What’s with the Attitude? Policymaker Attitudes towards Intelligence and National Security

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What determines why policymakers react to intelligence with elation or anger? There are countless examples of decision-makers blustering at their intelligence professionals, and there are equally as many instances of these same individuals later patting them on the back in triumph. This dissertation seeks to understand why. Specifically, it investigates what determines national security decision-makers’ attitudes towards intelligence. This research applies attitude theory to our understanding of intelligence utilization and represents a departure from previous intelligence research that employs cognitive psychology. The Cognitive-Affective Theory of Intelligence (CATI) contends that policymakers develop predictable attitudes towards intelligence. These attitudes are the result of three variables: 1) the type of intelligence, 2) the specificity of the intelligence, and 3) the level of decision-maker commitment to policy.
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1.0 Chapter 1: Attitudes and Intelligence

On October 27\textsuperscript{th}, 2019, President Donald Trump announced to the world that the United States had conducted an operation leading to the death of the Islamic State (I.S.I.S.) leader, Abu Bakr-al-Baghdadi. In his speech and subsequent answers to reporters’ questions, Trump lauded U.S. intelligence officials nearly ten times during the short news conference that concluded in under an hour. When asked about the intelligence that had resulted in the successful operation, Trump responded:

The level of intelligence, the level of work, was pretty amazing … I’ve gotten to know many of the intel people, and I will say that they are spectacular. Now, they’re not going to want to talk about it. They want to keep it quiet. The last thing they want, because these are — these are great patriots. But the people that I’ve been dealing with are incredible people. And it’s really a deserving name: “intelligence” It was flawless.\textsuperscript{1}

Trump’s attitude towards the work of the intelligence community (I.C.), however, has not always been praiseworthy. Nearly ten months before the Baghdadi Operation, the Director of National Intelligence (D.N.I.), Dan Coats, publicly deviated from the President’s positive stance on the situations in North Korea, Iran, and the Middle East (Morin & Toosi, 2019). The week prior, Trump was touting the success of his negotiations with North Korea, his administration’s hardline stance against Iran, and the United States’ gains against the I.S.I.S. insurgency. In response to his intelligence officials’ assessments, the President tweeted his scorn:

The Intelligence people seem to be extremely passive and naive when it comes to the dangers of Iran … They are wrong! When I became President Iran was making trouble all over the Middle East, and beyond. Since ending the terrible Iran Nuclear Deal, they are MUCH different, but a source of potential danger and conflict … Perhaps Intelligence should go back to school! (Oprysko, 2019).

This was not the first time that Trump, in a short timeframe, vacillated between praise and admonition for the I.C. and its assessments. He lambasted the I.C. when it provided evidence of Russian interference in the U.S. election, but lauded intelligence officials’ role in the territorial defeat of I.S.I.S. Former D.N.I. James Clapper provides one potential reason for his attitude: “If the Intelligence Community generates intelligence that the President likes, he praises them … If it generates intelligence he doesn’t like, he shoots the messengers” (Kelly, 2019).

While President Trump’s drastically varying attitudes towards the I.C. may seem like an aberration, previous U.S. presidents and other decision-makers have shown similarly disparate attitudes towards intelligence assessments. Those with a wide range of experience in intelligence, varying relationships with their intelligence producers, and divergent perceptions of threat have demonstrated attitudes towards intelligence assessments that are variable and dynamic.

1.1 The Puzzle: What’s with The Attitude?

This study seeks to answer a seemingly simple question: what determines the attitude of decision-makers towards intelligence? President Trump’s remarks praising the work of the I.C. professionals followed shortly by his furious outbursts on Twitter seem paradoxical. Yet, this is not an isolated event confined to the Trump administration, but rather a recurring theme in intelligence and policymaking. Policymakers, both staunch defenders and detractors of I.C. work, have exhibited fluctuating attitudes towards it.
Another example of these variable attitudes comes from George Tenet, former Director of Central Intelligence (D.C.I.) and second-longest-serving director in Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) history. As D.C.I., Tenet assumed the role of both producer and consumer of intelligence and displayed a wide range of attitudes towards it. For instance, after the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) due to incorrect database management by the C.I.A., Tenet met with his analysts to discuss the result of negotiations between U.S. and Chinese officials regarding compensation. When his analyst revealed that the agreed-upon number could mean “easy money” in Cantonese numerology, Tenet replied in an unusually favorable tone, “Now that’s interesting” (Priess, 2017b, p. 215).

This attitude is in stark contrast to his reaction to intelligence on the Balkans shortly thereafter. Tenet, confused by the conclusions of the piece, was so angry with his briefer that he blustered, “Do you know how bad this is? I’ll tell you how bad it is!” The D.C.I. then proceeded to scribble curses on the page and rip it out of the President’s Daily Briefing book. The only evidence of that Balkans assessment was an impression on the remaining pages underneath, etched with “Tenet’s anger-driven scrawl” (Priess, 2017b, pp. 215-217). Even George Tenet, an intelligence professional with one of the longest careers as a D.C.I. in U.S. history, displayed both favorable and very unfavorable attitudes towards intelligence.

Policymakers react to information in a variety of ways, and a better understanding of the determinants may provide insight into intelligence theory and practice. While there are many examples of individual policymakers displaying such varying attitudes, there is little research on the subject. This dissertation illustrates that these attitudes are significant for our understanding of both intelligence usage and social science research.
1.2 Why Study Attitudes Towards Intelligence?

While this dissertation provides a more detailed definition of these attitudes and an elucidation of why we should care about them, a brief introduction is necessary. An attitude is simply a summary evaluation of an object of thought: “I like China”, “Naval power is bad”, and “The F-22 is amazing” are all examples of attitudes. Even seemingly innocuous attitudes shape how we think, feel, and act. In the realm of international relations (I.R.), attitudes can have wide-reaching implications, and a pertinent example of this is the National Intelligence Estimate (N.I.E.) on the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

In the early 1990s, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia split apart in a series of political upheavals. While some were caught off-guard by this, the I.C. had correctly predicted this event in a “stunningly prescient” N.I.E. released in October 1990. However, despite its accuracy, the prediction seemed to have had no impact on policy (Treverton & Miles, 2017). Policymaker attitudes towards intelligence may explain this paradoxical outcome, where the intelligence was correct and digested by the desired audience but had no significant impact.

For example, one intelligence official found,

[The intelligence estimate] contradicted a narrative the Embassy had promoted and the [State Department’s European] Bureau had accepted since the 1980s. The State Department believed Yugoslavia not only would survive but would develop as a democracy under American – not European (a very important point) tutelage (Treverton & Miles, 2017, p. 14).

As the intelligence provided information that disagreed with policymakers’ preconceived notions, the decision-makers reacted unfavorably to the intelligence. In fact, the intelligence was “characterized as over-blown and greeted with disdain” by many (Treverton & Miles, 2017, p. 14). In this case, while the intelligence was read and absorbed by decision-makers, their attitudes may have influenced their behavior. It is clear, therefore, that attitudes can play a key role in
understanding foreign-policy decisions and intelligence usage. Nevertheless, attitudes towards intelligence products have been rather neglected in theory and practice.

1.2.1 History: A Departure from Theoretical Expectations

From a theoretical perspective, the concept of the intelligence-policymaker relationship is seemingly straightforward. The I.C. receives requirements from decision-makers and collects information pertinent to the abovementioned requirements. After the collection phase, this information is processed into a readable format so that it can be analyzed by intelligence analysts in the 17 intelligence agencies. Intelligence analysts then produce finalized intelligence to be disseminated to policymakers, who utilize the objective intelligence to reduce uncertainty and make informed decisions.

In practice, however, the theoretical expectations are often flawed and there is significant evidence that, in reality, policymakers often have mixed attitudes towards intelligence. This is vital because, as this research shows, attitudes can affect decision-maker behavior and cognition. In fact, one scholar claims,

The literature does not provide many illustrations of situations where intelligence analysis actually influenced policy-maker judgment when the analysis conflicted with policy preferences. Instead, it indicates that most of the time decision-makers will just ignore the analysis, or look for some analysis that is more consistent with their preferences (Marrin, 2009a).

In his seminal work, Betts argues that surprise attacks and incorrect decisions are the results of failing to use the available information (Betts, 1982). There are many historical examples of decision-makers ignoring intelligence and implementing poorly informed policy as a result. Why does this happen? Who, if anyone, is to blame? Do attitudes play a role? If so, how much of a role is this? This study explores this topic and examines the concept’s merit in
intelligence studies.

The study and application of intelligence has an extensive history; and a common theme is that policymakers do not always listen to it. One example is Stalin’s unwillingness to accept that the Nazis would break the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Researchers argue that despite intelligence warnings from Churchill, U.S. officials, and his own intelligence service, Stalin and the Soviet leadership failed to recognize the signs of the surprise attack (Whaley, 1973). Stalin’s attitude towards intelligence is evident from his reaction to two reports received on June 17th, 1941. The Soviet leader wrote to his Chief of Intelligence, Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov, “Perhaps you can send your ‘source’ from the staff of the German air force to go f*ck his mother. This is not a ‘source’ but a disinformer” (Roberts, 2006, p. 67). Stalin finally came to terms with the assault one day before the Germans’ attack, but many aspects of the bureaucracy remained unprepared and unwarned. Furthermore, this reluctance to accept intelligence is not reserved for dictators and autocratic regimes.

Israel, both the initiator of a surprise attack (1967) and the victim of another (1973), failed to update its strategic assumptions in the face of new tactical evidence. High-ranking government officials and military officers made the assumption that Egypt would not attack Israel unless it had air superiority, or at least sufficient airpower to support operations (Ben-Zvi, 1976). However, when intelligence revealed that this assumption was most likely flawed, the government failed to update its strategy accordingly. When intelligence illuminated that an attack was possible, General Eli Zeira, Major General and Chief of Military Intelligence of the I.D.F., questioned the information and referred to the intelligence as “too vague” and “probably just guesswork” (Riedel, 2017). One scholar reflects on multiple cases of intelligence failure: “In none of these cases did the flow of tactical information from the field result in a reassessment of
strategic assumptions; when discrepancies existed between tactical indicators and strategic assumptions, the latter prevailed” (Riedel, 2017, p. 394).

There is additional evidence that this also occurs within the U.S. intelligence apparatus. For instance, an in-depth examination of the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) found that the intelligence officers produced high-quality intelligence, but this was rarely utilized. As Katz contends,

there is precious little evidence that the reports, analyses, and forecasts churned out in the Branch figured decisively in the determination of military or diplomatic policy. The failure of the government to utilize this unique resource to the maximum was, in my opinion, a tragic waste (Katz, 1989).

Since the end of World War II, the United States has seen massive expansions of its I.C. Following Pearl Harbor and the end of global conflict, Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, which established a permanent peacetime intelligence apparatus. Over 50 years later, and following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (I.R.T.P.A.) of 2004, which sought to fix intelligence pathologies. Despite the continual restructuring of the I.C., there is still little evidence that intelligence plays a large role in U.S. foreign policy (Pillar, 2011). Attitudes towards intelligence may provide some insight into this conundrum.

In summary, the varying attitudes towards intelligence span both temporal and national boundaries and are demonstrated by historical anecdotes of democratic leaders and dictators alike. As one researcher aptly explains, “Regardless of the specific reason that decision-makers bypass or disregard intelligence analysis that conflicts with their policy preferences, their tendency to do so is well documented in the literature” (Marrin, 2009a, p. 139). My dissertation
seeks to shed light on the “specific reason” why, despite the “ideal model” of intelligence, attitudes towards it vary so substantially in practice.

1.2.2 Value Added to The Scholarly Debates On Intelligence

There are four primary reasons why my work is important for scholars and intelligence practitioners alike. Although not an exhaustive list, it provides further validation for the significance of this project. First, while this thesis focuses on attitudes towards intelligence, it also speaks to the value of intelligence. As one scholar contends, “Only when decision makers are receptive can the intelligence product enjoy great influence” (Leslau, 2010, p. 433). The primary goal of intelligence is objectively to inform policymakers. Normatively, if we can determine the circumstances under which decision-makers are more or less attuned to intelligence, we can increase the value of the products and the likelihood that objective information is used in the decision-making process. If intelligence producers can provide relevant information before an individual decision-maker commits to a policy or before preconceived notions are rooted, they can head off further commitment to undesirable consequences or mitigate unfavorable attitudes. For instance, in the Lyndon Baines Johnson (L.B.J.) case in Chapter 4, D.C.I. Richard Helms preempted the President’s request for information by setting up a team to examine the Arab-Israeli situation in the spring of 1967; thus, he was able to promptly deliver intelligence to his customer. Johnson had a favorable attitude towards the intelligence, and this arguably discouraged his commitment to the Israeli request for aid.

The second implication of this research is the proper attribution of intelligence failures. Intelligence failures are often wrongly attributed to the I.C. (Gentry, 2008, p. 249). While the
intelligence is not always correct, nor does it always accurately forecast, decision-makers can be blind to key pieces of intelligence or clear signals that could prevent tragedy. Another important aspect of this attribution problem is the scapegoating of the I.C. Policymakers and decision-makers can easily blame faulty intelligence for failed policies, regardless of the veracity of the claim, because intelligence works in the shadows and its need to protect its sources and methods mean it can neither confirm nor deny such assertions. This is not to say that intelligence does not get it wrong, but rather to set the record straight for cases where errors or inaction were the results of decision-makers. By looking at these attitudes, we may be able to discover a new variable in the equation.

The third reason why this research has both theoretical and practical significance lies in a time-honored debate in the intelligence literature: how to resolve intelligence failures. Although this is not a dissertation on intelligence failure, it does have implications for understanding how such failures can be reduced. A seminal argument in the literature is that intelligence failures are inevitable and the result of human fallibility; in other words, organizational fixes can do little (Betts, 1978). For example, analysts have argued that, despite significant reform in the early 2000s, “The US has reached a point of diminishing returns from organizational solutions to intelligence problems” as early as the 1980s (Betts, 1982, p. 17).² If the hypotheses and theory in this study have theoretical and empirical validity, they open up additional lines of inquiry into intelligence-policymaker pathologies, focusing on the consumers, specifically consumer attitudes, rather than the producers of intelligence.

Finally, attitudes towards intelligence might be the result of circumstance and other variables, not necessarily individual personality. This may allow future analysts and scholars to

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² Also see: (Betts, 2009)
understand patterns of attitudes and behavior. Put differently, although human beings are complex and unique, many act in the same way when placed in similar situations. My research primarily focuses on structural explanations for attitude, advancing the study of intelligence and participating in the larger debate in the social sciences about the relative influence of structure and agency on social and political outcomes.

1.3 Outline of this Dissertation

The next two chapters of this study outline the literature pertinent to attitudes towards intelligence, providing theoretical assessments and discussing methodological considerations. Chapter 2 examines the theoretical and empirical work related to attitudes towards intelligence. I then develop a new theory of attitudes towards intelligence, the “cognitive-affective theory of intelligence” (C.A.T.I.). Chapter 3 lays out the study’s methodology and case selection. I employ various tests, including congruence testing, process tracing, textual and sentiment analysis, mini-case studies, and counterfactual analysis.

The subsequent four chapters empirically test the C.A.T.I. In Chapter 4, I examine the attitude of President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s (L.B.J.) towards intelligence preceding the Six-Day War and find strong evidence for the model, as L.B.J. demonstrated an uncharacteristically favorable attitude towards this intelligence. In Chapter 5, I assess President Ronald Reagan’s response to intelligence on the Lebanon crisis in the early 1980s. As in the previous case, there is strong support for the C.A.T.I., and the textual and counterfactual analyses provide additional support for my claims where there is a dearth of other evidence. In the final full case study, I look at President Carter’s reaction to intelligence on the Korean peninsula. During his
presidential campaign, Carter made strong promises to be tough on human rights violations and used this as the impetus to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, an ally with an abysmal human rights record. When the Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) and the C.I.A. provided analyses that contradicted his plans, Carter showed an increasingly unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence he received.

The final two chapters of this dissertation provide additional historical context and credence to my claims. Chapter 7 includes five mini-cases that fill out my theoretical framework. While less detailed than the three previous cases, the five “mini-cases” reveal a correlational trend in the Eisenhower administration that should not be ignored. Finally, the concluding chapter discusses the generalizability and limitations of my claims and their policy implications.
2.0 The State of the Art: Synthesis and Evaluation

Despite historical examples of decision-makers’ varying attitudes to intelligence, there is little theoretical or empirical research on the determinants of these attitudes. One academic claims, “Little has been done to identify the conditions under which intelligence is likely to be accepted, or to identify the sources of intelligence-policy failure” (Rovner, 2011, p. 4). This chapter details why attitudes matter and reviews the pertinent research on attitudes towards intelligence. Attitudes matter because they introduce new interdisciplinary research into intelligence studies and contain the emotional or affective component often missing from the research in this field.

Having considered the theoretical and empirical gaps, I developed a new theory of intelligence), namely the C.A.T.I. Primarily drawing from psychology and other I.R. research, I lay out in this dissertation a generalizable theory of attitudes towards intelligence. At the broadest level, I contend that these attitudes are determined by circumstance. The most explanatory of the variables are the type of intelligence, the level of intelligence specificity, and the policymaker commitment to the relevant policy. I conclude this chapter with several hypotheses and predictions. However, before presenting a survey of the existing literature to highlight the determinants of these attitudes, a clear description of my dependent variable is warranted.
2.1 Defining Attitude

Drawing from the psychology literature, I define an attitude as “a summary evaluation of an object of thought” (Vogel & Wanke, 2016, p. 2). For the purposes of this dissertation, the object of thought is intelligence; more precisely, a piece of intelligence or several pieces on a single topic. Hence, an attitude towards intelligence (the dependent variable) is the individual’s overall summary evaluation of a specific piece of intelligence or multiple pieces of intelligence on the same topic. This includes products such as national intelligence estimates (N.I.E.s), special national intelligence estimates (S.N.I.E.s), ad hoc intelligence assessments, National Security Council (N.S.C.) intelligence briefings, and the P.D.B.s on specific topics. The summary evaluations of these intelligence products include an implicit or explicit favorable or unfavorable assessment (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). For example, in Chapter 4, I demonstrate that President Johnson had a favorable attitude towards intelligence on the Arab-Israeli conflict preceding the Six-Day War; and in Chapter 5, I discuss Reagan’s very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon.

There are two theories of when attitudes are formed. First, the “file-drawer theory” argues that attitudes are stored from previous experiences with the attitude object and accessed when one interacts with the object again (Allport, 1935; Eagly & Chaiken, 2007; Wilson, Lisle, & Kraft, 1990). In the second concept, the theory of “temporary constructions,” a person constructs a temporary attitude towards the attitude object at the time of the interaction. Advocates argue that “people do not retrieve any previously stored attitude from memory, but instead generate an evaluative judgment at the time it is needed” (Vogel & Wanke, 2016, p. 3).³

³ Also see (Schwarz & Bohner, 2001) and (Wilson & Hodges, 1992)
Although the file-drawer explanation has some validity, the theory of temporary construction is more pertinent when studying policymaker attitudes towards intelligence because, while policymakers may have attitudes stored from their previous experiences, they can nevertheless have entirely different attitudes towards the intelligence in front of them.

For instance, although President Richard Nixon had a notoriously unfavorable view of the C.I.A., he exhibited a variety of attitudes towards intelligence. As one C.I.A. historian claims, “Nixon’s refusal to receive intelligence briefings personally stemmed from negative attitudes about the C.I.A. that went well beyond an aloof and formal management style” (Helgerson, 1996a, p. 73). This general stance, however, did not affect his attitude towards intelligence on specific topics. President Nixon was occasionally favorable towards intelligence he received; and in one circumstance, “Nixon appears to have been pleased with the session; he later wrote positively in his memoirs about the ‘full-scale intelligence briefings’” (Helgerson, 1996b, p. 104). In other words, assessing attitudes through the lens of temporary constructions is more appropriate for specific, discrete attitude objects than for general attitudes.

The second reason the temporary constructions theory is preferred for my research is that attitudes are often stronger when the individual has direct experience with the attitude object. Attitudes are formed after (direct or indirect) interaction with the attitude object (Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1978). An attitude object is simply the thing toward which one has an attitude. It can be a person, group of people, place, physical object, concept, and so on. One cannot have an attitude before being aware of the attitude object. However, one can have indirect access to something and develop an attitude as a result. For instance, a woman might develop an unfavorable attitude towards drugs after watching a television program about them. This attitude would be very different to that of an individual who had had personal experience with drugs. Thus, direct
experience with the attitude object forms stronger and more accessible attitudes. Because policymakers, like presidents, have direct access to intelligence, they are more likely to form stronger and more accessible attitudes towards information they have recently digested, rather than retrieving stored attitudes and preconceived notions about an intelligence agency or its past analyses.

In addition to the previous examples, other policymakers have shown attitudes towards intelligence topics that differ from their general stances. For example, President Trump displayed a very unfavorable attitude towards an intelligence assessment that concluded Russia was behind the hacking of the 2016 U.S. elections in Trump’s favor. He has also demonstrated a more favorable attitude towards intelligence on the topic of I.S.I.S. when it presented evidence of U.S. gains.

Historical evidence of vacillating attitudes towards intelligence demonstrates why the theory of temporary construction is more valid for this study. President Barack Obama, while exhibiting unfavorable attitudes towards intelligence on I.S.I.S., had more favorable opinions of other pieces of intelligence (Hattem, 2015). While the Obama administration publicized successes against I.S.I.S., the White House and the President himself ignored or downplayed the less positive intelligence he received (Cooper, 2016; Engel, 2015). The President himself admitted as much in an interview, saying, “The ability of ISIL to not just mass inside of Syria, but then to initiate major land offensives that took Mosul, for example, that was not on my intelligence radar screen,” despite evidence and intelligence to the contrary (Liptak, 2016). However, President Obama was interested in intelligence on other topics. For instance, it was reported that, “He’s interested in ‘open source’ intelligence – including press accounts and, increasingly, social media – in addition to old-fashioned spycraft and intercepted
communications” (Korte, 2016). Thus, both theoretical and historical observations suggest that the concept of “attitudes as temporary constructions” is a more useful way of understanding attitudes towards intelligence. This dissertation demonstrates more thoroughly why policymakers develop particular attitudes, and it is clear that leaders can acquire attitudes that differ from the potentially “stored” attitudes.

This chapter has defined “attitude.” In the next section, I will illustrate why attitudes towards intelligence matter.

2.2 Attitudes matter: The Cognitive-Affective Theory of Intelligence

This section has two primary purposes: first, I detail what this dissertation provides that previous research in intelligence studies has lacked. The three primary contributions made by applying attitude theory to this topic are as follows: the benefits of interdisciplinary research, the role of the affect or feelings in intelligence research, and empirical testing of intelligence cases. The second point, related to the first, is to argue that attitudes matter – not only for intelligence theory and practice, but also for I.R. more broadly.

Previous research and theory-building in intelligence studies has primarily focused on cognitive bias and information processing (Coulthart, 2015; Heuer, 1999; Richards & Pherson, 2010). Emerging from cognitive psychology research, such as Tversky and Kahneman (1975), one literature stream has explored heuristics and information processing. Following 9/11 and extensive criticism for a “lack of imagination,” intelligence analysts redoubled their focus on heuristics and the cognitive bias literature. Heuer and others developed structured analytic techniques to mitigate these cognitive biases and produce better analysts. This is not uncommon,
and intelligence studies and mid-range I.R. theories often cannibalize other literatures. However, attitude theory has been strangely absent from intelligence studies (Jervis, 1976).

Having said this, not all social psychology has been neglected. Jervis is one example, though the focus of his seminal book *Perception and Misperception* is on decision making as a whole. Another prime example of social psychology in intelligence studies is Bar-Joseph and McDermott’s book, *Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor*; though this examines psychological pathologies and not attitudes towards intelligence. As I will discuss later, while Bar-Joseph and McDermott focus on individual pathologies, there is value in understanding the circumstances of the decision-maker, not simply their personality.

While the I.R. literature has begun to embrace a more interdisciplinary approach, intelligence studies has not. One researcher found a considerable lack of interdisciplinary theorizing in intelligence studies (Gill & Phythian, 2018). This is problematic for two primary reasons. First, peer-reviewed research papers have progressively cited work outside of their own discipline (Van Noorden, 2015). If intelligence scholars intend to remain relevant and at the forefront of social science research, interdisciplinary theorizing and empirical testing can lead to better outcomes. Second, interdisciplinary research provides solutions and answers to some of the world’s most complex and grand challenges ("Why interdisciplinary research matters," 2015). It can leverage the best methods, data, and knowledge of each discipline to provide unique solutions to intractable problems that cannot be solved individually. Thus, attitude theory’s applicability to intelligence becomes increasingly significant. To better understand broader issues of foreign policy decision making, an examination of attitudes can provide significant insight into how decision-makers process information and intelligence.

The second theoretical deviation from previous research – and providing further evidence
that attitudes matter – is demonstrated by attitude theory’s inclusion of the affective aspect, or feelings: an often understudied phenomenon in intelligence studies. Below is a chart illustrating the relationship between attitudes, emotions, behaviors, and cognition (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 10): 

![Figure 2-1: Relationship Between Attitudes and Indicators](image)

**Figure 2-1: Relationship Between Attitudes and Indicators**

While much has been written on the behavioral and cognitive aspects of intelligence, no studies focus on intelligence and attitudes or feelings. Bar-Joseph and McDermott (2017) examined individual-level personality variables; and while they do address emotions in their literature review, the research fits within an agency framework. My own theory also stems from psychology, but takes a structural approach, asking whether attitudes are the result of experience and circumstance or are caused by specific psychological pathologies or individual characteristics, as Bar-Joseph and McDermott argue. If personality remains constant while attitudes change, there may be another mechanism at work that should be explored.

Additionally, Bar-Joseph and McDermott argue that, “If different people who were

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4 Recreated from (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 10).
exposed to the same information (made of signals and noise) reached different estimates, noise-to-signal by itself cannot explain the outcome” (Bar-Joseph & McDermott, 2017, p. 24). While they explain that the difference is primarily due to personality (albeit in addition to other factors), I contend that attitude – the result of both information and commitment – can explain this difference. As Hatemi and McDermott herself wrote in a previous article on attitudes,

> When presented with the same evidence, individuals … find increased validity in their own positions and interpret neutral information as supporting their own positions … They recall confirmatory information far better than counter-attitudinal information … and the stronger the attitude, the greater the misperception (Hatemi & McDermott, 2016, pp. 341-342).

Therefore, an attitudinal explanation could provide new insights into intelligence and thus warrants further study.

The third contribution of this research is its empirical testing of a new theory in intelligence studies. As previously mentioned, intelligence studies tends to generate theories and provide historical case studies. However, the field often fails to test new and existing theories and cases are often focused on historical context, rather than empirical validation. This dissertation, however, provides both historical context and interdisciplinary theorizing and testing of a new theory of intelligence.

Ultimately, humans are both rational and emotional creatures, and a plethora of factors influences our behavior and outcomes. Not all of these factors influence behavior equally, and attitudes are an unstudied factor in the context of intelligence. Outcomes and behaviors are important and understanding the process can be equally so. For instance, Fred, who has a very unfavorable attitude towards John, is invited to John’s party. Fred may still to the party regardless, but he is likely to exhibit antisocial behaviors due to his unfavorable stance; and his behavior at the party would have been very different had he had a different attitude towards
being in attendance. In the context of intelligence, a policymaker could exhibit an attitude that influenced their receptivity to future intelligence reports. Hence, although attitudes do not necessarily affect decisions, they may, and this can have important implications for subjects such as intelligence studies and I.R.

In summary, attitudes matter because they

- include the affect and emotional aspects, a neglected topic in intelligence;
- are experienced more deeply when the stimulus is direct;
- represent a distinct area of study with implications for intelligence theory and practice; and
- provide an interdisciplinary testing ground for intelligence studies.

But to study attitudes towards intelligence topics, we first need to know how and why they are formed.

2.3 Literature review

As the previous section demonstrated, the existing literature tends not to focus on attitudes, but rather on some of the causally downstream consequences of attitudes, such as cognition and behavior. Moreover, we have determined that attitudes matter. Because attitudes play a critical role in our understanding of intelligence and I.R., we should examine the factors implicitly identified in the literature that could help to explain variation in attitudes.

This literature review comprises three sections. The first section focuses on individual-level explanations, including research on personality, experience, and interest, followed by a synthesis of organizational explanations for varying attitudes towards intelligence. 5 Theories

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5 “Individual-level explanations” is a reference to Kenneth Waltz’s influential book, *Man, the State, and War*. He organizes and classifies causes of war into three images or levels of analysis: Individuals, States, and the
addressed here include the proximity hypotheses. The literature review then examines the informational explanations for attitude, with a focus on variables such as timing, accuracy, granularity, and threat. While there is increasingly robust social science research on intelligence, the existing literature ultimately fails to provide a cogent answer to why policymakers develop particular attitudes towards intelligence products.

2.3.1 Individual-Level Explanations for Attitude

Although existing individual-level logics do not speak directly to attitudes towards intelligence (my dependent variable), there is reason to believe that these variables (personality, interest, and experience) matter for attitudes. In Chapter 3, I provide a further explication of why these rival explanations may affect attitudes towards intelligence and the implications for what we should expect if they do. Here, though, a review of the individual-level explanations that may have implications for attitudes towards intelligence is prudent. For example, a policymaker’s attitude towards intelligence can be the result of their individual personality or knowledge of the subject. Research suggests that a decision-maker’s knowledge – or a lack thereof – of intelligence capabilities can affect their receptivity to and interest in the topic, which define their attitude towards intelligence (Andrew, 1995; Preston, 2012, p. 53). For instance, Andrew argues that policymakers such as Eisenhower or George H.W. Bush were more receptive to intelligence due to their experiences – as Allied commander-in-chief in Europe during World War II and the D.C.I., respectively – which made them familiar with the potential and limitations of intelligence.

International System (Waltz, 2001). Drawing from this, I develop a similar method of categorizing the literature on attitudes towards intelligence. First-level are individual determinants of attitudes towards intelligence, organizational are “second image” explanations, and third are informational or “system-level.”
A policymaker with more intelligence experience as a whole may thus have a more favorable attitude towards it.

In one of the few theoretical pieces on how intelligence products are used by decision-makers, Leslau argues, “The decisionmaker’s psychological traits are a critical variable in determining if and how the intelligence assessment will be utilized” (Leslau, 2010, p. 444). Recent research lends further credence to this line of argumentation. Bar-Joseph and McDermott examined psychological pathologies as an explanation for why intelligence failures and successes occur and found evidence that personalities affect the learning process, leading to intelligence failures and successes (Bar-Joseph & McDermott, 2017). This research thread suggests that personalities and psychological pathologies that remain constant over time should lead to consistency in attitudes.

In a similar vein, some intelligence research suggests attitudes may vary based on the individual’s knowledge or perceived knowledge of the subject (Jervis, Farson, Stafford, & Wark, 1991). A joint case study on Lebanon and intelligence in the early 1980s by the C.I.A. and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government found that policymakers felt they had sufficient knowledge of the situation, regardless of I.C. estimates. One official said, “A policymaker usually has some expertise of his or her own, after all … I use the Intelligence Community as a resource of factual information, but I don’t need it for opinions. I have my own” (Kennedy & Brunetta, 1988). Thus, extensive experience could lead to both favorable and unfavorable attitudes towards intelligence. For example, if the policymaker is familiar with the subject and receives intelligence that confirms their preconceived notions, they may view the intelligence favorably; disconfirming intelligence may elicit an unfavorable attitude from a knowledgeable policymaker. Thus, a decision-maker’s knowledge and experience of the subject may affect their
attitudes towards intelligence. Hence, some of the literature implies that attitudes are primarily the result of personality and similar individual-level explanations. In other words, attitudes may be an omitted intervening variable for individual-level explanations, where the cause is personality or experience.

### 2.3.2 Organizational Explanations

Conversely, some intelligence studies research indicates that attitudes towards intelligence may be affected by organizational factors, rather than individual personality. As such, ill-fitting attitudes towards intelligence can occur because those who “do” and those who “report” are organizationally isolated. For example, one theory seeking to explain why a report of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor was not well-received notes that operational and intelligence officers “live in two separate worlds” (Ford, 1993).

Similarly, another organizational variable that may affect attitude is proximity. Proximity refers to the distance, either physical or personal, between a policymaker and the intelligence maker. The proximity hypothesis posits “that greater distance between intelligence and policy produces a more accurate but less influential product whereas greater closeness leads to increased influence but decreased accuracy” (Marrin, 2013, p. 2). In other words, the closer the decision-maker is to the intelligence maker, geographically and/or personally, the more receptive the decision-maker will be to the intelligence – though this information is also more likely to be politicized. This theory is significant because, if correct, it has implications for how intelligence is used. As previously mentioned, there is much historical and anecdotal evidence that decision-makers ignore and/or neglect intelligence; and the proximity hypothesis may suggest why this occurs.
Moreover, this theory also has implications for attitudes towards intelligence. Policymakers may have favorable or unfavorable attitudes towards intelligence, depending on their relationship with an intelligence briefer or producer. For example, Nixon received most of his intelligence through his trusted National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, and this may have affected his attitude towards intelligence. Specifically, he may have had a more favorable view of intelligence presented by his friend and trusted counselor. This could explain his favorable attitude towards intelligence on certain subjects, despite his overall dislike of the I.C. Likewise, a poor relationship with an intelligence chief may lead to unfavorable attitudes towards intelligence: if a decision-maker does not like the person providing the information, this may negatively affect their attitude to the report. In one of the few empirical tests of this hypothesis, Marrin found that while proximity does increase the influence of intelligence on policymakers, it does not lead to greater politicization as the hypothesis suggests (Marrin, 2009a).

A final organizational factor that may affect attitude is the number of intelligence agencies. Rovner, for instance, suggests that as there is a myriad of intelligence agencies in the U.S., policymakers can cherry-pick intelligence that fits their preconceived notions (Rovner, 2011, p. 27). Policymakers can take advantage of the organizational diversity of intelligence (especially in the United States, where there are 17 intelligence agencies) and choose those estimates that better align with their viewpoints. The implication of this is that policymakers with an abundance of options can afford to develop unfavorable attitudes towards assessments that conflict with their existing beliefs and choose favorable stances towards others. Thus, some literature suggests that policymaker attitudes towards intelligence are affected by organizational factors.
2.3.3 Informational Explanations

Finally, attitude may also be affected by the characteristics of the intelligence product and the intelligence producers themselves. Some researchers suggest that the timing of the product is significant. Jervis states, “For intelligence to be welcomed and to have an impact, it must arrive at the right time, which is after the leaders have become seized with the problem but before they have made up their minds” (Jervis, 2010a, p. 196). Indeed, the timing and accuracy of intelligence are critical factors for determining the value of intelligence (Cesar, Allen, Bankes, Bondanella, & Eden, 1994). Likewise, the quality of intelligence and the professional status of the intelligence organization may also affect attitudes (Leslau, 2010). In the same way that a policymaker can cherry-pick intelligence that aligns with their preexisting beliefs, the perceived quality or status of an agency can affect attitudes towards intelligence. The implication of this line of inquiry for attitudes towards intelligence is that a policymaker’s favorable view of an intelligence agency may lead to a favorable view of their products, and vice versa.

More recently, evidence has emerged that indicates the granularity and level of analysis can influence attitudes towards intelligence. In one of the few empirical studies on intelligence receptivity, Dahl concludes that “policymaker receptivity is largely influenced by the level of precision of the intelligence provided” (Dahl, 2013a, p. 70; 2013b). While not explicitly measuring attitudes, Dahl’s research on receptivity speaks to attitudes towards intelligence. That is, a favorable attitude towards intelligence may result in increased receptivity, and unfavorable attitudes can lead to decreased receptivity; thus, attitudes may be an omitted variable in informational-based explanations of receptivity.

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6 This is a further discussion and empirical test of this argument. In addition to the level of intelligence (tactical vs. strategic), Dahl (2017) also finds that intelligence receptivity also depends on the belief of the threat.
Although Dahl does not explicitly code the difference between strategic and tactical intelligence, he does provide some examples. Dahl refers to general warnings or indications, unspecific threats, and “chatter” as strategic intelligence. In contrast, tactical intelligence includes specific locations, attack plans, details of impending plots, and identification of individuals or specifically targeted people and facilities. While intelligence specificity is discussed in this dissertation, is coded similarly, and remains an integral part of my theory, it is important to note that specificity is necessary but insufficient alone to explain attitudes towards intelligence. This study demonstrates that specificity, in conjunction with the type of intelligence and the policymaker’s commitment, can fully explain a policymaker’s attitude towards intelligence. Moreover, this study builds on the concept of intelligence specificity and adds a coding schema.

Finally, threat level may also affect policymaker attitudes towards intelligence. Some research suggests that threat can focus the attention of the decision-maker and motivate information search and usage (Gray, 1987, 1990; Whalen, 1998). On the other hand, Dolan found a more complex relationship, concluding that, “Unexpected, threatening events seem to have elicited anxiety and efficient learning; familiar threat produced frustration and minimal learning” (Dolan, 2016a, p. 587). Dolan’s study demonstrates that the type of threat may affect attitudes towards intelligence and determine how the policymaker reacts.

It is also possible that the threat affects individuals differently. Levite argues that there is an interaction between personality and threat, though he does not empirically test this (Levite, 1987, p. 143). He contends that, “There is a strong case to be made to the effect that the personality variables are as likely to improve their receptivity to warning as they are to retard it.” In a similar vein, Dahl (2013a, p. 23) finds that belief in a threat is necessary but not sufficient
alone for the successful use of intelligence, concluding that it may affect attitudes towards intelligence.

While the precise relationship between threat and attitudes is complex, it is tested in both the intelligence and I.R. literature. Overall, the literature indicates that high threats may lead to unfavorable attitudes towards intelligence and low threats may result in more favorable attitudes. As this research is not a study of warning, the threats found in intelligence products could be described as “familiar” and would likely produce unfavorable attitudes, similar to the frustration that Dolan (2016a) reports. Therefore, a share of the literature on intelligence indicates that informational explanations – including timing, quality, perceived professionalism and credibility, level of analysis, and threat – may be important determinants of policymaker attitude.

As Chapter 2 has shown thus far, attitudes matter; and while the current research may provide some insight into the determinants of these attitudes towards intelligence, these are individually insufficient. There is no existing scholarship on the drivers of attitudes towards intelligence. However, there is research on phenomena such as receptivity, a variable causally downstream from attitude. The literature, therefore, may be inadvertently omitting an important aspect required for understanding of both these phenomena and attitudes towards intelligence. While useful, these theoretical frames typically lead to logically and empirically problematic conclusions about the value and variability of attitudes.

Thus, due to the importance of attitudes for our understanding of intelligence studies – and because current research cannot provide an adequate explanation – a new theory is required. In the following section, I formulate the C.A.T.I. and discuss why policymakers develop various attitudes towards intelligence.
2.4 Theoretical Deviation: What is New?

In this section, I employ attitude theory, psychology, interdisciplinary research, and deductive reasoning to develop a generalizable theory of attitudes towards intelligence. While some existing research has produced promising results on the subject, the existing literature has collectively failed to thoroughly address this topic. This is primarily for two reasons: first, attitudes have been largely absent from the intelligence literature. Although attitudes have been extensively explored in other fields, no study has explicitly measured attitudes towards intelligence. Second, the research related to attitudes often takes an agency approach. These studies examine attitudes as a result of specific personalities or psychological pathologies. Conversely, the main contention of this dissertation is that policymakers develop predictable attitudes towards intelligence. These attitudes are the result of three variables: the type of intelligence, the specificity of the intelligence, and the level of decision-maker commitment to policy. The theory outlined in this dissertation will henceforth be referred to as the “cognitive-affective theory of intelligence” (C.A.T.I.).

My research explores how leaders acquire particular attitudes towards intelligence; more specifically, attitudes towards topics or pieces of intelligence. While general attitudes towards intelligence are significant, this study focuses on how policymakers react to specific topics or pieces of intelligence. As this research shows, general attitudes towards intelligence are difficult to alter and may be affected by attitudes towards the specific topic. For example, the unfavorable attitudes of President Nixon or Johnson towards the C.I.A. and I.C. writ-large would be difficult to change, and there is little evidence that these attitudes altered in any measurable way over time. However, their attitudes towards specific intelligence topics varied significantly. Another example is President Gerald Ford, who admitted his “distrust of Agency analysis,” but also had
favorable attitudes towards intelligence on topics such as the Mayaguez Incident in 1975 (Helgerson, 1996a, p. 81). On May 12th, 1975, communist forces seized the U.S.-owned container ship. The C.I.A. briefed President Ford on the situation; and while he was “distressed to receive this news,” he also found the intelligence surprisingly favorable. After a P.D.B. session, Ford described the intelligence and his choice of rescue operations as “a welcome opportunity to show that we were not going to be nibbled by our enemies” (Helgerson, 1996a, pp. 80-81). Therefore, to reiterate, while general attitudes towards intelligence are important, this study focuses on the attitudes evoked by particular pieces of intelligence or topics.

The graphic below illustrates the basic logic of the C.A.T.I. model:

![Theoretical Logic Diagram]

Figure 2-2: Theoretical Logic
2.4.1 Hypotheses and Predictions

There are an infinite number of attitudes along the continuum and a significant number of factors that determine an attitude. This dissertation, however, tests the impact of intelligence specificity (unspecific or specific), type of intelligence (disconfirming and confirmatory), and commitment level to a policy (low or high) on attitudes towards intelligence at a particular time. These three variables were chosen for their explanatory power in other literature streams and previous theoretical debates on intelligence. Scholars have explored concepts similar to intelligence specificity and policy commitment, but none have empirically tested their effects on attitude. In addition, neuroscience scholars and cognitive psychologists have studied how the type of information affects individuals, but not its effect on attitudes towards intelligence.

While specificity is defined more fully in Chapter 3, a brief overview is also provided here. Intelligence specificity simply refers to the level of precision of the intelligence. If intelligence details troop movements, locations of enemy troops, specific details of a plot, or other precise indicators, it is considered specific intelligence. Strategic intelligence, in contrast, “tends to be longer-term, broader in focus,” and includes information on general warnings, trends, and so on (Dahl, 2013a, p. 22).

Intelligence specificity is relatively unexplored in intelligence studies, though recent research has illustrated its potential for illuminating policymaker reactions to intelligence. Dahl (2013a), for instance, found that informational specificity plays a key role in intelligence success or failure. Contradicting the findings of previous studies on the subject, he argues that, decision-makers require specific information to make decisions. One critic of Dahl argues that, “Far too much attention is given to current and tactical intelligence and insufficient attention to the big-picture needs of strategic intelligence” (Goodman, 2006). Similarly, Pillar argues that tactical
intelligence is rare and difficult to come by; thus, the I.C. should focus on strategic intelligence and broad assessments (Pillar, 2006). While these are valid points, Dahl is the only intelligence studies researcher to empirically test these notions, and he concludes that specificity is indeed significant. Furthermore, academics outside intelligence studies have begun to identify the value of information specificity. As detailed in the hypotheses section, research in public policy analysis, business, and medicine has also demonstrated the importance of informational precision. In conclusion, intelligence specificity is an understudied and likely significant variable in policymaker attitudes towards intelligence.

On the other hand, the significance of information type has been extensively studied in fields such as cognitive psychology and neuroscience (e.g: Golman, Hagmann, & Loewenstein, 2017). Again, although intelligence type is described more fully in the methodology chapter, a brief summary is warranted here. The “type of intelligence” concerns whether the information conforms to preconceived notions. For instance, if the policymaker believes an attack is imminent, and the intelligence bears out these concerns, this intelligence is coded as confirmatory. While not good news per se, the information fits within preconceived notions. Conversely, disconfirming intelligence, in the abovementioned example, would indicate that our policymaker’s preconceived notions about an impending attack were incorrect. Despite the intelligence portraying a theoretically less threatening situation, it does not fit with what was previously understood.

Overall, intelligence studies, cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and various other fields have each examined how discordant information affects individuals’ reactions. That said, informational type and specificity have not been combined or examined in the context of
attitudes, nor has this paradigm been applied to intelligence studies. Thus, while the type of intelligence is explored in existing interdisciplinary literature, this dissertation applies the concept in a novel fashion.

Finally, commitment to a policy is a concept that has been explored by intelligence scholars in the past, but never tested. Poteat concludes that the failure of U.S. intelligence to predict the Chinese intervention into the Korean War was not an intelligence failure, but rather a result of policymakers’ lack of attention (Poteat, 1974). Additionally, he found that military commanders and policymakers in Washington were reluctant to accept increasingly clear evidence of China’s capabilities and intentions. Based on these findings, Poteat theorized that commitment levels and receptivity became inversely related over time, though he never tested this claim (Poteat, 1976). The intelligence studies research on commitment to a policy suggests that personal motivation and vested interest can play a key role in determining attitudes towards intelligence. Similarly, Rovner tested how commitment affects politicization and found that leaders who make public commitments are “tempted to use intelligence to backstop the logic of action” (Rovner, 2011, p. 13). Therefore, although not explicitly testing attitudes towards intelligence, previous research in intelligence studies provides further evidence that commitment is a useful variable.

2.4.2 Hypotheses

I developed my hypotheses and predictions based on two characteristics of attitudes: valence and extremity (Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, 2005). Valence is simply the direction

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7 Furthermore, although scholars may argue that intelligence, “…supplements but does not supplant policy assessment,” this contention is not empirically tested in the Intelligence Studies literature (Marrin, 2017).
of the attitude: if the overall attitude is positive, then the valence is favorable; and, vice versa, if the attitude towards the attitude object is negative, the valence is unfavorable. Regarding valence, four hypotheses are drawn from psychology, international affairs, and various other literature streams. These hypotheses stem from the assumptions that people want to hear information that aligns with their preconceived notions and they want more specific information on which to base their decisions.

Humans, by nature, seek to rationalize their previously made decisions and thoughts and they strive for internal consistency. As one scholar notes,

The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce dissonance and achieve consonance. When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person actively avoids situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance (Festinger, 1957, p. 3).

In other words, individuals seek information that agrees with what they already believe to be true. This is also the case in situations where a person is not committed: as, “Even when the policy does not deal with countries about which decision-makers have deeply ingrained beliefs, it will be difficult for intelligence to persuade the former that their basic political judgements are incorrect” (Jervis et al., 1991, p. 171). More recent psychology research has reaffirmed this inference, finding that “decision makers systematically prefer decision-consistent information” (Fischer, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2008). As such, my first two hypotheses are as follows:

**H1a:** Confirmatory intelligence is more likely to result in a favorable attitude valence towards intelligence.

**H1b:** Disconfirming intelligence is more likely to result in an unfavorable attitude valence towards intelligence.

It is important to note that the type of intelligence (confirmatory or disconfirming) is related to the Festinger’s concept of cognitive consistency, who argues that, “we have an inner
drive to hold all our attitudes and beliefs in harmony and avoid disharmony (or dissonance)” (Festinger, 1957). This is an integral part of the development of an attitude in the C.A.T.I. That said, cognitive consistency is necessary, but not sufficient to explain an attitude towards intelligence. This is because the type of intelligence may explain the direction of the attitude, but not necessarily its strength. The knowledge that a policymaker has a different preconceived notion of an intelligence topic is not sufficient to fully predict their attitude, as we must also know the strength of their attitude towards intelligence. Therefore, the type of intelligence and its effects on cognitive consistency are required, but not sufficient alone to adequately explain attitudes towards intelligence.

The second set of hypotheses regarding the direction (valence) of the attitude focus on the specificity of the intelligence. These hypotheses rest on the idea that people prefer specific to more general information when making decisions. A recently declassified C.I.A. study, “Surveying Intelligence Customers,” found that the vast majority of policymakers prefer specific or in-depth intelligence. More than 70% found in-depth intelligence useful, and “nearly 90 percent of the officials from the Reagan White House cited current and in-depth intelligence as useful” (Appendix). The concept of information specificity is also seen in public policy and knowledge-use literature, as well as in the fields of business intelligence and medicine. For example, public policy researchers found that information and knowledge are composed of composition, expected effects, and scope (Dunn, 1983). The scope of information or knowledge can be general or specific. As Dunn’s typology demonstrates, specific information is utilized for decisional use. It is therefore likely that decision-makers want more specific information on which to base their decisions, while more general information is used for general employment, such as developing a mindset (Dunn, 2015, p. 394).
This notion is also prevalent in medical research. Researchers provided patients with a questionnaire enquiring about their preferences for both “general and specific information.” The study found that patients wanted specific information and, “Of the sample, 94% expressed a desire for as much information as possible … be it good or bad” (Fallowfield, Ford, & Lewis, 1995). Later research with a larger sample size confirmed this finding, although at the slightly lower rate of 87% (Jenkins, Fallowfield, & Saul, 2001).

Finally, the desire for specific information also appears in the business and competitive intelligence literature. Bernhardt (1994, p. 23) concludes that decision-makers desire specific information, and that, “there is much evidence to suggest that it is ‘more effective to concentrate on extensive and in-depth information … rather than continuous monitoring of a whole array of competitors. Focused intelligence efforts also achieve recognizable results quickly.” The clear decision-maker predilection for specific information across a range of literature streams leads to two additional hypotheses:

**H2a:** Specific intelligence is more likely to result in a favorable attitude valence towards intelligence.

**H2b:** Unspecific intelligence is more likely to result in an unfavorable attitude valence towards intelligence.

A critic may ask why general information would not serve to inform a general attitude, which may then affect the specific attitudes examined in this dissertation. While possible, the potential for general intelligence to lead to general attitudes towards intelligence is a proposition outside the scope of this study. Furthermore, while it is conceivable that these generalized attitudes may affect the specific attitudes I am studying, there is little empirical or historical basis for this notion. As previously discussed, the general attitudes of Nixon, Ford, and Lyndon
Johnson towards the C.I.A. did not overtly affect their attitudes towards specific intelligence topics. Each policymaker, while wary of the C.I.A. or I.C. more broadly, displayed favorable attitudes towards intelligence on particular topics.

In addition, it should be noted that while I hypothesize that policymakers are more likely to have favorable attitudes towards intelligence when it is specific, there is also an interaction effect with the type of intelligence. Notably, while a decision-maker wants specific intelligence on a threat, when this specific intelligence disagrees with their preconceived notions, the attitude may become unfavorable. Similarly, if specific intelligence agrees with their preconceived notions, their attitude may become favorable. Imagine a decision-maker who believes that there are weapons of mass destruction in a country: if they receive specific intelligence that their assumptions are correct, the policymaker can use this to justify their decisions, while retaining cognitive consonance. However, if the intelligence is more generalized, while the policymaker can retain cognitive consonance, they have less evidence of the validity of their preconceived notions. The interaction between the type and specificity of the intelligence, logically established above, is further explored in later chapters and empirically examined in the case studies.

