Returning to Demonstrations: A Multilevel Analysis of Abeyant Protestors across 84

Demonstrations in Eight European Countries

by

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While acknowledging that protest participants are not a homogeneous group, scholars in social movement studies tend to either overuse dichotomy in their typologies of protestors or overemphasize the extreme(s). Most attention is given to individuals who have never engaged in demonstrations before (i.e., new protestors) and individuals who engage in protest activities consistently (i.e., established protestors). This study focuses on people who lie in the middle – those who are active in protests in the past and return to demonstrations after a temporary leave (i.e., abeyant protestors). Through three-level multilevel analysis of data from 12,356 protestors in 84 demonstrations in eight European countries, this study compares abeyant protestors to new and established protestors. At the individual-level, I examine the roles of sociodemographic characteristics, political participation, social networks, grievances, perceived efficacy and ideology in individuals' abeyant participation. At the demonstration-level, I find that demonstrations in different types of social movements, in different forms (moving or static), with different claims and protest sizes attract different kinds of protestors. At the country-level, cross-national differences can explain part of individuals' abeyant participation in protest activities after controlling individual-level and demonstration-level predictors.

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1.0 Introduction

Studies of social movement participation have come a long way in the past half century. Scholars in sociology, political science and social psychology brought many perspectives in succession to explore the factors that account for individuals' involvement in social movements, ranging from macro-level social structures to micro-level individual perceptions. Such research offers a solid foundation for examining the complicated patterns of protest behavior. My Thesis focuses on a specific group of protestors: those who were active in protests in the past and returned to demonstrations after a temporary leave. I call these demonstrators "abeyant protestors". This study aims to explore whether and how abeyant protestors are different from new protestors and established protestors in terms of their sociodemographic and political profile, and patterns of protest participation. Moreover, I examine whether and why certain demonstrations in certain countries are more likely to attract abeyant protestors.

Social movement participants are not a homogeneous group. People protest for different reasons, through different mobilizing channels and in different patterns of action. Scholars have examined the distinctions between occasional protestors and regular protestors (e.g., Andretta and della Porta 2014), first-timers and experienced demonstrators (e.g., Verhulst and Walgrave 2009), participants at different commitment levels (e.g., Yu and Zhao 2006), etc. Despite the consensus on treating protestors differently, scholars tend to either overuse dichotomy in their typologies (e.g., first-timers vs experienced protestors) or overemphasize the extreme(s) (e.g., "professional" protest activists). Not until recently did scholars start to explore people who lie in the middle. Corrigall-Brown (2012) stresses the role of intermittent and disengaged participants who comprise about half of the people in contentious politics. Saunders, Grasso, Olcese, Rainsford and Rootes

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(2012) expand scholars' attention from first-timers and persistent protestors to returners and repeaters. In this study, I further develop the literature on protestors who are not at the extremes. To be more specific, I compare people who leave demonstrations and then come back (i.e., abeyant protestors) to people who have never engaged in demonstrations before (which I call "new protestors") and people who engage in protest activities consistently (which I call "established protestors").

Another important point is that protestors are nested in various demonstrations and demonstrations are staged in different societies. Meso-level demonstration features like the type of social movement, the protest issue at stake and the scale of demonstration all affect what type of participants the demonstration mobilizes. Macro-level institutional contexts also stimulate/ impede potential protest participation through political opportunities, resources and the general political environment. Scholars usually do cross-national comparative studies and apply multilevel analysis to incorporate influential factors at different levels in explaining people's protest behavior (e.g., Moseley 2015; Solt 2015). In my study, I use three-level multilevel models at protestor-, demonstration- and country- levels to display a full picture of abeyant protestors' unique role in demonstrations.

This study uses the *Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation* (*CCC*) data which is collected in eight European countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) during 2009-2013. A total of 84 street demonstrations are covered by the data collection team. I apply three-level multilevel logistic regressions along with descriptive statistics to examine who the abeyant protestors are. At the individual-level, I hypothesize that abeyant protestors are different from new and establish protestors in their social network affiliation, grievances, perceived efficacy and ideology both

before and during the demonstration. At the demonstration-level, I hypothesize that large-scale static demonstrations with new social movement claims are more likely to attract abeyant protestors. At the country-level, I hypothesize that a part of individuals' abeyant participation is explained by the between-country differences after individual- and demonstration- level factors are controlled.

2.0 Who are the Protestors?

Before examining the variations among people with different protest history, first I discuss how "protesters" are portrayed in social movement theories. The "social movement participants" we call today are viewed differently by different theoretical schools of social movement study. Each theoretical school was developed under a certain social background and has its own unique theoretical assumption of who the participants are and how their actions are shaped. Hence, scholars following different theoretical schools explore individuals' motivations to join social movements from different angles. In this section, I am going to review the main social movement theories and their explanations of who the protesters are.

The development of social movement theory can be traced back to Le Bon's book *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (1897). Inspired by Le Bon's groundbreaking study of crowd psychology, Park raised the collective behavior perspective in 1920s. The concept of "collective behavior" was first defined in Park and Burgess's book *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1921). In this book, Park introduced the forms and the mechanisms of collective behavior, which started the contemporary social movement research. Park's student, Blumer, further improved the collective behavior theory. He specified the typology of collective behavior and developed the well-known circular reaction theory (Blumer 1939). In the following decades, several new theories flourished the collective behavior perspective. Turner and Killian's emergent norm theory (1957), Kornhauser's mass society theory (1959), Smelser's value-added theory (1962), Davies's J-curve theory (1962) and Gurr's relative deprivation theory (1970) all produced far-reaching impacts on social movement research. Although having different theoretical constructions, these theories were built on the same theoretical assumption underlying the collective behavior perspective. In general,

the collective behavior perspective suggests that collective behavior is irrational actions taken together by a group of people with negative psychological reactions towards social strain and structural breakdown (Useem 1998). The breakdown of social order triggers people's extreme emotional imbalance. As a way to release such negative mental reactions like confusion, frustration, fear, hatred and anxiety, people get together spontaneously and act collectively. There is no clear form, goal, expectation, rule or procedure in such collective behaviors. Therefore, collective behavior is viewed as nontraditional and noninstitutionalized. Meanwhile, the outcome of collective behavior is unpredictable and, at most time, destructive. As the first attempt to explore the "social movement" phenomenon, the collective behavior perspective provides several inspiring factors in explaining people's protest behavior like grievances (relative deprivation) and emotions.

The collective behavior perspective was challenged in the 1960s. Empirical evidence showed that most protests at that time were well organized. The goals were clear, and the actions were rational, which were quite different from the irrational and destructive riots described by the collective behavior perspective. Skolnick (1969) and Tilly (Tilly et al.1975) further claimed that collective protest is a normal form of political conflict, not abnormal or irrational behaviors. With more and more empirical evidence inconsistent with the assumptions of the collective behavior perspective, a new theoretical framework gradually formed. Olson's book *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (1965) started the theoretical reconstruction. As an economist, Olson borrowed the rational economic man hypothesis from Economics to study collective action, which asserts that all the individuals are rational and tend to maximize benefits and minimize costs. In collective actions, people are stimulated to act collectively to achieve a common objective. Every member in the group can benefit from the public good no matter whether he/she participates in the collective action to fight for the common interest or not. However, only

people who join the collective action have to take the costs of their challenging actions. In large groups, People do not have to participate in collective actions and take the risks to share the public good. Based on rational choice theory, people may not be willing to act and, therefore, it is impossible to form large-scale collective actions. Olson called this collective action problem the "free rider problem". To stimulate collective action, there have to be selective benefits provided exclusively to participants. Olson's ideal model was criticized by later studies. However, there is no doubt that the rational man assumption underlying his theory completely subverted the theoretical assumption of the collective behavior tradition and set the theoretical foundation for the collective action perspective. In this new perspective, people's rational calculation of benefits and costs in the process of pursing a common objective is identified as the main cause of collective action, rather than their grievances or negative emotions raised by social strain and structural breakdown. Collective and selective incentives are stressed when scholars explore protesters' motivations.

