

Optical Theory and Feminine *Auctoritas* within Chaucer's the *Tale of Melibee* with an English Translation of Albertanus of Brescia's *Liber consolationis et consilii* in Full

by

Madeline Rose Fox

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This thesis was presented

by

Madeline Rose Fox

It was defended on

March 30, 2021

and approved by

Hannah Johnson, Associate Professor, Department of English, University of Pittsburgh

Christina Hoenig, Associate Professor, Department of Classics, University of Pittsburgh

Rita Copeland, Sheli Z. and Burton X. Rosenberg Professor of the Humanities, Departments of
Classical Studies, English, and Comparative Literatures, University of Pennsylvania

Thesis Advisor: Ryan McDermott, Associate Professor, Department of English, University of
Pittsburgh

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Madeline Rose Fox, BPhil

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There is an immediate discrepancy between Chaucer's the *Tale of Melibee* and its base text, Albertanus of Brescia's *Liber consolacionis et consilii*: Sophie's wounds. Chaucer does not include the eyes in the list of her wounds, whereas Albertanus of Brescia does. This discrepancy is often thought to be a mere scribal error, causing this aspect of the translation to be overlooked. However, evidence shows that this difference in translation is almost certainly not a scribal error. There is only one known French manuscript that replaces the word "*yeux*" with "*piez*." It is both unlikely that Chaucer used this manuscript and that he overlooked this mistake. Therefore, this was a conscious choice of Chaucer's. This unlocks an entirely new and intricate layer of optical theory and feminine *auctoritas* within the tale. Allowing the eyes to remain unharmed, Chaucer creates an opportunity for Prudence and her feminine wisdom to take center stage. The story's predominantly feminine voice is reminiscent of that of Boethius' Lady Philosophy as well as other female personifications of the time. However, Prudence's prose is distinct, and one of humanity rather than abstraction. Whereas a female personification like Lady Philosophy speaks in musical verse and empty proverb, Prudence puts meaning behind her words through the innately human quality of deduction. Most importantly, Prudence's words are presented in prose rather than verse, allowing her speech to act as standard dialogue. It is only the presence of eyes within the tale that allows this strong female figure to own her own voice. Applying medieval optical theory to the

Tale of Melibee in this way allows for a deep analysis of Prudence's wisdom as well as her authoritative role in her medieval marriage.

Table of Contents

Preface.....	ix
1.0 Introduction.....	1
2.0 Optical Theory and Feminine <i>Auctoritas</i> within Chaucer's the <i>Tale of Melibee</i>	5
Appendix A The Book of Consolation and Counsel	23
Appendix A.1 Introduction.....	24
Appendix A.2 Chapter 1	24
Appendix A.3 Chapter 2	25
Appendix A.4 Chapter 3	32
Appendix A.5 Chapter 4	33
Appendix A.6 Chapter 5	36
Appendix A.7 Chapter 6	39
Appendix A.8 Chapter 7	40
Appendix A.9 Chapter 8	40
Appendix A.10 Chapter 9	41
Appendix A.11 Chapter 10	42
Appendix A.12 Chapter 11	47
Appendix A.13 Chapter 12	51
Appendix A.14 Chapter 13	52
Appendix A.15 Chapter 14	55
Appendix A.16 Chapter 15	56
Appendix A.17 Chapter 16	57

Appendix A.18 Chapter 17	58
Appendix A.19 Chapter 18	61
Appendix A.20 Chapter 19	62
Appendix A.21 Chapter 20	64
Appendix A.22 Chapter 21	66
Appendix A.23 Chapter 22	67
Appendix A.24 Chapter 23	67
Appendix A.25 Chapter 24	68
Appendix A.26 Chapter 25	68
Appendix A.27 Chapter 26	69
Appendix A.28 Chapter 27	73
Appendix A.29 Chapter 28	76
Appendix A.30 Chapter 29	76
Appendix A.31 Chapter 30	79
Appendix A.32 Chapter 31	81
Appendix A.33 Chapter 32	83
Appendix A.34 Chapter 33	86
Appendix A.35 Chapter 34	87
Appendix A.36 Chapter 35	88
Appendix A.37 Chapter 36	91
Appendix A.38 Chapter 37	94
Appendix A.39 Chapter 38	97
Appendix A.40 Chapter 39	99

Appendix A.41 Chapter 40	101
Appendix A.42 Chapter 41	104
Appendix A.43 Chapter 42	105
Appendix A.44 Chapter 43	108
Appendix A.45 Chapter 44	110
Appendix A.46 Chapter 45	111
Appendix A.47 Chapter 46	112
Appendix A.48 Chapter 47	114
Appendix A.49 Chapter 48	116
Appendix A.50 Chapter 49	118
Appendix A.51 Chapter 50	128
Appendix A.52 Chapter 51	131
Bibliography	134

Preface

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1.0 Introduction

Albertanus of Brescia's *Liber consolationis et consilii*, or his *Book of Consolation and Counsel*, is just as, if not more, dense than Chaucer's fourteenth-century iteration, the *Tale of Melibee*. Both texts broach major religious and philosophical matters by means of both biblical and secular proverb—most of which come from the ancient canon of Marcus Tullius Cicero, Seneca, Aesop, and other classical sources. Chaucer's tale, much like Albertanus' treatise, weaves such proverb around a loose narrative surrounding a grieving and vengeful husband and father, Melibee, a stern and stoic wife and mother, Prudence, and a silent and wounded daughter—Sophie in Chaucer's text.

I have worked backwards, as it were, by translating Albertanus' *Liber* after reading and researching Chaucer's *Melibee* for quite some time. As there is no known English translation of Albertanus' *Liber*, I took it upon myself to translate the work in full. Chaucer's tale informed many of my translation decisions, but often these decisions were not hard ones—Chaucer does not stray too far from Albertanus' original. I will begin by explicating my translation, outlining my choice of words in relation to the original Latin. I will then go on to explain how these choices inform my reading of Chaucer's *Melibee*.

My translation of the *Liber consolationis et consilii* is a direct translation of the 1873 version edited by Thor Sundby—an edition completed on behalf of the Chaucer Society. I have also included his footnotes, which provide sources for the bountiful quotes and proverbs exchanged by the story's main characters. I have done my best to keep everything, from footnotes to punctuation, the same in my translation, so that my translation can easily be referenced in regard to the edition and vice versa, and so that the edition becomes just as accessible as my translation.

While in many ways Albertanus' text is quite straightforward—especially when it comes to quotations—there are still a few abnormalities that need to be addressed briefly. I will begin with the quotes that Albertanus attributes to Martial. What Albertanus considers Martialian proverb, Sundby considers *Pseudo-Martialian* proverb. On many occasions, Albertanus will incorporate the so-called words of Martial into his treatise—yet, upon further investigation it becomes clear that there is no accessible record of Martial ever writing such things. What Albertanus portrays as fact, Sundby reveals as contrived through his footnotes. While this seems quite simple, the words of Seneca pose a similar, but different, challenge. Seneca is one of the most quoted individuals in the *Liber*, and Sundby is able to attribute all of his quotes to a few larger works in his footnotes, sparing Albertanus' Seneca from a *Pseudo-Seneca* label. That said, I often ran into the same problem with Seneca as I did with Martial whilst translating the *Liber*. In many, but not all, cases, I was unable to trace Seneca's words from the *Liber* to one of Seneca's own works—even though Albertanus often specifies the works from which he quotes. The *Formula vitae honestae* appears quite often. Upon closer inspection of Sundby's footnotes and further research, it became clear that this work does not actually belong to Seneca. These words do, in fact, come from a piece called the *Formula vitae honestae*, but Albertanus incorrectly attributes the work to Seneca. While the contents of the text certainly echo Senecan themes, the quotations Albertanus incorporates must be more accurately attributed to a *Pseudo-Seneca*, of sorts. Different from the case of Martial, this pseudo-antique has a name, separate from that of the Roman philosopher and statesman: Martinus Bracaraensis or St. Martin of Braga, an archbishop and ecclesiastical author who lived during the sixth century. Because of my effort to keep my translation as close to the original as possible, however, I have not changed Albertanus' citations to reflect this.

Before I move onto the broader picture of the relationship between Albertanus' *Liber* and Chaucer's Melibee, I want to briefly address a few of my translation choices for the purposes of clarity and transparency. The first is in regard to the Latin *consilium*—a word that has many meanings ranging from “debate” to “jury” to “advice” to “counsel.” The Middle English *conseil* or “counsel” appears most often in Chaucer's Melibee, and “counsel” is what I have chosen to use for my translation as well. While Chaucer's translation decisions informed my own, I also chose this iteration for the sake of consistency. As a word in the title of the treatise itself, I wanted to ensure that its representation in the contents of the treatise reflected the title. In a book where both counsel and consolation are defined and heavily discussed, it only felt right to me to use “counsel” as the one and only translation for *consilium*—a word that appears several times in the body of the text.

Two other words that appear multiple times are the Latin *sapientia* and *prudentia*—two words that potentially have the same meanings: wisdom, prudence, and discretion. I have chosen to strictly translate *sapientia* as “wisdom” and *prudentia* as “prudence.” I kept the translations of these words separate, as I do not believe Albertanus was using them interchangeably. This becomes most evident when Albertanus quotes Job 12:12, “*in antiquis est sapientia et in multo tempore prudentia*”—“in old age is wisdom and in long time is prudence.” This is also a quote that Chaucer incorporates into his Melibee. It is Prudence who recites this quote in both versions, drawing a stark contrast between *sapientia* and *prudentia*, while also identifying herself as the *prudentia* to which Melibee should listen. Keeping *sapientia* and *prudentia* separate in my translation further singles out Prudence as both a character and a virtue within the text—a rhetorical tactic that I will utilize in my reading of Chaucer's Melibee.

It is clear that Albertanus' *Liber* and Chaucer's Melibee naturally complement each other. Yet, there are still differences that must be identified to truly understand what Chaucer has done with Albertanus' text and how he has manipulated it. The main difference lies within the length of the two texts. Albertanus' text is fifty-one chapters, each with the aim of adding to the readers' overall understanding of what good counsel truly is. Chaucer, on the other hand, condenses the story into one tale, albeit long. Chaucer, in a shorter amount of time, manages to still adhere to Albertanus' story while adding certain allegorical nuances that either don't exist in Albertanus' *Liber*, or are not fully developed in Albertanus' *Liber*. While the reference to the windows of the soul, for example, exists in Albertanus' text, it does not provide a framework for the story as a whole like it does for Chaucer's Melibee. Chaucer also adds the layers of optical theory into his text. Eyes are mentioned briefly in Albertanus' original, but not nearly to the extent of Chaucer's Melibee. In fact, there is virtually no connection between Melibee's eyes and soul in Albertanus' text. While these are not the only examples of how Chaucer manipulated Albertanus' work, they are prime examples of Chaucer's deliberate changes. In the spirit of Albertanus' *Incipit, look for the differences* between Chaucer's Melibee and Albertanus' *Liber* as you continue to read "Optical Theory and Feminine *Auctoritas* within Chaucer's the *Tale of Melibee*" and *The Book of Consolation and Counsel*.

2.0 Optical Theory and Feminine *Auctoritas* within Chaucer's the *Tale of Melibee*

As part of Geoffrey Chaucer's greater work, the *Canterbury Tales*, the *Tale of Melibee* has been often neglected. For centuries, due to its long, burdensome, and dense contents, it has seemed separate from the rest of the *Canterbury Tales*. Within the past few decades, however, the *Tale of Melibee* has caught the eyes of medieval scholars—Suzanne Akbari, Eleanor Johnson, and Amanda Walling foremost among them. Some discuss its unique representation of gender and some declare it a deliberate and unique statement of morality on behalf of Chaucer, similar in parts to the rest of its sister tales.¹ Modern scholarly work often argues that the tale's dense philosophical and moral matters are separate from its emphasis on gender. I agree that it presents a distinctive view of gender, yet I disagree with the notion that gender is separate from the intellectual matters of the tale. In fact, as both gender and philosophical counsel are central to the text as a whole, I will argue that the two are dependent upon one another—yet it is the way by which these two entities connect that forms the crux of this paper. Through a comparative study of the *Tale of Melibee* and its base text, Albertanus of Brescia's *Liber consolationis et consilii*, a discrepancy between the texts has manifested regarding Sophie's eyes. I will argue that the presence of Sophie's eyes preserves Prudence's feminine *auctoritas*, enabling Prudence to guide her husband with wisdom through a time of great grief and moral blindness. Once we recognize this connection, the dynamic between Prudence and Melibee begins to acquire a new meaning. Prudence's place within

¹For discussions of gender and contextuality in the *Tale of Melibee*, see Amanda Walling's articles "'In Hir Tellyng Difference': Gender, Authority, and Interpretation in the Tale of Melibee" and "Placebo Effects: Flattery and Antifeminism in Chaucer's Merchant's Tale and the Tale of Melibee," Celia R. Daileader's "The 'Thopas-Melibee' Sequence and the Defeat of Antifeminism," and Chad G. Crosson's "Chaucer's Corrective Form: The Tale of Melibee and the Poetics of Emendation."

the tale, fully realized through optics, reveals the depth behind the tale's central allegory, reveals Prudence's wisdom and feminine *auctoritas*, and reveals Chaucer's manipulation of medieval marriage politics.

The base of the tale forms within the first six lines, and thus the discrepancy is unveiled. Sophie, the daughter of Melibee and Dame Prudence, is attacked by her father's enemies when she and her mother are left alone in their home. She is left with five different wounds in five different places: her feet, her hands, her ears, her nose, and her mouth. These five wounds are reminiscent of the five senses, with one exception: the eyes. Rather than the fifth sense suffering injury, Chaucer lists Sophie's feet instead. It is within this seemingly simple exclusion that the discrepancy manifests. Chaucer does not include the eyes in the list of her wounds, whereas Albertanus of Brescia does. In the *Liber consolationis et consilii*, Melibee's daughter suffers injuries in her eyes, her hands, her ears, her nose, and her mouth. This discrepancy is often thought to be a mere scribal error, causing this aspect of the translation to seem insignificant, therefore overlooked. However, evidence shows that this difference in translation is almost certainly not a scribal error. Chaucer's tale is supposed to be a direct Middle English translation of the *Liber consolationis et consilii*'s French version, yet there is only one known French manuscript that replaces the word *yeux* with *piez*. It is unlikely that Chaucer both used this manuscript and overlooked this mistake. Therefore, this was a conscious choice of Chaucer's—to exclude the eyes from harm, leaving them functional.

Based on optical theory of medieval scientific and theological treatises, eyes and vision in medieval literature can often signal a character's connection with God, morality, and wisdom.² Peter Limoges's *Moral Treatise on the Eye*, a late thirteenth-century Latin text that "attempt[s] to articulate the moral and spiritual implications of perspectivist optics," connects optics and morality (Denery 6):

Vices, sins and every sort of moral laxity are explained in terms of perception, problems arising with the sinner's spiritual vision. Quite simply, the central problems of spiritual life are, when all is said and done, visual problems, problems with how things are seen and with how they appear. Just as God's ubiquity can be understood through an analogy with concave mirrors, so too can our distance from Him and our inability to see Him. (Denery 77)

The lack of clear vision can symbolize sin, moral confusion, and misconception, while clear vision symbolizes moral righteousness. Chaucer's choice to exclude Sophie's eyes from harm, understood according to optical theory, indicates a contrived outlet of wisdom and morality. Therefore, we can better understand Prudence's feminine wisdom and *auctoritas*³ and its relationship to Melibee's inaccurate perception. His vision is clouded by vengeance, for he wants his enemies to suffer for what they have done. We see the first evidence of this swiftly after Melibee seeks the counsel of his desired "congregascioun of folk," for "by the manere of his speche

² The basis of medieval optical theory and the science of perspective is summarized by Dallas Denery as he states, "Imagine that an eye is placed in the centre of a spherical, concave mirror. The natural properties of this mirror are such that wherever that eye looks, it will see only itself. Now imagine that another eye, placed somewhere else, anywhere else but the mirror's centre, looks at the mirror. It will never see the reflected image of that other eye. One eye sees itself everywhere while remaining entirely invisible to the other – ubiquitous, yet hidden" (75). This is further explained and related to the divine, for just like the eye in the concave mirror, God is ubiquitous. This forms the foundation for the relationship between eyes, the divine, and morality.

³ The Middle English connotation and definition is that of "the right to rule or command, legal power; position of authority, official position; without any outside sanction or authorization, independently; (b) the power to convince or influence people, capacity for inspiring belief or trust" (Middle English Compendium).

it semed that in herte he baar a cruel ire, redy to doon vengeaunce upon his foos, and sodeinly desired that the werre shold biginne” (Chaucer 1004, 1009). Throughout the rest of the text, the word vengeance in relation to Melibee appears sixty-six more times—emphasizing Melibee’s immoral fixation.⁴ Prudence, assisted by the clear sight of her daughter, is there to assert her wisdom and convince him of a more moral response.

Melibee continuously argues with Prudence, dismissing her words of wisdom. He must maintain his own *auctoritas* and *maistrye*⁵ within his marriage—to do this, he must make sure his own voice is heard. He sees Prudence as subordinate to himself, as per the usual gender dynamics in a medieval marriage. Therefore, his focus on vengeance takes precedence in their argument. Melibee’s lack of moral vision translates to his skewed self-perception. We can understand Melibee’s misguided self-perception and its historical relation to optical theory through Denery’s explanation of a similar concept:

The problem of spiritual misperception extends not only to how we see others, but to how we are seen by others and to how we see ourselves...a sinner only perceives his sins through the refracting medium of his lusts. As a result, he does not see the malice in his acts, but only the improperly magnified delight his sin provides him. Or again, just as we are unable to see a thick cloud of fog that surrounds us, so too the sinner is unable to see the clouds of sin in which he dwells. (103)

⁴ There are multiple forms of the word “vengeance” that are used that make up the total number of sixty-seven. These forms include, *venge*, *vengeance*, *vengeances*, *vengeancetaking*, *vengeancetakinge*, *vengeaunce*, *vengeauncetaking*, *venged*, *vengen*, and *vengeth*.

⁵ The Middle English connotation and definition is that of “(a) Control, dominance, rulership; to grant (the kingship) to (sb.); (b) preeminence, status, prestige; (c) authority, warrant; (d) the upper hand, victory in a contest” (Middle English Compendium).

Because of Melibee's moral blindness, he sees his obsession with vengeance, not as a malicious act or as a sin, but as a dire necessity—he feels that only vengeance will appease his overwhelming grief and sorrow. However, Melibee's focus on vengeance is not the only evidence of his misguided self-perception. Evidence lies within his view of his wife. Melibee sees Prudence as his subordinate. For the majority of the tale, she is seen without authority and good judgment because of her gender and typically submissive role. As Amanda Walling explains, "Melibee's refusal to listen to his wife is based not only on his contempt for her intellectual ability but also on his anxiety about the public performance of his own power as a man, a husband, and a lord" (170). He sees his own reasoning and inclination towards vengeance as inherently correct due to his presumed rightful *maistrye*. He dwells on vengeance just as he dwells on the injustice with which his family has been stricken. Melibee's refracted vision leads to misperception, not only in regard to how he sees his wife, but in regard to how he sees himself. With Melibee's visually and, therefore, morally wounded character, there must be a force present to both correct and heal him: his wife, Prudence. Through Chaucer's deliberate choice to include Sophie's eyes and, therefore, clear vision within his tale, the heroine, Dame Prudence, is able to possess her own wise voice, counsel her husband through allegory and wisdom, and gain *auctoritas* in her medieval marriage.

Suzanne Akbari's claim regarding optics within the *Tale of Melibee* seems to be at the forefront of scholarly discussion. Her claim revolves around the relationship between eyes and Melibee's moral and intellectual ignorance. Akbari argues, "Sophie's eyes, the embodiment of wisdom's capacity to perceive truth, are absent, figuratively representing Melibee's intellectual blindness" (218). Because Chaucer does not mention the eyes in the list of Sophie's wounds, Akbari considers them "absent" when they, realistically, remain present and unharmed. While this argument is reasonable, the relationship between Sophie's eyes and her parents is a bit more

complex. Rather than Sophie's absent eyes symbolizing her father's intellectual handicap, her intact eyes align with her mother. Prudence's strong and unwavering wisdom is the result of her daughter's eyes, for clear vision correlates with moral strength, allowing Sophie and Prudence to work together as one. Sophie, completely maimed, left only with her eyes, finds agency and mobility through her mother with one common quality: her eyes, and, in turn, her wisdom. Without the eyes listed as wounded, they remain unharmed, they remain *present*. Rather than the lack of eyes symbolizing Melibee's lack of wisdom, the *presence* of eyes symbolizes Prudence's *present* wisdom. The majority of this tale revolves around Melibee's inclination towards vengeance and Prudence's wisdom, swaying him towards forgiveness. While Melibee is devoid of wisdom, Prudence is replete with it.

Prudence's wisdom, however, is not immediately accepted by Melibee. It is not until the resolution of the allegory that Melibee accepts Prudence's counsel. The allegory begins within the first six lines of the tale. After explaining Melibee's departure, Chaucer narrates:

Thre of his olde foos had it esped, and setten ladders to the walles of his house and
by windows ben entred,/and betten his wif and wounded his doghter with five
mortal woundes in five sondry places/-- this is to seyn, in hir feet, in hir hands, in
hir eris, in hir nose, and in hir mouth—and leften hir for deed and wenten away.

(967-972)

Prudence will later interpret the damage of Melibee's house through its windows as connected with Melibee's moral damage through the windows of his soul. This description of the household as well as Sophie's wounds, of course, is also where the discrepancy lies. Albertanus similarly writes:

Three neighbors and old enemies saw this, and, with a ladder, entered through the window of the house, Melibeus' wife, named Prudence, was strongly beaten, and his daughter was served five strokes, namely in the eyes, ears, mouth, nose, and hands, and leaving her half dead, they went away. (2)⁶

Eyes, however, are not the only change Chaucer makes. Though these two versions seem quite similar, there is one more variance that is yet another connection between Sophie's eyes and Prudence's wisdom. In the *Liber consolationis et consilii*, Melibee and Prudence's daughter is unnamed. She is simply referred to as *filia* and *filia* only. Yet Chaucer names their daughter Sophie, or Sophia. *Sophia*, meaning "wisdom" in Greek, turns her into the personification of her name, assigning her with an embodied purpose. Sophie, specifically Sophie's eyes, as pertaining to the medieval conception of optics, acts as a beacon of wisdom. Yet, almost completely maimed, she herself does not act on this wisdom. Rather, it is Prudence who embodies *sophia* by acting on behalf of her daughter.

It is Prudence's unwavering wisdom that allows the allegory to form fully. The allegory comes full circle later in the tale when Prudence compares the windows of their home to the windows of Melibee's soul: all portals for damage within. "Thow hast doon sinne again our Lord Crist" Prudence counsels:

For certes, the thre enemys of mankind—that is to seyn, the flessch, the feend, and the world—/thow hast suffred hem entre into thin herte wilfully by the windowes of they body,/ and hast nat defended thyself suffisantly agains hir assautes and hir

⁶ "Quidam juvenis, Melibeus nomine, vir potens and dives, relinquens uxorem and filiam in domo, quas multum diligebat, clauso estio domus, ivit spatiatum. Tres vero sui vicini et hostes antique hoc videntes, appositis scalis ac per fenestras domus intrantes, uxorem Melibei, Prudentiam nomine, verberaverunt fortiter et, filiae ejus plagis quinque appositis, videlicet in oculis, auribus, ore et naso ac manibus, illamque semivivam relinquentes, abierunt."

temptacions, so that they han wounded thy soule in five places/ —this is to seyn,
the dedly sinnes that been entred into thin herte by thy five wittes./ And in the same
manere oure Lord Crist hath wold and suffred that thy thre enemys been entred into
thin hous by the windowes,/ and han ywounded thy doghter in the foreside manere.

(Chaucer 1419-1426)

Just as Sophie's body is wounded by enemies who have entered her home through its windows, Melibee's soul is wounded by the three enemies of mankind which have entered him through the windows of his body, or his five senses. However, this passage presents the allegory on a strictly surface level. A deeper familiarity with the medieval allegorical tradition is the key to unlocking the intricacies of this multifaceted allegory.

Each injury of Sophie's corresponds to a blow to Melibee's body and soul, or his "propre persone" (Chaucer 1026). The term *propre persone* encompasses both the body and the soul of an individual. As *propre* indicates ownership and possession of one's soul and nature, and *persone* indicates one's physical body, the phrase suggests ownership of not only one's physicality, but their essence, their soul, and what makes them an individual being (Middle English Compendium). Through her allegory, Prudence indicates that it is Melibee's *propre persone* that is damaged. The damage to his personhood leaves him with a lack of his own conscience, wisdom, and clear sight. However, with Sophie's eyes untouched, wisdom is still able to prevail throughout the story through the actions of her mother. Just as Sophie's eyes act as a beacon of wisdom, Prudence allegorically *is* wisdom. With all of these factors in place, Melibee is now exposed to a source of wisdom—an outside source that he must eventually accept as his own. In the end, Sophie is left with only her eyes, just as Melibee is left with only Prudence's wisdom—both providing him the

counsel he needs. In this case, Akbari's notion that Sophie's eyes symbolize a figurative relationship with her father is plausible, yet it works differently—it works by way of her mother.

Prudence is able to persuade Melibee through her unfaltering sagacity—she *becomes* wisdom. This is a fundamental aspect of the allegorical tradition. The allegorical tradition has presented numerous feminine personifications, all named after the trait they embody. In Boethius' sixth-century text *De consolazione philosophiae*, for example, Lady Philosophy is the personification of her name. Similarly, Prudence appears to be a personification in Chaucer's tale—she is an “allegorical figure, representing the virtue of reason, or indeed, prudence, as opposed to emotion, which in the tale is represented by her husband Melibee” (Pakkala-Wesckström 400-401). Yet, with a firmer understanding of Prudence's character and her personified ancestors, Prudence quickly becomes the outlier. Similar to Prudence, other personifications embody a certain quality like wisdom. But unlike those others, Prudence is able to take a fundamental step away from personification and towards personhood by *using* and *applying* wisdom in order to counsel her grieving husband.