The second characteristic that I use to generate my hypotheses is extremity. While valence is the direction of the attitude, extremity is “is the extent to which the attitude deviates from neutrality” (Petty & Krosnick, 2014, p. 6). In other words, extremity is the strength of the attitude or the extent of the favorability or “unfavorability.” I hypothesize that a decision-maker’s commitment to a policy affects the extremity or strength of their attitude towards intelligence. Commitment to a policy or decision is based on the concept of vested interest in the psychology literature. These may be private goals or public commitments to a certain policy.

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8 Commitment is defined and operationalized more thoroughly in Chapter Three.
The literature defines a vested interest as “the extent to which an attitude object is hedonically relevant for the attitude holder. If the attitude object has important perceived personal consequences, the attitude for terminological convenience is labeled of high vested interest” (Crano, 1995, p. 132). This is the extent to which something has political consequences for the policymaker. Research suggests that “motivation goals exert a fundamental influence on dominance of particular attitude components” (Maio, Esses, Arnold, & Olson, 2016, p. 4). Said differently, vested interest or decision-maker commitment to policy may affect the strength of attitudes. Furthermore, motivation exerts a strong influence on the affective component (feelings) of an attitude. This suggests that a policymaker’s commitment to a policy may not only influence attitudes, but specifically alter the affective or feeling components of an attitude.

Additionally, commitment may change the intensity of the effect that intelligence assessments have on attitude. For example, when commitment is high, specific disconfirming intelligence is more likely to trigger a very unfavorable attitude in a policymaker, and this intelligence is more likely to be ignored or pushed aside. A good example of this is “Operation Market Garden” during World War II in the Netherlands. Shortly before an attack, allied code-breaking revealed specific intelligence on unexpected German disposition, training, and numbers. However, commitment to the attack plan was high, thus attitudes towards this intelligence were unfavorable. When Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith of the U.S. armed forces attempted to convince Field Marshall Montgomery of the British forces not to attack, the British general “ridiculed the idea” and “waved [his] objections airily aside” (Bradley, 2001, p. 7; MacDonald, 1963, p. 122). This is because “once the basic decision was made, the political and psychological costs of reversing it were so high that the intelligence was disregarded, to the great cost of the soldiers parachuted onto the final bridge” (Jervis, 2010b, p. 167). While
causality is difficult to determine without a more in-depth evaluation, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that commitment may alter the intensity of the effect that intelligence assessments have on attitudes towards intelligence.

However, the intensity of effect may not be as strong in other circumstances. For example, when intelligence is specific and confirmatory, the difference between low and high commitment may be less significant. This is because regardless of the level of commitment, the policymaker is hearing what they expected to hear; moreover, they are getting specific evidence that their previous notions were correct. The intensity of the effect, therefore, may be weaker in this situation. In summary, the characteristics of the intelligence may explain attitudinal direction, but the level of commitment plays a key role in explaining the intensity of the effect on attitudes towards intelligence. The two final hypotheses are associated with commitment levels:

**H2a:** High policymaker commitment leads to increased extremity of the attitude towards intelligence.

**H2b:** Low policymaker commitment leads to less extremity of the attitude towards intelligence.

### 2.4.3 Predictions

There are five discrete measures of my dependent variable: very unfavorable, unfavorable, ambivalent, favorable, and very favorable. Very unfavorable and unfavorable attitudes are negative dispositions towards intelligence, while favorable and very favorable attitudes are positive dispositions. Attitudinal ambivalence “can occur when evaluations within a dimension are inconsistent, when one dimension of an attitude object is positive and another
dimension is negative, or even when a person’s attitude is inconsistent with the attitudes of positively evaluated others” (Fabrigar et al., 2005, p. 183).

**Low Commitment**

Type of Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disconfirming</th>
<th>Confirmatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specificity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2-3: Low Commitment Theoretical Predictions

When commitment is low and the intelligence is unspecific and disconfirming (Figure 2-3, bottom-right), I predict an unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence. The direction of the attitude is negative because the information disconfirms preconceived notions and is not specific. However, as commitment is low, the extremity or strength of the attitude is weaker.

In the top-right cell, I predict that the policymaker’s attitude will be ambivalent. This is because commitment is low, specificity is low, and the intelligence is confirmatory. While the intelligence agrees with their preconceived notions (H_{1a}), it is not very specific (H_{2b}); therefore, although one dimension of the attitude object is favorable (the type of intelligence), another is unfavorable (intelligence specificity), resulting in an ambivalent attitude.
Similarly, the C.A.T.I. predicts an ambivalent attitude when commitment is low and specificity is high, but the intelligence is disconfirming (Figure 2-3, bottom-left). This differs from the top-left cell (unfavorable), because the decision-maker can act on specific information if they choose. Finally, when commitment is low and the intelligence is both confirming and specific, I predict a favorable attitude. Both the type and specificity of intelligence indicate a positive valence of the attitude, while the low commitment indicates that the extremity of the attitude is not nearly as strong as when commitment is high.

![High Commitment Theoretical Predictions](image)

When commitment is high and the intelligence is unspecific and disconfirming, the C.A.T.I. predicts a very unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence (Figure 2-4, top left). This is because specificity is low and does not provide the level of granularity that the policymaker desires ($H_{1b}$) and the intelligence does not align with their preexisting beliefs ($H_{2b}$). In addition, as commitment is high, the extremity of the attitude is stronger, thus leading to an unfavorable
attitude. Likewise, in the bottom-left cell, while commitment and specificity are high, the intelligence is disconfirming. In this case, I predict a very unfavorable attitude, as the decision-maker is receiving very specific information that proves their preconceived notions incorrect, and they are receiving this intelligence while highly committed to a policy.

The final two cells in the C.A.T.I. have a positive valence (right side of Figure 2-4). When commitment is high and intelligence is confirmatory, but specificity is low, I predict a favorable attitude. Although specificity is low, the policymaker is receiving information that conforms to their preexisting beliefs. In this case, the strength of the attitude is attenuated by the lack of specificity of the intelligence, thus the attitude is weaker. In the bottom-right cell, the C.A.T.I. predicts a very favorable attitude towards intelligence when commitment and specificity are high and the intelligence is confirming. In this situation, the decision-maker is highly committed to a policy and receiving specific information that indicates their preconceived notions were correct.

2.4.4 Theoretical Framing

While this dissertation generates and tests a theory of intelligence, the hypotheses and predictions detailed in this research could be applied to other situations in which policymakers receive advice. For example, policymakers can be highly committed to policies unrelated to national security, and the information they receive on these subjects can be confirmatory or disconfirming and specific or unspecific. In these cases, the predictions of the C.A.T.I. are likely to be similar.

Although this research only tests the theory in the context of intelligence, my independent variables are examined in other fields of study, thus the C.A.T.I. could also have validity in these
other contexts. In other words, the C.A.T.I. is a theory of how leaders receive information, and it utilizes intelligence as a “petri dish” in which to empirically examine the validity of the theory.

2.5 Conclusion

In Chapter 2, I demonstrated why attitudes matter for I.R. and intelligence theory and practice. The addition of attitudinal theory to intelligence studies is significant because attitudes precede and affect cognition and behavior, representing a distinct area of study outside cognitive psychology and including affect, or feelings. In this chapter, I argue that the existing research does not sufficiently explain why decision-makers develop their attitudes towards particular intelligence topics. Although it has implications for attitudes towards intelligence, the literature tends to focus on the consequences of the attitudes in terms of cognition and behavior, rather than the attitudes themselves.

I have laid out the C.A.T.I. and the resulting hypotheses and predictions on the determinants of attitudes towards intelligence. The type and specificity of intelligence along with commitment to policy are the core influencing factors. For each variable, I provided the logical, empirical, and theoretical reasons for its inclusion in the study. While the characteristics of the intelligence (i.e., type and specificity) are necessary to understand attitudes towards intelligence, they are ultimately not sufficient for developing a holistic theory. Now that I have detailed the theoretical claims of this dissertation, Chapter 3 will discuss the variable measurement, operationalization, and research design.
3.0 Chapter 3: Variable Measurement and Research Design

With its theoretical underpinnings laid out, the C.A.T.I. now requires testing. This chapter elaborates on the variable measurement, case selection, and methodology. Table 3-1 below provides a summary of the variables and notes how each is operationalized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Type of variable</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards intelligence</td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Verbal, physical, and behavioral indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>The extent to which intelligence conforms to preconceived notions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specificity</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>The extent to which the piece of intelligence is detailed/precise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Conditioning</td>
<td>Stake, salience, certainty, immediacy, and self-efficacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.1 Attitude Measurement

Measuring an attitude is more difficult than defining it, as attitudes may or may not affect decisions (Vogel & Wanke, 2016, p. 3). As a result, a decision-maker may not exhibit characteristics or behaviors that reveals their attitude. Despite this limitation, there are several ways of measuring attitude, including the use of historical and archival records and survey
research (Vogel & Wanke, 2016). For this dissertation, I chose to measure attitudes indirectly via behaviors, thoughts, and emotions detailed in historical case studies. The operationalization theorized by Dolan (2016) supports a clear set of criteria for the measurement of attitude in qualitative case studies and enables observations of attitude measurement to be drawn from historical records. The indicators are disaggregated into three categories that mirror Dolan’s operationalization: words, physical manifestations, and behaviors (Dolan, 2016a, p. 577). It is important to note that behaviors are not decisions or outcomes, but rather behavioral indicators of the expected attitude. For example, a policymaker with a very unfavorable attitude might yell, bluster, blame their subordinates or others, or express negative emotions. Table 3-2 contains an extensive list of indicators one would expect given a specific attitude, but the list is by no means exhaustive. The table draws heavily from – and expands upon – the indicators of emotion proposed by (Dolan, 2016a).9

9 Dolan’s table includes words, physical manifestations, and behaviors of two emotions: anger and anxiety. I use the format of the table and some of the indicators from the table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-2: Indicators of Attitudes Towards Intelligence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Very unfavorable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Curse words”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disdain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Livid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inconsolable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hostile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enraged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fuming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refusal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Awful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Upset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Annoyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Frustration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Opposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anxious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dislike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unhappy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Doubt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Worry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mixed feelings/thoughts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conflicting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contradictory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hesitant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Wavering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Encourage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Affirmative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pleased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Glad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Receptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Elated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ecstatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joy/overjoyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Delighted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Euphoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Glee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Thrilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Happy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Credulous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unfavorable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ambivalent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Favorable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Very favorable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Blustering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Flushing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Distinct facial expressions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gloomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Somber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Distinct facial expressions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expressions of confusion, uncertainty, or mixed thoughts/feelings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Both positive and negative affects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Distinct facial features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expressions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Like smiling, calm, relaxed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expressions of optimism, amusement, and/or positive emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Laughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Energetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Facial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expressions of extreme pleasure or contentment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behaviors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Yelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resistance to change or new information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expressions of extremely negative emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Blaming/punishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Offensive approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Uninterested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expressing pessimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shaking of head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Defense approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Searching behaviors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Willingness to revisit preconceived notions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Slow to respond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• More susceptible to persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Receptive to new information and change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expressing approval and/or gratification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expressing affirmation or agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Credulity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expressing excessive approval or gratification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Celebratory behaviors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While there are limitations to this approach, there are also some mitigating factors. One concern is that measuring attitudes from historical records can be hindered by cultural factors, as different cultures may exhibit attitudes differently. For example, an American may present different indicators of an unfavorable attitude than a Japanese person. While this scenario is plausible, research has shown that “cultural differences do not seem to influence individuals’ ability to correctly identify particular emotional states” (Dolan, 2016a, p. 578). Moreover, these types of measures have been used extensively in recent I.R. literature, with considerable success. Dolan (2016) provides a list of additional research that uses similar measures:


In summary, the measurement of policymaker attitudes in this dissertation is rooted in interdisciplinary and I.R. literature. The variable measurement detailed above will provide three indicators for testing of attitudes towards intelligence.

### 3.2 Type of Intelligence

The type of intelligence is defined and dichotomized based on preconceived notions. The two discrete measures used in this study are confirmatory and disconfirming. Confirmatory intelligence is information that conforms to and fits within the decision-maker’s preconceived notions and beliefs. In some ways, it is the intelligence that the decision-maker expects. For example, if a general believes that the enemy forces are massing on the border, and subsequent
intelligence reports confirm this suspicion, that is confirmatory intelligence. Conversely, disconfirming intelligence is when the information contradicts or challenges a decision-maker’s preconceived notions or beliefs. Israeli assumptions in 1973 about Egyptian conditions for a surprise attack epitomize this concept. Israeli leaders believed that Egypt would only attack if it believed it had air superiority. Tactical indicators and intelligence demonstrated this assumption was dangerously incorrect (Ben-Zvi, 1976). This was therefore operationalized as disconfirming intelligence because it was contrary to previous thoughts.

While some cases may be clear-cut, such as those described above, other situations may include ambiguously coded intelligence products or circumstances in which policymakers’ preconceived notions are less perceptible. Selecting cases with different levels of the independent variables and more discernable measures of the type of intelligence would reduce the likelihood of this. Though case selection is thoroughly outlined in the methodology subsection below, there are two ways to mitigate ambiguously coded types of intelligence. First, choosing cases with discrete measures of the type of intelligence can moderate this concern. I discuss case selection on the dependent variables in the following section. Second, a single piece of intelligence can include both confirming and disconfirming information. Where this occurs, I use process tracing to determine which piece of intelligence has the strongest causal impact on the attitude.

3.3 Intelligence Specificity

The specificity of intelligence concerns the level of detail. This variable is dichotomized as either low or high specificity. Dahl’s definition of tactical and strategic levels of intelligence is
helpful in this regard. Low specificity, or what Dahl calls “strategic-level intelligence,” includes intelligence that addresses general intentions, chatter, unspecific threats, and general warnings (Dahl, 2013a, p. 22). Highly specific intelligence includes significantly more detail. This is information on troop disposition, attack plans, and identified targets, as well as the specific details of a plot (Dahl, 2013b, p. 22). Dahl inductively finds that, although policymakers say they want strategic and high-level intelligence, they actually need specific and tactical-level intelligence.

For instance, preceding the Israeli attack on the Sinai Peninsula in 1956, also known as “Operation Kadesh,” American intelligence agencies produced both unspecific and specific intelligence reports on Israeli intentions. The less specific intelligence included general warning reports, such as the S.N.I.E. on July 31st, 1956, which stated that although Nasser has nationalized the Suez Canal, Israel was not likely to attack (Dahl, 2013a, p. 73).10 This intelligence would be coded as low specificity. This is in stark contrast to more specific intelligence made available to the Eisenhower administration a few months later. The “Special Watch Report of the Intelligence Advisory Committee” included specific intelligence on heavy Israeli mobilization, and the N.S.A. produced signals intelligence (S.I.G.I.N.T.) that detailed Israel’s specific capabilities and intentions to attack in the near future (Dahl, 2013b, pp. 72-73). These two intelligence reports would be coded as highly specific.

Although I use Dahl’s conception of strategic and tactical intelligence to operationalize specificity, this is not the only way to do so. Both tactical and strategic intelligence, forward-looking predictions, and current intelligence updates can have both specific and unspecific

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characteristics. For example, in Chapter 4, I examine the prediction intelligence that the I.C. sent to L.B.J. prior to the Six-Day War. The memorandum, known as the “who will win” paper, was specific, containing a variety of order of battle information and specific qualitative and quantitative measures. On the other hand, the intelligence that President Carter received on the Korean Peninsula was forward-looking, but unspecific. In fact, Carter requested more detail and instructed his intelligence staff to “get figures.” Chapter 6 outlines that, while both pieces are forward-looking, one is specific and the other unspecific.

Similarly, current intelligence can be either unspecific or specific. Current intelligence simply refers to information about an unfolding situation. This differs from forward-looking intelligence, which makes predictions. The intelligence Eisenhower received leading up to Sputnik was current intelligence, but coded as unspecific. The C.I.A. admitted the low level of specificity, claiming, “We still do not have firm information on the numbers vehicles, their size, and the Soviet launching plans.”11 This differs from the current intelligence that, for instance, President Reagan received during the artillery shelling of U.S. positions in Lebanon. Reagan detailed specific signals intelligence (S.I.G.I.N.T.) that addressed the conflict. Therefore, both forward-looking and current intelligence can be either specific or unspecific.

Overall, my coding of intelligence specificity provides one primary advantage over operationalizing specificity, along the predictive analysis vis-a-vis current intelligence dimension. As previously demonstrated, the concept of information specificity is well-documented in other literature streams, including the fields of medicine, business intelligence, and intelligence and national security. By employing my operationalization of the concept, I am able to empirically test a variable that has been studied in a variety of fields. However, there are

neither theoretical frameworks nor tests of policymaker preferences along the analytic prediction-current intelligence dimension. While this is an interesting notion that should be tested, this variable is beyond the scope of this research.

3.4 Commitment

The third explanatory variable examined in this dissertation is commitment. As previously discussed, commitment to a policy or decision is rooted in the concept of vested interest, which originates in the psychology literature. In short, commitment may refer to private goals or public obligations to a particular policy. The literature defines vested interest as “the extent to which an attitude object is hedonically relevant for the attitude holder. If the attitude object has important perceived personal consequences, the attitude for terminological convenience is labeled of high vested interest” (Crano, 1995, p. 132). Commitment is the degree to which something has political consequences for the decision-maker.

I measure commitment based on the five components of vested interest defined in the literature: stake, salience, certainty, immediacy, and self-efficacy (Crano, 1995, p. 147). \(^\text{12}\)

\(^{12}\) Table created based on Crano (1995).
Table 3-3: Components of Commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stake</th>
<th>“Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to attitude object” (Crano, 1995, p. 148).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salience</td>
<td>Relevance to decision-makers’ goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainty</td>
<td>Confidence in the ramifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediacy</td>
<td>The time between potential action/inaction and consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-efficacy</td>
<td>The perception that actions are within the abilities of the decision-maker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High policymaker commitment is high stake, high salience, high certainty, immediate, and high self-efficacy. The individual’s perception of loss or gain would be high and relevant to their goals. Moreover, they would be sure of the ramifications of action/inaction and expect them to be relatively immediate. Finally, the policymaker would believe that they have the capability to act accordingly, if necessary. Conversely, with low commitment, the policymaker’s subjective perception of gains or losses is low and less relevant to their goals. They are also uncertain of the consequences, and the time between action/inaction can be lengthy. There may be low self-efficacy, with the policymaker perceiving action to be outside of their capabilities. It is important to note that the five indicators of commitment can be mixed, meaning that some are high while others are low. Where the indicators are mixed, but three (or more) of the five indicators were high, the variable was coded as high commitment.

One exception is stake, as this indicator plays an important role in commitment. If stake is low, it is likely that the other indicators will be less significant to the decision-maker. For instance, if stake is coded as low, then self-efficacy – or the perception that one’s actions are not within one’s capabilities – may be less relevant. In other words, if the perception of loss or gain
is weaker, then the potential action will be of less significance. This is not likely to be an issue, because if decision-maker stake is low, the other components of commitment are to likely be low as well.

### 3.5 Methodology

To test the C.A.T.I., the dissertation takes a comparative case study approach, with congruence testing and process tracing. This two-step methodology is frequently used in I.R. studies and other fields that work with rich qualitative data. Congruence methods determine “similarities between the relative strength and duration of the hypothesized causes and observed effects are assessed” (Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 28). This was used to establish whether there was a correlational relationship between my explanatory variables and the dependent variable. In other words, this study used congruence testing to determine whether the fluctuating measures of the variables in the C.A.T.I. match the predicted outcomes observed in my cases.

Process tracing is employed to assess the extent to which the correlation between predicted outcomes and theoretical claims is causal. In process tracing, a causal mechanism is hypothesized to be present in a population of cases of a phenomenon. The researcher selects a single case where both X and Y are present, and the context allows the mechanism to operate. Here the goal is to evaluate whether the evidence shows that the hypothesized causal mechanism linking X and Y was present and that it functioned as theorized (Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 11).

In short, the congruence testing determined the correlation between my theory and the case study outcomes, while the process tracing compared my theory’s explanatory power relative to other alternative hypotheses.

In addition, I conducted counterfactual analysis to mitigate the dearth of data in Chapter 5.
on President Ronald Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon. The counterfactual analysis is essentially a “what if” thought experiment to provide further context for the available evidence and to evaluate the solidity of the C.A.T.I.’s explanations for the historical outcome (Belkin & Tetlock, 1996; Fearon, 1991). I also sought to mitigate the lack of data in Chapter 5 through textual and sentiment analysis. Using President Reagan’s diary entries, I examined his sentiments about Lebanon over time, as reflected in the sentiments dataset from the tidytext package in R (Hu & Liu, 2004).

The final substantive chapter focuses on Dwight D. Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence and utilizes a “mini-case study” method. Taking a similar approach to Sechser and Fuhrmann (2017) and Dahl (2013a), I briefly examined five cases that address the five remaining squares in my two two-by-two matrices. The mini-case study approach not only lends credibility to the causal and correlational direction of my theory but also increases the generalizability of the findings. In summary, this dissertation tested the C.A.T.I.’s hypothesis, using a variety of rigorous qualitative methodologies to provide robust results in a data-scarce field of study.

3.5.1 Case Selection and Evidence

In the next stage, I define my universe of cases. This universe focused on political appointees and elected officials from World War II to the present. This was for two primary reasons. First, military officers may differ from civilians in their attitudes towards intelligence as they receive different types of intelligence and under different circumstances. In addition to the circumstances of battle, the difference between military and political intelligence limits generalizability and complicates explanatory power. Therefore, for congruency and simplicity,
this dissertation focuses solely on civilian policymakers. However, future tests of the C.A.T.I. should examine the theory’s validity with regard to a variety of actors.

Second, the timeline of World War II to the present was selected because it follows the establishment of large-scale intelligence apparatus. Although intelligence gathering and collection have existed for some time, World War II and its immediate aftermath saw a significant shift in the way that it was conducted. Axis and Allied intelligence operated at a level previously unseen in either combat or peacetime.

For the case studies, I chiefly used primary sources, including declassified documents, and secondary accounts such as memoirs. Each case, including the three full-length and five mini-cases, was outside the 25-year declassification period. Selecting cases from outside the mandatory declassification review timeframe eased data collection and reduced the classification issues prevalent in intelligence studies research. This is not to say that declassification issues did not occur, but selecting cases over the 25-year threshold facilitated collection. I also selected for a range of independent and conditioning variables to increase the variance of my dependent variable (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).

In addition, I sought “tough” cases for the C.A.T.I., such as those where a policymaker had a well-known general attitude towards intelligence or the intelligence apparatus, or when an alternative explanation may have more explanatory power than my own. For instance, Chapter 4 on Lyndon Johnson discusses his surprisingly positive attitude towards intelligence on the Six-Day War, despite his criticisms and skepticism of intelligence and the C.I.A. throughout his presidency. Finally, most of the selected cases concern political, high-level assessments, as it is preferable to compare similar cases. As such, this dissertation solely examines the attitudes of U.S. presidents towards intelligence. While this limitation does impede generalizability to other
levels of policymakers (i.e., Secretaries of State) and other nations decision-makers, the comparison of like cases increased the precision and accuracy of the findings.

Overall, the case selection covered a wide range of situations and intelligence from a variety of sources and circumstances. It also incorporated situations in which force or airdrops were not employed (U.S. intelligence and the Arab-Israeli War), where force was used (Reagan and the Lebanon plan), attitudes towards intelligence methodologies (Eisenhower and aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [I.S.R.]), and covert action (Eisenhower, Guatemala and Indonesia), and strategic troop withdrawal (Carter and the Korean peninsula). Figures 3-1 and 3-2 below lay out the C.A.T.I.’s variables, hypotheses, and test cases.

![Figure 3-1: Low Commitment Case Selection](image)

**Low Commitment**

Type of Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disconfirming</th>
<th>Confirmatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unfavorable</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ambivalent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Case: Dien Bien Phu</em></td>
<td><em>Case: Sputnik</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ambivalent</strong></td>
<td><strong>Favorable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Case: Operation HAID</em></td>
<td><em>Case: LBI and the Six Day War</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55
The first case study, L.B.J. and intelligence preceding the Six-Day War, was a tough case for the C.A.T.I. By nearly all accounts, Johnson was an extreme narcissist, he had a poor relationship with his intelligence apparatus, and the overall threat to U.S. interests was low. Nevertheless, the C.A.T.I. provided the most analytical leverage, vis-à-vis other theories.

The second in-depth case was that of Lebanon and Reagan Plan in the early 1980s. In 1982, Lebanon was in a precarious situation. Palestinian refugees were flooding into the country, Syria occupied much of the country, and the internal conflict between the Maronite Christians and Muslims had the region in a constant state of danger. Many experts believed Lebanon was the lynchpin of the Middle East (Kennedy & Brunetta, 1988). President Reagan’s ambitious plan was to station Marines in Beirut to stabilize the country. The Marines would act as a peacekeeping force and be home by Christmas. There is evidence that the Reagan administration was strongly committed to this plan. This case study explored the extent to which the type of intelligence and level of commitment affected the President’s attitude towards the intelligence.

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**Figure 3-2: High Commitment Case Selection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specificity</th>
<th>Disconfirming</th>
<th>Confirmatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Unfavorable</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Case: Carter and Korean Troop Withdrawal</em></td>
<td><em>Case: PBSUCCESS and PBHISTORY</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very Unfavorable</td>
<td>Very Favorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Case: Reagan and Lebanon</em></td>
<td><em>Case: Aerial Reconnaissance</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third case focused on President Jimmy Carter’s attitude towards intelligence regarding his plan to withdraw troops from the Korean Peninsula. In 1976, Carter ran a presidential campaign focusing strongly on human rights as a foundation for his foreign policy. Seeking to leverage U.S. posture in the region to punish and coerce South Korea’s poor human rights record, the President scheduled a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean border. While Carter was strongly committed to this course of action, the plan was declared by intelligence, military advisors, and domestic constituents to be deeply flawed and troubling. Ultimately, the president abandoned his plan, but his very unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence was well-documented.

Finally, for the mini-case study approach, I filled the remaining gaps in the theory matrices. To examine like cases, I focused on a single policymaker, namely President Eisenhower. Chapter 7 includes an examination of his attitude towards intelligence on covert action in Guatemala and Indonesia, the battle of Dien Bien Phu, Aerial I.S.R., and the Soviet launch of Sputnik.

### 3.6 Rival Explanations

This dissertation tests the C.A.T.I. against three alternative explanations: personality, proximity, and threat. Each rival explanation has received attention in intelligence studies with both historical and empirical evidence. Although attitudes towards intelligence are not explicitly examined in the intelligence literature, some prominent theories in the field may have significant explanatory power.
First, evidence suggests that personality can influence attitudes towards intelligence. Recent research has shown that psychological traits are a critical variable in determining intelligence usage (Bar-Joseph & McDermott, 2017). Bar-Joseph and McDermott argue that psychological pathologies play a significant role. They contend that specific psychological pathologies affect how intelligence is received and utilized; and this, in turn, affects the likelihood of future intelligence success. Additionally, there is some evidence in the psychology literature for a connection between individual pathologies and attitudes. Researchers have found that the need for cognition, cognitive closure, gender, age, and other personality factors can affect attitude change (Briñol & Petty, 2005; Haddock & Huskinson, 2004). Lending further credence to this line of inquiry is evidence that individual pathologies such as narcissism may affect attitude (Rhodewalt & Peterson, 2009). In summary, if individual pathologies and personality affect attitude, and these variables remain constant, one would expect attitudes to also remain constant. Thus, individual personality constitutes a plausible rival explanation.

The second plausible rival explanation explored by this dissertation is the proximity hypothesis. This theory posits that the closer the policymaker is to the intelligence producer, geographically or personally, the more influential they will be, though their intelligence is more likely to be politicized. This hypothesis is significant because, if correct, it has implications for attitudes towards intelligence. As previously mentioned, there is historical and empirical evidence that decision-makers ignore and/or neglect intelligence and the proximity hypothesis provides a plausible explanation for this. If a policymaker has a close relationship with an intelligence producer, they may have a more favorable attitude towards the intelligence produced. For instance, during World War II, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, commander of the Western Desert Campaign against the Nazis, and his Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Edgar
“Bill” Williams, had a strong relationship that arguably improved intelligence usage. Montgomery, whose contempt for intelligence was rather infamous, showed an increasingly favorable attitude after Williams began to speak in “Monty language” (Elliot-Bateman, 1970). In a similar fashion, a poor relationship between intelligence and national security policymakers may result in unfavorable attitudes towards intelligence. If evidence were to show that Nixon, for example, who had a strong relationship with Henry Kissinger and a very tenuous one with the C.I.A., had favorable attitudes towards intelligence presented by Kissinger and unfavorable attitudes towards that presented by C.I.A. staff, this would indicate the validity of the proximity hypothesis. Therefore, another plausible explanation for attitudes towards intelligence emerges at the organizational or interpersonal level.

Finally, the third alternative explanation is at the system level: threat. The purpose of intelligence is to determine adversary capabilities and intentions. If the threat to a state’s survival is significant, it may have a strong impact on attitudes towards intelligence. One concern regarding threat, however, is that commitment and threat may be collinear; in other words, threat may affect commitment levels. While this is possible, there are also situations in which threat and commitment do not co-vary. The Reagan Plan in Lebanon represents one example. At the height of the Cold War, the stability of Lebanon did not represent a significant threat to the United States. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the Reagan administration’s commitment remained strong. Thus, case selection was imperative to separate these two variables. The selection included cases where commitment was high and threat low, and vice versa. Although this did not completely mitigate collinearity issues, it did bolster the research design.

As previously discussed, I.R. research suggests that high threat leads to unfavorable attitudes and low threat to favorable attitudes (Dolan, 2016b). It is possible that the reverse may
also be true: when under threat, policymakers may be more likely to grasp any information they can, accepting information more willingly and less critically. A highly threatening situation could “focus the mind” and force the policymaker to accept hard truths. While this is feasible, many examples of intelligence failure saw policymakers failing to do exactly this. Examples of policymaker failures in the intelligence consumer-producer nexus include Pearl Harbor, the Soviet non-aggression pact with the Nazis, and the surprise attack on Israel in 1973 (Bar-Joseph & Levy, 2009; Kahn, 1991). In each case, highly threatening situations should have “focused the mind,” but did not.

In sum, this study tested three alternative hypotheses: individual, organizational, and system-level explanations. If the C.A.T.I. holds, given these additional explanations, I can make a strong argument for my case.

In addition to detailing rival explanations, it was important to address when and how the C.A.T.I. could be proven false. My theory could be falsified in several ways. However, for brevity, I selected the two most likely situations in which this theory could be proven wrong. First, the theory would have been falsified if the independent and conditioning variables did not lead to the expected attitude. For example, if there were evidence that a highly committed policymaker had an unfavorable attitude towards specific, confirmatory intelligence, the C.A.T.I. would have predicted the wrong outcome, as my theory predicts a very favorable attitude in this case. In this situation, both my independent and conditioning variables would not result in the expected value of my dependent variable.

Second, it would falsify the theory if it were demonstrated that alternative explanations have more explanatory power. For instance, even if my variables predicted the policymaker’s attitude, if the evidence revealed that personality, proximity, or threat better explained the
attitude, the theory would be falsified. Namely, concurrent variation in personality, proximity, or threat with variation in attitudes towards intelligence would be an indication that the theory did not have sufficient explanatory power relative to others.

3.7 Conclusion

Chapter 3 laid out the methods and case selection utilized to test the C.A.T.I. Attitude towards intelligence (D.V.) and the independent and conditional variables were measured and evaluated by proven methodologies and indicators from social science and psychology. Case selection was also decided using social science best practices. In addition to variance of each variable, the cases were selected for their “toughness.” The two-step procedure of congruence testing and process tracing – along with counterfactual analysis, textual analysis, and mini-cases – sought to establish correlation, causation, and generalizability in the results. In the next chapter, I examine President Johnson’s attitude towards intelligence before the Six-Day War.
4.0  Chapter 4: Johnson and the Arab-Israeli War

“Policy making is like milking a fat cow. You see the milk coming out, you press more and the milk bubbles and flows, and just as the bucket is full, the cow with its tail whips the bucket and all is spilled. That’s what CIA does to policy making”\textsuperscript{13}

- Lyndon Baines Johnson (L.B.J.)

Vice President L.B.J. was sworn in as President of the United States aboard Air Force One on February 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 1963. While intelligence scholars often focus on the role of intelligence in the Vietnam conflict (e.g. Rovner, 2011; Wirtz, 1991), Johnson’s role in the Six-Day War is often overlooked. This is unfortunate as, although the Vietnam conflict played a pivotal role in U.S. foreign policy for decades, the Six-Day War provides a unique perspective into how intelligence is employed by senior-level policymakers.

This case is useful for two primary reasons. First, as discussed in earlier chapters, most studies in intelligence emphasize failures as they are more easily perceived, while successes often quietly pass. But L.B.J.’s use of intelligence during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War illustrates that scholars can learn from successes as well as failures. As this chapter shows, L.B.J.’s handling of the crisis reveals how intelligence successes can not only have a strong impact on foreign policy, but also potentially shape general attitudes towards intelligence and future relationships with intelligence professionals.

\textsuperscript{13} (Brandon, 1973, p. 103). The quote is often reproduced with profanity as well, referring to the cow’s tail as “shit smeared.”
Second, Johnson was known to have a disdain for intelligence. Before Richard Helms was appointed in June 1966, D.C.I.s did not last long in the Johnson administration. John McCone, a holdover from the Kennedy administration, failed to keep Johnson’s interest despite a strong start. He ultimately preferred resigning over being ignored. Similarly, Admiral William Raborn only lasted a few months before being ousted by a frustrated Johnson. His relationship with Helm was equally discordant; and, while the president worked more smoothly with the Helms than with his predecessors, the experience was not without its challenges. Helms recalls that Johnson often “expressed his disapproval … in loud, wrathful tones” (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, p. 5). Despite his apparently poor relationships with intelligence professionals, Johnson’s experience during the Six-Day War represented a paradigm shift in his view of the subject. As Helms later recalls, “I think President Johnson came to understand what intelligence could do for him during the events leading up to the June War of 1967” (Priess, 2017b, p. 54). This case thus allowed for a serious test of the proximity hypothesis and first-level explanations for a President’s attitude towards intelligence. L.B.J.’s relationship with D.C.I. Helms preceding the crisis was strained; and afterward, a different rapport was apparent. Therefore, the Middle East Crisis of 1967 provides a unique opportunity to examine the alternative hypotheses and test the C.A.T.I.

4.1 Case Overview

This chapter progresses as follows. First, I provide a brief overview of the case, outlining the situation, intelligence, and L.B.J.’s favorable attitude towards intelligence on the Arab-Israeli Crisis. The second section focuses on various explanations for the President’s attitude. Overall,
evidence from the historical record suggests that personality, proximity, and threat variables cannot account for Johnson’s attitude towards intelligence on the Six-Day War. Conversely, the C.A.T.I. can explain his attitude at that time. The last part of this chapter briefly discusses the theoretical and policy implications of this case, the most significant of these being the following: there is strong evidence that, as a result of intelligence support during the crisis, Johnson’s relationship with Helms dramatically improved; and L.B.J.’s general attitude towards intelligence also seems to have changed following the Six-Day War.

4.1.1 The Situation

In May 1967, tensions between the Soviet-backed Arabs and the U.S.-backed Israelis reached a crescendo. Following Soviet intelligence reports of Israeli troop movements, the Arab states began to take defensive positions on the border, and Egypt expelled U.N. peacekeepers, a remnant from the Suez Crisis over a decade before. On May 22nd and 23rd, Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, declared the Straits of Tiran – and consequently the Gulf of Aqaba – closed to Israeli shipping. This action, a *casus belli* according to the Israelis, resulted in subsequent Israeli mobilization and a further breakdown of the already tenuous peace. Despite the Johnson administration working feverishly to keep tensions low, a newly signed Jordanian-Egyptian defense pact on May 30th further alarmed the Israelis. At the same time, President Johnson’s public declarations maintain secure free passage in the Strait failed to mollify Israeli concerns.

At 4:35 am on June 5th, 1967, Johnson awoke to a phone call from the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Walt Rostow. While each side was pointing fingers, and it was unclear who had fired the first shot, the war between the Arabs and the Israelis had begun.
Evidence later confirmed that the Israelis had conducted a surprise air attack (Operation Focus) on Egypt’s airfields, decimating its air force and turning the war strongly in their own favor early in the conflict. Syria and other neighboring Arab nations joined the conflict, but to little avail, as Israel took full advantage of the air superiority gained by Operation Focus, as well as its qualitative advantages in equipment and morale. As quickly as it began, the conflict ended: within six days, Israel had captured the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from the Egyptians, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from the Jordanians, and the strategically significant Golan Heights from the Syrians.

On June 10th, just five days after hostilities began, the Soviets reached out to Johnson on the “hot line.” To all, including Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, it had become clear that the Israelis had won a decisive victory.14 The Soviets, fearing the loss of influence in the Middle East, declared that they would take any action – including military – to maintain the territorial integrity of the Arab States. Not wanting to appear weak in the face of Soviet aggression, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara suggested dispatching the Sixth Fleet to the region as a show of force. After several tense hours, Moscow helped to broker a ceasefire between the two warring sides.

At a glance, it appears the Johnson administration did little in a conflict that nearly ignited a third World War; but, taking a closer look, one sees that L.B.J. and his cabinet deftly employed intelligence and diplomatic resources to successfully navigate the situation. Johnson’s open-mindedness and favorable attitude towards the intelligence played a significant role in the development of the crisis. The following sections detail the intelligence that Johnson received in late May, focusing primarily on the report, “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States.”

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14 The Soviet Premier was the head of government of the Soviet Union. Kosygin was Premier from 1964-1980.
The report, commissioned by Johnson and Helms, was jointly produced by the C.I.A. and the D.I.A. and provided significant insight into a region about which Johnson knew little. As a result of this report and other pieces of intelligence, L.B.J. refused to supply the Israelis or make public commitments to Israel. The next section deals with the intelligence that Johnson received preceding the crisis.

### 4.1.2 The Intelligence

Although the White House received extensive intelligence support before and throughout the Six-Day War, this chapter focuses primarily on intelligence that President Johnson received between May 23rd and May 26th. This brief period was chosen for two reasons: first, it is difficult to gauge attitudes towards intelligence in other cases due to Johnson’s reading routine. His most common form of intelligence consumption occurred during his “night reading” sessions before bed (Priess, 2017b, pp. 48-49). While sparse reports from Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President, are available, they are neither a reliable nor a consistent measure of attitudes towards the intelligence, especially that on specific topics.

Second, Johnson’s reaction to intelligence during the crisis is relatively well-documented. The documents that L.B.J. viewed are marked with a cursive “L” for Lyndon or “PS” for President Saw on the top of the first page. For instance, Figure 4-2, a cover page for a situation report from June 9th, 1967, shows the document was received and read by Johnson at 9:35 pm (note the “L” in the top right corner of the document):
Not only did the intelligence documents have Johnson’s “L,” but White House staff, foreign ambassadors, and Johnson himself have written on his reaction to intelligence during this period of the Arab-Israeli Crisis. For instance, Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, and others who interacted with him during this time have described his words, physical indicators, and behaviors. As such, the limitations are not as much of a hindrance in this case, as opposed to other time periods, and there is ample historical evidence of both Johnson’s attitude and the intelligence he received. Thus, the period of May 23\textsuperscript{rd} to May 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1967, provides sufficient data to determine Johnson’s attitude towards intelligence preceding the crisis. In the following section, I provide a brief overview and timeline of the intelligence Johnson received over those four days.

\textbf{4.1.2.1 Intelligence Chronology: May 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 1967 to May 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1967}

\footnote{15 Middle East Crisis, Codeword Situation Reports, Vol. 1, 5/67-6/67 [1-3], document 3, LBJ Library.}
On May 23rd, 1967, the day after Nasser announced the closing of the Straits of Tiran, the C.I.A. began to prepare for the unfolding crisis. Helms established “a 24-hour Arab-Israeli Task Force to work in our C.I.A. Operations Center, to focus all available intelligence and expertise on the responsibilities for current reporting.”

This prudence quickly became apparent, as Johnson pulled Helms from a House Armed Services subcommittee briefing to vent his frustration (Freshwater, 1969). President Johnson had just received a phone call from an irate U.S. ambassador to Israel, Arthur Goldberg. Goldberg was upset about the lack of warning and fearful that Israel was militarily outmatched. As a result of the conversation with the ambassador, Johnson directed Helms to produce intelligence on the military balance of the Arab-Israeli crisis as soon as possible. Leveraging his foresight, Director Helms promptly delivered two papers to the President by the regular Tuesday lunch, only four hours after his request (Freshwater, 1969; Robarge, 2005).

The papers, titled “US Knowledge of Egyptian Alert” and “Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities,” provided significant insight into the crisis before the administration had made public commitments or policy changes. The first of these documents remains significantly redacted; but the second, often referred to as the “who will win” memorandum was the most impactful. The overall assessment was as follows:

The judgment of the Intelligence Community is that Israeli ground forces “can maintain internal security, defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts, launch limited attacks simultaneously on all fronts, or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth.” In the air, the judgment is less clear: the Israelis “probably could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel’s air facilities were not damaged beyond repair.”

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16 Helms, Richard, “Draft Briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Helms for the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,” June 14, 1967. Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry Files: Job 80–R01580, Box 10, Folder 210, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified], LBJ Library.

The paper also provided troop numbers and a basic qualitative assessment based on Egypt’s experience in Yemen since the 1956 Suez incident. From May 23rd to the early evening of May 25th, the situation remained relatively stable and there were no major developments.\(^{18}\)

At 6:00 pm on May 25th, 1967, Rostow sent a memorandum to the President (Figure 4-2):\(^{19}\)

![Figure 4-2: Rostow Memo to President Johnson](image)

Attached to the memo was an Israeli intelligence estimate sent by an unnamed, high-ranking, Israeli spy. The second attachment was a C.I.A. assessment of the Israeli intelligence.\(^{20}\) While

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\(^{20}\) This document remains classified. The USG has a propensity to safeguard Foreign Government Intelligence (FGI) closely.
the C.I.A. essentially dismissed the Israeli estimate as a ploy to attract U.S. support, Rostow conveys the commonalities between the U.S. and Israeli estimates. In his own handwriting, Rostow wrote as follows:

P.S. The two estimates – Israeli and C.I.A. – both show how explosive are:
– Israeli anxieties;
– Nasser’s hopes of picking up prestige;
– U.S.S.R. desires for gaining prestige, short of a war.

Just two days before, Johnson had had a clear intelligence view of the crisis; but the Israeli document made Johnson and his administration doubtful (Robarge, 2005). As a result, L.B.J. requested that his staff “scrub this thing down,” or re-evaluate the information, and provide a new assessment (Helms, 1982b). The resulting paper, “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States,” was a joint C.I.A./D.I.A. memorandum. The report doubled down on the estimate given earlier, in “Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities,” that Israel would win quickly and decisively. Attached to the memorandum was a note from Helms, claiming this was the I.C.’s response to the request for a “scrub down.” The headline of the memorandum was as follows:

Israel could almost certainly attain air superiority over the Sinai Peninsula in 24 hours after taking the initiative, or in two or three days if the U.A.R. [United Arab Republic, referring to Egypt and Syria] struck first. In the latter case, Israel might lose up to half of its air force. We estimate that armored striking forces could breach the U.A.R.’s double defense line in the Sinai within several days. Re-grouping and re-supplying would be required before the Israelis could initiate further attacks aimed at driving to the Suez Canal. Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or Jordan during this period.

This piece provided more in-depth analysis of the relative military capabilities of both sides than the May 23rd report had. In addition to ground, logistical, and naval sections, the memorandum

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21 In addition, Rostow’s cover letter of the two estimates calls the Israeli analysis as “highly disturbing.”

22 Central Intelligence Agency, “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States,” National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 5/67–7/67. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified], LBJ Library. While this piece of intelligence is shockingly accurate, this dissertation does not focus the role of accuracy and attitudes towards intelligence.
concluded with a selected order of battle.\textsuperscript{23}

At 1:30 pm on May 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1967, Johnson held an emergency N.S.C. meeting on the Middle East Crisis in preparation for an upcoming meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, later that afternoon. After General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.), provided an update of the military picture and several staff members reported, the President asked how to deal with Eban. Among the important results of the discussion was the group’s agreement that, given the current intelligence assessments, Johnson should stress that if Israel decided to act, it would act alone. From 7:15 pm to 8:40 pm, Johnson and his senior military officials met with Eban; Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Avraham Harman; and Minister Ephraim Evron. After the meeting, Johnson attended a late-night dinner, and the President’s Daily Diary described his reaction to the meeting:

They came loaded for bear, but so was I … Secy McNamara said he just wanted to throw his cap up in the air, and George Christian said it was the best meeting of the kind he had ever sat in on.\textsuperscript{24}

Even before the intelligence estimates proved to be shockingly accurate, Johnson had an overall favorable attitude towards intelligence on the Arab-Israeli crisis.

4.1.3 The Attitude

As previously described in the attitude measurement section of Chapter 3, three primary indicators are used to determine attitude: words, physical manifestations, and behaviors. Behaviors are not decisions or outcomes, but rather indicators of an attitude; this includes acts such as receptiveness, blaming others, and resistance to new information. Overall, the data

\textsuperscript{23} The specificity and content of the intelligence will be further discussed in this chapter.
suggest that Johnson had a positive attitude towards intelligence on the Six-Day War. The following section details each indicator.

4.1.3.1 Words

The verbal indicators of a favorable attitude include “agreement,” “approval,” “encouraged,” “positive,” “supportive,” “affirmative,” “content,” “pleased,” “glad,” “receptive,” and “gratified.” While there is no explicit evidence that Johnson used these words, Helms and other third-party accounts describe physical and behavioral indicators that epitomize them and ultimately illustrate a favorable attitude.

4.1.3.2 Physical Indicators

There were physical manifestations of Johnson’s favorable attitude towards the intelligence. These include smiling; appearing calm and relaxed; and expressions of optimism, amusement, and other positive emotions. Helms depicts Johnson’s attitude at the time as “gratified,” “clearly impressed with the agency’s performance,” and “enormously relieved to be let off the hook” (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, p. 143; Helms & Hood, 2003, p. 295; Robarge, 2005). Another example is Johnson’s conceit when the war finally began: according to Helms, Johnson displayed an air of “smugness” when he was able to tell Congressional leaders, “You know, I had a feeling that this was coming” (Hathaway & Smith, 1993). Thus, Helms’ description of Johnson’s manner suggests a favorable attitude towards the intelligence leading up to the Middle East Crisis, in stark contrast to his reaction to other intelligence subjects. In addition, L.B.J.’s behavioral indicators provide even more evidence for his favorable attitude.

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4.1.3.3 Behaviors

As the methodological chapter outlines, receptivity to new information, expressions of approval and/or gratification, and expressions of affirmation and agreement illustrate a favorable attitude towards a subject. Johnson, who was often obstinate in his doubts about intelligence on other subjects, demonstrated an uncharacteristically flexible nature during the Middle East Crisis. For example, during his 1:30 pm meeting on the Middle East in preparation for the Eban meeting later that evening, the President discussed the purpose of the gathering. His notes were as follows:

Before meeting Eban, you wish patiently to walk around the problem of the Middle East in an open-minded way – to see all the angles, all the elements … On the basis of these statements, you wish to solicit comments from all sides. Finally, you wish to hear the recommendations for U.S. policy – and for talking to Eban – from the Secretary of State.\(^\text{26}\)

While this is an official agenda, the President’s actions and behaviors match the documentation. For instance, Johnson’s use of phrases like “look at all the cards” and his search for “inventive thinking” indicate that the President was indeed receptive and open-minded. Moreover, while Johnson had confidence Israel would “whip the hell out of them,” he also admitted that he could be wrong. When referencing the Israeli estimate to Eban, Johnson said:

My experts could of course be wrong. I remember that MacArthur was wrong about the Chinese intervention in Korea. But on this matter I have told my experts to assume all the facts that the Israelis had given them to be true. They all say that even on that assumption, it is their unanimous view that there is no Egyptian intention to make an imminent attack. And that if there is such an attack, Israel will win (Eban, 1992, p. 389).

Finally, the inclusion of Helms in the Tuesday lunches following the Middle East Crisis is indicative of Johnson’s favorable attitude. The famous Tuesday lunches were informal but

\(^{26}\) “Meeting on the Middle East, Friday, May 26, 1:30 pm Agenda,” The President’s Appointment File [Daily Backup] 5/23/67 – 5/31/67 Box 66, LBJ Library.
significant policy meetings, giving direct and personal access to the President. As one researcher notes,

> From then on, Johnson included Helms in all Tuesday lunches – the director had attended them occasionally since his appointment in 1966, but after the 1967 war he was assured of what he [Helms] later called “the hottest ticket in town” (Robarge, 2005).  

Rather than invite Helms for a singular, punitive meeting for the intelligence he had received in the past, Johnson regularly invited Helms into his inner circle. Not only does this provide further evidence of Johnson’s favorability towards the intelligence he received preceding the Six-Day War, but it also suggests that attitudinal theories of intelligence precede proximity-based analysis. This notion is discussed more thoroughly in the conclusion. Nevertheless, there are numerous behavioral indicators of Johnson’s attitude towards intelligence at the time.

> In summary, the verbal, physical, and behavioral indicators of Johnson’s positive attitude towards intelligence during the early days of the Middle East Crisis are abundant. As Director Helms explained during an official C.I.A. oral history interview:

> And I have always attributed to that Estimate [referring to the “who will win” paper] as being the first thing that had happened in his Presidency when he suddenly realized that intelligence had a role in his life and an important part at that. Because you will remember that when he first became President, John McCon[e] used to brief him every day. Then he obviously got bored with that and stopped McCon[e]’s briefings. And then nobody was briefing him and nobody got very close to him and McCon[e] quit as you remember because he had no impact with Johnson. He didn’t see him; he didn’t seem to have any influence with him, and so he just decided to go back to California. And during the [D.C.I. Admiral William] Raborn period, Johnson did not exactly spend a lot of time with Raborn. We were invited, he and I, to the National Security Council meetings because that was part of my so-called training period as they called it. But: this was the first time that he was really sort of jarred by the fact that those intelligence fellas had some insight that these other fellas don’t have.  

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27 This notion and its implications will be discussed further in the latter parts of this chapter and in the conclusion chapter.

Helms describes here the President’s favorable attitude, and it is important to understand why this attitude emerged. This question becomes increasingly significant when one examines all L.B.J.’s negative reactions to intelligence before and after the Six-Day War, which are discussed in later sections.

In the next section, I assess possible explanations for his uncharacteristically favorable attitude towards intelligence on the Middle East Crisis. The three primary possibilities include personality, proximity, and threat.

4.2 Theoretical Assessment of Explanations

Why did President Johnson have a favorable attitude towards the intelligence at the height of the Middle East Crisis? What factors could explain his uncharacteristically open-minded and gratified bearing, despite the uncertainty and immense domestic and international pressure? Here, I explore the three most plausible explanations in the literature, using congruence testing.

