Without Apparent Occasion: Melancholy and the Problem of Motive in Baroque England

by

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Abstract. Melancholy primarily presented itself to the English seventeenth century as a problem concerning the causes of passions that were, in the words of Robert Burton, “without any apparant occasion.” The configuration of this problem varied as it moved through a range of discourses. In this dissertation, I attend most closely to those configurations in medicine, dialectic, theater, and an emergent civil science. The desire to discover the possible causes of melancholic passions led medical texts to reproduce nearly the whole range of causality. The baroque medical texts, then, produced a “topics,” a collection of potential arguments, of the causes of melancholy. Melancholics also developed their own set of topical practices, adopting the methods of humanist dialectic for articulating their experience. In the theater, the problem of the melancholic's passion served as a form of encounter between a civil logic that sought to determine its causes and the melancholic articulation of the situation through their own passion. Finally, I argue that the modern architecture of the state as envisioned in Hobbes' *Leviathan* is premised upon the power to eliminate collective melancholy, that is, the arousal of “causeless fears” while instituting a power that keeps the imagination of the people in fear of the sovereign's punishments. I show that this vision of the state required a repression of the image of the melancholy tyrant.
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In Burton's preface to his *Anatomy of Melancholy*, he acknowledges that his authorship of the work is really an admission of debt: “*Omne meum, nihil meum*, 'tis all mine, and none mine.” The same could be said of this dissertation. All that may be found of value in it is the confluence of many others' generosity of mind and spirit—its flaws are all mine.

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Note on Dating

England followed the Julian calendar until 1752 when the country adopted the Gregorian calendar. The Julian calendar started the year on March 25th as opposed to January 1st. Therefore, a day in February would be in 1710 according to the Julian and in 1711 according to the Gregorian calendars. The Julian calendar was also several days behind the Gregorian calendar. Until 1700, it was ten days behind. Thereafter, it was eleven days behind. Where I am aware of contemporary bibliographical data that notes the Gregorian dating system, I have silently emended the year. Otherwise, dates quoted from primary sources will use the dating system used by the source.
1.0 Introduction

Emotions contain judgments about the world. Our anger, joy, fear, and grief take objects—we are angered by insult or injustice, joyed at success, fearful of coming evil, grieved by loss. Should the object of our emotion should change, the feeling changes in kind. The salience and quality of our experiences are disclosed through such passionate judgments. In this sense, emotions are apprehensions of and orientations in a diversely interpreted world. However, as the animal’s gaze in Rilke’s First Duino Elegy reminds us, we never are truly at home in this interpreted world. The causes of emotions are not always clear. What then are we to make of emotions whose object is unclear or when their causes cannot be accounted for? If one were to experience grief but could not articulate what had been lost or feel fear without the ability to name a future ill, what could we say was the meaning of this feeling? Here, the object and the cause of a passion are distinguished. Emotion, its cause and meaning, becomes a site of inquiry.

My dissertation studies the problem of emotions “out of tune” with the social situation through the historical reconstruction of melancholy in the English Baroque. Melancholy appeared as a problem of articulating the 'occasion' for a passion whose cause was not apparent. This archive is particularly well-suited for such a problem for two reasons. First, the problematic of melancholy took on a cultural prominence in the English Baroque that brought it to bear on a wide range of social formations. Second, the social dimension of this problematic was occluded early in the eighteenth century by developments in medicine and other spheres of cultural and economic life. Robert Burton, author of the encyclopedic work The Anatomy of Melancholy, first appearing in 1621, offered many definitions of melancholy. However, the one I foreground in this dissertation understands it as “a kinde of dotage without feaver, having for his ordinary companions, feare, and
sadnesse, without any apparaent occasion.” As the title of this dissertation suggests, I have laid emphasis in this study on his final codicil. It is in the absence of an “apparant occasion” that the social problematic of melancholy was formed. Tracing the enormous variety of uses of this problem gives this project a wide scope of primary sources to study, including medical literature, theatrical texts, emblem books, works on logic, meditations, treatises on the passions, and political theory. While this means that the dissertation risks a dispersal of its attention into many different areas, this danger is offset by its ambition to understand melancholy as a problem that appears in various discourses. Each appearance shows how the distinctive means of that discourse offered a medium for grappling with the problem.

The thesis of this dissertation is that *English Baroque melancholy constituted a problem within the common inference that there was a causal relation between passion and action that could be understood as motive*. I understand motive to be *a probable inference connecting an actor with an act or a passion and with a reason for the action or passion*. This is not far removed the question Kenneth Burke opened his *Grammar of Motives* with: “What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?” My inquiry into early modern melancholy looks at what is involved when one cannot say why they—or we—are doing or feeling what is being done or felt. It is, with Burke, a rhetorical inquiry. Unlike cause, motivational probability is grounded in discourse in the sense that certain inferences appear more “likely” than others within a certain interpretive community. In brief: I see patterns of imputed motives as evidence for a habit


of motivational inference-making. The assumptions of motivational probability reside in some social group’s *sensus communis*, a tissue of unreflective norms and presuppositions accumulated through the habits of a common lifeworld. In this sense, motive is not a mentalist construct. Motives have their life in the mesh of discourse, practice, and inquiry within a community, not in a single determinate judgment of a person or action.

Let me offer a word on “Baroque melancholy.” The etymology of the term “Baroque” shows a connection between a literary style and the unlikely formality of syllogistic inference. When the humanist Juan Luis Vives used *Baroco* as a term of abuse, calling certain members of the Parisian faculty “sophists in *Baroco* and *Baralipton*” he was ridiculing them for a kind of scholastic logic used to defend weak, partial conclusions. “Baroco” and “Baralipton” are the mnemonic names for two figures of the syllogism. Baroco has an affirmative universal major premise (All P are Q), a minor premise that is particular and negative (Some Q are not R), and therefore a particular, negative conclusion (Some P are not R). Of course, it would be absurd to attempt to assign this syllogism explanatory power in explaining the inferences of motive we encounter in the Baroque discourse on melancholy. It is, however, suggestive. The general is affirmed, the particular denied. One is left with a partial form of knowledge, a negative conclusion. The figure of *Baroco* epitomizes the thematic division we find in the various attempts to explain problematic cases of melancholy passions. A general form of received wisdom or medical aphorism is denied as an explanation for the individual’s sorrow, fear, love, or any unexplained passion. What results is simply the conclusion that this passion is not to be known in that way. Moreover, this inferential form is of a piece with an essential Baroque intellectual practice: commonplacing. A commonplace book's excerpted wisdom, *sententiae*, maxims, aphorisms, and apothegms are warrants for particular conclusions. Melancholic mood is sustained by the
passionate and rhetorical elaboration of melancholy commonplaces that forego a decision about particular causes.

It may seem strange to take a term whose purview is aesthetics to designate phenomena that are not being evaluated for their aesthetic merits. But precisely because it has been developed within a field of art and music history, it “cannot be defined as a class-concept in logic can be defined.” Unlike an example subsumed under a concept, “the work of art is not an instance of a class, but is itself a part of the concept of a period which it makes up together with other work.”

In this dissertation, the Baroque does not refer to a set of stable characteristics but a tension between distal positions taken up around the common problem of melancholy. By identifying my object as Baroque melancholy in England, I am claiming a recursive relationship between my archive and the context that warrants movement between its items. The principle behind this archive is my hypothesis, in each case, that the artifact has a relation, either as response or illumination, to the problem of melancholy as a problem of motives. Just as one discovers something about friendship through various and very different relations with one's friends, or the meaning of love through trysts, heartbreaks, and marriages with, perhaps, many lovers, we nevertheless realize that one cannot simply take each friend or lover as an instance of friendship or love. So it is with melancholy and its many melancholics. At the same time, one of my concerns in this study is to offer something like a reconstruction of *period perception*. My object is to recover some of the conflicts, inferential habits, desires, and controversies that made melancholy a fascination of the Baroque and an inextricable element of its style.

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By invoking the Baroque and melancholy together, I am also witnessing a commitment to a modern intellectual tradition, one that conjures the spectre of Walter Benjamin. This project is willfully haunted by his preoccupation with the melancholic in his work on the Baroque tragic drama. All who have entered into the thickets of that work’s difficult prose and profound insight cannot fail to recognize the distinct importance of melancholy to Benjamin’s thought, one that extends beyond the Baroque into his work on nineteenth-century Paris, photography, Baudelaire, and his philosophy of history. Scholars like Ilit Ferber and Max Pensky have fruitfully thematized melancholy in reading the Benjaminian corpus as an enduring attempt to deal with the problematic of melancholy. In Benjaminian thought, melancholia’s history joins its personal and political dimensions. Melancholy is not inherently pathological, but it nevertheless requires remedy. The tension in Benjamin’s work between a critique of “left melancholy” [Linke Melancholie] and his own development of critique, both Baroque and Baudelairean, out of melancholy, is not a contradiction but an insight into the curious demand made upon the subject by melancholic passion. Its opacity before explanation is not incidental, but the source of the melancholic’s insight: in melancholy, the contradictory nature of the social situation itself are represented in the intimate form of passion “without any apparent occasion.” It is for this reason that “the expert on the history and phenomenology of the occult history of saturnine melancholia, and the savage critic of the ‘tortured stupidity’ of the ‘newest’ phase of melancholia's ‘two-thousand year history’ are one and the same.”

The remedy to melancholy, that is, to the enduring of melancholic passion, cannot be the explication sought for it my medicine or moral philosophy. Rather, the melancholic must seek

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to objectify the passion, to express it in such a way that it becomes a power of acting differently. By construing melancholy as a problem of motive I make a new departure that attempts to move further down Benjamin’s one-way street of decisive thought. By recovering the problematic of Baroque melancholy we are able to critique the enjoyment of melancholy passion without pathologizing it, demanding that it resist the attempts to isolate it from its own sensitivity to an opaque world.

Yet one may still object to the idea of an *English* Baroque. Is the Baroque not principally a cultural formation of Tridentine Catholicism, foreign to the English seventeenth century perpetually suspicious of “popishness”? Indeed, one of the first to give scholarly attention to the Baroque, Heinrich Wöfflin argued that it was “incomprehensible without the spirit of the Counterreformation.”5 The simple answer is that this objection has been put to bed long ago.6 Although it has been forgotten, there was a German philological tradition that identified a distinctly


6 José Antonio Maravall’s discussion of this point in 1975 already treated it as a development of the thought of a past generation: “In granting the Mediterranean and Latin countries such a preponderant role in the appearance and development of baroque culture, we cannot forget the significance of such central-European figures as Comenius, whose work as a pedagogue and moralist is decisive in any attempt to define the baroque, nor, on the other hand, English literature and the art and thought of the Low Countries. From this new perspective, the baroque, while in force in Europe, covered more ground than it did in those already outmoded explanations that presented it as a complex of literary or pseudoartistic aberrations saturated with the bad taste that counterreformist Catholicism had cultivated in countries subject to Rome.” See Maravall, *Culture of the Baroque: Analysis of a Historical Structure* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 8.
English Baroque; indeed, some of the earliest usages of the term in scholarship are studies of Shakespeare,7 Donne,8 Dryden,9 and broad surveys of English literature.10 But despite this dusty literary precedent, I employ the Baroque as a provocation; tracing the problematics of melancholy leads us to a reconsideration of the supposed uniformity of English cultural expression and its “uniqueness” from intellectual, cultural, religious, and artistic trends developing contemporaneously on the continent. The tired image of the English radicals as disavowing ornamentation, collapsing style into earnestness, is belied everywhere in the melancholy archive.

How else should we take this line by Milton, in his ode to melancholy, Il Penseroso, when he asks:

Melancholy, personified as a pagan goddess, to help him to “love the high embowed Roof,/With antick Pillars massy proof,/And storied Windows richly dight,/Casting a dimm religious light,”—an image, clearly, of walking through the colored shadow cast by a stained-glass window in a cathedral, where Milton desired to hear “the pealing Organ blow,/To the full voic'd Quire below./In Service high.” The Puritan's cathedral was a palace of the mind, but its interior was no less exquisite than Chartres for that.

What I have termed “Baroque melancholy” has been deemed arid in comparison to its Renaissance forms. No distinctive contribution to the concept of melancholy can be awarded to the English seventeenth century. Stanley Jackson, in his oft-cited comprehensive history:

8 Mario Praz, Secentismo e Marinismo in Inghilterra: John Donne—Richard Crashaw (Firenze: La Voce, 1925).
9 Wolfgang Mann, Drydens Heroische Tragodien als Ausdruck höfischer Barockkultur in England (Württemberg: Gatzer & Hahn, 1932).
Melancholia and Depression, notes only two figures in his short chapter on the period: Sir Richard Napier, doctor and astrologist, and Thomas Willis, whom I read as a transitional figure. Napier presents Jackson with an “unusual opportunity” to examine actual medical treatments of melancholia, but it is only Willis, at the end of the century, who makes “important conceptual changes.”11 This would suggest that melancholy is static in the period studied here. Yet at the same time, the Baroque is recognized as a particularly difficult and labyrinthine period in the history of melancholy. Attesting to this is the preface to Klibansky, Panofksy, and Saxl's famous Saturn and Melancholy, first published in 1964: “The limits set to this book excluded any endeavor to do justice to the complex and enthralling topic of Elizabethan and Jacobean melancholy.” The authors aver that although it was “[t]empting...to delve into the riches of Burton,” they “had to content themselves with paying homage to the great ‘melancholizer’ by prefixing his effigy to the present volume.”12 How can it be that a period so barren in contributions to the concept of melancholy could nevertheless have so dense a cornucopia of “riches” that it must be excluded because of its complexity?

Within the last three decades, the literature on melancholia has grown significantly. I have elsewhere traced this broader trajectory, arguing that both the reworking of early modern and psychoanalytic interpretations of melancholia are grounded in common concerns.13 I will focus


here only on those works most pertinent to this dissertation project. *Saturn and Melancholy*, the joint work of Klibansky, Saxl, and Panofsky, laid much of the groundwork for future scholarship on the topic, and their narrative has since maintained a hegemony on the thought of early modern melancholy. Indeed, their narrative was so influential that at least one scholar (Hellmut Flashar) abandoned his plans to write a study of genial melancholy in the Renaissance, since “in light of the wealth of material presented in [*Saturn and Melancholy*] and its ingenious saturation [*Durchdringung*] of this area, I have completely abandoned my original plan to deal in detail with the after effects of ancient theories of melancholy.”  

Perhaps the inheritance of this dazzling wealth of materials has lulled its heirs into the complacency of those who hold “old money.”

In the standard received narrative, Marsilio Ficino’s *De vita triplicis* was a handbook for the health regimen of the scholar, but its great popularity was due to its arguments for the melancholic nature of artistic, poetic, and philosophic genius. This position has its germ in the authority of the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata XXX.1, which asked the loaded question, “Why is it that all those who have become eminent in philosophy or politics or poetry or the arts are clearly melancholics, and some of them to such an extent as to be affected by the diseases caused by black bile?”

This enigmatic account of “genial melancholy” afforded Ficino an opportunity to synthesize the Platonic divine mania afforded to poets, prophets, and philosophers in the *Phaedrus* with a medico-philosophical view of the natural causes of human excellence sealed


15 Translation in Klibansky et. al., *Saturn and Melancholy*, 18.
under an Aristotelian imprimatur. The valorization of what came to be termed *melancholia
generosa* into a cult of genius was a result of its popularity as a conceit among “men of letters” (*viri literati*) who brought the discussion of melancholia beyond the merely therapeutic indications found in “those of the almanacs and the booklets for the use of barbers” where it appeared as an unattractive malady.\(^{16}\) In this account, the association of melancholy with genius became ubiquitous. For example, the Wittkowers, authors of a 1963 work on the cult of the melancholic artist in the Italian Renaissance, argue that in order to make a claim to genius in that period, one had to fashion oneself as a melancholic. Therefore, it is “only to be expected that melancholy is an ever-recurrent topos in Vasari’s Lives” the famous compendium of the great artists’ lives and works. From this vantage, Burton’s work represents a falling out of “sympathy” with melancholic humor and a “growing interest of his age in the study of abnormal psychology.”\(^{17}\) Noel Brann’s account of the cult of genius holds that the Neo-Platonic synthesis of Aristotelian melancholic genius and Platonic frenzy disintegrated in the late Renaissance, becoming little more than a popular fad.\(^{18}\) Melancholy genius became “fashionable” melancholy, a pretense to profundity.

However appealing it was to the Renaissance (not to mention the scholars who so often invoke its mystique), the idea of melancholic genius simply cannot account for either the ubiquity or variety of uses it finds in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Winfried Schleiner's more recent *Melancholy, Genius, and Utopia in the Renaissance* acknowledges that “[g]enial

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 254.


melancholy's hold on the mind of the time can be easily overstressed.” This is not only because melancholy's cultural prominence included more than a claim to genius, but also because “certainly the link between melancholy and genius was in all senses of the word 'problematical'."19 This pat dichotomy has given rise to a sort of compressed sense of melancholy's historical meaning—there is the Galenic and the Aristotelian, the fashionable and the truly pathological, the poetic and the medical meanings of melancholy. Lawrence Babb, a twentieth-century scholar of Burton and Elizabethan melancholy, established this distinction when he argued that “[a]ccording to the Galenic tradition, melancholy is a most ignominious and miserable condition of mind; according to the Aristotelian tradition, it is a most enviable and admirable condition of mind.”20 This distinction was taken up with great erudition in Panofsky et al.’s project. They argued that Dürer managed to “synthesize” the two strands of melancholy (genius-giving and pathological) that the authors distinguish in the Renaissance in his famous print, Melencolia I. Yet some seventy years on from the publication of this undoubtedly major work of scholarship, we might doubt whether these two strands were ever really distinct. Even the famous question from the Problemata quoted above saw a danger of excellence: they were inclined to fall into morbid, atrabilious states [ἀρρωστήμασιν]. The melancholic genius was merely a variety of pathology, proceeding according to Burton “from blood adust, or that there be a mixture of blood in it,” as this was what “Aristotle meant, when he said melancholy men of all others are most witty, which causeth many times a divine ravishment, and a kind of enthusiasmus, which stirreth them up to be excellent

19 Schleiner, Melancholy, Genius, and Utopia, 31.

philosophers, poets, prophets, &c.” Burston thus glosses the Aristotelian maxim “no great genius without some madness mixed in” (nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiae) with the pithy “they have a worme as well as others.” Burton's gloss belies the view that there was an oscillating possibility between “two conceptions of melancholia” in the Renaissance. But the Baroque inclusion of genius within the orbit of melancholy is rather a tragic view that even the genius must struggle against the baleful influence of her own condition.

The status of the idea of melancholy plunges us into a seeming-dead twentieth-century dispute between Panofsky and Benjamin concerning the appropriate interpretation of and relationship between symbol and allegory. This dispute centered on the figuration of melancholy. For Panofsky, Dürer’s achievement was a “synthesis of allegorical pictures” into a “triad of Saturn, Melancholy, and Geometry.” Allegory was the raw material out of which the great artist of the Northern Renaissance was able to fashion a new “ideal” of melancholy. Benjamin never read Saturn and Melancholy, but he did have available to him the earlier, much shorter German-language 1923 monograph by Panofsky and Saxl on Dürer’s print. Working out a theory of the Baroque Trauerspiel or mourning-play, Benjamin felt that Panofsky was a member of a long pageant of doctrinaire misapprehension of allegory in its Baroque manifestation. It was no doubt partly with certain members of the Warburg Circle in mind that Benjamin argued that it was the “illegitimate talk of the symbolic which permits the investigation of every artistic form ‘in depth,’ and has an immeasurably comforting effect on the practice of investigation in the arts.”

21 AM, 399, 400. [1.3.1.3.]
22 AM, 100.
23 Klibansky et. al., Saturn and Melancholy, 322, 335.
not see Dürer’s sphere, placed at the foot of Melancholy, as the symbolic culmination of a Renaissance discourse on melancholy, but rather as the seed of “the allegorical flower of the baroque, still held in check by the power of a genius, [that] lies ready to burst into bloom.”25 As in Benjamin’s chiastic formula, we find that the “allegory of the seventeenth century is not convention of expression, but expression of convention.”26 Allegory was less a genre than an inferential practice, a concourse between matter and meaning, image and presence.

Doctrinaire preferences for symbol or allegory seem themselves rather parochial now, but, in a move that is important for this dissertation more generally, I take up Benjamin’s play on convention by emphasizing that the practice that finds expression by employing convention is the practice of topics. Topics were a technique of the ars topica, a technique of classical rhetoric for discovering arguments in any given case. The ars topica migrated from an antique oratorical practice to a branch of medieval logic and, in the Renaissance, to a humanistic account of general inquiry. Unlike medical or psychiatric observation, it was not a practice confined to a particular science with a set of guiding axioms. I argue that the distinctively Baroque use of melancholy can be seen by recovering the topical practices of the period. Topics were the invisible inventive logic whose central place in the humanistic curriculum repurposed the ancient rhetorical ars topica as a device for finding arguments in preparing oratory into a general method of inquiry into all uncertain matters. Only when we reconstitute the place of topics in thought and discourse of the period can we understand its cultural salience. The tension between the cultural prominence of melancholy in the English Baroque is at odds with the historical narratives that have attempted to

25 Ibid., 154.
26 Ibid., 175.
read it as a passing fashion or an unexplained epidemic. It is because of a topical ordering of thought, imagination, and memory that the seventeenth century contributed little to the development of the concept of melancholy. It is for the same reason that this period is richest in the elaboration of this received material. Insofar as some object could bring to mind a new possibility of speech, reflective experience could function as topics or loci argumenti. The world was a great memento; under the melancholic gaze all occasions were “sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought” and so lost “the name of action.”

We can then speak of a “melancholy topics” as a rival to the humanist restitution of civic science. Hans Baron's thesis argued that “civic humanism” emerged in quattrocento Florence as a response of the intellectuals to the defeat of Florentine and Bolognese forces against the threat of a Milanese tyranny. While scholars have complicated or revised significant portions of Baron's thesis, the idea of a humanistic politics has remained a central theme in the works of eminent scholars, including J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner. Skinner especially has emphasized the role that rhetorical education and ideas played in this development. The humanists were compelled by rhetoric's power of capturing, motivating, justifying the “enterprises of great pith and moment” in and through eloquence. Working upon the same materials, the Baroque “pensée mélancolique,” as Starobinski called it, called into question the meaning and import of civic, religious, and economic motives. As I argue in this dissertation, the melancholy topics developed out of the foundation of humanist dialectic, but it was put to use not for motivating one side of a civic controversy but instead as a method of mediating and elaborating the experience of melancholic passion.

Recent scholarship on early modern melancholy lays the foundation for my approach to melancholy as a problem rather than merely a disease, concept, or posture. Two works, by Angus
Gowland and Drew Daniel respectively, have both treated English Baroque melancholy within what could broadly be recognized as a problem-history, or Problemgeschichte, though both authors take a very different approach to their material. Gowland attempts to recover the contexts to which Burton was responding. His work recognizes melancholy as a problem, which “cannot be why so many suffered from the disease, but why so many were preoccupied with its assumed frequency.” He answers the question of why melancholy loomed so large in early modernity by arguing that “domain in which the concept of melancholy could be applied” increased. Its unique ability to enter into so many distinct arenas comes from its “flexible utility... in different religious, political and social contexts.” I agree that it is precisely the flexibility that is distinctive of the age, but I wish to specify this pliability further as emerging from a humanist training in topical invention. It is the practice of topics that supports a discursive, inferential tendency common to divergent discourses. Gowland argues that melancholy's extended range of relevance emerges from the rise of Protestant interest in the passions, occult humanist learning, and neo-Stoicism, but he concedes that neither “the humanist preoccupation with the passions” nor, “by extension, the perceived increase of melancholy in England or Europe generally, are simply reducible to a concern with the political-religious conflicts developing after the Reformation.” By recovering melancholy as a topics, we need not pin it to any single configuration of early modern concern; instead, it is the dark bloom of a confluence of inferential habits.

28 Ibid., 113.
29 Ibid., 119.
Where Gowland sees melancholy's problem as the cause of its frequency, Drew Daniel argues that it is in the judgment of the onlooker who decides whether an emotion is sincere or posed. Daniel argues that melancholy is to be taken as an assemblage in the Deleuzean sense, “a historically unique vector for a phenomenologically general problem.”

Although his archive of “paintings, drama, prose works, and poetry” are mostly within the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods, his inquiry is focused on a transhistorical question about the nature of emotional display, using the works “that repeatedly stage the melancholic as an object of speculation and mystery” to inquire into “the philosophical problems triggered by doubts about the material support for melancholy.”

But Daniel's sense of this problem rests upon the difference between a “fashionable” melancholy—that is, melancholy as a posture—and something that would count as real, or as he glosses it here, “material.” Daniel's point is to show that such a determination is undecidable. Nevertheless, he wants us to understand melancholy on “a model based on social extension” rather than through “its connotations of solitude and interior essence.”

While I agree that there was a “generative indeterminacy” in melancholy, I do not think that this is the result of two competing traditions that never achieved their desired synthesis. The problem of one who is “out of measure sad” is not whether this disproportion is a claim to a disease or a genius, but rather, in the words of Shakespeare's Don John, that “there is no measure in the occasion that breeds” the sadness. The question of a passion's fit, its embeddedness in a scene of social life, becomes a


31 Ibid., 4.

32 Ibid., 15.
question in the melancholic. When that question is raised, the broader question of what, as a rule, makes a passion appropriate or not is also at hand.

The archive of this project is unusual as it developed alongside my argument. It is therefore simplest to explain its composition by giving a brief account of the intellectual development of my project. In the Fall of 2015, I began an independent study of Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy and its context with Prof. David Marshall. The archive for the project began as an unfolding of this works weave of references and citations. The intellectual milieu of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century England was at once diverse, hybrid, polemical, and yet often organized in thoroughly conventional ways. There could hardly be a better representative of this seeming paradox than Burton’s Anatomy. As he himself admits, it is a cento—it is a “rhapsody of rags” a phrase that makes more sense when we recall that paper was produced from rag-pulp. That is, Burton’s work is a collection of quotations joined together through a topical analysis of his subject. But in spite of its constant cribbing (and voluminous citational apparatus), Burton’s work should not be seen as simply derivative, but an original production of a literary culture that celebrated rather than scorned erudition, imitation, and even superfluity.

A Mellon Dissertation Fellowship allowed me to spend the 2017-8 academic year reading in London’s Warburg Institute. I arrived in London, then, with a handful of hypotheses but no plan for how to investigate them together. I returned again to Burton’s Anatomy and began to read his contexts in greater depth. This meant an immersion in the Latin medical works that dealt with the causes of melancholia. On other days, I pursued reading in the literary works that Burton cited, following those through the unique arrangement of Warburg’s library. This desultory reading, moving me not only between genres but physically through the floors of the library, presented itself as an intellectual problem about the coherence of Burton’s conception of melancholy. While
I was at first simply working through Burton’s “rhapsody,” I slowly began to recognize a division within the wide literature of melancholy. Those works that attempted to know or describe melancholy treated the passions as symptomatic of some cause that needed to be discovered. While many of these works were not medical in the strict sense, they adopted a medical frame of reference for understanding melancholy even when they wished to praise it or attempt to render it non-pathological. This literature was the basis for Burton’s topical catalogue of the causes of melancholy.

Yet another strain of the literature identified itself with the melancholic position. Sometimes this was explicit though in other cases it was strongly suggested through the repeated themes or commonplaces associated with melancholy, a number of which I discuss in Chapter 3. This literature did not seek to explain the melancholic’s passion but give it grounds for expression and articulation. An enormous number of and kinds of texts offered themselves as candidates here. I chose those genres whose proximity both to topical method and melancholic passions was most salient. For instance, though I began by reading in the poetic tradition and have on occasion made use of these texts as evidence, I was confronted by difficulties in showing the topical character of poetic expression. This is both because we retain a bias (however much it has been argued against) of reading poetic works as products of an individual’s genius and because the commonplace character of melancholic expression in poems actually provided less nuance and complexity in articulating the problematic than I discovered in genres, like the emblem and occasional meditation, that seemed on face to be more formulaic. Nevertheless, should others wish to discover the melancholic topics at work elsewhere I imagine that they too will be embarrassed with riches.

The division in the two literatures—the knowledge of and expression of melancholy—nevertheless both appeared to me, trained in the history of rhetoric, as having a common
background of topical method. I then began to read the Renaissance tradition of topics closely, suspending the received notion that it was only so much revivification of an antique tradition. Tracing through the various significant texts in this tradition, I began to recognize that the secondary literature’s emphasis on Ramist method mostly captured the practices that organized knowledge. The expressive dimension of topics had not fallen away with the rise of Ramism, despite Walter Ong’s famous thesis of Ramus inaugurating the “decay of dialogue.” Rather, passionate expression made use of a logical division in the topics themselves. Rather than the dichotomizing tendency that worked to classify all objects according to their difference, copiousness could be more readily and powerfully found by attending to and attuning to similitude. This distinction of emphasis between essence as difference and copiousness from similitude illuminated the two strains of literature I had read out of Burton. Knowledge of melancholy was a constant attempt to organize all of the causes. This led to a fascinating effect—everything could potentially be read as a cause, however indirect, of melancholia. However, the passionate expression of melancholy and the genres developed for that purpose consistently relied upon metaphorical linkings of the predicates of objects to the underdetermined attitudes of melancholic passion. This too made sense of my hypothesis that melancholy was a problem of the motives of passion: the melancholic had to invent an object for her mood. The melancholy topics was a new mode of attuning passionately to a common humanist intellectual background and gave birth to a distinctly melancholic rhetoric.

It was against this background of a division in the Burtonian literatures that I was able to perceive Shakespeare’s scenes of the “melancholic’s defense”, discussed in Chapter 4, as a dramatization of these alternate approaches to melancholy as a problem of unmotivated passion: a pattern emerges where the melancholic’s companions assign the passion to some of those many
catalogued by Burton from the wide-ranging medical and philosophical literature on the topic. The melancholic’s response in refusing these causes, then, was also made possible by a tradition. The conflict between melancholy as a problem that needed a cause versus a passion that required elaboration was repeatedly dramatized in the theater. This led to me a consideration of why the melancholic appeared in the theater at all. The dramaturgical interpretation of this conflict was, paradoxically, a way of developing a character that was complexly motivated. This set the melancholic off distinctly from earlier characters ruled by fate or those stock characters of the *commedia dell’arte*. Yet contrary to a common hypothesis that Hamlet and his kind resulted from an increased emphasis on interiority, I could now read this development of a complex representation of the passionate human out of the rhetorical practices of the topics.

The melancholy rhetoric of the theater, however, was mediated through notions of the imaginative action that made passions possible. Here I turned to the early modern treatises on the passions. I discovered that just as the division between melancholy as a problem of cause or expression could be used to interpret Burton, so too the scenes of the “melancholic’s defense” could be seen to turn around opposing attitudes to the imaginative objects of the passions. Whereas the “civil imagination” proposed the imaginative function as supporting action, specifically in its instrumental and calculating orientation, the “melancholic imagination,” read by medical literature as diseased, was re-appropriated as a privileging the metaphorical potentials discovered in sense-experience into the elaboration of the significance of the passions. This inversion of the order of motives—where action is taken for the expression of passion rather than passions motivating action—was a means in which the theater celebrated its own form of imaginative education, instructing its audiences to learn to see the alternatives to calculative action directed towards conventional goods.
The political dimensions of melancholic imagination discovered in the theatrical texts were already partly motivated by the influence of Hobbes upon my thought, for it was first in a graduate seminar reading of *Leviathan* that the connections between passion, imagination, motive, and the commonwealth that Hobbes premises the construction of his civic philosophy on that I had begun to formulate a hypothesis about the importance of motive in early modern discourse on passions. This coincided with an iconographical dimension of research followed from an immersion in *Saturn and Melancholy* while at the Warburg. It was in searching a database of images that I recognized the melancholic posture of Abraham Bosse’s *L’Homme fourré de malice*, discussed in Chapter 5. When I learned that the creator of this image, Abraham Bosse, had been identified as the engraver of Hobbes’ *Leviathan* frontispiece I became doubly intrigued. The foundation of Hobbes’ theory of the state was the appropriate function of what I had termed “civil imagination.” The state emerged as a constant organizing force in the mental deliberation of its citizens. What then to make of this “flipside” of the Leviathan, a melancholy lecher, wrapped in “malice”? I hypothesized that Hobbes’ work sought to overcome early visions of political knowledge. My reading had showed me that in the Renaissance discourse on the tyrant a continual focus on his passions was at the core of many arguments about the right of resistance to tyrannical rule. I therefore sought to create a genealogy of Bosse’s image as a way of glossing Hobbes’ *Leviathan* as a complex and serious exercise in constructing a civil imagination that would be free from passions that could not be made legible to others—that is, the melancholic problem.

A problem remained of why melancholy as a problem of motives seemed to appear at a certain historical juncture. I hypothesized that this had something to do with the topical investments of the period. Yet I could not represent to myself what would have replaced this. In the summer following my time at the Warburg Institute I began reading the medical literature on
melancholia that followed the period I had been studying. I noticed that the catalogue of causes I
had taken for granted as in the sixteenth and seventeenth century medical texts no longer appeared
in the same form. The first chapter of this dissertation was then the last to be conceptualized, for
it is there I set out my argument for the conditions that made the problem of melancholy able to
appear. The medical works I chose were either those whose importance was marked by constant
references to them by contemporaries, new articulations of the problem of melancholy, or
significant passages that showed a reorientation towards the nature of causality in medicine.

With the exception of Hobbes and Shakespeare, and, in a more distended way, Burton, my
archive is not organized around authors. This may make its selection of various works as
representatives of a genre appear arbitrary, as the conventions of a genre do not produce a
homogenous field of discourse. But it is for this reason that the originality of a particular author’s
formulation is not necessarily at odds with its representativeness. For instance, when I discuss
Ercole Sassonia’s phrase of the “species insensibilis” I am treating what I believe to be a hapax
legomenon in the medical literature. Yet this striking formulation clarifies a set problem of the
object of melancholic imagination in a unique and illuminating way. Moreover, whatever is risked
in attempting to work from such a diverse archive is made up for in the gains of recognizing even
in dusty works of medicine, theology, or philosophy concentrations of a problematic that may
speak outside of its outmoded disciplinarity. While I have inevitably made errors by venturing
beyond what I can claim to have mastery in, I welcome those who have greater familiarity in these
areas to correct and improve the argument I have begun here. For a dissertation, after all, is more
valuable as one’s visa into professional academic life than it is as the death certificate of one’s
graduate studies.
The term melancholy variously refers to a disease, a temperament, a humor of black bile in its natural form or “adust” derivatives, a mood, a disposition, and the passions associated with each and all of these. However, it is melancholy as a passionate problem that organizes the archive of this dissertation. Even when “melancholy” named a temperamental inclination or a single passion, it was rendered through the prism of the passionate symptom of the illness — the passionate response is “without apparent occasion.” Melancholic passions appeared problematic to contemporaries. Fear and sadness were the signs of melancholia. Although there were many medical and physical explanations of the cause of these passions, this did not satisfy the typical ascription of the cause of a passion to its object. Therefore, medical explanations of the pathological passions did not close a field of explanation but rather opened it. The imagined object of melancholic fear or sadness was at once part of a physical malady and also tethered to the physical explanation only in the most general sense.

My own use of melancholy in this dissertation invokes the topicalized field of discourse organized around the melancholy passions. I read the various and sometimes deeply elaborated distinctions between various meanings of the term as part of a collection of plausible explanations for the problem of melancholy, a passion without apparent occasion. This is also a principle by which a certain set of texts have been excluded from my study, for instance, many of the works that focus on the temperaments where melancholy features as one among many. While we often find in these treatises the common ascription to the melancholic of fear and sorrow, these texts do not invoke melancholy as the name of a problem of passions but as a received category of temperament. While I have sometimes invoked various texts that have a non-problematic vision of melancholy in one of its various meanings, these are used to provide contextual or explanatory material rather than as an object of this study. At the same time, since one of the primary objects
of this archive are the results of practices of invention, a demand that the archive be representative
of an “average” subject is unwarranted.

Angus Gowland has noted that previous studies of melancholy are primarily concerned
with “its internal theoretical structure or literary expression.” Rather than treating these are two
distinct discourses, my thesis holds them in tension, seeing English Baroque discourse on
melancholy as a tension between topical organization of knowledge about its causes (as well as
treatment) and topical techniques for its expression. By centering melancholy as a problem of
motives and the causes of passions, I hope to place it in a field of inquiry that broadens its interest
beyond that of specialists of early modern medicine and letters. The peculiarity of melancholy
passions is a way of approaching a diverse field of contemporary inquiry into the history and
present significance of emotions.

One important nexus of contemporary inquiry into emotions is grouped under the heading
of affect theory. In a certain way the division between a focus on the cause and the meaning of
emotions I discovered in the early modern treatment of melancholy reappears in this contemporary
body of literature. Those who focus on the causes of affect emphasize its biological and therefore
non-cognitive conditions. Both Eve Kofosky Sedgwick’s work and Brian Massumi is grounded in
the inability of affect to be caused by a cognitive appraisal of the subject. But as Wetherell notes,
though these theories focus on the immediacy of affects, this does not mean that they can be well
understood when divorced from a social embeddedness, for often we witness “nonconscious and
automatic, extremely rapid, socially learnt and influenced registrations and categorizations of

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contexts and situations.”34 And if the idea of affect as “contagious” seems at first glance to offer the promise of moving social and cultural research on emotions away from the individual subject, it just as easily risks a backwards movement to the nineteenth-century theory of collectivities like Gustave Le Bon’s “crowds” that act in synchrony by giving up their autonomy to a collective affect.

Another strain of affect theory wishes to preserve the freedom to look at any and all social phenomena through the lens of affect but not to surrender its analysis to its precognitive and somatic effects alone. Sarah Ahmed emphasizes that emotions take objects and so imply intentionality. The “aboutness” of emotions means they involve a stance on the world, or a way of apprehending the world.35 Yet my own work on melancholy looks precisely at those cases where “aboutness” is problematic. I see this as a potential contribution and deepening of affect theory as melancholy offers to show us more distinctly features of emotional phenomena like intentionality and social embeddedness that are taken for granted when looking at affect in other domains. Moreover, the insight of affect theorists like Massumi and Sedgwick should not be entirely abandoned: there are indeed many sub- or preconscious factors that influence and orient emotions, moods, and affects. Yet melancholic rhetoric shows us that these can serve as meaningful orientations for the melancholic subject precisely by foregoing the reduction of the meaning of a passion to its cause. This allows us to navigate a pressing contemporary issue. On the one hand, those who defend the biological causality of depression, for instance, thereby wish to show that it


ought to be considered “real” in a way that subjective moods and judgments may not be. Those
who resist the biological reduction of depression to physiological explanation wish to preserve it
as a meaningful expression and response to the extraordinary complexity of contemporary life.
The early modern problem of melancholy shows us how we might affirm the physical reality of
the causes of depression while at the same time holding out the possibility that its meaning is not
exhausted by its physical reality.

It is not an accident that the writers of depression memoirs have turned to melancholia or
its medieval analogues like acedia or the “noonday demon.” They wish to understand depression
not (as it is often experienced) as an illness of devastating privacy but rather a psychic and corporal
expression of a common form (or rather deformation) of life. Ann Cvetkovich turns to the history
of melancholy “in search of resources for alternative understandings to the medical model and
finds them in the early Christian category of acedia.”36 These depression memoirs, such as Jeffrey
Smith’s *Where the Roots Reach For Water* or Andrew Solomon’s *The Noonday Demon*, take up
critical or even polemical ends precisely because as they seek to establish depression within a
cultural frame shared with their readers. It differs from certain narratives of trauma, like the
bestselling *A Child Called It*, where moral responsibility and forgiveness enclose the personal story
into one of overcoming adversity. (It is worth noting that this work was published by Health
Communications Inc., a publisher of self-help books. Significant doubts have been expressed about
the veracity of Pelzer’s account of his abuse.) Alain Ehrenberg has cogently argued that depression
is not simply a “construction of the pharmaceutical industry but a pathology arising from
inadequacy in a social context where success is attributed to, and expected of, the autonomous

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individual.” The threat, then, is that if depression is understood as having only natural causes that can be understood in isolation from social histories it will forfeit any possibility of being interpretable or meaningful. While I strongly agree with the project that wishes to show that nature is not a causality independent from histories of racism, misogyny, and class struggle, causality itself is not the only locus for bringing meaning to affective states whose causes are obscure or overdetermined.

However, the use of history as support for the analysis of a personal history can lead the memoirist to an aestheticist orientation towards historical matter, as when Cvetkovich admires “history as the dust and dirt of the items that come from other people’s pasts.” Where such an orientation to history may become fodder for a richly descriptive prose, it remains antiquarian even as it is anachronistic. Here I draw from the subdiscipline of the history of emotions, often pegged to an important article of Lucien Febvre’s from 1941 entitled “Sensibility and History.” Those who explicitly work under this heading, like Bill Reddy, Ute Frevert, Margrit Pernau, and many others, there are also scholars of an earlier generation who began work, often independently of one another, in unique directions, including Aby Warburg, Max Weber, Johan Huizinga, Jean Delumeau, Ernst Bloch, Piero Camporesi, and Raymond Williams. However, until recently and especially in the North American context, those identifying as historians of emotion have often posed their work against intellectual history, seeing it as a part of social history. This is in no small part due to the influence of Peter Stearns, an influential historian of emotions and founder of the *Journal of Social History* and his wife and intellectual partner, Carol Stearns. Their concept of “emotionology,” propounded in a much cited article, distinguished the “collective emotional
standards of a society from the emotional experiences of individuals and groups.”

Although they hoped this new concept and program of research would inspire “new contacts” between social and intellectual historians, they cautioned the new “emotionologists” to “not neglect earlier discoveries about the limits of intellectual history in exploring popular culture and behavior.” Insofar as what is imagined by “intellectual history” is a history of ideas, we would do well to heed this advice. However, my dissertation takes the position that close engagement with intellectual contexts may serve to illuminate emotional practices that would otherwise not be appreciated in their complexity and full social significance, as when topical practices, purportedly used for training in eloquence, argument, and the organization of knowledge, are appropriated for the expression, articulation, and recognition of melancholy passions. Moreover, emotionology as a “collective standard” also does not adequately account for the idiosyncratic and problematic phenomena of social emotions. While their methodology significant in its ability to establish what Reddy has termed the “emotional regime” but it cannot continue to pursue an inquiry into those passions that are unable to be accounted for within it. These, of course, are precisely the object of my own dissertation, passions whose “occasion” are not apparent.

I cautiously advance the claim that the approach to the history of passions in this dissertation offers a distinct alternative both to an intellectual history that values the “influential” for its own sake and a social history that prizes the “representative” for its own sake. The historical formation of melancholy as a problem of motives resonates with us not only because of its


38 Ibid., 816.
significance in its own period but for its power to illuminate our present concerns with the meaning of the present of emotional life. I also reject the opposition of intellectual and emotional life. Rather than beginning with a misogynistic logic that separates and then genders emotion and rationality, my project attempts to show that intellectual history and histories of emotion ought not to be seen as competing specializations but rather as different emphases of historical interpretation. My dissertation argues that these emphases need not be separated into distinct monographs and fields but instead can be drawn upon for illuminating various aspects of historical texts, artifacts, and practices. Yet I am wary of one approach to bridging this divide that describes emotions as having “rational content.” Rather, I find a richer ground for theorization in the early modern idiom of the imagination. In attending to early modern theories of the passions, especially as set forth in the genre of the treatise on the passions, the distinction between emotions as either rational or irrational is obviated—at least in the sense given to these terms in contemporary theoretical debates.

My own approach to the problem of passions without occasion is that of a rhetorician. My project engages with several contemporary discussions in rhetorical theory. A potential

39 I am not the first rhetorician to find in melancholia a provocation to rhetorical concerns. Perhaps most proximate to my own work, Susan Wells has read Burton’s discursive digressiveness as a model for reconsidering genre, thinking of it spatially rather than as instances of a type, or “species.” Her work is forthcoming in September 2019 as Robert Burton’s Rhetoric: An Anatomy of Early Modern Knowledge, published by Penn State University Press. See also Barbara Biesecker’s Biesecker, Barbara. “No time for mourning: The rhetorical production of the melancholic citizen-subject in the war on terror.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 40, no. 1 (2007), 147-169, where she offers a psychoanalytic interpretation of the political will for invasion of Iraq, and Phillipe-Joseph Salazar’s “Rhetoric on the Bleachers, or, The Rhetorician as Melancholic.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 41, no. 4 (2008), 356-374, where he turns the term onto the field of rhetoric, describing a permanent mood in the practice of rhetorical criticism. The melancholic rhetorician takes an indefinite nostalgia for some lost “rhetorical norms.”
contribution of this project is a reassessment of the concept of the “rhetorical situation.” Whether one thinks the concept of situation is the lynchpin or the bète noire of rhetorical theory, its prominence in Anglophone literature is perennial. Lloyd Bitzer's early articulation of the “rhetorical situation” has generated a minor theoretical literature. Richard Vatz has argued against Bitzer with the opinion that rhetoric must constitute, rather than await, its situation and its audience. Vatz's position has been developed by many others, most notably Barbara Biesecker. In her 1989 article, “Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation,” she argues that a deconstruction of the both the position of speaker and audience as “constituted in and by the play of différence.”40 More recently, the pendulum has swung away from an emphasis on discursivity to one on materiality. One recent attempt to enlarge the scope of situated rhetoricity in this framework is Thomas Rickert’s Ambient Rhetoric. As the title implies, Rickert’s project doubles down on a Heideggerean attunement. The early modern archive of melancholy offers an antistrophe to Heideggerean attunement. Melancholy is a detunement from the ambiens. In early modern medical jargon, something is awry in the six non-naturals, one of which is “air.” Indeed, the melancholic was often compared to a “lute out of tune.” Moreover, it was precisely in this condition, when one’s surroundings are not ready-at-hand, that they require inquiry and investigation. We can see Burton’s project in the Anatomy as a historical and philosophical elaboration of all the possibilities of detunement: one must see whether there is some problem in the air, sleeping and waking, one’s diet, sexual life, the regulation of passions and bodily fluids, etc. This bringing to consciousness of the ambient in the melancholic inquiry brings out a level of depth and complexity we do not

40 Barbara A. Biesecker, “Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation from within the Thematic of 'Différence','” Philosophy & Rhetoric 22, no. 2 (1989), 126.
feel in the perfect fit of “attunement.” At the same time, the “detunement” of the melancholic is a problem that contains a trace of something extra-discursive to which it responds, encouraging us to take up an inquiry that does not cease with deconstruction.

The most obvious contribution to rhetorical history made by my project is its attention to an often-overlooked period. While intellectual, cultural, and literary historians have produced an enormous body of scholarship on early modern rhetoric, North American rhetoricians have given little—and typically unsustained—attention to all that falls between the ancient and the modern. To find book-length treatments of early modern rhetoric within communication or rhetorical studies we must cast a wide net in a back catalogue of graduate seminar readings. The older literature here tends to be from the media studies tradition. Walter Ong’s *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* suffers the fate of many academic “classics” (often cited, rarely read), but its discovery of a transformation in European thought in the works of the sixteenth-century pedant, Peter Ramus, showed that philological work on early modern sources could result in major theoretical insights. Elizabeth Eisenstein's 1979 *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change* remains a landmark text both in historical media theory and early modern studies. However, within the latter field it has been surpassed by works such as Ann Moss' 1996 *Printed Commonplace-Books* that show a more complex relation between the technology of printing and humanist techniques. Thomas Sloane’s 1985 *Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist Rhetoric* sought to recover how in the seventeenth century English rhetoric learned to “think” again, discovering in Donne’s poetry the elaboration of *controversia*, “the search for probability by imagining the possible cases of
opponents in dispute.” 41 A rhetoric lived on in modern English with the thinking-through of controversy, and the poets—rather than the pamphleteers—were responsible for its survival. As media theory developed its interest in early modern history has waned, as the dates of these works suggest.

Closer to the interests of my study are several contemporary expeditions into the early modern archive that have stakes in current concerns within rhetorical studies. Daniel Gross’ *The Secret History of Emotion* reads early modern English and German sources to reveal a complex social understanding of emotional community and how differences in and claims to emotional response manifest relations of power. Nancy Struever’s *Rhetoric, Modality, Modernity* sets out a bold new agenda for rhetorical inquiry as civic inquiry into possibility, taking her lead principally from original readings of Hobbes and Vico. Several of Victoria Kahn's works, including *Machiavellian Rhetoric* and *The Future of an Illusion*, develop a hermeneutics of reading early modern texts “rhetorically”—that is, in opposition to rendering them as statements of “thematic or positive argument.” She instead attends to the period’s literary culture's techniques of “topics, maxims, commonplaces, and, in particular, argument on both sides of the question,” as a form of “dialectical thinking.” 42 My work intends to deepen and further specify the initiatives set out in these works. With Gross, I attend to the *economy* of passions in the early modern, finding particular intensities and complications within the problematic of melancholy. With Struever, I read uses of the rhetorical vocabulary inherited from the ancients in light of early modern attempts to delimit


possibilities, finding with her a special affinity between the medical and the literary elaborations of melancholic causes, symptoms, and effects. With Kahn, I argue for seeing in the rhetoricity of early modern melancholy a dialectical position that is not isolated from but stands in tension with civic humanism.

Apart from the specific contributions to expanding the field’s sense of early modern rhetoric, my project also engages broader concerns with rhetorical historiography. The recent edited collection *Theorizing Histories of Rhetoric* represents the broad range of historiographical views within the field today and sets out an agenda for future research. My approach to historical *practice* finds kinship with Steven Mailloux’s articulation of “enactment” as method, an “explication of a past interpretation” rather than the “object-historical” approach that dominates rhetorical studies—an approach that “appropriates the otherness of the past into a present-day, object-filled framework for sense making.”43 A similar orientation guides my own project, but where Mailloux (and innumerable other scholars influenced by Foucault) seek to map out *regimes* of praxis, I focus on idiosyncratic enactments of common practices. My approach is a perhaps unholy alliance of various more or less recognizable historiographical positions, borrowing equally from the Collingwoodian “logic of question and answer” and the Foucauldian sense of a discourse as encompassing not only the “speech acts” that intellectual historians keenly read out in their archives, but also itself having to be actively “controlled, selected, organized, and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery

over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.”44 But because Foucault's focus was almost always on a “discours à prétention scientifique” to follow his example would denature the shape of Baroque melancholy at those sites where it crosses forms of speech and practice that were not considered scientific (in whatever sense one translates that anachronism into the seventeenth century). Indeed, it is not simply the use of knowledge that is the object of this study, but the use of doubt; they are two movements in push and parry around the figure of the melancholic.

So far I have articulated the general orientation of this dissertation. In the remainder of the introduction, I will describe each chapter in turn. In the first chapter, “From Allegory to Asylum: The Problem of Melancholy in Baroque England and its Eclipse,” I argue that seventeenth-century medicine organized a topics of possible causes around the problem of melancholy. The best representative of this is Burton's *Anatomy*. In comparing the original 1632 frontispiece of his work with a later, nineteenth-century image of the melancholic, I argue that the problem of melancholy as a passion “without any apparant occasion” was occluded by developments in medicine that sought to reduce the scope of causality. In post-Newtonian medicine, melancholy becomes enclosed within the “animal economy,” a historical conception of the physiological space of the

44 “Voici l’hypothèse que je voudrais avancer, ce soir, pour fixer le lieu-ou peut-être le très provisoire théâtre du travail que je fais: je suppose que dans toute société la production du discours est à la fois contrôlée, sélectionnée, organisée et redistribuée par un certain nombre de procédures qui ont pour rôle d’en conjurer les pouvoirs et les dangers, d’en maîtriser l’événement aléatoire, d’en esquiver la lourde, la redoutable matérialité.” Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 216.
body's interior. The reduction of causality eclipses the social dimension of the problem of melancholy.

Where in the first chapter I chart a “topics” of the causes of melancholy, in the following two chapters I set forth an account of a melancholy topics, one that resisted simple ascriptions of cause to melancholic passion and instead found in its underdetermination a resource for the articulation of melancholic experience. In the second chapter, “A Thousand Similes: Humanist Dialectic as the Foundation of a Melancholy Topics,” I offer a reading of humanist dialectic, particularly in its articulation in Rudolph Agricola's *De inventione dialectica*, as a form of imagination. I argue that the humanist rediscovery of *inventio* was incorporated into dialectic in such a way as to extend its scope beyond the situated controversies typical of the *ars topica* in the classical tradition. The expansion of inventional dialectic was premised upon a notion of natural similitude between all things. As dialectic became imagined as a natural faculty, the practice of recognizing topical similarity between things instituted a form of experience that would be taken up in the articulation of melancholic experience.

I turn to the practices of articulating melancholy passions in the third chapter, “Melancholy Rhetoric: Commonplace and Emblem as Mood and Experience.” Here I return to Shakespeare's Jaques as an avatar for the rhetorical practices emerging from the “melancholy topics.” I show how the topicalized imagination developed into practices of the melancholy commonplaces, emblematic perception, and occasional meditation. The emblem book trained its readers in a mode of emblematic perception, attested to by *vanitas* painting and the popular genre of the “occasional meditation.” The collection of these practices generates a form of experience that serves as a counterpoint to the rival notion of experience as practical, political wisdom, seen in competing vision of what makes one a “traveler” in the world. These practices of discovering resources for
inquiring into the qualities and meanings of passion extended rhetorical invention into the intimate realm of private passions, or indeed, constituted them.

The two competing topics of the causes of melancholy and the articulation of melancholic experience confronted one another most fully in the representation of melancholics in the theater. In the fourth chapter, “The Motive and Cue: Melancholy in the Baroque Theater” I take up the question of the melancholic in the English popular theater. First, I show that popular theater developed techniques for the representation of motives. Then, I articulate the contemporary theory of motives through a reading of the relation between imagination and passion in seventeenth-century treatises on the passions. Finally, I read the Shakespearean figure of the melancholic as a theatrical representation of a conflict between two imaginative orientations, the melancholic and the civil. I look to melancholic characters—Queen Isabel in Richard II, Romeo in Romeo and Juliet, and Antonio in The Merchant of Venice—to study the problems of motive the theater represents in each case.

If the theater demonstrates the problem the melancholic posed to a predictable system of motives, the institution of a stable administrative state was predicated upon suppressing melancholic passions. In the fifth chapter, “Tyrannophobia: The Baroque Image of the Tyrant,” I examine a particular use of the melancholic problematic in a political context: the image of the tyrant. Beginning with a discussion of Hobbes’ Leviathan, I offer an analysis of another engraving by Abraham Bosse, the Frenchman who composed the book’s famous frontispiece, reading both works as companion pieces. I argue that the image of a sad, lecherous king is a satire on the traditional iconology of the melancholic tyrant. I trace a genealogy of this figure through the Italian Renaissance writings of Poggio Bracciolini to the Latin closet drama and Monarchomach writings of sixteenth-century Scottish humanist George Buchanan. I argue that Buchanan’s depictions of
the sad and fearful tyrants are a vivid part of a tradition that argued for the need to check the king's power because of the inevitable effects absolute sovereignty would have upon a fallen nature. I conclude that the Leviathan, the first modern imagination of the state, is able to provide a cause of passions without suffering them itself. We may fear Leviathan, but Leviathan itself has no fear. It is this re-orientation of passionate motives that makes state-structure possible.

Baroque melancholy was experienced as a state of uncertainty; its causes were at best probable, its symptoms various, its prognosis unclear. We might say that independent of the physicians, melancholy carried with it its own second opinion. All of that may apply also to this dissertation. It is a work also undertaken in the hopes of sustaining an uncertainty. If it cannot provide answers, my hope is that it can communicate a passionate question to those who follow its inquiry into the questions posed by the passions themselves.
2.1 A Tale of Two Frontispieces

I have before me, in rather poor condition, an 1857 reprinting of Robert Burton’s *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. This work is a library in one volume. It is a seventeenth-century compendium of all previous thought on the condition known since antiquity as melancholia. It is remarkable for the publisher’s decision to insert a second, contemporary image, giving the book two frontispieces on facing pages. On the left, we find an engraving based on a design made in 1804. On the right, a facsimile of the work's 1628 frontispiece.\(^{45}\) The difference between these two images suggests that a significant and perhaps even radical transformation had taken place in the meaning of melancholy. Yet they were prefaced to the same work, as if this difference was not perceived by the nineteenth-century publisher. Taking them together, they become a condensation of a striking transformation that occurred in the discourse on this disorder over the course of almost two centuries. The task now is to articulate both the significance of these two images of melancholy and also how their alien perspectives could have been seen as two instances of the same phenomenon. I want to read these images together as a fraught unity: let it be the diptych of a difference.

\(^{45}\) I have here included an image not of the facsimile, whose quality is poor, but a reproduction of the original frontispiece.
Figure 1 — The 1632 frontispiece of *The Anatomy of Melancholy*
Figure 2 — A nineteenth-century engraving of melancholic madness
The original frontispiece (Fig. 1) first strikes the modern viewer with its copiousness. We find ten distinct pictures ranged around the title plate. Each is given a title, appearing on a scroll at the bottom of its frame. The upper corners show two woodland scenes, populated with a variety of fauna, respectively labelled Zelotipia—Latin for jealousy—and Solitudo. We read in the accompanying verse description that the “landscape of Jealousy” contains a “kingfisher, a swan, an hern” and “two-fighting cocks.” We find a reason for associating these animals with jealousy deep in the leaves of Burton’s tome. He tells us that, according to Vives, “Swannes, Doves, Cocks, Bulls, &c.” are particularly jealous creatures. The sleeping dog in the “portraiture” of solitude is a visual quote of Dürer’s famous allegorical print, Melencolia I. In this famous 1514 print, a dog sleeps at the foot of a winged figure, perhaps an angel, deep in thought, surrounded by the tools of a geometer. Between these two panels we find Democritus, the ancient atomist, in the posture of the melancholic thinker, made iconic by Dürer's print. His head rests on his hand as he gazes off, ruminating. He sits in an outcrop with a book across his lap. A walled garden behind him is littered with the carcasses of animals. This is an allusion to Burton’s interpretation of a classical passage

46 The enigmatic character of this image is not merely an effect of historical distance; it was a lure to the gaze of contemporary readers who delighted in visual allegories. Although the frontispiece appeared first simply as an image, in the fourth edition the frames were numbered, and a key was provided to their meaning in the form of a poem written by the author. This is an indication that readers had asked for a legend to decode this image, and yet Burton preserved an air of mystery in his riddling stanzas. There is nevertheless the complication that Burton’s accompanying poem sometimes references something clearly not part of the image, as in the “two raging bulls” of the stanza accompanying the first panel, nowhere to be found in the print. He seems aware of this possibility in the poem as it tells the reader to “[m]ark well: if ‘t be not as ‘t should be,/Blame the bad cutter, and not me.”

47 AM, lxii.

48 AM, 3.277. [3.3.1.1.]
in the Hippocratean *Letter to Damagetes*. Democritus was “busie in cutting up severall Beasts, to finde out the cause of madnesse, and melancholy.”49 He was performing anatomies “to see the cause of these distempers, vanities, and follies,” though he admits “such prooфе were better made on mans body,” if only his “kinde nature would endure” the sight.50 It is no accident that in the central panel, “Democritus Junior,” Burton’s nom de plume, visually descends from the ancient philosopher in central panel above him. This arrangement suggests that the *Anatomy* of Democritus Junior is an attempt to complete the anatomical inquiry begun in Democritus’ garden, turning it from the bodies of beasts to the bodies—and souls—of humankind.51

The frontispiece's side panels present us with four figures, each representing a variation of melancholy. First, we see the *Inammarato*, a youthful, unmasked male lover of *commedia dell’arte*, or, following the fame of Boiardo's Renaissance epic, *Orlando inammarato*, a figure inflamed with a knightly love passion, prepared to duel for his lady's honor. At his feet are personal effects: a lute, laurels, a scroll with musical notation, some scattered papers. He is dressed in finery. A ruff, broad-brimmed hat, tight doublet, a cuirass at his side, perhaps a mark of the threat of romantic jealousy—all are mocked as “symptoms of his vanity” in Burton’s poetic gloss.

