Networking Strategies in Transnational Environmental Activism

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Since the early years of environmental activism, transnationally organized social movements have been crucial to advancing climate action within international politics. Transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) have developed robust, diverse strategies for achieving change, including but not limited to engagement with international governance organizations (IGOs). Historically, IGOs have tended to support market based, incremental carbon reductions, as opposed to more radical climate solutions that address the connection between global capitalism and the climate crisis. My research seeks to understand if TSMOs critical of the current political order are able to advance radical climate action within these historically reformist institutions. Drawing from updated data on the engagement of environmental social movements, I find that geographic location and the age of TSMOs continue to influence how much they engage with IGOs. However, I suggest that ideological alignment cannot fully explain the differences between pragmatic engagement and rejectionism. Rather among TSMOs critical of international environmental politics, the decision to engage with a given IGO is likely based upon the opportunities offered in the relationship and the usefulness of such opportunities. From this, I then analyze the specific opportunities that IGOs, reported by environmental TSMOs, provide and categorize these opportunities as influence or access. I argue that access opportunities, such as networking, that allow TSMOs to develop their movements, empower TSMOs to be in a better position to demand influence within international governance. I then suggest that spaces in which TSMOs are involved in designing how they participate have more potential to advance radical solutions. TSMOs are then able to operate as decision makers instead of actors trying to influence decision makers. Importantly, the affiliation and primary aim of IGOs influences what type of opportunities they provide such that we see developing collaboration among large UN affiliated IGOs, that could be suggestive of how international governance may come to support radical climate action.

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1.0 Introduction

To understand the future of climate action it is important to first understand why and how the current environmental movement has come to be. International climate politics consists of a wide range of actors not limited to an enormous, diverse network of activists working globally to mobilize solutions, international political agreements and agencies struggling to ensure meaningful commitments and many national governments and transnational corporations stalling action due to personal interests. Our ability to mitigate the worst effects of global warming will largely depend upon how these actors come together and compete for influence in international politics.

The globalization of national policies has forced activists to seek influence in actors beyond local and national governments, namely international actors like the UN, regional trade agreements and the WTO (Smith et al. 2017). This has brought about the development of a robust network of transnationally organized social movements (TSMOs), with the number of TSMOs growing from just about 100 organizations in 1953 to more than 2000 as of 2013 (Smith et al., 2017). These networks of organizations are "bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchanges of information and services" such that they are increasingly important actors on the international political stage (Keck & Sikkink, 2019, p. 2).

Not only has the number of TSMOs increased but the advancement of their networks has "helped fuel the growing participation of locally-based activist groups in global politics" and has "helped radicalize activist networks in these arenas" (Smith et al. 2017, p. 3). Transnational networks work both with IGOs and a wide number of other activists, ranging from short-term

cooperation to cohosting of events and even intensive movement building around common issues (Smith et al., 2017).

International governance has had a range of responses to the influx of social movements in global politics. A lack of democratic processes and continued emphasis on nation states in decision making has drawn the mechanisms of international governance under increased scrutiny by activists (Tallberg and Jonnson 2010). Globalized economic and political processes and the continued failure of national governments to address the deepening climate crisis and economic inequality suggest a much-needed shift away from the nation state as the most important form of international actor. This has created a normative call for IGOs to be more inclusive of a diverse set of actors in their operations, such that number of opportunities and resources available to TSMOs has greatly increased over the past two decades (Tallberg and Jonnson 2010).

However, this inclusion has not been uniform and is heavily influenced by the focus of international governance organizations (IGOs) and its membership, specifically powerful nation state members (Bond 2012). Member states work to limit the influence of TSMOs that challenge their particular national interest (Bond 2012). Additionally, though the number of opportunities provided by IGOs has increased over time, these opportunities may not be accessible or may not be meaningful in their inclusion of TSMO expertise, instead serving as a means of cooption (Smith et al. 2018). Finally, IGOs have been subject to heavy corporate influence both through direct lobbying and the indirect influence of corporations in national politics (Smith et al. 2018). So, even within the context of increased meaningful opportunities, TSMOs focused on anti-global capitalist work may not find strategic advantage to engaging with actors heavily influence by corporations (Smith et al. 2018).

From the range of ways IGOs have responded to growth of TSMOs, we see a corresponding range of strategies TSMOs have for engaging with international politics. Research by Jackie Smith and her colleagues found that TSMOs tended to report particular patterns of ties to IGOs. They identified three categories of TSMOs based on these ties: 1) *multilateralists*- those that are linked to a wide array of international agencies, 2) *pragmatists*- those that are more selective in their ties to IGOs, and 3) *rejectionists* those that don't report connections to IGOs and that operate outside the formal inter-state arena (Smith et al., 2020). This research found younger TSMOs have increasingly demonstrated rejectionist and pragmatist behavior (Smith et al., 2020).

Specifically, environmental groups appeared increasingly *pragmatic* in their approach to relationships with IGOs (Smith et al, 2020). This pragmatic approach allows TSMOs to be strategic in allocating time and energy to work with IGOs that gives them practical leverage in influencing climate action, namely through partnerships with treaties and treaty monitoring bodies. These particular partnerships may provide access to information on compliance such that TSMOs can work with IGOs and state leaders to strengthen compliance and influence the specifics of treaties (Smith et al. 2020). In this context IGOs can be categorized as operational and deliberative. Operational IGOs are considered international conventions and treaty monitoring bodies, which enforced specific legal commitments of states and may have mechanisms for monitoring compliance (Smith et al. 2020). Deliberative IGOs on the other hand are considered UN agencies and programmes based upon generalized mandates, and do not require specific policy commitments (Smith et al. 2020). Pragmatic environmental TSMOs more often reported ties to operational IGOs, as they provide access to resource and opportunities to advance their work, while still allowing TSMOs to distance themselves from the theoretical framing of established interstate politics. Specifically, when dividing environmental TSMOs into age cohorts, there did

not appear to be a difference in the number of ties they report to operational IGOs However, younger TSMOs (those founded after 1989) reported a lower number of ties to deliberative IGOs compared to older TSMOs.

I am interested in understanding how climate activism has continued to adapt their strategies in response to the increased political volatility and the persistent failures of national governments and international efforts to take action. I particularly focus on developments within the population of rejectionist and pragmatic TSMOs because I am interested in how environmental groups critical of established politics advance their goals within established politics. While it is suspected that multilateralist TSMOs are also strategic in their relationships with IGOs and may hold counterhegemonic values, focusing on developments of rejectionist and pragmatist allows us to more specifically discuss the strategic developments of TSMOs that work on solutions potentially more radical than those put forth by state actors.

I analyze both rejectionist and pragmatic environmental social movement organizations and the IGOs with which the pragmatic organizations report relationships. To most usefully build upon past research, I focus on the time frame of 2013-2019. I also analyze the opportunities IGOs offer TSMOs and how attributes of IGOs influence their provision of opportunities. Specifically, I divide provided opportunities between influence and access opportunities based upon if the opportunity provides TSMOs with a chance to influence the operations of the IGO or the chance to gain access to resources. I supplement this analysis with examples of relationships that exist between TSMOs and IGOs to see how the trends identified in my analysis manifest in real, dynamic relationships. These case studies in combination with my data analysis allow me to begin answering the questions of, “Can advocacy within IGOs advance radical solutions or must activists find other ways to bring about meaningful change?”

My research supports the findings of Smith et al (2020), with younger TSMOs and those located in the global south more often operating independent of established politics. However, overall, I note an increase in TSMO connectivity both to other non-governmental organizations and to IGOs. With this, I then looked to the opportunities provided by IGOs to understand how they may influence TSMO engagement strategies. Based upon an examination of IGOs to which TSMOs report ties, I analyze the opportunities and resources that different type of IGOs provide in established relationships. I find that some IGOs offer many basic opportunities and resources in high proportions, but more significant opportunities or resources are offered less frequently. The affiliation and primary aim of IGOs influences what type of opportunities they provide such that we see UN affiliated IGOs providing a relatively high number of both influence and access opportunities, suggesting the importance of UN affiliated IGOs in advancing the stance international governance as a whole takes towards radical environmental action.

From my case studies, I argue that TSMOs are not limited by the provision of influence opportunities and may engage with IGOs even in the absence of influence opportunities due to the range of ways that they have to enact pressure on IGOs. On the other hand, the provision of access opportunities is more important to ensure meeting spaces and informational resources to TSMOs. From this, I argue that the trends demonstrated in these relationships suggest that TSMOs are able to make use of engagement with IGOs to development their networks, use these networks to demonstrate their power and with this gain more opportunities to influence operations of IGOs. Specifically, we see that as demonstrated in the FAO's Committee of World Food Security, when TSMOs are involved in the planning the operations around partnerships they can advance progressive and even radical solutions. While rejectionist work is important for allowing TSMOs to strategize and put forth ideas more radical than what is generated by governance organizations,

I argue that in spaces where TSMO expertise is truly prioritized, the mechanisms of global governance may be capable of advancing radical climate solutions in a more diverse political arena and to a wider array of actors.

2.0 Literature Review

Transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) "challenge dominating political ideas and cultural codes as well as existing power structures" (Soyez, 2000, p. 8). As technological advancements made it easier for people working locally to connect with one another, independent, locally rooted work became global movements. Connectivity increased the organizational capacity of these groups, as they were able to share resources, knowledge and experience (Smith et al., 2017). Additionally, it also created a wider diversity in the types of people involved and the ways in which these groups function as there's been an increase in the number of activists and organizations based in the global south (Smith et al. 2017).