4.2.1 Personality

This section briefly examines two personality-based explanations for Johnson’s attitude. The first of these is interest- and experience-centric. As the literature suggests, the decision-maker’s knowledge of intelligence capabilities may affect their receptivity and interest (Andrew, 1995; Preston, 2012, p. 53). In other words, if the President has had intelligence experience or interest in the past, they are theoretically more likely to have a favorable attitude towards it. To test this theory, I examine the extent of Johnson’s involvement with intelligence preceding the
Arab-Israeli Crisis. Overall, “he had had little experience with or interest in intelligence when he suddenly became president in November 1963,” and this did not change throughout his presidency (Robarge, 2005). Several sources, including national security and intelligence advisors, note both Johnson’s lack of experience and his overall dislike of intelligence.

Johnson’s limited experience was likely the result of his rivalry with President Kennedy. Before the President’s Daily Brief was created, the Checklist provided the commander-in-chief with vital intelligence updates. Despite L.B.J.’s position as Vice President, he was entirely unaware of its existence until McCone approached him with it on his first morning as president. Johnson’s ignorance was due to Kennedy’s intelligence officer, Bromely Smith, who ordered that “under no circumstances should the Checklist be given to Johnson” (Helgerson, 1996a, p. 69). As a result, Johnson had no experience with intelligence before his presidency. While he had served on two congressional military-related committees, namely the Naval Affairs Committee and the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee for Preparedness, there is little evidence that he gained intelligence experience during that time (Dallek, 1994).

In addition, the little experience that he did have was often “painful.” A plethora of examples reveal the President’s negative reactions to intelligence on Southeast Asia. Scholars argue that when intelligence failed to align with his policy, he often chose to ignore and disenfranchise his intelligence staff (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, pp. 7-8). Furthermore, when the president was not disagreeing with intelligence, he was often quickly bored. As Helms recalls:

I finally came to the conclusion that what I had to say I should get into the first 60, or at least 120 seconds, that I had on my feet. Because after that he was pushing buttons for coffee or Fresca, or talking to Rusk, or talking to McNamara, or whispering here or whispering there. I had lost my principal audience (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, p. 7).

Other evidence of his attitude includes his visceral reactions to unpleasant information, third-party reports, and his behavior both before and after the Six-Day War. For instance, after a
negative assessment of Vietnam left Johnson disturbed, he called for an additional briefing on March 27th, 1968. The president sat through the longest briefing in his career, which lasted over an hour. The briefing of C.I.A. analyst George Carver’ reiterated the grim prospects in Vietnam, providing extensive detail and holding nothing back. L.B.J.’s very unfavorable attitude was clear; the President interrupted the briefing numerous times, and when finished, he “rose like a roused pheasant and bolted from the room. By the time Johnson came charging back, George’s career expectations had faded away” (Helms & Hood, 2003, p. 332). While Carver continued to have a fruitful career at the C.I.A., the anecdote demonstrates the negative reaction Johnson had to disconfirming intelligence.

Although this example comes from the end of Johnson’s career, there are earlier examples too. William Colby, C.I.A. officer and future director, was surprised when Johnson “failed to engage [him] except to warn him not to spill coffee” when briefing him on exciting, new intelligence that “Kennedy would have loved” (Priess, 2017b, p. 43). Johnson also expressed “anger at the C.I.A.” for Vietnam estimates, and even yelled at his DCIs, “I’m sick and tired of John McCone’s tugging at my shirttails. If I want to see you, Raborn, I’ll telephone you!” (Priess, 2017b, pp. 50-51).

President Johnson also displayed negative attitudes towards other intelligence subjects. During the summer of 1967, shortly after the Six-Day War, racial unrest and anti-war sentiment swept through the country. The President was convinced that foreign adversaries were behind the turmoil, and not the increasingly poor prospects for Vietnam or racial inequities across the nation. As Helms later recalled, Johnson pleaded for information:

“Can’t you fellows find out what’s going on here? Look at these people in the streets; we can’t imagine that good Americans do things like this.” … He was very concerned about this, and I don’t think that anybody that was in National Security Council meetings with him had any doubt that he was very worried about what kind of foreign influence was in
the antiwar movement and was talking about it constantly and couldn’t understand why people couldn’t find the evidence (Helms, 1982b).

Despite I.C. evidence, Johnson continued to badger Helms and his officers for information. Finally, the research of the specially formed Special Operations Group’ appeared in an Office of Current Intelligence (O.C.I) report in November 1967. Needless to say, the I.C. found no evidence of foreign involvement in the peace movements, and, “Given President Johnson’s expectations, the conclusions of the paper must have been a crashing disappointment” (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, p. 16). These negative attitudes towards intelligence on foreign influence in the antiwar movement and Vietnam are in stark contrast to his receptiveness to intelligence on the Middle East Crisis. The examples demonstrate that Johnson had a propensity to dislike intelligence and display anger at his intelligence producer, in profound contrast to his attitude leading up to the Middle East Crisis.

Furthermore, his administration exhibited a very similar disposition towards intelligence in general. In his handwritten notes made during a Special Committee meeting, McGeorge Bundy, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, said that intelligence should, “Keep on top of political thinking without getting in the way of day to day business.” The comment is in line with Johnson’s metaphor of the policy cow and the C.I.A.’s “shit-smeared tail” knocking over the milk bucket. Indeed, the entire national security staff and L.B.J. himself were generally skeptical of the value of intelligence.

In sum, the experience and interest theories provide little analytical leverage in the case of Johnson’s favorable attitude towards intelligence during the Middle East Crisis. One cannot

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29 It is important to note that OCI is the same office that produced some intelligence on the Six-Day War, just five months earlier.
30 “National Security Council History,” Volume 7, Appendix I (1-3), LBJ Library. McGeorge Bundy was asked to assist in the Middle East Crisis.
explain the variation in the dependent variable (attitude towards intelligence) with a constant over time: experience and general interest. Both his limited experience and subsequent lack of interest suggest a president who wanted little to do with intelligence.

The second personality-based explanation for attitude is psychological. A recent study on intelligence success and failures found that an individual’s psychological pathologies determine their receptivity and attitudes towards intelligence (Bar-Joseph & McDermott, 2017). They argue that narcissists are less likely to learn from previous mistakes, and it is “possible to generalize from certain personality types to certain behaviors or outcomes” (Bar-Joseph & McDermott, 2017, p. 42). Following the logic of this theory, Johnson’s positive attitude towards the intelligence during the Six-Day War should be the result of previous failure and an open-minded personality emerging as a result of the errors. The data, however, do not lend credence to this theory.

First, while there were intelligence scandals prior to the Middle East Crisis (e.g. when Ramparts Magazine revealed C.I.A. involvement in student groups), there were no major intelligence failures that would have prompted learning, as Bar-Joseph and McDermott suggest would precede an intelligence success. For instance, the most notorious intelligence failure of the Johnson administration, the C.I.A.’s lack of warning of a large-scale Viet Cong attack, known as the “Tet Offensive,” occurred in early January 1968, several months after the Six-Day War (Wirtz, 1991).

Moreover, incidents during Kennedy’s presidency provide little analytical traction, due to Kennedy’s instructions to prevent Johnson from viewing sensitive intelligence. Johnson may have learned from other failures after the Arab-Israeli conflict, but this would not explain his positive attitude at the time. Second, learning – and therefore intelligence success – is
significantly mediated by personality, and one trait that researchers highlight is narcissism (Bar-Joseph & McDermott, 2017, pp. 45-48). Johnson was, by several measures, an extreme narcissist. In fact, a recent psychological study of all U.S. presidents found that L.B.J. ranked the highest on two narcissism indices (narcissistic personality disorder and grandiose narcissism) and fifth-highest on a third measure, vulnerable narcissism (Watts et al., 2013, p. 2385). Therefore, not only did a major intelligence failure not precede the Middle East Crisis, but even if one had, Johnson’s extreme narcissism would have significantly abated the learning process. In both cases, neither of the antecedents exist for the positive attitude and intelligence success during the crisis.

That being said, for the purposes of intellectual integrity, it is important to note that Bar-Joseph and McDermott address other factors in their theory. These include relative stakes and organizational culture. Still, no historical or empirical evidence suggests that relative stakes or organizational culture would have affected L.B.J.’s attitude in this case, as there is no evidence of organizational culture changing during the period of study. Stake is addressed later in the section on commitment. While their theory may provide explanatory power for other cases, it fails to do so here. Thus, personality-based explanations for Johnson’s attitude at the time provide little analytical leverage.

4.2.2 Proximity

As psychological theories do not provide sufficient explanatory power, I must explore other rationalizations for Johnson’s attitude towards intelligence leading up to the Middle East Crisis. One of the most prominent theories in intelligence related to receptivity is the proximity hypothesis. The proximity hypothesis contends that “greater distance between intelligence and
policy produces a more accurate but less influential product whereas greater closeness leads to increased influence but decreased accuracy” (Marrin, 2013, pp. 1-4). That is, the closer or stronger the relationship between the decision-maker and the intelligence producer, the more receptive the decision-maker will be to the intelligence. The hypothesis also claims that this information is more likely to be politicized. Marrin found that proximity does, in fact, increase the influence of intelligence on policymakers, but it does not lead to politicization (Marrin, 2009a). The implication here is that proximity improves and strengthens attitudes towards intelligence.

In this case, the proximity hypothesis suggests that if Johnson had had a close relationship with his intelligence staff, then his attitude towards intelligence would have been favorable. The evidence, however, does not support this conclusion. Johnson’s relationship with his DCIs was generally rather strained. While this may explain his attitude towards intelligence at other times, it does not provide any analytical traction during the Arab-Israeli Crisis because of his favorable attitude at that time. That is, the proximity hypothesis is probabilistic: a strong relationship between consumer and producer is more likely to result in a favorable attitude. The closeness of the relationship is necessary but not sufficient alone; and in this case, the relationship is weak, thereby reducing the likelihood of the proximity hypothesis’s causal mechanism in the period leading up to the Six-Day War.

First, Johnson’s relationship with D.C.I. McCone “gradually soured to the point where McCone found resignation preferable to being ignored,” and his successor, William Raborn, “never came close to reestablishing a strong voice for D.C.I. in the White House” (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, p. 2). In each case, there was little variation in intelligence or attitudes towards intelligence. When Helms replaced Raborn in the summer of 1966, the relationship between
intelligence producer and consumer remained strained. Helms recalled that, in the first month alone, there were two occasions in which the President “was very vociferous with me and I was very vociferous right back” (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, pp. 4-5). In fact, Johnson, who became increasingly paranoid as his policies on Vietnam failed, accused Helms of leaking to Joseph Alsop of the Washington Post (Helms & Hood, 2003, p. 292). As the Middle East Crisis began to unfold, Johnson’s relationship with Helms was very similar to those he had with Helms’ predecessors, and the president rarely heeded I.C. analyses or warnings. As Johnson had a favorable attitude towards the Middle East Crisis intelligence, and the relationship between the president and D.C.I.A. Helms remained strained, the proximity hypothesis is unlikely to explain his attitude: one cannot explain variation with a constant.

Furthermore, although Johnson’s relationship with Helms improved after the Six-Day War, the President’s attitude towards other intelligence topics did not seem to change, further demonstrating the lack of explanatory power of the proximity hypothesis. It is true that L.B.J. invited Helms to the informal Tuesday lunches and made him part of the inner circle; as the D.C.I.A. claims, “after the initial altercations his relationship with Johnson was excellent,” and, “once our relationship developed, I could not have asked for a more considerate chief and taskmaster than President Johnson” (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, p. 6; Helms & Hood, 2003, p. 295). Nonetheless, Johnson continued to have unfavorable attitudes towards intelligence on Vietnam and other topics. He blatantly disregarded with intelligence on the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; and while L.B.J. kept Helms “close at hand,” this did not seem to affect his attitude towards intelligence on numerous topics (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, pp. 8, 52-53).

In sum, President Johnson’s relationships with his DCIs are not sufficient to explain his
attitude towards intelligence. L.B.J.’s distrust of intelligence producers included Helms preceding the Six-Day Crisis; but the President’s attitude towards intelligence vastly improved following the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The proximity hypothesis suggests that an improved relationship will improve attitudes towards intelligence; yet the evidence shows that, while Johnson did respect Helms and the C.I.A. following the crisis, he repeatedly exhibited unfavorable attitudes towards intelligence topics concerning Vietnam and Czechoslovakia. Hence, the proximity hypothesis cannot explain variation in the dependent variable.

4.2.3 Threat

While the personality and the proximity hypotheses cannot explain Johnson’s attitude, a threat-based approach may provide more explanatory value. Threat may affect attitudes towards intelligence because, if state sovereignty or survival is not in peril, a policymaker may feel more relaxed and amenable towards intelligence on a particular topic. In the case of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the survival of the Soviet Union was at stake; and although various intelligence sources, both domestic and foreign, revealed Nazi plans to attack, Stalin stridently refused to consider the proposition until it was too late. As discussed in the previous chapter, low threat should theoretically lead to favorable attitudes towards intelligence topics, while high threats may lead to unfavorable attitudes.

For Johnson, the threat to U.S. interests and sovereignty in the Arab-Israeli crisis was relatively low. The C.I.A. assessments of the crisis and its preceding events argue that Arab and Soviet intentions were simply to give the United States a “black eye.” In other words, the

31 “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,” National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. II. No classification marking, LBJ Library. A handwritten “L” on the
Soviets did not want to escalate the conflict, but rather to test U.S. resolve and hurt its status internationally. Johnson never believed that U.S. stakes or Israeli sovereignty were truly threatened. He was sure that even if Israel were attacked, the smaller country would “whip the hell out of them.” Abba Eban, who came to the White House to plead for assistance, understood the U.S. vantage point rather well: “Here, the American risk was minimal. Israel was strong, resolute, and united … Lyndon Johnson’s perceptions were sharp enough to grasp all these implications” (Eban, 1992, p. 393). In this case, the threat hypothesis correctly predicts Johnson’s attitude towards the Middle East crisis intelligence. Johnson was relaxed in his conversations with Eban and uncharacteristically receptive to intelligence during the crisis. However, the causal relationship between threat and attitude is uncertain, as there are other circumstances in which the threat was low, but L.B.J.’s attitude remained unfavorable.

His attitudes towards intelligence on the Vietnam War and foreign involvement with anti-war protests and racial unrest, for example, were unfavorable, despite subjectively low levels of threat. The threat of Chinese or Soviet intervention was rather minimal; and while U.S. interests were at stake, this was not a matter of state survival. In each case, the threat to U.S. interests and survival were low, but L.B.J.’s attitude remained unfavorable.

Moreover, Johnson had unfavorable attitudes towards threatening topics. For example, he pointedly ignored intelligence on the impending Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. With containment foremost on Johnson’s foreign policy agenda, the Soviet invasion would be considered a significant blow to U.S. interests. This is in contrast to the Arab-Israeli War, when the Soviets just wanted to give the Americans a “black eye.” Although the threat was high, and the intelligence certain, Johnson’s attitude was unfavorable. In fact, the intelligence was so clear

memorandum indicates the President saw it. Also retrieved from: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61.
to Helms, and the D.C.I. so frustrated with Johnson’s dismissal, that Helms ensured the conversation with the President was recorded. The Director said, “You heard my comments about the Russians invading Czechoslovakia. I want to be sure they’re in the minutes” (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, p. 53).

Conversely, one could argue that, given Johnson inherited the Vietnam War from his predecessor, this conflict was a greater threat than possible regime change in Eastern Europe. In addition, given L.B.J.’s domestic focus, unrest at home was certainly a threat. If true, this would provide evidence for a correlation between threat and intelligence on the Vietnam War and domestic unrest. This contention, however, explains neither President Johnson’s favorable attitude in this case nor the causal relationship demonstrated by the C.A.T.I. Therefore, while the threat hypothesis does correctly predict Johnson’s favorable disposition towards the intelligence during the Arab-Israeli crisis, evidence in support of the purported causal mechanism connecting threat and policymaker attitudes is more ambiguous. L.B.J.’s unfavorable attitudes towards both low and high threat situations suggest a lack of casual logic in the theory. Indeed, the relationship between threat and attitude may be more complex than this section details. Nevertheless, the historical evidence reveals continually varying attitudes towards intelligence, inconsistent with variation in threat.

4.2.4 The Cognitive-Affective Theory of Intelligence (C.A.T.I.)

The C.A.T.I., unlike the previous explanations, can explain President Johnson’s attitude towards intelligence on the Middle East Crisis. Table 4-3 below (reproduced from Chapter 2) provides an overview of the variables in this case. The subsequent sections measure the level of
commitment, type of intelligence, and intelligence specificity; and together, they explain why Johnson had an uncharacteristically favorable attitude towards the intelligence at the time.

**Low Commitment**

Type of Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disconfirming</th>
<th>Confirmatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Specificity</td>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Specificity</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4-3: L.B.J. Case Hypothesis*

The evidence shows that Johnson received specific, confirmatory evidence when his political commitment was low, which, as expected, resulted in a favorable attitude towards the intelligence.

**4.2.4.1 Commitment**

As discussed in Chapter 3, commitment can have a strong effect on attitude. The literature includes five components of vested interest, or commitment, as this investigation describes it: stake, salience, certainty, immediacy, and self-efficacy. Overall, the data show that Johnson had a relatively low commitment to Israel and policies committing to Israeli defense. Although he had some emotional investment in Israel, there were multiple instances when the President and his administration sought to avoid or reinterpret previous U.S. commitments to
Israel in an attempt to buy time and diplomatic leverage. This section discusses each component of Johnson’s commitment to Israel and reaches the conclusion that Johnson had a low commitment to supporting Israel through either military or public announcements leading up to the Arab-Israeli Crisis.

At first glance, the statement made by President Johnson on May 23rd, 1967, evidenced a firm commitment to Israel and its defense. He stressed support for “political independence and territorial integrity of all nations.”32 However, upon closer inspection, L.B.J.’s response to Nasser’s closing of the Straits of Tiran epitomized the administration’s lack of commitment and was simply an attempt to buy time. On May 19th, as tensions began to rise, Prime Minister Eshkol sent a message to L.B.J. describing an “urgent need for [the] U.S. to reaffirm commitment to Israel’s security.”33 Three days later, on May 22nd, Johnson received a State Department memo including a compilation of past U.S. commitments to Israel.34 These commitments became a significant part of the President’s reading material, and he received the compilation again on May 23rd, May 25th, and May 26th.35

Notwithstanding this interest in past promises, Johnson and his administration did as much as possible to avoid making explicit commitments. A memorandum of conversation between Israeli and U.S. military leaders illustrated Israeli frustration: “General Geva indicated that despite the President’s commitments to closer cooperation with Israel in defense and intelligence fields, the Israelis were finding that these commitments were being construed

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33 “Middle East Crisis Chronological Guide, May 12- June 20.” Top Secret Trine, LBJ Library.
34 “Middle East Crisis Chronological Guide, May 12- June 20.” Top Secret Trine, LBJ Library.
35 “Memorandum for the President, Subject: Reference Documents on our Commitments to Israel.” National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Box 106, LBJ Library.
narrowly by those given the responsibility for carrying them out.”36 In addition, L.B.J. came under intense pressure from pro-Israel and American Jewish lobbyists. However, this domestic pressure was not sufficient to make Johnson commit to Israel and its defense; in fact, when White House aide John P. Roche delivered a statement to the pro-Israel lobbyists, the “noncommittal response” left the Israeli ambassador “on the verge of tears” (Dallek, 1998, p. 426). Privately, Johnson’s counsel also suggested limited commitment to Israel. When preparing for the Eban meeting on the afternoon of May 26th, Secretary McNamara suggested that the United States should think carefully about being tied down by its previous commitments. He suggested the country “stop short of endorsing all previously made commitments because ‘there is some pretty bad language in them.’”37 Even after the war began, the Johnson administration avoided specific commitments. On June 7th, McGeorge Bundy provided feedback on a draft statement to an upcoming U.N. Security Council meeting; he added an additional sentence at the beginning of the first paragraph which, which read, “[This] doesn’t commit anyone to anything and I think there will be a favorable response.”38 It is therefore clear at a broad level that Johnson and his administration sought to avoid commitment to Israel, despite previous public declarations. An examination of each component of commitment will provide further evidence.

The first component of commitment is stake, or the “Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to the attitude object” (Crano, 1995, p. 148). Crano (1995) further emphasizes that greater stake results in stronger attitudes, and ipso facto, lower stake results in a weaker attitude. Overall, Johnson’s stake in the Arab-Israeli Crisis was relatively low, and this

36 OASD Files: FRC 330 71 A 4919, 333, Israel. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on June 2, Washington National Records Center. The meeting was held at the Pentagon. A typed notation on the memorandum indicates Hoopes saw it.
38 “Note from McGeorge Bundy,” The President’s Appointment File [Diary Backup] 6/1/67-6/7/67, Box 67, LBJ Library.
aligns with his merely favorable—rather than an extremely favorable—attitude. President Johnson’s stake in the Middle East Crisis was low, as the United States’ commitment to Israel was strictly defined. American commitment to Israel was tacitly defined as being to, “prevent Israel from being destroyed and [to] stop aggression.”39 As intelligence unambiguously agreed that Israel would “whip the hell out of them” (Johnson’s words), the stakes were low for the President, who had known for some time that Israel was not in danger of being destroyed.

The second component of commitment is saliency, or relevance to the decision-maker’s goals. While Johnson had an emotional interest in Israel (he had met with Eban in Israel as a senator), his domestic goals (i.e., the “great society”) and his foreign policy goals in Vietnam demonstrate the low saliency of the Arab-Israeli crisis’ for him. This is evidenced by the President’s foreign policy discussions during the crisis. As Eban describes in his autobiography, the administration’s cautious interpretations of American commitments were the result of Johnson’s quagmire in Vietnam. He explains the diplomatic language used by the L.B.J.’ administration:

The difference between adopting courses oneself and supporting other measure is not trivial. It is the distinction between responsible initiative and mere “joining.” It was impossible to believe that the change was inadvertent … The conclusion was plain: the powers were giving a most cautious interpretation to their commitments … In his own country and especially in his own party, the Vietnam trauma had set up a reaction not only against the Vietnam war, but against the notion of commitment itself (Eban, 1977, p. 362).

Eban recognized that Vietnam was foremost on Johnson’s mind, despite the crisis. This was also reflected in diplomatic conversations with French and British ambassadors. On May 19th, the President met with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Special Assistant Walt Rostow, and White House Press Secretary George Christian to discuss contingency plans.

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for the Middle East. In the notes section for the meeting, however, Rostow states that there
“wasn’t much discussion about [the] contingency plan … the bulk of the discussion concerned Vietnam.” 40

Johnson’s deflection towards Vietnam reoccurred during the height of the crisis. On May 25th, a few days after Nasser’s closure of the Strait, L.B.J. flew to Lake Harrington, Canada, to meet with Prime Minister Pearson. While the Middle East Crisis was on the agenda, according to the memorandum of conversation, “the subject of Vietnam bulked the largest.” 41 An additional memorandum after the lunch meeting also described a discussion of Vietnam. 42 Therefore, there is significant evidence that even at the height of the Middle East Crisis, Johnson’s focus on Vietnam demonstrates the low saliency of the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

The third component of commitment is certainty, or confidence in the ramifications of action or inaction. While there is little evidence of how certain Johnson was about the consequences of his decision, Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and North Africa, provided some detail. During the afternoon meeting in preparation for Eban on May 26th, Johnson asked his advisors for their opinions. According to the memorandum for the record,

Mr. Battle summarized by saying: (1) whatever we do we are in trouble. If we fail to stand by Israel, the radical Arabs will paint us as a paper tiger. If we stand by Israel, we will damage ourselves seriously with all the Arabs. 43

41 “Draft Memorandum by Ambassador to Canada (Butterworth),” National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. V. Secret. Drafted on May 26, LBJ Library. The President met with Prime Minister Pearson and External Affairs Minister Martin at the Prime Minister’s summer residence at Lake Harrington, Quebec, following a visit to the Canadian Universal and International Exhibition (EXPO ‘67) in Montreal.
42 Ibid. Also see, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. V, LBJ Library.
43 “Memorandum for the Record. Subject: Meeting on the Arab-Israeli Crisis, May 26, 1:30pm,” National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret. Drafted on May 27, LBJ Library. Filed with a covering memorandum from Saunders to George Christian stating that he had dictated this draft from his notes and Christian could make additions or revisions before putting it in the President’s records.
In addition, Johnson’s comments about how Israel would “whip the hell out of them” indicate that he was certain about the probable outcome. Thus, there is some evidence that certainty was high. While this is unlikely to have had a strong impact on overall commitment, it is important to accurately measure each component of commitment.

The fourth aspect of commitment is *immediacy*. This is defined the time between potential action/inaction and its consequences. Overall, there is evidence that immediacy was low for Johnson during the crisis. During the preparation for the meeting with Eban on May 26th, Johnson repeatedly asked his advisors about timetables, as this would be particularly important if the administration were to buy time for an international solution to determine whether a naval escort by other maritime powers or a United Nations Security Council resolution was possible. The president asked two primary questions of General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the J.C.S.: whether either side would attack soon, and whether the United States should “make any military moves now.”

In both cases, General Wheeler answered that there was no indication that either would attack or make any military moves. Johnson himself, and his administration as a whole, were convinced that Israel was not in impending danger of an attack.

During the conversation with Eban a few hours later, the President claimed “that no military attack on Israel [was] imminent.” Moreover, speaking with his advisors and Eban, the President referred several times to the Egyptian’s defensive positions. Johnson indicated that Egyptian positions, although lined up on the border, were purely defensive in nature, thus reducing the immediacy of the situation.

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44 National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Miscellaneous Material. Top Secret. Drafted on May 27, LBJ Library. Filed with a covering memorandum from Saunders to George Christian stating that he had dictated this draft from his notes and Christian could make additions or revisions before putting it in the President’s records.

McNamara also described low immediacy. The Defense Secretary said, “he saw no ‘perishability’ in the situation as it stands except for the fact that Israel probably cannot sustain its mobilization for too long without economic cost.” This was the standing notion until two days before the attack, when an Israeli contact gave U.S. officials a clear signal. Therefore, the data suggest that Johnson and his advisors believed that the time between potential inaction and its consequences was rather short. Hence, immediacy during the Middle East Crisis was low.

The final component of commitment is *self-efficacy*, or the perception that the actions are within the capabilities of the decision-maker. There are several indicators of Johnson’s low self-efficacy during the crisis preceding the Six-Day War. First, following the closure of the Strait, Johnson expressed a strong desire to play the multilateral angle, despite recognizing the low likelihood of garnering support for the maritime escort or a U.N. resolution. The President was well aware that U.N. resolutions often failed, especially when Israel was involved. As a result, during the N.S.C. meeting on the Middle East, the President ordered General Wheeler to brief him on U.S. capability in the area. General Wheeler’s conclusion was that, “US capability [is] limited in [the] absence of [an] ASW [anti-submarine warfare] unit, which is two weeks away.” Moreover, U.S. military activity in the Middle East would likely raise tensions with the Soviet Union and hurt the U.S. assertion that it intended to stay out of the conflict. After the war broke out, the United States continued to communicate its distance from the conflict. In a telegram to King Hussein of Jordan, the U.S. embassy in Jordan claimed, “no Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers had been closer than 400 miles to Israel and no aircraft from Sixth Fleet carriers had flown closer than 300 miles to Israel or Sinai.” This lack of military capability, in conjunction with

46 Ibid.
Johnson’s repeated attempts to circumvent public commitment to Israel, is indicative of low self-efficacy. Overall, Johnson not only felt his options were limited preceding and throughout the conflict, but also fervently sought to avoid confrontation.

Further evidence of Johnson’s low self-efficacy is revealed by an examination of domestic political pressures. During both the preparation for meeting with Eban and the meeting itself, Johnson and his administration repeatedly mentioned the domestic political limitations of unilateral action. When Abe Fortas, associate Justice of the Supreme Court and Johnson’s advisor, suggested that the United States use “whatever force necessary to enforce” the passage of Israeli vessels, the President responded that “he did not believe he was in a position now to say that”, and, “we have the unanimous pressure of the Congress to try the UN and multilateral machinery.” On at least five separate occasions, Johnson or his officials discussed “Congress” or “congressional support” as a limiting factor. L.B.J. also emphasized the abundant domestic limitations during the meeting with Eban. He stressed the limits of U.S. force without congressional approval, saying, “We are fully aware of what three past Presidents have said but this is not worth five cents if the people and the Congress did not support the President.”

President Johnson named congressional support as a limiting factor at least five times throughout the meeting. While Eban was initially dismayed, upon reflection, he ultimately understood that Johnson lacked “the authority to put them [the other options] to work” (Eban, 1977, p. 362).

In summation, of the five components of commitment described in the psychology and attitudinal literature, four are measured here as low. The table below summarizes the components of commitment.

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Table 4-2: Johnson and the Middle East Crisis: Measurement of commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stake</td>
<td>Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to the attitude object</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saliency</td>
<td>Relevance to decision-makers goals</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainty</td>
<td>Confidence in the ramifications</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediacy</td>
<td>The time between potential action/inaction and consequences</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-efficacy</td>
<td>The perception that actions are within the capability of decision-maker</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although certainty was high, other components in the commitment illustrate that Johnson’s overall commitment to policy or action during the Middle East Crisis was relatively low. As a result, Johnson’s attitude towards the intelligence was not nearly as strong as it would have been had commitment been high. This is evidenced by his reaction to intelligence on subjects in which he had a high level of commitment, such as Vietnam.

4.2.4.2 Intelligence Specificity

While commitment was low, President Johnson received intelligence prior to and throughout the Six-Day War that was more specific and tactical than his typical intelligence material. The P.D.B.s Johnson read focused on “brevity and simplicity,” often providing short overviews of various topics (Priess, 2017b, p. 47). Conversely, the intelligence on the Middle East Crisis and Six-Day War was much more detailed. For instance, the “who will win” assessment, “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States,” not only included a general
assessment, but also contained an in-depth evaluation of Israeli and Arab morale. Moreover, the last page, although still mostly redacted, contains a table with selected armament and force estimates, including ground forces prior to and after mobilization and the number of tanks and anti-tank weapons. The President ultimately appreciated this level of detail (Robarge, 2005).

Despite his negative attitude towards intelligence on the Vietnam War, Johnson still requested specific intelligence. Helms recalled his request for studies on the number of people affected by U.S. bombing:

get me the following: the best estimate you have on how many people are pinned down by our bombing. They [presumably the M.A.C.V.] say 300,000 repairing railroads, bridges, and roads … Second, I want to see how they have to travel at night because of the problem created by cleaning up in the day … I want twenty examples of what it costs them when we bomb (Helms & Hood, 2003, pp. 339-340).

Johnson continued his requests for specific information, such as the number of truck drivers lost and the extent to which this had stiffened resolve against the United States. Hence, Johnson’s desire for specific intelligence was not limited to the Six-Day War, and during the period leading up to the Middle East Crisis, the information he received had the level of specificity he desired.

When the conflict between the Arabs and Israelis finally erupted, the P.D.B. began to include tactical military developments and updates. This included reports of Arab losses as a fraction of total forces on June 6th, Israeli commander locations on the banks of the Suez Canal and Red sea on June 9th; and tactical gains by the Israelis, including capturing “a town on the main highway 40 miles south of the Syrian capital” on June 10th. 51 As Priess observes, “This detailed attention to the war and its implications resonated with Johnson, who paid even more

attention to the intelligence after this crucial time” (Priess, 2017b, p. 54). In each case, it is clear that Johnson preferred specific intelligence, requesting studies and information with precise numbers. Although there is no evidence for this preference specifically during the pre-war crisis, Johnson demonstrated a clear preference for specifics. When he did receive such intelligence, as during the aforementioned Carver briefing, he often displayed an unfavorable attitude towards it. Hence, specificity is necessary but not sufficient to explain the President’s attitude towards intelligence at the time.

4.2.4.3 The Type of Intelligence

As detailed in Chapter 2, the type of intelligence concerns whether the information provided to the decision-maker aligns with their preconceived notions. Confirmatory intelligence is that which aligns with the policymaker’s previous beliefs, while disconfirming intelligence counters these views. The intelligence preceding the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 unequivocally predicted that Israel would win if war were to break out. Moreover, both “Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities” and its successor “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States” detail circumstances in which, even if Israel absorbed significant losses, it would still decisively defeat all attacking Arab nations. The intelligence estimate verified what Johnson and his administration had known for some time: Israel was unmatched in military strength.

In the months preceding the crisis, Johnson discussed military aid to Israel with his national security staff. The first discussion in March followed the disastrous Israeli raid on the Jordanian town of Samu and subsequent denouncement by the U.N. (the United States included). At the time, Johnson did not want the United States to send a signal to Israel that this behavior was acceptable; yet, several months later, the President decided to reexamine the issue. Fulfilling
Israel’s request for 200 armored personnel carriers was seen as a “serious mistake” by Defense Secretary McNamara:

I recognize our interest in the maintenance by Israel of an adequate deterrent against attack by any of its Arab neighbors, but the present and prospective military balance in the Middle East strongly favors Israel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently confirmed their view that Israel will be militarily unchallengeable by any combination of Arab states at least during the next five years. As presently trained and equipped, the armed forces of Israel are greatly superior in effectiveness and firepower to those of their potential opponents, individually or collectively.52

At the same time, Johnson was under immense pressure from Ambassador Goldberg to reconsider. Rather than completely rejecting McNamara’s recommendation and choosing to weather the political repercussions, Johnson compromised and agreed to send 100 armored personal carriers, along with spare parts, to Israel on May 23rd, 1967.53 Therefore, L.B.J. knew of Israel’s strong military position relative to its neighbors several months prior to the crisis. This also coincides with Eban’s comments about Johnson’s understanding of Israel’s geopolitical position in the region. As previously mentioned, Eban claimed that Johnson knew that Israel was “strong, resolute, and united” (Eban, 1992, p. 393). When coding the variable, it is clear that this intelligence was confirmatory: the intelligence predicting a decisive Israeli victory should war break out corresponded with Johnson’s existing knowledge of Israel’s capabilities.

While there is significant circumstantial evidence that the confirmatory intelligence was partially the cause of his favorable attitude, there is no direct evidence of this point. Very rarely do policymakers claim to accept something simply because it agrees with their previously held beliefs. That said, psychological studies have shown that this is indeed often the case (Klayman,
Policymakers, and people in general, tend to accept new information that appears to confirm their existing beliefs and eschew information that does not. For instance, the myriad examples of Johnson’s unfavorable attitude towards disconfirming intelligence lends further credibility to attitudinal theory:

Helms’s Agency again and again produced intelligence analyses that conflicted with the optimistic line the White House took on the progress of the [Vietnam] war. Johnson’s response was not to change course, but to ignore what his intelligence experts were telling him. As administration policy became more and more beleaguered, the White House decisionmaking [sic] process became an exceptionally closed one with discouraging intelligence reports and analyses excluded from any role in policymaking (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, p. 36).

It is possible that, even though Johnson was upset by the findings, he chose to use the intelligence. After Helms sent a memorandum to the President in November 1967 arguing that the costs of failure in Vietnam were manageable, L.B.J. ultimately rejected Westmoreland’s request for more troops and began to discuss the concept of negotiations. One may argue that, while President Johnson was upset by the intelligence, it still informed his decision making. Nevertheless, this did not change Johnson’s attitude towards the intelligence, which may have played a role in his future decision making. In other words, while attitude may affect decision-making, the causal path is less clear.

This also pertains to Johnson’s attitude towards the intelligence on racial unrest in the summer of 1967 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In each case, Johnson demonstrated a negative attitude towards disconfirming intelligence. Together, the historical record provides a strong argument for a favorable attitude towards the Middle East Crisis intelligence. As previously noted, the other theoretical explanations for L.B.J.’s attitude either have little analytical traction or are undermined by significant contradictory evidence. Thus, the
additional causal indicators provide strong support both for this argument and for a correlation between confirmatory intelligence and attitude.

4.3 Conclusion and Implications

This chapter explained why President Johnson had a favorable attitude towards intelligence leading up to the Six-Day War. While uncommitted to a policy direction, the President received specific intelligence that aligned with his preexisting notions. This resulted in his favorable attitude and may have influenced his decision not to intervene in the conflict. In other examinations of L.B.J.’s use (or lack thereof) of intelligence, the President is often seen to have displayed an unfavorable attitude towards the information. This chapter provided an interesting divergence from previous such examinations. Furthermore, it provided evidence for environmental and systemic causes of attitude towards intelligence, rather than personality, proximity, or threat-based reasons. If the findings of this case can be generalized across a variety of policymakers, we can begin to understand how and why these decisionmakers react as they do in particular circumstances.

Although other traditional theories have sought to explain why Johnson had such an uncharacteristically positive attitude towards intelligence preceding the Six-Day War, only the C.A.T.I. both predicts the outcome and explains his attitude at the time.
Table 4-1: Explanations for President Johnson’s Attitude Towards Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical claim</th>
<th>Outcome predicted?</th>
<th>Causal logic supported?</th>
<th>Attitude explained?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity hypothesis</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudinal Theory</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, Johnson’s attitude towards intelligence preceding the Six-Day War is significant for theory and practice. It demonstrates a circumstance in which a highly narcissistic policymaker had an anomalously favorable attitude towards intelligence. While this is not a perfect test, it is – to my knowledge – one of the first systematic attempts to examine the conditions under which intelligence is likely to be accepted or rejected. As many politicians and leaders in U.S. politics have strong personalities, the conclusions of this case are hopefully generalizable and able to shed light on other decision-makers.
Chapter 5: Intelligence and the Reagan Peace Plan

“Lebanon has got to be the strangest place in the world. Combat, terrorism, and destruction are all taking place in the same city where a man is putting up a new $50 million resort hotel while TV cameras depict fashion shows taking place; men and women sit around watching as they eat elaborate lunches under the high wall that surrounds the place, and the owner is very optimistic that his $50 million will be safe”

- Ronald Reagan

Ronald Reagan was elected president in November 1980 and sworn into office in January 1981, amid significant Cold War tensions. While scholars often focus on President Reagan’s role in the Cold War and his relationship with the Soviet Union, historians and students of intelligence frequently overlook his part in Middle East foreign policy. Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon in the 1980s provides an interesting case for scholars and intelligence practitioners alike.

In stark contrast to President Johnson (discussed in Chapter 4), Reagan arguably had extensive experience with intelligence preceding the crisis. He worked with the Army Air Corps’ intelligence unit to produce briefing films to pilots during World War II and participated in the Rockefeller Commission on C.I.A. activities in the mid-1970s (Dujmovic, 2013). Furthermore, he seemed to generally appreciate intelligence, writing in the margins and reading his material extensively (Dujmovic, 2013). Despite his history and overall positive attitude towards

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54 President Reagan’s concluding comments of a National Security Council meeting on April 30, 1981 (Saltoun-Ebin, 2014, p. 38).
intelligence, Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence on the Reagan Peace Plan in Lebanon was often unfavorable. As this chapter shows, this attitude was the result of his strong commitment to Lebanon’s stability, in combination with the specific, disconfirming intelligence he was receiving. As such, this case is consistent with the C.A.T.I.

5.1 Case Overview

This chapter progresses as follows. The first section provides the background for the case, providing context for empirical testing. Here, I briefly discuss the situation in Lebanon from the civil war in the mid-1970s until U.S. withdrawal in February 1984. I then present an overview of the intelligence Reagan received during the formation of his peace plan and during the period of U.S. presence in the country. The subsequent section examines Reagan’s attitude towards these intelligence pieces on Lebanon and considers why the President developed this stance. In addition, I supplement the content and textual analysis with a counterfactual analysis to bolster the claims. I then examine the three most plausible explanations in the literature, finding these theories provide little analytical leverage. The C.A.T.I., however, is found to explain the President’s attitude towards intelligence. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the implications for the theory and practice of intelligence.

5.1.1 The Situation

In 1975, Lebanon was in the midst of a civil war. The war, with both religious and political dimensions, was exacerbated by significant demographic shifts, as Palestinian refugees flooded into the country. Christian and Muslim militias clashed, while the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (P.L.O.) joined the fray, attacking Israel from across the border. In the summer of 1976, Syria invaded Lebanon, hoping to maintain its influence in the country. In 1978, the U.N. sent peacekeepers to Lebanon under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (U.N.I.F.I.L.) to confirm the withdrawal of Israel, which had invaded five days before, all to little avail.

In 1980, Bachir Gemayel managed to unite the multitude of Christian militias in the country under the banner of the Lebanese Forces. Meanwhile, the P.L.O. and Israel continued to clash, until U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib brokered a ceasefire in 1981. The ceasefire, however, was short-lived, due to an assassination attempt on Israeli Ambassador to the UK Shlomo Argov by members of the Abu Nidal organization, a Palestinian splinter group. Israel eventually used the attack to justify a full-scale invasion of southern Lebanon in early June 1982.

Several months later, in August 1982, the Lebanese government, facing occupation by two foreign militaries and experiencing a multifaceted civil war, formally requested a multinational force (M.N.F.) to provide stability. By the end of August, U.S., French, and Italian troops were assisting with the evacuation of P.L.O. and Syrian forces from Beirut’s port. On September 1st, Reagan touted the smooth evacuation of hostile forces from Beirut and the Marines boarded their respective ships to leave.

The victory was fleeting, as Lebanese President Bachir Gemayel was assassinated just a few weeks later on September 14th, 1982. In retribution for the murder, Phalangists (a party of Maronite Christians) entered a Palestinian refugee camp and massacred hundreds of civilians. The Sabra and Shatila Massacre shocked the world’s conscience; and on September 20th, Reagan pledged to form a new M.N.F. In the summer of 1982, Amin Gemayel, Bachir’s Gemayel brother, was elected as president of Lebanon.

On September 29th, 1982, a new M.N.F. consisting of approximately 1,200 troops arrived
in Lebanon. Less than a month later, on October 28\textsuperscript{th}, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (N.S.D.D.) 64, laying out the plan of the U.S. government to facilitate the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. Throughout its tour, the M.N.F. was constantly under fire by various militias. The conflict was further punctuated by the bombing of the U.S. embassy by the Islamic Jihad Organization (a precursor to Hezbollah) in April 1983; the Marine Barracks Bombings in October 1983; and the kidnapping, torture, and murder of C.I.A. Chief of Station William Buckley.

Tensions continued to rise in late 1983, as French forces bombed Iranian assets in Lebanon, while Syrian and other militia batteries shelled U.S. forces. On October 28\textsuperscript{th}, 1983, five days after the barracks bombings, Reagan signed N.S.D.D. 111, which expanded the rules of engagement (RoE) for troops to promote “aggressive self-defense.” In December 1983, the U.S. and Syrian forces continued to exchange fire, and the U.S.S New Jersey fired its guns on Syrian positions. Finally, in early 1984, Reagan ordered the Marines to exit the country, following pressure from U.S. congressional leaders. By February 7\textsuperscript{th}, 1984, all Marines had left Lebanon (with the exception of a small protection force for embassy security and training). Despite the best efforts of the United States, Israel’s withdrawal was not complete until 2000, and Syrian forces did not leave the country until 2005.

5.1.2 The Intelligence

In the early 1980s, President Reagan and his administration were convinced that Lebanon was the lynchpin of the Middle East (Kennedy & Brunetta, 1988). Reagan hoped that U.S. leadership and presence in Lebanon would end the civil war and lead to the expulsion of foreign powers from the country. This would, in turn, bolster U.S. influence in the Middle East,
providing a victory over the Soviet Union in the area and stabilizing the region. If the problems in Lebanon were resolved, the world would finally know peace in the Middle East. How this mission would be completed, however, was a more controversial question. While the opinions of Reagan and his advisors varied, the intelligence view of Lebanon in the early 1980s was clear. As one D.I.A. official put it,

There was a very unusual unanimity of opinion on the realities of Lebanon and the costs of being involved there … Usually there’s a tendency in the intelligence coordination process – among C.I.A., D.I.A., I.N.R. – to soften judgments. With Lebanon, there was a tendency to make it even harder, even alarmist, to point out to policymakers – hard over, up front, early on – that this is a real can of worms (Kennedy & Brunetta, 1988, p. 42).

This chapter focuses on two sources of intelligence that President Reagan received. The first is intelligence assessments, including an S.N.I.E., an interagency assessment, and other pieces of analysis. For example, S.N.I.E. 36.4-83, or Prospects for Lebanon, provides a thorough and particularly bleak picture of Lebanon at the time. The second source of intelligence I examine is the N.S.C. memorandums, briefings, and talking points by N.S.C. staff. These documents provide a deeper understanding of Reagan’s real-time response to intelligence. The minutes of N.S.C. meetings include Reagan’s comments on the intelligence and the overall situation he was facing. The intelligence products and briefings that I analyze were produced between 1981 and 1984, the period between Reagan’s planning of his peace initiative and U.S. withdrawal from the country.

Due to classification laws, most P.D.B. products remain classified at the current time. This is particularly unfortunate because Reagan was known to write notes on his briefing packages, although not as frequently as President Jimmy Carter. Reagan’s writing on the P.D.B. could constitute a unique source of information from which to gauge his attitudes towards intelligence. For example, in Chapter 6, Carter’s attitude is conveniently scrawled on the top of
the page: “this conclusion is absurd.” While this lack of access is a limiting factor, there are some points that mitigate this issue. First, while access to the declassified P.D.B.s would enable a more refined analysis, we can still approximate a value for Reagan’s attitude towards the intelligence (D.V.). Moreover, the fact that Reagan frequently wrote notes in the margins is indicative of a President who was engaged with intelligence products and took them seriously.

Another limiting factor is that the S.N.I.E. was written in October 1983, only months before U.S. withdrawal. Some analysts claim the delay was due to extreme reluctance by policymakers and the inability of the N.S.C. to recognize the severity of the situation in Lebanon (Kennedy & Brunetta, 1988). Variable measurement may be challenging because the “premier” product of the I.C. on the topic was not sent out until commitment was high, thereby problematizing the measurement of attitudes over time. Nevertheless, the available C.I.A. products and N.S.C. briefings are sufficient for analysis, as Reagan often mentioned intelligence and N.S.C. meetings in his diaries and many N.S.C. talking points and minutes are currently declassified. A textual analysis of the President’s diary entries from 1981-1984 has revealed that more than 10% of his entries mention N.S.C. meetings and almost 18% refer to Lebanon.55 This illustrates how often Lebanon was on the President’s mind. In comparison, the Soviet Union is mentioned in approximately 23% of the entries in the same timeframe.56 Therefore, while there are issues with data collection, the data available is enough to gauge Reagan’s likely attitude.

This chapter shows that Reagan received specific, disconfirming intelligence while strongly committed to his peace initiative. On several occasions, the President requested more

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55 President Reagan recorded daily entries in his diary during the eight years of his presidency; the substance of his writing varied from national security topics to personal reflections. Douglas Brinkley compiled and edited the entries (Brinkley, 2007). There are 804 diary entries from 1981-1984. The analysis only included days that had a written account in them. Ninety-two included “N.S.C.” and one hundred forty-two included “Lebanon” or “Beirut”.

56 This includes 186 of the 804 diary entries during that period; includes the words “Soviet,” “Moscow,” or “Russia.”
tactical, specific information on which to base policy and military decisions. As a result of these products and briefings, Reagan often displayed an unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence he received on Lebanon.

5.1.3 The Attitude

Overall, Reagan displayed an unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon and frequently a very unfavorable attitude. Third-party reports from his cabinet and advisors, diary entries, and sentiment analysis provide insight into Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence on his peace initiative in Lebanon. This section assesses his words, physical manifestations, and behaviors to accurately measure this attitude.

5.1.3.1 Words

Reagan’s words provide some information about his attitude. A content analysis of Reagan’s diaries is particularly useful for primarily two reasons. First, Reagan often commented on intelligence and national security concerns. As previously mentioned, during the time in which the United States was involved in Lebanon, the President discussed the N.S.C. and Lebanon in 10% and 18% of all his entries, respectively. Second, the diary provides an additional window into his attitude at the time. While reactions in memoirs and other primary-source documents are useful, the President’s reaction in his own words, written shortly after the event, is invaluable.

To understand the context of his diary entries, I performed a sentiment analysis in R. After data cleaning, the spreadsheet had two columns: one for the date and the other for the text of the diary entry. I used the sentiments dataset from the tidytext package to download the
“Bing” lexicon. This dictionary provides binary positive and negative sentiment values for each word in the entry (Hu & Liu, 2004). The analysis subtracted the negative sentiments from the positive to provide a total score for that diary entry. For example, on April 29th, 1981, Reagan’s entry is as follows:

Again spent morning in the office – returned to residence for lunch & nap. I must be getting better – my naps are getting shorter. We had a Nat. Security Council briefing (meeting tomorrow). Several situations in the world are worsening – particularly Lebanon. Donn Moomaw came by & also the Ted Cummings. Recv’d. word that Jules Stein died last night. That is truly the end of an era (Brinkley, 2007, p. 16).

The analysis looks at each word and compares it to the positive or negative value in the Bing lexicon. The overall sentiment for this entry is -2. This sentiment analysis allows us to apply psychological measures to Reagan’s writing.

I reviewed all 804 diary entries for 1981-1984. Of those entries, 142 were related to Lebanon. This timeline was selected as it lines up with the beginning and end of U.S. involvement in the country. The results of the analysis reveal that, on average, sentiment for entries mentioning Lebanon are negative (-.67), and lower than the average sentiment for all data entries during that period (-.25). The graph below shows the total sentiment per month for entries mentioning Lebanon. The y-axis represents Reagan’s net sentiment for the month. Thus, a negative sentiment for the month means that more negative than positive words were used in the relevant entries.
The graph illustrates the events in Lebanon through Reagan’s words. The dip in August and September 1982 marks the failure of the Habib negotiations in early August and the Sabra and Shatila Massacre. The other low sentiments are in April and October 1983, the dates of the two terrorist attacks on the embassy and Marine barracks, respectively. This graph, however, provides little information about Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence. For this, a more in-depth analysis provides more context. For example, in early August 1982, Philip Habib was in the Middle East attempting shuttle diplomacy to secure the P.L.O. extraction from Beirut. The negotiations were repeatedly disrupted by Israeli and Palestinian fire.
Reagan received cables from Habib and intelligence reports of the increased fire. During this time, he described himself as “angry” and “severe.” The N.S.C. meetings also show that Reagan had a very unfavorable attitude. On August 4th, 1982, after receiving a report from Secretary of State Shultz on the condition of negotiations and the war, Reagan closed the meeting by saying, “I’m getting extremely tired of a war whose symbol has become a burn baby with no arms” (Saltoun-Ebin, 2014, pp. 194-195). While this provides us with more information about his attitude towards Lebanon, it does not give causal proof that the attitude was the result of intelligence.