The young lover seems at a great distance from the typical medical pathology of melancholia, marked by bodily pain, languor, constipation, and fatigue. This long medical tradition is captured in the figure of *Hypochondriacus*, a representative of ‘windy melancholy,’ so named because of the painful “wind” that was thought to originate in the left hypochondrium, the upper

49 AM, 1.33.
50 AM, 1.36.
region of the abdomen where the spleen is located. His floor is littered with empty vials and pharmacopoeic recipes. We sense he frequents the apothecary too often. He seems to be dressed in regal garments and donning something like a crown. This could be yet another symptom of the disease, since “melancholy men, and sicke men, conceive so many phantasticall visions, apparitions to themselves, and have such absurd apparitions, as that they are Kings.”52 He appears to be a man of means, even if his luxury brings him no relief.

The bodily discomfiture of the “windy” melancholic has no obvious connection to the spiritual anguish we find in “religious melancholy,” here represented by a figure titled Superstitiosus. He is praying with the assistance of a rosary, bears a tonsure, and dons an austere habit. He is perhaps a Franciscan friar. Although Burton included the standard arguments against “popishness” throughout his work, here he nevertheless uses this image to shame the viewer. The stanza coupled with the image tells us that the man we see “for Hell perhaps he takes more paine/Then [sic] thou dost, Heaven it selfe to gaine.”53 He looks up, away from the viewer, to a cross, the subject of his meditations.

Each of these figures can be seen as having a successively smaller contact with society: the lover abandons all of his beloved, the hypochondriac rarely leaves his private study, and the religious figure abandons the world for the asceticism of an anchorite. But it is with Maniacus, the final figure of the group, where we find a figure literally enclosed within a cell, shunned and abandoned by the world. He is dressed in rags and bound in chains that perhaps he has recently been able to break in an episode of furor. He seems to have only just broken the chain on one of

52 AM, 1.252. [1.2.3.2.]
53 AM, 1.lxii.
his fetters. Again, the viewer is addressed in a tone of reproach. We are told to “observe him; for
as in a glass,/Thine angry portraiture it was.”\textsuperscript{54} He wears rags and his hair is disheveled. He is
likely a resident of Bedlam, the infamous madhouse.

The 1804 image (Fig. 2) shows a portrait of a melancholic having descended into madness,
as if we have retained only the figure of the maniac. Now he is rendered in greater detail and
brought into a new time. A strait-coated\textsuperscript{55} figure, gaze distraught, is seated in a room of a private
asylum. His children vainly clamor for his attention while his wife weeps in the corridor, muffling
her sobs in a kerchief. She is too distressed to witness the scene placed before us, the impartial
spectators. The man’s bulging eyes are directed to some unoccupied corner of the room. He grins—
or grimaces—stiffly. We are witness to a domestic tragedy. Under the image, we read a caption:

\begin{quote}
\hspace{1cm}…………………….forgotten quite
\hspace{1cm}All former scenes of dear delight,
\hspace{1cm}Connubial love – parental joy –
\hspace{1cm}But all is dark within............
\end{quote}

This fragment of verse is excerpted from “Madness” a poem of Rev. Thomas Penrose, first
published in 1775. The selection is appropriate; Penrose’s rhapsody is almost certainly an
imaginative description of Burton’s original frontispiece. In the stanza that supplies the excerpt
selected for the caption, he writes of the madness of “the fetter’d Maniac” who “foams along,” but
also of three other characters. We hear of a “the love-lorn maid” who is, perhaps, our Inammorato

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} The “strait-waistcoat” was in use in private madhouses as early as the 1730s. Its first description in print
can be found in David MacBride’s \textit{A methodical introduction to the theory and practice of physic} (London: Strahan
et al., 1772), 591-2.
with a telling change of gender. There is an obscurely sketched figure he calls “the Momus of the flighty train” but who is recognizable as Hypochondriacus when we are told he is “Blanket-robed, and antick crown'd” a “mimick monarch.” Finally, the allusion to Burton's *Superstitiosus* is unambiguous when we come to “devotion's ruin'd child” whose mind is clouded by “Superstition.”

The final stanza of the complete, 1775 poem performs an abrupt halt to this pageant of figures: “too thick they croud, — too close they throng.” Madness has produced a whole troupe of characters, too many to name. We are instructed to “o'er the hapless groupe low drop Compassion's veil.” Where Burton wanted us to keep the madman’s image “still in [our] presence,” here we are instructed to not look too long—for pity’s sake.

The movement of Penrose’s “Madness” from a veiled ekphrasis of the *Anatomy*’s frontispiece to its appearance as a caption of the Thurston image, now also its frontispiece, is uncanny. We can trace its lineage through one more branching. We find a woodcut print published alongside Penrose’s poem in the January 1812 edition of *Polyanthos*, a literary review (Fig. 3). In the copperplate iteration of this image reproduced above, we note that a chain hanging by the


57 Ibid., 213.

58 Ibid., 214.

59 This image is itself curious, as it appears to be the only of its kind printed in the whole run of the review. Elsewhere, the only images appearing are standard portraits accompanying the ‘lives’ of prominent individuals. The portraits are provided, as noted in the June 1807 article on “Suliman Mellimelni,” “[t]o gratify the curiosity of our readers.”
young boy has been removed, perhaps in deference to a keener sense of the moral problematics surrounding the use of restraints. The image of “connubial love” is rendered explicit with the spouse, overwhelmed with grief, who stands outside the room. Although Penrose took up the theme of madness as a conceit for expressing a variety of figures, the accompanying image reduces madness to the maniac.
ODE TO MADNESS.

No pleasing memory left—forgotten quite
All former scenes of dear delight—
Conubial love—parental joy—
No sympathies like these his soul employ,
But all is dark within ——

Penrose.

Figure 3 — A woodcut of the melancholic madman
Where Burton's frontispiece gazed at the reader and rendered moral judgment upon the person who wished to distance herself from its figures, here the melodrama forestalls any possibility of commerce with the mad subject. Despite his seeming fixation on something “out of frame,” the verse caption, like the learned words of a psychiatrist, assure us that this is an illusion. He is a void. Though the mise-en-scène of this image places the mad melancholic in the center of a family portrait, this only heightens the distance of his diseased mind from society. The curious ekphrastic translation from image to text and back into a new image gives us insight into a shift in the imagination of melancholic mania. Penrose looked at Burton’s *Maniacus* and read into it the attitude towards the mad of his own day. Where Burton saw the madman as resembling, for instance, the rage of a gambling after losing and distinguished from melancholy by its vehemence, Penrose rewrites the Maniac as one who is not vehement at all but emptied of memory and contact with the concerns of the world.

The difference between the two frontispieces is an index of profound discontinuity in the interpretation of the *Anatomy* and therefore of melancholy itself, the subject of Burton's work. What Burton meant by “melancholy” required a lush presentation of variety, one he identified with the *theatrum mundi*. The early nineteenth century found the epitome of the melancholic in the singular, gentleman patient, isolated in his own mental world. What was nature of this transformation of melancholy from allegory to melodrama? What can account for the movement from a superflux of meaning that required a legend in Burton’s book to an image that tells us meaning is forestalled within the melancholic, that “all is dark within”? It is tempting to write down this difference to a simple opposition of style. The later image is a medicalized example of period melodrama, fit for a penny dreadful, while the Baroque image is typically allegorical,
copious, and polysemic. This, I think, would be a mistake. There was indeed a transformation in the meaning of melancholy in the first half of the eighteenth century.

2.2 Melancholy and Baroque Causality

My contention is this: in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, melancholy held a place in the English imagination as a general problem of motives. The formulation of this problematic had two characteristic features. The most marked symptom of pathological melancholy was an untethered passion, “fear and sadness without apparent occasion” as Burton puts it. That is, melancholic passions were those not legible as an appropriate response to a shared reality. Burton compares this characteristic of the melancholic symptoms to hounds that “many times run away with a false cry, never perceiving themselves to be at a fault.”60 The image is apt. The hound's cry is at once a response of fear or excitement to perceived danger or prey and a communication of this to others. Passions too are responsive to a perception of the world and communicate the subject's evaluation of it. Importantly, in the Renaissance, this was thought to be connected to motion towards a desideratum and flight from the feared. In this sense, the melancholic was a stand-in for errors of judgment and perception, like the dog who flees or chases nothing. Yet the metaphor contains another possibility; perhaps after all the hound does sense something, yet indefinite and not commonly perceived. The reason for the cry is not “apparent.” Much of the discourse on melancholy turns upon the question of whether an individual's passionate

60 AM, 1.384 [1.3.1.2].
response is sufficiently justified, whether it constitutes appropriate grounds for acting in accordance with its feeling or instead whether the passion must be corrected.

The uncertainty of the causes of melancholic passions was uniquely sustained by the openness of Galenic medicine to the consideration of many types of causality. This is perhaps surprising; what is commonly remembered of this antique system was its insistence upon humoral imbalance or *dyskrasia* as the cause of all disease. To the extent that this is true, it nevertheless underestimates the complexity of humoral causality. Galenic physiology developed an elaborate system predicated on the quantities and qualities of the four bodily humors, to wit, blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm. Each was associated with certain ratios of moisture and heat; while blood was wet and hot, black bile was cold and damp; phlegm was hot and dry while yellow bile was cold and wet. This same combinatorial arrangement was applied to the four elements so that each humor was felt to participate more in that element: blood with air, black bile with earth, phlegm with water, yellow bile with fire. Health was understood as the peculiar kind of balance of the humors to which each individual was naturally inclined; Galen recognized “nine possible mixtures” of humors that were called temperaments by “later Latinate interpreters.”61 The first was “an exact balance of the four Aristotelian primary qualities—hot, cold, wet and dry,” while the others showed “a predominance of one or two qualities, which indicated a predisposition to certain types of illness rather than being in themselves unhealthy.”62 A person who naturally had more black bile in their bodies, and so was inclined to dry and cold, had a melancholic temperament. But the features of pathology and temperament were often indistinct in the medieval

62 Ibid., 234.
and early modern accounts, as “complexionate melancholy shared the core qualities of the disease of melancholy.”

The pathological form of black bile could be produced in the body in two distinct ways: either through an excess of “natural” black bile, thought to be produced from the “dregs” of blood, or through a second pathological process of “adustion” in which a humor ignites and its smoky vapor darkened the animal spirits, responsible for coordinated mental activity with bodily action. Melancholia became the name of that disease in which an excess or vapor of black bile caused prolonged “fear and sadness.” Galen distinguished three versions of the disease in his De locis affectis: the first, located only in the brain, the second, throughout the blood so over the whole body, and a third with its origin in the gut [ortum a ventriculo], though later commentators would often hypothesize a splenetic origin for this, the “windy” [flatuosa] kind of melancholia. Various hypotheses developed about how black bile could produce passionate and imaginative disturbances. For instance, the dark fumes of adust mile could create an “inner darkness” that the melancholic feared just as children fear the dark around them. Another argued that the rarified animal spirits required for many functions, including sensation and voluntary action, became


64 See Galen, De locis affectis, where the Latin translates the difference as naturalis and praeter naturam. In the Isagoge, the Latin appears as naturalis and extra naturalem.

65 While these ideas are expressed in various passages throughout the Galenic corpus, the schematism is better attested to in the Isagoge, the introductory text in its medieval Latin translation to Galen's Ars medica. In many ways the so-called 'Galenic system' is most closely aligned with its presentation in this work, one that is perhaps best understood as a “medieval system.” See Oswie Temkin, Galenism: Rise and Decline of a Medical Philosophy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974), 106-7.
infected with the sooty residue of atrabilis, slowing them and distorting the function of the organs. Yet another thought that the cool, dry qualities of the humor distempered the brain and especially its imaginative power. However, beyond the humoral causes, melancholy could be recognized in its symptoms. All melancholics exhibit fear and sadness, a judgment in which Galen agrees with Hippocrates. However, beneath this common symptom of passion is a gallery of chimeras, figments of the melancholic's diseased imagination; one melancholic fears that Atlas will tire and shrug off the world, another, thinking himself a snail, runs from company because he does not want his shell crushed, and another imitates the song of the cocks whenever he hears it. It was in part that the melancholic was a subject for exploring such a gallery that they provided some fascination for early modern Europeans, giving an excuse for a “curieuse recherche” of their diverse imaginations.

The humoral theory did not serve as an explanation of the “causeless passions,” but instead brought a unity to a field of possibilities. The arabesques by which all of the passions were woven together into the facets of this humor were not outcomes of the humoral theory save in that the notion of a humor directed all the various resources of explanation back again ultimately to the body’s mystery. While humoral changes and interactions were the theoretical foundation of pathological causality, practical treatment required a recognition of what external factors brought about those changes. Because the humors were integrated into the system of natural elements, their composition was not different in kind from any other natural object. The Renaissance Galenic

66 AM, 250-5 [1.2.3.2].

body could not be removed from the world; causes of disease were of a piece with changes in the weather, the relative moisture and heat in one's diet, even the movements of the stars. Cause was not only explanatory, but also a specification of what was responsible for disease. Therefore, the “investigation of causes was essential to Galenic diagnosis, and emphasis on the necessity of their knowledge (even on a conjectural basis) to successful treatment was the hallmark of neo-Galenic rationalism.”

Physicians had to consider the six “non-naturals” of regimen, namely, diet, sleeping and waking, exercise, bodily retentions and excretions, air and all climatic effects, and the passion themselves. There were also potential supernatural causes of disease, as when God punished someone for their sins or the devil tempted someone into theirs. Luther had famously said that a melancholy head was the devil's bath or balneum diaboli. But beyond all this there were still a potentially infinite list of “adventitious” causes, in which Burton included nurses, education, terrors, jests at one's expense, imprisonment, poverty, other diseases of the whole body or organs, the death of loved ones, and many others. Therefore, to investigate the “false cry” of the melancholic by looking at all its potential causes was to rediscover the whole world, but now as something uncertain, tinged with the mood of the passion to which any of its parts may be the cause. However, as medical theory increasingly reduced the kinds of causality it recognized in pathology in the early eighteenth century this problematic was eclipsed. The cultural meaning of melancholy shifted from a question about the relation between passion and action to a continuum of nervous states, encompassing romantic moods and the mental alienation of the madhouse patient.

68 Gowland, Worlds, 72.
To see the meaning of Burton's melancholy we must account for his allegory. What can we make of Burton's four figures? What holds together this group that appeared to him and his contemporaries as melancholy? We can begin to explore this by looking at each in turn as they were discussed or treated by others at this time. Imagine we are in London in the 1630s. A gentleman is confined to his quarters, complaining of wind in his side. We can be sure he is a member of the upper class, as Michael MacDonald has showed that diagnoses of melancholia were almost entirely reserved for upper classes while similar symptomologies in commoners were dubbed “mopishness.”69 He is a melancholic of the “hypochondriack” variety, so named for that area of the body just below the rib cage—what Burton Englishes as the “hypochondries”—where a vapor of black bile was thought to originate, and which gave rise to a range of unspecified and constant complaints. This form of the disease was given special attention, since “early modern writers claimed to detect a prevalence of the hypochondriacal melancholy in particular,”70 including Burton himself who called it the “most grievous and frequent” form of melancholy.71 Daniel Oxenbridge, a physician practicing in London, gives this account of one such patient he treated:

Mr. Kyder, aged 55, in the Autumn, 1637, hypochondriacally Melancholy, troubled with Fumes, Frights, Fears, Perplexities, Sadness, Heaviness, discontented without a manifest Occasion; he feared more than ever the Plague, was troubled to hear the Bells toll, had unquiet Sleeps, durst not lye alone in his Chamber, he started and had Frights in his Sleep and in the Day, Apprehension of Death and Infamy causelessly; he was very hot in his Hands and Mouth; upon drinking but a little

69 MacDonald, Mystical Bedlam: Madness, Healing, and Anxiety in Seventeenth-century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 118-120.

70 Gowland, “Problem,” 97.

71 AM, 1.378 [1.2.5.4].

54
Wine He had a Pain, Weight, and Heaviness at his Heart and Palpitation thereof and small Occasions would raise these Fits.\textsuperscript{72}

Attending closely to this typical case and its method of recording will tell us much about how a typical seventeenth-century physician approached the melancholic. First, there is the matter of the work itself, entitled \textit{General Observations and prescriptions in the practice of physic on several persons of quality}. That these were “observations” signaled the work’s inclusion within the medical genre of \textit{observationes}, “a distinctly late-Renaissance genre, a specific product of humanistic medicine.”\textsuperscript{73} Unlike its medieval cousin, \textit{consilia}, in which case histories were organized as illustrations of theoretical descriptions of disease, the \textit{observatio} privileged personal and historical details of patients, detailed specific treatments provided, and often, if not always, gave a narrative of the course of the disease in the individual patient. This “intellectual novelty of the sixteenth century”\textsuperscript{74} became increasingly common as a humanistic practice of medical note-taking developed throughout the seventeenth century. This meant that there was increasingly some daylight between the still-dominant Galenic medical theory as well as its attendant physiology and the attention paid to individual cases. Oxenbridge is intent upon writing down the relevant complaints of his patient even if he cannot bring them under a physiological explanation.

Second, throughout we hear a certain refrain—his symptoms are “without a manifest Occasion,” he fears “causelessly,” he responds fitfully to “small Occasions.” Sure enough, this

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., 205.
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was the traditional mark of the melancholic whose fear and sadness was often described in medical works as *sine causa, sine occasione manifesta*, or the like. But the nature of the “occasion” is clearly open to dispute. Kyder's fear is judged as pathological, whether caused by an imagination of succumbing to plague or an apprehension that his name is in the wrong mouth. But some melancholics developed rhetorical and affective practices that transformed these “small Occasions” into a new discourse. Indeed, John Donne's famous reflection on “for whom the bell tolls,” in his *Devotions upon Emergent Occasions* takes as one of its “occasions” the one we find in Kyder: a sick man listening to the funeral bells toll. Yet we see in Donne's meditation that this does not remain a private and pathological passion, but precisely an “occasion” which dilates into a recognition of his profound connectedness to humankind. If the bell tolls for a baptism or a burial, “that action concerns me,” for “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”

Donne develops the “small Occasion” into a new form of experience, one premised upon discovering the similitudes in all things.

If hypochondria is, despite its strange symptoms, clearly a problem for medicine, it is less clear why our figure of the *inammorato* has been recruited into this pathological company. It is the difference between an expression of passion and the social scene, the paradoxical appearance of an absence of an occasion, that allows us to see the connection between the hypochondriac and the

lovestruck youth. He is overcome by love melancholy, “a kind of rage proceeding from an Irregular
desire of enjoying a lovely object; and is attended by Feare and sadness.” It is not “natural and
chaste love” itself that is melancholic, but the irregularity of desire for the beloved, an excess of
passion with reference to its cause. “Heroicall passion,” that is, a passion emerging from hereos,
was one of the medical terms for lovesickness. Arnoldus of Villanova defined it as “an alienation
[of the mind] accompanied by a deep and irrational lust.” Here the problem of motive is not the
inability to act, but the difficulty of articulating the reasons for the passionate acts undertaken by
the lover on behalf of wooing the beloved. Lovers are “apt to mistake, amplifie, too credulous
sometimes, too full of hope and confidence, and then againe very jealous, unapt to beleive or
entertaine any good newes.” Though the stars, climate, diet, temperaments of the lovers,
accoutrements and dress, and sight itself, are all indicated by Burton as causes of love-melancholy,
he gives a special consideration to mere opportunity, for “opportunity of time and place, with their
circumstances, are so forcible motives, that it is unpossible almost for two young folkes equal in
yeares to live together, and not be in love, especially in great houses, Princes Courts, where they

76 Jacques Ferrand, Erotomania, or A treatise discoursing of the essence, causes, symptomes, prognosticks,
and cure of love, or erotique melancholy (Oxford: Printed by L. Lichfield, 1640), 31.

77 The conflation between the similar-sounding hereos and eros has been postulated as one of the sources for
speculation on love-melancholy in medieval commentaries, usually referring to it as amor hereos. Probably the most
complete treatment of the complexity of this concept’s reception is in Mary Frances Wack’s Lovesickness in the Middle

78 Alienatio [sc. mentis] quam concomitatur immensa concupiscientia et irrationalis. Qtd. in Lowes, “The
Loveres Malady,” 6.

79 AM, 3.149 [3.2.3.1].
are idle in summo gradu, fare well, live at ease, and cannot tell otherwise how to spend their time.”80 We must be careful not to see love-melancholy as a specific emotional state deemed pathological, but rather a social judgment that the love was excessive given the circumstances.

Claims of melancholy in the sphere of love were not limited only to the young and lusty; they were also extended to the unhappy couples who had fallen out of it. Milton's defense of divorce strove to prove that in the case of an “indisposition, unfitness, or contrariety of mind, arising from a cause in nature unchangeable,” the dissolution of the marriage bond was Biblically lawful.81 Essential to his argument was the notion that the first reason God gave when instituting marriage in the Garden of Eden was for the “the apt and cheerfull conversation of man with woman, to comfort and refresh him against the evil of solitary life.” In the case that this was impossible, then “neither can it be of force to ingage a blameles creature to his own perpetuall sorrow, mistak'n for his expected solace, without suffering charity to step in and doe a confest good work of parting those whom nothing holds together.”82 A diminishment of pleasure in the body of one's partner can be better carried than “when the minde hangs off in an unclosing disproportion, though the body be as it ought.”83 Milton's felicitous phrase, an unclosing disproportion, captures the sense of the problem melancholy introduced into the social world, here in its most intimate example of the married couple. The divinely appointed motive for marriage is the enjoyment of the cheerful society of another; its impossibility justifies divorce. If one is bound to an “an image of earth and

80 AM, 3.108 [3.2.2.4].

81 John Milton, Doctrine & discipline of divorce: restor'd to the good of both sexes, from the bondage of canon law, and other mistakes, to the true meaning of Scripture in the law and gospel compar'd (London: n.p., 1644).

82 Ibid., 8.

83 Ibid.
fleam” (that is, a partner whose temperament is composed principally of black bile and phlegm), loneliness is only embittered by the proximity of an inept partnership. When marriage fails, it becomes a “drooping and disconsolate household captivity, without refuge or redemption.” If at first the moony-eyed lover and the immiserated spouse appear to be opposites, they are linked by a problem felt to be common to the melancholic: there is a disproportion in passions; for Milton, it was between the temperaments of spouses that made their situation, marriage, itself inappropriate; for the Inamorato, it is a disproportion between his excessive lust and the social determination of appropriate displays of affection.

The “unclosing disproportion” that one found between he unhappy couple could also be discovered in the soul. The religiously melancholy were those whose spiritual affect was either an excessive fixation upon scrupulous concerns or excessive exuberance through the opinion of spiritual inspiration. The superstitious or religious melancholic was a frequent figure in sermons and pamphlets on questions of conscience. The religious melancholic was overcome by scruple, that is, “a great trouble of minde proceeding from a little motive, and a great indisposition, by which the conscience though sufficiently determined by proper arguments, dares not proceed to action, or if it doe, it cannot rest.” The sermon on religious melancholy became a subgenre in English homiletics, “from Edmund Gregory’s Historical Anatomy of Christian Melancholy (1646) through to Richard Baxter’s Signs and Causes of Melancholy (1706).” Samuel Clarke's

84 Ibid., 2.

85 Jeremy Taylor, Doctor Dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her general measures : serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books (London : Printed by R. Norton, 1676), 208.

systematic work sets forth the question “What difference is there between Melancholly, and trouble of Conscience?” He marks four distinctions: melancholy affects only the imagination rather than the “whole man,” it can be cured by “physic,” it completely, rather than partially, eliminates courage, and most importantly, while the “sight of sin” is the cause of cases of conscience, in melancholy, “the imagination conceiveth a thing to be so which is not, making a man fear, and dispaire upon supposed, and feigned causes.” In one we read that the “principal sign, by which we may judge when the indisposition is chiefly or wholly in the body, is this: that the person accuses himself highly in general, without being able to give any instance in particular; that he is very apprehensive, of he does not know well what; and fearful, yet can give no reason why.” The ability to give an account of one's conscience distinguished genuine cases of conscience from melancholy. If the cause was unclear, the problem could be removed from the spiritual realm and returned to the remedies of “physick.”

This attempt to remove individuals' claims to spiritual passions also worked to discredit would-be prophets. In the confessional struggles of the mid-seventeenth century, this figure was dubbed an “enthusiast.” The criticisms of Meric Casaubon, Henry More, and Joseph Glanvill of religious “enthusiasts” was premised on an ascription of melancholia. Enthusiasm was “a

87 Samuel Clarke, *Medulla theologiae, or, The marrow of divinity: contained in sundry questions and cases of conscience, both speculative and practical: the greatest part of them collected out of the works of our most judicious, experienced and orthodox English divines, the rest are supplied by the authour* (London: Printed by Thomas Ratcliff, 1659), 357.

88 Ibid., 319.

misconceit of being inspired.”90 The authority of those who claimed prophecy or divine insight was challenged by those who called their preachings the result of a wounded imagination, a sign of melancholy. While the diagnosis of melancholia as a confessional slander was already underway in Lutheran Wittenberg, where Lutherans described Calvinists and Zwinglians as melancholics, this took on a new register in the confessional divides emerging in the beginning of seventeenth century English religious life. While “Papists” were melancholy in their superstitions, the “Non-Conformists on the other side are possessed by the same evil spirit,” as the Papists, which was evident because “they are frightened from our Communion, by such things as themselves acknowledge Indifferent.”91 The intense and passionate response of the Puritans to matters of rite and ritual was a fear without a justified cause. This religious and political division could be read in the symptoms of their manners, bodies, and habits, as “[t]heir whole constitution is sowed by the melancholy humor; uneasy both to Themselves and others, especially their Governors.”92 The

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80 More, Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, or, A discourse of the nature, causes, kinds, and cure, of enthusiasm; written by Philophilus Parresiastes, and prefixed to Alazonomastix his observations and reply: whereunto is added a letter of his to a private friend, wherein certain passages in his reply are vindicated, and severall matters relating to enthusiasm more fully cleared (London: Printed by J. Flesher, 1656), 2.


92 Ibid.
joining of conventicles or secret religious meetings, associated with Presbyterians, were labeled as symptoms of the solitariness of the melancholic by those who opposed them.

As noted above, the maniac, though chosen as the representative figure of nineteenth-century melancholy, has a wholly different valence of meaning in Burton and Baroque medicine at large. Rather than a figure whose inner imaginative life cuts him off from social activity, Burton's examples of maniacs are all figures who interpret the world through a fearful imagination. Burton's claim that the maniac is the “angry portraiture” of the reader is not only the wagging finger of a moralist, but a consequence of the theory of action held commonly in both the arts and medical faculties of European universities. All action is premised upon imaginative interpretation of the world—the maniac's error is different from ours in vehemence, not in kind. While the melancholic maniac represented an extreme of melancholy passion, his inclusion among the figures emphasizes the common relationship between his delusional ravings and the fanciful reverie of the lover and all other imaginative objects of the passions that fall between.

The figures of the lover, hypochondriac, enthusiast, and maniac that we encounter in various discourses of what I call the English Baroque, whether real or hypothetical, each specified a different domain in which the relation between passion and its causes—that is, motive—was a live problem. In each case, their passions are “without any apparant occasion.” Burton's use of “occasion” in his definition of melancholy preserves a sense of cause as the conjunction of circumstances, achieving a unity through their meaning for action. When Burton enumerates his catalogue of causes, it comes with the rider that they must be examined as possibilities, considered together with other concomitant causes that can inflect, amplify, mutate, or diminish any single cause. Astrology is the best representative of this form of causality; the stars always exert some influence upon us, but the nature and power of these astral and cosmic forces are variable, changing
both with their mutual interactions and because their motions through the “houses” of the zodiac endue them with new qualities. Yet even this whole complex of causality is not, in Burton's opinion, determinative: “they doe incline, but not compell.”

The astrological symbols floating above each of these figures as they appear in Burton's frontispiece suggest yet another inflection of the relation between Baroque conceptions of causality and melancholy. Each is represented by the symbol of a planet followed by signs of what astrologers called “aspect,” referring to the angle, in degrees, between two planets. Sextile marks sixty degrees, quadrate ninety, trine one hundred twenty, opposition one hundred eighty, and conjunction when two planets align. The lover's melancholy falls under Venus, but one that can be in sextile, trine, or opposition to some other, unspecified planet. The same is true of Hypochondriacus, whose Saturn is followed by conjunction, square, and opposition. The superstitious figure has three, generally salubrious planets—Jupiter, the Sun, and Mercury—above him, but these well-boding planets are qualified in some way by the crucifix that hovers uncertainly among planetary signs, as if Rome and its rite were another planet of baleful influence. The maniac has Mars and the moon in conjunction or Saturn and Mercury in opposition.

This may seem like so much arcana; but whatever the astrological meanings they were supposed to convey to Burton's readers, it is more important to note that these planetary conjunctions and their declinations will glide through the genitures of every person, determined or inflected differently in each case but excepting no mortal from their influence. Each one of us is in part a lover, a hypochondriac, superstitious and manic; these are less individuals than typical moments of the problem of melancholy itself. They are less subjects than predicates—the

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93 AM, 1.199 [1.2.1.4].
unfinished nature of the astrological determination suggests that each individual may at one point be inflected by some participation in superstition or mania, love or hypochondria.\footnote{See Gowland, Worlds, 52-3, 91.}

We might read these figures neither as anonymous individuals nor as wholly generalized types but as “Characters” in the sense that they appeared in a popular genre of the seventeenth century, Character-writing. We find, for instance, the superstitious man in one of the more famous examples of the genre, Joseph Hall's \textit{Characters}, an early modern updating of the ancient Theophrastean genre of rhetorical descriptions of various ethical types. He is “strangely credulous...Some ways he will not go, and some he dares not; either there are bugs, or he feigneth them; every lantern is a ghost, and every noise is of chains.”\footnote{Joseph Hall, \textit{Characters of Vertues and Vices} (London: Printed by Bradwood, 1608), 91.} He has habits he himself does not understand, as when he goes “a little about, and to leave the cross still on the right hand.”\footnote{Ibid.} Within the detailed catalogue of quirks and peculiarities, we find a disordered maxim of inference: “One event is enough to make a rule: out of these rules he concludes fashions, proper to himself; and nothing can turn him out of his own course.”\footnote{Ibid.} The melancholic reads the situation through his own fear.

Just as with Hall's \textit{Characters}, the figures of the frontispiece are midpoints between notional types and individuals. They are bundles of potentially consistent predications of a figure who can thus be recognized as a kind. What is true of the frontispiece is true of the work itself, for “although the Anatomy is steeped in humoral theory, Burton does not use it to treat individuals as part of a limited number of pre-set groups, but instead registers the fluidity between different types
of human experience and encourages his readers to recognise this in their self-examination.”\textsuperscript{98} This fluidity is not merely literary but was instituted within the medical treatments of melancholy at the time. Astrological physicians were extremely popular: “Forman, Napier, Lilly, and John Booker....each recorded more than a thousand consultations a year.”\textsuperscript{99} One reason for their popularity was their relatively low cost compared to the Royal College of Physicians practitioners and the ability for them to offer treatment at a distance: if a sick person was bed-ridden, another could go to seek a remedy from these physicians, sometimes bringing the sick person’s urine, but sometimes only a verbal account. For “astrology added a cosmological and social dimension to the egocentric experiences of disease and healing.”\textsuperscript{100} The astrological doctors knew “how to pick out from the thousands of intersecting geometrical relationships among the planets in any given geniture those that will affect the body, character and fate of a given client.”\textsuperscript{101} Indeed, it has been speculated that Burton himself was a patient of Simon Forman, the famous, or infamous, astrological doctor.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{98} Mary Ann Lund, \textit{Melancholy, Medicine, and Religion in Early Modern England: Reading 'The Anatomy of Melancholy'} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 44.


\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 128.


Pursuing the occluded humors through the body, seventeenth-century physicians did attribute local manifestations of pathology to some quality of a humor in want or excess, but this only constituted the most proximate cause; what was responsible for bringing about that excess or defect was much more difficult, and more important, to ascertain, for both treatment and prognosis depended on it. If a respected physician could argue that the “attributes of melancholy arise through a certain quality of the humor, which is nothing other than its color,”¹⁰³ this did not mean he was only concerned with descrying hues. The qualities of the elements were combinatorial. This was imagined not as a movement along a single continuum but as a qualitative passage between elements, from the hot, dry phlegm to the colder, wet black bile, or some other variation. The serious physician had to be knowledgeable and alert to all the causes and conditions that might attend these transformations. This presented another problem. The immediate causes of melancholy—excess of black bile or vapors rising to the head—failed to account for the great variety of melancholic symptomology. The variety of melancholic presentation was linked to the distempered imaginations of the melancholics. Melancholia was a disease of the imagination and “the kinds of melancholic ailments are many because of those hidden and deceitful imaginations which befall each individually.”¹⁰⁴ These hidden images that lay behind the strange behavior of the patient were pathologies of motive; in what we might anachronistically refer to as Renaissance “psychology,” the imagination was active in even the simplest acts of voluntary locomotion.

¹⁰³ “Melancholiae accidentia fieri per quondam humoris qualitatem, quae alia esse non potest, quam color.” Edmund Hollings, *Assertiones medicae de melancholia* (Bamberg: Grembs, 1602), 12.

We have mapped out a hypothesis for the variety of Burton's figures. But how should we understand the later image? In the course of the eighteenth century, the figure of the melancholic ceased to appear as a problem concerning the relation of passion and action. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, it was transformed into a special problem within the emergent science of psychiatry. The melancholic did not disappear; physicians continued to treat hypochondriacs or cases of “the vapours.” Nor, of course, did fear and sadness dissipate. Yet the absence of a manifest occasion no longer irritated the imagination to an inquiry into the passions. The riddle of pathology was to be read out from the body of the subject, not from his relation to the world. Attention was redirected, again and again, to the body, mannerisms and speech of the patient.

What can account for the dissipation of a cultural preoccupation with melancholy as a problem of motives? The seventeenth-century problem—that a passion could arise without its cause being known—was eclipsed from within the various projects for constructing a scientific medicine that emerged in the eighteenth century. Notably, the leading medical mechanist of the time replaced the “sine causa manifesta” with a distinctive symptom of the melancholic, now seen as a figure “always intent upon one and the same thought.”

105 “Melancholia vocatur Medicis ille morbus, in quo aeger delirat diu, et pertinaciter, sine febre, eidem fere et uni cogitationi semper affixus.” Hermann Boerhaave, Aphorismi (Lugduni Batavorum: Apud Johannem Vander Linden, 1715), 236, sec. 1089. Translation found in Jennifer Radden, The Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 176. This elision of melancholy's characteristic of passion without a manifest cause can be seen in other eighteenth century definitions. William Cullen: “A long insanity with sadness and fear” (Insania longa cum moestitia ac timore) in Synopsis nosologiae methodicae (Pavia: P. Bizzonius, 1817), 215. Sauvages: “Melancholics are those who are constantly fixated on one thought from which they are deluded about themselves or their state, though they rightly reason concerning other matters” (Melancholici dicuntur qui uni...
physician to see the melancholic in abstraction from the world in which she moved; this world was dissolved into a piecemeal and regenerated as the “animal economy,” preserving only what was already legible as a possible explanation of physiological order and disorder and, eventually, of norm and pathology. Whereas Burton's melancholic was everywhere a figure whose mystery could not be ranged within any sphere smaller than the complete range of causality, the eighteenth-century melancholic was contained by an 'economical' theory.

For eighteenth-century physicians, the older medical catalogues with their multiplicity of causes were little more than a tangle of quackish and disordered observation, badly in need of systemization. This was already evident in the century's first decades when Bernard Mandeville, later famous for his defense of laissez-faire government in The Fable of the Bees, wrote his treatise on the “Hypochondriack and Hysterick Diseases.” He was determined to “deviate from the usual method” and forego “the tedious enumeration of signs and causes upon the neck of one another, as well as the frightful heaps of different medicines found in those that have treated of the hypochondriack and hysterick passions.”

His answer was far simpler: hypochondria arose from

potissimum cogitationi constanter affixi circa semetipsos aut statum suum delirant, de caeteris objectis rite rationcinantes) in Nosologia methodica (Leipzig: Lipsiae Schwickert, 1797), 251. However, it is possible also to find definitions from the seventeenth century that are similar in the focus upon a mental fixation, a symptom of melancholia that was noted since antiquity by the likes of Rufus of Ephesus. For instance, John Jonston: “Melancholia is a delirium arising from a melancholy phantasm from which, by lingering upon a single thought, comes a madness and fever with fear and sadness attached” (Melancholia est dilirium a phantasmate melancholico exortum qua detentus uni cognitioni absque furore et febre cum tristitia et metu inhaeret.) in Ideae Universae Medicinae Practicae libris 8 (Amsterdam: apud L. Elzevirium,1644), 390.

a weakening of “animal spirits” arising from a distempered stomach.\textsuperscript{107} This desire to reduce causes was thought of as a reform to medical confusion and even a remedy to abuses. Alexander Stuart, a prominent Scottish physician who studied under Boerhaave, gave a description of an ideal physician in his notes, claiming that “the Quack’s Catalogue of specifique simples [that is, remedies of a single ingredient, like cinchona bark for malaria] & the physician’s catalogue of original simple causes which with Gods great & invalueable Gift the Light of Reason joined with diligent & careful observation & seconded by Gods favour & blesseing is a sufficient stock to sett up a good physician.”\textsuperscript{108} The idea here was to organize the much-contemned prescriptions of so-called “empirics”—physicians who worked primarily through trial-and-error—under a scheme of natural philosophical inquiry into causes, thereby creating something like a schedule of drugs attached to a slender list of pathological causes. We might contrast this attitude with Shakespeare’s Jaques who claims that his melancholy is his own, “compounded of many simples, extracted from many objects, and indeed the sundry contemplation of my travels, in which my often rumination wraps me in a most humorous sadness.”\textsuperscript{109} Though Jaques' use of the term “simples” here is metaphorical, this only serves to heighten the contrast: where Stuart saw at the beginning of the

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 121, 132.


\textsuperscript{109} As You Like It, 4.1.10-19. (All readings from Shakespeare follow The Oxford Shakespeare except where it is indicated otherwise.)
eighteenth century a need for reform, Jaques, the “Traveller” found a creative archive of experience.

2.3 The Eclipse of the Melancholy Problem in Eighteenth-Century Medicine

The eighteenth-century transformation in melancholy was an eclipse of melancholy's social problematic. This bucks against the historiographical trend that wishes to read this development out of the deepening of medical knowledge. Stanley Jackson, one of the twentieth century’s leading scholars on this history, saw in melancholia’s narrowing signification the “waning” influence of medical humoralism. He argued that as humoral explanations of melancholia compelled less assent, “chemical explanations” took their place. Yet this ignores that “chymistry” had been a competitor to Galenic physiology since the sixteenth-century in the medical theories of Paracelsus and Van Helmont. Indeed, already by 1650 the majority of licensed English physicians had rejected the Galenic view of the elemental composition of the humors in favor of some version of a chemical composition. With William Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood, first published in his 1628 *De Motu Cordis*, humoral physiology indeed faced a unique challenge. However, the traditional humoral theory faced challenges long before

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this. The theories of Paracelsus had been taken up in the medical faculties of Salerno and Leiden and gradually gained adherents in England from those returning with degrees abroad. Because of the exceedingly long course of medical study in England, many aspiring physicians chose to pursue their medical studies abroad and sometimes encountered the influence of Paracelsus on the continent. Even more influential were the iatrochemical theories of Johann Baptista van Helmont that were vociferously anti-Galenic; one chapter of his *Ortus Medicinae* is titled “The Ignorant Physics of Aristotle and Galen.” Disease was an “ens, non accidens” that opposed life. Its causes were invisible, seminal powers distinct from the living body. The body itself, insofar as it was living, was not a cause of disease. His explanations of physiological function through fermentation gained supporters in medical faculties across the continent, originating the movement that has come to be called “iatrochemistry.” While Helmontianism made a major showing in the Restoration when, in 1665, they applied for a medical college, this was the groundswell of a process that had been at least decades in the making. In 1618, the Royal College of physicians accepted “a great variety of chemical medicines…in its *Pharmacopoeia* of 1618…at the expense of the more traditional “Galenic” therapy of regimen, bleeding, and purging.”


114 Rattansi, “Controversy,” 4-5.
meaning were dependent on a rigid adherence to humoralism, we would expect to see its “narrowing” happen almost a century earlier.

If humoralism waned, the humors themselves did not disappear in the eighteenth century. Jackson admits that “the black bile lingered on for a while in some version or other of the above spleen related theories as a source of pathogenic 'vapors.'”\textsuperscript{115} Jackson admits that both of his exemplars of the changing nature of melancholia, Friedrich Hoffman and Archibald Pitcairn, described it “in familiar terms” borrowed from the humoralist treatments. As Jean Starobinski notes in his history of the treatment of melancholy, Hoffman only transferred to the blood “the qualities of slowness, thickness, and malaise that the ancients had attributed to black bile [les qualités de lenteur, d’épaisseur, de paresse que les anciens attribuaient à l’atrabile].”\textsuperscript{116} Moreover, it is hard to say something is “lingering” if it remains for nearly the whole century. Walter Charleton, a physician often marked as a transitional figure from humoralism to a corpuscularian worldview, nevertheless preserved a view of the reality of the humors, save for black bile, which he alone judged a “Fictitious Humor.”\textsuperscript{117} In Nicholas Robinson’s 1729\textit{A new system of the spleen}, we find a self-consciously modern physician, buttressed in his knowledge by “the Improvements


\textsuperscript{117} Qtd. in Emily Wood, \textit{A Subtle and Mysterious Machine: The Medical World of Walter Charleton (1619-707)} (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 163f.
of Natural Philosophy and Discovery of the Circulation of the Blood.”118 Yet when he discusses the theory of humors, he preserves it under a modification. The four temperaments were reductions of an observed variety of movements in the body, “for by increasing the Beating of the Heart, you evidently alter the prevailing Quality, and consequently the Humour depending on that Quality; so that the Difference of Constitutions is much more clearly grounded on the different Elasticity of Fibres, whereon those different Motions depend, that give those different Qualities.”119 The move was a typical one in the eighteenth-century medical discourse. Difference was not discrete; variation could be placed upon a continuum, all accounted for by a single principle. This principle, then, would be the true cause, insofar as a cause was sought as explanation.

What we must see is that the transformation in melancholy's meaning was not simply a result of a weakened Galenism but a result of a concerted program to reduce causality in medicine. Medicine was fraught with controversy both before and after 1700, but the latter controversies often pivoted upon a common point. Baroque medicine, whether informed most closely by Galen, Hippocrates, Avicenna, Paracelsus, van Helmont, or Telesio, assumed a world with plural causality. Post-Newtonian medicine, with all of its competing theoretical frameworks, maintained a consensus that cause should be simplified. Indeed, one of the first and most influential figures of

118 Nicholas Robinson, A New System of the Spleen, Vapours, and Hypochondriack Melancholy: Wherein all the Decays of the Nerves, and Lownesses of the Spirits, are Mechanically Accounted for. (London: Printed by Samuel Aris, 1729), x.

119 Ibid., 18. Here he was echoing William Cockburn, whose Oeconomia Corporis Animalis of 1695 said that temperament was the diversity of quantity and slickness of the fluids and solids of the body which inclines one to an action and another away from it, one prone to one or another illness. It was ultimately however a “mutatio in canalibus aut sanguine,” that is, an alternation in the ducts or blood of a person.
this movement, the Dutch physician Herman Boerhaave, took as his motto *Simplex Sigillum Veri*—the simple is the sign of the true.

The transition from the first frontispiece to the second is, in some ways, to be understood in terms of a transformation in the discussion of causation in the medical sciences in the course of the eighteenth century. Whereas in the early seventeenth century there had been a variety of kinds of cause at work in the conceptualizations of medicine, several eighteenth-century programs worked to narrow the range of causation. In the case of melancholia, we find that a change in the theorization of pathological causality can be seen to eclipse the problematic of the passion “without apparent occasion.” One of the common disputes was over whether medicine was an art or a science. Daniel Sennert, an esteemed professor of medicine at the University of Wittenberg in the early seventeenth century, addressed this question at the beginning of his major work on medicine, coming down on the side of it as an art, “for medicine departs from the sciences not only, as is said, because of its goal, which is to produce health, nor simply because of its method of inquiry [*cognitio*], but for these and also other reasons, because it neither rises to first causes, nor does it observe those other conditions which are required in a science.”

120 Medicine required a knowledge

120 “Etenim medicina non modo, ut dictum, fine, qui est sanitatis effectio, non solum cognitio, sed & alii a scientiarum natura degenerat: cum neque ad primas caussas [sic] ascendat, neque alias, quae in scientia requiruntur, conditiones observet.” Daniel Sennert, *Institutiones Medicinae institutionum medicinae libri V* (Wittenberg: Mevius, 1667), 3.
that would incorporate many distinct kinds of causality, some of which it inherited from other sciences and some of which were unique to its own *cognitio*.\textsuperscript{121}

The change in orientation towards causality in medicine began not with Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood but with the desire of a new generation to bring the success of Isaac Newton’s natural philosophical principles into medical research. Theodore M. Brown described a group of eighteenth-century physicians as “Newton-struck,”\textsuperscript{122} many of whom can be traced to the intellectual circles surrounding Archibald Pitcairne and his students “at Edinburgh, Leiden and Oxford” who together “envisaged a medical theory on the same level of certainty as Newton's theory of the world, which they referred to as a 'principia medicinae theoreticae mathematicae.'”\textsuperscript{123} Newton explicitly formulated a normative principle on causality in his *Principia*. In the revised edition of 1713, Newton formulated a rule: The effects of nature ought to be assigned to the same type of cause, however far it is possible.\textsuperscript{124} Pitcairne had advocated for a thoroughly mechanical view of the body, inspiring a generation of research in Scotland. (This was in large part due to the influence of Hermann Boerhaave, who had attended Pitcairne's lectures at Leiden.) His inaugural

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\item \textsuperscript{121} Archibald Pitcairn, *The Philosophical and Mathematical Elements of Physick: In Two Books* (London: Printed for W. Innys, 1745), xi. The preface which this is taken from was written by the apparently anonymous translator.
\item \textsuperscript{124} “Ideoque effectuum naturalium eiusdem generis eadem assignandae sunt causae, quatenus fieri potest.”
\end{itemize}
lecture at Leiden in 1692 was titled “Enquiries after Physical Causes as are generally proposed by Philosophers, are entirely useless and unnecessary to Physicians.”\(^{125}\) This seems at first glance to be not so distant from Sennert's argument that medicine is an art because it does not rise to first causes. But Pitcairne's problem is different; his task is to rid medicine of vain disputation over occult causes and other categories that arose from an attempt to ascertain the natura rerum. Newton gave a different model to the physician. Cause would be the designation for a certain regularity of effect, a unity ordered by mathematical regularity. One needed only the “observation of the actions and reactions of the corporeal bodies” in order to “discover the forces and establish the laws that direct their movement.” Once these were known, it did not matter what the “cause” was.

The elimination of a search into causes moved the inquiry into melancholic passions from one of the motives of passion to one concerning the motions of passions. Just as Newton had exactly described the laws of planetary motion but dared not to “feign any hypotheses” as to why this was the case, the Pitcairnean physician was to understand corporeal phenomena as a mechanism, so that “all Diseases may be comprehended under a Change of Velocity.”\(^{126}\) If it seems difficult to conceive of how this definition would account for melancholy, a disease of the imagination, we must recall that even in the Galenic system variations in thought and imagination were partially explained by the relative swiftness of the “animal spirits,” the ultra-fine fluid

\(^{125}\) Pitcairne's Leiden lectures from 1692-3 were published in *Elementa Medicinae physico-mathematica libris duobus* in 1718 and were translated into English as *The Elements of Physick* soon thereafter. The inaugural lecture appears as an “Auctoris Praeloquium.”

responsible for coordinating thought and bodily action. The emphasis had distinctively shifted, however, from the quality of the humors to their motion by the end of the seventeenth century. We find in Locke's *Essay* an explanation of mental habits through custom, which “seems to be but Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going continue on in the same steps they have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the Motion in it becomes easy and as it were Natural.”\textsuperscript{127} In the same way, a disruption of the mechanism used by thought could lead to a repeated, morbid motion that could become an inveterate habit. Since “all sensation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated by external objects,” then “the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation, as the variation or increase of it; and so introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits in that organ.”\textsuperscript{128} With this argument, we can imagine how an organic, mechanical lesion might initiate the imaginative errors still associated with the melancholic.

The emergence of the concept of the “animal oeconomy” allowed eighteenth-century physicians to isolate melancholic causality within the patient's body. The Galenic *crasis* was a ratio of qualities. Its effects could only be understood by seeing the body as part of the world and its many causes; the animal economy is a corporal account-book, ignoring any exchanges that did not first pass through the *bureau de change* of the body. Under the aegis of this phrase, medical reformers carried out a reorganization of the theory of the body. This excited and organized


\textsuperscript{128} Locke, *Essay*, 1.8.4.
physiological and medical research in Scotland and France and grew to have enormous importance throughout European medical faculties in the eighteenth century. This program embraced a great deal of controversy and variation, being championed by camps that could identify as mechanists or vitalists, iatrochemists and iatromathematicians. Indeed, by the end of the century, “animal economy” could be understood as a synonym for “physiology” itself, as when we read that the “history of the fluid parts comes into a system of anatomy only occasionally; because it properly belongs to what is called physiology, or the animal economy.” A desideratum of this new scheme was the reduction of the received catalogues of pathological causes to variations in general principles of the animal economy, subsuming the heterogeneous class of contingencies and occasions that affect the body under a general concept. This became a maxim of natural philosophy: “Nature is frugal in Causes, but various and manifold in Effects.” We see this echoed in Ménuret's *Encyclopédie* article on animal economy: “In this philosophic inquiry of all our functions, one sees more clearly than anywhere else the greatest simplicity of means joined with the greatest variety of effects, the least expense of force followed by the most substantial movements.” The variety of effects no longer required a plural causality to explain it.


130 George Cheyne, *The English Malady, or a Treatise of Nervous Diseases of All Kinds* (London: Printed for G. Strahan, 1735), 76.

The animal economy was less a concept than a regulative image that organized medical inquiry in pathology and physiology throughout the eighteenth century, part of what philosopher of science Wilfrid Sellars once called the “scientific image.”\textsuperscript{132} Whereas in the humoral system, the fluids served in the \textit{transferal of qualities} in the animal economy they become a \textit{conserved unit of exchange}. Diarrhea leads to a lessening of urination; the increase of a symptom in a fever in one part of the body “is generally attended with a Diminution of the Symptoms in other Parts.”\textsuperscript{133} This can be contrasted with the understanding of medical cause in the Galenic curriculum: “A cause is that which generates something in the body although it itself is not part of the body.”\textsuperscript{134} The animal economy reversed this principle, sealing medical causation within the body’s frame. This was wholly in line with the attempt to set medicine on a mechanical basis, as in Archibald Pitcairn’s attempt to derive fundamental medical phenomena from a single cause “answerable to all medicinal Uses, [that] ought to be derived from a Body dispersed through the extreme minutest Arteries of the Brain.”\textsuperscript{135} The Baroque problematic of melancholy passion as not responding to its appropriate cause was no longer coherent within the newly established medical view. A socially inappropriate emotional response may be judged in the first instance as a disproportion between

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\textsuperscript{133} Robinson, \textit{A Treatise}, 438.
\textsuperscript{135} Archibald Pitcairn, \textit{The Whole Works of Dr. Archibald Pitcairn} (London: Printed for F. Noble, 1740), 177.
\end{flushright}
the social situation and the subject but once the question was put to medicine the pathological understanding could only consider the body as a material and not a social fact.

George Cheyne’s *The English Malady*, published in the 1730s, is particularly instructive in showing how the mechanist's vision of animal economy was adopted in the description of “nervous disorders.” He conceived of the body as “a Machin of an infinite Number and Variety of different Channels and Pipes, filled with various and different Liquors and Fluids, perpetually running, glideing, or creeping forward, or returning backward, in a constant Circle, and sending out little Branches and Outlets, to moisten, nourish, and repair the Expenses of Living.” The variety of cause and its concomitant diversity of effects has moved from a theater of life where those differences are registered as so many character types to the “animal economy”, where silent and constant movements within the body vary along a continuum. The sum of all these exchanges constitutes the activity of life. All the nervous disorders are placed upon a continuum: “All Nervous Disorders whatsoever from Yawning and Stretching, up to a mortal Fit of Apoplexy, seems to me but one continued Disorder, or the several steps and degrees of it, arising from a Relaxation or a Weakness, and the Want of a sufficient Force and Elasticity in the Solids in general, and the Nerves in particular, in Proportion to the Resistance of the Fluids, in order to carry on the Circulation, remove Obstructions, carry off the Recrements, and make the Secretions.” The classes of nervous disorders invented by Cheyne are moments in a continua of a loss of voluntary Motion.

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138 Ibid., 14-5.
Melancholy is in the first and mildest class, in which there is a “partial or total Loss of Sensation for some Time,” upon which there will “necessarily follow a Suspension of Voluntary Motion.” From this vantage point, in which the melancholic is most acutely observed at those critical moments in which she loses voluntary control, where the passionate phenomena are secondary effects of disordered circulation of “animal juices” or the obstructions of glands by animal salts, the gaze turns away from the problem and meaning of melancholy that animates the variety in Burton’s frontispiece.

In Cheyne's system, melancholic variety was no longer located within that obscure region of the melancholic’s own imaginative experiences nor in the transmutations of humors through their range of possible qualities. The mind is no longer connected to the Baroque fascination with ethical types and temperaments; instead, the ethical and moral meaning of the mind’s pathologies must be discovered within its own economy. The variety of mental phenomena is infinite, but its causality is treated as homogenous. The Baroque cornucopia of character types and the variety of causes that give rise to them is liquified in an ideal of infinite and continuous gradations. Cheyne dealt with the Protean variety of nervous symptoms by arguing that “the true Reason of the Multiplicity, Variety, and Inconstancy of these Symptoms, is the vast Multitude of the Combinations possible, of these Natural functions, every one of which makes a new Symptom.” It is important to hear his use of “function” as a term to describe physiological processes, something clearer in his descriptions of “Perfect Health” as “the easy, pleasant, and uniform

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139 Ibid., 15-6.
140 Ibid., 193.
Performance of the Animal Functions, in a full Circulation, free Perspiration, and regular Secretions.”  

In a striking passage in his introduction, Cheyne imagines the mind as a bell surrounded with an infinitude of hammers, each of which being pulled “conveys a measur’d and proportion’d Impulse of Stroke to the Bell.” This nervous mind is a smooth surface, its pathologies and normal affections all moments of discrete variation along its exterior. Each hammer-strike is a stimulus whose material qualities can now be ignored; instead what is important is the intensity of its force and its equivalent effect. This can be traced to a larger movement in the development of a mechanical psychology, one in which the medium for the transmission of effects to the motor organs changed from the fluid animal spirits to vibrating solids. But this transition placed all of the explanatory burden on motion, eliminating the qualities of the spirits that had once participated in temperament and character. This meant that there was “[n]o essential difference...between the transmission of effects to the inert bodies that constituted the animal 'frame' and the inert bodies of the inanimate world.” The Newtonian ideal of assigning similar effects to the same type of cause had achieved prominence, if not dominance, in the medical literature on melancholia.

The reduction of medical causality was as much a moral as a physiological program. Where Cheyne is concerned in detail with diet, exercise, and the other questions of regimen, it is in the mode of moral prescription: the disturbances in regimen that lead to nervous disorders are always

141 Ibid.  
142 Ibid., 5  
the effects of “Luxury and Intemperance.” 144 This defect in morals is at once a sufficient explanation and not worthy of a physician’s inquiry. Moral language even finds its way into the description of physiological function, as when the liver is called “a Receptacle (for some time) for the destructive Effects of Luxury and Intemperance.” 145 People are liable to “ascribe their Distempers, acute or chronical, to a wet Room, damp sheets, catching Cold, ill or under-dress’d Food, or eating too plentifully of this or the other Dish at a certain Time,” which are “trivial Circumstances,” the “true Cause” is their own “continu’d Luxury and Laziness, because they would gladly continue this Course and yet be well if possible.” 146 Even if “Seasons, Climates, astral and aerial Influences, and many other Circumstances, had any Effect or Influence in begetting or propagating these Distempers,” they are nevertheless “slight, partial, and occasional Causes only, in respect of those others mention’d.” 147 Idleness and luxury are the “Efficient Causes” of these diseases.

The understanding of melancholy was more deeply entrenched as a phenomenon arising from the body with the mid-century association of mental disorders with the nervous tissues. Robert Whytt (pronounced 'White') claimed in 1765 that “all diseases may, in some sense, be

144 Cheyne, English Malady, 174.
145 Ibid., 185. For other instances of similar moralism in treatises on hypochondria, see, Joseph Raulin, Traité des affections vaporeuses du sexe (Paris: Jean-Thomas Herissart, 1758); Pierre Pomme, Traité des affections vaporeuses des deux sexes, (Lyons: Benoit Duplain, 1769); Edme-Pierre Chauvot de Beauchene, De l'influence des affections de lame dans les maladies nerveuses des femmes, avec le traitement qui convient a ces maladies, (Amsterdam & Paris: Mequignon, 1783).
146 Ibid., 48-9.
147 Ibid. 58.
called affections of the nervous system, because, in almost every disease, the nerves are more or less hurt,“¹⁴⁸ though he later recognized that “a diagnosis of nervous disease was increasingly being given ‘to many symptoms seemingly different, and very obscure in their nature, [which] has often made it be said that Physicians have bestowed the character of nervous on all those disorders whose nature and causes they were ignorant of.”¹⁴⁹ The range of causality has become identified with the animal economy; the events are part of the natural history of a case but are not properly considered as causes.

Indeed, it was in large part the reduction of the “hypochondriacal” disorders to the predisposing causes of “nervous delicacy” that transformed the melancholic symptomology from one primarily identified with men to a feminized disorder: “Women, in whom the nervous system is generally more moveable than in men, are more subject to nervous complaints, and have them in a higher degree.”¹⁵⁰ This opinion had already been voiced by David Kinneir at the opening of his landmark work *A new essay on the nerves and the doctrine of the animal spirits*: “As the Brain, and consequently the Spinal Marrow arising from thence, enter so much into the composition of all the solid parts of the body (which is manifest from repeated experiments) it is reasonable to conclude, that all distempers whatsoever must affect the Nerves in some degree.”¹⁵¹ This meant

¹⁴⁸ Robert Whytt, *Observations on the nature, causes, and cure of those diseases which have been commonly called nervous, hypochondriac, or hysteric, to which are prefixed some remarks on the sympathy of the nerves* (Edinburgh: Printed for J. Balfour, 1765), 392.


¹⁵⁰ Whytt, *Observations*, 118.

that the most important and immediate cause of the disease was anatomical. The treatment of melancholia would be dependent upon a field of scientific research into the nerves.

There is a close relation between the simplification of causality and the increased emphasis on morality in the treatment of melancholia and related disorders. Cause is both a means for explaining phenomenon and for assigning responsibility. As the causes of medical disorders were enclosed within the explanatory scheme of the animal economy, responsibility could only be assigned to the animal.