The story's predominantly feminine voice and unwavering wisdom is specifically reminiscent of that of Boethius' Lady Philosophy. Yet Prudence and her voice are unique in the way that they are presented. Often falling into a category of the otherworldly or the supernatural, traditional feminine personifications, found in ancient and medieval philosophical and religious treatises, are unlike Prudence; they do not necessarily act the way normal women would. Instead, their actions reflect their abstract and detached nature. They are usually platonic beings that express no real relation to the male counterpart whom they are trying to counsel. These beings are rarely considered *women*, rather, they are to be seen as a form of the *other*. Barbara Newman “suggest[s] a new interpretation of medieval goddesses,” or medieval personifications: “reading

them precisely *as* goddesses: *female* but not necessarily *women*...not ‘representations of woman’ but ‘modes of religious imagination’ (38). For this reason, they appear as distant figures without any emotional gain or connection to their narrative counterparts—appearing only as a mode for the philosophical and “religious imagination.” Similarly, these personifications must be described as having the “figure” of a woman. The word “figure” or *figura*, originally meaning “plastic form,” has a long history of being associated with allegory (Auerbach 11). Lucretius adapted the word further, forcing it to the connotation of “dream image,” “figment of fancy,” or “ghost” (Auerbach 17). By Boethius’ time in the sixth century, we find *figura* to be an indicator for the ethereal, the ghostly figments of the imagination, and personification. This forces feminine figures to further align themselves with the category of “goddess” rather than “woman.” This, however, is where Prudence and her form begin to differ from the long and rich tradition of feminine personification.

In Boethius’ *De consolazione philosophiae*, its central feminine personification, Lady Philosophy, is described by the narrator as an ethereal, ancient figure:

I was writing this in a silence broken only by the scratchings of my quill as I recorded these gloomy thoughts and tried to impose upon them a certain form that in itself is curiously anodyne, when there was a presence of which I gradually became aware looming over my head, the figure of a woman whose look filled me with awe. Her burning gaze was indescribably penetrating, unlike that of anyone I have ever met, and while her complexion was as fresh and glowing as that of a girl, I realized that she was ancient and that nobody would mistake her for a creature of our time. (3)

For Prudence, it would not be appropriate to refer to her as having the “figure of a woman.” She is introduced to us as Melibee's wife and Melibee’s wife alone; she is presented as a human woman

rather than an otherworldly ghost. In fact, Prudence is Melibee's wife above all else. This alone is a distinction from other medieval and ancient works that incorporate feminine personifications such as *De consolacione philosophiae*. These goddesses such as Lady Philosophy are platonic counterparts to a greater story. They are not included to develop a rapport with the other characters; rather, they are included to exude the wisdom their name implies. Prudence, on the other hand, has human qualities. She is Melibee's wife, and she is Sophie's mother. She has opinions in addition to her strictly proverbial wisdom. She is able to quote scholars and then interpret them in order to apply them to her own and her husband's situation: a human quality.

Whereas female personifications like Boethius' Lady Philosophy are ethereal beings that speak in musical verse and proverb, Prudence's words are presented in prose as she engages in marital discourse with her husband—establishing her as human from the tale's inception. Prudence's speech follows in the footsteps of Boethian prosimetrum: "The specific prose tale that the Chaucer pilgrim tells accentuates its affiliation with the proses of the *Consolation* and deepens this miniature prosimetrum's thematizations of Boethian literary theory and practice" (Johnson 130). While Chaucer's tale presents Boethian themes and overtly affiliates itself with *De consolacione philosophiae* in its style, Prudence's consistent prose is different than the verse of Lady Philosophy. They appear similar in the way that they converse and provide boundless tokens of proverbial wisdom for their male counterparts, but they are different in the way that their conversation is presented. Rather than appearing to assist Melibee in a moment of anguish by singing him songs of wisdom, Prudence, present at the onset of the trauma, provides him the counsel he needs through her wise prose, as she is his wife and companion. Prudence plays the role of both Lady Philosophy and Melibee's wife by counseling him and still engaging in marital discourse. She understands Melibee's disposition as his wife and is able to counsel him from a

place of familiarity. Rather than just presenting him with reason, she works with him, allowing him to gain opinions from other sources⁷ and allowing him the illusion that he is drawing conclusions for himself. Yet, in the midst of their discourse, Prudence continues to quote multiple sources such as the Bible, Seneca, and Ovid. She is providing counsel for Melibee by utilizing centuries' worth of influential thought, applying it to the situation at hand, and manipulating it in order to convince her husband to choose the path of forgiveness rather than vengeance. Though similar in this way to Lady Philosophy and possessing qualities of female personifications, Prudence is still human by nature.

An example of this wise application and manipulation of proverb appears in the very beginning of the tale as Prudence personally recalls something she once read: "This noble wif Prudence remembred hire upon the sentence of Ovide, in his book that cleped is the *Remedye of Love*" (Chaucer 976). After looking at her weeping husband, Prudence recalls the specific words of Ovid, remembering his verse regarding the disturbance of a weeping mother. Ovid's words, "He is a fool that destourbeth the moder to wepe in the deth of hir child til she have wept hir fille as for a certein time,/ and thane shal man doon his diligence with amiable words hire to reconforte , and preye hire of hir wepyng for to stinte," ring throughout her memory (Chaucer 976-977). Prudence, with her own words, does her "diligence" to comfort Melibee. She consoles him by saying, "Youre doghter, with the grace of God, shal warisshe and escape./ And al were it so that she right now were deed, ye ne oghte nat as for hir deth yourself to destroye" (Chaucer 982-983). This is our first real introduction to Prudence's way of thinking, and it previews how her character is going to be handled throughout the story. She is treated as a real, literal woman, someone who

⁷ Prudence suggests and allows Melibee to gain advice from professionals such as "sirugiens, phisiciens, olde folk and Yonge" before he accepts her counsel and her counsel alone (Chaucer 1005).

is able to remember teachings she has learned and apply them to her family's situation, specifically for the purpose of comforting her distraught husband. Unlike Lady Philosophy, who *is* wisdom, Prudence had to learn it. While much of her wisdom comes from sources such as Ovid, Seneca, and the Bible, she is undeniably clever, for she is able to rework the written word and apply it as a form of marital counsel to Melibee. She is able to establish her own *auctoritas* in her marriage while also assuring Melibee of his *maistrye* in order to appease him: something a personification would not need to do, nor care to do—there is not a relationship of which to be wary. While Lady Philosophy freely preaches without consequence, Prudence must strategically implement her wisdom. Prudence does not just apparate to provide counsel like Lady Philosophy. Prudence is Melibee's wife and must work within the bounds of her medieval marriage in order to ensure her voice is heard—she “exercises politeness befitting the medieval wife: she waits for the proper moment to speak, and assumes a humble tone” (Pakkala-Weckström 406). All of these elements of humanity present within Prudence's demeanor and speech come to fruition because of wisdom's place within the tale.

Similarly, Prudence is able to establish her *auctoritas* through her wisdom as well as her persuasion. Directing her remarks towards Melibee, Prudence persuades:

For the book seyth: “Axe alwey thy conseil of hem that been wise.”/ And by this same reson shul ye clepen to youre conseil, of youre freendes that ben of age, swiche as han seighen and ben expert in manye things, and ben approved in conseillinges;/ for the book seyth that in olde men is the sapience, and in longe time the prudence./ And Tuillius seyth that grete things ne ben nat ay acompliced by strengthe ne by delivernesse of body, but by good conseil, by auctoritee of persones, and by science; the which thre things ne been nat fieble by age but certes they

enforcen and encessen day by day./ And thane shal ye kepe this for a genral reule:
first shal ye clepe to youre conseil a fewe of youre freendes that been especiale.

(Chaucer 1162-1166)

Prudence utilizes quotes from the Bible as well as Marcus Tullius Cicero in order to establish a foundation for Melibee to accept counsel. She frames this advice in a way that gives Melibee the illusion of *maistrye* in the situation—she is allowing Melibee to choose his own source of counsel. Still, it is in this passage that Prudence hints at her own authority by naming herself, “for the good book seyth that in olde men is the sapience, and in longe time the prudence,” and that great things are not accomplished by strength, but by “good conseil” and “by auctoritee of the persones.” These are two qualities that Prudence possesses and offers to Melibee. She is setting the stage for Melibee’s later acceptance of her counsel, and her counsel alone. Nevertheless, she still must know her place within the bounds of her medieval marriage, “For Jesus Sirak seyth that if the wif have maistrye, she is contrarious to hir housbonde” (Chaucer 1058). Prudence must assure Melibee that he continues to possess the *maistrye* within their relationship.

Maistrye is not a concept or term that is unique to the *Tale of Melibee*. Discussion of Chaucer’s other uses of *maistrye* throughout his other works is crucial to understanding both the word’s place within his corpus and also its relationship to the characters to whom the word applies. The *maistrye* of a woman in a medieval marriage is a concept that Chaucer also explores in the *Wife of Bath’s Tale*, thus making it a recurring theme in *The Canterbury Tales*. However, the *maistrye* present in the *Wife of Bath’s Tale* is not quite the same as that in the *Tale of Melibee*. Nevertheless, it is important to understand its different representations and how it evolves throughout Chaucer’s greater work.

The Wife of Bath tells a tale revolving around a young knight tasked with searching for what women want most in life. From an old woman who becomes his wife, he learns that women most want *maistrye* and *soverainetee* over their husbands. The woman narrates, “But at laste, with muchel care and wo,/ We fille accorded by us selven two./ He yaf me al the bridel in min hond,/ to han the governaunce of house and lond,/ An of his tonge and of his hond also,/ And made him brenne his book anon-right tho” (Chaucer 811-816). It is “by maistrye” that she gains “al the soverainetee” (Chaucer 817-818). In this instance, *maistrye* is used to indicate the means by which the woman gains *soverainetee*, or supremacy in her relationship. *Maistrye* in the *Wife of Bath’s Tale* takes the form of both skill and authority—she gains sovereignty through *maistrye*, but in the end finally possesses the *maistrye* of her husband when she states, “Thanne have I gete of yow maistrye” (Chaucer 1236). *Maistrye*, what every woman wants, has finally been granted to her. Yet, from here, the story takes an unforeseen turn. The woman, even though she persistently works throughout the tale to gain *maistrye* over her husband, becomes cooperative and submissive after it is granted to her. Though possessing *maistrye*, she chooses not to utilize it—her husband’s realization is reward enough. This is far different from the *maistrye* we see in the *Tale of Melibee*. Rather than it being presented as both a skill and goal for women to attain, *maistrye* belongs to Prudence throughout the tale, but she must force her husband to realize it before she utilizes and enacts her power.

Rather than a skill and authority that only needs to be validated by her husband, Prudence’s *maistrye* takes a different form. *Maistrye* takes the form of decision-making in the *Tale of Melibee*. Prudence puts decision-making into the hands of her morally wounded husband, allowing him the illusion of authority before he is later forced to ask for her assistance. Wisdom is always present for Melibee, as Prudence is always there to provide it, therefore giving her the upper hand in their

relationship. However, he does not accept this wisdom immediately. His trepidation as well as his doubting and argumentative nature pose a challenge for Prudence, on top of her being the subordinate sex in a medieval marriage. She must work through this problem logically. Just as she does many times throughout the tale, Prudence is quickly able to relate an allegory to the situation at hand. She allegorizes her daughter's wounds to help Melibee make his decision. She begins by breaking the attack down piece by piece in order to show him how his situation looks holistically. Although Melibee resists Prudence's counsel both before and immediately after this explanation, Prudence is able to twist her husband's own words and references and use them in her favor.

The moment the allegory fully materializes is when Melibee says, "Therefore the prophete seyth that troubled eyen han no cleer sight./ But seyeth and conseileth me as yow liketh, for I am redy to do right as ye wol desire" (Chaucer 1701-1702). Melibee repeats a similar phrase a few lines later and says, "Seyeth shortly youre wil and youre conseil, and I am al redy to fulfille and parfoune it" (Chaucer 1712). In these moments, Melibee asks Prudence to act as his eyes, his wisdom. Melibee, referencing "troubled eyen han no cleer sight" admits that he alone does not contain the wisdom he needs in order to make the right and moral decision. He accepts Prudence's counsel, stating that he will act upon whatever decision she makes. She knows best; she, now, possesses the decision-making power; she, now, possesses the *maistrye*. Unlike the the *Wife of Bath's Tale*, this is not enough for Prudence. In fact, this is the moment that Prudence has been waiting for—she can finally fully act on her *maistrye* and make the moral decision for her husband. With Prudence acting as Melibee's eyes, this allows Melibee and Prudence to become a single entity and a single mind as Prudence's wisdom is now Melibee's. This unification, with Prudence's wisdom at the forefront, implies a *maistrye* that belongs to Prudence—*maistrye* that *has* belonged to Prudence throughout the entirety of the tale. Whereas Lady Philosophy's wisdom is contingent

on her detachment from her male counterpart, Prudence's wisdom as well as its impact grows stronger as she and Melibee more fully realize their marriage—allowing it to be a unifying factor of both their literal and allegorical relationship.

As Melibee lets down his guard, showing his damaged soul, he acknowledges Prudence's strength by asking for her "conseil," for his "troubled eye han no cleer sight." In other words, he is asking for her wisdom and for her advice, for he does not have the ability to make the moral decision on his own. He is letting her know that he is finally willing to listen, and he is finally willing to let her guide him with her moral genius. Melibee is no longer acting as an individual, or as his own *propre persone*. He no longer solely owns his being. Rather, he accepts Prudence as a replacement for his lost sight, his lost wisdom. As Denery explains, "The eye does not stand between the soul and the world. Rather, the eye, with its initial cognition and judgment, marks the sensitive soul's literal extension into the world and the world's immediate presence to the soul" (93-94). Melibee is allowing Prudence to be his beacon of light during his moment of blindness, allowing the world of morality back into his damaged soul. Sophie's sight has given Prudence a voice, and Prudence's voice has given Melibee clear sight.

Recognizing Chaucer's deliberate change to Albertanus' work, which exercises medieval optics and allegory, births a unique view regarding gender and marriage politics in medieval literature. Interpreting the tale in this way stretches the boundaries contained within the preexisting literature of the time. Often grouped in the same category of Chaucer's women such as The Wife of Bath, Prudence and her intricacies are overlooked. Her character must be read in the context of *The Canterbury Tales*, but in many ways she has carved out a place of her own. While there are many similarities between Prudence and the Wife of Bath, there are still clear differences. While Chaucer's women tend to have submissive qualities and cater to their husbands despite their clear

authority, Prudence hones her *auctoritas*, and she hones her *maistrye* in order to both think and act on behalf of her husband. By understanding the power she contains within her own tale and putting that power in the context of other medieval female characters, Prudence becomes distinct. Her character builds off of centuries'-worth of feminine personifications and subordinate wives. Yet, Prudence contains her own voice, her own *auctoritas*, and her own *maistrye*, defying medieval standards and catalyzing the future of autonomous female characters.

Appendix A The Book of Consolation and Counsel

The Book of Consolation and Counsel

Albertanus of Brescia

Appendix A.1 Introduction

The Book of Consolation and Counsel

There are many things that are damaged and suppressed by contrary and troubling things, since the soul awaits neither counsel nor consolation nor other things; thus, it is downcast by disturbance, so that it falls ill by evil: for that reason, my son Giovanni, who trains in the skill of being a medical surgeon, and who discovered so very many things, desired for me to write for you a little bit about knowledge, through which, the blessed Lord is able to present not only what was said before about healing treatments for the body, but he will also present what was said before about counsel and consolation and assistance. You will read similarities between these things below in this writing, and you will carefully observe the orders, and you will read over these things most eagerly, and thus, you will support these things with gratitude, and you will be able to reach the things previously mentioned, and you will be able to accomplish other things nimbly. Look for the similarities.

Appendix A.2 Chapter 1

An Example of Melibeus' Character

A certain young man named Melibeus, rich and powerful, abandoned his wife and daughter at home, whom he loved greatly, with the house doors closed, to take a walk. Three neighbors and old enemies saw this, and with a ladder they entered through the windows of the house, Melibeus'

wife, named Prudence, was strongly beaten, and his daughter was served five strokes, namely in the eyes, ears, mouth, nose, and hands, and leaving her half dead, they went away.

When Melibeus came back, and saw what had happened, he, like a mad man, began tearing his clothes, and began to weep and cry. However, his wife now speaking, immediately began to suggest that he should be quiet. With that, however, he was shouting more; but slightly delayed, she remembered the words of Ovid, from the *De Remedia Amoris*, who said: “Who is the fool that stops a mother from weeping on the death of her child? That is not their place to reprimand. When she has given her tears and fulfilled her sick soul, then a limit to her grief can be set with words.”⁶

Appendix A.3 Chapter 2

On Consolation

However, when the man has fulfilled his sick soul by stopping some of his tears, Prudence advises him by saying:

Why crazy fool, what worthless pain burdens you? Your groaning is not gaining you any rewards. Therefore, abstain from your manner of crying and be wise; dry your tears; look at what you are doing.⁷

Gravely weeping does not pertain to wisdom, for pain will not bring any reward to our home.⁸

⁶ Ovid *De Remed. Amoris* L. I, v. 127-130.

⁷ Pamphilus *De Amore Paris*. 1510; fol. d I verso.

⁸ Pamphilus *De Amore Paris*. 1510; fol. d V verso.

Your daughter, given by the Lord, is being freed well; for even if she were dead, still you ought not destroy yourself on account of that. For Seneca says: “A wise man is not afflicted by the loss of his friends of family; for the same mind brings an expectation of its own death.”⁹ “For I prefer, that you abandon the pain from which you were abandoned: and as soon as possible, stop doing this, for you will not be able to abandon your pain for a long time.”¹⁰

Melibeus responds: He who is able to weep more in pain is able to control his tears, for, our Lord, Jesus Christ, said about his friend Lazarus, that he “moved him in spirit and tears.”¹¹

But on the other hand, Prudence says: Moderate weeping from sadness or rather in spite of sadness is not forbidden, rather it gives precedence to the blessed Paul, who says in his letter to the Romans: “Rejoice with those who rejoice and weep with those who weep,”¹² and even Cicero says: “Proof of a well-trained mind is to rejoice at what is good and to grieve at the opposite;”¹³ to lament, on the other hand, or to shed many tears, is forbidden. The method, however, was found to be preserved by Seneca, who says: “After losing a friend, dry your eyes, and do not let them overflow: one may weep, but one may not wail.”¹⁴ However, before you lose any friend, prepare yourself, if you are able to comfortably, for Seneca prescribes the same: “Sacred is the friend for whom you prepare to weep.”¹⁵ Therefore, in order to live skillfully, you must repel the sadness of the world from your mind entirely, for Jesus of Sirach affirms, “For sadness has killed many, and there is no profit in it.”¹⁶ And another says: “The joyful heart is good medicine, but a crushed spirit

⁹ Seneca *Epist.* LXXIV 29.

¹⁰ Seneca *Epist.* LXIII 10.

¹¹ *Evang. sec. John.* XI, 33 & 35.

¹² Paul. *Epist. ad Rom.* XII, 15.

¹³ Cicero *Laelius*, XIII, 47.

¹⁴ Seneca *Epist.* LXIII 1.

¹⁵ Seneca *Epist.* LXIII 9.

¹⁶ *Ecclesiasticus*, XXX, 25

dries up the bones.”¹⁷ Salomon says: “Just as one who takes away a garment on a cold day, or like vinegar poured on a wound, is one who sings songs to a heavy heart;”¹⁸ and again: “No evil shall happen to the just: but the wicked shall be filled with bad.”¹⁹ Seneca in his *Epistles* says: “Nothing is more foolish than to court a reputation for sadness and to sanction tears;”²⁰ “for I consider the tears of a wise man to fall by consent, others by their own force;”²¹ just as in the case of blessed Job, who had to part with all of his sons and property and in his body sustained very many grievous tribulations, always stood upright giving thanks to the powerful Lord and said: “The Lord gave and the Lord has taken away; just as the Lord wished, just so it was done; may the name of the Lord be praised”²² “from now on and forever.”²³ Therefore, we should not withhold too much sorrow for children, or other things lost, and from the time she fell nothing has changed; but would we rather withhold the joy of life, than to be sorry for the loss, from which place it is better for someone who is willing to counsel a father about the death of his children: Do not weep over the loss of a child, but rather rejoice because you have such. And Seneca has also said in another place: “Nothing becomes offensive so quickly as grief; when fresh, it finds someone to console it and attracts one or another to itself; but after becoming chronic, it is ridiculed, and rightly so. For it is either assumed or foolish.”²⁴ And certainly there is not enough sadness in this world to drive you away, as St. Paul says around the middle of his letter to the Corinthians: “Worldly grief produces death. For God’s sorrow brings repentance that leads to salvation and leaves no regret”²⁵ and

¹⁷ Salom. *Proverb.* XVII, 22.

¹⁸ Salom. *Proverb.* XXV, 20.

¹⁹ Salom. *Proverb.* XII, 21.

²⁰ Seneca *Epist.* XCIX 17.

²¹ Seneca *Epist.* LXXI 24.

²² *Book of Job*, I, 21.

²³ *Psalm.* CXII, 2.

²⁴ Seneca *Epist.* LXIII 11.

²⁵ Paul. *Epist. II. to the Cor.* VII, 10

therefore it will stay away from you, but you do not study day and night to have joy, but rather to “reverse joy,”²⁶ as the Lord said in the Gospel. As Solomon said: “It is better to hear the rebuke of the wise man than to hear the song of fools.”²⁷ And again: “It is better to go to a house of mourning than it is to go to a house of feasting.”²⁸

Melibeus answered: Although all of the things you have said are true and useful, nevertheless, they have disturbed me so greatly that I must push back against the truth, I am troubled, and I do not what I ought to and what I should do what I withhold.

She said: Assemble your tried and faithful friends, relatives and kin, and ask for counsel concerning the above, and carefully decide according to their policy and deliberations. For Salomon said: “Do all things with counsel, and thou shall not repent.”²⁹

Melibeus then called together a great number of men, among whom were medical surgeons and physicians, old men and young men too, many were certainly neighbors, however, and many of whom are respected out of fear rather than out of love, and some out of spite, some of whom were foes who became his friends and who have returned as a favor to him. Many men gathered there, flatterers, sycophants, and wise lawyers alike. When they gathered there, he told them the order of all of the affairs, although these things had already occurred, and even though he asked them for a plan, he demonstrated a great desire for vengeance to be done immediately.

Then, with the consent of the others, one of the medical surgeons stood up and said to Melibeus: It is the duty of doctors to always inspect men in order to benefit all and to avoid injury. For the most part, when two men have wounded one another in a battle, it is of a doctor’s skill for

²⁶ *Evang. sec. John. XVI, 20*

²⁷ *Ecclesiastes VII, 5.*

²⁸ *Ecclesiastes VII, 3.*

²⁹ *Cf. Ecclesiastic XXXII, 24.*

both parties and to heal both troubled parties. And, therefore, it is neither practical for us to advise war, nor vengeance, nor do we advise you to take any part in vengeance, even to the smallest degree. Certainly, as for your daughter, although it be so that she is perilously wounded, we shall do such diligent work from day to night that with the grace of God she shall be whole and sound as soon as possible.

After he considered the advice of one actual medical physician, he also considered the inclinations of other men similar. And after many words of help and counsel regarding the practice of medicine for his daughter, for himself and others, he made a promise. Regarding war and vengeance, this is what he said: We say that, just as physical maladies are cured by their contraries, men must cure war with vengeance, the contraries are contrary to each other in other matters, so she would also be healed in the war, and other contrary things can be saved by their opposite.

His neighbors full of envy, his feigned friends that seemed reconciled, and his flatterers, made an outward show of weeping and anguish, they worsened and much aggravated this matter in greatly praising Melibeus' might, power, wealth, mind, relationships, and friends, and said that, out of despise for the power of his adversaries, he should annihilate them with his words and riches.

Then one of the wise lawyers rose regarding the good will of others and in between the others said, "This trouble of yours is a very difficult and serious matter because of the injury and the crime that has been done, and also for the reason of the great damages that in time coming are possible to befall for this same cause. The reason that it would be a very great peril to err in this arduous matter is for the great riches and power of both parties involved. Why, though, are you so hesitant to go forward; we will counsel you to whatever point you need to be protected, because we intend neither deceit nor trickery for you as a precaution. In addition, we will carefully fortify your home. We see however that there is great uncertainty regarding the act of vengeance and war,

why, which would be better, we are still not able to judge, which is why we are demanding room for deliberation about this cause; for it is not a matter to judge quickly or suddenly “for all things are tried with a sudden incautiousness,” and “it is shameful judgement that is done quickly,”³⁰ and “he who soon judges soon repents,”³¹ by which means he familiarizes himself with pleading: I think the best judge, is he who is quick to decide and late to judge; for instance, a delay is allowed but it is hated by all: “Everyone hates a delay, but that is what is wise,”³² why, it is no surprise if we want to deliberate over predictions. “A practical delayed deliberation is the safest;”³³ we are generally accustomed to say: “A good judge is one who understands a matter and judges slowly, rather than a judge who decides quickly, for instance, the Lord himself, when the woman that was taken in adultery was brought in his presence to determine what should be done with her person, although he knew the answer, he would not give his answer quickly, but he would deliberate, and in the ground he wrote twice.”³⁴ And by these cases we ask time for deliberation, and then we shall, by the grace of God, advise you something that shall be beneficial.

The trustworthy young men of courage and bodily strength and also a great number of those men, who appear to be friends, after many praises of the Lord Melibeus, and also his riches and kinship and power, asked for vengeance to be made into war and dragged out by the hand of power without delay, the power and wealth of our opponents reflect nothing, even now, blame the wise for introducing and requiring deliberation, also alleging that, just like an iron is hot with fire and a good office-seeker is made lifeless by being worked, and the recent injustice, thus, they must

³⁰ Cassiodor. *Variarum* L. I, Ep. 17

³¹ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 254 and *Sent.* 32 *W.*

³² Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 311. *W.*

³³ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 128. *W.*

³⁴ *Evang. sec.* John. VIII, 3 sqq.

always be bravely vindicated from a distance without delay. Then they cried out with a great noise:
Let it be, let it be!