Based on the collective action perspective, resource mobilization theory, political process theory and framing were developed in succession since the 1970s. The assumption of rationality roots deeply in these three theories and still has enormous impacts on the social movement research today. Resource mobilization theory was first introduced as an effective theoretical perspective to explain social movement participation in McCarthy and Zald's paper "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory" (1977). The authors elaborated the concepts, theoretical assumptions and main ideas of resource mobilization theory in this paper and further developed the theory in their following works (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 2001). The collective action perspective assumes that people protest only if the benefits outweigh the costs of their participation. Based on this assumption, resource mobilization theory stresses the role of resources

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that are indispensable to support people's collective action, like time, money and formal network. Sufficient resources can reduce the costs of action and increase the possibility to mobilize enough people to achieve the collective goal. Therefore, resources are closely related to people's level of involvement in social movements. In other words, people cannot be motivated to join collective action purely by their grievances and negative emotions as assumed by the collective behavior perspective. They are not isolated individuals that participate in aberrant protests only to release their distorted emotions. People are embedded in the society and their level of engagement in collective actions is decided by the available social resources they have. As the first theory that developed under the collective action perspective, resource mobilization theory identifies social movement participation as a normal political behavior that needs supporting resources, rather than behaviors violating societal norms and driven by people's grievances and emotions.

The second theory establishing on the collective action perspective is the political process theory. It was first elaborated in McAdam's work on black insurgency from 1930 to 1970 (McAdam 1982). Political process theory points out that resource mobilization theory underestimates people's subjective initiative which makes it possible to use limited resources to challenge the elite. Moreover, the overlook of grievances and related subjective feelings by the resource mobilization theory is hypercorrection. Instead, political process theory suggests three key factors that influence the emergence of social movements: "expanding political opportunities", "indigenous organizational strength" and "cognitive liberation" (McAdam 1982: 51). "Expanding political opportunities" indicates that under different political environments, the opportunities for social movements to emerge are different and these opportunities vary with different macro political structures. "Indigenous organizational strength" involves the number and composition of members, the role of leaders, the structure of solidary incentives and the communication networks

in social movement organizations. "Cognitive liberation" refers to the process that members in a disadvantaged group blame the political system for their unjust situation, recognize their ability to challenge the elite, be aware of the possibility for remedy, and finally make actions to challenge the political system. These three components work together to transfer the objective political opportunity to social movements. McAdam's political process theory is very inclusive, which covers many important factors that account for the formation of social movement. With the refinement of political process theory, the organizational perspective is gradually integrated into resource mobilization theory and the cognitive perspective develops into the framing theory. Political opportunity structure becomes the most influential explanatory factor in political process theory (Feng 2013). Individuals evaluate the potential risks brought by repression and the likelihood of making social changes in a given political system before deciding whether or not they are going to participate in a social movement.

Framing is the most recent theory in the collective action perspective (Snow et al. 1986). Framing stresses the role of ideology in social movement emergence, development and consequences. External stimulus is interpreted by individuals in their mind first. Then the subjective interpretations of the stimulus lead to people's following actions. Snow (Snow et al. 1986) claimed that the role of subjective interpretation in social movement participation was underestimated by previous theories. The collective behavior perspective links structure breakdown, which is the external stimulus, with people's irrational behavior directly and does not take people's subjective interpretations of such structure breakdown into consideration. In the resource mobilization theory and the political process theory, "interpretation" is taken into account. However, the interpretation process is identified purely as rational actor's calculation of benefits and costs, which is assumed to be constant in all kinds of societal and cultural

backgrounds. In other words, scholars just establish an assumed interpretation process and do not attempt to analyze it (Feng 2013). Framing is the first social movement theory that focuses on how individuals interpret external stimulus (i.e., the trigger of social movement) and, especially, how this interpretation process can be intervened by social movement organizations or other mobilization channels. Through different framing processes, individuals' evaluation of the benefits and costs of the potential social movement may vary. Moreover, people may generate different attitudes towards the goal and means of the proposed social movement. Having positive attitudes towards the goals and means of a social movement is the primary standard to identify the "mobilization potential" (Klandermans and Oegema 1987: 519) of the movement. Only individuals identifying the common goal and having the willingness to take unconventional political action will be mobilized by the social movement (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Therefore, the framing process works indirectly on people's protest behavior through shaping their interpretation of the proposed social movement. Although framing theory is very difficult to be operationalized as measurable indicators and it is hard to generate common laws in framing processes, we can see the importance of framing in the way people's subjective interpretations of social movement are shaped by it.

To challenge the collective behavior perspective which views social movement as people's irrational behavior, the collective action perspective as well as resource mobilization theory, political process theory and framing all stick to the completely opposite theoretical assumption --- rational economic man assumption. As discussed above, this theoretical transformation greatly promoted the study of social movements and brought many insightful angles to explain social movement participation. However, the problems of overemphasizing rationality and simplifying human mind emerged gradually (Feng 2013). In resource mobilization theory and political process

theory, human mind is simplified as cost-benefit evaluation and people's action is purely motivated by their attempt to maximize benefits. In framing theory, people's evaluation of benefits and costs (i.e., the subjective interpretation process) can even be manipulated by others (i.e., mobilization channels). The richness, diversity and variability of human mind are overlooked by these theories. Being aware of this theoretical defect, scholars turned to the cultural approach and tried to use the concept of "culture" to reincorporate the ignored mental factors into existing social movement theories in the 1990s (e.g., Gamson 1992; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Oberschall 1993). The new social movements emerged in Europe also facilitated this theoretical transformation. The main difference between traditional social movement and new social movement is that people are motivated by identities and values to participate in new social movements, instead of public goods or benefits. This change in protesters' motivations greatly contributed to the recent theoretical development of culture and emotion in social movement studies (e.g., Jasper 1997; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Polletta 2006).

There are two innovations underneath this theoretical trend. Firstly, the complex nature of human mind is stressed. Factors like emotion, cognition, morality and value are all considered to be mental activities that are related to people's protest behavior. Each factor also has different dimensions. For instance, emotion is no longer simplified as grievances or relative deprivation as it is treated in the collective behavior perspective. Anger, fear and joy formed before and during social movements have caught the scholars' attention (e.g., Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001; Japser 2011). Human mind is much more complex than the universal and constant rational choice hypothesis underlying the collective action perspective. Secondly, people's psychological reactions are recognized as products of social and cultural factors. Scholars do not just analyze the role of emotion, cognition, morality and value in protester's motivations. They also focus on the

way these psychological reactions are shaped by the social and cultural background of the protesters. In other words, unlike the early collective behavior perspective which views emotional reactions as people's instinct and individual character, the cultural approach emphasizes the way human mind is socially formed. People's psychological reactions towards social movement vary with their cultural backgrounds, which in turn leads to different protest behaviors.

In summary, social movement theories discussing why people protest are built on their unique theoretical assumptions of who the protesters are. In the collective behavior perspective, people with negative emotional responses towards social strain and structural breakdown may get together spontaneously and act aberrantly and destructively to release their emotions. Grievance is identified as the main trigger of such irrational protest behaviors. In the collective action perspective, people are willing to act collectively to pursue their common objective only if they think their benefits brought by the social movement outweigh the costs. Both collective and selective incentives are emphasized to be indispensable to mobilize these rational protesters. Grounding on this perspective, resource mobilization theory claims that protesters are people who have sufficient resources (i.e., national resources, social networks and individual resources) to support their participation in social movements. Political process theory suggests that people who are involved in social movement organizations, attribute their unjust situation to the political system and grasp the political opportunity are more likely to join social movements. Then, framing theory points out the possibility of expanding protest potential by shaping people's subject interpretations of social movements. Lastly, the cultural perspective indicates that people's socially constructed emotions (e.g., anger, fear and joy), collective identities and ideologies are strong facilitators of protest behavior even without material incentives, especially in new social movements.