So far we have traced the eclipse of the Protean variety in Burton's frontispiece in the first half of the eighteenth century, but it is in the latter part of that century in which we find the slow emergence of psychiatric medicine and asylum governance that would inform the other frontispiece. Indeed, this story is of a piece with the one we have been tracing, in that it followed from the desire to simplify medical research into etiology—the next step was to eliminate it. It would be replaced with a program of clinical description and ordered classes of disease, a new methodical arrangement of medical observation that was birthed under the name of “nosology.”

The 1760s saw two major works of general nosology, François Bossier de Sauvages' *Nosologia methodica* published in 1763 and closely followed by Cullen's *Synopsis Nosologiae Methodicae*, first published in 1769. Although the nosological program surged in the eighteenth century's latter half, the seeds from which it was drawn were planted in the seventeenth, almost entirely by Thomas Sydenham; the full title of Sauvages' work can be translated as *The Method of Nosology, Setting the Classes, Genera and Species of Diseases According to the Thought of Sydenham and the System of the Botanists*. Sydenham was a close companion of John Locke and in his own time had a reputation throughout the medical faculties of Europe. His ambition was to establish a science of medicine based upon a Baconian method of induction and natural history: “The improvement of
physic, in my opinion, depends (1.) upon collecting a genuine and natural description or history of all diseases as can be procured; and (2.) laying down a fixed and complete method of cure.”¹⁵² The search for causes drops out completely from his program, for he felt that “the causes of most diseases should seem absolutely undiscoverable” and the “curious inquirers into these causes lose their labor.”¹⁵³ Psychiatry emerged by turning to nosology. This granted new room for specialized treatments to be developed for each pathological order. In the case of the “neuroses,” this opened a path to interventions of the psychiatrist upon the behavior and ideation of the mad or melancholic subject. Since the melancholic's symptoms manifest as errors, moral correction, or *auxilia moralia*, in Sauvages' idiom, could not be neglected: “Thus [the melancholy and mad], imbued in false principles of some moral philosophy, can be called back to the use of reason through reasoning, should they want to reckon with us what truly is the good, what must be placed before other things and whose secure possession we should be content with when lacking all other things.”¹⁵⁴ This practical note of the nosologist would become a plan for the emergence of the alienist, the specialist in mental maladies. He (for they were all men) would become a corrector of ideas, equipped with experience and technique, rather than a researcher of the etiology of madness.

In the final decades of the eighteenth century, a passion was deemed pathological by accounting for the “cost” it exacted within a vitalist picture of the animal economy. Instructive is


¹⁵³ Ibid., xxxi.

John Brown's 1780 *Elementa medicinae*. His program uniquely combined all of the various reorganizations of medical causality we have so far reviewed: he created a nosological tabulation of disease classes (Fig. 4), a continuum of cause onto which they can be plotted, and the redescription of their causes from its various objects to a general principle, the relative excess of defect of “stimulation.” In Brown's system, as it came to be called, the organizing principle of all health as well as the cause of disease was a ratio between excitement and excitability. Excitability was a property of the organism and was localized in the medullary portion of the nerves and the solid muscle. As seen in the diagram below, the inverse ratio between excitement and excitability was conceived as a continuum onto which a tabulation of diseases could be precisely rendered. All diseases are occasioned by too great or too little excitement. When this model was applied to nervous disorders like hypochondria, the melancholic's body was said to be “exhausted by a passion or perturbation, in the same manner as by excessive excitement in other cases.”¹⁵⁵ When the eighteenth-century physician encountered a disorder of the passions, they were not encountering a social phenomenon. The passions became simply another class of stimuli.

## Table of Excitement and Excitability

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*Figure 4 — Brown's "Table of Excitement and Excitability"*
This returns us to where we began: the image of a man in a straitjacket (Fig. 2). The psychiatric asylum was not troubled by removing the melancholic from the social scene—their pathology was within, even if the cure could be rendered through a new environment. The problem of the melancholic's motive no longer appears as a symptom of melancholy, but as a question of administering treatment to those who may resist it. William Tuke’s York Retreat, famous for its “moral treatment” of the insane, made use of this regime as well. He consider fear of “great importance in the management of patients” although it should not be “excited beyond that degree which naturally arises from the necessary regulations of the family.”156 While Tuke argued passionately against the indiscriminate terrorizing of mental patients practised in county and private asylums, he saw fear as an essential tool for motivating patients when all other recourse failed, for when “it becomes the chief motive of action, it certainly tends to contract the understanding, to weaken the benevolent affections, and to debase the mind.”157 If Tuke represented the mildest voice in asylum management, we can very well expect that all houses for the insane employed fear as a technique for both governing and treating the insane. In the seventeenth century, the melancholic was marked by a fear without an occasion; in the nineteenth century asylum, the occasion for fear was supplied.

We may now see how the nineteenth-century frontispiece exemplifies the conceptual reorganization of melancholy as it took shape even in the first half of the eighteenth century. Psychiatric observation refers the concept to the behavior and appearance of the patient, and the

156 Tuke, Description of the Retreat, an institution near York, for insane persons of the Society of Friends : containing an account of its origin and progress, the modes of treatment, and a statement of cases (Philadelphia : Isaac Pierce, 1813), 141.

157 Ibid., 142-3.
observations are referred back again to the nosological construct in diagnosis. The stark difference between the subject of the psychiatric diagnosis and the melodramatic affect of his loved ones is indeed the content of the drama. Intuitively, the clinical gaze and the melodrama seem to be opposites. Where the former records, catalogues, abstracts its perceptions from the affairs of the heart and refers it to an ideal of knowledge, the latter casts away all parts of reality that do not service the intensity of some expression of the interior life and its subjection to fate and fortune. But the melodrama reworks precisely that field of meaning that the clinic casts off without intruding upon the domain of its researchers. We should see them as complementary, a neat transfer of psychiatric discourse into an artistic display for salacious public curiosity.

I have included this at once long-winded and yet much-abbreviated history to indicate a field of inquiry; its exploration and mapping will occupy the chapters of this study. What I hope to make intelligible in this restitution of the early modern discourse on melancholy is not a morbid attention lavished on one particular ailment, nor a chapter in the pre-history of depression, nor even an intriguing re-conceptualization of fear and sadness. Rather, I wish to show how melancholy constituted a problem of the relation between the passions and their meaning.

It may seem surprising to move from this medical narrative into the thickets of sixteenth-century rhetorical and dialectical texts as I do in the next chapter. My rationale is this: now that the reasons for the problem of melancholy’s eclipse have been outlined, we must rediscover the conditions that made it possible to appear in the first place. Having witnessed it disappear, we will now be able to better sense the subtle movements that accompany its emergence. In the standard if much controverted curricula of the humanist university we see a high valuation placed upon being able to speak copiously. The practices that supported this capacity were born from a reimagined vision of the classical rhetorical *ars topica*, the rhetorical practice of invention that
allowed one to discover arguments on any subject. Yet this value in copiousness, as it was carried into all the branches of the university including the medical faculty, is what we have just witnessed undergo a winnowing. It was *copia* that let melancholy speak and its exile silenced the melancholy problem.
3.0 Chapter 2: A Thousand Similes: Melancholy as Topics

In the previous chapter I argued that the problem of melancholy was one of motives—the inference from the phenomenon of a passion to its socially mediated object. In failing to discover an appropriate object, medical discourse intervened to assert probable causes of the passion. Robert Burton’s collation of these in a massive index recovered all of these various causes as topics, that is, sites of probable arguments for the causes of melancholy passions and habits. Yet there was another and far more unique way in which rhetorical-topical methods were used to articulate a passion without grounding it in explication of its causes. I call these the melancholy topics. However, the use of topical invention for the articulation of melancholy passions was of course never explicitly detailed in handbooks. Rather, these practices comprised the intellectual backdrop of humanistic education and training to such a great degree that the various inflections and appropriations of its resources are found across an enormous range of discourse. My purpose is not the pedestrian one of pointing to yet another instance of a rhetorical culture applying its habits of perception and expression to another phenomenon. Instead, I wish to show that the problem of Baroque melancholy contributed to a unique transformation of the resources of topical invention that privileged similitude and metaphor over the more typical method of topical argumentation that privileged essence and distinction.

We discover one of the most telling pieces of evidence of the self-consciously rhetorical elaboration of poorly-motivated passions from what Shakespeare places in the mouth of Jaques, one of his most famous melancholics. In *As You Like It*, he first appears not in person but through report. In the scene in question, we find an exiled Duke attempting to convince his displaced court, now living in the Forest of Arden, that their situation is less grave than it appears. Though the
court's new life in forest exile is “exempt from public haunt,” the duke now “[f]inds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks./Sermons in stones, and good in everything.” The cold blasts of “winter's wind” are his “counsellors/That feelingly persuade me what I am.”158 The Duke’s rhetoric here is the more traditional vision of rhetoric’s ability to move the passions—he attempts to move from a position of dissatisfaction with his exile to a cheerful if stoic optimism on its salutary effects. To discover the “good in everything” he must nevertheless bend his ear to the “sermons in stones.”

When a companion suggests that they prepare for a hunt, the Duke remarks that he is saddened that the deer, as the “native burghers of this desert city,” should have to be killed for his entertainment, though this does not dissuade him from his sport. Another exiled lord then reports that the melancholy Monsieur Jaques holds a similar sentiment. The lord came upon him earlier in the day, lying beneath an oak where a wounded stag came “to languish” and its tears “augmented” the brook. The Duke then asks whether he heard Jaques “moralize this spectacle.” Indeed, the lord says, he turned it “into a thousand similes.” He gives a sample of these similes. For example, Jaques addresses the stag, saying, “Poor deer....thou mak'st a testament/As worldlings do, giving thy sum of more/To that which had too much.” The dying stag weeping into the stream is a metaphor for those who vainly bequeath their wealth to the already-wealthy: the stream does not need the stag's tears. The Duke moves to meet the melancholy gentleman, expressing that he loves to rendezvous with Jaques when he is “in these sullen fits,/For then he's full of matter.”159 Here, the actors exit.

158 As You Like It, 2.1.1-17.
159 Ibid., 2.1.26-72.
The scene is strange. Why is the Duke so eager to hear Jaques' moralizing, when it seems as if he was able to do as much himself? What's more, when Jaques is criticizing the Duke and his court, calling them “mere usurpers, tyrants and what's worse,/To fright the animals and to kill them up/In their assigned and native dwelling-place”? Moreover, why is Jaques more “full of matter” when he is in a “sullen fit”? This cannot be explained away as one of the typical characteristics of the melancholic. In Galenic medicine, we see errors in speech attributed to an excess of black bile and in the moral diatribes against acedia in medieval writings. We find them as either taciturn or, occasionally, garrulous, but never eloquent. This was also true in the iconology of melancholia in the Renaissance. Yet the Duke attributes Jaques' apparently superior ability to “moralize the scene” to his melancholy.

The Duke says that he loves “to cope him” when he is in “these sullen fits/For then he's full of matter.” The verb “to cope” can mean to simply encounter or contest with.\textsuperscript{160} It appears commonly with this sense in Shakespeare's works. Yet because of the lines that follow it, we might take it as a glancing pun—also common in Shakespeare. Both the speeches of the exiled Duke and Jaques the Traveller are examples of one of Renaissance rhetoric's cardinal virtues: copiousness. Copiousness of speech was so prominent a feature of Renaissance that one can take the “phrase copia dicendi, or even copia alone” as “a ubiquitous synonym for eloquence.”\textsuperscript{161} To possess an abundance of words and things became a slogan of Renaissance humanists, borrowed from Quintilian's \textit{Institutio oratoriae}. \textit{Copia} was the key-term in the title of what was likely the most

\textsuperscript{160} The Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “cope.”

successful humanist publication of the sixteenth century, Erasmus' *De duplici copia verborum ac rerum*, a manual for achieving copiousness primarily through methods of linguistic variation. But the abundance designated by copia was more than a simple loquaciousness. It was rather a term for speech-in-potential, a facility of discovering what to say on any given occasion. Even *brevitas*, or the condensed style in speech, was felt to emerge from a careful selection of the plentiful storehouse of the mind, tastefully pared down. Erasmus wrote that “[i]f indeed it is true, as in Plato, Socrates acutely reasons, that the ability to lie and to tell the truth cleverly are talents of the same man, no artist will better compress speech to conciseness than he who has skill to enrich the same with as varied an ornamentation as possible.”\textsuperscript{162} Copia, then, was at once a style of profuse discourse and (more importantly) a power of producing such a discourse.

We have seen in the introduction that the problem of melancholy presented itself, especially in the medical literature, as a passion with an excess of possible causes. As Jaques shows us, it appeared quite differently to those who inhabited the position of the melancholic. “Sullen fits” can always be justified, so long as one was not limited to the causes that were “apparent.” Jaques allows himself to metaphorize the immediate objects of his experience to discover occasions for his sadness. The sources of such justifications of the passion are the melancholy topics. These topics gave rise to a melancholic rhetoric that sought occasions for feeling rather than deriving its feelings out of the occasion. Jaques again shows us another example. While listening to a song of Amiens, Amiens cuts off. Jaques pleads for more. Amiens warns him: “It will make you melancholy, Monsieur Jaques.” Jaques is not moved. “I thank it. More, I prithee,

more. I can suck melancholy out of a song as a weasel sucks eggs.” Jaques' ability to “suck melancholy” out of songs (and, as we see throughout the play, all things) is an example of his ingenious use of melancholy topics. The *ars topica*, a technique of classical rhetoric for discovering arguments, becomes a means for uncovering the world as a passion.

The discourse elaborated from the use of melancholy topics is no longer confined to argument but unfolds new qualities from experience. This restitution of topics as a means for constituting a melancholic persona and discovering modes of feeling was a radical development of the rhetorical tradition. If the topics of classical rhetoric were geared to deal with exigency, the tensely situated problems of public deliberation and legal disputes, the melancholy topics direct our attention away from these exigencies to the transience and fruitlessness of all endeavor. Rather than using the topics to analyze a situation, the melancholic orientation of passionate invention acts as a solution—or rather a dissolution—of the very notion of situation. Its goal is not negotiation but articulating a position that stands at a remove from the world and its “worldlings,” that is, it elaborates melancholic passion into a rhetoric that critiques conventional motives. At the same time, the techniques of melancholy topics are constitutive of a form of experience that metaphorizes sense-experience into the meaning of the insensible. Rhetorical invention does not look to justify an action but articulates a passion by seeking predicates in its immediate environment that find resonance with the objectless melancholic mood. That is, it discovers not sermons but passions “in stones.”

Melancholy itself is a topical selection of experience, adjusting which features are most salient in accordance with the melancholic's passion. Melancholy is also a mood discovered in the

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163 *As You Like It*, 2.5.1-9.
same way that one discovers arguments: not out of whole cloth but through the method of the
topics. It is sustained artfully, not accidentally. Though the passion of the melancholic is without
apparent occasion, through the melancholy topics every occasion appears to speak for the
melancholic's passion. Jaques runs through a set of conventional melancholics and rejects each as
a characterization; he has “neither the scholar's melancholy, which is emulation; nor the
musician's, which is fantastical; nor the courtier's, which is proud; nor the soldier's, which is
ambitious; nor the lawyer's, which is politic; nor the lady's, which is nice; nor the lover's, which is
all these; but it is a melancholy of mine own, compounded of many simples, extracted from many
objects, and, indeed, the sundry contemplation of my travels; in which my often rumination wraps
me in a most humorous sadness.”164 The variety of melancholic figures we saw arrayed around
Burton's frontispiece in the first chapter may suggest that Jaques' cannot be a synecdoche for the
whole class of melancholics. And of course, Jaques is also a fiction. Yet Shakespeare's
characterization of this melancholic shows how the formation of a melancholic persona could at
once be derivative and creative, a motley of postures and sentiments that draw from the whole
range of melancholic appearances. Although the Duke looks to find Jaques, so he might “cope”
with him, that is, engage in disputation for entertainment, Jaques flees into solitude. He tells
Amiens that he has been “all this day to avoid” the Duke, for “he is too disputable...for
company.”165 Jaques puts his use of copia not into dispute but as a resource of experience. While
he “think[s] of as many matters” as the Duke, he does not “boast of them” but instead gives

164 Ibid., 4.1.10-15.
165 Ibid., 2.5.847-8.
“heaven thanks.” The melancholic turns copia, originally a preparation for rhetorical wrangling, into a store of meaning that can be brought to bear upon every experience.

We might read the scene as a paragone between two rhetorical attitudes emerging from Renaissance practices of rhetorical invention. On the one hand, the Duke gives us the situational attitude. On the other hand, Jaques represents the melancholizing attitude. The Duke's social predicament, being in exile, is clearly poor. There are no clear courses of action. Although he, like Jaques, appeals to nature for his arguments, they all nevertheless turn back upon the specific condition of himself and his court. Moreover, the situation demands a rousing of morale, so his “sermons in stones” of course find the “good in everything.” It is moralizing in the modern sense; making a virtue of necessity as the old saw says. Jaques' reading out from the Book of Nature is copious; it finds moral significance in all things, but his ability to “moralize” the spectacle is not tethered to any specific situation. It is a capacity of his own perception.

It is then no surprise that we see this dispute organized around the topic of the hunt. Scholars have frequently (and correctly) recognized that Jaques' reproach of hunting “as a cruel, inhuman occupation, leading to barbarism and not befitting a free man” was a “stereotyped topos” of humanistic literature. However, we might also take the attitudes of the Duke and Jaques to the hunt as an image of two attitudes to rhetorical invention. The ubiquitous metaphor for the ars topica, formed in antiquity and elaborated in the Renaissance, was the hunt. Just as the hunter must know the likely places where game may be, so too the trained orator must know the loci where

166 Ibid., 2.5.30-33.

167 Claus Uhlig, "‘The Sobbing Deer’: ‘As You Like It’ II.ii.21-66 and he Historical Context,” Renaissance Drama 3 (1970), 97.
arguments are likely to dwell. As Quintilian says, “You will not succeed in finding a bird or beast if you do not know where it is born or accustomed to be...so not every kind of argument can be sought everywhere.” In the Renaissance, this metaphor was interiorized, so that the orator's mind is a hunting ground. Books that collected commonplaces on such themes were often titled silvae, forest, or viridaria, hunting preserves. While there is a clear difference in the Stoic cheer of the Duke and the dramatic allegories of Jaques, the difference is not only in the contrast between the optimist and pessimist. The more profound point of departure is what they find relevant: the Duke’s self-assuring case about the moral health of his exile is still pointed to the political conflict that hems in his condition. Jaques’ moralizing of the wounded stag is a deflection of the situation entirely: his rebukes are hurled not at the usurper, but at the motives of hunters in general who are viewed as usurpers in nature. Therefore, there are those who know these places so they may hunt, kill, and use the prey there. However, as we see with Jaques, there is another, melancholic possibility; one may know the place not as a hunter, but as a fellow traveler in the forest of rhetoric.

We will study Jaques' matter to understand his sullen fits. This chapter argues that the humanist revival of the ars topica in the early sixteenth century and its adoption in the European curriculum laid the foundation for Jaques' melancholy topics. My purpose is not to describe the typical or representative use and meaning of the humanist ars topica, but to act as a cicerone or guide through those parts of its tradition that could be cannibalized for the purposes of melancholizing. I argue that the conceptualization of dialectical invention that occurred in this

168 “Nam, ut in terra non generantur omnia, nec avem aut feram reperias, ubi quaeque nasci aut morari soleat ignarus...ita non omne argumentum undique venit ideoque non passim quaeendum est.” Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, 5.10.20-22. See also Cicero, De oratore, 2.3.147.
restitution of the classical *ars topica* seeded the grounds for the development of a distinctly melancholy topics in the English Baroque.

### 3.1 Humanism and Topical Invention

We have already seen that Jaques' “fullness in fits” requires us to grapple with the Renaissance theory of copia and its attendant art of topics. In the sixteenth century, humanists reconstituted the topics, also known as *loci*, or places, as the inventive part of dialectic. As the humanists gained dominance in the curricula of Northern Europe, logic itself began to become identified with topical technique. Logic embraced that what came to be called the trivium, the allied arts of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. Thomas Wilson, one of the first to write an English vernacular rhetoric and dialectic textbook, defined logic as “an arte to reason probably, on bothe partes, of all matters that bee put forth, so farre as the nature of every thyng can beare.” Peter Mack, a historian of Renaissance rhetoric, has argued that humanism demanded “the object language of dialectic ought to be not a semi-formalized subdialect, but real language with all its resources.” That is, dialectic was a preparation for all occasions of speech, not just university disputations. The topics were defined in an English glossary of the time as “that part of Logick,

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which treats of the invention of arguments.” Richard Sherry, once headmaster of Magdalen College for boys, gives us a contemporary's sense of the breadth of the meanings assigned to the topics. The topics, or “places” as he calls them, can be “taken foure maner of wayes.” First, there are those called common places because they are “entreated of, of [viz. by] bothe partes [viz. parties], althoughe not in all one cause.” That is, both parties in a case or controversy dispute the same issue to different purposes, such as the reliability or unreliability of witnesses. Second, there are the *sententiae*, “whych wee exaggerate as it were wythoute the cause, but so that they serue to the cause whiche wee haue in hande: as bee the amplificacions of vertues, and the exaggeracions of vices.” Third, there are the “seates of argumentes,” that vary across the different genres of rhetoric. In deliberative, we are concerned with what is “honest, profitable, pleasaunt easye, necessarie. &c.” In demonstrative or epideictic, we look to the “kynde, kynred, contrey, goodes of the bodye and of the mynde,” of the person being praised. Finally, there are the “general” topics, “whych declare what belongeth to euerye thynge, and howe oute of eche of them there be taken argumentes, partly necessary, and partlye probable.” They are shared by the “Oratours with the Logicians.” Sherry notes Aristotle's *Topics* as the primary source and recommends that this be read, but “the varietie of authors hath made the handlynge of them sumwhat darke, because amonge them selues they can not wel agre, neyther of the names, neyther of the number, neyther

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171 Thomas Blount, *Glossographia, or, A dictionary interpreting the hard words of whatsoever language now used in our refined English tongue : with etymologies, definitions and historical observations on the same : also the terms of divinity, law, physick, mathematicks, war, music and other arts and sciences explicated : very useful for all such as desire to understand what they read* (London: Printed by Thomas Newcomb, 1670), s.v. “Topica.”
of the order.”172 The conflation of these four—commonplaces, *sententiae*, *loci argumenti*, dialectical topics—was typical, for though theorists made many distinctions between and within them, practitioners saw them all as so many sources of discourse, the founts of rhetoric.

Yet invention itself would undergo a significant, if subtle, reimagining throughout the sixteenth century. Despite classical rhetoric's claim on invention as its first canon, the humanist reforms of university curricula would assign it to dialectic. This entailed a reform of the medieval curriculum on logic, organized around the reception of Aristotelian texts but interpreted through Peter of Spain's *Summulae*, written in 1246. The incipit of that work stated that “dialectic is the art of all arts and the science of all sciences, holding the way to the principles of all methods” and that therefore “it ought to have priority in the acquisition of knowledge.”173 Dialectic was largely concerned with the technical needs of students engaged in dialectical disputations at the university. The desire for a dialectic that was more responsive to the discursive and literary needs of a burgeoning Tudor humanism began to push against Peter's term logic, as when “Johannes Eckius, in his commented edition of the Summulae of 1516, stresses that *argumentatio* ranks above analysis of terms, and is the 'primary subject' of logic.”174 Both universities—Oxford and


174 Ibid., 38.
Cambridge—saw a strong humanist revision of the curriculum. By the mid-sixteenth century, the humanist revision of topics was established, and invention became an early and fundamental part of early modern schooling in England.¹⁷⁵

The specific subset of topics known as dialectical were familiar to Renaissance readers of Cicero’s *Topica*, an adaptation of the Aristotelian system for a Roman audience. Cicero describes topics as “a system developed by Aristotle for inventing arguments so that we might come upon them by a rational system without wandering about.”¹⁷⁶ The work purports to be a translation of Aristotle’s *Topics* but in fact offers a distinct view of the nature of topics if not an entirely new approach.¹⁷⁷ The Ciceronian topic is merely the single word “key” that urges the mind into a direction of thought. The first are those *loci* which are inherent to the subject. These are from the whole [*ex toto*], from its parts [*ex partibus eius*], from its signs or properties [*ex nota*], and from things closely affected [*ex eis rebus quae quodam modo affectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur*]. The first three are all topics providing the speaker with different materials to use when considering the question *quid sit?* of *What is it?*, and can be thought of as arguments from definition, from the enumeration of parts, and from etymology, respectively. The last heading contains under it thirteen


¹⁷⁷ For an account of the relationship between Cicero’s work and Aristotle’s, see Sara Rubinelli, *Ars Topica: The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2009), 111-41. Her conclusion, in short, is that Cicero’s primary source is not the *Topics* but the section on topics in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. However, much more is gained from her discussion than the last word in a *Quellenforschung*. 
other topics. The second class are those topics which are *extrinsecus*, separated from the subject under discussion. These depend “principally on authority [*ex auctoritate*].”

This refers to those proofs Aristotle called *atechnoi*, proofs that do not rely upon the art of rhetoric or dialectic. They are types of forensic evidence, including witnesses.

Scholastic dialectic relied upon an Aristotelian view of topics, where the humanist adopted a more Ciceronian view. They serve as practical reminders to aid an orator, jurisconsult, or philosopher for bringing to mind the possibilities of argument in any case. In *De Oratore*, Cicero explains how he imagines such an art to work just as if one “wished to reveal to somebody gold that was hidden here and there in the earth.” Then “it should be enough for me to point out to him some marks and indications of its positions, with which knowledge he could do his own digging, and find what he wanted, with very little trouble and no chance of mistake.” These topics, now reduced to a short list—down to 19 from roughly 300 in Aristotle—of “keywords,” become the basis, or at least the model, for the many sixteenth-century works on dialectical invention. In various combinations, reductions, and variations, the Ciceronian reading of the topics would come to be identified closely with dialectic, preserved in the middle ages by Boethius and developed by Abelard, Peter of Spain, and others.

It is easy to miss the humanist innovations in dialectic as the most radical innovations were often couched in language that made them appear to be simple derivations of tradition. Though the humanists were enacting a major revision of the subject of dialectic, it was possible to represent it more mildly as a restitution of the full classical tradition, one that preserved, or was even authorized by, Aristotle. Cicero's *Topica* was announced itself as a paraphrase of Aristotle's *Topics*.

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Essential to Cicero's revision, however, was a loss of an attempt to represent topics as a systematic art. This meant dramatically simplifying Aristotle's theory of predicables around which his system of dialectic was organized. A predicable is the object of a predication. A typical *topos* tells us to take one of the predicables in a statement and examine it for a certain argumentative possibility. The bulk of Aristotle's *Topics* consists of rules of this kind, 337 by one count.\textsuperscript{179} Let us examine a typical entry. In Book V, Aristotle takes up the problem of investigating whether something is a *proprium*, or non-essential quality, of the subject under consideration. He sets out a few general principles of the proprium: it is either always or only sometimes present. God is always an “immortal life” but man is only sometimes “walking in the theater.”\textsuperscript{180} When your opponent makes a claim about the *proprium* of a subject under dispute, you should examine to see whether it is always or only sometimes true.

Though Cicero comes between Aristotle and Boethius in the chronology, the humanist privileging of his simplified view of topics reorganized the meaning of the purported continuity between these three authors. The predicables dropped out of Cicero's *Topica* but were present in the medieval curriculum in mediated form through a number of commentaries on Aristotle, most importantly those of Boethius and Porphyry. Boethius' translation of Aristotle’s *Topics* was the only surviving version of it in the Latin West. His commentaries on Cicero’s works were even more important. His commentaries show his attempt to combine two distinct teachings on topics, the first coming through Cicero and Aristotle. In the Boethian interpretation of topics, the topic is neither a keyword nor a heuristic for discovering possibilities of argument. It is the equivalent of


\textsuperscript{180} Aristotle, *Topics*, 5.1.
a maxim or rule which Boethius calls the *propositio maxima*. We see that this was interpreted by Peter of Spain, the most widely read logical text in European universities, as a kind of general inferential proposition, such as *The whole is always greater than the part* and *Whatever is predicated of the species, also the genus*. When a maximal proposition is not included in the argument explicitly, it nevertheless gives it force. This allows him to define topics as propositions that are both universal and maximal. He gives an example with the argument that the *Moors are weaponless because they do not have iron*. What warrants this inference is the maximal proposition “where the matter is lacking, what is made from the matter is also lacking.” The topic is “*from matter.*” The Aristotelian topic is reinterpreted as a maxim of inference, describing a kind of inferential validity *ex rerum natura*. According to Peter Abelard, “a topic is an inference rule that helps one find what is missing in enthymemes.” This discovery of what was “missing”—the maxim that warranted an imperfect or rhetorical syllogism—that made up the bulk of what was called dialectic. It was this that Agricola wished to say was only one part of dialectic, its critical or juridical side.

The scholastic Aristotelian view of topics was organized around late antique commentaries on Aristotle rather than Aristotle's original text. While the predicables received their fullest treatment in Aristotle's *Topics*, this was not available in Latin until the twelfth century. The introduction of this text to Latin Europe, along with his *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* and *Sophistical Refutations*, formed what came to be known as the *logica nova* or “new logic” in the

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181 Peter of Spain, *Tractatus*, 12va-12vb, 59.
183 Ibid., 25.
medieval university. Earlier Masters of Arts had relied upon Porphyry's comments on the predicables in his *Isagoge*, also known as his *Praedicabilia*, an introduction to Aristotelian logic. This late antique text, in Boethius' Latin translation, was among the most commonly used logic in the medieval university. If modern scholars have seen in Porphyry a confused thinker, attempting to bring his neo-Platonic views into Aristotelian logic, the medievals held him in so high a regard as an Aristotelian that his little work became incorporated into Aristotle's *Organon.* Porphyry's analysis listed five predicables: accident, genus, species, property, and difference. Each of these terms is essential or non-essential, convertible or non-convertible. Definition requires both convertibility and essential predication. For instance, every human is a rational animal, and so too is every rational animal a human. Property or *proprium* is convertible but not essential. Every human laugh, and every being that laughs is a human. But laughter is not considered to be the essence of the human. Accidents were inessential properties that might be shared with other kinds, such as the color of a person's hair. These are all things that if changed or destroyed would not change the essence of the subject.

Because every genus is a species of a higher genus, the Porphyrian model of nature resembled a Great Chain of Being.\(^\text{184}\) If one could ask “What is Plato?” and hear the reply, “A man,” nothing prevented you from asking, “What is a man?” Peter of Spain's use of the term *arbor* to describe Porphyry's arrangement of predicates inspired graphic illustrations of his logic as a tree. Indeed, in the “four hundred surviving manuscript copies” of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, “at least 40

\(^{184}\) Remarkably, the classic study of this notion by Arthur O. Lovejoy in *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971) takes almost no cognizance of its logical underpinnings, mentioning the Porphyrian Tree only in passing and through quotation on p. 87. Neither Peter of Spain nor Porphyry are included in the index.
percent contain a drawing of the Tree of Porphyry."185 The model of the tree allows for moments of branching, but always emerging from the “trunk,” a rectilinear line of relation that always refers one to the highest metaphysical genus, substance. While the Tree of Porphyry's influence waned throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it nevertheless continued to appear in traditional discussions of dialectic, as attested by the graphic representation included, taken from the arch-Aristotelian John Case's 1589 *Summa veterum interpretum in universam dialecticam Aristotelis* (Fig. 5).186

The humanist reforms of dialectic transformed the vertical, topical model of logic and its ontological assumptions into a model that privileged similitude rather than belonging, a key feature of the melancholy topics. The arch-humanist Lorenzo Valla carried out a broad critique of Aristotelian ontology in his humanistic restitution of dialectic, as did later his compatriot Mario Nizoli. However, far more influential, especially in Northern Europe, was Rudolph Agricola's *De inventione dialectica*.187 Lisa Jardine tells us that the work appears in university booklists “three times as often as any other dialectic manual apart from Melanchthon (twice as often as that).”188

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187 The relationship between these two works is set out at length in Mack's *Renaissance Argument*, 244-250.

According to Walter Ong, “[j]ust as in the Middle Ages Peter of Spain’s logic was logic (even more than Aristotle’s was), so Agricola’s reoriented logic became for generations after him, in the absolute sense, logic unqualified.”\textsuperscript{189} It was presented to generations as a non-controversial text that would rightly order inference and speech. Those movements of thought that travel under the name of a school remain conspicuous in the histories of a period, but what often directs the practices rather than the products of thought is like a rip tide that’s force does not appear in the crests and crashes of waves of thought. It is here that we should locate Agricola's \textit{De inventione dialectica}, for however original its thought may have been, it was also read as a textbook in the basic logic course and served as a (sometimes unacknowledged) source for other texts used in the classroom.

Both Valla and Agricola's revivals of the topics left room for a critical dialectic focused on valid judgment and was principally concerned with the logical forms of the syllogism. This was largely what dialectic represented in the medieval university curriculum. Although both men had notions of how it could be reformed, they were far more concerned to revive and reform the “lost” part of dialectic: invention. They argued invention had been neglected by the scholastics and required a reappraisal of the meaning and use of the topics. \textit{Inventio}, the first of the classical canons of rhetoric, concerned the “finding” of appropriate sentiments for discourse and argument. Though the techniques for this varied slightly depending on the author, all were grounded in the classical \textit{ars topica}. According to Agricola, “all facility with argument and all \textit{copia} is drawn from the

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topics.”

Agricola was consciously making a gesture to revitalizing an ancient art, counting foremost among his predecessors Aristotle and Cicero, though he criticizes the former for being too obscure in his treatment of the subject and the latter for using only legal examples. Both looked to the scholastic tradition of dialectic with some disdain; Boethius was the “last of the learned” [eruditorum vltimus] for Valla, and he refers dismissively to the scholastic tradition of dialectic as those who “wrote after Boethius.”

In order for a melancholic rhetoric to be able to elaborate on even chance experience, it required a practice that could assimilate any material. It found this in humanist dialectic. Agricola defined dialectic as the art of knowing how to speak convincingly (probabiliter) on any subject whatsoever. This art relies upon deep familiarity with the topics, those “seats of argument” that lead one to consideration of a matter from many facets and so generation of potential arguments. The use of the places requires more than just holding the places in memory; they must be held as if they were in one's sight, in one's hands, through continuous exercise. This was imagined as becoming a habit of perceiving similitudes between apparently unlike things that “is always at hand to us, as whenever we seek similitudes between things through the topics, similitudes come

190 “Ut ergo dicamus id, quod praesentis est negotii tractatunque locorum aperiamus, id est, doceamus, quo pacto sit omnis argumentorum facultas & copia e locis eruenda.” Rudolph Agricola, Rodolphi Agricolae Phrisii De inventione dialectica (Coloniae: Alopecium, 1523), 374. Hereafter DID.

191 Lorenzo Valla, Vallae Opera (Basileae: 1543), 644.

192 “Nec vero memoria tenuisse locos satis esse credidero: sed paratos exercitos, & velut in conspectu, & ad manum positos teneat velim.” DID, 374-5.
forth for us in arguments.” Insofar as dialectic was a training in recognizing similitudes, it made it possible not to speak convincingly about all things, but to use all things in speaking. *Copia* is always “at hand” to the trained dialectician who is able to draw a simile—or a thousand—from what appears before her.

193 “Sed quod hoc usu & tractatuque rerum, cum ratio accesserit eis, copia quaedam & thesaurus paratur, qui semper nobis in promptu sit, ut quoties ex locis quaeremus similibus in rebus, similes nobis argumentationes occurant.” Ibid.
Figure 5 — A printed Porphyrian tree from John Case’s *Summa veterum interpretum*
Figure 6 — Synoptic diagram of Agricola's topics
By contrast with the Porphyrian tree, Agricola's topicalized view of nature begins from the thing and moves ever further out from its essence. Agricola saw the ontological grounding of the topics in the natural similarities between things. As Lodi Nauta has argued, this view grew in part out of Agricola's idiosyncratic view of logical universals as similitudes. Topical relation was thickest not in the singular proprium, but in the plurality of accidents of each object and its similarities to others. The tracing out of these “similitudes” was closely linked to a certain view of nature that subtends the Agricolan revision of dialectic. The support for dialectic is not simply its convenience for orators and pleaders at the bar; instead, it reflects the order of the societas rerum, the society of things. To justify its general application, Agricola sets forth a remarkably original theory of the origin of the topics:

All things which are said either for or against something fit together and are, so to speak, joined with it by a certain community of nature [quadam naturae societate]. Now the number of things is immense and consequently the number of their properties [proprietas] and differences [dversitas] is also immense. This is the reason why no discourse and no power of the human mind can comprehend individually all the relations in which individuals agree and differ. However, a certain common condition [communis quaedam habitudo] is present in all things (even though they are different in their appearances), and they all tend to a similarity of their nature [naturae similitudinem]. So, for example, everything has a certain substance of its own, certain causes from which it arises, certain effects it produces. And so the cleverest men have picked out [excerpsere], out of that vast variety of things, these common headings [communia capita] such as substance, cause, effect and the others.195

There are several things to be noted in this passage. First, the societas naturae is itself topical, that is, topical practice is authorized by the order of nature. Agricola imagines topics'

194 For an explanation of Agricola's view, see Lodi Nauta, “Universals to Topics: The Realism of Rudolph Agricola, with an Edition of his Reply to a Critic,” Vivarium 50, no. 2 (2012), 190-224.
195 DID, 9-10.
mythic origin in which ancient wise men “pluck out” the common features of the world through the comparison of individual things. Although things are individuated through their characteristics, “all things possess a certain common condition [habitudo] and tend towards a similarity of nature, because substance is common to all things, and all things arise from certain causes, and all things effect something.” The topics are simply these characteristics, namely definition, genus, species, proprium, whole, parts, conjugates, adjacents, acts, subjects, efficient and final causes, effects and aims, its place, time, connections, its accidents, and its incompatibles. These common characteristics or notae are nothing other than the topics or loci. The mind runs through these common characteristics and draws out of them what can be said, making the comparison of any two things possible.

Second, the common habitudo of all things is at once a misprision of the medieval dialectical tradition and a strikingly unique movements towards a dialectical view of nature. In medieval terminist logic, habitudines referred to relations between terms in a proposition or between propositions in a syllogism. Peter of Spain read the topics as habitudines. For instance, the locus from definition was the habitudo between the definition and the defined; the topic of description, the habitudo between description and described. Agricola is instead imagining a relation not between discourse and referent but between the natures of things. Speech is to be invented out of these common relations. The topics themselves are identified with the features of the world.

196 “Locus a diffinito est habitudo diffiniti ad diffinitionem....Locus a descriptione est habitudo descriptionis ad descriptum.” Peter of Spain, Tractatus, 61, 62.
Third, dialectic attunes the practitioner to the tendency of nature towards similarity. In this, it is foundational for the emergence of a melancholy topics that did not wish to speak with knowledge on all matters like the ancient sophists but to discover matter for dilating upon their passion in all things. The movement from a discourse of knowledge to rhetoric of passion does not take place within the works of humanist dialectic, but its reorganization of the societas rerum made this possible. Humanist dialectic transferred the illumination of things from their essential qualities to their aptitude for appearing similar. Agricola describes the simile in this way: “Of all the places from which arguments are drawn, perhaps none is of less power against a resisting listener than the similitude; to him who follows it freely, and proffers himself for instruction, nothing is more fitting. For, if rightly applied, it opens the matter, and places some image of it in the mind, so that although it may not produce a necessary assent, it brings about a silent shame for dissenting.”¹⁹⁷ It is used less for proving than for explaining and illustrating, and so while it is often used by orators, we find it more often in poets. It is a more difficult topic for invention because its material is wholly outside of the subject's own substance [tota extra rem].

Where Cicero's notion of the locus extrinsecus was the sort of argument that is “outside” of the art of invention properly speaking, as in the case of bringing in witnesses or authorities, Agricola took the Ciceronian topics that went past definition and saw them as extrinsic to the nature of the thing considered. Agricola places similia among the “extrinsic” topics, building upon a distinction in Cicero. But his use of this distinction involves a striking transformation. The

¹⁹⁷ “Omnium locorum e quibus ducuntur argumenta, nulli fere minus est virium contra renitentem auditorem, quam simillitudini: ad eum vero qui sponte sequitur, docendum se praebet, accommodatior nullus est. Aperit enim rem, si recte adhibeatur, & quandam eius imaginem subjicit animo: ut cum assentiendi necessitatem non afferat tacitum dissentienti pudorem.” DID, 119.
extrinsic topics in Cicero were the equivalents of Aristotle's *atechnoi*, proofs that came from outside of the art, such as material evidence, witness testimony, and authority. 198 With Agricola, the distinction becomes literal. The topic, as a “nota” of the “res,” is outside of the substance of the thing under consideration. In trying to prove that Cicero (Agricola's example of an individual) will die, to argue that he is a man, and therefore composed from corruptible elements and subject to disease, is to argue from topics within “Cicero.” In contrast, to argue that Cicero has a mortal father and mother and that all mortal-born die is to argue from topics outside of “Cicero.” Those topics that are *in substantia* get classed as part of its *definitio*. But, as we see in his discussion of simile, it is by placing the thing within the *societas rerum* that it becomes illuminated. 199 In topical method, we discover the thing most fully not in its substance, but in what is extrinsic to it.

Attention to similarity is developed in dialectic by a close classification of the various types of extrinsic relation. Agricola breaks the external topics into four classes: what is related either as a cause of effect of the thing [*cognata*], what is attached to it [*applicita*], its accidents [*accidentia*], and its opposites [*repugnantia*]. These classes proceed through a widening scope of distance from the thing. This mode of organization contrasts with the scholastic arrangement, premised upon the Porphyrian Tree, described above. It is in Agricolan dialectic where we see an alternative order. A graphical representation of topics as branching out from the subject under consideration (*res proposita*) was set forth in early printings of the work. The topics, the termini of these branching brackets, are arrayed on the right side. The divisions that come before them show that we are


199 Cf. this with Leonardo Bruni's early Renaissance view of ornamenta as illuminating ethical matters precisely by setting them in “a particular context.” See Clare Lapraik Guest, *The Understanding of Ornament in the Italian Renaissance* (Boston: Brill, 2006), 237.
moving ever further away from the essential nature of the subject. The first seven \((\textit{definitio, genus, species, proprium, totum, partes, coniugata})\) are those “internal topics” that are “within the nature of the matter” under consideration. Then we move to those that are “around its substance” \((\textit{circa substantiam rei})\). Then we turn to the external topics. First, the cognates, comprising its causes and effects. Second, the \textit{applicitia}, which include topics like the place and time. Finally, we arrive at the two related categories of \textit{accidentia} and \textit{repugnantia} where we find, among other topics, the similitude.

The melancholic's topicalized imagination is prefigured in humanist dialectic itself. Dialectic became seen as a mental power of imaginative perception as well as a facility in discovering metaphorical possibility. Just as the similitude creates an image in one's mind, so topical description becomes a model of mental vision \textit{tout court}.\footnote{200 This was reinforced through the conflation of the topics of invention and the techniques of artificial or trained memory, most notably, in Vives \textit{De anima} 3.354-5, 361 and Giulio Camillo's \textit{La Topica o vero della elocuzione}. The key classical sources for thinking of artificial memory in terms of “places” comes from the pseudo-Ciceronian \textit{Rhetorica ad Herennium}. It described a technique of that worked \textit{ex locis et imaginibus}, from places and images. Here the imagined places were to be taken literally; aedes, intercolumnium, angulum, fornicem, et alia quae his similia sunt. The images were to be set into these places as if hanging pictures or setting up statues in a mental house. It was essential to \textit{ex ordine hos locos habere}, to hold these places in a set order, and to select places that were deserted as “solitudo conservat integras simulacrorum figuras.” The most developed version of the adoption of topics in mental vision is undoubtedly in the masters of Renaissance \textit{ars memoriae}, Giulio Camillo, Girodano Bruno, and, to a lesser extent, Tommaso Campanella. To delve into the complexity and abstruseness of these thinkers, however, would take us too far afield. Moreover, although Bruno in particular remained alive in the memories of certain English neo-Platonists and esoterics, his contributions were \textit{sui generis} and risked running afoul of religious orthodoxy, even in the theologically disputatious England of the seventeenth century.

\footnote{200 If Agricola's purpose here was}
to offer a pedagogical model of habits that build eloquence, he nevertheless also articulated the formation of a new discursive position, one that would develop into the melancholy topics. As opposed to a procedure adopted adventitiously on the basis of a case, the art of invention began to be seen as a mental faculty. Melanchthon called dialectic a “certain natural power, by which we may give the order of things in their relations.”

Visorius, in his 1534 commentary on Agricola, writes: “Some call dialectic an art, other say it is a faculty.” Nearly all of the other important humanist writers on dialectic followed suit. Sturm wrote that it was not a form of knowledge, but a *dunamis*, a certain “power of the mind like an instrument” for “perceiving things.” Ramus distinguishes a *dialectica naturalis* in his *Partitiones* and claimed that “[d]ialectical art ought to

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201 “Est ars ipsa (dialecticae) domi nobis et in animis nostris nata, sicut numerandi scientia, plana et facilis est. Est enim propemodum naturalis quaedam vis, qua per ut demus rerum inter se ordinem.” Phillip Melancthon, *De Dialectica Libri Quattor* (Lipsiae: Fabrus, 531), 3. [1b. 1. 1.]


begin from an imitation and observation of natural dialectic.”204 One of the strongest statements of this kind is found in a 1568 work called On the Study of Dialectic Rightly Undertaken [De studio dialectices recte suscipiendo], written by Melanchthon's pupil David Chytraeus. He argues that God placed dialectic into the minds as “a light, by which we see, just as if they were things placed before our eyes, and determine the differences of colors,” but dialectic allows us to see “God and those other things not placed before our eyes, and as we discern the one from the many, and the order, difference [distinctionem], consequence.”205 Dialectic was a means of seeing what was not apparent. In this, humanist dialectic laid the foundation of the melancholic position, which “saw” the world through the passion without apparent occasion.

When dialectic was identified with the inventive mental faculty, the topics were the organ of experience. We see this most remarkably expressed in an Italian Baroque theorist, Pietro Sforza Pallavicino, who argued in his 1644 Del Bene that wit, or ingegno, was “that gift of nature which...consists precisely in joining, through cunning attention, objects which seemed to be disconnected, and tracing in them the hidden traces of friendship within that very contrariety, the unseen unity of a peculiar similitude amidst total dissimilarity, some bond, some kinship, some


205 Jodochus Willichus and David Chrytaeus, Iodoci Willichi Reselliani Erotematum Dialectices III, quibus accessit Davidis Chytraei de Studio Dialectices recte instituen in Libellus (Basileae: Guarinum, 1568), 255-6.
confederation where others would never suspect it.” Its rules, he tells us, are fully laid out in Aristotle's *Topics*. Agricola himself presents one of the original reasons for the invention of topics as the human confrontation with diversity and therefore, the need to distill the “common characteristics.” There is “no discourse or power of the human mind able to grasp how all things taken singly either agree or disagree with every other individual thing.” Agreements are similitudes of properties or accidents; where we don't find similitude, we have a “disagreement” between things.

The melancholy topics were predicated upon an interiorization of dialectic as a faculty and the objectification of predicates. These both mark a movement towards a *topicalized imagination*. Agricola’s suggestion for practicing the topics is an adaptation of the rhetorical practice of *ekphrasis*, or in Latin *descriptio*, which he calls a preliminary exercise (*praexercitamenta*) for boys. But unlike the rhetorical practice, purpose is not to achieve an elegance of expression. Topical ekphrasis is not a schoolroom oration, but the imaginative discovery of arguments in which “[i]t suffices....to have marked down a thing through single words, as if headings, of each of the


207 “Quo fit, ut omnia quae singulis convenient aut discrepent, sigillatim nulla oratio, nulla vis mentis humanae possit complecti.” *DID*, 9.
While rhetoricians seek to amplify, accuse, etc., the dialectical task is to first set out an exact vision of the thing, its nature and characteristics.

This description is the topical account that brings the thing into a single view. Agricola emphasizes several times that the use of the topics is to have everything in one glance. He imagines this as an imaginative exercise in which the soul is encircled by these common characteristics of things and, moving through each in turn as if through certain stations, it is laden with a great number of “probable” things.

We will achieve this, if first we should have all the topics and their precepts firmly affixed in our memories so that whenever we like we and without hesitation we are able to perceive everything as if in one view. Secondly, if through much practice we should accustom the mind to always have its eyes attentive and open, so to speak, so that it is immediately able to pluck out the concordances and discordances from the things described through the order of the topics.

Rather than preparing us for some already-existing situation, we run through the topics to create a mental habit. This habit was the grounds for the transformation of rhetorical and dialectic topics into a mode of melancholic experience. This practice was quite different from the classical use of the topics. In Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, however the topical techniques may have

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208 “Satis enim nobis erit, es singulorum locorum, singulis verbis velut capitibus quibusdam annotasse.” DID, 386.

209 “Necesse est autem quisquis volet rem aliquam describere, ut omnem eius naturam, proprietatemque exacte perspectam habeat.” DID, 386-7.

210 “Id assequemur, si primum locos omnes et omnia praecepta firmiter affixa memoriae habeamus, ut quotiescunque liberet, cuncta velut uno intuitu sine cunctatione perspicere possimus. Deinde, si multo usu assueferimus animum, intentos semper et apertos (ut sic dixerim) habere oculos, ut statim possit ex rebus per locorum ordinem descriptis consentiana discrepantiaque eruere.” DID, 403.
differed, they were aligned in attempting to discover an argument for a real situation calling for speech. That is to say, topical invention was limited by the motive of the speaker to prove a case or defend some point. In Agricola's *ekphrastic* use of topics, we find a new function for the classical technique. In the exercise, there is no set end for discovering the right predicates. One simply contemplates the object under each of the topical headings. Indeed, though it has been said that the humanist dialectic's “description of the *topoi*” is tantamount to “attempt[ing] to make an art out of the natural capacity to establish some state of affairs through observation and a methodical order,”211 it is equally true that they began to envision a natural faculty of observation that was made in the image of dialectical art.

The possibility of a melancholy topics depended upon the realignment of the topics with dialectic rather than within rhetoric. Although Agricola argued (prior to Ramus) that invention belonged to dialectic rather than rhetoric, most treatments of the *ars topica* treated the distinction as principally one of scope; the matter of rhetoric was “principally in politics,” whereas dialectic examined *all* questions (*materia rhetoris est in politicis principaliter, materia dialecti est in omnibus*).212 It is precisely in its openness to all considerations, its ability to invent matter on any question, that dialectic allows for the rhetorization of nature, expanding it beyond its sphere of *res humanae*. The distinction between dialectic and rhetoric, made by Agricola and championed by Ramus, has been viewed as a devalorization of rhetoric's claim since Ong's work. This is in one


212 Agostino Nifo, *Commentaria*, 1v.
sense true, but it is actually quite misleading; humanist dialectic was as much an intense valorization of rhetorical invention, giving it its own status as a branch of a classical art of probable reasoning. While Cicero had introduced the notion of the topics as *sedes argumentorum*, Agricola initiated its transformation into a logic of nature, in which things can be analyzed and compared.

### 3.2 The Question Infinite

In seeing Jaques as a practitioner of topics, we can see the difference of melancholy topics from the classical image of topical practice, which was used to train orators for participation in public life. Jaques uses the topics to disdain and criticize the “public haunt” and its motives. Jaques is ridiculed by other characters for being studied in his melancholic set-pieces. Orlando accuses him of having “studied [his] questions” from “painted cloths,” referring to a genre of popular, cheap, and conventional paintings on textile; Jaques' famous speech on the seven ages was one popular theme for these cloths. Jaques has formed his topical habits not by responding to the “public haunt” but through discovering those commonplaces that articulate his melancholic mood.

The shift in the nature of a topics was also paralleled by a melancholic reconceptualization of the “question,” or controversy around which arguments are built. The humanists emphasize the generality and universality of dialectical, topical, method. This opposes the situational focus of

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213 *As You Like It*, 3.3.275.


Cicero, where the “dominant sense of locus...is of a system of situational analysis comprising taxonomies of rhetorical forms that can be used to create arguments for a specific case (*quaestio finita*).” That is, the classical rhetorical *res* of circumstance, situation, case, occasion was replaced by the dialectical *res*, the general subject of discourse. The dialectical sense of *res* was best explored in the *quaestio infinita*, the “question infinite.” This distinction, probably first made by Hermagoras, was in Greek one between *thesis* (infinite) and *hypothesis* (definite). A youthful Cicero said that such questions were distant from the office of an orator [*procul ab oratoris officio remotas*]. But, as Quintilian noted, elsewhere he recognized that the particular question contains within it the general one: “For in their division of the different kinds of speeches they set up two sorts of cases: one they describe as raising general questions, not related to individuals or occasions; and the other as depending upon specific individuals and occasions; not knowing that any debate whatsoever can be brought under [referri] the notion and quality [vim et naturam] of the general kind.” Yet the Ciceronian rapprochement with the infinite question had a clear motive: the general questions were fewer in number and therefore made it easier for the orator to come to terms with the variations in particular cases. This same distinction was taken up in English vernacular treatises. Speeches either respond to a question that is “infinite...and without ende” or one that is “definite, and comprehended within some ende.” The person who speaks upon the “question infinite” talks “of thynges universally, without respect of persone, time, or place.”

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217 “Constituunt enim in partiendis orationum modis duo genera causarum : unum appellant, in quo sine personis atque temporibus de universo genere quaeratur ; alterum, quod personis certis et temporibus definiatur; ignari omnes controversias ad universi generis vim et naturam referri.” *De oratore*, 2.133.

218 Wilson, *Rhetorique*, 1r-v.
Commonly, the examples given of infinite questions are comparative, as in Wilson, who asks whether the courtier or the scholar leads a better life. It is in this sense that Jaques “studied...questions” from painted cloths—he has prepared set speeches on commonly disputed “questions infinite.”

The *quaestio infinita* was the statement of a general dispute within a specific case. However, Agricola notes that this often fails—in many cases the “whole question hangs upon a circumstance” [*totam quaestionem ex conditione pendere*].\(^{219}\) He gives the example of a common *controversia* subject—should Cato divorce Marcia? Agricola's departure seems at first to place all of rhetoric within the consideration of circumstance. Rather, it shows how political, deliberative rhetoric cannot be reduced to a general question or *thesis*.\(^{220}\) Circumstances are not merely the garb over the true thesis to be debated. Each circumstance within the controversy of a case is a *res* with its own arguments. Only by recognizing in Cato the various predicates of Stoic, politician, orator, etc. as well as those in Marcia are we able to adequately address the question. Whether Cato should divorce his wife depends upon the circumstance—is he poor? is he devoted to study? is his wife not virtuous?—rather than the general question of *Should a philosopher divorce his wife*, which simply moves Cato up the Porphyrian tree and replaces the individual with his genus.\(^{221}\)

Yet when Agricola turns to demonstrate how to use his topical practice, he gives the example of a *thesis*, that is, the question “Should a philosopher take a wife?” We see here that the

\(^{219}\) *DID*, 248.

\(^{220}\) See Mack, *Renaissance Argument*, 188.

\(^{221}\) *DID*, 377.
topics, even if they may be used to answer the questions of specific circumstances, find their clearest use in application to the *quaestio infinita*. Before addressing the question directly, he first runs “philosopher” and then “wife” through all of the places. Then from this material, he takes the definition of philosopher and “visits” it to all the now-filled places of “wife.” Since a philosopher is a man seeking virtue, and the *proprium* of a wife is seeking to bear children, Agricola “finds” here an agreement, since one may plausibly say that part of virtue is seeking to reproduce. While this may seem to be a simple combinatorial exercise, the order given to the process belies this. What is moved through the topics is a *res*, not a proposition. This pre-propositional collection of predicates shows how the dialectical topics have transformed to resemble a kind of imaginative play or predicates rather than a procedure for debate. Indeed, were we to consider all of the places, we would never come to a reason to terminate the topical collection of predicates.

The *thesis*, distinct from the *hypothesis* because it is not attached to specific circumstances [*circumscriptum circumstantiis*], is a seed of copia. Melanchthon argued that the general question “not only has a special place in the speech, but also gives forth words and *sententiae* to every part of the oration.”

The thesis, the question without occasion, was in this sense identical with the *loci communes*: the answers to such a question could be moved between different occasions for speaking. The mobility of speech directed towards a *quaestio infinita* complemented the unsituated passion of the melancholic. Just as there is a distinction between the question anchored to time, place, and persons and one that is not, so too we might take this analogy into the realm of passions. If feeling is directed to particular conditions, it is definite. But where it roams freely, as in Jaques'...

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“sullen fit,” we have the commonplace mood of the melancholic. Jaques shows us that what we have identified in the first chapter as a problem—the passion without apparent occasion—was also a capacity, an expectation that the melancholic may move more easily into a register of moral truth, forming a dark apotheosis out of a mundane scene. His melancholy is a rhetorical prism. He is expected to turn any scene into allegory.

When the topical ekphrastic method was absorbed by melancholy topics into a habit of experience, there was no case, but instead a passion. The discovery of predicates, then, was not limited to answering a controversy but could continue on indefinitely. What allowed melancholy passions to become sutured into this rhetorical structure was the indeterminate nature of its cause. In this way, melancholy passions become “questions infinite” in a new sense—the answer to How am I feeling? can be extended without bounds to any object in which a similitude to a potential reason for the feeling can be discovered. The melancholy topics transform the mood of melancholy itself, taking any object that could be said to be a cause of the passion as its occasion for elaboration.

Jaques makes a point that his form of speech does not address specific individuals. When the Duke accuses Jaques of being a hypocrite—“chiding sin” when he himself lives as a “libertine”—Jaques defends himself with recourse to the “question infinite.” He asks the Duke, “What woman in the city do I name,/When that I say the city-woman bears/The cost of princes on unworthy shoulders? Who can come in and say that I mean her,/When such a one as she such is her neighbour?” The similitude between the characters of those the melancholic criticizes trumps the speech about any specific circumstance. It is precisely in showing the typicality of their motives that the melancholic critique takes his sting. When he attacks, in general terms, a man “of basest function/That says his bravery is not of my cost,” this only shows the poignancy of the criticism.
It is the angered listener, who in “[t]hinking that I mean him...therein suits/His folly to the mettle of my speech.”223 The commonplace character of the melancholic rhetoric takes its wide applicability precisely by foregoing arguments from circumstance, letting the circumstance confess itself as an example of the typical.

We can follow the problematic introduced by the infinite question into the melancholy topics in seeing how it is used by Shakespeare's melancholic characters. Quentin Skinner's *Forensic Shakespeare* traces out in exacting detail how various scenes within Shakespeare's oeuvre are illuminated by mapping them out against the formulas of the *quaestio iudicii* as it appeared in vernacular rhetorics of the time. This even appears in the dialogue of certain characters, as when the Duke says to Portia in the trial scene of *The Merchant of Venice* saying she, disguised as a “he,” is “acquainted with the difference/ That holds this present question in the Court.”224 Despite his careful tracing of the *Hamlet* plot against the description of question analysis, Skinner's analysis does not take into account the most famous line in all of Shakespeare and its clear invocation of the *quaestio*; I speak, of course, of Hamlet's “To be or not to be; that is the question.”225 Here, the *quaestio* does not conform to the forensic model that Skinner is at pains to shows organizes the action of Hamlet. Cicero further divided the *quaestio infinita* in his *Topica*, making a distinction between the *quaestio cognitionis* “whose aim is the acquisition of knowledge,” and the *quaestio actionis* that concerns deliberation about an action. He contrasts a discourse that seeks to ascertain the nature of legal right from its origin, about which it may be disputed whether it comes from

223 *As You Like It*, 2.7.75-83.