This proliferation of transnational advocacy groups signals widespread discontent with global economic and environmental practices. In some ways, the very means by which these organizations enact change is a critique of global capitalism, but with an increase in the diversity of these organizations there has been an increase in the number of those working explicitly against global capitalism. In the past 30 years transnational activists have targeted and engaged with international governance more frequently and intensely (Hadden 2015). TSMOs have also been able to take advantage of civil society spaces such as the World Social Forum, to create alliances and build networks. Importantly, these spaces are independent from established political actors, allowing for activists to come together to develop their critiques of global capitalism (Bond 2012). This can be understood as a convergence of activists' critiques of the global economic and political system (Smith et al. 2018). So, by the mid 1990s transnational organizations had a growing consensus that issues as disparate as housing rights, climate change and racial justice, had a common root cause in global capitalism (Smith et al. 2018). At the same time that these groups

were strengthening their critiques of global capitalism, they were also compiling their vision for an alternative future.

Within the environmental movement, this convergence of analysis has had huge effects on the types of TSMOs working on 'environmental' issues and how TSMOs are going about working for such action. First, while practices related to sustainable land and resource use have been central to many indigenous communities around the world for generations, in countries of the global north it was not until the environmental degradation of the industrial revolution that notions of conservation caught on (Armerio & Sedrez 2014). In this context, conservation meant that areas of nature needed to be preserved and protected from human development. Prior to 2008 the environmental movement had largely consisted of one network that embodied western ideals of conservation, Climate Action Network (CAN). CAN is still active, representing a reformist perspective on environmental issues through the cooperation of well-established NGO's (Reitan and Gibson 2012). CAN's advocacy has largely emphasized the UN interstate and focused on incremental carbon reductions through carbon trading and offsets (Bond 2010). This has proven to be a 'false solution', thus leading many activist groups to emerge as critical of CAN (Bond 2010, p. 287).

This reached a tipping point following the 2007 global recession, as anti-neoliberal and global justice movement organizations 'spilled over' into the environmental movement (Hadden 2015). This influx of diverse organizations with a background in global justice encouraged the adaptation of climate justice ideals and language in the global environmental discourse (Hadden 2015). These ideals are embodied in recently emerged networks within the environmental movement, Climate Justice Now and Climate Justice Action (Hadden 2015). Climate Justice Now

and Climate Justice Action are both more critical of established climate politics, proposing more radical options than supported within the established political arena (Hadden, 2015).

This change in the composition of the environmental movement and what issues are deemed environmental alongside other trends in global politics has also changed the way environmental TSMOs organize and how they engage with IGOs. Not only has an influx of global justice oriented TSMOs into the environmental movement diversified the types of groups working on environmental issues, an expanded understanding of climate work also means a larger group of actors is relevant to 'environmental' work. Additionally, based on Smith et al.'s dataset that extends until 2013, the 'founding cohort', the range of years in which the organization was founded, was identified as the most important factor in determining TSMO's relationship strategy with IGOs (Smith et al. 2020). The founding cohort was classified as starting before or after 1989, citing the importance of the end of the cold war on the global political order (Smith et al., 2020). Older, more established organizations were more likely to be multilateralists, while younger organizations were disproportionately pragmatists and rejectionists (Smith et al. 2020). This categorization controlled for the effect of younger TSMOs lacking access and resources necessary to build connections by only including TSMOs which report connections to NGOs. The details of this idea are available in the appendix.

These longitudinal trends, identified by Smith et al. (2020), are also reflected in the research conducted by Hadden on the UNFCCC's 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15). Importantly, Hadden's research provides an understanding of how organizations operate depending on their engagement status with IGOs. Hadden categorized organizations as conventional or contentious based upon the tactics an organization used towards IGOs. Conventional organizations tended to attend conferences and lobby politicians, whereas

contentious organizations tended to hold demonstrations and public awareness campaigns (Hadden 2015). So, Hadden's research does the very important work of demonstrating how TSMOs work with and outside of established politics to achieve their aims, namely through conventional and contentious action, respectively. Pragmatist TSMOs likely deploy both conventional and contentious actions to achieve their aims, depending on the specific IGO they are engaging with. It is the importance of specific IGOs in determining engagement strategy that is of interest in this research.

Social movement organizing is flexible and adaptive, such that groups do not base decision making on ideological grouping, but rather the specific advantages and disadvantages of an opportunity. Meaning, a TSMO categorized as rejectionist is likely critical of established politics. Yet, the chance to have input on a meaningful and relevant treaty may be important enough to their goals that they are willing to work with an IGO to do so. Because of the flexibility of TSMO work, the notion of strategic engagement is not exclusively demonstrated in pragmatic TSMOs. Rejectionist and multilateralist TSMOs also weigh decisions in this way and may move between these categories depending on available opportunities. But, for the sake of this research, strategic engagement is explicitly demonstrated in TSMOs categorized as pragmatic in that we can see the limited ties they maintain and to what IGOs these ties are reported. This allows us to analyze what IGOs offer to TSMOs and how this engagement helps TSMOs achieve their aims.

To understand the type of opportunities that IGOs provide TSMOs, I return to the distinction of operational vs. deliberative put forward by Smith et al. (2020). Again, deliberative IGOs operate more generally and do not require commitments from members. Deliberative IGOs are designed to aid national responses to emerging challenges and contribute to consensus building around global norms (Smith et al. 2020). Deliberative IGOs are usually where treaties and

conventions are initiated, based upon generalized norms surrounding the issue. On the other hand, operational IGOs include international conventions and treaty monitoring bodies, which require specific legal commitments from states. Without a transnational state, treaty compliance is difficult to enforce. TSMOs play an important role in this way, as their ability to draw international attention to governments' treaty violations helps enforce treaty compliance (Smith et al. 2020). So, TSMOs gain access to resources and data through participating in compliance mechanisms.

From these two types of IGOs, we can begin to theorize opportunities that IGOs provide TSMOs. We saw the propensity of environmental groups to maintain relationships with operational IGOs because these relationships provide access to enforceable policy and compliance information (Smith et al. 2020). On the other hand, while environmental groups appeared to partner with deliberative IGOs less often, it is suggested by our understanding of multilateralists, that TSMOs are interested in deliberative IGOs to participate in more general global norm building. From this I propose two categories of opportunities that IGOs offer to TSMOs based upon pressure from activists to include social movements in global politics.

First, based upon the relationships demonstrated between operational IGOs and TSMOs I suggest the category of access. I considered access opportunities to be opportunities that provided TSMOs with resources, information or networks they would not otherwise have. I also suggest the category of influence based upon deliberative IGOs and more generally the appeal of international governance in the absence of a transnational state. I considered influence opportunities to include opportunities that allow TSMOs to have a say in the operations of IGOs, either through feedback mechanisms, the ability to participate in planning events or similar opportunities. While this binary provides a theoretical basis, I do not suspect that the categories of influence and access correspond to the deliberative vs. operative nature of IGOs. Rather these general categories capture the range

of opportunities provided by both types of IGOs. The specifics of these categories were developed in my data collection and there are more details on the procedure available in the following chapter.

Past research on environmental activism has demonstrated the constantly evolving nature of the environmental movement, as activists are developing strategies in real time to political, social, economic and environmental changes. We have seen the consistent failure of actors too embedded in the global capitalist system and the solutions they put forward, such that there is momentum towards global justice-oriented climate action that challenges the underlying causes of the crises and works to urgently mitigate the worst effects of warming. The role of social movements in leading this action is unquestionable given the role such groups have had in not only advancing climate action but bringing attention to the connection between the capitalist globalization of our political and economic systems and the climate crisis.

However, the hegemonic hold of global capitalist logic and the current mechanisms of international governance have historically and continue to emphasize the importance of nation state leadership over the expertise and experience of TSMOs. Effective climate action depends on the involvement of social movement groups being able to advance 'true solutions' as opposed to those based upon carbon markets and offsets (Bond 2010). This is the area of literature to which my research seeks to contribute. Understanding how TSMOs and IGOs currently interact and relate to one another sheds light on the larger power dynamics at play in determining how we may address the climate crisis. While I specifically focus on TSMOs categorized as rejectionist and pragmatic, the conclusions of how TSMOs are choosing to interact with IGOs and what motivates this engagement is relevant beyond the academic categories. Rather, I argue an understanding of why TSMOs engage with particular IGOs will advance our understanding of the ability of international governance to advance radical social movement led solutions.

3.0 Methodology

3.1 Data Collection: TSMOs

3.1.1 Source

For all data collection related to TSMOs I used the Yearbook of International Organizations. The Yearbook is published by The Union of International Associations and contains data on 73,000 international organizations, both IGOs and NGOs. The print versions of the Yearbook are updated yearly. The data for the Yearbooks are gathered year-round by soliciting organizations for updated information. The Yearbook reports that, on average, the response rate is about 35%, so profiles for organizations that do not provide updated information are supplemented by editors with information from websites, annual reports and similar documents (Union of International Associations). The IGO relationships reported by TSMOs refers to both formal relationships statuses, such as consultative status, as well as informal reported relationships. This information is available in two sections of the yearbook entries. “Consultative Status” refers to formal relationships and “IGO Relations” refers to informal relationships. Both categories were included in the count of ties to IGOs

3.1.2 Organizations of Interest

Drawing from Smith and her colleagues’ dataset on all transnational SMOs active as late as 2013, I selected the subset of environmental TSMOs that were categorized as environmental in

2013. From this, I selected all environmental TSMOs categorized as rejectionist or pragmatist and then collected additional data on all groups that were initially or that later became (according to Smith et al.'s coding) pragmatist or rejectionist for the years 2015, 2017 and 2019. Recognizing that the categorization of environmental is somewhat arbitrary, I used Smith et al.'s classification (Smith et al. 2020), which includes organizations focused on climate change, conservation, pollution, animal rights as well as those with environmental goals in regard to peace, development, human rights, third world debt abolition, food sovereignty and anti-consumerism.

