant labor organizations of the 1960s and 1970s (most of whom were from Algeria and Morocco), which protested living and working conditions in French cities. For instance, in 1971, North African workers at the Pennaroya lead and aluminum foundries in Lyon and Saint Denis, a suburb of Paris, organized a strike to protest poor living conditions in “insalubrious hostels” and dangerous working conditions where “they had to constantly breathe toxic fumes” and

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experienced other safety violations. Natasha Iskander writes of one occurrence at the Pennaroya factory in Lyon on December 19, 1971, in which a Tunisian worker, Mohamed Saleh, was crushed by a 1,500 kg lead smelting oven lid. Immigrant workers submitted documentation of that and other safety violations at the plant to their employer and the French government. Initially ignored, their grievances were supported by two established labor organizations, the Association des Marocains en France (Association of Moroccans in France, or AMF) and the Mouvement des Travailleurs Arabes (Movement of Arab Workers, or MTA), founded in Paris by Arab and French activists. A strike began on February 9, 1972, and after thirty-three days, it ended with workers winning concessions from the company to improve safety and living conditions.

By 1975, influenced by international labor organizations, legal barriers fell and allowed foreigners to become workshop delegates or works committee members in French unions. Such victories no doubt influenced and inspired the 1970s generation of French-North Africans who otherwise felt “invisible,” to paraphrase Djida Tazdaït. Yet much progress remained to be achieved. The French government pursued immigrant expulsions after immigration was virtually halted in 1974, particularly for those immigrants deemed “bad,” who “caused trouble and insecurity,” according one study. Officially called “encouragement” to leave the country,

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227 Natasha Iskander, Creative State: Forty Years of Migration and Development Policy in Morocco and Mexico (Ithaca: ILR Press, 2010), 82. Immigrant association formation was slow in the 1970s not just because of laws preventing their formal incorporation, but because many social networks took time to form.
expulsions along with segregation and outright repression was one way the French authorities attempted to control immigrant populations.\textsuperscript{228}

Immigrant communities organized a coordinated response to such anti-immigrant policies. Activists with the organization Permanences Anti-Expulsion (PAE) began the publication of a newsletter, “\textit{L’Anti-Raciste,}” in 1977 to protest government-sponsored expulsions. “\textit{Resistance}” reads the headline of one newsletter, published in 1979-1980. Several of the document’s 18-pages are printed in Arabic, as well. Numerous PAE offices situated around France enabled immigrants to connect with like-minded activists.\textsuperscript{229} This is just one example of how immigrant communities, and French advocates for immigrants, brought these issues to the attention of a broader French audience in the 1970s. However, these efforts waned due to a lack of financial support and failed to take advantage of mass media to broadcast their message, a strategy employed by activists in the 1980s.

Despite formal recognition in the labor force and early organizational formation from advocates, North African immigrants had little effective social capital. As Fysh and Wolfreys conclude, “With no community networks to favour their advancement, poor French and no recognised skills to begin with, they were the most vulnerable among the foreigners turned away from re-training courses which allowed many French workers to hang on to their jobs during downsizing by moving up the skill hierarchy.”\textsuperscript{230} As a result, writes Camille Hamidi, “immigrant


\textsuperscript{229} The office for PAE in the Lyon area was located in Villeurbanne. Generiques, accessed January 22, 2018, http://odysseo.generiques.org/ark:/naan/a011375687979el62j/6c778a9666.

\textsuperscript{230} Peter Fysh and Jim Wolfreys, \textit{The Politics of Racism in France} (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 34.
peoples’ mobilization was therefore slow to arrive, emerging timidly as it did towards the late 1980s.”

Immigrant association formation was, therefore, very fragile in the 1970s.

**3.4 Social Housing’s Aura Fades**

As the distaste for government-sponsored mass housing grew in the U.S., social housing also fell out of favor in France. “By the mid-1970s, high-rise publicly funded housing was almost uniformly rejected across Europe and the United States,” Cupers writes, as single-family home construction boomed in France between 1970 and 1980. France shifted from constructing apartments in the 1970s (nearly two-thirds of all construction was apartments) to constructing houses by the 1980s (when two-thirds were individual homes). In the Lyon area, this included Rillieux la Pape, just to the northeast of the city of Lyon, where 6,000 housing units were built between 1960 and 1976 for 21,160 residents (as of 1999).

Yet, during this period, an increasing number of North African immigrants moved into social housing, a proportion that grew in subsequent decades, according to Gregory Verdugo. “The increase in public housing supply in France during the 1960s and 1970s was followed by a

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231 Hamidi in Waddington et al (2009), 137. In addition, Iskander writes of North African laborers who were “Largely excluded from the large- scale labor mobilization during France’s hot summer of 1968 by French unions, which, despite their rhetoric, gave immigrants the cold shoulder, Moroccan migrant workers actively participated in the migrant labor protests that swept through France in the early 1970s.” Iskander (2010), 80-81.

232 Cupers, 319. Starting in the mid-1960s, France conceived of *villes nouvelles* (new cities) for middle-income residents similar to British New Towns or privately developed suburban planned communities in the U.S., such as Reston, Virginia (conceived of in 1964), and Columbia, Maryland (begun in 1962).

233 Power (1993), 52.

large increase in public housing participation by non-European immigrants after the 1980s.”

Many of these immigrants settled in larger French cities, such as Paris, Lyon, and Marseille. Particularly in Lyon, which already had an established population from Algeria and other North African countries, the banlieue developments became associated with these groups, and the connotation was frequently not positive.

Articles from the early 1970s highlight the negative aspects of social housing in Lyon. In La Duchère, the same article that touted how good life was for children in 1971 also noted how bleak and expensive the shopping is. “In the four shopping centers, one per sub-district, only the basic necessities are found. Many [store owners] do not live in La Duchère, and are not aware of the problems peculiar to him. And then, life is expensive here, more than at Vaise and even the supermarkets are priced higher than the center.”

As early as 1964, when La Duchère was brand new, an article observes that “Un sentiment d'insécurité et l’ennui [a sense of insecurity and boredom]” exists at La Duchère. In 1983, eleven years after the implosion of Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis, France demolished three of high-rise buildings in Les Minguettes, and more would be demolished in subsequent decades (during the summer of 2016, parts of La Duchère were still being demolished).

By the early 1980s throughout France, social housing attracted a negative stigma. But it did not stop the new Socialist Mitterand administration from constructing thousands of new units and renovating existing ones. As Power describes, “80,000 HLM units were built in 1983; by

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1990 the number was running at about 50,000 a year.”

Despite Mitterand’s new emphasis on social housing, his administration could not compete with the decline of large, basic industries, which directly impacted those living in social housing and men in particular. The unemployment rate had skyrocketed from 4.7% in 1977 to 9.4% in 1982. The banlieues which housed a large number of former industrial workers felt this impact most immediately and dramatically. Responses among unemployed residents were not always positive.

3.5 France Wrestles with Deindustrialization & Immigration in the 1970s

There is almost universal agreement among authors that deindustrialization, begun in the 1970s after the trente glorieuses (thirty years of post-war economic growth) had ended, was a major factor in the conflagrations which erupted in the banlieues in the late-1970s through the 1990s. The same trends which affected the United States, Britain, and other western countries also afflicted France. The response from respective governments in France and the U.S. was starkly different, however: while the U.S. federal government reduced funding for cities and social programs under the Nixon and Reagan administrations, France’s central government continued to fund social housing, social services, and other forms of economic support during the administrations of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and François Mitterand, both of whom governed over a twenty-one-year period, 1974 to 1995. In Fabien Jobard’s analysis, “Any suggestion that successive French governments may have neglected or abandoned the banlieues is not based on reality. In contrast to, say, the American situation of the 1960s, the French State has striven to

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238 Power (1993), 53.

239 Franck Chignier-Riboulon, Nicole Commerçon, Marcele Trigueiro, and Marcus Zepf, “Large Housing Estates in France: Overview of developments and problems in Lyon,” RESTATE paper, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht 2003, 16.
implement policies devoted to the deterrence of rioting in its urban areas.”

In the United States, the void left by government and private actors in inner city areas gave rise to nonprofit community development corporations; however, these types of organizations never developed in France because the central government played such an influential role in French life. In both cases, though, little could be done to stem the tide of factory closures and mill shutdowns as industrial work shifted to developing countries while western Europe and the United States shifted to a service economy.

These macro trends had a dramatically negative impact upon low-skilled, low-income communities. Years of high unemployment resulted in strained social relations, both within and among communities. In *Urban Outcasts* (2008), Loïc Wacquant notes three trends started in the 1970s, which became durable patterns affecting the banlieues: a shift in the employment sector, from industrial to service jobs; “spatial redistribution,” or the shift of jobs to the suburbs; and a shift toward jobs which required a college or advanced degree. Wacquant also highlights the segregated nature of work, where minority employment is concentrated in certain low-wage sectors, while whites earn far higher incomes in more specialized positions. In his analysis, communities hit hardest by deindustrialization in both the U.S. and France shared traits of marginalization. “Ghetto and banlieue are thus both territories ravaged by deindustrialization, where ethnically-marked populations tend to be concentrated, and where households suffering from unemployment and low income accumulate, translating into high rates of poverty and social

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dislocations.”242 The loss of manufacturing jobs took away one major opportunity for low-skilled workers to accumulate wealth.

In addition to unemployment, both countries shared social and physical segregation, deprivation and marginalization, overly aggressive policing, and racism.243 Discrimination is much easier to measure in the United States, where race is tracked on the census and as a disclosure requirement for fair housing and fair lending laws. But those laws only go so far as they are enforced. Absent enforcement and a concerted effort to hold banks, insurance companies, and governments accountable to poor communities, institutional actors follow popular trends as way to avoid risk. If companies perceive that a certain location or type of person is a risky proposition, investment will flee. This is what happened in France 1970s, just as international immigration was peaking.

In 1974 France shut its borders to international immigration just as the global oil shock, worldwide recession, and deindustrialization began. In 1973, net migration to France was 107,000 per year; this dropped to 31,000 in 1974, 25,000 in 1975, and zero in 1976 through 1980.244 The reduction in immigration had two effects: first, the proportion of foreign-born residents of the banlieues increased and added to the stigma of being immigrant-dominated

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communities; second, middle class residents who were able to leave social housing cités (high-rises) did so, leaving those left behind feeling “trapped” with few other housing options.

The first effect of immigration restrictions reverberated throughout mainstream French society, which saw them more as a security problem. As a UNICEF working paper on the topic concluded, “the desire for immigration control, combined with security concerns, led to a spate of police operations aimed at preventing clandestine immigration. However, the operations also sought more generally to control delinquency. This created confusion in people’s minds between immigration and delinquency.”

Suddenly, the stigma of being an immigrant played out in school, work, at the bank, and in daily life. On top of it all, the places where immigrants lived became associated with the same negative characteristics. As Jocelyne Cesari observes, “The poor and the excluded are henceforth associated with particular sections of urban space, even if they are not systematically concentrated within them.” And, although the Mitterand administration changed some of these policies in the 1980s to make it easier for immigrants to form associations and obtain legal rights, the goodwill did not last. These policies would continue into the 1990s and 2000s.

Secondly, as a result of France’s housing finance reform of 1977, the middle-class moved out of social housing into privately-financed homes. Lower-income populations and immigrants


247 The authors of the UNICEF working paper write that “the Government quickly reverted to a policy of control. When a right-wing administration was elected in March 1986, it adopted more restrictive measures, for instance by limiting the categories of foreigners entitled to residence permits or to protection from expulsion.” “The Children of Immigrants in France,” 2-3.
with unstable incomes occupied the empty apartments. Immigrants and the poor were “hardly welcome by the property market in city centres,” writes Mustafa Dikeç. Adding to the woes of the banlieues was the rise in unemployment when many of the factories which employed immigrants shut down. It is what led to an exodus of native French out of social housing, akin to “white flight” from American inner cities. Social mobility became an unobtainable dream for many low-income and immigrant families. The lack of jobs, coupled with a lack of upward mobility and discriminatory policies by employers, lenders, and society at large, created a perfect storm that would explode in the banlieues in the late-1970s and early-1980s.

France in the 1970s was openly hostile to immigrants. After the government of President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing halted international immigration in 1974, a backlash against immigration erupted. The government offered voluntary repatriation to immigrants, some immigrants in the country legally were forcibly deported, and French youth experienced an increasing number of violent incidents, often inflicted by police. As a result, cities such as Lyon, already reeling from deindustrialization, lost a substantial amount of population in a short amount of time. Lyon’s population in 1968 was 527,800, but dropped 14.6% to 456,716 in 1975. It declined an additional 9.6% by 1982 to 413,095, its lowest level since World War II. Given

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this environment, it should be no surprise to anyone when large-scale riots erupted in the suburbs of Lyon in 1979.

3.6 First Riots of the Banlieues

Most historians point to the riots that erupted in Vaulx-en-Venlin’s La Grappinère section in 1979 as one of the first full-scale riots of the banlieues. But there were a number of smaller clashes between youth and police across France earlier in the decade. In March 1971, in the social housing community of Le Narval (a cité of 4,000) located in La Courneuve, a commune five miles north of Paris, a clash between youth and police erupted after a youth was killed. In September of that year, La Grappinère exploded with violence. As one historian recounts, “Young people with ‘Maghrebian-sounding’ names, as Le Progrès [newspaper] reported, attacked a florist’s shop probably in retaliation for racist insults. The intervention of the police gave rise to violent exchanges between police officers and young delinquents. Three policemen were injured and eight youths were arrested. Although a gradation in the modes of action was observed, the regional newspaper ‘Le Progrès’ treated the phenomenon as if it were a simple fact, the national newspapers did not mention the event.” Still, throughout the 1970s, the state maintained that social housing was an ideal model for low-income residents, though the notion disintegrated as deindustrialization took hold in the late-1970s.

An outward sign that the banlieues were not the model communities as originally designed burst into the open in 1979 in Valux-en-Velin. On 15 September 1979, French police

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chased a young car thief, Akim Tabet, as he tried to escape by jumping off of a balcony in Vaulx-en-Velin’s Grappinière section. Sensing that he would be caught and possibly beaten, he cut his arm with a glass shard. A fight broke out between youth and the police, a car was set ablaze, then a brawl erupted, one of the first large-scale banlieue riots in France. One resident who remembered it at the time, known only as Mourad, was 17 in 1979. He told Libération in 2006, “My family had arrived from a [furnished apartment] in this socially mixed neighborhood, full of French people. We felt good. But with those of my age, we felt we were treated differently. The police were openly racist . . .” At the time, the incident contributed to the negative stigmatization of the banlieues in general and Vaulx-en-Velin in particular. It would be a difficult image to shake, as more violence erupted in the 1980s and 1990s. Such events overshadowed quieter activities, such as association building and efforts to organize peaceful responses to discrimination.

Seen from the perspective of the banlieue residents, society had abandoned them. Newly arrived immigrants could only watch as longtime French families obtained bank loans and moved out of social housing. Educational and business opportunities opened for people who disassociated themselves from stigmatized communities; but for those still living in social housing, even the word banlieue assumed a negative connotation. Those left in the cités were


seen as failures, or worse, problems. Few buses and no light rail or subway lines connected the *grandes ensembles* with the larger region. The sense of being an individual on the margins of society, hated, and targeted by police and the media looking to sell newspapers with the latest scenes of angst grated on the nerves of young people in the *banlieues*. Some, like Djida Tazdaït and others formed associations to respond to the hopelessness; others lashed out in violent rage. Both forms of resistance announced that humans, personalities, children, and families—not animals or inanimate objects—inhabited France’s poorest and most misunderstood communities.

### 3.7 Conclusion

From the 1950s through the 1970s, the Lyon region, like Pittsburgh, was a staging ground for numerous attempts at housing the poor, first through construction of the *cités de transit* as a temporary replacement for the *bidonvilles*, and then social housing high-rises organized in *grands ensembles* located outside central Lyon, such as La Duchère, Mas du Taureau, La Grappinière, and Les Minguettes. By 1980, more than 100,000 low-income individuals lived in communities surrounding Lyon, a city whose population by 1982 had bottomed out at 413,000.

Organizational formation by *banlieue* residents was very fragile and impermanent during this period as they sought outlets to combat the growing discrimination and anti-immigrant sentiment throughout the country. The situation was deemed “fragile” because strong social networks were slow to form among recently arrived immigrant groups. Some national organizations did exist, such as the Permanences Anti-Expulsion, Association of Moroccans in France, and the Movement of Arab Workers, but they were limited in scope and had limited local impact. By the late 1970s, without formal recognition at the national level, no opportunities to
control property, few civil rights laws, and a dismal employment outlook, it was difficult for low-income and marginalized *banlieue* residents to develop and exercise social capital. As the 1970s came to a close, *banlieue* residents faced a bleak future, with declining numbers of industrial jobs as factories closed, few public transportation options, and a native population increasingly intolerant of foreigners.

The late-1970s and early 1980s was a particularly frustrating time for young people, as some first generation French citizens expressed their anger in increasingly violent ways. As the 1980s unfolded, Lyon again became the site of some of the first “rodeo riots” in France (involving car burnings), a trend that would continue into the 1990s. It is not clear that an earlier generation of activists who arrived in France in the 1960s and early-1970s provided leadership to the youth who would promote civil rights in Lyon and throughout France. But as immigrant communities grew stronger networks and the first generation youth embraced a new version of what it means to be “French,” *banlieue* residents learned to mobilize their social capital into a new identity and powerful voice for marginalized people.
4.0 The Fight to Save Pittsburgh in the 1980s

In 1981, a year after presidential candidate Ronald Reagan famously visited the Bronx promising to revitalize urban America, Rick Swartz was on his way to an interview with the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation (BGC) to become its first paid staff person.\textsuperscript{255} He remembers “tumbleweeds blowing down the street” and a bleak streetscape along Penn Avenue, the main business corridor that separates mostly-black Garfield from mostly white Bloomfield and mixed-race Friendship.\textsuperscript{256} The vacancy rate along Penn Avenue was 65-75\% at the time, according to Swartz. By 1987, the community had lost a grocery store, bank, drug store, bakery, butcher shop, and a 5&10 store. Garfield had one of the top ten highest crime rates in the city, and its only school, Fort Pitt Elementary, was perceived as failing. Yet, Swartz began the job with great optimism, tempered with a healthy dose of reality. Helped along by a supportive board of directors and a super organizer, Aggie Brose, schooled in Alinsky-style techniques, Swartz initiated Penn Avenue’s three-decade transformation, one building at a time. Thus in 1981 began Penn Avenue’s renewal as an attractive business corridor for artists and the regeneration of housing in surrounding neighborhoods. But the transformation did not occur not from a government program developed in Washington or Harrisburg; it evolved from the people themselves. Garfield’s revitalization was the culmination of decades of neighborhood advocacy, innovative approaches, and hard-won fights to reinvigorate a neighborhood once left for dead.

\textsuperscript{255} In October 1977, President Jimmy Carter visited New York City’s South Bronx neighborhood promising new housing and jobs. His appearance was one of many presidential-candidate visits to the area over the next twenty years from politicians seeking the symbolism of the Bronx as a way to broadcast their message of urban regeneration. On August 5, 1980, California Governor Ronald Reagan used the same Bronx backdrop to exploit and highlight the perceived failures of the Carter Administration in his 1980 presidential campaign. “1980 THROWBACK: Ronald Reagan GOES To The SOUTH BRONX and Gets HECKLED, LOSES HIS TEMPER!!” YouTube, accessed March 15, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fZ8vI1DZhw.

\textsuperscript{256} Author’s interview with Rick Swartz, October 12, 2017, Pittsburgh, Pa.
The professionalization of citizen-led community development corporations (CDCs) and other community-based organizations in the 1980s laid the groundwork for the revitalization of poor, urban neighborhoods in the 1990s and beyond. CDC-built housing, historic preservation projects, and commercial revitalization proved that a market for urban real estate existed, despite larger negative forces at work, an almost Sisyphean task. Many American cities like Pittsburgh faced multiple challenges, such as population outmigration, the closure of many neighborhood businesses, and continued bank redlining all in the context of a reduction in federal government funding for cities. In response citizen leaders formed a number of community-based initiatives to reinvest in underserved neighborhoods in Pittsburgh and throughout the region. As organizations such as the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation hired staff, so did other CDCs in Pittsburgh by the end of the decade, helped along by philanthropies filling in where the government cut back. In 1983, the Ford Foundation, Pittsburgh Foundation and the Howard and Vira Heinz Endowments started the Pittsburgh Partnership for Neighborhood Development to channel scarce foundation resources into CDCs for staff and projects. Five CDC were chosen to receive operating grants, which became known as the “Fortunate Five”: East Liberty Development, Inc., Homewood-Brushton Revitalization and Development Corporation, Manchester Citizens Corporation, and the North Side Civic Development Council. The Hill Community Development Corporation and Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation were added later (as many as ten CDCs received PPND support by the late-1990s).

But residents had their own plans. In 1988, the Manchester Citizens Corporation organized Pittsburgh’s CDCs to challenge bank redlining practices under a new umbrella, the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group (explained further in this chapter and chapter 5). Outside of Pittsburgh in the depressed steel town of Homestead, former steel workers launched the Mon Valley Unemployed Committee in 1982 to assist out-of-work steelworkers. In 1986, the Steel Valley Authority formed to save industrial jobs in the region. In 1988, the Steel Industry Heritage Task Force began to document and preserve the region’s industrial history. That same year, the Mon Valley Initiative emerged as a coalition of CDCs focused on revitalization of Mon Valley communities. Collectively, these organizations represented citizens’ efforts to fight deterioration and stimulate growth in declining communities. Their efforts did not always succeed, but the 1980s represent a decade in which Pittsburgh residents refused to give up.

4.1 Hard Times

The 1980s were difficult times for low-income urban neighborhoods. Poor communities found it difficult to reverse the twin scourges of suburbanization and deindustrialization. The condition of the poor worsened in the 1980s. As Neal M. Cohen reported, “The poor have not been getting richer. Median family income declined by 3.5 per cent during 1981 after adjustment for inflation. And the incidence of poverty increased from 13.2 per cent in 1980 to 14.0 per cent in


1981, its highest level since 1967.”

In addition, President Ronald Reagan’s New Federalist approach extended President Nixon’s stance in what Cohen calls a “laissez-faire urban policy.”

But as a number of authors have shown, the unraveling of urban America began long before Ronald Reagan. Still, the decades-long momentum of decline was difficult to reverse.

CDCs serving poor communities struggled to compete with suburbanization and deindustrialization, which compounded urban problems. In the Pittsburgh region, people not only moved out of the city to the suburbs, but they also moved out of the region entirely. As such, Pittsburgh’s regional growth during the 1980s was uneven, divided along lines of race and class. Wealthy communities prospered, while poorer areas declined. In this sense, Pittsburgh represented a more typical rustbelt city, which supported an affluent suburban area surrounding a poorer urban area. Population declined the sharpest in low-income communities along the formerly industrialized valleys of the Allegheny, Monongahela, and Ohio rivers, a trend that accelerated after 2000. The decline of heavy manufacturing hit Pittsburgh hard in the 1980s, a

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262 Using Detroit as an example, Thomas Sugrue writes, “industrial and population flight have drained the city of resources necessary to maintain infrastructure, and the federal government, especially since the Reagan administration, has drastically cut urban spending.” Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 270.

263 Kent James notes in his dissertation, “Suburbanization allowed some communities to prosper, while others declined. Communities that declined the most were the low-income urban areas.” Kent MacIntyre James, “Public Policy and the Postwar Suburbanization of Pittsburgh, 1945-1990” (PhD diss., Carnegie Mellon University, 2005), 6.


trend that continued population losses since the 1950s. While Pittsburgh lost 10.7% of its population between 1950 and 1960, it lost 13.9% between 1960 and 1970 and 18.5% between 1970 and 1980. In the 1980s, an additional 12.8% of the city’s population left. From its peak in 1950 of 676,806, Pittsburgh supported just 369,879 people in the city by 1990. The city’s black population, which peaked in 1970, had begun a slow decline since then and leveled off at 79,710 by 2010, its lowest level since 1950. Manufacturing employment in the city declined by 42.6% between 1980 and 1986, and declined another 15.3% between 1986 and 1994. Black neighborhoods like Manchester, Hill District, Garfield, Larimer, and Homewood were net losers of residents as the city’s black population declined by 24% between 1970 and 2010. Communities outside the city which once supported thousands of industrial jobs, such as Braddock, Duquesne, East Pittsburgh, Homestead, Rankin, and Wilmerding, were among the poorest communities in Allegheny County during the 1980s.

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266 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics called labor trends of the 1980s “a tale of two sectors”: While the service industry gained more than 19 million jobs during the decade, manufacturing and mining lost more than two million jobs. Among the biggest losers was coal mining, which lost 115,000 jobs, or 46 percent of its employment over the course of the 1980s, and primary metals manufacturing, which experienced a net loss of 471,000 jobs, or a decrease of more than 37 percent over the decade. Lois M. Plunkert, “The 1980’s: a decade of job growth and industry shifts,” *Monthly Labor Review*, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, September 1990, 8. The Pittsburgh region’s loss of manufacturing in the 1980s was part of a long-term trend begun in the 1970s. In 1947, Allegheny County had 220,000 manufacturing jobs; by 1992, it had lost 150,000 jobs. Manufacturing jobs in the city of Pittsburgh declined from 81,000 in 1947 to 23,000 in 1992. Kent James (2005), 210.


Furthermore, the mistrust of big government was entrenched in many inner-city residents who opposed slum clearance and road building schemes as urban renewal ravaged inner cities.269 Efforts of many community activists in the 1980s stemmed from fighting both city hall and Washington, DC, regardless of party affiliation. Since the early-1970s, when Nixon eliminated or consolidated many of Johnson’s Great Society programs, neighborhood leaders advocated for smaller approaches to community development, in which poor people themselves could determine the future of their neighborhood.

4.2 Growth of the Community Development Movement

In the 1960s, most of the nation’s CDCs received direct funding through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development as a result of President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty. But by the 1980s, CDCs could no longer look to Washington to fund their programs. Despite the reduction of government support for urban development, the number of nonprofit organizations serving low-income communities expanded across the country, funded largely by foundations. James DiFillipis notes that “While only about 150 first generation CDCs were created in the late 1960s and early 1970s (and many failed within a few years), by the early 1980s another 500 to 750 second generation CDCs had been created.”270 In addition, local communities chartered

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their own banks, called community development financial institutions (CDFIs), though bank redlining continued.271

In addition, national intermediaries emerged as conduits for community development financing. These included the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, formed by the Ford Foundation in 1979; Self Help, created in 1980 in North Carolina in response to the collapse of the textile industry; and in 1982, the developer James Rouse started the Enterprise Foundation in Columbia, Maryland, to fund affordable housing.272 In 1985, a national trade group, the National Association of Community Development Loan Funds formed to serve the community development financial institutions.273 As CDCs, CDFIs, and intermediaries proliferated, they assumed greater scale and professionalization. The activism and conflict of the 1960s and 1970s yielded to collaboration and negotiation by the mid-1980s. Nowhere was this more evident than in Pittsburgh. Organizations like the Manchester Citizens Corporation (MCC), a CDC formed in the mid-1960s in Pittsburgh’s Manchester neighborhood, saw government funding cuts as an opportunity to change their operating strategy.274 As a result, some resourceful CDCs like MCC adapted to the new funding environment.

271 CDFIs of the 1980s and 1990s were based on models established in Chicago with South Shore Bank in 1973, and the aforementioned Neighborhood Housing Services of Pittsburgh, which became Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation.

272 The Enterprise Foundation is now Enterprise Community Partners. For more on these organizations, see Paul Grogan and Tony Proscio, Comeback Cities: A Blueprint for Urban Neighborhood Renewal (New York: Basic Books, 2001).

273 An earlier national intermediary, the National Federation of Community Development Credit Unions, had formed in 1974. The National Association of Community Development Loan Funds is now Opportunity Finance Network.

274 As I describe in my 2015 masters paper, “In the wake of the Nixon Administration’s budgetary cutbacks, community leaders sought alternative sources of funding. Led by Pittsburgh History & Landmarks Foundation and Manchester residents, they declared that private sources must be incorporated into a development plan. This mindset would be a critical component to the involvement of banks in Manchester’s real estate revitalization in the 1980s and 1990s, a strategy that similar community development corporations around the country would adopt, as well. But in the 1970s, MCC was on the forefront of this trend.” Dan Holland, “Forging A Consistent Vision,” (MA Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 2015), 32.
As I write in my masters paper, in the 1980s, MCC built upon the based of support it had developed in the 1970s and expanded its relationship with foundations to fund its operating budget and banks to finance its housing work.\footnote{Dan Holland, “Forging A Consistent Vision,” (MA Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 2015), 40-41.} As John Metzger writes, “The partnership, then, became the vehicle to combine the varied financial resources into a single funding stream, the control of which would result in a more coordinated and strategic approach to community development.”\footnote{Ibid, 14.} In 1989, the city of Pittsburgh created an additional funder, the Advisory Commission on Community-Based Organizations (ACCBO), to distribute block grant money to various organizations.\footnote{Prior to ACCBO, the city had created the Neighborhood Fund, Inc. in 1984, but it was dissolved “as a result of conflict of interest problems.” ACCBO was the successor fund. Roy Lubove, \textit{Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh, Vol. II: The Post-Steel Era} (1996), 112.}

MCC’s approach reflected a new political reality in Pittsburgh. Tracy Neumann characterizes Pittsburgh Mayor Pete Flaherty, who was in office during the Nixon administration, as a reformer ahead of his time. According to Neumann, Flaherty “heralded the emergence of policy instruments associated with devolution and privatization that took shape first under Nixon and then accelerated as the Carter and Reagan administrations increasingly withdrew federal resources from the urban sphere.” These actions “laid the groundwork for a neoliberal retrenchment under the Reagan administration.”\footnote{Tracy Neumann, “Renaissance and Retrenchment in the 1970s,” unpublished manuscript, October 2013, 9.} Many CDCs like MCC saw the writing on the wall. If they were to fulfill their mission of returning vitality to their neighborhoods, CDCs would need to change with the times and seek pragmatic solutions to real estate that involved foundations, limited government funds, and bank financing.
4.3 Proliferation of CDCs and Intermediaries in Pittsburgh

In the 1980s, Pittsburgh was emblematic of the nation’s growing community development industry. The number of CDCs serving Pittsburgh neighborhoods expanded from a handful to ten by 1987 serving low-income neighborhoods of the city’s North Side, Hill District, East End, and South Side. In addition, to the aforementioned Pittsburgh Partnership for Neighborhood Development, new intermediaries originated to serve the needs of CDCs, including the Community Technical Assistance Center (CTAC), formed in 1980 to provide technical assistance and leadership development to CDCs; Community Design Center of Pittsburgh (originally started in 1968 as the Architects’ Workshop); and the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group (PCRG) launched in 1988 to encourage banks to increase lending in poor neighborhoods through the Community Reinvestment Act.279 These partnerships reflected the shift to consensus among CDCs, local government, foundations, and banks.

PPND’s model has been held up as the legacy of the public-private growth coalition garnered by banker Richard King Mellon and longtime Pittsburgh Mayor David Lawrence to create the Allegheny Conference on Community Development in 1944. By the 1980s, this alliance had metamorphosed to serve community interests, rather than top-down objectives. In the words of John T. Metzger, “No group of CDCs in the country has become nearly so tightly integrated into the complex of financial and corporate leadership in its city as has the PPND. Pittsburgh pioneered the concept of a modern ‘liberal growth coalition’ during the 1940s, setting a national example for how local government and private elites could intervene to accomplish urban renewal. . . . As the federal government retreated from urban policy during the 1980s,

Pittsburgh became the first of many American cities where such strategic alliances between CDCs and the corporate-philanthropic sector were formed.” A number of authors tell the history of these organizations and their impact. These organizations represent citizen activism of the 1980s in which institutions serving low- and moderate-income residents achieved a high degree of professionalization during the 1980s.

Furthermore, the effort to rebuild Pittsburgh neighborhoods shows the interrelationship of the nationwide community development industry. The Ford Foundation had already been involved in Pittsburgh neighborhoods since the 1960s, but remained involved in the 1980s as a funder of the Pittsburgh Partnership for Neighborhood Development. But less well known is how influential community organizers from Chicago were in Pittsburgh, and vice versa. The Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group owes its existence to Gale Cincotta and Shel Trapp of the National Training and Information Center/National People’s Action (NTIC/NPA) in Chicago, who trained activists in Pittsburgh. When Stanley Lowe of the Manchester Citizens Corporation (MCC) challenged the merger of Union National Bank and Pennbancorp he knew

282 In addition to John T. Metzger’s dissertation (1999), chapter on PCRG and CRA in From Redlining to Reinvestment (1992), and article on PPND (1998), see chapter 5 on “Pittsburgh: Partnerships, Preservation, and the CRA” in Elise M. Bright, Reviving America’s Forgotten Neighborhoods: An Investigation of Inner City Revitalization Efforts (New York: Routledge, 2003).
284 Likewise, Chicago is indebted to Pittsburgh: Cincotta replicated the Pittsburgh NHS model in Chicago in the 1970s.
exactly who to call: Cincotta and Trapp. As Metzger describes in *From Redlining to Reinvestment*, “Shel Trapp of NTIC recommended that MCC follow a strategy and process used successfully to create neighborhood lending programs in other cities. . . . By April 1988, seven community development corporations from other areas of Pittsburgh and joined MCC and [the Northside Leadership Conference] groups to form a new citywide entity, the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group, to represent low- and moderate-income neighborhoods with Union National Bank.”285 By June 1988, Union National Bank became Integra Bank and negotiated a $109 million lending agreement over five years with PCRG, one of the largest such agreements in the country at the time. One of PCRG’s members, the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation, represents a microcosm of what many CDCs went through at the time.

4.4 Putting Alinsky’s Methods to Work in Pittsburgh: The Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation

BGC began like most CDCs with a group of unhappy citizens organized to combat neighborhood decline. In November 1975, Father Leo Henry, a priest in Garfield’s St. Lawrence O’Toole Catholic Church, organized a meeting attended by dozens of residents and politicians to announce the formation of a new community group. “‘I, like 99 percent of you here this evening, am not satisfied with the community in which we live,’ he said. ‘If we stay together as a unified people, we will begin a people’s revolution.’”286 Just as important were the people who

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stood beside Father O’Toole to help fulfill the organization’s mission. BGC’s deputy director, Aggie Brose, was there on that day when the organization was created. Brose, a product of Garfield, helped oversee the neighborhood’s regeneration through a mix of Alinsky-style activism, a steady presence at meetings, and old fashioned organizing, such as arranging church picnics and door-to-door advocacy. She remembers BGC’s formative years well. She said of the organization’s mission, “I did not want to raise my kids in an unsafe community, nor deny them opportunities to lead healthy and productive lives—and I could not fault anyone else for feeling the same way either—so we set out to change things.”

Thus began one of many organizations which became an effective force for inner city development in some of Pittsburgh’s poorest neighborhoods.

By 1981, as conditions in Garfield deteriorated, the organization sought funding from City Council to hire staff to focus its efforts on revitalizing its Penn Avenue business district. The neighborhood’s City Councilman, Richard Givens, a former Air Force captain and parishioner at St. Lawrence O’Toole, located on Penn Avenue, worried how the decline of Penn Avenue would affect adjacent Bloomfield’s Liberty Avenue business district. As a result, he sponsored legislation in City Council to direct $20,000 in federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds to BGC, making it the first CDC in the city to receive CDBG funds to hire staff. To match the funds from Council Father Henry went door-to-door raising whatever people would give, five dollars, ten dollars.

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287 Brose retired at the end of 2017.

Aggie Brose had the foresight to seek out and hire Rick Swartz, who served first as BGC’s commercial district revitalization coordinator in 1981, then became its first executive director. After a few years, BGC recorded some successes. Equibank opened a small office on Penn Avenue, the construction of single-family homes on vacant lots had begun, and BGC attracted 300 members to join the organization. But BGC’s efforts marked the start of a decades-long struggle to attract and keep businesses and homeowners in Garfield, which had mixed success. The community still lost residents and faced a negative reputation. In the 1980s, the city’s Planning Department believed that traditional business districts, many of which had a high number of vacancies and were run down, should “die a quiet death” and be demolished, according to Swartz. It was thinking leftover from the urban renewal era of the 1950s and 1960s—the same thinking that transformed East Liberty into a suburban mall that ultimately failed. In 1983, there were few CDCs in the city in part because the federal government ended direct funding of CDCs in the 1970s and few neighborhoods possessed the capacity to conduct real estate development.

BGC’s attempt to renovate its business district was not a proven model. The Main Street approach had yet to gain traction with planners. It started as a program of the National Trust for Historic Preservation in 1980 as a way to revitalize urban business corridors which contained mostly small, family-run businesses, a direct counterpoint to big box suburban shopping malls.

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289 Swartz had studied in Pitt’s Masters of Urban Planning Program before working for Housing Opportunities, Inc., in McKeesport in the late 1970s.

290 Author’s interview with Rick Swartz, Executive Director, Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation, October 12, 2017, Pittsburgh, Pa.

In 1982, the South Side Local Development Company was created to manage the city’s first Main Street district along East Carson Street. But few results were seen in Pittsburgh neighborhoods, where a number of neighborhood business districts were in need of revitalization. In 1983, BGC rehabilitated a former industrial laundry plant into Champion Commons, an office building in which West Penn Hospital leased space, one of the first community-driven victories along Penn Avenue. In addition to its nascent Main Street revitalization, BGC waded into housing construction. But securing funding was not easy. In one instance in 1983, taking its cue from Cincotta and Trapp at National People’s Action in Chicago, BGC loaded up a school bus with 50-60 members and went to a URA board meeting, where Paul Brophy presided as executive director and John Robin was the chairman. Brose acted as the spokesperson for BGC. As Swartz tells it, “she said, ‘we want an opportunity to build houses in our neighborhood for working people, but the URA won’t let us.’” At the meeting, Robin asked Brophy why the URA would not fund them. Brophy claimed that it was because they did not have the technical sophistication. But Robin said, “let them try.” As a result, Swartz directed the construction of the first of 25 to 30 new, scattered-site ranch-style Ryan Homes throughout the neighborhood along Broad, North Aiken, and Donna streets between 1983 and 1990. The new homes cost $49,500 per unit, and the URA provided $15,000 per buyer to make them affordable. As a result, BGC included housing renovation in its repertoire of development offerings.

Managing a neighborhood replete with vacant storefronts and the perception of crime was an immense challenge. Brose and Swartz knew they could not go it alone. Solving the puzzle of neighborhood regeneration would require different, untried approaches and new partners. Brose

292 “Making the Case for Main Street,” Main Streets Pittsburgh, Urban Redevelopment Authority, June 2009.
allied with Stanley Lowe’s Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group, which rallied around the cause of fair housing and community reinvestment. At the time, few could see the future of the neighborhood better than Brose and Swartz. Jim Cunningham, now Professor Emeritus of Community Organizing at Pitt, said in 2001, “‘it may take another 25 years’ to see recovery in a place as fraught with troubles as Garfield has been. ‘Investors have to realize it, too, and hang in there.’” With continued outmigration, along with bank redlining, the process of neighborhood rebirth would try the patience of activists, investors, business owners, and residents within the city and in former industrial towns hard hit by deindustrialization.

4.5 Leveraging Post-Industrial Social Capital in Pittsburgh’s Steel Valley

Outside of Pittsburgh, citizen-led efforts to galvanize people power in the most economically devastated communities along the Steel Valley—Homestead, Rankin, Braddock, Duquesne, and McKeesport along the Monongahela River—demonstrated residents’ ability to fight industrial decline. During the 1980s factory shutdowns devastated small towns on Pittsburgh’s fringes, which depended on large factories for employment and support of businesses on Main Street.

While this collapse and outmigration has been well documented, not everyone left.

In the 1980s, activists in the Mon Valley established a number of organizations in response to the decline. Former steelworkers Steffi Domike, Robert Toy, and Paul Lodico

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created the Mon Valley Unemployed Committee in 1982 to assist out-of-work steelworkers.\textsuperscript{295} Another organization started in 1986, the Steel Valley Authority, with the mission to save industrial jobs in the Pittsburgh region.\textsuperscript{296} The year 1988 was pivotal. Three organizations emerged to honor the region’s industrial past and propel it forward through job creation and housing development in low-income communities throughout the Mon Valley. That year Pennsylvania Senator John Heinz supported the creation of a Steel Industry Heritage Task Force to document and preserve the region’s industrial history; a coalition of CDCs formed the Mon Valley Initiative to coordinate housing redevelopment and small business creation in communities impacted by factory shutdowns; and finally, architect and urban designer David Lewis brought British Prince Charles to Pittsburgh for the Remaking Cities Conference, an acknowledgement that cities across the Atlantic shared deindustrialization.\textsuperscript{297} In March 1988, the prince offered creative ideas to remake cities. “I do believe there is \textit{less} chance of getting things wrong if sensible and effective ways are found of consulting the existing inhabitants of our cities,” Prince Charles remarked.\textsuperscript{298}


Despite the attention that Pittsburgh as a whole received from the princely presence, presenters’ remarks excluded the voices of community activists like Frankie Mae Pace, Dorothy Richardson, and Ethel Hagler. Mon Valley organizations’ established strong networks among the foundation community and sympathetic members of Congress, who funded many of the revitalization efforts. For neighborhoods in Pittsburgh, however, momentum built for a substantial revitalization effort from financial institutions.

4.6 The Community Reinvestment Movement in Pittsburgh

It took community activists a decade to fully realize the power of a little-known law passed under the Carter Administration, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977. In 1988 the newly-formed Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group mounted the first successful challenge to a bank merger under CRA, after Union National Bank proposed to merge with Pennbancorp to form a new entity, Integra Bank. In part, the ten-year delay in CRA enforcement was due to the complexity in managing bank lending data. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975 required banks to publicly disclose their home mortgage lending data on a loan application register, or LAR. But it was a complicated data set. In the late-1970s and early-1980s, the data were difficult to analyze unless one worked for the government, at a university with massive computing power, or had the patience to sift through reams of paper.

299 Frank Cahouet, Chairman and CEO of Mellon Bank, told the audience that, as a result of Pittsburgh’s urban renewal efforts, “Renaissance I addressed a long and formidable list of problems. . . . By 1955 the face of Pittsburgh had changed dramatically. The air and water were cleaner, new high-rise office complexes were being completed and occupied, a new airport was in the planning stages, and a new expressway was getting underway. The city had a new lease on life, and a renewed sense of purpose.” “A Renewal Formula for Cities and Business,” Remarks by Frank V. Cahouet, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Mellon Bank Corporation, “Remaking Cities: Proceedings of the 1988 International Conference in Pittsburgh,” program booklet, 46. Hunt Library Archives, Carnegie Mellon University.
presented in obscure numeric codes. Even after desktop computers became available, it was a challenge to find people with the skills to analyze the data provided by banks, and most banks themselves often did not have the capacity to understand the data. Even into the 1990s, banks would provide their bank lending data on a floppy drive. The lending data were coded in ASCII text, which needed to be separated, filtered, then analyzed. It was a data analysis challenge not for the faint of heart.

When this process first started in Pittsburgh in 1987, Stanley Lowe at the Manchester Citizens Corporation hired John Metzger, a recent graduate of the University of Pittsburgh, to analyze the bank lending data of Union National Bank (UNB). What Metzger found stunned Lowe. UNB was the fourth largest lender in Pittsburgh, with more than two billion dollars in assets and fifty-four branch locations, including one in Manchester. But the data showed that UNB had not made one home purchase loan in an African American neighborhood in Pittsburgh during fiscal year 1986-1987, and had only made two purchase mortgages in low- and moderate-income areas. Based on the data, MCC concluded that UNB redlined its neighborhood and threatened to protest its merger application with the federal financial regulatory authorities, Congress, and the White House.

Although CRA enforcement officially fell to one of the four bank regulatory agencies—the Federal Reserve Bank, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Office of Thrift Supervision—few banks were held accountable for their

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300 At the time, Pittsburgh had 102 low- and moderate-income census tracts and 36 majority black census tracts.

lending in poor and minority communities. After eight years of the Reagan administration’s animosity toward cities, there was little incentive to monitor bank performance or offer punitive sanctions. Enforcement, therefore, fell upon the community. Or, at least those in the community saw it that way.