Table 1 Influential Factors of Social Movement Participation

Macro-level Influential Factors	**Opportunity**	A. Political opportunity	a. Effects of democratization
			b. Type of polity: Corporatism; Ideological positions of political parties
			c. Openness of a political system
			d. Repressive force of the state
			e. State capacity
			f. Changes in public policy
			g. Countermovement opponents
		B. Cultural opportunity	a. Religious tradition: Type of religious heritage; Religious affiliation and commitment; Percent Protestant
			b. Ethnic cleavage: Ethnic political discrimination; Ethnic economic discrimination; Ethnic (language) dominance; Ethnic nepotism
		C. Other opportunity	
	Resource	A. Economic condition	a. Economic affluence: Media; Education; Urbanization; Social mobility; Individual resources
			b. Economic fluctuation
			c. Economic inequality
	Political Culture	A. Post-material values	a. Post-industrialism
		B. Leftist/Rightist extremism	
		C. Political tradition	
	Other	A. Population size	
Micro-level Influential Factors	**Incentive**	A. Attitude toward the goal and/or means of a social movement	
		B. Collective incentive	a. Value of the collective good
			b. Perceived efficacy: Group efficacy; Personal influence; Expectations about the number of participants
		C. Selective incentive	a. Material (nonsocial) incentive
			b. Nonmaterial (social) incentive: Reactions of significant others
			c. Cost: Perceived risk; Time; Resource; Costs of nonparticipation (social and nonsocial)
	Collective Identity	A. Identification with the recruitment social category	
		B. Identification with the social movement organization	
	Emotion	A. Moral shock/ fear	
		B. Blame	
		C. Moral indignation	
		D. Group-based anger	
	Ideology	A. Moral standard	
		B. Values/ principle	
	Resource	A. Social network	a. Social movement organization/ other association
			b. Interpersonal ties
		B. Individual resource	a. Education/ academic performance
			b. Income
	Grievance	A. Personal grievance	a. Life satisfaction
			b. Happiness
		B. Political grievance	a. Confidence in parliament/ institutions/ parties/ government
		C. Financial grievance	a. Financial satisfaction
		D. Specific grievance	
Individual Predictors	**Sociodemographic Characteristics**	A. Age	
		B. Gender	
		C. Religiosity	
		D. Availability	a. Marital status
			b. Number of children
			c. Occupation
	Attitudinal Factors	A. Value/ attitude	a. Political value: Importance of politics; Political engagement/ interests/ knowledge; Left/right attitude
			b. Cultural attitude: Post-material values
			c. Life attitude: Trust in others
		B. Personal preference	a. Protest experience

With the well-established theories of social movement participation, scholars are able to do comprehensive analyses of individuals' protest behavior. The influential factors of social movement participation are summarized in Table 1. Being aware of the limitations of any single social movement theory, despite the above distinct theoretical traditions, the explanations of social movement engagement are generally seen as complementary factors rather than "competing paradigms" (van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and van Dijk 2011:94).

3.0 Who are the Abeyant Protestors? – Micro-Level Factors

The research on patterns of social movement participation over time addresses three groups of protestors. The first group is novices, or first-timers in a demonstration. Scholars find that novices are distinct from experienced protestors in terms of their biographical availability (i.e., age), instrumental motivations, collective identity, organization membership, and mobilization channels (Verhulst and Walgrave 2009). The second group is persistent activists who engage in contentious politics over time. Corrigall-Brown (2012) highlights the importance of resources, biographical factors, social ties and life-course changes for sustained protest participation. Socio-political orientations explain protest participation but do not predict trajectories of participation over time well. On the contrary, Saunders et al. (2012) find that stalwarts (i.e., persistent activists) are not different from other protestors in their structural factors. Instead, it is political engagement (i.e., political interests, left-right identity, political trust and satisfaction, etc.) that makes them remain in protest activists over the life course. The last group contains people who fall between the novices and the persistent activists. There are a few ways to study these people who are not at the two extremes. Andretta and della Porta (2014) use protest frequency to distinguish low, medium and high participation, which is explained by protestors' sociodemographic characteristics and collective identity. Based on different trajectories of participation, Corrigall-Brown (2011) distinguishes people in the middle as "transfer" and "individual abeyance". The author stresses the role of people's life changes in their different trajectories of political participation.

Based on these studies and the review of social movement participation theories in the previous section, I hypothesize that abeyant protestors are different from new and established

protestors in five aspects at the individual-level: 1) social networks: organizational embedment and protest mobilization channel; 2) grievances: general political grievances and the participation motivation of defending interests; 3) perceived efficacy: general perceived political efficacy and specific perceived efficacy of the demonstration to achieve the goals; 4) ideology: left-libertarian value and moral obligation; 5) sociodemographic characteristics and political background: age, class and political participation in both voting and contentious politics.

3.1 Social Networks

Embeddedness in social networks, in general, facilitates social movement participation. Such social networks include membership in organizations, interpersonal ties and direct contacts like mail and email (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Passy and Giugni (2001) distinguish two functions that social networks have towards social movement participation: structural connection function and socialization function. With respect to the structural connection function, social networks work as a recruitment channel. Only through being reached by the social networks that are related to a potential social movement can mobilization potentials be motivated to join protests (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Scholars further classify social networks into formal and informal ties which work differently in the micro-mobilization process (Kriesi 1993; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Membership in formal organizations are powerful predictors of protest participation. Such organizations can be social movement organizations as well as other formal associations. At the same time, informal ties with friends, roommates, family members and acquaintances that have been involved in social movements are also forces that lead people to join social movements (della Porta 1988; Snow et al. 1980; Yu and Zhao, 2006). With respect to the

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socialization function, social networks keep shaping individuals' views toward the outer world and particular social movements (Passy and Giugni 2001). This political socialization process starts from the preexisting social networks people are embedded in and it is the foundation of the whole social movement mobilization process. The socialization in social networks directly influences people's attitudes towards certain political issues (i.e., the goals of social movements) and the forms of political actions (i.e., the means of social movements). In other words, it largely decides who the mobilization potentials of a social movement are.

Established protestors either have a long and consistent history of protest participation or are recently active in demonstrations. Their rich and recent experience in demonstrations may suggest their affiliations to both formal organizations and the social movement organizations (SMOs) that stage the demonstration during which the *CCC* data are collected. New protestors, on the contrary, have little experience in protests and, therefore, are less embedded in formal organizations. However, since they are brought to the street for the first time when the *CCC* data are collected, it is possible that these new protestors are associated with the SMOs that organize the demonstration. Lastly, abeyant protestors are not embedded in formal organizations as established protestors considering their inconsistent and recently inactive protest participation. Meanwhile, abeyant protestors have some demonstration experience in the long past, and they may not need the mobilization by SMOs to know and join the demonstration covered by the *CCC* data. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 1: Abeyant protestors have a moderate level of embeddedness in formal organizations compared to new and established protestors.

Hypothesis 2: Abeyant protestors are the least likely to be a member of the SMOs that stage the demonstration during which the CCC data are collected.

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3.2 Grievances

Building on the relative deprivation theory, scholars argue that people having a strong feeling of dissatisfaction with what they get, compared to what they believe they deserve, are more inclined to take actions to fight for their rights (Gurr 1970; Lipsky 1968; Opp 1989; Scott 1985). Such grievances include individuals' general dissatisfaction with their personal life, political environment and financial status, as well as their complaints about specific events. Grievances can be transformed into motivations of protest behavior through other facilitators, including incentives (Opp 2009; Tarrow 1998), collective identity (Klandermans 2004; van Stekelenburg et al. 2011; van Zomeren et al. 2008) and political opportunity (Meyer 2004). General political grievances are major indicators of people's attitudes towards the political system (Newton and Norris 2000) and they are effective facilitators of protest participation (Anderson and Mendes 2005; Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 2010). Having strong grievances towards the specific protest issue at stake influences people's motivation of protest participation. Mobilization potentials with strong grievances are more likely to join the movement to defend their interests. Materialist and realistic goals drive individuals with grievances to participate in certain demonstrations.

Abeyant protestors are less involved in demonstrations compared to established protestors, especially in the recent past. Unlike new protestors, although abeyant protestors stay away from demonstrations for a while, they have some protest experiences in the long past. This may suggest that abeyant protestors have the moderate level of political grievances compared to established protestors and new protestors. Moreover, established protestors are involved in demonstrations frequently and they may perceive more grievances. New protestors are taken to the streets for the first time, possibly due to strong grievances as well. Therefore, abeyant protestors may be the least likely to participate in demonstrations to defend interests. I hypothesize that:

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Hypothesis 3: Abeyant protestors have the moderate level of general political grievances compared to new and established protestors.

Hypothesis 4: Abeyant protestors are the least likely to demonstrate to defend interests compared to new and established protestors.

3.3 Perceived Efficacy

In light of the expectancy-value theory in social psychology (Feather 1982), Klandermans (1984) theorized the instrumental motivation in social movement participation as individuals' subjective expectancy that the goal they value, like improving the deprived situation or bringing positive social changes, can be achieved through this movement. Following this theory, individuals' expected efficacy to realize their goals by participating in unconventional forms of political activities is particularly important (van Zomeren et al. 2008). This perceived "efficacy" can be understood at the individual-level as one's own contribution by taking political actions as well as the effects of collective actions at the group-level (Passy and Giugni 2001). The "collective power" (van Zomeren et al. 2008: 507) gained from perceived group efficacy brings people confidence to resolve their grievances by acting collectively (Drury and Reicher 2005). People's belief in their individual and group efficacy to reach certain goals would facilitate their propensity to join social movements greatly.