3.1.3 Focus of Analysis

For all of these organizations, I collected data on the number of ties a TSMO reports to IGOs and NGOs and any available information on finances. If listed, I recorded the IGOs to which organizations reported ties. Additionally, I verified the data Smith and team collected on these organizations related to primary aim, founding year and headquarter location. Because these attributes are not expected to change, I only verified them for the 2015 data collection and my results were consistent with the data as of 2013. Relationships with IGOs were quantified as the number of relationships TSMOs report. I also coded additional variables for attributes of IGOs. I used dummy variables to express the operational[1] (0) or deliberative [2](1) nature of IGOs. I also coded headquarter location as a binary, between the global south (0) and global north (1), following

[1] Operational refers to "international conventions and treaty monitoring bodies, which reflect specific legal commitments of states, and may involve routinized mechanisms for monitoring government compliance with international agreements" (Smith et al. 2020, 5)

[2] Deliberative refers to "UN agencies and programmes, which operate with more generalized mandates, and do not require specific policy commitments from members" (Smith et al. 2020, 5)

the procedure as used by Smith and team. I collected data on budget amounts and funding sources when provided to be used in future research.

3.1.4 Analytical Approach

The analysis of TSMOs can be broken down into two sections. First, I identified trends across the timeframe of 2015-2019. Specifically, I analyzed the number of organizations that reported differing numbers of ties to IGOs. The second portion is dedicated to analyzing how basic attributes influence the engagement strategies of TSMOs. I did this analysis separately for each year. I used variables related to the age, location, primary aim and NGO connectivity to understand how these attributes relate to engagement strategies. I used basic statistics to determine the significance of these trends.

3.2 Data Collection: International Governance Organizations

3.2.1 Organizations of Interest

I defined the sample of IGOs based upon those to which that TSMOs report ties. Not every TSMO listed their ties explicitly, so this sample is limited in that it does not reflect all the relationships that environmental TSMOs maintain with IGOs. Beyond a simple lack of reporting, the political environment of international climate politics is complex and fluid such that TSMOs and IGOs are brought together in new and unanticipated ways that may not qualify as relationships reported to the Yearbook. For example, many IGOs allow for ‘informal relationships’ that can be

extensive yet are not necessarily reflected in this data. Because of this limitation, the sample of IGOs likely only represents more significant relationships or those which TSMOs felt comfortable reporting. To ensure the significance of the IGOs I analyzed, I only recorded information on IGOs that were reported by at least two TSMOs. This helped ensure that the IGOs are relevant within the broader environmental movement as opposed to the specific interest of an individual TSMO.

3.2.2 Focus of Analysis

I collected data on all 29 IGOs reported by at least two TSMOs. I read through these IGOs' mission statement and policies relevant to TSMOs in order to gather information on the resources and opportunities they provide TSMOs. I collected information on basic attributes of the IGO, similar to the information collected on TSMOs. Specifically, I recorded the founding year, headquarter location, primary aim and operational vs. deliberative nature of the organization. I also recorded dummy variables to capture affiliation with significant multilateral organizations, namely the UN, EU and World Bank. Additionally, I coded a dummy variable for independent IGOs, referring to IGOs not affiliated with one of the identified multilateral organizations. Similar to how these attributes were used to understand how historic dynamics influence TSMO behavior, it was thought that location, primary aim and proximity to larger organizations may influence the resources and opportunities IGOs are able to provide.

3.2.3 Analytical Approach

To gather this data, I consulted resources provided by the IGOs. All of the actors I studied maintain websites. I gathered basic information related to their location and founding year from

the *About Us* section of these websites. To gather information on the primary aim of actors, I consulted the first sentences of their home page or *About Us* page. For operational actors, specifically UN treaties and Conventions, I consulted the Role of the Secretariat in order to record the primary aim. This information can be relied upon due to the visibility of these areas of the website. Websites have become the most important means of communication between organizations and their audience (Ash et al. 2012). In this way, it is expected that these pages reflect the most up to date information on these organizations.

Gathering information on the policies towards engagement with TSMOs was less straightforward. Most IGOs had a subsection of the website devoted to partnership. The partnership subsection was housed under titles about the IGO's work such as, *Our Work, What We Do, Where We Work* and similar phrases, which was usually the second or third subsection after *About Us*. Within the partnership subsection, I gathered information from the *Nongovernmental Partners/Actors* or *Civil Society Actors* section. This page usually provided some information on the opportunities available through partnership and admission requirements. While the titles *nongovernmental partners* and *civil society* refers to a larger category of organization than that of TSMO, in most cases, it was the most relevant information available.

However, I only relied upon the information on the partnership page of these websites if a *Guide to Partnership* was not available. The guides for partnership varied in their exact title but they were usually linked as a pdf at the bottom of the *Partnership* page or provided in a side heading under a title such as *For Civil Society Organizations*. These guides provided much more detailed explanations of the opportunities available through partnership, the different levels of partnership available and the exact protocols for application and admission requirements. Additionally, because this information was written for civil society organizations and was usually

not displayed in a format for the more general audience, I expected it to be more reflective of the true nature of these relationships.

For every opportunity or resource provided I categorized it as either an influence or access opportunity. There was a large overlap in institutionalized opportunities, with the majority of IGOs providing the same types of opportunities. From this list, I identified more general categories to capture the range of opportunities provided by the identified IGOs. For influence opportunities, my 6 identified opportunities explicitly capture all of the opportunities noted in my data collection. However, there was a bit more variation in the access opportunities. Some IGOs were able to provide meeting spaces, access to libraries and grounds passes among many other varied resources. This range could only be effectively captured by the factor "other resources".

I considered influence opportunities to include the opportunity for established sustainable relationships, representation of social movements in the IGO and the ability to provide feedback through lobbying as well as participating in events. Participation in events primarily refers to participation in general conferences in which TSMOs are able to submit written and oral statements. Participation in more significant events or meetings such as workshops or pre-conference meetings was captured in the notion of providing feedback. This is made more explicit in the scoring scheme at the end of the chapter. I considered access opportunities to be the ability to attend events and meetings, have networking opportunities, organize events, and access data, meeting spaces, networking information and other similar resources.

For the analysis of the ties, attributes of interest refer to the general category of opportunities. Some attributes of interest have 2 possible points due to the wide range of opportunities relevant to the attribute. For each possible point I used a guiding question and acceptable response to determine the assignment of points. For each IGO I consider all of the

questions for each attribute of interest, assigning points accordingly. The points for each attribute of interest are then added together to provide an overall score for each IGO. Below I provide the tables reflecting this scoring scheme. However, the appendix holds the explicit scoring for each IGO. With these scores I was able to use regression to analyze the influence of different characteristics on the way that actors behave towards TSMOs. This also allowed me to identify the most common influence and access opportunities.

Table 1 Scoring for Influence Opportunties

Attribute of InterestA	**Established Relationships**	**Representation**	**Mechanisms for Accountable Feedback**	**Mechanisms for Accountable Feedback**	**Ability to Participate in Events**	**Ability to Participate in Events**
Guiding Question	Are there established relationship roles for social movement organizations with a clear means to achieving this status?	Are there permanent positions in the organization held by social movement organizations representatives?	Are social movement organizations able to provide feedback to partner?	Are social movement organizations able to contribute feedback in planning and goal setting?	Can social movement organizations speak/ present/submit written comments at events?	Can social movement organizations lobby decision makers?
Accepted Answers	Any titled role for social movement organizations that are involved with the established global actor (ex: observer, consultative)	Any permanent position designated for civil society representatives	Online mechanisms for lodging complaints/feedback, time allocated during conferences for feedback	Involvement of SMOs in planning sessions, allocated time for feedback/public comment on plans/policies before or outside of general conference meetings	Process for submitting comments, open questions/discussion time during general meetings	Designated time for lobbying, allocated meeting times with decision makers or less formally designated time for discussion

Table 2 Scoring Guide for Access Opportunities

Attribute of Interest	**Attend Events**	**TSMO Events**	**TSMO Events**	**Access to Information**	**Access to other Opportunities**
Guiding Question	Are TSMOs invited to attend conferences or meetings of the IGO?	Are there events specifically designated for STMOs?	Can TSMOs organize their own events affiliated with the IGO?	Are TSMO's able to access information from organizations?	Does IGO provide access to other resources?
Accepted Answers	Public meetings, widely attended/accessible conferences, TSMOs invited to attend events of interest	TSMO networking events, meetings specifically for SMO expertise	Organize events as apart of larger conference, Receive patronage from IGO, events otherwise sponsored by IGO	Accessible data, published reports, guides, access to historic documents, access to organizational planning,	Access to grounds passes, libraries, meeting spaces, access to contact information, website space, training opportunities, online courses, access to feedback and evaluation and similar

4.0 Results

Based upon the analysis as outlined in Chapter 3, my results are split into discussions of TSMOs and the IGOs with which they report ties. By splitting the analysis, I am better able to describe trends and development in each population of organizations. Chapter 5 then builds upon these ideas and explicitly discusses the relationships between these two types of actors. This chapter begins with a discussion of TSMOs, how they have developed over the time frame 2015-2019 and attributes of importance in understanding their behavior towards established interstate politics. I then discuss the IGOs these TSMOs report ties to, analyzing the factors that make these actors appealing partners and ultimately the potential these relationships hold for advancing radical climate solution.

4.1 TSMOs

The analysis of TSMOs suggests that organizations' behavior and strategies are responding in real time to global and regional political and economic developments. However, past research has suggested that using basic attributes of TSMOs to predict behavior also demonstrates that the age and primary aim of TSMOs influences the strategies they deploy. This tension is at the heart of this analysis, as I try to make sense of how organizations constrained by global institutional and power structures can intervene strategically to advance counterhegemonic agendas. In this section, I outline both the ways this TSMO network has changed over the time frame 2015-2019 as well as discuss the attributes that may influence their strategies more generally.