225 Italics mine.
nature or civic compact, with the question whether it is “the duty of the wise man to get involved with politics?” It is, rather, better modelled as a meditation that begins upon what Cicero called a “question of action” but, in the melancholic dilation upon similitudes, is upended by a *quaestio cognitionis*, a question of thought.

Indeed, the soliloquy dramatizes a contest between these *quaestio cognitionis* and the *quaestio actionis*. We see the topical movements of Hamlet's inferences. “To die—to sleep.” This similitude allows him to claim that death, like sleep, brings rest, and to “end/The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks/That flesh is heir to.” But this similitude can be extended. In the topical dilation of “sleep” we find one of its accidents; when we sleep, we are “perchance to dream.” Dreams have a more ambiguous status. The possibilities must “give us pause.” The question of what is in a dream is not a matter of action, but only of a kind of knowledge, perhaps one inaccessible to humans. But this uncertainty affects the deliberation about action, in that it breeds the “dread of something after death.” Hamlet argues that it is only this fear that is the real motive, not to flee life, but to persevere amidst its pangs and spurns.

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Thus conscience does make cowards of us all,
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pitch and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry
And lose the name of action.227

The question loses its name of “action” to “thought,” that is, the quaeestio actionis becomes the quaeestio cognitionis. This is imagined by Hamlet as changing the quality of bodily temperament. The ruddy attitude required for deeds is “sicklied o'er” with the ever more abstract forms of reasoning. The sanguine question of action becomes a melancholic question of thought through its topical dilation into similitudes and possibilities. This has the effect not of helping us to retrieve arguments but leaving us in a state unsuited for action altogether. The melancholic habit of topical generalization leads to a state in which deliberation always leads us to the point of uncertainty rather than to decision. Rhetorical and dialectical capacity become melancholic indecisiveness. But within this indecision is a topical flowering of an articulation of passion.

227 Hamlet, 3.1.57-91.
3.3 The Melancholy Commonplace

Hamlet’s soliloquy deploys a number of distinctly melancholy commonplaces. Commonplaces are discursive elaborations of topics that maintain the mobility across situated discourse that topical perception retained. Before we are able to see how melancholy rhetoric emerged from the topical tradition, we must first understand the relationship between commonplaces and the *ars Topica* proper. The *loqui argumentorum* were defined by Cicero and Quintilian as the *sedes argumentorum*, those that are detailed in descriptions of dialectic. We have so far discussed the rhetorization of these dialectical topics. However, the commonplace or *locus communis* is often thought to have had a different history, one more or less independent from the logical comprehensiveness of dialectic. Scholarship on the topic has often distinguished between “analytic” and “concrete” topics. Commonplaces are aligned with the “concrete” topics, that is, those that concern specific subject matters and are most familiarly deployed in the distinctive early modern practice of note-taking that came to be known as “commonplacing.” This practice is frequently traced to the influence of Erasmus’ pedagogical works, most importantly *De copia* and *De ratione studii*.

This use of topics was a way of mapping out a potential semantic space. Whereas in the classical works this potential space was the forensic speech, a defense or accusation in a courtroom

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228 For a recent analysis of this soliloquy that also attends to its resonance with the rhetorical tradition of the *quaestio infinita* and Renaissance commonplaces, see Vanessa Lim, “To Be or Not To Be”: Hamlet’s Humanistic Quaestio,” in *The Review of English Studies* (2019), 1-19.

setting or one of the schoolroom exercises modelled upon this, the Renaissance reimagined this space as the very power of discourse. The commonplace was fertile for the discursive elaboration of melancholic passions: it was precisely in the ability to discourse on the common conditions of human life that the melancholic is able to justify a passion not bounded by situational concerns. A key part of the skill of commonplacing was knowing how to embed one of the *sententiae* culled from reading into a new discourse. Erasmus explained this practice through a metaphor: “[j]ust as a gem must be set in a ring to realize its full splendor, so the literary commonplace needs a proper discursive setting in order to display its true value.”²³⁰ Then, “whenever the occasion demands, the stuff of speech will be ready at hand as if safe nests had been built, whence you can take what you wish.”²³¹ If the Erasmian commonplaces were geared towards amplification, this was nevertheless an amplification of the general proposition. Agricola argued that “what the rhetoricians call *loci communes* are nothing but the major propositions of arguments.”²³² For example, we want to prove that some man named Coelius should be convicted and so therefore we need to show that he is a sorcerer. The commonplace, then, is that *all sorcerers should be condemned*. It is the generality of the proposition that allows it to serve us on any occasion where a specific individual is before us. The commonplace is precisely that part of the argument that exceeds its occasion, allowing it to appear in others. If Erasmus focused on the re-embedding, he


²³² “Loci quidem communes (ut rhetores vocant) non sunt aliud quam maiores ratiocinationum propositiones.” *DID*, 280.
nevertheless fostered practices that trained the ear of the reader to find those expressions that echoed beyond their setting.

The strong distinction made by scholars between Agricolan dialectical topics and Erasmian commonplaces is overstated. The Erasmian “copy of things” or copia rerum was said to “take their rise from the places of Topics in dialectic.”233 At the same time, the notion that the Agricolan dialectic was purely logical has underemphasized his own description of the uses of topics as part of the practice of reading many of the same classical authors Erasmus had placed at the core of the reformed humanist curriculum. Melanchthon, in his De rhetorica libri tres of 1519 argued that the loci communes were both dialectical and rhetorical in nature.234 In his De copia, the first examples Erasmus gives of loci communes are dialectical topics, from definition (genus, species, proprium, differentiae, and two additional topics, partitio and divisio) and a loose set of others, including many found in Agricola, like contraries, similitudes, and opposites. That is, the commonplace was not unlike Jaques “studied question”—it moved the topic from a moment of perception into a patch of discourse that could be set within a variety of speeches. The transition from topic to commonplace is one from invention to elaboration. Attendant upon this transition is a movement from the quasi-logical categories of Agricolan dialectic to common themes of discourse. While we are unlikely to give a moving speech about genus or proprium, there are many occasions on which we may be called to speak about Justice, Love, or Mercy. However, unique to the melancholy commonplaces was a retention of universal applicability even within these themes. Because the

233 “Ergo parata sermonis facultate, si non luxiorosa, certe casta, mox ad rerum intelligentiam conferendus est animus. Tametsi ex his etiam scriptoribus.” Trans. in Baldwin, Small Latine, 1.178.

melancholic mood had no discrete object, it discovered the subjects of its discourse from the common qualities of all things.

Erasmus claims that even more powerful for its probative power are exempla, which are “employed either as similes, or dissimilia, or contraries.” Here we see that Erasmus gives a different shade and wider scope to the topic of comparison than did Agricola. It encompasses the “fabula, the apologue, the proverb, judgments, the parable, or collatio, the imago and anthology, and other similar ones.” These were to be gathered through reading. Erasmus advised the pupil to create headings in a blank book, “partly from classes of vices and virtues, partly from those things that are especially important in human affairs.” But the exact listing and order of these headings was up to the individual, for “anyone may make an orderly list of the virtues and vices for himself, following his own judgment,” though he can also borrow a listing he finds in a classical author or authority. The exempla, as headings, are simply superlatives of other topics, as we see from Erasmus' listing: “senile youth, unusual happiness, remarkable memory, sudden changes in fortune, sudden death, voluntary death, unnatural death, extraordinary eloquence, unusual riches, famous men of humble birth, subtlety of intellect, extraordinary physical strength, extraordinary appearance, distinguished character in a deformed body.” However, when he comes to examples of commonplace headings, we find them in the form of proverbs or sententiae, like “To each their own beauty” (Suum cuique pulchrum), “It is safest to believe no one” (Tutissimum est nulli credere), and “He who gives quickly gives twice” (Bis dat qui cito dat). Moreover, even with the

235 Erasmus, On Copia, 67.

236 Ibid.

237 Ibid., 88.
headings of the virtues, there was room for specification. Under the heading of Piety and Impiety, the commonplacer is to include the “several particular kinds,” such as “piety toward God...toward the fatherland...toward parents of children, or even toward those whom we ought to honor in place of parents as teachers and those by whose kindness we have been taken care of.” This method of introducing “heads” in the form of important terms or maxims can be brought into the organization of any aspect of one's reading, for “no learning is so far removed from rhetoric that you may not enrich your classifications with it.” The possibility of excerpting sententiae, similitudes, parables, and exempla from one's reading is linked to the habits of mind that held the commonplaces at the ready. To arrange a pithy sentence under “love” is not a different act from contemplating its causes, repugnantia, cognata, etc. What holds across all these various uses of the term “topics” and its analogues is a metaphor: a place where one might find arguments. Typically, this meant a mental habit that gave one greater acuity to know what to consider in a given discourse. Sometimes the metaphor was realized literally. The topics would become indexes for books, part of the burgeoning system of finding aids in the print era.

The topic and commonplace are respectively as the seed and the flower of rhetorical discourse. The tension between the logical structure of a discourse and its content was not a coincidence of two unrelated meanings but part of the incitement to a reconciliation between res et verba, that made Northern European humanism distinctive. The relationship between the two was good humanist practice, following the dictum of Quintilian: concern for words comes through solicitude after things, because “the best words are essentially suggested by the subject matter and

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238 Ibid.

239 Ibid.
are discovered by their own intrinsic light.”240 The dialectical art, then, was imagined as a way of seeing the source of a discourse through its verbal realization. If in practice, writers on topics leaned to one side or another of argumentative formalism or the collection of material, they nevertheless often imagined their enterprises under the same banner.

If, as in the case of Erasmus, the recommendations to excerpt and excise sentences, apothegms, and examples was a way of storing them for later re-contextualization, it nevertheless made possible a speaker who refused to weave the mobile sentence back into the scene. This speaker, one I identify as the melancholic, found meaning only once it was placed in this storehouse, or in Burton's phrase, kept all their treasure “in Minerva's tower.” Erasmus' claimed that by understanding the matters in “the literary monuments of ancient Greece,” one also reads “the whole of attainable knowledge.”241 The most dialectically inclined were often concerned with topical method as a compendium of the rules of an art and in this way were not far from the Erasmian collections of sentences and apothegms, as attested by Melanchthon's Loci communes, a work that with its arrangements of the “special topics” of theology set the model of Lutheran theological discourse for generations to come.242 We also see that those who set out headings under which “flowers” could be collected derived the headings and sometimes also the order from some dialectical process. The most extreme version of this is John Foxe's printed commonplace book which is mostly blank pages with headings. Yet the headings are a complete survey of dialectical possibilities broken down through the predicates of substantia, giving “twenty-five subdivisions,


241 Qtd. in Baldwin, Small Latine, 1.80.

which take us from God the Creator, through spirits, the soul, the heavenly bodies, and the elements, by way of inanimate and liquid substances, human inventions in clothing, arms, printing, gunpowder, bells, and clocks, and on to monsters, plants, and animals, and, finally, man and woman.”243 Here we see the nature reflected in the commonplace book according to its Porphyrian division into genera. However, the melancholy commonplace book, if such a thing existed, would not organize its headings according to their essential differences, but through the similitudes of all things in the societas rerum. We would find headings of Transience, Decay, Mutability, and Vanity. Here lies a paradox: the apparent profundity of the melancholic passion finds its initial matter in the generic qualities of existence. It becomes vivid through its topical exploration of the similarities across the rhetorical genres surveyed above.

The habit of melancholy topics has a history, but it did not live its life mostly on the page. Therefore, the history I have told here is irreducibly speculative. Yet this is only to acknowledge what is common to many other intellectual histories. Insofar as “influence” still remains an explanans in many histories of ideas, we are stuck with stories of androgenesis, of men illuminating the minds of other men, each thought a development of inflection of another extant thought. Instead, I attempted to follow out suggestions within a largely pedagogical literature to illuminate certain features of melancholic rhetoric. If we only look to the many instances of rhetoric that have melancholic themes, we can only catalogue their themes. In the next chapter, I wish to show that these consistent themes across melancholic rhetoric were topical, commonplace resources that helped to organize and justify the melancholic passion as a mood, that is, a passion that does respond to a situation but to a quality of phenomena that is not apparent before

articulation. This mood was the starting point for a rhetorical elaboration of melancholic experience, one that would turn upon a distinctive form of perception: the emblematic.
In the previous chapter, I argued that the habits of humanist topics disassociated rhetorical practice from response to oratorical exigency. The melancholy topics became a mode of perceiving through similitude rather than essence. This developed into genres of a melancholy rhetoric, capable of discovering matter to justify melancholic passion without having to take its object as the cause of its passion. I focus on three genres that each build upon the next. First is the melancholy set-piece built out of melancholy commonplaces. As discussed in the previous chapter, the commonplaces were prepared passages used to amplify a speech, or, in the Renaissance, a written work. They are likened to “arms that must always be readied for some certain use, so that through them, whenever the situation [res] calls for it, they are put to use.”\(^{244}\) However, the melancholic’s “use” of the commonplaces was not to respond to the call of a situation but rather to identify a scene with their passion. This was a rhetorical elaboration: mood was articulated through the commonplace. The second genre looks to how melancholy rhetoric developed around a dual movement of dilating passion into mood and articulating mood through sense experienced as an emblem. The emblem book assisted in developing what I call the melancholic’s *emblematic perception*. This consisted in taking the sights of one’s environment and treating them as emblems. This meant to “place” them in one’s mind beneath the verbal articulation of one’s mood in a commonplace. This is a habit trained upon the immensely popular genre of the emblem book. The emblem was a motto or inscription associated with a picture printed beneath it. The significance

\(^{244}\) “Arma sunt haec quodammodo praeparanda semper, ut iis, cum res poscet, utare.” Quintilian, Institutio, 2.1.12.
of their relation was made explicit or riddled at by a prose or poetic passage that followed. This
same structure describes the subjective orientation of the melancholic rhetor. Finally, I look to a
third genre, the occasional meditation, in which the emblematic perception was developed into
both a prose genre and a form of melancholic activity, or “melancholizing.” In the meditation, the
emblematic mode of perception. is translated directly into the melancholic’s lived experience. In
each of these genres, the relation between mood and meaning is elaborated through the topical
techniques described in the previous chapter and so developed into a melancholy rhetoric. This
rhetoric constituted melancholy no longer as a problem of motive but as a mode of experience.

4.1 Melancholy as Mood

Before embarking on a description of the history of this rhetoric, I must first clarify my use
of the difference between “passion” and “mood.” According to Jonathan Flatley, a scholar of
melancholy in modernity, mood is itself objectless, but it creates an “affective atmosphere” in
which “intentions are formed, projects pursued, and particular affects attach to particular
objects.”245 In glossing Heidegger’s term “thrownness” (Befindlichkeit), Flatley argues that the
“sense of a situation” always takes the form of a mood or Stimmung.246 I do not disagree that in
phenomenological inquiry mood is the appearance to the subject of the situation. But this makes it
all the more striking that we can speak of a melancholic mood. I have argued in Chapter 1 that

246 Ibid., 20.
melancholy is precisely a problem of judging the relationship between affect, emotion, passion, and situation. If we take melancholy in this problematic sense, rather than as a shade of sadness, the articulation of a melancholic mood also appears as a problem. Melancholic passion, then, is not mood as attunement or Stimmung, but Verstimmung, an underdetermined ill-feeling or detunement. It is only through the mediation of a discourse that discovered a way to justify and articulate melancholic passion as capable of rediscovering its occasion everywhere that it became a mood.

Mood typically orients us towards objects as potentials for action. I will treat my friend, coming to the door unexpectedly, differently depending on whether I am calm or troubled. In this way, mood is a generalized and underdetermined motive that is specified when it approaches a situation. The melancholic mood differs in that it resists the situatedness of objects as real determinants of action. The objectless mood of melancholy discovers in the world not the objects of its passions, but objects for its passions. It must be equipped with a practice that can transform the objects of experience into an object of passion without asserting that they are the causes of the passion. In doing this, melancholic mood remains unique in its ability to stand aside from the typical function of mood in organizing and orienting motives and projects. Unlike the Heideggerian interpretation of Stimmung as the phenomenological orientation under which things are given to us, melancholic mood cannot be easily divided between what is given to the melancholic through feeling and what is made by the melancholic for feeling.

Where mood is extended through some period of time, affecting our perception of all that appears in the mood. The “aboutness” of discourse makes it incapable of simply transmitting mood even if it can communicate it obliquely. We infer someone’s mood as a pattern: when someone puckers their face at the suggestion of a dish, we may first think that it is not suited to their palette.
However, as every suggestion is rebuffed, we begin to infer that the person responds from a peevish mood. They are disinclined to any suggestion. Melancholic mood artificially, in the sense of artfully, recreates the general extension of mood. Its content is not limited to a specific set of objects but is a reflection upon the similitude of all things. The melancholic commonplaces were developed by the comparison of all things, not only two things.

The melancholy topics allow melancholic mood to come into consciousness even without an object, for it discovers in each object not its essence but a similitude.

In the second part of this chapter, I show how the development of the emblem genre inaugurated a form of perception that took the objects of sense as images of something insensible. I examine the topical practices supported the development of the emblem book proper and show how these were taken up in a new way through their instantiation within the melancholic commonplaces. This generated a distinctive seventeenth-century practice, the occasional meditation. I argue that this is the melancholic rhetoric par excellence in which motive is replaced by the elaboration of experience.

4.2 Melancholy Commonplace as Articulation of Mood

Having seen the way melancholy commonplaces were born out of topical habits in Chapter 2, we are now prepared to see them in use. Here, we turn again to Jaques and his famous speech on the seven ages of man. This speech weaves together many of the principal melancholy commonplaces. This speech is one of the “purple passages” of Shakespeare, precisely those that are often recited because they are able to be detached from the scene in which they were spoken. By exploding the speech from its purple passage eloquence and returning it to its commonplace
sources, we will see the function these commonplaces play on articulating and justifying melancholic passions. In doing so, we will be able to recognize how the melancholic’s inflection of topical habits become recognizable discursive patterns that constitute a rhetorical melancholic subjectivity.

Jaques’ soliloquy on the commonplace “All the world's a stage” is a melancholic adaptation of the *theatrum mundi* topos. Jaques walk through each of the “seven ages” is a meditation upon mutability; each age is as if it were a different part. This changes the familiar topos that we all play a part by emphasizing how even the individual moves through distinct roles. Each of the ages takes upon a new motive and goal of action, showing in this mutability of human life the vanity of all things. This plays upon the *omnia vanitas* topos. The final age is “second childishness and mere oblivion,” a clear reflection upon the decay that is our common fate. The “strange eventful history” that is a life ends “Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans every thing.” This is a *memento mori*, the call to remember death. I will move through each of the commonplaces of this speech, as if they were stations, contextualizing it in its commonplace character. Jaques' speech takes its central commonplace—All the world's a stage—from a long tradition but mints it into a new, melancholic mood through its elaboration. This commonplace, known by its Latin name *theatrum mundi*, has dominated interpretations of Jaques' speech and is in its own right one of the most studied literary commonplaces. Ernst Robert Curtius’ seminal work on this topic catalogues the most salient examples of its employment. Yet it is not immediately obvious why the *theatrum mundi* commonplace would be a melancholy topic. In its re-emergence in the medieval era, we find it in

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John of Salisbury's *Politicratus*, where he suggests that human life “resembles a tragedy more than a comedy since the exit from it is usually sad.” But Salisbury's point in the passage was that this was the tragic fate of tyrants who deserve their fall, an episode repeated time and again in the political history he was charting. We see the Baroque melancholy interpretation of this commonplace most fully in Pierre Boaistuau's *Theatrum Mundi* of 1558. Boaistuau describes the “theater” of his work as a “rapsodie, collation or a gathering together of divers authorities.” In this, we see that the theater is an imaginative redescription of the commonplace book itself. It is in this theatrical commonplace book that we are taken through the stages of worldly misery. We first see “thy selfe what thou art, and what miserable creatures are subject to: thou maist also see the misery of the Cleargie, of governors, and magistrates, of Judges, Lawyers, and Marchants, of fathers and mothers, from mans first conception to his last departure out of this miserable and transitory world.” Indeed, what we find in Boiaustau's second book is a collection of examples that show the “corruption of all estates.” This is loosely organized around the ages of life, showing the “vayne toyes and trifles children are subject unto,” through the “miseries of soldiers,” and those who “minister justice.” So we find Jaques' dilating upon the “whining schoolboy,” the “soldier,/Full of strange oaths and bearded like the pard,” and “the justice,/In fair round belly with good capon lined.” Jaques is reproducing for us the commonplace book of misery and vanity, as if reading aloud the index of Boiaustau's commonplace book.


250 Ibid., iii.v.

251 Ibid., epistle 2 [unpaginated in original].
The “exits and entrances” of the actors of the world opens the view of the melancholic onto the mutability of all humane things. The world is not a stage only when the play is on, but remains an empty stage before and after the actors play their part. This commonplace combines both a meditation on the mutability of life with an image of the empty world. Mutability or changeableness assigns to a thing a property of potential divergence from its own essence. The specific conditions of change under which we observe nature are not the concern, except as exempla to embellish the central theme of instability itself. What is crucial is the ability of this commonplace to serve as a filter of any experience: wherever one goes, the objects of experience can be considered under the heading of Mutability, and the commonplace can in turn be elaborated by discovering the distinct way in which this object suffers its changes. The commonplace serves to justify a melancholic passion and transform it into mood: the sadness of things passing changes its emotional tone when the specific object of loss is no longer declared to be its cause. A rotten apple is a practical inconvenience; under the melancholic gaze, it is transformed into an emblem for the contemplation of our common condition as perishable, changeable natures. So too, the entrances and exits of the characters in *As You Like It* take on a ghostly meaning after we hear Jaques' speech: their exit from the stage echoes our common exit from the world.

Whether meditative or admonitory, melancholic rhetoric emerged from the discovery of arguments against conventional motives. The objects of invectives against vanity were traditionally of a misogynistic bent. It is aligned with the mutability topic in its focus upon fashion. The melancholic turn to the vanity topos brought together the religious lamentations of Ecclesiastes with the disdain of the search for the novel, the luxurious, and, above all, the speciously permanent. It was in the elevation of the *omnia vanitas* that we can see the working of a melancholic commonplace, a mode for exercising the emblematic gaze through the capacity to
reduce anything to an object not worthy of pursuit. Ubiquitous to the theme was a verse from the Book of Ecclesiastes: “vanity of vanities, and all things are vanity” (*Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas.*) The authority of this line's presence in Scripture afforded those who wished to dilate upon it the safe haven of religious sanction, as when Robert Granger's 1621 commentary on Ecclesiastes promises that in its pages “the worlds vanity, and the true felicitie are plainely deciphered.” We find it again in Donne's “satyr” on the theme, adorned with the sententious epigram: “Vanitas vanitatum, & omnia vanitas./Vanity of vanity, and all is vanity.” The verse reads:

When *Solomon* had tried all variety  
Of mundane pleasures, ev'n to full satiety;  
And after throughly weigh'd the worlds condition,  
And therein mans: concludes with this Position,  
All that man can in this wide World inherit,  
Is vain, and but vexation of the spirit.²⁵²

Solomon was the purported author of Ecclesiastes, but here he is also the exemplary melancholic figure of the vanitas topos. He is at once known for a divinely opulence and wisdom. The *omnia vanitas* is then read as the utterance of a sated and wise king rather than the cynical motto of a marginalized prophet. This is followed by a couplet on the same theme—indeed, its title is “Of the same”: “The World's a Book, all Creatures are the Story./Wherein God reads dumb lectures of his glory.”²⁵³ Just as the *theatrum mundi* is like a melancholy commonplace book, the Book of Nature too shows us the silent meaning of the world, but here, the “dumb lecture” speaks of divine glory. At first this seems at odds with the notion of the world as “meer vacuity.”²⁵⁴ How is it that God's Creation is both a canticle of his glory and absolutely empty? But these are two

²⁵³ Ibid., 2.
²⁵⁴ Ibid.
moments of the same melancholic attitude, developed out of the topical reorganization of
significance from essence to similitude. The true significance of Creation is extrinsic to it. Its
nature is fallen, postlapsarian, and points only to its own mortality. The “meer vacuity” of the
world is the stage that remains once the players have played their parts. It is in the contemplation
of that in which we see the full stage, or the creature, in the character of its eventual “exit.”

*Life is vanity* is, of course, can be a religious lamentation or jeremiad against sinful action,
but it is also a redescription of communal action as a form of patience, an action-in-waiting whose
end is not its immediate effect but rather the development of a supramundane habit of feeling. If
all action is vanity, one must learn to act while at the same time distancing oneself from the
outcomes of action. The melancholic activity of recognizing, glossing, and criticizing motives
becomes a rhetorical activity that takes the place of conventional pursuits. This transforms the
motive of action from a pursuit of some outcome to a passionate exercise. The world is no longer
the site of action, but action is an apotropaic ritual against the growth of worldly passions. Pierre
Du Moulin, a Huguenot refugee in England, argues in his *Heraclitus* that “the surest for a man to
separate himselfe from the world, [is] not with his feete, but with his affection.”²⁵⁵ He compares
this to being “within a Court or Palace, spectator of vanity and troubles, without participating of
them; and in the middest of a babbling multitude, to talke only with himselfe, & to entertaine his
thoughts with God.”²⁵⁶ This recommendation seems at first to be for a haughty disdain, but Du
Moulin immediately qualifies it. In the “meane time”—that is, while alive—one should “implo

²⁵⁵ Pierre Du Moulin, *The Teares of Heraclitus, or, The Miserie of Mankinde: The Vanitie f this Life, nd the
Inconstancie of this World* (London : Printed for John Grismond, 1635), 63.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.
his indevors to the edification of the Church, stretching out his hand to the erroneous...rather then [sic] to hide his Talent in the earth, and to cut himselfe cleane off from the body, and all civill societie, as an unprofitable member."\textsuperscript{257} What allows for one to continue to be engaged in civic and ecclesiastical life while holding one's passion at a remove hinges upon the subtle redescription of time as "meane time." The very activity of elaborating one's sense-experience into emblematic significance became a kind of activity that both kept one's mind free from melancholic idleness and at the same time did not place its significance into an effect in the world. True or real satisfaction is impossible in life. Earthly, temporal events do not hold enough significance to remain distinct. Rather, significance falls within the practice of elaborating experience itself.

In his conclusion, Jaques becomes grave, for after the course of life has run, the "strange pageant" ends in "mere oblivion/Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything." We see in this rhetorical climax the melancholy commonplace of decay. This commonplace discovered a similitude in all mortal things. Any process, natural or historical, could then be apprehended through the commonplace of decay. The moving power of this commonplace was bolstered by a common belief that history was an active process of decay evident throughout the entire sublunary realm. The twentieth-century scholar Victor Harris noted that though this belief in the decay of the world had been inherited from the middle ages, in the 1570s and 1580s, "there grew up a more explicit concern over the progressive or cumulative corruption, over the decay that did not stop with the original supernatural curse."\textsuperscript{258} Godfrey Goodman's 1616 treatise, \textit{The Fall of Man, or}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{257} Ibid., 63-4.
\item \textsuperscript{258} Victor Harris, \textit{All Coherence Gone: A Study of the Seventeenth Century Controversy Over Disorder and Decay in the Universe} (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1966), 3-4.
\end{enumerate}
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the Corruption of Nature, “gave the doctrine its most consecutive and extensive philosophical form.”259 To Goodman, the “decay of the world and the miseries of man are not merely punishments; they are reminders, intended in the end to save men.”260 We discover in decaying matter a reflection of the topical *societas rerum*. Decay can be rediscovered as a topic in its myriad instances. The contemplation of dying plants, for instance, has an analogical structure, the familiar dialectical inference of whole from part: the “decay in the whole is derived from decay of the part, and death of the species from death of the individual.”261 In this meditation, we see Goodman reinserting decay throughout the dialectical topics branching off from the individual plant he contemplates. This is important because corruption is often insensible; “corruption, discernible by reason, is difficult to prove from observation.”262 Topical dilation allows us to understand decay sensibly and passionately while at the same time generalizing it. The inferential discovery of decay in all things depends upon elaborating moments of salience—decaying plants, fruit, one’s aging face—and thereby making decay a feature of all melancholy experience. In the melancholic's topicalized imagination nature itself is a *memento mori*.

Melancholy became the most intimate stamp of nature's ability to frustrate action, and thereby frustrate the conventional rhetorical strategy to place a decision in a particular narrative, complete with motive and effect. Melancholy shows us that we are not always the authors of our actions, as “sometimes the soule proues the mint of our actions, and brands them with her own stampe; and somtimes the bodie ouerrules the freedom of our wils, and beares the whole sway;

259 Ibid. 4.
260 Ibid., 19.
261 Ibid., 27.
262 Ibid., 29.
mores sequuntur humores.” If the soul was not divided between its rational and sensitive faculties, then “should there be no greater difficultie to cleanse the vncleane blood, to purge the grosse melancholie, then now we finde in taking away some spot or blemish from the outward skinne.” Unlike the rest of creation, we are not only corruptible in our matter but divided in our spirits. Even our joy is attended by the traces of natural corruption. We must make our music on “the guts of dead creatures, a token of his crueltie, and the remainder of his riot.” The decay of nature gives us those instruments with which we can please ourselves in “melancholie fits,” and to “take...recreation, temper...passions, and vse them as a meanes to kindle...deuotion.” Goodman does appeal to the Aristotelian conceit that the best wits should bee most subiect to these fits; and in the most noble and deepest vnunderstandings, you shall most easily discerne some tokens and signes of melancholie.” Yet this is not a distinct form of melancholy, but rather a reflection on the nature of melancholy passions. Since “it is not the flesh, but the mind which is capable of griefe and of sorrow,” the greater the capacity of one's mind the greater is the intensity of one's sadness. Whatever the mind conceives of as true “shee is alike affected therewith, as if they were true indeed.” The perspicaciousness of thought is also a liability.

I have just elaborated how the rhetorical practice of commonplacing was taken up by the melancholic as a mode of articulating melancholic passion into mood. Jaques' weaving together of a cento-poem of the melancholic commonplaces makes his speech into a condensed vision of the imaginative perspective that result from the melancholy topics. But this condensed vision is

263 Ibid., 40.
264 Ibid., 40-1.
265 Ibid., 78.
266 Ibid., 124.
threatened with the charge of being vapid: if it only grasps the general and common characteristics of things it is not inventive but reductive. Jaques’ speech is so often cited because, as mentioned above, it is able to be spoken on any occasion. This shows only the commonplace character of melancholy rhetoric that create a mood. But melancholic rhetoric did not cease with the commonplaces. The commonplace mood of the melancholic could then be further articulated into the sensible and richly passionate language by elaborating and articulating itself through the particular and detailed objects of personal experience. The most inventive and powerful of the methods of joining mood to matter was developed out of the genre of the emblem that taught the melancholic how to relate a commonplace with an image.

4.3 Emblematic Perception

In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that the fully elaborated melancholic rhetoric was characterized by what I call *emblematic perception*. Emblems are complex objects, combining image, thought, and significance into a single work. Though, as we shall see, the emblem genre emerged in its principal form through the medium of print, it was also a practice that could be brought into one’s real experience. We see such a practice in Jaques’ musings upon the wounded stag that opened the previous chapter. As described at length in an article by Michael Bath, this was an image that would have been familiar to the audience as a common entry in an emblem book.267 Jaques, by taking what he sees before him as an emblem, is able to turn it into a “thousand

similes.” In his emblematic perception, the topical similitude and the melancholic commonplaces are united, as each similitude becomes a gloss upon the common sadness of all things. The *societas rerum* becomes the passionate commonplace book of the *theatrum mundi*, in which all of its entries are emblems.

I take the development of emblematic perception in the strong sense—it is the habit of perception that developed from the reading of emblem books. The first emblem book was Alciatus’ *Emblematum liber* and it was soon followed by many imitations. Emblems were often drawn out of material of commonplace books, and in some cases, printed commonplace books borrowed material directly out of emblem books. The *Emblematum liber*’s status as a kind of commonplace book was reinforced in its 1551 edition, where the emblems were arranged under topical headings. The reader could take “from the book of emblems, as from the best stocked storehouse, whatever he needs to inscribe and decorate the walls of his house, the glass of his windows, his wall-hangings, curtains and panels, his tableware, his seals, signet-rings, clothing, tables, bed-posts and weapons, his sword and all his house.” In the preface, Alciatus wrote that “just as one can fasten trimmings on to clothing and badges on to hats, so must each of us be able to write on dumb signs.” The ability to see emblematically relied upon the topical habit of picking out common characteristics of things. Like the habits of commonplacing, the emblematic

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269 Ibid., 35.


271 Ibid., 242.
perspective was an attempt to extract the “honey” of lettered experience and to preserve it in some form. Alciatus, the founder of the genre, wrote that he wished his emblems to depict “that fine something which is expressed from history or nature [quod ex historia, vel ex rebus naturalibus aliquid elegans significet].”\textsuperscript{272} The undetermined nature of the aliquid that emblem could express made it ideal for the elaboration of the melancholic passion, unmoored to the determination of a discrete object.

Where Agricola, Erasmus, and other humanists had described practices of copia as storehouses or reservoirs of potential meaning that were preparation for reembedding into situations, the emblem made these reservoirs of meaning their content. The emblem's removal from situated purposes made it perfectly suited for the elaboration of a melancholic passion whose occasion was not apparent. Jaques' “moralizing” must be recognized in this way: he looks at what is before him as itself an emblem. Emblem books were a prolific genre, with “well over six hundred authors” having produced “in excess of two thousand titles, which in turn represents tens of thousands of individual emblems.”\textsuperscript{273} Of course, there was some variation in the form of the emblem across this vast literature, but it was for this remarkably consistent. In almost all examples, the emblem had three parts: an inscription, a heading, often a sententia, the pictura, an image, often printed in a cartouche, and the subscriptio, an illumination of the significance of the emblem, often in the form of a quatrain. According to Bohuslav Balbin in his Verisimilia humaniorum Disciplinarum, the emblem was a “sententia, expressed through a picture, pertaining to the morals

\textsuperscript{272} Qtd. in Peter Daly, \textit{Emblem Theory: Recent German Contributions to the Characterization of the Emblem Genre} (Nendeln/Liechtenstein: KTO Press, 1979), 36.

\textsuperscript{273} Ibid., 11.
and life of men.” Balbin goes through several subgenres of emblems but excludes what others call “Ethical Emblems” because an ethical direction is present in all emblems. The inscriptiones of the emblems were often culled from those same sententiae that peppered the commonplace books. Sometimes this was done in a way that resembled those florilegia that collected lines from a single author, as in Otto van Haen's Moralia Horatiana. Sometimes they were organized topically. But the sententia is imagined here differently than in Erasmus. Rather than re-embedding the phrase into a context of use, the sentence becomes the germ for its own setting, an allegory for contemplation, in the emblem book. This is not to say that emblems themselves did not have uses; they were very important in jurisprudence, for instance. Nevertheless, the residue of the allegorical image now hangs upon the sentence in a way that refers us back to a scene that is not the scene of life.

Rather than drawing a sententia from one's commonplace book as a learned old saw to quote, the emblem inscribes the sententia into an image. This is a pivot between the proverb as a wisdom of an earlier and revered age and the sententia as the pith of meaning within a phenomenon whose essence is recruited into a similitude. The “first consideration” for preserving a sententia is that it comes to us from the “age of Saturn.”²⁷⁴ It is not difficult to imagine a taste developing for the excerpted, suggestive sententiae in these collections. Erasmus described the collections of adagia, parables, and sententiae he himself recommended as being “frozen when disjoined.”²⁷⁵ Erasmus meant this clearly in a negative sense. However, the “frozen” quality of these collections

²⁷⁴ “Iam hic igitur primus esto calculus, rerum ipsarum antiquitas, non ab Evandro, aut Aboriginibus,...sed ab ipso usque Saturni seculo, & si quid est hoc etiam antiquius, repetita.” Erasmus, Opera Omnia, 2.710.C-D.
²⁷⁵ “Separata frigent, ac minutula leviaque quaepiam esse videntur.” Ibid., 2.712.A.
of *sententiae* allowed for a kind of ageless contemplation of their meanings, a method for exploring the suggestibility of particular phrases that came, per Erasmus' suggestions, as if from the “age of Saturn.” In this respect, the commonplace book was almost, if not quite, a work of literature itself. It would find its literary expression, almost by accident, in the emblem book. The emblem books offered a distinctive “setting” of the stony sayings, apotheosizing their frozen character into the status of a hieroglyph.

The Renaissance, and especially the Baroque, emblem, by contrast, was “without apparent occasion.” Here, we must put the emphasis on apparent, since the emblem pointed to a significance that extended beyond what it depicted. A line from Alciatus’ 1530 work, *De verborum significatione*, provides a key to the inversion of the theory of meaning that melancholic rhetoric would adopt from the emblem. According to Quintilian, the *res* is “what is signified” [*quae significantur*] and *verba* “what signifies” [*quae significant*]. He writes: “Words signify, things are signified. Nevertheless even things sometimes signify, like the hieroglyphics in Horus and Chaeremon, on which we composed a little book of verse with the title *Emblemata.*”276 Things, as we discover in the topical literature, cannot refer to themselves. Insofar as a *res* becomes a *res significans*,277 its reference cannot be found in its definition, but rather in that broader orbit of its applicitia—it achieves a claim to truth not from its existence but from its appearance. As appearance, nature can take on the character of a similitude, an index that points from the appearance of beings to an invisible significance. Quintilian imagined the “emblematic” use of

276 “Verbum significant, res significantur. Tametsi et res quandoque etiam significant, ut hieroglyphica apud Horum et Chaeremonem, cuius argumenti et nos carmine libellum composuimus, cui titules est Emblemata.” Ibid.

277 Although Michael Bath calls this phrase, coined by Schöne, “quasi-historical,” I use it to refer back to the conceit expressed by Alciatus in his *De verborum significatione* discussed above.
loci communes as carefully prepared speeches that were at once ornamental and to be employed by an orator upon an occasion. He remarks that some orators had “certain writings, that is loci, committed most diligently to memory,” so that “they had “spontaneous” speeches ready, as the occasion might arise, as if they adorned it with emblems (emblematibus).”²⁷⁸ This passage comes shortly after Quintilian introduces the idea of loci communes. However, the emblems were enjoyed as collections, that is, before they were “inserted” into some other discourse or embossed on a shield.

The disarticulation of emblem from situation is supported by its etymology—from the Greek through Latin—as a removable piece of inlaid ornamentation. In Cicero's In Verrem, we hear a description of Verres' tearing emblema from a silver goblet at a feast and then establishing a shop where they were reset into gold goblets for sale, giving us the sense of a figural ornament that can be detached from its setting. Alciatus imagined his work as having some literal application to the creation of ornaments, giving “in each separate epigram a description of something, such that it signifies something pleasant taken from history or from nature, after which painters, goldsmiths and founders can fashion objects which we call badges and which we fasten on our hats, or else bear as trade-marks, such as the anchor of Aldus, the dove of Froben and the elephant of Calvo, which carries its young for so long without giving birth.”²⁷⁹ This sense of the emblem was widely repeated by its Renaissance and Baroque theorists. One writer defines it as a “Picture worke of wood, stone, or metall, finelie set or painted in divers colours, as in chess-bourdes and

²⁷⁸ “Quidam…scriptos eos (scilicet locos) memoriaeque diligentissime mandatos, impromptu habuerunt, ut quoties esset occasio, extemporales eorum dictiones, his, velut Emblematibus exornarentur.” Quintilian, Institutio, 2.4.27.

²⁷⁹ Qtd. in Miedelma, “The Term Emblema,” 236.
tables: small images, flowers, or like ornamentes set on plate, or other thing by a vice, to take off, and put on when we will.” These aspects of the etymological meaning of emblem—pictural, ornamental, and detachable—were fundamental to the view of the uses of the emblem proper.

The emblem consisted of three parts: inscription, picture, and subscriptio, a verse or prose elaboration of the meaning of the emblem. Ideally, all three parts of the emblem participate in a “mutual elucidation.”\(^ {280} \) The “res picta of the emblem is endowed with the power to refer beyond itself” as a “res significans.”\(^ {281} \) It is precisely this “beyond” that we must uncover. It is a semantic realm: the emblem's significance is able to be rediscovered in other contexts, and in that way, it is what lies beyond the appearances of a moral embedded in circumstances. The “beyond” of the emblem identifies a moral and semantic realm. The potential relevance of an emblem as a gloss upon an indefinite number of situations is also the guarantor of its moral stature. The repeated figures of the emblem—its floating hands, robed women, lyres, pelicans, lions—are only one part of an allegory. That is, as individual elements they represent generic characteristics of truth that are recombined time and again into new emblematic configurations. Images give a specification to the emblem's meaning wholly distinct from that of exempla, those moral histories in which individuals give instances of past embodiments of virtue or vice, of fortune or failure. As one Baroque theorist put it, “the course and nature of the contemporary world is depicted in a veiled manner by special figures,/and explained in accompanying rhymes.”\(^ {282} \) What is veiled here is of course not the image—this is made manifest. Rather, the image is the res significans of another

\(^{280}\) Daly, Emblem Theory, 22.

\(^{281}\) Ibid., 24.

\(^{282}\) Qtd. in Daly, Emblem Theory, 28.
thing, one which is not apparent and cannot be made to appear. For this reason, it must be intuited from seeing the emblem image under the inscription of a *sententia* that turns its salient meaning away from what it is to what it is like.

In order to see how the emblem became a genre uniquely suited to the melancholic critique of motives, it is instructive to compare it with its close cousin, the impresa, that was used to communicate a personal motive. Indeed, much of the Renaissance theory of the emblem was drawn initially from writings on the impresa. It differed from the emblem in two important ways. First, the impresa was similar to the emblem in form, with a motto and picture, though typically without an explicative *scriptio*. Its first and most notable theorist, Paolo Giovo, wrote a dialogue on the subject. He set forth rules for the *impresa*, the first of which was that there should be a “just proportion of body and soule,” that is, between picture and motto respectively. This analogy became a commonplace within theories of the impresa and emblem, though often slightly modified to account for the emblem’s addition of a *scriptio*. The Italian epic poet Tasso argued that the emblem had two souls, “an organic soul (which is provided by the painter) and a rational soul

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283 There remains a debate within emblem scholarship on the nature of the difference between emblem and impresa in various periods and across practices. I follow Daly's lead who sees the “basic difference” as “one of purpose.” The impresa is the expression of an individual's personal “undertaking” or reigning motive. The emblem, by contrast, is “addressed to a larger audience,” and, I might add, tends to trouble the very orientation towards personal “undertakings” implied by the form of the *impresa*. See Peter Daly, *Literature in Light of the Emblem* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1979), 28-30. At least one seventeenth-century example (Rollenhagen) takes the terms as synonymous, the *impresa* only being the more Italianate term.

(bestowed by the poet)." Where the impresa offered a suggestion of significance around which a private sense might evolve, the emblem took its materials in order to show the significance of something otherwise unable to be communicated. The impresa's enigma was coy where the emblem's was sacred. Second, the impresa or “devise” was a means for communicating the passions and motives of its bearer. It had the etymological significance of “an undertaking, enterprise, or intention,” and its use in heraldic imagery and on weaponry lent it a courtly or martial significance. It was explicitly linked to the human ability to “communicate and understand each others [sic] will.” The “devise” was held above all other “externall wayes of expressing our conceptions, be it by word, sentence, or gesture;” in its ability to show “all the motions of their soule; their hopes, feares, doubts, disdaines, affrights, anger, pleasure and joyes, anguishes and sorrowes, hatred and love, desires and other heart-possessing passions.” Indeed, the device's purpose was to “declare the humour or inclination of him that bears it.” If the emblem is distinct from the impresa in that it does not express a personal humor but rather points to a *sententia*, an impersonal statement that is represented as a natural or hieroglyphic revelation, the passion it communicates should also seem impersonal, as if it is the passion of nature itself. Where the impresa communicates an intention for action, the emblem invites the reader-viewer to participate in a passion.


288 Ibid., 14-15.
While certain emblems were also appropriated for these uses, the emblem book lent itself more to the contemplative purposes of the melancholic. Samuel Daniell, one of Giovio's English translators, added his own set of five rules, the third being that the “mot [viz. motto] be taken out of some famous author,” linking the impresa to the humanist facility with excerpting *sententiae.*

Another writer on *imprese,* Henri Estienne, defined the Enigma as “an obscure sentence, expressed by an occult similitude of things.” The Emblem, in turn, has an “affinity with the *Aenigma,*** and differs from it in that “drawing (as it were) the Curtaine from before the *Aenigma,* it declares the matter more plainly.” What does it mean that an emblem is a plainly-stated enigma? What can we make of this oxymoronic definition?

The enigma of the emblem depended upon its “hieroglyphic” character. The hieroglyph was something that at once both communicated and concealed. Horapollo's *Hieroglyphica* was the primary humanist source for knowledge of and speculation on hieroglyphics. Its 1517 appearance in a Latin translation by Ficino made it even more widely accessible. But the historical and philological work was less significant to the development of the emblem genre than, for instance, Ficino's sense of their occult meaning. In his commentary on Plotinus, we find a notion of them as the form of knowledge held by God, “not of a manifold working-out of the thing but as its simple

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289 Giovio, *Worthy Tract,* A.vii.r. However, it has been noted by Katherine Duncan-Jones that the prefatory epistles are far from original to Daniel, but are rather respectively “a mosaic of quotations from Ruscelli’s *Discorso,* appended to Giovio's work as early as 1555; and...a translation of about two thirds of the *Ragionamento* by Domenichi first appended to Giovio in a separate edition in the same year, and of three devices by Symeoni, whose devices together with those of Domenichi were combined with Giovio's.” See her “Two Elizabethan versions of a treatise on *imprese,*” *English Studies* 52 (1-6), 122.
and lasting appearance.” Symbols are knowledge of this place, or locus, and Hieroglyphics a sacred and chiseled form of this knowledge. The hieroglyphic was often a shorthand for pointing to a particular character of meaning, namely, “an old conception of language as participating in the reality which it expresses or refers to,” (une conception vieille du langage comme participant à la réalité qu’il exprime ou indique). Klibansky, Saxl, and Panofsky claim the early modern melancholic suffered primarily “from the contradiction between time and infinity, while at the same time giving a positive value to his own sorrow “sub specie aeternitatis” since he feels that through his very melancholy he has a share in eternity.” The emblematic res significans, poised between its natural morality and its eternal significance, was peculiarly apt for use in elaborating melancholic passions.

The humanist topics and the conceit of the emblem as hieroglyph held in common the theory of natural similitude. It was thought that in every emblem there is a comparison or a similitude. When combined with the motto or inscriptio of the emblem, we see the unity between the Erasmian excerpting of sententiae and the topical argument from natural similitude. Balbin argued that the emblem had the structure of a complex sentence, comparing the inscriptio and picture to the protasis and its explication in the subscriptio to the apodosis. He gives the example of an emblem with the inscriptio Flight is our victory (fuga est nostra victoria) and a picture of a Parthian, in flight, wounding an enemy. Parthians were famous for firing archer's volleys during horse-mounted retreats. Balbin glosses the emblem through a surprising similitude: “Just as a

290 “Deus scientiam habet non tanquam excogitationem de re multiplicem, sed tamquam simplicem firmamque rei formam.” Marsilio Ficino, Opera Omnia, ed. Oskar Kristeller (Turin: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1959), 1011.


292 Klibansky et. al., Saturn and Melancholy, 234-5.
Parthian, when he flees, wounds and overcomes his enemy (this is the Protasis), thus I, by fleeing, will triumph over my desire (voluptatem) (this is the Apodosis).” This is precisely an inversion of the traditional view of passions as motives, where we fear what we flee and pursue what we desire. In Balbin's example, we see an instance of how the emblematic subscriptio realigns the conventional system of motives to a passionate and contemplative register by an allegorical reorientation of the direction of the passion. Here, desire is not the passion but instead is made into an image. As an image, it can become the object of an emblematic reflection around which a passion can grow. Insofar as desire is made an emblem, one is able to be moved against it.

If the essence of things was articulated through their difference, their moral character was discovered through similitude. In emblematic perception, one does not seek the meaning of the object of experience, but instead this object becomes an illumination of the significance of something that is unable to enter into experience. Where knowledge looks to know the proprium of its object, the emblematic perspective takes the accidents of the object of experience as copia for the elaboration of a significance of something else. The topicalization of the societas rerum as a weave of res significantes was particularly rich for the making of emblems. Benjamin held as an essential characteristic of the German Trauerspiel, which he called the “the antinomies of the allegorical” (die Antinomien des Allegorischen), namely, that “any person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely anything else.” If this makes allegory appear arbitrary, we must recall that the meaning of things is not here to be taken in the sense of their definition, but

293 “Jede Person, jedwedes Ding, jedes Verhältnis kann ein beliebiges anderes bedeuten.” Benjamin, Origin, 175.
rather of their significance. Because similitude allows us to illuminate anything by the light of any other thing, the melancholic's allegorical weave of experience is truly infinite in its matter.

The vatic or prophetic character of the emblem emerges from the impersonality of the supposed speaker of the utterance that comes, artificially of course, from nowhere and from everywhere. It is this character that made it a vehicle for melancholic passions. By making the motto an inscription for a natural scene, “the appeal which humanist writers continually make to proverbs, maxims, and received authorities has to be seen as a process of naturalisation, and for this reason they frequently claim for their emblems the authority of hieroglyphs as a natural language.”

The inscriptio points to its pictura, charging it with the significance not of a merely witty rebus that must be deciphered but instead as a sacred character whose significance cannot be fully exhausted. The inexhaustibility of the emblem's significance comes, once again, from the topical flit of similitudes sensed by the acute reader-viewer. This then appeared as a discovery of a condensed mystery that the mind was attempting to decipher, just as the hieroglyph appeared as a communication of ancient wisdom, handed down across time. As Estienne had it, “Symboles and Aenigmas... serve as a Rind or Bark to conserve all the mysteries of our Ancestors wisdome.” These contained the “grave and serious mysteries as well of the faculty of Theologie as of Phisiologie and Policy.” The divine mysteries of nature are only available in sparks because of the fallen nature of the intellect. The hieroglyphs themselves are imperfect attempts to preserve a meaning that was originally part of the divine Word, as when these were first set before

294 Bath, Speaking Pictures, 6.
295 Estienne, The Art, 2.
296 Ibid., 3.
the eyes of Adam and Eve in Eden in the form of “living creatures... whence men might perceive, as through the traverse of a Cloud, the insupportable rayes of his Divine Majesty.” The supposed difference between the natural and hieroglyphic emblem is belied by this analogy between sacred writing and the creature as a form of God's writing. The Hebrew people, the special guardians of divine revelation, reflected their understanding by writing in “Characters” that shone like the objects which the Patriarchs saw illuminated by divine splendor. For this reason, they preferred to communicate in “Parables and Similitudes.” The divine power that is contained in the emblem is then comparable to the science of hieroglyphics that “illuminated the understandings of those who studied it, by expelling those shades of darknesse occurring in the Meanders and ambiguities of so great diversity of things, to conduct them to: perfect and true knowledge of their Characters.” Here the cool, windy plain of mental contemplation of nature is given a moral significance that emerges, on its occasion, with a different, more intense passion. By setting the reader of the emblem book into a contemplative, hieroglyphic mood, its moral maxims were transformed from clichés to oracles.

Here we might examine a few emblems that exemplify the problematizing of motives. The first comes from a 1624 collection by the Dutch writer Otto van Veen. Its inscriptio is *Humana cuncta vanitas*.

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297 Ibid., 2.
298 Ibid., 3.
299 Ibid.
All exterior things, like realms, victories, honors, loves, money, are sheer vanity, meaning nothing more to us than bubbles, depicted between the crown with its scepter, the laurel and palm, the bow of cupid, and moneybags.\footnote{Externa quaeque id est regna, victorias, honores, amores, pecunias, meram esse vanitatem, nobis significant bullae, inter coronam cum sceptro, lauream, palmam, arcum cupidinis, & loculos depictae. Otto van Veen, Emblemata, siue symbola a principibus, viris ecclesiasticis, ac militari\textit{bus}, alijsque usurpanda (Bruxellæ: ex officina Huberti Antonii, 1624), 5.}
Figure 7 — “Humana cuncta vanitas” from the Emblemata of Otto van Deen, 1624

Courtesy of the Emblematica Online Digital Collection and The Rare Book & Manuscript Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
This emblem plays upon a proverb in Erasmus' *Adagia*, *homo bulla*, man is but a bubble. The accompanying essay on this theme collects the variations on the sentiment in various authors as it typical of the work, but it concludes with an encomium disguised as lamentation on the late Archduke of Austria, Phillip, son of Emperor Maximilian. After praising him in through all the encomiastic topics, we learn that “no one mortal, though he be a neighbor to the very stars, is anything but a bubble.”\textsuperscript{301} The emblem's rhetoric shifts the meaning. Whereas Erasmus' encomium of Philip lamented the death of a great man, the emblem looks askance at any valorization of worldly pursuits. With the convention against the direct representation of the human, we instead gaze upon the “effects” of unrepresented persons—a crown, purses, laurels. These are the objects of all earthly passions, floating next to the bubbles with which they share an essential brevity. The vanity is not exemplified by some historical individual's loss, but rather the floating detritus of all historical action. Here we see the bubble topos, a commonplace of melancholic mood, absorbed within emblematic works as an element of the *pictura*. The interspersing of bubbles among the conventional objects of motives makes this emblem a highly condensed visual representation of the relation between melancholic mood and the critique of motives. While each of the objects of desire appear distinct, the melancholic interpolation of the “bubble” between each of these highlights their similitude of transience rather than their distinct essences.

Like in the image of the bubble across, melancholy commonplaces took on new dimensions of meaning as they were articulated in visual form. We see the *omnia vanitas* and *theatrum mundi* commonplaces brought together in a unique was by Francis Quarles, a preeminent English emblem

\textsuperscript{301} “[N]eminem esse mortalem usque adeo coelistibus vicinum, quin bulla est.” Erasmus, *Opera omnia*, 2.502f-503a.
writer. His sixth emblem's *inscriptio* is *In cruce tuta quies*—In the cross there is quiet repose. The picture shows a haloed cupid running towards the world, commonly represented in the emblem literature as a banded golden ball topped by a cross, that has fallen upon the table. The arms of the cross have prevented it from falling off, acting as a stop. On the facing page are stanzas of English verse, prefaced by a line of Scripture, Ecclesiastes 2:17, “All is vanity and vexation of the spirit.” The stanzas criticize those “befool'd...in desire,” the “studied plots of wit,” the possession of pleasure, honor, and wealth, all of which fail to “bring rest,” as the coda of each stanza tells us in turn. The final stanza returns us to the conceit in the image: “That fond breast/That is possess'd/Of Earth without a cross, has Earth without a rest.” An epigram also makes use of the image's logic. Whoever embraces the world sees it from behind, not knowing “the best end of what ye hugg's a cross.” Cupid is all desire, running to grasp the things of the world but failing to see what supports them.
Figure 8 — “In cruce tuta quies” from Quarles’ *Emblems, divine and moral*

Courtesy of the Emblematica Online Digital Collection and The Rare Book & Manuscript Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
In religious and devotional emblem books, the emblems become like stations, not of Christ's passion, but the reader's own. I do not draw this allusion to Catholic practice capriciously: many produced by English and continental Jesuits introduced an image of the heart into emblematic *pictura* as a leitmotif that connected the emblems into a sequence. The heart is the seat of the passions. Here, it also symbolizes the passion of the reader that moves between each emblem, finding itself under a new modulation in each image. An English vernacular example, Christopher Harvey's *Schola Cordis* [*School of the Heart*], is derivative of van Haeften's work of the same name, borrowing its plates and much of its order. The book is an ordered series of allegorical scenes in which we witness the heart's descent into the world, its tribulations, and, at last, its return to God. We begin with the “infection” of the heart in Eden, and proceed through its removal, its darkness, its flight, vanity, and so on. In the fourth emblem on the Vanity of the Heart, we see a demon pumping bellows into a heart. Escaping from its valve at the top are vapors filled with images of vain desires—a battle standard for martial glory, a crown for power, a fiddle for pleasure, and the world itself. We see too bubbles, the icon of vanity in the light of human life's brevity. This echoes a sentiment we find elsewhere, as in Jaques Abbadie's treatise discussed above, where he says that the virtuous man “sees not by his Heart, which sends into the uppermost parts of our Soul continual Clouds, which darken the Understanding.”

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the obscurities of a lower faculty, the Heart, may affect the reigning part, the Understanding, requires a way of imagining a diffuse effect.
Figure 9 — "Doctor Panurgus", curing the folly of his patients by purgative medicines and chemical cures, attributed to Michael Droeshout. Courtesy of the Wellcome Collection under a Creative Commons BY license.
Figure 10 — Engraving by Peter Rollos from *Le Centre de L’Amour*, c. 1630/1687
Figure 11 — “Stultorum medicus” (Doctor of fools) from Proscenium vitae humanae, 1627

Courtesy of the Emblematica Online Digital Collection and The Rare Book & Manuscript Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Figure 12 — Detail from the frontispiece of *Microcosmus Hypochondriacus*, 1651

Courtesy of the [Wellcome Collection](https://wellcomecollection.org) under a [Creative Commons BY](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) license.
Significantly, this iconographic topos of the images in vapors is an inversion of a common way of depicting melancholic fears and their potentially demonic sources. Michael Droueshot's satirical print, “Doctor Panurgus” curing the folly of his patients, shows the purging of a “gallant's” brain by placing him in the furnace. The smoke rising from it shows the phantasms that were the source of his illness. The witty verse on the print tells us that he was made mad “by crotchets” and we see crochet and other past-time activities floating in the cloud of smoke. This print and others like it show the iconographic conceit of the “cure of phantasms.” In the medical theory of the time, the imagination produced the objects of the passion, whether they be things desired or things feared. The matter out of which the images were formed came from the refinement of the blood into animal spirits. In melancholy, black bile corrupted these spirits, making them dark and producing fearful images. It was in this way, too, that demonic melancholy might be produced, as demons were believed to have the power to act upon the humors and spirits of the body. The demon would introduce a darkened spirit of vapor into the body of the melancholic in order to produce imaginative errors, resulting in excessive fear. We see this illustrated on the frontispiece to a medical text on hypochondriacal melancholy: the demon blows a corrupted vapor into the ear of the afflicted while the doctor prepares a remedy. At the same time, Harvey's vision of the heart's spiritual purification inverts the significance of melancholic passions. The remedy to the vain heart's flight from God begins with the reversio cordis, the heart's turn back to its source. The beginning of this process is dramatized as a dialogue between the Soul and Christ. The Soul senses its sinful condition and describes its response: “My trembling heart shakes with continuall feare/My frantick passions fill my mind with madness/My windy thoughts with pride are tympaniz'd.” The heart's error and indulgence into vanity is again described in terms
of melancholic symptomology. The “windy thoughts” are those image-filled vapors we observed in the *Vanitas Cordis* (Fig. 13).
Figure 13 — “Cordis Vanitas” from Harvey’s Schola Cordis

Courtesy of the Emblematica Online Digital Collection and Bibliothek der Herzog August Bibliothek.
The emblematic picture of the heart's vanity, then, merges two iconographical conceits to form a new argument concerning the status of the passions. The “gallant's wit” is infected with vanities, but we see this infection happening through a demonic channel of poisoned pneumatic winds. However, unlike the melancholic symptomology which produces images to be feared, here we see the demon producing the images of desire. It is not the melancholic who is infected but rather the man of the world whose desires maintain him in worldly pursuits.