Up rose then one of these old wise men, and with his hand made signal that men should sit still and give him audience. There are very many men who cry “Let it be, let it be!,” who know very little about what war amounts to. At its beginning, war has so big an entryway, so large that every person may enter when he pleases; but certainly what end that shall consequently befall, it is not easy to know. For truly, when war begins, there is very many a child unborn of his mother that shall die young because of that same war, or else live in sorrow and die in wretchedness. And therefore, before any war begins, men must have much counsel and much deliberation. And when this old man intended to reinforce his argument with reason, they all at once began to rise to interrupt his speech, and very often prayed for him to shorten his argument, for it is said: “Where there is no hearing, do not pour out words, and do not be lifted up out of season with your wisdom,”³⁵ for he who preaches to those who do not want to hear his words, annoys them with his sermon, it is like music in mourning. For Jesus Christ says that “An annoying story is as music is in mourning.”³⁶ When you are seen as elderly, you are denied attention, and knowing that no one is willing to listen to him, he said: With an unwillingness to accept counsel, you must expect ill-advised rashness, and for the second time: “Thoughtlessness, of course, rejects counsel.”³⁷ Now, I certainly know this to be true, and anyone who has become accustomed to it would say: “Counsel is always lacking when it is most needed.”³⁸

³⁵ *Ecclesiasticus*, XXXII, 6.

³⁶ *Ecclesiasticus*, XXII, 6.

³⁷ Cassiod. *Variarum* L. X, Ep. 4.

³⁸ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 594. W.

But Melibeus had among his advisors many men who secretly advised him on certain matters in his ear, and they openly advised him on the contrary.

When Melibeus had heard that the greatest part of his advisors agreed that he should make war, immediately he rose and consented to their advice and fully affirmed their opinion.

Then Dame Prudence, when she saw how Melibeus prepared himself to avenge himself on his foes and to begin war, she, in a very humble manner, when she saw her time, said:

I pray you not to hurry, I ask you for time as a gift.³⁹

For Peter Alphonsus said: “Whoever does to thee either good or harm, you must not avenge them, for in this manner your friend will abide and your enemy will live in dread longer.”⁴⁰ Therefore, “Cease your anger and leave your rage behind: fret not and do no evil.”⁴¹ My Lord, do you not wish to have my counsel?

Appendix A.4 Chapter 3

On the Abuse of Women

Melibee responded by saying: I do not intend to work according to your advice, for many causes and reasons. First of all, every person would consider me a fool if I, because of your advice, changed things that are ordained and affirmed by so many wise men. Secondly, I say that all women are wicked, and there is not one that is good out of them all. For it is Salomon who says:

³⁹ Ovid. *De Remed. Amoris*, L. I, v. 277.

⁴⁰ Peter Alfonsus *Disciplina Clericalis*, XXV, 15.

⁴¹ *Psalm*. XXXVI, 8.

“Of a thousand men, I found one good man, but certainly, of all women, I have never found a good woman.”⁴² And thirdly, if I governed myself according to your advice, it should seem that I had given you supremacy over me, I will give you the power over unimportant matters. For Jesus of Sirach says that “if a wife has supremacy, she is contrary to her husband.”⁴³ And Solomon says: “All people who listen to the nations and leaders of the church: Never in your life should you give any power over yourself to your wife, nor to your child, nor to your friend;”⁴⁴ “for it would be better that your children ask of you things that they need than than you see yourself in the hands of your children.”⁴⁵ The fourth reason is, if I were to work according to your counsel, my counsel must be secret, until it were time that it must be known, and this must not be the case, for: “A woman does not know how to keep a secret because of her of her chattering.”⁴⁶ The fifth reason, is because of a philosophic conversation, which says: “Men can be defeated by a woman’s bad counsel.”⁴⁷

Appendix A.5 Chapter 4

On the Woman's Apology

When Dame Prudence, very kindly and with great patience, had heard all that her husband had to say, she then asked of him permission to speak, and said in this manner: As to your first

⁴² *Ecclesiastes* VII, 28.

⁴³ *Ecclesiasticus* XXV, 30.

⁴⁴ *Ecclesiasticus* XXV, 30.

⁴⁵ *Ecclesiasticus* XXXIII, 22.

⁴⁶ M. A. Seneca, *Controv*, II, 13, 12. (Portius Latro).

⁴⁷ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 324. W.

reason, certainly it may easily be answered, because “it is not foolish to change one's counsel when the situation has changed,”⁴⁸ or else when the matter seems other than it was before. And moreover, I say that though you have sworn and promised to accomplish your undertaking, and nevertheless you abandon performing that same undertaking for a good reason, men should not say, therefore, that you are a liar nor forsworn. For it is written: the wise man tells no lie when he turns his inclination to the better. And although it be so that your undertaking is established and decided upon by a great multitude of folk, yet you need not carry out that plan unless you want to. For the truth of things and the benefits are rather found in few folk that are wise and full of reason than by a great multitude of folk where every man cries and babbles what he pleases; for such a multitude is not honorable.”⁴⁹

And as to the second reason, where you say that all women are wicked; with all due respect to you, certainly you do not despise all women in this manner, for “he who despises all, displeases all,” as it is written; And Seneca says, in his *De Forula Honestae Vitae*: “Whosoever will have wisdom shall no man disparage, but he shall gladly teach the knowledge that he knows without presumption or pride; and such things of which he knows nothing, he should not be ashamed to learn them, and ask for advice from lesser folk than himself.”⁵⁰ And, my Lord, there have been many good women who may easily prove this. For certainly our Lord Jesus Christ would never have condescended to be born of a woman, if all women had been wicked. And after that, for the great goodness that is in women, our Lord Jesus Christ, when he was risen from death to life, appeared to a woman rather than to his Apostles. And although Solomon says: “I have never found

⁴⁸ Seneca *Bene ficiis* IV, 38 1.

⁴⁹ *Authenticarum Collatio* II, Tit. 5. (*Novella X*).

⁵⁰ Martinus Duminensis *Formula Honestae Vitae* s. *De IV Virtutibus Cardinalibus* Cap. III

a good woman out of all,”⁵¹ because he found no good woman, even though, certainly, many other men have found many women very good and true. Or else, possibly, the intent of Solomon was this: that, in supreme goodness, he found no woman -- this is to say, that there is no creature who has supreme goodness other than God alone, as he himself records in his Gospels. For there is no creature so good that he does not lack something of the perfection of God, who is his maker.⁵²

Your third reason is this: you say that if you govern yourself by my counsel, it should seem that you had given me the supremacy and the lordship over you. Sir, with all due respect to you, this is not so. For if it were true that no man should be counseled but only of them that had supremacy and lordship, men would not be counseled so often. For truly that man who asks for counsel about a plan, yet has free choice whether he will follow by that counsel or not.

And as to your fourth reason, where you said: “The gossip of women can hide things that they do not know,”⁵³ I do not think this is similar, it is not to be considered in this situation, for these words are understood of women that are gossips and wicked; of which women, men say that there are three things that drive a man out of his house -- that is to say, smoke, dropping of rain, and wicked wives; and of such women says Solomon: “It is better to dwell in a desert than with a woman that is dissolute.”⁵⁴ That is not me, for you have very often tested my great silence and my great patience, and also how well that I can hide and conceal things that men ought secretly to hide.

And truly, as to your fifth reason, where you said: “In wicked advice women vanquish men,”⁵⁵ this is not able to be considered in this situation, because you ask for counsel to do

⁵¹ *Ecclesiastes* VII, 28.

⁵² *Evang. sec. Luc.* XVIII, 19.

⁵³ M.A. Seneca, *Controv.* II, 13, 12. (*Portius Latro*).

⁵⁴ *Salom. Proverb.* XXI, 19.

⁵⁵ *Publil. Syrus Sent.* 321. W.

wickedness; and if you will do wickedness, and your wife restrains that wicked purpose, and overcomes you by reason and by good counsel, certainly your wife ought rather to be praised than blamed. For St. Paul in his Letter to the Romans says: “Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good.”⁵⁶ If you were to say, however, that women give bad counsel to men who wish for good counsel, and defeat them in this way: this should be men who are masters of judgment, judgement that can choose between good and bad advice; the same is said in the first of Paul’s letters to the Thessalonians at the end: “Test all things: hold onto that which is good.”⁵⁷ Actually what you say, is to have this position, since vicious women give the wickedest advice to foolish men. Here, on the other hand, it is no such way.

Appendix A.6 Chapter 5

On the Praise of Women

When they hear the excuses of this woman, hear and understand the five other reasons, which can be proven true, women are good and most kind spouses, they listen to her counsel and, if it is good, they will save it. First, we must become generally accustomed to her speech: feminine counsel is either exceedingly valuable or exceedingly worthless. Understanding it as *exceedingly valuable*: that is the most valuable, that it is not notified by means of overflow, say of your friends what you would say of God: “Your friends have been made exceedingly honorable, God.”⁵⁸ And

⁵⁶ Paul. *Epist. ad Rom.* XII, 21.

⁵⁷ Paul. *Epist. I ad Thessal.* V, 21.

⁵⁸ David. *Psalm.* CXXXVIII, 12 (al. CXXXIX).

certainly, although there are many women who are very bad, whose counsel is worthless, nevertheless, in many ways, the best counsel must still be taken. For Jacob, through inheriting the good counsel of his mother, Rebecca, won the blessing of Isaac, his father, and the control over his brothers. And similarly, Judith, by her own good counsel liberated her city, the one in which she dwelled, from the hands of Holofernes, who had besieged it and would have destroyed it entirely. And similarly, Abigail, through her own good counsel freed her husband, Nabal, from the anger of King David, who wanted to kill him. And in a similar manner, Esther, through her own good counsel together with Mordecai in the kingdom of King Ahasuerus, freed the Jewish people. And therefore, by the infinite goodness in women and their infinite ability to provide counsel, we will discover their set example.

This is the second reason as to why you should listen to the good counsel of women and why protection and acceptance in the name of God should be applied to women; when God created man, he said: “I will make him a helper”⁵⁹ and thus he removed a rib from his body and thus he named her *the helper*, who is to help men by giving them her counsel. And those who are able to be of good help are called women, and as follows, through the consequence of counsel, for the world would not be able to endure without the help and counsel of women. And certainly, God has given bad counsel to men if unimportant men seek bad counsel from God, since it can hardly be one without the other.

The third reason is introduced when necessary, because a wife is better and more precious than gold and jewels, for she understands herself, and her understanding is acute and surpasses others; therefore they are accustomed to their speech being altered by others:

What is better than gold? Jasper. What is better than jasper? Understanding.

⁵⁹ *Genesis* 11, 18.

What's better than understanding? Woman. What is better than a woman? Nothing.

A fourth reason, however, is suggested by Seneca, recommended above by all blessed husbands; for he says: “Just as there is nothing better than a good husband, there is nothing more cruel than a hostile wife. For as wise as it would be to oppose the prosperity of one’s own life for a husband, it would still be more harmful to the marriage to reflect on one’s own life and death so much.”⁶⁰

Cato has introduced a fifth reason for women by saying:

I can remember the tongue of a wife if she is honest.⁶¹

“Therefore, you know, in good woman is a good ally,”⁶² which is to say: “a good woman is a faithful guardian and a good household;”⁶³ for, a good woman does good things and she only attracts an obedient man, for she does not want to provide counsel alone, so he is still seen as the ruler; why he is accustomed to speaking about wisdom: “A chaste matron acquires influence over her husband by obeying him,”⁶⁴ and: “She who cleverly serves, fulfills the role of master.”⁶⁵ If, therefore, you want to rule prudently and with counsel over your daughter, by the grace of God, lead in a satisfactory and healthy way, and speak about what has been done to you and, leave having done honorable deeds.

Then Melibeus, hearing this, with a small amount of cheer on his face, said: “Pleasant words are as a honeycomb, sweet to the soul, and healthy for the bones.”⁶⁶ And for, through your good and sweet words, and through recognizing your former experience, I will separate your

⁶⁰ Fulgentius *Mythologiarum* L. I, e. 27.

⁶¹ Dionysius Cato *De Moribus* L. III, Dist. 24.

⁶² Peter Alfonsus *Disciplina Cler.* XV, 11.

⁶³ Peter Alfonsus *Disciplina Cler.* XV, 12.

⁶⁴ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 93. W.

⁶⁵ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 544.

⁶⁶ Salom. *Proverb.* XVI. 24.

prudence from my faith in you; therefore, I will change my proposition, I prudently want you to control me with your counsel.

And still, she said to this: If you want to live prudently, it is only right for you to have prudence.

Melibeus responded: I have good prudence, from which I have you, yourself, which you are called in name only.

She said: I am not prudence, but I am the words of prudence.

He said in response: Can you tell me what prudence is and what qualifies it (6) how many types and kinds of prudence are there (7), what is the effect of prudence (8), and how does one acquire prudence (9).

Appendix A.7 Chapter 6

About Prudence

She responded by saying these things: “Prudence is the distinguishing of good and bad things from each other,”⁶⁷ when choosing the good, you must flee from the bad. And certainly, prudence is unencumbered and infallible, and it conquers all. For Cassiodorus said: “Infallible and unencumbered wisdom conquers all.”⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Cicero *De Invent.* II, 53, 160.

⁶⁸ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. II ep. 15.

Appendix A.8 Chapter 7

On How Many Types and Kinds of Prudence There Are

There are six types of prudence: Reason, Understanding, Providence, Circumspection, Caution, and Aptitude.

“Reason is the judgement of good and evil.”⁶⁹ “Nature follows reason. Therefore, what is reason? Nature is imitation.”⁷⁰ Even so, they are different: Reason is the power of discerning the good from the bad, the permitted from the prohibited, the honest and dishonest when choosing the good and fleeing from the bad; even then it is said as a form of argument that inquiry is reason.

Understanding is genuine observation.

Providence is now investigating the idea of future results.

Circumspection is the weapon contrary to vice.

Caution is to discern between vice and virtue, and preferring virtue.

Aptitude is to teach virtue to the inexperienced.⁷¹

Appendix A.9 Chapter 8

Regarding the Effect of Understanding

⁶⁹ Seneca *Epist.* LXVI 33.

⁷⁰ Seneca *Epist.* LXVI 36.

⁷¹ Cf. Gualt. *Ab Insuiis Moralium Dogma.* Havniae 1869. Cap. IV-VII. P. XVIII sqq.

However, the effect or the utility of prudence is blessedness; for he who is prudent is blessed, and prudence, alone, is sufficient for a blessed life. For Seneca says in his letters: “He who is wise is temperate; and he who is temperate is consistent; and he who is consistent is calm; and he who is calm is without sadness; he who is without sadness is blessed: therefore prudence is blessed, and prudence is enough for a blessed life.”⁷² Therefore, he who has prudence has an advantage, because he is blessed and prudent and consistent and temperate and calm and without sadness, and still he has all of the advantages, which will prosper from these kinds of prudence, and many others which do not have to be specified.

Appendix A.10 Chapter 9

On How We Acquire Wisdom

Naturally, prudence and wisdom and all knowledge are acquired from a good education and delivered by a good teacher and maintained study.

Therefore, about education delivered by a good teacher, it is said, because good teachers and doctors, each artist and tutor and worker, ought to always choose either their craft or their skilled profession should their counsel and help be needed or demanded. For, just as a good teacher through good teaching is responsible for good will, they are also responsible for evil through teaching destructive things in error; and good medicine cures the sick quickly, just as bad medicine is not able to cure the sick, and through this ignorance and after much work and much expense, it

⁷² Seneca *Epist.* LXXXV 2.

still kills many. So, too, a bad tutor, craftsman, and worker, after much good work and many labors, wastes expenses and attribute it to ignorance, by which means they are not able to have good business as said beforehand; on the contrary, these things are so sacred, that they are free of their own work and payed back well, which is to work freely and without value.

Truly, she said, the study of prudence and all the knowledge that must be acquired and preserved still, is seen as necessary and must be utilized.

Appendix A.11 Chapter 10

On Studying and Being Studious, and Those Things that are Useful and Necessary for Students

And so, “desire to apply the mind to the rigorous pursuit of many of the greatest things.”⁷³

For the pursuit of these things is useful: especially teaching, about which it has formerly been said, that plenty is written in books like *De Forma Vitae* which began in principle, guiding you towards Brother Vincent.

Secondly, it is useful to help care with the greatest intention of character and make use of sharpness and experience; for “experience often conquers both talent and nature, and utilizing the teacher’s lessons conquers all.”⁷⁴

Third, it is useful to sustain skill through the hands of experience, and talent with cure, for Cato says:

⁷³ Cicero *De Invent.* I, 25, 36.

⁷⁴ Alcuin. *De Arte Rhetor. Dialog.*

Practice zeal in whatever art you have taken up. Care and attention may aid talent, and sustain a useful hand.⁷⁵

Therefore, sustaining study is necessary, which provides an easy way for skill in whatever matter, so says the line:

Skill gives and holds a use: if the uses of skills are joined together,
skill provides a way to get a difficult thing done.

Seneca said, all skill is nothing more than an exercise that will help in fights. And Pamphilus said:

All prudent things are acquired from practice,
sustaining and teaching skill is what all men have a sense of.⁷⁶

And if by chance your pursuit concerns scientific literature, then you ought to sustain your soul and your talent, or your mind and memory in four ways, seems intentional or like the yoke of choice, and frequently and constantly mulling over memory.

Seneca said this of intention: “Intention sharpens the mind, remiss shatters it.”⁷⁷

About the yoke of choice, Cassiodorus says: “natural disposition can make one sick, unless the yoke of choice is repaired.”⁷⁸ And so, you ought to repair natural disposition with the yoke of choice with humbleness and gentleness; for it is written: “A good reader ought to be humble and gentle and be absolutely foreign to the enticement of pleasure and bad anxiety, be careful and attentive, so that you willingly learn from all and that you never presume anything about your own knowledge. Flee from authors of evil doctrine as if they are poison; manage these matters for a

⁷⁵ Dionys. Cato *De Moribus* L. IV Dist. 21.

⁷⁶ Pamphilus. *De Amors*. Parisiis 1510; fol. *b III* verso.

⁷⁷ Mart. Dum. *De Moribus*. Sent. 138.

⁷⁸ Cassiod. *Variar*, L. XI, Praef.

long time, before you give judgement; learn not from those who you see as wise, but from those who must be sought; learn from those who speak wisely, and value your understanding, and she who has always desired eyes, must possess her own face.”⁷⁹ Therefore, you out to seek a threefold of humbleness in desire: first, “having neither knowledge nor writing is worthless”⁸⁰ or even reflection, which although they are written, they are written for our own teaching, close to that which Seneca said: “You should look down on the ignorance of none,” and so on.⁸¹ “The second humiliation is certainly to be ashamed of no one,”⁸² like those words of Plato: “For is bad to be ashamed to know others, which is shameful for me to not know.”⁸³ The third is that, “with knowledge, you can gain anything; do not look down on others.”⁸⁴ Like Seneca said: “That which you will understand without arrogance will be bestowed upon you through demand: that which you do not understand without arrogance, ignorance will be generously bestowed upon you through demand.”⁸⁵ And he is permitted to say, not having worthless scripture, finally as if there are not many useless things in scripture that desire even to lose time; for “it is provided for readers, that eagerness is useless because work does not pay for itself, and tepid practice continues because it is good and useful. It is bad to neglect good things; it is evil to judge many labors in vain.”⁸⁶ And you are certainly not alone in reading, but, in addition, you ought to revive the nature of the scripture; in addition to writing: “We ought to neither write so much, nor read so much: some even restrain and drain their power, others loosen and dilute it: therefore, in turn, this and that must

⁷⁹ Hugo de S. Victore *Didascali* L. III cap. 14 in fine.

⁸⁰ Hugo de S. Victore. *Didascal.* L. III, c. 14.

⁸¹ Mart. Dum. *De IV Virtutibus*. V. supra p. 14 v. 7 sqq.

⁸² Hugo de S. Victore *Didascal.* III, 14.

⁸³ Hugo de S. Victore *Didascal.* III, 14.

⁸⁴ Hugo de S. Victore *Didascal.* III, 14.

⁸⁵ Mart. Dum. *De IV Virtutibus*. V. supra p. 14, v. 11 sqq.

⁸⁶ Hugo de S. Victore *Didasc.* L. III, c. 3 in fine.

come and go, one must temper the other.”⁸⁷ On contemplating truth and constant and regular remembrance, Martial said:

You will not know how to see something until you’ve learned it.

Learn, but learn constantly; learn so that you understand it.

Purchase something small that will be useful to you, which soon will be hurled as food:

An ox, which is in a pasture, contemplates this food.⁸⁸

Therefore, there is always the need to learn, “because there is no one, to whom all knowledge is given;”⁸⁹ and about which, even a man with a memory that wavers will order: “To have all memory and to mistake nothing is more preferable to humans than divine excellence.”⁹⁰ Therefore, in order to know more and maintain, always combine your hours through reading and learning; unless you have done these things, you will forget; for Seneca said: “You will forget if you learn nothing.”⁹¹ And learn from all; for it is written: “All will be wise if all are willing to learn; and, for instance, those men are wealthy from all.”⁹² And thus considering knowledge as the beginning, so that you have it spontaneously and in usage; “For that alone can be more useful, if a little bit of wisdom is taught and remembered, and those memories will be spontaneous and usable for you, which indeed if you don’t understand many things, and will not have entrusted those memories,”⁹³ for you ought to know the memories of your youth and your talents and discipline; for Cicero says, in his *De Senectute*, “Exercising my memory, I think, speak, and listen every day, I remember in the evening.”⁹⁴ And thus, you learn in the day and night, and do what

⁸⁷ Seneca *Epist.* LXXXIV. 2.

⁸⁸ Pseudo-Martialis.

⁸⁹ Hugo de S. Victore *Didasc.* L. III c. 14.

⁹⁰ Justiniani *Codex* I, XVII, 2 14.

⁹¹ Caecilius Balbus *De Nugis Philosophorum*, p. 21: Socrates.

⁹² Hugo de S. Victore *Didasc.* L. III, c. 14.

⁹³ Seneca *De Benef.* VII, 1, 3.

⁹⁴ Cicero *Cato Major* XI, 38.

Seneca says: “Nothing crosses my days through leisure, divide your learning in the night by night, not in emptiness, but restrain the need to lie down and let your eyes fall asleep: write for health and remembrance.”⁹⁵ Therefore, when the culture of work is able to regularly be pursued for your favor, and the noble will be prepared to pursue permanent honor for you, just as it was said:

Character makes for the inclination towards the culture of work,
which is regularly preparing you to pursue permanent honor.

Carefully listening to these words and understanding these words, Melibeus responded by saying: My God, I have neither prudence, nor hope. For now I will go forward with the end of my youth: and I will bargain time by giving my care to worldly affairs or pleasures in such a manner, because, although I am very rich, many opportunities have been destroyed for me, time is lost, and I am able to say:

I weep over damaged things, but I weep for more damaged days:

Anyone is able to help her, no one has for days.

Not even my desire for prudence is strong enough; for

Those who have not grown accustomed to virtue while in their youth, do not know to unlearn vice when they grow old.⁹⁶

And again:

Giving concern to the mind is to not know the laws of truth.

Therefore, when I do not know wisdom, wise counsel from you about the pain at hand is urgently required.

⁹⁵ Seneca *Epist.* VIII 1-2.

⁹⁶ Cf. Dialog. *Creaturarum* Dial 73.

To this Prudence responded: Although you must not be full of wisdom, nevertheless you must not be foolish; for it is impossible not to understand, he who understands that he is a fool; for if he is to be foolish, others will reflect over the foolishness. For Salomon said: “Even as fools walk along the road, they lack sense and show everyone how stupid they are.”⁹⁷ And elsewhere: “The way of fools seems right to them, but the wise listen to advice.”⁹⁸ Even in proverbs it is said:

And he who has a sense of wisdom considers himself foolish.

Truly, because counsel is sought in doubt, wisdom seems to be preferable rather than foolishness. For Pope Innocent in the book *De Contemptu Mundi* has said: “He who understands to a greater extent, doubts to a greater extent; and he who seems to know more is he who deceives more. Therefore, part of knowledge is to understand, because you do not know if you do not understand.”⁹⁹ “For hardly anyone is so cheap, hardly so good natured, because the more something is understood or comprehended, the more clear it is, unless by chance those things are known fully, because nothing is fully known.”¹⁰⁰ Therefore, if you do not know, from learning and believing wisdom; for he who does not know himself does not believe others, while he believes that he does not know things by means of others, he who puts himself forward fully, will fall and collapse.

Appendix A.12 Chapter 11

On Counsel

⁹⁷ *Ecclesiastes* X, 3.

⁹⁸ Salomon. *Proverb.* XII, 15.

⁹⁹ Innocentius III *De Contemptu Mundi* L. I, c. 11.

¹⁰⁰ Innocentius III *De Contemptu Mundi* L. I, c. 11.

Since, therefore, you desire to have my counsel, we must first see what counsel is (11a), from whom it is said (11b), from what it is built (11c), from whom counsel is demanded (11d—17) which counsel to avoid (11d—17), in what way to examine it (26), when and how to accept it (27, when and how to retain it (28), and when to change or promise it (29).

a. Counsel is the purpose or practice of human beings, because when humans or human beings are presented or granted with good or bad persuasion, they are able to move back to earlier times, in addition to doing or omitting other things. The same is said of counsel, since it is captured by many. “It is even said of giving counsel, permitting that your words of intervention do nothing, that you have the power available to commit evil in crime, that you look to lend a tool to burn a doorway, or to do something similar,”¹⁰¹ so says the law.

b. From whom counsel is said. It is said, however, of asking for counsel, that there are two significant things, you are clearly seeking the counsel of others, and then you have the ability to arrange accusation: truly, one’s counsel must be given to another, and then you will have the ability to build things from that gift; from the verse:

I counsel you: I seek your counsel: I give you counsel.

c. How counsel is to be arranged. Truly, it is to be arranged in two ways. It is first arranged out of and with knowledge, it is understanding, because it is what others ought to give, it is when they act together and agree when it is necessary, that is truly counsel. But others think counsel should be arranged from and with silence, because we ought to be silent to one another until it is suitable or necessary to be revealed.

¹⁰¹ *Digest*. XLVII, II, 54, 4.

d. From whom counsel is sought. Now, we see, from whom counsel ought to be sought. And certainly, there are three ways of seeking: the first, from the omnipotent Lord; the second, from you yourself; the third, from one another. In God, devotion and wisdom ought to be sought, in you yourself providence must be sought, and in one another caution must be sought, consideration and consolation are separate matters, rigidity must be avoided, learning must be rule, retention must be constant, change in moderation.