4.1.1 Trends 2015-2019

While the time period of interest is short, it is still important to understand how behavior and strategies of TSMOs may have changed in response to significant developments and changing political realities during the latter half of the 2010 decade. This research analyzes hypotheses developed over longitudinal studies of TSMOs and places these ideas in the context of a more volatile time in world history. A combination of decreased American influence abroad, increases in volatility within the US, the long-term impacts of the 2008 financial crisis and more general trends of growing inequality, social unrest and the growing impacts of climate change have made the past decade unprecedented in international politics and the effects on social movement organizing are not yet fully understood.

Politically, the number of organizations classified as rejectionist or pragmatist decreased from **223** to **204**. Every year between 12-15 rejectionist and pragmatist TSMOs became categorized as multilateralist, while the number of multilateralist that became categorized as rejectionist or pragmatist during this frame was only 2. A few TSMOs became inactive or did not report enough data for individual years, thus being categorized as blank, but for the most part it appears that more TSMOs were increasingly practicing multilateralist behavior. The proportion of TSMOs categorized as rejectionist vs pragmatist remained consistent throughout this time frame with a range of 2-10 TSMOs switching between these classifications each year. However, my research only tracked groups that existed as of 2013 so it is possible that new rejectionist and pragmatist could have been founded during this period. This is a concern future research could address.

Meanwhile, connectivity with NGOs increased. The average number of connections TSMOs reported during this time frame increased from **2.67** in 2015 to **3.05** in 2019, with 2017 in the middle at **2.97**. I examined subsets of the general population based on basic attributes like location, age and primary aim. There was no large divergence in these subgroups between the years, with these attributes demonstrating similar influences throughout the time frame. Chi-square test suggested that the discrepancies between years was not significant. However, when viewed in light of the political developments over this short time frame, the increase in general connectivity (to IGOs and NGOs) is important in understanding how TSMOs may be responding to the current political reality, with connectivity and relationships with actors that prioritize some notion of democracy as more appealing in light of the growth of nationalist populism and the threat of 21st century fascism (Robison, 2014).

4.1.2 Influential Attributes

To understand what influences the strategic choices of TSMOs, I examined the influence of basic attributes of TSMOs. Geographic location, age, primary aim, and connectivity to other NGOs. By considering the counts and averages of subsets of the overall sample, it is possible to gain an understanding of how these attributes influence the political strategies of TSMOs.

The location of TSMOs was coded to assign values based upon headquarters location in the global south or global north. The number of TSMOs headquartered in the global south ranged from 57-62 throughout the timeframe, comprising about **25%** of the total number of TSMOs. Of TSMOs located in the global south, 29-35 organizations (**50.8-58.3%)** exhibited rejectionist behavior compared to below **50%** for TSMOs based in the global north**.** There is considerable correlation between the variables related to location and age, with higher proportion of TSMOs

headquartered in the global south founded after 1989, which as explained earlier, is a crucial year, as the end of the cold war, in the global political order. The age of the organization was split into two groups: those founded before or after 1989. In younger organizations, for those founded after 1989, **47-50%** of TSMOs demonstrated rejectionist behavior. This proportion was about **46%** for TSMOs founded before 1989.

Table 3: Primary Aims

Environmental	Environmental +	Global Justice	Other
Conservation, Animal Rights, pollution, other exclusively environmental issues	Sustainable development, other economic environmental issues such as surrounding industries or energy use, peace/development /rights and environmental issues	Anti-capitalism, democratizing global institutions, anti-corporation, solidarity	any other aim

The primary aims of the TSMOs were classified into four categories: environmental, environmental and social (abbreviated as environmental+), global justice and other. The table above explains the specifics of each category. Of TSMOs primarily concerned with environmental matters 48-51 (**44.95-50.5%)** were rejectionist. Those with a broader environmental focus (environmental+) were **37.3 - 46%** rejectionist. Finally, those dedicated to a broad focus of global justice were **50 - 53.8%** rejectionist. This trend, with global justice organizations representing the highest proportion of rejectionist TSMOs is consistent with how we expected such aims to influence behavior. The difference between an exclusively environmental and more broadly environmental focus was smaller but still apparent, suggesting that the broader focus of

environmental and social issues may encourage TSMOs to engage with IGOs due to the broader nature of their work. These trends support the findings of research conducted by Smith et al. (2020) with TSMOs founded after 1989 and TSMOs headquartered in the global south as more likely to be categorized as rejectionist. Additionally, in these years we saw that among TSMOs categorized as environmental+ there was a lower proportion of rejectionist TSMOs, while TSMOs categorized as global justice had a higher proportion of rejectionists.

Table 4 Environmental TSMOs Attributes (frequencies and standard deviations)

	2015	**2017**	**2019**
Pragmatist	116 (47%) *0.500*	114 (49%) *0.5*	108 (48%) *0.500*
Founded after 1989	94 (38%) *0.48*	78 (33%) *0.47*	74 (33%) *0.47*
HQ Global South	58 (23.5) *0.42*	62 (26.5) *0.44*	62 (28%) *0.450*
Environmental Primary Aim	120 (48.5%) *0.5*	116 (49.5%) *0.501*	115 (51%) *0.500*
Environmental+ Primary Aim	84 (34%) *0.475*	69 (29.5%) *0.459*	71 (31.5%) *0.466*
Global Justice Primary Aim	29 (12%) *0.32*	32 (14%) *0.331*	26 (11.5) *0.302*
Other Primary Aim	16 (6.5) *0.246*	18 (7.5) *0.269*	16 (7%) *0.254*
Total number	247	233	225

Overall, this sample of TSMOs averaged about **2.8** connections to NGOs, but this number ranged widely with some TSMOs reporting 20+ connections. Rejectionist and pragmatism groups appeared to maintain relatively similar number of connections. TSMOs headquartered in the global south reported slightly more connections than those in the global north, as did younger TSMOs, though these differences were small. One TSMO, the Ban Terminator Campaign reported 45 ties to NGOs, while the other reported numbers were below 20. Removing the Ban Terminator Campaign lowers the overall average to **2.58** and suggests a larger difference between the averages

for rejectionist and pragmatist TSMOs, with rejectionist averaging around **2.4** and pragmatist averaging about **2.8**, such that we see a slight correlation between connections to NGOs and IGOs.

My analysis on the attributes and engagement strategies of environmental TSMOs over this time frame strongly support the longitudinal findings of Smith et al. (2020). However, to build upon these findings, we must not only further support the pragmatic strategies of environmental TSMOs but also try to understand why this pragmatism is advantageous and why some environmental TSMOs continue to engage with international governance despite strong critiques of such institutions from the environmental movement. In Smith et al.'s research on the categories of multilateralist and rejectionist, environmental groups complicated this binary, not clearly demonstrating rejectionist or multilateralist behavior, thus forcing the introduction of the idea of pragmatist. For TSMOs focused on other issues, the attributes of location and age appeared to serve as a proxy for ideological alignment, thus influencing how TSMOs engaged with international governance. However, the pragmatic engagement of environmental TSMOs appears to suggest that ideology cannot fully explain how and when TSMOs decide to engage with IGOs. Rather, a TSMO's choice to deploy rejectionist versus pragmatist behavior may instead rely upon the TSMO's specific framing or understanding of their goals, the IGOs that work in their field, and the opportunities that exist in relationships with those IGOs.

4.2 IGOs

The conclusions of the previous section suggest that factors besides TSMO attributes must play a part in determining why TSMOs may engage with IGOs despite demonstrated criticality of international politics. So, as explained in the methodology chapter, I next examined IGOs to

understand how the specific opportunities offered in these relationships may affect engagement strategies of TSMOs. I analyzed IGOs to which more than one environmental TSMO reported ties. This resulted in 29 actors of interest. However, I was only able to fully gather data on 24 of the 29 actors. I include information on all 29 in my discussion of counts and averages when possible. While only 29 IGOs were reported by two or more TSMOs, 168 IGOs were reported by at least one. This large difference in the number IGOs reported by one TSMO and the number reported by at least two suggests there is high level of specificity within the population of IGOs such that there is only a small number of IGOs that are more generally appealing to a range of TSMOs.

Of the 29 IGOs reported by at least two TSMOs, **51.7**% were affiliated with the UN and **20.6%** affiliated with the EU. The remaining roughly **30%** of IGOs were categorized as independent. Independent refers to organizations not affiliated with the UN, EU or other national governments. The Helsinki Commission as a US government agency was an exception to these categories. About **24%** of the IGOs were headquartered in the global south and close to **35%** were considered young, founded after 1989. Additionally, about a quarter of these actors were considered operational. As for the primary aim, I added a few categories to those used to categorize TSMOs. Governance as a primary aim referred to regional or global organizations that uphold political agreements and agendas, such as the European Commission. Development as a primary aim captured IGOs working on economic and infrastructure development, such as the UNDP. Peace/Human Rights as a category referred to IGOs working globally to maintain peace and protect human rights, such as the UNHCR. Environment and environmental+ are defined in the same way as in the analysis of TMSOs' primary aims. The categories are mutually exclusive. There is a roughly proportional distribution among the five categories, with environmentally focused IGOs representing the largest portion.