Insofar as all motives were understood to be turn upon aversion from or attachment to a mental image, the emblematic shift of the image's significance allowed for it to become a practice in the reorientation of motive. If every motive is organized around a mental phantasm which I either fear or desire, I am able to change my own motive by relating to this phantasm not as the thing-itself, but as an emblem. One takes the mental image and assigns it a motto, attaching to it not the passion of movement towards it as an object of desire, but letting it become a res significans whose properties become a similitude for a spiritual motive, an ascent towards the supramundane.

Emblematic contemplation was a topical immersion to discover matter for a passion without an object. At the end of his work, Harvey returns us to the notion of the emblem book as a “school of the heart.” It is through the passions that God himself instructs us in a spiritual trivium: “My Hearts my Prayer-book, in which he writes/Systems of all the Arts and Faculties/First reads to me, then makes me exercise,/But all in paradoxes, such high strains,/As flow from none but love Inspired Brains.” He concludes the book with three poems, one for each branch of the trivium: the grammar, rhetoric, and logic of the heart. The “Logick of the Heart” is left for last. The methods of dialectical invention have become resources for a spiritual, passionate inventio in

303 Harvey, *School of the Heart*, 191.
which we are “to find what terms/My Lord and I stand in.” This is no longer a discovery of arguments, but an inquiry into and discipline of motive, for “[w]hen to dispute and argue's out of Season/Then to believe and to obey is Reason.” Let us recall that Luther had said that the melancholic hears and sees nothing while others are “speaking, drinking, coming or going,” that is, engaged in the affairs of the world. Instead, what Luther had described as the pathological cause of this distance, where the “thoughts of the heart [cordis cogitationes] have been drawn away from the senses,”304 is reconfigu rised as the desideratum of a spiritual practice.

Emblematic perception extended past the emblem book into other forms of pictorial representation. The still life in general and the vanitas in particular was “a variation on those emblematic images which convey a message as if they were a text within reality.”305 The still life resembles the emblem in its “symbolic allusions, hidden symbolicity, frozenness in time, absence of narrativity and vaguely enigmatic character that calls for or even demands an explication and, therefore, a text,” while it differs from the emblem in its “realism and through its inscription onto the lived reality of the everyday world.”306 Yet this very difference serves to heighten the effect of


306 “D’une part, la nature morte ressemble à l’emblème par ses allusions symboliques, par sa « symbolique cachée » comme on dit parfois, par son immobilité dans le temps, par son absence de narrativité et par son côté vaguement énigmatique qui appelle, ou même exige une explication et par conséquent un texte. Mais elle diffère de l’emblème par son réalisme et par sa pleine inscription dans la réalité vécue du monde quotidien, alors que la pictura
emblematic perception, not only by attesting to its ability to move across the things of the world in experience, uncovering them as emblems, but also intensifying the emotional effect of emblematic meditation. The greater vividness that the painting offers pulls upon the tension between the res significans and the details of the real object. These details call to be placed within the metaphorical weave of the meditation, giving the suggestion of meditation's infinite quality of potential extrapolation. This gave rise to a feeling of reading out the hieroglyphs of God. The infinite extension of significance in hieroglyphic deciphering was both represented and felt in the contrast between explicit, verbal meditation and the grained texture of perception that was not—yet—brought into the full significance of the meditation.

Evert Collier's *Still Life with a Volume of Wither's 'Emblemes'* (Fig. 14) shows the relation between the emblem-genre and the reflection upon melancholy commonplaces. Collier lived in England from 1693 until his death in 1708. He made his name through trompe l'oeil and vanitas paintings. In his painting, the composition invites us to emblematic reflection. The objects, a composite of the topics of English Baroque melancholy, are set within a real space. It is an interior, perhaps with a window—its light does not reach the deep background—off to the viewer's left side. The “real” relations between these objects as physical, their points of contact and overlap, are haunted by another set of relations, their meanings. The presence of Wither's emblem book gives an unsubtle hint, one that other painters of the genre would leave unstated: we are to read these objects as emblems. (Perhaps the later date of the painting, 1696, called for reminding...
viewers of this convention that had been tacitly present since the 1620s.) As we have seen, though its practices emerged from humanist dialectic and rhetoric, now its concern with verbal copiousness is all but implicit, having been absorbed into the habits of perception and experience, captured in a still life.
Figure 14 — Still Life With a Volume of Wither’s ‘Emblemes’, 1696

Courtesy of Tate Galleries under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND (3.0 Unported)
4.4 The Occasional Meditation

The topicalization of reflective experience changed the nature of the 'occasion' itself, turning it away from the public event to the private observation. Whereas Harvey's *School of the Heart* sets out the allegory of the rightful exercise of the passions against worldly motives, we discover a fuller sense of its practical application in the popular seventeenth-century genre of the "occasional meditation." The occasional meditation turned the dialectical ability to speak upon any topic into a habit of being able to meditate upon any experience. It was "inspired by 'outward occurrences, accidents or random ideas." Peter Daly has called the occasional meditation "emblematic poetry." However, they "dispense with the printed picture," and take their visual element from perception itself. 307 The melancholic passion is at once not bound to the occasion in that it perdures beyond the specificity of emotional response required in the complexities of social life, but also in that it can take form around almost any fragment of experience. 308 Michael Bath distinguishes two varieties, "the unfolded aphorism and the meditation on the creatures," with clear echoes of the humanist practice of writing upon collected *sententiae* or *adagia* and the topicalization of nature in the emblem form, respectively. 309 The meditation beginning from a *sententia* is a development of a literary culture that had developed in the wake of the Erasmian commonplacing techniques. The material collected under the *loci communes* could be woven together into a discourse of its own. The second form, the "meditation on the creature," was


309 Ibid.
distinctly developed by Joseph Hall but received its most explicit theoretical elaboration from none other than Robert Boyle. Where the emblem began with the picture and so appealed to the sensible directly, “meditation addressed itself not to the material but to the spiritual eye, the eye of the mind which corresponds to the second faculty of the rational soul, namely understanding.” 310 The meditation on the creature took the sense-object of a natural scene and elaborated it in the occasional meditation through a similitude.

It is in the occasional meditation that we most clearly see how Jaques' topicalization of experience became a common and even popular practice. Just as the Erasmian commonplaccer was to choose a *sententia* from one's reading so the meditator should choose an object of experience. The Senecan metaphor of the bee, commonly employed in discussing the use of commonplace books, re-emerged in the discourse on occasional meditations as a mode of experience, as in James Harrington's *Horae consecratae*, where after a meditation on his early fall from horseback, he writes a hymn beginning: “O Gracious God, and Father; let my sense,/Be spiritualiz'd, and from each Providence,/As Bees from Flowers, suck sweetness.” 311 In the movement to selections from the Book of Nature, the *sententia* is replaced with sense itself. The position of the Reflector is solitary, ruminative, and save for the activity of meditation itself, idle. Occasional mediations are, to take the title of one such work, an attempt to form a “Solitarinesse improved” in which the “the beames of the heauenly Spirit are contracted into a point vpon the soule, as the beames of the Sunne by a Cristall, whereby the light and heate of grace are increased.” 312 The notion here was


of a nature that announced God's presence. *Praesentemque refert quaelibet herba Deum*, as the oft-cited verse had it. Therefore, “Every creature is a severall page, in which we may reade some instruction to further us in heavenly wisedome,” and “[t]he Occasional Meditations of such as are piously devoted, give us sensible demonstration of this.” This from a popular work on “strange prodigies” seen in Germany between 1618 and 1638.313

In the occasional meditation, the perceptible becomes an illumination of the imperceptible through the elaboration of a similitude. The topicalized predicates of sensed objects are a kind of gauzy texture that give constitute the medium of meditation. The first expositor of the practice of occasional meditations was Joseph Hall, a bishop in the Church of England. His instructions for meditation entailed “looking through” any “bodily objectes, at [the] spirituall and heavenly.”314 The meditator will always be climbing in her thoughts “from Earth to Heaven; and suffer no object to crosse us in our way without some Spiritual use.”315 This ascent into the heavenly is mirrored by the meditation’s force turning inwards: “It begins in the understanding, endeth in the affection; It begins in the braine, descends to the heart; Begins on earth, ascends to Heaven; not suddenly, but by certaine staires and degrees, till we come to the highest.” Here the celestial ambition of the meditation is assured by the vehemence of religious passion and precisely by its power to transcend “Earth” and the secular, opaque meanings of its objects. Yet in Hall's meditations, it is not Nature itself but the presence of divinity throughout nature that affords the stuff of meditation. This


315 Ibid., A5v.
difference between created essence and the trace of its creation is approximated by the topical
distinction between a thing's definition (what it has in substantia) and that which it bears in its
properties, accidents, and similitudes (what is circa substantiam and extra substantiam). These
extra-essential predicates are used to the end of “looking through” objects. The play upon
similitude is the most consistent trope in Hall's meditations. Each begins with its title, a description
of its “occasion.” For instance, flies gathering around the chafing wounds of a horse are like
“malicious detractors of the tongue” who “gather unto; and dwell upon” any point of infirmity in
the object of their calumnies.316 The owl's “strange Melancholike life” is discovered to have rightly
been accounted wise, for when “other domesticall and ayrie creatures are blind, she onely hath the
inward light to discerne the least objects for her owne advantage.” From this Hall draws several
lessons: “hee is the wisest man, that would have least to do with the multitude; that no life is so
safe as the obscure; that retirednesse, if it have lesse comfort, yet lesse danger and vexation; Lastly,
that hee is truly wise who sees by a light of his owne, when the rest of the world sit in an ignorant
and confused darknesse, unable to apprehend any truth, save by the helpes of an outward
illumination.”317 To apprehend things in their outward, daylit illumination is folly; the owlish inner
light of the meditation is precisely this ability to bring one's own illumination to experience, and
so to respond to it passionately not in the way that it appears to others but through the significance
that one invents in “looking through” it.

The topicalization of nature allowed one to practice the melancholic movement of the
passions at any time. They are emblems formed out of the material of experience itself. Hall

316 Ibid., 78-9.
317 Ibid., 157-9.
explicitly connects his meditations to the emblem genre. In considering a spider, he notes that “[t]here is no vice in Man, whereof there is not some analogie in the brute Creatures.”\textsuperscript{318} The spider is “an Embleme of those Spirituall free-booters, that lye in wayt for our soules.”\textsuperscript{319} In another meditation upon the magnetic properties of lodestone he muses that there is nothing “more heavy and less apt for motion then [sic] Iron, or steele,” and yet “these doe run to their beloved loadstone, as if they had the sence of a desire and delight; and doe so cling to the point of it, as if they had forgotten their weight for this adherence.” This serves as an “Embleme of the harts of men,” in which God's grace is the lodestone that “draws up the yron hart of man to it.”\textsuperscript{320} Yet what is remarkable for the literary production of the time is how few are the allusions and \textit{sententiae} in Hall's work. Aside from the occasional paraphrase of a verse of Scripture, his composition upon the “occasions” of his meditation give the impression of being worked out within his own experience.

The plasticity of the occasional meditation made it a particularly useful antidote to the increasing spiritual concern with the ills of idleness, chief among the symptoms and causes of melancholy. Boyle argued that the meditation keeps the “Soul from Idleness” as it is “busi'd about the present subjects of his Reflections.” This in turn discourages “our Ghostly Adversary” from trying it with temptation, seeing that it is already occupied “with something that is at least \textit{innocent} if not \textit{good}.”\textsuperscript{321} This itself is a “sufficient motive” for taking up the practice of occasional

\textsuperscript{318} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{319} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid., 109-10.
The emphasis on the importance of solitude for the soul ran up against the increasing concern with the temptation of idleness. The solution to this was to create within solitude a kind of activity. This was not to be a simple piety of devotional prayer, but a mental exercise of discovering the divine presence in all things. As the Puritan pastor George Swincock put it, “[i]f thou wouldst exercise thy self to godliness in solitude, labour to spiritualize earthly things.” He compared the use of occasional meditations to the Gospel story of Mary and Martha. While Martha is busied with preparing a meal for her guest (Christ), Martha sits in earnest conversation with him. When Martha rebukes her, Christ says that Mary has chosen the “better part.” Swincock conflates these two positions so that while one is “to spend the day in thy Shop, or fields, and about many businesses” you should also “think on that of Christ” and “by such occasional meditations, which are obvious to ordinary understandings” to improve “thy time in solitude.” If on the one hand, the meditation, like the religious emblem, is posed against the motives of worldliness, it is also able to supply its own set of motives to any activity whatsoever. The meditation is a practice of distancing the heart, one's concerns and passions, from the world. This distance is counterintuitively discovered in the ability to reflect upon any object or experience of the world itself. As I have already discussed in the section on the emblem, this is in part an effect of locating the significatio of things in their capacity for similitude. It is at the same time a negative image of worldliness. To be in the world is not simply to attend to whatever one may encounter but to discern from among all the possible predicates of things those salient for action.

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322 Ibid., 4.
324 Ibid.
The metaphorizing of all experience transformed idle time into exercise, transforming melancholic affect into an activity—what Burton called “melancholizing.” According to Boyle, the practice gives one a “Faculty, whereby an Inquisitive Soul may expatiate itself through the whole Immensity of the Universe, and be her own Teacher in a thousand cases.”

It allowed for a notion of interiorized activity. Though the Occasional Reflections “fill our heads, they need not employ our hands, as having perform’d all the service that need be expected from them within the mind already.” In this, the occasional meditation completes a dialectic of topical sense of time, wherein “the same Exercise inures a Man to draw his Conceptions from the very Nature of the thing he speaks of, which, among those that can judge of Wit, is held a far greater sign of it, than the saying things more specious, and elaborate, that appear to be Antienter [viz. more ancient] than the Occasion, as is usual in Epigrams, and other solemn premeditated pieces of Wit, where oftentimes the Thoughts were not made for the Themes, but before them.”

Here the conception is “rather suggested by the Occasion, than barely applied to it.” His style will become so “pliant” that “scarce any Thought will puzzle him to fit words to it” and “cut out Expressions” that closely fit the subjects of his speech. If the outcome of the practice is very similar to the Erasmian ratio studiorum, in that habitual reflection gives one a “store and variety of good Comparisons,” and its goal is now explicitly to suit one for rhetorical virtuosity, the material now is taken directly out of experience rather than through one's reading.

325 Boyle, Occasional Reflections, 35.
326 Ibid., 26.
327 Ibid., 37-8.
328 Ibid., 38.
329 Ibid., 39.
In the occasional meditation, we see melancholic copia become a resource for discovering meaning in experience. The melancholic imagination, considered pathologically overproductive in medical works, was disciplined through attention to similitudes into a resource for spiritual exercise. Topical reflection upon accidental similitudes will “insensibly, and by unperceiv'd degrees, work the Soul to a certain frame, or temper, which may not improperly be called Heavenly Mindedness, whereby she acquires an aptitude and disposition to make pious Reflections upon almost every Occurrence, and oftentimes without particularly designing it.”\(^{330}\) It is a “Disposition and a Readiness to make Spiritual uses of Earthly things” in which the world is both “Library and...Oratory.”\(^{331}\) The practice of occasional meditation is linked to topical habits but transforms them from a habit of reasoning into a new habit of perception in that “it accustomes a man to an attentive Observation of the Objects wherewith he is conversant.” The meditator's gaze “ingages us to pry into the several attributes and relations of the things we consider, to obtain the greater plenty of particulars, for the making up of the more full and compleat Parallel betwixt the things whose resemblances we would set forth.” Here is a melancholic copia, seeking not matter for arguments but metaphors through which one might experience the world.

If the explicit name of the “occasional reflection” did not yet emerge when Shakespeare wrote As You Like It, we nevertheless also find the movement from observation to moral significance in the figure of Jaques the melancholizer. It's most pointed instance, however, is one that he reports having been spoken by the fool, Touchstone. He admires the fool because of his

\(^{330}\) Ibid., 77.

\(^{331}\) Ibid., 78.
ability to “be so deep contemplative.” He draws a “a dial from his poke,” that is, a timepiece from his purse,

And, looking on it with lack-lustre eye,
Says very wisely, 'it is ten o'clock;
Thus we may see,' quoth he, 'how the world wags;
'Tis but an hour ago since it was nine;
And after one hour more 'twill be eleven;
And so, from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe,
And then, from hour to hour, we rot and rot;
And thereby hangs a tale.332

Jaques recognizes this as a version of his own ability to “moralize a spectacle” as he says that the heard fool “moral on the time,” though this moves him to laughter rather than tears. Yet Touchstone's ability to piece together a melancholic reflection from his motley, zanni-like wit is a comic reflection of Jaques' own melancholic ingenium, something Jaques perhaps acknowledges when he exclaims “O noble fool!/A worthy fool! Motley's the only wear.” Motley, that is, the sewn-together patches taken from many experiences. Jaques' “motley” is his experience itself, mediated through the melancholy topics.

Where the commonplacer extracts “flowers” from their reading, Jaques, the melancholic traveler *par excellence*, draws his *sententiae* from his own observation. The collection of commonplace arguments becomes for Jaques a collection of experience: his melancholy is “extracted from many objects” and “compounded of many simples.” Rosalind tells him that he has “great reason to be sad” for he has “rich eyes and poor hands.” Yes, Jaques says—”I have gained my experience.”333 Here Jaques makes the clearest statement of the result of melancholy topics:

332 *As You Like It*, 2.7.21-8.
333 *As You Like It*, 4.1.10-20.
he has exchanged a life of action, even motive itself, for experience. Experience is obtained through the topical extraction of significance from the objects of perception which are turned into emblems. The sense-experience is set within the commonplaces of the melancholic mood just as the emblem's *pictura* receives an inscription of a commonplace or *sententia*. Experience, then, is the emblematic *subscriptio*, the poetic working out of the relation between mood and sense.

Jaques' melancholic “experience” is a counterpoint to the contemporary image of the traveller whose “experience” is gained as a form of political wisdom to be put in service of the state. One short treatise called the *Profitable instructions* provides a topics of observation, instructing the aspiring diplomat or legate what should be noted about the foreign land he enters. It was written by William Davison, the secretary to Queen Elizabeth best remembered for his role in the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots. The treatise argues against those “sedentary traveller[s]”, for though he “may passe for a wise man, as long as hee converseth either with dead men by reading; or by writing, with men absent,” once he enters “the stage of publike imployment, and hee will soone find, if he can bee but sensible of contempt, that he is unfit for Action.” The ability to deal with “men of several humours, factions, and Countries; duly to comply with them, or stand off, as occasion shall require” cannot be gotten from books, but only from men. It is “Experience added to learning,” that “makes a perfect Man.”

334 Robert Devereux Essex, Phillip Sidney, and William Davison, *Profitable Instructions: describing what speciall observations are to be taken by traveller in all nations, states, and countries, pleasant and profitable* (London: Printed for Benjamin Fisher, 1633).

335 Ibid., A1r-A3r.

336 Ibid., A3v.
of what one is to “consider” when abroad. The main headings are the country's geographical features, the people, the “policy and government,” and the administration of justice.

The civil topics for observation are a dialectical outline of the very structure of situation. For instance, when we consider how the magistrate “doth carry himselfe in administration,” we should consider “1. His Court, 2. His Wisedome, 3. His inclination to 1. Peace 2. Warre, 4. How hee is beloved or feared of his 1. People 2. Neighbors, 5. His designments, enterprizes, &c., 6. His disposition, studies, and exercises of 1. Body 2. Mind, 7. His Favourites, 8. The confidence or distrust he hath in his people.” 337 Experience here entails travel to foreign lands for political or diplomatic purposes. It is the traveller's responsibility to furnish himself “with the knowledge of such things as may bee serviceable for your Country and & calling.” 338 This too requires a topical training of perception, which the treatise offers for the “right informing of your minde with those things which are most notable in those places which you come unto.” 339 The purpose is to methodically increase one's experience. This requires a clear motive and purpose for travelling, for “the only experience which I have gotten, is, to find how much I might have learned, & how much indeed I have missed, for want of directing my course to the right end, and by the right meanes.” 340

If the Italian courtier's ideal of sprezzatura was a kind of elegant ease, we should see in English melancholy a related performance: not a pretension to genius, but instead a distance from the world and all of its eagerness, studium, ambition, and business. So-called “fashionable

337 Ibid., 14-15.
338 Ibid., 78-9.
339 Ibid., 80-1.
340 Ibid., 75-6.
melancholy” was an attractive removal from worldly pursuits.\textsuperscript{341} But this was not the end of it. Just as the humanist was trained to have commonplaces readied for any discourse, melancholic sophistication allowed one to bring a passion before one, transforming social engagements from contests of wills to rival displays. The tension was not simply one between a disavowal of the world and a commitment to it. These two positions are not static but mark out a continuum. The refusal of the world, as we see with Shakespeare’s Timon, is the extremity of melancholy. It is contrasted with the greed and venality of his friends and parasites upon his magnanimity. But distance does not foreclose participation. Jaques is an attractive avatar for melancholy, for he is not so set against worldly motives that he rails against them. Rather, he stands apart from them as one to whom they are not proper. Jaques finds a distance that allows him to relish the \textit{theatrum mundi}. We need not object to the notion of “fashionable melancholy” if we attend to the seriousness of the self-fashioning that was frequently attendant upon it. To use Christa Olson’s notion of an “embodiable topos,” we should rather read the embodiment of such a posture as a transformation of it. It is not so much an inhabiting of a pose so as to lay claim to a “fashion of passion,” a decadent performance of malady akin to those French aristocrats who had rectal surgery on non-existent fistulae to show their allegiance to the King. Instead, to take up a position of explicit inaction is not only a claim to one’s own genius but also a repudiation of a worldview and its sense of action.

We can now narrate the sequence of the previous three chapters. In the first chapter, we discussed the plurality of probable causes of melancholy as a topical habit within Baroque medicine that allowed various kinds of causalities to be entertained simultaneously. Nowhere was this more elaborated than in Burton’s catalogue of melancholy’s causes, occupying most of his work’s first book. While Burton, the author of the *Anatomy of Melancholy*, was a self-professed melancholic, he also took up in his book the medical, philosophical, and historical tradition that saw melancholy as a problem. As a compiler and cento-maker of the medical tradition he inherited, Burton excelled in topicalizing the possible causes of melancholia. We see in his synopses how the chapter headings all originate from a dialectical division of melancholy. Each heading, in turns, becomes a reservoir for all discourse on the subject.

In the second chapter, I argued that humanist dialectic allowed for a new orientation towards topical method that emphasized copiousness and so privileged similarity over essence. This background of topics shows the common intellectual backdrop both of the medical humanism discussed in the first chapter and the rhetorical practices of melancholics described in this chapter.

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Because of the underdetermination of topical practice, they could be appropriated both for the habits of organizing traditional knowledge as well as the invention of individual emotive expression. I have argued that the logical source of this difference is contained in the dialectical tradition itself. It was both an organon highly refined for making distinctions and discovering ever finer *differentiae* as well as an attunement to the metaphorical similitudes between all things. Where the scientific and medical discourse privileged topical classification, the melancholy topics looked to figure, transform, and articulate the objectless passion of melancholy.

In this chapter, I have showed the outcome of the melancholizing tendency of topical habits in various rhetorical genres. Jaques is an avatar for melancholic habits of thought in discourse. Jaques' speeches and “studied questions” are preoccupied with melancholic commonplaces like vanity and the *theatrum mundi*; indeed, his formulation of the latter (“All the world's a stage”) is the form most familiar to us. All of these practices, commonplaces, and topical inventions were conventional. Yet because the theater dramatizes his rhetoric as that of a melancholic we are able to ascertain the link between his commonplace discourse and his moody persona. This persona, however, was not confined to the theater, but was even more elaborated in genres of “melancholizing,” that built from the commonplace to the emblem and finally to the occasional meditation. These nested practices of melancholic rhetoric mark a transformation from topical capacity as argumentative to expressive and from a rhetoric of the public to that of intimate experience. This history not only shows the extension of rhetorical habits into new domains but gives a skeptical reading of the apparently spontaneous and immediate nature of private experience. Recognizing that melancholy developed itself as a rhetoric restores the “persona” to the personal without implying that its passionate and discursive movements are disingenuous or deceitful.
The tension between the desire to discover the causes of melancholy passions and a will to elaborate and extend them is held most closely in *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. Burton, self-identified as a melancholic, not only sets out treatments for melancholy but goes to considerable rhetorical lengths to justify melancholic passions. It is possible to “give some satisfaction to melancholy men,” by showing them “the causes whence they proceed.” This “satisfaction” is at once one part of the attempt to cure their ailment; their fears may be alleviated when they learn that their ailment does not proceed from “Divels, as they suppose,” nor that they are “bewitched or forsaken of God,” but that all can be accounted for by “naturall and inward causes.” Burton then turns to one of his favorite examples: if someone should walk “upon a plank, if it lie on the ground, he can safely do it: but if the same plank be laid over some deep water, instead of a bridge, he is vehemently moved, and ’tis nothing but his imagination, *forma cadendi impressa*, to which his other members and faculties obey.”

This shows that even if the cause of melancholic passion is imagined, an imagined cause is not necessarily unreasonable and it is common to all. But if we insist that those who prepare to walk over a river “have a just cause to fear, a true object of fear; so have melancholy men an inward cause, a perpetual fume and darkness, causing fear, grief, suspicion, which they carry with them, an object which cannot be removed; but sticks as close, and is as inseparable as a shadow to a body.” The melancholic has a real and just cause of fear; it differs only from others in that it is not apparent. The opaqueness of the melancholic's passion makes it no less justified. If Burton shows how the topics of melancholy's causes can encompass both their removal and their justification, he is a unique case.

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343 *AM*, 1.419. [1.3.3.1].

344 Ibid.
The two topics of melancholy—its many causes and its resources for passionate elaboration—can be set off as two potentially antagonistic positions: the onlooker and the melancholic. If the cause of the passion simply must be made clear, melancholy is an object of potential knowledge. If the causeless passion is a license for passionate elaboration, melancholy is an invention topic for a new rhetoric. This conflict around the meaning of melancholic passions was indeed dramatized many times in the Elizabethan and Jacobean theater. It is this that I take up in the following chapter.
Chapter 4: The Motive and Cue: Melancholy in the Baroque Theater

In the previous two chapters, Shakespeare's Jaques was taken as an avatar for the practices of a melancholy topic. It is no accident that we find this emergence of a new rhetorical orientation in the theater. While it has long been observed that the poet-playwrights of the English stage were deeply influenced by their rhetorical education, it is also true that the stage was itself a form of public rhetoric. Were we to assume, in a seemingly flat-footed way, that rhetoric is oratory before a popular audience, where would we find it in Elizabethan England? There were three institutions of public declamation: the pulpit, the gallows, and the theater. On these raised platforms, the complex and turbulent ideologies of the age were woven and unspooled. Nearly every Elizabethan and Jacobean Londoner would have taken in sermons, plays, and executions every year. While it was imperative that one went to hear a sermon on a Sunday, on other days free from labor or religious obligations, one would see the city's residents flood forth in two directions, some heading north to Tyburn and the gallows, and others to Southwark or Shoreditch to spend a day at the theater.

The theater was singular in its ability to represent problems of motive. In the sermons, the problems of motive were always addressed as a problem of sin. In the gallows-speech, a criminal motive was the sinful cause of a tragic result. Only the theater could represent the complex intertwining of multiple motives within a “plot” allowed for speeches to be organized around different interpretations of a social situation. That today we so closely identify the theater with the presentation of character motivation is not a foregone assumption of theatrical form. That we understand theater as a representation of character's motives is in large part a legacy of the innovations of the Baroque theater.
5.1 The Baroque Theater and the Development of Motive

A primary factor in the development of character-motive was the absence of a chorus in tragedy. The classical chorus watched the issue of fate unfold and sang their passions into a wisdom that could not be contained, but only represented, by the civil institution of the drama. By contrast, the Baroque theater represented an action that was carried across the interwoven and conflicting motives of multiple characters. The plots were rightly often described within the plays as “confusion.” Theatrical motive does not emerge as a single-minded bent toward one overweening desire but rather as the constantly revisable orientation of a character towards a kind of action or object whose nature is disputable and capable of transformation through the character’s experience. Unlike the Greek hero of tragedy or even the comic slaves of Terence and Plautus’ Latin dramas, Baroque character was not determinative of action. Rather, the sense of who a character was had to be revealed through the development of their motives as each scene unfolded.

Although scholarship has frequently emphasized the influence of classical drama, and particularly Senecan tragedy, on early Elizabethan tragedies, it has neglected a significant study of the disappearance of the chorus in the translation of ancient tragic models into a new vernacular, popular theater. A nearly forgotten article, published by Robert Turner in 1963, perhaps comes closest to being such a study. Turner traces the brief development and disappearance of the “causal induction,” that is, a prologue to the play introduced by a character who represents the cause of the action. It was introduced in the 1580s as a technique through which playwrights could
“introduce the motives or external causes of the main action of the drama.” 345 This convention developed out of a transformation of the medieval morality plays in which the figures of Virtue and Vice were the principal characters, and the “causes of action were set forth clearly by an abstract figure.” 346 One such example is the 1564 drama Appius and Virginia: “Appius is given the plot to trap Virginia by the Vice Haphazard while Justice and Conscience lament Appius’s rejection of them as guides for his action.” 347 Turner argues that as dramatic matter shifted to non-allegorical subjects, the causal induction “banish[ed] the abstract figures from the story itself to a framework in which they occupy a position similar to the classical chorus or the medieval dream-vision.” 348 In Kyd’s The Spanish Tragedy, the first of the many “revenge tragedies” of the period, both Revenge and the Ghost of Andrea, murdered by the prince of Portugal, are identified as the Chorus in the dramatis personae. Revenge himself says in the prologue that they will together “serve for Chorus in this tragedie.” They speak only during the prologue and the end of each act. Kyd’s choral use of these motive-figures is a case of pseudomorphosis that shows the distinctiveness of the Elizabethan drama rather than its indebtedness to the classical tradition.

Although they were “adapting the function of the Vices and Virtues,” the playwrights using causal inductions, “wished to dissociate themselves as sharply as possible from their old-fashioned mode.” 349 This was first done by replacing them with mythological characters, as when we see

346 Ibid., 186.
347 Ibid.
348 Ibid., 187.
349 Ibid.
Cupid taking the place of Vice in the 1580s.\textsuperscript{350} The argument that the causal induction was a transitory technique is strengthened when we recall that “the morality plays did not themselves employ this convention and that the causal induction gradually died out after the early 1590's when a literal presentation of action became customary.”\textsuperscript{351} The presentation of an allegorical figure before, rather than within, a plot “trained the audiences to accept the literal story without the assistance of abstract causes and prepared for the eventual exclusion of all allegorical representations of motive.”\textsuperscript{352} This gradual reduction of allegorical figures coincided with the emergence of the history play that “did not come into its own until about 1590 when the causal induction was beginning to fade.”\textsuperscript{353} We may even venture to say that the emergence of history as a representation that could stand without any external comment required a training of the public in the rhetoric of motives that developed in the 1590s and through the end of the Jacobean period.

The sequence shows a development, from the abstracted Virtues and Vices of the morality plays, to the allegorical induction-figures, and finally to a character with a fully developed motive. In the early allegorical plays, the action “illustrates the motive force” that rules the scene, as in \textit{Histriomastix} when England is ruled successively by “Peace, followed by Plenty, then Pride, Envy, War, and finally Poverty before Peace reasserts her rule.”\textsuperscript{354} The transition from the simple allegory to the mixed character of the play introduced by its cause is more complex. We find one such transitional moment, lingering between the motive-figure of the causal induction and the
historical character in Middleton's *The Revenger's Tragedy*. The revenger, Vindice, stands between those allegorical, abstracted motives of the earlier plays and the character whose motive is enacted through the development of the plot. His abstract, allegorical quality can be seen from his name, Italian for “avenger.” In the opening scene, Vindice, his bile adust in vengeful mourning, walks onto the stage holding a skull, while “a train [of characters] pass over the stage with torchlight.”

We learn that the skull is his late betrothed's. He waxes upon the decadence of the court and prays for revenge. Vindice's skull is a constant, imaginative reminder of his motive: revenge for his wife whose skull he carries with him. In the end, the skull is the weapon with which he kills the Duke who poisoned his dead wife. The abstraction of Revenge has here shifted into the most concrete imaginable allegory of revenge, identifying its cause with its means. The allegory of the Baroque theater was not abstract but concrete. It apprehended action not in its concept but through an attempt to grasp the entirety of an action in each of its parts.

Shakespeare created the most memorable of all melancholic revengers in *Hamlet*. Between 1592, when Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy* was first performed, and 1600 when Hamlet took the stage, the nature of the melancholic's motive in the revenge play, and, therefore, in all of theater, had changed. Where Hieronimo along with the legion of theatrical revengers he inspired “depict themselves as afflicted figures who have been driven by violence into a melancholic madness,” with the character of Hamlet, we see a third and final moment of transformation of motive. Hamlet's melancholy appears as an obstacle to the vengeance he has been tasked with: he is

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“pigeon-liver'd and lack[s] gall/To make oppression bitter.”\textsuperscript{357} This is precisely what humoral melancholy provided to the revengers before him. Indeed, this passage is from one of his most famous soliloquies, in which he reflects upon the nature of motive—as a spectator of theater.

A band of players comes to Elsinore. Hamlet, greeting them, asks one of the principals to perform a speech he once heard, performed by this actor, though it was “never acted” because the play “pleased not the million; 'twas/caviare to the general.” The speech is Aeneas' recital to Dido of the Trojan War, recalling an episode from the second book of the \textit{Iliad}. Hamlet prompts the player with the beginning of the speech which he has apparently memorized, and the player picks up the speech where he leaves it. After a poetic description of Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles, and his murder of King Priam and his sons, the player comes to a description of Hecuba, the now widowed and childless Queen of Troy, at the moment she witnesses her husband's death:

\begin{quote}
But if the gods themselves did see her then
When she saw Pyrrhus make malicious sport
In mincing with his sword her husband's limbs,
The instant burst of clamour that she made,
Unless things mortal move them not at all,
Would have made milch the burning eyes of heaven,
And passion in the gods.\textsuperscript{358}
\end{quote}

In speaking these lines, the player himself is moved to tears. This is noted, seemingly with disdain, by Polonius, who asks him to stop. Hamlet moves to retain the troupe and warns Polonius to treat them well as the players are “the abstract and brief chronicles of the/time.” As Polonius departs with the actors, Hamlet and the player remain back. Hamlet asks him if he can put on a play called the \textit{Murder of Gonzago} and insert a short speech into the play. The player agrees, and

\textsuperscript{357} \textit{Hamlet}, 2.2.537-8.

\textsuperscript{358} Ibid., 2.2.475-481.
departs. It is then, alone, that Hamlet reflects upon the significance of the player's speech and his passion:

Is it not monstrous that this player here,
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
Could force his soul so to his own conceit
That from her working all his visage wann'd,
Tears in his eyes, distraction in's aspect,
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting
With forms to his conceit? and all for nothing!
For Hecuba!359

Hamlet interprets his own passionate inability as a failure to be moved by his own situation as powerfully as the player was by his imagination. Indeed, Hamlet's readiness with a play, one he knows as Gonzago's Murder, suggests that he knows the “appropriate” motive of revenge only as an audience member of revenge tragedy. As the actor is moved by his “own conceit,” he becomes like a moved member of the audience. The reciprocal role of the passions both as motivated by the actions of others and motives to act is reflected in the theatrical relation of actor both as mover of passions in the audience and moved by the passions of his role. The melancholic is then the ideal character for the theater’s reflection on itself, for it is when this relationship between actor as moving and moved breaks down from its conventional operations and begins to question itself.

It is no accident that Hamlet's speech concludes, then, on a consideration of the theater. Hamlet recalls that “guilty creatures sitting at a play/Have by the very cunning of the scene/Been struck so to the soul that presently/They have proclaim'd their malefactions.”360 Hamlet's abrupt movement in his soliloquy from self-reproach to a discussion of the theater is justified by the problem of motive. The nature of motive is made complex by the possibility that appearances are

359 Ibid., 2.2.510-516.

360 Ibid., 2.2.551-554.
deceptive. This applies even to his supernatural “cue for passion”: drawing upon the notion of melancholy as a *balneum diaboli*, the “bath of the devil,” he worries that perhaps the ghost he has seen is not his father but the devil, who is “very potent with such spirits” that are, like Hamlet, subject to “weaknesse and...mellancholy.” In the theater, this deception is open. When we are moved by the theater we are not moved by the opinion that is real, but because of its verisimilitude. It is for this reason that he thinks “the play's the thing/Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the king.” Claudius will never openly admit to having murdered his brother, but if he has he could not help but be moved by the sight, unless “things mortal” move him not at all. Hamlet's own course of action is his *mise en scène*, creating the conditions that will create a telling passion in Claudius.

The object of the passion is always a phantasm—even if it is true. Hecuba is “nothing” because she is a figure of the imagination. Berating himself, Hamlet asks, “What would he do,/Had he the motive and the cue for passion/That I have?” Here we should read *the motive and cue for passion* as a pleonasm, a rhetorical repetition of the same sense. This is supported by other editions of the text, as in the 1625 quarto, where the line reads “what woulde he doe/Had he the motive, and *that* for passion/That I have?” By “motive” Hamlet means the ability to be moved into passion: his own inability to discover the passion appropriate to his situation is at odds with the ability of the actor who in a “fiction” can bring himself to tears. Hamlet's corresponding “motive and cue for passion” is the discovery of his father's murder through visitation by his ghost. The ghost, like the actor's imagination of Hecuba, is an image, though one was witnessed directly with the eye's (and also the audience of *Hamlet's* eyes), while the other is in the imagination. The

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361 Ibid., 2.2.563-4.

362 *Hamlet* (1625), F2r. Italics mine.
ambivalence between these is played out early in the play, when Horatio meets Hamlet, and Hamlet exclaims, “methinks I see my father.” Horatio, having just seen the ghost but not yet having informed Hamlet of this, responds “Where, my lord?” expecting that Hamlet has too seen the spirit. Hamlet responds, “in my mind's eye,” that is, in the imagination. The theater is the intermediary between passion and object par excellence because it captures all of the dimensions implied by the early modern meaning of “imagination.”

Hamlet's play-within-the-play shows how the meaning of a situation or a scene depends upon the passions of those who witness it. Shakespeare's other melancholics, though they do not stage actual plays as Hamlet does, each trouble the meaning of action by responding differently to the scene than those around them. Unlike the Virtues and Vices of the Morality play or the allegorical figure of Revenge in the causal induction, Shakespearean melancholy does not stand over the Baroque theater to clarify the motives of the actors. Instead, as I shall show in this chapter, we see across Shakespeare's works a repeated pattern in which melancholy becomes the origin of a problem of motive. The pattern can be described as follows: the cause of the melancholic's passion is not clear, either to themselves or others. The melancholic's behavior is then not deemed an appropriate or conventional response to the situation at hand. This sets up an initial conflict, in which the cause of melancholic's passion becomes a site of dispute and hypothesis. In each case, this dispute cannot be solved through argumentation. Ultimately, the causes of all passions are attributed to various imaginations, like the player's “conceit” or the real apparition of a ghost demanding vengeance. In the conflict that emerges around the interpretation of melancholic passion in the theater, Shakespeare articulated distinct and conflicting attitudes towards the

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363 *Hamlet*, 1.2.180-185.
imagination. These two attitudes, which I will call respectively the “civil” and the “melancholic” imagination, issue forth wholly different forms of action. The conflict of these actors, the confusion of their motives, and the rhetoric of their imagined motives is what is played out in the dramas of Shakespeare organized around the figure of the melancholic.

The remainder of this chapter has three moments. I will first articulate the Baroque theory of the role of imagination and passion in motives. Here I seek to show how two distinct modes of imagination—the civil and the melancholic—served as competing hermeneutics of common life. Second, I will show how three examples of Shakespeare's melancholics pose distinct problems of motive that can be read as a conflict between the civil and the melancholic imagination. I look to Queen Isabel in *Richard II*, Romeo in *Romeo and Juliet*, and Antonio in *The Merchant of Venice*, discovering in the common pattern described above but, in each case, throwing a distinctive light upon the relation of passion, motive, and imagination through the confrontation of the civil and melancholic imaginations. Finally, I return to a consideration of *Hamlet* as it has been received in several important twentieth-century and contemporary interpretations, including those of T.S. Eliot and Carl Schmitt. I argue that the Baroque theater was a form of collective imagination and that the figure of the melancholic played a pivotal role in training her audience how to imagine differently.

5.2 Imagination and Passion

The early modern theory of passions is inextricable from a theory of motives. Passions were not “simple actions; but...compleat qualities and actions which are accompanied by many
others, and yet which all tend to one principal end which the soul proposeth.” 364 Because of the close conceptual connection between the ends of action and passion, we find the most elaborated theoretical treatment of motives in the “treatise on the passions,” a genre that flourished in the seventeenth century. These treatises set out a vision of passions and motives as part of a civil hermeneutic of situations. This was a departure from the discussion of passions in devotional manuals, in which the aim was to “mortify” the passions as part of an individual spiritual exercise. In the treatises, the modulation of passions is a form of civil prudence; one studies one’s own passions under the presumption that they are similar to others, and this institutes a general knowledge of motives. Hobbes would make this explicit in the introduction to his Leviathan, where he comments upon the commonly invoked maxim nosce teipsum, “Read Thy Self.” In Hobbes' interpretation, this meant a method for understanding the motives of others. Because of a common “similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another,” one can discover through introspection on one's own mental and passionate activity what the grounds are of your own motives, and therefore can “read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions.” 365 However, Hobbes made a crucial distinction: the similitude was in the motions accompanying the passions, and not their imagined objects.

Civil prudence proposed rules for passions that established a hierarchy of appropriate response. One's social station determined which passions were appropriate under various


conditions. The preacher and divine Thomas Cooper’s *The Mysterie of the Holy Government of Our Affections* laid stress on the differences in passionate expression appropriate to different stations. Ministers can censure, but private men cannot. Magistrates can punish wrongdoing, whereas private men can only grieve it. The result is that the possible objects of passion reflect the social order of importance that marks the appropriate form of expression. When “our private case be safe, and yeeld [sic] us sound matter of rejoicing; yet we must withall be sorrowfull for the publike: yea, our particular joy must give way thereto.”366 The public face of sorrow is mandated by the trump that common objects of passions have over the private. This is supported by Biblical precedent, for “[t]hough Nehemiah for his owne private be in good case; yet because the house of his God lyes waste: therefore, though he stand before such a Monarch, as would not endure any such melancholy passion; yet his sad countenance must needes bewray his *Affection* to his God, and compassion with his distressed and desolate Church.”367 In the case of public celebration, the reverse is also true; even though “in private it go ill with us; yet wee must rejoyce in the publike good, and be comforted in our particular distresse, by the consideration of the publike welfare of the Church of God.”368 The adjustment of passionate expression to a public situation is not dissimulation, but rather a directive for “mortifying” one's wayward passions by maintaining a public affect. However, even in this religious context, the mortification of passions is not imagined in this case, as it was in the devotional books and works of contemplation, as a private exercise. Rather, it is precisely as the work of adjusting one's private passion to focus on the public good or

367 Ibid., 26r.
368 Ibid., 26v.
evil. Indeed, the “sinceritie of our Affections,” is judged by whether they are “proportionable to the Object, and measure thereof: as, If the sinnes of the Times be grievous, and extraordinarie, so our griefe be su[i]table; If the mercies of God, and his deliverance, be wonderfull, so our Joy and Thankfulnesse be answerable.” 369 Sincerity is a judgment of fitness to a proper object rather than the candidness of an individual.

The Passions of the Minde in Generall, first appearing in 1601 and written by an otherwise little-known writer Thomas Wright, includes a section on “Pollicie in Passion” in which Wright outlines the civic proprieties of passionate expression. For instance, in order to please someone who is your superior or peer, “thou must apparell thy selfe with his affections, and love where he loveth, and hate where he hateth.” 370 Wright maintains that there is a difference between the right and wrong use of this strategy, as if “this meane fostereth flatterie, if it be abused, so it nourisheth charitie, if it be well used.” 371 The range of possible reasons for passions allows Wright to offer a lengthy topicalization of civil motives. In keeping with the passion-theory of motives, all of these can ultimately be reduced to love and hate, but within these we find a topical efflorescence of variations that attempts to capture the variety of possible situations. In Wright's “Discourse to the Motives to Love,” he lists seventeen such “motives,” printed with a synopsis in Ramus brackets, the standard print form of visualizing topics, based upon the system of the dialectician Peter Ramus. His discussion of them takes up over a hundred pages of his works as he offers a brief essay on each motive that he discovers through a further topical division of their varieties. In each

369 Ibid., 18r.


371 Ibid.
of these essays, Wright argues that “much more is insinuated then [sic] is set down.” It was the task of the “good Scholler” to apply these “generalities to particular matters,” since “a slender insinuation will content a ripe apprehension.” In this, the motives show themselves as topics.

Let us look to one of Wright's brief essays. One motive of love, paradoxically, is hate. Many “politike Potentates and Princes” form alliances with each other because they are “in dissension and warres with their professed enemies.” As examples, he lists Herod and Pilate, but also the “hatred of subjects against superiors” which unites them “in all uproars and commotions, riots and rebellions,...and causeth revolt against the State.” He connects this motive to other motives to love, discussed in an earlier essays, namely resemblance, profit, and advantage. Wright's reflections on the “pollicie” of passions are the more remarkable when it is remembered that the term was closely associated in the idiom of the day with ragion di stato or “reason of state.” “Reason of state” refers to the art associated with Machiavelli, that is, “the use of any and all available means, however immoral, to preserve the state and to increase the power of the ruler.” This can be seen from the title of a Spanish work translated into English in 1632: *Policie unveiled: wherein may be learned, the order of true policie in kingdomes, and commonwealths: the matters of justice, and government; the addresses, maxims, and reasons of state.* It was only with the Machiavellian turn and his famous reflections on being feared and loved that the political discourse on action and the passionate theory of motives were united. Works of

372 Ibid., 256.
373 Ibid.
374 Ibid., 228.
375 Ibid.
376 Kahn, *Machiavellian Rhetoric*, 60.
“pollicie” such as this one and similar genres like the “mirror of princes” that offered advice to rulers typically offered admonitions against being ruled by passion. The unique developments of English Machiavellianism, closely studied by Victoria Kahn, used the “emphasis on the religious ends of politics” as justification for the “assimilation of Machiavellian reason of state by Christianity.”\textsuperscript{377} This in part explains how Wright ends each of these essays, as in the motive to love from hate. It closes with a long prayer to God, whose central sentiment is that we must fight the enemies of God, “for that victory is more glorious, and that glory more illustrious where adversaries are strongest.”\textsuperscript{378}

Knowing the appropriate passionate response depended upon correctly apprehending the situation one was in. One element of this was recognizing the affective dispositions of others. Wright locates a civil topics of places for the “discoverie of passions.” These can be ascertained by learning how to read and interpret, variously, others' “externall Actions,” “play,” “feasting,” “drinking,” “gesture,” “voice,” the “managing of the hands and bodie,” “praising,” “Apparell,” “Conversation,” and “Writing.”\textsuperscript{379} These various topics give way to collections of heuristics and maxims. He who “talkes too muche before his betters” is full of “arrogancy, contempt, and lacke of prudence.”\textsuperscript{380} Too much “varietie...of garments proveth the ficklenesse of their heads.”\textsuperscript{381} Someone who is easily pleased by the praise of others has “selfe-love and vanitie” within the “best

\textsuperscript{377} Ibid, 90.
\textsuperscript{378} Wright, \textit{Passions}, 230.
\textsuperscript{379} Ibid., 124-144.
\textsuperscript{380} Ibid., 139.
\textsuperscript{381} Ibid., 136.
tenement of his heart.” The superficiality of these maxims belies the import of what they represented. While the commonsensical collection of observations that Wright makes do not seem to have much claim to psychological acumen, more important is his illustration of how one may come to a form of civil wisdom through topical observation. The topics for discovering passions were training forms of perception, attention, and observation onto various aspects of other's appearance, behavior, comportment, and speech.

This civil topics of motive developed into a practical hermeneutics that disproportionately addressed one side of motive: the corporeal rather than the imaginative. This kind of inference, drawn from emotional comportment and physiognomy, was an essential part of “politick” knowledge. The topical tradition was sometimes invoked directly, as when Wright turns from motives of love to those of hate. Rather than writing short essays on the various motives, he imagines that there is some “occasion...offered to moove the passion of hatred against some particular person, as to inveigh against a Traitor, or publike enemie of the State or our selves.” Wright enumerates the topics for which to discover arguments that will “perswade our auditors or friends to hate them” with “divers meanes” for different evils. Here he turns to the familiar rhetorical topics of vituperation found in Quintilian. In both praise and vituperation, one was to first consider the person's parents, country, and stock. Wright calls these topics of the persons “ingresse” into the world, under which we should consider first, if “his Parents were base, wicked, or infected with any notorious vice.” Second, “the manner of his begetting was unlawful.” Third, whether “he was born at such a time as the influence of the heavens as the influence of the heavens

382 Ibid.

had some extraordinary action in the tempering of his body.” Fourth, if he was “born in a bad
place.” Fifth, if his parents died or were tormented in his upbringing. Sixth, if he showed vice in
his childhood years. Similar topics are given for the course of his life and the manner of his
death if he is already deceased.

In Wright and especially in other treatises of the passions, the bulk of interest in discovering
the passions is shown in physiognomic and characterological judgments. In a section on the
“Discovery of Passions in Gesture,” Wright claims that the “subject is very ample, and would
almost require a whole book.” The topics of gesture are “reduced unto these heads; motions of the
eyes, pronuntiation, managing of the hands and body, manner of going.” Within these various
bodily topics Wright shows us the kind of inferences we may make from observation. If someone
has a “rowling eye, quicke in moving, this way, and that way,” it shows that he has “a quicke, but
a light wit, a hote cholerick complexion, with an unconstant and impatient mind.” The
“quicknesse” comes from an “abundance of hote spirits.” Much winking comes from “weakness
of spirits,” and so on in this manner. A popular physiognomy gave some scope reading motives
from the face, the complexion, or the gestures. In the face, “superiours may learn to conjecture the
affections of their subjects mindes, by a silent speech pronounced in their very countenances.”
The art of physiognomy uses these “characters” written on the face to discover the intentions of
others, based upon the premise that these are the results of motions of the spirits that correspond
to the kinds of acts that occur under a similar passion. The motions of the spirit, then, are visible

384 Wright, Passions, 262-3.
385 Ibid., 131.
386 Ibid., 29.
in the face through a mysterious influence. This physiognomic, “politick” hermeneutic of passions resembles in many ways the semiotics of medicine, attempting to read from a bodily sign an underlying cause.

However, when reading the body, the civil imagination was only able to infer one side of the motive, the internal motion that showed in the face or gesture gave the quality of the feeling. It could not discover the object in the imagination. Beyond the rough and ready attempt to read motive directly from the body, motives could only be inferred from the situation, according to what appeared most “fitted” to it. It was in the opinion of what was “fitting” to a situation that the theory of motives relied upon a theory of imagination. As mentioned above, passions were understood as motives as they provided both the efficient power to move the body and a direction of action. The direction was the imaginative component of the passion which held as its object something desirable or hateful. This view of the passions was traditional. Its _locus classicus_ was in Cicero’s _Tusculan Disputations_. There the _pertubationes animi_ or upheavals of the mind are linked with four kinds of “opinion” associated with four primary passions: _aegritudo_ or grief is an opinion of present evil, _laetitia_ or joy of present good, _metus_ or fear of an impending evil, and _libido_ or desire, of a future good.387 The basic motives were imagined as the beginnings of bodily locomotion were, then, fear and desire, as fear makes us flee our opinion of a coming evil and desire leads us towards a future good. In this way, all of human motives can be mapped onto bodily

locomotions precipitated by the four passions, which, according to Burton, "Bernard compares to the wheeles of a chariot, by which we are carried in this world." This allusion to Bernard is a clear example of an intentional misprision: in the original sermon, the four “wheels” of his chariot were not the four motive passions, but four vices that comprise malice: Cruelty, Impatience, Audacity, and Shamelessness. Clearly, what appealed to Burton here was but the image of passions as the basis of motion. This judgment of the values of objects was called the vis estimativa or estimative power. In this way, motive is a dual function of the imagination's estimative powers and the passionate response to what it presents to the soul.

In the treatises, this Ciceronian theory appeared alongside the famous Thomistic description of eleven passions, set out systemically in the Church Doctor's Summa Theologiae. The passions were organized into two portions of the “sensitive appetite,” the concupiscible and irascible. This was distinguished from the will, or the “intellective appetite.” The concupiscible passions encompassed the four basic motives in Cicero and included two more, bringing the total to six: joy and grief, desire and aversion, love and hatred. Whereas the concupiscible passions were concerned with the simple judgments of what was good or bad, the irascible are those passions that see the good and evil as difficult, that is, they imagine the good or evil as difficult to avoid or obtain. Aquinas makes clear that the “irascibilis objectum” must, nevertheless, remain a sensible

388 AM, 1.255 [1.2.3.3.].
389 St. Bernard, Sermons, 457.
390 “ Cum autem sit duplex appetitus in homine, scilicet appetitus sensitivus, qui dividitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, ut in primo habitum est; similes motus qui sunt in appetitu inferiori cum passione, in superiori sunt sine passione, ut ex supradictis patet.” Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, [39507] IIa-IIae q. 18 a. 1 co.
or imaginative difficulty [arduum sensibile], not a difficulty as judged by the intellect. The irascible passions then indicate a more complex imagination of the good or evil imagined within a situation or context that contains obstacles and complications.

In Aristotle's *De anima*, the division between the imaginative and the corporeal parts of a passion were viewed not as two distinct factors of action but as two possible descriptions emerging from distinct sciences. Aristotle defines the passions or *ta pathē* as “reasons expressed in matter” [*logoi enhuloi*].\(^{391}\) This allows for them to receive two distinct treatments, first from the *physikos* or natural philosopher who describes fear as a “surging around the heart of blood,” and alternately by the *dialektikos*, who defines it as a “craving for retaliation.”\(^{392}\) In Aristotle, the distinction is not between the interior feeling and exterior cause but rather between two genres of description, drawn from distinct inquiries. Both described the same phenomenon of passion.

By contrast, “the thinkers of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance thought about the *De anima* in the light of their own experience of the duality of minds and things.”\(^{393}\) This duality was described with “various older terms such as *species* and *intention*,” but early modern writers redefined these terms “in such a way that they now applied to the dichotomy between what was in the soul as against what is outside the soul.”\(^{394}\) According to Edward Reynolds, Bishop of Norwich

\(^{391}\) Aristotle, *De anima*, 403a25.

\(^{392}\) Ibid., 403a27-b1.

\(^{393}\) F. Edward Cranz, “‘Lecture(s) du 'De Anima' à la Renaissance,’” in *Reorientations of Western Thought from Antiquity to the Renaissance*, ed. Nancy S. Struver (Aldershot, Hampshire; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 372.

\(^{394}\) Ibid. The notion of “species” here refers back to an argument of Aristotle as it was interpreted by Thomas Aquinas, who argued that the ability to discern the individual objects of perception was not in the sense organs
and author of *A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man*, the passions, by “stirring up the spirits, and quickning the Fancy,” have a “direct influence upon the Habits and Manners of the Minde; which being in this estate constrained to fetch all her Motions from the Imagination, produceth them with the same clearness and vigour as they are being represented.”

The mind takes “all her Motions” from the imagination, indicating its role as the locus of motives and passions. Yet the medical literature went even further, claiming that not only all motions of the mind, including the passions, but all voluntary motion of the body as well depended on the imagination.

We may begin by looking at one such medical account of motive, from a seventeenth-century doctor, Daniel Sennert, in his explanation of “spontaneous motion”:

Spontaneous motion thus occurs in this fashion and order: first, an external object is presented; which, moving the immobile, is communicated through the external senses and the common receptacle of the imagination, and out of this, *what it is* is known. There, it is understood more carefully and accurately, seeing whether it is pleasing and convenient or harmful and unpleasant. Love or hate follows from this understanding, that is, the desire of having the pleasing and delightful thing or fleeing from the harmful. Indeed, the animal is not moved arbitrarily [*frustra*], but its appetite is incited by an object insofar as it is a goal or a good. Motion follows directly on the appetite in beasts...in men, however, before motion occurs, something intercedes. The appetite and the motions of the internal senses are presented to the mind in order that they may be approved or disapproved by it. If approved, and the mind reckons the sensitive appetite to be right, motion soon follows; however, if it is rejected as false, contention and struggle arise between the sensitive and rational appetites, until one conquers the other; and whichever wins is the principle of motion and orders its motion to the moving faculty. This faculty, imbued through the whole of the bodily muscle, draws together those muscles which are needed; the contracted themselves, but was an act of the intellect which the *species intelligibilis* is “abstracted” from the *phantasmata*. This acts as a mean or a *res media* between the unlike powers of the senses and the intellect. In fact, it was usually located in the middle ventricle of the brain.

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muscles draw forth the tendons, the tendons the bones, and, by movements of the bones, the limbs or the whole body is moved from one place to another.\textsuperscript{396}

When the sensible impression first comes through the sense-organs into the mind, the answer to the question \textit{Quid sit?} or What is it? is assigned to the \textit{sensus communis}. Yet the imagination is what determined the question \textit{Quale sit?} Here we recognize the rhetorical questions posed in “stasis” theory, the Hellenistic rhetorical method for determining the question at issue in a legal case. In the common sense, the various senses are gathered together in the mind to determine the nature of the thing in terms of its definition. The questions of whether it is good or bad is deferred to another faculty, the imagination. Burton defines imagination, similarly to Sennert, as “an inner sense which doth more fully examine the species perceived by common sense, of things present or absent, and keeps them longer, recalling them to mind again, or making

new of his own.” The “common sense” is that faculty through which “we discern all differences of objects.” That is to say, we do not individuate sense phenomena in the sense organs, “for by mine eye I do not know that I see, or by mine ear that I hear, but by my common sense, who judgeth of sounds and colours.” The common sense gives a preliminary answer to the question *What is it?* by grouping an array of predicates reported from the various sense organs under a single term or description.

Motive, then, was understood both in the sense that passions were thought to be the efficient causes of action and in the literal sense that they are part of the motive faculty, or *vis motrix*, the capacity for bodily movement. The completist and synthetic tendency of the treatises on the passions led them to integrate the Ciceronian theory of the passions, the Galenic theory of spirits, and the Thomistic-Aristotelian view of a tripartite soul divided into various faculties. In this synthetic view, the spirits were the efficient cause of action while imagination provided its final cause. The passions were formed from a composite of an imaginative judgment and the spirits and humors that moved the members of the body. In this way, passion mediated between the physical and psychic causes of action. The introduction of the imagination within an individual's motive opens onto a field of interpretation within Baroque theories of action that has no analogue in modern sociological, historiographical, or philosophical accounts of motive. The accounts of humoral theory as an account of passion has been misprized in contemporary scholarship where the humors are thought to imply “a materialistic determinism which predisposes the constrained
individual to be ruled by a dominating passion."397 Instead, we must understand the question of early modern motive as requiring a fuller account of its object, an object formed in the imagination. The early modern theory of imagination is the archive for the period’s understanding of this process.

The imagination combined at least three distinct capacities: an estimative capacity that judged whether its object was a good or an evil, a compositional power that was able to recombine forms into a new one, as in the chimera, and the interpretive, as when one can see a form in a cloud. This is part of its “double prerogative” over other faculties of the soul in having a great “multiplicity of Operations” and in its “framing of objects” in which it is at once creator, composer, and translator, making, mixing, and replacing objects.398 The civil topics of motive, elaborated in the treatises on the passions, interpreted the imaginative object as deictic, that is, a particular, concrete thing that could be moved towards or fled. We might say that civil understanding dealt with that part of things that was assigned in the ars topica to the internal topics. Its primary concern was with a hermeneutics that could apprehend what a motive was through a series of inferential topics.