1. On counsel required from God. Because you ought to seek counsel from God, it is said by Jacob himself in his letters, around this principle when: “But if any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God who gives to all men abundantly and who rebukes no one. And it shall be given him.”¹⁰² Therefore, counsel and all, although it is done in words rather than in work, it ought to be done in the name of God; for is it said by St. Paul in his letters to the Colossuses: “Everything done in words or in work, do all the same in the name of the Lord our Jesus Christ, giving thanks to our God and Father;”¹⁰³ for Paul also says: “All good gifts and offerings are brought about from above, the light of our Father descending, on what was before overshadowed by change.”¹⁰⁴ Therefore, in seeking counsel from the Lord, you ought to be devoted and wise, so that he, who is master will counsel you, you must claim much devotion “because he is just and because he seems honorable;”¹⁰⁵ and if this is done, without doubt because you want counsel from God, you will be successful. For the Lord says: “Everyone, whoever seeks counsel in the name of my Father, he will give it to you all.”¹⁰⁶ I understand this as, if you do what is just, justice will be done. For others, if not to whom counsel is done, in addition to it being deprived of you; for Jesus of Sirach

¹⁰² Jacob. *Epist. Cath.* 1, 5.

¹⁰³ Paul. *Epist. ad Coloss.* III, 17.

¹⁰⁴ Jacob. *Ep. Cath.* I, 17.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Dion. Caton. *De Moribus* L. I Dist. 31.

¹⁰⁶ *Ev. Sec. Joann.* XVI, 23.

says: “Bad counsel ought to be rolled back upon the author, and he shall not know from where it came to him..”¹⁰⁷ For if, “in the friendship between the land and the law that is so sacred that we neither ask shameful things nor do what is asked,”¹⁰⁸ and “we seek from honorable friends, and we act honorably for the sake of friends,”¹⁰⁹ many are strong in God, who is our true friend and guard of our mind, so much so that we ought to serve him; for if he who “does that which is loyal and valuable and respectable is able to hurt us, through his general speech, which is done against the good of customs, it will not even be able to be believed by us,”¹¹⁰ because the laws speak many strong things of God with the help of all, it is so grave to do something disdainful in addition to our self-induced anger and indignation for such petitions, about which Cato even says:

Justice is sought because it seems honorable; for to seek foolishness is to be able to deny law.¹¹¹

Therefore, when you are powerless without the counsel of humans or divine help and it is useless, we are strong enough to do nothing ourselves, so that we bear ourselves witness by saying: “Permitting my ability to do nothing, we first seek”¹¹² counsel from those “and justice from them, and all goods will be given to us.”¹¹³

2. On counsel sought from us ourselves. From you yourself is the second place you ought to seek counsel and seek it within yourself; and you ought to be the prophet in this way, so that from yourself and from your counsel you remove that third thing, which is the greatest opponent of counsel, certainly anger, pleasure or lust or haste. ¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁷ *Ecclesiasticus*, XXVII, 30.

¹⁰⁸ Cicero *Laelius* XII, 40.

¹⁰⁹ Cicero *Laelius* XIII, 44.

¹¹⁰ *Digest*. XXVIII, VII, 15.

¹¹¹ Dion. Cato *De Mor.* L. I Dist. 31.

¹¹² *Ev. sec.* Joann. XV, 5.

¹¹³ *Ev. sec.* Matth. VI, 33; sec. Luc. XII, 31.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Caec. Balb. *De Nugis Philos.* P. 38 5; p. 41 55 b & p 29.

Appendix A.13 Chapter 12

On Avoiding Anger in Counsel

And thus, you must first foresee, that you are not angry or seek counsel from anger; and this is for many reasons: the first, because the angry always believe they are able to do things, those things that are able to be done, and therefore, they are able to conquer them themselves; it is even written:

He who thinks that he can do more, supplies the character himself, he is able to conquer himself, is he who is able to lessen himself.¹¹⁵

The second reason, since “unless the angry speak nothing of crime,” so that Seneca says; and thus, you and others readily provoke anger, for “the law sees the angry, and the angry do not see them.”¹¹⁶ The third reason, since anger hinders the mind; Cato says:

The angry do not wish to dispute uncertain things: Anger hinders the mind, so that it is not able to discern truths.¹¹⁷

And thus, in consolation and in the matters of other, “you ought to hinder the harmful ways of the mind and nourish and listen to its reason,”¹¹⁸ Cicero even said: “Anger is absent and far off, when there are no rules to be followed, and there is nothing to be considered. For those disturbances done by others, they are neither to be done regularly, nor are they to be commended.”¹¹⁹ “Anger must certainly not be possessed for pity, nor should it burst with fury; and

¹¹⁵ Esopus *Moralisatus Daventriae* 1498, f. C. VIII, verso.

¹¹⁶ Publil Syrus *Sent.* 281. W.

¹¹⁷ Dionysius Cato *De Moribus* L II, Dist. 4.

¹¹⁸ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 38, 136-137

¹¹⁹ Cicero *De Offic.* II, 5, 18.

who will be able to bear agitated fury?”¹²⁰ For “consolation is believed to be an angry deed;”¹²¹ it is said: “Those who conquer through anger, overcome their greatest enemy.”¹²²

And if on anger, you wish to know many angry and ill-tempered people, you must read in the book, *De Forma Vitae*, for in it, I write to Vincentian, under the title: “On Avoiding the Friendship of Angry Men.”

Appendix A.14 Chapter 13

On Avoiding Lust and Pleasure in Counsel

For you ought to see, it is not that lust or pleasure hinders your counsel, so much that it weakens you and your counsel, in that too much pleasure conquers the senses entirely; and this has many reasons: first, because “lust is the root of all evil,”¹²³ that is what St. Paul says in his letters to Timotheus.

The second reason, is because pleasure destroys all the light of the soul and contains all evil and all vice within itself, for Cicero says in his *De Senectute*: “There is no plague as deadly as bodily pleasure which was given to humans by nature, zealous lusts for this kind of pleasure compel people toward pursuing them irrationally and without control. From this source springs treason against our country, overthrowing of the legitimate government, and from here it was said that secret meetings with enemies are born. In sum, there is no sin and no evil deed which the lust

¹²⁰ Salom. *Proverb.* XXVII, 4.

¹²¹ Publil. *Syrus Sent.* 262. W.

¹²² Publil. *Syrus Sent.* 251. W.

¹²³ Paul. *Ep. I ad Timotheum* VI, 10.

for pleasure will not drive men to undertake; certainly, rape, adultery, and all other similar evil deeds are set in motion by the enticements of pleasure and by nothing else; and since nature, or God, has given to humans nothing more excellent than his intellect, then this divine gift has no deadlier enemy than pleasure. For neither, dominant desire has a place in moderation, nor in pleasure's realm does virtue exist."¹²⁴ "Wherefore, nothing is to be as detestable as the plague of pleasure, if he indeed, it is great, all light of the soul will be destroyed."¹²⁵ And certainly pleasure is so wicked, that it should have never been created, unless it was to excel in indignation; for Peter Alphonsus says: "Of course, no pleasure was created, so that no one would thirst to take pleasure at any time, unless it was from suffering in famine, or even in rest, unless it was from an earlier effort to suffer, and in such a way of love for others."¹²⁶ And recognize, because even the smallest amount of pleasure threatens danger; because of which, it is said: Whatever pleasurable things you will do, you will not be able to be without vice.

The third reason that you ought to avoid or remove lust from counsel and other things is because it produces sin and it brings about death. For is said by St. Jacob in his own Letters: "For each one who is tempted and enticed by carnal desire must provide it themselves; then, when they receive their desire, producing sin: when sin is down completely, it brings about death."¹²⁷ And certainly, your carnal desire for the worst is so much that "nothing is enough for the hastened carnal desires of the soul;"¹²⁸ about which one is accustomed to say: "You must hasten hindered carnal lusts."¹²⁹

¹²⁴ Cicero *Cato Major* XII, 39-40 41.

¹²⁵ Cicero *Cato Major* XII, 41.

¹²⁶ Peter Alphonsus *Dialogi contra Judaeos* Tit. 1 Coloniae, 1536, p. 47

¹²⁷ Jacob. *Ep Cath.* 1, 14-15.

¹²⁸ Salust. *Jugurth.* C. 64.

¹²⁹ Caec. Balb *De Nug. Phil.* p. 19: Socrates.

The fourth reason that vice and lust must be thoroughly removed from counsel, is because “all lusts are doors to hell, through which you should be thoroughly removed from all thoughts of lust for and is to be avoided, because there are all manner of lusts of the gate of hell, by means of which leads to death, through which you will march towards death,”¹³⁰ “because if you are not able to remove sin from others, your own soul will be pulled.”¹³¹

The fifth reason is not on counsel alone, but you ought to remove or reject all of your acts of lust, for “lust is not love, unless such a thing is not permitted;”¹³² about which Seneca says: “The most cruel lust is a plague, which alone is destitute to seize anything, because you end should be sought, not discovered.”¹³³ “While one lusts from the end, the other will not have known the end.”¹³⁴ It is said: “He who conquers lust is powerful, and power exposes enemies.”¹³⁵

Finally, the sixth reason is because you must “remove and flee from lust all together in all troubles and in all acts, and with fire or sword, cut it down, totally separating it from skill”¹³⁶ because of this, weakness will be avoided to the greatest extent, for if lust is sought in the end and not discovered, it is said that those who deserve it ought to flee. For it is written in *Didascalo Hugonis*, under the title, “How to Read Divine Scripture to Correct Behavior:” “I do not want to follow boundlessness; for when there is not an end, you will not be able to read; when there is not rest, there is not peace; when there is not peace, God is not able to live. In peace, it is said in prophecy, He makes his home, and in Sion is His residence.”¹³⁷

¹³⁰ Prosperi *Sent. ex Operibus Augustini Sentent.* CXXXVI.

¹³¹ Seneca *Epist.* LI 13.

¹³² Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 393. W.

¹³³ *Dindimi, Regis Bragmanorum, Epist. Alexanderum Magn.*

¹³⁴ Seneca *Epist.* XIX 5.

¹³⁵ Mart. Dum. *De Mortibus Sent.* 81.

¹³⁶ Pythagor. laud. A S. Hieronymo *Apologia advers. Rufin.* L. III cf. Mart. Dum *De Moribus Sent.* 144.

¹³⁷ Hugo *de S. Victore Didascali* L. V, c. 7.

Appendix A.15 Chapter 14

On Avoiding Haste in Counsel

Finally, you think haste and counsel are incompatible; and therefore you cast aside quality in counsel; for it is said, “haste in judgement is shameful,”¹³⁸ from which it is accustomed to say: The most valuable judgement is that which is quickly understood and slowly judged, and even: “He who hurriedly judges hurries toward repent,”¹³⁹ and thus this is written about counsel: “On counsel, because it is discussed for a long time, it is believed to be correct.”¹⁴⁰ And we are accustomed to say: “Repent follows quick judgement.”¹⁴¹ Therefore, you ought not give or receive sudden and quick counsel, but deliberate or delay counsel for the sake of adequacy; for Seneca says in his *De Formula Honestae Vitae*: “Nothing is sudden to you, but you foresee all; for he who is a prophet does not say what he believes must be done; not because he is doubting, but because he is expecting, not because he is suspicious, but because he takes precaution.”¹⁴² Why is not deliberating to such an extent and delaying adequacy not condemned, on the contrary from great diligence. For, it is written: “To deliberate is useful, to delay is most prudent,”¹⁴³ and again, “All hate delay, but it is delay that creates all wisdom.”¹⁴⁴

¹³⁸ Publil Syrus *Sent.* 251. *W.*

¹³⁹ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 32. *W.*

¹⁴⁰ Caec. Balb *De Nug. Phil.* p. 29.

¹⁴¹ Caec. Balb *De Nug. Phil.* p. 41, 55: *Socrates.*

¹⁴² Mart. Dumiens *De IV Virtutibus Cardinalibus* cap. 1.

¹⁴³ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 128 *W.*

¹⁴⁴ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 311 *W.*

Appendix A.16 Chapter 15

On Secrets Not Disclosed Except On Account Of Necessity and Utility

Having foresight in addition to deliberation or diligence is removed from this, for this is contrary to counsel. Evidently, rage, one's pleasure of lust or haste, and even foresight, are contrary to counsel, since you have your own secrets neither from others nor from the counsel you sought, whether or not you are able to make a noble agreement through another's counsel; for Jesus of Sirach says: "Whether it be to a friend or an enemy, do not talk of others' lives; and if you can without offence, do not reveal them. For he heard you, and he gazed upon you, and when it comes times time for you to defend your sins, he will laugh at you."¹⁴⁵ And the other said: "What is to be willingly kept secret, is said to no one."¹⁴⁶ And another said: One scarcely considers a secret from someone who is unable to keep one. Even Peter Alphonsus said: "When you keep your counsel in your heart, you keep it in your prison, and when you reveal your counsel to any person, he holds you in his trap;"¹⁴⁷ why it is said: "It is better for you to hide your counsel in your heart, than to pray to him whom you revealed your counsel;"¹⁴⁸ that he will keep it safe and quiet. For Seneca says: "If it so be that you cannot hide your own counsel, how dare you pray any other person to keep your counsel a secret?"¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, if you truly believe the revealing of your counsel to a person will make your condition stand in the better condition, then you ought to explain your counsel in this way, for Seneca says: "You deliberate everything with friends, but you deliberate

¹⁴⁵ *Ecclesiasticus*, XIX, 8-9.

¹⁴⁶ Mart. Dumiens. *De Mor.* Sent. 16.

¹⁴⁷ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler.* IV, 3.

¹⁴⁸ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler* IV, 3.

¹⁴⁹ Mart. Dum. *De Moribus* Sent. 16.

earlier events concerning yourself.”¹⁵⁰ And Peter Alphonsus said: “Because of friends you do not give consent: provide on one occasion from your foes, and a thousand times from your friends; because perhaps friends become your enemy, and thus thoughtlessly they are able search everywhere for your injury.”¹⁵¹

Appendix A.17 Chapter 16

On Not Revealing Intent in Counsel

Similarly, you are to provide them with counsel above all, you shall not seek to reveal your intent through your counsel, for counsel is to bring all men approval, and they are to look back at and seek your face; and because they are to place their belief in Him, they shall willingly attempt to speak, and to a greater extent, look back on that intent, that applause, which displeases Him, for they wish to say that which He is not willing to use; and this is the rule, because you are an important and powerful man, if you yourself do not know, they are scarcely able to grasp good counsel; about which you yourself generously speak to the flatters and sycophants below you.

In seeking and providing counsel, first, in order that it is mutual counsel, you must remove yourself from the counsel; second, in order that you keep your secrets to yourself, you must agree is by means of counsel, not your ability to make another’s counsel better; third, you must deliberate and compensate by means of counsel; fourth, you must seek to revel in the pleasures of counsel.

¹⁵⁰ Seneca *Epist.* III 2.

¹⁵¹ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler.* IV, 1.

Appendix A.18 Chapter 17

On Seeking Counsel from Others

I seek counsel from you, and I provide it for you, and at whatever time it is suitable, just as you seek counsel from others and others seek counsel from you. He asked for a side of you, and from you, the advice is provided, it is appropriate to at some point, seek counsel from another, or counsel another yourself. Therefore, we ought to seek counsel from whom seems fit.

In seeking counsel from others, heed anxious care, in order to discern good friends from bad ones or from enemies. Therefore, pray for a good friend who is most faithful and most skillful, who finds and demonstrates counsel most faithfully, and who is the eldest.

This is said about friends, because, as Salomon said, “Just as the heart of a man delights in the oil that is sweet, just so the counsel of true friends gives sweetness to the soul.”¹⁵² For nothing “is like having a friend who speak to you with such sweetness.”¹⁵³ Why Salomon also says: “Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and silver is able to countervail the goodness of his fidelity;”¹⁵⁴ and again: “A friends if he continues steadfast, shall be to you as yourself, and shall act with confidence among them of your household.”¹⁵⁵ And again it is said: “A faithful friends is a strong defense: and he that house found him, has found a treasure.”¹⁵⁶ It is also customarily said: “The kind of body that is without a soul, is like a man

¹⁵² Salom. *Proverb*. XXVII, 9.

¹⁵³ Mart. Dum *De Moribus* Sent. 20. Cf. Cic. *Laelius* VI, 22

¹⁵⁴ *Ecclesiasticus*, VI, 15.

¹⁵⁵ *Ecclesiasticus*, VI, 11.

¹⁵⁶ *Ecclesiasticus*, VI, 14.

without friends,”¹⁵⁷ for “Although it endures, it is not said to have the gift of fortune, a life, nevertheless, is rough and lonely when not able to be delighted by friends.”¹⁵⁸

It is said about the wise and skilled, that this is true, because is a customarily said: “Wisdom is the weapon bared against all things, provided that he thinks.”¹⁵⁹ Therefore, though wisdom as well as your own counsel consulted in such a manner, which, if you will believe it, you will not be able to fall ill-advised. For it is written:

He does not fall off a bridge when he rushes wisdom.

And Seneca says in his *De Formula Honestae Vitae*: “The view of counsel is destroyed from public and secret, from small and great, from near and far, from in part and in whole.”¹⁶⁰

Truly, about approval and discovery of faith, it is said that much of the wisdom spoken about is wicked and is promoted by other bad things. How is this not believed by all, yet you discover such great approval and faith as it is said by St. John in his letters: “Most beloved, do not believe all spirits, but approve of the spirit who comes from God.”¹⁶¹ And, furthermore, Paul in his letter to the Thessalonians said: “Approve of all: preserve those who are good. You must withhold the bad from all kinds.”¹⁶² And Wisdom said: “He who easily believes, is fickle and will reduce intellect;”¹⁶³ “for it is easy for the soul to incline partly toward foolishness.”¹⁶⁴ And another said: “You should not praise friends, until you approve of them.”¹⁶⁵ And Salomon said: “If you hold possession of a friend, he is held in trial;” “for it is a friend of yourself the second time; in time,

¹⁵⁷ Caec. Balb. *De Nug. Phil.* p. 25: *Theophrastus*.

¹⁵⁸ Cicero *Laelius* XV, 55.

¹⁵⁹ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 587. W.

¹⁶⁰ Mart. Dumiens. *De IV Virtutibus* Cardinal. Cap. 1.

¹⁶¹ Joann. *Epist. I* IV, 1.

¹⁶² Paul. *Epist. I ad Thess.* V, 21-22.

¹⁶³ *Ecclesiasticus*, XIX 4.

¹⁶⁴ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 180 W.

¹⁶⁵ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler.* 11. 8.

however, trials and tribulations will not be permanent.”¹⁶⁶ And a certain philosophy says: “Beware the counsel from those whom you seek counsel, in order to be faithful to yourself and approved of.”¹⁶⁷

The aged, in the end, mentioned the cause, since, the sacred Job said, “In old age is the wisdom, and in long time the prudence.”¹⁶⁸ And for Cassiodorus said: “Those who are prudent are always those who have many men to approve of their learned manner of life;”¹⁶⁹ and also: “Since you drag many things out of old men, you have served to please your own.,”¹⁷⁰ For “old men have acquired the wisdom to counsel themselves.”¹⁷¹ Martial said:

It is easier for old cloths to be looked down upon than used:

Thus, my counsel, last born, is to not scorn the old.¹⁷²

And Cicero, in his *De Senectute*, said: "Great things are not always accomplished by strength, nor by agility of body, but by good counsel, by a person's power to persuade, and by knowledge; which three things are not weakened by age, but certainly they gain strength and increase day by day.”¹⁷³

From the above words of counsel, is summoned such great caution, first, you shall call to your council a few of your friends who are particularly esteemed; for Salomon says, “Many can make peace for you, but among a thousand you must choose yourself to be your one counselor.”¹⁷⁴ And it may be the case that you first counsel only a few, but you may later counsel many more.

¹⁶⁶ *Ecclesiasticus*, VI, 7-8.

¹⁶⁷ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler.* IV, 2.

¹⁶⁸ *Liber Job* XII, 12.

¹⁶⁹ Cassiod. *Variarum Lib.* I, Ep. 39.

¹⁷⁰ Cassiod. *Variarum Lib.* III, Ep. 5.

¹⁷¹ Cassiod. *Variarum Lib.* VIII, Ep. 9.

¹⁷² Pseudo-Martial.

¹⁷³ Cicero *Cato Major* VI, 17.

¹⁷⁴ *Ecclesiasticus*, VI, 6.

For a similar thing is said by Solomon: “Where there is no governor, the people shall fall: but there is safety where there is much counsel.”¹⁷⁵ In the second place, if the need arises, many others are followed by counselors; for Solomon says in Proverbs: “Scattered thoughts lack counsel: but with many counselors they are strengthened.”¹⁷⁶

Appendix A.19 Chapter 18

Which Counsel to Avoid [On Avoiding Foolish Counsel]

Having learned about and appreciated which kind of counsel to pray for, we must see which counsel to avoid.

To begin, you must avoid foolish counsel from deep within; for to appreciate foolish counsel is foolish and it is derived from your own foolishness. For it is written: “It is your very own foolish sin that you must distinguish from another’s, however, it is your own to which you are oblivious;”¹⁷⁷ and Salomon said: “The heart of wisdom is in your right hand, and the heart of foolishness is in your left hand.”¹⁷⁸ while another said: “Foolishness is in the ears of those who do not speak, for they despise the doctrine of your eloquence;”¹⁷⁹ and again: “The way to guide fools is by your eyes, wisdom, however, is heard by counsel.”¹⁸⁰ It is similarly said: “If you crush a fool

¹⁷⁵ Salom. Proverb. XI, 14.

¹⁷⁶ Salom. Prover. XV, 22.

¹⁷⁷ Cicero *Disput Tusc.* III, 30, 73.

¹⁷⁸ *Ecclesiastes*, X, 2.

¹⁷⁹ Salom. *Proverb.* XIII, 9.

¹⁸⁰ Salom. *Proverb.* XII, 15.

in a mortar with a pestle along with crushed grain, still his foolishness will not depart from him.”¹⁸¹
It is also said: “If a wise man goes to court with a fool, the fool rages and scoffs, and there is no peace.”¹⁸²

Appendix A.20 Chapter 19

On Avoiding the Counsel of Sycophants

A similar thing is avoiding the counsel of sycophants and feigners and flatterers, not so that you alone are not in opposition, but so that you are the most favorable thing. For Cicero said: “The more fortune helps us, the more we have to resort to the advice of friends, granting them even greater authority in our council than in the past. And in such a happy state, let us care not to listen to the flatterers and not to be flattered by them: by absorbing their words, it is easy to fall into deception, because we believe ourselves to be so good people as to deserve the highest praise. And from this bewilderment, innumerable troubles arise, when men, swollen with their presumption, wrap themselves in the greatest errors and are finally left with damage and mockery.”¹⁸³ From which we understand, “Amongst all the pestilence that re in friendship the greatest are flattery, compliments, and compliance.”¹⁸⁴ But “although compliance is dangerous, still no one is able to hurt you, unless he accepts compliance and is pleased by it. Thus, it reveals the flatterers to your

¹⁸¹ Salom. *Proverb.* XXVII, 22.

¹⁸² Salom. *Proverb.* XXIX. 9.

¹⁸³ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 26, 91.

¹⁸⁴ Cicero *Laelius*, XXV, 91.

own great ear, which is flattered by yourself and is a great pleasure of your own.”¹⁸⁵ From which Cato says:

When another praises you, you must remember to be the judge for yourself:

You do not want to believe too much about yourself from others.¹⁸⁶

Then, Seneca said in his *Epistles*: “Consider deep inside yourself: not at what kind of person you think you are, but how you believe others to see you.”¹⁸⁷ “Many wise men relate to this thing, what kind of person you seem to be, which is what kind of person you are to others.”¹⁸⁸ For, it is wiser “to poorly please yourself than other people.”¹⁸⁹ And to take hold of counsel is the most favorable thing uttered. Seneca, in his *De Formula Honestae Vitae*, says: “Then, counsel invites your salvation, when you are frolicking in a life of prosperity: then you want to retrain from or stop deceit, so that you do not surrender to an attack on your freedom, [but you must look around], at the time you are letting pass by, and for how long.”¹⁹⁰ And it is in counsel and in the counsel of others “you will not fear their sharp words, but their flattering words.”¹⁹¹ For Salomon says: “A bad man who speaks flatteringly, is an innocent trap;”¹⁹² and also: “A man who speaks flattering and feigned things in conversation to his own friends, expands his trap over their feet.”¹⁹³ Cicero said, “There are no traps more treacherous than those hidden in the same name and duty of a relationship.”¹⁹⁴ Secondly, Cicero, then says, “there is much good that comes from the sharp words

¹⁸⁵ Cicero *Laelius*, XXV, 97.

¹⁸⁶ Dionysius Cato *De Moribus* L. I Dist. 14.

¹⁸⁷ Seneca *Epist.* LXXX 9.

¹⁸⁸ Seneca *Epist.* LXXIX 10.

¹⁸⁹ Seneca *Epist.* LXXIX 10.

¹⁹⁰ Mart. Dumiens *De IV Virtutibus Cardinal.* cap. I.

¹⁹¹ Mart. Dumiens *De IV Virtutibus Cardinal.* cap. III.

¹⁹² Caec. Balb. *De Nug. Phil.* p. 27: Zenon.

¹⁹³ Salom. *Proverb.* XXIV, 5.

¹⁹⁴ Cicero *In Verrum Aetio* II, L. I, cap. 15 39.

of enemies, even those from friends, which seem sweet; it is those sharp words spoken that are true, these sweet words from friends are never.”¹⁹⁵ And Cato said:

Remember to avoid conversations of flattery and stammering.¹⁹⁶

Therefore, we must not gravitate toward flattering words, or sweet arrangements, but toward great things. Seneca says in his *Epistles*: “We move to those things, not to the words or arrangements;”¹⁹⁷ for “their speech which gives care to truth, ought to be clumsy and simple.”¹⁹⁸ And let yourself believe in the strength of wisdom, “so you are still not supported by prudence,”¹⁹⁹ but by others’ search for the counsel of wisdom, and Cassiodorus says: “Searching for wisdom in other is among the greatest kind of knowledge;”²⁰⁰ for to doubt wisdom and to not seek counsel is useless, not modest.