Established protestors have more experience in contentious politics, and they are active in demonstrations in the recent past. Thus, established protestors are more likely to hold strong perceived group efficacy and individual efficacy in political activities. They trust the efficacy of their participation in demonstrations to achieve collective goals as well. New protestors, in

contrast, have no experience in demonstrations, which indicates that they may have weak perceived individual and group efficacy in political participation. However, since this is their first time to join demonstrations when the *CCC* data are collected, new protestors may hold a relatively strong perceived efficacy of this particular demonstration to achieve the goals. Abeyant protestors are inactive in demonstrations in the recent past and, therefore, they are potentially close to new protestors in terms of their perceived individual and group efficacy. Moreover, the reason that abeyant protestors disengage in protest activities may be because they lose their trust in the efficacy of achieving collective goals through street demonstrations. Considering the previous protest experience of abeyant, new and established protestors, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 5: Abeyant protestors show similar perceived individual and group efficacy to new protestors, and weaker perceived individual and group efficacy compared to established protestors.

Hypothesis 6: Abeyant protestors have the weakest perceived efficacy of the demonstration during which the *CCC* data are collected to achieve the goals compared to new and established protestors.

3.4 Ideology

Ideology is an important factor that supplements the effects of incentives and grievances on people's protest activity (Klandermans 2004). Ideology refers to people's moral standards and values. Unlike unjust treatment or economic losses, violated ideology is the infringement of one's fundamental moral convictions, principles and values, not external belongings. Such ideology can be at both individual-level and group-level (Skitka et al., 2005; Turner et al., 1987) and can unite

people with similar values together to share and defend their convictions collectively (van Zomeren et al., 2011). As Klandermans (2004) points out, people are inclined to defend the violated values of the group they belong to. Facing with violations of moral standards and values, individuals' reactions involve being angry with the unpleasant event (Skitka et al. 2005; Tetlock 2002), distinguish legitimate and illegitimate behaviors based on their subjective absolute principles (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and van Dijk 2011), and go against the opponent. Participating in collective action is one of the ways people may take to defend their values (Feather & Newton, 1982; Klandermans 2004; van Zomeren 2013). Therefore, ideology is a crucial influential factor that stimulates social movement participation.

Andretta and della Porta (2014) find that the left-libertarian value is positively related to protest frequency among participants in new social movements in Italy. Abeyant protestors are inactive in demonstrations in the recent past, which may suggest a moderate-level of left-libertarian value. Abeyant protestors are not motivated to act for the first time either. I hypothesize that, compared to new and established protestors, abeyant protestors are more likely to be driven by moral issues.

Hypothesis 7: Abeyant protestors have the moderate level of left-libertarian value, compared to new and established protestors.

Hypothesis 8: Abeyant protestors are the most likely to act because of moral obligation, compared to new and established protestors.

3.5 Sociodemographic Characteristics and Other Contentious Politics Experience

In addition to the above individual-level influential factors, I also consider basic sociodemographic characteristics that may affect demonstrators' different patterns of participation. Age and class are widely used as control factors in large-scale quantitative research on protest behavior (e.g., Corcoran et al. 2011; Jenkins et al. 2008; Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi 2011; Martinez 2005; Wallace and Jenkins 1995). Theoretically, younger people are predicted to be more active in social movements. They are more idealistic about the desired world (Jenkins et al. 2008) and have stronger faith in the effect of contentious politics. Due to widespread post-material values among the younger generation, protesters' individual contributions are perceived to be higher among younger people. Meanwhile, young people have more free time for social movements and face fewer potential losses in violent political actions. Thus, younger people are more inclined to engage in protest events. It should be pointed out that both negative and non-linear effects of age on the level of social movement participation are found by some studies (e.g., Corcoran et al. 2011).

In addition to the age difference, social class is also noteworthy. Social movement actions, as an unconventional political action, are somewhat radical and aggressive. The cognition of risks brought by social movement participation may be lower among people in lower social classes. People in higher social classes may encounter more barriers like time-consuming activities, being arrested, etc. Their perceived risks are higher than other people, especially when there are violent activities. Considering people in higher classes may have fewer grievances as well, they may be less active in contentious politics. On the other hand, individual in higher social classes are more likely to have higher education, which equips them with political interests and skills to concern, understand, critique and influence politics (Dalton et al. 2010; Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi

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2011). Their political awareness and responsibility may make them more prone to take political actions. Considering different theoretical arguments, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 9: Abeyant protestors are dominated by older people in various social classes.

Protestors' characteristics are also shaped by their previous experience in political activities. Scholars have found both short-term and long-term impacts on protestors' political attitudes and behaviors after a period of active protest participation. The fact that abeyant protestors stay away from demonstrations for a while may be due to their trust in conventional forms of political action (e.g., voting in national elections). Compared to new and established protestors, abeyant protestors are more likely to take conventional political actions. Meanwhile, van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and van Dijk (2011) point out that for a person to be part of the mobilization potential of a social movement, he/she has to identify with the form of the political action (i.e., contentious politics). Although abeyant protestors are not active in street demonstrations in the recent past, they have some protest experience in the long past and they are involved in the demonstration when the *CCC* data are collected. Abeyant protestors should identify with the form of demonstration and have a moderate level of participation in other forms of contentious politics (e.g., signing petitions) as well. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 10: Abeyant protestors are more likely to vote in the last national election, compared to new and established protestors.

Hypothesis 11: Abeyant protestors have more experience in contentious politics compared to new protestors, but less experience in contentious politics compared to established protestors.

4.0 Which Demonstration Attracts More Abeyant Protestors? – Meso-Level Factors

Protest issues mobilize and hold together different types of protestors. Certain people are more concerned about certain protest issues and are more likely to take corresponding actions. In this section, I review three types of social movements that may attract different kinds of participants: old social movements, new social movements and the more recent anti-austerity social movements.

Old social movements fight for the interests of the working-class against the ruling capitalist class. They are driven by materialistic issues, centering around Marxist- Leninist politics, labor-capital struggle, resource distribution, social equality and economic equality (Touraine 1971, 1981). Old movements are hierarchically structured and tend to apply a limited repertoire of political action. Left libertarian or workers are the core social basis of old social movements (Kitschelt 1988). Moreover, old protests are dominated by male, less educated, and employed working-class participants from the older generation (Grasso and Giugni 2016).

New social movements are risen by the middle-class challenging the dominant power in the 1960s. Distinct from old social movements, new social movements emerge as forms of contestation in the cultural realm and are based around post-materialist topics (e.g., environment, feminism, peace, LGBT). They fight for values and identities rather than economic benefits. New social movements have a different social bases which are middle-class post-materialist (Inglehart 1977) and social-cultural specialists (Kriesi 1993; Kriesi and van Praag 1987). They are loosely structured and apply a diverse repertoire of action (Eggert and Giugni 2012). Compared to protestors in old social movements, participants in new movements are less embedded in formal

organizations but tend to be more active in non-institutionalized political participation (Grasso and Giugni 2016).

Anti-austerity social movements are newly emerged protests in democratic countries. Some scholars see them as a resurgence of the Global Justice Movements in the late 1990s (Fominaya and Cox 2013) reacting to the economic crisis across the world since 2000. They are against the austerity policies and have a materialist focus. Studies on the anti-austerity protests in Europe since 2010 suggest that this new type of social movement is a mix of old and new social movements in terms of their protest issue, social bases, mobilization network, organization structure, repertoire of action, etc. Grasso and Giugni (2016) find that anti-austerity social movements have a materialist concern but they react to a wide scope of protest issues. They emerge not only based on economic crisis and austerity, but also based around old issues as in old protests and new issues as in new protests. People in anti-austerity movements are mobilized through three major modes (Peterson, Wahlström and Wennerhag 2015): membership activism which refers to protests organized by national and local trade unions to fight against the national austerity policies, episodic mass mobilization that are staged by new civic organizers in reaction to the economic crisis, and radical mass activism which refers to confrontational protests raised by small radical leftist groups and unions. Anti-austerity protestors' sociodemographic characteristics (i.e., age, education, class) and ideologies (i.e., liberality, political grievance) seem to fall between those of old movement participants and new movement participants. Moreover, anti-austerity protestors are least likely to be involved in organizations or institutional political activities but are engaged in non-institutionalized activities frequently.

Hypothesis 12: Abeyant protestors are more likely to be attracted by protests in anti-austerity social movements compared to new protestors.

Hypothesis 13: Abeyant protestors are more likely to be attracted by protests in new social movements compared to established protestors.