Around the same time as the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group prepared its analysis of Union National Bank’s mortgage lending, a similar effort took place in Atlanta. A team of researchers led by Bill Dedman, an investigative reporter with the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, evaluated 109,000 mortgage loans from every bank and savings and loan in Atlanta. The analysis showed clear patterns of redlining that were the result of discriminatory lending decisions by banks. The initial *Journal-Constitution* article, entitled “The Color of Money,” began, “Whites receive five times as many home loans from Atlanta's banks and savings and loans as blacks of the same income -- and that gap has been widening each year, an Atlanta Journal-Constitution study of $6.2 billion in lending shows.” Furthermore, Dedman found that “most savings and loans had no offices in black areas, that offices taking home loan applications were almost all located in white areas and that demand for mortgage loans in black areas, while less than demand in white areas, as not low enough to explain the discrepancy in loan ratios.” The “Color of Money” series was a sensation, and Dedman won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting in 1989. Within two weeks after the “Color of Money” series was published,

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financial institutions offered a $65 million community reinvestment program for low- and moderate-income Atlanta neighborhoods. The national publicity generated by the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* series provided the impetus for PCRG to negotiate a similar lending agreement with Union National Bank that June.

Cathy Niederberger remembers the moment when PCRG and Union National Bank forged their now-historic agreement. In 1987 Niederberger was a real estate lender for UNB. “Union National’s image was ‘dusty but trusty,’” she said. “Union National was used to dealing with blue bloods, wealthy clients. They were archaic from a technology standpoint, but trusted in the community,” she explained.305 “The whole notion of community development wasn’t opposed; it was just new,” she said, referring to the president of UNB, Gayland Cook, who was brought in as a new president and CEO.306 UNB also hired Don Reed from Cleveland to become the bank’s CRA officer, the first one in Pittsburgh with that title. After the release of its report and a threatened picket of the bank, PCRG presented a list of demands to UNB which included affordable housing products, small business lending, technical assistance, philanthropy, and other needs. Under the leadership of Cook and Reed, UNB agreed to every one. By June 1988 the deal was done and a lending agreement between PCRG and the newly-formed Integra Bank was signed, worth $109 million over five years. PCRG’s strategy had worked. After all, banks were concerned with their reputation and with meeting federal compliance standards. Once word of the PCRG-Integra agreement became public, it was built into many agreements across the country. However, PCRG did not have such easy success with other institutions.

305 Author’s interview with Cathy Niederberger, executive vice president of community development banking, PNC Bank, May 25, 2018, Pittsburgh, Pa.

306 Metzger, “Reinvestment and Revitalization in Pittsburgh” (1992), 84.
4.7 PCRG’s Negotiations with Other Financial Institutions

In 1990, PCRG had a contentious relationship with another Pittsburgh-based institution, Equibank, which publicly criticized the published bank lending data. Unlike the relationship with Union National Bank, Equibank prepared to fight against the reinvestment movement. In an interview, former Equibank CRA Officer Howard Slaughter explained that Judy Fellheimer, the Vice Chairman of Equimark, the parent company of Equibank, was incensed about a recently-published report showing Equibank’s lending as “the worst.” At the time, Slaughter had planned to leave Equibank to take a job at PNC Bank, but Fellheimer called Slaughter and asked, “what can we do to keep you?” She said that he was valuable to the company because he knew the East End neighborhoods well as a branch manager who had worked his way up from a customer service representative. Slaughter said that he might want to work in CRA, since it was relatively new.

Soon after that initial conversation, Fellheimer invited Slaughter to a meeting attended by Stanley Lowe and Aggie Brose. When Lowe and Fellheimer started talking, they “cussed each other out,” Slaughter explained. The argument was over Equibank’s lack of lending to low- and moderate-income and African American neighborhoods in Pittsburgh. PCRG’s report, published in 1990, showed the bank had approved only 65 loans in low- and moderate-income Pittsburgh neighborhoods between 1984 and 1988. Instead, Equibank was making speculative loans in Florida, Wyoming, Idaho, and Texas.307 After the report’s release, Fellheimer told the Pittsburgh Press, “I think it’s more of a vendetta. I don’t think that the true purpose or motive of PCRG

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(the reinvestment group) is the good of the community,’ she said.” Lowe responded: “‘I know, with any organization, especially when a black person is involved, that the two places anyone tries to besmirch is with money and laziness. I never fall into these categories. I attempt to deal with the truth,’ he said.” Two years later, Fellheimer left Equibank.\footnote{Ellen M. Perlmutter, “Study of mortgage loans to poor declares four area banks lacking,” \textit{Pittsburgh Press}, February 20, 1990. “Fellheimer resigns top job at Equimark,” \textit{UPI News Archive}, Sept. 7, 1991, accessed May 6, 2018, \url{https://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/09/07/Fellheimer-resigns-top-job-at-Equimark/7076652680000/}. UNB purchased Equibank in 1993 to become Integra Bank, which was subsequently absorbed into National City Bank, then PNC.} But to her credit, she provided Slaughter with the opportunity to start Equibank’s CRA program as the Assistant Vice President and CRA Officer. Slaughter, a native of Garfield, was part of the first tier of CRA officers in Pittsburgh, which also included Don Reed, Marva Harris at PNC Bank, and Slaughter’s high school buddy from Garfield, Scott Brown at Mellon Bank. Slaughter’s job was to form relationships with community groups, city agencies, regulators, and others. His efforts earned Equibank a “Satisfactory” CRA rating as a result.\footnote{Author’s interview with Howard Slaughter, May 4, 2018, Pittsburgh, Pa. (he is currently the President & CEO of Habitat for Humanity of Greater Pittsburgh).} Other banks were difficult to negotiate with, but not impossible.

When PCRG began its negotiations with Dollar Bank in 1991, the bank had no CRA officer. It scrambled to put Jim Carroll, vice president of public relations, in charge of CRA. But the bank’s president, Steve Hansen, saw what Slaughter did for Equibank and hired him to run Dollar’s CRA department. One of the first things Slaughter did was recruit Cathy Gary, with whom he worked at Equibank, to set up Dollar Bank’s in-house credit counseling service. At the time, banks didn’t know how to work with families who had credit issues. In response, Dollar Bank started the first “Second Review” process for borrowers with bad credit to give them another chance to fix minor credit issues in order to prepare them for a loan. This was the model
followed by other banks in starting the Community Lender Credit Program in 1993. By 1991, PCRG had negotiated accords with four other banks. Similar deals were negotiated by community groups in other cities, namely Boston, Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee, but the Pittsburgh and Atlanta examples show the power that community groups leveraged through access to public data, proper analysis, and organizing prowess.\textsuperscript{310}

An essay published in 2009 reflected upon the early years of CRA by posing the question, “why would banks choose to ignore profitable lending opportunities?” The essay answered it in two ways: risk, or the perception of risk, by banks and lack of financial sophistication among borrowers. “When the CRA became law, 14,411 commercial banks and 4,388 thrifts were operating, but relatively few had branches in redlined neighborhoods,” the essay notes. “Because banks were not located there, they lacked awareness of attractive lending opportunities in those neighborhoods. Banks feel safer and found it more convenient to lend in a familiar neighborhood than an unfamiliar one, as investigating a new neighborhood requires spending time and effort. Likewise, low- and moderate-income borrowers typically lacked sufficient knowledge of finance; thus, unlike more active participants in the financial system, they may not have known how best to approach banks.”\textsuperscript{311} But some communities demonstrated knowledge of the community reinvestment process, starting with the evaluation of bank lending data, which

\textsuperscript{310} PCRG’s staff at the time consisted of two, Metzger and a secretary; Lowe worked for both MCC and Pittsburgh History & Landmarks Foundation as head of its Preservation Loan Fund. In Boston, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston released a study, “Geographic Patterns of Mortgage Lending in Boston, 1982-1987” in 1989 that concluded, “Housing and mortgage credit markets are functioning in a way that hurts black neighborhoods in the city of Boston.” It further underscored the racial dimension to mortgage lending. James T. Campen, “The Struggle for Community Investment in Boston, 1989-1991,” in Gregory D. Squires, editor, \textit{From Redlining to Reinvestment: Community Responses to Urban Disinvestment} (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1992), 49.

even most banks did not possess. It was the perfect illustration of Saul Alinsky’s training:

“Power is not only what you have but what the enemy thinks you have.” In this case, the community groups had the power of numbers that the banks or federal regulatory agencies lacked. Upon disclosure of the data and sensational media articles, banks were proven wrong and the community was provided with negotiating power. Community based organizations turned a risky proposition—lending in poor, urban neighborhoods—into a bankable opportunity.

Most importantly, though, the initial protests of banks transformed into a trust-building exercise. Community based organizations never intended to constantly be at war with banks. To maintain its partnership with banks, PCRG set up community development advisory group (CDAG) meetings with senior executives of each bank. The CDAG meetings occurred monthly or quarterly as a way to monitor bank commitments and for the community to discuss its needs. In addition, a neighborhood tour was provided for bankers. Although the cultural mismatch was pronounced, the common bond was mutual need. Bankers needed community folks to help them reduce their investment risk, and neighborhoods needed bankers to make loans to reinvigorate old houses. Through the CDAG process, many new programs were developed and trust was built. Ultimately, the CRA law operated as it intended and signaled a return to relationship banking. The bank-community relationships that PCRG negotiated under the Community Reinvestment Act set in motion a major change in community development strategy that unleashed the power of the market in inner city neighborhoods for decades to come.

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4.8 Conclusion

As the experiences of Rick Swartz and Aggie Brose of the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation show, citizen-led community development efforts in the 1980s achieved some success, but it was limited. BGC developed some new housing in Garfield and attracted a few new businesses to the Penn Avenue neighborhood business corridor. But the gains were tempered against continued outmigration of residents, few low-skilled industrial jobs, and a lack of housing and business production at a scale that failed to generate significant urban reinvestment. Outside of Pittsburgh, the efforts of organizations like Steel Valley Authority and Mon Valley Initiative ultimately could not forestall the inevitable decline of heavy manufacturing. Most people in the U.S. were still enamored with their cars, free parking at malls, and the perception that the American Dream existed in the suburbs. In addition, public housing was seldom considered as part of the community development agenda. That is, until Bill Clinton was elected president.

At the same time, a grassroots revolution had begun, not borne out of violent protests or the smoke and fire of riots, but in board rooms of banks. Through BGC’s participation in the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group in 1988, a select few Pittsburgh area financial institutions, namely Integra Bank, slowly opened up to the possibility of reinvesting in low-income areas they had previously redlined. Once neighborhood groups acquired the expertise to evaluate bank lending data, it unleashed a series of negotiated settlements with banks all across the country, and Pittsburgh was at the heart of this reinvestment movement. But the result of PCRG’s efforts would not be seen for another decade.

Severely reduced, the federal government’s support for community development initiatives never entirely went away; it was still needed to guarantee loans, support urban
programs through a mix of grants and tax credits, and fund community based organizations. But once banks became involved in the reinvestment equation, the conversation about neighborhood renewal no longer revolved solely around the government. Most importantly, the process of stitching back together neighborhoods and former mill communities torn asunder by decades of disinvestment and neglect had begun to be reversed, driven by the residents themselves.
5.0 Lyon’s Banlieue Voices Emerge in the 1980s

A decade before she served as the first woman of North African descent on the European Parliament and thirty years before she became a Lyon City Councilwoman, Djida Tazdaït was a tireless soldier against racism and discrimination in France. Photos of her from the 1980s show a woman of small stature but great courage leading protests and providing a voice for the oppressed. Born in Algeria in 1957, Tazdaït moved to Lyon in 1964 and lived in transitional housing until she was a teenager. At the age of twenty, she witnessed a crime by the police against an Arab youth in Mas du Taureau, a social housing complex in Vaulx-en-Velin, a suburb east of Lyon. From that experience, she decided to advocate for immigrants’ rights, as well as the rights of French citizens of North African origin. In 1979, Tazdaït and three friends (all of Algerian origin) formed the organization, “Zaâma d’Banlieue,” in Lyon’s Croix-Rousse district as one of the first French associations to combat racism.\textsuperscript{313} In an undated photo on Tazdaït’s Facebook page, a group of women sits at a table holding Zaâma d’Banlieue newsletters with the words, “\textit{ne comptons que sur nous}” in large, bold letters—“rely only on us.” Tazdaït’s organizing prowess elevated the causes of French citizens of North African origin in the national consciousness and opened the floodgates for French civil rights activism in the 1980s. Her organization was also a strong statement by women who asserted their agency by mobilizing large numbers of citizens.\textsuperscript{314}

\begin{flushright} 313 The impetus for the formation of Zaâma d’Banlieue was the Imbert Decree, passed on December 31, 1979, which required foreign university students to pass a French proficiency exam and prove that they could financially support themselves. The decree limited the admission of foreigners into France, and, predictably, university students demonstrated against it in large numbers. Cécile Deer, \textit{Higher Education in England and France Since the 1980s} (Wallingford, England: Symposium Books, 2002), 163.\end{flushright}

resistance that emerged from Lyon’s banlieues, which was rife with tension between youth and police in the 1980s.

While many Pittsburgh’s low-income communities organized themselves into community development corporations and struck alliances with local government, banks, and foundations during the 1980s, greater Lyon became a hotbed of French immigrant resistance against discrimination and marginalization. Both cities experienced the shock of deindustrialization and outmigration of people. In 1980, Pittsburgh (population 423,938) and Lyon (413,095 in 1982) were similarly-sized cities, but that would change in future decades.315 But Lyon experienced population growth after its 1982 census, largely due to an increase in international immigration, while Pittsburgh’s population continued to decline over the same period.

The French population’s antipathy toward immigrants perpetuated in the 1970s continued in the 1980s.316 Gérard Noiriel writes of the “red summer” of 1977 in which fifteen Algerians died in Marseille. Another report “counted twenty-three acts of violence perpetuated against foreigners in 1982 alone.” But immigrants, and first- and second-generation French citizens, pushed back against what the Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour l'Amitié entre les Peuples (The Movement Against Racism and for Friendship between Peoples), or MRAP, called “‘state racism’ which systematically singled [immigrants] out as those who should pay the price for economic ills.”317 Like civil rights activists in the United States France’s immigration activists


concerned themselves with integration into French society. But for immigrants in France, the issue of national identity was an issue that American civil rights leaders rarely had to confront. Most notably, Noiriel points out that “In the United States, immigrants were from the outset agents of national construction, whereas in France, they arrived massively after national unity had been achieved.” At the same time, immigrant-rights activists of the 1980s employed many of the same tactics as those of the American civil rights movement: hunger strikes, sit-ins, marches, and protests. As this chapter elaborates, these methods became effective in declaring their identity as French citizens.

In the Lyon region during the 1980s a large core of vocal activists with Algerian roots found its voice. Leaders such as Djida Tazdaït and Toumi Djaïdja formed associations to combat violence against immigrants and first-generation French citizens of Algerian origin. They also put a more positive face on the youth of the cités, the suburban high-rise towers that became associated with lawlessness and disorder in the minds of the French public. These efforts were a powerful expression of social capital among immigrants and first- and second-generation French citizens, often of North African descent. Based on interviews and archival information, French activists were inspired by American civil rights demonstrations more than a decade earlier. As a result, they formed associations, went on hunger strikes, and took to the streets across France to demand equal footing in employment, education, and housing. Many of these movements were centered in the banlieues of Lyon, where organizers utilized networks of immigrant collectives to mobilize thousands of supporters across the country. Lyon’s past as a headquarters for silk worker revolts in the 1800s and French opposition to Nazis during World War II inspired

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318 Noiriel (1996), xxii.
activists in the 1980s. But in the 1980s the region was also home to more than 100,000 social housing residents facing global deindustrialization and an increasing police presence in the banlieues.

In August 1981, the “Rodeo Riot” erupted in the social housing community of Les Minguettes in Vénissieux, which grew out of youth confrontations with police. The disturbance attracted national attention for all the cars which had been stolen and set on fire. Another youth revolt flared up Les Minguettes on June 20, 1983, the height of Ramadan. On that fateful night, a young leader from Les Minguettes, Toumi Djaïdja, tried to help a teenager who had been injured in confrontations between youth and French security forces. A blast rang out from the police. Djaïdja fell from a gunshot wound to the stomach, but was not killed. While recovering in a hospital, he and a small group of residents from Les Minguettes conceived of a vast march across France as a way to protest police brutality and bring immigrants out from the shadows.

Begun on October 15, 1983, *La Marche pour l’égalité et contre le racisme* (“March for Equality and Against Racism,” also known as *La Marche des Beurs* or simply La Marche), was the culmination of a 1,200-kilometer (745-mile) walk from Marseille to Paris. A hundred thousand strong by the time it reached Paris on December 3, 1983, La Marche was, in the words of Toumi Djaïdja, “a declaration of love” intended to showcase the beautiful bounty of humanity from the banlieues. More than a decade had passed since the May 1968 protests in Paris, led by

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319 Djida Tazdaït explained that “We have a heritage of fighting for our rights” in Lyon, she said. “It is a way of saying, ‘we are true French, true Lyonnaise,’” she added. “That was the purpose of Zaâma, a way of saying we want to be actors, not victims.” Author’s interview with Djida Tazdaït, June 27, 2017, Lyon, France.

students and the powerful French unions. But the march in 1983 was led by the sons and daughters of immigrants, and some were immigrants themselves. Such peaceful demonstrations, association formation, and other acts of resistance made greater Lyon a center in France for resident pushback against violence, discrimination, and marginalization in the 1980s.

Ahmed Boubeker (2009) attributes these mobilizations to the “Minguettes generation”—residents of Les Minguettes social housing community in Vénissieux who asserted their “right to a civil status beyond the immigration pool.” Leaders such as Djida Tazdaït and Toumi Djaïdja, who were residents of Les Minguettes at one time, drew inspiration from the transnational messages of Martin Luther King, Jr., Henry David Thoreau, and Mahatma Gandhi to assert the humanity and dignity of marginalized people. And, as in the United States, women were often on the front lines.

However, unlike the American community development movement of the 1970s, the aim of French civil rights leaders was not control over real estate. Instead, they sought to change laws and influence popular opinion about what it means to be “French.” Toumi Djaïdja and other activists illustrated the diversity of banlieue youth by forming associations, staging hunger strikes, and organizing demonstrations like La Marche. And although organizations formed in the wake of La Marche suffered from lack of funding and staff, their efforts were not in vain.

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322 Gérard Noiriel (1996) notes that between 1975 and 1982, “the percentage of women in the foreign population increased from 70 to 76%.” (193)

323 “Contrary to what is usually believed, over the past half-century the economic, social, and political importance of the immigration issue has been greater in France than in the United States.” Gérard Noiriel, The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity. Translated by Geoffroy de LaForcade (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 5.
a consequence of citizen mobilization from below, elites made significant changes to the banlieues themselves, with mixed success. French planners took inspiration from both American civil rights protests and the student demonstrations of May 1968 to create the Banlieues 89 initiative to reconfigure social housing. Yet, as riots continued to rage across French banlieues, physical investments did not always equal social improvements. High unemployment in the banlieues contributed to much of the unrest throughout the 1980s.

5.1 Les Minguettes’ “Hot Summer” of 1981

Starting in the 1970s, deindustrialization heavily impacted western nations in Europe and North America in the 1980s. Over the course of a decade, from 1980 to 1990, French manufacturing employment declined from 25.8 percent of the workforce in 1980 to 21.3 percent in 1990. Michèle Lamont suggests that in the United States racial tensions between white and black workers created workplace friction and competition; whereas in France, the tension was between whites and North Africans, who some French workers viewed as “unworthy.” In addition, the decline of unionization rates stoked racial tensions in both countries. In the U.S. 10.7 percent of the workforce was part of a union in 2016, a decline from 20.1 percent in 1983. Similarly, in

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325 Lamont, 170.

France, 8.1% of all workers belonged to a union in 2010, among the lowest unionization rates in Europe, down from nearly 30% in the 1950s.

Like Pittsburgh, Lyon’s manufacturing decline resulted in a dramatic reduction in residents. In 1968, Lyon’s population was 535,000; by 1982, it had bottomed out at 413,000, a loss of 22 percent in less than twenty years. As coal production plummeted in Saint-Étienne, just 45 minutes by train from Lyon, population there declined from a high of 220,000 in 1975 to 171,000 in 2012, a figure lower than pre-World War II levels. The loss of manufacturing employment was just one factor in the growth of the anti-immigrant National Front party (Front National in French) across rustbelt regions of France. As Mustafa Dikeç explains, “The increased popularity of the FN had much to do with the severe effects of the economic crisis and restructuring—the number of unemployed people had doubled in a period of five years, rising

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327 “At just 8 percent, the number of workers who are union cardholders is one of Europe's lowest. That compares with 19 percent in Germany, 27 percent in Britain and is even below the United States at 12 percent, OECD data shows. Union membership has slid in France from 20 percent in 1960, and what remains is heavily concentrated in the public sector.” “How powerful are France's unions today?” Reuters, October 21, 2010, accessed March 3, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-pensions-unions-qa-idUSTRE69K39V20101021.


from 1 million in 1977 to 2 million in 1982.” This situation created a crisis among white working class French, who felt there were “too many immigrants.” Deindustrialization exacerbated economic anxieties at all levels, creating an opportunity for the National Front to score some electoral victories and aggravated tensions in low-income communities. These tensions burst into the open in 1981.

The recession of the early 1980s dramatically affected minority and working class communities in both France and the United Kingdom. In April 1981, young men protesting high unemployment, poor housing, and high crime in London’s Afro-Caribbean neighborhood of Brixton clashed with police in what became known as the Brixton Riots (Time called it “Bloody Saturday”). The riot resulted in hundreds of injured police and citizens, more than a hundred burned cars, and more than 150 damaged buildings. It was a prelude to more violence in France later that summer.

In August 1981, youth-police confrontations starting in the Lyon suburb of Vénissieux shook France (subsequent riots occurred in the suburbs of Paris, Marseille and Avignon). It was not the first large-scale riot in Lyon’s suburbs. In 1979, riots erupted in the Lyon suburb of Vaulx-en-Velin when youth in the Grappinière district faced off with police, stole cars, and set them alight. But the riot in Vénissieux was known for “urban violence of a rare intensity” in

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what was known as “Les Minguettes Été Chaud,” or “The Minguettes Hot Summer.” The disturbances were led by unemployed youth who stole expensive cars from central Lyon and raced them outside the city before setting the vehicles on fire. Hence why this disturbance is called the “Rodeo Riot.” By the time the hot summer ended, approximately 250 cars had been destroyed (these activities became common among ensuing banlieue revolts).

The vast majority of protesters were young men, sons of immigrants who came to France in the 1960s after the Algerian War for Independence ended. As Fabien Jobard explains, “Banlieue areas came to host a generation of sons of unskilled and increasingly unemployed immigrant blue-collar families who were not able to overcome their disadvantaged legacy through education.” In addition to lack of job opportunities in the banlieues, grudges held by the police created tensions. Djida Tazdaït explained that many pied noirs who returned to France after the Algerian war went to work as police men and kept historical grievances against many of the Algerians who had settled in France, particularly in Lyon. “The war is still a sore spot in France,” she said. “It is always just under the surface.” As for their part, many of the pied noirs also felt disrespected and treated as migrants. The mix of immigrant discrimination, unemployed second-generation French youth, and ongoing police actions became an explosive mix that burst out into the open in the banlieues that summer.


5.2 Mitterrand Takes Action

France’s longest running president François Mitterrand, an avowed Socialist who served from 1981 to 1995, could do little to reverse factory closures. During his presidency, communist party membership in the once-industrial suburbs, known as the Red Belt, slumped. Despite the historic legacy of working-class activism in Lyon’s banlieues, communists could no longer rely on industrial workers as a solid voting block. Despite these challenges, Mitterrand’s actions to physically reshape the grandes ensembles and implement social programs for youth were some of his greatest accomplishments.

At the time of the Minguettes riots in 1981, François Mitterrand had just assumed the presidency, and he immediately took a number of actions to “cool” the potential for further disorders. These steps included the creation of anti-été chauds programs to provide recreation and entertainment opportunities for 100,000 youths across France and the abolition of a 1901 law which forbade foreigners from forming associations. More importantly, the émeutes (riots) in suburban Lyon generated new ideas for the physical restructuring of France’s cities, known as politique de la ville (“policy of the city”) to revitalize social housing zones in the banlieues.

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338 A number of communist names populate streets in and around Lyon’s suburbs. These include Lenine (a cluster of housing towers), Avenue Jean Cagne (a famous communist politician from Lyon), and Avenue Maurice Thorez (a longtime leader of the French Communist Party) in Les Minguettes; Avenue Salvador Allende (the first Marxist president of Chile) in Vaulx-en-Velin, along with the slogan “Liberté, égalité, fraternité, solidarité” on the Vaulx-en-Velin City Hall; and Rue Elsa Triolet (a French-Russian communist writer) in Bron.

report issued by the National Commission for the Social Development of Neighborhoods, entitled *Ensemble, refaire la ville* ("Together, Remaking the City"), proposed a new approach to neighborhood development. Two other reports issued at the same time, the Schwartz Report and the Bennemaison Report, focused on unemployment and delinquency. These reports connected the problems of second-generation immigrant youth with their social, economic, and spatial marginalization, in addition to negative portrayals of the *banlieues* in the media. In other words, the problem was not just the buildings, but the lack of resident engagement in civic affairs. It was a problem of top-down state planning, in which social housing developments "were often imposed upon the communes by the planners of the central state, and the possibilities for the intervention of locally elected officials remained very limited."\(^3\text{40}\) The call for youth activities and employment programs were long-term projects with long-term results. But physical changes could be implemented immediately, reinforcing the belief that poor conditions among working class communities were a consequence of their architecture.

### 5.3 Banlieues 89

Mitterrand adopted an expansive new philosophy to physically reconfigure France’s *grands ensembles* into lower-rise scattered sites arranged in a more traditional town format, akin to the new urbanist concepts emerging in the United States at the time.\(^3\text{41}\) Called “Banlieues 89,” it...

\(^3\text{40}\) Dikeç, *Badlands of the Republic* (2007), 53.

\(^3\text{41}\) For more on this, see Andres Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and Jeff Speck, *Suburban Nation: The Rise of Sprawl and the Decline of the American Dream* (New York: North Point Press, 2000). Duany and Plater-Zyberk were founders of the Congress for New Urbanism in 1994. While the authors claim the Congress for New Urbanism “is modeled on CIAM (Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne), the celebrated series of conferences first convened in 1928” (organized by Le Corbusier), CNU’s traditionalist, pedestrian orientation is a stark counterpoint to the sprawling modernist conceptions of the 1920s and 1930s that became *de rigeur* for American automobile suburbs.
was conceived of by the architecture-urban planning team of Roland Castro and Michel Cantal-Dupart in 1981.\textsuperscript{342} Castro and Cantal-Dupart drew influence from the May 1968 student revolution in France. Castro had been one of the architecture students who went on strike in May 1968 against the “abysmal stupidity” of a previous generation of architects such as Le Corbusier. “Particular scorn was reserved for the urbanism associated with the housing estates built in France in the 1960s, huge modernist developments designed using the language of an abstracted form of the Modern Movement, with slab blocks and point blocks, and constructed in concrete,” writes Marion Roberts.\textsuperscript{343} To Castro and Cantal-Dupart, Banlieues 89 exemplified their concept of “l’insertion urbaine,” or housing projects inserted into the urban fabric rather than ripping cities apart.

Twenty years after David Lewis started Urban Design Associates to make urban design a more bottom-up process, and fourteen years before the federal Hope VI program was implemented in the United States, Castro and Cantal-Dupart did the same for France. The architect-urban design pair talked with mayors, construction managers, and local associations in seventeen French cities to understand how to create more livable cities. The result was Banlieues 89, created in 1981 to better connect the isolated \textit{banlieues} and reconfigure poorly designed urban spaces. President Mitterrand embraced the new approach after a tour of Cité des Quatre Mille (“City of 4,000) in La Courneuve, a Paris \textit{banlieue}.

In \textit{Urban Alchemy} (2013), Mindy Thompson Fullilove casts the program in a positive light, explaining that “Cantal and Castro articulated a whole style of urbanism” and that

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\textsuperscript{342} Banlieues 89 was designed to culminate in 1989, the two-hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution, and reflect its notions of equality.

Mitterrand “made it clear that Banlieues 89 held hope for the nation if it could solve the problems of all.” But with any art form, Banlieues 89 had its critics. Architect Dominique Figeat claimed that “Banlieues 89 was an elite of architects and urbanists, what you could call a technocracy of architectural and urbanist action, projecting their representations of, well, both the existing populations and the existing neighbourhoods, on the formulation of policies.”

Despite the critiques, Paris funded 152 projects throughout France, including in the Lyon suburbs of Vénissieux (Darnaise, a building in Les Minguettes development), Saint-Priest, Saint-Fons, Écully, Oullins, and Décines.

To promote their concept, the two architects held press conferences in various cities selected for Banlieues 89 projects. In February 1983, Cantal-Dupart and Castrol held a press conference in Lyon to announce their plans for reconfiguring Les Minguettes. Olivier Philip, the Commissaire de la République de la Région Rhône-Alpes, exclaimed in a telegram to the Minister of Interior in Paris, “The Minguettes are presented as one of the highlights of Operation Banlieues 89. The architects spoke of the transformation of towers into superimposed cities, with gardens, terraces and workshops, constituting a much more reasonable solution than destruction, especially since the towers were destroyed without knowing why.” Expressing concern that he had not been informed, Commissaire Philip also questioned the cost of the operation. “I have not been kept informed of this visit that I have learned from the press and I regret that this press conference took place without my being informed. I would like to know

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how this operation will be financed.” The telegram indicated that the proposals crafted by Castro and Cantal-Dupart provided a viable alternative to simply demolishing buildings, but they lacked specific budget targets.

Still, President Mitterrand pressed on with his mission to reconstruct the banlieues. On June 9, 1983, Mitterrand initiated the demolition of three of the Minguettes towers. The Mayor of Vénissieux, Marcel Houël, expressed his pleasure in seeing the first of many towers fall and showed his disdain for the immigrant population of Les Minguettes. “We will get out [of the bad situation] by rehabilitating this ZUP des Minguettes, improving the living conditions,” he said. “We could see couples without children, bachelors arrive. We could see a different population arrive than we have.” But new immigrants were not welcome, “because we have plenty of our share,” Mayor Houël remarked. Like urban renewal in Pittsburgh in the 1950s and 1960s, demolition of Les Minguettes, which had housed working class people for over a decade, evoked “a strong emotion in the district. For many, years of memories are reduced to dust.”

At the time, the demolition set a precedent in France, both for the demolition technique (3,000 charges of dynamite were used) and the number of units destroyed (approximately 250). By 1994, ten more towers would come down.

Mitterrand decentralized power away from Paris and into France’s cities to facilitate more bottom-up planning. In August 1983, Mitterrand visited two social housing developments, Montchovet in Saint-Étienne (near Lyon) and again went to Les Minguettes in Vénissieux to promote their redevelopment. “I intend to apply our efforts so that, indeed, these areas are

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rehabilitated, that is to say, are habitable,” the president said. “That there is, for those who live there . . . enough friendliness, ability to develop a family and . . . returning from his work when we have, to be able to live with others. The housing conditions, the construction of these ensembles, the links with the outside, the school, the sport, the green spaces, in short, the space anyway, contribute, you understand it well, to the future balance, or contribute to the future balance of these neighborhoods. So, I prefer to see things for myself.”

Despite the critiques, Banlieues 89 signaled a sea change in thinking in France about how to design and build “livable” communities, particularly for low-income people. Eventually Banlieues 89 was incorporated into the new Le ministère de la Ville (the Ministry of the City) in 1990 to guide urban development throughout France.

5.4 La Marche, 1983

To residents of France’s banlieues, however, Banlieues 89 did not provide jobs, calm anxious police, or solve discrimination. An alternative approach devised by the people themselves called attention to the plight of many throughout France’s oft-misrepresented banlieues. As a result, youth activists organized a series of concerts called “Rock against the Police,” held in various cities across France, including Lyon, inspired by similar efforts organized by British youth activists. In addition, hunger strikes, marches, and other protests held throughout the 1980s called attention to police brutality and other forms of injustices experienced by banlieue youth, as well as people of all ages. “Their activities informed developing policies that emphasized the

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importance of local participation, which ultimately influenced urban renewal programs targeting youth living in banlieues,” writes Minayo Nasiali. These efforts represent the formation and deployment of social capital by low-income citizens who otherwise would not have been heard.

In the Lyon region, heart of the 1981 disturbances, large civil rights demonstrations in the United States, such as the 1963 March on Washington and Gandhi’s Salt March of 1930, captured in the 1982 film “Gandhi,” directly influenced activists in Lyon. Thus was born the idea of a vast march across France, starting in Marseille and ending in Paris, to draw attention to the plight of the banlieues and to raise the profile of French citizens of North African descent. The route retraces the original path set forth by Marseille residents during the French Revolution, who marched from Marseille to Paris in 1792 to support the revolutionary government. The revolutionaries sang as they went along, the origin of La Marseillaise, France’s national anthem. Since numerous authors have written about La Marche my intent here is not to rehash a well-worn story in detail, but to set the march in a context of resistance from below.

Toumi Djaïdja’s near-death experience, his background of activism in Les Minguettes, and his charisma made him perfectly suited to be the face of La Marche. Born in Algeria in 1962, he moved to Les Minguettes in 1971, when he was eight years old after having lived in

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350 Upon the 30th anniversary of the march, Djaidja told L’Humanité, “In reality, Gandhi’s film only reinforces our determination to lead this fight in non-violence since three months ago our action is imbued with this spirit, no need to underline it.” “Un Cri de Douleur Qui Jaillit En Moi Comme Un Hymne à la Vie” (“A Cry of Pain Who Welcomes Me as a Hymn to Life”), L’Humanité, 27 Mai 2013, accessed December 11, 2018, https://www.humanite.fr/social-eco/un-cri-de-douleur-qui-jaillit-en-moi-comme-un-hymn-542460.

} In 1982, Djaïdja formed *SOS Avenir Minguettes* ("SOS Minguettes Future") to highlight the fact that young people in the Minguettes were not all violent delinquents. The police saw it differently. Since the riots, they had subjected many young people to random searches (much like New York’s “stop-and-frisk” policy under Mayor Giuliani in the early 2000s). Such actions drove a further wedge between police and youth of French-Arab backgrounds. In his memoir about *La Marche*, Djaïdja corrects misperceptions about *banlieue* youth: “We were the first wave of a generation of immigrants, but French we are. We had hope in our future, in this country that is ours. It is necessary to remember what the regional press titled regularly: ‘The immigrants want to take the power,’ ‘Areas of non-right,’ ‘The [hooligans] want to dictate their law,’ etc. It’s amazing, all these allegations! It is really, and quite simply, a thirst for justice, that I shall never cease to say. For all that, it seemed enormous, as inaccessible.”\footnote{Toumi Djaïdja, *La Marche pour l’Égalité: Entretiens avec Adil Jazouli* (France: Editions de L’Aube, 2013), 36.} Rock-throwing youth protesting against security actions such as random searches, constant checks for identity papers, and general harassment added to a siege mentality among the police.

In March 1983, riots broke out again in Les Minguettes involving more than 400 youth in clashes with the police. In response, Djaïdja employed the nonviolent tactics of American civil rights demonstrators from the 1960s and staged a peaceful sit-in at the Vénissieux city hall to protest police brutality. And like Gandhi, he began a hunger strike and tried to cool tensions among youth in Les Minguettes. Then, on the night of June 20, 1983, during a police raid,
Djaïdja found himself at the wrong spot at the wrong time. While attempting to help a teenager who had been attacked by a police dog, he suffered a near-fatal gunshot wound from the police.

“There were rumors that he might have been killed,” Tazdaït recalls. But then, she learned he was in the hospital, so she went to visit him there. Then came the idea of the march, developed while Djaïdja was recuperating. “It was motivated by the movie ‘Gandhi’ [1982, starring Ben Kingsley] and Martin Luther King,” Tazdaït explained. “Some (activists) wanted to fight, but I was against it,” she recalled. When Djaïdja told her of the concept of a walk for justice and peace, she was cool to the idea. “I had no confidence in the institutional actors,” she said. “I was afraid of political manipulation and retribution.” In addition, “there was not much protection. It was very violent in France at that time. There were many tensions throughout France. We felt so exposed.” She stayed away from the initial concept of the march, but supported it as it went from Lyon to Paris.

To organize La Marche, Djaïdja had help from Father Jean Costil and Father Christian Delorme, two priests who worked in Les Minguettes and who had been part of the hunger strike, as well as Jamel Atallah, the treasurer of SOS Avenir Minguettes and a resident of the community. Costil was a Protestant priest who headed the CIMADE network to help resettle refugees after the conclusion of both World War II and the Algerian war.354 Father Delorme, known as Curé des Minguettes (“The Minguettes’ Priest”), provided assistance to protestors. Together, they served as the key organizers who ultimately led the trek from Marseille to Paris over the course of three months in the fall of 1983. The priests were likely inspired by the religious words of King, who wrote in his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” in 1963: “Just as the

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prophets of the eighth century B.C. left their villages and carried their ‘thus saith the Lord’ far beyond the boundaries of their home towns, and just as the Apostle Paul left his village of Tarsus and carried the gospel of Jesus Christ to the far corners of the Greco Roman world, so am I compelled to carry the gospel of freedom beyond my own home town.”

La Marche started slowly with only a handful of people walking from Marseille to Lyon. Networks of immigrant collectives in each town the march passed through helped the strikers and welcomed them. Even after they passed through Lyon, it was still a relatively small movement with about a thousand marchers. At this point, the march attracted little attention in the press. But this changed rapidly when news broke of an Algerian tourist on his way to Italy was thrown out of a French train window by French Legionnaires. Witnesses saw the crime and recounted it to the media. “They were courageous in coming forward” to tell their story, Tazdaït said of the witnesses. “This event created a national buzz about the March,” she explained.

After the Algerian was thrown out of the train window, many politicians expressed public support for La Marche, including Georgina Dufoix, Secretary of State for the Family under Mitterrand in 1983 (she later became Minister of Social Affairs and National Solidarity). Then, on December 1, 1983, without much notice, Fathers Delorme and Costil, Djaïdja, and two other people were chosen to meet with President Mitterrand. It created tension with the marchers because it was arranged in secret. But Tazdaït later found out that Father Delorme had organized the meeting weeks earlier, after the Algerian man thrown from the train had become big news.

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“He knew more than the average marchers,” she said of Father Delorme. The small gathering in the presidential palace attracted high profile media attention. Now the protestors had the ear of the French president and some of their demands were met. One victory was an extension on Arabs’ “carte de séjours” from two years to ten. Carte de séjours are legal papers (sometimes called “travel papers”) which allow non-resident visitors to stay in France for long periods of time due to work or family commitments. The extension had an impact on the integration of families, so that people could stay together longer. They also demanded jobs and better schools. Despite the clandestinely organized meeting with Mitterrand, the march arrived in Paris, 100,000 strong, some sporting T-shirts which read, “On s’appelle tous Toumi Djaïdja” (we are all called Toumi Djaïdja”). Tazdaït went to Paris to welcome and support her friends.357

Djaïdja took the podium and addressed the crowd, uttering his now famous line, “Je salue la France de toutes les couleurs!” (“I salute France of all colors!”).358 His address was as much an expression of love for his supporters as it was a sign of resistance, an announcement that he had survived the worst that France could throw at him, and he still loved it back. “Instead of raising our fists in anger, we held out our hands to a generous France,” Djaidja told The Telegraph in 2013 on the thirtieth anniversary of La Marche.359 The march was a defining moment in modern French social history, though the story often takes a backseat to other

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358 Michael Augustin, La Marche des Beurs (2015), 190. In Jazouli and Djaïdja, La Marche (2013), Djaïdja claims he said “Bonjour à la France de toutes les couleurs,” or, “Hello to France of all colors” (93).

contemporary social histories of France, namely, the 1968 student demonstrations, the 1981 _banlieue_ riots, and the Cold War.\(^{360}\)

Initially, La Marche generated positive energy, including a new sense of national identity and respect among French citizens of North African origin. Tazdaït expressed pride in those who participated. “The March was a way to reveal this hidden generation,” she said. “It was a huge discovery for France, the hidden children of the Republic. It was very positive,” she added. “Our goal was to force respect. This collective physical presence forced respect,” she said. “We shined light on the situation of the youth of the _banlieue._” Several organizations, including _SOS Racisme_, a nationwide anti-racist group, and Young Arabs of the Banlieues (focused initially on the Lyon region), emerged as a result of La Marche (explained below). In addition, New Urbanist concepts such as Banlieues 89 took on greater relevance among planners and politicians and gave hope that a new physical arrangement of communities would solve many of the social problems. At the same time, many of the original conditions which led to the riots and poor living conditions, namely racism, discrimination, and a dire economic situation, continued. The goodwill produced by La Marche was short-lived. To Tazdaït, the immediate aftermath of La Marche masked deeper problems. “The outcome benefitted the politicians more than the marchers,” she contends. After the March, it was back to the routine of drugs and unemployment and continued tension between police and youth in the _banlieues._

5.5 Security Deteriorates in Les Minguettes

The crisis situation in Les Minguettes that sparked riots in 1981 failed to subside two years later. Recently declassified documents reveal deteriorating security in Les Minguettes before and after La Marche, expressed by memos from local business leaders and the police. In a memo dated 25 May 1983, six months before the march started, the Lyon Police Commissioner, Bernard Grasset, sent a memo to the Secretary of State for Public Security, a cabinet-level position in Paris, about the “serious incidents” occurring in Les Minguettes. “Insults, throwing stones, tire lacerations almost daily punctuate the intervention of police officers called in this sector for tasks of general interest, be it acts of police judicial or administrative, as demands essentially preventive,” he wrote. He outlined several examples of vandalism, such as “broken cars, looted premises, devastated construction sites,” including the discovery of a weapons cache of rifles. “The situation is deteriorating day by day. . . . The image of the Minguettes is destroyed. Some journalists have made [a] star [out] of the ‘loubards’ [hooligans]; Father Delorme supports the movement with fervor.” He noted the declining reputation of Vénissieux. “In the past, Vénissieux was famous for its Berliet factory, currently its bad reputation is due to the discomfort that reigns in the district of Minguettes.” Grasset concluded by referring to Les Minguettes as a lawless area: “The vast majority of the population of the Minguettes’ ZUP, whatever their origins or social condition, aspires only to tranquility and undergoes this climate of violence

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361 An open records request filed by the author was granted in 2017, which enabled access to recently declassified documents found at the Rhône-Alpes archives in Lyon.
maintained by a core of diehards who, opposed to any police presence, demands the establishment of a true no-go zone.”362

Two months later, local business leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the security situation in Les Minguettes. Business owners from the Lyon Chamber of Commerce prepared a “manifesto” dated 8 July 1983 which announced that “There is no week without several shopkeepers being attacked in their own stores, and more and more people on the street. THE PROBLEM IS VERY SERIOUS! FEAR IS INTENSIVE! . . . For all these reasons, we urge the Prefect, the Commissioner of the Republic, to transmit to the highest authorities our cry of alarm, before unpredictable and uncontrollable reactions compromise everything.”363

Even after La Marche concluded, security remained unstable in Vénissieux. Local officials expressed concern about hostile crimes and the need for additional police actions, even as rehabilitation of Les Minguettes proceeded. A “Personal and Confidential” memo to “60 police officers under the Commissariat de Vénissieux” notes the importance of the towers’ rehabilitation to keep order in the community: “Failure to implement this [rehabilitation] program would be a failure for the Government and also a failure for all of us because we are all concerned. We will not accept this failure. We will take the necessary measures to ensure the execution of the work required by the population, by all those who support the immigrant population.”364


By late 1983, with the police on edge, business leaders highly agitated, and politicians searching for answers, quick and easy solutions were elusive. In November 1983, as the march progressed from Marseille to Paris, the Préfecture du Rhône (the state’s representative for the Rhône-Alpes region), Olivier Philip, reported vandalism and other disturbances in Les Minguettes in a memo to cabinet ministers in Paris: “The clearing work that should have been completed by mid-October is interrupted. The crawler excavator has just been, for the second time, and probably for a long time, put down and completely vandalized by a group of young people. It is not possible to specify when the work will be completed.” In addition, apartments which had just been refurbished were damaged with “pierced doors, ransacked interiors.”

Furthermore, he underscored concerns expressed by the Chief Rabbi of Lyon, who had just laid the foundation stone for a new synagogue of the Vénissieux Community Center on September 4, 1983. “But since September 7,” Philip wrote, “the masonry company has not done any work because of the threats to it and acts of vandalism. The company threatens to give up construction and the Chief Rabbi officially told me that he would consider this decision as disastrous for the Jewish community of Vénissieux, both psychologically and financially, especially since religious instruction courses are currently given in a room whose shutters are still closed to avoid too serious consequences during constant throwing stones. . . . In the current context, it will be difficult to carry out this work without police protection whose [duties] are difficult to specify.”