Figure 1 Primary Aims of IGOs

4.2.1 The Opportunities

Overall, I found that on average political actors provided **2.069/6** influence opportunities and **2.034/5** access opportunities, combined to average **4.103/11.** IGOs provided less of total influence opportunities than access opportunities. However, there was a wide range in the percentage of IGOs that provided each opportunity. For influence opportunities, the percentage of IGOs that provided opportunities ranged from **16%** (for the ability to lobby decision makers) to **83%** (for ability to provide feedback). There is a similar discrepancy in access opportunities, though the range was a bit smaller, from **20%** (for TSMOs to be able to organize their own events) to **67%** (for opportunity to access information). This wide range appears to be due to the significance of the opportunity or resource. For example, **83%** of IGOs provide the opportunity to provide feedback through online mechanisms or specific events but only **25%** of IGOs provide the opportunity to provide feedback in planning sessions or during planning phases of operations. Similarly, we see that IGOs are willing to provide informational resources to TSMOs, through the high proportion of actors that invite TSMOs to attend events, and that are willing to share data. However, resources designed specifically for TSMOs—such as those that require additional work

or resources beyond the IGO's primary function, such as organizing TSMO networking events or allowing TSMOs to organize events at conferences—are less commonly provided.

In this way, the IGOs provided more basic influence and access opportunities in high proportions but did not offer more substantial opportunities as often. This is expected, as IGOs likely want to minimize the amount of time and resources they deploy to the support of TSMOs while still publicly appearing supportive of local struggles and civil society generally. However, because these IGOs were reported by at least two TSMOs during this timeframe we can see that the opportunities and resources provided may still be telling of how engagement may be strategically advantageous, especially when discussed in the context of case studies.



Figure 2 Influence Opportunities Percent Provided



Figure 3 Access Opportunties Percent Provided

Operational IGOs appeared to preform slightly worse than deliberative IGOs (**4.5** vs. **4.61**). Deliberative IGOs provided more access opportunities than influence opportunities, while operational IGOs provided more influence opportunities than access opportunities. Organizations headquartered in the global south and organizations founded before 1989 provided slightly more opportunities. The influence of actor affiliation appeared to be more significant, with the UN affiliated IGOs out preforming EU affiliated and independent IGOs. Noteworthy is the low performance of EU affiliated actors. The primary aim of the IGO also appeared to be important. Environmentally focused IGOs averaged the lowest, while multi-issue IGOs, such as those focused on human rights or development, all scored relatively high.



Figure 4 Provision of Opportunities by IGO Primary Aim

4.2.2 Modeling:

I preformed cross validated stepwise linear regression, with all three influence, access and total as response variables in three independent models. I built the models with founding year, primary aim, actor affiliation, type of actor (operational vs. deliberative) and location as predictors and the number of provided opportunities as the response. Stepwise regression preforms variable selection, generating models based on the number of variables that optimize prediction accuracy and therefore identify the most important variables. These stepwise generated models performed well with two of the models reporting R squared values above 0.80. Notably, the Access model was built upon several more variables than the other two and had a much low r squared value.

Provided Opportunities= β_0 + β_1Founding Year + β_2HQ Location + β_3Type(UN) + β_4Type(EU)+β_5Type (World Bank)+ β_6Type (Indep.) + β_7Primary Aim(Envi.)+ β_8 Primary Aim (Envi.+) + β_9 Primary Aim (Human Rights) + β_{10}Primary Aim (Develop.) + β_{11}Primary

Total *R squared=.824*

(Intercept)	UN	EU
2.750000	3.183333	-1.416667

Influence *R squared=.98*

(Intercept)	UN	Envi
0.7459334	2.3710302	0.3113865

Access *R squared=.4747*

(Intercept)	`Founding year`	UN	EU	Envi	`Envi+`
27.81139382	-0.01319692	0.99562526	-0.75175388	-0.37498227.	-0.03547629

Table 5 Modeling Coefficients

The model for the total number of opportunities provided suggests UN affiliated IGOs provide more opportunities while EU affiliated IGOs provide fewer. The model for influence opportunities also suggests the positive influence of UN affiliation. Notably, the primary aim of environmental was also noted as positively significant. The model for access opportunities was less significant and built upon several more variables. Again, there is the positive influence of UN affiliation. However, this model suggests the negative influence of founding year, such that younger organizations provided fewer access opportunities. Notably, this model also suggested a slightly negative influence of environmental and environmental+ primary aims.

Together, these models suggest the significance of UN affiliation in the provision of opportunities. This can be understood as both a product of the ideological alignment of the UN as well as the UN's access to resources. The positive influence of environment as a primary aim on influence opportunities suggests that environmental IGOs seek the input of TSMOs within the environmental movement in their operations. However, the negative influence of environmental

focus on access opportunities suggests that environmental IGOs are not able or willing to provide resources to TSMOs.

5.0 Relationships between IGOs and TSMOs

To supplement my quantitative analysis in the previous chapter I conducted a select few case studies to see how these dynamics identified in my statistical analysis manifest in real relationships between TSMOs and IGOs. I conducted three extensive case studies on the IGOs that scored the lowest and highest in regard to total influence and access opportunities provided to TSMOs. This more detail-oriented discussion allows for the previous chapter's findings to contribute to an argument about how TSMOs are engaging with IGOs and how these relationships contribute to our understanding of social movement led climate action.

5.1 Case Studies

5.1.1 International Whaling Commission

The International Whaling Commission (IWC) was the IGO with the lowest total score (1) for which I was able to gather sufficient information. The only provided resource appeared to be publicly available research reports. However, the literature surrounding the IWC does suggest that in certain circumstances TSMOs may be able to attend events, though I did not find this in my own exploration of the IWC's policies (Andresen and Skodvin 2008).

The IWC was founded in 1946 and is located in Cambridge, England. It is considered an independent agency, dedicated to "the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus making possible the orderly development of the whaling industry." For this, the actor is considered an environmentally focused IGO. The IWC started as a group of whaling nations working to better

communicate and maintain whale stocks. However, advocacy work by environmentalists and conservation organizations successfully encouraged other nations to join, creating a majority of anti-whaling nations in the commission (Andresen and Skodvin 2008). This led to a moratorium on all whaling, except for limited hunting by indigenous communities in the 1980's (Andresen and Skodvin 2008). This has been strongly criticized by pro-whaling nations who cite that current whale stocks could be sustainably hunted (Andresen and Skodvin 2008). While some whaling countries have left the IWC over the moratorium, there is still pressure to keep the commission active due to past depletions of whale stocks. The role of NGOs and more specifically TSMOs in the expansion of nation states included in the commission and adoption of the moratorium is significant and has been extensively studied by scholars (Andresen and Skodvin 2008). The environmental movement's influence in the IWC was seen both in domestic relationships (social movements lobbied anti-whaling governments to join the commission) and international lobbying (lobbying- formally or informally- decision makers of IWC through a range of means).

In 2015, seven TSMOs reported relationships to the IWC. This number dropped to five for both 2017 and 2019. These five TSMOs (Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, International Dolphin Watch, International Primate Protection League, Nordic Council for Animal Welfare, World Council of Whalers) reported this relationship for all three years. Only two of these organizations (Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition and International Primate Protection League) reported relationships to other IGOs. These two TSMOs were also the only ones to report ties to NGOs as well (4 and 6, respectively). None of the TSMOs have headquarters in the global south and only one was founded after 1989. In this way the age cohort of the IWC corresponds with the age of the TSMOs.

Four of the TSMOs are dedicated explicitly to the arctic region or animal rights, such that one assumes they work to influence nation states to adopt anti-whaling positions. Their views are consistent with the groups which first influenced the membership composition of the IWC. The World Council of Whalers, dedicated to the social and economic issues surrounding whaling, likely advocates for pro-whaling that is monitored and sustainable. Though these stances are different, it appears that all of these organizations may have the same motivation in partnering with the IWC, which is to be able to influence the actor to enact policies consistent with their beliefs, even in the absence of provide influence opportunities.

5.1.2 UNCCD

The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) was one of two IGOs with an overall score of 9 out of 11. The UNCCD provided 5 influence opportunities and 4 access opportunities, only not providing the explicit opportunity to lobby decision makers and the provision of additional resources beyond information. Organizations are able to apply for observer status with the UNCCD and can hold positions within the convention through the CSO panel. The UNCCD allows observer organizations to attend and participate in events and also supports TSMO organized events.

The UNCCD was founded in 1994 as “the sole legally binding international agreement linking environment and development to sustainable land management” (UNCCD). The Convention specifically focuses on drylands, working to restore the productivity of degraded land to improve the sustainability of livelihoods in these regions. The headquarters of the convention is in Bonn Germany. The convention is made up of 197 members states and meets at rotating locations for its annual Conference of the Parties.

Between 2015-2019, seven TSMOs reported ties to UNCCD: Confederation of Environmental and Development NGOs of Central Africa, Esquel Group Foundation, International Association for Forest Resources Management, International Circle for the Promotion of Creation, International Court of the Environment Foundation, Indigenous Peasant Office of Central American Community Forestry and the Caribbean Youth Environment Network. Six TSMOs reported the relationship in 2015 and 2017 respectively but only 2 TSMOs (Confederation of Environmental and Development NGOs of Central Africa, Caribbean Youth Environment Network) reported the tie in 2019. This was due to a combination of TSMOs reporting more ties to TSMOs so as to be qualified as multilateralists and thus not considered in this population as well as several TSMOs not providing data for the 2019 data collection. Because of this the only TSMO to report a relationship with the UNCCD for all three years was the Confederation of Environmental and Development NGOs of Central Africa. Of these seven TSMOs, two were founded before 1989 (in 1984 and 1986 respectively) and five were headquartered in the global south. Only one of the TSMOs was categorized as having an exclusively environmental focus while the other six others were categorized as environmental+, focusing on social and environmental issues.