There is a lack of research on other aspects of demonstrations that may attract different protestors. In the present study, I hypothesize that the protest issue at stake, the form of demonstration (i.e., moving or not) and the number of potential participants shape the type of participants that a demonstration attracts as well. If the protest issue at stake is frequently mentioned in contentious politics in a country, then the demonstration would attract more established protestors because it is more likely for the citizens in this country to have been involved in demonstrations with similar protest issues before. If the demonstration is static, rather than moving, the demonstration is more likely to attract abeyant and new protestors. This is because static demonstrations are less time-consuming compared to moving demonstrations. It is also easier for bystanders to be motivated to join the protest if people are gathering in a square and do not have to move to other places. Lastly, large-scale protests tend to attract new and abeyant protestors. Usually social movement organizations put more efforts in mobilization if their goal is to attract more participants. New and abeyant protestors are more likely to be targeted by the information and network of protest mobilization. People in large demonstrations face less selective risks as well, which may diminish the barriers for new and abeyant protestors to show up. In sum, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 14: Abeyant protestors are more likely to be attracted by static and large-scale demonstrations with a non-salient protest issue at stake.

5.0 Between Country Differences in Abeyant Participation – Macro-Level Factors

Individuals' pattern of political participation is also influenced by the macro-level contexts in a given society. Political opportunities (McAdam 1982), cultural opportunities (Smith 1991; Zald and McCarthy 1987), resources (Auvinen 1997; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Norris 2002) and the political culture (Dalton et al. 2010) all shape the ways in which citizens participate in contentious politics in this country.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of new, abeyant and established protestors in the eight countries under study. We can see that although the majority of demonstration participants are established protestors in all eight countries, there are some variations among the countries. About 90% of protest participants in Italy are established protestors but there are only 48% participants are established protestors in the Netherlands. And, the percent of abeyant protestors in the Netherlands is much higher than those in other countries. Therefore, I hypothesize that after individual-level and demonstration-level factors are controlled, there are still country-level differences in individuals' pattern of abeyant participation.


Figure 1 Distribution of New, Abeyant and Established Protestors in the Eight Countries

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6.0 Data and Method

6.1 Dataset and Sampling Method

To examine the role of abeyant protestors, I use the *Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation* (*CCC*) data[1] for the present study. The *CCC* data was collected in eight European countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom), covering 84 demonstrations (16,537 participants) during 2009 – 2013. The research team in each country surveyed 8 to 13 street demonstrations during old, new and anti-austerity social movements in their home country. For each demonstration, twelve surveys were conducted before, during and after the protest, including questionnaires for social movement organizations, the police, protestors and survey interviewers. Standardized methodology was applied to collect data from protestors during street demonstrations. In each demonstration, about 1000 questionnaires were distributed. The response rate for surveys during the 84 covered demonstrations range between 10% and 40% (see van Stekelenburg, Walgrave, Klandermans and Verhulst 2012 for more details about the sampling method). With data from SMOs, protestors, the police and interviewers, I am able to analyze the nature of the covered demonstrations and the characteristics of protestors in these demonstrations. The total number of protestors surveyed by the *CCC* project is 16,537. I use listwise deletion to handle missing data and end up with 12,356 completed cases in the final dataset.

[1] "Caught in the act of protest: Contextualizing contestation" project website:

http://www.protestsurvey.eu/index.php?page=index

6.2 Measures

Dependent Variable I classify protestors into new protestors, abeyant protestors and established protestors by using the survey questions "How many times have you in the past taken part in a demonstration" *ever* and *in the past 12 months*. People with no experience in demonstrations both ever and in the past 12 months are categorized as new protestors. People with experience in demonstrations ever but not in the past 12 months are categorized as abeyant protestors. People participate in demonstrations ever and/ or in the past 12 months are categorized as established protestors. I generate two dummy variables: being an abeyant protestor (1) versus being a new protestor (0), and being an abeyant protestor (1) versus being an established protestor (0).

Individual-level Independent Variables I obtain all the individual-level independent variables from the core questionnaire distributed during the street demonstrations. The measures used are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 Individual-level Independent Variables

Variable		Survey Question and Coding Notes
Age	Survey question:	In which year were you born?
	Coding:	Continuous variable of age
Self-Identified Social Class	Survey question:	People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the...?
	Coding:	1. Lower class; 2. Working class; 3. Lower middle class; 4. Upper middle class; 5. Upper class.
Voting	Survey question:	Did you vote in the last general election (date of election day)?
	Coding:	0. No; 1. Yes.
Repertoire of Contentious Politics	Survey question:	There are many things people can do to prevent or promote change. Have you, in the past 12 months …?
		• Contacted a politician, government, or local government official?; Signed a petition/ public letter?; Donated money to a political organization or group?; Boycotted certain products?; Deliberately bought products for political, ethical or environment reasons?; Worn or displayed a campaign badge/ sticker?; Joined a strike?; Take part in direct action (such as: blockade, occupation, civil disobedience); Used violent forms of action (against property or people)?
	Coding:	The count of repertoire of contentious politics, ranging from 0 to 9.

Organization Involvement	Survey question:	If you have been involved in any of the following types of organizations in the past 12 months, please indicate whether you are a passive member or an active member?
		• Church or religious organization; Trade union or professional association; Political party; Women's organization; Sport or cultural organization; Environmental organization; Lesbian or gay rights organization; Community or neighborhood association; Charity or welfare organization; Third world, Global Justice or Peace organization; Anti-racist or Migrant organization; Human or civil rights organization; Other
	Coding:	The count of organizations in which the survey participant is an active member, ranging from 0 to 13.
SMO Affiliation	Survey question:	Are you a member of any of these organizations staging this demonstration?
	Coding:	0. No; 1. Yes.
Perceived Individual Efficacy	Survey question:	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? My participation can have an impact on public policy in this country.
	Coding:	1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. Neither; 4. Agree; 5. Strongly agree.
Perceived Group Efficacy	Survey question:	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Organized groups of citizens can have a lot of impact on public policies in this country.
	Coding:	1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. Neither; 4. Agree; 5. Strongly agree.
Perceived Demonstration Efficacy	Survey question:	How effect do you think this demonstration will be in reaching these goals? Goal 1; Goal 2.
	Coding:	1. Not at all; 2. Not very; 3. Somewhat; 4. Quite; 5. Very much.
		I merge the two questions into one variable (Cronbach's alpha .77).
Political Distrust	Survey question:	Below is a list of institutions. Please indicate, in general, how much you would say that you trust each of the following (types of) institutions.
		• National government; National parliament; Political parties; Trade unions; Judicial system; European Union
	Coding:	1. Very much; 2. Quite; 3. Somewhat; 4. Not very; 5. Not at all.
		I merge the six questions into one variable (Cronbach's alpha .79).
Defend Interests	Survey question:	Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements? I participated in the demonstration in order to defend my interests.
	Coding:	1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. Neither; 4. Agree; 5. Strongly agree.
Left-libertarian Ideology	Survey question:	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
		• Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off.
		• Children should be taught to obey authority.
		• Even the most important public services and industries are best left to private enterprise.
		• People from other countries should be allowed to come to my country and live here permanently if they want to.
	Coding:	For statement 1 and 4: 1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. Neither; 4. Agree; 5. Strongly agree; For statement 2 and 3: I reverse the coding.
		I merge the four questions into one variable (Cronbach's alpha .56).
Moral Obligation	Survey question:	Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements? I participated in the demonstration because I felt morally obliged to do so.
	Coding:	1. Strongly disagree; 2. Disagree; 3. Neither; 4. Agree; 5. Strongly agree

Demonstration-level Independent Variables I follow Grasso and Giugni (2016) and Klandermans et al. (2014)'s typology to classify the 84 demonstrations in the *CCC* dataset into new social movements, anti-austerity social movements, and old social movements (see Appendix A for the list of demonstrations and the type of movement). I generate a dummy variable for each type of social movement with 1 indicating "yes" and 0 indicating "No". For the protest issue at

stake, SMOs are asked by the survey team "Is the demonstration about an issue that causes on average a lot of protest or not in your country?", with 1 indicating "A lot below average" and 5 indicating "A lot above average". I use the mean of SMOs' responses in the same demonstration to measure how salient the protest issue at stake is. For the form of the demonstration, I use the records from the survey team showing whether the demonstration is moving (1) or not (0). For the size of the demonstration, I use the estimated number of participants from survey teams' records. I include the log of protest size in the multilevel logistic regression models.