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The situation was deemed so desperate that the wives of police officers sent a letter directly to President Mitterrand on 8 December 1983, asking that the officers be given greater powers to quell the violence. “The police must have the means to fulfill the mission of enforcing the ‘law.’ Will our spouses have to pay for a decision to be made?” Referring to Djaïdja and others who met with Mitterrand as “hooligans,” the wives asked for their own meeting, as well: “The young hooligans of the Minguettes have had the honor of being received by you, we also claim the honor of meeting you [meaning] we are French, of good morality, therefore of good citizens who perhaps, for a good number of they trusted you in 1981.” Signed by “Les Femmes des Gardiens de la Paix” (“Wives of the Guardians of the Peace”), they wrote of “fear,” “insecurity,” and “anguish,” but pleading for “tranquility, safety, security, and public health.”

That the officers’ wives made no distinction between the peaceful protestors and violent troublemakers illustrates the disconnect between the police and youth residents.

By early 1984, just six weeks after La Marche had ended, tensions between the police and youth in Les Minguettes intensified. Another confidential police memo, dated 27 January 1984, highlighted an incident in which the police chased a robbery suspect into Les Minguettes and “were very quickly assaulted with stones by thirty young Maghrebis and could only retreat a hundred meters. The attackers were able to seize the shotgun and then dispersed.” The memo continued, with a reference to Djaïdja: “The incidents in which Toumi DJAIDJA was seriously wounded were identical: the prosecution and arrest of robbery perpetrators.” The memo references continued “police surveillance of the sector” in order to control “the climate of fear and insecurity that continues to prevail” in the community. “We are approaching the hour of

truth: will the rehabilitation of the Minguettes continue normally next spring and will the work
done during the day not be destroyed the following night? I doubt.” The memo concludes with
a reference to a proposed “police operation” that might be carried out “if necessary, in a part of
the Minguette sector only if public order was seriously threatened during the planned renovation
work.”367

Another memo, dated 30 March 1984 from Olivier Philip to the Minister of the Interior,
indicates the seriousness of crime in Les Minguettes. “The situation is increasingly tense
throughout the Minguette ZUP, and more particularly in the districts of Monmousseau, La
Darnaise, the Windmill and Democracy [towers within Les Minguettes]. Burglaries multiplied
and trucks were seen taking the stolen furniture out of an apartment in broad daylight without the
police being aware of it, no one daring to prevent it for fear of reprisals.” In referencing
deteriorating security in neighboring suburbs Philip noted, “The situation described by the
Mayor of Vénissieux is indeed worrying but unfortunately, it is even worse in the neighboring
communes of Grigny and Vaulx-en-Velin. In these three communes, 4,000 housing units are
vacant. Expansion is accelerating due to insecurity and the process is quickly becoming
irremediable.” He concluded by calling for an increased security presence in these areas.368

As these memos make clear, despite the national significance of La Marche, local
relations between the police and youth failed to improve in Les Minguettes. In Vaulx-en-Velin,
police-community relations were no better: In 1985, fifteen-year-old Berded Barca died when a

367 “CONFIDENTIEL: “Action des forces de police dans la ZUP des Minguettes à VENISSIEUX.” Department du
Rhône-Alpes-Auvergne Regional Archives.

368 “Situation à Vénissieux,” Pour Monsieur le Ministre de l’Intérieur et de la Décentralisation de Olivier Philip, Le
Préfet Commissaire de la République de la Région Rhône-Alpes Commissaire de la République du Département du
police officer threw a walkie-talkie at his head as he rode his moped (he was not wearing a helmet). The continued breakdown of relations between police and banlieue youth of the 1980s was a harbinger of more violence to come in the 1990s and 2000s.369

5.6 Rise of the National Front

At the same time as French-Arab activists of Muslim backgrounds advocated for respect, the National Front achieved electoral gains in outlying areas through its anti-immigrant stance. The repatriated “Harkis” from Algeria, Muslim Algerians who fought for the French army during the French-Algerian War, found it especially difficult to obtain equal respect in France. Shunned by Algerians who fought for independence, as well as native French who saw them simply as foreigners, they suffered a host of racist attacks and discrimination (Toumi Djaïdja was the son of a Harki).370 Some took to extreme measures to call attention to their plight. A newspaper article from March 15, 1984, shows several Harkis on the floor of a school in Saint-Étienne, engaged in a hunger strike. Monsieur Belhadj, president of the Association for the Development of Educational and Cultural Social Action for the French of Islamic Confession, “insisted that the movement in Saint-Etienne is peaceful: it is a matter of raising public opinion on a French minority. There is a problem of the Harkis, and it seems to us that France wants to ignore this problem, wants to hide it, as a shameful disease. . . . The Harkis are the shame of France, which calls itself the land of human rights and freedom.” He called attention to the economic plight of


many Algerians: “The first generation was fatalistic; but today, young people no longer accept what their parents have undergone. These young people realize that they are always at a disadvantage compared to other French people . . . 67% of our young people are unemployed, then for all of France, the proportion of unemployed youth is 13%. If something happens to one of these hunger strikers, then we will move on to a less peaceful form of action.”

He continued his advocacy throughout March. On March 25, 1984, Belhadj told a French newspaper, “We are Frenchmen in their own right, but we have a history, a culture; although French, we will maintain our specificity within the national community.”

To National Front supporters, anyone of foreign ancestry faced the wrath of racism and “otherness” at a time when advocates for immigrant rights demanded stronger recognition within mainstream French society.

By 1984, the National Front, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, had gained a foothold among a French electorate skeptical of immigrants, opposed to anyone deemed “non-French,” and afraid of the banlieues and everything they represented. The movement reflected the same law-and-order policies which U.S. President Reagan (and subsequent administrations) implemented around the same time. The anti-immigrant sentiment among National Front supporters was based less on demographics than on perception.

Tazdaït confirmed this notion. With the

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373 As Dikeç notes, “There was not a spectacular increase in the proportion of immigrants in the total population from the 1970s to the 1980s (6.5% in 1975 compared to 6.8% in 1982). However, immigrants had become more ‘visible’ in everyday life starting from the end of the 1970s.” Dikeç, 57-58. Furthermore, the share of immigrants in social housing increased from 23.7% in 1982 to 27.3% in 1990 (they were nearly a third, 32.8% by 1999), while the proportion of native French in social housing over the same period increased only slightly, from 17.9% in 1982 to 18.7% in 1990 (and 19.7% in 1999). Gregory Verdugo, “Logement social et ségrégation résidentielle des immigrés en France, 1968-1999” (“Public Housing and Residential Segregation of Immigrants in France, 1968-1999”), Population 66, No. 1 (2011): 177.
early protests of Zaâma d’Banlieue, as well as other pro-immigrant demonstrations, Tazdaït said that “we managed to reveal the identities [of French citizens of Arab descent] to the media.” Speaking of the sons and daughters of Algerian immigrants who had grown up or were born in France, Tazdaït said. “We were a hidden generation.” The rise of the National Front was the backlash to the greater visibility of both immigrants and French-North Africans who had lived in France for decades as French citizens.

5.7 Emergence of Post-March Associations

It was this environment of mistrust, violence, and desperation that led to the formation of SOS Racisme in 1984. Its catchy slogan, “Touche pas à mon pôte” (“Hands off my pal”), was popular among students and youth activists as a united response against the National Front. Initially affiliated with the Socialist Party, the group held a rock concert in Paris in 1985, which attracted 300,000 people. Additional groups which fought racism in France included Ligue des droits de l’homme (League of Human Rights) and the Mouvement contra le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples (Movement against racism and friendship between peoples), which, along with SOS Racisme, advocated for the passage of French anti-discrimination laws. The Mémoire Fertile (Fertile Memory) organized in 1988 in Saint-Denis, a suburb north of Paris focused on neighborhood improvement issues and multiculturalism, a complement to the nationalist message of SOS Racisme. Despite these new associations, discrimination and economic deprivation lingered, and police continued to harass youths.

374 For more on this, see Michèle Lamont, The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000), 197.

In the mid-to-late 1980s, two organizations formed in the Lyon region provided a voice for Arab and Muslim youth. In 1985, Tazdaït initiated *Jeunes Arabes de Lyon et de la Banlieue* (Young Arabs of Lyon and the Suburbs, known by its French initials, JALB), to defend the rights of citizens who had been wronged by the police and the justice system and to denounce racism and discrimination. The impetus for JALB came from an unjust murder of a French Arab in Lyon. Michael Augustin recalls the moment: “In Lyon, the murder of Nordine Mechta will provoke a strong emotion and will constitute the first feat of JALB on the judicial level. On the night of 28 and 29 September 1985, this frail 23-year-old student was stabbed to death in the center of the city by Bruno Leroch, a bargeman from the Le Mistral barge, assisted by two accomplices.”376 From that moment, JALB dedicated itself to provide legal assistance to individual victims. But Tazdaït quickly realized it was national in scope when she learned of similar cases in Marseille, Nice, and Paris. JALB encouraged newcomers to become activists.

Throughout the 1980s, Tazdaït led many different demonstrations to support those who could not get access to the courts. In 1986 she participated in a hunger strike against unfair justice. At the time, people were being kicked out of France for crimes—“a double penalty,” she calls it. There was little support from politicians. “We had to invent new methods of protest,” she explained. It was in the common interest to tell the public that many Arabs were victims, that these were the first generation born in France. They wanted civility and inclusion in their own country. “We had two goals,” Djida said, “survival and respect.”377

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377 Interview with Djida Tazdaït by the author, June 27, 2017, Lyon, France.
Another group, the *Union des Jeunes Musulmans* (Union of Young Muslims, or UJM) formed in Lyon in 1987. Still in existence, UJM offers Arabic language instruction, hosts debates at the Centre Tawhid in Villeurbanne, and maintains a library as a way to encourage France to understand and recognize Islam as an important religion. Two additional Lyon-based groups, *Association Culturelle Franco-Tunisienne d’Oullins et du Grand Lyon* (Cultural Franco-Tunisian Association of Oullins and Greater Lyon), based in the city of Oullins, just across the Rhône from Lyon, and a Senegalese organization, raised awareness of Islamic culture and encourage community connections. Associations managed their own communication network by producing a magazine, *Sans Frontière*, as well as Radio Beur and Im’média news agency, and organized demonstrations, such as those against the National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen by a “Youth Collective for the Lyon Region” in 1984. A new organization, *France Plus* was formed, and a national conference, Convergences ’84 attempted to mobilize support for a multicultural agenda. But a robust civil rights agenda did not last.

### 5.8 Setbacks

Despite the gains French civil rights activists achieved during the first half of the 1980s, fissures in the movement opened in the second half of the decade. It was not for lack of trying. *France Plus* and *SOS Racisme* desperately tried to mobilize supporters, organizing a second and third March Against Racism in 1985 (the last one on scooters), but the demonstration fizzled from

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internal conflicts. Nationally, the movement suffered from intergenerational conflicts, infighting, and an agenda coopted by the Socialist party. According to Boubeker, the Socialists “bungled a historic opportunity to initiate a major public debate on the new multiethnic and multicultural dimension of French society.”

Fabien Jobard echoes the sentiment expressed by Camille Hamidi that “these movements . . . experienced blatant failure, due to the political inexperience of the young banlieues leaders, who found themselves detached from older and more experienced first-generation movements, and marginalised by the hegemonic Parti Socialiste, whose short-sighted tactics stymied the development of an institutionalised immigrant on the left of French politics.”

In addition, many French civil rights organizations lacked long-term funding to hire staff to continue their work, unlike American nonprofits, which relied on private foundation support (community development corporations also generated fee-based income from real estate projects). Although private investors funded SOS Racisme and France Plus, their infighting thwarted a sustained, coordinated effort. Finally, civil rights advocacy created a backlash among National Front supporters and a presidential administration wary of embracing an unstable movement. As Fysh and Wolfeys explain, by 1988 “As many as 4,375,000 French citizens had cast their votes for the leader of a party committed to racial discrimination and the outgoing government had shown signs of wanting to go down he same road.”

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381 Boubeker, “Outsiders in the French Melting Pot” (2009), 75.
382 Jobard, “An overview of French riots, 1981-2004” (2009), 28. Hamidi writes that “The younger Beurs were portrayed at this time as secular and firmly on the path to integration, whereas the older migrants, who were asking for a decent place of worship in the factory, were said by the then Prime Minister (Pierre Mauroy) not to form ‘part of French reality’, as leading an ‘ayatollah’s strike’. ” Hamidi, “Riots and protest cycles: immigrant mobilisation in France, 1968-2008” (2009), 142.
383 Fysh and Wolfeys, 177.
Despite these setbacks, France’s anti-racism project continued throughout the 1980s. In another photo on her Facebook page (most likely from 1989), Tazdaït appears with a look of serious determination, her hair windswept and carrying a sash. She walks in front of a large street protest with people carrying signs with the face of Abdallah Bouafia, a 42-year-old former Renault worker who had been brutally murdered by four men in Lyon on November 24, 1989. Actually, the men merely kidnapped Bouafia and transported him to a fenced-in facility where they unleashed vicious dogs on him to do the rest. His last words were reportedly, “Pardon, qu’est-ce que j’ai fait...” (“Sorry, what did I do?”). Another man of North African origin, Aïssa Bettiaoua, 59 years old and a former French soldier decorated with the Croix de Guerre, a heroism award bestowed upon brave survivors of combat by the French military, was kidnapped at around the same time and thrown into a cage where dogs attacked him. He survived, but is an invalid. An article reported that, “A la place de ses mains, il a des moignons” (“In place of his hands, he has stumps”). During the trial of Bouafia’s murderers in 1992, Tazdaït told the publication L’Humanité, “We need an example to discourage racism.”

Despite the setbacks of the second half of the decade, French civil rights leaders such as Tazdaït kept the movement going. In 1989, Tazdaït, along with Nora Zaïdi, a member of SOS Racisme, were elected to the European Parliament, the first people of North African descent to serve on the body. In 2014, Tazdaït was elected to Lyon’s City Council representing the city’s Eighth Arrondissement.

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5.9 Conclusion

The Atlantic connection between citizen movements in the United States and France is stronger than has been previously acknowledged. Motivated by civil rights organizations in both the United States and United Kingdom, France’s civil rights organizations gained significant momentum by the mid-1980s. As Camille Hamidi writes, “Inspired by the Black movement in the United States and in the UK, all these groups sought to construct an independent immigrant movement and to break free of the stereotype of the ‘Beur,’ which was ceaselessly propagated by the media of the day.”


As in Pittsburgh, the role of women in forming organizations and defining the civil rights agenda is far more important than previous authors have acknowledged. Women continued to play a leading role in France’s civil rights struggles of the 1990s. While the efforts of Tadzaït are highlighted, many more women worked behind the scenes, out of the media spotlight. They helped organize meetings, make signs, write articles, and advocate for change.

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385 Likewise, French activists inspired American civil rights leaders. In the early 1990s, Djida Tazdaït explained that she met with community leaders in Los Angeles after the riots there in 1992. Author’s interview with Djida Tazdaït, June 27, 2017, Lyon, France.

386 Hamidi, “Riots and protest cycles” (2009), 141.
Despite the outsized role of the state, marginalized populations formed associations to manage life in their community, to advocate for the passage of civil rights laws (particularly in the subsequent decade), and hold elected officials accountable for conditions in their communities. In fact, due to the advocacy of these individuals and their associations, the state poured more resources into communities of need. There were setbacks, to be sure. The continued violence in Les Minguettes and in Vaulx-en-Velin after La Marche, along with electoral gains garnered by the National Front, show that the efforts of a few brave activists could not completely change the nature of police-community relations or curb hate. The higher profile of immigrants and first-generation residents who asserted their citizenship rights may have fueled a backlash among longtime French who felt threatened by “la France de toutes les couleurs.” In this respect, the banlieue movement that emerged from Lyon during these years bore a resemblance to the U.S. civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s.

The question—why does Lyon occupy such an important place in France’s civil rights history?—can partly be answered by sheer numbers. Lyon plays a central role in defining France’s civil rights agenda during the 1980s and 1990s due to the city’s long legacy of resistance, key leadership, and tens of thousands of social housing units surrounding a relatively small central city population. With a large proportion of young people out of work in the formerly industrial suburbs, it was just a matter of time before unrest manifested itself.

From 1979 to 1989, community leaders from Lyon and its suburbs played an instrumental role in defining the civil rights agenda for France. Inspired by transatlantic currents of self determination and ethnic pride, the region’s citizens of North African origin awakened the country’s political consciousness to define a new conception of what it means to be “French.”
The founding of Zaâma d’Banlieue in 1979, the 1983 march, numerous peaceful demonstrations, hunger strikes, and formation of associations during the 1980s provided proof that civil rights activists—mostly young and often female from the most subjugated communities—had pried open a window of opportunity with the central government, as well as the general public, to exercise their social capital and announce their right to the city. As Boubeker explains, “It was very much in an antiracist language that the banlieue of the 1980s found expression. Political questions were reduced to moral universals and the great encompassing love of humankind.”

These associative actions also challenged negative media stereotypes of young people as directionless, unemployed troublemakers in a region which suffered disproportionately from deindustrialization and a large influx of immigrants. The civil rights project contributed mightily to a national conversation about race, place, and aspirations of people who were often described as lost souls. Far from astray, leaders from the Lyon region announced that a French multicultural society is here to stay.

Although the civil rights demonstrations of the 1980s have been described as temporary or fragile and created a backlash among France’s most conservative core, they were were a beginning, not an end. The project continued in the 1990s and beyond. While some of the movement’s highest profile leaders, such as Toumi Djaïdja, faded from view, they never went away.

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388 Thirty years after the 1983 march, a feature film, “La Marche,” directed by Nabil Ben Yadir (a Belgian), opened in 2013. Djaïdja revisited the issues raised in the initial march, a sign that he still exerts influence over the media and a new generation of activists. In his 2013 mémoire, Djaïdja, now the owner of a home help service company, explained his humble role in the civil rights project, that of initiator and motivator, but not necessarily timeless torchbearer: “I did not want to become the ‘guardian of the temple’ alone keeping the flame of faith: I had better things to do. I was in love. After the March, I did what was most beautiful: to [start] a family.” Adil Jazouli et Toumi Djaïdja, La Marche pour l’Égalité. Une histoire dans l’Histoire. (La Tour-d’Aigues: Éditions de l’Aube, 2013), 105.
The French civil rights movement, like that of the U.S., did not progress along a straight line. There were counter-movements, corrections, infighting, and misinterpretations. The rise of the National Front is but one example of how self awareness of race, class, and gender among the sons and daughters of North African immigrants—ultimately French citizens—created a backlash that allowed an opening for racist leaders such as Le Pen and his daughter Marine to counter with a rhetoric of hate. This is similar to the Republican wave that emerged in the U.S. in the 1960s as a backlash to civil rights and other social changes. Some will never be convinced that multiculturalism is not only good for society, it is good business.

In the presentation of Karim Taharount’s book *On est chez nous* (*We are at home*, 2017), about France’s civil rights era of the 1980s, Professor Annie Fourcaut calls the period “that of a failure, whose consequences still weigh heavily on French society today.” Yet, it would only be a failure if the efforts simply ended with no victories, even temporary ones. The era succeeded in raising the profile of French citizens of North African and Arab descent, secured important legal victories for the rights of immigrants, and set in motion a consciousness-raising among the general public about the racist dimensions of a seemingly egalitarian society. In the United States, one can point to the election of America’s first black president, the implementation of fair housing and fair lending laws, the integration of whites and blacks into mainstream society, along with enduring civil rights and community development organizations, as examples of “success,” even if the fight for equality and justice was never really “won.” Such struggles for humanity and a more just society continued in subsequent decades.

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6.0 Pittsburgh’s New Approaches to Community Development in the 1990s

Ron Weathers became a homeowner in Pittsburgh’s Garfield neighborhood in 1994. Ordinarily, this would not be a noteworthy occurrence, but Weathers, a twenty-four-year-old African American, became a symbol of the increasing minority homeownership trend that swept across the United States in the 1990s, a drastic change from just a half a decade earlier. At the time, Weathers said that “I felt a need to have homeownership rights in my community. . . . I want people to see that the knowledge and understanding that I have can be shared. Homeownership is not impossible for black people. It is necessity.” African American borrowers like Weathers helped the U.S. achieve a historic high for minority homeownership, at 42.7% by the end of the 1990s. Weathers joined a growing number of African Americans who became real estate owners “to understand prosperity . . . to obtain assets and properties as the only way to gain wealth,” as he explained in an interview. His home on Broad Street in Garfield, purchased for $105,000, according to Allegheny County real estate records, included a rental unit that gave him

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390 A report published by the University Pittsburgh showed that in 1990 “Pittsburgh has one of the poorest, most economically disadvantaged black populations of any large city in the U.S.,” including the “Highest percentage of black males age 25-54 not in the labor force (30.9%) . . . Highest poverty rate for blacks age 18.64 (35.2%) . . . [and the] 15th lowest rate of homeownership for blacks under age 65 (29.5%).” University Center for Social and Urban Research, “Black and White Economic Conditions in the City of Pittsburgh: A Benchmarks Special Report,” University of Pittsburgh, June 1995, 5. Hillman Library Archives.

391 “What Homeownership Means to Me, by Ron Weathers,” PCRG News, Spring 1995, 15. In a follow-up interview twenty four years later, Weathers said he got into real estate “to understand prosperity . . . to obtain assets and properties as the only way to gain wealth.” Author’s interview with Ron Weathers, Pittsburgh, Pa., March 5, 2018.


393 Interview with Weathers, March 5, 2018.
additional income. Weathers would go on to own six additional properties throughout the East End in the 1990s and 2000s. The spotlight on Weathers caught the attention of a branch manager for Fidelity Savings Bank, Donna Stanny, who wrote, “Ron Weathers is a man that all single males can emulate. His pride and self-respect is well-warranted, and the community of Garfield is fortunate to have him as a resident.”

The 1990s represented the culmination of efforts by Pittsburgh’s neighborhood activists to forge lasting relationships with the private sector after decades of public sector withdrawal from urban America. Due to a recovering economy, strengthened commitments from financial institutions and foundations, expert staff working for neighborhood groups, and enforcement of a little-known law from the 1970s, the Community Reinvestment Act, a record number of affordable housing and commercial properties were restored or built in city neighborhoods. Borrowers like Ron Weathers were also products of the maturing partnership between the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group (PCRG) and Pittsburgh-based financial institutions. PCRG, formed in 1988 as a coalition of 30 community based organizations representing low- and moderate-income and minority neighborhoods, successfully challenged Pittsburgh financial institutions under the federal Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). As a result, banks agreed to increase outreach and lending to formerly redlined neighborhoods in Pittsburgh. Weathers

396 As Deitrick explains, the economy had not recovered for all parts of the Pittsburgh region. “Hard-core poverty stretched from Pittsburgh’s inner-city neighborhoods to the Monongahela River Valley towns where the steel mills once stood. In some of these areas, over one-fourth of all families lived in poverty in 1989. The economic and social conditions of the region’s African-American population fell to among the nation’s worst by 1990.” Sabina Deitrick, “The post industrial revitalization of Pittsburgh: myths and evidence,” Community Development Journal 34, No. 1 (January 1999): 7.
obtained his home mortgage loan from Integra Bank using the Housing Recovery Program
developed by PCRG. The Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation rehabilitated the home he purchased.
Out of the deal, Weathers received equity in a new home, and Integra received credit for making
a loan in the majority African American Garfield. Such transactions became increasingly
common as banks regulated by CRA, along with many independent mortgage and finance
companies, competed for borrowers in communities they had previously ignored. The public
sector played a key role later in the decade with the federal Hope VI program, which transformed
neighborhoods, such as the Hill and Manchester, with the reconstruction of old public housing
units, long a community development problem. Such conditions not only laid the foundation for
increased rates of minority homeownership, but it created unintended consequences such as
gentrification, income inequality, and predatory lending which emerged in the following decade.

6.1 The Maturation of Community Development Corporations

The 1990s represent a productive decade for community development corporations (CDCs)
nationally, which finally accomplished scale in affordable home production that first generation
CDC leaders had only dreamed of in the 1970s. CDCs amassed incredible power to shape urban
markets through their advanced capacity and sophistication.397 According to Paul Grogan and
Tony Proscio, “CDCs have become prodigious producers of housing: by 1988, they were turning
out more than 20,000 affordable houses and apartments every year, and by 1994 that number had
risen above 40,000—a number that eclipses the federal government’s total output at the apex of
the public housing program. A further surge of production erupted between 1994 and 1997, as

CDCs generated 247,000 new and rehabilitated houses.”\textsuperscript{398} The ability of locally-controlled CDCs to generate tangible results in low-income communities represented a risk-reduction strategy that made them ideal partners for government agencies, banks, private housing developers, and other investors.\textsuperscript{399} In Pittsburgh, this era marked a shift to consensus; the community mounted few protests and presented little conflict with corporations or government as community development corporations turned their attention to production of primarily for-sale housing in the city’s low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. In one neighborhood alone, Crawford Square in the Lower Hill District, more than 400 new housing units were constructed on 18 acres in three phases in the early 1990s, one of the largest community refill developments in the city at that time. Of the properties constructed in Crawford Square, 350 were affordable rental units and 71 were for-sale houses (in Phase III, homes were offered at market rate).\textsuperscript{400}

Such productivity was the result of innovative CDCs with the capacity to become major market players. It also reflected the diversity of capital sources that CDCs drew upon to accomplish their objectives—from federal, state, and local government funds to foundation and corporate donors, equity investments, tax credits, and private investors. By 2010, across America and in urban areas around the world, real estate markets like Garfield became attractive to higher-income residents as demand for urban real estate made housing prices unaffordable to

\textsuperscript{398} Grogan and Proscio, 70.

\textsuperscript{399} Grogan and Proscio note that a CDC with a long track record of competency “soon becomes an experienced, legitimate vehicle for addressing other neighborhood and community needs. . . . Successful housing initiatives serve as concrete evidence that the community group is an actor to be nurtured, bargained with, and consulted. . . . Governments of every ideological stripe will work with CDCs because doing so brings decision making down to the neighborhood level, where it’s closest to the people it affects.” Grogan and Proscio, 71-73.

an increasing number of low- and moderate-income residents.\textsuperscript{401} But who could have predicted such circumstances in the aftermath of a widely publicized riot in Los Angeles?

The highly publicized violent rebellion that erupted in L.A. in 1992 after the acquittal of four police offers accused of beating motorist Rodney King stimulated greater action for revitalizing low-income areas, as well as the need to try different approaches. Presidential candidates in the 1992 contest, most notably those in the Democratic Party, wanted to keep the national focus on revitalizing urban America, in part to address the immediate concerns surrounding South Central Los Angeles, site of the riots, as well as the larger issue of America’s neglected cities. Bill Clinton, who ultimately won, resurrected programs from both the Carter and Reagan administrations and, claiming them as his own, rolled out a number of market-based initiatives that reduced the reliance on federal government involvement in urban America. These programs included enhanced enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act and other fair housing laws and an interagency push to increase homeownership, especially among minorities. Clinton also revived the Enterprise Zone plan (developed under Reagan but which ultimately became federal law in 1993). He promoted nonprofit community development lenders after a campaign visit to South Shore Bank in Chicago, which inspired the creation of the federal Community Development Financial Institutions Fund. Perhaps the largest impact on urban America was the creation of the Hope VI program to remake public housing, explained in greater detail below. But Clinton was responding to change from below. In Pittsburgh during the 1990s, many of these initiatives were already underway, particularly the relationships between community development corporations and banks.

Although some CDC directors had a comfort level working with banks to finance housing construction, most neighborhood leaders did not understand the retail side of banking—lending to consumers in low- and moderate-income and minority neighborhoods. In Pittsburgh’s Manchester neighborhood in the 1970s, the Manchester Citizens Corporation recruited banks and foundations to supplement government support of community real estate projects. But leaders such as Manchester’s Stanley Lowe realized that bank redlining undermined the very projects that CDCs recruited banks to support. For instance, a bank may have provided financing to the CDC to construct new townhomes in a low-income area, but just across the street in the same neighborhood, individual homeowners could not obtain a home purchase or home improvement loan from the same bank because it had redlined the neighborhood. It was as if there were two completely divergent actions from the same financial institution in the same neighborhood.

Despite the initial CRA agreements the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group (PCRG) negotiated with Pittsburgh’s largest banks in the late-1980s, results were slow to materialize. In December 1993, a month after Clinton was elected, newspapers told the story of continued bank disinvestment in Pittsburgh neighborhoods: “Blacks still face problems getting mortgages, group says,” read one headline. PCRG had just published its latest home mortgage lending report using publicly available data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. In Pittsburgh’s thirteen majority African American neighborhoods in 1992, only 204 loans were approved, or seven percent of all loans in the city. The organizer of PCRG, Stanley Lowe, remarked, “‘Some (banks) just don’t care’” and he “threatened to ask the [U.S.] Justice Department to investigate four or five institutions if they failed to make efforts to improve

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402 “Summary of Neighborhood Lending In the City of Pittsburgh 1992” (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group, January 1994).
neighborhood lending and work with the Reinvestment Group.” At the time, PCRG had adversarial relationships with some financial institutions, and it was not clear that bankers believed in the culture of reinvestment.

In the early 1990s, the environment for race relations in the Pittsburgh area was not good. A housing discrimination case settled in 1994, the Sanders consent decree, had failed to be implemented as intended. Fears expressed by whites in suburban communities delayed the consent decree’s implementation, heightening a sense of race consciousness in the Pittsburgh region. In addition, police brutality had also become a front-page issue. On October 12, 1995, police in suburban Brentwood stopped a black motorist, Johnny Gammage. The routine traffic stop escalated into violence, resulting in the strangulation death of Gammage by three police officers. The case created a national sensation, making national news and attracting Jesse Jackson to Pittsburgh. The following year, Pittsburgh’s black citizens filed numerous complaints against overly-aggressive police, including false arrest and abuse. An 83-page consent decree filed in 1997 between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Pittsburgh Police “turned Pittsburgh into a widely emulated model department — for a time, at least.”


However, to Lowe and members of PCRG, the issue of community reinvestment was related to place as much as race, and the Community Reinvestment Act was seen as an opportunity to influence the destiny of Pittsburgh’s low-income and minority neighborhoods. An example of a neighborhood which leveraged its social capital into financial capital was the California-Kirkbride neighborhood on the city’s North Side, sandwiched between Manchester and the Mexican War Streets. A resident of the neighborhood, Harriet Henson, formed a community group, Calbride Place Citizens Council, but had trouble obtaining loans to fix up houses. She realized that in order for her neighborhood to advance beyond a reliance on government support and foundation grants, it needed bank capital. Therefore, she was quick to sign on to the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group when it first formed. Due to challenges from advocates like Henson, the community’s stance of conflict with financial institutions changed as banks saw the opportunities to invest in low-income areas. Although Henson died in 1999 at age 54, she oversaw a $4.5 million redevelopment of Brighton Place that stabilized the neighborhood and created community security patrols on the streets. Nineteen Victorian homes were restored and turned into 34 affordable housing units for community residents. “The housing looks better. People seem to be proud. Now, I can see the potential that was here all along,” she explained.407

6.2 Trust Builds Between Banks and Communities

Community advocates like Lowe and Henson used Alinsky-style techniques to gain bankers’ attention, but once they came to the negotiating table, it was time for the community to respond.

As Shel Trapp wrote in *Blessed be the Fighters* (1986), “Partnerships are great as long as there is mutual respect.” The Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group expressed its needs in three ways: on paper with a “Community Needs Assessment,” on foot through neighborhood tours for bankers, and in regularly scheduled community development advisory group meetings with bank executives. All three methods reinforced the notion that a bank-community relationship was an ongoing process, not just a one-time arrangement.

PCRG developed a list of various projects and demands for each financial institution entitled, “Community Needs Assessment.” Items included favorable terms on home improvement loans for historic houses, CDC project financing for affordable housing, collaborative projects with the Urban Redevelopment Authority to construct or rehabilitate residential or commercial projects, bank branches in low-income and minority neighborhoods, participation in a credit counseling service, and other products and services targeted to hard-to-reach populations. The community needs assessment was a signal to the banks that communities were ready to do business, not ask for handouts.

PCRG published an annual lending report that became a critical component of the community needs assessment. The lending report highlighted the loans the bank had approved and rejected the previous year. Every bank with which PCRG worked provided operating support for the organization, which went for paid staff to produce the lending report and manage the bank-community relationship. This arrangement is why some critics of CRA called organizations like PCRG “extortionists,” since it seemed that banks were paying their watchdog

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408 As Shel Trapp wrote in *Blessed be the Fighters* (1986), “Partnerships are great as long as there is mutual respect.” Quoted in Squires (2003), 21.

409 Three staff ran PCRG in the 1990s; Lowe received no compensation from PCRG. His salary came from Pittsburgh History & Landmarks Foundation as its loan fund manager.
groups to keep quiet. In reality, though, PCRG provided a valuable service to the banks by helping them develop innovative programs and enabling them to connect with low- and moderate-income and minority communities.

PCRG also expressed community needs by providing neighborhood tours for bankers to understand community needs at the ground-level. Dollar Bank’s CRA Officer, Howard Slaughter, explained that having bankers tour low-income and minority neighborhoods convinced them to see these communities differently than what appeared in the news. He credits Integra Bank’s CRA Officer, Don Reed, with starting the neighborhood tours. “That was when the believability really began,” Slaughter exclaimed. “Not only hearing about the challenges, but seeing them and meeting the people in the neighborhoods—it made it real, beyond the paper loan applications,” he said. Bank presidents and vice presidents walked in the neighborhoods and saw the opportunities and challenges. “It was the human side of banking,” Slaughter explained.410

Finally, through Community Development Advisory Group (CDAG) meetings established by PCRG, senior banking officials met regularly with community group representatives to monitor bank loan performance and mutually develop a number of solutions for investment in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods. Together, PCRG and the banks developed several innovative programs in the 1990s which revitalized Pittsburgh’s low- and moderate-income neighborhoods and fueled further affordable housing and commercial development by neighborhood-based CDCs. The community development advisory group meetings provided an opportunity to build trust and credibility between senior bank executives and the community on an ongoing basis.

410 Author’s interview with Howard Slaughter, May 4, 2018, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Financial institutions which hired key personnel who had both a professional and a personal commitment to community reinvestment, enhancing these banks’ CRA efforts. Scott Brown, an African American commercial lender at Mellon, was appointed the bank’s CRA officer in 1993 by Matthew Giles, an African American vice president of Mellon’s retail bank. Not sure if he would remain in the role, Brown thought, “I’ll give it a shot for a little while before going back to commercial lending.” He stayed. “I’ve enjoyed it,” he reflected 25 years later. “It was because of the people inside the bank and outside the bank [in the community]. “A lot of what you do [as a CRA officer] is relationship building,” Brown explained.

A native of Garfield, Brown built strong relationships with Aggie Brose and Rick Swartz of the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation, among other neighborhood leaders.

The start of bank-community relationships in the late-1980s and early-1990s was not smooth. “Initially, the requests were all over the place,” Brown explains of neighborhood needs articulated by community leaders. “There was an educational process on both sides. In the beginning, Aggie Brose was one of those people saying, ‘we demand that you lend in Garfield’ without really understanding the position of the bank. But after a while, Aggie became one of the biggest supporters of the bank. She stood up and said that ‘we can’t just ask the bank to lose money. We can’t just give mortgages to people who don’t have good credit or were too highly leveraged.’” Brown remembers the initial relationship building between banks and communities “was an educational experience for both of us,” he said. “In the end, we came into a meeting of the minds. How do we do this on a reasonable basis, as opposed to just yelling at each other and

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accusing banks of redlining and not lending.” Thus began a decades-long relationship between financial institutions and community based organizations.

Another Garfield native, Howard Slaughter, who served as the Assistant Vice President and CRA Officer for Dollar Bank in the early-1990s, remembers the period as one in which he became a powerful advocate for neighborhoods within the bank. As a bank officer in charge of CRA, Slaughter reported directly to Dollar Bank’s president, Steve Hansen, which allowed him to influence how the bank perceived community reinvestment. Slaughter recalled taking Hansen to meet with Lowe and other community representatives at PCRG’s offices on the North Side in 1992. After the meeting, Hansen saw the need in the community and better understood the willingness to do community reinvestment. “Key decision makers need to be at the table in order for change to occur,” Slaughter exclaimed.412

PNC Bank’s current CRA officer, Cathy Niederberger, grew up in Pittsburgh’s Mt. Oliver neighborhood. “We had a real sense of community,” she reminisces. “It sensitized me to community development.” In 1987 Niederberger worked for Union National Bank (which became Integra Bank in 1988), where she, along with Stephanie Cipriani, became part of the CRA team under Don Reed in the late-1980s and early-1990s. “I loved it,” Niederberger exclaimed when asked about her time at Integra. “The work of lending on projects and dealing with community groups . . . That was the best part of my banking career.”413

Niederberger helped close a number of real estate deals in Pittsburgh’s low- and moderate-income communities, such as the 24-unit affordable housing development called

412 Author’s interview with Howard Slaughter, May 4, 2018, Pittsburgh, Pa.
413 Author’s interview with Cathy Niederberger, executive vice president of community development banking, PNC Bank, May 25, 2018, Pittsburgh, Pa. PNC Bank’s Marva Harris noted Niederberger’s prowess and hired her in 1996, where she has been ever since.
Alequippa Place in West Oakland, the Dorothy Day Apartments in Larimer, and Edwards Court on the South Side, one of the first new housing developments in that community in decades. As the examples of Scott Brown, Howard Slaughter, and Cathy Niederberger attest, bankers’ personal commitments to Pittsburgh neighborhoods drove many of the community investment initiatives in the 1990s.

6.3 New Programs Emerge

A number of innovative programs developed to meet community needs, the results of trust forged between community-bank relationships. These programs included the Housing Recovery Program (HRP), which enabled banks to bundle a conventional home purchase loan with a home improvement loan to a borrower wishing to buy and rehabilitate an older house. The Urban Redevelopment Authority provided additional financing that lowered the purchase price of the home so middle-income buyers could participate. In addition to Garfield, adjoining Friendship saw the re-conversion of apartments into single-family homes (some of the homes had been subdivided during the Depression). The loan figures showed the results: between the program’s inception in 1990 and 1995, 226 HRP projects were completed and produced 311 owner-occupied housing units. The HRP transformed neighborhoods like Friendship into attractive places for first-time homebuyers of modest incomes.

The community development advisory group meetings also identified poor credit among borrowers as one of the barriers to increased lending among African Americans and low-income

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individuals. Therefore, PCRG and the banks created a new credit counseling service, the Community Lender Credit Program (CLCP) to provide credit repair services for borrowers who had spotty credit or other conditions that would prevent them from obtaining a bank loan and prepare them for homeownership. Citizen Bank’s Scott Brown said CLCP was “one of the big wins for us as a city. So, instead of saying to the bank, lower your credit standards, we as organizations said, how do we get credit standards up.”415 Once borrowers had “clean” credit histories through the CLCP counseling process, they became eligible for bank loans from one of the twelve banks with which PCRG worked. The program not only provided a “pipeline” of borrowers for the banks, but provided a way for borrowers to repair their credit and become worthy of a loan. Between 1993 and 1995, CLCP provided counseling services for 110 individuals who eventually purchased homes.

CRA mortgage lending was not just for large institutions with abundant staff and resources to develop and deploy innovative programs. Lowe worked with two executives at small institutions, Tom Chunchick of Community Savings Bank and Mike Mooney of Fidelity Savings Bank, to create the “Ain’t I A Woman” program in the fall of 1993.416 The name was chosen as an appeal to African American women to inspire them to take the leap into homeownership outside of public housing. As Stanley Lowe remarked, “‘Ain’t I Woman’” is a program we’ve developed and designed to simply sing the praises of people who have gone

415 CLCP was succeeded by NeighborWorks Western Pennsylvania.

through the struggle of getting the mortgages, rehabilitating their homes and living in them successfully, and are now in a position to tell others, ‘You can do it as well.’”417

However, the name was a difficult sell to suburban white male bankers, who had little understanding of African American culture. To allay bankers’ concerns, Lowe devised a seminar in which women could interact with bankers to develop home mortgage relationships—kind of like “speed dating” for the lending industry. On a cold, rainy Saturday morning in November 1993, more than 300 women from public housing communities across Pittsburgh showed up in the basement of a church to hear what Chunchick and Mooney had to say.418 After another seminar held in 1994, both banks came away with a list of prospective borrowers, and the women built trust among institutions that had historically ignored African Americans. The results showed up in the next lending report. In 1994, Community Savings Bank made seven loans to African American census tracts and approved six loans to African Americans. Fidelity approved four loans in African American census tracts, and eleven loans were approved to African American borrowers.419 Fidelity’s Mike Mooney said, “‘We’re committed to this program year-to-year. . . . Our staff knows we’re doing the right thing to keep our neighborhoods together. . . . Everyone is in tune with CRA.’”420 In sum, these innovative programs encouraged homeownership among low- and moderate-income and

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African American borrowers and connected financial institutions with new markets. Banks now competed for market share in neighborhoods they had ignored just five years ago.

In addition, PCRG helped Allegheny Valley Bank, based in the Lawrenceville neighborhood, develop an “Upstairs/Downstairs” loan program that provided a purchase-rehab loan to buyers of commercial properties along the city’s older Main Street corridors that enabled them have a storefront or art gallery on the first floor and live upstairs. It was the perfect program for artists to buy properties along Butler Street in Lawrenceville and Penn Avenue in the Bloomfield-Garfield-Friendship corridor and have a long-term presence on the street. The Upstairs/Downstairs loan was one of the programs that encouraged the remaking of Penn Avenue into an arts corridor and Butler Street into a model of Main Street revitalization.

Lastly, in 1996, PCRG renegotiated its agreement with Integra Bank, then worth $1.67 billion in lending, services, and investments in the Pittsburgh market through 2000. It was the largest deal in the nation at the time, as Integra prepared to be acquired by Cleveland-based National City Corp. Pittsburgh Mayor Tom Murphy said, “It is clear to us that the public dollar can not be the only investment in many neighborhoods. . . . We need private partners. This is the kind of commitment that gives us a strong partner along with our neighborhood community organizations.”

These and other innovative products and programs encouraged low- and moderate-income borrowers and African Americans to become homeowners and enabled financial

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institutions to connect with a new market. Although these CRA loans were not high-value, such as jumbo loans more commonly made in the suburbs, banks received CRA credit, goodwill from the community, and a relatively stable portfolio of loans. The community not only received new attention from banks, but acquired enduring relationships. Most CDC directors could now pick up the phone can talk directly to a bank president, an action unheard of just a few years prior.

6.4 The Revival of Main Street

With its origins in the 1970s, the Main Street approach to revitalizing small town and neighborhood business districts was slow to take hold in the 1980s. At a time when suburban malls were still popular, older, pedestrian-friendly business districts such as Penn Avenue, which ran between Garfield and Friendship, had become obsolete and anachronistic, at least in the eyes of planners, as well as consumers. In 1977, the National Trust for Historic Preservation oversaw a three-year Main Street demonstration program for three midwestern communities.422 At the time, it was difficult to convince a skeptical public, planners, and politicians of the program’s utility. But with a formula that emphasized four points—economic vitality, design, promotion, and organization—the Main Street approach attracted investment dollars, retained and attracted businesses, and created jobs. The National Trust transformed the experimental program into the National Main Street Center in 1980 and expanded it to include communities in six states, including Pennsylvania.423 By 1995, the Main Street program had generated $6 billion in new


423 The western Pennsylvania towns of Titusville and Uniontown were among the first demonstration cities in 1980.
investment, attracted 33,000 new businesses, created 115,000 new jobs, and rehabilitated 34,000 historic buildings across the country.\textsuperscript{424}

In Pittsburgh, the East Carson Street Historic District became one of the first big-city Main Street programs in America in 1982, managed by the South Side Local Development Company. Between 1982 and 2010, the retail vacancy rate on East Carson Street decreased from nearly 50\% to less than 10\% as more than 230 façades were restored, 250 new businesses opened, and more than $100 million was invested.\textsuperscript{425} Some believe that the South Side’s Main Street program was so successful, the South Side Local Development Company declared “mission accomplished” and closed its doors for good in 2010.\textsuperscript{426}

But in the early 1980s, Pittsburgh’s City Planning Department still held a view that traditional neighborhood business districts, many of which had a high number of vacancies and were run down, and in the words of BGC’s executive director Rick Swartz, should “die a quiet death” and be demolished. It was thinking leftover from the urban renewal era of the 1950s and 1960s—the same mentality that transformed East Liberty and the North Side into a suburban mall that ultimately failed. In 1983, there were nine CDCs in the city at the time.\textsuperscript{427} With the exception of the South Side Local Development Company, which began in 1982, none had focused on business district revitalization. BGC’s attempt to renovate its business district was not a proven model. The vacancy rate along Penn Avenue was 65\% to 75\% at the time. But with

\textsuperscript{424} Moe and Wilkie, Changing Places, 151.