Later in the war, Reagan’s diary entries continue to provide insight into his attitude. After the embassy bombings in April 1983, he described his N.S.C. briefing as “unpleasant.” When intelligence continued to pour in about the perpetrators, the president responded angrily: “Awakened with word a car bomb did great damage to our embassy in Beirut – killed scores of people including 5 of our Marine guard detail. First word is that Iranian Shiites did it – d--n them” (Brinkley, 2007, p. 145). For Reagan, “damn” was a curse word (he censored this
himself), indicative of a very unfavorable attitude. While the wording may reflect his attitude towards the situation in Lebanon itself, his reactions often occurred immediately after an intelligence report or N.S.C. briefing and thus provide evidence of his attitude towards intelligence. His diary entries often specify when the N.S.C. meeting or briefing occurred. In summary, Reagan’s words indicate that his attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon was often very unfavorable.

To bolster my claims, I also employ a counterfactual analysis of each indicator of Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence. For this, one needs to ask the following question: what verbal indicators should we expect to observe if Regan’s attitude towards the intelligence was positive, even while his attitude towards the situation was negative? If we do not observe these indicators, this would provide further evidence that his attitude was towards the intelligence, and not simply a result of the situation. As detailed in Chapter 3, the verbal indicators of a favorable attitude towards intelligence include words of agreement, approval, contentment, gratification, appreciation, and so on. One would expect to see some of these indicators if President Reagan’s attitude towards the intelligence were favorable, even if his attitude towards the situation were not. In fact, we do not observe these verbal favorable indicators towards the intelligence in this case.

That said, Reagan does display a favorable attitude towards intelligence in other circumstances, even when his attitude towards the respective situations is negative. For instance, on February 11th, 1981, the President detailed an intelligence briefing that he received on Soviet arms shipments to El Salvador, stating, “We have absolute proof of Soviet & Cuban activity in delivering arms to rebels in El Salvador.” Reagan displayed an unfavorable attitude to the situation, claiming in the same entry that, the Soviets and their allies had “succeeded in raising
riots & demonstrations in Europe & the U.S.” Nevertheless, he referred to this intelligence briefing as a “high spot,” denoting an enjoyable or significant part of his day (Brinkley, 2007, p. 4). As the counterfactual logic illustrates, Reagan exhibited favorable attitudes towards intelligence, alongside an unfavorable stance on the situation. Furthermore, as the President did not manifest the verbal indicators of a favorable attitude towards the intelligence in the case of Lebanon, this provides further evidence for the C.A.T.I.

5.1.3.2 Physical indicators

While there are few examples of physical indicators of Reagan’s attitudes towards intelligence on Lebanon, there was one instance in which the President displayed a very unfavorable attitude. During the aforementioned negotiations between the P.L.O. and Israel, another massive shelling of Beirut followed by multiple airstrikes threatened to end the peace talks once again. On the morning of August 12th, 1982, Habib cabled Shultz in an attempt to persuade the Israelis to stop their attacks. Habib and Shultz were convinced that the P.L.O. would believe the negotiations were a sham intended to corner the organization (Shultz, 1993, pp. 69-70).

Concerned that the reputation of the United States was at stake, Shultz hustled over to the White House to give his report. Shultz described the President as “visibly angry,” and furiously trying to reach Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (Shultz, 1993, p. 70). At 11:05 am, Reagan discovered that Begin was in a cabinet meeting and he sent a cable to the prime minister in the “harshest tone possible” (Shultz, 1993, p. 70). Finally, when the president was able to get in touch with Begin, his rage continued. As Shultz records, “President Reagan’s anger must have come through on the telephone. Such anger, particularly towards the Israelis, was rare for Ronald Reagan” (Shultz, 1993, p. 71). This rare bout of anger from a normally reserved president (who
had shown significant support for Israel in the past) provides further evidence of his attitude towards intelligence. Nevertheless, it is possible the attitude object in this particular situation is Israel; that said, again, the attitude displayed follows intelligence reporting from Secretary Shultz. Furthermore, while it is feasible that the unfavorable attitude was the result of the deteriorating situation, there is reason to believe that the C.A.T.I. has merit here. As with other studies in social science, uneven evidence is problematic, but common. Although there is a relative paucity of evidence due to Reagan’s style, classification issues, recordkeeping, and so on, the proof inferred aligns with the predictions of the C.A.T.I. Given the measures of the independent (intelligence type and specificity) and conditioning (commitment) variables in the later sections, the C.A.T.I. correctly predicts Reagan’s attitude. Moreover, a counterfactual analysis provides further evidence of the C.A.T.I.’s explanatory power in this case.

A counterfactual analysis of the physical indicators would ask the following question: what physical indicators would we observe if Regan’s attitude towards the intelligence were positive, even if his attitude towards this situation were negative? Thus, if these indicators were not present, this would provide further evidence that the attitude were towards the intelligence, and not simply the situation. The physical indicators of a favorable attitude towards intelligence include distinct facial features such as smiling, calm, and relaxation and expressions of optimism, amusement, and positivity. If the attitude towards the situation differed from the attitude towards the intelligence, we would expect to see some of these indicators towards the intelligence, even while his attitude towards the situation were unfavorable. For example, Reagan showed a favorable attitude towards intelligence on the Soviet Space Program, alongside an unfavorable attitude towards the situation. On October 14th, 1982, Reagan wrote in his diary that he “saw a 20 min. C.I.A. movie on the Soviet Space Prog[ram]. They are much further ahead
than most people realize and their main effort has been military” (Brinkley, 2007, pp. 105-106). While upset with the situation, Reagan “indicated how much he appreciated” the intelligence on the subject (Dujmovic, 2013, p. 17). Reagan also described the intelligence films produced by the C.I.A. as “good preparation,” despite featuring some of his “unfavorable actor[s],” such as Libya’s dictator, Muammar Gaddafi (Brinkley, 2007, p. 392; Dujmovic, 2013).

Similarly, other policymakers have shown favorable attitudes towards intelligence even when their attitudes towards the situations were poor. In Chapter 2, there was the example of President Gerald Ford exhibiting a favorable attitude towards a C.I.A. briefing, despite being “distressed by the news” of the Mayaguez’s capture by communist forces (Helgerson, 1996a, p. 81). Therefore, Reagan did not demonstrate physical indicators of a favorable attitude towards the intelligence, which provides further evidence for the C.A.T.I. in this case.

5.1.3.3 Behaviors

There is also behavioral evidence of Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon. Someone with a very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence would be extremely resistant to new information, express powerful negative emotions about it, and/or blame others for failures and missteps (see Chapter 2). One example of Reagan’s resistance to new information occurred during an in-flight briefing in January 1981. After the President had meticulously studied an extensive intelligence report on Palestinian groups, including the P.L.O., it became clear that this information had done little to change his preconceived notions. These suspicions were confirmed when, after finishing his reading, the President said, “But they are all terrorists, aren’t they?” (Priess, 2017b, p. 133). As Priess (2017b) contends, Reagan’s statement only confirmed the briefer’s growing concern that the intelligence had failed to “expand” the President’s view. The statement is indicative of Reagan’s refusal to address the nuance in the political climate, further
illustrating his resistance to new information. Although the President spent ten minutes reading the intelligence report, the analysts found his thoughts on the subject to be “firm and fixed.”

As with the previous indicators, a counterfactual analysis would provide additional evidence that the attitudes observed in this case concerned the intelligence and not the situation. Hypothetically, if Reagan’s attitude towards the intelligence were favorable but his attitude towards the situation were unfavorable, we would still expect the following behavioral indicators: receptivity to new information and change and expressions of approval, gratification, affirmation, or agreement. That said, Reagan evidently did not display these behavioral indicators in this case. In fact, we observe the opposite: Reagan demonstrated a lack of receptivity to the intelligence. As such, the counterfactual logic provides substantiation for the C.A.T.I., indicating that the attitude was towards the situation itself.

In sum, the verbal, physical, and behavioral indicators of Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence provide evidence of a very unfavorable stance. While concerns remain about the extent to which the data speak to my dependent variable (attitudes towards intelligence), counterfactual analysis of the verbal, physical, and behavioral indicators provides further evidence for my theory. In the next section, I test the intelligence literature’s three most plausible reasons for this attitude to explain the president’s reaction. Ultimately, existing theories provide little value, and the C.A.T.I. provides the most analytical leverage.

5.2 Theoretical Assessment of Explanations

In this section, I assess the empirical validity of three explanations for Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence: personality, proximity, and threat. After evaluating the evidence for each, I
then test the C.A.T.I., concluding that this model provides more analytical leverage than the other theories.

5.2.1 Personality

Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon may have been the result of his personality. As such, I explore two factors that the literature indicates may have affected his attitude towards intelligence. As previously mentioned, some research in intelligence studies suggests that a decision-maker’s attitudes towards intelligence may be affected by their knowledge of intelligence capabilities (Andrew, 1995; Preston, 2012, p. 53). If this theory has merit, the evidence should show that previous intelligence experience or interest theoretically lead to favorable attitudes. This, however, is not the case for Lebanon. As I demonstrate, unlike President Johnson, Reagan had extensive experience and interest in intelligence, both preceding and throughout his presidency. As the theory chapter discussed, a policymaker with experience or interest in intelligence is more likely to develop a favorable attitude towards the intelligence, and vice versa. Thus, if experience and interest were the primary drivers of Reagan’s unfavorable attitude towards intelligence in Lebanon, we would expect to see a lack of experience and interest in the intelligence discipline. The historical record, however, does not support this notion.

Reagan’s experience with intelligence began with his film work during World War II. His work with the Army Air Corps’ intelligence unit provided him with direct experience in intelligence analysis and production:

The intelligence unit to which Reagan was assigned used prewar photographs and intelligence reports to construct large scale models of targets, over which a moving camera would film; Reagan would then record a narration telling the pilots and
bombardiers what they were seeing and when to release their payloads (Dujmovic, 2013, p. 10).57

Reagan, therefore, had some level of familiarity with the production and processing of operational intelligence. Moreover, years later, as governor of California, Reagan acquired a “Q” clearance for his oversight duties at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This is the Department of Energy equivalent of a “Top Secret” clearance in the Department of Defense (DoD). Holders of security clearance receive limited training and obtain experience with classified materials, including intelligence. The final pre-presidential experience Reagan had was in 1975, with the Rockefeller Commission on C.I.A. Activities within the United States. The Rockefeller Commission was created by Carter to investigate alleged illegal spying on domestic targets during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Through those meetings, “Reagan was well grounded on both the fundamentals and specifics of C.I.A.’s missions, activities, and responsibilities as well as its organization, oversight, and legal and regulatory constraints” (Dujmovic, 2013, p. 13). While Reagan’s experience with intelligence may reflect his interest in the subject, more evidence is required from this period of his presidency to reach a conclusion.

Overall, Reagan expressed substantial interest in intelligence during his presidency. For instance, on topics such as the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet Union, analysts claimed that, “he absorbed whatever raw and finished intelligence we were able to offer on the subject” (Kerr & Davis, 1997, p. 54). In addition to acute, timely issues, Reagan read the P.D.B. daily, referring in his diaries to intelligence and reading material as his “homework.” Richard Allen, National Security Advisor from January 1981 to January 1982, claimed that he read the P.D.B. nearly every day. In fact, the P.D.B. was so integral to President Reagan’s daily work that his advisor, George Shultz, who vehemently disliked the intelligence apparatus, read the P.D.B. because he

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57 Also see: (Andrew, 1995, pp. 457-458).
knew it had Reagan’s attention (Dujmovic, 2013; Shultz, 1993, p. 864).

Finally, there is some evidence that President Reagan also read intelligence in addition to the P.D.B. and high-level assessments. For example, several Bureau of Intelligence and Research (I.N.R.) *Morning Summaries* from December 1983 are marked with the President’s initials, “RR.” The Executive Secretariat Box at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library contains I.N.R. morning Summaries from November and December 1983. At the time of data collection, seven related to Lebanon are fully or partially declassified, and each has Reagan’s initials on the right-hand side:

![Signed I.N.R. Morning Summary](image)

Figure 5-3: Signed I.N.R. *Morning Summary*

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58 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Morning Summary,” Executive Secretariat, NSC: Agency File: Records RAC Box 8, 9, Ronald Reagan Library.
Although this box contains a small fraction of the I.N.R. summaries during the Reagan administration, it is still significant that Reagan read intelligence reports outside of the “flagship” publications (i.e., S.N.I.E. and P.D.B.).

Given Reagan’s extensive experience with intelligence both preceding his presidency and throughout it, one would expect him to have a more favorable attitude towards it. Moreover, analysts, cabinet members, and others recognized Reagan as a voracious reader of intelligence and his diary entries repeatedly mentioned the “homework” he had to complete. Nonetheless, Reagan’s very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon indicates that personality- and experience-based factors cannot explain the deviation in my dependent variable. The President’s disparate attitude towards intelligence in the case of Lebanon further illustrates this point.

Finally, a narcissistic personality may have altered Reagan’s attitude because, as the literature has shown, narcissism can affect attitudes (Rhodewalt & Peterson, 2009). That said, in stark contrast to Johnson, as described in the previous chapter, Reagan did not score highly on the measures of narcissism. In a ranking of all U.S. presidents, he was 16th for narcissistic personality disorder, 15th for grandiose narcissism, and 40th for vulnerable narcissism (Rhodewalt & Peterson, 2009, p. 2385). While narcissism can result in unfavorable attitudes towards intelligence if it is disconfirming, Reagan did not exhibit narcissistic tendencies. It is therefore unlikely that narcissism is the causal mechanism for Reagan’s attitude towards the intelligence in this case.
5.2.2 Proximity

As personality-based theories cannot explain Reagan’s attitude, I must explore other possibilities. The implications of the proximity hypothesis, a prominent theory in the intelligence literature, suggest that relationships between consumers and intelligence producers can explain attitudes towards intelligence (Marrin, 2013, pp. 1-4). A prediction in accordance with this theory would be that Reagan’s very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence was the result of a strained relationship with his advisors and intelligence producers. However, this section demonstrates that Reagan’s relationship with his intelligence professionals was rather positive, indicating that proximity theory has little analytical traction in this case.

Here, I briefly examine Reagan’s relationship with two administration officials: C.I.A. Director William Casey and National Security Advisor William Clark (January 1982-October 1983). Various descriptions of Casey’s relationship with President Reagan range from professional to extremely close and personal; with the truth more likely to be the former, as supported by evidence from foreign administration officials and Reagan himself. Reagan’s Deputy D.C.I., Robert Gates, wrote,

I always believed that Bill Casey’s closeness to Ronald Reagan was exaggerated. I think the relationship was closest in the first months of the administration, while there was still a genuine sense of gratitude on Reagan’s part for Casey’s management of the presidential campaign … Over time, however, their contacts grew less frequent (Gates, 2011, p. 218).

59 Reagan did have two other National Security Advisors, Richard Allen and Robert McFarlane, when the US was involved in Lebanon. I will, however, only focus on Clark. This is because most of the analysis I conduct is during Clark’s tenure. In addition, Richard Allen only served for a few months as he was caught in a bribery scandal and resigned shortly after. Robert (Bud) McFarlane also resigned in the midst of a scandal, but there is a evidence he and Reagan had a favorable relationship. Namely, Reagan appointed McFarlane to several positions of increasing rank over the years; first to Counselor to the Department of State, then Deputy National Security Advisor, then Special Representative in the Middles East, and finally National Security Advisor (Reagan, 1990). This does not match Reagan’s unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence.
Although their contact grew increasingly infrequent, there is no evidence that this is the result of a growing distance between the two.

This account fits with Reagan’s words and behaviors. Early in his presidency, Reagan wrote in his diary that, “I believe we are getting back on track with a proper approach to intelligence under Bill Casey” (Brinkley, 2007, p. 7). However, analyses of Casey’s meetings with the president revealed that he did not meet with his spymaster as often as one may think. In 1981, Casey met with Reagan alone just four times and had six phone conversations with him (Dujmovic, 2013, p. 20). In 1982, the D.C.I.A. met with Reagan 54 times in large group settings (e.g., N.S.C.), five times in smaller groups, and only three times alone; and these numbers did not change dramatically in 1983. While this appears to align with the proximity hypothesis, there is evidence to the contrary. Specifically, Reagan maintained a positive relationship with his friend during and after the Lebanon debacle. For example, when the D.C.I. was diagnosed with cancer, Reagan commented on the issues in the C.I.A. caused by his absence and even offered him a cabinet position if he did not sufficiently recover to take his old post (Reagan, 1990, pp. 535-536). Therefore, Casey’s relationship with Reagan, although not particularly close, was clearly not nearly as strained as the predictions of the proximity hypothesis would suggest. As Dujmovic (2013) neatly summarizes, “Contrary to the conventional wisdom at C.I.A., it does not appear that the Agency’s fortunes and influence during the Reagan administration rested entirely or even mostly on a close personal relationship between the D.C.I. and the President.”

The president’s relationship with his National Security Advisor William Clark (also known as “Judge”) similarly cannot explain Reagan’s attitude. Clark’s relationship with Reagan was incredibly close, dating back to the 1960s when Clark became then-Governor Reagan’s Executive Secretary. They had a common love of ranching, and Clark followed Reagan to
Washington DC when he won the election in 1980. In public addresses, Reagan referred to Judge as “one of [his] most trusted and valued advisors.” Privately, his friend’s influence was so profound that the White House staff referred to him as Uncle Bill, and Reagan’s biographer claimed that Reagan “regarded Clark as a brother” (Kengor & Doerner, 2007, pp. 15, 71). Clark himself said that the relationship was so close that they did not require verbal communication to know what the other was thinking (Kengor & Doerner, 2007).

Although Clark’s remarkably strong relationship with Reagan may explain the president’s attitude towards intelligence on other topics, there is insufficient evidence in this case to make this claim. Thus, Reagan’s very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon does not reflect his relationships with the D.C.I.A. or his National Security Advisor, respectively. As the proximity hypothesis cannot explain his attitude, we must examine other theories.

5.2.3 Threat

As neither the personality nor the proximity hypotheses can explain Reagan’s attitude, a threat-based approach may be more helpful. As discussed in the previous chapter, threat may affect attitudes towards intelligence, with low threat theoretically leading to favorable attitudes and high threat to unfavorable attitudes. While Reagan considered Lebanon the cornerstone of his Middle East policy, there is considerable evidence that the threat to U.S. interests was relatively low. This is evidenced by U.S. perceptions of Soviet intentions in the region. Overall, it was clear to American officials and to President Reagan that the Soviets had no intention of interfering militarily with the United States in Lebanon.

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For instance, shortly after the Israeli invasion in early June 1982, President Reagan sent a message to Leonid Brezhnev, leader of the Soviet Union, detailing the U.S. efforts to broker a ceasefire through Habib. On June 10th, Brezhnev responded to Reagan in an uncharacteristically unthreatening matter. A memorandum from the Director of East European and Soviet Affairs on the N.S.C., Richard Pipes, to National Security Advisor Clark is reproduced in Figure 5-4. Pipes described Brezhnev’s response as “extraordinarily mild” and said there were “no threats, no deadlines, no hints even of “unpredictable’ consequences.”

Figure 5-4: National Security Council (N.S.C.) memo from Pipes to Clark

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Over a year later, diplomatic efforts continued to fail and the M.N.F. was under constant fire. On September 13th, 1983, Clark sent a memorandum to the president, detailing the military options available to induce “Syrian flexibility and demonstrate U.S. resolve.” In the final section, labeled “Third Party Responses,” Clark argued that Arab reactions would be overall positive, predicting that, “Moscow would launch a strident propaganda campaign, but it would not act militarily.”

This account matches Brezhnev’s public declarations. The Soviet leader initially supported the UN force’s mission to restore peace in the region, but objected to unilateral action by the United States (Doder, 1982).

Throughout the Lebanon crisis, the Reagan administration’s perception of the threat of Soviet intervention into the country was generally low. Thus, while both the president and his administration believed that vital U.S. interests were at stake, the threat was relatively low. As the situation was relatively unthreatening to American sovereignty, the threat hypothesis would predict that attitudes towards intelligence on this subject would be favorable. However, this is certainly not the case, and there is no causal evidence from the verbal, physical, or behavior indicators that the threat level played any role in Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence in the Lebanon case. Hence, threat-based explanations for Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon do not have sufficient explanatory power.

5.2.4 The Cognitive-Affective Theory of Intelligence (C.A.T.I.)

Unlike the previous explanations, the C.A.T.I. can explain President Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon. Table 5-5 below illustrates the measurement of my independent and conditional variables and the predicted value of my dependent variable.

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62 Executive Secretariat, NSC, NSDD. NSDDs 109-126, Box 10, Ronald Reagan Library.
The evidence shows that Reagan received specific, disconfirming intelligence when he was strongly committed to his peace plan, resulting in a very unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence. However, as time progressed and the administration became increasingly committed, it is not clear that Reagan’s attitude became increasingly unfavorable, as my theory predicts. In the conclusion of this chapter, I provide two reasons why my theory may not have adequately predicted this.

5.2.4.1 Commitment

As discussed in the chapter on theory, commitment should have a strong impact on attitude. The psychology literature on attitude and vested interest includes five components: stake, salience, certainty, immediacy, and self-efficacy. These components are indicators of commitment, and the evidence shows that not only did Reagan have high commitment to his Lebanon Peace Initiative, but also that that commitment increased over time. In addition to
verbal and diplomatic commitments, Reagan was psychologically and morally committed to assisting Lebanon. This section measures each component of Reagan’s commitment to Lebanese policy.

The President’s steadfastness on this subject began well before the administration’s public commitments in August and September of 1982. As early as 1981, the President enlisted Philip Habib out of retirement to act as a Special Envoy to the Middle East. One month after Israel’s June 1982 invasion, on July 6th, 1982, Reagan confirmed in principle that U.S. troops would be sent to support the peace process. In August 1982, the U.S. troops, as part of the M.N.F., assisted in the evacuation of the P.L.O. from a besieged Beirut and departed shortly thereafter. However, this respite was short-lived, as the massacres of Palestinians by Christian militias stunned the world. On September 20th, President Reagan, in a speech to the world, publicly committed to his peace initiative.

Stake, or the “Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to the attitude object,” is the first component of commitment (Crano, 1995, p. 148). Crano (1995) contends that the greater the stake, the stronger the attitude. The stake Reagan had in his Lebanon policy was generally high. Numerous official documents mentioned Lebanon’s role in the overall Middle East strategy, and Reagan’s personal perception of the stake was also high. Immediately following the Sabra and Shatila massacres in September 1982, Reagan placed a high priority on his policy; and immediately before his speech on September 20th committing troops to the region, Reagan told Secretary Shultz, “Let’s go for broke right now” (Shultz, 1993, p. 107). The relationship between the increasing commitment to the policy and Reagan’s attitude is revealed

by an examination of his sentiment in his diary entries, as shown in Figure 5-1 earlier in the chapter.

Several months later, his stake in the country had only increased. On October 13th, 1982, N.S.C. staff members Geoffrey Kemp and Howard Teicher sent a memorandum to Clark, outlining the President’s perception of the gains and losses in Lebanon:

The President felt that unless we took the initiative our Mid-East policy for the rest of the administration would be a reactive one, particularly given the complicated and tortuous agenda of items in Lebanon … The President is determined to pursue this initiative irrespective of temporary setback.  

At the end of 1982, Reagan’s stake in Lebanon continued to rise. Several weeks after the signing of N.S.D.D. 64, which codified U.S. policy in Lebanon, little progress had been made. Another memorandum from Kemp and Teicher to Clark repeated Reagan’s interest in Lebanon, stating that, “the President assigned a high priority to restoring Lebanese sovereignty throughout the country.”

During a National Security Planning Group meeting (N.S.P.G.) meeting on March 18th, 1983, the President acknowledged the disagreement among his staff members, but also stressed the importance of his goals:

I know there are objections to the use of U.S. forces in the south, but what is at stake here is our overall Middle East policy. We must get the Israelis out of Lebanon, we must ensure their security needs have been met.

On September 24th, 1983, several months after the embassy bombings in April, then-Ambassador Robert McFarlane wrote a cable to Shultz about the need to update U.S. strategy to

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correct misleading assumptions about Syrian resolve in Lebanon. McFarlane proposed a strategy based on the belief that Syria truly had no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire and that the United States needed a new direction. At the top of the cable, the President wrote, “I consider this very important. RR.” In sum, Reagan perceived the gains and losses in Lebanon to be very high; moreover, his stake in the peace process intensified, as the United States became increasingly involved over time.

The second component of commitment is saliency, or relevance to the policymaker’s goals. While Reagan ran his campaign on a strong stance against the Soviet Union, his foreign policy goals eventually began to focus on Lebanon. This is evidenced through official administration documents and public addresses; and in the end, the Lebanese crisis was highly salient for President Reagan. As the United States became increasingly mired in the country, so Reagan’s commitment continued to rise too.

By February 1983, it was clear that his peace initiative was a key component of the administration’s foreign policy. This was demonstrated by his public addresses, as well as the content of the N.S.C. meetings. In preparation for a N.S.P.G. meeting on Lebanon, Clark provided some suggestions for the President’s talking points; the most significant of which was as follows:

Perhaps the most important purpose of tomorrow’s meeting is for you to outline in unambiguous terms what is at stake for our foreign policy … I have prepared for you talking points (at Tab A) that stress your determination to exert U.S. leadership and to obtain progress on this first step in progress on your peace initiative.  

While Clark did use the word “stake,” thus providing further evidence of Reagan’s high stake, this piece of evidence also illustrates the salience of the Lebanon policy for Reagan. In a briefing package sent from Clark to President Reagan less than two weeks after that meeting, the “Background” section stated the obvious: “The Middle East peace process has become a cornerstone of your foreign policy.” Therefore, despite Reagan’s strong stance against the Soviet Union during his campaigns, Lebanon had become a central aspect of his foreign policy by 1983 and an immensely salient topic for him.

*Certainty* is the third component of commitment; and it is defined as the confidence that the decision-maker has in the ramifications of their action or inaction. There is evidence that Reagan believed success in Lebanon would ultimately determine the outcome of his entire Middle East policy. Early in the crisis, Clark penned a memorandum to Reagan in preparation for an N.S.C. meeting. He argued that, while the June 1982 invasion was a serious setback for U.S. diplomatic efforts, there needed to be “a fundamental and immediate review of our Middle East policy” (Saltoun-Ebin, 2014, p. 185). This illustrates the understanding of both Clark and Reagan, early in the policy development, that there would be consequences regardless of the actions taken.

Less than a year later, in the points for the N.S.P.G. meeting on March 18th, 1983, the President articulated that he felt the “overall Middle East strategy” was in the balance. In October of that year, Secretary of State George Schultz wrote a memorandum to Reagan detailing the ramifications in Lebanon. Shultz argued that objectives in Lebanon and the Middle East were “interrelated” and that setbacks and successes in one area would determine those in the

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other. He continues by saying, “The stakes are high – they go far beyond Lebanon.” Again, while the word “stake” is used in this case, it provides additional evidence for Reagan’s certainty. From the early days of the crisis until a few months before U.S. troop withdrawal, Reagan believed the consequences for action or inaction in Lebanon were high.

The fourth aspect of commitment is immediacy, defined as the perceived period between potential action/inaction and its consequences. There is evidence that immediacy was high for the President throughout the Lebanese crisis. From the early planning stages of N.S.D.D. 64 and the U.S. strategy in Lebanon, there was a high level of urgency among Reagan and his administration. In a message from Clark to Shultz, the National Security advisor said, “The President has made clear his desire for early progress.” This request was further specified by Clark in a memo to the Secretary of State two weeks later. The memorandum identified a five-week timetable for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country, stating that the President had approved the plan.

The National Security Decision Directive 64 itself also illustrated a sense of immediacy, originating with the President. One of the last paragraphs begins with the sentence, “I cannot overemphasize the sense of urgency and importance I attach to this mission.” Several months later, the United States had failed to make the progress it had outlined in previous strategies. An undated memo from Robert McFarlane (likely early November 1982), with the subject “Getting on With it in Lebanon,” concluded with the following: “Simply talk to George [Shultz] to stress

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again the urgency the President attaches to this.” Indeed, the President and his staff were frustrated with the failure to achieve the strategies laid out a few months earlier, and this sense of immediacy continued throughout the period of U.S. involvement in the country.

As the situation worsened, the administration scrambled for solutions, often highlighting a sense of immediacy. Reagan’s talking points at an N.S.P.G. meeting on February 4th, 1983, illustrated his frustration:

But, I want there to be no question of how I feel on this subject. These delays we’ve had over the past six months have had a bad impact on overall efforts for the peace process. We simply cannot afford to allow this to drag on for another six months.  

Several months later, in a cable to the White House Situation Room, McFarlane detailed the deteriorating situation and the immediacy of the consequences. The paper, titled “Worse Case Strategies for Lebanon,” included a section called “The Press for Time,” which stated, “While we would ideally prefer more time to thoroughly study and sort through the costs and benefits which attend these options … we need to act promptly.” Another section of the paper, “Rationale: to gain time,” also discussed a temporal aspect of the crisis. There is, therefore, a great deal of evidence that immediacy was high for both Reagan and his administration throughout the situation.

The final component of commitment is self-efficacy, or the policymaker’s perception that the actions are within their capabilities. Overall, Reagan’s self-efficacy in Lebanon was high. During an N.S.C. meeting, he exclaimed, “From what you have told me … Gemayel has good reason to be concerned. It seems as though the foundation of his government is beginning to

75 McFarlane, Robert, “Subject: Getting on With it in Lebanon.” Undated [likely November 3, 1982], Executive Secretariat, NSC; NSDD. NSDDs 62-70, Box 4, Ronald Reagan Library.
crack and we are really the only ones who can help” (Saltoun-Ebin, 2014, p. 251). Reagan consistently believed that it was within his power to assist Lebanon and to defuse the situation. This is evident from his use of the military as a tool for foreign policy in the region. From 1982 to 1984, he deployed the 32nd, 24th, and 31st, Marine Amphibious Units (M.A.U.). In addition, he ordered the U.S.S. New Jersey to deploy in early September 1983 for naval gunfire support to M.N.F. units being shelled by Druze and Syrian forces. This was in stark contrast to the situation Johnson faced’ during the Arab-Israeli conflict, when naval support was weeks away and unlikely to help.

Moreover, Reagan enjoyed strong congressional support for the U.S. presence in Lebanon. George Shultz was able to assuage congressional concerns and lobbied successfully on the President’s behalf (Yoshitani, 2011, p. 74). When U.S. troops came under fire from Druze attacks that resulted in the deaths of two Marines, the Reagan administration submitted a report to Congress related to the War Powers Resolution, seeking to expand the mission. On October 12th, 1983, it was clear that Reagan had convinced Congress of his goals. Congress passed Public Law 98-119, which authorized U.S. forces to remain in Lebanon for another 18 months (Yoshitani, 2011, p. 203). Reagan initially had little political opposition, which likely led to higher self-efficacy; as, without domestic opposition, he had more options for his policies in Lebanon. Hence, Reagan’s self-efficacy was high due to the military assets at his disposal and his domestic political support. As each component of Reagan’s commitment to Lebanon was high, we can conclude that the President’s overall commitment to the policy was also high.

79 Reagan eventually withdrew forces well before the eighteen months.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stake</td>
<td>Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to the attitude object</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saliency</td>
<td>Relevance to decision-maker’s goals</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainty</td>
<td>Confidence in the ramifications</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediacy</td>
<td>The time between potential action/inaction and consequences</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Efficacy</td>
<td>The perception that actions are within the capabilities of decision-makers</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, Reagan’s commitment to his Lebanon policy primed his unfavorable attitude towards the specific and disconfirming intelligence. As detailed in the theory chapter, commitment affects the strength of the attitude; and as commitment was high, the specific, disconfirming intelligence had an increased effect on his attitude towards the intelligence. Reagan, who had previously demonstrated a generally positive attitude towards intelligence on other topics, reacted differently to intelligence on the Lebanon Crisis. This case shows the explanatory power of the C.A.T.I., which illustrates how situational variables affect policymakers regardless of their previous intelligence experience or their proximity to intelligence producers. Just as the previous case study of L.B.J. showed how someone with a normally dismissive attitude towards intelligence could demonstrate a favorable attitude, given a set of circumstances, this case reveals the reverse is also true.
5.2.4.2 Intelligence Specificity

Ultimately, the intelligence Reagan received preceding and throughout the crisis was often specific (in terms of variable measurement). As my theory predicts, policymakers want specific information when making decisions, and this was certainly the case for Reagan during the Lebanese situation. This section demonstrates that while Reagan preferred specific intelligence, specific and disconfirming intelligence elicited an unfavorable attitude. In other words, while Reagan desired this specific, tactical-level intelligence, he often had an unfavorable attitude towards specific intelligence that did not match his goals and preconceived notions. For example, analysts working on Lebanon at the time wrote talking points for Casey’s briefings to the President, namely, the P.D.B., and the National Intelligence Daily (N.I.D.). These subject matter experts described those products as, “much more on the tactical day-to-day stuff than big perspective pieces” (Kennedy & Brunetta, 1988, pp. 43-44). This indicates that the intelligence presented to Reagan could be described as more specific than other iterations of the P.D.B. and “flagship” intelligence pieces.

Reagan often requested specific intelligence or information on Lebanon. While drawing up N.S.D.D. 64, the strategy for the withdrawal of forces from Lebanon, the President requested explicit plans. In a memorandum from National Security Advisor Clark to Secretary of State Shultz, Clark outlined what the president wanted from his staff. He concluded the memo with, “The recommendations should include specific missions and objectives for the MNF and estimates as to its size, composition, deployment and withdrawal. The President wishes to approve this plan prior to Ambassador Draper’s return to the Middle East.”80 In an undated memo (likely sent around the same time), Clark reiterated the President’s request for specific

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information. In the memo to Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Clark wrote, “What is now required is a more explicit road map as to how to proceed over the next two months … The President would like more explicit descriptions of the role that senior U.S. officials should play”

Reagan also wanted more intelligence when targeting a terrorist camp after the Marine Barracks Bombings. On November 8th and 9th, 1983, he wrote in his diary: “Began the day however with a short meeting re a possible air strike in Beirut against those who murdered our Marines. Decided we don’t have enough intelligence info as yet” (Brinkley, 2007, p. 195). Less than a week later, he felt he still did not have enough intelligence: “At 2 P.M. a meeting re the same Beirut problem we’d discussed before the trip. We have some additional intelligence but still not enough to order a strike” (Brinkley, 2007, p. 197). Therefore, both preceding the direct role of the U.S. in Lebanon and throughout the crisis, the President was seeking specific intelligence.

However, when he received specific and disconfirming intelligence, he often had an unfavorable attitude, as my theory predicts. For example, in his diaries, the President frequently mentioned cables and intelligence. On August 10th, 1983, Reagan cited a piece of intelligence and lamented about the complexity of the region: “A cable from Lebanon tells us the Druze are shelling the Beirut Airport where our Marines are based–no casualties. The world must have been simpler in the days of gunboat diplomacy” (Brinkley, 2007, p. 174). In this case, the specific, disconfirming intelligence resulted in an unfavorable attitude. The President also mentions tactical-level signals intelligence (S.I.G.I.N.T.) several days later. On December 15th, 1983, the New Jersey returned fire against Syrian targets. The President wrote, “Today the New

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Jersey fired only its 5-inch guns at Syrian artillery. We intercepted a message between 2 units of Syrians – saying “‘We don’t want the N.J. to fire anymore’” (Brinkley, 2007, p. 205). Thus, there are several instances of the president both requesting specific and tactical-level intelligence and displaying an unfavorable attitude towards such intelligence when it did not align with his goals and preconceived notions.

It is important to reiterate that although it is possible the unfavorable attitude was the result of the deteriorating situation, there is a reasonable amount of evidence in support of the C.A.T.I. Uneven evidence is common in social science research. While there is a relative scarcity of evidence due to Reagan’s style and classification issues, the circumstantial proof aligns with the expectations of the C.A.T.I. Indications preceding this case and in later cases provide direct evidence for the causal mechanism of the C.A.T.I.; thus, there is good reason to conclude that my theory can also account for Reagan’s attitude in this situation.

5.2.4.3 Type of Tntelligence

The type of intelligence is measured on previously held notions and is confirming or disconfirming. Confirmatory intelligence is information that conforms to the decision-maker’s previously held beliefs, while disconfirming intelligence contradicts or challenges these beliefs. In addition to the intelligence Reagan received from Shultz and Habib during the P.L.O. withdrawal negotiations, there was disconfirming intelligence from the I.C. and N.S.C. staff. The president’s ambitious goal was to have the Marines act as a peacekeeping force, while diplomats planned the withdrawal of Israel and Syria from the country: “They thought that if they played Lebanon right, everything – the East-West problem there, the terrorist problem, the internal Lebanon problem – could all be cleared up at once” (Kennedy & Brunetta, 1988, p. 40). The President laid out his plan to the public in a speech in September 1982, after Gemayel’s

The I.C. and N.S.C. staff were not nearly as convinced that Reagan’s plan was bound for success. An interagency assessment published on June 17th, 1982, and disseminated to executive policymakers on June 21st, detailed the ominous prospects for Lebanon.82 In fact, the paper was re-sent (probably to colleague Bob Copaken of the Department of Energy), with a handwritten note from the author, Charles Waterman of the National Intelligence Council. The note read, “Since you’re in an I told you so mood on the PLO, you might be interested in this piece on Lebanon written 1 year ago. Blatantly self-serving, but I can’t resist!”83 The intelligence assessment was prepared with input from the C.I.A., D.I.A., N.S.A., State/I.N.R., and the military intelligence organizations. It correctly predicted that the P.L.O. would be largely eliminated, Syria would continue to control significant territory in Lebanon, Israel would not withdraw, and the Lebanese central government would remain weak. This analysis was only intended to assess the following 60 days (i.e., until mid-August 1982), but it remained accurate throughout the crisis and stood in stark contrast to the preexisting beliefs of Reagan and his administration about Lebanon, including their faith in the ability of the M.N.F. to resolve the problem quickly and the likelihood of the troops departing “in time for Christmas.”

The I.C. was not the only entity with significant reservations about the peace plan. Staffers at the N.S.C., including Geoffrey Kemp and Howard Teicher, also had substantial

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concerns about the initiative. Kemp and Teicher expressed their concerns in a memorandum to National Security Advisor Clark on October 7th, 1982. The N.S.C. was drafting N.S.D.D. 64, the strategy for the withdrawal of all forces from Lebanon. Teicher and Kemp called the plan “ambitious,” but added the following:

[We] see some major faults with the plan which the President should be alerted to. Of principal significance is its failure to view accurately the possible implications of this plan for our larger goals in the region, notably that it could be it less likely that either the Israelis or Saudis would support the President’s initiative.84

This is disconfirming because there is evidence that key allies may be opposed to the President’s plan, representing an impediment to his policies. Several days later, Kemp, Teicher, and Philip Dur continued to express concern with the plan. On October 11th, 1982, the memorandum to Clark underlined the major pitfalls in the peace initiative. They argued that the plan “underestimates the practical difficulties we face, the potential political problems we will have to consider in the Congress, and the realistic time frame for implementing the strategy.”85

While both the I.C. and the N.S.C. staff had reservations about the initiative, there is little available evidence on Reagan’s attitude towards these intelligence products and briefings. The most significant evidence for his very unfavorable attitude emerged during the aforementioned P.L.O. withdrawal negotiations. This intelligence also differed from his preconceived notions that Habib could successfully convince Israel and Syria to withdraw from the country. As illustrated by the sentiment analysis graph presented earlier in the chapter, there was a substantial decline in his attitude during the P.L.O. evacuations in 1982. This provides further evidence of not only a correlational relationship between disconfirming specific evidence, but a casual one.


It should also be noted that the extensive intelligence Reagan received in 1982-1983 continued to be disconfirming. On July 14th, 1983, the C.I.A. produced “Bleak Prospects for the Gemayel Government,” which restated previous agency concerns. The final section, “Implications for the United States,” concluded as follows:

The goals of the United States in Lebanon – withdrawal of foreign troops and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity – are being jeopardized as much by Christian militancy … as by the stalemate in the withdrawal process. Confessional polarization has reached the point that the withdrawal of foreign forces could produce as many problems for the central government as continued occupation.  

By August 1983, the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asian Analysis reported,

[a] bleak outlook for US interest in Lebanon. I believe we must face the prospect that our current policies towards Lebanon are not going to work … we must be ready to face the fact that we have reached the end of the road in Lebanon this time around.  

Several months later, in October 1983, the I.C. released the watershed S.N.I.E. 36.4-83, or Prospects for Lebanon, which reiterated the community’s concerns over the past year. The bad news continued to pour in, and the talking points of the then-National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane’ during an N.S.P.G. meeting on December 1st, 1983, included the following:

Our military posture at present may not be adequate to support the kind of diplomacy it will take to resolve the issues. Put simply, our military forces are not having much political impact, dug-in as we are at the airport, and we incur significant risks – political and human – if we take another toll of casualties.  

On December 15th, 1983, the I.N.R.’ Current Reports analysis section had the headline, “US-Syrian Confrontation in Lebanon: Time is on Syria’s Side.”  

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In summary, from 1981 through 1983, Reagan and his administration received a great deal of disconfirming intelligence about the likelihood of success for his peace initiative. The intelligence included reports from cabinet members and special appointees, S.N.I.E.s, N.S.C. briefing points, and memorandums from his national security staff. During the early negotiations in August 1982, Reagan displayed a very unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence that he received from Shultz and Habib. However, as the disconfirming intelligence mounted, there is little evidence of Reagan’s attitude becoming increasingly unfavorable, as my theory predicts that it would. There are two possible explanations for this lack of evidence: first, there is simply no available evidence of Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence at that time; or second, his attitude was not nearly as unfavorable as my theory would suggest. These possibilities are addressed in the following section.

5.3 Conclusions and Implications

As this chapter has demonstrated, President Reagan was highly committed to his Lebanon peace plan, despite specific, disconfirming intelligence from N.S.C. briefings and other sources. This combination of factors resulted in Reagan’s very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon, a result that existing theories cannot explain.

According to the C.A.T.I., Reagan’s attitude should have become increasingly unfavorable as commitment increased over time. While the direction of his attitude was properly predicted by my theory, the intensity and strength were not. In this section, I provide some reasons why my theory did not accurately predict the strength of Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence on Lebanon.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical claim</th>
<th>Outcome predicted?</th>
<th>Causal logic supported?</th>
<th>Attitude explained?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity hypothesis</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudinal theory</td>
<td>Mostly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One possible explanation for Reagan’s attitudinal strength lies in the disagreements between the N.S.C. and his cabinet members. Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger were vocal about their feelings on the Lebanese situation. Weinberger, affectionately known as “Cap,” made clear in both memorandums and interviews his reservations on the M.N.F. Cap, along with the J.C.S. and the DoD, continued to express their concerns about the military’s role in Lebanon throughout the crisis. Shultz, on the other hand, supported Reagan’s ambitious plan. As such, the Department of State supported his initiative from the beginning and Shultz lobbied for it in Congress. The divide was so stark, in fact, that a memo from Clark to Shultz provided a table of how the N.S.C. and State Department differed on key issues. The table from the memo of November 8th, 1982, is provided below:

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The internal memo details the disparate positions of the N.S.C. and the State Department on Lebanon, indicating that leadership and management in the Reagan administration were not simply in disagreement, but advocating for contradictory policies. With significant disagreement between members of his administration, it is possible that President Reagan received information from the conflicting parties that attenuated his attitude.

This is not the only occasion when the President’s national security staff provided him with mixed advice or information; and even at the tactical level, Reagan received varying opinions. For instance, as Syria’s intractability in Lebanon began to irk the administration, Clark suggested a “demonstrative airstrike” to coerce the Syrians and show American resolve. He
argued that a single strike at a critical junction would severely impede Syrian operations in the area. 91 The J.C.S. and DoD vehemently disagreed. A J.C.S. analysis of the interdiction signed by Chairman John Vessey provided a target package, but also expressed doubt about the plan, saying, “Although a strike could be carried out, the J.S.C. do not recommend the one-time interdiction on a choke point be undertaken by U.S. forces.” 92 Enclosure Three continued with the analysis and contended that the strike would “probably have negligible short term impact … produce undesired collateral casualties/damage,” and, “be unlikely to produce the tractability in Damascus.” 93 Reagan ultimately decided to conduct the tactical airstrikes. As the military was a significant tool of Reagan’s plan for Lebanon, the dissenting opinions may have affected components of commitment such as self-efficacy. In other words, it is possible that the President’s self-efficacy was reduced by the political infighting and, consequently, the strength of his attitude was weaker than predicted.

These disagreements spanned across a variety of issues in Lebanon. The RoE in Lebanon were expanded by N.S.D.D. 103 to incorporate the concept of “aggressive self-defense,” and the addendum to N.S.D.D. 103 authorized naval gunfire to engage enemy positions in Suq-Al-Gharb, dramatically escalating the U.S. role in the conflict. Despite these new RoE, the DoD continued to express its concerns with the new tactics and strategy. The J.C.S., in concurrence with Weinberger, believed that,

the current RoE are appropriate for the current situation and for the mission now assigned to the USMNF … Moreover, potential actions resulting from the RoE change could adversely impact the ongoing Lebanese national reconciliation talks in Geneva and the safety of the US MNF. 94

93 Ibid.
On the other hand, N.S.C. member Howard Teicher and Secretary Shultz were adamant about the need to further expand the RoE. Shultz wanted to strike Syrian and Lebanese positions in the Bekaa Valley, and Teicher argued that the RoE were insufficient (Varady, 2015, p. 232). After considering arguments from both sides, Reagan signed N.S.D.D. 111, which further expanded the RoE to include the defense of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Ultimately, bureaucratic fighting may have affected the President’s attitude. Shultz’s support could have mitigated the effect of the specific, disconfirming intelligence on Reagan’s attitude towards the intelligence. This notion is supported by the literature on attitudes:

> When presented with the same evidence, individuals … find increased validity in their own positions and interpret neutral information as supporting their own positions … They recall confirmatory information far better than counter-attitudinal information … and the stronger the attitude, the greater the misperception (Hatemi & McDermott, 2016, pp. 341-342).

Hence, the infighting in the administration – along with Shultz’s support – may have reduced the effect of commitment, specificity, and the type of intelligence on his attitude towards the intelligence he received.

Furthermore, this is not the only disagreement to arise due to N.S.D.D. 111, as there was stark disagreement on the role of strategic relationships, specifically Israel. Specifically, N.S.D.D. 111 required a re-evaluation of the strategic cooperation between Israel and moderate Arab nations. In a memo sent in preparation for the visit of an Israeli delegation, N.S.C. members Dur and Kemp suggested that, “Because the disagreements between State and DoD on strategic cooperation issues are sharp and deeply-held we believe it would be useful to go one step further and have the President provide the scope presentation.”⁹⁵ Thus, it is clear that

Reagan received differing advice and reports from his cabinet and national security advisors on Lebanon.

As discussed in the Chapter 2 section on theory, commitment is the conditioning variable that affects the strength or extremity of the attitude towards intelligence. Thus, if Reagan’s attitude was not as unfavorable as predicted, this may indicate that the differing advice reduced components of his commitment to the Lebanon plan. For example, differing advice on the utility of tactical airstrikes may have affected the President’s self-efficacy. If Reagan received information that sapped the military as an effective tool for his Lebanon Plan, this could have attenuated the effect of commitment on his attitude towards intelligence. In sum, the administration’s lack of consensus on Lebanon may have altered Reagan’s attitude towards intelligence.

Another reason for the strength of Reagan’s attitude may have been politicized and/or altered intelligence. A C.I.A. study of intelligence support for key stakeholders reached a similar conclusion. The study concluded that the intelligence was timely, accurate, specific, and properly disseminated (for the most part), providing strong analytical judgments on warning prior to the Israeli invasion, the status of the Gemayel government, Syrian interests in Lebanon, the impact of an Israeli invasion on the P.L.O., and prospects for Reagan’s peace initiative. The report describes the underlying message and policymaker attitudes:

Its focus was primarily internal and its message bleak … The estimate delivered an unwelcome message to policymakers, who were considering increases in the application of US force in Lebanon. Dissatisfied with the October SNIE, senior policymakers, notably Secretary of State Shultz, asked that a fresh look be taken … But the message delivered by this SNIE was also depressing.96

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While the intelligence was clear, it may have been that policymakers were not getting the full picture. Several key decision-makers discussed their own experiences with politicized or changed intelligence. Robert McFarlane argued that,

[The State Department] intelligence reports … had adopted a policy of essentially whistling past the graveyard. It downplayed the risks of war, discounting reports … This tendency to downplay clear evidence of growing tensions was a reflection of the general culture in a department whose professionals regard themselves as the custodians of peace (McFarlane & Smardz, 1994, p. 205).

McFarlane was not the only national security staff member to state that intelligence was downplayed or altered. While drafts of the aforementioned S.N.I.E., *Prospects for Lebanon*, circulated in the analytical community, Shultz told his intelligence contact, Herb Meyer, that he disliked the conclusions as they were “too harsh, too pessimistic.” Casey, C.I.A. Director, eager to have his products read by a recalcitrant Shultz, ordered the estimate to be reevaluated. This time, however, the estimate was even gloomier, arguing that prospects in Lebanon were “nil.” The director, hoping to increase visibility, instructed that the language be changed: “Make it ‘bleak’ instead of ‘nil’ and release it” (Persico, 1990, p. 352).

One N.S.C. staffer reported similar alterations to finished intelligence products. Howard Teicher claimed that the D.I.A. was instructed to adopt a view more in line with the policy of Secretary Weinberger ‘(Teicher & Teicher, 1993, pp. 120-121). The result, Teicher claimed, was a bottom-line that was very different to the analyst’s interpretation of the events. One intelligence officer said:

I contributed to the report, but the product was considerably changed before the final version was released for distribution. I can only surmise that my superiors disagreed with my analysis and substituted it for their own. Perhaps they thought the conclusions were inconsistent with what they thought the secretary and chairman wanted to hear about Israel’s role in Lebanon (Teicher & Teicher, 1993, p. 120).
Teicher caught up with the officer before he left the briefing room and thanked the man for his honesty. The analyst responded by saying that no one wanted comprehensive analysis on Lebanon, and anytime he tried to set the record straight, he would “get an earful.”

Thus, there were multiple reports of politicization of intelligence by high-ranking policymakers. It is therefore possible that Reagan’s attitude was moderated by the lack of unvarnished intelligence. That said, even with the reports he received, Reagan’s attitude towards the intelligence should have worsened over time. While the President was highly committed to his peace initiative, there are multiple reports of both his Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense influencing the analytical process. This could have increased the ambiguity and led to a less unfavorable attitude than my theory predicts.

One final possibility is that Reagan’s attitude was already as unfavorable as it was going to be. That is, personality could serve as a bounding condition, with Reagan’s generally favorable view towards intelligence – born out of the personality indicators cited in the section on alternative theories – constrained how negative his attitude in any given situation could become. This notion is addressed in the conclusion of this dissertation.