6.3 Method

Using the *CCC* data, I begin with descriptive statistics of individual-level and demonstration-level explanatory variables. A correlation matrix of all variables is applied to test multicollinearity. In what follows, I explore the differences between abeyant protestors and new/ established protestors in terms of their individual-level characteristics, perceptions and motivations, as well as the reasons why different protests attract different types of protestors. I apply two sets of three-level multilevel logistic regression models here. One set is to estimate odds ratios of being an abeyant protestor, compared to being a new protestor. The other set is to estimate odds ratios of being an abeyant protestor, compared to being an established protestor. For both sets of models, I start with the baseline model with only sociodemographic characteristics and political participation. Then, I add other individual-level factors related to protest participation (i.e., social network, grievances, perceived efficacy and ideology) into the model. In the last model, I include demonstration-level factors (i.e., type of movement, form of demonstration, protest issue at stake and protest size). Country-level differences are controlled across all models. For each model, I

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report the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) at the demonstration-level and at the country-level to examine the chances of being an abeyant protestor explained by between-demonstration differences and between-country differences. To asses model fit, I report log-likelihood, AIC and BIC for each model. After the multilevel analysis, I compare the odds ratios in both sets of models and discuss the differences among abeyant, new and established protestors. I use Stata version 15 in the statistical analysis.

7.0 Results

7.1 Descriptive Statistics

Among the 12,356 protestors in the dataset, there are 2208 abeyant protestors (17.87%), 878 new protestors (7.11%), and 9270 established protestors (75.02%). Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for each category of protestors. Compared to new and established protestors, abeyant protestors are older people from higher social classes with the highest proportion of voters in the last national election and the moderate level of engagement in contentious politics. In terms of social networks, abeyant protestors are moderately involved in formal organizations, but they have the smallest proportion of SMO members. For incentives, abeyant protestors have the lowest grievances and the weakest perceived efficacy of achieving collective goals through participating in demonstrations. They have moderate levels of perceived group and individual efficacy in politics, as well as moderate levels of left-libertarian ideology and moral obligation.

Among the 84 surveyed street demonstrations, 51% are in new social movements, 29% are in anti-austerity social movements, and 20% are in old social movements. The average-level of issue salience is 2.82 on the 5-point scale. 68% of the demonstrations are moving marches. The average number of protestors is 27742.41, with a large variation from 100 to 1000000.

Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Variables at the Individual-Level and the Demonstration-Level

Individual-Level Variables	Abeyant Protestors	New Protestors	Established Protestors	All Protestors
	Mean (Std.)	Mean (Std.)	Mean (Std.)	Mean (Std.)
Age	44.48 (14.03)	34.31 (14.03)	42.72 (15.27)	42.44 (15.15)
Self-Identified Social Class	3.15 (0.96)	3.15 (0.98)	2.81 (0.94)	2.90 (0.96)
Voting (Last Election)	0.89 (0.31)	0.79 (0.41)	0.88 (0.33)	0.87 (0.33)
Repertoire of Contentious Politics	2.86 (1.56)	2.23 (1.55)	4.24 (1.71)	3.85 (1.81)

Organization Involvement	0.73 (1.01)	0.68 (0.88)	1.28 (1.34)	1.13 (1.28)
Social Movement Organization Affiliation	0.35 (0.48)	0.36 (0.48)	0.47 (0.50)	0.44 (0.50)
Political Distrust	3.12 (0.68)	3.13 (0.68)	3.30 (0.73)	3.26 (0.72)
Motivation: Defend Interests	3.48 (1.36)	3.62 (1.34)	3.72 (1.28)	3.67 (1.30)
Perceived Individual Efficacy	3.75 (0.85)	3.61 (0.94)	3.86 (0.86)	3.82 (0.86)
Perceived Group Efficacy	3.93 (0.75)	3.74 (0.84)	4.11 (0.76)	4.05 (0.77)
Perceived Demonstration Efficacy	3.15 (0.96)	3.16 (0.97)	3.24 (1.00)	3.22 (0.99)
Left-libertarian Ideology	3.51 (0.62)	3.24 (0.61)	3.84 (0.66)	3.74 (0.68)
Motivation: Moral Obligation	3.68 (1.29)	3.47 (1.37)	3.84 (1.25)	3.78 (1.27)
N	2208	878	9270	12356

Demonstration-Level Variables	Mean	Std.	Min	Max
New Social Movement	0.51	0.50	0	1
Anti-Austerity Movement	0.29	0.45	0	1
Old Social Movement	0.20	0.40	0	1
Protest Issue Frequency	2.82	1.29	1	5
Moving Demonstration (or Static)	0.68	0.47	0	1
Number of Participants	27742.41	113333.4	100	1000000
N	84			

Note: 1. No multicollinearity problem is found through the correlation matrix.

Table 4 presents the distribution of abeyant, new and established protestors among the eight covered countries by the *CCC* project. While established protestors predominate all eight countries, the percentage of abeyant protestors varies across countries. The Netherlands has the largest share of abeyant protestors (32.59%), followed by Switzerland (20.05%) and Belgium (19.93%). In Italy, only 7.94% of the surveyed protestors are abeyant protestors, which is much less than other countries. This variation suggests the need for controlling between-country differences in addition to examining both individual-level and demonstration-level factors in explaining individuals' pattern of protest participation.

Table 4 Distribution of Protestors in the Eight European Countries

	Abeyant Protestors	**New Protestors**	**Established Protestors**	**Total N**
Belgium	294 (19.93%)	76 (5.15%)	1105 (74.92%)	1475
Czech Republic	125 (14.60%)	108 (12.62%)	623 (72.78)	856
Italy	90 (7.94%)	16 (1.41%)	1028 (90.65%)	1134
The Netherlands	718 (32.59%)	440 (19.97)	1045 (47.44%)	2203
Spain	235 (11.83%)	25 (1.26%)	1727 (86.91%)	1987
Sweden	201 (13.71%)	45 (3.07%)	1220 (83.22%)	1466
Switzerland	301 (20.05%)	69 (4.6%)	1131 (75.35%)	1501
UK	244 (14.07%)	99 (5.71%)	1391 (80.22%)	1734

7.2 Multilevel Logistic Analysis: Abeyant Protestors vs New Protestors

First, I run an empty multilevel model with no predictors. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) at the demonstration-level is 0.174, indicating that 17.4% of the chances of being an abeyant protestor rather than a new protestor is explained by between-demonstration differences. The ICC at the country-level is 0.076, showing that 7.6% of the chances of being an abeyant protestor is explained by between-country differences. Within-demonstration differences (i.e., between-demonstrator differences) explain 75% of the chances for the surveyed demonstrator to be an abeyant protestor. The above ICCs show the necessity for including explanatory variables at both the individual-level and the demonstration level. Country-level differences should be controlled.

Table 5 reports the findings of the multilevel logistic analysis estimating odds ratios of being an abeyant protestor with new protestor as the reference category. Looking across Model 1, 2 and 3, we can see that older people with richer experience in contentious politics are more likely to be abeyant protestors rather than new protestors. Self-identified social class and voting behavior do not differentiate abeyant protestors from new protestors significantly. For social networks, the general intensity of organization involvement does not influence the chance of being an abeyant protestor significantly. However, protestors who are affiliated with the SMOs that stage the demonstration are less likely to be an abeyant protestor. Grievances exert no significant effect on the chance of being an abeyant protestor. The surveyed protestors with a lower perceived efficacy to achieve the goals through demonstration are more likely to be abeyant protestors. But, abeyant protestors are not significantly different from new protestors in terms of their general perceived individual and group efficacy in politics. People holding a stronger left-libertarian ideology have

a higher chance to be an abeyant protestor. Abeyant and new protestors are not significantly

different in their protest motivation of moral obligation.