\textsuperscript{425} “Making the Case for Main Street,” Main Streets Pittsburgh, Urban Redevelopment Authority, June 2010.


the success of the South Side and slow, methodical accomplishments along Penn Avenue, BGC helped sway planners’ thinking.

By the late-1980s, Pittsburgh’s City Planning Department was no longer talking about demolition, but BGC still did not have a plan for the communities it served, Bloomfield, Garfield, and Friendship. On Penn Avenue, the vacancy rate remained at about 65%. In 1990, architect Stephanie Ledewitz approached Swartz to help BGC develop a long-term plan for the neighborhood’s future and lay the foundation for an arts corridor. At the time, Swartz was skeptical. He did not know much about the art community. He wondered, why had artists not approached him about space on Penn Avenue? Still, the Urban Redevelopment Authority and Pittsburgh Partnership for Neighborhood Development (PPND) funded an arts district plan, which was completed in 1992.428 Also around the same time, the Friendship Development Associates (FDA) was formed and received its first funding from PPND in 1992. Mark Minnerly, hired as its first director, occupied an office in the back of BGC’s office on Penn Avenue. Swartz noticed that people who lived in Friendship had many connections to the arts. As a result, the Dance Alloy and the Pittsburgh Glass Center located their headquarters on the Friendship side of Penn in 1995. Around the same time, FDA and BGC started selling properties to artists. Jeff Dorsey, a graduate of Carnegie Mellon University’s school of art, became the first Penn Avenue Arts District Coordinator and helped connect artists to spaces along Penn Avenue.

By the mid-1990s, it was clear that these new neighborhood-based programs and services developed as a direct result of community challenges to bank lending practices. The partnership

428 The concept was initially framed as an “Arts Colony” in the study, one of four ideas considered, including a “Multicultural Marketplace,” “Trades District,” and a “Professional Corridor.” “Penn Avenue Urban Design Study,” prepared for Penn Avenue Development Corporation, Quick Ledewitz Architects, P.C., 1992. The study showed a vacancy rate of 24.4% (56 vacant properties out of a total of 229) on both the north and south sides of Penn Avenue, 102-106.
also penetrated into personal relationships, as well. In the summer of 1995, Rhonda Brandon, executive director of the Manchester Citizens Corporation, lost her son to gun violence in the city’s East Liberty neighborhood. An audience of hundreds turned out to the funeral service in the Hill District. Among those shedding tears were dozens of bank vice presidents with whom Brandon had worked at MCC. When bankers show up at funerals, it is not because they receive CRA credit. Through their work together, bank officers and community leaders established deep personal connections, as well, an expression of the value of social capital. Despite these local accomplishments and personal relationships, a major fight was brewing at the national level over the Community Reinvestment Act, the law that had stimulated this activity.

6.5 Pittsburgh’s Campaign to Save the Community Reinvestment Act

In the midterm elections of 1994, Republicans swept into Congress in a major upset of the established Democratic order. Directly in the crosshairs of their attack on government regulations was CRA, listed as “the tenth most burdensome regulatory act in the nation” by a Congressional committee. In response, community activists mounted a nationwide pro-CRA campaign that put the reinvestment law in a positive light and saved it from being eliminated by the Republican-dominated Congress. Although Saul Alinsky had died in 1972, he was very much present in the wave of protests to save CRA, from the local through national levels.

In the spring of 1995, PCRG organized two busloads of neighborhood people to attend the annual National People’s Action conference in Washington, DC. Chicago-based Gale Cincotta and Shel Trapp presided over a convention of more than 800 activists from around the

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country to protest cuts to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other agencies which supported neighborhood development, as well as express support for CRA, the law Cincotta helped create. Protesters organized “hits” at the homes of Senator Phil Gramm, Republican of Texas, who had called CRA activists “extortionists” and Alan Greenspan, then-chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank. Aggie Brose of the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation led the charge.

The executive director of PCRG, Nancy Schaefer, described how Brose, with two hundred protestors behind her on the lawn, knocked on the door of Alan Greenspan, two weeks after he and NBC correspondent Andrea Mitchell were married. Mitchell answered Brose’s knock. “Aggie says, ‘Hello, are you the new bride?’ and Andrea says, ‘No, I’m Andrea Mitchell,’ and she looks out and sees all our signs. One read, ‘How come if you’re on your honeymoon, we’re the ones getting screwed?’ “Aggie saw her alarm and touched her arm and said, ‘It's OK,’ and the group left the doorway.” Meanwhile, a policeman had shown up. He asked for a permit. Schaefer continued, “Aggie said, ‘You know we don’t have one. But let me ask you something. Do you own your own home?’ and the policeman said, ‘No, I don’t.’” Brose made her pitch for the virtue of neighborhoods taking ownership, beginning with homes. “The policeman agreed to take our letter to the door,” Schaefer said. “It was classic Aggie, so quick on her feet.”

Some criticized NPA’s tactics. But to Gale Cincotta, “they say we are not nice when we protest and demonstrate at people’s homes and offices. But bad housing isn’t nice,

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redlining isn’t nice, high oil prices aren’t nice, crime on our streets isn’t nice,” Cincotta remarked.431

While protests at the homes and agencies of national leaders in Washington channeled activists’ outrage, it was hard to identify immediate outcomes. As a result, NPA encouraged local actions. On September 7, 1995, PCRG organized its own “Save CRA Day Town Meeting” in the Pittsburgh City Council chambers for more than 400 people, including every major media outlet, the Mayor of Pittsburgh, and a host of community leaders.432 Neighborhood activist T.C. Calvert of San Antonio added an emotional exclamation point to the protest: “The fight has just begun,” and left the lectern chanting “Save CRA!  Save CRA!” The crowd joined in as Council Chambers erupted with cheers, applause, bells, and whistles.433

But once the cheering died down, the hard work of actually saving the gains made through CRA continued. Later that fall, PCRG returned to Washington, DC, this time in business attire to provide testimony to Congress to save CRA. Stanley Lowe testified before the Housing Banking Committee, explaining to subcommittee chairwoman Marge Roukema, “‘Without CRA, the 11,672 Pittsburgh residents who received loans in our neighborhoods in just the last four years would view affordable homeownership as nothing more than a dream.’”434 Furthermore, data from the Federal Reserve Bank provided evidence that CRA lending was safe and sound


434 Elise M. Bright, Reviving America’s Forgotten Neighborhoods, 123.
business. In a 1995 letter to Democratic Congressman Barney Frank, who served as the ranking member of the House Banking Committee, Lawrence Lindsay, a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors referred to a number of studies which “demonstrates that the consortium approach to lending in these [low- and moderate-income] areas can serve to spread the risk and make this type of lending possible without undue risk to any individual institution.” Furthermore, he said, “I have not heard of situations involving loans of this type putting any banks at risk.” In other words, there was ample proof that CRA lending was as safe and sound as any other form of lending, perhaps more so in certain cases. As a result, CRA was saved—temporarily, at least. Although Congress failed to pass legislation to eliminate CRA, new regulations were approved to ease banks’ paperwork burden.

But larger market forces at work toward the end of the 1990s threatened to unravel many of the gains achieved by CRA. These included bank consolidations, the expansion of bank operations into non-bank services, the rise of non-bank lenders not covered by CRA, an increase in predatory loans, and an explosion of payday lenders in low-income areas. None of these institutions made commitments to underserved neighborhoods, no relationships were formed, and in most cases, their intentions were not in the best interests of community residents. As Gregory Squires notes, the multi-million-dollar CRA commitments made by the mergers of Citicorp and Travelers and NationsBank and Bank America in the late-1990s “were made without any prior research or planning, or discussions with, neighborhood groups.”


Furthermore, the bankers’ lobbying associations advocated rolling back of CRA. In 1999, Congress passed the Financial Services Modernization Act, which permitted “banks, insurers, and securities firms to enter each others’ business more freely,” but did not apply a CRA-like test on these other lines of business, the first time CRA’s authority was weakened. Such an expansion of banking activity not covered by CRA, some believed, led to the implosion of the housing industry and the Great Recession just eight years later. But bankers continue to view CRA and HMDA in a negative light. In December 2017, the Independent Community Bankers Association called for an increase to HMDA exemption for small institutions, despite PCRG’s evidence that small banks can be equally as effective as large banks at community reinvestment.

At the same time, while many low- and moderate-income communities enjoyed the gains from CRA, residents in public housing were left out. By the mid-1990s, home mortgage and home improvement loans were being made in low-income neighborhoods and to African American borrowers, CDCs were producing a record number of affordable housing units, and individuals had a better connection to the market economy. But from a neighborhood development perspective, the sticking point to further growth remained public housing. Banks refused to lend to properties adjacent to public housing developments. The developments themselves were in poor physical condition. And public housing authorities across the United States were rife with corruption or lacked visionary and risk-taking leadership. This changed

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437 Squires, Organizing Access to Capital (2003), 18.

dramatically under the Clinton Administration, and Mayor Tom Murphy seized upon the moment to reshape Pittsburgh’s low-income neighborhoods in profound ways.

6.6 Hope VI and the Remaking of Public Housing

In the 1990s, one of the cornerstones of the Clinton Administration’s plans to “remake welfare as we know it” called for demolition of the nation’s most “severely distressed” public housing to be replaced with New Urbanist-style infill housing for a range of incomes, not just the poorest. It was the administration’s way of dispersing concentrated poverty.\(^{439}\) The program was a refashioned program from the Bush administration, Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE), promoted by then-HUD secretary Jack Kemp in 1989, which allowed public housing tenants to purchase their own homes.\(^{440}\) The Clinton administration resurrected HOPE as the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, later renamed Hope VI (“Hope Six”) under the leadership of HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros, the former mayor of San Antonio.\(^{441}\)

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\(^{439}\) Hope VI was the result of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, established by Congress in 1989, which found that “roughly 86,000 of the 1.3 million public housing units nationwide qualified as severely distressed and that a new and comprehensive approach would be required to address the range of problems existing at these developments.” Susan J. Popkin, Bruce Katz, Mary K. Cunningham, Karen D. Brown, Jeremy Gustafson, and Margery A. Turner, “A Decade of Hope VI: Research Findings and Policy Challenges” (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute and The Brookings Institution, May 2004), 1.


\(^{441}\) One of the concept’s greatest champions was Professor Sir Peter Hall, an English town planner, urbanist, and geographer who promoted the idea of “regulation free zones” in blighted areas to stimulate development. Amy Glasmeier, “Elastic Peter,” Built Environment 41, No. 1 (2015): 49. In 1978 Sir Geoffrey Howe, a Member of English Parliament, outlined the concept where “everything possible should be done to maximize economic freedom. Taxation should be reduced and regulation should be cut . . . a climate created that would encourage innovation, risk taking and job creation.” Stuart Butler, Enterprise Zones: Greenlining the Inner Cities (New York: Universe Books, 1981), 2.
When Hope VI began in 1995, Pittsburgh was among the first cities chosen for the multi-million-dollar program.

At the time, however, Pittsburgh’s housing authority was considered “troubled” by HUD. The problems were numerous and structural. Pittsburgh’s public housing units built decades before were 25 percent vacant, contractors were trying recoup $17 million in unpaid fees, and employees were either listless or demoralized. In addition, inflexible HUD regulations prevented creative solutions. “We watched for a long time how destructive public housing can be with the regulations,” recalls former Mayor Tom Murphy, who still lives a mile from the Northview Heights public housing community on the North Side. “The rules discouraged homeownership. The more income you made, the more rent you paid. Plus, no churches, no stores or anything could be located near public housing,” he explained.442 “Initially, [the city] received a HUD grant to fix showers and kitchens, but it did little to change anything,” Murphy says about the years prior to Hope VI. “These public housing communities were the poorest census tracts in the state with the highest crime rates. We used Hope VI to improve inner city properties. We didn’t see it as a public housing development; we saw it as neighborhood development, and public housing was one piece.”

In 1995, Murphy had appointed Lowe executive director of the Pittsburgh Housing Authority to manage the agency’s transition to a new way of thinking. Lowe made substantial transformations at the decades-old agency of poor people’s housing, but it was a difficult, often gut-wrenching process. To begin with, the agency was also top-heavy. Lowe recalls the door to

442 Author’s phone interview with former Mayor Tom Murphy, November 1, 2018.
the director’s office was hard to open because the carpet was so plush; yet, hundreds of
Pittsburgh’s poorest residents lived with leaky roofs, drafty apartments, and rampant crime.

In the community Lowe had heard enough. He spent several months living in the Saint
Clair Village public housing community to see what it was like first-hand. “‘I moved there to
understand,’” Lowe exclaimed in 1999. “‘People say, ‘You never lived there, so you don’t
understand,’ so I moved to understand. I wanted to understand about living where there’s no
store. I wanted to understand why kids had no place to play. I wanted to see what it’s like to live
in a place where no matter how high you turn the thermostat, it doesn’t get warmer. To see a
man whose child is teased by other children when he gets off the school bus because of where
the family lives.’”

Life as an activist is one thing, when one can challenge the status quo and utilize Alinsky-
style tactics to rattle the cages of bankers, government officials, and politicians. But when one
is on the inside as an elected official, the perspective is much different. When it was announced
that Alequippa Terrace in the Hill was the first public housing development in the city targeted
for demolition, Murphy, Lowe and his staff held a number of public meetings to brief residents
on the plans. The news did not go over well. At one meeting, people grew irate and threw chairs
at Murphy and Lowe; Murphy was hung in effigy. Lowe did not back down. “‘I told them, ‘I
am not going to continue fixing up messes for you to live in,’ he said. ‘We must make a leap into
the future.’”

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444 Diana Nelson Jones, “A fighter from Manchester: Stanley Lowe still raises hackles -- and hope,” Pittsburgh Post-
Murphy explained in a 1996 interview that the demolition of Alequippa Terrace was
difficult for the residents. “That initially was met with a great deal of controversy, much of it
coming from people outside the community,” he explained. “Subsequently, Allequippa Terrace
has elected a new resident committee, which is now 100 percent on board and moving forward.
We will probably begin new construction later this summer in Allequippa Terrace, and shortly
thereafter begin demolition of the units as we replace them with a mixed-income community.”
He reinforced the notion that reshaping public housing was about the reinvention of whole
neighborhoods. “We’re changing those kinds of rules [at the Housing Authority], in effect, to
change the theory of public housing. Public housing ought to look like any other neighborhood,”
Murphy exclaimed.

Despite the efforts of the Mayor and his staff, residents continued to resist the proposed
changes. In 1996 when it was announced that the Broadhead Manor public housing community
on Pittsburgh’s western border was either to be demolished or renovated, a public hearing was
held to air various viewpoints. In a meeting attended by more than 100 residents, the atmosphere
was heated. At the meeting, Lowe explained that “‘Conditions in Broadhead Manor are so
intolerable, so inhuman, that we will not force the good, honest families of Broadhead to
continue to live there.’” Dorraine Green, a resident of the community since 1976, pushed back:
“‘I don’t want my community torn down,’” she said. Another, Sharen McDonald, said “‘This is
where I’m from. . . . These are my roots. How can Stanley Lowe come in and say he’s going to
take my roots from me? We can’t go to the North Side and tear Mayor Murphy’s house down.’”
Others supported demolition. “‘I got a bullet hole in my door,’” said resident Carol Moore.

https://shelterforce.org/1996/03/01/reinventing-housing-in-pittsburgh/.
“‘Why spend all that money remodeling? Why waste it?’” Another, Mariah Sharp, agreed.

“‘I’m not knocked nobody. I just want to move. I’m scared to death for my children,’” she said.\(^\text{446}\) It quickly became clear to Lowe and his team that the concept of de-concentrating poverty sounded good on paper, but its implementation was far more difficult, in part because it tore apart people’s sense of place and increased insecurity.

In the Arlington Heights public housing community on Pittsburgh’s South Side Slopes, one resident, Carrie Upshaw said in 1999, “‘I hate to see the community go down like this. With all the money they put in, it seems a shame. But I’m trying to look at it as a positive thing. I’ve lived in the projects since I was a baby.’”\(^\text{447}\) But federal rules required that a total of thirty-one buildings were to be demolished. According to Lowe, the government “‘won’t give you the money to modernize it. Don’t ask. Here are the rules you must play by, now move forward.’”\(^\text{448}\) Thirty-one percent vacant by the time it closed, down it went in 1999 after 56 years of serving as the home of some of Pittsburgh’s poorest residents. The Housing Authority promised to assist with relocation efforts for the 110 families which had to move, but it was not clear exactly where they went.

Part of the problem of remaking public housing communities was that it relied on the same strategy as urban renewal, mass demolition. As Mindy Thompson Fullilove (2004) shows, such large physical disruptions can cause a psychological “root shock” among affected residents.

As demolition proceeded in public housing communities throughout Pittsburgh during the late-1990s, it became clear to Lowe and his team that the concept of de-concentrating poverty

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\(^{446}\) Tom Barnes, “Broadhead Manor residents tangle,” *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, September 6, 1996.


was far more difficult in practice because it tore apart people’s sense of place and increased insecurity, proof that the physical capital of the buildings cannot replace people’s social capital.

But some who worked for Lowe helped smooth the transition from old public housing to new Hope VI units. Pittsburgh Housing Authority Senior Development Manager, Mike Eannarino, stayed close to Lowe through the remaking of public housing. Eannarino remembers those early meetings. “It was so new,” he said of the initial demolition plans. “It required a lot of interaction with tenants associations and the community at large. HUD wanted the surrounding community involved. So, my job was to set up coordinating committees to manage input.” He explained the Housing Authority’s process evolved as each project was redeveloped. “We spent a lot of time building trust,” Eannarino said. “We had to send the message that we were expecting a new set of behaviors, so people had to get involved in the program.”

Eannarino had what one would call an “A-Ha Moment” at Bedford Dwellings in the Hill District. “The initial challenge was to overcome skepticism and build trust—to address fear of the unknown,” he said. In Bedford, Urban Design Associates architects were hired to handle the urban design. They held charrettes in the neighborhood in which many designs were shown of the new units that would replace the old ones. As Eannarino recalls, “One elderly woman raised her hand and asked, ‘how will this affect me?’ This was my epiphany. It changed the way we presented information. Involving the community was one thing, we then had to figure out how to maintain control over the process.” A core group of residents showed up and talked through many of the issues, to air out the differences. Eannarino was well-versed in the process of community participation. To assuage fears in the community, Eannarino explained that “one of

449 Author’s interview with Michael J. Eannarino, Senior Development Manager, Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh, March 8, 2017. He retired in December 2017.
the first things we did was build The Hope Center—a community center right in the middle of the Bedford community. We built a brand new building where now the resident council has offices, there are meeting rooms, supportive services, and HACP staff. The physical site was a statement that HACP was serious about remaking and improving the community.” Despite the difficulties Lowe and his staff experienced with the demolition of public housing in the Hill and other communities, Pittsburgh’s Manchester neighborhood stands out for the support residents showed for the demolition of the neighborhood’s public housing units.

6.7 Hope VI in Pittsburgh’s Manchester Neighborhood

In September 1995, the Manchester Citizens Corporation received a $7.5 million federal Hope VI grant, one of only five Hope VI demonstration grants selected that year. It received funding because it was a distinctive infill project in a historic African American community.\footnote{“Manchester on the Move,” \textit{PCRG News}, Spring 1996, 5.} The project featured new housing construction that was to be compatible with the surrounding historic fabric of the Victorian neighborhood. In addition, the grant required the participation of youth in construction and rehabilitation jobs through YouthBuild, a program with roots in the 1970s, which Congress had authorized in 1992.

But Manchester had a major gang problem, and in order to build support for Hope VI, a truce was negotiated between two of the neighborhood’s most notorious gangs, the OGs and Hood Town. Rhonda Brandon, who served as the Manchester Citizens Corporation’s executive director from 1993 until 2005, explained that the process took months to build consensus.

“There was a lot of gang activity at the time,” Brandon remembers about Manchester in the
early-1990s. “I said prayers every day” that things would work out. “We met with [the gang leaders] in the office to reinforce respect. ‘You respect me and I’ll respect you,’ we told them,” she said. What the gang members really wanted was jobs. So, Brandon established an opportunity for them to build a flower bed in one part of the community. “We got the guys to work together,” she recalls. “If you get the leader of the gang to buy into it, you can get the rest of the guys along.”451 The gang truce held. “‘People really wanted change in Manchester,’” she explained. “They wanted to be pioneers. In Manchester, we realized that we needed to work together.”

In retrospect, the lack of resistance to change in Manchester resulted from Lowe’s organizing prowess, the work that Brandon did to shore up support in the community, and the lack of dissent among the MCC Board of Directors. Brandon helped incorporate some of the whites and public housing tenants onto the board. Her reasoning was, “So why shouldn’t those who made a major investment have a voice?” Consensus came slowly. There were a series of meetings, a lot of negativity, and questions about property value and higher taxes. “It was not an easy buy-in,” she says. “It was a constant battle, a struggle, a huge struggle. It was like an octopus . . . and Stanley managed it all.”

Hope VI catalyzed Manchester’s transformation and set in motion two decades of steady growth that had a measurable economic impact on the community.452 Most importantly, the New

451 Author’s phone interview with Rhonda Brandon, February 13, 2017.

452 In place of the demolished public housing “barracks,” 120 new housing units arose—86 rental units for public housing residents and 34 units of market-rate housing, all constructed after 2000. Between 1995 and 2002, property values in Manchester increased from $40,506 to $48,781. Most tellingly, on blocks that featured Hope VI developments, property values increased from $45,031 to $54,689, a higher rate of increase than non-Hope VI blocks. Poverty, unemployment, and crime declined in Manchester at greater rates than the city as a whole. Dan Holland, “Forging A Consistent Vision: The People, Place, and Race That Shaped Manchester’s Renewal, 1964-2014,” University of Pittsburgh masters thesis, 2015, 52.
Urbanist units “took away the myth” of public housing, said Brandon. As one article about the new development explained, “The new housing is designed to reinforce the historic character of the neighborhood, with buildings close to the sidewalk, attractive red brick exteriors, gabled roofs, and traditional design details.” Those residents who did not stay were not missed, recalls Brandon. “Some of the folks in public housing were not paying rent and were problems—what we call ‘negative rent’ for those not working or have no income. Now, everyone has to pay something. Those who were committed to the whole project came back,” she says.

Manchester is one example of how the restructuring of physical capital, controlled by members of the community, accompanied improvements in social capital. The critical piece was the inclusion of those impacted by the development in the decision-making process.

6.8 Conclusion

As these above examples show, the participation of community members was instrumental in remaking low-income communities from the inside out and bottom up. The changes would have never endured without resident support. Leadership from women in the community, such as Aggie Brose, Harriet Henson, and Rhonda Brandon provided a morally righteous voice which convinced bankers, policy makers, and community members alike of the worthwhile nature of neighborhood reinvestment.

Strong relationships forged between low-income African American communities and banks boosted homeownership rates to an all-time high, crime and unemployment decreased, and slowly, higher-income people moved back into neighborhoods such as Friendship, which by the

late-1990s saw an increase in new homeowners who did not need government assistance. Social capital among community members and bankers not only strengthened, first through conflict then through cooperation, but it translated into political and financial capital deployed in the neighborhoods. Furthermore, the personal neighborhood connections of bank executives reinforced corporate commitments. The childhood experiences of Cathy Niederberger, Scott Brown, and Howard Slaughter motivated community reinvestment work at their respective banks. Despite the cultural differences between banks and low-income communities, the CRA process forged long-lasting relationships.

It is less clear where Murphy, Cox, and Lowe got their ideas to demolish thousands of units of public housing. Did it come from Europe? “We had an awareness of what was going on in Europe,” Murphy remembers, “but it didn’t influence our thinking.” Murphy admits that “Europe probably influenced the initial building of public housing. That’s what people thought cities needed.” As Christopher Klemek shows, Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius, Robert Moses, and others rebelled against the Victorian age and influenced modernist thought in the United States that produced the urban renewal programs of the 1950s and 1960s. “The emergent urban renewal order represented a culmination, an intense revival, of that older transnational conversation,” Klemek writes. By the 1970s and 1980s, it was time for neighborhood leaders like Murphy, Cox, and Lowe to create a revolution. “There was a rebellion across America when I was mayor,” Murphy exclaims. Their ideas seemed radical at the time. They rejected planning for the automobile; they rebuilt poor neighborhoods through preservation and infill new

454 Author’s phone interview with former Mayor Tom Murphy, November 1, 2018.

construction; and recruited banks to reinvest in communities they had previously ignored.

Pittsburgh was on the cutting edge of these ideas in the 1990s, just as it was in the 1950s.

As these examples from the 1990s show, Pittsburgh’s role as a national center of innovation for new community development programs developed for, by, and about residents themselves remained consistent since the 1960s. More victories were yet to come. But other concerns loomed on the horizon, such as predatory lending, the Great Recession, and gentrification.
7.0 Lyon in the 1990s: A Decade of Frustration and Hope

The one thing David Rosset remembers about the sixth of October 1990 is the smoke. Two years before the L.A. riots shook America in 1992, upheaval unnerved France in the eastern Lyon suburb of Vaulx-en-Velin. Rosset was in transition between attending university in Bron and working and playing in a band. He chose the social housing community of Mas du Taureau as an affordable housing option. Days later a riot led by disenchanted and unemployed youths erupted. The death of a young man on a motorcycle, 21-year-old Thomas Claudio who had been fleeing the police, fueled the violence. “I could feel the electricity in the air, something is wrong,” Rosset explained. “People were nervous,” he said. “The police were frequently asking youth for their papers, which created a lot of tensions,” he said. “It seemed like each side was provoking each other, as if people wanted to have a confrontation.”

That night, Mas du Taureau erupted in flames. Several buildings in a semicircle of businesses that served the community were set alight close to Rosset’s first floor apartment. Stolen cars were put on fire and driven into the stores. About a hundred young people in the shopping center started throwing rocks and picking up handfuls of coins and throwing them at the police and firefighters who had just arrived.

“Money became a weapon,” Rosset explained. “It was disturbing to watch,” he said.

Another resident of Mas du Taureau, Djoudi Hamida, also remembers the smoke and fires coming from the central business district. Police shut the city down. “It began in the afternoon, and you could see all the mothers running to the playgrounds to grab their children,” she

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457 Author’s interview with David Rosset, June 19, 2017, Lyon, France.
Indeed, the smoke still lingers in the minds of many people and often obscures the positive aspects of the community. Another resident of Mas du Taureau since the mid-1970s, Lemouddaa Nassyra, said of the riots, “It surprised me,” she said. “It was like a real war. It was shocking, scary. There was a lot of fire and violence.” The riot, which lasted for four days and involved 200 to 300 youth, was televised internationally. The injured included seven firefighters and two police officers. Damage was estimated to be $120 million. It was particularly disheartening to politicians, who had spent $12 million on improvements to the Mas du Taureau community—new trees, library, day care center, a climbing wall for youths, and “a fresh coat of salmon-colored paint on the six-story apartment buildings,” according to an account published in the New York Times. “Nationally televised images of flames engulfing the shopping district left much of France debating what went wrong with generously financed government programs that aim to uplift 400 poor communities, including Mas-du-Taureau,” the article reported.

In the United States, the L.A. riots of 1992 were largely an aberration. There was little inner city rioting in most American cities during the 1990s. In fact, the decade was better known for a healthy economy, bank reinvestment in underserved neighborhoods, and a federal government more responsive to minority needs than the Reagan-Bush era of the 1980s.

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458 Interview by the author with Djoudi Hamida (coordinator) and Narjesse Aouni (animatrice) of the Centre Social Georges Levy, Vaulx-en-Velin, France, June 20, 2017.


Pittsburgh, which had suffered decades of outmigration and job losses, finally started to see new housing construction, small business investment into main street business districts, and banks extending loans to minorities and in minority neighborhoods. That is not to say there were not issues of police violence, inequality, and vacant and blighted housing in underserved neighborhoods. But later in the decade, the federal Hope VI program profoundly changed public housing—through demolitions and reconstruction—and opened up urban real estate opportunities to the private market. It seemed that during the 1990s, some of Pittsburgh’s minority neighborhoods, such as Manchester and East Liberty, had turned a corner and put the failures of the past behind them for good. In others, such as Garfield, Larimer, and Homewood, much progress was still to be made.

Meanwhile, in the Lyon region, the Vaulx-en-Velin riot of 1990 was a reminder that state efforts to “fix” the problem of poverty, isolation, and discrimination had failed. The Mitterand government continued to rely on civic improvements, such as building demolition, reconstruction, and renovation of public spaces, housing, and other amenities as called for by the Banlieues 89 program, similar to the Hope VI program in the United States. But the physical improvements failed to address what young people saw as a larger problem, police harassment of young people. “‘The cause of the explosion wasn't that someone died in an accident,’ said a 19-year-old son of Moroccan immigrants. ‘The reason was we had it up to here with the cops.’”

Greater Lyon of the 1990s was punctuated by frustration and hope. Banlieue riots in Vaulx-en-Velin in 1990 and in La Duchère in 1997 garnered national headlines and portrayed the region as a community beset by disorder. In addition, national issues related to the changing nature of French identity, including a growing immigrant population, a number of headscarf
affairs, the rise of fundamentalist Islam in the banlieues, ongoing youth-police violence, and a resurgent National Front party indicated that France’s civil rights agenda still had much to achieve. The image of the suburbs as dangerous “no-go zones” lingered.

France in the 1990s is a period that some have described as “a phase of decline in the tendency for political mobilisation” as a result of the “close links now forged between the government and certain migrant associations thus made them dependent on public funding and grants, and weakened their fighting potential,” writes Camille Hamidi. But she also argues that many new Muslim cultural associations emerged in France, “embodying a new ‘centrality of protest.’” These included the Mouvement des Immigrants de Banlieue (Movement of Suburban Immigrants, MIB) and the Collectif des Musulmans de France (Forum of French Muslims), both based in Paris.

The Lyon region of the 1990s had its own “centrality of protest” as outspoken community leaders such as Djida Tazdaït and other activists built upon the mobilizations established in the 1980s. New associations formed, such as Agora and Antidote in Vaulx-en-Velin and DiverCité in Villeurbanne, adjacent to Vaulx-en-Velin. Lyon’s population growth enhanced the region’s tax

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463 The MIB website includes the statement, “Enough crimes and unpunished police violence, [identification] checks, schools at a discount, enough scheduled unemployment, underemployment, unhealthy housing, enough prison, enough hagra and humiliation! We get used to the silent suffering of millions of men and women who suffer daily social violence much more devastating than a car that burns. It is legitimate to revolt against this social order!” The term “hagra” means misery or injustice. Mouvement de l'Immigration et des Banlieues website, accessed on February 7, 2019, http://mibmib.free.fr. See also “Mouvement de l'Immigration et des Banlieues (English subtitles),” documentary by Reynald Bertrand, video, 50:40, accessed February 7, 2019, http://www.bboykonsian.com/Mouvement-de-l-Immigration-et-des-Banlieues-English-subtitles_a3342.html.
base and suggested its worst years were over.\footnote{While Pittsburgh lost more than 35,000 of its residents in the 1990s (a decrease of 9.5%), the city of Lyon added more than 29,000 residents between 1990 and 1999, a 7.2\% increase. Pittsburgh’s population in 1990 was 369,879, but by 2000, it had dropped to 334,563. Social Explorer, U.S. Census, GSPIA, Joe Trotter and Jared Day, \textit{Race and Renaissance: African Americans in Pittsburgh Since World War II} (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 203. Lyon grew from 415,487 people in 1990 to 445,452 people in 1999. “Populations légales communales depuis 1968,” table download, Institut National de la Statistique de des Études Économiques (INSEE), recensement de la population, accessed January 27, 2018, https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques?debut=0&idprec=2522602&theme=0&geo=COM-69123. The greater Lyon region, which encompasses 68 communes, did not grow as fast, but still added 32,792 people (an increase of 2.8\%). The Lyon region’s population grew from 1,166,797 to 1,199,589 between 1990 and 1999. “Séries historiques sur la population et le logement en 2014, Arrondissement de Lyon (691),” Institut National de la Statistique de des Études Économiques (INSEE), accessed February 8, 2018, https://www.insee.fr/fr/"} Nationally, some high profile events of the 1990s seemed to push back France’s racist tendencies. The Gayssot Law was passed in 1990, which prohibited discrimination based on ethnicity, nationality, race, or religion. The elation the country felt in 1998 from the World Cup victory carried by a diverse soccer team signaled a sea change in national attitudes about tolerance. In addition, France’s willingness to spend billions of euros on restructuring the suburbs demonstrated the country’s commitment to low-income communities. At the same time, a nihilistic attitude about the \textit{banlieues}, expressed in popular film and rap and hip hop music, indicated that a new generation of angry youth was willing to challenge the state, often at the expense of the peace brokered by previous efforts. These dual narratives of resistance from the \textit{banlieues} framed against negative public attitudes about the \textit{banlieues} created a tension that permeated the Lyon region in the 1990s.

7.1 Aftermath of the Vaulx-en-Velin Riot

The Vaulx-en-Velin riots of October 1990 reinforced negative perceptions of the \textit{banlieues}. But the events also revealed many of the problems contributing to the violence in the first place, such as high unemployment, drugs and gangs, and isolation. Riots often distort the character of a neighborhood, at least in the eyes of the media—think Watts in Los Angeles, Washington, D.C.’s...
Shaw, or Pittsburgh’s Hill District after riots in the 1960s. Vaulx-en-Velin was no different after the 1990 riots. According to media sources, the cause of violence was “la crise de la banlieue,” or “the crisis of the suburbs.” But to the mayor of Vaulx-en-Velin, Maurice Charrier, and other elected officials and activists working there, such characterizations were “an injustice.” The media did not accurately portray the community and its benefits. “Our city was not this suburb described by most journalists,” the mayor wrote. “We lived in a popular city near Lyon, proud of its identity and history.”465 But larger problems out of the mayor’s control tempered his good intentions.

Charrier, who served as mayor from 1985 until 2009, said the riot surprised him. He was well aware of the dire economic conditions, but was not prepared for the mayhem which ensued in 1990. “There was a big rupture in the economy when industries like TASE closed [the silk factory which shut down in 1980]. It hit young people hard. Unemployment particularly affected youth,” Charrier said in a 2018 interview.466 Other phenomena played a role, such as young people’s social withdrawal. “There was a lack of perspective for young people,” he said. “They couldn’t see beyond their own quartier (neighborhood).” As a result, “many delinquent groups formed that dealt drugs and created other problems,” he claimed. When the riot broke out, “we had to be compassionate but firm. We tried to understand young people and their exclusion, the fact that they had no jobs. But we couldn’t justify their actions of violence.”

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466 Author’s interview with Maurice Charrier, former mayor of Vaulx-en-Velin (1985-2009), June 26, 2018, Lyon, France.
In the 1990s, unemployment in France was 13 percent, but in Lyon’s suburbs, it was far higher.\textsuperscript{467} Between the 1970s and 1990s, Vaulx-en-Velin’s unemployment doubled, growing from 14 percent in 1982 to 28.4 percent by 1999. Unemployment was particularly acute for young people. For those under the age of 20, the unemployment rate in 1990 was 36.2 percent.\textsuperscript{468} As a result, Mayor Charrier mobilized a network throughout the Lyon region to find solutions. “We didn’t want to give [the violent actors] jobs [to reward their behavior], but we did reeducate them and put them on another path,” he said. One of the people who got involved was Abdel Belmokadem, a former French boxing champion who eventually became Deputy Mayor.\textsuperscript{469} “He spontaneously acted as a mediator [in the discussions with young people] and played a positive role,” the mayor said of Belmokadem.

A longtime resident of Vaulx-en-Velin, Bellache Hafid, whose father worked at the TASE factory, remembers the bleak conditions in Mas du Taureau which contributed to the police-youth tensions. “The police will tolerate a lot of behaviors, until it’s too late,” he said. “The youth have no access to culture, sports, or jobs,” he explained. He saw kids playing soccer with balled up plastic bags because they could not afford a soccer ball. “There were few social centers and lack of social structures.” Hafid believes the youth violence was related to the economic situation of their parents. In the 1990s, he observed that some of the kids’ parents were working 55 hours per week and did not have much time for the children, thus the absence

\textsuperscript{467} Paul A. Silverstein, “‘Why Are We Waiting to Start the Fire?’: French Gangsta Rap and the Critique of State Capitalism,” in Alain-Philippe Durand, editor, \textit{Black, Blanc, Beur: Rap music and hip-hop culture in the francophone world} (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2002), 49-50.

\textsuperscript{468} Dikeç, \textit{Badlands of the Republic} (2007), 132-133.

\textsuperscript{469} Abdel Belmokadem is the founding President of the NGO Nés & Cités (“Born and Cities”) and author of the book “Tendez-nous la main.”
of parental control. “When kids are in a group, they act much differently than when they are alone,” he said. “Some kids don’t know why they riot.”

In addition to the economic disparities, residents of Vaulx-en-Velin noted the drug trade, gangs, and physical isolation which negatively affected Vaulx-en-Velin. The combination of these created a toxic mix of frustrations among young men that spilled out in 1990. During the late-1980s and early-1990s, drugs such as cocaine and heroin were sold between Algeria and France. Djoudi Hamida, coordinator of the Centre Social Georges Levy in the Grappinière section of Mas du Taureau, explained that youth who did drugs “were like zombies walking around.” Jean-Jack Queyranne, who served as the president of the Rhône-Alpes Regional Council from 2004 to 2016, echoed Hamida's perspective. “Drugs have created a kind of social control: criminals ruled all the neighborhood and no one was trying to stop them. It was like a deal between local officials and drug dealers who were keeping the neighborhood calm and were able to continue their traffic.”

Gangs also operated in the social housing community. In the 1980s, “Vaulx-en-Velin was right in ideas and creativity,” Hamida explained. At the time, communists ruled the town and reflected the working class roots of many of Lyon’s “Red Belt” suburbs, hence the names of some of the streets in Vaulx-en-Velin. In 1981, when riots broke out in both Vénissieux and Vaulx-en-Velin, the communist mayor wanted people to be calm and built a social center. Hamida explained that there were two groups in Mas du Taureau, the studious ones and the

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471 Author’s interview with Jean-Jack Queyranne, 1 July 2016, Lyon, France.
472 Area names with communist references include Avenue Salvador Allende, the first Marxist to become president of a Latin American country through open elections in 1970-1973; Rue Gabriel Péri, a communist French journalist who died in 1941; and Social Centre Georges Levy named for a member of the French Communist Party in the 1920s.
delinquents, who began to operate gangs. Charrier believes that these same gangs helped to inflame tensions in the community prior to the 1990 riot.

Finally, the physical isolation of Mas du Taureau in Vaulx-en-Velin added to the economic disparities. The Mas du Taureau housing complex was designed much like Les Minguettes in Vénissieux, La Duchère, and many others throughout France: simple and economical, unadorned with superfluous details, designs, or colors, and far away from major conveniences. As Kenny Cupers elaborates, “The lack of nearby amenities in such peripheral locations—schools and shops in the first place—only aggravated this sense of isolation.”\textsuperscript{473} The enormous scale of the complex enhanced the lack of privacy and intimacy. The high-rises consisted of nearly 10,000 units for 30,000 people, the majority of whom live in social housing spread across several acres, a reflection of the industrial process by which they were built.

Vaulx-en-Velin also suffered from few public transportation connections to central Lyon. When the social housing high-rises were first built in the 1960s and 1970s, there was little mass transit and the population seldom mixed in public spaces. Small towns like Vaulx-en-Velin became big cities of towers almost overnight. Lyon’s A-Line subway opened in 1978, but it only stopped at Laurent Bonnevay in Villeurbanne bordering Vaulx-en-Velin. One bus ran between the Laurent Bonnevay stop and Mas du Taureau. If there was a transportation strike, people in the cités “would become prisoners,” explained Hamida due to the lack of connections to the outside world.\textsuperscript{474}


\textsuperscript{474} Author’s interview with Djoudi Hamida, Vaulx-en-Velin (La Grappinière, Mas du Taureau), June 20, 2017. The sense of isolation and “otherness” is the topic of a PhD dissertation by Marine Huet, \textit{“Les pratiques urbaines des lycéens de quartiers populaires: quelles expériences de l’altérité?”} (“Urban Practices of Working-Class High School Students: How Do They Experience Otherness?”), ENTPE (l’école de l’aménagement durable des territoires, National School of State Public Works), 2018, a study which focuses on Vaulx-en-Velin.
After 1990, debates continued about community, education, and employment. Mayor Charrier emphasized not just physical reconstruction but the social project, as well. He asked, “what type of society do we want to live in? We must create social cohesion.” In the wake of the riots, Mayor Charrier supported a city center concept in which a new school, a planetarium, and new social centers were built close to the city hall. These structures complemented the architecture and engineering school called ENTPE, built in 1987. Although violence flared up in Vaulx-en-Velin on occasion during the 1990s, none reached the scale of the riot of 1990. In addition to the construction boom, citizens formed associations to manage their environment.

7.2 Emergence of Citizen-based Associations in Vaulx-en-Velin

Unfavorable economic conditions in banlieues such as Vaulx-en-Velin were directly tied to issues of identity and belonging. Despite the organizing efforts of the 1980s, many of Vaulx-en-Velin’s residents of North African background had a “thirst for citizenship”—to feel included as a French citizen, not as an immigrant—in the words of one organizer from the community, Yves Mena. This need for inclusiveness, to actually be included in major decisions affecting the community drove many residents to form “Agora,” an association created in 1991 after the death of Thomas Claudio. Agora’s objectives included education and cultural activities, community services such as job preparation, the promotion of anti-police brutality measures, and

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the denunciation of marginalization. The extensive renovation projects that preceded the 1990 riots were conducted with little input from residents. Agora’s formation was a response to this marginalization.

However, Agora did not last. It was poorly funded, suffered through unsteady leadership, and lacked support from Mayor Charrier. In 1992, Agora’s founding director resigned; two years later, the social center in which its members met, called Le Calm, was de-funded and then demolished. Hamida describes the transition away from communists, especially the mayor, who seemed only to want to hire “The Good Arabs” who supported him politically. “Residents turned against the idea that ‘we are all brothers’—the slogan was not true,” she said. Agora’s lack of focused direction also hindered its effectiveness. “Agora was more about protests,” Hamida said. “They were very eager, but did not have many results to show for it.”

A resident of Mas du Taureau since 1973, Lemouddaa Nassya served as Agora’s secretary. She explained that “we tried to fight against it”—the negative stereotype of the community. But after 1995, there was less mobilization. “People were tired,” she explained. “There were no results to show for our efforts.” At the same time, Agora remained an important network in Vaulx-en-Velin. Although there was disappointment, people remained active in the community.

The demise of Agora did not discourage activists from forming other associations to address the lack of community cohesion. In the mid-1990s, local residents formed “Antidote” to focus on more constructive conversations with police, who were known to search youth for their

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“citizenship papers.” Antidote aligned with the mayor for jobs, promoted anti-discrimination laws, and assisted with citizenship for newly transplanted immigrants. Students formed and funded these groups. They wanted to change the way the media portrayed their community and to show the good things happening in Mas du Taureau. In the 1990s, both Agora and Antidote encouraged people to stay in the community. But they also had an appeal outside of Mas du Taureau, such as in Paris and Reims.

As an *animatrice* (activities coordinator) of Au Grand Bois, one of the high-rises in Mas du Taureau, Lemouddaa Nassrya helped organize parties in the neighborhood called *“fêtes du quartier”* in 1991 and 1992. The celebrations involved various families throughout the Mas du Taureau community and lasted all afternoon and into the night. These festivals built community unity by including artists, dads, moms, kids, food, and games. “It was an intergenerational exchange,” she explained. Working through the social center, Nassrya helped make it possible for women to travel outside the region to get out for a weekend, to feel free, and to discover the sea, for instance. Once they did this, it became easier to mobilize, discuss events, and strategize about future activities. “They were motivated,” she remembers of the women. Although temporarily halted by the riots of 1990, Nassrya helped restart the voyages and even led to more informal associations being formed within the community. “[The organization] was a way to have fun together, create relationships, and prevent events from happening again,” Nassrya explained. “Organizations are not always about politics. Some were just about cooking and eating.”