The final implication for this chapter is related to the analyst-policymaker relationship; namely, proximity. The aforementioned C.I.A. postmortem noted that while the Agency could be “satisfied” with its work on Lebanon, there was one problematic area in which they wished to improve. Overall, analysts felt they had been cut out of the policy-making process and that officers needed to do a better job explaining the support process and maintaining contact with policymakers.97 While it discusses the issue, the report does not specify why this gap occurred. Similar to the L.B.J. case, it is possible that attitudes towards intelligence precede proximity. For

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L.B.J. and his C.I.A. director, Richard Helms, a favorable attitude towards intelligence on the Arab-Israeli conflict ultimately led to increased proximity between the producer and consumer. Likewise, Reagan’s unfavorable attitude towards intelligence could have distanced him from the intelligence producers. Nevertheless, the C.A.T.I. performs well in the Reagan case, providing – at a minimum – correlational evidence for my theory.
6.0 Chapter 6: Jimmy Carter, Intelligence, and Troop Withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula

“It’s difficult for someone in my position to distinguish between the appearance of things and the actual facts, the reality of them. And you do a superb job in trying to bring to me and others who make opinions and then make decisions about what our Nation should do in the pursuit of our own goals and purposes, in the enhancement of our own ideals and principles.”

- Jimmy Carter

This case focuses on President Jimmy Carter’s attitude towards intelligence on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. While previous studies have examined the role of intelligence during the Carter administration (Jervis, 2006; Yarhi-Milo, 2014), there are no studies of Carter’s attitude towards intelligence. Furthermore, there have been few rigorous examinations of the role of intelligence in Carter’s decision to withdraw troops from the Korean Peninsula, with Hoffman (2002) and Wood and Zelikow (1996) being the exceptions. While Hoffman’s analysis is well-documented, it was conducted over 15 years ago and was just three pages long. Since then, there have been significant declassifications, mandatory reviews, and memoirs providing further insight into the case. Similarly, Wood and Zelikow’s piece is even older, and while an excellent account of the intelligence history, it does not constitute the empirical research into this subject needed to understand Carter’s attitude and his perceptions of intelligence. In addition, further analysis could also offer more information about the attitudes of other decision-makers.

From the beginning of Carter’s candidacy, his preconceived notions about U.S. troop

removal were in stark contrast to the opinions of the I.C. Although Carter firmly supported the removal of U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula as a mechanism for political liberalization in South Korea and both a moral and strategic imperative, his top intelligence and military advisors did not share his convictions. Despite several intelligence reports indicating North Korean numerical and industrial superiority relative to that of its southern neighbor, Carter continued to tout his unpopular policy. Overall, his strong commitment to withdrawal, along with the disconfirming and unspecific intelligence, led to his very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on the subject. Examination of the President’s attitude reveals that the C.A.T.I. has the most explanatory of the theoretical avenues. Moreover, this case provides further evidence for a correlational and causal understanding of attitudes towards intelligence.

6.1 Case Overview

This chapter progresses as follows: first, I detail the situation, intelligence, and President Carter’s attitude towards the intelligence. The following section focuses on the most likely potential explanations for his attitude. As in the testing of previous cases, I examine personality, proximity, and threat and their causal relationship to Carter’s attitude. Ultimately, existing theories have little explanatory value in this case, and the C.A.T.I. is able to explain the President’s attitude towards intelligence on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Carter’s strong commitment to the withdrawal policy, combined with the unspecific and disconfirming intelligence, provides the most explanatory power. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the case’s role in intelligence theory and practice.
6.1.1 The Situation

Throughout his presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter argued for a foreign policy grounded in strong moral imperatives. Even early in his candidacy, he pushed hard for human rights, moral principles, and an emphasis on his personal ideology. This stress on ethical foreign policy represented a significant shift from the policy and practice of the Nixon administration. As a result, Carter often stood in opposition to military advisors and Congress on several issues, including South Korea. To establish a legal and political foundation for his policies, the President cited the recently passed Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. The Act, as well as eliminating aid to the South Korean military and limiting independent Presidential covert action, includes section 502B, which directs the United States to reduce or end its aid to governments that are in “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights standards” (Choi, 2017, p. 940). Carter argued that the questionable human rights record of South Korean President Park Chung-Hee, including the extensive jailing of political prisoners, was inextricably linked to U.S. military assistance.

President Carter’s top secret initial plan, outlined in Presidential Directive/N.S.C.-12, ordered the removal of one brigade by the end of 1978, and a second by 1980. This amounted to a reduction of approximately 25-30% of the troops deployments at that time. Nevertheless, Carter faced significant opposition from both domestic and international audiences; and by the end of 1978, just 1,500 troops had left South Korea and the President found himself unable to convince Congress to pass a bill for complete withdrawal (Choi, 2017, p. 936). In July 1979, in

secret negotiations with Korean C.I.A. Director Kim Chae Kyu, Carter secured the release of 180 political prisoners in exchange for a freeze on troop withdrawals (Gleysteen, 2012, p. 50). By the time South Korean President Park Chung-Hee was assassinated three weeks later, Carter’s withdrawal plan was essentially non-existent. The domestic, international, and intelligence pressures were too great for Carter to withstand. The President cancelled his withdrawal plans.

6.1.2 The Intelligence

The intelligence on military forces in the Korean Peninsula during much of the Nixon administration suggested a relative balance of power between North and South Korea, absent U.S. forces. This consensus in the I.C. provided Nixon with the rationale to withdraw nearly 20,000 troops. According to senior intelligence officers, however, this intelligence was greatly flawed. Many argued that because so many resources were diverted to Vietnam, the “IC generally took the 1970 estimates and drew a line forward in time at a constant rate of growth in order to arrive at the present year’s estimate for North Korean forces” (Wood & Zelikow, 1996, p. 98). In essence, due to a lack of resources, the I.C. had no choice but to assume that the military balance remained unchanged. This shifted after the fall of Saigon 1975, when the I.C. slowly began to push resources back to the peninsula.

As the I.C. moved its focus back to state-based threats on the Korean Peninsula, a new perspective emerged. By 1978, the I.C. recognized that the static lines were significantly off the mark, as North Korea had dramatically ramped up its industrial base:

[The] generally accepted numbers put North Korean ahead of South Korean [armaments] in almost all types of equipment … and more important, the character of the North Korean forces appeared more offensively oriented than before, and all these trends had been moving in this direction since 1970 (Wood & Zelikow, 1996, p. 99).
Similar to events in the Reagan case, by the time the S.N.I.E. was released in late May 1979, the results of the study had little impact and were essentially a forgone conclusion. This chapter focuses on President Carter’s attitude towards intelligence specifically related to the Korean Peninsula. One such example is, “Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula,” produced by the C.I.A.’ National Foreign Assessment Center in 1978.\textsuperscript{101} The key judgments of this memorandum were in direct opposition to Carter’s policy goals of a timely withdrawal. While Carter ultimately abandoned his withdrawal policy, he exhibited a very unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence preceding this decision.

6.1.3 The Attitude

Throughout his term as President, and even as a candidate, Carter displayed a wide range of attitudes towards intelligence on various topics. Overall, a significant amount of data illustrates Carter’s surprisingly unfavorable attitude towards intelligence surrounding the question of South Korean military disengagement. As I have demonstrated in earlier chapters, attitude can be observed and measured by three indicators: words, behaviors, and physical manifestations.

6.1.3.1 Words

On May 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1978, the C.I.A. presented President Carter with an assessment of the military situation in Korea. The intelligence, “Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula,” provided a conclusion in stark contrast to the President’s preconceived notions. Carter believed that the South’s economic growth, China’s desire for restraint, and military aid would not change.

\textsuperscript{101} The National Foreign Assessment Center was a newly established office that combined the Director of Intelligence and the Office of National Intelligence Officers in 1977.
the situation (Carter, 2010, p. 279). The President’s language not only reveals his preconceived notions, but is also useful for understanding the attitudinal issues, given his penchant for writing on intelligence products. Below is a copy of the first page of the declassified report:
KEY JUDGMENTS

The static military balance between North and South Korea alone now favors the North by a substantial margin. This represents a significant shift from the rough parity that existed eight years ago and results from successfully North Korean efforts to acquire large quantities of weapons from the Soviet Union and China, to establish a large domestic arms industry, and to expand and modernize their armed forces.

In the critical areas of ground firepower and mobility, the North Koreans have moved well ahead of the South Koreans. The North has achieved an approximate two-to-one advantage in numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. Moreover, the North has greatly reduced the South's longstanding advantage in military manpower and could have as many men under arms as the South by 1980.

The North also holds a substantial numerical edge in combat aircraft, but the South has better planes. The South probably has too few aircraft to accomplish both air superiority and close air support.

The ability of North Korea to translate its overall military advantage into a potent offensive against the South would depend to a large extent on achieving surprise. If the North did achieve surprise, the South might be hard pressed to stop the North Koreans before they reached Seoul. With adequate warning, however, South Korea could exploit its defensive advantage to blunt an attack.

This memorandum was prepared by the Regional Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Research in response to a National Security Council request.
The report argued that the military balance strongly favored the North Koreans by a “substantial margin.” The increased production of North Korean industry had given the North a two-to-one advantage in tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. This information would have been particularly jarring to Carter for two primary reasons: first, as previously mentioned, the I.C. consensus on the military balance in the Korean peninsula had not been updated in nearly a decade. The President was under the assumption that the status quo was acceptable. Second, the newly released intelligence represented a threat to his withdrawal policy. The increased mobility and offensively oriented North Korean military, in conjunction with the perceived benefits of a surprise attack, made Carter’s plan for extrication problematic. On the top of the document, in the President’s sprawling script, is his response: “This conclusion’s absurd.” This is a useful indicator of Carter’s attitude, as he often marked up intelligence products, thus etching his attitude towards the intelligence directly on the page (Priess, 2017b, p. 108).

In his diary, Carter continued to admonish the intelligence he was receiving on the Korean Peninsula (Brown, 2011; Carter, 2010, pp. 279-280). The President felt that internal pressures from the C.I.A. and Pentagon, external pressures from South Korea, and the relationship between the two nation’s leaders were reason enough not to trust the intelligence. One scholar described Carter’s attitude in his diary entries as “livid” (Brown, 2011, p. 61). The President wrote that he was skeptical of the intelligence he was receiving. Referring to a new intelligence report received on January 19th, 1979, he wrote, “I was somewhat skeptical of intelligence reports that North Korea had doubled the size of its military within a few years, but had no way to disprove them” (Carter, 2010, pp. 279-280). This entry was likely a result of the D.I.A.’s increasing evidence of North Korean military achievements. The day before this diary entry was

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102 This notion partially stems from the recent Koreagate scandal in which South Korean politicians attempted to influence members of Congress (Brown, 2011, p. 74).
written, Eugene Tighe, director of the D.I.A., sent a memorandum to the Office of the D.C.I. pushing for an S.N.I.E. to be produced on the subject. By the time the S.N.I.E. was released in May 1979, Carter had seen a significant amount of intelligence with the inescapable conclusion that the military balance had shifted drastically.

Less than two months later, Carter traveled to Asia to attend the G-7 Economic Summit in Tokyo. After the summit, he flew to South Korea to speak with President Park and detailed his trip in his diary for June 29th to July 1st, 1979. On June 30th, 1979, President Carter described the “abusive harangue” he received from Park when discussing troop commitments. After discussing force numbers and recent intelligence reports, the U.S. President described himself as, “so angry,” claiming, “I could not understand how a tiny nation like North Korea could surpass so greatly a large and strong South Korea, even with forty thousand American troops and superb air cover, and I was deeply disturbed about this trend” (Carter, 2010, p. 338). Following this meeting, there was a private engagement between the two leaders that Carter described as “unsatisfactory.” In this meeting, Carter and Park argued about South Korean equipment numbers, including tanks, and had an “equally frank discussion” on human rights (Carter, 2010, pp. 338-339). This provides a second example of Carter’s words evincing a very unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, while one may argue that the President ultimately accepted the intelligence, this acceptance is a behavior and not necessarily indicative of an attitude. Furthermore, not only did Carter write his attitude towards the intelligence on the report itself, but discussions related to intelligence on the Korean Peninsula continued to evince a very unfavorable attitude.

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While verbal indicators reveal Carter’s very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on Korean troop commitments, other situations suggest a variety of attitudes towards intelligence. For example, in preparation for one of his trips to Camp David, Carter became enamored with psychological profiles. D.C.I. Stansfield Turner recalled the President saying,

“When I got ready to go to Camp David, I asked for a psychological profile on Begin and Sadat. That was one of the most valuable things I ever had. When I got to Camp David, I knew all about them … So those kinds of data paid rich dividends for me (Turner, 2005, p. 181).”

Thus, Carter’s words reflect a range of attitudinal states on a variety of intelligence topics. His behaviors and physical manifestations provide additional evidence for this spectrum of attitudes. Nevertheless, Carter’s verbal indicators demonstrate a very unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence. His skepticism, as demonstrated in his journal entries and markings and language on finished reports, further illustrate this attitude. In addition, his own description of his attitude during the meeting with President Park provides additional proof of a very unfavorable attitude.

6.1.3.2 Physical Indicators

Carter’s physical manifestations are also indicative of a very negative attitude. As the literature demonstrates, blustering, flushing, and distinctly negative facial impressions are suggestive of a very unfavorable attitude, and Carter exhibited several of these after his interaction with intelligence on Korea. For instance, during the previously mentioned trip to Tokyo and Korea summer of 1979, Carter himself described himself as “very angry” and “deeply disturbed,” while third-party accounts suggest that Carter likely understated his reaction. During the meeting with President Park, Secretary of State Vance, could “feel the contained anger of the President” after a discussion of human rights and recent threat intelligence (Wood & Zelikow,
1996, p. 110). This was immediately following the leak of the S.N.I.E. that led Carter to be “not happy, feeling that his hand was being forced” (Wood & Zelikow, 1996, p. 110). The estimate clearly affected both Vance and Carter. Even after U.S. officials warned the Koreans not to mention the withdrawal and intelligence, Park made it the first item on the agenda (Wood & Zelikow, 1996, p. 110). Secretary Vance and others later described Carter as “furious” and said that the President had “unburdened himself” (Vance’s phrasing) outside the ambassador’s residence (Wood & Zelikow, 1996, p. 110).104 Although neither “blustering” nor “flushing” were observed, it is quite clear from Carter’s “unburdening” that he was extremely agitated. While we cannot be sure that this was directly due to the intelligence, the temporal proximity to the discussion with President Park on tank levels, in addition to the other indicators, provide strong evidence of this.

Despite his clearly very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on Korean troop commitments, the President’s physical manifestations in other situations demonstrate a broader range of attitudes towards other pieces of intelligence. For example, Carter showed a positive attitude towards satellite imagery of the Soviet Union. The day after the President was inaugurated, acting D.C.I. Henry “Hank” Knoche showed Carter pictures from the new KH-11 satellite. The National Reconnaissance Office (N.R.O.) launched the KENNEN (K-11) in 1976 which provided “near real-time” overhead imagery.105 Previously, satellites dropped films from space, and these needed to be collected, developed, and analyzed in a lengthy process. When Carter saw the images, he “shook his head in amazement, laughed, and congratulated Knoche. ‘Of course,’ he said turning to Brzezinski, ‘this will also be of value to our arms control work’”

104 Also see: (Vance, 1983, p. 129).
(Andrew, 1995, p. 427). The laughter and congratulatory nature are both indicative of a very favorable attitude towards this specific intelligence capacity.

Another example of the range in Carter’s physical indicators concerns the subject of covert action. Carter, running his presidential campaign on a platform of staunch moral values, decried much of the C.I.A.’s covert action around the world, particularly in South America. His attitude towards intelligence on this topic is especially clear during his early briefings as president-elect. In a more private setting, D.C.I. Bush detailed some of the C.I.A.’s most sensitive assets and programs. The director described Carter as, “impatient,” “turned off,” and “uncomfortable” when they discussed the sensitive collection programs, recalling that the President-elect reacted positively to just one (currently undisclosed) item (Helgerson, 1996a, p. 100). Several moments later, when they returned to the other briefings, Carter’s attitude had changed significantly. The spymaster said Carter was “obviously relieved … very attentive, listening intently and showing much more warmth” (Helgerson, 1996a, p. 100). Thus, physical indicators of Carter’s very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on Korea are clear, and he appeared to have varying attitudes towards other subjects. The next section outlines the behavioral indicators of Carter’s very unfavorable attitude.

6.1.3.3 Behaviors

As outlined in the chapter on theory, yelling, resistance to change or new information, expressions of extremely negative emotions, and blaming others are demonstrative examples of a very negative attitude. While Carter may have understated his reaction to the intelligence on Korea, his staff did not. The newly appointed ambassador to South Korea, William Gleysteen, was present at the G-7 conference in the summer of 1979 and he received significant rebuke. Gleysteen, meeting with Carter in Korea after his session with Park, meticulously described the
President’s behavior in his memoirs. He described Carter as “unburdening himself,” “clearly venting anger,” and “wagging his finger” at the adviser (Brown, 2011, p. 63; Gleysteen, 2012, p. 48). While not referring to the intelligence, the events occurred immediately following an intelligence update and meeting with Park. In addition, his admonishment of another staff member demonstrated Carter’s blame of others.

Carter also punished General Sinlaub for speaking to the *Washington Post* about his reservations on the withdrawal plan. Major General John Singlaub, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Command in Korea, told *The Washington Post* in May 1977 that removing ground troops from the Peninsula would lead to war. Singlaub’s notion aligned with the findings of the new intelligence estimates and stood in stark contrast to the President’s withdrawal plan. In response, “Carter immediately transferred Singlaub to a domestic post, thus giving the impression that the Major General was receiving punishment” (Brown, 2011, pp. 28-29). He also summoned Singlaub to the White House, an action that even those who felt Carter was justified in his discipline of the general described as “overkill” (Wilson, 1977). After apologizing to the President and claiming he meant no disrespect, Singlaub was summoned before the House Armed Services Committee to testify. There, the general referred to intelligence and the recent Armstrong studies that provided rhetorical ammunition to Carter’s political opponents (Valersky, 1991; Wood & Zelikow, 1996). Thus, both outbursts at his staff revealed very unfavorable attitudes towards intelligence; and these instances were not the only behavioral indicators of Carter’s attitude.

The President also showed signs of resistance to information. On multiple occasions, Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown attempted to raise the subject of withdrawal, and each time they found the President “adamant” and unwilling to listen (Wood
& Zelikow, 1996, p. 109). Other advisors documented Carter’s resistance to new information on Korea even before his presidency. When Carter became the Democratic nominee in 1976, he asked D.C.I. Bush for briefings on important topics (discussed further in the next section). Evelyn Colbert, the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, and her counterparts proposed that Carter listen to the latest assessments on Korea, considering the nominee’s outspoken policies on troop withdrawal. However, Carter never chose Korea as a topic (Wood & Zelikow, 1996, p. 100). This is particularly revealing because the Democratic candidate requested extensive briefings in the period leading up to his presidency. For instance, Carter’s first session with the C.I.A. lasted several hours and the President engaged and actively participated in the meetings: “Carter began about 1:00 p.m. and continued without interruption for a full six hours, adjourning about 7:00 p.m.” (Helgerson, 1996a, p. 90). There are, therefore, at least two separate examples of Carter’s resistance to new information on Korea, indicating an unfavorable attitude towards intelligence.

These behavioral indicators are also in contrast to behaviors observed in other settings. As previously mentioned, Carter was extremely receptive to psychological profiles of the Arab and Israeli leaders (Andrew, 1995, p. 432; Turner, 2005). He studied these profiles intently and used the results during his negotiations. The President also used intelligence to justify his energy policy, citing the (now declassified) agency report, “The International Energy situation: Outlook to 1985” (Andrew, 1995, p. 432). The conclusions in the report were fiercely disputed by subject matter experts, and some argued that the C.I.A. had “cooked the facts to fit the President’s recipe” (Andrew, 1995, p. 432). Both examples involve behaviors indicative of a more favorable attitude towards other intelligence subjects. This shows that Carter’s general attitude towards intelligence was not monolithic.
In sum, Carter’s words, physical indicators, and behaviors signpost a range of attitudes towards various intelligence topics. That said, the President’s attitude towards intelligence on the Korean peninsula is plainly very unfavorable. Both Carter and third-party observers described him as very angry after discussions of the intelligence. He “unburdened” himself outside the ’Ambassador’s residence, giving evidence of his attitude through physical manifestations. Similarly, his resistance to new information and his punishment of and outbursts towards subordinates illustrate his very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on the Korean peninsula. This range of attitudes shows that Carter’s attitude varied by subject and that his general attitude towards intelligence was not solely unfavorable. The next section explores some explanations for his attitude towards intelligence on Korea.

6.2 Theoretical Assessment of Explanations

6.2.1 Personality

As discussed in the previous chapters, there are three primary alternative explanations for Carter’s attitude towards intelligence on Korea: personality, proximity, and threat. This section briefly articulates why each variable does little to explain the President’s attitude at the time. The three facets of personality that may affect attitude are experience of and interest in intelligence and narcissistic personality disorders. Although there are more factors, I focus on these three as they are prominent in the literature. Overall, none provides a strong explanation for Carter’s very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea.

First, Carter showed interest in intelligence even before he became the Democratic party nominee in 1976 (Priess, 2017b, p. 105). In fact, he was the first presidential nominee to request
intelligence briefings before receiving his party’s nomination and he required special permission from President Ford to receive them (Helgerson, 1996a, p. 87). Moreover, when Carter received the briefings, C.I.A. officer Dick Lehman described him as “terribly interested” (Helgerson, 1996a, p. 106). Once Carter was elected, he continued to show enthusiasm for some intelligence products. This is evidenced by his frequent interaction with the C.I.A. and his propensity to jot down questions and notes on his briefings (Gates, 1989). Carter’s general enthusiasm for intelligence was not limited to his earlier experiences, and he continued to pay close attention throughout his presidency. As his most trusted advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski also claimed that the President “would follow it [the P.D.B.] in great detail” (Priess, 2017b, p. 121). These examples, in addition, to his aforementioned interest in topics such as psychological assessments and satellite imagery, paint a picture of someone with an interest in intelligence.

It is also important to note that Carter often spoke poorly of the C.I.A. and other intelligence assets. D.C.I. George Bush complained of Carter’s “frequent and vituperative” attacks on the C.I.A. (Andrew, 1995, p. 426). In addition, much of Carter’s moral foreign policy and campaign rhetoric admonished the C.I.A.’s work in foreign countries. Thus, while this lack of trust and dislike of the C.I.A. may explain his attitude, there is no causal element. In other words, like L.B.J., Carter had negative views of the C.I.A., but this does not wholly explain his attitude on this topic. Carter had a wide range of attitudes on other intelligence assessments. As this section shows, Carter had positive attitudes towards intelligence in a variety of circumstances, thus the intensely negative attitude in this case is somewhat surprising. Furthermore, Carter’s reproach of the C.I.A. actually reflected a level of interest in the subject of intelligence. In fact, it is a sign of significant interest in a topic that he engaged with throughout his presidency. Therefore, a lack of interest is not likely to be the explanatory factor in the Korean case.
The second facet of personality-like factors influencing attitude is experience. Overall, while Carter had limited experience of the I.C. prior to his presidency, there is no evidence that this resulted in his unfavorable attitude towards intelligence. Although Carter was a navy submarine officer during the Korean War, there is evidence that he did not fully grasp the workings of the I.C. writ large. For example, when D.C.I. George H.W. Bush and his staff began to brief the President-elect, the briefers assumed that he had little or no previous knowledge of the I.C. The C.I.A. attempted to appeal to Carter’s industrial side by likening the intelligence cycle to a peanut-processing firm, as the President owned such a business (Andrew, 1995, p. 426). However, if experience were the primary cause of the President’s attitude, then, as Carter saw more intelligence, his attitude should have become more favorable. Yet, this concept does not align with the observations of his attitude over time. As the section on attitude demonstrated, Carter’s demeanor on intelligence varied substantially. Therefore, experience was unlikely to have been the cause of his very unfavorable attitude towards Korean intelligence.

Finally, the literature also suggests that psychological pathologies may explain the President’s attitude towards intelligence. Recent research has shown that psychological pathologies are a critical variable in determining intelligence usage (Bar-Joseph & McDermott, 2017). Rhodewalt and Peterson (2009) demonstrate that narcissism can affect attitudes, and Bar-Joseph and McDermott (2017) empirically tested the effect of narcissism and other psychological pathologies on intelligence usage. However, there is little evidence that Carter was narcissistic. Studies on three narcissism indices place Carter in the lower 50\textsuperscript{th} percentile in each category, lower than both Johnson and Reagan (Watts et al., 2013). As the previous chapters have demonstrated, attitudes towards intelligence can be unaffected by psychological pathologies, even in decision-makers with high levels of narcissism, such as Johnson. It is thus unlikely that
Carter’s very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on South Korean troop withdrawal was the result of personality-based explanations. While first-level explanations cannot explain the President’s attitude, the proximity hypothesis may provide some additional analytical leverage.

6.2.2 Proximity

As personality-based theories cannot explain Carter’s attitude, I explore here other potential causes. The implications of the proximity hypothesis suggest that relationships between consumers and intelligence producers can explain attitudes towards intelligence (Marrin, 2013). In this case, the proximity hypothesis would indicate that the President’s very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence was the result of a strained relationship with his advisors and intelligence staff. While Carter’s view of the I.C. prior to his inauguration was quite poor, this section argues that the policymaker’s relationship with his intelligence providers was overall positive, thus the proximity theory has little explanatory value in this case.

Carter primarily received his intelligence through his Director of C.I.A., Stansfield Turner, and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. However, as time progressed, Carter received fewer briefings from Turner, and scholars have described Brzezinski’s anxiety about allowing Turner access to the President (Andrew, 1995, p. 430). At the beginning of his presidency, Carter received briefings from Turner several times a week. Yet as time passed, the meetings decreased to just one every two weeks, with Brzezinski always present. Eventually, Brzezinski began to provide Carter with his briefings, and Turner, becoming discouraged, brought it up with the National Security Advisor. Brzezinski’s solution, rather than to include the D.C.I., was to rename the intelligence sessions “national security briefings” and maintain his role in the meetings (Priess, 2017b, p. 112). In this way, Brzezinski acted as a gatekeeper, meeting
with Turner privately and then reporting that which he deemed “appropriate” to Carter (Andrew, 1995; Brzezinski, 1983, p. 72). The proximity hypothesis suggests that a poor relationship with Brzezinski or Turner may have affected Carter’s attitude towards intelligence. However, there is no evidence to support this claim.

First, there is little data indicating that Carter and Turner’s relationship was poor or soured over time. Carter and Turner attended Annapolis at the same time, though they did not know one another personally. While their relationship was not strong, Carter did not speak poorly of Turner in his diary nor do any third-party accounts report animosity between the two. Carter’s diary entries referred to some of the D.C.I.’s briefings and described several of them as “superb” and he often requested more in-depth reports (Carter, 2010, pp. 252-253; Priess, 2017b). While briefings and interactions with Carter did decrease over time, there is no evidence to suggest that this was the result of a poor relationship. The President frequently invited Turner to advise on various issues, including the Iranian hostage crisis, I.C. management, Lebanon, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty negotiations, and more, and he communicated any concerns or criticisms directly (Carter, 2010; Gates, 1989, p. 21). Moreover, he trusted the D.C.I. to reorganize the I.C. and “put Stan in ultimate control of all the agencies,” a goal Carter considered a moral and organizational imperative (Carter, 2010, p. 32). Therefore, Turner’s reduced access to the President over time was unlikely to have been the result of a soured relationship. Hence, the next most probable explanation under the proximity hypothesis is Brzezinski’s expanding influence.

Carter describes his relationship with his national security advisor as “solid,” and this is very likely an understatement.106 Brzezinski was Carter’s chief foreign policy advisor and speechwriter during the 1976 campaign. Carter admittedly had little foreign policy experience,

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and Brzezinski was a former academic at Harvard and Columbia Universities. Early in the campaign, Carter became dependent on Brzezinski for his foreign policy education. Scholars have described Carter and Brzezinski’s relationship as “symbiotic” and going beyond “mere agreement.” Madeline Albright claimed that “‘Zbig’ really did have Carter’s mind” (Glad, 2009, pp. 36-37). Furthermore, there is evidence that their relationship grew stronger over the years. For instance, after Carter’s “unburdening” outside the Ambassador’s residence in Korea, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance reported Carter’s frustration. Vance claims that Carter felt “isolated, opposed by all his advisors except Zbig” (Glad, 2009, pp. 36-37; Vance, 1983, pp. 128-130). Even when Carter was at his most frustrated, he maintained a positive relationship with his national security advisor; and towards the end of his term in office, Carter awarded Brzezinski with the Medal of Freedom. This deepening relationship demonstrates that, despite Carter’s feelings about the intelligence, the President remained strongly connected to his intelligence provider.

Thus, there is neither correlational nor causal evidence to support the proximity hypothesis. This hypothesis contends that Carter’s unfavorable attitude towards intelligence on Korea was the result of his relationship with his advisors; but the data suggest that not only was Carter’s relationship with his intelligence staff strong, but he still felt this bond even during his emotional outburst.

6.2.3 Threat

As neither the personality nor the proximity hypotheses can explain President Carter’s attitude, a threat-based account may be more useful. If state sovereignty or survival is not at risk, a decision-maker may be more responsive to intelligence on a topic. Highly threatening
situations can result in progressively unfavorable attitudes, as policymakers must deal with distressing subjects. As previously discussed, low threat should therefore theoretically lead to favorable attitudes, and high threats to unfavorable attitudes.

In the case of the United States’ withdrawal of troops from South Korea, I argue that while the threat to U.S. interests was high, Carter did not perceive the situation as dangerous or disconcerting. U.S. troops were stationed at the border and on nearby bases, thus a North Korean invasion would guarantee U.S. casualties. Moreover, recent intelligence estimates had determined that, as a result of its build-up of armor and artillery, North Korea now outclassed its neighbor to the South. The intelligence in the summer of 1979 indicated a progressively mobile and offensively oriented force that could quickly punch through South Korean defenses. While the threat was seemingly high, Carter did not perceive it as so because his primary focus was humanitarian and not security-centric.

Although the military build-up was alarming to his intelligence and military advisors, Carter focused primarily on humanitarian-related and liberalization issues. He did not mention the threat during his outburst outside the Ambassador’s house in Korea, but instead focused on the question of “why Park was so resistant to some real measure of political liberalization” (Brown, 2011, p. 63; Gleysteen, 2012, p. 48). Several months later, in October 1979, Carter wrote a confidential letter to President Park Chung-Hee to express his distress about recent political repression. Rather than addressing security concerns, Carter mentioned “the liberalizing trend in human rights” several times in fewer than two pages (Ostermann, Person, & Kraus, 2013). In fact, in several meetings and personal letters to Park, Carter clearly favored discussion of liberalization over that of security concerns. This further illustrates that the President was more concerned with human rights abuses than with security interests. There is neither
correlational nor causal evidence to suggest that Carter’s attitude towards the intelligence has a threat-based explanation. While none of the alternative hypotheses can explain Carter’s very unfavorable attitude towards intelligence, the C.A.T.I. is able to do so.

6.2.4 The Cognitive-Affective Theory of Intelligence (C.A.T.I.)

Unlike the previous hypotheses, the C.A.T.I. can explain President Carter’s very unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence on Korea. The table below, reproduced from the chapter on theory, illustrates the measurement of my independent and conditional variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specificity</th>
<th>Type of Intelligence</th>
<th>Disconfirming</th>
<th>Confirmatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Unfavorable</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carter and U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very Unfavorable</td>
<td>Very Favorable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6-2: Carter Hypothesis Prediction

The evidence shows that Carter received unspecific, disconfirming evidence when he was strongly committed to his plan to withdraw troops from the Korean Peninsula. As a result, he exhibited a negative attitude towards the intelligence that indicated flaws in his strategy. The remaining three sections of this chapter describe the explanatory power of C.A.T.I. for the Carter case. First, I show the President’s high level of commitment to human rights and the withdrawal
of troops from Korea, highlighting how Carter linked these issues through his campaign promises and personal beliefs. Second, the type and specificity of the intelligence Carter received are operationalized; and it is demonstrated that Carter received unspecific, disconfirming intelligence while highly committed to troop withdrawal due to Korea’s poor human rights record. In summary, the President’s commitment and intelligence led to his very unfavorable attitude.

6.2.4.1 Commitment

In the psychology literature, commitment is measured by the five components of vested interest: stake, saliency, certainty, immediacy, and self-efficacy (Crano, 1995). President Carter’s commitment to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea was high, as evidenced by high levels of all five elements. As Secretary of State Cyrus Vance states, “Almost all of us had serious misgivings, but the President, having made such strong public commitments so early, still felt strongly about it” (Vance, 1983, p. 129). Ultimately, Carter’s strict adherence to a perceived morally based foreign policy resulted in a high commitment.

Stake, or the “Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to the attitude object,” is the first component of commitment (Crano, 1995, p. 148). Crano (1995) argues that the greater the stake, the stronger the attitude. In this case, Carter’s stake in the withdrawal was high, as evidenced by his strong personal convictions. The next section on saliency discusses the relevance of the troop withdrawal to Carter’s political goals, and it is clear from his personal conviction alone that his stake was high.

For example, although Carter declared as early as 1976 his plans to withdraw, he decided it was important to reaffirm security commitments to the South Korean President. On February 15th, 1977, Carter penned a letter to Park Chung-Hee, stating his intentions for a gradual
withdrawal and a $275 million defense loan and sharing his personal feelings about Korea’s human rights track record. After detailing the support the United States intended to provide to its Asian ally, Carter added a caveat:

At the same time there is in the Congress, which must approve these requests, and in other important groups in the United States, a continuing concern about human rights issues throughout the world. It is a concern which I deeply share, over the rights of the individual, particularly as they relate to personal liberty, due process and imprisonment … Just as we intend to defend our relationships with your country, particularly in the security field, I request that you give consideration to what can be done in the human rights area in Korea. I ask you to consider how you could help deal with this question, which is of personal and public importance, and let me know your views (Ostermann et al., 2013, p. 53).

With this reference to the role of Congress, Carter implicitly stated that support for Korea would be contingent upon improvements in its human rights record. Though this was almost certainly intended as a bargaining statement to elicit concessions on human rights, Carter mentioned twice that this subject was of personal importance to him. The addition of personal import provided no additional bargaining leverage, but merely highlighted Carter’s stake in the issue. In other words, Carter’s personal convictions regarding human rights resulted in his high stake in the argument for Korean troop withdrawal. In addition, Carter inextricably linked the withdrawal of U.S. troops to this support, presenting his bargaining chip to leverage political change in Korea (Wood & Zelikow, 1996, p. 103).

Furthermore, there is evidence that Carter’s foreign policy focus was not merely rhetoric or the result of domestic politics. While it is true that the revelations about C.I.A. covert action altered both congressional and constituent positions on human rights, Carter’s focus on human rights was as personally as it was political. For instance, in a private, personal letter to Nicaraguan dictator Somoza, he wrote, “Steps toward respecting human rights you are considering are important and heartening signs; and, as they are translated into actions, will mark
a major advance in answering some of the criticisms recently aimed at the Nicaraguan
government” (Schmitz & Walker, 2004, p. 138).” Here are therefore at least two examples of

Carter’ reaching out personally to leaders with questionable human rights records.
Some argue that Carter’s morally focused foreign policy was due to his religious
upbringing and practice. Rice (2018) and Smith (2011) both contend that Carter’s I.R. goals were
the result of his faith. There is some evidence for this proposition. Carter has described himself
as deeply religious and prayed every day, and one of his memoirs is even called Keeping Faith
(Richardson, 1998). While Carter did sever his connection with the Southern Baptist Convention
in 2000, this was only to establish a new organization, New Baptist Covenant, which more

closely aligned with his beliefs. Another example of the President’s religiosity was seen during
his trip to Korea in 1979, when he tried to convert President Park. In the car on the way to the
airport, Carter asked about Park’s religious beliefs. When the Korean leader said he had none,
the U.S. President said, “I’d like for one of the Baptists to explain our faith, and would send Billy
Kim [Korean Baptist pastor] to see him” (Carter, 2010, p. 339). From these examples, it is clear
that Carter’s policy resulted in his high stake.

The second component of commitment is saliency, or relevance to the policymaker’s
goals. There is significant evidence that the withdrawal of Korean troops was highly salient for
Carter. First, as previously mentioned, the plan to withdraw from the peninsula was the result of
his human rights policies. During his campaign and throughout his presidency, Carter repeatedly
committed to his campaign promise of withdrawal (Choi, 2017, p. 951; Wood & Zelikow, 1996).
One example of this was his address to the Foreign Policy Association on June 23rd, 1976, when
Carter stated his intention to

withdraw our ground forces from South Korea on a phased basis over a time span to be
determined after consultation with both South Korea and Japan. At the same time, it
should be made clear to the South Korean Government that its internal oppression is repugnant to our people, and undermines the support of our commitment there (Brown, 2011, pp. 19-20).

Carter evidently drew an inextricable connection between President Park’s human rights record and his foreign policy goals. Not only did Carter articulate the salience of this policy in public, but he also conveyed this message to his advisors. In a handwritten note to Cyrus Vance and Brzezinski on March 5th, 1977, Carter made three points: first, that American forces would be withdrawn, but air coverage would continue; second, that U.S.-Korean relations were at an all-time low; and third, “Present military aid support and my reticence on human rights issue will be temporary unless Park voluntarily adopts some open change re political prisoners” (Brown, 2011, pp. 27-28).\(^{107}\) By linking his policy of withdrawal and military aid to Korea with his human rights goals, Carter demonstrated that this policy was highly salient for him.\(^{108}\) Even the South Koreans understood the link between U.S. troop withdrawal and human rights foreign policy. A declassified assessment from the South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive reported that, “The U.S. is expected to cite human rights issues in strengthening its position regarding U.S. troop withdrawal, reduction of the Armed Forces Assistance for Korea, and ROK itself” (Ostermann et al., 2013, p. 21).

Second, in addition to the linkage between the two topics, human rights were a key part of the President’s foreign policy. Scholars have highlighted the moral dimension of Carter’s foreign policy preceding and throughout his presidency (Choi, 2017). Indeed, Carter sought to reset the world opinion following various intelligence debacles, including the recent Watergate scandal. It is important to note that not only was there a moral dimension of his foreign policy

\(^{107}\) Carter described himself as ‘reticent’ on the issue of foreign rights, despite his consistent public messaging. Also see “Memo from President Carter to Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance, March 5, 1977,” NSA Brz. Matl. Collection, Box 43, 22, Jimmy Carter Library.

\(^{108}\) Also see: (Im, 2006, p. 168) and (Cumings, 2005, p. 384).
writ large, Carter also made “human rights a key element of all discussions and considerations of American foreign policy” (Schmitz & Walker, 2004, p. 114). Therefore, Carter linked his withdrawal policy with his human rights policy in an attempt to both persuade South Korean leadership to liberalize and punish it for its recalcitrance. As Carter’s human rights policy was highly salient, so too was his policy on troop removal.

*Certainty* is the third component of commitment, and this is defined as the confidence that the decision-maker has in the ramifications of their action or inaction. In this case, certainty was high, as Carter was convinced that withdrawing troops would not be problematic for U.S. interest. Two pieces of evidence illustrate this point. First, the Top-Secret Presidential Review Memorandum (P.R.M.) N.S.C.-10 shows that Carter believed deterrence would be unaffected by troop withdrawal and planned for the United States to switch to a more flexible naval strategy. Although there was dissent by the J.C.S. and other military strategists, P.R.M./N.S.C.-10 says,

> Once the US land forces are out of Korea, the United States has transformed its presence in Asia from a land-based posture to an offshore posture. This … provides the United States flexibility to determine at the time whether it should or should not get involved in a local war (Wood & Zelikow, 1996, p. 100).

Notwithstanding outspoken military officials such as Vessey and Singlaub, Carter was certain that the United States could deter North Korean aggression. In fact, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, the man in charge of writing the P.R.M. that preceded P.R.M./N.S.C.-10, was not permitted to offer the option of *not* withdrawing (Vance, 1983, p. 128). Furthermore, the strategy also relied on reducing commitment by allowing the United States to enter a war of its own volition. This was an unambiguous shift from the previous “tripwire” policies that had tied policymaker hands. In other words, if U.S.

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ground forces remained and the North Koreans attacked, there would certainly be casualties, thereby forcing the United States into a local war. But Carter was confident that his withdrawal policy would provide increased flexibility.

Additionally, Carter was convinced that the withdrawal would not affect South Korean security and U.S. national interests to the extent that his detractors suggested. On January 19th, 1979, Carter wrote in his diary that he would continue to reassess the “withdrawal issue,” but could not see why there was a problem. He wrote, “Although North Korea has built up additional forces, a countervailing factor is the extremely good economic circumstances in South Korea, which lets them defend themselves, plus the restraint that China might place on North Korea” (Carter, 2010, p. 279). Thus, certainty was high, as there is evidence that Carter was self-assured that his withdrawal strategy would not have a significant impact on U.S. interests or Korean security.

Another aspect of Carter’s high certainty was his confidence that troop removal would push the South Koreans to improve their human rights practices. Scholars have argued that one reason South Korea became the primary target of Carter’s liberalization policy was the country’s reliance on U.S. military power and “the questionable nature of its leadership” (Choi, 2017, p. 935). As such, Carter was convinced that the threat of a U.S. withdrawal would have liberalizing effects. He made this notion clear on June 23rd, 1976, when he argued, “I believe that it will be possible to withdraw our ground forces from South Korea … At the same time, it should be made clear to the South Korean government that its internal oppression is repugnant to our people, and undermines the support of our commitment there” (Choi, 2017, p. 935). Not only was the President sure that his plan would not result in strategic vulnerability, he was also
convinced that his leverage of troop removal would push the Koreans to change their domestic policy.

The fourth aspect of commitment is *immediacy*. This is defined as the perceived time between potential action/inaction and its consequences; and there is evidence that, while Carter called for a “gradual withdrawal,” immediacy was actually high. In an interview with Bill Moyers on P.B.S. in May 1975, then-candidate Carter suggested the removal of all land forces from South Korea over a three- to four-year period (Brown, 2011, p. 19; Carter, 1975). One year later, in the aforementioned Foreign Policy Association speech, the Presidential hopeful altered his schedule to a phased time span to be determined after consultation with his advisors. By March 1977, he had solidified his timetable from his speech nine months earlier. Carter himself announced that all ground forces would be removed in four to five years, and this plan was reiterated in June of that year.

Regardless of the President’s shifting timetable, military officials and foreign policy specialists believed that the withdrawal was too rapid; the J.C.S., for example, “favored a much long phasing out of troops if a withdrawal had to occur” (Wood & Zelikow, 1996, pp. 101-102). Holbrooke’s final submission of the P.R.M. recommended slower and more cautious withdrawal rates, limited to support and ground troops. Additionally, this downgrade would be supplemented by significant U.S. airpower (Vance, 1983, p. 128). It is evident from the President’s plan that he felt the immediacy of withdrawal more keenly than his advisors. Although he progressively updated his plan at the behest of his advisors, the fact that each of his timetables was far hastier than his staff felt comfortable with suggests high immediacy.

In addition, there was also a sense of immediacy with regard to the removal of U.S. military aid as leverage for liberalization. In a memorandum from Brzezinski to President Carter,
the National Security Advisor reported that South Koreans were beginning to make slight changes to their human rights record, but the situation could change at any moment:

Seoul, in response to U.S. concern over human rights issues, is loosening, slightly, its constraints against domestic dissent, but the trend could be reversed at any time. The recent favorable signs include Seoul’s decision not to carry out the death sentence imposed on a theology student recently convinced of espionage and the slight relaxation of press censorship (Ostermann et al., 2013, p. 47).

The memo, titled “Information Items” and sent on February 7th, 1977, illustrated Carter’s desire to make early gains on human rights policy in South Korea. Looking to seize the initiative less than a month later, Carter wrote a handwritten note to Brzezinski and Vance: “Park must understand … Present military aid support and my reticence on human rights issue will be temporary unless Park voluntarily adopts some open change re political prisoners” (Ostermann et al., 2013, p. 77). Thus, Carter demonstrated a sense of immediacy on the removal of troops as a mechanism for human rights liberalization.

The final element of commitment is self-efficacy, or the policymaker’s perception that the actions are within their capabilities. There are several reasons to believe that Carter’s self-efficacy on withdrawal from South Korea was high. First, there was his continued insistence – despite blowback from domestic audiences, Korean leadership, and his own military and intelligence professionals. While a plan as a candidate to withdraw troops may seem like an empty promise, Carter continued to push for withdrawal, years into his presidency. Less than ten days after being sworn into office, Carter released P.R.M./N.S.C.-13, which directed his staff to reexamine U.S. policy towards North Korea. Several months later, in September of 1977, the President announced that he would continue with the withdrawal, regardless of whether Congress passed a military aid package (Ostermann et al., 2013, p. ix).
Two years after P.R.M./N.S.C.-13, he continued to push for the withdrawal policy. In January 1979, he again requested a comprehensive review of “U.S. objectives and policies towards Korea in the light of recent developments affecting the Korean peninsula.” It was not until the leak of a C.I.A. intelligence report and his disastrous meeting with Park in the summer of 1979 that he recanted his strategy. Thus, even in the face of opposition, both domestic and foreign, Carter’s self-efficacy regarding the removal of troops from South Korea was high. In sum, as each component of Carter’s commitment to Korean withdrawal was high, we can conclude that the President’s overall commitment to the policy was high. In fact, when facing opposition from Congress, “Carter was unable to present it with any convincing rationale for his plan. His only valid justification was the reminder that the ‘troop withdrawal is my campaign pledge’” (Choi, 2017, p. 951).^{111}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Stake</td>
<td>Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to the attitude object</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saliency</td>
<td>Relevance to decision-maker’s goals.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainty</td>
<td>Confidence in the ramifications</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediacy</td>
<td>The time between potential action/inaction and consequences</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-efficacy</td>
<td>The perception that actions are within the capability of decision-maker</td>
<td>High</td>
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</tbody>
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6.2.4.2 Intelligence Specificity

While Carter was highly committed to his plan, the intelligence he received on Korea was often unspecific. As the C.A.T.I. predicts, Carter wanted specific information when making decisions, and this was increasingly evident during the Korean withdrawal debacle. Intelligence specificity concerns the information’s level of detail. As the chapter on theory outlines, this variable is dichotomized as low and high specificity. Low specificity, or what Dahl calls “strategic-level intelligence,” includes that which addresses general intentions, chatter, unspecific threats, and general warnings (Dahl, 2013a, p. 22). This section shows that while Carter preferred specific intelligence, including tactical and technical reports, the intelligence he received was unspecific.

First, there is a substantial amount of evidence from both Carter himself and third-party observers that, like other policymakers, Carter preferred detailed and specific intelligence. For example, on multiple occasions, the President expressed interest in satellite imagery and psychological profiles (Andrew, 1995; Priess, 2017b). Both imagery and psychological profiles allow the reader to delve into the minutiae and see tanks, Soviet missiles, and test sites. As an engineer, Carter relished in the details. While satellite imagery and psychological profiles could constitute strategic-level intelligence, the cases towards which Carter displayed a favorable attitude were often more tactical and specific. For example, he mentioned in his diary, “Stan Turner’s intelligence briefing was a videotape of the South African nuclear test site episode that showed data collection through satellites, photography, and electronic signal analysis, [and it was] superb” (Carter, 2010, pp. 252-253).

In addition, Carter was interested in specific, non-technical pieces. The C.I.A. veteran and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates wrote that the President had a penchant for reading whole papers and often had trouble distinguishing between interesting and essential (Gates,
1989, p. 20). When Carter first became president-elect, he would request follow-ups and further details after briefings. This happened often enough that it got the attention of Richard Kerr, the P.D.B. manager at the time, who noted, “We thought he was more interested in detail, so we started to do pieces with a little more richness and substance to them” (Priess, 2017b, p. 127). Carter concurred with this notion, saying, “A brief outline in the P.D.B. would not fulfill my desire for a more thorough understanding” (Priess, 2017b, p. 118). It is thus evident that Carter preferred specific intelligence.

Although Carter was interested in specific, detail-oriented intelligence, the information he received on Korea was not of this nature. Of the three pieces of intelligence supplied to the President on May 10th, 1978, one had particular analytical value (the other pieces are discussed in the subsequent section) in this case. “Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula,” produced by the C.I.A.’s National Foreign Assessment Center, bears a striking resemblance to the “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States” that L.B.J. received ten years earlier. While the report that L.B.J. received on Arab and Israeli military assets preceding the Six-Day War was specific, Carter’s intelligence was not. For example, the 1967 piece included an order of battle for each type of weaponry, in addition to a qualitative assessment of each side.112 Conversely, “Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula” only contained advantage ratios and provided little other than, “The North has achieved an approximate two-to-one advantage in numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery,” and, “holds a substantial numerical edge in combat aircraft, but the South has better planes” (Ostermann et al., 2013, p. 315). For President Carter, who had a penchant for specifics, this was likely insufficient information. In fact, on the following page of the assessment is an analysis of Chinese military aid to North Korea. Carter underlined almost

Additionally, the warnings in the Arab-Israeli piece were far more specific. The key judgments of the 1967 intelligence estimate concluded as follows:

Israel could almost certainly attain air superiority over the Sinai Peninsula in 24 hours after taking the initiative, or in two or three days if the U.A.R. [the United Arab Republic, referring to Egypt and Syria] struck first. In the latter case, Israel might lose up to half of
its air force. We estimate that armored striking forces could breach the U.A.R.’s double defense line in the Sinai within several days.\[^{113}\]

By contrast, the Korean Peninsula piece was far more ambiguous and less specific. The analysts wrote that a successful invasion would “be dependent upon several factors,” and provided several caveats. The overall judgment of the piece is unambiguous and straightforward, as it is clear the I.C. believed the North Koreans had a substantial advantage. That said, the details and specifics of the piece are not only lacking in comparison to similar intelligence estimates, but also fail to provide the level of detail that Carter appreciated. The comparison of L.B.J.’s intelligence preceding the Six-Day War with Carter’s material on Korea is merely to illustrate how two seemingly alike pieces, can – under different circumstances – elicit such different attitudes towards intelligence. Indeed, Carter was more accustomed to intelligence with a “little more richness and substance.” Dick Kerr, the analyst who managed the P.D.B. at the time, added graphics, charts, photos, and other specific items, demonstrating that Carter had received more specific intelligence in the past (Priess, 2017b, p. 127).