Appendix A.21 Chapter 20

On Avoiding the Counsel of Those Who are Now Useless or Enemies and Returning to Them

Afterwards in Favor

¹⁹⁵ Cicero *Laelius*, XXIV, 90.

¹⁹⁶ Dionysius Cato *De Moribus* L. III, Dist. 5.

¹⁹⁷ Seneca *Epist.* LII 14.

¹⁹⁸ Seneca *Epist.* XL 4.

¹⁹⁹ Salom. *Proverb.* III, 5.

²⁰⁰ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. X, Epist. 4.

Similarly, avoiding the counsel of those who are now useless or enemies, but returning to them afterward in favor. For it is written: “No one with enemies returns to them safely in favor.”²⁰¹

For Aesop said:

Neither confide in them, nor disclose secrets to them,
with whom you have battled with divisions of sorrow.

And another said similarly:

There is no loyal enemy to you, such things are known,
And your persuasion is absolutely worthless to an enemy.

A cry of hatred always lies in the heart of the enemy, and, as Seneca says, “there will never be fire if it falls short of air.”²⁰² Why it is also said, “He who obtains superiority on behalf of a friend’s fall can survive with enemies.”²⁰³ Then Solomon said: “you cannot believe old enemies for eternity; and if you humbly advance toward the morally wrong,”²⁰⁴ “you must not believe him; your mind is most useful, not friendship, you must return to good will so that you can flee their capture, because you will not be able to take vengeance on them.”²⁰⁵ And another said something similar: “In your eyes your enemies are weeping over you, and if you see this in time, you are not to satisfy them with your own blood.”²⁰⁶ And Peter Alphonsus said: “Do not associate yourself with enemies, when others are able to discover allies; for they will note the bad conduct, which will make good truths stray.”²⁰⁷

²⁰¹ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 91 W.

²⁰² Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 389. W.

²⁰³ Caec Balb. *De Nug. Phil.* p. 25. *Socrates.*

²⁰⁴ *Ecclesiasticus*, XII, 10-11.

²⁰⁵ Caec. Balb. *De Nug. Phil.* p. 25: *Pythoagoras.*

²⁰⁶ *Ecclesiasticus*, XII, 16.

²⁰⁷ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Clericalis* IV, 4.

Appendix A.22 Chapter 21

On Avoiding the Counsel of Others Who Do Not Love but Fear Displaying Respect

Similarly avoid the counsel of others who do not love but fear displaying so much respect and good will. For they are no friends, but distasteful enemies. For Cicero, in his *De Officiis* said: “Of all these means, no one is better suited to defend and preserve the power of being loved and no one is more opposed to being feared. A man, regarding fear and hate, said very clearly: they hate the one they fear, and the one each hates desires for them to perish. It has been seen recently, if it was not known before, that no power can resist the hatred of many.”²⁰⁸ Therefore, you must not believe, a good friend or acquire counsel through fear, for it is that which a philosopher says, no one is loyal enough to it which he fears. Why Cicero said something similar: “Wicked guards are feared for a long time, opposite of those who have faith in kindness and continuity.”²⁰⁹ “But those who, in a free city, prepare to be feared, reach the height of madness.”²¹⁰ “For those who want to be feared: it is necessarily that they themselves must, in turn, be afraid.”²¹¹

Flattery is not power, it births a love of power.²¹²

About which Martial said:

A grim and threatening mouth is not able to love duly:

No one is unwilling, no one loves constraint.

Flattery is not power, it births a love of power.

²⁰⁸ Cicero *De Offic.* II, 7, 23.

²⁰⁹ Cicero *De Offic.* II, 7, 23.

²¹⁰ Cicero *De Offic.* II, 7, 24.

²¹¹ Cicero *De Offic.* II, 7, 24.

²¹² Cf. Publil. Syr. *Sentent.* 56. W.

A cow certainly desires a gentle bull, but a lioness flees from the ire of the lion;

Therefore, love all, so that you alone will be loved by all.

Seek something like love, something different from hatred.²¹³

And note, that neither a friend or good counsel can be acquired through dread and fear, but even power will be destroyed by dread. For Cicero said: “There is no force of power so great that it can last a very long time;”²¹⁴ “For you ought to fear many things, those things which many fear.”²¹⁵ From which Seneca in his *Epistles*: “No one is able to be safely frightful.”²¹⁶

Appendix A.23 Chapter 22

On Avoiding the Counsel of Those Addicted to Drinking

Similarly, you must avoid the counsel of those who are intoxicated, who are not able to keep their counsel a secret. For Salomon said: “There is no secret where intoxication reigns.”²¹⁷

Appendix A.24 Chapter 23

On Avoiding the Counsel of Those Who Consult Others Privately and Avoiding the Counsel of Those Who Wish to Consult Others Publicly

²¹³ Pseudo-Martial.

²¹⁴ Cicero *De Offic.* II, 7, 25.

²¹⁵ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 338. W.

²¹⁶ Seneca *Epist.* CV 5.

²¹⁷ Salomon. *Proverb.* XXXI, 4.

Similarly, you must avoid the counsel of those who consult other privately, and you must avoid the counsel of those who wish to consult other publicly. For Cassiodorus said: “It is a harmful method to say something privately and wish to reveal the other publicly.”²¹⁸

Appendix A.25 Chapter 24

On Avoiding the Counsel of Bad Men and Having Suspicion

Similarly, you must avoid the suspicious counsel of bad men. For it is written: “A bad man never recalls good counsel from someone.”²¹⁹

Appendix A.26 Chapter 25

On Avoiding the Counsel of Young People and Having Suspicion

Similarly, you must avoid the suspicious counsel of young people in all events. For young people do not have the maturity of their elders, and young people value and cling to themselves. For they are not able to have the long-lasting juice which they will quickly gain so much in

²¹⁸ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. X. Epist. 18.

²¹⁹ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 354. W.

maturity. Why Solomon said: “Woe to you, land, when your king is a child, and your princes eat in the morning.”²²⁰ And Martial said of you:

Trust in the counsel of the young, Melibee: you can await catastrophe, until you are without counsel.²²¹

Appendix A.27 Chapter 26

On Considering Counsel in Variety

To see what follows, you must consider counsel in this way. And certainly you ought to be discrete in the consideration of counsel, in order that you inspect its principles and limits, and, you must diligently foresee in consideration, what is useful and what is necessary.

In the consideration of counsel, you must first abandon the counseling from yourself and you must remove yourself from deep within, which above all is said to be contrary to counsel, one may see the speed of anger, pleasure, and desire in themselves.

Second, you must refer to the origin of your trouble, because “each thing is able to be part of the origin.”²²² And even in undertake each one, each one must be looked at initially. And even the methods, depending on the heads being examined, they are not able to understand that they dictate principles. Therefore, the initial or the principal thing is the most valued thing for which they were searching. For it is written:

²²⁰ *Ecclesiastes* X, 16.

²²¹ Pseudo-Martial.

²²² *Digest*. I, II, 1.

Resist beginnings: too late is the medicine prepared, when the disease has gained strength by long delay.²²³

“All bad precedents originated as a good beginning,”²²⁴ as Salustius said. And because, “in all that is good there is twice as much evil,”²²⁵ as Jesus of Sirach said, therefore, you ought to fear wise men in the beginning because of their two-faced evil, which is in all things. For, if in good things there is danger because they are destroyed by twofold evil, there is much power in foreseeing the beginning evil and dangerous things and turning them over; because “it is scarcely good for evil things which are established to begin to peak and be carried out through the end,”²²⁶ as it has been decreed. Why it is not only the beginning, but it the end in name and it will reflect on what was made valuable. For Pamphilus said:

Look at the beginning and end of prudence.

The end has blame and glory in all things.

The beginning words seek the ending words,

In order that good things are to be spoken of and considered in advance.²²⁷

This is also said in Seneca’s *Epistles*: “It is easier to prevent the initial vice than it is to manage an attack.”²²⁸ And again: “It is easier to prevent a vice than it is to control a crime;”²²⁹ “for the beginnings are in our power: fortune judges the outcome.”²³⁰ Therefore, you must consider

²²³ Ovid. *De Remed. Amoris* L. I, v. 91-92.

²²⁴ Salust. *Catilina*, c. 51.

²²⁵ *Ecclesiasticus*, XII, 7.

²²⁶ *Decret. Gratiani* P. 11, Causa I, Quaest. I, C. 25.

²²⁷ Pamphilus *De Amore*. Parisiis 1510. fol. c. IIII recto.

²²⁸ Seneca *Epist.* LXXXV 8.

²²⁹ Seneca *De Ira* I, 7, 3.

²³⁰ Seneca *Epist.* XIV 14.

counsel prudently and with great delay. “For to consider it prudently is a characteristic of counsel, as to not falsify its trustfulness and to not urge its collapse.”²³¹

In the consideration of counsel’s truth and in other things, the second thing to consider is this, seen by Cicero, “as the ability to perceive what in any given instance is true and real, what its relations are to other things, its consequences, and its causes.”²³²

We ought to examine *what is true*, because “truth must always be cherished, for that alone is done by men nearest to God,”²³³ since God, himself, is truth, he, himself, bears witness, which is said: “I am the way and the truth and the life.”²³⁴ Which, however, added to and purified by Cicero, therefore, he said this, because clean and pure truth is observed, deceitful falsehood is driven out from deep within. Why Cassiodorus said: “The truth is good, if it is being mixed in with nothing of the opposite.”²³⁵ And the Lord said: “The Devil is deceitful and is the father of the very same.”²³⁶ And Salomon said: “The Devil constantly finds superior value in falsehood.”²³⁷

In addition, it is true, because it increasingly fitting, you ought to examine immediately the manner of your pain, whether or not that method of counsel is appropriate for your pain. Similarly, you ought to examine that which is appropriate for this pain and what counsel you want, and what contradicts that and what kind, in order that you learn through this, whether or not it is what you wish for or it is appropriate counsel that is a possibility for you. And you must foresee all by examining things in advance, in order that the method is appropriate for your desire, usefulness, and possibility.

²³¹ Mart. Dumiens. *De IV Virtutibus. Card. cap. 1.*

²³² Cicero *De Offic.* II, 5, 18.

²³³ Pythagor. laud. a S. Hieronymo *Apol adv. Rufin.* L. III ef. Mart. Dum. *De Moribus Sent.* 147.

²³⁴ *Ev. sec. Joann.* XIV, 6.

²³⁵ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. III Ep. 7.

²³⁶ *Ev. sec. Joann.* VIII, 44.

²³⁷ *Ecclesiasticus*, XX, 27

Additionally, there is the third proverb, which has been exposed by Cicero when he was speaking of such consequence, you foresee examination with a troubled mind, whether it is from the consequence of good counsel or bad, where it is from hate or love, whether it is from fear or goodwill, whether it is from law or crime, whether it is from peace or war, whether it is from damage or utility, and other things, which are able to be observed concerning the consequence, and to specify that which will not prevail agreeably.²³⁸ In which all of the good things are chosen and all useful things obtained, hatred and fear, crime and war, and other bad things will be let get and removed from deep within.

In addition, on the other hand, the fourth thing suggested by Cicero, is seen from who and what he brought forth, over which we must ponder greatly, I order that you consider each and every word of counsel, or you bear truth or vice to some degree, or you ought to rightly avoid it to some degree, or you must be able to derive convenience or utility from such a thing.²³⁹

And finally, the fifth proverb, is where Cicero said that there is a reason for each thing, you must foresee and carefully consider the reasons for things, and this requires concern.²⁴⁰ For Seneca said: “It is required to create a reason for each thing, and with the initial discovery, you will be able to imagine an end,”²⁴¹ from which you are to speak enough of the beginning and beyond the end. Therefore, you must seek a reason, certainly it must be materialized and theoretical and brought about in the end; similarly, it must be the chief and accidental reason, which is able to be spoken of by chance and which reason is superior; similarly, the reason must be near and far.

²³⁸ Cicero *De Offic.* II, 5, 18.

²³⁹ Cicero *De Offic.* II, 5, 18.

²⁴⁰ Cicero *De Offic.* II, 5, 18.

²⁴¹ Mart. Dumiens. *De IV Virtutibus Card.* cap. I.

Therefore, do this, so that you consider good counsel, and you discuss your trouble prudently, “stretch your sight and that which you are able to produce, for in the future your soul will display all.”²⁴² And not only in the future, but also you ought to stretch in the past. For Seneca said in his, *De Formula Honestae Vitae*: “If you are prudent, your soul will be dispensed into a tribe at the right time: the present order, the provident future, and the remembered past; for nothing is considered about the past, it is the which destroyed life; nothing about the future is considered in advance, it falls upon all of those who are incautious. However, a bad future will govern your soul and it will be placed forward, and a good future will govern you soul so that it will be able to sustain itself.”²⁴³

Appendix A.28 Chapter 27

When Counsel Should be Accepted or Approved

I’ve looked at when counsel is considered, we must look at when it should be accepted and approved. And certainly, counsel should be accepted and approved, then, by a community, when it is being considered, and it seems to be good or useful. And although it seems to be good counsel, it ought not to be immediately taken or grasped then, but carefully examined, how it will be able to be executed. For Cicero said: “If anyone is entering public life, let him beware of thinking only of the honor that it brings; but let him be certain also that he has the ability to succeed. At the same time, let him take care not to lose heart too readily through discouragement nor yet to be over-

²⁴² Mart. Dumiens. *De IV Virtutibus Card.* cap. I.

²⁴³ Martinus Duminens. *De IV Virtutibus Car.* c. I.

confident through ambition. Before undertaking all troubles, careful preparation must be made.”²⁴⁴ Therefore, do not grasp for too much consideration, for it is said in proverb: He who grasps for too much, draws from it too little. Then, Cato said:

Whatever you can, try, if not under the weight of the burden of the task.

Work succumbs, and you leave behind your attempt in vain.²⁴⁵

For you ought to undertake something so great, that you are able to bring it through to the end, Seneca said: “You should not seek the things that are too powerful for you.”²⁴⁶ “To search for power, is the ability to discover it; learn this so that you are able to understand it; it is desired because it is able to be good before your eyes. Do not inflict far-fetched things onto yourself, it is that which you must tremble and beware of.”²⁴⁷ Similarly, in another place, it said: A burden is distributed, under which you fail to reach the end of the road, for you wish to worry yourself with it, before you weigh what you have obtained, you fatally fall. And if you look back at the goodness or at the usefulness or even and the honor merely for the power, and not for the opportunity or the possibility, you will quickly fall, for it was said before:

He who thinks that this can do more than the nature of what he can serve himself,

To be able to conquer himself, he must be able to do less for himself.²⁴⁸

If, however, there is dubious counsel, or it concerns speech or fact, you always ought to be quiet and not do anything, and choose what is superior, not what is as follows. For Peter Alphonsus said. “If you are afraid to speak about what displeases you, it is always good not to do what

²⁴⁴ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 21, 73.

²⁴⁵ Dionys. Cato *De Moribus*, L. III, Dist. 15.

²⁴⁶ *Ecclesiasticus*, III, 22.

²⁴⁷ Mart. Dumiens. *De IV Virtutibus Card* cap. I.

²⁴⁸ Esopus *Moralizatus*, cf. above chap. XII, p. 34.

follows.”²⁴⁹ “For the wisdom of a wise men is obtained to be passed over in silence on behalf of himself, which is as if he speaks against himself; because small men or no body is silent about something, we seem to be surrounded by many speakers.”²⁵⁰ For words are liked an arrow: they are easy to send, difficult to bring back or improve;²⁵¹ for which is it is customarily said:

A word once uttered flies away and is irrevocable.²⁵²

How is a good thing to be said which is in the same way to be silenced in doubt, and it is the good things to be done that are not to be done through doubtless deeds, Cicero has said something on this reasoning: “They advise well who forbid to do anything which your doubt is fair or unfair. Fairness itself shine though itself, doubt signifies the thought of injury.”²⁵³ And another said: “If you doubt this, you should not do it; for the soul is the judge of things refused to be done, things avoided;”²⁵⁴ because, in addition, Seneca also said a second thing, “to be alone in doubt concerns rashness in counsel.”²⁵⁵

Finally, in all things, you go through a forewarning and others are taught it, in order that you always choose for good, truth, utility, rationality, and justice, opposite of what lays inside deep within.

²⁴⁹ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler.* VI, 12.

²⁵⁰ Caecilius Balbus *De Nugis Philosophorum*, p. 28: Diogenes.

²⁵¹ Cf. Caecil. Balb. *De Nugis Phil.* p. 34.

²⁵² Horat. *Epist.* I, 18, 71.

²⁵³ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 9, 30.

²⁵⁴ Caecil. Balb. *De Nugis Philos.* p. 40: Socrates.

²⁵⁵ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 593. W.

Appendix A.29 Chapter 28

At What Time and What Kind of Counsel Should be Preserved

Having learned and considered at what time and what kind of counsel to grasp or to accept, it would seem as though we learned and considered, at what time and what kind of counsel should be preserved. And certainly, good and useful counsel is to be preserved and obeyed at the time of acceptance and trial for, in addition, it was said by Paul: “Test all things; hold fast to that which is good.”²⁵⁶ And you ought to hold fast those things with great consistency for Cato said:

Be both firm and lenient, depending on what you are doing;
the wise without guilt change their customs often.²⁵⁷

For Seneca, in his *De Formula Honestae Vitae* said: “Existing in motion is not trivial, and consistency is not obstinate.”²⁵⁸ Therefore, consistency will preserve counsel, not stubbornness.

Appendix A.30 Chapter 29

At What Time You Ought to Promise Your Counsel and What Time You Ought to Change Your Counsel

²⁵⁶ Paul. *Epist. I ad Thess.* V, 21.

²⁵⁷ Dionysius Cato *De Moribus* L. I Dist. 7.

²⁵⁸ Mart. Dumiens. *De IV Virtutibus Cardin.* cap. III.

Now you ought to see what remains to be performed, at what time you are able to promise your counsel and at what time you ought to change your counsel. And certainly, counsel is able to change many times for different cases.

For, you must be able to change counsel quickly based on the case, or to come up with new counsel for the case; for “delayed cause ought to have a delayed effect,”²⁵⁹ and that which emerges from something new, lacks new counsel, in order that law can be discussed. What it is customarily said:

You should never believe a fool when the matter is to change counsel.

Then, too, Seneca said: You must listen to the counsel of your own enemy, you must exchange dispositions of arguments for counsel.

And you should be able to change counsel, if it is faulty or if it is from some bad case or if it is useless to be grasped, which happens often; for, Seneca, “there are certain people, who do not seem to be good, and they are; and there are certain people, who do not seem to be good, and they are not.”²⁶⁰ “Indeed, persevering and revering falsehood happens frequently; concealing revered falsehoods also happens frequently. For, similarly, finally, friends should reveal sorrowful deeds, and flatter sycophants; thus, those which attempt to deceive or steal give the deceptive appearance of truth.”²⁶¹ Therefore, Ovid said:

Deadly poisons are concealed under sweet honey.²⁶²

For, “you will discover double the bad in all good people,”²⁶³ as it was said formerly.

²⁵⁹ *Descretal. Gregorii IX*, L. II Tit. XXIV, c. 26.

²⁶⁰ Mart. Dumiens. *De IV Virtutibus Cardin.* cap. 1.

²⁶¹ Martin. Dumiens. *De IV Virtutibus Cardin.* cap. 1.

²⁶² Ovid. *Amorum* L. I, Eleg. VIII, v. 104.

²⁶³ *Ecclesiasticus*, XII, 7.

Similarly, counsel must change, if it is base or if it is from a base case; for if it comes from and is also acquired from a previous case, still it is not support execution, because it is either the law itself or now, or it is an exception granted to the opposite; for we generally find out, “base promises are not to be of importance,”²⁶⁴ as the laws say.

Similarly, counsel must change, if it pertains to sin, because it is generally customarily said: “There is no counsel contrary to God.”²⁶⁵

And what was said about base promises does not protect you, you must still understand impossible promises or the very same, which is not able to comfortably protect you, or from the very same promises, where wise men harm the promiser, which is useful for them, their promises, or, even from that, which is worthless or contrary to our promised deeds: For Cicero said: “Promises are not to be kept, if the keeping of them is to proven harmful: those to whom you have made them and, if the fulfilment of a promise should do more harm to you than good to him whom you have made it.”²⁶⁶ Hence, it is said above: wisdom is not to be spoken about falsely, since its manner changes for good. For, it is said, “It does not seem to swear an oath which will be without a temporary case,”²⁶⁷ as the law says: this, finally, protects basic principles in general, because, concerning wisdom, it is customarily said, “There is bad counsel, which is not able to be changed.”²⁶⁸ Why this kind of oath, which is to be abrupt, because those which seem bad must be changed in some way.

Prudence said: My Lord, I ask of you, if I were to have said something by chance, that displeased you, do not reply against what I say, for the sake of your soul, because I say these things

²⁶⁴ *Digest.* XLV, I 26.

²⁶⁵ Salom. *Proverb.* XXI, 30.

²⁶⁶ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 10, 32.

²⁶⁷ *Digest.* II, VIII, 16.

²⁶⁸ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 362, W.

for you and for your benefit, because you will be supported with patience; for, “He who rebukes a person will in the end gain favor rather than on who has a flattering tongue.”²⁶⁹ Therefore, you know: counsel, just because you said it was given to you, is not able to be called counsel, but safe peace for you, someone addressing an assembly or making thoughtless and indiscrete remarks. For, it is a mistake to grasp onto the bad counsel given in many chapters.

Appendix A.31 Chapter 30

On Deceptive Counsel

For, first, it is a mistake to give counsel in a congregation; for, first, you ought to have only a small congregation to consider a case and afterwards, if many have done work: you must immediately begin to name your “great number of burdens.”

Secondly, it is a mistake because, whereas you should have only called to your congregation your true friends both old and wise, you called foreign men, young men, false sycophants, and enemies reconciles, and men who you revere without love.

The third reason it is a mistake is because you have brought with anger, greed, and haste, with you to your congregation, which three things are contrary to every honorable and beneficial congregation; which three things you have not yet annihilated or destroyed, neither in yourself, nor in your counselors, as you ought to do.

²⁶⁹ Salom. *Proverb*. XXVIII, 23.

The fourth reason it is mistake, is because have revealed to your advisors your desire and your inclination to immediately make war and to do vengeance. They have caught sight of your inclination by your words, and therefore, they have advised you to your inclination rather than to your advantage.

The fifth reason it is a mistake is because it seems as though being advised by these counsellors only is sufficient to you, and with little consultation, whereas in so great and so urgent a situation it is necessary that you have more counsellors and more deliberation to perform.

The sixth reason it is a mistake is because you have not examined your counsel.

Finally, the seventh reason it is a mistake is because you have made no division between your counsellors, that is to say, between your true friends and your feigned counsellors, and you have not known the will of your true friends both old and wise, but you have cast all their words together, and inclined your soul toward the larger part and to the greater number, and that you have yielded. And since you know well that men shall always find a great number of fools than of wise men, and therefore the counsel from congregations and many people, where men pay more attention to the number than to the wisdom of the people, you see well that in such congregations, those who do not have wisdom, are pursued without consequence.

Melibeus responded: I admit well that I have erred; but whereas you have told me before now that he not to blame who changes his counsellors in certain cases and for certain just causes, I am ready to change my counsellors just as you will devise. The proverb says that “to sin is human, but certainly to persevere long in sin is the work of the devil.”²⁷⁰

To this Prudence responded: “Counsel, because it is said to be fact, is not able to begin to speak to the law. For the law says: “However, no facts are able to begin to be spoken of that abide

²⁷⁰ Joann. Chrysostom. *Adhortatio ad Theodor. lapsus* I, 14.

by these things. Nevertheless, because it is fact, you are able to examine it and dismiss mistakes, separating and accepting what is beneficial.

Appendix A.32 Chapter 31

On Examining Counsel in Detail

We must examine the quality of this counsel, accepting and dedicating its usefulness to God. Therefore, in order to examine this properly and in a powerful way, from the beginning chapter, we must discuss and cleanse one at a time.

Counsel, of course, is average from the surgeons and they made good rules; for “it is the duty of those people to watch all benefit and none be harmed”²⁷¹ and it is their own skill to worry about what follows, in order that they speak with wisdom. Therefore, those people are rewarded with lavish things, so that they rejoice and worry themselves to pursue their craft, so much so that your own daughter is able to benefit, swiftly from those things, surrender to God, to health, to their guidance. For friends of your permit, just the same that they be rewarded. For it happens frequently, that some cure from their craft and still place beneficial money in front of friends and, where light is felt, there is where wise men manage. And this was said about the medical surgeons, the same is understood about the counsel of the physicians, who are said be the same. Nevertheless, I want to listen to what kind of understanding you have of their dubious words, because they mentioned, of course: opposites being cured by opposites.

²⁷¹ *Decretal. Gregorii IX, L. I, Tit. XXXVII, cap. 3.*

Melibeus responded: I understand that my enemies have done to me a contrary, right so I wish to do them another; therefore, just as they have avenged themselves on me and caused me injury, just so shall I avenge myself upon them and cause them injuries, and then I will be able to cure one contrary by another.

Prudence said: Men believe what they want because it is easy, they are so quickly inclined to their own soul and to their own desires. I, however, do not understand those words; for bad contrary arguments are evil, they are neither the injury of injuries, nor the vengeance of vengeance, but they are similar. For, vengeance or injury does not cure injury or other vengeances, on the contrary those things increase and thrive from them. And also, I understand that contrary arguments are said to be good, peaceful wars, harmonious discord, frigid heat; and thus, they are able to list infinite examples. Therefore, the second thing said about this is right, the opposite of discord is harmony, and peace is the opposite of war. And these second St. Paul said in his letters to the Romans: “Nothing is conquered by evil, but evil us conquered by good;”²⁷² and he all said something similar in his letters: “Let us therefore make purse what leads to peace;”²⁷³ and he said something similar in the above letter: “Do not repay anyone evil for evil. Be careful to do what is right not only before the eyes of God, but before the eyes of everyone; if it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with all men.”²⁷⁴

Now that we and accept the examination and explanation of counsel, which has been given to advocate for you by wise men and old men, who are the same men who called to counsel you, who you called to protect your character above all else, and called to carefully fortify your home, and even to plea, not to advance so suddenly or so hurriedly, but with careful vision and preparation

²⁷² Paul *Epist. ad Rom.* XII, 21.