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478 Author’s interview with Djoudi Hamida, Vaulx-en-Velin (La Grappinière, Mas du Taureau), June 20, 2017.
Other organizations were formed in neighboring communes. In Villeurbanne, one resident, Abdelaziz Chaambi, formed DiverCité in 1996 to connect Islam with leftist movements in the Lyon region. He told a reporter that “We defended the sans-papiers (immigrants without official papers) and the people who were discriminated against. We had fought the first fights against Islamophobia at a time when no one was talking about it.” Although the organization did not last, Chaambi became involved in other movements, such as Coordination contre le racisme et l’islamophobie, an anti-discrimination group convened in 2008.\footnote{Fouad Bahri, “Abdelaziz Chaambi: ‘Il nous faut sortir de la victimisation et devenir des acteurs de transformation’” (“Abdelaziz Chaambi: ‘We need to get out of victimization and become actors of transformation’”), mizane.info., septembre 5, 2017, accessed August 15, 2018, http://www.mizane.info/abdelaziz-chaambi-il-nous-faut-sortir-de-la-victimisation-et-devenir-des-acteurs-de-transformation/. See also: “DiverCité: ‘Migrations, interculturalité et citoyenneté en France: enseignements d’un dialogue avec les institutions et les habitants dans le quartier parisien de Belleville’” (“DiverCité: ‘Migrations, interculturality and citizenship in France: lessons from a dialogue with institutions and inhabitants in the Parisian district of Belleville’”), January 2011, accessed August 15, 2018, http://base.d-p-h.info/fr/dossiers/dossier-2959.html.} The efforts of Chaambi, Nassyra, and others demonstrated the community’s struggle against injustice and reinforced the idea that marginalized people refused to be victims.

7.3 Mitterand Reinforces France’s Commitment to the Banlieues

Mustafa Dikeç and other authors refer to France in the early 1990s as “the return of the state,” exemplified in a major policy speech on urban regeneration President Mitterand delivered in Bron, an eastern suburb of Lyon.\footnote{Dikeç, Badlands of the Republic (2007), 75.} On December 4, 1990, he announced a new “d’un ministère de la ville,” or Ministry of the City, and a number of initiatives for the banlieues, including the reconfiguring of the grands ensembles proposed by Roland Castro, the co-creator of Banlieues 89, the participation of residents, and the creation of jobs for 400 communities referred to as “neighborhoods in difficulty.” In addition, Mitterand announced a number of bureaucratic...
changes, such as the creation of *sous-prefects*, who reported to the prefect, or the state’s representative for that region in an attempt to de-centralize power away from Paris.

Vaulx-en-Velin’s Mayor Charrier explained that Mitterand’s *politique de la ville* policy was helpful to his city, but the former president “was a bit like the Sphinx, above it all,” the mayor said. When Mitterand went to Bron, he did not visit Vaulx-en-Velin. Asked why, the mayor said it was a matter of pure politics. Mayor Charrier was communist; the mayor of Bron was a member of Mitterand’s Socialist Party. Still, Mayor Charrier went to Bron to meet with Mitterand, and as he shook his hand, “the mayor was already looking elsewhere, aloof and Sphinx-like.” To local activists from Lyon, however, Mitterand’s visit was an opportunity to protest. According to Djida Tazdaït, the organizers from the initial 1983 march were not invited to hear Mitterand’s speech. Instead, Tazdaït and a large group congregated in front of the location where he was to speak. As a result, according to Tazdaït, Mitterand changed the last part of his speech when he learned of the large group. In a nod to activists, Mitterand said in his remarks, “You, the activists that you are, have been able to group the essential elements and you now have teams,” meaning state representatives who will assist with jobs and greater inclusion of *banlieue* youth in the larger French society.481

Despite the acknowledgement of activists and the rhetoric of hope and inclusion, Mitterrand maintained the state was in control over local decisions. After all, the various prefect ministers reported directly to Paris. Still, he gave the impression that local actors had more sway over initiatives than was the reality. In his speech in Bron, he called for the involvement of

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481 “Speech by Mr François Mitterrand, President of the Republic, on the principles of action and the means to be implemented to improve the most disadvantaged suburbs and fight against social exclusion,” Bron, December 4, 1990, accessed February 8, 2018, http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/907025600.html.
residents, “especially the young . . . Without the broadest participation of all, there will be no identity, there will be no dignity, neither will there be any citizenship. In particular, it is necessary for young people to appropriate their neighborhoods. . . . They like their neighborhoods, they do not want to change neighborhoods, they want the neighborhood to change. They have this natural attachment to the place, where one takes root, even if it is in ugliness, disorder and boredom.” Mitterrand concluded his speech by referring to the value of youth participation. “So it’s the new confidence of young people in these neighborhoods that will determine the future. It is their imagination, their energy that we will wait for solutions. . . . So, I call for the development of projects as soon as we put in place the means to answer them.”

Mitterand’s repeated references to banlieue youth was an acknowledgement that activists’ efforts to raise the profile of France’s low-income communities during the 1990s resonated with the president, even if Paris maintained control over funding and other decisions.

Furthermore, Mitterand highlighted several new laws that empowered lower-income communes, though not all programs were fully implemented.482 The Besson Law of 1990 defined the right to housing. A financial solidarity law of 1991 transferred funds from wealthier communities to poorer ones. A “Global Urban Act” passed in 1991 encouraged diversity through local housing programs, a way to “counteract segregation and its geographic spread.”483 In addition, France introduced the Gayssot Law of 1990, an update to a 1972 anti-discrimination law. The Gayssot Law was in response to remarks that National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen made on television, as well as the vandalism of 34 graves in a Jewish cemetery in Carpentras,

482 Dikeç, Badlands of the Republic (2007), 76.
Evidently efforts such as these to keep civil rights in the forefront of national politics “was a power struggle,” Tazdaït recalls, but one which was rewarded with new legal protections.

Low-income communities around Lyon reaped the benefits of Mitterand’s new approach, though there was considerable debate as to whether it made a lasting difference. For instance, the city of Vaulx-en-Velin became a “laboratoire de la politique de la ville,” or a laboratory for Mitterand’s politique de la ville urban programs. The community created a new social center to promote “social mixity” in the community among old and new residents. Some objected to the action. A member of Agora, Abdel Della, said “[the government] tells us there’s lots of money allocated to the neighbourhoods, but there’s nothing, there’s no change.” And yet, despite the activism of Agora, Antidote, and other organizations, the mayor, Maurice Charrier, seemed stubbornly resistant to citizen participation. “Let’s get this straight: there are things to be discussed with inhabitants, and others that are not discussed with inhabitants,” he said. Still, the existence of these associations—an outward expression of social capital—signaled a


485 Interview with Djida Tazdaït, June 27, 2017, Lyon, France.


willingness of residents to vocalize their concerns about the future of their community and develop solutions, an increasingly common trend in the 1990s.

The riots expressed a push back against what Wacquant calls “ethnoracial injustice” and “economic deprivation and widening social inequalities.” But once the smoke cleared and the violence subsided, the examples of citizen mobilization illustrate the importance of social capital to establish a greater sense of control over the spaces which residents inhabit.489 “In the 1990s, the emergence of new social movements such as the Mouvement de l’immigration et de la banlieue (MIB) reflected a desire among immigrants and their children to be more autonomous and proactive in fighting discrimination and racism,” asserts Rabah Aissaoui.490 Furthermore, the prominent role of women stands out. As in Pittsburgh, women in Vaulx-en-Velin played a critical role in the organizing machinery of communities, even if their efforts did not have a long-lasting effect. National associations such as France-Plus and SOS Racisme did not have a strong local impact in part because they lacked the infrastructure to mobilize people around municipal issues such as the construction of social centers. Taken as a whole, however, these local organizing efforts reflect the ability of residents to assert greater control over their community, a goal that was difficult to achieve with the state dictating the physical form of the banlieues and local officials not yet fully cooperative.

489 Wacquant, Urban Outcasts (2008), 22.
7.4 Physical Restructuring of La Duchère and Les Minguettes

In addition to Mas du Taureau in Vaulx-en-Velin, Lyon’s La Duchère and Les Minguettes in Vénissieux also received considerable funding to physically reshape its social housing. These plans were more than a decade in the making. In 1983, Gérard Collomb, the future mayor of Lyon, but acting as the elected socialist from the 9th Arrondissement at that time, called for the renovation of La Duchère. “It is time for the municipal majority to take its responsibility, concluded Gerard Collomb - otherwise, in the Duchère as Venissieux, the only solution will be dynamite,” a reference to the demolition pursued in Les Minguettes in 1983.491 Again in 1985 and 1988, the Lyon media discussed renovation plans in the context of American optimism for suburban housing.492 “As in Mermoz and in the United States . . . the grass will turn green again. . . The rebirth of La Duchère is part of the restructuring of the 9th arrondissement.”493 By the early 1990s, renovation plans had been finalized.

Regional leaders expressed optimism about the prospects for rehabilitating both the buildings as well as the people. A 1991 article notes that “For Charles Million [president of the regional council] as well, it involves associating the Region with the State, the City, the Urban Community, the Offices and societies of H.L.M. and to ‘all those who have kindly given energy’ to ensure that ‘La Duchère remains this specific city, but where children can find a place of education, parents a place to live family and that the whole community of these neighborhoods

491 “Réhabilitation de la Duchère,” news article (unspecified publication), 14 May 1983. Lyon Municipal Archives.
492 “Projet de réhabilitation,” La Duchère newspaper, March 1, 1985. Lyon Municipal Archives.
can find a place of culture, meeting and civilization.” In 1992, the redevelopment plan was presented publicly, which included substantial improvements to the housing units and the grounds around the complex. In August 1993, SACVL, the site manager for La Duchère, proposed to spend 42,124,164 francs to renovate one of the towers of the complex that contained 313 units, including creating two lifts in the front of the building for handicapped tenants. The work was to begin in September 1993 and be completed by February 1995.

La Duchère’s renovation was part of a widespread national effort to encourage a greater integration of people in the banlieues mandated by federal law, the Loi d’Orientation pour la Ville, or LOV. This “social mixity” measure passed in 1991 “aimed at a better distribution of social housing,” though it was not fully implemented. But the problems of economic, social, and spatial isolation remained. Particularly in the wake of riots in Vaulx-en-Velin, planners and politicians soured on renovation plans that failed to change economic or social conditions in the banlieues. As a result, an emphasis on demolition took precedence.

On October 11, 1994, 800 kilograms of TNT was used to bring down ten towers at Les Minguettes social housing development in Vénissieux in a matter of seconds at a cost of 14.4 million francs. The image is eerily reminiscent of the demolition of Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis

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494 P.A., “La Ville En Neuf. Des plans sur La Duchère. Le représentant de l'État, le président du conseil régional et la maire de Lyon ont signé la charte d'objectifs définis dans le cadre de la mesure de Développement Social des Quartiers dont bénéficie La Duchère” (“The New City. Plans for La Duchère. The state representative, the president of the regional council and the mayor of Lyon signed the charter of objectives defined in the framework of the social development measure of the districts of which La Duchère benefits”), Lyon Matin, 25 June, 1991. Lyon Municipal Archives.

495 Pierre Aouizerate, “Un programme de réaménagements sur trois ans. Celui-ci devait être présenté hier, à l'occasion d'une réunion, pilotée par élus et responsables des espaces publics” (“A three-year redevelopment program. It was to be presented yesterday at a meeting, led by elected officials and officials of public spaces”), Lyon Matin, 22 July 1992. Lyon Municipal Archives.


twenty-two years prior. Seen in an archival video, the towers fell in coordinated fashion, almost like a ballet of implosion that ends in a plume of dust. Cheers from the crowd can be heard in the background. “The goal is to knock down walls that obscure the view of the future,” reported a French correspondent. Groupe IPM, a rap/hip hop group in Vénissieux, used the demolition footage in their music video. The towers had stood since their initial construction in 1966, but on the eve of their destruction, they had become mostly empty and run down.

Plans were drawn up in 1989 to demolish at least four towers in Les Minguettes, in part due to the high number of vacancies in the units. Public officials responded not only to the violence that had afflicted Les Minguettes in the 1980s, but a rapid outmigration of people from the community, along with persistent unemployment particularly for young people. As Wacquant explains, it was the result of the loss of factory jobs. “If these neighborhoods have suffered such demographic hemorrhaging, it is essentially because they have been emptied of their economic activities and because they have borne the full brunt of skyrocketing unemployment tied to the deindustrialization of the advanced economies.” A memo outlining the reasons for demolishing Tower 43 related to the high vacancy rate testified to the seriousness of the condition. “This district was in a crisis situation in 1985, characterized by an uncontrollable

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501 Wacquant, Urban Outcasts (2008), 146-147.
evolution of the vacancy rate (55% at the end of 1985).”

Demographic figures for the entire grand ensemble tell the story of exodus. In 1975, the number of inhabitants living in Les Minguettes was listed as 35,000; but by 1999, only 21,151 people lived in the social housing complex. The unemployment rate was 15% in 1975; but by 1999, that rate skyrocketed to 42% as industrial work either disappeared or became too specialized for those without an advanced degree. As a result, the French state changed its strategy from renovation to demolition and reconstruction during the 1990s, much like U.S. policy toward public housing under the Hope VI program.

Prior to France’s mass demolition strategy, the prevailing thinking was that the troubled housing units could be adequately rehabilitated. But with the demolition and reconstruction of the social housing complexes, consistent with the philosophy promoted by Castro and Cantal-Dupart in Banlieues 89, the state “avoids the creation of a no-man’s land, a desert left behind by the demolition operation.” In addition to housing, urban restructuring included amenities and environmental improvements. The aim was to encourage a wider land-use mix and, where possible, a greater social mix at a considerable cost. The reconstruction of Vénissieux alone cost a total of 80 million euros during the 1990s.

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503 Franck Chignier-Riboulon, Nicole Commerçon, Marcele Trigueiro, and Marcus Zepf, “Large Housing Estates in France: Overview of developments and problems in Lyon,” RESTATE Project (Restructuring Large-scale Housing Estates in European Cities), Urban and Regional research centre Utrecht, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University, 2003, 69.

504 “Large Housing Estates in France,” 23.

Aside from the demolitions, additional activities such as sports and music were implemented in the late-1980s and early 1990s to reform the social fabric of the banlieues. The Rhône-Alpes Prefecture initiated an Opération Été Fête de la Jeunesse (Operation Summer Youth Day) in Vénissieux on 31 August 1989 as a way to prevent youth delinquency, similar to the Opérations de Prévention Été (Summer Prevention Operations) implemented in 1982 after the first riot. The goal of the operation was to preoccupy nearly 45,000 young people in the Rhône-Alpes region at a cost of 3.5 million francs with activities such as a football tournament, table tennis, baseball, “and a circus demonstration by the young people of Saint Priest.”

Clearly during the 1990s, the French state had spent considerable sums on the physical and social restructuring of the banlieues around Lyon, often coopting the organizing efforts of residents. Still, questions remained. Was the creation of an attractive, desirable community a matter of funding, educational programming, architectural reconstruction, connectivity, jobs, or some magical combination of all elements that would bring peace and prosperity to the cités?

7.5 La Duchère Explodes in Violence, 1997

Despite the millions of French francs spent on renovating La Duchère, the community became the latest casualty of rioting on December 18, 1997. A twenty-four year-old resident of La

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Duchère, Fabrice Fernandez, was shot and killed while he was detained in a police station.\textsuperscript{508} Didier Lapeyronnie describes the community response: “A few days later, his neighborhood held a silent demonstration in his memory. His mother ‘lectured’ the young people present and asked them to stay calm, but she was unable to prevent further clashes with the police and violent incidents from erupting shortly thereafter. The most responsible ones said there was no point discussing things that night: ‘We’re going to avenge Fabrice, we’ve had it up to here.’”\textsuperscript{509}

Media images of the aftermath are consistent with similar riots, featuring burning cars, masked youths running, and riot police squads racing to scenes of fires and smoke.\textsuperscript{510}

The incident proved that physical changes alone were insufficient to calm an anxious population weary of police abuse, unemployment, and hopelessness. As Lapeyronnie argues, “In every case, rioting occurs as the culmination of a local or national history characterized by tension, violence, and antagonism between police and residents of the neighborhoods involved, rather than simply as the result of ordinary ‘urban violence.’”\textsuperscript{511}

Ironically, a riot erupted in Dammarie-lès-Lys outside of Paris on the same day as the La Duchère riot. These incidents may have provided an outlet for youth rage and angst, but they resulted in few productive solutions.


\textsuperscript{511} Lapeyronnie “Primitive Rebellion in the French Banlieues” (2009), 28.
As a result, Dikeç writes, “this has created further tensions by frustrating the democratic aspirations of banlieue youth eager to be part of the political life of their cités.”\footnote{Dikeç, Badlands of the Republic (2007) 157.} These disturbances reinforced notions among politicians that something, anything, must be done to prevent further violence. In 1998, additional security measures were put in place which included augmenting the police force by thirteen national agents, construction of a new municipal police station, and introduction of a new video surveillance system.\footnote{“Aline Duret, Quatre-vingts mesures pour La Duchère” (“Eighty measures for La Duchère”), Le Progrès, December 9, 1998. Lyon Municipal Archives.} But the fact remained that few young people had jobs, leaving them exposed to criminal activities such as drugs and crime.

7.6 Setbacks: Headscarf Affairs, Rise of the National Front, and Terrorist Bombings in Paris and Lyon

In addition to rioting that punctuated banlieues throughout France during the 1990s, several high profile headscarf affairs, along with “law and order” policies promoted by a rising National Front party, and terrorist bombings in Paris and Lyon left many French uneasy about government investments in the banlieues. French citizens of North African background continued to express themselves openly, a continuation of an ethnic “awakening” that had begun in the 1980s. But these expressions ran counter to French cultural norms, namely that of laïcité, or French secularism, especially as fundamentalist Islam took hold in the banlieues.
A highly publicized “headscarf affair” in 1989 touched off a debate in France still being argued today: how and whether to display religious clothing in public places. During the 1990s similar headscarf affairs were repeated throughout France, when more than 100 girls were refused entry into public schools throughout France. The veil became another form of resistance, “a symbol of national identity and opposition to the West during independence and nationalist movements,” according to Caitlin Killian.

Interviews I conducted in the summer of 2017 and 2018 confirmed that many French of North African origin feel conflicted about the issue. Few of the interview subjects wanted to talk about religion. But one who did, Djoudi Hamida, coordinator of the Centre Social Georges Levy in Vaulx-en-Velin, explained that “there were important debates in the banlieues [around religion and identity]. In the 1980s, the decision for many families was whether people were going to choose to be ‘French’ or ‘Algerian’ as their primary identity,” she said. In the 1990s, she witnessed the rise of fundamentalist religions. At one time, the mosques organized humanitarian dinners and other activities to educate people about global issues. As part of Ramadan, Muslims were required to donate to the poor—“you had to give [to people in the community]” she said. But with the rise of Salafism, “now you only have to give to Muslim people, no one else.”

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514 In September 1989, three teenage girls of North African descent wore foulards islamiques, or Islamic veils, to cover their hair as they walked into school in Creil, France (about 50 kilometers north of Paris). They refused to remove their veils and were asked to leave. At the time, the incident caught the attention of the French press and instantly became national news. A month later, the minister of education, Lionel Jospin, recognized that schools were secular spaces but indicated support for keeping the girls in the classroom. “School is made for receiving children and not for excluding them,” he told Libération on 10 October 1989. The French Supreme Court, the Conseil d’État, agreed. But a public opinion poll published in Le Monde around the same time showed that 75 percent of French people opposed girls wearing the veil in school and other public buildings (most French, however, supported the wearing of the veil in private or on the sidewalk). Even France-Plus and Djida Tazdaït of JALB opposed wearing veils in public places. Caitlin Killian, “The Other Side of the Veil: North African Women in France Respond to the Headscarf Affair,” Gender and Society 17, No. 4 (Aug., 2003): 567-590. See also: Alec G. Hargreaves, Multi-Ethnic France: Immigration, Politics, Culture and Society (New York: Routledge, 1995), 117, and Talal Asad, French Secularism and the “Islamic Veil Affair,” The Hedgehog Review (Spring & Summer 2006): 93-106.

515 Killian “The Other Side of the Veil” (2003), 570.
people are being asked to follow what the prophet says. It is harder to voice openly your opinion and offer different perspectives,” she said.516

To outsiders, however, Islam and the banlieue became intertwined. Incidents such as the headscarf affair sparked a larger debate about immigrants and their role in France, a negative view of which the National Front exploited to their advantage.517 Jean Marie Le Pen, the National Front leader, said in 1989 “that all immigrants, legal or otherwise, who had entered France since 1974 should be deported and that workers who wanted to be reunited with their families would have to go home. Nobody ever promised them they could stay indefinitely.”518

At the same time, an ethnic and religious awakening begun during the 1980s was in full bloom by the 1990s. As explained by Djida Tazdaït, her generation “had to decolonize the mindset” of the era. The 1990s were particularly difficult for Harkis, Algerians who fought for France during the Algerian War for Independence. They faced considerable ostracism in both Algeria and France. Vincent Crapanzano calls the Harkis “marginalized, alien and alienated.” In the 1980s, many Harkis in France suffered from “the effects, say, of loneliness, shame, humiliation, guilt, anger, dishonor, and defeat. . . .”519 A decade later, the environment was much different. “This new generation is already decolonized. They are clear-sighted about their

516 Author’s interview with Djoudi Hamida, coordinator, Centre Social Georges Levy, Vaulx-en-Velin, France (Grappinière, Mas du Taureau), June 20, 2017.


rights,” Tazdaït said of the next generation of French activists. “They will have to use their new rights and use the internet and social media. In the 1980s, we didn’t have the internet. It’s much easier to organize people now.” At the same time, the more outspoken residents of the banlieues did not go unnoticed among France’s most conservative population.

Much like the backlash in the United States in the wake of the turbulent 1960s, which enabled Nixon’s rise to the presidency, events in France in the early 1990s led to the consolidation of power among conservatives and National Front supporters. In 1993, conservative Jacques Chirac won the presidency and the National Front party won 12.4 percent of the vote nationally, demonstrating the potency of race as a political issue. The 1990 riot in Mas du Taureau served as a “protoype,” in the words of Fabien Jobard, that set off a wave of copycat disorders throughout France during the 1990s, “at the rate of 10 to 15 conflicts, both large and small, each year.” This added to the public’s view of the banlieues as centers of “violence urbaine,” places that were unsafe, unruly, and uninviting. At the same time, the 1990 riot in Vaulx-en-Velin reinforced Mitterand’s commitment to politique de la ville, with its focus on renovating or replacing the buildings that purportedly led to the riots in the first place. But Jobard believes such approaches were an “indisputable” failure, “especially since no policy was able to reverse the slow but inevitable effects of deindustrialization or bridge the growing

520 Author’s interview with Djida Tazdaït, Lyon, France, June 27, 2017.
gap between the fresh needs of a more demanding labour market and the unsuitability of the growing number of banlieue working-class young males.”

Despite physical improvements, reconstructions, and renovations to banlieue areas during the 1990s, relations between youth and the police failed to improve due to new policies of the Chirac administration, which was transfixed by law and order. In 1994, two Algerian teenage students in Lyon, Mouloud Madaci and Abdelhakim Youbi, were arrested and expelled to Algeria. In response, a protest march featuring 30,000 demonstrators with signs that read ‘Liberez nos camarades’ (“Free our comrades”) took to the streets. Although the French court deemed the expulsion order illegal, the Lyon Police challenged the ruling. Raghu Krishnan concluded that “It seems there is nothing the country’s rulers fear and hate more than the children of Arab and Black immigrants, all the more so if they are joined by their white class- and work-mates.”

Incidents such as these reinforced the backlash from conservative political leaders. Rita Chin explains that “when the conservatives returned to power under Chirac in 1993, they immediately cracked down on juvenile delinquency, violent crime, and riots with a heightened police presence in the banlieues, a strategy that exacerbated the confrontations between young male residents and law enforcement.”

These dual actions—the disruption of social housing demolition and reconstruction and an increased police presence—failed to solve problems of joblessness and outright racism. In addition, a new element that had not presented itself in the

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1980s, the rise of fundamentalist Islam, became an additional trigger point for National Front supporters and a French public wary of the suburbs.

A final force the prevented the banlieues from being perceived in a positive light was the specter of international terrorism. The 1990s were a perilous decade for terrorist attacks in major global cities, such as London, New York, Paris, and Tokyo each of which suffered civilian casualties from bombings. Both Lyon and Paris experienced several bombings in the summer and fall of 1995 that left people uneasy and justified an increase in aggressive “law and order” policing. The bombings were linked to the Armed Islamic Group which had been battling Algeria’s military government since 1992. The incident “testified to France's lack of immunity in the postcolonial struggles over the future of its former colony,” according to Paul A. Silverstein. For Lyon’s suburbs, the killing of one of the bombers, Khaled Kelkal, a resident of Vaulx-en-Velin, by the police only confirmed the public’s view of these communities as homegrown centers of terrorism.

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526 Six people died on February 26, 1993, when a bomb went off in the basement of New York’s World Trade Center, followed by the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Office Building on April 19, 1995, killing 168 people; on March 20, 1995, a gas attack in the Tokyo subway killed 12 people and injured 5,500; London, reeling from a series of IRA bombings in the 1980s, was hit with another wave of bombings during the 1990s, one of the worst of which was an IRA bombing at Bishopsgate on April 24, 1993, which killed a photographer, injured 40 people, and caused £1 billion worth of damage, in addition to another IRA bombing of the Canary Wharf on February 9, 1996, which killed two, injured 40 and caused £100 million in damage.


528 Paul A. Silverstein, Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 1.
Yet, France reinforced its commitment to the poorest communities, unlike American cities reeling from decades of government retrenchment. Prime Minister Alain Juppé announced in November 1995 a “Marshall Plan for the banlieues” with twenty zones franches (“tax-free zones”) and 546 zones urbains sensibles (“precarious urban zones”), including one in Vaulx-en-Velin, that hired youth to work with associations. In addition, the “Marshall Plan for the banlieues” called for more police and surveillance. In 1999 Prime Minister Lionel Jospin promised to bring in thousands of riot police to patrol social housing communities, a legacy continued by president Nicolas Sarkozy in the 2000s, particularly in the wake of the U.S. attacks of September 11, 2001. But the physical reconstruction of the grands ensembles, coupled by an increased police presence, only appeared to solve problems of the banlieues. As marginalization and discrimination continued throughout the 1990s, young people had their own responses.

### 7.7 Residents Push Back: Music and Sport as Expressions of Resistance

In the 1990s, variants of popular culture that depicted life in the banlieues embraced a nihilistic outlook and provided an angry element of resistance. Films such as Mathieu Kassovitz’s “La Haine” (1995) and rap and hip hop music called attention to a generation of banlieue youth who were unemployed and marginalized. These cultural forms originated from the bottom-up and presented a shocking reality to outsiders, which was the point. Many institutions operate in the banlieues such as schools, training centers, medical and social services, cultural facilities, and sporting and recreational programs. But these are top-down institutions, state-funded and operated. Grassroots artistic expressions like rap and hip hop are a form of local control,

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designed not only to shock, but to protest the lingering conditions in the banlieues. Music is a powerful means of transatlantic communication that binds banlieue youth with minorities in the United States who also feel marginalized. It provides what Tyler Stovall calls “a running commentary not just on suburban life, but on the state of France—especially French politics—in general.”

As in the United States, when rap and hip hop burst onto the scene in France during the 1990s, the music was not well received by the general public. Silverstein explains that “While French politicians brought repeated court cases against rap artists for incitement to violence, anti-white racism, and hate speech, the artists themselves narrated the urban insurrection through a French revolutionary vocabulary, painting the young men rising up against the police as a new generation of sans culottes, if surely inspired by the history of Black Power and anti-colonial resistance as well.” No doubt, with lyrics such as those of “Police” (1993) from Suprême NTM, a rap group formed in Saint-Denis (near Paris) in 1988, rappers like Joey Starr (Didier Morville) did not make any new friends with the French security services. Young rappers established their street credibility with lines such as “From us, it won’t just be a ‘f*** the police,’ but a special ‘f*** your mother’ from the ‘mother homeland’ of the vice!” The state and

530 Paul Gilroy highlights the notion that music, like other artistic forms, is an expression of pain from “dispersal and exile,” the “redemptive power of suffering” that often transcends national borders. Quoting James Baldwin, Gilroy says “Music is our witness, and our ally.” Paul Gilroy, The Back Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 201, 203.

531 Stovall, “From Red Belt to Black Belt” (2003), 356.


animation directors at community centers condemned such artistic expressions. But like Saul Alinsky’s approach, the appeal of rap and hip hop is not designed to be polite. Music from the *banlieues* is a powerful expression of resistance against a state that has all but failed its low-income and minority youth.

In addition to music, many residents of the *banlieues* signaled their cultural identity through sport. The World Cup match of 1998 gave the entire country something to cheer about, chronicled by Laurent Dubois in *Soccer Empire* (2010). Sport became a symbol of resistance among the impoverished and marginalized living in the *banlieues*. As Laurent Dubois writes, “In this context, some saw the [1998 World Cup] football team as the symbol of a new kind of France, one that could embrace its diversity and profit from it.”

Throughout France, soccer occupies a central place in the country’s identity, and like sport rivalries in the United States, competition is fiercely regional. In Lyon, the Olympique Lyonnais football club has a heated rivalry with Les Verts (“the Greens”) of Saint-Étienne, just 50 kilometers to the south. The seasonal competition between the two teams is known as “Derby du Rhône” or simply, “Le Derby.” It is a battle not only over regional supremacy but among class, between the white collar, upper-class Lyon versus the blue collar (or green, in this case) of working-class Saint-Étienne. In every *banlieue* I visited around Lyon, a soccer pitch was the center of recreational activities. It is no wonder, then, that members of France’s national team, as well as professional players at the regional level, are considered heroes among *banlieue* youths.

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536 The 1998 team captain, Zinédine Zidane, a product of the *banlieues* of Marseille, was high-profile role model for *banlieue* youth.
Cup also became a rallying point for those wary of “diversity.” In the 1990s, the National Front pointed to a new round of émeutes (riots) in the banlieues of Lyon and other cities as a sign that France had enough immigrants. “Le Pen attacked the team—as he had once before, in 1996—for having ‘too many players of color,’” Dubois writes. It was an indication that sport, like many variants of popular culture throughout the world, often reflects political realities. The larger the stage, the greater the debate.

In the 1990s, residents fought against the characterization that banlieues are ethnic “ghettos,” but it was an uphill battle. On the one hand, the success of the national team in 1998 and the work of community organizers provided a hopeful view of the banlieues. On the other hand, extensive media coverage of banlieue rioting in the 1990s, along with the nihilism embraced by rap and hip-hop artists, reinforced negative portrayals. As they did in the previous decade, France’s low-income communities struggled in the 1990s to put unsavory perceptions behind them.

7.8 Conclusion

Lyon of the 1990s reflected the battles waged from below and above in determining how best to revitalize marginalized communities. In some ways there were parallels with Pittsburgh’s experiences during the same period. From below, Lyon’s banlieue residents formed associations,

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537 Dubois Soccer Empire (2010), 4.


mobilized, and influenced the passage of laws that reinforced social mixity, encouraged economic equality, and pushed back against negative community stereotypes. In response, the Mitterand administration proposed new initiatives to remake France’s poorest communities. The mass demolitions that followed in the 1990s radically reconfigured social housing on both sides of the Atlantic. But less clear is why Pittsburgh and suburban Lyon pursued these same strategies at around the same time.

It is easier to trace the transatlantic progression of music and culture from inner city America to French banlieues. In the 1990s, popular media such as television, compact discs, and film criss-crossed the ocean with increasing speed and regularity. But the reasons for a sudden transition to demolition on both sides of the Atlantic are more subtle; few scholars address it completely. Part of the explanation has to do with communities’ shared experiences with global economic restructuring. William Julius Wilson notes that “much of the sharp rise in inner city joblessness in the United States and the growth of unemployment in Europe and Canada stems from the swift technological changes in the global economy.” He also calls attention to the isolation of large housing estates in France, which “have been cut off from mainstream labor market institutions and informal job networks, creating the vicious cycle of weak labor force attachment, growing social exclusion, and rising tensions.”

Other authors point to the persistence of social problems and physical decline prevalent in both French banlieues and U.S. inner cities.

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Pittsburgh’s Mayor Tom Murphy said that there was “no European influence” upon his decision to pursue Hope VI funds to reduce the city’s public housing communities to rubble. Rather, he points to “a general rebellion in many places toward a more human livability” that permeated the planning profession and political discourse in the 1990s. From their neighborhood work in the 1960s through the 1980s, Murphy, Stanley Lowe, Tom Cox, and others revolted against government intrusion into neighborhoods while fighting against urban renewal of North Side neighborhoods. Once in power in the 1990s, they sought different approaches to remake neighborhoods. Yet the solution was the same as urban renewal. Demolition appealed to politicians seeking to show immediate results. Long-term solutions such as job training, education, and anti-discrimination were slower and less visible.

But in assessing the Lyon region in the 1990s, three conclusions can be drawn from experiences of low-income people in their efforts to form and utilize social capital that are markedly different from those in Pittsburgh. First, French property ownership was absent as a form of social capital formation among low-income residents. In Pittsburgh, the capacity of neighborhood-based CDCs to acquire and develop real estate in Pittsburgh’s low-income communities created a powerful form of financial capital, which in turn reinforced social status within the larger society. The ability of Pittsburgh-based CDCs to frame their economic demands in terms of real estate and financial transactions, rather than a social rights proposition, encouraged banks to invest in low-income neighborhoods; whereas in France, the private sector did not play a major role in shaping communities because the state remained such a major force.

542 Author’s phone interview with former Mayor Tom Murphy, November 1, 2018.
Second, the ability of Pittsburgh’s community based organizations to marshal resources from the private sector such as foundations and financial institutions afforded these organizations a measure of stability and durability that French associations lacked. In other words, no community development corporation-like framework evolved in France in part because the public sector controlled most real estate development. Furthermore, a considerable amount of attention and billions of euros were invested in the rehabilitation, demolition, and reconstruction of French banlieue communities to deal with the problem of poverty and lingering image of lawlessness and disorder. In the United States, on the other hand, CDCs and other community based organizations filled gaps in service left by the withdrawal of banks and the state.

Finally, the Lyon region’s ability to increase its population in the 1990s, coupled with a state willing to invest in urban real estate, provided some momentum for the area to weather the effects of deindustrialization and outmigration. But as evidenced by the violent outbursts in the banlieues, along with other forms of resistance, not everyone benefited from Lyon’s growth. It left many asking if France’s politique de la ville urban policies benefited banlieue residents. The answer to this question depends on whom one asks.

Former Rhône-Alpes president Jean-Jack Queyranne explained the faulty assumptions embodied in French urban policy during the 1990s. “The ‘politique de la ville’ started in Bron [in 1990] failed. We know today that it was a mistake. Tearing down buildings is not enough. Architecture doesn’t create problems but the concentration of immigrants does. Thirty years ago, the government thought that the problems were from the architecture.” Such failures provided an opening for the far-right conservatives. “The Front National used [the failures] to get votes,”

543 Author’s interview with Jean-Jack Queyranne, 1 July 2016, Lyon, France.
Queyranne observed. “The white middle class became jealous of all the benefits granted to Arabs from the suburbs. Billions have been granted for the suburbs and it is a fail. . . . This policy led them to find French people racists and also lead the French to be more racist.”

Djida Tazdaït offered a slightly more optimistic assessment. While she is aware that poverty and discrimination still exist, she is a living example of how resistance can produce results. “We have a heritage of fighting for our rights” in Lyon, she said. “It is a way of saying, ‘we are true French, true Lyonnaise.’ That was the purpose of Zaâma, a way of saying we want to be actors, not victims.” Many people of Djida’s generation are now making decisions for the region. “Urban renewal has many positive effects,” she said. “It’s normal to be tired of all the demolition. But after all, people will have a better place to live.” Of course there are still problems after they are demolished, she admitted. One of the problems is the lack of social mixity among various ethnicities and generations. “This creates segregation,” she said.

In Vaulx-en-Velin, Djoudi Hamida expressed weariness with the constant changes, that residents of Mas du Taureau “were the rats of the laboratory” with all the various social and architectural experiments taking pace in the 1990s. “Vaulx is a laboratory—so many things were tried here. Yet, planners never listened to the people,” she exclaimed. “Politicians ask people [in the banlieues] to be good citizens, but people wait a long time for repairs. People don’t feel heard,” she said. Lemouddaa Nassyra, also from Vaulx-en-Velin, agreed with the “laboratory” characterization of the community. After the 1990s riots, “everything was tried to help change the image of Mas du Taureau,” but the riot really stuck as as a negative stigma, she said. “We have a lot of good things here, but the constant demolition and construction gets repetitive.” As a building gets demolished, “I see the destruction of all the memories in the buildings. When
you see it fall, you discover the feelings you had for it, and then it’s wiped out forever in a matter of seconds,” Nassyra reminisced. “Too many changes killed the change.”

It is evident from these and other responses that the transformations which took place in Lyon during the 1990s were difficult for low-income people and minorities, despite the intended positive effects. Many reported feeling disconnected physically, socially, and economically from the larger region. The hate, discrimination, and joblessness never went away, even as new buildings arose amidst the rubble of the old. But during this time Lyon began a process toward regional governance in an attempt to create stronger linkages among communities and address longstanding issues of inequality and access.
8.0 Too Much of a Good Thing? Pittsburgh’s New Urban Dynamics in the 2000s

A decade after owning his first home in Garfield, Ron Weathers had extended himself beyond his means in an attempt to build personal wealth. By 2008, he had purchased six properties in Pittsburgh’s East End and owned nine units of housing, including two duplexes. When tenants in his units could no longer afford to pay the rent, he could do nothing but evict them. One tenant, known only as “T,” whom Weathers knew since childhood, became enraged by the pending eviction. One night, when Weathers went to T’s apartment to give him his final eviction notice, T shot Weathers six times. Miraculously, Weathers lived, but spent eighteen months recovering. But then Weathers fell afoul of the law and spent a year in jail, plus two more on probation. By the time the country had dug itself out from the recession several years later, Weathers was down to only three properties, including his home in Garfield. In early 2018, now walking with a limp (his days as an elite middle-distance runner long over), he found himself fighting a Sheriff’s sale of his house for nonpayment of taxes since 2015.544

Exemplified by people like Ron Weathers, the economic downturn known as the Great Recession, which extended from 2008 to 2009, affected African Americans in profound ways. People like Ron Weathers personified its impact. Blacks experienced high unemployment, a rise in foreclosures, a reduction in home mortgage lending, and a dramatic loss of wealth at rates twice that of whites.545 Many observers concluded that Pittsburgh was “recession proof,” the result of its reliance on “eds and meds” employment. While other parts of the country suffered

544 Author’s interview with Ron Weathers, March 5, 2018, Pittsburgh, Pa.

545 “The median wealth of the Hispanic population, which had participated actively in the housing boom, plunged by 86.3 percent between 2007 and 2010. The median African American household saw virtually its entire housing wealth wiped out, and African American home owners were twice as likely to suffer foreclosure as white borrowers.” Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (New York: Viking Press, 2018), 157. See also, Laura Gottesdiener, A Dream Foreclosed: Black America and the Fight for a Place to Call Home (New York: Zuccotti Park Press, 2013), 7.
through the worse economic downturn since the Great Depression, the parking lot at Pittsburgh International Airport was jam packed. The transition from a depressed rustbelt city to a cutting edge knowledge center seemingly had buffered Pittsburgh from the Great Recession.

But closer inspection reveals vast inequalities throughout the Pittsburgh region, drawn along lines of race and class as poverty shifted beyond the urban core, exacerbated by the Great Recession. In addition, a persistent vacant property problem in many low-income areas threatened to unravel recent community development gains. At the same time, an urban renaissance, driven by empty nesters and young professionals in their 20s and 30s, increased demand for close-in neighborhood real estate and thus, increased price pressures on properties through an often misunderstood process of gentrification as higher-income residents moved in to certain low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.

The accomplishments achieved by community power in the 1990s were fragile victories. Investments in Pittsburgh’s low-income communities in prior decades unleashed unintended consequences that surfaced in the 2000s as market forces assumed a greater role in these areas. Coupled with a global recession that levied long-term damage on minorities, the gulf in wealth between blacks and whites in the Pittsburgh area widened. These broader trends did not mean that the mobilization efforts of community based organizations failed. Hope VI, the Main Street program, and CDC housing development showed that investments in underserved neighborhoods was good business for banks and investors. But threats such as predatory lenders and rising real estate costs threatened to unravel these accomplishments. As recent protests against gentrification show, low- and moderate-income neighborhoods can better respond to external pressures through new alliances and creative approaches to organizing social capital.
8.1 Growing Disparities “Beyond the Urban Core”

During the first decade of the 2000s, many things went well for Pittsburgh’s low-income neighborhoods. Hope VI transformed some of the least attractive low-income housing in the city to some of the most desirable affordable homes; the Main Street program expanded to include fifteen business districts served by the Urban Redevelopment Authority; many brownfields and vacant properties were redeveloped; and the once-reluctant private sector became an integral part of inner city revitalization. Despite these accomplishments, poverty continues. The growth of poverty outside the city, along with lingering vacant properties, presented challenges to the work of the city’s neighborhood-based organizations.

Fifty years after the 1965 Kerner Report in the wake of high-profile urban riots detailed deep differences in wealth between blacks and whites in the United States in the wake of high-profile urban riots, a new report, Healing Our Divided Society: Investing in America Fifty Years After the Kerner Report, found persistent inequalities. In 1968, the Kerner Report concluded that “The segregated housing, subpar public schools and aggressive policing of black and brown communities could all be traced back to the second-class treatment of America’s darker citizens. The nation . . . was ‘moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.’” A new report published in 2018 found that “poverty has increased and so has the inequality gap between white America and Americans who are black, brown and Native American. . . . Poverty is such a problem, the study concluded, that if it is not mitigated, America’s very democracy is threatened.”

In fact, poverty not only increased, it moved. A University of Pittsburgh report, “Poverty Beyond the Urban Core” (2016), shows that the new geography of poverty is no longer associated with inner city neighborhoods, but now poverty is synonymous with inner ring and formerly industrial suburbs, a finding echoed by the Brookings Institution in 2014. For cities like Pittsburgh, poverty became a suburban phenomenon for the first time. The Pitt report notes that “Between 2002 and 2013, Allegheny County experienced a 3 percent rise in poverty occurring outside the City of Pittsburgh.” However, the report also shows that nearly a quarter (23 percent) of all city residents live in poverty, demonstrating that Pittsburgh still contains high concentrations of low-income people.

Furthermore, homeownership rates and wealth figures among African Americans remained substantially lower than for whites in Pittsburgh and Allegheny County. In 2000, in the city of Pittsburgh, the white homeownership rate was 60%, but it was only 36% for African Americans. According to a Pitt report, “The median income of White households in the city of Pittsburgh exceeds that of African Americans, Asians, and Hispanics by more than $10,000.” When examined by population, whites are 67% of the population in Pittsburgh and have 78% of the income; by contrast, blacks in the city are 27% of the population but only have 18% of the

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549 In the United States, the national homeownership rate for whites in 2000 was 73%; but only 46% for blacks. The ratio was not much better for Allegheny County, which had a white homeownership rate of 72% and a black homeownership rate of 39%; in the Pittsburgh MSA, 75% of whites owned their own homes, compared with only 40% of blacks. “Pittsburgh’s Racial Demographics: Differences and Disparities,” Center on Race and Social Problems, School of Social Work, University of Pittsburgh, June 2007, iv.

550 “Pittsburgh’s Racial Demographics” (2007), iii.
These data suggest that poverty shifted outside the city, but there is still a wide gap between wealthy and poor throughout the region. Meanwhile, vacant properties proliferated and presented community based organizations with another challenge, but also a great opportunity.

8.2 The Benefits and Challenges of Vacant Properties

Vacant and abandoned properties in low-income neighborhoods, long a problem in rustbelt communities, grew in the 1990s. Their presence in many low-income neighborhoods threatened to unravel many of the community development achievements of the previous thirty years. A complex bureaucratic system at the local, state, and national level stifled citizen attempts to manage vacant properties, such as site acquisition, renovation, demolition, and redevelopment. In fact, it was not clear who owned many of the vacant properties in low-income areas. But determining ownership was just one step in a long process of acquiring and reusing vacant land and abandoned buildings.

Since publication of the Brookings report, “Seizing City Assets: Ten Steps to Urban Land Reform” in 2002, it became clear that these vacant structures and abandoned properties were potential assets for the city, especially as affordable housing options. Lacking a comprehensive vision or strategy, however, Pittsburgh took a piecemeal approach to the problem, with demolition a leading remedy. While demolition solves one part of the problem—it rids

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neighborhoods of a blighted and potentially dangerous property—it eliminates valuable affordable housing options for thousands of people in the Pittsburgh area.

The problem of vacant properties has been acute for the City of Pittsburgh. In 2004, the Housing Alliance of Pennsylvania estimated that there were approximately 18,000 vacant properties and land in the City of Pittsburgh, about 11.5% of the total housing units.\textsuperscript{553} According to Pittsburgh Today, the Pittsburgh-based organization that publishes regional indicators, “Nine percent of the housing in the seven-county Pittsburgh Metropolitan Statistical Area is vacant [in 2011], up from 6.8 percent in 1990.”\textsuperscript{554} These vacant properties threaten recent developments, devalue occupied properties, and discourage the private market from making further investments.