### 6.2.4.3 The type of Intelligence

Not only was the intelligence unspecific, but it was also disconfirming. Intelligence type is measured based on preconceived notions. The two discrete measures of the type of intelligence are confirmatory (supportive of policy) and disconfirming (implicitly or explicitly critical of the prospects for success of the current policy). Confirmatory intelligence is information that conforms to the decision-maker’s previously held notions and/or beliefs. For example, if a policymaker believes that enemy forces are preparing for an attack, and subsequent intelligence reports confirm these suspicions, that would be categorized as confirmatory intelligence.

Conversely, disconfirming intelligence contradicts or challenges the decision-maker’s preconceived beliefs.

In the case of Carter and the Korean Peninsula, the President’s preconceived notions were clear. First, he believed that troop withdrawal from the country would not dramatically alter the strategic position of the United States (Choi, 2017, p. 936). Carter assumed that deterrence would still be credible with air cover and an off-shore presence. A Policy Review Committee Meeting titled “Korea,” on April 21st, 1977, succinctly described the preexisting understanding:

There was general agreement with the Intelligence Community’s assessment that the North enjoys a substantial advantage in the static military balance between the forces of North and South Korea alone. The prevailing view was that U.S. ground combat forces can be withdrawn from Korea without undermining the deterrent, provided our troops are withdrawn slowly, we offer substantial assistance to the Republic of Korea in augmenting its firepower and overcoming other deficiencies in its defenses, consult closely with the South Koreans and Japan on this issue, and remain prepared to provide air, naval, and logistic support for the foreseeable future (Ostermann et al., 2013, pp. 98-100).

Moreover, as previously mentioned, the President also thought that regional and domestic factors would prevent northern aggression. He held that South Korea’s bustling economy in conjunction with China’s constraint on the North’s actions would be sufficient (Carter, 2010, p. 279).

The second preconceived notion that the President held related to human rights, which Carter believed to be a significant issue in South Korea. This was evidenced by his continued push for liberalization over a five-year period. Yet, the intelligence that Carter received was also disconfirming of this notion.

Throughout Carter’s presidency, the intelligence he received diverged from his belief that a withdrawal would not affect South Korean security or U.S. interests. In May of 1977, General Singlaub expressed his concerns over the President’s policies in front of Congress:

Singlaub highlighted recent intelligence findings that showed the significant reinforcement of North Korean armed forces and argued that South Korea would be in grave danger if U.S. troops left as scheduled. He also emphasized that this view was
almost universally held in the U.S. military in South Korea and elsewhere (Choi, 2017, p. 935).

Two weeks later, Secretary of Defense Brown and diplomat Philip Habib testified in front of the Senate. A confidential memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, dated June 10th, 1977, described the session. Several senators, after meeting with intelligence officials, became increasingly concerned with the Korean threat:

The CIA briefing was extremely pessimistic, raising serious questions about the wisdom of your policy … Concern was expressed over whether you had access to this intelligence before you made your decision on Korean troop withdrawals. Even Senator Humphrey, who supported your decision, indicated that it was an extremely serious matter and deserved the most careful study by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Others were even less positive in their comments (Ostermann et al., 2013, pp. 167-168)

The I.C. continued to release reports that were disconfirming to Carter’s preconceived notions. The two intelligence pieces published on May 10th, 1978, were disconfirming of the President’s national security and human rights policies. First, Carter described the key judgments in the aforementioned “Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula” as “absurd.” A year later, S.N.I.E. 12.2 1-79, “Northern Korean Military Capabilities and Intentions,” continued this disconfirming trend. The report argued that North Korea could attack with little warning and the “presence of US forces in the South,” in addition to other factors, were a deterrent to North Korean leaders.114

This stood in clear contradiction to Carter’s strategy to adjust to an offshore presence. Indeed, if North Korea could attack as suddenly as the I.C. claimed, the President’s naval strategy would be ineffectual.

Second, the C.I.A.’ intelligence on U.S.-South Korean relations also disconfirmed Carter’s notions around human rights. While Carter believed his moralistic foreign policy would

be welcomed by the South Korean people, the I.C. found the reverse. The document, “US-South Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects,” found that although relations were improving, there were several nascent issues, one of which was human rights. Despite the President’s intentions, “There is lingering resentment in Korea over what [redacted] a majority of the Korean public [redacted] regard as unwarranted US interference in Korean affairs” (Ostermann et al., 2013, p. 325). Despite Carter’s insistence that the South Korean people wanted liberalization, the I.C. estimates provided a different account.

In sum, the I.C. produced many intelligence estimates that were disconfirming of Carter’s preconceived notions. These estimates were also unspecific, despite the President’s clear proclivity for details and specific intelligence. Carter made commitments early in his candidacy but continued to receive the unspecific disconfirming intelligence as he doubled down on his strategy. This led to a very unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence, eventually culminating in Carter’s angry outbursts following his discussion of intelligence estimates and human rights with President Park Chung-Hee in July 1979. In the case of Carter’s plan to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, the C.A.T.I. is the only theory supported by causal logic to predict the outcome. Moreover, it is the only explanation able to explain the President’s attitude at the time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical claim</th>
<th>Outcome predicted?</th>
<th>Causal logic supported?</th>
<th>Attitude explained?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personality</td>
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<td>Proximity hypothesis</td>
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</table>
6.3 Conclusions and Implications

This chapter explored why President Carter displayed such an unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence on South Korea. The President committed to a policy as a nominee and received several intelligence estimates over his term that were contrary to his goals. Furthermore, as Carter was a former navy officer and engineer with a proclivity for details, the unspecific intelligence is also likely to have influenced his attitude.

One can see both similarities and differences between this and the L.B.J. chapter. First, both Carter and L.B.J. were vocal about their strongly negative opinions of the C.I.A. and the U.S. intelligence apparatus. However, in this case, Carter’s very unfavorable attitude is in striking contrast to the favorable attitude of L.B.J. This demonstrates the power of the C.A.T.I. for explaining different outcomes of similar circumstances. While “Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula” and “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States” shared some similarities (as “who will win” pieces”), both the situations and the intelligence differed. Johnson was uncommitted and the intelligence he received was specific and confirmatory. Conversely, Carter was highly committed to his policy, and the intelligence was unspecific and disconfirming. These factors explain the significant deviations in their respective attitudes towards the intelligence they received.

There are also similarities with the Reagan case study. In fact, both are paradoxical success stories for intelligence producers. In both cases, the decision-makers were inclined to reject the disconfirming intelligence; and in each case, the I.C. reaffirmed its conclusions. Likewise, both Reagan and Carter did the “painful” thing and shifted their policies: Reagan withdrew troops from Lebanon and Carter abandoned his plan to remove troops from the Korean Peninsula. To some extent, the cases defy expectations in that the Presidents exhibited anger and
rejection, but ultimately decided on rational reconsiderations of policy. Ultimately, this case shows the explanatory power of the C.A.T.I.
7.0 Chapter 7: Eisenhower’s Spycraft

“There is no glory in this business ... if it is successful, it can’t be told”\textsuperscript{115}

- Dwight D. Eisenhower

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was sworn into office on January 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1953, with two lofty and seemingly disparate goals: to balance the military budget and to stem the spread of communism around the world. To achieve both, Eisenhower commissioned Project Solarium, a strategic examination of foreign policy and defense objectives to meet the challenges facing the new administration. The findings of Project Solarium led to N.S.C. 162/2, which underpinned Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy and emphasized massive nuclear retaliation against Soviet offensive actions. By focusing the U.S’ response to Soviet actions on nuclear weapons, as opposed to conventional military force, Eisenhower hoped to reduce the cost of national defense.

A lesser known aspect of N.S.C. 162/2 was its discussion of the role of covert action operations in combatting the communist threat. The president believed that the cost of covert action, compared to large-scale military operations, was minuscule and represented a “silver bullet that could slay communist-dominated puppet governments easily and almost with impunity” (Callanan, 2009, p. 93; Daugherty, 2006, p. 140). Considering the President’s goals and beliefs regarding covert action, it is useful to examine his attitude towards intelligence on the subject. A focus on one topic provides a static measurement for some variables, while others can

fluctuate significantly. As such, although the goal of many clandestine operations during the Eisenhower administration was the containment of communism, there were differences in other aspects of each case, such as the threat level, commitment, and type of intelligence. For example, as this chapter illustrates, Eisenhower’s policies intended to halt the spread of communism in Indonesia, Guatemala, Iran, and elsewhere, all had varying levels of commitment, threat, and intelligence. Furthermore, cases such as Dien Bien Phu and Sputnik, although related to the communist menace, also demonstrated different levels of threat, policy commitment, and intelligence. In other words, studying Eisenhower’s varying attitudes towards intelligence on multiple cases of covert action can enable a like-for-like comparison.

This chapter also covers Eisenhower’s attitude towards other topics, such as the Sputnik launch, Dien Bien Phu, and aerial reconnaissance programs. By examining cases outside the purview of covert action, we add a breadth of analysis and more generalizability to test the C.A.T.I. Five separate mini-cases are presented to test Eisenhower’s attitude and examine the generalizability of the C.A.T.I. for Eisenhower throughout his presidency and on a variety of topics. While there is a growing body of literature on Eisenhower’s role in intelligence and the national security enterprise during his presidency (Immerman, 2010, p. 10), few studies have examined his attitude towards intelligence. Although some theorists have contended that Eisenhower pursued strategies regardless of the intelligence, the theoretical and empirical gap here is significant (Bowie & Immerman, 1998; Dockrill, 1996, pp. 17-18; Eisenhower, 1965; Pickett, 2000, pp. 9-33) As Immerman (2008) argued on Eisenhower and the role of intelligence:

Intelligence need not disconfirm a predisposition or preexisting belief in order to matter. Confirming or reinforcing evidence is no less valuable than that which disconfirms or disproves. Further, because intelligence in the aggregate is ambiguous to some degree, the product of the process, no matter how well informed that process, cannot be judged in terms of absolutes. Rarely if ever is a policy preference or option, when correlated to the intelligence received, categorically “right” or “wrong.” Yet if one can discern patterns
and draw generalizations by surveying the history of the Cold War, one can arrive at reasonable judgments about what distinguishes the rules from the exceptions that prove those rules.

Indeed, Immerman’s argument is that intelligence need not necessarily affect the decision of a policymaker, but this does not diminish the value of intelligence, nor the attitude towards it. That said, Immerman’s conclusion provides a more skeptical conclusion. He argues that, “Instances of the formulation of national security policy, or grand strategy, hinging on intelligence collection and analysis are few and far between – if they exist at all.” The C.A.T.I. may provide more insight into this observation. This chapter seeks to test Immerman’s assertion within the context of Eisenhower’s presidency, and the C.A.T.I. will apply this across multiple policymakers.

7.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter progresses differently from the previous chapters due to the mini-case study approach I have taken. As there are multiple cases, there are multiple perceived levels of threat. In addition, if the C.A.T.I. is correct, Eisenhower will have had varying attitudes towards intelligence, and each must be examined. This chapter focuses more on the correlational relationship between attitudes towards intelligence and my independent and conditional variables. As I cannot go as in-depth for the five cases, I instead demonstrate the overarching correlation between the variables, while previous chapters have expounded more elaborately on the causal elements of the theory.

The chapter develops as follows: first, I delve into each mini-case, examining Eisenhower’s perceived threat level and attitude towards the intelligence he received at the time. Following this, I measure the situational variables articulated in the C.A.T.I.: commitment,
intelligence type, and intelligence specificity. I then test the other two alternative explanations for Eisenhower’s attitude towards the intelligence: personality/experience and proximity. These theories, unlike the C.A.T.I., are neither logically nor empirically linked to the President’s attitude. In the conclusion, there is a discussion of the overarching themes and the chapter’s contribution to intelligence theory and practice. Below is the table of the cases examined in this dissertation.

![Low Commitment Hypotheses](image)

**Low Commitment**

Type of Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disconfirming</th>
<th>Confirmatory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Case: Dien Bien Phu</em></td>
<td><em>Case: Sputnik</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Case: Operation HAIK</em></td>
<td><em>Case: LBJ and the Six Day War</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7-1: Eisenhower Low Commitment Hypotheses
The first case in this chapter examines Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence on Dien Bien Phu. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, between the communist Vietminh and the French Far East Expeditionary Corps, began on March 13th, 1954, and ended less than two months later, on May 7th, 1954, with a decisive victory by the communist forces. The French military strategy to “hedgehog,” or fortify an area and defend it with airpower, failed as a result of poor analogizing on the part of the French decision-makers. The plan was based on the French Battle of Na San, where the strategy had been properly employed; but the situation at Dien Bien Phu differed in two significant ways. First, the Vietnamese General, O Nguyen Giap, learned his lesson and did not recklessly attack the fortification as he had done one year earlier. Second, French artillery was outclassed and did not have the high ground, leading to a one-sided barrage.

While the United States provided some covert and substantial financial support,
Eisenhower and other European allies decided against aiding the French. The loss to the communists in Indochina lead to a split Vietnam, with communist Ho Chi Minh in control of the north and Emperor Bao Dai ruling the south. Leading up to the battle, Eisenhower received military and political intelligence updates from his staff. Ultimately, Eisenhower’s unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence he received on Dien Bien Phu provides further support for the C.A.T.I.

7.2.1 Eisenhower’s Attitude Towards the Intelligence

As discussed in Chapter 3, verbal signals can provide evidence of an attitude. If President Eisenhower had an unfavorable attitude towards intelligence, one would expect verbiage including terms such as “upset,” “annoyed,” “frustrated,” “opposed,” “disproved,” “anxious,” “dislike,” and “unhappy.” Shortly after receiving military and intelligence updates from Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower used several of these aforementioned words.

For example, preceding the Battle at Dien Bien Phu, there was some evidence that the French would eventually be overrun. On January 8th, 1954, D.C.I. Allen Dulles and Admiral Radford, Chairman of the J.C.S., briefed the President on the situation. Dulles claimed that the French, while in no immediate danger, were surrounded, and Radford claimed that the French might lose the fortification.\textsuperscript{116} After asking several clarifying questions, the President reached the conclusion that either the French “don’t know what do to” or they want the United States to become secretly involved. He responded to the intelligence update with, according to the stenographer, “great force,” saying, “I can not tell you, said the President with vehemence, how

bitterly opposed I am to such a course of action. This war in Indochina would absorb our troops by divisions!”. The “great force” and “vehemence” described by the notetaker, as well as Ike’s bitter opposition to the implications of the intelligence, together illustrate an unfavorable attitude. In the same N.S.C. meeting, the President described himself as “anxious … to keep our men out of the jungles”.

While it is possible that his words are reflective of his attitude towards the situation, evidence suggests that this is probably not the case. First, Eisenhower himself described his reaction to the situation, and this description puts his reaction to the intelligence into context. In an interview, he said he was “disgusted with the situation at Dien Bien Phu. ‘As a soldier … I was horror stricken. I just said, my goodness, you don’t pen troops in a fortress, and all history shows that they are just going to be cut to pieces’” (Hadley, 2009, p. 81). The president’s self-described reaction to the situation is far more unfavorable than his reaction to the intelligence briefings. This suggests that the more toned-down attitude was likely the result of the intelligence briefings and the concern that the United States might need to intervene.

Second, while there is a dearth of verbal indicators, President Eisenhower’s behavior and physical manifestations further indicate an unfavorable attitude. While this is discussed shortly, other indicators of his attitude towards the intelligence match his words, which provides further evidence of his attitude towards intelligence, not the situation. That said, there are few verbal indicators of Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence.

The second indicator of attitude is physical manifestations. Someone with an unfavorable attitude would be expected to exhibit a gloomy or somber disposition. There is some evidence in the President’s physical manifestations of his unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence. One

117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
example is the “great force” and “vehemence” with which he was said to have expressed his opinion. While this is neither gloomy nor somber, it does show a level of emotion that is likely – at a minimum – to be unfavorable. In addition, it provides correlational evidence for the C.A.T.I.

Second, Eisenhower had a notable temper, thus the lack of physical expression provides evidence for an unfavorable attitude:

[Eisenhower was known for his] “legendary temper, which he struggled – usually unsuccessfully – all his life to control. When angry, he could not keep the bright red color out of his face, and the back of his neck would become red as a beet, but he did manage to sit perfectly still. Under his desk, however, he would tear his handkerchief into tiny bits, down to the individual strands of cotton. When he finished, there would be a loose ball of cotton strands at his feet, and no handkerchief” (Ambrose & Immerman, 1999, p. 256).

The absence of an outburst by the policymaker following the intelligence briefing indicates that he did not have a very unfavorable attitude. As other indicators do show such an attitude, therefore, we can say with some confidence that his attitude was unfavorable.

The final indicator of attitude is behavior. As Chapter 3 illustrated, behaviors indicating an unfavorable attitude include uninterest, pessimism, disagreement, and defensive approaches. There are several instances of Eisenhower reacting with disagreement and defensiveness to intelligence updates from Allen Dulles. For instance, on February 4th, 1954, less than a month after the January 8th N.S.C. meeting, Allen Dulles delivered a “disheartening” briefing about communist support among the Vietnamese. He claimed there was evidence that most people in Vietnam supported the Vietminh rebels. Eisenhower interrupted the briefing to ask about the religious angle of the conflict and whether a Vietnamese religious leader could be bolstered to stop the communist takeover. During the aside, both Allen Dulles and Vice President Richard Nixon argued that this was very unlikely, while the President remained “undaunted” in his
disagreement with the pessimistic intelligence and the briefer’s rebuttal.\textsuperscript{119} After some additional questions about French intelligence, Dulles returned to his briefing, reading a summary of the C.B.S. newscast from that morning.

In the following N.S.C. meeting on February 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1954, Allen Dulles led with his usual intelligence report and finished with an additional rebuke of the President’s idea from the previous week, “Referring to the discussion of last week, Mr. Dulles said that … the possibilities of developing more dynamic leadership in Vietnam, with particular reference to the President’s emphasis on religious dynamism … thus far had not been very helpful.”\textsuperscript{120}

Later in that meeting, and after the briefing had concluded, Ike complained about his intelligence support. He “commented on the extraordinary confusion in the reports which reached him from the area of Indochina. There were almost as many judgments as there were authors of messages”.\textsuperscript{121} While unrelated to the comment on religious leadership in Indochina, this nevertheless demonstrates his unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence.

The following month, on March 18\textsuperscript{th}, Eisenhower received another briefing during an N.S.C. meeting. Dulles said that while the eventual outcome would be impossible to predict, the French forces were outnumbered by more than two to one. Despite this discouraging report, the President disagreed the situation was as dire as the intelligence suggested. Ike commented that “The odds of two to one in numbers were not really very heavily against the French, in view of the fact that they were fighting from prepared and heavily fortified positions.”\textsuperscript{122} Thus, there is sufficient evidence in Eisenhower’s own words, physical manifestations, and behaviors that his

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} “Memorandum of Discussion at the 189th Meeting of the National Security Council,” Thursday, March 18, 1954. Retrieved from: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d620
attitude towards the intelligence on Dien Bien Phu was unfavorable.

7.2.2 The Threat Level of Dien Bien Phu

As previously noted, a low level of threat should theoretically lead to favorable attitudes towards intelligence topics, while a high level may lead to unfavorable attitudes. Overall, while the President frequently evoked the domino theory (that states will successively fall to communism like dominos), Eisenhower did not truly believe the communist threat in Indochina to be high. Although he gave impassioned speeches about the fall of Indochina, his private conclusions were very different (Greenstein & Immerman, 1992, p. 579). For instance, during an N.S.C. meeting in March 1954, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson asked to concentrate on other efforts unrelated to Southeast Asia. The President “expressed great doubt as to the feasibility of such a proposal, since he believed that the collapse of Indochina would produce a chain reaction which would result in the fall of all of Southeast Asia to the Communists.”

Eisenhower used the domino analogy with respect to Indochina again in another N.S.C. meeting on April 6th, 1954. From this example, it seems as though Eisenhower’s perception of the threat was high. However, there is evidence to suggest the reverse. This section will discuss the threat level indicated in his personal correspondence and discussions during N.S.C. meetings.

In that same meeting in which Eisenhower discussed the domino theory, he also argued that losing Indochina would not necessarily mean the loss of all Southeast Asia. The notes of the N.S.C. meeting describe Eisenhower’s comments:

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125 Ibid.
The President expressed his hostility to the notion that because we might lose Indochina we would necessarily have to lose all the rest of Southeast Asia. This had not been the view of the Council at an earlier time. Indeed, the Council had set up a Special Committee to recommend measures for saving the rest of Southeast Asia in the event that Indochina were lost.126

This comment represents a deviation from Eisenhower’s previous allusions to the domino theory. Here, he argues that if the United States were to take appropriate action, the domino theory would not be determinative and the progression of the collapse could be arrested. The implication is that the threat is there, but not as dire as previously thought (assuming appropriate preventative action were taken).

In a meeting with John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower argued that the United States should not get involved in Indochina unless it could win (Hadley, 2009, p. 96). His statement shows that the President believed the French loss was plausible and not as threatening to U.S. interests as previously designated. In other words, Ike believed Dien Bien Phu was not a “must-win” battle to deter communist aggression.

This notion is further exemplified in Eisenhower’s letter to his friend and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Al Gruenther. In his correspondence, the President wrote that the loss of Dien Bien Phu would not necessarily represent the end of the war in Indochina “and that a concert of nations in the area, such as NATO, would be best, as, ‘we possibly wouldn’t have to fight’” (Hadley, 2009, p. 106). Here, not only is the President saying that the loss of Dien Bien Phu would not inevitably mean the loss of the whole region, but it may not even result in the loss of the country itself. Therefore, while Eisenhower’s pronouncements on the domino theory seemed to indicate he perceived the situation as highly threatening, the truth is that he did not believe the threat to be as dire as he publicly argued. As one scholar succinctly argued: “Though

126 Ibid.
a deviation from the Domino theory, the argument justified the lack of U.S. commitment in the region Eisenhower desired” (Hadley, 2009, p. 100).

Thus, because threat cannot explain Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence, we must explore other options. The C.A.T.I. can explain the President’s unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence on Indochina, demonstrating that it was the result of his receiving unspecific, disconfirming intelligence while his policy commitment was low.

7.2.3 Eisenhower’s Commitment to Preventing the Fall of Dien Bien Phu

Overall, Eisenhower’s commitment to preventing the fall of Dien Bien Phu was low. His military policy was one of covert or overt intervention to prevent the Viet Minh from overrunning the French defensive positions at Dien Bien Phu. A brief examination of the evidence and measurement of each component of commitment demonstrates this contention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7-1: Eisenhower’s Commitment to the Prevention of the Fall of Indochina to Communists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Stake     | Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to the attitude object | • Would not be considered a military defeat  
• Eisenhower believed that losing Vietnam would not necessarily mean losing all Southeast Asia | (Hadley, 2009, p. 100) | Low |
| Saliency  | Relevance to the policymaker’s goals | • Dien Bien Phu was highly relevant to domino theory and fear of Asia falling to the communists | (Kennedy, 1996, p. 2)  
• Memorandum of Discussion at the 192d Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, April 6th, 1954. Retrieved from: [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d705](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d705) | High |
| Certainty | Confidence in the ramifications of action or inaction | • Eisenhower was increasingly certain that losing Vietnam would necessarily mean losing all Southeast Asia | • (Kennedy, 1996, p. 2) • Memorandum of Discussion at the 192d Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, April 6th, 1954. Retrieved from: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d705 | Low |
| Immediacy | The perceived time between potential action/inaction and the consequences | • Eisenhower received intelligence that there were 50:50 odds of Dien Bien Phu falling, if no action were taken and no planning conducted<br>• Eisenhower argued the U.S. was not prepared to take action with respect to Dien Bien Phu<br>• He commissioned several studies | • (Hadley, 2009, pp. 88, 100) | Low |
| Self-efficacy | The perception that the actions are within their capabilities | • General Ridgway claimed it would take at least six divisions to hold the area<br>• Eisenhower wanted options, including ground units, and directed his advisors to look at unilateral and multilateral options<br>• Eisenhower did not exclude the possibility of airstrikes<br>• In April, Eisenhower claimed there was no possibility of intervention and there would be domestic implications | • (Ambrose & Immerman, 1999, p. 259)<br>• (Hadley, 2009, pp. 89, 96, 100)<br>• Memorandum of Discussion at the 192nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, April 6th, 1954. Retrieved from: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d705 | Low |

First, the data on Eisenhower’s commitment to Dien Bien Phu suggest that his stake in preventing the fall of Vietnam to communism was low and further reduced over time. While there was some concern that the fall of Indochina to the communists would result in significant foreign policy losses, this perception also lessened over time. For example, one month before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, in the N.S.C. meeting on April 6th, 1952, Eisenhower argued that the battle
could not be considered a defeat considering the significant casualties the French inflicted. Moreover, he expressed great “hostility to the notion that because we might lose Indochina we would necessarily lose all the rest of Southeast Asia.”\textsuperscript{127} It is clear that despite Eisenhower’s strong stance against communism, his stake in Indochina was relatively low.

While Eisenhower’s stake was low, saliency was high. This is evidenced by his commitment to communist containment and his continued reference to the domino theory, especially with regard to Indochina. The president wrote extensively about the threat of communism. For instance, in his journal, he wrote, “a) The free world is under threat by the monolithic mass of communistic Imperialism. b) The U.S. must wake up to prepare a position of strength from which it can speak serenely and confidently” (Ferrell, 1981, pp. 155-156; Kennedy, 1996, p. 2). As the Vietminh were communist guerrillas, the saliency of preventing Indochina from falling into communist hands was high.

Third, certainty was low. This is illustrated by the President’s multiple statements on the possibility of the French losing at Dien Bien Phu. In addition to claiming that losing at Dien Bien Phu might not mean the loss of Indochina, he also claimed that the battle’s outcome might not mean the loss of all Southeast Asia. In both his private correspondence and N.S.C. meetings, Eisenhower expressed uncertainty about how the battle’s result would affect U.S. policy in the region. While he became increasingly sure that the French would lose, Ike expressed uncertainty about the short and long-term effects of inaction and the loss of Dien Bien Phu.

Eisenhower’s sense of the immediacy of Dien Bien Phu was also low. Despite the French encirclement, there is no evidence to suggest that Eisenhower felt rushed or required to act. On March 18\textsuperscript{th}, five days into the battle, when U.S. intelligence estimates gave the French “50:50”

\textsuperscript{127} \textit{“Memorandum of Discussion at the 192d Meeting of the National Security Council,”} Tuesday, April 6, 1954. Retrieved from: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d705.
odds of winning, Ike decided that no further action or planning was necessary. As the situation on the ground deteriorated, the President still did not feel that inaction would be significantly consequential. On April 6th, he stated, “We are not prepared now to take action with respect to Dien Bien Phu in and by itself, but the coalition program for Southeast Asia must go forward as a matter of the greatest urgency.” In other words, he believed immediate unilateral action was unnecessary and the United States should take some time to build a multilateral defense coalition. While this attempt at multilateralism failed, this – along with the lack of overt military support – indicates that Ike did not believe time was an important factor.

Finally, there is evidence that self-efficacy was low and the President did not believe actions were realistically within his capabilities. Despite some evidence that self-efficacy was initially high, this measurement appears to have fallen over time. For example, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Matthew Ridgway, told President Eisenhower that it would take at least six divisions to provide meaningful assistance to the French (Ambrose & Immerman, 1999, p. 259). In response, the President refused to act; his opinion on this matter was clear and he had stated his opposition to putting ground troops into the region. While Eisenhower ordered the N.S.C. Planning Board to examine the situation and provide options, including ground troops and multilateral strategies, he spoke to his N.S.C. just a week later and said, with “great emphasis” that,

there was no possibility whatever of U.S. unilateral intervention in Indochina, and we had best face that fact. Even if we tried such a course, we would have to take it to Congress and fight for it like dogs, with very little hope of success.  

Therefore, despite one high measure, overall commitment to the prevention of Indochina’s fall to

129 Ibid.
communism was low, and commitment actually decreased over time.

7.2.4 The Specificity of Intelligence on Dien Bien Phu

The intelligence the President received regarding the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was often unspecific. As the C.A.T.I. predicts, Eisenhower sought specific information when he was required to make a decision, and this was clear in the periods preceding and throughout the battle. Intelligence specificity concerns the information’s level of detail, and this variable is dichotomized as low and high specificity. Low specificity, or what Dahl calls “strategic-level intelligence,” includes intelligence that addresses general intentions, chatter, unspecific threats, and general warnings (Dahl, 2013a, p. 22). This section demonstrates that, while Eisenhower rarely read daily briefings and preferred specific intelligence when making decisions, he did not receive this during the Dien Bien Phu crisis.

For example, he explicitly requested the C.I.A. produce maps, “with red arrows point[ing] to strategic points” (Ambrose & Immerman, 1999, p. 257; Helgerson, 1996a, p. 20). This is likely a remnant of his experience as a general officer. Although he asked few specific questions during N.S.C. meetings, he would request follow-ons with Allen Dulles to ask more probing questions or seek out specific “raw reports” or analytic papers (Helgerson, 1996a, pp. 21-23).130 Thus, while Ike did not enjoy “ponderous intelligence reports,” he valued specific intelligence.

As the President received the vast majority of his intelligence through oral briefings during the N.S.C. meetings, it is more difficult to gauge its specificity. However, based on Dahl’s measurements and the previous case studies, I have constructed a table (below) that

130 This is in general, not in the specific case of Dien Bien Phu.
outlines all N.S.C. meetings leading up to and immediately following the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. There were 19 meetings related to the battle and its immediate aftermath, of which 12 contained intelligence briefings. Nearly all the briefings were provided by Allen Dulles, although several were military intelligence briefings presented by the G-2 (army intelligence or a similar unit). In addition, I have coded two dichotomous variables, “Intelligence Map” and “Chart and Troop Count.” If the briefing included a chart or map, it is coded “yes,” and if troop counts of either side (in actual numbers or battalions) were discussed, it is coded as “yes.” These measures are useful, as Eisenhower had specifically requested detailed maps in the past, and order of battle is an apt proxy for specificity, considering he did not read written products.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>National Security Council (N.S.C.) Meeting #</th>
<th>Intelligence update</th>
<th>Intelligence map or chart</th>
<th>Troop count</th>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>06/03/54</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Slightly more than half the intelligence briefings included troop counts, a quarter of the

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intelligence updates contained a map or chart, and only two of the 12 included both. Thus, although more than half the briefings contained troop counts, only two included what the President had specifically requested. Ike often also inquired about specific tactical updates during these briefings. On March 18th, he requested information about the usage and effectiveness of Napalm on enemy artillery. The following week, he asked about a specific unit within the Vietminh: “The President inquired why the French had not sought to prevent the 308th Vietminh division from returning to Dien Bien Phu after its incursion into Laos."\footnote{132}{“Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council,” March 25, 1954. Retrieved from: \url{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d646}.} Finally, in April, after seeing a detailed chart and relief map, he asked a “number of questions about the terrain.”\footnote{133}{“Memorandum of Discussion at the 193d Meeting of the National Security Council,” April 13, 1954. Retrieved from: \url{https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d745}.} Therefore, as the President clearly desired tactical intelligence, and generally did not receive it, I have judged the intelligence on Dien Bien Phu to be unspecific.

7.2.5 Type of Intelligence on Dien Bien Phu

The intelligence Eisenhower received was not only unspecific but also disconfirming. Intelligence is judged to be either confirmatory or disconfirming, depending on its alignment with the decision-maker’s previously held notions. Confirmatory intelligence is information that which conforms to preconceived beliefs, while disconfirming intelligence contradicts or challenges a decision-maker’s preconceived beliefs. In this case, the intelligence provided in the periods preceding and throughout the battle of Dien Bien Phu is coded as disconfirming.

Two of Eisenhower’s primary preconceived notions were disconfirmed by the intelligence. First, he believed that the Vietnamese did not want communism or support the
rebels. Although he did not explicitly say this, this notion was made clear by comments such as, “If the point had been reached when the French forces could be moved only by air, it seemed sufficient indication that the population of Vietnam did not wish to be free from Communist domination.” As detailed in his personal memoirs, Eisenhower disdained the spread of communism and believed that most people would not want to be bound by communist rule (Ferrell, 1981, pp. 155-156, 222-223). This presumption was disconfirmed by the Allen Dulles briefing, of which the President said, the “most disheartening feature of the news from Indonesia … was the evidence that the majority of people in Vietnam supported the Vietminh rebels.”

The second preconceived notion the President held was that the French would be victorious in Indochina. As the previous section described, although the French were outnumbered two-to-one, Eisenhower still believed that they could hold. At the N.S.C. meeting on April 28th, shortly before the defeat at Dien Bien Phu and at the beginning of the Vietminh’s incursion into Laos, the President “expressed great disappointment over the developments in Laos. Until this invasion, he and most other people had imagined that in due course, however slowly, the French would succeed in overcoming their enemies. This confidence had now been shattered.” Yet before this time, the intelligence on the French chances was clear. While there was “no immediate danger” on January 8th, by March the odds had fallen to

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In early April, intelligence detailed the “very bad shape” of the French in Indochina and Dien Bien Phu. Hence, the intelligence was increasingly disconfirming of President Eisenhower’s preconceived notions.

This mini-case has provided additional evidence for the C.A.T.I. Eisenhower received unspecific, disconfirming intelligence on Dien Bien Phu, which elicited an unfavorable attitude from him. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the President began to exercise covert action more freely, in fear of losing another nation to communism. The next case details Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence on Guatemala, a few months later. While the intelligence was also unspecific in the Guatemalan case, it was confirmatory, and commitment was high, thereby leading to a favorable attitude.

7.3 Case 2: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the 1954 Guatemalan Coup

While the crisis at Dien Bien Phu was unfolding, the United States was also monitoring the perceived communist threat from Guatemala. Only one month after the French lost in Indochina, Eisenhower ordered the execution of Operation PBSUCCESS to overthrow the President Jacobo Arbenz, the democratically elected leader of Guatemala. The C.I.A. selected the nomenclature “PB” as it was the cartographic designation for Guatemala at the time (Fraser, 2005, p. 491). This order came after the fall of Dien Bien Phu and was bolstered by the C.I.A.’s recent success with Operation AJAX in Iran, with the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddegh. By
July 1954, the U.S.-backed dictator Castillo Armas was unanimously elected president of the Junta and de facto leader of Guatemala.

Shortly after the coup, Eisenhower ordered a follow-on covert action, codenamed “Operation PBHistory.” The goals of the operation were to collect documentary evidence of the communist incursion into Latin America and to dispel the narrative pervasive in the international community that the U.S.-backed intervention was guided by United Fruit Company interests. The story of a corporate-backed intervention gained traction as many of Eisenhower’s staff had significant ties to the fruit monopoly. Ultimately, while scholars argue the C.I.A. failed to produce sufficient evidence to counter the narrative and alter public opinion, it did produce a booklet of material for the President. The booklet included communist literature owned by Arbenz, and it led to a further expansion of the project at Ike’s behest. There is clear evidence of Eisenhower’s favorable attitude towards intelligence on PBSUCCESS and PBHistory. The intelligence provided throughout the operation was unspecific but confirmatory and commitment was high.

7.3.1 Eisenhower’s Attitude Towards the Intelligence on Guatemala

Much of Eisenhower’s reaction to the intelligence on PBSUCCESS and PBHistory has been lost, as the operations were discussed informally, but there is nevertheless evidence for his favorable attitude. Most of the evidence appears to be in the form of physical manifestations and behavior, but there were also verbal indicators. First, policymakers with a favorable attitude would be expected to use words such as “gratified,” “pleased,” “contented,” “agreement,” or similar. One example occurred at a reception at the White House, where Eisenhower addressed the C.I.A. agents involved in the operation, saying, “Thanks, Allen, and thanks to all of you.
You’ve averted a Soviet beachhead in our hemisphere” (Rabe, 1988, p. 61). While not immediately following a briefing, these remarks illustrate Eisenhower’s attitude towards the intelligence and the I.C. during that time and on the topic. That said, the physical manifestations and behavior provide significantly more data.

Physical indicators of a favorable attitude include positive emotions, distinct facial features (e.g., smiling), relaxation, and calmness. One example of Eisenhower’s favorable attitude came during an intelligence briefing outlining the results of the operation. The President misunderstood some of the general conditions, which led him to believe that Castillo Armas had only lost one man; this was, in fact, quite inaccurate, but regardless, the president, “reacted in astonishment” to this near-flawless operational success (Cullather, 2006, p. 109; Thompson, 2016, p. 67). Again, Eisenhower reacted favorably to intelligence on Guatemala and PBSUCCESS. However, more telling than Eisenhower’s words and physical indicators were his behaviors.

The general behaviors linked to a favorable attitude are receptivity to new information and change, expressions of approval and/or gratification, and expressions of affirmation or agreement. Eisenhower engaged in at least two of these behaviors. For example, although Arma’s rebels exhibited early setbacks, Eisenhower remained receptive to the new information and showed a willingness to take risks. On June 22nd, 1954, when the Guatemalan government’s antiaircraft gun shot down one guerrilla plane and damaged a second, Allen Dulles and Henry Holland, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, met with the President. Castillo Armas’ men requested more materiel and equipment, including the pricy P-51 aircraft. In his memoirs, Eisenhower recalled the interaction:

Allen Dulles reported to me that Castillo had lost two of the three old bombers with which he was supporting his “invasion.”
“What do you think Castillo’s chances would be,” I asked Allen Dulles, “without the aircraft?”

His answer was unequivocal: “About zero.”

“Suppose we supply the aircraft. What would the chances be then?”


Despite the low probability of success, Ike told Dulles to send the P-51s to the rebels. In his memoirs, the President describes himself as “smiling” after his interaction with Allen Dulles (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 426). This behavior demonstrated receptivity to new information and a relatively positive attitude.

The second example of behavior indicating a favorable attitude came immediately following the operations of PBSUCCESS. Eisenhower threw a “grand reception in the White House for the CIA agents” (Rabe, 1988, p. 61). There, he playfully joked with the officers that they had let Arbenz escape, and he shook each intelligence officer’s hand, while personally thanking Allen Dulles. As previously mentioned, expressions of gratification are a key indicator of a favorable attitude. And this stood in stark contrast to other circumstances in which Eisenhower criticized intelligence (discussed later). Thus, Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence on Guatemala throughout operation PBSUCCESS was favorable.

While the evidence for a favorable attitude is convincing, additional information would be useful. For instance, Eisenhower ordered Operation PBHistory to collect documentary evidence of Arbenz’s communist inclinations. On July 20th, the C.I.A. presented the preliminary results of their first two weeks of work. Tracy Barnes, principal manager of Operation PBSuccess operations, created a booklet comprising 23 documents that supposedly demonstrated

Figure 7-3: C.I.A. Documentary Evidence of Arbenz’s Communist Leanings
It is important to note that while the documents themselves are seemingly inculpatory, the final report found little evidence of significant communist influence. In a memorandum to Allen Dulles on January 19th, 1955, the agency found, “Very few of the documents discovered were of the hot, top level, damaging type which might have been successfully exploited on an international basis,” and the Final Summary Report of PBHISTORY Project claimed, “The low percentage of valuable documents precluded any large scale intelligence operation since few leads were obtained.”\textsuperscript{141} Overall, despite the lack of evidence, both the N.S.C. and Eisenhower were sufficiently “impressed” by the brochure (Cullather, 2006, p. 107).

While it would be useful to know the additional reactions to the booklet, the intelligence apparatus more often than not confirmed Eisenhower’s beliefs (Immerman, 2010, p. 11). This is demonstrated by the booklet produced for the N.S.C. that did not contain any meaningfully incriminating evidence for Eisenhower’s preconceived notions but showcased several pieces of evidence that aligned with the President’s assumptions. The I.C.’s desire to please Eisenhower is discussed further in the conclusion. Nevertheless, Eisenhower’s words, physical indicators, and behavior in response to the operational intelligence on PBSUCCESS and PBHistory show a favorable attitude.

### 7.3.2 The Threat of a Communist Guatemala

The threat of a communist Guatemala may have affected President Eisenhower’s attitude towards the intelligence. As previously discussed, low threats theoretically lead to favorable attitudes, and high threats to unfavorable attitudes. Overall, Eisenhower considered the threat to

U.S. interests to be very high; thus, in this case, there is no correlation between the threat level and his attitude. Furthermore, while a threat may lead to increased interest and attention, a high threat level would be unlikely to evoke the positive attitude observed from Eisenhower.

First, the President truly believed that communist infiltration of the Western Hemisphere, specifically Guatemala, was a serious threat to national security. It is clear that Eisenhower’s believed communism posed an existential threat to the United States. In his speeches, private diary entries, and N.S.C. meetings, the President repeatedly reminded his listeners of the Red Threat. This became even more significant as it moved into the United States’ sphere of influence. Even years later, in his memoirs, the President describes his views in detail: “The Communist conspiracy in Guatemala did represent a very real and very serious menace to the security of the United States” (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 423). As high threats are more likely to lead to unfavorable attitudes, it is unlikely that this threat caused Ike’s attitude towards the intelligence. This is not surprising, as one scholar argued:

> It is true that no one from the Intelligence Community challenged Eisenhower’s perspective of a Jacobo Arbenz-led Guatemala as a threat that demanded regime change. That was because there was no one from the Intelligence Community who challenged Eisenhower’s perception (Immerman, 2010, p. 12).

The notion that the I.C. served Eisenhower’s cognitive consistency is further discussed in the conclusion. Nonetheless, threat variables cannot explain Eisenhower’s attitude; therefore, we should test the validity of the C.A.T.I.

### 7.3.3 Eisenhower’s Commitment to Preventing a “Red” Guatemala

Unlike the previous case of Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower showed a high commitment to policies associated with the prevention of a communist takeover in Guatemala. This is evidenced
by the five components of commitment: stake, saliency, certainty, immediacy, and self-efficacy.

In each case, there are considerable data for each of the indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Stake</td>
<td>Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to the attitude object</td>
<td>• Eisenhower demonstrated his stake in the issue, by framing the issue with quotes such as this: “I want all of you to be damn good and sure you succeed … When you commit the flag, you commit it to win.”</td>
<td>(Schlesinger &amp; Kinzer, 1983, p. 170) (Thompson, 2016, pp. 69-70) (Wise &amp; Ross, 1964, p. 113)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saliency</td>
<td>Relevance to the policymaker’s goals</td>
<td>• Eisenhower and his administration argued that a “communist-controlled regime in our backyard was unacceptable” • Eisenhower released numerous public statements about communism in the Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>(Gleijeses, 1991, p. 367) See also the State Department editorial note: <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d549">https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v06/d549</a></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certainty</td>
<td>Confidence in the ramifications of action or inaction</td>
<td>• Eisenhower, sure of the communist incursion, told Allen Dulles, “You’ve averted a Soviet beachhead in our hemisphere” • In his diaries, Eisenhower wrote that the communist threat in Guatemala was “unequivocal”</td>
<td>(Rabe, 1988, p. 61) (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 423)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediacy</td>
<td>The perceived time between potential action/inaction and the consequences</td>
<td>• Eisenhower argued that, “Something had to be done quickly” about the potential for communism in Guatemala • The rapidity of the administration’s actions taken against Guatemala provide further evidence of immediacy</td>
<td>(Eisenhower, 1963, p. 422)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-efficacy</td>
<td>The perception that the actions are within his or her capability</td>
<td>• Eisenhower ordered the quarantine of Guatemala and airlifted aid to other countries in competition with the Guatemala government • Eisenhower pushed harsh resolutions as the Caracas Conference • Eisenhower personally ordered covert action</td>
<td>(Eisenhower, 1963, p. 424)</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
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</table>
First, President Eisenhower’s stake in the prevention of a communist Guatemala was high. As the quote in Table 7-2 illustrates, Eisenhower considered Guatemala’s loss to the communist threat to be unacceptable. In early June 1954, the President continued his breakfast meeting on the second-floor dining room of the White House with the J.C.S. and other aides. As senator Thurston B. Morton recalled, Ike finished the meeting by saying,

I’m prepared to take any steps that are necessary to see that it succeeds, for if it succeeds, it’s the people of Guatemala throwing off the yoke of Communism. If it fails, the flag of the United States has failed (Wise & Ross, 1964, p. 113).

While this quote was several days before the Castillo Armas’ invasion occurred, it is further evidence that his stake in the matter only increased after the operation was underway.

Saliency, the second component of commitment, was also high. As the New Look focused on reducing military spending and defeating communist expansion, the existence of a communist government in the United States’ “backyard” was distressing to Eisenhower and its prevention fit within his primary policy goals. This is evidenced by his memoirs, public statements on Guatemala, and third-party accounts. As one aide recalled in an interview, the President “firmly believed that the presence of a communist-controlled regime in our backyard was unacceptable … He had a great inventory of principles in order, some would say, to rationalize whatever he wanted to do” (Gleijeses, 1991, p. 376). While his stake illustrated the importance Eisenhower placed on preventing Guatemala from falling into communist hands, the high saliency is evidenced by the link back to his primary goal of communist containment. That is, the prevention of Guatemala “turning red” was directly relevant to Ike’s policy goals.

The third element of commitment is certainty, and there is evidence that this was also high. Eisenhower was sure that if the United States allowed communism to flourish in Guatemala, this would be devastating for its national security. This is primarily illustrated by his
quote thanking Allen Dulles for preventing a communist “beachhead in our hemisphere” (Rabe, 1988, p. 61). Moreover, in his autobiography years later, the President remained certain that Guatemalan communism was a threat and inaction would be intolerable. In response to four questions – whether Arbenz was communist, Guatemala was controlled by the Kremlin, Guatemala intervened in other countries, and it was a threat to national security – he said, “My answer to all four of those questions is an unequivocal ‘yes’” (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 423).

Finally, though not coming directly from Eisenhower, a draft memorandum from to the N.S.C. from the Bureau of the Inter-American Affairs summed up the views of the administration and the President’ as follows: “A policy of non-action would be suicidal, since the communist movement, under Moscow tutelage, will not falter nor abandon its goals.”\footnote{National Security Council, “Draft Policy Paper Prepared in the Bureau of the Inter-American Affairs,” August 19, 1953. Retrieved from: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d424.} It is therefore clear that both Eisenhower and his administration were certain of the ramifications of action and inaction in Guatemala.

Fourth, there is evidence that immediacy was high for Eisenhower. Unlike the previous case of Dien Bien Phu, the administration quickly took action to commit itself to preventing communism from spreading in the country. In the Indochina case, Eisenhower and the N.S.C. repeatedly requested studies and asked for recommendations; but in Guatemala, the President felt “Something had to be done quickly” (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 423). Within a year of President Arbenz announcing the expropriation of uncultivated land from the U.S. company United Fruit in 1953, the United States had orchestrated the coup. In March 1954, the United States drafted a resolution at the Organization of American States (O.A.S.), condemning Guatemala and communism in the Western hemisphere. By May, the United States was openly airlifting arms to Nicaragua and Honduras to “counteract” Guatemalan aggression and quarantine the country to
prevent it obtaining Soviet weapons. June 1954 ended with the U.S.-backed Castillo forces mounting an insurgency. Thus, immediacy was high for Eisenhower in this case.

Finally, there is a significant amount of data to show that Eisenhower’s self-efficacy was high in the case of PBSUCCESS. The high measurement is illustrated by the President’s actions taken to prevent Guatemala turning communist. This includes pushing for “harsh” (his verbiage) resolutions from the Caracas Conference in March 1954, providing airlifts and materiel support to neighboring countries, quarantining Guatemala to prevent arm shipments, and supporting a coup through small arms, training, psychological warfare, and aircraft on a budget of less than ten million U.S.D. (Immerman, 1982, pp. 138-143). In summary, Eisenhower’s commitment to PBSUCCESS and the prevention of communism in Latin America was high.

7.3.4 The Specificity of Intelligence on Guatemala

While Eisenhower’s commitment to PBSUCCESS and the prevention of the Guatemalan domino from tipping over was high, the intelligence he received was unspecific. For example, early C.I.A. reports noted that communism had a “significant influence despite [its] small size.” The N.I.E. from March 11th, 1952, provided little additional information and pointed to vague, unspecific threats: “The political situation in Guatemala adversely affects U.S. interests and constitutes a potential threat to U.S. security.”143 Scholars argue that there was little hard intelligence on the role of communism in Guatemala and C.I.A. analysts leaped to conclusions. Archival research suggests that C.I.A. analysts assumed members of the socialist party in Guatemala (P.G.T.) had been trained and indoctrinated in Russia and that the Guatemala military

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had been receiving training and assistance from the Soviet Union since the 1940s (Fraser, 2005, p. 490). However, there was no evidence to support this claim.

After the successful coup, the C.I.A. published a report illustrating the unspecific nature of intelligence on communism in Guatemala. The top secret document, published on November 16th, 1954, admitted that, “The Station has limited surveillance assets … [and] has no penetrations of the PGT, government agencies, armed forces or labor unions.” Essentially, the only intelligence Eisenhower had was the P.G.T.’s four seats in Congress, the expropriation of unused land, and a mid-May 1954 shipment of Czechoslovakian arms to the embargoed Latin American country (Hybel, 2014, p. 94). Despite this unspecific information, Eisenhower was committed to Operation PBSUCCESS and gave the green light. This was likely because while the information was unspecific, it was confirmatory.

7.3.5 The Type of Intelligence on Guatemala

The intelligence on Guatemala, Operation PBSUCCESS, and PBHistory indicated that Guatemala was trending dangerously towards communism. Eisenhower himself believed that Guatemala had been “red” since 1950 (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 83). The President discussed his “unequivocal” preconceived notions in his memoirs, stating, “The Arbenz government, beyond any question, was controlled and dominated by Communists. Those Communists were directed from Moscow” (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 423). Allen Dulles’ C.I.A. provided Ike with information to match those preconceived beliefs.

The intelligence, in this case, is coded as confirmatory because while perceived
infiltration of the Western hemisphere was not good news by any means, it was what Eisenhower and his administration expected. In April 1954, the National Board of Estimates produced a report, based on limited and unspecific evidence, that said, “The Communists now effectively control the political life of Guatemala” (Barrett, 2011). Regardless of the veracity of this estimate, it clearly confirmed the President’s preconceived notions. As one researcher correctly asserted, “The intelligence, like many other situations during Eisenhower’s presidency, resulted in cognitive consistency of the administration; a situation in which the policymakers paid undue attention to intelligence or information consistent with their beliefs” (Hybel, 2014, p. 98).

Overall, the intelligence on PBSUCCESS and PBHistory was unspecific but confirmatory. This, in conjunction with his high commitment, led to President Eisenhower’s favorable attitude towards the intelligence. Eisenhower had committed personally, publicly, and covertly to preventing Guatemala from “turning red.” While the information was unspecific and would not be described as “good news,” it conformed to his beliefs, which allowed for a state of cognitive consistency that is discussed theoretically in psychology literature and empirically in historical research focused on Eisenhower (Festinger, 1957; Hybel, 2014; Immerman, 2008). High commitment to a policy, combined with intelligence that aligned with his worldview, resulted in a favorable attitude towards the intelligence.