While the UNCCD scored highly in my analysis, literature surrounding the Convention suggests these provided opportunities do not necessarily capture the entire picture. It has been argued that "the civil society interface mechanism established in the context of the UNCCD, was in fact captured early on by intermediary NGOs" (McKeon 2013, p. 7). These NGOs then resisted the involvement of organizations that truly represented the people most effected by desertification. The UNCCD supported the NGOs, which McKeon suggests may have been due to the Convention's preference to deal with NGOs over "potentially more problematic people's

organizations" (McKeon 2013, p. 7). This ultimately led to the most relevant actors in the movement, small farmers and herder organizations, working outside of the UNCCD (McKeon 2013, p. 7).

This contrast brings up the important point that while my research suggests the UNCCD is providing meaningful opportunities, the accessibility of these opportunities is just as important. The relationships between TSMOs and IGOs are too complex to assume that the provision of opportunities directly correlates with a support of social movements. Elites are able to divide civil society actors in order to ensure that underlying economic struggles are obscured. Rather, as McKeon suggests, these opportunities may be provided but reserved for more formally established NGOs, as seen in the example of the UNCCD. The TSMOs identified over the years 2015-2019 support the argument raised by McKeon in that the Confederation of Environmental and Development NGOs of Central Africa was the only group to report the tie for all three years. However, the inclusion of TSMOs like Indigenous Peasant Office of Central American Community Forestry and the Caribbean Youth Environment Network suggests that perhaps the UNCCD has begun work to be more inclusive in its partnerships since McKeon's writing. It is also possible that the high number of access opportunities is attractive to TSMOs, in that though they may not be able to take strategic advantage of influence opportunities, networking opportunities and access to information is still useful in their work.

5.1.3 Food and Agriculture Organization

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was the other IGO with the highest overall score (9). The FAO provided 3 out of the 4 possible access opportunities and 4 out of the 6 possible influence opportunities. TSMOs are able to apply for special statuses with the FAO that grants

them the ability to attend and participate in events and meetings. These special relationships also allow representatives from TSMOs to obtain roles in the FAO thorough the Committee on Relations with International Organizations. The FAO is located in Rome, Italy and was founded in 1945. It is a specialized agency of the UN focused on hunger and food security. With half of the organization's eight departments devoted explicitly to the environment, the FAO is categorized as having an environmental+ focus. The organization works to ensure access to nutrition and well-being, while also concerning itself with the sustainability of food production around the world.

Over the 2015-2019 timeframe, 3-4 TSMOs reported relationships with the FAO. Only two of these organizations reported the relationship for all three years (International Movement for the Defense of and Right to Pleasure, World Forum of Fisher People). The International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance, Network for Voluntary Development in Asia, Asia Pacific Mountain Network and Genetic Resources Action all reported the relationship for one year only. All of the TSMOs were founded in 1989 or later. Two of them, Asia Pacific Mountain Network and World Forum of Fisher People are headquartered in the global south. The Asia Pacific Mountain Network and World Forum of Fisher People was categorized as environmental+, while the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance was considered strictly environmental. The Network for Voluntary Development in Asia and Genetic Resources Action International were considered global justice focused. The remaining TSMOs were categorized as Other.

While from the data I collected the FAO appears to offer many resources and opportunities, historically the organizations openness to TSMOs been inconsistent and varied even within the organization (Liese 2010). However, in recent years advocacy work on behalf of TSMOs has carved out meaningful space in the FAO that is potentially telling of future relationships between

TSMOs and IGOs (Mckeon 2015b). To discuss the FAO and the development of its stance towards TSMOs, there is no more significant actor than Via Campesina. While Via Campesina is categorized as a multilateralist, the significant work of this TSMO, and its particular relevance in the work of the FAO, makes it so it is worth discussing.

Via Campesina is a global movement to establish food sovereignty based upon the practices of peasants and indigenous peoples around the world (McKeon 2015a). Their work stands in opposition to neoliberal food policy. Notably, the IMF, World Bank and WTO have propagated a globalization of our food system that has given control to a select few corporations while undermining local food production (McKeon 2015a). La Via Campesina has been crucial to critiques of this model and finding potential alternatives by working both outside of and with international governance, notably FAO. Within food politics, FAO has stood in contrast to transnational finance institutions due its more democratic set up and relative openness to engagement with civil society (McKeon 2015a).

In 2002, La Via Campesina helped establish the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty to open up "political space for rural movements in global FAO forums and coaching them in how to occupy it effectively" (McKeon 2015a, p. 245). Following the 2007 global recession, this committee became the Committee of World Food Security, which is unprecedented in its recognition of expertise from TSMOs (McKeon 2015a). In fact, the committee was designed to foster "inclusively debated, paradigm-changing, normative guidance in which these constituencies (TSMOs) are full participants" (McKeon 2015a, p. 229). While there is still much room for progress within the Committee of World Food Security it represents how a governance system may be able to enforce guidance and promote coherent global policy while also uplifting the experiences of local, vulnerable people such that a diversity of strategies can flourish.

In this context, the high score of the FAO appears to truly reflect a prioritization of TSMOs, which contrasts the high score of the UNCCD. Both actors provide opportunities, but the FAO provides these opportunities in a way that is more accessible to the groups that critically need access. A notable difference between these IGOs is the way in which policies towards TSMOs were designed, with the FAO's Committee on World Food Security coming out of advocacy work by TSMOs in the aftermath of the 2007 global recession as opposed to policies designed by IGOs for TSMOs.

Additionally, the crucial role of La Via Campesina in this work is an example of how the categories necessary to conduct this research are arbitrary and that groups are constantly operating across our different categories to achieve their goals. While the number of ties that La Via Campesina reports suggests that the group is multilateralist, the work they do and the strategy behind it very much embodies strategic engagement in that operating both within and outside of established politics allows for groups to carve out meaningful space within established politics to further establish support for the work they are doing outside of established politics. This raises the question of whether further research that looks at the multilateralist category along the lines of this analysis can shed more light on how social movement groups are advancing radical change.

5.2 Discussion

Generalizing these case studies in conjunction with the previous quantitative analysis, allows us to discuss the engagement strategies of TSMOs. This discussion provides insight into the strategic advantage of specific engagement opportunities such that from this we can gain an

understanding of how TSMOs may advance radical climate action from within the established political order.

5.2.1 Access Opportunities

TSMOs may engage with IGOs to secure resources necessary for their operations. Immediately, it is evident that some access opportunities will not depend upon the particular actor, which is providing them, such that a TSMO seeking access to meeting space or other basic resources does not need to seek out particular IGOs in order to get these needs met but rather can partner with any IGO that provides these resources. As noted in the modeling of access opportunities, IGOs affiliated with UN were better able to provide resources while those affiliated with the EU as well as younger IGOs provided fewer access opportunities.

On the other hand, there does appear to be a large portion of access opportunities that do depend on the significance of the actor. While resources like meeting spaces are useful regardless of who is providing them, resources like data, updated operational materials, networking opportunities and the ability to attend events depend heavily upon the importance of the IGO. Data and information on the operations of an IGO are obviously important when the work the IGO is doing is considered relevant to the work of the TSMO. The appeal of networking opportunities and events are also heavily reliant on the perceived relevance of the IGO. For example, the annual Conference of the Parties for the UNFCCC is a large, multiple week-long conference that brings together a diverse range of TSMO and other political actors from around the world working on a large range of issues relevant to climate action.

The provision of access opportunities appears important in that there is not an alternative for securing resources in the same way that TSMOs are able to achieve influence through a variety

of methods. Rather, TSMOs pursue these particular engagements for the resources, such that in their absence there is less reason for the engagement. My research supports this idea in that all of the access opportunities were provided by at least **20%** of IGOs and 3/5 were provided by over **40%.** However, as seen in other research on TSMOs, basic resources within TSMO networks have greatly developed in recent years, such that there is not the same sort of dependence on the resources of established actors (Abbott et al. 2016). Rather, I argue that networking opportunities and access to information is far more likely to be useful than access to basic resources like meeting spaces.

As seen in the UNCCD, FAO and UNFCCC, conferences bring together TSMOs working within the same field and provide them, some more than others, with the opportunity to meet, network and plan. While the World Social Forum has played an important role in providing TSMOs space to network without the influence of IGOs, civil society space within IGOs is likely also useful, especially among TSMOs that are interested in working with IGOs. A crucial element of the power of TSMOs to demand and use influence opportunities is the network that supports them outside of established politics. The work that happens through access opportunities is important for TSMOs to demonstrate and build the power of their movements. This puts TSMOs in better positions to demand accessible influence opportunities.

5.2.2 Influence Opportunities

TSMOs may engage with IGOs as to influence the actor to adopt certain policies or stances to see their own goals and ambitions achieved. However, solely the provision of influence opportunities may not be significant in and of itself. Rather, I argue there are three factors that are

relevant to TSMOs seeking to influence IGOs. First, is the provision of influence opportunities. As seen in the opportunities provided by the FAO, with actual space for TSMOs to share their expertise and voice their opinions, partnership with the FAO is appealing. However, as seen in the example of the UNCCD, as equally important to the provision of these opportunities is their accessibility. While UNCCD offers many of the same opportunities as the FAO, TSMOs have not had the same type of access to them. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the significance of the IGO in determining motivation. As an in the example of the IWC, we see TSMOs exerting influence even in the absence of provided influence opportunities. Because there are not many significant IGOs that work specifically on whaling, the IWC maintains particular importance in the operations of TSMOs that work on similar issues. This also appears to be the case with IGOs like the UNFCCC and other conventions on specific topics.