Low- and moderate-income neighborhoods contain a disproportionate share of the city’s vacant properties. A survey of Manchester conducted in 2003 revealed that there were 162 vacant properties throughout the community. Of those, individuals and organizations in Pittsburgh owned 41.3%; the city owned 16.6% of the vacant properties; and those outside the city owned 12.3% (ownership could not be determined for nearly a quarter of the properties).\textsuperscript{555} An updated report, prepared in 2005, listed 194 abandoned properties.\textsuperscript{556} In March 2018, \textit{The}


Bulletin reported that Garfield had “131 empty houses, many of them in deplorable condition.” These vacant properties threaten to devalue the 45 new homes that BGC built in 2012, part of the organization’s effort to convert 300 blighted properties into 90 new houses. In Larimer, the vacancy rate was estimated to be 42 percent, while it was 44 percent in Homewood, which also translates into higher crime, as well, even as new homes rise up on vacant lots. Costs to residents were spread across the city, not just to those homeowners in poor neighborhoods. A study of vacant properties in Philadelphia showed that “vacant properties reduce market values by 6.5 percent citywide and by as much as 20 percent in high-vacancy neighborhoods, resulting in an average loss in value of $8,000 for each city household.”

Solutions were slow to emerge, but creative ideas have evolved in the years following the Great Recession. These include a greening program by Green Up Pittsburgh to convert some vacant lots to neighborhood green spaces and side yards; an online database, operated by the city of Pittsburgh, that lists city-owned properties that are available for sale; a Vacant Property Recovery Program operated by Allegheny County; and a vacant property land bank.

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559 “Nobody Home,” 5-6.
established in 2017. In other parts of the city, agricultural uses have been proposed for vacant land, such as the conversion of the former St. Clair Village public housing community on the South Side Slopes into an urban farm. The Open Door Presbyterian Church and Valley View Presbyterian Church created the Garfield Community Farm in 2009, which occupies 2.5 acres of formerly abandoned land. It produces tomatoes, squash, zucchini, herbs and greens for the community. Although crime remains a problem in Garfield, solving the vacant property problem can build upon the momentum established through the Hope VI and Main Street programs.

8.3 Evaluating the Impact of Hope VI in Garfield

On a national level, the federal Hope VI program reported mixed results. But in Garfield, Hope VI, coupled with the remaking of Penn Avenue, dramatically improved the neighborhood. In a report co-authored by Bruce Katz of the Brookings Institution, one of the chief advocates of Hope VI when he was Chief of Staff to HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros in the 1990s, the program was found to be a combination of meaningful results coupled with challenges of

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565 In 2017, there were 17 shootings in Garfield, up from 13 shootings in 2016. In the space of four months, between January and May 2017, an 18-year old male and a mother of twins were found shot to death in two separate incidents near the farm. Jeffrey Benzing, “Shootings in Garfield dampen the community’s rejuvenation,” Public Source, August 21, 2017, accessed September 25, 2017, http://publicsource.org/shootings-in-garfield-dampen-the-community-rejuvenation/.
relocating thousands of displaced residents.\footnote{Mindy Turbov, who was a presidential appointee at HUD and worked with Katz to develop and implement Hope VI, authored her own account of the Hope VI program during the Clinton years, “Public Housing Redevelopment as a Tool for Revitalizing Neighborhoods: How and Why Did it Happen and What Have We Learned?” \textit{Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy}, Volume 1, Issue 1 (Summer 2006).} CDC directors, banks, developers, and mayors of cities where Hope VI was implemented agree that the program’s “ability to transform entire neighborhoods is one of the program’s most revolutionary opportunities and significant outcomes.”\footnote{Between 1992 and 2004, more than 250,000 public housing units destroyed in 166 U.S. cities since the 1990s under the federal government’s Hope VI program. Susan J. Popkin, Bruce Katz, Mary K. Cunningham, Karen D. Brown, Jeremy Gustafson, and Margery A. Turner, “A Decade of Hope VI: Research Findings and Policy Challenges,” Urban Institute and Brookings Institution, May 2004, 41.} It is less clear how the tenants have fared because “the number of original residents who will ultimately return to the revitalized sites is unknown.”\footnote{“A Decade of Hope VI,” 28.} But while Hope VI had a major impact on America’s cities during the 1990s and early 2000s, low-income residents and African Americans in particular found it increasingly difficult to find affordable housing near where they had lived for generations.\footnote{A \textit{New York Times} article that profiled life after Chicago’s Cabrini-Green public housing development was demolished, real estate prices around the former development saw a rapid increase. Ben Austen, “After the Towers. Since the 1990s, American Cities Have Destroyed 280,000 Units of Public Housing—and Replaced Them with a System in Which the Poor are Increasingly Left to Fend for Themselves,” \textit{New York Times Magazine}, February 11, 2018, 40-41.} Perhaps on a macro level, Hope VI had mixed results, but in Garfield, Hope VI lived up to its name as a result of resident trust in the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation and Garfield Jubilee, Inc.

It was just a matter of time before Pittsburgh’s Public Housing Authority targeted the public housing tower in Garfield Heights for demolition. More than 30\% vacant when it was demolished in 2005, the building had outlived its useful life. The environment was far different when it was first built in 1964 and Mayor Joseph M. Barr announced funding for the 300-unit, 14-story high-rise. He proclaimed that it “‘dramatizes the [Public Housing] Authority’s ability
and willingness to respond to the ever-changing housing needs of Pittsburgh. Such an attitude is essential to the economic and social progress of this city.”

On September 23, 2005, just 41 years after the towers were constructed, Mayor Tom Murphy, along with Mary Knox, a resident of the high-rise for 32 years, pushed the button to bring down the buildings in a massive implosion. At the time, reports in the press were similar to those in Lyon’s suburbs, a mix of nostalgia with joy in seeing a decrepit structure fall. Knox referred to the structure as the “Garfield Hilton.” She told the Post-Gazette, “‘We had good times and fond memories, and then we had bad times, but I still called it home,’ she said. ‘Farewell Garfield high-rise. Adios!’”

The process of demolishing public housing in Garfield Heights was years in the making and proceeded in several phases. In addition to the 300-unit high-rise, there were several hundred units of two-story low-rise buildings surrounding the tower. The first six low-rise units were demolished on November 14, 1996, while the decision to implode the 300-unit senior high-rise was approved on February 12, 1999. But by 2006, it was clear that mass demolition of the entire public housing community was necessary. As a result, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development approved demolition of the remaining two-story “barracks-

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“Relocation Plan” indicates that the demolition involved the clearance of 326 housing units in 58 buildings on 48.6 acres of land. At the time, there were 1,085 residents, consisting of 296 families, living in the development. The “Justification of Demolition,” the cost of demolition was $66,443,813.46, while the cost of rehabilitation was estimated at $60,733,100. Yet, the Housing Authority decided that demolition was warranted.

The Housing Authority justified demolition based on the project’s ability to change perceptions of the community. Based on a “Viability Assessment” of the Garfield Heights public housing community conducted in 1998, the “Justification of Demolition” included age (mid-1960s construction) and “usage of the units,” meaning wear and tear. Additional rationale included “the lack of unit identity, lack of defensible outside space, poor landscaping, and density.” As a result, the “Justification” stated that “These items contribute to the Garfield Community being considered obsolete due to physical condition and configuration.” The May 11, 2006, memo further stated that “The buildings in their current configuration in the community and their physical conditions are obsolete and modernization of the existing buildings and other areas within the community is not cost effective to ensure long-term viability.” The memo concluded that “The HACP considers it prudent and necessary to demolish the 58 buildings in order to support effective redevelopment.”


576 “Justification of Demolition.” Attachment to the May 11, 2006 Memo.

577 May 11, 2006 Memo, 2.
Housing Authority photos show the low-rise housing units were of 1960s vintage, but it was not obvious that the buildings were in poor shape, aside from some boarded up windows, Dumpsters in full view, and lack of attractive landscaping (the Housing Authority’s Mike Eannarino said the interior features were also obsolete). Similarly, photos of the high-rise just prior to demolition make it difficult to ascertain the building’s condition. Though Rick Swartz of the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation mentioned dysfunctional elevators and deteriorated stairwells, in addition to a 30% vacancy rate for the entire building. These poor physical conditions mirror those of the high-rises outside of Lyon, making it clear how they could be demolished.

But unlike those public housing communities in the Hill District, demolition of Garfield Heights was a relatively smooth process with little community dissent. “Good plan? ‘I think so,’ said Eva Taylor, a Fern Street resident who balances seven kids and two jobs. Just don’t move her far. ‘I have so much stuff,’” she told the Post-Gazette prior to the building’s demolition. Resident relocations were said to be kept “to a minimum,” but concerns were raised about where residents would go. Still, compared to the uproar that Mayor Murphy and Lowe faced in the Hill, when the demolition of Alequippa Terrace was first announced, reactions in Garfield were mild. “We would like to see this development touch the community in such a way that it revitalizes the neighborhood,” said Housing Authority chairman Dennis Regan. Aggie Brose of BGC echoed this notion by stating, “It will be one of the crown jewels that will turn our neighborhood around,” she said.578

In part, these positive reactions were the result of social capital that had accumulated as a result of the trust that residents had in the community organizations. More sensitive development and sensible organizing devised by the Housing Authority in collaboration with the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation and Garfield Jubilee, Inc., helped manage resident relocations. The Housing Authority's Eannarino credits community organizations operating in Garfield who assisted in “selling” the Housing Authority’s plan to public housing tenants. “BGC was somewhat involved; we had meetings with them,” he explained. “We also worked with Joann Monroe with Garfield Jubilee to match job needs and maintain a job bank and employment program.” In 2017, Eannarino remarked that the neighborhood image was much improved as a result. “The way a person perceives their neighborhood is a powerful thing,” he said. “When a big investment is made [such as Hope VI], it changes the way people see it. It creates a better sense of place.” Then, he added toward the end of the interview that he is originally from Garfield. “I am stunned to see the neighborhood turn around. Today, Garfield Heights is beautiful. The voices of the people are important.” Eannarino was not the only former Garfield resident to have a hand in its resurrection.

In 2006, Keith B. Key, President and CEO of KBK Enterprises, LLC, a housing developer based in Columbus, Ohio, and a former resident of Garfield Heights, was awarded a $21 million contract by the Housing Authority to construct 90 new units of infill housing sensitive to the surrounding neighborhood once the tower came down. A second phase of construction called for 45 new units. At the time it was “the largest contract in the city of Pittsburgh's history to be awarded to a minority contractor,” according to the New Pittsburgh
“My mother was a major consideration for pursuing the contract,’” Key told the newspaper. “My mom still lives three doors away from the development site. My best friends in school—Arsenal and Peabody—were from Garfield. The area still has a history, and it’s surrounded by a lot of single-family structures.”

Key’s selection as the primary developer for the new housing was an important consideration in the community’s support for the project. “Because Keith has a vested interest in the development, I think its great that he was selected. It means a lot to our neighbors in the community,” Garfield resident Brandon Jennings told the Courier. Key also promised to work with Garfield Jubilee, Inc. and BGC to ensure the development plan is consistent with the overall neighborhood plan. A longtime Garfield resident, Mayme Williams, said of Key’s involvement in the project, “I love this neighborhood,” said Williams. ‘My grandchildren are safe here (on the cul-de-sac) and everyone knows and looks out for one another. And to have this young man come back to bring it back is fantastic.’”

Another component to the success of Garfield’s Hope VI project was the development of a senior center on Penn Avenue that served as a relocation site for residents of the high-rise. The Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation and Friendship Development Associates identified an abandoned building and a former Eat n Park restaurant in the 5400 block of Penn. The senior center was designed by Edge Studio, a group of architects whose office is two blocks away from the senior center on Penn Avenue. Constructed in 2006, BGC now owns the senior center. Today, it has a long waiting list, which demonstrates demand for the units in the building.


But while it may seem like the senior center on Penn Avenue was a foregone conclusion, it was the result of more than a decade of reinvestment along the commercial corridor. In 2001, Friendship resident Becky Mingo assumed leadership over the Friendship Development Associates and proposed that the organization purchase several buildings and renovate them for sale to artists.\textsuperscript{581} With a $250,000 grant from the Richard K. Mellon Foundation, FDA purchased twelve buildings along Penn Avenue and sold them to artists. Penn Avenue was designated a MainStreets Pittsburgh district in 2006, known as the Penn Avenue Arts Initiative.\textsuperscript{582} Since 2008, it has hosted an “Unblurred” gallery crawl event on the first Friday of each month. By 2008, “More than 30 artists, arts businesses and arts organizations now call Penn Avenue home. Ten hold an equity stake, and more than 20 artists rent spaces on Penn Avenue.”\textsuperscript{583}

Bankers who closely observed developments in Garfield expressed optimism about the neighborhood. Citizens Bank’s Scott Brown, a product of Garfield, expressed pride in his former neighborhood: “I grew up in Garfield Heights,” Brown explained. “To me, I never knew that I was poor. That’s home to me. It was a good community. I never in my life had a key to our front door. The front door was open, the back door was open, during the day, at night. Everybody knew each other. No one was into breaking into houses. I didn’t know anyone else who had a key to their home either.”\textsuperscript{584} Brown noted that “Garfield has been on a roller coaster”

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\item \textsuperscript{582} “About Penn Avenue Arts Initiative,” accessed October 24, 2018, http://www.pennavenue.org/content/about.
\item \textsuperscript{584} Author’s phone interview with Scott Brown, Vice President, Community Development Market Manager, Citizens Bank of Pittsburgh, April 4, 2018, Pittsburgh.
\end{itemize}
\end{flushleft}
economically and socially over the last thirty years. “From when I was a kid (in the 1960s and
1970s), it really went down hill [in the 1980s]—a lot of drug activity, gang activity, not a place
that you’d really want to live.”

Today, as a result of the investments on Penn Avenue and throughout the community,
Garfield has come close to the “crown jewel” that Brose spoke about in 2006. “Garfield now,
it’s unbelievable to think that some homes are selling for $250,000,” Brown said. “Fifteen,
twenty years ago, I could buy a whole block in Garfield for $250,000. There was so much
abandoned housing, houses being burned down, nothing but bars and vacant stores on Penn
Avenue,” he reminisced. Brown acknowledges the contribution of BGC which spearheaded
much of the housing redevelopment. “I have to give a lot of credit to BGC for cleaning up those
nuisance bars—it can be pretty damn scary. I’m sure Rick and Aggie had a lot of threats to get
the drug dealers off the corners. What they did was amazing.”

Brown remarked that the Hope VI development was a catalyst for the neighborhood’s
overall improvement—from the perspective of outside observers, as well as from residents
themselves. “Tearing down the old projects makes people have more of a sense of pride,” Brown
exclaimed. “The folks who manage it have done a good job. There was a time when it was just
horrible. Drive through there now, and people are really taking pride in what they are doing.”
This public-private partnership among key neighborhood actors—the Housing Authority, City of
Pittsburgh, BGC, GJA, KBK Enterprises, banks, and most importantly, the citizens themselves—
was the critical factor in the successful remaking of Garfield. For the first time in generations,
public housing, at least in Garfield, was no longer seen as “the projects,” but rather as “a project”
that became integrated—economically, socially, and physically—into the neighborhood. This
combination of social capital exercised by the community in collaboration with public and private partners ensured success of the project.

8.4 End of the Party: The Great Recession Hits Home

In the first decade of the 2000s, Pittsburgh was a homeowner’s dream. The city attracted international attention for its relatively affordable real estate, distinctive neighborhoods populated with longtime homeowners, and stable job market. Pittsburgh had an advanced infrastructure of community development corporations supported by local foundations, banks willing to extend loans to consumers of modest means, and a redevelopment authority that subsidized affordable housing. Pittsburgh also had access to a national market through the government-backed mortgage intermediary Fannie Mae.

In the early 2000s, Fannie Mae began to purchase banks’ CRA portfolios to sell them on the secondary market, the legacy of the Clinton Administration’s push to encourage greater homeownership across the country. Pittsburgh received one of Fannie Mae’s first Partnership Offices in 1999, led by former Dollar Bank CRA Officer, Howard Slaughter (who ran the office until 2007). Fannie Mae was able to utilize its national market power to underwrite major housing developments throughout the city. Slaughter was instrumental in providing a $5 million loan for infrastructure improvements for Summerset at Frick Park, the high-end housing development constructed on a former slag heap in Squirrel Hill. He also secured a $10 million loan for the Hope VI project at Alequippa Terrace that provided 1,000 units of low-income

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housing as part of the Oak Hill mixed income community. “These were catalytic projects,” he beam with pride.\footnote{586}

Over the course of his eight-year career at Fannie Mae, Slaughter secured $2 billion worth of investment that provided 24,000 people with affordable houses (Fannie also provided funding to PCRG). One of the biggest deals Slaughter secured was a “$500 million-plus” investment with PNC Bank—“it was a goals-rich deal,” he says. Fannie agreed to purchase PNC’s CRA portfolio, a move that helped both companies. At the time, “nobody was buying CRA loans,” he explained. “But we saw the opportunity.” Yet, there was trouble brewing with some of the loans which lenders secured. “Some CRA loans went bad, but not all,” he said. Some lenders did no or low-doc loans and did not have proper collateral for borrowers. “Look at what happened with Wells Fargo and Countrywide,” he said. “Wells was setting up fake accounts for people that didn’t exist, or opened accounts for people without their knowledge.”\footnote{587}

By late-2007, the housing bubble collapsed, plunging the global economy into decline.

The homeownership boom that marked the 1990s and early 2000s did not last. A deep economic downturn between 2007 and 2009, called “The Great Recession” by economists, plunged the U.S. economy into a tailspin. Home mortgage lending decreased sharply, foreclosures skyrocketed, and unemployment more than doubled. Although the Pittsburgh region did not experience the same level of foreclosures as many other parts of the country,

\footnote{586} Author’s interview with Howard Slaughter, May 4, 2018, Pittsburgh, Pa.

select communities were severely affected. Within the city, Sheraden (in the city’s west), had the highest foreclosure rate of 22.2 filings per 1,000 housing units between 2008 and 2009. Knoxville, in the south, had 17.1 foreclosures per 1,000 housing units, while Marshall-Shadeland on the North Side, has a foreclosure rate of 16.4 per 1,000. In contrast, Garfield had a foreclosure rate of 11.9 filings per 1,000 units, lower perhaps as a testament to the work of Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation and other organizations. Outside the city, the inner ring suburb of Penn Hills, “had more foreclosures last year than the City of Pittsburgh, which has seven times Penn Hills’ population,” reported City Lab in 2012. Tiny Mt. Oliver Borough, in Pittsburgh’s South Hills (population, 3,403 in 2010), had 73 home foreclosures in 2006-2007.

As the real estate market collapsed nationwide, home mortgage lending declined precipitously. Conventional home purchase loans made in 2010 were nearly a quarter of what they were in 2005, but the effects were felt greatest among African Americans. In Allegheny

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588 The University of Pittsburgh reported that “The second quarter of 2008 brought a 14 percent increase in U.S. foreclosures over the first quarter, and a 121 percent spike in foreclosures over the corresponding period in 2007; estimates suggest that one in every 171 homes in the United States were in foreclosure between April and June, 2008.” “Home Foreclosures in Allegheny County, 2006-2007,” Pittsburgh: Allegheny County Department of Human Services and University of Pittsburgh Center for Social and Urban Research, 2008, 1, accessed March 7, 2018, https://ucsur.pitt.edu/files/center/foreclosuresDHS1.pdf.


County, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland reported a decline of 35.5% in home mortgage lending to African American borrowers in Allegheny County between 2005 and 2015, while lending to whites only decreased by 9.7% over the same period.\textsuperscript{593} The slowdown in lending reflected not only an unwillingness of banks to extend credit to borrowers, but the lack of jobs.

During the Great Recession, unemployment rates soared. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the overall unemployment rate went from five percent in December 2007 to a peak of ten percent in October 2009.\textsuperscript{594} In the U.S. the impact was felt strongest among African Americans, who, after a decade of prosperity starting in the mid-1990s, found themselves desperately searching for work. While the white unemployment rate topped off at close to eight percent in 2009 then declined, for blacks the unemployment rate surged past 15 percent and remained above that level through 2010.\textsuperscript{595} This disparity between white and black employment was just one aspect of the Great Recession, but it was one which created a chain reaction felt across the United States and across the globe as America’s first black president came into office.

The debate over what triggered the Great Recession may never be settled.\textsuperscript{596} But one thing is certain: subprime loans, offered by independent mortgage and finance companies to

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  \item \textsuperscript{593} Matthew Klesta, “Home Lending in Allegheny County Neighborhoods,” Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (July 13, 2017), 13. Lending volume recovered between 2010 and 2015, as both blacks and whites saw increases in conventional home purchase loans in Allegheny County.
  \item \textsuperscript{595} “BLS Spotlight on Statistics,” 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{596} In dozens of articles, reports, and books, from Bethany McLean and Joseph Nocera, \textit{All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis} (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2010) to Adam Tooze, \textit{Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World} (New York: Viking, 2018), economists, regulators, and policy experts may forever argue about the conditions which led to the greatest economic contraction in America’s post-World War II era.
\end{itemize}
borrowers with poor credit, had increased dramatically prior to the recession.\textsuperscript{597} The Center for Responsible Lending reported that the market for subprime loans increased from $35 billion in 1994 to $665 billion in 2005. In 1998, subprime loans were ten percent of all mortgages, but by 2006, they comprised 23 percent.\textsuperscript{598} Backed by Wall Street, which purchased the high-cost loans by the millions, when the “house of cards” came tumbling down in 2007, it set off a wave of foreclosures from which some cities, such as Cleveland, are still recovering.\textsuperscript{599} Some argue that the same conditions which existed in 2007, namely the high rate of loan originations by non-bank financial institutions, persist today.\textsuperscript{600} Furthermore, the number of wealth-destroying businesses, such as check cashing outlets, pawn shops, cash-for-jewelry stores, bail-bond centers, and other nefarious businesses have mushroomed in low-income areas.\textsuperscript{601} But in an ironic twist,


inner city real estate became desirable once again, such that many properties are being priced out of reach for even middle-income buyers.

8.5 Gentrification, Pittsburgh-Style

The efforts of CDCs, banks, and government agencies over the past thirty years produced an unintended consequence—gentrification—that worsened after the Great Recession. For decades neighborhood activists and community developers fought to revitalize or remove unattractive housing, reduce crime, and stimulate investment. But they were unprepared for a flood of demand for inner city real estate from the private market. More demand equals higher prices. Gentrification as we know it today is a product of the post-World War II era, after many cities had hit rock bottom in population and manufacturing employment. It has its roots in the 1960s, when advocates first began to question big government urban renewal schemes and encouraged more sensitive development such as historic preservation and infill housing compatible with the surrounding neighborhood fabric. But for Pittsburgh, gentrification in many low-income neighborhoods occurred after the 1990s.

Beyond the capitalism-as-evil implication, gentrification is a widely misunderstood process that can affect price-sensitive renters greater than homeowners. In fact, gentrification may actually help homeowners. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia studied housing price appreciation in the city of Philadelphia and concluded that gentrification “may benefit homeowners by increasing their wealth from the increased value of their home, and this may also

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entice them to move so they can cash out on the increased home equity. In this interpretation, gentrification aids residential mobility for established homeowners.

To some authors, though, gentrification is a sinister, systemic problem driven by elites determined to displace lower-income residents. “Gentrification is not about individual acts,” Peter Moskowitz writes, “it’s about systemic violence based on decades of racist housing policy in the United States that has denied people of color, especially black people, access to the same kinds of housing, and therefore the same levels of wealth, as white Americans.”

Perhaps in Moskowitz’s New York, where population grew and real estate demand spiked during the decade between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, it may seem as if gentrification is part of a larger capitalist ploy to push poor people out of desirable neighborhood. But in some low-income areas in slower-growth cities, such as Pittsburgh, price appreciation is welcome. In fact, African American homeowners in neighborhoods such as Manchester or Garfield experienced an increase in home value, a positive development in formerly abandoned neighborhoods. For price-sensitive renters, however, an increase in value is indeed harder to manage.

CDCs have long sought to produce affordable housing as a key strategy, but the concept came from experiments in historic preservation conducted in the 1960s and 1970s.

Gentrification concerns motivated Arthur Ziegler of Pittsburgh History & Landmarks Foundation (PHLF) to team up with the Manchester Citizens Corporation to control the development process

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603 The study was noteworthy in that it found “gentrification leads to a higher risk of delinquency on homeowners’ tax bills on average, but there has been no sign of a large-scale departure of elderly or financially disadvantaged homeowners in gentrifying neighborhoods. Tax delinquencies were somewhat inflated by appeals for reassessments, and programs designed to provide tax relief for long-term homeowners and new construction also help mitigate the risk of tax delinquencies and displacement.” Lei Ding and Jackelyn Hwang, “Effects of Gentrification on Homeowners: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” Philadelphia: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (April 2018), 1.

and encourage greater diversity in the neighborhood. In an article published in the *New Pittsburgh Courier* in 1974, Ron Suber, then-vice president of the Manchester Citizens Corporation, expressed the organization’s support for economic and racial diversity in Manchester: “Manchester needs more moderate income people in the area to help boost the property value as well as increase the economic value. . . We want quality housing in Manchester, whether it’s being provided by a white or black housing developer.”

The effects of gentrification depend on neighborhood dynamics. In Manchester and Garfield, where residents had greater control over real estate, price appreciation was not as swift. Former director of the Manchester Citizens Corporation, Rhonda Brandon, explains the community’s need for housing with a diversity of price ranges. “We had so much affordable housing and low-income housing and rental properties that weren’t being taken care of. We needed some upper-income homeowners. But it created tensions with everyone. We had a little bit of both—the market taking over as well as a concerted effort by MCC. You need that balance. I saw [gentrification] as a plus.”

In Garfield, housing values did not increase as much as in adjacent neighborhoods due in part to Hope VI, which reshaped the most beleaguered housing stock in the city, but also because BGC created numerous affordable housing options. These investments created new opportunities throughout the neighborhood. “Banks now make loans on adjacent properties [in Garfield Heights],” observed Mike Eannarino. “People are starting to take care of their properties. You can see that along Black Street in Garfield, just down the street from the new

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606 Author’s phone interview with Rhonda Brandon, February 13, 2017, Pittsburgh.
Housing Authority development.” On the other hand, it also created a demand for real estate that many in Garfield never thought they would see. As the first decade of the 2000s progressed, interest in real estate along the Penn Avenue Arts Corridor intensified.

“We demonstrated that we could reinvigorate a blighted neighborhood,” Swartz exclaimed. But he also acknowledge the introduction of market demand. “Now, how do we protect Garfield from complete gentrification?” he asked. “Some gentrification is good, but today we have to be alert to the fact that the private market has discovered Garfield.” Currently, a single-family house costs $300,000 to build; renovation costs $250,000. Swartz is also concerned about displacement of tenants—“we are less concerned with homeowners,” who are less likely to be displaced, he said. “Now, BGC is focused on rental housing.” In the last five years, BGC completed 60 rental houses with a for-sale option at $65,000-$70,000 per house.607

The altruistic aims of community developers forty years ago are difficult to reconcile in neighborhoods like East Liberty, which has suffered from displacement amidst sharply rising real estate costs in recent years. Such market dynamics created a backlash among many African American residents. On September 28, 2017, a large group of people gathered at Duquesne University to see a portion of the 2006 film, “East of Liberty: A Story of Good Intentions,” by filmmaker Chris Ivey and hear a panel of speakers talk about race, class, and gentrification in East Liberty. The film opens with a scene from 2005, in which Pittsburgh Mayor Tom Murphy pulls a giant slingshot filled with paintballs aimed at a boarded-up low-income high-rise that straddles Penn Avenue and will soon be demolished. The party-like atmosphere is part of the city’s effort to “remake” East Liberty to attract new investment. But many African Americans

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saw it as a concerted attempt to displace poor people. In the film, Jorge Myers, an independent artist, said of the paintball “party,” “As far as that being a celebration, I thought that was more of a disgrace. . . . There were a lot of good individuals in that building. And to see a group of individuals . . . take paintballs and throw it at the building, I saw it as a slap . . . because there’s no consideration of the generations of families that were born and raised in that building. In my opinion, that whole thing was an insult.”

Ernest Prescott, a former manager of the Shadow Lounge in East Liberty complained about the lack of African American investment. “If you don’t change your community, someone will change it for you,” he said.

After the film the panelists offered their perspectives on what is happening in East Liberty and responded to audience comments and questions. Randall Taylor of the Penn Plaza Support and Action Coalition said “we see ourselves crossed out of big plans.” Alethea Sims of the Coalition of Organized Residents of East Liberty said, “Why does development mean ‘we have to go?’” Chris Ivey asked, “Progress, but for whom?” “When will development benefit the people who live there?”

The individual stories of gentrification’s effects can be heartbreaking. Reporter Maranie Rae Staab wrote a series of stories for Public Source about people displaced from Penn Plaza Apartments, a low-income housing development along Penn Avenue in East Liberty that was demolished in 2017. One low-income tenant she profiled, Vivian Campbell, has had family in East Liberty since 1892. Campbell says, “There is a real family connection here. Leaving East Liberty: A Story of Good Intentions (part 3 of 9),” YouTube, accessed September 30, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3AW8RywAJI.

Liberty will destroy that. I feel like I am continuing the legacy of my family here. It keeps me connected to the folks that I have lost, to the folks that are no longer here.”\textsuperscript{610} Another resident of Penn Plaza, Geary Rivers, a veteran of the Vietnam War, told a similar story. “These people here,’ Geary said referring to the property owner LG Realty Advisors, ‘they’re pushing us out. They’re rude and they’re disrespectful. . . . ’ But what can you do? What can you do when you’re poor? It’s the way you gotta live.”\textsuperscript{611}

At the same time, many people forget how long East Liberty struggled with vacant buildings that had no market. In 1991, Karen LaFrance, who, as the executive director at East Liberty Development, Inc. at the time, expressed frustration at the lack of demand for buildings in East Liberty. “We are faced with a potentially vacant building,” she said of the 13-story Highland Building, constructed in 1909 by Daniel Burnham. “It’s distressing because we have a good momentum going in East Liberty and we don’t want to see vacant buildings.” she told the \textit{Post-Gazette}.\textsuperscript{612} “The building needs a complete renovation, but we haven’t been able to find any developer willing to make the investment necessary.” Under Mayor Tom Murphy’s direction, the city’s Urban Redevelopment Authority purchased the Highland Building in 2004 to keep it from being demolished. It sat for more than a decade before Mayor Luke Ravenstahl sold


it to Walnut Capital Partners in 2012 for $1.8 million.\textsuperscript{613} Today, the Highland Building is a hot property with a long waiting list (its 2019 taxable market value is $10,583,900). The cheapest apartment, a one-bedroom, one bath efficiency, rents for $1,320 per month (larger apartments rent for more than $2,000 per month). The challenge for East Liberty, as with many East End neighborhoods, is how to maintain the authentic look and feel of the neighborhood without displacing more residents or losing its soul.\textsuperscript{614}

Former Mayor Murphy defends the decisions he made to improve East Liberty. “The East Liberty high rises were privately owned but in foreclosure with HUD. They had a high vacancy rate and were not being kept up,” he explained. After they were demolished, “we gave gave people right of return. Hundreds returned. There are hundreds of units of affordable housing in East Liberty. McCormack Baron and Community Builders helped with the relocation and construction of new units.” Murphy admits that the gentrification that followed was “something we wanted, but we didn’t expect it to the extent that it has.” He emphasized that “60% of the properties around the Home Depot site were tax delinquent when it was first built. We had to create value.”\textsuperscript{615}


\textsuperscript{614} “Real estate data shows a steady increase in Bloomfield home sale prices—from $116,000 on average in 2013 to $179,838 in 2017, according to West Penn Multi-List data provided by Howard Hanna Real Estate Services. . . . Monthly average rent is $877 for a one-bedroom apartment in the area and $1,262 for a two-bedroom unit. . . . ‘How do we keep Bloomfield Bloomfield?’” remarked Christina Howell, executive director of the Bloomfield Development Corp. Kate Giannarise, “Bloomfield confronts rising cost of housing; Concerns grow amid new development,” \textit{Pittsburgh Post-Gazette} (front page), May 23, 2018.

\textsuperscript{615} Author’s phone interview with former Mayor Tom Murphy, November 1, 2018.
Gentrification in Pittsburgh has become a hot topic of debate among those in the community development industry.\(^{616}\) Experts at the national level such as Don Rypkema and Stephanie Meeks of the National Trust for Historic Preservation offer a corrective interpretation of the real estate phenomenon. “Affordability, displacement, the rising cost of living, and loss of neighborhood identity are all issues that preservation and urban revitalization efforts must contend with and, if possible, work to mitigate,” writes Meeks.\(^{617}\) But those at the local level offer more nuanced assessments.

Howard Slaughter believes that gentrification is an inevitable market force, but it is important to get it right. “Revitalization has to occur,” he says. “The way a neighborhood is revitalized is equally as important. If you can avoid displacement, do so.” But while gentrification is a challenge for some, “there are still people who do come back and remain in the neighborhood,” he said. “Are we really displacing people? Some minorities do move out, but some move back. The goal is to provide choices so people can live where they want.” Slaughter continued, “People forget that many of the places we talk about as being gentrified were not safe, but now they are. It is a challenge to get it right. Communities never stay the same. Businesses don’t go where they can’t make a profit. People should have a chance to grow and move. It has to be balanced and done right.”

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PNC Bank’s Cathy Niederberger agrees with Slaughter. “I’m not for displacing lower-income people, but we need a mix of incomes,” she said. “Sometimes, attracting higher-income people is a necessity. It’s not good to maintain a large concentration of low-income people.” She said that government funding is essential to underwrite the cost of housing to make it more affordable. “That [public support] was critical; that was all part of the deal,” exclaims Niederberger. Public subsidies used to underwrite affordable mortgages, strengthen housing counseling programs, and support CDCs were fundamental to reinforce bank reinvestment. Community land trusts, such as one which began in Lawrenceville, is another possible solution. The Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation is considering a similar program for Garfield. This allows a community group to acquire properties, hold them, and sell them as affordable housing. But the process of “getting it right” to avoid price inflation is not so easy.

Citizens Bank’s Scott Brown made two observations about gentrification in Pittsburgh’s East End. The first is that young people are no longer deterred by racially homogenous communities. “Young people don’t care that much about race as those in the past. Now, people of all races are walking, jogging, riding bikes through [mostly black] Homewood,” he says. “Two years ago, I wouldn’t walk through Homewood. Homewood is becoming the new Garfield,” Second, “the biggest change in Pittsburgh is that young people want the urban experience,” he says. “Kids who grew up in [suburban] Mt. Lebanon or Upper Saint Clair don’t necessarily want to live there anymore. They want to live somewhere where they can walk down the street to the local coffee shop or store.”

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618 Author’s interview with Cathy Niederberger, executive vice president of community development banking, PNC Bank, May 25, 2018, Pittsburgh, Pa.
The other challenge is the supply of affordable housing. New housing investments in Garfield, Larimer, and Homewood increased price pressures in neighborhoods where it had not been a major issue. Therefore, the need for affordable housing became increasingly important. But, Brown is quick to point out that “the bank doesn’t make those decisions; the community makes those decisions. What works in one community may not in another.” Howard Slaughter takes a market-based approach to housing prices, dictated by supply and demand in the market. “Who really has control?” Howard asked. “The market has control. Who determines the price of housing? The market. The community has no real control over the market,” he asserts. “Communities can help make things happen, but the market ultimately dictates what happens.” In Pittsburgh’s East End neighborhoods, this has become an increasingly contentious point, as the previous testimonies attest.

When Pittsburgh was one of 20 finalists for Amazon’s HQ2 (which ultimately went to New York and Arlington, Virginia), many people asked, what will be the role of low-income people and minorities in Pittsburgh’s future economy? Will the presence of a huge corporation make housing out of reach for many? A number of protestors opposed the bid, including those from East Liberty. Filmmaker Chris Ivey was not optimistic about the impact that Amazon, or any other large corporation, could have had upon locating to Pittsburgh. “I don’t see Amazon contributing, and I definitely don’t see the city seeing to it that they contribute,” Ivey told The Bulletin in December 2017. “These are the stories they don’t want to talk about, like, we get so focused and excited about all these new developments, but what about the people?”

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620 Brentin Mock, City Lab, “The side Pittsburgh doesn’t want you to see,” The Bulletin, August 2017, 11.
protestors from a number of East End neighborhoods opposed new development on the Penn Plaza apartment site that was cleared in 2017 because it does not contain affordable housing.\textsuperscript{621} These examples of citizens organizing, protesting, and demonstrating against unwanted neighborhood changes were another expression of social capital. As they had done in the past, this process of negotiating the use of urban space by low-income people and minorities was a declaration of their right to the city. The struggle for who is entitled to define and control the neighborhood continues.

8.6 Conclusion

The story of the first decade of the 2000s was one of mixed results. Some success can be seen in neighborhoods with a strong community voice, such as Manchester and Garfield. But there are immense challenges of gentrification, persistent poverty, and rising inequality on a regional level. The Great Recession curtailed the attempt of African American homeowners like Ron Weathers to increase his wealth through property ownership. But low-income people and minorities actively resisted many of the attempts to negate gains made in previous decades through protests, demonstrations, and the fight for control over land.

Three conclusions can be drawn from an examination of new urban dynamics of the 2000s in Pittsburgh. First, using Garfield as an example, the existence of enduring community development corporations like the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation, Garfield Jubilee, Inc., and

\textsuperscript{621} The Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation and Friendship Development Associates filed a lawsuit in 2016 to urge the City Planning Commission to deny a redevelopment proposal for the former Penn Plaza apartment site. In 2017, a court-ordered consent decree “established conditions to guide the redevelopment,” according to The Bulletin (April 2018). Yet, this consent decree did not stop protests from being staged in November 2017 (The Bulletin, December 2017) and in March 2018 (“Penn Plaza Matters: neighbors rally for East Liberty residents displaced by developers,” The Bulletin, April 2018).
Friendship Development Associates played a key role in defining the development agenda for the surrounding community. BGC’s focus on housing and the role it played in the remaking of public housing in Garfield Heights through Hope VI suggest that community input was critical to the success of the project. Some changes were not always consistent with resident demands, such as higher-income whites moving to the Penn Avenue business district. But absent the Main Street strategy, one can only speculate about how long, and in what form, it would have taken Penn Avenue to recover. Yet, with the exception of Aldi and Family Dollar, all the businesses along Penn Avenue are unique, one-of-a-kind (BGC encouraged Aldi to open on Penn despite the location of another Aldi just a half-mile away).

Second, the role of the private sector, namely banks and socially-conscious developers such as KBK Enterprises, prevented Garfield from following a similar fate of Penn Hills or Mt. Oliver, which lacked a community based organization. Bank lending in Garfield with assistance from community development corporations enabled residents to acquire much-needed home mortgage and home improvement loans. Although mortgage lending was highly variable during the 1990s, more recent data show that lending remained steady in Garfield in 2013 even after the Great Recession. However, it is unknown how well banks will meet community needs in light of recent bank consolidations. Also, it remains to be seen how neighborhoods respond to

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622 Lenders approved 38 loans in Garfield in 2013 (14 were for home purchases), the same amount as in 1996, an illustration that the market for home mortgage loans recovered to pre-recession levels. “Pittsburgh Neighborhood Mortgage Lending 2013 by Loan Purpose,” PCRG’s 21st Annual Mortgage Lending Study (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group, 2013), 243.

fewer but larger and less personal banks. It is not clear if these larger banks will continue to compete for deals in low-and moderate-income neighborhoods with the same vigor as they once did in the 1990s.

Finally, gentrification experienced by other neighborhoods were not as acute in Garfield, but that does not mean the neighborhood escaped price appreciation. While Rick Swartz expresses concern about the displacement of tenants, “we are less concerned with homeowners,” which are less likely to be displaced, he said. For now, Garfield has higher homeownership rates than Bloomfield or Friendship. As a result, BGC is focused on rental housing. In addition, BGC is creating a community land trust to encourage affordable homeownership where people own their house but not the land, a concept currently being tested in Lawrenceville. These type of mitigation strategies may help contain sharper price spikes and displacement. The fight for the neighborhood is far from over. As developers on Garfield’s fringes seek to develop higher-income properties, organizations like the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation may be limited in their ability to fight the changes. Across from Children’s Hospital on Penn Avenue, a new hotel is planned. A Shur-Save grocery store in Bloomfield will be demolished to make way for market-rate apartments. And the struggle to control the Penn Plaza site may bend toward the demands of the developer. But one thing is sure: low- and moderate-income citizens of Garfield and surrounding areas will continue to organize, voice their opinion, and exercise their social capital to ensure they have a future in their community.

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624 Swartz explained that during the last five years, 60 rental houses were completed, with a for-sale option at $65,000-$70,000 per house.


9.0 Refashioning Greater Lyon in the 2000s

It might be easy to be intimidated by Younès Atallah’s height of more than six feet, capped off with a flock of curly dark hair, and the knowledge that he is a black belt in jiu jitsu. Despite his formidable physical size, Younès’s infectious smile and quiet demeanor convey a powerful message of peace, justice, and confidence. Eighteen years old and a former resident of Les Minguettes in Vénissieux, Younès is a next generation freedom fighter from the banlieues. His uncle, Jamel Atallah, helped organize La Marche pour l’égalité et contre le racisme in 1983.

Younès humbly explains the efforts he has taken in recent years to highlight the positive aspects of his community. He has traveled to Brussels, Belgium, and Granada, Spain, to interact with other youth as a way to overcome issues of cultural identity. “Abroad, we are ‘French,’ but in the banlieues, we are ‘different,’” he observes (his parents came to France from Algeria in the 1960s). In his community, Younès edits the “Wesh Le Monde” newsletter (“wesh” means “hello” in Arabic), produces a local radio show, and organizes an improv theater “to help us avoid shame in a crowd.” Like Toumi Djaïdja thirty years before him, Younès struggles daily to put the negative reputation of the banlieues behind him. “I’m part of Djaïda’s fight,” he says. “We fight that fight every day, every minute in our head, in our articles.” “We have a beautiful group with beautiful people,” he remarks of his community. Yet, he also acknowledges what others find inescapable. “The stigma (of the neighborhood) is hard to shake,” Younès explained.627 Or, in the words of Lyon-based writer Hacène Belmessous, “in the banlieues, people are always chasing a new reputation, but it is hard to outrun the past.”628

627 Author’s interview with Younès Atallah, June 14, 2017, at the Social Centre Social Eugénie Cotton, Vénissieux, France.
628 Author’s interview with Hacène Belmessous, July 2, 2018, Lyon, France.
The experience of Younès Atallah is emblematic of many residents of the Lyon region who struggle to put the negative stigma of the *banlieues* behind them and push forward with optimism about the future. The *violence urbaine* (urban violence) which afflicted France’s *banlieues* over the past several decades did not douse the efforts of citizens, politicians, and urban planners at the local and regional levels to refashion a more equitable and connected Lyon region. Like the Pittsburgh area, greater Lyon maintains two divergent experiences, those of poor and minority communities and those of the wealthy and white. But by working through Grand Lyon, the regional planning organization that serves 1.3 million people in 59 communes, planners and politicians made significant changes to the Greater Lyon region.

The Great Recession of 2008 hit both countries hard, but France’s response—a continuation of investment in its poorest communities while the U.S. bailed out its banks—showed that an enhanced role of the state kept low-income areas from falling deeper into despair. During the 2000s, Pittsburgh’s low-income communities saw modest improvements, but the city continued to lose population and poverty shifted to the suburbs, evidenced by Pitt’s report, “Poverty Beyond the Urban Core” (2016). In Garfield, the demolition and reconstruction of public housing under the federal Hope VI program rid the neighborhood of some of its worst residential properties while creating attractive affordable housing options. In Larimer, the federal Choice Neighborhoods grant awarded in 2014 enabled the community to build new affordable homes, consistent with the affordable housing construction in East Liberty. But these

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[^272]: Aaron Lauer with contributions from Moe Coleman and Karlie Haywood, “Poverty: Beyond the Urban Core,” Policy Brief, University of Pittsburgh Institute of Politics, Health and Human Services Committee (September 2016).
investments had unintended consequences in that it made urban real estate prices more expensive as gentrification became a more pressing issue, a trend shared by Lyon.