Table 5 Multilevel Logistic Regression on Being an Abeyant Protestor Compared to Being a New Protestor

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Odds Ratio	AME	Odds Ratio	AME	Odds Ratio	AME
Individual-Level Factors (Level 1)						
Sociodemographic Characteristics						
Age	1.05*** (0.00)	0.01***	1.06*** (0.00)	0.01***	1.06*** (0.00)	0.01***
Self-Identified Social Class	1.07 (0.05)	0.01	1.06 (0.05)	0.01	1.06 (0.05)	0.01
Political Participation						
Voting (Last Election)	1.18 (0.15)	0.02	1.13 (0.15)	0.02	1.13 (0.15)	0.02
Repertoire of Contentious Politics	1.28*** (0.04)	0.04***	1.24*** (0.04)	0.03***	1.24*** (0.04)	0.03***
Social Networks						
Organization Involvement			0.96 (0.05)	-0.01	0.96 (0.05)	-0.01
SMO Affiliation			0.73** (0.08)	-0.05**	0.74** (0.08)	-0.05**
Grievances						
Political Distrust			0.87 (0.07)	-0.02	0.88 (0.07)	-0.02
Motivation: Defend Interests			0.99 (0.04)	-0.00	1.00 (0.04)	-0.00
Perceived Efficacy						
Perceived Individual Efficacy			1.06 (0.06)	0.01	1.06 (0.06)	0.01
Perceived Group Efficacy			1.03 (0.07)	0.00	1.03 (0.07)	0.00
Perceived Demonstration Efficacy			0.90° (0.05)	-0.02°	0.89* (0.05)	-0.02*
Ideology						
Left-libertarian Ideology			1.63*** (0.14)	0.06***	1.63*** (0.14)	0.07***
Motivation: Moral Obligation			1.03 (0.04)	0.00	1.03 (0.04)	0.00
Demonstration-Level Factors (Level 2)						
New Social Movement (ref. Old Movement)					0.64° (0.17)	-0.07
Anti-Austerity Movement (ref. Old Movement)					0.48* (0.14)	-0.12*
Protest Issue Frequency					0.97 (0.06)	-0.00
Moving (or Static) Demonstration					0.83 (0.18)	-0.03
Number of Participants (Log)					1.00 (0.06)	0.00
Intercept	0.18*** (0.06)		0.06*** (0.04)		0.11* (0.10)	
Random Effects						
Demonstration	0.22 (0.07)		0.42 (0.24)		0.14 (0.05)	
Country	0.40 (0.23)		0.17 (0.06)		0.38 (0.23)	
ICC – Demonstration	0.16		0.15		0.14	
ICC – Country	0.10		0.11		0.10	
Log Likelihood	-1522.30		-1493.43		-1489.75	
AIC	3058.61		3018.87		3021.50	
BIC	3100.85		3115.42		3148.23	
N	3086		3086		3086	

Notes: 1. Entries are odds ratios, standard errors between brackets and average marginal effects with 1 discrete change.
    2. ° p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
    3. There is no significant difference between new social movement and anti-austerity social movement.

At the demonstration-level, compared to new protestors, abeyant protestors are more likely

to be attracted by demonstrations in old movements rather than anti-austerity or new movements.

The protest issue at stake, moving or static demonstration, and the protest size do not have significant effects on surveyed person's chance to be an abeyant protestor.

The average marginal effects in Model 3 give us a more specific picture of the differences between abeyant and new protestors. As age increases by one year, the probability of being an abeyant protestor increases by 0.01 on average. People with one more repertoire of contentious politics in the past 12 months are 0.03 higher in their probability of being an abeyant protestor on average. Being a member of the SMOs decreases the probability of being an abeyant protestor by 0.05 on average. As people's perceived demonstration efficacy increases by 1, their probability of being an abeyant protestor decreases by 0.02. People with one-score higher in their left-libertarian ideology are 0.07 higher in their probability of being an abeyant protestor. Being in an old movement increases surveyed person's probability of being an abeyant protestor by 0.12, compared to anti-austerity movements. All these effects are statistically significant.

Notwithstanding the significant predictors, we can see that many of the hypotheses are not confirmed. The AIC and BIC increase after demonstration-level predictors are added to the model. This suggests that abeyant protestors are somewhat similar to new protestors, especially in the type of demonstrations they tend to attend. There are some individual-level differences, but the differences are not as salient as expected.

7.3 Multilevel Logistic Analysis: Abeyant Protestors vs Established Protestors

The analysis process for the odds ratios of being an abeyant protestor, compared to being a new protestor, follows the same logic. With new protestors as the reference category, 26.5% of the chances of being an abeyant protestor is explained by between-demonstration differences

(ICC=0.265) and 8.7% is explained by between-country differences (ICC=0.087). 64.8% of the variance in type of protestor is due to individual characteristics. As we can see, demonstration and country factors account more for the chance of being an abeyant when established protestor is the reference group, compared to when new protestor is the reference group. I expect more significant effects at the demonstration-level.

Table 6 presents the findings of the multilevel logistic analysis estimating odds ratios of being an abeyant protestor with established protestor as the reference category. At the individual-level, sociodemographic characteristics, political participation, social networks, grievances, perceived efficacy and ideology all differentiate abeyant protestors from established protestors.

At the individual-level, older people (AME = 0.001) in higher social classes (AME = 0.02) who are less active in contentious politics (AME = -0.04) are more likely to be abeyant protestors, compared to established protestors. These effects last across all models in Table 6. Protestors who are less active in formal organizations (AME = -0.03) and who are not affiliated with the SMOs staging the demonstration (AME=-0.04) have a higher probability to be abeyant protestors. People who have a lower level of distrust in general politics (AME = -0.01) and who are less likely to attend demonstrations to defend interests (AME = -0.01) are more likely to be abeyant protestors. Individuals with lower perceived efficacy about protest activities and lower left-libertarian ideology have a higher chance of being abeyant protestors, rather than established protestors. All the above relationships are statistically significant in Model 6.

At level-2, compared to established protestors, abeyant protestors are more likely to engage in new social movements, rather than anti-austerity movements (AME = 0.07). Static demonstrations (AME = -0.06) with less salient protest issues (AME = -0.02) and lager protest sizes (AME = 0.04) are more likely to attract abeyant protestors. Adding demonstration-level

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predictors reduces the ICC at level-2 and increases the model fit (although the changes in the model fit indices are not consistent).

Table 6 Multilevel Logistic Regression on Being an Abeyant Protestor Compared to Being an Established Protestor

	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Odds Ratio	AME	Odds Ratio	AME	Odds Ratio	AME
Individual-Level Factors (Level 1)						
Sociodemographic Characteristics						
Age	1.00° (0.00)	0.00°	1.01** (0.00)	0.00**	1.01** (0.00)	0.00**
Self-Identified Social Class	1.20*** (0.04)	0.02***	1.15*** (0.04)	0.02***	1.15*** (0.04)	0.02***
Political Participation						
Voting (Last Election)	1.03 (0.09)	0.00	1.06 (0.10)	0.01	1.06 (0.10)	0.01
Repertoire of Contentious Politics	0.59*** (0.01)	-0.05***	0.66*** (0.01)	-0.04***	0.66*** (0.01)	-0.04***
Social Networks						
Organization Involvement			0.79*** (0.02)	-0.03***	0.78*** (0.02)	-0.03***
SMO Affiliation			0.71*** (0.05)	-0.04***	0.72*** (0.05)	-0.04***
Grievances						
Political Distrust			0.91° (0.04)	-0.01°	0.91° (0.04)	-0.01°
Motivation: Defend Interests			0.92*** (0.02)	-0.01***	0.92*** (0.02)	-0.01***
Perceived Efficacy						
Perceived Individual Efficacy			0.96 (0.04)	-0.00	0.96 (0.04)	-0.01
Perceived Group Efficacy			1.02 (0.04)	0.00	1.01 (0.04)	0.00
Perceived Demonstration Efficacy			0.86*** (0.03)	-0.02***	0.85*** (0.03)	-0.02***
Ideology						
Left-libertarian Ideology			0.63*** (0.03)	-0.04***	0.64*** (0.03)	-0.05***
Motivation: Moral Obligation			0.98 (0.02)	-0.00	0.98 (0.02)	-0.00
Demonstration-Level Factors (Level 2)						
New Social Movement (ref. Old Movement)					1.44 (0.37)	0.04
Anti-Austerity Movement (ref. Old Movement)					0.80 (0.23)	-0.02
Protest Issue Frequency					0.86° (0.07)	-0.02°
Moving (or Static) Demonstration					0.54** (0.12)	-0.06**
Number of Participants (Log)					1.36*** (0.09)	0.04***
Intercept	0.48** (0.12)		8.69*** (3.64)		1.25 (0.93)	
Random Effects						
Demonstration	0.28 (0.18)		0.75 (0.14)		0.48 (0.10)	
Country	0.75 (0.14)		0.27 (0.18)		0.42 (0.25)	
ICC – Demonstration	0.24		0.24		0.22	
ICC – Country	0.07		0.06		0.10	
Log Likelihood	-4401.51		-4274.60		-4260.38	
AIC	8817.02		8581.20		8562.76	
BIC	8868.46		8698.77		8717.08	
N	11478		11478		11478	

Notes: 1. Entries are odds ratios, standard errors between brackets and average marginal effects with 1 discrete change.
2. ° p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
3. There is a significant difference between new social movement and anti-austerity movement. Odds ratio is 1.81. P-value is 0.01. AME is 0.07. (Anti-austerity movement is the reference category.)