The ability to establish a formal relationship with the actor, provide feedback, elect civil society representatives among other opportunities may dictate how easy it is for a TSMO to have influence in the operations of an IGO. However, the provision of these opportunities does not dictate how influential a TSMO can be in the operation of an IGO. For example, the IWC did not provide any of the influence opportunities and yet has been heavily influenced by the work of TSMOs, especially on the domestic stage (Andresen and Skodvin, 2003). TSMOs can influence actors through provided influence opportunities, access opportunities, outside of provided opportunities or some combination of these strategies. In the absence of civil society representation in leadership of an IGO, individual TSMOs can leverage their formal affiliation with the actor to advocate on behalf of particular issues. Additionally, TSMOs may be able to take advantage of access opportunities to influence actors. If an actor allows TSMOs to attend events but does not allow TSMOs to participate in events, TSMOs can show up in large numbers to demonstrate their

investment in the cause or the amount of attention a particular issue is attracting. In this way, the actual provision of factors is far less important than the perceived significance of the IGO in the work of the TSMO.

As noted in the modeling in the previous chapter, IGOs with environmental primary aims provided more influence opportunities compared to IGOs with aims not focused on the environment. TSMOs can use access opportunities to build their networks and position themselves to better be able to carve out meaningful space in established politics. From this, TSMOs can then advocate for and pressure IGOs to provide influence opportunities. The positive influence of environmentally focused IGOs may suggest that the environmental movement has already begun to take advantage of this transitional period in international politics, as international governance organizations are forced to contend with their democratic legitimacy, to demand more opportunities to influence the operations of IGOs they seek to influence. However, this advocacy work appears to have two important stages: the provision of opportunities and the accessibility of these opportunities. So, while it is possible that environmental IGOs have begun to succumb to the pressure of providing more influence opportunities, the success of the Commission on World Food Security is still unfortunately rare.

6.0 Conclusion

To summarize, my research contributes to an understanding of how TSMOs are developing strategies to exert influence in global climate action and a broader understanding of TSMOs' ability to advance radical climate solutions within established politics. My findings support past findings that younger TSMOs and those located in the global south are more likely to operate outside of established politics, particularly relationships with UN programmes, as opposed to operational IGOs (Smith et al. 2020). However, I suggest that to understand when engagement with IGOs is advantageous to radical environmental groups we must look closely at the opportunities these IGOs provide as opposed to how ideological alignment may dictate strategy. Additionally, TSMOs with more general or broader primary aims (ie: Environmental+) appeared to be more often pragmatic than others. This supports past research and also suggests that a larger scope of work may necessitate more engagement with other actors, including IGOs.

This idea is further supported by the behavior trends during the time period of 2015-2019. During these years there was an increase in overall connectivity, both with IGOs and among TSMOs. This can be seen as a response to a resurgence in nationalist populism threatening progress of climate action as well as our established democratic norms. From 2015-2019, as environmental TSMOs were forced to contend with larger obstacles than previous opposition to climate policy it is possible that relationships with IGOs allowed these groups to adequately respond to the increased threat of both regressive climate politics in significant countries like the US and Brazil as well as the threat of growing nationalist populism in many of these same nation states.

However, I argue that broader focuses requiring increased connectivity does not take away from the potential development of a social movement lead solutions to the climate crisis. Instead,

I argue that the trends demonstrated in these relationships suggest that TSMOs are able to make use of engagement with IGOs to develop their networks, use these networks to demonstrate their power and with this gain more access to influence opportunities. TSMOs seeking access to resources will engage with IGOs based upon some combination of the opportunities provided and the significance of the actor. Important network building happens through events and conferences hosted by IGOs, such that TSMOs are in better position to engage with IGOs in a way that allows them to influence operations.

TSMOs are less constrained by the actual provision of influence opportunities because they have a range of ways to enact influence and pressure on IGOs. However, to advance radial social movement led solutions within established politics, TSMOs advocate for both the provision of opportunities and maintained accessibility of these opportunities. Based upon this, advancing social movement led solutions within established politics depends upon the successful wins of spaces within significant IGOs. TSMOs, especially La Via Campesina worked to create a space within the FAO that prioritized their expertise and experiences. While IGOs like the UNCCD provide many opportunities without this same type of prioritization, the success of social movement advocacy to transform provided opportunities into meaningful relationships, is a hopeful sign that IGOs which currently provide nominal support of social movements may one day be pressured into providing actual space for TSMO solutions.

While radical ideas are never propagated without cooption and pushback, if these spaces are set up as so to equally weigh the say of TSMOs and other actors, there is the potential for international politics to address the corporate influence and neoliberal logic that currently makes our democratic international institutions ineffective and unpromising tools for meaningful change.

Specifically, as seen in the success of the Committee on World Food Security, TSMO spaces ought to be designed and implemented by TSMOs, as opposed to designed by IGOs for TSMOs.

In weighing the question of "Can advocacy within IGOs advance radical solutions or must activists find other ways to bring about meaningful change?" I argue that there is a way forward within international governance to advance radical solutions, but it is largely dependent on the expansion and further development of spaces like the Committee on World Food Security. However, this Committee is totally unique in its prioritization of TSMO expertise, such that given the urgency of the climate crisis and the slow movement of international governance, social movement climate work will likely continue to exist and succeed mostly outside of established politics.

While I believe my research contributes to conversations about developing strategies in the environmental movement, there is much more research to be done in order to better inform the theoretical framing of a social movement led solution to the climate crisis. First, my research focuses on a small-time frame and is based upon incomplete data from alternating years. A longer time frame and a more dedicated commitment to obtaining data on all relevant TSMOs could allow for more robust analysis of recent developments in the behavior of TMSOs. The largest area for further research is a more qualitative endeavor into the stated motivations of TSMOs. By examining the opportunities provided by IGOs in pragmatic relationships, I worked backwards trying to understand how these opportunities may motivate engagement. However, it would be more useful and accurate to analyze the stated intention of TSMOs in these engagement through interviews and case studies. My research attempted to focus on a more macro analysis of these motivations but examining particular relationships more closely and gathering data from the perspective of TSMOs would make for a more robust analysis of motivations.

Finally, in understanding the power dynamics between TSMOs and established global actors it also important to consider financial ties. Financial ties were excluded from the analysis of this paper because the relationships were considered too different from partnerships with IGOs to make for a cohesive analysis. Additionally, it is very difficult to gain access to reliable data on funding ties. However, to fully gain an understanding of the developing power of TSMOs it is important to consider how they are funded and how this funding influences their operations. I collected the data to make this analysis possible in the future, though as suggested in Smith et al 2018, considerable gaps in reporting would require this data is supplemented with further research on funding ties.

In all, addressing the climate crisis will require radical solutions that challenge the current political, economic and cultural world order. Currently, the corporate influence, neoliberal logic and emphasis on nation states that dominates within international politics makes it so many IGOs are not hospitable to radical climate solutions. So, meaningful solutions to the climate crisis are being organized outside of these spaces, under the leadership of social movement organizations and the knowledge of local experiences. This work will likely continue to be propagated outside of established politics for years to come. However, this research demonstrates that there exists a number of TSMOs that are working to advance radical solutions within established politics, as to make these solutions better known and understandable to a diverse range of actors and that there is increasing signs of hope for cooperation and ways for TSMOs to carve out space within established politics that is hospitable to radical solutions.

Appendix A

Appendix A.1 IGO Connection Data Methods

Empirical challenges to Documenting these relationships over time:

- Not every IGO has a formal mechanism for engaging with non-state actors
    - Only select few IGOs allow TSMOs to apply for what is called *consultative status*
    - TSMOs may be rejected
- Many IGOs establish informal connections with TSMOs and other NGOs
    - often based on interpersonal connections between activists and IGO officials
- Many groups neglect to report ties and some reported ties may no longer be active

Methods to Combat Empirical Challenges:

The methods used to combat these empirical challenges were developed and used by Smith et al. (2020). I followed their methodology. Basically, it is expected that IGO relationships may not be reported or may be underreported for two types of groups: those with "limited resources that rush through the survey" and those with "extensive resources that rely less on ties to IGOs for legitimacy". To deal with this only TSMOs that report at least one tie to an NGO are included in the sample. Because it is expected that groups which report ties to NGOs are likely to report ties to IGOs if they have them. So, rejectionist TSMOs are "rejectionist" from IGOs only, meaning that they report at least one connection to NGOs. This also helps ensure our ideological understanding of rejectionism in that these TSMOs are capable of forming connections and relationships and successfully do so with actors that are not IGOs. Also, this ensures there is not a cofounding relationship between age and difficulty in forming relationships. Although this approach decreases the chance TSMO are miscategorized as rejectionist, it also likely leads to an underestimation of the share of TSMOs without any ties to IGOs.