Meanwhile, the Lyon region prospered during the 2000s. Bolstered by a supportive state, it invested in infrastructure, rebuilt social housing, and expanded its population by an astounding 15.7% between 1999 and 2016. Over the course of the past decade, Grand Lyon sponsored transportation improvements, created mixed-income housing developments, and implemented numerous other changes. In addition, a 2014 law requires citizen input into urban planning decisions, though some residents claim it is a sham. At the same time, Greater Lyon’s minority and lower income residents forged their own responses to marginalization through the formation of social enterprises and other associations. Despite the improvements, residents continue to struggle for a say in planning decisions, to improve relations with the police, and to change the territorial stigma of life in the banlieues. Within France, there is no other regional planning body like Grand Lyon. As a result, the Lyon region is often referred to as a “laboratory” for an ever-evolving range of experiments in regional planning and citizen input. While Lyon’s citizens can learn much from Pittsburgh-based community development corporations and social enterprises, Grand Lyon offers a prime example of effective regional governance that can serve as a model for greater Pittsburgh. At the same time, a lingering negative image of France’s low-income suburbs continued to hinger progress for many of its residents, particularly young people seeking opportunities elsewhere.

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9.1 The Lingering Image Problem of the Banlieues

As the comment by Atallah and Belmessous attest, the reputation of the banlieues as unsafe or unattractive communities lingers in the minds of many in the Lyon region and throughout France. As residents, the reputation of living in “a banlieue without hope,” as one headline read, is difficult to escape. In fact, the country experienced so many riots in the 1990s—as many as 48 “large-scale revolts,” in addition to some 300 “mini-riots” (compared to just five in the 1980s)—it is no wonder that the banlieues became associated with lawlessness and hopelessness. In the minds of many, space, race, and class are melded together such that the banlieues are associated exclusively with “minority” and otherness. In addition, although the United States was “ground zero” for the financial crisis of 2008, it “spilled far beyond America” into France. As a result, the European Union imposed stiff austerity measures on its member states that only worsened unemployment, threatened coveted institutions such as education and transportation, and created a political backlash. In France, state service cuts impacted schools in the banlieues. In 2016, a sign outside of a middle school in Vénissieux, near Les Minguettes social housing community, read “Services publics en danger. Des mesures d'austérité injustes et inefficaces!” (“Public services in danger. Unjust and inefficient austerity measures!”). As in the United States during the 2016 election, the crisis emboldened racist French nationalists to give

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the National Front’s Marine Le Pen enough votes to force a runoff in the 2017 French presidential election won by Emmanuel Macron.

At the same time, the French government has spent billions of euros—even at the height of a global recession—to improve transit connections, physically restructure communities, and offer better services in an attempt to cultivate an improved image of its banlieues. Many of Lyon’s suburban areas have changed in profound ways. Many outdated social housing towers have been torn down and replaced by new housing that welcomes individuals of many income types, not just the poorest. In the last decade, new bus and tram lines connect the banlieues with central Lyon, new community centers and other recreational facilities serve a growing youth population, and a regional plan is in full swing with a requirement to incorporate many voices, not just the wealthy and powerful, into a dynamic vision of Lyon’s future. Many of the changes were driven by elites responding to agitation from below—the decades of riots, protests, and social movements from activists. Yet, persistent negative images of the banlieues over the past thirty years have been hard to erase for those who live in Lyon. Violent disturbances and an intractable “War on Terrorism” have overshadowed many efforts to rebuild and reconnect the banlieues to the larger region.

In addition to the rebellions of previous decades, massive riots which erupted outside of Paris in 2005 and 2007 spilled over into Lyon and other cities, and were seen globally. They left an indelible impression that the banlieues were dangerous places to live. Discrimination and racism still exist, drug sales continue, and police-community relations are fragile. A magazine article in the April 2017 issue of Lyon Capitale featured the headline, “Jeunes et Police: Le Dialogue Impossible” (“Youth and Police: Impossible Dialogue”). It highlights the ongoing
police-community conflicts which have fueled many of the riots of the past. An article in *Le Monde Diplomatique* references the difficulty young people living in the *banlieues* face in getting jobs or decent housing. “Discrimination then serves as a fuel for the employers’ ideology. Young men, especially black or Arab, are constantly reduced to a ‘crime of address,’ a source of discrimination that closes the doors of the labor and housing markets.”

Although these portrayals underemphasize resident efforts to improve their community, as will be explained later in this chapter, they reinforce a negative image of communities which have endured a disproportionate share of France’s violence, discrimination, and social and economic isolation.

As the first decade of the new millennium began, the persistent images of the *banlieues* as ethnic enclaves dominated by violent youth, which became synonymous with “*les violences urbaines*” (“urban violence”), made it difficult for residents to counter these notions. The film “La Squale” (2000), which detailed sexual violence in Parisian *banlieues* by young men of immigrant backgrounds, contributed to this negativity. “The graphic details of girls being subjected to gang rape in the dingy cellars of the dilapidated, vandalised, filthy tenement blocks of the housing estates have remained vivid images within French public imagination,” argues Kiran Grewal. In addition, fears of international terrorism, enhanced by the 2001 attacks in

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the United States, contributed to an image of the banlieues as “breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism,” a myth that became more difficult to dispel after several high-profile terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Nice in 2016. But domestic riots which erupted in the Paris and Lyon suburbs in 2005 and 2007 contributed to long-term image problems for the banlieues.

9.2 The Riots of 2005 and 2007

The riots that took place in the banlieues outside of Paris in October 2005 radiated across France for three weeks and made international news. Less well known are the riots which began in Lyon’s banlieues just prior to those outside of Paris. On October 16, 2005, in the social housing community of Mas du Taureau in Vaulx-en-Velin, east of Lyon, two young men were injured when a stolen scooter they were riding crashed as they were fleeing police. While only one youth was seriously injured and required hospitalization, word got out that the police were responsible. The memory of Claudio Thomas, who died fifteen years ago in the same neighborhood, was still very much present in the minds of residents. As a result, youth in the community fought with the brigade anti-criminelle, or BAC special police unit, for two nights, an illustration of the “‘permanent duel with the police.’” Then, on the morning of October 27, 2005, ten cars were burned in Lyon’s La Duchère neighborhood after an apartment building was demolished. At the time, the minister of social affairs and the mayor of Lyon had been holding a

638 Grewal, “The Threat from Within” (2007), 49.

press conference in La Duchère. In response to the car burnings, the mayor said the fires
“‘seemed to be purely recreational, designed merely as a play for media attention.’”

That same evening, the worst rioting in more than a decade exploded outside of Paris in
the banlieue of Clichy-sous-Bois. It was started by news of the deaths of two boys of African
descent, Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré, who had been running from the police. The boys hid in
an electrical substation building and were electrocuted. Within two hours of the two boys’
deaths, rioting erupted in Clichy-sous-Bois. It touched off three weeks of violence in cities
across France, an event that was broadcast internationally.641 With cable news and the internet,
reports of French banlieue disturbances went global. The cost of the riot in terms of casualties
(201 injured police and 26 firefighters), hundreds of destroyed cars, trucks, buses, and public
buildings, and more than 5,200 arrests amounted to more than €200 million ($300 million) in
damages. The uprising stimulated a number of books, articles, and reports with theories as to
why these riots occurred, who should be held responsible, and what can be done to prevent future
ones. To many across France, the immigrants had perpetrated the violence. But as Laurent
Dubois points out in Soccer Empire (2010), “the vast majority of those involved in the riots were
French citizens; only 7 percent of those arrested were born outside of France, most of those
longtime residents of the country.”642 The rioting also attracted commentary from global human
rights organizations, which called attention to the violent police tactics used in France’s poorest

640 Lapeyronnie, 24.

641 For a more detailed account of these riots, see “The Recent Violence in the French Suburbs is Difficult to
Integrate into the General Class Combat,” Mouvement Communiste, Letter number 19, December 2005, accessed on
See also, David Waddington, Fabien Jobard, and Mike King, eds., Rioting in the UK and France: A
Comparative Analysis (Abington, UK: Taylor and Francis, 2011).

642 Laurent Dubois, Soccer Empire: The World Cup and The Future of France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 217.
communities. Amnesty International wrote in its 2006 Annual Report, “The riots in France drew attention to decades of social inequality and discrimination against migrants and French nationals of African descent.” Although the majority of the rioting occurred in the Paris region, Lyon was also in the spotlight.

By November 2005, two hundred and seventy-four communes throughout France were affected by the October riots, including Lyon. Again in La Duchère on November 6, 2005, an exchange between a police officer and a group of local youth was broadcast on French television, with the officer barking at the youths, “‘We don’t give a shit whether the neighbourhood calms down or not. In a way, the worse the shit, the happier we are!’” Then, on November 12, 2005, rioting hit Lyon’s city center, the first central city in France to feel the impact of suburban violence. In Place Bellecour, located at the heart of Lyon’s historic district, rioters vandalized vehicles and stores and clashed with police. A day later, Lyon authorities banned all public meetings. To mobilize, youth used text messages and Facebook to organize their movements. Though the Parisian suburbs saw the worst effects of the rioting, all of France was under a state of emergency.


The riots inspired commentary from the left and the right. A number of journalists and academics noted the high unemployment and lack of public spending on social programs as contributors to problems in the *banlieues*.\textsuperscript{646} Conservative politicians such as Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy called those in the *banlieues* "‘rabble’ that should be cleaned out with a ‘power hose,’ and after the civil unrest started he called the perpetrators ‘scum.’”\textsuperscript{647}

An additional two days of rioting occurred in November 2007 after two teenagers were killed in the northern Parisian suburb of Villiers-le-Bel when the motorcycle they were riding hit a police car. News reports at the time claimed the violence was “more intense” and “far worse” than that of 2005. The damage included more than 70 vehicles and buildings, and 77 officers were injured on the first day of violence. Twenty six police and firefighters were injured and 30 vehicles were torched on the second day.\textsuperscript{648} Unlike the 2005 riots, however, the 2007 revolts did not spread to other French cities and were contained over the course of two days.

The 2005 and 2007 riots inspired a variety of responses from citizens themselves, some productive, some nihilistic. Organizations emerged as a result, such as ACLEFEU (“Enough Fire”) and the politically motivated groups *Le Collectif Banlieues Respect* (Respect the Suburbs Collective) and *Devoir de Mémoire* (Duty of Remembrance).\textsuperscript{649} In June 2005, Azouz Begag, an

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Algerian scholar who grew up in Lyon’s banlieues, was appointed “minister of equal opportunity,” the first minister of Algerian background to serve in the federal government. He gave hope to some that leaders in Paris were not entirely tone deaf to conditions in low-income communities. But rappers and hip hop artists reacted with cynicism. Music from the banlieues exploded with anti-police lyrics, much as they had in the 1990s. One CD, entitled Insurrection, announced, “‘Any regime born in oppression can only perish through insurrection.’” With new social media platforms, YouTube and Facebook, every day citizens, musicians, and other creative types found a global outlet for their angst. As Charles Tshimanga observes, “Through rap, the African diaspora continually challenges the notion of ‘Frenchness’ that is a mainstay of the dominant discourse. . . . rappers present a concept of civic identity rooted in the French revolution . . . [and that] ethnic minorities are ‘at home’ in France, although they maintain multiple allegiances.” In addition to spatial stigmatization, banlieue residents now had to deal with another stain, a fabricated connection to transnational terror groups.

As terrorist fears increased after 2001, French suburbs’ reputation as “breeding grounds” for jihadists became widespread. In recent years, a wave of terrorist attacks left France on edge and exhausted from the constant security presence, states of emergency, funerals, and candlelight vigils. These include the Charlie Hebdo attacks of January 7, 2015, which left twelve people dead; coordinated terrorist actions in Paris on November 13, 2015, which left 130 dead, including 89 people at the Bataclan concert hall; and a truck attack on innocent bystanders in...
Nice on July 14, 2016, killing 84 people and wounding 202. In all the cases, the attackers had ties to North Africa or had connections to the Middle Eastern terror group ISIS. In the hunt for the attackers, several news reports said that they were from “the banlieues” or “disenfranchised communities.” Such reports only reinforced the notion among the public that the banlieues were incubators for terrorism, not to mention dangerous and forbidden for the general public.

Although George Packer argued in The New Yorker that “Radicalization, then, is not a mass phenomenon in the banlieues,” it is an ignominy that lingers.

Such incidents showed that France is still grappling with issues of identity, as are many Western countries. On July 19, 2016, twenty-four-year-old Adama Traoré died in police custody in Beaumont-sur-Oise, a town about 20 miles north of Paris, setting off a number of protests. One protest featuring demonstrators holding “Black Lives Matter” signs (in English) in Paris on September 2, 2016. One demonstrator told Al Jazeera, “The French police are killing our brothers. Adama didn’t even do anything wrong. He was killed at the hands of the ones who were supposed to protect him.” Four months later, three hundred people staged a “Justice pour Adama” protest in central Lyon on January 22, 2017. It featured signs that read, in English,

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“Hands Up! Don’t shoot!” Similar “Black Lives Matter” protests have been held in the UK, Canada, and Germany, adding an Atlantic dimension to a call for action. In the Lyon region, urban planners and politicians, as well as citizens themselves, lend legitimacy to various diversity experiments in the banlieues.

9.3 Attempts to Re-Legitimize the Banlieues: Métropole de Lyon (Grand Lyon)

Lyon has a long history with urban planning as a way to improve the region’s image. Claude-Marius Vaïsse (1853–1864), prefect of the Rhône from 1853 to 1864, was known as the “Hausmann lyonnais,” or Haussmann of Lyon, a reference to Georges-Eugène Haussmann who reshaped Paris between 1853 and 1870. Vaïsse designed many of the grand boulevards of Lyon, built up its riverbanks, and developed the Parc de la Tête D’Or in Lyon’s sixth arrondissement in an attempt to transform Lyon into a Parisian-style cosmopolitan city. His plans also led to the demolition of 289 houses and the displacement of 12,000 people. Additional plans constructed massive new roads and housing on the city’s outskirts, including the Plan Chalumeau (1935), Plan Lambert (1942), Plan Maillet (1960), and Plan Delfante (1969). But what many of these plans lacked was a comprehensive view of the entire Lyon area.


In 1966, the French government created fourteen *communautés urbains* so municipalities within close proximity of each other could share resources. In the Lyon region it was called *Communauté Urbain Lyon*, the forerunner of Métropole de Lyon, a comprehensive regional planning organization. Pamela Vennin of Métropole de Lyon explained that “it was designed to be a macro view of metropolitan government.” In 1992 the French legislature passed a *Loi d’orientation* (Framework Law) that called for a regional planning body that ultimately became Métropole de Lyon. In 2015, it was renamed Grand Lyon. Grand Lyon is the legacy of Michel Mercier, a Senator of the Rhône region, and former Lyon Mayor Gérard Collomb, both of whom conceived of Grand Lyon to combat the loss of manufacturing employment and population outmigration. It is a unique form of regional governance in France.

Today, Grand Lyon is in charge of housing development, transportation connections, the administration of social welfare services, and promotes employment with companies large and small through its economic development department. It also delivers health services and administers nearly every public service in the region such as water, sanitation, environment, museums, parks, and events. Many of the projects are designed to make the region more pedestrian friendly such as bike lanes and waterfront recreation trails. There are 9,000

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660 Author’s interview with Paméla Vennin, Grands projets d’expérimentation & réplication, Métropole Intelligente, Métropole de Lyon, June 25, 2018, Lyon, France.


662 Mercier served as Minister of Rural Areas and Spatial Planning in 2009, then Minister of Justice from 2010 until 2012. Though, according to Vennin, Collomb (who became Interior Minister in 2017) drove the Métropole idea and helped develop the enabling legislation. Collomb was reelected as Mayor of Lyon in 2018.
employees who work for Grand Lyon with a budget of €3.3 billion. It is run by a president, who serves a five year term (in 2020 the president will be selected through a direct election). In 2018, the president of Grand Lyon was David Kimelfeld, but the position had been occupied since its inception by Lyon Mayor Gérard Collomb. Pamela Vennin says that the real power of the Lyon region is embedded in Grand Lyon. Although it started as a way to gain local control over funding and planning decisions, this large regional planning entity replicates the complex bureaucracy and hierarchy of governance found at the national level.

Some authors have deduced that as a result of Grand Lyon’s efforts the region has featured relatively low unemployment and rapid business growth, buoysed by a robust tech sector. However, unemployment in Lyon’s banlieues remains stubbornly high. Over the past decade, the Lyon region initiated a number of urban planning schemes to address the economic and social isolation of Lyon’s banlieues as a way to better connect people, de-concentrate poverty through income diversification, and to include citizen voices in development plans. Such

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663 As Métropole de Lyon states on its website, the regional planning effort was organized “so that public action is more efficient, faster, and more coherent in our daily life and on our territory.” Grand Lyon, “Pourquoi la Métropole de Lyon ?” accessed April 24, 2018, https://www.grandlyon.com/metropole/pourquoi-la-metropole.html.


665 The organization is governed by a “Council of the Metropolis,” which features 165 elected “advisors” who represent the 59 communes (by 2020, advisors will be directly elected by citizens).

666 Deborah Galimberti, Rémi Dormois and Gilles Pinson, “Lyon: Unbreakable boundaries between economic development and social integration policies,” in Roberta Cucca and Costanzo Ranci, eds., Unequal Cities: The challenge of post-industrial transition in times of austerity (Abington, UK: Routledge, 2017), 155. The employment sector entitled, “Technical and scientific activities, administrative and expertise services,” representing 15.26% of Lyon’s employment, is higher than that of France (at 10.85%). This technical sector is the second largest sector in France behind “Public administration, education, health and social work” (29.70%), 157.

667 Galimberti, Dormois and Pinson, report that 50,000 to 60,000 households are awaiting the allocation of social housing units since 2015, 155.
efforts reflect the decentralization of power away from Paris begun in the 1980s that provides metro areas greater autonomy over planning decisions, though the national government still provides key infrastructure funding. Yet, according to resident interviews, the inclusion of low-income and minority voices often falls short because the planning effort is largely a top-down process.

Despite (or perhaps because of) its top-down approach, Grand Lyon has made significant changes to the Lyon region with help from Paris. Paul Stouten and Herman Rosenboom elaborate on the urban development strategy of *Espoirs Banlieue*, initiated in 2008 after the riots of 2005 and 2007, which linked the Lyon region through a network of transit connections for low-income people in the *banlieues*. Unlike the U.S. federal government, whose federal spending contracted significantly during the Great Recession (except to bail out the largest financial institutions), the financial crisis prompted France to invest an additional 1.4 billion euros in housing and plan for the construction of 100,000 new housing units, most of which were subsidized.\(^{668}\) The *Espoirs Banlieue* strategy complements two other national laws passed in the early 2000s: the law on urban solidarity and renewal, (*Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain*) or SRU, passed in 2000, and law for the city and urban renovation, sometimes called *Loi Borloo*, passed in 2003.\(^{669}\) The SRU law requires municipalities within large metro areas to have at least 20% social housing, an attempt to more evenly distribute social housing throughout the region. The *Loi Borloo* enables municipalities to reconstruct neighborhoods after older structures have been demolished as a way to reduce social inequalities. Both laws are coordinated from the

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\(^{668}\) Stouten and Rosenboom, 106.

\(^{669}\) The law is named for the Minister for the City and Urban Renewal, Jean-Louis Borloo, who served in that capacity from 2002 to 2004.
Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine (ANRU), or National Urban Renewal Agency in Paris, and focused on the physical restructuring of 530 communities throughout France impacting four million residents by 2013 at a cost of 40 billion euros. For the Lyon region, this combination of urban renewal laws dispersed poverty and attracted a mix of incomes in the banlieues, much like the aim of Hope VI in the United States. But unlike Hope VI, the implementation of which was restricted to cities, Lyon’s strategy considers the entire metropolitan region.

Some mayors within the orbit of Métropole de Lyon, such as Maurice Charrier of Vaulx-en-Velin, have benefitted from their commune’s proximity to central Lyon. In 1985, he held a meeting with his deputy mayor and others at which he said, “we have a project, ideas, but no money. But the money is out there. We just need to make the Lyon agglomeration realize that Vaulx-en-Velin has potential.” Twenty years later, many state-funded projects have been built in Vaulx-en-Velin, due to its proximity to Lyon. There is a lot of culture, strong economy, population in the region, he explained. And at the same time, Lyon needs Vaulx-en-Velin. “It is a win-win dialogue,” he said. “As part of the Greater Lyon region, Vaulx-en-Velin gains status being close to Lyon. In the bigger picture, Vaulx-en-Velin is at the center.”

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670 Stouten and Rosenboom, 105.

671 Author’s interview with Maurice Charrier, former mayor of Vaulx-en-Velin (1985-2009), June 26, 2018, Lyon, France.
9.4 Lyon’s Transit Experiments

One of the disadvantages French banlieues have over denser, older cities is the lack of transit connections, a problem Grand Lyon has struggled to correct. In the Lyon region, the spatial separation between its banlieues and the central city are not great—most banlieue residents can be in the city center within 20 minutes—but culturally, they are worlds apart. Research conducted by Marine Huet of high school students in two lycées (Robert Doisneau in Lyon’s 2nd Arrondissement and Juliette Recamier in Vaulx-en-Velin) confirms this sense of “otherness.” Students reported that they were more likely to be stigmatized in shops or by police where dress code plays a role. They feel stigmatized by French society, by the media, and by former president Sarkozy. As a result, they create a counter identity for themselves.

Much of Lyon’s transportation infrastructure is relatively recent. Until the late-1970s, Lyon lacked a comprehensive subway and bus system. Its C-line subway opened in 1974, and a more extensive integrated subway system was opened in 1978 with stations added in subsequent decades. In 2010, central Lyon was connected to Lyon-Saint Exupéry Airport (itself opened in 1975) by the Rhône-Alpes Express tram. Transportation connections between central Lyon and its suburbs are also relatively new, and the cost is affordable.

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Until recently, many communities outside of the center of Lyon lacked a comprehensive mass transit system. The current mayor of Vaulx-en-Velin, Hélène Geoffroy (a Socialist elected in 2014), advocated for a tram or metro extension into her town. “We are the only sector of the metropolis where more than 30,000 inhabitants have no tramway or metro,” she told L’Express. “It would make sense to extend the T1 line from the Doua, in Villeurbanne, to the center of Vaulx.”674 Yet, the subway stop was never built. On the other hand, former mayor Charrier points to the opening of a new subway stop at Carré de Soie (“Silk Square”), a mall constructed in 2009 on the border of Vaulx-en-Velin and Villeurbanne.675 The subway stop “was something that we fought for,” he said. “We did try to get a subway stop in the center of Vaulx, but it only made it as far as Carré Soie.” The current station stops right at the border of Vaulx-en-Velin and Villeurbanne. The mayor lobbied to have the station opening on the Vaulx-en-Velin side, so that it retained the name “Vaulx.” “It is important to have these connections,” he said. “Young people need to get out of their communities and see the world.” When Carré de Soie mall opened, it provided jobs for those in Vaulx-en-Velin. “We encouraged young people to apply for jobs at the businesses there,” Charrier said. He ensured the employers trained and hired people from Vaulx-en-Velin.

South of Lyon, in Vénissieux, a light rail tram constructed in 2014 connected the social housing community of Les Minguettes with the Parilly subway station, which opened in 1992. Until the tram connected to the subway system, thousands of low-income residents of Les


Minguettes were virtually isolated from central Lyon for nearly fifty years. Now, residents can hop on a tram and be at a large Carrefour grocery store within fifteen minutes or in Lyon’s Part-Dieu mall in thirty minutes. In a 2017 interview with high school students from Lycée professionnel Marc Seguin, a vocational high school in Vénissieux, they reported that their favorite places to hang out included Parc de Parilly, the Carré de Soie shopping centre in Vaulx-en-Velin, and Fourvière overlooking Lyon.676 The students said that only recently do they feel like barriers are being removed and they feel less isolated. Just five years earlier, these destinations would have been virtually unattainable due to the lack of transit connections. Now, within a matter of minutes, they are connected to greater Lyon. This connectivity is key to transforming community economies so that people can get to jobs and other amenities quickly and easily.

9.5 The Physical and Economic Reshaping of the Banlieues

In recent years, Grand Lyon has taken significant steps to restructure the region’s banlieues physically, as well as economically. Similar to the New Urbanist Hope VI projects in Pittsburgh, the physical remaking of some of Lyon’s poorest communities has been notable. Physical rehabilitation of social housing has concentrated on the communes of Bron, Vaulx-en-Velin, and Vénissieux, as well as La Duchère within the city of Lyon. Much of the recent changes are the result of the national “Lamy Law” (named for François Lamy, Minister of the City), promulgated in 2014 as a way to improve the living environment of residents, develop a social mix of people, and reduce discrimination (it also called for the establishment of “citizen councils,” discussed

676 Author’s interview with students at the Lycée professionnel Marc Seguin, June 6, 2017, Vénissieux, France.
As a result, numerous physical changes were implemented. In Vaulx-en-Velin, the street grid was changed to “ordinary streets and squares” and lower-rise structures were built for both market-rate and affordable rental housing. In addition, the commune constructed new centers for health, science, swimming, and the community. According to Stouten and Rosenboom, 370 housing units were rebuilt (30% are social housing), and nearly 60% of the 490 households stayed in the same neighborhood. A majority of households pay the same or slightly less than what they had been spending on housing. My visit to the Mas du Taureau section of Vaulx-en-Velin in the summers of 2017 and 2018 revealed a number of active construction sites in the center of town with several areas fenced off for future development. It was obvious that many changes were taking place in Vaulx-en-Velin.

To some residents, however, the constant construction has worn out its welcome. Lemoudda Nassyra, an animatrice (activity director) in the Mas du Taureau section of Vaulx-en-Velin, reports that “too many changes killed the change. The constant demolition and construction gets repetitive.” Sounding a lot like the responses in Fullilove’s Root Shock after Pittsburgh’s Lower Hill District was demolished in the 1950s and 1960s, Nassyra noted that as a building gets demolished, “I see the destruction of all the memories in the buildings. When you see it fall, you discover the feelings you had for it, and then it’s wiped out forever in a matter of seconds.” It is not clear that resident voices were incorporated into the urban restructuring.

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678 Stouten and Rosenboom, 111.

Nassyra helps renters try to be part of the resettlement effort. But many people do not have a say in what is demolished and rebuilt. “The city and Grand Lyon are making decisions, but it’s hard to understand who or why they make their decisions,” she said. “Other buildings that should be demolished remain, while others go down that should have stood,” she observed. “There is great ambition with the renewal of the area, but all the demolition and asking people to go into new buildings will be more expensive. This changes people’s mindset. There is cheap rent for longtime residents, mainly older people, but it is expensive for new renters in new units.” When asked why more people are not speaking up, she said there is a time lag between the time the changes are implemented and residents respond. “People always react afterward, not before,” she said. “Information is only shared once the decision has already been made.”

Many sections of Lyon’s La Duchère community look like New Urbanist infill housing that one might find in the United States—colorful and modern, with landscaped features and streetscape improvements designed to be pedestrian friendly. A few large housing blocks remain from the 1960s, but it is not clear how much longer they will stand. In 2007, as the new project’s construction was underway, Bertrand Bosc, a pastor in La Duchère, expressed optimistic sentiments that it would “create a link between old and new inhabitants.” On a site visit in 2017, a sign advertises “Coming Soon: Your studio apartment to five rooms,” an appeal to single renters as well as families with children. Stouten and Rosenboom note that the population was reduced by 18% between 1999 and 2006 and now numbers 10,214, while the

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unemployment rate fell to 13.6%. Other changes were notable, such as the reduction in the percentage of social housing from 80% to 60%, the construction of a new neighborhood center, school, and neighborhood facilities, and the development of more transit connections. In sum, the urban dynamic in La Duchère is an attractive, pedestrian-friendly mix of people. It did not have the depressing feel of “dead” public spaces in other social housing quartiers, where people were confined to small, sterile gathering spaces. La Duchère is clearly attracting more upscale clientele, making home and rental prices more expensive.

Whether the residents reap the benefits of these changes remains to be seen. Some who attended the demolition of one of La Duchère’s towers in May 2010 expressed sadness upon its removal, but all said they planned to purchase units in the same area. A woman named Hanane told Le Progrès, “It made my heart ache. I hope that with the Big City Project, we will find the same solidarity between neighbors and the warm atmosphere that reigned there.” But she also said that “I would like to buy in the neighborhood.” Another woman, Zoulikha, said “Seeing the (tower) falling, I felt it was a part of me that was demolished. I’m afraid it will never be the same again.” She, too, wanted to stay and make an investment in a new home. “But I believe in the project and so I bought.” Finally, Jahida expressed her dissatisfaction with the new project. “I cried to see so many people moved. I have never lived here but I always had the image of a warm neighborhood. So I decided to buy, even if, in my opinion, the project is a great humbug.” One man, Begna, expressed concern about where he will go next. “It will not be like before. I

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682 Stouten and Rosenboom, 113-114.
have always lived here and in 25 years there has always been a good atmosphere. . . . The future and the project of the City scare me.”

After new housing in La Duchère was completed some residents reported feeling stuck, despite its emphasis on “social mixity.” One resident told *Le Progrès* in 2015 upon the demolition of the last 1960s-vintage tower, “In fact, I can not wait to leave La Duchère. But I do not have enough money to leave. . . . New homes? They are more expensive but it will bring new blood. . . . But we, the inhabitants of La Duchère, are relegated to the background. Prices are prohibitive. And I feel that in the long run, there will be a cleavage between new and old.”

Stouten and Rosenboom argue that over the previous decade, there was a shift away from centralized power located in Paris to one in which cities and regions have a greater say in the remaking of cities. But as the resident interviews attest, it has not always involved citizen input. The authors agree that “policy and institutional innovation still hinder bottom up planning including participation of local people,” though this may change.

The idea of “social mixity”—meaning income diversity—is heavily promoted by planners throughout the Lyon region. Like the aim of Hope VI in the U.S., French planners seek to disperse concentrated poverty. One way to achieve this is to construct housing for a range of incomes, not just the poorest. In the Ville de Bron, a suburb just to the east of Lyon, planner

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686 Stouten and Rosenboom, 115.
Natacha Chabert confirmed that a diverse range of incomes make for a stronger community.

“Key to changing the city’s image is to build new apartments and attract new people to the city,” she said. “We try not to talk about the delinquency. Now, it is more about rich and poor living together in a diverse environment,” hence the concept of “social mixity.” Chabert has worked in Bron since 2001. She is in charge of social housing, private housing, immigrant housing, demolition, and rebuilding for the City of Bron. Her aim is to bring more people to her city.

Many people who had left in the 1980s and 1990s returned and moved into new units. “We want to get them involved in the community,” she said. “They came back to be owners for less cost and in better conditions,” she said of the returnees. As Lyon gets more expensive, Bron becomes more attractive. Amenities which serve Bron include schools and transportation which connects to central Lyon. “There is a strategy to build new, attractive neighborhoods that includes market-rate housing, not just social housing,” she explained.

In addition to housing, employment is an issue of concern for Bron. Chabert explained that there is high unemployment in a quartier called Parilly on the border with Vénissieux.

Bron’s major employers include industries such as a carton factory, Ikea Lyon, a university, airport, and a mall. But many residents are not qualified for good jobs, don’t have the right education, or do not have cars, she said. However, there is an effort to attract businesses near Bron’s social housing development of Terraillon. Called a Zone Franche Urbaine (“Urban Tax-Free Zone”), it operates much like an American Enterprise Zone by allowing businesses which

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687 Author’s interview with Natacha Chabert, Chargée de Mission, Politique de la Ville/Habitat, Ville de Bron, June 26, 2017.
locate in the area to operate without paying taxes. The combination of employment opportunities coupled with a range of incomes is a strategy to create more socially and economically integrated communities throughout the Lyon region.

The aim of social and economic diversity is supported by private developers such as Cédric Van Styvendael, Directeur Général of Est Métropole Habitat. His company builds and manages thousands of units of social housing throughout the Lyon region, including in the communes of Bron, Vaulx-en-Velin, and Villeurbanne. “We need to stop ghettoizing poverty,” Van Styvendael said. He points out that in Vaulx-en-Velin, 67% of the housing is social housing, a similar percentage as Vénissieux. “Many towns want this proportion closer to 50%,” he said. Van Styvendael said that these communities are also attracting more middle income people because Lyon’s housing prices are becoming too expensive for many people. Currently, the market dictates where people live. For instance, in Vaulx-en-Velin and Vénissieux, the cost per unit is about €3.5 to €4.5/m². In Villeurbanne, it is about €6.5-€8.5/m². In areas such as central Lyon, it can be €11 to €13/m² and up, he explained. In Vénissieux, residents can also buy units, as well as rent. But he acknowledged that there is still a problem of people living in social housing units that have not been renovated. “I didn’t believe in the myth of ‘mixity,’” he said. “It is more a question of mobility, the power to change.” But some low-income residents cannot move out of their communities. “Choice is one of the most powerful things,” he said. “But it is a difficult objective to achieve.”


Author’s interview with Cédric Van Styvendael, Directeur Général, Est Métropole Habitat, June 29, 2017 Villeurbanne, France.
9.6 The Inclusion of Citizen Voices

Lyon’s planners struggle to obtain resident input, despite being required by the Lamy Law. Citizen Councils (Conseil Citoyen) in the Lyon region have only existed since 2014, and not many residents are even aware of the councils. Interviews with planners who work in Vaulx-en-Velin and Bron reveal a wide variety of perspectives on the quality, quantity, and value of citizen inclusion. Given how much demolition and reconstruction of the banlieues has occurred throughout greater Lyon, resident input is critical to ensuring that changes benefit the community. However, it is doubtful that adequate citizen input has been achieved.

A small but dedicated staff works at the Grand Projet de Ville (a liaison agency between the state and Grand Lyon) in Vaulx-en-Velin with the sole purpose of recruiting residents to provide input on development plans for the community. Yet, an interview with one of the planners, Audrey Berthot, in June 2018, revealed that “not all residents feel like they have participated in the planning process. We try to reach as many people as possible. For some, it is hard to think about the future when one is trying to put food on the table,” she said. Vaulx-en-Velin still feels the effects of the 1990 riots. “People’s memories are long,” she reported. “The media often emphasizes the negative, when there are many positive examples. We try to change

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691 According to information provided by Grand Lyon, between 2005 and 2010, 3,708 units of housing were scheduled to be demolished (many of the units were in La Duchère and Mas du Taureau), and more are planned. “Operation de Démolition,” Atlas du logement locatif et social du Grand Lyon au 01/01/2010, Grand Lyon, accessed April 17, 2018, http://www.urbaleyon.org/pdf/accueilHLM/2010/0_4_DEMOLITIONS.pdf.

692 Author’s interview with Audrey Berthot, Chargée de projets, Développement Social et coordination de la programmation, Grand Projet de Ville, June 22, 2018, Vaulx-en-Velin France.
the image of the community.” She referenced a number of government-sponsored initiatives that will be implemented to change the community’s image. Berthot and her colleague, Elise David, said that their efforts to solicit resident input in Vaulx-en-Velin—called adulte relais (literally, “adult relay”)—has become a model for France. It provides a link between the state and residents. As required by law, each of the three communities in which Berthot and David work must have a Conseil Citoyen. The Citizens Council officially has 62 members, but only about 30 attend meetings regularly. Half are voluntary and half are chosen randomly. “The next stage is to focus on 2020, to work on what the community needs” such as social engagement, education, and citizenship, David explains.

One resident who has been active in the community process, Jaafar Greinch, has participated in many community meetings over the past year, including a pilot committee on new buildings, new urban projects, and the future of the Mas du Taureau social housing community over the next decade. “We are trying to completely change the banlieue,” he said.693 A native of Vaulx-en-Velin, Greinch is a manager of financial controls at the Volvo plant in Vénissieux (the former Renault truck plant). Though he has a masters degree, he admits that it is difficult to get a job when one has a Mas du Taureau address. A father of three young boys aged 18 months to 6 years he volunteers a lot in the community. Asked why he volunteers so much, Greinch says, “I want better for my city. We need to be better in this city. I hope that can happen. We work very nice together with Elise and Audrey on technical answers.” He became involved in the citizens council only three years ago. When asked if he is satisfied with the results so far, he said “I am not completely satisfied, but somewhat satisfied.” Elise David said that “it is only fairly recent

693 Author’s interview with Audrey Berthot, Elise David (Chargée de projets Urbains), and Jaafar Greinch, community member, June 26, 2018, Grand Projet de Ville, Vaulx-en-Velin.
that residents have become involved in projects.” Cédric Van Styvendael agrees that citizen engagement is a challenge for planners. “We try to do that—get more people involved. But it is a problem of trust,” he said. “It is not part of our culture in France to enable people to organize themselves.” The tenants must agree to changes to a building. Previously, there was no consultation with residents. However, when it comes to new construction, there is no obligation to solicit resident input.

“One of the problems is that people don’t vote,” Van Styvendael said. “So, why should politicians listen to them?” In Villeurbanne, where his company manages 800 units of social housing, only 25% of the tenants voted. “It’s not clear that additional investment will enable people to vote more,” he said. However, his company has seen greater levels of citizen engagement when they work on highly visible projects. For instance, there is an initiative called Zero Unemployment that works with people to create their own enterprises. Unemployment insurance is put into companies that will hire people who have been unemployed for more than two years. The goal of these enterprises is to help people spend less on utilities and help them maintain green spaces throughout the neighborhood by hiring people for landscaping services. “We help them to help themselves through an enterprise,” Van Styvendael said. “Our problem is one of trust. People don’t trust authorities.”

During renovations of Mas du Taureau about five years ago, his company organized a mural project with residents (the mural is still in good condition). “At first, many people did not interact with the project, but we worked with them for a year (and still work with them),” he said. “Now, we have a community that wants to be more involved. “We want to have people

694 Author’s interview with Cédric Van Styvendael, Directeur Général, Est Métropole Habitat & Président, Housing Europe, Villeurbanne, June 29, 2017.
with whom we can discuss issues. This helps minimize difficulties and protects our investment,” he explained. Several years ago in Le Beurs, a social housing community in a priority zone, his company proposed a number of renovations. They were prepared to spend €60,000 per unit, but 55% of the tenants rejected the project. “They said, ‘this is not what we need,’” he explained. “So, we dropped the project.” With citizen engagement, “we can preserve the investment,” Van Styvendael said. “There is more risk without tenant involvement. All our work is respected because people protect it—they take ownership.”

Not everyone agrees that the Conseils Citoyen have been effective. The process is not set up to accurately reflect citizen views, says Samia Bencherifa, a project manager with the Centre Social Georges Levy in Vaulx-en-Velin. “No. It’s a masquerade,” she exclaims. Community-driven development “is steered and directed by municipalities. People really don’t listen to citizens.” She continued: “It’s sort of a perverted game. The idea of social mixity is supported only if there are problems, but there may be no problems. The government tells the community the problems that they are willing to fund, but it is not always accurate. . . . It’s a question of power and money. Unfortunately, that’s reality. It would work well if we trusted people to manage our money and make good decisions. But the state’s needs don’t correspond with the reality.” She said the state is quick to give money for a football tournament, for instance but other needs go unmet.695

Instead, Bencherifa employs organizing methods from the United States, courtesy of Saul Alinsky, to enable citizens to control the community agenda. Educated about Alinsky from the internet, she works with members of Vaulx-en-Velin’s Conseil Citoyen to set up their own groups.

695 Author’s interview with Samia Bencherifa, Project Manager & Youth Expert, Centre Social Georges Levy, June 28, 2018, Vaulx-en-Velin, France.
so that people can organize. Referencing Alinsky’s *Rules for Radicals*, Bencherifa said that to mobilize, one needs a common enemy (such as an unresponsive government). “When you hear the term ‘shared enemy,’ then we can negotiate when the enemy comes to the table. It motivates us to do something,” she said. Bencherifa’s position as an *animatrice*—a paid employee of the state—makes it impossible for her to organize people in the Alinsky method. Instead, she trains other leaders to organize. “People need to be trained in how to defend themselves,” she said. “Knowledge equals power.”

It is clear, then, that citizen participation is widely variable, depending on the community. But even in places like Vaulx-en-Velin, where citizen participation is a model for other areas, residents have differing views about the effectiveness of the system. Bencherifa captured the essence of the problem: with Paris or Grand Lyon controlling the resources, not the community, citizen input can feel like an empty process to many. Resident responses suggest people have a lot to say about how their community looks and functions, even if the planning process remains driven from the top-down. But a bottom-up approach to community improvement organizes social capital in innovative ways.

### 9.7 Citizen-Led Initiatives and Lyon’s VRAC Common Purchasing Network

Although relatively new, the citizen councils have produced some measurable results. In Vaulx-en-Velin, Jaafar Greinch encouraged the construction of a new “Médiathèque” multi-media center that will be built near the city center in 2019. Greinch contributed to another project called “Policité,” which aims to build better relationships between youth and public safety officials. At one meeting, young people met with police and, with help from a theater company,
developed a short play together. Afterward, the youth and police shared food together. One young man shook hands with one of the officers and bragged to his friends, “It was the first time I shook a police man’s hand!” The community responded with cautious optimism. “It is a good start,” Greinch said. “It is a different approach, a model for other areas.” The initiative has funding from Vinci, a construction company, Open Society, Fondation de France, and Crédit Mutuel. The companies show their commitment to the community by helping young people obtain employment.

In recent years, social entrepreneurship—nonprofit organizations or businesses that generate revenue while benefiting society—has emerged in France as an expression of self-determination. Social enterprises utilize market-based approaches to create value for the community as government support has declined.696 These initiatives have a much longer tradition in the U.S. in the form of community development financial institutions (CDFIs), microenterprise entities, and other initiatives which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s.697 In the case of France, social enterprise is relatively new, as the welfare state has only recently pulled back. Although France does not have a community reinvestment law comparable to the U.S. model, it does have a law called MURCEF (mesures urgentes de réformes à caractère éonomique et financier), which allows for individuals who do not have a bank account to open

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696 Brigitte Hoogendoorn, Enrico Pennings, and Roy Thurik define social entrepreneurship in the United States “as a type of entrepreneurship that concerns the process of discovering, evaluating, and pursuing opportunities primarily and intentionally aimed at the creation of social value by addressing social needs,” in “Conceptual Overview of What We Know about Social Entrepreneurship,” in The Community Development Reader, 118.

697 In both the U.S. and Europe, the scholarship is relatively new, though the concept has been around for nearly fifty years. For more on this topic, see Nancy Jurik, “The International Roots of Microenterprise Development,” in The Community Development Reader, 293-301.
one with the Postal Bank or Treasury. For the most part, though, social enterprise ventures in France are in their infancy.

In the Lyon region, an innovative food distribution network launched in 2013, called VRAC (*Vers un Réseau d’Achat en Commun*, or Towards a Common Purchasing Network), is a creative response to poverty and isolation. Météropole Habitat’s Cédric Van Styvendael conceived of VRAC to disseminate affordable, healthy, and sustainable food to banlieue residents, an indication of strong demand for bottom-up solutions to critical community needs. Citizen-led activities such as these are drivers of sustainable and equitable policies for the region, similar to community-supported agriculture and farmers markets in the United States. As Emilie Lanciano writes, organizations such as VRAC “often meet the needs of certain consumers who intend to invest their economic power by involving ethical, social if not political criteria in their acts of consumption.” Van Styvendael hired Boris Tavernier to run the program. With a background in social work, Tavernier served as a chef for a restaurant he started in the early 2000s, which featured all local products and beers, one of the first in Lyon. Funded mostly by foundations, such as Danone, Abbé Pierre, and Fondation Carasso, as well as Grand Lyon, VRAC distributed the first food in Les Minguettes and La Duchère in October 2014.

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700 Emilie Lanciano, “Engagement citoyen et action entrepreneuriale sont-ils conciliables? Le cas des systèmes alimentaires alternatifs” (“Citizen engagement and entrepreneurial action are they reconcilable? The case of alternative food systems”), unpublished manuscript, Université de Lyon et Université de Saint-Étienne, 2016, 2.
In an interview conducted in June 2017, Tavernier explained that self-sufficiency is important for the organization, but its mission is to provide food to low-income people at affordable prices. A visit to a VRAC distribution site at the Centre Social de Grand Vire in Vaulx-en-Velin showed that by noon, the space is filled with subscribers eager to pick up their orders of organic flour, oil, sugar, and other staples. Membership in VRAC costs one euro for residents. VRAC started at this location in 2015 and has since grown to 120 members. While most of the people come from the neighborhood, one man who lives in Lyon’s Part-Dieu quartier came by to pick up his food order. He said it was a much more affordable option to get basic foodstuffs such as flour, chocolate, oil, cheese, soap, and other items. Another woman who lives just a five-minute walk away heard of VRAC through a sewing program at the social center. She obtains chocolate, cheese, sugar, and butter. “Here it is organic, better,” she says. Another woman with two kids in a stroller said this was her second time at the market. She found out about it on the internet. Although there is a larger Casino supermarché nearby, she was attracted to VRAC for its cheaper organic foods. The VRAC enterprise is one example of dozens of social entrepreneurship organizations throughout France which are meeting the needs of low-income communities in innovative ways. This entrepreneurial method of resistance to state privatization efforts and labor reforms led by the European Union is an alternative to the frequent demonstrations and strikes that have plagued France since Emmanuel Macron took office.