²⁷³ Paul *Epist. ad Rom.* XIV, 19.

²⁷⁴ Paul *Epist. ad Rom.* XII, 17-18.

and deliberation and great worry you will carry the cure for all to the end. And certainly, when there is a plan and a guide for this counsel, and you will be powerful from the wisdom of all because your own distribution of the plan is rightly accepted, in my view, peace requires examination or explanation. What they said about protecting the good over your own person is recorded.

Appendix A.33 Chapter 32

On the Protection of Character Constituted in War

For you ought to know, that he who has a war with multiple people ought to protect himself.

Therefore, first, you ought to suppliantly and faithfully pray for protection from God, from whom “all good things are given”²⁷⁵ and without his concern, nothing good prevails to be protected, the Prophet testifies to this, who said: “Unless the people of God are protected, he will watch those who protect him in vain.”²⁷⁶

Secondly, you must entrust your protection your esteemed and notable and faithful friends, if it works, it is from those people that you should ask for help and to protect you. For Cato said:

Seek help from loyal friends, if you cannot work by change,

Any man does not have to be a good doctor, just a faithful friend.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁵ Jacob. *Epst. Cath.* I, 17.

²⁷⁶ *Ps.* CXXVI, 1.

²⁷⁷ Dionysius Cato *De Moribus* L. IV, Dist. 13.

Thirdly, you must protect yourself from all the foreigners and strangers, those people are always suspect. For Pet Alphonsus said: "Accept no one by the way of a strange man, but if it so be that he fall into your company by chance, without your assent, inquire then as subtly as you can about his way of life and of his life before and feign your way; say that you will not go her nor there; and if her bears a spear, hold yourself on the right side, and if he bears a sword, hold thyself on the left side."²⁷⁸

Fourthly, you must protect yourself wisely from those people, and as I have said, their counsel is to be avoided, as it is said in the title above: Those from Whom Counsel must be Avoided.

Fifthly, you must protect yourself so that you do not despise your enemies nor account not the power of your enemies so little that you disregard your own protection, for every wise man dreads his enemy. About which Salomon said: "Happy is the man who has dread of all, for certainly, he who through the hardiness of his heart and through the hardiness of himself has too great self-confidence, to him shall evil befall."²⁷⁹ Therefore, you ought to fear all traps; for Seneca said: "He who fears every ambush falls into none;"²⁸⁰ and again he said something similar, "the wise man who dreads harm, avoids being harmed;"²⁸¹ and again: "He who does not avoid peril always falls into peril."²⁸² And although it be that it seems that you are in a safe place, still you ought not always do your best efforts in protecting your character. For Seneca said: "He who is most free from danger, even when safe, is on his guard."²⁸³ Do not be negligent in guarding your

²⁷⁸ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler.* XVIII, 10.

²⁷⁹ Salom. *Proverb.* XXVIII, 14.

²⁸⁰ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 542. W.

²⁸¹ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 807. W.

²⁸² Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 380. W.

²⁸³ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 116. W.

character not only from your greatest enemies but from your smallest enemy. For similarly Seneca said, “A man that is well advised dreads his smallest enemy.”²⁸⁴ And even Ovid said, in his *De*

Remedia Amoris:

The small viper will slay the great bull with a bite;

Often a wild boar is captured by a small dog.²⁸⁵

And Pamphilus said:

Still, sometimes small things move powerful kings;

From small sparks come great fires,

And small beginnings produce grand ends.²⁸⁶

And in another place:

Petty cases are harmful, and wise cases avoid harm.²⁸⁷

And Martial said:

He who does not strike a lion, is bitten and wounded while in the arena.

The competitor, not so large, must beware of small things.²⁸⁸

But although you ought to be afraid, you ought not to be exceedingly afraid. For Seneca said, “Fear is dangerous, even if it does not seem to be.”²⁸⁹ And in other place, he said: “He who is constantly in fear is condemned every day.”²⁹⁰ And another wrote: “It is those who show deception, they fear being deceived.”²⁹¹ And even Cato said:

²⁸⁴ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 225. *W.*

²⁸⁵ Ovid. *De Remed. Amoris* II, 25-26.

²⁸⁶ Pamphilus *De Amore. Parisiis* 1510; fol. c V verso.

²⁸⁷ Pamphilus *De Amore. Parisiis* 1510 fol. c VII verso.

²⁸⁸ Pseudo-Martial.

²⁸⁹ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 452. *W.*

²⁹⁰ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 452. *W.*

²⁹¹ Seneca *Epist.* III. 3.

For the fearful and suspicious ones are most suitable for death.²⁹²

Finally, sixthly, you ought to protect yourself from poisonous people and toxic people and from all mocking and all evil partners or conversations. For it is written: You must not have mocking partners: flee from their repetitious speech as if it were poison.²⁹³ Their partnership is a trap for you, and their wavering friendship is an act of looking down on you.

Similarly, those same wise men who counsel, say that carefully fortifying your home requires examination and explanation. Why I wish to listen to you, just as you must understand those words.

Melibeus responded: I believe, to understand those words, that you ought to fortify my home with towers and other structures, which I want for protection or fortification, and our enemies will fear the case of an accident taking place there

Appendix A.34 Chapter 33

On the Towers

Prudence responded: Fortification with a tower and other strange structures will extend above the majority of things, and fear and hate will spring from that place, thus, because neighboring places of friends near enemies create fear, all bad things will be born from that place, such fear of yours is noted in the title above: On Avoiding the Counsel of Those People, Who Do Not Love, But Reveal That They Fear Reverence. Why Salomon said: “He who does far-fetched

²⁹² Dionysius Cato *De Moribus* L. IV, Dist. 43.

²⁹³ Cf. Albertan. *De Arte Loquendi* p. CVIII.

things to his own home, seeks catastrophe; and who avoids learning, falls upon evil.”²⁹⁴ In the past, towers are made with great work and infinite expenses; and even with deeds done, nothing prevails, unless it is with prudent and faithful help from friends and the great expenses averted. Jesus of Sirach said this about pride:

Appendix A.35 Chapter 34

On Pride

“A man’s pride begins when he departs from God; it is because the heart slipped away from he who made him; for pride is the beginning of all sin.”²⁹⁵ And again, he said, “pride is hateful before God and men, and all iniquity of nations is execrable.”²⁹⁶ And again he said: “Injuries and wrongs will waste riches: and the house that is very rich shall be brought to nothing by pride: so the substance of the proud shall be routed out.”²⁹⁷ Thus, a wise man said: “Where there is pride, there is also be reproach: but where there is humility, there also is wisdom.”²⁹⁸ together with glory. And again, he said similarly: “Humiliation follows the prideful: and glory shall uphold the humble spirit.”²⁹⁹ And again, he said similarly: “Prides goes before destruction: and the spirit is lifted up before it falls.”³⁰⁰ And even Job said: “If his pride mounts up even to

²⁹⁴ Salom. *Proverb*. XVII, 16.

²⁹⁵ *Ecclesiasticus*, X, 14-15.

²⁹⁶ *Ecclesiasticus*, X, 7.

²⁹⁷ *Ecclesiasticus*, XXI, 5.

²⁹⁸ Salom. *Proverb*. XI, 2.

²⁹⁹ Salom. *Proverb*. XXIX. 23.

³⁰⁰ Salom. *Proverb*. XVI, 18.

heaven, and his head touches the clouds: In the end he shall be destroyed like a dunghill.”³⁰¹
Therefore, since pride is so detestable, and so many bad things are born from it and infinite others, which were written in the book *De Forma Vitae*, under the title: On avoiding prideful friendships or evil men; and since so many bad things are born from towers, the towers will never be chosen by me, unless if other fortification fails or is not sufficient after all.³⁰²

And Melibeus said in response: How should I powerfully fortify my home differently?

Prudence responded by saying:

Appendix A.36 Chapter 35

On Fortification

Fortification is complex. For there is fortification, which pertains to goodwill, that fellow citizens are fond of; and this is impregnable about which Cicero said: “There is one kind of impregnable fortification: The love of fellow citizens.”³⁰³

There is another kind of fortification, which reinforces the soul and the body, one may see this in virtue; and this is similar to impregnable fortification; about which Aesop said:

I do not want the help of fortification nor the help of a sharpened dagger

Nor the assistance of our enemies’ customary javelin,

But virtue’s existence alone reinforces our protection.

³⁰¹ *Liber Job XX*, 6-7.

³⁰² Albertan. *L. De Amore et Dilectione Dei* cett.

³⁰³ Seneca *De Clementia I*, 19, 5.

There are other kinds of fortification, which pertain only to protection, in the cases of the ditches, mounds, and similar things outside the city walls.

Finally, there are other kinds of fortification, which is all fortification for your house and body, since the house is your soul, which you are able to fortify through towers, which are made for protection at the beginning, have allowed in such arrows and missiles and other arms.

Since you took counsel from wise and the old men in the end, this pain is not sudden nor is it hurriedly judged, but with careful vision and preparation and deliberation and caution, they all carried your care through to the end: they said good things, but I think wisely. For Cicero said: “There is pain in everything, which attacks earlier things, it is careful preparation that invites it,”³⁰⁴ therefore pain is made in vengeance and in fortification and in battle and in war and in all pain, before embarking or attacking, prepare and envision what is necessary, if those things are able to be done suitably, for is it similarly said, that preparing for a long war makes it a quick victory. And even Cassiodorus said: “Fortification, of course, then, is brought about very strongly, if it is done over a long period of time, it reinforces the plan, and if ever it is sought, then, to be constructed in a bad place, the danger of it is now feared.”³⁰⁵ “Therefore, the good affairs of the fight are places here and there, as often as it can be managed in peace,”³⁰⁶ and “fortification is always to be managed in spare time; because then, bad things will be sought with necessary judgement;”³⁰⁷ “all things are decided carefully are decided in mature judgement.”³⁰⁸

Let us now accept to examine this in the form of counsel, because I took what you said about the neighboring places as a display of a fear of good will, and of your enemies, who returned

³⁰⁴ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 21, 73.

³⁰⁵ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. I Ep. 17.

³⁰⁶ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. I Ep. 17.

³⁰⁷ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. III Ep. 48.

³⁰⁸ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. VIII Ep. 13.

to you in the way of gratitude; and of the flatterers or sycophants and those who counseled you for hearing other secrets, which were revealed publicly by your words; and of the young people, who gave you counsel, and who took vengeance on the continent and waged war with manly vigor and were able to carry it through to the end with their own hands. And certainly, you were counseled in this way, and, as you said above, there were many mistakes, because those people ought to voice their counsel less; and, if good things are to be remembered, that is the kind of counsel of yours that is so great as it is examined in the title above: What kind of counsel to accept. Nevertheless, because there is counsel spoken in the home, we demean this spoken counsel, but you must examine this kind of counsel.

Let us see, then, according to Cicero, first, what in this matter is true and sincere; second, what is appropriate for this matter, what you wish to do, and if it is vengeance; third, what consequences; fourth, what is to be born from this vengeance; fifth, what you win from causing injury, and in what way God will permit this, you causing this injury.³⁰⁹

And certainly, pure truth is not born from examining this great pain, because you learn what is good, what has caused those matters and matters of the like, what has inflicted this injury onto you, and when and how and what kind of injury has been done.

Therefore, let us examine, what is most suitable for this matter, what it is, what and how many and what kind of counsel you want and is suitable to you, and what and how many, and what kind is suitable for your enemies and adversaries. And certainly, those things are understood by you and agreeable to you, which were named above, there are many judges and neighbors, and relatives and kinsmen, and those people who gave you counsel, who are taking vengeance on the continent. But we see and we examine, who you are, and what how many and what kind of people

³⁰⁹ Cicero *De Offic.* II, 5, 18.

they are, who are said to be your friends. And you are able to observe your character and you ought to, because, although it is great and rich and powerful, you do not exist alone, and you endure. For you do not have male children, nor brothers or full brothers by blood of other necessary men, who are free from the fear of your enemies after the destruction of your character; and the destruction of your character is a good experience, because a multitude of riches are dispersed, and you want nothing. There are three true enemies to you, and they have many brothers and many full brothers and other necessary men, and if you kill two or three of them by taking vengeance, others will remain who want to destroy your character quickly. You ought to observe those other friends around you, although, many are friends of enemies, still they are not so great to you; they are remote and distant blood relatives. Therefore, you should be around those people and around those principal characters, who agree with you or about these things, the condition of those people is much better than yours.

Secondly, we see above in the proceeding words about suitability, whether or not we see counsel clearly, and whether or not taking vengeance is an appropriate method. And certainly, it is not an appropriate method, because vengeance is not from the law unless is it permitted by a legal authority in trial, although this justification is not permitted in this certain continent, if it were done blamelessly by the guardianship of the government, then it would be called a law.³¹⁰

Appendix A.37 Chapter 36

By How Many and By What Ways Ability Defined

³¹⁰ Justiniani *Codeae* VIII, IV, 1.

The third thing seems to be the same as the proverb about that which is most fitting, whether or not you desire such counsel or you share it or you are capable of the possibility. And certainly, there are many possibilities in how to define ability. For to define ability, which is able to be made suitable to, you must be able to practice it suitably. And whenever ability is defined, fairly of course, about ability, it is said, “it is made, that which is a duty, our value and respect are injured, and generally, it is that which goes against good customs, not our ability to be trustworthy,”³¹¹ and this is approved through the law. And about ability, the gospel of Mark regarding Christ himself, says: “And he could not do any miracles there.”³¹² And the Apostle said near the end of his second letter: “For we can do nothing against the truth: but for the truth.”³¹³ Another thing was said about defining the power of ability, which the suffering Lord said about himself to Peter: “You think that I cannot ask my Father, and he will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels?”³¹⁴ Another thing was said about the many possible ways of defining ability by the Lord to Moses in Exodus: “You cannot see my face: for man shall not see me, and live.”³¹⁵ Another thing was said by the Lord in the Gospel of Matthew about acquiring or facilitating or even asking for ability: “Are you able to drink from the chalice that I shall drink?”³¹⁶ Another thing was said about ability being influential, by the character Wisdom in the Book of Wisdom: “And as I knew that I could not otherwise be sustained, unless God gave it to me”³¹⁷ and in other respects. And the Lord said in the in the gospel: “No man can come to me except the Father, who hath sent me, draw

³¹¹ *Digest*. XXVIII, V, 15.

³¹² *Ev. sec.* Mark VI, 5.

³¹³ *Paul Ep. II ad Corinth.* XIII, 8.

³¹⁴ *Ev. sec.* Matth. XXVI, 53.

³¹⁵ *Exodus.* XXXIII, 20.

³¹⁶ *Ev. sec.* Matth. XX, 22.

³¹⁷ *Lib. Sapientiae* VIII, 21.

him.”³¹⁸ Another thing was able to be placed in the law, it ought to be. And ever these words were customarily said in the above verses:

Indeed, to be able to give these things to the law, nature, power,

The duty of merit, you desire prophesy for the fifth time.

And if all of these meaningful words are able or strong or possible or powerful and not harmonious nor agreeable and your consent or counsel thus, in order for you to have the authority to be able to take vengeance, unless by change, you are able or it is suitable above other powers, to be able in the end or your power with damage and pass on other bad things, which you ought to do to your enemies. Therefore, you must not be able; for it is written:

He who thinks he is capable of more than what his own nature provides him,

capable of outdoing himself, he is capable of less than himself.³¹⁹

And again:

The law is capable of restricting none of what is fair.

I do not believe it to be capable of such a thing, which is capable of carrying things through to the end in entirety.

It is not, therefore, capable of withdrawing itself for your vengeance. For, which you want to take vengeance or with other disputes, with damaging adversaries and you ought to carry the protection of yourself through to the end. For it is written: “Fighting is not good, you must reveal to yourself that other types of good will are superior, and again: Therefore, you injure others, if you are not open to misfortune; and again; for you do not extend a branch, you see, you do not consider yourself exposed. For you destroy all people simultaneously, who fight in an unskilled

³¹⁸ *Evang. sec. Joann, 44.*

³¹⁹ *Esopus Moralizatus.*

and cowardly manner: in some respects, whoever you please is able to be killed, and even the king. For common people customarily say: He who desires to die or to be destroyed, are able to be killed by the king; et: “vindicate yourself for bad injury, but taking vengeance aggravates those injuries.”

And these words about suitability were briefly mention three times above, and you seek the first, which consents to your proposition and which contradicts mine. The second is a prudent plan whether it is agreeable with your proposition or not. The third concerns your power whether it consents to the possibility of your proposition or not. And what was said above about appropriation courses of action is sufficient.

To see what follows the third examination of the words above, there is said to be a logical consequence, which is briefly mentioned above, which is about vengeance, what you wish to take, the consequence is other vengeance, danger and war; and infinite damage and hinderances follow.

In the fourth things articulated above, where it speaks about from whom and from where you were born; you ought to know, who gave birth to your injury from the hatred of your enemies; and from vengeance other disputes will be born, and disputes are born and hatred emerges and so does war; from war comes strife and substantial waste, necessities and war and innumerable bade things will be born and spring forth.

We see from the examination of the fifth of those words above that he is the cause of each of those things.

Appendix A.38 Chapter 37

The Case Above

Therefore, the case of your injury is divided by its causes, of course, both near and far. The case's remote cause is God's doing, who is the cause of all cases, "All things are done through him, and without him nothing is done,"³²⁰ said the gospel. The case's close cause is in your three enemies, who engaged in this crime. The occasion of this case, which is said to be an accidental case, the hatred done, which you have opposite of you, and the preceding acts. The materials of this case's crime were made by a trap, and acts were done to your daughter like an animal. The cause, however, served as a model for the figure of this crime, because this figure was accomplished by climbing up the ladders and intruding through the windows. The ultimate goal concerning the case was this crime, because they wanted to destroy or to kill your daughter and lead her to her final death; not let her remain. The final remote cause, that is, the final cause they ought to have reached, we still are not able to know, unless it is by change through credulity or presumption. For we are able to believe and presume that the final bad deed had thence been reached; because, it is said above: "the death of a good thing a rarely carried thought to the end, for they are evil who begin to peak at the start."³²¹

However, the cause, which was allowed by God caused this injury of yours, similarly we are not able to know, unless it is through credulity and presumption, for it is said "To judge the heart of a foreigner by his secrets is foolish,"³²² which was said by the sacred Fortune and even St. Paul in his first letter to the Corinthians, this act is not able to be and it ought not to be judged by God.³²³ I speak through credulity and presumption, because in heaven, as Cassiodorus said, "nothing is done without cause, nor are their accidental fates in heaven."³²⁴ And I believe that God

³²⁰ *Ev. sec. Joann. I, 3.*

³²¹ *Descret. Gratiani P. II, Causa I, Qu. I, C. 25. v.*

³²² *Prosperi Aquitani Sent. ex. Op. Augustini Sent. XXI.*

³²³ *Paul Epist. I ad Corinth. IV, 5.*

³²⁴ *Cassiod. Variar. L XIII, Ep. 25.*

has allowed justice to be granted to you fairly. For this cause is made at my will because I neither fear god nor revere men, for you follow your name. For it is constructed from honey and drink. From which you are called Melibeus. For you drink from honey and you will go to heaven drunk on sweetness, because you will leave the Lord behind and your maker, you rely on the multitude of your riches have superior worth to you in emptiness, and all things however small long for your eyes, they would not refuse them, it is written that you will surrender to forgetfulness, as it is said: “Never drink honey without poison,”³²⁵ and in Ovid’s writings, he said:

Wicked point lies hidden under the sweetness of honey —³²⁶

And Solomon said in Proverbs, “You have found honey, eat what is sufficient for you, unless by chance you vomit up that which is satisfactory.”³²⁷ How, by chance, did God turn himself away from you, allowing this to happen to you, punishing you in this way, in what way have you failed him. For, failing him or sinning allows the three enemies of the soul to overcome you take you captive, one may say that they are the flesh, the world, and the devil, who are your three enemies and the three enemies born of all humankind. These are enemies who have been allowed into your body through windows, some may say there are five, which have been born from and have originated from your five senses, some may say these are vision, hearing, tasting, smelling, and touching. The three enemies, who you say entered through the windows, also weakened your soul by wounding its five windows, which are those five, which have been born and have originated from the five senses, which are said to be vision, hearing, tasting, smelling, and touching. And if, by chance, you reject what was said beforehand with scorn this was said beforehand about what God allowed, about your daughter’s three enemies climbing through the

³²⁵ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler.* XXXI, 3.

³²⁶ Ovid. *Amor.* L. I, Elegia VIII, v. 104.

³²⁷ Salom. *Proverb.* XXV, 16.

windows with ladders, wounding her body with five injuries, which are said to be in her eyes, nose, mouth, hands, and ears, you ought to remember this, for Christ suffered five bodily wounds himself, so that you and your daughter and all of humankind could be redeemed from so great an enemy and injury, he save and he healed.

Melibeus responded: Although others have been mentioned by you and they have the appearance of truth, I still do not believe them, those who have acted on behalf of the goodwill of God, also ought to have committed crimes so great. For God reconciles all who speak goodwill in the name of his scripture, so men do good things, and do not commit such great crimes.

But Prudence replied:

Appendix A.39 Chapter 38

On the Five Kinds of God's Good Will

God's good will is divided into five parts: for the first is lessons, the second is restraints, the third is things that are allowed, the fourth is counsel, and the fifth is completive. These are fivefold with one kind being commands, another prohibitive, permissive is the third, the fourth is consultative, and the fifth is complementarity. Hence, the verse:

Lessons, restrictions, things allowed, and counsel, satisfy.³²⁸

³²⁸ Cf. Vinc. Bellov. *Spec. Hist.* I, 5.

For, about lessons, it is said: “And you should love the Lord your God with your whole heart and with your whole should and with your whole mind and with your whole strength.”³²⁹ This is the first commandment. And the second is similar: You should love your neighbor as yourself. There is a restraint, however, since things need to be restrained to an extent, it is said: “Thou shall not commit adultery, thou shall not steal”³³⁰ and similarly in other respects. Things are allowed by God’s goodwill, since some of your credit is unworthy, turning about from his deed because of your own sin, and thus that seems to allow for such sins to be taken away from your unworthiness in a certain way, and only for other sins are you allowed to be punished: and thus, you have been permitted to act in a sinful way. Counsel is God’s will, since few people are receiving counsel, it is said: “Go sell what you have, and give it to the poor, if you will be perfect.”³³¹ It is truly complete when you completely fulfill yourself; for all wish to fulfill themselves.

Melibeus responded: You always seem to introduce me to level and agreeable words, in order for me to abstain from vengeance, revealing the dangers, which I would be capable of bringing about. But certainly, whether or not I take vengeance, if at all, those who are able to be connected with it, look forward to it; and thus, continuing such crimes goes unpunished and unrestrained, because it ought to be unimportant. For many good things come into being from vengeance; for crimes decline, and other things are deterred in such a manner, because they dare not to do similar things at other times. For, “many people are threatened, because of those who

³²⁹ *Evang. sec.* Mark XII, 30-31.

³³⁰ *Exodus* XX, 14 and 15.

³³¹ *Ev. sec.* Matth. XIX, 21.

unite to cause injury,”³³² thus many people withdraw from committing crime, and many crimes are prohibited, which, regarding crime, is effectively enforced through vengeance.

And Prudence responded:

Appendix A.40 Chapter 39

On the Duty of Judges Concerning Vengeance

What you said is true, and the judges have authority in this matter, and they hold jurisdiction over it; for it pertains to those crimes that exercise vengeance to inflict punishment on many men and to frighten many men. For Cassiodorus said: “A man withdraws from doing such things in fear, when it is believed to displease the judges.”³³³ I must say more still because, taking vengeance is a particularly sinful, thus, vengeance is not to be disregarded as free from sin by a judge. Therefore, judges ought not refrain from crimes, for Seneca said, “good things harm he who show consideration to bad things.”³³⁴ And another said: a judge, “who deliberates over punishment, does many wicked things;”³³⁵ and again: A judge, “who does not chastise sinners, orders sins.”³³⁶ About which another said:

To give way to sin increases untroubled recklessness.

³³² Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 310. W.

³³³ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. I, Epist. 4.

³³⁴ Mart. Dum. *De Moribus* S. 114.

³³⁵ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 528. W.

³³⁶ Caec. Balb. *De Nug. Phil.* p. 33.

Therefore, a judge ought to punish men who took vengeance bodily and with regard to money. Regarding bodily vengeance, Paul in his letter to the Romans said: “A judge must not carry a sword without a cause,”³³⁷ but to vindicate crime, is to approve it as a good thing. For good things ought to be valued rather than feared by judges, for the very same was said by Paul: “Princes are not a terror to good work, but to evil. Will you not then be afraid of their power? Do that which is good: and you shall have praise from those same things.”³³⁸ Bad things ought to frighten a judge, about which the same is said: “If you do that which is evil, fear.”³³⁹ Thus, it is written:

Good men hate sin through the love of virtue;

Bad men hate sin through fear and punishment.³⁴⁰

Therefore, a judge is able to and ought to suppress, punish, chastise, and deprive criminal activity well with severity, so that is neither, in the disdain of others, allowed under your own rule, nor proclaimed a law. And even Cicero said: “For it is neither against nature to deprive and to suppress he is worthy, if you are able.”³⁴¹ And Cassiodorus said: “Authority, if it is thought little of, has outraged everyone in part.”³⁴² Therefore, if you carefully examine what was said beforehand, you can still read still read plenty of things about vengeance in the book, *De Forma Vitae*, in the title: On taking vengeance, you will have understood well, you will be able to learn openly, from the vengeance of God alone or from other things that particularly pertain to this.³⁴³

And if you desire to take vengeance, you must return to the jurisdiction of the judge or to the authority you hold which ought to be restrained, so that justice is not hindered by means of

³³⁷ Paul *Epist. ad Rom.* XIII, 4.

³³⁸ Paul *Epist. ad Rom.* XIII, 3.

³³⁹ Paul *Epist. ad Rom.* XIII, 4.

³⁴⁰ Horat. *Epist.* I, 16, 52-53.

³⁴¹ Cicero *De Offic.* III, 6, 32.

³⁴² Cassiod. *Variar.* L. II Ep. 12.