As mentioned above, both Burton and Sennert's accounts of motive, linked back to motion, are ultimately derived from Aristotle's discussion of imagination or phantasia in the De anima. We owe it to Martha Nussbaum for illuminating the close connection between imagination, motion, and interpretation for us. She notes that in Aristotle’s works “phantasia and desire are


jointly necessary conditions for animal motion...and *phantasia* is a necessary condition for
desire...which must prepare desire before desire can lead to action."\(^{399}\) Just as important is her
argument that *phantasmata* are not to be understood in every case as an internal mental image, as
“representing has always been a matter of interpreting rather than reproducing.”\(^{400}\) Indeed, this is
the function that is given to the imagination in its evaluation of its object as *grata vel noxia*,
agreeable or harmful. This is an activity of imagination either when it is confronted directly with
an object of sense or a composite phantasm formed within the imagination itself. Aristotle's
discussion of the power of the imagination or *phantasia* in *De anima* turns upon the example of
seeing forms in clouds. This is also his explanation for dream images: the blood that passes before
the eyes of the sleeper seem to take on forms of old friends, gods, the dead, in just the same way
that a cloud may appear as a dragon. However, as Nussbaum notes, “Shadow-pictures and dream-
images are distinguished from the *phantasia* that follows from them” as when “[w]e take a shadow-
picture for an animal, a dream picture for a real one.”\(^{401}\) The only difference is that when we see a
dragon in the clouds, we do not believe it is a dragon, though we do in dreams.

The role that melancholy played in the theater's rhetoric of motive depends upon the fraught
relation between passion and imagination unique to the melancholic. Discovering a motive from a
situation posed a significant problem in the case of the melancholic, whose passion was without
“apparent occasion.” While a great deal of scholarship has been devoted to understanding

\(^{399}\) Martha Nussbaum, “The Role of Phantasia in Aristotle’s Explanations of Action” in *Aristotle’s De motu
1978), 221-2.

\(^{400}\) Ibid., 225-6.

\(^{401}\) Ibid., 1.247.
melancholy’s grounding in the humoral theory, far less attention has been paid to melancholy as a disorder of the imagination. In medical works, the immediate cause of melancholia was described in two ways: first, as an excess or corruption of black bile, and second, as a distempering of the imagination, or even as a laesa imaginatio, a wounded or infected imagination. Burton transforms imaginative distemper into the primary cause of melancholy, writing that “great is the force of imagination, and much more ought the cause of melancholy be ascribed to this alone, than to the distemperature of the body.” When the imagination affects the soul with some conceit, the body responds to this as real. Burton constantly appeals to the example of the ease with which we might walk across a board on the ground, but the terror of doing the same when it is placed over water: “tis nothing but his imagination, forma cadendi impressa, to which his other members and faculties obey.” But if the imagination works on all of us, his imaginary scoffer says, sane people have a “just cause” for fear. Burton replies that melancholics do as well, but it is an “inward cause, a perpetual fume and darkness, causing fear, grief, suspicion, which they carry with them, an object which cannot be removed, but sticks as close, and is as inseparable, as shadow to a body, and who can expel or overrun his shadow?” The melancholic responds to an imaginative understanding that is not legible to others; she carries the cause of her passion with her, as an “inward cause,” one that is within the imagination itself.

How did melancholy disturb the function of the imagination? Nussbaum’s essay on imagination’s role in perception is instructive: the imagination is “the agent’s selective interpreting

402 AM, 419-20 [1.3.3.1.]
403 Ibid.
of his environment.” 404 The perception of even an object present to sense requires imagination, as when we perceive a rose “it is not the rose qua rose, but the rose qua white that acts upon our sight.” The motive function of the imagination comes from its unique ability to present “forms of the pleasant and the fearful, hence necessarily of the thing as a unitary object under some description, not just as an assortment of various perceptible characteristics.” 405 It is precisely the question of how the unity of the object is formed from imagination’s privileging a certain predicate that is at issue in the melancholic. While the melancholic’s imagination is not simply an assortment of “various perceptible characteristics,” its topicalizing character allows it to evaluate more than one characteristic as pleasant or fearful. Various potential attitudes towards the imagined object are made possible by privileging now one characteristic or another. Melancholic copiousness of imagination leaves it prone to “those strange and yet strong delusions, whereby the Minds of melancholly men (in whom this Facultie hath the most deep and piercing operation) hath been peremptorily possessed.” 406 It would be wrong to think that “delusion” here corresponds with fictions. When we find George Puttenham in The Arte of English Poesie say that the “the phantasticall part of man (if it be not disordered) [is] a representer of the best, most comely and bewtifull images or apparences of things to the soule and according to their very truth,” 407 “truth” here implies verisimilitude, a quality that can be attributed to a fiction. The imaginative “delusion” is not mere imaginative fiction but the melancholic's departure from the “appropriate” passion as deemed by a civil hermeneutics.

404 Nussbaum, “The Role of Phantasia,” 258.
405 Ibid., 259.
406 Reynolds, A Treatise, 19.
According to the medical literature, the melancholic imagination was dramatically different from the normal imagination. Hercules de Saxonia, one of Burton’s foremost authorities on melancholia, describes the difference in this way: “The imagination turns around the *species sensibilis* from an absent object, but the passions of the melancholic turn even about a *species insensibilis.*” The *species sensibilis* is a technical phrase within scholastic philosophy with roots in the late antique psychology of Augustine and Arabic medicine. But a *species insensibilis* is an oxymoron—an insensible appearance. The *species insensibilis* of melancholic imagination is opposed to the interpreted sense-object. The example given by Saxonia is a commonplace: the sheep sees a wolf and knows it as an enemy through the wolf’s nature [ex propria natura lupi]. It is the phenomenological salience of a *proprium* that allows sheep to avoid wolves even without having the human power of reasoning. This is thought to be within the power of their imagination.

In contrast, the melancholic’s imagination, often described as too strong, is topicalized; but rather than beginning with a specific object of the imagination, the melancholic passion itself becomes the source of invention. In Saxonia's words, the melancholic brings an opinion of what is good or evil to that which is neither. As discussed in the previous chapter, the melancholy topics

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408 “*Imaginatio versatur circa speciem sensibilem absente obiecto, at vero melancholicorum affectiones versantur etiam circa speciem insensibilem, concipiunt enim speciem boni, vel mali fugiendi, aut prosequendi ex specie sensata extrahere, quandoquidem sentiant Averr. O. Thomas & Albertus, qui hac in brutis tribuunt non imaginationi, sed aestimativae, accedit, quod pro rei veritate bruta non extrahunt hos conceptus, sed ex proprietate naturae consecutive illos concipiunt: sic ovis inspecto lupo ex propria natura lupi inimicitiam concipit, in melancholicis alia est ratio: nam ipsi intellectivae partis beneficiuo extrahunt huiuscedomi conceptum boni vel mali & propterea ad differentiam brutorum hoc concipiunt in illo subjecto, quod revera neque bonum neque malum ipsis inferre potest.” Hercules Saxonia, *Opera Practica*, (Patavie: Iacobus de Cardorinis, 1681) 374.
were organized both to recognize the common features that every object has as well as to turn any image into an emblem. Just as the sheep reads the imaginative judgment of the wolf out of its nature, so too does the civil topics of motive read a conventional judgment of what is good or bad as if it is a natural one. The melancholic, in contrast, discovers in every object of the imagination a reason for her passion. The reason, however, is not the cause of the melancholic's passion, which remains elusive if not inarticulable. Rather, the imagined object becomes fuel for sustaining the passion. In this way the melancholic’s imagination turns its object into allegory, and its motives become metaphors. That is, passion is both motivated by metaphor and there is motive to the discovery of apt metaphors for melancholy passions. In the melancholic imagination, the passion is the movement, disarticulated from the world of objects and ends. Every figure of the imagination, whether present to sense or an absence recalled from memory and composed in some new manner, becomes an image of passion.

The two distinct forms of imagination, civil and melancholic, emerged to confront one another as distinct character-types in the Baroque theater. In the dramatic figure of the melancholic, passion remains a motive. Rather than being seen as a response to an imaginative judgment of a situation, the melancholic passion interprets everything through itself. The discovery of a means for sustaining its own passion is premised upon the melancholy topics described in the previous chapter. But in the theater, we see also that the melancholic topics place the individual at an interpretive remove from others. It is no accident, then, that Theseus' speech on the subject in A Midsummer's Night Dream, amounting to a Shakespearean theory of the melancholic imagination, is placed in the mouth of a character who disdains this position. Theseus views the melancholic imagination from the point of view of the civil hermeneutics. As he sees it, both “lovers and madmen” have “such seething brains./Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend/More than cool
reason ever comprehends.” The distinction between *apprehension* and *comprehension* is the difference between judging what something is and understanding it intellectually. In another passage in *A Midsummer’s Night Dream*, we learn that “Darke night, that from the eye, his function takes,/The eare more quicke of apprehension makes.” Theseus then makes an addition: not only the “lunatic” and the “lover” but also “the poet/Are of imagination all compact,” that is, in a league, one that we recognize as a compact of melancholics. But each is defined by a variation on imaginative activity. The “madman” sees “more devils than vast hell can hold.” The mad produce terrifying phantasms and are also beholden to them. Imagination and perception cannot be discriminated for the melancholic as they can in the civic hermeneutic, as the melancholic responds passionately to their phantasms as if they were present. The lover, who Theseus says is “as frantic,” sees “Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt.” The racist connotation here, that Egyptian beauty could not rival Hellenic, is clearly the point of Theseus’ negative evaluation.

The play provides an extreme example. The Queen of the Fairies, Titania, is given a potion that induces her to love the first person she sees. She awakes to see Bottom, a comic character who has been himself transformed into an ass and falls in love. Titania’s potion-induced love for Bottom is a kind of an extreme form of this same translation of beauty to a figure that is conventionally seen as grotesque. She does not see Bottom as other than he is—an ass—but finds this ass to be

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409 *Midsummer's Night Dream*, 5.1.4-6.

410 Ibid., 3.2.180-1.

411 Ibid., 5.1.7-8.

412 Ibid., 5.1.9-10.

413 Ibid., 5.1.10-11.
beautiful, with his “sleek smooth head” and “fair large ears.”

But we should pause over the metonymic “brow.” Though “brow” is often taken in Shakespeare as a synecdoche for face, we might still ask whether the synecdoche is Theseus’ or the lover’s. I hold to the latter: the lover’s imagination is not only active in its ability to transpose similitudes but also to discover the ideal in the part.

The poetic imagination edifies the common objects of mundane experience with an “eye, in fine frenzy rolling,” that “[d]oth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven.” The imagination “bodies forth/The forms of things unknown,” but the complementary activity of “the poet's pen/Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing/A local habitation and a name.” Poetic imagination supplies the “occasions” for the “airy nothing” that is, turns them into the characters and places of poetry. We do well to remember that the author of this speech, Theseus, is himself such an “airy nothing,” and therefore his disdain must be taken with the ironic distance we hear in an imaginary character speaking against the vanity of imagination.

Theseus’ description of the melancholic’s imaginative disorder can be tracked to the three abovementioned functions assigned to the imagination—estimation, interpretation, and composition. First, there is the question of an interpretation of what is good or bad to the sensitive appetitve, part of the vis estimativa. As observed in the Hercules de Saxonia's description of the

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414 Ibid., 4.1.3-4.

415 Ibid., 5.1.12-13, 15-17.

416 Although this was originally a power distinct from imagination, it was conflated with it in Arabic commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima. The real source of the conflation remains a disputed point in scholarship. Fazlur Rahman holds that the conflation was not Avicenna’s but instead his Latin translators. See his Avicenna’s
melancholic's *species insensibilis*, the melancholic does not evaluate its imaginative objects according to their nature, but according to the sense given to them by their passion. The melancholic joining of image and sense in the imagination can be likened, therefore, to the emblem. Insofar as the object imagined was not taken as a real, worldly object, but rather as a symbol or *res significans*, the movement of the melancholic was itself unworldly. She no longer could be seen to be moving towards a desired object or fleeing from a fearful one, even one complexly mediated by civil imagination. It is in this sense we should take Hamlet's “there is nothing either good or bad/but thinking makes it so.” This is often heard either as a moral skepticism or Stoical position. Rather, we should hear in it the ambiguity that is inherent in the image awaiting inscription.

Second, melancholic imagination derives the situation from their passion rather than adjusting their passion to the situation. Theseus’ speech ends by calling these the “tricks” of a “strong imagination.” He gives two examples. In both cases, the imagination reverses the standard order of operations, supplying a reason for a passion that has no apparent reason. First, “if it would but apprehend some joy,/It comprehends some bringer of that joy.” According to the work of American philosopher and semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce, this is an abductive inference, a judgment concerned not only what the object is, but what the situation is. Abductive inferences are essential in attributions of motive. Alfred Gell, the late British anthropologist, connects this form of hypothesis to inferences of social agency, typically following some logic that “for any

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agent, there is a patient, and conversely, for any patient, there is an agent.” \(^{417}\) Gell’s famous example was the richly ornamented war-canoes of the Trobrianders. He argued that the purpose of this ornamentation was to inspire fear, for the inhabitants of the invaded islands who saw the canoes coming ashore would make the abductive inference that whoever was able to make such an elaborate design would surely be more powerful than themselves. In the same way, the passion of “joy” leads to the imaginative inference of a “bringer of joy.” Theseus’ second example is similar, showing a kind of inferential humor leading to an interpretation that justifies a passion, as if it is night, and “imagining some fear,/How easy is a bush supposed a bear!” Fear looks to interpret a situation by making hypotheses that would justify this fear.

Third, the melancholic’s imaginative capacity for composition was precisely the topical ability to isolate and rearrange predicates. The civil hermeneutic sees the melancholic's compositional power of “strong imagination” as disordered because it produces new, non-existent objects, created through the joining together of predicates. Burton says that melancholics’ strong imagination leads them to construct “many chimeras, antics, golden mountains and castles in the air.” This poetic, inventive power of the melancholic imagination is registered as a symptom only when the composed phantasm becomes an object of a passion, fearing or loving what is non-existent, formed from a topical imagination. The imagination operates upon the same model that Agricola posed for the topics: it is through comparison that it composes. Its primary method of discovery is the similitude. We find this in the typical discussion of imaginations of impossible things, such as a “golden mountain.” The metonymic composition of the fictive beings depends upon the composition of diverse sense experiences, since “unless we have seen gold and a

mountain, we cannot imagine a golden mountain...[and] unless we had seen a lion, a goat, and a serpent, it would be impossible to imagine a chimera.”\textsuperscript{418} This returns us to the “brow” of the Egyptian. Just as Sennert argued that in making the chimera, the imagination fashioned together the parts of other sense-impressions, so too does the lover's imagination compose the face of the beloved from a variety of sources.

Whereas in the civil hermeneutic, the passion is the motive as a cause of the action whose image is its end, for the melancholic, the passion is the final cause of a topical elaboration of the imagination itself. That is, the melancholic's motive is not towards a discrete action. Instead, she adopts the melancholy topics, described in the previous chapter, to extend her passion into an imaginative interpretation of any situation. The melancholic's failure to conform to a civil strategy of passion and the occlusion of its causes are two moments of the same phenomenon. The strategic motive has a clear and distinct image of its end; strategic reasoning, often appearing as “reason of state” in the theater, subordinates the instrumentality of action towards this goal. However, the imagistic component of the melancholic's motive is the seed of questions. Burton says that the “moving faculty” can be divided into two causes: the “end is the object, which is desired or eschewed; as in a dog to catch a hare, &c,” while the “efficient cause in man is Reason, or his subordinate Phantasie, which apprehends good or bad objects.”\textsuperscript{419} Here Burton points out a potential division between the object of desire and the “subordinate phantasy” of the subject. The

\textsuperscript{418} “Et quamvis aureum montem & Chimæram imaginemur quae nunquam tota vidimus, tamen secundum partem ea percepimus. Et nisi aurum & montem conspexissemus, aureum montem imaginari non possemus. Sic nisi leonem, capram, draconem vidisset, Chimæram imaginari impossibile esset.” Sennert, \textit{Institutiones}, 111.

\textsuperscript{419} \textit{AM}, 1.154 [1.1.2.8].
melancholic, rather than seeking to apprehend the good or bad of an object of action as part of deliberation, instead subordinates the fantasy to her passion.

Many of the most confounding passages in Shakespeare's works resolve back to the question of imagination that—to the modern—seems to erupt in the middle of a discourse without reason. Recall Mark Antony's speech that comes just before his suicide attempt. Speaking to his manservant Eros, Antony begins a wistful meditation upon cloud-gazing. The cloud may take on different forms, sometimes “dragonish;/A vapour sometime like a bear or lion,/A tower'd citadel, a pendent rock,/A forked mountain, or blue promontory/With trees upon't, that nod unto the world.”420 However, these clouds “mock our eyes with air”; their “signs” are only “black vesper's pageants.”421 This seems to be the rational distinction between appearance and reality. Yet Antony's reverie precipitates his drastic act: he assigns his own form to the phantasmic one: “here I am Antony/Yet cannot hold this visible shape.”422 In this, he finds support for his passion of despair, but the “subordinate phantasy” of the cloud is by no means the object of his action. Rather, the extreme passion that motivates suicide must discover the self as an imaginative object. The tragic action of self-slaughter cannot be accessed by the vision that only sees in the clouds the signs of rain. So too, the theater must train its audience to take its “pageants” as imaginative objects of their own passions and so be moved by the passions of actors.

5.3 Shakespeare's Melancholics

At this point we turn to an examination of melancholic characters in the works of Shakespeare precisely at the point where they resist the civil hermeneutic of their passions. Here the Shakespearean theater dramatizes a conflict between the civil topics of motive and the melancholic imagination. This appears in Shakespeare's works as a scene in which a melancholic and her companion argue about the cause of her passion. The topics of the causes of melancholy passion collide with a melancholic rhetoric. These debates not only index an attitudinal difference between the characters of the scene but are an oblique commentary on the way we should view theater itself. Which form of imagination—civil or melancholic—should lead us in our understanding of this human drama?

One of the earliest instances of the scenic formula of the “melancholic’s defense” is found in Richard II. Richard, still king, has left the palace to quell an Irish rebellion. Queen Isabel, entering with her attendants, comports herself mournfully. Bushy, a loyal servant, reminds her that she has promised the king she would “lay aside all life-harming heaviness/And entertain a cheerful disposition.”423 She responds that though she made this vow to please the king, but “to please myself I cannot do it: yet I know no cause.”424 She cannot think of any reason for her sadness other than Richard’s departure, but she feels that this cannot be the cause: her sorrow is “unborn” and her “inward soul/with nothing trembles: at some thing it grieves/More than with parting from my lord the king.”425 The stage is set for an emotional tribunal.

423 Richard II, 2.2.4.
424 Ibid., 2.2.5.
425 Ibid., 2.2.12-13.
Bushy prosecutes the case for the public cause: Richard’s absence has made the Queen sorrowful. Bushy’s case opens with a maxim: “Each substance of a grief hath twenty shadows.” The maxim, if taken on its own, would appear like a gesture of dismissal. Bushy develops it thematically, working out the opposition between “substance” and “shadow” as a division between the true and imagined cause. The shadow “shows like grief itself, but is not so.” The “shadow” is a standard metaphor for the imaginative cause of the passion. “Shadow” as a visual metaphor, allows Bushy to move to the image of the eye, which “expresses” sorrow in weeping, and it is in this expression that its proper function is distorted. Sorrow affects the imagination's ability to interpret perception, as “sorrow's eye, glazed with blinding tears,/Divides one thing entire to many objects.” He subtly connects the opposition of singular–plural (“Each substance” – “twenty shadows”) with the act of crying: many tears come from one sad occasion. This offers a metaphor for the distortion of perception: each tear acts something like a prism. While it does not obstruct vision, it multiplies the perceived object into a confusion of partial images.

Bushy wishes to convert the pageant of melancholic images that support the Queen's sorrowful passion into a single cause, and in so doing bring her within the civil hermeneutic appropriate to the court of the absent king. According to Bushy, the Queen, in imagining something in these shapes, moves until she finds a standpoint that enables her to ‘distinguish form.’ Bushy compares this to “perspectives, which rightly gazed upon/Show nothing but confusion, eyed awry/Distinguish form.” This describes the painterly technique of anamorphosis. This

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426 Ibid., 2.2.14.
427 Ibid., 2.2.15.
428 Ibid., 2.2.17.
429 Ibid., 2.2.18-20.
technique, most famous to us from Hans Holbein’s *The Ambassadors*, was popular in Shakespeare's time. Holbein's painting can serve as an example of the type. The famous anamorphic skull in the painting’s lower region appears, from the frontal standpoint of true perspective, like an odd stain. Its form can only be seen by standing “awry.” The Queen, who is “Looking awry” on the King's departure, finds “shapes of grief, more than himself, to wail;/Which, look'd on as it is, is nought but shadows/Of what it is not.”430 The situation, “as it is,” can only be seen from the perspective that Bushy suggests, in which her passion is clearly motivated by “what is not,” that is, the King's absence.

After the conceit has reached its full elaboration, Bushy turns the sentence back into the particular circumstances of the Queen’s sorrow. Here we find another curiosity. The “substance” of grief is, in this case, *absence*. Bushy wishes to see this as the *real* absence of the King’s person. To look directly at an absence is to see nothing, or perhaps only the traces of a former presence, the “shadows of what is not.” To look “awry” upon the departure is to allow one’s eyes to travel in the projected direction of the departed. Curiously, it is precisely this performance of attachment which would cause the Queen to think her woe has an object other than the King, since this produces the anamorphic illusion. Bushy is thus quite artfully able to maintain a complex set of commitments: he must, by the bidding of the king, ensure the Queen is not sad; at the same time, he must confirm the propriety of her sorrow when he addresses the claim that her sadness does not refer to the king, which is its only proper object. So he must find a way to show the Queen that her sadness is unreasonable and also should be put aside.

430 Ibid., 2.2.25.
The Queen's response is an articulation of another image of absence with which she identifies her passion. Her sorrow is not caused by the absence of a king, but is established through an imagination of “what is not.” Isabel concedes the plausibility of Bushy's account, but maintains her claim: “my inward soul/Persuades me it is otherwise.”

Whatever the cause, she cannot end her sadness, since “thinking on no thought I think” she “with heavy nothing faint[s] and shrink[s].” Here she turns Bushy's dismissal of her sorrow as “nothing,” showing that thinking on “nothing” has effects; she is deprived of something vital, becomes fearful, and “heavy,” beginning a play on the idiom of pregnancy she will play on through the rest of her speech. This is, of course, a speech written by a man and used to suit the problems of the play: Richard is heirless. However, it also points up a certain kind of melancholic knowledge. Just as in pregnancy before the modern era, one knows one is “heavy” without knowing anything about the child-to-be. Bushy, almost comically given the overtly conceit-laden style of his own speech, calls this “nothing but conceit.”

This prompts the Queen to state her own case:

'Tis nothing less: conceit is still derived
From some forefather grief; mine is not so,
For nothing had begot my something grief;
Or something hath the nothing that I grieve:
'Tis in reversion that I do possess;
But what it is, that is not yet known; what
I cannot name; 'tis nameless woe, I wot.

431 Ibid., 2.2.28-29.
432 Ibid., 2.2.31-32.
433 Ibid., 2.2.33.
434 Ibid., 2.2.34-40.
This sentence, a heaping up of anacolutha, develops an opposition borrowed from Bushy, but stripped of its courtly images. Shadow becomes simply nothing, and substance becomes something. The movement between this pair rests upon an implicit image of pregnancy, already introduced in her prior speeches. This image imbues each clause with a double meaning which is never fully unfolded. First, we must hear “conceit” both in its sense of a rhetorical device and as sexual conception, a sense still present to the early modern ear. We can understand the Queen’s response (‘Tis nothing less) in light of this double entendre: to admit that it is conceit is not to say that it is nothing but that it is the beginning of something. It is not less than what might be born. The next use of it foregrounds the rhetorical sense: “conceit is still derived from some forefather grief.” We should hear the possibility of a hyphen between “still” and “derived”: that is, the poetical conceit is stillborn, the abortion of a sad occasion that is its father. Her own grief is unique—it is parthenogenic. Here we can hear a faint allusion to Luke 2:35, Nicodemus’ prophecy to the Virgin Mary: “Yea, a sword shall pierce this soul also, that the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed.” This is a figuration of a mystical sympathetic union between the King and Queen of England, as between Christ and Mary, the Queen of Heaven. She plays upon the image of virginal pregnancy further: “nothing had begot my something grief.” The next clause completes a chiasmus but shifts the image. Now, the something—her conception—holds the nothingness she feels. To “possess in reversion” means to be written into a will. The property reverts to the willed party upon the death of the holder. Recalling again Nicodemus’ prophecy, the sadness will become the possession of the virgin mother upon the death of her child. What she carries is yet unknown, and precisely because of this, cannot be named: like children, grief can only be named upon its birth. Yet this very namelessness is proper to the feeling, and so becomes its name: “‘tis nameless woe,
I wot.” The Queen's elaborate metaphorizing of her passion is at once a rejection of Bushy's understanding of the civil situation and a far more astute rendering of it. Her woe is “nameless” in that it cannot be born: what is crucial to the situation is not what is happening, but what has failed to happen.

The Queen's sorrow inverts the Ciceronian understanding of sorrow as an opinion of a “present evil.” Her sorrow, as she articulates it, is rather like an absent good. Bushy's civil hermeneutic attempts to render absence as a motive of passion that is no different from the discrete objects of conventional fear and desire. This has the comforting corollary that it may be corrected in time, as the absence of the king is removed once he is made present again. But the Queen's “nameless woe” arises from absence itself. Its image is the imaginative support for a passion that has no corresponding object in the situation. Yet the concealed presence of an unborn child is also marked by the quickening of something—or here, nothing—to come. The Queen eloquently speaks to her strange feeling of a premonition that includes a feeling for the future without imagining any specific outcome. Whereas the civil hermeneutic prides itself on its ability to calculate possible futures from present indications, the Queen’s melancholy hermeneutic defends feeling as a sign that exceeds and is not bound by knowledge of the present.

Where the mournful melancholy of the Queen requires her to invent an image to justify it against the civil hermeneutic, the melancholy lover's imagination invents a beloved to support his passion. Here, however, the beloved is not simply a metaphor, for Romeo’s two loves, Rosalind and Juliet, are both real. But Romeo’s love-melancholic rhetoric shows that the imaginative object of his love adventitiously makes use of the qualities of these two girls for the support of his all-consuming passion. Though Rosalind never appears on stage, her presence in the play is decisive for orienting us to the melancholy nature of Romeo’s love. His profound, mad, and unrequited
love for her is quickly followed by his brusque dismissal of his previous devotion upon meeting Juliet. Romeo is in love less with Juliet than the passion of love itself.

In the opening act of *Romeo and Juliet*, Romeo’s cousin, Benvolio, discusses Romeo’s strange behavior with his mother. Romeo has been found weeping in the morning, and “[a]dding to clouds more clouds with his deep sighs.” 435 As the sun rises he “in his chamber pens himself,/Shuts up his windows, locks far daylight out/And makes himself an artificial night.” Lady Montague fears for her son, “Black and portentous must this humour prove,/Unless good counsel may the cause remove.”436 The plan, then, is to discover the cause of Romeo’s melancholy and to seek to remove it. Soon enough it is found that Romeo is in love with one Rosalind who does not return his affection.

Romeo’s cousins have misapprehended the cause of Romeo’s melancholy by presuming he suffers from love of Rosalind. This leads to their plan to take him to a party, no less one thrown by their enemies, the Capulets, hoping that meeting other girls will dispel his gloominess. Rather, Romeo is moved by the imagination of love, one that may move from one individual to another. Though at the start of the play he loves Rosalind beyond all, he tells us after meeting Juliet that he has “forgot that name, and that name's woe.” 437 Indeed, he is a typical, almost parodic vision of the youthful melancholy lover. Mercutio mocks him for this: “Romeo! humours! madman! passion! lover!/Appear thou in the likeness of a sigh.”438 His love is bound up in metaphor: “Now will he sit under a medlar tree,/And wish his mistress were that kind of fruit/As maids call medlars,

435 *Romeo and Juliet*, 1.1.123.
436 Ibid., 1.1.130-132.
437 Ibid., 2.3.36.
438 Ibid., 2.1.7.
when they laugh alone.” 439 Though Romeo overhears this, he goes on to soliloquize in just this manner: “O, that I were a glove upon that hand./That I might touch that cheek!” 440 When Romeo walks “underneath the grove of sycamore/That westward rooteth from this city side,” Klaus Bartenschlager has argued we must hear the “sycamore” as a pun on “sick amour.” 441

The misapprehension of imagination’s power is the tragic significance in Mercutio’s Queen Mab speech. Romeo and Mercutio argue over the truth of dreams. The fairy Queen Mab “gallops night by night/Through lovers' brains” so that they “dream of love,” on “courtiers’ knees” who dream of “curtsies straight,” the fingers of lawyers who “dream on fees” over “ladies’ lips” who “on kisses dream,” and so on. 442 Queen Mab, then, is precisely the conjunction of spirits that move an organ and the image-object they are moved towards. She is motive in an allegorical form. Mercutio’s position is that the fantasies of dreams are false insofar as they are non-existent, reflecting the desires of the dreamers. But it is precisely the devaluation of these desires that leads him to miscalculate. When Romeo begs him to end his litany because he “talks of nothing,” he retorts that he does, because he talks of “dreams…nothing but vain fantasy.” 443 Romeo is a melancholic lover, whose object revolves around the particular beauty and virtues of the beloved. In the treatises on the passions, motion was always imagined as locomotion. Yet, as the melancholic’s imaginative object was not deictic, it could not project its motive into the locomotion

439 Ibid., 2.1.34-36.
440 Ibid., 2.2.24-25.
442 Romeo and Juliet, 1.4.71-75.
443 Ibid., 1.4.97.
that would follow in the simple case of the concupiscible animal passions. Instead, the motion of
the spirits provoked by the passionate response to the imagination itself serves as the motive.

Juliet, by contrast, is also in love, but preserves the sense of civil appearance as distinct
from passion. Juliet remains torn between love and reason: She tells Romeo that though “joy[s]”
in him, she has “no joy of this contract to-night.” The formation of the compact has come
directly on the heels of their meeting, and so “is too rash, too unadvised, too sudden;/Too like the
lightning, which doth cease to be/Ere one can say 'It lightens.'" Juliet maintains the awareness
that Romeo’s passion may simply be hot-bloodedness; time must test whether it perdures. She tells
him that if his “bent of love be honourable,” he should send her word tomorrow. It is not entirely
surprising that it is Romeo rather than Juliet that is marked this way. In fact, we see that Juliet is
quite right to question the ardor of Romeo’s passion, as his attachment to her immediately ends
his devotion to Rosalind.

The melancholy of the Queen is dominated by sorrow, and Romeo’s by love. In this is
recognizable still the less complex shading of the humor character or even the allegorical motive-
figures of the earlier theatrical era. But Shakespeare's most complex melancholics, Hamlet and
Antonio, we find that their passions are complexly mixed. To grasp this complexity requires a
deeper reading of Antonio's melancholy as functioning as a motive within the play. The opening
lines of *The Merchant of Venice* set forth Antonio as a melancholic whose sadness is “without
apparent occasion.” He confides to his companions that he is confused about the cause of his
sorrow:

444 Ibid., 2.2.116-17.
445 Ibid., 2.2.118-20.
In sooth, I know not why I am so sad:
It wearies me; you say it wearies you;
But how I caught it, found it, or came by it,
What stuff 'tis made of, whereof it is born,
I am to learn;
And such a want-wit sadness makes of me,
That I have much ado to know myself.446

His companions, the similarly-named Salarino and Salanio, puns on the Italian salaario or wages, offer competing hypotheses on the cause of Antonio’s sadness. They first suggest that his occupation as a merchant is the source of his sadness. His mind is “tossing on the ocean” with his investment abroad. The fear of shipwreck or other misfortune could “out of doubt” make one sad.447 Salarino suggests that Antonio is dogged by all the similitudes of this possibility, as when one blows upon one’s soup to cool it makes one think of “[w]hat harm a wind too great at sea might do,” or in going to church and looking upon its stony façade one might “bethink…straight of dangerous rocks” that would “touching but my gentle vessel's side,/....scatter all her spices on the stream.”448 In every case, Antonio’s sadness ultimately turns upon “his merchandise.” Antonio rebuffs these suggestions, saying that his “ventures are not in one bottom trusted,/Nor to one place.” He has limited his risk through diversification, and he has not risked his “whole estate/Upon the fortune of this present year.”449 He is clearly a prudent merchant.

Salarino then moves on to another possibility: Antonio must be in love. This suggestion is immediately, and perhaps angrily, dismissed by Antonio. Salarino then jests, if in some frustration,

446 The Merchant of Venice, 1.1.1-7.
447 Ibid., 1.1.8, 21-22.
448 Ibid., 1.1.31-33.
449 Ibid., 1.1.42-44.
that Antonio is sad because he is “not merry.” There is to be no cause other than Nature having “framed strange fellows” who either “laugh like parrots at a bag-piper” or have “such a vinegar aspect/That they’ll not show their teeth in way of a smile,/Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable.” That is, there is no other cause but a melancholy temperament. Antonio is sad...just because. Salarino’s solution is clearly inadequate. The humor in the theater is, as we have seen in the treatises, only a partial motive, giving a tendency and manner to a character’s actions. Scholarship has been keenly pointed on the most evident instances of “humors” in the theater, given an undue emphasis to the Jonsonian theory, in which humor “may by metaphor, apply itself/Unto the general disposition:/As when some one particular quality/Doth so possess a man, that it doth draw/All his affects, his spirits, and his powers, /In their confluctions, all to run one way,/This may truly be said to be a humour.” The Jonsonian humors comedy is closely tied to the tradition of commedia dell’arte, where the zanni of traveling troupes played in the masks of stock characters. However, it is within the works of Shakespeare that imagination becomes a central feature of character motives. After Salarino and Salanio have offered the most conventional of imaginative motives for sadness—money worries or love troubles—they have exhausted their possibilities. Salanio’s reliance upon humoral theory is here not insight but its dearth.

We hear of the two guesses of Antonio’s melancholy, his “merchandise” and love, both of which he rejects. Commentators have missed the important pivot in the very next exchange of dialogue. Bassanio tells us that he owes the most to Antonio “in money and in love.” Gratiano had

450 Ibid., 1.1.45-47.
451 Ibid., 1.1.54-56.
452 Jonson, Every Man, 104-115.
guessed wrongly at the cause of Antonio's melancholy because he said or rather than and. It is not the desire of money or love, but the fact that he is owed both. This is an insoluble debt—one cannot lend money out of love. This, of course, is precisely why Antonio hates Shylock, who lends at a rate. For the same reason, Shylock hates him, for he lends “out money gratis and brings down/The rate of usance here with us in Venice.” But Antonio also violates the civil form of hate, for “[e]ven there where merchants do most congregate” he “rails” against the “sacred nation.” The two things “owed” to Antonio are at odds with one another. Bassanio claims that it is from Antonio's love that he has “a warranty/To unburden all my plots and purposes/How to get clear of all the debts I owe.” Antonio tells Bassanio that this explanation is unnecessary; he only “spend[s] but time/To wind about my love with circumstance.” Here we should recall that circumstance is a topical argument, a situating of an argument within the conditions of specific persons, place, and time. Antonio's “unconditional” love is a love that ignores, and is even offended, by any motive that would require these particularities. It does “more wrong” than if Bassanio had “made waste of all” Antonio's wealth.

The imaginative problem in Antonio’s motive is the confusion that leads him to see a loan as an act of love. The question of Antonio’s love for Bassanio need not decide whether it was paternal, friendly, or erotic. Instead, what is crucial is to understand its place within a logic of exchange. From the emerging economic rationality, Antonio’s interest-free loans are non-sensical. Antonio misunderstands the nature of exchange, assuming a position in which he remains a non-

453 *The Merchant of Venice*, 1.3.44-47.
454 Ibid., 1.1.134-36.
455 Ibid., 1.1.155-56.
party. “I neither lend nor borrow/By taking nor by giving of excess,” he says, but we see him doing this precisely at the moment of asking Shylock for a loan—for he is giving here far in excess of what he has.\textsuperscript{456} It is only the motives of others, in his mind, that he serves, or as he says, he borrows “to supply the ripe wants” of Bassanio. As Salanio says elsewhere, “he only loves the world for him.”\textsuperscript{457} (Bassanio himself says: “I have engaged myself to a dear friend,/Engaged my friend to his mere enemy,/To feed my means.”\textsuperscript{458}) At the same time, he does not free himself from economic rationality. Antonio does freely give his money to his friend, but nevertheless it is not a free gift. It is understood that the money is to eventually be repaid. What is to be returned is the identical amount. Yet, he is beholden to Shylock for either the amount or a pound of flesh. Flesh is the “currency” of exchange in the erotic relationship, but here it emerges within the economic, subjected to its absurd logic of precise exchange, a logic that will ultimately undermine the contract.

Antonio's motive is precisely this uncertainty of meaning: he wishes to maintain the metaphoric similarity between debt and erotic commitment as if it were really identical. This entails a radical generosity towards the beloved. For this, Antonio, moved by a passion ambiguously erotic or friendly, gives away the very means for his ability to act. Antonio tells Bassanio that “My purse, my person, my extremest means,/Lie all unlock'd to your occasions.”\textsuperscript{459} There is a danger here for modern readings of taking passion as passivity. Daniel, despite having reproached other critics for reading out an answer to Antonio's motives, goes on to diagnose him

\textsuperscript{456} Ibid., 1.3.385-6.
\textsuperscript{457} Ibid., 2.8.50.
\textsuperscript{458} Ibid., 3.2.268-70.
\textsuperscript{459} Ibid., 1.1.145-6.
as a masochist. Yet something useful can come from taking Antonio’s plight as if it were told to us on the couch rather than from the stage. If we are to turn to Freud, we should not read *Mourning and Melancholia* once again, but rather a passage from his too-neglected work, “Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety,” where he describes the mechanism behind general inhibitions of the ego: “When the ego is involved in a particularly difficult psychical task, as occurs in mourning, or when there is some tremendous suppression of affect or when a continual flood of sexual phantasies has to be kept down, it loses so much of the energy at its disposal that it has to cut down the expenditure of it at many points at once.”

Antonio at once suppresses and expresses his erotic passion by converting it into the metaphor of “means”—deferring sexual ends to Bassanio’s own erotic adventure to woo Portia. Freud’s metaphor is all too apt. In such a case, the ego is placed in “the position of a speculator whose money has become tied up in his various enterprises.” Such a “general inhibition” of action “characterizes states of depression, including the gravest form of them, melancholia.” In this sense, Antonio is both an early modern and a modern melancholic, for, as Shylock puts it, “his means are in supposition.” Just as Antonio's economic means are invested abroad, so too his passionate “means” of motive are invested in an absent object, one that neither he nor anyone else can articulate.

Shylock is the motive foil to Antonio: where Antonio puts his “means in supposition,” Shylock makes means—in his case, money—his only image of an end. This has bizarre effects upon his imagined desires. Salanio and Salarino appear again in a parallel scene to question

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461 Ibid.

462 *The Merchant of Venice*, 1.3.17.
Shylock about his motive in enforcing the Antonio’s payment in flesh. He is overcome by “a passion so confused,/So strange, outrageous, and so variable.”463 They show their immunity to metaphoric meaning when Shylock, mourning his daughter Jessica’s elopement with a Christian—and many of his ducats—laments “My own flesh and blood to rebel!” Salanio replies, “Out upon it old carrion! Rebels it at these years?”464 He takes Shylock’s meaning of “flesh” rebelling in a literal sense; meaning that he feels lust. Shylock must gloss his metaphor: “my daughter is my flesh and blood.”465 Since he cannot have his daughter back, Shylock will at least take back his metaphorical due. Antonio’s flesh is also his flesh—in that he has contracted for it. At the same time, Shylock’s passion is “confused” because it refuses to recognize its own erotic element: his mourning for his late wife, Leah, and her memory. His two reminders of her—Jessica and his wife’s turquoise ring—have both been taken by a Christian man.

When it comes time to exact his payment from Antonio, the Duke of Venice tells Shylock that he expects that his pressing of the payment of his bond in flesh is a “fashion of…malice,” that is, a show that he is playing until the final moment, when he will “show thy mercy and remorse more strange” than his “strange apparent cruelty.”466 Shylock persists. His motive is real, even if he cannot account for its reason: “You'll ask me, why I rather choose to have/A weight of carrion flesh than to receive/Three thousand ducats: I'll not answer that:/But, say, it is my humour: is it answer'd?”467 We might reply, no. The humor is not the answer. But in this case, we see that the

463 Ibid., 2.8.12-13.
464 Ibid., 3.1.29.
465 Ibid., 3.1.30.
466 Ibid., 4.1.20-21.
467 Ibid., 4.1.41-43.
resort to humor is not an inability to account for his reason but a refusal to disclose it. We have already seen his reasons for hating Antonio—he has insulted Shylock and the other Jews of Venice publicly and regularly and his lending of money gratis has brought down the rate or usury. (Antonio is “wont to lend money for a Christian courtesy.” And “I hate him for he is a Christian,/But more for that in low simplicity/He lends.” 468) We also know that he has been incensed by the loss of his daughter and part of his fortune. Indeed, in the scene where he calls her his own “flesh” we can now see that Shylock, too, has a metaphor as his motive: he wants Antonio’s flesh as a replacement for his loss of Jessica, his “flesh.” In this way, Shylock is the foil to Antonio in his subjugations of ends to means, as when we hear him say after his final judgment: “you take my life/When you do take the means whereby I live.” 469 Whereas Antonio has confused the ends with his means, Shylock has substituted means for end. Whatever his passion is, he imagines its satisfaction as some form of payment. This means his motive-imagination takes on grotesque forms where the logic of payment is mixed with the cause of his passion; his grief at his daughter’s rebellion will be satisfied when she is returned to “dead at my foot, and the jewels in her ears.” The metaphor also emerges when his desire for revenge against Antonio is made out in the terms of a payment of a “pound of flesh.”

When the courtroom scene begins, Antonio calls himself “a tainted wether of the flock,” recalling the Biblical mandate Shylock uses to authorize their deal. In a dispute between Laban and Jacob about the division of the forthcoming litter of lambs, they come to an agreement that the “eanlings,” or kids, “which were streak'd and pied” would all be of Jacob's. Jacob then takes “rods

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468 Ibid., 1.3.34-36.
469 Ibid., 4.1.368-9.
of green poplar, and of hazel, and of the chestnut tree, and pilled white strakes in them, and made
the white appear in the rods.” Because the sheep were “in heat before the rods,” they “brought
forth young of parti-color, and with small and great spots.”

Antonio imagines that, like the sheep of the Biblical fable, he has been impressed with the
mark of his own melancholic conceit. It was believed in both the ancient and the early modern
world that a pregnant woman might affect the appearance of her child based upon what she saw.
This theory, known as maternal impression, was extended in Renaissance medicine of what was
imagined, as we find in Burton. Pregnant women may produce “moles, warts, scars, harelips,
monsters,” caused by the “force of a depraved phantasy in them: Ipsum speciem quam animo
effigiat, faetui inducit: She imprints that stamp upon her child which she conceives unto herself.”

Antonio's allusion here adds layers of complexity. A “wether” was a castrated ram; Antonio marks
himself as one that cannot pursue love himself. Those who have interpreted this passage
overliterally—arguing that Antonio fears the pound of flesh taken from him will itself be
castration, a kind of anti-Semitic play upon circumcision—mistake here. Shylock is explicit about
removing the pound of flesh from Antonio's chest: that is, his heart. The “tainted” quality is both
an allusion to the spotted streaks of the newborn lambs and to the form in which it was generated:
through the imagination. When the imagination is “very apprehensive, intent, and violent, it sends
great store of spirits to, or from the heart, and makes a deeper impression, and greater tumult, as
the humours in the Body be likewise prepared, and the temperature itselfe ill or well disposed, the

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471 AM, 1.252 [1.2.3.2]
passions are longer and stronger." Shylock's removal of Antonio's heart is the literal realization of the metaphoric motives of both men.

By the play's conclusion, the two motive logics of economic and affectionate value are brought to a head. Portia gives Bassanio a token or her love with a ring before he returns to Venice to prevent Antonio’s death at the hands of Shylock. She gives him the ring, warning him that it will “presage the ruin of...love” if he gives it away. Bassanio replies “when this ring/Parts from this finger, then parts life from hence:/O, then be bold to say Bassanio's dead!” The ring is ambiguous in its value, as it is both a piece of material wealth and a symbol of the bond of love. This comes into play when, Portia, in disguise, resolves Antonio's problem by enforcing a literalist interpretation of the law; Shylock must take only a pound of flesh, no more and no less, or else forfeit his life. The impossibility of this forfends Antonio's doom. After this, she and Nerissa, her maidservant, decide to test their husbands, Bassanio and Gratiano respectively, by demanding in payment the rings they gave them as sworn tokens of ever-abiding affection. Antonio has said, after being saved, that both he and his friend “stand indebted, over and above,/In love and service...evermore,” to the judge. Being pressed to accept some reward, the disguised Portia asks for gloves from Antonio and Bassanio’s ring, which she asks to have “for his love.” After he explains that this was a gift from his wife, Portia retorts that “if your wife be not a mad-woman,/And know how well I have deserved the ring,/She would not hold out enemy for ever,/For
giving it to me.” Antonio urges Bassanio to let the judge’s “deservings” and his own “love” to be “valued against” his wife’s commandment.

Though sometimes accounted as the third of a triple plot, we should instead read the ring scene as the resolution of the motive confusion between gifts of love and of payments initiated by Antonio at the play’s beginning. The men rejoin Portia and Nerissa. No longer in disguise, the women demand explanations for why they are not wearing their rings. After hearing their explanations, Portia claims that she too will be as “liberal” as Bassanio with the doctor of the law, not denying him either “body nor...husband's bed.” Antonio inserts himself here, saying he is the “unhappy subject of these quarrels.” This is just: it is Antonio's position as both bond and bondsman that has led to the disruption of this other exchange of ring as res and res significans. The resolution is in the false nature of the exchange: Portia and her servant Nerissa were only in disguise: the rings were not given away, but given back. Although Bassanio's motive has been tested, the exchange has not occurred. Portia and Nerissa, to the astonishment of their husbands, give them back their rings. The women's ability to inhabit both the civil and private roles allows for the end of the cycle that began with Antonio's liberality.

Yet the comic ending and the revelation of the disguises does not unravel the sadness of Antonio nor the grief of Shylock. Although Antonio's argosies return, making him a wealthy man, and Shylock, however diminished, remains alive, their passions remain a problem as we leave the theater. The civil logic of the gift is able to be resolved, but the emerging logic of the loan has no

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475 Ibid., 4.1.442-4.
476 Ibid., 5.1.228.
477 Ibid., 5.1.238.
termination. Indeed, it is precisely the ambiguous status of lending that upsets the civil passions. In Wright's treatise, he names gift-giving as a motive to love, but then pursues this through fourteen “circumstances.” Two are especially interesting for reading *The Merchant of Venice*: if the gift were “given by our Enemies” or if “the Person by giving was endangered or endamaged.”

In the case of a gift given by an enemy, “the value of the gift...most effectually moveth to love: for, bestowing benefits upon our enemies, we heape burning coales upon their heads, able to consume and drie to dust all the malignitie of malicious enmitie...for as benefits at enemies hands were not deserved, so being bestowed they deserve to be loved.” Love here is the payment one expects to receive from an enemy. Wright's image is telling: the gift is a kind of punishment able to be described as a “remedy”—the “hot coal” of a gift forces the enemy into a situation in which he cannot maintain civil hatred, even if his personal enmity remains. In the other case, where the “Giver, to doe us good, depriveth, not onely himselfe of the gift hee giveth, but thereby he incurreth some great peril, danger, or evill.” He compares this to the Biblical account of Ahimelech, who has put to death for showing hospitality to David while he was fleeing King Saul. The valuation of the gift is increased by whatever degree of “greater perill, or grievouser evill” its giving incurs. It is precisely these excess valuations that emerge from the civil logic of the gift disrupt exchange. It is Antonio's “surplus” value of his risking his life that ends up becoming a demand for Bassanio to give away his ring; how could one refuse any price for the salvation of someone's life when that life has been “lent” precisely to win you the ring? At the same time, the whole enterprise becomes

479 Ibid., 251.
480 Ibid.
ridiculous; Antonio's risk was taken precisely to help Bassanio win his love, and now it is jeopardized by giving back the ring. In the same way, when Antonio tells Shylock not to lend him money as a friend, but rather to “lend it rather to thine enemy,/Who, if he break,...mayst with better face/Exact the penalty,” allows the “burning coals” to be returned and heaped upon his own head.481

5.4 The Baroque Theater as Collective Imagination

When we come in Hamlet to the play-within-the-play, Hamlet takes on the role of interpreter, whispering to Ophelia the meanings of the action of the puppet's “dumb shows,” before the main action begins. “You are as good as a chorus,” she tells him. “I could interpret between you and your love, if I/could see the puppets dallying,” he replies.482 To “interpret” was a term of art for the ventriloquism of the time, that is, the dialogue given to puppets by their master. The bawdiness of this line has long been noted, but its significance in Hamlet's vision of theater has not. If we accept that Ophelia's love is Hamlet, as all the previous exchanges between Ophelia and Hamlet have shown, the scene that Hamlet wishes to see is the very one he is engaged in: if only he could stand outside of it and watch himself and Ophelia as puppets.

Here we see the divergence of the Baroque tragedy from the classical; around the figure of the melancholic, the Baroque theater introduced a new form of theatrical irony. The irony is no longer between the knowledge of the characters and that of the audience, but instead the various

481 The Merchant of Venice, 1.3.133-5.
482 Hamlet, 3.2.246-7.
meanings that can be “interpreted” into the theatrical scene only by the audience, taking the scene as an image, appearance, a dream. When one is involved in an action, motives cannot be interpreted as they can in the theater, for only in the theater is one able to receive an action as an image. Insofar as the audience is able to recognize the mutually divergent possible interpretations of a scene, they are participating in the topical perception that the figure of the melancholic represents.

The reception of *Hamlet* has been of a piece with reflection on the nature of theater itself. My own reception has been no different in this. I have organized my understanding of the Baroque theater around the figure of the melancholic. In this, I offer a view that departs from significantly from some of its most influential receptions. Here I take up two, both of which treat the figure of Hamlet as an “enigma” that cannot be resolved within the play itself. The first is T.S. Eliot; the second Carl Schmitt.

In his famous essay, “Hamlet and His Problems,” Eliot’s characterizes Hamlet’s “problem”: he is “dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the facts as they appear.” Eliot thought this was an “artistic failure” on the part of Shakespeare. Hamlet’s passion he could not “drag to light, contemplate, or manipulate into art.” I strongly disagree: Shakespeare renders in Hamlet the quintessential melancholic, someone whose private drama does not match the scenes of social life. His passions are “without apparent occasion.” That the passion is in excess of the facts is not because, as Eliot claims, Shakespeare failed to grasp the need for an “objective correlative”; rather, the drama of melancholy is precisely that it poses a

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484 Ibid., 91.
problem concerning the motives of passions. In this, it is homologous to the problem, described in
the first chapter, that we find in Burton's catalogue of medical causes. Hamlet's melancholy has so
many possible causes so as to return us to Burton's catalogue: his love-sickness for Ophelia, his
betrayal by former friends ("loss of friends"), his grief, religious melancholy, his education,
excessive reading, ambition, anger, even the devil himself. Yet the drama of Hamlet's melancholy
is not simply the list of possible causes, but the attempt to discover these by other actors. As I have
sketched above, melancholy is essential to Hamlet's own problem of "being moved" within the
situation, but, in a double movement, it also serves as the motivations of those others—Gertrude,
Claudius, Polonius, Ophelia, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern—who variously try to determine the
true cause of his melancholy and madness.

For Eliot, the "only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an ‘objective
correlative.’" 485 Eliot imagines this as "a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall
be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate
in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked." 486 But the "immediacy" of
feeling limits the capacity of response only to the absolutely conventional. Eliot admits so much
by calling this a "formula." The artistic "inevitability" of a tragic work arises from the "complete
adequacy of the external to the emotion." Eliot recognizes that "the intense feeling, ecstatic or
terrible, without an object or exceeding its object, is something which every person of sensibility
has known; it is doubtless a study to pathologists." 487 This is a feeling that is typical of the

485 Ibid., 92.
486 Ibid.
487 Ibid., 93.
adolescent, while “the ordinary person puts these feelings to sleep, or trims down his feeling to fit
the business world.” But as I have argued in this chapter, it is precisely in this that the conflict
between the civil imagination, ready for the “business” of civil action, opposes the melancholic
passion that cannot be incorporated within its imaginative perception of action.

Carl Schmitt, the erstwhile-Nazi jurist and political theorist, like Eliot, believed that the
“incredible profusion of interpretations of Hamlet” could not be “solved by means of the contents
of the play, nor by tracing the threads of an isolated process.” However, Schmitt did not think
this was because the play was dramatically flawed but because it had to be explained through the
common historical understanding of its audience. He interpreted the play as if it were a roman à
clef of the political events of 1566 in which Gertrude was Mary Queen of Scots, and King Hamlet,
her murdered husband, Henry Lord Darnley, and Claudius, the assassin and later husband of Mary,
the Earl of Bothwell. But it is not only the many historical allusions in the play, nor the “true
mirror reflections” of historical events like the abovementioned. There is a third thing, which
Schmitt calls the “irruption” of history into the play. The first example of this is the argument that
despite the play avoiding the topic, Schmitt argues that Gertrude must be seen as guilty in light of
Mary Queen of Scots' guilt. Secondly, the fact that Hamlet refuses to play the role of avenger

488 Carl Schmitt, Hamlet or Hecuba: The Irruption of Time into the Play, trans. Simona Draghici (Corvallis,
OR: Plutarch Press, 2006), 43.
489 Ibid., 16.
490 Ibid., 12-18. It is interesting to note here that Eliot, however misguided in his judgment of Hamlet's
success, was a much better critic than Schmitt, recognizing that “[t]o have heightened the criminality of Gertrude
would have been to provide the formula for a totally different emotion in Hamlet; it is just because her character is so
reflects the fact that Mary's son, James Stuart, the future King of England and Scotland, failed to avenge his father. Schmitt supports this with the evidence that Hamlet's indecision is caused by “the paralysing question whether his father's ghost was a devil from hell or not.” 491 This is an “irruption” of time into the play, because James wrote “a demonology in which he posed the question of apparitions in the same manner as Shakespeare in Hamlet.” 492 (The explanation is hardly explanatory, since James' Daemonologie is quite forthright and not at all doubtful about the existence of demons.) The eruptions of time have a formative effect on Hamlet in two ways—“the taboo which occults the Queen's guilt, and the deflection of the avenger as type.” 493 The audience, in recognizing these two as related to their shared historical reality, experienced the tragic that no play can adequately represent.

Schmitt recognized the theater as a “public space,” but argued that this publicity is a strong limit on dramatic license, as “the audience no longer follows what is going on on the stage whenever the action departs too much from what the public knows and expects, and so becomes incomprehensible or absurd.” 494 In a much more sophisticated form, András Kiséry's argues in Hamlet's Moment that beginning “around 1600, drama as a form of popular entertainment and as the most influential secular public medium was instrumental in familiarizing its audience with negative and insignificant that she arouses in Hamlet the feeling which she is incapable of representing.” Eliot, “Hamlet,” 93.

491 Ibid., 25.
492 Ibid.
493 Ibid., 38.
494 Ibid., 31.
politics as a profession.”495 In reflecting on the reception of Hamlet, Kiséry notes that much of the interpretation of the play “has concentrated on ‘that within which passes show’ and how this relates to ‘actions that a man might play’—preparing us to reading it as a play about the tortured, inscrutable yet insistently scrutinized psyche, conscience, and intentions of Hamlet and of Claudius, about the secret of old Hamlet’s murder, about a world of spying and hiding behind the arras—about the consequences of things that are out of sight, about the threats they pose and how they might come to light.” In this he identifies the primary function of the theater's training of audience with a curiosity about the political. The play's constant concern with “foreign politics, diplomacy, correspondence, and travel” are all attempts to “control, represent, and negotiate that without which passes show, another privileged space which threatens to define or dramatically alter the situation that is in plain view.” Interiority and the foreign lands discussed in ambassadorial conversations and letters are “analogous spaces...spaces of potentiality where life’s future course is determined and prepared.”496 In one respect, Kiséry's argument and the massive erudition he summons to support it must be correct: the theater undoubtedly did train audiences not only in a kind of political speech but in a form of political interpretation of action. However, through the figure of the melancholic, it at the same time showed the shortcomings of this view and what it was unable to assimilate to its hermeneutic. The imagination of the melancholic, whether or not we wish to describe it as “interior” is precisely a space in which a future course is not determined, but remains overdetermined in a topical sweat of possibilities.


496 Ibid., 132.
Schmitt's argument turns upon a clear demarcation between action and acting, premised upon his reading of the scene from Hamlet that opens this chapter, his reflection upon the player weeping for Hecuba. In *The Future of an Illusion*, Victoria Kahn takes up Schmitt's interpretation of theatricality and its relation to the political through a critical reading of *Hamlet or Hecuba*. She notes that “what’s strange about Schmitt’s reading of Hamlet and Hecuba— and the distinction between politics and aesthetics on which it rests—is that it is undermined by the very speech from Hamlet to which Schmitt alludes in the title of his book.”

Kahn mentions several times that Schmitt replies on the 1603 quarto, known to Shakespeare scholars as the “bad quarto,” as opposed to the more reliable editions of the second quarto and first folio. This has special relevance for us: the epigraph to Schmitt's book, drawn from this quarto, is precisely the line which includes Hamlet's question about the “motive and cue for passion” of the actor. In the 1603 quarto, this is flattened: “Why these Players here draw water from eyes:/For Hecuba, why what is Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba?/What would he do an[d] if he had my losse?/His father murdered, and a Crowne bereft him.”

In the “bad” quarto, the question of “motive” is flattened precisely into the conventional idiom of the civil imagination. Hamlet has lost his claim to power and a father. Such a loss calls, clearly, for revenge. Hamlet “imagines the player king with his own ‘motive' and 'cue for passion'—rather than a simple cue for action, as Schmitt reads the scene.”

Schmitt argues that “It is inconceivable that Shakespeare intended no more than to make his Hamlet into a Hecuba, that we are meant to weep for Hamlet as the actor wept for the Trojan queen.” If we were to weep

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498 *Hamlet* (1603), F1r.

with the player “it would prove that at the theatre we have other gods than in the marketplace or in church.” One might also say, at the gallows or on the pulpit.

Yet this ignores that Hamlet's response of self-reproach does not lead him to decisive action, but instead to put on a play. It is not the play itself that can give him “grounds more relative” but the passionate reaction of the audience, in this case Claudius, that will serve as proof of the meaning of the situation. The theater is a collective imagination whose meaning is the passions it engenders as responses to itself. The compositional function of the theatrical imagination was assigned to the playwright and actors. It is to this that Theseus alludes when he puts the poets among those of “strong imagination,” the one who write the “occasions” for the “airy nothings” that are the characters and situations. It is under this description that Puck's famous closing speech, from the same play, takes on significance. Speaking directly to the audience, he says, “If we shadows have offended,/Think but this, and all is mended,/That you have but slumber'd here/While these visions did appear.” The “shadows” were the actors themselves, composed by the poet, but dreamt by the audience.