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701 Author’s interview with Boris Tavernier, Lyon, and VRAC site visit, Vaulx-en-Velin, June 21, 2017.

9.8 Lyon as Urban Lab

Nearly everyone with whom I spoke referred to Lyon as an “urban laboratory,” replete with experimental programs dictated by the state, but also initiatives conceived of by citizens.

Natacha Chabert said that Lyon feels like it is constantly under a microscope. For the past thirty years, “Lyon has been a bit like a lab, especially for the politique de la ville” policy, she said. “It’s like we are the good student of France,” she added. “Paris and the outskirts are too individualistic and compete too much among themselves. Grand Lyon is a more inclusive process,” she said. Van Styvendael agreed with Chabert’s observation and noted that in Lyon, there are better connections, better buildings. Before that, “people felt abandoned and isolated,” he said. “There were bad schools, no transportation, no programs, and no jobs. Now, they can’t say that we haven’t done anything. But there is still much work to do. The situation is still very fragile.”

France’s long history of urban experimentation in the post-World War II era, starting with the cités de transit in the 1950s, the banlieue high-rises of the 1960s and 1970s, then Banlieues 89 has not always benefited the poorest residents. In “Disciplining the Metropolis” (2011), Sophie Gonick takes a critical view of the Grand Paris plan, one similar to Grand Lyon. While the Paris plan “has the potential to alter the everyday, providing new services and opportunities to disadvantaged members of the population,” she writes, “it also enhances the state’s ability to command and control its urban space.” By this she means the state would have a greater say in who gets excluded from the public realm through the “criminalization and penalization of immigrants” and exercise of police powers, hot-button issues in the banlieues. On the other

hand, Grand Lyon’s regional plan represents a new era for reframing the region’s image and connecting formerly isolated people to economic and social opportunities.

Van Styvendael acknowledged that Lyon has many economic problems, but is hopeful that the changes taking place in Greater Lyon will help build wealth among its poorest residents. “Employment is key,” he said. “Right now, there are some communities where the unemployment rate is between 40 and 50% for youth aged 18-25. People don’t have anything to do. You can change a building, but what do they have to feel integrated into society?” Furthermore, he said, “we want to create a new narrative of belonging. Our job is to create a new story for the people who live there and help them find a new way of life, of what they can give to our country. This starts with good maintenance.” When asked if other companies which manage social housing complexes are doing the same, he said, “more and more, I hope.”

Vaulx-en-Velin’s Samia Bencherifa believes the lingering stigma of the banlieues should be embraced. Rather than getting rid of the stigma, she said, “let’s work with it.” She preferred to call the riot of 1990 an “urban revolt” which ultimately led to positive changes. “We need to consider the rest of the population in the community,” she said. “Only a few young people revolted.” She acknowledges that changes to a region’s image take time to cultivate, starting with the media. “We need to tell them that there is good and evil here, but they must create better stories.” Using Alinsky’s methods, she aims to train youth to work with media, to generate positive stories from the banlieues, a view echoed by youth in Vénissieux.

In addition to social enterprise initiatives, a new generation of activists is taking the helm to assert their civil rights and, in the spirit of Henri Lefebvre, right to the city. An hour-long conversation with nine high school seniors at the Marc Seguin vocational school in Vénissieux
conducted in June 2017 revealed a mix of optimism and despair about the history, present, and future of their community. Most of the students live in the social housing community of Les Minguettes. The interviews revealed a dual narrative: one about the oft-mentioned discrimination, poverty, crime, drugs, and sense of hopelessness; the other more hopeful. With quotes such as “I want to leave,” “I don’t want to live here when I grow up,” and “If you want to get ahead, you have to change your address,” the students acknowledged the discrimination they face on a daily basis. On the other hand, the construction of a new social center, pool, soccer fields, and tram connection provides young people with opportunities they did not have three years ago. It makes them feel free and unencumbered by their neighborhood.

Les Minguettes has changed so much that social distress must be fabricated. The students reported that a few years ago, Jordan Shoes (a division of Nike) conducted workshops in Vénissieux to spread the word about their products with street credibility. One student explained that there had been so little violence in Vénissieux recently that when videographers came to Les Minguettes looking for scenes of abandonment and despair for their videos, it had to be created for the film. Another student joked that the producers grew frustrated for the lack of burning cars. “The community is evolving,” one student said. Social media plays an important role in helping students connect with the larger world around them. “We want positive stories,” one student remarked. “A positive point is better than a negative one,” another student exclaimed.

Young people carry the weight of the past on their shoulders, a weight they did not create. They were not alive when the riots erupted in 1981, nor could they have witnessed Toumi Djaïdja’s Marche Pour Égalité et Contre Racisme in 1983. They never saw Mitterand visit Les

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704 Author’s interview with nine high school students at the Marc Seguin Lycée vocational high school, June 6, 2017, Vénissieux, France.
Minguettes that same year, or sat in awe as several of the Minguettes towers were demolished. What they do see is the world around them, not of their making, but a present they own. These interviews revealed that young people are desperate to forge a better future, an aspiration expressed by Younès Atallah. In a follow-up conversation on December 3, 2017, he said he is enrolled in a Lyon university, where he takes a number of science classes in hopes that he can some day teach chemistry. Younès does not want to sugar-coat it—there are still many problems. “But here (in Vénissieux) we have more good than bad. It is a better chance to be here. I need to move on to see the world. But I like the people here. It is a simple place with simple people,” he said. “I think I can help here and contribute to change.” Young people such as Younès Atallah are the future leaders of communities like Vénissieux.

9.9 Conclusion

Several conclusions can be drawn from an examination of Lyon during the first decade of the 2000s. First, despite the criticisms of Grand Lyon as a top-down organization, it has produced at least three tangible results: new transit connections, diversified incomes in social housing communities, and a concerted attempt to include citizen voices. And, despite a global recession, funding for banlieue areas did not abate. Between 2007 and 2011 the national urban renewal agency funded twelve projects submitted by Grant Lyon for a total of €914 million, which included the demolition and reconstruction of 5,400 social housing units. As a result, the supply of social housing increased, a welcome development in a region desperate for affordable housing options.

At the same time, the critiques are valid. Top-down planning, whether dictated by Paris or Grand Lyon, raises concerns that business interests will dominate regional decision-making, or that an overly zealous security state and militarized police presence, in the name of “anti-terrorism” (known in France as *vigipirate*), will further drive a wedge between citizens and decision-making elites. But as the *banlieues* become more economically and socially diversified, it will be harder for employers, banks, the police, and others to justify discrimination based solely on place. For now, though, race and ethnicity remain a cause for discriminatory practices. What remains to be seen is to what extent low-income people are able to secure bank loans to move into non-subsidized housing, a process known as residential mobility. Absent a fair housing law or community reinvestment requirement, along with non-existent racial data, it is nearly impossible to analyze the extent to which French banks discriminate.

Second, inequality remains a challenge in the Lyon region, where the wealthy suburbs to the west of the city contrast with the poorer eastern and southern areas. Like many European cities, gentrification has become a potent force, especially in Lyon’s city centre. The average price for housing in Lyon more than doubled in the space of fourteen years, increasing from €1,200/m² in 2001 to €2,760/m² in 2015. The average price of a new apartment is €3,200/m², which increased 82 percent between 1998 and 2008. Average price for a resale apartment is €2,600/m², an increase of 166 percent during the same period. Although Lyon prices remain considerably lower than Paris, Geneva, Milan, or other large European metro areas, increased housing costs in Lyon create a dilemma for the poorest households, which are often not able to

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707 Franz and Torri, 81.
afford the €500-€600 per month average rent for social housing units. Although state-sponsored “mixity” zones, such as those in Bron, La Duchère and Vaulx-en-Velin, are designed to reduce gentrification and displacement, other areas remain spatially fragmented and segregated.

Although the Lyon region’s population has grown, as interviews and other evidence attest, it continues to have problems of racism and place-based discrimination. But the growth has also brought new transit connections, enabling more social interactions, as well as economic opportunities that otherwise would not be available in a depressed market. The Great Recession’s impact in the U.S. did not result in massive infrastructure investments; in France, on the other hand, the French state invested a large amount in infrastructure. In Lyon’s case, there were experiments with innovative and comprehensive regional planning and development. Grand Lyon is a unique model seldom found in Europe or the United States and could serve as a valuable model for the Pittsburgh region to emulate.

Third, as in the United States, residents responded to global neoliberalism and EU austerity policies by creating innovative social enterprises such as the VRAC purchasing cooperative. Yet, these movements are in very early stages. Greater research as to the dimension of these enterprises is needed to evaluate their effectiveness. Even amidst a negative environment, Lyon’s youth remain cautiously optimistic about their role in the region and ability to obtain social and economic mobility. Physical mobility is part of this trend. Greater transit connections enable youth in the banlieues to more easily obtain employment, educational, and recreational opportunities in central Lyon and throughout the region. Young people’s value as

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the future of Lyon’s economic and political leadership is undeniable; to what extent employers
and others embrace this sentiment remains to be seen.

The state largely determines how communities will be shaped economically and
physically. Lyon’s low-income residents do not have much say over what is built or demolished,
but they do influence their communities through associations, art, and music. But as far as real
estate is concerned, residents are only consulted on minor changes, such as improvements to
buildings or individual housing units. Major decisions as to whether or not a building will be
constructed, rehabilitated, or demolished are left to Grand Lyon. Interviews revealed that many
residents of the banlieues do not feel empowered to act in a proactive way or that they respond
only to changes currently underway. Van Styvendael said that public participation is not part of
the French culture as it pertains to community planning. Many poor people do not vote and
therefore do not have much say in community affairs. But this may change as community
leaders such as Samia Bencherifa, Jaafar Greinch, Younès Atallah, and others build social capital
to transform low-income neighborhoods from the bottom up and inside out.
10.0 Conclusion to Building Social Capital: An Assessment of Lyon and Pittsburgh, 1980-2010

The results of this inquiry describe a thirty-year effort by low-income and minority residents in both Pittsburgh and Lyon to fight for their community, for fairness and inclusion, and to assert their rights in these two rapidly advancing, globally important metros. This dissertation highlights their struggles and accomplishments as they accumulated and used social capital to control their communities. Politicians, planners, architects, and corporate leaders often claim praise for the two cities’ makeover, such as pollution control, the remaking of the central business district, and guiding their cities’ transformation from an economy based on industry to one based on knowledge. But the contributions of poor people must be acknowledged for their role in rescuing their communities from the dustbin of obscurity (with credit to E.P. Thompson). The formation of community development corporations in the U.S. and citizen-led associations in France are just two examples of how low-income people raised awareness of and helped guide the rebuilding of their communities.

Over the course of thirty years, 1980 to 2010, the progress of justice, inclusion, and empowerment has not always been linear. It progressed in cycles, and strategies changed as activists sought new ways to accomplish their objectives. In Lyon during the 1980s, advocates fought for immigrants’ rights and for the dignity of French citizens of foreign backgrounds by using techniques similar to the American civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Activists staged sit-ins, hunger strikes, and marches to raise awareness of their causes. One of their own, Djida Tazdaït, was elected to the European Union Parliament in 1989. By contrast, in Pittsburgh during the 1980s, few protests were held. Instead, low-income residents formed
community development corporations and sought new sources of funding beyond the federal
government to construct homes and businesses in their neighborhoods. By the 1990s, Lyon
activists focused on legal reforms and attempted to redirect state resources into the *banlieues*. As
a result, massive numbers of social housing units were razed to create mixed-income
communities. At the same time, a nihilistic, impatient attitude about the slow pace of change
could be found in music from the *banlieues* such as rap and hip hop, films such as “La
Haine” (“The Hate”), produced in 1995, and even clothing, which appropriated African
American inner-city styles. Meanwhile in Pittsburgh in the 1990s, CDCs forged meaningful
partnerships with banks and other funding sources and had begun building record numbers of
homes, restoring Main Street business districts, and reconstructing public housing through the
federal Hope VI program. By the 2000s, the physical reform of public housing in low-income
communities could be seen in both Pittsburgh and Lyon. However, during this time Lyon
benefited from a new regional apparatus, Métropole de Lyon, or Grand Lyon, that facilitated
many regional improvements, such as new transit lines connecting the once-isolated social
housing communities with the rest of the region.

One could say that the capacity of low-income people was realized more fully in
Pittsburgh, with the formation of sophisticated, durable community development corporations.
But in Lyon, the state responded to many citizens’ demands such that American-style
organizations were not necessary. Both cities struggled to reconcile their past—Pittsburgh’s
infamous days of smoke and Lyon’s violent rebellions. Citizen responses shared by both
Pittsburgh and Lyon, such as various anti-racism campaigns, as well as vocal opposition to
gentrification, suggested that efforts to address poverty and build wealth in low-income areas
were incomplete. Numerous examples of police brutality remain on both sides of the Atlantic.709

Since the Great Recession, the gulf in wealth between whites and blacks in the U.S. has widened. In many cities across the Western world, housing affordability and gentrification have become central issues.710

The history of low-income communities of the last thirty years is an undulating series of highs and lows. Such is the shared fate of cities like Pittsburgh and Lyon: a mix of optimism for metro areas which have rebounded from decline with the challenge of growing without leaving the poor behind.711 It is hard to declare “mission accomplished” in the war on poverty, discrimination, and economic disparities. The struggle is ongoing. Those along the margins continue to advocate for their communities and a more equitable and fair world, not just for themselves, but for the benefit of all. The essence of social capital is not always about doing battle, but creating a base of support to fulfill the hopes, dreams, and aspirations of everyone who lives in the community.


10.1 Similarities and Differences

This comparative study showcases the role that social capital, or people power, plays as a way to resist exclusion, marginalization, and discrimination in both Lyon and Pittsburgh. This dissertation outlines numerous organizations and individuals who struggled against blight, big government, and complacency to create innovative programs, laws, and strategies that benefit low-income communities. In Pittsburgh these examples include the use of the Community Reinvestment Act to encourage banks to invest in poor neighborhoods, the use of Hope VI to radically reshape public housing, and the Main Street Program to bring neighborhood business districts back to life. In Lyon, activists agitated for anti-discrimination laws and for the right of minorities to be treated as French citizens, created an innovative VRAC food purchasing network, and pushed for more citizen involvement in community development decisions still dictated by Grand Lyon and Paris. These efforts are the essence of social capital.

Clearly, though, there are key similarities and differences in the experiences of low-income people and minorities in Pittsburgh and Lyon. In general, the Lyon region has maintained a greater level of state support for housing and transportation infrastructure in low-income areas than in Pittsburgh, which provided key linkages so residents could better access the region’s assets. In addition, with Grand Lyon acting as a central planning authority, greater Lyon operates as a cohesive metropolitan region, as opposed to 130 independent communities within Allegheny County and Pittsburgh’s 90 neighborhoods all competing for scarce resources. On the other hand, residents of low-income communities in Pittsburgh formed durable organizations with staff, obtain long-term private sector funding, and gain control over real estate, a key factor missing in Lyon’s low-income areas.
As was mentioned in the introduction, both Pittsburgh and Lyon share a history of housing experimentation that became became national programs in their respective countries. In Pittsburgh, this included historic preservation of working-class neighborhoods such as Manchester in the 1960s and 1970s; the development of a network of CDCs which involved the private sector in neighborhood development in the 1970s and 1980s; the involvement of banks as a result of CRA advocacy in 1990s; Hope VI the integration of public housing into surrounding neighborhoods of the 1990s and 2000s, such as in Garfield and the Hill District; and the implementation of land trusts to control gentrification in the 2000s. In the Lyon region, the cités de transit pioneered in the 1950s were some of the nation’s first housing to be constructed for a rapidly growing postwar population in the 1950s. Some of France’s first and largest social housing towers of the 1960s and 1970s were constructed in Lyon’s suburbs. Unlike Paris, Lyon received a disproportionate share of social housing units relative to its size. Starting in the 1980s, but accelerating in the 1990s and 2000s, Lyon saw some of the first and largest demolitions of social housing towers, followed by economic integration of new housing in the 1990s and 2000s in an attempt to de-concentrate poverty.

As a result of these transformations, low-income communities in Pittsburgh and Lyon are far from popular images of a “ghetto.” Many communities have been radically reshaped since the 1990s. Particularly in many of Lyon’s banlieues, the housing stock is relatively new and well-cared for, and both cities changed their images, as negative stereotypes of Pittsburgh as “steel city” and “rust belt poster child” and Lyon’s banlieues as dangerous no-go zones have faded into the background. If the next generation is any guide, their actions to change these perceptions will go far to making a new, positive image for both regions.
Yet, both cities also share wealth inequality among its citizens that has worsened and shifted to outer areas. The suburbanization of poverty in the Pittsburgh region accelerated as the inner city was renovated in the 1990s and 2000s. As real estate prices rose in certain city neighborhoods, such as East Liberty, many low-income residents moved to more affordable housing outside the city. As a result, gentrification became widespread in the post-Great Recession era. In Lyon deindustrialization created a “lost generation” of youth, primarily men, in the *banlieues* who faced bleak prospects of employment, police brutality, racial profiling, and spatial discrimination in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. As Lyon’s central city became more expensive, affordable housing became more unattainable. Both cities found that they cannot build their way out of poverty through the construction of new social housing units. Issues of racial, economic, and spatial discrimination required concerted strategies from citizens and city leaders alike.

On the other hand, there are profound differences between the experiences of minority and low-income residents in Pittsburgh and Lyon. While Lyon experienced several instances of violence during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, Pittsburgh did not (Pittsburgh’s last major riot occurred in the wake of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination in April 1968). Pittsburgh’s experience could be attributed to the strong public-private partnerships which had been built over several decades. Planning in Lyon, even at a regional level, is still very top-down. There is very little resident involvement in planning or development decisions. In Pittsburgh, on the other hand, citizens have since the 1960s protested and demanded for inclusion in projects through the use of Saul Alinsky-style organizing techniques.
In terms of community-based associations, Pittsburgh supports numerous well-funded and enduring organizations, while those formed in the Lyon area were largely temporary. As a result of government cutbacks unleashed in the 1970s and expanded in the 1980s, Pittsburgh’s nonprofit community development corporations guided and in some cases led development in low-income neighborhoods. In Lyon, local organizing focused more on civil rights and belonging for citizens of the French republic, though demands for jobs were part of the appeal as well. Associations such as Zaâma de Banlieue and Agora did not endure; whereas in Pittsburgh, many CDCs started in the 1970s and 1980s continue to operate today. In addition, there was little to no bank involvement in Lyon’s low-income communities unlike in Pittsburgh’s low-income neighborhoods.

A final difference between the two cities involves their disparate approaches to regional development. Starting in the late-1990s and early-2000s, Lyon city planners focused on holistic regional planning and implementation through the Grand Lyon organization as the region experienced three decades of growth since its low-point in 1980. In Pittsburgh since the 1980s, many neighborhoods had their own community development corporation, which often competed against each other for funds, and there was very little alignment between city and county priorities. Issues such as mass transit are seldom linked to community development, though this may be changing slowly as the Port Authority of Allegheny County encourages more transit-oriented development throughout the region. In general, though, the Pittsburgh region’s infrastructure remains woefully underfunded and in need of greater investment. Allegheny County’s 130 communities rarely collaborate on projects, though there are a few examples of cost-sharing arrangements.
10.2 Key Observations

This comparative study between Pittsburgh and Lyon yields several observations about how low-income and minority residents built and deployed social capital to obtain greater control over their communities. First, low-income and minority citizens in both countries mobilized in vastly different ways to achieve similar outcomes. In the U.S., a lack of government funding for cities gave rise to a durable and professionalized community development corporation and community development financial institution sector. These organizations were comprised of neighborhood residents eager to take real estate development into its own hands. Some organizations were products of President Johnson’s Great Society, which provided direct funding to CDCs. But in the 1970s and 1980s, when these government funds diminished, community based organizations found alternate sources, such as foundations and corporations, to supplement their operating budgets. The CDC movement culminated in the Community Reinvestment Act advocacy efforts of the late-1980s and early-1990s, led by CDC directors and other advocates. In recent years, many CDCs have found creative ways to fund their operations.712

In France, the civil rights demonstrations, such as the March for Equality and Against Racism in 1983, and formation of associations (sans professional staff) are evidence that French activists not only struggled for their self-dignity and rights as French citizens, but also fought for their communities. Like many American community based organizations, these organizations formed to combat discrimination. But unlike those in the U.S., French associations did not take on real estate development or employment projects. Therefore, residents did not have the same

level of control over real estate as did those in the U.S. Yet, both efforts led to investments in communities otherwise abandoned. In the U.S., market-based approaches, due in large part to citizen-driven CRA advocacy, led to greater levels of bank investment, which in turn complemented the Hope VI program with its focus on public-private partnerships and mixed-income communities. In France, the state increased its level of investment in the banlieues, even during a global recession, and, like Hope VI, encouraged a diversity of resident incomes.

In Pittsburgh’s three neighborhoods of Bloomfield, Friendship, and Garfield, for instance, residents formed durable organizations with professional staff. Through key real estate acquisitions and a collaborative approach, the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation, Garfield Jubilee, and Friendship Development Associates rebuilt the community from within. The transformation of Penn Avenue from a derelict, abandoned business corridor into a highly desirable Penn Avenue Arts District is perhaps the best example of their efforts. In addition, resurrecting the housing market in all three neighborhoods through bank relationships strengthened the residential sector. Federal programs such as Hope VI provided further impetus for the community to influence the redevelopment of a large public housing site with hundreds of units, such as Alequippa Terrace and Bedford Dwellings in the Hill and Garfield Towers in Garfield. In fact, like the South Side Local Development Company, which closed in 2010, the Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation may soon cease to exist due to improved market conditions.713

In Lyon, on the other hand, community organizations had less influence over real estate, but nevertheless influenced development decisions in subtle but important ways. Neighborhood

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713 BGC’s Rick Swartz explained, “We weren’t here in 1950 when the neighborhood was going strong . . . so we may not need to be here in 2025 when the neighborhood is going strong again.” Jones and Lord, “Neighborhood boosters face new challenges,” A12.
associations such as Agora and Antidote, groups focused on anti-racist causes like Young Arabs of the Banlieues, and social enterprises such as VRAC developed innovative solutions to poverty and marginalization not addressed by the government or private sectors. In addition, the national government’s funding of banlieues remained consistently high, even during the Great Recession. This facilitated the physical transformation of social housing communities in Bron, La Duchère, Vaulx-en-Velin, and Vénissieux. In addition, improved mass transit connections and new housing for a range of incomes helped fulfill the region’s vision of “mixity.” In the case of both cities, the agency of poor people must be considered as an important factor in guiding development decisions.

Second, the role of the private sector in the transformation of low-income communities was far greater in Pittsburgh than in Lyon, though not necessarily by choice. Banks in particular were initially reluctant to invest, but through CRA protests they realized lending to poor neighborhoods was a profitable and safe investment. Once banks acquired the expertise to develop and maintain community reinvestment initiatives, innovative programs met the needs of low- and moderate-income communities. Private foundations also sustained Pittsburgh organizations through critical operational support. In Lyon, there is no community reinvestment law for banks, so there is little incentive for them to invest in poor communities. Most importantly, the French state, through agencies in Paris or Grand Lyon, dominates real estate development of affordable housing. Therefore, nonprofit community development corporations are practically nonexistent in France and therefore, community-based nonprofits rarely control real estate, making it nearly impossible for citizens to have site control over their neighborhoods.
Third, women play a leading role in the mobilization of residents in both cities, part of the struggle for civil rights seldom explored by other studies. The contributions of women organizers are often considered “invisible labor,” part of a “women-centered model of community organizing.” The “invisibility” of women is due not necessarily to a willful ignorance on the part of researchers, but because many of women never thought of themselves as part of any “movement.” “The cumulative effect of their interactions with these [public and private] institutions,” Lisa Levenstein writes, “transformed the . . . landscape of cities and the configuration of state policies and modern racial politics.” At the same time, more needs to be said about the distinctive role of women in community organizing and development.

Male leaders, such as the organizers of the March for Equality in 1983, Toumi Djaïdja, Father Jean Costil, Father Christian Delorme, and Jamel Atallah in Lyon and Pittsburgh’s Stanley Lowe, Rick Swartz, and Kevin Wells were effective representatives for their respective communities. But female leaders such as Djida Tazdaït, who formed one of the first anti-racist organizations in France, Zaâma d’Banlieue, in 1979, as well as Young Arabs of Lyon and the Suburbs in 1985, and then became the first woman of North African descent to be elected to the European Parliament in 1989, showed that the struggle for civil rights was not entirely dominated by men. In addition, Lemouddaa Nassyra, who served as Agora’s secretary in Mas du

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Taureau in the early 1990s, organized fellow women to support community activities through her “fêtes du quartier,” activities. In Pittsburgh, Frankie Mae Pace in the Hill District; Manchester Citizens Corporation’s Betty Jane Ralph and Rhonda Brandon; Dorothy Richardson and Ethel Hagler, who founded Neighborhood Housing Services; Calbride’s Harriet Henson; Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation’s Aggie Brose; and Joann Monroe of Garfield Jubilee joined a long line of influential women who influenced their respective neighborhoods over the course of more than fifty years. These key female leaders in both cities influenced local and national policies and were critical organizers of social capital in their respective communities. Future narratives of civil rights and community revitalization should give a more prominent place to women.\footnote{Wendy Pojmann, “Muslim Women’s Organizing in France and Italy: Political Culture, Activism, and Performativity in the Public Sphere.” Feminist Formations 22, no. 3 (2010): 229-51.}

Fourth, large investments in transportation and affordable housing on a regional level mattered. These investments have transformed Pittsburgh and Lyon in dramatic ways. Lyon connected the region through extensive mass transit linkages and by taking into consideration regional affordable housing needs and focused more on a holistic approach, incorporating low-income communities into a wider regional vision. In Pittsburgh each neighborhood dictated its own terms. With the exception of the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group, neighborhood demands were rarely coordinated as a citywide or region-wide strategy. Pittsburgh’s aging transit system, organized as the Port Authority of Allegheny County in the 1950s, is very limited and relies almost entirely on buses; its light rail consists of one line serving the South Hills. Conversely, state-sponsored mass transit investments—an extension of subway lines, new light rail trams, and buses—made Lyon’s regional plan possible. It enabled low-income people to better connect to the regional economy. Also, the French state has maintained
a fairly high level of funding for cities and low-income communities, unlike in the U.S., where urban funding has varied widely from administration to administration. The housing investments in both countries made a difference in turning around impoverished neighborhoods through the provision of higher-quality, mixed-income housing. In the case of Lyon, transit investments provided poor people with key linkages throughout Greater Lyon. Regions cannot prosper unless its poorest residents are included in future plans for its growth and development. Attempts to marginalize citizen voices only reinforced resistance.

On the other hand, these investments created the problem of gentrification. The losers are generally low-income renters unable to find affordable housing or housing that is convenient to work. This is a greater problem in the U.S., where mass transit is severely underfunded and disjointed. The supply of affordable housing has been an acute problem in both cities grappling with steep price increases. But effective bottom-up solutions emerged more prominently in the United States. For instance, Pittsburgh’s Lawrenceville neighborhood implemented a land trust to control real estate prices, a concept that is being considered in Garfield and West Oakland.\(^{718}\) Sales of homes in land trusts are income-restricted, allowing lower-income people to enter the market, an initiative that may spread to other parts of the region as well.

Fifth, despite these investments, discrimination and inequality continue in both cities. In France, the state’s investment in affordable housing which has occurred in the banlieues will be difficult to maintain without fair housing and fair lending laws, better community-police relations, and stronger enforcement of discriminatory employment practices. In the U.S., the lack of regulation around independent mortgage and finance companies and the unregulated

growth of the high-fee check cashing industry threatens reinvestment work being conducted by CRA-regulated banks. The proliferation of vacant properties creates obstacles for CDCs and other developers from sustaining momentum from previous projects. In addition, the importance of financial education must be stressed so consumers can make wise decisions and avoid the lure of predatory lenders.

Sixth, metro areas cannot build or demolish their way out of poverty. Although the removal of obsolete public housing opened up new housing opportunities in both France and the United States, it was not clear that renovation of existing units or responsible building management would have produced different outcomes. The mass demolitions not only disrupted the physical spaces which people inhabited, it ruptured their social capital. A concerted building campaign cannot minimize poverty, inequality, and discrimination, whether it includes new construction, renovation, or demolition. Over the course of thirty years, both Pittsburgh and Lyon imploded thousands of public housing units, only to see the same conditions return. Poverty never went away, it just shifted to outer areas.

Finally, while the transatlantic nature of ideas and people between Pittsburgh and Lyon are not obvious, it is hard not to miss similar trends which occurred in both cities around the same time. The most apparent is the decision by leaders in Lyon and in Pittsburgh to demolish public housing in the mid-1990s. As Mayor Tom Murphy explains in chapter 5, “We had an awareness of what was going on in Europe,” Murphy remembers, “but it didn’t influence our thinking.” However, just as transatlantic notions of urban renewal made their way from Europe to the United States and back again (explained in Klemek, 2010), so too did new ideas

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719 Author’s phone interview with former Mayor Tom Murphy, November 1, 2018.
for how to remake public housing in the 1990s. This process only accelerated as the internet and relatively cheap and easy jet travel enabled the sharing of even more concepts, such as popular culture, the “Black Lives Matter” campaign, and Alinsky-style organizing techniques. What remains to be seen is how the uniquely American ideas of property ownership, bank investment, and social enterprise will play out in France in coming years. Likewise, will greater Pittsburgh ever embrace the regional planning apparatus of Grand Lyon? Some political and social structures are more difficult to change, even though distinctive solutions exist.

10.3 Topics for Future Research

This dissertation suggests a number of topics that could be explored in more depth. The discussion about gentrification needs additional study. Although gentrification as a trend has been studied since the 1960s, it has become a popular topic in the press and among academics as the back-to-the-cities movement accelerated in the last decade. Residents of large cities, such as New York, Paris, or London, have lived with gentrification’s effects for decades. In smaller cities, such as Pittsburgh or Lyon, the trend is relatively new, especially in those areas formerly abandoned and redlined, such as East Liberty and Garfield. But the fact that few cities offer affordable housing options is a problem that should occupy urban historians and policy makers for the near future.720 Today, however, nearly everyone is talking about gentrification of inner cities. It is one that became a greater concern since the Great Recession. The issue of gentrification came up in nearly every interview I conducted in both Lyon and Pittsburgh.

However, the element of community control is missing in the conversation about gentrification. In the U.S., community development corporations have a certain level of control over price and supply through property ownership. In addition, governmental authorities can incentivize private developers to construct low-income housing through tax credits, enable land banks to control housing prices, or develop it outright through public housing. In France, the state largely guides the supply of affordable housing. In both cases, though, the market dictates price. A deeper understanding of prices and demographics is required to more accurately understand gentrification’s effects on neighborhoods in Pittsburgh and Lyon.

Similarly, as new residents populate inner city neighborhoods, how do these demographic shifts rearrange voting patterns? Do new residents reinforce or upend traditional party politics? How do candidates respond? To what extent do these demographic trends change public policy? Likewise, as the suburbs have changed, how are poor people responding? What services are available to help low-income suburban residents? Answering these questions requires additional study of demographic, economic, and social patterns.

Antisemitism rarely came up in interviews with residents of Lyon’s banlieues or in Pittsburgh’s inner city neighborhoods. It is still a topic to be explored in both the U.S. and France, where antisemitism is on the rise. The conversation about civil rights often revolved around the struggle for either African American or French-North African identity. But in France, as a growing number of new migrants enters the country from Islamic countries, to what extent

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do they bring antisemitic views, as well? What is the response among French Jews, who fear a backlash against their religion from both the National Front and fundamentalist Islam. In both France and the United States, to what extent do antisemitic views among one set of minorities complicate the larger message of civil rights for all minorities? Religion is a touchy subject in France, which prides itself on laïcité, or secularism. However, this topic is ripe for further study and could be combined with a study of Islamaphobia.

The importance of social enterprise should be given greater attention, particularly in France. As neoliberalism spreads across the European Union, helped along by French President Macron, microfinance institutions and other alternative lending entities which support social enterprises (and as counterpoints to banking discrimination) will become more important as wealth-generating entities, particularly among low-income residents. As Sophie Brana and Yves Jégourel write, French “social income earners are victims of discrimination from the banking sector: 48 per cent do not have a chequebook whilst 96 per cent do not benefit from a credit card.” Access to capital is a critical determinant to wealth creation.

The role of labor unions in the civil rights and economic justice movement needs additional study. It is not clear why community-based organizations (CBOs) and unions do not work together more often. The research yielded few if any collaborations among CBOs and organized labor. Particularly in France, where the formerly industrialized banlieues surrounding many cities were known as the “Red Belt” for the strong support of communism and unions,

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sparse evidence suggested cooperation among civil rights activists and communists or among labor organizations. Similarly, in the United States, unions are conspicuously absent from the community development field. Perhaps it is due to researchers’ oversight or due to other circumstances, such as conflicting agendas, but it warrants further attention.
10.4 Concluding Thoughts

“It ne dépend que de nous que cette unité de l’un et la diversité de tous trouvent leur plus belle expression.” (It depends only on us that this unity of the one and the diversity of all find their most beautiful expression.)

—Toumi Djaïdja

The comeback stories of Pittsburgh and Lyon are compelling. Both cities refashioned their images from a smoky steel town or a war-torn metropolis into clean, shiny knowledge centers. But as it pertains to remaking low-income neighborhoods on the margins, the story “from below” is not often told. The poorest neighborhoods did not regenerate due to elite decision makers’ intentions. If anything, elites contributed to the un-doing of these communities. Instead, low-income and minority residents fought back to make their communities relevant and rebuilt them through the mobilization of social capital over many decades. As the forces of gentrification and displacement creep in, the fight is far from over.

If systems thinking is applied to remaking cities, the availability of transportation, capital, and wealth building opportunities are critical to connect people to jobs, enable access to financial resources, and provide freedom of movement, both physically and economically. Metropolitan regions should be thinking about how to create wealth, not just increase the supply of low-income housing. While a greater supply of housing affordable to low-income residents is important, wealth must be created so that people have housing choice. Jobs, education, small business opportunities, and transportation are essential components in the transformation of communities and individuals.

724 Adil Jazouli et Toumi Djaidja, La Marche pour l’Égalité. Une histoire dans l’Histoire (La Tour d'Aigues, éd. de l’Aube, 2013), 149.
The persistence of poverty, discrimination, and inequality fuels revolution. People can only endure pain so long before they rise up and make their voices heard. Generational poverty produces resistance of many kinds—passive, such as art and music; active, such as organizational formation and citizen mobilization; and extreme, such as riots—all have an effect on policies affecting cities. Ultimately, however, impoverished people never remain silent.

Despite the gains that residents have made over the past thirty years, there are still reasons for concern. In a follow-up meeting in June 2018, Younès Atallah explained that he is losing hope. After his first year in university studying challenging science courses, he is awakening to a world that is often very unfair, aggressive, and discriminatory. Police-community relations remain tense in France. I mentioned the protests in Pittsburgh after the death of Woodland Hills high school student Antwon Rose in East Pittsburgh on June 19, 2018—Juneteenth of all days—expressing sadness and outrage at the loss of yet another young man of color at the hands of police (Younès has had his own negative experiences with police). A friend of Younès, Yacine Arioua, who graduated from high school in Vénissieux in the summer of 2018, shared the pessimism about the world. Such sentiments are a reminder that no matter how many homes are built, demolished, or restored, minority communities continually live in a world much different than whites, even if it is within the same physical space. The economics are less favorable, the discriminatory practices are greater, and hope is harder to come by. The current environment leaves the next generation with an ongoing struggle for fair and equal treatment in housing, employment, and in life.

725 Author’s interview with Younès Atallah, June 22, 2018, Lyon, France.

726 Author’s interview with Yacine Arioua, July 3, 2018, Lyon, France.
This dissertation is not an attempt to place low-income people as the sole drivers of economic development activities in metropolitan regions. Rather, it updates the oft-repeated narrative that has only considered state-level actors or a political-corporate growth “machine” as responsible for regional uplift. Low-income people and minorities matter, too, and their agency has transformed neighborhoods in large and small ways, even if political and corporate leaders take sole credit for a region’s resurrection. More needs to be said of the contributions of poor people and minorities in the transformation of urban neighborhoods.

In the thirty years between 1980 and 2010, much has occurred in Pittsburgh and Lyon that can no longer be solely attributed to the standard tourism bureau speech that political and corporate elites enlivened old, tired, industrial cities. In fact, while the political and corporate elites had given up on low-income neighborhoods, poor people fought back to establish their legitimacy and redirect capitalist intentions that would have otherwise ignored low-income areas. Now, with capital flowing back into cities again, low-income people must continue to marshal social capital in the form of people power to remain relevant throughout the region, in the workplace, and in their homes.
Research Resources and Bibliography

This research expands upon my masters paper, “Forging A Consistent Vision: The People, Place, and Race That Shaped Manchester’s Renewal, 1964-2014” (2015), to include an international comparative perspective. In France, I consulted two main archives, the Lyon Municipal Archives, located in Perrache, Lyon (in particular, the archives of SACVL (Société Anonyme de Construction de la Ville de Lyon), and the Rhône-Alpes Archives, located in Part-Dieu, Lyon. Both provided numerous primary source documents, such as news articles, blueprints, memos, and reports that provided unique perspectives of the banlieues. In addition, I was granted an open records request in 2017, which allowed me to access files that were otherwise restricted, including memos and letters from the Préfeture du Rhône (Police Commissioner), that underscored the extent of the violence in the early 1980s. In Pittsburgh, the Allegheny Conference on Community Development archives at the Heinz History Center, the digitized archives of the Pittsburgh Courier and New Pittsburgh Courier, and archives of the Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh (accessed through an open records request) allowed me to reconstruct historical events and profiles of key actors. These primary sources complemented the extensive number of secondary sources, such as books, papers, reports, journal articles, dissertations, and news accounts to formulate a more complete picture of life in Lyon’s banlieues and Pittsburgh’s inner city neighborhoods.

Finally, interviews with key stakeholders in both Pittsburgh and Lyon (listed below) provided an invaluable amount of information and first-person perspectives of Garfield, Homewood, Larimer, and Manchester. In Lyon, the interviews were conducted over the course
of three summers, from 2016, 2017, and 2018, in addition to some conducted in November 2017 in the communities of Lyon, Bron, Vaulx-en-Velin, and Vénissieux. These interviews also afforded me the opportunity to conduct site visits to these communities. In Pittsburgh, interviews were conducted during 2017 and 2018.

Interviews

Lyon Region Interviews

1. Camille Hamidi, Lecturer in Political Science, Lyon II University, Lyon, France, June 2016

2. Jean-Jack Queyranne, former Regional President of the Rhône-Alpes region, Lyon, France, June 2016

3. Nine high school senior students—seven boys and three girls—and three teachers at Marc Seguin Lycée vocational high school, Vénissieux, France, June 2017

4. Bellache Hafid, Retired & Community Historian, Vaulx-en-Velin, June 2017

5. Cédric Van Styvendael, Directeur Général, Est Métropole Habitat & Président, Housing Europe, Villeurbanne, June 2017

6. David Rosset, Chargé de projet action éducative et culturelle, Archives du département du Rhône et de la Métropole de Lyon, Pôle Éducation-Culture-Tourisme, Département du Rhône, Lyon, France, June 2017

7. Djida Tazdaït, City Councilwoman, Lyon’s 8th District, Lyon, France, June 2017
8. Djoudi Hamida (coordinator) and Narjesse Aouni (animatrice) of the Centre Social Georges Levy, La Grappinière, Mas du Taureau, Vaulx-en-Velin, France, June 2017

9. Hacène Bellmesous, Independent Writer/Researcher, Lyon, France June 2017 and June 2018

10. Lemouddaa Nassya, animatrice, Au Grand Bois, Mas du Taureau, Vaulx-en-Velin, France, June 2017

11. Younès Atallah, Student, June & November 2017 and June 2018

12. Natacha Chabert, Chargée de Mission, Politique de la Ville/Habitat, Ville de Bron, June 2017

13. Boris Tavernier, Directeur, VRAC (Vers un Réseau d’Achat en Commun—Towards a Common Purchasing Network), Lyon, France, June 2017

14. Audrey Berthot, Chargée de projets, Développement Social et coordination de la programmation, Grand Projet de Ville, Vaulx-en-Velin, June 2018

15. Elise David, Chargée de projets Urbains, Grand Projet de Ville, Vaulx-en-Velin, June 2018

16. Jaafar Greinch, community member, Vaulx-en-Velin, June 2018

17. Laurence Berne, Coordinatrice de l’observatoire des espaces agricoles et naturels, Strategie des grands territoires, Métropole de Lyon, Lyon, France, July 2018

18. Maurice Charrier, former mayor of Vaulx-en-Velin (1985-2009), Lyon, France, June 2018

19. Maurine Huet, PhD candidate, ENTPE (École nationale des travaux publics de l’État—National School of Public Works of the State), Lyon, France, June 2018

20. Paméla Vennin, Grands projets d’expérimentation & réplication, Métropole Intelligente, Métropole de Lyon, Lyon, France, June 2018
21. Samia Bencherifa, Consultant and Trainer, Project Manager, Youth Expert, Conflict prevention, communication, strategy consultant, project development in non-profit sector, Centre Georges Levy, Vaulx-en-Velin, France, June 2018

22. Yacine Arioua, student, Vénissieux, France, July 2018

Translation services were provided by Hacène Belmessous, Bonnie Einsiedel, Auguste Michaud, Patrick Samzun, and Angelo Tonolli.

**Pittsburgh Interviews**

1. Rhonda Brandon, former executive director, Manchester Citizens Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pa., February 2017

2. Kevin B. Wells, resident of Larimer, Pittsburgh, Pa., March 2017

3. Michael J. Eannarino, former Senior Development Manager, Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., March 2017

4. Stanley Lowe, founder of the Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group and former executive director of the Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., May 2017

5. David Lewis, founder of Urban Design Associates, Architects and former professor of architecture at Carnegie Mellon University, West Homestead, Pa., September 2017

6. Moe Coleman, Professor Emeritus of Social Work at Pitt, Pittsburgh, Pa., September 2017*
7. Rick Swartz, Executive Director, Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation, October 2017 and January 2018

8. Ron Weathers, resident of Garfield, Pittsburgh, Pa., March 2018

9. Scott Brown, Vice President, Community Development Market Manager, Citizens Bank of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., April 2018

10. Cathy Niederberger, EVP of Community Development Banking, PNC Bank, Pittsburgh, Pa., May 2018

11. Howard Slaughter, President & CEO of Habitat for Humanity of Greater Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., May 2018

12. Tom Murphy, former Mayor of Pittsburgh, via telephone, November 2018.

* Moe Coleman died on January 27, 2019.
Archives and Libraries

**France**

Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris

Bibliothèque Municipale de Lyon, Lyon, France

Bibliothèque Municipale de Lyon, Photographes en Rhône-Alpes, https://numelyo.bm-lyon.fr/

include/babelyo/app/01ICO001/

Institut François Mitterrand, https://fresques.ina.fr/mitterrand/accueil


Legifrance, legifrance.gouv.fr

Métropole de Lyon (Grand Lyon)

Rhône-Alpes-Auvergne Regional Archives, Lyon, France

**United States**

Allegheny County Real Estate Portal, http://www2.county.allegheny.pa.us/realestate/search.aspx

Bloomfield-Garfield Corporation

Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh, Pa.

H. John Heinz History Center, Allegheny Conference on Community Development Archives, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Hillman Library, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Historic Pittsburgh image archives, https://historicpittsburgh.org

Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Independent Community Bankers Association

Manchester Citizens Corporation

National Archives, College Park, Md.

National Public Radio

Penn Avenue Arts Initiative

Photo Archives of the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, https://newsinteractive.post-gazette.com/thedigs

Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment Group Annual Lending Reports

*Pittsburgh Courier* and *New Pittsburgh Courier* archives (via ProQuest)

Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives

U.S. Census Bureau

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Urban Redevelopment Authority

Western Pennsylvania Regional Data Center, University of Pittsburgh Center for Social & Urban Research

YouTube
Periodicals

Al Jazeera

Atlanta Journal-Constitution

BBC News

Bloomberg News

The Bulletin

Chicago Tribune

City Lab

CNN Money

Echo Liberté

The Economist

The Guardian

La France Catholique

L.A. Times

L'Écho

L'Express

L'Humanité

Libération

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Storyburgh

The Telegraph

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Books, Studies, Journal Articles, and Dissertations


Briem, Christopher and Sabina Deitrick.  “Real Estate Owned Property and Impacts on Neighborhoods in Pittsburgh.”  *Pittsburgh Economic Quarterly* University Center for Social and Urban Research (September 2010).


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