³⁴³ Albertan. *L. de Amore et Dilectione Dei* cett.

avenging your enemies. For, you either avenge your enemies bodily, or you defame yourself by bringing about injury and condemnation, and thus, after your great and substantial amount of loss, you defame and impoverish yourself with dishonorable deeds and you blame those who are alive.

And Melibeus said: So much vengeance displeases me; for defame or loss provide nothing good. If I acquire jury for myself and my daughter admires those jury members, without dishonorable deeds and I will not want to blame the rest of those who are alive. And for the judges who despise vengeance, I wish to test my fortune, I will take vengeance by myself, to cling to fortune; because fortune is always favors me now, and the blessed Lord, will help me to take vengeance.

Appendix A.41 Chapter 40

On Fortune

Prudence responded: My counsel will not test fortune, nor will you cling to taking vengeance on those men; and I named many reasons for this. The first reason is because, “Everything which is carried out thought a faith in fortune is evil,” said Seneca in his *Epistles*.³⁴⁴ The second reason in because “fortune resembles glass, with shine, it will shatter,” as it is said.³⁴⁵ The third reason is because is because it exceeds and disregards nature, for it is similarly said: Men who entrust themselves with fortune, put nature out of their mind. The fourth reason is because,

³⁴⁴ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 320. W.

³⁴⁵ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 180. W.

“fortune is like an unskilled doctor, it kills many.”³⁴⁶ The fifth reason is because fortune does not favor, but it “overtakes and clings to itself.”³⁴⁷ Therefore, you must not cling to fortune, and you must not confide in it by other means; for it is not stable or lasting. For it is written: Nothing is able to be stable in this unstable universe.³⁴⁸ And Seneca similarly said: “Neither life nor fortune is lasting to men.”³⁴⁹ Since, therefore, fortune is inconstant, and it is not able to hold back its allure, you are mistaken if you believe in it yourself, because it will always favor you, because it has favored you up until now: indeed, to you are able to believe in the opposite; for if fortune has favored you too much until now, it made you a fool. For it is written: “He who is favored too much by fortune too, has been made a fool.”³⁵⁰ Therefore, you should not be confident in foolishness you carry from fortune; for foolishness is rarely or never accustomed to be benefitted from. And wise men exits, and they conquer fortune with virtue; for Seneca said in his *Epistles*: “He who is wise conquers wisdom with virtue.”³⁵¹ You should not even believe in your ability to assist fortune; for it is similarly said, “He is mistaken who says that we are able to grant fortune to others, good or bad.”³⁵² And you must understand this about that fortune appeals to men who are unaffected; for it is said in Boethius’ *De Consolatione*: For fortune is nothing, unless that is the favored opinion of the common people.³⁵³ Why Cato said:

If you are careless and do not steer your affairs with reason,

Do not say that fortune is blind, which she is not.³⁵⁴

³⁴⁶ Caec. Balb. *De Nug. Phil.* p. 23: Chilo.

³⁴⁷ Seneca *Epist.* LXXXII 4.

³⁴⁸ Cf. Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler.* XXX, 6.

³⁴⁹ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 411. W.

³⁵⁰ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 173. W.

³⁵¹ Seneca *Epist.* LXXI 29.

³⁵² Seneca *Epist.* XCVIII 2.

³⁵³ Cf. Boeth. *De Consol. Philosophiae* L. IV.

³⁵⁴ Dionysius Cato *De Moribus* L. IV, Dist. 3.

And it is said to be explained in another way: You do not want to say that fortune is blind, for she is not, it is, it is it who is nothing. If you, however, you were to believe that the Lord fortune, you think correctly, he is able to bear those things that are bad, and he bestows all good things with his power. Therefore, if the judges are displeased with your aforementioned vengeance, and you desire all vengeance, you must return to the highest and true judge, who abandons no unpunished injustice and will rightly punish you, testifying himself, he who said: “I punish myself, and I reward myself.”³⁵⁵ And even the Apostle said to Colossians in his Letter: “For he that has done an injustice shall receive for that which he has done unjustly.”³⁵⁶ And he will not punish you alone, but he will remove and pull out each and every bit of uncertainty from your heart; for the prophet said: “Cast your care upon the Lord, and he shall sustain you, and he shall not suffer the just to waver eternally.”³⁵⁷

Melibeus replied: If I tolerate injustice, and do not take vengeance, I will invite my enemies and other men to inflict new injustices onto me. For it is written: I suffer old injury, you invite new ones.”³⁵⁸ And inviting new injuries from every side is so much of an injustice to me, that I am not able to endure it. For it is written: “By enduring many things, what cannot be endured will come.”³⁵⁹ Therefore, such patience is the worst, and vengeance is truly the best.

And Prudence responded: The two previously mentioned decrees hold power in the judgement of men in other places; for if judges do not punish crime, they do not only invite new injury, but they also rule over new sin, and if many crimes are suffered, crimes which are not able to be endured will come; because so many evil crimes are committed, they are not able to be

³⁵⁵ Paul *Epist. ad Rom.* XII, 19 cf. Deuteronomium XXXII, 35.

³⁵⁶ Paul. *Epist. ad Coloss.* III, 25.

³⁵⁷ *Psalms.* LIV, 23.

³⁵⁸ Publil. *Syrus Sent.* 645. W.

³⁵⁹ Publil. *Syrus Sent.* 487. W.

tolerated: and thus, the judges must be banished from office. And such judges and rulers choose crime rather than to investigate crime, to attack and punish those who are concerned rather than suffer from look down on and depose those criminals with blame, they suffer from their own dignity and must be removed from their office. And you if you believe in the aforementioned decrees of other men in other places, still they decay in this detestable patience, so you say. For, to become well acquainted with the greatest things, you must not consent to your desires surrounding vengeance and your possibilities. For, it hinders reason, to take vengeance from respite; vengeance does not care about reason and it is not able to be long lasting. For it is written: “You must be willing to succeed in total neatness, expose yourself to reason.”³⁶⁰ Why I think, if someone does what is contrary to reason, he ought to succumb to pain rightly and justly. This is not a possibility for you, reckoning the things done, it is unequal to the power of your enemies, or it is a possibility that we observe what was said above, on the contrary, it is very small, thus, you are not able to take vengeance without the danger or destruction of your character. Why I do not think in this case, patience is the worst, like you said, but it is the very best. For it is written:

Appendix A.42 Chapter 41

On Tension

“To compete with a superior is mad, with an equal it is variable, with an inferior it is shameful.”³⁶¹ I think it is useful to avoid tensions, and he who is not able to resist them, manages

³⁶⁰ Seneca *Epist.* XXXVII 4.

³⁶¹ Seneca *De Ira* II, 34 1.

his power with a troubled mind because he also wishes to please himself. And to not compete alone or to resist violently is mad, but to fly into a rage with power is dangerous; for Seneca said: “To seek to fly into a powerful rage is dangerous.”³⁶² How, if he who wounds another with his power, without risk of suffering those powerful wounds, just as those did who flew into a rage; because Cato seemed to have turned this over in his mind when he said:

When wounded, yield to the power of fortune:

He who was able to wound, may be able to benefit you.³⁶³

Therefore, if he who has powerfully wounded you or flew into a rage with you, is not punished, you must return “to a place of refuge with patience.”³⁶⁴

Appendix A.43 Chapter 42

On Patience

For patience is considered a mild form of tolerance; or “patience is the virtue or abuse and it brings all enemies’ assaults to equanimity;”³⁶⁵ or “patience is the cure for injury,”³⁶⁶ as it is said in the *Morilium Dogmtate*.

³⁶² Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 483. W.

³⁶³ Dionysius Cato *De Moribus* L. IV, Dist. 39.

³⁶⁴ Cf. Caec. Balb, *De Nugis Phil.* p. 21.

³⁶⁵ Gault. ab *Insualis Moral. Dogma* cap. CCIV, p. XXXIX.

³⁶⁶ Gault. ab *Insualis Moral. Dogma* c. XXX, p. L.

“And you conceal the riches you have in patience;” “for he who patience and strong creates luck for himself,” and “the cure to his anguish is patience.”³⁶⁷ And certainly, it is said this certain this, that patience is more powerful than all other things; from which this verse comes:

No other virtue is as great as patience.³⁶⁸

And again:

...virtue is weak if not strengthened by patience.³⁶⁹

And even Cato said:

For the greatest moral is always the virtue of patience.³⁷⁰

And Socrates said: “Patience is a place of refuge for the miserable.”³⁷¹ Finally, you must know this, because it is not taught, what is not able to be suffered well; for Salomon said: “The learning of a man is known by patience: and his glory is to pass over the unjust;”³⁷² and again: “He who is patient, is governed with much wisdom: but he that is impatient, exalts his foolishness,”³⁷³ and in another place: “A passionate man stirs up his strife: he that is patient appeases those that are stirred up.”³⁷⁴

Note, too, that because patience is the best, impatience is the worst; for it is said, “He who is impatient, shall suffer damage: and when he shall take away, he shall add another thing.”³⁷⁵ For you confuse yourself thought impatience because those things which are simultaneously blamed and foolish do not pertain to you.”³⁷⁶ Why Salomon says in Proverbs: “As he who takes a dog by

³⁶⁷ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 456, 464 and 96. *W.*

³⁶⁸ Cato *Novus* L. I, Distich. 38.

³⁶⁹ Aurel. Prudentius *Psychomachia* v. 177.

³⁷⁰ Dionys. Cato *De Mor.* L. I, Distich. 38.

³⁷¹ Caec. Balb. *De Nug. Phil.* p. 21.

³⁷² Salom. *Proverb.* XIX, 11.

³⁷³ Salom. *Proverb.* XIV, 29.

³⁷⁴ Salom. *Proverb* XV, 18.

³⁷⁵ Salom. *Proverb.* XIX, 19.

³⁷⁶ *Digest.* L, XVII, 36.

the ears, so is he that passes by in anger, and meddles with another man's quarrel."³⁷⁷ Why he said similarly: "The patient man is better than the valiant: and he who rules his soul is better than he who conquers cities."³⁷⁸ For patience has worked perfectly, the apostle Jacob attested to this when he said: "My brothers, count it all joy, when you shall fall into various temptations: Knowing that the trying of your faith works patience and patience works perfectly: that you may be perfect and whole, failing in nothing."³⁷⁹

But Melibeus said: Such patience, which pertains to perfection; I wish to have less of; for it threatens danger, my soul is still always fussing about taking vengeance. For my enemies, as said before, threaten all of us with danger with great excess and wickedness. Therefore, if I take an excessive amount of vengeance with a certain amount of scornful danger, it will not be admired nor thought of as foolish because, "danger is never conquered without danger;"³⁸⁰ and even the law permits violence to refute violence because and crime to hinder crime.³⁸¹

Prudence responded: "Reasoning things well determines and brings about that which is best: neglecting the truth is immediately connected to many mistakes."³⁸² If you examine reason well, you become aware of the bad things you have said openly. For you will not be able to conquer danger with danger in this case, but it will be doubled, if you desire to call to mind what was said preciously. For, although your enemies have sinned so gravely, you are not immune from sin by taking excess vengeance for Cassiodorus said: "Nothing differs from sin, which advances itself thought excess vengeance."³⁸³ And although your enemies united in wickedness, you must not

³⁷⁷ Salom. *Proverb.* XXVI, 17.

³⁷⁸ Salom. *Proverb.* XVI, 32.

³⁷⁹ Jacob *Ep. Cath.* I, 2-4.

³⁸⁰ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 383. W.

³⁸¹ *Digest.* IX, II, 45 4.

³⁸² Cicero *Disput. Tusc.* IV, 27, 58.

³⁸³ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. I Ep. 30.

commit wickedness by the same means, if I do not defend you, but I attack you for the vengeance you recently took, against the order of the law: that which one is obligated to follow; for Seneca "Never vindicate wickedness with wickedness."³⁸⁴ That said, however, the laws submits to fending off violence with violence and to hindering crime with crime,³⁸⁵ this is true, if I defend it will not be for vengeance.³⁸⁶ However, you do not want this, to be defended in front of the guardianship of the content, but about vengeance and from a distance.³⁸⁷ Similarly, you do not want crime to hinder crime, but you want to commit a new crime, which is contrary to all reasonable laws. Therefore, you will embrace reason, and you will not revert back to other means.

Then Melibeus said: Although my powerful enemies seem to be of reasonable character to me, I am still capable of those reasonable things; because; poor men are respectful of me; and I have wealth, and "many is the ruler of all things,"³⁸⁸ men are easily able to have a multitude of things by means of money, thus, he who is able to overcome those things with reasonable character is able to lead those who are needy and impoverished and also those who are beggars and those who are dead.

Appendix A.44 Chapter 43

On Poverty and Wealth

³⁸⁴ Mart. Dumiens. *De Moribus* S. 139.

³⁸⁵ *Digest.* IX, II, 45 4.

³⁸⁶ Justiniani *Codex* VIII, IV. 1.

³⁸⁷ *Digest.* XLIII, XVI, 3 9.

³⁸⁸ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 458. W.

Prudence responded: Because you seem to very much rely on your wealth and you seem to look down on poverty, we must discuss poverty and wealth to some extent, you must avoid destruction by means of wealth, and poverty, which is inevitability and will lead to indignancy, you must avoid all of those things. It is true, as it was said, that money is to be the ruler of all things, that is, all things are ruled and controlled by means of money; and temporary wealth and power, to some degree, are good things, “because all creations of God are good;”³⁸⁹ for is it said that the body is not able to live without the soul, thus, without temporary wealth and power, one is not able to last. For, nourishment and clothing are necessities for the body, because without temporary power, the life in the heart of person is not able to last for a long time. For, thought temporary wealth, men can acquire and produce great things, and they can acquire great honors, about which, Pamphilus said

Provided that a rich man chooses a certain farm laborer from a million men who please him, he himself is nobility.³⁹⁰

It is also said elsewhere:

Ordinary people glorify the treasures of the nobility,

And poor men overwhelm the homes of the nobility for nourishment.³⁹¹

And even Horace said:

Money, like a queen, bestows both rank and beauty.³⁹²

Through temporary power and wealth, a person acquires great power, thus people follow and fear whoever is considered a ruler and whoever is considered a leader. And note this, for it is

³⁸⁹ Paul *Ep. I ad Timoth.* IV, 4.

³⁹⁰ Pamphilus *De Amore.* Parisiis 1510; fol. a IIII recto.

³⁹¹ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler.* VI, 4.

³⁹² Horat. *Epist.* I, 6, 37.

said that good things and an infinite amount of other things follow the occasion of temporary power and wealth, thus, power must be parted with and we must meet with the impoverished and the indignant and the needy, and we must force all bad people to support them.

Appendix A.45 Chapter 44

On Necessity

For, necessity is said to be the mother of crime. Why Cassiodorus said: While the mother of crime is raised by necessity, ambition bears sin.”³⁹³ “For necessity is not valued by those in control,” as it is said.³⁹⁴ “And Peter Alphonsus said: “Great necessity is confined to an honorable man’s visit to a wash-room.,”³⁹⁵ and even to asking for the help from your enemies, because this is the most burdensome. And he also said: “One of the greatest adversities of this world is when a man free by nature or by birth is constrained by necessity to eat the food of his enemy,”³⁹⁶ and because we place this burdensome trap for old enemies, we accept their goods. And thus, sin is a necessity, in that it forces all men to be tested, and it confines all of their deceitful acts to those matters, and it leads to beggary and indignity and all death. Why, law and proverb claim: “Necessity does not have a law.”³⁹⁷ And Seneca said: “Necessity is required to do deceitful

³⁹³ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. IX, Ep. 13.

³⁹⁴ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. IV, Ep. 13.

³⁹⁵ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler.* IV, 5.

³⁹⁶ Peter Alphonsus *Disciplina Cler.* IV, 4.

³⁹⁷ *Decretum Gratiani* P. III, Dist. I, cap. 11.

things.”³⁹⁸ And again: “Necessity wants from men that which they obtain;”³⁹⁹ and again: “Necessity compels to all men.”⁴⁰⁰ And Cassiodorus said: “We avoid indignity with justice, which recommends withdrawal.”⁴⁰¹ And Salomon said: “There are five things, which people conquer: freedom, grief, famine, war, and the ignorance of the greatest common people: necessity controls all of those things alone.”⁴⁰² And again: “It is better to die than to want.”⁴⁰³ For indignance leads to beggary, about which Innocence speaks in his book, *Comtemptu Mundi*:

Appendix A.46 Chapter 45

On Beggary

“Oh, how miserable the condition of beggary is! For, if one seeks it, he will be united with shame, and if one does not seek it, he will be destroyed by poverty; but he who is a beggar, is driven by necessity: he who is indignant mutters and prays.”⁴⁰⁴ Why Salomon said in Proverbs: “Give me neither beggary, nor riches,” Lord!⁴⁰⁵ And money and wealth, and so many good things follow temporary power, and we avoid so many bad things, they are good things if they are possessed by good men. However, those who possess respect for bad men, are said to be bad, because nothing of a man is good without he himself being good. For although there are good men,

³⁹⁸ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 407.

³⁹⁹ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 403.

⁴⁰⁰ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 210. *W.*

⁴⁰¹ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. I, Ep. 19.

⁴⁰² Caec. Balb. *De Nug. Phil.* p. 34: *Pythagoras.*

⁴⁰³ *Ecclesiasticus*, XL, 29.

⁴⁰⁴ Innocentius III *De Cont. Mundi* L. I, cap. 14.

⁴⁰⁵ Salom. *Proverb.* XXX, 8.

bad men are still said to be evil, because those men are responsible for bad things; for Seneca said: “Wealth is the cause of evil, not because of a certain thing it does, but because it provokes causes.”⁴⁰⁶ About which a philosopher said: “Money is greedy torture, lavish splendor, a treasonous traitor.”⁴⁰⁷ Therefore, you must make use of wealth, and you must moderately and skillfully and favorably withhold from power. For Cicero said: “Power is a things, which we acquire, use it moderately and skillfully.”⁴⁰⁸ And Ovid said:

To withhold power is mildly good.⁴⁰⁹

Therefore, in acquiring power and conserving wealth and making use of the three companion you have with you, certainly God and conscience, followed by that which you have discovered by the full record in these books, *De Amore* and *Delectione Dei* and *Proximi* and *Aliarum Rerum* and *de Rorma Vitae*, in the title: On Acquiring and Conserving Power, and in what followed these four titles.⁴¹⁰

I am not counseling you with these records and this careful inspection of things surrounding wealth and poverty and indignance and necessity and fortune, so that you do not rely on your wealth too much, but so that not destroy the very same things by bringing things about in war.

Appendix A.47 Chapter 46

On the Evil of Feuds

⁴⁰⁶ Seneca *Epist.* LXXXVII 27.

⁴⁰⁷ Caec. Balb. *De Nug. Phil.* p. 23.

⁴⁰⁸ Cicero *De Offic.* II, 5, 18.

⁴⁰⁹ Ovidius *Heroid.* Ep. XVII, v. 98. (*Helena Paridi*).

⁴¹⁰ Albertanus *De Amore et Delectione Dei* cett.

For no power or wealth is worth the expense of feuds, my authority is sufficient; for a philosopher said: No one who desires a feud shall ever have enough. For, the more wealth a man has, the more he orders to continue a feud for a long time, or either to waste money or to waste a feud, whether it be for his power or his character. For if he is a poor man, he is not able to support the method of a feud; if he has a large amount of wealth, he is at the expense of a large number of wise men. For many say, he who sins, is much more powerful, than a famous criminal, according to what Martial said:

The most famous criminals of all men have as much power as those who sin.⁴¹¹

Thus, a man who constitutes a feud is as powerful as those who order great expenses to be brought about; and if he, by change loses the feud, he will be exposed to great calamity. About which it is said: "It is easier to do harm from falling on high."⁴¹² And Lucano said:

A sequence of hate speech, is to remain for a long time and is the last to be denied

And it is too heaver of a burden to slip under and fall.⁴¹³

Martial said:

Climbing to the highest place, is more serious than falling from the highest place.⁴¹⁴

And not only is wealth lost through a feud, but so is the love of God and paradise and present life and friends and acquaintances, and the enemy of a feud must be parted with by means of fortune, who follows all bad things as it was previously mentioned, and it struggles to proceed

⁴¹¹ Pseudo-Martial.

⁴¹² Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 162. W.

⁴¹³ Lucan. *Pharsal.* I, 70, 70-71.

⁴¹⁴ Pseudo-Martial.

toward hell with the human soul and body. Thus, love God and you ought to fear the evils of a feud as much as you do power.

Appendix A.48 Chapter 47

On Avoiding War

And also war, which is customarily made in the occasion of a feud, there are many reasons why this should be avoided by many powerful men. The first reason is because war is displeasing to God, about which the Prophet said: “Squander the people who desire war.”⁴¹⁵

The second reason is because war is not singularly for men, but it is customary to conquer a people, for Salomon in a previous order said: “There are five things that people can conquer: freedom, grief, famine, war” and the remaining.⁴¹⁶

The third reason is because war is very feared, for it is written: “Your blessed fellow citizen, are those who fear war in a time of peace.”⁴¹⁷ And they do not only fear war, but they fear the name of war; for it is written: “If you value peace, you will not make mention of war.”⁴¹⁸

The fourth reason for avoiding war is because. “War is a changing and uncertain event,”⁴¹⁹ it is neither by means of a multitude of many nor by another other reasons capable of being seen; about what Judas Maccabaeus said: “It is not in the multitude of soldiers that makes a war

⁴¹⁵ David *Psalm*. LXVII, 31.

⁴¹⁶ Caecil. Balb. *De Nugis Philos.* p. 34: *Pythagoras*.

⁴¹⁷ Caecil. Balb. *De Nugis Phil.* p. 39: *Epaminondas*.

⁴¹⁸ Caecil. Balb. *De Nugis Phil.* p. 41: *Socrates*.

⁴¹⁹ *Regum Liber* II, XI, 25.

victorious, but it is the army from heaven. For it is easy for God to liberate from a small number of people, and to give victory to over many small numbers of people.”⁴²⁰ And David said to Philistia, who killed him with a stone in a sling: “And the church will learn this in whole, because the Lord neither saves by sword nor by spear: for that in itself is war.”⁴²¹

The fifth reason that war should be avoided is because you dwell in the most danger, which many wise men say is to be avoided; for Cicero said: “We must never be guilty of seeming cowardly and craven in our avoidance of danger; but we must also beware of exposing ourselves to danger needlessly. Nothing can be more foolish than that. Accordingly, in encountering danger, we should do as doctors do in their practice; in light of cases of illness they give mild treatments; in cases of dangerous sickness, they are compelled to apply hazardous and even desperate remedies. It is, therefore, only a madman who, in a calm, would pray for a storm; a wise man’s way is, when the storm does come, to withstand it with all the means at his command, and especially, when the advantages to be expected in case of successful issue are greater than the hazards of the struggle.”⁴²²

The sixth reason to avoid war is because death is rightly expected in war by all; for “it is uncertain, the place to expect your death: however, you are ought to and you are able to expect all places,”⁴²³ and especially in war. Finally, there are infinite reasons, why you should avoid war and feud, which you do not want to learn about easily; nor do you be required to observe presently.

⁴²⁰ *Machabaeorum* L. I, cap. III, v. 19 and 18.

⁴²¹ *Regum* L. I, c. XVII, v. 45 and 47.

⁴²² Cicero *De Offic.* I, 24, 83.

⁴²³ Seneca *Epist.* XXVII 7.

Then Melibeus said: Although you will lead me towards many wise laws and reasons, you seem to be averse to vengeance and feud and war, not the counsel that has been bestowed upon be thus far, which I desire to have from you with affection in this business.

Appendix A.49 Chapter 48

On Avoiding War Through Reconciliation

Prudence responded: It is my counsel, that you conquer discord and war through reconciliation and harmony; for it is written: “There is always victory where there is harmony.”⁴²⁴ And thus, you will have everlasting blessedness; and you will avoid the evil mentioned before, your things will thrive and multiply. For Salomon said in Proverbs: “Joy follows he who takes counsels of peace.”⁴²⁵ And Seneca said in his *Epistles* “Harmony thrived in the smallest of things: discord fall apart to the utmost extent.”⁴²⁶ And Cicero said: “In my opinion, at least, we should always strive to secure a peace that shall not admit of guile.”⁴²⁷

And Melibeus said: How can I make peace with my enemies? Because they have caused the initial discord themselves, they do not seek reconciliation.

Prudence responded: If your enemies want reconciliation from you, they will trust in you and they will ask you with great allegiance to you. For, I accept this, because they very much suffer from their own sin and foolishness, and they long to obey your orders in everything and through

⁴²⁴ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 289. W.

⁴²⁵ Salom. *Proverb.* XII, 20.

⁴²⁶ Salust. *Jugurth.* cap. X. (Seneca *Ep.* XVIV 46).

⁴²⁷ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 11, 35.

everything with oaths and vows. How I am to believe this safely, when this reputation or danger and feud comes about, since there is much danger in fearing the destruction of the body and soul and things similar. I'm telling you more because although your enemies have not begun to seek reconciliation, you ought to start the beginning of the reconciliation nonetheless; for it is written: "Always begin from another's conflict, however, the reconciliation is from you."⁴²⁸ For the Prophet commands, reconciliation and peace are not the only things expected from others, but they are scrutinized and pursued; for it is said: "Turn away from evil and do good: seek after peace and pursue it."⁴²⁹ And an Apostle said in his letters to the Romans: "To no man rendering evil for evil. Priding good things, not only in the sight of God but also in the sight of all men. If it be possible, as much as it is in you, have peace with all men."⁴³⁰ And it is written in Isaiah: "How beautiful are the feet of them that preach the gospel of peace?"⁴³¹ Therefore, you must examine peace, and injury must be forgotten; for Seneca said in his *Epistles*: "We ought to forget injury, to remember it is a privilege;" for "forgetting injury is the cure."⁴³² About which Jesus of Sirach said: "Remember not any injury done to you by your neighbor, and no them nothing by deeds of injury."⁴³³

And Melibeus said: I do not want to forget my injury, but I wish that you say this to me, if, in another case, I am permitted to make war or to fight.

Prudence replied: All men always support to make war and to fight with sin and vice; for it is written: "He will not be crowned, unless he strives lawfully;"⁴³⁴ for, by such means, all who

⁴²⁸ Mart. Dumiens. *De Mor.* Sent. 49.