The melancholic character is decisive for the theater in his indecision. Hamlet speaks the maxim of the estimative imagination when he claims that, as mentioned above, “[n]othing's good or bad but thinking makes it so.” This is just after he has declared to an incredulous Guildenstern that Denmark is a “prison.” Rosencrantz and Guildenstern cannot scan this except in terms of conventional motives. Rosencrantz, now in the pattern familiar from the scenes described above,

500 Schmitt, *Hamlet or Hecuba*, 37.

501 *A Midsummer's Night Dream*, 5.ep.

502 *Hamlet*, 2.2.249-50.
where the companion explains the conventional cause of a melancholic passion: “Why then, your ambition makes it one; 'tis too/narrow for your mind.” Rosencrantz engages in the appropriate courtly rhetoric to the prince, indulging in a concealed form of flattery by construing his complaint as a sign of his virtue. The topic of invention deployed here is to look for a conventional motive that could explain the prince’s passion—ambition is a virtue that eulogizes the prince’s dark sentiment.

In the exchange that follows, we see more clearly perhaps than in any other passage in Shakespeare the conflict between the melancholic and the civil imagination. Hamlet rejects the courtier’s explanation, for even if he were “bounded in a nut shell” he could consider himself “a king of infinite space, were it not that I/have bad dreams.” The “infinite space” is the mind, which is, according to a resemblance between the walnut and the brain, bounded in a “nutshell”—that is, a skull. But this space is not free, as the melancholic imagination shows the dark, bitter sides of things. Guildenstern glibly rolls over this enigmatic sentence, saying that his “dreams indeed are ambition, for the very/substance of the ambitious is merely the shadow of a dream.”

The courtly rhetoric by which Guildenstern attempts to remake the situation into a conventional one—the discontent of an heir—is resisted by Hamlet, as a “dream itself is but a shadow.” For Hamlet, the imaginative quality of the passions alludes to a melancholic contemplation on the common transience of all things. The courtiers misconstrue this insistence on the unrealized nature of an ambitious desire. Acknowledging the imaginative nature of ambitious desire by calling it in a courtly inversion a “shadow of a dream,” Rosencrantz nevertheless preserves the character of

503 Ibid., 2.2.254-6.
504 Ibid., 2.2.257-9.
ambition as an orientation towards a potential object. The final exchange shows the impasse of the two attitudes towards motive:

   Rosencrantz: Truly, and I hold ambition of so airy and light a quality that it is but a shadow's shadow.

   Hamlet: Then are our beggars bodies, and our monarchs and outstretched heroes the beggars' shadows. Shall we to the court? for, by my fay, I cannot reason.  

   Hamlet's ironic conclusion, that he cannot “reason,” is instead his refusal to reason within the limits of the commonplace motives ascribed to reasoning about passion and action within the civil imagination. Hamlet has placed at the climax of this exchange of a rhetorical metaphor the supreme object of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s own ambitions: the monarchy is only the phantasm or “shadow” that moves so many “beggars”—the sycophantic courtiers—into a vain form of “reason.” What is at stake here is not only an interpretation of the scene’s situation but a fundamental attitude towards the reliability of all “situatedness.” Where the courtier approaches the situation as something requiring calculation, the melancholic disdains the conventionalism that gives the courtier his goal.

   In exchanges such as this one, the melancholic character trained the audience in seeing passion not only as the precondition for the locomotive action, but as a movement in itself, one that opposed the conventional estimations of good and bad. The struggle to define the meaning of an action is not able to be resolved by action itself, but only by a recognition of the role of imagination within action. But this is not a division between the interiority of the mind and the hard external realities of politics. Rather, the conflict arises between the civil imagination that does

505 Ibid., 2.2.261-5.
not account for its interpretive hermeneutics but takes them for granted and the melancholic imagination that recognizes that the “external” reality needs the support of the imagination in order to take on meaning.

The interpretive function of the imagination is seen in its full topical capacity only in the melancholic, not only in the constant allusion to seeing various forms in clouds, but in seeing in the nebulous actions of others something whose determination can always bring in another circumstance, another predicate. When Hamlet, prepared to kill Claudius, finds him at prayer, he envisions his own action differently having included this circumstance within it. To kill a praying sinner “is hire and salary, not revenge.”506 The meaning of an action is changed by the circumstance that would affect its passion: Hamlet would not perform revenge if he did not feel avenged. When the conventional ends of action are suspended, passion becomes purpose. And this is precisely to be an audience for the theater is to perform the melancholic act. One learns an imaginative habit there that makes all the world a stage.

The depths of Shakespeare's melancholic characters emerge in part because they performed the position of the audience member but brought it into the action. Alone among the critics, Walter Benjamin recognized that the “secret of [Hamlet's] person is contained within the playful [spielerischen], but for that very reason firmly circumscribed, passage through all the stages [Stationen] in this complex of intentions [intentionalen Raums], just as the secret of his fate is contained in an action [Geschehen] which, according to this, his way of looking at things, is

506 Ibid., 3.3.80.
perfectly homogenous." The stations of Hamlet's passion are those motive-spaces in which he encounters the possible causes others wish to attribute to his passion. There, in almost every scene where we find him, he performs his character in such a way that it is not Hamlet who is indecisive, but everyone else: we cannot be sure even to this day what the cause of his passion is. This is not a flaw in the play or the cause of a historical taboo, but the very problem that the melancholic poses, brought to its complete representation in the Baroque theater.

The contest between the civil and melancholic imaginations was not confined to the stage, however. England would erupt in civil war and the theaters would close. Rather than seeing this as a purtiancial ordinance against an institution deemed too sinful we should also understand it as a desire to suppress a rival to the imposition of a new civil order. Nowhere was the role of imagination in the construction of such an order expressed more clearly than in Thomas Hobbes’ civil philosophy. His *Leviathan* looked to create an order out of the diversity of citizen’s passions. For Hobbes knew that the objects of the passions were not uniform—only their motions were the same. Therefore, a collective civic image was needed to install into the common imagination in order to organize a commonwealth. It was this image, the image of the Leviathan, that he hoped would do this, supplanting forever the equivocal imagination of the theater and its indecisive melancholics.

Thus far, I have discussed melancholy primarily as a problem of discerning the causes of passions that were “without any apparant occasion.” I drew this phrase from Burton's definition of melancholy in his *Anatomy*. But it is now important to recall that this portion of the definition specified “fear and sadness” as the two “constant companions” of melancholy. While the sadness of the melancholic has implicitly served as the primary example of melancholic passion, I now turn to the passion of fear. The most influential and sustained thinking of the nature of fear, both in its typical manifestation and as something whose cause was unclear, is found in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. In this chapter, I argue that in Hobbes' vision of the state it is the collective cause of passion but not itself subject to passions. The essential problem, then, was to motivate the citizenry through fear without having them act from fear against the state. I argue that Hobbes' approached this problem through the iconology of the tyrant, the Baroque image of a ruler both feared and fearful. The suppression of the image of the tyrant is necessary to inaugurate a new civil imagination that includes in its chains of reasoning about motives fear of state-sanctioned punishment without conceiving of the state as a personal agent that might devolve into tyranny. Unlike Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Hobbes took the melancholic imagination’s power seriously and considered it a threat.
6.1 The Dynamics of Fear in Hobbes

Sensitive readers have often noted that beneath its geometry of obligation and authority, Hobbes' political philosophy is animated by fear. Some have even ventured that the fearful mood of this account of civic life is in no small measure Hobbes' own temperament rarified into a vision of the state. In his poetic *vita* Hobbes wrote

> And when my mother conceived me, also fear,  
> So that she bore twins: both fear and me together.\(^{508}\)

In saying that he was fear's “twin,” Hobbes alluded to the significance of his birth year. Hobbes was born in 1588, the year Spanish Armada attempted to invade England and overthrow the Queen. Hobbes was playing on the theory of maternal impression discussed in the last chapter, as if his mother's fear in her pregnancy has left him marked with fear in some way. However, Carlo Ginzburg argues that in this passage Hobbes confessed more than “a private weakness” but also “some pride at his decision to put fear at the center of his political philosophy.”\(^{509}\) It is in the movement of the individual passion to a common source of motive, the passage from fear to awe, that fear serves both as the original problem in founding a commonwealth and the ultimate means of its maintenance.

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\(^{509}\) Carlo Ginzburg, *Fear, Reverence, Terror: Five Essays in Political Iconology* (Florence: European University Institute, 2008), 2.
Reading the core sequence of Hobbes' political works running through *De Cive*, *De Homine*, and *Leviathan*, we find we can distinguish four different dimensions of fear. First, fear is flight. Hobbes' definition of fear in the *De Homine* as “aversion with the opinion of a coming evil” (*aversio cum opinione damni secuturi*) tracks closely to the Ciceronian notion of fear as an opinion of a future evil discussed in the previous chapter.\(^{510}\) We can understand fear's aversion in two ways: it is both the mental aversion from some possibility in mental deliberation and the real beginning of flight from some imagined harm. Hobbes' contribution was to identify these two moments, one imaginative and one embodied. His oft-quoted dictum that imagination is “first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion” should be understood within his broader argument in Chapter 6 of the first book of *Leviathan*. Indeed, the chapter's first section is entitled “Of the Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions, Commonly Called the Passions and the Speeches by Which They are Expressed.” Hobbes identifies both imagination and passion as the “beginnings” of voluntary motion. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this was a conventional view insofar as both imagination and passion were essential components of early modern understandings of the *vis motrix*. Hobbes also retains the notion that the imagination acts as an estimative power, providing “the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, evill; And of his contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable.”\(^{511}\) Hobbes' innovation was to fully identify this imaginative judgment of “things’ good and evill” with the locomotive force of passion. This in effect identifies the motion of the imagination with


\(^{511}\) *EW*, 3.41.
the motions of a passion. Whereas in Mercutio’s Queen Mab speech, we saw a disjunction between the parson’s dreamed desire of a “tithe-pig” and the “tickling” of his nose, Hobbes banishes all the fairy-work of this explanation, seeing in the image itself an insensible tickle that is felt in the organ through amplification. In Hobbes, the two moments of motive—bodily motion and image—are collapsed into one. He makes this explicit in his De Homine, where he writes that “the image or colour is but an apparition unto us of the motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance of the head.”512 The image of the passionate motive itself is the motion of the body.

Hobbes' theory of motive was based upon his general ontology of motion. The passions are the “Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions,” and so the seed of all motives.513 Passions could not be Stoically exorcised since “Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense.”514 Fear and desire are oppositely valued vectors in a counterfactual space. Animal motion reveals only the last “appetite in deliberation,” Hobbes deflationary definition of the will.515 Hobbes defined deliberation as when “in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions, Hopes and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately.”516 But they do not simply manifest in movement to and fro; rather, the minor motions

512 EW, 4.31.
513 Ibid., 3.38.
514 Ibid., 3.51. Cf. Introduction, 3.ix: “For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principall part within; why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life?”
515 Ibid., 3.52.
516 Ibid., 3.27.
of the passions in their first instance, a tug of motions within the mind, vie for control in the internal deliberation of mental discourse. For Hobbes, the imagination is the locus of motive, for the “small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR."\textsuperscript{517} Desires cannot defeat one another except through force; without fear, humans are rapacious and are led about by their lusts. Fear, then, is a refinement, even an education, of desire. Fear introduces the conditional into mental discourse; I want $x$, but that could lead to $y$. This changes desire from merely the start of locomotion into a grammatical unit, from the condition of motion to the apodosis, or the dependent clause, of a conditional proposition.

Fear transcends individual deliberations when we see it as the motivating condition for following the terms of an agreement. Fear then is a \textit{conditio sine qua non} for the emergence of transferals of right in contracts and covenants. Here, Hobbes was scaffolding his theory of motive into a polemic against the prevailing jurisprudential view. An important jurisprudential question in the disputes leading to the English Civil War concerned the validity of contracts made in a condition of fear. In Roman jurisprudence, the “exception from a cause of fear” (\textit{exceptio quod metus causa}) was considered a principle on which a contract might be voided. Hobbes addresses this doctrine directly. He holds that not only are contracts made from fear valid, but that the very institution of law proceeds from it. Since fear is the primary motive that leads citizens to fulfill their obligations, “a man sometimes pays his debt, only for \textit{feare} of Imprisonment, which because

\textsuperscript{517} Ibid., 3.39.
no body hindered him from detaining.”\textsuperscript{518} Voiding contracts made in fear would dissolve the possibility of a commonwealth.

Fear and liberty are consistent, a point Hobbes wryly makes by imagining someone at sea in a storm who not only is free to “throweth his goods into the Sea for feare his ship should sink,” but does this “very willingly.”\textsuperscript{519} This is because for Hobbes liberty is precisely the liberty to move, that is, to have unhindered locomotion. Political freedom is no different, save that the obstacles to motion are the laws. This is Hobbes' meaning when he says that the “Greatest Liberty of Subjects” is dependent upon the “silence of the laws.”\textsuperscript{520} Obligation comes from the transferal of this liberty to another since it is “DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act” of one's transferal of right.\textsuperscript{521} If fear is the negative value in a complex assessment of future possibilities, hope serves as the legitimation of what is done under fear. Indeed, it is a limitation on it. Self-defense is not a right one could transfer away because “there is no benefit consequent to such patience.”\textsuperscript{522} The motive and justification of all such transferals of right is “nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it.”\textsuperscript{523} The foundations of a contract do not tremble merely because one of the parties does.

If fear is the condition of obedience between individuals in a contract, it is also the condition for the foundation of a commonwealth, turning from the anxiety of individuals to the

\textsuperscript{518} Ibid., 3.197.
\textsuperscript{519} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{520} Ibid., 3.206.
\textsuperscript{521} Ibid., 3.119.
\textsuperscript{522} Ibid., 3.120.
\textsuperscript{523} Ibid.
collective motive for the construction of a common power. The mutual transfer of right is a contract, and the idea that Hobbes is famous for originating, the idea of a social contract, emerges from the ability of transferring this right not merely as an exchange but to a third party. In the constitution of a commonwealth, individuals contract to renounce their natural liberty and endow it in a sovereign representative. The contract made from fear is binding “in the condition of meer Nature,” but it is also in this condition that trust is weakest. A covenant made in the state of nature for which there is “any reasonable suspicion” of one party's delinquency is “Voyd” unless there is “a common Power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compell performance.” The institution of sovereign power not only frees the members of a commonwealth from the natural fear in a condition of war but also binds them in their trust of one another since the fear that one party will break its agreements falls below a threshold of reasonableness when there is redress to the civil power. That is, sovereign power is the centralization of fear. The sovereign is like the alchemical nigredo of fear, sublimating it from a force that disperses and atomizes individuals into one that binds them closely.

While accounts of Hobbes’ theory of fear tend to focus on its power to organize the state, it is an equal (if not greater) concern for Hobbes that fear of the sovereign may lead to civil unrest or even civil war. The institution of a common power as a solution to our fear of other individuals carries a risk: should we not fear this common power? When the sovereign power itself becomes an image of fear, the fear of the subjects may be organized into a new form of power that can challenge the state. On the one hand, as I have just argued, it is imperative to Hobbes' view of the

524 Ibid., 3.124.
525 Ibid.
commonwealth that the subjects fear the punishments of the sovereign power so that they do not disobey its laws. Yet another source of fear remained: the sovereign may be a tyrant. English political discourse's constant preoccupation with tyranny was deemed pathological by Hobbes; he dubbed it “Tyrannophobia.” The coinage is significant. Whereas Hobbes recognized that fear was an essential element in the construction and maintenance of a commonwealth, he felt that “tyrannophobia” would disturb the state. Among Hobbes' most memorable—and controversial—arguments was that “because every Subject is by this Institution Author of all the Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice.” The impossibility of sovereign injustice follows from Hobbes’ definition of justice as action pursuant to or not interfering with contract or covenant. The sovereign, as the author of all law in a commonwealth may therefore take any action whatsoever to preserve the power to enforce contracts and the security of the commonwealth. Since the sovereign power can create or annul law, its representative is not subject to civil law but only bound by the law of nature. While the sovereign

526 “In sum, I cannot imagine, how anything be more prejudicial to a monarchy, than the allowing of such books (that claim tyrannicide is lawful) to be publicly read, without present applying such correctives of discreet masters that are fit to take away their venom: which venom I will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad dog, which is a disease the physicians call hydrophobia, or fear of water. For as he that is so bitten, has a continual torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an estate, as if the poison endeavoured to convert him into a dog: so when monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those democratical writers, that continually snarl at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain tyrannophobia, or fear of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhor.” EW, 3.315-6.

527 Ibid., 3.163.
may be judged to act with “iniquity,” this moral dimension of action never invalidates political authority. The impunity of sovereign power was, needless to say, not a commonly-held belief in Hobbes' England. Parliament had not only limited but beheaded its sovereign in 1649, two years prior to the publication of *Leviathan*. Even the moderate parliamentarian wing of the conflict often argued that while monarchs may have prerogatives, tyrannical rule made these forfeit.

This fourth dimension of fear is the emergence of the problem of melancholy into the political philosophy of Hobbes. In a discussion of melancholy in *Leviathan*, Hobbes begins by linking the two typically melancholic passions of fear and sadness, saying that “Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears.” The “causeless” passions of melancholy, however, are of course not without cause, but caused by the individual's imagination. Yet, given that in Hobbes' theory passion always depends upon imagination, there is no hard line between passions and the madness of the melancholic. Madness, Hobbes argues, is simply a passion that is stronger or more violent than is normal. When vain-glory is continued one suffers from “Rage, and Fury.” In Hobbes' self-translation of *Leviathan* into Latin, Hobbes translates both with the single *furor*. Love, jealousy, self-conceit—all taken to excess become furor. Any too-great imaginative capacity becomes a threat of madness without the check of a good judgment. Hobbes' associates the freedom of imagination with a kind of motiveless style of discourse, for “without Steddinesse and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse; such as they have, that entering into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by everything that comes in their thought, into so many,

528 “You see then that the difference between injustice and iniquity is this; that injustice is the transgression of statute-law, and iniquity the transgression of the law of reason.” Ibid., 6.26.

529 Ibid., 3.62.

and so long digressions, and Parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves.” Those who let the imagination freely play are threatened to become, like Actaeon, the hunter of Greek myth who, punished by the goddess, became the prey of his own hunt.

If Hobbes disapproves of the melancholic individual's imaginative reverie, it nonetheless is clear that she poses a danger mostly to herself. However, in his section on melancholy, his concern with “causeless fears” immediately turns from individual to collective passions. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the theater, along with the pulpit and gallows, was a key site for the fomenting of public habits of linking imagination to passions. It is no accident, then, that Hobbes glosses the category of common madness with a classical anecdote about the effects of tragedy. In Abdera, during the "acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an extream hot day," many members of the audience fell into "Fevers," doing nothing but singing "Iambiques" until winter came. Hobbes assigns two causes for this: their madness arose "from the heat, and from The Tragedy together." Andromeda, let us recall, was sacrificed to the “sea monster”—surely no coincidence, then, that it is opposed to the Leviathan, the great Biblical sea monster.

The inspiration of collective fear may start from a single individual who communicates it to a collective. Hobbes give two telling instances of this process. One is that of the enthusiast, one who is “possessed of an opinion of being inspired.” When this passion is only “in one man,” it is “not visible...by any very extravagant action.” But when this passion takes hold of many who “conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible enough.”

\[531\] *EW*, 3.57-8.
\[532\] Ibid., 3.63.
\[533\] Ibid.
as the “first internall beginnings of voluntary motions” are not visible until they are amplified through a passion, so too we see that the opinion of one individual may remain invisible until it is amplified in the passionate body of the multitude. In a second example, Hobbes imagines how a group comes to be seized with “Panique Terror.” He defines this as “Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what…called so from the fables that make Pan the author of them; whereas in truth there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.”534 That is, one person’s fear of a phantasm is perceived by others who take it as evidence of a real reason to fear. This logic of collective fear is the same as that of “Tyrannophobia,” just as the movements stirred by the enthusiast are the same as those who lead a rebellion. The traditional image of the tyrant as plena metus or full of fear is the seed of a “panique terror” that grips the multitude and dissolves it into civil war.

Collective imagination may become a threat to the integration of the commonwealth and shows the need to create a state that serves to give a common, overriding cause to all civic motives. The ability to the control fearful imagination is thus a fundamental concern of the governing power in a commonwealth. I read the final book of Leviathan, on the “Kingdome of Darknesse,” as a systematic attempt to deal with the problem of imagination in a fearful polity. In this book, Hobbes describes fears arising from a condition of “darknesse,” that is, an error concerning the nature of images. Hobbes addresses this when he talks about the meaning of a “kingdome of darknesse” as

534 Ibid., 3.45.
“another power” beside “these Soveraign Powers, Divine, and Humane.” Here he embarks on an adventurous piece of scriptural interpretation. If Beelzebub is the “prince of darknesse, this means only that he is 'Prince of Phantasmes,'” and that “Inhabitants of his Dominion of Air and Darkness, the Children of Darknesse, and these Daemons, Phantasmes, or Spirits of Illusion, signify allegorically the same thing.” Darkness is the limitation and errors of the imagination. He lists four causes: misinterpretation of scripture, the belief in demons which are “but Idols, or Phantasmes of the braine, without any reall nature of their own, distinct from humane fancy,” the mixing of religion with philosophy, “especially that of Aristotle,” and finally mixing these with “uncertain Traditions...or History.” He believed that demonology originated because the “ancient pretenders to Naturall knowledge” did not discover the nature of sense, and so were unable “to conceive of those Images in the Fancy, and in the Sense, otherwise, than of things really without us,” that is, outside of our internal sensation. Spiritual darkness, then, is fear of phantasms. The melancholic is the figure of spiritual darkness.

To understand the connection between collective fear and the popular imagination, we must articulate more fully Hobbes’ theory of imagination. As in the previous chapter, Hobbes closely links his theory of passions to a theory of imagination. Yet Hobbes’ distinctive theory of imagination meant that he did not accept the conventional view of how imagination and passions become linked. Unlike those theorists who began by describing imagination as a power of the mind, Hobbes views sense and imagination as a continuum of sensation in time in which sense is

535 Ibid., 3.575.
536 Ibid., 3.603.
537 Ibid., 3.605.
538 Ibid., 3.637.
“originall fancy” and fancy, or imagination, is “decaying sense.” Imagination and memory “are but one thing” except that “Decaying Sense, when wee would express the thing it self, (I mean Fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I said before; But when we would express the Decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called Memory.” In the memorial imagination, the first degradation is the location and magnitude of the sensed object. The result is a patchiness of memory, the common experience in which “we lose (for example) of Cities we have seen, many particular Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances.” Memory and phantasm float freely in their own space.

Since imagination is “decaying sense,” it is often impossible to determine the difference between a dim perception, memory, and a wholly imagined object. Hobbes treats this problem when he discusses dreams. He concedes that “it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming.” In the dream, the senses are “benumbed” to outward impressions, and so dreams are images produced by “the agitation of the inward parts of mans body.” The distempers of the body, then, are productive of images that have the power to deceive us. Because of this, the confusion of dream images and waking experience is most liable to happen to someone “full of fearful thoughts; and whose conscience is much troubled.” This can also happen to the waking “if they be timorous, and superstitious, possessed with fearful tales,

539 Ibid., 3.3-4.
540 Ibid., 3.6.
541 Ibid., 3.5.
542 Ibid., 3.7.
543 Ibid., 3.8.
and alone in the dark.”544 Here Hobbes follows closely upon Burton’s discussion of fear as a cause of melancholy. Fear caused melancholy in that it made the “imagination conceave what it list...and tyrannizeth over our Phantasie more then [sic] all other affections, especially in the darke.”545 As the imagination produces images, it inclines us towards belief in their existence: “Quae metuunt, fingunt; what they feare they conceive and faigne unto themselves, they thinke they see Goblins, Hags, Divells, and many times become melancholy thereby.”546 Perception and imagination have no clear criterion of difference for the fearful. For Hobbes, this indistinction between dream, phantasy, and sense gave rise to the “Religion of the Gentiles.”547 With this phrase, Hobbes means the pagan religion that does not come from divine revelation, but one may also take it as a wink at Christianity itself. Or, more pithily, we might say that collective imagination is common sense decaying. More pithily, we might say that collective imagination is common sense decaying.

Fear without a discernible cause is tantamount to second sovereign, since it is only by an organization of fear through the single executor of law that life in a commonwealth avoids civil war. It is in this way that we see the problematic of melancholy passions traced throughout the previous chapters emerge as a principal concern at the institution of civic science. The well-governed commonwealth should seek to eliminate as far as possible the imaginative play of melancholic topics that upsets the balance of civil imagination. Like we saw the various figures arrayed around Burton’s frontispiece, Hobbes brings together the superstitious, the enthusiasts, and the mad as common sources of threat to the state. They are persons with an infinite motive

544 Ibid., 3.9.
545 AM, 260 [1.2.5.3].
546 Ibid.
547 EW, 3.637.

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and therefore impossible to reliably integrate into the body of Leviathan. We may say with Hobbes that fear is the beginning of motion from, but if the object of fear is not specified, this can be any motion whatsoever. The fear of the merely imaginary undermined the motive powers necessary for the preservation of the commonwealth. The elimination of “superstitious fear of spirits” would make people “more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.”

Yet the sovereign also depends upon religion as a means of enforcing civil obedience, and the only distinction between superstition and religion is the question of permission: “Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imaged from tales publiquely allowed, Religion; not allowed, Superstition.” (His rider to this obviously less than pious definition is weak tea: “And when the power imagined, is truly as we imagine, True Religion.”)

Insofar as the ignorant “stand in awe of their own imaginations,” the law—as “a common Power to keep them all in awe”—is itself weakened. A melancholic man, and so too a fearful polity, is easily manipulated by apocalyptic rhetoric, for he can be made to believe that spirits “will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do, or omit, is contrary to the Lawes,” like the prophet who turns the omens against the king. It is through the people's “superstitious fear of Spirits...Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon,” that “crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people.”

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548 Ibid.
549 Ibid., 86.
550 Ibid., 3.93, 3.113.
551 Ibid., 3.286.
552 Ibid., 3.8.
out of supernatural fear are “not to be Excused.”\textsuperscript{553} The tyrannophobe and the superstitious melancholic are two variations on a common political problem. For Hobbes, fear without apparent occasion is the internal beginning of a seditious movement.

The importance of an iconology of state that could overcome melancholic passions is a structuring feature of Hobbes' \textit{Leviathan}. In the famous frontispiece of \textit{Leviathan}, the inscribed line from the Book of Job that hangs over Leviathan's head—in fact a half-verse—may be said to be the work's first line. It begins “Non est super terram potestas quae conparetur ei,” but the remainder of the line is telling, “qui factus est ut nullum timeret”—Who was made so that he might fear nothing. The King James Bible renders it, “Upon earth there is not his like, who is made without fear.” We might read the elision of the Vulgate's full line as a suppression: the Leviathan needed to claim fear in order to make the motion to war. The question of the king's fear was integral to a constitutional crisis of the 1640s, a major contributing factor to the conditions that led to civil war. It was brought to a head by the case of ship-money, a long defunct medieval tax that enabled the king to ask a county who could not supply a warship in time of emergency to forfeit the equivalent in currency. The trial of John Hampden, a parliamentarian who refused to make this payment, became a theater for the testing of competing jurisprudential theories of sovereignty. (Hampden was “assessed at 20s.”\textsuperscript{554}) As the pleaders continually noted, the controversy in the case was not \textit{de persona}, that is, who had the power to levy a common tax for the purpose of naval defense; all parties stipulated that the King had this power. The dispute was \textit{de modo}, as there must

\textsuperscript{553} Ibid., 3.289.

be judged a necessary danger that would allow the King to use this extraordinary power. The defense of the imposition of a new tax to raise funds was made by the sovereign's ability to judge the nearness of danger: “That is the cloud be seen but afar off, the king, without the consent of the subjects, cannot tax them; but if the cloud be overhead, the king may call certain wise persons to him, and tax his subjects.”\(^{555}\) Within the king's providence “probabilities and conjectures” were admitted.\(^{556}\) Hampden's defense appealed to the possibility that this judgment could be counterfeited, and the rebuttal of this argument, however, weak, relied upon the persona of the king: “But what if the king will levy money, upon pretence of defence, in time of danger, and dispose of it otherwise, and the danger not so apparent? I say, so pious and just a king will never pretend a danger, if it were not re vera.”\(^{557}\) The assurance of the King's advocate did not satisfy the aggrieved parliamentarians.

In turn, fear became the justification of the Parliament's right to sever military command from the King, as can be read in the Militia Ordinance or 1642. The ordinance reports a “design” upon the House of Commons, the result of “bloody counsels of Papists and other ill-affected persons, who have already raised a rebellion in the kingdom of Ireland.” The event of this report, attended by many other “discoveries,” resulted in a fear that was also a prophecy: “we cannot but fear they will proceed not only to stir up the like rebellion and insurrections in this kingdom of England, but also to back them with forces from abroad.” This precipitated the constitutional crisis

\(^{555}\)Ibid., 1083.

\(^{556}\)“The moralists do make three parts of Providence. 1. Memoria praeteritorum. 2. Perspicientia praesentium. And 3. Providentia futurorum. It much concerns the king, the head of the commonwealth, to be circumspect in the prevention of public danger; conjectures and probabilities are to be regarded.” Ibid.

\(^{557}\) Ibid.
that initiated the English Civil War. In an irony that was surely savored by the Parliamentarians at the time, the very defense that Hampden had used in the Ship Money case now became the King's own plea.\[558\]

Hobbes surely held these two cases in mind when discussing the integrity of sovereign power in *Leviathan*, recognizing the need for the sovereign both to instill an imaginative object of fear in the polity of the commonwealth without becoming so fearful himself that he causes civil uprising. He imagines the abdication of sovereignty as if he were an advocate on behalf of Charles I, saying “if he transferre the *Militia*, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want of execution of the Lawes: Or if he grant away the Power of raising Mony; the *Militia* is in vain.” But he adds another rider to these: “if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of Spirits.”\[559\] As we have seen, superstition was linked closely in Hobbes’ mind to

\[558\] “The Lords and Commons, holding it necessary for the Peace and Safety of the Kingdom to settle the Militia thereof, did for that Purpose prepare an Ordinance of Parliament, and with all Humility did present the same to His Majesty, for His Royal Assent, who, notwithstanding the faithful Advice of His Parliament, and the several Reasons offered by them of the Necessity thereof, for the securing of His Majesty's Person, and the Peace and Safety of His People, did refuse to give His Consent; and thereupon they were necessitated, in Discharge of the Trust reposed in them as the Representative Body of the Kingdom, to make an Ordinance, by Authority of both Houses, to settle the Militia, warranted thereunto by the fundamental Laws of the Land: His Majesty, taking Notice thereof, did, by several Messages, invite them to settle it by Act of Parliament; affirming, in His Majesty's Messages sent in Answer to the Petition of both Houses presented to His Majesty at Yorke, March the 26th, that he always thought it necessary the same should be settled, and that He never denied the Thing, only denied the Way; and for the Matter of it, took Exception only to the Preface, as a Thing not standing with His Honour to consent to; and that Himself was excluded in the Execution, and for a Time unlimited.” Ibid.

\[559\] *EW*, 3.167-8.
rebellion. Someone who fears spirits “either through his own superstition, or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him of strange Dreams and visions” can be persuaded that these imagined forces have powers. We might compare this sentiment to the speech of the bastard in King John:

I find the people strangely fantasied;  
Possess’d with rumours, full of idle dreams,  
Not knowing what they fear, but full of fear:  
And here a prophet, that I brought with me  
From forth the streets of Pomfret, whom I found  
With many hundreds treading on his heels;  
To whom he sung, in rude harsh-sounding rhymes,  
That, ere the next Ascension-day at noon,  
Your highness should deliver up your crown.\(^{560}\)

The people “strangely fantasied” was a perpetual, internal danger of the state. One possible response to it was to project a greater fear—perhaps an invasion—that would organize the popular imagination back into popular support for the state.

However, we might also read the omitted half of the Biblical line from the Leviathan's frontispiece as an opportunity to complete an enthymeme: the Leviathan was made “to fear nothing.” The solution to the double-edged fear of the ruler, that is, the fear necessary for the commonwealth and the fear that could threaten, is suggested through the image of the frontispiece. The image, so famous that it hardly needs description, is an image of the people composing the body of an “artificial man.” They all hold in common the image of his face, but they are the material out of which his body is made. The state is in fact one person, an artificial person, of which the subjects are both matter and artificers. The multitude becomes one when “they are by

\(^{560}\) King John 4.2.144-152.
one man, or one Person, Represented.”\textsuperscript{561} Hobbes did not mean this metaphorically. The sovereign is “obliged by the Law of Nature” to ensure the safety of the people not because of a moral precept, but because in the state of nature one has the right to defend one's life by any means and the obligation to take the action agreed upon in covenant. The reflexive nature of the artificial person of the state means that its own health is the health of the people; its right to wage war with other states is perfectly analogous to the right of an individual in the state of nature to defend themselves. Hobbes makes clear that the safety of the commonwealth is not “bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life.”\textsuperscript{562} The sovereign representative has no obligation to his subjects enforceable by civil law and so therefore cannot be punished. Nevertheless, the old humanist question of good governance was reformulated as the preservation of the state's health, for although “Sovereignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.”\textsuperscript{563} In\textit{ Leviathan}, Hobbes took the commonplace metaphor of the commonwealth as body and made it literal; if life is “but motion” then nothing prevents the artificial construction of life, and the commonwealth's order of motions comes ultimately from its artificial imposition upon the individual passions of its members. But like a natural body, the artificial body is also subject to breakdowns through disease, here imagined as “discords” that are ultimately internal motions that disrupt the vital motions of the body.

\textsuperscript{561} \textit{EW}, 3.151.
\textsuperscript{562} Ibid., 3.322.
\textsuperscript{563} Ibid., 3.208.
6.2 Abraham Bosse’s *L’Homme Fourné de Malice*

*Leviathan's* frontispiece shows a new vision of a collective imagination, one that solved the problem of melancholic passions not through the individual's recourse to a rhetorical elaboration of experience, but through instituting a public image so powerful in its passionate effect that it could be taken as a common motive. We see this in the citizens' common gaze directed towards the face of Leviathan in the frontispiece. This detail was important and likely added on the basis of Hobbes' suggestion. We know that Hobbes discussed the composition at length with the engraver, Abraham Bosse.\(^564\) While the final version shows the subjects awed before the image of their own representative, the draft version of the frontispiece shows the faces turned towards the reader. Hobbes famously argues that without a “common Power to them all in awe,” men are in a state of war. In one passage, he specifies this as a “visible Power to keep them in awe.” It is the captivated vision of the polity looking upon its sovereign that will “tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of these Lawes of Nature.”\(^565\)

Where the tragedy gave the Abderites a common madness, the *Leviathan* will create a common imagination of awe, a passion saved from madness by its binding and regulating force. The iconology of state is to replace the collective imagination of the theater.

The captivated vision of an awed commonwealth in the frontispiece could not appear further from the Melancholy and Panique Terror that Hobbes warned of. Yet, in an obscure

\(^{564}\) Here I follow Horst Bredekamp in ascribing both the initial sketch and the final work to Bosse. Noel Malcolm reserves Bosse's work to the sketch. If the reader is more persuaded by Malcolm, this does not shake the foundations of the argument which trace the initial sketch to a visual conceit developed by Bosse in his earlier work.

\(^{565}\) *EW*, 3.153.
companion to the frontispiece, we see the figure of the sovereign as a melancholic; Bosse's original vellum sketch, with the faces of Leviathan's body facing outwards, is strikingly similar to a visual conceit Bosse developed in another work, known as *L'Homme Fourré de Malice*, or *The Man Wrapped in Evil*. This text-image composite is a dense site of meaning with both “some enigmatic verses” (*les vers peu obscur*) and a complex of emblematic or allegorical motifs in its design. To unpack it we must resort to some speculation. The engraving was executed during Bosse's 1650 collaboration with Hobbes. Indeed, according to Préaud, Bosse “seems to have loved these collaborative exercises of engraving à deux mains.” We might suppose that receiving an intellectual luminary into his atelier, one with whom he perhaps could discuss his beloved topic of projective geometry, he may also have relished a chance to treat Hobbes as the second hand in a collaboration. The engraving has to this point never been interpreted fully. Horst Bredekamp addresses it in his *Der Leviathan*. Bredekamp's concern with the engraving is primarily to establish Bosse as the author of the Leviathan image. However, in building this argument, he conjectures that *L'Homme Fourré* was not only produced within the same time as the frontispiece but served as “an answer to the 'Leviathan'“ (*eine Antwort auf den Leviathan*) that was “clearly ironic” (*voller Ironie*). The enigmatic engraving is a “kind of verso-image that completes the Janus-face of the

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567 « Bosse semble avoir aimé ces exercises de collaboration, de gravure à deux mains. » Ibid., 15.

568 It is possible that this was part of Blum's reasoning, for the frontispiece is listed in the catalogue raisonné, 604. Blum lists its year of production as 1650, the same year as the vellum sketch of the Leviathan frontispiece. Préaud contests this, dating the engraving to 1634, saying that Blum's is *sans justification*, but whatever reason he had for his uncertain dating is bolstered by the similarity to the Leviathan sketch.
reign of an artificial God,” (eine Art Kehrseite, die das Janusgesicht der Herrschaft eines künstlichen Gottes ausmacht).

Figure 15 — Abraham Bosse’s *L’Homme fourré de malice*, c. 1650

Courtesy of [The British Museum](https://www.thebritishmuseum.org) under a Creative Commons [Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/) license.
Why should a melancholic be the Janus-face of the modern state? I argue that it is a vision of the individual who has lent his face to the Leviathan. In this figure, two things are accomplished. First, we see that the figure is in fact ineffectual: his power does not come from him but only from his image. But second, this nevertheless shows the effectiveness of Hobbes' image of the state. For here the iconology of the tyrant, wrapped in melancholic lust, is made a figure of laughter rather than terror. Though Bredekamp has discussed this image as evidence of Bosse’s authorship of the frontispiece, he gives no further elaboration of its significance. I take this image of a melancholic figure as not only a visual riddle to be decoded for curiosity’s sake, but as a valuable key to a the thematic of Tyrannophobia in Hobbes. If in Hobbes’ own theory of the mind, names always refer to phantasms, here we have a rare glimpse into the strange phantasm of the tyrant whose melancholy haunts the Leviathan.

In order to see the *L’Homme Fourré* as a wryly Hobbesian transformation of the iconology of tyranny, we must first look closely at Bosse's print. The man is shown in the attitude of a melancholic made famous by Dürer, discussed in Chapter 1: seated, his head holding his hand, his glance downwards. His mantle is covered in the faces of women. Beside him we see a monkey “aping” his master and so also resting his head in his hand. The short, misogynistic poem at the foot of the image helps to illuminate its intention:

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I think the engraver
Considers more than his whim
When he calls this dreamer
*The Man Dressed [fourré] in Malice,*

If he's freighted with faults
whence else could they come
save from those dangerous animals' heads
who beguile the most delicate beasts?
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Whatever's his vice, it
Comes not from his nature
Or if he is wicked [malicieux]
It must be his mantle [fourrure].

On first take, this is a work squarely situated within a tradition of misogynistic satire; the man is made worse by his encounters with women and they cling to him like a robe. But the poem’s final line is pointedly equivocal. The *fourrure* indicates both his mantle but also his *fur* insofar as he is one of those tricked animals, *les plus fines bestes*. An historical French dictionary tells us that “one calls crafty or instinctively malicious people *fines bêtes*.” That his fur is made of their furs is at once a saucy joke and a hint of a latent violence: where there are furs there once was a trapper, and he now wears these furs as if they were trophies. Moreover, there is likely a pun with the Latin *furor*, often used to describe the melancholic. *Furor amoris* was discussed by Cicero in his *Tusculan Disputations* as something that must be cured by bringing the afflicted “back to other

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570 Je ne vois point que le Graveur
Ait pour raison que son caprice,
Quand il appelle ce Resueur [sc. rêveur]
un homme fourré de la malice

Car s'il est tout chargé de maux
D'où procèdent ils que de testes
De ces dangereux Animaux,
Qui trompent les plus fines bestes?

Tout ce qu'il a de vicieux
Ne vient donc pas de sa nature
Ou bien s'il est malicieux
Il s'en faut prendre à sa fourrure.

571 « On appelle des personnes rusées ou malicieuses par instinct de *fines bêtes*, de mèchantes bêtes. »

*Glossaire* Français, 1.468. s.v. bête. If we assume that Bosse was familiar with the basic tenets of Hobbes’ theory of the *Leviathan*, which surely he must have been in order to design its densely rhetorical frontispiece, we might also read the reference to beast as a schoolboy pun. Hobbes made use of the Latin *Homo homini lupus*; if one asks what is *femina homini*, this sets up a pun, as the Latin *lupa* means both she-wolf and prostitute.
pursuits [studia],” including to love itself, for “some even think that by a new love a certain old one might be put out, as a nail dislodges a nail; however, this must greatly be advised against, if the love-furor is great.” Indeed, similar treatments appear in the handbooks of remedies for melancholy. Jaques Ferrand's discussion of this treatment in Erotomania is moralized but relies upon the Galenic medical aphorism, “contraries are remedied by their contraries.” Those who attempt to cure love melancholy by becoming profligate “will only find themselves more inclined to lust and wantoness: 'for the passages will become dilated thereby allowing for a freer flow of seminal fluids, and moreover, the remembrance of past pleasures creates a powerful longing to repeat them.'“ The image seems to show that the man wrapped in malice precisely in a dark fantasia of erotic remembrance.

The engraving's accompanying verse plays upon a strategy of attenuating agency, and therefore responsibility. All three of the abovementioned meanings of fourrure—mantle, furor, and fur—converge upon the ambiguity of something that can dissociated from one's person. Indeed, they show three degrees of that difference. The “nature” of the man is clearly distinct from his mantle, which can be taken on and off. Once we read the cloak as his own fur, we see this assemblage of faces as part of his bestial nature. Here we should recall the famous passage in Il

572 “Sic igitur affecto haec adhibenda curatio est, ut et illud quod cupiat ostendatur quam leve, quam contemnendum, quam nihili, sit omnino, quam facile vel aliunde vel alio modo perfici vel omnino neglegi sit; abducendus etiam est non numquam ad alia studia sollicitudines curas negotia, loci denique mutatione tamquam aegroti non convalescentes saepe curandus est; etiam novo quidam amore veterem tamquam clavo clavum eiciendum putant; maxume autem admonendus est, quantum sit furor amoris.” Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 35.74-5.

573 Ferrand, Erotomania, 334.

574 Ibid., 334f. This medical evidence comes from Aristotle's Historia Animalium 7.6.
Principe where Machiavelli says that the education proper to the prince, modelled on Achilles' tutelage under the centaur Chiron, is to be taught by one who is “half-beast, half-man,” so that he knows how to use “both natures.” Yet here the nature of the beast is not the ferocity of the tyrant, but his luxurious fur robe. Knowing how to put on or take off the nature of the beast is not a description of the Machiavellian prince’s ability to shuttle forth between self-composure and terrifying fury but the ability to assign responsibility for his faults to the “dangereux Animaux”—his female seducers, both the motives and objects of his lustful passion. He discharges responsibility for his actions by attributing them to his fourrure, a mantle or mania that he can put

575 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harey Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 69. The image of a tyrant as a beast was one Hobbes was aware of and tried to suppress in his works. In the dedicatory epistle to Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, Hobbes argues that in the Roman Republic, the name “king had been rendered odious, as well by the tyranny of the Tarquins as by the genius and decretals of that city; it was the speech, I say, of the public, however pronounced from a private mouth, (if yet Cato the censor were no more than such), that all kings are to be reckoned amongst ravenous beasts.” But Hobbes inverts this ascription. Instead, it is the “Roman people” who were “a beast of prey,” represented “with its conquering eagles it erected its proud trophies so far and wide over the world, bringing the Africans, the Asiatics, the Macedonians, and the Achaeans, with many other despoiled nations, into a specious bondage, with the pretense of preferring them to be denizens of Rome!” Hobbes here draws upon an anecdote in Plutarch, told upon the feted arrival of King Eumenes in Rome. The Senate gave him honors, but Cato looks upon him with suspicion and fear. When a friend reproaches him that he is a “friend to Rome” [philorommaios] Cato delivers his line, “Yes, but the animal, king, is by nature a flesh-eater.” Hobbes returns to this passage more than once. In De Cive we find it in a more refined form. Hobbes remarks that Cato, classical exemplar of wisdom, nevertheless is so partisan “that he censured in Kings what he thought reasonable in his own people.” Hobbes’ is making a riposte to the Catonian defense of republican liberty; the true “beast of prey” is the populus on the march.
on and off, having learned Machiavelli's lesson of having both the nature of a man and a beast ready at hand.\footnote{576}

The tyrant's passions were generated and sustained by sycophants. This is what is alluded to in the figure of the collared ape, also posed as a melancholic, who sits beside the man. Because it takes the same pose as the sitter, it clearly calls up the stereotyped figure of \textit{singerie}: the ape as a human mirror, an imitator, who is one variation away from a flatterer who mirrors the ruler's desire back to him as counsel. The monkey had long held a place the medieval imagination of sins, especially acedia and \textit{vanitas}. The theme of the “dreamer” is perhaps reinforced by the similarity of the French for monkey, \textit{singe}, with dream, \textit{songe}. The \textit{songe-creux}, or idle-dreamer is likened to a \textit{singe-creux}, idle monkey. But if we do not take it as an allegory, the monkey is a pet and so reflects upon the wealth and extravagance of the sitter. He is at least a noble, and perhaps even royalty. An ape counsellor is found in the English tradition: “an English popular poem of the fifteenth century tells of King Robert of Sicily, who was punished for his pride by being changed into a fool and set to caper in his own palace, with an ape for a counsellor.”\footnote{577} The monkey is this foolish and blandishing advisor, consistent with the iconology of “fool's advice.”\footnote{578} But his ability to modulate the tyrant's passion comes at the price of being subject to the tyrant's will. It was a common pictorial topos to show “fettered simians” attached to “the palaces or thrones of heathen tyrants.”\footnote{579} Since several different lines of interpretation point to a reading of the sitter as a king,

\footnote{576 For a related discussion, see Marshall, “Warburgian Maxims.”}

\footnote{577 Horst W. Janson, \textit{Apes and Ape Lore in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance} (Nendeln/Liechtenstein : Kraus, 1976), 211.}

\footnote{578 Ibid.}

\footnote{579 Ibid., 150.}
we may read the pet monkey's collar as a play on the fetter; it is at once vain, the sign of a courtier, and the mark of the fetter of pleasure, the *grata compes*, of a lover's sexual favors. The dreamer and his ape are locked together like Narcissus and Echo: the tyrant is unable to see in the world anything but the objects of his passion, and his sycophant can do nothing but imitate these back to him.

The iconology of the tyrant's erotic melancholy created by Bosse undercuts the awe that is due to the sovereign person. Seeing him wrapped in his private passion, we see him as a figure removed from action. The cause of his melancholy is at the edges of agency: he both pursues the women he lusts after and claims that this pursuit is out of his control. The king both suffers from it but also wears it; we may hear the poem as not merely misogynistic doggerel (though it's surely that) but also as an example of indirect discourse: the *fourrure* of the king offers a defense for his own faults. This both reveals the distance of the private ruler's motives from the duties of state and mocks the fictions of agency that support the state. The same forms of “personation” that empower the sovereign representative to act on behalf of the people are inverted in his passion: here the causes of his passion are given their own personas. The visual echo between *L'homme fourré* and the Leviathan frontispiece suggest this: where the people are incorporated through a fiction into the sovereign by their common awe at his image, the sovereign representative is subject to his passions and makes melancholy his excuse for his indulgences, out of place with his supposedly elevated state.

If, as Bredekamp suggests, we read Bosse's erotomaniac not only as a king but specifically Charles II, the joke becomes pointed towards his own ineffectual rule and the defenses made of it. Indeed, we find one such defense of Charles II in the diary of John Evelyn. In his famous diary of the times, Evelyn described the young princes as having both “many virtues, and many great
Imperfections.” Evelyn suggests that we would have been as “excellent prince” if he had been “lesse addicted to Women, which made him uneasy & allways in Want to supply their immeasurable profusion...those wicked creatures tooke him from all application becoming so greate a King.”

Here Evelyn makes use of the same logic that is ironized in Bosse's engraving: the prince was, in his own nature, a great ruler, but was prevented from realizing this by his womanizing, even describing them in the misogynistic idiom of “wicked creatures” like the “dangereux animaux” of the engraving's verse. Bosse's engraving, then, is a joke about the sovereign person whose face dons the artificial person of the Leviathan: he is not the Machiavellian prince, but an ineffectual melancholic absorbed in the disappointments of his amor furoris.

In ironizing the rhetoric that removes agency from the prince for his misdeeds, Bosse's engraving is not only as a visual counterpoint to the frontispiece of the Leviathan but also a counterargument to the book's theory of representation. While Hobbes concerned himself in great detail with the conditions for authorizing a representative, that is, to make another the author of one's actions, he neglects the question of how one might forfeit authority—and therefore responsibility—without appointing a representative. Inanimate objects can be personated, as a hospital may have an overseer, but it cannot, obviously, appoint its own representatives; it lacks authority. Nevertheless, “Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are Owners, or Governours of those things.”

The man wrapped in malice, by contrast, attributes his actions to a disease. Bosse's dreamer is involved in an elaborate prosopopoeia, the rhetorical figure in which one creates another persona and represents their speech. But in this

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581 EW, 3.150.
prosopopoeia, he inverts the iconology of the tyrant: no longer is he the dangerous beast. Instead, the women he chases pursue him in his imagination. He is the prey of his own desire.

The duality of Bosse's image attests to Hobbes' overcoming of a long tradition that closely associated the erotic lust of the tyrant with his most terrifying violence. Hobbes’ elision of this commonplace theme is not accidental; his political philosophy is tantamount to the suppression of this image. The power of the Leviathan is not, like Machiavelli's prince, an outcome of his person's virtù and good fortune; rather, the power of the state is the common passion that its image arouses in the people. Yet it is in fact this break between the power of the person and the image of the state that remains one of Hobbes' lasting contributions to our own political imagination. The Leviathan, because it is not a natural person, can serve as the cause of passions without suffering them. The disguised image of Charles II in L'homme fourré de malice surely does not show the passion of the state but only of its private person. The subject of the tyrant and his distinction from the king is ubiquitous in the context of early modern English political philosophy. The image of the modern state is an ability to represent the sovereign power as distinct from the melancholy personage of the prince.

6.3 The Humanist Image of the Melancholic Tyrant and Leviathan as Response

We must see the Leviathan against the backdrop of the humanist elaboration of the tyrant as a figure whose terrifying aspects resulted from his inability to rule his lustful passions. First, because this was the image of the tyrant that Hobbes wished to dissociate his new civil science from. Second, because the association between tyrannical passions and the humanist political arguments against sovereign injustice are opaque to us now. It remains difficult to see Leviathan
as a counter to the melancholic tyrant because its iconography has been so successful in suppressing the figure's Baroque iconology. By setting out the Baroque image of the tyrant as it was elaborated in the early modern period by humanists we can see Hobbes’ Leviathan not retrospectively as an early version of the all-too-familiar authoritarian nation-state but as a creative work upon the political imagination of his own time. Hobbes’ Leviathan was an insurgent phantasm in a war against Tyrannophobia—to recall the meaning of that struggle is to reawaken ourselves to one possible meaning of the state as an image.

In the nascent political theory of Italian humanism, the erotic problems of the tyrant were emphasized because it was thought that in tyranny the ruler's libido replaced the law. Xenophon's *Hiero* is the *locus classicus* for the unhappy eroticism of the tyrant. The *Hiero* is a dialogue between two characters: the eponymous Syracusan tyrant and the poet Simonides. Simonides asks Hiero to compare the happiness of a private person with that of his current position, since he has experienced both. Hiero complains that no one is as unhappy as the tyrant. Simonides then leads him through all the pleasures and Hiero explains how the tyrant's fear corrupts his enjoyment of each one in turn. He is too fearful to travel and so sees less, his ears hear only false honors, and his palette is corrupted; food, through surfeit, becomes dull or cloying and he must be vigilant always for fear of poisoning. But above all other pleasures, the tyrant suffers from erotic problems. He cannot marry anyone except an inferior, which is degrading and unattractive. In his pederastic pursuits, he cannot be assured to the boy's passion. Hiero, the tyrant, complains that erotic love...

582 It is evident that the *Hiero* was part of English humanist education. A manuscript English translation of the Hiero, apparently from the Latin, in Cambridge Library has been attributed to Queen Elizabeth. See Leicester Bradner, “The Xenophon Translation Attributed to Queen Elizabeth I,” *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 27 (1964), 324-6.
“comes least to the tyrant, for it delights not in what is commanded, but in longing.”\textsuperscript{583} The tyrant suspects that all ostensible sexual affection for him is a shown born from fear.\textsuperscript{584} The dialogue proceeds with Simonides showing the tyrant how he might improve his pleasures through just rule. Essentially, the poet teaches the tyrant how to become just, but disguises this counsel as a way of returning to a state of sensual pleasures.

The theme of the unhappy tyrant reappears in the Florentine humanist Poggio Bracciolini’s \textit{De infelicitate principium}, or \textit{On the Unhappiness of Princes}.\textsuperscript{585} The greater part of the dialogue is the effort of Niccolo Niccoli's character to prove that the majority of rulers from history held up as examples were in fact bad. But this opens into a division between kings and tyrants, for where “life of tyrants is torture to them, but not of kings or emperors, since even Justin agrees that tyrants always abound in vices and therefore are necessarily unhappy.”\textsuperscript{586} Nicolaus attempts to extend this concession to contain all rulers, whether they go by “the name of emperors, kings, dukes, or any others,” since even if they are good, they are weighed down more than Atlas with “unlimited cares, troubles, anxieties, labors.”\textsuperscript{587} The record of praise left by the historians is a rhetorical effect. They

\textsuperscript{583} Xenophon, \textit{Hiero} 1.30.

\textsuperscript{584} Ibid., 1.38.


\textsuperscript{586} “Tyrannorum...non regum aut imperatorum vita iis cruciabatur que dixisti malis, quoniam et Iustinus affirmat tyrannos semper vitiiis abundare.; idque et esse infelices nescesse est.” Poggio Bracciolini, \textit{De infelicitate principium}, ed. Davide Canfora (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1998), 34.15-18, 22.

\textsuperscript{587} “[N]omine imperatores, reges, duces, ceterosque qui aliis dominantur comprehendi volo...Nam mali nullo modo felices erunt, a maius enim Athlante onus ferunt —propter infinitas curas, molestias, anxieties, labores quibus cruciantur, omnis felicitas abest.” Ibid., 19.7-8, 14.
take any “scintilla virtutis” and turn it into a blaze. Moreover, human nature is so fragile that “we slip easily into wantoness and vice” and so that “rule, evil through its license and very nature [re ipsa] is the maker and minister of evils.” Imperium is like fire; whoever holds it is either heated or burned, and either returns them evil or at least worse. Too great an abundance of pleasures makes them bitter. It has been speculated that Bracciolini's work was in some ways a response to his fellow humanist Leonardo Bruni's translation of Xenophon's *Hiero*. Brian Jeffrey Maxson has argued that Bruni used this translation as part of his argument with Salutati “about tyrannical rule and vernacular culture.” Bracciolini's dialogue is a truncated reprisal of Xenophon’s *Hiero*; the melancholy plaints of the tyrant become its whole substance and the poet's remedies are forgotten. Simonides advises Hiero to divide his actions into two classes: “a great ruler should delegate to others the task of punishing those who require to be coerced, and should reserve to himself the privilege of awarding prizes.” The remedy of the tyrant's unhappiness is an oblique use of power; through acts like greeting his subjects familiarly, instructing his bodyguards to also look after the city, and awarding prizes in contests, the tyrant produces a

588 Ibid., 27.18

589 “Nam tum natura fragiles sumus etque imbellices, qui facillime ad lasciviam et vitia labiamur, tum principatus re ipsa et licentia malus est malorumque opifex ac minister.” Ibid., 28.21-26, 18.

590 “Sicut enim ignis, quicquid illi heret, aut calefacit aut urit, ita et imperium, quos apprehendit, aut malos reddit aut certe deteriores.” Ibid., 28.2-4, 19.

591 “Nam voluptates, quo magis affluunt, eo ex copia et satiete fiunt insuaviores.” Ibid., 32.19-20, 21.


593 Xenophon, *Hiero*, 9.3.
popularity for his person that does not reduce envy and fear, allowing him to once again enjoy the pleasures of *commercio hominum*.

King and tyrant could not be discerned through their office, which was identical, but only in the relation of their passions to the law. The analysis of tyranny in humanist political thought turned upon the division between the image of the happy, just king and the melancholic tyrant as a means for reflecting on the nature of tyranny. No one made greater use of it than George Buchanan, eminent Scottish humanist of the sixteenth century, in his *De iure regni apud Scotos*.594 Here the humanist image of the tyrant had direct political relevance, as they sought to provide justification for the then-recent deposition of Mary Queen of Scots. Framed as a dialogue, Buchanan sets himself as a character in conversation with Thomas Maitland, a courier for the Earl of Suffolk. It is the deposal that Maitland’s character refers to obliquely when he speaks of his horror at the “atrocity of a recent crime” [recentis criminis atrocitas]—made more horrible because it involved violence against a woman, something even foreign enemies refrain from. Buchanan's persona asks Maitland if he “has an image of king and tyrant in his mind,” and the remainder of the dialogue is an exposition of this diptych and its consequences.595 Buchanan argues that recognizing the images of king and tyrant is the basis of civic education.596 The initial difficulty is


596 “Et imagine utriusque proposita nonne vulgus etiam intellecturum putas quodnam sit suum erga utrunque officium.” Ibid., 55-6.
that both king and tyrant fall within the same genus, and therefore accidental similarities allow the worse to impersonate the better. It is critical, then, to elaborate in detail the respective images. Buchanan calls this an *imago descripta*. This signals that his method is drawn from the Ciceronian topic of *descriptio*, which answers questions like “what is a miser? what is a sycophant? and other subjects of the same type where one traces the portrait after nature and living reality.” The described character or image makes clear the differences contained within the type. These are so many roles in a mental theater.

Buchanan's description of the respective images of king and tyrant are not simply a rhetorical flourish upon his political theory but a central argument of this theory itself. As we learned in the previous chapter, the imagination gives an orientation to a passion that makes it a motive. The citizen's relation to power depends upon the image they have of good and evil rulers. But these images are not to be read out directly from the physical appearance of rulers; instead, the quality of their rule must be assessed in light of the respective ideal images of king and tyrant. For Buchanan, the truest image of the king is the law itself, an image formed by the conception of a ruler held in mind by the lawmakers. The law is an ideal image not of the king’s body, but his *cogitatio* or thought. Moreover, it is deliberately set as an image for the natural king to gaze upon in order to check his “hate, fraud, love, anger, envy and all the other perturbations of his soul.” The king must be bound to the law because of the weakness of human nature: “within man, the two cruellest monsters of greed and wrath forever wage war on reason,”

\[\text{intra hominem duo}\]

597 “[I]n rebus dissimilis quae sub eodem genere continentur, similitudines quaedam inesse possunt, quae imprudentes facile queant in errorem inducere.” Ibid., 9.