7.4 Case 3: Eisenhower, Intelligence, And Operation Haik

Several years after the success in Guatemala, the C.I.A. was called to defeat communism again when it reared its ugly head in Southeast Asia. The nationalist Sukarno of Indonesia (also known as “Achmed Sukarno” by foreigners) became the first democratically elected president of
Indonesia in 1955. Although Vice President Nixon met with Sukarno in 1953 and described him as “completely non-communist,” the Communist Party of Indonesia (P.K.I.) received a fifth of the vote in 1955 (Chaudhry & Vanduzer-Snow, 2011, p. 500; Kennedy, 1996, pp. 8-9).

Moreover, Sukarno’s attempt at neutrality during the Cold War led the United States to believe he was leaning towards the Soviet Union. This fear was only heightened when the State Department and C.I.A. reported that support for P.K.I. had “increased markedly” in the last few months of 1957, and a State Department message claimed the situation bore “some unpleasant similarities” to Guatemala.\(^\text{145}\) While the C.I.A. was providing limited support to rebels outside the capital, contemporary intelligence ultimately led the President to order clandestine action in September 1957 to overthrow the Sukarno regime; thus, Operation HAIK was born (Kennedy, 1996, p. 40).\(^\text{146}\)

As in the situation in Guatemala, the rebels in Indonesia were failing to overthrow the central government; and as in Operation PBSUCCESS, the President ordered more support. This time, however, the C.I.A. and the U.S. personnel, under the C.I.A. front organization “Civil Air Transport” (C.A.T.), were directly involved in military conflict from late-1957 and early 1958. The U.S. government’s plausible deniability eventually evaporated in May 1958, when pilot Allen Pope was shot down while carrying a variety of incriminating documents (Conboy & Morrison, 2018, pp. 132-133). Ultimately, the C.I.A. failed to overthrow Sukarno, and Operation HAIK represented a significant embarrassment for the Eisenhower administration. Nevertheless, this chapter primarily focuses on Eisenhower’s attitude preceding his order to begin Operation


HAIK. Overall, the President showed an ambivalent attitude towards intelligence preceding the operation, reflected by his searching behaviors, an unusual susceptibility to persuasion, and a willingness to revisit preconceived notions.

7.4.1 Eisenhower’s Attitude Towards Intelligence on Indonesia

Preceding Operation HAISK, the President exhibited an ambivalent attitude. This was shown, to some extent, by his words, but it was mostly evidenced by his physical manifestations and behaviors. The verbal indicators of an ambivalent include “doubt,” “concern,” “mixed feelings,” “conflicting” or “contradictory,” “hesitant,” or “wavering.” While the President did not explicitly use any of these words, his language did illustrate a similar attitude. For example, during an N.S.C. meeting on August 1st, 1957, Eisenhower expressed hesitancy, unlike in the previous case of Guatemala. First, he requested that, before anything was done, the views of the State Department be made clear. Later in the meeting, he asked for a study of the situation and what could be done about it.147 While those comments alone do not fully prove an ambivalent attitude, the President’s physical indicators provide further evidence.

Physical manifestations indicative of an ambivalent attitude include mixed thoughts or feelings, positive and negative emotions, and expressions of confusion or uncertainty. There are several examples of an ambivalent attitude from the President towards the intelligence on Indonesia. For instance, during the aforementioned N.S.C. meeting on August 1st, 1957, according to researchers, the atmosphere of the meeting changed significantly when Dulles gave his intelligence update: “The meeting’s atmosphere became charged. Dulles’ briefing depicted a

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gloomy situation that troubled the members” and the President demonstrated “angst” (Kennedy, 1996, pp. 20-25). One month later, following another intelligence update by Allen Dulles, the President seemed confused by the central government’s ability to hold territory: “Pointing to the map, the President inquired how it happened that the Central Government still held on to a position in the northern part of Sumatra.”

During another N.S.C. meeting, when the D.C.I. suggested that the rebels’ lack of airpower had led to their poor progress against the government (reminiscent of the Guatemalan case), the President “found that difficult to grasp.” He believed that any damage done to infrastructure or roads could be easily repaired and that there were few valuable targets in the jungle. While Eisenhower expressed hope that the situation was salvageable, he contradicted his intelligence director, claiming that the dissidents needed submarines, not planes. This demonstrated Ike’s contradictory and conflicting attitude towards the intelligence. While he believed the state of affairs to be fixable, he had mixed feelings about the D.C.I.’s reports. In sum, the physical manifestations of Eisenhower’s reaction to the D.C.I. briefings suggested confusion and uncertainty, thus providing further evidence for an ambivalent attitude.

The final indicators of an ambivalent attitude are searching behaviors, willingness to revisit preconceived notions, slow responses, and susceptibility to persuasion; and the President exhibited each of these. One example of a searching behaviors was the President’s request for a study to see what “we can do about it [the situation in Indonesia].” Unlike the case in

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Guatemala, where the President took decisive action, in Indonesia, Eisenhower sought answers through the J.C.S., the State Department, and the C.I.A. The searching behavior became even clearer when, grasping for a solution to the problem, the President suggested that the rebels needed amphibious support or submarines, rather than air power.

Other behavioral indicators of an ambivalent attitude include a willingness to revisit preconceived notions and a susceptibility to persuasion. In this case, we find two examples of these behaviors. First, while Eisenhower eventually became interested in the situation in Indonesia, he originally did not consider the Southeast Asian country to be of concern. After an intelligence update detailing communist trade to Indonesia, the President, responding with “some warmth,” asked why it mattered. He was “weary” of the rigidity of U.S. controls on trade and “not impressed” with his advisors’ arguments to the contrary.152 This reaction was quite different to his later concerns about the ’island’s communist ties, thus demonstrating a willingness to revisit his preconceived notions and a susceptibility to persuasion.

The second example of his susceptibility to persuasion concerns Dulles’ suggestion to support rebel air power. While the President was originally unconvinced that aircraft would make a difference, he ultimately decided to provide both material and pilots. The C.I.A., working under the front organization, C.A.T., flew sorties for several months before Allen Pope was shot down in May 1958. Eisenhower, the former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, altered his tactics, against his own better judgment, when D.C.I. Dulles suggested a farfetched option. In summary, President Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence on Indonesia was ambivalent. While his verbiage on the intelligence was limited, the physical indicators and behaviors show a typically decisive and self-assured president becoming slow to respond and susceptible to

7.4.2 The Threat of a Communist Indonesia

As with the previous cases, I have also assessed whether threat was the primary cause of Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence on Indonesia. Overall, Eisenhower’s perception of the threat was low. That said, while it was lower during the early part of his presidency, the perceived threat did increase with the belief that communism was spreading to the islands in late 1957. It is difficult to determine whether the threat had an impact on his attitude in this case, as an ambivalent demeanor has both positive and negative aspects. That said, there was certainly a correlational relationship.

During an N.S.C. meeting in late 1953, Eisenhower responded to an intelligence briefing on threats to U.S. strategic and commercial interests in Indonesia with “warmth,” and he reportedly disagreed with his advisors’ concerns. Yet, this levity did not last long; and when reports began to stream in that communism was creeping into the Southeast Asian archipelago, the president changed his rhetoric. By the end of 1954, while he had begun to recognize Indonesia as an area of strategic significance, he still did not understand why his advisors thought it “seemed so much more important” than other areas.

Despite the President’s increasing concern about communism in Indonesia, he did not feel the need to become overtly involved or use conventional forces. For instance, on February 27th, 1958, months after Operation HAIK had been initiated, Eisenhower stated, “We would have


to go in if a Communist take-over really threatened” (Kennedy, 1996, p. 59). This indicates that the President did not feel that Indonesia was “really threatened” at the time, as no U.S. conventional forces were employed, thus the perception of threat was low.

As low threat should theoretically lead to favorable attitudes and high threats to unfavorable attitudes, there is some correlation. The intelligence indicated that communism was growing in Indonesia, and Ike’s attitude became increasingly ambivalent. While there is no causal evidence for the role of threat in this case, we cannot rule this out. Nevertheless, a test of the C.A.T.I. can provide more insight.

### 7.4.3 President Eisenhower’s Commitment to Preventing Communism in Indonesia

Overall, there is evidence that commitment to the Indonesia containment policies was minimal, as four of the five components of commitment are found to be low. The table below provides an overview of the evidence, source, and measurement for each.

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<th>Component</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Stake     | Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to the attitude object | • Eisenhower argued Indonesia may not be of “great significance” in strategic terms  
• Scholars found that, “When situation required increased commitment, he chooses not to” give this  
• Eisenhower provided recommendations to support rebels, but little else | Memorandum of Discussion at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, December 21st, 1954. Retrieved from: [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d143](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d143)  
• (Kennedy, 1996, pp. 10, 33) | Low |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saliency</th>
<th>Relevance to the policymaker’s goals</th>
<th>• Foreign affairs, and in this case, U.S. policy in Indonesia were linked to the country’s relationship to communism</th>
<th>• Various memoirs and speeches. For example, see: <a href="https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d716">https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v13p1/d716</a> and (Cha, 2016, p. 158)</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Certainty | Confidence in the ramifications of action or inaction | • Eisenhower argued that the U.S. would have to intervene if the country was “really threatened”  
• Eisenhower requested multiple studies about how to tackle the issues. | • Editorial Note, 356th meeting of the National Security Council, February 27th, 1957. Retrieved from: [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d26](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d26)  
| Immediacy | The perceived time between potential action/inaction and the consequences | • At Eisenhower’s direction, the C.I.A. slow in developing a plan of action  
• On April 24th, Eisenhower sent a letter to the British Prime Minister, saying Indonesia did not have the “same time factor” it used to have | • (Kahin & Kahin, 1997, p. 106; Kennedy, 1996, p. 50)  
| Self-efficacy | The perception that the actions are within his or her capability | • The National Security Council (N.S.C.) provided a report of U.S. limitations in Indonesia  
• Eisenhower requested a study about “what we can do about it”  
• Eisenhower recommended amphibious equipment  
• (Kahin & Kahin, 1997, p. 122) | Low |

The President’s stake in Indonesia was generally relatively low, especially preceding
Operation HAIK. This is illustrated by his early lack of concern for Indonesia and his administration’s comments during N.S.C. meetings. For instance, in late 1954, Secretary of State Dulles argued that countries like Indonesia “are not really of great significance to us, other than from the point of view of prestige, except that they must be regarded as staging grounds for further forward thrusts by the Communist powers. An example would be Indonesia.”\textsuperscript{156} This mirrors Eisenhower’s comments months earlier about his lack of concern for Indonesia. In addition, researchers have argued that when the situation required an increased commitment to Indonesia, the President decided against it and, in fact, did little other than provide a small measure of support preceding the commencement of Operation HAIK (Kennedy, 1996, p. 10). While this changed when U.S. pilots became involved, the United States did not intervene conventionally or overtly. This provides further evidence that his stake in preventing Indonesia falling to communism was low, as Eisenhower said that if Indonesia were “really threatened,” the United States would need to take action.

The second aspect of commitment, saliency, concerns the relevance to policymaker goals. This is coded as high as a result of Eisenhower’s focus on countering communism around the globe. As in the previous two cases, saliency was high. In reality, it is likely that almost any case involving communist expansion would have had high saliency for President Eisenhower, due to his primary policy goal of containment.

Third, certainty, or confidence in the implications of inaction or action, was low. Eisenhower asked the J.S.C., State Department, and the C.I.A. to complete a report quickly as he did not know the full “implications” of the events in Indonesia. On August 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1957, he continued, “The best course would be to hold all Indonesia in the Free World. The next best

\begin{footnotesize}\textsuperscript{156} “Memorandum of Discussion at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council,” December 21, 1954. Retrieved from: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d143.\end{footnotesize}
course would be to hold Sumatra if Java goes Communist. We should also consider what to do if all Indonesia votes Communist.”

This reaction was starkly different to his comments on Indochina years earlier. In April 1954, the President “sharply” rebuked an N.S.C. member for suggesting that a country would vote for communism, contending that, “no free government had yet gone communist by its own choice.”

Several years later, faced with the threat of Indonesia turning red, Eisenhower was not as certain of his earlier assumptions. Hence, certainty about inaction or action was low.

Immediacy is the fourth component of commitment. This is measured as the ‘perceived time between potential action or inaction and the consequences of such a policy. The President’s sense of immediacy was low in the case of Indonesia. This is evidenced by the C.I.A.’s slow progress and Eisenhower’s personal letter to then British prime minister Harold Macmillan. First, the C.I.A. did not become fully involved until months after Eisenhower’s orders in September of 1957. Funding did not markedly increase until December of that year and the C.I.A. did not take an active role until the end of February 1958 (Kennedy, 1996). This slow timetable reflects the President’s lack of immediacy on the subject. In a response letter to Macmillan about potential military action in Southeast Asia, Eisenhower writes that, while there was still a threat, the situation “does not have the same time factor that seemed at one time to be the case.”

Therefore, immediacy preceding and in the early stages of Operation HAIK was low.

The final measure of commitment is self-efficacy, or the policymaker’s perception that actions are within their capabilities. Overall, self-efficacy was low, and this is chiefly measured


by N.S.C. reports detailing U.S. capabilities in the area, as well as Eisenhower’s recommended actions. For instance, an N.S.C. report on Indonesia outlined the significant limitations of U.S. forces. The most valuable asset the United States had, the committee argued, was “a basic good will toward the U.S … due largely to long U.S. tradition of anti-colonialism and a willingness to help newly-independent peoples.” Furthermore, this reasoning was unlikely to have been accurate, especially since U.S. participation in Guatemalan internal affairs had dramatically reduced the international community’s view of U.S. anti-colonial sentiment. Reports such as this led Eisenhower to ask for additional studies to determine what could be done about it, as he did in August 1957; and this is likely to have resulted in his odd proposal to use amphibious equipment (Kahin & Kahin, 1997, p. 122).

Finally, one could make the argument that commitment was low even after the commencement of Operation HAIK, as Eisenhower prized plausible deniability. Civil Air Transport (C.A.T.) pilots flying on behalf of the C.I.A. were explicitly told not to have any incriminating evidence in their possession if they were shot down (Callanan, p. 135). Despite this order, Allen Pope had a plethora of incriminating documents with him when he was flying, which historians have argued was an insurance policy to ensure he was not executed as a soldier of fortune or a stateless pilot. Nevertheless, plausible deniability and low public commitment were key components of Operation HAIK; and when Pope was captured by Indonesian government forces, Dulles immediately “pulled the plug” on the entire operation (Thomas, 1996, pp. 159-160).

7.4.4 The Specificity of Intelligence on Indonesia

Unlike in the previous case in Guatemala, the President received specific intelligence on the communist threat in Indonesia. In addition to giving other, unspecific information, the intelligence in Latin America claimed that communism represented “significant influence despite [its] small size.” For Indonesia, however, the intelligence, while possibly incorrect in its assessment, was certainly more specific. (Kahin & Kahin, 1997, p. 85; Kennedy, 1996, p. 30)161 The N.I.E. published in concurrence with the Department of State, all branches of the military, J.C.S., and the C.I.A. outlined “the communist” threat in significant detail. It reported P.K.I. polling results and the numbers of “extreme leftist” and “communist sympathizers” in the government.162 Several months later, Allen Dulles sent an intelligence memorandum titled, “Probable Developments in Indonesia,” a month before C.I.A. pilots became directly involved in the fighting. The letter was sent to Eisenhower and a few select cabinet members, with the classification “Top Secret; Eyes Only.” The memo details each provincial leader and his willingness to undertake “some action to force a change in the central government.” In addition, it discusses the movement of party leaders and their families to the main island of Sumatra and what the moves were likely to indicate.163 This was vastly different from the Guatemalan case, in which the C.I.A. had “limited surveillance assets” and “no penetrations” of the government or society. The intelligence Eisenhower received preceding and during the early stages of Operation HAISK was therefore specific.

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161 Members within the State Department disagreed with the assessment of Sukarno’s Communist leanings. They argued that the “guided democracy” and inclusion of the PKI was a matter of cultural appropriateness rather than purposeful Communist inclinations.


7.4.5 Type of intelligence on Indonesia

While the intelligence was specific, it was also disconfirming, as it diverged from the President’s preconceived notions; namely, that Indonesia was unlikely to fall to communism. Eisenhower was not concerned with Indonesia’s commercial ties to the U.S.S.R or other Soviet countries, nor was he “impressed” by the N.S.C. members’ arguments to the contrary. Intelligence at the time also supported this notion. On March 14th, 1957, several months before the C.I.A. reported communist gains in Sumatra, Allen Dulles described that the possibility of communists exerting an influence on the island as a “less possible problem.”

But this belief was quickly dispelled by intelligence updates in the summer of 1957. On July 25th, reporting of P.K.I. gains over a short period of time led Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to order a reexamination of intelligence assessments on Indonesia (Kahin & Kahin, 1997, p. 89). Intelligence became increasingly disconfirming over time. By the end of November, Allen Dulles reported to the N.S.C. that the Communist Party was the “strongest” organization on the island and it was becoming “increasingly bold” (Kennedy, 1996, p. 44). The following two N.S.C. meetings in early December continued this trend of communist gains, as Dutch labor commercial interests were reportedly seized by “Communist labor organizations” (Kennedy, 1996). Thus, Eisenhower received increasingly disconfirming intelligence preceding Operation HAISK and during the Operation’s early inception.

Ultimately, Eisenhower displayed an ambivalent attitude towards intelligence on Indonesia before his decision to intervene and shortly thereafter. The ambivalent attitude was likely the result of his level of commitment to the covert action, combined with specific,

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disconfirming intelligence, while he was not fully committed to preventing Indonesia falling to communism.

Based on the C.A.T.I., one would expect to observe an increasingly unfavorable attitude as commitment and specific, disconfirming intelligence increased over time; yet this is not the case here. In fact, the President and his N.S.C. staff displayed rather positive attitudes towards the intelligence, even after the failure of Operation HAIK. While this is discussed more in the conclusion, it is noted here that the reason for these attitudinal deviations is that the administration changed its view on Sukarno. Before the failure of HAIK, Sukarno was a communist menace that needed to be removed; but after the unsuccessful C.I.A. operation, the administration and Eisenhower himself took a “striking” new attitude towards Sukarno (Kahin & Kahin, 1997, p. 218). This new attitude was likely to have been the result of cognitive consistency, or a need to reconcile the information with the current situation. This tendency to shift intelligence to confirm Eisenhower’s beliefs and maintain cognitive consistency was a recurring theme in Eisenhower’s role in the intelligence process.

7.5 Case 4: Eisenhower’s Reaction to Intelligence on Sputnik

On October 4th, 1957, several days after Eisenhower authorized covert action in Indonesia, the Soviet Union launched into orbit the first artificial earth satellite, Sputnik 1. The press released a flurry of articles quoting politicians such as Representative William E. Marshall from Ohio, accusing the C.I.A. of being “asleep at the switch” (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, p. 10). While the U.S. public was shocked by Soviet advances in the space race, President Eisenhower addressed the launch at a press conference several days later with unusual calm. His serenity and
self-assuredness in front of the press were not merely show, but rather an accurate portrayal of Eisenhower’s attitude at the time. Recently declassified documents reveal that Eisenhower was “amply informed” about the potential for a Soviet launch several years earlier (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, p. 3). Allen Dulles and the C.I.A. had provided a multitude of briefings on the subject, ensuring the President was abreast of the situation.

Some scholars have even argued that the launch was beneficial for the United States, providing a “legal precedent for future reconnaissance satellites” (Ambrose, 1993). Indeed, from 1955, Eisenhower frequently pushed his “Open Skies” initiative, a plan to mutually reveal military information as a mechanism to reduce escalation, knowing that the Soviets were unlikely to take up his offer (Glass, 2010). In addition, the purpose of U.S. participation in the International GeoPhysical Year (I.G.Y.) program was to establish the freedom of space (McDougall, 1985). The I.G.Y. was an international scientific effort that ran from July 1st, 1957 and December 31st, 1958 encompassing a variety of earth sciences; and during this time, the United States and the Soviet Union sought to launch satellites into orbit. This following study explores Eisenhower’s attitude towards the intelligence on the Soviet earth satellite program leading up to and immediately following the launch on October 4th, 1957. As the C.A.T.I. predicts, Ike demonstrated an ambivalent attitude towards unspecific, confirmatory intelligence that he received while relatively uncommitted to the I.G.Y. space program.

7.5.1 President Eisenhower’s Attitude Towards the Intelligence

As detailed in the previous case, the verbal indicators of an ambivalent include “doubt,” “worry,” “concern,” “mixed feelings,” “conflicting or contradictory,” “hesitant,” or “waveri-
likely to have been ambivalent. He exhibited neither favorable indicators (such as positivity, affirmation, gratification, or approval) nor unfavorable indicators (such as annoyance, frustration, opposition, or disproval).

Overall, the President’s words, physical manifestations, and behaviors suggest numbness and mixed feelings. After the D.C.I.’s intelligence briefing at an N.S.C. meeting on October 10th, 1957, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Donald Quarles, briefed the President on the launch and worldwide reaction. The meeting minutes describe the President’s attitude at the time:

At the conclusion of Mr. Allen Dulles’ briefing, Mr. Cutler asked Secretary Quarles to speak. Secretary Quarles began by stating that much of what he was going to say would be familiar to the President and other members of the Council. The President quipped that this was indeed the case, and he was beginning to feel somewhat numb on the subject of the earth satellite.165

The “numbness” Eisenhower describes was also seen during his press conferences. While this was not immediately following an intelligence briefing, it provides evidence that his verbal indicators were linked to his attitude towards intelligence. During the October 9th, 1957 press conference, the President remained calm and stated, the launch of Sputnik “does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota” (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, p. 2). This attitude, according to close advisor James Killian, was explicitly the result of “Eisenhower’s knowledge of Soviet plans and intentions based on intelligence provided to him over several years” (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, pp. 2-3).

The President’s physical manifestations also suggested mixed emotions and an ambivalent attitude. For example, the C.I.A.’s Studies in Intelligence describes Eisenhower’s attitude at an N.S.C. meeting following the launch of Sputnik. The authors say the meeting

minutes highlight Eisenhower’s “lukewarm attitude” (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, p. 6). Similarly, third-party accounts of Eisenhower’s demeanor argue that, immediately following the news about Sputnik, the President was “barely troubled” and displayed an attitude of “nonchalance.” Researchers claim it was Ike’s knowledge of the program beforehand that gave him “good reason for nonchalance” (Newton, 2011, p. 254). In summary, while the physical manifestations are not definitive proof of an ambivalent attitude towards the earth satellite program, the mix of emotions – such as “lukewarm” and “calm” – provide at least correlational evidence.

There are also some behavioral indicators of Eisenhower’s ambivalent attitude to intelligence. For example, slowness to respond is suggestive of an ambivalent attitude, and Eisenhower’s response, or lack thereof, to the Sputnik launch reflects this. His daily journal reports that,

He had played eighteen holes of golf that morning, then inspected his cattle and toured a neighboring pig farm in the evening. He was home by 6:30 and spent the rest of the night with family, which he did not bother to interrupt to respond to reports of the Soviet satellite (Newton, 2011, p. 254).

Again, while not directly linked to intelligence products, it is argued that this ambivalent attitude was the result of the intelligence briefings he had received over time (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, pp. 2-3). In summary, a variety of verbal, physical, and behavioral indicators reflect President Eisenhower’s attitude towards the launch of Sputnik and the Soviet satellite program in general. Ike demonstrated mixed emotions on the topic, through his numbness, lack of concern, lukewarm demeanor, and slowness to respond.
7.5.2 The Threat of Sputnik

As earlier cases have illustrated, low threats should theoretically lead to favorable attitudes and high threats to unfavorable. However, as an ambivalent attitude includes both positive and negative aspects, this is more difficult to gauge. Nevertheless, there is no causal evidence of a link between the level of a perceived threat from Sputnik or the Soviet satellite program and Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence. First, in addition to the President’s public announcements about his lack of concern for the Soviet satellite issue, his advisors echoed this sentiment. Andrew Goodpaster, for example, said that, “for Eisenhower, Sputnik itself was not a threat; rather, the important thing was what it told us about [Soviet] capabilities for long-range missile attack” (Coaty, 2018, p. 67).

This perceived lack of threat was emphasized during the N.S.C. meeting following the launch of Sputnik 1. Secretary Quarles’ briefing concluded with the statement that there was clear evidence the Soviets “possess a competence in long-range rocketry and in auxiliary fields which is even more advanced than the competence with which we had credited them; although, of course, we had always given them the capability of orbiting an earth satellite.”166 Despite Goodpaster’s comments about Eisenhower’s concern regarding the Soviet long-range missile program, the President’s first question was about the effect on U.S. prestige, not the implications of the threat posed by long-range missile capabilities. This point is further exemplified by the intelligence report that the launch would produce “data of limited military value” (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, p. 7). Thus, although Sputnik demonstrated a threatening ballistic missile

capability, Eisenhower did not perceive the satellite program as a threat and was more concerned about the factor of prestige.

Second, there is more evidence that the President was significantly more preoccupied with the psychological effects of the satellite, rather than national security concerns. Bulkeley (1991) found that the “Eisenhower administration was far more concerned about the political and above all the prestige aspects of an IGY satellite project” (Bulkeley, 1991, p. 212). Therefore, Ike’s attitude towards the intelligence on the Soviet satellite program was not the result of low threat, as he did not exhibit a favorable attitude; and there is neither a correlational nor a causal link between threat and attitude. As threat cannot explain Eisenhower’s attitude at the time, the C.A.T.I. may provide additional insight into this case.

7.5.3 Eisenhower’s Commitment to the Earth Satellite Project

While President Eisenhower’s commitment to the U.S. earth satellite program was low, there were some elements of high commitment. The varying measurements of the components of commitment are likely to have contributed to the President’s ambivalent attitude towards the intelligence. For example, holding constant the independent variables in this case (intelligence specificity and type), if commitment were high, the C.A.T.I. hypothesizes that Eisenhower’s attitude would be favorable. Indeed, there is some evidence of a favorable attitude, such as the calm the President exhibited throughout the intelligence and press briefings. Overall commitment in this case, however, was low, leading to the ambivalent attitude observed.

The table below summarizes the indicators of commitment to the earth satellite project and their measurements.
Table 7-5: Eisenhower’s Commitment to the Earth Satellite Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Stake                       | Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to the attitude object | • Eisenhower’s goal was to set a precedent that satellites do not violate air space  
• Eisenhower’s comments on public commitment to the program during the National Security Council (N.S.C.) meeting  
• Eisenhower stressed the importance of national prestige during the National Security Council (N.S.C.) meeting | • Memorandum of Discussion at the 339th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 10th, 1957. Retrieved from: [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v11/d348](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v11/d348)  
| Saliency                    | Relevance to the policymaker’s goals                                        | • Eisenhower was not notably enthusiastic about the program  
• Eisenhower purposefully separated the civilian satellite research from the military applications  
• Eisenhower expressed repeated disapproval of additional satellites  
• Eisenhower’s primary concern was prestige | • Memorandum of a Conference, President’s Office, White House, Washington, October 8th, 1957, 8:30 a.m. Retrieved from: [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v11/d347](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v11/d347)  
| Certainty                   | Confidence in the ramifications of action or inaction                       | • Eisenhower considered an investment in the satellite program to be a “gamble”  
• Eisenhower also said that the U.S. might want to launch more satellites, and even do so once a year | • Memorandum of Discussion at the 310th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 24th, 1957. Retrieved from: [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v11/d344](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v11/d344) | Low         |
| Immediacy                   | The perceived time between potential action/inaction and the consequences    | • Eisenhower deferred a decision to launch additional satellites in May 1956  
• Eisenhower argued the rush into space was unwarranted and that there was no “space race” | • [Ryan & Keeley, 2017, pp. 2-6](https://example.com)  
• Memorandum of a Conference, President’s Office, White House, | Low         |
While the intelligence and attitude section focus on Eisenhower’s attitude towards the Soviet space program, the commitment section details his vested interest in the United States’ domestic I.G.Y. program, as the two superpowers competed to launch a satellite. However, as this section will show, Eisenhower was not as concerned about beating the Soviets into space, but rather establishing a legal precedent for satellite flyovers. While the President was not “noticeably enthusiastic” about the space program, his stake in it was relatively high. This is on evidence in the President’s comments during N.S.C. meetings. For instance, a primary objective of the satellite program was to substantiate a principle of “freedom of outer space.” The Eisenhower administration offered the Soviet government the Open Skies treaty to deescalate conflict and provide mutual information about military technologies. At the same time, the United States was flying over Russian airspace with U-2 spy planes. Sputnik’s launch set a precedent that flying a satellite was not in violation of a country’s territorial sovereignty. The stake in the program was described during an N.S.C. meeting on October 10th, 1957:

Another of our objectives in the earth satellite program was to establish the principle of the freedom of outer space – that is, the international rather than the national character of outer space. In this respect, the Soviets have now proved very helpful. Their earth satellite has overflown practically every nation on earth, and there have thus far been no
protests.\(^{167}\)

The second reason that the stake was high was Eisenhower’s public commitment to launching a scientific satellite during the I.G.Y., an international scientific project to promote technological exchange. In an N.S.C. meeting on May 3\(^{rd}\), 1956, the President articulated both his personal and the national stake in the program. The meeting minutes show that Eisenhower admitted he was not “notably enthusiastic” about the I.G.Y. satellite project, but felt that “we certainly could not back out of it now. The President could not imagine the United States having made an announcement that it proposed to launch an earth satellite and then failing to deliver on its commitment.”\(^{168}\) A year later, Eisenhower continued to expand upon this point. During another N.S.C. meeting in May 1957, he “stressed … the element of national prestige” and argued that the scientific instrumentation was not as important as actually launching the vehicle.\(^{169}\) In sum, his stake in the program was high.

In contrast, the second component of commitment – saliency, or relevance to the policymaker’s goals – was low. In addition to not being “notably enthusiastic” about the program, Eisenhower did not consider the satellite program related to his primary goals of containing the Soviet Union and balancing the budget. First, the satellite program leading up to Sputnik 1 was intentionally separated from the military research into intercontinental ballistic missiles. The President made this guiding point in a memorandum following the launch of Sputnik on October 8\(^{th}\), 1957: “The U.S. [is] determined to make the Satellite a scientific project


and to keep it free from military weaponry to the greatest extent possible."\(^{170}\)

Although Eisenhower supported the satellite reconnaissance project years later, he did not appreciate an expensive program that did not contribute to either of his most important policy goals. This was further evidenced by his continued disapproval of additional satellites and his frequent complaints about the rising costs of the program.\(^{171}\) For example, during one meeting he “confessed that he was much annoyed by this tendency to ‘gold-plate’ the satellite in terms of instrumentation.”\(^{172}\) Hence, the earth satellite program was clearly unrelated to the President’s goals, thus saliency was low.

There is also evidence that the third element of commitment, certainty, was low for Eisenhower. With his reluctant approval of the satellite program, the President was unsure of the consequences of launching a satellite or of allowing the Soviets to launch one first. He described additional investment into the scientific program as a “gamble that he did not feel was justified.”\(^{173}\) Moreover, while seemingly prescient about the role of satellites in the military-industrial complex, he was unsure during the early phases of development. For instance, in early 1957, he contended that while he had been initially reluctant to fund the program, the U.S may want to launch more in the future:

once we have succeeded in getting one satellite into its orbit we will then desire to make a decision as to how many more such satellites we need to have. This might well prove to be more than six. Perhaps we should even want to launch an earth satellite once every year.\(^{174}\)

\(^{170}\) "Memorandum of a Conference, President’s Office, White House,” October 8, 1957, 8:30 a.m. Retrieved from: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v11/d347. Note: This was due to the need to receive international acceptance of “freedom of space.” Eisenhower felt that the world would accept an overflight of a non-military, scientific satellite but not a military satellite, at least until the precedent was set.


\(^{174}\) Ibid.
His wavering opinion on the use and quantity of satellites reflects low certainty for the earth satellite program.

The fourth component, immediacy, or the perceived time between action or inaction, was also low. This is illustrated in Eisenhower’s policy, behavior, and words. The President deferred the decision on additional satellites for a year before the launch of Sputnik and continued to be wary leading up to and immediately following the launch of the Soviet spacecraft (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, p. 6). In addition, the president frequently argued that science was more important than speed, stating that, “Time was a secondary factor!” (Sputnik, p. 4). Even after the announcement of Sputnik’s successful orbit, the President’s policy remained unchanged. Four days later, on October 8th, 1957, the guiding points policy memo included the notion that, “No pressure or priority was exerted by the U.S. on timing, so long as the Satellite would be orbited during the IGY 1957-1958.” Sputnik had already set the precedent of freedom of space, thus the only option that remained was to ensure the U.S. satellite orbited during the I.G.Y. to ensure the United States did not suffer a further loss of prestige. Therefore, immediacy for the earth satellite program was low. However, immediacy is likely to have increased following the multiple failed attempts of Project Vanguard in late 1957 to 1959 and the successful launch of Sputnik 2 by the Soviet Union in November of 1957. Nonetheless, there is still evidence of low immediacy leading up to and immediately following Sputnik 1.

Finally, the fifth component of commitment, self-efficacy, was high for Eisenhower. This was shown by his willingness to free up DoD emergency funds and his confidence when dealing

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with congressional committees. On May 10th, 1957, Eisenhower ordered that additional funds be made available to continue work on the satellite program through the DoD emergency fund. The order also included requirements for work with appropriate Congressional committees. This is in contrast to previous cases, where Congress was a detriment or roadblock to the President’s plans. For example, in the case of Dien Bien Phu, Eisenhower felt that he would have to fight Congress like “dogs,” with “little hope for success.” Therefore, despite his reluctance to support the earth satellite program due to its cost and initial separation from military applications, Eisenhower exhibited high self-efficacy.

Overall, three of the five components of commitment were low. While Eisenhower wanted to deploy a satellite, the primary goal of establishing a legal precedent of freedom of space was achieved by the Soviets when they launched Sputnik. That said, stake and self-efficacy were high, and it is likely that commitment increased over time, especially after the launch of Sputnik 2 in November 1957. Holding all variables constant, if Eisenhower’s commitment were high, the C.A.T.I. would predict a favorable attitude. This could explain the positive aspects of Eisenhower’s attitude and his increased interest in satellite.

The reconnaissance satellite WS-117L was approved in 1955 and began in 1956. Its production was deliberately slowed to ensure that the I.G.Y. satellite would launch first, thus establishing the freedom of space precedent (McDougall, 1985). While reconnaissance satellites contributed to Eisenhower’s primary goal of containment (discussed in the next mini-case), the commitment to the I.G.Y. differed for the reconnaissance satellites. As one scholar notes:

For there were two ways the legal path could be cleared for reconnaissance satellites. One was if the United States got away with an initial small satellite orbiting above the nations of the earth “for the advancement of science - and had no one object to it. The other way was if the Soviet Union launched first. The second solution was less desirable, but it was

not worth taking every measure to prevent (McDougall, 1985, pp. 123-124).

Thus, while orbiting the I.G.Y. was important for setting the precedent of freedom of space and represented a significant prerequisite to ensuring the legality of reconnaissance satellites, Eisenhower was aware that a Soviet launch would accomplish the same effect.

7.5.4 Intelligence Specificity on the Sputnik Launch

While the President’s commitment to the earth satellite program was low, the intelligence he received was unspecific. For instance, on January 24th, 1957, Allen Dulles provided a briefing to the N.S.C. and the President. The briefing provided information about the potential launch of a satellite, but ultimately admitted, “we still do not have firm information on the numbers vehicles, their size, and the Soviet launching plans.”

A few months later, the C.I.A. continued to provide unspecific intelligence, finding that a launch was likely, but it was unclear what kind. Furthermore, the agency was “reluctant to convey a specific time frame” (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, p. 8).

Generally, the I.C. knew a launch was forthcoming, but it did not make the connection or definitive link to the U.S. earth satellite program. In fact, the C.I.A.’s post-mortem found that the spy agency had provided intelligence to the President that contained “little tactical information” and was “based more on educated guesses than hard facts” (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, p. 11).

Regardless of the veracity of those guesses, the information was unspecific. These strategic-level estimates were also confirmatory, as they aligned with Eisenhower’s preconceived notions.

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7.5.5 The Type of Intelligence and Sputnik

President Eisenhower’s previous knowledge aligned with the intelligence he received leading up to and immediately following the launch of Sputnik 1. Both the C.I.A. and Eisenhower admitted they were well aware of the Soviet satellite-launching capabilities in 1956. The C.I.A. published intelligence about the Soviet’s ability to launch as early as January 1956, and Eisenhower, in his memoirs, claimed, “As early as November of 1956 our intelligence people had estimated the U.S.S.R. would probably have the ability to launch an earth satellite after November of 1957” (Bowie & Immerman, 1998, pp. 206-207; Ryan & Keeley, 2017). Regardless of the timing, the President had, at a minimum, a year of lead time proceeding the launch of the U.S.S.R.’s satellite. Secretary Quarles, during the N.S.C. meeting immediately following the launch, reiterated this point, saying, “of course, we had always given them the capability of orbiting an earth satellite.”

Other intelligence leading up to Sputnik 1 also conformed to President’s preconceived notions. Allen Dulles’ briefings noted that, “The USSR will probably make a major effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite,” and, “we believe that the USSR possesses the basic technical capabilities, skills, and other resources required” to do so. In addition, intelligence reporting told Eisenhower that the Soviet Union had made significant advances in launch capabilities (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, p. 10). Hence, a series of intelligence products leading up to Sputnik 1 had Eisenhower “amply informed” of a potential satellite launch (Ryan & Keeley, 2017, p. 10). As a result, the intelligence on the Soviet’s satellite program matched what Eisenhower believed was possible and was thus confirmatory.

In sum, Ike’s low commitment to the scientific satellite program – in conjunction with the unspecific, confirmatory intelligence – resulted in his ambivalent attitude. Initially, the President was unenthusiastic about the program and the “space race” in general, but he eventually become more committed. Recently declassified intelligence provides the reasoning for his lack of surprise and ambivalent attitude. This case also provides further evidence for the C.A.T.I.’s explanatory power when variables have ambiguous measures. The components of commitment (specifically, the high measures of stake and self-efficacy) can help to explain the favorable aspects of the President’s attitude leading up to the first Sputnik launch. Furthermore, this case provides another example in which, although the “news” was bad, the President did not have an unfavorable attitude towards it, thereby showing the significance of the other independent variables. As in the Guatemala case, the intelligence allowed Eisenhower to maintain cognitive consistency; but in this case, his commitment was low. As such, there were both favorable and unfavorable aspects of his attitude towards the intelligence.

7.6 Case 5: Eisenhower, Aerial Reconnaissance, and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)

While President Eisenhower was not thrilled with the development of scientific satellites, he was far more interested in the implications of these high-altitude vehicles in the realm of I.S.R. Since 1954, Eisenhower had been hounded by the press, congressmen, and even members of his own administration arguing that his desire to reduce the budget was putting U.S. national security at risk. His opponents felt that the United States was falling woefully behind the Soviet Union in strategic bombers, and this “bomber gap” was only widening. After Sputnik was launched in 1957, criticism shifted to the “missile gap,” a term credited to John F. Kennedy and
referring to the United States’ lack of missiles relative to the Soviet Union. Kennedy maintained that the nation “was losing the satellite-missile race with the Soviet Union because of … complacent miscalculations, penny-pinching, budget cutbacks, incredibly confused mismanagement, and wasteful rivalries and jealousies” (Preble, 2003, p. 804). The Soviets picked up on the inflammatory rhetoric and subsequently exaggerated their capabilities to the world, as they had previously done with the bomber gap.

Despite vehement opposition from his political opponents, Eisenhower continued to disagree, giving little reason why. What only a few select C.I.A. officers and the highest levels of the Eisenhower administration knew was that a highly classified, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2, had flown over the Soviet Union and debunked the “gap” completely, as early as 1956. As one researcher wrote, “For years, the President resisted unnecessary defense spending almost single-handedly against immense pressure. This was perhaps the principal achievement of the U-2 program and of his Presidency” (Beschloss, 2016). This case examines Eisenhower’s attitude towards U-2 and other high-altitude reconnaissance intelligence products such as the CORONA intelligence satellite program. Overall, the President showed a very favorable attitude towards this intelligence. While the C.I.A. did mislead the commander-in-chief on the aircraft’s traceability and vulnerability to Soviet radar, Eisenhower was evidently fascinated by the detail and capabilities of photographic intelligence (Pedlow & Welzenbach, 1998, pp. 110, 122). Although this case focuses on an intelligence technology and analysis discipline, rather than a specific subject, the C.A.T.I. may nevertheless provide additional insight into policymakers’ attitudes towards intelligence.
7.6.1 Ike’s Attitude Towards the Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (I.S.R.) Programs and their Products

As in the previous cases, the President’s was manifest in his words, physical indicators, and behavior. The verbal indicators of a very favorable attitude include “elated,” “ecstatic,” “overjoyed,” “delighted,” “euphoric,” “love,” “glee,” “thrilled,” “happy,” and “credulous.” The President used similar verbiage when describing his reaction to the intelligence. For instance, regarding a detailed briefing on the first U-2 flight, the C.I.A. briefers said, “…the President found [it] ‘very interesting, very positive’” (Pedlow & Welzenbach, 1998, p. 101). This provides evidence of an initially favorable attitude, and Eisenhower’s fascination with photographic intelligence only increased over time.

In March of 1956, Richard Bissell, the C.I.A. officer in charge of the U-2 program, sent the plane over the President’s farm in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, for a demonstration. When shown the imagery, Ike blurted out, “this is close to incredible” (Taubman, 2003, p. 167). The President’s verbiage continued to reflect his very favorable attitude. In late October 1956, several months after the first U-2 flight, Eisenhower authorized reconnaissance missions over the Middle East, as tensions rose due to the Suez Crisis. The United Kingdom and France joined the Second Arab-Israeli war and bombed an Egyptian airfield. The U-2 pilot made two passes, before and after the attack, allowing the President to see the remnants of a burning airfield, without involvement in the conflict. The President exclaimed to Arthur Lundahl, the imagery intelligence analyst and later founder of the National Photographic Interpretation Center (N.P.I.C.), “Ten-minute reconnaissance, now that’s a goal to shoot for!” (Pedlow & Welzenbach, 1998, pp. 117-120). Observers described Eisenhower as extremely pleased with the intelligence, though unhappy about the European countries’ actions. This demonstrated the difference between his
attitude towards the situation and that towards the intelligence.

Over the years, President Eisenhower received many briefings and continued to be amazed by the monumental technological intelligence achievements. While concerned by the political and escalatory ramifications of being caught over enemy territory during the Cold War, Ike personally authorized more than 50 flights in the Soviet bloc countries alone (although many were specifically ordered to fly along the border or in satellite countries). The flights, however, ultimately ended when Gary Powers was shot down and captured alive on May 1st, 1960. Despite assurances by the C.I.A. that there was essentially no chance of the plane or pilot surviving a crash, thereby ensuring plausible deniability, the reverse occurred. While upset, the President described the U-2 program several days after the shootdown as “nothing short of remarkable” (Beschloss, 2016). Thus, Eisenhower’s verbal indicators provide evidence of his very favorable attitude toward imagery intelligence and aerial reconnaissance programs, even after the political disaster.

While less numerous than the verbal indicators, physical manifestations also illustrate Ike’s very favorable attitude. Physical indicators of a very favorable attitude include expressions of extreme pleasure or contentment, laughter, and an energetic nature; and the President displayed several of these. For example, when Robert Cutler, an N.S.C. consultant, brought the new C.I.A. report, “Estimate of the World Situation,” in 1956, he deemed the assessment, “a very superior piece of work” (Ambrose, 2014, p. 456). However, Eisenhower vehemently disagreed, describing the piece – with its exaggerated missile and bomber estimates – as something that “could have been written by a high-school student.” But his attitude changed dramatically when the intelligence was revised in August of that same year. When the U-2 intelligence was released, observers described him as “pleased with the conclusions” (Ambrose,
Another example occurred when Eisenhower decided to brief 18 bipartisan leaders of Congress after the Gary Powers incident. The President gave Dulles permission to share several U-2 photographs with the congressional members, nearly all of whom were unaware of the program, and Arthur Lundahl began the briefing. The session resulted in a “standing ovation” and was so well received that, “Dulles dropped his pipe into the lap of his suit. As an aide recalled, Lundahl was torn between accepting the ovation and saving his boss, smiling at his audience as he helped Dulles bat out the embers” (Beschloss, 2016). While the President’s attitude was not explicitly mentioned, the audience’s energetic applause and overall positive attitude fit with Eisenhower’s verbiage on the subject. Moreover, the President’s behavior provides yet more evidence for a very favorable attitude.

Behavioral indicators of a very favorable attitude include credulity, expressions of excessive approval or gratification, and celebratory behaviors. First, Ike demonstrated extensive gratitude for the U-2 program, and there are multiple instances of the President praising the quality of the intelligence after seeing the imagery (Beschloss, 2016). When the U-2’s briefing team brought magnifying glasses and large boards presenting the imagery, he showed significant interest and approval. As one observer noted,

"Asking his usual volley of questions, Eisenhower put on and snatched off his reading glasses as his eyes darted up and down the pictures of factories, railroads, highways, bomber fields, and submarine pens. Once the President slapped an analyst on the back and said what a mistake it had been to staff Army intelligence with castoffs before Pearl Harbor: “Thank God for you careerists who came in during the war!” (Beschloss, 2016)."

Although Eisenhower had reservations about the flights over the Soviet Union, the C.I.A. assured him that they could not be tracked by Soviet radar. This faulty assumption was proved incorrect on multiple occasions, with Soviet tracking and tailing of the aircraft by fighters,
leading to the President’s “rapid disenchantment with the program” (Pedlow & Welzenbach, 1998, p. 110). Yet, even after the President became disappointed with the program, he authorized various flights over the Soviet Union and the rest of the world (Pedlow & Welzenbach, 1998, p. 120). A C.I.A. document from August 1960 lists more than 50 sorties over the four-year period.180

In addition, Eisenhower showed considerable support and approval for aerial reconnaissance programs despite the failures and setbacks. Aware that the U-2 project would eventually be untenable due to Soviet technology and world views on espionage, the President pushed for new methods to replace it, one of which was the CORONA imagery satellite program. The CORONA project, a closely guarded secret, with special access controls directed by the commander-in-chief himself, was initially a disaster. Of the first 12 attempts to launch, all 12 were failures. Figure 7-4 reproduces a table from the N.R.O. that illustrates numerous attempts to orbit the first intelligence satellite (Clausen, 2012, p. 33).

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<td>Launches</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Failures</td>
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<td>6</td>
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Figure 7-4: Record of spy satellite failures to launch

Nevertheless, and despite the project’s significant cost, Andrew Goodpaster said the Eisenhower was “1,000 percent supportive, in spite of the repeated failures” and was constantly telling his aide, “They’ll get it right. They’ll get it right” (Clausen, 2012, p. 45). The N.R.O.’s

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official history puts the President’s excessive approval into context: “Between the President’s confidence and the downing of Gary Powers’ U-2, the intelligence agency kept the CORONA project going. If that happened today, two or three failures, we’d be out of business” (Clausen, 2012, p. 45). Further behavioral evidence comes from Eisenhower’s decision, in the final days of his presidency, to establish the N.P.I.C., a major predecessor to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, whose primary mission was to analyze and exploit imagery intelligence.181

One final example illustrative of Eisenhower’s very favorable attitude towards the intelligence is his desire to see the CORONA photographs on his death bed. While there is no record of the President’s first reaction to the CORONA photographs, there is a report of one instance towards the end of his life. Six weeks before his death, the old general was briefed in his bed at Walter Reed Army Hospital by Richard Helms and Arthur Lundahl. Dino Brugioni, an intelligence analyst and senior official at the N.P.I.C., described the briefing:

> The men showed Eisenhower clear pictures of Soviet missile silos, shipyards, and submarine bases. Objects as small as 6 feet in size could clearly be seen from 120 miles out in space. Eisenhower peered at the pictures closely, marveling at the fine resolution and telling detail. He took notes as Lundahl spoke. He seemed pleased to see how far the technology had advanced. “The General was just absolutely flabbergasted” (Brugioni, 1991, p. 568; Taubman, 2003, pp. 232-234).

In summary, there is significant verbal, physiological, and behavioral evidence that Eisenhower had a very favorable attitude towards imagery and aerial reconnaissance intelligence. The next section examines threat as an alternative explanation for his attitude and explores whether this was the primary cause of the President’s demeanor.

181 Retrieved from: [https://www.nga.mil/About/History/NG AinHistory/Pages/NPIC.aspx](https://www.nga.mil/About/History/NGAinHistory/Pages/NPIC.aspx)
7.6.2 Aerial Reconnaissance and The Threat of Surprise Attack

Eisenhower’s attitude may have been the result of the perceived threat from a Soviet nuclear surprise attack. Threat can affect attitudes towards intelligence in several ways. For example, if state sovereignty or survival is not at risk, a decision-maker may feel more responsive towards intelligence on a topic. Highly threatening situations may result in increasingly unfavorable attitudes, as policymakers must deal with distressing subjects. As previously discussed, low threats should theoretically lead to favorable attitudes and high threats to unfavorable attitudes. Overall, I argue that, while Eisenhower was concerned about the threat of a surprise attack from the Soviet Union, he did not believe that the bomber or missile gap existed; therefore, the sense of threat was low. While this threat level correlated with Eisenhower’s very favorable attitude towards imagery intelligence, there was no causal relationship between the two.

Having entered office in the early 1950s, and being mindful of the catastrophic intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor, the President was acutely concerned about the possibility of a surprise attack. As a result, he established the Technological Capability Panel (T.C.P.), led by his scientific advisor and president of the Massachusetts Institute for Technology (M.I.T.), Dr. James Killian, Jr. The committee’s February 1955 study on surprise attacks found that, “Because of our air-atomic power we have an offensive advantage but are vulnerable to surprise attack.” However, the report stated that, in the future, “We will have a very great offensive advantage relative to USSR and will be less vulnerable than previously to surprise attack.”\(^{182}\) The panel recommended, among other actions, improving intelligence procedures to “increase the number of hard facts.” Thus, while Eisenhower was concerned about surprise attacks, the situation was

not as dire as his political opponents contended; and this is illustrated by his reactions to the rhetoric on the missile gap.

In his memoirs, the President was explicit that he did not believe there was a bomber or missile gap. He described the missile gap as “a useful piece of demagoguery” for his political opponents during the period leading up to the 1960 election (Bowie & Immerman, 1998, p. 390). Later, in his memoirs, Eisenhower continued his admonitions of the “gaps”:

During the four years of its operations, the U-2 program produced intelligence of critical importance to the United States. Perhaps as important as the positive information – what the Soviets did have – was the negative information it produced – what the Soviets did not have. Intelligence gained from this source provided proof that the horrors of the alleged “bomber gap” and the later “missile gap” were nothing more than imaginative creations of irresponsibility (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 547).