Appendix A.2 IGO Provided Opportunities Scores

Org Name	Operational	actor attribute	Location (South=1)	Primary Aim
Asian Development Bank	0	Independent	0	Development
Bern convention	1	Council of Europe (EU)	1	Environment
CITES	1	EU Convention	1	Environment
Convention on Biological Diversity	1	UN Convention	1	Environment
Council of Europe	0	Independent	0	Governance
ECOSOC	0	UN Principal Organ	0	Sustainable Development
European Commission	0	European Union	0	Governance
European Parliament	0	European Union	0	Governance
European Union	0	EU	0	Governance
European Youth Center	0	European Commission	0	Development
FAO	1	UN Specialized Agency	0	Health
GIZ	0	Independent	0	Development
Green Climate Fund	1	UN Fund	0	Sustainable Development
Helsinki Commission	0	US Government Agency	0	Peace/Security
IBRD	0	World bank	0	Development
International Whaling Commission	1	Independent	0	Animal Rights
Mega Florestasis	0	Independent	0	Environment
OECD	0	Independent	0	Development
Ramsar Convention	1	Independent	1	Environment
UN Commission on Sustainable Development	0	UN Conference	0	Sustainable Development
UN DPI	0	UN department	0	Governance
UNCCD	1	UN Conference	1	Environment
UNCTAD	0	UN Convention	0	Trade
UNDP	0	UN Program	0	Development
UNEP	0	UN Program	1	Environment
UNESCO	0	UN Specialized Agency	0	Peace
UNFCCC	0	UN Related Organization	0	Environment
UNHCR	0	UN Subsidary Organ	0	Human Rights
WHO	0	UN Specialized Agency	0	Health

Table 6 IGO Basic Attribute Information

Org Name	Established Relationships: Are there established relationship roles for social movement organizations with a clear means to achieving this status?	Points Earned	Civil Society Representation: Are there permanent positions in the organization held by social movement organizations representatives?	Points Earned	Mechanisms for Acountable Feedback: Are social movement organizations able to provide feedback to partner?	Points Earned	Mechanism for Accountable Feedback: Is there a way to provide feedback in planning stages of operations?	Points Earned	Ability to Participate in Events: Can social movement organizations speak/ submit written comments at events?	Points Earned	Ability to Participate in Events: Can social movement organizations lobby decision makers?	Points Earned
Asian Development Bank	none	0	no specific position	0	yes, develop policy plans in consultation with SMOs	1	no	0	no	0	no	0
Bern convention	none	0	no specific position	0	yes, can provide information if contracted to do so	1	no	0	no	0	no	0
CITES	none	0	no specific position	0	no	0	no	0	no	0	no	0
Convention on Biological Diversity	observer status	1	no specific position	0	no	1	no	0	no, only observe	0	yes, have access to governments	1
Council of Europe	participatory status	1	no specific position	0	yes, may address secretary general, may be invited to provide expertise	1	no	0	yes, abel to contribute to work and speak when invited	0	no	0
ECOSOC	General, Special Consultative, Roster, Accredation for Specific Events	1	no specific position	0	yes, partnership forum,	1	no	0	yes, for general and special consulatative status	1	no, no designated events	0
European Commission	none	0	no specific position	0	yes, greenpapers	1	no	0	no	0	no	0
European Youth Center	yes, partners	1	no specific position	0	no	0	no	0	no	0	no	0
FAO	consultative status, special consultative, liaison	1	yes, Committee on Relations with International Organizations	1	yes, several means of feedback	1	yes, through ability to particiapte in events- able to comment on proposed plans	1	yes, able to speak and circulate writing	1	yes, able to lobby and influence discussions	1
GIZ	none	0	no specific position	0	yes, develop policy plans in consultation with SMOs	1	no	0	no	0	no	0
Green Climate Fund	accredidation, active participation	1	no specific position	0	no	0	no	0	yes, participate in board meetings	1	no	0
Helsinki Commission	none	0	no specific position	0	yes, public hearings	1	no	0	no	0	no	0
IBRD	none	0	yes, Global CSO team	1	no	0	yes, civil society policy forum	1	no	0	no	0

Table 7 IGO Influence Opportunities part 1

Org Name	Established Relationships: Are there established relationship roles for social movement organizations with a clear means to achieving this status?	Points Earned	Civil Society Representation: Are there permanent positions in the organization held by social movement organizations representatives?	Points Earned	Mechanisms for Acountable Feedback: Are social movement organizations able to provide feedback to partner?	Points Earned	Mechanism for Accountable Feedback: Is there a way to provide feedback in planning stages of operations?	Points Earned	Ability to Participate in Events: Can social movement organizations speak/ submit written comments at events?	Points Earned	Ability to Participate in Events: Can social movement organizations lobby decision makers?	Points Earned
International Whaling Commission	none	0	no specific position	0	no	0	no	0	no	0	no	0
OECD	none	0	no specific position	0	yes, sends out surveys	1	no	0	no	0	no	0
Ramsar Convention	international organization partners of the convention	1	no specific position	0	yes, servers as advisors	1	not specified	0	yes, serve as advier	1	no, no specific designation	0
UN Commission on Sustainable Development	General Affiliation	1	yes, organizing partners	1	yes, organizing partners can address the plenary	1	no	0	yes, organizing partners can speak at designated times	1	no, no designated specific lobbying times	0
UN DPI	formal association	1	no specific position	0	yes, Civil Society Briefings	1	yes, through civil society briefings	1	no	0	yes, access to Civil Society Resource Centre for holding meetings and lobbying	1
UNCCD	oberserver status	1	yes, CSO panel	1	yes, open dialgoue sessions	1	yes, open dialogue sessions	1	yes, may participate directly	1	no, no designated time	0
UNCTAD	general observer status, special observer status	1	no specific position	0	no	0	no	0	yes, make oral statements	1	no, no designated time	0
UNDP	none	0	yes, Civil Society Advisory Committee	1	yes, annual meetings between CSAC and UNDP	1	no	0	no	0	no, no designated events	0
UNEP	consultative status	1	no specific position	0	yes, provide feedback on documents and in meetings	1	no	0	yes, make oral and written statements	1	no, no specific designation	0
UNESCO	Consultative status, associate partner	1	yes, NGO-UNESCO Liaison Committee	1	yes, NGO Forum	1	not specified	0	no	0	no, no designated events	0
UNFCCC	oberserver status	1	no specific position	0	yes, calls for intervention	1	yes, intervention opportunities are provided by the presiding officers of the respective negotiating bodies	1	yes, invited to do so on topics of contention and during formal proceedings	1	no, no designated events	0
UNHCR	operating partner	1	no specific position	0	yes, forum for regular discussion	1	yes, mechanisms for mailing, briefings, etc	1	no	0	no	0
WHO	none	0	no specific position	0	perceptions of its external stakeholders	1	no	0	no	0	no	0

Table 8 IGO Influence Opportunities part 2

Org Name	Ability to Attend Events: Can social movement organizations attend meetings/conferences of the organization?	Points Earned	Social movement Specific Events: Are there established regular events specifically for social movement organizations?	Points Earned	Social movement Specific Events: Are social movement organizations able to organize their own events?	Points Earned	Access to Informational Resources: Are SMO's able to access information from organizations?	Points Earned	Access to Other Resources: Are SMO's provided other resources?	Points earned
Asian Development Bank	no	0	no	0	no	0	yes, guides, annual reports, articles	1	yes, online courses	1
Bern convention	no	0	no	0	no	0	yes, access to monitoring informaiton	1	no	0
CITES	no	0	no	›	no	0	yes, access to monitoring information	1	no	0
Convention on Biological Diversity	yes, those with matters of direct concern	1	no	0	no	0	yes, newsletter, guidelines	1	no	0
Council of Europe	yes	1	yes, conference of international NGOs	1	no	0	yes, access to all documents	1	no	0
ECOSOC	yes, UN events and HR Commisssion Events	1	yes, annual Partnership forum	1	yes, able to organize side events at conferences	1	not specified		yes, grounds pass	1
European Commission	no	0	yes, citizens dialogue	0	no	0	yes, publishes reports	1	no	0
European Youth Center	no	0	no	0	no	0	yes, provides information	1	yes, provides feedback and evaluation of programs	1
FAO	yes, attend conferences and meetings	1	no	0	no	0	yes, access to all documents and data of FAO	1	information distribution forums, networking information	1
GIZ	no	0	no	0	no	0	no	0	yes, shares policy development	1
Green Climate Fund	yes, participate in activities of the board	1	no	0	no	0	no	0	yes, opportunity of funding and other support	1
Helsinki Commission	no	0	no	0	no	0	yes, public reports	1	no	0
IBRD	yes, grievance redress service and WB independent inspection panel	1	yes, Civil Society Policy Forum	1	yes, regional capacity building workshops	1	no	0	yes, information and trainings	1

Table 9 IGO Access Opportunities part 1

Org Name	Ability to Attend Events: Can social movement organizations attend meetings/conferences of the organization?	Points Earned	Social movement Specific Events: Are there established regular events specifically for social movement organizations?	Points Earned	Social movement Specific Events: Are social movement organizations able to organize their own events?	Points Earned	Access to Informational Resources: Are SMO's able to access information from organizations?	Points Earned	Access to Other Resources: Are SMO's provided other resources?	Points earned
International Whaling Commission	no	0	no	0	no	0	yes, commission reports, historic documents	1	no	0
OECD	yes, can attend conferences	1	no	0	no	0	yes, publishes reports	1	yes, calls for contributions of varying	1
Ramsar Convention	yes, able to attend	1	no	0	no	0	yes, scientific and technical review panel information	1	no	0
UN Commission on Sustainable Development	yes, open to general affiliation	1	no	0	yes, able to organize side events	1	yes, access to all documents	1	yes, access to learner centre	1
UN DPI	yes, events organized by the office	1	yes, UN Civil Society Confernece, Weekly Briefings	1	no, able to hold meetings but not events	0	no	0	yes, access to library, grounds pass, directory of SMOs	1
UNCCD	yes, sessions of the COP	1	yes, open dialogue sessions	1	yes, able to organize side events	1	yes, PRAIS reporting (national data on	1	no	0
UNCTAD	yes, able to attend public meetings	1	no	0	no	0	yes, information on UNCTAD programs and data	1	no	0
UNDP	no, but only CSAC representatives	0	no	0	yes, events organized to promote civic engagement by CSAC	1	yes, access to strategy plans and information from UNDP	1	no	0
UNEP	yes, public meetings	1	no	0	no	0	yes, access to documents	1	no	0
UNESCO	no, only international conference of NGOs	0	yes, international conference of NGOs	1	yes, receive patronago from UNESCO	1	yes, A database of NGOs, foundations and similar institutions	1	yes, access to website to share information	1
UNFCCC	yes	1	no	0	yes, able to organize side events	1	no	0	no	0
UNHCR	not specified	0	yes, UNHCR Annual Consultations with Non-Governmental Organizations	1	yes, forum for regular discussion	1	yes, sharing of infromation	1	no	0
WHO	no	0	no	0	no	0	yes, publishes reports	1	no	0

Table 10 IGO Access Opportunities Part 2

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