⁴²⁹ David. *Psalm.* XXXIII, 15.

⁴³⁰ Paul *Epist. ad Rom.* XII, 17-18.

⁴³¹ Isaiah LII, 8 cf. Paul *Epist. ad Rom.* X, 15.

⁴³² Publil. Syrus S. 250 (*Sen. Ep.* XCIV 28).

⁴³³ *Ecclesiasticus*, X, 6.

⁴³⁴ Paul *Ep. II ad Timoth.* II, 5.

fight deserve eternal life and perpetual victory's crown. But, you ought to have peace with all human beings; about which it is written: "With human beings, you have, with vice, what you have with war."⁴³⁵

Melibeus said: I am not speaking about fights and wars against vice, but about fights and wars against the three men who committed the crime.

Appendix A.50 Chapter 49

A Case in Which We Are Able to Fight Lawfully

Prudence responded: There are eight cases or causes, where we are able to fight lawfully: For the conservation of faith and not dishonoring it, for supporting justice with a band of soldiers, for having peace, for the conservation of freedom, for avoiding shame, for repelling violence, for making guardianship for your own body and for necessary causes, about which we must become acquainted with separately.

Certainly, for faith, war is supported, and it is supported with a band of soldier. For it is said faith ought to be our shield, under with all virtue confined, and we ought to fight with the aid of our shields, about which the Apostle said in his letters to Ephesians near the end: "Taking the shield of faith with you may be able to extinguish all the fiery darts of the most wicked ones,"⁴³⁶ and about which it was also said:

⁴³⁵ Mart. Dumiens. *De Mor.* Sent. 34.

⁴³⁶ Paul. *Epist. ad Ephes.* VI, 16.

Faith is the first to seek the fate of the battle grounds and to appear to face the uncertainty of warfare and conflict.⁴³⁷

Thus, for faith, wars are supported, and they are supported by bands of soldiers. And enduring death is more preferable, than leaving the principle of faith behind, as Judas Maccabaeus said, to Moses and David and Carolus, and all other who make wars. And they even fight to the death in order to support boundless and sacred faith.

Similarly, for ought to fight for justice and we ought to strive continuously up to death; for Jesus of Sirach said: “Strive for justice for thy soul, and even unto death fight for justice, and God will overthrow your enemies for you.”⁴³⁸

Supporting wars is also for having peace, and it supported by a band of soldiers. For Cicero said: “Wars which are supported for the sake of a cause, so that people can survive in peace without harm.”⁴³⁹ And again, he said: “Thus, war must be supported, so that nothing else is considered unless peace is sought.”⁴⁴⁰

For the conservation of freedom and refuting slavery that is not owed, war must be supported up to death; for Cicero said: “When time is right, the support of a band of soldiers is required and necessary, and shame and death are valued above slavery.”⁴⁴¹ And Seneca said: “To perish is noble, if it is done by a disgraced slave.”⁴⁴² This is said about slavery that is not owed, because if it is owed and if he is a slave in truth, he ought not worry about it; for St. Paul said in his letter to the Corinthians: “Let every man abide in the same calling in which he was called.

⁴³⁷ Aurelius Prudentius *Psychomachia*, v. 21-22.

⁴³⁸ *Ecclesiasticus*, IV, 33.

⁴³⁹ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 11, 35.

⁴⁴⁰ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 23, 80.

⁴⁴¹ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 23, 81.

⁴⁴² Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 442. W.

Were you called, being a slave? Do not care for it.”⁴⁴³ And St. Peter in his first letter, said: "Slaves, be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle but also to the deformed.”⁴⁴⁴

Similarly, war is supported for avoiding shame, and death is valued above shame, as it is said above in those orders: “when the time is right” and otherwise.⁴⁴⁵

For refuting violence, fighting and a band of soldiers are supported; for this is said through laws and judge’s decrees; for the law says: “That which is done for the sake of the guardianship of your own body, is seen to be right;”⁴⁴⁶ for is reasonable and permissible to defend yourself from the dangers of your natural enemies.⁴⁴⁷

And my defense in whole is permitted, so that violence is not permitted to occur before the time is right; “for it is best for it to occur at the right time, which is after you vindicate the solution,” so the laws proclaim.⁴⁴⁸ And my defense of you in whole is permitted, so that, if you are not able to avoid other dangers, and you kill men, through avenging them by means of laws and justice; for “if rams and cows engage in battle between themselves, the attacker will be dead, and the others are left to defend themselves, and without union they shall die,” so the law says.⁴⁴⁹ For, you are permitted to resist injury and violence in such a manner so that you are able to resist injury, and so that you do not speak of certain vices and are not guilty. About which, Cicero said: “He who does not prevent or oppose injury, if he can, is just as guilty of wrong as if he left his parents or his friends or his country behind.”⁴⁵⁰ Still, you ought to make guardianship of your body on the continent and with guardianship from the blameless government; and if they wish to pierce you

⁴⁴³ Paul. *Ep. I ad Cor.* VII, 20-21.

⁴⁴⁴ Peter. *Epist.* I, II, 18.

⁴⁴⁵ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 23, 81.

⁴⁴⁶ *Digest.* IX, II, 45 4 *Descretal. Gregorii IX*, V. XII, 18.

⁴⁴⁷ *Dig.* IV, II, 13.

⁴⁴⁸ *Digest.* I, I, 3.

⁴⁴⁹ *Dig.* IX, I, 11.

⁴⁵⁰ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 7, 23.

with their darts, you will be able to pierce those beaten guardianships with darts before them, and not by vengeance.⁴⁵¹

Finally, it is necessary to fight for causes and for the support of a band of soldiers, since war leads in and summons purity; for Cicero said: “It is able to be understood that war is not just, unless it is sought to manage things, or because it was threatened and lead in before.”⁴⁵² And Cato said: “Fight for the country.”⁴⁵³

And these things, which are said about fighting and about battles are accomplished by bands of soldiers, you must understand that men who are not religious devotees are not to have rank in whatever pleases you. However, excellent religious devotees, who do not learn how to move weapons, are spoken about by the Lord: “Vengeance is mine, I will repay”⁴⁵⁴ and: “If one strikes you on your right cheek, turn to him and also the other: And if a man will contend you in judgment, and take away your coat, let go of your coat also unto him.”⁴⁵⁵ For such religious devotees ought not to fight in a band of soldiers, but endure a powerful death, which is to make shame or any sins transient.

Then Melibeus responded: I agree with you well, because having a band of solders and fighting for peace is supporting peace; why I wish to fight my enemies with the aforementioned things; and thus, I will be able to have peace with them afterwards.

And Prudence, said, as if with an angry soul and a changed expression:

He is a fool to fight with the current’s force

⁴⁵¹ Justiani *Codex* VIII, 4, 1.

⁴⁵² Cicero *De Offic.* I, 11, 36.

⁴⁵³ Dionysius Cato *De Moribus* L. I, Sent. XXX>

⁴⁵⁴ Paul *Epist. ad Rom.* XII, 19.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ev. sec.* Matth. V, 39-40.

Which can descend the flood with a slanting course.⁴⁵⁶

You are truly a fool for your ability to reflect, which, you will be able to consider with peace and with an oath of allegiance and with an oath to your lessons, since you desire to lead with danger and with feuds and with war to the end. For, you consider well what is good, and you grasp poorly at what is bad, either you produce wisdom for yourself or you make a fool of yourself. Then Melibeus said: I do not want any of what you said with your angry soul against me: but if I say or do that which is foolish or silly, you must chastise me to your desire; for I will not reason with evil, you must say something to my idle soul. For it is written: “He who rebukes man, shall afterward find favor with him, more than he who deceives with a flattering tongue.”⁴⁵⁷

And Prudence responded: I am not angry at you without cause, but rather for your prosperity; for Salomon said: “Anger is better than laughter: because by the sadness of the countenance the mind of the offender is corrected.”⁴⁵⁸ And I will take counsel from you, so that I chastise you, and you must allow me to urge you towards peace with my words, and if it, which was said, about your enemies wanting to acquire a good soul, you must look up to those orders.

Then Melibeus said: These things said by you are pleasing, and from this is my counsel, which is pleasing to you, as long as you do not neglect to do these things.

Then Prudence, asked for a short amount of time, about the will of those men, which is still non-existent to him, so she secretly summoned his enemies to him, and said, in present time there is such goodness of peace and such evil of feuds which relates to the aforementioned way of war, and those who begin to encourage it, so that they suffer the pain of the injury itself and of Lord

⁴⁵⁶ Ovid. *De Remed. Amoris* I, 121-122.

⁴⁵⁷ Salom. *Proverb.* XXVIII, 23.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ecclesiastes* VII, 4.

Melibeus and of the acts on his daughter, and to stand firm with the lessons of his home with oaths and vows of obedience and with retribution which by no means should be delayed. However, those men who hear this should rejoice with great delight; and the moved men speak with the sweetness of their words, and the influence of the internal pain of their hearts respond with weeping: Wisest lord, “You have anticipated us with blessings of sweetness.”⁴⁵⁹ For that said, we ought to have spoken earlier; for the beginning of discord advanced from our foolishness; why the beginning of reconciliation ought to start from us. Truly, because we were ignorant, we by no means listened to those words previously said to you or said those things to please you, Lord. Therefore, you wished for us to submit to your counsel and the orders of you, Lord Melibeus, in everything and through everything, they said, we submit ourselves to the excellence and benevolence of your lordship, and we are ready to obey all of your orders, so that you carry out your good and sacred words with power between you, Lord Melibeus, and us. We still fear, because of our excessive sin and our wickedness, that you, Lord Melibeus, are angry at us for the hurried and unfair commands against us, why we ask for your counsel in addition to those faithful things.

Prudence responded: Although every hardship is contrary to reason, because it relies on adversaries or enemies, or in your own power and it is set against a judge, as it is said above in this book, under the title, On Avoiding the Counsel of Those Who are Now Euseless or Enemies and Returning to Them Afterwards in Favor: because Lord Melibeus will still be managed by the things I said previously, my counsel will not return to an unfair order, for that reason, my counsel for you, is that you do not despair of those things. For, I have become aware of my lord’s aforementioned abundance of benevolence; for it is not unfair, nor is it because of a longing to for money, he always aims at honor, he thinks little of all unfairness and money. In any case, there is

⁴⁵⁹ *Psalm. XX, 4.*

no other means of counsel, without giving authority to examination and to preceding treatment methods either to enemies themselves or to power itself. For Salomon said: “Hear me, great men, and all people, and hearken with your ears, you rulers of the church: give not to son or wife, brother or friend, power over you while you are alive.”⁴⁶⁰ For, if you forbid it, giving power above you to your children, brothers, and friends, you will forbid however much you please powerfully, without submitting to any enemies above your power. You, Melibeus, heard previously, that those three enemies responded to what you said cordially: be confident in your kindness and your customary mercy, we must carry out your promise and the good will of you, Lord Melibeus, for the blessed Lord. Therefore, whenever it pleases you, you must send for us and for all the orders that we should be equipped to obey.

Prudence agreed with the men and recounted those things that were discussed and whatever was asked for to Melibeus, or those things which were believed to have been previously said.

When the allegiance of those men was accepted and they acknowledged their excessive regret and the grief in their sin, he responded by saying: They are suitable to be pardoned, for they did not make excuses about their sin, but they confessed with tears and pain in their heart and they did not hold back from asking for pardon; for Seneca said: “Where there is confession, there is forgiveness;”⁴⁶¹ for innocence is closest to confession. And again: “Confession preserves and is closest to innocence and sin preserves and is closest to shame,”⁴⁶² for “he who gives way to sin is

⁴⁶⁰ *Ecclesiasticus*, XXXIII, 19-20.

⁴⁶¹ Mart. Dum. *De Moribus* S. 94.

⁴⁶² Mart. Dum. *De Moribus*. S. 94.

quickly chastised.”⁴⁶³ That is, the act of me giving counsel to you is very peaceful for me, if we are able to do this for the desire of friends and for harmony.

But Prudence, with a glad countenance and a smiling face, said: Respond properly, for you must propose to do this with the counsel of our friends and with the help of vengeance, thus, you must not neglect to seek the counsel of them for harmony and reconciliation. “It is very natural that an obligation should not be dissolved but by the same principles which were observed in contracting it,” says the law.⁴⁶⁴

And you must discuss this, so summon your faithful friends to the continent, your relatives, your esteemed kinsmen, and your faithful discoveries; speak to them all, who are written above, by means of recounting their rank, which is composed in what was previously said above, carefully pray for them. You will these men as true friends, after much investigation and careful examination of their aforementioned affairs, counsel them about reconciliation, praise making harmony and peace and commend them cordially.

Prudence listened this and carefully examined this and said: Always listen to what is said: because you are able to do good, wishing not to differ from it, and for that reason, counsel is must take place immediately, because it ought to take place after many obstacles. And, thus, you must send the news about the wisdom of harmony for you aforementioned adversaries, who said those things: that, if it pleases you, to mention the congregation in advance, the cause of the union and the concord, as to not delay summoning them, so they do not postpone coming to suitably take a vow of obedience to you. You kindly respond to them and you thank them for the news, they ask

⁴⁶³ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 489. W.

⁴⁶⁴ *Dig.* L, XVII, 35.

about the same things, as Lord Melibeus did when he brought back the news of his congregation, those who came immediately, and the orders of those in all forums and those who were ready to be obeyed by all.

However, when they want to come, there is one thing you must say: We compose our great congregation and we agree with our great congregation, as to honor those within the congregation. Another said: I make these things, as obstacles hinder our actions easily, for:

Whatever dangers the sea has, whatever dangers the earth has,
I suspect there to be such a long delay.⁴⁶⁵

Why must acquire this counsel without delay, because it pleases others. And, thus, we must immediately agree with our vows of obedience to the care of Lord Melibeus and other small and devoted men.

Then, Melibeus said to the rise among the others: It is true, that you have caused such great injury to me and my home and my daughter without a just cause by violently entering my home, about which you deserve to suffer in death; I wish to hear from you, if my previously mentioned vengeance pleases you or you wish to engage in battle with my wife Prudence.

They responded to those things by saying: Lord, we are unworthy to come to so great a court and a Lord of such excellence; for we united in such wickedness and we are worthy of death; nevertheless, we are relying on you, not to understand us or our power, but we came for the power of your customary mercy and benevolence, and we look to be ready to obey your orders and with oaths and vows of obedience in everything and through everything, we bend a knee as our tears flow, to obey in character and in affairs. And, thus, we fall to prostrate to the feet of Melibeus and Dame Prudence, with highest devotion they ask for pardons from them. Melibeus himself accepted

⁴⁶⁵ Ovid *Heroid.* Ep. I, v. 73-74.

this agreement by the kindness and support of his own hands and by his own aforementioned order, so that, on one occasion, he is able to anticipate those who are often against him, to choose and to proclaim his way of thinking. And he also anticipates those who represent themselves before perceiving themselves and accepting their own will and orders on the eighth day; for he wanted to treat himself with the doctor of his daughter who is regaining her health, and he wanted to consider the orders made with great deliberation and careful foresight. In such an order, all of these things, thenceforth, slip away with joy and delight.

After this rule, Melibeus, you must call for physicians, concerning the healing of your daughter. Why the physicians said: Look at your daughter as if she were free, it is not right for you to have doubts about her convalescence by any means. Melibeus repaid them plentifully, and he asked them to manage the health of his daughter most attentively.

Thus, when this was completed, Prudence, arose very in the morning in a far and secret location with Melibeus, and she said to him: Lord, be willing to listen to the kinds of orders that are pleasing to you and we will be willing to make that happen for your enemies.

And he said: I want to deprive those men of all good things and I want to order those men to transfer themselves overseas, not turning back until they are farthest from this place.

And she said: This order is unfair to these men, it is not in harmony with reason. Why, if you make the orders, you will never be able to live with honor; for, you step forth with more than enough wealth, you by no means lack money, and you enable yourself to be deservedly blamed with enthusiasm, which is customarily called, “the root of all evil.”⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁶ Paul *Epist. I ad Timoth.* VI. 10.

Appendix A.51 Chapter 50

On Good Reputation

For, it is best for you to admit of yourself, that which you hold back disgracefully. For it is written: “Prefer that which will destroy you to that which you disgracefully accept.”⁴⁶⁷ About which it is customarily said:

An honorable mind surpassed piled up treasures.⁴⁶⁸

For an honorable and good reputation is ruined by no treasure or money. Why Jesus of Sirach said: “Take care of a good name: for this shall continue with you, more than a thousand treasures precious and great.”⁴⁶⁹ For, it is also said: “The light of the eyes rejoices the soul: a good reputation fattens the bones.”⁴⁷⁰ Therefore, you must despise avarice entirely just as you despise injury entirely; for it is written: “Avarice will solicit injury with a bad reputation.”⁴⁷¹ Why Cassiodorus said: “You must try to control the benefit of reputation and neglect the increase of money. For the free-born soul is to be valued proof a favorable reputation; for a good man is recognized by a good reputation”⁴⁷² for it is said: He who is recognized for having a good reputation should be praised.”⁴⁷³ Why Salomon said: “A good name is better than great riches;”⁴⁷⁴ and he also said: “A good name is better than precious ointments.”⁴⁷⁵ And Seneca said: “The best

⁴⁶⁷ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 479. W.

⁴⁶⁸ Anonym. *Epistola ad Raynaldum* v. 189.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ecclesiasticus*, XLI, 15.

⁴⁷⁰ Salom. *Proverb.* XV, 30.

⁴⁷¹ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 135. W.

⁴⁷² Cassiod. *Variar.* L. III, Ep. 12.

⁴⁷³ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. IX, Ep. 22.

⁴⁷⁴ Salom. *Proverb.* XXII, 1.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ecclesiastes*, VII, 2.

opinion of men is safer than money;”⁴⁷⁶ because it is said that, “a good reputation holds its brightness in the midst of shadows.”⁴⁷⁷ Thus, it is said that money must be despised, the Apostle who spoke his order to protect all, said in his letter to Timothy: “Whatever of good reputation, think on this;”⁴⁷⁸ for a philosopher said, “leave all virtue unmentioned, but make reputation widely known.”⁴⁷⁹ You must admit to all reputation, if you desire to make such excellent orders. Since, therefore, it is written: “Glory” or reputation, “unless it has newly emerged, old glory and reputation must not be parted with,”⁴⁸⁰ you ought to desire not to part with those things but to restore them. However, that said, to be willing to order those things, so that they transfer themselves to parts overseas, not turning back until they are farthest away, seems unfair to me; for by surrendering the source of your honor in addition to your power and your dominion, you are willing to turn yourself over to everlasting dishonor and shame. For you ought to not waste power for those men over your own concession, since according to the law, “to part with earned privilege, is to concede yourself to wasted power.”⁴⁸¹ I say this additionally, because although you are able to do this according to the law, I do not concede to this, regarding your wish to carry out this low deed. Because if they do not want to carry out your unfair order with strength, it is right to return to advancing in battle with your blame and injury. Therefore, it is better for you to be obeyed, than it is for you to feebly order those men; for it is written: “It is better to be obeyed than to give a feeble order.”⁴⁸²

⁴⁷⁶ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 62. W.

⁴⁷⁷ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 69. W.

⁴⁷⁸ Paul *Epist. ad Philipp.* IV, 8.

⁴⁷⁹ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 266. W.

⁴⁸⁰ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 203. W.

⁴⁸¹ *Descretal. Gregor.* IX. III, 31, 18.

⁴⁸² Seneca *De Clementia* I, 24, 1.

Melibeus responded: It does not seem to me that my strong order is so unfair; for they ununited in such wickedness, they ought to die by sustaining corporal punishment from the law. Therefore, they must be punished a little bit, if suffering corporal punishment is too much; for cruel corporal punishment is favored by the law anywhere there is money, as the laws claim. Additionally, Jesus of Sirach said: “A kingdom is translated from one people to another, because of injustices, and wrongs, and injuries:”⁴⁸³ This is not harsh, if you are against injustices, wrongs, and injuries and those men being transferred from place to place, but their own nature must be parted with.

Prudence responded: Jesus of Sirach was speaking about divine judgement, the laws that speak about the severity of justice; but you ought not to discuss the divine law nor the severity of justice, but the power of peace and the benevolence of harmony. Why, I give counsel to you so that you do not injure those men in such a manner, but so you give up your evil order; for the emperor Constantine said: For he who tries to accomplish that which is bad, he desires to take benevolence captive alone; therefore, when the victor survives battle, he maintains victory. Thus, you must rule on this trouble in such a way, that you conquer your concession in this victory; and that you would be able to conquer this twice. For Seneca said: “He who conquers something twice, conquers it in victory;”⁴⁸⁴ “for he who conquers something continuously, learns to combine all things.”⁴⁸⁵ Thus, combine your courtesy and the mercy of your soul; for Cicero said: “Nothing is more praiseworthy, nothing is greater in a noble man than courtesy and mercy.”⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁸³ *Ecclesiasticus*, X, 8.

⁴⁸⁴ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 64. W.

⁴⁸⁵ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. II. Ep. 44.

⁴⁸⁶ Cicero *De Offic.* I, 25, 88.

Appendix A.52 Chapter 51

On Mercy and Piety and Compassion

And another said: “For he who conquers continuously makes use of mercy.”⁴⁸⁷ I say this to you additionally because piety and mercy are not only honored and revered a small or average amount, but because they adorn great kings and leaders, and they protect and preserve their authority. Why, St. Paul in his first letter to Timothy, said: “Piety is useful for all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come.”⁴⁸⁸ And Cassiodorus said: “Piety protects all leaders’ authority accordingly.”⁴⁸⁹ And Salomon said in Proverbs: “Compassion and truth preserve the king, and his throne is strengthened by mercy.”⁴⁹⁰ And the emperor Constantine said: And those who approve all the true lords are those who display themselves as true servants of piety. For we are capable of being true victors against everything, if we conquer piety alone. And Seneca, in his *De Clementia Imperatoris*, said: “Nothing is as suitable for wise men and kings than mercy;”⁴⁹¹ and again: “Those with the most angry and little bodies are bees, yet a king is without a sting.”⁴⁹² Therefore, you must administer this vengeance around courtesy, mercy, and piety: besides, if you administer unfair vengeance, disregarding what was previously said, you will suffer from a bad reputation after a victory of such a kind, and it will destroy you, because Seneca said: “He who conquers wickedly, is displeasing to victory;”⁴⁹³ for it is better to forgive, than to

⁴⁸⁷ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 500, W.

⁴⁸⁸ Paul *Ep. I ad Timoth.* IV, 8.

⁴⁸⁹ Cassiod. *Variar.* L. XII, Ep. 13.

⁴⁹⁰ Salom. *Proverb.* XX, 28.

⁴⁹¹ Seneca *De Clementia* I, 3, 3.

⁴⁹² Seneca *De Clementia* I, 19, 2.

⁴⁹³ Publil. Syrus *Sent.* 366, W.

be sorry after your victory. Why I give counsel to you, so that you follow Seneca's feelings, who said: "If, by chance, you see your enemies as under your rule, you will think that you are able to punish them through vengeance. For I know to pardon men of noble and great birth from vengeance."⁴⁹⁴ Thus, you must administer compassion in this trial of yours, so that God feels pity for you in your ultimate judgement and he spares you: besides, God will punish you without compassions. For St. Jacob said in his own letter: "For judgement without compassion is done to him that has not done compassion."⁴⁹⁵

You must carefully listen and learn this, Melibeus said: "Ointment and perfume rejoice the hard: and the good counsel of a friend are sweet to the soul."⁴⁹⁶ This is because I changed my order because of your sweet and agreeable counsel, I want to follow your benevolence, and I want to bring about your good will out of in this trouble to all and through everything.

Thus, coming to this final decree, his enemies agreed with what was previously said and took a vow of obedience to court of Lord Melibeus, and they bent their knees and wept at the feet of who they call Lord and Dame Prudence, they said as the prostrated: Look, we came prepared to obey your order in all and though all. Nevertheless, although we are unworthy, we beg of your power, so far as, you deem us worthy to grant us your pardon, you do not administer vengeance on us, but you supply us with your courteous power, mercy, and piety. For it will come from your power, as it is written: "I pardon many powerful men with my power."⁴⁹⁷

⁴⁹⁴ Mart. Dumiens. *De IV Virtutibus Card.* cap. II.

⁴⁹⁵ Jacob *Epist. Cath.* II, 13.

⁴⁹⁶ Salom. *Proverb.* XXVII, 9.

⁴⁹⁷ Publil. *Syrus Sent.* 350. W.

Then, Melibeus, from the good will and customs of Dame Prudence, said: Although, there is great pride preceded your reply to us, still there is power in the humility that accompanies it, which, even if it is minor, still it ought to be weighed before all bad things, since, in addition, we ought to benefit from what is good than experience harm from what is bad. Besides, your sweet words and mild responses alleviated our anger and indignation, additionally, the word of Salomon says: “A sweet word multiplies friends, and appeases enemies;”⁴⁹⁸ and again: “A mild answer breaks anger: but a harsh word stirs up fury;”⁴⁹⁹ and even a favored authority spoke on this: “The beginning of friendship is to speak well; to speak badly is the beginning of enmity.”⁵⁰⁰ And, in addition to our allegiance to you and the dismay and regret and sin in our hearts, our confession must lead in courtesy, mercy, and piety. Therefore, care for the neighborhood, because—as Salomon said—“Better is a neighbor who is near than a brother who is far off,”⁵⁰¹ and Cato said:

He who is able to be praised, will want to profit from it before it is too late.⁵⁰²

And we are trusting your word that you will fulfill your work by your expression: The love of God, your honor, and your duty to us and our part of the injury are diminished our anger and indignation, we admire you in our thanks and in our good will. And thus, we support those men with our hands, who are accepted in the mouth of peace. Melibeus, following in the footsteps of the Lord, said: “Go in peace, and sin no more.”⁵⁰³

And thus, they went back to each of their duties with joy and happiness.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ecclesiasticus*, VI, 5.

⁴⁹⁹ Salom. *Proverb*. XV, 1.

⁵⁰⁰ Isocrates *Orat. ad Demonicum*.

⁵⁰¹ Salom. *Proverb*. XXVII, 10.

⁵⁰² Dionysius Cato *De Moribus* L. IV, Distich. 39.

⁵⁰³ *Evang. sec. Joann*. VIII, 11.

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