While the President knew the real extent of the threat, or lack thereof, the secrecy of the U-2 and CORONA programs meant that he chose to refute these claims with little tangible evidence.

Though there is a correlational trend, there is no causal evidence. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary, including Ike’s reaction to U-2 intelligence on the aforementioned Suez Crisis. Analysts described the President as “pleased” with the intelligence, but angry and concerned by the situation (Pedlow & Welzenbach, 1998, p. 119). The United Kingdom and France were igniting a situation that could have resulted in a significant escalation with the Soviet Union. Threat was thus high, but Eisenhower nevertheless demonstrated a favorable attitude towards the intelligence. Although he perceived the threat of a surprise attack to be low, there is no causal evidence that his very favorable attitude towards aerial reconnaissance and intelligence was the result of this. As the threat-based approach does not provide a useful explanation, the C.A.T.I. may elicit some additional insight into this case.
7.6.3 The President’s Commitment to Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance (I.S.R.) Platforms and Intelligence

Although the threat of the missile and bomber gaps was low for Eisenhower, he continued to demonstrate a high commitment to the aerial reconnaissance program and imagery intelligence. This included policies and funding for the development of satellite reconnaissance and aerial I.S.R. platforms. Moreover, this high commitment extended to policies that supported the analysis and resulting products of these platforms, such as the N.P.I.C., a predecessor to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The table below provides data demonstrating that each of the five components of the President’s commitment was high.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
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| Stake     | Subjective perception of gain-loss consequences attached to the attitude object | • Eisenhower privately excoriated those who touted the missile gap  
• Eisenhower supported aerial intelligence research and analysis despite multiple failures over multiple programs  
• Eisenhower endorsed a large variety of aerial reconnaissance programs over many years. | • (Beschloss, 2016)  
• (Clausen, 2012, pp. 33, 45)  
• (Robert, 1973, pp. iii-iv) | High |
| Saliency  | Relevance to the policymaker’s goals | • Eisenhower’s commitment to containment was demonstrated by more than 50 flights of U-2 planes over the Soviet Bloc  
• Eisenhower claimed the choice of whether to use the U-2 was one of the most “soul-searching questions” a person could have  
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Certainty</th>
<th>Confidence in ramifications of action or inaction</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eisenhower was confident in the quality and capabilities of photographic intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eisenhower understood the risks of U-2 and continued flights</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• (Beschloss, 2016)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• (Taubman, 2003, p. 177)</td>
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<th>Immediacy</th>
<th>The perceived time between potential action/inaction and the consequences</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eisenhower fast-tracked the CORONA project after U-2 shot down</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eisenhower supported multiple aerial reconnaissance projects</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• (Clausen, 2012)</td>
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<th>Self-efficacy</th>
<th>The perception that the actions are within their capabilities</th>
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<td></td>
<td>• Eisenhower said, “The decision of such espionage is something that the President, and the President alone, has to decide”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Eisenhower maintained personal control over U-2 flights</td>
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First, Eisenhower’s overall stake in the aerial reconnaissance program was high. This was demonstrated by his significant personal support for the U-2, CORONA, and other aerial reconnaissance platforms. The N.R.O.’s official history argues that it was “Eisenhower who got us through the first twelve in a row down” (Clausen, 2012, p. 33). The “first twelve in a row down” is referring to the 12 costly failures to launch a spy satellite. Despite these failures, as
previously mentioned, Eisenhower was “1,000 percent” supportive, and his support only strengthened over time (Clausen, 2012, p. 33). In addition to funding the U-2 and CORONA, Eisenhower pushed for a variety of aerial reconnaissance and imagery platforms, including the following projects: Argon, Lanyard, Gambit, Hexagon, Samos, Sentry, Genetrix, and Oxcart (Robert, 1973, pp. iii-iv). These projects ranged from high altitude planes to satellites to balloons.

Despite the President’s silence on the “gap” in public, observers note that his demeanor in private was not so sanguine. He took significant umbrage when journalists or political opponents reported on the topic. Eisenhower “pounded his desktop and threw offending magazines and newspapers against the Oval Office walls: Alsop was ‘about the lowest form of animal life on earth.’” Alsop, a famous journalist, was the offending party in this case (Beschloss, 2016). In addition, the President referred to his critics on the question of the missile gap as “sanctimonious, hypocritical bastards” (Beschloss, 2016). These visceral, private reactions further illustrate his personal stake in the program. Therefore, although the threat was low, Eisenhower’s stake in the aerial reconnaissance and rejection of the “gaps” was high.

The second aspect of commitment is saliency, or relevance to the policymaker’s goals, and this was also high. The first indicator of this measurement concerns Eisenhower’s foreign policy focus on containment. In addition to supporting guerilla fighters to counter communist aggression, he also focused much of the U-2’s limited lifespan on the Soviet Bloc. The United States flew 50 U-2s within or along the borders of Soviet Bloc countries. In addition, the aerial reconnaissance program met the President’s goal of budget reduction. While the cost of research

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and development was high, the potential and ultimate cost-saving information far-outweighed the failures. Eisenhower described the approval of the overflight programs as “one of the most soul-searching” questions to come before a president, while acknowledging the cost-saving benefit of the “knowledge that the Bison aircraft was not being produced in the quantities originally estimated.” Put differently, the bomber gap was unequivocally debunked by the U-2, thereby saving millions in weapons development. In a similar vein, James Killian later argued that,

The President had enough intelligence to be assured that there was no Missile Gap. The U-2 had a very important role in keeping down the Air Force budget as Ike was so anxious to do. There were billions of dollars that the U-2 saved (Beschloss, 2016).

Hence, saliency was high, as Eisenhower sought to disprove the “gaps,” while reducing the U.S. deficit and balancing the budget. The reconnaissance programs allowed him to do both.

The third component of commitment, certainty, was also high for the aerial I.S.R. programs. While Ike was uncertain about the Soviet Union’s anti-aircraft and tracking capabilities, he had no illusions about the role of aerial intelligence in uncovering the missile gap and answering other detailed questions. James Killian remarked that, “The President had enough intelligence to be assured that there was no Missile Gap” (Beschloss, 2016). In addition, after seeing another example of the U-2’s photographic capabilities, Eisenhower stated, “There can be no doubt about the quality of information to be obtained” (Taubman, 2003, p. 177).

Second, Eisenhower was certain that if the U-2 were shot down, the consequences would be dire. In a meeting on February 8th, 1960, the President said,

he has one tremendous asset in a summit meeting, as regards effect in the free world. That is his reputation for honesty. If one of these aircraft were lost when we are engaged

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in apparently sincere deliberations, it could be put on display in Moscow and ruin the President’s effectiveness.\textsuperscript{185}

Thus, Ike was highly certain about both the consequences of an aerial reconnaissance vehicle being shot down and the intelligence value to be gained from such technology.

There is also evidence that immediacy, or the time the policymaker perceived between action/inaction and its consequences was also high. This was illustrated by Eisenhower’s tolerance for failure over multiple years and the fast-tracking of the CORONA satellite. As mentioned earlier, Eisenhower supported a variety of aerial reconnaissance programs over nearly a decade. After Gary Powers was shot down in 1960, the President deemed research on the U-2 “low priority,” as he believed the primary use of military intelligence was during war.\textsuperscript{186} Although deeming the U-2 “low priority” seems to be low commitment, in fact the reverse is true: Eisenhower pushed for the fast-tracking of the CORONA satellite program as a far superior replacement (Ruffner, 1995). Within three months of the Powers incident, the United States had launched its first spy satellite, which in a single mission provided “more photographic coverage of the Soviet Union than all previous U-2 missions” (Ruffner, 1995, p. xiii). Thus, immediacy was high, as Eisenhower pushed a variety of alternatives to the U-2 and accelerated the CORONA program.

The final aspect of commitment is self-efficacy. Eisenhower believed that actions concerning the reconnaissance programs were within his capabilities, and therefore his self-efficacy was high. On May 26\textsuperscript{th}, 1960, three weeks after the Powers incident, Eisenhower met with congressional representatives at a bipartisan leaders’ breakfast. Eisenhower took full


responsibility for the U-2 program, arguing, “The decision of such espionage is something that
the President, and the President alone, has to decide.” And this talk was not simply boasting:
Eisenhower personally approved or disapproved specific U-2 flights over the years. In fact, the
President, cognizant of the risks of U-2 overflights, ordered that only one additional operation
could be flown, but no later than May 1st, and that “No operation is to be carried out after May
1.” Powers was shot down in that May 1st mission. In conclusion, each component of his
commitment was high, therefore President Eisenhower’s overall commitment to aerial
reconnaissance was high. In the next section, I examine the type and specificity of intelligence he
received on the subject.

187 Goodpaster, A.J., “Memorandum of Conversation, Bipartisan Leaders Breakfast with the President,” Held in the
State Dining Room, The White House, Thursday, May 26, 1960 at 8:45 A.M. Retrieved from:
https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/u2-incident/5-26-60-breakfast-
meeting.pdf.
188 Goodpaster, Andrew J., “Memorandum for the Record,” March 4, 1959. Retrieved from:
189 Goodpaster, Andrew J., “Memorandum for the Record,” April 25, 1960. Retrieved from:
7.6.4 The Specificity of Aerial Reconnaissance and Space-Based Intelligence

While his commitment was high, President Eisenhower received very specific intelligence from his aerial reconnaissance platforms and imagery analysis. This chapter has demonstrated that not only did Ike prefer specific intelligence, but he often received it when the U-2 or other aerial platforms were concerned. As discussed, there are multiple examples in this chapter of the President’s amazement regarding the specificity of the imagery. Often, he would mark up the flight paths with a pencil and use a magnifying glass to examine the images for himself (Beschloss, 2016; Pedlow & Welzenbach, 1998, p. 128).

The official historical account from the N.R.O. provides another example. Sherman Kent,

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the Director of the Office of National Estimates, “while pointing at a book of National Intelligence Estimates, once told Eisenhower, ‘This is not an Estimate Book any longer. It is a Fact Book!’” (Clausen, 2012, p. 76). Although certainly hyperbolic, Kent’s remarks to the President demonstrate the level of specificity offered by these programs. Another example of the level of specificity comes from the C.I.A. Studies in Intelligence article on the CORONA satellite program:

President Eisenhower and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles inspected the mission’s photographs. In films “good to very good,” the camera had photographed 1 S million square miles of the Soviet Union and East European countries. From this imagery 64 Soviet airfields and 26 new surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites were identified. That the first satellite mission could produce such results stunned knowledgeable observers from imagery analysts to the President (Ruffner, 1995, p. 2).

In sum, this chapter has shown that Eisenhower demanded specific intelligence, and the aerial reconnaissance vehicles and imagery analysis provided him with the most specific intelligence to date.

7.6.5 The Type of Intelligence Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (I.S.R.) Provided to Eisenhower

Finally, while the intelligence was specific, it was also confirmatory, meaning that it confirmed the President’s preconceived notions. First, Eisenhower did not believe that the missile gap theory was accurate, and the intelligence supported this assumption. When addressed with circumstantial and unspecific intelligence on the bomber and missile gap, Ike’s reaction was “more than skeptical; he was unconvinced, challenging repeatedly, ‘what do they base this on?’” (Helgerson, 1996a, p. 22). The new intelligence from the U-2, however, was highly specific and confirmatory. As early as 1956, analysts adjusted the Soviet bomber production estimates. By
June 1958, a “CIA report revealed not much to worry about after all” (Ambrose, 2014, p. 456). Finally, by 1961, when the CORONA satellite program was operational, analysts were able to fully confirm Eisenhower’s notions: “Eisenhower knew that he was almost home free, there was no missile gap, there never had been, and there might never be one” (Clausen, 2012, p. 72). Thus, aerial I.S.R. platforms such as the U-2 and CORONA confirmed the President’s assumption that the “gap” was simply a political tool employed by his opponents.

Second, the old general was convinced that, “There can be no doubt about the quality of information to be obtained” from the early stages of the programs (Taubman, 2003, p. 177). Eisenhower, from his approval of the project in 1953 to six weeks before his death, received a stream of imagery intelligence and confirmation of this belief. Not only did the U-2, CORONA, and other programs debunk the bomber and missile gaps, thereby providing him with evidence to justify a reduction in the air force budget, they also facilitated his ability to coerce actors in the Suez Crisis by providing timely, accurate, and specific battle damage assessments. These are just two examples of aerial I.S.R. providing quality, specific intelligence to the president that conformed to his preconceived notions about the efficacy of such programs.

In sum, Eisenhower displayed a very favorable attitude towards aerial I.S.R. platforms and the intelligence they produce. Although concern about the threat of a surprise attack did play a role in their creation and maintenance, these programs also allowed the President to reach his policy goal of reducing the budget. While highly committed to these aerial reconnaissance I.S.R. vehicles and the imagery intelligence they produced, Eisenhower was able to confirm his preconceived notions with specific intelligence. Overall, the platforms and resulting intelligence products are likely to have resulted in Eisenhower’s state of cognitive consistency while he was highly committed to them. His personal investment and subsequent vindication led to his very
favored attitude, thus providing additional evidence for the C.A.T.I., which predicts that high commitment will increase the strength of a favorable attitude generated from specific, confirmatory intelligence.

7.7 Alternative Explanations for Eisenhower’s Attitude

As discussed in earlier chapters, there are three primary alternative explanations for a policymaker’s attitude towards intelligence: personality, proximity, and threat. While each case here has discussed the respective threat levels, this section briefly considers why personality and proximity variables do little to explain the 34th President’s attitude towards intelligence. As in the previous three case studies, there are three personality-based explanations that may affect attitude, each widely investigated in the literature. These are experience and interest in intelligence and narcissistic personality disorders. Overall, none of these “first-level” theories provide a strong explanation for Eisenhower’s varying attitudes towards intelligence. The failure of these alternative explanations to adequately determine Eisenhower’s attitude thus provides additional credence for the C.A.T.I.

7.7.1 Personality and Experience

Of all the policymakers examined in this dissertation, few, if any, have the experience in intelligence that Eisenhower demonstrated. Before his presidency, Eisenhower was a career military man with decades of continuous service. Scholars describe Ike as a man “who had become accustomed to the use of intelligence in the tactical and strategic roles during a military career dating back to 1915” (Laurie, 2010, p. 2). He served as Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe and was subsequently designated Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (S.H.A.E.F.) until the end of World War II. During those roles, he was closely involved with intelligence and covert operations, including Operation Overlord, the storming of Normandy beach.

Eisenhower wrote several books about his military experience, and his writings demonstrate a clear understanding of intelligence operations. In his book, *Crusade in Europe*, the general illustrated the ruinous state of U.S. intelligence during the World War II: “Within the War Department a shocking deficiency that impeded all constructive planning existed in the field of Intelligence … In the first winter of the war these accumulated and glaring deficiencies were serious handicaps” (Eisenhower, 1997, p. 32). He discussed these issues with intelligence, describing the G-2 (army intelligence unit) as the “stepchild” position and criticizing the army’s failure to emphasize the importance of intelligence (Eisenhower, 1997, p. 32). Eisenhower’s derisive assessment of the G-2 as a stepchild was not born of disdain for the organization or the intelligence; rather, it was indicative of his frustration at the lack of appreciation and support it received.

Although there were instances of Eisenhower criticizing intelligence, there were also situations in which the President showed a positive attitude. During World War II, Eisenhower met with the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, to discuss intelligence operations and new technology. Researchers described the general as, “enthralled,” as Churchill walked him through the secret war, “through cocktails, through dinner, through brandy, coffee, and more brandy” (Ambrose & Immerman, 1999, p. 5). During a briefing on the value of ULTRA, the breakthrough by British intelligence of enemy-encrypted messages, “Ike fairly beamed as Churchill brought him in on the secret, but others were to be dubious at best” (Ambrose &
Immerman, 1999, p. 12). In summary, Eisenhower’s experience with intelligence was extensive. This included both military intelligence and strategic-level intelligence, such as ULTRA. If experience were the cause of President Eisenhower’s attitude, one would expect a linear relationship between his service time and his attitude towards intelligence: in other words, more experience would have a linear correlation with his attitude over time. However, this does not seem to be the case. Over time, Eisenhower, in his military and political positions, expressed varying attitudes towards the intelligence, thus illustrating that experience was neither a correlational nor a causal factor.

The second facet of personality-like factors that can influence attitude towards intelligence is interest in the subject. Eisenhower expressed a healthy and realistic interest in intelligence during his presidency. Although he often avoided reading daily deports, the President felt overall that the “formal estimates and papers were the genuine view, meaning not politicized” (Helgerson, 1996a, pp. 22-23). This demonstrated at least a basic level of trust for the work of the I.C. Furthermore, Eisenhower’s lack of interest in written products does not necessarily suggest a lack of interest in intelligence updates; rather, he simply preferred to receive them through oral briefings. This is evidenced by almost every N.S.C. meeting beginning with a briefing by C.I.A. Director Allen Dulles. Throughout Eisenhower’s presidency, the D.C.I. was almost always afforded the start of the meetings (Hadley, 2009, p. 72; Weber, 2002, pp. 21-22).

Additionally, Eisenhower’s policies exemplified his interest in and respect for intelligence. While his C.I.A. focused heavily on covert action, the New Look also emphasized intelligence-gathering (Snead, 1999, pp. 32-55; 2017, p. 314). The President, wary of the spread of communism, sought to learn more about Soviet capabilities and intentions and ultimately
authorized the U-2 aerial reconnaissance program. The manned, high-altitude spy plane snapped pictures of previously unseen Soviet bases, until it was shot down in the spring of 1960. While his decisions reflected a clear interest in intelligence, there are also data to suggest his frustration with his spies.

During the war, although Eisenhower was sympathetic to the lack of resources and respect that the G-2 received, he also criticized them for “faulty work.” He claimed, “Staffs were too prone to take one isolated piece of intelligence in which they implicitly believe and to shut their eyes to any contrary possibility” (Eisenhower, p. 147). His disapproval for some intelligence work was also seen throughout his presidency. During an N.S.C. meeting in 1954, Eisenhower complained that the intelligence did not do enough to distinguish between Russian capabilities and intentions; and he argued that the products did not put the issue into a proper perspective (Ambrose & Immerman, 1999, p. 253). This condemnation, however, did not reflect a general uninterest in intelligence, but was rather a response to the political situation. At the time, his political opponents plagued his administration with claims of the “bomber gap,” specifically that Soviet long-range aviation had gained an advantage in strategic nuclear bombing. The fifth mini-case on aerial I.S.R. later demonstrates Eisenhower’s change in attitude following the disproval of this claim. In other words, Eisenhower’s attitude towards the intelligence in that case was due to variables outlined in the C.A.T.I., not his general view of intelligence. That said, while there were instances of his disapproval, a speech in Langley, Virginia, summed up his general opinion on intelligence:

In war nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peacetime the necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources, requirements, and attitudes prevailing in the world. They and their correct interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long-term national security and best interests (Laurie, 2010, p. 5).
Therefore, it is clear from Ike’s policies, reactions, and behavior, that he was, at some level, interested in intelligence. One cannot explain variation in attitude towards intelligence with a constant.

Finally, the literature suggests that psychological pathologies may explain a President’s attitude towards intelligence. For example, Rhodewalt and Peterson (2009) demonstrated that narcissism can affect attitudes, and Bar-Joseph and McDermott (2017) examined how narcissism and other psychological pathologies play a role in intelligence usage. Still, there is little evidence that Eisenhower’s attitude was the result of narcissism. Studies applying three narcissism indices ranked Eisenhower, among the 42 U.S. presidents, as 24th for narcissistic personality disorder, 21st for grandiose narcissism, and 37th for vulnerable narcissism (Watts et al., 2013). There is therefore little evidence that Ike’s attitude towards intelligence has a personality-based explanation. The proximity hypothesis, however, may provide some additional insight.

7.7.2 Proximity

As personality-based theories cannot explain the president’s disposition, I turn now to the proximity hypothesis, which suggests that the relationship between the consumer and producers of intelligence may explain the consumer’s attitudes towards the product (Marrin, 2013). If this conjecture is valid, the President’s attitude towards intelligence would correlate with his relationship with his advisors and intelligence staff. Specifically, we would expect to observe a negative attitude when Eisenhower’s relationship with his D.C.I., Allen Dulles, was strained; and similarly, a positive relationship with Allen Dulles would result in a favorable attitude towards intelligence. While there were instances in which Eisenhower’s attitude varied, there is no
evidence that the variance was the result of Dulles’ “proximity.” In fact, the data show that the President often defended Allen Dulles when others shared concerns about his competency.

First, historical accounts show that Eisenhower and Allen Dulles had a very positive relationship. A prime example came following Dulles’ mishandling of Cuban policy:

The confused policy was the outgrowth of poor intelligence, for which Ike’s advisers blamed Dulles. Kistiakowsky, the science advisor, complained that Dulles would misrepresent essential details of intelligence matters … and “knows absolutely nothing about what goes on in CIA.” Bryce Harlow, a long-serving deputy to the president, considered Dulles ill informed and said he misunderstood basic responsibilities of his job. John Eisenhower [his son] regarded the director of Central Intelligence as a “bum” (Newton, 2011, pp. 306-307).

Despite these admonitions of his spymaster, the President did not remove him and rarely rebuked him. When John Eisenhower, the President’s son, suggested he fire Dulles, Eisenhower was livid (Newton, 2011, p. 307). While Eisenhower did find some of Allen Dulles’ briefings “too philosophical, laborious, and tedious,” this was the extent of his criticism for his spy chief (Ambrose, 2014, p. 469).

The troublesome Cuba policy was not the only occasion on which Eisenhower defended Allen Dulles against reprimand. Another example came when the Doolittle Report of 1954 illuminated a variety of faults in the D.C.I. The commissioned group, led by Air Force General James H. Doolittle, sought to study the efficacy, security, personal, and adequacy of the C.I.A. The report criticized Dulles’ management style; and Doolittle himself called Allen Dulles, “‘too emotional’ for his job” (Ambrose, 2014, p. 227; Kennedy, 1996, p. 5). Before Doolittle could finish, Eisenhower interrupted him, saying, “I have never seen him show the slightest disturbance. Here is one of the most peculiar types of operation any government can have, and it probably takes a strange kind of genius to run it” (Ambrose, 2014, p. 227).

Despite being the longest-serving director of U.S. intelligence to date, Allen Dulles and
his brother, John Foster Dulles, were clearly disliked by many. In addition to receiving domestic criticism, the brothers were ridiculed many times by Winston Churchill, who purposefully mispronounced their surname (Ambrose, 2014, p. 21). Even when his own son cast doubt on Allen Dulles’ capabilities, Eisenhower liked and respected Allen Dulles, according to Andrew Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary and close confidant of the President (Laurie, 2010, p. 5). Weber (2002) argues that Eisenhower and Dulles had one of the strongest relationships of any president and his spymaster. It is thus clear that Eisenhower and Allen Dulles’ relationship was overwhelmingly positive.

According to the proximity hypothesis, Eisenhower’s attitude would be favorable towards the intelligence as a result of his positive relationship with his chief intelligence officer. However, there is neither correlational nor causal evidence to support this assertion. There are several examples of Eisenhower expressing an unfavorable attitude towards intelligence, despite his relationship with the D.C.I. The aforementioned case during the bomber gap was one instance in which Ike criticized the intelligence he received, but there is no evidence that his relationship with Dulles had changed at that time. In sum, one cannot explain variation in attitude with the constant of the consumer-producer relationship cannot explain the variation in attitude, and therefore the proximity hypothesis does not explain Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence. Thus, while threat, personality, and proximity cannot explain the variation in Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence over the five cases, the C.A.T.I. provides the most evidence to date.
7.8 Conclusion

The five Eisenhower cases provide new insights into the inner workings of the consumer-producer relationship in the early stages of U.S. intelligence gathering and give new evidence for existing scholarly arguments. It is clear that Eisenhower’s C.I.A. tended to favor his cognitive consistency and essentially told him what he wanted to hear (Immerman, 2008, p. 11). In the case of the Dien Bien Phu, despite the increasingly dire situation of the French, Dulles sought to spin the news to fit Eisenhower’s sensibilities. He “suggested that the pessimistic French reports from Saigon might be designed as a build-up to exaggerate the extent of their final victory.”191 This notion was in marked contrast to the reporting that Allen Dulles had provided up until that point, but it fit with Eisenhower’s optimistic view of the situation.

Another example of the I.C.’s active goal to align information with the President’s worldviews emerges from the Indonesian case. After the failure of Operation HAIK, Eisenhower and the C.I.A.’s view of the formerly communist-leaning leader changed dramatically, suggesting that the United States could work with him. As Kahin and Kahin (1997, p. 210) write, Most striking in the new directive was the change shown in the Eisenhower administration’s attitude toward Sukarno. No longer was he regarded as an obstacle to be gotten rid of or at least needing to have his wings clipped. He was now portrayed as pivotal in Indonesian politics.

When Eisenhower recognized his failure to remove Sukarno from power, he began to believe that he could work with him. This notion of Sukarno as a capable leader permeated the C.I.A. for several years after Eisenhower left office.192

These two examples demonstrate that Eisenhower often received intelligence that he

wanted, rather than which accurately reflected the situation. As a result, it would be difficult to find a case in which President Eisenhower was highly committed to a policy and then received disconfirming intelligence. Even in cases where he was less committed, such as Dien Bien Phu and Operation HAIK, his intelligence professionals sought to soften the impact of disconfirming intelligence by updating it to fit the President’s preconceived notions.

This also makes it more difficult to gauge Ike’s attitudes towards intelligence. If the intelligence apparatus were actively seeking to please the commander-in-chief, one would see less variation in the dependent variable. In summary, the mini-cases provide both correlational and some causal evidence for Eisenhower’s attitude towards intelligence. While the threat to U.S. interests offers a reasonable explanation for his attitude towards the intelligence on Indonesia, this represents only one-fifth of the cases; the C.A.T.I., in contrast, can explain all five. The final chapter of this dissertation discusses the implications of the C.A.T.I. for generalized intelligence theory and practice beyond the scope of a single policymaker.
8.0 Chapter 8: Conclusions and Implications for the Cognitive-Affective Theory of Intelligence (C.A.T.I.)

This dissertation has demonstrated that attitudes matter, particularly in the context of intelligence studies. Through the application of attitude theory and interdisciplinary and social science research techniques, this study has shown the value-added to both intelligence and I.R. research. More often than not, researchers focus on the causally downstream consequences of attitudes, such as cognition and behavior, rather than the attitudes themselves. After constructing the theoretical foundations of the C.A.T.I., I empirically tested my theory using case study analysis.

Chapter 4 examined President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s surprisingly favorable attitude towards the intelligence leading up to the Six-Day War. Johnson, an outspoken opponent of the C.I.A., found the intelligence particularly useful; and third-party observers described him as “gratified” and “clearly impressed” with his I.C.’s performance. After the Agency’s success in the Spring of 1967, the President’s D.C.I., Richard Helms, was continually invited to Johnson’s weekly luncheons, providing evidence of an altered relationship. The next section of this chapter explores this notion in more detail.

Chapter 5 assessed President Ronald Reagan’s attitude towards the intelligence on his Lebanon peace initiative. Reagan hoped that U.S. military presence in Lebanon would solidify U.S. leadership in the region and resolve many of the Middle East’s problems. Despite intelligence arguing that the initiative was overly ambitious and likely to fail, the President increasingly committed to his course of action. While the C.A.T.I. correctly predicted the direction of Reagan’s unfavorable attitude towards the intelligence, it was less accurate in its
determination of the strength of his attitude. This conclusion addresses several potential reasons why this was the case. In addition, Chapter 5 featured techniques such as sentiment analysis and counterfactual logic to bolster my claims.

Chapter 6 explored President Jimmy Carter’s attitude towards intelligence on the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea. In this case, the C.A.T.I. correctly predicted both the direction and strength of Carter’s attitude towards the intelligence. Despite opposition from military advisors, intelligence officials, and domestic constituents, Carter pushed for his plan to withdraw troops as a mechanism for coercing South Korea to liberalize and improve its human rights record. When he received intelligence contrary to his preconceived notions, the President exhibited a very unfavorable attitude, contending that the I.C.’s conclusion was “absurd.”

Chapter 7 evaluated President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s attitudes towards intelligence on a variety of subjects. In each of the five mini-cases, I found evidence for the explanatory power of the C.A.T.I. with little support for alternative theories. This chapter examined cases with varying levels of the dependent, independent, and conditioning variables. In two of the cases, Eisenhower had an ambivalent attitude due to there being favorable and unfavorable aspects of the intelligence (Sputnik and Operation HAIK). In other circumstances, Eisenhower displayed favorable attitudes (PBSUCCESS and aerial I.S.R.) and unfavorable attitudes (Dien Bien Phu), thereby demonstrating the significance of the C.A.T.I., as well as its generalizability.

This research provides an important starting point for the evaluation of attitudes towards intelligence, and it is hoped that it will encourage additional inquiries into the subject. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, intelligence studies suffers from a considerable lack of interdisciplinary theorizing (Gill & Phythian, 2018). This dissertation has contributed to the
social science and intelligence studies communities in this regard. The next section addresses the implications, conclusions, and my final thoughts.

8.1 Implications for the Cognitive-Affective Theory of Intelligence (C.A.T.I.)

When Professor Richard K. Betts addressed the topic of strategic intelligence and its value to policymakers at a lecture, one of his concluding remarks described the need for research that focuses on the circumstances under which policymakers accept or reject intelligence.193 This research seeks to bring us one step closer to understanding these conditions. Here, I focus on the implications for both the cases and the C.A.T.I. in general.

8.1.1 Attitudes towards intelligence and proximity

The implications of the L.B.J. case primarily lie within two camps: the demand side, or policymakers; and the supply-side, or intelligence producers. Most significantly, it is important to note that policymaker attitudes matter, especially with regard to specific topics or pieces of intelligence. The attitude Johnson exhibited towards the Middle East Crisis intelligence had a profound impact on his relationship with Helms and with the I.C. as a whole. This was because,

This was the first time that he [Johnson] was really sort of jarred by the fact that “those intelligence fellows had some insight that these other fellows don’t have.” From that time forward Helms regularly joined the President’s Tuesday luncheons, where Johnson and his closest advisers hammered out many of the nation’s principal national security policies. As Helms himself has observed, invitation to these informal sessions ushered him into the administration’s “magic inner circle” (Hathaway & Smith, 1993, p. 143).

There are two notable insights here. The first is that the crisis may have changed Johnson’s attitude towards intelligence and intelligence producers. While he did clash with intelligence staff in the future, this situation altered how he viewed the I.C. and its products.

Second, the crisis gave Helms and Johnson a stronger relationship—in other words, an increased level of proximity. In fact, Helms credited his success during the crisis for his inclusion in the Tuesday lunches. This is noteworthy because this case demonstrates how attitudes towards intelligence can lead to increased proximity between intelligence producers and consumers. As research has shown, proximity is required for intelligence to have an impact (Marrin, 2009b). If proximity indeed affects how intelligence is used, this research demonstrates that attitude can lead to increased proximity and ultimately make intelligence more consequential.

The second policymaker-related implication is that attitude may have influenced Johnson’s decisions to not supply Israel. The first two chapters of this study showed that attitudes may influence both behaviors and thought processing. In Chapter 2, I described a situation in which Fred is invited to John’s party. Fred may have an unfavorable attitude towards John but choose to go to the party nonetheless. However, Fred’s attitude may influence his behavior at the party. Similarly, while it is impossible to know how Johnson’s favorable attitude towards the intelligence affected his thought processes or decision making during the crisis, it is likely that it did. In summary, the L.B.J. case showed that policymaker attitudes towards intelligence topics have both theoretical and practical implications.

While this dissertation primarily focuses on demand-side explanations, there are also important contributions for intelligence producers. The Johnson case illustrates the significance of preparation and task forces. As previously noted, Helms established a task force on May 23rd,
within 24 hours of Nasser’s announcement of the closing of the Strait of Tiran. This group was able to leverage all available intelligence on the topic and provide timely reports to Johnson, within a few hours of his request. While Helms’ diligence was admirable, there had been a long-standing Arab-Israeli group within the I.C. since the Suez War in the 1950s. The Arab-Israeli Ad Hoc Working Group originally focused on Soviet equipment deliveries to Arab states, but began to morph:

Over the years, experts from CIA, State, DIA, and NSA had learned to know each other, to work together, and to debate on the basis of commonly-shared corpus of information. Thus, when Nasir made his move and the Israelis reacted, the spadework on the central problems had long since been done, and the policy makers could be presented with informed judgements confidently arrived at (Freshwater, 1969, p. 8).

The preparation and the ingrained formal and informal institutions in the I.C. led to a quick turn-around. This is important because some intelligence scholars argue that information can only have an impact if it is timely (Jervis et al., 1991). As both theory and history have shown, commitment to policy or military action increases as time passes. An early injection of intelligence by the taskforce limited Johnson’s commitment to supplying Israel. Had the intelligence arrived later, Johnson’s commitment and attitude towards the intelligence may have been vastly different.

### 8.1.2 Bounding Conditions and Methodological Limitations

The second implication of this study concerns bounding conditions and methodological limitations. In Chapter 5, I discussed why Reagan’s attitude was not as unfavorable as the C.A.T.I. predicted. One reason proposed was the political infighting that may have affected Reagan’s self-efficacy and commitment levels. This could ultimately have reduced the strength of the unfavorable attitude. The second possible explanation is that Reagan’s attitude towards the
intelligence was already as unfavorable as it could be. If true, personality could serve as a bounding condition, with Reagan’s generally favorable view towards intelligence constraining how negative his attitude could become in any circumstance.

This demonstrates the value of both the C.A.T.I. and personality-level theories. For example, while L.B.J. had a favorable attitude towards intelligence preceding the Six-Day War, it is possible that, due to his general attitudes towards the C.I.A., his attitude could not have become any more favorable. The same holds true for other policymakers, such as Nixon and Ford, who exhibited negative attitudes towards the I.C. Therefore, this notion could bridge the gap between agency and structural theories in intelligence studies; that is, personality variables (such as Bar-Joseph and McDermott’s work on psychological pathologies) and circumstantial variables (such as commitment and intelligence specificity and type) both play a role in diving attitudes towards intelligence.

A third reason why the C.A.T.I. may not have accurately predicted the strength of Reagan’s attitude is that observers may have chosen not to comprehensively record it. In a C.I.A. report on intelligence support to Reagan, the briefers decided not to record certain observations: “One thing we decided early on was that we were not going to report on the conversations we participated in or overheard, or the personal reactions or comments of those we were briefing unless it directly related to intelligence support” (Kerr & Davis, 1997). If this is true, all Reagan’s reactions that observers deemed unrelated to the intelligence support may have been omitted.

A final methodological consideration is related to the policymaker-intelligence producer nexus. In the chapters on Reagan and Eisenhower, it was observed that the I.C. had altered its conclusions or presented the information in a manner intended to limit negative reactions
towards it. In the Reagan chapter, for instance, the S.N.I.E., *Prospects for Lebanon*, was altered because the conclusions were “too harsh, too pessimistic.” Hence, C.I.A. Director Billy Casey revised the assessment, hoping to increase the distribution of the product and enhance its favorability among policymakers in support of the peace initiative (e.g., Secretary of State George Shultz). The prospects for Lebanon went from “bleak” to “nil” (Persico, 1990, p. 352).

Similarly, Eisenhower’s I.C. was known to cushion the impact of disconfirming intelligence and, more often than not, confirm the President’s preexisting beliefs (Hybel, 2014; Immerman, 2010, p. 11). Before the failure of Operation HAIK to quell communism in Indonesia, Sukarno was a communist menace and needed to be removed; but after the C.I.A.’s failure, both the administration and Eisenhower himself experienced a “striking” new attitude towards Sukarno (Kahin & Kahin, 1997, p. 218). This inclination to shift intelligence to maintain cognitive consistency is a recurring theme in both cases. This desire to please the commander-in-chief reduced the variation in the dependent variable. In other words, the C.A.T.I. predicts that with fewer disconfirming intelligence estimates, we are more likely to see favorable attitudes. While both Reagan and Eisenhower had various attitudes towards intelligence, the “cushioning” of intelligence could be a limiting factor. The final section of this chapter discusses the implications of “softening the blow” of disconfirming intelligence.

### 8.1.2.1 Limitations

In addition to the limitations listed above, the C.A.T.I. may have less explanatory power in certain situations or when attitudes are difficult to measure. That is, all intelligence is not equally likely to end up on a policymaker’s desk or in a briefing. When a policymaker has low commitment, they may be less likely to be presented with intelligence on that topic. The decision-maker may want more information on high commitment items, which requires their
immediate attention or is more salient to current policies. This is not to say that updates on low commitment topics do not occur. The P.D.B., for example, may provide additional insight into how many items appear on a President’s desk.

Table 8-1: L.B.J. and Nixon Presidential Daily Brief (P.D.B.) Items for One Month

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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-May-68</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29-Oct-76</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-May-68</td>
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<tr>
<td>31-May-68</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>3.923077</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Average</td>
<td>3.923077</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The C.I.A. recently released 5,000 P.D.B. documents in 2015 and 2016 from the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations. I examined one random month from each of the L.B.J. (May 1968) and Nixon (October 1976) presidencies to identify the number of items in a P.D.B. In May 1968, Johnson’s P.D.B. contained an average of seven items. The fewest number of items in a single day was five and the most was 11. The average number items in Nixon’s P.D.B. in October 1976 was 3.9, with a low of two and a high of eight items. The number of intelligence topics in the P.D.B. illustrates two points. First, at a cursory glance, the number of items varies significantly by president. Johnson had, on average, nearly twice as many subjects as Nixon. Second, as there are only a few intelligence topics each day, low commitment items will not frequently make the agenda. This may be especially true if commitment is low and the intelligence is confirmatory. Under these circumstances, the policymaker would receive information that agreed with their preconceived notions on topics of low commitment, as intelligence producers sought to avoid squandering the limited space on the P.D.B. with these types of topic.

In a similar vein, even if an intelligence topic with low commitment were to appear in a P.D.B. or other briefing, the C.A.T.I. suggests that it would attract a weaker attitude. Researchers have found that weaker attitudes have less influence on behavior and are less cognitively accessible than stronger attitudes (Howe & Krosnick, 2017). Thus, circumstances of low commitment, which the C.A.T.I. expects to produce weaker attitudes, are less likely to result in observable behavior.

8.1.3 Better Late Than Never? Special National Intelligence Estimates (S.N.I.E.S)

As I discussed in the introduction, if this research could reveal the circumstances under which policymakers are more (or less) attuned to intelligence, it could aid understanding of the value of intelligence products and the likelihood of the information being used in the decision-making process. That is to say, if intelligence agencies could provide relevant information before a policymaker committed to a policy or before preconceived notions were ingrained, it would be possible to limit further commitment to undesirable consequences or to reduce the strength of unfavorable attitudes. The issue with this notion, however, especially with regard to S.N.I.E.s, is that these pieces are often released well after the policymaker commitment has been made.

National intelligence estimates (N.I.E.s) and S.N.I.E.s are “the I.C.’s most authoritative written judgments on national security issues. N.I.E.s usually provide information on the likely course of future events and highlight the implications for U.S. policymakers” (Rosenbach, Peritz, & LeBeau, 2009, p. 36). The N.I.E. and S.N.I.E. are produced by the National Intelligence Council in concurrence with all intelligence agencies. While S.N.I.E.s appear to be an excellent source of study and a definitive attitude object in which researchers can examine attitudes towards intelligence, this is often not the case due to the lengthy process by which N.I.E.s and S.N.I.E.s are produced. As the process requires interagency coordination and the meshing of nearly 20 intelligence agencies, it can take several months or even more than a year to publish one report (Rosenbach et al., 2009, p. 37). In cases where assessments are rushed, such as the 2002 N.I.E. on W.M.D.s in Iraq, the product can be inaccurate and faulty.

As the chapters on Reagan and Carter showed, the N.I.E.s were released well after each president had committed to a set of actions. The S.N.I.E. 36.4-83, or Prospects for Lebanon, was released in October 1983 and simply reiterated the I.C.’s concerns from the previous year. By the
time it was released, Reagan was already significantly committed to his peace initiative.

Similarly, when the S.N.I.E. on the Korean Peninsula was released in late May 1979, Carter had already pushed his withdrawal plan for years. The implications for the C.A.T.I. are this: in each case, high commitment led to a stronger attitude towards the intelligence. As S.N.I.E.s are medium- to long-term efforts, and because commitment often increases over time, attitudes towards N.I.E.s and S.N.I.E.s are expected to be stronger.

In addition, this demonstrates the value of proactive intelligence producers. In Chapter 4, D.C.I. Richard Helms stood up the Middle East task force in anticipation of President Johnson’s needs. When Johnson eventually approached Helms, the Director was able to provide his customer with high quality, but more importantly, *timely* intelligence, before Johnson had become overly committed. This type of quick turnaround would not be available with flagship pieces such as an N.I.E. or S.N.I.E. Future research should examine how policymakers develop attitudes towards varying intelligence pieces, comparing S.N.I.E. with P.D.B. and I.N.R. intelligence summaries, and so on.

### 8.1.4 The Value of Specificity, Interactivity, and Technology

In this section thus far, I have discussed the significance of the type of intelligence and commitment. In addition, I have articulated how the C.A.T.I. aligns with other theories of intelligence, specifically the personality- and proximity-based explanations. However, I have not yet discussed the implications for the specificity of intelligence. One overarching theme in several of the chapters is policymaker interest – not only with regard to specific intelligence, but also fascination with satellite imagery and advanced intelligence collection methods. When Carter saw the new satellite imagery he “shook his head in amazement, laughed, and
congratulated” his intelligence staff (Andrew, 1995, p. 427). Similarly, the fifth mini-case study provided several examples of President Eisenhower’s very favorable attitude and sometimes “flabbergasted” reaction to imagery intelligence (I.M.I.N.T.). These examples illustrate that policymakers not only value specific intelligence, but also novel intelligence technology.

While current advanced intelligence technology is classified, the delivery system by which intelligence is delivered to the President has become increasingly transparent. For example, newspapers have reported that President Obama often received the P.D.B. on an iPad (Miller, 2012). The C.I.A. has also examined the role and implications of delivering the P.D.B. in electronic form, and this intelligence delivery system has implications for the C.A.T.I. The figure below is from the Studies in Intelligence article, “Rethinking the President’s Daily Brief”:

![Interactive Example for the President’s Daily Brief (P.D.B.)](image)

Figure 8-1: Interactive Example for the President’s Daily Brief (P.D.B.)

While not a real P.D.B., the image above demonstrates the value of an interactive intelligence product. It depicts an interactive map, created through geographical information systems (G.I.S.)
and geospatial intelligence analysis (G.E.O.I.N.T.). This technology allows a policymaker to delve into the specific details in which they are interested and to avoid the “ponderous” briefings that some, such as Eisenhower, have complained about. The policymaker can click on links and receive more specific intelligence on topics or areas of their choosing. The findings and recommendations of the C.I.A. study argue as follows:

The PDB should allow principals to link to as much standard finished intelligence information as possible and to include biographical information on individuals cited; empirical data on organizations and states and economic and financial data. It should tailor access to more specific resources, e.g., recent NIEs or relevant collection reports. Where a PDB piece relies on finished analysis or formal collection reports, hotlinks should be available (Meador & Cerf, 2013).

This C.I.A. analysis has another implication for the C.A.T.I. as well; namely, the future of data collection on attitudes towards intelligence. Earlier in this chapter, I noted that Reagan’s briefers would selectively report the reactions that the President exhibited towards intelligence. An interactive intelligence product would allow for substantially more engagement. A section in a Studies in Intelligence C.I.A. article, “Annotation and Feedback,” stresses this point:

The PDB device should be more than just a stuffed briefcase; it is a vehicle for engagement … Briefers should be able to conveniently make electronic notes in real time, noting where principals pause, make comments, or otherwise react … Principals should be able to provide direct electronic feedback and receive direct responses in return … Principals should be able to make notes to themselves and share an article or piece of information (and their reactions) with authorized staff or fellow senior officials (Meador & Cerf, 2013).

Indeed, this type of data would allow researchers to accurately measure attitudes towards intelligence. The delivery system would not only provide third-party accounts of the policymaker’s reactions, but could also record how long they spent on any particular article and where they wanted more specific information, providing a wealth of data for textual analysis. In
summary, the future of intelligence delivery will provide unique opportunities to measure attitudes towards intelligence.

8.1.5 Scholarly Implications and Final Thoughts

Some significant implications for practitioners and students of intelligence arise from my argument and research. The first is the importance of interdisciplinary theorizing and testing in intelligence studies. One of the more curious findings from this research is that this model can explain seemingly paradoxical outcomes in a variety of policymakers. For example, in Chapter 4, L.B.J.’s favorable attitude towards intelligence preceding the Six-Day War stands in stark contrast to his attitude towards both specific intelligence products and the I.C. as a whole. Similarly, if we apply the C.A.T.I. to decision-makers such as President Trump, his range of tweets on intelligence make more sense. Interdisciplinary theorizing and, more importantly, testing in intelligence studies is difficult, given the secrecy and lack of data, and so on. That said, the insights this type of research can provide should not be ignored. In political science, interdisciplinary theorizing has resulted in some of the most significant research in the field. Rationalist explanations such as realism and international political economy, and even network theories of how terrorist groups organize, all resulted from interdisciplinary theorizing and methodological diversity. Intelligence studies should learn from political science and embrace the theoretical and methodological variety of social science, physical science, and mathematics to create more generalizable and testable theories.

Second, intelligence producers and briefers should be cognizant of how the information they provide affects policymakers. Intelligence analysts are trained to remain neutral and provide only the facts. Nevertheless, an unbiased assessment from the I.C. can mean disaster for a
policymaker’s goals. While there is little that an intelligence official can do in this regard (“softening the blow” will be discussed shortly), it is important that intelligence professionals are aware of how their seemingly non-political analysis can affect policymaker attitudes.

Third, while more difficult to discern, the internal processes that occur inside of the decisions are significant. In essence, much of the intelligence literature focuses on how intelligence affects decisions or behavior. For example, Rovner’s seminal book, *Fixing the Facts*, examines why politicization occurs. This research is undoubtedly important and helps us to understand intelligence and human behavior. Nevertheless, the internal processes are just as important for understanding complex phenomena such as intelligence usage and attitudes towards intelligence. Although we may not be able to see the effect, this does not mean that these processes do not exist.

Fourth, this research has implications for the receivers of intelligence. My dissertation has theorized and tested a structural theory of attitudes towards intelligence; namely, that policymakers react similarly under like circumstances. As such, while policymakers are not able to fully obviate their reactions, they can be aware of their attitudes and seek to modulate them or avoid acting upon them immediately. As with other internal processes such as cognitive biases, it is difficult to mitigate the effects of one’s attitudes. Pherson and Heuer Jr (2020) propose structured analytic techniques as a means by which intelligence analysts can reduce the effect of biases of this sort. The effectiveness of these techniques depends, however, on a variety of factors, such as training, isolated idea generation, and a careful process of analysis, and these may be lacking in the kinds of situation that I examine (Coulthart, 2015). Moreover, neither analysts nor policymakers typically have the time to conduct such rigorous analyses when an

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issue requires timely action. Therefore, while there are some tools for the receivers of intelligence, simple awareness of one’s attitude may be the best solution.

This dissertation began with an anecdote about President Trump’s attitude towards intelligence. After the annual World Wide Threat Assessment hearing by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2019, the President spewed anger and vitriol on Twitter, demanding his intelligence professionals “go back to school,” in response to their assessments that differed from his preconceived notions on subjects like Iran, North Korea, and I.S.I.S. (Morin & Toosi, 2019). One year later, the I.C. sought to delay or completely drop the public portion of that annual briefing, in “a move compelled by last year’s session that provoked an angry outburst from President Donald Trump” (Matishak, 2020).

In this dissertation, I have not only formulated and tested a theory about the determinants of attitudes towards intelligence, but also demonstrated that these attitudes matter. While it is difficult to demonstrate the impact of these attitudes, the unusual cancellation of an annual intelligence briefing provides some indication of how and why they matter. This action highlights that policymakers’ attitudes towards intelligence can even influence the producers themselves.

This is not the only time that President Trump’s attitude towards intelligence has caused the I.C. to change its behavior. According to one former intelligence officer, briefings may exclude or skirt particular topics, such as Russia, as this type of intelligence can “draw Trump’s ire” (Priess, 2017a). Although it may seem troubling that intelligence producers are intentionally avoiding difficult topics, some researchers believe that there may be some advantages to this practice. It has been argued that, “Leading off with some sensitive or contentious topic could prompt a knee-jerk reaction, clouding the communication of subsequent items” (Priess, 2017b).
The observations of Priess, a P.D.B. briefer and intelligence scholar, support the primary contentions of the C.A.T.I.; namely, that attitudes precede and affect cognition. Priess contends that “softening the blow” of intelligence is beneficial because it ensures receptivity.

The concept of softening the blow is known in the intelligence literature as a type of soft politicization. While scholars such as Priess argue that soft politicization can lead to better outcomes, other disagree. (Rovner, 2013), for instance, found little evidence that this mechanism helps to maintain healthy relationships between policymakers and intelligence officials. Instead, his research concludes that there are few examples of soft politicization leading to better outcomes. This softening the blow typically risks the quality of intelligence estimates, results in cynicism among analysts, and may ultimately accustom decision-makers to intelligence that supports their preferences. Rovner illustrates this point by highlighting that a sudden switch to intelligence that disagrees with policymakers’ preconceived notions can create a psychologically distressing situation (Rovner, 2013, pp. 66-67).

At a glance, Priess and Rovner’s arguments appear to be in stark contrast with one another. However, upon closer examination, the contentions are not mutually exclusive. Priess’ observations are primarily drawn from short-term reactions to intelligence; and his concerns about policymaker attitudes towards intelligence are related to “knee-jerk reactions” that can cloud immediate judgement. Conversely, Rovner claims that results of soft politicization are detrimental to the intelligence producer-policymaker nexus writ large. The scholarly implication of the C.A.T.I. in this case is that the “knee jerk reactions” matter in two ways. First, as Priess suggests and my research confirms, knee-jerk reactions may cloud the communication on subsequent topics. Thus, the President may not receive vital intelligence because he is still livid about the previous topic. Second, these knee-jerk reactions affect the intelligence producers. As
the postponement of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s World Wide Threats shows, the President’s attitude towards an intelligence topic can change what his intelligence professionals brief. Topics that elicit that knee-jerk reaction may therefore show up less frequently on the policymaker’s desk.

My research has provided numerous examples of the I.C. softening the blows of its assessments, whether concerning Reagan’s peace plan in Lebanon or Eisenhower’s stance on Sukarno of Indonesia. I will not discuss the normative value of changing intelligence to affect attitudes towards such reports, regardless of the reason for the changes. What this dissertation has shown, however, is that attitudes towards intelligence matter.
9.0 Appendix

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