598 Cicero, *Topica*, 83.

599 Buchanan, *De Iure Regni*, 20.
saevissima monstra—cupiditas & iracundia—perpetuum cum ratione bellum gerunt]. Here Buchanan develops the Italian argument: Because license can only worsen our natural weakness, it is necessary to “adjoyn to him a Law, which may either shew him the way, if he be ignorant, or bring him back again into the way, if he wander out of it.” This is even the origin of the law—a corrective to the lust of an ancient king.\textsuperscript{600} The image of the tyrant, by contrast, is one who does not use “the strength of their authority for the benefit of the people, but for fulfilling their own lusts.”\textsuperscript{601} They are “surrounded with arms, always fearing, always the cause of fear” (\textit{circumspecti armis, semper metuentis, aut metum facientis}).\textsuperscript{602} He argues that the image of the fearful, melancholic tyrant is best painted in Seneca's \textit{Thyestes}. Here, he identifies the tyrant with the Fury, a creature who, themselves tormented, rejoices in the torments of others.

Why would the image of a tyrant not be the tragic figure of the tyrant himself? The Fury in \textit{Thyestes} is the personated motive of the tyrant, not unlike the allegorical figures of the causal inductions discussed at the beginning of the previous chapter. When she first appears, she speaks in imperatives.

\begin{quote}
And let no one at leisure to hate old fault,
let a new one rise always, and not
one in one, and while it is avenged let
the foul deed grow.\textsuperscript{603}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{600} Ibid., 15.

\textsuperscript{601} Ibid., 98.

\textsuperscript{602} Ibid., 59.

\textsuperscript{603} “Nec vacet cuiquam vetus/odisse crimen: semper oriatur nouum,/nec unum in uno, dumque punitur scelus,/crescat.” Seneca, \textit{Thyestes}, 29-32.
This is spoken to the ghost of Tantalus, ancestor of the house of Thyestes who infamously served his son Pelops in a stew to the gods. Thyestes will unwittingly eat his own sons, one of whom is named Tantalus, in the same fashion, served to him by vengeful Atreus. Tantalus wishes to be fully passive; it is right for him to suffer punishment, but not to render it. But he will be sent as a “harsh vapor” [dirus vapor] to infect his descendants and in this way carry out the commands of Fury. Buchanan's image of the tyrant as Fury connects the exempla of tyrants through history. In his etymology of tyrant in *De iure regni*, Buchanan acknowledges that the Greek *tyrannos* had no negative connotation, but only accrued this over time through the example of the “wicked deeds” of those who adopted it. Fury crosses time; it transcends the rise and fall of any particular tyrant, but constantly engenders anew the story of a self-punishing lust.

The humanist imagines the tyrant as a personification of *furor*. This bolsters my claim that Hobbes’ *Leviathan* had to overcome the collective imagination of the theater—Buchanan draws his image of Fury from tragedy. Indeed, he wrote the tyrant into it as well. Among his other literary accomplishments and ambitions, Buchanan sought to reform the theater and return it to its antique model. His other political work—or at least a work which took on political significance—was an academic Latin tyrant play named *Baptistes, sive Calumnia, Tragoedia*. Buchanan dedicated the work to James VI, his former student and future king. His words of dedication are unusually straightforward for the genre. Buchanan, however, wished for a humanist reformation of the theater, so that “young men might be moved to imitate the ancients through the common custom.

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604 Ibid., 86-7.
605 Ibid., 87.
606 Buchanan, *De Iure Regni*, 65.
of theatrical stories.” His *Herodes* was his most concerted effort towards this goal. The “other neo-Latin plays (by Grimald, Schoepper, and much later, Schoenaeus) present only hypocritical priests” and so make Herod and Herodias more sympathetic by “suggesting that the matter is as much a matter of uncontrollable passion as of political strategy” and that Herod is “a drunken nitwit or a basically good but weak character.” Buchanan's stated intention is to present to the king an image of the tyrant as a tortured figure:

Moreover that part of it may seem to concern you particularly which sets forth the torments of tyrants and their miseries when most they seem to flourish, a lesson which I deem not only advantageous for you to understand, but also necessary; so that you may early begin to hate that which you must always avoid.

Buchanan calls upon his “little book” as a witness to posterity; if bad counsel or his own license leads James into tyranny, “it should be imputed not as a failing to your teachers, but to you who did not obey their various warnings.” The play is the capstone to the education of the prince.

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607 “Quod...adolescentes a vulgari fabularum scenicarum consuetudine ad imitationem antiquitatis provocet.”


608 Ibid., 163f.

609 “Illud autem peculiaris ad te videri potest spectare, quod tyrannorum cruciatus, & cum florere maxime videntur miseries dilucide exponat. Quod te nunc intelligere non conducibilie modo, sed etiam necessarium existimo: ut mature odisse incipias, quod tibi semper est fugiendum.” Ibid.

610 “Volo etiam hunc libellum apud posteros testem fore, si quid aliquando pravis consultoribus impulsus, vel regni licentia rectam educationem superante secus committas, non praeceptoribus, sed tibi, qui eis recte monentibus non sis obsecutus, id vitio vertendum esse.” Ibid., 350-1.
Buchanan's *Baptistes* dramatizes the two images of tyrant and king as competing motives of a ruler. In this, it is a profound reflection upon the Baroque understanding of tyranny, so much so that one of its English renditions was entitled *Tyrannicall-government anatomized: or, A discourse concerning evil-councellors*. Buchanan's subject was chosen from the long medieval institution of the Herod-play in which Herod is recognized as the epitome of a tyrant. The medieval Herod was a character formed from conflation. The dramatic figure of Herod first appeared in the passion plays common throughout Europe were incorporated within the liturgies of certain feast-days. The action is, as a rule, extremely limited, but already in the mystery plays of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Herod appears as one enraged and is assigned the gestures of *furor*, as we see in the stage-direction:

> Then Herod, in a prophetic vision, inflamed by furor, throws his book; but his son, hearing the tumult, comes to pacify his father, and standing greets him.  

It is to this that Hamlet refers when he complains that histrionic actors “out Herod Herod.” Herod, then, is the commonplace of a furious tyrant. But the English vernacular cycles of these mystery plays also show this fury as emerging from Herod's profound sorrow and fear, that is, his melancholy. He is shown in the character of fear when he learns of the prophecy of a new king

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611 In the medieval genre, Herod the Great and Herod Antipas are confounded into a single character. Anachronism is seen in the Orientalizing of this figure, who, despite being a Jewish king, appears as a worshipper of “Mahound,” that is, Mohammed.

612 “*Tunc Herodes, visa prophetica, furore accensus, projiciat librum; at Filius eius, audito tumultu, procedat pacificatus patrem, et stans salutet eum.*” Ibid.

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from the magi. He interprets this superstitiously, fearing it tells of a revolution. Even these relatively pale dramatizations of narrative began to develop this figure in reference to a court. A telling piece of dialogue comes down to us in the York cycle:

Herod: Als for sorowe and sighte  
   My woo no wighte may wryte;  
   What deuell is best to do?  

Consolator 2: Lorde, amende youre chere  
   And takis no nedles noy,  
   We schall you lely lere  
   That ladde for to distroye,  
   Be counsaille if we cane.  

Unlike in the Gospel narrative, the massacre of the innocents does not begin with Herod's command but rather through the sycophancy of a counselor—here, rightly termed Consolator—who attempts to relieve the king from his woe. This marks an early transformation of the Herod-character. When he is a histrionic raver, his actions are clearly of a piece with his wild intemperance. However, once his sadness and fear becomes the points of emphasis, this opens his motive to the influence of other factors.

Yet when we come to Buchanan's humanist inflection of the Herod-play, we do not simply see him as a man in furor: the Baroque wishes to see Herod become a tyrant. This was best dramatized not by the bloodbath in the massacre of the innocents, but by shifting the drama to another story with the same figure: the events leading to the execution of John the Baptist. There

613 “Rex est natus fortior/Nobis et potentior./Vereor ne solio/Nos extrahet regio.” (A king is born stronger/Than we, and more powerful/I fear lest he shall drag us/From our royal throne.) In Joseph Quincy Adams, Chief Pre-Shakespearean Dramas: A Selection of Plays Illustrating the History of the English Drama from its Origin Down to Shakespeare (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 37.

614 The York Cycle, Play 19, 136-143.
is no conclusive evidence that Buchanan's *Baptistes* was ever performed, but it is not unlikely that it was put on at the Collège de Guyenne. At the time of its publication, however, Buchanan seems to have consigned it to a closet drama to be read by a prince. The development of the Herod character into the “characteristic...idea of the tyrant,” encouraged a dramatization of the other narratives in which he featured. It was important for Buchanan's purposes of educating the prince that his Herod showed two possibilities: he could have been a good king had he not given way to his lusts.

Herod’s pivot from king to tyrant dramatizes a moment in the Gospel account that gives an interpretation to his ambiguous sadness. Though the play follows the essential structure of the Gospel narrative, it is recast in Senecan dramatic form, allowing for a far greater development of the motives compounded in the decision to execute John the Baptist, a story that unfolds in eleven lines in Matthew's account and fifteen in Mark's. The two accounts left an ambiguity in Herod's decision to execute the prophet. Both remark that Herod was troubled and saddened by Salome's request. The “saddened king” (*rex contristatus*) of this passage developed a large Biblical commentary but also a moral-philosophical one. For instance, Nicholas Caussin's *The Holy Court* (*La cour saincte*) is a treatise on the passions, but its final book, a gloss on the example of Herod, becomes a novella. At each place in the story where moral interpretation of Herod's gestures, actions, or motives becomes available, Caussin treats it as a resource for making explicit the moral significance of his character. When he comes to the passage on Herod's sadness, Caussin treats this as an example of dissimulation and simply “affected all the marks of a true sadness with a

615 Ibid., 264f.
616 Benjamin, *Origin*, 70.
hypocritical guise."⁶¹⁷ John Calvin, by contrast, in his *Harmonia ex evangelistis tribus composita* recognized a discrepancy between the two accounts; in Matthew, it is Herod's own desire to kill the Baptist, but initially refrains from doing so because he fears the reaction of the people; in Mark, it is Herodias' cruelty that motivates the execution. When Calvin comes to interpret his sadness, then, we find not the Machiavel playing at piety while plotting a crime but a political struggle playing out in his breast. He does not dare to deny the “little dancer” for fear that he will gain a reputation for inconstancy; it is his own misplaced fear that constrains Herod's power to command.⁶¹⁸

Buchanan shows Herod’s sadness (in line with Calvin’s interpretation) as a moment of conflict between the competing images of the king and the tyrant. Here we see the image of the Law versus tyrannical Fury as a contest of maxims. He is counselled, on the one hand, to fear the Baptist as the leader of a popular revolt. This is the path of tyranny. At the same time, he fears that abdicating the rule of law and executing the prophet will lead to unrest. This is an image of the king whose passion is bound by the law. In one such exchange the Queen and her daughter tell Herod that if he allows popular assemblies (*conventicula*) he will not be feared.⁶¹⁹ Herod dismisses

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⁶¹⁷ “Il fit paroistre au dehors avec une feinte hypocrisie toutes les marques d'une vraye tristesse. Il detestoit le jeu, il accusoit la fortune, il se plaignoit que le Ciel luy avoir envié sinistrement un object sur lequel il desirot faire paroistre tout l'amour & le respect qu'il portoit à la Maison Royale, dont il tenoit en partie son avancement. » Nicolas Caussin, *La Cour Saincte, Ou Institution Chrestienne des Grands : Avec Les Exemples de ceux qui dans les Cours ont fleury en Saincteté* (Lyons: Gay, 1646), 463.


this as a good. They argue, in Senecan stichomythia (a sequence of alternating single lines) as in the following typical passage:

   Daughter. If the prince's pleasure is his right, then there is no law for kings, but kings make the law.
   Herod. Rumor will turn me from a king to a tyrant.
   Daughter. But it fears the scepter.
   Herod. It fears, and yet groans.
   Daughter. Curb it with the sword.
   Herod. Fear does not preserve kingdoms well.620

   Buchanan places in Salome's mouth a line from Ulpian, the Roman jurist: *Quod principi placuit legis habet*. This would have been familiar not only to the king, but to anyone paying attention to the political debates of the time. Particular sentences drawn from the Roman law and its commentary had become political shibboleths in the rule of Henry VIII.621 By placing this line in the mouth of Salome, Buchanan associates the Tudor and Stuart ideology of the relation between law and sovereign as an inversion of the truth that leads to tyranny. Hearing this, it becomes clear why this was the narrative of Herod's tyranny Buchanan chose to dramatize; the massacre of the innocents is diabolical, but one can see how the execution of a religiously eccentric prophet may be more easily presented as “politic,” a necessary aspect of absolute rule. Indeed, when the Queen reveals the plan behind her design, it is not as much directed towards revenging her own private


slight but is presented as a political act, an example by which to instruct the people.” Not only was the maxim of expediency the result of a corrupt philosophy but such a course of action would lead to the prince’s unhappiness.

The Baroque saw the tyrant as the epitome of a body motivated, and so moved, by lust; he was an image of a body filled only with desire and without and impediments within it. What they saw, then, was motion without act—the tyrant was self-consuming, desiring what was impossible for him. It was this image or arbitrary lust that made Herod the perfect tyrant. The dramatization of Herod's rule of lust was transformed in the sixteenth century by the selection of yet another episode from his life, but one not found in scripture: his violent love for his wife, Mariamne. Once appearing on stage, it became a staple of dramatic writing. The popularity of this story is seemingly obvious when considered against the oft-struck stereotype of the Baroque taste for extremity. However, this story brought together each aspect of the tyrant-theme; his deviation from law, his unbridled libido, the inability to command the desires of others, his fall, the punishment through conscience. Herod's character must not merely display a paradox, but contain it. He must at once be both vengeful plotter and hapless abandonné of love. Benjamin's observation on Calderòn's Herod play also applies here: “Herod does not kill his wife out of jealousy; rather it is through jealousy that she loses her life.” It is passion that acts rather than Herod. He is so lost

622 Buchanan, Herodes, 1262-3.

623 In his monograph on the subject, Maurice Valency wrote that a scholar in 1895 had “reckoned some thirty” distinct versions of the play, while he had found “without any difficulty, thirteen others” while “doubtless, many more, [are] growing dusty somewhere.” See his The Tragedies of Herod and Mariamne (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), vi.

624 Benjamin, Origin, 133.
to jealousy that no other passion emerges and so no deliberation occurs. When we witness Herod having succumbed to a passion unqualified by another, he no longer has a motive but simply is possessed by the principle of jealousy. Josephus himself already notes that this problem in *Antiquities* in which he says that Herod seems to have a “double nature.” To the Renaissance ear, this can mean nothing other than Saturnine man, the melancholic oscillating between the extremes of his temperament. At the violent climax of his action, Herod no longer oscillates but devolves from his melancholic indecision into a manic furor.

In the agitated movements of the sad, fearful tyrant, the Baroque theater presented a vision of command's impotence to fulfill desire. The anonymous tyrant of *The Second Maiden's Tale* hacking at the stone door of the tomb of the woman he has lusted after is an emblem. We can supply its *inscriptio* and *subscriptio* with two of his own lines: *The monument woos me* and *My joys have all false hearts*. The first irony is the feigned *anteros*, a love requited only in show, and so a separation of soul from body in dissimulation; the second is the absolute separation of soul and body in death. The disturbed tyrant seeks to preserve the corpse he lusted after, but just as he cannot command love or belief, he cannot command the body to live. Benjamin recognized that the “antithesis between the power of the ruler and his capacity to rule led to a feature peculiar to the Trauerspiel” or mourning-play. Its representation is “indecisiveness of the tyrant.” The tyrant, like in Xenophon's *Hiero*, is not able to enjoy erotic love because of his suspicion that all love him out of fear—they have *false hearts*. This suspicion then leads him to destroy his loves. But his desire does not cease at their death—even the grave, the *monument*, woos.

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625 Josephus, *Antiquities*, 16.5.4.

626 Benjamin, *Origin*, 70-1.
Bosse's man wrapped in malice is an homage to the iconology of the Baroque melancholic tyrant. Like Herod, we see him wrapped in the remembrance of loves he has, in some way, destroyed. He too is moved about by the counsel of a sycophant, his pet ape. In Buchanan's *Herodes*, the *Second Maiden's Tale*, and throughout the tradition of the Herod-play, we discover an image of the tyrant's fury which we see develop out of his erotic libido. His lust is a fearful image. It was such a fearful image that was used to argue for the just deposition of a tyrant, as a tyrant could only be recognized through their resemblance to an image of the past. In Bosse's engraving, the image of the ruler's lust is not fearful, but ridiculous. He uses the Machiavellian arcana of tyranny only in order to excuse his many dalliances. The unpredictability of the tyrannical passions arises from the melancholy problematic—the tyrant is not embedded within the normal social constraints that allow for the calculation of passions required by the civil imagination. Instead his passions burst forth and are justified after the fact through an appeal to the topical causes of love-melancholy and zelotypia, melancholic jealousy. Bosse’s poem plays upon these arguments that lessen the agency of the king from his actions. This is the perverse underside of Hobbes’ doctrine of representation and authorization. Just as the sovereign is able to deputize others to act in his person the same process can be reversed. By assigning the causes of his passion to others he distances himself from responsibility for them. Bad rule is not strong government but the deliquescing of sovereign power into the personal improprieties of the representative who, to avoid consequences, makes himself ineffectual by diminishing his own authority. The Man Wrapped in Malice is not an author of even his own actions—Leviathan seeks to be the cause of all the movements in the commonwealth.

The frontispiece of *Leviathan* is not the vision of a personal cult of power but the dissolution of the fear of the personal passions of the ruler. Though this new monster retains its
monarch’s face, Hobbes’ Leviathan is perhaps the first instantiation of an image of the state as an impersonal power, divided into various civil powers that cannot be identified with any single individual though incorporated into a new one: the commonwealth. This is the “answer” Bosse's mantled man gives to the Leviathan. If in it we see the revelation of the sovereign person's true character, this only shows that the power of Leviathan is distinct from the character of the individual who occupies its sovereign position. The state does not operate because of the passions within the sovereign but is mobilized by the “visible Power” that keeps the multitude in awe. The state *Leviathan* imagines is an image of a ruler that can serve as the cause of fear without being subject to it. Indeed, as the elided line from the frontispiece's inscription reads, he was *made* to fear nothing. Bosse's image is a joke in that it gives the lie to Leviathan's face, for the real person who bears it can hardly command awe. At the same time, it shows the success of Leviathan: we do not fear the real person but the artificial man that is the state.

Hobbes' theory of the state is not only an articulation of the conditions of legitimacy and the division of power among its administrative functions. It is also an attempt to replace the theater with a new culture of collective imagination. When Hobbes published *Leviathan*, the theatres were closed. The Puritan Interregnum government was opposed to plays, ungodly entertainments that attracted lewd behavior. But though the doors of the theaters proper were closed, Hobbes recognized that the state itself was a kind of theater, premised upon belief in the idea of a sovereign person. In *Leviathan*, he defined a “Person” as “the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other.”627 The

627 *EW*, 3.148.
sovereign representative was the artificial person of the people.\textsuperscript{628} The people were the “authors” of his actions.

But insofar as the Leviathan was to command awe and so transform melancholic fear into civil obedience, it was necessary that the imagined character of the state also be personated. And indeed, Hobbes tells us that even a “meer Figment of the brain, may be Personated.”\textsuperscript{629} Where Buchanan had instructed his King to imagine the tyrant as a figure in a play so that he may avoid it, Hobbes sought to turn the imagination of the King into a real power. The state \textit{Leviathan} imagines is an image of a civil order that can serve as the cause of fear without being subject to it. We do not fear the motives of the real person (the sovereign representative) but the punishments of the artificial man that is the state. The image of the Leviathan \textit{is} the will of the people, for it should be the last, or next to last, image in all deliberation of popular civic action.

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{628} David Runciman has argued that the Leviathan should not be understood as an artificial person but rather as a “person by fiction.” While I am convinced by his argumentation that the state is indeed a “person by fiction,” I remain skeptical as to why this would be incompatible with an “artificial person.” Runciman relies upon the philoigloical fact that Hobbes does not use this phrase in “later accounts,” a point that seems irrelevant to my lights. See Runciman, “What Kind of Person is Hobbes’ State?” \textit{Journal of Political Philosophy} 8, no. 2 (2000), 268-78.
\end{quotation}
7.0 Conclusion

In 1720, an enormous amount of speculation inflated the South Sea Company, a joint-stock company with a profitless monopoly over South American trade. Although Helen J. Paul's monograph on the topic seeks to correct the lingering conception that the Bubble was caused by a collective imaginative mania, this was nevertheless the dominant contemporary understanding of the event and the key to its moral significance.\textsuperscript{630} Because the political situation prevented any trade from happening, the returns the South Sea Company was able to provide depended upon investments in government debt. This scheme was unsustainable and led to the collapse of the stock price in 1720, ruining many would-be speculators. This event came to be known as the South Sea Bubble.

The Bubble caused a major scandal as disappointed and ruined investors demanded an account of what had caused the crisis. The standard explanations of cause placed the responsibility on the imagined hopes of the investors themselves. Sir John Blunt, the founder and director of the South Sea Company, argued that a “Cause of the Misfortune” of the Bubble was the “Distemper of the Times.” The “Reason of Mankind in General” was captivated by the “fond Opinion of being rich at once.”\textsuperscript{631} This, of course, omitted his own role in promising dividends of up to fifty percent. Blunt, sanctimoniously, says that this truth “needs only an Appeal to every Man's own Conscience


\textsuperscript{631} Sir John Blunt, \textit{A True State of the South-Sea Scheme: as it was first form'd, &c...and an examination of the conduct of the directors} (London: Printed by J. Peele, 1722), 76.
and to desire him to reflect on the Operations of his own Mind at that Time and what he did and
saw and knew to be done by others.”632 In the immediate aftermath, the House of Commons
deated the appropriate course of action to take to uphold the “public credit.” At the bequest of
King George III, an inquiry was begun that “to inquire into the Causes of these Misfortunes, and
apply the proper Remedies for restoring and fixing Publick Credit upon such solid and lasting
Foundations, as may effectually give Ease and Quiet to the Minds of his Majesty's Subjects.”633
Sir Robert Walpole argued against a search into the causes of the distemper and instead proposed
immediate remedy. One Lord Molesworth opposed this, saying that “before they consider'd of the
proper Remedies, they ought to enquire into the Cause and Nature of the Distemper: That it is with
the Body Politick, as with the Body Natural.”634 Walpole replied that “if the City of London were
on Fire, they did not doubt but all wise Men would be for extinguishing the Flames, and preventing
the spreading of the Conflagration, before they inquir'd into the Incendiaries.”635 When on
December 19th, Sir Joseph Jekyll proposed creating a select committee to investigate the causes
of the bubble, Walpole led the successful resistance of the motion by arguing that such an action
“would take up a great deal of Time, and that the publick Credit being in a bleeding Condition,
they ought to apply a speedy Remedy to it.”636 Walpole's suggested action was to engrraft nine

632 Ibid.

633 *The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons of England: With the speeches, debates, and
conferences, between the Two Houses; through every session from the year 1660. Faithfully collected from the best
Authorities, and Compared with the Journals of Parliament* (London: 1741), 222.

634 Ibid., 220.

635 Ibid., 221.

636 Ibid., 225.
million pounds into both the South Sea Stock and the East India Company. He soon after became the first Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, largely due to his handling of the crisis. The modern party system, developed under Walpole's leadership, was partly an outcome of the disarray and confusion of the South Sea Bubble.

Financial crises bring forth the peculiar dynamics of group affects that resist the simple situational accounts offered in the traditional theories of the passions. In the South Sea Bubble, the surge and plunge of the stock reflected a collective passion of enthusiasm followed by fear. No one can answer why the stock rose and fell at precisely those times. Indeed, it is the very unpredictability of the moment of the market’s surge or collapse that offers the incentive for investment. Everyone wishes to be ahead of the situation perceived by others. Yet the outcomes of these investments do lead to real and highly charged emotional situations of windfall and ruin, not to mention the effects of a large crash on all those others who though they did not invest their own wealth may be materially effected by its “negative externalities.”

As the South Sea Bubble occurred before the crises of financial markets had become a normalized fact of capitalist economic life, the emotional dynamics resulting from it were not distinguished from those that caused it. It is no surprise, then, that satirists turned to melancholic distempers of the imagination as an explanatory hypothesis. As can be seen in both the Parliamentary debate and in Blunt's apologia, the Bubble episode was frequently represented in the literature that emerged around it as a “distemper” of the times, one in which a disordered public imagination led people into passionate confusion. Nor was this concept always taken metaphorically. Defoe's criticism of another “bubble,” the Mississippi scheme, was entitled *The Chimera*, recalling the typical example of a thing possible only in the imagination. He believed that the “Arbitrary Power” of the French sovereign
rais'd an inconceivable Species of meer Air and Shadow, realizing Fancies and Imaginations, Visions and Apparitions, and making the meer speculations of Things, act all the Parts, and perform all the Offices of the Things themselves; and thus in a moment their Debts are all vanish'd, the Substance is answer'd by the Shadow; and the People of France are made the Instruments of putting the Cheat upon themselves, the Name of the thing is made an Equivalent to the Thing it self, transposing the Debts from the King to themselves, and being contented to Discharge the Publick, owe the Money to one another.⁶³⁷

Defoe here identifies the central problem of financial speculation as the separation of the imagination of things with the “Offices of the Things themselves.” As we saw in Chapter 4, effects of the “strong imagination” associated with melancholics were criticized as errors of interpretation. This helps to explain why the “distemper” from the Bubbles was linked to the symptoms of hypochondriasis and the vapors, gendered diagnoses of melancholy.

In the attempt to discover a cause for a collective passion “without apparent occasion,” the theorists of the Bubble took up the position of the Baroque medical doctor standing before the melancholic patient. Looking into the passion they seek to discover the passion’s imaginative object. Yet these objects were all commodities, things hoped for but not acquired. The risible character of these imaginations was put to great use in satire. Indeed, it was in satire that melancholy was explicitly invoked. Among the many “Bubble” satires written in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, we find one appearing in the genre of medical “observations” by the pseudonymous physician Sir John Midriff, entitled Observations on the Spleen and Vapours: Containing Remarkable Cases of Persons of Both Sexes, and all Ranks, from the Aspiring Director to the humble Bubbler, who have been miserably affected with those melancholy disorders since

the Fall of the South-Sea, and other Publick Stocks. The doctor writes in his introduction that the observations are “calculated for the relief of those Persons who date their Spleenick and Vapourish disorders from the melancholy circumstances of the time.” The text stays remarkably close to its pretended genre of medical observations, giving great detail about many individual cases of “spleen.” In one case, the doctor arrives to find a “Mr. Pitfal” who fears that he is at the brink of death. Pitfal is already attended to by his neighbor and his cousin, a clergyman, though the doctor calls them “Job’s Comforters” for not talking him back from this delusion. Then he learns that Pitfal was doing “tolerably well” until the neighbor informed him that “the Stocks had fallen that Day above 30 per Cent.” The doctor responds by making “several Arguments” on how the “Price of all such things were precarious; that they were up one Day, and down another, and that in time they perhaps might rise as high as ever, and let the worst come, they would hardly sink so low as some People imagin’d.” The doctor prescribes a “continued Course of frugal Management in his Affairs at Home.” In addition to being a slow but sure way to recoup his losses, his “continual Employment” will help to “refresh his mind” with “the Succession of one easy and useful Project after another.” Yet despite these long speeches, the doctor admits that he can “discover nothing” that Pitfal had “aim’d at, but what was very reasonable, and what any Man in the same Condition would have done as well as he.”

638 Sir John Midriff, Observations on the Spleen and Vapours; containing remarkable cases of persons of both sexes, and all ranks, from the aspiring Director to the humble Bubbler, who have been miserably afflicted with those melancholy disorders since the fall of South Sea, and other Publick Stocks (London: Printed for J. Roberts, 1721), [i].

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The case concludes with a debate between the doctor and the clergyman about motives of the Government’s recent plan to absorb the South Sea Company into their capital stock and to repay the investors’ principal with interest. The clergyman asks what “Motive could prompt those persons, who were already remarkable for their vast Possessions, to toil and struggle, and to watch every Opportunity of buying and selling to the greatest Advantage, as if they were the poorest Creatures upon Earth, toiling and labouring for Bread.” While the doctor holds that this was to increase the “Public Credit” the clergyman sermonizes that Avarice drives them as an “evil Humor” that runs through the whole civic body. But Pitfal, who “was deeps’ t engag’d in the Affair, and had hitherto understood but little of the matter” stops the clergyman and asks him “[w]hat he judg’d be the Reason why the Stocks had risen so high? And why, all of a sudden, they should fall so low?”

In an explanation similar to Hobbes’ accounts of collective passions, the clergyman hypothesizes that the “Eyes of all Persons” were turned upon those “principal Members” in the scheme as an example that “could not avoid being strictly follow’d.” When they pulled their investments, all others followed suit and sank the Public Credit lower than it should have gone. But at the same time, there was hope that the Stock may be restored, as the “Fear of Losing” would now hold off “many for some Time of becoming purchasers,” and what’s more, as the “Whole Nation was now in a manner link’d” to the affair, “it was not therefore improbable but such prudent Measures would be taken as would not only in time raise it to a moderate Height but also support it.” The episode would only be an instruction in civic morality, reminding those involved that “they were all Members of the same Body, at nothing in the End turn so much to their real Account,

640 Ibid., 68.
641 Ibid., 69-70.
as consulting the Interest of other Persons, as well as their own.” Pitfal is cheered, and the work concludes.

Pitfal’s question—Why did the stock rise and fall?—is the now familiar melancholic problem of a passion that has no apparent occasion though now it is the individual’s passion but that of the “whole Nation.” The doctor still gives Pitfal the advice he would to any melancholic though recognizing that he has already followed a reasonable course of action. The clergyman is the one who recognizes that the cause must be attributed to something collective. The melancholic “evil Humor” of avarice that runs through the body politic is avarice. This is still imagined, however, in the rest of the work as an imaginative malady on the part of the individual. The familiar infinite causes of melancholy illness now begin to manifest a new universality: the commodity-form. One woman is “disappointed of a Diamond Ring, a new white Damask Gown, and a large Silver Cup.” One man promises his wife “a new Damask-Bed...an easy Chair...with a Carpet for the Dining-Room” and is then driven “into the Bubbles” to fulfill these wishes. The domestic drama complicated by speculative possibilities deteriorates into nervous disorders of the individuals. Midriff's send-up of the bad investments of the “vaporous” speculators takes the idea of a melancholic object of imagination and inverts it: although everyone had their own imagination of desire, these are, in the end, all equivalent. They all desire luxury. The imagination is distempered, but this is now a collective disorder. But this satirical doctor moralizes the suffering of his melancholic patients, for though “[t]heir Sufferings were great indeed,” they “would not

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642 Ibid., 70.
643 Ibid., 6.
644 Ibid., 7.
have been so...had they not ty'd themselves in a thousand ridiculous Engagements, and, upon a false Presumption of being rich, run into many unnecessary Debts and Expences, which might well have been spar'd, till their Affairs were brought to a more certain Issue."645 Although the moralizing message is clear—look beyond your own interest while prudently managing your own affairs—we may wonder whether these imperatives are consistent in the financial capitalism that reared its head in public so clearly in the Bubble.

This study began with an argument that, in the eighteenth century, the problematic of melancholy was eclipsed by a medical program that sought to reduce causality. Here, in these works that associate “vapours” with financial speculation, we see a similar attempt to collapse the “motives” of those who look for occasions of personal advantage to the moral vice of avarice or vanity. Indeed, the very term “bubble” brings us back within the ambit of the relation of passion to motive. As we saw in Chapter 3, the commonplace of a pursuit that is a bubble was a melancholy topic, a means for criticizing motives. When Jaques moralizes on the solider who seeks the “bubble reputation/Even in the cannon's mouth,” he stands at a distance from the world of action and critiques the worldly desire for honor because of its transience and triviality. The eighteenth-century application of this notion to a newly financialized public sphere transformed its meaning. The OED's earliest recorded use of “bubble” in a sense related to speculative investment comes from a satirical work of 1700, entitled Labour in vain: or, What signifies little or nothing. In an introductory dialogue imagined between the book's Printer and Author, the Printer asks what the title is to be. When the author responds, the Printer laments “Then I'm like to make a very hopeful Bargain this Morning; and grow Rich like a Jacobite, that would part with his Property, for a

645 Ibid., 32.
Speculative Bubble.” The Author is ready with a retort: “Be not angry; for the same Estimate and Epithet the greatest Divines give to the whole World.” He here refers to what is now familiar to us as the *vanitas* topos from Ecclesiastes, *omnia vanitas*. But the satire inverts the significance: rather than a criticism of worldly action as vanity, as we saw with Jaques in Chapter 2, the *vantias* topos provides comfort: everything is in vain, so continue on as before. The financial “bubble” is the collective effect of a melancholic imagination.

That the critique of imagination proliferated in satire was no accident. Nowhere is the connection between the genre and its object of attack more clearly elaborated than in Shaftesbury's *A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm*. In tackling this subject, Shaftesbury recalled Henry More's *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus*, discussed in Chapter 1. In Shaftesbury's famous letter, we still find that “[t]here is a Melancholy which accompanys all Enthusiasm,” and that “till the Melancholy be remov'd, and the Mind at liberty to hear what can be said against the Ridiculousness of an Extreme in either way.” Yet whereas More's conception of enthusiasm was a “misconceit of being Inspir'd” caused by an inflammation of black bile, Shaftesbury means by melancholy any presumption of seriousness. This is dangerous, because “[g]ravity is of the very essence of

646 Edward Ward, *Labour in Vain; or, What Signifies Little or Nothing. Viz. I. The Poor Man's Petitioning at Court. II. Expectation of Benefit from a Covetous Man in his Life-time. III. The Marriage of an Old Man to a Young Woman. IV. Endeavours to Regulate Mens Manners by Preaching or Writing. V. Being a Jacobite. VI. Confining an Insolvent Debtor. VII. Promise of Secrecy in a Conspiracy. VIII. An Enquiry after a Place* (London: n.p., 1700), A2r.

647 Ibid.


649 Ibid., 20-1.
imposture.”650 The remedy of satirical laughter, then, is not that it distracts the mind of the melancholic and activates her sluggish spirits, but instead that it diminishes the object of the imagination. We only know whether things are ridiculous “by applying the Ridicule, to see whether it will bear or no.”651 Satire becomes a genre for testing prudence. This is a wholly different laughter than Burton's Democritus Junior, who laughs at the world for its confusion of vain endeavors. Shaftesbury's satirical laughter seeks to eliminate melancholy and hold all things lightly.

The notion of imagination that was used to explain the Bubble was part of a reconceptualization of the imagination itself that disarticulated it from the passions and its interpretive function. Robert Mitchell has argued that “when early eighteenth-century commentators attributed the fluctuations of public credit and the stability of the state to the imagination, they were not applying an existing notion of the imagination to new economic institutions but rather inventing a new concept.”652 The publication of the stock price's rises and falls in “publications such as John Freke’s The Price of the Several Stocks (1714–22) and John Castaing Jr.’s Course of the Exchange (1697–1810), as well as the stock listings included in most early eighteenth-century newspapers,” as the unexplained or speculatively accounting of the movements of these prices “highlighted the extent to which these paper instruments were part of a system that operated beyond state control, responsive only to collective “Opinion” or “Fancy.””653

650 Ibid., 17.
651 Ibid., 18-9.
653 Ibid., 125.
The eighteenth-century insouciance towards the inner workings of the imagination corresponds to
the desire to assign a whole set of collective errors, moral, religious, and political to the
individual’s mental life. Collective passion is reduced to the single principle of imaginative excess
just as in medicine melancholic symptomatology was reduced to the principle regulating the
animal economy or its conceptual cousins.

Defoe, a complex figure in this history, was at once a frequent opponent of the “stock-
jobbers” and a public propagandist for the South Sea scheme. In his 1722 historical novel, A
Journal of the Plague Year, Defoe includes a lengthy critique of public imagination. The general
character of fear that comes with the plague leads people to false imaginations; the “terrors and
apprehensions of the people led them into a thousand weak, foolish, and wicked things, which they
wanted not a sort of people really wicked to encourage them to.” He discusses people's
superstitious sightings of ghosts, fear of comets as portents, and even the classical commonplace
of phantasia, discovering figures in a cloud. Defoe's narrator ascribes this to “hypochondriac
fancies” that “represent Ships, armies, battles in the firmament.” His healthy, prudential advice
comes in the form of a couplet: “Till steady eyes the exhalations solve, And all to its first matter,
cloud, resolve.”654 The “first matter” must be the end of any chain of thoughts, for in it, and it
alone, is the truth of the situation. In one passage, Defoe's narrator gives an extensive account of
his encounter with the melancholic perceptions of a woman looking at a cloud:

I think it was in March, seeing a crowd of people in the street, I joined with them
to satisfy my curiosity, and found them all staring up into the air to see what a
woman told them appeared plain to her, which was an angel clothed in white, with
a fiery sword in his hand, waving it or brandishing it over his head. She described
every part of the figure to the life, showed them the motion and the form, and the
poor people came into it so eagerly, and with so much readiness; 'Yes, I see it all
plainly,' says one; 'there's the sword as plain as can be.' Another saw the angel. One

654 Defoe [under pseudonym H.F.], A Journal, 27.
saw his very face, and cried out what a glorious creature he was! One saw one thing, and one another. I looked as earnestly as the rest, but perhaps not with so much willingness to be imposed upon; and I said, indeed, that I could see nothing but a white cloud, bright on one side by the shining of the sun upon the other part. The woman endeavoured to show it me, but could not make me confess that I saw it, which, indeed, if I had I must have lied. But the woman, turning upon me, looked in my face, and fancied I laughed, in which her imagination deceived her too, for I really did not laugh, but was very seriously reflecting how the poor people were terrified by the force of their own imagination. However, she turned from me, called me profane fellow, and a scoffer; told me that it was a time of God's anger, and dreadful judgements were approaching, and that despisers such as I should wander and perish.655

Defoe's narrator is not only unconvinced by the woman's ekphrasis of the cloudy omen, but he cannot even perceive it. His eyes have lost the imaginative capacity to see the cloud as anything but a cloud. In this, the woman's judgment is quite right: he is a “profane fellow” in a literal sense, as the hieroglyphs of past experience have fallen into a profane assumption of mere existence. This critique of public imagination was of a piece with concerns about financialization. Indeed, how Defoe describes the astrologers in his Plague Year is nearly identical with his earlier polemic against the stock-jobbers: “tis a compleat System of Knavery; that 'tis a Trade founded in Fraud, born of Deceit, and nourished by Trick, Cheat, Wheedle, Forgeries, Falshoods, and all sorts of Delusions; Coining false News, this way good, that way bad; whispering imaginary Terrors, Frights, Hopes, Expectations, and then preying upon the Weakness of those, whose Imaginations they have wrought upon, whom they have either elevated or depress'ud.”656 Imagination is no longer the condition for experience but precisely that subset of belief for which one has no experience.

655 Ibid., 27-8.

Though it may first seem strange to conclude this dissertation on early modern melancholy with a story of financial speculation, the South Sea Bubble provides another view, alongside the medical history charted in the first chapter, of the eclipse of the problematic that has concerned me in this study. There I argued that the figure of the melancholic was no longer seen against the against the absent occasion of their passion but through a positive nosology of symptoms. At the same time, the South Sea Bubble was read as a problem of imaginative misprision of a situation. Now, however, it is not that the melancholic holds a different interpretation of their passion than others, as we saw in the theater in Chapter 4. In a certain sense, the aftermath of the South Sea Bubble crisis shifted public discourse to regard any interpretation of a situation as part of an imaginative folly. Just as Defoe's narrator's inability to see a figure in the cloud is a sign of his prudence, so too a limitation of the imagination to the realm of fiction changed the hegemonic narrative of what it meant to be in the world. What is nebulous in a situation should be seen only as that: the situation simply is cloudy.

But if the clear-eyed satirist looking into the social collective moved by the whims of the market imagination is in the position of the doctor, what can be said for the collective melancholy of those unhappy subjects that are afflicted with its effects? Today, none of us can in good faith stand to the side of at once pervasive and inarticulable forces of global capitalism and say that we can look upon it as someone unaffected. We are all the melancholics of the South Sea Bubble. Perhaps, then, there is a melancholy topic for our collective passions that cannot be tethered to a single situation. While the scope of this project has limited its historical sources to primarily the contexts of 1580-1660, it is inevitable that anyone who has moved through these thickets wants to arrive at some clearing. What does this have to do with our present moment? How does this problem, emerging from a literary, medical, religious, and political context distant from our own
bring clarity to the ever-urgent problems of our own time? Though it is not possible to fully answer such questions in this conclusion, I do wish to provide some guiding propositions that would take this project into present concerns.

Our own present moment is also “cloudy,” both in a prevailing mood of generalized discontent and an inability to articulate the causes of this discontent. The World Health Organization estimates that there are 300 million sufferers of depression globally, making it the largest single cause of disability in the world. While the reality of depression cannot be reasonably doubted, often the assertion that depression is real is accompanied by an insistence that it is a “biological” phenomenon. Attempts to articulate the social, political, and economic causes of depression are framed as “factors” that trigger this biological response. In this way, they are only accounted for as indirect and partial factors of depression. Nevertheless, there is mounting evidence that shows the close connection between common realities and individual mental health outcomes. A study in the British Journal of Psychiatry shows evidence of 10,000 “economic suicides” following upon the 2007 global financial crisis. At the beginning of their report, the authors cite the nineteenth-century French sociologist, Émile Durkheim, who wrote in his 1897 book Suicide that “[i]t is a well-known fact that economic crises have an aggravating effect on suicidal tendency.”

While many have looked to the history of melancholia in order to better understand the modern epidemic of depression, this is not the primary goal of my project. Instead, the

657 World Health Organization, “Depression.”


659 Ibid., 246.
reformulation of the melancholic problematic that appears in the modern era is best captured in Durkheim's theory of *anomie* developed most fully in his work on suicide. It is hard not to hear the early modern concern with idleness leading to melancholic disorders of the imagination when we read Durkheim saying that “Inactive or disrupted group life is seen to create unregulated individuals with “insatiable appetites” and “fevered imaginations.” But Durkheim recognized that *anomie* was not the product of an abnormal psychology, but instead its primary contributing factor was economic progress and its accompanying disasters.

Like Burton's definition of melancholy as a passion “without any apparent occasion,” *anomie* is a negative cause: it is the privation of *nomos*, the absence of a rule. It is the result of changes in social relations. As a new order of relations come into being, new ideas of these relations only develop slowly. This leads to an ideological disorientation. Durkheim assigned the cause of *anomie* principally to economic progress, because it “principally consist[s] in freeing industrial relations from all regulation.” According to Durkheim's theory, *anomie* itself becomes the motive for the anomic suicide or its correlative, the anomic homicide. The inability to articulate one's social position leads to an intense but undirected frustration that under certain circumstances breaks forth into violence against self and others.

If a collective *anomie* describes the feeling of a population, the ability to articulate a cause for this common feeling becomes a source of power. Dangerous political formations like antisemitism are organized by recognizing a common emotional distress that is not able to be

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661 Ibid., 210-14.

662 Durkheim, *Suicide*, 215.
accounted for and assigning responsibility for it to another group. Heinrich von Treitschke's early slogan of German antisemitism, *Die Juden sind unser Unglück*, or, “the Jews are our sorrow,” is a dark formulation of what occurs when the melancholic position of remaining uncertain about one's own *Unglück* collapses. But the formula's political power begins with its conclusion: unser *Unglück*. Within the slogan of hate we find a promise, already accepted as a fact, of fellow-feeling, a recognition that one's sorrow is a common bond with others. The first step is to establish that a feeling is common, but its crystallization into a political formation requires that a common cause of this feeling become accepted. It is the double movement—recognizing a common sadness and assigning it a cause—that organizes passion into the inchoate beginnings of a political party.

Should anyone be in doubt, contemporary satire clarifies the connection between individual experiences of stress, anxiety, and depression and the possibility of this becoming a political force. In 2010, the *Onion* posted a satirical video titled “Overcome Stress By Visualizing It As A Greedy, Hook-Nosed Race Of Creatures.” Imitating the vapid promotion of self-help literature on morning talk shows, an invited guest trains the two anchors in “problem visualization.” She explains the process: “The first thing I like to do is imagine my money-related stress is the most disgusting terrifying creature I can think of. I like to imagine an ugly, greasy little creature with a hooked nose and oily black hair.” She calls him the “Grabbler because he's a greedy little monster who wants to grab-bel up all my money.” An anti-Semitic cartoon appears on the monitor behind them. She then instructs them to think of “all the problems your Grabbler is causing: he invented interest rates like the ones on your credit card, he's taking the jobs because grabbers only hire their own kind.” The “stress” is solved by imagining the Grabbler, “slowly disintegrating like a pile of ashes blown away by a purifying wind, and now you're in a peaceful meadow full of lilies swaying in a gentle breeze.” The dark humor of this satire is further darkened beyond humor when we see that
the highest-voted comment on the video, from user monolyth421, with 2,800 likes, reads, “How is it satire if it's true?”

What use can we make of a history of melancholy for our life? My primary contention here is that the history of passion is the counterpoint to an insistence on the immediacy of feeling. The stakes are the interpretation of our emerging present. Rather than seeing a negative passion whose cause is unclear simply as a moment of ignorance, the articulation of a melancholy topics worked out in Chapter 2 shows that there are alternatives to causal explanation in the articulation of a passion. The justification of melancholic passion through the melancholy topics carved out a critical subject position. Although from the conventional viewpoint, the melancholic does not participate in action and withdraws into contemplation, I argue that melancholic rhetoric shows the contingency of conventional motives and in doing so opens a possibility for imagining new motives and forms of action.

Yet the study of history fails to understand its subjects if it sees its subjects as also operating within the rubric of historicity, for it presumes that every orientation to action is either premised upon some version of historical understanding or reactive to historical content that it fails to grasp in its proper context. In his famous essay on the “Uses and Abuses of History for Life,” Nietzsche describes three uses and abuses of history for life: the antiquarian derives it from the details of the artifact, the monumentalist from the rule that derived from the example, and the critical historian from the oppositions derived from genealogy. Each of these positions has a privileged method for drawing significance from history.

We can blithely say that opposition to historical meaning is, of course, “historical,” in the sense that it emerges in historical context. But if history is to mean more than an account of past existents, we must recognize that our own modes of historical understanding are regularly resisted by the very artifacts we seek to understand. A recent movement in this direction has been the call, made so consistently, that we must attend to the “materiality” of these objects. We are to study the worm-eaten texts as if we were the worms who ate them. Yet such a position reproduces a historical position that it fails to understand. What is being practiced in this attention to material is very often a form of contemplation, one that seeks to shuffle off the historical coil of context through the hope of some illumination from matter. The contemplation of vanitas paintings, and, as I suggest we must assume, complementary practices of contemplating objects, was antihistorical: all action, both past and future, was already vain. This gave rise to an antihistorical mood in which past and future are felt through a similitude and so do not possess distinct qualities. In the same way, we do well to recall Durkheim's nostrum in Suicide: “The entire morality of progress and perfection is thus inseparable from a certain amount of anomie.”\(^{664}\) If the ultimate image of action's meaning, and therefore the meaning of history, is reducible to a forward line, the significance of any individual action is reducible to a point upon that line. Progress, as an image, fails to be a motive. Indeed, “progress” takes the locomotive direction that is implied in the early modern theory of motive and duplicates it within the imagination. Instead of an orientation, this leaves us disoriented.

I argue we should attend to the imaginative orientation of our present moment. These orientations do not read themselves as historical objects but rather oppose the attempt to historicize

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\(^{664}\) Durkheim, Suicide, 331.
their action. That is, they do not attribute the results of action simply to historical causes. Where there is historical understanding, there is also an anti-history which opposes its mode of understanding. I name these three modes, respectively, the paranoiac, the apocalyptic, and the melancholic. Anti-history develops as a reaction to the imposition of historical meaning upon action. In this opposition, present orientations are anti-historical. As in the case of Nietzsche’s three “uses and abuses” of history, I too read each anti-historical position as having a privileged object of understanding: the paranoiac looks to the cipher, the apocalyptic to the sign, and the melancholic to the emblem. I will sketch, in broad strokes, a character of each position.

To the paranoiac, the meaning of history is immanent, but it is hidden, obscured by a set of appearances that wish to hide the aggressive and malevolent intentions of things. The struggle in history is fought over meaning’s encipherment and deciphering. The revealed meaning is not that of another, future time, as it is for the apocalyptist, but instead a restitution and advertisement of the motives behind all things. For everywhere that one might find purposiveness the paranoiac discovers purpose. History is both the emplotment of intriguers' intentions and their duplicitous communication that disguises them. History is its own kind of alien life, haunting and antagonizing those who are forced to live in it.

From the apocalyptic position, history is a quality of time, but not its essential character. History may very well be progressing upon its own terms, but within history a moment of transcendence can emerge, presaging the meanings of all previous things that will be revealed after history. Historical understanding is here a struggle to overcome history, felt as an obscuring, dark force over the reign of truth and light. The sign is what emerges in history that shows its meaning is not historical. But the distance between history and its meaning cannot be traversed except through a radical violence. The violence that is within history is of a different order, for it follows
from the vanity that attends all ambition that cannot bring about its own transcendence. Apocalyptic violence seeks to kill history itself; it is in this way that the paranoiacs often make the prophet of end times their leader. The fearful paranoiacs seek deliverance from a strange, oppressive force but their prophets are motivated by the vision of a new force that will obsolesce the life of the present.

Anti-history is an elaboration of passions that, in their mundane character, are common to us all: the fear of the paranoiac and the hope of the apocalyptic. Hobbes and Spinoza both argued that hope and fear were only two moments of the same passion, yet they failed to see that the imaginative component of each was different. If it is true that the provisionality of hope's desire means that it always contains a logical fear of the non-realization of its hope, the content of hope is not this provisionality but the image that it throws forward, not only into the future but also in its interpretation of the meaning of the past and present. Apocalyptic hope is an image of time's meaning. In this, it is not the simple complement of the paranoiac's fear. Fear, as Aristotle reminds us in the *Rhetoric*, causes us to deliberate. The decay of place and time that brings the image into the imagination means that the feared image cannot simply be fled: it first must be placed back into a perception of the present. The paranoiac's image is potentially anywhere, lurking behind an appearance. In this, the feared image becomes the hermeneutic of what is most present. The mood of presence becomes one of foreboding: the simply existing has less of an ontic claim than what can foretell, presage, or wink. Indeed, the existent is often discounted as mere appearance and in this way it is not to be accounted for as presence at all.

To the emblematic position, history is the dead part of nature. But it is through the muteness of this death that it gives meaning to the living. Both natural and human history are linked by the death of what they study. The anatomy of melancholy is both gross and comparative. Burton's
topical organization of melancholy allowed for this non-phenomenon to appear and gave it an
order necessary for its contemplation. But is also made possible the contemplation of its similitudes
through time. Where the trope of the *similitudo temporum* gives to the monumental historian a
warrant for taking history as an example, it functions as an anti-history for the melancholic. The
similitude of times is not a reduction of their meanings to an underlying principle, but an opening
of history as a field fallow for mutual illuminations. Emblematic meaning imposes no causal
relation between the nodes of its similitudes. Indeed, any causal relation would collapse the
emblem's significance.

The emblematic position can be variously characterized as hopeful or fearful in that it
imagines a better or worse future, but its mood is never either. Emblematic imagination suspends
anticipation for an experience of savoring. In this, it sublimes the erotic into all things. Sappho's
famous characterization of erotic love as γλυκόπικρον, bittersweet, is precisely what the early
modern manuals of contemplation instruct the contemplator to discover in experience. In Joseph
Hall's *The Art of Divine Meditation*, the first rung on the ladder of contemplation is to “[l]et the
heart...first conceive and feele in it selfe the sweetnesse or bitternesse of the matter meditated:
which is never done, without some passion; nor expressed, without some hearty exclamation.”665
The *glukupikron* is a topic for discovering the similitude of one's own passionate response to all
possible objects.

In each of the moments of anti-history here sketched, the image is paramount. Yet
recognizing this returns us to a fundamental claim. Insofar as the imagination participates in

motive, all action contains an anti-historical element. This is not to say that the content of all thought should be identified with the imagination, but rather something stranger: all thought seeks to rest in an image. When thought is not captured by a sensible intuition (as much of thought is not), it either becomes irritating in its vagueness or as it sparks a desire to continue on its path in order to arrive at the imagination. Ernst Bloch, in his monumental *Principle of Hope*, wrote “let the daydreams grow really fuller, that is, clearer, less random, more familiar, more clearly understood and more mediated with the course of things.”\textsuperscript{666} The emblematic view is the attempt to take the various “daydreams” of the present and intensify this passion by bringing it to bear upon all experience.

The emblematic orientation also resists the ascriptions of the cause of common passions that, as I have argued above, are inherent in the formation of organized political violence. Without meaning to trivialize the serious, and according to Durkheim, often fatal consequences of anomie, we can recognize in its concept an earlier and surprising correspondence with the Kantian judgment of taste. In his *Critique of Judgment*, Kant argues that the judgment of taste is based only on the “purposiveness” of its object. It is possible, though, that there one can conceive of a “[p]urposiveness...without an end, insofar as we do not place the causes of this form in a will, but can still make the explanation of its possibility conceivable to ourselves only by deriving it from a will.”\textsuperscript{667} We should interpret this in relation to an important remark in the first section of the *Kritik* that has received little notice. Kant argues that the representation or *Vorstellung* is referred


not to a determinate concept, but to feeling, and specifically to *Lebensgefühl*, a feeling of life, that goes under the name of pain and pleasure.\textsuperscript{668}

I suspect that Kant's philosophical aside shows an insight that Kant did not fully develop, perhaps because its consequences would have spoiled the system he was attempting to construct. If pain and pleasure are not simple, static states, but only names for ranges of feeling on a continuum, we begin to see that the form of a reflective judgment is not as stable as Kant had hoped. When we refer the representation to a feeling, the articulation of that relationship cannot be coded in the binary of pleasure and pain if these are only vague names for a diapason of intensities. However, even an attempt to recognize the various intensities of pleasure and pain, to code them through their localization on the body and movement across it, will fail to incorporate a passion into the “feeling of life.” Insofar as pain and pleasure are not mediated through an object, they become alien experiences of passive transience. The articulation of an object of one's pain and pleasure is the attempt to move the merely *experienced* into *experience*, that is, the factical into the inventional.

The articulation of this experience is not a recommendation of autobiography. It is precisely in the figure of the melancholic that an account of the self fails to articulate the passion, for she encounters both a surplus of possible causes and a sense that all of these fail to satisfy the experience of the pain itself. Melancholic articulation of experience requires imaginative creation. In his “Democritus Junior to the Reader,” Burton writes a utopia.\textsuperscript{669} *Utopia* is a topos through which the existent appears contingent and amenable to acts of imagination. Burton's closing

\textsuperscript{668} Ibid., 89-90.

\textsuperscript{669} *AM*, 1.85-97.
remarks to his *Anatomy*—Be not solitary, be not idle—are a minimal program of melancholic solidarity. Though it may appear as simple advice to remain in the company of others and to keep busy (advice that Burton endorses many times in the *Anatomy*) we might also take it as a repeated insistence to *melancholize*. To “be not solitary” in melancholy is not only to be in the company of others, but to discover others *within one's passion*. This inquiry into melancholic passion is itself an activity that prevents idleness, as Burton himself admits: “I write of melancholy by being busy to avoid melancholy.” Utopia is not a vision of the future but an articulation of melancholy itself, having moved through the experience of not having an apparent occasion to discovering in this a similitude to problems that move far beyond one's experience. The material conditions that give rise to *anomie* also make possible an extension of the melancholy topics to social formations. It is precisely in the anomic condition of modern life subsumed under capitalistic production that the emblematic position becomes a potential for liberation. Melancholic utopia is a topical response to *anomie*, organizing the rules of a society around the possibility of new mode of feeling. As opposed to the apocalyptic utopia that places its image after history as history's true motive, the melancholic utopia is an imaginative landscape in which one can set the emblems one invents out of mundane experience.

I offer one example. William Carlos Williams' poem titled “A Woman in Front of a Bank,” can be read as an emblem, like of those many in the Renaissance whose image was not made explicit through an engraving but required the reader to create it in their imagination. The poet perceives an apparently mundane scene of a “woman in front of a bank” but his perception is organized around the similitude of the *columnar*:

> The bank is a matter of columns,  
> like . convention,  
> unlike invention; but the pediments  
> sit there in the sun
to convince the doubting of investments “solid as a rock” — upon which the world stands, the world of finance,

the only world: Just there, talking with another woman while rocking a baby carriage back and forth stands a woman in a pink cotton dress, bare legged and headed whose legs are two columns to hold up her face, like Lenin’s (her loosely arranged hair profusely blond) or Darwin’s and there you have it: a woman in front of a bank.670

The column that is “like convention” is the bank, whose real business of finance is the least solid of all, adopts onto itself the historical performance of solidity. The columns of “invention” are her legs that “hold up her face.” It is in the face that Williams pivots to another similitude: he sees there a similarity with the dual revolutions of politics and biology and its avatars of Lenin and Darwin. The women, and of course also the baby, are an emblem that the bank's world of self-assured convention is not the “only” world.

If, as discussed in Chapter 5, the imagination's materials are limited to “decaying sense,” decay nevertheless makes possible its creative power. The fading away of place, time, and occasion make the sensuous images of one's own experience recombinable elements of a yet to be determined, new image, preserving only the details of sense-experience that are made meaningful.

Whereas the concept takes the example merely as an instance of itself, the imaginative decay allows for a mediation of the most particular features of experience and its “communicability,” that is, its ability to be made common across other experiences. Imagination then allows us to move from a motive that is only ever an induction of past experiences to one that may break with the past precisely by imbuing its debris with a significance that the past, rendered strictly under the historian's gaze, would never admit. The logical manipulations of the topics open the factical experience into an array of predicates that allow it to be connected with other experiences. The imagination's graphic graftings-on of sense creates new “chimeras,” things that have-not-been—but may-yet-be. Our present experience is not simply a subjective, monadical view, ever limited and partial, into the causes of an immediate future, but it can be, when taken up as an emblem, the meaning of some other experience, one yet to be realized. To the emblematical anti-historian, history appears not as the collection of sufficient reasons for the present but an imaginative exercise in exchanging the range of possible meaning. Historical detail becomes image, awaiting its inscriptio and subscriptio.

Melancholic experience is always mediated: its articulation, moreover, takes the immanent content of experience as the light by which the meaning of something non-present is to be articulated. In Chapter 3, I articulated two opposed views of “experience” associated with the early modern “traveller”—one “politick,” the other melancholic. But the significance of this should not be analogized to modern uses of the term in which “experience” is both a prerequisite for hiring and what is sought after in the off-hours by beautiful souls. In a sense, the character of both of these apparently opposed uses of experience—what is for others, what is for self—are nevertheless identical in that its significance is immanent to what is experienced. To the melancholic traveller, movement is without motive. The melancholic traveller, like the celebrated figure of the flaneur
who emerged in the anomic metropolis of the nineteenth century, has only contemplation as an activity. Space becomes filled with stations that provide matter for this all-consuming activity. The movements of the “traveller” presume a different constitution of space than the crowd that rushes around them, one in which the present is already accomplished, treated as part of the nature morte of history. The dead are not unreal, nor are they inert. The decay of the organic world, and the corpse as an undifferentiated moment in it, is an emblem of the creative history of melancholy. The “decaying sense” of the past is the condition of the creation of something new.
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