Lastly, I compare the odds ratios of being an abeyant protestor versus a new protestor (Model 3), and the odds ratios of being an abeyant protestor versus an established protestor (Model 6). We can see that most pairs of odds ratios are both larger than 1 or smaller than 1. This means that abeyant protestors are not simply a middle category of protestors between new protestors and established protestors. Abeyant protestors are systematically different from the other two groups of demonstrators. To be more specific, abeyant protestors are the most likely to be older and in higher social classes. They are the most likely to vote in the national election (not statistically significant). They are the least involved in formal organizations and the least likely to be a member of the SMOs that stage the demonstration they are in. They have the lowest general and specific grievances. They have the highest group efficacy in politics (not statistically significant) and the lowest perceived demonstration efficacy. Abeyant protestors are moderate only in their experience in contentious politics, individual efficacy (not statistically significant), and ideologies.

At the demonstration-level, abeyant protestors are more likely to be motivated by old movements compared to new protestors, but are less likely to be in old movements compared to established protestors. Moreover, abeyant protestors are the most likely to be motivated by larger-scale static demonstrations with protest issues that are less salient in their country. Hypotheses 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 ,14 are confirmed. Other hypotheses are partially confirmed.

8.0 Discussion and Conclusion

This research yields interesting findings for both the characteristics of abeyant protestors as well as the type of demonstrations that tend to attract this unique group of people. Social movement studies mainly focus on people who participate in protest activities in extreme patterns and neglect protestors in the middle. Based on the existing gaps in the literature, I compare people who leave demonstrations and then come back (i.e., abeyant protestors) to people who have never engaged in demonstrations before (i.e., new protestors) and people who engage in protest activities consistently (i.e., established protestors). Through two sets of three-level multilevel logistic regressions, I examine the individual-level factors and the demonstration-level factors that are related to individuals' abeyant participation. I also discuss the effect of country-level differences on protestors' pattern of participation.

Firstly, abeyant protestors are very different from established protestors, but they are relatively similar to new protestors. In previous studies, scholars tend to put abeyant protestors and established protestors into the same category as "experienced protestors", and compare them to first-timers. This study shows that, however, abeyant protestors and first-timers actually share a lot of similarities, including social class, voting behavior, organization involvement, grievances, perceived individual and group efficacy in politics, and moral obligation. Abeyant protestors are more inclined to engage in old social movements, compared to new protestors. Other than this, there is no salient difference between the type of demonstration that tend to attract abeyant protestors and the demonstrations that tend to mobilize new protestors. In contrast, abeyant protestors are different from established protestors in almost all of their individual-level characteristics. The demonstrations that attract abeyant protestors are different from those mobilize

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established protestors as well. Abeyant protestors are actively engaged in new demonstrations, rather than anti-austerity demonstrations. Moreover, large-scale static demonstrations with protest issues that are less salient are more likely to attract abeyant protestors. These findings emphasize the need to treat abeyant protestors as a separate category of protest activists, instead of putting them in the "experienced" category.

Secondly, "abeyant protestor" is not simply a category in the middle. Abeyant protestors have some protest experience in the far past, and they are inactive in protests in the near past. They are in the middle between new and established protestors in terms of their pattern of participation. However, the findings of the present study show that abeyant protestors have some unique and salient characteristics. Compared to both new and established protestors, abeyant protestors are older, in higher social class, and less involved in social networks related to social movements. They have less grievances, and lower perceived efficacy to achieve the collective goal through protesting. Their political attitudes are more moderate, and they tend to trust and use conventional forms of action to express their political views. Abeyant protestors seem to be less radical in contentious politics. Due to the limitation of the available data, I am not able to examine what factors lead abeyant protestors to come back to street demonstrations. I suggest that future research is needed to identify the specific triggers that mobilize abeyant protestors who are not active in demonstrations to show up again.

Thirdly, individuals' patterns of protest participation are impacted by individual-level, demonstration-level and country-level differences. Across the models, over 14% of the chances of being an abeyant protestor rather than a new protestor is explained by between-demonstration differences. Over 7% of such chances is explained by between-country differences. Similarly, over 22% of the chances of being an abeyant protestor, compared to being an established protestor, is

explained by between-demonstration differences. Over 6% of such chances is explained by between-country differences. The cross-national nature of the *CCC* data and its rich information about both demonstrators and demonstrations all make it possible for me to conduct the multilevel analysis of abeyant protestors. However, because all the covered countries are West European countries, their macro-level contexts in politics and culture are relatively similar. Future research covering societies with various polity, political opportunity, cultural environment, etc. are helpful in explaining cross-national differences in individuals' pattern of protest participation.

Appendix A Demonstrations in the *CCC* Datasets

Appendix Table 1 84 Street Demonstrations and Type of Social Movement covered by the *CCC* Datasets

Country	Type	Street Demonstrations
Belgium	Old	1st of May March (Antwerp)
	New	Climate Change (Brussels), No Government, Great Country (Brussels), Not in Our Name (Brussels), Fukushima never again (Brussels)
	Anti-austerity	March for Work (Brussels), No to Austerity (Brussels), Non-Profit Demonstration (Brussels), We have alternatives (Brussels)
Czech Republic	Old	The End of Godfathers (Prague), Meeting of Workers' party for social justice (Duchcov)
	New	Prague Pride (Prague), Czech Communist Party May Day (Prague), In defence of academic and civil freedoms (Prague), Veggie Parade 2013 (Prague), Prague Pride 2013 (Prague), DIY carnival 2013 (Prague), Great antiregime demonstration (Prague), "Velvet" feast 2013 (Prague)
	Anti-austerity	Stop the Government (Prague), Demonstration against extreme-right march in Prague (Prague)
Italy	Old	May Day (Florence)
	New	Euromayday (Milan), Demonstration Perugia-Assisi (Assisi), Gay Pride (Bologna), Seeds of Justice. Flowers of shared responsibility, Semi di Giustizia. Fiori di Corresponsabilità, No Mous (Niscemi)
	Anti-austerity	General Strike (Florence), No Monti Day (Rome), Florence 10+10/Joining forces for another Europe (Florence)
The Netherlands	New	Climate demo (Utrecht), Culture demo Utrecht (Utrecht), Student demo 2 (The Hague), Anti Nucleair demo (Amsterdam), Stop racism and exclusion (Amsterdam), Pink Saturday Parade Survey (Haarlem)
	Anti-austerity	Retirement demonstration (Rotterdam), Student demo 1 (Amsterdam), Culture demo Amsterdam (Amsterdam), Together strong for public work (The Hague), Student demo 2 (The Hague), Military demo (The Hague), Stop budget cuts (care & wellfare) (The Hague), Occupy Netherlands (Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam)
Spain	Old	Self-determination is democracy (Barcelona), Demonstration against language decree (Santiago de Compostela), Demonstration against the new labour law (Santiago de Compostela), We are a nation, we decide (Barcelona), 1st May, Labour Day (Barcelona), Celebration May Day (Vigo)
	New	Demonstration Against Abortion (Madrid),
	Anti-austerity	Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War (Barcelona), Against Labor Law (Madrid), Real Democracy Now! We are not good in the hands of politicians and bankers! (Madrid), For employment, not capital reforms. Defend Our Rights (Vigo)
Sweden	Old	May 1 March, Social Democratic Party (Stockholm), May Day (SAP/LO) (Malmö), May Day (Social Democratic Party/LO) (Gothenburg)
	New	Climate March (Copenhagen), May 1 March, Left Party (Stockholm), Against racist politics (Stockholm), Anti-nuclear demonstration (Stockholm), May Day (Left Party) (Malmö), May Day (Left Party) (Gothenburg), Rainbow Parade (LGBTQ festival) (Gothenburg)
Switzerland	Old	May 1st Demonstration (Zurich), May 1ste demonstration 2011 (Geneva)
	New	World March of Women (Bern), Anti Nuclear Manifestation (Beznau), Gay Pride Geneva (Geneva), Women demonstration Geneva (Geneva), Anti-nuclear (Mühleberg), Pride demonstration (Zurich)
UK	Old	May Day Labour March (London), 'TUC's March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice (London)
	New	National Climate March (London), Take Back Parliament (London), No to Hate Crime Vigil (London), Unite Against Fascism National Demo (London), National Climate March 2010 (London), Million Women Rise (London), London Pride Parade (London)
	Anti-austerity	Fund Our Future: Stop Education Cuts (London), National Climate March 2010 (London), "TUC"s March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice (London),

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